

THE BRAZILIAN REVOLUTION, 1964-1971:
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

by

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INTRODUCTION

There has been a great deal of literature published in recent years regarding armed forces intervention in governments and countries ruled by military regimes. Most of these countries have been referred to as "underdeveloped" or "emerging." Since 1930, the incidence of military coups d'état and revolutions have been numerous throughout the world. The Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have probably experienced more military involvement in government activities than most other regions of the world. Historically, Brazil has not been immuned from the phenomenon of the military engaging in the politics of governing the country. After Brazil experienced a relatively brief period (1945-1964) of democracy, the military assumed control of the government in 1964, ostensibly to save the country from economic and political chaos. Prior to 1964, after a coup, the Brazilian military always rapidly returned the reins of national leadership to civilian politicians. The aftermath of the coup of 1964 marked a departure from that procedure. Military rule has remained until the present (1971) in Brazil.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the role of the revolutionary government, from 1964 to 1971, in the areas of political, economic, and social affairs to determine any indications of the trend of national politics in Brazil. A brief historical review of military intervention in Latin

America and Brazil is provided in the opening chapters to establish a background for the analysis in the remainder of the thesis.

CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

In order to view the current Brazilian military-based government in the proper perspective, it is meaningful to consider the background of Latin American military involvement in politics. The Brazilian experience is similar in many respects to that of former Spanish colonies. On the other hand, Brazil has had a distinctly unique relationship with its armed forces that has served to positively influence the country's modern military leaders.

Pre-Independence Period

Soldiers have always been prominent in the development and politics of Latin America. For three centuries prior to 1800, Spain ruled Spanish America mainly through force and violence perpetrated in large part by the military. To establish themselves in the New World, one noted author suggested that the conquerors were neither men of peace nor entrepreneurs, but warriors on horseback who fought with atavistic fervor. Their conquests were by force, slaughter, and terror--victories of the strong and bold over the weak and timid. The conquerors gave little thought to their roles as colonizers until the Conquest was completed.¹

During the majority of Spanish and Portugese rule,

colonies in Latin America were governed under a viceregal system. In political control of each colony was a viceroy, who was the personal representative in America of the Crown of the mother country. He lived in a palace in the capital city, maintained a court and all forms of royal pomp and prestige, appointed all officials with the king's authority, and supervised the economic, religious, intellectual, and social affairs of the colony. The viceroy was the supreme judge who made and enforced the laws. Areas governed by a viceroy were called viceroyalties. Boundaries of the viceroyalty were fixed by the Crown.

1825-1850

After the Wars of Independence (1810-26), most of the Spanish colonies broke away from Spain. The colonial system had been content only to extract wealth from the colonies, and failed to create a reserve of qualified leadership. The criollos (pure blooded whites born in the colonies), who were to assume the primary role in forming the new states, had enjoyed few opportunities to learn how to govern. As is so often the case after colonization, e.g., Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Venezuela, and all of Central America, the military was the most prominent and available element to provide leadership. Following independence there was no place, except in politics, for the military officers to satisfy their desire for power and wealth. Since political resources were extremely scarce, commanders formerly allied in battle now engaged in vicious battles with each other in the struggle to seize and secure dominion over governments. Because of this situation,

many military men were the actual rulers during the fight for independence when representative assemblies convened to draft liberal constitutions.

During the period 1825-1850, turmoil, dissent, and disruption continued to repress stable government. Civil wars were prevalent, and political power often went to local caudillos ("men on horseback") who were either civilian or military. At this time the military profession was far from becoming a monopoly in most republics. So it was in many cases the civilian that filled the void and assumed the role of military leader. Caudillos were of all varieties, each having his own style of achieving control in his area. Invariably they became all-powerful and arbitrary in ruling their territory. John J. Johnson says:

The caudillos felt obliged to invoke constitutional rights, but this did not keep them from ruling with a minimum of political action and a maximum of administration. They almost invariably discussed issues in personal terms. Their governments were essentially paternalistic, as was society in general; they gave whatever there was to give--roads, tax exemptions, personal favors--to communities or individuals in exchange for loyalties to the government.²

The conditions that encouraged the rise of caudillos and the accompanying pockets of provincial loyalties rendered many governments incapable at any given time of commanding the allegiance or respect of more than a very small sector of their total populations. During this period, governments had very little legitimacy among the people; in fact, the United States government, according to historian Walter Webb, came to be looked upon as a great benefactor by the populace.³ What little aid the Brazilian people received seemed to come from the United

States and not their own government. In Spanish America the only time the government was seen as a benefactor was when a new confiscation of church holdings made land and buildings available, and then they went mostly to the friends of the incumbent leaders of the regime.⁴ Creating effective government in many republics was practically impossible, and any semblance of national control was lacking. Constitutions and laws were set aside, and despotism, tempered by coup d'état, revolution, and assassination, became the prevailing form of government in most of the new nations.

The republics were unable to prevent coercion by violence from becoming the ultimate form of power. In addition to the armed forces, civilian politicians, landholders, and practically anyone else resorted to violence at one time or another to countermand laws or convert them to special advantage.

The full, devastating force of militarism and violence had made its mark on Spanish America by the middle of the nineteenth century. Political regimes changed, but politics were still firmly rooted in personal relationships, and public office remained a principal means of social advancement. A few of the republics--notably Argentina, Chile, and Mexico--foresaw a new order, and somehow found the resources to launch sustained efforts at reform, which by World War I had torn them loose from many of their links to the past and had set them on the road toward becoming modern, responsible nations. Within both Chile and Argentina, economic, social, and political developments changed the character of violence and of the

armed forces as well as the public's attitude toward them. After 1850, progress through economic development and modernization received primary emphasis in most of Spanish America.

1850-1914

While emphasis may have been on economic development and technical progress, the military establishments of Latin America were striving to improve themselves. Serious military professionalization is generally dated from the arrival of the German captain (later general) Emil Koerner in Chile in 1886. Prior to his appearance, several countries had made efforts toward modernizing the military by establishing military academies and superior war colleges, but only in Chile and in Argentina were academies graduating reasonably well-trained, disciplined officers. Elsewhere the military schools were poorly supported and inadequately staffed, and their graduates bore little resemblance to true professionals. Military science was not conceived as a unique or specialized branch of knowledge. Consequently, the usual pattern outside Argentina and Chile was for officers to be leaders with few military skills that would distinguish them from their common soldiers. Koerner's success in improving the Chilean system by instituting the Prussian system and providing the latest German armament and equipment moved other Spanish American republics to improve their armies by employing foreign military missions.

It was determined by Chile in 1900 and by Argentina in 1901 that there were insufficient volunteers to maintain regular standing armies. The alternative chosen was to institute compulsory military service. Such a move marked a sig-

nificant shift from amateurism to military professionalism. Universal military service appealed to the nationalist who saw it as a means to prevent the rise of a professional soldiery and also as a means of making conscripts aware of the existence of the nation. Mandatory military service provided the government an opportunity to give young men from all walks of life a more sheltered and gradual introduction into the modern world in contrast to the experience of the villager who was involved in the process of being urbanized. The army recruit would acquire technical skills of particular value for economic development of a country. Probably most important was the notion that the army usually offers some form of training in citizenship. Finally, the total experience of young men in the army would help more rapidly achieve the goals of nationalism and the process of nation-building. Compulsory military service was general throughout Latin America by World War I, and it has continued since that time. In practice, it was and is applied only to the lower classes. The privileged class took advantage of various escapes from military service, such as providing substitutes to serve for them or enlistment in the reserve corps by those in institutions of higher learning.

Little advantage was gained by the republics from efforts to strengthen themselves militarily through professionalization and modernization, since the armed forces seldom were actually called upon to perform defense functions. Another disadvantage of these national armies was the disproportionate expansion of the officers corps compared to

enlisted strength. For example, in 1901 the Venezuelan Army had 11,365 active and inactive officers, although the regular army consisted of approximately 4,000 men. In 1910 in Ecuador there were 3,500 officers in an army that numbered six thousand.⁵ There were few significant wars for officers to display their talents, nor was there great military tradition to develop pride in the services. Primary use of the armed forces was for suppression of fellow subjects, which brought little prestige or status for the officer participants. Consequently, men in uniform turned to politics despite the fact that even limited military professionalism was encouraging a way of life that tended to divorce officers from the populace and its problems. Officers in politics normally did so in support of the reactionary oligarchies. Although involved in politics, most officers maintained a continuing personal and institutional interest in the armed services. They were concerned with the attitudes of civilian politicians toward security, salaries, pensions, and privileges and with armed forces budgets, armaments, and new barracks. Whether the military acted on its own or under civilian control, too often they were employed as policemen, strikebreakers, and instruments of violence by the government. Such violent acts usually committed in "defense of the state" hardly endeared the armed forces to the general public.

Despite many differences with the ruling class (of which the military is considered part) as well as with working groups, a representative sampling of the literary output and folklore of the period suggests that for every half dozen

anti-military pieces there were just as many pro-military.⁶ Most unfavorable public comment was directed primarily against individual officers rather than against the military as an institution. In Spanish America prior to World War I, the armed forces were considered a part of a scientific vanguard in those societies anxious to become technologically advanced but lacking a scientific intelligentsia. The scientific training offered at the new military academies, although limited, was equal to or better than that provided by other institutions of higher learning of the period. Possibly because of their advanced technical skills, many officers were overwhelmingly on the side of those civilian elements who advocated technological change.⁷ Officers of the Argentine and Chilean armies, for example, were leaders of national groups who supported the development of modern communications and transportation. The railroad systems of Uruguay and Argentina were initiated and advanced by generals who became presidents. Another point in favor of the military was that the era was one of individualism and emergent nationalism, both of which played into the hands of the military. Latin American societies had produced few intellectual, scientific, or industrial celebrities to honor. Therefore, the valiant soldier was extolled as the personification of individualism and the leader in the struggle for nationalism.

1914-1964

During the early part of the twentieth century, influence of military regimes steadily diminished until by 1928 only six Latin American countries containing but fifteen

percent of the total population were under military governments.⁸ This temporary loss of influence could be attributed to the political maturation of governments and to the trend of the privileged groups continued emotional and intellectual commitment to modernization. Immediately after the world depression in 1930, militarism was again on the rise. As an example, in Argentina, after nearly half a century of civilian rule, eight out of ten presidents between 1930 and 1957 were military officers. In 1954 thirteen of the twenty republics were ruled by military presidents.⁹ The military tradition was reinforced in those countries, such as the republics of the Caribbean and Central America, which had not developed a civilian tradition in politics. Perhaps the best reasoning for the new rise in militarism is provided by Edwin Lieuwen:

This re-emergence of the armed forces upon the Latin American political scene was a by-product of the area's developing economic and social crisis, which the political institutions were not strong enough to contain. In the resulting political chaos the armed forces again and again were provoked or called upon to intervene. Their motives for so doing were not always the same. The devoted professionals might intervene in the name of their legitimate duty to preserve internal order, while the latent militarist might be motivated only by political ambition, and still a third group, the idealistic officers who believed it their duty to provide social justice, might compete with the other two.¹⁰

Lieuwen's assessment supports the theory of Dankwart A. Rustow that it is not the strength of the military, but the weakness of the civilian structure that encourages military intervention.¹¹

As militarism became increasingly institutionalized, the unity between the armed forces and civilians was reflected in the junta (legislative and administrative council) government.

The junta was used in its civilian context in the colonial period, but only since the 1920's has it been regularly employed by the military in Spanish America. The military juntas simply are boards or committees that assume power and rule by decree following the removal of a regime. They represent dominant groups within the armed forces and present a unified front against dissident elements within the services. Juntas are considered transitory, and several have terminated their rule in favor of civilians, but usually after establishing terms under which a new government is to be selected. By this procedure the military retains close bonds with those in power. Such intimacy with the political process makes it possible for the military to figure prominently in the governance of Latin America. It might be argued that the military forces itself on the political processes over the objections of the civilian sector. However, two prominent authors recently noted:

...the Latin American military participate in the political process with substantial civilian support, as members of coalitions, arbitrators of disputes, watchdogs of the rules of the game, an extremely powerful corporate interest group, and consumers of the national patrimony. These activities are not carried on, nor could they be in the force of united civilian opposition.¹²

The history of Latin America since the Wars of Independence features an almost continuous succession of chaos, revolutions, dictators, and constitutions. Three distinct stages can be identified. The first period is from 1825 to about mid-nineteenth century during which time the white aristocratic element was in control of most countries, and political power and rule was characterized by caudillos with

their private armies. However, centralization and professional training of the armed forces broke the power of the caudillos without removing the military completely from politics.

Another period can be established from mid-nineteenth century to 1914, when amid continued turmoil individualism and emergent nationalism prevailed, both of which played into the hands of the military. In societies void of intellectual spokesmen, the soldier personified the virtues of individualism. Furthermore, the presence of the soldier gave support and meaning to nationalist trends and movements. Finally, the period from 1914 to the present is looked upon as an era of resurgent militarism and the soldier in politics.

Although the military has been predominant in politics throughout Latin American history, this position has not been totally to the detriment of the countries involved. In fact, on many occasions, the military establishment was the only institution capable of providing badly needed leadership during a crisis of government. One unfortunate aspect of most military interventions in Spanish America has been the associated violence and bloodshed. Another lamentable facet of Latin American military governments is their inability to transfer the reins of leadership to a stable civilian government. Brazil does not have a history of violent military intrusions into government affairs, but it has not solved the problem of establishing a durable, legitimate civilian government.

FOOTNOTES

¹John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 13.

²Ibid., p. 41.

³Ibid., pp. 46-47.

⁴Ibid., p. 47.

⁵Fritz T. Epstein, "European Military Influence in Latin America" (unpublished manuscript, Library of Congress), p. 44.

⁶Johnson, op. cit., p. 81.

⁷Ibid., p. 71.

⁸Edwin Lieuwen, Arms & Politics in Latin America (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 122.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 122-123.

¹¹Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 176.

¹²Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr. eds., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970), p. 401.

CHAPTER II

BRAZILIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

1822-1964

The Wars of Independence lasted sixteen years in Spanish America, after which Spain's American empire broke into fragments. Brazil, on the other hand, was peacefully established as an Empire in 1822 with its integrity preserved. According to a prominent Brazilian historian, this fortunate outcome of peaceful independence in the case of Brazil was due chiefly to the transference of the seat of the Braganza dynasty and the Portugese court to America, to the raising of the former colony to the status of a kingdom, and to the decision of Dom Pedro I to remain in Brazil and place himself at the head of the independence movement as emperor.¹ Dom Pedro, as emperor, stirred a great wave of patriotic enthusiasm that brought about unity among the various dissident and rebellious elements in Brazil.

1822-1889

Brazil, unlike most other Latin American countries, has had a stable and permanent military organization since 1822. The foundation of the armed forces, although initially weak, was provided through the presence of experienced Portugese troops and officers. A primary factor that shaped the Brazilian military mind was the winning of the country's independence

without a major sacrifice of lives and property in contrast to the carnage of human beings and waste of resources experienced in Spanish America. This achievement is credited in part to the influential scholar and statesman José Bonifacio, who after noting the turmoil and dissension in Spanish America, counseled successfully against violent revolution in favor of political evolution. Because of his enlightened reasoning the break with Portugal was smooth, and the nation was spared the ravages of uprisings and wars.

From 1830 to 1870 there were brief periods of turbulence in the country but the emperor (who was Dom Pedro I until 1831, rule by Regency from 1831-1840, and Dom Pedro II from 1840) and his advisors were in complete command. This situation encouraged Brazil to sustain an effective military establishment, but also discouraged the armed forces from openly aspiring to a civilian role of the nature that had become commonplace in most of Spanish America. After 1870, dissatisfaction with the emperor spread throughout the country. There were complaints of the emperor interfering too much in the details of the administration. Many Catholics became opposed to the emperor because the government sided with the Masons in a dispute between the church and the Masons and two bishops were imprisoned. Certain military circles were dissatisfied because of the tendency of the government to disregard what the army officers considered as their prerogatives and to punish certain officers who criticized the government through the press. With the abolition of slavery in 1888, many plantation owners,

who were impoverished by the loss of their slaves, also sided with the enemies of the emperor. After 1870, republican ideals spread throughout the country under the benevolent rule of Dom Pedro II. Republican propaganda and sympathy for republicanism played a significant role in rallying opposition to the emperor. The rising discontent of powerful interest groups was brought to positive action by the army when it effected a coup d'état on November 15, 1889. The coup was a bloodless affair that had the support either openly or secretly of practically all social groups.² This event again points out the contrast in the Brazilian military and the armies of most of Latin America that staunchly supported the status quo. In favoring abolition of slavery and overthrowing Dom Pedro II, the army broke with the past and supported change. The Brazilian experience of shifting from a traditional ruling monarchy to a middle class conservatism illustrates the theory of Samuel P. Huntington which holds that such moves are usually mediated by the military. Huntington also says: "The military is typically the most modern and cohesive force in the bureaucracy of a centralized monarchy, and the monarchy typically falls victim to those it has strengthened to serve its ends."³

Prior to the coup in 1889, Brazil maintained armed forces sufficient to discharge the country's domestic and foreign military responsibilities. Although the military was influential in the country, open involvement in politics was discouraged primarily by the Duque de Caxias, an outstanding armed forces hero and defender of Pedro II. After the death of Caxias in 1880, the military became increasingly active

in politics.

1889-1914

In the wake of the coup of 1889, the army had general public support. The hopes of the populous were high in expectation of major social, economic, and political reforms. Republicanism had replaced monarchism, promising elections and greater participation in government by the people. In an attempt to escape from a purely de facto situation, the government issued a decree the day after the coup that proclaimed a federative republic until the definite adoption of a constitution. A special commission was appointed to prepare a first draft of a constitution. The provisional government revised it, and it was published as a draft to be laid before the constituent convention which held its first session on November 15, 1890, with delegates who were elected on September 15, 1890. Until that first constituent convention, the provisional government held the powers of both the executive and the legislature. The situation is explained in part by João Calogeras, a Brazilian historian.

The electorate was considerably enlarged; the only qualifications for voting were the enjoyment of civil and political rights and the ability to read and write. The provincial assemblies were dissolved. A general naturalization device was issued providing that all foreigners resident in Brazil on November 15, 1889, should be regarded as Brazilian citizens unless they should make legal declarations to the contrary. A movement toward greater decentralization was initiated through the enlargement of the powers of the provinces.⁴

Finally, on February 24, 1891, the new constitution was adopted. It was considered a remarkable achievement, both liberal and prudent in its disposition, and according to

Calogeras, a masterpiece of political science, far superior to what might be expected of a parliament elected in a time of revolution.⁵ Quite another view of this constitution and the government is provided by an eminent writer on Latin America.

The new charter was imposed upon the United States of Brazil without any pretense of popular referendum. On its face, this constitution was fashioned after that of the United States: there was the same distribution of powers and privileges among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. Under pressure from stout regionalist, it paid lip service to the principle of states rights, granting to the states control of their local affairs and investing each with the right to impose import duties on goods from other states. But in reality it endowed the chief executive with almost dictatorial powers: the president could impose a 'state of siege' at will, intervene in any states' internal affairs, and supplant elected governors. Theoretically democratic, the constitution gave less voice to the electorate than had the parliamentary system under the Emperor.⁶

The conflicting interpretations of the new government and constitution notwithstanding, a framework for a democratic government was established. Furthermore, the dictatorial powers mentioned by Herring would probably be considered necessary by many contemporary political scientists who advocate strong central governments or a single party system for developing nations.⁷

Marshal Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca, a military hero, was the first president of what has become known as the "Old Republic" to distinguish it from the regime established by the revolution of 1930. As president, he proved inept and capricious, and after eight months, disbanded his congress and again ruled by decree. The people, in no mood to accept dictatorship, rebelled, forcing his retirement in favor of Marshal

Floriano Peixoto; but he proved even more irritating. Thirteen generals who demanded his resignation were jailed and exiled. Ruy Barbosa, his Minister of Finance, speaking for the civilians, denounced him through his (Barbosa's) newspaper. Barracks revolts broke out in Rio de Janeiro, spread north and south, with the most formidable opposition coming from the province of Rio Grande do Sul. In 1893 the navy rebelled under the leadership of Admiral de Mello, and for eight months the civil war continued. After severe fighting between land forces loyal to the government and the ships which had revolted, the rebellion was suppressed. The revolt ended by impoverishing the government, but with Floriano in command of a consolidated republic. Floriano was succeeded in 1894 by the first civilian president, Prudente de Moraes, who was elected for the term 1894-1898. Other crises have occurred, but from the time of Floriano there was no questioning the existence of the Brazilian Republic as an established fact and an increasingly powerful political force in the Western Hemisphere, especially in Latin America.

Civilians retained control of the executive branch of the government until 1910. Insubordination, however, was general and in 1897 an attempt, directed by senior military officers, was made upon the president's life. The army, considering itself the "backbone of the nationality," refused to be isolated from politics, and army officers, still strongly under the influence of positivism, were in part responsible for the preoccupation with material progress that was one of the unmistakable characteristics of the era. The military

came into power again in 1910 after a contested election in which the army was accused of manipulating the elections and making bargains with political bosses. In 1914 the presidency was returned to civilian control after what is generally conceded to be the most inept, corrupt, and extravagant government that modern Brazil has known.⁸

1914-1964

From 1914 until 1922, the military avoided any serious confrontation with the civilian leadership. In 1922 a few disgruntled military officers were unsuccessful in imposing their man in the presidency. Probably the most dramatic episode of this period was the revolt of the tenentes (lieutenants) at the Igrejinha Fortress in Copacabana on July 5, 1922. It was significant that the rebels, lower middle class in origin, were inspired by lively concern for national renovation and social justice, ideals which their elder officers seldom shared. The revolt was stamped out in short order, and finally the tattered survivors (the "Eighteen of Copacabana") retreated to the beach where most of them died under gunfire. But the survivors and their admirers continued to exert a disproportionate moral influence well into the days of Getúlio Vargas.⁹ Again in 1924, rebellious army elements--including some survivors of the Copacabana revolt--held the city of São Paulo against federal forces for several weeks. Fragments of the rebels continued their resistance throughout the country for two years.

After the election of a civilian to head the government in 1926, millions of people honestly supposed that the major

political and social problems of Brazil were approaching something like a definite solution. Events soon afterward proved such optimism unfounded. In 1930, the armed forces were again directly involved in changing the government, opening a new era in Brazilian politics.

Brazil is an enigma among developing nations when the criteria of modern political science for modernity and progress are applied. The country obtained its independence peacefully without having to go through a period of struggle and violence. Independence in 1822 bred the beginnings of nationalism, and the establishment of an Empire provided a great symbol of national unity. From this beginning, the Brazilian people had potentially a stronger bond than the violence advocated by Frantz Fanon to unify people of a liberated country.¹⁰ Again in 1889, circumstances were in favor of political stability and progress when without bloodshed the country became a republic. Some necessary steps were taken to give permanency to the government, such as writing a sound constitution, which was used for many years afterward, and establishment of an institutional framework under which the government could function.

Given the above favorable conditions for political stability, the question arises as to why the country experienced so many disruptions of its government. Every radical change of government normally results in an alteration or stoppage of social, economic, and international as well as political activities. Consequently, a continuous pattern of national development was difficult to maintain. Understandably, there

were strong factors opposing the sincere efforts of those charged with running the government. The nationalism mentioned earlier was mainly confined to a relatively few intellectuals and elites. The great racial, geographical, and intellectual separations prevented nationalism from permeating the masses to instill a desire to create, maintain, or strengthen their nation-state. The term nation-state is used advisedly. It is certainly debatable as to whether Brazil met any definition of a nation-state especially one provided by Dankwart Rustow describing it as a group of individuals who rule themselves on the basis of a sense of ultimate loyalty.¹¹

It seems obvious that the political culture of the country remained on too narrow a base to indefinitely support a political system. Political culture is described as the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system.¹² It is said that the demands made upon the system, the responses to laws and to appeals for support, and the conduct of individuals in their political roles will all be shaped and conditioned by the common orientation patterns.¹³ Too often demands made upon the Brazilian political system were not articulated by interest groups representing large segments of society, but by those representatives of purely elitist elements.

The downfall of the "Old Republic" came as an after-effect of the presidential campaign of 1930. In choosing the official candidate that year, the outgoing president, Washington Luis of São Paulo, broke the tacit agreement with the state of Minas Gerais and selected the outgoing governor of his own

state of São Paulo, Júlio Prestes, as his successor. The agreement between the two strongest states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais was to control selection of the president by working together to manipulate rotating the office of president of the republic between their outgoing governors. Their efforts were successful during most of the years of the republic. Leaders of Minas Gerais refused to accept the imposition of Júlio Prestes and banded together with the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Paraíba, forming the Aliança Liberal (Liberal-Alliance) to contest the election. When Júlio Prestes won the election, the losers did not accept the electoral verdict. On July 26, 1930, the governor of Paraíba and the vice-presidential candidate of the Aliança Liberal were assassinated. This act provided the catalyst for a revolt that was launched against the government on October 3, 1930. By October 24, 1930, President Washington Luis was forced to resign, and on November 3, 1930, Getúlio Vargas of Rio Grande do Sul, defeated presidential candidate of the Aliança Liberal, assumed the presidency. This successful revolt is known as the "Revolution of 1930" or the beginning of the "New Republic."

Military support of the revolution came initially from the tenentes and later from senior officers aware that public sympathies were overwhelmingly on the side of the revolutionaries. Without the military behind him, President Luis could not impose his new president on the country, as previous regimes had done against strong protest of the opposition in 1910 and 1922. In reality the Revolution of 1930 was neither directed at nor did it achieve basic changes in the social

structure of the nation. The main cry for reform concerned a demand for achievement of a real political democracy through free, fair, and representative elections that would utilize the secret ballot. Thomas E. Skidmore asserts there was a common willingness to experiment with new political forms in an attempt to discard the old.¹⁴ He states:

The effort resulted in seven years of agitated improvisation, including a regionalist revolt in São Paulo, a new constitution, a popular front movement, a fascist movement, and an attempted Communist coup.¹⁵

Getúlio Vargas ruled by decree as provisional president from November 3, 1930, to July 16, 1934. On the latter date a new constitution, drawn up by a popularly elected constituent assembly, was promulgated which provided for the continuance of essentially the same type of presidential, federalist system operative during the "Old Republic." The secret ballot, proportional representation in the legislative assemblies, a special electoral court to supervise and conduct elections, and other safeguards aimed at ensuring free and fair elections, and representation of the minority was included in an attempt to perfect the functioning of a democratic electoral and legislative process. Vargas was elected by the constituent assembly to continue to serve as president until 1938, when a new president was to be elected by direct popular vote.

These elections were never held. On November 10, 1937, Vargas with the aid of the army, staged a bloodless coup d'état, ostensibly "to preserve the internal order of the country."¹⁶ Congress was dissolved, most of the state governors were ousted and replaced by Vargas appointees, and a new constitution was decreed which gave Vargas complete discretionary power to rule

by decree until a national plebiscite could be held in which the voters would be given a chance to accept or reject the new order. The plebiscite never took place. Higher army officers justified the authoritarian turn of the government on the grounds that free political competition had proven bankrupt and even dangerous to national unity and national security.¹⁷ Armed forces involvement in this latest coup was testimony to the re-emergence of military influence and power in Brazilian politics since the Revolution in 1930. The Brazilian military establishment has maintained its dominant position in politics to the present.

Vargas proclaimed his discretionary regime the Estado Novo (New State). The constitution under which he supposedly governed was influenced greatly by Italian fascism. It was full of civil liberties and guarantees, but with a final clause allowing the president to suspend portions in order to meet emergencies. His regime was a highly personalistic dictatorship; he governed the country until 1945 by presidential decree. The Estado Novo had no consistent ideological base, nor was it dependent on popular support. Its perpetuation was based on support of the armed forces, Vargas' own police, and an ineffective opposition.

By 1943 dissent and pressures were mounting against the government demanding the end of discretionary rule and the institution of a democratic form of government. Vargas yielded to these demands and scheduled presidential elections for 1945. As the election date approached, apprehension

spread that Vargas might attempt another 1937-style coup in order to remain in power. On October 25, 1945, the armed forces quietly deposed Vargas without violence and installed the president of the supreme court, Jose' Linhares as head of the government. The Estado Novo had come to an end.

Presidential and congressional elections were held on schedule on December 2, 1945. Again the military was turned to for leadership. Both major parties nominated armed forces generals to head their presidential tickets. General Eurico Dutra, candidate of the Partido Social Democratico (PSD), a party organized with Vargas' backing, won the election. Soon after his inauguration in 1946, Dutra moved to restore a democratic system of government. In September of 1946 a new constitution was promulgated. It affirmed the basic rights to universal suffrage and the secret ballot, but maintained wide government authority over social and economic institutions, including the power to ban any political party considered anti-democratic. The office of president was downgraded so that its occupant could no longer dominate the states, congress, judiciary, and armed services. Congress was to exercise the sovereign power, but the other branches were intended to be able to protect themselves from encroachments.

The guardian role of the military is often given as reason for armed forces interference in government activities. Such a role is characterized as a position taken by the military such that it is neither the modernizer of society nor the creator of a new political order, but rather the guardian and perhaps the purifier of the existing order.

Samuel P. Huntington maintains that the guardian role was written in part into the 1946 constitution, which provided that the function of the armed forces was to "defend the fatherland and guarantee the constitutional powers, and law and order."¹⁸

In 1950 national elections were again held, and Getúlio Vargas, the candidate of the Labor party, was elected president, winning sixteen of the nineteen states. The chief opposition candidate was Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, who was favored by the military. With the victory of Vargas, the elections became a severe test of the military's alleged devotion to constitutional processes. Since the military had reason to be fearful after its role in deposing Vargas in 1945, the generals took steps to protect the armed forces from presidential grasp and to make certain that dictatorship would not be revived. Military fears were enhanced by the fact that Vargas was returning to power at the head of a movement pledged to alter drastically the social and economic structure of the country i.e., to transform its basic institutions. Political tensions mounted as the Vargas administration failed to find adequate solutions to the nation's growing economic problems. In August, 1954, the breaking point was reached with the attempted assassination of anti-Vargas newspaper owner, Carlos Lacerda, who had regularly denounced Vargas. Though Lacerda was only wounded, an air force officer died in the attempt. A national scandal grew out of the suspicion that the killing was attributable to someone close to the president. The military hierarchy had

become restless to the point of forcing Vargas to resign and turn over his office to Vice President João Café Filho. Then on August 24, 1954, for no apparent reason, Vargas shot and killed himself. He allegedly left a very melodramatically worded note with strong nationalist appeal. The note read in part: "I offer my life in the holocaust. I choose this means to be with you always." The message concluded: "I gave you my life. Now I offer my death. Nothing remains. Serenely, I take the first step on the road to eternity as I leave to enter history."¹⁹

João Café Filho presided over continuing political and economic turmoil. Café Filho's influence was not great enough to overcome his status as caretaker president. Presidential elections were held October 3, 1955, in which Juscelino Kubitschek, candidate of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and João Goulart the vice-presidential candidate of the Brazilian Workers Party (PTB) were victorious. Kubitschek, who was a former backer of the discredited Vargas regime, was unacceptable to the armed forces. After Kubitschek and Goulart won the election, tensions in the military reached a breaking point. A military coup to prevent the inauguration appeared inevitable. Café Filho then suffered a heart attack and had to take a leave of absence, turning the presidency over to the president of the chamber of deputies, Carlos Luz, who was rumored to be involved in the plot to stop the inauguration. The military, headed by Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott, Minister of War, intervened and deposed Carlos Luz, replacing him with the next man in the line of presidential succession, the

president of the senate, Nereu Ramos. This caretaker government with the aid of War Minister Lott and the army, prevented an expected military coup and insured the peaceful inauguration of Kubitschek and Goulart. The new president, however, with the majority of navy, air force, and some army officers and the bulk of conservative groups against him, was extremely dependent upon military support from people such as Marshal Lott. As a reward, the armed forces demanded and received a near doubling of their pay soon after inauguration. Five officers served in Kubitschek's cabinet and, during his presidency, Brazil spent more funds on the armed forces than on all public development programs. Military opposition and demands also seriously hindered Kubitschek's attempts to solve the nations' economic problems.

The Kubitschek government embraced a policy of developmentalist nationalism. It was a pragmatic approach to an already mixed economy, aimed at achieving the most rapid rate of growth possible by encouraging expansion in both the private and the public sectors. The primary emphasis was on basic industries. Industry continued to expand under Kubitschek while the nation was struggling to overcome inflation. Perhaps Kubitschek's greatest achievement was the construction of the new capital of Brasilia located 600 miles northwest of Rio de Janeiro in the state of Goias. Although the country was suffering from financial problems, construction of the city continued to include a presidential palace, halls for congress, and housing for workers. Some arguments for building the new capital were of long standing: it would

serve to open up the inland area of the nation, so that farmers and industrialists could expand; and it would remove the seat of the government from the less desirable climate of Rio de Janeiro. Some arguments against the city were: it cost too much, and it provoked further inflation which restricted social reforms.

Janio Quadros, who styled himself as "the man with the broom" was inaugurated in January, 1961. His "man with the broom" slogan alluded to his promises to sweep graft and corruption out of the government and to reduce inflation and bring order to Brazil. Quadros only lasted seven months as president, when he resigned and sailed away on a cruise. His problems arose from his quick temper; his suspected neutralist foreign policy, which leaned to the left; and his difficulties with congress trying to pass fundamental reforms such as tax increases and land reforms.

Quadros' resignation threw the nation into acute political turmoil. Part of the military was against Vice-President João Goulart assuming the presidency because of the support given him in his election campaigns by the Communists and his supposed leftist leanings. This part of the military threatened to launch a coup to prevent Goulart from taking office. The military was divided on the issue, as evidenced by support given Goulart by the very important garrison of Goulart's home state, Rio Grande do Sul. As civil war threatened, a form of parliamentary rule was adopted by constitutional amendment under which the presidency was retained but the powers of the office were curtailed. A

plebiscite was scheduled for April, 1965, in which the voters would decide whether to continue the parliamentary system or to abolish it and return to the old presidential system. João Goulart was finally permitted to assume the presidency with the powers of his office restricted. During the months that followed, the economic ills of the nation grew worse, particularly the problem of rampant inflation. The parliament was ineffective in providing leadership. In response to pressure from Goulart, the national legislature consented to have the national plebiscite January 6, 1965, instead of October, 1965. The voters decided to end the parliamentary experiment and restore full powers accorded to the president by the Constitution of 1946. Goulart and his regime were not saved by the restoration of full presidential powers. Instead of slowing down, the pace of inflation quickened. Goulart did not show himself to be an able administrator capable of using the powers of the presidency to guide the nation out of its increasingly chaotic economic state. Considering Goulart's association with communists and the state of the economy, the stage was set for military intervention "to save the nation."

FOOTNOTES

¹João Pandia Calogeras, A History of Brazil (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1963), p. 82.

²John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 188

³Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 202.

⁴Calogeras, op. cit., p. 277.

⁵Calogeras, op. cit., p. 282.

⁶Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 848.

⁷Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 223.

⁸Johnson, op. cit., p. 194.

⁹Herring, op. cit., p. 856.

¹⁰Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963), pp. 93-94.

¹¹Rustow, op. cit., p. 35.

¹²Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham G. Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 150.

¹³Ibid., pp. 50-51.

¹⁴Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 7.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 7-8.

¹⁶Martin C. Needler, Political Systems of Latin America (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), p. 472.

¹⁷Skidmore, op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁸Huntington, op. cit., p. 227.

¹⁹Skidmore, op. cit., p. 142.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, 1964-1971

The Coup d'état

The Brazilian army assumed power in March-April, 1964, after the President, João Goulart, vacated his office and fled the country. Pressures from the military and some civilian elements had been mounting against the president for his inept administration of the country and his close flirtation with communism. Inflation was rampant and Brazil's economic growth was slower than her population increase. Her foreign debt was huge and growing. Some of Goulart's speeches indicated that he was embracing the radical left as he talked of expropriating land and foreign properties. The top brass of the armed forces were against him. Their fury was increased when the president made a dramatic appeal to non-commissioned officers and enlisted men to take his side against their superiors.¹ Most important, among those opposing the president were the aggressive "young officers," known as the "Radicals" and representing the "Hard Line." Adamant in their anti-political attitudes, they had no desire to finish their intervention by simply delivering power to a different group of civilian politicians, as had happened in the past. The "hard-line" military had been the earliest conspirators and had

waged a long campaign to convert their moderate elders. The latter thought in terms of the army's traditional role as the guardian of the political equilibrium and could not contemplate the vision of a Brazil governed indefinitely by men in uniforms. The moderates among the military were reluctant to depose the constitutional head of state, in whose legitimization the army had played an active role by tacitly underwriting the plebiscite of January, 1963. The plebiscite restored full powers to the president as awarded in the Constitution of 1946. It was the aggressive young officers who pushed their senior colleagues to a more militant position.² The position of the military in opposing the president was justified in a memorandum circulated on March 20, 1964, by Castello Branco, Chief of the Army General Staff. While attacking Goulart's idea of a constitutional assembly as the prelude to a dictatorship, Branco wrote:

Are the Brazilian people requesting a military or civilian dictatorship and a constituent assembly? Not yet it would appear. There must be no compromise with the "historic role" of the armed forces as the defender of the constitutional order and the enforcer of the laws, including those which guarantee the electoral process.³

Governors of the major states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Guanabara joined with the military to overthrow Goulart. Most Brazilians did not expect the military to take over the political system. The army was expected to follow historical tradition and return to its barracks after the revolution. Its failure to do so resulted in a widening gulf between the civilians and military in the years 1964-1969.⁴ Since much of Goulart's political strength came

from populist and leftist elements, the army was for the first time united in an ideological stance against populism.⁵ The revolution of April, 1964, was Brazil's most drastic repudiation of civilian government since the 1800's. Opposition was almost non-existent--most of the leaders of the political parties accepted military rule as the only alternative to chaos.⁶

The Government

Even before Marshal Humberto Castello Branco was inducted into office on April 15, the military had proclaimed the Institutional Act, which empowered the three chiefs of the armed forces--and later the president--to arrest whomever they chose for "subversive activities" without recourse to civil courts and to suspend their civil liberties for as long as ten years. The witch hunt that followed was a graceless affair, with the tracking down of "subversives," "communists," and "grafters"--all in the name of "economic, financial, political, and moral reconstruction of Brazil."⁷

The powers given the president by the Institutional Act amounted to the creating of a dictator. Beside the right to dismiss public servants at will, he was given almost complete control of the budget and the right to declare a state of siege without the consent of Congress. Any measure proposed by the president was to be automatically effective if Congress did not act upon it within thirty days.⁸

This act by the Supreme Revolutionary Command was a new response to the crisis of political authority that had been evident in Brazil since the mid-1950's.⁹ Perhaps here

lies the basis of Brazil's problem of lack of political stability. A noted political scientist maintains that authority, identity of people to the nation, and equality of participation in the government form the political basis of the modern nation-state.¹⁰ All three of these elements of modernity reinforce each other. It is pointed out that the need for authority, which is the essence of all government, sharply rises as modern man becomes more dependent on his fellow man and as his demands for public services multiply.¹¹ The institutional act, it appears, was a new and decisive response to the apparent inability of the Brazilian executive to command the necessary authority.

Furthermore, in October, 1964, the Second Institutional Act eliminated all old political parties and established a government party, the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA); and for good measure the act also set up an "official" opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). This act is said by some to have effectively ended democratic processes and established a dictatorial order in Brazil.¹² All doubt of the government's intentions was removed by the promulgation of the Third Institutional Act which decreed that the president and all federal and state officials would be chosen not by the people, but by the state and national legislatures. Congressmen alone would be freely elected by popular vote.¹³

Restrictions on popular participation in national elections should be contrasted with the fact that the voting population of Brazil prior to 1964 had demonstrated in a number

of ways considerable desire to participate even though voting was compulsory for literate men and women over eighteen years of age. No penalties really followed if one failed to vote; consequently, there was little fear of not voting. Consistently, over eighty percent of the eligible population has voted when allowance is made for padded registration rolls, deaths, and the like. Since the Brazilian public is forty to fifty percent illiterate and has fifty percent of the population seventeen and under, rarely has the voting represented close to twenty percent of the total population.¹⁴

Castello Branco was elected president by the Chamber of Deputies to serve until January 31, 1966. He repeatedly stated that he intended to turn over the government to his successor by January 31, 1966. However, other military and congressional leaders had urged the postponement of the elections for another year to enable reforms to take effect. Little support could be found in any quarter for another change in government. Consequently, in July, 1964, the Brazilian Senate, by a vote of 46 to 6, and the Chamber of Deputies, by a vote of 283 to 4, acted to postpone presidential elections until December, 1966, and to extend President Castello Branco's term until March 15, 1967. This measure was also supported by all the state governors but one, Carlos Lacerda, who was a potential presidential candidate. At the same time, the legislature also voted to require a winning candidate for president to have a majority of the popular vote and specified that the president and vice-president be of the same party.¹⁵

At this point in time, it is difficult to detect any

traditional political ideology in the actions of the new government leaders. In fact, the new regime did not attempt to establish a political position. The nearest the government came to stating a position was an explanation by the President, Castello Branco, that the revolution had been made in order to insure continued economic development and social justice for all.¹⁶ Branco's reasoning was in line with that of Huntington who maintains that the military in its guardian role views itself neither as the modernizer of society nor as the creator of a new political order, but rather as the guardian and perhaps the purifier of the existing order.¹⁷ But the government's heavy emphasis on anti-communism, coupled with the suspension of the rights of national figures such as former presidents Kubitschek, Quadros, and Goulart, suggested that the influence of the "hard liners" was great. It appeared that the extremists were poised to demand resumption of emergency powers for use against any opposition that threatened the new government's monopoly of power.¹⁸

Another view of the revolutionary government's approach to running the country is offered by a noted Brazilian scholar, Dr. Candido Mendes de Almeida.

The model which emerges from the Institutional Acts can be characterized as a "technocracy," in the form of a new authoritarian state, which furnishes the institutional conditions to carry out the economic planning of the country on bases of an extreme centralism.¹⁹

There is little wonder an ideology was not evident, for according to Morris Janowitz, one is difficult to find.

While it is impossible to identify a military ideology in the new nations, common ideological themes are found which help to explain the professional officer's political

behavior. These include a strong sense of nationalism, a puritanical outlook, acceptance of extensive government control of social and economic change, and a deep distrust of organized civilian politics. As a result of social background, education, and career experience, military personnel of the new nations become interested in politics, but they maintain a strong distrust of organized politics and civilian political leaders.²⁰

Janowitz also explains that the difference between the military of the new nations and their counterparts in Western industrialized nations center on their greater acceptance of "collectivist" forms of economic enterprise and on their more powerful hostility toward politicians and organized political groups.²¹ It was obvious from the actions of the revolutionary government that it intended to remain in power and to restrict opposition to allow necessary social and economic reforms to come about. Castello Branco had repeatedly said he would retire from the presidency in March, 1967. He issued a "decree" for Congress to elect a new president on October 3, 1966. General Costa e Silva was easily the winner. In addition to being hand-picked by Branco, he was the consensus candidate of the military and the government party, ARENA, which held a majority of congressional seats. Castello Branco next decreed a new congressional election on November 22, 1966. After the election in which ARENA and MDB "opponents" were reelected, Branco turned Congress into a constituent assembly, sent it a new constitution, and had it accepted on January 22, 1967.

According to the Constitution, Brazil is a Federal Republic with broad powers granted to the Union. There are 22 states, four territories, and a Federal District (Brasilia). All powers not explicitly or implicitly forbidden the national

government are reserved to the States, which are empowered to establish their own constitutions and governments in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Federal Constitution. The autonomy of the municipalities (the only territorial subdivisions of the States) is also guaranteed by constitutional provisions. In practice, the broad powers granted the Union, and the financial weakness of the States and municipalities have made for a strongly centralized system.

At the national level the Constitution establishes a presidential system with three "independent and harmonious powers"--the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. It forbids the delegation of powers and provides a series of mutual checks and balances. The framework of the State and local governments closely parallels that of the Federal Government.

The president is elected to a four-year term by an electoral college composed of members of Congress and representatives of State legislatures. The President is the head of the executive branch and is assisted by a Vice President, a Cabinet made up of Ministers who head the principal executive ministries, and a number of specialized administrative and advisory bodies. Despite the superficial similarity between the governments of Brazil and the United States, the Brazilian president normally plays a more predominant role in national affairs than does his U.S. counterpart. The Constitution gives the Chief Executive the power to declare a state of siege and intervene in the individual States when he determines that conditions warrant such action. The trend toward the centraliza-

tion of power was reinforced on December 13, 1968, when an "Institutional Act" was issued giving the Chief Executive even broader powers.

Under the 1967 Constitution the bicameral National Congress consists of 66 members in the Senate (three from each state) elected to eight-year terms and 409 members in the Chamber of Deputies, elected at large in each State and territory on a basis of modified proportional representation to four-year terms.

The Supreme Court is composed of 11 Justices, including the Chief Justice, appointed for life by the president.

This new constitution changed the name from the United States of Brazil to simply Brazil, included a plan to put public employees on a tight civil service system, and provided for the collection of all taxes except those on property owned by the federal government and their reallocation to local units. The executive also maintained the power to initiate all legislation concerning public finance and national security, and to suspend civil rights for individuals.

Such undemocratic and high-handed procedures were considered necessary to bring about the desired reforms. Castello Branco himself issued a new unit of money, curbing inflation by stabilizing it at 2.20 to the dollar. He enforced a tough universal income tax law. He expropriated unused land from large estates dating from colonial times and encouraged "homestead" type colonization. The new government pointed with pride to the civilian activity of the army; both officers and privates were building schools, teaching in them, and launching

road building and community sanitation campaigns. By achieving some success in slowing down inflation and controlling corruption, Castello Branco was reassured that his type of government was best for Brazil at that time. With the peaceful inauguration of Costa e Silva on March 15, 1967, Brazil could look forward to four more years of the same kind of rule.

The manner in which Costa e Silva was elected with little or no opposition was a strong indication of the government's intention to consolidate its ruling position. Skidmore elaborates on this point.

The government's turn away from the electorate, whatever its short term justification, seemed to develop its own momentum. A regime that so pointedly refused to practice the arts of electoral politics found itself developing a rationale for longer-term authoritarianism. Above all, the purges of elected politicians, the constant changing of the rules to prevent significant victories for the opposition--made clear that any eventual return to open political competition would find the political elite and the public ill-prepared. The organization of new political groups appeared virtually impossible in the manipulated atmosphere created by the revolutionaries.²²

The regime of Costa e Silva failed to identify its political personality as being different from its predecessor. Costa e Silva turned out to be indecisive, and while he talked of "humanizing the revolution," he actually did very little and allowed military associates to get the upper hand in his government. Under Costa e Silva's loose reins, opposition that remained consistent after 1964 was that of radical university students and the progressive Roman Catholic clergy. These were the only two groups that actively retained their respective ideological positions. Nevertheless, in the autumn

of 1968, opposition from other areas became evident. Members of the old political class--Carlos Lacerda (a former governor of Guanabara), João Goulart, Janio Quadros, and Juscelino Kubitschek--began negotiations aimed at forming a "broad front" to end the revolution and restore civil government. Urban guerrillas were boldly robbing banks and tossing bombs into buildings. Right wing groups reacted by also resorting to violence and murder. University students advocated a Marxist program and demonstrated openly against the inept educational policies of the government. Catholic church leaders expressed inconformity with the revolution and identified themselves with the students. In November, 1968, the army insisted that a member of Congress, Márcio Alves, be brought to trial for publicly attacking the military. Congress refused to submit to military pressure to remove Márcio Alves. During this deepening national crisis, the president hesitated to act. Finally, on December 13, 1968, the president decreed Institutional Act No. 5. Using decree powers, the president closed the Congress for an indefinite period. Costa e Silva provided justification for his actions three days later: "The revolution is irreversible...The revolution will follow the sure road which takes the country to the goal of rapid and certain development."²³

In August, 1969, Costa e Silva became too ill to continue his functions as president. The Constitution provided that Vice President Pedro Aleixo become president. Aleixo was not acceptable to the armed forces because his democratic idealism conflicted with the aims of the revolution: he had

been the only member of Costa e Silva's cabinet to oppose Institutional Act No. 5, because he felt the nation already had sufficient legal instruments to deal with the crisis. Additionally, increased urban terrorism was convincing the military leaders that they were confronted with a "revolutionary war." The kidnapping of the American Ambassador on September 4, 1969, seemed to confirm this analysis. Under these circumstances a junta composed of the heads of the three Armed Forces decreed a new Institutional Act No. 12 bypassing Aleixo and assuming power. Another Institutional Act No. 14, provided penalties of death, banishment, and prison for subversives. The junta then selected General Médici, head of the National Information Service, to be the next president.

The armed forces' method of selecting a third straight military officer without consulting politicians or representatives of other interest groups indicated a move closer to institutionalizing the revolution. Congress was convened to ratify the choice of Médici as president on October 25, 1969. He was approved by a vote of 293 with 76 abstentions. President Médici's term will run to March 15, 1974. General Médici was not a leading conspirator of the revolution in 1964, but as commander of the military academy at Agulhas Negras, near Rio, he immediately joined the movement.

During President Médici's term, the revolutionary government achieved unprecedented political unity for several reasons: the confidence aroused by Brazil's world soccer championship in 1970, the economic prosperity, and Médici's decisiveness. He is considered representative of the "hard line" element

of the military, but he has used repressive measures available to him in moderation, and the public associates him with a swing toward democratic normalcy. The current government casts the image of being hard at work running the country. One of Médici's strengths is his control over the Armed Forces. The divisions of the hard liners and conservatives are no longer apparent. Brazil is a country with a firm hand at the helm, and the Armed Forces are staying out of politics because of the strong influence of President Médici.²⁴

The Médici government has also moved to gain popular support by policies of internal conciliation and external nationalism. Until recently, the revolution functioned with the support of the industrial and business classes, who benefit from and spearhead economic development, along with that section of the middle class which so disliked and feared the previous "populism" that they could not help but appreciate the new order and moral renovation after 1964. The Médici government realizes that the institutionalization of the revolution requires a broader political base, and it has now turned to organized labor, utilizing the same paternalism that the regimes before 1964 did. Getúlio Vargas first cultivated the technique of granting benefits to labor in return for political support, and the lesson has not been forgotten.

The government justifies its opening to labor as a form of "participation" in company profits and redistribution of the benefits of the country's growth. The concessions did not come from union pressure at all, in fact, they were kept secret until announced by the president. It must be noted

here that labor received only those concessions as determined by the government. The working class was not permitted to discuss or even present specific claims. Such activity is considered by the government a simple cover for political agitation.

In a continuing effort to broaden its base of support, the government has been taking a conciliatory approach toward the Catholic church, which is today the foremost critic of the revolutionary regime. In early 1970 both church and government leaders seemed eager to establish a more harmonious relationship. Church leaders criticized government repressive measures and torture, but in a generally conciliatory manner. Attacks on the archbishop of Recife, Dom Hélder Câmara, by journalists and television announcers with the apparent knowledge and consent of the government and the imprisonment of two priests in the state of Maranhão have again strained relations between the church and the government.

Much has been publicized about repressive acts to eliminate unwanted political opposition of the Brazilian government, and the regime is sensitive to international opinion in this regard. Specific information on repressive activities and official terrorism is difficult to document. However, Marcio Moreira Alves, a Brazilian journalist, former member of Parliament, and a leader of the Catholic Left in exile has written an article describing government repression and terror in Brazil. Moreira Alves accuses the government of using force as an instrument of policy to assure its stability. In developing his position against the government Alves writes:

State terrorism is not the product of sadistic inclinations on the part of some independent warlords in Brazil. It is the base from which the government operates and, therefore, no amount of international pressure, of diplomatic interference, of public denunciations, be they uttered by the most influential persons, will restrain it.²⁵

In discussing recent elections, President Médici made a statement concerning opposition to the government.

I repeat that every Brazilian has the right to oppose the government. I consider indispensable to the proper functioning of the regime the existence of opponents... But also there will be no impunity for acts of violence and disturbance of order, which contradict our Christian spirit, wound our traditions of pacific evolution, and only open the way to solutions of force. The way of liberty is the way of law.²⁶

More specifically, Brazil today allows no political role for those who preach revolutionary change, seek to arouse man's emotions, or propose the change to a Marxist or semi-Marxist system. The revolution is conservative, and it believes in orderly evolution.²⁷ For the present, aspirants to public office and individuals with influence on public opinion know that they are safer if they do not question the legitimacy of the revolution.

Authority to curb political opposition is derived from Institutional Act No. 5, decreed on December 13, 1968. It gave the president power to close Congress and other legislative assemblies, renewed the authority to remove citizens from office and political activities, and eliminated the right of habeus corpus "in cases of political crimes against national security, the economic and social order, and the popular economy."²⁸

Reacting to international responses to some of its

repressive measures, the regime has attempted to explain its position as one necessary to stabilize the revolution. It is contended that the revolutionary government does not understand the genuine concern in North America and Europe, when military regimes, under the guise of combating communism, reduce or eliminate mechanisms of popular opinion, restrict the press, imprison critics, harass religious leaders who are trying to defend the poor, and especially, torture political dissidents.²⁹

The government of President Médici is showing awareness of its external image problem. For months now it has forbidden tortures as a policy, though the world continues to be skeptical because of the unwillingness to admit that tortures occurred or to bring torturers to trial. Also, in their quest for information that will dismantle the guerrilla apparatus, government officials continue detaining innocent people and treating them with indignity. Many Brazilians are afraid that friendships, associations, or even coincidence may bring them to the attention of the authorities.

Nevertheless, the momentum is now toward conciliation, restoration of democratic forms, and national unity. This momentum is limited only by the aims and leaders of the revolution. When the government has said the revolution is irreversible, it is very serious, and there is no reason to doubt that sufficient power will be used to enforce that intention.

Critics claim that Brazil's greatest potential weakness lies in the political arena. They argue that political realities

may be working against Brazil because the military governments since 1964 have been forced to maintain too firm a hand for the "man on the street" to accept for long. They point to such actions as precedent to violent swings to the left which have occurred in Peru, Chile, and Ecuador on the west coast of South America, and to snowballing instability throughout Latin America.³⁰

Except in the case of Chile, the upheavals in the countries on the west coast of South America are characterized by reform-minded military governments. Brazil's upheaval occurred six years earlier, in 1964, and its own reform-minded military-based governments now have more than a half decade of experience and success behind them.

Thus the west coast military coups interestingly enough actually lend greater legitimacy to and therefore strengthen the mandate of Brazil's military based regime, particularly since in Brazil the government's administrative machinery is already in the hands of civilian technicians. The firm base which Brazil had laid for sustained economic growth will make a return to elective government easier when the time is ripe, and the first steps are even now being taken.³¹

The new generation of military leaders in Brazil shows little resemblance to the personalistic type that characterized the first post World War II wave of military regimes in Latin America, such as those of Peron in Argentina, Rojas Pinilla in Columbia, and Perez Jimenez in Venezuela. Today, in Brazil, there is a different breed, the technocratic variety, much less personalistic and much more concerned with institutional

modernization.

In 1964 the revolutionary government was established in a political vacuum. The country was in chaos, and there was no political organization willing to take the reins of government and establish order. The military stepped in, with little or no opposition, to form a type of government thought best for Brazil at the time. Although the facade of a democratic functioning government was presented, in actuality a military dictatorship existed. Even so, the military indicated it had no intention of remaining in power indefinitely. The current regime makes the same assertion.

Perhaps the greatest threat to the revolutionary government is its own economic policies and their effect on the middle-class population. Jordan M. Young discussed this possibility as follows:

Since 1964, middle-class political behavior has been in a critical stage. The army may not be skilled or sophisticated enough to interpret the demands and desires of the middle class, and economic reforms which may have hurt only the lower-income groups could begin to pinch the middle sectors. However, the middle groups are accustomed to complaining and having their complaints heeded. If the army does not listen to their demands and chokes off their ability to change and shift politicians, the middle class may resort to leading a movement to oust the military from control of the country.³²

FOOTNOTES

¹Herbert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 878.

²Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 304.

³Ibid., pp. 295-296.

⁴Jordan M. Young, "Brazil" in Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson, eds., Political Forces in Latin America (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), p. 567.

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⁶Herring, op. cit., p. 879.

⁷Ibid., p. 880.

⁸Ibid., p. 881.

⁹Skidmore, op. cit., p. 308.

¹⁰Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 36.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 36 and 72.

¹²Herring, op. cit., p. 883.

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¹⁴Brazil: Election Factbook (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1965), pp. 21-22.

¹⁵Hispanic American Report, XVIII (September, 1964), 660.

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¹⁷Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 225.

¹⁸Skidmore, op. cit., p. 310.

¹⁹Candido Mendes de Almeida, Sistema Politico e Medelos de Poder No Brasil (Dador, I, 1966), pp. 8-9.

²⁰Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of Nations (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 28-29.

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²²Skidmore, op. cit., p. 320.

²³Thomas G. Sanders, "Institutionalizing Brazil's Conservative Revolution," American University Field Staff Reports, East Coast South American Series (1970), p. 8.

²⁴Ibid., p. 10.

²⁵Marco Moreira Alves, "Brazil: What Terror is Like," The Nation, 212 (March 15, 1971), 338.

²⁶Sanders, op. cit., p. 7.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Paul E. Sigmund, ed., Models of Political Change in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 142-145.

²⁹Sanders, op. cit., p. 15.

³⁰"Brazil Watchers Begin to Discern 'Economic Miracle' in the Making," Journal of Commerce (December 21, 1970), 13A.

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CHAPTER IV

AN ANALYSIS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Economic Groups

Jordan M. Young has identified four Brazilian economic groups that should be considered as serious political power contenders, though none possess the power capabilities of the military. (The business community is not ^{UNIFORM} monolithic and suffers from lack of leadership and a true spokesman. Businessmen were politically active under the banner of IBAD, the Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action, in the early 1960's. Their apparent agitation of the government provoked Goulart to outlaw the IBAD in 1963. Since 1963, the business community has been a relatively ineffective political force.) Middle-class conservative groups have enjoyed widespread success in support of candidates to carry out their objectives. The lower-income groups have not sought their own direction, but have tended to accept middle class conservative platforms. Finally, the upper-income groups, who have benefited from traditional political operations, do not appear to be threatened by the revolutionary military-based government.¹ None of these groups resisted the military coup in 1964, possibly based on the reasoning that economic conditions had to improve with a change of government. Currently, it is not evident that any

of these groups significantly influence economic policy of the country.

Model for Development

The neocapitalist model of economic development was chosen as best for Brazil's approach to recovery. This choice, not surprisingly, was also favored by businessmen and middle-class groups. A neocapitalist approach compared to a communist type economic program provided greater assurance of security to businessmen and the middle class. Chief architect of Brazil's economic recovery was Roberto Campos, an economist who was Minister of Planning and Economic Development from 1964 to 1967. Campos was considered Brazil's economic czar. The economy is now directed by Antônio Delfim Neto, Minister of Finance, and João Paulo dos Reis Vellozo, Minister of Planning. Delfim became Finance Minister in 1967 with the support of former Minister of Planning, Roberto Campos. (Delfim built on Campos' policies, which were aimed basically at encouraging private enterprise and eliminating some of the distortions in the economy resulting from years of wild inflation and haphazard government intervention. Although Brazil is working toward free enterprise, the government still plays a big role in industry, and it has wide influence over business through measures such as tax incentives and wage-price guidelines. Delfim is quoted as saying, "We have chosen the capitalist system of development. We believe over the long run in complete liberalization."² Another opinion of how the government is implementing its economic policies is provided by Professor Candido de Almeida, who says, "The model which emerges from

the Institutional Acts can be characterized as a 'technocracy,' in the form of a new authoritarian state, which furnishes the institutional conditions to carry out the economic planning of the country on the basis of an extreme centralism."³

The Economy

Brazil's national motto, which dates long before 1964, is "Order and Progress." President Médici says that his administration's great goal is to create a politically and economically "open society." There is a newer phrase, coined by the present government. "Ninguém segura este país," meaning "Nobody will hold back Brazil." It applies to the massive social-economic effort underway in the country.⁴ The economy of Brazil is characterized by many contemporary writers as one that is "booming." Growth and the dynamic character of the economy are signified by GNP increases of nearly 9 percent annually in the past three years, with industry showing raises of 13.2 percent in 1968 and 10.8 percent in 1969. Between January and October, 1970, exports increased 20.8 percent over the same period in 1969 to reach \$2.23 billion, while exports of manufacturers increased 62.4 percent to \$361 million.⁵ Brazil's growth rate of about nine percent is by far the highest in Latin America--the United States has been stationary for the past year--and behind only those of Japan and Israel among the nations of the free world. The GNP of \$44 billion in 1970 is equal to that of India--a country with nearly six times as many people. Exports have topped the \$2 billion mark for the second year in a row. It is expected that within four years the chemical and oil industries will quadruple,

steel production will double, and construction work will expand by sixty percent. All this is expected to be supported by an annual gross investment equivalent to twenty percent of GNP.⁶ Brazilians are showing confidence in the economy by investing their money in Brazil, instead of sending it to Switzerland and other areas. Foreign companies from Europe, Japan, and the United States are increasing investments in the country. Not all of the business community is happy with the current circumstances. (There are complaints that the government is making it too easy for foreign investments, and that these foreign investors restrict ~~expansion of private enterprise and~~ ^{BRAZILIAN} drain the country's riches.)

It is widely accepted by scholars on Brazil that the revolution of 1964 was influenced more by economic problems than by political ills. The political system that preceded 1964 was based on the liberal 1946 constitution which provided for popularly elected president and state governors, bicameral legislature, independent judiciary of substantial powers, and constitutional guarantees of civil rights. That system and its leaders were put under great stress by rapid growth, inflation, expansion of the electorate, and bickering over national finances. The political in-fighting that accompanied the succession of João Goulart to the presidency following the resignation of President Quadros in 1961 further burdened the system. Goulart's administration did little to solve the many social and economic problems. By 1964 circumstances had deteriorated to the point that there was widespread hope and support for a government that offered change and progress toward

a better Brazil.

During the 1950's, the economy expanded at annual rates of about seven percent. By 1962 Brazilian industry, which had been relatively unimportant 15 years earlier, had assumed a major role in the economy. Agriculture had lost its primary role in the economics of the country. Industrialization quickened the pace of social change. Cities expanded in population at annual rates of up to five percent as migrants flocked from jobless countrysides seeking factory and service employment.

A high rate of inflation was established from 1955-1960. President Kubitschek is best remembered as a builder on a grand scale. He expanded the automobile industry, built highways and skyscrapers and the new federal capital of Brasilia. Inept planning and gross corruption in the government intensified inflation. The gross national product increased as did disparities in income. Kubitschek's successor, Quadros, added to the economic problems by stepping up the pace of spending. As mentioned earlier, João Goulart's government presided over the status quo and made little effort toward change. It was against this unhealthy economic background, and to save Brazil from the resulting inflation that was destroying what was left of it, that the generals took power in 1964.

When President Castello Branco had the political situation well in hand, he turned the attention of the government to the dire economic conditions of the country. The cost of living had increased by 12 percent during the first six months of 1964 and by almost 15 percent since the ouster of

the old government. The monthly rate of inflation had increased to a level of 8.9 percent during the first quarter of 1964. As a result of the rising inflation and the unsettled political situation, foreign investment was decreasing and the national debt increasing.⁹ To cope with these economic problems, the government developed a two-year program for economic recovery. Major provisions of the plan were controls of wage and price levels and encouragement of foreign investment to help specific aspects of the economy essential to basic development. The government recognized the need (1) to stimulate investment, (2) to expand the economic infrastructure, (3) to stimulate housing, and (4) to expand production of food crops. Actions were initiated to achieve structural changes in four areas: agriculture, housing construction, the export sector, and the public sector.¹⁰

Agriculture

Beginning in 1964, there occurred a basic shift to agriculture from industry, and within the agricultural sector a shift to non-coffee production. Price controls were gradually replaced by price supports for essential food crops. This action provided greater incentives for agricultural expansion. Agricultural investments were further facilitated by government policies, which expanded credit to the agricultural sector. As a result, the relative contribution of agriculture to overall growth soon exceeded the contribution of industry. This relationship is reverse that of the late 1950's and early 1960's when industrial growth was ahead of agricultural growth. In 1967, for example, agricultural

production increased eight percent and industrial production three percent.¹¹)

Housing Construction

The housing field was stagnant during the 1950's and early 1960's. In its attempt to hold down the cost of living, the government initiated rent controls. The combination of inflation and rent control sharply curtailed private investment in the housing field. After 1964 the revolutionary government began actions in several areas to stimulate new housing construction. Rent controls were to be gradually relaxed. A housing bank was established which, however, did not obtain substantial funds until early in 1967 when social security pension funds were channeled to it. Provisions were made in the private sector for the application of a "monetary correction" to mortgage bonds, real estate notes, and savings deposits in real estate credit societies and newly formed savings and loan associations. This mechanism compensated for the continuing, but slowing, inflation and made such financial paper and savings attractive to private investors. In 1967, for the first time in years, the input of private funds into the housing sector increased significantly. Additionally, the National Housing Bank channeled greatly increased amounts of public funds into the housing sector during the year.

In 1967, expenditures in housing increased more than fourfold and represented an estimated 2.6 percent of gross national product.¹² Since 1967 the expansion of housing construction has continued. Unfortunately, despite the building boom, planned new housing starts fell considerably short of

estimated housing needs. With an increase in population of well over three percent a year, new housing requirements were estimated by the government in 1964 at 400,000 living units per year. This figure is now considered conservative. In 1967, the Brazilian Planning Ministry made a revised estimate of about 500,000 new units. The higher figure was just to keep up with population growth. It does not include replacement of obsolete housing. Brazil in coordination with the World Bank and the U.N. estimate that somewhere between 4.5 to 8.0 million families in Brazil live in substandard accommodations.¹³ The three-year plan for 1968-1970 called for financing 692,000 new units during the three year period or about 230,000 units per year. This represents between 45 and 50 percent of the estimated need for new housing alone. There were 167,000 units of new housing in 1967.¹⁴

The Export Sector

During the 1950's, the Brazilian economy received strong growth stimulus from the expansion of the automobile and related industries via the government's import substitution plan. With reduced possibilities for further import substitution, the government, after April 1, 1964, shifted to a policy of export promotion as a stimulant to growth and as a means of restoring balance of payments equilibrium.

Throughout the 1950's, not only import policy, but foreign exchange policy discouraged exports. The exchange rate was purposely kept at levels that made essential capital goods imports for the expanding industrial sector relatively cheap but which, in turn, made exports unattractive. In order

to remedy this situation, the government, since April, 1964, removed numerous of the encumbering restrictions of the exchange system, eliminated many administrative obstacles to exports, and developed new ways and means for financing exports. The government also initiated in 1968 a system of more frequent currency devaluations in order not only to discourage the previous rhythm of annual speculation against the cruzeiro (Brazilian unit of money), but also to keep exports competitive. The cruzeiro was devalued one percent to two percent every 45 days or so. In 1970, ten such "mini devaluations" lowered the exchange rate of the cruzeiro by 13 percent.¹⁵

The Public Sector

(THE Public sector, including all levels of government expenditure, as a percentage of GNP increased rapidly from 1956 (22.5 percent) to 1963 (30.2 percent) as a consequence of growing public investments such as Brasilia.) About half of the increase was accounted for by the federal government, whose expenditures rose from 11.1 percent of GNP in 1956 to 15 percent in 1963. Federal government revenues rose from 7.5 percent of GNP in 1956 to 9.3 percent in 1963, with most of the difference being financed by inflationary borrowing from the Central Bank.¹⁶

As part of the stabilization effort initiated in 1964, the upward trend of public sector expenditures was halted and even slightly reversed. Total public sector expenditures were estimated at about 29 percent of GNP in 1968, compared with 30 percent in 1963. Federal government expenditures

declined to an estimated 14 percent of GNP in 1968, compared with 15 percent in 1963.¹⁷ Revenues on the other hand continued to increase as the government strengthened tax collections as part of its stabilization effort. In 1969, over four million people paid income tax, compared with only 470,000 in 1967.¹⁸ Revenues for 1968 are estimated to be about 12 percent of GNP, compared with 9 percent in 1963. As revenues increased, the government's inflationary borrowing from the Central Bank decreased proportionately.¹⁹

The revolutionary government's emphasis on economic progress has produced positive results. Runaway inflation has been stopped by government enforced economic austerity measures. Business expansion had practically halted during the early years of the revolution. Brazilians have learned to live with a controlled inflation and business is booming again. Private investment, domestic and foreign, has been encouraged to the point that economic growth is outpacing a high population increase.²⁰

United States Aid

(To maintain the proper perspective in viewing the revolutionary government's efforts to solve its development problems, U. S. aid to Brazil must be considered. Since mid-1964, the United States government has been putting into Brazil an amount of U. S. taxpayers money that has averaged about 400 million dollars per year. About \$300 million of this has been via the bilateral aid programs. The remaining \$100 million has been made available via financial institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the

Export-Import Bank.)

Basically the bilateral aid program has been designed to serve three closely related purposes. First, it has provided essential imports for Brazil. These have consisted largely of raw materials and capital goods required by the industrial sector. Second, the large U. S. involvement in the Brazilian development efforts has provided the opportunity to influence a variety of basic economic policies such as credit, fiscal, foreign trade, agricultural price supports, and banking. Third, U. S. aid has contributed to the long-range development of basic economic and social institutions in fields such as education, public health, agriculture, and public administration.

By and large, these programs have been well managed, have been largely effective, and have been understood by Brazilians. The assistance from the United States has most certainly helped Brazil not only to deal with its balance of payments problem but also to push ahead in the construction of power plants, transportation facilities, and the infrastructure that is essential for economic expansion. In the social and economic fields, the program has accepted the need for increased agricultural research, for reappraisal of the educational system that could lead to adequate reforms, and to large scale improvements in the health sector. By 1968, the Brazilian government had reduced the rate of inflation from 100 percent to less than 25 percent. At the same time it restored the rate of growth of GNP to the highest level since 1962, to about six percent. These achievements would not have been possible without the substantial United States' aid program.²¹

The cornerstone of U. S. assistance to Brazil is a commitment by the Brazilian people and their government to self-help. This is based on the sound principle that nations, like individuals, can only grow and prosper by sacrifice, hard work, and cooperation. Thus, in Brazil, as elsewhere in the world, we have asked that the people tax themselves more equitably, fight inflation, put more money into education, and do many other difficult things--which, if left undone, would make the U. S. aid program ineffective.²²

Income Redistribution

Social conditions in Brazil will be discussed in the following chapter; thus, only brief mention will be made here of who is getting the most benefit from the economic progress of the country. In general, the rich and the middle-class have profited from the boom. Although the government states that its policies include income redistribution, there is little evidence of that policy's implementation. Government figures do indicate that industrial wages rose faster last year than the inflation, though they do not show improvement in labor's relative position.²³ There is no denying that the middle class is growing, thereby assimilating greater numbers of the poor and illiterate which is about 40 to 50 percent of the population.²⁴ By the summer of 1971, for example, employment did increase by 10 percent, and while the cost of living rose by 20 percent (in comparison the cost of living rose over the previous year by 26 percent in 1970 and by 100 percent in 1964), wage levels were 26 percent higher. Therefore, employment is rising, the cost of living is going down, and wage levels

are rising. Consequently, as of the summer of 1971, the wage earner enjoyed a six percent edge in earnings over the cost of living. Meanwhile the national income is probably more unequally distributed than anywhere else in Latin America. Although the GNP was \$44 billion, this breaks down to only \$420 per capita. In the city of Recife, 25 percent of the heads of households are unemployed.²⁵

The progress of the Brazilian economy since 1964 has created a new confidence in the country among the educated and business elite. Social reforms are considered to be the greatest weakness of the revolutionary regime because they do not meet the vast needs of the people. The government maintains that its economic-social programs are for the benefit of all Brazilians, and it has, in fact, initiated numerous social programs. Social conditions in Brazil from 1964 to present will be discussed in the following chapter.

FOOTNOTES

¹Jordan M. Young in Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson, Political Forces in Latin America (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970). pp. 583-584.

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⁵Sanders, op. cit., p. 5.

⁶Selden Rodman, "Don't Underestimate Brazil," The National Review, XXIII (August 10, 1971), 861.

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¹⁰John Wills Tuthill, "Economic and Political Aspects of Development in Brazil and U. S. Aid," Journal of Inter-American Studies, XI (April, 1969), 190.

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¹²Ibid., p. 191.

¹³Ibid., p. 192.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵"Booming Brazil Finds a Key to Growth," op. cit., p. 90.

¹⁶Tuthill, op. cit., p. 193.

¹⁷Tuthill, op. cit.

¹⁸Sanders, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁹Tuthill, op. cit., p. 194.

²⁰"How Generals Are Ruling Most of a Continent," U. S. News and World Report, LXVIII (June 22, 1970), 75.

FOOTNOTES CONT.

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²²Tuthill, op. cit., p. 202.

²³Henry J. Steiner and David Trubek, "Brazil-All Power to the Generals," Foreign Affairs, 49 (April, 1971), 465.

²⁴Rodman, loc. cit.

²⁵Rodman, op. cit., p. 862.

CHAPTER V

AN ANALYSIS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Much of Brazil's political future hinges on what the government accomplishes economically. So far the results are encouraging. The current administration apparently recognizes that an expanding national product and higher per capita income are not enough. Brazil's vast social problems must be solved. The government therefore is investing billions of dollars in programs to integrate the country and enhance social progress.

Brazil is a huge country of 3.3 million square miles, larger than the continental United States, excluding Alaska. It is the eighth most populous (92 million) country in the world. Nearly 45 million people live south of the Tropic of Capricorn, 23 degrees south of the equator, and the remainder of the population inhabits the much larger land area north of the Tropic of Capricorn. The country is considered a racial "mosaic" or "melting pot," with its social, economic, and political elites predominantly white but with a substantial minority of Negroes. Recent estimates indicate the racial distribution as 60 percent white, 15 percent black, and 20 percent "brown" or obvious mixtures of three races, with the remaining 5 percent being pure Indians.¹ It is claimed that to be Brazilian is to be black or white or any mixture in between. In the United States the common assumption is that

to have one-sixteenth Negro blood is to be Negro, while in Brazil, to have one-sixteenth white blood is to be white, even though it makes very little difference.² Brazilians pride themselves on the absence of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, there is a distinct absence of dark-skinned people among the well-to-do or the professional classes and a preponderance of markedly Negroid and Indian types performing heavy menial labor. Brazilian sociologists claim that these circumstances result from class rather than race prejudice.³ The landowning class is still wealthy, and its members seldom marry outside their class. Old class lines are being broken down as new fortunes are being made in industry. The members of the new commercial middle class show little race or economic prejudice.

In recent years Brazil has experienced a large influx of people into the cities from the rural areas. This movement grew out of prospects for greater social and economic opportunities in the urban areas. The majority of these people must exist on a very low standard. Employment is simply not available for the great number seeking jobs. The plight of working class inhabitants of the cities is summarized as follows:

The white-collar workers have a hard time making ends meet, as a pair of shoes costs a clerk's weekly salary, and bookkeepers or teachers make far less proportionately than they would in the United States. The day laborers and factory workers find it very expensive even to buy shoes. The hills of Rio are covered on one side with fancy hotels or luxuriant tropical vegetation; on the other side, the shanties of the poor fill the entire hillsides with communities called favelas. There are 232 separate favela communities totalling more than a million inhabitants, on the hills of Rio, each with its own governing council. The councils cannot provide

schools or running water or electricity, and cannot control the criminal element, but they do try to keep up the stone steps and the "goat trails" that connect the hillsides with the city streets.⁴

The problems of the poor are the same in most of the more than 30 larger cities of 100,000 inhabitants or more.⁵ For example, in the city of Recife, heart of the perennially hungry northeast, 25 percent of the heads of households are unemployed.⁶ One problem of the economic boom, discussed in the previous chapter, is that few of the new industries are labor intensive. Ten percent of the total work force is employed in industry, 55 percent in services (including government), and the remainder in agriculture.⁷

Education

To provide true social mobility to its citizenry, half of which is under 18 years of age, Brazil must establish a national program to meet the expanding educational requirements. The government stresses education as part of the country's overall development. Government realization of the importance of education in a modernizing society is compatible with thoughts of John V. P. Saunders who states:

Education may foster modernization through the creation of a population more willing to accept technical innovations and make use of them: by diffusing among the population the skills, organizational, administrative, and technical, which are necessary for the institution of changes and for the inevitable accommodation to these same changes; and by instilling in students, through the classroom and school situation, aspirations beyond their present means to achieve while, at the same time, equipping them with the means with which to achieve them. By creating thus, that necessary dissatisfaction with the personal status quo of a significant number of individuals without which the motivation to innovate and effect changes would be in short supply in the society.⁸

The dilemma facing the government is first to meet and

then to stay ahead of steadily expanding educational requirements. Although there now is a primary school building of sorts in every Brazilian village large enough to be called a town, in 1970 there were still approximately four million children in rural areas who had no school to attend, and the nation remained more than 50 percent illiterate.⁹ The primary schools are poorly equipped, often poorly taught and generally over-crowded. A large percentage of the children--especially those from the favelas and the rural areas--have great difficulty getting past the first grade.¹⁰ The secondary education situation is still inadequate for an industrializing, modernizing nation.¹¹ There is a very limited number of vacancies in the public secondary schools and only a small percentage of the children in the primary schools are able to obtain entry into public secondary schools. Private secondary schools are available for those whose parents can afford the cost, but the number accommodated in such schools is small. Under the existing system the majority of Brazilians do not have more than a few years of primary education and thus do not even reach the stage of training to become skilled workers. The loss of natural resources and talents is staggering. Despite all the problems in the national school system, higher education (university level) enrollment has been expanding in recent years at close to ten percent a year.¹²

The new middle class, which is rapidly growing in the cities, is now demanding better elementary and secondary school education for its children. Whether in response to public demands or not, the government is sharply focusing on

education. The Ministry of Education now gets the biggest appropriation of the federal budget. Not only is the nation's school system in expansion, but it is being revamped to meet current and future needs. There are also government programs to supplement the normal school system such as: Basic Christian Action (ABC) and the Basic Educational Movement (MEB) to improve adult literacy; the National Commercial Apprenticeship Service (SENAS) and National Industrial Apprenticeship Service (SENAI) to provide technical instruction for workers in their respective sectors; and the Ministry of Education and Culture, through the National Campaign for Advanced Studies for Professors (CAPES) provides professional training in various scientific and technological disciplines.

In his book The Brazilians José Honório Rodrigues advanced additional reasons for the government of Brazil to improve its system of public education. Rodrigues agrees with the thoughts of Saunders stated above. The main point made by Rodrigues, and undoubtedly considered by government leaders, is that: "above all, education is the longest lasting basic factor in national security and one of the fundamental requirements of national strategy."¹³

Health

There is a theory that education and health, linked by an insoluble bond, have become instruments for attaining that efficiency which is indispensable for the development of national power.¹⁴ In matters of sanitation, disease, and public health, Brazil still has great problems but, as in education, the situation varies between regions. Since the

turn of the century, the country has developed a strong tradition in biological-medical research and tenacious anti-epidemic campaigns. The Ministry of Health is continuing to develop its two most important programs. The first was a campaign to eradicate smallpox, which accounted for three percent of all deaths in Brazil. Brazil is the only Latin American country where this disease is endemic. Resources for the campaign were supplied by the government. Ninety percent of the population was to have been vaccinated for smallpox by 1970. The other major program was the eradication of malaria. This campaign, to be concluded in 1971, is aimed at controlling the disease in areas with an aggregate population of 36 million. Deaths from tuberculosis, gastrointestinal disorders, and syphilis are still alarmingly high, and much of the interior is afflicted by two dread parasitic maladies: schistosomiasis (liver fluke disease) and chagas' disease (transmitted by the barbeiro insect that infest wattle-and-daub dwellings).

Particular attention has been given to establishing, expanding, and improving the water supply and sewage services so important to environmental sanitation. A program was launched in 1964 to provide water in adequate quantity and quality to 80 percent of the urban population and to 50 percent of the rural population over a period of ten years. Various agencies relating to these services have been established or reorganized to facilitate execution of the plan. In 1967 a Sanitation Finance Fund (FISANE) was established to provide resources for financing sanitation studies and projects. A decree was issued

in 1968 instituting the sanitation finance system in order to guarantee the progressive installation and expansion of water supply and sewage systems in urban areas. The National Housing Bank (BNH) is the central organ of the system, which consists of various financial and executive agencies and has available resources mobilized at the federal, regional, state, and municipal levels. The major responsibility for operating and managing water supply and sewage systems is assigned to the Special Foundation of the Public Health Service (FESSP), a unit of the National Department of Sanitary Works. The National Department for the Control of Rural Disease (DNERU) supplements its activities in the rural sector.

Disparities

Despite government efforts gross disparities continue to haunt Brazil. The Amazon region, comprising half of the land mass, still numbers only four million people, little different from a century ago. A third of the population lives in the Northeast, but that arid region contributes less than ten percent of the industrial product. Rural incomes are half those in urban areas. While nearly half of the labor force works in agriculture, it produces only one-fourth of Brazil's GNP.¹⁵ Brazil's per capita income runs between \$300 and \$400 a year, but many millions live on less--about \$60 a year. Relatively few earn "U. S. standard" wages of \$5,000 or more.¹⁶ The housing shortage is estimated at seven million units. Less than half of the children finish primary school. Of the country's more than 90 million people, only 10 million are served by a sewage system. About 20 million have a public

system of potable water. For the four million inhabitants of Amazonia, there are reportedly 40 medical doctors.

Brazil realizes that its social problems are vast and must be given proper attention. As part of the program to integrate the country, roads are being constructed across the length and breadth of Brazil. In the last 10 years the country's road system has more than doubled from 285,000 miles to 600,000. Only about 70,000 miles were paved in 1960, but currently this total exceeds 260,000 miles.¹⁷ Similarly, the country is being brought together by a telecommunications program connecting every important city by telephone, telex, telegraph, and television. A series of major power complexes are under construction, so that Brazil will more than double its power producing capacity this decade.

The demands of the largely impoverished Northeast and the Amazon region have won extra attention. Hundreds of projects--in the school system, sanitation, power, housing, industry, transport, and agriculture--are under way supported by federal assistance. One well known effort in the interior is project RONDON, an adaptation of the United States Peace Corp, whose slogan is "Integrar para nao entregar" (roughly, integrate or vanish). The aim of the project is to bring the students in the universities to terms with Brazilian reality through voluntary service, and in the process increase their social consciousness. It began in 1967 in the Federal Territory of Rondonia. Under the Ministry of Interior, a group was composed, mostly of students, to plan a national program allowing students to spend their vacations in the interior,

working on literacy programs, health education, and social assistance. The number of university students participating has grown from 650 in 1968 to 4,300 in 1970.¹⁸

Transportation, supplies, and technical assistance were provided the project by the armed forces. Of all government agencies, the army is probably the greatest contributor to development of the interior. An article in a Brazilian Army magazine says, "The Brazilian Army will turn the 70's into the period of the overland integration of the Amazon Region. In so doing, the Army will link three-fifths of the land area of Brazil to the economy of the southern part of the country."¹⁹

Contribution of the Military

By most accounts the government is pleased with the contribution of the military to the goal of modernizing the country. In addition to numerous construction projects, as mentioned above, the armed forces have diligently worked at furthering social development of the country.

Presence of the army as a prominent national entity throughout the land constitutes, in Brazil, a great system for social mobility and integration and bridges the large coastal centers with the interior. In the community of the interior, army garrisons not only constitute a factor for security which encourages and supports endeavors dedicated to development, but they are also centers for the irradiation of social progress. In many Brazilian localities, the state relies on military garrisons to guarantee the presence of the doctor and the dentist; the organization of athletics; help in case of

calamity; incentives to commerce; the refinement of customs and educational methods and other elements which are fundamental to social development. The universal military service system is in itself a catalyst for education and social refinement in that it brings to the garrisons, without discrimination, citizens of all social classes who are leveled off under the same schedule of life, of discipline, and of training. Once inside the garrison, the citizen of the most modest origin, who has at times been cast aside even within his own community, develops social purpose through the influence of a common existence, and thereby acquires habits and knowledge which normally would have been inaccessible to him.

Other Government Efforts

Among the most effective of the government's efforts to improve the lot of a large number of Brazilians is a massive housing program. That program has built several hundred thousand houses for low and middle income groups, and will absorb over a billion dollars this year.²⁰ Although rehousing of the slum-dwellers moves ahead at a tremendous pace, in many cases it leaves the rehoused family worse off. They now have to pay rent, which they frequently cannot do. Many have been located far from their work necessitating a bus ride to and from work for a fare they can ill afford to pay.²¹

A limited agrarian reform has been set up, but implementation has lagged behind execution of programs aimed at economic expansion.²² The Federal Constitution was amended to permit payment in bonds for expropriated lands, revenue from the tax on rural property was transferred to the Federal

Government and a land statute was enacted. This statute established the Brazilian Institute of Agrarian Reform (IBRA) and the National Institute of Agricultural Development (INDA). IBRA was assigned the duties of executing agency for agrarian reform and INDA, among other functions, implementation of programs of land settlement, agricultural extension, marketing of agricultural commodities, and rural electrification. The statute authorized the expropriation of unutilized or underutilized lands and established a progressive tax on rural property, the revenue from which has considerably increased tax receipts. The reform is financed by the National Agrarian Reform Fund, consisting of allocations included in the federal budget, contributions from regional agencies, bond issues and foreign credits. Additional benefits were promised the poor when, in March, 1971, President Médici announced legislation to establish social security coverage for rural peasants and farm workers. The plan is part of a shift of emphasis in government economic planning from urban industry to rural farming.²³

One important relevant factor sure to impact significantly on the development of Brazil is its birthrate which is the highest of any country in the world.²⁴ Some Brazilians indicate a concern for the high birthrate and its effect on social gains. The government has not publicly encouraged birth control. Allegedly the government claims that Brazil is big enough and rich enough to cope with the growth rate.²⁵ Such reasoning supports the ideology of national development and the population of 200,000,000 anticipated in several

decades which will support Brazil's claim for recognition as a major economic and military power.²⁶

In order to gain political support and to establish a stable government, the leaders of Brazil appear to realize the importance of social reforms that are responsive to the needs of the people. Reform programs have been initiated but, as yet, are not extensive enough to meet the vast requirements. The soundness of the Brazilian revolutionary regime's approach to social reforms is endorsed by a contemporary writer who says:

A government that spends a large proportion of its budget on education, health, and housing for the general population develops long-range support of the society while investing in human resources, which is probably the best way to promote sustained economic development.²⁷

FOOTNOTES

¹Helen Miller Bailey and Abraham P. Nasatir, Latin America--The Development of its Civilization (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 534.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Bailey and Nasatir, op. cit., p. 536.

⁵James W. Rowe, "A Note on Brazil," American University Field Staff Reports, East Coast South American Series, XIII (1967), 8.

⁶"Don't Underestimate Brazil," National Review, XXIII (August, 1971), 862.

⁷Ibid.

⁸John V. D. Saunders, "Education and Modernization in Brazil," in The Shaping of Modern Brazil, Eric N. Baklanoff, ed., (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 109.

⁹Bailey and Nasatir, op. cit., p. 538.

¹⁰John Wills Tuthill, "Economic and Political Aspects of Development in Brazil and U. S. Aid," Journal of Inter-American Studies, XI (April, 1969), 196.

¹¹Bailey and Nasatir, op. cit., p. 538.

¹²Tuthill, loc cit.

¹³José Honorio Rodrigues, The Brazilians (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1969), p. 139.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 143.

¹⁵Richard Lawrence, "Political Systems Undergoing Change--Socio Economic Push Gaining," Journal of Commerce, December 21, 1970, Sec. 2, p. 1A.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 2A.

¹⁷"Highway Network Undergoing Expansion," Journal of Commerce, December 21, 1970, Sec. 2, p. 6A.

¹⁸Wilson Choeri and Mauro C. Rodrigues, "Project RONDON," Military Review, L, 1970, p. 68.

¹⁹"The 5th Engineer Construction Battalion is a Bulwark for Integration and Security," Sentinels of the Amazon, undated, p. 45.

FOOTNOTES CONT.

²⁰Henry J. Steiner and David M. Trubek, "Brazil--All Power to the Generals," Foreign Affairs, 49 (April, 1971), 470.

²¹"Don't Underestimate Brazil," loc cit.

²²Steiner and Trubek, loc. cit.

²³"Brazilian Indicates No Political Changes," New York Times, April 1, 1971, Sec. 1, p. 4.

²⁴Tuthill, op. cit., p. 200.

²⁵"Don't Underestimate Brazil," op. cit., p. 863.

²⁶Steiner and Trubek, op. cit., p. 475.

²⁷Theodore W. Schultz, The Economic Value of Education (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 38, 39, 42.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY RULE IN BRAZIL SINCE 1964

Alexis de Tocqueville said: "Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased."¹ Similar thoughts may have been on the mind of President Castello Branco when he explained that the 1964 revolution had been made in order to insure continued economic development and social justice for all.²

The involvement of the military in the 1964 coup and its aftermath opened a new and highly significant chapter in the history of Brazilian civil-military relations. In contrast to previous cases of military intervention in national politics, the 1964 coup was not followed immediately by a transfer of power to civilians in order that they might establish conservative rule. Rather than taking chances on old-style politicians, the new government relied on well-trained and serious-minded civil technicians (technocrats).

The reasons for numerous occasions of military intervention in Brazilian political affairs are complex and varied. Regardless of the actual motivation, the armed forces invariably

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maintained that they were intervening only because the civil government had failed. Whenever a government crisis was imagined, was pending, or had occurred, it was the military, as the strongest institution, that became the arbiter of the situation. The revolution in 1930 propelled the armed forces into the center of Brazilian politics, however, the military's role was ill-defined and, toward the end of the Vargas period, was threatened by Vargas' attempts to shift his power base while lessening his dependence on military support. Democratic politics had its heyday in Brazil from 1945 to 1964. The overthrow of Goulart terminated the experimentation with popular government and marked the culmination of fifteen years of ideological preparation and political socialization for electoral democracy in Brazil.

The primary options open to the revolutionary government in 1964 were to establish a democratic form of government, the policies of which would be out of the control of military hands, or to proceed with a military regime emphasizing stabilization and development. As pointed out above, the government selected the policies of economic development and social justice in order to bring about political stability. A stable political system is defined as one which can manage change within its structures.³ The members of a stable political system consider it to be both legitimate and effective. The system, in turn, must have the power and ability to meet the demands and needs of the society as well as the flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances.⁵

Although Brazilian government leaders periodically

promised return to a democratic system, authoritarian military-based rule prevailed. Meanwhile, those in control of the government have yet to work out permanent civilian political institutions able to facilitate the developmental process. Thus, until acceptable civil institutions and leaders can assume control, the country will remain under military tutelage.

The developmental approach employed by the military-technocratic alliance, reform-oriented and based on comprehensive planning, was at the same time gradualist and rooted in basically a free-enterprise economy. Measures such as a top-to-bottom final overhaul of the economic system and the progressive land tax were supposed to result in income redistribution, increased productivity, and rural rationalization. The planners appeared to seek institutional rather than "impact" reforms and held that these must be gradual. In an assessment of the new government's approach to development, James W. Rowe has stated that:

...The model is that of a tutelary centralized technocracy, which breaks up the institutional equilibrium of Brazilian federalism, institutionalizes a virtually unchecked executive power, maintains a few rituals of "democratic formalism", and, above all, constrains social mobilization and popular political participation. Its designers appear convinced of the basic incompatibility between the requirements for economic growth and the satisfaction of the immediate demands surging from mass suffrage.⁶

Development apparently is viewed by the government as a technological process, combining economic expertise with a realistic assessment of national possibilities, and politics must be subservient to this process. Undoubtedly the government is aware of the risk involved in restricting political

activity in favor of economic progress. One of the most important reasons economic development sometimes fails to produce political stability is that while the economy is making it possible for the political and economic systems to satisfy the demands of the population, it is also raising the level of expectations.⁷ As the level of expectations is raised, the level of political demands goes up. These demands cannot be suppressed indefinitely. Eventually frustrations and pressures will build to a point that will force the government to moderate its stance on political activity or risk open rebellion. "On the other hand, a dynamic economy leads to higher employment, greater economic mobility, new opportunities for the ambitious within the economic system and lower demands on the political system."⁸ In any case, as a country enjoys economic progress, the government must attempt to insure an acceptable distribution of income and benefits to all classes of people.

As pointed out in this thesis, many of the Brazilian government projects are designed for economic and social betterment of the people of all classes. Government intentions notwithstanding, many of Brazil's poor suffer from hunger, unemployment, disease, and inflation. There has not been widespread clamor for better treatment from the lower classes, possibly because of lack of leadership, government suppression of opposition, or the hope of eventual participation in the wealth of the country. An insight of the attitude of the Brazilian people is provided by Thomas G. Sanders.

What many outsiders critical of Brazil do not realize is that most Brazilians do not oppose the present government and think that it is fulfilling its responsibilities adequately or well. Brazil is not seething with a resis-

tance that is only checked by a harsh dictatorship. Its citizens are predominantly indifferent or favorable.⁹

By most indications Brazil can be considered a modernizing country. Modernization is seen in rapid urbanization, continuing increases in literacy, emphasis on industrialization, rising per capita gross national product, and expanding mass media circulation.¹⁰ The one area in which Brazil is lacking with regard to modernization is political participation. Samuel P. Huntington says: "Modernization means mass mobilization; mass mobilization means increased political development. Participation distinguishes modern politics from traditional politics."¹¹ Correspondingly, Lerner says: "Traditional society is non-participant..."¹² It can be concluded from the reasoning of Huntington and Lerner and actions and policies of the current Brazilian regime that Brazil would be considered a traditional political society. Emphasis seems devoted to the quality of government leadership, and not to the issue of mass participation in national political affairs. The idea of "inputs" into a political system, demands, and mobilization stemming from authentic political parties, interest groups, and ideologies is virtually ignored in an apparent concentration on "correct" policies, "rational" decisions, and a "good image" abroad.

There are contemporary writers who suggest that a strong single party organization and/or an authoritarian government is the best alternative for developing countries.¹³ Huntington maintains that "Military coups and military juntas may spur modernization, but they cannot produce a stable

political order."¹⁴ Lucian Pye argues that "at present in many situations rapid economic growth is more likely to be stimulated by a reduction in authoritarian practices and an increase in popular participation in the national process."¹⁵ The revolutionary government's success in bringing relative stability and economic progress to Brazil, in comparison to performances of past governments, supports the theories of the three writers above regarding the type of government best employed for economic growth and modernization of developing countries. Whether the Brazilian government will eventually reduce its authoritarian practices and cultivate a stable political system with popular participation remains to be seen. For the long range betterment of Brazil, Morris Janowitz offers perhaps the best advice when he says, "...once political power has been achieved, the military must develop mass political organizations of a civilian type, or it must work out viable relations with civilian political groups. In short, while it is relatively easy for the military to seize power in a new nation, it is much more difficult for it to govern."¹⁶

The gamble of the rulers of Brazil to establish economic development as the national project at the expense of participant politics appears, thus far, to have been the best for the country. This reasoning is supported by the passive acceptance of the people, growing confidence in the future of the country, and the belief of elites that development is more important than politics. The theme of the government and positive guidance was provided by President Médici when he said that "the revolution and this government are essentially

nationalist, nationalism being understood as the affirmation of national interest over any other interest and the prevalence of Brazilian solutions for the problems of Brazil."¹⁷ President Médici's thoughts on democracy for his government are indicated in the following:

I do not question if this political regime corresponds, in its basic structure, to a democracy of Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American type, of this or of past centuries, or if it adjusts itself to the Latin or German kind of democracy-- be it of our own times or of the past. It is enough to know that democracy, as a form of political intercourse, is not a logical concept, unchangeable in time and space, but an historical concept, subject to the revisions which are imposed upon it by social conveniences.¹⁸

President Médici's statements above perhaps provide reasonably good indications of the intentions of the current Brazilian regime. Brazil's goal is national development. The current Brazilian government seems convinced it has the country on the right path to that objective. Various Brazilian government leaders, since 1964, have intimated that the country would eventually return to a democracy, but the type of democratic system was never described. However, if President Médici's statement on democracy above is a true indicator, Brazil will fashion a democracy to fit its particular circumstances. Whether Brazil moves toward a democratic system of majority rule or any other derivation of democracy, or continues with some form of authoritarian government embodying increased popular participation, depends on continued movement toward the national goal.

The revolutionary government has known success in developing Brazil. This success of authoritarianism can be compared to that of the contemporary governments of South

Korea and Soviet Russia. These two countries have steadfastly maintained their strong central governments ostensibly to meet national objectives. There is no reason to believe the military regime of Brazil will relinquish control to popularly elected civilian officials in the near future.

FOOTNOTES

¹Democracy in America (New York: Phillips Bradley edn., 1955), II, 118.

²Thomas E. Skidmore, "The Military in Power," in Wayne Cornelius, Jr. and Richard R. Fagen, eds., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 190.

³Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," The American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 1125.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶James W. Rowe, "A Note on Brazil," American University Field Staff Reports, East Coast South American Series (1967), p. 9.

⁷Duff and McCamant, op. cit., p. 1127

⁸Ibid., p. 1128.

⁹Thomas G. Sanders, "Institutionalizing Brazil's Conservative Revolution," American University Field Staff Reports, East Coast South American Series (1970), p. 14.

¹⁰Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., Political Modernization (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), p. 212.

¹¹Ibid., p. 209.

¹²Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, 1958), p. 48.

¹³Huntington, op. cit., p. 207.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 245.

¹⁵Lucian W. Pye, "Democracy and Political Development," in Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 73, quoted in James W. Rowe, "Brazil Stops the Clock," American University Field Staff Reports, East Coast South American Series (1967), p. 10.

¹⁶Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of Nations (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 1.

¹⁷Sanders, op. cit., p. 4.

FOOTNOTES CONT.

¹⁸Alvaro Galvão (trans.) from speech made by President Medici in 1970 (source document not identified).

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THE BRAZILIAN REVOLUTION, 1964-1971:
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the role of the revolutionary government, from 1964 to 1971, in the area of political, economic, and social affairs and to determine any indications of the trend of national politics in Brazil. The enquiry was conducted through the medium of library research and interviews with Brazilian Army personnel and United States' citizens familiar with information germane to this thesis.

To provide a background and better understanding of the current military regime in Brazil, a sketch of the role of the military in Latin America and Brazil is presented. Soldiers have always been prominent in the development and politics of Latin America. The history of Latin America since the Wars of Independence features an almost continuous succession of chaos, revolution, dictators, and constitutions.

Although the military has been predominant in politics throughout Latin American history, this position has not been totally to the detriment of the countries involved. In fact, on many occasions, the military establishment was the only institution capable of providing badly needed leadership during a crisis of government. One unfortunate aspect of most military interventions in Spanish America has been the associated violence and bloodshed. Another lamentable facet of Latin American military governments was their inability to transfer the reins of leadership to a stable civilian government.

Brazil, unlike most other Latin American countries, has had a stable and permanent military organization since the country was established as an Empire in 1822. A primary factor that shaped the Brazilian military mind was the winning of the country's independence without a major sacrifice of lives and property in contrast to the carnage of human beings and waste of resources experienced in Spanish America. The armed forces intervened to change governments on at least three occasions--1889, 1930, and 1964. There was also military involvement in various coups, movements, and displays of strength in 1937, 1945, 1954, 1955, and 1961. Significantly, most of these actions were bloodless and if the military gained control of the government, it was only a brief time until power was returned to civilian politicians.

Brazil experienced a democratic form of government from 1945 to 1964. During that time inflation became rampant and many prominent citizens, civilian and military, envisioned communism as a threat to the country. In April, 1964, the military assumed the reins of government without opposition and with apparent endorsement of most interest groups. Military rule was accepted as the only alternative to chaos. Although the facade of a democratic functioning government was presented, in actuality a military dictatorship existed. Even so, the military indicated it had no intention of remaining in power indefinitely.

After the revolutionary regime was firmly installed, its attention was turned to the dire economic conditions of the country. The cost of living was high, inflation was continuing

to rise, foreign investment was decreasing, and the national debt increasing. To cope with these problems the government employed a neocapitalist model of economic development. A two-year program for economic recovery was developed. Major provisions of the plan were controls of wage and price levels and encouragement of foreign investment to help specific aspects of the economy essential to basic development. Growth and the dynamic character of the economy are signified by gross national product increases of nearly nine percent annually in the past three years.

Social problems of health, education, housing, and medical attention are vast and must be given proper attention. In order to gain political support and to establish a stable government, the leaders of Brazil appear to realize the importance of social reforms that are responsive to the needs of the people. The government has many meaningful programs and projects ongoing to assist in the social integration of the country. However, because of the tremendous scope of requirements, current efforts of the government fail to meet adequately the social needs of the country.

By most indications, Brazil can be considered a modernizing country. The one area in which Brazil is lacking with regard to modernization is mass political participation. Brazil has established national development as the primary goal of the country, and any deviation, such as a different form of government, from reaching that objective will not be tolerated. Consequently, it is conceivable that a military-based strong central government will rule Brazil for an indefinite time.