

THE SENATE AND THE PACIFIC, 1877-1889

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
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I. Introduction

In the realm of foreign policy the Constitution grants the Senate a variety of powers. The upper body may advise and consent to the appointment of ambassadors, ministers, and consuls and may approve treaties. In conjunction with the House of Representatives the Senate may declare war on another nation. However, the breadth of the Senate's power and influence on foreign affairs is greater than these three Constitutional authorizations, which are directly related to foreign policy. For example, Senate amendments to financial legislation, such as tariffs or consular appropriation bills, may also affect the conduct of foreign affairs. At times the Senate has even been known to upstage the President and initiate movements for treaties by requesting the executive to negotiate such pacts with nations.¹

The foreign policy decisions made by this body from 1889 to 1900 helped to make America a major power to be reckoned with in the Pacific. The activities of the United States ranged from acquiring islands to establishing a sphere of influence in China with the Open Door notes in 1899.

¹George Haynes, The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1938), II, 577. Haynes cites as one instance the March 3, 1888 Senate resolution requesting the President to negotiate such a treaty with China to prevent the importation of Chinese labor into the United States.

During these years of vigorous and visible activity the Senate voted to carve up the Samoan Islands, annex Hawaii, and enter the Spanish-American War. The nation's bounty for entering the war resulted in the acquisition of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Wake Island. The prize of Guantanamo naval base and American control of Cuban internal affairs under the Platt Amendment were the rewards in the Caribbean. These tangible yields were the result of an active policy and a solidification of attitudes about American foreign policy in which the Senate's decisions played a vital part.

Yet the period just prior to the active nineties has been assessed by many highly respected historians as a low and rather inactive point in American diplomacy.² In particular, Thomas A. Bailey³ has applied this theme of inactivity to the years from 1877 to 1889. He has stated that "foreign affairs were of secondary importance," and even entitled a chapter of his textbook, "Diplomacy, a Football of Politics, 1877-1889." His generalization is antithetical to Walter LaFeber's contention that the years 1860-1890 were "years of preparation" for a "New empire."⁴ Foster Rhea Dulles, who offers a more balanced account of the 1860-1890 years, describes America's post Civil War interests in Eastern Asia as composed of "a number of hesitant, probing moves toward acquiring commercial outposts or naval

²For example, see Julius Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 12 or Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1936), p. 432.

³Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 8th ed. (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1961), p. 405.

⁴Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 60-61.

bases that might safeguard the road to Asia."⁵ Last, Milton Plesur, who largely agrees with LaFeber, offers the latest interpretation. He writes that "despite its supposed diplomatic tranquility, the post-Reconstruction period was a seedbed of future interests. This was a time of flux, a period of transition, during which the signs of a more vigorous foreign policy began to appear on the American horizon. Interest in the World beyond our shores was quiescent rather than dead; in truth, America was never isolated from the world."⁶ Thus a study of the period 1877-1889, the years between Reconstruction and overbearing participation in foreign affairs, especially in the Pacific, should yield some insight into the question of whether the Senate's activities in the nineties were mutations or simply culminations of an evolving Pacific "policy."

Even before the Civil War, the Senate was concerned with the Pacific and wished to remain politically non-entangled from Europe. This preoccupation with the Far East survived the interruption of the Civil War and afterwards became a realistic speculation as the American foreign carrying trade was squeezed out of the Atlantic. European penetration of the Pacific was still in its infancy and American hegemony in the Pacific was a realistic possibility. Was the Senate 1877-1889 oblivious to the Pacific, or was it laying the groundwork for the nineties, that is, was there a general "policy" or attitude towards the

⁵ Foster Rhea Dulles, Prelude to World Power: American Diplomatic History, 1860-1900 (New York: Collier Books and London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1971), p. 96. Hereafter cited as Dulles, Prelude to World Power.

⁶ Milton Plesur, America's Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), pp. 228-229.

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Pacific? This is the key question to be raised. If there was a general "policy," three other salient questions arise. First, was party loyalty⁷ a strong influence or did it break down on certain issues? Sectionalism has always played an important role in American decision-making, thus the influence of sectional, and its corollary, local interests, as geographical considerations on the general "policy" or attitude is a second problem to consider. Last, it has been asserted that America has always searched for new markets. A question to muse over is whether this search can be detected in the Senate, 1877-1889.

These interrelated questions can be answered by examining five issues that were of concern in the Senate⁸ throughout the

⁷ The Senate during these years was Republican dominated, except for the forty-sixth congress, 1879-1881, which was dominated by the Democrats. In addition, third parties were also represented. Antimonopolists from California represented a third party movement of protest against the railroads, particularly against Collis Huntington in California. In 1884 their platform called for government of commerce among the states, reform of existing conditions, and the general "overthrow of monopoly in every shape when and wherever found." Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, eds., National Party Platforms, 1840-1956 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), pp. 64-65. Readjusters founded in Virginia in 1878 by William Mahone repudiated Bourbon rule. Readjusters frequently voted with the Republicans. Thomas V. Cooper and Hector T. Fenton, American Politics: From the Beginning to Date, Embodying a History of all the Political Parties, with their Views and Records on all Important Questions (Chicago: Charles R. Brodix, 1882), p. 263. Conservatives were former Confederate Democrats who vigorously opposed Radical Reconstruction. Virginia sent the only Conservatives and Readjusters to the Senate during this period.

⁸ The chief primary source of the Senate's "policy" or attitude of course is the Congressional Record. Though it does not contain a verbatim account of the debates (because some speeches are merely inserted and others are revised and edited), it is "a guide to the opinion of the members, but it cannot be relied upon as a report of words spoken in debate." Laurence F. Schmeckebier and Roy B. Eastin, Government Publications and Their Use, 2d rev. ed., (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1969), p. 140.

twelve year period. Stated briefly, the Senate was preoccupied with the continuous decline of American shipping and foreign carrying trade and the problem of extending American commerce, the division over Hawaii's significance and the unanimous belief that an American coaling station in Samoa was necessary, the question of maintaining a respectable democracy and increasing the China trade while simultaneously excluding Chinese laborers from the United States, the problem of how much of the Japanese Indemnity Fund should be returned and revision of the tariff treaty, and finally the question of Korea's worthiness as a marketplace. This thesis proposes to examine these five issues to determine if there was a general "policy" or attitude towards the Pacific⁹ and how party, section,¹⁰ and the search for markets influenced the Senate's action towards the Pacific.

II. The Shipping Syndrome

During the period under consideration the argument over how to stop the continuous decline of American shipping and foreign carrying trade, coupled with the desire to extend commerce and the disagreement over the merits of protectionism pervaded in many of the Senate's debates. In terms of quantity and quality of deliberation, the complicated issue superceded the upper house's discussion on expressly Pacific controversies.

⁹ The terms "Pacific", "Asiatic" or "eastern Asia" shall apply to the Far East, including China, Japan, Korea, Hawaii, Samoa, New Zealand, and Australia, excluding Russia and Canada.

¹⁰ The various sections are defined as follows: Northeast: N.H., N.Y., Vt., Pa., N.J., Conn., Mass., Me., and R.I.; North: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin; Middlewest: Minn., Id., Ks., Neb., and Ia.; Border States: Del., Tenn., Md., Mo., Ky., Ark., W. Va.; South: La., Tex., Ala., Miss., Ga., Fla., N.C., S.C., and Va.

This large and complex question indirectly affected America's and the Senate's attitude towards the Pacific. The problem of policy towards eastern Asia as it related to the shipping and commerce problem was hardly a dominating issue. Yet at the same time the Senate's concern for the Asiatic region was never totally inactive nor dormant. In essence the problem as it related to the Pacific was only one piece of the entire puzzle.

The dilemma of American shipping and foreign carrying trade was obvious; the remedies were not. There is no doubt that the Senate desired to stop the decline of American shipping and yearned to extend trade. The root of the problem rested on the disagreement over method. Thus the stalemate of opinion over the remedies to stop the decline of U.S. foreign carrying trade and to extend commerce and its relationship to the Senate's attitude toward the Pacific, 1877-1889, provides a general framework, perspective, and a reference point of the Senate's attitude on particular issues treated in the following chapters of this thesis.

American shipping and the foreign carrying trade had been declining since the 1850's and showed no sign of reviving. The symptoms of the decline had appeared before the Civil War and were more clearly manifested after the rebellion. America's wooden sailing ships could not compete with Britain's iron steam ships. The shipper or ship owner was inhibited by certain navigation laws which prohibited the entry of foreign built or foreign vessels into the American registry. Europe, especially Britain, liberally subsidized her steamship lines on the Atlantic. In short, while European control of the Atlantic rose, American

goods carried in U.S. vessels on the same ocean plummeted. South America and the Pacific were the only two regions where American shipping and commerce could compete successfully with European rivals.

Prior to 1877 the Senate experimented with subsidizing certain ocean mail steamship lines, apparently under the assumption that commerce followed mail, as one method of resolving the shipping and foreign carrying trade problem and as an instrument to extend American commerce. This test, which failed in the mid-seventies, left a permanent distaste for subsidies as a method of aiding the merchant marine among many Democrats in the Senate, 1877-1889.

In 1865 the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, which employed a line of steamships between San Francisco and several ports in the Orient, via Hawaii, sought federal aid from Congress. The enterprise was granted an annual subsidy of \$500,000 on the condition that the company would make twelve round trips a year in ships of not less than 3,000 tons register whose design was subject to the Secretary of the Navy's inspection. The charter was for a term of ten years. The service began in 1867, but almost immediately the company failed to meet its quota of twelve round voyages because its vessels were not completed on time. Without a roll call, the Senate promptly granted the firm, after virtually no debate, in a joint resolution in July of 1868, more money on the basis that the company would perform the 'lost' trips and carry mail every voyage without additional

expense to the federal government.¹¹

After rejecting extended service to New Zealand and New South Wales, and repudiating an increase of service on the China Line in 1871,¹² the Senate in the spring of 1872 decided to increase service between San Francisco, Japan, and China. The upper house, while considering H.R. 1070, voted to appropriate \$500,000 for iron steamships to carry mail in American built vessels of at least 4,000 tons, subject to inspection by the Secretary of the Navy. While Senator William Windom (R. Minn.) flatly stated that the remedy to solve ailing American commerce was government aid, Senator William M. Stewart (R. Nev.) eulogized the Asiatic trade. He declared, "The commerce of the Pacific is is naturally and legitimately between Asia and America. They lie on opposite sides of the same ocean."¹³

¹¹Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 4282-4283. According to John G. Hutchins, The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy, 1789-1914, An Economic History, Harvard Economic Studies, vol. 71 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), pp. 529-530, this company had great control of American trade. "It was also operating six wooden paddle ships in its old service to Panama. It thus possessed almost complete control over the American steamship traffic in the Pacific. One other firm, the North Pacific Transportation Company, maintained services out of San Francisco, one to Mazatlan, Mexico, with two wooden steamers, one to Oregon and Puget Sound ports with four steamers, and one to Honolulu with one vessel, the Idaho, 1077 tons. The Hawaiian service was established under the Act of 1867 to replace that formerly provided by the Pacific Mail Company, and involved a payment by the government of \$75,000 annually under a ten year contract. It was designed to attach the rising sugar economy of Hawaii, closer to that of the United States. Both services were designed to prevent the extension of British contract services into the western Pacific. These contractors were, in fact, symbols of the American intention to organize the commerce of the Pacific about San Francisco as a hub." Hereafter cited as Hutchins.

¹²Congressional Globe, 41st Congress, 3d Session, p. 1725.

¹³Congressional Globe, 42d Congress, 2d Session, p. 2991.

Senator John W. Johnston, a Conservative from Virginia, presented an argument against the proposal which was frequently heard later in the Senate between 1877 and 1889. Referring to the problem of constructing cheap vessels in the U.S., he simply stated, "If we cannot build ships as cheap as they build them in England because the tariff is high and because taxation makes living and materials high, then, of course the only resource left for us is to reduce the tariff, reduce taxation, and thus reduce the cost of building ships."¹⁴ Senator James K. Kelly (D. Ore.) believed that if the government was going to indulge in subsidies, then it should subsidize weak steamship lines and not strong ones, such as Pacific Mail. However, he added another reason why he opposed subsidizing this specific company: the monopolistic enterprise brought unwanted Chinese to the west coast.¹⁵ The opposition was unsuccessful. The bill passed without a roll call vote, thus increasing service on the China route through subsidy.

Notwithstanding the additional subsidy, the company continued to encounter severe trouble. According to the Committee on the Judiciary in February of 1875, the enterprise again failed to provide the required vessels and service on the agreed date, October 1, 1873. Later, on July 8, 1874, Pacific Mail presented the Tokio and the Peking for the Postmaster-General's inspection.¹⁶ Since the company had not begun service on the scheduled date,

¹⁴Ibid., p. 3024.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 3027.

¹⁶Senate Report 674, 43d Congress, 2d Session, p. 2.

the question rose whether the contract should be annulled or retained. The committee recommended termination basically because "the Postmaster-General had no lawful power or authority to accept the vessels under the circumstances, or to bind the United States in the premises."¹⁷

The Senate followed the judiciary committee's suggestion in the spring of 1875. However during the debate on H.R. 4529, the postal appropriations bill for the year ending June 30, 1876, the company did not go undefended. Aaron A. Sargent (R. Cal.) shielded Pacific Mail by dramatizing the pending collapse of American commerce on the Pacific if the contract were annulled. Using the same threat tactics he employed during the debates on Chinese immigration, he exclaimed "I think it will be a very great misfortune to the country for the commerce of the East as well as the West, if by a repeal of this contract the Pacific shall be left in the condition of tending toward a European mill-pond, as the Atlantic now is."¹⁸ However, more than failing to meet the service schedule was involved. John G. Hutchins insists "Internal graft, corrupt lobbying, the waste of funds, extensive propaganda for subsidies, and the use of Oriental crews all injured its [Pacific Mail's] prestige."¹⁹ According to Senator John S. Hager (Anti-monopolist, Cal.), who was instructed by the California legislature to vote against any subsidy to Pacific Mail, the business had recently come under

¹⁷Ibid., p. 3024.

¹⁸Congressional Record, 43d Congress, 2d Session, p. 1593.

¹⁹Hutchins, pp. 530-531.

the control of the Southern Pacific and Central Pacific Railroad companies of California, which owned all transportation facilities in that state anyway.²⁰ Thus under such circumstances of monopoly, Hager preferred the pending establishment of a British line. Without a hint of party loyalty nor sectional influence, the Senate voted to terminate the additional contract by a large margin of fifty-two to eleven.²¹

In spite of Pacific Mail, subsidies for Asian lines died a hard death in the Senate. In december of 1876, during the Hayes-Tilden controversy, the postal committee offered an amendment appropriating \$500,000 to continue the mail steamship service between San Francisco, Japan, and China for one year with Pacific Mail. The Senate at first passed the amendment to this postal appropriations bill, H.R. 4187, by a vote to twenty-seven to eighteen with most Republicans favoring the subsidy and the Democrats split on the question. Later when the House refused to accept the proposal, the Senate receded from the amendment which appropriated \$500,000 to the San Francisco-Japan-China line as well as \$500,000 to a New Orleans-Rio Janerio line by a vote of twenty-nine to twelve with most Democrats now favoring recession and Republicans generally split.²²

The discussion between James G. Blaine (R. Me.), a protectionist who also desired commercial expansion especially to Latin America, and James B. Beck (D. Ky.) during the debate in January of 1879 on the annual naval appropriations bill is

²⁰Congressional Record, 43d Congress, 2d Session, p. 1624.

²¹Ibid., p. 1627.

²²Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 3d Session, p. 2155.

representative of the various arguments and positions on the general shipping and extension of commerce controversy. Blaine, whose own state of Maine built ships, stated "My idea is that the Government of the United States should give to any man or company of men aid from the Treasury of the United States if he or they shall establish and maintain a line of steamships to any foreign ports, or I might limit it to European, South American, and Asiatic ports."²³ Blaine also believed in establishing a merchant marine first, apparently by large subsidies, and building up a navy second to protect American shipping. His remedy fit logically into the mind of a protectionist. He ignored the high cost of American built ships which were expensive partly because of American labor. Since American navigation laws allowed only U.S. constructed ships to enter the American registry and participate in the foreign carrying trade or else prohibitively taxed foreign built vessels, subsidies obviously benefitted certain shipowners and indirectly aided especially the iron ship builder who sold high priced vessels to the American shipper.

Beck, an ardent commercial expansionist who favored free ships and revenue taxation, preferred an entirely different remedy for the problem. Referring to the impact of the great railroads on American commerce, the Kentuckian chided Blaine's reluctance to reform navigation ordinances and scolded the 'plumed Knight's' protectionist philosophy. Beck declared,

The people of this country expected when those roads were built that they would have a right to reach by the Pacific Ocean and by those roads the eastern world,

²³Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 3d Session, p. 630.

and have the products of China, Japan, Australia and the east brought back to them cheaper than they could raise them at home, and in return send our products to them; but you have by your navigation laws and your high protective tariff absolutely excluded the people of this country from the benefit of all that great commerce almost as effectively as if the Pacific Ocean were a sea of fire instead of being, as it should be, a great free highway for all the nations of the earth.²⁴

Beck's reference to remodeling the navigation laws in essence meant that he wanted to buy foreign built or simply foreign vessels and enter them into the American registry, thus allowing such ships to haul U.S. foreign carrying trade. His allusion to protectionism meant he wanted to lower the importation duty on ship building materials. Thus the deadlock over method as represented in the Senate hindered America's search for markets in Asia.

The Pacific region again emerged in May of 1880 during the debate on the annual postal appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1881. The general problem of American shipping and the extension of commerce indirectly affected the proviso attached to the postal bill which authorized the Postmaster-General "to remit in favor of the colonies of New Zealand and New South Wales so much of the cost of the overland transportation of the Australian closed mails as he may deem just."²⁵ Senator John T. Morgan (D. Ala.) stated the general philosophy concerning the relationship between mail carriage and trade. The commercial expansionist declared, "Commerce and the mails go together as naturally as electricity and the copper

²⁴Ibid., p. 634.

²⁵Congressional Record, 46th Congress, 2d Session, p. 3429.

wire go together to transmit messages across the continent. Commerce without mails would be almost useless."²⁶ Senator Newton Booth (Anti-Monopolist, Cal.) provided the theory behind this specific proviso. Since New Zealand and New South Wales were paying an American steamship line \$450,000 annually to carry American mail to Hawaii, Samoa, Fiji, New Zealand and New South Wales, because American trade with New Zealand and New South Wales amounted to \$7,000,000 in exports, and since Great Britain paid the United States \$83,000 to transport British mail across the North American continent, Booth reasoned "it seems to me to be nothing but an act of grace and favor which we can well afford to perform to remit to them--not to Great Britain--such portion as may be just of what we charge for transporting their mail across the continent."²⁷ Booth's motives were basically commercial. He apparently agreed with Morgan that commerce followed mail. Without much meaningful debate, the Senate refused to strike out this House originated proviso by a very partisan, though also sectional vote. Most southern Democrats and all voting border state Democrats voted "yea" to reject the proviso, while most northern, northeastern, and middlewestern Republicans aligned with the tri-partisan west coast against rejection and for retention. Thus partisanship and to some extent sectional interests influenced the Senate's decision to retain the provision remitting \$10,000 to New Zealand and New South Wales in the pursuit of commerce in the Pacific through mail.

Just as party loyalty and sectional interests played a

²⁶ Ibid., p. 1549.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 3429.

major role in the Senate's determination of the very specific mail remission issue, partisanship and regional interests also influenced the Senate's decision concerning the general problem of the decline of American shipping and the extension of trade. These influences are well illustrated in the argument over the postal appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1882.

An amendment establishing ocean mail iron steamship lines to be "equitably distributed among the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific ports," and owned and manned by American citizens set off a debate on the general problem of American shipping and the extension of commerce. This amendment, offered by the majority of the Committee on Post Roads, did not require the vessels to be American built. If the amendment passed, shippers would be able to buy foreign built vessels and employ them, thus possibly preventing a monopoly such as the Pacific Mail Steamship Company came to have over American-Asiatic foreign trade.

The introduction of this amendment inspired Senator James L. Pugh (D. Ala.) to deliver a long lament about the decline of American foreign carrying commerce. He wailed that the United States had not only lost her carrying trade, but not one iron American ship sailed the oceans.²⁸ He offered several remedies for the problem: (1) importation of building materials in bond; and upon proof that such materials would be used for ship construction, no duties would be charged, (2) exemption from local and municipal taxation on property invested in shipping, (3) repeal of the tonnage duty, (4) reshaping of navigation laws so as to allow procurement of foreign built ships and their

²⁸Congressional Record, 46th Congress, 3d Session, p. 1411.

entry into the American registry, and (5) provision that the purchased iron ships would be under government contract to carry American mail.²⁹ The Alabamian then added that railroads were liberally subsidized, but "We have shown no such liberality to our shipowners, but after burdening them with taxation, and allowing no freedom in the race with rival foreign nations for the ocean carrying trade of our country we compel them to carry the mails for a mere trifle when compared with the millions paid to railroads for similar service."³⁰

Almost immediately opposition developed against the amendment. Eli Saulsbury (D. Del.), James E. Bailey (D. Tenn.), and James B. Groome (D. Md.), all members of the postal committee, disapproved of the amendment and Pugh's presentation. William W. Wallace (D. Pa.) raised two points of order against the amendment. Consequently a debate about rules ensued. The chair ruled first that the amendment was not out of order merely because it augmented the amount of appropriation and later decreed that the amendment was out of order because it proposed general legislation to an appropriation bill.

The vote on whether to sustain the chair's decision that the amendment was out of order split the Democrats and found voting Republicans against the chair's ruling by a 12:1 margin. Thirteen out sixteen Democrats against the chairman's edict were southerners while nine out of the twelve Republicans who voted that the amendment was in order were northeasterners, representing New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, and Connecticut.³¹

²⁹Ibid., p. 1412.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., p. 1467.

Hannibal Hamlin (R. Me.) altered the character of the amendment which was offered by the majority of the postal committee. He required public advertisement for the lowest bidder, compensation for these wholly American owned and American registered ships of not more than \$30.00 per nautical mile, and finally stipulated that at least half the appropriation should apply to ports of Fort Monroe.³² In effect, this amendment indirectly limited the authority of the Postmaster-General and made competition for bids more fair. Hamlin's amendment was decided out of order by a partisan vote in which border state and most Southern Democrats (sixteen out of twenty-three Democrats), opposed fifteen Republicans most of whom were from the northeast, north, and middlewest.³³

The real issue emerged when Senator John T. Morgan (D. Ala.), a commercial expansionist who voted against Hamlin's amendment along with Joseph E. Brown (D. Ga.), desired to give foreign built vessels the same privileges secured to American built ships, except the right to engage in coastwise trade.³⁴ This in effect greatly aided the American ship owner, while Hamlin's proposal ignored the question of the right of Americans who owned foreign built ships. Both amendments amounted to subsidizing ocean steamship lines, but Morgan's scheme proposed to subsidize foreign built iron steamships as well as indigenous constructed vessels.

Senator Francis Kernan (D. N.Y.) opposed Morgan's amendment,

³²Ibid., p. 1499.

³³Ibid., p. 1503.

³⁴Ibid., p. 1503.

resisted Hamlin's attempt to clarify the postal committee's plan, and objected to the whole idea of subsidies. He declared, "The Senator from Maine [Mr. Hamlin] and other Senators have intimated that the real purpose of this amendment is to inaugurate a system by which our ship-building industry will be prompted and our ocean carrying trade restored by subsidies paid from the Treasury to the owners of American-built steamships. . . . As a measure to restore our foreign carrying trade I do not think this proposed amendment is in the right direction at all. The idea of building up our ocean carrying trade by taxing our people to pay subsidies to a few steamship lines is fallacious, in my judgment."³⁵ Instead Kernan believed the navigation laws which protected the American ship builder and the American worker should be changed so as to allow duty free importation of construction materials of vessels.³⁶ Theoretically the result of this would be cheaper ships.

Fellow Democrats opposed Morgan's amendment to the postal committee's suggestion. Senator William P. Whyte (D. Md.) who originally voted against the committee's amendment, followed the same action on Morgan's proposal because both changed "existing laws."³⁷ Joseph E. McDonald (D. Ind.) believed both amendments amounted to class legislation, but "If subsidies are to be resorted to I would rather go at once to the freighter than to the shipowner. . . ."³⁸ Though he agreed in principle, Senator

³⁵ Ibid., p. 1504.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 1505-1506.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 1507.

³⁸ Ibid.

William W. Eaton (D. Conn.) voted against Morgan's proposal to give Americans the right to buy ships anywhere because he thought the amendment was out of order. Yet, he preferred to change navigation laws. James E. Bailey thought the navigation laws should be abolished, but added that "you must extend to all the American people (not to a few, not to the builder of an iron vessel upon the Delaware, excluding everybody else) the advantages that are to be derived from legislation, and you must have freedom of competition."³⁹

Morgan's amendment was ruled out of order by a partisan vote with evidence of some sectional influence. The Democrats split on this vote with almost all voting southerners against ruling out of order the Alabamian's plan. Those Democrats who opposed the Morgan proposal came from all regions of the country, though six out of the sixteen came from the border states. Only two Republicans, George F. Edmunds (R. Vt.) and Samuel Kirkwood (R. Ia.) voted with the southern Democrats, while Republicans from the north, northeast, middlewest, plus Colorado, cast fourteen votes against the commercial expansionist's alteration.⁴⁰ Morgan then claimed that since existing laws allowed the Postmaster-General to contract with American and foreign built ships, American and foreign officered ships, and American and foreign owned ships, he desired to change the postal committee's proviso in an amendment that the vessels be only officered and manned by Americans. Thus such ships could be owned by foreigners. By allowing the Postmaster-General to contract with foreign owned

³⁹ Ibid., p. 1509.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 1546.

ships in the amendment, repetition of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company's performance on the Pacific could possibly be avoided. Again Morgan lost. The Senate decided his amendment was out of order by a majority of Republicans who largely came from the north, northeast, middlewest, and Colorado and a coalition of multisectional Democrats especially representing the border states and parts of the south. Those who believed the "officered and manned" amendment was in order were mostly southern Democrats, aided by two Republicans, Hannibal Hamlin from Maine and George F. Edmunds from Vermont; two Democrats, George G. Vest from Missouri and John S. Williams from Kentucky; and Newton Booth the Anti-monopolist from California.⁴¹

The question now recurred on the postal committee's original amendment which appropriated \$1,000,000 for "the establishment of steamship lines by the Postmaster-General to be equitably distributed between the Atlantic, Mexican-Gulf, and Pacific ports." Senator Thomas F. Bayard (D. Del.) whose state possessed a ship building interest at Wilmington, opposed the idea of subsidy as advanced by the amendment. He claimed, "The political party with which I have acted ever since I had a right to take part in the politics of the country have been [sic] for that doctrine of 'hands off' by the Government in matters of individual enterprise and industry."⁴² In Bayard's case either principle or party loyalty superceded sectional, or in this instance, local interests. William P. Whyte began a long tirade on the

⁴¹Ibid., p. 1547. A similar vote declared out of order an amendment to the committee proposal which required the establishment of the proposed ocean mail steamship lines to be based on the value of exports from particular ports.

⁴²Ibid., p. 1548.

decline of American commerce which culminated in a protest against subsidies in general to steamship lines. In remonstrance to the postal committee's amendment, Whyte exclaimed, "Do not let us forget the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. Gentlemen will not forget how we subsidized that line. While we may not forget it, can we not draw a veil over the eyes of the American people and save them from the specter of that scandal which smirched Congress and excluded one of the members from the House of Representatives?"⁴³ The memory of the experiment in the Pacific of earlier days still lingered on. In Whyte's mind, mail and commerce would have to find other ways to reach Asia.

The additional appropriation amendments from the majority of the postal committee lost when twenty-five Democrats, mostly from the south and the border states and a sprinkling of Republicans from Wisconsin, Vermont, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota and Illinois voted to table the amendment. The voting Republicans split on the issue. The Democrats were decidedly against the establishment of ocean mail steamship lines along the Atlantic, Mexican-Gulf, and Pacific ports, since they thought it amounted to subsidy.⁴⁴ This Democratically controlled Senate refused to establish additional postal service by subsidy. Party loyalty and to some extent sectional interests influenced the Senate's decision against additional appropriation for mail steamship lines, and John T. Morgan was more maverick than Democrat.

The rejection of the postal committee's amendment and repudiation of Morgan's proposal signified that the Senate's

⁴³ Ibid., p. 1552.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 1560.

stalemate over the general problem of shipping and the extension of commerce also affected Senate action towards the Pacific as a region. The markets of the Pacific would not be reached by additional subsidies to mail steamship lines at this third session of the forty-sixth congress. The deadlock over method on this particular bill could not be broken as senators variously clung to party loyalty and corresponding sectional interests.

The general shipping and extension of commerce problem continued to harrass the Senate at the expense of treating the Pacific as a particular region. At times sectional interests emerged prominently during the debates. This occurred in an attempt to excise compulsory mail carriage and allow the Postmaster-General to contract with the lowest bidder at a sum not over \$1.00 per nautical mile in a bill to remove certain burdens from the American merchant marine, H.R. 7061, in January of 1883. Senator Preston Plumb (R. Ks.) who claimed to be taking the whole country into consideration, pointedly spoke of sectional interests in regard to the general shipping and commerce problem. Plumb said,

I want that which ministers to the commerce and prosperity of the entire country. I want something which gives us an outlet at the mouth of the Mississippi for the flour, the wheat, the pork and the beef of Kansas and Missouri, and of all the Mississippi Valley. We have had here, presumably under the auspices and by the direction of those who live on the eastern shores of this country, who have been potential in its legislation, obstructive legislation in regard to the shipping interests of the country. They have controlled it; they have made it; they have imposed upon this country a hide-bound policy . . . and have prevented the development of the internal portion of the country in order to minister to their own profit.⁴⁵

He continued that the bill, H.R. 7061, regardless of the amendment

⁴⁵Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2d Session, p. 3692.

invalidating compulsory mail carriage, ". . . is a matter of no possible consequence, as I understand it, to anybody except to the people who maneuver the few wooden ships represented by the ship building interest of the State of Maine and some few localities of that kind."⁴⁶

Consideration of the Pacific as a region and its relationship to the general problem of American shipping and extension of commerce became further entangled in the merchant marine controversy in 1884. The Senate continued to concern itself more with the general problem than as the question related to the Pacific. During the debate on S. 1448, a bill to encourage American shipping and remove burdens from the shipping industry, Senator James B. Beck succinctly outlined the fundamentals of the problem. He began by tersely stating, "I know that all the interests in the country that either are or are seeking to be subsidized protest against free ships [foreign built ships to be allowed into the U.S. registry]. Of course they do; and the great political parties of the country are dividing on what shall be our future policy in regard to these great questions."⁴⁷ He claimed the views of the majority and minority of the Committee on Commerce represented the views of the two political parties. Both parties agreed on resolving trivial impediments. But on "the fundamental cause of the admitted decay and the means of restoration of our merchant marine, they fall back upon, or rather seek to push to the front, the principles and the policy of their respective party organizations."⁴⁸ The majority,

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Congressional Record, 48th Congress, 1st Session, p. 3573.

⁴⁸Ibid.

ostensibly the Republicans, according to Beck, favored the high tariff, cherished existing navigation laws, advocated subsidies for both American ship builders and owners, opposed the concept of free ships, and urged "protection by Congress against even home competition from that class of ships not favored through pretended mail contracts, which only American steamships of a certain class are to have, that being only another name for subsidy, pension, bounty--call it what you will--to a privileged few."⁴⁹ On the other hand, the minority, apparently the Democrats, observed Beck, favored free ships, that is allowing Americans to buy cheap foreign built vessels and allowing them to enter the American registry, and preferred the importation of free construction materials to cut the cost of building indigenous ships. This minority view would obviously aid the American shipper in general who would be able to buy cheap ships both at home and abroad and the American ship builder who would be able to build cheaper ships.

During the debate on S. 1448 Senator Thomas F. Bayard (D. Del.) noted that the House of Representatives was simultaneously considering a bill to aid American shipping. The House bill, H.R. 2228, according to Bayard, "proposed to admit ships to American registry free of duty," while the Senate measure, S. 1448, projected subsidies to postal steamship lines. Bayard, who abhorred subsidies, made a very astute observation: "As this debate has progressed one thing must become obvious to every man who has attended to it, and that is the impossibility of treating either ship-building or ship-owning as a thing

⁴⁹Ibid.

separate and apart from the general business of the country, in which it is imbedded and inextricably intertwined."⁵⁰

George G. Vest (D. Mo.) offered an amendment to S. 1448 which provided duty-free importation in bond, of materials used to build ships in the United States and provided that after January 1, 1886 any American citizen would be allowed to buy any vessel of more than 3,000 tons, and have it registered free of duty as an American craft, provided such ships were not used in coastwise trade. By a very partisan vote the Senate rejected this amendment. Twenty Democrats, mostly from the south and border states favored Vest's proposal, while the "nays" consisted largely of Republicans from the north, northeast, middlewest, and west coast who opposed the amendments.⁵¹ Party loyalty influenced this vote; Democrats preferred open competition to subsidy.

The Democrats lost again when the usual Republican coalition of northerners, northeasterners, middlewesterners, and senators from the west coast, plus a few border state Democrats (six of them) and one Democrat from Indiana, voted against John T. Morgan's amendment which allowed foreign built vessels owned exclusively by Americans into both the American registry and coastwise trade. Those in favor of Morgan's proposal consisted solely of Democrats.⁵² Again party loyalty colored the issue.

The next year, 1886, the Senate amended the postal appropriation bill, H.R. 5887, for the fiscal year ending June 30,

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 3865.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 3869.

⁵²Ibid., p. 3974.

1887, by adding a provision granting \$800,000 "For the transportation of foreign mails in American built and registered steamships" to Brazil, Republic of Mexico, Central and South America, Sandwich Islands, West Indies, the Windward Islands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, the Australian colonies, China, and Japan. The amendment also authorized the Postmaster-General, after proper advertising, to make contracts of no less than five years, with a compensatory rate of no more than \$1.00 per nautical mile.⁵³ The Senate sustained the chair's decision that the amendment could be considered by the Senate, by a very partisan vote. Northern, northeastern, middlewestern, west coast Coloradan Republicans, plus seven Democrats voted to lay the appeal on the table. Those who voted against laying the appeal on the table consisted solely of Democrats from the south and border states.⁵⁴ However, the upper house later receded by a non-measurable vote from the amendment.

The Senate never resolved the American shipping problem. Republicans generally favored subsidies and retention of navigation laws, while Democrats generally preferred changing navigation laws so as to allow foreign built ships to enter the American registry, or more simply favored American purchase of foreign vessels and duty free importation of construction materials so as to allow the building of cheaper ships. Thus party loyalty and sectional interests, as shown by the votes analyzed, contributed to the deadlock over the general problem of American shipping and the extension of commerce. The Senate's general search for markets and resolution of the shipping

⁵³ Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 3960; 4022.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 4022.

question was hampered by domestic politics and sectional interests, such as the eastern ship builders who generally favored subsidies. Because the Senate could not solve this general problem of method, it failed to solve the same problem on a more regional level such as the Pacific. In essence, at times the Pacific as well as other regions, simply got lost in the whole controversy. Only infrequently were references made particular to the Pacific, and when they were made, they constituted only a small aspect of the whole problem. The Pacific was important to the Senate in this controversy, but it was not the only region whose importance was considered in this context.

While the Senate fought over how to resolve the general shipping and foreign carrying trade problem, the upper house agreed on the necessity of a new naval station on the Pacific coast as an extension of commerce and an arm of defense.

In late 1887 and early 1888 the Senate without much internal dissension, considered a joint resolution, S. Res. 8, which provided for the appointment of a commission to choose a site for a naval station on the Pacific coast. Championed by John H. Mitchell (R. Ore.), the joint resolution easily passed the upper house in June of 1888 without a roll call vote.

Mitchell's strategy consisted of stressing the eminence of British power in the Pacific region. "Already Hong-Kong, Sydney, and other points on the western boundaries of the Pacific, the Fiji and other islands of the Southern Pacific, are converted into magnificent establishments as sources of naval supplies and protection for British fleets now occupying the waters of the

Pacific, or which may occupy them more largely in the future."⁵⁵
 His colleague, Senator Joseph N. Dolph (R. Ore.), offered similar concrete reasons why a naval station should be established. "It is time that Congress gave careful consideration to the subject of the future of the trade of the Pacific. . . . We are already engaged in a contest with Great Britain for the trade of the Pacific, and in spite of our natural advantages it is liable to be wrested from us by her aggressive and liberal policy."⁵⁶
 He became very specific. Dolph flatly claimed, ". . . the United States can not permit the Sandwich Islands to pass under the control of any European power. This is so, not only on account of our commercial and treaty relations, but for a stronger reason, and that is, we can not afford it. If you will examine the map of the Pacific Ocean you will see that the Hawaiian group lies on nearly all the lines of commerce from Australia and Asia to the American continent."⁵⁷ He significantly asserted that U.S. control of the Nicaraguan canal would develop the Pacific coast, build American coastwise trade, and especially allow the United States to control the Pacific trade.⁵⁸ Dolph ended his speech on a note of commercial expansionist logic. Though he did not refer to the Pacific, his remarks quoted above insure that he was also thinking of that region when he said, "It is time that we had a well-defined foreign policy known to the world, a policy looking to closer relations with the Central

⁵⁵Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st Session, p. 260.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 264.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 265.

⁵⁸Ibid.

and South American Republics, to the restoration of our merchant marine and the extension of our commerce, and to the prompt protection of the property and personal rights of our citizens upon every land and in every sea."⁵⁹ The Senate's agreement to establish a naval station simply did not balance the disagreement over the resolution of the shipping and foreign carrying trade problem. This deadlock over method in the Senate contributed to the prevention of America's search for markets at an optimum capacity. However, in spite of this partisan and to some extent sectional impasse, when it came to the specific issues of Hawaii and Samoa, the upper house agreed to acquire bases and trade treaties as instruments to extend American commerce on the Pacific.

III. Hawaii and Samoa: Future Markets and Coaling Stations

Though sectional interests tried to stifle the majority of the Senate's desire for trade with Hawaii, the upper house's attitude towards the islands, 1877-1889, was basically one of commercialism. The issue of extending the 1875 reciprocity treaty remained unsettled for three years. Senate procrastination and opposition towards the approval of commercial pacts between Hawaii and the United States was not new. In 1852, 1854, and 1867 the upper house refused to endorse reciprocity agreements with the islands. Various factors entered into the Senate's decision. In the first attempt sugar interests influenced the

⁵⁹ Ibid.

upper body's adjudication.⁶⁰ The second was stopped by several elements ranging from internal problems in Hawaii to British influence in the islands and the provision in the pact that Hawaii should become a state.⁶¹ A combined force of sugar interests and anti-annexationists defeated the last attempt.

By 1875 the Senate was more receptive to the idea of commercial reciprocity with the Hawaiian Islands. On March 18, 1875 without regard to party or section, the Senate approved by a vote of fifty to twelve, a pact which economically tied Hawaii to the United States.⁶²

The treaty theoretically provided for mutually beneficial reciprocity. The agreement essentially opened up a long list of enumerated American products to Hawaii. The list of specified goods which could enter the U.S. duty-free included rice and most significantly "muscovado, brown and all other unrefined sugar . . . syrups of sugar-cane, melado, and molasses. . . ." ⁶³ By denying the King of Hawaii the right to lease or dispose of

⁶⁰ Senate Doc. 231, Compilation of Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 1789-1901, First Congress, First Session to Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, Treaties and Legislation Respecting them, 56th Congress, 2d Session, p. 8, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 148, Seward to Mc Culloch, Jan. 17, 1867.

⁶¹ Foster R. Dulles, America in the Pacific: A Century of Expansionism, 2d ed., (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1938), pp. 160-163. Hereafter cited as Dulles, America in the Pacific.

⁶² Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, vol. 20, p. 42. Hereafter cited as Sen. Exe. Jour.

⁶³ Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909, Comp. William M. Malloy, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), p. 916. Hereafter cited as Treaties.

any port, harbor, or territory and forbidding him the right to make similar reciprocity treaties with other nations, the Senate cautiously laid commercial claim to the Hawaiian archipelago. In order to be operative, the seven year agreement required passage of a congressional enforcement act.

The effects of the treaty quickly revealed themselves during the debate on the enforcement bill. The most significant result of the 1875 pact was the spurring of Hawaiian sugar production. The discussion on the treaty operation bill in 1876 pitted senators representing sugar planters and refiners and high protectionists against the rest of the Senate which favored the treaty basically because of trade. The 1875 agreement and subsequent discussion and passage of the implementation act in 1876 were the foundations of the arguments over abrogation versus retention of the Hawaiian pact during the period under consideration.

Evidence of sectional interests and tariff philosophy emerged during the discussion on the enforcement bill, H.R. 612, in the summer of 1876. However these essentially domestic factors did not stop the Senate from proceeding with a commercial policy towards the Hawaiian Islands because the enactment measure passed the Senate.

The chief opposition to the bill came specifically from Justin Morrill (R. Vt.), a protectionist, J. Rodman West (R. La.), Thomas Norwood (D. Ga.), and John B. Gordon (D. Ga.), all senators from sugar and rice producing states. Basically Justin Morrill feared that allowance of reciprocity as proposed by the treaty would set a dangerous precedent. The southern senators simply dreaded competition against southern sugar and rice.

The discussion on H.R. 612 opened with Morrill insisting that the bill should be submitted to the Committee on Finance. He incorrectly claimed that the proposed measure was purely a question of finance. Adamant about his position, Morrill reiterated that since the measure "relates to the tariff and the tariff alone, I think it is a subject that ought to have been submitted to that committee [the finance committee] in the first place."⁶⁴ As chairman of the Committee on Finance, Morrill obviously intended to kill the bill. Senator Aaron A. Sargent (R. Cal.) ably refuted Morrill's contention that the measure should have gone to the finance committee. The Californian accurately stated, "So far as the change of the tariff law is concerned, that was done by the treaty itself, and this bill which has passed the House is simply to carry that treaty into effect."⁶⁵

Morrill later defended southern interests. With a trite reference to the Civil War, he stated, "While I am disposed to hold treason as a great crime, yet I am the last man who would strike down the national interests of our southern brethern--prosperity makes good citizens--and I regard this as a measure affecting great and vital interests of the South."⁶⁶ He also applied his sectional benevolence to his own region. In an attempt to appeal to Hannibal Hamlin (R. Me.), Morrill claimed that "The port of Portland, Maine, had been built up by the molasses and sugar trade of the West India Islands, and its

⁶⁴ Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, p. 4261.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 4266.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 5567.

prosperity largely depends upon that interest." He then queried, "How will his [Hamlin's] constituents like it to have that interest seriously embarrassed, as it will be, by this measure?"⁶⁷ Morrill's philanthropic attitude towards the south was charitable; his tariff philosophy on this issue was sectionally oriented.

J. Rodman West amply supported Morrill. He opposed the treaty because he thought Hawaiian produced sugar would keep down the price of southern produced sugar. He claimed that the enforcement bill amounted to subsidizing the Hawaiian economy. "What would be thought of the proposition if this bill came before the Senate headed, as it is in effect, 'A bill to give the Sandwhich Islands \$3,000,000 per annum for a lease of sufferance for seven years?' How many Senators would vote for it? That is what it is in effect, and that is why I say it is the most gigantic and the most unwarrantable subsidy that was ever sought to be foisted upon the American Congress."⁶⁸ In West's opinion this "subsidy" would accrue only to the sugar planters of the islands, the sugar refiners in San Francisco, and to the consumer of the Pacific coast.⁶⁹ Instead of a reciprocity treaty, West, at one time, proposed to "buy the islands out and out."⁷⁰ The senator from Louisiana also employed the same tactics of the anti-Chinese senators from the west coast. Just as they minimized the China market when discussing Chinese immigration, West claimed the commercial advantages in the Hawaiian trade were simply fantasies.

Senator Thomas Norwood aided both Morrill and West by

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 5488.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 5489.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 5491

attacking the argument held by many senators that Hawaii was important to the United States commercially and militarily. He claimed that "It is said we need those islands for our commercial interests. That is not true. . . . In a time of war we do not need them for defense; we can take care of ourselves."⁷¹ In an apparent attempt to appeal to the anti-Chinese sentiment of the senators from California, Oregon, Nevada, and Colorado, Norwood stated that "The Chinese are taking possession of the Hawaiian Islands. . . ."⁷² More importantly the islands could produce more per yield than the U.S. could produce.⁷³ Later he chided the Pacific coast senators by stating that one of the reasons why Hawaii could produce so much was because of immigrating Chinese laborers who had been rejected by the west coast inhabitants.⁷⁴ Significantly he pointed out the various interests he thought the treaty would benefit. In his opinion, "a few capitalists who reside in Boston and New York," sugar refiners in San Francisco, and the sugar and rice planters of Hawaii would accrue all the profits of the treaty.⁷⁵ Even more fateful, Norwood stated that the reciprocity pact would not benefit and in fact would hinder specifically the rice and sugar planters of South Carolina, Georgia and Louisiana.⁷⁶

⁷¹Ibid., p. 5535.

⁷²Ibid., p. 5563.

⁷³Ibid., p. 5565.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 5566.

Senator John B. Gordon, "a free trader in the sense of a tariff for revenue alone," wailed that the bill was unfair because the treaty did not prohibit re-exportation to America of goods sent to Hawaii from other countries. In short southerners feared, with some legitimacy, that Hawaii would become a great depot of non-indigenous produce which would be shipped to the United States duty-free as Hawaiian grown or Hawaiian manufactured goods. He especially apprehended the re-exportation of rice and sugar which would directly compete with southern sugar and rice. Gordon was reacting to the defeat of Morrill's amendment requiring proof that the goods to be admitted to the U.S. free of duty were grown or produced in the islands. Defeated largely by a northeastern, northern, and middlewestern Republican majority,⁷⁷ Gordon claimed the bill without the amendment injured only one section of the nation--the south. Therefore the measure should not pass.⁷⁸ Finally he lamented, "Let me once again repeat, however, that you are proposing a grave injustice--injustice to the southern planter of rice and of sugar; injustice to the laborer who produces these commodities; injustice even to the West, whose productions of wheat and corn and meat these planters are now able to consume, but which they may no longer be able to purchase when this bill shall become a law."⁷⁹

Aaron A. Sargent, who also led the fight against Chinese immigration, led the advocates of reciprocity. Essentially a

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 5535.

⁷⁸ Ibid.,

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 5572.

commercial expansionist, except when discussing Chinese workers, Sargent lauded the fertility of the Hawaiian pact. In terse language he stated, "This treaty is valuable for commercial interests. It is valuable because it turns a balance of trade heretofore against us in our favor."⁸⁰ He also felt a political consideration was involved. Conversely the vociferous opponents from the south and Vermont either totally ignored or discounted the importance of American hegemony in the islands. Sargent perceived Hawaii as a defense post for the protection of American commerce on the Pacific. In one of his most persuasive arguments, the Californian declared, "These islands lie directly along the parallel between San Diego and China and Japan, on a line which runs straight on through New Orleans and Texas, a great route for commerce which is developing. It had been the anxiety of American statesmanship for years past, and of your businessmen, to increase and enhance our commerce in the Pacific. It is the only place where the American flag floats on great ocean steamships. It is the only great ocean where our commerce is not vexed by a competition that almost sends it from existence."⁸¹ The establishment of American influence now, according to Sargent, would prevent unfriendly rivals from gaining further ascendancy in the islands. In one sweep Sargent exploited sentiments concerning the trade of the south and California, shipping interests, and the desire to keep European competitors out of the Pacific.

Sargent, who thought the Hawaiian Islands would naturally gravitate towards the United States, revealed his imperialistic

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 5485.

⁸¹ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

designs on the isles. He considered Hawaii as analogous to Texas and a future American colony.⁸² Implicitly denying an intention of annexation, Sargent conceded that territorial acquisition of the islands might be indispensable in the event of military necessity.

Almost hypocritically, he begged the Senate not "to be governed by mere sectional considerations in matters of this kind. . . ."⁸³ Yet, Sargent expected the entire Senate to prohibit Chinese immigration just because the west coast objected to the workers. He obviously did not consider the San Francisco refining interests important enough to obstruct a potential trade with Hawaii or else he believed the refiners would be benefited by the pact.

The idea of commerce dominated Senator George S. Boutwell's (R. Mass.) thoughts. He considered the treaty, regardless of its consequences, as "one of the best opportunities the country has had for the enlargement of its trade and the advancement of its commercial influence in the Pacific and toward the great nations that lie upon the other side of the Pacific Ocean."⁸⁴ John A. Logan (R. Ill.) bolstered Boutwell's statement. He did not believe the importation of Hawaiian rice would affect southern rice.⁸⁵ He snidely declared, "It would have just about the same effect upon rice production in Georgia, or in any other State, that the tariff on a hand-saw would have on the price of pigs

⁸²Ibid., p. 5486.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 5569.

⁸⁵Ibid.

in Illinois, just about the same."⁸⁶ He even criticized Morrill by claiming that the importation of duty-free Hawaiian sugar "will be just about the same that the tariff on wool would have on the price of tobacco."⁸⁷ In essence Sargent, Boutwell, and Logan completely discredited the cries of high protectionism and sugar senators and voted for trade when they cast a "yea" vote for passage of the bill on August 14, 1876.

The vote on the passage of the enforcement act closely resembled the rejection of Morrill's amendment.⁸⁸ The former was passed and the latter was rejected by largely northeastern, northern, and middlewestern Republicans. In both cases a sprinkling of west coast, southern and border state Democrats, voted with the northeastern, northern, and middlewestern Republicans. With the exception of Morrill (R. Vt.) and Newton Booth, (Anti-Monopolist, Cal.), the latter who only voted against the bill, those for the amendment and those defiant to passage were composed of bi-partisan southerners and border state Democrats. In essence southern sectional interests in sugar and the high tariff philosophy lost to trade on these roll calls.

A reciprocity treaty with Hawaii meant a stronger foothold in the Pacific and more trade, probably to be carried in American bottoms. The pact ruled that only sugars below no. 16 Dutch Standard would be allowed to enter the United States duty free. All sugars above no. 16 Dutch Standard were not to be admitted freely because they were similar to the coffee sugar produced in the United States.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 5570.

⁸⁸ Ibid., see pages 5571 and 5572.

The south, especially Louisiana, was never happy with the 1875 Hawaiian agreement, because sugar, and to some extent rice production boomed in Hawaii almost immediately after ratification of the pact. The south's opposition to the reciprocity had some validity. For example, Claus Spreckels, a shrewd businessman, formed an agreement between sugar growers in Hawaii and the sugar refiners in San Francisco and monopolized the Pacific coast sugar market.⁸⁹ The production and importation of Hawaiian sugar spiraled, while the importation of American products to Hawaii grew at a slower rate. American investment in the islands also grew, especially investment in sugar plantations. Staunch agitation quickly developed outside the Senate. Henry A. Brown, a former Treasury agent from Massachusetts, began a campaign against Hawaiian reciprocity. Brown wrote several pamphlets lambasting the reciprocity treaty. The San Francisco Chronicle soon took up the crusade against Hawaiian sugar and Claus Spreckels. "Taking cue from the San Francisco Chronicle, spokesmen for the sugar and rice planters of the East now began a vigorous agitation against the Hawaiian convention."⁹⁰

In both houses of congress southern representatives and senators from Louisiana and Georgia introduced resolutions to terminate the reciprocity treaty in late 1881 and early 1882. "During the opening weeks of the Forty-Seventh Congress sugar

⁸⁹ David M. Pletcher, The Awkward Years: American Foreign Relations Under Garfield and Arthur (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1962), p. 174. Hereafter cited as Pletcher. See also Donald Dozer, "The Opposition to Hawaiian Reciprocity, 1876-1888," Pacific Historical Review, 14, (1945), 158. Hereafter cited as Dozer.

⁹⁰ Dozer, pp. 168-164.

and rice planters in Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, sugar refiners in the Atlantic seaboard states, the chambers of commerce in New York City and State, the boards of trade in Providence and Philadelphia, and many other commercial organizations bombarded congress with petitions for the abrogation of the convention."⁹¹ The House Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted a hearing on the Hawaiian question in the spring of 1882, while the Senate waited until early 1883 to debate the problem.

On January 8, 1883, Justin Morrill introduced S. Res. 122, a resolution providing for the termination of the 1875 pact.⁹² The fight over this resolution began with a committee battle. The real issue involved the question of whether the philosophy of high protectionism and the complaints of domestic sugar interests, especially southern planters, could supercede broader political and economic considerations. In short, the Senate faced the problem of deciding whether sectional interests and

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 165-166.

⁹² It should be noted that protests against Hawaiian sugars and rice appeared in discussions on other bills besides those relating directly to the Hawaiian question. In the debate on the great Mongrel Tariff on February 15, 1883 Senator Pope Barrow (D. Ga.) insisted that rice entered the U.S. illegally because of the Hawaiian pact. He specifically stated, "The rice that is introduced into this country under the provision of this treaty which is not strictly Hawaiian rice is the rice that is grown in the islands of the Pacific Ocean and some of it in China which is produced by the cheapest labor upon this earth. They can raise it and do raise it absolutely for less than one-half of what it can be raised for in the United States, and here stands a treaty which admits free of duty this very rice which is produced under circumstances which we can never hope to compete with, and with a labor down to which we can never reduce ours." Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2d Session, p. 2713.

and protectionism should be allowed to hinder commerce with Hawaii.

Morrill, still the chairman of the Committee on Finance, insisted that the bill should be referred to his committee because the question involved was solely a financial one. He of course favored termination. Morrill argued that the treaty had been violated since sugars not contemplated by the pact were being imported into the United States duty-free.⁹³ Taking an essentially anti-imperialist stand, the high protectionist had little "faith" in the establishing "a sort of jingo empire in the Pacific Ocean. . . ." Besides, "in case of war these Hawaiian Islands will go to the strongest naval power, and it will not affect us one groat whether we have a treaty foothold there or not."⁹⁴

William P. Frye (R. Me.) supported Morrill with a rather nationalistic note. He boldly declared to the Senate, "The Hawaiian treaty turns out as our other treaties. Every nation, no matter how inferior, gets the advantage of us in every treaty we make."⁹⁵

The opposition to termination led primarily by John F. Miller (R. Cal.), who was aided by John T. Morgan (D. Ala.), insisted that the bill belonged to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Both were members of that committee and both favored retention of the pact. Thus if the proposed measure had gone to

⁹³ Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2d Session, p. 1003.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 1004.

the foreign relations committee, Miller and Morgan would have killed it. Miller posited that more than a financial question was involved. He felt his section of the country was especially affected by the treaty. More importantly Miller asserted that political considerations complicated the issue. In fact if the treaty were terminated, such abrogation "will operate in this instance in respect to this kingdom to deprive the people of the United States of that control over that country which now makes it practically a dependency of the United States. . . ." ⁹⁶ Thus he believed the proposed measure should go to the foreign relations committee which would "decide whether the political advantages outweigh the financial disadvantages, or whether there are any financial disadvantages." ⁹⁷ Obviously Miller thought the financial objections were simply too minute to be allowed to hinder American commercial and potential political hegemony in the islands.

The brevity of the debates on the bill clouds any generalization about the vote on referral. The finance committee won by a vote of thirty-one to twenty. ⁹⁸ Donald Dozer claims Morrill's motion that the measure be referred to him (Morrill's) committee was granted by the help of "senators from states interested in sugar-refining and the production of cane and sorghum." ⁹⁹ Essentially a bi-partisan, multi-sectional coalition voted "yea." Southern Democrats split on the question, while

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 1005.

⁹⁹ Dozer, p. 170.

a large minority of northeastern and northern Republicans voted against referral to the finance committee.

Morrill presented the finance committee's report to the Senate on February 27, 1883. The majority report basically discounted any benefits of reciprocity. "It is manifest that the treaty has given an artificial stimulus to the growth of Hawaiian sugars, and to the introduction of a grade of free sugars much above the standard of such as were to be lawfully admitted under the treaty."¹⁰⁰ This accusation, which had some cogency, was accompanied by the prediction that Hawaiian sugar production would grow enormously.¹⁰¹ Obviously such growth would hinder domestic sugar planters and sugar refiners in the south and the east. The majority report's main point rested on the claim that the United States was in fact losing money every year because of the lack of a duty on Hawaiian sugar. The finance committee's disclosure also stated that rice importation had increased 300% since the ratification of the treaty. Completely discounting "any future advantages to our own country," regarding the islands, the majority report stated that the cane crop of 1882 amounted to 125,000 tons; domestic maple sugar production was annually decreasing; sorghum sugar would in the near future "contribute largely to the stock of sugars required for our home consumption;" and the beet-sugar production in "Europe was established by direct encouragement, granted at first by Napoleon, to the home producers."¹⁰² The

¹⁰⁰ Senate Report 1013, 47th Congress, 2d Session, p. 1.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 3.

significance of the last point, a rather nonsensical, rhetorical flourish, rested on whether the United States would imitate Napoleon's example. The whole thrust of this "sugar" point amounted to sectional interests.

In discussing both internal and international politics regarding Hawaii, the majority of Morrill's committee correctly noted that most of the sugar plantations were owned by foreigners,¹⁰³ including some Chinese. In addition, " . . . the power behind the throne is made up of sugar planters and sugar corporations."¹⁰⁴ On the international level, the committee daringly asserted that it did not matter who ruled the islands since they were 2,000 miles away and "there will never be any exclusion of American vessels or denial of any advantages now accorded, as such exclusion or denial would be greatly and obviously to the detriment of Hawaiian interests."¹⁰⁵ The majority committee's logic led it to conclude that the pact should be terminated because the treaty was "so obviously adverse to the interests of the United States. . . ."¹⁰⁶

The minority report, written by Justin Morrill (R. Vt.), Daniel Voorhees (D. Ind.), and Nelson Aldrich (R. R.I.), all protectionists, added only a superfluous reason for termination. Relying on the Constitution, the three senators claimed "that it was never intended that the President and the Senate should have

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

even the initiative in regulating trade or commerce.¹⁰⁷

The last statement of the minority disclosure truly revealed the protectionist philosophy or anti-reciprocity feelings of Morrill, Voorhees, and Aldrich. They concluded "that experience shows, in every instance where a reciprocity treaty had been tried, that immense American interests have been sacrificed. No [sic] one had resulted to our advantage."¹⁰⁸ In essence both the majority and the minority reports favored the protection of domestic interests at the possible expense of a fruitful commerce with Hawaii.

On the same day he delivered the above report to the Senate, Morrill presented two other measures relating to Hawaiian treaty and asked for indefinite postponement.¹⁰⁹ Apparently Morrill preferred indefinite delay, which would not kill the measures, to reference to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the majority of which favored retention of the Hawaiian pact. This time Morrill, other protectionists, and the sugar senators lost. The foreign relations committee became the recipient of the proposed measures, which were never heard of again.

The Senate chose not to act on the Hawaiian issue for almost a year. In September of 1883 the treaty became officially terminable or retentive. In December of 1883 Senator Benjamin F. Jonas (D. La.) introduced S. Res. 27, a resolution notifying the King of Hawaii of termination of the reciprocity treaty. The bill, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁰⁹ He reported S. 742, a bill to repeal the treaty and S. Res. 20, a joint resolution for termination of the treaty. Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3322.

Relations, never emerged from that body.

Instead the committee, chairmaned by John F. Miller, who favored retention, recommended adverse action on the termination resolution, because the findings of the Committee on Finance in 1883 failed to show that commerce and revenue had in fact been injured.

The resolution was obviously never discussed, but the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 24, 1884 disclosed a revealing report consisting of a majority and a minority opinion.

The majority of the committee supported treaty retention basically because it did not believe that domestic sugar interests were truly hindered by the reciprocity treaty and because Hawaii offered a fertile trade of great potential. First, it had not been proven that commerce or U.S. revenues were harmed by the treaty. Second, the improvement of transportation advised holding on to the treaty. The opening of the Suez Canal allowed Britain and France to extend their commercial influence in the Pacific. Thus, "We have also extended our treaty relations to Korea [sic], Siam, Persia, and Madagascar, with a view to a future profitable trade with all of the countries of Asia and Australiasia."¹¹⁰ The isthmian canal would also stimulate Pacific commerce. Third, the Hawaiian Islands were of strategic importance since they were the only stopping off place between the United States and the Japanese, Korean, and Chinese markets. Significantly the majority report claimed that Hawaii was "within the area of the physical and political geography of the United States."¹¹¹ Fourth, the Hawaiians had been greatly influenced

¹¹⁰

Senate Report 76, 48th Congress, 1st Session, pt 1, p. 1.

¹¹¹

Ibid., p. 2.

by American social and economic interests. In essence this meant the Hawaiians were becoming more like Americans, and most importantly, the Hawaiian economy had become tied to American investment, business, and management.

The foreign relations committee continued its argument for retention. In terms of defense, the importance of Hawaii could not be underestimated. It was the only neutral power in the Northern Pacific. Concerning the material advantages, the treaty brought work, more goods at lower prices, and a growing market.¹¹² American capital now amounted to \$20,000,000 and most of the trade was carried in American bottoms. In short, the majority report held "These advantages of trade which we gain through our control of the commerce of these islands are of much greater value to us than the amount of revenue we could have possibly collected on the goods admitted under this treaty free of duty."¹¹³ Furthermore, the complaints of the sugar and rice interests that the importation of free Hawaiian goods hindered domestic industries were invalid. The majority of the committee felt that there were "no sugar or rice lands of any consequence in the United States west of the Rocky Mountains, and it is at least just to that important region that it should enjoy the means of obtaining these supplies on equal terms with the country east of those mountains."¹¹⁴ The committee also refuted the accusation that Hawaii re-exported to the United

¹¹² Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

States illegal sugar and rice which was not grown in the islands. The majority simply stated that" . . . these accusations . . . have been thoroughly disproved by the report of the commission sent out to the Hawaiian Islands in May, 1883, by our Secretary of Treasury."¹¹⁵ Last, but perhaps most significantly, the majority of the committee concluded, "that our national interests are so identified with those of Hawaii that we cannot permit any other nation to gain such control in that country as will endanger our western coast, or seriously impede our commerce on the Pacific Ocean."¹¹⁶ This group of men on the foreign relations committee had come to believe that Hawaii was so strategically and economically important to the United States that this country could not afford to abandon the treaty for the sectional sugar interests of a few and allow European rivals to take America's favored place in Hawaii.

Two members of the Committee on Foreign Relations disagreed with the majority report. John Sherman (R. Ohio) and Joseph E. Brown (D. Ga.),¹¹⁷ presented to the Senate in January of 1884

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

¹¹⁷ Brown's position on this issue is debatable. While he concurred with the minority report in 1884, he voted for the exclusive right to use Pearl Harbor and to extend the treaty for seven years. Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 25, pp. 708-710. On January 19, 1889 during the debate on H.R. 9051, a tariff bill, Brown stated, "Although it seems to me there is no adequate commercial benefit derived by the United States from the Hawaiian reciprocity treaty, an annual average of 9,000,000 pounds with a maximum of 12,000,000 pounds of rice has been imported in the past five years from those islands. Unlike the Asiatic rice annually remaining in bond, although approximating it in amount, the Hawaiian import is not only a check but a direct and unconditional participant in the freedom on the market pari passu with the home product, is produced by Asiatic labor, and shares none of the burdens of government borne by the home producer." Congressional Record, 50th Cong., 2d. Sess., p. 989.

the same report of the Committee on Finance, February of 1883, and merely added that the losses entailed by the treaty were greater than the benefits.¹¹⁸

Though the majority of the Senate implicitly agreed to bury termination resolutions for a while, the same majority did nothing towards retaining the reciprocity agreement until President Arthur on June 9, 1884 transmitted to the Senate the Hawaiian government's request that the pact be extended for seven years. Instead, the Senate chose to follow Justin Morrill, the protectionist who opposed the treaty, by voting on July 5, 1884 for his motion to delay action until December.¹¹⁹ Yet during this time in the early summer of 1884, a presidential election year, the Senate in executive session agreed to extension and significantly advised that the President secure a naval base and obtain "revision and further extension of the schedule of articles to be admitted free of duty from the United States into the Hawaiian Kingdom."¹²⁰

Postponement of action obviously signified delaying approval. Similarly request for a naval base meant deferring endorsement. Most significantly, permission for establishment of a naval base also meant a permanent American foothold in the islands. Revision and extension of American articles to be exported to Hawaii denoted that the majority of the Senate did not think American commerce with Hawaii was expendable because of the complaints of southern and eastern sugar interests. In fact, the Senate did absolutely nothing about revising the treaty provisions allowing

¹¹⁸ Senate Report 76, 486, 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 171.

¹¹⁹ Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 24, p. 335.

¹²⁰ Ibid., pp. 298; 335.

the duty-free importation of sugar and rice into the United States. Though the treaty was renegotiated on December 6, 1884 the Senate continued to procrastinate.¹²¹

Meanwhile the House of Representatives acted on the issue. Several congressmen introduced resolutions for ending the reciprocity pact. These were referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, which held a hearing in February of 1886 on the matter¹²² and eventually recommended abrogation.¹²³ Later the majority of the House shelved the committee's recommendations because it played no real part in the committee's decision.¹²⁴

Finally on April 14, 1886 John T. Morgan of the foreign relations committee recommended the establishment of a coaling station near the mouth of the Pearl River.¹²⁵ Still the Senate did not act definitively. Meanwhile the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange and the wholesale grocers of Chicago sent petitions seeking abrogation of the 1875 convention.¹²⁶ Finally on January 20, 1887, after nearly three years of hesitation, after Cleveland's recommendation for ratification, and after the rumor that Hawaii was seeking a loan from British bankers,¹²⁷ the Senate voted to acquire the port and voted to approve the newly extended treaty.¹²⁸

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 486, February 26, 1885.

¹²² Dozer, pp. 172-173.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 175.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 25, p. 419.

¹²⁶ Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 3657; 4447.

¹²⁷ Dozer, p. 177.

¹²⁸ Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 25, pp. 708-710.

The vote on the amendment granting the United States the exclusive right to establish a coaling and repair station at Pearl Harbor was basically partisan. Republicans voted 5:1 in favor of the base, while Democrats voted almost 2.5:1 against the coaling station.¹²⁹

On the next vote, partisanship broke down. A bi-partisan and multi-sectional coalition voted against the amendment requiring a congressional enforcement act to make the new treaty effective.¹³⁰ Those who voted against the amendment were northeastern Republicans, some of whom were protectionists, and southern Democrats from Texas, Louisiana of course, and Alabama.

The Senate overwhelmingly passed a resolution ratifying the newly extended treaty. Again a bi-partisan and multi-sectional coalition, consisting of many southern Democrats, voted for seven more years of reciprocity, duty-free sugar and rice, a new coaling station and the opportunity to export more articles to Hawaii.¹³¹ Most of the eleven "nay" votes came from the south, especially from Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina, and from northeastern Republicans, specifically Morrill of Vermont, Chace of Rhode

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp. 708-709; Dozer, p. 178. In discussing this stage of the Senate's action of the treaty, Donald Dozer, without specific examples or evidence, claims there was "strong opposition to the Pearl Harbor amendment. Those from sugar and rice states of the South, from the refining states of the East, and from the sorghum-producing states, regardless of their party ties, denounced this move to extend American interests still further in the islands as prejudicial to the interests of their constituents. Aside from these senators who were influenced largely by this economic factor the principal opposition to the amendment came from Democratic senators who favored the maintenance of the anti-imperialist traditions of their party."

¹³⁰ Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 25, p. 709.

¹³¹ Ibid., Dozer, pp. 1780-179.

Island, and Sewell of New Jersey. The opponents of Hawaiian reciprocity after three years of senatorial hesitancy finally lost. The majority of the Senate chose to extend and maintain American political and economic hegemony in the islands. Since no provision was made during the era under consideration to revise the treaty clauses allowing the importation of duty-free sugar and rice, the majority of the upper house either did not believe or simply spurned the complaints of protectionists and senators from sugar producing regions. The extension of the treaty and acquisition of the coaling station were two important steps in the Senate's effort to secure American commercial predominance in the Pacific. The Senate in essence refused to share Hawaii with European rivals.

Unlike the Hawaiian question, there were no sectional interests, such as sugar and rice producers, to consider in the Samoan issue. Extension of U.S. political and economic hegemony did not adversely affect any domestic interests. Instead the whole country, as reflected by the Senate's unanimous approval of the 1878 trade pact, stood to benefit.

The Samoan question had been smoldering for years. This group of islands suffered from internal power struggles and external manipulation by Britain, Germany, and the United States.

The U.S. first attempted to establish treaty relations with Samoa in 1872, to secure the use of Pago Pago as a coaling station. Commander Richard W. Meade signed the pact on February 17, 1872 without specific authorization from the State

Department.¹³² In May of the same year President Grant submitted the newly signed agreement to the Senate.¹³³ On motion of Simon Cameron (R. Pa.) the pact was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and never heard of again.¹³⁴ Though the treaty was buried, Cornelius Cole (R. Cal.) from the committee submitted a resolution¹³⁵ on May 13, 1872 inquiring into the practicality of American protection to the islands, since such a protectorate was desired by Samoa. However, the Senate failed to act on the proposal.

While the Senate refused to act, the executive and the State Department sent Colonel Albert B. Steinberger to pursue the possibility of establishing treaty relations with the islands. On April 22, 1874 Secretary of State Hamilton Fish transmitted to the Senate Steinberger's report. The colonel returned to the United States with Samoa's request for American protection of the islands. Samoa's request never reached the Senate. Since a resolution to purchase the necessary privileges and land for a coaling station was adversely reported and indefinitely postponed on February 9, 1875, the Senate obviously opposed a treaty of protection for Samoa at this time.

Meanwhile international rivalry in the islands bent to the low level of skillful handling of native princes to achieve more

¹³²W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle Between President and Senate over the Conduct of Foreign Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), pp. 98-99. Hereafter cited as Dulles, Prelude to World Power.

¹³³Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 18, p. 254.

¹³⁴Ibid.

¹³⁵Congressional Record, 42d Congress, 2d Session, p. 3352.

privileges. Steinberger became over zealous and persuaded the natives to elect Malietoa Laupepa as their king.¹³⁶

The Samoan government, possibly under the influence of the American consul, sent its Secretary of State, M. K. Maea, in September of 1877 to secure an American protectorate over the islands,¹³⁷ to help them govern, and to establish treaty relations. According to George Herbert Ryden, who quoted Frederick Seward,

Seward [the Under-Secretary of State] found the Navy Department 'warmly' favoring the Samoan proposition, as it had long 'desired the establishment of naval outposts in the Pacific.' But upon sounding the leading members of the committees on foreign relations in both Houses, as well as the important Republican leaders in Congress, it was found that while there 'were differences of opinion among them . . . practically all were agreed that the times were inauspicious for the consideration of any such project.' It would have been impossible to secure the Senate's 'consent to any treaty that involved expense or obligation' and the opposition of the House to any proposal from a Republican majority was certain on account of the Democratic majority.¹³⁸

The Samoan Secretary of State went home without an American protectorate, but instead he carried a ten year pact which granted the United States the use of the Pago Pago port; established a coaling station; allowed duty-free importation and exportation of American goods; provided for U.S. mediation of disputes between American citizens and Samoan inhabitants and most

¹³⁶ George Herbert Ryden, The Foreign Policy of the United States in Relation to Samoa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), p. 122. The islands' first premier was the colonel, who also wrote Samoa's first constitution. Pp. 122-123. Steinberger, who had no official status, except as special agent from the State Department and who also had a contract with a German firm based in the islands was eventually arrested and ejected by the British who were just as ambitious as the colonel. Hereafter cited as Ryden.

¹³⁷ Ibid., pp. 191-193.

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 195-196.

significantly, mediation "between the Samoan Government and any other Government in amity with the United States. . . ." ¹³⁹ The Senate unanimously approved this agreement on January 30, 1878, ¹⁴⁰ after all possibility of a protectorate had been ruled out. ¹⁴¹ Apparently the entire voting Senate believed the agreement would be beneficial to all regions of the country, since no sectional interests protested its ratification. However, this treaty exempted only American goods and not Samoan goods. Thus there was no fear of Samoan sugar and rice. While the Hawaiian pact, ratified in 1887, granted the United States exclusive right to use the Pearl River harbor and to establish a coaling station, the Samoan pact merely granted America the privilege to use the Pago Pago port and to establish a coaling station. Nevertheless, both amounted to extending American commerce. However, though the Senate quickly and unanimously approved the first American-Samoan pact, no appropriation for the coaling station was made until 1889 during the Samoan crisis.

Soon after the negotiation of the American pact with the islands, Germany and Britain secured commercial privileges and the right to establish naval stations in Samoa. On September 2, 1879 the three powers agreed to establish tripartite control over Samoan affairs, in particular the municipality of Apia, the Samoan capital and commercial center. This agreement was never submitted to the Senate. The wobbly pact began to collapse as early as 1884 when the Germans proceeded to establish German

¹³⁹ Treaties, pp. 1574-1575.

¹⁴⁰ Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 21, pp. 220-221.

¹⁴¹ Dulles, Prelude to World Power, p. 101.

hegemony at the expense of American and British influence. Washington's reaction to the assertion of the German flag and fomentation of internal rebellion in Samoa, was an invitation to come to the American capital in 1887 to establish a stable tripartite settlement over the islands. Unfortunately the conference accomplished nothing.¹⁴² The Senate's only tangible reaction to the abortive conference were two requests in December of 1887 for official correspondence regarding the German take-over.¹⁴³

Germany continued to challenge America's place in Samoa. The new empire landed troops, seized Apia, supported a native king who favored the Germans, and threatened both Americans and their property. Obviously Germany's actions in Samoa after the 1887 conference meant German domination of the islands and German aggression signified potential American expulsion.

The Senate reacted to the Samoan crisis in December of 1888 with a resolution emanating from the Committee on Foreign Relations which inquired into U.S.-Samoa treaty relations, the maintenance of Samoan independence, and "the condition of affairs in the Samoan Islands so far as it affects the interests and rights of American citizens resident of doing business there. . . ."¹⁴⁴ In

¹⁴² Ibid., pp. 102-103.

¹⁴³ It should be noted that at the same time the Senate requested all official correspondence concerning Samoa, the upper house also requested on December 19th and agreed on the 21st to a resolution which called for all official correspondence "concerning the right to or occupation of Midway harbor, in Midway Island in the Pacific Ocean, . . ." Sen. Exe. Jour. vol. 26, pp. 92; 99.

¹⁴⁴ Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2d Session, p. 108.

a very brief discussion on the proposed measure, Senator William P. Frye (R. Me.) who believed the Hawaiian treaty as well as all other pacts cheated the United States, immediately described the importance of Samoa. He accurately stated, "The interests of the United States in the preservation of the independence of Samoa no American citizen can question for a moment. These islands are the dominating power in that portion of the Pacific Ocean, and the center of commerce. . . . They are in line [sic] of all our commerce with New Zealand and Australia."¹⁴⁵

Only Senator George Gray (D. Del.) offered opposition to Frye's statement. He rebuked potential American interference in Samoa as an "impulse of jingoism"¹⁴⁶ especially without national legislative consent. He objected to a possible policy of "Territorial aggrandizement of entangling alliances contrary to American precedent and American tradition. . . ."¹⁴⁷ He also claimed that he was not aware that U.S. interests and rights were affected in the Samoan crisis any more than in any other uprising. His demurrer convinced few. Without a roll call vote the Senate quickly passed the resolution. This signified that the Senate believed adverse internal actions in Samoa and unfavorable foreign movements directly hindered America's interest in Samoa, which was too important to U.S. national interest and American trade to allow Germany to oust America out of the islands.

In January of 1889 President Cleveland sent to Congress the correspondence. During the debate on a diplomatic and consular

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 108-109.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 109.

service bill in January the Senate considered the recent Samoan crisis. The Senate attached two significant amendments concerning Samoa to this appropriation bill. One appropriated \$500,000 to protect American interests and execute obligations under the 1878 treaty and the other provided \$100,000 to make Pago Pago into a harbor and coaling station.¹⁴⁸ By these two amendments, the Senate decided to secure American influence in the islands.

Senator John Sherman (R. Ohio) led the commentary. He astutely outlined the situation: "Mr. President, the time has arrived when Congress and especially the Senate, must give intelligent attention to the questions involved in the occupation and settlement of the Samoan Islands."¹⁴⁹ Then he traced the history of U.S.-Samoan relations from American discovery in 1840 to January of 1889. His historical description was permeated with comments and observations that Samoa and a profitable American trade on the Pacific were inseparably linked. He pointed out that Samoa was in direct line with the San Francisco-Australian-New Zealand traffic; that use of the excellent harbor of Pago Pago was granted to the United States by the 1878 treaty; that Germany and Britain were using other harbors in Samoa; and that Apia, the Samoan capital, was governed by the three powers. He also reaffirmed that the U.S. was obligated to insist upon American rights and the rights of the recently deposed King, since his successful rival, Tamaseese, was German controlled and German supported. Sherman also called the Senate's attention to the fact that during the German-Britain-American conference

¹⁴⁸Ibid., p. 1283.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

held in 1887 to decide Samoa's fate, the German fleet took over Apia.¹⁵⁰ In reaction to the move of the German fleet he believed that the U.S. should "assert our power and occupancy and possession of the Bay of Pago Pago, and so much of the shores of the island of Tutuila as is necessary for a coaling station."¹⁵¹ In addition he said "We ought to secure that [a coaling station], and not treat it as we have done our privileges in the Hawaiian Islands."¹⁵² Sherman then spoke of the crux of the situation: "if we had had a foothold in this bay as firmly and as strongly as the Germans have theirs in their bay, I believe American interests would not be so endangered as they are to-day."¹⁵³ Last, the United States should re-establish local government with "moral power" if necessary.

Senator Joseph N. Dolph (R. Ore.), who believed the crisis was really one of "national policy and principles which enter into the question of the control of the islands of the Pacific. . . ." ¹⁵⁴ further elucidated Samoa's place in American commerce. He said "Our commerce is small, but it is worth protecting." In addition the Samoans belonged to the same race as the Kanakas of the Hawaiian Islands, which meant they were superior to any other indigenous race in the Pacific and they were susceptible to American improvement.¹⁵⁵ He used the same

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 1288.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 1290.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 1325.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

Keep-Europe-Out rationalization which was applied to Hawaii. Dolph believed the U.S. should not stand by and watch Germany acquire control of the islands, which was "entirely inconsistent with our treaty rights and injurious to our commerce."¹⁵⁶ Thus American commerce simply could not afford anymore European rivalry in the Pacific. He even misinterpreted and stretched the Monroe Doctrine to include the Samoan Islands.¹⁵⁷ If Samoa invited America to preserve its autonomy, then the U.S. should accept the invitation and peacefully intervene; yet he thought Hawaii was more important to the U.S. than Samoa.¹⁵⁸ "The only question that can arise is whether our commercial and other interests in the Samoan Islands are great enough to require us to assert the same doctrine in regard to those islands that we have maintained in regard to the Sandwich Islands."¹⁵⁹ Senator John H. Reagan (D. Tex.) caught an underlying thread of Senate foreign policy in the Pacific when he said, "Our relations to them [the Samoan Islands] commercially and geographically make it to our interest that the control of the islands of the Pacific should not be absolutely absorbed by the powers of Europe to the exclusion of the interests of the American Government."¹⁶⁰ And Senator William P. Frye (R. Me.) was thinking ahead: when the canal was built across Central America, Samoa's importance would supercede Hawaii's because the former was in direct line from the Isthmus

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 1329.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 1334.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 1335.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 1337.

to China, Japan, Australia, and the East Indies. He also assessed reality: Samoa and Hawaii were the only "resting places" America was using on the Pacific and American steam commerce was on the Pacific and not on the Atlantic. Therefore he declared that the importance of Pago Pago as a harbor can not be over-estimated to us in our future."¹⁶¹ Accordingly the Senate voted to extend American commercial influence when it passed the appropriation bill with the amendments which protected American interests in Samoa and provided for the construction of a harbor at Pago Pago.¹⁶²

Unlike the general shipping question, the Senate eventually resolved the Hawaiian issue and the Samoan problem during the period under consideration. Without significant regard to party loyalty, the majority of the Senate refused to share Hawaii with European rivals. Disregarding the cries of sugar senators and protectionists, the upper house voted to extend reciprocity for seven years--without adjusting the treaty provisions concerning rice and sugar. The Senate's search for markets in regard to Hawaii ended in the acquisition of the exclusive right to use the harbor at the mouth of the Pearl River and extended trade relations.

The Senate shared Samoa with European rivals and was even willing to mediate disputes between Samoa and other governments. Neither party loyalty nor sectional interests influenced the

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 1374.

¹⁶² The Senate later expunged the amendment providing for \$100,000 to make Pago Pago into a harbor because "the House of Representatives put it in a better form in the naval appropriation bill." Ibid., p. 1816.

Senate's unanimous decision to acquire privileges but not exclusive right to use the Pago Pago port, to establish a coaling station, and to extend trade.

The Hawaiian issue was more of a gadfly in the Senate from 1877 to 1889 largely because of domestic interests. The Samoan question was easily answered. Its strategic importance on trade routes was obvious and the islands did not send sugar, rice, or workers to the United States.

IV. The Search for Markets and American Democratic Ideals Versus Agitation for Chinese Exclusion

While the Senate remained deadlocked over how to build up the merchant marine and thus extend commerce to regions such as the Pacific, this same body of men voted for permanent American hegemony in Hawaii and Samoa. It also responded to the urgent demands for Chinese labor restriction and exclusion from west coast, Nevada, and Colorado senators. This agitation and dissatisfaction eventually resulted in federal legislation which violated treaties between the two nations, raised questions about America's definition of democracy, and threatened U.S.-Chinese relations.

The problem stemmed from the west coast's altered opinion about the benefits of Chinese labor. At first in the 1850's Chinese workers were welcomed because the Pacific coast states and territories needed labor and the Chinese worked for very low wages. In time, annoyance developed against such labor partly because the Chinese worked so cheaply that white laborers could not compete with the Oriental wage-earner. Though many workers

returned to China, the number coming to the west coast appeared to be interminable, except by some form of limitation by the American government. A final irritation was that the Chinese laborers were racially, socially, and politically different from their white counterparts.

Scholarly opinion differs on the question of whether the Chinese laborers were in fact personally free wage-earners of contracted, unfree workers, known as coolies. Mary Coolidge insists that the Chinese immigrants came voluntarily to California; therefore these workers were not coolies.¹⁶³ Tyler Dennett believes that some of the Chinese immigrants were free, ". . . but so secretive and so impenetrable were the methods of Chinese trade relationships it was rarely possible to distinguish with certainty between the free and the contract labor."¹⁶⁴ Elmer C. Sandmeyer claims, "The evidence is conclusive that by far the majority of the Chinese who came to California had their transportation provided by others and bound themselves to make repayment," but ". . . the laborer was free to choose his employer so long as he made his monthly payments."¹⁶⁵ Most importantly, as Sandmeyer correctly points out, "Californians, in constantly increasing numbers, either doubted that this difference existed or discounted its significance, holding that

¹⁶³ Mary Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1909), pp. 41-54. Hereafter cited as Coolidge.

¹⁶⁴ Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 538. Hereafter cited as Dennett.

¹⁶⁵ Elmer C. Sandmeyer, "The Anti-Chinese Movement in California," Studies in the Social Sciences, 24, No. 3, (Univ. of Ill. Press, 1939), p. 28. Hereafter cited as Sandmeyer.

the living and working conditions of the Chinese were those of slavery, even if legal evidence were lacking."¹⁶⁶ Sandmeyer's assertion about Californians can also be applied to other inhabitants of the Chinese problem states.

As early as 1862 sufficient exhortation resulted in a federal law prohibiting the American transportation of Chinese coolies to the West Indies and South America.¹⁶⁷ In 1869, one year after the ratification of the Burlingame treaty, Congress "made it a felony for a citizen of the United States to take to or from the United States any subject of any Oriental country without his free and voluntary consent, for the purpose of holding him for a term of service. . . ."¹⁶⁸ Thus original legislative limitation applied to only coolie labor. However, the Senate in later years managed to blur the distinction between the coolie laborer and the free Chinese worker.

From the perspective of those who lived on the west coast the Burlingame treaty came to represent a bittersweet diplomatic victory. Though the pact provided for residence and travel in both countries on the "most-favored-nation" basis, it also recognized the right of voluntary Chinese immigration and disapproved of involuntary immigration. Through the reciprocal immigration clause America indirectly tried to extend her commercial friendliness to the Celestial Empire by allowing free Chinese immigration to the states, and directly sought to increase trade by allowing American immigration to China. Yet,

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 28-29.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 81.

in a few years the United States began to decrease the number of entering Chinese laborers by smearing the distinction between voluntary and involuntary immigration.

In the Senate sectionalism and party loyalty variously tinged the argument over this essentially regional problem. The blurred distinction between the terms "voluntary" and "involuntary" caused the bi-partisan and at times tri-partisan, west coast to seek remedies in Congress which conflicted with the commercial and democratic ideals of certain northeastern Republicans.

At least two-thirds of the Republican dominated Senate in 1868 approved the Burlingame treaty. Yet two years later the same Republican body denied citizenship to Chinese workers, regardless of their status. Thus, even before the overt and active agitation of the 1870's and 1880's for restrictive or exclusive legislation, the Senate had already implemented a "policy" towards China of simultaneously attempting to increase American exports and decrease the importation of Chinese workers.

Movements for limitation were hampered by the agreement. Thus the solutions for termination of the influx of Chinese labor were two: (1) modification of the pact so as to allow restrictive or exclusive legislation, or (2) legislative restriction or exclusion without modification, resulting in violation of the treaty and in effect de facto abrogation. Formal abrogation, the most drastic measure of all met the greatest opposition in the Senate.

By 1876 the Chinese question in California was ready to

explode. The state Republicans desired modification of the 1868 pact. The state Democrats organized a mass meeting on April sixth to consider the evils of the Chinese worker. According to Mary Coolidge, "The Chinese question was at last launched as the vital political issue of California. During the whole summer of 1876 the excitements of the Presidential campaign increased and the closeness of the contest, and the Hayes-Tilden controversy, did not tend to quiet the turbulent masses, who were still further inflamed by the industrial hardships."¹⁶⁹ Senator Aaron A. Sargent (R. Cal.) and other Pacific coast senators responded to this agitation.

In the spring of 1876 west coast senators appeared to be willing to seek modification of the treaty. Sargent, who thought the people of the east coast should try to understand his position,¹⁷⁰ inclined towards waiting for modification because the 1868 pact prevented U.S. restrictive or exclusive legislation. He flatly declared "I do not think that such a law would stand the test of the Supreme Court, even if passed by Congress under the clause of the Constitution authorizing the regulation of commerce, because it would interfere with a treaty which is the supreme law of the land."¹⁷¹ This commercial expansionist on April 20, 1876 introduced a resolution requesting the executive to seek negotiation with China to modify the Burlingame treaty. However, his statement that "There can be no remedy but general exclusion . . ."¹⁷² revealed what was

¹⁶⁹ Coolidge, pp. 111-113.

¹⁷⁰ Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2850.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 2857.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 2850.

really on his mind. In a long and dramatic speech Sargent told of the evils of the problem. The Chinese were anti-democratic and they worked too cheaply. "In San Francisco the laborer cannot support his family for less than two dollars or two and a half per day. The Chinaman will work for one, and monopolizes the market. The white laborer must emigrate or starve."¹⁷³ In order to appeal to the northeastern Republicans' sentiment, he cited the North Adams, Massachusetts strike in 1870 in which Chinese workers were brought in as strikebreakers. Sargent further contended that the laborers did not come to the United States voluntarily as provided by the treaty; instead they came involuntarily,¹⁷⁴ and thus "They were quasi slaves."¹⁷⁵ His argument also posited that the women were prostitutes, that no Chinese obeyed American laws, and that all would corrupt American youth. Significantly Sargent believed the Burlingame treaty had been ratified in a state of emotional fervor arising from the emancipation of the slaves and the Civil War. America was too generous, Sargent claimed, in opening of its doors to all peoples. He now wanted to shut those doors to the Chinese. A staunch advocate of expanding trade with Korea and Japan, Sargent remained silent about the China market because on this issue his political survival and California's immediate interests were more important than California's long term interests in trade. In essence when it came to the Chinese problem his commercial expansionist outlook was expendable.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 2853.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 2853-2857

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 2853.

He was willing to seek modification because he knew Congress and the Supreme Court were not ready for legislative violation. Yet he was dubious about referring his proposal to the Committee on Foreign Relations because, "the result would be, on account of the avocations of that committee, its great business, or on account of there being no member from the Pacific coast upon it who understands this subject to bore you with it and continually to call your attention to it, and where objections arise to answer those objections, that the subject will be overlooked again, and this session will go by and another year's horrors be added to those which already exist."¹⁷⁶

His skepticism convinced both Democrats and Republicans by over a 2:1 margin to vote against referral. Multi-sectionalism generally pervaded both the "yea" and "nay" votes; however the tri-partisan senators, who were present, from California, Oregon, and Nevada voted against sending the measure to the foreign relations committee.¹⁷⁷ Still flexible in tactics, Sargent modified his resolution from requesting the executive to initiate negotiations to one of appointing a joint special committee to investigate the Chinese question.

According to Mary Coolidge, the appointed Joint Special Committee of Congress to Investigate Chinese Immigration, was composed originally of Senator Oliver P. Morton, the chairman and a Republican from Indiana; Congressman Edwin R. Meade of New York; Congressman Henry Wilson of Massachusetts; Senator

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 2857. Emphasis mine.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 4421.

Henry Cooper, a Democrat from Tennessee; Aaron A. Sargent, a Republican from California; and Congressman W. F. Piper of California. Coolidge claims Morton took no part in the preparation of the committee's report because of his illness and death in November of 1877. Meade and Wilson essentially did not participate in the investigation. Accordingly "The working committee was thus reduced to three, Sargent, Piper, and Cooper. Senator Sargent and Mr. Piper though of opposing parties, were one on the Chinese question." Professor Coolidge concludes that the majority report was mostly the work of Sargent.¹⁷⁸

The majority statement,¹⁷⁹ disclosed during the Hayes-Tilden controversy in February of 1877, was founded on over 1000 pages of testimony by 129 witnesses.¹⁸⁰ The report recommended modification of the Burlingame treaty so that the pact would be confined "to strictly commercial purposes" and suggested federal legislation to regulate oriental labor immigration.¹⁸¹

Senator Morton's minority report¹⁸² was not presented to

¹⁷⁸ Coolidge, p. 97.

¹⁷⁹ Senate Report 689, 44th Congress, 2d Session.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. Coolidge miraculously quantified the quality of the testimony and concluded at one point that "Measured quantitatively, 53 per cent of the testimony is distinctly favorable to the Chinese, 40 per cent as distinctly unfavorable and the remaining 8 per cent may fairly be divided between the two." Coolidge, p. 97. Yet several pages later after criticizing Sargent for "his undisguised determination to suppress pro-Chinese and encourage anti-Chinese witnesses," Coolidge claims, "no investigation outside the Report itself is necessary to convince any reader that the Congressional committee came to its task committed to an anti-Chinese conclusion and that it had no judicial character whatever." p. 107.

¹⁸¹ Senate Report 689, 44th Congress, 2d Session, p. viii.

¹⁸² Senate Misc. Doc. 20, 45th Congress, 2d Session.

the Senate until the second session of the forty-fifth congress in January of 1878. His report poignantly stated, "Labor does not require that a price shall be fixed by the law, or that men who live cheaply, and can work for lower wages, shall, for that reason, be kept out of the country."¹⁸³ Morton's tolerance however, could not offset Sargent's determined obstinacy.

The recommendations of the majority report were simple and concise, but they did not take into account that the whole question of restricting or excluding Chinese worker immigration involved sharply conflicting goals. In the seventies and the eighties Pacific coast, Colorado, and Nevadan senators, and eventually most southern and border state senators desired to keep the Chinese laborers in China, while Republican commercial expansionists and democratic idealists from the northeast in particular, who were not convinced of the horrors of Chinese labor, preferred American merchants to roam China ports in the hope of increasing U.S. trade. At the same time America wanted to remain a respectable democracy and even adopted Japan as its protege to learn about republican government. Yet America, with the Senate's aid, sought to restrict and exclude a whole race from U.S. shores.

These contradictory goals raised serious considerations about American foreign policy. Was the discontent so serious on the Pacific coast that a carrying trade should be jeopardized by restrictive or exclusive legislation? Senator George F. Hoar, for example, abominated such remedies on the basis that they would hinder American merchant maturation in the Celestial

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 14.

Empire. The moot issue of exploring other alternatives if China refused to cooperate in modification remained unanswered. Was restriction the real goal or was exclusion the ultimate objective? If such legislation were enacted, whether the rest of the world would believe the United States honored treaties continued to be unknown.

The question of the nature of American democracy involved equally serious ramifications. For instance Senator Hoar at one time bolstered his business argument by his appeals to American democratic ideals. His definition of democracy was challenged by a different interpretation of republicanism when Senator Samuel B. Maxey (D. Tex.) stated that "The constitution of the United States . . . never contemplated the bringing of all people of all colors, climes, races, and conditions into this country and making them citizens."¹⁸⁴ The labor argument and the racist argument were so interwoven that it is impossible to determine which was the tactic and which was the end. Since restrictive or exclusive legislation directly affected only one geographical section of the United States, the influence of party loyalty and sectionalism on the Senate's final decision must be determined.

The arguments remained roughly the same from 1877 to 1889. The tripartisan west coast senators and most southern and border state Democratic advocates of restriction or exclusion used rhetoric saturated with diatribes on every conceivable personal habit or belief of the Chinese laborer. They portrayed his work as an economic, political, and social illness which would

¹⁸⁴Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1583.

bring down the United States. They consistently deprecated the China trade. The vocal opposition to restriction or exclusion, composed mostly of Republicans from the northeast, especially New England,¹⁸⁵ based its argument on American principles that the U.S. had been traditionally a refuge for oppressed peoples because of its civil liberties. These Republicans also stressed that the significance of the China market was more important than a few complaining west coast agitators. The fusion of restriction and exclusion and the movement from treaty modification to treaty violation, to de facto abrogation, evolved rather rapidly between 1877 and 1889. The Senate's search for markets in the Pacific in these years yielded to party loyalty and sectional interests over the Chinese question.

On March 4, 1878 Senator Aaron A. Sargent introduced a joint resolution, requesting the President to correspond with China and Great Britain "with a view of securing a change or abrogation of all stipulations in existing treaties which permit the unlimited immigration of Chinese to the United States."¹⁸⁶ This trade expansionist sought to jeopardize friendly intercourse with China because his constituents demanded that Chinese labor immigration cease.

Sargent specifically tried to refute Joseph C. G. Kennedy's argument¹⁸⁷ against prohibition of Chinese immigration. The California senator lambasted Kennedy, the Six Companies'

¹⁸⁵ The most notable exception was James G. Blaine, a Half-Breed and one term senator, who favored a "soft line" towards the south and friendly relations with Latin America.

¹⁸⁶ Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 2d Session, p. 1544.

¹⁸⁷ Sen. Misc. Doc. 36, 45th Congress, 2d Session.

lobbyist, by using historical precedents to bolster his position that Congress had a legal basis to change treaties. He cited Supreme Court rulings such as the Cherokee Tobacco case in which an 1868 internal revenue law taxing Cherokee-produced tobacco, whiskey, snuff, and cigars superceded a previous treaty prohibiting such taxation. On the basis of this precedent Sargent concluded that Congress could change or abrogate pacts, such as the Burlingame agreement.

He became almost ingenious in his presentation of evidence as to why his resolution, S. Res. 20, should be passed. His reasons ran the gamut from logical to ambiguous. He believed that the Chinese government disfavored immigration and that the Burlingame treaty was a one-sided agreement in favor of China because the United States was only allowed access to a few ports. He minimized the China trade. "The value of American trade with China judged by the usual tests is greatly overrated."¹⁸⁸ Even though he claimed statistics showed that the China market was increasing, Sargent held, "it is passing away from the grasp of foreign merchants with startling rapidity. . . ."¹⁸⁹ He hammered his point: "Never was there a greater fallacy than that this country should adhere to this treaty for the sake of its commercial advantages to our people."¹⁹⁰

After arguing that the advantages of the foreign merchant were slipping away in China, Sargent again claimed that the immigrating laborers came to the U.S. involuntarily. Basing

¹⁸⁸ Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 2d Session, p. 1546.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

this part of his argument on the testimony of witnesses before the Joint Special Committee on Chinese Immigration, Sargent belabored the point that the Oriental worker and his female counterpart were under contract and represented "a species of cooly slavery for men and slavery of women worse than any other the world has ever known."¹⁹¹

Labor, as well as the culture of the Chinese worker, were key considerations in Sargent's reasoning. "Chinese labor is not merely a cheap labor, but its introduction here introduces elements into the labor problem new in the history of this country and fraught with momentous consequences to the future social conditions of the laboring classes."¹⁹² He described the character of the Chinese, as he had two years before, as anti-democratic, irreligious, morally lax, and money-hungry. Significantly the Senator pointed out that most Californians were opposed to the Chinese worker. "The people of the Pacific States demand relief."¹⁹³

Predictably Sargent's fellow senator, Newton Booth, an Anti-Monopolist, and John H. Mitchell, a Republican from Oregon, agreed with his remarks. Booth essentially repeated Sargent's argument, while Mitchell reserved the exposition of his view when the joint resolution was reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Without comment, nor by a measurable vote, the Senate referred to the foreign relations committee Sargent's proposal

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 1548.

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 1551.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 1553.

to correspond with China and Great Britain for the limitation or extinction of all treaty clauses which allowed "Unlimited Chinese immigration to the United States." However, the joint resolution failed to emerge from the foreign relations committee in the same form it entered that body. Perhaps the composition of the committee helps to explain the substitution of a "softer" resolution, which only suggested modification of immigration clauses of the Burlingame treaty in "the best interests of both governments," and invited the President's attention to the subject.¹⁹⁴ The members of the committee came largely from the north and the northeast: Hannibal Hamlin, chairman (R. Me.); Timothy O. Howe (R. Wisc.); Stanley Matthews (R. Ohio); William M. Eaton (D. Conn.); and William A. Wallace (D. Pa.). Samuel Kirkwood (R. Ia.) and Thomas C. McCreery (D. Ky.) represented the middlewest and the border states respectively. Only one southerner, John W. Johnston, a Conservative from Virginia, represented the south. Obviously the Pacific states had no representation in the form of actual membership on this Republican dominated committee.

The debate on S. Res. 20 consisted largely of long tangents by Sargent and Booth with virtually very little or no significant opposition. The resolution was simply agreed to without any vote delineation recorded in the Congressional Record. However, in May of 1878 Senator Sargent warned that he would ask for definitive action before the forty-fifth congress closed.

In January of 1879, two months before the end of the third

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 3772-3773.

session of the forty-fifth congress, H.R. 2423, a bill restricting the immigration of Chinese, reached the Senate. In a tri-partisan move with the aid of a southern ally, John T. Morgan (D. Ala.), Sargent, LaFayette Grover (D. Ore.), Newton Booth (Anti-Monopolist, Cal.) vociferously tried to push through the Senate what is commonly known as the "Fifteen Passenger Bill." Basically the bill restricted the number of passengers (except Chinese officials and shipwrecked persons), to fifteen passengers per vessel landing at a U.S. port and abrogated articles five and six of the 1868 Burlingame treaty, which provided for voluntary immigration and reciprocal rights in each country, but not naturalization.¹⁹⁵

Aaron A. Sargent again led the offensive. Just as the property depreciation argument is used against the Negro today, Sargent employed the same tactic against the Chinese. Describing the situation in San Francisco, he depicted the Chinese section of the city as so filthy that white people left the vicinity. "White people flee the contact of that neighborhood, and property all around it depreciates."¹⁹⁶ In essence Sargent's logic which was largely racist, placed the cause squarely on Chinese feculence which he thought produced the undesirable effect of property devaluation.

To add force to his argument the Californian attempted to show that everyone detested the Chinese. Disavowing any personal sympathy for the violence of Kearneyism,¹⁹⁷ Sargent

¹⁹⁵ See Appendix A for the text of articles five and six of the treaty.

¹⁹⁶ Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 1265.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 1266

asserted "All classes of people on the Pacific coast who have observed this [the Chinese problem] are of the same opinion."¹⁹⁸ He contended that this hatred not only transcended class structure, but had even reached the state of discussion at the international level among Britain, France, and Russia.¹⁹⁹ This particular invective on the international unpopularity of the Chinese, became more invidious when Sargent claimed that both Japan and Korea "hated and feared" them.²⁰⁰ Sargent's prejudiced argument culminated in the assertion that "there is an aversion to them instinctive, arising from their habits and their peculiarities above all other peoples."²⁰¹ To substantiate his racist view, he facetiously chided the importance of trade. "Commerce is interested, and therefore we should give up a State!"²⁰² Later he significantly added, "Mr. President, there is something more important than commerce; there is something more important than wealth, if the Senators from the commercial States will appreciate that fact. There is something in national purity. . . ."²⁰³ What he really desired was immediate sectional purity, but he appealed to national chastity to get more votes for the passage of the bill.

Sargent received plenty of aid from other Pacific coast senators. The Oregonian Democrat, LaFayette Grover, aided his

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 1267.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 1313.

²⁰³ Ibid.

California friend by criticizing previous American-Chinese treaties because they restricted U.S. access to only certain ports in China. Though Grover advocated no "mixture of races,"²⁰⁴ he preferred treaty modification to legislative violation.²⁰⁵ Newton Booth, applied Darwinism to the Chinese problem in America. He said, "The doctrine of the survival of the fittest does not mean the survival of the best or the strongest, but of that best fitted to its surroundings." Booth deliberately introduced this general proposition to establish a tangible point concerning labor. "A class of laborers whose wants, natural and artificial, are the least, will, if its volume be be large enough, take the place of every other."²⁰⁶ By using a scientific concept in a threatening and sociological context, Booth attempted to convince the rest of the Senate that the Chinese were on the verge of engulfing the Pacific coast states.

The united tri-partisan senators from the west coast states found a sympathetic ally in John T. Morgan (D. Ala.). The Alabamian, then a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, stated basically the same arguments of Sargent, Booth, and Grover. However, Morgan added his own thought about the politics of the bill. "There is also a strong political significance in this measure. Politicians have seized upon it as a means of controlling votes in the Pacific States, and each party is eagerly pressing its claims at present in forcing

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 1269.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 1270.

this bill upon the attention of Congress."²⁰⁷ With mounting racism he continued, "This bill is even political, and is expected to have much to do with the election of a President. It contains nothing but the question whether an inferior race shall be allowed to infest our country with the loathsome evils of paganism."²⁰⁸ Omitting any comments about the China trade, the southern commercial expansionist in this speech combined the elements of politics and race to defend the position of the west coast. Similar to Grover, Morgan preferred to go through diplomatic channels; however, if necessary to achieve restriction, the Alabamian would break the treaty and jeopardize commercial development in China.

The opposition to immediate restriction, as proposed by H.R. 2423, began with Senator Hannibal Hamlin (R.), chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He remained unconvinced that the Chinese had "invaded" the west coast and he drolly promised to join the anti-Chinese forces only when the Chinese overran the entire country. He then entered a commercially sectional plea. "A particular quality of the cotton goods of the North is finding an open market in China. . . ."²⁰⁹ He appealed to the commercial interests of California by pointing out that from San Francisco alone one million dollars of flour was exported to China, thus showing that American flour would replace Chinese rice.²¹⁰ He snidely added, "And that flour is grown upon the Pacific coast, produced more or less by 'Chinese

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 1271.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 1273.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 1386.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

cheap labor.'"²¹¹

Democratic idealism and commerce formed the basis of the opposition to the proposed Fifteen Passenger Bill. Senator Blanche K. Bruce, the Negro Republican from Mississippi, was silent except for one pungent comment when he rose and said, "Representing as I do a people who but a few years ago were considered essentially disqualified from enjoying the privileges and immunities of American citizenship, and who have since been so successfully introduced into the body-politic, and having large confidence in the strength and the assimilative power of our institutions, I shall vote against the pending bill."²¹² While Bruce opposed the bill on the basis that it violated American ideals, certain northern and northeastern Republicans disapproved of the measure because its passage would hinder American commerce in China. Senator Stanley Matthews (R. Ohio), bitingly stated, "Why, Mr. President, the civilization of Europe thundered on the Asiatic coast with fleets armed with guns to open China to Christian civilization, to compel them to sell to us their tea and to buy our opium."²¹³ It was Senator George F. Hoar (R. Mass.) who elucidated the significance of the Chinese treaty to American trade, especially to American commercial interests based on the Atlantic coast. He said, "This treaty with China itself is one upon which very large commercial and business interests depend. The men of New York, the men of Boston, the men of Philadelphia, the men of Baltimore,

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid., p. 1314.

²¹³ Ibid., p. 1275.

and of other commercial cities, have large interests in the trade with China."²¹⁴ Bainbridge Wadleigh (R. N.H.) who paired with Senator Jerome B. Chaffee (R. Colo.) on the roll calls, had just recently returned from New Hampshire where he learned that leading manufacturers were gaining the China market for cotton goods.²¹⁵ Wadleigh however, was thinking specifically of northeastern cotton goods, a definite sectional consideration.

The most notable absence from the northeastern and northern opposition was James G. Blaine. Because he was a commercial expansionist as well as a protectionist at times and from a state trying to survive the shipping dilemma, it would seem logical that he would oppose legislative violation of the 1868 treaty in favor of increasing American commerce with China. Instead, Blaine who analyzed the whole Chinese problem as an over simplified proposition of Anglo-Saxon or Mongolian possession of the Pacific slope, flatly stated, "I am opposed to the Chinese coming here. . . ."²¹⁶ Conciliatory towards the south, "the plumed knight" would help Senator John T. Morgan plan the Atlanta Cotton Exposition in 1881.²¹⁷ However, this friend of southern cotton, as William A. Williams observes, "saw collaboration with Southerners like Morgan as one way to

²¹⁴ Ibid., p. 1312.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 1398.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 1301.

²¹⁷ William A. Williams, The Roots of the Modern Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Market Place Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 193. Hereafter cited as Williams.

²¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 253-254.

begin rebuilding the Republican party in that region.²¹⁸ In 1879 when this immigration bill was passed, Blaine was still a senator with high aspirations for the executive office. He was also in disfavor with the Stalwarts. Although a commercial expansionist, Blaine apparently was also a racist who was more interested in the markets of Latin America than those of China.

The northern and northeastern hard core opposition to this bill was composed of Angus Cameron (R. Wisc.), Timothy O. Howe (R. Wisc.), Thomas Ferry (R. Mich.), Henry B. Anthony (R. R.I.), Stanley Matthews (R. Ohio), Hannibal Hamlin (R. Me.), Roscoe Conkling (R. N.Y.), George Hoar (R. Mass.), George F. Edmunds (R. Vt.), Justin Morrill (R. Vt.) and Henry Dawes (R. Mass.). These senators consistently voted for the amendments requesting presidential notification of America's desire to modify the Burlingame pact and U.S. acknowledgement of China's reciprocal right to regulate intercourse. These amendments essentially deferred legislative action for approximately a year, while the original bill legislated restriction almost immediately.

Since the Senate passed the Fifteen Passenger Bill, obviously the amendments postponing legislative initiative lost. The south generally split over the amendments with Blanche K. Bruce (R. Miss.), Matthew C. Butler (D. S.C.), and Simon B. Conover (R. Fla.) consistently voting for the amendments and against passage. Middlewesterners representing Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and Nebraska and most border state senators generally voted with the west coast senators.

The vote on the amendments and passage of the bill was not exclusively sectional. The Democrats voted by almost a 2:1 margin in every case against the amendments and voted for

passage by a 3:1 margin. The Republicans consistently divided their votes with most northern and northeastern GOP members opposing the majority of the middlewestern Republicans and their west coast partners.

The victory of the tri-partisan west coast and the Democratic party was short lived. The bill was vetoed by President Hayes because it violated the Burlingame treaty. Shortly thereafter, in 1880, a presidential election year, Hayes sent an all Republican commission to China to negotiate a new treaty, which would allow U.S. legislation to limit the number of Chinese laborers entering America. The significance of Hayes' veto is that he preferred treaty modification, while the majority of the Democrats and the united tri-partisan west coast, and the majority of the middlewestern Republicans sought immediate action by legislation through the Fifteen Passenger Bill.

No bill of significance concerning the limitation of Chinese immigration survived committee referral in the Democratically controlled Senate of the forty-sixth congress, 1879-1881. A new treaty, necessitated by Hayes' commission in 1880, remained pending until May 5, 1881 when an overwhelming number of senators crossing both party and sectional lines approved the clauses "providing for future regulation of Chinese immigration," but not absolute prohibition of immigration, and a guarantee of protection for Chinese residing in the United States.²¹⁹ A concurrent treaty also prohibited American trading of opium. The Senate's approval of this pact reveals that the vast majority of the upper house in 1881

²¹⁹ Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 23, p. 66.

including most voting northern and northeastern Republicans would limit Chinese immigration if treaty modification preceded such legislation.

Congress only needed to pass a bill enacting the restriction now allowed by the new treaty. Senator John F. Miller (R. Cal.) in December of 1881 introduced S. 71, a bill to enforce the stipulations of the new treaty as the instrument of enforcement. The measure provided for twenty years of exclusion of Chinese laborers defined as skilled, unskilled, and mine workers. This bill was a violation of the newly signed treaty, since it (the bill) absolutely prohibited the coming of such laborers for twenty years. To go into effect after ninety days of its passage, the bill also prohibited a state from granting citizenship to Chinese and required certificate identification for those who left and desired to return.

The arguments of the advocates of S. 71 remained similar to the arguments used by the west coast senators and their southern ally, John T. Morgan in the discussion on the Fifteen Passenger Bill. Since Sargent was now practicing law in San Francisco, John F. Miller led the assault.

Miller began by stating that the Chinese problem was essentially solved since the Congress knew "what it was doing" when it passed the Fifteen Passenger Bill.²²⁰ He repeated Sargent's biggoted rhetoric that assimilation of Chinese and Caucasians was like mixing oil and water.²²¹ He used the former senator's reasoning that cheap Chinese labor caused wages to

²²⁰ Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1482.

²²¹ Ibid., p. 1483.

decline. Miller also prophesied that in ten years the Chinese would conquer the Hawaiian Islands,²²² unless they were stopped. He added that since high tariffs protected manufacturers, the same type of protection should apply to American labor.

Miller was aided by a Democrat from Texas, Samuel B. Maxey, who reflected the stake the south had in the solution to the Chinese problem. Maxey had voted for the passage of the Fifteen Passenger Bill because of "paramount necessity." In discussing the passenger measure, he stated that he did not want to break the treaty and cautioned that American commerce in China could be jeopardized.²²³

Yet he believed the constitution was meant for whites only. In defense of S. 71, he claimed "There is today direct railway connection between the State of Texas and the Pacific slope. A few days will carry a Chinaman or anybody else from San Francisco out into Texas."²²⁴

Miller received substantial aid from other senators. LaFayette Grover (D. Ore.) agreed with Maxey that "When they [the founding fathers] declared that all men were created equal . . . they undoubtedly meant all men like themselves."²²⁵ James T. Farley (D. Cal.) in an appeal to the south, queried about the influence of the Chinese on the newly freed Negro worker.²²⁶ Eli Saulsbury (D. Del.) simply wanted to limit

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 3d Session, p. 1393.

²²⁴ Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1534.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 1546.

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 1582.

Chinese immigration to the U.S. because the Chinese were a "distinct race." Ironically he would not stop the ingress of workers "simply upon the ground that they entered into competition with labor."²²⁷ Augustus H. Garland (D. Ark.) offered probably the newest reason for supporting the bill: limiting Chinese immigration was now a matter of policy, because a new treaty had been ratified which allowed restriction.²²⁸

Some Republicans from other sections of the country showed signs of new support for this enforcement bill. John J. Ingalls (R. Ks.) simply believed in home rule. He felt the people of the Pacific states had a right to choose between immigration and restriction.²²⁹ Angus Cameron (R. Wisc.) who voted against the Fifteen Passenger Bill because it contradicted the then existing Burlingame treaty, decided to vote for S. 71, because of policy, the same reason expressed by Garland. Even George F. Edmunds (R. Vt.) thought ten years of prohibition, provided in an amendment offered by Ingalls, was allowed by the new treaty.²³⁰ John Sherman (R. Ohio) thought the outright prohibition violated the pact. However, he agreed with Edmunds' earlier statement that every nation had a right to decide who shall enter and who shall leave.²³¹

Though senators appeared to be more inclined toward limitation since the 1880 treaty contained such a provision,

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 1584.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 1585.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 1586.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 1674.

²³¹ Ibid., p. 1747.

the bill faced some opposition. George F. Hoar (R. Mass.), who had no fear of the Chinese worker coming to Massachusetts because of the state's geographic location, spoke of sublime American democratic idealism. He sarcastically taunted, "The doctrine that free institutions are a monopoly of the favored races, the doctrine that oppressed people may sever their old allegiance at will, but have no right to find a new one, that the bird may fly but may never light, is of quite recent origin."²³² He quickly left idealism for the bare facts. The new treaty did not allow absolute prohibition of immigration; yet "The bill [S. 71] is intended absolutely to prohibit it."²³³

Orville H. Platt (R. Conn.) could not vote for the bill because he also thought it violated the treaty. The bill was pernicious. It amounted to race legislation,²³⁴ according to Platt, and assaulted free labor.²³⁵

The only southern Democrat who consistently opposed the bill was Joseph E. Brown (D. Ga.). A commercial expansionist when it came to the China trade and southern cotton, Brown spoke while John T. Morgan, a fellow southern merchant expansionist, remained essentially silent on this bill. Brown, a practical southerner, stated, "As a commercial power we are striving to compete with Great Britain and to build up our own trade there [in China] as much as possible. . . . In this state of the case it seems to me to be a most unfortunate time for us to do

²³² Ibid., p. 1515.

²³³ Ibid., p. 1516.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 1705.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 1639.

injustice to the people of China or to offend that government unnecessarily."²³⁶ He became more specific when he pointed out that cloth from southern mills was popular in China and southern cotton manufacturers could not compete in the rest of the world as well as they could in China.²³⁷ Unlike most southern senators, Brown rose above party and the southern identification of the Chinese worker with the Negro. He ignored cries from labor groups and voted against the bill to save southern cotton interests in China.

The exact correlative influence of the upcoming congressional elections on roll calls cannot be measured. These variables, plus years of persistent agitation by the west coast states, undoubtedly influenced voting.

The roll call votes on the amendments and passage of S. 71 were more partisan than the previous votes on the Fifteen Passenger Bill. Yet the roll calls on this enforcement bill showed some distinctive signs of sectionalism. For example the votes on amendments reducing the period of prohibition, excluding skilled laborers from the prohibition, excluding skilled laborers who possessed certificates from the prohibition, forbidding the grant of citizenship, and including skilled and unskilled, and mine workers in the definition of "Chinese laborer," pitted the vast majority of the Democrats against the Republicans. However, west coast Republicans always voted with most Democrats, while Republicans from Colorado and

²³⁶ Ibid., p. 1639.

²³⁷ Ibid., pp. 1640, 1643.

Nevada generally voted with the Democrats.²³⁸ Further analysis of the partisan vote reveals that most northern, northeastern, and middlewestern voting senators who opposed the bill were Republicans, while most southern and border state senators in favor of the bill were Democrats. Significantly most middlewestern Republicans changed from voting with the Pacific coast senators on H.R. 2423, the Fifteen Passenger Bill, to generally voting with the Republicans on S. 71. Partisanship was increasing, but the Republican senators from states directly affected by Chinese immigration crossed party lines and joined the Democrats on this bill.²³⁹

There were exceptions of course. Joseph E. Brown (D. Ga.), a commercial expansionist, and David Davis (D. Ill.) generally voted with the Republicans against the bill. Two Republicans, Angus Cameron of Wisconsin and Warner Miller of New York voted variously with both parties. Eugene Hale (R. Me.) voted against reducing the time period of prohibition and then voted with the Democrats on all other amendments. Though earlier he had stated that he would vote for curbing Chinese immigration only when it became apparent that the problem could affect the whole country, he did vote for the 1880 treaty as well as this bill.

The passage of this measure, mostly partisan and sectional in character, met the same fate as the Fifteen Passenger Bill met in 1879. President Arthur vetoed S. 71 primarily because this bill of enforcement violated the new treaty. The President

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Nathaniel Hill of Colorado and Henry Teller of Colorado usually without explanation, voted at times with the Republicans on the amendments. But both voted for passage of the bill.

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Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session. For a break down of the votes see pages 1707; 1716; 1717; 1749; 1750; 1752; and 1753.

preferred to remain within the provision of the treaty, but the bi-partisan²⁴⁰ west coast, Nevada and Colorado, most southern and border state Democrats preferred immediate legislation even though it violated the treaty. The Senate could not muster the required two-thirds vote to override Arthur's veto because the upper house divided its votes again along the same partisan and sectional lines as it did on the original passage of the bill.²⁴¹ But the concept of exclusion was gaining popularity.

President Arthur suffered severe criticism because he Vetoed S. 71. Congress wasted very little time in drafting a new immigration bill. On April 18, 1882, H.R. 5804, a bill to execute certain stipulations of the new treaty, reached the Senate. Arthur did not emerge unscathed from the debate on this new bill. In his defense of H.R. 5804, Morgan bitingly criticized the President's veto of the previous bill, S. 71. He stated, "Sir, I commend that piece of arrant executive hypocrisy to the profound consideration of the men and philosophers of this and of coming generations."²⁴² Though he had remained largely silent during the debate on S. 71, he became vociferous during the discussion on H.R. 5804. He dramatically portrayed the south's position on Chinese immigration. A racist as well as a commercial expansionist, Morgan let the former supercede the latter when he said that "you can understand why it is that a Southern man who has been raised in the midst of the Africans,

²⁴⁰The Anti-Monopolist, Newton Booth, was no longer in the Senate.

²⁴¹See Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2617.

²⁴²Ibid., p. 3269.

and who now experiences the difficulty of getting along with that class of people, must revolt and turn away with despair at the fate to which the President of the United States would consign us. This, sir, is not the quarrel of the Pacific slope alone; the entire Southern people are involved in it."²⁴³

He denied that he favored exclusion because "the Republicans of the Atlantic slope are in favor of their immigration and the Democrats on the Pacific slope and elsewhere are opposed to it, and that I am governing my conduct simply by a question of party fealty and allegiance."²⁴⁴

Morgan never used labor as an argument for exclusion, instead he usually used the issue of race. He held that the Chinese were as inferior as Negroes. He claimed the Chinese-American treaties were unfair. He even dared to ask, "What freedom have we to go to China to reap the harvest of her trade?"²⁴⁵

Obviously he illogically reasoned that since China restricted American access to Chinese ports, then the U.S. had the right to exclude Chinese immigration to America. Since Morgan did not even allude to the labor issue, almost on cue, James H. Slater (D. Ore.) chimed in "We who are pressing this bill understand it to be a bill in the interest of labor,"²⁴⁶

The rhetoric of Morgan and Slater was colorful and dramatic. But such rhetoric did not insure passage of the bill. James Farley (D. Cal.) knew what did. He succinctly summed up the

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 3270.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 3269.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 3310.

entire crisis: ". . .on the Democratic votes in the Senate depends the success of this measure."²⁴⁷

The opposition refuted the statements of the advocates of the bill. George F. Hoar deplored the measure as a violation of American principles and as an infraction on the democratic ideals upon which the Republican party was founded.²⁴⁸

Joseph Hawley (R. Conn.) still did not believe the Chinese problem was as huge as the senators from California, Oregon, Nevada, and Colorado portrayed the issue. Yet he was willing to limit and restrict immigration. However, this bill, he thought, excluded the Chinese on the basis of race. Thus, he opposed the measure and declared, "I leave the bill to posterity for its condemnation."²⁴⁹

The bill, H.R. 5804, which required strenuous registration procedures of certificate identification, prohibited Chinese labor immigration for ten years, but exempted those laborers who were in the U.S. on November 17, 1880 or those who came before the passage of this bill, passed the Senate by a very partisan vote with signs of sectional influence.²⁵⁰ The "nays" were composed solely of Republicans from the north, northeast, and the middlewest. The composition of the "yeas" was more complex, but the Democrats dominated the constituency. All voting southern Democrats and border state Democrats voted for passage. They were joined by the united bi-partisan senators

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 3352.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 3265.

²⁴⁹ Congressional Record and Appendix, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 185.

²⁵⁰ Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 3412.

from California, Oregon, Nevada, and Colorado. Angus Cameron (R. Wisc.) and Warner Miller (R. N.Y.) sided with the Democrats as they had done before. Three other Republicans, Eugene Hale (R. Me.), Alvin Saunders (R. Neb.), and Charles Van Wyck (R. Neb.), without explanation, joined the Democrats though they had voted with the Republicans on the amendments.²⁵¹

By 1882, a congressional election year, President Arthur had changed his mind about legislative violation of the 1880 Chinese-American treaty. He had been severely criticized by the press, Pacific coast agitators, and labor groups for his rejection of the Fifteen Passenger Bill. Consequently he did not veto H.R. 5804, a bill excluding immigration for ten years, though it was substantially the same as S. 71.

The 1882 act proved to be deficient. It did not define the term "Chinese laborer" broadly enough to include the whole Chinese race. Shortly after its passage two conflicting judicial opinions rose reflecting the sectional influence on the issue of immigrating Chinese workers. In California the judicial ruling claimed the term "Chinese laborer" included those born in China as well as those born in any other territory or who lived or left for America from any nation other than China. This in effect was a ban on the basis of race. The Massachusetts decision held that the 1882 act applied to only Chinese subjects born in or coming directly from China.²⁵² In essence each state court followed the sentiment of its senatorial representatives in application of the new law.

²⁵¹ Ibid. See pages 3264 and 3411.

²⁵² Congressional Record, 48th Congress, 1st Session, p. 5938.

Agitators from the Chinese problem states thought a new law which broadened the definition of "Chinese laborer" was needed to correct the 1882 ordinance. In 1884 H.R. 1798, a bill defining "Chinese laborer" to include all Chinese subjects and Chinese regardless of the place of their birth or residence, reached the Senate. This bill excluded by race, an absolute prohibition, and therefore violated the treaty of 1880.

Without any qualitatively significant discussion raising new points, the Senate passed the measure by an easy vote of forty-three "yeas" to only twelve "nays." Though the vast majority of the voting Democrats cast "yea!" votes, almost half of those who voted for the bill were Republicans. Those who voted "nay" were all Republicans except one. Joseph E. Brown (D. Ga.) voted as usual with the hard-core Republicans from the northeast and the north against exclusion. Few middlewestern Republicans voted "nay," while the northeastern group broke down, when Henry Blair (R. N.H.), and Austin F. Pike (R. N.H.) voted for the bill. Most middlewestern Republicans followed Blair and Pike, the united bi-partisan west coast, plus Colorado and Nevada, the Democratic south and border states.²⁵³

The 1880 treaty, even though it was strengthened in 1882 and 1884, was still inefficient according to the senators from the west coast states. Senator John H. Mitchell (R. Ore.) in February of 1886 decided the solution was complete abrogation of all treaties with China which permitted immigration. On February 12, 1886 he introduced S. 1483 to achieve such an end.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 5938.

In the ensuing debate Mitchell stated, "The objection that our commerce with China would suffer and great commercial interests be stricken down by the abrogation of this treaty is not well-founded. . . . China has too much at stake, too many interests to subserve to close her ports against American commerce."²⁵⁴ He believed past acts restricting Chinese immigration had failed to stop the crafty worker who evaded such statutes. But this bill, S. 1483, would end the evasion. Mitchell explicitly stated the effects of the measure: "This bill, unlike our restriction acts and proposed acts, is not elastic; it is absolutely iron-clad; it leaves nothing to construction; it is conclusive. . . . Restriction acts simply apply the knife in a rather delicate manner to some of the outer branches of the deadly upas tree, while the bill under consideration lays the ax with a determined and vigorous hand at all of its poisonous roots."²⁵⁵

His bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and never heard of again. Though the committee was composed of anti-Chinese advocates, the majority of the members had opposed legislative violation of the 1880 treaty and now opposed blatant abrogation.²⁵⁶

However the same foreign relations committee was more receptive to S. 1991, a bill which defined the term "Chinese

²⁵⁴Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1815.

²⁵⁵Ibid., p. 1817.

²⁵⁶The membership consisted of John F. Miller (R. Cal.), John Sherman (R. Ohio), William P. Frye (R. Me.), William Evarts (R. N.Y.), John T. Morgan (D. Ala.), Joseph E. Brown (D. Ga.), Eli Saulsbury (D. Del.), and Henry B. Wayne (D. Ohio).

laborer" to include any worker of the Chinese race regardless of his allegiance or departing port. The same definition also applied to the term "Chinese passenger."²⁵⁷ John Sherman illustrated the changing sentiment in favor of exclusion. Though he had previously voted against laws excluding the Chinese and the recent treaty, he said, "yet I am not sure but in that the time has come when exclusions must be made for the sake of American nationality."²⁵⁸ Regarding the bill under consideration, Sherman simply declared that it did not violate any treaty obligations.

The bill passed the Senate by a non-measurable vote. Thus partisanship and sectional influence can not be determined. The House was not so cooperative; the bill failed to be even considered.

The Senate's debates in the 1870's and the 1880's on Chinese immigration were hot and volatile. Public opinion was even hotter and more explosive. The Kearneyism of the seventies spread to other states and territories by the eighties. Numerous Chinese were killed or beaten in Rock Springs, Wyoming, southern California, and Tacoma, Washington. In the midst of the debates over exclusion in 1886, the Senate upon the recommendation of President Cleveland, considered paying an indemnity to China for the Rocks Springs outrage in September of 1885, in which twenty-eight Chinese had been killed. Only ten senators opposed reimbursing the Chinese government. All of these came from the border states, the south, and the Pacific coast. The "yeas"

²⁵⁷ Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, p. 4958.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 4959.

were composed of both Democrats and Republicans from all sections of the nation. Thus some senators transcended party and section to pay the Chinese the rightly deserved indemnity.

Continued feverish agitation for exclusion and more violence led John H. Mitchell (R. Ore.) to attempt legislative abrogation again in December of 1887. He used the old and stale tactics of informing Congress of its rights regarding treaties, portraying the Chinese as vile, immoral and sly, and disparaging the potential China market. "We are told, furthermore, that we have a right to look in the near future to China as a market for our surplus wheat; that the Chinese will soon become a wheat eating people. . . . I venture to suggest in the first place that the Chinese never will in all human probability become a flour-eating people to any extent whatever."²⁵⁹

The reason Mitchell felt compelled to introduce S. 582, a bill abrogating all treaties between China and America which allowed the immigration of Chinese to America, was because he believed the restriction laws of 1882 and 1884 were not sufficiently exclusive. He asserted, "It must therefore be remembered that the rate of arrivals from China in San Francisco annually has never been so large as since the date when the United States sought by treaty to restrict this class of immigration, thereby conclusively proving that restriction treaties do not restrict, and restriction acts, so far from restricting, have naturally increased Chinese immigration to this country."²⁶⁰

²⁵⁹ Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st Session, p. 418.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 420.

Mitchell's repetitive rhetoric did not convince the Senate to abrogate existing treaties which allowed Chinese immigration to America. The measure was indefinitely postponed, thus implicitly signifying that outright abrogation was still too drastic, especially since negotiations for modification of the treaties were pending.

Even though on March 12, 1888 a new treaty between the U.S. and China was to be signed in Washington, the Senate on March 3, 1888 requested the President to negotiate a new pact. At this stage, according to Mary Coolidge, the treaty which had been in the making for several months contained the following provisions: (1) prohibition of the coming Chinese laborers for twenty years, (2) exemption of the Chinese laborer who had a wife, child, parent, or property, or debts of at least \$1,000.00, and the exercise of the right to return to the U.S. within one year after departure, (3) requirement of a certificate for Chinese subjects, excluding laborers, to re-enter the country, (4) guarantee of rights to Chinese subjects in the U.S., (5) denial of U.S. obligation to grant indemnity and at the same time agreement to pay for past damages.²⁶¹

The newly negotiated treaty emerged from the secret Senate sessions with two amendments of significance. The first amendment, attached to the clause prohibiting Chinese laborers for twenty years, extended this prohibition to Chinese laborers who were then out of the country whether they held certificates or not.²⁶² This addition amounted to injustice to those laborers

²⁶¹Coolidge, p. 194.

²⁶²Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 26, p. 256.

who were not then in the U.S. and desired to come back. The second amendment prohibited the entry of a Chinese laborer who did not possess and show the ~~proper~~ certificate to the customs officer.²⁶³ The unanimously approved amendments in essence assured maximum exclusion. Without a roll call vote, the Senate on May 7, 1888 approved the pact with the two amendments.²⁶⁴

The Chinese government never ratified the treaty. The matter remained pending throughout the summer and autumn of 1888, a presidential election year. Congress became impatient, when China did not respond as quickly as the national legislature thought Peking should reply. The administration remained silent about the progress of Chinese ratification. However, if the Chinese accepted the pact, Cleveland, who was up for re-election would gain votes from the west coast states. Harrison, according to Mary Coolidge, "had voted against the first restriction law with Senator Hoar, and for striking out the clause excluding the Chinese from naturalization. The fact that his attitude at that time was the attitude of the best men of his party, and indeed, of the statesmen as opposed to the politicians of both parties, did not prevent his action from being called pro-Chinese by the Democrats in the campaign of 1888. Thus the Republicans, even more than the Democrats in Congress, were driven to put themselves on record on the Chinese question in order to secure the vote of the Pacific

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

states."²⁶⁵

Rumors spread that China had rejected the treaty. Regardless of the validity of such hearsay, Joseph N. Dolph (R. Ore.) could wait no longer. On July 11, 1888 he introduced S. 3304, a bill prohibiting the entry of Chinese laborers into the U.S. Assuming the pact would be ratified, he considered the proposed measure to be the best possible bill which could be passed by congress and simultaneously remain within the provisions of the new treaty.²⁶⁶ John H. Mitchell, who also could wait no longer, supported this new bill because he did not believe the pending treaty would be effective.²⁶⁷

Yet the solidarity of the anti-Chinese advocates began to show some signs of ambivalence as represented by John T. Morgan. He conceded that he preferred to exclude on the basis of race, but he also realized that the Chinese laborers had made substantial contribution to the American economy: the building of thousands of miles of railroads. His statement that "there is such a thing as going to extremity," merely revealed that he had reconsidered the problem, but had not fundamentally changed his view. Besides Morgan was still a politician and a bigot. Only that combination of characteristics could allow a man to boldly state: "The old Democratic party has been doing a great deal of good after all, for we have at last converted the Republican party of this country to the idea that this is

²⁶⁵ Coolidge, p. 196.

²⁶⁶ Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st Session, p. 6570.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 7301.

really a white man's country and an American's country. . . ." ²⁶⁸

The bill passed without any debate of significance. Since the vote was not a roll call vote, the influence of party and section can not be determined. The measure was sent to the House of Representatives and was returned with an amendment which repealed the acts of 1882 and 1884, effective as soon as the treaty was ratified. The Senate promptly concurred. Cleveland signed the amended bill on August 29, 1888. Thus the race in this election year to show the voters which party was the most anti-Chinese started with a Democratic lead.

The Democrats continued to hold the lead when H.R. 11336, a bill supplemental to the 1882 act, passed the House without debate and reached the Senate on the same day, September 3, 1888. Specifically the proposed measure prohibited the return of any Chinese laborer who had left the United States before the passage of this bill and voided the certificate required for entry into the U.S. ²⁶⁹

Since the press had reported that Peking had rejected the treaty, the debate became an entangled maze of political chicanery, ambivalence, ethics, wisdom, and emotionalism. Henry Teller (R. Colo.), was delighted that the Chinese had rejected the treaty because he was "in favor of legislating upon this subject without reference to treaties." ²⁷⁰ John Mitchell was just as elated, but claimed the bill did not go far enough. John Sherman hoped the bill would pass, provided that the treaty.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 7301.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 8215.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 8216.

had been rejected by Peking.²⁷¹ However, Matthew C. Butler provided the most pointed remark of all: "I think it is a game of politics, this whole business, and not a very seemly one, either, I must say. But for the fact that we are on the eve of a Presidential election and each party wants to get the vote of the Pacific slope, this Senate would not be engaged in this debate."²⁷² George Vest's (D. Mo.) attempt to show that Benjamin Harrison's law partner had naturalized seven Chinese in 1881 and that they had voted for a Republican ticket in the next election, illustrates Butler's point very well.

Signs of the long years of west coast agitation and subsequent reconsideration revealed themselves in this debate. Orville Platt (R. Conn.) decided to vote for this bill, although he voted against the 1882 law. He had altered his opinion because, "I have come to see and believe, and in that respect my sentiments have somewhat changed, that the great bulk of the population of China, and especially that portion of it that will come here to enter into competition with our laborers, is of a character which is incapable of assimilation with us in any form, incapable of having the aspirations which an American citizen must have in order to make a real sovereign of the Republic."²⁷³ Henry W. Blair (R. N.H.) also expressed the same sentiments and voted for the passage of the bill.

The problem of the Chinese laborer directly affected only

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 8217.

²⁷² Ibid., p. 8219.

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 8331.

one section of the country, the Pacific coast states, Colorado, and Nevada. Popular agitation became so intense that at first a tri-partisan and later a bi-partisan alliance was forged in these states. The reasons for the west coast's dissatisfaction with the Chinese worker were largely social, or racist, and economic. Popular clamor for restriction or exclusion caused Pacific senators to expend some of their commercial goals in order to achieve a solution to the Chinese problem. For example, Aaron A. Sargent disparaged the trade with China when discussing Chinese immigration.

Since most Pacific coast senators claimed the American share in the Chinese market was trivial, they could afford to clamor for outright abrogation as John Mitchell did in 1887. Thus the west coast senators sought immediate relief, without much thought about the long range consequences of exclusion.

Most southern and border state Democrats were sympathetic to the west coast senators. Commercial expansionists, such as John T. Morgan, were also racists. Only in 1888 did Morgan express doubt that there was such a thing as going too far. Similar to sympathetic southerners, he never discussed the cause of labor. He and other southern Democrats ended their search for new markets in China when they discovered that Chinese laborers were searching for work in America. The only southern exception, Joseph E. Brown, bolted the party and the south by voting against anti-Chinese bills. Georgia's cotton needed to be sold and Brown thought China would be a lucrative market.

Since very few Chinese or Negroes resided north of the Mason-Dixon line, it was very easy for Henry L. Dawes and

George F. Hoar to preach American democratic idealism. Most northern, northeastern, and middlewestern Republicans slowed down the route to legislative violation of the treaties. Their concern for commerce complemented their concern for American principles.

To the Pacific coast senator, regardless of party loyalty, the problem was immediate. His constituents wanted relief. To most northern and northeastern and some middlewestern Republicans the problem possessed long range implications concerning American democracy and American commerce. To most southern and Border state Democrats, the Chinese worker was too similar to the Negro.

The Senate's search for markets in China yielded on the Chinese question due to both party loyalty and sectional interests. Though U.S. trade with China did not cease, such legislation as condoned by the Senate failed to maximize Chinese-American commercial intercourse.

V. Paying Back Japan and Opening Up Korea

Relations between the United States and Japan and between America and Korea during the seventies and the eighties lacked the tension of the Chinese-American consociation. Neither Asian country was sending workers to the United States at this time. Japan was America's protege in the Far East and the only friend in Asia that Korea trusted.

The Senate's role in Japanese-American relations, 1877-1889, produced positive results. The upper body swiftly and

frequently unanimously approved several treaties between the two countries. On the basis of American honor, friendship, and a lucrative trade, the Senate aided in the return of the Japanese Indemnity Fund in 1883. Because Japanese laborers were not immigrating to the United States, west coast senators, southern and border state Democrats, did not disparage Japanese commercial intercourse. In essence, the Senate viewed Japan as a useful friend to reach Korea, a marketplace for American products, and as a student of American culture.

Since there were no crucial domestic issues affecting the Japanese-American association, the Senate could foster an amicable intimacy and a commercial relationship. Neither party loyalty nor sectional interests played any role in the Senate's unanimous approval of three treaties between the two nations.

The Senate's unanimous approval of the treaty of 1878 was a concrete step toward increasing trade with Japan.²⁷⁴

Significantly this treaty annulled the clauses in the 1858 and 1868 pacts which limited the Japanese government's taxation power to only five per cent ad valorem on products imported and exported to Japan. It generally loosened trade regulations and opened up two new ports to the United States. However, implementation of the pact was contingent on the agreement of other powers. In essence the new pact cautiously deepened American commercial penetration in Japan because of the provision which hinged implementation on the approval of other countries. Thus, the Senate voted unanimously for a rather conservative

²⁷⁴Sen. Exe. Jour., vol. 21, p. 432.

step towards increasing trade with Japan.

The Senate's unanimous action on the other two treaties signified America's desire to welcome Japan into the community of nations and indirectly strengthened the commercial ties between the two countries. The "Convention for Reimbursing Shipwreck Expenses," approved March 23, 1881, provided for reciprocal payment of the cost of rescue of shipwrecked persons. The extradition treaty, approved with minor amendments on June 31, 1886, provided for the reciprocal exchange of persons charged with crimes named in the pact.²⁷⁵ Such agreements drew the two nations closer together. The Senate's unanimous endorsement revealed that the upper house followed a commercial and amiable policy towards Japan.

Though the treaties helped to consolidate the relationship between America and Japan, a small thorn, the Japanese Indemnity Fund, nagged at the symbiotic friendship. The Senate argued over how much of the fund should be returned to Japan, and finally decided in 1883 to return \$785,000, that is, the principal. This issue was debated in the Senate more than any other question during the years under consideration.

The Japanese Indemnity Fund was the indirect result of Commodore Matthew C. Perry's opening of Japan. The Commodore had negotiated the 1858 trade treaty with the Shogunate, who held the real power. The Meiji Emperor and the Shogunate were then engaged in a power struggle. This grapple was complicated by certain lords who opposed the result of the pact: American access to Japanese ports. These lords, especially those from

²⁷⁵ Ibid., vol. 23, pp. 42-43, vol. 25, p. 509.

the provinces of Nagato and Satsuma attacked foreign ships in the straits of Simonoseki.²⁷⁶ In 1863 the lord of Nagato attacked the American steamer, the Pembroke, when the ship attempted to pass through the straits. Immediately the American minister to Japan demanded redress of grievances and sent the Wyoming to avenge the Pembroke. The Wyoming killed forty Japanese and suffered a loss of only five or six sailors. The Japanese government promptly paid \$21,517.00 for the damages the vessels incurred. However, the lord of Nagato had not been sufficiently intimidated by the Wyoming, since he continued to fire on foreign vessels. In September of 1864 Britain, Spain, the United States, and the Netherlands banded together and sent a naval expedition, including the American chartered vessel, the Takiang, to subdue the lord, who unconditionally surrendered and agreed to pay the expenses of the expedition.

Japan was allowed a choice of paying \$3,000,000.00 or opening up more ports to the foreign powers. Britain, Spain, the United States, and the Netherlands preferred the latter, and therefore changed the original indemnity of \$2,000,000.00 to \$3,000,000.00 to coerce Japan into severing its old isolationist policy. Since a civil war was raging in that country, partly because of indigenous opposition to foreign access to Japanese ports, the Shogunate chose to pay the \$3,000,000.00 to the four powers rather than grant access to more of her harbors. The United States netted \$750,000.00 of this sum.

The \$750,000.00 in gold was delivered to the United States

²⁷⁶ It should be noted that the ports opened to American access by the treaty of 1858 could be reached without passing through the straits.

and promptly invested in bonds. Since Secretary of State William H. Seward was not sure America was entitled to the money, because of the possibility that Japan was overcharged, he kept it as a separate fund and did not deposit it in the Treasury. Through wise investments the fund grew to exceed over a million dollars by 1878.

Almost every year until Congress voted to return part of the money to Japan in 1883, a bill was introduced in either house of congress to restore a portion of the fund to the Japanese government. The Senate had even passed such a bill in 1876, but the House of Representatives disagreed and voted against passage. Every administration since the acceptance of the fund, recommended that the fund be returned to Japan because America should not have accepted the gold in the first place.

The crux of the problem in the Senate in 1878 lay in how much of the fund should be returned to Japan. Concerning S. 742, a bill relating to the fund, the Committee on Foreign Relations recommended the return of \$750,000.00 in gold, without interest. The committee also recommended that the crew of the Wyoming should be paid out of the interest accrued and the remainder of the interest should be returned to the U.S. Treasury.²⁷⁷

The committee claimed America's action against Japan in October of 1864 in consort with the other powers was "a declaration of war against an ally. . . ." ²⁷⁸ More significantly

²⁷⁷ Senate Report 378, 45th Congress, 2d Session, p. 4.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

the committee's reasons for returning the fund were largely commercial. This body concluded that since Japan had recognized America as one of the most favored of nations, it was "our duty to afford them aid and encouragement, and to continue to cultivate with them intimate friendly commercial relations."²⁷⁹ The return of the fund was the vehicle. More American trade with Japan was the end.

The committee's amendments were never acted on and the bill was not even discussed. This inaction continued as such bills were introduced in 1879 and 1880 and were indefinitely postponed.

The Committee on Foreign Relations in 1881 was more generous toward Japan. Because of friendly relations with the Japanese, the committee recommended "that after deducting the amount of \$140,000 and the interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent., amounting in all to the sum of \$248,000, that the balance of the fund, amounting on the 15th day of February, 1881, to the sum of \$1,463,224 in gold, be returned to the Government of Japan."²⁸⁰

In a discussion of S. 2022, a bill relating to the fund, John T. Morgan (D. Ala.) was the champion of returning at least part of the fund to Japan and paying proper restitution to the crews of the Wyoming and the Takiang. He correctly noted "that the Government of Japan had no treaty engagement with any country in the world by which this strait of Simonoseki was to be kept open, and it was as strictly an inland sea as the

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Senate Report 752, 46th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 3.

Bosphorus or the Sea of Marmora."²⁸¹ The United States had neither a case nor a claim. However Morgan's reasons for returning the fund were not entirely based on ethics and legality. America should return the fund because in October of 1864 "we did not want the money of Japan, but that our only purpose was to have open and free commercial intercourse with her. . . ."²⁸² In contrast to his remarks about the China trade, Morgan amplified the fertility of the Japanese markets. He stated, "Our trade with Japan is increasing steadily, and gives promise of being most advantageous to our merchants and people."²⁸³ Thus Morgan, who remained totally silent during the debate on the Chinese Indemnity Fund for the Rocks Springs outrage, thought the United States should return the fund in order to maintain friendly commercial relations with Japan.

Opposition to the bill was slight and not a serious threat to its passage. Senator Eli Saulsbury (D. Md.) lamely protested the return because he was afraid the fund would accrue to some lobby and not to the Japanese government.²⁸⁴ Charles W. Jones (D. Fla.) felt the fund should only be returned through a "regular international channel"²⁸⁵ and in conjunction with Britain, Spain, and the Netherlands.²⁸⁶ Unlike Morgan, Jones was not attuned to Japan's trade potential with the United States. The Floridian simply stated, "I will not be carried

²⁸¹ Congressional Record, 46th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 2263.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 2264.

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 2266.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 2265.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 2271.

away by any false sympathy, by any far-stretched notions of commercial advantage that may inure to the Government under which I live."²⁸⁷ Obviously none of the protests were related to domestic issues.

Reflecting essentially neither party loyalty nor sectional influence the Senate on the last day of the third session of the forty-sixth congress overwhelmingly passed the bill by a vote of forty-six to six. The final draft of the bill granted Japan \$1,463,224.00 and paid the crews of the Wyoming and the Takiang \$248,000.00. The six negative votes came from southern and border state senators, of whom, only one, Charles W. Jones, was vociferous in his opposition to the bill. The House of Representatives responded negatively to the Senate's action and the matter of the fund recurred again in 1882.

In the early spring of 1882 H.R. 1052, a bill concerned with the Japanese Indemnity Fund, came from the House of Representatives stipulating that \$1,516,364 in bonds be paid to Japan minus \$250,000 for payment to the crews of the Wyoming and the Takiang. The debate in the Senate on this bill was carried on without any hint of party loyalty or sectional influence.

Senator John T. Morgan again championed the cause of the Japanese Indemnity Fund. In an attempt to persuade the rest of the Senate to vote for the bill's passage, he asserted that the 1864 expedition produced an imbroglio which led to a civil war in Japan.²⁸⁸ Then he abruptly left this absurdity for the

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 4230.

stark facts: "I merely wish to call the attention of the Senate to one fact, and that is that Japan is the only true and tried friend we have in the Orient, and she is indeed a true and honorable friend."²⁸⁹ He accused Britain of tricking the United States into participating in the expedition, because Her Majesty's government wanted to improve her trade with Japan and maintain the five per cent ad valorem limitation on imports and exports, which the 1878 treaty annulled.²⁹⁰ The whole purpose of Britain's "apparent generosity," according to the Alabamian, "was to bind us to an understanding that we would further combine in forcing a certain tariff policy upon Japan that England desired. . . ."²⁹¹

Morgan's speeches were exciting, dramatic, and sometimes inaccurate. Charles W. Jones however, held to his own view. He remained convinced that the fund should be returned through the proper diplomatic channels and that the other three powers, Britain, Spain, and the Netherlands, should be consulted about the proposed return.²⁹² He was "perfectly willing" to restore the fund to Japan provided the other powers were notified of such action.²⁹³ He even corrected the Alabamian's preposterous

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 4262. Emphasis mine.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 4263.

²⁹¹ Ibid., Justin Morrill (R. Vt.) early in the second session of this congress also commented on the 1878 treaty. Since operation of the pact depended on agreement by other powers, Morrill thought the Senate should try to persuade the other countries to approve the treaty. This, according to Morrill, would be a greater service to Japan than reimbursement of the fund. Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2d Session, p. 2766.

²⁹² Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 4236.

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 4237.

statement that the 1864 expedition precipitated the civil war between the Shogunate and the emperor. "The unsettled state of that empire for long years previous to this transaction is well known to those who have taken the pains to read it. The Senator from Alabama alluded to it, but he did not state the whole case. He did not tell us of the insecurity that existed there with respect to all Europeans."²⁹⁴

Several other senators for various reasons quibbled with Morgan's position. Noting the diametrically opposite views the Alabamian held about the Chinese and Japanese markets, Charles H. Van Wyck (R. Neb.) chided Morgan's unsystematic logic. "I am very glad to hear my friend from Alabama say a good word for the Japanese. That may be taken in part atonement for the very bitter and scorching denunciation which he passed upon the Chinese bretheren, who are only a little farther off."²⁹⁵ Yet Morgan and the Nebraskan essentially agreed about the bill, H.R. 1052, under consideration. Both were willing to return the entire fund, principal, legal interest, and the interest accrued from the purchase of the bonds.

Senator George F. Hoar (R. Mass.) questioned the use of bonds as the instrument of payment to Japan. He wondered "whether it is quite becoming the dignity of this Government to be giving to other governments its bonds payable at a future time?"²⁹⁶ Hoar continued his argument that if the original amount of the fund was invested in bonds which were above par

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 4257.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 4292.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 4299.

at that time, then we should pay Japan at the above par value, instead of the face value.²⁹⁷

Other senators offered varying opinions about the issue. Apparently following Morgan's logic, John F. Miller (R. Cal.) also wanted to return the fund and noted that U.S. commerce with Japan annually amounted to over \$15,000,000.²⁹⁸ Henry W. Blair (R. N.H.) desired to return the entire fund, while John J. Ingalls (R. Ks.) claimed he had never seen "a more shining illustration of pseudo-philanthropy."²⁹⁹ Preston Plumb (R. Ks.) thought the United States should keep the fund to thwart the Japanese lobbies which he believed were trying to get it back. John Sherman (R. Ohio) provided a stinging indictment of the issue. He said, "I believe myself that there is no money due to Japan. . . . The Japanese are the shrewdest nations of the eastern continent. You may say they are the English of the Pacific."³⁰⁰

The Senate changed the bill considerably. 'Without signs of party loyalty or sectional influence the Senate voted to reduce the amount to be returned to Japan from \$1,516,364.00 to \$785,000.87 to be paid in legal coin.³⁰¹ Similarly the Senate also voted to cancel and discharge all bonds, known as

²⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 4302. Hoar was specifically responding to an amendment offered by Justin Morrill which provided for payment in legal coin and the sale of the bonds.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 4367.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 4371.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 4708-4709.

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 4780.

the Japanese Indemnity Fund.³⁰² While the original House bill proposed to pay \$250,000 in prize money to the crews of the ships involved in the 1864 expedition, to be subtracted from the amount to be paid to Japan, the Senate proposed to give the crews \$140,000 out of the Treasury.

The vote on the passage of the bill also failed to reflect party loyalty or sectional influence.³⁰³ Those who voted against the bill did so for other reasons. Matthew C. Butler (D. S.C.) refused to vote for the measure's passage because he thought it had been emasculated.³⁰⁴ Samuel B. Maxey (D. Tex.) agreed with Butler and cast a "nay" vote. Those who voted for the bill did so for reasons other than party loyalty and sectional interest. Morgan voted "yea" as "an act of justice to Japan."³⁰⁵ Alvin Saunders (R. Neb.) preferred the proposal to no settlement at all.³⁰⁶ Isham G. Harris (D. Tenn.) voted for the bill's passage because he thought the conference committee could perfect the measure. John A. Logan (D. Ill.) thought the Senate should have given Japan the interest, but he voted for the bill anyway, "for the purpose of showing that there is a disposition on the part of some at least to keep up the credit and honor of the nation. . . ."³⁰⁷ In essence each voted without regard to any domestic issues or influences such as party politics or

³⁰² Ibid., p. 4835.

³⁰³ Ibid., p. 4842.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 4840.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 4841.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

sectional interests.

The whole debate on this bill and previous measures essentially boiled down to how much of the fund should be returned to Japan. Obviously most senators thought Japan deserved at least part of the fund or else the bill would have never passed. Very few senators thought Japan deserved nothing.

The Senate wanted to maintain friendly relations with Japan and not jeopardize American commercial influence in that country. Restriction of part of the indemnity fund and unanimous approval of the 1878 commercial treaty, the 1881 shipwreck expenses pact, and the 1886 extradition agreement revealed the Senate's desire for an honorable, friendly and commercial relationship with Japan. The Senate's desire could be realized during the period under consideration because no crucial domestic issues, such as immigrating workers, influenced senators to vote by party or by section.

While the United States, with the aid of the Senate, was busy building an intimate relationship with Japan, Korea remained a different matter. In 1878 the small peninsula jutting between the sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea was little known to most Americans.

One American who knew about Korea and her potential place in America's search for markets, was Senator Aaron A. Sargent (R. Cal.). On April 8, 1878 almost one month after he had introduced a joint resolution to alter the immigration clauses of the Burlingame treaty, Sargent introduced a joint resolution (S. Res. 24) to negotiate a treaty with Korea. Shortly thereafter,

Commodore Robert W. Shufelt was commissioned by the Navy department to go to Korea.³⁰⁸

Since Japan was the only Asian nation Korea trusted, Shufelt went to Japan to secure Japanese aid in the procurement of a United States-Korean treaty. Failing to obtain the necessary aid and receiving an initial rejection from Korea, Shufelt engaged the services of Li Hung-Chang, the Chinese viceroy. In 1880 he returned to the United States while negotiations for a treaty with Korea were left in Li Hung-Chang's hands.³⁰⁹

Senator Sargent and the Commodore were personal friends. Sargent was also chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in 1878 and a commercial expansionist who wanted to export American products. In 1878 he literally "campaigned" in the Senate for a treaty of amity and commerce with Korea. A shrewd tactician, the Californian presented the proposition by first describing the success of American commercial penetration in Japan. Since Perry's opening in Japan and ratification of the first treaty in 1868, a lucrative trade had sprouted. Sargent significantly pointed out that "It [Japan] is the only place where we have a fine American trade carried on in American bottoms."³¹⁰

Displaying a bit of nationalism, Sargent thought Japan had been introduced to a better civilization--the American one.³¹¹ He reasoned that if Japan could be induced to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce, Korea could be similarly prompted.

³⁰⁸ Charles Paullin, "The Opening of Korea," Political Science Quor., 25, No. 3, (1910), 477.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 482.

³¹⁰ Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 2d Session, p. 2600.

³¹¹ Ibid.

Since Japan commercially dominated Korea by right of the 1876 treaty between the two nations, Sargent believed that the Korean-Japanese treaty "illustrates the wisdom of our former action in opening intercourse with Japan."³¹² He painted a vivid picture of Korea's characteristics and assets. Geographically the little nation sat between Japan, Russia, and China on a small peninsula inhabited by about twelve million people. The climate ranged from severe to temperate and the people "were superior to the Japanese in strength and stature."³¹³ "Gold, silver, iron, and salt are said to abound, but mining is restricted by the government to its own requirements."³¹⁴ Very significant to Sargent was the fact that no Chinese could settle in the Hermit Kingdom.³¹⁵ However, it should be noted that Sargent failed to mention that Korea was in essence a Chinese dependency which complicated Korea's relations with any other country.

The Senator even told of early U.S.-Korean confrontations in which the General Sherman, a ship captained by an American, but manned by Chinese, was attacked and burned by native Koreans. In retaliation the Wachusett under the command of Shufelt was sent to inform the King of Korea of the fate of the General Sherman. The King half apologized for the General Sherman's destruction and tried to placate Shufelt with allusions that the whole affair was "but a particle of autumn dust, not

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

worthy to be entertained as a matter of doubt and solicitude."³¹⁶
 Sargent presented the King's reply to Senate and said he was
 sorry the Navy department never answered the King's note.³¹⁷

Apparently seeking sympathy for the Hermit Kingdom, the
 Senator then described to the Senate the Rogers Expedition to
 Korea in 1871. He claimed Rogers entered Korean waters in
 violation of the international law, since America had no
 treaty with the Hermit Kingdom. The expedition ignored warning
 shots fired from the banks and proceeded along the way.
 Suddenly Admiral Rogers "caused fire to be opened upon the
 forts of the Koreans [sic] "³¹⁸ and killed about 200 natives.
 Sargent rightly concluded, "What had been gained divine Providence
 might see, but I must say that it is beyond my comprehension
 and I doubt if any Senator can see any good by it all."³¹⁹

The Senator ended his speech on Korea with a mercantilistic
 note. He believed Korea was ready and waiting for American
 products. American vessels needed her coasts and harbors for
 refuge in case of storms. "The trade with Northern China would
 be increased by the security of navigation in the Yellow Sea,"³²⁰
 and the addition of Korea among America's friends in Asia would
 increase American influence on that continent, strengthen Japan,
 and stop the Russian advance down the eastern coast of Asia.
 "Here are twelve million people, our neighbors, who want our

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 2601. Quoted in the Congressional Record.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Ibid.

products. Let us invite them to be our customers."³²¹

Sargent's speech on Korea certainly contrasted with his remarks on China. He portrayed the Koreans as hard working and thirsting for American exports. He described the Chinese as vile and immoral. In this speech he also sought the protection of the North China trade, which he underrated in debates on Chinese exclusion legislation. Since no Koreans were immigrating to California, Sargent could afford to be hypocritically flattering to the Hermit Kingdom.

Only the Navy department paid attention to Sargent's joint resolution, while the Committee on Foreign Relations buried the measure in 1879. The Senate was totally silent about the proposed Korean pact until January of 1883 when a treaty of amity and commerce was approved by the upper house without a roll call.³²²

Approval of the treaty proved to be a bit more complicated than the Senate's quick unanimous action on the three Japanese-American pacts. For one thing Korea's political status was uncertain. Li Hung-Chang, the Chinese viceroy, stipulated to Shufelt that the treaty between the United States and Korea had to include a clause stating that Korea was a dependent state of China. According to David M. Fletcher, "After considerable grumbling over Korea's dependent status, the Senate approved the treaty, but added an ill-humored resolution opposing the use of executive agents such as Shufelt who had not

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Sen. Exe. Jour., vol 23, pp. 584-585.

received senatorial confirmation."³²³

The Senate's grumbling over Korea's political status, as asserted by Pletcher, proved to be justified. The Chinese and Japanese continued to manipulate Korea's internal affairs. In 1884 the Korean King, supported by Chinese troops, terminated Japanese influence. American influence wavered as the Celestial Empire and Japan fought over the disputed Korean entity.³²⁴

The trade treaty with the Hermit Kingdom was the most important accomplishment of the Senate regarding U.S.-Korean relations. This new pact and the passage of a joint resolution in 1886 authorizing the President to send one or more Army officers for purposes of military instruction were the only events of positive significance. Yet the upper house showed its skepticism over Korea's political status and internal affairs when it agreed to a reduction of the Seoul post to minister resident.³²⁵

Neither party loyalty nor sectional interests influenced the Senate's decisions concerning U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-Korean relations. However, the Senate was cautious when it agreed to hinge implementation of the 1878 pact, which annulled Japan's five per cent ad valorem limitation on imports and exports to that country, on the agreement of other foreign powers. Unanimous approval on the three treaties with Japan showed the Senate's desire for friendly and commercial association with that country.

³²³ Pletcher, p. 209.

³²⁴ Pletcher, p. 213.

³²⁵ Congressional Record, 48th Congress, 1st Session, p. 4953; Senate Report 633, 48th Congress, 1st Session, p. 5; Pletcher, p. 213; and Dennet, p. 475.

The issue of the Japanese Indemnity Fund revolved essentially around the question of how much should be returned, not whether the fund should be restored at all. A vote to return the fund to Japan amounted to a vote for an honorable and commercial friendship. Similarly the Senate's approval of the 1878 Korean trade pact was a step towards a new commercial friendship.

No crucial domestic issues influenced the Senate's largely commercial policy or attitude towards Japan and Korea. The three treaties with Japan, the restoration of the fund and the pact with Korea, were apparently relatively small matters in comparison to the shipping and export controversy, the Chinese question or the Hawaiian reciprocity issue. In essence, the majority of the Senate crossed both party and sectional lines to vote for more trade and friendship with Korea and Japan.

VI. Conclusion

The Senate's attitude towards the Pacific, 1877-1889, was largely commercial, yet ambiguous and hesitant. It was commercial because the upper house desperately, though futilely, tried to resolve the general shipping crisis and the problem of extending commerce. At times the Senate even dealt with these two intertwined issues as they related specifically to the Asiatic region. Hawaii and Samoa amounted to steps to an economic end--the markets of the east. Yet the Senate's attitude was not explicitly imperialistic, though the rhetoric of certain commercial expansionists gave that appearance. Only a very small minority spoke of establishing colonies. Generally this idea remained

absent in the debates. Besides idealism, commercial potential burst forth as one of the arguments against restrictive and exclusive legislation during the debates on Chinese immigration. Last, revision of the Japanese-American treaties, return of the Japanese Indemnity Fund, and the opening of Korea all represented either directly or indirectly acts towards extending American trade to the Pacific region in the search for new markets.

Still the Senate's policy towards the Pacific was ambiguous. Party loyalty, sectional and local interests, at times prevented the Senate from acting cohesively on certain issues. It was ambiguous because it never resolved the general shipping and foreign carrying trade question, nor even approached the resolution of this problem as it related to the Pacific. Both party loyalty and to some extent sectionalism entered into the upper house's impasse over how to stop the decline of American shipping and to extend commerce. Yet it can not be denied that the Senate desired to solve the general merchant marine controversy and to extend American trade. Ambiguity in the form of sugar interests and high protectionists entered into the disagreement about the merits of Hawaiian reciprocity. The majority of the Senate disregarded the pleas of the sugar interests and the high protectionists and voted to expand American commerce. The Chinese question presented a unique case of contradiction: the extension of commerce and maintenance of a respectable democracy, while simultaneously stopping the immigration of Chinese workers. Party loyalty and sectional influence represented by northern, northeastern, and middlewestern

Republicans against restriction and exclusion and southern and border state Democrats for ending the coming of the Chinese worker, played a very important part in the resolution of this regional problem. Acute ambiguity rose especially in the commercial expansionist who was also a racist and a politician. In the case of the Chinese question, trade expansionists such as John T. Morgan (D. Ala.) and Aaron A. Sargent (R. Cal.) generally expended their commercial desires. Such equivocality, spawned largely by domestic politics and sectional interests, simply did not appear in the Samoan question, the Japanese issue, and the Korean problem.

The Senate also expressed a hesitant or halting attitude towards the Pacific. The upper house remained skeptical, especially certain Democrats, about the merits of subsidizing specific steamship lines because of the Pacific Mail fiasco. As a whole this upper body never seriously considered outright territorial annexation of either Hawaii or Samoa. The Senate further revealed its halting attitude by its refusal to formally abrogate the Chinese treaties and its slowing of the evolution of restriction to exclusion. Concerning Japanese-American relations, the upper house hinged implementation of the 1878 treaty on the agreement of other powers and only returned the Japanese Indemnity Fund after years of arguing. Last according to David M. Pletcher, this body expressed some hesitancy over Korea's political status.

Thus the Senate's commercial, ambiguous, and hesitant attitude towards the Pacific was influenced variously by party loyalty, sectional and local interests, and the continuous search for markets.

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APPENDIX

* 1868 Treaty of Trade, Consuls, and Emigration

ARTICLE V:

The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from the one country to the other for purposes of curiosity, of trade or as permanent residents. The high contracting parties therefore join in reprobating any other than an entirely voluntary emigration for these purposes. They consequently agreed to pass laws making it a penal offence for a citizen of the United States or Chinese subjects to take Chinese subjects either to the United States or to any other foreign country, or for a Chinese subject or citizen of the United States to take citizens of the United States to China or to any other foreign country without their free and voluntary consent, respectively.

ARTICLE VI:

Citizens of the United States visiting or residing in China shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, or exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation; and, reciprocally, Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. But nothing herein contained shall be held to confer naturalization upon citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States.

*Source: Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909. William M. Malloy, comp., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 235-236.

THE SENATE AND THE PACIFIC, 1877-1889

by

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The Senate has always played a vital role in the making of American foreign policy. In the 1890's it helped to make the United States a major power in the Pacific, by voting a policy towards this region of continuous penetration and benevolent dominance over newly acquired possessions. However, the Senate's role in the formulation of a Pacific policy in the period just preceding the nineties, 1877-1889, has been questioned.

This study of the Senate's attitudes towards the Pacific (primarily the Far East, Hawaii, and Samoa), reveals that it held an ambiguous, hesitant, and commercial outlook towards this region, exhibited by its handling of five issues of lasting concern during the twelve year period. The action taken on these issues reflects the influence of party loyalty, sectional and local interests, and the continuous search for new markets.

The Senate dealt rigorously with the dilemma of the merchant marine, but never resolved the problem. It seldom dealt with the problem as it particularly related to the Pacific as a region. The Senate wanted to solve the problem, but remained divided over means, reflecting the pressure of sectional and mostly party influences. Certain northeastern Republicans consistently favored subsidies, opposed reform of shipping laws, and spoke of the merits of protectionism, while certain southern and border state Democrats generally opposed subsidies, favored reform of shipping laws, and sought a lower tariff in building materials. Other southerners and agrarian senators of both parties vacillated on these issues. This haggling over the

remedies contributed to a slowing of America's search for new markets.

The Hawaiian reciprocity treaty and acquisition of Pearl Harbor also concerned the Senate. Party loyalty remained insignificant, while sugar interests were reflected in the debates and roll call votes. In finality the Senate voted for deeper commercial penetration.

Samoa posed no domestic threats to any sectional or local interests. Party loyalty and sectionalism were absent in the discussion, as well as in the unanimous vote which approved the 1878 treaty acquiring the use of Pago Pago. Thus the Senate was cognizant of Samoa's importance to American commerce.

The question of immigrating Chinese laborers caused a distinctive breakdown along both sectional and party lines. Frequently northern, northeastern, and middlewestern Republicans opposed anti-Chinese legislation because of idealism and commerce, while almost all southern and border state Democrats sanctioned anti-Chinese legislation primarily out of sympathy with the tri-partisan and later bi-partisan west coast senators. Commercial expansion and ideals were compromised by section and party influence. Ambiguity rose over the conflicting goals of exclusion and simultaneous increase of trade with China and maintenance of a respectable democracy. However hesitance entered in because the Senate refused to plunge immediately into exclusion and formally abrogate Sino-American treaties.

Relations with the Japanese centered on the 1878 commercial pact, the shipwreck expenses pact of 1881, and the extradition agreement of 1886 and the amount of the Japanese Indemnity

Fund to be returned to Japan. Without regard to party, local, or sectional interests, the Senate voted to approve all three treaties and to return \$785,000 in the name of honor and commerce. Japanese trade was considered vital, because American bottoms carried American goods between the two countries and Japanese laborers were not immigrating to the United States.

In secret session the Senate approved a commercial treaty with Korea. America in 1878 initiated this commercial move to acquire new markets and the Senate endorsed it.

Depending on the issue, party loyalty, local and sectional interests, and the continuous search for markets affected the Senate's ambiguous, hesitant, and commercial attitude towards the Pacific.