

THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ATTACHÉ:
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND ROLE FULFILLMENT

by

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The end of World War II was a benchmark of change in institutional responsibilities for United States foreign policy making. Prior to 1940, foreign policy making below the level of the President was largely the responsibility of the State Department. After the war, the new consolidated Department of Defense (DoD) and the emergent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assumed broader roles in the foreign policy process in response to apparent alliance, security, and information requirements of postwar diplomacy.¹ Although the State Department is still the primary cabinet agency responsible for policy formation and conduct of U.S. relations with foreign governments, the political responsibilities of the military have expanded.² This expansion has also introduced increased responsibilities for military officers in political and quasi-political assignments although acceptable norms for specific military responsibilities have not been established.³ The contemporary military attaché exemplifies this expanded political responsibility. The attaché is a structurally elite career officer who works directly with civilian diplomats in the formation and

implementation of United States foreign policy while maintaining primary ties to the military establishment.

This investigation locates the military attaché at the conjunction of diplomatic and military systems and describes the attaché's responsibilities as dictated by statute, tradition, and structural and functional factors in his typical operational environment. This study examines these responsibilities first against the background of typical career political socializing experiences prior to appointment, and second under constraints associated with the attaché's dual roles as an embassy staff member and as a military officer.

Aside from pre-World War II stereotypes, little is known about what behavior is expected from military attachés, and there are few norms for anticipating and evaluating the ability of military attachés in coping with their apparent broadened responsibilities. The institution of military observers in the diplomatic corps is ancient, but, in contemporary scholarship, the military attaché is either ignored or disparaged. Available literature concerning the U.S. foreign policy process makes little mention of the military attaché.⁴ Scholars suggest a decline of the institution on the grounds of professional limitations of military careerists and on the grounds of insurmountable obstacles in the position of military attaché. Burton

M. Sapin mentions the decline; Elmer Plischke recognizes the position and includes it in a listing of elements; Cecil V. Crabb fails to mention the military attaché in his foreign policy analysis.⁵ Alfred Vagts' The Military Attaché is the only general study, in English, of the subject.⁶ Vagts' survey is a broad treatment of the influence of military attachés in the past, and is devoted mainly to non-United States attachés. In January 1972, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) commissioned a history of United States military attachés.⁷ The lack of attention given the institution of the military attaché in the study of foreign policy and military organizations has several implications. The first implication is that the position is insignificant and not worthy of investigation since it contributes little to the foreign policy process. However, the Foreign Service List, an official State Department document, lists the attaché section as one of the major sections of the country team. A second related implication is that the total number of military officers involved at one time is too small to merit consideration by either foreign policy analysts or students of military sociology and politics. A third implication is that the study of State-Defense relationships has concentrated on elite, domestic relations with little consideration given to subordinate elements in

the field.

The skeptical and disparaging view of the diplomat-officer emerges in a 1966 article by Raymond J. Barrett in Military Review, an official organ of the Army's Command and General Staff College (C&GSC). Barrett suggests that the attaché does not possess the necessary breadth of skills to operate in political assignments outside of the strict military field.⁸ Barrett classifies the requisite skills in two categories.⁹ His first category includes the military expertise developed through service and training experience. This expertise should then be integrated with his second category, that of a consciously developed sensitivity to the interaction of political and social considerations in public policy. In his view, military officers, typically, do not meet the requirements of the second category. Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, in 1954, anticipated Barrett's criticism. In a description of the "military mind", they suggested that typical officers inadequately weigh non-military factors in solving military problems and are unable to understand complex political-military relationships.¹⁰

The patent, albeit controversial, political responsibility of military officers in contemporary United States foreign policy, military alliances, and military advisory operations, implies that scholarship cannot afford either inattention or empirically remiss

disparagement of the institution of the military attaché. Moreover, there is no convincing evidence that role inferences, by themselves, explain military attaché behavior or provide more than a self-fulfilling basis for evaluation. A deeper examination of actor socialization is required at this stage of attaché analysis. Stereotyped approaches of Barrett and others foreclose -- rather than promote -- practical, useful evaluation of behavioral norms, and evaluation of an institution which is firmly embedded in the United States' and other countries' diplomatic practice.

The following chapter describes State Department-Defense Department relationships affecting the military attaché and traces the background of the institution. A discussion of the selection process for military attachés concludes with a description of the sample of military attachés surveyed for this study. Chapter three discusses characteristic political socialization of career officers who are appointed as military attachés. Chapter four examines attaché responses against a model of structural and functional components of the role of military attaché.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The defense attaché system is a subsystem of two United States executive agencies: the Department of State and Department of Defense, one responsible for broad foreign policy and representation, and the other responsible for the operation of United States armed forces. Their shared responsibility for representation and information defines the setting in which the military attaché works, and the qualifications for his appointment.

State-Defense Relationships

The Department of State advises the President on foreign policy, supervises the foreign service, conducts negotiations with foreign governments, and promotes productive relations with other countries in trade, international development, and cultural exchange. Through its various bureaus, such as the geographical desks for European, Inter-American, and Far Eastern Affairs, the State Department helps corrdinate the flow of information on other countries and international organizations. The Department of Defense, as part of its primary security mission, is responsible for military research and

engineering, weapons systems evaluations, installations and logistics, supplies, personnel and manpower, communications, institutions for advanced training, intelligence, and international security affairs. These responsibilities are accomplished through the staff agencies of the three military services, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Both departments depend on a flow of information relating to international security and to a coherent foreign policy.¹¹

Since World War II, United States isolationism has, unquestionably, declined. During the pre-war period, foreign and military policy were more easily separated.¹² Today, in the view of some observers, the terms military and foreign policy, as well as the terms economy, use and availability of resources, people and social patterns and characteristics, have all become subcategories of national security.¹³ State and Defense are two central agencies among many involved in determination of policy for national security, suggesting requirements for cooperation and liaison between the agencies to include an exchange of information and personnel.¹⁴ Establishment of contact points for information exchange, and efforts toward long-range planning would be expected.

Burton M. Sapin, a political scientist and former State Department aide, suggests how erratic the movement toward cooperation has been.¹⁵ Sapin posits that a

major reason for this situation was the lack of trained, experienced military analysts in the State Department.¹⁶ Consequently, the efforts of State were considered inadequate between 1946 and 1961, when State established a Politico-Military Affairs staff.¹⁷ Joint efforts at long-range planning are now being conducted, with State recently being required to review and comment on the Defense budget.¹⁸

Establishment of the Military Attaché System

The United States Military Attaché System was established during a period of relative diplomatic calm for the nation. The need for the type of information gathered by military attachés was recognized in 1880. War Department General Order Number 64, on August 25, 1880, required officers traveling in foreign countries to obtain, and to report in writing to the Adjutant General, information of value to the military service. Such a report, rendered by Lieutenant F. V. Greene on the Russian army and its campaigns in Turkey (1877-1878), filled an information gap for the U.S. War Department concerning Russian army operations and organizations. This type of military information was not considered important by the War Department until 1886, when Secretary of War William C. Endicott requested that the Adjutant General furnish him, immediately, with information

regarding a foreign army. Much to his embarrassment, General Richard C. Drum, the Adjutant General, did not have the requested information. No staff department had the responsibility for gathering and filing such data. General Drum, to prevent a recurrence, established a unit in his office for the collection of military data concerning United States and foreign armies. Called the Division of Military Information, this office originated the military attaché system.

Congress, by the Act of September 22, 1888, officially established the attaché system, and the first military attachés were detailed to the U.S. legations in London and Berlin on March 11, 1889. Later, that year, attachés were detailed to Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. Attaché instructions were to report monthly (or more often as circumstances might require) to the Secretary of War on matters of a military or of a technical nature which might be of interest and of value to any branch of the War Department or the service at large.¹⁹ The Army and the Navy assigned attachés to various countries. These attachés reported back to their particular service arms.

With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the Air Force was created and another service representative was added to the system. From 1947 to 1964, military advisors and representatives proliferated.²⁰

In addition to the attaché sections, U.S. Forces and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) were established in many foreign countries. This proliferation created coordination problems which Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara finally sought to resolve in 1964. At the center of the difficulty were the three service attachés (Army, Navy and Air Force), each reporting back to his respective service with the possibility at least, of service bias. The U.S. Forces and MAAG's further aggravated the situation by usurping some of the traditional attache functions, such as liaison with the host countries' military forces and monitoring of force training. Direct day-to-day contact for the service arm was better maintained through the offices of the MAAG's, as was the supervision and monitorship of training. This program provided a higher quality of technical assistance to the host country by the presence of trained, experienced technicians. Since this program was not provided in all countries, those attachés not affected were able to operate in more traditional ways. To resolve the proliferation problems, McNamara, in 1964, changed the system by centralizing control under the Defense Intelligence Agency, a part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).²¹ Under the system, as changed by McNamara, the senior attaché in each country was designated the

defense attaché (DATT). As suggested by the title, the individual assumed the responsibility for the attaché system in his country. The reporting system was also changed so that the defense attaché reported to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS rather than to his particular service arm.²² Each service arm was given the responsibility of providing the defense attaché for selected countries. For example, the Army provides the defense attaché for Brazil, France, and Belgium. The Navy provides the defense attaché for Italy, Greece, and Uruguay. The Air Force is responsible for Canada, Thailand, and Honduras. No particular significance is discernible in the assignment responsibility. This change was designed to bring about inter-service cooperation among attachés in a host country, and to direct the attaché reports to a higher joint level rather than just the service level. Likewise, the ambassador now had one point of contact for the military information flow rather than three.

Although coordinative needs were served, this reorganization heightened the need to determine the attachés' responsibilities, particularly with MAAG or U.S. forces deeply involved in post-World War II political affairs. The attempt to satisfy each service, since overall responsibility was moved to DIA, created a new problem. Uruguay illustrates this problem graphically

in that the main service arm is the Army while a naval officer is the defense attaché. A graphic portrayal of attaché location in both systems is presented in figures II-1 and II-2.

Institutionalization of the attaché system is demonstrated by its adherence to institutional properties: the system is well bounded, it is relatively complex, and it uses universalistic criteria for conducting business. The property of being well bounded means that the system can be differentiated from its environment. Differentiation is demonstrated by the following criteria: attachés are selected from the military system, and military attachés are easily identified in their working environment. This selection is based on established position requirements. Meeting these requirements does not guarantee an officer assignment as an attaché since host countries eventually reject two out of three selected officers.²³ Having been accepted as an embassy staff member, the military attaché is unique since he is the only senior staff member who wears a uniform, making identification quite easy. In crises, such as the 1966 labor disputes in Nicaragua, and the 1964 coup d'état attempt in Honduras, attaché personnel may not be permitted to wear uniforms. Identification becomes more difficult, but individual officers gain protection against direct verbal or physical

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Figure II-1
Attaché in Department of Defense





Figure II-2
Attaché in Department of State



attacks on a representative of a foreign military.

The cross system movement of the attaché and the subsystem status of the position merely suggest that the functions of the attaché are indeed complex. Having been socialized as a United States military officer, and having developed role orientations related closely to military variables, the attaché must then undergo a new socialization process of which the U.S. military is only a part. During the socialization process, the attaché must develop new role orientations toward the U.S. military and, in addition, he must develop role orientations toward the U.S. diplomatic corps, and toward host country variables to include military and governmental elements and, possibly, other foreign country variables. Instead of being a military officer functioning in the military system, the attaché is now a military officer functioning in the diplomatic system.

A degree of complexity was removed in 1964 by centralizing the attaché system under the DIA. This centralization suggests the use of a universalistic criteria for the conduct of business for the system as a whole. Instead of each service is providing direction for its separate attachés, direction for all attachés now emanates from one source through the defense attaché. Although each country must receive separate treatment,

depending upon the situation, instructions are provided in the name of the Defense Department, and not just in the name of the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force.

Attaché Selection and Host Country Expectations

Assuming host country expectations have an influence on selection criteria, parallels between the two should be easily drawn. Selection criteria can be separated into two broad categories: military requirements and personal requirements. There is also a language requirement included in these two broad categories since it represents a requirement of special significance.

The military requirements specify that the individual have the rank of captain or higher, a well balanced career in command and staff assignments with intelligence experience, an outstanding service record with at least one year of service remaining after the end of the attaché assignment, and attendance at military schools through the Command and General Staff College level. Paralleling these prerequisites, host countries expect an officer, although no rank is indicated, to have a well balanced career, outstanding service record, and military education through the C&GS level. Since they desire a C&GS graduate, rank should be understood to be at least captaincy; an officer must be a captain before he can attend C&GS.

Personal requirements include a baccalaureate degree; a good appearance with no embarrassing handicaps plus the capability of meeting physical classification requirements; U.S. citizenship with no foreign influence, family problems, or business complications; and a personality that is sociable, loyal and pleasing.²⁴ Although not specifically stated, it is desired that the individual be married. Host country expectations paralleling the prerequisites are that the individual be married, have a pleasing personality and be of good character, and have a family readily adjustable to the new environs.²⁵

Selection criteria and host country expectations indicate a required language ability in the language of the host country. Two major reasons for rejection of an individual by a host country are unmarried status and lack of language ability. No parallel can be drawn to the host countries' desires for West Point graduates. Based on the past reputation of West Point, this may imply simply that the attaché should be the formally best qualified military officer available.

From its beginning in the 1880's, with representation in three countries, the attaché system has expanded to representation in 87 countries, with Army personnel serving 83 of these countries.²⁷ The best source of information would be provided by attachés

serving in countries which share mutual interests with the United States. The interests should cover a broad range, including economic, social, scientific, cultural, and defense interests. Regional interests rather than bilateral interests would better show the mutual interest. An example is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is basically a multilateral defense arrangement, of which the United States is a member. Collective interests are not restricted to defense measures. Other defense arrangements of this nature are the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) for defense and economic cooperation, and the Organization of American States (OAS) for defense, economic, social, educational, and cultural exchanges in the Western hemisphere. The 1961 Alliance for Progress agreement, an economic program for development in Latin America, involves the OAS members (except for Cuba) in such a mutual interest program. These nations would permit the military attaché a broad latitude of freedom to travel within the country and would provide access to neighboring countries. These organizations represent forty nations with thirty-two army attachés assigned. Questionnaires were sent to each of the army attachés resulting in a 65 per cent response with 53 per cent providing data for the survey. Former army attachés, through an open letter to the Army Times, November 17,

1971, were invited to participate, thereby providing data from 1965, the starting point for current data, back to 1946. Additional data, in the form of biographical information on eleven current army attachés (who chose not to respond) were provided by DIA. The data base was formed by completed questionnaires from ten former attachés and seventeen current attachés, and biographical data on eleven other current attachés.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The defense attaché system has both formal and informal mechanisms for the socialization of its members. The new attaché must learn the norms of behavior and the limitations and potentialities of his roles. Socialization stress may be just as difficult for the new ambassador and other new staff members. The socialization most germane to the military attaché's broadened political responsibilities is political socialization. This chapter examines socializing instruments in typical officer careers, although political socialization begins long before an officer receives his commission.²⁸ This political socialization may be defined as the development and inculcation of norms which help the eventual military attaché interpret his role and guide his behavior.

Political socialization is a relatively new field of study when compared with religious, economic, or even military socialization. Morris Janowitz, in The Professional Soldier, associates political socialization with adaption to the new requirements of international relations.²⁹ Janowitz asserts that one of the demands on the military is an increased responsibility toward political affairs.³⁰ The military attaché is socialized

as a professional military officer and not as a diplomat in the classic sense of the word. The induction, training, and career patterns are referred to by Janowitz as professional socialization.³¹

Samuel Huntington, in The Soldier and The State, traces the professionalism of the United States military officer and relates it to such values as nationalism, belief in the state as the basic political organization, and a mission orientation leading to a realistic and conservative military ethic.³²

To determine norms, it is necessary to explore those mechanisms which influence and affect the military officer and lead to development and inculcation of those norms. Several mechanisms are available for examination of a typical officer career. Among these mechanisms are branch, types of assignments, and education. These variables define the officer's career and are influential in developing and instilling the norms which the attaché will use to interpret his role and guide his behavior.

Branch

Branch, signifying an Army officer's specialization, helps shape an officer's self-image as "warrior" or "manager" as well as his perspectives on integrated command and on execution and support of complex missions.

The several branches of the Army are divided into three categories: combat arms, combat support, and combat service support. For the purpose of this

investigation, two classifications, combat arms and non-combat arms, will be used. Table III-1 depicts the branch assignments of the sample.

Table III-1

Sample Attachés by Branch

<u>Branch</u>		
Artillery	18.4%	(7)
Infantry	36.8	(14)
Armor	21.1	(8)
Military Intelligence	15.8	(6)
Other	7.9	(3)
Total	100.0%	N=38

The combat arms include infantry, artillery, and armor branches of the army. Janowitz pointed out that the military controls the instruments of violence.³³ These branches directly exercise that control for the army.

The ultimate mission of a military force is to wage war, regardless of the type of war. War, here, means the use of instruments of violence to inflict damage on some kind of enemy. Since the combat arms control the instruments of war, officers of those branches are trained in -- and are responsible for -- the use of the tools. The implication is that combat arms officers, by virtue of their training and of their mission with reference to the instruments of violence, depict the

"warrior" image. Officers in other than combat arms branches, then, depict the "managerial" image. The mission of the "managerial" type is to supervise the planning and installation of communications, roads, transportation and supply systems, which support the conduct of the war.

Based on the mission of the military to wage war, and the assumption that the "warrior" type is better oriented for this mission than the "managerial" type, the United States and the host countries assign and prefer a combat arms officer who symbolizes the "classic" military mission, to analyze the military situation. This is an objectively irrational criterion. The non-combat staff support officer may be just as qualified -- or perhaps better qualified -- for the staff role and information gathering requirements of military attaché. This approach is a more "rational" criterion. For example, the Military Intelligence (MI) share found in Table III-1 may indicate a breaking down of old preferences. This service, prior to branch establishment in 1962, relied on officers from other branches to perform the intelligence function. These officers were subject to branch assignments based on needs and were moved from intelligence assignments as branch needs changed. The Department of the Army (DA) determined that it was sufficiently important for officers oriented to the

intelligence mission to remain in that field, and, for this reason, a separate intelligence branch was formed. Since these officers were members of other branches prior to 1962, they were mission-oriented and served assignments in those branches. Of the six MI attaches in Table III-1, five served in combat arms prior to transfer with a minimum period of service of four years. For the three attachés shown as "other", all served in a combat arm during their career.

Assignments

Assignments for military officers are made by branch, and fall into two general categories -- command and staff. While defining the officer's career, assignments help to develop the unity-of-command ethic, which is a guiding factor in the future attaché's behavior. The unity of command ethic presumes support for the responsible command who, in the case of the attaché, is the ambassador. Additionally, assignments serve to inculcate the mission orientation developed in the branch variable. A variety of assignments supports the well balanced career requirements for selection as an attaché. Without this balance, it can be assumed that the officer would not be selected to serve as an attaché. Although the distinction between command-staff assignments is not important relative to the ethic developed, separate treatment is presented as command assignments demonstrate a

structurally elite officer.

The military officer serving as an attaché is considered a staff officer. Table III-2 shows the various staff assignments in which the sample members served.

Table III-2

Attachés as Staff Officers
Staff Positions Served by Members Prior
to Duty as an Attaché

<u>Position</u>	<u>Number</u>
Intelligence	27
Operations	22
Personnel	11
Logistics	8
Special	7

N = 27

Once determined that an officer had served an assignment in a specific staff position, subsequent assignments to that staff position were not considered for purposes of Table III-2. All staff assignments were prior to attaché duty.

Staff officers, in general, are responsible for supporting the commander by providing him information relative to their staff positions upon which he can make a decision. Staff officers have no authority, except in the name of the commander, and once a decision is announced, their efforts are directed at support of that

decision regardless of prior recommendations. For example, in briefing the commander, the intelligence officer may recommend defense. The commander, after having received the entire staff briefing, decides to attack. The intelligence officer must now support the decision and reevaluate the available information to support the attack.

Of the staff positions shown, operations is considered important due to the coordination efforts required in support of an operation. Examination of Table III-2 shows all sample members served as intelligence staff officers with operations being the positions served in next, frequently. In opposition to the positions of Sapin and Snyder, as presented in Chapter 1, intelligence analysts must consider non-military factors in solving military problems. Such factors include local civilian and economic situations and support. When related to the branch variable, and the finding that attachés serving in the military intelligence branch are essentially equal to those serving in either armor or artillery branches, the importance of the intelligence staff assignment should be anticipated. When the staff experience, evident in the sample, is related to the staff position of the attaché, it can be assumed the unity of command ethic and the mission orientation are applied. This application, along with the intelligence orientation demonstrated in both the branch variable and the staff

category of the assignment variable, implies that the attaché has the ability for coordination with other embassy staff members, and that he is able to consider non-military factors in a military analysis to support the ambassador.

Command assignments, while they serve to demonstrate a well balanced career and a structurally elite officer, also develop the unity of command ethic and strengthen mission orientation. The staff provides information for decision-making. The commander is the decision maker. Janowitz posits that the most influential positions in the army are command positions in the combat arms.³⁴ Command positions are divided into three levels: lower, platoon level; middle, company level; and higher, battalion or brigade level. Officers who are successful at the lower levels of command will probably not be selected for command positions at a level higher than the one at which they were unsuccessful. Table III-3 depicts the command distribution, first by level, then by different levels, for the sample.

Commanders at lower levels are responsible to higher level commanders just as the staff officer is responsible to his immediate commander for accomplishment of a mission. As an officer advances in rank, the opportunity for command decreases because there are fewer high command positions. The responsibility of the position, however,

Table III-3

Levels of Command Distribution Prior
to Assignments as Attaché

<u>Levels</u>	<u>By level Percentage</u>	<u>(N-31)</u>	<u>Various Levels</u>	
			<u>Levels</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Lower	77.4	(24)	Only 1 level	9.7 (3)
Middle	90.3	(28)	Only 2 levels	29.0 (9)
Higher	83.8	(26)	All 3 levels	<u>61.3</u> (19)
			Total	100 N-31

increases with higher level command positions. The high percentage of the sample, having served as commanders at the higher level, and having served at all three defined levels, suggests success at the previous levels, leading to additional command assignments. It can be concluded that the sample members comprise a structurally elite group. Furthermore, the high percentage shown to have served at two or more levels of command attests to balanced careers.

Education

The education variable for the military attaché is divided into two general categories, military and civilian. Each category suggests the allocation of different values for the military attaché. Military education develops certain values and norms for the officer and further

allocates those values and norms to specific military use. Civilian education develops values and norms which are allocated to use in another area, not necessarily the military, such as economics, social studies, and political science. In general, a military education has specific military use with some possible outside application, while the civilian education has general use with some possible military application.

Military education is further subdivided into two categories: career developing courses, which promote traditions and axioms while providing a strong nationalistic orientation and strengthening mission orientation; and career enhancing courses, which develop an orientation to the state as the basic political organization. There are two career developing courses promulgated by the individual branches, basic and career. Attendance at the branch basic course is usually the first assignment for the newly commissioned officer, while career course attendance usually follows after about five to seven years. These courses acquaint the officer with the mission and function of his branch units, at various levels, as those units fit into the overall accomplishment of the army's mission. Training, at this developmental level, signifies a stereotyped approach as opposed to the more flexible approach found at the career enhancing level. For the army as a whole, all officers attend their branch

basic course while 85 to 90 per cent attend the branch career course. All of the sample attended branch basic course, while 94.8 per cent attended the branch career course.

Career-enhancing courses are those courses which limit attendance to selected individuals. Such a course is C&GSC. Only 50 per cent of all eligible officers are selected for attendance at this course.³⁵ Individual education is more visible at this level as compared with the stereotyped mass training received at the developmental level. Attendance at C&GSC broadens the individual's military knowledge and acquaints him with more intricate staff functions at a higher level. With the widened field of education presented, consideration is given to all branches and services as opposed to a focus on branch, as in previous military education. At the C&GSC level, the officer strengthens the earlier developed orientation toward the state as the basic political organization.³⁶ Subject matter delves into the field of international relations with a consideration of economic, social, and political factors for the solution of military problems. Since only about 50 per cent of all eligible officers attend C&GSC, it is important to note that of the sample, 94.8 per cent attended the course, further suggesting the attaché is a structurally elite officer. Moreover, it suggests that he has had an introductory experience in considering social, economic,

and political factors in solutions to military problems.

Civilian education provides a measure of differentiation for the officer who becomes an attaché. Janowitz and Barrett posit that officers schooled in international relations or a related field could possess the required skills to serve as an attaché. Table III-4 shows the type of degree and the major area of study for the sample, thus providing a key element for analysis of Barrett's statement that attachés do not have the requisite skills. The education received in civilian institutions provides the values of the field of study to the individual for use in a general way, not specifically the military. The officer may use these values and apply them to the military.

Table III-4

Degrees Held by Subject for Attachés

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Baccalau- reate</u>	<u>Master's</u>	<u>Doctor's</u>	<u>Other</u>
International Subjects	2	7	1	
Political Science	1			
Engineering	1	3	1	
Business	3			
Education	3	1		
Military Science	4			
Bacc., field undetermined	5			
No degree				6
Totals	19	11	2	6
			N=38	

To say that an attaché should have an education in a specific field would, of course, be presumptuous. If a

precise definition of the attaché's responsibilities for today's world were available, the type of educational background could be more easily determined. Janowitz and Barrett suggest that a background which permits analysis of economic, social, and political imperatives directly with the military factors is necessary. If this assumption is valid, it should be expected that studies in an international field would be most beneficial for the defense attaché. Such studies should suggest to the individual a need to understand the culture of the environment which he is exploring. International history, history of a foreign area, international relations, foreign area studies, sociology, and political science could best satisfy this background need. Language studies, which include cultural training, likewise would be beneficial.

Communication is understandably a necessary requirement in political discourse whether that discourse be on a local, national, or international level. Lucian W. Pye, in the introduction to Communications and Political Development, points up some of these communication problems. At the international level, language skill is an obvious and acknowledged element of effective communication.³⁷ The language requirements for attachés were shown in chapter two, and all sample members have an ability to use the spoken language of the host country. Language

training and resultant proficiency give the individual the art of verbal communication. This training is concentration on form rather than on substance, whereby the attaché is able to talk across a language barrier. The true meaning of the words may be lost, however, because of a cultural barrier. Words have different meanings in different cultural spheres. The western concepts of words, such as "good," "evil," and "morality," have different meanings in the East. The degree to which an attaché can bridge the cultural barrier with a language proficiency cannot be measured. The ability to bridge the communications barrier through language proficiency can be measured. There are certain implications concerning language ability which are not empirically substantiated. A language ability, on the part of the attaché, gains for him the confidence of his hosts. This confidence is important since he will be working with these people for a period of two to four years. Secondly, when learning the language, there develops an incentive to learn something of the culture and the people. This secondly knowledge should provide better preparation for an assignment to an area where the language learned is spoken.³⁸

Other Variables

Two other mechanisms should be considered in the socialization process of the attaché: previous

assignments in the attaché system, and training received subsequent to selection and prior to assignment as an attaché. Although such files are not maintained by DIA, indications are that about 10 per cent of all officers in the system have served a prior attaché assignment.³⁹ For the 28 current attachés in the sample, three served previously in the attaché system.

Prior to assumption of duties, an officer selected as an attaché attends a training session at the Defense Intelligence School (DIS). An investigation of this training is necessary to complete the attaché's socialization process. The information, although requested, was not made available for this investigation.⁴⁰

Political socialization for the military attaché is a development and inculcation of norms which will assist the officer in interpreting his role, and in guiding his behavior. Branch, the key variable examined, provides the officer a strong mission orientation. This orientation is strengthened in examination of the other variables -- education and assignment. This examination also introduces the unity of command ethic, a sense of nationalism, and the belief that the state is the basic political organization.

The intelligence staff experience gives the officer an opportunity to consider extra-military factors in solving military problems. The course at C&GSC provides a basic introduction to incorporating extra-military

factors into military problem solution. The broad explorations in civilian education, with 30 per cent participating in international relations and political science fields, also assists in considering other than military factors in solving military problems. These points, all applicable to the attaché, create some doubt about the contentions of Barrett, Sapin, and Snyder concerning the attaché's analytical skills.

CHAPTER IV

ATTACHÉ ROLES: EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS

As an identifiable military actor expected to perform established institutionalized tasks in a civilian setting, the military attaché fulfills a role. Role is defined by the expectations of others concerning the player's behavior and by the role player's perceptions of how he should behave. The attaché applies the established socializing norms of his military career to help define his role. To further define the military attaché's role, determination and investigation of the interacting variables is necessary to establish additional norms.

In 20th century social science, George Herbert Mead's Mind, Self and Society is an early formal statement of role theory. Since that time it has been adopted and variously interpreted by analysts in sociology, anthropology, and social psychology, indicating its utility for tying together the concerns of institutional, functional, and behavioral studies in political science. The concept of role has been widely used to investigate the behavior, expectations, and functions of legislators.⁴¹ The wealth of information available for such study has allowed analysts to develop a fairly conclusive scheme in demonstrating relationships between role expectations,

perceptions, and legislator's behavior. The term "role theory" unfortunately implies more genuine theory than in fact is the case in social science. Consequently, there is much hypothesizing about particular aspects of the subject, but there is no one grand theory.

It does not follow from role theory that all military attaché behavior is appropriate role behavior. If the attaché is to consider factors other than military needs, as suggested by Barrett, then his behavior depends on variables more proximate and concrete than the socialization variables of Chapter III. These role variables inhere in the nature of the military attaché post itself, and hence should serve to define the role and lend themselves to an analysis of that role.

The variables affecting the military attaché can be grouped under two broad headings: structural and functional. Included under the structural heading are the ambassador; other members of the U.S. Country Team such as the political officer, economic officer, and the officer in charge of the Agency for International Development (AID); U.S. military influences such as DIA, MAAG or other U.S. forces in the country, and the attaché's own interested branch or arm of service; and host country structures including its military and civilian governmental bodies. This study confines itself to proximate structural variables, which of course are

affected principally by technological changes, changes in the relationship between the State and Defense Departments and the President, and changes in the civilian military relationships within the host country as well as changes in host country military professionalism. Functional variables include the attaché's representational responsibilities either as salesman-entrepreneur or as liaison between the military establishments of the United States and the host country; and his analytical responsibilities, either broadly or narrowly defined of military-extra-military factors.


Figure IV-1 shows various attachés (A, B, & C) and the major structural and functional variables which serve to define the attaché's role. This figure combines objective features of the attaché position with the perspective of the attaché as reflected in sample responses.

Structural Variables

I Ambassador - The military attaché perceives the ambassador as his immediate commander, whom as a staff member, he is responsible to support. This perception derives from the unity of command ethic presented as a socialization norm. The attaché could perceive the ambassador as either a traditionalist or a modernist as depicted by the following statement.

Figure IV-1

Attache Role Variables



I served under two ambassadors in [host countries]. The first encouraged my contacts with any [citizens of host country]. The other discouraged such contacts outside of the military. While the second ambassador was in office, the Army Chief of Staff, with whom I had formed a close friendship, was appointed Prime Minister by the [head of state]. As a result, this source of information was denied the United States due to the ambassador's policy.⁴²

The first ambassador suggests the modernist style whereby the attaché was permitted to make extra-military contacts to obtain information. The style of the second ambassador is suggestive of a traditional style in that contacts outside the military were discouraged. The ambassador, as the head of the United States mission in a host country, influences the representational style of the staff members. Ambassadorial style may be a function of method of appointment to the ambassadorship. A political appointee, unfamiliar with the current diplomatic structure, may have a mandate to concentrate on some specific area such as economics. His visibility is limited to that field while all reports, studies, and programs are written to reflect this area of concentration. As a result, work in other vital areas is made to reflect the economic preoccupation. The political appointee may come into the position and institute changes reversing any recent progress towards a political-military analysis of host country information.

Both instances are suggestive of a traditional style. The second method of appointment is a career-diplomatic promotion, thus bringing to the position a person familiar with the current political structure and knowledgeable in recent operational changes.

The attaché may also come to his position with the notion that he is to analyze only military factors suggesting a traditional style. A modernist would recognize that he should consider extra-military factors in his analysis. When ambassadorial and attaché styles are considered, a possible source of role conflict results. Figure IV-2 shows this style comparison.

Figure IV-2

Sources of role conflict based on
traditional and modernist attitude

Military Attaché Perceptions

		Traditional	Modern
<u>Traditional</u>	Expectation:	Military	Military
	Perception:	Military	Extra-Military
Ambassador	Result:	No Conflict	Conflict
<u>Modern</u>	Expectations:	Extra-Military	Expectation: Extra-Military
	Perception:	Military	Perception: Extra-Military
	Result:	Conflict	Result: No Conflict

The style model depicts the possible relationships between ambassador and attaché: traditional-traditional, traditional-modern, modern-traditional and modern-modern. The case presented depicts a modernist attaché with a modernist ambassador and then a change to an apparently traditionalist ambassador thereby suggesting a role conflict and the loss of an information source to the attaché and the United States as well. A traditional ambassador would expect only a military analysis from the attaché. The traditionally oriented attaché would also perceive this type of analysis resulting in no conflict of roles. A modernist ambassador would expect an extra-military analysis. The traditionalist attaché would not perceive this as his mission and a role conflict would result.

II Country Team - Socializing norms of military staff assignments suggest a need for cooperation and coordination for the military attaché. The Country Team, as the ambassador's staff, is such an assignment. The importance of any one member of the Country Team could vary according to specific problems of the host country, e.g., a military uprising in a distant province would cause important focus on the military attaché. Country Team members would expect an analysis, from the attaché, of the military situation as it applies to their specific fields. The attaché, having been socialized as a staff officer, would

presumably perceive his responsibility to provide the necessary military analysis. A coordinative situation exists in some countries, particularly with the political section. "I work very close with the political officer,"⁴³ or, "My section is co-located with the political section, so we can provide the ambassador with a good political-military report."⁴⁴ These statements suggest a cooperative role between the military attaché and the political members of the Country Team.

III U.S. Military - Three values can be assigned to the U.S. military variable DIA, branch or service arm, and MAAG or U.S. forces in the host country. The expectations and perceptions of these values influence the role of the attaché as to the standpoint of attaché system support.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, as the recipient of the attaché reports to the JCS in accordance with 1964 system changes, expects to receive a full range of military information from the attaché. These reports should include ground, sea, and air information. The attaché in turn perceives this as a part of his assigned mission as suggested in the following statement. The respondent said the mission was accomplished, "by rendering [honest] reports, without regard to the expressed wishes or desires of the local [ambassador] to put the best possible interpretation of events."⁴⁵ Other respondents had a different perception indicating this perception

thusly; there was "little monitoring, support, or direction from service superiors."⁴⁶ This perception suggests that DIA desires may be sent through the ambassador or that reports rendered are complete and do not present a question to DIA interpreters. In either case, a lack of support by DIA is perceived by some attachés, which could foster an attitude that reports are not worth the detailed analysis put into them or further that superiors are not vitally concerned.

Military officers desire to advance in rank and therefore seek assignments which are important and enhance opportunities for advancement. The qualifications for these positions are necessarily limiting and rigid so as to reduce the number of persons eligible to serve. The qualifications for attaché duty are likewise limiting and rigid, and the position is considered important. Attachés, in supporting the attaché system, perceive that in turn the system should be supported by the Army through selection of qualified personnel and through promotion consideration for attachés.

Where qualifications are not met and promotion consideration is not given, a lack of support is perceived. Commenting on qualifications one attaché states,

it is essential that an attaché be competitive and not in his terminal assignment. He should have combat arms experience, C&GSC education, and area experience. There is nothing more disturbing to me professionally than to see a full colonel, without these qualifications, in a terminal assignment as an attaché.⁴⁷

The officers' branch is responsible for promotion consideration. One attaché expresses his opinion of branch support:

Most people in the Army who accept attaché assignments soon learn they have forfeited hopes for advancement. I realized this after returning to the [branch]. Still we are supposedly selecting only outstanding officers for the [system].⁴⁸

Opinions concerning service support are reflected in the following statements. "The separate services have no influence or control in the attaché system and are not concerned except to furnish bodies."⁴⁹ Elaborating on this divisions among the services, another attaché points out, "The Army personnel are, in my experience, head and shoulders above the Navy and Air Force. The Navy tries, but the Air Force apparently just sends anybody."⁵⁰

From the foregoing statements, it appears that some attachés develop an attitude whereby they are expected to support the attaché system, but the same system fails to support them in that apparently unqualified officers are assigned as attachés and consideration for promotion is lacking.

There is little empirical data in the sample to suggest firm perceptions of the attaché concerning MAAG or U.S. forces in country. The MAAG's and other U.S. elements have taken over some functions, such as training and technical assistance, which were formerly a part of the attachés mission. This transfer of responsibility allows the attaché to devote additional time to his staff

role, thereby permitting more time for analysis of extra-military factors, if perceived as a part of the mission and role. Close coordination and cooperation, with a resultant exchange of information between the office of the attaché and other in country U.S. elements, should be anticipated. This cooperation between the two offices should provide an opportunity for added information to the attaché. A reciprocal arrangement with the attaché providing information to the MAAG would depend on the position of the ambassador. Routine exchanges would seem feasible, whereas higher priority information may require ambassadorial approval.

Notable in the U.S. military variable is a negative perception by some attachés regarding the DIA and branch/service arm categories. Since the system has been centralized under DIA, branch/service arm support should be minimal except to provide qualified personnel and to give consideration for promotion to those officers who have served as attachés. The negative perceptions presented suggest some possible problems in the selection process.

IV Host Country - Host Country expectations assume a highly trained military expert, capable of speaking the host country language, and able to adjust socially with his family to the life style of the host country. The attaché perceives his role as requiring him to make contacts with host country officials from whom he can gain essential information. The traditional/modern style of

the attaché imposes itself in this variable as in the ambassador variable. To seek out and make contacts in both military and civilian governmental offices would be the perception of the modern style attaché. In those countries where the military establishment controls the government offices, such as Iran, Greece, and Thailand, the position of the attaché would conceivably be enhanced, possible to the point of being more important than the ambassador's chair.

Figure IV-3 demonstrates how the military attaché could conceivably be placed in the more important position.

Figure IV-3

Type of Government Compared
with attaché style

		Traditional	Modern
Host Country Government	Civilian	Expectations: Civilian=Civilian Military=Military Perceptions: Attaché=Military only Result: Military only source of information	Expectations: Civilian=Civilian Military=Military Perceptions: Attaché=Military or civilian Result: Information from both sources
	Military	Expectations: Military=Civilian & Military Perceptions: Attaché=Military only Result: Possible confusion, middle man	Expectations: Military=Civilian & Military Perceptions: Attaché=any contact Result: Attaché may be more important than Ambassador

The traditional attaché, functioning in a host country civilian controlled government, would experience no difficulty in performing his mission. His perception is to deal with the military which is his only information source. In a military controlled host country government, he may become confused by placing himself in a middle-man position. Whereas, the host government desires to deal with the attaché, but the attaché wants the government to conduct business with the ambassador. This could lead to frustration particularly if the ambassador espouses the traditional style. The modernist, however, may find a greater confidence on the part of the host government in dealing with the military, and may convince his ambassador that he can handle the situation. Ambassadorial support would be required for this situation, and the ambassador-attaché relationship would have to be close.

Functional Variables

Functional variables define the attaché role by providing perceptions of the attaché toward the particular variable. The variables considered as functional are representation and analysis.

V Representation - The representation variable is divided into two types of styles: liaison and salesman. The expectations to be examined are found in the variables of host country and of the other U.S. military elements. If the host country expects the attaché to represent as

in the following statement, "in negotiating mutual arms sales,"⁵¹ then the attaché's perception would be that of a salesman representative, thereby aiding the host country in procuring presumably more modern military equipment for its armed forces. The attaché may perceive his representational role to be liaison oriented as depicted in this statement: "liaison between Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and host Chief of Staff."⁵² The liaison representation could be an important link between the chiefs of staff of the two military establishments.

VI Analysis - The functional variable of analytical requirements is the point where the extra-military analysis need, as suggested by Barrett as a part of the broadened political responsibilities of the military attaché, comes to bear. The style matrix of the ambassadorial variable is closely related to the analysis variable in defining the attaché's role. One attaché states, "I insure that military implications are taken into account."⁵³ Another attaché describes his experience as follows: "As senior military member of the country team with a close [ambassadorial relationship], my comments are always heard...and accepted [concerning] military policy in [host country]."⁵⁴ One attaché reports that he accomplishes his mission "by observing, reporting, and evaluating strategic military, economic, and political overt intelligence in host country."⁵⁵ Another attaché states he is involved in "direct military and political military

reporting."⁵⁶ The role of the military attaché can be broad including extra-military factors or it can be narrow, including only military factors. The role or eventual role is dependent on the interaction of expectations and perceptions from the structural and functional variables encountered by the attaché. These interactions result in emergence of a role which is plagued by conflict or develops smoothly with no conflicts. Conflicting roles result when expectations and perceptions are not compatible, while compatibility may produce non-conflicting roles. Figure IV-4 depicts graphically these role possibilities when controlling for the type of information analyzed.

Figure IV-4

Paradigm: Role conflicts in relation to
information analyzed by attachés

	Non-Conflicting Roles	Conflicting Roles
Extra-Military	Expectations = Perceptions Result: No Conflicts	Expectations = Perceptions Result: Conflicts
Informa- tional Factors	Expectations = Perceptions Result: No Conflicts	Expectations = Perceptions Result: Conflicts
Military Only	Expectations = Perceptions Result: No Conflicts	Expectations = Perceptions Result: Conflicts

Roles involving an extra-military analysis should be attributed to a modernistic attaché, while the military only roles should be attributed to the traditionalistic attaché. The ideal role is achieved with no conflicts and an extra-military analysis. This situation results only when the attaché-ambassador relationship is modern-modern, as shown in Figure IV-2, and all other expectations and perceptions are equal. The least desirable role would result with a traditional-modern, attaché-ambassador role relationship and difficulties matching other expectations and perceptions. Conflicts, as used here, refers only to "intra-role conflicts."⁵⁷

As an identifiable military actor, the military attaché fulfills a role in the diplomatic arena. This role is defined by the expectations and perceptions of structural and functional variables interacting to determine the attaché's eventual role. The limits of the attaché's role help to determine his contribution to the formulation of United States foreign policy and types of military support available to the host country. If variable expectations are traditional and military attaché perceptions are traditional, military information only would form the attaché contribution. However, if expectations permit and the attaché perceptions are modernistic, the contributions to foreign policy formulation should include extra-military considerations approaching

the desires presented by Barrett. Empirical data indicates that military attachés do analyse extra-military information. This analysis is greatly dependent on ambassadorial style, through his control of contacts and sources of information. In this case the attaché perception was to include extra-military factors. Although a negative attitude concerning lack of support is evident, there is no indication that this attitude detracts from role fulfillment.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Functioning at the conjunction of military and diplomatic systems, the contemporary United States military attaché is a formally established element of American foreign policy. The statutory designation and institutionalization support a working assumption that the attaché is significant in United States foreign policy. However, the general analytical literature on the foreign policy process says little or nothing about attachés. This inattention implies either the position is insignificant, or that the policy process is best studied at the Department of State-Department of Defense level, or that the officer is a military stereotype who inadequately weighs non-military factors in solving military problems. The political responsibility delegated to military officers suggests that the inattention of foreign policy process analysts such as Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Burton M. Sapin, and Elmer Plischke cannot be accepted as a useful judgment of the attaché's significance. The stereotype approach of Raymond J. Barrett, Burton M. Sapin, and Richard C. Snyder discourages useful practical evaluation and study of the institution. Therefore, this

thesis examines the contemporary United States military attaché at the conjunction of the military and diplomatic systems, and focuses on determining what can be expected of that position. The analytical design suggests that the attaché's behavior is a function of his political socialization as a military officer and of his role, which is governed by the structural features and functional requirements of the diplomatic assignment.

Behavioral and attitudinal norms derived from the literature of Morris Janowitz, Samuel Huntington, Burton M. Sapin, Richard Snyder, and Raymond Barrett depict the attaché as a realistic, conservative, military expert who has been granted broad political responsibilities. Having been granted these responsibilities, which are neither defined nor established, the officer is purported to be unable to understand complex political military relations and is, therefore, unable to adequately weigh non-military factors in solving military problems.

The point of contention generated by this literature, then, hinges on the broad political responsibilities of the military attaché. Since these responsibilities are neither defined nor established, it is difficult for the authors empirically or otherwise to substantiate their contentions. Documentary evidence, based on the sample experience, indicates this contention may not be valid, particularly in view of the attaché's intelligence experience.

The attaché is socialized as an elite combat arms officer who has served in a variety of command and staff assignments at all levels of the military structure. The socialization process has instilled a mission orientation and a unity of command ethic which the attaché transfers to his new role at the embassy where there is both mission and a hierarchy with an ambassador in charge. Trained and educated in the military system, the attaché also presents a broad educational level outside of the military field with fully 30 per cent of this investigation's sample having undergraduate and graduate level civilian degrees in the international relations or political science fields. Therein lies another point to create doubt concerning the political analysis contention of the authors quoted. The socialization process generally supports the other points of the authors, with which there is no disagreement. In the role of an attaché, the military officer finds he is a staff officer working for a new commander, the ambassador.

The role of the military officer in an attaché position is defined by the structural and functional variable encountered in the role and identified from information furnished by the sample. The socialization phase provides the basis for establishment of attitudes relative to the variables which define the role. Mission orientation, unity of command ethic, military education and type of assignments define the military expertise

required of the position. Specific military assignments, such as intelligence positions and civilian education, provide the officer with a basis for his analysis of extra-military factors encountered as an attaché. In the attaché role, the officer can compare his position to that of a staff officer with a mission in support of the ambassador as the commander.

Empirically, it appears that the ambassador and the host country government exert the greatest influence on the officer's attaché role. Although some attachés display a negative perception of the support provided by DIA, Branch, and Service. There is insufficient data available to measure accurately the effect on the system.

The evidence presented suggests, ideally, that the officer who serves as an attaché should have education in area studies in addition to the other socialization elements discussed. Since there was a lack of non-combat arms officers in the attaché system, information concerning their efficiency in this capacity is not available. The relationship between the ambassador and the attaché is beneficial to the input for foreign policy. The modern-modern relationship is preferred with traditional attaché and modern ambassador the least desirable relationship. The traditional attaché may experience some difficulty in those countries where the military controls the host government.

The past derogation of the military attaché is based

on inconclusive generalizations concerning the United States officer corps as a whole and not the attaché society in particular. Substantial empirical data must be presented before the generalizations can be confirmed. Considering the lack of literature containing the required data, these generalizations are unfair and only serve to discourage substantive investigation in this field.

FOOTNOTES

1. Three standard texts on foreign policy process are: Burton M. Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy (New York and Washington: Frederick A Praeger, 1966); Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (2nd ed., New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965); and Elmer Plischke, Conduct of American Diplomacy (3rd ed., Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967).
2. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. vi.
3. See Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, "The Role of Military Institutions and Agencies in American Foreign Policy," American Foreign Policy (New York: Rinehart, 1954), and J. William Fulbright, The Pentagon Propaganda Machine (New York: Vintage Books, 1970).
4. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. in American Foreign Policy In The Nuclear Age, fails to mention the military attaché; Sapin, op. cit.; and Elmer Plischke, op. cit.
5. Sapin, op. cit., p. 260, Plischke, op. cit., and Crabb, op. cit.
6. Alfred Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
7. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) commissioned the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress to write a history of U.S. military attachés.
8. Raymond J. Barrett, "Politico-Military Expertise," Military Review, ILVI, (November, 1966), pp. 44-52, and "The Role of the Military Attaché," Military Review, LI (May, 1971), pp. 50-55. Mr. Barrett is a U.S. Foreign Service Officer who has served in Spain, Mexico, Nicaragua, Ireland, and Egypt, in addition to regional office service for the State Department. His military experience includes Secretary of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense for the United States and Canada, and a member of the Directorate of Plans in Air Force Headquarters where he is currently serving.
9. Barrett, "The Role of the Military Attaché," p. 53.

10. Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, op. cit., p. 369.

11. Intelligence should probably be a sub heading under international security. See Burton M. Sapin, op. cit., p. 2.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Plischke, op. cit., pp. 157-159.

15. Sapin, op. cit., pp. 122-125.

16. Ibid., pp. 127-130.

17. Ibid., pp. 122-123.

18. Ibid., p. 125.

19. Information furnished by DIA. Footnotes of this type refer to information provided in correspondence or telephone conversations between the author and DIA personnel, 1972.

20. Sapin, op. cit., p. 260.

21. Alfred Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 100. Additional accounts are in Time, July 5, 1963, and the New York Times, December 13, 1964.

22. Ibid.

23. Information furnished by DIA.

24. Army Regulation 611-60. Personnel Selection and Classification (16 March, 1970), and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) Form 334, 17 November, 1971.

25. Information obtained in an interview of three NATO staff members. The interview was conducted December 8, 1971 at Kansas State University. Interviewees included: André Houel of France, who is the Assistant Director of Information for Regional Relations and External Affairs. Mr. Houel has served on the NATO staff since 1965. He was a lieutenant colonel in the French Army and saw duty as an attaché. Mr. Anthony King-Harman of Great Britain is a defense expert on the Planning and Policy Staff in Brussels. He has served on the International Staff since 1968.

Mr. King-Harman served thirty years in the British Army. Mr. Eivind Berdal of Norway is a political briefing officer for the NATO International Staff where he has served since 1966. Mr. Berdal is a graduate of the University of Illinois where he studied journalism and political science.

26. Information furnished by DIA.

27. Information furnished by DIA.

28. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 68.

29. Janowitz, op. cit., p. vi.

30. Ibid.

31. Morris Janowitz, The New Military (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 20-22.

32. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1959), Chapter 3.

34. Morris Janowitz, The Military In the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 27.

35. John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 281.

36. Ibid., chapter 13.

37. Lucian W. Pye, (ed), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. ii.

38. Personal experiences and impressions of the author in preparation for a foreign assignment.

39. DIA furnished information.

40. Requests were made to the State Department and DIA.

41. Some investigations are available in: Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), chapter 16, and John C. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), particularly pp. 7-24.

42. Statement of respondent 4-2.

43. Statement of respondent 1-16.

44. Statement of respondent 1-16.
45. Statement of respondent 4-10.
46. This is a consensus of several respondents.
47. Statement of respondent 1-7.
48. Statement of respondent 2-6.
49. Statement of respondent 4-4.
50. Statement of respondent 1-12.
51. Statement of respondent 4-3.
52. Statement of respondent 4-11.
53. Statement of respondent 1-9.
54. Statement of respondent 1-5.
55. Statement of respondent 4-6.
56. Statement of respondent 2-9.
57. Wahlke, op. cit., p. 15.

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THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ATTACHÉ:
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND ROLE FULFILLMENT

by

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The field of the military attaché has been little studied and seldom considered as an element of American foreign policy in the past. Since World War II, U.S. military officers' political responsibilities have expanded, but accompanying norms of responsibility and performance remain unclear. This expanded political responsibility is exemplified in the contemporary military attaché. The attaché is a structurally elite military officer who works directly with civilian diplomats in providing information for the formation of United States foreign policy.

This investigation explored norms for anticipating the evaluating the ability of military attachés to fulfill these expanded responsibilities. The attaché system is a sub-system of the diplomatic and military systems with the attaché serving at the conjunction for the two systems. The attaché's responsibilities depend on formal and informal structural and functional factors. Archival and survey data were applied to models of attaché political socialization prior to appointment and of dual diplomatic-military role performance as an attaché.

Attaché performance was found to be clearly associated with ambassadorial style. The study includes suggested reforms in attaché preparation and designation of attaché responsibilities.