

A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MATTINGLY THESIS
THE CASE OF CUTHBERT TUNSTALL

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
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INTRODUCTION

The Renaissance of the sixteenth century was a period typified by a revival of arts and letters in Western Civilization. Yet this term represents more than a rebirth-- it also symbolizes a transformation in Western European history. Along with artistic and architectural innovations, the Renaissance signifies a period during which dynastic monarchs sought to enhance and extend their own power in unprecedented ways.

During and prior to the Renaissance, forces were at work that assisted the monarchs in their quest for power. The emancipation of the serfs, the growth of cities, the rise of the middle classes, the expansion of trade, the invention of the printing press, and the discovery of a New World aided in undermining a church-dominated society, giving its kings more freedom of action. With this changing world, monarchs needed new ways to aggrandize their states.¹ One of these newer methods that monarchs used was an organized diplomatic corps, which is the subject of Garrett Mattingly's Renaissance Diplomacy.²

¹George Trevelyan, History of England II (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc.), p. 1.

²Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p. ii.

One of the most important features which Mattingly notes of Renaissance diplomacy was the establishment of resident embassies. With the creation of permanent embassies the function of the diplomatic corps altered from its medieval predecessor. Before the Renaissance, diplomats were not only representatives of their monarch, but also representatives of Christendom. During the Renaissance, however, sovereigns stressed that the diplomat's duty was first and foremost to support his lord's aims. No longer was the diplomat's major concern Christendom; the service of their liege lord was paramount. One should not be surprised to find diplomats such as Ermolao Barbaro (1454-1493), and Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)³ accepting and encouraging their fellow diplomats to place their first loyalty to their respective monarchs. They argued that the first duty of an ambassador was to serve and preserve the state.⁴ During the Renaissance, diplomats were predominantly citizens of the nations which they served. Prior to this period sovereigns often contracted ambassadors to serve them and upon completing their specified duties these representatives were free either to renegotiate their covenants or seek new benefactors. Another notable feature of the Renaissance diplomacy was the transformation of diplomatic activity from an ad hoc process to one of continuous activity. It is also noteworthy that diplomats

³ Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince trans. E.R.P. Vincent (New York: The New American Library, 1952).

⁴ Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p. 219.

were instructed to be pleasant, cultured, imperturbable, and (in their private lives) ascetic. In this way no scandal would jeopardize their duties. The first responsibility of the diplomat was the frequent and complete reporting of any information that dealt with either his embassy or with weaknesses in the affairs of other states. Diplomats bribed their professional competitors or courtesans for this information.⁵ Thus Mattingly argues that during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, specific criteria characterize diplomatic activity.

Considering the criteria suggested by Mattingly, this thesis will test his theory by examining one of the most interesting and ignored diplomats under Henry VIII (1491-1547). The intention of this paper is to test Mattingly's thesis by applying it to Cuthbert Tunstall (1474-1559).

Cuthbert Tunstall was one of the most interesting men in Henry VIII's vast circle of advisors and bureaucrats. Born in 1474, Tunstall was the son of Thomas Tunstall, squire to Richard III (1452-1485). While a young man, Cuthbert attended Oxford, Cambridge, and the University of Padua. Upon the completion of his studies at Padua, Tunstall returned to England in 1509. Thereafter, Archbishop Warham (1450-1532) appointed Tunstall his chancellor. By 1514, with his appointment to the King's Council, Tunstall entered the service of the crown. After this appointment,

⁵Ibid, pp. 211-283.

his rise in power and influence was rapid. In May of 1515, Tunstall led an embassy to Flanders to negotiate a treaty of alliance and commerce, thereby beginning a career that was to span some thirty years in the diplomatic corps. He also was invested as a bishop attending the sees of London and Durham in 1522 and 1529 respectively.⁶ Obviously then, Tunstall wielded influence in deciding the fate of the country not only in affairs of the sword, but also in matters regarding religion.

As a result of Tunstall's important role in governmental and ecclesiastical affairs, one would expect numerous amounts of material published about him. Yet upon closer examination, I found that Tunstall has been largely ignored by modern historians. In Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator⁷, Charles Sturge argues that one of the reasons for this apparent disregard resulted from the lack of lustre and dramatics in Cuthbert's life.⁸ Historians tended to concentrate their efforts on men such as John Fisher (1469-1535) and Thomas More (1477-1535), thereby relegating the events and successes of Tunstall's life to a secondary position. As a result, a correlative purpose of this thesis will be to reevaluate Tunstall's activities, with special attention to his diplomatic missions. Therefore, there are two aims to this study: first, the application of Mattingly's theory to Tunstall's diplomatic activities in order to test his conclusions; and second, a reevaluation of Cuthbert's career.

⁶ Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee, eds., The Dictionary of National Biography, XIX (Oxford: University Press, 1921-2), 1238-1241. Hereafter cited as DNB.

⁷ Charles Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1938).

⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

THE LIFE OF CUTHBERT TUNSTALL

Born in 1474, Cuthbert Tunstall was the eldest son of Thomas Tunstall (squire to Richard III of Thurland Castle, Lancashire). While a young boy Tunstall attended school at St. Anthony's in London and was a classmate of Thomas More's.¹ At seventeen Tunstall began his studies at Oxford University. With the outbreak of plague in the area, Tunstall left Oxford and renewed his studies at Cambridge University in 1493. In 1499 Tunstall again changed universities, this time joining the student body at the University of Padua. He remained at Padua for about six years, where he received a classical education. Beyond the ordinary scholastic and theological accomplishments, he acquired an outstanding knowledge of Greek, Hebrew, mathematics and civil law. In 1505, Tunstall returned to England.²

Upon Tunstall's return, Archbishop Warham of London appointed him chancellor of the metropolitan see. As chancellor, Tunstall involved himself in three noteworthy affairs: in 1511 he participated in the trials of fifty heretics, at a later date he presided over an investigation into allegedly scandalous living conditions in several monasteries, and lastly he also cooperated in the Purgation of Clerics imprisoned at Maidstone Jail. Apparently after the court acquitted the prisoners, they remained in custody.³ Tunstall sought the

¹Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 7.

²Ibid., pp. 8-9.

³The reason for their continued imprisonment remains a mystery. For additional information see Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, pp. 20-22.

prisoners' release and investigated the reason for their protracted incarceration.⁴

Tunstall's participation in these affairs came to the attention of Henry VIII. Because of Tunstall's behavior, Henry sought to recruit Cuthbert into England's diplomatic corps. In 1515 Tunstall participated in his first diplomatic mission to Flanders. The renewal of trade treaties between England and Flanders was the major reason for the negotiations. The previous treaty lapsed with the death of Henry VII in 1509. The embassy consisted of Cuthbert Tunstall, Dr. Richard Sampson (d. 1554), Sir Thomas Spinely, Thomas More and John Clifford.⁵ The protracted negotiations lasted some six months, and were not concluded until January 1516. In October 1515 Henry issued another commission instructing Tunstall to seek a treaty of amity between England and Flanders. Upon the successful completion of that affair Tunstall returned to England in October of 1517.⁶

During the next three years Tunstall served in the King's Council. Little is known of his activities during this period. He did write, however, In Praise of Matrimony,

⁴Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, pp. 18-22.

⁵Commission to Tunstall, Sampson, Spinely, More and Clifford, May 7, 1515 in Great Britain, London. Public Record Office. Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII, eds. J.S. Brewer and J. Gairdner (London: His Majesties Stationary Office, 1908), vol. II, pt. 1, no. 422. Hereafter cited as Letters and Papers of Henry VIII.

⁶Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 50.

an oration dedicated to the proposed betrothal of the Dauphin of France and Princess Mary of England (1516-1558). In his speech Tunstall spoke of the almost forgotten blood relationship between the French and English, and he implied that this betrothal would contribute to ending the almost constant warfare between England and France and promote a new era of peace and prosperity.⁷ But while Tunstall devoted his attention to Anglo-French relations in his writing, relations between England and Germany would soon occupy his more personal and active involvement.

On June 28, 1519, Charles V (1500-1558) was elected Holy Roman Emperor. At the time of Charles' election, he resided in Spain. While traveling to Aachen for his coronation, Charles chose to visit England to consult with Henry. During the subsequent interviews Henry suggested that Tunstall join the Emperor as England's ambassador (legatus) to attend his coronation and to act as Henry's representative in other uncompleted negotiations.⁸ Tunstall left England in September 1520 and remained as ambassador throughout the winter of 1520-21, returning to London in the following April.⁹

With Tunstall's investiture as Bishop of London in 1521 and his appointment as dean of Salisbury, a new chapter was added to his growing career. Just before his investiture, however, Tunstall published his De Arte Supputandi, a treatise on arithmetic. Simon Grynaeus, a contemporary of Tunstall's, reviewed the De Arte Supputandi as follows: "assuredly you

⁷Ibid., p. 58.

⁸Commission to Tunstall, July 1520, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, III, No. 892.

⁹Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, pp. 60-2.

have explained the calculating of numbers of every sort excellently in a single volume so written that no one today could have made these complicated matters more clear."¹⁰

But Tunstall's personal writing interest soon gave way to his duty to Henry. Not for the first time would the man subordinate himself to the state.

On June 16, 1522, Henry and the Emperor declared war upon France. In order to raise sufficient funds to support the war effort, Henry assembled Parliament. During the deliberations Tunstall delivered an eloquent oration in defense of the King's actions and encouraged the assembly to grant Henry's petition.¹¹ In spite of Parliament's hesitation to grant the needed sums, Henry entered the war with high hopes. The money problem continued to plague the king, however, and this, coupled with the failure of Suffolk's march on Paris, clouded English prospects. By 1523 England virtually withdrew from any military operations. The military situation suddenly reversed itself on February 24, 1525, when the Emperor's armies completely routed the French army at Pavia and captured France I.¹²

Henry immediately dispatched Tunstall and Sir Richard Wingfield to Spain. They pressed Charles for the immediate dismemberment of France. The ambassadors quickly found the

¹⁰Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 76.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 79-86.

¹²DNB, XIX, 1238.

atmosphere of the Spanish court far from promising. Henry (in one of his most egotistical moments) demanded the French crown for himself! The Emperor had no desire for France and England to have the same temporal ruler. The ambassadors found that their only recourse was to ensure that Charles did not make a separate peace with France. Therefore Tunstall remained in Spain as an envoy to Charles V's court until January 1526.¹³ He would scarcely have thought that when he was next called upon, it would be to gain the support of his nation's most recent enemy.

In 1527, a shift of alliances occurred, precipitated by Charles V's sack of Rome, and Henry VIII proposed divorce from Katherine of Aragon (1485-1536). Later in that year Tunstall accompanied Cardinal Wolsey, Thomas More, and Bishop Stephen Gardiner in an embassy to France. Tunstall played only a minor role in the negotiations, but he was valuable because of his intimate knowledge of the Imperial Court. In exchange for French support of the divorce, the English were to invade Flanders while the French encroached upon Italian soil. Henry declared war upon the Empire, but the French alliance was very unpopular in England. Henry quickly abandoned the plan and sued for a truce. At the peace

¹³DNB, XIX, 1238.

negotiations, Tunstall and More were England's representatives. They concluded the Treaty of Cambrai in 1529 and returned to England. In essence, the Treaty merely re-created the international situation of 1527.¹⁴

By 1533 the question of the divorce between Henry and Katherine was a major concern in England. Prior to the crisis, Henry had appointed Tunstall President of the Council of the North. As president, Tunstall's duties included the maintenance of the northern boundaries against Scottish raids. In 1534 Henry ordered Tunstall to appear before him because of recalcitrance in the matter of the divorce. After extensive discussions with Henry, Tunstall announced on May 16, 1534 that he supported Henry on the divorce issue. There are two common explanations for Tunstall's sudden change of heart. Chapuys, then Spanish Ambassador to England, put forth one argument when he wrote,

"he is justly considered as one of the most learned, prudent and honest prelates in the whole kingdom, and had hitherto upheld the queen's cause by his word as well as his writing; but nowadays, not wishing to become a martyr, and lose such ecclesiastical benefice as his, bring him 15,000 ducats annually, he has been obliged to swear like the rest though with, it is said, certain reserves and restrictions."¹⁵

Tunstall explained his own transformation when he argued that many universities throughout Europe had declared the

¹⁴ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, pp. 103-111.

¹⁵ Chapuys to Charles V, May 1534, in Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, V, No. 986.

marriage between Henry and Katherine unlawful. The universities based their conclusions on the premise that Katherine consummated her previous marriage to Henry's brother Arthur and thus no force could justify Katherine's second marriage to the brother of her first husband.¹⁶

With Tunstall's decision not to share the fate of John Fisher and Thomas More, he became a powerful weapon in lending legitimacy to Henry's ecclesiastical changes. Throughout the ecclesiastical revolutions, Tunstall maintained a policy of moderation. He retained an unshaken belief in Catholic dogma and with varying intensity opposed resolutions aimed at destroying the faith. At the same time, though, Tunstall believed in obedience to civil power and thus, when ecclesiastical changes were sanctioned by parliament, he supported their enactment.¹⁷

While Tunstall continued to participate, however unwillingly in religious matters, he was also re-employed from 1537 until 1547 as President of the Council of the North. Even with his many lay duties, Tunstall continued to play an active role in religious matters. Henry commissioned Tunstall to write the Institution of a Christian Man which he endeavored to make as Catholic in tone as possible. He also oversaw the publication of the Bible in English in 1541.¹⁸

¹⁶ J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 330-331.

¹⁷ DNB, XIX, 1239.

¹⁸ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, pp. 204-34.

Tunstall remained as President of the Council for ten years, curtailing his duties once to negotiate a peace treaty between England and France. War had erupted between the two nations in 1543 because France attempted to wreck a proposed Anglo-Scottish alliance. The cost of maintaining the war soon over-taxed the English treasury, so in November 1545 Tunstall traveled to France in order to negotiate a settlement. Nothing came of those discussions, and Tunstall returned to England in January 1546. Henry realized that it was essential to end the war, so in June Tunstall again returned to France and concluded the Treaty of Camp.¹⁹ He later returned to England and attended Parliament until Henry's death in January of 1547.²⁰

With Henry's death, Tunstall resumed the presidency of the Council of the North. Because of the growing power of religious radicals and his half-hearted opposition to the persecution of Catholics, Tunstall's position became vulnerable. It is not surprising that in May 1547 King Edward IV (1547-1553) ordered Tunstall be confined to his house and later charged him with treason. Upon her accession in 1553, Queen Mary dismissed the charge against him and Tunstall resumed his duties as Bishop. For the next six years Tunstall faithfully pursued the obligations of his see

¹⁹The provisions of this treaty and its ramifications will be examined in the chapter entitled "Tunstall: A Loyal Diplomatist and Royal Advisor."

²⁰DNB, XIX, 1239.

but in 1559 he refused to take the oath of supremacy. The then-reigning Queen Elizabeth ordered his arrest and while in custody, Tunstall died November 18, 1559.²¹

While Tunstall fell from grace with his sovereigns in his later life, this by no means indicates that he was disliked or disrespected by his contemporaries. On the contrary, they thought very highly of the distinguished humanitarian, royal advisor, diplomat and cleric. Thomas Stapleton, the famous Catholic controversialist who wrote The Life and Illustrious Martyrdom of Sir Thomas More in 1588 declared that More's closest friend was Cuthbert Tunstall.²² Stapleton reached his conclusion by discussing the matter with various members of More's household and by examining many letters More wrote regarding his friendship with Tunstall, most of which have long since disappeared.²³

One letter still in existence concerning More's opinion of Tunstall was written shortly after the two men returned from a diplomatic mission to Flanders in 1515. More wrote Erasmus describing the mission and emphasizing his dislike for the diplomatic life; and he added:

"But yet certain things on that mission of mine pleased me very much. The first of these was that Tunstall dwelt with me for such a long time continuously, for while no one is better versed in all good literature, no one more strict in life and behaviour, yet no one whatever is a more delightful companion."²⁴

²¹Ibid., XIX, 1241.

²²Thomas Stapleton, The Life and Illustrious Martyrdom of Sir Thomas More, trans. P.E. Hallett (London: Burns, Oats and Washborne, 1928), p. 48.

²³Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 23.

²⁴Thomas More, St. Thomas More: Selected Letters, ed. Elizabeth Rogers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 71.

In 1516 More had his book Utopia published. The work opens with a reference to More's mission the previous year and to his good friend Cuthbert Tunstall whom More calls a man without comparison, a man known throughout Europe for his virtue and learning.²⁵ It is also interesting to note that More, in his epithet, wrote highly of Tunstall and spoke of his love for the man. Because Tunstall's letters to More have not survived, it is difficult to establish whether Tunstall returned More's affection. However, there remains little doubt of his feelings because he did dedicate his De Arte Supputandi to More. Of Tunstall's connection with other leading statesmen, more substantial information remains.

Christopher Urswick, confident of Margaret of Beaufort (mother of Henry VII), was a close friend of Tunstall's. Urswick, after participating in eleven embassies, became Dean of Windsor and Registrar of the Order of the Garter.²⁶ In 1522 Urswick died, but prior to his death he named Tunstall executor to his will and bequeathed to him a gown, mule (with saddle and bridle), a book of prayers and a great ring.²⁷ Tunstall was also acquainted with Polydore Vergil who wrote the first critical history of England. Tunstall assisted Vergil in researching the book, and as a result of his help the author declared that the bishop always sought to advance literature and was an inspiration to scholars.²⁸ One of the most respected men of the Renaissance, Desiderius Erasmus (1467-1536), honored and loved Tunstall. In a letter to Mexia,

²⁵ Thomas More, The Utopia of Sir Thomas More trans. Ralph Robynson and J. H. Lupton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895).

²⁶ DNB, XX, 55.

²⁷ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 28.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 29.

a close friend of his, Erasmus wrote of his affectionate relationship with the English Bishop. Erasmus declared that more than an exchange of opinions dealing with politics and religion characterized their relationship; rather an intimate bond of friendship was the true nature of their relationship.²⁹ William Grocyn, Thomas Linacre, William Latimer, John Colet, Richard Pace, and William Lily were among the other intimate friends with whom Tunstall associated.³⁰

²⁹James Froude, Life and Letters of Erasmus (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), p. 377.

³⁰Beatus Rhenanus, Christian Humanism and the Reformation, Selected Writings of Erasmus ed. John Olin (New York: Fordham University Press, 1975), p. 35.

RENAISSANCE EUROPE AND THE MATTINGLY THESIS

During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a change occurred in Western Civilization. Indeed, there was such a difference in Europe during the Renaissance that men living then recognized this transformation. The Italian philosopher Giovanni Villani declared that a rebirth of the arts of painting, architecture, poetry and music occurred in the fourteenth century.¹ More than an artistic revitalization ensued; an extraordinary reorientation took place in the mental outlook of the Renaissance Man.

Heretofore men thought of Europe as one entity--the res publica Christiana. Medieval man believed in the commonwealth of Europe and accepted the principle that God governed Christendom. By the late medieval period, though, the precept of a united Europe was beginning to wane.² This does not mean that the unitary ideal of Christendom suddenly ceased to exist; rather this transformation was a gradual process. Charles V was able in 1532 to organize an international army to combat the Turks in Hungary³ and he led a fleet in an attack on Tunis in 1535.⁴

¹Renaissance to Revolution (London: Aldus Books Limited, 1968), p. 27.

²Mandel Creighton, The Cambridge Modern History, "The Renaissance" (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), I, p. 3.

³John Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs, Empire and Absolutism, 1516-1598 I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 85.

⁴J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 159.

Charles entered the Holy League, allying with the Papacy and Venice against the Turks in 1538.⁵ Later in the same century Charles's son and heir, Philip II (1527-1598) joined in a multi-national league that ended with a Christian naval victory at the Battle of Lepanto.⁶

While this gradual transformation of Europe occurred, voices continued to be heard that encouraged people to return to the principles of the Middle Ages. Two works in this period that encouraged this return were Thomas More's Utopia (1516) and Desiderius Erasmus' Education of a Christian Prince (1516). More's work is significant because he described a society opposed to regionalism. More argued that man should forego the bonds of regionalism and return to the commonwealth of Europe.⁷

In The Education of a Christian Prince, Erasmus instructed the young Prince Charles of Castile in the art of governing. In this monumental work, Erasmus praised the prince who served the people of his state with compassion and righteousness. Erasmus argued that first duty of a prince was the improvement of his subjects' lives. The qualities of a just and good prince included an absence of cruelty, harshness, and intolerance, and an abundance of clemency

⁶Ibid., p. 226.

⁷More, The Utopia of Sir Thomas More.

humaneness and kindness. The benevolent prince acted as a philosopher, pacifist and a shepherd. Of the many duties and responsibilities of the Christian prince, the most important was the fostering of internal and external concord. The main objective of the monarch was not the extension of his domains, but the betterment of his estate.⁸

While it is difficult to dispute that publications such as More's Utopia and Erasmus' Education of a Christian Prince encouraged international concord based on international and universal religious agreement, a change nevertheless occurred in the philosophy of Europe. The unitary ideal of Christendom did not flounder as a result of a decline in religious fervor but rather was the result of a recognition of regional and dynastic differences. Beginning in the fourteenth century a corporate identity developed between the citizens of particular areas. Impetus toward regionalism resulted from the increased efficiency of governments, the development of truly national organizations such as representative institutions and a decline of the influence of the clergy.⁹ Other forces that further advanced regionalism were the new discoveries overseas, the Protestant Revolutions, better communications and the invention of printing by movable type. These forces

⁸ Desiderius Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince trans. Lester Born (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936).

⁹ Maurice Keen, A History of Medieval Europe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1968), p. 276.

combined in creating viable areal separation, especially during the later Middle Ages and predominantly among the dominant classes such as the clergy, men of letters, the military and the members of the mercantile class.¹⁰ From the writings of More and Erasmus, one may deduce that they desired a continuation of the Christian Commonwealth--they were in reality the last heralds of a dying age.

A new theory of statecraft developed during the Renaissance which was compatible with the evolution in the idea of state's interest. Niccolo Machiavelli was one of the more outspoken political theorists during this period. In his book, The Prince, Machiavelli outlined the policies that a monarch should follow in order to ensure his survival. In The Prince, one will seek in vain for the notion of the unity of Christendom, for it was the state, Machiavelli argued, that was paramount. Unlike More and Erasmus, Machiavelli allowed the sovereign to perform evil when necessary. He defined "when necessary" as anytime either the state or the monarchy was in jeopardy. The first responsibility of the prince was the maintenance of his own power, and only secondly came the care of his subjects.¹¹

Obviously with these two very differing philosophies of statecraft, Garrett Mattingly assumed a difficult burden

¹⁰ David Jayne Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, The Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty (New York: Howard Fertig Inc., 1967) II, p. 2.

¹¹ Machiavelli, The Prince.

when he examined Renaissance diplomacy. However, Mattingly did make significant conclusions regarding diplomacy and its function in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries.

The most important feature of the Renaissance diplomat, according to Mattingly, was a new or at least different set of priorities from his medieval counterpart. As mentioned previously, during the Middle Ages a collective consciousness existed among the Western Europeans. A European Commonwealth or the unity of Christendom was the goal to which monarchs were supposed to address themselves. However, by the fourteenth century, new regional loyalties were beginning to develop and to undermine traditional conceptions of statecraft.

Mattingly argues that one of the characteristics of the Renaissance Diplomat was a stronger and deeper sense of devotion to his lay sovereign. In essence, the diplomat was to perform whatever tasks his sovereign assigned.¹² The Renaissance Diplomat was to do exactly as any other public servant would do, that is, think and advise in such a way to preserve and aggrandize the state.¹³ Mattingly cited the opinion of three Renaissance diplomats to substantiate his conclusions. The first diplomat examined by Mattingly

¹²In this instance "state" signifies more than the area of occupation; rather state and monarch are interchangeable terms. The Renaissance Diplomats, especially those sent by Charles V represented differing lands. Therefore an ambassador's loyalty, while theoretically to the state, was in actuality to his monarch.

¹³Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 117.

was Don Juan De Vera. De Vera published a popular diplomatic handbook, El Embajador.¹⁴ De Vera realized that resident ambassadors could not disregard instructions sent them without the possibility of grave harm to their respective states.¹⁵ De Vera concluded then, that no matter how distasteful some orders were, the diplomat must obey. Another diplomatic advisor, Alberio Gentili, who was a regius professor of civil law at Oxford, wrote De legationibus, libri tres in 1558, in which he states that an ambassador must always further the needs of the sovereign. The diplomat must complete the instructions sent him, no matter how unwise he perceives them. Nonetheless, Gentili refined this argument somewhat by stating that the perfect ambassador will refuse to abet murder and conspiracy.¹⁶ One of the most prolific writers of the time was the Venetian diplomat Ermolao Barbaro. He argued in Epistolae, Orationes et Carmina that ambassadors must uphold the interest of their state against the world. Scruples and morality were secondary and should not interfere with the functioning of the diplomat's office. Any question an ambassador may have had regarding his mission should not hinder its completion, for the diplomat

¹⁴Ibid., p. 211.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 220.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 221.

was to serve his lord without compunction or restraint. He said that a diplomat upon receiving an order must faithfully carry out his obligation; the diplomat was a reflection of his monarch's desires and should serve accordingly.¹⁷ These authors were not alone in their advice, as Mattingly points out:

"Later Italian writers from Maggi to Braggacci were none of them so succinct and decisive as Barbaro, if only because of the growing interest of their age in nice points of moral casuistry invited them to expand and qualify and distinguish. But most of them, however reluctantly, and by whatever devious windings ended in a position not unlike Barbaro's."¹⁸

Of the many burdens assumed by diplomats, one of the most critical was the successful conclusion of defense and economic treaties. It was imperative that nations ally with one another for financial and material support, especially whenever war was brewing.¹⁹

More than unquestioned loyalty characterized the Renaissance Diplomat, for education was paramount to ensure a diplomat's appropriate behavior. The diplomat's education included theology and sacred letters. Also required

¹⁷Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 220.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 110.

in the emissary's education was a familiarity with mathematics, history, music, geometry, astronomy, philosophy, law and literature.²⁰

Mattingly contends that the diplomat of the Renaissance should be an ethical man. Yet, one must recognize the fact that this morality existed in a vacuum for it was not to interfere with his duties. The diplomat was only to demonstrate morality when it would be advantageous in furthering his goals. The ethical qualities of a diplomat were loyalty, temperance and prudence. Along with the high ethics of the Renaissance diplomat, there also existed a need that he at least publicly profess Christian virtues. Yet his virtue, as his morality, was a tool used to advance a cause.²¹

According to Mattingly, a need for substantial outside income characterized all diplomats. Without large monetary reserves, diplomats relied on the generosity of their own sovereigns. Sent with the promise of a generous stipend, many diplomats soon found to their utter dismay that monarchs were months or years behind

²⁰Ibid., p. 216.

²¹Ibid., pp. 218-219.

in the payment of their ambassadorial salaries. A diplomat was normally paid enough to manage if he received payment promptly. This, however, was the exception rather than the rule.²² An excellent example which illustrates the enormous financial burden of maintaining a Renaissance Embassy is the mission of Rodrigo de Puebla, the Spanish Ambassador to England in the early portion of the sixteenth century. The King of Spain promised him a rather small salary of three hundred and fifty crowns a year. The Spanish Royal Treasury managed to withhold about two-thirds of this sum during the years 1495-1508. De Puebla was not a man of extravagant taste and owned little land in Spain, so his only alternative was to borrow the needed sums to maintain his household, servants, and standard of living. It was only through the King's grace that De Puebla escaped the ignominious insult of being thrown into a debtor's prison.²³

A final example will help in demonstrating the financial burden one encumbered while maintaining a diplomatic post. Thomas More was sent to Calais in 1518 to negotiate with the French.²⁴ Upon the conclusion of these talks, More wrote Erasmus describing the negotiations and ended his letter by

²²Ibid., p. 234.

²³Ibid., p. 235.

²⁴Thomas Bridgett, Life and Writings of Sir Thomas More (London: Burns of Oates, Limited, 1891), p. 75.

declaring that it is far better for a church official to act as an ambassador than as a secular man. Priests, More wrote, had incomes from their parishes and other beneficiaries and thus did not have to rely on the infrequent allowances awarded them by their sovereign. More also said that clerics did not have to maintain two households as laymen did, so priests were less incumbered. Thus he concluded the best diplomats were ecclesiastical officials.²⁵

While More believed that church officials made better diplomats, Mattingly argues that a lesser number of clerics made up the diplomatic corps during this period. During 1560, churchmen outnumbered secular men in the corps. After that, however, laymen were appointed because many monarchs felt that priests sometimes served two masters. It will be recalled that a diplomat's highest allegiance was to his lord, thus secular rulers, especially after 1560, hesitated to install clerics who might serve the church with greater fervor than their state.²⁶

The Renaissance Diplomat was also a man of breeding and lineage.²⁷ Gone were the days when kitchen knaves and couriers were employed as nuncios,²⁸ for in the Renaissance

²⁵ St. Thomas More, Selected Letters of Thomas More ed. Elizabeth Rogers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 69.

²⁶ Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 216.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 215.

²⁸ Donald Queller, The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 5.

the diplomat was a man of distinction. With the growing ostentationess of court life during this period and with the increasingly complex diplomatic activity, diplomats came from among the most distinctive families in the realm. The Renaissance Diplomat was well born, handsome and rich. Without these qualities, the diplomat usually was neither well received nor successful.²⁹

The diplomat also needed to learn how to control his emotions. Mutual suspicion and hatred could also isolate representatives of differing ideologies. Perhaps the most outstanding example of an emissary creating ill will was Dr. John Man, Queen Elizabeth's ambassador to Spain. During the negotiations for the release of English shipping, Dr. Man acted as if he were in enemy country. When at a later date Dr. Man insisted upon holding Anglican services at his embassy, the Spanish Inquisition became alarmed. During an argument between Dr. Man and the representatives of the Inquisition, he made insulting remarks about King Philip and the Catholic faith. Obviously Dr. Man's attitude harmed English and Spanish relations.³⁰

²⁹Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 215.

³⁰Ibid., p. 202.

In essence, the Renaissance diplomat was a regulated and educated man. He was to be well-mannered but forceful. The Renaissance emissary also had to have the outward appearance of a good and virtuous Christian. The most important characteristic of the Renaissance diplomat, however, was loyalty. The diplomat functioned in order to serve the state; if he did not, he was worthless. Therefore the diplomat of the Renaissance served the state in whatever capacity that would best aggrandize and strengthen it. In the remaining pages, an examination of Cuthbert Tunstall will take place to see if he fulfills these requirements and expectations.

In May of 1515 Henry VIII selected Tunstall to lead an embassy to Flanders to negotiate a treaty of commerce between the two nations. This mission was important to England because the English needed to find foreign markets for their surplus wool.

Wool was an important commodity in England because the industry not only involved shepherds but also spinners, weavers, landowners, and merchants.¹ The industry was so extensive that wool was practically the sole export of the country. Prior to Henry VIII's reign, his father had encouraged the wool industry, and in order to stimulate its exportation, he awarded bounties to ships carrying cargoes of eighty tons or more. Henry VII continually sought to extend the rights of English merchants and to strengthen the wool industry.² In 1478, Henry VII concluded a commercial treaty with Flanders, which benefited English interest because it made international commerce more secure and safe.³ Indeed, the major foreign policy objective during Henry VII's reign was the continuation and encouragement of trade.⁴

Trade between the two nations was threatened in 1490 when the Netherlands supported and protected Perkin Warbeck, the imposter claimant to the English throne. This situation caused retaliatory measures in both England and the Netherlands.

¹R. B. Wernham, Before The Armada (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), p. 65.

²Ibid., p. 66.

³Edward Surtz, "St. Thomas More and His Utopian Embassy of 1515," Catholic Historical Review, XXXVIII (October, 1952), p. 273.

⁴Paul Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1973), p. 237.

A new treaty signed in February 1496 between the English and the Flemish provided for the repression of English rebels abroad. The treaty included a provision establishing the freedom of travel and the prohibition of new tolls and restrictions.⁵ By 1506 England and the Netherlands again concluded a revised treaty. The central feature of this agreement concerned the sale of cloth and the collection of tolls. This treaty caused hardships on Flemish cloth workers for it lowered many duties previously leveled against English wool.

When Henry VIII came to the throne, he, like his father, recognized the importance of the wool trade and its continuation. Immediately after Henry's succession, the Flemish increased tolls, customs and taxes on English goods exported to Flanders. Matters continued to deteriorate for the English merchants, especially after the failure of an Embassy in 1512. In June 1514 the Flemish informed the English that on October 1, all English goods discovered in Flanders would be confiscated. While the English Ambassadors, Sir William Knight and Sir Edward Poyning, were able to negotiate a delay in these sanctions, the English were apprehensive.⁶ Henry sent three more advisors, Charles Brandon, Nicholas West

⁵ Surtz, "St. Thomas More and His Utopian Embassy of 1515," p. 274.

⁶ Ibid., p. 277.

and Richard Wingfield to Flanders. In February the new ambassadors wrote,

"it is to be feared that the Prince of Castile and his Council that now ruleth about him, upon the pride of the said alliance and amity with France, will suddenly arrest the English fleet and cast off the merchants' necks all the arrearages of the Sewe toll and the toll of the Hound, which amounteth to a marvelous great sum, not able to be paide by our merchants without their utter undoings."⁷

Obviously this matter required great care for not only was the confiscation of English goods involved but the fate of an important segment of the English economy as well. In May Henry chose five men to mediate the situation. The chief commissioner was Cuthbert Tunstall. Richard Sampson, vicar-general of Tournai, Thomas Spinelly of Florence, John Clifford, governor of the English merchants, and Thomas More, Under-Sheriff of London were the other ambassadors.⁸

Prior to this embassy, More was relatively unknown; but, as Under-Sheriff of London he began to associate "with the merchants who admired his quickness of wit."⁹ As the government continued to contemplate a new commercial treaty the merchants were asked to assist in the selection of an individual to represent their particular interest. More was recommended for this post by the mercantile class.¹⁰

⁷Charles Brandon, Nicholas West and Richard West to Henry VIII, February 1515, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, II, No. 5159.

⁸Ernest Reynolds, Saint Thomas More (London: William Brendon and Son, LTD., 1953), p. 99.

⁹Sidney Lee, Great Englishmen of the Sixteenth Century (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904), p. 27.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 27.

On May 7, 1515, Henry commissioned Tunstall, Sampson, Clifford, Spinelly and More to negotiate a treaty of commerce. Since Spinelly and Sampson were already in Flanders, Tunstall and More made hurried preparations and left England to join them on May 12th. By the end of May all the commissioners were present in Bruges and the negotiations between the regency government of Prince Charles and Henry VIII commenced.¹¹

The nominal leaders of the negotiations representing Flemish interest was the Mayor of Bruges. Though the Mayor was the leader of the Flemish negotiators, many of the discussions were led by the Provost of Casselses, George de Temsice,¹² who is described by Thomas More as follows:

"A man, not only by lernying, but also be nature of singular eloquence, and in the lawes profoundly learned: but in reasonynge and debatynge of matters, what by his naturall witte, and what by daily exercise, surely he hadde few fellowes."¹³

In June serious discussions began and the Flemish leveled more than eighty complaints against the English. The major complaint of the Flemish was the nullity of the treaty of 1506. They claimed the treaty was void after Henry VII's death. The Flemish sought the nullity because they

¹¹Surtz, "St. Thomas More and His Utopian Embassy of 1515", p. 279.

¹²Thomas More, The Utopia of Sir Thomas More trans. Ralph Robinson, ed. George Sampson (London: G. Bell and Sons, LTD., 1910), p. 22.

¹³Ibid., p. 22.

believed the consequences of the 1506 treaty had been the reduction of native cloth makers to poverty. The Flemish argued that this poverty was aggravated by the deluge of English wool in the Netherlands. Tunstall argued that the treaty of 1506 was legal and avoided discussing the other complaints.¹⁴

On July 4, the English called another meeting to discuss the interpretation of the treaty of 1506. The Netherlanders insisted that the treaty was void after the death of the contracting sovereigns and would listen to no argument to the contrary. After this exchange the Flemish negotiators refused to respond to any points without first consulting their prince. After which,

"they shewed vs a letter directed vnto theym for the prynce, by which he gave theym in commaundement to resorted vnto hym and h(ys) Counsayle at Meclyne, wher he intendyd to bee hymself, within a few dayes, at whiche theyr resortyng to his presence they shold habe on his behalf a full and a perfite knowleg(e) of his plesure concernyny oure busynesse."¹⁵

The talks were renewed in early September when the ambassadors moved the seat of discussion from Burges to Antwerp. As the talks slowly moved to their completion, all the English Ambassadors returned to England except Tunstall and Knight.

¹⁴Surtz, "St. Thomas More and His Utopian Embassy of 1515", p. 279.

¹⁵Tunstall to Wolsey, July 1515, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, II, No. 732.

Finally, on January 24, 1515, the English and Flemish signed a treaty. The treaty specified that for five years the validity of the 1506 treaty would not be questioned. English merchants traveling to Antwerp were not to pay the Zeeland tolls unless they were there to trade. The Netherlands were to pay English tolls and customs as prescribed in the treaty of 1496. The English also succeeded in nullifying all law suits involving taxes, tolls and customs.¹⁶

Before the signing of the trade treaty, Henry, who had been impressed with the ability and industry of Tunstall, commissioned him to negotiate a treaty of alliance between England and Flanders.¹⁷ Henry decided such a treaty was necessary because of King Francis's recent invasion of Italy. Henry feared that if the ambitious and warlike Francis succeeded in occupying large areas of Italy, the Papacy would no longer be independent. Henry realized that England could not intervene directly because the distance between England and Italy was too great; instead, he sought to spur the Emperor and the Swiss to act vigorously against the French.¹⁸ Thus it was important that the rulers of the Low Countries support and ally with England.

¹⁶ Tunstall to Wolsey, January 1516, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, II, Nos. 204, 1427.


¹⁷ Commission to Tunstall, October 1, 1515, Ibid., II, No. 976.

¹⁸ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, pp. 30-50.

The Regent of the Netherlands was Margaret of Savoy, daughter of Emperor Maximilian.¹⁹ Margaret ruled Flanders during the minority of her nephew Charles who had been born at Ghent on February 24, 1500. It was Tunstall's assignment to seek an English alliance with the Netherlands.

The prospects for an alliance were severely hindered when on September 13 and 14, 1515 the French won a crushing victory at Marignano. Thereafter Maximilian was no longer keen on military adventures. The French, for their part, were also quite ready to give Maximilian lavish payments to ensure that he did not intervene in Italy.²⁰

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²⁰Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 34.

A new, complex issue was soon added to this perplexing situation when on February 1, 1516, Ferdinand (1452-1516), King of Aragon, died and left his crown to Charles. Margaret skillfully used the situation to play the French against the English. She informed Tunstall that as soon as Charles was safely in Spain, she would throw off her pretended friendship with France and openly ally with England.²¹ The situation remained unchanged until April 14, 1516. Prior to that, Tunstall often met with Margaret to discuss the proposed alliance. In April, Tunstall learned that a conference between the representatives of Charles (hence Margaret) and Francis was to be held at Noyan. At once his suspicions were aroused. Later he discovered that the Netherlands and France signed a treaty which included the provision that Charles would eventually marry Louise, the French King's daughter. It is not surprising the English were horrified by this hoodwinking.²² Though this alliance clearly threatened England, the Ambassador realized that the treaty would not last and that before long the Netherlands would welcome an English alliance.²³

²¹Ibid., p. 36.

²²Tunstall to Wolsey, August 13, 1516, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, II, Nos. 4478, 4485, 4658.

²³Tunstall to Wolsey, August 13, 1516, Ibid., II, No. 2270.

Even though the Flemish signed the Treaty of Noyan, Tunstall persisted in discussing a proposed pact between Henry, Margaret and Maximilian. Tunstall continually sought amity though it was now certain that there would be no united war effort. Immediately after the Flemish signed the treaty, relations between Margaret and Henry were strained, but with the passage of time these feelings slowly improved. It was this growing friendly discourse that Tunstall played upon to draw the Regent and Maximilian away from Francis. As a result, the French King began to question the good faith of his new allies.²⁴

Another element soon enhanced the English position. After nearly a year and a half of waiting, Charles decided to travel to Spain. Fearing the long and dangerous route by land, the young King decided to journey to Spain via the sea. In order to accomplish this, English assistance was essential. In May 1517, Henry wrote Tunstall directing his ambassador to remain with Charles until the monarch embarked for Spain.²⁵ Henry also ordered Tunstall to assist Charles in whatever way possible and to loan him 10,000 florins toward

²⁴Ibid., II, cxxix.

²⁵Henry to Tunstall, May, 1517, Ibid., II, No. 3343.

the expense of the voyage.²⁶ Tunstall remained in the Netherlands until September when Charles left for Spain. By October, he was again in England.²⁷

This first embassy in Tunstall's long diplomatic career clearly demonstrated his unquestioned loyalty. Tunstall's mission to Flanders was twofold: he had to negotiate a treaty of commerce as well as an alliance.²⁸ Tunstall never approved of Henry's plans to ally with the Empire and Flanders nor to financing their war aims,²⁹ but his opinions never interfered with the performance of his duties.³⁰ On another occasion Tunstall wrote Henry assuring him, "I will not fail to accomplish the king's desire."³¹ The way in which the treaty took final form jeopardized the economic interest of the Flemish clothmakers, though at the same time it assured the English of a virtual monopoly of the wool market.³² In essence, Tunstall did

²⁶ Henry to Tunstall, June, 1517, Ibid., II, Nos. 3402, 3491.

²⁷ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 50.

²⁸ Edward Surtz, "Sir Thomas More and His Utopian Embassy of 1515", pp. 278-280.

²⁹ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 37.

³⁰ "Whether my opinion be seen good or not good I am ready to follow his (Henry's) ordiance and to conform my mind to his most honorable counsell which I know well seeth further... than I do." Cotton Mos., Gdb. B.V., f. 197 quoted in Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 37.

³¹ Tunstall to Henry, August 2, 1515, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, II, No. 782.

³² Surtz, "Sir Thomas More's Utopian Embassy of 1515", pp. 294-295.

not object to injuring other nations and peoples to further English aims.

Tunstall remained in England serving as Henry's advisor until 1520.³³ During Charles's visit to England in that same year, it was suggested that Tunstall join the Emperor as the English Ambassador to the Imperial Court.³⁴ Charles accepted Henry's suggestion and on September 13, 1520 Tunstall departed from England and remained the English Ambassador until April 1521.³⁵

Upon Tunstall's embarkation for Germany the international situation was extremely complicated. Henry and his principal advisor, Cardinal Wolsey, desired to ally with the Emperor should war break out between England and France. Henry, however, was in no hurry to precipitate a crisis, so he instructed his ambassador to keep Charles in doubt as to English intentions. In this way, he hoped to exact the most favorable terms such as a promise of marriage between Charles and Princess Mary of England. Charles was not ready to accept irrevocably the betrothal to Mary. He was still considering marriage with either the French Princess or the Princess of Portugal. Since he and Mary were first cousins, a papal dispensation would be required, thus Charles found an excuse to delay a

³³Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V trans. C. V. Wedgwood, (London: Jonathan Cape LTD., 1936, reprint 1970, pp. 99-114.

³⁴Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 62.

³⁵Ibid., p. 62.

decision regarding the marriage. At the same time, Francis was forcing an issue by threatening to increase his conquests in Italy. Even without further expansion, communications between Spain and the Empire were difficult. Charles believed he could not allow further French aggression, for it would destroy all contact between the Empire and Spain. As Francis threatened war, Charles received an urgent appeal requesting that he return to Spain because a rebellion had started. If the Emperor returned to Spain, it seemed certain that Francis would overrun Naples and completely undermine all Imperial authority in Italy.³⁶ As the situation worsened for Charles, Henry sent word to Tunstall that he was willing to modify his demands. All the English monarch required was confirmation that the Emperor intended to break his betrothal to Princess Charlotte of France. Instead of a betrothal to marry, Henry desired only a pledge that he would marry the English Princess. While Henry hoped that Charles would wed Mary, the most important feature of the instructions was not an English marriage contract, but rather an assurance that Charles would not wed Charlotte.³⁷

Charles desired an English alliance but did not wish to bind himself to a projected English marriage.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 60-63.

³⁷ Wolsey to Tunstall, February 1521, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, III, No. 1162.

He realized that as long as he delayed a decision, England would do nothing particularly dangerous to the Empire or Spain. Accordingly, Charles hesitated to make a definitive decision regarding the marriage and remained in Germany. Tunstall was unsuccessful in exacting a promise of marriage throughout his six-month stay with the Emperor. On April 11, 1521, Henry ordered Tunstall to return to England.³⁸ Prior to Tunstall's departure he received a promise from Charles to meet him at Calais in the coming summer to negotiate a marriage treaty.³⁹

On August 2, 1521, Wolsey and Tunstall met the leader of the Emperor's representatives, Mercurin de Gattinara, at Calais. The discussions took some four months, but by August 25, 1521, Charles' representatives agreed to his betrothal to Mary, and they also concluded a military alliance against France. Tunstall took an active role in the negotiations and frequently acted as a deputy when Wolsey was either ill or unwilling to appear in person. Shortly after the conclusion of the negotiations, Wolsey and Tunstall returned to England.⁴⁰

After Tunstall's return to England we note his ascendancy in the royal council. Many instances occur

³⁸ Henry to Tunstall, April 11, 1521, Ibid., III, No. 1223.

³⁹ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 65.

⁴⁰ Garrett Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1941), pp. 201-211.

whereby he shows himself to be a devoted and willing servant of the state. An interesting example demonstrating his willingness to further Henry's demanding and sometimes egocentric aims occurred when the king declared war in 1522. The king needed large sums of money to finance the conflict with France. In order to secure these funds it was necessary that Henry summon Parliament. During Parliament's deliberations, Tunstall delivered an oration that lasted a full hour. In his speech Tunstall outlined the respective rights and duties of Kings, subjects, the organization of the state, and the function of Parliament. Kingship is ordained by God, he declared, and is unquestionable. Subjects must obey their sovereign and pursue whatever goals he desires. God selected the monarch and thus the King must be served. Tunstall concluded by giving his enthusiastic support for Henry's war aims and added that good and just peaces are produced by good wars.⁴¹ Following Tunstall's oration, Parliament voted Henry much of the money the king had requested; thereby Tunstall received the King's gratitude.⁴²

⁴¹Edward Hall, Chronicle (New York: Ams Press, 1968), pp. 652-3.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 652-3.

In April 1525, Tunstall and Richard Wingfield departed for Spain. This mission was prompted by the need for a new treaty between Henry and Charles for the continuation of the war against France which had started in 1522. England had entered the war with hopes of a quick victory, but very quickly these plans were dashed. Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk (d. 1545), who Henry ordered to march on Paris with his army, soon discovered that without proper reinforcements and additional funds the war effort could not continue. Henry could not supply the sorely needed monetary and material requirements that Suffolk required. By autumn all hopes for an English victory were gone and England all but withdrew from any military operations.⁴³ The war remained a virtual stalemate, until Charles' army in Italy attacked the French army on February 24, 1525. At the Battle of Pavia, the Emperor routed the French Army and captured Francis. Henry immediately dispatched Tunstall and Sir Richard Wingfield to Spain. Henry viewed the startling news as a golden opportunity to break the Valois house forever.⁴⁴

The ambassadors were instructed to congratulate Charles on his victory at Pavia and to point out to him that as long as Francis ruled, the security of Charles' and Henry's domains would be threatened. The only alternative, as

⁴³Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 88.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 92.

Henry put it, was to divide France between themselves. To this end, Henry offered the Emperor 5,000 archers, or 100,000 crowns, to supplement his army. As an additional incentive, Henry promised 350,000 crowns to convince Charles of his good faith and willingness to destroy France. In exchange for Henry's assistance, Charles had to award the French Crown to the English monarch and announce publicly his forthcoming marriage to Princess Mary.⁴⁵

After listening to Tunstall's and Wingfields' proposals, Charles countered by demanding that Princess Mary, who was then only nine, be sent to Spain immediately with a dowry of 400,000 ducats.⁴⁶ If Henry met this demand, Charles promised to announce his projected marriage to Mary. Charles also said that for an additional 200,000 crowns, in addition to the previously promised funds for the war effort, he would march on France.⁴⁷

The English Ambassadors were aghast at the effrontery of the proposal. To send the princess to Spain at nine years of age with such a vast sum and to leave her hostage at the hands of the Emperor would constitute a dangerous move for Henry thereafter would have no pawn to use in his diplomatic maneuvers. Tunstall and Wingfield told the Imperial counsellors that Henry would never agree to the removal of Mary from England at such a tender age, nor could he pay the dowry

⁴⁵The Letters of Henry VIII ed. Byrne St. Clare (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1968), pp. 30-40.

⁴⁶Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 93.

⁴⁷Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, IV, ixiv.

in one staggering sum. Instead the English representatives suggested that Henry pay the dowry in installments and any other suggestions they said were wholly inadmissible.⁴⁸

Obviously, Charles's proposal was purposely made so extravagant and unreasonable that it was no more than a feint. He made his demands as impractical as possible thereby allowing himself a pretext for evading his prior agreements. In short, Charles was not going to marry the princess nor assist Henry in dismembering France.⁴⁹ With Henry's grand plans dashed, Tunstall resigned himself to the task of negotiating a peace between the warring parties.⁵⁰ On July 9, the English agreed to an armistice which would facilitate the visit of the French Duchess of Alencon to Spain, who would assist in arranging a treaty between Henry, Charles and Francis.⁵¹

Before the Duchess's arrival in Toledo, Henry instructed Tunstall to ensure that Charles did not make a separate peace. At the same time, however, Henry and Louise of Savoy, mother of the French king, and regent in his absence, negotiated a settlement to end English involvement in the war. Tunstall, who was not a party to this fraud, learned of the English peace in late October. After Charles heard about the English peace treaty, Henry's ambassador was barred

⁴⁸Ibid., IV, ixv.

⁴⁹Ibid., IV, ixvii.

⁵⁰Wingfield died on July 22, 1525, leaving Tunstall as the sole English representative at the Spanish Court.

⁵¹Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 94.

from attending further negotiations. In January, the French Duchess and Charles concluded the Treaty of Madrid. In essence, the treaty gave the Emperor control of the French areas in Italy. After the conclusion of the treaty, Henry recalled Tunstall who reached England on May 5, 1526.⁵² As in Tunstall's prior missions, he again demonstrated his willingness to travel great distances in order to serve Henry.

No diplomat could have faced a more difficult task than the one Henry assigned Tunstall. Henry ordered Tunstall to persuade the Emperor to invade, conquer and then after that award the French throne to the English monarch.⁵³ Tunstall faithfully served his English lord and constantly attempted to convince Charles of the merit in Henry's plans.⁵⁴ Upon the day of his arrival in Toledo, Tunstall sought and received an audience with the Emperor. At that audience Cuthbert Tunstall outlined Henry's plans for the continuance of the war and the benefits that would occur with an Anglo-Spanish victory.⁵⁵ Tunstall told Charles that

⁵²Ibid., p. 96-102.

⁵³The Letters of Henry VIII, ed. M. St. Claire Byrne (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1968), pp. 31-40.

⁵⁴It has previously been stated what Henry offered Charles in exchange for the French throne.

⁵⁵Tunstall to Henry, June 2, 1525, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, IV, No. 1378.

"he (Henry) and the Emperor might bring their common causes to some notable and desired effect for themselves and Christendom; that they had it now in their power either to establish their affairs or suffer their cruel wars to increase,..."⁵⁶ This set the tone Tunstall used during the next four months in his attempt to convince Charles of the necessity of an Anglo-Spanish invasion of France. In all, there are twenty-three dispatches from Tunstall in the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII dealing with the negotiations.

In those dispatches Cuthbert Tunstall not only reports the conversations he has with the Emperor but he also seeks direction from Henry. In short, Tunstall attempted to further Henry's aims.

Upon Tunstall's return from Spain in May 1526, he found that Henry had embarked on a course that was to have profound effects on English history. This event was Henry's annulment of his marriage to Katherine of Aragon and his amour with Anne Boleyn. Previously we have reviewed the divorce and the role Tunstall played in the proceedings. The reader will also recall that Tunstall opposed the divorce until he was summoned to London and spoke with Henry. At that conference we may conclude Henry informed Tunstall that he desired a divorce and ordered Cuthbert's support. Shortly thereafter, on May 16, 1534, Tunstall publicly announced his support of the divorce and argued ardently for Henry's cause.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Tunstall to Henry, June 2, 1525, Ibid., IV, No. 1378.

⁵⁷Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 185.

After that, Henry employed Tunstall to convince Katherine and her supporters, notably Fisher and More, of the futility of remaining adamant in their opposition to the divorce.⁵⁸ Tunstall wrote Katherine explaining the reason for his transformation regarding the divorce,⁵⁹ and added:

"Therefore I had now changed my former opinion and exhorted her to do the semblable, and to forebear to usurp any more the name of Queen... if she would so do she might thereby obtain much quietness for herself and her friend, and... I doubted not but that your Highness...would entreat her as your Grace's most dearest sister."⁶⁰

Tunstall's arguments enraged Katherine who replied that she would never relinquish the title of Queen nor agree to a divorce, and branded Tunstall a traitor to her cause.⁶¹ Tunstall replied to her biting criticism saying he was the 'King's subject and vassal' and this political philosophy caused him to bow to the express commands of his liege Henry.⁶²

During this period of marital strife, Tunstall was again sent abroad. On July 3, 1527 Henry commissioned Wolsey, Tunstall, More, and Gardiner to negotiate an Anglo-French alliance. Even though peace prevailed throughout

⁵⁸ Garrett Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), pp. 369-371.

⁵⁹ See page 11 for additional information.

⁶⁰ Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, quoted in Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 185.

⁶¹ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 184.

⁶² Spanish Calendar, IV (2), quoted in Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 185.

Europe after the Treaty of Madrid, each country studied the situation and maneuvered for dominance. Henry, who desired a united English-French throne was vexed at Charles for not continuing the war. At the same time, Francis had no intention whatsoever of abiding by the Treaty of Madrid, and looked toward England for assistance in undermining Charles. The Emperor, while in print achieving a diplomatic victory with the Treaty of Madrid, in fact faced a difficult task. He needed many troops in Italy to enforce his hegemony and in addition to that, he had other pressing problems, such as the Peasant's Revolt in Germany, the heresy of Luther, and Turkish encroachment in the Empire.⁶³

Henry added another element to the international situation with his infatuation with Anne Boleyn and his need for a male heir. Anne complicated the problem with her refusal of Henry's romantic overtures until he promised that she would become Queen of England.⁶⁴ In order to fulfill this promise, Henry needed to divorce Katherine of Aragon, the aunt of Charles V. To achieve this end, Henry required the Pope's sanction. It was very unlikely that Pope Clement VII would grant the divorce, for Charles was devoted to his aunt

⁶³Scarisbrick, Henry VIII pp. 136-145.

⁶⁴Lacey Baldwin Smith, Henry VIII, The Mask of Royalty (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 105.

and controlled large areas of Italy. With this realization Henry resolved to ally with Francis in order to further his own interest.⁶⁵

On July 3, 1527 Henry commised Wolsey, Tunstall, More, and Gardiner to seek an alliance with Francis. While the idea of an Anglo-French alliance was not extremely popular in England, the populace generally condoned the pact because of the Imperial Armies' sack of Rome during the previous May.⁶⁶ In France, Tunstall played only a minor role in the negotiations, though his knowledge of the Imperial court was indispensable. England and France agreed in January of 1528 to declare war on Charles. The ministers also concluded that in exchange for French support for the divorce England would invade the Netherlands. While this English invasion took place, the French would march on Italy.⁶⁷

As agreed to, both monarchs declared war on January 22, 1528. By that time, however, popular approval of Henry's war aims had dissipated. The Emperor robbed Henry of his excuse for war when he released the Pope, who had been captured during the sack of Rome. The English merchants also stirred the populace to the point of revolt against

⁶⁵ Scarisbrick, Henry VIII pp. 135-162.

⁶⁶ Edward Hall, Chronicle (New York: AMS Press, 1965), p. 726.

⁶⁷ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, pp. 104-107.

the war because they feared a disruption of the wool trade.⁶⁸

Henry had no alternative but to sue for peace. The peace treaty remained only to register a fait accompli at Cambrai in August of 1529. At Cambrai, Tunstall and More represented England's interest. The only point that caused serious difficulty during the course of the negotiations was the English demand that commercial relations between Flanders and England be permanently re-established. The Flemish represented by Margaret, Regent in Flanders, did not want the previous trade agreements extended. The English threatened that if the previous treaties were not continued, England would break off negotiations. In face of that threat, Margaret gave way and peace was concluded.⁶⁹ In essence, the Treaty of Cambrai merely re-created the international situation of 1527. Following the signing of the treaty, Tunstall and More returned to England on August 22, 1529.⁷⁰ Thereafter, Tunstall did not participate in any continental missions until 1545 when he was again sent to France.

In 1545 Henry sent Tunstall to France to conclude peace between the two warring nations. Prior to the war, Henry

⁶⁸ See Letters and Papers of Henry VIII during the first half of 1528.

⁶⁹ Tunstall to Henry, July 1529, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, IV, Nos. 5822 and 5830.

⁷⁰ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 109.

strove to maintain good relations with the Emperor, and to achieve English suzerainty over Scotland.⁷¹ This was the major foreign policy objective of Henry's during the period 1540-1545.⁷² Because of the English monarch's desire, an almost constant state of warfare existed between the two nations. This agitation was particularly strong during 1542 when James V (1512-1542) of Scotland gave refuge to fugitives from the Pilgrimage of Grace, rejected Henry's invitation to despoil church property, and refused to break with Roman Catholicism. Insult was added to injury when Irish chieftains made overtures to James requesting his assistance in removing the English from Ulster soil.⁷³

Henry keenly resented James' attitude. Because James refused to participate in English attacks on the Church, Henry threatened to invade Scotland immediately if James would not agree to a perpetual peace between England and Scotland and renounce any future Scottish-French leagues. Henry said war could only be avoided in this way. Henry hardly expected the Scots to accept such a one-sided alliance and thus war broke out. The two armies met at Solway Moss on November 24, where the Scots were utterly routed. James, upon receiving word of the disaster, died some three weeks later, thereby passing the crown of Scotland to his daughter Mary (1542-1587), who was only eight days old.⁷⁴

⁷¹Ibid., p. 232.

⁷²Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy, p. 125.

⁷³Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, pp. 231-233.

⁷⁴Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy, p. 237.

After Solway Moss, Henry ordered all military operations to cease. The English monarchs suggested to the Scottish parliament that his son, Prince Edward, wed Mary upon her majority. The Scottish Parliament approved the plan and the two were betrothed.⁷⁵ At the same time, the French who feared the Anglo-Scottish alliance because they had few allies, declared war on England. The Scottish Parliament, upon receiving word of the war on December 11, 1543, denounced their treaty with England and renewed their league with France.⁷⁶ The English invaded France and succeeded in capturing Boulogne on September 14, 1544.⁷⁷ By this time, though, the cost of the war was overtaxing the English treasury. Therefore, Henry ordered Tunstall to travel to France and negotiate a settlement. Henry instructed Tunstall to remain adamant in demanding the continued English occupation of Boulogne. He was also instructed to seek French agreement that they would not ally with Scotland.⁷⁸ Because of Henry's second demand, little progress was made. Henry recalled Tunstall in January 1546 and the English renewed the war.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 241.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 243.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 247.

⁷⁸ Henry to Tunstall, September 1544, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, XX (2), No. 553.

⁷⁹ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 250.

Yet ending the war was essential for Henry had no money to pay his soldiers. Tunstall returned to France in June 1546 and concluded the Treaty of Camp.⁸⁰ Embodied in this treaty was the agreement that Boulogne would remain in English hands for eight years. After that, on payment of two million crowns, the city would return to French control.⁸¹ Henry's demand that France promise not to ally with Scotland was dropped. At the same time, Henry offered peace to Scotland. In order to conclude peace, the Scots would have to declare themselves bound to the old treaty of 1543. This proposal was so distasteful to the Scots that they rejected English attempts to end the war. Hostilities continued and were still in progress when Henry died in January 1547.⁸²

After Henry's death Tunstall never again took part in any continental foreign missions. His long and successful diplomatic career spanned some three decades and involved economic, military and ecclesiastical problems. Few diplomats have achieved such success or participated for so long in the foreign policy of the nation. Tunstall stands as a major statesman and diplomatist of the Renaissance.

⁸⁰Commission to Tunstall, June 1546, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, XXI (1), No. 687.

⁸¹Ibid., XXI (1), No. 1014.

⁸²Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 250.

CONCLUSION

As has been demonstrated, Tunstall was more than willing to subordinate his own particular interests and beliefs to those of his liege Lord Henry. Again and again throughout his long career, many instances are found whereby he shows himself willing to serve Henry without any compunction or restraint. The most important element of the Renaissance Diplomat, according to Mattingly, was this very characteristic, willingness to do whatever one's liege instructed. Though this was the most important criteria of the Renaissance Diplomat, there were many others, such as a need for large outside financial resources, a classical education, and a sense of ethics. In all of these areas Tunstall again fulfills the characteristics suggested by Mattingly.

Money was a major concern. Throughout the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII one finds many instances of Tunstall's near bankruptcy during his diplomatic career. The earliest example of this occurred during his first mission and continued throughout his career. Tunstall was beset with financial difficulties from the very beginning of his mission to Flanders in 1515. On July 9, 1515 one finds him sending two dispatches to England. One of the letters was to the King's Council and the other to

Wolsey. The theme of both letters was identical...the need for additional money.¹ On July 21, Tunstall wrote Wolsey requesting the Chancellor's intercession regarding his financial crisis.² In September another dispatch highlights the diplomat's critical monetary problem. Tunstall bluntly wrote, "wants money, has been there more than four months since I was last paid."³ When at last Tunstall was recalled to England, Henry instructed him to return without delay. Tunstall wrote his monarch, "your Grace could have commanded me nothing that I should do with a better will not only because I have been long absent, but also because my purse doth remember me to make haste as oft as I look in it."⁴

Tunstall's financial difficulties were not confined to his first mission. One finds on his second embassy the same problem and few alternatives to rectify the situation.⁵ One need not proceed further with Tunstall's financial difficulties; suffice to say that true to Mattingly's formula, Tunstall experienced grave financial problems when sent abroad.

Another criterion of a Renaissance Diplomat was an outstanding education.⁶ Of Tunstall's wide erudition and love of learning there can be no doubt. He was a scholar of

¹Tunstall to Wolsey and Tunstall to Council, July 9, 1515, Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, II, Nos. 678, 679.

²Tunstall to Wolsey, July 21, 1515, Ibid., II, No. 733.

³Tunstall to Henry, September 1515, Ibid., II, No. 904.

⁴Tunstall to Henry, January 29, 1516, Ibid., II, No. 1458.

⁵Tunstall to Henry, December 1520, Ibid., III, No. 1098.

⁶See page 24 for further elaboration.

high distinction, deeply read in theology and classical literature. Along with his command of ancient languages, he also spoke several modern tongues. He was very interested in mathematics and much has already been said about that. Because of his public activities Tunstall wrote very little, but he was generous in his aid to other scholars. Two of the most well known scholars that he assisted were Erasmus and Polydore Vergil.⁷

Tunstall was also an ethical man. He had the reputation of not only being a knowledgeable and learned man but humane and moderate as well.⁸ There can be no doubt that foreign princes respected Tunstall for he was always well received whenever sent abroad.⁹ Equally important he was also respected by his opponents in England. Although the radical Protestants disliked what Tunstall believed and vehemently attempted to discredit him, they always acknowledged his honesty and brilliance.¹⁰

⁷ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 344.

⁸ Ibid., p. 341.

⁹ This is verified by the fact he was never refused as a resident ambassador throughout his long career. On several occasions throughout the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, one finds letters sent from Charles to Henry testifying to Tunstall's honesty and forthright manner.

¹⁰ Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator, p. 340-3.

Without hesitation, then, Tunstall adds support to the Mattingly thesis. Tunstall was unquestionably devoted to his master. He also experienced the monetary crisis that the Renaissance diplomat often faced. The other criteria of Mattingly's, such as lineage, distinction and respectability, also fit Tunstall. Without reservation then, I conclude that Tunstall's career and activities add support to Garrett Mattingly's definition of an ideal Renaissance diplomat.

As stated in the Introduction, the correlative purpose of this paper was the reevaluation of Tunstall's diplomatic career. After the extensive review of Tunstall's diplomatic adventures, one can hardly claim that his life lacked lustre or dramatics. For a man to participate in the domestic and foreign policy of his nation for over thirty years, especially during the Renaissance, hardly justifies the conclusion that his life was without lustre. Perhaps the reason historians have generally ignored Tunstall results not from his alleged lack of dramatics but rather because an attempt to study a man involved in so many diverse issues would be a complicated and difficult undertaking.

Tunstall was also a successful diplomat. Taking his missions in the order of their occurrence, he succeeded in the embassies of 1515, 1527, 1529 and 1545. He failed in 1519 and 1525. Even though he failed twice, Henry must have been impressed with his work for he continually re-employed Tunstall as an ambassador.

Thus, Tunstall, a man who served his country for over thirty years in such diverse duties as president of the Council of the North, member of Parliament, bishop of the Church of England, member of the King's Council and lastly as an ambassador cannot with justice be accused of leading an uneventful life.

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A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MATTINGLY THESIS
THE CASE OF CUTHBERT TUNSTALL

by

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ABSTRACT

The Renaissance of the sixteenth century was a period typified by a revival of arts and letters in Western Civilization. Yet this term represents more than a rebirth--it also symbolizes a transformation in Western European history. Along with artistic and architectural innovations, the Renaissance signifies a period during which dynastic monarchs sought to enhance and extend their own power in unprecedented ways.

During and prior to the Renaissance, forces were at work that assisted the monarchs in their quest for power. The emancipation of the serfs, the growth of cities, the rise of the middle classes, the expansion of trade, the invention of the printing press, and the discovery of a New World aided in undermining a church-dominated society, giving its kings more freedom of action. With this changing world, monarchs needed new tools to aggrandize their states.¹ One of these new tools that the nascent monarch used was an organized diplomatic corps, which is the subject of Garrett Mattingly's Renaissance Diplomacy.²

¹George Trevelyan, History of England II (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc.), p. 1.

²Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p. ii.

Mattingly argues that during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, specific criteria characterize diplomatic activity. Mattingly studied the changing mode of diplomacy and made significant conclusions about the Renaissance Diplomat. This thesis will apply these conclusions to Cuthbert Tunstall, one of the most experienced diplomats of the Renaissance and thereby test Mattingly's arguments.

Cuthbert Tunstall was a member of the King's Council in Henry VIII's court. Unlike many men during Henry's reign, Tunstall was able to weather the political, ideological and ecclesiastical revolutions of the era. Entering Henry's service in 1514, he continued to serve his sovereign in different capacities until Henry's death in 1547, and continued in the service of the crown until his own death in 1559.

Henry VIII employed Tunstall not only as a royal advisor but also as an ambassador to Flanders (1515), to Germany (1520), to Spain (1525), to France (1527), to Cambrai (1529), and again to France (1547). The international situation at this time was marked with the continued Habsburg-Valois conflict. Henry maintained a foreign policy which capitalized on this struggle.³ He allied himself to both sides with impunity, fostering his own dynastic ends with each diplomatic maneuver. Tunstall was also an ecclesiastical official of some repute; as the Bishop of London and Durham successively. Yet with this long and successful career, modern historians have largely ignored Cuthbert Tunstall.

³Lacey Baldwin Smith, Henry VIII, The Mask of Royalty. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), pp. 142-145.

There are two reasons for this historical indifference to Tunstall--his alleged unsuccessful career in diplomatic affairs and the conspicuous absence of the dramatic element so commonly found in men such as John Fisher and Thomas More.⁴ The secondary aim of this thesis will be the re-evaluation of Tunstall's diplomatic activities.

After applying Mattingly's thesis to Tunstall, added weight is given to his conclusions. Almost in every way Tunstall fulfills the expectations and requirements of the Renaissance Diplomat as defined by Mattingly. It is also apparent after studying Tunstall's career that he was neither unsuccessful in diplomacy nor lacking in historical interest.

The materials used for this thesis include the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII, The State Papers of Henry VIII, and the Calendar of State Papers. To supplement these primary sources, I have also relied on such works as Edward Hall's Chronicle, John Cavendish's Life and Death of Cardinal Wolsey, Thomas More's Utopia and John Roper's Life of Sir Thomas More. In addition to these primary materials, secondary sources provide additional information. Notable among these secondary works is the primary biography of Tunstall, Charles Sturge's Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator.

⁴Charles Sturge, Cuthbert Tunstall, Churchman, Scholar, Administrator. (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1938), p. 1.