

The Logic of Strategic Consensus:
State Environment and Civil War

by

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B.A., Université d'Abomey-Calavi (Benin), 2009
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AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Security Studies
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

2017

Abstract

Why are states sometimes unable to avoid the occurrence of civil war? Most existing theories of civil war focus on rebels' motivation and capabilities, while taking government's actions as givens. Not only is the government a key player in the process leading up to civil war, but it is also a non-unitary actor composed of individuals and groups with diverging aspirations. Thus, understanding civil war requires an explanation of the conditions that facilitate or impede what governments do to provide political order.

To fill this gap, this dissertation proposes a state-centered theory that explains civil war as an indirect function of state environment, defined in terms of structural and institutional conditions under which governments operate. The argument is that state environment determines the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion, two strategies that governments rely on to provide political order. Specifically, harsh socioeconomic conditions reduce leaders' strategic consensus. Moreover, leaders' divisions in socioeconomically poor societies are further exacerbated by democratic institutions. In turn, the lack of consensus on accommodation and coercion increases the risks of civil war.

Quantitative and qualitative methods are used to test the theory. The quantitative analysis relies on mediation techniques and on a cross-sectional time series of 162 countries from 1960 to 2007. The results support the theoretical argument. Socioeconomic development is indirectly and inversely related to civil war. About two-thirds of its effect is transmitted through accommodation, while one-third occurs through coercion. Moreover, democratic institutions are positively associated with civil war. When socioeconomic development is low, states with open institutions are the least accommodative and the most coercive.

The qualitative methods of “structured, focused comparison” and “process tracing” are used to investigate three cases (Côte d’Ivoire, Romania, and Benin). The findings show that the emergence of sociopolitical dissidence often results from changes in the structure of the state’s socioeconomic or political environment. However, the risks of escalation into civil war are highest when leaders lack consensus about a strategy to resolve the issue at stake. In turn, leaders’ disunity about a bargaining strategy is found to be a product of calculations for political survival.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to Dr. Emizet F. Kisangani for his admirable role as my advisor. His guidance and his mentoring have immensely improved the quality of the research contained in this dissertation. Most importantly, his work ethics and his intellectual rigor have inspired me in my desire to become a scholar in the field of political science. I am also grateful to Dr. Jeffrey Pickering for the positive impact he had on my personal development as a scholar. Under his leadership as the head of the Political Science department, I have been provided magnificent opportunities to further my skills as an educator. Dr. Carla Martinez Machain decisively helped shape my understanding of political violence and transnational security. I am thankful for her support and advice throughout the dissertation process. Dr. Andrew Orr, through his relentless and spontaneous assistance with regard to historical research methods, tremendously helped me expand my interdisciplinary research skills. Dr. Andrew Long has been a positive influence, and was always eager to provide any counsel and support I needed as a graduate student. I am forever indebted to my superiors in the Benin Armed Forces, especially to General (retired) Soumanou Oké and Colonel (retired) Pascal Tawès, for granting me this rare chance to pursue a doctoral degree in Security Studies at one of the world's pioneer programs in the field.

Dedication

To my son, Jefson, who had to endure my absence for several years. I admire your resiliency. I am proud of what you have been able to achieve without your father on your side. My younger sister, Estelle, departed this world too soon to see this day come. I will work tirelessly to protect and honor your legacy. To my late father, Vincent, for inspiring me.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 The Puzzle

Why are governments sometimes unable to avoid the occurrence of civil war? This question remains a major puzzle to students of political instability. It is especially perplexing given that a core function of the state is to provide political order (Hobbes [1651] 1994). In fact, governments have financial resources and public force, which they are generally expected to use to ensure that citizens have little motivation or opportunities to rebel. Even when rebellion occurs, governments can still maintain order by engaging in a peaceful settlement with dissidents or by resorting to force to compel them. Despite all these options available to the state, it is puzzling why civil wars occur.

In this dissertation, civil war refers to “a sustained military conflict, primarily internal, pitting the central government against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance,” which results in more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year with at least 5% of this number caused by the weakest side (Small and Singer 1982, 214-216; see also Levy and Thompson 2010; Sambanis 2004). This definition is sometimes criticized by scholars. For instance, Salehyan (2009, 66) argues that reliance on the 1000-death threshold is arbitrary because “authors offer no good explanation” for it. Gleditsch et al. (2002) contend that this threshold is too high, and thus excludes well-known conflicts with lower numbers of fatalities.

Although this dissertation will capture different types of civil war in its quantitative analysis, Small and Singer’s (1982) definition is preferred because it emphasizes several important criteria. First, to qualify as civil war, a conflict must not only oppose the government to a non-governmental group, but the hostilities must also occur within the boundaries of a state.

Second, the hostilities must involve armed forces on both sides that are capable of “effective resistance.” This means that both sides need to be organized and prepared to inflict and sustain attacks, whereby the weaker side must inflict at least 5% of the number of the fatalities it sustains (Sarkees 2010). Finally, the conflict must result in at least 1000 battle-related deaths between/among all war participants. The purpose of these criteria is to differentiate civil wars from massacres by one side or riots by unorganized groups (Sarkees 2010).

Previous explanations of civil war often rest upon three major theoretical grounds. First, the “grievance” framework (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970) explains civil war as a function of objective injustices that lead citizens to strike against the state. Second, the “resource mobilization” theory (Tilly 1978) emphasizes opportunities that enable citizens to acquire the means to challenge the government. Third, the “greed” approach models civil war in terms of profitable opportunities and costs of rebellion (Grossman 1991, 1999). In this view, civil war is more likely when the benefits of rebellion outweigh its costs (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004).

Relying mostly on these theoretical frameworks, scholars empirically investigate civil war in relation to political, economic, and structural factors. However, empirical research on civil war is plagued with competing explanations and inconsistent findings. For example, economic and political studies offer rivaling accounts about why poverty is empirically shown to be a major cause of civil war (Dixon 2009; Hendrix 2010). In the economic view, which relies on the greed approach (Grossman 1991, 1999), poor economic conditions lower the costs of recruitment to rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Yet, political analyses, inspired by the resource mobilization framework (Tilly 1978), insist that low country income only indicates weak government capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

In addition to these competing explanations, empirical studies of civil war also produce inconsistent results, especially with regard to the effects of regime type. For instance, many works based on the grievance (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970) and the resource mobilization (Tilly 1978) theories show no steady relationships between democracy and civil war. A number of scholars find democratic regimes to be negatively associated with civil war (Hegre et al. 2001), while others indicate no association between democracy and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Still other research findings suggest that the effect of democracy is conditional on the level of economic development (Hegre 2014).

In light of these gaps in theoretical and empirical research on civil war, a number of scholars have called for a shift from a rebel-centric to a state-centered approach (Goldstone et al. 2010; Bates 2008; Kisangani 2012). In their view, priority should be given to a theoretical framework that “focuses on political structures and elite relationships, rather than simply on state resources or insurgent capabilities” (Goldstone et al. 2010, 191). They contend that citizens in most states always have grievances that challengers can take advantage of. In addition, states often have a comparative advantage in capabilities over their challengers (Goldstone et al. 2010).

In recent years, studies based on the state-centered approach have proposed that civil war is more likely to occur in states “where regimes are paralyzed or undermined by elite divisions and state-elite conflicts” (Goldstone et al. 2010, 191; Kisangani 2012). They argue that a “united and administratively competent regime can defeat any insurgency” (Goldstone et al. 2010, 191). However, this claim has yet to be formulated in a comprehensive theory that provides answers to two questions. First, what accounts for unity or disagreement among state elites? Second, how does such unity or such disagreement determine the likelihood of civil war?

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide answers to these two questions. Thus, the focus is on explaining the determinants and the impacts of elite behavior on political order. Doing so will shed light, not only on why governments fail to deter social dissidence, but also on why they may fall short at averting its escalation into civil war. Achieving this goal may ultimately be critical to solving the puzzle of why governments are sometimes unable to avoid the occurrence of civil war despite the resources and capabilities at their disposal.

1.2 The Argument

This dissertation builds upon existing theories of civil war to propose a state-centered framework that explains civil war as an indirect function of state environment. The term “state environment” refers to the structural and institutional conditions under which governments operate. As highlighted in figure 1.1, the main argument is that state environment indirectly affects civil war through the mediated effect of leaders’ strategic consensus. Strategic consensus describes the proportion of political leaders committed to the implementation of a strategy that is aimed at providing political order.


The indirect impact of state environment on civil war occurs through a two-stage process. First, when leaders assume office, they must decide whether they should accommodate citizens’ needs by supplying public goods or coerce them into compliance as a means to remain in office.¹ When the state’s structural and institutional conditions incentivize only a few state leaders to commit to accommodation or coercion, the government will be less effective at providing public

¹ A public good refers to a good that is non-excludable and jointly supplied to all people. Besides political order, other examples of public goods supplied by the state may include, among others, public safety, social justice, public education, public healthcare, transportation infrastructure, and social welfare (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 29).

goods and imposing high costs to dissent. This raises the likelihood of public discontent and social dissidence.

Second, when the government is challenged by dissatisfied groups, leaders must decide whether they should accommodate challengers through a peaceful settlement or coerce them through military force. Unless leaders share broad consensus on these strategies, civil war is more likely as a result of failed negotiations or ineffective repression. This is because a large group of leaders opposed to the government's crisis bargaining strategy will seek to undermine its execution. They might even be willing to provide support to dissidents.

Figure 1.1 A Model of Strategic Consensus and Civil War



(Adapted from Kisangani 2012, 7)

Empirically, two dimensions of state environment will be critical in explaining civil war. First, the level of the country's socioeconomic condition determines the proportion of leaders committed to accommodation and coercion. Socioeconomic environment describes the physical quality of life in society (Jaffee 1998). One of the predictions is that poor socioeconomic conditions not only reduce the proportions of leaders committed to accommodation, but they also encourage leaders' polarization about the political benefits of coercion. In turn, such lack of

consensus among leaders regarding accommodation and coercion will result in poor governance and failed crisis bargaining strategies. This significantly raises the risks of civil war.

The second decisive characteristic of state environment in accounting for civil war through leaders' strategic consensus is political openness. This refers to the extent to which all politically active members of society are allowed, in principle, to participate in the selection of leaders and be selected (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016, 22; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). It is predicted that the impact of political openness will be contingent on the state's socioeconomic condition. In societies that are socioeconomically underdeveloped, open institutions further reduce the proportions of leaders committed to accommodation while exacerbating leaders' divisions about coercion. In more advanced states, however, open institutional arrangements broaden the scope of leaders' commitment to accommodation and opposition to coercion.

The proposed argument draws on research from two different fields. First, it relies on a body of literature on strategic consensus developed by business management scholars (see Kellermanns et al. 2005). From their perspective, strategic consensus refers to the "level of agreement among senior managers concerning the emphasis placed on a specific type of strategy" (Homburg, Krohmer, and Workman 1999, 340), whereby agreement is understood as the "product of [...] management commitment to, and understanding of, strategy" (Wooldridge and Floyd 1990, 235).² According to this field of research, the business environment impacts managers' ability to achieve strategic consensus (Dess and Origer 1987; Knight et al. 1999), which in turn affects the performance of the organization (Bourgeois 1980).

² Business management scholars offer different definitions of the concept of strategic consensus. For a survey of these definitions, see Kellermanns et al. (2005, 721).

Second, this dissertation's argument draws on the logic of political survival also known as the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). This well-established framework in political science suggests that institutional arrangements for selecting political leaders determine their policy performance once in office. This contention is based on the assumption that political leaders are motivated by their desire to obtain and maintain public office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Unlike the selectorate theory, however, this dissertation relies on explicit assumptions about the properties of the goods supplied by the state and about the preferences of citizens regarding these goods.

1.3 Scope and Significance of the Study

This dissertation is both theoretically and methodologically significant. Theoretically, it suggests an indirect relationship between civil war and state environment described as socioeconomic conditions and political institutions (see figure 1.1). Most studies tend to model civil war as a direct function of structural, economic, and political factors. Thus, they overlook the possibility that these elements may affect the policy process, and thus indirectly determine whether or not the government produces public goods such as political order. Rare exceptions include Kisangani (2012) and Young (2013). While Kisangani's (2012) analysis is limited to Congo, Young's (2013) mediation model examines repression only. Thus, this study takes a different approach. It argues that the impact of socioeconomic and political conditions on civil war is mediated through leaders' consensus around accommodation and coercion, which are two main strategies on which leaders rely for survival in office (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010).

By suggesting that the effect of state environment is mediated through leaders' strategic consensus, this dissertation unpacks a black box that extant research on civil war often

overlooks.³ As Aldrich (1995) contends, the provision of public goods is a result of “collective action” within government. Yet, most civil war studies based on grievance, greed, and resource mobilization theories simply assume the state to be a unitary actor, and are thus unable to provide insight in the dynamics and challenges facing members of the government during the policy process. Moreover, they tend to focus on rebels’ attitude while taking government behavior as given. They seem to neglect the fact that civil war is the consequence of strategic interactions between the state and its citizens (Bates 2008; Young 2013). This is in fact a major issue of model specification in extant research on civil wars that this dissertation addresses.

The present work is also methodologically significant. Unlike the majority of previous studies which rely on either quantitative approach or qualitative analysis, this dissertation uses both methods. Relying on only one of these methods to study civil war may be a limited approach. Quantitative methods “are often unable to untangle competing causal stories or determine causal ordering, and require a deeper analysis to validate a proposed mechanism” (Clayton 2014, 18-19). On the other hand, the use of qualitative studies alone limits generalization of findings (George and Bennett 2005). Combining both methods therefore enhances confidence in the empirical findings (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney and Goertz 2006). As Clayton (2014, 18-19) argues, “the combination of methods can help quantitative researchers address measurement issues, assess outliers, discuss variables omitted from the large-N analysis, and examine cases incorrectly predicted” by their models.

By taking a different theoretical and methodological approach, this study hopes to make significant contributions to the study of civil war. First, the results of the mediation modeling will enable evaluation of the competing economic and political explanations of the effects of

³ A black box refers to “unobserved mechanisms by which an input affects an output” (Mackinnon 2008, 4).

economic development. Second, unlike existing theories, the strategic consensus framework offers a single explanation for several puzzles and inconsistencies in extant research on civil war. Specifically, it sheds light on (1) why poor countries are more prone to civil war than wealthy societies while explaining the differences within these two types of environment; (2) why democracies are more likely to experience civil war than autocracies while accounting for variations among these regime types; (3) why anocracies or mixed regimes are particularly prone to civil war; (4) why and when repression may or may not reduce the odds of civil war; and (5) why states have weak or strong accommodative and repressive capabilities.

1.4 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation contains eight additional chapters. The next chapter provides a review of extant literature on the causes of civil war. Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical development. The argument is that socioeconomic and political openness indirectly affect civil war through their impact on leaders' consensus on their strategies for political order. The following chapter conducts a time series cross-sectional analysis to determine whether or not there is a statistically significant relationship between indicators of state environment and the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion on one hand, and between such consensus, or the lack thereof, and the prospects of civil war, on the other.

Chapter 5 highlights the qualitative methodologies of “structural focused comparison” and of “process tracing” (George and Bennett 2005; Goldstone 1998; Mahoney 2012) through the use of “critical antecedents” and “critical junctures” (Slater and Simmons 2010). Chapters 6 through 8 apply these methodologies to examine the findings of the statistical model by investigating 3 cases that include a civil war in Côte d'Ivoire (2002), the Anti-Ceausescu

Revolution in Romania (1989), and a military mutiny in Benin (1992). The last chapter outlines the policy implications of the findings, and identifies potential avenues for future research.

Chapter 2 - Literature Review

The literature on civil war has expanded since the end of the Cold War. Yet, it is still plagued with puzzles and inconsistent findings that need to be reconciled. This chapter seeks to examine the various works accomplished by scholars in the field, and identify potential gaps to be filled. It is organized into two sections. The first provides a review of extant research on civil war. The second outlines a critical analysis of the theoretical and methodological approaches underlying previous studies.

2.1 A Review of the Empirical Research

Three theoretical frameworks dominate the study of the causes of civil war. They include grievance (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970), state capacity or resource mobilization (Tilly 1978), and greed (Grossman 1991, 1999). However, statistical analyses mostly model civil war in terms of political, economic, and structural approaches (Kisangani 2012, 7). Thus, the review of the literature will be organized along these lines in order to facilitate understanding of this vast body of research.

2.1.1 Political Determinants of Civil War

A large body of research on civil war in the political science tradition revolves around the notion of “objective grievance.” This literature dates back to Davies’ (1962) suggestion that revolutions originate from an evolving gap between individual aspirations and actual economic status. Gurr (1970) popularized this idea in his seminal work on “relative deprivation,” which describes “a perceived discrepancy between men value expectations and their value capabilities.” The argument is that rebellion is a function of public discontent that arises from a sense of

relative deprivation. People who feel that they are deprived of the goods and conditions they “ought” to receive from their political community are likely to politicize and actualize their discontent through instigation of violence against the government. Thus, violence against the state becomes more likely as the intensity of public grievance increases.

The main hypothesis is that grievance increases the prospects of civil war. To investigate this relationship, researchers operationalize grievance in a number of ways. The first is “vertical inequality,” which refers to an uneven distribution of socioeconomic and/or political power among individuals in society (Østby 2013). Common measures of vertical inequality include the Gini index and the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index. The former captures the distribution of income or land assets among the residents of a country. The latter gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethno-linguistic groups (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 78).

The empirical findings about the effects of vertical inequality on civil war are inconclusive (see Lichbach 1989). In his statistical analysis, Muller (1985) examines the effects of economic inequality (measured as income distribution) on political violence. The study covers European, American and Asian countries between 1958 and 1977. The results provide support for a positive relationship (see also Gurr 1968).

Later works lack statistical evidence to support a positive relationship between vertical inequality and civil war. Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) estimates of ethnic and religious fractionalizations are statistically insignificant. Similarly, their measures of inequality based on the Gini coefficient are not significantly related to civil war. Relying on these same indicators, Theisen (2008) discovers no relationship between vertical inequality and civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2004) show no significant effect between measures of the Gini coefficient and

civil war. However, they do find a non-linear association between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and civil war. They argue that, rather than ethnic fractionalization itself, it is the degree of fractionalization which most facilitates rebel coordination that relates to civil war.

Another measure of grievance is horizontal inequality. First introduced by Stewart and her colleagues (Stewart 2008a), the term “horizontal inequality” describes “inequalities in economic, social, or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups” (Stewart 2008b, 3). Proponents of this measure prefer it to the traditional ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) indicator which only captures individual-level rather than group-level inequality (Stewart 2008a; Denny and Walter 2014). They contend that “ELF values may not measure the dimensions of ethnicity most likely to be linked to conflict” (Denny and Walter 2014, 107). They insist that “it is not the dominance of one group, but rather a host of other factors (political inclusion, geographic location, group homogeneity, etc.) that connects ethnicity with conflict” (Denny and Walter 2014, 107).

The main proposition is that the likelihood of civil war is higher in countries where a particular group is economically, politically, or culturally disadvantaged relative to other groups in society (Gurr 1993, 2000). The causal mechanism linking horizontal inequality to civil war may involve two processes. Not only does such inequality produce grievance, but it also facilitates ethnic mobilization for violence (Gurr 2000; Denny and Walter 2014).

A number of studies seem to support the suggestion that horizontal inequality is positively related to civil war. Stewart and her colleagues (Stewart 2008a) qualitatively examine a number of cases. The results show that horizontal inequalities were a cause of the civil wars in Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire and Sri Lanka (Stewart 2008a). Statistical studies also confirm the horizontal inequality hypothesis. They often rely on the share of excluded population as a

measure of inequality provided by the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Koubi and Böhmelt (2014) use this dataset and find that the share of excluded population is positively and significantly related to civil war.

Repression is another indicator of grievance that scholars often relate to civil war. Gurr (1968) provides a positive relationship between repression and political violence. When the government suppresses civil liberties and political rights, it generates discontent among the oppressed people who will eventually strike against the government (Hegre 2014). Thus, repressive regimes would be at high risks of civil war while accommodative regimes that grant civil and political rights to their citizens would be less prone to civil war.

Empirical investigation of the repression-conflict nexus is inconclusive. In her qualitative analysis of the Iranian Revolution, Rasler (1996) finds that repression decreased protests in a short term while increasing it in a long term. She also shows that government inconsistency in the use of repression and concessions increased protest in the Iranian case.

Quantitative studies often rely on regime types as proxies for repression and accommodation. Using the Polity index or the Freedom House data, most studies show evidence that repressive regimes are negatively related to civil war (Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Goldstone et al. 2010).⁴ In contrast, anocracies, regimes that mix repressive and accommodative features, appear to be particularly prone to civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001).

The results about accommodative regimes are inconsistent. Some studies find democratic regimes to be negatively associated with civil war onset (see Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et

⁴ The Polity index is a 21-point measure of political regime constructed from five component variables. Freedom House is a U.S.-based non-governmental organization that publishes the *Comparative Survey of Freedom*, which rates the level of democracy or freedom in all independent states and some disputed and dependent territories.

al. 2001), while others show no relationship between democratic regimes and civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Still other works discover that the effect of accommodative regimes is conditional and negative when democracy is interacted with economic development (Hegre 2003, 2014).

In addition to grievance, studies in the political science tradition also rely on state capacity to investigate the causes of civil war.⁵ This approach dismisses the importance of grievance as a determinant of civil war, focusing instead on political and military conditions that make rebellion feasible (Cederman et al. 2011). The state capacity framework echoes Tilly's (1978) theory about resource mobilization (Goldstone et al. 2010). In this perspective, civil war is a function of opportunities that facilitate resource mobilization by potential rebels (see also Olson 1965; Lichbach 1995). This includes the "incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the government to suppress" challengers (Tilly 1978, 200). In other words, the occurrence of civil war is closely related to the government's coercive capabilities and its ability to reach into rural areas (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80).

Many statistical studies examine the relationship between state capacity and civil war. Operational measurements of state capacity include, among others, military expenditure, military personnel per capita, mountainous or rough terrain, bad neighborhood, expert assessment of bureaucratic quality, and foreign support to rebels in the form of sanctuary or material support (see Hendrix 2010 for a review on measures of state capacity).

The common finding is that states that lack the military and administrative capacity to effectively control their territory are more prone to civil war. For instance, Fearon and Laitin

⁵ The term "state capacity" often describes the government's "capacity to penetrate society, to provide order, to protect groups, to arbitrate groups' issues, and to produce social goods" (Kisangani 2012, 4).

(2003) rely on GDP per capita as the main proxy for the state's military and administrative capability, and find that low-income states are associated with high risks of civil war.⁶ Other measures of capacity that positively correlate with civil war include mountainous or rough terrain, large population size (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and bad neighborhood operationalized as the number of neighboring countries in conflict or experiencing state weakness (Goldstone et al. 2010; Salehyan 2009). Gibler and Miller (2014) also show statistical evidence that external territorial threats reduce the risks of civil war. They argue that such threats enable the government to legitimately increase their coercive capabilities.

2.1.2 Economic Causes of Civil War

The economic approach models civil war as a function of greed (Grossman 1991). According to this view, civil war is more likely when the benefits outweigh the costs of insurgency. The objective of every rebellion is to either “capture the state or secede from it,” thus inducing some benefits to conflict participants (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 564). Yet, there are costs associated with participation. The lower the costs are in comparison to the benefits, the more attractive civil war becomes. Like criminals motivated by greed, insurgents will not pass up any “profitable opportunity” to rebel (Grossman 1991, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Thus, civil war is explained by the balance between opportunities for profit and costs of rebellion.

One of the initial empirical tests of the greed argument is performed by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). They operationalize opportunity for profit in terms of a “taxable base” that is

⁶ However, Hendrix (2010) suggests that the use of GDP per capita as a proxy for state capacity does not allow researchers to distinguish between competing explanations. For instance, low GDP may also be capturing grievance among low-income people or cheap recruitment as research in the economic tradition suggests (Justino 2009; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

attractive to rebels. This is captured through per capita income measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), the natural resource endowment (share of primary commodity exports to GDP), donations from the diaspora, and financing from foreign governments. The cost of rebellion, which relates to the “loss of income sustained during the conflict and the costs of coordination” (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 566), is proxied by per capita income, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, conflict capital, and the size of the population.

The results provide support to the greed explanation of civil war. Per capita income is significantly and inversely related to the risks of civil war, which Collier and Hoeffler (1998) interpret as evidence for the cost of rebellion (loss of income) rather than profit opportunity. The effect of natural resources is also significant but non-monotonic. The possession of natural resources initially increases the risk of civil war before decreasing it. States with larger populations are found to have higher risks of civil war. The effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization is also significant but non-monotonic, which they argue is evidence for the coordination-cost hypothesis.

In another empirical investigation, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) expand their operationalization to include more measures of greed. Additional indicators include male secondary schooling, economic growth (forgone income), time since the last conflict or peace duration (conflict capital), forests, mountainous terrain, geographic dispersion, population density, and rates of urbanization (proxies for the government military capability).

The results show that two of their three measures of profit opportunity are significantly related to the onset of civil war. The export of primary commodity tends to increase the risks of conflict. This relationship is however curvilinear, with a pick when such exports constitute 33% of GDP. Donation from diaspora is also significant and positive. Several of the cost measures are

also significantly related to civil war. These include male secondary schooling, per capita income, economic growth, and duration of peace. Low levels of these measures increase the risks of conflict. In addition, large populations significantly raise the prospects of civil war while proxies of weak military capacity (mountainous terrain, geographic dispersion, and social fractionalization) are found to be positive and significant. These findings are also supported by a later study by Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009).

A number of scholars cast doubt on the greed argument. Reynal-Querol (2002) shows that primary commodity exports are correlated only with the onset of non-ethnic wars. According to Hegre (2002), primary commodities are related to civil war (conflict with 1000 battle deaths) but not to low-intensity conflicts. Fearon and Laitin (2003) fail to confirm that primary commodities are associated with civil war, as does a replication of Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) data by Fearon (2005). Ross (2004a) discovers that a category that includes oil, non-fuel minerals, and agricultural goods is not robustly associated with the onset of civil war.

Several qualitative studies also fail to confirm a positive relationship between civil war and primary commodity (see Ballentine and Sherman 2003). An analysis of 13 cases of civil war by Ross (2004b) yields no support to the looting mechanism suggested by proponents of the greed argument. Examining the Columbian civil war, Guáqueta (2003) shows that economic factors and actors were relevant to the intensity and duration of the conflict. Yet, she argues that the onset of the conflict was more related to socio-political factors. Ndikumana and Kisangani (2005) also find no relationship between natural resources and the onset of civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (see also Kisangani 2012).

Contrary to primary commodity, oil export seems to be linked to the onset of civil war (Ross 2004a; Bates 2008). Fearon and Laitin (2003) report that countries whose oil exports

exceed one-third of their total export revenues are prone to civil war (see also Humphreys 2005). In a recent quantitative study, Koubi and Böhmelt (2014, 25) confirm that oil exporting countries face high risk of domestic conflict.

Another common proposition within the economic tradition is that poverty positively relates to civil war because it provides cheap recruitment to rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Justino 2009). Poverty is often measured in terms of GDP per capita, per-capita energy consumption, literacy rate, infant mortality, and OECD dummy (see Dixon 2009). The results of empirical studies overwhelmingly show that poor countries are prone to civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Dixon 2009; Goldstone et al. 2010).

Scholars offer different explanations to the finding relating poverty to civil war. Contrary to the economic contention that poverty provides cheap recruitment for rebel groups, Fearon and Laitin (2003, 86) argue that country income is a proxy for state capacity. Low-income states are prone to civil war because they often possess poor counter-insurgency capabilities, thus making them unable to effectively deter or repress rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Also, in his analysis of political disorder in Africa, Bates (2008, 25) suggests that when public revenues are low, leaders tend to turn to predation of state resources rather than providing security.

2.1.3 Structural Origins of Civil War

Studies based on the structural approach seek to explain the occurrence of civil war through the impact of “environmental scarcity.” The main contention within this research tradition is that civil war may be caused by a shortage of renewable resources such as cropland,

fresh water, forests, and fisheries, among others.⁷ Homer-Dixon (1999, 142-146) argues that when social groups are forced to compete over scarce resources, they “might opt for violence against those they perceive as their oppressors.” In addition to generating a sense of deprivation, environmental scarcity may also provide opportunity for rebellion as it weakens the state’s capacity to cope with potential challengers (Kahl 2006, 44; Homer-Dixon 2010). Also, Kahl (2006, 50-51) suggests that environmental scarcity may provide government leaders “incentives and opportunities to instigate violence as a strategy to stay in power.”

Scholars operationalize environmental scarcity in terms of supply-induced scarcity, demand-induced scarcity, and structural scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1994, 2010). Supply-induced scarcity refers to resource shortage that occurs when resource degradation outpaces generation of renewable resources. Measures of supply-induced scarcity often include land degradation, deforestation, and freshwater shortage (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998). Demand-induced scarcity describes scarcity due to rapid population growth or an increase in consumption per capita. It is often captured through demographic factors such as population growth or population density (Urdal 2005, 2008). Finally, structural scarcity is shortage resulting from unequal distribution of resources among social groups (Homer-Dixon 1994). It is usually measured through indicators of income or land inequality, ethnic or religious fractionalization (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998).

A number of studies seem to support the environmental scarcity hypothesis. Several case studies find a positive link between resource scarcity and conflicts (Bretthauer 2014). Kahl’s (2006) examination of a communist insurgency in the Philippines as well as ethnic land clashes in Kenya also suggests a positive relationship between “demographic and environmental stress”

⁷ Structural arguments draw on Malthus’ ([1798] 2003) claim that the growth of food production would be arithmetical, while that of human population would be exponential, thus leading to serious food shortages and human misery at some point (Urdal 2005, 418).

and violent conflict. Qualitative analyses by Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999) also confirm the proposed relationship. In their quantitative study, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) test Homer-Dixon's hypotheses and found that resource scarcity is positively related to low-intensity conflicts, and to a lesser extent to the onset of civil war. They claim that land degradation "seems in general to have the strongest effect on the likelihood of domestic conflict."

However, many works fail to support the proposition linking environmental scarcity to civil war (see Gleditsch 2012; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Urdal 2008). For example, Urdal's (2005) statistical analysis shows that measures of population growth, population density (a proxy for scarcity of cropland), and urban population growth are unrelated to civil war (measured as 25 battle-death conflicts). When replicating Hauge and Ellingsen's (1998) model, Theisen (2008) finds no relationship between civil war and measures of scarcity such as deforestation, freshwater availability, water per capita, drought, population growth, and population density. Also, Bretthauer's (2014) fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of 31 cases concludes that scarcity conflicts are unlikely to occur if the local population does not rely on agriculture as a way of subsistence, and if the state does not lack the ingenuity to cope with the scarcity it faces.

2.2 A Critical Overview of Extant Literature

The empirical works reviewed here point to a number of puzzles. One is related to regime type studies of civil war. It is still unclear how regime type affects civil war. For instance, the diverging results about the effects of democracy remain perplexing. Also, existing theories offer little explanation as to why anocracies or mixed regimes lack the repressive capacity attributed to autocracies and the administrative capability of democracies (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Economic studies of civil war also leave out some critical gaps to be filled. By insisting that natural resource abundance causes civil war because it provides rebels with opportunities for greed, these works overlook some other mechanisms through which natural resource may relate to civil war. For instance, exploitation of natural resources might generate grievance among the local population over insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, inadequate job opportunities, and labor migration (Klare 2001). It could also provide residents in resource-rich areas an incentive to seek secession from the central government (Le Billon 2001). Alternatively, state leaders can be divided over how to allocate the benefits derived from the resource rents, thus leading to a political crisis (Kisangani 2012).

Another important issue associated with the economic approach is the mechanism through which economic development impacts civil war. Economic studies contend that poverty provides cheap and easy recruitment for rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). However, political works insist that poverty is rather a proxy for state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003). They also contend that poverty may affect the behavior of state leaders (Bates 2008). In other words, the competing explanations about the impact of poverty on civil war invite further analyses.

Finally, structural arguments on the causes of civil war are often criticized in the literature on theoretical grounds. Scholars who object to the environmental scarcity hypothesis contend that the impact of demographic pressures on conflict is probably conditional on the government's overall capacity. Specifically, the quality of political institutions, state policies, as well as technologies will improve the availability of resources despite rapid population growth (Deudney 1990). Even in the presence of resource scarcity, large-scale violence is unlikely in the

absence of political struggles that set elites in opposition to the state (Goldstone 2001; Peluso and Watts 2001).

These irregularities in extant literature on civil war may be the result of a number of limitations. First, scholars tend to model civil war as a direct function of political, economic, and structural factors. Thus, most studies do not distinguish the impact of government policies such as repression and the provision of public goods from that of political institutions, economic, and structural conditions. Many works fail to recognize that the effects of these systemic factors on civil war may be mediated through their impact on government policy. In other words, they overlook the fact that structural and institutional factors may affect the public policy process, and thus indirectly determine what public goods governments produce.

The inconsistencies in the empirical findings may also be the consequence of another shortcoming. Although civil war is the result of a strategic behavior between government and citizens (Bates 2008; Young 2013), previous explanations tend to focus on rebels' motivations and capabilities, and state resources (Goldstone et al. 2010). Less attention has been paid to the role of elite relationships in the occurrence of civil war (Goldstone et al. 2010; Bates 2008; Kisangani 2012). By not focusing on government behavior, many existing theories overlook an important "black box": how leaders behave with regard to the policy process. In a recent study, Hegre and Nygård (2014) refer to this black box as "informal governance." They explain that:

"even if decisions are made with the sincere intention to reduce poverty and provide public goods, decisions have to be implemented to be effective. Successful implementation requires that the bureaucratic apparatus is competent and nonbiased and that the government carries out economic policies that are suitable to achieve its political goals" (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 8).

To fully understand civil war, one must therefore unpack the black box represented by the public policy process, which refers to the circumstances surrounding the adoption and the

implementation of state policies by the government. There are two reasons why unpacking the black box is critical. First, contrary to what existing theories often assume, the government is a non-unitary actor (Allison and Zelikow 1999). As Aldrich (1995, 32) contends, “Everything governments [...] produce constitutes goods that are primarily public, and collective action is required to secure them.” Thus, failing to examine how potential collective action problems within government may affect its ability to supply political order limits understanding of the causes of civil war.

Second, political leaders make decisions based on their beliefs and interests. Yet, these beliefs and interests often result from the leaders’ surrounding environment. In general, state leaders strive to simultaneously reconcile several imperatives when making decisions (Putnam 1988, 460). Such imperatives may be domestic or international, and they can be associated with the state’s political, sociological, and economic conditions. Therefore, understanding civil war requires explanation of how a state’s structural and institutional environment shapes the policy process that leads to the provision of public goods. Ultimately, this process will determine “the quality of the bureaucratic apparatus, the extent of political corruption, and the appropriateness of the economic policies chosen by political leaders,” all of which “also affect governments’ ability to prevent domestic violent conflicts” (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 2).

At this point, the black box has not been fully unpacked. Although Hegre and Nygård (2014) identify the policy process as being the black box, which is an important step, they do not examine the process itself. Instead, they focus on the outcomes produced by the process, including factors such as bureaucratic quality, rule of law, level of corruption, quality of economic policies, repression, and political exclusion.

A limited number of scholars have attempted to unpack the black box. For example, Kisangani (2012) shows how “politics of exclusion” and “control of rents” can generate elite divisions and lead to civil war. Also, a study by Bates (2008) demonstrates how social, economic, and political conditions may lead government agents to favor predation of resources over provision of political order.

These studies are, however, limited to specific regions. While Kisangani (2012) examines only civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bates’ (2008) analysis is focused on Africa. Thus, there is still a need for a comprehensive theoretical framework that addresses the causes and effects of elite behavior in its relation to civil war.

In the light of the gaps identified in the literature, the next chapter develops a theoretical argument that attempts to unpack the black box. It will do so by offering an explanation of how leaders’ behavior during the policy process mediates the effects of state environment on civil war. This theoretical approach will allow empirical investigation of the indirect and direct effects of socioeconomic development and political institutions on civil war. In addition, it will provide an understanding of (1) why the government may be unable to implement policies that reduce the level of grievance in society (Gurr 1970), and (2) why it may sometimes fail to maintain strong capabilities or implement policies that successfully deny rebels opportunity to organize and mobilize resources (Tilly 1978; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

To achieve its purpose, this dissertation draws on a number of studies across different fields. First, it relies on research on strategic consensus from business management scholars (e.g. Bourgeois 1980; Wooldridge and Floyd 1989; Dess and Priem 1995; Knight et al. 1999; Markóczy 2001; and Kellermanns et al. 2011). According to these scholars, an organization’s performance is a function of consensus among its managers regarding strategic matters such as

priorities, goals, methods, and resources (Kellermanns et al. 2011). In turn, strategic consensus among managers is determined by the organization's environment (Dess and Origer 1987) and the managers' personal background (Knight et al. 1999).

The consensus-performance logic offered by business management scholars imply that, if applied to political science, the state's environment might determine leaders' consensus on strategic matters related to the provision of political order. In turn, leaders' strategic consensus may affect the government's performance and the existence of political order.

Second, given the difference between politics and business, this dissertation also relies on a comparative politics theory. Thus, it draws on the "logic of political survival" that underlies the selectorate theory proposed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). The selectorate theory offers a comprehensive explanation of political leaders' behavior and performance in office. It first assumes that the behavior of political leaders is motivated by their desire to obtain and retain public office. From this logic, it then suggests that "selection institutions – the mechanisms that determine how leaders are chosen or deposed – explain the differences in policy choices across all regime types" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 26).

In the view of proponents of the selectorate theory, two institutional arrangements, the "selectorate" and the "winning coalition," often "shape the incentives leaders have to promote or inhibit social welfare" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 9). The selectorate refers to "the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government's leadership" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 42). The "winning coalition" is "the subgroup of the selectorate who maintain the incumbents in office and in exchange receive special privileges" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 42).

This dissertation, however, departs from the approach adopted by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) in two ways. First, in contrast to the selectorate theory, the present study assumes that the government is a non-unitary actor (Tsebelis 2002). This allows examination of the dynamics that take place within government during the policy process.

Second, the theory proposed by this dissertation makes explicit assumptions about the goods supplied by the state and the preferences of members of the selectorate with regard to these goods. Rather than presuming that people universally prefer public goods over private goods, this study assumes that public goods and private goods have different properties that may lead to a variation across space and time with regard to how much people value one over the other. As a result of variations in how much people value these goods, leaders may or may not prioritize the provision of public goods.

Chapter 3 - Theoretical Development

This chapter seeks to develop a theoretical framework that explains civil war as an indirect consequence of state environment through the mediated impact of leaders' behavior (see Figure 1.1). In doing so, it treats the onset of civil war as a result of a strategic interaction between citizens and the government. As Bates (2008, 5) argues, political order exists when “rulers ... choose to employ the means of coercion to protect the creation of wealth rather than to prey upon it and private citizens choose to set weapons aside and to devote their time instead to the production of wealth and to the enjoyment of leisure.”

From this dissertation's perspective, the government-citizen interactions that determine the occurrence of civil war take place at two levels. First, upon assuming office, the government adopts and implements policies that impact the lives of citizens. When the outputs of government policies meet the priorities and aspirations of citizens, the latter are unlikely to challenge the established order (Gurr 1970). In contrast, in case citizens are unhappy with the outputs produced by government actions, they may seek to mobilize and drive members of government out of office, by violence if necessary. This study refers to this first level as the *governance stage*.

The second phase of the government-citizen interactions leading up to civil war occurs when citizens are unsatisfied with the outcomes produced by the state. This is the *crisis bargaining stage*.⁸ At this level, the government must adopt and implement actions in response to citizens' demands. When the execution of these actions fails to convince or compel citizens to renounce violence, political disorder occurs. In other words, the crisis bargaining stage will

⁸ There is abundant literature on crisis bargaining between the state and its domestic or international rivals (see for instance Fearon 1995).

likely result in civil war if the government's actions fail to dissipate citizens' grievances or deny them opportunity to sustain military operations against its troops.

Students of political violence suggest two types of strategy that governments rely on in their strategic interactions with citizens at each of these two stages. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010, 949), "[l]eaders can ameliorate revolutionary threats by either increasing the provision of public goods, such that citizens are satisfied, or by suppressing their ability to organize" (see also Tilly 1978; Gurr 1970; Poe and Tate 1994; Rasler 1996). This study refers to these strategies as *accommodation* and *coercion* respectively.

An accommodation strategy consists in the provision of all forms of public goods. These may be tangible goods, such as electricity, water, public hospitals, transportation infrastructure, and schools. Public goods can also refer to intangible goods such as civil liberties, justice, and security (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). An accommodation strategy serves two goals. First, at the governance stage, accommodation seeks to deter political dissidence by lowering the levels of grievance in society. The logic is that supplying public goods provides satisfaction to citizens, and people who are satisfied are unlikely to rebel against the state (Gurr 1970). Second, at the crisis bargaining level, the purpose of accommodation is to resolve disputes with domestic challengers through peaceful settlements. This may involve negotiations or judiciary actions.

The second strategy that governments rely on to provide political order is coercion. A coercion strategy also serves two purposes. First, at the governance stage, coercion is often intended to deter dissention by denying citizens the possibility of organizing and challenging the established order. In general, this form of coercion occurs through suppression of some intangible public goods, such as freedom of speech or of assembly. Second, at the crisis bargaining level, the goal of a coercion strategy is to resolve potential political dissidence

through the use of force. Governments that adopt a coercion strategy at the second stage are prepared to use violence to repel any domestic challenge to their rule.

Together, the main theories of civil war reviewed in chapter 2 imply that effective implementation of accommodation or coercion would reduce the likelihood of civil war. Specifically, if the government successfully executes an accommodation strategy in the governance stage, the levels of grievance would be low (Gurr 1970) and social dissidence is unlikely. Also, if accommodation is successfully implemented at the crisis bargaining stage, civil war is unlikely because social conflicts can be resolved peacefully (Hegre and Nygård 2014).

Similarly, the resource mobilization and the greed theories imply that successful execution of coercion would reduce the risks of civil war. If coercion is successfully implemented during the governance stage, social dissidence is unlikely because dissatisfied people would be unable to organize (Tilly 1978) and coordinate their actions (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). At the crisis bargaining level, successful coercion would enable the government to repel any nascent rebellion before it escalates into civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Assuming that these theories are pertinent, civil war is still likely to occur because of potential flaws in the adoption and the implementation of accommodation and coercion strategies. For instance, faulty policies may be adopted by the government. Alternatively, even sound policies might be wrongly executed (Hegre and Nygård 2014). Moreover, implementation of flawless policies could suffer from insufficient resource allocation or from a lack of technical skills. Thus, understanding why accommodation and coercion might fail requires explanation of the causes of shortcomings in the adoption and implementation of these strategies.

One of the major challenges faced by the government with regard to the adoption and implementation of accommodation and coercion is that it is a *non-unitary* actor. As suggested by

Tsebelis (2002) and Allison and Zelikow (1999), the government is composed of several branches and subunits that perform different tasks. In general, two types of actors are involved in the process that results in the adoption and implementation of government strategies. These are bureaucrats and political leaders. Consequently, the flaws that may occur during the policy process could result from the behavior of bureaucrats and political leaders alike.

Bureaucrats are government officials who implement, execute, and enforce state law and policy (Dickovick and Eastwood 2013). They include managers and agents of public agencies such as the police, the military, the judiciary, the diplomatic corps, or the intelligence force. While these actors might partly shape decisions about the government's strategies, they are almost always responsible for implementing them. Thus, success or failure of accommodation and coercion might be a function of the attitude of bureaucrats.

For theoretical purposes, this dissertation takes the attitude of bureaucrats as a given. It assumes that the behavior of bureaucratic managers and agents is determined by the actions of political leaders. This assumption is a simplification of reality because political leaders and bureaucratic managers may actually have conflicting goals, or they may face other principal-agent problems (see Eisenhardt 1989 for a review on agency theory). However, it is generally admitted that bureaucrats care about their promotion and about budgetary resources (Allison and Zelikow 1999). Thus, it is realistic to presume that their behavior will reflect the preferences of leaders who have the power to promote them and allocate resources to their agencies. Consequently, this dissertation rather focuses on explaining the attitude of political leaders.

Commonly, the role of political leaders is four-fold. First, they provide policy guidance to bureaucrats, and decide which policy option will be implemented. Second, they allocate resources required for the implementation of the adopted policies. Third, they are in charge of

recruiting, promoting, and appointing bureaucratic managers and agents. Last, political leaders often have the responsibility of overseeing the actions of bureaucratic agencies involved in the implementation of public policy.

When incumbent political leaders prioritize these four functions, one can expect bureaucratic agencies to successfully implement the government's strategy about accommodation or coercion. Yet, political leaders may have conflicting preferences and motivations. Aspirations of leaders of the executive might not match the priorities of some legislators. Thus, disagreements may occur within the political leadership with regard to these critical functions. For instance, some leaders may favor policies that accommodate the needs of their citizens while others would prefer coercive policies. Even those who support accommodation may still disagree as to what accommodative policies should be given precedence. For instance, should provision of education prevail over that of electricity?

Differences may also occur regarding resource allocation. For example, whether state revenues should primarily serve public or private goods may become a dividing issue among political leaders (see Kisangani 2012). Also, discords are likely to emerge when these leaders consider appointment of individuals who manage implementation of public policy. Finally, some leaders may commit their time to overseeing the actions of state agencies while others might prioritize private or lucrative activities instead. In short, state leaders face a type of "collective action" problem throughout the policy process (Aldrich 1995; see also Olson 1965, 1990).

Understanding civil war thus requires elucidation of the conditions that determine political leaders' ability to achieve consensus on the key functions related to the adoption and implementation of accommodation and coercion. To provide these explanations, this dissertation takes three steps. First, it clarifies the consensus-performance logic, showing how consensus

among leaders, or the lack thereof, affects organizational performance. Second, it examines the circumstances that may increase or reduce leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion. The third step is to shed light on how such consensus, or the lack thereof, impacts the government's ability to supply political order.

3.1 Strategic Consensus and Government Performance

This study draws on the business management literature to explain government performance as a function of consensus among political leaders. According to scholars in this field, consensus is a complex and multi-dimensional concept (Dess 1987; Wooldridge and Floyd 1989). It varies along two different dimensions. The first is a cognitive dimension, often referred to as "shared understanding," which refers to the collective state of managers' knowledge about whether and how a specific strategy will achieve its desired goal (Floyd and Wooldridge 1992; Kellermanns et al. 2005). The second dimension of consensus, which is "common commitment," describes how managers are committed to a specific strategy (Floyd and Wooldridge 1992). A group of managers share a common commitment to a strategy when they strongly support that strategy and are willing to devote resources and time toward its adoption and implementation.

This dissertation relies on Floyd and Wooldridge's (1992) definition of consensus based on the combination of these two dimensions. According to this conceptualization, consensus is "strong" when the levels of both "understanding" and "commitment" are high. Thus, consensus on accommodation is strong when leaders not only share understanding about whether and how this strategy will lower grievance in society, but also commit to its implementation. Similarly, consensus on coercion is strong when leaders share the belief that this strategy will increase the costs of dissention, and also commit to its implementation.

The government being a large organization, consensus might be strong in one part but not in others. For instance, a policy might enjoy strong consensus within the executive but not in the legislative branch, or vice versa. Therefore, the focus of this study is on the *scope* of consensus among political leaders across all branches. The term “scope of consensus” indicates the proportion of leaders with shared understanding of and strong commitment to a strategy (Wooldridge and Floyd 1989; Markóczy 2001).

In order to make predictions about the scope of strategic consensus, further clarification about the concept is necessary. Anytime an accommodative or coercive measure m is being considered by the government, one can presume that leaders may broadly support it, broadly oppose it, or they may be divided about it. For theoretical purposes, this study refers to these three respective possibilities as *broad consensus*, *broad dissensus*, and *polarization*.

Assuming that p , the proportion of leaders represented in government, varies between 0 and 1, these values of the scope of consensus can be understood as follows. Broad consensus exists among leaders about m when $p_{support}$, the proportion of leaders supporting m , is close to 1. There is broad dissensus about m when p_{oppose} , the proportion of leaders opposing m , is close to 1. Polarization occurs when there is neither broad consensus nor broad dissensus.

These variations in the scope of leaders’ consensus about public policy have implications for government performance. More specifically, broad consensus among leaders about a policy aimed at improving government performance increases the chances of success of that policy. This is because almost all leaders will cooperate and coordinate their efforts in order to ensure effective adoption and implementation of the policy. In the case of broad dissensus, a policy has little chance of being adopted. The effect of broad policy dissensus m will thus tend to depend on the scope of leaders’ consensus on alternative options after m is rejected.

In contrast, leaders' polarization reduces government performance. When leaders are polarized or divided about a policy, it might or might not be adopted. However, if adopted, that policy is unlikely to be successfully implemented. This is because the counter-efforts by leaders opposing the policy will likely cancel out the positive actions of those who support it. In short, government performance with regard to political order should be a function of the conditions that broaden or weaken leaders' consensus about accommodation and coercion.

3.2 State Environment and Strategic Consensus

This dissertation argues that the scope of state leaders' consensus on the government's strategy for political order is determined by state environment, which describes the structural and institutional conditions under which governments operate. This claim is based on a premise that systemic factors such as socioeconomic conditions, sociological elements, and political institutions impact individual-level variables like political leaders' beliefs and interests. These structural and institutional factors might ultimately determine whether broad consensus, broad dissensus, or polarization exists among leaders regarding accommodation and coercion.

3.2.1 Leaders' Consensus on Accommodation

The use of accommodation as a strategy to deter dissidence or resolve domestic crisis implies that the government predominantly commits to the provision of public goods. One might distinguish between two types of public goods: tangible and intangible goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Tangible public goods are material goods supplied by the state that benefit whole society. These include, among others, public schools, hospitals, roads, water, electricity,

and public housing. Intangible public goods describe non-material goods that the state provides to all members of society. These are, among others, security, justice, and civil liberties.

In order to make predictions about the determinants of leaders' consensus on the provision of these goods, a number of assumptions are in order. First, this dissertation assumes that the behavior of political leaders is driven by their desire to obtain and remain in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Thus, when the government considers a specific measure m to provide tangible or intangible public goods, an incumbent leader's support or opposition to m depends on how implementation of m would affect her chances at remaining in office.

The political survival assumption has the following implications for the scope of leaders' consensus. When considering a measure m , broad consensus on m is likely to emerge within government if $p_{support}$, the proportion of leaders whose political survival is positively tied to the implementation of m , is close to 1. Similarly, the likelihood of broad dissensus is higher if p_{oppose} , the proportion of leaders who might lose office because of the implementation of m , is close to 1. In contrast, leaders are more likely to be polarized about m , if most of them are unclear about the political implications of m , or if $p_{support}$ and p_{oppose} are approximately of equal sizes.

Another assumption is that public and private goods have different properties. Private goods tend to generate immediate dividends to recipients while public goods might take longer to produce benefits. For instance, resources invested by the government in public education might take several years to yield profits for citizens. In contrast, when those same resources are distributed as private goods, their recipients can immediately feel the benefits. In addition, private goods might enable leaders to exclude opponents while rewarding supporters. Yet, the provision of public goods might not convey to supporters this sense of reward for their efforts.

The immediacy of benefits and the discriminatory properties associated with private goods have two major implications. First, office-seeking political leaders are likely to prefer provision of private goods to members of society who have the institutional power of selecting them into and out of office. As Clark, Golder, and Golder (2013, 395) contend, “leaders always prefer to use private goods to keep their winning coalition loyal.”

A second implication is that members of society may accept or reject private goods offered by political leaders. This will depend on their discount factors. The term “discount factor” describes “the rate at which future benefits are discounted compared with today’s benefits” (Clark, Golder, and Golder 2013, 138). When people have low discount factors, they tend to value today’s benefits much more than what they will receive tomorrow. Thus, individuals with low discount factors are likely to accept private goods because of the immediate benefits they produce. In contrast, individuals with high discount factors are more likely to value future benefits almost as much as what they get today. Consequently, citizens with high discount factors will generally prefer the government to supply public goods, even though such provision may take time to generate dividends.

It follows that leaders’ commitment to accommodation is a function of the distribution of discount factors within their selectorate. For instance, when members of the selectorate overwhelmingly value the present more than the future, leaders who supply private goods are more likely to be selected into office. Once in office, these leaders will tend to oppose policies that do not generate immediate dividends. In contrast, when members of the selectorate overwhelmingly value the future more than the present, leaders who supply public goods are more likely to be selected into office. During their tenure in office, these leaders will likely support policies that supply public goods.

Information about the distribution of discount factors within the selectorate is difficult to obtain. However, it can be assumed from two critical dimensions of state environment. These two elements can thus be used to predict the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation. The first is the state's socioeconomic condition, which refers to the physical quality of life in society. At the lowest socioeconomic level, most members of society have little to no education, and lack the capacity to cover basic needs such as food, healthcare, and decent housing. As societies advance socioeconomically, so does the quality of life of their members. In the most advanced societies, most citizens are well educated, and have the means to cover their basic needs.

At the lowest socioeconomic levels, most citizens will tend to have low discount factors. They are therefore less likely to have a preference for public goods given the harsh socioeconomic pressure upon them. With little or no education and trying to survive, they will likely prefer goods that generate immediate benefits over others that may take longer to produce dividends. As a result, broad dissensus on accommodation is likely among their leaders, who need to supply private goods in order to retain office.

As the society's socioeconomic level improves, the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation increases. The proportion of leaders relying on public goods to obtain and retain office will rise gradually. However, this means that leaders of societies at mid-level of socioeconomic development are likely to be polarized about accommodation. Ultimately, broad consensus on accommodation is likely in advanced societies, where citizens in large majorities have high discount factors. Thus, the prediction is that:

H1: The scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation increases as societies develop socioeconomically.

A second dimension of state environment that is relevant to the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation is political openness. This refers to the extent that all the politically active population has the institutional power, in principle, to select leaders and be selected (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2016; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). In some societies, institutional arrangements are "open" with regard to who gets to select leaders or to who can be selected as a leader. In others, they are "closed," which means that the institutional rules for selecting political leaders are restrictive. Restrictions may be related to, among other things, race (apartheid regimes), religion (theocratic regimes), political ideology (communist regimes), profession (military regimes), or social class (aristocratic regimes).

The effect of political openness on leaders' consensus on accommodation is, however, conditional on the state's socioeconomic environment. At the lowest socioeconomic level, open institutions will further broaden leaders' dissensus about accommodation because almost all leaders must supply private goods in order to obtain or retain office. Thus, p_{oppose} , the proportion of leaders opposed to accommodation, would be closed to 1. At mid-level of socioeconomic development, open institutions will likely exacerbate leaders' polarization about the political benefits of accommodation. This is because the proportion of supporters will tend to equal that of opponents. It is only at high socioeconomic levels that open institutions will generate broad consensus among leaders about accommodation. At these levels, almost all leaders must rely on public goods to survive in office. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:

H2: Open institutions reduce the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation at low socioeconomic levels, but increase it as societies develop.

3.2.2 Leaders' Consensus on Coercion

A coercive strategy generally means that leaders must opt for suppression, rather than provision, of some public goods. Coercion implies a deliberate choice by leaders to impose physical and psychological constraints on others that cause suffering. Because of the pain suffered by the victims of coercion, one can expect them to seek retaliation by trying to drive incumbent leaders out of office by all means, including violence, if necessary. Additionally, coercion not only induces suffering for the victims. It also exposes the lives of the government agents who implement that strategy, especially when they attempt to repel armed challengers. Therefore, the scope of leaders' commitment to coercion will be determined by their shared belief that this strategy will secure their individual chance to remain in office.

The state's socioeconomic condition will account for the scope of leaders' consensus on coercion. Empirical studies indicate that "under conditions of scarcity, people give top priority to materialistic goals; while under conditions of prosperity, they become more likely to emphasize self-expression and emancipative values" (Welzel and Inglehart 2009, 131; see also Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Diener et al. 2013). In short, whether or not leaders commit to the protection of civil liberties will have to do with the socioeconomic environment in which they operate.

At low socioeconomic levels, broad support and polarization are more likely among leaders than broad opposition to coercion. Because members of this type of society presumably care less about emancipative values, their leaders are less likely to share broad opposition to coercion. At mid-levels, polarization is more likely to occur because the proportion of leaders opposing coercion would approximate that of those supporting it. In contrast, broad opposition to coercion is more likely among leaders in societies with high socioeconomic levels.

H3: The scope of leaders' commitment to coercion weakens as the level of socioeconomic development increases.

The openness of the state's political institutions also affects the scope of leaders' consensus on coercion. In general, leaders' consensus on coercion is likely to be broad when institutional arrangements restrain participation in the selection of leaders based on factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, class, profession, or political ideology. Under such arrangements, incumbent leaders might overwhelmingly commit to coercion because their selectors most likely wish to maintain their privilege of being part of a closed selectorate.

In contrast, the impact of open institutions will be conditional on the state's socioeconomic environment. Unlike their counterparts in closed societies, leaders in open political systems lack unity about the political benefits of coercion. In societies with high levels of socioeconomic development, open institutions will further broaden the scope of opposition to coercion among leaders. At lower socioeconomic levels, however, leaders of politically open societies are more likely to be polarized about coercion.

H4: Open political institutions further increase leaders' polarization about coercion in poor states while broadening the scope of leaders' opposition to it as societies develop.

3.3 Strategic Consensus and Civil War

The scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion will have implications for government performance regarding political order. As business management scholars contend, strong consensus among managers about a strategy increases the performance of the organization (Kellermanns et al. 2011). During the implementation of a business' strategy, managers who share strong consensus will act independently but "in a way that is consistent with the actions of others and consistent with the spirit of the decision" (Amason 1996, 125; see also Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Walter et al. 2013). In contrast, the lack of consensus on a given

strategy decreases the likelihood of performance (see Walter et al. 2013; Floyd and Wooldridge 1992; Kellermanns et al. 2005, 2011). Disagreements among managers about a given strategy may result in poor or failed implementation due to possible foot-dragging or counter-efforts by those who disagree with the strategy (Guth and MacMillan 1986; Wooldridge and Floyd 1989).

3.3.1 Consensus on Accommodation and Civil War

The scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation as a strategy to supply political order has implications for the occurrence of civil war. When leaders share broad consensus on accommodation, civil war is unlikely. In contrast, the lack of consensus on accommodation raises the prospects of civil war. The effect of leaders' consensus on accommodation on civil war occurs through the two stages described at the beginning of this chapter.

At the governance stage, broad consensus on accommodation will enable leaders from all branches of government to coordinate their efforts in order to guarantee that (1) policies that further public interests are adopted; (2) qualified bureaucrats are appointed; (3) sufficient resources are allocated to government agencies; and (4) the actions of bureaucrats are properly overseen. When leaders collectively commit to performing these functions, the quality and the performance of the bureaucracy increase. More oversight would ensure that state resources are spent on public services and goods are supplied effectively. As the government produces sufficient public goods to content most members of society, the levels of grievances will be low and social dissidence is unlikely (Gurr 1970).

In contrast, the lack of consensus among leaders about accommodation will increase the likelihood of dissidence during the governance stage. When leaders are polarized or broadly oppose accommodation at this level, they are unlikely to invest in the policies and bureaucratic

capabilities that are necessary for the provision of public goods. State resources will be used to serve private interests and buy off segments of the population, including regime supporters or even members of the opposition. Leaders who care about private goods doled out by the executive will unlikely perform their oversight duty. Others who do not receive these benefits might engage in actions that seek to destabilize the regime. The consequence is likely to be a society that is poorly governed, with a weak administrative capacity and rising public discontent. This raises the probabilities of social dissidence (Gurr 1970).

The second phase leading up to civil war is the bargaining stage, which occurs when dissatisfied groups decide to challenge the government. At this level, the government might still avoid escalation into civil war if there is broad commitment to accommodation among leaders. This is because societies where state managers share broad commitment to accommodation would have built in the past the type of bureaucratic capacity required for a peaceful settlement of social crises. In addition, their past behavior as an accommodative government signals to discontented groups that they can have trust in the negotiation process. Most importantly, the fact that there is broad consensus on accepting their demands means that aggrieved citizens who resort to violence would not enjoy support among political leaders. Together, these conditions increase the chances of peaceful settlement of a social crisis.

On the contrary, the lack of consensus on accommodation during the crisis bargaining phase puts leaders at higher risks of escalation into civil war. First, governments lacking consensus on accommodation have probably not built the type of state capacity required for peaceful settlement. Most likely, the justice system will not inspire confidence to dissidents, who might thus resort to violence. Second, these governments have not displayed the kind of consistency in accommodation that would reassure challengers to settle their dispute peacefully.

Third, in a polarized government, there will likely be some political leaders who choose to provide support to dissidents if they opt for violence. Together, these conditions reduce the chances for successful accommodation of dissidents, and increase the odds of escalation into civil war. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H5: Civil war is more likely when leaders lack consensus on accommodation.

3.3.2 Consensus on Coercion and Civil War

The scope of leaders' consensus on coercion also determines the risks of civil war. As stated in the previous section, coercion as a strategy for political order has a unique property in that it induces suffering on others. Retaliation by the victims and defection by agents who implement it are potential costs that leaders must accept to incur. Thus, for coercion to reduce the odds of civil war, broad consensus among leaders is required.

The effect of leaders' consensus about coercion on civil war occurs through a two-stage process. At the governance stage, state managers who share broad consensus on coercion will cooperate and coordinate their efforts in order to adopt policies that successfully coerce opponents and coopt supporters. They will agree to appoint supporters who identify themselves with the regime and its goals. Also, they will most likely allocate sufficient resources to and properly oversee government agencies involved in the implementation of coercive measures. These agencies often include, among others, the police, the intelligence and the military. Through the endowment of private goods to selective groups, the government can also ensure the loyalty of its supporters. Together, these measures are likely to result in strong coercive capabilities and practices that might prevent dissidents from organizing (Tilly 1978).

In contrast, leaders who lack consensus on coercion during the governance stage are more likely to face dissidence. One reason is that their coercive measures will likely fail to deter challengers. When there is no broad consensus on coercion, executive leaders who engage in imposing high costs to dissention are more likely to marginalize a large proportion of the political leadership. Because their actions do not enjoy broad support, these executive leaders may also have difficulty securing the support of key segments of the bureaucracy. The consequence is likely to be a society with rising public discontent and poor coercive capabilities and practices. These conditions increase the odds of social dissidence (Gurr 1970; Tilly 1978).

At the second stage, when the government is challenged by aggrieved groups for any given reason, broad consensus on coercion might also enable leaders to escape civil war. Governments whose members broadly share consensus on coercing their citizens are more likely to succeed in de-escalating a nascent crisis. They have probably built in the past strong coercive capabilities that they can rely on to locate or repel challengers (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Also, their past repressive behavior, coupled with strong capacity, signals to challengers that their chances of victory are low. This may allow the government to force challengers into surrendering to its terms. Moreover, there will be little support to challengers when the costs imposed by the government are high. Consequently, the risks of escalation into civil war are lower when leaders' consensus on coercion is broad.

On the contrary, the crisis bargaining phase is more likely to result in civil war when leaders lack consensus on coercion. First, governments that are divided about the political benefits of coercion have certainly not built strong repressive capabilities in the past. A government with weak coercive capacity has more difficulties locating and repelling its challengers (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Second, these governments have not displayed consistency

in coercive measures in their past behavior that would signal strength to challengers. Thus, dissidents might believe they have high chances of victory against government forces. Third, with polarization within the political and the bureaucratic leadership there will likely be some members of government who are willing to provide support to dissidents if they choose escalation into violence. These state managers might also engage in counter-efforts aimed at undermining the government's strategy. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H6: Civil war is more likely when leaders lack consensus on coercion.

This chapter has argued that civil war is an indirect function of state environment. This indirect effect is mediated through the scope of political leaders' consensus about the government strategy to supply political order. The main predictions are that (a) the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion varies as a consequence of the country's socioeconomic conditions; (b) the state's socioeconomic environment moderates the impact of political openness on leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion; and (c) the lack of consensus about accommodation and coercion raises the prospects of civil war. The next chapter relies on a quantitative method to test these propositions.

Chapter 4 - Quantitative Methods

This chapter relies on quantitative models of civil war to statistically evaluate the theoretical claims outlined in chapter 3. Two main sections form this chapter. The first lays out the research design and describes the models to be used. The second presents, discusses, and summarizes the statistical findings.

4.1 Research Design and Models of Civil War

The present analysis examines an unbalanced time series cross sectional (TSCS) dataset of 161 countries from 1960 to 2007. The unit of analysis is the country-year. The sample is unbalanced because a number of countries became independent after 1960. The choice of a temporal space that starts in 1960 and ends in 2007 is based on the lack of data on some of the key variables. The lack of data also explains why only 161 states are incorporated in the study. **Appendix A** provides a list of these countries.

Figure 1.1 suggests that the relationship between state environment and civil war is mediated through the scope of strategic consensus among political leaders. State environment describes the socioeconomic conditions and political institutions under which the government operates. The scope of strategic consensus refers to the proportion of leaders committed to the government's strategy for political order. The main contention is that some characteristics of state environment determine the extent to which political leaders rally around accommodation or coercion as ways to supply political order. In turn, the scope of leaders' consensus on these strategies will affect the likelihood of civil war.

As a result, this dissertation relies on mediation modeling to investigate the causes of civil war. Baron and Kenny (1986, 1173) define mediation as “the generic mechanism through

which the focal independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable of interest.” Hypotheses 1, 2, and 5 suggest that leaders’ consensus on accommodation mediates the effects of state environment on civil war. Following hypotheses 3, 4, and 6, the impact of state environment on civil war is mediated through leaders’ consensus on coercion.

4.1.1 Operational Definition of Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is *civil war onset*. Civil war refers to “a sustained military conflict, primarily internal, pitting the central government against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance,” which results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year (Small and Singer 1982, 214-216). *Civil war* is a binary variable. It takes a value of 1 if a conflict starts in any given year and is coded by the Correlates of War (COW) as civil war for “central control” or over “local issues” (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Otherwise, it takes a value of 0. A number of scholars (e.g. Salehyan 2009) are critical of the 1000 battle-death threshold used by the (COW) project. To account for this criticism, a robustness check of the results is performed using lower thresholds of 25 battle-related deaths per year. Data are from Gleditsch et al. (2002).⁹

4.1.2 Mediating Variable: Strategic Consensus

Two indicators operationalize leaders’ strategic consensus. The first is *accommodation*, which is a proxy for the scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation. It is an index that is intended to capture the extent to which state leaders (1) adopt policies that further public

⁹ The authors of this dataset distinguish between two categories of armed conflict: “minor armed conflict” and “war.” Minor conflicts those that resulted in at least 25 battle-deaths per year, but which have not reached 1,000 battle-deaths in any given year over their course. War refers to conflicts with at least 1,000 battle-deaths in a year (UCDP/PRIO 2016, 8).

interests; (2) appoint qualified bureaucrats; (3) allocate sufficient resources for public agenda; and (4) properly oversee the actions of bureaucrats. Time series cross sectional data on the proportion of leaders committed to these four functions are unavailable. Thus, construction of the accommodation index relies on four indicators of governance, which capture the outcomes produced by governments across space and time. These governance indicators are provided by Hegre and Nygård (2014).

The first component of the accommodation index is Hegre and Nygård's (2014) indicator on "economic policies." This measure is based on the World Bank's score and assessments from the Economic Freedom Network (EF). These scores relate to economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management. The EF evaluations center on areas such as the size of government (expenditures, taxes, and enterprises), access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of credit, labor, and business (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 10-11).

The accommodation index is also based on Hegre and Nygård's (2014) indicator on "bureaucratic quality." This component combines ratings on administrative capacity from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) with scores from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). WGI scores assess "perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies" (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 9). ICRG ratings indicate, for a given year, the extent to which a country "tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training" (Hegre and Nygård 2014).

A third component of the accommodation index is Hegre and Nygård's (2014) "rule of law" measure. It is based on assessments from three sources. The first is the WGI's rule of law, which captures "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 10). The second source is an evaluation of "commercial and economic law and security of property rights" provided by the Economic Freedom Network. Last, the rule of law indicator relies on the Freedom House scores on civil liberties. These scores classify countries according to whether or not they "have an established and generally fair system of the rule of law (including an independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of opportunity for everyone" (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 10).

The fourth component of the accommodation index is Hegre and Nygård's (2014) "corruption" indicator. This dimension relies on the ICRG corruption scores, the WGI control of corruption assessment, and the Transparency International index on corruption perception. These different ratings are all concerned with "actual or potential corruption" in different forms, as well as the "degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians" (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 10).

Together, these four components of the accommodation index are believed to be a valid indicator of leaders' commitment to the four functions that this proxy intends to capture. For instance, the economic policy dimension denotes whether or not leaders adopt policies that further public interests. The bureaucratic quality, corruption, and rule of law elements indicate whether political leaders appoint or recruit qualified bureaucrats, allocate sufficient resources for public rather than private agenda, and properly oversee the actions of government agencies.

Hegre and Nygård (2014) originally transformed the values of each of their indicators in order to have their mean and standard deviation equal 0 and 1 respectively. Using these normalized values, the accommodation index is constructed as an unweighted average of the four components. High values indicate broad consensus among state leaders regarding accommodation, while lower levels denote dissensus or polarization among leaders. In the sample, observations with the lowest values include Cambodia (late 1970s), Liberia (early 1990s), and Somalia (early 1990s). Meanwhile, Canada (1982, 1993) and Switzerland (1981, 1989) have the highest values. This measure is expected to be negatively related to civil war.

The second measure of leaders' strategic consensus is *coercion*. It is an index that intends to capture the extent to which state leaders (1) adopt policies that discriminate and increase the costs of dissention; (2) appoint bureaucrats that are committed to the execution of discriminatory and repressive policies; (3) allocate state resources for their coercive agenda; and (4) properly oversee the actions of bureaucrats involved in the implementation of coercion.

The coercion index relies on three components. The first is Hegre and Nygård's (2014) indicator on "political exclusion and repression." It is based on the proportion of ethnic exclusion provided by the Ethnic Power Relations (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and on the Political Terror Scale's ratings of government repression (Wood and Gibney 2010). It is intended to indicate the scope of leaders' commitment to discriminatory and repressive policies as a means to provide political order.

The second component of the coercion index is Hegre and Nygård's (2014) indicator on "military in politics." This variable combines the ICRG assessment of military participation in political affairs with military spending as a share of GDP from the World Bank. It is expected to

capture the extent to which leaders are committed to the use of the military and state resources for the execution of their political agenda.

The third component of the coercion index is military personnel per capita. It indicates the number of army soldiers per inhabitant. The data are from the Correlates of War project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). This component intends to capture the extent to which leaders are committed to building and maintaining a coercive force that is sufficiently strong to deter or repel domestic challengers.

Using these three components, the coercion index is built following Morris (1979). The indicators of “military in politics” and “political exclusion and repression” were originally coded by Hegre and Nygård (2014) so that high levels indicate good governance. In order to have them reflect coercion, they have been multiplied by -1. Next, all three components are rescaled to obtain values that range from 0 to 100 (Morris 1979). This requires the highest and the lowest scores for each of them. In the sample, the highest value of the new “military in politics” (MiP) variable is 3.38 and the lowest is -3.60. As for the new “political exclusion and repression” (PER) indicator, the highest value in the sample is 3.84 while the lowest is -2.34. The highest value of military personnel (MPC) is 76.89 while the lowest is 0.

The following steps are taken to compute the coercion index. First, the MiP minimum is subtracted from its maximum and then divided by 100 $(3.38 - (-3.60)) / 100$, obtaining 0.07. Second, the same procedure is followed for PER and MPC, obtaining 0.06 and 0.77 respectively. Third, the coercion index is computed as follows: $coercion = ([MiP - (-3.60)] / 0.07) + [PER - (-2.34)] / 0.06 + [MPC - 0] / 0.77 / 3$. The coercion index is fairly highly correlated with Wood and Gibney’s (2010) Political Terror Scale’s ratings of government repression (0.76) and Cingranelli and Richards’ (2010) physical integrity rights index (0.68).

4.1.3 Independent Variable: State Environment

This dissertation argues that the likelihood of civil war is an indirect function of the state's environment. Two variables measure state environment. The first is socioeconomic environment, which is operationalized in terms of *gross domestic product per capita* (GDP per capita). This measure divides, for every country-year, the gross domestic product by the mid-year population size. Data are from the World Bank (2015) and are featured in constant 2005 US dollars. The raw data have a positive skew with a mean of 6997 and a standard deviation of 11239. Thus, the natural log of these values is used instead.

Compared to alternatives, GDP per capita is preferred because it is not only widely used in extant research on civil war, but its effect is also subject to rivaling interpretations (Dixon 2009). While economic studies use it as a proxy for costs incurred during conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2004), political works contend it is an indicator for state capacity. Relying on GDP per capita enables this dissertation to assess its direct and indirect effects on civil war, thus allowing evaluation of the competing economic and political explanations. Nonetheless, alternative indicators are considered. **Appendix A** provides the coding procedure of and the results produced by a quality of life index (PQLI) that combines infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rates.

The second variable that operationalizes state environment is political openness. Political institutions for selecting leaders are “open” to the extent that “all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process” (Marshall, Gurr and Jagers 2016, 22). Political institutions refer to the “rules regulating how political leaders are recruited and how citizens participate in this selection” (Hegre and Nygård 2014, 2; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

This dissertation relies on the variable *de facto open* to measure political openness. It indicates the “observed” political party system in a country in a given year. Most likely, a party system is a reflection of whether participation in the political process is open to all or restricted to a subset of the population. In addition, this measure does not capture how state managers behave. It can thus be used to test the effect of political institutions on leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion without engaging in a circular argument. Political openness is coded in terms of “open” versus “closed.” It takes a value of 1 (open) if at least two political parties exist in the country in a given year. Otherwise, it is coded as 0 (closed).

Measurement of *de facto open* is based on Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s (2010) variable “defacto” or “existence of parties.” This is one of three measures of party system that they provide. The other two are “legal status of parties,” which indicates the number of parties legally allowed in the country, and “parties within the legislature,” which highlights the number of parties represented in parliament. Existence of parties is preferred to legal status of parties because “legal status alone is not always a good reflection of empirical reality” (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2009, 5). Also, the number of parties represented in parliament might not always indicate whether or not the system is restricted. However, robustness checks are performed using the other two indicators.

The choice of the party system to operationalize political openness is based a number of reasons. First, it has the advantage of providing information about the political class in general rather than just the executive or the legislative. This is important because the theory outlined in chapter 3 seeks to explain the behavior of leaders of all political branches of government.

The second reason why the party system is preferred is that, in comparison to many of the alternatives, it is a more valid and reliable measure of political openness as defined in this

section. For instance, the variable “competitiveness of executive recruitment” of the Polity data (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2016) seems to capture the state’s ability to enforce the selection rules in order to make the process competitive. Yet, enforcement of rules has to do more with the behavior of the government agents who are in charge of the selection process.

Similarly, the Polity component “executive constraints” appears to be an indication of whether or not state managers from the legislative or from the judiciary are capable of constraining the executive. It might also be a proxy for the existence of a free and/or qualified press and civil society that are capable of constraining the executive. In other words, the “executive constraints” component is most likely a reflection of the government’s policy with regard to civil liberty or the state’s socioeconomic environment rather than that of political institutions.

In short, if the theoretical contention is that the openness of institutional arrangements determines leaders’ behavior and performance, as it is in this dissertation, relying on a measure of institutions that captures how leaders behave or perform may lead to a circular argument. Thus, the traditional measures of regime type, including the Polity components (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2016), the Scalar Index (Gates et al. 2006), and the X-polity indicator (Vreeland 2008), should not be used to operationalize political openness as conceived in this study.¹⁰ This is because these indicators are based on the components highlighted above.

¹⁰ A potential valid measure of political openness would be the Polity component of “openness of executive recruitment.” However, this indicator might not reflect the institutional arrangements related to leaders of the legislative branch. Following the assumption about the government being a non-unitary actor, the institutions regarding the selection of legislative leaders must also be accounted for.

4.1.4 Control Variables

Three approaches dominate empirical research on civil war. First, political analyses emphasize the impacts of grievance and state capacity in determining the prospects of civil war. Second, economic works focus on the idea of greed. Third, structural models revolve around environmental scarcity. Unlike this dissertation, most of these studies posit a direct relationship between civil war and a state's socioeconomic conditions and regime type. In order to check for the robustness of the indirect effects highlighted in chapter 3, the strategic consensus argument is tested using each of these three approaches.

As indicated in chapter 2, operationalization of grievance in extant research generally revolves around the ideas of vertical inequality, horizontal inequality, and repression. This dissertation accounts for measures of vertical and horizontal inequality. Previous arguments about repression are tested through the results of coercion, the second mediating variable.

Vertical inequality is controlled for in the forms of *ethnic fractionalization* and *religious fractionalization* (Fearon and Laitin 2003). These two variables are coded using the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index, which captures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethno-linguistic groups (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 78). Data are from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Their study does not extend beyond 1999. The original values are therefore extrapolated for every country to cover post-1999 years.

Horizontal inequality is accounted for in terms of the *share of excluded population*. This variable indicates the proportion of excluded groups relative to the ethno-politically relevant population in a country in a given year. Data are from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) project (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), which identifies political status for all politically relevant

ethnic groups worldwide for all years since 1946.¹¹ These three measures of grievance are expected to be positively related to civil war.

In addition to grievance, political studies also emphasize state capacity. Following these studies, this dissertation controls for *mountainous terrain* (Fearon and Laitin 2003), *bad neighborhood* (Goldstone et al. 2010), *population size*, *oil dependency* (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and *external threat* (Gibler and Miller 2014). The variable *mountainous terrain* indicates the proportion of the country that is mountainous. Data are from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and are extrapolated to cover more recent years. *Bad neighborhood* is represented by a measure of the number of countries at civil war in the region. Data are from the Center for Systemic Peace project on Major Episodes of Political Violence (Marshall 2016).

The next indicator of state capacity is *population size*. Data are from the Correlates of War project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). Logged values are used in order to minimize the effects of outliers (Koubi and Böhmelt 2014). The variable *oil dependency* is a dummy that equals 1 if a country's oil exports in a given year surpass one third of its total GDP (Fearon and Laitin 2003). It is 0 otherwise. Data are from the World Bank (2015).

One last state capacity measure is *external threat*. Gibler and Miller's (2014) work shows that an external territorial threat reduces the likelihood of civil war because it increases the government's ability to mobilize resources and coerce citizens. This is accounted for by relying on their measure of "external territorial threat." It is a dummy coded 1 if a state has a new or an ongoing territorial dispute with a land-contiguous neighbor in a given year and 0 otherwise.

¹¹ The variable *share of excluded population* is one of the components of the coercion index. Thus, it is excluded from models that include coercion.

The strategic consensus argument is also tested using economic modeling of civil war. Economic studies typically rely on opportunity for profit and costs of rebellion. This dissertation relies on Collier et al.'s (2009) work to operationalize opportunity and costs. Two measures of opportunity are included. The first is *mineral resource rent*, which is the share of mineral exports as a percentage of GDP. Economic analyses (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2004; Collier et al. 2009) show that the relationship between this variable and civil war is curvilinear. Thus, its *squared term* is also incorporated. Data are from the World Bank (2015). The second opportunity indicator is a *post-Cold War* dummy to measure “financing from foreign governments” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). It equals 1 for all years after 1989 and 0 otherwise.

Following Collier et al. (2009), five variables operationalize cost of rebellion. The first is *economic growth*, which indicates forgone income during conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). It is measured as growth in total *GDP* and data are from the World Bank (2015). Collier et al. (2009) uses growth in the previous year. Therefore, *economic growth* is lagged one year.

Economic studies also operationalize cost of rebellion in terms of the “duration of peace,” which is a proxy for the costs associated with conflict capital (weapons and military skills). In their work, Collier et al. (2009) include both a dummy that captures the occurrence of a previous civil war and a continuous variable that indicates the number of years since the last civil war. They contend that such a dummy is a control for potential “fixed effects” that might have caused the initial war while making the country more vulnerable to further conflicts. In contrast, the peace years would account for the “legacy effects which might be expected gradually to fade” (Collier et al. 2009, 10). Thus, two variables that indicate *previous war* and *peace duration* are included. Data are from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). The coding of the peace years starts from 1816, the first year for which data are available.

Another measure of insurgency cost in the economic tradition is *social cohesion*, a proxy for coordination costs. As recommended by Collier et al. (2009), this variable is obtained by multiplying a country's value on ethnic fractionalization by its value on religious fractionalization. Data are from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and are extrapolated to recent years. Collier and his coauthors point out that this coding implies that societies with a score of 0 with respect to either religion or ethnicity might be coded as homogeneous on both because of the multiplicative approach (Collier et al. 2009, 15). In the sample used here, only Mauritania and Somalia fall under this category.

The last two measures of cost of conflict included in economic models are *mountainous terrain* and *logged population* (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2004; Collier et al. 2009). Fearon and Laitin's (2003) data on mountainous terrain are used, while data on population are from the Correlates of War project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972).

Finally, the strategic consensus argument is tested using structural models of civil war. These studies revolve around the idea of environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1999, 2010; Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Urdal 2005; Theisen 2008). Environmental scarcity is often operationalized in terms of "supply-induced scarcity," "demand-induced scarcity," and "structural scarcity" (Homer-Dixon 1999; Hauge and Ellingsen 1998).

Supply-induced scarcity is measured through *drought*. This variable is from Slettebak (2012), and indicates, for every country-year, the number of drought instances that have either affected 100 or more people, led to declaration of a state of emergency and/or a call for international assistance. Climate disasters in the form of drought may be associated with scarcity in critical resources such as water and crop. Slettebak (2012) find a significant relationship between drought and civil war. However, the relationship is negative.

Three variables operationalize demand-induced scarcity. These are *logged population* (Urdal 2008), *population density* (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998), and *population growth* (Urdal 2005). These measures are proxies for the resource pressure exercised by rapid demographic changes on society. They are lagged one year. Data are from the World Bank (2015).

Last, structural scarcity is measured through *ethnic fractionalization* and *religious fractionalization* (Urdal 2008). Data are from Fearon and Laitin's (2003). Each of these indicators of environmental scarcity is expected to be positively related to civil war.

To control for time dependency (Carter and Signorino 2010), three additional variables are included in the political and structural models. These are *peace years*, *peace years square*, and *peace years cubed*. Data are from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). The coding starts from 1816, the first year for which data are available.

Table 4.1 highlights the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the present analysis. There are a total of 132 instances of *civil war* onset in the sample. This represents roughly 2% of all country-years. **Appendix A** provides a list of all the cases included in the sample.

Accommodation, the first mediator, has a mean value of -0.05 and a standard deviation of 0.90. Its minimum and maximum values are -2.31 and 2.60, and were respectively produced by Cambodia in 1976 and Canada in 1982. The accommodation index is highly correlated with the indicator of socioeconomic environment (0.80), but less so with political openness (0.31). The second mediator, *coercion*, has a mean value of 33.40 and a standard deviation of 9.29. Its minimum and maximum values are 9.33 and 87.53, and were respectively generated by New Zealand in 1965 and Iraq in 1990.

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics

| Variables | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|-----------------------------|------|-----------|-----------|--------|------------|
| Civil War | 6563 | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Accommodation | 6561 | -0.05 | 0.90 | -2.32 | 2.60 |
| Coercion | 6275 | 1.93 | 3.14 | 0.00 | 36.71 |
| GDP per capita | 5439 | 6996.57 | 11238.87 | 69.58 | 81788.95 |
| De Facto Open | 6540 | 0.73 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 6459 | 0.40 | 0.29 | 0.00 | 0.93 |
| Religious Fractionalization | 6459 | 0.38 | 0.22 | 0.00 | 0.78 |
| Excluded Population | 6013 | 0.18 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 0.98 |
| Mountainous Terrain | 6484 | 17.33 | 20.66 | 0.00 | 82.20 |
| Bad Neighborhood | 6546 | 3.53 | 2.21 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| Population | 6555 | 34503.66 | 115089.80 | 122 | 1324655.00 |
| Oil Exporter | 4631 | 0.06 | 0.23 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| External Threat | 6552 | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Economic Growth | 5442 | 4.08 | 6.79 | -64.05 | 149.97 |
| Mineral Rent | 4793 | 0.91 | 3.07 | 0.00 | 42.42 |
| Mineral Rent Square | 4793 | 10.24 | 67.54 | 0.00 | 1799.30 |
| Post-Cold War | 6563 | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Social Cohesion | 6459 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.00 | 0.65 |
| Drought | 6563 | 0.07 | 0.27 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| Population Density | 6311 | 114.68 | 388.94 | 0.63 | 6602.30 |
| Population Growth | 6448 | 1.97 | 1.60 | -6.34 | 17.62 |
| Peace Years | 6563 | 43.57 | 46.82 | 0.00 | 191.00 |
| Peace Years Square | 6563 | 4090.51 | 7574.81 | 0.00 | 36481 |
| Peace Years Cubic | 6563 | 516609.30 | 1236504 | 0.00 | 6967871 |

The descriptive statistics of the two indicators of state environment are as follows. The first, *logged GDP per capita*, has a mean value of 7.67 and a standard deviation of 1.58. Its minimum and maximum values are 4.24 and 11.31 respectively. The minimum value is from Liberia in 1995 while the maximum is from the United Arab Emirates in 1980. The second indicator of state environment is *de facto open*. A total of 4,762 observations are coded as

politically open, which is about 73% of the sample. A correlation test indicates no strong correlation (0.23) between the two measures of the independent variable.

4.1.5 Statistical Models and Methodological Issues

This dissertation posits that strategic consensus mediates the effect of state environment on civil war. Thus, the statistical analysis must assess the indirect effect of state environment on civil war through the measures of leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion. There is little precedent of mediation modeling in the study of civil war.¹² However, researchers in other fields including medical research, psychology, and communication more often investigate mediating effects (Mackinnon 2008; Hayes 2009). The methodology adopted in this analysis mainly relies on mediation approaches described in Mackinnon (2008).

Table 4.2 provides seven models to test the six hypotheses suggested in chapter 3 and the mediation argument outlined in chapter 3. Four of the models are used to test the indirect impact of state environment on civil war through leaders' strategic consensus as highlighted by paths *a* and *b* in **figure 1.1**. Specifically, **models 1** and **2** evaluate path *a* relating state environment to leaders' strategic consensus. These two models are also used to test hypotheses 1 through 4. **Models 3** and **4** investigate path *b*, which links leaders' strategic consensus to civil war. They are also relied on to test hypotheses 5 and 6. While **model 5** is an evaluation of the total effect of state environment on civil war, **models 6** and **7** are used to assess the indirect effect of state environment on civil war (path *c* in figure 1.1).

A few methodological issues are of concern. For instance, models 1 and 2 confront the possibility of endogeneity between the two measures of state environment and each of the strategic consensus indicators. However, the results of several Hausman tests of simultaneity

¹² Young (2013) is one the rare exceptions.

(Hausman 1978; Gujarati 2003, 753-757) are inconclusive. Some tests suggest that the independent and the mediating variables are interrelated while others show that they are not.¹³ In case of simultaneity, the use of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions does not produce consistent estimates. Meanwhile, relying on alternative statistical methods when there is no simultaneity yields consistent but inefficient estimators (Gujarati 2003, 753). Given the inconclusiveness of the simultaneity test, the OLS method is used.

Another potential issue is multicollinearity between the two independent variables. On one hand, computation of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) was unable to detect multicollinearity of *logged GDP per capita* and *de facto open* with the constant in each of the models. The mean VIF value for all models used vary between 1.05 and 2.06. On the other hand, the two mediating variables, accommodation and coercion, are fairly highly and inversely correlated (-0.65). Thus, both indicators are not included in the same models.

4.2 Statistical Analysis

This section discusses the findings of the statistical analysis. It first relies on models 1 through 4 in **table 4.2** to provide the results of the empirical investigation of the six hypotheses formulated in chapter 3. Second, an assessment of the mediation argument is performed using the findings of the models in **table 4.2**. Next, a number of robustness tests are performed based on traditional political, economic, and structural modeling of civil war. The analysis ends with computation of the direct and indirect effects of state environment on civil war.

¹³ The results of the Hausman test vary depending on the variables included in the right-hand side of the reduced equations.

The dependent variable or civil war is dichotomous. Consequently, population-averaged logit regressions with robust standard error (Gujarati 2003) are used to estimate civil war. The two mediating variables, *accommodation* and *coercion*, are continuous. Thus, their estimation relies on OLS regressions with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). Beck and Katz (1995) recommends the use of PCSE estimator when the number of cross-national units is greater than the number of time units. The present data fit this condition because the sample covers 161 countries over a 48-year period.


All 7 models in **table 4.2** fit the data quite well as indicated by the highly significant chi-square statistics. **Model 1** investigates the relationship between state environment and accommodation. It includes *logged GDP per capita*, *de facto open*, and their interaction term *GDP x open* as explanatory variables. The results show that *logged GDP per capita* is positively and significantly (1 percent level) related to accommodation. The slope coefficient for *logged GDP per capita* is 0.22. This supports **hypothesis 1**, which states that the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation increases as societies develop socioeconomically.

The slope coefficient for *de facto open* is negative (-1.53) and significant at 1 percent level. Meanwhile, that for the interaction term *GDP x open* is positive (0.26) and also significant at 1 percent level. The results about the interaction term suggest that improvement in socioeconomic development increases accommodation regardless of regime type. Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), testing the conditional effect of political openness as suggested by hypothesis 2 would require illustration of the marginal effects of *de facto open*.

Figure 4.1 displays the marginal effects of *de facto open* at different values of *logged GDP capita*. It appears that, at lower levels of socioeconomic development, open party systems are associated with the lowest values of accommodation. Among poor states, the performance of

politically open regimes is lower than that of closed ones. Yet, at higher levels of socioeconomic development, open regimes outperform closed ones by far. As shown by the shaded area indicating the 95 percent confidence interval, these results are significant at low and high levels of GDP per capita. This provides support for **hypothesis 2**, which predicts that open political institutions reduce the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation in poor states but increase it as societies develop socioeconomically.¹⁴

Figure 4.1 Marginal Effects of Party Systems on Accommodation (95% CIs)



Model 2 tests the effects of state environment on coercion. This model also includes *logged GDP per capita*, *de facto open*, and their interaction term *GDP x open* as explanatory

¹⁴ Appendix A displays the results of model 1 using alternative specifications and statistical methods. These include an OLS PCSE model that accounts for accommodation in the previous year, as well as random effects and fixed effects OLS models. The direction of causality and the statistical significance of the findings do not change.

variables. The results indicate that *logged GDP per capita* is negatively and significantly (1 percent level) related to coercion. This seems to support the predictions of **hypothesis 3** that the scope of leaders' support to coercion weakens as the society's socioeconomic level increases.

Table 4.2 Models of Strategic Consensus & Civil War

| Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 |
|----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Accommodation | Coercion | Civil War | Civil War | Civil War | Civil War | Civil War |
| Ln GDP Capita [♀] | 0.22*** (0.01) | -1.33*** (0.11) | | | -0.57*** (0.09) | -0.36*** (0.12) | -0.45*** (0.08) |
| De Facto Open [♀] | -1.53*** (0.11) | 11.56*** (1.04) | | | 0.87** (0.35) | 0.99*** (0.34) | 0.94*** (0.36) |
| GDP x Open | 0.26*** (0.01) | -1.71*** (0.14) | | | | | |
| Accommodation [♀] | | | -0.91*** (0.14) | | | -0.64*** (0.24) | |
| Coercion [♀] | | | | 0.06*** (0.01) | | | 0.06*** (0.01) |
| Constant | -2.03*** (0.09) | 44.60*** (0.93) | -4.29*** (0.16) | -6.28*** (0.36) | -0.72 (0.60) | -2.49*** (0.92) | -3.66*** (0.81) |
| Observations | 5,439 | 5,392 | 6,402 | 6,336 | 5,287 | 5,287 | 5,241 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.68 | 0.24 | | | | | |
| Chi Square | 10395.03*** | 2033.60*** | 39.82*** | 57.57*** | 48.30*** | 57.99*** | 83.38*** |


[♀] These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models.

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 2 also shows that *de facto open* is positively and significantly (1 percent level) related to coercion. Meanwhile, the slope coefficient for the interaction term *GDP x open* is negative and significant at 1 percent level. Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), this suggests that the effect of socioeconomic development on coercion holds regardless of regime type. To assess the conditional impact of political openness as suggested by hypothesis 4, an illustration of the marginal effects is required (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).

Figure 4.2 indicates that when socioeconomic development is low, open regimes are associated with the highest levels of coercion. However, when per capita income is high, the levels of coercion in politically open states are lower than those of closed regimes. Apparently, open political institutions further increase the divisions about coercion among leaders in poor states, which explains the high levels of coercion. Meanwhile, this same type of institutions seems to reduce coercion in advanced societies. The shaded area around the marginal effect on **figure 4.2** shows that these findings are significant at low and high levels of GDP capita. These results support **hypothesis 4**, which states that open institutions further polarize leaders in poor states about coercion, while broadening their opposition to it as societies develop.¹⁵

Figure 4.2 Marginal Effects of Party Systems on Coercion (95% CIs)



¹⁵ Appendix A displays the results of model 2 using alternative specifications and statistical methods. These include an OLS PCSE model that accounts for coercion in the previous year, as well as random effects and fixed effects OLS regressions. The direction of causality and the statistical significance of the findings do not change.

Model 3 investigates the effect of accommodation on civil war. This model includes the accommodation index as the sole explanatory variable. The results indicate that *accommodation* is inversely associated with civil war. For a unit increase in accommodation, the odds of civil war decrease by -0.60 or about 60%.¹⁶ This suggests that the likelihood of civil war is higher at low levels of accommodation. This relationship is statistically significant at 1 percent level. These findings support the expectations of **hypothesis 5** that civil war is more likely when leaders lack consensus on accommodation.

Model 4 evaluates the relationship between coercion and civil war. It includes only the coercion index as explanatory variable. The results show that *coercion* is positively associated with civil war. A unit increase in coercion raises the odds of civil war by 1.062 or about 6.2%. This effect is statistically significantly at 1 percent level. This suggests that, unlike accommodation, coercion is not an effective strategy to avoid civil war. This is not surprising given that coercion induces suffering on victims, who might seek retaliation. However, as posited by hypothesis 6, one must assess whether the scope of consensus among leaders regarding its use affects this impact in any way. Thus, a comparison of the effects of coercion across political and economic environments is performed using the “clarify” software.¹⁷

In the first “clarify” test, the differences in the probabilities of civil war are computed by changing the values of *coercion* and *GDP per capita* while holding *de facto open* at its mean. In the poorest country in the sample, increasing coercion from its mean to its maximum value raises the probability of civil war by about 54%. In the wealthiest state, however, such increase in

¹⁶ The interpretation of the results of the logit models follows Gujarati (2003, 600-603).

¹⁷ The “clarify” software is a Stata program based on King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) that uses Monte Carlo simulations to convert raw outputs into results that convey meaning to a broader audience. The present test is based on the results of model 7 as displayed in table 2.

coercion leads to a surge of about 5% only in the probability of civil war. These results, which are statistically significant at 1 percent level, suggest that the use of coercion in poor societies significantly increases the risks of civil war. This is not surprising because leaders in poor societies are more likely to be divided about the political benefits of coercion.

In the second “clarify” test, the differences in the probabilities of civil war are obtained by changing the values of *coercion* and *de facto open* while holding *GDP per capita* at its mean. In a closed state, the probability of civil war increases by about 13% when coercion changes from its mean to its maximum value. In an open regime, such an increase in the level of coercion doubles the probability of civil war to 26%. These findings, which are statistically significant at 1 percent level, suggest that the use of coercion in politically open societies raises the prospects of civil war more than it does in closed ones. Together, the results of the two tests support **hypothesis 6**, which states that civil war is more likely when leaders lack consensus on coercion.

The findings so far support the predictions of an indirect relationship between state environment and civil war through leaders’ strategic consensus.¹⁸ First, the effect of the socioeconomic environment seems to be mediated through leader’s consensus on accommodation and coercion. A mediation analysis will help assess and compute these impacts.

Second, as suggested by hypotheses 2 and 4, the findings show that the effect of political institutions on leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion is conditional on the state’s socioeconomic environment. However, computation of conditional indirect effects often requires statistical techniques that are beyond the scope of this study (see Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007). Thus, the mediation analysis below focuses on the effect of the socioeconomic indicator.

¹⁸ Appendix A displays results that support the robustness of the civil war models to alternative specifications and statistical methods that account for random and regional effects. The direction of causality and the statistical significance of the findings do not change.

To investigate the mediated effect of socioeconomic development on civil war, this paper follows Baron and Kenny's (1986) causal steps approach because it is the "most widely used method to assess mediation" (Mackinnon 2008, 68). It requires four tests for mediation to hold. First, the independent variable must affect the dependent variable (*step 1*). Second, the independent variable must also be significantly associated with the mediator (*step 2*). Third, the mediator must be significantly linked to the dependent variable when the independent variable is accounted for (*step 3*). Fourth, the effect of the independent variable must not be significant when controlling for the mediator (*step 4*).¹⁹

The results of models 1, 5, and 6 are used to test mediation between socioeconomic environment and civil war through accommodation. Model 1 shows that *GDP capita* and *accommodation* are significantly related, thus meeting the condition of step 2. Model 6 indicates that accommodation is negatively and significantly (1 percent level) associated with civil war when *GDP capita* is included. This meets the requirement of step 3. According to model 5, *GDP capita* is negatively and significantly associated with civil war when accommodation is not accounted for. This satisfies the condition of step 1. The sign and the significance of this effect remain unchanged when accommodation is included (model 6). However, the size of the slope coefficient for *GDP capita* drops from -0.57 to -0.36. This suggests partial, rather than full, mediation between *GDP capita* and civil war through accommodation (see Mackinnon 2008).

The test for mediation through coercion relies on models 2, 5, and 7. The findings of model 2 indicate that GDP capita and coercion are significantly related, meeting the conditions of step 2. Similarly, the results of models 5 and 7 satisfy the requirements of steps 1 and 3

¹⁹ Although Baron and Kenny (1986) require these four conditions, Mackinnon et al. (2002) show that steps 2 and 3 are the most critical requirements for mediation to hold.

respectively. Additionally, when accounting for coercion in model 7, the effect of GDP capita on civil war remains significant, but the size of its slope coefficient drops from -0.57 to -0.45. This partially meets the requirement of step 4. Together, these findings suggest that the impact of socioeconomic environment on civil war is partially, not fully, mediated through coercion.

A number of tests are performed to assess the robustness of the findings. The first investigates whether the results of the hypothesis testing are robust to alternative theoretical arguments. **Table 4.3** summarizes the results of five models that account for the measures of grievance and state capacity often emphasized by studies using the political approach. Models 8 and 9 investigate the determinants of accommodation and coercion respectively, while models 10 through 12 are civil war models. All five models fit the data quite well as indicated by the highly significant chi-square statistics.

The results indicate that accounting for control variables emphasized by political studies does not alter the findings in any significant way. In models 8 and 9, the significance and the direction of the effects of *logged GDP per capita*, *de facto open* and *GDP x open* on accommodation and coercion remain unchanged. This confirms the findings about the effects of state environment and leaders' strategic consensus. The three civil war models also perform in a similar way. The only important change is that the impact of *logged GDP per capita* on civil war loses statistical significance when accommodation is accounted for. Following Baron and Kenny's (1986) method, this suggests that the effect of GDP capita on civil war is fully mediated through accommodation (see also Mackinnon 2008).

Table 4.3 Political Models of Strategic Consensus & Civil War

| Variables | Model 8 | Model 9 | Model 10 | Model 11 | Model 12 |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Accommodation | Coercion | Civil War | Civil War | Civil War |
| Ln GDP per Capita [♀] | 0.29*** (0.01) | -1.97*** (0.13) | -0.24** (0.11) | -0.04 (0.13) | -0.21** (0.11) |
| Political Openness [♀] | -1.15*** (0.10) | 6.47*** (1.07) | 1.15*** (0.40) | 1.24*** (0.38) | 0.99** (0.44) |
| GDP x Open | 0.20*** (0.01) | -0.98*** (0.15) | | | |
| Accommodation [♀] | | | | -0.69** (0.32) | |
| Coercion [♀] | | | | | 0.05*** (0.01) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.06*** (0.02) | -0.80*** (0.21) | 0.88* (0.52) | 0.85* (0.51) | 0.82 (0.58) |
| Religious Fractionalization | 0.41*** (0.03) | -3.13*** (0.38) | -0.03 (0.54) | 0.22 (0.56) | 0.51 (0.56) |
| Excluded Population | | | 1.24*** (0.37) | 0.93** (0.38) | |
| Mountain | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.03*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) |
| Bad Neighborhood | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.33*** (0.07) | 0.13** (0.06) | 0.14** (0.06) | 0.15** (0.06) |
| Ln Population [♀] | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.09 (0.08) | 0.23** (0.10) | 0.29*** (0.10) | 0.25** (0.10) |
| Oil Exporter | -0.55*** (0.05) | 3.48*** (0.61) | 1.55*** (0.40) | 1.35*** (0.38) | 1.32*** (0.35) |
| External Threat | -0.12*** (0.01) | 3.14*** (0.31) | -0.67*** (0.26) | -0.81*** (0.24) | -0.79*** (0.25) |
| Peace Years | | | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Peace Years Square | | | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Peace Years Cubed | | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -2.95*** (0.13) | 46.90*** (1.21) | -6.47*** (1.53) | -8.76*** (1.50) | -8.69*** (1.71) |
| Observations | 4,435 | 4,395 | 3,969 | 3,969 | 4,341 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.73 | 0.32 | | | |
| Chi Square | 24396.9*** | 9504.8*** | 157.6*** | 192.2*** | 178.4*** |

The results of the political control variables in the civil war models mostly support the predictions of previous studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The grievance measures, *excluded population* and *ethnic fractionalization* (to a limited extent) have a positive and significant impact on civil war. All five state capacity indicators are also significantly related to civil war. *Mountainous terrain*, *oil dependency*, *population size*, and *bad neighborhood* have a positive and significant effect on civil war while *external threat* decreases the risks of civil war.

Table 4.4 highlights the results of additional models of civil war that rely on the economic and the structural modeling. As the findings of models 13 through 15 show, the strategic consensus argument is robust to the economic explanation of civil war. While the impacts of *de facto* open and the two mediators remain statistically significant across all models, the effect of GDP capita barely retains significance when accommodation is accounted for. This provides further evidence that the effect of GDP capita is at least partially mediated through accommodation. The mediation is also supported by the fact that the impact of economic growth loses statistical significance when accommodation is included.

The findings displayed in **table 4.4** also indicate the strategic consensus argument is robust to structural explanations of civil war. As shown by the results of models 16 through 18, *de facto open*, *accommodation*, and *coercion* remain statistically and significantly associated with civil war. The effect of GDP capita, however, loses statistical significance when accommodation is accounted for. This further supports the mediation contention about socioeconomic environment and civil war through leaders' consensus on accommodation.

Table 4.4 Economic & Structural Models of Civil War

| Variables | Model 13 Civil War | Model 14 Civil War | Model 15 Civil War | Model 16 Civil War | Model 17 Civil War | Model 18 Civil War |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Ln GDP Capita (lag) | -0.46*** (0.12) | -0.26* (0.13) | -0.38*** (0.11) | -0.45*** (0.12) | -0.20 (0.12) | -0.37*** (0.11) |
| Political Openness (lag) | 1.28** (0.50) | 1.33*** (0.49) | 1.44*** (0.53) | 0.87*** (0.33) | 0.96*** (0.32) | 0.91*** (0.33) |
| Accommodation (lag) | | -0.64** (0.29) | | | -0.76*** (0.21) | |
| Coercion (lag) | | | 0.05*** (0.01) | | | 0.05*** (0.01) |
| Mineral Rent | 0.02 (0.09) | 0.00 (0.08) | -0.01 (0.08) | | | |
| Mineral Rent Square | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | | | |
| Post-Cold War | -0.52* (0.28) | -0.47* (0.27) | -0.64** (0.27) | | | |
| GDP Growth (lag) | -0.03** (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) | | | |
| Previous War | -1.03 (1.10) | -1.07 (1.12) | -1.07 (1.03) | | | |
| Peace Duration | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | | | |
| Social Cohesion | 1.45* (0.76) | 1.45** (0.73) | 1.47* (0.76) | | | |
| Mountainous | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.01* (0.01) | | | |
| Ln Population (lag) | 0.17* (0.10) | 0.20** (0.10) | 0.18 (0.11) | 0.18** (0.08) | 0.21*** (0.08) | 0.19** (0.08) |
| Drought | | | | -0.43 (0.30) | -0.42 (0.31) | -0.41 (0.32) |
| Ln Population Density (lag) | | | | -0.06 (0.12) | 0.01 (0.11) | -0.05 (0.12) |
| Population Growth (lag) | | | | 0.01 (0.13) | 0.02 (0.10) | -0.04 (0.12) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | | | | 0.41 (0.56) | 0.37 (0.55) | 0.49 (0.58) |
| Religious Fractionalization | | | | 0.88 (0.55) | 1.15** (0.54) | 0.92 (0.59) |
| Peace Years | | | | -0.03** | -0.03** | -0.02 |

| | | | | | | |
|--|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Peace Years Square | | | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Peace Years Cubed | | | | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 |
| | | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Constant | -3.53*** | -5.54*** | -6.16*** | -3.12** | -5.96*** | -6.02*** |
| | (1.34) | (1.46) | (1.49) | (1.35) | (1.37) | (1.28) |
| Observations | 4,472 | 4,472 | 4,432 | 5,125 | 5,125 | 5,085 |
| Chi Square | 95.78*** | 105.56*** | 109.00*** | 139.00*** | 176.35*** | 145.05*** |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | | | | |

The next test evaluates whether the indirect effect of socioeconomic environment on civil war is robust to alternative mediation methods. Scholars are critical of Baron and Kenny's (1986) approach because it does not quantify, but simply infers the indirect effect by testing a set of hypotheses (Hayes 2009, 410). Thus, a computer-intensive method called "binary_mediation" is used to compute the direct and indirect effects of the economic environment on civil war through accommodation and coercion. It is a Stata user-written program (Ender, n.d.) that computes indirect effects based on the "product of coefficients approach" (Sobel 1982). The significance of the effects is tested using the bootstrap command (see Hayes 2009).

Table 4.5 provides a summary of the findings of the indirect and direct effects of *GDP per capita* on civil war using the binary_mediation method. The test relies on 1000 replications of each of **models A, B, C, and D**. While models A and C replicate models 6 and 7, models B and D include the control variables emphasized by political, economic, and structural studies.

The results show that about half to two thirds of the total effect of *GDP per capita* is mediated through *accommodation*. Also, about one third of the relationship between *GDP per capita* and civil war is transmitted through *coercion*. While the indirect effect is statistically significant (1 percent level) across all four models, the direct impact fails the bootstrap significance test when control variables are included in the accommodation model. These

findings provide further evidence that a state's socioeconomic condition indirectly affects civil war through its effect on the actions of state managers.

Table 4.5 Effects of Socioeconomic Environment on Civil War

| Variables | Through Accommodation | | Through Coercion | |
|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Model A | Model B | Model C | Model D |
| Total Effect | -0.51*** (0.04) | -0.28*** (0.10) | -0.48*** (0.05) | -0.32*** (0.08) |
| Indirect Effect | -0.25*** (0.06) | -0.19** (0.09) | -0.12*** (0.02) | -0.10*** (0.03) |
| Direct Effect | -0.26*** (0.08) | -0.10 (0.12) | -0.35*** (0.05) | -0.23** (0.09) |
| Proportion Mediated | 49% | 68% | 25% | 31% |
| Observations | 5,287 | 3,905 | 5,241 | 4,273 |

Results are based on 1000 replications.

Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The findings of the mediation analysis strengthen political explanations of civil war while weakening the economic argument. For instance, the statistical significance and the magnitude of the indirect effects of GDP capita in models A through D suggest that this variable substantially impacts the behavior of government leaders. In addition, the statistical insignificance of the direct effect in model B and the performance of economic growth in models 13 and 14 cast doubt on the economic proposition of forgone income (see Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004).

The results about state environment, strategic consensus and civil war are robust to other tests. For instance, the effects of socioeconomic environment on strategic consensus and on civil war remain significant when an index composed of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rates is used instead of GDP per capita. The results are also unchanged when these indicators are used individually. Moreover, the impacts of political openness do not change when using alternative indicators that capture the legal party system or the number of legislative parties

represented within the legislature. The results of all civil war models are also robust to the inclusion of regional dummies and to the use of the random effect method. Finally, the results generally hold when the 1000-battle-death measure of civil war is replaced by internal armed conflicts that resulted in at least 25 battle deaths. **Appendix A** provides the results of all the tests.

The last step of the analysis briefly reports the risks of civil war with regard to state environment as a whole. Based on their socioeconomic conditions and political institutions, states are categorized into four types of environment: *closed & poor*, *open & poor*, *closed & advanced*, and *open & advanced*.²⁰


Figure 4.4 displays the odds of civil war associated with each of these four types of state environment. The results are based on model B. The safest environment appears to be one that has above-average GDP per capita and where the party system is closed. Economic and political conditions in these societies certainly enable leaders to commit to accommodating the economic needs of their citizens while imposing high costs to dissention, especially when the government is challenged by dissatisfied groups.

In contrast, poor states with an open political system are by far the most prone to instability. The odds of civil war in this type of environment are about seven times higher than in closed advanced societies. Leaders of open poor societies are the most inclined to elite divisions about how to govern and about how to resolve a sociopolitical crisis. As a result, these polities are not only more likely to experience public discontent and domestic conflict, they are also more exposed to escalation of dissidence into civil war.

²⁰ Poor states are those whose GDP per capita is below the sample mean while advanced countries have above-mean GDP per capita.

These findings have major implications for the study of civil war. First, they help explain why poor states are at higher risks of civil war than wealthy states while accounting for variations within each of these two categories. For instance, poor socioeconomic conditions limit the proportion of leaders devoted to the provision of public goods. Yet, some poor countries might be at higher risks of conflict than others because they have an open political system that exacerbates leaders' divisions about accommodation and coercion.

Figure 4.3 State Environment & Civil War



Second, these results contribute to explaining why some states have weak accommodative and coercive capabilities while others do not. Due to their polarization, leaders in an open poor environment are unlikely to succeed in building and maintaining strong bureaucratic and military capabilities. Third, the findings imply that repression increases the

risks of civil war. However, the prospects of civil war are higher when coercion is used in an environment where leaders are divided about the political benefits of using repression at home.

These findings also provide explanation about how regime type relates to civil war. The effect of democracy on civil war might vary depending on the state's environment. When combined with advanced socioeconomic conditions, democratic institutions are likely to reduce the risks of conflict because they will further increase the proportion of leaders committed to accommodation as a strategy to retain office. This may explain why some previous studies find a negative impact between civil war and the so called "consolidated" or "consistent" democracy (Hegre et al. 2001).

In contrast, democratic institutions raise the odds of civil war in poor states. In these countries, open institutional arrangements intensify the divisions among leaders regarding their strategies for governance and crisis bargaining. These polities are consequently more likely to have weak accommodative and coercive capacity as well as failed accommodation and ineffective repressive policies. This matches the findings about mixed regimes (anocracies) in the literature (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

This chapter has relied on a statistical analysis to investigate the indirect and direct effects of state environment on civil war through leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion. Overall, the findings support the predictions that socioeconomic environment reduces the risks of civil war through its impact on leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion. The use of two different mediation methods reveals that half to two-thirds of its negative impact is transmitted through accommodation. Up to one third of that effect seems to occur through coercion. These results are robust to an alternative measure of socioeconomic environment that captures literacy, life expectancy, and infant mortality rates instead of country income. They are

also robust to alternative explanations, including the traditional political, economic, and structural modeling of civil war.

The findings of the statistical analysis conducted in this chapter also show that political openness is positively and significantly associated with civil war. However, this relationship is conditioned by the state's socioeconomic environment. In poor states, open institutions seem to broaden leaders' opposition to accommodation while exacerbating their polarization about coercion. In advanced societies, this same type of institution is associated with high levels of accommodation and low values of coercion. To uncover the specific mechanisms through which these relationships occur, three cases are qualitatively examined in the next chapters.

Chapter 5 - Qualitative Research Design

The statistical findings support the argument that the state's socioeconomic environment and political institutions indirectly determine the likelihood of civil war through their impact on the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion. In addition, they confirm the prediction that the indirect effect of political institutions is conditioned by the socioeconomic level of the state. However, the use of a statistical approach alone may limit confidence in the argument because quantitative methods "are often unable to untangle competing causal stories or determine causal ordering, and require a deeper analysis to validate a proposed mechanism" (Clayton 2014, 18-19). Thus, complementing the quantitative investigation with a qualitative analysis can enhance confidence in the statistical results.²¹

The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, often referred to as "mixed methods research" has some value (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner 2007; Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989). Rossman and Wilson (1985) suggest three reasons for combining quantitative and qualitative methods. First, a mixed approach enables corroboration of the quantitative and qualitative findings through triangulation. Second, mixed methods research may allow investigators to develop analysis in order to provide richer data. Third, it can be used to initiate new modes of thinking by highlighting paradoxes that emerge from the two large-N and small-N data sources. In short, convergence of findings produced by several methods "enhances our beliefs that the results are valid and not a methodological artifact" (Bouchard, 1976, p. 268).

This chapter outlines the qualitative method used to examine cases of political instability in the next chapters. Section 5.1 describes the benefits of relying on a qualitative method. Section

²¹ For further details on comparing and contrasting the quantitative and the qualitative approaches, see Ragin (1987), Levy (2007), and Mohoney and Goertz (2006).

5.2 provides details about the structured, focused comparison technique on which the cross-case analysis is based. Section 5.3 highlights the process tracing approach, which is a within-case examination tool.

5.1 Qualitative Approach

The qualitative approach is “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George and Bennett 2005, 5). It generally involves combination of cross-case comparisons and within-case investigation. The purpose is to use within-case methods to minimize the risks of inferential errors that can arise from using comparative methods alone (George and Bennett 2005).

George and Bennett (2005) identify four advantages of qualitative methods. First, case studies enable identification and measurement of the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts. Second, they can be used to generate new hypotheses. Third, qualitative methods can help establish the specific causal chains through which variables of interest are related. Fourth, case studies are an effective tool for assessing complex causality such as the indirect and the conditional relationships posited in chapter 3.

The use of case studies for causal inference requires two critical assumptions (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). One is that of unit homogeneity. According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 91, emphasis in original), “*Two units are homogenous when the expected values of the dependent variables from each unit are the same when our explanatory variable takes on a particular value.*” The standard of unit homogeneity implies that the observations under study are, for analytical purposes, identical in relevant aspects (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 93). However, it must be noted that it is impossible for researchers to attain unit homogeneity. All

they can do is to acknowledge the degree of heterogeneity in their units of analysis, which would help them to estimate the degree of uncertainty to be attributed to the inferences they make (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 93-94).

The second assumption required for causal inference when using case studies is conditional independence (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This means that the values of the explanatory variables are presumed to be assigned independently of the values of the dependent variable. The goal of this assumption is to make sure that the values of the dependent variables did not cause those of the explanatory variables (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This issue is similar to the endogeneity problem described in the statistical analysis.

5.2 Structured, Focused Comparison

The method of structured, focused comparison was devised to study historical events in ways that would generate accumulative scientific knowledge (George and Bennett 2005). Prior to the emergence of this approach, researchers traditionally examined individual cases for the development of knowledge and theory. Yet, individual cases, even though they were often instructive in their own ways, did not allow comparison or “orderly cumulation” (George and Bennett 2005, 68). As a result, researchers’ interest in relying on case studies for theory development gradually diminished. Thus, accumulation of knowledge through the use of case studies required a new method that would enable systematic comparison.

Two features characterize the method of structured, focused comparison. First, it is “structured.” This characteristic is borrowed from statistical and survey methods, and consists in asking a set of standard and general questions of each of the cases under study. These questions should be carefully designed to reflect the research objective and the theoretical focus of the

study (George and Bennett 2005). The second dimension is that it is “focused,” which means that cases “should be undertaken with a specific research objective in mind and a theoretical focus appropriate for that objective” (George and Bennett 2005, 70). By focusing their case study on objective and theoretical framework, researchers are better equipped to make contributions to theory development.

The use of structured, focused comparison must meet three requirements in order to achieve its goal of theory development and testing. First, the researcher “should clearly identify the universe – that is, the ‘class’ or ‘subclass’ of events – of which a single case or a group of cases to be studied are instances” (George and Bennett 2005, 69). Second, the selection of cases within class or subclass of the phenomenon under investigation ought to be guided by a well-defined research objective and a strategy to achieve it. In other words, cases “should not be chosen simply because they are ‘interesting’ or because ample data exist for studying them” (George and Bennett 2005, 69). Third, for the purpose of explanation, investigation of cases must rely on variables of theoretical interest.

The use of structured, focused comparison approach is valuable for the study of civil war. Chapter 3 outlines a number of causal factors and mechanisms in relation to civil war. In chapter 4, the statistical relationship between these elements was investigated. The use of the structured, focused comparison method would allow for their qualitative examination in a comparative manner. The focus is on the impact of state environment on civil war through leaders’ strategic consensus.

The questions that guide the use of structured, focused comparison in this dissertation highlight the motivations and the actions of the government at the two levels described in chapter 3. The first is the governance stage or the phase leading up to citizens’ discontent. The second,

the crisis bargaining stage, relates to the government's response to the demands of aggrieved citizens. By examining government actions and motivations at the two levels, this dissertation helps fill an important gap in extant research, which most often focuses on the motivations and actions of rebel groups alone. This approach also enables this study to analyze both why social dissidence arises in the first place and why it may or may not escalate into civil war. This is accomplished by providing answers to the questions displayed in **table 5.1**.

Table 5.1 Structured, Focused Comparison Questions

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Governance Stage | 1 | What was the executive's governance strategy and what motivated that choice? |
| | 2 | How much support did the executive's governance strategy enjoy within the other branches of the government and why? |
| | 3 | How much did the executive's governance strategy determine public discontent, and to what extent did leaders' consensus contribute to that outcome? |
| Crisis Bargaining Stage | 4 | How did the executive respond to the demands of aggrieved groups and why? |
| | 5 | How much support did the executive's response enjoy within the other branches of the government and why? |
| | 6 | Did the executive's response result in escalation into or avoidance of civil war, and to what extent did leaders' consensus to that outcome? |

5.3 Process Tracing

Process tracing is an important tool of qualitative research (Collier 2011; George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013). It is sometimes defined as “the systematic examination

of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011, 823). The purpose of this method is to trace the relationships between potential causes and outcomes. When using process tracing, the researcher “examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether a causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” (George and Bennet 2005, 6).


Process tracing is fundamentally different from other methods. Unlike statistical analysis, which is more concerned with correlations of data across cases, process tracing “focuses on sequential processes within a particular historical case” (George and Bennet 2005, 13). Also, although it shares some similarities with historical explanations, the two approaches are different. The main difference is that process tracing emphasizes theory development and theory testing (George and Bennet 2005, 208-209), while historical accounts tend to be “narrative-based” and often favor complex interpretations (Levy 2001).

Scholars use different forms of process tracing techniques (George and Bennett 2005; Collier 2011; Beach and Pedersen 2013). This dissertation relies on the *critical antecedent* approach proposed by Slater and Simmons (2010).²² This method highlights the utility of “critical antecedents” and “critical junctures” in explaining outcomes (see **figure 5.1**). It is based on the idea that “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture combine in a causal sequence with factors during a critical juncture to produce divergent long-term outcomes” (Slater and Simmons 2010, 887). It can thus be used to uncover the complex causal nexus that might exist between the independent, the mediating, and the dependent variables of this study.

²² Recent studies that use the critical antecedent technique include Pfannenstiel (2015) and Mitchell (2016). Also, Kisangani (2012) relies on this technique to highlight the causes of civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

An important advantage of the critical antecedent approach is that it enables the researcher to isolate the most decisive conditions preceding a critical juncture from less causally relevant elements. When explaining an outcome, investigators run the risk of getting lost in the search for the “cause of the cause” (Slater and Simmons 2010). Yet, not all factors of a historical context have the same causal weight, and thus deserve attention. The critical antecedent technique can help guard against the dangers of “infinite regress” (Slater and Simmons 2010).

Figure 5.1 Critical Antecedents and Critical Juncture



This dissertation relies on these two methods to qualitatively examine three cases of political disorder. The first is the instance of civil war that started in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. The second is the revolution that occurred in Romania in 1989. The third is a military mutiny that emerged in Benin in 1992. While these three cases are all incidents of political instability, only the Ivorian and the Romanian conflicts qualify as civil war according to the operational definition adopted by this study. Both are instances of “a sustained military conflict, primarily internal, pitting the central government against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance” (Small and Singer 1982, 214-216). In addition, according to the Correlates of War (COW) data, both conflicts resulted in more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year with at least 5% of this number caused by the weakest side. They are thus considered positive cases. In contrast the mutiny in Benin is a negative case because it did not result in the outbreak of civil war.

The choice of these three cases meets the standards generally set by scholars for case selection (Levy 2007; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; George and Bennett 2005). The inclusion of positive and negative cases ensures variation in the dependent variable. The presence of diverging outcomes produced by similar environments shows that the argument is not deterministic (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Also, the two positive cases (Côte d'Ivoire and Romania) provide for geographic diversity. This minimizes concerns that the results are the product of geographic biases. Furthermore, these cases offer variation in the independent variable (state environment). Thus, the effects of different socioeconomic environments and political institutions can be explored across all three cases.

Chapter 6 - Côte d'Ivoire: The September 2002 Civil War

Located on the Atlantic Coast in West Africa, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire achieved its independence from France on August 7, 1960. Its total area is 322,463 km². It is bordered by Guinea and Liberia in the West, Burkina Faso and Mali in the North, and Ghana in the East. Mostly flat, the Ivorian territory is marked by a few mountains in the Northwest. The current political structure in Côte d'Ivoire is a set of democratic institutions that emerged mainly in 1990. The political landscape is composed of more than 150 registered parties, but less than 10 parties are competitive in national elections (Election Guide 2017).

Côte d'Ivoire is a multiethnic society that is composed of five major ethnic groups speaking about 66 languages (Keita 2013; Kouadio 2009). **Table 6.1** highlights the proportions of the major ethnic groups to the total population. The Akan group is the largest in the country. The country is also home to several religions, including Islam, Christianity, and Animism, which is a religious system endogenous to many African societies (Kouadio 2009).

The purpose of this chapter is to qualitatively investigate the causes of the civil war that started Côte d'Ivoire on September 19, 2002. It is organized into five sections. Section 6.1 provides a brief history of Côte d'Ivoire, while section 6.2 is an overview of political developments in the country since independence. Section 6.3 answers the structured, focused comparison questions presented by **table 5.1**. Section 6.4 traces the causes of the 2002 civil war using the process tracing method highlighted by **figure 5.1**. The focus is on the *critical antecedents* and *critical junctures* that led to the outbreak of the conflict in September 2002. Section 6.5 summarizes and discusses the findings.

Table 6.1 Côte d’Ivoire: Ethno-Regional Configuration

| Ethnic Groups | Major Subgroups | Main Location in Country | Estimated Percentage of Total Population | |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|------|
| | | | 1980 | 1998 |
| Akan-Lagunaire | Baoulé; Agni; Abbe; Alladian | East, Center & South | 35% | 42% |
| Kru | Bété; Guéré; Kru | West | 18% | 13% |
| Northern Mande | Malinké; Bambara; Dyula; Mahon | North | 15% | 16% |
| Voltaic (Gur) | Senufo; Lobi | North | 17% | 18% |
| Southern Mande | Dan (Yacouba); Gouro | West | 9% | 10% |
| Others | | | 6% | 1% |

Note: Estimations of the year 1980 are from Morrison, Mitchell and Paden (1989, 498) and those of the year 1998 are from Keita (2013, 32).

6.1 Brief History of Côte d’Ivoire

The history of Côte d’Ivoire can be divided into three major periods: *pre-colonial*, *colonial*, and *post-independence*. The pre-colonial era was marked by the occupation of the land of contemporary Côte d’Ivoire by a variety of kingdoms and empires (Kablan 2013). These include the Gyaaman State, the Anyi and Baule Kingdoms, as well as the Kong, Mali, and Ghana Empires. For centuries, some of these polities struggled for domination of the region, either among themselves or against Islamic or European invaders (Kablan 2013). It is generally believed that the population of contemporary Côte d’Ivoire is the result of migrations by different ethnic groups following the collapse of the Ghana and Kong Empires (Kablan 2013).

In the late nineteenth century, European competition over territories in Africa led to the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 that resulted in the partition of Africa among European powers. France was attributed a large part of West and Central Africa. However, French attempts to

occupy these territories were met with resistance (Kablan 2013). In the northern part of what is now known as Côte d'Ivoire, French troops had to overcome a challenge by Samory Touré, the founder and the leader of the Wassoulou Empire, which covered the contemporary lands of northern Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, and Sierra Leone (Kablan 2013). France eventually established control over the region after its troops defeated and captured Touré in 1898 (Collet 2006; Kablan 2013).

During the colonial period, Côte d'Ivoire was ruled as a portion of the French West African federation, commonly referred to as the *Afrique Occidentale Française* (AOF). Like the other seven colonies of the AOF, Côte d'Ivoire underwent a series of social and political struggles imposed by the French policies of forced labor and political subjugation. Toward the end of World War II, French officials and representatives from French African colonies met at the Brazzaville Conference (Congo) in 1944 to decide on new orientations for the French colonial empire. The participants agreed on the need for social, political, and economic reforms. The main policy shift resulting from the summit was the so called *assimilation*, which sought to gradually assimilate African people into French citizens (Pedler 1979).

The reforms undertaken by the French government led to the emergence of Félix Houphouët-Boigny as a key figure of the Ivorian politics who will later shape the future of his country. A medical doctor and a wealthy plantation owner, Houphouët-Boigny was a Baule (Akan ethnic group) born in central Côte d'Ivoire on October 18, 1905 (Nandjui 1995). He was one of the few Ivorians of his generation to attend the then-prestigious *Ecole Ponty* in Senegal, a school that trained Africans for jobs in teaching, administration, and medicine. Upon graduation, he was assigned as an “African doctor” in the southeastern region of Côte d'Ivoire. In 1940, he

returned to his home region in the center of the country to accept an appointment as chief canton, and to manage vast lands of cocoa and coffee that he inherited (Nandjui 1995; Glickman 1992).

Houphouët-Boigny began his political ascension in the years after World War II. In 1944, he co-founded the *Syndicat Agricole Africain* (African Farmers' Syndicate), which lobbied colonial authorities to improve work conditions for farmers (Kablan 2013). Elected to the French Constituent Assembly in October 1945, he later pushed for the adoption of the law of April 4, 1946 that abolished forced labor in French colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa (Nandjui 1995). In October 1946, he convened leaders of different French African colonies to the Bamako Congress, which led to the creation of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA). This was the first political movement that advocated for the emancipation of the peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa under French rule (Nandjui 1995). The same year, he founded the *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), the Ivorian branch of RDA which later became the state party for several decades (Collet 2006).

Contrary to other leaders in other colonies,²³ Houphouët-Boigny showed no eagerness for his country's independence from French colonial rule. As the Ivorian representative at the French Constituent Assembly in September 1946, he famously declared that "There are no separatists on these benches" (Hargreaves 1979, 71), indicating that his country was not seeking independence. Between 1956 and 1960, he was a member of all the French governments under the Fourth Republic (Nandjui 1995).

The Ivorian charismatic leader was particularly involved in the process leading up to the creation of the French Community. In fall 1958, the French government introduced a new

²³ In other colonies such as Indochina and Tunisia, the French colonial rule was challenged in the 1940s by nationalist movements demanding independence.

constitution that was submitted to a referendum in the metropole and in the colonies alike. The new provisions gave African colonies the opportunity to leave the Community and attain independence. Houphouët-Boigny actively campaigned for a “No” vote. As a result, his country, along with all other colonies but Guinea, voted “No” on September 28. Thus, Côte d’Ivoire became an autonomous republic within the French Community (Nandjui 1995).

Houphouët-Boigny’s political ascension was also materialized through his dominance of Ivorian politics under the French rule. In the March 1957 national and territorial elections, his party, the PDCI, won 80 percent of the vote and 58 out of 60 seats in the Territorial Assembly (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 500). His leading role in the September 1958 referendum and the resulting “No” vote further consolidated his political prominence in the country.

Two years into the existence of the French Community, Paris decided to grant independence to its African colonies. Thus, Côte d’Ivoire attained political independence on August 7, 1960. Three months later, a new constitution was adopted. According to the new institutional arrangements, the parliamentary system that was in place at independence would be replaced by a presidential system (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989). The new constitution conferred to the president enormous powers, including that of appointing and dismissing cabinet ministers, determining and conducting public policy, and appointing managers of the bureaucratic agencies and security forces (Loi n° 60-356, Unpublished).

A few years after independence, Côte d’Ivoire signed a number of agreements with France that would later impact the course of the new country’s political development. According to these agreements, which remained secret for the most part, Côte d’Ivoire was to export its strategic resources to France as a matter of priority. In addition, it was to buy its military equipment from the former metropole. In return, France was to assist the newly independent state

with expertise in military and administrative matters. The agreements also required France to come to the defense of Côte d'Ivoire when the latter faced domestic or external threats to its security.²⁴

The post-independence era is marked by two main phases. The first, which extended through 1990, was dominated by Houphouët-Boigny's rule over the country. During this period, which coincided with the Cold War, the PDCI was the only political party tolerated by Ivorian authorities (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 500-501) although the constitution legally allowed the existence of multiple parties (Loi n° 60-356, Unpublished). The Cold War years were also the most stable in the post-independence Ivorian history.

The second phase of the post-independence era started when the country democratized in 1990. The main change in the institutional order was the adoption of a multiparty system. For the first time, political competition was open to other political formations. Ironically, this second phase characterized by open political competition is also the most unstable of Côte d'Ivoire's modern history. The next section provides an overview of political developments throughout these periods.

6.2 Post-Independence Political Developments in Côte d'Ivoire

Political stability in Côte d'Ivoire has evolved significantly since its independence on August 7, 1960. Once one of the most stable states in Africa, the country has experienced two bloody civil wars in less than 10 years. Five regimes have succeeded each other in Côte d'Ivoire since independence (see **table 6.2**). First, Houphouët-Boigny ruled the country from August

²⁴ For copies of these French agreements with African countries, see <https://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTSONline.aspx?id=3>. See also the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays>.

1960 until his death on December 7, 1993. He was followed by Henri Konan Bédié, whose rule ended on December 24, 1999 when a military junta led by General Robert Guéi staged a military coup against his regime. General Guéi was succeeded by Laurent Gbagbo (October 2000 through April 2011), and Alassane Dramane Ouattara (April 2011 to the present).

Houphouët-Boigny's tenure in office was mostly associated with political stability. The first twenty years of his rule were characterized by steady economic prosperity (Collet 2006, Kablan 2013). During this period Côte d'Ivoire was often referred to as an African exception (Kouadio 2009). In the 1980s, however, Côte d'Ivoire started to experience economic recession. By the end of the decade, the country had lost its status of economic miracle.

Table 6.2 Côte d'Ivoire's Regimes, 1960-2017

| Period | Name of Chief Executive | Ethno-Regional Origin |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Aug 1960 – Dec 1993 | Félix Houphouët-Boigny | Baule (Akan) – Central Region |
| Dec 1993 – Dec 1999 | Henri Konan Bédié | Baule (Akan) – Central Region |
| Dec 1999 – Oct 2000 | Robert Guéi | Yacouba (Dan) – Western Region |
| Oct 2000 – April 2011 | Laurent Gbagbo | Bete (Kru) – Western Region |
| April 2011 - Present | Alassane Dramane Ouattara | Northern Mande – Northern region |

The peak of the economic recession coincided with the global wave of democratization that accompanied the end of the Cold War. Like many countries, Côte d'Ivoire underwent a series of political reforms that allowed for a transition from a single party system to democratic rule. Thus, for the first time since independence, multi-candidate presidential elections were held

in October 1990, followed by multiparty legislative elections a month later. Three years into his term as a democratically-elected president, Houphouët-Boigny died on December 7, 1993.

According to the Ivorian constitution, the President of the National Assembly was to succeed a deceased president. Thus, Henri Konan Bédié, the sitting president of the parliament, legally succeeded late Houphouët-Boigny on December 7, 1993. Like his predecessor and mentor, Bédié is a Baule (Akan ethnic group). He was born on May 5, 1934 in Dadiékro (Daoukro department) in the central eastern region of Côte d'Ivoire. He was educated in Senegal and France. At independence, he was appointed Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations until 1966. He then served in Houphouët-Boigny's administration as a minister of economy and finance from 1966 through 1977. In December 1980, he was elected as President of the National Assembly (Bédié and Laurent 1999).

Bédié's tenure in office was marked by social unrest and political instability. The most dramatic instance was a military coup d'état that occurred on December 24, 1999. The coup was preceded by a mutiny of a group of soldiers. On the basis of alleged poor governance and ethnocentrism, the mutineers demanded that the president stepped down. As Bédié refused, he was deposed the following day (Adjagbe 2014; Kablan 2013). This was the first military coup in Côte d'Ivoire after almost 40 years of sovereignty (Akindès 2004).

The transition that followed the coup was led by retired army General Robert Guéi. A member of the Yacouba tribe from the far western region, Guéi was born on March 16, 1941 in the department of Man. He was a graduate of the French Military Academy of Saint Cyr. In 1990, he was appointed by Houphouët-Boigny as a Chief of Defense Staff, the highest military position in the country. He was dismissed by Bédié in October 1995, and retired in January 1997.

Under Guéi's rule, which lasted about 10 months, the domestic tensions that motivated the coup did not dissipate. Upon assuming office, he promised to release power after holding corrupt politicians accountable. "Once we know that the house is clean and politicians can dance without tripping," he declared, "we will withdraw after holding transparent elections" (cited in Collet 2006, 626). However, he became increasingly unpopular for reneging on his promises, especially after he announced his intention to run for the upcoming presidential election. In September 2000, just 9 months after he took over, a group of soldiers staged another coup d'état, which failed to overthrow his regime. The following month, he lost the presidential elections, but declared himself as the winner after dismantling the electoral commission. As protesters stormed the presidential palace, Guéi was forced to leave power and flee to his home town (The Economist 2000; Kouadio 2009).

Guéi was succeeded in office by Laurent Gbagbo. A historian by profession, Gbagbo was born on May 31, 1945 in Gagnoa in the southeastern region of Côte d'Ivoire. He identifies as a Bété, an ethnic community that had long been opposed to Houphouët-Boigny's rule. Gbagbo was imprisoned several times for speaking out against the regime. In the 1980s, he was forced to live in exile in France. In 1988, he returned to Côte d'Ivoire after being reassured by the Ivorian president for his safety (Gbagbo and Mattei 2014). After the transition to a democratic system, he emerged as the main opponent to the old regime. Founder of the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI), he was elected to the parliament in November 1990 after losing the presidential election (Kablan 2013, 146).

Gbagbo's rule lasted from October 26, 2000 through April 11, 2011 (Gbagbo and Mattei 2014). Under his rule, political instability reached its worst levels. The first major episode of political violence, which is often referred to as the first Ivorian civil war, occurred in fall 2002. It

started in the night of September 18-19, as armed groups simultaneously attacked military and security facilities in Abidjan (south), Bouake (center), and Korhogo (north). The attackers were members of a movement later identified as the *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI). On November 28, two other movements, the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO) and the *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MPJ), emerged in opposition to the government (Ikpo 2015; Soro and Daniel 2005). Although the fighting between the government and these three movements ended in November 2004, the country remained portioned until April 2007, when a unity government was formed (Adjagbe 2014; Kouadio 2009). The conflict resulted in 2,700 battle related deaths, of which 200 occurred on the government's side (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).

A second episode of civil war took place under Gbagbo's rule. It lasted from March 13 through April 27, 2011. This conflict broke out following a presidential election that opposed incumbent Gbagbo to Alassane Dramane Ouattara. After the Constitutional Court declared Gbagbo the winner, former rebels loyal to Ouattara took up arms and resorted to violence. After several weeks of fighting, the insurgents successfully attacked the presidential palace. Gbagbo and his family were captured. He was later extradited to the International Criminal Court to face charges of crime against humanity and war crimes (Gbagbo and Mattei 2014; Ikpo 2015).

After Gbagbo's forced departure, Alassane Ouattara assumed office on May 6, 2011. Born on January 1, 1942 in Dimbokro (center) to a Muslim family, Ouattara was educated in the United States. He earned a Bachelor's degree in Business Administration from the Drexel Institute of Technology in 1965, a Master and a Doctorate in Economics in 1967 and 1972 respectively (Diaby and Ouattara 2012; Diakité 2008; Cissé 2007). He served in various high-level positions at international financial institutions. At the Central Bank of West African States,

he held the positions of vice-governor in 1984 and governor in 1988. He was also employed at the IMF as an economist from 1968 through 1973 before rising to the level of director of the African department in 1984 and later deputy managing director from 1994 to 1999 (Diaby and Ouattara 2012; Diakité 2008; Cissé 2007).

Under Ouattara's rule, which is still ongoing, the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire has been volatile. Although he was reelected on October 25, 2015 without major incidents, sporadic incidents of political violence have occurred. In early January and early February 2017, his regime was challenged by instances of military mutiny. Former rebels, who have returned to the armed forces, rose up to demand bonuses and better working conditions. In the bargaining over these demands, the mutinous soldiers went as far as holding the defense minister hostage (British Broadcasting Corporation 2017a, 2017b; Voice of Africa 2017). Despite the release of the defense minister and the president's promises to satisfy the demands, domestic stability remains fragile in the country.

This section provided an overview of the political developments in Côte d'Ivoire since independence. The remainder of this chapter focuses on explaining the causes of the civil war that started on September 19, 2002. Section 6.3 relies on the structured, focused comparison method to investigate the determinants of this conflict. In section 6.4, the analysis is conducted using the process tracing framework.

6.3 Structured, Focused Comparison

The previous two sections provided a historical background and an overview of political developments in Côte d'Ivoire since its independence in 1960. Although two civil wars occurred in the country, the focus of the qualitative analysis is on the causes of the September 2002

conflict. This is because the second one is beyond the temporal domain covered by this dissertation. In this section, the structured, focused comparison approach is used to investigate the causes of the 2002 civil war. Two subsections will help achieve that goal. The first examines the one-party era (1960-1990), while the second analyzes the multiparty regimes that ruled the country between 1990 and 2002. The six questions highlighted in **table 5.1** serve as the basis of the study of the actions of and the outcomes produced by these successive regimes.

6.3.1 The Single Party Rule: 1960-1990

Between 1960 and 1990, Côte d'Ivoire was ruled by Houphouët-Boigny under a single party system. The ruling elite was selected among members of the *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI). The party controlled all branches of government. This made Côte d'Ivoire under the PDCI a politically closed environment in addition to being a socioeconomically poor society. The outcome of this 30-year combination of closed institutions with poor socioeconomic conditions was a stable society with no major incidents of political violence as highlighted in section 6.2. To understand the relationship between Côte d'Ivoire's relative stability before the 1990s and its socioeconomic and political environment, the six questions highlighted in **table 5.1** must be answered. The first three examine the regime's governance strategy, while the last three cover its bargaining strategy.

The questions used to analyze the regime's governance strategy under the one-party system are as followed. First, *what was the executive's governance strategy and what motivated or facilitated that choice?* Second, *how much support did the executive's governance strategy enjoy within the other branches of the government and why?* Third, *how much did the executive's governance strategy determine public discontent and to what extent did leaders' consensus contribute to that outcome?*

In his first 30 years, the Houphouët-Boigny administration relied on cooptation, a strategy that mixed accommodation and coercion. On one hand, the administration prioritized implementation of economic policies that increased production of commodities like cocoa and coffee. Part of the revenues generated by the exportation of these products was used to supply socioeconomic goods that benefited some communities more than others (Akindès 2004). For instance, the focus of distribution of economic dividends was primarily on those regions that produced cocoa, coffee, or timber, all of which were products that the government relied on for revenue (Kouadio 2009). However, it must be noted that Houphouët-Boigny generally tried to balance out these selective policies by awarding project infrastructures to the other regions. Illustrations of this point are the construction of sugar factories in the north and a sea port in the west, two geographic areas that might have otherwise felt marginalized (Kouadio 2009, 83).

On the other hand, Houphouët-Boigny's administration tolerated no criticism to its rule. Opponents were systematically imprisoned or forced into exile. Laurent Gbagbo, a university professor and union activist, consistently experienced the repressiveness of the Houphouët-Boigny regime. In the 1970s, he was jailed for voicing against the lack of civil liberties in the country. In the 1980s, he was forced into exile in France, as the regime increased its pressure on him. Other activists and critics of the administration were subjected to similar treatments (Kouadio 2009).

The use of cooptation was largely intended to secure loyalty among supporters while making potential opponents fragile (Cohen 1974, 90). The choice of locations for the government's public projects was tied to political support. In 1962, the head of the PDCI, the state party, personally provided the minister in charge of public infrastructure, a list of one hundred villages eligible for urbanization projects (Kouadio 2009, 108-109). Similarly,

allocation of public projects was used to punish communities for their hostile attitude toward the regime. Throughout the 1960s, the town of Agboville in the south, which was perceived to be hostile to the regime, was simply left out of most public programs (Kouadio 2009).

Houphouët-Boigny's cooptation strategy appeared to be widely approved within the government. At least, there is no records of open dissent among the ruling elite. For thirty years, the PDCI remained the only party in the political arena. Several reasons explain this unity among the ruling elite. The first is related to how the political party system shaped leaders' instinct for political survival. The single party system implied that dissidence from the PDCI meant political suicide. Although the constitution, through its article 7, allowed for multiple parties, the "de facto" institution was a one-party rule.

The de facto single party system was the result of a general consensus around the need for only one party. Observers indicate that this consensus arose after the PDCI overwhelmingly won the 1957 general elections when Côte d'Ivoire was an autonomous republic within the French Community. At independence, the country's elite agreed that a one-party system was the best option they had, and thus decided to rally behind the PDCI. Consequently, any break from the PDCI would have indicated a breach of this historic agreement, and would have isolated the dissidents, leaving them with little chance for political survival.

Another element that facilitated consensus among the ruling elite was Houphouët-Boigny's charisma and leadership style. Some scholars refer to this as "Houphouetism" (Akindès 2004). In his role as a president, Houphouët-Boigny "emphasized regional and ethnic inclusion in the management of the affairs of the state" (Kouadio 2009, 83). Members of the parliament and party officials were selected across ethno-regional communities. Also, Houphouët-Boigny constantly associated "Traditional Chiefs" to his rule. These were well-respected moral figures in

local communities throughout the country. Following the Houphouët-Boigny administration's guidelines, these local leaders were in charge of overseeing land property in their respective area of responsibility (Kablan 2013). In a country that heavily depended on agriculture, this was a substantial power. Thus, the chiefs became natural allies to Houphouët-Boigny's regime, and were constantly relied upon to secure loyalty among the people.

Houphouët-Boigny's leadership style and his cooptation strategy were in line with the country's sociological context. Kouadio (2009) describes it in terms of "African democracy." The expectation among the general population in the African context is often that power and the benefits associated with it must be shared. In a society where individuals are highly attached to their ethno-regional identity, promoting people from tribes that are different from one's own is usually praised as good governance. As a matter of fact, this context led Ivorians to refer to Houphouët-Boigny as the "Wise Man" or the "Nation's Father" (Gadou 2009), which was a validation of his leadership and governance style.

Houphouët-Boigny's governance strategy based on cooptation thus enjoyed support among the ruling elite and within the general population. As a result, his administration faced little social unrest under the one-party rule. However, two instances of political violence occurred during this period. The first was an insurgency in December 1969 by members of the Agni tribe. The second was a revolt that occurred in October 1970 in the southwestern region of Gagnoa, also known as the Guébié Rebellion.

These two events have, unfortunately, received little attention in the literature on Côte d'Ivoire. Nonetheless, a brief examination of the government's handling of these incidents is conducted to investigate why they did not escalate into civil wars. The following three questions are used. First, *how did the executive respond to the demands of dissatisfied people and why?*

How much support did the executive's response to the crisis enjoy within the other branches of the government and why? To what extent did leaders' consensus contribute to avoiding escalation into civil war?

The December 1969 revolt by members of the Agni tribe took place in the southeastern region along the borders with Ghana. The group of insurgents was known as the Sanwi Liberation Movement (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 502). Its goal was to obtain separation of the Sanwi region from Côte d'Ivoire (Touval 1999, 95). The movement, which was reportedly supported by Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah, was severely repressed by the military (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 502). Its leaders were imprisoned for several years. In 1981, the Houphouët-Boigny regime released the leaders of the movement, and successfully secured peace with the region (Amani 2013).

The second instance of political instability under the single party system occurred in fall 1970 in the southwestern region of Gagnoa, close to the borders with Liberia. In late October, a group of individuals led by an activist named Kragbé Gnagbé attacked several government facilities. The motives of the uprising are barely documented (Kouadio 2009; Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 502). It is believed that Gnagbé and his followers sought to denounce the unjust treatment inflicted upon the Bété tribe by the central government. In response to their actions, the Ivorian authorities deployed military troops in the region. Subsequently, the movement was brutally repelled within a few days (Kouadio 2009).

In the absence of credible sources about the government's handling of these incidents, explaining why they never escalated into civil war could be of great challenge. Arguably, the fact that the incidents remain largely undocumented despite their repression by the government may be an indication that the people of Côte d'Ivoire do not consider these events to be relevant. It

could also be that the country's elite or the general population did not approve of the movements and their actions. In this case, the lack of interest in their investigation might be a sign of support to the government's repressive response.

Most certainly, the Ivorian government's ability to effectively repress these two movements was facilitated by the political environment under which the government operated. In an open system, opposing or denouncing the government's response would potentially provide political gains to dissenting leaders. In a closed environment, however, such a move would imply a political suicide. Thus, members of the PDCI, the ruling party, had no incentives to side with the movements. Also, Houphouët-Boigny enjoyed strong support from the French government, which had no reason to denounce or sanction repression by one of its main allies in Africa.

In sum, the Ivorian single party rule between 1960 and 1990 largely resulted in political stability. The absence of major political violence seems to be a consequence of the general consensus around the de facto one-party system at independence. This closed institutional arrangement provided the ruling elite with no incentives for dissidence. Thus, they rallied around Houphouët-Boigny's cooptation strategy, which helped consolidate the PDCI's grasp on power for almost 30 years.

6.3.2 Multiparty Rule: 1990-2002

After experimenting a politically closed system for almost 30 years, Côte d'Ivoire transitioned to democratic institutions in 1990. On April 30, Houphouët-Boigny agreed to democratize by allowing opposition parties to form (Bailly 1995). Later in October, multi-candidate presidential elections were held for the first time since independence. Houphouët-Boigny decisively won against his longtime critic Laurent Gbagbo. A month later, the first

multiparty legislative elections since independence opposed candidates from twenty-six different parties (Widener 1991). The PDCI won 71% of the seats, followed by Gbagbo's *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI), which obtained about 20%.

The democratic transition was the consequence of a number of external factors that significantly impacted Côte d'Ivoire's domestic affairs. The first was the decline in the prices of cocoa and coffee on the world market. The Ivorian economy was highly dependent on exports of cocoa and coffee. In the early 1980s, the global prices of these goods dropped dramatically. This affected the earnings of farmers and businesses involved in the production and exports of these commodities (Kouadio 2009). The government's initial response was to provide subsidies to farmers. However, the prolonged decrease in price forced the authorities to cut back on the subsidies. This decision was also driven by the requests of the IMF and the World as a part of the 1989 structural adjustment plans. The result of the government's responses to the economic crisis was a series of public outcry from farmers, public servants and students. Several strikes and protests ensued, forcing the administration to consider demands for more democratization (Kouadio 2009).

The second external factor that led to political openness in Côte d'Ivoire was the global wave of democratization that emerged in the years 1989 and 1990. With the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, several countries around the world began opening up their institutions, which inspired African societies, including the people in Côte d'Ivoire. In the case of the former French colonies in Africa, this global desire for democratization led the French government to revise its longstanding policy of turning a blind eye on repressive practices of allied authoritarian regimes (Lissouck 1994). This shift in French policy was explicitly communicated by President François Mitterrand to African leaders. In a historic speech delivered

at the end of the 16th Summit of African and French Heads of State held on June 20, 1990 at La Baule-Escoublac (France), the French president urged African leaders to undergo reforms that seek “representative systems, free elections, multiparty system, freedom of the press, independent judiciary, and abdication of censorship.”²⁵

The transition to democratic institutions significantly impacted the governance and the crisis bargaining strategies of the successive administrations from 1990 until the outbreak of the civil war in 2002. The structured, focused comparison is used to examine the causes and the effects of these strategies. The following three questions provide the framework to analyze the governance strategies of four administrations that ruled the country in the 12 years preceding the first civil war. First, *what was the executive’s governance strategy and what motivated that choice?* Second, *how much support did the executive’s governance strategy enjoy within the other branches of the government and why?* Third, *how much did the executive’s governance strategy determine public discontent, and to what extent did leaders’ consensus contribute to that outcome?*

Under the multiparty system, Côte d’Ivoire was ruled by Houphouët-Boigny for three years, from 1990 until his death on December 7, 1993. Following his victory in the 1990 presidential elections, he appointed Alassane Dramane Ouattara as his prime minister. He assigned him one important mission: to help implement reforms that would mitigate the country’s economic difficulties. A former IMF official, Ouattara began to execute a series of drastic measures that in no way resembled Houphouët-Boigny’s traditional cooptation strategy (Collet 2006; Akindès 2004). Ouattara’s attempts to repress social unrest that followed his

²⁵ An electronic copy of the Mitterrand’s speech is available on the George Washington University’s website at <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB461/docs/DOCUMENT%203%20-%20French.pdf>.

policies were largely met with even more resistance. The opposition used the executive's repressive practices as a recruitment tool (Kirwin 2006).

The administration's inability to resort to Houphouët-Boigny's traditional governance style was primarily the result of the change in state environment in Côte d'Ivoire. The first aspect of this change is the adoption of a new political system under harsh economic circumstances. As Kirwin (2006, 46) argues, "The internal politics of Côte d'Ivoire would be forever changed by the introduction of multipartism ... In the days of better economic conditions and before the advent of multipartism Houphouët-Boigny was able to co-opt leaders of the various ethnic groups, and offers of cash and political appointment were enough to quiet ethnic discontent."

To be specific, the change in state environment in Côte d'Ivoire altered the incentives as well as the actions of citizens and leaders alike. The economic decline increased citizens' and leaders' need for more economic means, while reducing Houphouët-Boigny's capacity to supply these goods. Meanwhile, the new multiparty system allowed leaders like Laurent Gbagbo, now represented in parliament, to exploit these weaknesses for political gains. In addition, France's decision to withdraw its support to the strong men of Africa further weakened Houphouët-Boigny in his ability to keep his opponents under control without being exposed to international criticism.

The situation only worsened under President Bédié. Leaders' consensus within the PDCI openly broke after Houphouët-Boigny died in December 1993. Although Bédié was believed to have been handpicked by the late president to succeed him, he lacked the legitimacy of his predecessor. Ouattara, who was then the prime minister, resisted Bédié's ascension to power after the president's death. As it became clear that he could not stop it, Ouattara resigned from his prime minister position (Kouadio 2009; Chaléard 2000; Konaté 2004).

Following Ouattara's resignation, internal dissensions within the PDCI reached their peak in January 1994. Just a few weeks into Bédié's administration, a group of leaders publically announced their dissidence from the PDCI, the party that had managed to remain united behind Houphouët-Boigny for more than 30 years. The dissidents formed a new party under the name of *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR). Upon its formation, the RDR pleaded allegiance to Ouattara (Chaléard 2000, 45), whom Bédié now perceived as the most serious threat to his political survival.

In response to the emergence of this new threat, Bédié resorted to a governance strategy that emphasized politics of exclusion. In preparation of the 1995 general elections, an electoral law was passed by PDCI-controlled parliament on December 8, 1994. The new law, also known as the "94-642" Law, suppressed voting rights for foreigners, who had previously been allowed to vote (Konaté 2004; Kouadio 2009). In addition, it required presidential candidates to be descendants of two Ivorian-born parents. This marked the introduction of the so called *Ivoirité*, which is often referred to as a major turning point in Ivorian politics (Collet 2006; Keita 2013).

The goal of the *Ivoirité* institution was political in essence (Akindès 2004; Gadou 2009). The new law was intended to disqualify Ouattara, the principal threat to Bédié's victory in the upcoming 1995 elections. It was widely believed that Ouattara either had Burkina Faso citizenship or was born to at least one parent with Burkinabe citizenship. Another goal of the *Ivoirité* was to rally supporters while dividing the opposition (Keita 2013). The exclusion of foreigners was a political concession of the PDCI majority in parliament to the minority, which feared that foreigners's votes would favor the regime as it was the case in Houphouët-Boigny's victory in the 1990 presidential election (Kouadio 2009; Konaté 2004).

Although Bédié won the 1995 presidential elections, the introduction of the *Ivoirité* further fragmented the political elite, while polarizing the Ivorian society. For Ouattara and his supporters, the continuation of *Ivoirité* meant the end of his ambitions to hold the highest office, whereas its repeal would further his political chances. For some ethno-regional groups, especially Muslims and residents from the northern region, *Ivoirité* had political and socioeconomic consequences. On one hand, they were being deprived from the right to vote, which they had been provided under Houphouët-Boigny's one-party rule (Kablan 2013). On the other hand, *Ivoirité* also entailed provisions that legally made it more difficult for them, especially those with Burkinabe descent, to own land. For instance, a law passed in 1998 deprived non-Ivorian residents from land ownership rights (Chauveau and Colin 2010; Kablan 2013, 151). This ultimately excluded large numbers of families that "had worked under the [Houphouët-Boigny] patronage systems for years" (Kablan 2013, 151).

The sociopolitical crisis associated with the implementation of *Ivoirité* would eventually have dire consequences on the country's domestic stability. The following three questions serve as a basis to examine how the Bédié regime and subsequent administrations handled the crisis. First, *how did the executive respond to the demands of the people impacted by Ivoirité and why?* Second, *how much support did the executive's response enjoy within the other branches of the government and why?* Third, *did the executive's response result in escalation into or avoidance of civil war, and to what extent did leaders' consensus contribute to that outcome?*

As the initiator of the *Ivoirité* provisions, Bédié made no significant efforts to repeal the law. Rather, he and his supporters consistently defended the concept and its implications (Kablan 2013). They were hoping to gain political benefits from this line of rhetoric and policy. Also, by accusing the FPI and RDR of representing ethnic groups rather than national constituencies, they

intended to delegitimize them (Collet 2006). This was a carefully chosen tactic designed to appeal to a large audience in a “multiethnic Côte d’Ivoire, where Houphouët-Boigny had constructed a one-party state based on alliances between potentially opposed regional groupings” (Collet 2006). The strategy was conceived in preparation of the upcoming 2000 general elections. In December 1999, however, a military coup d’état prematurely deposed Bédié and his regime.

Bédié was succeeded in office by (retired) General Robert Guéi. Having been selected by the perpetrators of the 1999 coup to lead a democratic transition, Guéi promised to “clean up the house” and step down after organizing presidential elections in 2000. He too failed to address the grievances associated with the introduction of *Ivoirité*. He even used it in his attempt to remain in power. Contrary to his promise, the retired General decided to run for the 2000 election. His “handpicked Supreme Court disqualified all the major candidates of the PDCI and RDR from standing in the presidential elections” (Collet 2006). Before the results of the election were announced, he suspended the electoral commission and declared victory. Ultimately, his main opponent in the election, Laurent Gbagbo, urged the population into the streets. Angry protesters eventually forced Guéi to flee the capitol city, and seek refuge in his hometown in the western region of Côte d’Ivoire.

In October 2000, Gbagbo succeeded Guéi in the aftermath of what he referred to as “calamitous” electoral process. In all fairness, he inherited the sociopolitical crisis associated with the *Ivoirité*. Yet, like his predecessors, he did little to address the issues. He also attempted to utilize *Ivoirité* for political gains. According to Collet (2006), Gbagbo “used ivoirité to consolidate governmental power in the south at the expense of the northerners and Muslims, who

he increasingly associated with foreigners.” Like Bédié and Guéi, Gbagbo perceived Ouattara as the main threat to his survival in office.

In response to Gbagbo’s exploitation of *Ivoirité*, Ouattara and his supporters became radicalized in their demands. They began to describe *Ivoirité* as “a concept inspired by fear ... with the musty smell of xenophobia that is dangerous for national unity” (Collet 2006). Populations in the northern region started calling for Gbagbo’s resignation. The tensions expanded to the neighboring countries as immigrant communities in Côte d’Ivoire became the targets of verbal and physical abuses under the pretext of *Ivoirité*. Presidents Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Alpha Oumar Konaré of Mali openly criticized Gbagbo for his handling of the issue (Gadou 2009). Appalled by the situation, the Malian president declared that “We have never seen a hostile Côte d’Ivoire toward immigrants ... and we reject this image” (Gadou 2009, 3).²⁶

Gbagbo and his administration also adopted policies that further deteriorated the country’s social order. They attempted to demobilize soldiers who had been enlisted by Guéi’s regime (Collet 2006). In addition, several ethno-regional communities suspected that “the government of Gbagbo and his ethnic group had a stranglehold on the means of entry into the police and gendarmerie” (Kirwin 2006, 48; Akindès 2004). On some occasions, he would promise to repeal *Ivoirité*. Yet, on others, he would ensure supporters about his commitment to upholding it. This sent no clear signal to Ouattara, who had now “become the symbol for the grievances of the disenfranchised northern political, economic, ethnic and regional grouping” (Collet 2006). To some extent, the disenfranchised groups became united in their search for

²⁶ The original quote in Gadou (2009, 3) is “Nous n’avons jamais connu une Côte d’Ivoire d’hostilité vis-à-vis des étrangers. Et cette image nous la refusons.”

justice, and were “only waiting for the signal to rebel against Gbagbo’s southern-based government” (Collet 2006).

6.4 Process Tracing

This section examines specific historical events that have influenced the outbreak of the 2002 Civil War in Côte d’Ivoire. It relies on Slater and Simmons’ (2010) method to identify the *critical antecedents* that shaped the process leading up to the civil war. In addition, the analysis focuses on the instrumentalization of *Ivoirité* by the country’s political leadership, which was the *critical juncture* that preceded the emergence of the civil war.


6.4.1 Critical Antecedents: Political Openness in Difficult Socioeconomic Context

As highlighted in **figure 6.1**, the occurrence of the 2002 civil war in Côte d’Ivoire appeared to be an indirect consequence of changes in the country’s socioeconomic and political conditions. Three of these changes in state environment, which took place over several years, constitute the critical antecedents to the conflict. The first is the socioeconomic crisis that resulted from the decline in the commodity prices. The second is the global wave of democratization that resulted in the introduction of a multiparty system and open elections. Third, the death of President Houphouët-Boigny on December 7, 1993 created a power vacuum and a struggle for succession that would profoundly influence the course of events leading up to the civil war.

Côte d’Ivoire experienced rapid changes in its economy at the beginning of the 1980s. As **figure 6.2** indicates, the first twenty years of Houphouët-Boigny’s rule were characterized by steady economic prosperity. On average, country income grew by 8.13% between 1960 and 1980


(World Bank 2017). This led many observers and scholars to refer to pre-1980 Côte d'Ivoire as an African exception (Kouadio 2009).

Figure 6.1 Tracing the Causal Path: Côte d'Ivoire



In the 1980s, the country entered economic recession. In 1980, economic growth dropped by 10.95% compared to the previous year (**figure 6.2**). In the subsequent years, growth levels remained below 5% until the end of Houphouët-Boigny's era. As highlighted in **figure 6.3**, the country's debt also increased significantly. In 1975, Côte d'Ivoire's external debt stocks represented about 97% of its exports of goods and services. In 1980, that debt level doubled to about 205%. At the end of that decade in 1989, it rose dramatically to about 457%. Consequently, the government defaulted on its international debt payment several times during the 1980s (Kirwin 2006).

Figure 6.2 Côte d'Ivoire: Annual GDP Growth, 1960-2015




Source: World Bank (2017)

In response to Côte d'Ivoire's inability to maintain its debt under control, the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank required the Houphouët-Boigny administration to undergo a set of austerity reforms. The policies are commonly known as “structural adjustment” or “stabilization” programs (Kisangani 1997, 17). Their goal was to lower the government budget deficit by reducing government spending, eliminating government subsidies for items of popular consumption such as food, and privatizing state-owned enterprises (Naiman and Watkins 1999). The initial phase of the IMF programs started with two stand-by arrangements in November 1989 and 1991.²⁷ These arrangements with the IMF were accompanied by six World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans from 1989-1993 (Naiman and Watkins 1999).

²⁷ A stand-by arrangement is an agreement between a government and the IMF on an outline of economic policy changes, which precedes a full agreement (Naiman and Watkins 1999).

Figure 6.3 Côte d'Ivoire: External Debt Stocks, 1975-2002




Source: World Bank (2017)

The origin of the economic downturn was the dramatic drop in the prices of cocoa and coffee, which were two critical commodities for the Ivorian economy. As **figure 6.4** indicates, the price of cocoa on the global market in 1977 was 8.29 US dollars per kilogram. In 1980, it declined by more than 50% to 3.99 US dollars. At the end of the decade in 1989, one kilogram of cocoa only cost 1.56 US dollars. The trends were similar for coffee robusta, of which Côte d'Ivoire was one of the largest producers in the world. In 1977, one kilogram cost 10.78 US dollars. This price dropped to 4.97 US dollars in 1980 and 2.08 US dollars in 1989.

The sudden and prolonged decline in the commodity price affected citizens and the government alike. Average citizens and businesses that relied on the production and exports of cocoa and coffee saw a reduction in their economic capacity. Kouadio (2013, 17) reports that “many people could not afford to send their children to school, and buy basic goods, including medicine ... [and] their habits and lifestyles changed dramatically creating anger, frustration, and general misery.” Also, public revenues significantly decreased as a result of the negative changes

in the global prices. The severity of the economic crisis for both citizens and government was reflected in the difference in per capita income. In 1979, the per capita income level was about 2,348 US dollars. In 1989, it dropped to 1,529 US dollars (World Bank 2017).

Figure 6.4 Global Commodity Price, 1975-1995



Source: Food & Agriculture Organization (2017)

The economic downturn required the government to implement long-term oriented policies that would reduce deficit and increase savings in order to pay its external debts. Some of these measures were imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions, which conditioned any help to the Ivorian government to their implementation. Thus, in November 1990, Houphouët-Boigny appointed a former IMF executive, Alassane Ouattara, as his prime minister. The months preceding his appointment, Ouattara had chaired a special commission on economic recovery at the Ivorian president's request (Kouadio 2009).

Ouattara's main mission as a prime minister was to lead the implementation of the recommendations made by the committee he had chaired a few months earlier. As one would expect, he initiated cuts in the budget that affected public servants. Several enterprises, previously owned by the state, laid off workers. These drastic measures led to social unrest in the form of strikes by students, police, customs officers, university professors, transport workers and trade union members (Kirwin 2006, 46). The most extreme of these incidents was the takeover of the national airport in Abidjan in 1990 by army conscripts (Kirwin 2006, 46).

The Ivorian government's ability to manage the public anger associated with the socioeconomic difficulties was significantly restrained by several aspects of the country's new political environment. The fall of the Berlin Wall On November 9, 1989 did not just impact the sociopolitical life in East European countries. It also affected African societies. For instance, it generated a sense of liberation, and provided citizens and activists with incentives for democratization. Traditional authoritarian regimes, like Houphouët-Boigny's administration, were suddenly confronted with more challenges than they were used to. Demands for more political and civil rights increased because citizens felt empowered by what was happening in other states.

Meanwhile, the French government, which was Houphouët-Boigny's main ally, was sending a clear signal that it would no longer support or intervene on behalf of crony regimes. This shift in the global structure heavily constrained Houphouët-Boigny's ability to cope with domestic challenges to his rule. Most importantly, it forced his regime to respond favorably to the demands for democratization.

The introduction of open political institutions further restrained the Houphouët-Boigny administration's options for political order. Specifically, this new structure of the political

environment made it difficult for Houphouët-Boigny to resort to its traditional cooptation strategy, especially in the face of the country's economic downturn. As Kablan (2013, 147) suggests, "Within the one party Ivorian state, Houphouëtism was able [to] subdue social tensions because the majority of farmers—autochthones and alogenes—prospered from the plantation economy. In less prosperous time and under the Ivorian multiparty state, disagreements between autochthones and alogenes became politicized in the diverse party structures of the electorate and government."

The adoption of political openness also weakened consensus among leaders in Côte d'Ivoire. This became most apparent after Houphouët-Boigny passed away on December 7, 1993. The death of the charismatic leader who had ruled the country for more than 30 years created a power vacuum followed by a struggle among his potential successors. By law, the President of the parliament, Henri Konan Bédié, was to take over as an interim president until the next elections. Yet, Ouattara, who had been appointed as a prime minister by Houphouët-Boigny three years earlier, believed he was the *de facto* successor. These struggles for succession occurred although both individuals were from the ruling party.

Under the single party system, these events might have unfolded differently. However, the adoption of open political institutions provided different incentives. The next presidential election following the power struggle between Bédié and Ouattara was scheduled to be held in 1995. With the advent of open elections, Ouattara and some other members of the PDCI, many of whom were represented in parliament, believed they could further their political future by forming their own party. Thus, in January 1994, just a few weeks after the power struggle, nine PDCI members of the parliament announced that they were creating a new party under the name of *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR). The new party declared its intention to mobilize

followers behind Ouattara in the presidential election (Chaléard 2000; Konaté 2004; Kouadio 2009), which was less than two years away. This was the sign that consensus had broken within leaders of the PDCI, the party that controlled all branches of government since independence.

In sum, by 1993, Côte d'Ivoire's leaders were divided in a way that had not been seen during the single party rule. These cleavages were the consequence of the changes in the Ivorian state environment. In the following years, consensus among leaders continued to weaken. Ultimately, this lack of consensus materialized through a series of events that resulted in the occurrence of the civil war in September 2002.

6.4.2 Critical Juncture: Leaders' Lack of Consensus Around *Ivoirité*

Leaders' instrumentalization of *Ivoirité* was the critical juncture in the process leading up to the 2002 civil war in Côte d'Ivoire. As highlighted in section 6.3, the *Ivoirité* Law adopted on December 8, 1994 redefined the terms of Ivorian citizenship. It restricted voting rights for immigrants, who had previously been eligible to vote (Collet 2006). *Ivoirité* also restrained the requirements for candidacy to presidential elections. Together, these rules not only excluded large numbers of immigrants, mostly from Malian and Burkinabe origins, but they also served to disqualify Ouattara from running for the highest office (Gadou 2009). For almost eight years, leaders of three successive regimes were unable agree on how to best address the discontent generated by this policy among certain segments of the population.

Although the *Ivoirité* yielded political gains for Bédié in the 1995 election, its introduction polarized Ivorian politics and society. This polarization was most obvious in the years leading up to the 2000 presidential election. By 1998, two years before the scheduled election, the political leadership and the general population were divided into three camps. The

first was made of president Bédié, his party PDCI, and the Akan ethnic group located mostly in the center. This group was considered to be the core of Bédié's political basis. The second was composed of Ouattara, his party RDR, and the Northerners, mostly Muslims, and disenfranchised immigrants. The third was that of Gbagbo, his party the FPI, and the Bété ethnic group, mainly located in the southwest.

Each camp had its own interests that did not necessarily match the aspirations of the others. For the Bédié coalition, maintaining the presidency and a majority of seats in parliament were considered the only way of protecting the Akan hold on power. In that regard, the priorities of the political leadership matched those of their core constituents. The Ouattara coalition was also united in similar ways. Overcoming the barriers imposed by the *Ivoirité* system would increase Ouattara's chance for the presidency and the RDR's political expansion. These in turn would provide an opportunity for the Northerners and marginalized immigrants to successfully have their grievances addressed. For Gbagbo and his camp, success in the 2000 presidential elections would provide political and socioeconomic power to a region they believed had been neglected for decades since independence, especially since the Guébié revolt in 1970.

In prelude to the 2000 presidential elections, the three camps adopted strategies that primarily drew on the exploitation of *Ivoirité* and the exclusion of others. Initially, Bédié was reluctant to the exclusion of immigrants from the electoral process because of the significance of their votes to Houphouët-Boigny's success in past presidential elections. Thus, he proposed new measures that would make modifications to the original *Ivoirité* Law. However, several parliamentarians made it clear they would not support his proposed provision that was believed to be too lenient toward immigrants (Konaté 2004; Kouadio 2009; Gadou 2009). Some leaders of the opposition favored termination of voting rights for foreigners. They must have calculated

that, without foreigners' votes, Bédié had little chance of winning the presidential election. Suppression of foreigners' votes was also in the interests of PDCI legislators because it would reduce the RDR's chances. In the end, the parliament adopted a new law that imposed further restrictions on the political and economic rights of those who were not believed to be "true Ivorians" (Gadou 2009).

By 1999, the sociopolitical tensions increased to the point of leading to a military coup d'état. Ouattara's bi-nationality became a contentious issue as the 2000 election approached (Akindès 2004, 20). The Bédié regime issued an international warrant against the RDR leader (Akindès 2004, 19). Several militants of his party were imprisoned. Entire communities in the North, mostly Muslims, complained about harassments by the police. In this highly polarized context, a group of soldiers staged a coup d'état that deposed Bédié and forced him into exile.

Apparently, the military coup was an attempt to end the tensions generated by *Ivoirité* in pre-election context. Many of the soldiers are believed to be from the northern region of the country. Gadou (2009, 5) reports that some of the soldiers who participated in the coup justified their action by the polarization that had infiltrated the ranks of the military. According to one of the perpetrators of the coup, "In the Ivorian army, people were judged by their ethnic or religious affiliation" (Gadou 2009, 5).²⁸

Leaders' exploitation of *Ivoirité* for political gains did not end with the December 1999 coup. General Guéi, who was from the far western region of Côte d'Ivoire, was put in charge by the perpetrators of the coup, most of whom were from the north. One of Guéi's major promises was to repeal *Ivoirité*, which he considered "a threat to national unity" (Akindès 2004, 21). Also,

²⁸ The original quotation in Gadou (2009, 5) is "Dans l'armée de Côte d'Ivoire, les gens étaient jugés par rapport à leur appartenance ethnique ou religieuse."

he offered that he would allow Ouattara to return from exile and enjoy all his political rights. However, in March 2000, Guéi started to renege on his promises. With an eye on the upcoming election, he increasingly resorted to his predecessor's exclusionary rhetoric. Ouattara suddenly became a target in his speeches and actions. Guéi handpicked a supreme court that would disqualify several leaders from the election, including Ouattara and Bédié (Kouadio 2009; Gadou 2009).

In his attempt to consolidate his power, Guéi also resorted to what seemed to be a politics of exclusion. Following a failed coup in September 2000, he arrested several soldiers, many of whom were among those who brought him to power the preceding year. Some officers managed to escape and seek refuge in neighboring countries. Reports indicated that Guéi also started to enlist people from his home region into the military (Akindès 2004; Konaté 2004). Moreover, he became critical of Akan domination of the public administration and of politics more broadly. On the eve of the election, he appealed to the Akan community, a PDCI base, making the case for power rotation. In his own words, "power had to shift from the control of the Akan group to the Krou group, to which the General belonged" (Akindès 2004, 21-22).

Guéi's electoral strategies resulted in a presidential election that was perceived by many Ivorians as illegitimate and "calamitous" (Gadou 2009). Contrary to his promise, he was a candidate. After his administration disqualified several major contenders, the voter turnout was 37%. Before the results were announced, he dismantled the electoral commission, and declared victory. Gbagbo, who was his main contender in the election, urged his followers to take to the streets. Large protests followed, and security forces clashed with civilians, resulting in many casualties. As Guéi fled to his hometown, Gbagbo proclaimed himself the elected president. The next days, several bodies were discovered in a river in Abidjan, most of whom were Ouattara and

RDR supporters (Radio France Internationale 2000). This further exacerbated the tensions that had accompanied the election a few days earlier.

Having been elected in dubious circumstances, Gbagbo made no great efforts to legitimize his power. Rather, like his predecessors, he resorted to ethnic politics and exploitation of the *Ivoirité*. This instrumentalization of the status quo by a president largely viewed as the product of an “electoral hold-up” (Akindès 2004) became another step in the critical juncture leading to the civil war. Gbagbo signaled his intention to hold on to the status quo by refusing to allow Ouattara to compete for the legislative elections that took place in the month following his ascension to power. This led to violence and riots on December 4, 2000 between the police and RDR militants, whose main slogan was “Enough is enough” (Akindès 2004, 5).

Gbagbo’s hanging onto the status quo radicalized Ouattara, his party RDR, and their supporters. They must have come to the realization that, after three consecutive administrations’ unwillingness to resolve the issue of *Ivoirité*, the only option they had was to force their way into power. This first materialized in early 2001, just one month after the clashes between the police and RDR militants. On January 7, a group of soldiers staged a coup that failed to depose Gbagbo. Believed to be RDR and Ouattara sympathizers, they were arrested although many of them managed to escape into exile. Gbagbo’s attempts to unify the country in the aftermath of these incidents were unsuccessful. A national reconciliation forum in fall 2001 and a national unity government featuring all major parties in August 2002 did nothing to reassure his opponents. In the night of September 18, 2002, a failed coup attempt in Abidjan was followed by attacks by three groups of rebels in different parts of the country.

It is unclear how the rebel groups had come to organize and mobilize. However, civil wars in next-door Liberia and Sierra Leone must have provided opportunities for mobilization.

Also, alienation of immigrants from Côte d'Ivoire's northern neighbors Mali and Burkina Faso certainly contributed to the mobilization process. Another possible factor that might have facilitated rebels' mobilization is the polarization of the Ivorian society as a whole. In fact, mobilization by three different groups could not have been unnoticed by the population of the regions where the rebel groups were located. Yet, these same populations perceived the Gbagbo regime as unwilling to change the status quo that had restrained their political (voting) rights and their economic privileges (eligibility to own land). Thus, denouncing the rebels to the Gbagbo regime was not in their best interests.

Despite the possibility of these mobilization opportunities, it is puzzling why the security forces were unable to detect them. One possible answer resides in the weakening of the military over the years, which was another manifestation of the lack of consensus among political leaders. Like many other Francophone countries in Africa, the Houphouët-Boigny regime had relied on the French patronage for its security (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner 2009). This provided little incentive to build a strong military. Under the multiparty system, the military was further weakened by the sociopolitical dissensions that took place in the country. With the antagonist sociopolitical blocs that emerged around the main political figures, it would not be surprising that members of the military too were divided along those ethno-regional lines. This is further supported by reports about Guéi and Gbagbo's efforts to enroll members of their ethnic groups in the military (Collet 2006; Akindès 2004).

The September 2002 military coup, which evolved into an armed rebellion the next day, was a sign of and a consequence of a weak military. Collet (2006) reports that the coup "was driven by soldiers protesting against their impending demobilization from the military." They were members of Guéi's ethnic group, and had enrolled in the military during his 10-month

tenure in office. As the coup failed, members of the *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI) took the opportunity to seize control of several cities and towns in the north, the center, and the west. The emergence of the MPCI was quickly followed by the formation of two other groups, the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien pour le Grand Ouest* (MPIGO) and the *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MJP). The three organizations soon merged into the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) under the leadership of Guillaume Soro (Adjagbe 2014; Soro and Daniel 2005).

Many of the rebels were former military personnel forced into exile under the Guéi and the Gbagbo regimes (Gadou 2009). For instance, the MPCI consisted of deserters who had previously brought Guéi to power before falling in disgrace with him. Also, many of the MPIGO leaders were military personnel who deserted under Gbagbo's rule. Thus, it is highly likely that these former soldiers still had contact with some of their comrades who were still in the armed forces. These divisions within the military were a heavy constrain on its ability to perform adequately. This explains its incapacity to detect and even repel the three rebel groups that operated in the earlier days of the rebellion, thus facilitating escalation into civil war. In short, it appeared that the lack of consensus among leaders translated into fragmentation of the military, which made it difficult for the government to compel insurgents into surrender in the early days of the rebellion.

6.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings

This dissertation contends that state environment indirectly affects the likelihood of civil war through its impact on leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion. The six hypotheses outlined in chapter 3 highlight two features of state environment as critical in explaining civil war. First, the decline in socioeconomic conditions increases the risks of civil

war because it encourages leaders' polarization about a strategy for political order. Second, the indirect impact of political openness is conditional on the socioeconomic environment. In poor states, it exacerbates leaders' polarization about a strategy for political order.

The qualitative findings of this chapter support the argument that leaders' consensus mediates the impact of state environment on civil war. Like the statistical analysis in chapter 4, this case study indicates that state environment significantly impacts the behavior of political leaders during the governance and the crisis bargaining phases. Specifically, it seems that the inability of state leaders to rally behind a common strategy to resolve a crisis is a critical step in the process leading up to civil war.

The structured, focused comparison questions examined the motivations and the actions of the ruling elite in Côte d'Ivoire from the country's independence in 1960 through the outbreak of the first civil war in 2002. The approach compared and contrasted the one-party rule to the multi-party era. The results showed that the one-party era resulted in no major instance of political violence. Throughout this period, the political leadership, which belonged to a single party, was united around President Houphouët-Boigny's cooptation or patronage strategy. Despite the economic decline that started in the 1980s, the ruling party registered no open dissidence.

Unlike the single party era, the multi-party system of the post-Cold War years was associated with multiple instances of political instability in the forms of military coup and civil war. The structured, focused comparison of this period indicated that, in addition to a weakening economy, the introduction of open institutions in 1990, paralyzed the Houphouët-Boigny regime's ability to govern based on the traditional cooptation strategy. Also, the desire to win multi-candidate elections during harsh socioeconomic times led his successors to initiate and

manipulate divisive policies based on ethnocentrism and nationalism. The result was polarization of the political leadership, the military, and society.

The process tracing analysis highlighted the sequences that indirectly connected the changes in the Ivorian socioeconomic and political environment in the 1990s to the onset of civil war in September 2002. Three aspects of the shift in state environment were found to be *critical antecedents* in the process. First, the socioeconomic crisis that resulted from the drop in the prices of cocoa and coffee on the global market increased the economic needs for citizens, while weakening the president's ability to rely on his traditional cooptation strategy. Second, the global wave of democratization that resulted in the introduction of democratic institutions in Côte d'Ivoire also provided incentives to citizens to make more demands, while preventing the government from rallying behind a common strategy to cope with these demands. Third, the death of Houphouët-Boigny on December 7, 1993 created a power vacuum and a struggle for succession that was decisive in shaping the course of events in the next years.

Process tracing also revealed that the instrumentalization of the *Ivoirité*, which was introduced by Bédié in the mid-1990s as an electoral strategy, was the critical juncture that led to the civil war in September 2002. The exploitation of this polarizing policy materialized through the political calculations of Ivorian leaders over a course of almost eight years. Leaders who at one time supported repealing of the Law later retracted when continuation of exclusion of others benefitted their political survival. The inability of political leaders to unite around a strategy to resolve the *Ivoirité* crisis not only further deteriorated cohesion among society broadly, but it also restrained the military's ability to detect and repel insurgents involved in the September 2002 rebellion.

Chapter 7 - Romania: The December 1989 Revolution

Located in southeastern Europe, Romania is bordered by the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Ukraine, and Moldova. According to a 2011 estimation, its population is composed of several ethnic groups. The dominant one is the Romanian community (83.4%), followed by the Hungarians (6.1%), the Roma (3.1%), the Ukrainians (0.3%), and the Germans (0.2%). Romania has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since March 29, 2004 and of the European Union (EU) since January 1, 2007.

The purpose of this chapter is to qualitatively investigate the causes of the armed violence that occurred in this country during its revolution in December 1989. It is organized into four sections. Section 7.1 is an overview of political developments in Romania between 1944 and 1990. Section 7.2 answers the structured, focused comparison questions presented by **table 5.1**. Section 7.3 traces the causes of the December 1989 civil unrest using the process tracing method highlighted by **figure 5.1**. The focus is on the *critical antecedents* and *critical junctures* that led to the outbreak of the conflict. Section 7.4 summarizes and discusses the findings.

7.1 Political Developments in Romania, 1944-1990

The political history of Romania since 1944 has been dominated by the communist rule until December 22, 1989, followed by a transition into a democratic era that has extended to the present. Two main political figures shaped the course of the communist period of Romanian politics. The first was Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Born on November 8, 1901 to a poor family and with no formal education beyond the age of 11, Gheorghiu-Dej rose to prominence during the 1930s as one of the symbols of Romanian communism (Roper 2000, 5). At a time when communist ideology was still unpopular in Romania, he became famous for organizing workers'

strike. Between 1933 and 1944, he was imprisoned for his activism. While in jail, he was recognized by both the domestic and the exiled factions of the Romanian Communist Party (*Partidul Comunist Roman* or PCR) as their leader (Roper 2000). He died in office on March 19, 1965.

The second most prominent figure of the communist era in Romania was Nicolae Ceausescu. When he assumed office as the head of the Party after Gheorghiu-Dej's death, Ceausescu was the youngest Party leader in the Eastern European region (Fischer 1981, 117). One of ten children, he was born on January 26, 1918 to a peasant family. Like his predecessor in office, Ceausescu did not receive any formal education beyond the age of 11 (Siani-Davies 2005, 27). A shoemaker by profession, he joined the communist party as a teenager. At the age of 21, he met Lenuta (Elena) Petrescu, whom he later married on December 23, 1947. Together, the couple ruled Romania until their fall from power on December 22, 1989. They were both executed three days after losing power (Hitchins 2014; Siani-Davies 2005).

The emergence of a communist regime in Romania was mainly a consequence of the Soviet occupation during World War II. Prior to the Soviet invasion of August 31, 1944, communist ideology was espoused by only a small proportion of Romanians (Deletant 1995). From its foundation in May 1921 through the end of the 1920s, membership of the Romanian Communist Party "was extremely low, often numbering in the hundreds" (Roper 2000, 3-4). Prior to the formation of the PCR, communists' participation into Romanian politics was through the Romanian Social Democratic Party (*Partidul Social Democrat Roman* or PSDR). The unpopularity of communism in this period was, in part, due to the fact that the PCR was considered by many Romanians as a foreign organization with antinationalist views (Roper

2000).²⁹ However, the Soviet presence decisively changed the role of communism in the Romanian society. On March 5, 1945, the Soviets went as far as conditioning the existence of Romania as an independent state to the setting-up of a pro-Soviet government (Deletant 1995). This contributed to the gradual rise of the PCR.

The PCR's gradual dominance of the Romanian political landscape was also the result of Gheorghiu-Dej's leadership. Throughout the late 1940s and in the 1950s, he engaged in rapid recruitment of followers. As a result, the PCR's membership rose from 884 people before 1944 to 1,377,847 members in December 1964 (Roper 2000, 21). By 1950, both the PCR and the PSDR had merged to form the Romanian Workers' Party (*Partidul Muncitoresc Roman* or PMR). During the 1950s, Gheorghiu-Dej successfully purged the new party from his political rivals. In March 1960, he consolidated power by merging the leadership positions of the party and the government (Roper 2000). Until his death, he jointly held the functions of first secretary of the party and president of the Council of State (unofficially president of the country).

After Gheorghiu-Dej's death on March 19, 1965, there were several contenders to succeed him. Among the most-likely successors were Nicolae Ceausescu, Chivu Stoica, Georghe Apostol, Ion Georghe Maurer, and Alexandru Draghici (Fischer 1981; Roper 2000). These men had been in prison alongside Gheorghiu-Dej, and had been in party and government leadership positions under his rule. While Stoica and Maurer were senior to the others, Ceausescu, Apostol and Draghici had equal chances for the position of first secretary of the party (Fischer 1981,

²⁹ Roper (2000, 4) indicates that, at the time, "ethnic Romanians constituted less than 25% of the [PCR] membership, and ethnic Hungarians and Jews held many of the party's leading positions." In addition, most people resented the fact that the PCR supported the Soviet claim over Bessarabia, which Romania had occupied since the beginning of World War II.

137). To minimize the risks of power struggle, the ruling elite opted for a collective leadership. Also, the Romanian leaders decided to separate state from party functions.

Several nominations followed the decision for collective leadership (Roper 2000). The party and state functions previously held by Gheorghiu-Dej were awarded to two leaders (Fischer 1981, 121). Ceausescu was appointed as the first secretary of the party. The position of president of the Council of State (unofficially president of the country) went to Stoica. Maurer remained president of the Council of ministers (prime minister).

Several rules were implemented or changed to reflect the desire to lead collectively. For instance, a party congress adopted new rules in July 1965 that prohibited leaders from holding joint positions in the state and the party apparatus (Roper 2000, 46). Ceausescu's new position as the first secretary was renamed "general secretary" to indicate that no one was "first" within the party (Roper 2000, 46). To send a signal about the changes in leadership direction, a new constitution approved in August 1965 changed the name of the party from PMR back to PCR.

Between 1965 and 1967, the collective leadership gave priority to populist policies. Thus, the government increased wages, reformed the pension system, and lowered the prices for consumer goods (Roper 2000, 47). Meanwhile, several leaders, including Ceausescu, toured the country to promote the idea of nationalism. They emphasized unity among all ethnic groups in order to form a common nation. The purpose of these policies was to "bolster the standing of the party," while furthering Ceausescu's own popularity as general secretary (Roper 2000, 47; Fischer-Galati 1981). Promoting nationalism, especially, was a way for leaders to measure the party's popularity among all ethnic groups.

By 1969, collective leadership had been superseded by Ceausescu's domination of the state apparatus. In December 1967, a party congress made changes to the July 1965 rule that had

previously prohibited leaders from holding joint state and party positions. At this same congress, Ceausescu was elected Chairman of the Council of State in addition to his position as the head of the PCR (Fischer 1981, 117-118). Taking advantage of his position, Ceausescu replaced leaders at the local level, who then assumed joint responsibility for party and government functions. In prelude to the 1968 Central Committee Plenum, the general secretary and his allies reorganized the Central Committee, leaving the position of country's unofficial president without a staff. This further reinforced Ceausescu's authority over the party, the state, and the population more broadly (Roper 2000, 48). In March 1974, he became "President of the Republic," an office that was specifically created for him (Fischer 1981, 118).

After more than 30 years in power, the most serious challenge to Ceausescu's regime occurred in December 1989. It started as a small-scale protest by residents of Timisoara on December 15 against the eviction of Pastor Laszlo Tokes from his parish house (Siani-Davies 2005). Pastor Tokes, an ethnic Hungarian, was a priest of the Reformed Church and well known to the Romanian security forces for his political activism. The orders to evict him followed a court decision to transfer him away from Timisoara into a small village. Despite the Romanian government's attempts to suppress the uprising, the protests spread to other cities within days. The mass demonstrators eventually prevailed over Ceausescu, whose regime collapsed on December 22, 1989 (Roper 2000; Siani-Davies 2005).

Several decades after the Romanian civil unrest, there is still controversy surrounding some aspects of the event. As Cinpoes (2009, 181) put it, this is "not only because important details are still missing but also because the nature of the events continues to be disputed in numerous studies, press articles and TV documentaries." First, scholars disagree about whether it was a coup d'état or a revolution (Roper 2000, 59; Siani-Davies 1996, 2005). This echoed Nicu

Ceausescu's claim that his father, the deposed Romanian leader, was the victim of "a coup d'état that took place against the background of a revolution, or a popular revolt" (cited in Calinescu and Tismaneanu 1991, 47). His view seemed to be shared by a large proportion of Romanians. In two opinion polls conducted in the country in 1992 and 1999, less than 50 % of respondents were willing to refer to the event as a revolution (Siani-Davies 2005, 3). Supporters of the coup argument often point to the fact that the subsequent regime that followed Ceausescu's rule was made of former and current members of the Romanian Communist Party (Siani-Davies 2005; Tismaneanu 2009; Ramesh 1991).

The exact actors involved on both sides of the armed confrontations also remain controversial. While the Correlates of War data indicate that the conflict occurred between the Romanian government and "Anti-Ceausescu rebels" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), the UCDP/PRIOD dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) presents it as an opposition between the government and the National Salvation Front (NSF). Meanwhile, Siani-Davies (2005) reports that the confrontations opposed "defenders of the revolution" to forces believed to be loyal to Ceausescu. On the side of the defenders of the revolution were army troops, reinforced by other branches of the security forces. Alongside these government units were also "eager civilians responding to the desperate pleas heard on television and radio" (Siani-Davies 2005, 129). According to these same accounts, "a surprisingly large number [of these civilians] were given guns and effectively became armed irregulars" (Siani-Davies 2005, 129).

The real mystery concerns the nature of the forces that opposed the government troops. Initially, several terms were used to describe them, including "hooligans," "extremists," "fanatics," and "hostile elements of the old regime" (Siani-Davies 2005, 146-147). Over time, they came to be widely called "terrorists." According to an official communiqué by the NSF on

December 28, 1989, “Are considered terrorists and declared as such, persons who carry about themselves firearms and other offensive weapons, ... [and who] struggle against the National Salvation Front and the victors of Free Romania” (Siani-Davies 2005, 147).

There is also no consensus in the literature about the exact number of casualties. According to the Correlates of War data (Small and Singer 1982; Sarkees and Wayman 2010), the confrontations resulted in 1,000 battle-related deaths, of which 300 were incurred by the government forces. This meets the operational definition of civil war adopted by this dissertation. However, other sources indicate a lower death toll. For instance, the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) categorizes the Romanian 1989 conflict as a minor one that resulted in fewer than 1,000 deaths. This lack of precision about the number of casualties makes it difficult to qualify the conflict in precise and definitive terms.

Despite the controversy on some aspects, a number of causes have been highlighted to explain the Romanian Revolution at both domestic and international levels. This is in line with the theoretical framework of this dissertation. However, most of these studies tend to focus on explaining the causes of the revolution. Although this is an important step in understanding the event, this approach does not shed light on why the revolution in Romania was the only one in the region that escalated into violent armed confrontations. To fill this gap, this chapter relies on the methods of structural, focused comparison and process tracing to examine the events that led up to the violence.

7.2 Structured, Focused Comparison

This section relies on the structured, focused comparison to investigate the relationship between Romanian state environment, leaders’ consensus about strategies for political order, and

the escalation of violence in December 1989. This is done in two steps. First, the Ceausescu regime's governance strategy prior to December 1989 is examined. The second step analyzes the administration's crisis bargaining strategy in the face of the uprising that started on December 15.

The following questions are used to analyze the regime's governance strategy. First, *what was the executive's governance strategy and what motivated or facilitated that choice?* Second, *how much support did the executive's governance strategy enjoy within the other branches of the government and why?* Third, *how much did the executive's governance strategy determine public discontent and to what extent did leaders' consensus contribute to that outcome?*

Between 1965 and December 1989, Ceausescu relied on a governance strategy that emphasized coercion as a strategy to deter open dissent. However, his policies greatly evolved over the years (Nelson 1988). From the beginning of his rule until the early 1970s, he placed a heavy emphasis on reforming the domestic economy (Roper 2000, 45). He prioritized the production of consumer goods during this period. Gradually, he de-emphasized production of socioeconomic goods in favor of a massive industrialization (Fischer-Galati 1981). By 1975, the production of machine equipment and tools in Romania had more than doubled (Roper 2000, 52).

Ceausescu's emphasis on industrialization had consequences on other aspects of the economy. In previous years, agriculture had been the predominant sector of the economy (Roper 2000, 53). The shift of the focus to industrial development led to a reduction of the state investment in agricultural outputs (Ratesh 1991; Fischer-Galati 1981). Also, the administration required more financial resources to sustain its industrial policies. Thus, it turned to private

Western banks to mobilize the necessary funds. In 1980 alone, the regime borrowed 11 billion US dollars on the foreign market (Le Monde 1989b).

In the 1980s, Ceausescu's focus was on paying back the country's foreign debt. Thus, he directed a large proportion of state revenues toward that end. In 1982-1983, the regime launched a program of land collectivization (Le Monde 1989a). The objective was to increase agricultural outputs, which were primarily destined to exports in order to increase revenues. The result was a shortage of food for domestic consumption. The state also engaged in other austerity measures to reduce public spending with the goal of lowering debt (Ratesh 1991). Together, these policies generated socioeconomic difficulties that were directly felt by ordinary Romanians.

Meanwhile, Ceausescu gradually consolidated his power through coercion. He heavily relied on the state's secret police, the *Securitate*, to deter and suppress opposition to his leadership (Roper 2000). His use of the *Securitate* was not directed at opposition outside the Party only, but also within the Party. This was a major shift in his standpoints about the secret police. In fact, during the 1965 transition after Dej had died, one of Ceausescu's main themes was "the need to bring the *Securitate* more firmly under party control" (Hall 1997, 96). However, "the *Securitate* rather than the party was the defacto institutional basis of communist rule" in Romania in the post-1970s (Hall 1997, 106).

The year 1971 was a turning point in Ceausescu's choice of coercion as a governance strategy. During a state visit in China and North Korea in June, he was impressed by the special treatment enjoyed by Mao Tse Tung and Kim Il-Sung. The personality cult of these leaders, especially in North Korea, inspired the Romanian ruler (Hitchins 2014). Upon returning home, he launched a new ideological campaign on July 6, 1971 that was "designed to enforce tighter

regime control over culture, art, education, and the media” (Hall 1997, 107). This was announced in an address that became to be known as the “July Theses” (Hitchins 2014; Hall 1997).

The “July Theses” was the beginning of a cult of personality that lasted until Ceausescu’s death (Hitchins 2014). In March 1974, he was selected as “President of the Republic,” an office that was created for him (Fischer 1981, 118). Around this same time, he also held the functions of Chairman of the National Defense Council, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as well as chairman of several other committees of the party and state apparatus. From the late 1970s and beyond, Ceausescu’s cult of personality had reached exceptional levels among Eastern European communist states. In Fischer’s (1981, 118) accounts, “by the mid-1970s, no Romanian official could deliver a report or write an article without referencing to President Ceausescu’s political insight and leadership as the major source of inspiration and guidance.”

Ceausescu’s governance alienated some influential members of the Party. For instance, Iliescu, who succeeded him in office, declared that his break with the Romanian leader dated back to 1971, when they visited China and North Korea. In his accounts as reported by Ratesh (1991, 50), Ceausescu “was literally fascinated by Korea. On our return, he drew up a kind of platform for a cultural revolution Romanian style. That was the break.” After Iliescu opposed Ceausescu’s platform in a meeting, he was accused of intellectualism, and deprived from major state and party positions (Ratesh 1991; Hall 1997).

In subsequent years, several of Ceausescu’s collaborators gradually started to publically express their dissatisfaction. At the 12th Party Congress in 1979, Constantin Pârvulescu, one of the founding fathers of the Romanian Communist Party, openly criticized Ceausescu. Speaking after the Romanian president, Pârvulescu “launched a bitter attack on the leader and pledged he would not vote for his reelection” (Siani-Davies 2005, 27). This conduct cost him his position in

the Party, and he did not appear on the political arena until 1989. Another prominent internal dissent was Karoly Kiraly. In 1977, Kiraly, who was a member of the Party's Political Executive Committee, started expressing his discontent by sending out letters of protest to key leaders of the Party. One of the letters even made its way into the Western media in January 1988 (Siani-Davies 2005, 27).

Prior to 1989, these types of dissent within the ruling elite were limited (Lamasanu 2010). Despite their frustration with Ceausescu's policies, many party leaders did not express their resentment openly. The examples of Iliescu in 1971, Kiraly in 1977, and Pârvulescu in 1979 showed that open disagreement with Ceausescu could endanger their political future in a country where the state was the single most important source of employment. It was therefore not surprising that most leaders either pretended they were satisfied or simply avoided challenging Ceausescu on his policies.

By 1989, leaders' consensus about Ceausescu's governance strategy had broken further. More leaders were willing to openly criticize the regime. The most remarkable instance of open elite dissent was the so called "Letter of Six" (Ratesh 1991). In a letter broadcast on BBC World Service on March 10, 1989, six prominent dissenting leaders publically challenged Ceausescu on his policies. They denounced him for suppressing civic freedom and for economic mismanagement, among others (Siani-Davies 2005).

The "Letter of Six" was considered to be "the most significant piece of Party dissent to appear during Ceausescu's long years of rule" (Siani-Davies 2005, 27). All six co-signatories were former party or state dignitaries. For example, Gheorghe Apostol was a former first secretary of the Party (1954-1955). At one point, rumors had it that he was chosen by Gheorghiu-Dej to succeed him. Another co-signatory of the "Letter of Six" was Kiraly, a former member of

the Party leadership, who had previously criticized the regime through a series of letters. The other four members included a former foreign minister, a former Romanian ambassador to the United States, and two former party leaders (Siani-Davies 2005, 27-28).

In the months preceding the revolution, Romanian political leaders increased their criticisms of the regime. Ramesh (1991) reports that three letters were sent by a group of dissidents to Radio Free Europe (RFE) in 1989. In one of the documents, which was broadcast on August 27, the authors appealed to the delegates to the 14th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party not to reelect Ceausescu as secretary general of the party (Ramesh 1991, 89-90). Apparently, this did not influence the outcome of the congress as the Romanian president was reelected on November 24, 1989.

The impact of Ceausescu's governance strategy prior to 1989 rarely materialized through organized protests like the ones observed in December 1989. Before the 1980s, protests centered more on individuals rather than groups. Pastor Tokes, who was at the origin of the Timisoara events, was one of the few people who openly criticized the regime. He was a contributor to *Ellenpontok* (Counterpoints), a journal that featured ethnic Hungarian intellectuals (Siani-Davies 2005). The ethnic German community was also engaged in dissident through the activities of a group of writers, "most of whom were dismissed from their jobs and forced into exile during the 1980s" (Siani-Davies 2005, 29). By 1988, the scope of dissent had expanded to also include ethnic Romanians, especially poets.

The absence of meaningful collective dissent in Romania could be attributed to several factors. Obviously, the regime's coercive practices were effective at deterring mobilization of dissidents. Most party and state leaders had no incentives at risking losing their positions or more (Hall 2000). The same was true for other people outside the political leadership. For instance, the

intellectuals who criticized the regime lost their jobs. In some instances, they were denied publication of their academic works, or simply placed under house arrests (Siani-Davies 2005, 29). In addition, the tactics employed by the *Securitate* were also effective at increasing the costs of mobilization (Hall 1997). The use of civilian informants to report on the political activities of members of their communities made it difficult for dissidents to organize.

The ability of the Ceausescu's regime to effectively deter collective dissent through the use of coercion prior to 1989 may have been facilitated by a number of elements associated with Romanian domestic and external environment. Siani-Davies (2005) has suggested that the country's sociological context mattered. From his perspective, Romania was "a society that did not necessarily place value on the expression of opposing views." This was apparent in a popular Romanian proverb, which states that "the sword will not sever the bowed heads" (Siani-Davies' 2005, 29). In Siani-Davies' (2005) view, the intellectuals' choice of poems and letters rather than organized protests to express their criticisms may also have been a product of Romanian culture. They may have been influenced by the teachings of the Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica, which emphasize "resistance through cultural development rather than outright dissident" (Siani-Davies' 2005, 29-30). Despite its attractiveness, the sociological argument remains open, especially in the face of the December 1989 Revolution.

A more plausible explanation for the effectiveness of Ceausescu's coercive policies prior to 1989 has to do with the country's political environment. Specifically, the single party system excluded political competition outside the PCR. In addition, the possibility of jointly holding government and party functions as re-instituted in December 1967 provided Ceausescu ways to manipulate the elite to his advantage. There was also an informal principle of "elite rotation," which he used to secure loyalty within the party, the military, and other branches of government

(Roper 2000). The informal elite rotation institution, especially in the single party context, created insecurity among the leadership while ensuring that “no individual could consolidate power within the party or at the local level” (Roper 2000, 51). Together, these political features provided favorable conditions for the success of Ceausescu’s coercive strategy for most of his rule. However, as the next section shows, the regional developments in East Europe in the late 1980s triggered a change in Romanian domestic politics, thus making coercion a less viable option at the times of the revolution.

Another more plausible contributor to the success of Ceausescu’s governance strategy in deterring collective dissent prior to 1989 was the Romanian geopolitical environment in the Cold War context. Throughout his tenure in office, Ceausescu pursued an “independent” or “non-aligned” foreign policy (Roth 2016). Although his country was a communist state, he maintained a ‘maverick” position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This became most apparent after he had publically denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact countries on August 28, 1968 (Siani-Davies 2005). However, a number of observers have suggested that Ceausescu’s “independence” toward Moscow was rather a political strategy designed by both countries (Roth 2016; Siani-Davies 2005; Linden 1981). This reportedly allowed the Kremlin to use Ceausescu as “a middleman to deal with states with which the USSR preferred not to have a direct interaction” (Roth 2016, 38).

Meanwhile, Ceausescu entertained healthy economic and diplomatic relationships with the West for most of his rule over Romania (Roth 2016; Linden 1981). His regime benefited from financial loans from Western banks, especially in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Romanian exports to the West more than doubled between 1970 and 1975 (Linden 1981, 223). Unlike most Warsaw Pact countries, Romania had a Most Favored nation (MFN) status with the United

States. Diplomatically, Ceausescu also enjoyed Western attention. On August 2, 1969, he hosted Richard Nixon for a state visit, which the American president described as his “most memorable foreign trip” (New York Times 1969).

These geopolitical factors must have helped Ceausescu at home. Technically, the Soviet Union and Western powers were the only states that had the means to effectively undermine Ceausescu’s coercive policies. However, doing so was not in their best interests for most of his time in office. The Soviets, to the extent that they had some strategic interest in his “independent” behavior, had little reason to destabilize his regime in its golden years. Also, destabilizing the Ceausescu government would not have benefited Western powers given the economic and diplomatic benefits at stake. Thus, until the early 1980s, both Western countries and the Soviet Union implicitly provided an umbrella for Ceausescu’s coercive policies at home. However, as will be shown in the next section, a new geopolitical context emerged in the late 1980s that impacted his ability to maintain control at home through the use of coercion.

The next step is to examine why Ceausescu’s coercion strategy during the December 1989 protests failed to deter escalation into violence. The following three questions are used. First, *how did the executive respond to the demands of dissatisfied people and why? How much support did the executive’s response to the crisis enjoy within the other branches of the government and why? To what extent did leaders’ lack of consensus contribute to the escalation into civil war?*

On December 15, 1989, a few residents of Timisoara gathered to prevent Pastor Laszlo Tokes’ eviction from his parish house. Tokes had been serving at this Hungarian Reformed Church since 1986 (Ratesh 1991). He was very outspoken against state interference in the affairs of the Church. He was also an active defender of the rights of ethnic Hungarians. In 1984, he was

excluded from the clergy for “indiscipline” before being reinstated in 1986 (Ratesh 1991, 20). Shortly after his transfer to Timisoara, Tokes’ troubles began anew. In spring 1989, he was once again accused of “indiscipline” by his superiors. In addition, he was charged of “entering in contact with political activists, foreign radio and TV station in order to denigrate and present in a tendencious way the realities of our country” (Ratesh 1991, 20). On May 1, his superiors ordered his transfer to another parish in a village. The decision to evict him followed his refusal to comply with the transfer orders.

The initial government response to the gathering outside Tokes’ house involved local authorities. The first day of the protests, December 15, ended with a clash between the police and demonstrators who tried to prevent a man from being taken into custody (Ratesh 1991). The next day, the mayor of Timisoara was on the scene, and his attempts to calm the crowds were unsuccessful. By that time, protesters’ chants that initially called for freedom for the pastor had evolved into “Down with Ceausescu” (Siani-Davies 2005). They were met by “fire engines spraying water on them” (Ratesh 1991, 23). By the end of the third day of the uprising, which was December 17, the central government in Bucharest had gotten involved. Ceausescu ordered two of his top aides into Timisoara to direct the repression of the movements (Ratesh 1991). According to reports, around sunset, “with no warning, the troops started to shoot in all directions,” killing several people (Ratesh 1991, 30). The confrontations between the armed troops and civilians throwing rocks continued throughout the night.

The next day, December 18, Ceausescu went to Iran, leaving his wife in Bucharest to manage the crisis. The purpose of this trip was unclear. Some speculations indicated that he was trying to arrange for Iranian support, while others insisted he was preparing his exile in case he was overthrown (Siani-Davies 2005; Ratesh 1991). By the time the Romanian dictator came

back from his Teheran visit on December 20, “the situation in Timisoara had become untenable, with a general strike and huge demonstrations, the army fraternizing with the people, and all attempts to negotiate an end to the uprising totally unsuccessful” (Ratesh 1991, 33). Nonetheless, he addressed the nation on television a few hours after his return. He informed Romanians of the events in Timisoara, insisting that the army acted in self-defense. He blamed the uprising onto foreign states, especial Hungary.

In the morning of December 22, Ceausescu organized a rally in Bucharest, the capital city, to restore legitimacy to his regime. The event soon turned into a demonstration against his rule. As tensions grew, the Romanian leader and his wife escaped the scene by helicopter (Ratesh 1991; Roper 2000). They were captured the same day and detained in a military garrison in the city of Targoviste (Siani-Davies 2005).

In the evening of December 22, the same day the Ceausescus escaped town, a group of dissidents announced that they had taken control of the government. They called themselves the National Salvation Front (NSF). Mostly composed of former party officials, intellectuals, and military authorities, the NSF moved quickly to secure power. A list of the new leaders was presented on television to the public. In addition, a 10-point program was read that “embraced the widest aspirations for freedom, democracy, prosperity, and independence of the Romanian people” (Ratesh 1991, 56).

The new regime’s ascension to power on December 22 coincided with armed violence in Bucharest. The exact circumstances of the shootings remain unclear (Siani-Davies 2005). The same evening when the NSF announced its assumption of power, there were gun shots reported in the vicinity of the national television and elsewhere in Bucharest (Siani-Davies 2005, 123-125). The subsequent “battle” lasted for the following three days. It must however be noted that

“during this time the fighting was never continuous, being essential sporadic in nature, reaching several crescendos, and then subsiding into a fitful warfare of occasional isolated shots” (Siani-Davies 2005, 125).

In the morning of December 25, Ceausescu and his wife were placed on a trial before a military tribunal at the same garrison. Several charges were brought by the prosecutor, including genocide and economic mismanagement. The deposed leader refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the tribunal. After no more than fifty-five minutes of proceedings, the couple was convicted. They were executed immediately after the trial ended (Siani-Davies 2005, 134-143).

Apparently, Ceausescu’s decision to repress the uprising was not shared by some other state and party leaders. In Ramesh’s (1991) accounts, his orders to let security forces shoot demonstrators with live ammunition were purposefully ignored by members of his cabinet. During an emergency meeting held during the Timisoara protests, the Romanian dictator was furious at Minister of Defense Vasile Milea and Minister of the Interior Tudor Postelnicu for not following his orders. “I told you to arm them all,” he recalled in his rage, adding “Why did you send them unarmed?” (Ramesh 1991, 27). This “foot-dragging” by cabinet members was a sign that consensus within the leadership had broken over how to manage the demonstrations.

There was another instance of foot-dragging by high-level officials. In the morning of December 22, Ceausescu was scheduled to speak at a rally at the Party headquarters in Bucharest. The event was set to start at 11:00 am. In order to secure order at the proceedings, a large number of troops and equipment were deployed to the area at least four hours ahead of time. By Siani-Davies’ (2005) account, there were fourteen tanks, forty-five armored personnel carriers, more than a thousand troops from the army and the *Securitate*. By the time the event began, all the troops had been withdrawn from in front of the building where Ceausescu was to

speak (Siani-Davies 2005, 91-92). Although it is still unclear who gave the order to remove the troops, this seems to suggest that some of the commanders were breaking ranks.

These instances of foot-dragging denoted a lack of consensus among the top leaders about a strategy to handle the crisis. This form of leaders' disunity had consequences for political order. In Timisoara, the attitude of the defense and the interior ministers undermined the effectiveness of the government's initial response in the early hours of the protests. In Bucharest, the decision to withdraw the troops from the main scene provided a favorable condition for the protesters to move freely toward the building, forcing Ceausescu to escape. To fully understand how the breaking of leaders' consensus about the events in Timisoara led to the collapse of political order and to violent confrontations in Bucharest, the next section relies on the method of process tracing.

A number of factors might explain the breaking of consensus within the Romanian leadership with regard to how to respond to the crisis. One is the change in the structure of the international system, especially the political developments in Eastern Europe. Other scholars have argued that the wave of revolutions in the region in the late 1980s increased Romanians' desire to challenge the regime. For instance, Siani-Davies (2005, 45-52) contended that "The events of December [1989] cannot be divorced from the other Eastern European revolutions of that year and the breakup of the Soviet bloc." Together, these two interrelated factors "provided the permissive international context required" for a successful mobilization of the regime's challengers (Siani-Davies 2005, 45).³⁰ While this is a valid claim, it is also likely that this same

³⁰ Writing about the revolutions of 1989 in East and Central Europe more broadly, Tismaneanu (2009) also attributes the uprisings to the change in Soviet Union policies, particular Gorbachev's moderate positions regarding political liberalization.

regional element impacted the process of the revolution through its effect on Ceausescu and the other leaders. The process tracing analysis investigates this possibility in the next section.

The lack of consensus within the Romanian leadership during the crisis might also have been induced by domestic factors. The literature on the domestic causes of the Romanian Revolution focuses on the decline of the country's economy in the late 1980s, the weakening of its security forces, and the structure of the state apparatus. In the words of Siani-Davies (2005, 31), the economic crisis faced by the country during the 1980s was at "the heart of the causes of state breakdown, but also of the sense of grievance which was to fuel popular mobilization" (see also Roper 2000). In addition, some scholars emphasize Ceausescu's cult of personality as a cause of the dissent within the ruling elite. "While the circumstances of the Romanian revolution are still unclear," writes Roper (2000, 45), "there is no doubt that by the time of his death, Ceausescu had alienated domestic groups that were essential to his very survival." Process tracing will help to investigate the potential causal paths relating these elements to one another.

7.3 Process Tracing

This section examines specific historical events that influenced the *outbreak of deadly confrontations* during the December 1989 Revolution in Romania. A few months prior to the Romanian civil unrest, other countries in East Europe experienced similar popular uprisings. The difference, however, was that they did not escalate into deadly armed confrontations. Thus, it is important to shed light on the circumstances that led to this divergent outcome. This is done by relying on Slater and Simmons' (2010) method to identify the *critical antecedents* that preceded the breakdown of consensus among Romanian leaders over the government's response to the demonstrations in Timisoara. This lack of consensus on a bargaining strategy during this


particular crisis constitutes the *critical juncture* that led to the escalation into deadly armed violence.

7.3.1 Critical Antecedents: Changes in Domestic and Regional Environment

Figure 7.3 highlights two factors that constitute the critical antecedents in the process leading up to the occurrence of armed violence in December 1989 in Romania. The first is the socioeconomic decline that took place in the country throughout the 1980s. The second is the political developments that led to a democratic transition in several East European countries. Together, these two changes in the Romanian domestic and external environment shaped the aspirations and demands of Romanian citizens. Moreover, they affected consensus within Ceausescu's government by changing leaders' calculations for political survival.

Romania experienced a decline in its socioeconomic conditions throughout the 1980s. From 1965 through 1984, infant mortality had been continuously decreasing. However, it started rising in 1985 and remained on the rise throughout 1989 (World Bank 2017). As figure 7.1 shows, food production decreased between 1984 and 1989. Meanwhile the size of the population grew by 2.2% during this same period (World Bank 2017). This, in part, created food shortage that led the government to impose food rationing.

Figure 7.1 Romania: Food Production, 1960-1990



Source: World Bank (2017)


Romanians' living standards were affected by the socioeconomic decline of the late 1980s. On August 22, 1989, a French Newspaper reported that each Romanian was entitled one kilogram of sugar and one liter of cooking oil per month. It seemed as if "Nicolae Ceausescu's Romania had installed itself in a wartime economy that had taken the country 40 years back" (*Le Monde* 1989a). In addition to food shortage, other critical goods such hot water, gas, and electricity, were also under rationing. Ratesh (1991, 7) noted that in 1988 "only 5.4 percent of the electricity consumed in the country went to the people for household use."

The decline in socioeconomic condition was largely the result of Ceausescu's policy that prioritized the country's debt payment. As figure 7.2 indicates, Romania's external debt stocks in 1980 constituted 80.28% of its exports of goods and services. This level remained fairly constant for the next three years. However, in 1989, it dropped to about 9.45%. These trends reflected Ceausescu's efforts to repay its foreign debt. On August 22, 1989, *Le Monde* reported that,

between 1975 and 1989, the country paid back 21 billion US dollars of foreign debt (Le Monde 1989b). In March 1989, Ceausescu proudly announced that Romania had effectively reimbursed the last dollar of the 11 billion US dollars it had borrowed in 1980 (Le Monde 1989b).

The rapid debt repayment was only possible through massive exports of goods and services, including food and agricultural products. As Ratesh (1991, 6) contends, “Ceausescu’s decision to repay Romania’s \$12 billion foreign debt in a few years meant that everything that could be sold abroad for hard currency, raw materials, or energy was exported.” The debt reimbursement also occurred at the expense of investment in other areas of the economy. It also induced large cuts in government consumption. Together, these measures aggravated the country’s socioeconomic situation throughout the 1980s (Ratesh 1991).³¹

Figure 7.2 External Debt Stocks, 1972-1990




Source: World Bank (2017)

³¹ For a recent study on Ceausescu’s debt policies, see Ban (2012).

Although the devastating impact of the socioeconomic decline on citizens' daily lives was palpable, Romanians remained passive for most of the 1980s. Rather than mobilizing and expressing their dissatisfaction, they actively schemed “to bypass the most unpleasant aspects of the system and to secure goods and services through the informal economy” (Siani-Davies 2005, 14). As noted by *Le Monde*, the people of Romania responded to the economic challenges with great humor. In the midst of a cold winter and despite the rationing of gas and electricity, they were heard saying “Close the window! Otherwise people on the streets would be cold” (Le Monde 1989a).

Figure 7.3 Romania: Tracing Causal Paths



It was only in the late 1980s that Romanian citizens began to show evidence of frustration. This was illustrated in the city of Brasov on November 15, 1987. On that day, a group of factory workers on their way to a voting location began to chant anti-regime slogans

(Siani-Davies 2005, 35; Lamasanu 2010). They were quickly joined by other people from the town as they ransacked the local Party headquarters (Siani-Davies 2005, 35). At the core of their grievance were dissatisfaction over food shortage and rationing, and cuts in wages at the factory (Siani-Davies 2005, 36; Lamasanu 2010). Although authorities managed to contain this uprising, it was a sign that citizens were gradually willing to openly challenge the government. By the time of this incident, food shortage had become “more accurate and fewer and fewer people, even with the requisite connections, were able to acquire the goods they required” (Siani-Davies 2005, 34).

Besides citizens, the worsening of the country’s socioeconomic condition must have affected Romanian leaders as well. Prior to the 1980s, some leaders were dissatisfied with Ceausescu, but they rarely expressed their frustration openly. According to (retired) General Nicolae Militaru, the minister of defense in the post-revolutionary government, dissent within the leadership dated back to 1974 with the idea of a conspiracy against Ceausescu (Ratesh 1991, 91-92). It involved himself and several other key members of the regime, including the then Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer. However, the plot was never conducted in the 1970s because the conspirators believed that the conditions were not right (Ratesh 1991, 91-92).

In the early 1980s, the group of conspirators quickly extended to other government and party officials. One of them was Ion Iliescu, who later succeeded Ceausescu in office. Among others were Ion Ionita, a former minister of defense, and Virgil Magureanu, who was a member of the *Securitate*. They “were all dissatisfied Communists” who all served the party faithfully (Ratesh 1991, 94). However, the coup never materialized. It was aborted in 1984 by the government (Ratesh 1991, 94).

Dissent extended to bureaucratic leaders as well. According to Radu Nicolae, who served as an officer in the Romanian navy, the military and the *Securitate* were both involved in planning plots against Ceausescu (Ratesh 1991, 92-93). This was later confirmed by (retired) General Militaru, the minister of defense in the post-revolutionary government. On August 23, 1990 he publicly acknowledged that “sectors of the army and the *Securitate* had been already won over by a conspiracy against Ceausescu by the time of the uprising” (Ratesh 1991, 85).

The expansion of the group of conspirators coincided with the worsening of the economic and social conditions. Rather than a mere coincidence, the dissidents believed at the beginning of the 1980s that the socioeconomic decline provided the right circumstances to act against Ceausescu (Ratesh 1991, 93). Apparently, the country’s socioeconomic difficulties provided an opportunity for dissidents to expand the group. It is however unclear whether the economic situation motivated their behavior.

A succession of political developments in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s constituted the second critical antecedent in the process leading up to the bloody December 1989 revolution in Romania. At the beginning lied Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking.” In February-March 1986, a year after his ascension to power, the Soviet leader announced his new plans for economic liberalization (*perestroika*) at 27th Party Congress. It was followed two years later by the initiation of political openness (*glasnost*), which granted more political freedoms to the Soviets (Serban 2012; Roth 2016).

Gorbachev’s “new thinking” triggered a series of political changes in the region. As argued by Sianis-Davies (2005, 46), the Soviet leader’s reforms “were crucial in providing a permissive environment for revolution in Eastern Europe.” Consequently, by December 1989,

several East European countries, including Romania's neighbors Hungary and Bulgaria, had begun a transition toward democratic institutions.

This cascade of regional events impacted the behavior of Romanian citizens and leaders alike. They provided new aspirations to the general population. The news about the removal of the elderly Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, from power on November 10, 1989, must have generated among the population new incentives for leadership change in their country (Siani-Davies 2005, 46). This was highly plausible given that Bulgarian television channels could be accessed in Bucharest (Siani-Davies 2005).

Meanwhile, these new regional political developments must have further fragmented consensus among the political leadership about how to respond to the protests of December 1989. On one side, there were those who perceived these events to be a threat to their political survival. Ceausescu was one of them. The Romanian leader disapproved of the ease with which other regimes seemed to be collapsing in the region. During a meeting in Moscow on December 4, 1989, less than two weeks before the Timisoara uprising, he urged Gorbachev to take a firm stance against these new trends (Siani-Davies 2005, 49). On the other side, there were those leaders, like the signatories of the "Letter of Six," who saw the events in the region as a political opportunity. They were mostly dissatisfied communist leaders who had been waiting for the right moment to overthrow Ceausescu.

Within this regional and domestic context, the 14th Party Congress, which opened on November 20, 1989 in Bucharest, was a missed opportunity for a peaceful change in Romania. Throughout the Congress, many leaders and citizens were hoping for "news of a last-minute conversion to Gorbachev-style reforms" (Siani-Davies 2005, 51). Instead, the Romanian leader vowed to maintain his position in party and state. Even the call of dissident leaders through the

“Letter of Six” urging Party officials not to reelect him changed nothing. Ceausescu was “unanimously” reelected by the Congress. At this particular moment, Romanian dissidents, leaders and citizens alike, lost hope. They felt that “the last prospects for peaceful change evaporated, the only option left was to be a violent overthrow” (Siani-Davies 2005, 52).

7.3.2 Critical Juncture: Leaders’ Dissent over the Timisoara Uprisings

The lack of consensus among Romanian leaders about how to respond to demands of democratization was the critical juncture that led to a diverging outcome. In other countries, such as Hungary and Poland, the communist leadership not only shared power with the opposition, but it eventually lost it (Tismaneanu 2009, 274). On November 10, 1989 the Bulgarian president was removed from power without bloody confrontations. In Romania, however, the communist regime appeared to be divided about the necessity of reforms. Thus, when Ceausescu ordered the repression of the uprising in Timisoara, some members of his cabinet were in disaccord with him, even though they did not express their disagreement. This was shown in the December 17 emergency meeting described in section 7.2.

The lack of leaders’ consensus about a strategy to address the demonstrations in Timisoara had profound implications for political order. As described by Pasti (1997, 65), “On the moment when the institutions of the power were seriously challenged ... they collapsed, offering no resistance.” Apparently, leaders and managers in charge of defense and internal security deliberately sent military troops onto the streets with no live ammunition. In other instances, they purposefully positioned their troops to avoid direct confrontations with the protesters (Siani-Davies 2005). These types of “foot-dragging” were aimed at walking around Ceausescu’s orders for repression. Ultimately, they undermined the troops’ ability to contain the

crowds early on. In addition, the demonstrators must have realized that the military was disoriented, especially in the early hours in Timisoara. It was not surprising that protesters were able to seize armored tanks from the military (Ratesh 1991).

Ceausescu's sudden trip to Iran amid the Timisoara crisis potentially reduced the scope of support to his actions, while widening dissent among Romanians. Leaving the country during this sensitive period not only created a vacuum in leadership. Most importantly, it sparked speculations about his intentions. Some people even interpreted it as an exile (Ratesh 1991). At that moment, many leaders who were contemplating the possibility of regime change may have had an opportunity to mobilize other members of the ruling elite. Thus, uncommitted leaders could have easily been converted into dissidents during his absence.

Ironically, it was during and after Ceausescu's trip to Teheran that protests grew stronger. The Romanian leader returned on December 20. By that time, demonstrations against his regime had spread to several towns outside Timisoara. The next day, many cities followed, including Bucharest (Siani-Davies 2005). During this same period, the breakdown of consensus over the government's response to the civil unrest extended to the security forces. One evidence was provided on December 20 in Timisoara, where "the army was fraternizing with the people" on the streets (Ratesh 1991, 34).

Disparity within the security forces also materialized through the contrasting behavior of the army and the *Securitate*. There were no reports of the type of open collaboration between the secret police and the protesters similar to the army's "fraternizing with the people." According to Ratesh (1991), the army was always resentful of Ceausescu's preferred treatment of the *Securitate*. Compared to the *Securitate*, the army was underequipped and poorly trained (Bacon 1981; Ratesh 1991). In addition, Ceausescu relied on the secret police to control the army, while

the latter was used in construction and agriculture. As a result, “In the wake of the revolution, the army sought to take advantage of the strong popular sentiment against the *Securitate* to affirm its preponderance in the power structure” (Ratesh 1991, 137).

The escalation of violence in Bucharest after the National Salvation Front took over on December 22 seemed to be a consequence of a chaos. This was subsequent to the lack of cohesion in the leadership after Ceausescu had escaped town. There must have been elements of the political leadership and the security forces, especially the *Securitate*, who sought to prevent a leadership change. In contrast, several high-level officials appeared to have contributed to the NSF’s ascension to power immediately after Ceausescu’s departure from Bucharest on December 22. This disparity within the political leadership translated into incoherent orders to and a fragmentation of the security forces. Ultimately, many casualties occurred that were attributed to this lack of coordination between leaders and military commanders.

7.4 Summary and Discussion of Findings

This dissertation theorizes that the impact of a country’s structural and institutional conditions on the likelihood of civil war is mediated through leaders’ consensus about strategies for political order. Chapter 3 outlined six hypotheses that indirectly relate socioeconomic environment and political openness to civil war through leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion. The qualitative findings support the argument that the effect of state environment on civil war is mediated through leaders’ consensus on the government’s strategy for political order.

The structured, focused comparison relied on several questions to examine Ceausescu’s governance and crisis bargaining strategies. The first set of questions revealed that, for the most

part of his tenure in office, Ceausescu relied on a governance strategy that emphasized coercion as a way to deter challenge to his rule. Prior to the late 1980s, his policies were effective at minimizing open dissent among leaders and citizens alike. The analysis showed that three features of the Romanian state environment enabled the effectiveness of Ceausescu's coercive practices in deterring mobilization of citizens. First, the single party system excluded political competition outside the communist party. Thus, leaders had little incentives to openly challenge Ceausescu's policies. Second, the geopolitical context prior to the late 1980s implicitly provided the Romanian dictator an umbrella under which he could freely coerce citizens and leaders without criticism from the Soviet Union and the West.

The second set of questions examined Ceausescu's bargaining strategy during the civil unrest that started on December 15, 1989 in Timisoara. The findings show that, by December 1989, a number of changes had occurred in the Romanian state environment. First, the Soviet Union's reforms toward political openness in the late 1980s provided new incentives for citizens and leaders contemplating the possibility of liberalization. Second, the regime changes undergone by some East European states only reinforced the prospects for a new direction. Together, these factors influenced the calculations of leaders and citizens alike. As a result, citizens rose up to demand reforms. In response, Ceausescu ordered repression, which many leaders seemed to disapprove of.

The findings of the process tracing method also support the mediating effect of leaders' strategic consensus in the process that relates state environment to civil war. Two elements were critical antecedents to the December 1989 revolution in Romania. The first was the socioeconomic decline that occurred in the country throughout the 1980s. The second was the wave of democratic transition that started in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Together, these

two changes in the Romanian domestic and external environment shaped the aspirations and demands of Romanian citizens. Moreover, they affected consensus within Ceausescu's government by changing leaders' calculations for political survival.

The process tracing technique also indicated that leaders' lack of consensus about a strategy to respond to the demands for political reforms was the critical juncture that led to a violent outcome. Members of Ceausescu's administration engaged in foot-dragging as an apparent consequence of their disapproval of his decision to repress protesters. This in turn undermined the effectiveness of the security forces on the ground. Ultimately, the chaos that resulted from the lack of cooperation among political leaders and managers of the security forces laid the conditions for escalation into armed violence.

Chapter 8 - Benin: The August 1992 Military Mutiny

Benin, formerly known as Dahomey, is located in West Africa on the Atlantic coast. It borders Nigeria to the east, Burkina Faso and Niger to the north, and Togo to the west. Its total area is 112,622 km². It is considered “one of Africa’s most stable democracies” today (British Broadcasting n. d.). Historically, the peoples of the area were involved in slave trade in the 17th century, during which the shore was used as the departure point for captives destined to the Americas. Thus, many elements of the culture of Benin, including Voodoo, are present in parts of the American continent, mostly Haiti, Cuba, and Brazil (British Broadcasting n. d.).³²

Prior to the French invasion in the 1890s, the area of present-day Benin was under the control of several kingdoms. In the southern region, the most prominent ones were Danhome or Dahomey, Allada, and Xogbonou or Porto-Novo. The northern area was dominated by the kingdoms of Nikki, Kouande, and Kandi, among others. Many of these kingdoms were bitter rivals (Decalo 1973). Most of Benin’s population immigrated from the west (Togo and Ghana), the east (Nigeria), and from the north (Burkina Faso and Niger).

The colonial period began in 1863 with the installation of a French protectorate in Porto-Novo. By 1894, the French had conquered most of the territory. They established a colony under the name Dahomey, thus implicitly raising the status of the people of the former Danhome Kingdom over the others. On December 4, 1958 the colony of Dahomey officially became a republic within the French Community. The internal affairs of the new republic were led by Prime Minister Hubert Maga, a former teacher from the northern city of Parakou. On August 1, 1960 Dahomey achieved independence from France.

³² Some of the general information in this section is obtained from the official website of Benin government. See <http://gouv.bj/histoire/>.

Present-day Benin is a multiethnic society. It is composed of about 42 ethnic groups speaking more than 60 languages. The main religions are Christianity, Islam, and Voodoo. The ethno-regional configuration is as follows. The south and the center are predominantly occupied by the Fon, Gun, Mina, Adja, and Yorouba. The northeast is dominated by the Bariba ethnic group. The northwest is occupied by several groups, including Dendi, Somba, and Pila-Pila (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989). The Fon, who are mostly from the former Dahomey kingdom, constitute the largest group in the country (about 26%). Traditionally, ethno-regional identity is of great importance in Benin (Codjo 2016). In addition to being attached to their ethnic group of origin, the people of Benin tend to identify themselves in terms of “southerners” and “northerners.” This is sometimes a source of instability (Decalo 1973).

This chapter examines a military mutiny that occurred in Benin on August 2, 1992. Its purpose is to investigate the causes of the mutiny while assessing why it did not escalate into civil war. It is organized into four sections. Section 8.1 provides a brief overview of political developments in the country from 1960 through 1998, the year in which the crisis related to the mutiny was successfully resolved. Section 8.2 relies on the structured, focused comparison questions presented by **table 5.1** to identify the factors that led to the emergence of the mutiny. Section 8.3 uses the process tracing method highlighted by **figure 5.1** to focus on the *critical antecedents* and *critical junctures* that enabled a peaceful outcome in 1998. Section 8.4 summarizes and discusses the findings.

8.1 Political Developments, 1960-1998

The political course of post-independence Benin revolves around three main periods. The first is generally referred to as “the instability period” and covers the years 1960 through 1972.

The second is the “Revolution Era,” which was an autocratic rule. It lasted about 18 years. The third period, the “Democratic Era,” started in 1990 with a transition into democratic institutions.

The first 12 years of the post-independence history of Benin was marked by many instances of political instability. When the country achieved independence on August 1, 1960, the political regime was a parliamentary system resulting from the French Community era. Three months after achieving sovereignty, Benin opted for a presidential system instituted by a new constitution adopted on November 25, 1960. By switching to a presidential system, Benin’s leaders were hoping to avoid political instability that they feared would result from a parliamentary regime (Codjo 2016).

Just three years after the instauration of a system that concentrated power in the hands of the president, Benin experienced its first military coup d’etat (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989; Decalo 1973). On October 28, President Hubert Maga was deposed by Colonel Christophe Soglo, the army chief of staff. The last few weeks preceding the coup had been characterized by violent demonstrations in the northern city of Parakou, Maga’s home town, and in Porto-Novo, the capital city. At the core of the protests in the south, were complaints that President Maga, a northerner, had been engaging in ethno-regionalist discriminations. The coup occurred without any violence. The next day, Colonel Soglo justified the coup as necessary to preserve national unity and cohesion. In December, he returned power to a civilian leadership that included Sourou Migan Apithy as the president and Justin T. Ahomadegbe as his vice-president. The following month, a new constitution was adopted on January 5, 1964 (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 370; Decalo 1973).

The new leadership did not last long in office. In late 1965, rivalry between Apithy and his vice-president resulted in Colonel Soglo asking both leaders to resign. Following

constitutional rules, the president of the parliament, Tahirou Goungou, assumed power as an interim president. However, a political impasse soon followed. Once again, Colonel Soglo intervened. On December 22, 1965 he dismissed the parliament and government, suspended the two-year old constitution, banned all political parties, and declared himself president (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 371; Decalo 1973).

The following seven years were marked by a series of coups d'état. On December 17, 1967 Colonel Soglo's regime was overthrown by a group of soldiers led by Lieutenant-colonel Maurice Kouandete and Major Mathieu Kérékou. Two years later, on December 10, 1969 another coup occurred. The following year, a three-member Presidential Council was installed on May 7, 1970. The three main political figures, Maga, Ahomadegbe, and Apithy, respectively from the north, the center, and the south, were to rotate as heads of state every two years. Maga completed his term and was followed by Ahomadegbe. However, six months into the latter's term, the military intervened on October 26, 1972. Regime change occurred once again without any violence (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 370). The new junta was led by Major Mathieu Kérékou, who would shape the history of Benin for the remainder of his life until his death on October 14, 2015.

Mathieu Kérékou was born on September 2, 1933 in Kouarfa, in the northwestern region of Benin. The Cotonou-based daily newspaper *Fraternité* describes him as "enigmatic and unpredictable" (Fraternité 2015). He attended school in Senegal and Mali before enrolling in the French army. As a young officer, he was once a special aid to President Maga. Prior to the October 1972 military coup, he was commanding an armored unit in Ouidah, in the south, not far from Cotonou. He also attended military courses in different schools in France (Fraternité 2015).

Kérékou's ascension to power on October 26, 1972 brought political stability to the country. His regime lasted until March 1990, when Benin transitioned into democratic institutions. Over the course of these 18 years of authoritarian rule, the country went through several changes. On November 30, 1974, he proclaimed his adherence to Marxism-Leninism. A year later, he changed the name of the country from Dahomey to Benin. The intent was to foster national unity because "Dahomey" was perceived by many people as the domination of the ethnic group Fon, whose identity was tightly related to the pre-colonial history of the Dahomey Kingdom. That same year, on November 30, 1975, he instituted a single party system. The *Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin* (People's Revolution Party of Benin or PRPB) became the official state party (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989, 371; Decalo 1973).

On January 16, 1977 Kérékou's regime was challenged by a group of mercenaries (Jeune Afrique 2015). They invaded Benin by plane, arriving from Morocco via Gabon. It turned out that in these early hours of Sunday, the regime was expecting them. Soon after they landed, they were attacked by Benin troops before they had time to leave the airport. The subsequent fighting resulted in casualties on both sides. The mercenaries quickly retreated, leaving behind one of their men. In his memoirs, Bob Denard, a French citizen and leader of the group, revealed that he was on a paid mission to overthrow the Kérékou's regime at the demand of some of his opponents, including former President Emile Derlin Zinsou (Denard 1998; Nandjui 1995, 185-189).

In the 1980s, Kérékou's regime began to face difficulties. An economic decline that began in the late 1970s gradually worsened (Adekounte 1996). In his description of the situation, Adjaho (1992, 15), a finance inspector, "the financial situation of the state of Benin rapidly deteriorated, and began, in 1983, to descend into hell." In 1987, the state lacked the means to pay

salaries to its civil servants. This was believed to be the product of a “total absence of appropriate oversight of state revenue and expenditure, and above all because of reckless investment” (Adjaho 1992, 15; Adekounte 1996). From January through August 1989, a general strike organized by public servants and students paralyzed state and society (Dossou 2005). In response, President Kérékou called for a national conference that took place from February 19 through February 28, 1990.

The February 1990 National Conference opened a new era in the domestic politics in Benin. During the Conference, participants agreed on a set of decisions. A one-year transitional system would be put in place. Kérékou was to remain head of state during the transition. He was to be assisted by a prime minister who would be responsible for the chief executive. Legislative duties would be provisionally performed by the *Haut Conseil de la République* (High Republican Council or HCR). A new constitution was to be adopted, and general elections were scheduled for the following year. Kérékou accepted to implement these measures. Thus, on March 1, he signed a series of executive acts that effectively suspended the old constitution, dissolved the old parliament, appointed a prime minister, and changed the country’s official denomination from People’s Republic of Benin to Republic of Benin (Dossou 2005).

The one-year transition lasted from March 1990 through April 1991. It was conducted by President Kérékou and his prime minister Nicéphore Soglo, who had been selected at the National Conference. According to plans, a new constitution was approved in a referendum on December 2 and signed into law on December 11, 1990. Its provisions instituted a presidential regime and a multiparty system. On February 2, 1991, legislative elections took place. Neither the president nor the prime minister had a political party. The next month, both men ended up in

a run-off during the presidential election featuring more than 10 candidates. Soglo won the election. Kérékou effectively released power on April 4, 1991.

During Soglo's tenure in office, political stability deteriorated quickly. Between April 1991 and April 1992, there were at least three instances of alleged coup attempts. The most dramatic act of instability occurred in the morning of August 2, 1992. A group of soldiers took control of a military base in the northwestern town of Natitingou, the hometown of former President Kérékou. The event occurred a day after the celebration of the independence. The mutiny was led by an army officer, Captain Pascal Tawès. As the army tried to retake control of the base in the next hours, the soldiers felt outnumbered and retreated. Many of them fled the country, including their leader. This incident came to be known as the *Affaire Tawès*.

For the remainder of Soglo's term in office, the *Affaire Tawès* remained a central concern to citizens and government alike. Until he left office on April 4, 1996, his administration never captured Tawès. It was only in 1998, during his successor's tenure in office that the issue was peacefully resolved. Despite the anxiety it created in Benin for several years, the *Affaire Tawès* has not been previously examined in the literature. This chapter fills this gap. To do so, the structure, focused method and process tracing are used. The first will help to understand why the crisis occurred and why it sustained for so long. Process tracing will focus on explaining why and how escalation into civil war was avoided by Soglo's successor in 1997-1998.

8.2 Structured, Focused Comparison

This section relies on the structured, focused comparison to investigate the role of government actions in causing the August 1992 military mutiny. It is composed of two subsections. The first seeks to examine the relationship between government actions, leaders'

consensus and the emergence of the mutiny. To do so, the governance strategy adopted by the Soglo administration in the years preceding the incident is analyzed. The purpose of the second subsection is to determine the conditions that allowed the Benin government to avoid escalation of the mutiny into civil war. This is accomplished by assessing how the Soglo regime managed the crisis.

8.2.1 Soglo's Governance Strategy, 1991-1996

The following questions are used to analyze the Soglo administration's governance strategy from its assumption of office on April 4, 1991 until the outbreak of the mutiny on August 2, 1992. First, *what was the executive's governance strategy and what motivated or facilitated that choice?* Second, *how much support did the executive's governance strategy enjoy within the other branches of the government and why?* Third, *how much did the executive's governance strategy determine public discontent and to what extent did leaders' consensus contribute to that outcome?*

Nicéphore Soglo was born on November 29, 1934 in Lome (Togo). He graduated from the University of Paris with a degree in law and economics. At the age of 31, he was appointed finance minister in the Cabinet of his cousin Colonel Christoph Soglo. For most of the single party rule, he lived in Washington, DC where he worked at the International Monetary Funds and the World Bank. He returned to Benin to attend the February 1990 National Conference.³³

During his single five-year term, the focus of Soglo's governance was on economic policies. He was most preoccupied by creating favorable conditions for foreign investment. As a

³³ In the absence of a biography on Nicéphore Soglo, most of the information provided here about his background was obtained from the official website of the government of Benin (see <http://gouv.bj/les-anciens-presidents>).

result, foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP was higher under his administration than for most of the subsequent years. On average, FDI constituted 2.44% of GDP during his 5-year term (see **table 8.1**). This was more than double of what would later be produced in the next three terms. The Soglo administration also emphasized agriculture and exports. During its 5-year term, the value added by agriculture was 35.04% on average (see **table 8.1**). With the exception of the immediate following term, the level was much lower in all subsequent years. In a country that whose economy was largely based on agriculture, this was a sign of Soglo's commitment to economic policies that involved the most vulnerable class in society.

Table 8.1 Benin: Regime Performance in the Democratic Era

| Regimes | External Debt (current US\$) | FDI (% of GDP) | GDP Growth | Trade (%GDP) | Agriculture (value added as % GDP) |
|--------------------------------|---|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Nicéphore Soglo (1991-1995) | 1,190,000,000 | 2.44 | 4.22 | 58.33 | 35.04 |
| Mathieu Kérékou (1996-2000) | 1,230,000,000 | 1.04 | 5.04 | 59.10 | 35.71 |
| Mathieu Kérékou (2001-2005) | 1,410,000,000 | -0.16 | 3.91 | 49.93 | 25.34 |
| Boni Yayi (2006-2010) | 854,000,000 | 0.65 | 3.85 | 54.97 | 28.26 |
| Boni Yayi (2011-2015) | 1,550,000,000 | 3.28 | 4.68 | 65.85 | 25.64 |
| Country (1991-2015) | 1,250,000,000 | 1.45 | 4.34 | 57.64 | 28.89 |

Note: Numbers are average values for each of the periods indicated in the first column. Data are from the World Bank (2017).

Although his economic policies seemed to yield good results, Soglo faced hostility on the political front. When he assumed office in April 1991, he had no party affiliation. Thus, he had no clear and stable basis of support in parliament. In 1992, however, his wife Rosine Vieyra-Soglo, created a political party under the name Renaissance du Benin. This intensified some of

the opposition to the Soglos. The first lady's front role was often criticized. People were not accustomed to seeing a woman play a major role in a field dominated by men.

Soglo also drew negative attention through his public posture. For instance, his constant criticism of Kérékou's 18-year autocratic regime was perceived as arrogant, especially given that Kérékou had rarely appeared in public since he lost the 1991 election. It was also not well received by his peers in the region who, for the most part, were dictators. He also commonly referred to his professional experience in terms of "when I was at the World Bank" or "when I was in the United States," which was sometimes perceived as an attempt to lecture others. One of his opponents famously asked him "to leave the banks of the Potomac River and come back to Lake Nokoué," implying that the president should stick to local realities and stop lecturing them about his American experience. People's resentment over Soglo's attitude was summarized by his wife during a discussion in parliament on July 21, 1998, two years after they left office. "I have heard people all over the country say: [President] Soglo must apologize to us," she said. "I have often asked myself: about what? What crime did he commit? But I have been told repeatedly that he must apologize for his arrogance," the former first lady disappointedly reported (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1998b).

Soglo's unpopularity was materialized in the legislative election of March 28, 1995. As the sitting president, he certainly had some advantage over his opponents. He could easily travel around the country and campaign on behalf of his party the *Renaissance du Bénin* (RB), which was participating in an election for the first time since it was founded in 1992. Despite being the party of the incumbent president, the RB performed poorly. It won only 21 out of the 84 seats. Although no other party exceeded that number, the opposition parties heavily dominated the new legislature (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished n. d.a).

Another major defeat soon followed for President Soglo. For the upcoming presidential election, some of his opponents lobbied for Kérékou's candidacy. The former president had rarely spoken in public since he left office in April 1991. He had become a Christian (Tawès 1998), which his supporters presented as a sign that he was a new born. On March 18, 1995 Kérékou or Saint Mathieu as he was then called, defeated Soglo in the run-off, winning 52, 49% of the votes. Soglo reluctantly conceded.

Another criticism that Soglo often faced while in office was that of ethno-regional discrimination. These charges echoed complaints in the 1960s about his cousin Colonel Soglo, who, as a president, was then "accused of nepotism and a pro-southern bias" (Decalo 1973, 460). Ethno-regional discrimination had traditionally been a source of political disorder. Several of the military coups staged during the period of instability in the 1960s were orchestrated on the ground of governance along ethno-regional lines. This was confirmed by Decalo (1973) in his study. He found that ethnic and regional discrimination in politics and the military largely accounted for the 12-year instability observed in post-independence.

In his choice of the military leadership, Soglo either paid little attention to the importance of perception about ethno-regional balance, or he was simply condescending toward northerners. In either case, this was a risky governance style in a country where southerners were often accused of "typical expatriate arrogance, disdain, and displeasure at their posting to the 'savage north'" (Decalo 1973). As indicated in **table 8.2**, he barely had a northerner in a key military leadership position. All defense ministers and army chiefs of his administration were southerners. Only in the Chief Defense Staff did he have a northerner, who was actually appointed during the 1990 transition. In contrast, President Kérékou, who was from the north, almost exclusively appointed southerners in these three key military leadership positions. Out of

the six individuals who assumed these functions during his first 5-year term, only one was from the north and was appointed a year before his term was set to expire.

Table 8.2 Benin: Key Military Leadership, 1991-2001

| Position | Occupant : 1991-1996 (Soglo's Term) | Occupant : 1996-2001 (Kérérou's Term) |
|------------------------|--|--|
| Defense Minister | Florentin Feliho (South) | Sévérin Adjovi (South) |
| | Désiré Vieyra (South) | Pierre Osho (South) |
| Chief of Defense Staff | Aristide A. Boni (North) | Kodjia Gandonou (South) |
| | Séraphin Noukpo (South) | Félicien Dos Santos (South) |
| | | Fernand Amoussou (South) |
| Army Chief of Staff | Séraphin Noukpo (South) | Fernand Amoussou (South) |
| | Félicien Dos Santos (South) | Jean Kouagou M'pina (North) |

Source: Based on information obtained at the Benin Ministry of Defense.

Within this context of ethno-regionally unbalanced leadership in military affairs, the Soglo administration took a number of actions that generated frustration among some members of the military. On April 11, 1991 (see Decret n° 91-71), a week after assuming power, President Soglo signed a decree that dissolved the *Bataillon de la Garde Présidentielle* (Presidential Guard Battalion or BGP). This was the unit that had previously been in charge of the president's security under the single party rule. The dismantling of the BGP, although understandable from the president's security standpoint (given his rivalry with his predecessor), created an atmosphere of persecution.

The feeling of harassment developed by members of the BGP was aggravated by the fact that the military leadership took no immediate action to position them into new functions. It was

only two months later that most of them were transferred to new stations. For instance, the transferring order for the commander of the BGP, Major Jean N'tcha, and his deputy, Captain Pascal Tawès, was signed on July 1, 1991 (Note de Service n° 316/S1/CH/D1/EMAT). According to the order, signed by Army Chief of Staff Colonel Séraphin Noukpo, a southerner, the officers and their men were given a week to report to their new stations. After a waiting for a transfer for more than two months, a one-week notice only reinforced the sentiment of persecution or harassment among members of the BGP.

This sense of persecution and harassment among members of the former presidential guard was the beginning of a situation that later deteriorated and evolved into a revolt or the so called *Affaire Tawès*. Its leader was Captain Pascal Tawès. Born on May 10, 1956 in Tourou, in the northern region, Tawès was a very athletic man when he joined the military on July 21, 1978 at the age of 22. He was promoted Second Lieutenant on October 1, 1980. A year later he attained the rank of First Lieutenant and became a Captain on October 1, 1985. He attended an infantry course in Montpellier in France in 1984. From January through July 1987, he attended a captain career course in Porto-Novo in Benin. Three months after completion of this course, he married Christine Kata on October 16, 1987. On July 20, 1988 he was appointed by then President Kérékou as a deputy commander of the BGP.³⁴

Captain Tawès particularly resented the administration's governance of the military. First, he disapproved of the treatment inflicted up on members of the former BGP. As a former deputy commander, he was being transferred to the *Bataillon des Service* (BS) with no portfolio. This felt like a humiliation for a man once in charge of hundreds of soldiers committed to the

³⁴ The information contained in this paragraph was obtained from Pascal Tawès' personnel file at the *Direction de l'Organisation et du Personnel des Armées* (DOPA), which is the directorate in charge of personnel in the Benin Armed Forces.

security of the most powerful man in the country. In his accounts of the events leading up to the mutiny, he often referred to his being transferred to a unit with no responsibility. Second, he also constantly pointed to what he perceived as ethno-regionalist management of the military. For instance, he wrote in a short memoir that one of the goals of the August 1992 mutiny was to “demand termination, within the Benin armed forces, of a system based on regionalism and tribalism.” He implicitly accused Soglo of appointing “his cousins and nephews to [several] command posts in the Benin military” (Tawès 1998, 6).

Captain Tawès did not last long at his new position “with no portfolio.” On December 20, 1991 he was ordered to transfer to the *Deuxième Bataillon Inter-Armes* in Parakou, which was located up north about 450 kilometers away from Cotonou. In his accounts, the decision to transfer him, and several others, followed rumors about plots that had allegedly been in preparation. He complained about the brutality with which they were being transferred. “On the unsubstantiated ground of rumors of alleged coups d’état,” the captain wrote, “some soldiers including myself have been transferred by force to their regions of origin and put under the command of their subordinates without any precise functions, like criminals” (Tawès 1998, 3). He added that “all attempts to be heard by the military hierarchy were unsuccessful.”

During a discussion in parliament on September 2, 1997, Honorable Pascal N’Dah-Sekou referred to the circumstances of Tawès’ transfer to Parakou to explain why the captain decided to rebel. He informed his colleagues that Captain Tawès was notified by his hierarchy at 11 am that he was being transferred to the northern city of Parakou. An hour later, a military truck parked in front of his residency at the military base. He was asked to aboard the vehicle for his new post. Despite his complaints, he was forced to enter the truck, which then drove him to Parakou. A few days after he arrived at his new station, the captain was called back to Cotonou. Upon his arrival,

he was simply arrested and put in a military jail. However, informed Honorable N'Dah-Sekou, “as a proud soldier, who had correctly learned all his lessons about physical and strategic training, he escaped” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 33).

It is unclear whether Captain Tawès was given an hour to prepare for the trip to his new station. However, Honorable N'Dah-Sekou's accounts about the timing of the captain's imprisonment do not match the reality. On May 28, 1992 the administration announced that there was a coup attempt the night before. The exact circumstances of the incident remain controversial. Nevertheless, there were security breaches in three cities in the south, including Ouidah, Cotonou, and Porto-Novo. Soldiers had broken into the armament storage unit of police stations to steal weapons and ammunition. The authorities insisted that this was a coup attempt (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 1997b).

On May 29, the government formed a commission to investigate the incident. Captain Tawès was summoned to the Army headquarters in Cotonou for July 10. Upon his arrival, he was asked by the commission to testify about the incident. In his own accounts, “After [rounds of] audition, confrontation, and whispering, I was kept in Camp Guezo by an armed troop, on regionalist basis.” He added that “when a soldier is arrested under such circumstances, he must escape.” He explained that after escaping he went to Natitingou to “intervene” in the garrison known as *Camp Kaba* (Tawès 1998, 5).

What Captain referred to as an “intervention” was an armed attack on the garrison in the morning of August 2, 1992. With his men they took control of the base. In Tawès' accounts, the military hierarchy was notified by radio that *Camp Kaba* was no longer under the government's command. The commander of the garrison and several other personnel were held hostage. There were no casualties reported during the operation. The captain insisted that the armed assault was

the expression of frustration by “patriotic soldiers fed up with being tracked by a regionalist regime” (Tawès 1998, 6). They demanded that the administration freed up all soldiers that had been detained in connection with the alleged plots. They also asked the regime to stop its ethno-regionalist management of the military.

The next step is to examine how the Soglo administration responded to Captain Tawès’ demands. The following questions are used. First, *how did the executive respond to the demands of dissatisfied people and why? How much support did the executive’s response to the crisis enjoy within the other branches of the government and why? To what extent did leaders’ lack of consensus contribute to the escalation into civil war?*

The administration’s initial response was to deploy military troops to recapture *Camp Kaba*. As the troops were moving toward Natitingou, there was an encounter with a group of the mutineers aboard a military truck. Captain Tawès referred to the incident as an ambush staged by the military. He found it deplorable that the commander of the troops ordered his men to shoot their “comrades.” While the official records make no indication of casualties, Captain Tawès claimed that one of his men was killed (Tawès 1998).

Apparently, some members of the unit that deployed to Natitingou did not like the idea of a confrontation with the mutineers. In his accounts, Captain Tawès reported that his team was informed of the counter-attack by two men of the unit that was deployed to “capture or destroy Tawès.” He said that the leaders of the unit deliberately sent these two soldiers as precursors to let them know that “more than 90% of the soldiers selected to fight them were from the north” (Tawès 1998, 7). Upon learning that information, the captain decided that it was better to avoid a “fratricide confrontation.” Thus, he and several of his men escaped town. He would spend the next years in exile in Togo and Burkina Faso (Tawès 1998).

While Tawès was in exile, instability persisted in Benin. In March 1994, there was another instance of security breach where weapons and ammunition were stolen. In 1995, rockets were fired into the International Conference Center in Cotonou. This was a new building scheduled to host an international summit that many heads of state, including the French president, were expected to attend that year. In November 1995, there was another alleged plot against the regime. Several people were arrested, including military officers and a French citizen. Also, a local government official went missing in Boukoumbe, the home town of Captain Tawès. These various incidents further increased the anxiety and fear that had started since the August 1992 mutiny (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 1997b, 1998a).

Besides the military operation to retake *Camp Kaba*, the Soglo regime took other measures. The first was an administrative action to discharge Captain Tawès and his colleague Captain Raymond Saghi and revoke their ranks. It was proposed to the president by his minister of defense, Jean Florentin Feliho. On October 21, 1992, the issue was considered in a cabinet meeting. A month later, on November 25, President Soglo signed a decree that effectively discharged both officers and revoked their ranks. The sanction was to start retroactively from September 3, 1992. The reason was that both officers had been “absent from their units for more than two months and [were] on the run outside the national territory” (Decret n° 92-319, unpublished).

Following the occurrence of other instances of political instability, the Soglo administration took a legal action (Procès-verbal des débats n° 63, unpublished; Arrêts n° 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, unpublished). On August 16, 1994 the criminal court in Cotonou indicted 27 military personnel for “Preparation or execution of acts qualified as plots.” Among them were four officers, including Captain Tawès. Of the 27 indicted soldiers, who were all from the northern

region of Benin, only 11 showed up. Captain Tawès did not. The four jurors, randomly selected by lot, were from the southern region. This may have been because the prosecution was taking place in Cotonou, a city predominantly composed of southerners. The court was presided by Guy Martin Correia, a judge who was from the southern region. He was assisted by two other judges, Pascal Ahouangonou and Jérôme Assogba, both of whom were also from the southern region. The defense team was composed of two state-appointed lawyers and five legal counsels. Most of them were also from the south (Procès-verbal des débats n° 63, unpublished; Arrêts n° 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, unpublished).

After more than two weeks of proceedings, the court rendered a decision on September 5, 1994. Of the 27 indicted men, three were acquitted, while the other 24 were convicted. They were found guilty of “planning a plot, around 1991 and 1992, at unspecified time and on the national territory [of Benin], with the purpose of destabilizing or overthrowing the government in place in Benin” (Arrêt n° 68, unpublished). They were also guilty of a number of acts “committed in preparation of the execution of the plot,” including duplication of the keys to the weapon storage unit of the National Police Academy, attempt to steal weaponry, and movement of soldiers from the city of Ouidah to Cotonou. The court sentenced two of the individuals who attended the proceedings to two years in prison, while six of them walked away with a sentence of five to 10-year forced labor. All the 16 individuals who did not attend the proceedings were sentenced to lifetime forced labor (Procès-verbal des débats n° 63, unpublished; Arrêts n° 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, unpublished).

None of the measures considered by the Soglo administration succeeded in resolving the crisis known as the *Affaire Tawès*. The regime’s military operation failed to capture Captain Tawès and many of his colleagues. This was mainly because members of the military unit sent to

accomplish the mission were uncommitted to the government's strategy. This lack of commitment suggests the regime's crisis bargaining strategy was not shared in the military and maybe in other parts of government and society. In his accounts, Captain Tawès claimed that, while in exile in Burkina Faso, he would visit his hometown in Benin passing through Togo and showing his identity. He concluded that "everybody was convinced that I did not do anything wrong, and that I was just a victim of human evilness" (Tawès 1998, 10). The next section examines the conditions that enabled President Kérékou to resolve the conflict.

8.3 Process Tracing

Between 1997 and 1999, a process initiated by President Kérékou led to the effective resolution of the *Affaire Tawès*. The decisions that resulted from this process accommodated Captain Tawès and his comrades. On December 22, 1998, President Kérékou signed into law a bill approved by the parliament that granted amnesty to 319 military and civilians involved in this or other similar affairs (Loi n° 98-028, unpublished).

In accordance with the amnesty law, the president signed a decree on August 5, 1999 that repealed the previous regime's 1992 sanction of discharge and rank revocation (Decret n° 00-377, unpublished). On December 30, 1999 he signed another decree that readjusted the career of 79 military officers and enlisted personnel who had been associated with various national security issues. Captain Tawès, like his colleagues, was retroactively promoted. His new rank of Lieutenant-colonel was set on January 1, 1997. In addition, the decree ordered the payment to the soldiers of all the financial benefits induced by this career readjustment (Decret 99-633, unpublished). This section examines the critical antecedents and the critical juncture that led to this peaceful outcome.

8.3.1 Critical Antecedents: Democratic Transition, 1989-1991


As figure 8.1 shows, two elements related to the 1989-1991 democratic transition are the critical antecedents in the process that led to a peaceful resolution of the *Affaire Tawès*. On one hand, the outcome of the 1991 presidential election created conditions that facilitated the occurrence of the crisis. On the other hand, despite the tensions generated by this first element, the legacy of tolerance and inclusiveness that accompanied the preparation and the organization of the 1990 National Conference later enabled the different actors to lower the risks of instability.

Kérékou's loss of power on April 4, 1991 laid the ground for the occurrence of the *Affaire Tawès*. It significantly affected Captain Tawès' behavior. For the last two years of Kérékou's autocratic regime, the young captain had been accumulating power and gaining the trust of the president. On November 15, 1989 Captain Tawès, who was deputy commander of the presidential guard, was appointed by President Kérékou to chair a 10-men special commission. His mission was, to lead the investigation of three state-owned financial institutions, including the *Banque Commerciale du Bénin*, the *Banque Béninoise pour le Développement*, and the *Crédit Agricole* (Decret n° 89-400, unpublished). These organizations were accused of mismanaging state resources. Allegedly, they arbitrarily granted loans to their customers, but failed to recover the money back.

Captain Tawès and the members of his commission were given "full power" by President Kérékou to conduct the investigations. Most importantly, they were instructed to "recover, by all necessary means" all the money lent by the three institutions (Decret n° 89-400, unpublished). The president also gave the commission the authority to "call upon or hear any person whose competency or audition it judges necessary for the proper execution of its mission" (Decret n°

89-400, unpublished). According to the president's orders, Captain Tawès and his collaborators were to report to him monthly. At a time when state resources were scarce, this was an important mission. As the chairman of a commission entrusted with such a high priority mission, Tawès most certainly, to say the least, enjoyed the president's full confidence.

Figure 8.1 Benin: Tracing Causal Paths



In addition to his responsibilities as head of the loan recovery commission, Captain Tawès was also given another task by the President Kérékou. This time, he was to chair a four-men inquiry commission. Their mission was to investigate a claim of mismanagement within the *Société Béninoise des Travaux Publics*, which was a state-owned public infrastructure company (Decret n° 89-401, unpublished). The president once again entrusted him with the power to “call upon any person whose competency was judged necessary for the proper execution of [his] mission.” The commission had 12 days to submit its findings. The decrees that created these two commissions chaired by Captain Tawès were signed the same day by President Kérékou. This

suggests that the president knowingly sent Tawès on two critical simultaneous missions, which could only be a sign of confidence in the young captain.

Soglo's ascension to power at the very moment when the captain was on the rise was certainly not a situation he appreciated. This was reflected in some of his declarations, where he traced the beginning of his problems back to the 1991 presidential election. He stated that "My disgrace started with the process of opaque (not transparent) ballot during elections in my country in 1991" (Tawès 1998, 2). Describing the electoral process, he offered that "The procedure was often based, among others, on regionalism." In another strikingly political statement, he indicated that "Benin plunged into insecurity for accepting the verdict of opaque ballot" (Tawès 1998, 11). The implication seems to be that people should have contested the outcome of the 1991 election.

As a military officer, bound by his country's constitutional prescription of political neutrality, casting such judgements on the electoral process could only mean he had more to lose than the ordinary citizen or soldier. In this context, his later treatment by the military leadership must have amplified his resentment. His frustration also seemed to result from his belief that he was the victim of a "witch hunt." He felt that he was being harassed for his role in the investigation of state affairs. He found this to be unfair given that the commission he had led "worked diligently and recovered several million francs CFA for the state" (Tawès 1998, 1). In short, the source of his bitterness appeared to be in strong connection with the regime change of 1991. As such, any solution short of leadership change offered by the Soglo regime had little chance to dissolve the crisis.

The second critical antecedent that indirectly influenced the observed outcome was the legacy associated with the process that led to the democratic transition in 1989-1990. The

February 1990 National Conference, which opened the door to the adoption of democratic institutions, was itself a product of compromise and tolerance. Its main source lied in Kérékou's leadership style. As described in **section 8.1**, the country's socioeconomic difficulties were severe in the late 1980s. Amid the social tensions generated by the general strikes of 1989, Kérékou was approached by René Ahouansou and Robert Dossou, two university professors who were newly elected to the parliament. He met with both men on July, 28 1989. Both leaders were concerned about the direction of the country. They explained to the president that "democracy was inevitable" (Dossou 2005, 595). They told him that, by accepting the structural adjustment programs of the IMF, he had opted for economic liberalization. It was better for him, they advised, to also include political liberalism before it was imposed upon him.

Three days later, on July 31, Kérékou addressed the parliament and alluded to the possibility of political openness. On August 4, he appointed Robert Dossou as a member of his Cabinet. In November, the president announced to his minister that "I have been thinking about a national conference" (Dossou 2005, 595). On December 5, he informed Party leaders about his intent. They gave their approval, and thus started the planning of the event.

The National Conference lasted from February 19 through February 24, 1990. Its legacy was one of inclusiveness, forgiveness and tolerance. The 520 delegates who attended the discussions came from different backgrounds. These included, soldiers, educators, farmers, students, and even former exiled citizens who resented the single party rule. The youngest delegate was a 22-year old student. The chairman of the discussions was Monseigneur Isidore de Souza, a catholic bishop. The debates were covered on live radio, thus allowing people to connect to the historic moment. After days of heated arguments, several compromises were made to accommodate the different views represented. There were rumors that President Kérékou

would reject some of the conclusions. However, Bishop De Souza, with tact and diplomacy, convinced the president. The last day of the Conference, Kérékou appeared in front of the audience, and solemnly announced his willingness to implement their decisions (Dossou 2005). As the next sub-section shows, this legacy of compromise and inclusiveness later influenced the course of Benin's sociopolitical life, especially with regard to the *Affaire Tawès*.

8.3.2 Critical Juncture: Kérékou's Outreach to Parliament

The critical juncture that enabled a peaceful outcome to the *Affaire Tawès* resided in Kérékou's decision to reach out to the parliament in 1997 to resolve the crisis. As a president, he had the constitutional authority to pardon Captain Tawès and his comrades. However, he decided to involve members of parliament in his strategy to address the issue. Thus, a year into his first term as a democratically elected president, he sent a bill to the parliament that would provide amnesty to all people involved in the August 1992 mutiny and in other national security related incidents.³⁵ The purpose of the bill was to "create better conditions for political détente in order to enable true national reconciliation" (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 1).

Although Kérékou's outreach to parliament was a risky decision, it allowed large discussions about the *Affaire Tawès*. Through this action, the executive broadened the scope of consensus about its strategy to accommodate Captain Tawès and his comrades. The first round of debates in parliament opened on September 2, 1997 under the auspices of the second vice-president of the parliament, Honorable Théophile Natta (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished

³⁵ The bill related to several incidents. The first concerned the theft of arms and ammunition in the night of May 27-28 1992. The second was the firing of rockets upon the International Conference Center. Third, the bill also covered felonies and crime perpetrated during all elections held between 1990 and 1996 (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a).

1997a). A former member of Soglo's Cabinet during the mutiny, Honorable Natta was a native of the same region as both President Kérékou and Captain Tawès.

The amnesty bill proposed by President Kérékou faced some opposition in parliament. One of the opponents was Honorable Emile Kpikpidi, a deputy from Soglo's party. He called for caution. "If soldiers can join a rebellion today, wander around and come back in three or four years," he wondered, "are we consolidating the military?" (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 3). His position was that the management of the *Affaire Tawès* should be left to the military. Another argument against the bill came from Honorable Guy Soglo, who was also from the opposition party. He expressed what some members of the Soglo administration back in 1992 might have thought was at the core of the events: "For some of our fellow citizens, tribal patriotism prevails over national patriotism, and I believe that is why they find it impossible to accept an order, however democratically established, as long as it is not incarnated by a citizen from the [ethno-regional] community of their origin" (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 4).

A number of parliamentarians were not opposed to the idea of amnesty, but they were reluctant to vote for the bill as proposed. They were concerned about the security implications of granting an amnesty without recovering the weaponry that had been stolen back in 1992. This view was best expressed by Honorable Candide Azannai, a member of Soglo's opposition party RB, on the second day of the first round of debates. Referring to President Kérékou who proposed the bill, he explained that "I do not understand why a president, who is a military officer by profession, who knows the gravity of national security ... [wants to] provide amnesty for these incidents even though the country is still facing threats because the [stolen] arms have not been recovered" (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 30).

There were also reservations in other parts of the government. One was the *Commission des Lois* (Law Committee), which was the parliamentary committee that had studied the bill before it was presented to the plenary for discussion. According to Honorable Pascal N'Dah-Sekou, a member of the committee who was also from the same region as Captain Tawès, there were diverging views within the committee. Some committee members even tried to block the process entirely. He informed the plenary that it took the personal efforts and the “intellectual honesty” of Honorable Rosine Vieyra-Soglo, the former first lady, to enable the committee to move past these tactics (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a).

The military leadership also had reservations. Their main concern was a provision of the bill that called for a career readjustment for the mutineers. According to the initial bill, the readjustment measure should ensure that the beneficiaries’ new career situation “is neither worse nor better than that of their colleagues who remained in the military” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 32). During a hearing at the parliament, the commanders told the *Commission des Lois* they only disapproved of this part of the bill. Later, changes were made to reflect the commanders’ concern. Overall, they strongly recommended adoption of the bill “to avoid a ‘Kabila’ effect” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 30). The reference was about the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Joseph Kabila had led a rebellion to seize power in the previous year.

In response to these reservations, supporters of the amnesty bill drew on a number of precedents, especially in relation with the process that led to the democratic transition in 1989-1990. First, they recalled an executive action “voluntarily” signed by President Kérékou on August 30, 1989 to grant amnesty to all exiled citizens. These individuals were thus allowed to return home without facing charges for criminal acts they might have committed prior to their

exile. Second, supporters of the bill also drew on a presidential ordonnance signed by Kérékou on March 8, 1990 that provided general amnesty for plots staged against his government in the 1980s (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a; 1997b).

Defenders of the bill also relied on a third example from the democratic transition in 1990, thus showing how decisive the legacy of the National Conference was to the adoption of the bill. Back in 1990, they argued, President Kérékou personally lobbied members of the *Haut Conseil de la République* (HCR) to pass a bill that extended amnesty for all national-security-related criminal cases that had occurred since the beginning of his October 26, 1972. The HCR, which was the provisional legislative body during the transition, effectively passed the bill. It was signed into law by the president on October 9, 1990 (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 31).

The supporters of the bill claimed that this third precedent was significant because it granted amnesty to the people that were involved in the mercenary invasion of January 16, 1977. Honorable N'Dah-Sekou used this example to urge his colleagues to “listen to the voice of wisdom and vote for this bill” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 33). If President Kérékou could forgive and extend amnesty to people who invaded the country trying to overthrow his regime, he suggested, members of the parliament had no reason to deny a similar gesture to Captain Tawès and his colleagues.

Throughout the discussions, the legacy of the 1990 National Conference was constantly referred to as a reason to rally members of the parliament around a peaceful resolution. One example was provided on September 3, 1997, by Honorable Albert Chinkoun, who was a member of the opposition party. Despite being from the opposition, he urged his colleagues to vote for the bill. “We wish that the spirit of the National Conference continues to prevail,” he

pleaded, adding “I mean the sense of tolerance and forgiveness” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 51). He argued that

“Since our historic national conference of February 1990, Benin has astonished [the people of] Africa and the world. By adopting the proposed bill, we would give liberty and justice to other citizens of Benin. We will thus continue to astonish [the people of] Africa and the world” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 4).

After two days of debates, the bill was adopted on September 3, 1997. A total of 59 members voted in favor of it, while two opposed it and 12 abstained (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 51). In his closing statements, Honorable Marcellin Degbe, First Vice-president and chairman of the discussions, praised President Kérékou for his sense of consensus. He could have used his executive authority to pardon the convicted fellows. “Had he used this [constitutional] right, we would not have attained our goal, that of creating an environment of peace [and] national cohesion, necessary for the nation’s socioeconomic development” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 51).

The Chairman concluded that “by introducing the bill [to parliament], ... the administration wanted to waken in you, the representatives of our population, a sense of consensus that everyone envies us for” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 51). He thanked his colleagues for allowing the country to overcome “the devil of division [and] ethnocentrism.” In a rather prophetic tone he declared that “the fear of civil war is over” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 51). Five days after its adoption in parliament, the bill was signed into law by President Kérékou.

The victory of the supporters of amnesty was, however, short lived. Some members of the opposition soon engaged in counter-efforts. On September 9, just a day after the president’s

signature, the new law was challenged in court. Nathaniel Bah, a member of Soglo's party, filed a legal complaint before the Constitutional Court. He argued that, among other things, the process by which the bill was introduced to parliament by the executive was unconstitutional. On October 7, 1997 the court rendered its decision. It declared the amnesty law unconstitutional on the ground that, through the lack of proper procedure, the bill was in violation of the constitution (Cour Constitutionnelle, unpublished 1997, 221-225).

On February 20, 1998, the bill was back in parliament. After long discussions, it passed the vote, with 49 in favor of it, zero against it, and 11 abstentions (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1998a). However, Honorable Bah once again took the newly approved bill to task. Just three days after its adoption, he filed a complaint before the Constitutional Court. He contended that the vote in parliament had occurred in the absence of the two parliamentary secretaries, which he claimed was a violation of the legislative rules. This time too, the court ruled in his favor (Cour Constitutionnelle, unpublished 1998, 199-203). For the second time, one man's counter-efforts were preventing the majority to have its way. Consensus was being proven to be a delicate goal to achieve.

A new bill was introduced by a group of members of parliament. It was debated on July 21, 1998. The debates centered around the themes of previous rounds. There was a general consensus about the need to forgive in order to consolidate national unity and domestic peace. However, there were still reservations due to the fact that the stolen weapons had not been recovered. In the end, after several amendments, the bill was passed. A total of 60 deputies voted in favor of it, 18 against, and three abstained (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1998b). On December 22, 1998 the president signed the approved provisions into law.

Thanks to broad consensus initiated by President Kérékou, the *Affaire Tawès* was resolved in a peaceful manner. Amnesty to Captain Tawès and his comrades became a reality after several years of trying. They were effectively reintegrated in the military in 1999. Captain Tawès rose to the rank of Colonel. From 2011 through 2013, he was stationed in Washington DC as a deputy Defense Attaché and later as a Defense Attaché. On October 1, 2013 he retired from the military after 35 years of service.

8.4 Summary and Discussion of Findings

This dissertation theorizes that leaders' consensus about a strategy for political order mediates the effect of state environment on civil war. The six hypotheses in chapter three predict that two features of state environment are critical in explaining civil war. First, the decline in socioeconomic conditions increases the risks of civil war because it encourages leaders' polarization about a strategy for political order. Second, the indirect impact of political openness is conditional on the socioeconomic environment. In poor states, it exacerbates leaders' polarization about a strategy for political order.

The evidence presented in this chapter supports the argument about the mediating impact of leaders' consensus. Although the case examined was not an instance of civil war, the analysis shows that the lack of consensus increases the risks of escalation. In contrast, de-escalation is more likely when leaders share broad consensus about a strategy, especially during a crisis.

The Structured, focused comparison method was used to investigate the causes of the August 1992 military mutiny. The examination of President Soglo's governance strategy showed that the actions of his administration, especially the treatment of members of the former presidential guard by the military leadership, contributed to the onset of the mutiny. When

managing the crisis, the administration made little effort to associate other people outside the executive. This only complicated the bargaining process. In addition, Soglo's military leadership team did not reflect the ethno-regional diversity of the country. This appeared to have influenced how the affair was managed. Ultimately, the lack of ethno-regional diversity within the military and judiciary leadership, coupled with the failure of the president to reach out to other people beyond the circle of his advisors made de-escalation of the crisis less likely, thus raising the risks of civil war.

The use of process tracing focused on Kérékou's strategy to manage the crisis. The main finding is that de-escalation was made possible because of broad consensus within government as a whole. The analysis about critical antecedents revealed that the outcome of the 1991 presidential election generated frustrations among members of Kérékou's presidential guard. These frustrations were later exacerbated by the way some of these members of the former presidential guard were treated by the military leadership. Another critical antecedent was the legacy of compromise, inclusiveness, and tolerance that surrounded the democratic transition during the years 1989-1990. That legacy was later useful in uniting members of the parliament around an amnesty bill in 1997-1998.

Process training also showed that the 1991 Kérékou's outreach to parliament to extend amnesty to Captain Tawès and others was a critical juncture in the process leading to a peaceful outcome. In 1997, about a year after his return to power, Kérékou made a decision not to rely on his executive constitutional power, but to associate members of the parliament to his strategy to accommodate the mutineers. Although many members of parliament were initially opposed to an amnesty bill, the discussions allowed the opponents to express their concerns and hear from the supporters. Also, the spirit of the 1990 National Conference (tolerance and peace) was constantly

invoked by members of parliament to rally their colleagues. This significantly contributed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

In sum, a change in the state environment provoked a sense of deprivation among members of the armed forces who were invested in the old system. This grievance was further amplified by the treatment they received from the military leadership. Within this context of high tensions, another dimension of state environment, this time a socio-historical one, was important in indirectly influencing the outcome by enabling broad consensus among leaders regarding how to resolve the crisis. This supports the theoretical argument of this dissertation.

Chapter 9 - Conclusion

The main purpose of this dissertation was to explain why governments sometimes are unable to avoid the occurrence of civil war. This puzzle is particularly intriguing given that states are traditionally invested with the function of providing political order. In addition, government capabilities often outweigh those of their domestic challengers (Goldstone et al. 2010). Building upon existing scholarship on civil war, this dissertation proposes a state-centered theory that emphasizes the link between political structures and elite-relationships as recommended by scholars of the Political Instability Task Force (Goldstone et al. 2010). The argument is that the outbreak of civil war is an indirect consequence of the structural and institutional conditions that account for the lack of consensus among state leaders about a strategy for political order.

9.1 Summary

This dissertation contains nine chapters, including this one. Chapter one, which is the introduction, provides an overview of the study. Chapter two provides a review of the existing literature on civil war. It is organized around three approaches that dominate empirical research on the subject. First, studies in the political science tradition rely on the grievance and state capacity frameworks. Grievance-based studies emphasize the importance of vertical inequality, horizontal inequality, and repression. The findings about vertical inequality, often measured as economic inequality, ethnic fractionalization and religious diversity, do not conclusively support the proposed positive relationship. Horizontal inequality, operationalized in terms the share of excluded population, is generally found to be positively associated with civil war. In contrast, empirical results about the effect of repression, commonly captured through regime type and respect for civil liberties and human rights, provide no consistent evidence.

The empirical evidence about state capacity and civil war in previous studies generally supports the argument that countries with weak capabilities are more prone to civil war. Proxies for state capacity usually include, among others, GDP per capita (Fearon and Laitin 2003), military personnel per capita (Gibler and Miller 2014), mountainous or rough terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003), bad neighborhood (Goldstone et al. 2010), oil dependency (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and foreign support to rebels in the form of sanctuary or material support (Salehyan 2009).

Scholars also rely on the economic approach to investigate the causes of civil war. They tend to focus on economic factors that provide opportunity for greed and those that represent cost of rebellion. The findings are mixed. While some works (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009) show that civil war is caused by the availability of primary commodity, lack of economic growth, and foreign financing (proxied through a Post-Cold War dummy), others (Fearon 2005; Ross 2004b) find no such evidence.

The third main approach that dominates the empirical study of civil war is the structural framework. Studies in this tradition explain civil war as a consequence of shortage in critical resources produced by environmental degradation or exponential increase in population (Homer-Dixon 1999, 2010; Kahl 2006). Traditional measures of environmental scarcity include population growth, population density, ethnic and religious fractionalization, and climate disasters (Hauge and Ellingsen; Urdal 2005). While qualitative studies (Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999; Bretthauer 2014) find a positive relationship between environmental scarcity and civil war, statistical works do not support these results (see Theisen 2008; Gleditsch 2012; Slettebak 2012).

Although the existing literature on civil war provides important insights about why and when people would rise against the state, it is still unclear why governments are sometimes

unable to avoid escalation of domestic disputes into civil war. Also, most scholars model civil war as a direct function of political, economic, and structural factors. By doing so, they overlook the possibility that structural and institutional factors may affect the public policy process, and thus indirectly determine whether or not the government produces political order.

In light of some weaknesses in extant literature, chapter three theorizes that civil war is an indirect function of the structural and institutional conditions that affect the scope of state leaders' consensus on a strategy to provide political order. The theory revolves around accommodation and coercion, which are two strategies that are commonly used by governments to supply political order. The main argument is that when leaders lack broad consensus on either of these strategies, the government is less likely to succeed in deterring dissidence or avoiding its escalation into violent conflict because leaders opposed to the implementation of the strategy may engage in counter-efforts or foot-dragging that would reduce its chances of success. This contention about leaders' strategic consensus and government performance is inspired by research in the business management field (Bourgeois 1980; Floyd and Wooldridge 1992).

Chapter three also develops six hypotheses that highlight mediated and conditional effects between the state's socioeconomic and political environment and civil war. It is predicted that the state's socioeconomic condition inversely and indirectly impacts civil war through leaders' consensus on accommodation and coercion. Meanwhile, open political institutions are expected to be indirectly and positively related to civil war. However, it is hypothesized that their mediated impact through leaders' consensus on accommodation is conditional on the country's socioeconomic environment.

Chapter four statistically evaluates the theoretical argument developed in chapter three. It examines a time series cross sectional dataset of 161 countries from 1960 through 2007. The

findings are twofold. First, the impact of the state's socioeconomic environment on civil war is negative and largely mediated through the actions of state leaders. Second, political openness increases the risks of civil war, but its mediated effect appears to be conditional on the country's socioeconomic environment.

The evidence meets the expectation of hypothesis 1. The state's socioeconomic level is positively associated with the scope of leaders' consensus on accommodation, proxied through an index that includes the quality of economic quality, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, and level of corruption. As predicted by hypothesis 2, political openness, measured as party system, is positively related to accommodation in advanced states, but its effect is negative in poor countries.

The statistical results also support the expectations of hypotheses 3 and 4. Leaders' consensus on coercion is measured through an index of coercion that captures military involvement in politics, military capacity, repression, and military spending. Socioeconomic development is found to be negatively related to coercion. The effect of political openness on coercion is negative in advanced societies, but positive in poor states.

Hypotheses 5 and 6 are also confirmed. The likelihood of civil war increases as the level of accommodation declines. The risks of civil war are higher when coercion is used in a politically open society than otherwise. This suggests that a coercion strategy is less likely to work if the environment does not foster leaders' consensus on repression.

The statistical test also supports the argument of mediating effect of leaders' strategic consensus on civil war. The use of two mediation techniques reveals that up to two-thirds of the effect of socioeconomic condition on civil war is mediated through accommodation. Meanwhile, about one third of that impact occurs through coercion.

Chapter five outlines the qualitative research design. The choice for a qualitative analysis is intended to enable an assessment of the causal mechanisms relating state environment to civil war. This is specifically oriented toward investigation of the role of leaders' strategic consensus in the outbreak or the avoidance of civil war. Two qualitative methods are used. The first is that structured, focused comparison. It highlights a set of six questions directed at examining the executive's governance and crisis bargaining strategies. The second qualitative technique is process tracing. Slater and Simmons' (2010) approach of *critical antecedent* and *critical juncture* is used. This technique enables this research to trace the specific causal paths that connect state environment and civil war. These two qualitative methods are applied to two positive cases, Côte d'Ivoire and Romania, and one negative case, Benin.

Chapter six qualitatively investigates the causes of the September 2002 civil war in Côte d'Ivoire. The findings show that the actions of political leaders mostly accounted for the emergence and the escalation of a social crisis around the concept of *Ivoirité*. The onset of the crisis dated back to the 1994 *Ivoirité* policy adopted by Henri Konan Bédié as a strategy for political survival. However, it took about eight years and two additional regimes for the crisis to escalate in 2002.

The process tracing revealed that the instrumentalization of the crisis for political gains was the critical juncture that led to the outbreak of the civil war. Political calculations prevented leaders to agree on a strategy to resolve the crisis. The process tracing also showed that, during this eight year-period preceding the escalation, aggrieved people relied on other methods to obtain satisfaction, including electoral participation and several coups attempts, of which one succeeded. This suggests that, even though the government failed to address their concern, civil war was not the first resort of the deprived groups and individuals.

Another finding of chapter six was that, under the 30-year single party system (1960-1990), the Ivorian government faced two incidents of rebellion that it effectively repressed before they escalated. Although the focus of the analysis was not on these events, the evidence suggests that members of the state party were united around the Ivorian president's strategies to provide order because the political system provided leaders with no incentives to instrumentalize the issues at stake during this period.

Chapter seven qualitatively examined the Romanian December 1989 Revolution. The findings show that a change in the regional sociopolitical environment mostly accounted for the revolution and its escalation into violence. Gorbachev's policies of political liberalization and the beginning of democratic transition in the region affected the aspirations of Romanian citizens while also influencing the political calculations of some members of the ruling elite. The consequence was a weakening of consensus among leaders, many of whom became less willing to commit to President Ceausescu's coercion strategy. The process tracing showed that escalation into violence was the results of foot-dragging, a manifestation of lack of consensus, by members of the administration who were in charge of the implementation of the coercion strategy.

Chapter eight qualitatively analyses the August 1992 military mutiny (also known as *Affaire Tawès*) in Benin. This is a negative case because the crisis did not escalate into civil war. The findings revealed that the mutiny occurred largely because of government actions. The military leadership's treatment of some members of the former presidential guard aggravated existing frustrations. In response to the mutiny, the executive *unsuccessfully* relied on military operations, administrative measures, and legal actions. All these three components of the Soglo regime's crisis bargaining strategy involved the military and the judiciary branches of the

bureaucratic apparatus only, all of which were under the supervision of the chief executive. The fact that a strategy failed to de-escalate the crisis suggests that the lack of inclusion of other political leaders into the process may have reduced the chances of success.

Most importantly, the process tracing method showed that de-escalation became possible only as a new administration reached out to leaders in parliament to seek their implication into the process. A legislative rather than an executive action generated broad consensus around the executive's strategy to accommodate the soldiers involved in the incidents. Ultimately, a law was adopted by the parliament that granted amnesty to the mutineers.

The analysis in chapter eight also found that broad consensus within the parliament and beyond was largely the product of the president's leadership style, and most importantly of the legacy of a historical event. The inclusive nature of the process that surrounded the February 1990 National Conference was decisively used in 1997-1998 to rally leaders around the amnesty bill.

In sum, the quantitative and qualitative analyses largely support this dissertation's argument that leaders' consensus on a strategy for political order mediates the impact of state environment on civil war. The cases examined revealed that several aspects of state environment may affect leaders' strategic consensus. These may be domestic or international factors, which could be structural or institutional. While these elements may simultaneously determine the behavior of citizens and leaders alike, their impact on the latter seems to be more decisive in avoiding or precipitating escalation of a crisis into civil war.

9.2 Implications for Policymaking

This dissertation has policy implications for institutional design. First, the evidence of the statistical analysis suggests that, in poor states, multiparty systems tend to be associated with poor governance and high levels of coercion. Apparently, under harsh socioeconomic circumstances, leaders of politically open societies may turn to exclusionary and coercive policies to secure their survival in office. Thus, sociopolitical crises can easily be instrumentalized for political gains at the expense of political order. Second, the findings of the qualitative studies indicate that, although dissidence may occur for several reasons, escalation into civil war is not automatic. The critical juncture that determines whether a domestic conflict is resolved peacefully or escalates into armed violence seems to be the extent to which leaders share broad consensus on how to respond to the challenge.

One way to reduce political instability in poor states would be through the crafting of institutional arrangements that make it difficult for political leaders to benefit from instrumentalization of sociopolitical crises. To this end, institutional designers in the developing world should pay special attention to mixed arrangements that provide a balance between democratic and non-democratic institutions. For instance, the institutionalization of an unelected branch of government that is specifically dedicated to preventing the onset of and avoiding escalation of sociopolitical crises could minimize the risks of civil war in poor states, especially if the following three conditions are met. First, members of this government body should not be subject to political competition. Second, they must not be dependent on the political branches for their survival in office. Third, they ought to have a constitutional power to constrain political leaders at times of crises (see Codjo 2016 for an example).

9.3 Prospects for Future Research

This dissertation opens new venues for research on civil war. First, in light of the results of the statistical analysis, scholars should explore the possibilities of indirect and conditional effects of other aspects of state environment on civil war. Second, the statistical significance of the relationship between party system and civil war suggests that regime type studies should rely on measures that dissociate institutions from the outcomes produced by the government or by other elements of society. Third, future works seeking to use this framework for the study of civil war should try alternative measures of strategic consensus, although it is difficult to capture the type of process highlighted in the qualitative studies of this dissertation. Last, students of civil war should pay closer attention to the conditions that explain divisions among elites during a domestic crisis bargaining situation. Ultimately, the factors that determine the extent to which leaders agree on a bargaining strategy might account for whether a domestic conflict is peacefully resolved or escalates into civil war.

This study also has implications for future research on government performance. The theory developed in chapter three identified the socioeconomic capacity and the openness of the political institutions as two factors that are critical to leaders' performance in office. Together, they capture the preferences of individuals who have the institutional power to select leaders. Whether members of the selectorate prioritize short-term benefits over long-term gains, or private over public goods, might be decisive in determining what types of leaders are selected in the first place. It will also account for how leaders behave in office. Thus, future research on government performance should pay more attention to the role of voters' socioeconomic conditions in influencing leaders' performance.

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Appendix A - Quantitative Analysis

Table A.1 Country List

| Nr. | State Name | COW Code | Time Period |
|-----|----------------------------|----------|-------------|
| 1 | United States of America | 2 | 1960-2007 |
| 2 | Canada | 20 | 1960-2007 |
| 3 | Cuba | 40 | 1960-2007 |
| 4 | Haiti | 41 | 1960-2007 |
| 5 | Dominican Republic | 42 | 1960-2007 |
| 6 | Jamaica | 51 | 1962-2007 |
| 7 | Trinidad and Tobago | 52 | 1962-2007 |
| 8 | Mexico | 70 | 1960-2007 |
| 9 | Guatemala | 90 | 1960-2007 |
| 10 | Honduras | 91 | 1960-2007 |
| 11 | El Salvador | 92 | 1960-2007 |
| 12 | Nicaragua | 93 | 1960-2007 |
| 13 | Costa Rica | 94 | 1960-2007 |
| 14 | Panama | 95 | 1960-2007 |
| 15 | Colombia | 100 | 1960-2007 |
| 16 | Venezuela | 101 | 1960-2007 |
| 17 | Ecuador | 130 | 1960-2007 |
| 18 | Peru | 135 | 1960-2007 |
| 19 | Brazil | 140 | 1960-2007 |
| 20 | Bolivia | 145 | 1960-2007 |
| 21 | Paraguay | 150 | 1960-2007 |
| 22 | Chile | 155 | 1960-2007 |
| 23 | Argentina | 160 | 1960-2007 |
| 24 | Uruguay | 165 | 1960-2007 |
| 25 | United Kingdom | 200 | 1960-2007 |
| 26 | Ireland | 205 | 1960-2007 |
| 27 | Netherlands | 210 | 1960-2007 |
| 28 | Belgium | 211 | 1960-2007 |
| 29 | France | 220 | 1960-2007 |
| 30 | Switzerland | 225 | 1960-2007 |
| 31 | Spain | 230 | 1960-2007 |
| 32 | Portugal | 235 | 1960-2007 |
| 33 | Germany | 255 | 1990-2007 |
| 34 | German Federal Republic | 260 | 1960-1989 |
| 35 | German Democratic Republic | 265 | 1960-1989 |

| | | | |
|----|------------------------|-----|-----------|
| 36 | Poland | 290 | 1960-2007 |
| 37 | Austria | 305 | 1960-2007 |
| 38 | Hungary | 310 | 1960-2007 |
| 39 | Czechoslovakia | 315 | 1960-1992 |
| 40 | Czech Republic | 316 | 1993-2007 |
| 41 | Slovakia | 317 | 1993-2007 |
| 42 | Italy | 325 | 1960-2007 |
| 43 | Albania | 339 | 1960-2007 |
| 44 | Montenegro | 341 | 2006-2007 |
| 45 | Macedonia | 343 | 1991-2007 |
| 46 | Croatia | 344 | 1991-2007 |
| 47 | Yugoslavia | 345 | 1960-1990 |
| 48 | Serbia & Montenegro | 345 | 1991-2005 |
| 49 | Serbia | 345 | 2006-2007 |
| 50 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 346 | 1991-2007 |
| 51 | Slovenia | 349 | 1991-2007 |
| 52 | Greece | 350 | 1960-2007 |
| 53 | Bulgaria | 355 | 1960-2007 |
| 54 | Moldova | 359 | 1991-2007 |
| 55 | Romania | 360 | 1960-2007 |
| 56 | Soviet Union | 365 | 1960-1990 |
| 57 | Russian Federation | 365 | 1991-2007 |
| 58 | Estonia | 366 | 1991-2007 |
| 59 | Latvia | 367 | 1991-2007 |
| 60 | Lithuania | 368 | 1991-2007 |
| 61 | Ukraine | 369 | 1991-2007 |
| 62 | Belarus | 370 | 1991-2007 |
| 63 | Armenia | 371 | 1991-2007 |
| 64 | Georgia | 372 | 1991-2007 |
| 65 | Azerbaijan | 373 | 1991-2007 |
| 66 | Finland | 375 | 1960-2007 |
| 67 | Sweden | 380 | 1960-2007 |
| 68 | Norway | 385 | 1960-2007 |
| 69 | Denmark | 390 | 1960-2007 |
| 70 | Guinea-Bissau | 404 | 1974-2007 |
| 71 | Equatorial Guinea | 411 | 1968-2007 |
| 72 | Gambia | 420 | 1965-2007 |
| 73 | Mali | 432 | 1960-2007 |
| 74 | Senegal | 433 | 1960-2007 |
| 75 | Benin | 434 | 1960-2007 |
| 76 | Mauritania | 435 | 1960-2007 |

| | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------|-----|-----------|
| 77 | Niger | 436 | 1960-2007 |
| 78 | Ivory Coast | 437 | 1960-2007 |
| 79 | Guinea | 438 | 1960-2007 |
| 80 | Burkina Faso | 439 | 1960-2007 |
| 81 | Liberia | 450 | 1960-2007 |
| 82 | Sierra Leone | 451 | 1961-2007 |
| 83 | Ghana | 452 | 1960-2007 |
| 84 | Togo | 461 | 1960-2007 |
| 85 | Cameroon | 471 | 1960-2007 |
| 86 | Nigeria | 475 | 1960-2007 |
| 87 | Gabon | 481 | 1960-2007 |
| 88 | Central African Republic | 482 | 1960-2007 |
| 89 | Chad | 483 | 1960-2007 |
| 90 | Congo | 484 | 1960-2007 |
| 91 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 490 | 1960-2007 |
| 92 | Uganda | 500 | 1962-2007 |
| 93 | Kenya | 501 | 1963-2007 |
| 94 | Tanzania | 510 | 1961-2007 |
| 95 | Burundi | 516 | 1962-2007 |
| 96 | Rwanda | 517 | 1962-2007 |
| 97 | Somalia | 520 | 1960-2007 |
| 98 | Djibouti | 522 | 1977-2007 |
| 99 | Ethiopia | 530 | 1960-2007 |
| 100 | Eritrea | 531 | 1993-2007 |
| 101 | Angola | 540 | 1975-2007 |
| 102 | Mozambique | 541 | 1975-2007 |
| 103 | Zambia | 551 | 1964-2007 |
| 104 | Zimbabwe | 552 | 1965-2007 |
| 105 | Malawi | 553 | 1964-2007 |
| 106 | South Africa | 560 | 1960-2007 |
| 107 | Namibia | 565 | 1990-2007 |
| 108 | Lesotho | 570 | 1966-2007 |
| 109 | Botswana | 571 | 1966-2007 |
| 110 | Swaziland | 572 | 1968-2007 |
| 111 | Madagascar | 580 | 1960-2007 |
| 112 | Mauritius | 590 | 1968-2007 |
| 113 | Morocco | 600 | 1960-2007 |
| 114 | Algeria | 615 | 1962-2007 |
| 115 | Tunisia | 616 | 1960-2007 |
| 116 | Libya | 620 | 1960-2007 |
| 117 | Sudan | 625 | 1960-2007 |

| | | | |
|-----|----------------------|-----|-----------|
| 118 | Iran | 630 | 1960-2007 |
| 119 | Turkey | 640 | 1960-2007 |
| 120 | Iraq | 645 | 1960-2007 |
| 121 | Egypt | 651 | 1960-2007 |
| 122 | Syria | 652 | 1960-2007 |
| 123 | Lebanon | 660 | 1960-2007 |
| 124 | Jordan | 663 | 1960-2007 |
| 125 | Israel | 666 | 1960-2007 |
| 126 | Saudi Arabia | 670 | 1960-2007 |
| 127 | Yemen Arab Republic | 678 | 1960-1989 |
| 128 | Yemen | 679 | 1990-2007 |
| 129 | Kuwait | 690 | 1961-2007 |
| 130 | Bahrain | 692 | 1971-2007 |
| 131 | Qatar | 694 | 1971-2007 |
| 132 | United Arab Emirates | 696 | 1971-2007 |
| 133 | Oman | 698 | 1970-2007 |
| 134 | Afghanistan | 700 | 1960-2007 |
| 135 | Turkmenistan | 701 | 1991-2007 |
| 136 | Tajikistan | 702 | 1991-2007 |
| 137 | Kyrgyzstan | 703 | 1991-2007 |
| 138 | Uzbekistan | 704 | 1991-2007 |
| 139 | Kazakhstan | 705 | 1991-2007 |
| 140 | China | 710 | 1960-2007 |
| 141 | Mongolia | 712 | 1960-2007 |
| 142 | Taiwan | 713 | 1960-2007 |
| 143 | North Korea | 731 | 1960-2007 |
| 144 | South Korea | 732 | 1960-2007 |
| 145 | Japan | 740 | 1960-2007 |
| 146 | India | 750 | 1960-2007 |
| 147 | Pakistan | 770 | 1960-2007 |
| 148 | Bangladesh | 771 | 1971-2007 |
| 149 | Myanmar | 775 | 1960-2007 |
| 150 | Sri Lanka | 780 | 1960-2007 |
| 151 | Nepal | 790 | 1960-2007 |
| 152 | Thailand | 800 | 1960-2007 |
| 153 | Cambodia | 811 | 1960-2007 |
| 154 | Laos | 812 | 1960-2007 |
| 155 | Vietnam | 816 | 1960-2007 |
| 156 | Malaysia | 820 | 1960-2007 |
| 157 | Singapore | 830 | 1965-2007 |
| 158 | Philippines | 840 | 1960-2007 |

| | | | |
|-----|------------------|-----|-----------|
| 159 | Indonesia | 850 | 1960-2007 |
| 160 | Australia | 900 | 1960-2007 |
| 161 | Papua New Guinea | 910 | 1975-2007 |
| 162 | New Zealand | 920 | 1960-2007 |

Table A.2 Civil War Cases, 1960-2007

| Nr. | Country Name | Country Code | Start Year |
|------------|------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | Dominican Republic | 42 | 1965 |
| 2 | Guatemala | 90 | 1966 |
| 3 | Guatemala | 90 | 1970 |
| 4 | Guatemala | 90 | 1978 |
| 5 | El Salvador | 92 | 1979 |
| 6 | Nicaragua | 93 | 1978 |
| 7 | Nicaragua | 93 | 1982 |
| 8 | Colombia | 100 | 1989 |
| 9 | Peru | 135 | 1982 |
| 10 | Chile | 155 | 1973 |
| 11 | Argentina | 160 | 1975 |
| 12 | Croatia | 344 | 1995 |
| 13 | Serbia and Montenegro | 345 | 1991 |
| 14 | Serbia and Montenegro | 345 | 1998 |
| 15 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 346 | 1992 |
| 16 | Moldova | 359 | 1991 |
| 17 | Romania | 360 | 1989 |
| 18 | Russian Federation | 365 | 1994 |
| 19 | Russian Federation | 365 | 1999 |
| 20 | Georgia | 372 | 1991 |
| 21 | Georgia | 372 | 1993 |
| 22 | Azerbaijan | 373 | 1991 |
| 23 | Guinea-Bissau | 404 | 1998 |
| 24 | Cote d'Ivoire | 437 | 2002 |
| 25 | Guinea | 438 | 2000 |
| 26 | Liberia | 450 | 1989 |
| 27 | Liberia | 450 | 1992 |
| 28 | Liberia | 450 | 1996 |
| 29 | Liberia | 450 | 2002 |
| 30 | Sierra Leone | 451 | 1991 |
| 31 | Sierra Leone | 451 | 1998 |
| 32 | Nigeria | 475 | 1967 |
| 33 | Nigeria | 475 | 1980 |
| 34 | Chad | 483 | 1966 |
| 35 | Chad | 483 | 1980 |
| 36 | Chad | 483 | 1989 |
| 37 | Chad | 483 | 1998 |
| 38 | Chad | 483 | 2005 |

| | | | |
|----|--|-----|------|
| 39 | Congo (Brazzaville, Republic of Congo) | 484 | 1997 |
| 40 | Congo (Brazzaville, Republic of Congo) | 484 | 1998 |
| 41 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 490 | 1960 |
| 42 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 490 | 1963 |
| 43 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 490 | 1964 |
| 44 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 490 | 1978 |
| 45 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 490 | 1996 |
| 46 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 490 | 1998 |
| 47 | Uganda | 500 | 1966 |
| 48 | Uganda | 500 | 1980 |
| 49 | Uganda | 500 | 1986 |
| 50 | Burundi | 516 | 1972 |
| 51 | Burundi | 516 | 1993 |
| 52 | Burundi | 516 | 2001 |
| 53 | Rwanda | 517 | 1963 |
| 54 | Rwanda | 517 | 1994 |
| 55 | Rwanda | 517 | 1997 |
| 56 | Rwanda | 517 | 2001 |
| 57 | Somalia | 520 | 1988 |
| 58 | Somalia | 520 | 1991 |
| 59 | Somalia | 520 | 2006 |
| 60 | Ethiopia | 530 | 1963 |
| 61 | Ethiopia | 530 | 1975 |
| 62 | Ethiopia | 530 | 1976 |
| 63 | Ethiopia | 530 | 1978 |
| 64 | Ethiopia | 530 | 1982 |
| 65 | Ethiopia | 530 | 1999 |
| 66 | Angola | 540 | 1976 |
| 67 | Angola | 540 | 1992 |
| 68 | Angola | 540 | 1998 |
| 69 | Mozambique | 541 | 1979 |
| 70 | Zimbabwe | 552 | 1972 |
| 71 | Zimbabwe | 552 | 1983 |
| 72 | Algeria | 615 | 1962 |
| 73 | Algeria | 615 | 1992 |
| 74 | Sudan | 625 | 1963 |
| 75 | Sudan | 625 | 1983 |
| 76 | Sudan | 625 | 2003 |
| 77 | Iran | 630 | 1978 |
| 78 | Iran | 630 | 1979 |
| 79 | Turkey | 640 | 1984 |

| | | | |
|-----|---------------------|-----|------|
| 80 | Turkey | 640 | 1991 |
| 81 | Iraq | 645 | 1961 |
| 82 | Iraq | 645 | 1965 |
| 83 | Iraq | 645 | 1969 |
| 84 | Iraq | 645 | 1974 |
| 85 | Iraq | 645 | 1985 |
| 86 | Iraq | 645 | 1991 |
| 87 | Iraq | 645 | 1996 |
| 88 | Syria | 652 | 1981 |
| 89 | Lebanon | 660 | 1983 |
| 90 | Lebanon | 660 | 1989 |
| 91 | Jordan | 663 | 1970 |
| 92 | Yemen Arab Republic | 678 | 1962 |
| 93 | Yemen | 679 | 1994 |
| 94 | Yemen | 679 | 2004 |
| 95 | Yemen | 679 | 2007 |
| 96 | Oman | 698 | 1973 |
| 97 | Afghanistan | 700 | 1978 |
| 98 | Afghanistan | 700 | 1989 |
| 99 | Tajikistan | 702 | 1992 |
| 100 | China | 710 | 1967 |
| 101 | India | 750 | 1970 |
| 102 | India | 750 | 1984 |
| 103 | India | 750 | 1990 |
| 104 | Pakistan | 770 | 1971 |
| 105 | Pakistan | 770 | 1973 |
| 106 | Pakistan | 770 | 2004 |
| 107 | Myanmar | 775 | 1967 |
| 108 | Myanmar | 775 | 1983 |
| 109 | Myanmar | 775 | 1988 |
| 110 | Sri Lanka | 780 | 1971 |
| 111 | Sri Lanka | 780 | 1983 |
| 112 | Sri Lanka | 780 | 1987 |
| 113 | Sri Lanka | 780 | 2006 |
| 114 | Nepal | 790 | 2001 |
| 115 | Nepal | 790 | 2003 |
| 116 | Thailand | 800 | 1972 |
| 117 | Cambodia | 811 | 1971 |
| 118 | Cambodia | 811 | 1989 |
| 119 | Cambodia | 811 | 1993 |
| 120 | Laos | 812 | 1960 |

| | | | |
|-----|------------------|-----|------|
| 121 | Laos | 812 | 1963 |
| 122 | Laos | 812 | 1976 |
| 123 | Philippines | 840 | 1972 |
| 124 | Philippines | 840 | 2000 |
| 125 | Philippines | 840 | 2003 |
| 126 | Philippines | 840 | 2005 |
| 127 | Indonesia | 850 | 1965 |
| 128 | Indonesia | 850 | 1976 |
| 129 | Indonesia | 850 | 1989 |
| 130 | Indonesia | 850 | 1999 |
| 131 | Indonesia | 850 | 2003 |
| 132 | Papua New Guinea | 910 | 1989 |

Table A.3 Alternative Models of Accommodation

| VARIABLES | PCSE Accommodation | Random Effect Accommodation | Fixed Effect Accommodation |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Lagged Accommodation | 0.73*** (0.03) | | |
| GDP Capita | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.36*** (0.02) | 0.38*** (0.02) |
| De Facto Open | -0.42*** (0.07) | -0.22** (0.10) | -0.08 (0.10) |
| GDP x Open | 0.07*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.04*** (0.02) |
| Constant | -0.56*** (0.08) | -3.02*** (0.13) | -3.11*** (0.15) |
| Observations | 5,338 | 5,439 | 5,439 |
| R-squared | 0.85 | | 0.18 |
| Chi Square | 12372.10*** | 1585.93*** | 372.40*** |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | |

Table A.4 Alternative Models of Coercion

| Variables | PCSE Coercion | Random Effect Coercion | Fixed Effect Coercion |
|--|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Lagged Coercion | 0.84*** (0.02) | | |
| GDP Capita | -0.28*** (0.08) | -0.74*** (0.26) | 0.12 (0.30) |
| De Facto Open | 1.54** (0.74) | 2.08 (1.46) | 1.89 (1.51) |
| GDP x Open | -0.24** (0.10) | -0.27 (0.22) | -0.24 (0.23) |
| Constant | 7.78*** (1.04) | 38.60*** (1.93) | 32.00*** (2.148) |
| Observations | 5,282 | 5,392 | 5,392 |
| R-squared | 0.78 | | |
| Chi Square | 6770.78*** | 33.06*** | 1.04 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | |

Table A.5 Alternative Models of Civil War

| Variables | Random Effect Civil War | Random Effect Civil War | Random Effect Civil War | Regional Effect Civil War | Regional Effect Civil War | Regional Effect Civil War |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Ln GDP Capita (lag) | -0.30** (0.14) | -0.12 (0.16) | -0.29** (0.14) | -0.51*** (0.16) | -0.30 (0.20) | -0.44*** (0.16) |
| De Facto Open (lag) | 1.63*** (0.45) | 1.66*** (0.45) | 1.54*** (0.45) | 1.76*** (0.49) | 1.80*** (0.48) | 1.46*** (0.45) |
| Accommodation (lag) | | -0.61** (0.29) | | | -0.59** (0.30) | |
| Coercion (lag) | | | 0.06*** (0.01) | | | 0.06*** (0.02) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.91* (0.52) | 0.89* (0.53) | 0.95* (0.52) | 1.23** (0.54) | 1.12** (0.55) | 1.28** (0.55) |
| Religious Fractionalization | 0.11 (0.69) | 0.38 (0.72) | 0.62 (0.68) | 0.76 (0.73) | 0.87 (0.75) | 1.12 (0.73) |
| Excluded Population | 1.24*** (0.47) | 0.99** (0.49) | | 1.27*** (0.49) | 1.09** (0.50) | |
| Mountainous Terrain | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.01) | 0.01** (0.01) |
| Bad Neighborhood | 0.14** (0.07) | 0.15** (0.07) | 0.15** (0.07) | 0.13 (0.08) | 0.12 (0.08) | 0.15* (0.08) |
| Ln Population (lag) | 0.26** (0.11) | 0.30*** (0.11) | 0.30*** (0.11) | 0.29** (0.12) | 0.31*** (0.12) | 0.31*** (0.11) |
| Oil Dependency | 1.77*** (0.40) | 1.63*** (0.44) | 1.61*** (0.43) | 1.78*** (0.44) | 1.65*** (0.44) | 1.63*** (0.43) |
| External Threat | -0.83*** (0.31) | -0.94*** (0.31) | -1.02*** (0.31) | -0.98*** (0.32) | -1.06*** (0.32) | -1.16*** (0.32) |
| GDP Growth (lag) | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) |
| Mineral Rent | 0.03 (0.11) | 0.04 (0.11) | 0.04 (0.10) | 0.06 (0.12) | 0.06 (0.11) | 0.05 (0.10) |
| Mineral Rent Square | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.01) |
| Post-Cold War | -0.70** (0.29) | -0.69** (0.29) | -0.94*** (0.29) | -0.66** (0.30) | -0.61** (0.30) | -0.81*** (0.29) |
| Drought | -0.76 (0.53) | -0.74 (0.52) | -0.74 (0.52) | -0.74 (0.53) | -0.71 (0.52) | -0.71 (0.52) |
| Ln Population Density (lag) | 0.03 (0.13) | 0.07 (0.14) | -0.01 (0.13) | 0.05 (0.14) | 0.07 (0.14) | -0.01 (0.13) |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Population Growth (lag) | 0.04 (0.12) | 0.02 (0.12) | -0.07 (0.11) | -0.01 (0.14) | -0.00 (0.14) | -0.09 (0.12) |
| Peace Years | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | | | |
| Peace Years Square | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | | | |
| Peace Years Cubed | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | | | |
| Lagged Civil War | | | | -0.89 (0.77) | -0.90 (0.77) | -1.13 (0.76) |
| Middle East | | | | 0.66 (0.75) | 0.51 (0.75) | 0.56 (0.73) |
| Asia | | | | -0.26 (0.74) | -0.11 (0.73) | -0.09 (0.71) |
| Africa | | | | -0.54 (0.76) | -0.47 (0.75) | -0.48 (0.73) |
| Americas | | | | 0.29 (0.69) | 0.20 (0.70) | 0.38 (0.68) |
| Constant | -6.79*** (1.71) | -8.88*** (1.99) | -8.97*** (1.90) | -5.97*** (1.91) | -7.96*** (2.18) | -8.01*** (2.09) |
| Observations | 3,905 | 3,905 | 4,273 | 3,803 | 3,803 | 4,197 |
| Insig2u | -12.82 (15.45) | -12.56 (15.74) | -12.36 (29.05) | | | |

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6 Physical Quality of Life, Strategic Consensus, & Civil War

| Variables | OLS (PCSE) Accommodation | OLS (PCSE) Coercion | Logit Civil War | Logit Civil War | Logit Civil War |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| PQLI [♀] | 0.01*** (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.03*** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02*** (0.01) |
| De Facto Open [♀] | -1.13*** (0.10) | 11.06*** (1.01) | 0.70* (0.39) | 0.79** (0.36) | 0.75** (0.37) |
| PQLI x Open | 0.02*** (0.00) | -0.18*** (0.01) | | | |
| Accommodation [♀] | | | | -0.97*** (0.20) | |
| Coercion [♀] | | | | | 0.07*** (0.01) |
| Constant | -1.28*** (0.06) | 35.60*** (0.86) | -2.87*** (0.40) | -4.35*** (0.54) | -5.48*** (0.50) |
| Observations | 5,380 | 5,335 | 5,249 | 5,249 | 5,205 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.48 | 0.13 | | | |
| Chi Square | 1272.93*** | 262.76*** | 16.87*** | 47.46*** | 73.99*** |

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models

Table A.7 Physical Quality of Life, Strategic Consensus, & Civil War

| Variables | OLS (PCSE) Accommodation | OLS (PCSE) Coercion | Logit Civil War | Logit Civil War | Logit Civil War |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| PQLI [♀] | 0.02*** (0.00) | -0.07*** (0.01) | -0.02** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02** (0.01) |
| De Facto Open [♀] | -1.14*** (0.11) | 9.55*** (1.31) | 1.57*** (0.60) | 1.567*** (0.573) | 1.48** (0.67) |
| PQLI x Open | 0.02*** (0.00) | -0.15*** (0.02) | | | |
| Accommodation [♀] | | | | -0.75** (0.31) | |
| Coercion [♀] | | | | | 0.08*** (0.01) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.56 (0.42) | 1.25** (0.60) | 1.31** (0.58) | 1.40** (0.57) |
| Religious Fractionalization | 0.47*** (0.03) | -3.37*** (0.40) | -0.12 (0.63) | 0.03 (0.68) | 0.54 (0.64) |
| Excluded Population | | | 1.75*** (0.46) | 1.38*** (0.50) | |
| Mountainous Terrain | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.04*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| Bad Neighborhood | -0.02*** (0.01) | 0.37*** (0.09) | 0.15* (0.09) | 0.13 (0.08) | 0.12 (0.08) |
| Ln Population [♀] | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.28*** (0.09) | 0.34*** (0.12) | 0.37*** (0.12) | 0.42*** (0.12) |
| Oil Exporter | -0.25*** (0.07) | 1.16 (0.74) | 1.22*** (0.38) | 1.23*** (0.37) | 1.14*** (0.34) |
| External Threat | -0.15*** (0.01) | 3.33*** (0.28) | -0.96*** (0.25) | -1.09*** (0.23) | -1.19*** (0.24) |
| GDP Growth [♀] | 0.004* (0.00) | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Mineral Rent | -0.03*** (0.01) | 0.05 (0.08) | 0.06 (0.09) | 0.05 (0.09) | 0.05 (0.08) |
| Mineral Rent Square | 0.00*** (0.00) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Post-Cold War | -0.15*** (0.03) | 1.70*** (0.41) | -0.56* (0.34) | -0.62* (0.35) | -0.87*** (0.32) |
| Drought | -0.10** (0.04) | 0.43 (0.46) | -0.94* (0.52) | -0.99* (0.51) | -0.91* (0.54) |
| Ln Population Density [♀] | 0.00 | 0.18** | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.12 |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | (0.00) | (0.08) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.16) |
| Population Growth [♀] | 0.03* | 0.35*** | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.16* |
| | (0.01) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Peace Years | | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Peace Years Square | | | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Peace Years Cubed | | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Constant | -1.59*** | 33.07*** | -8.88*** | -10.29*** | -11.81*** |
| | (0.10) | (1.11) | (1.55) | (1.39) | (1.47) |
| Observations | 3,950 | 3,918 | 3,551 | 3,551 | 3,875 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.53 | 0.25 | | | |
| Chi Square | 7925.14*** | 4145.87*** | 168.81*** | 226.94*** | 225.02*** |

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models.

Table A.8 Infant Mortality, Strategic Consensus & Civil War

| Variables | OLS (PCSE) Accommodation | OLS (PCSE) Coercion | Logit Civil War | Logit Civil War | Logit Civil War |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Infant Mortality [♀] | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.01** (0.00) | 0.005 (0.004) | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| De Facto Open [♀] | 0.94*** (0.05) | -7.51*** (0.48) | 1.55*** (0.48) | 1.55*** (0.47) | 1.50*** (0.54) |
| Mortality x Open | -0.01*** (0.00) | 0.08*** (0.01) | | | |
| Accommodation [♀] | | | | -0.61** (0.29) | |
| Coercion [♀] | | | | | 0.06*** (0.01) |
| Ethnic Frac. | | | 0.57 (0.69) | 0.67 (0.67) | 0.39 (0.79) |
| Religious Frac. | | | 0.13 (0.61) | 0.27 (0.64) | 0.77 (0.66) |
| Excluded Population | | | 1.19*** (0.44) | 0.93** (0.46) | |
| Mountainous Terrain | | | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) |
| Bad Neighborhood | | | 0.19** (0.08) | 0.18** (0.08) | 0.19** (0.08) |
| Ln Population [♀] | | | 0.24** (0.11) | 0.28** (0.11) | 0.30*** (0.12) |
| Oil Exporter | | | 1.31*** (0.41) | 1.29*** (0.40) | 1.16*** (0.37) |
| External Threat | | | -0.72*** (0.27) | -0.84*** (0.26) | -0.84*** (0.27) |
| GDP Growth [♀] | | | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| Mineral Rent | | | 0.02 (0.08) | 0.03 (0.08) | 0.00 (0.06) |
| Mineral Rent Square | | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Post-Cold War | | | -0.55* (0.31) | -0.63** (0.31) | -0.74** (0.31) |
| Drought | | | -0.49 (0.43) | -0.52 (0.42) | -0.50 (0.43) |
| Ln Population Density [♀] | | | 0.01 | 0.04 | -0.04 |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| Population Growth [♀] | | | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| | | | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.11 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| Peace Years | | | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.02 |
| | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Peace Years Square | | | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.000377 |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Peace Years Cubed | | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Constant | -0.04 | 35.78*** | -9.27*** | -9.52*** | -11.50*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.37) | (1.11) | (1.13) | (1.32) |
| Observations | 6,076 | 6,008 | 3,915 | 3,915 | 4,283 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.49 | 0.12 | | | |

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models

Table A.9 Number of Legislative Parties, Strategic Consensus & Civil War

| Variables | OLS (PCSE) Accommodation | OLS (PCSE) Coercion | Logit Civil War | Logit Civil War | Logit Civil War |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Legislative Open [♀] | -1.41*** (0.09) | 7.65*** (0.95) | 0.97*** (0.29) | 1.05*** (0.29) | 0.96*** (0.27) |
| Ln GDP per Capita [♀] | 0.23*** (0.01) | -1.39*** (0.12) | -0.26** (0.12) | -0.05 (0.12) | -0.25** (0.12) |
| GDP x Open | 0.25*** (0.01) | -1.47*** (0.12) | | | |
| Accommodation [♀] | | | | -0.71** (0.31) | |
| Coercion [♀] | | | | | 0.07*** (0.02) |
| Ethnic Frac. | | | 0.93 (0.60) | 0.95 (0.58) | 0.96 (0.72) |
| Religious Frac. | | | 0.05 (0.58) | 0.31 (0.62) | 0.73 (0.60) |
| Excluded Population | | | 1.31*** (0.41) | 1.05** (0.42) | |
| Mountain | | | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.01** (0.00) |
| Bad Neighborhood | | | 0.15** (0.07) | 0.15** (0.07) | 0.171** (0.07) |
| Ln Population [♀] | | | 0.26** (0.12) | 0.31*** (0.11) | 0.31*** (0.12) |
| Oil Exporter | | | 1.85*** (0.42) | 1.68*** (0.42) | 1.69*** (0.37) |
| External Threat | | | -0.77*** (0.27) | -0.89*** (0.25) | -0.97*** (0.26) |
| GDP Growth [♀] | | | -0.03* (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.03* (0.02) |
| Mineral Rent | | | 0.05 (0.09) | 0.06 (0.08) | 0.06 (0.07) |
| Mineral Rent Square | | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Post-Cold War | | | -0.57** (0.29) | -0.58** (0.29) | -0.86*** (0.29) |
| Drought | | | -0.81* (0.44) | -0.80* (0.44) | -0.78* (0.44) |
| Ln Population Density [♀] | | | 0.05 | 0.11 | 0.01 |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Population Growth [♀] | | | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| | | | 0.06 | 0.06 | -0.06 |
| | | | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.13) |
| Peace Years | | | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.00 |
| | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Peace Years Square | | | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Peace Years Cubed | | | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Constant | -2.11*** | 46.39*** | -6.55*** | -8.98*** | -9.08*** |
| | (0.07) | (1.03) | (1.68) | (1.44) | (1.78) |
| Observations | 5,439 | 5,392 | 3,905 | 3,905 | 4,273 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.70 | 0.26 | | | |

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

♀ These variables are lagged one year in the civil war models

Table A.10 Logit Models of Internal Armed Conflicts (UCDP/PRIO)

| Variables | Minor | Minor | Minor | Any Intrastate | Any Intrastate | Any Intrastate |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Ln GDP per Capita (lag) | -0.19* (0.11) | -0.05 (0.13) | -0.16 (0.11) | -0.18 (0.11) | 0.07 (0.13) | -0.14 (0.12) |
| De Facto Open (lag) | 0.84*** (0.30) | 0.90*** (0.30) | 0.87*** (0.30) | 0.63** (0.32) | 0.76** (0.31) | 0.70** (0.31) |
| Accommodation (lag) | | -0.33** (0.16) | | | -0.63*** (0.17) | |
| Coercion (lag) | | | 0.05*** (0.01) | | | 0.08*** (0.01) |
| Constant | -1.27 (0.88) | -2.37** (1.04) | -3.37*** (1.04) | -0.84 (0.92) | -2.91*** (1.12) | -4.03*** (1.19) |
| Observations | 5,283 | 5,283 | 5,237 | 5,283 | 5,283 | 5,237 |
| Chi Square | 12.96*** | 16.51*** | 52.21*** | 7.64** | 20.62*** | 69.22*** |

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Minor: internal armed conflicts with at least 25 battle-deaths but less than 1000 battle-deaths.

Any intrastate: internal armed conflicts resulting in 25 battle-deaths or higher.