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MODERNIZING LEADERS: A COMPARISON OF REVOLUTIONARY AND MANAGERIAL ELITES IN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

by 7214

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INTRODUCTION

In terms of nation-building, the twentieth century has been marked by significant changes. This era is a period characterized by unusually rapid rate of change in the economic, social, political, and cultural institutions of society.

Improvement in communication and transportation devices, the rising expectations of people in underdeveloped countries to be self-sufficient, and the external influences from swirling world politics have inspired them to wage the struggles for political independence, and to achieve economic betterment. Nationalism coupled with these struggles also has provided the leaders of modernization with guidelines for nation-building.

The aftermath of World War II has brought forth many new countries which set their goals for modernization and development. They have established new political institutions, economic systems, and social organizations. They also have built many industrial plants to improve their way of life, and to achieve economic stability. However, lacking both capability and experience, the leaders of the new nations owe much to the already developed countries in terms of economic and technical assistance. Moreover, they depend on strong nations in the fields of defense, diplomacy, and so forth. The post-World War II bipolar power structure has greatly influenced these new nations in choosing the pattern of development, management, and in recruitment of leaders. These intermingled international environments, in turn, have caused

different types of change in the course of modernization and development. One group of leaders has adopted industrialization by the methods of hard-core socialization, or of collectivization, whereas the other group has taken the form of incremental reform of the existing political, economic, and social environment. The former is hereafter referred to as the revolutionary group; the latter the managerial modernizers. This research is designed to observe the trends of the political elites in terms of their political reponses toward the environmental challenges, both internal and external.

This project, it must be noted, is based on empirical observations of a selected small segment of the divided world, a divided nation of only about one hundred thousand square miles... Korea. Korea has a unique race, language, culture and tradition. She also had had a unique history, geographical area, population, sovereignty and government until she was forcibly annexed to Japan in 1910. Korea is now divided into two extremely different communities, the North and the South. North Korea (The Democratic People's Republic of Korea) has been controlled by ideological Communist leaders, while South Korea (Republic of Korea) by non-ideological elites through a long series of trial and error experiments. However, the leaders of both territories have exhaustively struggled for the betterment of the political, economic, and social conditions in terms of development.

It is important to note that this paper is not an attempt to compare two areas in terms of the degree of achievement; its focus is an intensive observation of the elite formation, behavior, and roles of the leaders in the modernization and development stages respectively.

CHAPTER I

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

1. Research Scope

In handling the data and samples, the concepts of historical sociology will be utilized. This paper intends to raise such questions as:

1. What are the costs modernizing elites pay to get power in a society or in a nation?
2. What do they risk in order to manipulate the polical mass?
3. If modernization and development are related to the elite's stability in power, what pattern of leadership is expected in accordance with the environmental settings?
4. How does external influence serve the modernization in terms of responses of political leaders?
5. What is the process of elite replacement in the modernizing and developing periods, and in the stages of stagnation?
6. What contradiction is likely to be found between institutional stability and political development, especially in modernizing nations?
7. Why is it becoming harder for the divided Korea to achieve unification, even though the leaders of both territories raise cries for "unification"?
8. How does the string link Pyong-yang, Seoul, Washington, Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and Saigon, and what reaction is likely to come when it is pulled?

2. Definitions

The most frequently used terms in this paper are modernization, development, and elite. The term "revolution", "Evolution", "reform", and "managerial" will be used almost as frequently as the others.

Modernization: David E. Apter defined modernization as the "process of consciously directing and controlling the social consequences of increased role of differentiation and organizational complexity in a society."[1] The definition suggests the mediators for "controlling" and "directing" as leaders, which are referred to as "elites" in this paper. Politics is strongly involved in the modernization, either by revolution or by evolution. Thus, political modernization can be "both causes and consequences of modernization."[2]

Development: Development is an extended stage of modernization, which leads to the stages of reproduction of the conditions comprised in the phase of modernization. Development is more powerful in its consequences, and it alters dysfunctional social instruments, based on the use of advanced technology.[3]

Elite: In this context, an elite is a person or a group of persons who are in the position to direct or control the processes of modernization and of development. The concept "elite" has been a subject of continuous argument and has suggested a variety of meaning from the classical writers to the present ones.[4] The most

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1 David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 56.

2 Ibid., pp. 54-55.

3 Ibid.

general usage refers to those who are in positions in a society which have roles and capabilities of influencing by means of power, wealth, and knowledge.

Revolution: Revolution is a change in values, social structure, political governmental policies and in social and political leadership through rapid, complete, and v iolent forms. Thus, the more a complete the change, the more total is the revolution. When a revolution is conducted by an individual or a group of individuals, these actors are called "revolutionary elites" or "revolutionaries". These elites emerge as kew activists in modernization processes and aim at the polities, by simplifying, dramatizing and amalgamating the issues into a single clear-cut dichotomy between the forces of "progress" and those of reaction. They also try to promote rigidity in politics and society.[5]

Modernization and development are both the goals and means of power to the revolutionaries. Crane Brington described the conditions which favor revolutionary change as economic progress in a society; bitter class antagonism; desertion of the ruling class by the intellectuals; inefficient governmental machinary; and a politically

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[4] Vilfredo Pareto referred to the "superior being"; Gaetano Mosca advocated the "leaders of the social forces"; and C. Wright Mills referred to the men who occupy "the institutional command posts". See Pareto, Mind and Society (New York: Dover Publications, 1935), passim; Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 42; and Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 7-8.

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 264-268.

inept ruling class.[6] Thus, the revolutionaries are the men who are able to dichotomize social forces and to wage the class struggles against the opposition.

Evolution is a generic term referring to progresses of change whereby simple things tend to become progressively more complex, homogeneous things progressively more heterogeneous, less organized things progressively more organic. The ruling elites, in the evolutionary processes, are key factors affecting the changes without abruptly hurting their positions, prestiges and traditions.

In many cases modernization initiated by revolutionaries shifts to evolutionary stages, and accordingly, those revolutionary characteristics are converted to moderate and pragmatic personalities. Samuel P. Huntington uses the term 'reformer', which comprises more rigid and dynamic characteristics. To him, reformer means a mediator between the conservatives and the revolutionary elites.[7] The reformer must be a man of politics and be more sophisticated in the control of social change, whereas the revolutionaries may not be master politicians.[8] The reformer fights a two front-war against both of these forces by trying to diversify and to disassociate cleavages, to promote fluidity and to manipulate them.[9] They aim at change, but not total change; their goal is incremental change, not abrupt change. Reformers, who are more selective and

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[6] Crane C. Brington, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1938), pp. 38-61.

[7] Huntington, op. cit., pp. 344-374.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

discriminating than the revolutionaries, give much attention to the means, techniques, and the timeliness of changes.

Reformers often collaborate with managerial elites in the implementation of development processes, for the reformers themselves are from competent managerial classes. James Burnham has argued that the managerial class is taking over the economic power which was formerly in the hands of the capitalist owners of industry, and are thus acquiring the power to shape the whole social system.[10] Burnham distinguished two principal sections among the managerial classes: the scientists and the technologists, and the directors and coordinators of the process of production. Since modernization and development require a much higher order of political skill and harmony, the managerial qualification of political leaders is a requisite in the developmental stage.[11] In other words, the better managed and more directed the changes they plan, the more effective and greater the social, economic, and political developments they can expect, broadening the opportunities to the mass in the society.

However, the differences between the revolutionaries and the managerials do not become apparent readily. They must be observed empirically in terms of their socio-economic backgrounds, experiences and training as well as their attitudes and behaviors

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10 James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening in the World (New York: The John Day, 1941), p. 71.

11 Ibid.

toward the surrounding environment. John H. Kautsky has conducted an extensive study on these criteria to delineate the differences. Kautsky's description of these distinctions laid out a good boundary, but he failed to give precise distinctions, because of his limited research scope and inconsistent methodology.[12]

To examine the roles of the leaders in the stages of modernization, it is necessary to minimize the variables which are applicable to the leaders who came from different environments. The social origins of the leaders affect the perceptions of modernizing elites which influence to form their political behavior in the contemporary world. The distinctions between the revolutionaries and managerial elites are likely to come rather clear by these methods of observations.

3. Methodology

Several sets of hypotheses are presented in this research which encompass the elite, modernization, and development in Korea. The proposed hypotheses include abstractions of relevant aspects of the data, a generalization to wider situations, insights into social relationships and processes, association of the phenomenon studies with the analogous phenomena that are better understood and various other devices, including personal insights.

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[12] John H. Kautsky, "Revolutionary and Managerial Elites in Modernizing Regimes," in Comparative Politics, I, 4 (July, 1969), pp. 443-465.

The tentative hypotheses are:

1. In the modernizing progress, the revolutionary elites seem more influenctial than managerials, and, on the contrary, in the development stage, the managerial elites become more effective than the revolutionary.

2. The modernizing elites in North Korea seem to be more revolutionary, whereas those in the South have more evolutionary tendencies.

3. There are strong indications that both revolutionaries in the North and evolutionaries in the South are to be replaced by the managerial elites as the degree of development proceeds.

Geographical scope is limited to a small country and the methodological techniques applied are adopted from various theories, models, and concepts. 386 political leaders are selected for the empirical observations in terms of their backgrounds, trends in political behaviors and roles in the changing society. Among these, 224 are from South Korea and 162 from North Korea, all of whom have held influential positions for political, economic and social modernization.[13]

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[13] The author is confident with this sample, even he concedes that the selected samples still lack generality and the data provided are not sufficient enough to support the hypotheses. It was extremely difficult to gather information on North Korea, because every book published in Pyong-yang (North Korea) was politically propaganda-oriented; the statistics were obscure, since they have been expressed only in percentages (%); and, furthermore, the statistical expressions themselves are inconsistent and exaggerated.

CHAPTER II

SOCIO-HISTORICAL REVIEW

1. Pre-modernization Era (1392-1910)

There have been several significant eras in the history of Korea which can be categorized as periods of advancement or development. The spirit of change and reform in the early period of the Yi dynasty (1390-1940) especially must be noted for its revolutionary characteristics. All land nationalized for ligitimate and equal distribution of wealth and cultural development was stimulated. The golden period lasted only for about seventy years. The invention of Korean alphabet by King Se-jong must be noted, which freed the Korean language from the restrictions imposed by use of Chinese characters. Known now as Hangul, this alphabet is used extensively today in South Korea and exclusively in North Korea.

Traditional Korea was dominated by the ideas of Confucianism which spread throughout all social classes and created a uniformity of customs and thoughts. Confucianism introduced brilliant culture to Korean society on the one hand, but, on the other hand, it made the creative nation a cripple in terms of development. Confucianism was a past-oriented, static, and sophisticated philosophy which distinctly lacks creativeness. It made society extremely stratified with its strict codes.[1]

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[1] Moon-ok Park, Han-Kuk Chung-bu Ron (Government of Korea) (Seoul: Pak-yung Sa, 1967), pp. 38-47.

The Yang-ban, the highest form of social status, was that of the bureaucrat and of literary intellectuals. The Yang-ban class formed an inviolable bureaucracy of their own class; they enjoyed all the political and economic prestige. No important government position was allocated to the other classes; the discriminations were further extended to the other aspects of social life, i. e., marriage, associations, etc.

Table 1. Class Strata of Yi Dynasty

Class	Occupations
Upper Class (Yang-ban)	Scholar-officials
Middle Class	Doctors, Interpreters, Weathermen, etc.
Lower Middle Class	Peasants, Fishermen, etc.
Lower Class	Actors, Monks, Butchers, Purged Officials and their Descendents, etc.

The middle class was composed of specialists; such as doctors, interpreters, weathermen, accountants, and so on. However, this class did not have prosperous social lives. Commerce was disdained and the artisan was looked down upon.

The emphasis on intellectualism was on the theoretical rather than on the development of practical knowledge. Technology was minimized, because the lowest strata of society was employed in this field. In other words, the technological occupations

were the only field opened to this class.[2]

The caste system of the Yi dynasty was based on Confucianism, and this was the major factor which prevented development in old Korea. However, in the later period of the kingdom, efforts to reform this system were made by the government.[3]

Table 2. Progress in Releasing Class System by Percentage

Year	Upper Class (Yang-ban) %	Middle Class %	Lower Class (Slaves) %	Total Families
1670	8.3	51.1	40.6	2,663
1732	15.3	56.3	28.4	2,860
1789	34.7	59.9	5.4	2,518
1858	65.5	32.8	1.7	2,464

Source: Moon-ok Park, op. cit., p. 46.

The above table shows that the lower class was minimized by 1858, and the higher class families were increased from 8.3 % in 1670 to 65.5 % in 1858. The number of middle class families gradually increased up to the year of 1789, and abruptly fell down to 32.8 in 1858. This phenomenon was caused by the mobility of the classes: lower class to the middle; middle class to the higher; and often the lower to the higher.

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2 Kie-jun Cho, et al, Han-kuk Kyong-jae Sa (History of Korean Economy)(Seoul: Chi-yun Kak, 1962), p. 330. See also Park, op. cit., p. 39.

3 Park, op. cit., p. 46.

Table 3 indicates that the number of officials who passed the examination gradually increased, although the number of examinations taken had decreased. However, this trend does not mean the complete obliteration of the class strata. Extreme discrimination among the classes remained in society until the end of the kingdom.

Table 3. Number of Royal Examinations and Recruited Officials

Period (years)	Number of Exams	Number of Officials Recruited
1393-1608	95	2,200
1609-1700	264	3,545
1701-1800	244	4,625
1801-1894	192	3,804
Total	805	14,194

Source: Numerical figures are arranged from Park, op. cit., p. 113.

Another factor causing development to stagnate was the struggle among the scholarly factions. The factions of Yi dynasty struggled against each other; they claimed the traditionalism and authoritativeness of their own interpretation of Confucian teachings. Accordingly, the attitudes of these elites were entirely past-oriented and non-creative. Toward the end of the Fifteenth century the court was torn by struggles for power in which the great families and the Confucian scholars came into bloody conflict. The scholars of the Yang-ban class broke up

into bitterly antagonistic factions over the interpretation of Chu-ja Confucianism, which was to lay a heavy hand on Korea for the next 340 years. The following table explains how serious the struggle was.

Table 4. Prime Ministers Purged in the Early Yi Dynasty (1392-1567)

Period (Name of Kings)	Years Ruled	No. of Prime Min.	Purged to Death	Purged %
Tae-jo	7	4	0	0
Chung-jo	2	5	2	40
Tae-jong	18	11	4	40
Sae-jong	32	15	7	50
Mun-jong	2	2	2	100
Tan-jong	2	3	0	0
Se-jo	14	17	3	20
Yae-jong	1	3	0	0
Sung-jong	25	11	2	20
Yunsan-kun	11	11	5	50
Chung-jong	39	23	7	30
In-jong	1	2	1	50
Myong-jong	22	12	6	50
Total	175	119	39	30%

Source: Moon-ok Park, op. cit., p. 149.

The factionalism continued until Korea was annexed to Japan by force in 1910. Among the thirteen kings after Myong-jong, four were assassinated in the conflicts.[4]

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[4] Ibid.

In spite of the rigid traditionalism of the kingdom, the new movement for modernization began among the young intellectuals, including Park Chi-won, Chung Yak-yong, Park Che-ga, and so on. They introduced Western civilization and culture through secret channels from China. The Claims of this new-frontiers included: establishment of a modern civil state; destruction of the traditional feudal system; abolition of the caste system and intensive land reform. The modernizing leaders also introduced and systemized the new sciences, i. e., political science, economics, law, medical science, mechanics, etc.[5]

As a result, the Tong-hak religion, an adapted Christianity, awakened the under-privileged through its idea concerning equal rights and prestige under God, claiming:

> The king is not a superhuman who created and bred the people, but he is selected and anointed by the people. Therefore, it is self-evident that the people are the base of the nation.[6]

The responses from the poor and lower class were explosive when the Tong-hak followers proclaimed a revolution. This movement is noteworthy for its issues of civil rights and its influence. The Tong-hak Revolution can be related to la grand revolution of France and to the Gorious Revolution in England in terms of the struggle against absolute royal authority, feudalism, class

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[5] Sung-chil Kim, "Yun Haeng So Ko," Journal of Korean History, XII (May, 1962), p. 4.

[6] Park, op. cit., p. 158. Quoted from The Bible of Chon-do Kyo.

system, etc. Tong-hak movement, however, could not succeed due to severe suppression from the government.

The most significant contribution to modernization in Korea was initiated by handful groups of patriotic young people who were exiled abroad in resistance to the Japanese occupation in Korea. Geo-politically, Korea was attractive to several expansionist countries in the early part of this century. General Yamagata, a Japanese military strategist states that:

> If you look at the geographical position of Korea, you will see that it is a poniard pointed at the heart of Japan... If Korea is occupied by a foreign power, the Japan Sea ceases to be Japanese, and Korean straits are no longer under our control.[7]

Indeed, Japan needed Korea as an "outlet for her surplus population and as a source of food supply."[8] Japanese immigrants to Korea after annexation were to increase surprisingly.

Table 5. The Number of Japanese Immigrants to Korea

Year	No. of Immigrants
1889	5,000
1910	171,543
1921	367,618
1923	403,000
1934	561,384
1942	753,823

Source: Government of Japan, Chosen Ren-kan, 1945, p. 278.

[7] Frederick Palmer, With Kuroki in Manchuria (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1904), p. 154.

[8] C. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York: John Day, 1956), p. 171.

The massive immigration of Japanese to Korea caused another massive Korean migration to Manchuria, China and Russia. The major reasons for the migration were: economic suppression by the Japanese; the excess of immigrants; the political exile of Korean leaders; and the forced emigration of Koreans to Manchuria by the Japanese who had migrated to Korea. The number of Korean migrants to Manchuria and Russia reached 736,918 as of 1924.[9]

Under the serious suppression of Japan, the Korean leaders perceived the environmental stimuli as the most realistic challenges. The forced dethronement awakened them from the long nightmare of authoritarianism, and the experiences of imprisonment and confinement caused a realization of the new power controlling them. The heartbreaking agony of colonial chains developed a resistance-spirit against the colonial masters. The young Korean elites began to awaken the grass-roots of Korean polity as well as themselves. They founded schools for new sciences and Korean language, which were neglected by the old dynasty. They published newspapers, journals, and books in the sentiment of anti-colonialism. They also waged numerous bloody mass struggles against the colonial police forces. The movement for the social reforms also served to overcome the economic poverty and devastation, spiritual-mental subservience and political oppression. The nationalism which spread all over the nation became the all controlling spectrum in the minds of later Korean leaders, who

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[9] Park, op. cit., p. 204.

built a nation on the colonial ruins.[10] The leaders of the independence movement established a provisional government in Shang-hai, and Syngman Rhee became the first President. The independence movement was extended to the young Koreans exiled in Hawaii and the United States, and these activities lasted until World War II ended.

2. Post-War Period

After a thirty-six year colonial experience under Japan, Korea was liberated and promised independence by the declaration of the Cairo Convention in 1943 and of the Potsdam Conference in 1945, just before the war ended.[11] However, before the people found their land actually divided between American occupation in the South and Soviet control in the North. In September, 1947, the Korean problem was brought to the General Assembly of the United Nations with the result that a resolution was passed on November 14, stating that "the Korean people themselves must create a provisional government through free and secret ballot, which would be followed by withdrawal of foreign troops."[12]

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10 I-sop Hong, "Historical Characteristics of Korean Nationalism," in Korea Journal, VI, 12 (December, 1966), pp. 14-16.

11 U.S. Department of State, Selected Documents on American Foreign Policy (Washington, D. C., 1951), p. 10. The Declaration reads, "The three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

12 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 404-405. See also United Nations' General Assembly Resolution 112 (II) of Nov. 14, 1947, concerning the problems of the independence of Korea.

Under the terms of this resolution, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was formed in January, 1948 in order to supervise the elections. However, when the Commission arrived in Korea that same month to start work, it was barred from the Russian-occupied zone of North Korea. The boycott of the Russians of the U.N. resolution for elections caused a worst situation for the new nation developing in Korea. Furthermore, Kim Il-sung who already had taken power in the North and built a strong political rampart with the support of the Soviet Occupants, was ready to establish his own regime.

The elections were held only in the area of American occupation on May 10, 1948, and gave the birth to a 200-seats unicameral national assembly, still leaving 150 seats for the representatives from the North. The Liberal Party, headed by Dr. Syngman Rhee, won a majority of votes in the elections and formed the first government of the Republic of Korea, based on democratic principles.

The young Republic, from the time of its birth, had to face difficulties and tough tasks in the way to the restoration of political, economic, and social welfare out of the post-war confusion. First of all, the nation was divided by the foreign power. This fact caused the most intolerable agony and a totally shaken dream for Rhee, who had sacrificed his whole life for the restoration of the Fatherland.[13] The numerous new parties emerged on the political scene, including Communist and Socialist. The flood of parties and organizations was gradually reduced to two streams of ideology; the Leftist and the Rightist. Gradually

increasing tensions between these ideologies finally resulted in a serious terrorism in the political arena. The terrorism became the dominant means for power struggles among parties and factions.

Syngman Rhee was very realistic in his political perceptions. He faced the disordered situation and attempted to consolidate one by one, under his charismatic personality. Rhee, man of the Yang-ban origin with a solid Confucian philosophy, was trained in Western educational institutions, and spent most of his exile in the United States. He opposed any Communist movement and outlawed all socialist activities in December, 1948. Elaborate plans for reconstruction and development were laid and implemented. However, the war waged by the aggressive revolutionary forces from the North on June 25, 1950, brought total destrruction over the country.

The war swallowed all property and killed millions of people and left everything dislocated. Worst of all, the country still remained hopelessly divided, and the antagonism between the two parts has grown to extreme polarization. The efforts of the Korean people to recover the war-lost instability were greater than any other country.

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13 In the Press Conference, Rhee Syngman stated that he had not known the division of Korea until he returned to Korea. See Mae-il Shin-bo (Daily) and Cha-yu Shin-moon (Freedon News), October 17, 1945.

The increasing expectations of political freedom and of welfare confronted the status quo oriented political system. The increasing corruptions of the government officials, and Syngman Rhee's dogmatism became the targets of the grievances of the people. Gradually, the ruling class cut the channels of communications between the political system and the grass-roots. The accumulated complaints and grievances could find no other way than an outburst, a revolution, which resulted in the collapse of Rhee's government in 1960.

The new government, after the revolution, gave the power to the Democratic Party which had been the major opposing party during the Liberal Party's tenure. Many changes were set forth, discarding the old presidential system of government under which Rhee ruled autocratically for twelve years, and adopting a parliamentary system in which the president was a mere figurehead and the prime minister was to exercise the executive power of the state.

Another political setback was fostered under two new incumbents. Newly elected Prime Minister John M. Chang and President Po-sun Yun had niether the political wisdom nor the dynamic leadership to handle the untrained, quarrelsom politicians. They could not manage even their own party, which was divided and in conflict. In nine months of the governmental "boss-ship", Chang had to shuffle his cabinet three times. The national treasury was empty. The rate of economic growth fell from 8.6 percent in 1957 to 2.3 percent in 1960.[14] Again the students took to the streets, staging

violent demonstrations against the government, distrusting its naive handling of problems. The left wing organizations staged anti-government campaigns and marched against Chang's residence. Radio Pyung-yang wired the demagogic propaganda and anti-imperialist speeches to the people of South Korea.

On May 16, 1961, another revolution was proclaimed through the national broadcast system by the Army Chief of Staff, General Do-young Chang. Army airborne and marine troops occupied all the government buildings and communication facilities. Prime Minister Chang resigned with his entire cabinet and went into hiding. President Yun also resigned, but was presuaded to remain as titular chief of state by the military junta. A newly formed six-man military revolutionary committee (subsequently increased to 32) created an all-military cabinet of fourteen, headed by General Chang. On july 3, 1961, six weeks after the coup, General Chang was replaced by Major General Chung-hee Park, who had long been regarded as the real power behind the scene.[15] Park is a career military man and trained in a Japanese military academy.

The political structure in North Korea has been formed on the basis of extreme Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Stalin's long dream of expansionism was realized in the northern half of the

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[14] Hap-dong Yong-gam (Hap-dong Annual)(Seoul: Hap-dong News Agency, 1967), p. 38.

[15] R. O. K. Ministry of Information, Han-kuk Kun-sa Hyong-Myong Sa (The History of Korean Military Revolution).

peninsula, along with growing tension of containment. The Russian occupation forces backed up Kim Il-sung, a one-time captain in the Soviet Army, to build a strong Communist satellite. Kim, whose original name was Sung-ju Kim, was unknown even to the Korean Communists, and changed his name to Kim Il-sung, a mysterious hero in the independence struggle, for the purpose of utilizing the name's value.[16]

On October 13, 1945, Kim organized the North Korean Chapters of Korean Communist Party, by absorbing the Chinese trained Moo Chong, Kim Tu-bong, Kim Chang-man, Choi Chang-ik and others. Again in August, Kim Il-sung absorbed the Korean New Democratic Party (KNDP) and organized the Korean Workers' Party (NKW). Holding the vice-chairmanship, Kim gave the Party's chairmanship to Kim Tu-bong, when the latter's KNDP was annexed to his NKWP.[17]

Meanwhile, the South Korean Workers' Party (SKWP) headed by Park Hun-young in Seoul, absorbed all the local chapters and organizations in the South by November 1946, and strived to take power until SKWP was outlawed by Syngman Rhee's government. Most of the SKWP members were exiled to the North, where they aligned with Kim Il-sung's NKWP to organize the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), on June 28, 1949.[18] Kim, holding power in the party,

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16 Dae-suk Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 254.

17 Ibid., pp. 294-329.

THIS BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS PAGES WITH DIAGRAMS THAT ARE CROOKED COMPARED TO THE REST OF THE INFORMATION ON THE PAGE.

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Figure 1. Kim Il-sung's Seizure of Power
(Diagram of Communist Party
Unification in Korea)



Source: Dae-suk Suh, op. cit. arranged.

set off an overall revolution in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres, claiming that:

> Our task is revolution in Korea, not in any other nation. Revolution in Korea is the score of our Party's ideology and activity.[19]

Kim's revolutionary "task" began with purges of those who opposed him and with the confiscation of farmlands, enterprises, even individual properties in the name of socialization. Along with his land reform, Kim administered the relocation of people throughout the country, mainly to extinguish the grass-roots' complaints against his violence, and to supply the necessary working force for industrial plants, mines, and farms.[20]

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18 Ibid. See also R. O. K., Pan-kong Mun-jae Seminar (Seminar on Anti-Communism), Korean ed., (Seoul: Department of Public Information, 1967), p. 25.

19 D. P. R. K., Iron-kwa Sil-chon (Theory and Practice), Korean ed., (Pyong-yang: National Publishing House, 1962), p. 62.

20 U. S. Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 60-75.

CHAPTER III

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The backgrounds of the political leaders are regarded as one of the most important independent variables, which form the political personality of the elites. The study of socio-economic background also suggest the elites' values and group behavior. In many cases, the social backgrounds of leaders provide an insight into the pattern of political recruitment.[1] This chapter is designed to observe the differences in the backgrounds of political leaders of North and South Korea. The samples are taken from the top leaders, including presidents, premiers, cabinet members, and important party leaders. The numbers and positions of the chosen sample are analyzed in the following table.

Table 6. Analysis of the Sample

Categories	Number of Samples	
	South	North
Top Leaders (Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Prime Ministers, etc.)	10[2]	15[3]
Cabinet Members	213	110
Party Leaders	35	52
Total	258	177

[1] Bae-ho Hahn et al, "The Korean Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skills," Asian Survey, III, 7 (July, 1963), pp. 305-323.

1. Social Background

During the Japanese occupation period (1910-1945), most of the Korean Independence movement leaders were exiled to the United States, Manchuria, China or Russia; they allied with members of underground activities in the home land. The provisional government established in Shanghai, headed by Syngman Rhee and later Kim Ku, consisted mostly of nationalist Koreans, excluding the hard core Communists. Accordingly, Communist leaders joined either Mao Tse-tung's guerrilla forces, or the Soviet Army.[4] These two cliques gained control first by consolidating within the Korean Communist Party and then, through the party, by securing strategic positions within the administrative arena. Their previous backgrounds are obscure except for a few cadre members in the party.

Table 7 shows that 80% of the politbureaus are Kim's former entourage in China or Russia, among which only one graduated from a university, two from military schools, and two from high schools. There were numerous highly educated men in the North and even in the Communist party, but these intelligentsias were excluded from the leading positions.

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[2] Syngman Rhee, Po-sun Yun, Chung-hee Park, John M. Chang, Si-young Yi, Sung-su Kim, Tae-young Ham, Ki-bung Yi, Young-tai Pyon, and Il-kwon Chung.

[3] Kim Il-sung, Kim Tu-bong, Park Hun-young, Choe Chang-ik, Choe Hyon, Nam Il, Kim Chaek, Park Il-woo, Choe Yong-kun, Park Kum-chol, Park Chung-ai, Kim Il, Kim Kwang-hyop, Kim Chang-man, and Suk San.

[4] Dae-suk Suh, op. cit., passim.

Table 7. Top Leaders in the First Congress, KWP in 1946

Categories	Names	Political Background	Education
Secretariat of the KWP	Chairman:		
	Kim Tu-bong	Y	Military School
	V. Chairman		
	Kim Il-sung	K	High School
	Chu Young-ha	D	High School
Members of Politbureau, KWP	Kim Tu-bong	Y	Military School
	Kim Il-sung	K	High School
	Chu Young-ha	D	High School
	Choe Chang-ik	Y	University
	Ho Kah-ui	S	Military School
Director of Organization	Ho Kah-ui	S	Military School

K - Kim Il-sung's pre-1945 entourage in Manchuria
S - Soviet-Koreans before 1945
Y - Yenan Koreans, headquartered in Yenan, China
D - Domestic Communist in Korea before 1945

Source: Joung W. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," World Politics, XXII, 2 (January, 1970), p. 252. See also Asia Who's Who (Hong Kong: Pan-Asia News Alliance, 1960), pp. 429-502.

On the other hand, the members of the first Cabinet of Syngman Rhee's South Korea had more bureaucratic and heterogeneous backgrounds. Their educational backgrounds and political experiences were higher and more sophisticated. Four of the thirteen come from the upper class; seven from the middle; one is unknown;

Table 8. Origins of Rhee's First Cabinet Members

Name	Position	Class Origin	Education	Experience
Rhee, Syngman	President	Upper	* Univ. (Ph.D.)	President of Provisional Gov't
Yi, Pom-suk	Prime Min.	Middle	* Mil. Academy	Military Gen.
Chang, Tack-sang	Foreign Affairs	Upper	* Univ.	Police Gen. under U.S. Mil. Gov't.
Yun, Tchi-young	Home Affairs	Upper	* Univ. (M.A.)	Student
Kim, To-yon	Finance	Upper	Univ. (Ph.D.)	Gov't official under Japan
Yi, In	Justice	Middle	Univ.	Lawyer
Yi, Pom-suk	Defence	Middle	* Mil. Academy	Mil. Gen.
An, Ho-sang	Education	Middle	* Univ. (Ph.D.)	Principal to High school
Cho, Bong-am	Agriculture	Lower	* Univ.	Communist Leader
Im, Yong-sin	Commerce & Industry	Middle	* Univ.	Professor
Min, Hui-sik	Transportation	Unknown	Univ.	Gov't Official
Yun, Sok-ku	Communication	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Yi, Chong-chon	Min w/o Portfolio	Middle	* Mil. Academy	Military Gen.
Yi, Yun-yong	Min w/o Portfolio	Middle	Univ.	Gov't Official

* University education from abroad

Source: The chronology of the service of incumbents in different position from Hap-dong Annual (1959), p. 589 and from The Asia Who's Who, op. cit., pp. 429-468.

and only one from the lower strata. Almost all the cabinet members had a university education, and nine of them were educated in foreign countries. The interrelations between cabinet recruitment and their social backgrounds are remarkable, and this trend is likely to continue, despite the changes of regimes.

Table 9. Occupation of the Fathers of the Cabinet Members (Percentage)

Occupation	All Cabinet	Rhee's Cabinet	Chang's Cabinet	Park's Cabinet
Tenant Farmers	2.6	3.2	4.5	--
Owner, Small Farmer	24.5	24.2	22.8	26.5
Owner, Small Business	5.0	6.5	--	5.9
Gov't Officials & Teachers	16.9	14.5	22.8	17.7
Landlords	33.9	37.1	40.9	23.5
Large Business Owner	5.1	3.2	--	11.8
Professionals	9.4	11.3	4.5	8.8
Laborers	1.7	--	4.5	2.9
Others	.9	--	--	2.9
Total Percentage	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total Number	119	63	22	34

Source: Bae-ho Hahn et al, op. cit., p. 322. See Hap-dong Annual, op. cit. for Park regime.

The above table shows that 33.9 percent of all members of the three regimes in South Korea (Rhee, Chang, and Park) are from the families of landlords, considered upper class; 24.5 percent from small farmers' origins; and 16.9 percent from those of teachers or government officials. The major reason for such a breakdown is thought to be social structure of their fathers' generation, which was under Japanese occupation.

The occupational background of cabinet ministers of three regimes indicates that the greatest proportion of them come from the civil servant arena (22.1%), next from education (21.2%), and then from the military (13.5%). (See Table 10)

Table 10. Occupational Backgrounds of the Ministers of the Three Governments (Percentage)

Occupation	All Cabinet Members	Rhee's Gov't	Chang's Gov't	Park's Gov't
				**
Civil Servant	22.1	16.1	22.7	20.5 (2.9)
Journalist	4.5	1.6	9.1	2.8 (2.9)
Lawyer	10.9	14.5	13.6	4.8 (5.9)
Businessman	3.1	1.6	--	7.7 (8.8)
Military	13.5	9.9	--	33.5 (70.7)
Banker	7.2	4.8	9.1	7.7 (8.8)
Police	4.2	8.1	4.6	-- (--)
Professor	21.2	27.5	22.7	16.5 (8.8)
Other	13.2	15.9	18.2	6.5 (--)
Total Percentage	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total Number	212	83	22	107 (34)

** Percent in ( ) shows for the early period of the military regime

Source: Arranged from Bae-ho Hahn et al, op. cit., p. 317, and from Hap-dong Annual, op. cit., pp. 203-204.

The military participation in the cabinet peaked at 70.7 percent during 1961-1962, just after the military revolution. However, with the increase in other occupations, the percentage decreased to 33.5 percent as of 1971. Another significant trend is the gradual increase of professors and lawyers. Compared with the North Koreans, the Southern leaders were recruited from more varied origins.

In the North, on the contrary, most of the leaders come from lower strata. Many factors are involved to create this phenomenon. First of all, except for a few big cities, the people were neglected by the central government throughout the Yi dynasty.[5] The upper class society consisted of bureaucratic scholars, and most of these Yang-bans came from Southern Korea. The lands were allocated to these bureaucrats, and the majority of the population were employed as tenant farmers. These circumstances continued even in the colonila period. The Japanese monopolized the land to establish industrial plants. The poor people could not survive under this situation and they migrated to Manchuria, Siberia, or to China, where the opportunities for education were limited. According to the report made by the Japanese government, 736,918 Koreans moved to these areas, and 90 % of these were from the North.[6]

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[5] Yong-mo Kim, "The Social Background and Mobility of State Ministers of Yi Dynasty," Korean Affairs, III, 2 (July, 1964), pp. 239-41.

[6] Cho-sen Ren-kan, op. cit., p. 279. See also Park, op. cit., pp. 203-204.

2. Education and Training

The upper class in the period of Japanese rule consisted mostly of landlords, because their political activities were extremely limited. Instead, they wanted their sons to leave Korea for better education. The leaders of the independence movement were exiled abroad, i. e., United States, England, France, Japan, etc., where they attended higher educational institutions. In accordance with these these variables, the Southern political leaders are significantly higher educated, and a great number of them studied abroad. (See Table 8 and 11)

Table 11. Educational Backgrounds of Southern Leaders

Background	Number
University Graduates:	
B. A. only	140
B. A. & M. A.	34
B. A., M. A. & Ph. D.	28
Subtotal	202
Unknown	15
Total	217

Source: Arranged from Hap-dong Annual, op. cit., passim.

According to the above table 206 leaders out of 217 received a university education, among which 34 have M. A. and 28 Ph. D. degree.

In the North, the education of the leaders is significantly lower. Most of the leaders returned from the guerrilla forces in Manchuria, or from the Soviet army, where they could not have

satisfactory education in length and quality.

Another factor influencing the situation is quite dependent. When the main forces of Kim Il-sung entered Korea, they purged a great number of intellectuals, specifically "pro-Japanese imperialists," or "anti-revolutionaries." Among them, there were thousands of government officials who served in the Japanese administration, domestic Communist leaders who did not welcome Kim's cliques, and prominent nationalist leaders who were considered to be his political rivals.[7]

The third, the Communist revolutionary forces overtly excluded the intellectuals from their political wagon, by advocating that the revolutionaries are the "vanguard of workers and peasants," smashing the "bourgeois."

Table 12. Educational Background of Northern Leaders

School	Number of Person	Percentage
University	38	22 %
High School	42	25
Unknown	97	53
Total	177	100 %

Source: Arranged from The Asia Who's Who, op. cit., and from various other sources.

[7] Chang-soon Kim, "The North Korean Communist Party-- Historical Analysis," in Korean Affairs, II, 2 (April, 1963), pp. 130-132. See also Seminar on Anti-Communism, op. cit., pp. 193-204.

The research of Northern elites' educational backgrounds shows that among 177 persons, which included all key members of the cabinet, KWP, and of Supreme Council of People's Assembly (SCPA) from the year of 1947 to 1969, only 22 percent of the total are known as university graduates, 25 percent high school graduates, and the rest unknown. A great number of Communist leaders covered their educational backgrounds, as a political security measure and for other reasons.[8]

3. Ages of the Leaders

Political elites in the North were presumably younger than those of the South in the early period of division. First of all, the majority of the Northern leaders from Russia or Yenan were members of regular or guerrilla forces, while those of the South were composed of senior politicians or aged persons who had returned from their exiles. Secondly, those young revolutionary forces in the North also excluded the older leaders, mainly because of the generation gap.

The ages of the elites have formed an interesting dual trend between the North and the South. In the former, the age graph is gradually elevated year by year, whereas in the South, the graph shows a gradual decrease. The trends are closely correlated with the frequency of elite replacement, the age spans of the newly

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[8] Glenn D. Paige and Dong-jun Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," in R. A. Scalapino, ed. North Korea Today (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 17-20.

recruited, and with their duration of service.

The logic will read:

> if the initial age point is low (young),
> and if the frequency of replacement is less,
> then the graph will gradually show upward (1)

On the contrary,

> if the initial age point is higher,
> and if the frequency of replacement is greater,
> and if the newly recruited are younger,
> then the graph will show downward propensity (2)

Figure 2. The Age Graph of the Leaders



Applying this graph to Korean elites, graph (1) fits the age trends of the North. The key members of North Korea have not been replaced for more than twenty years, and the replacing positions have also been filled by Kim Il-sung's former guerrilla members (except for a few cases in recent years). The ages of most of the key members in 1947 were between 35 and 40; the average age span in 1970 was 55-60.

By contrast, in the South, the average age span of the leaders in 1948 was 41-55. There were three political upheaval (April

Revolution, Military coup, and shift to civilian government), and eight total reshuffles of cabinet members.

Table 13. Age Spans of Southern Political Leaders

Age Group	Rhee Gov't		Chang Gov't		Park Gov't		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.
31-35	1	0.9	1	2.8	6	5.5	
36-40	11	9.4	0	0	10	18.7	
41-45	27	23.6	13	36.2	39	36.4	
46-50	29	25.2	7	19.4	30	27.9	
51-55	26	22.8	9	25.0	3	2.9	
56-60	11	9.4	4	11.1	6	5.6	
Above 60	10	8.7	2	5.5	3	2.9	
Total	115	100	36	100	107	100	258

Source: Arranged from various sources. For the different age distribution, see Bae-ho Hahn et al, op. cit., p. 314

The table (13) shows the age-spans of cabinet members in three regimes. It indicates that there has been a great change in the leaders' ages. In the Rhee government, the predominant age groups were 41-45, and 51-55. Young age groups are low, while older groups (above 56) are significantly large (18.1%). Furthermore, the driving forces were composed of the old.

Chang's administration recruited a number of younger elites, compared with that of Syngman Rhee. Age span of 41-45 shows remarkable increase to 36.2 percent. However, the age groups of 31-35

and 36-40 extremely decreased. Most of the cabinet members were those who had struggled for their political vurvivals under Syngman Rhee's oppression.

In Park's government, on the other hand, the younger leaders (age group 36-40, 41-45, 46-50) are dominant and the power is steered by these groups. The military Revolution of 1961 eliminated most of the old politicians from the political scene. Indeed, the two revolutions (students' revolution of April, 1960 and military coup of May, 1961) were the outbursts of the new generation in terms of 'change'. The following table indicates a sufficient condition to cause a revolution. The society was not ready to absorbe the educated young men which had explosively increased by 1960.

Table 14. Statistical Survey on Young Intellectuals (As of 1960)

Age Group	Highest Year of School Completed as of 1960					
	13	14	15	16	17 & over	Total
19	2,960					2,960
20-29	60,383	70,241	40,322	60,070	2,945	233,956
30-39	10,360	15,649	19,296	48,328	3,695	97,328
40-49	3,223	7,068	10,230	10,302	1,666	32,489
50-59	1,382	2,530	3,598	3,053	607	11,170
60-69	382	561	896	851	216	2,906
70 & over	86	96	185	160	25	552

Source: Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook 1965, pp. 28-29. Han B. Lee, op. cit., p. 110.

Several trends are indicated in the above comparisons of social origins, education, and age spans of the political leaders. The Southern elites came from the considerably better social origins, and as the result, they have higher educational background than those of the Northerners. In the Southern regimes, the age span of the leaders shows a gradual decrease through the period of 1948-1970, whereas the ages of Northern leaders increased. This fact, in turn, indicates that the founding fathers of South Korea have been continuously replaced by young intellectuals, while those of North Korea are still those who organized the first regime, without notable replacement by younger groups.

In connection with the socio-economic backgrounds, the trends of the leaders' personality, attitudes, and political bahavior will be reviewed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

ATTITUDES OF KOREAN ELITES

1. Personality Trends

The backgrounds of the political elites have been examined in the preceding chapter which will serve to trace the personality traits, political behavior, and policy trends of the modernizing elites.

Political socialization, which is affected by these backgrounds, has been defined as "the learning by men in important positions of responses appropriate to the environmental circumstances confronting them."[1] This, in turn, explains "who learn what, when, and how." As far as modernization is concerned, it is important to examine the functions and processes of the leaders, because modernization is characterized by the strategy of the leaders. Modernization belongs to the realm of 'means', not of 'ends'. Taking this point into account, this chapter will give emphases on the observation and analyses of Korea's modernizing elites in terms of their art of management.

A. Syngman Rhee

The organizing forces for the nation-building led by Syngman Rhee appealed to the public to realize the importance of the surrounding situation and the necessity of national unity.

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[1] Bernard C. Cohen, "National-International Linkages: Superpolities," in James N. Rosenaur (ed.), Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 139.

Syngman Rhee expressed his "new spirit" of the nation-building in the following manner:

> Although a new government is indispensable for building a new nation, a nation can never be built without a new spirit. A noble state can not be erected with a corrupt spirit. Out nation must seek a new way with a new spirit and action throwing away what was old. Only through daily striving forward, can we recover the time we have lost during the past forty years and compete with the civilized nations of the world.[2]

However, the "new spirit" and action was not strong enough to throw the old way entirely away. The zeal for reform had to confront the existing social conditions. Lacking the skill of political manipulation and violent forces to carry out the reform, the uproars of change left only vanishing echoes behind. The aftermath of the colonial experience caused further confusion and society-dislocation. Increasing urban populations and lack of industrial facilities created a mass of unemployed, and this situation, in turn, caused a malfunction in government control.

The failure of land reform widened the unbalance between the haves and the have-nots.[3] Furthermore, misconceived notions of democracy imported through uncontrolled channels, i. e., foreign soldiers, smugglers, repatriated second generations, etc., accelerated this confusion.

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[2] Republic of Korea, President, Inaugural Speech on July 24, 1948, Collected Speeches of President Syngman Rhee (Seoul, 1953), p. 3.

[3] T. S. Han, op. cit., pp. 128-134.

The scheming unmoral politicians surrounding Rhee gradually were able to manipulate him, and he lost control of the situation. Under such circumstances, a bureaucratic power oligarchy was emerging. Thus the combination of the retrospective political leaders and the weakened task elites led Korea to stagnant conditions, in spite of its great potentiality to develop.[4] Accordingly, the attitudes of Rhee and his subordinates toward the reform were not revolutionary in character. Their attitudes are characterized by the "trial and error' methods. They attempted incremental changes, instead of abrupt ones.

B. Kim Il-sung

The conditions which made Kim Il-sung a revolutionary leader were not only his personal background, but also requirements from the revolutionary oriented society of North Korea. First of all, Kim and his followers came from the lower social strata, having been expolited by their landlords and by the Japanese industrial bureaucrats.[5] The liberation of the nation from the colonial power resulted in a serious social disorder and power vacuum in the North, and, eventually, a strong agitator and power-oriented revolutionary leader was needed. Kim Il-sung, having power, planned a total change in the society, including the political, economic, and social arenas.

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[4] Han B. Lee, op. cit., p. 78.

[5] Yoon-tai Kwark, "North Korea's Industrial Development during the Post-War Period," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), North Korea Today (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 51.

Kim's personality was tough enough to ignore all the existing systems and to crush the complaining opponents. His agitating claims were idealistic enough to hold the attention of the poor masses. Applying to Kautsky's classification, Kim Il-sung's attitudes and behavior fall into the typical revolutionary categories. He was not an impractical dreamer, but rather a highly realistic "organizer" and "agitator".[6] To Kim, objectives were the primary concerns, while methods were the secondary. He did not hesitate to create terrorism or to utilize his power to achieve his goals.

Chang-soon Kim, a Kim Il-sung specialist, has analysed Kim's manipulating skill of organization-building into three steps. The first step was discrimination between the party member and non-party member, giving the farmer every social privilege. The second step was a coalition with the other parties, political ostracism of cadre members, deprivation of political freedom. The third one was to force the coalition counterparts to be entirely amalgamated into the party.[7]

Kim Il-sung's attitudes toward the reforms were dramatic, creating a crisis situation in the society. Kim tended to see his pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary enemies as counter-revolutionary elements and whenever the situation permitted,

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[6] Kautsky, op. cit., p. 449.

[7] Chang-soon Kim, op. cit., pp. 133-137. See also Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage," in Scalapino, op. cit., p. 9.

he used these people as scape goats, in the name of "revolution", or "development". Two significant events are good examples of Kim's dramatic reactions. The first event was the purges of Park Hun-young and his group, the strongest political rivals to Kim, shortly after the Korean War. Kim Il-sung attributed the serious defeat of the war to Park's clique, and he put them to summary execution before the public, accusing them of being "American imperialists' spies".[8] Park Hun-young, ironically, was one of the most radical and strongest opponents against the cease-fire and compromise with South Koreans, while Kim Il-sung and Nam Il accepted the proposal for the truce. Eventually, Kim was attacked by Park Hun-young group as a betrayer and anti-Kim sentiments gradually spread through the KWP, jeopardizing his political life as well as his survival.[9]

Another event happened in 1958, when North Korea began her second five-year economic development program. The clash between Kim Il-sung and Choe Chang-ik, one of the most intelligent Vice-Premiers, raised a serious argument concerning the scale of industrialization. Kim urged heavy industry, while Park and his followers argued for light consummatory productions.[10]

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8 Sun-sung Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX, 2 (January, 1967), pp. 221-222.

9 Ibid., pp. 227-230.

10 Ibid.

Before this activity took place, Choe and Park Chang-ok, another Vice-Premier, had disclosed their reluctance to Kim's personality building attitudes. Kim had blamed Khruschev's de-Stalinization, and cut relations with Russia; Kim himself attempted to appear as Stalin in North Korea.[11] Park Chang-ok had written a letter to Khruschev after the Third Congress of KWP to complain that Kim Il-sung was not complying with line of the Twentieth Congress concerning the style of party leadership. These series of counter-actions made Kim Il-sung nervous, and finally he purged Park and Choe as anti-revolutionaries. Four other cabinet members were sentenced to death, simply because they opposed Kim's heavy industry policy.[12]

Kim Il-sung often used the terms "nationalism", "self-identity", and "self-sufficiency" in his speeches concerned with development. Kim's attitudes toward the South were, furthermore, rough and aggressive. He justified the revolution as the means for the "ultimate victory in the revolutionary struggle against South Korea," and continued that:

> The decisive factor in leading the Korean revolution to ultimate civtory lies in intensifying the revolutionary struggle to fulfill the national and social liberation of the people in South Korea, and expanding socialist construction in North Korea in order to solidify the democratic foundation for revolution.[13]

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[11] Il-kun Ham, "The North Korean Regime in the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Korean Affairs, II, 2 (February, 1963), pp. 154-156.

[12] The purged Cabinet members include Yun Kong-hum (Commerce), Kim Sung-hwa (Construction), Suh Hoe (Chairman of Trade Union Association), and Kim Kang (Director of Cultural and Public Information Service). See S. S. Cho, op. cit., p. 228.

In short, Kim Il-sung related the terms 'revolution', 'liberation', and 'development' with his political aspirations. However, the terms he used are too flexible and dogmatic to be understood. Kim's rhetorics are characterized by the aggressive context and vocabularies. His public speeches overtly bring the salvos such as "imperialist's puppet", "war-monger", "stooge" against South Korean leaders and government.[14] His agitating attitudes often succeeded in mobilizing the national strength from the grass-root in the crises situations. Kim Il-sung's attitudes toward the unification of North and South Korea will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

C. Park Chung-hee

Delicate arguments can be raised about Park Chung-hee and his political lieutenants who took parts in the military revolution. The arguments include whether these new military men be categorized as a revolutionary, or as a managerial group. Indeed, Park Chung-hee and his men were regarded as revolutionaries in the following aspects. Park successfully took power from the existing Chang's regime by means of military power. His attitudes toward change

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[13] D. P. R. K., Iron Kwa Sil-chon(Theory and Practices)(Pyongyang: National Publishing House, 1962), p. 65.

[14] These terms are easily picked up in the Military Armistice Conference table in Pan-mun-jom, Korea. See news articles on DMZ crises.

were hasty and revolution-oriented. On the other hand, the means for the changes were not violent, nor were they cruel. Although he removed the naive administration of Chang, Park did not attempt to blow up the total political and social systems, per se. He preserved most of the existing social values and systems, on which he incrementally reformed as the situation requires and permits. Park's revolution in South Korea must be considered as an efficiency-oriented reformation, rather than a structural change-oriented revolution. Park's major revolutionary task expressed in the oath reveals this context clearly, by stating that:

> Our primary task of revolution is to eliminate corruption, and eradicate other social evils, to inculcate fresh and wholesome moral and mental attitudes among the people, to provide relief for poverty-stricken and hungry people...[15]

Park further stated that the revolutionary forces would return to their proper military duties as soon as the government was restored to honest and conscientious civilians.[16] Park Chung-hee's revolution, eventually, brought a rushing stream in the age-old swamp. Following measures are series of salient actions taken by the military regime during the first one hundred days, from May 16 to August 17, 1961.[17]

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15 Kie-chang Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial (New York: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 107.

16 Ibid.

17 Han B. Lee, op. cit., p. 155. The items in the table 15 are selected from the editorial resumes in Tong-a Il-bo (December 16, 1963, pp. 4-5) with title, "Two and half Years of Rapid Change: A Diary of the Military Administration."

Table 15. Major Revolutionary Tasks
(May 16 - August 17, 1961)

Date	Measures
May 16, 1961	Martial law: dissolution of National Assembly and local councils. Disbanding of political parties and social organization.
May 22, 1961	Arresting of 4,200 gang leaders and 2,000 Communist suspects, by this date.
May 23, 1961	Proclamation of "Press Purification Act."
May 25, 1961	Announced Plan for Liquidation of Rural Usurious Debts.
June 10, 1961	Act Establishing Central Intelligence Agency.
June 10, 1961	Act for Liquidation of Rural Usurious Debts.
June 10, 1961	Act on the National Reconstruction Movement.
June 14, 1961	Act on Disposition of Illicit Fortunes.
June 15, 1961	Consolidation of Three Public Electric Companies.
June 27, 1961	Agricultural Price Support Act.
July 18, 1961	Emergency Economic Measures for Industrial Recovery.
July 22, 1961	Establishment of Economic Planning Board and Development Plan.
August 17, 1961	Act Establishing Capital Defense Command.

As listed in the Table 15, most of the revolutionary programs centered around the economy. The reforming pace was hasty and dynamic. However, Park Chung-hee did not attempt to build the

personalism as other revolutionaries did. Park himself confessed in his memoirs that the purpose of the revolution was to reconstruct the nation and establish a self-sustaining economy. The driving forces of the revolution consisted mostly of young colonels, especially members of the eighth graduating class, or the class of 1949, of the Korean Military Academy. They initially formulated five measures for "military purification" on May 8, 1960, one year before the revolution. The measures were:

1. Punishment of the top military officers who collaborated with the Liberals in the 1960 presidential election.
2. Punishment of military officers who amassed wealth illegally.
3. Elimination of incompetent and corrupt commanders.
4. Political neutrality of the armed forces and elimination of factionalism.
5. Improvement of treatment of military servicemen.[18]

Their proposals were, however, refused and they were punished even to the dishonor of discharge from the military service; thus they planned a total overthrow of the government, and supported Park Chung-hee as their revolutionary leader.

The early history of the military administration is characterized by containment and mutual accommodation of role conflict

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[18] R. O. K. Supreme National Reconstruction Council, Han-kuk Kun-sa Hyong-myong Sa (History of Korean Military Revolution) (Seoul: S. N. R. C., 1962), p. 102.

among the three pillars of the regime: i.e., the Cabinet, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), and the Central Intelligence Agency. Of these three the cabinet came closest to the managerial orientation of the military as a whole, whereas the CIA held to the traditional and operational orientation.[19]

2. Economic Policy

There are many similarities between Kim Il-sung and Park Chung-hee. First of all, these two leaders came from the same backgrounds. Both came from poor families and had military careers. These two perceived the best way to modernization as their major concern. They also are in accord with their attitude toward economic development, and are willing to take hasty and radical steps. In their outlook, long-range economic plans look similar in their length and their scope.

However, greater differences come into the comparison. Kim Il-sung perceived the revolution as the "goal" of development, whereas Park Chung-hee and the Southern leaders regarded development as the means for political and economic reforms. Kim adopted Mao Tse-tung's economic program by means of mass mobilization of labor under a totally "Planned Economy system".[20]

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[19] R. A. Scalapino, "What Route for Korea?," Asian Survey, II, 7 (September, 1962), p. 7.

[20] For Kim Il-sung's economic policies, see Y. T. Kwark, op. cit., pp. 51-64.

Every member of North Korean society is put into compulsory work in various fields: mines, cooperative farms, collective factories or fisheries. He dislocated all occupations for the task. This situation totally complies with what Kautsky defines as the revolutionary character:

> The revolutionary modernizers seem to be inclined to do away with a specialized army, demanding that military units be employed in agriculture, industry and public works... and that civilians be turned into soldiers and that factories, rural communes, and government and party organizations all be turned into "revolutionary schools" like the army.[21]

Kim's manipulated development programs thus have been mostly transplanted from China. The Chollima (Flying Horse) movement that began in late 1958-59 copies the Great Leap of China. "Shonsap-tugo-huri-pyogi movement", "Huri-anpyogi movement", "Pyul-bogi movement", which look just like children's game, were applied to the mass labor programs.[22]

Kim's hard labor programs are attributed to the lack of a labor forces in the North. This situation is also regarded as the typically manipulated class stratification in the socialist camps to fit the mass population into "equal opportunity".

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21 Kautsky, op. cit., p. 457. See also Joseph A Kahl, "The Moral Ecomony of a Revolutionary Society," Transaction, VI(April, 1969), pp. 30-37.

22 Series of movements to encourage mass work. Huri-anpyogi movement is referred to "no rest before one thousand shovels." Pyol-bogi means "to see the star," that is the hard work from the early dawn until late evening.

The report on the occupational division of the North Korean population shows a gradual increase of the working class year by year.

Table 16. Distribution of Occupations in North Korea

Categories	1946	1949	1953	1956	1960
Workers & Office Employees	18.9	26.0	29.7	40.9	52.0
Farmers	74.1	69.3	66.4	56.6	44.4
Others (Managers, Officials)	5.0	2.9	2.4	2.0	3.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: DPRK, Facts About Korea (Pyung Yang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961), p. 9 and Chong-sik Lee, "The Socialist Revolution in the North Korean Countryside," Asian Survey, II, 8 (Ocotber, 1962), p. 12 ff.

The gradual increase of the labor forces and managerial power brought serious trends, which jeopardized the authority of the operational revolutionary forces.

Accordingly, Kim's attitude toward managerial groups became strict, and deprived many of the rights to manage by accusing them of subversive plots:

> Among the managerial personnel of some cooperatives were found subversive elements who had crept their way into the cooperatives and managed to occupy the leading positions. [23]

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[23] DPRK, Agricultural Cooperativization in Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Pyong Yang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1958), p. 43. See also Chong-sik Lee, op. cit., p. 18.

Again, Kim Il-sung purged and accused them of conspiracy, claiming that "the anti-revolutionary elements' infesting, destructive, and obstructive behavior had become more vicious."[24] Eventually, the key positions in the managerial element were filled with non-managerial (revolutionary) forces, i.e., military officers, party members, etc.

On the other hand, Park's economic policy was characterized by its multi-dimensional approach. He began the long-range economic plan, in 1962, far later than Kim Il-sung did. The main goals of the Second Five-year Economic Development include:

1. To stress self-sufficiency in foods and fishery products and to achieve reforestation.
2. To lay solid foundation for the modernization of industry by building up chemical, steel and machinery industries, and to double industrial output.
3. To boost exports to $700 million (commodity exports to $500 million), and to lay a solid foundation for a healthy international balance of payments position by promoting import-substitute industries.
4. To expand employment opportunities and to curtail the population growth by promoting family planning.
5. To promote science and management and to raise the level of technology and productivity.[25]

The plans were based firmly on the managerial techniques of Park's regime. Numerious economically-specialized organizations

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[24] DPRK, Kim Il-sung Sun-j[illegible] (Quotations from Kim Il-sung), VI, Korean ed. (Pyong-yang: natio[illegible] Publishing House, 1965), p. 175. See also Chong-sik Lee, op. c[illegible] p. 13.

[25] Youn-hui Mooh, "Long Te[illegible] conomic Development Plan," Korea Journal, VI, 10 (Octobe[illegible] 966), pp. 12-13.

were formed either by the government or civilian entrepreneurs to study the achievability of the plan. They concluded the plan would be possible. The following facts were considered:

1. That continuous availability of a labor force with high level of education.
2. That foreign capital investment has been steadily increasing.
3. That there are many entrepreneurs and investors capable of handling their resources in such a manner as to enlarge both domestic and foreign markets.
4. Although the agricultural labor force has been slowly absorbed by the industrial sections, the enduring progress of agricultural field can be assured.[26]

Unlike Kim, Park, however, has not attempted any violent means for the development plan, i.e., collectivization, socialization of property, mandatory working-hour system, food distribution system, etc. Nor did Park give the initiatives for development to the revolutionary group, but to the deliberately selected civilian managerial forces.[27]

The labor training schedules in the North included the elementary and high schools (9 year mandatory),[28] while in the South, these depend on the students' abilities. Both in the

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[26] Ibid., p. 13.

[27] Ibid., pp. 13-14. See also Hui-bom Park, "Economic Development Plan and Korean Nationalism," Korea Journal, VI, 12(December, 1966), pp. 20-24.

[28] Key P. Yang, and Chang-bo Chi, "North Korean Educational System: 1945 to Present," in Scalapino, op. cit., p. 135.

North and South, the basic training for technology is not only the matter of schools and institutions, but also is extended to the factories, armies, and government organizations.

However, the major concerns of both South and North Korea were serious lack of skilled workers. North Korea with the first economic development plan in 1955 attempted to repatriate the Japanese-Koreans from Japan to reinforce the labor force.[29]

Since the repatriation program ended in 1967, the labor shortage caused serious problems pushing Kim to negotiate for another program for repatriation.[30]

According to the reports of Ministry of Labor, South Korea also suffers from the shortage of skilled workers. The following table shows that a 70-100% annual increase of trained workers still cannot cover the increasing demand.

Table 17. Distribution for Laborer Demand and Support

Year	No. of Trained Workers	No. of Workers Needed
1967	8,392	13,900
1968	18,215	20,250
1969	22,446	24,900
1970	30,102	39,400

Source: Han-kuk Il-bo, February 17, 1971, p. 6

[29] Dong-a Il-bo, September 17, 1960.

[30] Han-kuk Il-bo, March 9, 1971.

of the characteristics of the two parts of Korea. While the North's products depend on the unskilled mass workers, the South depends on a fewer number of trained technicians. North Korea has a better program for placing the labor forces at the working project; however, the South does not have an efficient coercive placement program. This resulted in loss of labor in the South due to the workers' freedom in moving from job to job, or refusing to work under adverse working conditions.

Lastly, the characteristics of industry are differentiated by heavy-light dichotomy: heavy industry in the North, light in the South; primary products in the North, consumer products in the South.

In summary, the leaders' attitudes and behavior vary in accordance with their backgrounds. The survey has shown that the revolutionary elites who came from the less prestigious social origins tend to realize a total and radical changes in modernizing processes, on the one hand, and the managerials with better social backgrounds ...es an incremental change on the order. Thus, the former gr... p attempts to utilize all possible means for their goals with the ... dramatic personalities, while the latter put their emphasis ... means, not on goals, for the overall efficiency. The linkag... between the personality and the management of the reality ...l be further described in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V

LINKAGE ELITE: MANAGERIAL VS. REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS

The influence-reaction model indicates that the leaders' political socialization is greatly affected by the degree of influence, and, at the same time, the flow of influence is affected by the attitudes of the leaders.[1] The rapid socialization of aspiring leaders may cause the abrupt reaction in the domestic systems. On the other hand, the escapist attitudes of the leaders toward external stimuli may also work to isolate the domestic system.

1. Factors affecting influence

The various media area regarded as important factors affecting degree of influence. In the primitive society the interchange of influences among nations or communities depended on the limited device of media, i.e., messenger, signal, etc. First, the development of transportation and communication devices provided a flood of information exchange shrinking the distances between nations. Then the innovations of radio and television made it possible for men to see and hear happenings from all around the world simultaenously.

Transportation facilities, likewise, provide human being with the possibility of easily exchanging goods. Secondly, the frequency

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[1] Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in R. Barry Farrel (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 5-26.

of diplomatic exchanges, including non-governmental affairs, has gradually reduced the degree of isolation among nations. Economic and technical assistance, military aid, and educational systems are introduced to the underdeveloped countries by the developed nations.

Finally, a negative factor, extreme containment, also serves as an influence in the current world. This takes the form of either confrontation or competition. In confrontation, two or more nations are involved in a serious tension. In the situation of competition, on the other hand, the behavior of these nations is more active and creative in terms of reciprocal or retaliatory response of the other.[2] Influence factors, thus, are applicable to the model to analyze the foreign policy outcome of the leaders of Korea.

To Kim Il-sung, political and social stability precedes the economic development. With this in view, Kim implemented a completely controlled reform in political organizations as well as vertical penetration. The communication systems were mobilized for this purpose and came under the tight control of the leaders. (See Figure 3). The well established communication system served the leaders in many ways. First, the communication system helped the mass to be implicitly aware of public policy. Through the system the political leaders could manipulate their policies

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[2] Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multi-polar Systems and International Stability," in James Rosenau, ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy. op. cit., p. 321.

Figure 3. Organization of Propaganda (North Korea)



Source: U.S. Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 92.

in terms of development.[3] Second, the development of the communication system served the leaders as a means for isolating the mass from the outer world.[4] In the modernizing socialist countries, the radio audiences have limited channels, either a government channel or a collective community broadcast. Radio Pyong-yang is the only station in North Korea.

2. Isolationism in Pre-modern Society

In the pre-modern period, the influence factors worked less intensively and accordingly, the policy outcomes were weak. Chinese attitudes toward Korea were not jeopardizing the survival of the Yi dynasty; Japanese, being regarded as savages, were not so dominant in the early period. However, these slow and weak environmental stimuli shifted into strong challenges in the mid-nineteenth century when the flood of external influences came to the Korean leaders. These new stimuli caused changes in the leaders' attitudes and reactions.

The introductions of Western religion, foreign troops, schools, and civilization were serious stimulating factors in terms of reform. The kings and the cabinet members, all from the Yang-ban

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[3] Lucian W. Pye, "Communication Patterns and the Problems of Representative Government in non-Western Societies," Public Opinion Quarterly, XX, I (Spring, 1956), pp. 249-257.

[4] Lucian W. Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," in G. A. Almond et al, eds. Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 135-138.

class, regarded these as the disturbing elements to the traditional society. Thus, the leaders of the kingdom reacted against the challenges and closed the nation. The teachings of Confucian again were adopted as the predominant values of the society, while any new civilization was regarded as savage. Thousands of Christians were persecuted; schools were closed; foreign books were burned. International relations, eventually, were limited to China, until Korea was annexed to Japan in 1910.

3. Isolationism in the Modern Society

Isolationism in current world affairs is defined as "low level involvement in most issue areas of the system."[5] The national actors pruposely avoid or reduce the involvement. According to K. J. Holsti, highly complicated variables of "system structure, domestic needs, threats, and geographic features are related to the isolationist strategies."[6]

The isolation of Korea, both the North and the South, were greatly influenced by the international system structure, in terms of foreign policy. After the division of the nation both parties acted in accordance with the block norms: the North with

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[5] K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1967), p. 99.

[6] Ibid.

the Communist camp and the South with Western leaders. The structural systems were furthermore tightened by the Korean War and by the war's aftermath. No positive interaction has been exchanged between these two parties, but there always exist hardcore tensions.

Figure 4. Information Channel between the North and the South



As fiugre indicates, no information channel links North and South Korea, except through mediators such as neighboring block nations, or neutral countries.

The isolationism between the two parts of Korea has tightly tied the politics to the respective domestic political system

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7 There are contacts through non-political organizations, i.e., International Red Cross, International Olympic Commission, etc.

by means of political manipulation. Because imperialism has been ascribed to Southern regimes, anti-imperialism became the dominant agitating device of the Northern leaders, whereas anti-Communism is employed by the South.[8] All the newspapers from abroad, loaded with criticisms on the illegitimacy of government, are checked and forbidden for circulation. Such conditions can be observed in the revolutionary stages.

The other news media, i.e., newspapers, periodicals, etc., are likewise controlled by the party. Since no private ownership of communication channels is allowed in the North, criticism against policy, or against political leaders is rarely heard.

In a system of isolationism, international activities are limited or prohibited to the common citizen. At the modernizing stage in a socialist system, because of wealth distribution, the government cannot afford to have citizens take trips abroad.[9]

The extreme isolation from the outer world naturally causes normative values within a domestic society. This situation is likely to cause a malfunction in adjusting capabilities of the

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[8] International Broadcasting Service in South Korea, and Radio Pyong-yang fall into this category.

[9] According to the official report, the average manager's salary is around 150 won (4 won is equivalent to 1 U.S. dollar), and average workers' monthly wage is about 65 won. DPRK, North Korea's Economic Development (Pyong-yang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960), pp. 38-39.

mass to changing world affairs. According to Karl W. Deutsch, intensive totalitarian information controls will easily cause a breaking of the external flows of influence.[10]

However, when outer influences are unavoidable, the domestic policy is put into a situation of frustration. Such unavoidable influences may come iether through a long-range infiltration of adjacent communities, or through an abrupt transplantation of the causing element from the outer world. Recent anti-government demonstrations and riots in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary are referred as instances of the former, and the North Koreans' repatriation of Japanese-Koreans as instances of the latter. In the latter case, the frustration was more serious. The intermix of extremely different environmental elements raised a serious problem in the society in terms of the values of these two polities.[11]

The political leaders in this situation perceived a danger created by the heterogeniety of values and managed a strict control of the newcomers. They reassigned these problematic new groups to isolated factories, and at last, sent them to separate places. Under the situation of isolationism, national leaders attempt to preserve thedomestic political and economic systems. In the adjustment system, the survival of national systems is jeopardized

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[10] K. W. Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

[11] The private property of the newcomers was regarded with curiosity by the native people. On the other hand, the new arrivals were totally disappointed with the socialist society, which was completely different from the alleged paradise.

by foreign impact in many cases. A national system that is likely to collapse or to go to pieces will make the country remarkably sensitive to foreign influence.

4. Modernizing Leaders toward Environmental Stimuli

A nation with highly cohesive community, with a high capacity for adjustment and learning, is able to absorb the impact of foreign influences. The real leaders of such a nation are those who implicitly perceive the causes of environmental stimuli and the possibility of adjustment of domestic policy. These leaders are positive in managing the situation and highly skilled in its manipulations.

Park Chung-hee's manipulating skill is shown in the 1965 crisis ... a student demonstration against Park's attempted Korean-Japanese normalization policy. He was fully aware of the the difficulty of quelling the demonstration, and of how serious the direct confrontation would be. His alternative was to raise another issue which would draw popular support.[12]

Park successfully manipulated the situation by raising the alternative of involvement in Vietnam War. Supporters and dissidents turned their attention to this new policy, and public interest turned toward the Vietnam problem. All the news media took the spotlight off the Korea-Japan normalization issue. Park finally gained support from the polity on the Vietnam issue as well as the issue of the normalization with Japan.

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12 Han-kuk Il-bo, May 25, 29; September 25, November 4, 1965.

In international relations, the importance of a linkage group must be considered in terms of its composition.[13] This group may be composed of hard core revolutionaries, of intellectuals, or of industrialists. However, this group's diverse perceptions of reality must be considered to relate them to their domestic environment. It is also important to observe the diversity of the behaviors of these linkage groups in the international political arena.

Table 18. Comparison of Diplomatic Relations

	Kim Il-sung (1948-70)	Rhee Syngman (1948-60)	Park Chung-hee (1961-70)
No. of Total Linkage elites (President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister)	47	32	37
No. of Univ. Graduates among these linkage leaders	14 (31%)	27 (90%)	34 (96%)
No. of Nations in Diplomatic Relations	25	54	76
Total number of Official Visits (Out) of Top Officials	64	72	154
Total number of Official Visits (In)	123	101	176

Sources: Arranged from Hap-dong Annals, Asia Who's Who, Asian Survey (1963-1970), Asian Recorder (1960-1971), Deadline Data on the World Affairs (1946-1971), Dong-a Il-bo, Chosen Il-bo (1947-1971), and Pyong-yang Times.

[13] O. R. Holsti and J. D. Sullivan, "National-International Linkage: France and China as Non-conforming Alliance Members," in J. Rosenau, ed., op. cit., pp. 147-162.

Syngman Rhee's foreign policy was characterized by its selectivity of a nation for international relations in terms of a "good guy-bad guy" dychotomy. Rhee's major enemies were Communist, because of the ideology conflicts between North and South Korea, and the Japanese, mainly because of the long colonial experiences with them.

As far as development was concerned, Rhee's policy toward Japan is important. Neglecting the fact that there were more than 700,000 Korean residents in Japan, Rhee maintained a strict antagonism toward Japan, which caused thoudands of Korean-Japanese to repatriate to North Korea, not to the South. Besides, being anti-Japanism, Rhee pursued strict anti-Communism in his foregn policy. The so-called Halstein doctrine was adopted to avoid the relations with nations which recognized North Kim Il-sung, who, on the contrary, utilized every opportunity to make diplomatic and economic relations with those countries which Rhee excluded. Even without legitimate diplomatic sources, North Korea successfully negotiated with Japan concerning the repatriation of Korean-Japanese to the North.

Kim Il-sung, on the other hand, was very active in his unification policy, while Rhee's regime avoided any proposals except Rhee's own unification policy, which was the unification under U.N. supervision. Kim's unification policy is categorized

by three significant phases:

1. Unification by revolutionary war -- 1950.
2. "Peaceful unification" through free elections, under the supervision of neutral nations -- 1953-60.
3. Unification through economic and cultural exchanges since 1960. [14]

Kim's revolutionary program for unification was expressed in his demagogic speech via Radio Pyong-yang on June 26, 1950, one day after he ordered the war:

> We, the Korean people, must liquidate the unpatriotic Fascist puppet regime of Syngman Rhee; we must liberate the southern part of our mother land from the domination of the Syngman Rhee clique; ... the war which we are forced to wage is a just war for the unification and ... [15]

He justified his aggression as a just war for the unification and exhausted every effort to wage the war. A comparison of military strength in 1950 shows what constant preparation Kim had made for the war.

Kim's unification policies, however, were so inconsistent that a systemic analysis is not easy. Kim talks in peaceful terms in the morning, but in the evening, he may sound a challenging note.

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[14] Sun S. Cho, op. cit.

[15] Pravda, June 27, 1950. See also Sun S. Cho, op. cit., p. 219.

Table 19. Comparison of Combat Strength as of June 1950

Classification	North Korea	South Korea
All troops	199,950	103,827
Combat troops	135,438	64,697
Combat aircraft	211 (Yak)	22 (Non-equipped liaison craft)
Patrol boat	35 (heavy)	41
Artillery	2,893 (pieces)	Little
Tanks	242	None
Degree of Training	Above division level	Company level

Source: Han-kuk Il-bo, June 24, 1967, p. 3.

Just after the war, Kim made a speech at the KWP advocating peaceful unification stating that "the unification of our motherland must be achieved only by peaceful means without foreign intervention."[16]

Kim Il-sung then made contradictions by purging Park, Hun-young and his followers during this party session, accusing him of being an "American spy". Park, defected from the South, was a typical hawkist, and urged that the war be continued to the final victory. After a week Park and his followers were shot to death, in accordance with Kim's death sentence.[17]

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16 DPRK, Kim Il-sung, All Efforts toward the Restoration and Development of the National Economy, (Pyong-yang, 1961), pp. 6-9.

Kim Il-sung's foreign policy was likewise inconsistent. Kim Il-sung and the KWP took the Leninist International Communist line which was already approaching obsolescence. Since Khrushechev claimed the Stalinization at the 20th Communist Party Congress of Soviet Union in 1956, Kim turned his back on China. At this Congress, Khrushchev laid bare Stalin's fallacies while ironically, Mao Tse-tung's message to the meeting eulogized Stalin.

Kim's speech at the Communist and Workers' Party conference in Moscow (1960), emphasized the Leninist line:

> We consider the Korean revolution to be an integral part of the international communist movement. We have held the position that struggle for successful revolution in Korea would, in the long-run, strenthen the world revolutionary potential and would expedite the ultimate victory. 18

North Korean relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated when Khrushchev showed naive reaction to the Cuban crisis in 1962. Kim Il-sung, blaming the Russian foreign policy of coexistence and de-Stalinization took the side of China. His repeatedly expressed appraisal of Mao's line, made North Korea more frequently disposed to China: "increasing unity in the common struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism". 19

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17 Il-kun Han, "The North Korean Regime in Sino-Soviet Dispute," Korean Affairs, II, 2 (February, 1963), p. 140.

18 Kim Il-sung's speech at Communist Workers' Party Conference of 81 countries in Moscow. See Chang-soon Kim, op. cit., p. 130.

Several reasons for Kim Il-sung's anti-Soviet feelings may be found. First, the Soviet Union's de-stalinization movement threatened Kim's manipulatory attempt to idealize himself to the people, which he regarded as the best method to tie the people into the Communist role.[20] Second, China is geographically close to Korea, and these are long historical ties between the two. Third, Khrushchev's negative reaction to the Cuban crisis and his intention to back India in the Sino-Indian border conflict made Kim doubt Khrushchev's support as the ultimate necessity such as another Korean war. Fourth, Mao Tse-tung was an ideal revolutionary to Kim, in the method of revolutionary movements, i.e., the Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution, and the Red Guard movement.

Lastly, the most important and direct reason occured when the Soviet Union cut its economic aid to North Korea, which desperately hurt its long term economic plan.[21]

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19 The Times (London), August 5, 1963. Quoted from speech at Peking airport by Choe Yong-gun, who was the Chairman of the Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly of DPRK.

20 Jong-won Kim, op. cit., pp. 249-250. No-dong Shin-moon (North Korean Labor News), October 28, 1963.

21 No-dong Shin-moon, October 29, 1963. Radio Pyong-yang, on October 30, 1963, accused the Soviet Union of taking an attitude in its ideological quarrel with Communist China that "may break up the international Communist movement completely", and denounced the Soviet Communist Party for interference in North Korea's affairs and for its alleged interference in Asian Communist generally. (See Deadline Data on World Affairs, October 30, 1963)

The official organ of the Korean Workers' Party, No-dong Shin-moon (Labor's Newspaper), in an editorial on October 29, 1963, hinted that Russia had tried unsuccessfully to discourage North Korea from carrying out her five-year plan. Radio Pyong-yang repeatedly warned the Soviet Union that any attempt to break the brotherhood of Asian Communist countries will cause a serious collapse of international Communist movement. Kim's accusation of Southern government followed the usual Communist line, labeling the leaders as "war-criminals", "Capitalist exploiters", with usual propaganda tactics.

Since South Korea deployed an active diplomatic corps in the neutralist countries, as well as in the western states, Kim's South Korean policy turned to one of creating internal political turmoil in the South. Since 1967, North Korea has changed its tactics from focusing on the DMZ violations to launching fully equipped guerrilla forces into the rear areas of South Korea in an attempt to precipitate another Vietnam -type war.

On January 21, 1968, almost simultaneously with the Viet-cong's Tet Offensive in Vietnam, Kim infiltrated South Korea to Seoul with a platoon-sized, well-trained commando team to murder Park Chung-hee and to destroy the United States Embassy, but the team was completely annihilated by police and military forces. Two days later they kidnapped the USS Pueblo, a U.S. navy intelligence ship, in the East sea of Korea. A Subsequent

Table 20. North Korean Military Attacks to the South

Via DMZ

Year	No. of Attack	No. of Troops	No. killed	No. of Engagements
1965	42	141	4	23
1966	37	110	8	19
1967	445	1,042	117	122
1968	486	1,286	197	236
1969 (Jan/Mar)	34	64	---	15

Via Sea

Year	No. of Attack	No. of Troops	No. killed	No. of Engagements
1965	36	51	---	--
1966	28	64	10	--
1967	31	167	111	--
1968	12	155	124	--
1969 (Jan/Mar)	4	14	8	--

	Total Killed	Total Captured
1965	4	--
1966	18	--
1967	228	58
1968	321	10
1969 (Jan/Mar)	8	--

Source: Han-kuk Il-bo, April, 1969, p. 2.

attack was made on the EC 121, an American intelligence plane on April 15, 1969. All these aggressive actions were proclaimed as a "heroic victory" by the North Korean Government and were hailed by "revolutionary-blind" people in the North, just as in Cuba or in North Vietnam. South Korea remained far behind in this

method of manipulation and propaganda, and had to build its diplomatic foundation by means of a steady and ceaseless effort.

During the regimes of Rhee and Chang, Korea's diplomatic activities were so negative that it could maintain deplomatic relations with only fifteen countries. Park's significant effort to increase international activities brought about tremendous results, which increased the number of countries to seventy-eight by 1966.[22] To meet the demands of increasing international activities, Korea established a Foreign Service Institute in Seoul, alongside a new Administrative Staff College for civil servants' training. Park Chung-hee succeeded in reviving the Korean-Japanese relationship which was a significant controversy in both countries. The most notable demonstration of South Korea's willingness and ability to play a part in international affairs was the decision taken in 1965 in response to a request from the Government of South Vietnam for combat troops. Since that time, South Korea has allowed 50,000 troops and 15,000 civilian technicians to go that area. South Korea played a major part in starting the Asian Pacific League (ASPAC), which was organized in Seoul in 1966 to initiate economic and trade cooperation among the nations in the Pacific area and in Asia.

Another of Park Chung-hee's successes was the initiation of the Manila Conference, which included seven Vietnam-assisting

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22 Samuel D. Burger, "Korea -- Progress and Prospects", U.S. Department of State Bullitin, LIV, 1405 (May 30, 1966), p. 864.

countries, in October, 1966. The performance of the first five-year economic plan demonstrated the credibility of the Korean economy and, in turn, convinced numerous countries to invest for the second and third plans.

In summing up, the tentative hypotheses proposed in the early portion of this paper will be taken as conclusions, admitting some limits of application:

1. In modernizing processes, the revolutionary leaders seem to be more influential than the managerials, and the managerial elites are more effective than the others in developing stages;

2. The modernizing elites in North Korea seem to be more revolutionary, whereas those in the South have more evolutionary trends; and

3. There are apparent indications that both the revolutionary and evolutionary leaders are to be replaced by the managerial developmentalists as the degree of change proceeds, because the development of managerial skills is both a necessary and sufficient condition for development.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This study has shown the significant differences between the modernizing elites of North and South Korea, in terms of their strategies of economic development. The revolutionary elites in the North are characterized by organizing power as well as their dramatic and radical approaches toward the changes, while those of the South display greater emphasis on managerial characteristics in their thrust toward modernization.

The study also has revealed the differences in terms of their socio-economic backgrounds, training and experiences. The research is apt to present normative judgement that these two elite groups seem to be incompatible in the modernizing processes. Nevertheless, the main purpose of this survey was to prove the possibilities of the compatibility of these two types of elites. The study also has suggested many similarities between the revolutionaries and the managerials, in terms of motives, perceptions, and tactics for modernization. Both groups of leaders realized modernization was a means of exit from the long nightmare of stagnation. They also perceived modernization as decisive means for self-sufficiency and for stability, merely differing in their emphases. Furthermore, the leaders of both the North and the South laid similar blueprints for long-range economic plans for better achievement of modernization.

Since the different political setting of the North and the South and the different strategies of the leaders in development are the major elements which differentiate the patterns of development, it is not completely realistic to expect the harmonization of these dimensions in the near future.

However, as development proceeds, the managerial skills will be increased in degree and intensity. Korea, including both the North and the South, is no exception to this principle. The percentages of educated young men will be gradually increased in North Korea, ironically with the revolutionary programs for education. The shrinking world may shorten the distances and dimensions of all different ideologies, which in turn will bring forth influences from the other parts of the world. The workers may rise up for better individual livings, instead of "equal, but poor distribution of wealth". They may agitate for better working conditions and for wage hikes. The self-realization or self-criticism of the political leaders themselves on their failure in domestic and in foreign policy may be another assumption.

In the sema vein, leaders of South Korea amy also find the right way to development through the long series of trials and errors in the process of modernization. As the economy grows, political stability may well be achieved and maintained.

One generation has passed since the people of Korea woke up from the long sleep of underdevelopment. The new generation of Koreans, both North and South, will, sooner or later, take the development projects from the hands of their predecessors, the current Korean modernizing leaders. Furthermore, this new generation will set off unique and dynamic programs for development, which the present elites have failed to generate .

APPENDIX 1. Cabinet Members of the Republic of Korea (South Korea)

(See p. 84 for Key)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Year	Period Served	Education	Ages in Service	Occupational
An, Ho-sang	C	2	A	4-G	D	8
An, Kyong-mo	H	6	C	2-J	D	4
An, Dong-jun	E	6	A	5-J	D	1
Cha, Kyun-hee	F	7	C	2-J US	D	2
Chang, Kyung-kun	D	5	A	3-J	C	6
Chang, Kyung-sun	D	7	C	2-J	C	1
Chang, Myon	A	1	A, B	3-US	E	1, 8
Chang, Suk-yun	C	1	A	2-US	E	2
Chang, Ki-yung	A	6	A, C	2-K	D	4
Chang, Taik-sang	C	1	A	2-E	E	1
Chang, To-young	F	6	C	5-J	D	3
Chang, Tok-sung	F	7	C	5, 2-K	D	3
Chang, Yon-sun	E	7	C	6-K	C	6
Chin Hun-sik	B	4	A	2-K, J	D	2
Cho, Chae-chon	D	5	B	3-J	D	6
Cho, Chin-man	B	2	A	2-K	E	6
Cho, Chung-hwan	A	1	A	3-US	F	8
Cho, Chu-yong	E	2	A	2-J	F	2
Cho, Han-back	D	4	B	2-K	F	1
Cho, Bong-am	C	1	A	2-R	F	1
Cho, Byong-il	A	4	C	2-J	F	6, 8
Cho, Byong-ok	A	1	A	4-K, US	F	1

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Year	Period Served	Education	Ages in Service	Occupation
Cho, Si-hyung	C	8	C	5-K	B	3
Cho, Sung-kun	C	7	C	5-K	D	3,4
Cho, Yong-sun	A	1	A	2-K	G	6
Choe, Chae-yu	A	4	A	5-K, J	E	5
Choe, Duk-sin	F	5	A	5-C	C	3
Choe, In-kyu	B	5	A	2-J, K	D	2, 5
Choe, Kyu-ha	I	6	A,C	2-J	C	2, 10
Choe, Kyu-nam	A	1	A	5-K, US	G	8
Choe, Kyu-ok	C	4	A	2-K	D	2
Choe, Sun-ju	B	2	A	2-K	D	2
Choe, Du-sun	A	1	C	4-J,K	I	8
Choe, Yong-cuk	A	1	B	5-C	G	3
Choe, Young-hi	A	7	C	5-K, US	E	3, 4
Chang, Duk-jin	I	9	C	3-K	B	2
Chon, Pyong-ky	C	6	C	2-J	D	11
Chon, Taek-po	G	2	B	2-J	G	4
Chon, Yae-yong	A	4	C	2-J	F	11
Choo, Won	E	7	C	5-K	E	3
Choo, Yo-han	F	1	C	2-K,C	H	4,9
Chung, Chae-sul	C	5	A	2-K	D	4
Chung, Jun-no	D	2	A	3-J	F	5
Chung, Hun-ju	C	5	B	2-J	D	4
Chung, Hui-sup	F	6	C	3-J	E	5
Chung, Il-hyung	F	2	B	4-US	G	1

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Year	Period Served	Education	Ages in Service	Occupation
Chung, Il-kwon	G	6	C	5-J,US	E	1,3
Chung, Nae-hyok	D	7	C	5-J	C	3
Chung, Nak-hoon	D	4	A	2-J	E	2
Chung, Nak-un	A	6	C	2-J	D	12
Han, Sin	G	7	C	5-J,K	C	3
Han, Tong-suk	G	4	B	2-K	F	1,6
Ham, In-sup	E	4	A	2-J	E	4
Ham, Tae-young	U	U	A	U	U	1
Hong, Chin-ki	A	6	A	2-K	D	6
Hong, Chong-chul	F	7	C	5,2-J	D	3
Hong, Hun-pyo	A	6	[illegible]	2-J	E	2
Hong, Ik-pyo	B	4	[illegible]	2-K	F	2
Hong, Sung-hui	C	6	C	2-K	D	11
Huh, Chung	C	1	A,B	2-K,J,C	F	1
Hwang, Chol-yul	A	4	C	2-J	F	2
Hwang, [illegible]o-yon	D	4	A	2-K	D	2
Hyon, Suk-ho	C	4	B	2-K,J	E	1
Im, Byong-jik	A	1	A	4-K,US	G	10
Im, Chul-ho	E	2	A	2-J	E	5
Im, Chung-sik	D	7	C	5-K,US	E	3
Im, Moon-hang	E	2	A	2-J	F	U
Im, Young-sin	E	1	A	4-US	E	8
In, Tai-sik	E	4	A	2-J	D	2
Kal, Hong-ki	U	U	A	U	U	2
Kang, In-taik	A	4	A	2-J	D	2
Kang, Su-ryong	A	6	C	5-K	E	3

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Year	Period Served	Education	Ages in Service	Occupation
Kang, Sung-tae	B	2	A	2-K	C	4
Kil, Chae-ho	F	7	C	5-K	C	3
Kim, Chae-chun	A	7	C	5-K	D	3
Kim, Chang-hun	E	7	C	2-K	D	8
Kim, Chung-nyum	A	7	C	3-K,US	C	2
Kim, Chong-pil	E	7	C	2,5-K	D	3
Kim, Chung-nyol	A	6	A	5-J	C	3
Kim, Chun-yun	D	1	A	3-G	F	1,9
Kim, Hak-nyul	C	7	C	4-K,US	D	2,4
Kim, Hong-il	F	1	C	5-C	H	1,3
Kim, Hong-sik	C	6	C	2-K	E	2
Kim, Hoon	A	1	A	3-US	E	2
Kim, Hyo-suk	U	U	U	U	U	U
Kim, Hyon-chul	A	2	A,C	4-US,K	F	1,2
Kim, Hyong-kun	A	5	A	2-J	C	2
Kim, Hyung-wook	U	U	C	5-K	D	3
Kim, Il-hwan	I	6	A	2-C	C	3
Kim, Kwan-ok	C	7	C	5-K	E	3
Kim, Pan-sul	C	5	B	3-K,J	E	5
Kim, Po-hyun	D	7	C	2-K	D	2
Kim, Pom-lin	C	1	A	4-K,F	F	8
Kim, Byong-sam	D	7	C	5-K	D	3
Kim, Sang-hyop	D	6	C	3-J,K	D	8
Kim, Sae-ryon	E	6	C	2-K	E	11

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Place	Period Served	Educa-tion	Ages in Service	Occupa-tion
Kim, Suk-kwan	B	2	A	2-J	E	2
Kim, Sung-jin	A	5	B	3-K	D	5
Kim, Sun-tae	D	4	A	2-J	D	6
Kim, Sung-un	C	7	C	5-K	C	3
Kim, Tai-dong	E	6	C	3-J,K	D	5
Kim, Tai-sun	G	2	C	3-K,US	E	2
Kim, To-yon	A	1	B	4-US,K	I	1
Kim, Won-tai	E	4	C	U	D	2
Kim, Yong-chan	B	5	A	2-K	D	11
Kim, Young-jin	D	5	C	3-K,US	E	8
Kim, Yong-sik	C	5	A	3-J,US	D	6,10
Kim, Young-son	E	6	B,C	2-K	D	2
Kim, Yong-woo	A	5	A	2-K,US	D	2
Kim, Yoo-taik	H	5	A,C	3-K,J	C	11
Kim, Yoon-ki	D	2	A,C	4-K,J	E	8
Kim, Ki-hyoung	A	7	C	4-K,US	D	8
Ko, Kwang-man	D	2	C	3-J,US	G	8
Ko, Won-jung	E	7	C	5-K	C	3
Kong, Jin-hang	B	1	A	2-J	E	4
Koo, Yong-suh	A	1	A	2-J	G	11
Kwark, Ui-yong	C	5	A	2-J	D	6
Kwon, Chung-don	C	5	B	2-J	E	1
Kwon, O-byung	C	5	C	3-K,J	E	2,6,8
Kwon,Sung-nyol	A	1	A	2-J	E	6
Min, Pok-ki	A	5	A	3-K,J	C	6

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Year	Period Served	Education	Ages in Service	Occupation
Min, Hui-sik	A	1	A	4-K,J	C	8
Min, Pyong-ki	A	8	A	4-K,US	C	8
Moon, Hong-ju	C	6	C	4-K,US	E	8
Moon, Hui-sul	E	7	C	5-K	C	3,8
Moon, Pong-jae	E	5	A	2-J	E	2
Na, Yong-kyun	D	1	B	2-B	G	1
Nam, Duk-woo	B	7	C	4-K,US	D	8
Oh, Chi-sung	H	8	C	2,5-K	E	3
Oh, Chon-suk	A	5	B	4-K,US	E	8
Oh, Chong-soo	F	1	B	3-K,US	H	4
Oh, Wi-yong	E	4	B	2-J	D	11
Oh, Won-sun	E	7	C	4-K,US	D	5
Pae, Duk-jin	B	7	C	5-K	D	3
Pae, Young-ho	C	6	C	3-J	F	5
Paik, Han-sung	A	6	A	2-J	E	2
Paik, Nak-jun	F	1	A	4-US	F	8
Paik, Sun-jin	A	7	C	5-K	E	3
Paik, Sun-yop	F	6	C	5-J	E	3,10
Paik, Sung-wook	A	1	A	4-K,US	F	8
Paik, Tu-jin	H	4	A,C	3-K,J	D	1,11
Park, Chan hyun	C	6	B	3-K,US	D	4,9
Park, Chai-hwan	A	4	B	3-K,US	D	2,8
Park, Chu-byong	C	7	C	3-K	D	5
Park, Chun-sik	C	6	C	5-K	D	3
Park, Chung-hoon	J	6	C	2-J	D	2

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Year	Period Served	Education	Ages in Service	Occupation
Park, Hai-jung	C	6	B	2-K	D	2
Park, Hui-hyun	C	4	A	2-J	E	11
Park, Hyun-suk	A	1	A	3-K,US	F	11
Park, Il-kyung	C	8	C	4-K,US	B	8
Park, Im-hang	F	7	C	5-R,K	E	3
Park, Ki-suk	F	7	C	2-K	D	2
Park, Kyoung-won	D	7	C	2,5-K	C	3
Park, Pyong-kwon	D	7	C	5-K	C	3
Park, Tong-gyu	C	6	C	2-K	E	11
Park, Tong-myo	G	7	C	3-K	D	8
Park, Won-bin	G	7	C	2,5-K	D	3
Pyon, Young-tai	A	1	A	4-K,C,J	C	1,8,10
Shim, Hung-sun	U	U	A	U	U	U
Shin, Chung-mok	A	2	A	2-J	E	8
Shin, Hyon-don	C	5	B	2-K	D	2
Shin, Pom-sik	E	7	C	3-K	E	2,9
Shin, Sang-chul	E	7	C	5-K	E	3,10
Shin, Sung-mo	C	1	A	2-E	E	1,10
Shin, Tai-hwan	B	5	C	4-K,J	G	6,8
Shin, Tai-young	B	4	A	5-K	D	3
Son, Chang-hwan	A	2	A	4-K,J	E	5,8
Son, Won-il	F	4	A	3-C	D	3
Song, In-sang	A	5	A	2-K	B	2,10,11
Song, In-sup	A	2	A	3-K	D	2
Song, Yo-chan	E	6	C	5-J,US	D	3

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Year	Period Served	Education	Ages in Service	Occupation
Sok, Sang-ok	B	5	B	2-J	F	4
Suh, Il-kyo	C	7	C	3-K	D	2,8
Suh, Pong-kyun	C	8	C	3-US	E	11
Suh, Sang-kwan	C	1	A	2-J,K	F	5
Tai, Wan-sun	C	5	C	3-K	G	5
Um, Min-young	C	6	C	3-K,J	D	2
Won, Yong-suk	E	4	C	2-K	G	4
Yang, Chan-woo	C	8	C	2,5-K	C	3
Yang, Sung-bong	C	4	A	2-K,J	D	2
Yi, Chong-chan	D	6	B	5-K	E	3
Yi, Chae-hyong	A	4	A	2-	D	2
Yi, Chong-chon	A	1	A	5-J,C	H	3
Yi, Chong-hwan	C	6	C	2,5-K	D	3
Yi, Chong-hyun	A	2	A	2-J	E	2
Yi, Chong-lim	B	5	A	U	D	4
Yi, Chong-woo	I	2	C	4-K	G	8
Yi, Chung-jai	D	7	B	2-K	B	1
Yi, Hai-ik	A	6	B	3-K	D	8
Yi, Han-lim	G	7	C	5-J	E	3
Yi, Ho	C	5	B,C	3-J,K	D	6
Yi, Hu-rak	C	7	C	5-K	E	3
Yi, Ik-hung	F	2	A	2-J	E	2,6
Yi, In	D	1	A	2-J	G	6
Yi, Ki-boong	A	1	A	2-US	F	1
Yi, Kun-jik	C	2	A	2-J	D	2

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Year	Period Served	Education	Ages in Service	Occupation
Yi, Kwang	D	4	A	2-J	F	2
Yi, Kye-sun	C	5	C	1-J	G	2
Yi, Nak-sun	C	8	C	2-K	D	2
Yi, Pom-suk	B	1	A	5-J,C	E	3
Yi, Pyung-do	B	1	B	4-K,J	F	8
Yi, Pyong-ha	C	2	B	2-K	E	6
Yi, Pyong-ho	H	6	C	2-K	D	4
Yi, Pyong-ok	D	8	C	5-K	C	3
Yi, Sang-chol	A	5	B	U	D	9
Yi, Suk-jai	C	8	C	5-K	C	3
Yi, Sun-kun	A	2	A	4-K,J	F	8
Yi, Sun-yong	C	5	A	2-J	E	2
Yi, Tai-young	F	5	B	4-K,J	C	8
Yi, Woo-ik	C	2	A	2-J	E	6
Yi, Ung-joon	F	1	A	5-J	H	3
Yi, Yun-yong	B	5	A	2-K	C	2
Yoo, Chang-sun	F	6	C	3-US	D	4
Yoo, Pyong-hyon	E	7	C	5-K	C	3
Yoon, Tchi-young	A	1	A	3-US	E	1
Yoon, Chon-ju	C	7	C	4-K,US	D	8,9
Yoon, Ho-byong	D	4	B	2-J	F	8
Yoon, Kon-jung	B	4	A	2-K	D	2
Yoon, Po-sun	E	1	A,B	3-K,E	F	1 (President)
Yoon, Suk-gu	B	1	A	3-US	E	U

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Birth Year	Period Served	Education	Ages in Service	Occupation
Yoon, Sung-soon	A	1	A	4-K,US	F	8
Yoon, Tack-jung	U	U	C	U	U	U
Yoon, Wi-young	B	8	C	2-K	C	9,10
Yoon, Young-son	C	2	A	2-K,J	E	2

Source: Hap-dong News Annual, op. cit., 1965-1967; Asia Who's Who, op. cit., 1960-1961; and accumulated data from Han-kuk Il-bo, Chosen Il-bo, and Dong-a Il-bo, 1948-1971.

Key

Birth Place

A. Seoul
B. Kyung-gi Province
C. Kyong-sang Province
D. Chon-la Province
E. Choong-chong Province
F. Pyong-an Province
G. Ham-kyong Province
H. Hwang-hai Province
I. Kang-won Province
J. Che-ju Province
U. Unknown

Birth Year

1. 1890-1900
2. 1901-1905
4. 1906-1910
5. 1911-1915
6. 1916-1920
7. 1921-1925
8. 1926-1930
9. 1931-1935
10. 1936-1940
U. Unknown

Period Served

A. Syngman Rhee Regime
B. John M. Chang Regime
C. Chung-hee Park Regime
U. Unknown

Key (continued)

Education

1. High School Graduate
2. Univ. (B. A.)
3. Univ. (M. A.)
4. Univ. (Ph. D.)
5. Military School
6. Miscellaneous

Educated Country

C. China
E. England
F. France
G. Germany
J. Japan
K. Korea
US. United States
M. Miscellaneous
U. Unknown

Occupation

1. Politician
2. Civil Servant
3. Military Officer
4. Businessman
5. Medical Doctor
6. Lawyer
7. Farmer
8. Professor
9. Journalist
10. Diplomat
11. Banker
12. Engineer
U. Unknown

Ages in Service

A. 26-30
B. 31-35
C. 36-40
D. 41-45
E. 46-50
F. 51-55
G. 56-60
H. 61-65
I. 66-70
J. 71-above
U. Unknown

APPENDIX 2. Political Leaders of North Korea

(See p. 91 for Key)

Name	Birth Place	Education	Position Held	Faction	Remarks
An, Sung-hak		B	C		
Chang, Hai-woo			E		
Chang, Il-yong		B			
Chang, Si-woo		B	B,C,F		
Chin, Ban-soo		C-1	C,F,G		
Cho, Man-sik	4	C-2	B	N	
Chin, Moon-duk		B	C		
Cho, Dong-sup			C		
Choe, Chang-ik		C-4	A,B,C	Y	1
Choe, Chang-suk		B	C		
Choe, Chong-hak		D	D,G		
Choe, Hyon		A	A,B,C,D,G	K	
Choe, Il-si			F		
Choe, Il		C-1	F		
Choe, Kwang		D	D,G	K	
Choe, Won-taik	6	B	B,D		
Choe, Yong-jin		B	C,D		
Choe, Yong-kun	4	D	A,B,C,D	K	
Choe, Yong-soo		C-3	C		
Choo, Hwang-sup		A	C		
Choo, Young-ha		C-4	C,D,G	S	2 (1953)
Chung, Chun-taik		C-3	B,C,D,G	K	
Chung, Dong-chul		B	C	K	

APPENDIX 2 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Education	Position Held	Faction	Remarks
Chung, Il-yong		B	A,B,C,D		
Chung, Kook-rok		A	F,G	Y	
Chung, Sung-un			D		
Chung, Yoo-ho		C-3	C		
Ha, Ang-chon		B	C,G		
Han, Il-moo			D		
Han, Chun-jong			D		
Han, Sang-tu		B	C,G		
Han, Sul-ya		C-2	C,F		
Han, Tai-yong			C		
Hong, Ki-jo			D		
Hong, Myong-hi	7	C-2	C		
Huh, Bon			D		
Huh, Bong-hak			G	K	
Huh, Ga-ui		C-3	C	Y	2
Huh, Hun	3	C-2	F		1
Huh, Jung-suk	3	C-2	C,D,E		1
Hwang, Si-hwan			D,E		
Hyon, Chil-bong		A	D,G		
Hyon, Jun-hyuk		B	B	S	2
Hyon, Jun-min			D		
Hyon, Moo-kwang		B	C,D	K	
Kang, Chan-ku		C-3	C	K	
Kang, Jin-kun			D		

APPENDIX 2 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Education	Position held	Faction	Remarks
Kang, Ryang-un	4	C-2	D		
Kang, Young-chang			C,D		
Ko, Bong-ki			D		
Kim, Bong-ryul		D	C	K	
Kim, Byong-ik		B	C		
Kim, Byong-jai		B	F		
Kim, Byong-sik			C		
Kim, Chack		A	A,C	K	
Kim, Chang-bong		D	C,G	K	
Kim, Chang-duk			D		
Kim, Chang-jun			D		
Kim, Chang-man		D	D,G	K	
Kim, Chi-do			C		
Kim, Jik-hyun			D		
Kim, Chon-hai		A	D		
Kim, Chong-hang		C-4	C	S	
Kim, Dong-hyuk			D		
Kim, Duk-lan			D		
Kim, Duk-yung			D		
Kim, Ung-ki			C,D,F		
Kim, Hoi-il			C,D		
Kim, Hyon-kuk			C		
Kim, Ik-sun			C,D,E	N	
Kim, Il		C-4	A,B,C,D	K	

APPENDIX 2 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Education	Position Held	Faction	Remarks
Kim, Il-sung		B,D	A,B,C,D	K	
Kim, Kwang-hyup		D	A,B,C,D	K	
Kim, Kyong-suk			D		
Kim, Kyong-yon			D		
Kim, Man-kum		C-4	C,D		
Kim, Byong-ha		C-3	C		
Kim, Sam-yong			D		
Kim, Se-bong			C		
Kim, Sang-chul			D		
Kim, Sung-hwa		C-1	C,D	S	2 (1958)
Kim, Tae-hyon			C		
Kim, Dong-kyu		D		K	
Kim, Tu-bong	6	B	D,G	Y	1
Kim, Tu-sam			C,D		
Kim, Ung-sang			C		
Kim, Won-bong	6	D-1	C,D		1
Kim, Young-ju		D	B	K	
Kim, Yul			C,D	S	1
Kim, Yong-jin			D		
Kim, Yong-su			C		
Ko, Jun-taik			D,F		
Kwon, O-jik			F	K	
Kye, Ung-tai			C		
Lim, Hae		B	C,D,F		

APPENDIX 2 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Education	Position Held	Faction	Remarks
Lim, Kye-chuk			C		
Moo, Chung		D	G	Y	1
Moon, Man-uk		B	C,D		
Nam, Il		C-4	A,B,C,D,	S	
Noh, Byong-uh		B	C		
Oh, Chin-woo			C		
Oh, Dong-uk			C		
Oh, Paek-yong			C		
Oh, Sung-yul			C		
Paik, Nam-un	8	C-2	C,D		
Paik, Son-il			C		
Pang, Hak-se		B	C,D	S	
Pang, Ho-san			C,D	Y	2 (1958)
Park, Chang-ok		C-4	A,B,D		1 (1958)
Park, Chong-ai	3	C-4	C,D	D	
Park, Ui-wan			C,D	S	
Park, Hun-il			D		
Park, Hun-young	7	C-3	A,B,D	D	2 (1953)
Park, Hyo-sam		D-1	D,G	Y	1
Park, Il-woo			C,D	Y	1
Park, Il-yong		D-1	D		
Park, Kum-chul		C-4	D	K	
Park, Kwang-sun			C		
Park, Moo			D		
Park, Moon-kyu			C,D		

APPENDIX 2 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Education	Position Held	Faction	Remarks
Park, Pung-sik			C		
Park, Se-chang			C		
Park, Sung-chul		B	A,C,D	K	
Park, Ui-won		D-4	D	S	1
Park, Ung-gul		C-3	C,D		
Park, Yong-bin			C		
Park, Yong-kuk			C,D		
Park, Yong-sung			C		
Park, Yung-sun			C		
Suk, San			A,C	S	1
Song, Bong-wook			D		
Song, Bok-ki			C		
Suh, Hee			D,F		1 (1958)
Yang, Hyung-sup		C-4	C,D		
Yi, Byung-nam			C,D		
Yi, Chang-soo		C-1	C,D		
Yi, Chong-ok			A,C,D	D	
Yi, Chu-yon	3	C-4	A,B,C,D,F	D	
Yi, Dong-kun			C,F		
Yi, Ho-hyok			C,D		
Yi, Hyo-sun		C-4	D	K	
Yi, Il-kyung		C-4	C,D		
Yi, Im			D		
Yi, In-dong			D		

APPENDIX 2 (Continued)

Name	Birth Place	Education	Position Held	Faction	Remarks
Yi, Kang-kuk			D	D	
Yi, Kuk-ro	6	C-1	C,D		
Yi, Ky-ryong	7	C-2	A,C,D		
Yi, Min-soo			C		
Yi, Sang-cho		D-1	G,D		
Yi, Song-woon			D		
Yi, Sang-hyup			D		
Yi, Nak-bin			C		
Yi, Sung-yup			D	D	2
Yi, Yang-suk			C,D		
Yi, Yong		D-1		Y	2
Yi, Young-ho			C,D,F		
Yom, Tai-jun			C		
Yoo, Chuk-won			D		
Yoo, Kyong-soo			D		
Yoon, Ki-bok		C-4	C,D		
Yoon, Kong-hum			C,D	Y	2 (1958)
Yoon, Kyu-chol			D		

Source: Asia Who's Who, op. cit.; Asian Recorder; No-dong Shin-moon; Deadline Data on the World Affairs.

Key

Birth Place

1. Kyong-gi Province
2. Kang-won Province
3. Ham-kyong Province
4. Pyong-an Province
5. Hwang-hai Province
6. Kyong-sang Province
7. Chung-chong Province
8. Chon-la Province
9. Seoul

Education

A. Under High School
B. High School
C. University
D. Military School

Educated Country

1. China
2. Japan
3. Korea
4. Russia

Positions

A. Secretariat of KWP
B. Member of Politbureau
C. Cabinet Member
D. Key Member of Supreme People's Assembly
E. Judicial Member
F. Diplomat
G. Military Commanders

Factions

D. Domestic Communist
K. Kim Il-sung's Pre-1945 entourage in Manchuria
S. Pre-1945 Korean Residents in the Soviet Union
Y. Yenan Koreans, headquartered in Yenan, China before 1945

Remarks

1. Purged to Compulsory Work
2. Purged to Death

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MODERNIZING LEADERS: A COMPARISON OF REVOLUTIONARY AND MANAGERIAL ELITES IN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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the requirements for the degree

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Modernizing is a process; it belongs to a category of becoming, not of being; to the realm of means, not of ends. Modernization is partly a political process, partly a social process, and partly an economic process. Modernization can be conceptualized as "an especially rapid increase in progress," and may be defined as "the totality of the influence of the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge of control over his environment." Moreover, modernization is a "will have" process from the "have not" condition, the "will know" process from a "know not", and the "will work" process from the situation of "long rest". If these are the concepts of modernization, then the leading modernizers must be referred to as conductors of the orchestra, performing the harmonious concerts for the audience.

This study is designed as an observation of the roles of Korean leaders in the modernizing processes. Several hypotheses are presented and examined throughout the paper by reviewing: 1) socio-economic background of the decision-makers; 2) factors influencing modernization and roles of the leaders; and 3) possible alternatives for the future processes in development.

More than 390 key political leaders have been sampled from Rhee Syngman, Chang Myon, Park Chung-hee government, and from North Korea's Kim Il-sung regime, for the purpose of comparing

the trends of their motivations, attitudes, and policy outcomes toward the nation's modernization.

The influence factors consisted of internal and external elements. The internal variables such as the socio-economic backgrounds, education, training, and experiences have formed the personalities and characteristics of the leaders. On the other hand, the external variables such ideology, threats, alliances, and was have shaped the norms of the leaders in terms of their attitudes, behavior, and policy outcomes.

The factors are analized and examined in this study to observe the interrelations, and to picture out their outcomes. The findings of the study suggested the the proposed hypotheses are considerably well tested, and that the research design is highly applicable to the case of Korea's modernization. The proven hypotheses presented conclusions which are:

1. In the stages of modernization, the revolutionary leaders are more influential, whereas the managerial elites are more efficient in the stages of development.

2. The modernizing elites in North Korea are more revolutionary in trends, while those in the South are more evolutionary and managerial; and

3. There are significant indications, however, that the revolutionary leaders are to be gradually replaced by the managerial group, accordant with the increasing degrees of development.