PRESIDENTS POLK AND LINCOLN AS TACTICAL MILITARY DECISION-MAKERS: PERSONALITY INSIGHTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Four United States Presidents in two limited wars since World War II have supposedly amplified their role of ultimate strategic commander by exercising tactical military authority normally delegated to uniformed military commanders. President Truman exercised tactical authority during the Korean War when he made decisions concerning the Inchon landing, pursuing the enemy North of the 38th parallel, and bombing bridges on the Yalu River.[1] Presidents Kennedy,[2] Johnson,[3] and Nixon[4] exercised this same authority during their involvement, as President, in the Viet Nam war. The President-as-tactician suggests a fundamental modification of the President's several roles as commander in chief, as well as changes in the environment and decision making of national security. Strategy involves all of a nation's means and ends, and the President is properly and feasibly accountable to his constituency for mobilizing them. Tactics, much narrower in scope, involves disposing military forces in or near battle for immediate objectives; the traditional logic of both organization and popular scrutiny assign tactical decision making to proximate (theater and field) commanders. If tactical military decisions and responsibility are significantly different from strategic decisions and responsibility, and if Presidential tactical military decision-making has

indeed increased, then the problem is important for United States Constitutional politics, governmental effectiveness, and national as well as international security.

However, tactical military orders from the White House (Presidents on horseback?) are not an entirely modern phenomenon of international politics and limited wars in the nuclear age. Seven Presidents were commander in chief during six United States wars between 1789 and 1945. Only two, James Polk and Abraham Lincoln, can be shown to have made tactical military decisions.

In his study of President Polk, Charles A. McCoy states that during the Mexican War "Polk asserted the President's prerogative to know and to decide even the minute details of military operations,..." -- that he not only "...insisted upon directing over-all strategy but often he was so unwise as to attempt to direct even local matters of tactics."[5] Speaking of President Lincoln's actions as Commander in Chief during the Civil War, T. Harry Williams says: "He formulated policy, drew up strategic plans, and even devised and directed tactical movements."[6]

This paper examines personality aspects of the behavior of these two pre-nuclear age Executive tacticians in order to refine models for future scholarly explanation and evaluation of Presidential tactical military decision-making.

Strategy, Tactics, and the President's Perspective

Military strategy is the science or art, during both peace and war, of utilizing all resources, through large-

scale, long-range planning and development, to ensure national security or military victory. Military tactics is the art or science of disposing military forces in immediate anticipation of, or actually in, battle for immediate objectives.

Since these two terms, strategy and tactics, are interrelated, it is at times difficult to ascertain where one ends and the other begins. The above definition of strategy is only concerned with the classical application of the term strategy to war, including relevant aspects of the planning processes prior to, and in preparation for war, and during the war.

Strategy, as pertaining to the President of the United States, can be viewed in two ways. Looked at in light of his numerous roles, or even in light of the singular role of commander in chief during national emergencies, it could be said that he has the responsibility for determining what has been referred to as "grand strategy."[7] "Grand" strategy being that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory -- or strategy as defined above. Grand strategy or strategy in this sense includes non-military as well as purely military phases and are not merely concepts of war, but inherent elements of statecraft at all times.

Strategy, as pertaining to the President, could also be viewed in purely military terms. The word in this sense

could be narrowly defined as the art of military command: of projecting and directing a military campaign, much in the same manner as would be the strategy employed by a general or admiral in a military chain of command. However, the President not only has a responsibility for military strategy in itself, he also has a responsibility for national strategy as well. He executes these responsibilities through large-scale, long-range planning.

That leads to the crucial distinction between strategy and tactics in this paper. Obviously the President, as well as other senior commanders in the military chain of command, has a responsibility for military strategy and, as implied therein, for military tactics as well. Responsibility for the applied tactics is one matter, however, and the actual tactical decision-maker is another. It could be stated that anyone in a specified military chain of command, because of overall inherent responsibility, may give tactical direction to the lowest echelon of the organization if he so desires. However, it could equally be said that this prerogative of responsibility is not generally exercised unless the higher commander sees a need for such action in order to achieve success. Evidently five of the seven wartime Presidents up to 1945 did not feel compelled to issue tactical orders.

Presidential Military Operational Decision-Making: 1789-1945

The seven Presidents who were wartime Commander in Chiefs from 1789 to 1945 range from James Madison in the War of 1812

to Harry Truman in the final year of World War II.

James Madison -- War of 1812

James Madison, in the War of 1812, was the first American President to exercise his power as Commander in Chief during wartime. President Madison had no model for action of the commander in chief during wartime except his recollections of the Constitutional deliberations on these powers, primarily on the question of whether a President could take actual command of troops in the field.

A hint of precedence had been given in this direction by President Washington when he had been prepared to or actually did take personal command in the field during the 1794 Whisky Rebellion.[8] Perhaps Madison took cognizance of this lead when he showed some impulse in this direction as "he visited in person -- a thing never known before -- all the offices of the departments of war and the navy, stimulating everything in a manner worthy of a little commander-in-chief, with his little round hat and huge cockade."[9]

However, it does not appear that President Madison participated in tactical military decision-making either as a commander in the field or through the issue of tactical orders.

There is evidence that a member of his cabinet actually took command of troops in the field, possibly with Madison's approval; however, this cabinet member was eventually reprimanded for his action.[10] Evidence is not available which

proves Madison's involvement in military decision making in other than strategic matters and the general handling of the war as the man responsible for the overall control of the army and navy.

James Knox Polk and Abraham Lincoln

Both President Polk and President Lincoln, in their role of Commander in Chief, made tactical military decisions in the Mexican War and the Civil War, respectively. President Polk's behavior will be discussed in Chapter IV and President Lincoln's behavior will be discussed in Chapter V.

William McKinley -- Spanish American War

President McKinley, who had more experience as a military man than any other American President during time of war, up to his term in office, did not make tactical military decisions during the Spanish-American War.

At the outset of the war he generally approved whatever the War and Navy departments proposed on strategic matters. As Ernest May says, "McKinley seemed disposed to let the navy and army fight Spain where and how they chose."[11] Eventually, McKinley saw that he was going to have to become more involved in the war decision making, but even as he became more involved, he only acted in the role of strategic planner and decision-maker.[12] However, even this increased activity in the military operational situation was short lived as he eventually fell back into his original routine of little involvement in operational matters.

Woodrow Wilson -- World War I

Alexander and Juliette George, in their book Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, note that "When the United States entered World War I, President Wilson openly sought that dictatorial power which his critics suspected he had coveted all along. Wilson took the position that he must become the commander-in-chief of a necessarily autocratic society."[13]

In mobilizing the nation's resources for prosecuting the war, Wilson was persistent in his purpose of enlarging his authority and exercising it without restriction. The war crisis furnished an excuse for Wilson's subjugation of Congress and his resistance of all attempts to qualify his power:

> The private individual of Congress is dead...The traditional separation of powers has broken down...
> The key to the whole in fact, has come to lie in the President's hands. The pathway of decision is his own, influenced, above all, by his personal cast of mind and by the few who can obtain direct access to him.[14]

The above bit of evidence concerning Wilson's behavior would make it appear that another Polk or Lincoln was in the making, as pertaining to becoming a tactical military decision-maker. However, for the control of the armed forces per se, President Wilson took a different view of his role as commander-in-chief from that taken by Presidents Polk and Lincoln. Wilson was more interested in executing his duties in the form of policy direction than in military command. He stated that "the armed forces of the country must be the instruments of the authority by which policy [is] determined."[15] And, he was unflinching in his adherence to this view as noted in his

warning to the Navy's General Board and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy: "When a policy has been settled by the Administration and when it is communicated to the Joint Board, they have no right to be trying to force a different course and I wish you (the Navy Secretary) would say to them that if this should occur again, there will be no General or Joint Boards. They will be abolished."[16]

However, President Wilson endeavored to avoid acting as a military decision-maker in an operational sense in his role as commander in chief. He clearly delegated authority in this sphere of his role, abstaining from interference with his military commanders.[17]

Franklin D. Roosevelt -- World War II

Before the United States entered World War II, President Roosevelt was busy asserting his authority as Commander in Chief.[18] He put the military command structure under his immediate control and made the strategic decisions of the prewar period, in many instances without even consulting his military chiefs. As Mark Watson has written, "Roosevelt was the real and not merely a nominal Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces...in these prewar days...[T]he decisions were made at the presidential level...and in these and other instances the dutiful behavior of the Chief of Staff was determined by his civilian superior as precisely as orders from the Chief of Staff in their turn determined the dutiful behavior of his subordinates."[19]

But these decisions were strategic, and even though

President Roosevelt may have approved tactical plans before the war, his actions would not have fit within this investigation's definition of tactical operational decisions during the war.

After the United States entered the war, the President's involvement diminished in the operational aspects. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and their planners enjoyed a considerable autonomy, and Roosevelt did little to affect operational strategy. William Emerson states: "Roosevelt never meddled in operational planning or in the duties of theater commanders."[20] The "details" which Roosevelt became involved in were with other than tactical operations by our definition. Emerson goes on to say that "the Joint Chiefs and their staffs, free from presidential interference, settled the daily business of war and were dominant in their own spheres."[21] Though there is not agreement on the amount of actual involvement President Roosevelt had in the planning and deciding of military strategy, there is no evidence which would indicate that he became involved in the details of operational tactics as did Presidents Polk and Lincoln.[22]

Harry S. Truman -- World War II

President Truman did not make any tactical operational military decisions during his short time in the Presidency while the United States was still in World War II. He did not make any changes in President Roosevelt's method of running the war. The major decisions which he made during World War II were those concerning the dropping of the atomic bomb on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both strategeic decisions.

During the 156 years from the ratification of the Constitution of the United States and the inauguration of the first President in 1789 to the end of World War II in 1945, seven American Presidents performed duty as Commander in Chief of the armed forces during time of war. Yet, in the six wars which were fought by the United States during those years, only two of the seven Commanders in Chief made tactical military decisions.

Toward a Fuller Explanation of Polk's and Lincoln's Behavior

In seeking an explanation of the behavior of Polk and Lincoln as tactical military decision makers, some of the factors which may have influenced this behavior could have been situational aspects -- both governmental and military -- and, the men themselves -- the Presidential style of Polk and Lincoln, their perceptions of the commander in chief role, as well as their own individual personalities.

In his book, Lincoln and His Generals, T. Harry Williams offers an explanation of Lincoln's behavior as a military decision-maker by emphasizing the influence of the military situational aspects. Williams contends that the problem which Lincoln faced was the Union Army commanders, particularly those generals who were in command up to General Grant's assumption of command as general-in-chief during the latter stages of the war. He contends that Lincoln was a military

"genius" who came to know more about military operations than any of his generals with the possible exception of Grant. Williams says:

> Sometimes Lincoln "interfered" without meaning to. He had the type of mind that delighted to frame a plan of military operations. He loved to work up a plan and spring it on a general. The mental exercise gave him pleasure, and he liked to get the reaction of soldiers to his schemes. He did not mean for the generals to adopt his designs, but they did not always understand this. What he intended as a presentation of his ideas or a suggestion to be considered sometimes came through to the military mind as an order from the commander in chief.
>
> Much of Lincoln's so-called interfering with the conduct of the war occurred in the first years of the conflict, when he believed, with some reason, that he was more capable of managing operations than were most of the generals.[23]

Before accepting Williams' explanation of Lincoln's behavior, the above statement should be looked at in a different perspective. If Lincoln did not "mean" to interfere why did he, considering his background, get involved in the technical details of military tactics? Why did he have the "type of mind" that loved to "spring" a military operation plan, via a message or letter, on a commander in the field who probably had more to do handling thousands of troops than to play "games" with the President? Why would the "military mind" not think that a detailed plan of action, drawn up by his commander in chief, and presented to him on the battlefield rather than in a conversation in a White House parlor, not in effect be an order? Would not the impact of other generals being relieved have affected the "order" perception by the generals receiving these "designs" forwarded by the President? Like-

wise, if the generals receiving the plans from Lincoln should have attempted to be discriminating about the numerous plans which they received, which ones should they have considered "mental exercises" and which ones as the "real orders"?

Finally, what made Lincoln think he was more "capable" of managing military operations during the first years of the war? Was it his experiences fighting "mosquitoes" in the Black Hawk War? What made Lincoln decide immediately that he could be a military commander as measured by his personal qualifications rather than by virtue of his power as commander in chief of the armed forces? Could personality help explain Lincoln's beahvior as commander in chief?

Polk's behavior as tactical military decision-maker could be partly explained by military situational influences in view of his assessment of the senior military commanders, the professional soldier and the military organization as noted in his Diary.[24] However, in light of Charles McCoy's earlier qualifying statement that Polk "was often so unwise as to attempt to direct even local matters of tactics", even though situated hundreds of miles from the battlefield, could there be another explanation for his involvement in matters of military tactics?

Could the varient behavior of President Polk and President Lincoln as tactical military decision-makers be further explained by the factor of the individual personality of these Presidents? Could Polk and Lincoln's personality have accounted for their behavior as tactical military decision-makers --

behavior which varied from other pre-1945 wartime presidents?

The purpose of this investigation is to determine if and how personality contributed to this noted variation in presidential operational military decision making. Specifically, the purpose is to determine the influence of personality on this type of behavior by President Polk and President Linoln.

In the pursuit of the above stated purpose this investigation is organized into six chapters, this Introduction being Chapter I. Chapter II presents the methodology of this investigation -- the exposition of personality as an explanatory factor in the study of Polk and Lincoln's behavior. In Chapter III an analysis of the Constitutional role of the President as Commander in Chief of the Nation's armed forces, as intended by the delegates to the 1789 Constitutional Convention, is presented. The purpose of Chapter III is to determine the Framer's intentions as pertaining to the President's authority as a military commander so as to obtain a feeling for the boundaries of the Commander in Chief role. These boundaries will allow fuller understanding of the role behavior of Polk and Lincoln.

Chapters IV and V are the heart of this investigation. Respectively, they present analyses of the personalities of President Polk and President Lincoln, and the influence which their individual personalities had upon their behavior as tactical military decision-makers. Chapter VI presents the findings and conclusions of this investigation -- the relation-

ship of personality to the explanation of the phenomena of presidential tactical military decision-making during the pre-1945 era, and the significance which the study of personality lends to the explanation of political behavior.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

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3. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 123-132, 600-601.

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5. Charles A. McCoy, Polk and the Presidency (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1960), p. 140.

6. T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 8.

7. For an explanation of the term "grand strategy", see B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, Third Printing (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), pp. 335-336.

8. Marcus Cunliffe, "Madison", in Ernest R. May, (ed.), The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960), p. 36.

9. Quoted in Henry Adams, History of the United States, VI (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1890), p. 229.

10. Cunliffe, op. cit., p. 38.

11. May, op. cit., p. 96.

12. Ibid., pp. 97-102. (May uses the word "tactics", but it is a misnomer in light of the definition as used here and the type of operations which McKinley directed and the general content of his directions.)

13. Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: John Day Company, 1956), p. 177.

14. Quoted in Ibid., p. 178.

15. Ibid., p. 111.

16. Arthur Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 298-299.

17. See May, op. cit., pp. 111-131, for an excellent treatment of Wilson as Commander in Chief.

18. See William R. Emerson, "FDR", in Ibid., pp. 135-149, for an account of Franklin Roosevelt as Commander in Chief in the pre World War II days.

19. Mark S. Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 5-7.

20. Emerson, op. cit., p. 152.

21. Ibid., p. 153.

22. Ibid., pp. 135-177. This reference gives a good account of FDR's role behavior, or actions, after U.S. involvement in World War II.

23. Williams, op. cit., p. 9.

24. Milo Milton Quaife, (ed.), Diary of James K. Polk (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Company, 1910), I, pp. 14-15, 117; II, pp. 150-151, 249-250, 393-394; III, pp. 58-59.


CHAPTER II

THE ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY

As tacticians twenty years apart, Presidents Polk and Lincoln faced different and historically unique wartime situations. However, the work of four social scientists, Brewster Smith, Fred Greenstein, Harold Lasswell, and Alexander George, helps relate their unique environments to common measures of personality among role players regardless of historical period.

The discussion in this investigation of the influence of personality on the behavior of Presidents Polk and Lincoln will be framed in terms of M. Brewster Smith's five part model of types of variables that are relevant to the study of personality and politics:

Figure 1[1]



Smith's model is designed to serve as a reminder of the complex interdependence of different classes of psychological and social determinants of political -- as well as other -- behavior.[2]

In essence the model is a sophisticated expansion of a point made by Fred Greenstein: "behavior is a function of both the environmental situations in which actors find themselves and the psychological dispositions they bring to those situations."[3] It is a display of the stimulus → organism → response relationships. The end product of this display, response, is shown in panel V of the model. The remainder of Smith's display consists of an economical set of elaborations on the environmental and predispositional antecedents of behavior. Psychological predispositions are summarized in Panel III. Panels I, II, and IV are designed to differentiate social and other environmental determinants of behavior into three classes: (1) the immediate situation within which behavior occurs (panel IV); (2) the immediate social environment, extending from birth through adult life, within which the actor's psychological development occurs (panel II); and (3) the "distal" or remote social environment which the actor does not experience directly, but which shapes the immediate environments that socialize him and provide him with situational stimuli (panel I). The phenomena summarized by the three environmental panels are clearly empirically continuous with each other, but analytically separable.

The solid arrows on the "map" indicate the foregoing and

other types of causal relationships. The dotted arrows note certain feedback relationships: the further effects of an actor's political behavior on the situation within which he acts and on his own attitudes, and the effects on the distal environment.

Reference will now be made to Figure 1 in order to explain the methodology in this investigation. This study's dependent variable -- presidential tactical military decision-making -- will be the "political behavior" (panel V) which is to be analyzed. As stated above, the "response" ("political behavior" or presidential tactical military decision-making) is influenced not only by the "organism" (personality of the particular President in this study), but also by the "stimulus", or situation (panel IV).

The study of personality and politics cannot afford to neglect situational factors if the study is designed to isolate the distinctive contributions of personality -- that both the contribution of the person and that of his situation, in interaction, must be included in any adequate analysis. However, it may be asked which component, the personal or the situational, is the most important in terms of being the major influence on individual behavior. In this investigation the focus will be on the influence of the personal component in seeking an explanation of presidential tactical military decision-making. Therefore, for the purpose of determining the influence of presidential personality in these decisions, situational interaction with the personality of a particular

president will not be considered. President Polk and President Lincoln will be studied in their role as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and it will be asserted that they are in a common situation -- as the supreme military commander during wartime with the opportunity available, through their power in this role, to make military decisions -- with the option to make strategic, tactical, or no decisions at all. This method will more effectively lead to a determination of how the particular President's personality influenced his response. Therefore, in this investigation the discussion will dwell within the "personality processes and dispositions" and the "social environment" panels (III and II) of Smith's model. Specifically, an analysis of each president who made tactical military decisions during the pre-1945 era, Polk and Lincoln, will be made within the confines of Harold Lasswell's "power seeker" hypothesis.

"Power Seeker" Personality

In 1948, Harold Lasswell drew upon the findings and theories of various schools of dynamic psychology in formulating a general hypothesis about the "power seeker" as a person who "pursues power as a means of compensation against deprivation. Power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self or the environment in which it functions."[4]

By linking the emergence of an individual's high valuation of, or need for power to low self-estimates, Lasswell's hypothesis usefully orients research on "power-oriented" leaders to findings emerging from research on childhood deve-

lopment and socialization and to ego psychology. Attention is directed to the development of the "self" component of the ego, beliefs about the self, the extent and quality of self esteem and its application for behavior.

In this context, attention is also directed to the emergence of the individual's personal values. Thus, the hypothesis holds that some individuals develop an unusually strong need or striving for power as a means of seeking compensation for damaged or inadequate selfesteem. Personal "values" or needs of this kind -- which may be regarded as "ego motives" since they are part of the ego subsystem of the personality -- are an important part of the individual's motivational structure. The operation of these "values" in the individual's behavior can be related not merely to deeper unconscious motives but also to the sphere of the "autonomous" functioning of the ego. In addition to utilizing various devices for dealing with unconscious motives, the ego is also capable of adjustment and construction to secure satisfaction for personal "values" such as the need for power, affection, or deference, thereby maintaining personality equilibrium. The emergence of these adjustive and constructive devices, and their operation in the individual's choice, definition and performance of political roles constitute a useful focus for studying the interaction of personality and political behavior in political leaders.[5]

Operationalization of "Power Seeker" Hypothesis

Before progressing further, operational definitions should

be given to the key terms in Lasswell's hypothesis: "low self-estimates," "power," "compensation".[6]

Low Self-Estimates. The presence of the low self-estimate dynamism in an individual lends relevance to questions about his interest in leadership and his performance in a political office. The causal question is not essential and there is no need to go deeply into a question of the genesis of such low self-estimates.[7] Feelings of unimportance, moral inferiority, weakness, mediocrity and intellectual inadequacy are factors which express the presence of this dynamism in an individual and evidence of the presence of these factors within the make up of Polk and Lincoln will be sought within this investigation.

Power Motive. "Power need" is defined as the "desire for and enjoyment of power, the high valuation or cathexis of power."[8] It is a value or need for the possession or exercise of sanction or means for influencing others. Power may be desired for one or more of these reasons: (1) so as to dominate and/or deprive others; (2) so as not to be dominated, or interfered with, by other political actors; and (3) so as to produce political achievements.[9] Instrumentally, power may be desired and exercised in order to satisfy other personal needs such as need for achievement, respect, security and rectitude. Alexander George also has found that this need or demand for power does not operate uniformly under all conditions in the subject's political motivation, and that it may be reinforced or in conflict with other strong needs.[10]

Compensation. If Lasswell's hypothesis is correct and applicable to President Polk and President Lincoln, it should be expected that in acquiring and exercising power they experienced not merely reduction of tension but also euphoric feelings of a kind that serve to counter some of the low self-estimates from which they may have suffered. Establishing and tracing such a compensatory process empirically requires a close examination of the relationship between (a) low self-estimates, (b) specific items of behavior that express the individual's power demand and satisfy it to some extent, and (c) the substantive content of the ensuing compensatory gratifications, if any.

Alexander George lists six items of behavior that serve as possible indicators of a striving for power gratification on the part of a compensation-seeking personality:[11]

(1) Unwillingness to permit others to share in his actual or assumed field of power;

(2) Unwillingness to take advice regarding his proper functioning in his actual or assumed field of power;

(3) Unwillingness to delegate to others tasks that are believed to belong to his regularly constituted field of power;

(4) Unwillingness to consult with others, who have a claim to share power, regarding his functioning in the actual or assumed field of power;

(5) Unwillingness to inform others with respect to his functioning in his actual or assumed field of power;

(6) Desire to devise and impose orderly systems upon others in the political arena.

The "actual or assumed field of power" terminology above is a more selective statement by George of Lasswell's general

hypothesis. This was done in order to compensate for the attempt of the power-seeking personality to "carve out a sphere of activity in which he can demonstrate his competence and worth."[12] Thus, the selective version of the hypothesis holds that manifestations of power-striving are not encountered throughout the entire range of the subject's political behavior but operate more selectively, that is, only when he is performing in his actual or assumed field of power.

As noted above the hypothesis requires evidence that the exercise of power over others does indeed yield the individual compensatory gratifications. In order for the hypothesis to hold, the individuals exercise of power must provide him with satisfaction of a special kind appropriate to his low self-estimates. This requirement leads to a need to establish the types of euphoric feelings a personality of this kind might be expected to experience if the hypothesis is correct regarding the compensatory character of his interest in power.

In this respect, the five indicators of low self-estimates noted above, and the corresponding euphoric feelings to be expected in cases when power was exercised in a manner that the subject could represent to himself as being successful are listed below:[13]

Low Self Estimates	Euphoric Feeling
	(From successful functioning in actual or assumed sphere of power).

Feelings of unimportance:	Sense of uniqueness, the subjective experiencing of which may be paraphrased as follows: "If what should be done is to be accomplished, I must do it since no one else will undertake it or is in a position to do it." (Note the relation to the feeling that one is the "chosen instrument," the feeling of being "indispensable" for a certain task, the feeling of having a "mission".)
Feelings of moral inferiority:	Sense of superior virtue: "I know best what is right (moral) in this matter."
Feelings of weakness:	Sense of superior strength: "No one can tell me what to do in this sphere; others, not I, must yield."
Feelings of mediocrity:	Sense of superior ability: "No one else can do this (whatever the subject is doing in his field of power) so well."
Feelings of intellectual inadequacy:	Sense of intellectual superiority (in sphere of competence and power functioning): "My judgement is infallable; I never make mistakes; I can rely upon my own reasoning."

As suggested by Alexander George, the testing of Lasswell's "power seeker" hypothesis requires a developmental study of the individual, rather than a cross-sectional one, in order to establish whether individuals who apparently possess high selfesteem, suffered earlier in life from low self-estimates and, hence, whether their selfesteem is importantly "compensatory."[14] This type of approach will be used

for the study of President Polk and President Lincoln.

Applicability of Lasswell's Hypothesis to This Investigation

The observation of behavioral data of the kind noted above provides a demonstrable basis for inferring the applicability of Lasswell's general hypothesis to the personality of President Polk and Lincoln -- i.e., their interest in power as a means of compensation for low self-estimates -- and for additional analysis of the role this dynamism played in their political behavior: in their need to become involved in the details of tactical military operational decision-making.

Behavior of the type listed above (unwillingess to permit others to share power, take advice, consult) may serve personality functions other than its power need. They may be solely role-determined, being called for by the actor's assessment of the way in which role expectations should be interpreted in the light of the requirements of the "situation". In this context, Polk and Lincoln's individual expectations, or perceptions, pertaining to the role of commander in chief, will be considered in order to clarify the relevance of presented evidence as influenced by the interplay of role and personality.


Final Note on "Map"

For the purpose of this investigation the following adaptation of Brewster Smith's model will be utilized:

THIS BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS PAGES WITH DIAGRAMS THAT ARE CROOKED COMPARED TO THE REST OF THE INFORMATION ON THE PAGE.

THIS IS AS RECEIVED FROM CUSTOMER.

Figure 2



It should be noted that both Smith's model (Figure 1) and this study's adaptation (Figure 2), in efforts to project simplistic but realistic relationships, do not handle three basic psychological apparatuses and processes: motivation, perception and learning. These are assumed implicitly rather than being explicitly delineated.

Smith, in a triadic functional classification, attempts to sort out the ways in which a person's attitudes are rooted in his underlying motives and their fusions and transformations, whatever they may be.[15] The "power seeker" hypothesis spells out a conception of human motivation within the genesis of this type of personality.

Although not shown, a perceptual screening process intervenes between panel II (the environmental factors) and what the person makes of them in panel III. Likewise, the same

process intervenes between the immediate behavioral situation as it might appear to an objective observer (panel IV) and how the person defines it for himself (panel III).

The models ignore the details of the learning process. However, they make the broad functionalist assumption that people in general acquire attitudes that are useful, that is, rewarding to them.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. M. Brewster Smith, "A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," Journal of Social Issues, 24:3 (1968), p. 17.

2. For a full exposition of the "map", see Ibid., pp. 15-28.

3. Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), p. 7.

4. Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1948), pp. 39, 53.

5. Lasswell's general hypothesis has had some influence on subsequent studies of political leadership and political behavior more generally. See James D. Barber, The Law Makers (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965); Lewis J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior (Stanford, Conn.: Stanford University Press, 1965); Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: John Day, 1956); Erwin C. Hargrave, President Leadership: Personality and Political Style (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1966); and Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959).

6. The primary source for the following sections is found in Alexander L. George, "Power As A Compensatory Value for Political Leaders," Journal of Social Issues, 24:3 (1968), pp. 24-49.

7. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

8. Ibid., p. 34.

9. Ibid., p. 35.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 37. (These are drawn upon the syndrome of behavior associated with the so-called "compulsive" character in Freudian psychoanalytic accounts.)

12. Ibid., p. 38.

13. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

14. Ibid., pp. 47-48.

15. Smith, op. cit., p. 27.

CHAPTER III

THE CONSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE

Neither President Polk nor President Lincoln remembered the original Constitutional debates first hand, but both leaders knew and learned from elders who were alive when the document was hammered out. Hence, as chimerical as it may be to establish direct relationships between their tactical excusions and their perceptions of the Framers' intentions, one must assume that Polk and Lincoln were at least as sensitive as most early nineteenth century political and judicial leaders to their interpretive, constructive roles in Constitutional development.

If this type of presidential involvement in military decision-making was expected or intended by the Constitutional delegates of 1787, these intentions would allow for a fuller understanding of the variant behavior of Polk and Lincoln since they would verify the choices available to each of the pre-1945 wartime presidents as pertaining to their personal operational control of the military forces under their command. Specifically, intended behavior of this type by the Framing Fathers would substantiate the assertion that Polk and Lincoln's behavior did indeed vary from an established norm of chosen behavior if the same choice was available to the other pre-1945 wartime presidents.

Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States states that "The President Shall be Commander in Chief

of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;...." Under this provision the Framers of the Constitution vested the President with a function that which there is none "more significant as indicating his independent and exalted position."[1]

What influenced the Founding Fathers to add this powerful clause to the Constitution, as a specific power of the President? What were the intentions of these men pertaining to the President's powers under this clause, particularly those pertaining to personal command of the armed forces? The purpose of this chapter is to determine the answers to these questions through an analysis of the Constitutional role of the President as Commander in Chief as intended by the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, giving particular attention to their intentions in regards to the President's authority as a military commander.

The real aim of the framers of the Constitution in giving the commander in chief power to the President has remained a mystery. The political and military history of the United States has belied what may appear on the surface to some people as an apparent simplicity when viewing this important clause. That the mystery of the Framer's intentions should be so is all the more surprising since the brief clause has proved to be one of the most important in this revered document. Ernest May writes, "Along with the provision that he (the President) 'take care that the laws be

faithfully executed' it has supplied the legal basis for most of the vast expansion in the presidency."[2]

Strangely, in spite of this extraordinary grant of power, this clause of the Constitution appears to have aroused very little discussion and scarcely any serious opposition in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. It was offered, by the Committee on Detail to the Convention as a whole, and approved by it, on 27 August 1787.[3] Some objections to the clause were evidently made, but rather to the idea of the President assuming active command in the field than to his exercise of the general powers of command.[4] However, the Constitution is silent on both of these matters; neither does it specifically describe nor define the full powers of the President as commander in chief.

The discussion in this Chapter will be grouped into two areas. First, six major influences which conditioned the Convention delegates' approach to the placement of military control within the budding government will be discussed. These influences were: (1) the British historical experience with the control of the military, and the British Constitution; (2) the philosophy of Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone; (3) their experiences with control of the British commander in chief during the Pre-Revolutionary War days; (4) the experience of the Colonial Governors and the newly formed States' Constitutions; (5) the dominance of strong executive advocates at the Convention; and (6) the anticipation that George Washington would be the first President of the United States.

No thesis text appears on this page.

The second area of discussion in this Chapter will center around the Constitutional question of Presidential command authority under the Commander in Chief clause.

Major Influences on the Constitutional Delegates

Perhaps the prevailing attitude of the Founding Fathers towards the President as commander in chief was expressed by Alexander Hamilton in a letter of 14 March 1788 to the People of the State of New York. In this letter, No. 69 of The Federalist, Hamilton, who was a strong executive advocate at the Philadelphia Convention, defends and defines the commander in chief power of the proposed President:

> The President is to be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same as that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which by the Constitution under consideration would appertain to the Legislature.[5]

With this view of the President "as first General and Admiral of the confederacy" in mind the influences noted above which led to this interpretation by Hamilton should be looked at.

Influence of the British

Ernest May states that "...part of the explanation for" the commander in chief clause "...presence in the Constitution

...lies...in the experience of Americans as Englishmen."[6]

The men in Philadelphia in 1787 knew from the British example of Lord Cromwell that a supreme commander responsible only to the legislature was a potential dictator. After the final breach with Charles I in 1642, the British had a trial of legislative control over the armed forces. The original control of the forces by the Long Parliament through committees eventually became centralized under one man, Cromwell, who then used his troops to overawe Parliament and set up a dictatorship.

The delegates to the Convention could also reason from the more recent examples of the Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill, and the Duke of Cumberland that the power of military control should not be vested in any individual other than the executive himself.

"More than any other example, that of Marlborough showed the makers of the American Constitution the peril that could come if command were separated from the crown."[7] Some British subjects thought that the battle of Blenheim, where Marlborough won a spectacular victory in the marshes between the Neckar and the Danube rivers, was not necessary and "posed the question of whether even so technical an issue as the choice of a battlefield could be left to an independent commander."[8] A question of where responsibility should lie for determining military aims was also raised by Marlborough's actions against the French Army, and it seemed to some Englishmen a "great disadvantage...that the question should have

become the business of the commanding general rather than of civilians such as ministers of the crown or members of parliament."[9]

The action of independent commanders, unresponsive to the Crown, continued to be an example of how not to control the armed forces when William Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland, was given the post of commander in chief of the British forces when the Austrian Succession War of the 1740's came. Even in defeat, Cumberland collected glory. He became identified with a Europe-first strategy and the Americans, who also blamed him for sending them General Braddock, viewed him as a menace. But, unlike Marlborough, Cumberland's example was one of defeat rather than victory. When he signed the humiliating Convention of Klosterzeven in the Seven Years War, he proved that a commander in chief who was not capable could be disastrous; whereas, Marlborough proved in victory that one who was capable could be dangerous.

These examples which gave indications to the Framers where not to vest control of the military, were not the only influences which the English heritage provided them. The British Constitution provided an experienced example of governmental operations and organization.

James Wilson stated that the British Constitution, specifically that documents handling of the executive, "was inapplicable to the situation of this Country"; however, there is ample evidence that it was a point of reference for the delegates and that they kept faith with the English past

even as they prepared to make a break with it.[10] There were those who held the view that the British constitution was the example which determined the final form which the American executive took. This view was taken by Sir Henry Maine when he wrote:

> It is tolerably clear that the mental operation through which the framers of the American Constitution passed was this: they took the King of Great Britain, went through his powers, and restrained them whenever they appeared excessive, or unsuited to the circumstances of the United States...It was George III they took for their model....[11]

Maine also stated that "the American constitution is the British constitution with the monarchy left out", to which Edward S. Corwin replied that this statement "...is, from the point of view of 1789, almost the exact reverse of the truth, for the presidency was designed in great measure to reproduce the monarchy of George III with the corruption left out, and also of course the hereditary feature."[12] In deference to these observations it will suffice to note that the executive in both the British and the American constitutions was given the power of Commander-in-Chief and was thereby made the supreme military commander.

Influence of Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone

Executive power is delineated in no suspicious or grudging terms in the writings of Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone. The dogma of "separation of powers" and that of "checks and balances" was not unfamiliar to the men of the Philadelphia Convention. The influence of these philosophers is evidenced

in the distribution of powers within the Constitution and its structure of the governmental organization. The popularity of these writers is evidenced by Edmund Burke's statement "I hear as many Blackstones are sold here (America) as in Britain."[13]

The writings of these men conditioned the political thought of the Framers as well as their interpretations of the British Constitution. The Framers did not make a conscious decision not to adopt the British parliamentary system. The celebrated form of "responsible government", of which Britain was the significant prototype, had not developed sufficiently by 1787 for Americans to recognize an alternative to the separation of powers. Their determination to effect separation of powers among the three branches of the government calls attention to Alexander Hamilton's definition of the President's power of command and the legislature's implied supervision of the military by virtue of the power to "declare war", "raise" the fleets and armies, and "regulate" the same. In view of Locke's writing on "prerogative", this separation of powers was an obvious oversight on the part of the Framers when considered in light of the ensuing "implied" powers of the President which has permitted him to sidestep these requirements in his control of the armed forces.

British Commander-in-Chief

A third, and more immediate, influence was the Founding Fathers' memory of the power and importance of the Pre-Revolutionary War commander-in-chief of the British forces stationed

in North America. The authority of the Provincial Governors over these British troops, and particularly over their appointed commander-in-chief who from 1755 up to the American Revolution was almost constantly present in America, was not very clear. The commander was inclined to look upon the colonial governors simply as liaison officers between himself and the assemblies, and successfully established his right to command all men under arms in the provinces in spite of the terms of the governors' commission.[14] One of the grievances in the Declaration of Indêpendence pointed out this lack of control of the British military commander in the passage which asserted that King George III had "affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power."[15] This lack of civil control served to reinforce the British examples of Lord Marlborough and Cumberland within the minds of the Constitutional delegates.

Colonial Governors and State Constitutions

Although, as noted above, the colonial governors did not have the desired control over the British troops, they were apparently more successful through their control of the provincial forces, and this success became another influential factor on the Founding Fathers as to whom the command of the armed forces should be given. This success was realized within the individual colonies through their experience of combining the Commander-in-Chief with the governorship.

Under the royal commission issued to the colonial governor

"The King was commander-in-chief of the army and navy: the governor was captain-general of the provincial military forces, as well as vice-admiral."[16] He was commander-in-chief of his province and the commission endowed him with all powers belonging to his rank. All officers of the provincial military forces were under his command and subject to his authority. He might employ all persons residing within the province for its defense, and, in case of necessity, transport them to any of the American possessions of the crown for service against the common enemy. With the advice of the colonial council he might establish forts or other defenses, and provide them with ordnance and other equipment.[17]

The granting of the military powers contained in the governor's commission by the British Sovereign were more utilitarian than unique. These provincial governors

> were primarily military or naval officers, who often held positions of civil authority chiefly to enable them better to maintain their military leadership or to repay them financially for the often unwelcome assignment of an American Command. Sometimes naval officers were appointed as governors or lieutenant governors of provinces which were strategically important.[18]

Regardless of the Crown's reasons for appointing specific individuals as governors of American colonies, the successes which came from combining the commander-in-chief of the military with the governorship set a precedent for later American states.

The power of commander-in-chief which the colonial

governors possessed was carried over into practically all of the State Constitutions, where it was vested in the state governor. Charles Warren writes that in some State Constitutions the governor had few powers or functions other than military, and that in many states, he was "scarcely more than a military official."[19] Even though the power of commander-in-chief was vested in the chief executive of the colonies and eventually the state constitutions, the respective assemblies claimed and asserted the rights to vote money for troops and to authorize their calling up.

Evarts Greene notes that the colonial governors were closely dependent upon the assemblies, not only for supplies, but also for the legal machinery necessary for the enforcement of their military authority.[20] Accordingly, Leonard Labaree writes that in "military as well as in civil affairs the governors found their authority greatly limited by their lack of financial independence."[21] On 14 November 1746, Benning Wentworth of New Hampshire declared that military power was "rather vested in the assemblies than in the king; the governors by virtue of his Majesty's commission can cause one or more regiments to appear on a certain date and at any place [t]he[y] shall order within the limits of the regiment, but they have no power to cause them to be subsisted one day, let the emergency be so great, unless there is a vote of the assembly for it."[22] Under these conditions the executive power was "checked", setting precedence for the state constitution and eventually for the American Constitution.

The Framers of the Constitution did not have to cross the Atlantic Ocean to England to find models for a national government. These were close at hand in the governments of the thirteen states that had so recently made the transition from colonies. John Adams stated "that it was from the Constitution of Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland that the Constitution of the United States was afterwards almost entirely drawn."[23] More specifically, the office of the President has been compared to the governors office in the state Constitution of Massachusetts and New York, where the governor was not a "mere cipher" as he was noted to be in the other state constitutions.[24] The New York Constitution, which was the only one to set up a separate and independent executive not bound to a privy council, was seen to be a model Constitution.[25]

Article XVIII of the New York Constitution of 1777 stated that the "governor...shall by virtue of his office, be general and commander in chief of all the militia and admiral of the navy of this state;...."[26] The New York handling of the executive was quite a change from many of the other state Constitutions which had retained weak executives in favor of strong legislative bodies. However, according to Alexander Hamilton, even those state Constitutions which "coupled the chief magistrate with a council" had "for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone."[27] He notes that the propriety of the commander-in-chief clause in the American Constitution "is so evident in itself, and

it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State Constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it."[28]

Strong Executive Advocates

Another of the influences on the Framers of the Constitution was the resolve of several strong personalities at the Convention who saw a need to establish a strong executive. The office of the President was created for specific reasons by the framers, among these being the excesses of the state legislatures, the "incompetency of Congress as an administrative body," and the "catalogue of legislative misdeeds which Madison enumerated in his list of causes for the calling of the Convention."[29]

The Convention's leading advocates for a strong and independent executive were Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris. By forwarding their plans for obtaining this objective at every opportunity, they made possible a final settlement in which they would gain much of what they desired.[30] In particular, Wilson and Morris were given key positions which afforded them the opportunity to ensure that the President was provided with the specific power of "Commander-in-Chief".

On 23 July 1787 it was moved by Elbridge Gerry, and unanimously resolved by the Convention, "that the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of the Natl. Govt. (except the part relating to the Executive), be referred to a Committee to prepare and report a Constitution conformable

thereto".[31] The Convention chose John Rutledge, Edmund Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham, Oliver Ellsworth and James Wilson as members of this committee on 24 July.[32]

The Convention debated the executive resolutions, which they had withheld from the committee as noted above, for two more days and then referred them, along with resolutions submitted by Pinckney and Paterson, to this "committee on detail." The committee did not change any of the basic principles already adopted by the Convention, which by this time had only explicitly conferred upon the executive the powers of the veto, to make appointments, not including judges, and to execute the laws. However, the committee played an influential part in determining the final wording of the Constitution, and in particular the vital matter of defining the specific powers to be conferred on the executive.

There is some conflict among authorities as to who the chairman of this committee was. Charles Thach notes that it was Rutledge, whereas Edward Corwin states that the chairman was Wilson.[33]

Rutledge and Randolph opposed a strong executive, Gorham was more or less a fence sitter in this regard, and Wilson, along with Ellsworth, advocated a strong executive.[34] Although Wilson may not have been the chairman of the committee he obviously had the opportunity to incorporate his conception of the executive office in the preliminary draft of the Constitution, since it was the Wilson draft which became the report of the committee.[35] It contained the clause "He", (the

President), "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several States,"[36] and with some verbal changes in other sections, the Wilson draft became the executive article with its enumeration of specified powers.

With mention of these verbal changes this discussion shifts to the other individual who had opportunity to incorporate his conception of the executive office into the Constitution, Gouverneur Morris. His specific contribution was with the final document itself.

On 31 August 1787, the Convention created a committee to work out some yet unfinished business, which was for the most part the executive provision.[37] Gouverneur Morris was appointed as a member of this committee of eleven men. This committee did not produce any decisive work; however, they did present one item of peripheral interest.

This entirely new point which became a part of the finished Constitution stated that the chief executive must be a natural-born citizen of the United States, or a citizen at the time of the adoption of the Convention. A letter written by John Jay probably had some influence in the decision to add this as one of the qualifications of the Presidency. Jay had written this letter to George Washington, wherein he wrote, "Permit me to hint whether it would not be wise...to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration..., and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the American army shall not be

given to any but a natural born citizen."[38] The specific influence of Morris on the adding of this clause is not known, but he had made a similar suggestion on 9 August in respect to the qualifications of Senators.[39]

The specific contribution of Morris was ordained on 8 September when he, along with William Samuel Johnson, James Madison, Rufus King and Alexander Hamilton, was entrusted with the task "to revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to by the House."[40]

Again, there is some conflict as to who the chairman of this committee was. Corwin says that it was Morris. Clinton Rossiter names Johnson as chairman. Applying the same logic which Charles Thach uses in selecting the "first named" committee member as the likely chairman, it would be a logical assertion that Johnson was the chairman.[41] However, there is much evidence to support the fact that Morris was the actual "penman of the Constitution", that he wrote the committee report, and that in this capacity he had the opportunity to give added meaning to the final document through his choice of words.[42]

It is important to note that in the report of this committee on style, the grant of the legislative and the judicial powers was changed from what they had been up to the time the draft was given to the committee for revision. The change for each of these two branches of the government was made so as to bring attention to the specific enumeration of powers or responsibilities listed under the respective Article

of the Constitution: "All legislative powers herein granted ...." in Article I, Section 1; "The judicial power shall extend to...." in Article III, Section 2. Conversely, the vesting clause of the executive article remained the same as it had been written by Wilson for the committee on detail: "...the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." Whether Morris fully realized the possibilities of the wide range of interpretative power which he had provided the executive is not clear and will not be pursued further here. However, through the wording he used, Morris vitally influenced the role of the President for each occupant of the office thereafter.

George Washington as the First President

The Convention delegates were to emerge with a strong executive. The proposed Presidency was an office of unusual vigor and independence. The President was to be a strong, dignified, largely non-political chief of state, and for our immediate interest, the supreme military leader. Had this office been designed more perfectly for any man other than George Washington?

To answer this question, particularly as pertaining to his military qualifications, the Convention delegates had only to look to their most recent experience in the Revolutionary War. Even though there is some evidence that Washington often lacked full control over certain commanders, this war had been fought successfully under his direction as commander in chief of the Continental forces.

There is evidence that George Washington's image was cast in the power of the President and that his experiences as a military commander was partly responsible for the President having the power of commander in chief.

Evidence of this statement is noted in a letter of 5 May 1788 written by Pierce Butler, who had been a delegate to the Convention from South Carolina, to Weedon Butler. In his words, the powers of the President

> are full greater, and greater than I disposed to make them. Nor, Entre Nous, do I believe they would have been so great had not many of the members cast their eyes towards General Washington as President; and shaped their Ideas of the Powers to be given to a President, by their opinion of his Virtue.[43]

In Pierce Butler's mind, as indicated by his writing, there was no doubt that Washington was the man to whom the delegates to the Convention were looking to be their first President, and that the Presidential powers were described with him in mind.

George Washington, in the eyes of the Constitutional delegates, fit the requirements of the strong leader who could fulfill the demands of the chief executive of this new Nation. He had provided the Framers of the Constitution with an example of military success in his Revolutionary War role of commander in chief. And, his widespread popularity would make ratification of the new Constitution by the states more feasible.

President's Command Authority

In the state ratifying conventions there was more dis-

cussion and opposition to the "commander-in-chief" clause. Ernest May notes that Patrick Henry, Elbridge Gerry, George Clinton and William Miller were the only prominent men to protest the clause.[44]

Miller, in the North Carolina Convention, expressed himself fearful that the influence of the President, particularly over the military, would be too great and that he was given extensive powers too easily liable to abuse. "He considered it as a defect in the Constitution, that it was not expressly provided that Congress should have the direction of the motions of the army."[45] James Iredell, also from North Carolina, defended the clause by stating "From the nature of the thing, the command of armies ought to be delegated to one person only."[46] Richard Dobbs Spaight, who had been a Convention delegate from North Carolina, gave support to Iredell when he stated "it is well known that the direction of an army could not be properly exercised by a numerous body of men."[47]

On the whole, however, the propriety of such a power in the President, so far as to give orders and exercise a general supervision over military and naval movements, was not seriously questioned in the state conventions, the opposition again being largely to the possibility of the President's assumption of personal command of the forces.[48] The general feeling throughout the country, as pertaining to singleness of command, was probably expressed by Alexander Hamilton when he wrote: "Of all the cares or concerns of government, the

direction of war most particuliarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand." And, as to the question of where this command should rest, Hamilton continues "The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of executive authority."[49]

It is an interesting question whether the President, under this exclusive executive authority, may assume active, personal command of the armed forces, in time of war. While the expediency of such action on the part of a President may be doubted there does not seem to be any ground for questioning his power to do so. This matter was specifically raised, discussed and determined in the Constitutional Convention in 1787, and in the state ratifying conventions, as already mentioned above.

The New Jersey plan presented to the Convention by Paterson on 15 June 1787 authorized the Executive to direct all military operations, "provided, that none of the persons composing the federal executive shall, on any occasion, take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct any military enterprise as general or in any other capacity."[50] A plan presented by Alexander Hamilton likewise vested the chief command and direction of war in the Executive, but with the proviso that "he shall not take the actual command, in the field, of any army, without the consent of the Senate and Assembly."[51]

The action of the Convention in refusing to adopt any of these specific proposals,[52] and the further attempts in the state ratifying conventions to secure amendments expressly forbidding such exercise of command by the President, certainly make it clear that the Framers of the Constitution understood and intended that the President should have the right. Thus the New York Convention proposed an amendment, "That the President, or person exercising his power for the time being, shall not command an army in the field in person, without the previous desire of the Congress."[53] In the Maryland convention a similar amendment was submitted, but defeated in committee and never reported.[54]

While there is therefore no doubt as to the Constitutional right of the President to assume personal command of the armed forces at his direction, the sound construction of the Constitutional provision is that no such action on his part was contemplated unless there was an extraordinary emergency.

Authority Summary

In summary, the following points have emerged from this inspection of the factors which led the Framers of the Constitution to grant the specific power of commander-in-chief of the military forces to the President. They were influenced in this direction by:

(1) their knowledge of the British system of government and the lessons which were learned from the periods when the command of the British forces was removed from the Crown,

i.e., Lord Cromwell, the Duke of Cumberland and the Duke of Marlborough.

(2) the writings of Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone, and their views of separation of powers, checks and balances, dualism and prerogative;

(3) the precedence set in the commission of the Royal Governors and the State Constitutions conferring the title of commander-in-chief of the military forces on the respective executive;

(4) the example of the commander-in-chief of the British troops in North America not being checked by the colonial governors;

(5) the strong executive advocates at the Philadelphia Convention, in particular Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson;

(6) the military success and influence of George Washington, the man who was expected to be the first President under the new Constitution.

With these influential factors noted, what has been uncovered as to the intentions of the Framers regarding the commander-in-chief clause and the President's use of this power as pertaining to command? The discussion above indicates that there were three major intentions. First, the Framers intended to ensure that the military forces of the national government would be subordinate to civilian authority. However, the sometimes worn phrases under "civilian authority" or "civilian control" do not logically give the full intent since this could have been affected by placing command of the

armed forces under Congress, a committee of Congress, or any other individual civilian or group of civilians one would care to formulate.

Second, the Framers intended that there be unitary civilian direction of the nationally controlled military forces and that this direction should come personally from the President. Finally, they wanted the civilian President to have all of the prerogatives of command as pertaining to the military, to include direct command if necessary.

None of these intentions was incompatable with the military powers which the Constitution bestows upon Congress. Here the consideration is with the personal item of command only. The constraints which the Framers of the Constitution intended in an implied "control" of the military are not at issue in this investigation. The commander-in-chief clause was intended primarily as a device for limiting the influence of the military in determining the course of the nation, and ensuring that when the nation was on a course of war the national executive would be the one to make the decisions which would keep the course within specific political, as well as military, boundaries. The type of command decision, strategic or tactical, was not intended to be restrained by the men who framed and adopted the Constitution. The Nation was born in war and the Constitution spoke in a war language. There was no need to specify the types of war commands which the President should or should not give, nor the specific type of command decision he should or should not make.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. Emlin McClain, Constitutional Law in the United States (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910), p. 210.

2. Ernest R. May, (ed.), The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960), p. 5.

3. Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937), p. 530.

4. See Luther Martin's letter to the Maryland Legislature in Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several States Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, I (2d ed.; New York: Burt Franklin, 1888), p. 378; also Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, III (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1911), pp. 217-218. James Madison leaves no evidence of debate pertaining to the clause in Gailland Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, III and IV (New York: G.P. Putnams' Sons, 1910).

5. The Federalist, Introduction by Edward Gaylord Bourne (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1937), Book II, p. 42.

6. May, op. cit., p. 11.

7. Ibid., p. 14.

8. Ibid., p. 15.

9. Ibid.

10. Farrand, I, op. cit., p. 66. The British Constitution was an object of reference to these men, as witness the represenative remarks recorded in Farrand, I, pp. 86, 99-101, 139, 150, 233, 234, 238, 253-254, 288, 376, 381, 398-399, 425, 484, 545; II, pp. 75-76, 77, 203, 250, 278-279; III, pp. 102, 301.

11. Quoted in Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1969), p. 173. This view is criticized by Thach on pp. 173-176.

12. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957 (4th rev. ed.; New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 14-15.

13. Cited in, Claude H. Van Tyne, The Causes of the War of Independence (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1922), p. 343.

14. Leonard W. Labaree, Royal Government in America (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1958), p. 108.

15. Quoted in Richard B. Morris, (ed.), The Era of the American Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 172. See also May, op. cit., p. 9.

16. Evarts Boutell Greene, The Provincial Governor in the English Colonies of North America (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1898), p. 93.

17. Labaree, op. cit., pp. 107-112. See also Greene, op. cit., p. 105; May, op. cit., p. 9.

18. Labaree, op. cit., pp. 37-40.

19. Warren, op. cit., pp. 530, 176.

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21. Labaree, op. cit., p. 309.

22. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 309-310.

23. Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 3.

24. Ibid., p. 23.

25. Thach, op. cit., pp. 34-43, 52.

26. Francis N. Thorpe, (ed.), The Federal and State Constitutions, V (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909), pp. 2632-2633. Also, see reference to this power in The Federalist, op. cit., Book II, pp. 42-43; Binkley, op. cit., p. 24.

27. The Federalist, op. cit., Book II, p. 77.

28. Ibid.

29. Thach, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

30. Ibid., pp. 76-104.

31. Farrand, II, op. cit., p. 95.

32. Ibid., p. 106.

33. Thach, op. cit., p. 111; Corwin, op. cit., p. 9.

34. Thach, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

35. Ibid., p. 111.

36. Farrand, II, op. cit., pp. 171-172.

37. Ibid., p. 481.

38. Warren, op. cit., pp. 354-355.

39. Ibid., p. 639.

40. Farrand, II, op. cit., p. 547.

41. Corwin, op. cit., p. 11; Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 224; Farrand, II, op. cit., pp. 547, 553 (Morris is listed first by McHenry, p. 554). See also Thach, op. cit., p. 138.

42. Rossiter, op. cit., pp. 225-226. There is evidence that James Wilson may have contributed to this effort, as noted by Rossiter, p. 225, and Warren, op. cit., pp. 687-688.

43. Farrand, III, op. cit., p. 302.

44. May, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

45. Elliot, IV, op. cit., p. 114.

46. May, op. cit., p. 12.

47. Ibid.

48. James Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (5th ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1891), pp. 328-329. Compare remarks of Patrick Henry in Elliot, III, op. cit., pp. 58-60.

49. The Federalist, op. cit., Book II, p. 77.

50. Elliot, I, op. cit., p. 176.

51. Ibid., V, p. 587.

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54. Ibid., II, pp. 552-553.

CHAPTER IV

JAMES K. POLK -- POWER SEEKER

Leonard D. White states that during the Mexican War (1846-1848) President Polk gave the country its first demonstration of the "administrative capacities of the presidency as a war agency. He proved that a president could run a war."[1] Charles A. McCoy states that Polk asserted the President's prerogative to "know and decide even the minute details of military operations", that Polk not only "insisted upon directing overall strategy but often he was so unwise as to attempt to direct even local matters of tactics."[2]

President Polk felt that he was responsible for the conduct of the Mexican War and he exercised his responsibility to the limit of his endurance. He determined the general strategy of the army and navy operations as well as some of the tactical aspects of these operations. He personally chose the commanding officers, gave personal attention to supply problems, controlled the army and navy financial estimates, and used the cabinet as a major coordinating agency for the conduct of the campaigns of the war. He told the Secretaries of War and Navy to give their personal attention to all matters, even of detail, and to advise him promptly of every important step that was taken. President Polk was the center on which all else depended. He was unwilling to permit others to share in the military decisions, to take advice regarding his proper functioning, to delegate tasks to

others, and to consult with others who had claims to share in the military responsibilities of conducting the war.

President Polk possessed a "power-seeker" personality. Observation of his power seeking actions was made by Judge Catron in a letter to Andrew Jackson, wherein he stated: "Our friend (President Polk) is very prudent and eminently firm, regardless of consequences. He came here to be...The President...which at this date is as undisputed as that you was the General at N. Orleans."[3]

Polk's Feelings of Low Selfesteem

The importance of James K. Polk's childhood experiences in presenting evidence of the dynamism of low selfesteem is suggested in materials collected by one of his biographers, Charles Sellers.[4] These suggest that some of the critical experiences leading to Polk's damaged selfesteem lay in his experiences with the dogmatic Presbyterianism of his mother, pitted against his mental wrestling with the common sense, or rational, religious philosophy of John Witherspoon, as conveyed by Doctor Joseph Caldwell at the University of North Carolina during Polk's days as a student there.

Jane Knox Polk, his mother, had provided young James with a strong religious influence. Mrs. Polk was remembered by people for "her piety, her theological acumen, her vigorous and masculine intellect", and "her great tenacity for Presbyterianism". James' father, Samuel, noted that her chief pleasure was "in the Bible, the Confession of Faith, the Psalms and Watt's Hymns."[5]

Young Polk seems to have found the Witherspoon philosophy convincing, yet it seemed to have had the effect of "discouraging personal religious committment, even while it was indoctrinating against heretical ideas."[6] Polk's mixed emotions on religion are recorded in a paper which he prepared for the Dialectic Society at the University of North Carolina. He wrote that "'Ambition, that fell destroyer that rankles the breast of unregenerated man'...had on occasion perverted reason to wicked purposes; the noble faculty had even been 'basely used by a Paine a Hume and a Bolinbroke [sic] as the harbinger of infidelity'." He adds that in these speculations "it were sacraligious indeed to attribute the present elevation of our spirits exclusively to human exertion."[7] Polk's religious uncertainties, giving him a feeling of moral doubt, are evidenced in the fact that even though he was a regular church goer he never felt "himself strongly enough 'convicted' to join a church."[8]

An earlier event brings this internal turmoil into more vivid focus. Shortly after the birth of James Polk on 2 November 1795 in Mecklenburg County, near Pineville, North Carolina, his mother persuaded his father, Samuel, to take the baby to the church in Providence, North Carolina, for baptism. Although Samuel was not as sternly religious as Mrs. Polk, he was by no means antireligious, and in fact took his wife the seven miles distance from their home to church each Sunday with little persuasion on her part. However, Samuel had not made the required profession of faith, as

expected of parents who brought babies for baptism, and the minister of the church in Providence, Parson Wallis, "was hardly the man to abate this requirement."[9] On the day of the expected baptism of James, Samuel and the parson quarrelled over the requirement of his profession of faith and James went home unbaptized. The Presbyterian doctrine of infant damnation necessitating infant baptism, was never fulfilled "and knowledge of this episode was to leave such deep scars that he (James) would not receive the sacrament of baptism until he lay on his death bed."[10] These scars produced deeper aggravation by stimulating Polk's moral self-doubts in later years.

Even the event of his final baptism brings out the incongruity of James Polk's religious struggling. Upon completion of his Presidential term Polk returned to Nashville, Tennessee, his family having moved from North Carolina to Tennessee when James was eleven years old. At the age of fifty-four, he experienced a recurrence of an illness from which he had suffered on his homeword journey, and it appeared that he would not recover. The Polk family, in addition to the now ex-President's wife, Sarah, was Presbyterian; and, although he attended church with Sarah on most occasions, Polk had expressed a preference for the Methodist denomination.[11] A few days before his death, his mother came from her home in Columbia, Tennessee bringing her own church pastor in hopes that her son might accept baptism and unite with the Presbyterian church. However, James recalled a promise which he

had given at the significantly late age of 38 years old to Reverend McFerrin, of the Methodist Church, that, when he was ready to join the church, McFerrin should baptize him.[12]

Polk's Methodist leanings had been rooted in a moving sermon given by Reverend McFerrin in 1833, in which McFerrin exhorted the listeners to embrace the "inheritance...reserved in heaven for you."[13] Polk had never been able to respond to the rigorous predestination of the Presbyterianism which his wife and mother embraced. But McFerrin's appeal "so affected him that he 'went away from the campground a convicted sinner, if not a converted man'."[14] Yet, the conflict of his Methodist leanings with the faith of his family, plus the scars left by his boyhood encounters with Presbyterianism, had prevented him from making an open profession of faith at anytime up to the baptism several days before his death as noted above.

Feelings of moral inferiority must have been tugging at him even in the latter years of his life. On his fiftieth birthday he "thought of the vanity of this world's honours and that it was time for me to be 'putting my House in Order'."[15] And on his fifty-third birthday Polk wrote in his Diary, "I am solemnly impressed with the vanity and emptiness of worldly honours and wordly judgements, and of [the wisdom of] preparing for a future estate...I pray God to prepare me to meet the great event."[16]

Another factor evidenced in James Polk's youth, which caused him to experience feelings of low selfesteem, was his

poor health. Small for his age and sickly, he lagged at the numerous tasks imposed on other boys around their homes and in the fields in his pioneer setting. When his father, hoping that his oldest son James might one day follow in his own footsteps as a surveyor, took him on surveying trips into the Tennessee wilderness, the boy usually had to be "left in camp to care for the horses and prepare the evening meal."[17] Young James was unable to hold his own in the vigorous outdoor sports of the neighboring farm boys. He was branded as a weakling by a frontier community where physical prowess and the arts of field and forest were major virtues.

His early sickness did have specific physical causes. The abdominal pains which reduced him to listlessness were finally diagnosed as gallstones. Even though he recovered some vigor after an operation to remove the stone, he was continually plagued with bad health throughout the remainder of his life.[18]

James was never robust, even after the operation, but he developed a dogged determination and toughness of character to compensate for the sense of inadequacy which he felt was caused by his poor health. The feverish drive of his later years, his intense ambition, his passionate resolution not only to equal but to excel those about him, must have arisen from his boyish aspirations, conditioned as he was by his mother's stern Presbyterian gospel of duty.

Because young Polk's health was poor, his father had

arranged for James to learn the merchandising business by working in a store. However, Polk had already decided that he wanted the life of a professional man for which he needed schooling. Eventually Samuel gave in to the young boy's desires and allowed him to go to school even though he was starting at an age older than usual. In 1848, President Polk recalled, "I closed my education at a later period in life than is usual, in consequence of having been very much afflicted and enjoyed very bad health in my youth. I did not commence the Latin Grammer until the 13th of July 1813."[19] He was seventeen at that time.

Polk's illnesses and his religious struggles produced within him feelings of unimportance, moral inferiority, weakness, mediocrity and intellectual inadequacy. All of his abilities were acquired only by dent of unremitting effort over a considerable period of time. His development was continuous throughout his life, rarely progressing ahead of the challenges that presented themselves, forcing him to the limit of his abilities in every new situation.

Behind the matter-of-fact exterior, young Polk harbored an insatiable appetite for success as compensation for his low-estimates of himself. Lacking intellectual brilliance and great personal magnetism, he drove himself ruthlessly, exploiting the abilities and energies he did possess to an extent that few men ever equal. When opportunities for success came he pursued them with a furious energy in order to demonstrate his competence and worth.

Striving for Power Gratification

Upon Polk's graduation from the University of North Carolina in 1818, and subsequent return to his home in Tennessee, leanings toward law and politics began to emerge. Evidence is insufficient to pinpoint a time during Polk's adolescence when he first showed an interest in politics. However, the political interests of the Polk family in North Carolina and later in Tennessee probably influenced young Polk's political leanings.[20] Evidence of political interest is presented in papers which he wrote at the University of North Carolina for the Dialectic Society debates, with a hint of interest in law.[21]

What may have been a hint of interest in law was started toward fruition shortly after Polk's return from college to Tennessee when he went to Nashville to study under a celebrated lawyer, Felix Grundy. During this period of American history would be lawyers generally sought admission to an established attorney's office where they traded their personal services, i.e., building fires, running errands, for the privilege of reading the law books available, and obtaining answers to knotty legal questions which arose in the apprentices' minds.

While Polk was serving his apprenticeship with Grundy in 1819, the first quoted evidence of his interest in politics as the "field" or "sphere of competence" within which he could satisfy his need for power as compensation for his low self-estimates is found.[22] Grundy was a member of the

Tennessee legislature and had offered his assistance to another young apprentice in his office in becoming elected as clerk of the state senate. Overhearing the young man refuse the offer, Polk told him that since "you have refused Mr. Grundy's offer, I would be glad if you would tell him that I would like to have the place myself, if he will assist me to get it."[23] With Grundy's assistance, young Polk was elected to the post and a political career began.

Ever since his gallstone operation, Polk had driven himself to overcome his boyhood sense of inadequacy. Politics would now become his whole life, aside from which he had no aspirations, intellectual interests, recreations, or even friendships. His wife and family would contribute the only break in this almost total committment of his personality.

Polk was an introverted, unrelaxed man who worked feverishly at presenting himself not as he actually was but as he wished to be. In order to subdue his feelings of low selfesteem he tried to express determination and rigorous self-discipline, an air of restrained power and passion. These things he worked at relentlessly.

By training and practice Polk was able to overcome a lack of the natural gift of eloquence. At the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill he had preferred logical appeals to reason, clothed in eloquent language, but when these proved ineffective with Tennessee political audiences later, he developed a new style that, despite its incongruity with his personality, "eventually made him one of the most celebrated

stump speakers in the history of the state."[24]

This incongruity, even though possibly indicative of a process of maturation, is pointed out in his changed attitude on "eloquence of speech" from his senior year at Chapel Hill and his later return to his alma mater as an elder statesman. At Chapel Hill, and upon being elected President of the Dialectic Society for a second time, he delivered an inaugural address on "Eloquence". He told the members that "your proficiency in extemporaneous debating will furnish you with that fluency of language, that context of ideas and boldness of delivery that will be equally serviceable in the council, in the pulpit, and at the bar."[25] Upon his return to the campus as an elder statesman he advised the younger Dialectic Society members that one of the faults of the society's debates was that "too much attention (was) paid to the eloquence of language and too little to the ideas conveyed by it." It "will make you timorous and unprepared to engage in unforeseen discussion." By focusing on the ideas to be conveyed the "attention of your hearers will not then be diverted from the merits of the question by the studied methaphors and flowers of language."[26]

Polk realized that he lacked the imagination for the flowery flights that made other politicians so impressive to their listeners. Recognizing his limitations on what he could make himself do, he compensated by appealing to simple reason. There was "something in his manner and delivery that suggested the idea of labor, effort, power," something "deliberate yet

vehement," the sense he somehow conveyed of the strength and passion that were pent up and channeled by his disciplined will.[27]

Polk's political aspirations required an exertion of will so nearly continuous that it became second nature. His personality seemed unbelievably methodical and calculated, but he worked so hard at making it believable that his listeners were convinced. With all his outgoing impulses and aspirations turned inward and focused on the satisfaction of politics as a source of power, he had set himself as a young man to cultivating the qualities requisite for political success in order to quench his need and desire for power, his need for respect, security, rectitude and the production of political achievements.

Schooling himself to a rather ceremonial affability, Polk collected acquaintanceships avidly and cultivated them assiduously in furtherance of political aspirations. One of his acquaintances, Colonel Holman, recalled an incident that illustrates this aspect of Polk's personality. Upon seeing Colonel Holman, whom he had only met once ten years previously, Polk approached him with outstretched hand. When Holman remarked that they were not acquainted, he was assured by Polk that the reverse was true. Polk said, "I don't think I was ever introduced to a man and talked to him ten minutes, that I ever afterwards forgot him."[28] As suggested by Charles Sellers, Polk's energetic application to the "business of personal relations compensated in large measure for his

inability to achieve real spontaneity."[29]

After having served as a Tennessee legislator, a U.S. Representative, and governor of Tennessee, Polk was nominated on the ninth ballot by the Democratic party as their candidate for President. He defeated the Whig candidate, Henry Clay, in 1844. Although he had been a compromise candidate of the Democratic Party, after the election he wrote to Cave Johnson that he felt himself to be fully capable of formulating his own plans for selection of his cabinet and handling patronage. He noted that with or without a united and harmonious set of cabinet counsellors, "I intend to be myself President of the U.S."[30]

Polk let it be known that he not only intended to be an independent President. Upon the outbreak of the Mexican War he made it equally clear that he intended to be an active Commander in Chief when he told his land office Commissioner, James Shields, that he hoped his friends in Congress would allow him to conduct the war as he thought proper.[31]

Acting within his role as Commander in Chief of the armed forces during the Mexican War the evidence mounts quickly pertaining to his striving for self-gratification and vividly portrays his compensatory need for power. It was this specialized area of authority which provided him with an opportunity to function with considerable autonomy and freedom from interference from others. Within this role he could operate in a manner which would help him obtain a personality equilibrium. And, his zeal to produce political achievements

would cause him to not only determine the strategic aspects of the war but would spur him to act as a tactical military decision-maker.

Once the Mexican War was declared by Congress, Polk wasted no time in determining the precise course of the campaign. On 14 May 1846 President Polk noted in his Diary that he gave to Secretary of War Marcy and General Winifield Scott his "opinion that the first movement should be to march a competent force into the Northern Provinces."[32] This piece of strategic guidance was further formulated into a more detailed tactical plan by the President and presented to the cabinet two days later. In it he noted that his plan was "to march an army of 2000 men on Santa Fe and near 5000 on Chihuahua...leaving General Scott to occupy the country on the lower Del Norte and in the interior."[33]

Polk continued his attempts at formulating tactical military operations when he outlined his plans for the capture of Mexico City at a cabinet meeting in August of 1846.[34] On 21 September he drafted the orders for an advance on Tampico, the first step in those plans.[35] The President not only directed the advance; he sent orders directly to General Robert Patterson, who was under the command of General Taylor, to organize a force for the expedition. General Taylor wrote a scathing letter to the War Department complaining about "corresponding directly with my subordinates, and communicating orders and instructions on points, which, by all military precept and practice, pertain exclusively to the general in

command." He denounced this interference "as a violation of the integrity of his command."[36] However, the Commander in Chief prevailed, the expedition proceeded, and Polk was not prevented from further tactical direction.

On 10 October President Polk noted in his Diary that the Tampico expedition "having been heretofore resolved upon, the question of extending that expedition to Vera Cruz was discussed."[37] A week later a meeting was held at the White House attended by Polk, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and a former consul at Vera Cruz who had been summoned from Rhode Island to Washington. At the President's request, the former consul drew up a detailed diagram of Vera Cruz and the surrounding country, and from this diagram the detailed plans for the landing and capture of that port city were drawn.[38]

Polk's desire to direct the military operations, and frustration at not being able to obtain information which he felt was needed in order for him to direct tactical operations is exhibited in his report of a cabinet meeting. He wrote: "Great embarrassments exist in directing the movements of our forces, for want of reliable information of the topography of the country, the character of the roads, the supplies which can probably be drawn from the country, and the facilities or obstructions which may exist in prosecuting the campaign into the interior of the country." He goes on to complain that "Gen'l Taylor...seems to act as a Regular Soldier, whose only duty is to obey orders."[39] Polk wanted information so he

could exercise every command prerogative.

Polk not only made tactical operational decisions. He was also involved personally in the selection of commanders, the selection of officers down to the grade of second lieutenant,[40] supply problems,[41] and his cabinet's war efforts.

One week after the war was declared President Polk conferred with his Secretaries of Navy and War, whereupon he wrote:

> I had however a long and full conversation with the Secretaries of War and of the Navy in relation to the prosecution of the war with Mexico, and urged upon both the necessity of giving their personal attention to all matters, even details, and not confiding in their subordinates to act without their supervision. I required them, too, to keep me constantly advised of every important step that was taken.[42]

Justifying his preemption of Secretary of War Marcy's duties, Polk noted on 22 September 1846 "The Secretary of War is overwhelmed with his labours and responsibilities."[43] And on 13 May 1847 Polk further noted that "The Secretary of War is greatly oppressed with the duties of his office,...On this account I aid the Secretary of War in giving all the attention to details that my time will permit."[44]

This assistance in "details" may have been necessitated in the case of Marcy since there is evidence of his inadequacy within his post. Marcy had confessed his inability to control the quartermaster general's department.[45] And, it was not uncommon for Marcy to bring dispatches on the war to the White House, and, seated before the President, read them aloud to the Commander in Chief.[46] However, in reply to this

evidence of a lack of initiative on Marcy's behalf, the President's rejoinder to the Secretary of War and Navy to keep him "advised of every important step that was taken" should be noted.[47]

Further, evidence of Polk's control over his cabinet members would not indicate that he allowed for very much initiative and participation on their parts even though Polk indicates on numerous occasions that certain members of the cabinet "approved" his plans, "agreed with" them, or that he "consulted" with them. One member of his cabinet, George Bancroft, noted that Polk "insisted on being its (the cabinet) center and in overruling and guiding all his secretaries to act so as to produce unity and harmony."[48] Gideon Welles noted that several cabinet members "have been at particular pains to tell me that the President has his way," and "does as he has a mind to."[49] Nowhere is Polk's unwillingness to a allow others to share in his "field of power" more vividly expressed than in his Diary, when he stated: "No President who performs his duty...consciously can have any leisure. If he entrusts the details...to subordinates constant errors will occur. I prefer to supervise the whole operations of the Government myself...,and this makes my duties very great."[50]

Compensation

As noted earlier, in order for the "power-seeker" hypothesis to fit an individual, the exercise of power must provide him with satisfactions, which are expressed as euphoric feelings, that he might be expected to experience as a com-

pensatory character of his interest in power. The process of carving out a sphere of competence is marked by a tendency to shift from one extreme of subjective feelings to the other: from lack of self-confidence to higher self-estimates and self-assurance in the actual or assumed field of power. In the military commander field, Polk found a sphere of power in which he could function autonomously, as a leader of men, and one in which he could prove his competence. Within this sphere of competence, he felt free to assert, almost defiantly, a sense of intellectual superiority.

On 20 March 1847, upon learning that the Mexican government refused to reopen negotiations without the lifting of the blockade of her ports and the removal of U.S. armed forces from the territories of Mexico, President Polk declared that the "conditions required were wholly inadmissible, and that no alternative was now left but the most energetic crushing movement of our arms upon Mexico." Secretary of State Buchanan disagreed with this alternative, whereupon Polk noted his disagreement with Buchanan, saying that "if I had a proper commander of the army, who would lay aside the technical rules of war to be found in books...I had no doubt Santa Anna and his whole army could be destroyed or captured in a short time."[51] It should be noted that President Polk made complaints about his generals, and other officers, throughout the war, never finding a commander to his satisfaction. In light of the fact that the war was won with these undesired commanders in charge, and the lack of continous effective control by the

President due to slow communications, an observer is led to wonder if his desire to dominate was not the real source of his dissatisfaction, or at least a major contributing factor.

Another example of Polk's obtainment of satisfaction, experiencing euphoric feelings of intellectual superiority, and reinforcing a sense of infallible judgments, was over a decision which he had made concerning a conflict between three surgeons serving in the Army in Vera Cruz. Polk had quickly settled the dispute by directing that one of the surgeons be ordered to serve elsewhere. He recorded in his Diary: "The Secretary of War did not seem to concur in this opinion, but I had no doubt on the subject and issued the order accordingly."[52]

In a similar situation, Polk had told Marcy to write a letter placing Colonel Harney under his personal command, after learning that General Scott had placed Harney, a Democrat and friend of General Jackson, under arrest. Instead of writing the letter, Marcy brought the matter to the attention of the entire Cabinet, whose members sided with Marcy's opposition. Polk settled this conflict, stating: "I told the Cabinet that I had great respect for their opinions, but that in this case I was sure I was right, and would take the whole responsibility."[53]

A sense of uniqueness is another of the euphoric feelings which Polk experienced from the exercise of his power. Some of those have already been noted above, i.e., his feeling of being indespensable for his task of "supervising the whole

operation of the Government" himself.[54] Polk felt that if his responsibility for the wars direction was going to be fulfilled properly, he would have to be the one to decide the actions, even the most minute details of these actions. An example of his interest in these details concerned the procurement of army mules and horses. He stated that he "was much vexed at the extravagence and stupidity of purchasing these animals in the U.S. and transporting them at vast expense to Mexico...I shall find it necessary to give more of my attention to these matters of detail than I have heretofore had it in my power to do."[55]

Further evidence of President Polk's feeling of uniqueness, as well as superior ability, in the military field is available, as the following excerpts from his Diary indicate:

> Several matters of public business were considered and disposed of, most of them relating to our military operations. I find it to be necessary to give my personal attention to the minute details of these operations, as far as the other indespensable duties of my office will permit me to do so.[56]

And later he writes:

> I am devoting all my time and energies to these (military) matters, and in examining all the details of everything that is done, as far as it (is) possible for me to do so.[57]

Thomas Bailey notes that President Polk wrote in his diary, "In truth, though I occupy a very high position, I am the hardest working man in this country."[58]

Polk Personality Summary

In order to compensate for his feelings of low self-

THIS BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS PAGES WITH MULTIPLE PENCIL AND/OR PEN MARKS THROUGHOUT THE TEXT.

THIS IS THE BEST IMAGE AVAILABLE.

esteem -- feelings of unimportance, weakness, mediocrity, moral inferiority, and intellectual inadequacy -- which were rooted in his poor health and his experience with religion, James K. Polk developed a need or desire for power. Particularly, he felt a need for the exercise of power in order to gain respect, security and rectitude for himself.

In order to gain respect, security and rectitude for himself, compensating for his feelings of low self-estimates, he worked relentlessly towards obtaining political office. Ultimately, he arrived at the apex of American politics, the Presidency. Even though a compromise candidate for the office, he let it be known that he felt he had a mandate from the people by virtue of his electoral victory over the Whig candidate. Whether or not he achieved harmony among the Democratic factions that had preferred other candidates, he intended to be an independent, and strong President. The Democratic Party platform had called for a vigorous policy towards Oregon and Mexico and his victory convinced him that he had a directive from the American people to pursue this policy.

George Bancroft indicates that President Polk entered the White House with four "great measures", or political achievements, in view: a lowered tariff, the Independent Treasury System, the settlement of Oregon disputes, and the annexation of California.[59] Whether Polk actually announced these "goals" beforehand or not does not particularly matter here. The fact is that each of them was attained. The

Democratic campaign slogan had been "Reoccupation of Oregon and reannexation of Texas" and the pursuit of those objectives provided the arena within which Polk became a tactical military decision-maker.

Polk had tried to buy California from Mexico. When she refused to sell, he ordered General Taylor's small army into disputed territory on the Rio Grande, where it might be said that the Mexicans were goaded into an attack. Whether Polk's action was spurred by a desire on his part for a war with Mexico is not the issue here. It suffices to say that the goal of annexing California was there, within which he could produce a political achievement, war or no war. But, when the war came he lost no time in asserting his authority as Commander in Chief, a role within which he felt there was a need to dominate if he were to gain the political achievement needed by his personality conflicts.

There is no doubt that Polk realized his responsibility for the conduct of the war as Commander in Chief.[60] He viewed his role as Commander in Chief the same as that proclaimed by Alexander Hamilton -- as "first general and admiral of the Confederacy."[61] This view by Polk is presented in his Diary when he stated to the Adjutant General of the army, who had attempted to withhold information on officer vacancies from him: "I repeated to him that he must regard what I said as a military order and that I would expect it to be properly obeyed."[62]

The immediate question which could be gathered from the

above view is: could Polk have perceived his role to be one of tactical operational military decision-maker? In other words, could his behavior have been role-determined, being called for by his assessment of the way in which role expectations should be interpreted in light of the requirements of the situation? The plausibility of such a determination should be considered.

There is evidence that President Polk considered his senior military commanders, General Taylor and General Scott, unqualified for their commands and were not to be trusted.[63] He was also suspect of the political aspirations and affiliation of these men, as well as other members of the military.[64] He also displayed contempt for the professional soldier, who he felt had been made soft and lazy by garrison life.[65] His lack of confidence in his officer corps was evident when he wrote: "The truth is our troops, regular and volunteers, will obtain victories wherever they meet the enemy. This (they) would do if they were without officers to command them higher in rank than Lieutenants. It is injustice, therefore, to award to the Generals all the credit."[66]

This evidence of Polk's assessment of the military leadership, in addition to the evdience of his assessment of the supply and transport effort,[67] and his assessment of his Secretary of War, could lead a rational thinker to conclude that Polk's detailed military direction was necessitated by his role expectations in view of the military situation.

Evidence in this direction is by no means overwhelming. On the contrary, the evidence shown above indicates that Polk's personality needs conflicted with the role requirements and distorted his assessment of the military situation and his choice of action alternatives -- his involvement in "details" and tactical operational areas as opposed to the alternatives of giving general, strategic direction and guidance, or no direction at all.

The President's distrust of his leading generals' "politics" was an excuse given by him as a factor which influenced him in his determination to direct the war activities from his desk in Washington, hundreds of miles from the scene of battle. Yet, because of the primitive nature of communications during that time he was often weeks behind in his knowledge of field conditions.[68]

In light of these communications problems an observer might well question the wisdom of Polk's insistence on making the decisions of the war himself. For, despite all his complaints concerning his commanders, the professional soldiers, the supply system, and particularly his complaints of the political opposition of the military leadership to his administration, to which he seemed to attribute most of his conceived problems, the army marched to the field, was supplied, fought a numerically superior enemy, won a series of victories, and conquered a peace. It is hard to conceive that politically minded military leaders would have gone so far as to discredit Polk's administration by risking loss of the war.

The evidence here asserts that President Polk's personality needs influenced his selection and definition of his military commander role, and that these needs infused themselves into his performance of the role and help account for his sometimes skillful and sometimes inexpedient behavior in behalf of the annexation of California political achievement objective to which he had committed himself. Attempts to explain President Polk's Commander in Chief role behavior in terms of role demands should not discount the fact that aspects of his basic personality were expressing themselves and shaping his behavior.

President Polk's insistance upon directing the most minute details of the military during the Mexican War, to include tactical operational decision-making, was a further manifestation of his total approach to administration. This type of power driven behavior, in compensatory reaction to his feelings of low selfesteem, is indicative of Professor Lasswell's "power seeker" hypothesis, and President Polk can be placed within the confines of this type of personality.

The first American President who made tactical military decisions has been observed as a "power seeker" in explaining his behavior. Was Lincoln, the other President who made this type of military decision during wartime in the pre-1945 era, a "power seeker" also? Can Lincoln's behavior as a tactical military decision-maker be explained in terms of the influence of a "power seeker" personality such as has been done in explaining Polk's behavior?

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Leonard D. White, "Polk", in May, op. cit., p. 57.

2. Charles A. McCoy, Polk and the Presidency (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1960), p. 140.

3. Quoted in Eugene Irving McCormac, James K. Polk: A Political Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1922), pp. 321-322.

4. Charles Sellers, James K. Polk: Jacksonian, 1795-1843, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). (All further references to Sellers are to Vol. 1.)

5. Ibid., p. 23.

6. Ibid., p. 46.

7. Ibid., p. 48.

8. Ibid., p. 46.

9. Ibid., p. 24.

10. Ibid.

11. Milo Milton Quaife, (ed.), Diary of James K. Polk (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Company, 1910), I, p. 86.

12. Lucien B. Chase, History of the Polk Administration (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1850), pp. 474-475.

13. Sellers, op. cit., p. 210.

14. Ibid.

15. Quaife, op. cit., I, p. 86.

16. Ibid., IV, p. 177.

17. Sellers, op. cit., p. 39.

18. Ibid., pp. 39-41, 45, 52, 55, 232, 285, 356, 442-443, 467; Quaife, op. cit., II, pp. 93, 94, III, pp. 181-187, 484, 488-489, 492, 494, 506.

19. Quaife, op. cit., IV, p. 160.

20. Sellers, op. cit., Chapter 1.

21. Ibid., pp. 47-50.

22. The importance of such a developmental process to a personality suffering from damaged selfesteem can be related to Eric Erikson's concept of the adolescent identity crisis. See Eric Erikson, Insight and Personality (New York: W.W. Norton, 1964).

23. Sellers, op. cit., p. 59.

24. Ibid., p. 277.

25. Ibid., p. 50.

26. Ibid., p. 51.

27. Ibid., p. 278.

28. Ibid., p. 277.

29. Ibid.

30. Quoted in McCormac, op. cit., p. 287.

31. Quaife, op. cit., I, pp. 427-428.

32. Ibid., I, p. 400.

33. Ibid., I, pp. 403-404.

34. Ibid., II, p. 104.

35. Ibid., II, p. 148.

36. Otis A. Singletary, The Mexican War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 108-109.

37. Quaife, op. cit., II, p. 179.

38. Ibid., II, p. 196.

39. Ibid., II, pp. 139-140.

40. White, op. cit., pp. 61-65. Also McCoy, op. cit., pp. 128-133.

41. White, op. cit., pp. 65-67; McCoy, op. cit., pp. 134-135.

42. Quaife, I, op. cit., p. 407.

43. Ibid., II, p. 150.

44. Ibid., III, p. 24.

45. Ibid., III, p. 80.

46. Many examples of this conduct exist from Ibid., II, p. 139 to III, pp. 29-30.

47. Ibid., I, p. 407.

48. Quoted in James G. Wilson, (ed.), The Presidents of the United States, II (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1914), p. 230.

49. McCormac, op. cit., p. 324.

50. Quaife, op. cit., IV, p. 261. Also see Norman Graebner, "James K. Polk," in Morton Borden, (ed.), Americas Ten Greatest Presidents (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), p. 138.

51. Quaife, op. cit., II, pp. 432-433.

52. Ibid., III, p. 181.

53. Ibid., II, p. 386.

54. Ibid., IV, p. 261.

55. Ibid., II, pp. 430-431.

56. Ibid., III, p. 34.

57. Ibid., III, p. 91.

58. Quoted in Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness, 3d printing (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 133.

59. James Schouler, History of the United States of America, IV (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1880), p. 498.

60. Quaife, op. cit., II, pp. 355-356.

61. Federalist, No. 69.

62. Quaife, op. cit., III, p. 31.

63. Ibid., II, pp. 249-250, 393-394.

64. Ibid., II, pp. 150-151, 249-250, III, pp. 58-59.

65. Ibid., I, pp. 14-15; II, p. 117.

66. Ibid., II, p. 482.

67. Ibid., I, pp. 485-486; II, pp. 158, 165, 430-431; III, pp. 80-81.

68. Ibid., II, pp. 139-140.

CHAPTER V

ABRAHAM LINCOLN -- POWER SEEKER

Abraham Lincoln was the second American President to become involved in the details of tactical military decision-making and direction in wartime.

During the Civil War, President Lincoln dominated all aspects of military operations. He gave detailed tactical plans to his senior generals for their execution. Not only did he devise tactical plans for his generals-in-chief. He devised detailed tactical plans for subordinate commanders, corresponding directly with these commanders rather than through their superiors -- or the structured chain of command -- suggesting operational plans, approving or disapproving their tactical plans and operations, and requesting their opinions on the competency of their superiors as well as subordinates. Lincoln believed that his strategic and tactical operational plans were more sound than those of his military commanders and he was reluctant to accept any plan which was not in agreement with his views of the military operations. Lincoln's involvement in tactical decision-making and his methods of communicating his decisions and suggestions to his commanders resulted in confusion among the military leaders and absence of a cohesive unity of command within the Union forces. Lincoln's "power seeker" personality was an important influence on his behavior as a military tactician.

Lincoln's Low Self-Estimates

The writings of Abraham Lincoln, as well as observations made of him by others, indicate that he experienced feelings of low esteem from a very early age up to the time of his assassination in office. The evidence which these sources reveals indicates that Lincoln experienced feelings of unimportance, moral inferiority, weakness, mediocrity, and intellectual inadequacy.

Feelings of Unimportance

Lincoln's feelings of unimportance were rooted in his image of himself which placed him with the poor, and the forgotten. He often felt the injustice of his family background -- that of a poor boy's lot in the world.

In December, 1858, Lincoln was asked by a friend, Jesse Fell, to write an autobiographical sketch to promote Lincoln's bid for the Presidency. Lincoln admitted to Fell that "I am ambitious, and would like to be president but there is no such good luck in store for me as the presidency of the United States; besides there is nothing in my early history that would interest you or anybody else."[1] Lincoln did not write a sketch at that time, but one year later, on 20 December 1859, he did oblige Fell with three scant pages of autobiography.

In a short note accompaning his short autobiography Lincoln noted, "There is not much of it, for the reason, I suppose, that there is not much of me."[2] Indeed there was not much of it and Lincoln felt the unimportance of his

biography was almost an absurdity.

Of his family, Lincoln notes in this biography: "My parents were both born in Virginia, of undistinguished families -- second families, perhaps I should say." Of his mother, he only notes that she "was of a family of the name of Hanks," and the only mention of his father was that "he grew up literally without education and removed from Kentucky to what is now Spencer County, Indiana, in my eighth year."[3]

Lincoln's feelings of the unimportance of his life up to this date in 1859 is mirrored in a pathetic attempt at wit in the last sentence of his autobiography where he in description applies a phrase for lost live stock to himself: "No other marks or brands recollected."[4] Lincoln's feelings of unimportance is again noted in April, 1860, when in reference to his candidacy for President he remarked to Lyman Trumbull that "when a not very great man begins to be mentioned for a very great position, his head is very likely to be a little turned." However, he said, "The taste is in my mouth a little...."[5]

These feelings of unimportance can be traced to Lincoln's early years with his family. Young Lincoln and his father, Thomas, appear to have been estranged. When Abraham lived in Springfield, Illinois, his sick father lay dying only seventy miles away in Coles County. Yet, there is no indication that he visited Thomas during his sickness, even upon appeals for a visit from Thomas' stepson. Abraham gave his own wife's illness and his own business interests as explanation for his

absence from his father's bedside. When Thomas Lincoln died, young Lincoln did not attend the funeral.[6]

Young Lincoln's behavior suggests that he wanted to dis-associate himself with a source of his feelings of unimportance, an undistinguished father who was himself also born of an "undistinguished famil[y]." Richard Current notes in The Lincoln Nobody Knows that Abraham spoke "most kindly" of his mother, Nancy Hanks, that he "remembered the day his mother died."[7] Yet, Current also says that Abraham did nothing to see that his mother's grave was properly marked and cared for at anytime during his life.[8]

Further witness to Lincoln's inner feeling of unimportance, as well as a guarded fatalism, was indicated in a political handbill which accompanied a political speech he made at the age of 23. The handbill noted that "if the good people in their wisdom shall see fit to keep me in the background, I have been too familiar with disappointments to be very much chagrined." In the speech, he had stated, "If elected, I shall be thankful; if not, it will be all the same."[9]

Such behavior in a man who has been praised by numerous authors for his "humility", "compassion" and "love for his fellow man" suggests the reaction of a man who felt the pangs of damaged self-estimates.

Feelings of Moral Inferiority

Lincoln's feelings of moral inferiority are evidenced in his view of man and in his encounter with religion.

Donn Piatt, a man who came to know Lincoln as President --

elect and maintained a friendship with him up to Lincoln's assassination, observed that Lincoln, while not at all cynical,

> ...was a sceptic. His view of human nature was low...I could not call it suspicious, but he believed only what he saw. This low estimate of humanity blinded him to the South. He could not understand that men would get up in their wrath and fight for an idea...He unconsciously accepted, for himself and party, the same low line that he awarded the South.[10]

Piatt continues that he was

> ...not at a loss to get at the fact, and the reason for it, in the man before us (Lincoln). Descended from the poor whites of a slave State, through many generations, he inherited the contempt, if not the hatred, held by that class for the negro;...his strong nature was built on what he inherited, and he could no more feel a sympathy for that wretched race than he could for the horse he worked or the hog he killed.[11]

Piatt's observations must be treated as unqualified opinions at this point. But, Lincoln's behavior in the Presidency, discussed below, could validate his observed view of man as he proclaims superior virtue. Exclamations of superior virtue, as has been shown above, can compensate for feelings of moral inferiority. This observation of Lincoln's view of man, to include himself, signals moral inferiority.

This alleged view of man by Lincoln can be given some roots through an investigation of his religious experiences.

Lincoln wrote to Mary Owens on 7 May 1837 about his new life in Springfield, Illinois. He said, "I've never been to church yet, nor probably shall not [sic] be soon. I stay away because I am conscious I should not know how to behave myself."[12] This feeling of not knowing "how to behave" himself may have had some reference to a reported occasion in which he

"imitated Thomas, the preacher, in such a way that the audience laughed uproariously, while the preacher began to weep." About this mimicking of Thomas, President Lincoln is later reported to have said, "If all the good things I have ever done had lingered in men's memories as vividly as this bad turn, I could congratulate myself."[13]

Lincoln's law partner in Springfield, William Herndon, wrote, "Inasmuch as he (Lincoln) was so often a candidate for public office Mr. Lincoln said as little about his religious opinions as possible, especially if he failed to coincide with the orthodox world." Herndon goes further to note that an acquaintance of Lincoln said that "Lincoln had no faith, in the Christian sense of the term," but that he "had faith in laws, principles, causes and effects."[14] Jesse Fell noted that "No religious views with him seemed to find any favor except of the practical and rationalistic order."[15]

Lincoln apparently did believe in a maker of the universe, a god who controlled events in a fatalistic sense. In a Chicago speech on 10 July 1858, Lincoln spoke of moral perfection: "he who did most toward reaching that (God's) standard, attained the highest degree of moral satisfaction."[16] Lincoln had confessed in an earlier letter to Joshua Speed that his "peculiar misfortune" was his propensity to "dream dreams of Elysium far exceeding all that anything earthly can realize."[17] But Lincoln was to go through several crises of the spirit which had a cumulative effect upon him, and which point out his inner feelings of moral inferiority and an eventual effort to compensate for them.

Richard Current points out three of these "crises of the spirit" which Lincoln went through.[18] The first occurred in 1841 when Lincoln broke his engagement with Mary Todd (later his wife). This experience depressed him almost to the point of a mental breakdown. The mother-in-law of Joshua Speed (a personal friend) gave Abraham a copy of the Bible, hoping that he would find some solace in its writings. In regards to the therapeutic value of the Bible, Lincoln wrote Mary Speed a letter, asking her to express his appreciation for the Bible to her mother, in which he said: "I doubt not that it is really the best cure for the 'Blues' could one but take it according to the truth."[19] The second crisis came after Lincoln's marriage to Mary Todd, with the death of his son Eddie. Eddie's death caused Abraham to sink into one of his periods of melancholy. After this experience he started going to church. The final crisis came with the death of a second son, Willie, which sank Lincoln into deeper grief than ever before, and he was reported as having felt a "change which amounted to a true religious experience."[20]

The summer before Lincoln's assassination, Joshua Speed found him reading the Bible one evening. Speed said, "Well, if you have recovered from your skepticism, I am sorry to say that I have not!" President Lincoln replied, "You are wrong, Speed; take all of this book upon reason that you can, and the balance on faith, and you will live and die a happier and better man."[21]

In the three "crises" Lincoln had realized feelings of moral inferiority and that his earlier view of man was wrong,

and that he must seek compensation for those feelings. Mrs. Lincoln further substantiated his "change" when she said, "He first seemed to think about the subject (the church) when our boy Willie died, and then more than ever about the time he went to Gettysburg."[22]

Feelings of Weakness

Courtlandt Canby states that "Mr Lincoln had not a hopeful temperament, and, though he looked at the brighter side of things, was always prepared for disaster and defeat."[23]

A near disaster in Lincoln's life centered around his broken engagement to Mary Todd. After the breaking off of this engagement, Abraham fell into deep melancholy and suffered bodily anxiety which could find expression as insufficiency, or weakness.

Afterwards, Lincoln wrote several letters to his friend Joshua Speed. In one letter he wrote, "I must gain my confidence in my own ability to keep my resolves when they are made...; and until I do, I cannot trust myself in any matter of much importance." Further, "I am so poor and make so little headway in the world, that I drop back in a month of idleness as much as I gain in a year's sowing."[24]

Lincoln had been torn by this incident and had lost confidence in himself and in the uprightness of his motives and it had damaged his self-estimates.

Feelings of Intellectual Inadequacy

In the biographical sketch which Abraham Lincoln prepared

for Jesse Fell, Lincoln wrote of his early background, "There was absolutely nothing to excite ambition for education. Of course, when I came of age I did not know much...The little advance I now have upon this store of education, I have picked up from time to time under the pressure of necessity."[25]

Although, as noted, there was little opportunity for education in his earlier life, his lack of education gave Lincoln a feeling of intellectual inadequacy. Helen Nicolay, daughter of one of Lincoln's Presidential secretaries, John Nicolay, quotes Lincoln as saying, "I remember how, when a mere child, I used to get irritated when anybody talked to me in a way I could not understand. I don't think I ever got angry at anything else in my life. But that always disturbed my temper, and has, ever since."[26]

William Herndon, who subscribed to the Westminister and Edinburgh Review and was an avid reader of the works of Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and other English scientists, notes other evidence of Lincoln's feelings of intellectual inadequacy. Herndon says that he "had little success in inducing Lincoln to read" these items. He goes on to say that occasionally Lincoln "would snatch one up and peruse it for a little while, but he soon threw it down with a suggestion that it was entirely too heavy for an ordinary mind to digest."[27]

Lincoln's feeling of intellectual inadequacy is further pointed out by Joseph Gillespie, who served with Lincoln in the Illinois Legislature. Gillespie noted that in "the discussion of great questions", Lincoln thought "nothing

adventious [sic] should be lugged in as a make weight. That was contrary to his notions of fairness." Lincoln was sensitive where he thought he had fallen short, as when he "was pitted by the Whigs in 1840 to debate with Mr. Douglas." Conscious of his failure and deeply distressed, he "begged to be permitted to try it again" and Gillespie had "never heard...such a triumphant vin[di]cation."[28]

In 1846 Lincoln was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives but he did not run for reelection in 1848. Helen Nicolay says, "It is significant that after this experience (in Congress) and contact with the larger minds of the day, he set himself like a schoolboy to study works of mathematics and logic. Evidently, he felt in himself a lack of the power of close and sustained reasoning."[29]

Abraham Lincoln suffered low self-estimates in a number of operational areas. Lincoln's damaged selfesteem undoubtedly contributed to what his Assistant Secretary of War, Charles Dana, referred to as Lincoln's "prevailing characteristic -- the natural gloom of a melancholy and desponding temperament."[30]

Behind Lincoln's melancholic exterior he harbored an appetite for success as compensation for these low self-estimates. Lacking the opportunity for educational opportunities he would learn to use the inate ability and energies which he did possess to carve out a sphere of competence within which he could prove his worth to himself and to other men.

Lincoln's Striving for Power Gratification

At the age of 21 young Abraham Lincoln left the work of a farmer and started into the world on his own. He settled down in New Salem, Illinois where he worked for a year as a store clerk. At the end of his year as a clerk came an experience which delightfully spurred the imagination of this young man.

Lincoln relates in his autobiography, "Then came the Black Hawk war; and I was elected a captain of volunteers, a success which gave me more pleasure than any I have had since."[31] Further evidence of the elation which Lincoln received from this event was voiced to a personal friend who practiced law in the Eighth Illinois Circuit with Lincoln, Leonard Swett. Swett notes that Lincoln said, "I cannot tell you how much the idea of being the captain of that company pleased me."[32] Herein was young Lincoln's first "election" and his first taste of power. His 1859 autobiography continues: "I went the campaign (the Black Hawk war), was elated, ran for the legislature the same year (1832), and was beaten -- the only time I ever have been beaten by the people."[33] It is interesting to note that Lincoln, in another autobiography written in 1860, adds a little more by referring to his popularity. In this newer version he notes that after "Returning from the campaign, and encouraged by his great popularity among his immediate neighbors, he...ran for the legislature, and was beaten...This was the only time Abraham was ever beaten on a direct vote of the people."[34]

Lincoln had received the first taste of success and power as a militia captain, had suffered his one and only electoral defeat; yet, spurred by a felt popularity and sensing his need for the things which power could bring -- respect, security, esteem, rectitude -- his political ambitions would quickly grow. The defeat had not dampened Lincoln's hopes nor soured his ambition. The acquaintances which he had made, the practice in public speaking, the confidence of the people which he perceived, together with the needs of his damaged personality, had made a surplus of capital on which he would draw in his second bid for the legislature, and on which he would draw many times in the future.

During the time between the unsuccessful election of 1832 and his second bid in 1934, William Herndon notes that Abe, in addition to working at numerous jobs, started studying law on his own and that "He never at any time abandoned the idea of becoming a lawyer." Herndon continues that law "was always a spirit which beckoned him on in the darkest hour of his adversity."[35] Law was a way to politics during this period and the two professions were at times almost indistinguishable one from the other.

In Lincoln's bid for election to the legislature in 1834 his first published "Address to the Voters of Sangamon County" describes his early ambition: "Every man is said to have his peculiar ambition. Whether it be true or not, I can say, for one, that I have no other so great as that of being truly esteemed of my fellow men by rendering myself worthy of

their esteem."[36] The complimentary majority by which he won the 1834 election indicates that he may have won some of the esteem which he desired.

The brief taste of public office which Lincoln enjoyed in his first term in the state legislature, and the distinction it gave him only whetted his appetite for further honors and in 1936 he again was a candidate for the legislature.

In the campaign for his second term, Lincoln again refers to his need for respect and esteem. Herndon indicates that Abraham, in reply to a rebuttal of one of his campaign speeches, said: "...I am older in years than I am in the tricks and trades of politicians." However, "I desire to live, and I desire place and distinction."[37] Again, Lincoln was elected, as he was for a third and fourth term in 1838 and 1840.

During his terms in the Illinois legislature, Lincoln further refined his oratory, and cultivated acquaintances which would benefit him politically. Brash, at times gaining confidence, and ambitious, his rise as a politician was rapid within the confines of Illinois politics. As a wheelhorse of the Whigs he quickly learned the tricks of the political trade, and his continued study of law during these terms in office, resulted in Lincoln being licensed to practice law in 1837, shortly after the transfer of his domicile from New Salem to Springfield, Illinois.

During this time of building his self-estimates and carving his field of politics the incident of his broken engagement to Mary Todd, mentioned above, damaged these self-

estimates and threw him into the frame of mind that "I am now the most miserable man living."[38] But even during this time of mental depression Lincoln's striving for accomplishment, for self respect and his need for rectitude are again seen.

Joshua Speed's mother recalled to William Herndon that Lincoln,

> ...was much depressed. At first he almost contemplated suicide. In the deepest of his depression he said one day he had done nothing to make any human being remember that he had lived; and that to connect his name with the events transpiring in his day and generation, and so impress himself upon them as to link his name with something that would redound to the interest of his fellowmen, was what he desired to live for.[39]

This incident ended in 1842 with the marriage of Lincoln to Mary Todd, but it gives further insight into the personality needs of Lincoln.

Lincoln did not run again for the Illinois legislature in 1842, and from that time until 1846, when he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, he continued his law practice.

However, politics was not very far from his mind. "He was an exceedingly ambitious man," his Springfield law partner, William Herndon wrote, "a man totally swallowed up in his ambitions. Rouse Mr. Lincoln's peculiar nature in a point where he deeply felt -- say in his ambitions -- his general greed for office --...then Mr. Lincoln preferred Abe Lincoln to anybody else."[40] Lincoln eventually sought a congressional seat and was elected to the House in 1846 where he served but

one term, until 1848, whereupon he once more returned to his law practice which he practiced "more assiduously than ever before."[41]

Though he was not to run again for political office until his candidacy for the Presidency, there is no indication that he lost interest in politics.[42] He became the master wirepuller who operated the state political organization first of the Whig party and, after its decay, that of the Republicans.

During his apprenticeship in politics, Lincoln had worked at cultivating political assets which would enhance his ambition. Herndon says that "the consciousness of his short comings as a society man rendered him unusually diffident," and that he had a marked dislike for fashionable society "although he appreciated its value in promoting the welfare of a man ambitious to succeed in politics."[43] Lincoln was ambitious in politics and he endeavored to present a more intensified political personality to "fashionable society" as well as other classes of the electorate. When the repeal of the Missouri Compromise roused him he had prepared himself in the art of oratory and seemed to be a different Lincoln in the Douglas debates which followed. He had a graver dignity, a new tone of authority. He used fewer anecdotes; historical fact and cold logic had replaced good-natured thrusts at men ane events. The anecdotes had given way to axioms, and illustrations, sparingly used when employed at all, were forcible rather than humorous. During this time he had developed the

style, so noticable later, of compressing "truths" into short, ringing sentences. Of this change, Herndon has noted that Lincoln "discovered through experience that his mind, like the minds of other men, had its limitations, and hence he economized his forces and his time by applying his powers in the field of the practical."[44]

The controversy over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in 1854 had aroused Lincoln, for he saw in it the opportunity to gain the ultimate prize, the height of political power -- (and he needed it). He saw in the controversy an opportunity to propel his personal ambition, his need for power, through a moral commitment which he had acquired for the containment of slavery. The whole period from 1854 to 1860 was but a single campaign in which Lincoln sought to bring, first, to the people of Illinois, and then, to the entire nation, his political availability as a Senator, and then as Presidential candidate. Because of his damaged personality, the purpose of gaining and retaining power had seldom been far from Lincoln's thoughts. It blended with his other purposes and influenced most of his actions not only before but after he was elected President in 1860.

In 1860, as President-elect, Lincoln was standing at the door of power but he was immediately faced with the problem of what to do about the recent happenings in South Carolina. He had grasped the opportunity to achieve power by his stand on the containment of slavery. He had won the election with this objective as the major plank in the Republican party platform.

It was his opportunity to produce a real political achievement which his ego needed; and, practically speaking, to divert from this objective would possibly cause the splintering of the Republican party and his base of power.

In a speech on 1 March 1859 in Chicago, Lincoln said: "Never forget that we have before us this whole matter of the right or wrong of slavery in this Union, though the immediate question is as to its spreading out into new Territories and States."[45] Lincoln felt that slavery was evil and that it must be done away with, but that if the spread of it were stopped and contained, it would in time disappear by virtue of legal, economic or other means.

To Lincoln there could be no compromise on the containment of slavery for the Republican party. On 10 December 1860, in a letter to Senator Lyman Trumbull, he wrote: "Let there be no compromise on the question of extending slavery."[46] On 13 December 1860, he wrote to Congressman Elihu Washburne, "Prevent, as far as possible, any of our friends from demoralizing themselves, and our (the Republican Party) cause, by entertaining propositions for compromise of any sort, on 'slavery extention'...On that point hold firm, as with a chain of steel."[47] And, on 1 February 1861, Lincoln wrote to William Seward: "I say now, however, as I have all the while said, that on the territorial question...I am inflexible."[48]

Lincoln did not want a war over the slavery issue and he did not think it would come. He had his ultimate political objective in view, and nothing was going to deter him from

reaching it, peacibly if possible or by winning the war if it came.

Pursuit of Power in the Presidency

Lincoln's struggle for power did not end with his election to the Presidency; the striving entered a new and more complex phase. It now became a struggle to establish and maintain control, and to exert his will against the force of other powerful wills.

One of these other powerful wills was held by William Seward. To avoid playing into the equally ambitious hands of politically strong Seward, while gaining the benefit of Seward's political following, Lincoln delayed committment to Seward in regards to a cabinet appointment.

When President-elect Lincoln finally offered Seward the Secretary of State post, Seward accepted the bid. However, events occurred which did not please Seward, and he tried to turn down the offer just prior to the inauguration. Lincoln, in his determination to assert dominance over his party and the men within it "waited until the inaugural procession was forming in the street, and sent him (Seward) a short note, refusing to release him." John Nicolay, the President's Secretary to whom Lincoln handed the note to be copied, quotes the President as having said: "I cannot afford to let Seward take the first trick."[49] This doggedness was the beginning of a dominating Presidency.

Lincoln had been President less than twenty-four hours when, on the morning of 5 March 1861, he learned of the pre-

carious situation at Fort Sumter.[50] General Winfield Scott, the Army Chief of Staff, at that time, had advised the President that Sumter should be evacuated, but Lincoln overruled him and on 6 April he ordered an expedition to relieve the fort.[51] On the morning of 12 April, before the expedition arrived in Charleston harbor, the first shots were fired on Fort Sumter and the Civil War had begun.[52]

The war became the major subject which Lincoln would deal with up to his assassination. To other matters, such as the conduct of foreign relations and the enactment of even highly important domestic legislation, the president rarely gave more than perfunctory attention. Don Fehrenbacher says that "Lincoln had always been one to confine his intellectual energies within a narrow range", that he had "the gift of selectivity", and that his "whole genius was for concentration."[53]

The war would be a major obstacle to overcome before Lincoln would be able to produce his political achievement. The war would have to be won in order to save the Union, and the Union would have to be saved in order to achieve the shorter goal of containing slavery, and hopefully the future goal of abolishing slavery. To attain this needed achievement, Lincoln felt that he must dominate every step of the way to its fruition. In particular, he would run the war as a military commander determining not only strategy, but tactics as well.

In the Bull Run campaign conducted in the summer of 1861 Lincoln exercised his full authority. On 29 June General

Scott advised that no forward movement be made by the army until autumn and that the advance then be made down the Mississippi River. Lincoln wanted immediate action and felt that an advance should be made in Virginia. General McDowell, who had been put in command of the forces south of the Potomac, agreed with General Scott that the army was not yet ready for an offensive movement. But President Lincoln, not to be put off or dominated, persisted and ordered an immediate offensive. The offensive failed. T. Harry Williams says, concerning this offensive:

> The first big Northern strategic movement was initiated and planned by the President and forced by him upon his generals...Strategist Lincoln made the decision to undertake the offensive for reasons he considered militarily sound and not because of the politicians, the press, and the public who were screaming 'Onward to Richmond'.[54]

During the days which followed this disaster Lincoln gave his entire attention to the military situation. He wanted decisive action for an immediate end to the war, so that he could continue toward producing his political achievement.

General Scott and McClellan had each submitted similar plans for campaigns, beginning on the Potomac or the Ohio River and terminating on the Gulf of Mexico, but they apparently made little impression on the commander in chief who needed to dominate and have his own way in all of the military matters. On 23 July 1861, Lincoln, with little assistance from his technical advisers evolved these ideas and wrote them out in his own hand:

> push forward the blockade -- let the volunteer forces at Fort Monroe and vicinity, under General Butler, be constantly drilled, disciplined,and instructed without more for the present -- hold Baltimore -- strengthen and secure the position under Patterson and Banks -- General McClellan command the forces in western Virginia -- General Fremont push forward in the West -- let the forces late before Manassas, except the three month's men, be reorganized as rapidly as possible in their camps here and about Arlington -- discharge the three month's forces who don't desire to continue in the service as rapidly as possible -- let the new volunteer forces be brought forward as fast as possible and especially into the camps on the two sides of the river here (the Potomac).[55]

Lincoln goes on to say that after the above has been accomplished:

> Let Manassas Junction (or some point on one or other of the railroads near it) and Strasburg be seized, and permanently held, with an open line from Harper's Ferry to Strasburg -- the military man to find the way of doing these. This done, a joint movement from Cairo to Memphis; and from Cincinnati to east Tennessee.[56]

General Francis Green notes that this plan "emanated from his (Lincoln's) own mind and not from that of any of his generals."[57]

Lincoln never swerved from this plan throughout the war. He replaced many generals and commanders before he found someone who would execute his original plans. Whether his plan was brilliant or poor is not a question here. Whether the plans submitted by his commanders were brilliant or poor is not the question in this case. The fact is that Lincoln's steadfastness to his own plan -- his method for obtaining victory and ensuring the realization of his "political achievement" -- was held onto with a death grip and he would not change from his own superior judgement nor be dominated in any

instance which would forestall the final execution of his plan.

At times, it appears that Lincoln acquiesced to the plans of his commanders, as in General McClellan's Urbana plan for a movement on Richmond, Virginia.[58] However, after approving this plan which differed from his own, Lincoln issued two orders which showed his dislike for it. One order was to organize twelve divisions of the Army of the Potomac into four corps. T. Harry Williams notes that "Lincoln made the order without consulting McClellan and knowing that the General would be opposed to it."[59] In reference to this organizational order, Williams notes that "It was as if he (Lincoln) said to the General: I will let you do what you want but I don't like it, and I am going to set some older heads (the Corps Commanders) to watch you."[60]

The second order directed that adequate forces should be left in and around Washington in order to secure it, and that the "move to Urbana must start on March 18."[61] But, due to intervening action of the Confederates, the Urbana plan was never executed. Shortly thereafter, McClellan was relieved of his overall command.

Again, in February of 1862, McClellan came up with another plan, which was to move a force from a landing at Fortress Monroe and up the Peninsula, between the York and James Rivers in Virginia, on to Richmond. This plan would require much tactical and logistical support. "If ever a general taking the field needed the complete trust of his

superiors, McClellan did, and if ever a general lacked it, he did," Williams concludes.[62] Lincoln did not like the plan, but again he acquiesced, yet, again with strings attached -- that "sufficient" forces were to be left to secure Washington and Manassas.[63]

This time the expedition got under way. Again Lincoln became concerned with the forces left to secure Washington, and as McClellan was making his first contact with the enemy on the Peninsula, Lincoln withheld one of the Corps, of 30,000 men, which was preparing to embark for the campaign and posted it in front of Washington.[64] The question of whether "enough" forces had been left in accordance with Lincoln's instructions has not been adequately explained. However, McClellan's Peninsula campaign failed. He said he needed more troops, but Lincoln would not release them. It does not appear logical that Lincoln desired McClellan's defeat; however, was the lack of support due to the fact that the campaign was not Lincoln's?

Perhaps Lincoln was a "military genius" as T. Harry Williams indicates in his book Lincoln and His Generals and his plans for the conduct of the war was the result of this genius. However, Lincoln had personality problems which undercut the accomplishment of his plans and war direction. His inner self-effacement, diffidence, doubt whether the country would sustain him if he peremptorily asserted his opinions against those of his professional military subordinates -- opposed as it was to his need to dominate, hold the power which he had

obtained, and to produce political achievements -- caused inner conflicts which at times left the army with two heads, or three heads, or no head at all. From this confusion and lack of unity of command came the indecisive, inconclusive movements and battles of the Army of the Potomac during the interval between McClellan's defeats on the Peninsula in 1862 and Grant's victories in the Wilderness in 1864.

After losing hope of McClellan's taking Richmond in 1862, Lincoln stated: "I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsakes me."[65] Even while McClellan was still inching toward Richmond, Lincoln continued giving military direction -- detailed tactical direction -- as indicated by his instructions to other commanders. In the Valley campaign, Lincoln took direct charge of the defense system. He instructed General Fremont where to put his army and how to cooperate with General Banks if the Confederates came north again. Getting down to fine details, the President told Fremont what precautions to take against a surprise: "By proper scout outlooks, and because of smoke by day and fires by night, you can always have timely notice of the enemy's approach." Then, as a rejoinder to the commander to follow his campaign instructions, he said: "I have arranged this, and am very unwilling to have it deranged."[66]

From the time Lincoln ordered the removal of McClellan in November, 1862, until just after the battle of Gettysburg in July 1863, Lincoln gave no positive orders as such. He

corresponded with the generals, discussed military questions with them, and gave his conceptions of strategic, as well as tactical, operations freely, but always qualified them with such remarks as, "This is a suggestion, not an order", "I suggest this plan, incompetent as I may be", "I leave this to the military men".[67] During most of this time Lincoln had a nominal general-in-chief with whom he could have discussed the business of the war. However, to carry on correspondence with the general-in-chief's subordinates without his knowledge, to require the general in the field to submit his plans and then to send a reply expressing approval or disapproval of it ending with the remarks "this is a suggestion only, not an order", is not the way in which military operations are successfully conducted and was not constructive in breeding commanders to cope with Robert E. Lee and his top generals. Lincoln's personality demanded that he show his newly found superior ability and intellect.

Lincoln continued to dominate his military commanders throughout the war. He appears to have intervened less after Grant became general-in-chief possibly because Grant finally executed Lincoln's original "plan" for the war. Even then, however, Lincoln never hesitated to exercise his authority when he thought that Grant was making a mistake. When he gave the supreme military commander post to Grant he forestalled Grant's demands by telling him a "little story" about a monkey who thought he could be the commander of an animal army. The monkey kept asking for more tail, which he felt would enable him to be a better commander, until the weight of the added

tail broke him down.[68]

Lincoln showed his need for domination, unwillingness to delegate, to inform, adequately consult and to properly take advice in areas other than military command. Charles Dana, Lincoln's Assistant Secretary of War, recalled that "it was always plain that he (Lincoln) was the master and they (Secretary of War Stanton, Secretary of State Seward, and Secretary of the Treasury Chase) the subordinates."[69] Lincoln seemed to make a point of doing the opposite of what Stanton recommended.[70] Even the power minded John Seward finally realized Lincoln's determination not to be dominated when he said: "There is but one vote in the cabinet, and that is cast by the President."[71] John Nicolay wrote, "No descendant of the hundred kings could be more sure of his right to command. Even Louis could not have been more dictatorial or emphatic; but his methods were characteristically his own."[72] Donn Piatt recalled that: "There never lived a man who could say 'no' with easier facility, and abide by his saying with more firmness, than President Lincoln. His good manner misled the common mind. It covered as firm a character as nature ever clad with human flesh."[73]

Leonard Swett discussed Lincoln's unwillingness to inform others at times. "He always told only enough of his plans and purposes to induce the belief that he had communicated all; yet, he reserved enough to have communicated nothing."[74]

Even Lincoln's adherence to no policy was an expression of his need to dominate, although possibly expressing the fundamental pragmatic element in the American political tradition.

By rejecting a doctrinaire approach, declining ideological labels, considering every problem unique in itself, changing with events, and avoiding irredeemable pledges against the future, Lincoln was in better position to dominate the political and military scene and prevent domination and interference by others who may have been in a position to do so.[75]

Lincoln had the political power of the President. He was working toward his goal of producing a political achievement. However, he had to keep the power of that office in order to reach his objective, thereby satisfying his personality needs. When the election of 1864 approached, Lincoln grew fearful that his dream of "Elysium" would go down with him in defeat at the polls. Lincoln craved a second term. Regarding this power and his desire for a second term, Lincoln said, "No man knows what that gnawing is til he has had it."[76]

Alexander McClure draws a despondent picture of Lincoln as he saw him in fits of abject depression during the time after his second nomination when he and all the leaders of the Republican party thought his defeat was inevitable. McClure says, "Lincoln's desire for a renomination (and election) was the one thing ever apparent in his mind during the third year of his Administration."[77] In Our Presidents and How We Make Them, McClure notes, "A more anxious candidate I have never known...I could hardly treat with respect his anxiety about his renomination."[78]

To ensure his renomination and reelection Lincoln used every method available. Charles Dana recalls: "All the power and influence of the War Department, then something enormous from the vast expenditures and extensive relations of the war, had been employed to secure the re-election of Mr. Lincoln."[79] David Donald records that patronage, requirements of party loyality from its leaders, the release of military men to return to their homes to vote and military "riot" troops in New York were all used by Lincoln to ensure his reelection.[80]

Lincoln, driven by his need for power as compensation for his feelings of low self-esteem, carved his field of politics propelled by his ambition and this power need. Having achieved the presidential powers, he demonstrated his unwillingness to be dominated, his need to dominate others and his continuing need for power.

In order to complete the picture of Lincoln having a "power seeker" personality his behavior should be investigated to determine whether or not he obtained compensatory, or euphoric, feelings from the exercise of his power.

Compensatory (Euphoric) Feelings

One of the most vivid pictures of the euphoric feelings which Lincoln felt when exercising power is indicated in a letter from John Hay to John Nicolay, wherein Hay said: "The Tycoon (their reference to President Lincoln) is in fine whack. I have rarely seen him more serene and busy. He is managing this war, the draft, foreign relations, and planning recon-

struction of the Union, all at once. I never knew with what tyrannous authority he rules the Cabinet till now. The most important things he decides, and there is no cavil."[81]

In his performance of duties as President, Lincoln felt himself to be unique in his calling to save the union and free the slaves. He displayed euphoric feelings in this sense when he told a group of visiting ministers who had called upon him in 1862 that he considered himself "an instrument of Providence". He looked upon himself "as an agent of God upon Earth, and he strove to make out the Almighty's purposes, so that he might best perform his own mission in giving effect to the supernal will."[82]

Mrs. Lincoln noted the President's tendency toward a fatalistic attitude when she said that "his only philosophy was, what is to be will be, and no prayers of ours can reverse the decree."[83] However, he did not rule out all possibility of human will and human choice, particularly as noted in his "instrument of Providence" statement about his own uniqueness. In 1864, Lincoln wrote to Mrs. Eliza Gurney that we must recognize God's wisdom and our own error. "Meanwhile we must work earnestly in the best light He gives us, trusting that so working still conduces to the great ends He ordains."[84]

Lincoln also expressed his feeling of uniqueness -- "I must do it if it is to be done!" -- in his military direction behavior. Speaking to General Grant of his earlier commanders, Lincoln expressed this feeling when he said, "They all wanted me to be the General."[85] This feeling of uniqueness is by no means substantiated in the comments by Lincoln's

commanders who felt that he interfered too frequently.

Compensatory feelings of his own superior virtue and moral insight, which balanced his earlier feelings of moral inferiority, were expressed on numerous occasions. To a Tennessee woman who sought the release of her prisoner husband with the plea that he was a religious man, Lincoln said, "The religion that sets men to rebel and fight against their government, because, they think, that government does not sufficiently help some men to eat their bread on the sweat of other men's faces, is not the sort of religion upon which people can get to heaven!"[86] Again, Lincoln exhibited his feeling of superior moral perception when upon being congratulated on his second inaugural speech that labelled the long war a punishment for both the North and South for the national sin of slavery, he said, "It is the truth which I thought needed to be told."[87]

Lincoln's habit of compressing a moral truth or a guiding principle into a short and telling sentence, and relating stories or anecdtoes, were expressions of feelings of superior virtue, strength and intellect. John Nicolay quoted Lincoln as saying: "If it were not for this vent I should die."[88] He even based his ability to tell these stories on one of the sources of his earlier feelings of low selfesteem, his meager family beginnings, when a friend noted: "He always maintained that the best stories originated with Country boys and in the rural districts." The writer continues that Lincoln "had great faith in the strong sense of Country People and he gave them credit for greater intelegence [sic] than most

people do...He told me in the spring of 1864 that the People were greatly ahead of the poloticians [sic]...He prized the suggestions of...unsophisticated People more than what was called statecraft."[89] These observations would help verify the conflict of Lincoln's feelings of low self-estimates, or the sources of them, and his compensatory strivings to display superiority.

John Hay notes an example of the feelings of superiority which Lincoln displayed at times. Hay said that Lincoln "scarcely ever looked into a newspaper unless I called his attention to an article on some special subject. He frequently said, 'I know more about it than any of them'." Hay goes on to say, "It is absurd to call him a modest man...It was his intellectual arrogance and unconscious assumption of superiority that men like Chase and Sumner never could forgive."[90]

Lincoln's tendency at times to be lenient in matters of discipline within the armed forces, particularly toward the militiamen, has been pointed out by Donn Piatt. Piatt states that Lincoln knew that he was dependent on volunteers for soldiers, and to force on such the stern discipline of the regular army -- the shooting of deserters in this case -- was to render the service unpopular. Lincoln's need for respect is pointed out as Piatt continues, "it pleased him to be the source of mercy, as well as the fountain of honor, in this direction."[91]

President Lincoln only acquiesced to God in noting his feeling of superior ability in conducting the war -- the feeling that no one else could do it so well -- when he said

in 1862: "I have sought his (God's) aid; but...I must believe that for some purpose unknown to me, he wills it otherwise. If I had been allowed my way, this war would have been ended before this; but we find it continues."[92]

A euphoric feeling of superior ability over his conduct of the war was also expressed by President Lincoln in explanation of his "My policy is to have no policy" statement. In this regard, Lincoln once said, "If we had had a great man for the Presidency, one who had an inflexible policy and stuck to it, this rebellion would have succeeded, and the Southern Confederacy would have been established."[93]

Another expression of compensatory high self-estimates was pointed out after Lincoln's handling of a running battle which was being conducted between two of his cabinet officers, Secretary of State Seward and Secretary of the Treasury Chase. During an intrigue apparently instigated by Chase, and abetted by some members of Congress who were extremely critical of Seward's influence in the Cabinet, Seward tendered his resignation to President Lincoln. Lincoln's immediate acceptance of Seward's resignation could have allowed him to gracefully get rid of Seward and his power ambitions. However, Lincoln decided to follow another route. He called the censorious Congressmen and the Cabinet, with the exception of Seward, to the White House for a face to face confrontation. The discussion ended in a defense of Seward's actions by the Cabinet, to include Chase, much to the disappointment of the Congressmen. The next day, in order to save consistency, Chase tendered his resignation. Thereupon, Lincoln stated to

an aide, "Now I can ride. I have a pumpkin in each end of my bag." He then proceeded to write notes to each man, asking for a withdrawal of their resignation. Lincoln, apparently well satisfied with his manner of handling the problem, said: "I do not see how it could have been done better. I am sure it was right...When Chase sent in his resignation I saw the game was in my own hands, and I put it through."[94]

Compensatory feelings of intellectual superiority, that his own judgement was infallable, are evidenced in several observations by men of Lincoln's time. Charles Dana wrote that "Even in his freest moments one always felt the presence of a will and an intellectual power which maintained the ascendancy of the President...he was always conscious of his own ideas and purposes, even in his most unreserved moments."[95]

Don Piatt, notes about Lincoln: "The fact was that [his] power came from a sense of a reserve force of intellectual ability that no one took account of, save in its results... and this sense of superiority possessed President Lincoln at all times." Lincoln "was not modest in his assertion, and he as quietly directed Seward in shaping...foreign policy as he controlled Chase in the Treasury and Edward M. Stanton in the War Department."[96]

Lincoln's air of intellectual superiority was observed by his Springfield law partner William Herndon, who said that Lincoln "saw what no man could well dispute, but he failed to see what might be seen...by other men...His own mind was his own and exclusive standard."[97]

Summary

Abraham Lincoln possessed a "power-seeker" personality within the terms of Lasswell's general hypothesis. In order to compensate for his low self-estimates, Lincoln sought to establish equilibrium in his personality by seeking political power. He felt a need for this power in order to gain self respect, security and rectitude. This power need, or desire, was also manifested in a need to dominate others and prevent others from dominating him in his sphere of politics.

Lincoln prepared himself for the rigors of the political scene through self-education, cultivation of political and social contacts which could help him politically, and through constant refinement of his oratorical abilities.

When the opportunity presented itself for his venture into national politics, Lincoln entered with determination and vigor, striving to place himself in a position to advance to candidacy for the Presidential seat. Once Lincoln's nomination by the Republican party for the Presidency was obtained, he worked with all of his abilities to gain the apex of national political power, expounding the cause of preventing the expansion of slavery.

When elected to the Presidency, Lincoln had within his grasp the opportunity to produce a profound political achievement through his slavery stand. Additionally, this stand on slavery was a means whereby he could retain the coherence of his party, which was necessary in order for him to maintain the power which he had obtained. There could be no compromise

with anyone on Lincoln's stand on the extension of slavery.

When the Civil War began, Lincoln took up his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in war time with vigor. He managed every aspect of that power with determination and dominance. He not only gave strategic direction in his handling of the war but he also gave tactical operational military direction as well. Lincoln's chance for producing a successful political achievement lay in the military submission of the South once the war had begun. His Emancipation Proclamation was not only an attempt to achieve an end to slavery in the conquered areas and other free states, but an attempt to maintain the support of the non-Abolitionists of the North in an effort to save the Union. In the Union lay his only chance for producing his political achievement -- for gaining his personality needed goals -- and continuing the power which he held to achieve these goals.

President Lincoln was a "power seeker" and one of the factors which influenced his behavior in the role of Commander in Chief, particularly his involvement in the operational military details of tactics, was his compensatory guided, power-seeking personality.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted in William Barton, President Lincoln, I (Indianapolis,Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1933), p. 59.

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3. Ibid., I, p. 62.

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11. Ibid.

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13. Ludwig, op. cit., p. 68.

14. William H. Herndon, Herndon's Lincoln, edited by David Freeman Hawke (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), pp. 188-189.

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16. Current, op. cit., p. 60.

17. Ibid., p. 11.

18. Ibid., pp. 62-64.

19. Ibid., p. 62.

20. Ibid., p. 64.

21. Ibid., p. 65.

22. Herndon, op. cit., p. 192.

23. Courtlandt Canby, (ed.), Lincoln and The Civil War: A Profile and A History (New York: George Braziller, 1960), p. 16.

24. Ludwig, op. cit., p. 90.

25. Barton, I, op. cit., p. 62.

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27. Herndon, op. cit., p. 187.

28. Quoted in James G. Randall, Lincoln The President, I (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1945), p. 45.

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31. Barton, I, op. cit., p. 63.

32. Leonard Swett, "Lincoln's Story of His Own Life," in Rice, op. cit., p. 76.

33. Barton, loc. cit.

34. Randall, I, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

35. Herndon, op. cit., pp. 36-40.

36. Nicolay, op. cit., p. 64.

37. Herndon, op. cit., p. 50.

38. Ibid., pp. 74-75.

39. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 75-76.

40. Quoted in David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 66.

41. Barton, loc. cit.

42. His autobriography notes that he "...was losing interest in politics when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise aroused me again." Barton, loc. cit.

43. Herndon, op. cit., p. 179.

44. Ibid., p. 186.

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46. Paul M. Angle and Earl S. Miers, (ed.), The Living Lincoln (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1955), p. 365.

47. Basler, IV, op. cit., p. 151.

48. Angle, op. cit., p. 374.

49. Nicolay, op. cit., p. 236.

50. Barton, I, op. cit., p. 226.

51. Ibid., p. 230.

52. Ibid., p. 231.

53. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Leadership of Abraham Lincoln (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), p. 5.

54. Williams, op. cit., p. 20.

55. Francis V. Greene, "Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief," Scribner's Magazine, XLVI (July 1909), p. 105.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Williams, op. cit., pp. 63-67. For letter to McClellan, on Lincoln's disagreements, see Angle, op. cit., pp. 461-462.

59. Williams, op. cit., p. 68.

60. Ibid., p. 69.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 74.

63. Ibid., p. 73.

64. Ibid., p. 82; also see letter notifying detachment of troops, Angle, op. cit., p. 478.

65. Current, op. cit., p. 182.

66. Williams, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

67. Angle, op. cit., p. 544.

68. U.S. Grant, "Two Stories of Lincoln," in Rice, op. cit., pp. 283-286.

69. Charles A. Dana, "Lincoln and the War Department," in Rice, op. cit., p. 275.

70. Ibid., pp. 280-282.

71. Nicolay, op. cit., p. 239.

72. Ibid., p. 240.

73. Piatt, op. cit., p. 352.

74. Current, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

75. For a discussion of Lincoln's "No Policy", see Donald, op. cit., pp. 131-141.

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78. A. K. McClure, Our Presidents and How We Make Them, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1905), p. 184.

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80. Donald, op. cit., pp. 77-81.

81. Barton, II, op. cit., pp. 590-591.

82. Current, op. cit., p. 72.

83. Herndon, op. cit., p. 186.

84. Current, loc. cit.

85. Donald, op. cit., p. 102.

86. Current, op. cit., p. 73.

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97. Randall, I, op. cit., p. 28.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

Of seven wartime Presidents between 1789 and 1945, two made tactical military decisions normally expected of uniformed field commanders. The "power seeker" personalities of Presidents Polk and Lincoln appear to have contributed to their similar behavior in dissimilar situations as Constitutional commanders in chief.

It was the intention of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States that the President, in his role of Commander in Chief of the Nation's armed forces, should have the authority to direct the operational employment of these forces as a military commander, to include tactical direction and decision-making. As interpreters of this authority, President Polk and President Lincoln displayed "power seeker" personalities. Individual needs to produce political achievements to compensate for their feelings of low self-estimates were a major influence on their behavior as tacitical military decision-makers. Specifically, tactical military decisions which were made by Presidents Polk and Lincoln were responses stimulated by their personality needs. Moreover, this analysis points to three more general contributions to the study of political phenomena.

First, this study has not been intended to present all of the aspects which are necessary for a full understanding of the phenomenon of presidents who make tactical military

decisions, or of comparable elite actors who modify traditional operational styles. In order to gain a full understanding of this phenomena, the analyst must consider all of the variables which have influenced this type of presidential behavior: the military situation -- type of conflict, military leadership, military organization, military weaponry and technology; the influence of governmental politics -- political pressures and persuasion, presidential publics' expectations; and the personality of the president or presidents who exhibit this behavior. Moreover, the focus can not be only on the pre-1945 era. Nuclear era presidents have exhibited this behavior as well.

Graham T. Allison, in his book Essence of Decision, points out that President Kennedy's blockade of Cuba during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis presented a factor "...unique in naval history and, indeed, unparalleled in modern relations between American political leaders and military organizations." "...For the first time in U.S. military history, local commanders received repeated orders about the details of their military operations directly from political leaders -- contrary to two sacred military doctrines...(the) circumvention of the chain of command and the accompanying countermand of the autonomy of local commanders...."[1]

Significantly, there is reason to believe that all nuclear era Presidents of the United States have made tactical military decisions. If this observation is true, an understanding of this phenomena of behavior which has been

approached on a small scale here could contribute much to an understanding of the capacity of the Presidency. Hopefully the foregoing study of this phenomena during the pre-nuclear era will be a building block for a fuller understanding of presidential tactical military decision-making.

The second contribution which this investigation has made to the study of political phenomena is that it has strengthened the analyst's attempt at explanation. In the questioning of T. Harry Williams' explanation of President Lincoln's behavior as a military operational decision-maker an attempt was made to divert attention to another aspect of Lincoln's behavior, that of personality.

The questioning was not intended to detract from Williams' explanation of Lincoln's behavior. The investigation which followed these questions simply points out that different answers can be produced for the same question by variation of the conceptual framework which the analyst brings to an investigation. Both Williams' work and this study indicates that in attempting to explain what happened, certain features of Lincoln's behavior were distinguished as the relevant determinants. The conceptual framework which each of these studies used consisted of a cluster of assumptions and categories which were found to be puzzling, the respective formulation of the investigative question, where evidence was sought, and what was produced as answers. Each approach attempted to emphasize what was relevant and important, and the different conceptual lenses led each analyst to different

judgements about what was relevant and important. Each concentrated on one class of variables, in effect, relegating other important factors to a lower position of influence on behavior. Therefore, both models can be better understood as building blocks in a larger model of the determinants of outcomes, each widening the methods of explanation of political behavior, both sensitive in explaining why political decisions were and are made.

The third contribution which this investigation has contributed to the study of political behavior is further evidence of the importance of political actor's personality in explaining their behavior. The effects of the psychological variables that mediate between stimulus and response in politics can be great. In view of the ever expanding growth of the powers of the American Presidency and in consideration of the number of important decisions over a broad range of policy questions which the President makes, it becomes important that an understanding of how the individual occupants of the office fit into the role that has been defined for them be sought.

In this study, it has been observed how Presidential behavior has been influenced by personality. As one's perspective of political activity becomes closer and more detailed, the political actors begin to loom as full-blown individuals who are influenced in politically relevant ways by the various strengths and weaknesses to which the human species is subject. Viewed in proximity, political partici-

pants present themselves as something considerably more than can be indicated by the impersonal categories students of politics ordinarily use to explain political behavior -- as more than role-players, creatures of situation, members of cultures, and possessors of social characteristics such as occupation, class, sex and age. For, even if consideration of situational and role pressures lead us to believe that there is very little variation in the ways that nuclear era American presidents can be expected to respond to the warning system that signals a missile attack, the consequences of presidential action under these circumstances are so great that even small variations acquire profound interest.

In any political analysis adequate attention must be given to the personality of the actors involved. As Walter Lippman has observed: "to talk about politics without reference to human beings...is just the deepest error in our political thinking."[2] It may be desirable to have the intellectual sensitivities which enable the analyst to see the political actor as:

> a full-bodied individual living partly in a world of reality and partly in a world of make-believe, beset by conflicts and inner contradictions, yet capable of rational thought and action, moved by forces of which are beyond his reach, by turn confused and clearheaded, frustrated and satisfied, hopeful and despairing, selfish and altruistic; in short a complex human being.[3]

CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

1. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 127, 128.

2. Walter Lippmann, Preface to Politics (New York: Mitchell Kennerly, 1913), p. 2.

3. Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 72.

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PRESIDENTS POLK AND LINCOLN AS TACTICAL MILITARY DECISION-MAKERS: PERSONALITY INSIGHTS

by

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During the 156 years from the ratification of the Constitution of the United States and the inauguration of the first President in 1789, to the end of World War II in 1945, seven American Presidents have performed duty as Commander in Chief of the nation's armed forces during time of war. Although the Framers of the United States Constitution intended that the President, in this role of supreme military commander, should have the authority of direct military command, to include the prerogative of tactical military operational decision-making, only two of these seven Commanders in Chief have made tactical military decisions.

Tactical military operational decisions are those which deal with the details of how to dispose military forces in battle for immediate military objectives. Tactics is the "how to do" part of military strategy. Military strategy would appear to be the norm of involvement by the supreme military commander, the President -- the large-scale, long-range planning and development from the highest level of military command.

President Polk and President Lincoln, in the Mexican and Civil wars respectively, not only directed military strategy but made tactical military operational decisions as well. Why did these two presidents make tactical military decision, varying from the norm of behavior by wartime presidents during the 1789-1945 era? What effect did the individual personality of President Polk and President Lincoln have upon their behavior as tactical military decision-makers.

The purpose of this investigation is to determine it and how personality has influenced Presidential operational military decision-making, specifically tactical military decision-making during the pre-1945 era.

President Polk's and President Lincoln's behavior as tactical military decision-makers is looked at through the lense of Harold D. Lasswell's general "power-seeker" hypothesis -- a "power seeker being a person who pursues power as a means of compensation again deprivation, whereby power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self or the environment in which it functions.

The presence of behavioral data of this kind provides a demonstrable basis for inferring the applicability of the general hypothesis to the political personality of President Polk and Lincoln, i.e., their interest in pwoer as a means of compensation for low self-estimates, and provides an explanation for their respective behavior as tactical operational military decision-makers.

Conclusions are that both President Polk and President Lincoln had "power-seeker" personalities and that their personalities explain their behavior as tactical military decision-makers in their role as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Thereby, the phenomena of presidential tactical military decision-making during the 1789-1945 era is explained as the behavioral response of personality dominance.

The investigation is presented as a building block for a fuller understanding of the phenomena of presidential tactical

military decision-making, and the impact which individual president's personality has upon understanding this phenomena of behavior.