

GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY IN THE
INDIAN STATES 1967-1972

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENT | iii |
| LIST OF TABLES | iv |
| LIST OF FIGURES | vi |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| CHAPTER I | |
| PROBLEMS AND APPROACH | 5 |
| CHAPTER II | |
| GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY AND LEGISLATIVE FRACTIONALIZATION | 12 |
| CHAPTER III | |
| GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY AND GOVERNMENTAL FRACTIONALIZATION | 35 |
| CHAPTER IV | |
| RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY AND IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES | 56 |
| CHAPTER V | |
| RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY AND PARTY LOYALTY | 64 |
| CHAPTER VI | |
| SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 85 |
| FOOTNOTES | 90 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 93 |

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LIST OF TABLES

| | Page |
|--|------|
| Tables | |
| II-1. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for Bihar Legislative Assembly | 17 |
| II-2. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly | 20 |
| II-3. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for Punjab Legislative Assembly | 22 |
| II-4. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for West Bengal Legislative Assembly | 25 |
| II-5. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for Haryana Legislative Assembly | 27 |
| II-6. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly | 28 |
| II-7. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for Orissa Legislative Assembly | 30 |
| II-8. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for Kerala Legislative Assembly | 31 |
| II-9. Relationship Between Stability and Legislative Fractionalization for Analysis of 31 State Governments in Eight Indian States | 33 |
| II-10. Relationship Between Stability and Legislative Fractionalization for Analysis of 27 State Governments in Eight Indian States | 33 |
| III-1. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for Bihar State Governments | 39 |
| III-2. Governmental Stability and Fractiona- lization Values for Uttar Pradesh State Governments | 42 |

| | | |
|---------|---|----|
| III.3. | Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values for Punjab State Governments | 44 |
| III-4. | Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values for West Bengal State Governments | 47 |
| III-5. | Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values for Haryana State Governments | 48 |
| III-6. | Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values for Madhya Pradesh State Governments | 50 |
| III-7. | Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values for Orissa State Governments | 52 |
| III-8. | Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values for Kerala State Governments | 53 |
| III-9. | Relationship Between S and Fg for Analysis of 21 Coalition Governments | 54 |
| III-10. | Mean Life in Days (S) of Congress and Non-Congress Governments | 54 |
| III.11. | Mean Life in Days (S) of Coalition and Non-Coalition Governments | 55 |
| IV-1. | Classification of Coalition Homogeneity | 59 |
| V-1. | Governmental Stability and Party Loyalty | 66 |
| V-2. | Party-wide Defections in State Legislative Assemblies | 68 |
| V-3. | Defector-formed Ministries in Indian States 1967-1972 | 69 |
| V-4. | The Relationship Between Fractionalization and Party Defections in State Legislative Assemblies | 72 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | Page |
|---|------|
| Figure | |
| 1. Hypothetical Determinants of Governmental Instability | 3 |
| 2. Defection as an Intervening Variable | 71 |

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth General Elections were a crucial landmark in the democratic development of India's political system. One of the most remarkable developments in the post-1967 political scene was a break-down of the Congress hegemony leading to the formation of coalitions of widely heterogeneous elements in several states. Of the sixteen states which went to the polls in 1967, the Congress Party failed to form the government in seven. The diminished Congress strength led to a "dispersion of power" among the fragmented opposition parties, and no single party secured a majority to form a government of its own.

Since in these states the Congress Party failed to capture the required majority of assembly seats to form its own government, the highly-fragmented opposition parties were offered an opportunity to come to power. Various non-Congress parties and groups were no longer on the periphery of the parliamentary scene, but they joined together on the basis of minimum common programs. United Fronts were forged, and non-Congress coalition ministries emerged in a number of states--Kerala, Bihar, Punjab, West Bengal. The non-Congress governments were formed first in Uttar Pradesh, and then in Haryana, and later in Madhya Pradesh.

On the eve of the fourth general elections, and afterwards, the political observers and analysts pessimistically predicted that a high degree of political instability would obtain at

the state level. They also questioned whether parliamentary order could at all co-exist with coalitional politics. The political realities in these states, so far, have given some answers their questions. Discontinuity of government occurred very frequently during the period 1967-1972. No state government could last its full term of five years. Concretely, thirty-one governments were formed in the above eight states. Some ministries fell in a matter of days rather than months or years. The political alternatives were the take-over of a State government by the Center, constitution of new governments or mid-term elections.

However, coalition government itself does not preclude stability. There are numerous instances in which coalition governments have been more stable than the governments formed by a single party. Stability and instability are not automatically accounted for by the existence of coalitions. In other words, the success or failure of any government depends on, to a great extent, various factors regarding the ways in which the government was formed, the nature of the coalition, and its base of support or political leadership.


Can the fractionalization of the Indian party system be blamed as a factor of instability? In other words, are the numerical structures of the party system and its fragmentation determinants of governmental instability? These variables, while helpful, do not exhaust the complexity of governmental instability in Indian states since Indian politics has been highly fragmented by religion, language, and culture. Ideology

therefore would seem to be a significant factor explaining variations in governmental stability or instability. By ideology is understood party's policy or goals pursued by various means.

In Indian states, we assume that ideological cleavages among parties affected the instability of the government, especially in North Indian states where the multi-party governments were formed where political parties and party politicians showed an unwillingness to reach compromises on the basic issues relating to party interests.

Furthermore, since the Indian democracy is parliamentary and federal, the state government could survive only when it secured the majority support in the legislative assembly, or it could pass the non-confidence vote by opposition parties. In Indian states, the base of support was unstable and uncertain because party members frequently changed sides. Lack of party affiliation stability was manifested through the party defections taking place in almost all Indian states. These very party defections brought about the downfall of many state governments. Therefore, defections were a prominent feature of governmental instability during the period under review and their relationship to stability will be explored in Chapter five.

Figure 1. Hypothetical Determinants of Governmental Instability



This thesis is intended to test several causal relationships between governmental instability and fractionalization, ideological cleavages and defections. Eight Indian states are selected for analysis: Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, West Bengal, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Kerala. In these states, Congress and non-Congress coalition governments were formed as a result of elections, but no government could be called a stable one because it failed to last its full term of five years. A series of governmental changes occurred in these states. However, the degree of instability varied from state to state, and from government to government. Party fractionalization, ideological cleavages and defections are assumed to be important factors in bringing about such instability.

CHAPTER 1

PROBLEMS AND APPROACH

In this study, the state is selected as a level of analysis. Our units of analysis are legislative assemblies and state governments.

The selection of state politics for analysis is based on our observations that the politics at state levels and the actors involved therein assume great significance because a meaningful understanding of Indian political system at the national level depends to a large extent on our assessment of patterns of development within the constituent states. As Professor Myron Weiner has noted,

...each of the Indian states provides us with an unusual microcosm and macrocosm for studying processes of development. A microcosm because the units are themselves so large that they can be studied as total systems.¹

The states in India also provide us excellent material and a laboratory to develop new conceptual frameworks for research or to test our new political theory.² In addition, since India has a federal constitution, the role that the states play is of great significance in the federation in terms of division of power with the Center. The state governments have been responsible for a number of key activities--agricultural production, irrigation, and community development programs--which directly affected the great majority of the Indian people. The states also "represent the strong regional and linguistic

elements in Indian life and these forces exert a good deal of pressure in Indian independent of the centralizing forces...."³

India also adopted a parliamentary democracy, so that political parties and groups contend for legislative seats in popular elections. The state government was then formed and sought to attain a vote of confidence from the legislators. If it was successful, the government and its legislative supporters would control the formation and execution of public policy. If it had no strains, the government could fulfill its full term; otherwise, it would collapse before the fixed term ended.

In other parliamentary democracies, the legislature has been controlled by a single party. This party could then form a cabinet and govern according to its proclaimed policies without relying on the support of any other party. In the Indian polity, the one dominant-party system was replaced by a multi-party one in the state level as a result of the fourth general elections in 1967. The state legislature was therefore not controlled by any one party. In order for a state government to have a necessary majority support, the state government must be supported by a coalition including several heterogeneous political parties or groups.

Our widely-held belief is that the larger number of political parties in the government and their fragmentation in terms of ministerial shares, would make the task of supporting stable and effective government a more difficult one. Since each of the political parties represents a different interest, has a different power base, and pulls in different directions,

the government formed by them would tend to be unstable and ineffective.

On the other hand, since different types of non-Congress governments were exhibited in the above states according to the ways in which they were formed, and since Indian politics was characterized by great regional and linguistic diversity, no single generalization would be therefore scientifically sufficient to highlight the whole feature of our topic. Accordingly, the next step in our research is to look at the effects of ideological differences on the governmental stability. We will examine the relationship between ideological cleavages among participating political parties in the government and its stability in the context of policy conflicts.

Finally, we will observe the effects of party loyalty or disloyalty on the continuity of the governments.

Three main hypotheses are selected for verification as follows: 1) The governmental stability is negatively associated with the degree of fractionalization--a) the lower degree of fractionalization there is in coalition government, the more likely that government will be stable, and b) the lower degree of fractionalization there is in legislature, the more likely that government will be stable. 2) The more ideological homogeneity there is in a coalition government, the more likely that government will be stable. 3) The higher degree of party loyalty there is in parliamentary parties, the more likely the government will be stable.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Three independent variables need to be operationalized: fractionalization, ideological homogeneity, and party loyalty.

Fractionalization is defined as a situation in which the participation in the government is shared by more than two parties or groups. This indicator is simply the number-of-parties with relative shares of seats in the government or in the legislature. It indicates the fragmentation of the party system which takes account of both number and size. We expect that governmental stability depends not only on the number of parties but also on their relative sizes. Accordingly, fractionalization is treated as indicator for measuring the degree of the fragmentation of the party system. It denotes the competitive situation in which many political parties and groups are involved.

The fractionalization measure was originally formulated by Douglas W. Rae, who had suggested substituting his notion "fractionalization" for the concept of multi-partism.⁴ Indeed, "multi-partism" implies only the numerical aspect of political parties in any polity. It does not show the relative size and the strength that political parties really gained in a competitive situation.

For this purpose, Rae's index is used here to measure the degree of the fragmentation in the government. One of the main advantages of Rae's measure of fractionalization, or simply F, is its ease of calculation.

Rae's formula is as follows:

$$F = 1 - \sum_{I=1}^M \left(\frac{f}{N} \right)$$

Where $\frac{f}{N}$ stands for the proportion of ministerial seats associated with the Ith party, or stands for seat shares in the legislature by political parties, groups and independents.⁵

The higher the F value, the greater the degree of fractionalization will be. F varies from a minimum of zero (0) when there is only one party to a maximum of one (1) when there is an infinite number of parties.

The second variable is ideological homogeneity which designates a partisan agreement among participating parties or groups on a number of policy issues. Conversely, ideological heterogeneity indicates a partisan disagreement. To identify the area of agreement and disagreement, we will not look totally at the party's election manifestoes because political parties might not do exactly what they said when they joined the government. Therefore, we will also observe their positions over specific issues coming up in the government besides their inherent ideologies. In other words, the government will be ideologically homogeneous if the participating units have an agreement on policy issues; conversely, it will be heterogeneous if there is a disagreement or a conflict. In this respect, we expect that any government which is formed by conglomerates of heterogeneous parties or groups is hardly durable.

The third identified variable is party loyalty which signifies an allegiance of each party member toward his party. The party attachment is a most important factor for the stability

of any party system. The degree of party loyalty will be measured by the number of party members who defected from one party to another. In this respect, we assume that any government which is supported by a fluid party system, is less likely to be stable. Conversely, the stability of party affiliation is likely to bring about the stability of the government.

Finally, the dependent variable selected is governmental stability. It is defined as "duration" or "longevity" of the government, measured in days. It indicates the period from the date the government was installed until it collapsed. Every change in Chief Minister along with the formation of a new Cabinet (Council of Ministers) will be treated as one time of governmental change. Governmental stability is a condition where the policy-makers do not change very frequently, and therefore they can allocate and distribute resources in the society. They also keep control of the coercive forces and maintain the legitimacy of the regime.⁶ A study of stability and instability of government helps us understand how and why some governments have been able to remain viable and successful--able to adapt to a changing environment without losing essential forms and patterns--and why others have been less fortunate in coping with the exigencies of change. In other words, governmental stability can be used as one gross indicator to measure the health of the system as a whole.

The term "coalition" is used here to denote a political phenomenon in a multi-party system where the political power is jointly shared by diverse political parties, groups, and/or

independents. It is not a merger of political parties. The coalition is formed in India states when the political parties agree on a common program in order to run a government, or for a purpose of election to defeat a common opponent, as N.C. Sahni has defined "the joint use of resources to determine the outcome of the decisions where a resource is somewhat such that some critical quantity of it is in the control of two or more parties to the decision is both necessary and sufficient to determine its outcome."⁷ In order to discover the trends, patterns or designs of a coalition, the human behavior of the members constituting a coalition will therefore be assessed, because the coalition which maintains or disintegrates, depends a great deal on the political behavior of coalition partners, especially its leaders.

CHAPTER II

GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY AND LEGISLATIVE
FRACTIONALIZATION

It is generally assumed that governmental instability is related to the fragmentation in the whole of the state legislative assembly. The more fragmented is the legislative party system, the more unstable we might expect the government to be. This chapter is intended to test the relationship between these two variables. To do so, Rae's formula has been used to calculate the fractionalization scores; Pearson's product moment correlation will be used to assess the relationship between the governmental stability and fractionalization.

The fourth general elections disclosed two important trends: Firstly, the election results at least temporarily changed the Indian party system from the dominant party to the multiple one due to the erosion of the Congress power at the state level. In every state, except Madhya Pradesh and Haryana, the Congress was returned as the largest party, but without an absolute majority. Secondly, the fourth general election opened competition and a spreading of power over a number of groups.

These remarkable trends characterized the political feature in a number of Indian states where the opposition parties succeeded in breaking the Congress monopoly and entered the political market effectively for the first time. The proliferation of parties and groups therefore yielded the fragmentation of the party system and highly competitive politics in Indian

states.

In the mid-term elections in 1968 and 1969, the Congress slightly improved its position in Uttar Pradesh and Kerala, but it still suffered heavily in West Bengal, Punjab, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Haryana. However, the mid-term polls, once again, witnessed a proliferation of minor parties and spinter groups in some states, especially in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where the "mushroom" parties which emerged were mainly splinter groups or interest groups. They turned out to have negligible support because they have no organizational units below the district or were confined to a special constituency. For instance, in Bihar, eight local parties were formed on the eve of mid-term polls in order to contest the elections. Some of them were in fact qualified as factions or splinter groups rather than parties. In Uttar Pradesh, at least ten newly-formed parties were founded on the eve of the elections, but all of them were localized, and none won assembly seats.¹

The emergence of a "market polity" underlined the fact that a large number of decisions were taken by a substantial number of participants who stood in positions of both dependence on and conflict with others. Important decisions were therefore harder to reach in the legislatures where various political parties and groupings represented almost all shades of political ideology. In addition, so few parliamentary parties were really important because many parties were formed entirely from among members of legislatures and constituted, in effect, temporary groupings within an assembly for the purpose of making

or breaking a ministry. They had little or no extra-parliamentary organization and social support which are the essence of party. In other words, they were typically projections of personal ambitions rather than parties. They were therefore less disciplined and ideologically less coherent.

Because of the large number of weakly structured parties and legislative groupings, political alignment therefore became weak; and the base of support for the government was rendered unstable. These characteristics affected the life of the governments.

Before testing the hypothesis concerning the effect of the parliamentary party system on the stability of government, it is helpful to review in brief the party-wide position in each state.

Bihar

When the fourth general elections were held in 1967, there were six all-India parties and eleven regional parties contesting the elections. Of the national parties, the Congress suffered heavily. It could secure only 128 of 318 seats. The party which had the most compact organization was Jana Sangh. From 3 seats in 1962, it increased its strength to 26 seats in 1967.

The Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) was well entrenched in this state, where it emerged as a second largest party in 1967 with a strength of 68 out of 318 seats in the state legislative assembly. Therefore, it formed the ministry in coalition with

with the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), the Communist parties, the Jan Kranti Dal (JKD) and the Jan Sangh.

The Communist parties have showed a gradual decline in this state. The Communist Party of India (CPI) captured only 24 seats and polled 6.91% of votes. The Communist Party (Marxist) (CPM) polled a mere 1.3% of votes and captured only 4 seats.

The PSP was weaker than the SSP. It won only 18 seats and polled 8.96% of votes.

Of local and splinter groups, the Jana Kranti Dal, a dissident Congress group, was an important one because it made headway and gained popular support. It captured 24 seats and polled 0.75% of valid votes. Its leader Shri Mahamya Prasad Sinha in cooperation with other non-Congress groups formed the government. The party later on merged with the BKD and CPI.

The Jharkhand party was also an important local party. Coming into existence in 1939, the Jharkhand Party was gradually evolved into a modern political organization.² It captured 9 seats in the state assembly. Its strength improved in the mid-term elections in 1969, and for the first time, it joined the Congress-led minor coalition government headed by Harihar Singh.

The other minor parties which gained both seats and votes in 1967 were the Republican Party, the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Swatantra and Independents.

Prior to the mid-term polls, the polarization of political forces occurred inside and outside the state legislative

assembly due to party defection and merger. The realignment of power led to the emergence of small parties which contested the mid-term polls. Among these minor parties were the Lok Tantrik Congress Dal (LTC), the Janta Party, the Soshit Dal, and the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD).

The LTC was formed by Congress defectors Bhola Paswan Shastri and Binodanand Jha on the eve of the mid-term elections. Disenchanted with the Congress leadership, Bhola Paswan Shastri and 23 Congress dissenters dissociated from the Congress Party to form the LTC. In the mid-term polls, the LTC entered into an electoral alliance with the SSP and PSP with a view of forming a coalition government. But it captured only 8 out of 118 assembly seats.

The Janta Party was established by Raja of Ramgarh, a famous zamindar (landlord) in Bihar state. His party included most of his family members and wielded extensive political power in the state. In the mid-term polls, the Janta Party successfully captured 14 assembly seats.

The Soshit Dal was formed as a consequence of defections by 12 SSP members led by B.P. Mandal who headed the minority government in February 1968. Its membership rose to 31 at the time the Soshit Dal was installed in office. In the mid-term polls, the party won successfully 37 seats.

The BKD was formed by ex-Congressman Mahamaya Prasad Sinha in May 1967 at a convention in Patna. It was an anti-Congress party and advocated "the establishment of a socialist democratic state through peaceful constitutional methods, and the provision

of an honest and efficient administration to tackle the burning problems of the nation."³ Later on, the BKD was merged with the Jana Kranti Dal. In the mid-term poll, the BKD captured only 3 assembly seats.

In the mid-term elections, no party could secure an absolute majority in the legislative assembly. The Congress emerged as the single largest party with 118 seats. The Jana Sangh won 34 seats against 26 secured by it in 1967. The SSP party secured 16 seats, less than what it had obtained in 1967. The Janta Party secured 14, Jhardkhand Party 10, LTC 9, the Soshit Dal and the B.K.D. 6 seats each.

The fractionalization scores in seat shares by political parties and groups in the Bihar Legislative Assembly are presented in Table II-1.

TABLE II-1

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Bihar Legislative Assembly

| Ministry | Stability values (Life in day) | Fractionalization values |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. M.P. Sinha | 335 | 0.880 |
| 2. B.P. Mandal | 47 | 0.850 |
| 3. B.P. Shastri | 95 | 0.880 |
| 4. Harihar Singh | 115 | 0.806 |
| 5. B.P. Shastri | 12 | 0.793 |
| 6. Doroja Prasad Raj | 390 | 0.793 |
| 7. B.P. Shastri | 275 | 0.815 |
| Mean: | 8 | 0.832 |

NOTES: a) The differences in F value are due to the party defections, and the formation of new legislative groups such as Soshit Dal, LTC, BKD, and the mid-term elections.

b) To simplify calculations, those parties or groups which held less than 5 seats are excluded: Swatantra, CPM, Republican party, RSP, Forward Bloc. Their inclusion would have altered the index much.

Sources: Election data for 1967 are taken from Fourth General Elections: An Analysis (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India), election data for mid-term elections are from Report on the Mid-Term General Elections

Uttar Pradesh

In the 1967 elections the Congress and the PSP continued to exhibit a downward trend both in terms of seats and votes while the Jana Sangh and the SSP registered considerable gains. Particularly, the Independents who had lost both votes and seats in 1962 increased their seats from 31 to 38 in 1967. The Congress captured only 199 seats (down from 249 seats in 1962) despite its percentage of votes polled being highest among main parties. The CPI won 13 seats while the CPM seats were reduced to one. Swatantra strength was reduced to 12 seats. The Jana Sangh emerged as the second largest party in the state by capturing 98 seats. Its anti-cow slaughter campaign swelled its votes substantially in the backward areas.

The SSP remarkably increased its strength in Uttar Pradesh because its organizational structure and election strategy were far superior to that of the PSP, it bagged 44 seats. Thereby it emerged as a fairly large group in the state assembly. The Republican Party won 10 assembly seats because it had great influence in the western districts of Uttar Pradesh. Formed out of the All-India Scheduled Castes Federation, the Republican Party represented, therefore, the depressed and backward communities in India, and sought to protect their interests. On the eve of the 1967 general elections, it was recognized as a national party by the Election Commission, and fought the elections against Congress.⁴

One the eve of the mid-term elections, some Congress dissenters left the Congress Party to form the Jana Congress. It was renamed later the Bharatiya Kranti Congress Dal (BKD)

shortly prior to the mid-term polls. Led by Charan Singh, the party successfully captured 98 seats in the House of 423 in the mid-term elections.

When mid-term polls was held in February 1969, the Congress Party was better prepared than in 1967. However, the UP Congress was deeply divided into C.P. Gupta's group (Cong O) and Kamlapathi's group (Indira Gandhi). Even so, the Congress still improved its position with 211 seats, falling short of an absolute majority by only two. It secured the cooperation of Swatantra and Independents to be able to form a reasonably stable ministry on February 26, 1969.

The Jana Sangh had won 98 seats in the 1967 elections but declined to only 49 seats in 1969. The SSP strength also decreased to 33 from 44 seats in 1967 due to a revolt of a large number of SSP workers in Uttar Pradesh who left the party to join the Congress and the BKD. The Swatantra strength was also reduced to 5 seats from 12 in 1967. The Republicans fared no better and could secure only one seats against nine in 1967.

Among the leftist parties, the PSP and Communist parties lost considerable seats and votes. The PSP captured only three seats, the CPI four, and the CPM one.

Only the BKD emerged in the mid-term polls as the most formidable party. It successfully captured 98 seats, and caused great damage to the Congress Party.

TABLE II-2

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values
for Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly

| Ministry | Stability values (Life in day) | Fractionalization values |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. C.P. Gupta (Cong) | 18 | 0.713 |
| 2. Charan Singh | 312 | 0.850 |
| 3. C.B. Gupta (Cong) | 344 | 0.682 |
| 4. Charan Singh | 225 | 0.804 |
| 5. T.N. Singh | 103 | 0.808 |
| 6. Kamlapathi Tripathi | 336 | 0.692 |
| Mean: | 223 | 0.758 |

NOTES: a) The differences in F values are due to the party defections, the formation of new legislative groups, such as BKD, PLP, and the mid-term elections.

b) Those parties or groups which held less than five assembly seats are excluded from calculation because their inclusion would not have altered the index much: CPM (one seat) for 1967; PSP (3 seats); Republican Party (1), and Hindu Mahasabha (1) for the mid-term elections.

Sources: Election data for 1967 are taken from Fourth General Elections: An Analysis (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India), election data for mid-term elections are from Report on the Mid-Term General Elections in India (1968-1969), Vol. II, by Election Commission of India, 1970.

Punjab

In this state, the Congress Party which had enjoyed a stable majority during the first three elections was not able to secure absolute majority after the fourth general elections. Its strength was reduced to 47 seats from 90 seats in the previous elections. The Congress decline in the state paralleled the rise of the Akali strength. The Akali Dal Sant group could capture 24 seats against 18 seats in the third general elections whereas the Master Tara Singh group won only 2 seats in the 104-member legislative assembly.

Riding on the anti-Congress and anti-Akali wave in the

Hindu constituencies, the Jana Sangh won all the urban seats with 9 seats against 4 seats in the third general elections. Both Communist parties were minor parties in the state because their assembly seats had declined greatly; the CPI won 5 seats, the CPM 3.

The Republican party secured only 3 seats. Yet, its role in the coalition government was important because the Congress and other political parties were equally divided. The number of Independents elected in Punjab were increased to ten. They played a decisive role because neither Congress nor any other party was in a position to form a government without the support of the Independents. Some of them joined the United Front and thus helped in the formation of a coalition government of the non-Congress parties.

Prior to the mid-term poll, the defections of L.S. Gill along with his followers caused the polarization of political forces in the legislature. Dissociated from the Akali Dal, Gill along with 16 members of legislature formed the new legislative group called Jana Party.

The 1969 election results did not give clear verdict in favor of any party. The Congress slid from 43 to 38 seats. Meanwhile, the Akali Dal's strength increased from 26 to 43. The Jana Sangh won only 8 seats against 9 in 1967. The CPI obtained 4 seats as against 5 and CPM 2 seats as against 3 in the previous elections. The Jana Party lost heavily and only L.D. Gill was fortunate enough to get elected because of his personal popularity in his own constituency which he profusely nursed during the tenure of his Chief Ministership. The

Independents elected in the mid-term polls were also reduced to 4 as against 10 in 1967.

After the Gurnam Singh ministry was installed on February 17, 1969, the defections of 14 Congress legislators to form the Progressive Congress Legislators' Group changed drastically the power structure in the legislature and brought about the fall of the ministry.⁵ In addition, there were four Congress legislators defecting from the Congress to join Akali Dal.

TABLE II-3

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Punjab Legislative Assembly

| Ministry | Stability values (Life in day) | Fractionalization values |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Gurnam Singh | 254 | 0.736 |
| 2. Lachhman Singh Gill | 266 | 0.749 |
| 3. Gurnam Singh | 398 | 0.692 |
| 4. Prakash Singh Badal | 437 | 0.735 |
| Mean: | 339 | 0.728 |

NOTES: a) the differences in F values are due to the party defections, and the formation of new legislative groups such as Jana Party, Congress Legislators' group. Keeping in mind that the F scores are calculated at the moment the ministry being installed.

b) those parties or groups which held less than 3 assembly seats are not included because their inclusion would not have altered the index much such as SSP, CPM, Workers Party, Akali Hudiara Group.

Sources: Election data for 1967 are taken from Fourth General Elections: An Analysis (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India); election data for mid-term elections are from Report on the Mid-Term General Elections in India (1968-1969), Vol. II, by Election Commission of India, 1970.

West Bengal

In the 1967 elections, the Congress strength in this state declined to 127 seats due to the disharmony in the Congress

ranks, and the strong alliance among leftist parties.

No party except the Congress contested the elections on its own. The various parties joined together under the labels of leftist front against the Congress. However, the leftist alliance was divided between the United Left Front composed of leftist parties -- CPM, Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), SSP, Forward Bloc (M), Workers' Party, RCP, and Socialist Unity Center (SUC)--and the People's United Left Front composed of four parties--CPI, Bangla Congress, Forward Bloc, and Bolshevik Party. Both the Fronts together obtained 136 seats. Of these 68 were won by the ULF (CPM 44, RSP 6, SSP 7, SUC 4, Workers' Party 2, FBM 1, Gorkha League 2, UP supported Independent 1) and 65 seats were annexed by PULF (Bangla Congress 34, CPI 16, FB 13, UF supported Independent 1). The Lok Sevak Sangh and PSP stood outside the Fronts, and obtained 5 and 7 assembly seats respectively.

The election results caused surprise to most of the political parties. Congress lost and was not in a position to form the government. Yet, neither of the two Fronts could claim even half the number of seats in the assembly. Therefore, Ajoy Murkherjee of the Bangla Congress was designated to form the coalition government of all parties except Jana Sangh and Swatantra.

Prior to the mid-term polls in the state, party defections took place and subsequently led to the formation of three new legislative groups. The notable cases were the formation of the Progressive Democratic Front, of the People's Democratic Front, and of the Indian National Democratic Front.

The Progressive Democratic Front emerged shortly after Dr. Ghosh resigned from his ministerial post in the UP government. He and 17 defectors from the United Front (consisting of 3 Independents, 9 Bangla Congress, 4 PSP, 1 Swatantra, and 1 RSP) joined together to form the independent legislative Bloc called PDF.

The People's Democratic Front was forged as a consequence of a personal clash between Shri Humayan Kabir and Ajoy Mukherjee of the Bangla Congress. The defection occurred when Kabir announced the formation of the Jana Kranti Dal in West Bengal in order to split Mukherjee's Bangla Congress.

The Indian National Democratic Front (INDF) was formed by a group of 18 defectors dissociating from the Front-Congress Alliance. The Front led by Shri Sankardas Bannerjee captured one seat in the mid-term polls.

In the mid-term elections, 12 non-Congress parties along with Lok Sevak Sangh and the PSP were united in a single poll alliance against the Congress Party. The Congress strength declined from 127 seats in 1967 to 55 seats. Its defeat could be accounted for the emergence of the splinter groups breaking away from the Congress and the strong poll-alliance among the leftist parties.

The rightist parties such as Jana Sangh and Swatantra did not make any headway in West Bengal elections. Rather, the Communist parties gained considerable number of seats. The CPM took the lead among all West Bengal parties. Its seats were formidably increased from 43 seats in 1967 to 80 seats. The CPI's assembly seats were also increased to 30 seats from 16

in 1967.

The SSP's seats increased slightly from 7 seats in 1967 to 9 seats, whereas the PSP's seats declined to 5 seats from 7 seats in 1967.

All minor parties and leftist local parties improved their strength except the Lok Sevak Sangh: the Forward Bloc secured 21 seats, FBM 1, SUC 7, RSP 12, Revolutionary Communist Party of India (RCPI) 2, Workers' Party 2, Lok Sevak Sangh 4, Gurkha League 4, Muslim League 3, and Independents 12. The Bangla Congress seats declined slightly from 34 seats in 1967 to 33.

TABLE II-4

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values
for West Bengal Legislative Assembly

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in day) | Fractionalization values |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. A.K. Mukherjee | 261 | 0.741 |
| 2. C.B. Ghosh | 92 | 0.740 |
| 3. A.K. Mukherjee | 321 | 0.842 |
| 4. A.K. Mukherjee | 86 | 0.855 |
| Mean: | 190 | 0.794 |

NOTES: a) The differences in F values are due to party defections, and the formation of new legislative groups such as Progressive Democratic Front, Indian National Democratic Front, People's Democratic Front, and some minor cases of defections.

b) Those parties or groups which held less than 5 seats are not included because their inclusion would not have altered the index much.

Sources: Sources are the same as Table II-1.

Haryana

In this state, there were only four main political parties --the Congress, the Jana Sangh, Swatantra and Republican party-- contesting the fourth general elections. Though the Jana Sangh

and Swatantra collaborated to fight against the Congress, the Congress still successfully secured 48 seats out of 81, owing to its superior propaganda and organization, while the Swatantra and the Jana Sangh won only 3 and 12 seats respectively. The Communist parties and the socialist parties were badly defeated. None of them won any assembly seats. The Republican Party contested 25 seats but won only 2 seats. The Independents gained a total of 16 seats and therefore played a decisive role in the stability of the U.F. government headed by Rao Birendra Singh.

Being in the majority, the Congress Party was allowed to establish its own government headed by Bhagwat Dayal Sharma. But after 12 days in office, the government fell because of the defection of 13 Congress members of the legislature. The defectors formed a new legislative group called Vishal Haryana Party or Haryana Congress. Its leader Rao Birendra Singh was later invited by the Governor to form the first coalition government in the state. But re-defections soon developed in the Singh ministry and brought about its fall.

In the mid-term elections held in May 1968, the Congress captured the same number of seats as it had captured in the fourth general elections. That meant it still secured an absolute majority of seats in the legislative assembly. The Vishal Haryana Party was returned with 13 seats, whereas the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra's seats were reduced to 7 and 2 respectively. The leftist parties were completely routed.

TABLE II-5

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Haryana Legislative Assembly

| Ministry | Stability values (Life in day) | Fractionalization values |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. B.D. Sharma (Cong) | 12 | 0.590 |
| 2. R.B. Singh | 597 | 0.613 |
| 3. Bansilal (Cong) | 967 | 0.606 |
| Mean: | <u>525</u> | <u>0.603</u> |

NOTES: a) The differences in F values are due to party defections, and the formation of new legislative groups such as Vishal Haryana Party, and due to re-defections of some Vishal Haryana Party members.

b) Those parties or groups which held less than 2 seats are not included such as Republican Party (2 seats); Swatantra (2), Republican Party (1) and BKD (1) after mid-term elections, because their inclusion would not have altered the index much.

Sources: Sources are the same as Table II-1.

Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh was a Congress-dominated state in the first three general elections. In the fourth election, Congress still secured 1967 seats in the 296-member Legislature. The second largest party was the Jana Sangh which won 78 seats. The rest of the assembly seats were allocated to the Swatantra (7 seats), the SSP (10), PSP (9), CPI (1), Ram Rajya Parishad (2), Jana Congress (2), and Independents (20).

Being in the majority, the Congress formed its ministry with Shri D.P. Mishra as Chief Minister, but defections soon developed in the Congress ranks. Two cases of massive defections were noted. The first case was the defection of 40 Congress members of the legislature led by G.N. Singh. These defectors formed a new legislative group called the Lok Sevak Dal. The

other was the defection of 16 other Congress legislators led by Rajmata Vijaya Raje Sandia of Gwalior. The defectors left the Congress Party to form the Bharatiya Kranti Dal Party. Both the cases together brought about the fall of the Mishra ministry after 148 days in office.

The new ministry was formed by the United Front with G. N. Singh as Chief Minister. After 552 days in office, the new ministry collapsed due to the formation of the Soshit Dal by 17 U.F. legislators. This paved the way for the Congress to come back into power. In the meantime, G.N. Singh had managed to rejoin the Congress along with 19 other members of the legislature. As a consequence, the new Congress ministry headed by Shyama Charan Shukla was installed in office. This ministry managed to survive till January 1972.

TABLE II-6

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values
for Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in day) | Fractionalization Values |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. D.P. Mishra (Cong) | 148 | 0.605 |
| 2. G.N. Singh | 552 | 0.724 |
| 3. S.C. Sukla (Cong) | 998 | 0.582 |
| Mean: | 566 | 0.637 |

NOTES: a) The differences in F values are due to the party defections and the formation of new legislative groups such as Lok Sevak Dal, BKD, Soshit Dal, etc.

b) Those parties or groups which held less than 5 seats are not included because their inclusion would not have altered the index much.

Sources: Election data are taken from Fourth General Election: An Analysis (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India).

Orissa

In this state, the Congress was reduced to 31 seats of the 140 assembly seats. Conversely, Swatantra as "a holding company for local dissident groups"⁷ who have come together in an effort to provide effective opposition to Congress at the Center, secured 49 seats in the 1967 elections. The party emerged as the strongest in the state and took power in coalition with the dissident Jana Congress. The Communist parties lost the few seats they had had in the previous assembly. The CPI gained only 7 seats, whereas the CPM was reduced to 1 seat. The Jana Sangh which made gains elsewhere throughout North India has little strength in this state. It gained to capture any Orissa assembly seats. The PSP captured 21 seats, but the SSP won only 2 seats. The Jana Congress made a great gain with 17 seats. Thereafter, it shared the coalition government with Swatantra.

In the mid-term polls, the Congress (Mrs. Gandhi's group) improved its strength with 51 seats against 31 in 1967. Conversely, the Swatantra slumped to the second position with only 36 seats. The Utkal Congress which was a splinter from the Orissa Congress did well in its first appearance on the poll scene. Formed by Biju Patnaik on the eve of 1971 elections, the Utkal Congress won 32 seats in the polls and stood as opposition to the Congress. It later joined with the Swatantra to form the alternative government.

Besides the dominant parties, the PSP won 4 seats, CPI 4, CPM 2, Jana Congress 1, the Congress (O) 1, Kharkhand 4, and Independents 4.

TABLE II-7

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Orissa Legislative Assembly

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in day) | Fractionalization Values |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. R.N. Singh Deo | 1350 | 0.788 |
| 2. Biswanath Das | 267 | 0.793 |
| Mean: | 808 | 0.775 |

NOTES: a) The differences in F value are due to the mid-term polls in 1971.

b) Those parties or groups which held less than 3 seats are not included because their inclusion would not have altered the index much.

Sources: Data for 1967 elections are taken from Fourth General Election: An Analysis (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India); data for mid-term elections are from "India elects for Change and Stability," by W.H. Morris. Jones, Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 8, August 1971, p. 732.

Kerala

In this, the smallest state in our study, the Congress Party was thrown out of power by its defeat in the fourth general elections. It won only 9 assembly seats whereas a United Front of seven parties captured 113 seats--despite the fact that the Congress polled the highest percentage of votes for any single party. The CPM became a formidable party which managed to obtain 54 seats of the 134 member-legislative assembly. Therefore, it emerged as a largest political party in Kerala, a position previously enjoyed by the undivided Congress. The CPI was reduced to 19 seats, and the SSP to 19 seats. The rest of the assembly seats were allocated to RSP (6 seats), Kerala Socialist Party (1), Karshaka Thozilal Party (2), Kerala Congress (5), Muslim League (15), and Independents (6). The Republican Party, Swatantra, Jana Sangh, and PSP did not capture any seats.

In the mid-term polls in 1970, the Congress had an occasion to recoup its strength. Its seats were increased to 32 from 9 in the previous elections. Conversely, the CPM lost heavily to the Congress, the CPI, the Muslim League and the socialist parties.

The Bangla Congress improved its strength with 12 seats. On the other hand, the socialist parties--three (SSP, ISP, KSP) on the side of the Marxist People's Democratic Front, and two (RSP, PSP) on the side of the U.F.--paid the price of disunity. None showed itself a strong force, even taken together, they secured only 20 seats with 9 percent of the poll. Finally, the Muslim League was reduced to 11 seats from 15 seats in 1967.

Table II-8

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Kerala Legislative Assembly

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in day) | Fractionalization Values |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. E.M.S. Namboodiripad | 909 | 0.789 |
| 2. C. Achuta Menon | 750 | 0.693 |
| Mean: | 829 | 0.693 |

NOTES: a) The differences in F values are due to the mid-term elections in 1970.

b) Those parties or groups which held less than 3 seats are not included because their inclusion would not have altered much the index.

Sources: Data for 1967 elections are taken from Fourth General Elections: An Analysis (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India); those for mid-term elections are from "The Kerala Communists" by Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., in Paul R. Brass and Marcus F. Franda, eds., Radical Politics in South Asia (MIT Press, 1973), p. 176.

Correlation Analysis

Our hypothesis was stated that governmental stability is negatively correlated with the legislative fractionalization. We also assumed that the fragmentation of the legislative party system depends not only on the number-of-parties but also their relative sizes in terms of seats held. We have found that 31 governments (21 coalition governments and 10 one-party governments) were in office during the period under review with mean duration of 364.2 days. As presented in Table II-9, the correlation between the two variables for 31 governments is found to be $r = -.297$ ($p = 0.51$). The correlation is therefore relatively weak at best, and not significant at the .05 level of probability. If this coefficient is squared, we see that the legislative fractionalization explains only 8.8% of the variance in governmental stability. In other words, fractionalization of the legislative party system does not greatly affect the governmental stability, and it is not as great as we have thought.

However, if we excluded from our sample four exceptional governments headed by R.N. Singh Deo, E.M.S. Namboodiripad (coalition governments), D.P. Mishra and B.D. Sharma (Congress governments), we would find that the correlation between the two variables would become much stronger and significant (see Table II-10). These four governments were exceptional because the first two governments had the longest tenures in office owing to the ideological homogeneity among the coalition units, meanwhile the last two governments (though Congress governments) suffered heavily from the large defections, as a result, they

TABLE II-9

Relationship Between Stability and Legislative
Fractionalization for analysis of 31 state
Governments in Eight Indian States

| Coefficient | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|---|----------|--------------------|
| S | 364.2581 | 327.8096 |
| Fp | 0.733 | |
| Product-moment correlation = $-.297$ ($r^2 = 0.05$) | | |
| p .051 | | |
| N = 31 | | |

TABLE II-10

Relationship Between Stability and Legislative
Fractionalization for analysis of 27 State
Governments in Eight Indian States
(Four exceptional cases were excluded)

| Coefficient | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|--|----------|--------------------|
| S | 303.9581 | |
| Fp | 0.738 | |
| Product-moment correlation = 0.70908 ($r^2 = 0.50279$) | | |
| p 0.00002 | | |
| N = 27 | | |

died very soon. These problems will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

In sum, the correlation between the governmental stability and the fractionalization of the party system in the legislative assemblies was weak and not statistically significant (at .05) in the case of 31 governments, but the correlation became much stronger and significant in the case of 27 governments. Four governments which were excluded from computation, included two coalition governments and two Congress governments. These two coalition governments were apparently able to survive for relatively long periods of time due to the ideological homogeneity among parties which formed the coalitions. The two above-mentioned Congress governments could not survive long in office because of the disease of defections or internal factionalism.

Though legislative fractionalization explained about 8.8% of the variance in governmental stability for all 31 governments, it explained 50% of the variance in governmental stability when our exceptional governments were excluded from analysis.

CHAPTER III

GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL FRACTIONALIZATION

Is governmental fractionalization responsible for the instability of coalition government? How much does the fractionalization of the party system in a coalition government explain the variation in governmental stability? This chapter seeks to answer these questions. Our method used is the same as in the last chapter: Rae's formula has been used to calculate the fractionalization scores for each government; Parson product moment correlation will be used to assess the correlation between the governmental stability and fractionalization.

As a result of the fourth general elections, the coalition governments were established in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, Orissa, and Kerala. They were ideologically divided into three categories:

-- The first category composed of the Kerala and West Bengal coalition governments in which both the CPI and the CPM participated, and the composition of which governments were predominantly leftist.

-- The second category consisted of the Bihar and Punjab governments which included leftist parties as also the Jana Sangh and the Akali Dal. With the exception of Punjab governments, there were ideologically heterogeneous governmental coalitions in which both the rightist and leftist political parties joined together besides local parties.

-- The third category consisted of the coalition governments

formed in Orissa, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh where the Jana Sangh, Swatantra, and other rightist parties were in a majority.

During the full term of five years, 31 Ministries were found in the mentioned states. Of these, 21 Ministries or governments were identified as coalition governments including non-Congress coalitions and coalitions formed by the Congress party and one or more local parties. Thus our units for analysis in this chapter are 21 coalition governments.

Our hypothesis selected for empirically testing, is that the lower degree of fractionalization there is in coalition, the more likely it is that the government will be stable. We assume that the numerical structure of the party system along with the relative ministerial shares is a determinant of the stability of the ministry.

Before our hypothesis is statistically tested, the chronological review on political developments in the above-mentioned states is helpful and necessary.

Bihar

Bihar was one of the poorest states in India, where the political life was dominated by caste rather than by religion, language or class diversity. "If Bihar has a predominant political image" as Paul R. Brass pointed out, "it is one of a state in which caste is the most important symbol, providing the preeminent basis for political mobilization and a good portion of the political dialogue."¹ In the Fourth General Elections, the Congress suffered heavily to the opposition parties. It

secured only 128 out of 318 seats in the state assembly. Taking this opportunity, non-Congress parties formed a United Front (Samyukta Vidhayak Dal) of five parties including the SSP, PSP, Jana Sangh, Jana Kranti Dal and the CPI. M.P. Sinha (JKD) was selected as a leader of the Front. The Governor invited him to form the first non-Congress coalition Ministry in the state. The Ministry was installed in office on March 5, 1967. It consisted of 21 Ministers and Deputy Ministers. Ministerial posts were shared by the Jana Sangh (3 posts), the SSP (8 posts), the PSP (3 posts), the CPI (3 posts), and the JKD (4 posts). Due to party defections from the United Front to the Congress, the Sinha Ministry collapsed on January 25, 1968 after less than a year in office.

To replace the Sinha government, the second Ministry was installed in office on February 1, 1968 with Shri B.P. Mandal as Chief Minister. This was the largest Ministry in the state, composed entirely of defectors with the support of the Congress.² Shortly after its formation, a sharp split occurred within the ranks of the Congress; accordingly, the Congress decided to withdraw its support from the Mandal government. This new development denied the Mandal government majority support and it consequently fell on March 18, 1968.

Bhola Paswan Shastri, a leader of the LTC, was designated to head a new Ministry. The 13-member Ministry was officially installed on March 22, 1968, and participated by the Jana Sangh (2), the SSP (2), the CPI (2), the LTC (5) and Janta party (2). However, the government lasted just 95 days due to internal confrontations among coalition partners. Subsequently,

President's rule was imposed in the state, along with the dissolution of the state assembly.

In the mid-term elections held in February 1969, the Congress Party captured 118 out of 318 seats in the assembly. Harihar Singh was chosen Chief Minister of the new Congress-led coalition government. The 22-member Ministry which was sworn into office on February 26, 1969, was composed of Congress (8 ministerial posts), Janta Party (5), Shosit Dal (4), Jharkhand (3), and Independents (2). But after 115 days in office, the government was broken because the Raja of Ramgarh resigned from ministerial positions, and the six-member Shosit Dal group withdrew its support.

The subsequent Ministry was returned to the United Front on June 22, 1969, with Bhola Paswan Shastri as Chief Minister, and was participated in by LTC (3 ministerial posts), Shosit Dal (2), Jharkhand (5), BKD (2), and Independents (4). This most short-lived government fell on July 4, 1969 after 12 days in office due to the withdrawal of support by the 34-member Jana Sangh group. The fall of the Paswan Ministry resulted in the suspension of the state assembly and the imposition of President's rule.

The new Congress-led coalition government headed by Daroga Prasad Rai was sworn in on February 6, 1970 to end the second spell of President's rule in Bihar. The new ministry included 24 posts shared by Congress (20), Hulla Karkhand (1) and Independents (3).⁵ But on March 31, 1971, the Raj Ministry fell following a split in the Congress Party and the withdrawal of support from it by the BKD.

support from it by the BKD.

The Congress-LTC coalition government headed by Bhola Paswan Shastri (LTC) was installed in office on April 4, 1971. The Ministry was limited to 11 ministerial positions in which the Congress occupied 6, Congress (O) 3, LTC 1, and Independents 1.⁶ The last government came to an end on January 9, 1972, following the President's rule imposed for the third time in the state, and the dissolution of the Bihar state assembly.

In sum, all Bihar governments except the Mandal ministry were participated in by a number of parties, groups, and Independents. The fractionalization scores of the ministerial-post shares and the governmental duration are presented in the following table.

TABLE III-1

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Bihar State Governments

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in days) | Fractionalization Values |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Non-coalition governments (excluded from analysis): | | |
| 2. B.P. Mandal | 47 | 0.00 |
| Coalition governments: | | |
| 1. M.P. Sinha | 355 | 0.721 |
| 3. B.P. Shastri | 95 | 0.761 |
| 4. Harihar Singh | 115 | 0.768 |
| 5. B.P. Shastri | 12 | 0.620 |
| 6. D.P. Raj | 390 | 0.284 |
| 7. B.P. Shastri | 275 | 0.614 |
| Mean: | 214.83 | 0.628 |

Sources: India--A Reference Annual since 1967-1973; Sabhash C. Kashyap, The Politics of Defection, ICPS, New Delhi, pp. 186-229, 1969, Union-State Relations in India, ICPS, New Delhi, 1969, pp. 109-112, 116-120, Link, April 27, 1969, p. 23.

Uttar Pradesh

In Uttar Pradesh, the Congress Party failed to secure an absolute majority in the fourth general elections. It captured 199 seats in the 423-member state assembly. Though it was 14 short of the required majority, the Governor invited the Congress Party leader C.B. Gupta to form the new government, because the United Front failed to show that it controlled the majority in the Assembly. The new 11-member Ministry assumed office on March 14, 1967. But it lasted just 18 days due to floor-crossings by its supporters. The same day, Charan Singh was elected leader of the United Front. He was designated to establish the U.F. Ministry on April 5, 1967. New ministerial positions were shared by Swatantra (1 post), the Jana Sangh (8), the SSP (5), the PSP (1), the CPI (2), Republican Party (2), Jana Congress (7), and Independents (2).⁷

Soon, the Swatantra and Communist parties withdrew their ministers from the government. Three SSP Ministers and two Deputy Ministers also resigned. The 44-member SSP group was the second biggest constituent unit of the eight-party U.F. government. Charan Singh replied promptly by taking in more Ministers, all Independents. But on January 9, 1968, both Houses were prorogued by the Governor. As a result, the Singh Ministry fell on February 17, 1968. President's rule was imposed a week later. The Assembly was also dissolved as recommended by the Governor.

In the mid-term elections held in February, 1969, the Congress improved its position, falling short of an absolute majority by only two. Owing to the cooperation of Swatantra

and Independents, the Congress was designated to form the 16-member Congress government in the state on February 26, 1969, headed again by C.B. Gupta. Coincidentally, the Congress Party met a greater crisis on the national scale, which led to the deep division within its rank. A group of Ministers who had allegiance to Mrs. Indira Gandhi resigned from the Ministry in order to topple the Syndicate (Congress-0) boss C.P. Gupta and brought about its break-down on February 10, 1970.

On February 17, 1970, Charan Singh was invited again to head the new Cong-BKD coalition Cabinet, with the support of the Congress (R). Its eight ministerial positions were shared by these two parties: the Congress (R) held 3 posts, and the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BDK) 5 posts.⁸ Talks about merger of the BKD and Congress (R) ensued but could not settle the terms of trade. In time, Charan Singh had himself to step down and make room for a new government headed by T.N. Singh, who was not a member of any House in U.P. The T.N. Singh Ministry consisted of five members: the Congress (0) 1, the Jana Sangh 1, the SSP 1, and BKD 2.⁹ However, the Singh Ministry lasted until February 1, 1971, when it was replaced by a Congress Ministry headed by Kamlapati Tripathi (Indira Gandhi's Congress -R). The Tripathi Ministry was the largest Ministry in the states with 40 Ministers and Deputy Ministers.¹⁰ It managed to survive until the fifth general elections held in the state.

In short, there were three Congress Ministries, two Congress coalition Ministries, and one United Front coalition Ministry in Uttar Pradesh during the full term of five years. The Ministry which had the longest duration was the Tripathi

Ministry. The Ministry which had a shortest duration was the C.B. Gupta Ministry. The fractionalization scores for each Ministry are presented in the following table.

TABLE III-2

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values
for Uttar Pradesh State Governments

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in Day) | Fractionalization Values |
|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Non-coalition governments (excluded from analysis): | | |
| 8. C.P. Gupta | 18 | 0.000 |
| 10. C.P. Gupta | 344 | 0.000 |
| 13. Kamlapati Tripathi | 366 | 0.000 |
| Mean: | 242 | 0.000 |
| Coalition governments: | | |
| 9. Charan Singh | 312 | 0.817 |
| 11. Charan Singh | 225 | 0.470 |
| 5. T.N. Singh | 103 | 0.808 |
| Mean: | 213.33 | 0.698 |

Sources: India--A Reference Annual, since 1967-1973; Sabhash Kashyap, The Politics of Defection, ICPS, New Delhi, 1969, pp. 128-183; Union-State Relations in India, ICPS, New Delhi, pp. 106-109; Link, April 11, 1971, pp. 17-18; Link, April 26, 1970, p. 14; Link, April 11, 1971, pp. 18-18.

Punjab

In the elections held in 1967, no party could secure an absolute majority in the Punjab assembly. The Congress Party was regarded as the largest single party with 48 seats in a House of 104. Thereupon, several non-Congress parties came together to form the United Front, consisted of all the 53 non-Congress legislators belonging to the Akali Dal, CPI, CPM, Jana Sangh, SSP, Republican Party and Independents.

Thus, the Front controlled the necessary support and formed

a 17-man Ministry headed by Gurnam Singh. The new Ministry was sworn in on March 8, 1967, and participated in by Jana Sangh (2 posts), CPI (1), Republican Party (2), Akali Dal (2), Congress defectors (6), and Independents (4).¹¹ Due to massive defections from the United Front, the Ministry soon lost legislative support. Accordingly, it fell on November 22, 1967.

On November 25, 1967, Lachhman Singh Gill, a defector from the United Front was invited by the Governor to form the other Ministry, consisting of 16 defectors from the United Front.

Within a month of the Gill Ministry coming into power, the Congress ranks were seething with serious discontent over all three Harijan legislators of the Republican party occupying Ministerial offices. The bitter crisis between the Chief Minister and the Governor over the right to summon the assembly rendered the Ministry unstable. Thereafter, Singh Gill submitted the resignation of his Cabinet on August 21, 1968, following the withdrawal of Congress support. President's rule was proclaimed within two days and the Assembly was dissolved.

In the mid-term elections held in February 1969, the Akali Dal captured 43 seats while the Congress only 38 seats. The leader of the Akali Dal in the Assembly, Gurnam Singh, returned to office on February 17, 1969 with the cooperation of Jana Sangh. The Jana Sangh-Akali Ministry was a small one with 15 ministerial posts;¹² Jana Sangh occupied 3 positions, the Akali Dal (Sant group) 12. It managed to survive until March 25, 1970 when Prakash Singh Badal was elected leader of the Akali Dal in the Assembly, and Gurnam Singh was suspended from the party because he lost the confidence of the Akali Chief Sant

Fateh Singh.

A new 26-man Akali-Jana Sangh coalition Ministry headed by Prakash Singh Badal came into existence on March 26, 1970. Its ministerial offices were shared by Jana Sangh (4 posts), Akali Dal (21 posts) and Independents (1). But, differences soon arose between the two parties in the coalition when the Akali Working Committee flatly rejected the Jana Sangh stand on the territorial jurisdiction of a newly-established university. Consequently, the four Jana Sangh Ministers submitted their resignations; and the government collapsed on June 13, 1971 after which President's rule was imposed in the state.

TABLE III-3

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Punjab Governments

| Ministry | Stability values (Life in Day) | Fractionalization Values |
|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Non-coalition governments (excluded from analysis): | | |
| 15. Lachhman Singh Gill | 266 | 0.000 |
| Coalition governments: | | |
| 14. Gurnam Singh | 266 | 0.780 |
| 16. Gurnam Singh | 398 | 0.320 |
| 17. Prakash Singh Bodal | 437 | 0.312 |
| Mean: | 367 | 0.470 |
| Sources: <u>India--A Reference Annual since 1967-1973</u> ; Kashyap, S.C. <u>op. cit.</u> , p. 230-280; and <u>Union-State Relations in India</u> , pp. 113-116; <u>Link</u> , March 30, 1969, pp. 18-19. | | |

West Bengal

The Congress Party failed to secure absolute majority in the Assembly that it had maintained through the first three elections in West Bengal but emerged the largest single party with the considerable size of 127 in a House of 280. Yet it

decided to go into the opposition. On the other hand, the non-Congress opposition parties came together to form the United Democratic Front of fourteen parties with Ajoy Mukherjee, a leader of the Bangla Congress, as United Front leader.

Ajoy Mukherjee assumed office on March 1, 1967. Eighteen ministerial positions were widely shared by various parties: SSP, PSP, RSP, Workers' Party, Lok Sevak Sangh, SUC, Ghorkha League, each of these parties had one post; CPI (2), CPM (3), Forward Bloc (2) and Independents (1).¹³ However, the Front lasted less than a year, it officially collapsed on November 21, 1967 because deep splits arose within the ranks of the UDF.

The next Ministry was installed in office on November 22, 1967. Headed by C.P. Ghosh, a former minister defecting from the Mukherjee Ministry, the new ministry was composed of all defectors-made ministers (17), and it was supported by the Congress. But the conflict regarding the right to summon the assembly soon arose between the ruling ministry and the United Front opposition rendered the Ghosh Ministry unstable. The constitutional deadlock ended the government on February 20, 1968. The political alternative to this situation was the imposition of the President's rule for the first time in the state since Independence, along with the dissolution of the state assembly.

Mid-term elections held on February 9, 1969, drew the United Front together with renewed strength. The Congress had reduced its strength to 55; meanwhile the CPM almost doubled to 80, CPI 30, Bangla Congress 33.

The new UF Ministry consisting of 14 parties was installed

on February 25, 1969 with Ajoy Mukherjee as Chief Minister: the SSP, PSP, Workers' Party, Lok Sevak Sangha, Forward Bloc Marxists, Gorkha League, Progressive Muslim League (each had one ministerial post), CPI (4), CPM (7), Bangla Congress (4), Forward Bloc (3), Revolutionary Socialist Party (2), SUC (2), and Independents (3).¹⁴

From the time the UF Ministry took over, series of clashes, gheraos, and violence took hold of the state. The government thus faced a dilemma: either to resign or to resort to repressive measures. Ajoy Mukherjee chose the resignation on January 16, 1970 to end the 14-party Ministry's rule. President's rule was imposed for the second time in the state, and the State Assembly was dissolved again.

New elections were held in the State Assembly, along with the general elections to the Lok Sabha on March 10, 1971. The new Congress regained much of its lost prestige and position with 105 seats, but it did not get an absolute majority to form its own government. Thereupon, the UF government took power again with Ajoy Mukherjee as Chief Minister on April 2, 1971. The new 25-man Ministry was joined by the Congress (18), SSP (1), PSP (1), Muslim League (3), Bangla Congress (1), and Gorkha League (1).¹⁵ But, it lasted only 86 days, and it was officially ousted from office on June 28, 1971 due to internal controversies among coalition partners. President's rule was subsequently imposed in the state for the third time since the fourth general elections.

As shown in Table III-4, there were four Ministries installed in the state. The average life for each Ministry was 190 days.

TABLE III-4

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for West Bengal Governments

| Ministry | Stability values (Life in days) | Fractionalization Values |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Non-coalition government (excluded from analysis): | | |
| 19. C.B. Ghosh | 92 | 0.000 |
| Coalition governments: | | |
| 18. A.K. Mukherjee | 261 | 0.898 |
| 20. A.K. Mukherjee | 321 | 0.870 |
| 21. A.K. Mukherjee | 86 | 0.536 |
| Mean: | 222.66 | 0.768 |
| Sources: India--A Reference Annual 1969, p. 508-513; Kashyap, S.C., <u>op. cit.</u> , pp. 323-378; and Link, April 11, 1971, p. 18. | | |

The state also suffered from the President's rule three times since the fourth general elections.

Haryana

As a result of the fourth general elections, the Congress was returned to power with a comfortable majority. A new Congress Ministry of 11 members was formed by Shri Bhagwat Dayal Sharma on March 10, 1967. But the new Ministry was convincingly defeated on March 22, 1967 in the Assembly when its nominee for Speakership lost to the dissident Congressman Rao Birendra Singh, who had the support of the opposition and of 12 Congressmen. The dissident Congressman who defected from the Congress Party formed a new party under the label of Haryana Congress. In addition, most of the Cabinet members of Sharma's Ministry resigned from the Cabinet and joined the opposition group. In view of this, B.D. Sharma tendered his resignation to the Governor.

Rao Birendra Singh was elected as leader of the United Front and was invited to form, on March 24, 1967, the new Ministry, consisting of 22 members: Haryana Congress (12), Republican Party (1), and Independents (9). At the request of the Governor, the President issued a Proclamation to dismiss the United Front Ministry on November 24, 1967, and dissolved the State Assembly because the UF Ministry had been totally paralyzed by frequent defections in the legislature.

The state went to the polls again on May 12, 1968. The Congress was returned to power. The new 7-man Ministry with Bansilal as Chief Minister was installed in office on May 22, 1968. Bansilal continued to be a Chief Minister until the dissolution of the State Assembly on January 21, 1972.

In short, Haryana was a relatively stable state with an average Ministry life of 525 days. The Congress and non-Congress parties took turn in assuming power, but the Congress Ministry with Bansilal as a Chief Minister had the longest duration.

TABLE III-5

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Haryana State Governments

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in days) | Fractionalization Values |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Non-coalition governments (excluded from analysis): | | |
| 22. B.D. Sharma | 12 | 0.000 |
| 24. Bansilal | 967 | 0.000 |
| Mean: | 326.33 | 0.000 |
| Coalition government: | | |
| 23. Rao B. Singh | 597 | 0.534 |

Sources: Kashyap, S.C., op. cit., pp. 79-127; Link, January 30, 1972, p. 14.

Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh was a stronghold of the Congress in the first three elections. In the fourth general elections, the Congress still secured an absolute majority with 167 seats in the House of 296 members. D.P. Mishra was unanimously elected leader of the Congress Legislature Party and a Ministry was sworn in on March 8, 1967.

Shortly after the formation of the Congress government, the Rajmata of Gwalior announced that about 60 Congress legislators would soon join the United Opposition Forum to topple the Mishra government and form a U.F. government. In addition a group of 36 Congress MLAs led by G.N. Singh crossed the floor. Consequently, Mishra tendered his resignation on July 30, 1967, after 148 days in office.

Accepting the government's resignation, the Governor, on the advice of the Rajmata, leader of the United Front (consisting of the Jana Sangh, the defectors, Rajmata's Kranti Dal, CPI, PSP, and SSP) then invited Govind Narain Singh to form the government.

The new Council of Ministers consisting of 31 members included the Jana Sangh (7 posts), the Rajmata's Krantikari Vikhayak Dal (5), and the Madhya Pradesh Jana Congress (19).¹⁶ The PSP which had not joined the Ministry felt free to be more and more critical of the 25-point common program of the U.F. In addition, the SSP and Jana Sangh Ministers decided to resign from the Singh Ministry. At the end, the Chief Minister had to resign on March 15, 1969, after differences had developed between the members of the Front.

This crisis created an opportunity for the Congress to come back to power after about 20 months of being ousted following the defection by G.N. Singh and his supporters. On March 26, 1969, Shyama Charan Shukla was elected to head the second Congress Ministry of 36 members. It lasted until the fifth general elections were held in the state.

TABLE III-6

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization Values
for Madhya Pradesh State Governments

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in days) | Fractionalization Values |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Non-coalition governments (excluded from analysis): | | |
| 25. D.P. Mishra | 148 | 0.000 |
| 27. S.C. Shukla | 998 | 0.000 |
| Mean: | <u>537</u> | <u>0.000</u> |
| Coalition government: | | |
| 26. G.N. Singh | 552 | 0.551 |
| Sources: India--A Reference Annual, 1969, p. 462, and 1971-1972, p. 500; Kashyap, S.C., <u>op. cit.</u> , pp. 291-303. | | |

Orissa

The Congress suffered more heavily in Orissa than it had in many other states in the fourth general elections. It could secure no more than 30 seats in a 139-member legislature. The Swatantra party, on the other hand, captured 39 seats, PSP 21, Jana Congress 26, CPI 7, CPM 1, SSP 2, and Independents 3. No single party had therefore secured an absolute majority in the Assembly or even such a dominating position as to be able to form a Ministry. The Swatantra had to cooperate with the Jana Congress to form a coalition. R.N. Singh Deo of the Swatantra,

leader of the coalition, was invited by the Governor to form a two-party government on March 8, 1967.

The 15-man Ministry was shared by the Swatantra (8), and the Jana Congress (7).¹⁷ It was able to survive until the Jana Congress withdrew from the coalition and elections were held in March, 1971. It showed a relative stability unknown in the other states.

The 1971 elections which were held simultaneously for the state legislature and the Lok Sabha, produced a new power balance. The Congress (R) improved its strength to 51 seats. Conversely, the Swatantra slumped to the second position with only 36 seats. The Utkal Congress did well in its first appearance on the poll scene, bagging 32 seats. Besides, PSP captured 4 seats, CPI 4, CPM 2, Jana Congress 1, others and Independents 4 each.

Thus, the Swatantra and the Utkal Congress came together to form a coalition on April 3, 1971 with Biswanath Das as Chief Minister. The Ministry was composed of 13 positions shared by the Swatantra (6), Utkal Congress (6), and Jarkhand (1).¹⁸ This Ministry lasted until January 31, 1972.

In sum, Orissa was relatively stable with an average Ministry life of 808 days.

Kerala

In the 1967 elections, the United Front of seven political parties led by the Communists (M) was voted to power having won 117 of the 134 seats. The United Front assumed office on March 15, 1967. E.M.S. Namboodiripad, leader of CPM was

TABLE III-7

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Orissa State Governments

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in days) | Fractionalization Values |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Coalition governments: | | |
| 28. R.N. Singh Deo | 1350 | 0.173 |
| 29. Biswanath Das | 267 | 0.629 |
| Mean: | 808 | 0.401 |

Sources: India--A Reference Annual 1967, pp. 459-462; Link, April 18, 1971, pp. 19-20; India--A Reference Annual 1971-1972, p. 506; Link, April 11, 1971, p. 21.

selected Chief Minister. The 12-man Ministry was joined by CPM (4 posts), CPI (2), Muslim League (2), RSP (1), KTP (1), and KSP (1).¹⁹ However, the seven-party Ministry was ridden with charges and counter-charges of corruption and other allegations against several of its members. Six non-Marxist Ministers decided to resign from the U.F. Ministry and the Ministry disintegrated on October 24, 1969 after a defeat in the State Assembly.

A week later, a new CPI-led coalition Ministry headed by C. Achutha Menon was installed. It was made up of the Kerala Congress (1 Ministerial post), CPI (4), Muslim League (2), and RSP (2).²⁰ The Congress (R) stayed out of the coalition but supported it from outside. The new Ministry lasted until December 31, 1971.

The correlational analysis

As pointed out earlier, our first hypothesis was concerned with overall assertion about the effects of the party system on

TABLE III-8

Governmental Stability and Fractionalization
Values for Kerala State Governments

| Ministry | Stability Values (Life in days) | Fractionalization Values |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Coalition governments: | | |
| 30. E.M.S. Namboodiripad | 909 | 0.808 |
| 31. C. Achuta Menon | 750 | 0.307 |
| Mean: | 829 | 0.557 |

Sources: India--A Reference Annual 1967, pp. 424-426; India--A Reference Annual, 1970, pp. 477-448; Link, November 9, 1969, p. 14; and Link, October 26, 1969, p. 14.

the stability of the government (here, coalition governments). The fractionalization scores used here not only reflected the number of parties in the government but also the competitive situation or cleavages existing in the multi-party system. The higher the F value, the greater the degree of fractionalization would be. The hypothesis was related to the relationship between governmental stability and governmental fractionalization. During the full term of five years, 21 coalition governments were found in above-mentioned states, with an average life (mean) of 384 days.

As shown in Table III-9, the correlation between governmental stability and governmental fractionalization is found to be $r = -.479$, which is moderately strong, bearing in mind that the unit of our analysis is the coalition government; it is significant at the .02 level. The hypothesis is well confirmed. However, since $r^2 = 0.229$, we see that governmental fractionalization explains about one fifth of the variation in Governmental stability.

TABLE III-9

Relationship Between S and Fg for Analysis
of 21 Coalition Governments

| Coefficient | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|--|---------|--------------------|
| S | 384.000 | 314.187 |
| Fg | 0.572 | |
| Product-moment correlation = $-.479$ ($r^2 = 0.229$) | | |
| p .02 | | |
| N = 21 | | |

Some additional observations may be made. Our data shows that Congress governments were only slightly more stable than non-Congress governments (see Table III-10). Seven Congress governments had an average life of 352 days. However, if an analysis of variance was used, we would find that the differences were not statistically significant at 5% level of probability ($F = 0.124$).

TABLE III-10

Mean Life in Days (S) of Congress
and Non-Congress Governments

| Number of cases | Life | Mean | SD | Variance |
|-----------------|-------|----------|----------|-------------|
| Congress (7) | 2823 | 403.286 | 417.577 | 174370.313 |
| Non-Cong (24) | 8469 | 352.875 | 306.720 | 94077.500 |
| N = 31 | 11292 | 364.2581 | 327,8096 | 107459.1875 |

Unexpectedly, and contrary to the widespread belief that one-party governments are more stable than multi-party govern-

ments, here we have found that coalition governments were more stable than one-party governments (see Table III-11). However, the differences were also not statistically significant at 5% level of probability, using analysis of variance ($F = 0.2301$).

TABLE III-11

Mean Life in Days (s) of Coalition
and Non-Coalition Governments

| Number of cases | Life | Mean | SD | Variance |
|--------------------|-------|----------|----------|-------------|
| Non-coalition (10) | 3228 | 322.800 | 368.801 | 136014.188 |
| Coalition (21) | 8064 | 384.000 | 314.187 | 98713.750 |
| N = 31 | 11292 | 364.2581 | 327.8096 | 107459.1875 |

The second observation might seem to be contradictory to the first one. Reasons were that during the period under review, there were 10 non-coalition governments in office, among them, two were defectors-made governments headed by B.P. Mandal and C.B. Ghosh; these governments lasted for 47 days and 92 days respectively. Besides the B.D. Sharma government had the shortest tenure of 12 days due to the large defections of 12 Congress legislators.

The problem of defections will be investigated more closely after looking at the effect upon governmental instability of ideological cleavages among coalition partners.

CHAPTER IV

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY
AND IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES

In the last two chapters, we found that analysis of 31 governments did not reveal a great impact of fractionalization of the party system in the legislature upon governmental stability, but that an analysis of 27 governments (exclusion of four exceptional governments) showed a much stronger relationship. In the latter case, the fractionalization, in fact, contributed half of the variation in governmental stability; and the correlation between the two variables was quite strong and statistically significant at the .00002 level of probability.

We have also found that the correlation between the fractionalization of the party system in coalition government and governmental instability was moderately strong, and significant at the .02 level of probability. In this case, the fractionalization managed to explain one-fourth of the variation in governmental stability.

In this chapter, our attempt is to examine whether ideological cleavages are related to governmental stability or not. Our concern is inter-party cleavages in coalition governments.

Political parties in India never tire of proclaiming their faith in ideologies. On the contrary, political battles are often fought on ideological grounds. Thus, ideological stance remains a good method of analyzing political parties and their behavior in coalition governments.¹

As defined earlier, ideological cleavages are to be understood as policy conflicts or incompatibility. To understand ideological compatibility and incompatibility, we not only examine the social base of the political parties but also their positions pronounced in election manifestoes, and their stance on major socio-economic issues, like land reforms, land revenues, food grains, and language.

On the other hand, political scientists tend to classify political parties along a Left, Center, Right continuum. Communist parties and socialist parties are put on the Right of the continuum, the Congress in the Center, and the Swatantra and Jana Sangh on the Left. But this approach has not dealt with many local parties and splinter groups whose ideologies are not clear or are non-existent. As a matter of fact, instead of using the Left-Right dimension to classify coalition governments in terms of ideological homogeneity and heterogeneity, we combine and coordinate the parties' inherent ideologies with their positions on major policy-issues which came up in the government. By using this approach, state governments under review could be classified into four categories:

-- One-party governments: no inter-cleavages existed. They might have intra-party cleavage, but this kind of cleavage is not our concern here.

-- Homogeneous coalition governments: in these governments, parties were close to another ideologically and their positions were generally the same toward policy-issues arising in ruling coalitions.

-- Moderately-homogeneous coalitions: parties were close to one another ideologically but their positions were not identical to policy-issues arising in ruling coalitions.

-- Heterogeneous coalition governments: there were the ideological incompatibility and conflicting policies in coalitions.

As presented in Table IV-1, we have thus classified:

-- 10 one-party governments with an average life of 322.8 days;

-- 5 coalition governments, considered to be ideologically homogeneous, with an average life of 669.9 days;

-- 4 coalition governments, regarded as moderately homogeneous, with an average life of 375 days; and

-- 12 coalition governments, found to be heterogeneous, with an average life of 268 days.

An analysis of mean values revealed that for coalition governments the degree of stability varied with the ideological homogeneity. Ideologically-homogeneous coalitions tended to have a longer tenure than ideologically-heterogeneous ones. Moreover, an analysis of variance disclosed that these differences were statistically significant at the 5% level (F value is 3.6498). From this test statistic, we can conclude that there were real differences between and among ideologically-homogeneous governments which brought about the stability of governments, and ideologically-heterogeneous governments which brought about the instability. In other words, the relationships between ideological cleavages and governmental instability was tested and our stated hypothesis was therefore confirmed:

TABLE IV-1

Classification of Coalition Homogeneity

| I-One-party Governments | | Life | II-Homogeneous Coalitions | | Life |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-----------------------------|----------------|-------|
| 2. | B.P. Mandall | 47 | 11. | Charan Singh | 225 |
| 8. | C.P. Gupta | 18 | 26. | R.B. Singh | 597 |
| 10. | C.P. Gupta | 344 | 28. | R.N. Singh Deo | 1350 |
| 13. | K. Tripathi | 336 | 29. | Biswanath Das | 267 |
| 15. | L.S. Gill | 266 | 30. | E.M.S. | |
| 19. | C.B. Ghosh | 92 | | Namboodiripad | 909 |
| 22. | D.P. Mishra | 148 | | Mean | 669.6 |
| 24. | S.C. Sukla | 998 | | N=5 | |
| 25. | B.D. Sharma | 12 | | | |
| 27. | Bansi Lal | 967 | | | |
| | Mean | 322.8 | | | |
| | N=10 | | | | |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| III-Moderately Homogeneous Coalitions | | Life | IV-Heterogeneous coalitions | | Life |
| 6. | Daroga Prasad Raj | 390 | 1. | M.P. Sinha | 355 |
| 7. | B.P. Shastri | 275 | 3. | B.P. Shastri | 95 |
| 16. | Gurnam Singh | 398 | 4. | Harihar Singh | 115 |
| 17. | P.S. Bodal | 437 | 5. | B.P. Shastri | 12 |
| | Mean | 375 | 9. | Charan Singh | 312 |
| | N=4 | | 12. | S.N. Singh | 103 |
| | | | 14. | Gurnam Singh | 254 |
| | | | 20. | A.K. Mukherjee | 321 |
| | | | 21. | A.K. Mukherjee | 86 |
| | | | 18. | A.K. Mukherjee | 261 |
| | | | 23. | G.N. Singh | 552 |
| | | | 31. | Achuta Menon | 750 |
| | | | | Mean | 268 |
| | | | | N=12 | |

ideological cleavages have a definite effect, significant at the 5% level. However, at this level of probability, ideological cleavages did not produce as powerful explanations of governmental instability as governmental fractionalization and legislative fractionalization.

In summary, ideological cleavages were related to the stability of government. Homogeneous governments tended to have longer tenure than heterogeneous ones. Our expected relationship between ideological cleavages and governmental stability was confirmed.

In order to support further our hypothesis, two exceptional cases are taken for analysis: the coalition government headed by R.N. Singh Deo (Orissa) and the coalition government headed by E.M. Namboodiripad (Kerala). Both governments had relatively long tenures, both were ideologically homogeneous, but one was a rightist dominated coalition, and another was a leftist-dominated coalition.

-- R.N. Singh Deo government.

The United Front government headed by R.N. Singh Deo was installed in office on March 15, 1967. The government was a coalition between the Swatantra and the Jana Congress which together held the majority of seats in the legislative assembly. The two parties were close to one another ideologically. Swatantra always described itself as an alternative to socialism and communism. It worked for individual freedom and called for free enterprise, freedom for the private investor, and non-interference by the state in the natural laws of market. Politically, the party leadership was moderate, secular and

nationalist. Thus, its ideology was very close to that of the Congress, or at least there was no ideological conflict. In many states, the Swatantra tended to cooperate with local parties or Congress dissident groups in order to displace the Congress.

The Jana Congress was originally a Congress splinter group without having a clear-cut ideology, or rather its ideology was close or similar to the ideology of the Congress. The party broke away from the Congress because of a personal clash over political leadership rather than for ideological reasons. Because of their origins, Congress defectors tended to be highly critical of the Congress government's policies and leadership.²

Both Swatantra and Jana Congress were interested in displacing the Congress at the Center and in the states. So both the parties tended to avoid any clash in the government. They quite ignored or compromised important issues like land revenue, procurement, or language. Owing to the same attitudes toward the Congress, the identical views to the day-to-day politics, the two parties cooperated closely in the coalition. During its tenure, the government worked smoothly; no strains or stresses could be seen in the coalition. Therefore, the two-party government was able to last until the 1971 elections which were held simultaneously for the state legislature and the Lok Sabha. It was also the single government with the longest tenure of 1350 days in office.

-- E.M.S. Namboodiripad's government.

The second most durable government in the states under

review was the leftist-dominated government headed by E.M.S. Namboodiripad, a CPM leader. The government was a coalition of CPM, CPI, Revolutionary Socialist Party, Indian Socialist Party (a splinter group from the SSP), Kerala Socialist Party, Karshaka Thozilal Party (Workers' Party) and the Muslim League.

Basically, the two communist parties had no sharp difference on questions of day-to-day politics except in foreign policy and some aspects relating to political tactics rather than long-range goals. In their 1967 election manifestoes, both the communist parties stood for a drastic agrarian reform, abolition of landlordism by the imposition of effective ceilings on land-holdings and distribution of surplus land between agricultural laborers and poor peasants free of cost.³

Socialist parties -- RSP, ISP, KSP, and KTP, were local parties. Their ideologies were close to those of communist parties, or leaned Left. On the eve of the fourth general elections, these socialist parties entered the alliance with two communist parties. In most matters, the positions of the socialist parties converged with those of the communist parties.

The Muslim League which the CPM particularly insisted on bringing into the United Front was its staunch ally. It was represented by two ministers in the Cabinet, one of whom held Education, an important portfolio. In the government, it normally played a balancing role between the CPM and the CPI.

However, with the passage of time, a number of daily issues such as food shortage, and allotment of governmental land to the landless and agricultural workers divided constituent parties of the ruling coalition. For instance, the CPM Revenue Minister

was accused by the CPI of abusing the governmental machinery to advance the parties cause, and to serve the personal interest. In addition, splits among constituent parties went deeper when the CPI and its allies demanded inquiries into charges of corruption against B. Wellington, a K.T.P. Health Minister. The corruption issue promptly provoked seven ministers of the Cabinet to tender their resignations to the Chief Minister. Six of them were from the major U.F. parties -- the CPI, ISP, RSP, and Muslim League. This marked the end of the coalition government in Kerala. However, it set a record by completing 909 days in office, the longest tenure of Kerala's 10 ministries.

As mentioned in previous chapters, these two governments (coalition governments) were exceptional ones because both of them were ideologically homogeneous and free from defections. They could survive for relatively long period of time. From this analysis, we can generalize that:

-- Ideological coherence and party coherence are important factors for the stability of coalition government regardless of number of parties in the government and in the legislative assembly.

-- Any coalitions of all Right parties or of all Leftist parties are the best forms of coalition for maintaining stability.

In sum, in this chapter, we have found that there was the relationship between ideological cleavages and governmental instability, which served to explain some of the exceptions to our previous analysis of the impact of fractionalization.

CHAPTER V

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY
AND PARTY LOYALTY

In the previous chapter, we found that ideological cleavages were related to instability, but they did not fully explain instability in all states, particularly in non-coalition states. In this chapter, we seek to examine whether party loyalty is related to the fall of state governments. To do so, we have collected the figures of defectors who transferred from their original party to others in legislative assemblies, and then have attempted to determine whether or not party loyalty was related to governmental stability. Our concern here is the party loyalty in the legislative assembly generally. Therefore, all 31 state governments are considered.

Party loyalty was defined as the allegiance party members extended to their parties. The degree of party loyalty is determined negatively by the figures of party members who dissociated from their initial parties to other parties, groups or leaders. Since governments must rely on the legislative support for survival, the process of defection made the base of support become fluid, uncertain and temporary. Because party members frequently changed their parties, the party-wide position in the legislative assembly therefore changed. In addition, in every legislative assembly, the balance of seats between the ruling coalition and the opposition was so close that a shift of allegiance by a few party members could bring the government down, because this process changed the party's

legislative majority into a minority.

After the 1967 elections, the traffic of defections not only occurred in the ranks of the Congress but also in non-Congress parties. As shown in Table V-1, the party defections took place in almost any period of time in legislative assemblies when Congress and non-Congress governments were in office. The shifts in party loyalty resulted in governments losing command of majority support or failing to pass non-confidence votes moved by opposition parties in legislative assemblies. Many defectors changed their party more than one time. The Congress Party lost more members than others. It was more prone to defections than leftist parties and rightist parties. In fact, as shown in Table V-2, during the period of 1967-1972, 199 Congress members indulged in the process of defections, while the SSP lost 36 members, Jana Sangh 16 and Swatantra 9. Communist parties, conversely, maintained a relative stability of party affiliation. Both CPI and CPM did not lose any members during the above period owing to their better organization and ideological grip on members. In the Kerala legislative assembly, no case of defection was found because the assembly was dominated by Communist parties.

In the eight states under review, defectors were normally rewarded with Chief Ministerships and Ministerships. Some deserters who became Chief Ministers formed minority governments with the support of the Congress Party. In order to secure party defectors or to prevent the fall of his government, the defector-Chief Minister tended to expand the size of his ministry, and to make defectors Ministers. Accordingly, large ministries

TABLE V-1

Governmental Stability and Party Defection

| Ministry | Stability | Defection by MLAs |
|-----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| <u>Bihar:</u> | | |
| 1. M.P. Sinha | 355 | 25 |
| 2. B.P. Mandal | 47 | 23 |
| 3. B.P. Shastri | 95 | 55 |
| 4. Harihar Singh | 115 | 5 |
| 5. B.P. Shastri | 12 | 9 |
| 6. Daroja Prasad Raj | 390 | 7 |
| 7. B.P. Shastri | 275 | 0 |
| Mean: | 184 | 18 |
| <u>Uttar Pradesh:</u> | | |
| 8. C.B. Gupta (Cong) | 18 | 17 |
| 9. Charan Singh | 312 | 5 |
| 10. C.B. Gupta (Cong) | 344 | 62 |
| 11. Charan Singh | 225 | 35 |
| 12. T.N. Singh | 103 | 30 |
| 13. K. Tripathi | 336 | 0 |
| Mean: | 223 | 14.5 |
| <u>Punjab:</u> | | |
| 14. Gurnam Singh | 254 | 17 |
| 15. L.S. Gill | 266 | 7 |
| 16. Gurnam Singh | 398 | 16 |
| 17. Prakash S. Badal | 437 | 0 |
| Mean: | 339 | 10 |
| <u>West Bengal:</u> | | |
| 18. A.K. Mukherjee | 261 | 17 |
| 19. C.P. Ghosh | 92 | 18 |
| 20. A.K. Mukherjee | 321 | 0 |
| 21. A.K. Mukherjee | 86 | 0 |
| Mean: | 190 | 17.5 |
| <u>Madhya Pradesh:</u> | | |
| 22. D.P. Mishra (Cong) | 140 | 36 |
| 23. G.N. Singh | 552 | 27 |
| 24. Shyama Charan Sukla (C) | 998 | 0 |
| Mean: | 556 | 31.5 |
| <u>Haryana:</u> | | |
| 25. Bhagwat D. Sharma (C) | 12 | 12 |
| 26. Rao Birendra Singh | 597 | 44 |
| 27. Shri Bansilal (C) | 967 | 0 |
| Mean: | 525 | 28 |

TABLE V-1 Continued

| Ministry | Stability | Defection by MLAs |
|--------------------------|------------|-------------------|
| <u>Orissa:</u> | | |
| 28. R.N. Singh Deo | 1350 | 0 |
| 29. Biswanath Das | 267 | 0 |
| Mean: | <u>808</u> | <u>0</u> |
| <u>Kerala:</u> | | |
| 30. E.M.S. Namboodiripad | 909 | 0 |
| 31. Achuta Menon | 750 | 0 |
| Mean: | <u>829</u> | <u>0</u> |

TABLE V-2

Party-wide Defections in State
Legislative Assemblies

| A. All-India Parties | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------|------------|------------|-------------------|------------|------------|-----------------|
| <u>Congress</u> | <u>Swatantra</u> | <u>SSP</u> | <u>PSP</u> | <u>Jana Sangh</u> | <u>CPI</u> | <u>CPM</u> | <u>Indepen.</u> |
| 199 | 9 | 36 | 1 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 29 |

| B. Local Parties and Splinter Groups | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|------------|------------|------------------|------------|-------------------|
| <u>Sant Akali</u> | <u>Bangla Cong.</u> | <u>JKD</u> | <u>BKD</u> | <u>Jharkhand</u> | <u>RSP</u> | <u>Republican</u> |
| 7 | 17 | 24 | 21 | 14 | 2 | 2 |

Sources: Kashyap, S.C., The Politics of Defection, ICPS, New Delhi, 1969; Singhyi, L.M., Union-State Relations in India, ICPS, New Delhi, 1969; and compiled from newspapers.

were more liable to instability than small ministries.¹

In some states the legislators, after they left their parties, formed their own legislative groups with a view of toppling existing governments. In doing so, they hoped to be invited to form a new ministry in case of the ruling ministry losing the majority support, or to be offered ministerships in the coming government. For instances, in Bihar state, B.P. Mandal and his group of defectors formed a defectors' ministry with the support of the Congress. In Uttar Pradesh, Charan Singh and his supporters were invited to install a ministry of defectors. In Punjab, Lachhman Singh Gill, a dissident Akali member who dissociated from the Jana Sangh-Akali coalition, was

selected to form a ministry of defectors in the state. In West Bengal, C.B. Ghosh was not hesitant to give up his ministerial-post in order to be invited to head a new ministry with the support of the Congress. In Madhya Pradesh and Haryana, G.N. Singh and Rao Birendra Singh dissociated from the Congress, and a few days later they were invited by the Governor to establish new ministries in which they were Chief Ministers (see Table V-3).

TABLE V-3

Defector-formed Ministries in Indian States
1967-1972

| Chief Minister | Original Party | New Party or Legislative Group |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2. B.P. Mandal | SSP | Soshit Dal |
| 3. B.P. Shastri | Congress | LTC Dal |
| 4. Harihar Singh | Congress | - |
| 9. Charan Singh | Congress | Jana Congress |
| 15. Lachhman Singh Gill | Akali (Sant) | Janta Party |
| 19. C.P. Ghosh | Bangla Congress | P.D.F. |
| 23. G.N. Singh | Congress | Lok Sevak Dal |
| 26. Rao Birendra Singh | Congress | Vishal Haryana Party |

Sources: Kashyap, S.C., The Politics of Defection, ICPS, New Delhi, 1969; Singhvi, L.M., Union-State Relations in India, ICPS, New Delhi, 1969.

In short, lack of party attachments and consistencies shortened the tenure of the state governments. As S.C. Kashyap has observed,

the political defection phenomenon, thus, was responsible for the collapse of seventeen governments in a period of almost as many months. Significantly, each of these cases was the direct result of defections by legislators, most of whom hoped to gain

ministerial office or other personal benefit and were prepared to assist in the toppling of governments and the formations of others in their place to attain their objective.²


As presented in Table V-1, most governments suffered from defections. The defections brought about the fall of both Congress and non-Congress governments. But large defections tended to occur when Congress governments were in office. The reasons were that the Congress power in the states under review had declined and transferred to opposition parties; the Congress underwent a bitter split at the Center between the Ministerial wing and Organizational wing which in turn brought about fractionalism among the Congress legislators in state assemblies.

However, defection does not help much to explain the variation in governmental stability, because some governments had relatively long tenures in spite of large defections. For instance, the M.P. Sinha government which suffered heavily from defections (government 25) had a duration of 355 days in office; the G.N. Singh government was in office for 552 days in spite of the defection of 27 MLAs; the Congress government headed by C.B. Gupta (government 10) had a duration of 344 days, though it suffered heavily from party defections of 62 Congress legislators; and most notably the government of Rao Birendra Singh (government 26) had a long tenure in office in spite of large defections. Conversely, some governments suffered from a few defections but they were short-lived; for instance, the government of B.P. Shastri (5) was in office for 12 days though there were very few defections in the Bihar Assembly.

From another perspective, the relationship between defection and fractionalization in the legislative assembly was statistically too weak. As shown in Table V-4, the relationship was weak and not significant at .05 level. Thus, partisan defection was not related to the number of political parties or groups in the legislative assembly (fractionalization).

Finally, in many occasions, the partisan defections occurred only when sharp splits took place in the ranks of political parties and groups. The fall of many governments were attributed to defections which were, in fact, really due to internal factionalism. For instance, the Congress government headed by C.B. Gupta (government 10) fell due to the defection of 62 Congress legislators led by K. Tripathi, which was due to a split in the ranks of the Congress between the organizational wing and ministerial wing in the Center, and which in turn, brought about factionalism at the state level. The Praja Socialist Party was also split between a faction led by Basawan Singh and a faction led by Suraj Narayan Singh. The split brought about the fall of the Sinha government in Bihar. In other words, the partisan defections or partisan loyalty could be treated as an intervening variable between factionalism and instability.

Figure 2. Defection as an Intervening Variable



In summary, the partisan loyalty was related to the stability of government. Partisan defections were responsible

TABLE V-4

The Relationship Between Fractionalization
and Party Defection in State Legislative Assembly

| State Government | Defection Scores | Fp Scores | D rank | Fp rank | d ² |
|--------------------|------------------|-----------|--------|---------|--------------------------|
| 10. C.P. Gupta | 62 | 0.682 | 1 | 26 | 625 |
| 3. B.P. Shastri | 55 | 0.880 | 2 | 1.5 | 0.25 |
| 26. Rao B. Singh | 44 | 0.613 | 3 | 27 | 576 |
| 22. D.P. Mishra | 36 | 0.606 | 4 | 28.5 | 552.25 |
| 11. Charan Singh | 35 | 0.804 | 5 | 10 | 25 |
| 12. T.N. Singh | 30 | 0.808 | 6 | 8 | 4 |
| 23. G.N. Singh | 27 | 0.724 | 7 | 21 | 196 |
| 1. M.P. Sinha | 25 | 0.880 | 8 | 1.5 | 42.25 |
| 2. B.P. Mandal | 23 | 0.850 | 9 | 4.5 | 20.25 |
| 19. C.P. Ghosh | 18 | 0.740 | 10 | 18 | 64 |
| 8. C.B. Gupta | 17 | 0.713 | 12 | 22 | 100 |
| 14. Gurnam Singh | 17 | 0.736 | 12 | 19 | 49 |
| 18. A.K. Mukherjee | 17 | 0.741 | 12 | 17 | 25 |
| 16. Gurnam Singh | 16 | 0.692 | 14 | 24.5 | 100.25 |
| 25. B.D. Sharma | 12 | 0.590 | 15 | 30 | 225 |
| 5. B.P. Shastri | 9 | 0.793 | 16 | 12 | 16 |
| 6. D.P. Raj | 7 | 0.793 | 17.5 | 12 | 30.25 |
| 15. L.S. Gill | 7 | 0.749 | 17.5 | 15.5 | 4 |
| 4. Harihar Singh | 5 | 0.806 | 19.5 | 9 | 110.25 |
| 9. Charan Singh | 5 | 0.850 | 19.5 | 45 | 225 |
| 7. B.P. Shastri | 0 | 0.815 | 25.5 | 7 | 342.25 |
| 13. K. Tripathi | 0 | 0.692 | 25.5 | 24.5 | 1 |
| 17. P.S. Badal | 0 | 0.735 | 25.5 | 20 | 30.25 |
| 20. A.K. Mukherjee | 0 | 0.842 | 25.5 | 6 | 380.25 |
| 21. A.K. Mukherjee | 0 | 0.855 | 25.5 | 3 | 506.25 |
| 24. S.C. Shukla | 0 | 0.582 | 25.5 | 31 | 30.25 |
| 27. Bansi Lal | 0 | 0.606 | 25.5 | 28.5 | 9 |
| 28. R.N. Singh Deo | 0 | 0.788 | 25.5 | 15.5 | 100 |
| 29. Biswanath Das | 0 | 0.793 | 25.5 | 12 | 182.25 |
| 30. E.M.S. | | | | | |
| Namboodiripad | 0 | 0.789 | 25.5 | 14 | 132.25 |
| 31. Achuta Menon | 0 | 0.693 | 25.5 | 23 | 6.25 |
| | | | | | d ² = 4709.75 |

N = 31

$$R_o = 1 - \frac{6 \times 4709.75}{31(961-1)} = + 0.06; \quad p .05$$

for the collapse of many governments. Both Congress and non-Congress governments suffered from the disease of defection. However, the phenomenon of defection could be treated as an independent variable with respect to stability of government, and as a dependent variable being affected by internal factionalism among political parties and groups. The partisan loyalty, like ideological cleavages, did not help much by itself to explain the variation in governmental stability because the direction of the relationship between the two variables was not clear enough to come to a conclusion that the higher degree of party loyalty there was in legislative parties, the more the governments were stable.

To illustrate the fall of state governments caused by the disease of defection, some typical governments are singled out for analysis as follow:

Bihar

Shortly after its formation, the Sinha ministry suffered from party defections. This process began when the inner-party clashes occurred in the ranks of the SSP. The group of 25 disgruntled legislators led by B.P. Mandal crossed the floor to join the opposition party. The defectors consisted of 18 from the SSP, 3 from Jana Kranti Dal, 2 from Jana Sangh, 2 from PSP and Independents.³ B.P. Mandal had been an SSP member, but he was not a member of the legislature. Dissatisfied with the U.F. leadership, he and a group of his followers dissociated from the U.F. in order to form a new group called Soshit Dal (The Exploited People's Party) with the support of the Congress.

To counter balance, M.P. Sinha got a few defectors from the Congress and made them Ministers. However, the traffic of defection from the U.F. to the opposite camp was more massive than that from the opposite camp to the U.F. As a result, those opposing the U.F. rose to 162 in the legislature of 318 members. The weaknesses and uncertainty of the government were aggravated by internal confrontations inside the U.F. on a number of policy issues. The crisis was deepened when 27 SSP legislators led by Yadav submitted their resignations and dissociated from the SSP.⁴ Massive resignations along with large-scale defections kept the Sinha government from overcoming a no-confidence motion raised by opposition to the U.F. in the state assembly. Consequently, the U.F. ministry was voted out on a no-confidence motion by 163 votes to 150.

The fall of the Sinha ministry created a favorable opportunity for the Congress to extend its support to Shri B.P. Mandal in forming an alternative ministry. First of all, Mandal was authorized by his party to nominate someone who could become temporary Chief Minister, who in turn would get Mandal nominated into the legislature.⁵ Mandal promptly selected Satish Prasad Singh, a member of his party as "stop gap" Chief Minister without ministry formation.

The alliance with the Congress put the Dal in majority in the legislature. A month later, Mandal was invited to form the Congress-backed Soshit Dal ministry in Bihar. For the first time, the state had a minority government headed by a party defector with the declared support of the Congress. It was the

largest ministry that Bihar ever had: 19 Cabinet Ministers, 14 Ministers of State, and 3 Deputy Ministers.

Shortly after its installation, the new government met with difficulty when the Congress decided to withdraw its support for the Mandal ministry. The Congress-Soshit Dal alliance disintegrated when the state assembly opened for the budget session. Sudhansu, a speaker, and other Congress legislators declared the withdrawal of their support from the Mandal ministry on grounds of "morality and political propriety."⁶ They formed a new legislative group called the Loktantrik Congress Dal under the leadership of Sudhansu. As a result of party defections, the Mandal ministry collapsed on March 8, 1968 after a no-confidence motion was raised in the legislature.

In short, both ministries--the Sinha and the Mandal--suffered heavily from the lack of party loyalty. The Sinha ministry fell due to the party defections from the rank of United Front parties. The Mandal ministry collapsed due to the denial of Congress support, and to dissociation of disgruntled Congressmen.

Uttar Pradesh

In this state, two ministries deserve our detailed attention: the C.B. Gupta ministry and the Charan Singh ministry.

As a result of elections, the Congress government headed by C.B. Gupta was installed in office on March 14, 1967. Immediately after its installation, Shri Charan Singh, a well-known leader in Uttar Pradesh, crossed the floor to the United Front camp. His floor-crossing was followed up by massive defections

of 17 disgruntled Congress legislators. Charan Singh and his followers promptly formed a new party under the name of Jana Congress (People's Congress). The new party identified itself with a unit of the United Front. Charan Singh's defection from the Congress was related to a disagreement over the composition of the Gupta ministry.⁷ Because of marginal balance of strength between the Congress and the United Front, massive defections from the Congress to the United Front rendered immediately the former to the minority position in the state assembly, and the latter became the majority camp. Consequently, Gupta had to tender the resignation of his Cabinet to the Governor on April 2, 1967. This marked the end of a long-time domination by the Congress in Uttar Pradesh.

Charan Singh, after his dissociation from the Congress Party, was promptly elected as a leader of the United Front. He was thereafter invited by the Governor to establish the non-Congress coalition government in the state. This marked the first time in Uttar Pradesh that a party defector from the Congress was nominated as Chief Minister. The Charan Singh ministry was also over-represented by defectors. Out of 28 Ministers and Deputy Ministers, 7 were defectors.

The ruling Front consisted of the Jana Sangh, SSP, Republicans, CPI, CPM, Swatantra and Independents. The United Front, however, did not have a clear majority; therefore it had to depend not only on party defections but also shifting allegiances of 37 Independents in the state assembly.

The epidemic of defection started when 3 Congress members who had previously joined the Jana Congress returned to the

Congress Party. The U.F. government was weakened further by the defections of 5 legislators from the United Front. They formed their own legislative group called Pragastisheel Vidhayak Dal (Progressive Legislators Party) after deserting from their parties. Resignations and defections reduced the strength of the government to 141 in the 423-member state assembly, thus changing it from a majority position to a minority one. This change of power structure brought about the fall of the Charan Singh ministry on February 17, 1968.

In short, both the first two governments in Uttar Pradesh banked on defections from the ranks of each other or from among the floating Independents for its survival. For mutual convenience, Independents and defectors tended to form their small parties or legislative groups. These parties or groups were normally used as bargaining chips for portfolios with potential alliance partners among bigger parties. In other words, the looseness in the party system caused by the existence of large numbers of independents and the relative absence of strong party affiliation helped to bring about government instability.

Punjab

The relative absence of party affiliation stability was also visible in Punjab state where party members were ready to change their sides for personal ambitions rather than political conviction. Two governments--Gurnam Singh and Lachhman Singh Gill--might be used to illustrate this point.

The Gurnam Singh ministry came out after the heavy defeat of the Congress Party at the polls, but this government could

not prevent party defections and the looseness of party identifications. The source of governmental uncertainty was rooted in the close balance between the ruling Front and the Congress Party. The initial balance was so close that even independents had to be rewarded with governmental posts to win their support. Accordingly, both the ruling Front and the Congress were willing to offer them ministerial posts or governmental positions. Thereby, four out of five independents in the legislative assembly were given ministerial positions in the Gurnam Singh ministry. To gain a heavy majority and to ward off the threat of a defeat, the Gurnam Singh ministry also was obliged to offer ministerial posts to 6 supporters who defected from the Congress.

However, this decision aroused the criticism from the ruling coalition. Giving defectors ministerial posts at the expense of the loyalty of party members who had not been similarly rewarded, created dissensions among the latter. Lachhman Singh Gill who had long been a rival of Gurnam Singh for leadership in the Akali Party, was among these dissenters. Dissatisfied with his own position, and with the fact that his personal supporters had not received offices in the government, Gill along with 16 disgruntled legislators left the ranks of the United Front. The defectors included 5 Sant Akali, 1 Master Akali Party member, 6 Independents and 3 Republicans. Among them, there were 3 defectors who had earlier defected from the Congress to the United Front.⁸

After he dissociated from the ruling Front, L.S. Gill along with his supporters formed a new legislative party called the Janta Party with the support of the Congress which had 47

members in the legislature. Owing to his commanding the majority support, Gill was invited by the Governor to establish a new ministry. For the first time in Punjab, a minority government was installed with the support of the Congress. Thereby, the fate of the government depended completely on the attitude of the Congress Party because any change of the Congress policy or any split within its rank could bring about the fall of the government.

In the Gill ministry, all members were defectors from the United Front. Many of them had dissociated from the Akali Dal earlier. The remainder of them were the Congress defectors.

Four months after its installation, the government faced a new development taking place at the time of Budget session when the Speaker of the legislature adjourned the House for two months to ward off a motion of no-confidence against him backed by the ruling party. The adjournment of the House created a constitutional crisis. Since the House could not pass the Budget, the Governor had to promulgate an ordinance in order to transact final business. His action evoked protests from the leaders of the Opposition Front. They criticized the Governor on the legality of the ordinance, and demanded the adjournment of the House for two months.

Apart from the constitutional crisis, the process of floor-crossings weakened further the Gill ministry when the ministry had to face the defection of 11 legislators from the Janta Party to the Congress, thereby raising the latter's strength to 54 in the 104-member legislative assembly.⁹ These two developments offered the Congress an opportunity to cease its

support for the Gill ministry; consequently, the Gill ministry fell and President's rule was imposed in the state.

West Bengal

In this state, two special cases could be taken as evidence to illustrate our assumption that the political disloyalty was a causal factor of governmental instability. The first case was the massive defection of 17 legislators led by Food Minister P.C. Ghosh, which brought about the collapse of the first U.P. ministry headed by Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee. The second case was the political disengagement of 18 legislators led by Shri Sankardas Banerjee. These massive defections resulted in the fall of the Ghosh ministry.

As a result of elections, the first non-Congress government was installed in office with A.K. Mukherjee (Bangla Congress) as Chief Minister. The governmental coalition consisted of the Bangla Congress, the CPM and the CPI, with several small parties. On November 3, 1967, a severe blow was given to the United Front government when Dr. P.C. Ghosh, a Minister for Food, Supply and Agriculture resigned from the U.F. ministry to form a new group with 17 other defectors, namely, Progressive Democratic Front.

In view of the defections of Dr. P.C. Ghosh and 17 other MLAs and the subsequent formation of the PDF, the Governor of West Bengal expressed his doubts as to whether the U.F. ministry retained the majority in the legislature. He advised the state Chief Minister Ajoy Mukherjee to summon the Assembly into session as early as possible to settle the issue of the strength and stability of the U.F. ministry. The Cabinet made a decision

to convene the State Assembly on December 18, 1967 in order to buy time to secure defections from the ranks of the opposition. But the Governor urged the Chief Minister to convene the Assembly into session no later than November 30, 1967. Because the cabinet refused to go along with his orders, the Governor dismissed the United Front on November 21, 1967. On the same day, Dr. Ghosh, leader of the PDF was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the new ministry.

Though the Ghosh ministry was supported by the Congress from outside, it soon suffered from massive defections taking place in the ranks of the PDF and the Congress. The party defections stemmed from the dissension of Congressmen over the domination of the PDF members in the ministry. They denounced the domination of Shri Atulya Ghosh in the internal affairs of the Congress Party. Consequently, a group of 18 MLAs belonging to the PDF and Congress defected from the PDF-Congress coalition to form a new group called the Indian National Democratic Front.¹⁰ The INDF was led by Shri Sankardas Banerjee, former Finance Minister, as its leader, and Shri Ashu Ghosh as the deputy leader.

All these developments motivated the Governor to submit a report to the President that the state could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, for the first time since Independence, the President's rule was imposed in West Bengal on February 20, 1968.

Haryana

In this state, the Rao Birendra Singh ministry could be

singled out for analysis because it was a single coalition ministry formed in the state, and it was a minority government formed by Congress defectors and Independents. The Birendra Singh ministry was established on March 24, 1967 after the breakdown of the 12-day Congress ministry. The ministry enjoyed the support of the Front consisting of 44 legislators against the opposition strength of 37 in the 81-member legislature. Seven months later, the process of defections reduced the strength of the United Front from majority to minority. First of all, 4 Jana Sangh members announced their dissociation from the Front to join the Congress Party. These defections were followed by the those of other party members. For instance, 2 Harijan leaders, Shri Gaya Lal and Shri Chand Ram, along with a Jat leader, Shri Randhir Singh, decided to rejoin the Congress Party.

Though several legislators defected from the United Front, the government continued to survive because the Jats and the Ahirs (large caste groups in the state) continued to be staunch supporters of the ministry. Out of 81 members in the legislative assembly, 37 legislators belonging to the Jat and allied castes were elected. The Jat was traditionally anti-Congress, and the non-Jat, pro-Congress. The R.B. Singh ministry was loaded with Jat legislators. Despite the growing economic problems and the serious food situation, the Jat castes stood behind the ministry and opposed the Congress. As a matter of fact, the survival of the Rao ministry mainly relied on the active support of the Jat leader, Devi Lal.

Yet, the Jat leader, Devi Lal, soon rebelled against Rao

Birendra Singh, after a period of independent maneuvering. Devi Lal decided to dissociate from the Haryana Samykt Dal and was determined to break down the Rao ministry.¹¹ To do so, he rejoined the Congress Party along with his six supporters after he dissolved the Haryana Congress. As a consequence, the strength of the United Front was reduced drastically.

To ward off possible defeat and to secure defectors from the opposite camp, Chief Minister Rao Birendra Singh expanded his cabinet and offered ministerships to those who defected from the Congress. But the ministry was dismissed immediately after the Chief Minister expanded his cabinet to prevent its fall.

Madhya Pradesh

In this state, the Congress government headed by Shri D. P. Mishra deserves detailed attention because massive party defections took place in the ranks of the Congress Party which has for a long time dominated the political life in the state. The party defections brought about the immediate breakdown of the first Congress government despite the fact that the initial balance between the Congress and the combined opposition was far from close in terms of seats held in the legislative assembly.

In fact, after three months in office, the Mishra ministry met a great crisis on June 5, 1967, when the Rajmata of Gwalior openly announced that about 60 Congress legislators would soon desert the Congress to join the United Front with a view toward breaking the Mishra government. This threat of defection put the Mishra government into a situation of uncertainty. To ward off his defeat, Mishra succeeded in swelling the party strength

by securing the defection of 8 opposition legislators including 2 Jana Sangh members and 6 Independents after a few days of political maneuvering. However, the fate of his government was still uncertain because 36 disgruntled Congress legislators, led by Shri Brijlal Verma, crossed the floor to opposition parties.¹² The defection of 36 Congress legislators became a great shock to Mishra because the strength of the Congress was reduced to a minority in the legislative assembly. In order to prevent the collapse of his ministry and to stop the traffic of defection from the Congress Party, Mishra immediately advised the Governor to prorogue the legislative assembly by exercising his Constitutional powers. Simultaneously, he advised the Governor to dissolve the Assembly and to hold fresh elections.¹³ But unfortunately for his plans, Mishra was defeated in the Assembly during a crucial vote on demands from the Education ministry. The Congress got only 137 votes in favor of passing the demand while the opposition secured 153 votes against it. Therefore, the chances of his getting the Congress High Command's approval asking for mid-term elections were uncertain. Conversely, in the opposition camp, the Rajmata called on the Governor to demand that the United Front be given an opportunity to form a government. At the end, the Congress Party recommended Mishra to resign in order to put an end to this crisis. Accordingly, Mishra reluctantly tendered the resignation of his cabinet to end the Congress's rule on July 30, 1967.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1) Findings

In this thesis, we have been occupied with governmental instability in eight Indian states where multiple coalition and non-coalition governments were formed during the period of 1967-1972. Our attempt was to identify a number of determinants which brought about the fall of many governments in the states under review. We have singled out three independent variables to test empirically the relationships between these three variables and governmental instability. Such variables were fractionalization of the party system in coalition governments and in legislative assemblies, ideological cleavages, and partisan defections. Our findings are summarized as follows:

-- There was a poor relationship between the legislative fractionalization and the instability of government for an analysis of 31 governments. But this correlation became fairly strong for an analysis of 27 governments. For this smaller sample, it could contribute to the explanation of 50% of variation in governmental stability. •

-- There was a moderate relationship between the fractionalization of the party system in governments and the instability of the government. It contributed about 25% of variation in governmental stability.

-- Therefore our hypotheses (1a) and (1b) were well confirmed.

-- There was a moderate relationship between ideological cleavages and governmental instability. However, it was not as powerful a explanation of instability as the two types of fractionalization.

-- There was a relationship between the party loyalty and the stability of government. However, the party defections increased the degree of fractionalization. Partisan defections were also related to the internal factionalism of the political parties and groups, because most typical cases of defections occurred only when the sharp split took place in the ranks of the political parties and groups. Thus, the partisan defection was treated as an intervening variable.

We have also found that:

-- Congress governments were slightly more stable than non-Congress governments. These differences were not statistically significant at the 5% level of probability.

-- Coalition governments were more stable than non-coalition ones. However, these differences were also not statistically significant at the 5% level of probability.

From our findings, we can generalize a number of propositions as follow:

a) -- In coalition government, the ideological coherence and/or party coherence might help to restore the stability of the government, regardless of the number of parties participating in government.

b) -- Conversely, the fractionalization of the party system in both coalition government and legislative assembly will be a more potent cause of instability of coalition governments than

ideological cleavages or party defections (factionalism).

c) -- In one-party government (Congress government), party defections deriving from intra-party factionalism are a major cause of instability.

Theoretical application.

Samuel P. Huntington has asserted that,

....The rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability and disorder. The primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.¹

On the other hand, he has defined institutionalization as coherence and unity in political organization:

The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is, the greater the disunity of the organization, the less it is institutionalized....²

Therefore, the political developments in the states under review were very pertinent to the Huntington concept. The decline of the Congress gave rise to numerous small parties and legislative groupings which, in turn, brought about an expansion of political participation. Being political parties and groupings, they participated in electoral and governmental processes. But "the participation explosion" lagged behind the level of institutionalization because many new parties and legislative groups did not have formal organizations and social bases which are essences of political parties. They were also less organized and incoherent. In fact, eight states under review witnessed

the emergence of many legislative groupings such as Soshit Dal, LTC Dal, Jana Congress, Lok Sevak Sangh, Vishal Haryana Party, and the Progressive Democratic Front. They were considered to be splinter groups rather than political parties though they participated in electoral and governmental processes.

Since stability depends on the relationship between political institutionalization and political participation, the rapid expansion of political participation by such parties helped to bring about the instability in the states.

Generally speaking, our research has supported Huntington's overall assumption which stated that instability is at least partially a function of structural characteristics of the political system.

2) Suggestions for further research

As pointed out in previous chapters, inter-party ideological cleavages and party defections did not produce considerable explanations of governmental instability. However, the fractionalization of the party system in both government and legislative assembly gave us powerful explanations of instability, but some of the fractionalization was also a product of intra-party factionalism. Therefore, the future research should be concentrated on the relationship between intra-party factionalism and instability. In addition, the relationship between the governmental instability and the governmental performance might be empirically tested. Finally, future research could also be conducted on the coalition formation or coalition behavior in 21 governments used in this research. To do so, we might hopefully

explore additional propositions regarding the relationships between coalition behavior and governmental instability.

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GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY IN THE
INDIAN STATES 1967-1972

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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The purpose of this thesis is to explain empirically the situation of governmental instability in selected Indian states during the period 1967-1972. To do so, the problem is formulated into a number of hypotheses for empirically testing. The first hypothesis is concerned with the numerical aspect of the party system in both government and legislative assembly. It is stated that the degree of fractionalization of the governmental party system and of the legislative party system is negatively correlated to the stability of the government. The degree of fractionalization is determined by the number of parties and their relative seat shares. The degree of governmental stability is defined by the duration of the government in days. The hypothesis is supported first by review of political developments in eight Indian states: Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, West Bengal, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, and Kerala during the period 1967-1972; secondly, the hypothesis is empirically tested by use of Rae's formula to measure the fractionalization of the party system in both coalition governments and state legislative assemblies, and by use of Pearson product-moment correlation. The negative correlation between the legislative fractionalization and governmental instability is not confirmed in analysis of all 31 coalition governments but well confirmed for 27 coalition governments when 4 deviant cases are excluded. Generally, the fractionalization explains much of the variation in governmental stability. The negative correlation between the governmental fractionalization and government instability is also

supported by an analysis of 21 coalition governments.

The second hypothesis is concerned with the ideological aspect of the party system in coalition governments. It is stated that the greater degree of ideological homogeneity there is in a coalition government, the more likely such coalition government is stable. The degree of ideological homogeneity is determined by party's inherent ideology and party's position on a number of important issues which came up when the coalition government is in office. The correlation is confirmed by an analysis of variance for 21 coalition governments.

The third hypothesis is concerned with the cohesive aspect of the legislative party system. The hypothesis is stated that the greater degree of party loyalty there is in legislative parties, the more likely the government is stable. The degree of party loyalty is measured by the number of legislators who defected from their parties to others. The analysis of average life and stability is made for 31 governments. The expected relationship is not clear.

Though the last two aspects--ideological and cohesive--do not provide as much meaningful explanations of instability as fractionalization, they are added to fractionalization in order to give more potential explanations of instability.

Finally, the relationships among independent variables are also tested. There is no apparent relationship between the fractionalization and the ideological cleavages. There is very weak relationship between the fractionalization and partisan defections.