

AN INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY FORCE: PROBLEMS  
UNDERLYING ITS CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT

by

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A MASTER'S THESIS

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
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## Chapter 1

### AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

#### Introduction

Throughout the turbulent history of Latin America, there has always existed a resentment toward any interventionist acts by one country against another.<sup>1</sup> Not only has the role that the United States performed, i.e., one of playing parent to and protector of the Western Hemisphere, been the object of much dislike, but indeed any type of expeditionary or protective force has generally been frowned upon, if not rejected outrightly. The last truly cooperative force conceived totally voluntarily in what is now Latin America was the movement for independence in South America, primarily under the leadership of Simon Bolivar.<sup>2</sup> Since that time, there have been no occurrences whatsoever of Latin American nations forming nonaggressive military defense agreements without strong pressure from the United States, as in the Second World War.

The establishment of an interventionary force for maintaining peace and security throughout Latin America is to be the subject of investigation in this study. An examination of the possibilities for the creation of an inter-American defense force to be developed in time of need under

the aegis and within the framework of the Organization of American States is of primary importance, especially in view of the high potential for violence in Latin America. Building the mechanisms for the creation of a force gives the United States the freedom from having to be the principal provider in terms of manpower for any interventionary ventures for there would instead be a preponderance of Latin American personnel. At the same time, the United States would no longer be the main target of abuse and criticism that could arise over such actions as the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. An international force made up and controlled by Latin American states would allow the latter the flexibility necessary for creating security policies for the hemisphere. This paper does not assume that the role of the United States will not be greatly felt in the creation of any such force. Clearly, the United States is the strongest military and economic power in the area, and its influence would of course be felt all over. Such power not only permits but requires a very strong role on the part of the American government. What is desired, however, is that the Latin American nations increase their role in the decision making process concerning security far more than has been the case in the past.

In attempting to present a clear and useful understanding of the complexities involved in any inter-American

defense force, the study is divided into several chapters. The first is the introduction, the remainder of which shall treat the history of the concept, along with the problems that would be encountered by both the United States and by the Latin American nations in preserving the security of the area.

Chapter two covers the political, economic, and social factors that must be met by the various nations in order that they be able to participate in a security force in an active fashion. In terms of politics, the character of internal events both in the past and the present as well as relevant prospects for the future must be examined. The issue of civil-military relations is very important in that the goals of a civilian government must meet with the satisfaction of the armed forces.<sup>3</sup> A part of this is the degree to which the nation is receptive to performing an interventionist role in terms of military action outside its own boundaries. It might be added that such decision to intervene is often in the hands of the armed services themselves, since in many cases they are better organized than existing civilian institutions.<sup>4</sup> Just as important is the necessity to establish what economic level is required in order to sustain a viable and active role in the inter-American arena. The economy must not present any weaknesses that could undermine a nation from within, thereby inhibiting the national policy objectives of active military involve-

ment on an international scale. It is doubly important that the economy be strong, since the cost of maintaining armed forces ready to be committed outside the nation is a major expense.<sup>5</sup> Also to be examined are the social factors necessary for participant nations, with particular emphasis on the ethnic and cultural diversity of the population. These include the level of education as well as any major religious or linguistic cleavages that adversely affect the unity of the nation. Size, internal geography, and mobility of the population are considered as important factors in that they also have a bearing upon unity, which is among the most important points for successful force participation. Related to the above is the issue of national interaction, a factor requiring careful investigation in that upon it hinges the entire success of any security force. Basically, it involves the ability and willingness of the nations to cooperate with each other in a fruitful fashion.

Chapter three introduces the military requirements that countries need to meet in order to ensure a successful base for participation in the force. Facets such as the characteristics of the armed forces' leadership, i.e., the degree to which the officer corps has been professionalized, the size and quality of personnel, along with the levels of training and armament are important in that civil power in some situations is placed in the hands of military

authorities.<sup>6</sup> Favorable geographical factors that need to be considered for active participation are also treated here.

Chapter four covers the future of the security concept, uses of the force, and suggestions for the regulation of its employment. At this point, the manner in which the Organization of American States would possibly react to any contingency requiring the force's deployment, together with the various advantages and disadvantages that could arise from such an attempt at hemispheric security, is also discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the national requirements, from which is determined what nations could be considered most eligible for providing manpower, support services, or both.

The final part is the conclusion, where the previous information is summarized, and the possibilities for future employment of the force examined.

### Historical Background

Prior to analyzing the requirements listed above, it is helpful to understand the philosophy behind the decisions that lead nations into agreements involving collective security. Without such an understanding, the dynamics of power politics cannot be fully comprehended. In the quest for improving their position relative to others, nations have been forced historically into strengthening their military

and economic positions. The evolution of highly destructive weaponry has inhibited somewhat the number of conflicts since the end of World War Two.<sup>7</sup> Even so, those nations choosing to ignore the harsh realities of political survival by renouncing the power struggle have had their sovereignty terminated and have been absorbed by more potent entities.<sup>8</sup>

Before the communization of Cuba, which caused it to become a major source of trouble in the hemisphere, there were few threats to any of the Latin American nations<sup>9</sup> other than from revolutions, coups d'etat, and similar internal occurrences.<sup>10</sup> Up until the Second World War, there were absolutely no efforts at even the slightest degree of military cooperation and indeed at any major form of inter-continental assistance.<sup>11</sup> The only controversy settled up to such time through the structure of existing inter-American treaties and procedures was the settlement of an armed dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic which had involved the massacre of between fifteen and twenty thousand Haitians, an indirect result of a border dispute.<sup>12</sup>

World War Two gave credence to the principle of inter-American military assistance, and a number of very encouraging steps were taken in that direction. Aside from such symbolic acts as declaring war on the Axis (within five days of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, all of the

Central American and Caribbean states had declared war),<sup>13</sup> a number of concrete moves were taken. Most notable among these were El Salvador's authorization on the part of the president allowing foreign troops to occupy its territory or waters if needed for continental defense and Venezuela's open port policy toward the United States and allied war-ships.<sup>14</sup> The only exception to an otherwise bright situation for the allies was the unwillingness of the Argentine government to taking part in any military or political cooperation with the United States, a stand which resulted from its ideological affinity with Italy and Germany.<sup>15</sup>

The end of the war saw the program of close military cooperation that had previously been agreed to at the Rio de Janeiro Conference of 1942, held specifically for such purpose, disintegrate. The only possible common threat to the Western Hemisphere in the late nineteen-forties was the rising power of the Soviet Union, with a corresponding increase of left wing movements in Latin America.<sup>16</sup> Even in view of this, no moves came about calling for the re-establishment of any defense arrangements, although there were declarations in support of joint defense in the event of aggression against any one state.<sup>17</sup> At the Ninth Inter-American Conference in Bogota, Colombia, a statement acknowledging the threat of the "political activity of international communism," along with what the delegates regarded

as its "interventionist tendency" was made. There still remained, however, the absence of any resolution calling for forces to combat the newly formed threat of communism.<sup>18</sup> The effort of the United States government to involve the Latin American states in the Korean War was received in a very dim fashion, and was the source of much resentment. In the end only Colombia sent troops to Korea, while most of the other nations regarded the venture as one that was not related to combatting the communist threat at home.<sup>19</sup>

The advent of Castro's regime, especially after Cuban inspired guerrilla movements began to appear throughout South America, had the effect of quickly rallying the non-communist countries, with the exception of Mexico, into providing for some form of common defense.<sup>20</sup> This was however, not done by all, nor was it carried out immediately. At the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Organization of American States in 1962, there was created a Special Consultative Committee on Security, with the aim of rendering assistance in the field of internal security to any nation requesting it. Resulting from the same meeting was the recognition of the need for more security consciousness on the part of the Organization of American States, this is to ensure vigilance against any acts of aggression aimed at American nations from communist quarters.

The need for well coordinated planning among all the Latin American nations to assure the success of any inter-

American force was well demonstrated by both crises involving Cuba in the early nineteen-sixties. These directly affected all of Latin America, yet each had different results in solidifying the Americas into forming defense agreements. Whereas the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion was a major embarrassment for the Kennedy Administration due to poor planning and coordination,<sup>21</sup> the 1962 blockade of Cuba, which was well planned and which had the backing and active support of the Latin American nations (Colombian and Venezuelan ships participated in the blockade), was seen as a major success.<sup>22</sup> The results of the blockade served to re-emphasize the desirability of keeping ready the mechanisms for joint military efforts. Although the United States' intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, which was eventually sanctioned by the Organization of American States and joined by some Latin American nations, rekindled the interest in common defense arrangements, this interest soon began to subside.

Inherent in any security agreements are a multiplicity of problems. In the case of Latin America, there exist for both the United States and the Latin American nations a number of complex issues to solve before the force can be placed into operation.

The most pressing issue, and one that is to the Latin American states a most sensitive one, is the degree to which the United States would wish to use its influence in such a

way as to control a force. The memory of the interventionist moves of the United States in the Caribbean during the early part of this century<sup>23</sup> remain as a most vivid reminder of the potential abuse that could come about from the careless employment of an inter-American force.

Throughout Central and South America the fear of being exploited by the United States is paramount in the rejection of such a security force, again, the main reason being a possibility of resurrecting past United States policies toward Latin America. This has been accentuated by the strong tradition of noninterventionism that has characterized the foreign policies of Latin American nations toward each other.<sup>24</sup>

For the United States there exists the threat of the domination of the force by a single powerful nation or bloc of nations, thereby turning it into a mere arm for the political and economic expansion of one or two states. An illustration of this would possibly be the two South American giants, Brazil and Argentina, using the force to their advantage as a tool of coercion against smaller countries in the area. Should such a situation come about, it would serve not only to bring about the threat of lessening United States political and economic influence in Latin America, but could also create the potential for plunging the latter into a period of turmoil, the result of which could be the opening up of a political vacuum with disastrous

results, i.e., a long period of revolution.

Posing a further danger to the success of a security force is the number of times it would have to be placed into action, due to Latin America's volatile politics. This problem is well illustrated by viewing the amount of violence and strife in the area; within the period of from 1952 to 1969, there were fifty-two instances of conflict in Central and South America.<sup>25</sup> Although included in this figure are a number of nonviolent cases such as the Cuban missile crisis and some relatively bloodless coups d'etat, the majority involved violence to varying degrees. The length of time foreign troops stayed in the Dominican Republic in 1965 indicates that if the response to regional violence or threats is to send in forces, then a very large number of them will have to be kept available. There exists the definite need for a determination as to what type of threats or violence call for intervention, and what the processes are to be if intervention is decided upon.

The following chapters will help to establish the national requirements for participation in a security force, along with examples of the uses of the force, the aim being a realistic investigation into the possibilities that such a force holds for the maintenance of hemispheric peace and security.

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## Chapter 2

# ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY FORCE PARTICIPATION

### Introduction

There are three internal nonmilitary factors that perform important functions in determining a nation's ability to contribute effectively to the operation of an inter-American defense force. These factors are the nation's degree of economic attainment (e.g., gross national product, distribution of wealth, future industrial expansion, etc.), the amount of social stability present, and most importantly, the amount of development in the nation's political system. A final factor, and one which is related to the nation's political composition, is the issue of national interaction, which as explained earlier, is the level of ease at which international cooperation may be undertaken.

### Economic Requirements

For a state sharing the burden of maintaining a security force, regardless of its degree of activity, e.g. providing troops versus merely giving financial support, an active economy is a prime necessity. Without the presence of the potential for economic progress, there will not exist the safeguards necessary to guarantee against financial losses resulting from taking action against former trade partners.

This might possibly be illustrated in the case of Argentina assisting in the intervention of Chile, a major trade partner. An economy that demonstrates growth in all sectors, or at least shows the possibility of it in the near future, is a sign that although particular actions on the international stage may be economically harmful, they need not lead to economic disasters. It is worth pointing out that all sectors of the economy need be strong in order to permit the necessary growth. A clear illustration of this point is Paraguay, which although having a somewhat prosperous trade level, is hindered in its full economic development by a budgetary deficit.<sup>1</sup> Another nation similarly affected is Haiti, whose economy has been relatively stagnant over the past few years.

In order to merely cope with the rising demands of a growing population, a major increase in the amount of investment in Latin America is required.<sup>2</sup> The major source of these investments will be, as in the past, from the United States. Again, one is confronted with the seemingly unsolvable problem of how the Latin American nations are to receive financial assistance without continuing their ties to the United States economy.<sup>3</sup> Any attempts at taking a route completely independent from that of the United States is to court economic and political misfortune, for it would require a major shift in national orientation. Such moves would probably cause more economic problems than

would otherwise occur, e.g., in Cuba, and presently Chile.

The only alternative to complete dependence on a foreign country, or a group of such countries, is the creation of regional economic alliances. This however, is only supplemental to nonregional foreign trade in that so far regional agreements in Latin America have not fared very well. The strongest argument made against regional systems is that the various nations participating in them simply do not have enough of the wealth necessary to help each other. The flow of capital, the fluctuations in market demand, and the technology that is made available to the developing nations, are an integral part of the international market system, and any regional agreements made up of nations unable to provide such services only perpetuates the cycle of deprivation that is faced by the underdeveloped countries.<sup>4</sup> Although the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) has had a rather smooth existence (and has indeed spread beyond being a mere economic tool),<sup>5</sup> the Central American Common Market, with its bureaucratic control measures, has had the effect of creating numerous inter-regional disagreements due to greater infringement of the sovereignty of the different nations.<sup>6</sup> Such problems in turn continue the path of dependence on the bigger nations, specifically the United States.

The Latin American nations are troubled not only by an inability of knowing where to turn for economic assistance,

but are also harmed by the emphasis upon which their industries are concentrated. Historically, the major source of profits for Latin America have been in the primary industries, i.e., agriculture, mining, etc. Whereas in the past these may have brought worthwhile rewards, this no longer holds true due to the current world emphasis on the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy. Attempts at increasing the amount of nonprimary industry entail prohibitive amounts of capital, most of which would have to be obtained elsewhere; furthermore, because of the already established foreign competition in these sectors, there can be no guarantees made as to the long range profitability of such ventures.<sup>7</sup>

The requirement of force participant nations to have strong economic systems is paramount; they must also possess the potential for rapid expansion of the economy in the near future. The active role required of those states participating in a force does not permit any exemptions from this rule, for weak economies increase the chances of collapse from within during times of crisis.

### Social Requirements

Any nation that is to take part in an inter-American defense force must meet a number of basic social conditions. Although Latin America appears to the layman as one large and homogeneous mass, with Brazil as the only possible

exception, this is by no means correct. With the exception of Brazil and Haiti, all use Spanish as their official language, and all are primarily Roman Catholic. Beyond this similarity, however, any mass unity between the different states in the region is an illusion. Each of the Latin American countries have their own unique problems, and it is the lack of internal unity which has proven to be a major obstacle at creating Latin American cohesion in the past. The problem most often faced by most of the nations concerns that of the rural Indian versus the urban mestizo or white populations.

For the purposes of this study, the social conditions to be examined are those that would have a negative impact upon bringing about national unity due to their centrifugal effects. It is these conditions that are capable of indirectly discouraging hemispheric unity, thereby retarding the amount of cooperation between the various countries in Latin America needed to make up a security force.

One of the most essential ingredients in achieving national cohesiveness is the lack of any linguistic cleavages. Any divisions in the population along linguistic lines will, of course, lower the degree to which national integration can be achieved. The example of Bolivia merits attention; over two thirds of the population do not speak Spanish as their mother tongue,<sup>8</sup> thereby causing a major problem in implementing efforts to integrate the population.

A homogeneous ethnic and cultural composition is favorable to the creation of a unified nation in that it enhances the perception of a national identity among the citizenry. There exist only two states that at the present time meet this requirement, these being Argentina and Uruguay;<sup>9</sup> both of which are comprised largely of European immigrants with cosmopolitan attitudes. Large scale ethnic and cultural diversity, on the other hand, can present an extremely harmful impediment to national development. A prime example of this is Guatemala, which is poorly unified due to its large Indian population.

Social interchange has been the most efficient manner of bringing together a population formerly torn apart by cultural differences. Numerous routes for the prevention of disunity exist. Widespread education has proven to be successful, as are efforts to distribute the wealth in a fashion more just than in the past; the stabilizing effects of a large middle class serve as proof of this.<sup>10</sup> The creation of a large middle class permits a form of social mobility formerly unknown, thereby fulfilling many of the economic aspirations of the populace. Before a nation can achieve true unity, there must be present a degree of social communication such that the differences within the population can easily be bridged through existing institutions. These would take the form of equal opportunities for all, thereby resulting in the closing of the near caste system that exists

in many parts of Latin America today.

The physical requirements for unity are more difficult to meet. The size of the population should match the area and physical resources of the nation. The splitting up of the country into different regions is, of course, harmful to the achievement of unity; unfortunately, it is often dictated by unfavorable geographic features such as mountain ranges, climactic zones, etc.<sup>11</sup> Again, Bolivia serves to illustrate this. The physical characteristics that disrupt national unity are many, but they all have in common the fact that they have been in the past, and in some cases continue to be, major obstacles at preventing the full development of internal communication.

Although I have suggested something of the essential conditions necessary in the economic and social sectors, by far the most important factor concerns the fashion in which the internal political scene is constructed. Associated with this are the lengths to which the different Latin American nations are willing to interact to achieve common ends.

### Political Requirements

The internal political machinery of the Latin American nations must be such that it operates without any major traumatic events during, and especially in the period in between, the different regimes. It is essential that a

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smooth functioning of the government exist; without such functioning no active commitment of troops to an inter-American force can be made, at least not without exposing the efforts of the government to sabotage from within.<sup>12</sup> If there exist any major political differences that run so deep in the national fabric that they are sources of great national strife, it can then be assumed that such state does not qualify for participation in the force.

It has been argued by some<sup>13</sup> that a democratically elected government need not exist if the government is to have complete freedom of action while still enjoying popular support. That this is accurate is shown by the case of Argentina during the Peron regime. Whereas Peron was the classic dictator, his support among the people allowed him wide latitude in the policies his government chose to follow. It is a mistake to assume that a well developed democracy is a prerequisite to being part of a security force for the Americas. A democracy such as that currently in office in Venezuela or Colombia certainly allows the force a good face; the support of the larger nations such as Brazil and Argentina, however, is still indispensable. The latter nations have had many dictatorial regimes, yet their important role has often been recognized in assisting in hemispheric security as in World War Two (excepting Argentina). Other than the United States, Brazil was the largest contributor of troops in the 1965 intervention in the Dominican

Republic; its strong dictatorial regime may be viewed as a major factor in the lack of internal trouble arising from such a decision, trouble that would have otherwise prevented a civilian government from carrying out such an action.

In regard as to whether a dictatorship or democracy allows the most flexibility in policy decisions, the most important point of emphasis is that the government have the capability to move freely without fear of alienating large segments of the population. Internal stability is a factor that cannot be substituted if a nation is to form part of an inter-American force designed to curtail any hemispheric threats. Without such internal stability, a country's participation can become a liability for the force, this being due mainly to the unpredictability of political events in the nation. States which are poorly integrated internally make poor partners in regional agreements because of the reluctance of leaders to further undermine their control at home.<sup>14</sup>

#### Prospects for Collective Action

The foreign policy stance of the nations involved in the force merits as careful an examination as their internal developments. The countries involved should have a tradition of an outward looking attitude as concerns their relations with other states. Nations such as Argentina and Brazil meet this qualification, although they have gone about it in

different ways. Argentina, much to the displeasure of the United States, has in the past chosen a pattern of close ties with Europe, while Brazil has been in sympathy with the United States.<sup>15</sup> Nations such as Mexico, however, have preferred to undertake a much more cautious role in their commitments and could therefore not be expected to be active participants.

The amount of international cooperation that the Latin American countries would be willing to engage in concerning an inter-American force is dependent, of course, upon any final agreement that would be reached. A number of general observations may be made, however, as concerns the over-all trend of relations between the countries as they exist today. An agreement creating a defense force would be in the form of an alliance, and would thus be the military arm of the Organization of American States. Being an extension of the Organization, the force would therefore reflect the weaknesses inherent in both the internal dynamics of the member states and those of their external relations with their neighbors.

\* Hans J. Morgenthau<sup>16</sup> has stated that "whether or not a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances is...a matter not of principle but of expediency." Such a view calls for an insight into the relations between the different Latin American states. An understanding of their relationships permits a realistic determination of exactly what role each of the nations should pursue (i.e., what scale of activity) within an inter-American defense system.

Although in 1971 the efforts at creating greater solidarity among the Latin American states continued,<sup>17</sup> there still has not come about a truly harmonious existence between them. Latin American nations can be expected to continue mistrusting their neighbors for a long time to come (due mostly to past experiences), thereby holding on to their respective jealousies and nationalistic weaknesses, i.e., blindness to long range cooperation within other countries.<sup>18</sup> Attempts to create any joint efforts at planning have so far been slow and have met with increasing difficulties.<sup>19</sup> Among the major reasons for the occurrence of this is the introverted nationalism of many of the newer military governments (e.g., Peru and Ecuador), which do not see hemispheric unity as worth working for. The moves of the more powerful nations in the area (Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, etc.) to use the concept of integrative planning to their own political ends (such as at the Punta del Este Conference), have served to discourage the participation of the smaller countries. This has had the effect of robbing the lesser states of the benefits that would otherwise have been theirs (having been originally intended for them). Reciprocal benefits, especially if the benefits accrue at a later period, are generally impossible because of the dearth of resources. Since issues cannot be easily kept separate, national differences in size and power become points of friction.<sup>20</sup>

The process of achieving cooperative interaction among

the Latin American nations will be a low one, yet it is one that is needed if an effective force to be controlled by the Latin American republics for hemispheric protection is finally to be created.

### Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to cover the dynamics of internal national characteristics as they affect a nation's participation in a security force. Without the required understanding of the above factors it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to gauge the many complex variables that enter into the successful implementation of an inter-American security system.

The economic, social, and political requirements that nations need to meet in order to participate in a force must be kept at forefront when considering the next chapter, that of the requirements of the national armed forces. If these are not considered jointly, then a realistic evaluation of national capabilities needed for force participation will not be accomplished. All of the factors are interwoven in that without complete fulfillment of each one, there will be lacking the strength necessary for active involvement in a force, thereby causing harm to the concept of a collective defense arrangement for Latin America.

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### Chapter 3

## MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY FORCE PARTICIPATION

### Introduction

This chapter has as its purpose a description of the military requirements that must be met by the states that are to participate in an inter-American defense force. The military requirements that are to be discussed here are necessary to understand, for upon them depend the mission of a security force. This mission could be impeded in a variety of ways, such as shortages in manpower, lack of needed logistical support, last minute lapses in cooperation between military commanders from the different participating nations, and a score of other similar obstacles. These troubles, of course, would vary according to the particular type of action that the force would be ordered to undertake, its ultimate location and the time factor involved; no sweeping generalizations can be made prior to the deployment of a force as to what obstacles could be expected. It is essential however, that it be kept in mind that since problems of the above nature will exist, the success of the force is contingent upon meeting as closely as possible the requirements covered below.

The internal political role that the armed forces of a nation should play, the amount to which the military influences

national policy, and the degree of foreign impact on the armed forces is treated in this chapter. Also discussed is the willingness to engage in profitable inter-American cooperation as well as the general outlook that the military has. Essential characteristics of the armed forces themselves, e.g., personnel, armaments, expenditures, etc., and the subject of relative geographical factors that affect a nation's regional influence are also discussed.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Political Role of the Latin American Armed Forces

Politically, the Latin American nation have been affected throughout their history to a very large extent by their armed forces. The fashion in which the political institutions in many of the nations operate at the present has been determined, to a great degree, by the very active role of the military in the political sphere. Examples of this abound. Between 1907 and 1957, a period spanning fifty years, the Dominican Republic had only six years of civilian rule, while Venezuela had civilians in power for only three years. With the sole exception of Costa Rica, all of the Central American nations have been governed by the military longer than by civilians.<sup>2</sup> In itself, this is not to be considered a crippling factor as concerns the ability of a nation to participate in a force. What is necessary, however, is that the assumption of power by military elements not create a hostile reaction within the

nation such that it would impair a nation's potential to actively aid in the security of the hemisphere.

In order to ascertain the reliance that can be placed on a nation contributing its part to a force, it is necessary to establish the current role of the military. If there is a rapid turnover of governments by the armed forces, then such acts serve as a hindrance to the preservation of a uniform foreign policy, a prime necessity for force participation. An example of this would be Bolivia, which, because of the constant rotation of different governments, would be hard pressed to maintain an active role in a security force.

A further item that requires attention is the posture that the military takes vis-a-vis the aims of a civilian government, if one is in power. If the two differ sharply, as is often the case, then major difficulties will arise in engaging the allegiance of the generals and colonels, an important factor if a regime wishes to remain in power and to maintain freedom of action. This was clearly illustrated by the military coup d'etat against the regime of Arturo Illia in Argentina, which resulted from mutual distrust between the president and the generals. Once armed forces elements have vetoed a popular leader and his party, the hostility between the two becomes self perpetuating, and those who participated in the coup d'etat are very hesitant to allow a return of the deposed leader for fear of their career,

or in some cases, their lives.<sup>3</sup> An example of this can be found in the Dominican Republic; after the overthrow of Juan Bosch, the army was in no way prepared to allow his return under any circumstances whatsoever.

The internal role that the military undertakes in Latin America, as mentioned previously, should be one that will result in the strengthening of national effectiveness in an inter-American force. It is for this reason that the armed forces, either truly or as perceived by the population, must not appear as the champion of any highly unpopular causes.<sup>4</sup> The past sympathies of the officer corps with the landed aristocracy and business elite, as in Bolivia before the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) takeover in 1952, generally no longer exist.<sup>5</sup> The regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru fully exemplifies the trend of quasi-populist military governments. The new military policies have included land reform programs, limiting the role of the church, reorganization of the nation's economic structure, along with other such measures. The future role to be played by the military in Latin America leaves a number of questions open. Among the most important of these is what their outlook will be internally, for it is on the internal political stage where the value of participation in a security force will be determined. It can be expected that the current internal political trend of the military will continue in the future,<sup>6</sup> thus allowing a bright out-

look for inter-hemispheric cooperation in that the new leaders will jointly seek common solutions to common problems.

With the exception of Mexico and Costa Rica,<sup>7</sup> the military is still an important center of power in national politics. Although not always active, the armed forces have the capacity to interfere at will should events not be to their satisfaction. One need only look at the actions of the Uruguayan military in their placing pressure against the Bordaberry regime. In view of this, the leaders of the armed forces, if they are to avoid popular disenchantment, must continue to placate not only the influential sectors of society (affluent businessmen, landowners, etc.), but the masses as well. The efforts at improving their acceptability with the general populace have resulted in the military engaging in civic action programs such as assisting in housing, education, etc.<sup>8</sup>

What the above section has attempted to do is illustrate the need for the military to command both the respect, and in some cases, the power to act at will. If there is in existence a weak civilian government that fears acting in a bold fashion (as would be needed in an interventionary role), then the armed forces must build the necessary power so as to influence government decisions in the direction of assisting a security force. In the absence of any strong leadership from the civilian community, it is imperative that the military assume power in order to guarantee the

strength necessary for supporting the operations of a force.

### Impact of Foreign Developments on the Latin American Armed Forces

Since the establishment of an inter-American defense force entails considerable international cooperation between the many Latin American nations, it is highly desirable that the military establishment of each of the participants have a somewhat international outlook. This international outlook involves an appreciation of the necessity for joint goals and planning with other nations in order to achieve common ends. Beyond merely having similar ideals and allowing for joint planning, it also involves the willingness to permit troops of one country to be part of an international force under the command of a foreign national. This is a matter that holds much potential for internal political controversy in that it could lead to charges against the government of permitting foreign policies to be controlled by another nation (i.e., the nation supplying the troop commander).

The rapid process of modernization in Latin America has resulted in the development of a resurgence of nationalism, from which has resulted a large number of advantages, e.g., a redistribution of wealth, increased economic progress, etc. Unfortunately, such increases in nationalism have also brought about a moderate amount of xenophobia. When carried

over into the process of international dealings, this attitude tends to accentuate the differences among the various countries, rather than their similarities such as common language, similar economic problems, and historical background.<sup>9</sup>

The higher echelons of the armed forces have the ability to be instrumental in changing such a dangerous national course. In view of their influence, they could, if they so desired, set the stage for inter-American military cooperation. It is the higher ranking officers, in fact, that are among the most internationally versatile individuals in positions of power. This is due mainly to many of them having been trained in the United States and/or Europe or by foreign military missions.<sup>10</sup> Among the many programs stressing joint defense procedures that are attended by Latin American military personnel are the Command and General Staff and Inter-American Defense Colleges, along with various refresher courses conducted by the United States in the Panama Canal Zone.

A foreign outlook by the armed forces of the different nations (whether or not they dominate the political scene), is a major prerequisite if the development of an inter-American defense force is ever to occur. National defense in Latin America, as has been stated, is inexorably tied to continental defense.<sup>11</sup> The corollary to this obviously is that the Latin American military must be at the forefront of

efforts at defending the southern half of the hemisphere (at the same time, of course, being supported by the United States in so far as training and large scale/long range support is concerned. If the present system of United States domination of inter-American military efforts in the Western Hemisphere is to be reduced, it is then a primary requirement that the Latin American militaries work jointly so as to operationalize a security force.

#### Structure of the Latin American Armed Forces

At the present time there does not exist any semblance of uniformity among the different Latin American military establishments. Each nation has dissimilar problems and points for improvement in its defense program. What may turn out as profitable for one state may not have any positive effect on another. Below follow a number of items that are essential to the functioning of the armed forces, especially as they affect efforts at achieving Latin American security. Without the support of efficiently operating military establishments, a security force would prove itself a liability rather than an asset, mainly in that it would most probably be lacking in military effectiveness.

There should exist a high degree of professionalism in the armed forces. Finer has described a professional officer corps as one that "stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority

within the state."<sup>12</sup> To achieve this professionalism requires a well defined set of rules governing the amount of pay received, the rate of promotions, and the methods of recruitment that are to be employed (the results of the recruitment process have served for example, to bring about cohesion between different ethnic groups in the same nations<sup>13</sup>). Also needed is an officer corps that is well trained in military studies and that has the opportunity for advanced training in allied fields prior to assuming important commands. A further element of professionalism is the willingness to root out all sources of corruption, even at the cost of possibly tainting the reputation of the armed forces. Many Latin American nations meet a number of these qualifications, yet there is the need to expand the number of these states, along with trying to meet all of the aforementioned points.

Although in many of the countries it is quite common for the military to involve themselves in partisan politics, such moves, if any, should be limited to the very top echelons of command. If partisan controversies infiltrate the lower ranks, there is the grave risk that any efficiency that the military may previously have had will be compromised by the political infighting resulting from political differences within the middle and lower grades of the officer corps. This has occurred between the pro- and anti-Peronistas within the Argentinian military, and similar issues have divided

the armed forces of other countries (Dominican Republic, Peru, etc.). Although these splits are by no means rare in Latin America, it is best that they not be allowed to permeate the lower ranks.

The introduction of the frequent inter-service rivalries<sup>14</sup> that from time to time erupt into fighting have perhaps just as corrosive an effect as partisan controversies. Such disputes between the services often serve to completely nullify any of the effectiveness that the military would otherwise have in that it prohibits them from functioning as a unified military team; at the same time it tends to put their opponents at an advantage. Divisions within the armed forces have had the result of making the military itself, along with the regime in power, extremely vulnerable. One need only look at the downfall of Peron in Argentina as an example of strife between the army, navy, and air force.<sup>15</sup> Generally, such disputes have not been in the open; yet they are constantly in the background.<sup>16</sup>

The ability of the armed forces to respond to military threats, in this case those that would call for the intervention of a security force in another country, are by the nature of the problem dependent upon four standards of measurement. These four standards are the number of personnel available, the level of armaments and training, the expenditures on defense, and the command structure.

Noncommunist Latin America, of all the regions in the

world, has one of the lowest percentages of the population in the armed forces.<sup>17</sup> The proportion of the population in the military service ranges from one tenth of one percent in Haiti to six tenths of a percent in Argentina.<sup>18</sup> It is a difficult task to establish the number of personnel necessary, for it is dependent upon national objectives as well as upon the location of the country (Panama, for example, need not have a big military, since the United States has sizable numbers of troops in the Canal Zone). If a nation has had a traditionally influential role, such as Argentina or Brazil, and desires to maintain such, then the number of people in the military will, of course, have to be large. The strength of the armed forces has to be enough to maintain internal security, along with providing for basic defense against foreign attack. This clearly involves a number of other items, including topography and demographic factors. However, in order to participate in a security force, there must be a large enough military establishment so as to allow for domestic tranquility while personnel are sent to other countries.

The level and sophistication of the armaments to be employed are dependent upon the amount of training that has been received by armed forces personnel.<sup>19</sup> Certainly, it is foolish to expect a poorly developed nation to be able to handle the most modern and sophisticated weaponry in a competent fashion. The urge that is widespread among many

of the Latin American nations of acquiring the newest weapons (e.g., Peru's purchase of French Mirage Jet Interceptors) is not only useless, but dangerous as well. The result of such actions is an increase in the destructiveness arising from internal revolts and armed clashes between bordering states. The weaponry should be that required for internal needs (civil disturbances and anti-guerrilla operations), and for meeting the basic requirements of a ground defense in the event of attack. Along with these would be the armaments necessary for supporting the nation's participation in a security force. Air and naval elements would exist for the sole purpose of assisting in such a defensive role and would serve no other purpose other than to possibly assist in internal civil transport. Basically, Korean War vintage equipment would suffice. Training would be geared for the same, with higher ranking officers being exposed to foreign instruction (mainly U.S. senior service colleges and Military Assistance Programs) in order to equip them with the skills necessary for inter-American military operations (methods of international cooperation, logistical support, etc.).

In the major noncommunist nations of Latin America, the percentage of the budget reserved for defense varies considerably, from a low of six tenths of a percent in Panama to over eighteen percent in Paraguay.<sup>20</sup> Basically, the amount of the budget to be allotted to the military should be determined after the size and role of the armed forces

has been established, keeping in mind that all expenditures should be enough to ensure the full effectiveness of those forces in existence. If not enough is spent on the defense establishment, there is the danger of an unsatisfied and inefficient military (mainly because they then cannot fulfill their established mission of defense), thereby making the armed forces more of a hindrance than a source of national strength.

The command structure, regardless of the size or mission of the armed forces, must be one that will permit centralized control at all levels. This prevents any overlapping of actions and functions as well as ensuring an overall method of maintaining unit efficiency, along with discipline to orders from higher echelons. Such a system also guarantees a rapid and effective response to any actions that a security force may have to take, a prime requirement if the latter is to succeed. A well-developed command structure is of great importance to military efficiency in that it is the organ through which the national military policy directives are carried out, thus ensuring their rapid and effective implementation.

The ability of the various Latin American states to meet the military qualifications outlined in this section is a factor that will have a major bearing upon the success of an inter-American force. Without the fulfillment of the above requirements, the force would be lacking in the strength

necessary to perform its objective, thereby questioning its very existence.

### The Problem of Geography

Geographically, nations are placed relative to one another in both advantageous and disadvantageous ways. A state such as Colombia possesses a strategic location in that it has access to both seas, thereby allowing it to respond rapidly to trouble on either the Pacific or Atlantic sides of the continent. This access also provides for a convenient transfer point of troops and material, both of which would be necessary in actions undertaken by a security force. In direct contradiction to Colombia is Paraguay and Bolivia. Since both are landlocked, they are dependent upon bordering nations with coastlines for allowing their trade to pass through. This, of course, puts them at an extreme disadvantage in that they are dependent upon neighboring states for their very livelihood and are therefore at the mercy of the coastal states.

The shape of a country will have an important bearing upon its defensive capabilities and thereby, its ability to actively contribute to an inter-American security force. Chile is the most obvious example of a poorly shaped state, being at a great disadvantage due to its extreme length and narrow width. This has the effect of hindering internal movement, with the result being that any efforts at reacting

to a military threat are slowed down considerably.

In summarizing, the closer a nation is to a threat, the more strategic its location is for serving as a base of operations from which to counter such. The ability of a state to respond (assuming it meets the requirements for participation in the security force), is greatly enhanced by its proximity to the area from which the threat comes, for it is thus able to effect a response in a much shorter period of time than a nation located further away.

### Conclusions

In this chapter, the requirements necessary for military participation in an inter-American security force have been covered, with the aim of obtaining a clearer understanding of the essential factors involved in maintaining hemispheric security.

The creation and success of a security force is very heavily dependent upon the military stature of the various nations that would participate in it. Without being able to receive the contribution of highly trained military units for its operations, a security force would be nothing more than an inefficient and costly waste (both in money and lives) for the Latin American nations. It is for this reason that the subject of the operational requirements for an effective armed force is so heavily emphasized.

The different items discussed in this chapter, along

with those touched upon in the preceding ones will, together, hold the key to the success that joint efforts at maintaining the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere could have.

TABLE 1  
DEFENSE ECONOMIES OF CENTRAL AND  
SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES  
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND RELATED DATA: 1970  
(Figures are given in Millions of Dollars)

Nation	Military exp.	GNP	Military exp. as % of GNP	GNP per capita
Argentina	514	23,830	2.2	989
Bolivia	19	976	1.9	208
Brazil	1,017	35,440	2.9	372
Chile	167	6,670	2.5	717
Colombia	97	7,070	1.4	335
Costa Rica	---	904	---	532
Cuba	290	5,200	5.6	612
Dom. Rep.	30	1,500	2.0	357
Ecuador	26	1,880	1.4	295
El Salvador	11	997	1.1	293
Guatemala	29	1,786	1.6	337
Guyana	3	250	1.2	313
Haiti	7	360	1.9	73
Honduras	7	685	1.0	254
Jamaica	6	1,156	0.5	578
Mexico	224	33,000	0.7	651
Nicaragua	12	772	1.6	406
Panama	2	1,016	0.2	726
Paraguay	11	600	1.8	250
Peru	196	4,800	4.1	353
Trinidad & Tobago	15	850	1.8	773
Uruguay	44	2,145	2.1	740
Venezuela	204	10,300	2.0	990

Source: U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 1971 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), Table II, p. 11.

TABLE 2  
POPULATION AND ARMED FORCES

Nation	Population 1970 (1,000's)	Armed Forces (1,000's)	Armed Forces per thousand Population
Argentina	24.1	144	6
Bolivia	4.7	17	4
Brazil	95.2	225	2
Chile	9.3	64	7
Colombia	21.1	55	3
Costa Rica	1.7	--	-
Cuba	8.5	200	24
Dominican Republic	4.2	19	4
Ecuador	6.1	17	3
El Salvador	3.4	6	2
Guatemala	5.3	9	2
Guyana	0.8	1	1
Haiti	4.9	5	1
Honduras	2.7	5	2
Jamaica	2.0	2	1
Mexico	50.7	71	1
Nicaragua	1.9	6	3
Panama	1.4	0	-
Paraguay	2.4	13	5
Peru	13.6	50	4
Trinidad and Tobago	1.1	1	1
Uruguay	2.9	16	6
Venezuela	10.4	31	3

Source: U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 1971 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), Table II, p. 11.

## FOOTNOTES

1. See U.S., Department of the Army, Latin America: Hemispheric Partner (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964).

2. Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," The American Political Science Review, LX (September, 1966), 623.

3. Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions, trans. by Helen Katel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 230.

4. Alexander Taylor Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics: The Dynamics of a Revolutionary Society (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 195.

5. Examples of the assumption of power by General Barrientos in 1964 in Bolivia and General Velasco Alvarado in 1968 in Peru illustrate this.

6. Lambert, op. cit., p. 255.

7. See Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan, Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 192 for an interesting discussion of this issue.

8. Norman A. Bailey, Latin America in World Politics (New York: Walker and Co., 1967), chapter 8.

9. Whitaker and Johnson, op. cit., p. 21.

10. Edelmann, op. cit., p. 191.

11. Victor Alba, Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy versus the People in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 217.

12. S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 24-25.

13. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 70.

14. Janowitz, ibid., pp. 71-72 contains a discussion of this issue, in which is included rivalry with the police.

15. Edelmann, op. cit., p. 194.

16. Edwin Lieuwen, The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 71.

17. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, S. Rept. 1969, 90th Cong., 2d sess., Hearings of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs.

18. U.S., Department of the Army, Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 290.

19. For a detailed description of the levels of armament of the Latin American nations, see T. N. Dupuy (ed.), The Almanac of World Military Power (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1970).

20. U.S., Department of the Army, op. cit., p. 289.

## Chapter 4

### ESTABLISHMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY FORCE

#### Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a framework under which an inter-American security force would operate. A standardized system by which the force would be employed is an absolute requirement, for without a firm set of guidelines for its use, there exists the strong possibility of the force being abused. Such abuse could take many forms; among these are its not being used when required, or just as bad, its use when not required. If efforts are made to commit the force, a number of predetermined steps to be taken before it is sent into action must exist. Once the decision is made as to whether to employ the force, it is necessary that a well defined system be present so as to effectively control its operations. If such a system is not developed, there is the danger that the force will degenerate into an occupation army, rather than a peace force, together with all the risks involved in such.

As mentioned previously in the study, a force designed to assist in the security of the Americas can be used to the advantage of a particular nation or group of them. In view of the presence of such a potentially dangerous element, it

is essential that the mechanisms involved in committing the force into action in a particular country or area be subject to the opinions and decisions of all nations that constitute the Organization of American States.

The development of a set of ground rules for creating and maintaining a security force involves a number of rather complex issues. In order to present a clearer understanding of these, there shall be discussed the numerous factors that are necessary for the establishment of a set of rules with which to govern the employment of an inter-American security system.

The first issue to be examined is the force's legal justification as regards the Charter of the Organization of American States and the United Nations. These are examined so as to indicate the relevant provisions permitting the nations in the hemisphere to take an active part in operations aimed at common defense. The methods by which any internal or external threats to the security of the hemisphere would be acted upon in the executive sector is then covered. An analysis of the administrative vehicles by which the Organization of American States would effect a response (included in these are the inter-American Peace Committee and the Advisory Defense Committee) is given, along with a review of the different types of situations that would require the intervention of inter-American security teams. This includes the reasons behind any intervention, as well as the

possible effects that such would have. Instances of past joint Latin American military cooperation are described, along with an overview of those nations that meet the political, economic, social, and military requirements outlined in the previous chapters.

Legal Foundations for the Establishment  
of an Inter-American Security Force

The Charter of the Organization of American States,<sup>1</sup> although it strongly guarantees the sovereignty of the member states, allows for foreign forces to enter a nation if requested. Chapter I, Article 24 of the Charter especially states that it is the aim of the Organization to "...strengthen the peace and security of the continent..." and "...to provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression...."<sup>2</sup> Chapter V, Article 24, allows most strongly the justification inherent in the creation of an inter-American security force. It states:

Every act of aggression by a state against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American state shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American states.

Such statement clearly sets forth the permission necessary for joint military actions in defense of the security of the hemisphere.

The above is in full harmony with the Charter of the

United Nations. Article 51 of the UN Charter states that it is the "...inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations...." (All of the Latin American republics are members of the United Nations). Supplementing this is Article 52, which allows the existence of "regional arrangements or agencies" for the purpose of handling security matters, along with Article 53, whereby the United Nations, with consent of the Security Council, may act through regional organizations (in this case the Organization of American States), to effect enforcement action.

In 1962 the Inter-American Peace Committee, which under Article I of its statutes<sup>3</sup> "...shall keep constant vigilance, within the scope of its authority...", (i.e., at ensuring the preservation of peace in the Americas), labelled Communist efforts in the Western Hemisphere, especially those of the Cuban government, as acts of "political aggression." These acts, in the opinion of the Committee, were deemed threatening to the security and sovereignty of the American States and, as such, were seen to be in violation of the fundamental principles upon which the inter-American system is based.<sup>4</sup> Two years later the Investigating Committee of the Organ of Consultation reaffirmed this view and categorized political aggression (i.e., that aggression which is nonmilitary in nature) as a threat to the hemisphere.<sup>5</sup> Under such a ruling, any subversive activities directed from

without and constituting an internal threat to a nation may be deemed as a threat to all. Since, as has already been examined, Chapter V, Article 24, permits joint action in the event of a common threat, any foreign force sent into another country with the latter's permission is in full concert with the principles upon which both the United Nations and the Organization of American States were founded.<sup>6</sup>

The 1965 action of the Organization of American States, supporting the movement of troops into the Dominican Republic, underscored the Organization's belief in the legal obligation to assist in thwarting any threats to the continent. In taking this action it acted on the principle of Article 18, which allows recourse to the use of force in the event of attack. This is in accordance with the fulfillment of a treaty, i.e., the 1947 Act of Rio de Janeiro, which called for joint defense in the event of aggression against any one American state. This act has continuously served as a supplement to the above articles in that it was specifically created for the purposes of military defense.

Even though the legality of an inter-American force has been ascertained, it remains necessary to establish the procedures that would be followed in the event that a nation requested assistance from the force in order to preserve its security.

#### Methods for the Deployment of an Inter-American Security Force

The Organization of American States has three major bodies

through which responses to threats may be undertaken. These are, in order of hierarchy in the organization, the Inter-American Conferences, which have been held periodically and which generally attract the most attention; the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (The Organ of Consultation), held whenever urgent problems jointly concerning all states arise; and the Council of the Organization of American States, which handles the day-to-day routine operations of the organization.

The instrument that is most important is the maintenance of hemispheric security is the Organ of Consultation.<sup>7</sup> In the event that a nation felt its security threatened, or another party felt the issue important enough to be brought up, it would call for a meeting of Consultation (in all cases throughout the early part of the nineteen-sixties, such meetings were called due to the aggressive acts of communist Cuba against the other Latin American nations in general and Venezuela and Colombia specifically). If other countries recognized the specific complaint of the nation that felt itself threatened, a meeting would be called, at which point various options could be pursued.

Depending upon the urgency of the problem at hand, the response would differ. An action often followed by the Organ of Consultation has been to appoint an investigative committee to examine the complaints and reports on them at some later time. An example of this was the Special Committee

which examined the Haiti-Dominican Republic border dispute in 1963 and later presented its findings to the Council. If security problems pose an extremely serious and urgent threat, the Council may act as the provisional Organ of Consultation if it is felt that the situation warrants it.<sup>8</sup> This happened during the Cuban missile crisis, when the United-States called for an Organ of Consultation, and also when Venezuela requested one to look into the matter of her territorial integrity and sovereignty being threatened by the Cuban government.

As is evident, the two most important bodies that act upon any security threats are the Organ of Consultation or, in its absence, the Council acting on its behalf. All requests for active military assistance from other nations must pass through either of these two which, if decided upon affirmatively, are then passed down to the specialized committees for implementation.

The vehicles of response in the event of conflict have long been in existence. If a dispute is not of an urgent nature, but is one that can be negotiated, the Inter-American Peace Committee will be called in to mediate. This Committee is made up of members from five nations, with membership being rotated among the different Latin American states (although when established in 1940, it was to be composed of representatives of two North American nations, two South American nations, and one nation from the Caribbean area,

all such allotments on a geographical basis have been discontinued). The Inter-American Peace Committee serves an important role in that it has kept the number of potentially troublesome disputes to a minimum. The first problem that it considered was the controversy between Cuba and the Dominican Republic in the late nineteen-forties (which concerned political interference in Cuban affairs by the Trujillo regime), and it has since served to insure the peaceful settlement of disputes threatening the peace of the hemisphere. The major weakness of the Committee is that before acting it must have the consent of the parties involved, and in the absence of such, it must refrain from any actions concerning the controversy.<sup>9</sup>

If requests for military action from a nation feeling itself threatened is approved by the Organization, the necessary military moves would be determined by the Inter-American Defense Board, which is composed of military staff representatives of the nations belonging to the Organization of American States. The Defense Board operates under the establishment of the Advisory Defense Committee, which being a mere extension of the Organ of Consultation, is only in session sporadically. Thus, in order to allow for a continuously operating institution, the Defense Board was set up to handle the day-to-day defense planning tasks. The inter-American Defense Board is organized into three main divisions, i.e., the Council of Delegates, the Staff, and

the Secretariat. The Council of Delegates has as its function the over-all control of the Defense Board as well as the power to make recommendations to the national governments concerning defense requirements. The staff is the body concerned with actually planning for hemispheric military collaboration, while the Secretariat handles the administrative tasks necessary for the operations of the Board.

If any military actions are to be undertaken, the existence of the Inter-American Defense Board would be an invaluable tool in that it forms a pool of Latin American military expertise. Since its formal inception in 1949, the Defense Board has been involved in making plans, studies, and recommendations aimed at assisting in the common defense of the hemisphere, along with other allied military projects. The Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C., established to train Latin American officers for positions of high command, has greatly expanded the Defense Board's influence, while the document prepared by it entitled "General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent," (which consists of the Defense Board's recommendations on improving the procedures for joint defense), has enhanced its image.<sup>10</sup>

Much progress has been achieved by the Inter-American Defense Board in the direction of military cooperation among the American states; examples of these are the training programs it sponsors and its planning efforts. Due to its

ability to serve as a major body for military coordination between the Latin American nations, it is assured an important role in the direction of any joint military ventures taken to preserve the security and peace of the hemisphere.

If one is to get a clear view of the role that a security force is to perform, it is necessary to consider the limitations that must be available for it. To do this I shall first discuss the types of situations that would call for the employment of the force as well as what the possible effects of such would be. Throughout this section, it should be remembered that an inter-American security force would operate at all times within the framework of the Organization of American States and its specialized agencies.

As has been noted throughout the study, a security force operates for the sole purpose of preserving the peace and security of the American states. As such, all actions taken in the name of the force must be executed as to guarantee that no harm to any party, either of a short or long range nature, occur (this can best be achieved through careful adherence to the Charter of the Organization of American States, thereby providing a built-in safeguard). An example of short range harm might be an unnecessarily large amount of troops being committed, thus proving a financial burden upon the nations supplying the troops; long

range harm would possibly be the stunting of the economic, social, and political development of the nation in which troops intervened, mainly by upsetting the national fabric as to create unsettled conditions after the force's departure.

Since no actions would be taken in moving troops into a country that did not request them in the first place, it is incumbent upon the Organization of American States to seek to lessen as much as possible any adverse impact that the employment of nonindigenous troops would have. The fact that the force would respond not only to direct external military threats, but also to internal violence directed from without (to be discussed in the next section), allows for the simultaneous use of the other agencies of the Organization to assist in preserving the security and welfare of the local population.

It is helpful to examine an example of the manner in which the different agencies within the Organization of American States would respond in a combined fashion. Let us assume a situation in which country A is faced with recurring exile invasions supported by Cuban arms. Let us furthermore assume that the exile forces are able to bring about vast destruction in lives and property before country A requests and receives an inter-American force made up of troop contingents from the various nations.

While the military units making up the inter-American

security force would, under a provisional command established by the Inter-American Defense Board, assist the local military forces in pushing back and destroying the invaders, certain nonmilitary actions would be pursued. Under the control of the Organization of American States, the Pan American Health Organization would insure that provisions for maintaining the health of the public would be present. At the same time, the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences would furnish the necessary assistance for restoring the local agricultural economy, while the Inter-American Economic and Social Council would help re-establish any educational and social services that might have collapsed due to the invasion.

Although the introduction of foreign troops into a country generally has a negative impact upon the political and, in some cases, economic development of the nation, built-in safeguards would exist with an inter-American force. Since no security forces could be sent into a nation without its express consent, these same forces could be withdrawn at any time by removing such consent. In view of the fact that military aid would accompany the other non-military assistance described above, the use of the inter-American security force would at the same time permit for the economic and social progress of the state involved to continue unimpaired (it would, in fact, supplement other development programs that might already exist). The option that a state

has of being able to call for the removal of foreign personnel from its territory assures that any political development that would otherwise have come about will in no way be harmed through introducing troops, since they can be removed at will. The latter would be guaranteed, since all foreign troops would be controlled by the Defense Board, and not by their respective governments.

The effects of the employment of an inter-American force would generally balance out the positive side. Although one cannot deny the ill effects resulting from any form of military intervention, the nonmilitary aid discussed before and, above all, the preservation of the state speak in favor of a strong security force. Unless the Latin American nations are able to see the periodic possibility of foreign troops being sent in to assist another government (at the request of the latter, of course), then there will continue to exist a wide gap in the security of the hemisphere. Such a gap will only mean a continuation of a strong United States presence in Latin American affairs.

#### Situations Necessitating the Utilization of an Inter-American Security Force

An inter-American security force controlled by the Organization of American States would be a strong and functional institution, and would not, therefore, take up the time and efforts of planners that could be used elsewhere. Throughout the last thirty years, there have been numerous

occasions of conflict during which such a force could have been used to advantage. In this section a description will be given of those situations in which the Latin American military acted jointly to solve disputes, along with other instances during which the use of joint military action may have been useful.

The most obvious examples of the profitability of creating a common defense system is the Second World War. Although there did not occur any attacks against the continent, the Latin American nations (excepting Argentina) did up an end to the activities of Axis agents attempting to stir sentiment against the Allied Cause. Two of the Latin American states, Mexico and Brazil, assisted in the war effort by sending armed forces personnel into combat, albeit on a small scale. This was the first instance of joint military efforts, and although immediately following the war it fell apart, it served to demonstrate that intra-continental military cooperation could be accomplished.

To illustrations of joint Latin American military efforts at preserving peace in the hemisphere are the sending of armed forces officers to patrol the border, disarm dissident rebel forces, and curtail illegal activities between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1948 and 1955<sup>11</sup> and later between Honduras and Nicaragua during the period 1957-1961. It was in the 1948 intrusion into Costa Rica that invasions by exile groups were classified as external threats,<sup>12</sup> a pre-

cedent has had a far reaching effect in that it permits many of the guerrilla movements currently operating in Latin America to qualify as external threats. Such precedent allowed the United States to send naval elements under the aegis of the Organization of American States to protect the Panamanian coastline after an invasion by Cuban nationals and pro-Castro exiles in 1961. Although it later developed that the whole affair was inspired by the political opposition in Panama,<sup>13</sup> the fact that an Inter-American military observer group was sent to the scene did much to prevent any further bloodshed.

The largest, and indeed most controversial, military action taken by the Organization of American States was the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. As a result of fighting between opposing political groups, the United States sent in forces, which although supposedly designed to evacuate American citizens, remained as the threat of Communist involvement on the rebel side increased. Since it was disputed by many whether the rebel forces under Colonel Caamano Deno were actually infiltrated by communists, the United States intervention was very heavily criticized. Later, when the intervention was sanctioned by the Organization of American States, the Latin American countries participated by sending troops. The final breakdown by nation was:<sup>14</sup>

Brazil. . . . .	1,115
Costa Rica. . . . .	20
El Salvador . . . . .	3
United States . . . .	10,900

Honduras. . . . .	250
Nicaragua . . . . .	160
Paraguay. . . . .	183

Brazil, the United States, and El Salvador provided general staff officers, while Costa Rica furnished civil police assistance. The above contingents remained until shortly after a presidential election was held. They were successful in containing the violence and insured a peaceful transfer of the government to the newly elected president.

There have been numerous occasions during which an inter-American security force might have been helpful. Three such cases will be discussed in this section; these are the Dominican Republic in 1961, Venezuela in 1963, and Bolivia in 1967. It should be noted that these are only examples and are placed in the text for the sole purpose of illustrating the potential uses of a force.

After the assassination of Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, in May of 1961, the position of the caretaker government of Joaquin Balaguer was continuously threatened. When the family and followers of Trujillo attempted to overthrow the government later that same year, the United States sent naval forces to the Dominican Republic as a show of support for the legally constituted government. A better course of action, and one that would have reduced the role of the United States, would have been for the Council of the OAS to meet in emergency session to dispatch a joint force to ensure that pro-Trujillo elements did not regain

control of the government. Such action would have done much to ease the turmoil in the Caribbean by demonstrating Latin American solidarity against the renewal of dictatorships, if only in that it would have restrained those seeking unlimited power. Action along these lines might have discouraged violent action by Dominican exile groups since it would have reinforced the Balaguer government, without making it appear that the United States was behind the former's existence. It is probable that if an inter-American force had been used, the 1965 troubles could have been averted in that it would have added to the prestige of the Balaguer administration.

Throughout 1963 Venezuela was threatened with violence by guerrilla groups supported by the Castro regime, with arms and ammunition being supplied via sea from Cuba. Such a situation would have been ideal for the use of an inter-American naval force to help screen the Venezuelan coast against arms deliveries from Cuba. A joint effort such as this would have resulted in the weakening of the guerrilla forces operating in Venezuela by denying them arms, while at the same time serving notice to Cuba that any efforts to inspire violence would be met with force. Inter-American military efforts against Cuban aggression would also have brought about popular support for a security force, mainly because it would have inspired a constructive nationalism resulting in the common welfare and defense of Latin America.

The third case meriting discussion is the problem of Communist inspired guerrilla activity (under Che Guevarra), which was faced by Bolivia in 1967. Rather than to rely solely on United States military assistance in combatting the communist forces, the Organization of American States could have considered the issue through the Council or through the Organ of Consultation. If agreed to by Bolivia, Latin American military personnel from other nations might have assisted, especially in an advisory role, in helping to eliminate the communist threat in Bolivia. This would have resulted in strengthening the cooperation between the Latin American nations, for it would have lessened the role of the United States. Again, it would have served notice to Cuba of the firm intent on the part of the OAS nations to fight Cuban inspired activity.

Military efforts coordinated by the Latin American states themselves reduce their dependence upon the United States, while at the same time permitting them a greater voice in the decision-making process of policies that directly affect them. It is the absence of the latter that has for a long time been the major complaint that the Latin Americans have had against participating in such a force. Unless the heavy handed defense role of the United States is reduced considerably, then the indifferent and sometimes hostile reaction felt in Latin America toward military preparedness will in all probability continue unchecked. If attempts are

not made to directly involve the Latin American nations in their own defense, then considerable harm will be done to the security of the continent.

The Probable Role of the Latin American Nations  
in an Inter-American Security Force

The troops that would take part in forming an inter-American security force would be drawn from the member nations of the OAS. Participation in the force would be on a rotating basis, so as to avoid having any one country or countries dominate it. There are four nations that because of their power and influence, would be needed to participate, although not all at the same time. This section discusses these four states -- namely, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela, and why they qualify for an important role. Also discussed are some of the other Latin American countries and why they would have only a minor role, or in some cases, no role at all.

The state that is the most qualified to take an active part in the security force is Brazil.<sup>15</sup> It has an active military strength of 225,000 men, along with numerous paramilitary type forces. Although there has recently been a sizable amount of political subversion, a strong crackdown by the government against this threat has compromised the ability of subversive elements to serve as a major internal security problem. Thus Brazil is capable of sending sizable numbers of armed forces personnel to other countries without

the chance of security problems arising at home. The government has favored the use of joint inter-American military efforts, as exemplified through its commitment of troops in the Second World War, and more recently, in its large scale military participation in the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis. The economy has been developing at a fairly rapid rate and in contrast to the past, has become relatively stable. Social divisions do exist. There is a racial problem, together with a heavy amount of poverty, both rural and urban. The northeastern part of the nation is economically very depressed, while the interior has still not been fully taken advantage of. On the whole, however, these are not capable of sabotaging Brazil's ability to assist in a security force.

Argentina,<sup>16</sup> although it has in the past not been receptive to inter-hemispheric defense cooperation, would be able to perform an active role in security operations. Its military numbers 144,000, is modern, and is controlled by one of the broadest based officer corps' in Latin America.<sup>17</sup> The legacy of Peron has been the major cause of disturbance on the political scene. The changes in government since the dictator's downfall in 1955 have caused relatively little change or disruption, and many, in fact, have been nothing but changes in personality. With the widening split in the ranks of the Peronistas, the government has had an increase in its latitude of policies, such

that participation in an inter-American defense force is now permissible.

Reinforcing the government's ability to pursue an active role in a force is an economy that has shown a remarkable improvement over a short period of time along with a cosmopolitan population unequaled in Latin America, both of which have served to produce a high degree of social unity.<sup>18</sup>

Colombia<sup>19</sup> has proven its willingness at sharing in efforts to maintain hemispheric security through its commitment of naval forces in the 1962 blockade of Cuba. Its total armed forces strength is 55,000, and since the termination of the 1948-1952 civil war and the defeat of communist insurgents in the mid nineteen-sixties, there exist no major threats to internal security. Throughout the last fifteen year, the political system has guaranteed a very high degree of stability,<sup>20</sup> thus permitting much national development to take place. The economy, although not on the same level as that of Brazil or Argentina, is improving and does not present a problem as regards force participation. The only strong source of social disunity is the rapid growth of the urban areas, many of which host serious poverty. The previously explosive urban-rural conflict has subsided somewhat, since Colombia is now increasingly urban (in 1951 38% of the population was urban, by 1964 it was 52%).<sup>21</sup> Even with such shifts in the population, the level of social unrest does not present a threat to Colombia's possible participation in

a force. Venezuela,<sup>22</sup> until recently threatened by pro-Castro guerrilla forces, has emerged as a strongly unified nation. Its economy is on a similar GNP per capita level as that of Argentina, while socially it has no differences that could damage over-all national development. The government is a stable one and has historically taken an interest in the issue of Latin American security. The military has 31,000 personnel, enough to permit active involvement in an inter-national force. As is the case with Colombia, Venezuela's strong democratic system is an ideal asset to the force in that it serves as an example to other nations of what all planned national development can achieve.

Aside from the countries discussed above, no other states in Latin America would be able to perform a significant role in hemispheric security. An example of a state that could serve only in a small supporting role is Nicaragua.<sup>23</sup> Possessing a combined armed forces of only 6,000, of which one third are civilians, Nicaragua does not have the military strength required for active participation. The added burden that the military has of performing routine police functions, along with the threat of internal strife, permits but a symbolic contribution to the force.

Numerous other countries present similar situations, either due to internal strife, poorly developed economies, or small military forces. These states would be able to contribute only token forces, and these would serve as mere

appendages to the troop contingents of the larger nations. Examples of states able to perform in only a small way are the Central American republics, which have weak military forces and poorly developed economies, along with Paraguay, Bolivia, and Ecuador, which have similar problems.

A nation that is incapable of performing any role whatsoever is Uruguay.<sup>24</sup> Although socially well developed, it is faced with an extremely serious threat to its internal security. The successful actions of urban guerrilla groups have reduced confidence in the government, thereby necessitating the full use of its armed forces (16,000) for exclusive use at home.

Several other states would, along with Uruguay, not be able to participate for various reasons. Mexico, which has a long tradition of noninterventionism, is one that in all possibility would refuse to take part in a force. Chile, if the present trend of internal dissatisfaction continues, would also not be well prepared to participate. The rising nationalism in Peru would most probably eliminate it as a contributor of troops, while unsettled economic and political problems in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic would put into question their ability to serve profitably. Even if attempts to participate were made by the above nations, their assistance would most probably be a liability rather than an asset, this due mostly to the internal trouble that they would develop. This would, in turn, create another threat

to security in an area of the world already overladen with security problems.

### Conclusions

The employment of an inter-American security force would allow many of the nations in Latin America the opportunity to have a much greater voice in security matters affecting them; presently, such affairs are controlled by the United States. It would furthermore permit them to expand their respective roles in the international decision-making process, a factor that would increase their stature on the world scene. Such an increase in stature would end the traditional view that the outside world has long had of the Latin American nations as being a mere arm of whatever policies the United States chooses to follow.

The past history of Latin America is filled with numerous international controversies, many of which resulted in large amounts of violence and destruction. Such destruction has held back national development in an area of the world that cannot afford to lose such development. The by-products of a formerly intense cold war (such as Soviet support of Communist Cuba, and the latter's support of guerrilla operations), have increased the potential for aggressive acts against the nations of Latin America. The relaxation of the cold war, however, allows for Latin American states to form an alternative to the heavy defense role of the United

States, since the U.S. would not be concerned so much with gaining absolute control over security operations in the area (unlike during the earlier cold war years). If the amount of violence directed against this region is to be significantly countered, it seems essential that a security force for the Americas be given serious consideration.

## Footnotes

1. For further reference, see the Charter of the Organization of American States in its entirety in Jose, cited below.

2. Charter of the Organization of American States, Part One, Chapter 1, Article 4, sections a and b respectively.

3. Statutes of the Inter-American Peace Committee (1956), 1. Competence, Article 1.

4. Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, The Inter-American System, its Development and Strengthening (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1966), pp. 114-115.

5. Ibid.

6. See James R. Jose, An Inter-American Peace Force within the Framework of the Organization of American States: Advantages, Impediments, Implications (Metuchen, N.Y.: Scarecrow Press, 1970). This book not only proposed a new charter for the Organization of American States, but also provides an interesting over-all review of a possible Latin American security system.

7. Carlos Stoetzer, The Organization of American States: An Introduction (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 32.

8. Ann Van Wymen Thomas and A. J. Thomas Jr., The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), pp. 86-93.

9. Ibid., p. 127.

10. See Pan American Union, Annual Report of the Secretary General to the Council of the Organization 1957-1958, p. 118 (1958).

11. Jerome Slater, The OAS and United States Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), pp. 78-79.

12. Ibid., p. 69.

13. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

14. Jose, op. cit., p. 63.

15. See U.S., Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Brazil (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

16. See U.S., Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Argentina (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969).

17. Peter G. Snow, "Argentina," in Political Forces in Latin America: Dimensions in the Quest for Stability, ed. by Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson (2d rev. ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 514-517.

18. Tomas Roberto Fillol, Social Factors in Economic Development: The Argentina Case (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1961) provides interesting information on the subject.

19. See U.S., Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Colombia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

20. See Edwin G. Corr, The Political Process in Colombia (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1971).

21. S. H. Steinberg and John Paxton (eds.), The Statesman's Yearbook 1969/1970 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1969), p. 821.

22. See U.S., Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Venezuela (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

23. See U.S., Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Nicaragua (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).

24. See U.S., Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Uruguay (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

## Chapter 5

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The issue surrounding the creation of an inter-American security force is a very controversial one. Although such a force would guarantee the security of the American continent from both external and internal threats, thus maintaining peace in the hemisphere, the receptivity of the different nations to such a concept has varied considerably. Yet, as has been underscored throughout this study, a security force controlled and manned by and for the Latin American states is an absolute requirement if such nations are to emerge eventually as masters of their own destinies.

For the sake of clarity, the economic, social, political, and military obstacles that at present block the establishment of a security force are discussed, followed by treatment of those points that indicate a favorable reaction by the Latin American nations toward the concept. The historical background to a security force is summarized with special reference to its legal and administrative framework. How the force would be brought about, as well as the different roles that the various countries would be able to perform, is then discussed; the desirability of United States participation is also considered.

There exist a number of obstacles that must be overcome before a force to be truly controlled by Latin American

states can be placed into operation. Many of the Central and South American nations still fall short of having an economy that would be able to sustain the stresses that active military participation would require. The expenses incurred from mobilizing troops and sending them into action in another country would detract from the amount of money that could otherwise be spent on public works and projects. Various Latin American states are not well unified socially, for they are lacking in national integration due to linguistic and ethnic differences. In the political sphere, many of the nations are still plagued by political instability, whether it be from popular dissatisfaction or from military coups d'etat.<sup>1</sup> The military requirements are in some cases not yet fully met, for although most of the states have the potential for creating in their defense establishments an efficient and rapidly responding military force, improvements in equipment and in the structure of the higher command machinery must be made.

The above weaknesses are not to be construed as meaning that the Latin American nations are not capable of entering into defense agreements. On the contrary, it is the Latin American countries that due to the international character of the force, will be required to perform leading parts. It must be remembered, of course, that within the military establishment of the various republics, there are different views as to what the nation's role should be.<sup>2</sup> Certainly,

much improvement has been shown by the nations in Latin America in this respect. Throughout the last decade they have undergone major economic and social development, and while political instability still prevails, the amount of political violence, both during and in between the different administrations, has shown a very marked decline. Another encouraging note is the improvement that has been achieved in the military. Whereas previously the armed forces of Latin America were more efficient at interfering in partisan politics than they were in military operations (even when not seizing control of the government, they often mediate between the different political parties),<sup>3</sup> efforts at alleviating this have made for a more effective defense establishment (much of the credit for this development goes to the United States Military Assistance Program, which reflects the U.S. view of strict military careerism<sup>4</sup>).

The over-all trend of economic, social, political, and military patterns in Latin America today point toward the definite possibility of successfully building a security force. The improvements that have been achieved in the above sectors indicate a more responsible and effective role for the states of Latin America in mutually assisting to maintain hemispheric security.

Most of the Latin American nations have reached the stage where they are more or less willing to accept a role in an international force. The past policies of the United States toward intervention in the area, mainly those from

the time of the Monroe Doctrine until the beginning of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1934, left a deep mistrust of the United States. World War Two, by necessity, unified all but one of the Central and South American states militarily; yet this alliance was only temporary. The efforts of the United States to involve the entire Western Hemisphere in an anti-Communist bloc met with increasing resistance until the time of Castro's takeover in Cuba. With the advent of Communist Cuba as one of the greatest threats to hemispheric peace, the noncommunist nations looked for protection under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Although this was necessary due to the seemingly aggressive stance of Cuba, it still did not ease Latin American mistrust of the United States, which was not eased by the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. It is for this reason that the Latin American nations need to seize the current opportunity to establish a security force that they can control themselves, through the Organization of American States. For the first time in history, a military force free of control from the United States can be established; it is a chance that has never before been present.

The legal justification for an inter-American security force, operating within the framework of the Organization of American States, is present in the Charter of the OAS. The administrative machinery is also present, with authority

for employment of the force being in the hands of the Organization's Council and Organ of Consultation. The expertise necessary for the actual implementation of the force is present in the form of the Inter-American Defense Board, a specialized agency of the Organization.

The security force could be established through the joint efforts of various Latin American states (the issue would in many cases be subject to the approval of the military establishment in many of the participating nations, since it is common to defer to their opinions, even in foreign affairs).<sup>5</sup> It would be necessary to raise the subject through the channels of the OAS, preferably at either an International Conference of American States or at a Meeting of Consultation. If decided upon, the issue of a force would then be pursued by the subordinate bodies, namely the Inter-American Defense Board and Inter-American Peace Committee, which would determine the actual mechanics of the force's operation.

The manner in which the various nations would participate merits review here. Since the strength of the Latin American nations vary considerably, there would be a number of ways in which the different countries could contribute to the force. The more powerful states could commit large amounts of troops, while those of lesser importance could send in smaller numbers of military personnel. The smaller and relatively insignificant nations could contribute token amounts of troops or could aid in some other fashion (health

aid, civil police assistance, etc.).

The role that the United States would play is of course highly important in view of the fact that the force is designed to be managed primarily by the Latin Americans themselves. Since the United States is clearly the most powerful nation in the hemisphere, it will have to be active in support of the force's creation and employment. The most desirable approach for the United States to take is that of helping decide when the force is to be committed; this is to be done solely within the framework of the Organization of American States. It is inadvisable that the United States actually send in troops to trouble spots as part of the force, for such action would lend itself to the charge of control from Washington. Military support to a security force would take the form of logistical support (supply and transportation); supplementing this would be a continuation of the current military assistance given to the nations in Latin America (supplying armaments and training of personnel). United States support of a security force is crucial, for its backing allows a reflection in the force of the prestige and power of the leader of the Western World.

The security of Latin America, and thereby its future development, is dependent upon the nations in the region gaining a voice in their own defense affairs. Unless this responsibility is fully seized, and an inter-American

security force can be created, the present domination of the United States in security matters may very well be perpetuated, a condition that can lead only to further irritation of Latin American nations with United States hemispheric policies.

## FOOTNOTES

1. See Samuel P. Huntington (ed.). Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 32-33 for a description of three different means by which to categorize coups d'etat.

2. See S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 229.

3. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 2-8.

4. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), chapter 6.

5. Finer, op. cit., p. 74.

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AN INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY FORCE: PROBLEMS  
UNDERLYING ITS CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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The subject of this study concerns the creation and development of an inter-American security force to operate under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). Such a force would be manned and controlled through the OAS and would exist for the purpose of maintaining the peace and security of the American continent.

The emergence of an inter-American security force is of major importance, for it would serve to counteract any external threats and, if needed, could intervene in a nation threatened from within if the government of that nation so requested. A further advantage of such a force is that it would reduce the dependence of the Latin American countries upon the United States for their defense. Certainly, the United States is the most powerful nation in the Western Hemisphere and will continue to be of major importance in the defense of the Americas. It is hoped, however, that with the establishment of an inter-American security force, all military actions within the Latin American countries would be undertaken by American nations other than the United States.

The study first examines the economic, social, and above all, political requirements needed by nations to participate in the inter-American security force. This examination is followed by an analysis of the requirements necessary for a given state's armed forces to participate

in that force. The legal and administrative factors, and finally, the actual control of the inter-American security force, along with the nations that could be expected to perform active roles in it, is considered.

The study of the instruments for maintaining peace and security in the hemisphere is of prime importance. An understanding of these allows for a realization of the definite need for establishing an inter-American security force as soon as possible.