

Development, religiosity, and women's formal employment in the MENA region: an
exploratory study

by

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B.A, Bu-Ali Sina University, 2002
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AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

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Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work
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Abstract

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have seen significant changes in human development indicators that suggest considerable improvement in people's lives. As a result of development, the total fertility rate for the region has dropped, and access to secondary education has increased in most nations in the region. However, throughout the region, many development outcomes remain gendered: that is, women and men do not share equally the benefits of development. For example, the women's labor force participation rate, a key measure of development, is the lowest in the world. The individual and national factors impacting women's right to employment are not well understood. Thus, this study in examining attitudes toward women's equal right to employment looks at individual-level indicators as well as relevant economic, political, and cultural factors.

First, I reviewed the existing theories and literature related to the status of women in the region and developed a comprehensive theory of the factors that shape attitudes toward women's right to employment. This study creates a more comprehensive model to understand the factors behind the low rate of women's labor force participation in the MENA region. This is followed by two sets of analyses that examine the impact of these factors.

In the first set of analyses, considering the nested structure of the dataset, the hierarchical linear model (HLM) that takes the hierarchical structure of the data into account is applied to analyze the dataset. The cross-level interaction analysis also is applied to explain variation in individual religiosity using level 2 predictors. The HLM and cross-level outcomes indicate that the cultural, economic, and political differences of the study nations have a significant effect on their

support for women's equal rights in the labor market. Consequently, individual-level predictors of egalitarian gender attitudes may also have different predictive power across the nations.

Thus, in the second set of analyses, I compare individual attitudes toward women's rights to employment within the sixteen MENA nations available in the World Values Survey (WVS) using years 2001, 2007, and 2014 and employing the logistic regression model. Findings show a clear variation among MENA nations regarding the individual and national indicators of gender ideology, which, in turn, results in different statuses for women in each nation. The analysis of this study indicates that nations cannot be unified regarding egalitarian gender ideology and their attitudes toward women's rights in the labor market. Different factors are associated differently with attitudes toward women among the nations. Thus, the attempt to rank or categorize countries in the MENA region regarding women's status is possible but complicated and difficult.

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Dedication

I dedicate my dissertation work to my family. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my loving parents, whose words of encouragement and push for tenacity ring in my ears. I also dedicate this dissertation to my husband, Sina Tonek, who has supported me throughout the process. I will always appreciate his efforts to help me pursue my education and advance my career. *In addition, I dedicate this work to my lovely child, Rodean Tonek, without whom this dissertation would have been completed two years earlier.*

Chapter 1 - Introduction

As the world nears the close of the second decade of the 21st century, women have more economic, social, and political opportunities than ever before; however, women do not enjoy these opportunities equally. Some developing countries have become wealthier and more democratic over the last three decades (Moghadam, 2003; Ross, 2012), yet the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is lagging on many of these indicators (Ross, 2012).

The driving purpose behind naming the Middle East region has its roots in military-strategic interests and the security conceptions of their inventors. Captain Alfred, a U.S. naval officer and the author of critical words on naval strategy, is ascribed as the inventor of the Middle East region. In 1902, Mahan, in his article, applied the term Middle East to discuss the security of the region from the Persian Gulf coast to India. However, the geographical scope shifted toward the West over time. The discovery of oil resources and the increasing velocity of Jewish migration to Palestine expanded the scope of the Middle East region. Britain added some counties, such as Iran, to the region and dropped others, such as Eretria, during the Second World War (Gilgin, 2019).

MENA covers an extensive region, including North Africa in the west to Pakistan in the east. Different organizations consider different countries in their definition of MENA. Per World Atlas, the MENA region traditionally comprises 19 nations, including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. An additional 16 territories are sometimes included in the scope of the region. These are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chad,

Comoros, Cyprus, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, and Turkey (www.worldatlas.com).

While many countries in the MENA region are expected to generate dramatic economic growth from oil production, civil war and internal conflicts remain as problems, and women have not benefited equally from economic growth (Moghadam, 2003). In the region, many development outcomes remain gendered; that is, women and men do not equally share the benefits of development (Doepke & Tertilt, 2008; Croix & Donckt, 2010; Doepke & Tertilt, 2011; Volart, 2004). Indeed, women's legal status and social position in the MENA region are the lowest in the world (Moghadam, 2003), and women still have restricted job opportunities and political influence compared to men (Ross, 2012).

The MENA region has seen significant changes in its Human Development Index (HDI), which suggests a considerable improvement in people's lives. The MENA nations are classified moderate to high in many human development indicators, such as life expectancy, adult literacy, and gross enrollment in education (United Nations, 2018). The Total fertility rate for the region has dropped from seven children per woman in 1960 to 2.8 children in 2015 (World Bank database, 2015). Besides, the gender gap in access to education at the primary and secondary levels has closed in most countries of the region (the World Bank, 2009). Thus, women in the region have the same access to education as women in other middle-income countries.

Simultaneously, the region has seen a notable back to early marriage even though secular governments in Iraq and other countries in the region enacted minimum age restrictions on marriage. Their goal was to give more educational opportunities to young women. However, in recent years, fundamentalist governments in Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey have taken action to lift the

restriction in favor of early marriage for girls. Consequently, child marriage for young women who have wed before the age of 18 in Iraq has been raised from 15% in 1997 to 24% in 2016 ([Nabeel & Wirtschafter, 2018](#)). The trend is similar in Turkey, where 15% of women in the country marry before the age of 18. The child marriage rate is also high for most of the MENA nations such as Yemen (32%), Egypt (17%), and Morocco (16%). Among countries with available data, Algeria has the lowest percent of child marriage by 2% (UNICEF, 2017).

Despite development and modernization in various ways, such as a decline in the fertility rate in the MENA region and a rise in MENA women's education levels, women's participation in the labor market in the MENA region is the lowest in the world (United Nations, 2012). According to the World Bank database (2012), the women's labor force participation in the MENA region is 26%, compared to 61% for women in other middle-income countries and 74% for men participating in the labor force in the MENA region. A recent World Bank Group (2017) study noted that there is a variation on the leading indicators of women's status in the region. For example, the women's labor force participation rate—a key measure of development—was as high as 32.4% in Turkey and 25% in Morocco in 2017 and as low as 6% in Yemen and 14% in Jordan (World Bank development indicators, 2016). This leads to the following central questions: Do individuals in the MENA nations hold specific attitudes toward women's employment that lead to a low rate of women's labor force participation in the region, and if so, what factors can explain this? Furthermore, how do men's and women's attitudes toward women's employment vary based on their sex? How do people's attitudes toward women's employment vary across the nations in the region? Understanding the elements that shape attitudes toward women's employment in the MENA region provides an opportunity to predict future changes in women's labor force

participation. This insight may enable women to initiate future changes that enhance women's situation in the labor market in the region.

The United Nations (2018) found that an investment in women's economic empowerment results in a direct path toward gender equality, poverty eradication, and inclusive economic growth. Moreover, Duflo (2012) stated that economic development reduces gender inequality and leads to higher personal satisfaction in life. In another study, UNICEF (2001) found that gender equality "refers to the equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys" (p. 2). The World Bank (2012) concurred with these findings. There is a significant difference in closing the gender gap with policymakers addressing this issue in the development stages. Thus, greater gender equality can enhance economic productivity and improve development outcomes for the next generation. Consequently, it is well established that empowering women through economic development is beneficial for society.

Development projects that address gender equality lead to a healthier economy for all society. As emphasized by the unified growth theory, enhancing gender equality through the development process in a society helps women escape poverty (Prettner & Strulik, 2014). Sustained economic growth is associated with declining fertility rates, rising incomes, and increasing investments in education (Prettner & Strulik, 2014). Economic growth also affects couples' childbearing and child-avoidance behaviors. Economically disadvantaged families in most of the developing nations have a significantly higher proportion of sons compared to economically advantaged families (Clark, 2000). Rohlfs, Reed, and Yamada (2010) believe that sustained economic growth lowers preferences for boys.

Furthermore, the literature on gender-specific resources and outcomes shows that the increase in the women's share of household income is associated with increased expenditures on children's care and clothing, women's clothing, and food, and decreased spending on alcohol and cigarettes (Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995; Haddad et al., 1997; Haddad et al., 1994; Engle, 1993; Kennedy & Peters, 1992; Thomas, 1990; 2000). The increase in household resources improves children's health and nutrition, particularly for girls. The extension of family resources' effect on children's health is also more significant when the recipients of the resources are women rather than men (Duflo, 2000; Duflo, 2003; Duflo & Udry, 2004).

Women's labor force participation increases not only their income but also their bargaining power within their households (Atkin, 2009). Increasing females' income improves survival rates for girls and educational attainment of all children, whereas increasing male income does not affect the boy's educational achievements. Girls' survival rates also drop when male income increases and female income remains constant (Qian, 2008; Das Gupta, 1987; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2001; Burgess & Zhuang, 2001; Reed & Yamada, 2005).

Given the importance of women's involvement in social life, it is crucial to understand the factors that influence gender equality in the labor market. The MENA region offers the possibility of refining and expanding prior research even further, as there is a significant variation on important gender and development indicators in the region.

1.1. The importance of attitudes

Attitudes play a significant role in shaping people's beliefs and behaviors. In sociology, the attitude is a "mental position with regard to a fact or state [or] a feeling or emotion toward a fact or state" (Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary). Regarding the importance of attitudes, the

link between attitude and gender equality is well established. Women face many obstacles in their efforts to gain equal access to employment in the MENA region. As AlMunajjed (2010) mentioned, one of the obstacles that women face is the attitude that their primary role is that of wives and mothers and that women's participation in the labor force is unnecessary, as men are the breadwinners of the family.

On the other hand, women's subordination, which is based on assigned gender roles, has political, economic, and cultural aspects (Moghadam, 1988). It creates a gendered workplace that exacerbates gender inequality in terms of the distribution of responsibilities and power (McIntosh & Islam, 2010). Thus, societies with greater gender equality are more likely to create and sustain democratic institutions (Htun & Weldon, 2010). Davis and Greenstein (2009) found egalitarian attitudes toward women in the labor market increase women's employment. Therefore, due to the influence of widespread attitudes in forming people's behavior and beliefs, this study examined attitudes toward women's equal right to employment in relation to individual religiosity, development indicators, and the level of wealth of the nations in the MENA region.

1.2. Development and attitudes toward women equal right to employment

The MENA countries' rates in human development are diverse as their incomes, which is an essential determinant in the variations of human development. The MENA nations, which have a population of 725 million people, can be categorized into three groups based on their petroleum revenue. The oil-rich countries in the region, with an average GDP of \$26,959, are Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, U.A.E., and Saudi Arabia, and Libya; they account for just 9% of the region's population. The second group, which accounts for 78% of the total MENA population, consists of the middle-income countries of the region: Iran and Iraq, with an average per capita GDP of \$7,842. The third

group consists of the low-income countries, with the average per capita GDP of \$1,880 in 2007, including Djibouti, Sudan, and Yemen. These account for 13% of the region's population (Isfahani, 2010).

Despite the similarities among MENA nations, there is a high degree of diversity in the HDI dimensions, such as unemployment rate, tertiary education rate, fertility rate, women's economic rights, level of democracy, and the number of the seats held by women in national parliament, due to the possession of oil and gas resources. The development of the oil-rich countries is grounded on petroleum income, which yields a large public sector. Many of the oil-rich countries have invested a portion of the petroleum revenue in free education for women and youth (Isfahani, 2010). The possibility of having a high level of income in the large public sectors explains why the sector is the primary destination for the young and educated groups in the population (Isfahani, 2010). Thus, the education system does not encourage creativity that leads to a high rate of employment, since the public sectors do not have enough capacity for all school graduates. Therefore, it is not easy to measure the human development index due to disparities of the income that binds these characteristics in the MENA region. However, human development indicators are well-documented in the country-level reports.

The MENA countries have a diverse experience in the HDI level. The low-income MENA countries, along with Africa, had the lowest HDI level in 1990 but experienced rapid growth in the HDI level by 2015. The low-income MENA countries' growth in the HDI level was twice as fast as the index of their GDP per capita. The middle-income countries that similarly begun with a low HDI in 1990 managed to improve their HDI level by 2015. According to the health index, middle-income MENA countries improved their level of health, including life expectancy and education,

over the considered period. For instance, the average life expectancy in the middle-income MENA countries reached 71 years of age in 2007, which is the same as the life expectancy in other non-MENA middle-income countries. However, the high-income MENA countries that have the highest income index of 0.91 in 2007 have ranked the third in the region when it comes to H.D. indicators (Isfahani, 2010).

One of the key markers of gender equality as one of the human development indicators is the share of women employed in the paid nonagricultural sector (World Bank, 2003). Klasen and Lamanna's 2009 study also indicated that there is a significant association between a higher level of women's labor force participation and lower fertility rates. Besides, Moghadam stated that women's employment elevates national economies by providing human resources for the labor market (1998). Therefore, from one point of view, women's employment enhances women's status in society by providing financial resources for individual women. From the other point of view, women's employment boosts economic development by enabling nations to utilize neglected human sources. The overarching research question at the macro level is as follows:

1. To what degree do development indicators (unemployment rate, tertiary education rate, fertility rate, women's economic rights, level of democracy, and the number of the seats held by women in national parliament) affect attitudes toward women's labor force participation in the MENA region?

1.3. Petroleum revenue and attitudes toward women equal right to employment

At first glance, it would appear that religion is the dominant social factor affecting women in the MENA region. These nations, however, share many similar attributes that are distinct from

the rest of the world. For example, a significant number of nations in the region benefit from a high income of petroleum exports. The GDP of the oil export countries in the MENA region is based on oil, and governmental activities are funded from oil rent. The reliance on oil revenue varies among oil export countries from more than 40% for Libya and Iraq to 20% for Algeria. However, oil comprises more than 50% of exports and is the primary source of fiscal revenue for most of the countries in the region (International Monetary Fund, 2016). These benefits, however, do not come without consequences.

According to the I.M.F. (2016), oil revenue in all oil export countries is linked not only to government activities but to non-oil and non-government sectors such as construction, which are heavily dependent on government support. The dominance of the oil revenue on GDP and fiscal revenue leads to limited diversification in economic sectors, employment, and labor productivity (I.M.F., 2016). The region has a high fertility rate, resulting in the rapid growth of the youth population (Isfahani, 2010). Additionally, it leads to a high rate of youth unemployment and the low rate of female participation in the labor force (Isfahani, 2010). The overarching research question at the macro-level is as follows:

Oil production reduces the share of the agricultural sector of the economy and, consequently, women's participation in the nonagricultural labor force (Ross, 2008). As a result, women's failure to join the workforce and inability to contribute to household income decrease women's influence on the family, which leads to fewer educational opportunities for girls. Illiterate women are more likely to have more children, leading to a higher fertility rate in the region (Ross, 2008). Thus, Ross (2008) suggests that not Islam—but oil revenue—can explain the underrepresentation of women in the workforce.

Ross (2008) also argued that despite the widely accepted assumption that development enhances gender equality, different types of development have different effects on gender relations. He believed that development brings about gender equality when growth facilitates women's contributions to the economy. In contrast, the growth that discourages women from joining the workforce tends to elevate gender inequalities.

Blaydes and Linzer (2006) stated that economic opportunities have a remarkable effect on women's belief systems toward religion, assumptions of women's status in society, and gender equality. They suggested that women with fewer opportunities to join the labor market are more likely to carry on the fundamentalist Islamic perspective. Fundamentalist ideologies that tend to favor men place restrictive rules upon women's education and employment opportunities.

2. To what degree does oil wealth affect attitudes toward women's labor force participation in the MENA region?

1.4. Individual religiosity and attitudes toward women equal right to employment

Too often, the problems are reduced to the effects of religiosity and specifically Islam upon the population (e.g., Goldscheider et al., 2014; Seguino, 2010). For example, Inglehart and Norris (2003) argued that Islam perpetuates gender inequality and restricts women's presence in social life. Tessler (2002) also believes that Islam promotes a patriarchal social structure that oppresses women and reduces women's participation in society and the labor market. Yet Fish (2002) argued that gender inequality and restrictive segregation according to sex, do not have a strong scriptural basis. Even further, the *Kuran* provides much more liberal instructions on the relationship between sexes than what is practiced under *Shari'a* law in modern Muslim societies (for example, 2:2-41;

4:128; 58:1-4). Thus, social practices are the determinant factor of women's status in Muslim societies.

To better understand religiosity, which is a complex idea, Kellstedt, Green, Guth, and Smidt (1996) proposed a classification of religiosity to conceptualize and measure it. The three aspects of religiosity are belief, behavior, and belonging.

Belief is a conviction or idea about the nature of reality that an individual or group accepts as accurate. The belief component encompasses theology, an understanding of the divine, and human relationship and social theology, which connects the individual to the religious institution and the world. One may also believe in God, heaven, hell, and life after death (Bloom & Arikan, 2011).

Behavior is the private and public practice of religion. The components of private behavior encompass social religious practices such as reading sacred texts, fasting, and prayer. The social practice of religion consists of participation in organized religious communities and attendance at places of worship. Religious belonging is group identification and affiliation to a specific organized religious group or faith community (Bloom & Arikan, 2011).

There are dimensions of religiosity which have been found to have various effects on practitioners' attitudes and social tolerance. These dimensions may be associated with traditional conservative values that tend toward order and cause intolerance to change. On the other hand, beliefs may fuel charitable activities and foster volunteering among those who attend places of worship (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002; Dekker & Halman, 2003). A further review of religion needs to be addressed to better understand the dynamics of religiosity.

Religion may be defined as “[p]ersonal or institutional system of beliefs, practices, and values relating to the cosmos and supernatural” (Bell Sociology Dictionary, 2013–2019). Three of the world’s major religions, known as the Abrahamic religions, are Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2010). These religions lay claim to Abraham as the father of their respective faiths. They teach that Abraham had a special destiny that God had determined. God selected Abraham to “become the father of a mighty nation that will one day be more numerous than the stars in the sky, and one day his descendants will possess the land of Canaan as their own” (Armstrong, 1993, p. 13).

A brief history of these religions reveals that Abraham is recognized as the founder. All these religions started in what is now known as the MENA region. The oldest monotheistic religion, Judaism, arose in the second millennium B.C.E. through Abraham. A defining moment for Judaism was when Moses freed the Israelites from slavery in Egypt. Subsequently, he met Yahweh in the desert, and this interaction confirmed Judaism as a monotheistic, patriarchal religion.

As religions developed, men dominated them. In Judaism, Abraham, Moses, David, and Solomon each served as the moral compass of the religion. Christianity followed suit as the more memorable followers of Christ were his disciples Mark, Luke, Matthew, John, James, and Paul. Finally, Mohammed founded Islam, and men also dominated this faith. Rumi of Persia, Saladin of Egypt and Syria, and Ali Jinnah were keepers of the faith.

Although all of these religions are patriarchal, the focus of this paper is on the effects of Islam on women. In order to appreciate the role of women in Islam, it is essential to look at the religion’s history.

Islam was born from both Christianity and Judaism. Islam arose in Mecca (in Saudi Arabia) around the year 570 and expanded from the mid-eight centuries and after into North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Europe. However, the new Muslim societies in different areas created a broad cultural tradition that adapted local traditions and customs into the teachings of Islam (Henning, 2016). Although many traditions were incorporated into Islam, gender equality was not addressed in Islamic precepts. In fact, gender equality may have predated the Abrahamic religions in hunter-gatherer societies. Indeed, there is evidence of gender equality in the history of the early civilizations of the ancient Near East. For example, Enheduanna, daughter of King Sargon of Akkad, is the first woman who held the title of lord or priest. She also co-ruled with her brother (Roberts, 2004) even though the hunter-gatherers and other pre-plow peoples had a more egalitarian attitude toward women than people in agricultural societies (Keddie & Baron, 2008).

Some scholars argue for the opposite—that Islamic doctrine introduced gender egalitarianism, but patriarchal men managed to destroy it. For example, Mernissi (1991) argued that the founder of Islam, Mohammad, assumed gender equality and rejected any inequality. However, from the seventeenth century, the Muslim clerics manipulated the sacred texts, such as *Hadith*, to implement male priority and to subordinate women in Muslim societies (Mernissi, 1991). In contrast, Badawi (1995) argue that feminism and Islam are incompatible because feminism conflicts with the Islamic conception of piety (*taqwa*). As a result of technological development, the agricultural revolution brought along a more significant division of labor and expanded class differences (Keddie & Baron, 2008). Class differences developed as well as differences between men and women. After the agricultural revolution, the urban women of the middle and upper classes no longer had to go outside to work (Keddie & Baron, 2008). As women

lost their interest in working outside the home, they became more subordinated to men in society. For example, as land inheritance became important, female virginity and fidelity became the principal solicitude (Keddie & Baron, 2008). Thus, women in the Ancient Near East societies were often treated as men's property that primarily needed to be guarded to eliminate their contact with other men (Keddie & Baron, 2008). The results were the creation of a patriarchal society that controlled women's social presence in the Islamic Middle East region in the pre-Islamic era.

The Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are patriarchy and stultify women (Sharpe, 2005). As Carol Christ (2013) argued:

Patriarchy is a system of male dominance, rooted in the ethos of war which legitimates violence, sanctified by religious symbols, in which men dominate women through the control of female sexuality, with the intent of passing property to male heirs, and in which men who are heroes of war are told to kill men, and are permitted to rape women, to seize land and treasures, to exploit resources, and to own or otherwise dominate conquered people.

When carried to an extreme, religiosity may lead to a radical interpretation of sacred texts. That is, fundamentalism, or "[t]he tendency to reduce religion to its most fundamental tenets, based on a strict interpretation of core texts" (Wiktionary n.d., Bell, Sociology Dictionary, 2013–2018), is created by followers of the faith. These tenets affect people's attitudes toward social, economic, and political change (Niehoff, 2017).

In this study, a review of the MENA region studies reveals a male-dominant culture that may result from the patriarchal approach of Islam. The results are predictable. Male dominance is profound and widespread in this region. Leaders rule the nations based on the various

interpretations of *Shari'a* Law and *Kuran*, and the result is gender-based inequities in the MENA Region (Henning, 2016). Therefore, it is essential to understand the role of Islam in the MENA context. At the micro-level, this study investigates the role of religion as a critical explanation of gender equality. Most of the studies examining women's employment in the MENA region emphasize the role of Islam for women's social status (e.g., Goldscheider et al., 2014; Seguino, 2010).

According to Martin van Bruinessen (2018), there is a rising trend in conservative and radical Islamist ideas throughout the region that prompts intolerance toward non-Muslims. However, research on the influences of Islam on development outcomes, especially on women's status, is mixed. On the one hand, adherence to Islam is considered to perpetuate gender inequality and restrict women's presence in social life (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). It is argued that Islam promotes patriarchal social structures that oppress women and reduce women's participation in society and the labor market (Tessler, 2002). On the other hand, other researchers argue Islamic doctrines are not the primary cause of women's inferior status in Muslim societies (e.g., Hibri, 1997; Read, 2002; Olmsted, 2002; Mojab, 2001). From these perspectives, individual religiosity—not Islam per se—adversely affects women's social representation (Read, 2004; Al-Faruqi, 2000; Banaszak & Plutzer, 1993). Thus, at the micro-level, my overarching research question is:

3. To what degree does individual religiosity affect attitudes toward women's labor force participation in the MENA region?

1.5. Individual socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes toward women equal right to employment

Besides the macro-level factors, individual sociodemographics also shape attitudes toward gender equality. Davis and Greenstein (2009) categorized the elements into two groups of individuals' interests and exposures that shape gender ideology. Personal interests include sex, marital status, age, and exposure indicators such as employment status and education that develop through life experiences that shape the individuals' gender ideology.

Studies supported the effectiveness of all individual sociodemographics on shaping attitudes toward gender ideology. For example, Kroska (2009) and Price (2008) indicated that young, single, educated, and employed women expressed the most support of gender equality. Additionally, women with a higher level of education are more likely to promote gender equality than others, since a high level of education opens a broad range of careers for women (Banaszak & Plutzer, 1993; Klein, 1984). Not only educated women but also men with higher education are likelier to support gender equality than uneducated people. Educated men usually have more interaction with educated women in professional positions, which can undermine the false assumption of the lower capability of women in the public sphere. Thus, education provides more enlightening opportunities for men by producing higher awareness of gender inequality (Davis & Robinson, 1991). The employment status of women also appears to have effects on gender egalitarianism in which women who are employed are more economically dependent on the labor market (Baxter & Kane, 1995). Besides, men who experience inequality and obstacles in the workplace become more gender-egalitarian (Davis & Greenstein, 2009).

Marital status is also an essential factor in determining individuals' attitudes toward gender equality. Adamczyk (2013) showed that single or divorced women are more liberal than married women when it comes to supporting the ideas of gender equality. Thus, the second overarching research question at the micro level is:

4. To what degree do individual sociodemographic characteristics (sex, age, marital status, education level, number of children, and employment status) affect attitudes toward women's labor force participation in the MENA region?

1.6. A unique contribution of this study

Prior researchers have identified several explanations of gender equality at the macro- and micro-subjective levels (Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Yu & Lee, 2013; Baxter & Kane, 1995; Inglehart & Norris, 2003a). Based on the previous studies, the reason for women's labor force participation limitation is varied, and factors as diverse as development indicators, oil wealth, individual religiosity, individual sociodemographic characteristics, and gender ideology are relevant. Gender ideology "refers to attitudes regarding the appropriate roles, rights, and responsibilities of men and women in society (Sociology Guide, 2017)." Most of the previous studies have considered gender ideology as an independent factor without paying attention to the national context (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). As a result, prior research may not adequately explain gender and development processes outcomes in the MENA region.

Since previous research identified important explanatory factors at both the macro (national) and micro (individual) levels of analysis, the hypotheses of this study are situated at both levels. Following the literature, the study focuses on individual religiosity as the micro-level

indicator of attitudes toward egalitarian attitudes toward women in the labor market. It also examines the influence of each nation's oil wealth as one of the critical macro-level explanations of gender equality. Besides, this research also investigates the role of several dimensions of economic development, including unemployment rates, women's economic rights, fertility rates, political democracy, and the number of women in a national parliament.

Thus, this study exploits these variations to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the essential indicators of gender equality by focusing on an underinvestigated region. This research will attempt to determine the degree of effect that development indicators, oil wealth, individual religiosity, and individual sociodemographic factors have upon attitudes toward women's labor force participation in the MENA region. This study, therefore, contributes to the examination of gender-related attitudes in the labor market in the MENA region. Additionally, it contributes to the understanding of how gender ideology is formed and shapes attitudes toward women's equal right to employment within a specific national context. In examining gender ideology, this study also contributes to relevant economic, political, demographic, and cultural factors. Finally, it creates a more comprehensive model to use to understand the factors behind the low rate of women's labor force participation in the MENA region.

1.7. Study outline

This chapter has provided an overview of the study and stresses the importance of the included study and research questions. The second chapter provides a review of the related theories; it consults and incorporates dominant classical, modern, and postmodern views of relevant theories to the development of gender ideology to utilize the theoretical framework of the study. The chapter also evaluates the strengths of the theories in explaining the women's labor

force participation in the MENA region. In the third chapter, I review the literature related to attitudes toward women's labor force participation and the influential factors shaping gender ideology. In this chapter, I design the study hypothesis based on the theoretical views of chapter two and empirical studies reviewed in chapter three. Chapter four provides the research methodology selected for the study. In this chapter, I also discuss sources of the applied data for the study. Chapter five includes findings using data analysis and statistical procedures. In this chapter, univariate and bivariate, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) and cross-level interaction analysis, and regression analysis outcomes are presented. Chapter six discusses the findings in chapter five. It reviews the relationship between study variables to develop the explanations of the attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in the MENA region. Chapter six concludes this study and sheds light on the contribution of this study to the literature. It also identifies the limitations of the study and identifies the avenue for future research.

Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework

Analysis of this study is situated within the framework of gender and development. This chapter is an overview of theories relating to women's status in the paid labor force and egalitarian attitude toward gender equality in the labor market. Theories about women in the labor market and gender inequality are reviewed in two parts. The first part deals with the developmental theories that are applicable to explain the association of development and women's status in the paid labor force. Afterward, the capability of each theory in explaining the women's low status in the labor market in the MENA region is also discussed. The second part deals with the feminist theories that bring discussions on gender inequality into the development theories. Theories of women's participation in the labor force and gender inequality are discussed and examined for their applicability to explain gender inequality in the labor force of the MENA region. This section serves as the basis of shaping hypotheses of this study.

2.1. Theories of Development

This section provided the theoretical framework for this study. It is informed by relevant development theories and serves as a ground in designing the theoretical framework for this study. This section also provides a piece of fundamental theoretical knowledge for the empirical studies in the following chapter. However, the concept of development as the basis of development theories needs to be discussed before reviewing the theories of development.

Development is a complicated question of industrial policy and economic processes, and it is also an ultimate social process that arises internally from a society. Therefore, there is no universal formula for development (Kiely, 1995; Rist, 2014). Social scientists have generalized the concept of economic development in many areas of society, such as communication, education,

and political development (Etzioni & Halevy, 1973). In more recent literature, development refers to a situation in which society experiences increases in welfare; social service infrastructure such as health, sanitation, and education; and people working smarter rather than harder (Amsden, 2003).

Although development has different meanings, and different definitions of development demonstrate various scholars' perceptions, for the purposes of this paper, development is defined as a process that promotes people's access to income, education, health, and a clean physical environment (Rist, 2014). However, another aspect of development is found in developmental studies. Development in the social evolutionism perspective refers to the process of achieving equality with industrial countries (Rist, 2014). On the other hand, the individualism of development is centered on enhancing individual incomes. Finally, the economist's view of development emphasizes the process of economic growth and an increase in national income (Rist, 2014).

In the post-World War II era, a broader perspective known as world development emerged because of two historical streams. First, the development debate emerged in the 1950s due to the need for the reconstruction of ruined postwar Europe. At the time, Europe relied upon the United States and the Soviet Union to reconstruct its economy (Rist, 2014).

The second historical stream started with the decolonization of Asia and Africa between 1945 and 1960. Following World War II, European countries such as Great Britain and France controlled a large part of Asia and Africa. These European nations had colonies, but in the power vacuum of a war-weary world, a wave of nationalist movements spread in these colonial nations. European countries that were damaged as a result of the Second World War did not have enough

power to face the nationalist movements and maintain their domination in the colonial nations (Rist, 2014). Consequently, these former colonies freed themselves from their imperial overseers.

At the same time, the United States, which incurred the least amount of damage during the Second World War due to its geographic situation, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) rose to dominance. The United States and the USSR had no interest in protecting colonial nations in Asia and Africa. Therefore, the colonial regions became ideological battlegrounds for the United States and the Soviet Union (Rist, 2014). Consequently, a series of movements started around the world to identify a common development policy for pre-colonial regions that were considered less developed or developing countries.

During this period, a development referred to economic development and economic cooperation of developing countries in the global system (Rist, 2014). Additionally, it was considered a necessary process that all developing nations should go through this path to integrate into the world economy (Rist, 2014). Many economists argued that development would come to the developing countries at the end of a significant economic effort based on private investment, external assistance, and free trade (Rist, 2014).

As capitalism rose in the European nations, so too did their need for economic growth to finance military protection and political legitimacy. It then followed that the definition of development as economic growth emerged. This idea further evolved and became a global concept in the mid-twentieth century (the 1940s–1970s) (McMichael, 2008). Consequently, the “Development Project” emerged after the political independence of the colonial world to enhance the development in colonial countries and also to provide a safe environment for international aid, trade, and investment flows during the Cold War period. The concept of the Development Project

is based on the idea that the less developed countries need to transfer from agricultural resources to industrial resources to move toward development (McMichael, 2008).

Theories such as modernization emphasize the economic aspects of development and defined developing countries as regions where “the economy has not yet reached the level of North America, Western Europe, etc.” (Rist, 2014, p. 8). Additionally, studies of development consider modern societies secular and rational. Modern development is the Western project to expand the value of the commodity around the world (Rist, 2014). Thus, development is a process of changing the national environment and social relations to maximize commodities’ production.

However, an economic interpretation of development was not enough for sociological analysis. Cardoso and Faletto (1979) argued that development is a political process that alters the internal and external aspects of underdeveloped societies through a social and economic transformation. Thus, a broader and more sophisticated analysis of development is needed to study both structure and the action of social forces as well as the cultural values and ideologies that are related to social actions and movements (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979).

Booth (1994) characterized the argument of development in the post-War order as a construction of power relations that eased the intervention of the industrial West into the marginalized third world through the international project of development (Appelbaum & Robinson, 2005). In this perspective, development is progress that enhances people’s potential and self-confidence. Moreover, it enables them to overcome the fear of exploitation. The process of development will result in significant political independence and economic growth. The majority of development scholars defined the purpose of development as providing various political and economical choices for people to make development more democratic and participatory (Rist,

2014). Thus, development should promote people's access to income, education, health, and a clean physical environment (Rist, 2014). Over time, this power relationship turned development into the concept of opportunity and sustainability.

From this perspective, development can also be understood through inequities around the world. As seen through a Eurocentric view, development is the European achievement in the global hierarchy. The world is categorized into developed and undeveloped (third-world) regions. Hence, "development" is a political concept in which dominant political powers define the world (McMichael, 2008; Appelbaum & Robinson, 2005).

2.1.1. Classical Theories of Economic Development

Economic development became established as a discipline in the 1950s (Dang & Pheng, 2015), but there is an earlier history of the topic. Adam Smith (1776) and Karl Marx (1867) were prominent economists who had opposite perspectives toward economic development. In his analysis of economic development (capitalism) in *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith (1776) focused on the market and saw the division of labor as an accelerator of the production process. He argued that nations would be able to enhance their wealth through specialization in the production process and exchange in the free market. He also believed that the "invisible hand" is the foundation of the economic market and capitalism. He explained that in a competitive market, private investors are pursuing their own interest, which promotes national outputs that lead to an increase in public benefits. The role of the government in this system is limited to activities such as the administration of justice, national security, and enforcing the rights of private property owners. Meanwhile, private property and competition in the free market would improve the economy and reduce poverty. However, these goals have not always been achieved. In some cases,

capitalism has raised the economic gap between the poor and the rich around the world (Schumpeter, 2010).

Karl Marx (1933) held a different position. He argued that capitalism is the cause of poverty and inequality in societies because the wealth of the capitalist is coming from the exploitation of the surplus values created by workers. Therefore, public ownership of properties should be the essence of the economy, and the state needs to manage and plan the economy to serve the interests of the nation. Hence, the state needs to end private property to remove poverty and inequality. Marx believed that an inevitable evolution abolishes the increasing concentration of wealth in the capitalist system to establish socialism (Souise, 2007). However, the historical experience of socialism showed little or no improvement in providing equality for human societies. For example, the socialist model of Marx failed to provide a solution to poverty and inequality in the Soviet Union (Meier, 2001).

2.1.2. Modernization Theory

In the aftermath of World War II (1945), credence in the human's power in achieving development gave way to a search for obstacles of development in the social and political structure of former colonies now independent but “underdeveloped” countries (Kandiyoti, 2002). Despite apparent differences in the theories of development, Modernization theory, dependency theory, and the world-system theory of development became the dominant models of development in sociology (Kandiyoti, 2002). Each model created a “universal” framework to explain the pattern of development around the globe. The scholars of the modernization theory, dependency theory, and world-system theory consider development as economic development and modernization.

However, each perspective takes into account different factors in the analysis of development (Kandiyoti, 2002).

Many of Daniel Lerner's (1958) ideas were the principle of the modernization theory. He studied the role of mass media in the post-colonial world's journey to democracy and modernization. He believes that mass media spread the idea of modernization in terms of democracy, civilization, and free-market all over the post-colonial nations. His main question was about how nations become modern. His definition of modern was based on the characteristics of Western societies, and modernization, in his discussion, means westernization of the societies. He believes that modernization starts when the transition of the rural population to cities and from farms to factories starts. This transition of the population results in growing the city's population density, which demands modernized institutions such as schools, mass media, and the free market. In this process of transition, mass media is the central element in enhancing and spreading the modernization model by making the model attractive and irresistible to people. Mass media can assist in the transformation of the traditional way of thinking and do of the people to the modern one. In his study, Lerner focused on the modernization process in the Middle East. He states that the Middle East is left behind the modernized world, and only the strengthening of civil society can fix the region's retardation. He states that modernization is not in line with Islam and in the clash between Islam and modernization, Islam is vulnerable.

Modernization theory, to address the dynamics of a changing world, emphasizes the internal factors of underdevelopment, and denies the effect of colonization. This approach toward development became a dominant view that addressed the failure of development in underdeveloped regions. In modernization theory, development is a process of transition from

‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ societies. Unfortunately, the persistence of tradition keys an imperfect transition to the capitalist social structure, and underdevelopment ensued. Modernization theorists believe that traditional societies can go through the stages of economic growth if these societies follow the path created by Western capitalist societies. These societies also must discard their values and accept modern values and ideas (Rostow, 1960).

Modernization theory is an offshoot of the Marxist developmental theory. Development in the Marxist theory is considered as material conditions of the society in which people can fulfill their basic needs, such as feeding, clothing, and housing (Marx, 1933). Additional development theories within social science disciplines emerged. These are based upon the materialistic view of Marxism, but they tend to be more pessimistic toward development. Rostow (1960) argued development in terms of economic development; however, he took issue with the Marxist economic view of development. According to Rostow (1960), development is the modernization of a nation through industrialization and economic growth. Rostow (1960) formulated the economic “stage of growth” model to explain development, how certain societies developed in the past, and how undeveloped countries with fewer chances for economic growth than traditional societies can achieve development in the future.

Economic development proceeds in a “five-stage” sequence: linear pattern, traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption (Rostow, 1960). An alternative approach is that Western countries are modernized and advanced societies, whereas less-developed countries are traditional or third-world societies (Rostow, 1960). These less-developed economies are based upon agriculture, and there is a

hierarchical social structure, limited productivity, limited chances for vertical mobility, and an absence of a robust political system (Rostow, 1960).

Development is a transition from traditional to modern rational society (Kiely, 1995). Therefore, the third-world countries will move toward the Western model of development. It is also important to consider that internal factors, such as cultural values and social instructions, play an essential role in development (Rostow, 1960). Consequently, changes in the traditional social structure, social values, and the political system will result in economic growth and technological transformation (Rostow, 1960). In the modernization perspective, traditional societies need to go through the take-off stage of growth with the help of external investments and move toward the maturity stage. In this stage, society goes through the replacement of agriculture with industry, and that change is followed by technological improvements and a rise in workers' wages. The next step, the maturity stage, paves a way "toward durable consumers' goods and services" in "the age of high mass-consumption (Rostow 1960, p. 10)." During the post-maturity stage, the individual's income increases to a point where a shift occurs in consumption patterns from the basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing, to high-quality and durable goods and services (Rostow, 1960).

Additionally, for classical modernization theory, foreign investment plays a critical role in the early stage of industrial development in the third world, which results in the promotion of the goods produced in the third world. Therefore, modernization researchers define development as "per capita national product or income, of the industrialization of entrepreneurial capacities to engage in accumulation and reinvestment, and so on (Booth & David, 1994, p. 47)." Therefore, development is a progressive movement toward a modern society that involves more complex institutions and advanced technology (Booth, 1994). However, new modernization studies, while

accepting the classical modernization theory, focus on the history of different cases in their analysis. These theories present a specific path of development for each country. They also include external factors into the analysis of development and indicated multidirectional paths of development (So, 1990).

2.1.2.1. The MENA region and the Modernization Theory

Modernization theory suggests that underdeveloped countries should follow the experience of western countries in the modernization process. From this perspective, the modernization process for all nations is the same and has to go through stages of modernization. Modernization also will change the culture of the society consequently. However, modernization theory has failed to explain the MENA region modernization process in various ways (Richards et al., 2013).

First, modernization theorists argue that culture, demographic characteristics, and occupational structure of society will change along the modernization process. Modernization provides more educational and occupational opportunities for citizens during the transition. These changes will bring more opportunities and comfort to women's lives, notably through a reduction in fertility and household responsibilities. This condition liberates women from their traditional roles as mothers and caregivers and enhances women's opportunities to participate in the labor market (Haghighat, 2012), yet the MENA region does not precisely follow the stages of modernization. Many countries in the MENA region are oil-rich nations and reached the consumption stage without passing through some stages of modernization, such as the take-off stage. As a result, the modernization process did not occur alongside cultural and social changes as it did in Western nations (Haghighat, 2014).

Feminists believe that modernization is a male-centered theory that does not pay attention to gender relations. The primary purpose of modernization is to promote a capitalist market that leads to the marginalization of women's traditional roles. Women in the modernization process also lose their rural kinship support network as a result of urbanization. Thus, the modernization process creates a hierarchal system of gender inequality (Haghighat, 2014; Haghighat, 2012; Sklair, 1991). Therefore, the MENA region needs an internal perspective to explain women's status in the job market and the demographic changes in the region.

2.1.2.2. Critical views on the Modernization Theory

One of the earliest critics of the modernization approach was Andre Gunder Frank. Frank (1966), in his dependency theory, found Rostow's model of development useless. He considered the external factors of development instead of the internal factors and created a model of satellites (the underdeveloped societies) and metropolises (developed societies) to explain the underdevelopment of peripheral societies. Frank (1966) considered development in Western metropolitan countries on exploitation of the third world through colonialization.

In this model, a lack of economic development is connected to exploitative relations between the metropolis and peripheral satellites. Thus, the free-market system is based on unfair trade that ignores the historical economic and political disparities of the nations. The only way for peripheral nations to achieve development is to free themselves from capitalism since underdevelopment is a necessary product of the exploitative nature of a capitalist world economy (Frank, 1966).

Dependency theory is based upon the idea that the third world will remain underdeveloped within the global capitalist system because the global capitalist system operated actively to prevent

development in the third world through transnational corporations. The best outcome of development under the global capitalist system is “enclave development,” in which it reproduces third-world exploitation by the first world (Sklair, 1991, p. 31). “For dependency theory, precapitalistic social formations, along with international capitalism, are often portrayed as ‘obstructions’ to the realization of truly autonomous development in the periphery” (Scott, 1995, p. 88). Thus, according to Frank’s dependency theory, development occurred in modern countries as a result of the imperialism system and “appropriation economic surplus exploitation” at the expense of underdevelopment in other regions. Consequently, the only way toward the development of undeveloped countries is to weaken their ties to capitalism (Kapoor, 2008; Kandiyoti, 2002).

World-system scholars developed almost the same framework as a dependency framework to show how various parts of the world have changed differently in odd ways. The ideas of time and space are fundamental elements of the world-system study of the “ever-changing modern world” (Dickinson & Schaeffer, 2001, p. 9–10). The analysis of this approach is based upon the assumption that the “dynamic changing division of labor between the core, periphery, and semi-periphery societies are within the orbit of the capitalist world system” (Sklair, 1991, p. 31). Imperialism and capitalism have a close relationship with the structuralism and socioeconomic perspective of development. State and class control of capital development is the premise of development politics (Kapoor, 2008).

Wallerstein (1979) expanded Frank’s dependency model to construct a world-system perspective upon the historical analysis of specific cases. Wallerstein’s world-system theory is a neo-Marxist explanation of the development process, which is more acceptable in developing

societies (Moghadam, 1952). He divided the world into three distinct zones—core (developed societies), semi-periphery (Second World or less developed societies), and periphery (Third World societies). While the peripheral countries produce labor-intensive products, the core states produce technology-intensive products. Semi-peripheral states facilitate the core and periphery trade relations to import raw materials from peripheral regions and export the manufactured goods to them (Wallerstein, 1979). As a result, peripheral countries will experience a process in which reproduces their subordination status in an unequal relationship to the core (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995).

2.1.2.3. The MENA region and the Dependency Theory

Despite modernization theory, dependency and world-system theorists analyzed the dynamics of international capital flows and market in the MENA region. Nevertheless, dependency scholars presumed that capitalist countries determine the development strategies, and the government of peripheral nations have no control over their interaction with the core nations. Core countries have a powerful instrument such as the IMF and the World Bank to impose the proper models of economic development in developing countries. (Richards, et al., 2013). Therefore, dependency and world-system advocates have missed the representation of state and the power of sovereigns of peripheral nations in their analysis of development strategies. In the case of the MENA region, they did not take into account the primary role of the states in development plans based on the oil revenue which is persuaded mainly by the governments (Kapoor, 2008; Richards et al., 2013).

Dependency and world-system scholars in their analysis of development also have focused on the relationship between nations rather than on social classes within the nations. This

perspective toward development has led them to ignore the women's situation in the patriarchal system of developing countries. Thus, they failed to notice the gender inequality that is created through the development process in developing countries (Jacqueline, 1982).

Even though the dependency theory goes back to the 1960s and 1970s, some scholars believe that the dependency theory can be applied in finding the root of the economic and political conditions of poor countries. For example, ATEŞ, Es, and Bayraktar in 2005 applied the dependency theory in understanding the politics and economy of the Middle East. They refer to Samir Amin's statements on the Middle East's economy in 1986; he claimed that the economy of the Arab world heavily depends on the import of consumer goods and foreign investment. Samir Amin believed that the economy of the Arab world is more externally oriented and more dependent than the economy of all less-developed nations in the world (ATEŞ, Es & Bayraktar, 2005). The Middle East's economic dependency is noticeable in the export of petrochemicals and the need for Western technology to maintain the petroleum infrastructure to be able to import the necessary products such as food and household goods. Considering the lower price of raw materials such as petroleum, the states of less-developed countries have to get some loans to be able to import the necessary products. Thus, they become dependent financially when they cannot pay back their loans to their creditors who are Western financial institutions such as IMF and the World Bank (ATEŞ, Es & Bayraktar, 2005).

Also, the dependency on oil exports also results in declining food self-sufficiency in the Middle East region. Higher oil revenues in the 1970s resulted in economic growth and, consequently, a rise in incomes. Furthermore, rapid population growth of 3.3% during 1976—97 in the Middle East region raised the demand for food consumption (USDA, 1999). The growth of

migration from rural areas to cities as a result of industrialization also sped up the demand for food consumption. The expansion of urbanization, on the one hand, results in a higher demand for food among urban residents than rural population because of the increase in public education and public health awareness. On the other hand, the migration from rural to urban areas results in the reduction of food production in rural areas because of the lack of human resources. Also, geographical conditions and the region's climate are unsuitable for agriculture and worsen the situation of food production in the area (ATEŞ, Es & Bayraktar, 2005).

To understand the post-colonial trajectories of Middle East societies, not only the historical characteristics of the region but also the ongoing influences of the global market have to be taken into account (Kandiyoti, 2002). There are two basic approaches regarding the beginning of the modern era in the Middle East. One approach known as Orientalism refers to the invasion of Napoleon in 1798 as the symbolic effect of the West and, consequently, the beginning of the modernization process in the region (Kandiyoti, 2002). In contrast, the other approach suggests that modernization has a root in the history of the region and before the invasion of the French revolutionary army (Kandiyoti, 2002).

However, the new perspective toward modernity in the Middle East suggests that modernity in the area is a result of the colonial history of the region (Kandiyoti, 2002). Women in Muslim countries are producing their narratives of Islam and women's rights under Islamic law. These activists seek reforms to the Islamic laws formed based on a patriarchal interpretation of Islam to achieve gender equality and women's empowerment within Islam (Spellberg, 2005). Thus, engagement with Islamic text and Islamic law is the first step in demand for changes toward gender equality in Muslim societies (Hibn, 2001).

2.1.3. Neoclassical Growth Theories

The ideas of the free market and the invisible hand of Adam Smith are the basis of the new classical theories. They define development regarding economic advancement and modernization. Based on these theories, the economic development followed by structural adjustment program assists developing countries to access economic development. “Well-being in developing countries had to be adjusted downwards to the ‘imperatives’ of the market economy.” (Rist, 2014, p. 173)

The Neo-Marxists Zeitlin (1984) and Paige (1998) take issue with Frank’s dependency model and Wallersteinian world-systems framework. Zeitlin argued that the Frank and Wallerstein development model does not consider the historical context of class relations in their analysis of development. This lack of historical context limited their explanation of underdevelopment in third-world societies (Zeitlin, 1984). Therefore, Zeitlin attempted to explain the economic impoverishment of developing countries by analyzing their socio-political and economic contexts of class relations. He considered the historical background and context of each nation to explain how certain countries failed to develop.

Paige (1998) also made an effort to address the underdevelopment in the social and economic structures of each region separately. He believed that the only possible way to understand class relations is through studying the historical events in a given society. Besides, one must consider external and ideological factors and their influences on the local events.

Development scholars of the twenty’s century were eager to shift their definition of development to “Sustainability Projects” to boost third-world countries’ economies (McMichael, 2008). The terminology of the development theories for these scholars is different, yet their

explanation of development is very similar. All development perspectives identify development as modernization and industrialization. Therefore, development theorists attempted to identify the obstacles of industrialization in the developing world and to theorize a way to relocate first world manufacturing to the third world (Kiely, 1995).

Regarding theories, development perspectives assume that development would occur in developing countries via increasing their capital accumulation through domestic savings and investment in production, or through external financing (Evans, 2005). Development in all development theories was closely tied to Western superiority and industrialization, while the problems of the underdevelopment of less developed nations were getting worse. Thus, the revival of development perspectives began in 1983 by modern economists, and sustainable development came into consideration (Rist, 2014).

2.1.4. New Growth Theories

In the new growth theories, culture and norms are involved, and development is no longer considered as a process of capital accumulation, but rather as a process of organizational change (Evans, 2005, p. 91). Sen (1999) believed that the ultimate purpose of development in the new growth theories is to enhance health, education, civil rights, and security in societies. Following Sen, the capacity approach, while accepting Sen's development indicators, argues that the expansion of human capacities is the absolute goal of development that will be reached through the expansion of real incomes (Evans, 2005).

The concept of capacity development emerged in the late 1980s and became the dominant theory of development throughout the 1990s. Capacity development is a perspective that targets individuals, organizations, and societies to enable them to achieve their development objectives

over time. At the individual level, capacity development emphasizes enhancing the skill and knowledge of individuals through training to fill the gaps. Capacity development focuses on the improvement of management systems through reconstruction and decentralization when it comes to organizations. Societal capacity development has targeted politics and policies to enhance civil society and strengthen budgeting (Brinkerhoff & Morgan, 2010). Capacity development is about growth, and the mission of developed nations is to offer support wherever it is needed.

Nevertheless, development is built upon the existing capacity; this support may require an intervention. Thus, capacity development refers to practices that eliminate the effect of the intervention. First, engage local participants in determining the resources and needs. Second, assess the needs and capacity. Third, formulate a capacity development plan with the local participants. Fourth, implement a capacity development plan via the established system. Finally, evaluate capacity development and monitor the results (Lavergne & Saxby, 2001).

In the process of capacity development, this perspective concerns power. As Baser and Morgan (2008) note,

Capacity development is about altering the access of people to authority, resources, and opportunities. It privileges some groups and individuals and not others. Coalitions with power either inside or outside organizations must, in some way, either directly support or tacitly accept these altered patterns and their implications for their interests (p. 20).

2.1.5. Endogenous Growth Theories

By the 1970s, the dependency and world-system scholars started to consider the MENA region in their analysis of development. The Orientalism theory by Edward Said (1978) was the

founding text of postcolonial studies. Said combined “the mutual relations of knowledge and power with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to argue that Western power enabled the production of knowledge about other cultures that, in turn, became an instrument of further western domination” (Kandiyoti, 2002, p 281). Said believes that Western domination in the development models was introduced in the MENA region with the term “Third World.” The term “Third World” implies that the culture and religion of the MENA region are secondary to the dominant Western culture. Thus, the development projects bring along the Western lifestyle of consumption to the MENA region.

The strength of the Orientalist perspective in analyzing the development process of the MENA region is found in consideration of culture as a “semantic practice grounded in everyday life and through which shared signs and symbols are deployed to represent our world.” (Kapoor, 2008, p. 21). Knowledge as a “will to power” is accessible for the semiotic construction of culture. Thus, the post-colonial perspective enables us to see culture as an “immediate and inescapable lens or horizon” (Kapoor, 2008, p. 21).

Timothy Mitchell (1991) attempts to explore Western societies’ cultural values and norms and the way they impact developing countries. According to Mitchell (1991), Western researchers observe the world as an object. They look at the world as a picture and try to understand reality. Western researchers’ goal is to be objective and, at the same time, immerse themselves in their analysis of societies. This perspective toward developing countries creates an unequal relationship between the dominant Western powers and the third world (Escobar, 1995). Thus, “The production of discourse under conditions of unequal power is what Mohanty and others refer to as ‘the colonialist move’” (Escobar, 1995, p. 9). This perspective toward development shows the

patronizing attitude that the West has for the rest of the world. The process of modernization in the MENA region needs to be based on the specific cultural and historical dynamics of the region.

2.1.6. Neopatriarchy Theory

In response to this Western-centric approach, Hashim Sharabi (1988) created a neopatriarchy to examine the implementation and outcomes of modernization theory in the Arab world. Sharabi analyzed the Arab world's internal system and external factors to describe the social, economic, political, and historical dynamics of the region. He believed that Arab countries became involved in the Western model of development after the colonialism era. During the post-colonial period, through the interaction with colonialism and dominant external power, a new area of structural transformation to modernization has emerged in the Arab world. These post-colonial changes led to a new structure of social, cultural, economic, and political arrangements in the Arab world.

However, Sharabi believed that modernization in the Arab world has not resulted in a real change in the social and economic system but a superficial change. The Arab countries are modernized; however, patriarchy is the dominant structure of the whole system. Modernization has created a modern feature of the social, economic, and political systems, but with a dominant neopatriarchy structure.

Sharabi, in his analysis of neopatriarchy (Sharabi, 1988a, b, Chs 1 and 10), writes that:

An underlying assumption of this study is that over the last 100 years, the patriarchal structures of Arab society, far from being displaced or truly modernized, have only been strengthened and maintained in deformed, “modernized” forms. That is to say, the Arab awakening

or renaissance (*nahda*) of the Nineteenth Century not only failed to break down the inner relations and forms of patriarchalism but by initiating what is called the modern awakening; it also provided the ground for producing a new, hybrid sort of society/culture – the neopatriarchal society/culture that exists today. Material modernization, the first (surface) manifestation of social change, only served to remodel and reorganize patriarchal structures and relations and to reinforce them by giving them the appearance of “modern” forms.

Neopatriarchy is a result of modernization that has created a hybrid system including a combination of European and Arab cultures in the modernized Arab world. Thus, the patriarchy in the modern Arab world still controls the social, economic, and political systems. The modernized neopatriarchal form of the Arab world is a patriarchal system that is founded upon the old one. For example, in the patriarchal system of the Arab world, kinship and tribalism indicate social and political identity. In this system, a woman’s role as a mother plays a crucial role in the local community. The role of women as mothers and caregivers is still as vital as it was before modernization. Thus, the social life of women has been restricted in the neopatriarchy as well.

2.2. Feminist Theories: Women, Gender, and Development

The analysis of this study is situated within the framework of gender and development. A theoretical interpretation of feminist theories of development is needed to examine the effect of development on women’s social presence in the MENA region. Accordingly, this section is formed with the related discussion of gender and development and feminist theories of development. Moreover, this section serves as the basis of shaping the hypotheses of this study.

2.2.1. Women in Development (WID)

Women in Development (WID) is an approach that seeks to integrate women into development projects. Ester Boserup (1970), the founder of the WID approach, documented women's disadvantages in the modernized economy compared to the agricultural economy in developed societies. She applied the same approach toward development projects in the developing countries, and she criticized the gender relations in the development process that usually leads to the disempowerment of women. She believed that development plans are male-biased and that women are ignored or disadvantaged in development plans. The development has assisted men in expanding their control over economic and political resources because they have access to education and paid work. As a result, women's economic situation and the work burden had expanded over the years. Thus, integrating women into the development processes will improve the women's status and also will assist the total development by providing more human labor for the modernization process. Therefore, she called to add women to the existing structure of development to empower women and to enhance equality, efficiency, and equity in societies.

However, women in developing countries criticized WID. They argue that in the WID theory, it is assumed that women were not participating in the development plans. Thus, the historical representation of women in the development process in the third world has been denied (Boulding, 1980). Besides, the women's role in the informal economy and household production has been devalued in the analysis of WID of the third world. As a result, this perspective toward women's integration in development projects has concealed women's multiple work roles (Koczberski, 1998).

The scholars of WID also portray all women of the third world in the same category. They assume that third-world women all have the same needs and interests. They are all economically unproductive, unskilled, and housekeepers who are equally disadvantaged. Thus, they have missed taking into account different cultural contexts and various women's role and status in their perspective toward development.

2.2.2. Women and Development (WAD)

As a reaction to the WID approach, Women and Development (WAD) emerged in the late 1970s. This approach, as a part of the neo-Marxist feminist movement, is an essential link between WID and Gender and Development (GAD) approaches. The WAD approach criticizes the modernization theory of development because of its connection to capitalism and its fundamental basis of exploitation (Rathgeber, 1990; Kabeer, 1997). They believe that the capitalistic mode of production and division of labor creates a gendered division of labor that promotes inequality among women and men (Kabeer, 1997). The WAD concentrates on equality as an essential element in the relationship between the development process and improving women's status. The WAD comes from the perspective that, to examine the problems that have resulted from modernization, the integration of women into the Development is essential. Advocates of WAD suggest that women's access to the productive sector may bring changes that benefit women in development projects (Rathgeber, 1990). Women and Development scholars paid specific attention to the developing countries and the impact of the development process on women in those nations. The WAD approach urges this study to investigate the failure of modernization theory in

promoting women's recognition in economic spheres and the labor market in the development process.

2.2.3. Gender and development

A network of female development professionals in the early 1970s, who were influenced by Ester Boserup and other 'new anthropologists,' worked on third world development (Boserup, 1970; Tinker, 1982; Maguire, 1984). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) term swiftly adopted the women in development (WID) approach to address the importance of women's contribution to development. The main argument of this work is that women are central players in the economic system who have been omitted from development plans (Overholt et al., 1984; Moser, 2012).

Later, researchers drew attention to the Gender and Development (GAD) approach to eliminate the limitation of the WID approach that focuses on women in isolation (Oakley, 1972; Rubin, 1975). The GAD approach focuses on gender as the social relationship between men and women in which women have been systematically subordinated (Moser, 2012). This perspective enables scholars to critically examine the unequal relationship between women and men based on the socially constructed gender roles assigned to each sex (Moser, 2012). The literature on gender and development in developing countries criticizes modernization theory, dependency, and world dependency theories of development for missing gender dimensions (Boserup, 1970). This critique is followed by incorporating gender relations between men and women and considering the productive role of women in development by following approaches such as the Marxian approach and the third-world perspective (Bakker, 1994; Elson, 1995; Arun, 2002).

The GAD advocates believe that the persistence of gender inequality is a central issue in development research since women's empowerment and economic development are significantly related (Doepke & Tertilt, 2008; Croix & Donckt, 2010; Doepke & Tertilt, 2011; Volart, 2004). Development, on the one hand, can play a role in reducing gender inequality by empowering women through improving the women's ability to access the main component of development such as health, education, economic opportunities, and political participation (Stark, 1996; Zhang et al., 1999; Lagerlof, 2003; Greenwood et al., 2005). Empowering women, on the other hand, can promote overall economic development by accelerating the development process through providing more human labor and balancing the growth path (Duflo, 2012; Doepke & Tertilt, 2011; Hajnal, 1965; Galor & Weil, 1999,2000; Lagerlof, 2003). Thus, gender equality is associated with a range of socioeconomic advantages, "including improved children's development (through better health and education), reduced poverty, and the promoted long-term economic growth." (Croix & Donckt, 2010, p. 86)

Gender inequality is significantly related to poverty. It is also more often found among the developing nations (Nussbaum, 2001). For example, countries such as Sierra Leon, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Mali that are ranked lowest in the gender-adjusted development index (GDI) are also ranked low in the Human Poverty Index (Nussbaum, 2001). Thus, economic development may positively affect both attitudes toward women's labor force participation and women's labor force participation rate.

2.2.4. Socialist Feminist Theory

Socialist feminist theory as an offshoot of the feminist movement emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The theory's central belief is based upon the interconnection of patriarchy and

capitalism. Advocates of socialist feminism believe that women produce a positive social and economic value for the capitalist; however, the patriarchal system oppresses women in all societies (Kabeer, 1997; Lorber, 1998). Socialist feminist advocates assert that women are not economically independent and they financially rely on men, causing an uneven balance of wealth and power among men and women. This uneven balance of wealth puts women in an unequal relationship with men in the capitalist system that leads to their oppression in the patriarchal system. Therefore, women's liberation would not happen without enabling them to be financially independent. Socialist feminists declare that patriarchy is a historically constructed system that is perpetuated by men's domination over time (Kabeer, 1997; Lorber, 1998). Thus, women's liberation should be a necessary part of any development plan.

Hisham Sharabi (1988) argued that the socialist feminist perspective toward the interconnectivity of patriarchy and capitalism could not be applied in the Arab world. He asserted that the patriarchal system in the Arab world is based on social solidarity and forms of kinship rather than capitalism. Even though the generalization of patriarchy without taking the cultural and historical background of each society into account is criticized, the radical critics of patriarchy are useful for this study, in that it provides a basic understanding of the patriarchal system in the MENA region.

2.2.5. Post-Colonial Feminist Theory

Post-colonial feminism was born as a response to the hegemonic Western feminist theories and provoked a different perspective on women's status in developing countries. The post-colonial advocates criticize the generalization of the Western cultural strategy to liberate women. Instead, they take into account different cultural and historical characteristics of developing societies.

Chandra Mohanty (1988) states that Western feminists failed to understand the reality of developing nations. They tended to categorize women into two main groups: women in developed countries and women in developing countries. Thus, they missed recognizing the cultural and historical differences in developing nations. Therefore, Western feminists were unable to understand women's problems in developing nations.

Post-colonial theorists, in their analysis of development, pay close attention to social, economic, and political differences between developing nations (e.g., Andre Lorde, 1993). They have stated that women are facing different types of oppression in different nations. Thus, women need different strategies to enhance gender inequality in various nations. Hence, the meaning of "equality" is as diverse as nations and not a universal meaning. The meaning of gender equality varies and depends on the social, political, and historical context of the nations (Chandra Mohanty, 1988).

Post-colonial feminism is a relevant approach to this study since the post-colonial theorists are emphasizing the importance of economic, political, and cultural aspects of the nations in their analysis of women's status in society. The situation of women in the MENA region is different from other developing regions. One explanation could be that the particular cultural and religious contexts of the region have created different conditions for women's presence in the labor market. The other explanation based on this theory could be that the economic situations and oil wealth of the nations in the area have distinguished them from other developing nations.

2.2.6. Islamic Feminism

The relationship between Islam and gender equality is a fundamental issue for women in Muslim societies. Islamic feminism first appeared in the 1990s, when it gained prominence and

power, particularly in Iran, Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia. However, according to Mir-Hosseini, the feminist movement started at the turn of the 20th century, so it has been around for 120 years. Islamic feminism is based on proposing a reinterpretation of Islamic texts, including the *Kuran*, the *Hadith*, and the *Sunnah*. The *Kuran* is the holy words of Allah transferred to Mohammed through the Angel Gabriel, the *Hadith* is a collection of the Prophet Mohammed's sayings, and the *Sunnah* is the practices of the Prophet Mohammed. The *Shari'a*, or Islamic, law is based on the interpretation of these three texts. Islamic feminism calls for gender equality via *ijtihad* (autonomous investigation of religious sources to provide an unconventional rationalization) and *tafsir* (a reinterpretation of the *Kuran*). The theological and theoretical ground of Islamic feminist movement is through the works of scholars such as Fatima Mernissi (1991), Leila Ahmed (1992), and Hidayet Sefkatli Tuksal (2000) who had focused on *Hadith* and *Sunnah* and the history of early Islam, as well as Riffat Hassan (1988) and Amina Wadud (1999), who focused on the interpretation of *Kuran* verses.

Islamic feminism has a different perspective than Western feminism. While Western feminism is based on secularism and the abandonment of traditional authority, Islamic feminism is a combination of both post-colonial feminism and Islamic theology (Sociological Dictionary). The imposition of Western Imperialism has grown in the MENA region as a consequence of the Islamic empire overthrown by the end of the 15th century. The colonial exploitation in the region was along with the imposition of secular values by the West as well as a reduction in the Islam power in Muslim societies. As a result, the Islamic revival of the 18th century is an effort to repudiate Western power and secular values and to restore the Islamic Empire in the region (Montasir, 2014). Islamic feminism draws upon *Kuran's* concepts on equality, trying to liberate Muslim women by promoting gender equality through an Islamic revival (Montasir, 2014).

Mernissi (1997) critiques the patriarchal interpretation of Islam as well as capitalism. She believed that the male's priority in the social and economic realm is promoted by both religious conservatism and capitalist development in the region.

Thus, Muslim feminism's principle is to bring about gender equality in Muslim societies through the reinterpretation of Islamic texts. Muslim feminists do not believe in the Western feminist concept of equality, but they advocate for men's and women's complementary roles in the Islamic domain (Montasir, 2014). Islamic feminism aims to challenge male priority in patriarchal *tafsir* of the *Kuran* through utilizing *tafsir* and a reinterpretation of Islamic texts (Badran, 2002). Thus, Muslim women are challenging the patriarchal laws through the reinterpretation of Islamic texts (Al-Alawi, 2016).

Mir-Hosseini (2011) stated that there is a connection between Islam and feminism in which "both Islam and feminism are contested concepts that mean different things to different people and in different contexts" (p. 1). Islam is not the reason for women's difficulties in Muslim societies, but the patriarchal interpretation of Islam is. Islam is no different; it is just a religion that depends upon people's interpretation of it. In any religion, people may be violent or peaceful, and that depends on politics, the social world, and the way they see their communities (Aslan, 2005). Thus, barbaric practices everywhere in the world should be condemned and criticized by everyone, but to blame Islam for the women's problem in the Muslim countries as though Saudi Arabia and Indonesia or Turkey are the same is not accurate. Thus, the goal of these Muslim feminists is to interpret the Islamic text from the Muslim women's perspective and condemn the patriarchal interpretation of Islam.

Leila Ahmed (1997) offers a more pointed argument on the topic of feminism in Islam. She analyzed the role of the hijab concerning the women's movement in the Islamic world. For her, the Islamic world included Muslims in the United States and Europe. Through research and interviews, Ahmed concluded that the hijab is an article of political expression. Although the modern wearing of the hijab came about from the pressure of the Muslim Brotherhood, the hijab may have origins in ancient Mesopotamia.

Ahmed (1997) reviewed this history of the role of women in the Middle East, and she started her work with a review of the role of women in ancient Mesopotamia. In a brief but thorough description, she revealed that although civilizations came and went and societies and cultures were born and died, there was a constant treatment of women.

She argued that women were subservient to men in the Sumerian, Byzantine, Greek, and Roman Empires. Moreover, the status of women was punctuated via the use of the veil. Men coerced women to hide their faces as a means of controlling women. Additionally, the early Christian church encouraged the infanticide of female offspring, so from the cradle to the grave, women were considered disposable. It is from this historical setting that the treatment of women in Islam developed. Consequently, she expressed deep concern for the resurgence of the hijab in the past decade.

She maintains that the resurgence of the hijab started as a result of the Muslim Brotherhood. This organization provides critical care to people in need. When a disaster strikes, it is the first organization on the ground. It provides food, clothing, and medical care to those in need. Additionally, it follows a conservative and fundamental interpretation of Islam. Consequently,

victims of disasters receive physical, emotional, and spiritual support. Along with this support goes the hijab.

It is viewed as a symbol of traditional Muslim women. This resurgence has led to the advancement of women in the Muslim world. For example, women who wear hijabs find more work opportunities than those who do not wear it. She argues that it is because a woman who wears the hijab is proclaiming her obedience to a conservative lifestyle, and this lifestyle will not cause problems with men in the workplace. Consequently, women hold jobs in coed situations that they would not have been able to hold heretofore.

Thus, the dominance of male's status in the public eye throughout the Arab world is considered as a sign of gender inequality. Men are outnumbering women in most aspects of public life, such as employment, leadership positions, and politics in the Arab world because of the traditional beliefs regarding gender roles and not Islam (Golkowska, 2014).

However, some scholars believe that Islamic feminism cannot bring about gender equality because Islam is a patriarchal religion, and the *Kuran* has many verses that discriminate against women (Darvishpour, 2008). From this perspective, Islam cannot co-exist with feminism because Islam is essentially misogynistic, and it conflicts with women's liberation, while feminism is a movement against misogyny. Islam legitimizes gender inequality and subordinate women in Muslim societies. Darvishpour (2008) maintained that there is a tension between Islam and feminism in which women in Islamic philosophy are considered an active sexual power who are ordered to cover their bodies to prevent them from luring men into committing sin by provoking sexual relationships. Besides, the *Shari'a* laws supporting polygamy and sexual segregation are strategies to restrict women's power and representation in Muslim societies (Darvishpour, 2008).

The source of male authority in Islam is in *Koranic* verse 4:34. This verse has been applied to society via the process of *qiwamah*, which means protector or maintainer; a righteous Muslim woman is *qanitat* (obedient). Additionally, if a woman is rebellious, a man may discipline her by striking her (*adribuhunna*). These lines in this verse have given men the power to dominate women. Additionally, this worldview has infiltrated all aspects of Muslim society and is most keenly evident in the Muslim legal system (Weclhman, 2011).

Thus, Islam and feminism are essentially antagonistic, and Islamic feminism represents an oxymoron. Islamic feminism is in a bargaining game with the patriarchy that is ultimately unable to provide solid ground for a total social reform so as to abolish patriarchy and provoke gender equality in that society (Kandiyoti, 1987).

In contrast, other scholars, such as Valentine Moghadam (2002) and Ziba Mir-Hosseini (1999), argued that Islamic feminism is a suitable alternative discourse to the orientalism that provides a middle ground between religious feminism and secular feminism. Islamic feminism is a functional movement to provoke gender equality through the MENA region because of its close connection to the life of Muslim women in the region.

Islamic feminism is a relevant approach to this study since the main body of the literature on gender inequality in the MENA region tends to attribute women's status in Muslim majority nations to Islam. Muslim feminists specify the patriarchal culture of these societies as the primary cause of women's low status and gender inequality. Muslim feminists believe that it is the patriarchal interpretation of Islam and not Islam itself that is the barrier of gender equality and the critical factor in shaping attitudes toward women equal right in the labor market.

Chapter 3 - Literature Review and Hypotheses

3.1. Human and economic development indicators and attitudes toward women's employment

In this chapter, I will review the previous studies related to attitudes toward women's equal right to employment and the discussions on the relationship between macro- and micro-level factors explaining gender equity to develop study hypotheses and research questions. Reviewing the related theories and previous studies will also help interpret the findings and suggest possible future studies.

This chapter draws from the theories of the determinants of women's employment and from the literature on gender egalitarianism to develop a theory of attitudes toward women's employment in the MENA region. It is suggested that economic development, political democracy, and cultural characteristics at the national level have a critical influence on shaping individual attitudes toward women. A person's demographic characteristics and individual religiosity are also influential factors in shaping gender ideology. It is expected that individuals with more to gain from gender equality are more supportive of the idea of equal rights for both sexes in the paid labor force.

3.1.1. Fertility rate

Previous studies used national demographic trends relevant to women's status to explain gender egalitarianism and women's employment patterns. For example, Brewster (2000), in her study of fertility and women's employment in industrial nations, documented two significant demographic changes in the MENA region: a decrease in the fertility rate and an increase in women's share of higher education. These changes caused by economic development in the region

are supposed to boost women's employment rate. Conversely, women's greater caretaking responsibilities lead to lowering women's employment rate (Brewster, 2000).

De Jong, Smits, and Longwe (2017) indicated that those ideological factors are cause and effect of the changes in women's status and rising women's employment—that an investment in family planning is followed by an increase in the women's labor force participation rates. Also, Wood and Neels (2017) indicated that women who are more inactive due to limited access to employment are likelier to have children. Moreover, childbearing strategies in response to unemployment are more common among women with a low education level. Other studies posit that marriage rates are high for women with a college education and who have higher grade occupations and good earnings (Brewster & Rindfuss, 2000; McDonalds, 2000; Oppenheimer & Lew, 1995).

Even though childbearing has mainly been a consequence of male decision-making, development empowered women to control childbearing by providing family planning methods. Thus, to understand the changes in women's status and position in society, it is required to understand women's values, attitudes, and perspectives (Hakim, 2003). Further studies on fertility patterns focused on the role of ideological factors in fertility rate changes. Preference theory emphasizes women's choices and understands women as heterogeneous in lifestyle preferences. Their preference theory emphasized changes in values and attitudes more than economic factors in contemporary societies (Lesthaeghe & Meekers, 1986; Lesthaeghe, 1995).

Additionally, the fertility rate also falls as the women's labor-force participation rate increases due to the difficulties of the adjustment of the childbearing demand and employment requirements (Stycos & Weller, 1967). Since the mid-1980s, however, the relationship between

the fertility level and women's labor force participation at the macro level seems to contradict the previous theories. The studies later demonstrate a positive association between fertility rate and women's level of employment. That is, countries with relatively lower rates of fertility have low levels of women's employment, and those with a higher level of fertility tend to have sizeable female labor force participation (Bettio & Villa, 1998). The recent correlation between the fertility rate and women's employment rate in some nations can be attributed to the changes in a socio-cultural and institutional context, such as changing attitudes toward working mothers. These changes lead to a decrease in the conflict between women's employment and childbearing (Castles, 2003; Rindfuss et al., 2003; Brewster & Rindfuss, 2000). Besides, the role of the socio-cultural and institutional setting, such as unemployment and fixed working hours, are considered influential factors on the fertility rate (e.g., Ahn & Mira, 2002; Ko'gel, 2004, 2006; Matysiak & Vignoli, 2008). However, the correlation turns negative by controlling the cross-country heterogeneity and country-specific factors while other research rejects the negative relationship in some developed countries such as East Germany and Hungary (Berinde, 1999; Santow & Bracher, 2001; Bernardi & Nanio, 2005; Kreyenfeld, 2004; Robert & Bukodi, 2005).

Unquestionably, women who work for pay have fewer children, and those who have more children spend less time in paid employment (Wood & Neels, 2017). Women's labor force participation is strongly tied to their family status, and most working women leave paid work. However, the women's level of labor force participation varies among women across nations with different levels of development, depending on family law and supportive policies such as leave policies and childcare availability (Rindfuss et al., 1999; Brewster & Rindfuss, 2000). When childcare is considered to be women's primary responsibility, paid work becomes a less important role for women, while employment is considered to be the primary role for men. Besides,

industrialization tends to provide low-wage jobs at a far distance for women so that their benefits are not compatible with childcare costs (Brewster, 2000). Taking all into account, assigning childcare responsibility to women as their primary role may contribute to explaining less supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in areas such as the MENA region with a high fertility rate. Here I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1. The higher the fertility rate of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment.

3.1.2. Unemployment rate

Some researchers also argue that national unemployment rates, which are high in MENA, are one of the critical factors in shaping attitudes toward women's equal right to employment (Karshenas, 2001; Moghadam, 1998; Raphaeli, 2006; Noland & Pack, 2008). There is evidence that a high national unemployment rate harms women's probability of being employed (Pattit & Hook, 2005; Van Ham & Bucher, 2006). Some believe that national unemployment rates are one of the key economic factors in determining the women's labor force participation rate in the MENA region due to this region's high unemployment rates (Karshenas, 2001; Moghadam, 1998). Unemployment rates in some nations affect women's economic activities through discrimination against them in the job market. In other countries, men's unemployment rates affect women's presence in the job market since they tend to have less human capital than men (Moghadam, 1998). However, other scholars argue that while high female unemployment discourages women's economic participation, in some cases, a high unemployment rate among men encourages women to join the labor market to compensate for their partner's unemployment (Janmote, 2004; McGinnity, 2004; Steiber & Haas, 2010).

Furthermore, men's unemployment rates may not only affect women's employment rate, but they also may influence attitudes toward women's equal right to employment. As Moghadam (1998) argued, the high national unemployment rate may raise discrimination against women in the labor market because women have lower human capital than men. The high unemployment rate may also lead to discrimination against women in the labor market since their primary responsibility is to provide child and adolescent care for the family.

Even though the previous researchers did not study the relationship between unemployment rates and attitudes toward women's equal right to employment, some studies showed that the economic situation of a nation affects attitudes toward immigrants and the acceptance of immigration (Kehrberg, 2007). Thus, I hypothesize that national unemployment rates in this region may affect attitudes toward women's right to employment.

Hypothesis 2. The higher the unemployment rate of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal right to employment.

3.1.3. Women's tertiary education

One of the critical determinants of gender ideology is educational attainment. The studies show that there is a linear relationship between education and attitudes toward women's equal right to employment (Cazes & Verick, 2013). Klasen (2017) argued that women with a high school education tend to stay out of the labor market, while women with a post-secondary education are more likely to join the labor force. Dowling and Worswick (2001) and Zheng (2010) also showed that women with tertiary education have more chances to join the labor force compared to women with no education. Thus, women with higher education have been more likely to find a job with higher wages.

When this information is applied to the MENA region, one finds that the education level of girls and women has been significantly increasing. As a result of more educational opportunities for women, the average age of women at marriage has risen significantly in the region. For example, the number of married women ages 15–19 decreased from 22% in 1976 to 10% in 2003 in Egypt, and from 11% in 1975 to 1% in 2001 in Tunisia (Population Reference Bureau, 2013). The rise in the average age of marriage has provided women with more opportunities in the labor market (World Bank, 2007). Higher-level, or tertiary education, also enables women to have access to the professional and managerial jobs that once exclusively belonged to men. Demographic changes (such as later marriage, fewer children, and more divorce) because of these economic and educational changes reinforce women's social representation (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Oppenheimer, 1976). Furthermore, women with high education and special skills are more interested in paid works and “white-collar” jobs, mainly in the clerical sector. Simultaneously, the growth of “white-collar” jobs due to industrialization leads to a rise in women's labor force participation since these jobs are not only attainable, but they are acceptable forms of employment for women (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004). Thus, I expected to find that:

Hypothesis 3. The higher the women's tertiary education rate of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women equal right to employment.

3.1.4. Women's economic rights

Socioeconomic development has brought tremendous transformations in people's lives. Women's representation in the paid labor force because of economic development that provides more opportunities for women's economic activity has challenged the traditional attitudes toward

women's role in families and societies. Women's economic rights, which may be protected or restricted women's access to paid employment, are expected to affect gender relationships and, in turn, shape gender attitudes toward women's equal right to employment (Orloff, 1993; Yu & Lee, 2013). Societies where women are more involved in economic activities and able to achieve a higher status in the workplace are more likely to support women's economical representation and social participation (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). Macro-level gender equality also changes public opinion on women's role in society by exposing people to women in various social and economic roles rather than traditional roles (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). Moreover, women's representation in less traditional roles shows women who are less dependent on men, showing women's capabilities in public and causing more egalitarian attitudes toward women's participation in the society's labor force (Cha & Thébaud, 2009; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Seguino, 2007). Thus, a higher level of gender equality leads to greater support for all egalitarian gender roles in society (Cha & Thébaud, 2009; Charles & Cech, 2010).

Economic development provides more economic opportunities for women as well as men that bring considerable changes in gender roles in the family and society, changes that result in a greater acceptance of women in nontraditional and familiar roles (Mason & Lu, 1988; McBroom, 1986; Thornton et al., 1983). However, these changes occur faster among women than men, and men usually show significantly less egalitarian attitudes toward sex roles than women (Thornton et al., 1983; Alwin et al., 1992). Thus, gender-egalitarian views may be enforced and empowered through the laws and regulations related to equal pay, equal opportunity, affirmative action, reproductive rights, and maternity leave (Crompton & Harris, 1997; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Norris, 1987). Here I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 4. The higher the women's economic rights of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment.

3.2. Political participation

The gender gap in labor force engagement can also be affected by women's political involvement, such as political interest, knowledge, and efficacy attributable to development (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2007; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993, Schlozman, et al., 1994). The biased attitudes toward women's roles in politics may be reinforced by women's absence from prominent political roles. In contrast, modeling female political engagement might not only challenge the dominant norms and stereotypes about unsuitability of political roles for women but may also lead to more significant political and economic participation among girls (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006; Carroll, 1985; Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Sapiro, 1997; Burns et al., 2001). Thus, visibility in politics appears to be such an essential factor in changing the stereotypes about women and may increase social engagement among women. The higher level of socio-economic development and women's involvement in the policy may lead to more egalitarian attitudes toward women in society.

3.2.1. The number of women in parliament

Women in politics serve as role models, and their presence encourages political involvement among female citizens. Female members of Parliament are political role models, particularly for adolescent girls (Swers, 2002; Wolbrecht, 2002; Walsh, 2002; Childs & Withey, 2004; Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2007). Women's representation in policy may become a subject for discussion among women and increase their interest in political participation and legislative

decision-making. Thus, adult females are more likely to discuss and to intend to participate in politics when there are more women in Parliament. The discussion, in turn, may foster an egalitarian attitude toward women and encourage women to enter the public arena (Swers, 2002; Wolbrecht, 2002; Walsh, 2002; Childs & Withey, 2004; Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2007).

Furthermore, women-friendly attitudes are more likely to be adopted by female federal executives who are working in an agency or department with an office that deals with women's issues. Female executives' influence on gender ideology is even greater when a higher percentage of women have leadership roles in an organization (Dolan, 2000). Female policymakers are also more aware of women's issues than men, and have a different feeling of problems women encounter since they usually have common personal experiences of those problems (Tamerius, 1995). Thus, women are constantly more likely than men to recognize the policies that meet women's unique needs to advocate and support women (Hale & Branch, 1992; Thomas, 1994; Dodson et al., 1995; Dolan, 1998).

Consequently, development improves the share of women in Parliament, which is an influential political factor on women's status, and it also furthers women's political participation. On the one hand, women's representation in politics reflects the idea that women are legitimate actors in shaping society, since female politicians support women's lives. Policies such as maternity leave and childcare provision are more likely to be backed by women in Parliament than men (Kittilson, 2008). This suggests that development ameliorates egalitarian attitudes toward women's rights to employment, which is associated with the greater share of women in Parliament.

Ultimate policy decisions in a democratic system are in connection with an administrator's values and attitudes that are shaped in part by their different life experiences (Dolan, 2000).

Therefore, leaders' values and life experiences shape their decisions, and a demographically different bureaucracy is needed to produce a policy that recognizes the needs and preferences of a diverse citizenry (Meier, 1993). For the same reasons, we expect that administrative decision-making is about their gender. Studies show that women experience different socialization processes and face more gender discrimination and obstacles than men (Hochschild, 1989; MSPB, 1995). As a result, the female administrators consider gender discrimination and show greater support for women's issues such as pregnancy leave, employee balance, pay equity, job sharing, flexible work schedule, and childcare (Sigel, 1996; Dolan, 2000; Hale & Branch, 1992).

Thus, the more significant the proportion of women within an organization, the more likely an individual will come into contact with supportive colleagues who are more likely to actively represent their wishes to the dominant groups (Dolan, 2000, Hinderer & Young, 1998). However, active representation partially depends on the supportive political environment, such as supportive, organized groups within the communities that support advocated policies of the administrator (Meier, 1993a; Meier & Stewart, 1992).

Hypothesis 5. The higher the number of women in parliament of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment.

3.2.2. The level of democracy

Inglehart and Norris's study on Western and Muslim societies (2000) shows that people of Muslim societies are less likely to support women's equal rights and opportunities than those living in democratic Western societies. Muslim societies are also less supportive of homosexuality, abortion, and divorce than Western democratic countries. Scholars believe that the measurement

of structural and demographic characteristics of Muslim and non-Muslim societies is essential for discussions on democracy and gender equality (Karatynycky, 2002; Stepan & Robertson, 2003; Talbi, 2000).

For example, Fish (2002) found that religious traditions have a considerable effect on gender inequality, presenting an obstacle to democracy in the Muslim countries analyzed in his study. Structural and demographic variables such as the literacy gap between men and women, the sex ratio (i.e., the mean number of males per 100 females), the percentage of women in government at all levels, and gender empowerment were measured by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) cross-nationally. Fish (2002) found that female illiteracy is higher than that of men in Muslim countries. Muslim countries also have higher sex ratios that may result from poorer treatment of girls and women, evident in their comparatively substandard access to healthcare and nutritious food. Muslim countries also have lower employment rates for women, fewer women in political positions, and lower gender empowerment scores in comparison to non-Muslim nations (Fish, 2002). Fish (2002) concludes that “[w]omen’s status is, on the whole, inferior in Muslim societies; this factor appears to account for part of the link between Islam and authoritarianism” (p. 29). Fish (2002) also found that “Muslim societies are not more prone to political violence; nor are they less ‘secular’ than non-Muslim societies; and interpersonal trust is not necessarily lower in Muslim nations” (p. 5). Once again, he noted that “one factor does help to explain the democratic deficit: the subordination of women” (p. 5).

Finally, it is essential to compare the level of gender inequality and democracy within Muslim societies. Thus, the comparison between Arab and non-Arab Muslim populations is critical to examine the link between gender inequality and democracy. Stepan and Robertson

(2003) centered their attention on 31 Muslim-majority non-Arab countries included in the World Values 2000 survey in the 30 years between 1972 and 2002. They found that a significant subset (one-third) of the 31 Muslim-majority non-Arab countries are “democratic overachievers” when their levels of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) are used to predict the likelihood of holding competitive elections. Some non-Arab Muslim countries, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, and Nigeria, were almost 20 times more likely to hold competitive elections than Arab Muslim nations.

Moreover, other researchers have studied the presence or absence of women in a high political position to examine the importance of gender equality to democracy in Arab and non-Arab Muslim nations. For instance, Moghadam (2003) found that no Arab nation has ever had a female head of state, while there have been female presidents or prime ministers in four out of six non-Arab Muslim countries (Indonesia, Bangladesh [twice], Pakistan, and Turkey).

Rizzo et al. (2007) show that non-Arab Muslim countries are more likely to support democracy and women’s rights than Arab countries. Thus, individual religiosity does not seem to be a barrier to democratization and women's rights.

Therefore, an examination of Arab and non-Arab Muslim nations shows that even though both subsets of nations are Muslim, religious identity is not the only explanation for their lack of gender equality and democracy. Muslim countries with different structural and demographical characteristics have different levels of gender inequality and democracy that must be entered into the study of Muslim countries, as Moghadam (2003) and Inglehart and Norris (2003) suggest.

Nevertheless, a suitable and free political context is the primary condition for women's representation in politics. We have long assumed that the market-based economy and modernization provide a suitable condition for stable democratic societies in which political power is transferred from the leader to the people. Thus, democratic society limits the state's autonomy through two processes: "(1) the emergence of institutionalized 'contestation' between parties and pressure groups representing a plurality of interest groups in society and (2) the widening scope of 'participation' by the people in the contestation. Combined, contestation, and participation generate genuine democracy" (Mann, 1993, p. 46). Thus, in modern and developed democratic societies, many interest groups participate with various origins such as economic, as well as religious, linguistics, ethnic, communities, regions, and gender. Even though parties are formed to represent particular class interests, states ultimately represent most citizens' interests.

Democracy does not bring equality of power for all interest groups, but it generates enough competition and participation to place competing and responsive elites in the authority that leads to dispersed rather than increasing power inequality (Mann, 1993). However, democracy is expected to improve women's rights and worker's rights. Kelly (2010) focused on the development and political factors that may influence attitudes toward women's employment rates. Developed nations, with a higher level of democracy, are supposed to have more favorable attitudes toward women's employment; there is a strong association between democracy and egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment rights (Pratt, 2007; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Thus, it may be that a low level of women's employment is associated with a low level of democracy in authoritarian regimes in most MENA nations. Thus, I will hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 6. The higher the level of democracy of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment.

3.3. Petroleum revenue and attitudes toward women's employment

Corden and Neary (1982) argued that oil production affects gender relations and tends to exaggerate gender inequality by discouraging women from entering the labor force and reducing women's labor force participation. Ross, Noland, and Pack (2008) stated that the pattern of growth is a significant factor in shaping gender egalitarianism that, in turn, impacts women's employment rate. Oil wealth is one of the most important economic indicators in shaping attitudes toward women's equal rights in the labor market. The studies demonstrated that people in wealthier countries hold a more supportive attitude toward women than less-developed nations (Ross, 2008). However, an economy with heavy reliance on oil is one of the primary explanations of women's low representation in the workforce (Ross, 2008). Ross argued the reliance of nations' economy on oil and mineral production explain women's low status not only in the MENA region but also in other oil-rich countries such as Azerbaijan, Botswana, Chile, Nigeria, and Russia. He believed that development in those nations that have a heavy reliance on oil creates an economic environment that is not conducive to women's labor force participation (Ross, 2008).

A new economic condition emerges in countries that discover oil. The new economy is characterized by a rise in the real exchange rate, and an economic transformation from a decline in the traded sector (agriculture and manufacturing) toward expansion in the nontraded sector (construction and services) (Corden & Neary, 1982). Buiter and Purvis (1983) discussed that a boom in oil production generates a new source of foreign currency through oil sales. This raises

the exchange rate, which enables locals to import tradable goods from other countries at a lower price than buying them from domestic producers. The new wealth also raises the demand for things that can be imported, known as non-tradable goods, such as construction and retail services (Frederiksen, 2007). Thus, this process increases the production costs by drawing labor away from the tradable goods sector (Frederiksen, 2007).

This economic model of oil-rich nations also affects women's labor force participation rate. Mammen and Paxson (2000) identified two main factors that affect women's labor force participation in oil-rich nations. One is the rise in prevailing women's wages, which encourages women to enter the market for wage labor. Goldin's study (1995) illustrated that industrialization provides more educational opportunities for women and enhances women's tertiary level. Women with high education and specialized skills are more interested in paid work and white-collar jobs, mainly in the clerical sector. Simultaneously, the growth of white-collar jobs due to industrialization leads to a rise in women's labor force participation since these jobs are not only attainable but also acceptable forms of employment for women.

The second factor is the increase in the household income called "female unearned income" that women do not earn directly (Mammen & Paxson, 2000). Ross (2008) stated that the rise in home income that comes from the male's income discourages women from joining the labor market to provide a second income. "Women's reservation wage" is the wage at which she finds it worthwhile to join the workforce. If women's unearned income is high, then women's reservation wage will also be high, and only a well-paying job will lure women into the workforce. If women's unearned income is low, then the reservation wage also is low, meaning women are willing to join the labor force even if the prevailing female wage is low (Ross, 2008).

Mammen and Paxson (2000) asserted that the rise in women's income or increase in the "female unearned income" is the consequence of the oil boom. The effects of the oil boom on the job market are the same for men and women. However, the gender-based segregation in the labor force in many developing countries eliminates women's representation in many kinds of non-trade jobs such as construction and retail, since these jobs typically require substantial work, or contact with men outside the family (Anker, 1997). Women in these societies are mostly represented in the trade sector and low wages jobs in factories and agriculture. Thus, a shift away from the trade sector to the non-trade sector caused by oil booms boosts the demand for male labor to work in the non-trade sector that also leads to wage raises for the male. In contrast, the decline in the trade area caused by oil booms will decrease the demand for female labor and will cause a reduction in the prevailing female wage (Ross, 2008).

Besides, Norris (2006) examined the effect of individual religiosity on egalitarian attitudes toward women in oil-rich Muslim societies. His findings demonstrated that the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward gender equality in countries with high petroleum revenue is more significant than countries without oil revenue. Thus, oil wealth is a unique, influential factor in attitudes toward gender equality present in the MENA region. Therefore, it is expected that higher levels of oil wealth negatively impact attitudes toward women's equal right to employment. For this study, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 7. The higher the oil wealth of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment.

3.4. Individual religiosity and attitudes toward women's employment

The gender system is a determining factor in both the rate of women's participation in the labor market and their success in finding a job. "The gender system includes processes that define males and females as different in socially significant ways and justify inequality based on that difference" (Ridgeway & Lovin, 1999, p. 191). Through this process, society assigns different roles to men and women based on their sex. Consequently, it is their sex that shapes the beliefs concerning the sexual division of labor. Assigning different roles to men and women based on sex is defined as gender ideology (Nordenmark, 2004; Davis & Greenstein, 2009). Some of the differences in the division of labor between men and women are related to gender ideology. The different degrees of male and female involvement in paid or unpaid labor is also relevant to gender ideology (Nordenmark, 2004; Lavee & Katz, 2002). Thus, gender ideology is a critical factor in explaining unemployment patterns in Muslim societies (Miles, 2002).

Currently, the literature addressing the relationship between gender ideology and women's status mainly focuses on the role of religion (e.g., Goldscheider et al., 2014; Seguino, 2010). Specifically, the role of religion is the primary focus of the literature examining women's employment in the Middle East. Religion is an essential cultural element in the discussion about women's status in the MENA region (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Badron, 1988). Islam is the dominant religion in MENA countries in which "More than nine-in-ten people in the region were Muslim as of 2010 (93%), and the share of the region's population that is Muslim is expected to be slightly higher in 2050 (94%)" (Pew Research Center's Religion and Public Life Project, 2015). Islam, as the dominant religion in the MENA region, is related to individual attitudes toward gender ideology (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Islam is also a religion of law that is relevant to society's organization (Tessler, 2002; Tessler, 1997; Kamrava, 1998; Karawan, 1996; Eickelman

& Piscatori, 1996). Islam has become an important and influential socio-political factor. The approach of “Islam as the solution” had been found in policies (Amin, 1997). Thus, the influence of Islam in Arab culture has increased in the last quarter-century, and the number of new Muslim associations, study groups, and financial institutions, as well as public prayers and mosque attendance, have increased in the region (Tessler, 2002).

Oppressed women by patriarchal Islamic doctrines is a traditional stereotype of Muslim women (Obermeyer, 1992) in which religious affiliations significantly influence women’s behavior in the labor market (Amin & Alam, 2008; Lehrer, 1995; Beit-Hallahmi, 1997; Murphy, 1995; Grossbard-Shechtman & Neuman, 1998). Amin and Alam (2008) asserted that religiosity affects women's economic share in rural areas more than women in urban areas. Religiosity also influences married women more than single women (Amin & Alam, 2008; Mazumdar, 1981). Iannaccone (1998) believed that ideological beliefs are an essential explanation for non-egalitarian attitudes toward women's participation in the labor force. From his perspective, Islam is a crucial factor in explaining a gap between women's status in Muslim and non-Muslim societies. Seguino (2010) considered Islam as a patriarchal religion that has a unique impact on justifying and perpetuating unequal gender ideology. In highly religious Muslim societies, Islam is attributed to women's low employment level, and the unequal gender ideology since Islam has an initial contribution in creating law and norms, which in turn shapes paternalistic attitudes (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Badron, 1988). Thus, religiosity is a critical factor in determining women's labor force participation in Muslim societies.

Inglehart and Norris (2003) believed that Islam is a patriarchal religious system and the greatest obstacle to women's economic participation in Muslim societies. This patriarchal religion

leads to women's oppression in Muslim societies. They believe that Islamic feminism is not able to challenge the current system of Islam in politics, society, and culture. Mojab (2001) also argued that Islam affects attitudes toward women in various ways and different rates based on their fundamentalism degrees. Therefore, Islamic feminism leads to justification and perpetuation of unequal gender ideology by ignoring the difficulties of Muslim women in patriarchal Islamic societies.

However, various studies argue that Islamic doctrine is neither universal nor discriminatory against women in economic terms (e.g., Hibri, 1997; Mojab, 2001; Frank et al., 2010; Seguino, 2010; Emerson & Hartman, 2006). As Mernisi (1987) found, “the effects of modernization, which had gradually thrust women out of their home and into classrooms, offices, and factories.” has altered the balance of power between the sexes in the Muslim world (p.15). Olmsted (2002) and Heineck (2004) also showed a high number of educated Muslim women who are progressive in their gender ideologies and economic roles. Read (2002) challenged the impact of Muslim affiliation on Arab-American women’s labor force participation and argued that the images of Muslim women are severely overstated. Later in the other study of the Arab-American women in 2004, she examined the role of the family in mediating the influence of religion on women’s labor force activity. Her research showed that religiosity has an adverse effect on participation in the labor force of those women who have children. She also stated that religiosity has no impact on the employment of women with no children (Read, 2002).

According to Roded (2008), Islam may be divided into Islamic modernism, Islamic fundamentalism, and pluralizing Islamism (examining the relationship between Islam and gender ideology). Islamic modernism accepts modern rationalist methods and scientific discoveries that

establish a more liberal and progressive view of women in society. Pluralizing Islamism emphasizes the concepts of independent judgment or interpretation (*ijtihad*) and consultation (*Shria*). Roded believed that these two initial concepts of Islam show that Islam is in harmony with democracy and modernity. However, as Francesca (2014) described, Islamic fundamentalists disallow all types of modernity and believe in the establishment of *shari'a* law to achieve human sovereignty and solidarity in society. Thus, the interpretation of Islam and the way society utilizes it in political, social, and economic contexts determine the outcomes.

Al-Faruqi (2000) stated that Islamic feminism should be accepted as a functional and appropriate ideology in Muslim words to consider the self-identity and gender identification of Muslim women. He suggested that the high level of individual religiosity is the main obstacle of egalitarian gender ideology in Muslim societies, rather than Islam itself. Thus, the corruption of Islam leads to unequal gender ideology in Muslim societies. Archer (2007) also asserted that Islam and feminism are identical, but social institutions and formal structures manipulate Islam to justify their patriarchal norms and traditional laws in creating barriers to women's social participation. Frank (2010) added that the problem is not Islam but the corruption of Islam and using it to justify patriarchy. As Mernissi (1987) put it, "[t]he fears of female self-determination is basic to the Muslim order and is closely linked to fear of *fitna* (fear or chaos) (p. 52)." Therefore, it is not surprising that Seguino (2010) found that it is not Islam itself, but a high level of individual religiosity that leads to female subordination. Norris (2009) found that individual religiosity has a significant effect on egalitarian attitudes toward women in Islamic societies.

This literature on the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward gender equality provides support for the hypothesis that individual religiosity in Muslim nations in the MENA region affects egalitarian attitudes toward women.

Hypothesis 8. Religious individuals are less likely to support women's equal right to employment in the MENA region than non-religious individuals.

3.5. Individual sociodemographic characteristics and attitudes toward Women equal right to employment

Studies of changes in gender ideology consider a variety of structural factors. In addition to the structural and macro-level factors in shaping gender ideology, individual sociodemographic factors also affect attitudes toward gender equality. Previous studies have highlighted several important individual characteristics that shape gender ideology. Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) and Davis and Greenstein (2009) specified that individual interest, versus exposure, shapes individual attitudes around gender ideology.

Interest-based explanations emphasize the personal goals and benefits of gender equality. Davis and Robinson (1991) found that young women are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideology than men because gender equality will benefit the former. The sex of individuals is an influential factor in attitudes toward gender equality, in that women are more likely to have egalitarian attitudes than men (Davis & Robinson, 1991). It is in women's rational self-interest to support gender equality since they have more to gain from gender equality than men (Davis & Robinson, 1991). Adamczyk (2013) showed that sex is associated with liberal attitudes toward women. For instance, women are more likely to support abortion than men. However, Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) found that the predictions of men's and women's opinions about feminism and

gender equality are similar. The only factor that seems to make a difference between men's and women's attitudes toward gender equality in labor force participation is employment status. Thus, women and men who are employed are more likely to support gender equality in the labor market than those who are not employed (Bolzendahi & Myers, 2004).

Exposure-based explanations are that an individual's understanding of feminist issues changes over time due to exposure to different situations (Bolzendahi & Myers, 2004). The exposure to egalitarian beliefs through education or employment encourages individuals' egalitarian attitudes toward women (Bolzendahi & Myers, 2004). The most common exposure-based explanation reflects the relationship between individual education and personal experience and egalitarian gender ideology (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). Economic development also increases the proportion of non-traditional jobs that demand female workers (Huber, 1990). As the women's labor market participation increases, the tertiary educational opportunity increases for women, which provides more opportunities for them in the professional occupation once filled by men. Thus, the number of employed women with secondary education rises to fill out new positions in the labor market. These changes bring about demographic change, such as late marriage and fewer children, that also reinforces women's labor force participation (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004). Women with a college education and special job skills tend to have a more egalitarian gender ideology and suffer more from gender inequality than women with elementary educational levels since they have more on stake in the labor market (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). Additionally, a high level of education opens a broad range of careers for women, and those women with a higher level of education are more likely to promote gender equality than do others (Banaszak & Plutzer, 1993; Klein, 1984).

Studies have supported both interest-based and exposure-based explanations. The studies indicate that young, single, and employed women have the most egalitarian attitudes toward gender equality (Kroska, 2009; Price, 2008). The explanation for the relationship between marital status and egalitarian gender ideology is that single women are more dependent on the labor force than married women with a male breadwinner (Davis & Robinson, 1991). Besides, Davis and Robinson's (1991) study showed that young women tend to have less conservative attitudes and more liberal attitudes. Besides, women are more likely to be exposed to gender inequality in their daily lives than men are (Baxter & Kane, 1995). Thus, I expect to find the following:

Hypothesis 9. Women in the MENA region are more likely than men to support women's equal right to employment.

Hypothesis 10. Young individuals in the MENA region are more likely than older people to support women's equal right to employment.

Hypothesis 11. Single individuals in the MENA region are more likely than married individuals to support women's equal right to employment.

Hypothesis 12. Individuals with a higher level of education in the MENA region are more likely to support women's equal right to employment than those with a lower level of education.

Hypothesis 13. Employed individuals in the MENA region are more likely than unemployed individuals to support women's equal rights.

Chapter 4 - Data Analysis and Methodology

This chapter describes how the study was structured and the scale at which the research was conducted. It also explains how the study sample was selected and introduces the sources of the dataset applied in this study. Moreover, it details the research methods employed in analyzing the dataset to examine the factors associated with attitudes toward women's equal right to employment within and between MENA nations.

4.1 Data and Sample Selection

The individual survey data comes from the World Values Survey (WVS) years of 2001, 2007, and 2014 (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). The WVS is an organization conducting a worldwide survey to collect individual-level attitudinal data and to investigate the sociocultural and political change in almost 100 countries and about 90% of the world's population. This survey is the only academic study that covers all ranges of nations with various cultures, economies, and religions. "The WVS is the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever executed, currently including interviews with almost 400,000 respondents" (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Consequently, it is an ideal tool to use for this study.

The WVS association seeks to design high-quality research in each country by using a comprehensive questionnaire to function as a nationally representative survey. The sampling method is a full probability—or a combination of probability and stratified—in order to obtain as many primary sampling units in the sample as possible and to make sure the survey collects the attitudes of different individuals in each wave of the survey.

A considerable number of political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, anthropologists, and economists have used the WVS dataset to analyze various topics related to gender equality, religion, economic development, and cultural factors (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Additionally, there is no other universal dataset accessible to the public that allows measurement of attitudes toward women's labor force participation in the MENA region. The WVS dataset covers a large sample of 47,039 cases in 16 countries in the MENA region over the last three waves of the survey. The last three waves of the WVS were selected because they comprise the most recently available dataset and include more countries in the MENA region than previous waves of the survey. The 16 MENA countries covered by the WVS are Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.

This study first pooled all three years of the WVS together because, based on the analysis, the attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment have not changed significantly over time.

In order to assess the variation of responses in 2001, 2007, and 2014, it is common to calculate the coefficient of determination R^2 , which can be interpreted in terms of percentage of variance explained by the model. "The R^2 coefficient is often interpreted as the percentage of the variance of the response variable, which is explained by the explanatory variables" (Rousson & Goşoniu, 2007: 332). Thus, I regressed attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment and religiosity on two dummy variables representing two of the years (2001 and 2007) with one year being left out (2014) as the reference group. It is indicated in Table 1 that the r -value for the years is 0.059, and our coefficient of determination, r^2 , is 0.004. The R-Square of 0.004 indicates that

the attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment have not changed significantly over time. In other words, only about 0.04% of the variation in attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment can be explained by the year of the survey. Regarding religiosity, the analysis in Table 2, indicating that our r -value is 0.030, and our coefficient of determination, r^2 , is 0.001. The R-Square of 0.001 indicates that individual religiosity has also not changed significantly over time. Thus, considering that both individual religiosity and the attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment are almost invariant over time, the data from all three years can be pooled together for these two variables.

This study also uses various sources to provide data on macro-level variables, such as the World Bank dataset, Human Rights dataset, Population Reference Bureau, and Index of Democracy database, as is discussed in the following section.

4.2. Variables and Measurements

4.2.1 Dependent variable

The dependent variable for this study is attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. I conceptualized egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment as an ideology that one gender should not be favored over the other in job decisions, and both genders should have equal rights to employment. Thus, the best indicator among those available in the WVS for the dependent variable is "when jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women," where 1=agree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, and 3=disagree. I created a dummy variable for the dependent variable in which "agree" is coded 1 and the rest 0.

4.2.2 Independent variables

This study covers individual level and national demographics relative to women's status. The first group of the national level independent variable consists of economic and human development indicators, including fertility rate, unemployment rate, female tertiary rate, women's economic rights, level of democracy, the proportion of women in the national parliament, and oil wealth.

Total fertility rate

Total fertility rates were obtained from the World Bank dataset indicators for each country for the years of 2001, 2007, and 2014. According to the Population Reference Bureau (2014), Total fertility rate (TFR) is:

The average number of children a woman would have to assume that current age-specific birth rates remain constant throughout her childbearing years. In other words, the Total fertility rate is the average number of children a woman would have if she survived all her childbearing (or reproductive) years. Childbearing years are considered from ages 15 to 49. The Total fertility rate can be calculated using age-specific birth rates. An age-specific birth rate is the number of babies born within a 5-year increment during reproductive years. The TFR is the calculation of adding up all the age-specific birth rates for a population and multiplying by five (The sum is multiplied by five because the age-specific birth rates are in 5-year increments.)

Unemployment rate

Unemployment rates are one of the primary indicators of egalitarian attitudes toward women in the labor market. Unemployment rates for this study are obtained from the World Bank

dataset for 2001, 2007, and 2014. The unemployment rate is the ratio of the total working-age population that is employed to the total population of working age of that country (World Bank, 2016).

Women's Tertiary Education rates

Women's tertiary education rates were obtained from the World Bank dataset (2015) for each country. Women's tertiary gross enrollment is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, in tertiary education to the population of the age group (typically ages 18–23) officially corresponding to the tertiary level of education. Tertiary gross enrollment is also used as an indicator because the net enrollment data regarding the ages of enrolled students is not available for all countries. Women's tertiary education rates range from a low total rate of 28% in Morocco to 96% in Turkey.

Women's economic rights

To measure women's economic rights as assured by law in each country, I used the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI, 2011). The CIRI is a worldwide dataset that measures the degree of government respect for human rights in 195 countries. The dataset includes the measure of women's political, economic, and social rights in each country. Women's economic rights in the CIRI include measures of several internationally recognized rights, including:

- Equal pay for equal work
- Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent

- The right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent

- Equality in hiring and promotion practices

- Job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs, etc.)

- Non-discrimination by employers

- The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace

- The right to work at night

- The right to work in occupations classified as dangerous

- The right to work in the military and the police force (p. 77).

The latest datasets available about women's economic rights are for the years of 2001, 2007, and 2014. The CIRI scores range from 0 to 3. A score of 0 means that there are no rights for women under the law, and in some cases, the law includes systematic sexual discrimination. A score of 1 indicates that women had some rights that were not adequately enforced. A score of 2 equates with some enforced legal rights for women, and a score of 3 means that women had all or nearly all the rights listed, and the government "fully and vigorously" enforced these laws (CIRI Short Variable Descriptions, 2011).

Women in parliament

The percentage of women in parliament in the lower or single house for 2001, 2007, and 2014 come from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Women in National Parliaments dataset. The

Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) is a “focal point for world-wide parliamentary dialogue and works for peace and co-operation among people and for the firm establishment of comprehensive democracy (IPU, 2019)”. IPU co-operates with the United Nations, regional inter-parliamentary organizations and international intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations.

Level of democracy

To measure the level of democracy, I used the available dataset of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). The V-Dem dataset covers 177 countries from 1900 to 2016 that makes the V-Dem one of the largest social science datasets on democracy. Varieties of Democracy provide a multidimensional and disaggregated dataset to measures democracy in the world. The V-Dem, to measure the complex concepts of democracy, evaluates five-level principles of democracy, including electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Thus, the database to measure the level of democracy for each country is obtained from V-Dem for the years of 2001, 2007, and 2014. Political rights and civil liberties are assessed and scored for each nation on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 represents no democracy, and 1 represents a high level of democracy. The average of democracy dimensions will be used for each country as an overall score.

Oil Wealth

This study uses Michael Ross’s (2008) oil rents per capita measure to estimate oil rent. “Oil Rents per Capita, which is a country's total rents from oil and gas divided by its midyear population. Similar to other economic variables, it is measured in constant 2000 dollars. I calculated oil rents by subtracting the country-specific extraction costs, including the cost of capital from the total value of each country's annual oil and natural gas production” (Ross, 2008, p. 111). Oil Rents Per Capita is a better variable than the Oil Exports over GDP, which previous

studies have used in measuring oil wealth. “It subtracts production costs, leaves out the oil that is imported and subsequently re-exported, and includes the value of oil that is produced and consumed domestically” (Ross, 2008, p. 112). Thus, it is not only the more precise measure of the value of oil production, but also “it avoids indigeneity problems that come from measuring exports instead of production, and from using GDP to normalize oil wealth” (Ross, 2008, p. 112).

Individual religiosity

The individual level of religiosity is conveyed in a variety of WVS questions. Recent researchers (e.g., Seguino, 2010; Price, 2015) that have applied the WVS dataset in their studies have defined individual religiosity in terms of the intensity of belief. While most of the previous literature used just one variable to measure religiosity, the recent studies analyzed multiple variables from the WVS to increase the test validity. Thus, for this study, the following variables from the WVS will be used in the empirical analysis, including:

(1) Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days? This variable, as a measure of practice, is presented on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 rarely attending religious services and 7 attending more than once a week.

(2) How important is religion in your life, on a scale of 1 to 4 (with 1 representing “not important at all” and 4 representing “very important”)?

In order to create a scale measure of individual religiosity, I computed both indicators of religiosity to create a new variable. The new variable for religiosity is an average score of both religiosity indicators.

Individual socio-demography characteristics

Individual socio-demographic predictors included in the analysis are sex, age, marital status, educational attainment, and employment status. To address individuals' socio-demographic characteristics, I used the WVS dataset. Sex is coded as a dichotomous where 1 = female and 0 = male. Age is a continuous variable, and I did not change this variable in my analysis. Marital status is coded as a dichotomous variable where 1 = single and 0 = divorced, separated, widowed, or married. Employment status is also coded as a dichotomous variable where 1 = employed and 0 = unemployed.

The data on individuals' education has nine categories in WVS, and I applied that in my study as follows:

1= no formal education

2= incomplete primary school

3= complete primary school

4= incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type

5= complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type

6= incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type

7= complete secondary school: university-preparatory type

8= some university-level education, without a degree

9= university - level education, with a degree

4.3. Analytical Strategy

In this section, I explain the methods utilized in the analysis of data. First, a descriptive analysis of both individual-level variables and national-level indicators of the region will be presented to provide a better picture of the region. The first section of the univariate analysis will be followed by a section representing the nation's univariate analysis to explain the differences in indicators of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment across MENA countries.

Second, I check for collinearity, considering that the study predictors seemed redundant and could be correlated with other predictors. Multicollinearity is the correlation between independent variables. Multicollinearity is a problem in a regression model because the independent variables are supposed to be independent. The main purpose of the regression model is to determine the mean change in the dependent variable for each unit's change in an independent variable while holding all other independent variables constant. However, when the independent variables are correlated, the changes in one variable are associated with changes in another variable. Thus, the correlation between independent variables makes it difficult for the regression model to estimate the relationship between a single independent variable and the dependent variable. Therefore, the high multicollinearity of variables in the regression model leads to a coefficient sensitive to small changes in the model.

Multicollinearity weakens the statistical power of the regression model and makes the interpretation difficult. To determine multicollinearity in my dataset, I calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) identifies the correlation between independent variables and the strength of the relationship. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

starts at 1 and has no upper limit. Any value between 1 and 5 indicates that there is a moderate correlation between the independent variable, which is not strong enough to warrant corrective measures. However, VIFs greater than 5 suggests severe multicollinearity among independent variables that weakens the predictively of the regression model.

The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test indicates that there is high correlation among the fertility rate, unemployment rate, and Democracy indicators. Thus, to address the issue, I used the Z score of the macro-level variables in the regression modeling.

Third, considering that the analysis includes individual-level explanatory variables nested within national-level variables, I use Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) and cross-level interaction to explore the relevant factors of both individual characteristics and contextual factors regarding attitudes toward women's employment. Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), also known as multilevel modeling, is a more sophisticated form of regression that takes the hierarchical structure of the data into account. HLM enables the analyst to control for potential dependency due to nesting effects by producing appropriate error terms that make it superior to Logistic regression (Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2007). HLM enables examination of the variation in attitudes toward women's right to employment at various levels within the nations. Thus, this strategy allows predicting the individual attitudes toward women by providing some information about the relative importance of contextual factors and individual characteristics in these areas.

Although HLM can be used on data with multiple levels, the two-level model will be used for the analysis of the variables in this study. For this study, the level 1 regression equation is:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} + e_{ij} \quad (5)$$

Where:

- Y_{ij} refers to the score on the individual observation of the dependent variables at level 1 (subscript i refers to individual case, subscript j refers to the group);
- Y_{ij} is the score on the individual observation of the dependent variable (Attitudes toward women's equal right to employment) at Level 1 (individual) for Individual i in Country j ;
- β_{0j} refers to the intercept of the dependent variable in Nation j (level 2);
- X_{ij} value on the level-1 predictor (individual religiosity, tertiary education, age, marital status, and employment status);
- β_{1j} is the regression coefficient associated with X_{ij} for the j th level 2 unit (Country);
- e_{ij} = random error associated with individual i in Country j

Trough substitution, the regression prediction equation is:

$$\hat{Y}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i$$

One possible problem with the single-level analysis is that the slopes and intercepts may vary across countries. Thus, three general steps will be taken in developing a multilevel model (with 2 levels).

Step1: Specification and testing of the null (no predictors) model to determine if there is a significant variation across level 2 units in terms of the intercepts.

Step 2: Specification and testing of the level 1 model.

Step 3: Specification and testing of level 2 model by adding the predictors of level 2.

Step 1: Variance component model (null, or no predictors, model)

This model is used to test whether there is a significant variation in level one residuals and level 2 means. For this model, some equations represent variation at each level.

Level 1	$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + e_{ij}$ $e_{ij} = \beta_{0j} - Y_{ij}$	<p>This equation states that the score for person I in group J is a function of the intercept for group J + prediction error at level 1.</p> <p>Where random prediction error at level 1 is equal to the group mean on the dependent variable minus the person's score on Y.</p>
Level 2	$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0j}$	<p>Where random error at level 2 is equal the difference between the group intercept and the average of intercepts across level 2 units.</p>
Mixed model	$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0j} + e_{ij}$	

If the outcome of the null model (step 1) indicates a significant variation at the level 1 and level 2, we need to calculate the interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) which is used to determine whether there is significant clustering of observations within higher level units. It is computed as:

$p = \frac{\sigma_B^2}{\sigma_B^2 + \sigma_w^2}$	It represents the proportion of the total variation in Y “explained by the grouping structure” (p.89).
$p = \frac{\sigma_B^2}{\sigma_B^2 + \sigma_w^2} = \frac{.019797}{.019797 + .160203} = \frac{.019797}{.18} = .1099$	

ICC's with values around .05 or higher is often taken as an indication of substantial clustering of observations within level 2 units.

Step 2: Specification and testing of level 1 model

In this step, I will address the question, “Is there a relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward women equal right in the labor market (at level 1)?”

This step involves incorporating a level 1 (fixed) predictor but allowing the intercepts to vary across countries. The equations for each level in this example are:

Level 1	$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} + e_{ij}$
Level 2	$\beta_{0j} = y_{00} + \mu_{0j}$ (Variation in intercepts around the ground mean) $\beta_{1j} = y_{10}$ (Fixed slope for individual religiosity)
Mixed model	$Y_{ij} = y_{00} + \mu_{0j} + y_{10} Ri_j + e_{ij}$

Step 3: Specification and testing of level 2 model by adding the predictors of level 2

The current illustration addresses the question, “Does the effect of individual religiosity (Religion importance) on attitudes toward women equal right in the labor market compound at the country level? Do other country-level compositional factors predict attitudes toward women equal right in the labor market as well? To address any compounding effect of individual religiosity (Religion importance) (R) the level 2 predictors being added to the model including:

- Fertility rates
- Unemployment rates
- Female Tertiary education rate
- Women's economic rights
- Level of democracy
- The proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments
- Oil wealth (OW)

The equations for this level are:

Level 1	$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}R_{1j} + e_{ij}$
Level 2	$\beta_{0j} = y_{00} + y_{01}WER + y_{02}UR +$ $y_{03}FR + y_{04}LD + y_{05}SP + y_{06}OW +$ μ_{0j}

	$\beta_{1j} = y_{10}$
Mixed model	$Y_{ij} = y_{00} + y_{01} WER + y_{02} UR +$ $y_{03} FR + y_{04} LD + y_{05} SP + y_{06} OW +$ $\mu_{0j} + y_{10} Rij + e_{ij}$

The next question is, “Do the slopes for individual religiosity vary across countries?” Multilevel modeling also allows the researcher to understand the effect of national-level indicators on individual-level factors. To address this question, estimating cross-level interaction effects using multilevel modeling is applied to explain variation in individual religiosity using level 2 predictors across countries. I will leave all previous specifications in place but add a random slope parameter (μ_{1j}) at level 2.

Level 1	$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} R_{1j} + e_{ij}$
Level 2	$\beta_{0j} = y_{00} + y_{01} WER + y_{02} UR + y_{03} FR + y_{04} LD + y_{05} SP +$ $y_{06} OW + \mu_{0j}$ $\beta_{1j} = y_{10} + \mu_{1j} \text{ This specification allows the slopes to random vary}$ <p>access level 2 units</p>
Mixed model	$Y_{ij} = y_{00} + y_{01} WER + y_{02} UR + y_{03} FR + y_{04} LD + y_{05} SP +$ $y_{06} OW + \mu_{0j} + (y_{10} + \mu_{1j}) Rij + e_{ij}$ $Y_{ij} = y_{00} + y_{01} WER + y_{02} UR + y_{03} FR + y_{04} LD + y_{05} SP +$ $y_{06} OW + \mu_{0j} + y_{10} Rij + \mu_{1j} Rij + e_{ij}$

A chi-square test also will be run to indicate the association between country of residency and attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. Finally, if the chi-square outcome is significant, I will run Logistic Regression for each country to measure the relationship between individual-level factors and attitudes toward women's equal right to employment. In other words, a significant outcome of cross-level interaction analysis indicates that there is a significant variation within the country in terms of individual indicators of egalitarian attitudes toward women in the labor market due to the effect of macro-level indicators.

Chapter 5 - Data Analysis Finding

The following sections present the statistical results for the World Value Survey dataset of 47,039 cases over the years of 2001, 2007, and 2014. Measures of association are constructed to examine the relationships between the dependent variable of the study's "attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment" in the MENA region and independent variables, including the following:

- Development indicators, including fertility rate, unemployment rate, women's tertiary education, women's economic rights, the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, and the level of democracy
- Oil wealth
- Individual religiosity
- Individual sociodemographic characteristics, including sex, age, marital status, education level, and employment status

After providing a univariate analysis of the study sample in the first section, this chapter examines the joint effect hypotheses on attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in the MENA region while simultaneously controlling for alternative explanations. For these analyses, the multivariate finding of hierarchal linear modeling, cross-level interaction, and regression outcomes for each country are presented.


5.1 Univariate Analysis

The previous chapters attempt to explain attitudes toward women's employment in the MENA region. This section covers the univariate analysis of both individual-level variables and

national-level indicators of the region to provide a better picture of the region. However, the second section represents the nation's univariate analysis to explain the differences in indicators of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment across MENA countries.

Univariate analysis of the World Value Survey dataset of 47,044 cases in 2001, 2007, and 2014 include respondents from sixteen countries in the MENA Region: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen (Table 3).

Figure 1. MENA Nations in the study



The best indicator among those available in the WVS for the dependent variable is “When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women,” where 1 = disagree and 0 = Agree or neutral. The descriptive analysis in the following table shows that 71.9% of the respondents agree with the above notion, while 28.1% disagree.

The descriptive analysis for the sex of individuals indicates that 49.2% of the individuals in the study are male and 50.8% are female. The descriptive analysis also indicates that 35.1% of the individuals in the study are single and 64.9% are married, divorced, or widow.

The descriptive analysis of the educational level of the respondents indicates that 17.2% have no formal education, 8.7% have not completed primary school, and 14.7% have completed primary school. It also shows that 11.1% of individuals have completed secondary school, 6.7% have some university-level education without a degree, and 14% have university-level education with a degree. The descriptive analysis of Table 5.2 shows that 53.4% of the individuals in the study are unemployed, while 46.6% are employed.

Table 5-1 When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree or neutral	33842	71.9	71.9	71.9
	Disagree	13202	28.1	28.1	100.0
	Total	47044	100.0	100.0	


Table 5-5-2 Micro-level variables descriptive analysis (World Values Survey, 1999-2014)

Variables	Values	Frequency	Percentage
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	Agree	33842	71.9
	Disagree	13202	28.1
Sex	Male	23148	49.2
	Female	23896	50.8
Marital Status	Married	30540	64.9
	Single	16504	35.1
Employment Status	Unemployed	25136	53.4
	Employed	21908	46.6

The macro-level indicators' descriptive analysis in the following table indicates that fertility rates vary among nations from as high as 6.72 for Mali to as low as 1.71 and 1.79 for Lebanon and Iran, respectively. Table 5.3 also shows that Libya, with 17.03%, and Tunisia, with

15.1%, have the highest rates of unemployment, while Qatar, with 0.2%, and Kuwait, with 2.90%, have the lowest unemployment rates.

Figure 2 Macro-Level Indicators Descriptive Analysis



Women's tertiary gross enrollment is also well distributed among the MENA nations in which Algeria and Saudi Arabia, with 115.26% and 116.39%, have the highest rates of women's tertiary gross enrollment, respectively. In contrast, Yemen, with 86.05%, and Lebanon, with 90.19%, are ranked the lowest in women's tertiary education.

Based on the CIRI measurements of women's economic rights, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen scored a zero in 2014, which means that there are no economic rights for women under the law. The rest of the countries scored a one, which means that there are some economic rights for women/the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively.

Table 5-3 Macro-level variables descriptive analysis by country

Country	Fert ility Rate	Unemplo yment Rate (%)	Women's Tertiary	Women's Economic Right	Women in	Level of Democr acy	Oil Wealth (in USD)
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			Educatio n (%)		Parliam ent		
Algeria	2.90	10.21	115.26	1	31.60	1.3	57 B
Azerbaijan	1.97	4.91	105.49	1	15.60	.49	36 B
Egypt	3.34	13.10	100.97	0	12.50	.57	21 B
Iran	1.79	10.60	111.50	1	4.10	.81	152B
Iraq	4.48	7.93	99.00	0	25.20	1.50	98 B
Jordan	3.51	11.90	97.00	1	12.00	1.06	750 k
Kuwait	2.01	2.90	105.14	0	1.50	1.32	95 B
Lebanon	1.71	6.28	90.19	0	3.10	1.92	.00
Libya	2.35	17.13	102.00	1	16.00	1.11	17 B
Mali	6.72	6.4	72.32	0	9.50	2.30	.00
Morocco	2.56	9.7	107.05	1	17.00	1.30	18 M
Qatar	1.95	0.2	100.78	1	.00	.44	48 B
Saudi Arabia	3.83	5.7	116.39	0	19.90	.25	355 B
Tunisia	2.23	15.1	111.48	1	31.30	1.52	2 B
Turkey	2.23	9.9	106.25	1	14.40	1.52	171 M
Yemen	4.22	13.5	86.05	0	.30	1.11	6 B

Number North America

thousand *K*

Million *M*


Billion *B*

Trillion *T*

The rates for the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments are also well distributed. The figures range from 31% women in the national parliament in Algeria and Tunisia to no women in the national parliament in Qatar and 0.3% in Yemen. The level of democracy also varies among nations. Mali and Lebanon have the highest levels of democracy, while Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and Egypt have the lowest levels of democracy. Based on the oil rent per capita, the countries can be divided into two groups. The oil reach countries category includes Algeria, Saudi

Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Libya. The countries with less or no oil wealth are Yemen, Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and Mali.

Figure 3 Oil Wealth Distribution among MENA Nations



5.2. Hierarchical Linear Modeling and Cross-Level Interaction

Taking into account that the nested structure of the dataset violates the independent assumption of the logistic regression model, in this section, the Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) that takes the hierarchical structure of the data into account will be applied to analyze the dataset. HLM is useful for drawing out the causal inferences and also for indicating the predictor variables. Three general steps will be taken in developing a multilevel model (with two levels).

Step1: Specification and testing of null (no predictors) model to determine if there is a significant variation across level 2 units in terms of the intercepts.

Step 2: Specification and testing of the level 1 model.

Step 3: Specification and testing of level 2 model by adding the predictors of level 2.

Step 1: Variance component model (null, or no predictors, model)

This model is typically considered a baseline model to test whether the intercepts randomly vary between groups. This is the same thing as a random effect ANOVA. This model determines whether there is a significant variation in intercepts across groups. Thus, the first step for running HLM is to run the random intercept model, which has no predictors included. The estimate of the covariance parameter presented in Table 5.4 indicates that the variation of residuals at level one (.189593) is significant, and the variation of residuals and intercepts at level two (.011815) is also significant. This means that there are significant variations at level 1 and at level 2 that can be potentially explained through the addition of predictor variables at those levels.

Table 5-4 Estimates of Covariance Parameter

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald Z	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Residual	.189593	.001236	153.343	.000	.187186	.192032
Intercept [subject = Country]	.011815	.004351	2.715	.007	.005741	.024318

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

Step 2: Specification and testing of level 1 model

In this step, the random-intercept and a fixed level one predictor will be added to the previous model. The slope for the level one predictor in this model is considered fixed or the same across the groups. The fixed level one predictor considered in this model is individual religiosity.

The outcomes of the following tables indicate that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights in the labor market (slope across all groups is -.016908). This indicates that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of attitudes toward

women equal right to employment in the labor market. Thus, the data may imply that there is a significant predictive relationship between individual religiosity and support for women's equal rights to employment in the labor market. The variance estimates (Residual = 0.187791 and Intercept = 0.012380) are also significant, suggesting that other predictors could be added to the model to explain the variation of attitudes toward gender equality at the two levels.

Table 5-5 Estimates of Fixed Effects^a

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	.441595	.028737	16.792	15.367	.000	.380908	.502282
Religiosity1	-.016908	.000836	46755.069	-20.218	.000	-.018547	-.015269

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

Table 5-6 Estimates of Covariance Parameters^a

Parameter		Estimate	Std. Error	Wald Z	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Residual		.187791	.001228	152.887	.000	.185399	.190214
Intercept [subject =	Variance	.012380	.004560	2.715	.007	.006015	.025482
Country]							

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

Step 3: Specification and testing of level 2 model by adding the level 2 predictors

This step is typically geared toward the role of contextual factors in variation in intercepts and/or slopes. This model illustrates the effect of macro-level indicators on the relationship between individual-level variables and dependent variables. To address any compounding effect of individual religiosity, the level 2 predictors are added to the model.

Considering that the nested structure of the dataset violates the independent assumption of the logistic regression model, in this section, the Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) outcome for

the micro-level predictors of attitudes toward women equal right to employment are discussed. The HLM analysis outcome for the macro-level variable is discussed in the following section.

Table 5-7 HLM outcomes: Estimates of Fixed Effects^a

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	T	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	.214649	.064610	12.366	3.322	.006	.074337	.354962
Religiosity	-.008634	.002850	14.720	-3.030	.009	-.014718	-.002550
Sex	.148534	.014347	14.515	10.353	.000	.117865	.179203
Age	-3.2031	.000207	4.994	-.155	.883	-.000565	.000501
Marital Status	.033640	.007455	11.085	4.513	.001	.017248	.050032
Education Level	.015889	.003019	14.874	5.262	.000	.009449	.022330
Employment Status	.026289	.010879	13.489	2.416	.031	.002872	.049706
Fertility Rate	.066393	.027102	251.947	2.450	.015	.013017	.119769
Unemployment Rate	.047601	.006395	4587.304	7.444	.000	.035064	.060138
Female Tertiary	-.009110	.007483	34315.859	-1.217	.223	-.023776	.005557
Women's Economic Rights	.116701	.006483	4294.816	18.001	.000	.103991	.129411
Women in Parliament	.062473	.006729	26626.419	9.284	.000	.049283	.075662
Democracy	-.061960	.005937	8571.370	-10.437	.000	-.073597	-.050323
Oil Wealth	.041753	.006554	3091.491	6.370	.000	.028902	.054604

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

The analysis outcome at level 1 shows that individual religiosity ($b = -0.008634$, $p < 0.05$) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal right to employment in the labor market, in which religious individuals hold a conservative attitude toward women's equal rights to employment in the labor market and are less supportive of women's equal rights to employment.

The HLM outcomes of this study also support our hypothesis on the relationship between individual socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes toward gender equality. The outcome

shows that all individuals' socio-demographic characteristics, except the age of the individuals, are significant predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

The analysis indicates that the sex of individuals is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .148534$, $p < 0.001$) in which women are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment than men. The analysis also indicates that the marital status of individuals is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .033640$, $p < 0.001$) in which single individuals are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment than married ones. The analysis also indicates that the level of education is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .015889$, $p < 0.001$) in which individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. Employment status is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .026289$, $p < 0.05$) in which employed individuals are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

At the level 2 predictors, the outcome of the HLM models of this study indicate that fertility rate ($b = .066393$, $p < 0.05$) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, the outcome does not support the study hypothesis of "the higher the fertility rate of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely females residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment", in which it shows that nations with higher fertility rate are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

The HLM outcomes illustrate that the national unemployment rate ($b = .047601$, $p < 0.001$) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, this outcome does not support the study hypothesis of "the higher the unemployment rate of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individual residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment", and shows the opposite in which those of the nations with a higher level of unemployment are more likely to support women's equal rights to employment. However, female tertiary education is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

The HLM outcomes illustrate that women's economic rights ($b = .116701$, $p < 0.001$) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The outcome supports the hypothesis of "the lower the women's economic rights of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment." In other words, nations with a higher level of women's economic rights are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

The number of women in parliament ($b = .062473$, $p < 0.001$) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The outcome supports the study hypothesis of "the higher the number of women in parliament of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment." Thus, nations with a higher number of women in parliament are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

The HLM outcomes illustrate that the national level of democracy ($b = -.061960$, $p < 0.001$) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, this

outcome does not support the study hypothesis of “the higher level of democracy of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women’s equal rights to employment”; it shows the opposite—that individuals of nations with a higher level of democracy are less likely to support women’s equal rights to employment. In other words, individuals of nations with a higher level of democracy hold a more conservative attitude toward women’s equal right to employment.

The HLM outcomes illustrate that the national level of oil ($b = .041753$, $p < 0.001$) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women’s equal right to employment. However, this outcome does not support the study hypothesis of “the higher the oil wealth of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women’s equal right to employment” and shows the opposite in which individuals of nations with higher-level oil wealth are more likely to hold a more supportive attitude toward women’s equal right to employment.

Table 5-8 Does HLM outcome support the study hypotheses?

	Hypotheses	HLM Outcomes
1	The higher the fertility rate of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women equal right to employment.	No (opposite direction)
2	The higher the unemployment rate of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women equal right to employment.	No (opposite direction)
3	The higher the women’s tertiary education rate of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women equal right to employment.	No
4	The higher the women’s economic rights of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women equal right to employment.	Yes
5	The higher the number of women in parliament of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women equal right to employment.	Yes
6	The higher level of democracy of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women equal right to employment.	No (opposite direction)
7	The higher the oil wealth of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women equal right to employment.	No (opposite direction)

8	Religious individuals are less likely to support women equal right to employment in the MENA region than not religious individuals.	Yes
9	Women in the MENA region are more likely to support women equal right to employment than men.	Yes
10	Young individuals in the MENA region are more likely to support women equal right to employment than older people.	No
11	Single individuals in the MENA region are more likely to support women equal right to employment than married individuals.	Yes
12	Individuals with higher level of education in the MENA region are more likely to support women equal right to employment than those with lower level of education.	Yes
13	Employed individuals in the MENA region are more likely to support women equal right to employment than unemployed individuals.	Yes

5.3. cross-level interaction analysis for individual religiosity using level 2 predictors

The cross-level interaction analysis is applied to explain variation in individual religiosity using level 2 predictors.

The cross-level interaction outcome in the following table indicates that the national fertility rate ($b = .025974$, $p < 0.05$) has a significant effect on how individual religiosity affects support for women's equal rights. The national unemployment rate ($b = .004243$, $p < 0.001$) also has a significant effect on how religiosity affects support for women's equal rights. Besides, women's economic rights ($b = .010791$, $p < 0.001$) has a significant effect on how religiosity affects support for women's equal rights. The number of women in parliament ($b = .006301$, $p < 0.001$) and national level of democracy ($b = -.006167$, $p < 0.001$) are other significant indicators in shaping the relationship between individual religiosity and its effect on how religiosity affects support for women's equal rights. Moreover, the national level of oil wealth ($b = 0.003954$, $p < 0.001$) has a significant effect on how religiosity affects support for women's equal rights. However, female tertiary education does not have a significant effect on how religiosity affects support for women's equal rights.

In general, the cross-level interaction analysis indicates that individual religiosity interacts with macro-level indicators of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment across nations. This analysis shows that the cultural, economic, and political differences of the study nations have a significant effect on how religiosity affects support for women's equal rights to employment. Consequently, individual socio-demographic predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment may also have different predictive power across nations. Thus, the next section discusses differences in women's status in the selected MENA nations and tests the variation of individual-level predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment across the countries.

Table 5-9 Cross-level Interaction: Estimates of Fixed Effects^a

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	.204236	.036631	15.115	5.575	.000	.126210	.282262
Religiosity	-.006654	.003736	13.540	-1.781	.097	-.014693	.001385
Religiosity * Fertility Rate	.006358	.002491	58.967	2.552	.013	.001373	.011343
Religiosity * Unemployment Rate	.004243	.000702	1283.837	6.047	.000	.002867	.005620
Religiosity * Female Tertiary	-.001014	.000864	6098.346	-1.174	.241	-.002708	.000680
Religiosity * Women's Economic Rights	.010791	.000647	1649.222	16.672	.000	.009521	.012060
Religiosity * Women in Parliament	.006301	.000770	5738.078	8.184	.000	.004792	.007811
Religiosity * Democracy	-.006167	.000694	2364.299	-8.891	.000	-.007527	-.004807
Religiosity * Oil wealth	.003954	.000730	1261.963	5.413	.000	.002521	.005387

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

5.4. Variation across the region: Regression Analysis for micro-level indicators of egalitarian attitudes toward women equal right to a job by country

This section takes a micro-level approach by examining variation in support for gender equality in the labor market across the selected MENA nations. Although the focus in this section is on the regression outcomes for each country, a summary of the distribution of the dependent variable and the main micro-level variable (individual religiosity) is presented to provide a smooth transition to the regression analysis by nation.

The following chart shows the variation across nations in their support for women's equal rights to employment. As can be seen in the chart, a high percentage of individuals who hold conservative attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment are the residents of Egypt (88.1%), Jordan (83.4%), Iraq (77.8%), Yemen (76.9%), Azerbaijan (76.5%), Tunisia (72.9%), Iran (71.0%), and Libya (70.4%). In contrast, the majority of individuals from Lebanon (58.3%), Turkey (43.3%), Mali (37.4%), Kuwait (36.7%), Algeria (36.0%), and Morocco (33.3%) are supportive of women's equal rights to employment.

Figure 4 Variation across Nations on Attitudes toward Women equal right to Employment Descriptive Analysis

COUNTRY * WHEN JOBS ARE SCARCE, MEN SHOULD HAVE MORE RIGHT TO A JOB THAN WOMEN

■ When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women Agree or neutral
 ■ When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women Disagree




Table 5-10 Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7492.504 ^a	45	.000
Likelihood Ratio	5675.087	45	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	186.110	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	46770		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.99.

Algeria

Algeria is located in North Africa and has a population of 41.32 million people (99% of whom are Muslim). Petroleum and natural gas exports dominate the economy of Algeria. Algeria is one of the countries with discriminatory laws against women, even though Algeria's family law experienced significant changes between 1975 and 2005 (Mala & Weldon, 2011). In these countries, women lack the rights to custody over children and inheritance of marital properties, and it is difficult for women to obtain a divorce with the same ease as men. Men are the breadwinners and the heads of households, and women are required to obey their husbands (Mala & Weldon, 2011). Although many women with secondary education are active in the workforce as teachers, nurses, physicians, and technicians (Putzi, 2008), female labor force participation in Algeria is still as low as 15%. Women are less represented in decision-making areas such as politics; however, Algeria has a high level of democracy and the highest rate of women in parliament in the MENA region, with 31.60%. The female illiteracy rate in Algeria is 68%, and women also have access to higher education (World Bank, 2014).

The descriptive analysis of the study (Table 5.3) shows that Algeria has a fertility rate of 2.9% and an unemployment rate of 10.21%. Women have some economic rights that were not adequately enforced by the state. Women's gross rate of schooling for Algeria is 115.26%. Algeria is an oil-rich country with high GDP among the nations in the study sample.

The regression model for Algeria indicates that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = -0.019$, $p < 0.001$) in which religious individuals are less likely to support women's equal rights to employment when jobs are scarce. The regression model also shows that sex is a significant predictor of attitudes toward

women's equal rights to employment ($b = .210$, $p < 0.001$) and women are more likely to support women's equal rights to employment than men.

The regression model also shows that the education level of the individuals is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .016$, $p < 0.001$), and those individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to support women's equal rights to employment. Employment status also is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .044$, $p < 0.05$), and employed individuals are more likely to support women's equal rights to employment than unemployed ones. However, age and marital status of individuals are not significant predictors of individuals' attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is located in Southeastern Europe and Southwest Asia and has a population of 9.862 Million. Although Azerbaijan is a Muslim country with more than 90% of its population classified as Muslims, most people are non-religious yet traditional. The primary source of economic growth in Azerbaijan is from the oil and natural gas revenues. Azerbaijan is a patriarchal society in which men dominate society and are the head of the household, and women are expected to do housework. Women's representation in politics is as low as 15.60% of seats in the national parliament (Putzi, 2008).

Women and men have equal legal rights and freedom. Under family law, women have equal rights to divorce and custody of their children. However, divorce is not an acceptable action among Azerbaijanis people. To some, it is so repugnant that some men and women prefer to commit suicide rather than tolerate the shame of divorce (Putzi, 2008). Women also have equal

legal rights to education and employment; however, women face discrimination in some sectors of the labor market, such as construction, transportation, and manufacturing (Putzi, 2008).

Again, the micro-level indicators are operating differently based upon each country's macro-level indicators. In this case, Azerbaijan's female literacy rate for 2014 is 99.72%, and female's labor force participation is 62%. Azerbaijan has a low fertility rate of 1.97 and an unemployment rate of 4.91%. Women have some economic rights that were not adequately enforced by the state (World Bank, 2014). The country has a medium level of democracy, and women hold 15.60% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross rate of schooling for Azerbaijan is 105.49%. Azerbaijan is an oil-rich country with a high GDP of 75,244,294,275 (World Bank, 2014).

The regression analysis for Azerbaijan indicates that individual religiosity is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The regression analysis also shows that the micro-level variables, including an individual's age, level of education, and employment status, are not significant predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, sex is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.113$, $p < 0.001$), with women being more likely than men to support women's equal rights to employment.

The regression model also shows that marital status is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.059$, $p < 0.05$), with single individuals being more likely to support women's equal rights to employment.

Egypt

Egypt is located in North Africa, and its population is 97.55 million; it is a predominantly Muslim nation (94.9%). The economy of Egypt is mainly dependent on agriculture, media, petroleum exports, and tourism. Egypt is one of the most discriminatory countries in the MENA region (Mala & Weldon, 2011). Although Egyptian women have some social rights, such as the right to vote and own property, they are not equal to men in the firmly rooted tradition or under the family law. A woman cannot obtain a divorce unless her husband is suffering from an incurable defect. Polygamy is legal in Egypt, and court permission is not required for a man to marry again (Putzi, 2008). Although women may sue for divorce, the divorce may be conditional and result in the loss of other rights, such as children's custody rights (Mala & Weldon, 2011). Egyptian divorced women get custody of their girls until they are 12 and their boys until they are 10 (Putzi, 2008).

The female literacy rate is 66%, and women with higher education have many job opportunities in the labor market. However, there is a big gap between men and women's labor force participation in which 76% of men and only 23% of women are employed in the year of 2014 (World Bank, 2014). Also, many women occupy low-paying jobs, either in factories or service industries (Putzi, 2008).

Egypt has a low fertility rate of 3.34 and a high unemployment rate of 13.10%. There are no rights for women in the law, and in some cases, the law includes systematic sexual discrimination. The country has a medium level of democracy, and women hold only 12.50% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross rate of schooling for Egypt is 10.97%. Egypt is an oil-rich country with a GDP of 30, 5 billion Dollars.

The regression analysis for Egypt indicates that individual religiosity is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, sex is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .087$, $p < 0.001$), and women are more likely to support women's equal rights to employment than men.

The analysis shows that the age of individuals is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The analysis shows that marital status is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .040$, $p < 0.001$), and single individuals are more supportive of women's equal rights to employment.

The outcome also indicates that an individual's level of education is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .009$, $p < 0.001$) in which individuals with a higher level of education are more supportive of women's equal rights to employment. However, the employment status of individuals is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Iran

Iran is located in Western Asia. This country, with 82 million residents, is the 18th most populous country in the world (World Bank, 2017). It is 99.4% Muslim. Iran is a rich country with its massive oil reserves, gas reserves, and other natural resources, along with its young population and its access to free seas through the Persian Gulf. The economy of Iran is a mixed and transitional economy with a large public sector. However, Iranian residents suffer from economic inequality and a high rate of unemployment. The female literacy rate for Iran in 2014 is 80%, and the female labor force participation rate is 16%, while the male labor force participation is 71% (World Bank, 2014). In a study of women's socioeconomic status in Iran, Shavarini (2006) determined a paradox

between higher education and women's social status in Iran exists. She stated that Iranian parents support their daughter's higher education despite their awareness of high unemployment. Many parents are aware of the lack of economic opportunities for their daughters' post-graduate lives.

Nonetheless, parents encourage daughters to seek higher education as a means for their daughters to enhance their chances of finding a husband of a higher socioeconomic status and to eventually improve the family's social status. Consequently, despite the improvement in women's educational attainment at the secondary and college level, there has been no corresponding increase in women's social status. The result is the perpetuation of an economically deprived country with a government that imposes traditional family values. As a result, men have priority in the job market because they are considered the breadwinners, while many highly educated women remain unemployed (Shavarini, 2006).

Iran has a low fertility rate of 1.97 and an unemployment rate of 10.60%. Women in Iran have some economic rights that were not adequately enforced by the state. The country has a medium level of democracy; however, women hold only 4.10% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross rate of schooling for Iran is 111.50%. Iran is an oil-rich country with a GDP of 4.34 billion U.S. dollars.

The regression analysis for Iran indicates that individual religiosity ($b = -0.021$, $p < 0.001$) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. Thus, the analysis shows that religious individuals are less likely to hold a supportive attitude toward women's equal rights to employment.

The analysis also shows that sex is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.127$, $p < 0.001$), and women are holding more supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The outcome shows that marital status is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.033$, $p < 0.05$), and single individuals are more supportive of women's equal rights to employment. The outcome also indicates that an individual's level of education is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .016$, $p < 0.001$): individuals with a higher level of education are more supportive of women's equal rights to employment. However, employment status and age are not significant predictors of attitudes towardon this subject.

Iraq

Iraq is located at the eastern end of the Arab world, with a population of 38.27 million, of which 95% are Muslim. The country is one of the most oil-rich countries in the world, and the economy heavily relies on petroleum revenue (World Bank, 2017). Many years of war have had an undeniable impact on Iraqi women's status in social life, education, and the labor market. Although women have an equal right to employment and education, the female literacy rate in 2014 was 12%, and the female labor force participation was 38%, while the male labor force participation was 73% (World Bank, 2014). Iraq also has the second-highest fertility rate of 4.48 after Mali, whose rate is 6.72, but the former has a high level of democracy, and women hold 25.20% of the seats in the national parliament. Family law also grants the same rights for men and women regarding divorce and custody of the children. The unemployment rate is 7.93%. There are no rights for women in the law, and in some cases, the law includes systematic sexual discrimination. The gross rate of schooling for women in Iraq is as low as 99%. Iraq is an oil-rich country with a GDP of 2.34 billion U.S. Dollars.

The regression analysis for Iraq indicates that individual religiosity ($b = -.009$, $p < 0.001$) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. Thus, the analysis shows that religious individuals are less likely to hold a supportive attitude toward women's equal rights to employment.

The analysis also shows that the sex of individuals is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = -.129$, $p < 0.001$), and women are holding more supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

The outcome shows that the marital status of individuals is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women equal right to employment ($b = .067$, $p < 0.001$), and single individuals are more supportive of women's equal rights to employment. The outcome also indicates that an individual's level of education is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .012$, $p < 0.001$) in which individuals with a higher level of education are more supportive of women's equal rights to employment. The analysis also shows that the employment status of individuals is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.043$, $p < 0.001$), and employed individuals are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, age is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Jordan

Jordan is located in the middle of the Arab world; its population is 9.702 million, and it borders countries with large populations such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Approximately 93% of the population is Muslim. Even though Jordan is entirely reliant on oil imports for energy, Jordan's economy is an emerging market with liberal economic policies. The Jordanian labor market has a

distinctive feature due to its geographical location. Jordan is close to the wealthy Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Thus, the flow of workers to Jordan from large populated countries and workers' migration from Jordan to the rich Gulf countries lead to a complicated and unstable labor market in Jordan (Mryyan, 2012).

Jordan is also a young country, with 38% of the population below the age of 15 and 20% between the ages of 15–24. Only 58% of the population is of working age (15–64) (Mryyan, 2012). Jordan's unemployment rate is high, and this rate is more than double (30%) among the youth population age between 15 and 24. The reason for this concentrated high rate of unemployment among youth population is the absence of adequate programs to provide a smooth transition from school to labor market besides the “mismatch between education outputs and labor market requirements” (Mryyan, 2012, p.7). However, economic structure, social perceptions, and cultural factors as exists in other Arab societies lead to a higher rate of unemployment among young females (40%) than young males (Mryyan, 2012).

The female literacy rate for Jordan in 2013 is 97%, and the female labor force participation rate is 14%, while men's labor force participation is 64% (World Bank dataset, 2014). Jordan has a fertility rate of 3.51 and an unemployment rate of 11.90%. Women have some economic rights that were not adequately enforced by the state. The country has a high level of democracy, and women hold 12% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross rate of schooling for Jordan is as low as 97%. Jordan is not an oil-rich country, and the GDP for the country is 3.58 billion U.S. Dollars.

The regression analysis for Jordan indicates that individual religiosity is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women equal right to employment. However, sex is also a significant

predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.078$, $p < 0.001$), as women themselves are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. In addition, marital status is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.039$, $p < 0.05$); single women are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment as opposed to married individuals. The education level of individuals is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.009$, $p < 0.001$), and those individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to support women's equal rights to employment. However, neither age nor employment status serves as a significant predictor of individuals' attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Kuwait

Kuwait is located in Western Asia at the top of the Persian Gulf. Islam is the official religion for the 4.137 million citizens. Kuwait is a tiny country with massive oil reserves that stands as the fourth most prosperous country in the world per capita, according to the World Bank. With a semi-democratic political system, Kuwait is considered one of the freest countries in the Middle East. The constitution of Kuwait grants gender equality and affords many equal rights to men and women in education and employment. Education at the primary and intermediate levels is free and compulsory (Putzi, 2008), which results in a literacy rate of 94% for females (World Bank Dataset, 2014). Educated women in Kuwait enjoy a relatively high degree of freedom and are represented in diverse occupations in the government, oil industry, and independent businesses (Putzi, 2008). Female labor force participation is at 58%, and for men, it is 86% (World Bank Dataset, 2014).

Women in Kuwait also have the right to vote and to own property. However, Sunnis and Shias follow different family law when it comes to divorce, as it is much easier for a Sunni woman to initiate divorce compared to a Shia woman.

Kuwait has a low fertility rate of 2.01 and a low unemployment rate of 2.90%. There are no rights for women in the law, and in some cases, the law includes systematic sexual discrimination. The country has a medium level of democracy, and women hold only 1.50% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross rate of schooling enrollment for Kuwait is at 105.14%. Kuwait is an oil-rich country with a high GDP of 1.62 billion U.S. dollars.

The regression analysis for Kuwait indicates that individual religiosity is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. Sex, however, is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .176, p < 0.001$) as women are more likely to be supportive toward women's equal rights to employment. Marital status is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .082, p < 0.05$) as single individuals are more likely to be supportive toward women's equal rights to employment. The analysis also shows that individuals' age and level of education are not significant predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, employment status is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .148, p < 0.001$) as employed individuals are more likely to be supportive toward women's equal rights to employment.

Lebanon

Lebanon is located in Western Asia, with a population of 6.082 million. Islam (54%) and Christianity (40.4%) are the two main religions in Lebanon besides several different minority

religions. The economy of Lebanon is mainly service-oriented. Under family laws in Lebanon, men have an absolute right to divorce, and polygamy is legal for Muslim men. Lebanon also has no minimum age for marriage. There is a significant wage gap between men and women in Lebanon and no law to make employers not discriminate based on gender in hiring (United Nations, 2015).

The female literacy rate for Lebanon in 2008 is 88%, and female's labor force participation is 23% while men's labor force participation is 70% (World Bank dataset, 2014). The economic stagnation and political problems of the region persuade the government of Lebanon to value women's traditional roles to justify discrimination against women (Lattouf, 2004). Therefore, the government offers educational resources to women but not an equal job opportunity for educated women in the labor market. Highly educated women are left with limited job opportunities because men have priority as breadwinners under traditional family values (Kabeer, 2000). As a result, despite women's impressive achievement in their educational attainment, the social status of women has not increased commensurately (Lattouf, 2004).

Lebanon has a low fertility rate of 1.71 and an unemployment rate of 6.28%. There are no rights for women in the law, and in some cases, the law includes systematic sexual discrimination. The country has a moderate level of democracy; however, women hold only 3.10% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross rate of schooling in Lebanon is 90.19%. Lebanon is not an oil-rich country and has a GDP of 4.8 billion US dollars. The regression analysis for Lebanon indicates that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = -.022$, $p < 0.001$); individuals who are more religious are more likely to hold a conservative attitude toward women's equal rights to employment. Sex is also a significant

predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .097$, $p < 0.001$); women are more likely to hold a supportive attitude toward women's equal rights to employment. Age is another significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = -.003$, $p < 0.05$); younger individuals are more likely to hold a supportive attitude toward women's equal rights to employment. In addition, education level is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .022$, $p < 0.001$); individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to hold a supportive attitude toward women's equal rights to employment. However, marital status and employment status are also not significant predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Libya

Libya, with 6.375 million Muslim residents, is located in North Africa. The economy of Libya primarily depends upon petroleum revenue. Libya has the highest GDP in Africa (50.98 billion USD) due to the small population and massive oil revenue (World Bank, 2017). The Libyan constitution gives equal economic and political rights to men and women; however, strong traditions and Shari'a law bind women's freedom and their access to resources (Putzi, 2008). Under the traditional values, men are the heads of the houses and the breadwinners, while women are required to obey their husbands and look after the houses and children (Putzi, 2008). Although the number of women pursuing education has been on the rise over the last decade, the female literacy rate for Libya is only 77.8% (World Bank dataset, 2014). Women face barriers to have jobs. For example, they are prohibited from working at night or in risky jobs. Thus, female labor force participation is as low as 26%, while the male labor force participation is 79% (World Bank, 2014). The Libyan government provides free day care centers to increase women's labor force participation after marriage.

Libya has a fertility rate of 2.35% and a high unemployment rate of 17.13%. Women have some economic rights, but they are not adequately enforced by the state. The country has a medium level of democracy, and women hold 16% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross rate of schooling for Libya is 102%. Libya is an oil-rich country with a GDP of 4.11 billion U.S. dollars.

The regression analysis for Libya indicates that individual religiosity is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Sex is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .176$, $p < 0.001$) as women are more likely to be supportive toward women's equal rights to employment. Level of education is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .016$, $p < 0.001$) as individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to be supportive toward women's equal rights to employment. However, age, marital status, and employment status are also not significant predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Mali

Mali is the eighth-largest country in Africa located in West Africa. With 18.54 million residents, Muslims make up 95% of the population, and 67% of its population was under the age of 25 in 2017 (World Bank, 2017). The economy of Mali is mainly based on agriculture, and a large portion of Mali's population lives in rural areas. Women are a crucial source of labor for the agricultural society and the economy of Mali. Malian law provides equal rights to women and men; however, the traditional, male-dominant society prevents women from utilizing economic and political opportunities. In traditional Malian society, men are the head of the family, and

women are confined to their roles as wives and mothers (Putzi, 2008). Although education in Mali is free and compulsory, women's access to education is limited due to the lack of resources and inferior educational infrastructure. Therefore, the female literacy rate for Mali in 2014 is 22%, and the female labor force participation rate is 60%, while the men's labor force participation rate is 82% (World Bank, 2014). The Malian constitution granted women's right to vote, and the country has a high level of democracy; however, only 9.5% of seats in the national parliament are women's.

Mali has a high fertility rate of 6.72 and an unemployment rate of 6.4%. There are no rights for women under the law, and in some cases, the law includes systematic sexual discrimination. Women's gross rate of schooling for Mali is as low as 72.32%. Mali is not an oil-rich country with a GDP of 1.43 billion U.S. dollars.

The regression analysis for Mali indicates that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .022$, $p < 0.001$). However, the outcome shows the opposite direction of the association between attending religious services and attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in which those religious individuals more often hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

The analysis also shows that the sex of individuals is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .207$, $p < 0.001$), and women hold more supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. An individual's level of education is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women equal right to employment ($b = .029$, $p < 0.001$), and those individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, age, marital status, and employment status are not significant predictors of attitudes toward.

Morocco

Morocco is a North African country with a population of 35.74 million. Approximately 93% of the Moroccan population is Muslim. The economy of Morocco is based on agriculture, minerals, and tourism. Morocco is the second country, after Tunisia, in the Arab world that transformed its family law to be in favor of women. The female literacy rate for Morocco in 2014 was 59%, and the female labor force participation was 24%, while the male labor force participation was 73% (World Bank, 2014). Despite the progressive family law and constant fights for women's rights in Morocco, illiteracy among Moroccan women is high (59%), and female labor force participation also lagged at 23% (World Bank, 2016).

The first transformation of gender roles within the family unit occurred as a result of the first wave of family law reform in Morocco in 2004 (Charrad, 2012). The reforms attempted to expand women's rights in the family to meet the international standards of human rights while adhering to the Islamic doctrine of justice (Charrad, 2012). Under the reformed family law, the marriage age for women is at least 18, and underage marriages are prohibited. Both men and women are seen as joint custodians of the home, and the legal requirements around women's obedience to their husbands are abolished. There are some restrictions on polygamy, but the practice is not illegal, as is the case in Tunisia. Women, under the new family law, can legally initiate divorce, and it gives women a priority in custody rights (Charrad, 2012).

Morocco has a fertility rate of 2.56% and a national unemployment rate of 9.7%. Women have some economic rights that are not adequately enforced by the state. The country has a medium level of democracy, and women hold 17% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross

rate of schooling for Morocco is 107.05%. Morocco is not an oil-rich country with a GDP of 110 billion U.S. dollars.

The regression analysis for Morocco indicates that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.022$, $p < 0.001$). However, the outcome shows the opposite direction of the association between attending religious services and attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in which those religious individuals are holding more supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

The analysis also shows that sex is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = -0.238$, $p < 0.001$), and women are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment than men. Level of education is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 0.026$, $p < 0.001$) in which individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. Besides, individuals' employment status is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = 110$, $p < 0.001$) in which employed women are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women equal right to employment. However, the analysis shows that age and marital status are not significant predictors of attitudes toward women equal right to employment.

Qatar

With a population of 2.639 million, Qatar is located in Western Asia. Approximately 67.7% of the population is Muslim. It is one of the wealthiest economies in the world, ranked between fifth and seventh in 2015 and 2016 by the World Bank, United Nations, and IMF. Qatar has a monarchical political system, and the Shari'a is the primary source of Qatar's legislation. The Qatar

constitution offers equal rights to men and women; however, the patriarchal society eliminates women's equal access to economic and political opportunities (Putzi, 2008). About 47% of Qatari women are from low-income families and suffer from discrimination in the form of domestic violence, polygamy, and child custody. Education in Qatar is free and compulsory until the intermediate level, and the women's literacy rate for Qatar in 2014 was 93% (World Bank dataset, 2014). Educated women have high access to job opportunities in the labor market as labor force participation for Qatari women is 57% (World Bank, 2014). However, Qatar has remarkable occupation segregation in which women are overrepresented in low-paying jobs in the government and services sector, while men's labor force participation is 94% (World Bank, 2014).

Qatar has a low fertility rate of 1.95 and an unemployment rate of only 0.2%. Women have some economic rights that were not adequately enforced by the state. The country has a low level of democracy, and there are no women in the national parliament. Women's gross rate of schooling for Qatar is 100.78%. Qatar is an oil-rich country with a high GDP of \$206,225,000,000.

The regression analysis for Qatar indicates that individual religiosity is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The analysis also shows that age, sex, level of education, and employment status are not significant predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, marital status is the only significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b=.105$, $p<0.001$), and single individuals are more likely to hold a supportive view toward women's equal rights to employment than married individuals.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is located in Western Asia. It is a Muslim nation with a population of 32.94 million. The population is all Muslim. The economy of Saudi Arabia, one of the top twenty economies in the world, is dependent on oil. Saudi Arabia is a male-dominant Islamic society where there is no attempt to address gender equality under the law. Discrimination in this conservative society against women is apparent, and there are many limitations of women's social presentation (Putzi, 2008). Sex segregation is prevalent in Saudi Arabia, and one may find it in libraries, schools, and public transportation. Women are prevented from studying subjects such as engineering and journalism (Putzi, 2008). Despite these limitations, there are more women in universities than men, and the literacy rate for Saudi women is 91% (World Bank dataset, 2014). However, the patriarchal society of Saudi Arabia does not approve of women working with men outside the family. Thus, women's labor force participation is as low as 21% (World Bank, 2014).

Saudi Arabia has a fertility rate of 3.83 and an unemployment rate of 5.7%. There are no rights for women under the law, and in some cases, the law includes systematic sexual discrimination. The country has the lowest level of democracy among the studied nations; however, women hold 19.9% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross schooling rate for Saudi Arabia is also the highest among the nations at 116.39%. Saudi Arabia is an oil-rich country with a high GDP of 7.56 billion U.S. dollars.

The regression analysis for Saudi Arabia indicates that individual religiosity is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The analysis also shows that sex is the only significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .157$, $p < 0.001$), and women are more likely to hold a supportive position toward

women's equal rights to employment than men. However, age, marital status, level of education, and employment status are not significant predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Turkey

Turkey is located in eastern Europe and western Asia and has a population of 79.81 million. Turkey is a Muslim country, with 98% of the population registered as Muslim. Even though the agricultural sector still accounts for 25% of employment, Turkey's free-market economy is driven by its industrial and service sectors. Turkey is one of the few nations in the region with a desire to establish a liberal western society and a remarkable emphasis on the separation of religion and the state (Moghadam, 2003). For example, the female literacy rate was 92%, and the female labor force participation was 30%, while the male labor force participation was 71% (World Bank, 2014). The country has a medium level of democracy, and women hold 14.40% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's gross rate of schooling for Turkey is 106.25%.

Additionally, Turkey has made efforts to join the European Union that persuade the government to honor human rights and promote equal economic and political opportunities for Turkish people (Moghadam, 2003). Thus, Turkish people possess greater democratic freedom, and women have more rights than other nations in the region. Turkey also has a progressive family law that gives women equal legal rights in the family (Yilmaz, 2016). However, despite its excellent progress in democratization, industrialization, and women's rights, Turkey's female labor force participation is in line with the MENA region with 33% (World Bank dataset, 2017). The traditional gender role and male-breadwinning values, the prevalence of unpaid and informal

family work, and the lack of strong economic growth have eliminated women's labor market activity (İlkkaracan, 2012).

The regression analysis for Turkey indicates that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = -0.027$, $p < 0.001$) in which religious individuals are more likely to hold a conservative attitude toward women's equal rights to employment.

The outcome also indicates that sex is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .113$, $p < 0.001$); women are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment than men. Marital status is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .034$, $p < 0.05$); single individuals are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment than married individuals. Education level is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = .043$, $p < 0.001$); individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. However, the analysis shows that age and employment status are not significant predictors of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Tunisia

Tunisia is a small country situated in a sub-region of North Africa (the Maghreb) with a population of 11.53 million. Approximately 99% of the population is Muslim, and Islam is the official state religion in Tunisia. The economy of Tunisia is based on agriculture. Postcolonial Tunisia has firmly enshrined women's rights in its progressive family law in which it bans polygamy and gives women the rights to child custody and divorce (Arfaoui & Moghadam, 2016).

The Tunisian state encourages women's schooling to incorporate women into the public sphere and improve their legal status (Charrad, 2001). The female literacy rate was 72%, and female labor force participation was 25%, while male labor force participation was 68% (World Bank, 2014).

Besides, Tunisia established the first women's rights organization (Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, ATFD) in 1989 and a hotline to protect the survivors of domestic violence in the Arab region. This women's rights movement was a successful democratic outcome, making Tunisia a positive example of the Arab Spring, along with its egalitarian constitution (Arfaoui & Moghadam, 2016).

The descriptive analysis of the study (Table 5.3) shows that Tunisia has a fertility rate of 2.23 and an unemployment rate of 15.1%. Women have some economic rights that were not adequately enforced by the state. However, the country, along with Algeria, has a high level of democracy, and women hold a considerable proportion of the seats in the national parliament (31.3%), which is the highest rate in the region. Women's gross rate of schooling for Tunisia is 111.48%. Tunisia is ranked eleventh among the sample nations in both oil wealth and GDP.

The regression analysis for Tunisia indicates that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment ($b = -.015$, $p < 0.001$). In other words, religious individuals are more likely to hold conservative attitudes toward women equal right to employment.

The analysis also shows that sex is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women equal right to employment ($b = .239$, $p < 0.001$). In other words, women are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women equal right to employment. The analysis also shows that the level of

education is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women equal right to employment ($b = .028$, $p < 0.001$). In other words, individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women equal right to employment. Employment status is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women equal right to employment ($b = .058$, $p < 0.05$). In other words, employed females are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women equal right to employment. However, age and marital status are not significant predictors of attitudes toward women equal right to employment.

Yemen

Yemen is a country in Western Asia with a population of 28.25 million. Yemen is a Muslim society, with 100% of the population being Muslim. Yemen is one of the poorest Arab countries with an underdeveloped free-market economy and relatively small oil and gas reserves. Yemen is a traditional and patriarchal society in which women are subordinate to men. Yemeni society prevents women from being in public and defines them as mothers and wives and primarily responsible for housework and taking care of children (Putzi, 2008). Thus, women have minimal access to education and employment, and the literacy rate for Yemeni women is as low as 35% (World Bank, 2019). Consequently, women's labor force participation is only 6%, while men's labor force participation is 67% (World Bank, 2014).

Yemen has a fertility rate of 4.22 and an unemployment rate of 13.5%. There are no rights for women under the law, and in some cases, the law includes systematic sexual discrimination. The country has a medium level of democracy; however, women hold only 0.3% of the seats in the national parliament. Women's rate of schooling is as low as 86.05%. Yemen is not an oil-rich country with a GDP of 4.3 billion U.S. dollars.

The regression analysis for Yemen indicates that individual religiosity is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal right to employment. Sex is the only significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal right to employment ($b = .215, p < 0.001$). Women are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's right to employment than men. However, the outcomes show that age, marital status, level of education, and employment status are not significant predictors of attitude toward women's equal rights to employment.

Table 5-11 Logistic Regression Results Predicting Attitudes toward Women equal right to Employment (World Values Survey, 1999-2014)

Indicators Countries	Religi osity	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Education	Employment Status
Algeria	-.019	.210**	.000	-.006	.016**	.044*
Azerbaijan	-.010	.113**	.001	.059*	.000	.007
Egypt	.002	.087**	.391	.040**	.009**	.016
Iran	-.021**	.127**	.000	.033*	.016**	-.021
Iraq	-.009**	.129**	.744	.067**	.012**	.043*
Jordan	.001	.078**	.000	.039*	.009**	-.014
Kuwait	-.008	.176**	.578	.082*	.001	.148**
Lebanon	-.022**	.097**	-.003*	.022	.022**	.030
Libya	-.004	.176**	.000	.039	.016**	-.037
Mali	.022**	.207**	-.001	-.027	.029**	-.042
Morocco	.022**	.238**	.000	.031	.026**	.110**
Qatar	-.010	.046	.002	.105**	.005	.049
Saudi Arabia	.002	.157**	-.001	-.012	.002	.036
Turkey	-.027**	.113**	.001	.034*	.043**	.026
Tunisia	-.015**	.239**	.001	-.006	.028**	.058*
Yemen	-.011	.215**	.001	.024	.007	.032

Chapter 6 - Discussion and Conclusion

Islamic feminist theory argues that Islam is not the reason for women's difficulties in Muslim societies. Islamic feminism is based on proposing a reinterpretation of Islamic texts and calls for gender equality via *ijtihad* and *tafsir*. Islamic feminism critiques the patriarchal interpretation of Islam. As Mernissi (1997) stated, males' priority in the social and economic realm is promoted by both religious conservatism and capitalist development in the region. Various studies also argue that Islamic doctrine is neither universal nor discriminatory against women in economic terms (e.g., Mojab, 2001; Frank et al., 2010; Seguino, 2010; Emerson & Hartman, 2006).

In contrast, classical development theorists such as Daniel Lerner (1958) state that the Middle East is left behind the modernized world because there is a tension between Islam and modernization. He believes that in the clash between Islam and modernization, Islam is vulnerable. Besides, consistent with prior research (Amin & Alam, 2008; Lehrer, 1995; Beit-Hallahmi, 1997; Murphy, 1995; Grossbard-Shechtman & Neuman, 1998), religious affiliations significantly influence women's participation in the labor market. Islam is considered a patriarchal religion and an essential explanation for non-egalitarian attitudes toward females' participation in the labor force (Seguino, 2010). Thus, individual religiosity seems to shape gender ideology and to be a barrier to women's access to equal rights and opportunities (Goldscheider et al., 2014; Seguino, 2010). Thus, I hypothesized that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women equal right to employment in which "religious individuals are less likely to support women equal right to employment in the MENA region than not religious individuals."

Regarding the outcome of HLM analysis, it could be concluded that the high level of individual religiosity is the main obstacle to egalitarian gender ideology in Muslim societies.

However, the cross-level interaction modeling indicates that individual religiosity interacts with macro-level indicators of attitudes toward women equal right to employment across nations. This analysis shows that national fertility rate, national unemployment rate, women's economic rights, number of women in parliament and national level of democracy, and oil wealth have a significant influence on how religiosity affects support for women equal right to employment. Considering the influence of macro-level variables on the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward women equal right to employment, we may need to accept Islamic feminism's interpretation of religiosity. Thus, we can claim that individual religiosity is a significant predictor of conservative attitudes toward women's equal right to employment because the patriarchal interpretation of Islam leads to unequal gender ideology in Muslim societies.

Furthermore, as the Table 5-11 shows, even though individual religiosity predicts the conservative attitudes toward women in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey, it is not a significant predictor of gender ideology in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Surprisingly, individual religiosity is a significant but negative predictor of conservative gender ideology in Mali and Morocco, and those religious individuals are more supportive of women's equal right to employment than non-religious individuals.

It can be discussed that individual religiosity does not operate the same in all MENA nations as a determining factor of attitudes toward women's employment. Thus, as Mernissi (1991) and Ahmed (1997) discussed, the male-dominant culture and the patriarchal social structure could be the real obstacles to women's advancement and not Islam, per se. Alternatively, as Henning (2016) discussed, states rule the nations based on the various patriarchal interpretations of *shari'a* law and the *Kuran* that result in gender-based inequities in the MENA region (Henning, 2016).

Thus, individual religiosity does not seem to be a barrier to egalitarian attitudes toward women in the labor market. These variations in the association of individuals' religiosity to successfully explain variations in attitudes toward women's equal right to employment in each nation could be due to the different cultural norms in each nation that shape gender ideology. Cultural norms are the standards that guide people to assign gender roles to each sex and tend to overshadow the effect of modernization. As the study of Aycan (2004) shows, the patriarchal ideology is still a significant barrier to women's access to managerial roles in Turkey.

Calling back, the classical development theories such as modernization theory argued that culture, demographic characteristics, and occupational structure of society would change during the modernization process. Moreover, modernization provides more educational and occupational opportunities for individuals, which in turn brings more opportunities and comfort to women's lives. Modernization enhances women's opportunities to participate in the labor market. The new growth theorists also believed development enhances health, education, civil rights, and security in societies. Thus, capacity development targets individuals, organizations, and societies to enhance the skills and knowledge of individuals to fill the gap between modern societies and the less-developed world. Thus, capacity development affects the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals.

According to previous studies, a variety of socio-demographic factors, in turn, affects people's attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. For example, Adamczyk's study (2013) indicated that the sex of the individuals is associated with the liberal attitudes toward gender equality in which women are more likely to have egalitarian gender attitudes than men. As Adamczyk (2013) stated, it is in women's rational self-interest to support gender equality since

women have more to gain from gender equality than men. Thus, I hypothesized that “women in the MENA region are more likely to support women’s equal rights to employment than men.” The regression analysis proves the hypothesis and shows the association between sex and attitudes toward women’s equal rights to employment. The regression analysis of the nations also indicates that sex is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women’s equal rights to employment. Women in almost all nations except Qatar are more likely to have a supportive attitude toward women’s equal rights to employment than men are.

Besides, Bolzendahi and Myers (2004) stated that being exposed to different situations through education encourages individual egalitarian gender attitudes. Furthermore, Adamczyk (2013) believed that single or divorced women have a more supportive attitude toward women’s equal rights than married women do. Kroska (2009) and Price (2008) also indicated that young, single, educated, and employed women are more supportive of women’s equal rights to employment. Consequently, we can hypothesize that an individual’s socio-demographics are significant predictors of attitudes toward women’s equal rights to employment. Thus, I suggested that young, single, and employed individuals with a higher level of education in the MENA region are more likely to support women’s equal rights to employment than men are.

Some of these statements are supported by this study in which the HLM outcomes indicate that marital status is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women’s equal rights to employment. In other words, single individuals are more likely than married individuals are to hold a supportive attitude toward women equal right to employment. However, in each nation, there is a variation in how references to individuals’ religiosity and individual socio-demographic factors explain the variation in attitudes toward women equal right to employment.

The country-level regression outcome shows a variation in the association between marital status and attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The outcome indicates that marital status is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Turkey. Thus, in these nations, single individuals are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment than married ones. However, marital status is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, or Yemen.

Individuals' education level is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in HLM modeling. Thus, individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment than those with a lower level of education. The country-level regression also outcome shows a variation on the association between level of education and attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The outcome indicates that, even though the level of education is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in some nations, it is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in most of the MENA nations, including Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Turkey, and Tunisia.

The other significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment is employment status, in which employed individuals are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment than unemployed individuals. Besides, the country-level regression outcome shows a variation in the association between employment status and

attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The outcome indicates that employment status is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment in only five out of 16 nations in the study, including Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Both the HLM outcome and the national level regression shows that attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment are not associated with age.

In addition, the country-level regression outcome shows a variation in the association between individuals' socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. This variation could be due to different cultural norms in each nation that shape gender ideology. Cultural norms are the standards that guide people to assign gender roles to each sex and tend to overshadow the effects of modernization. As the study of Aycan (2004) shows, the patriarchal ideology is still a significant barrier to women's access to managerial roles in Turkey.

According to all theories of development, development is equivalent to modernization and industrialization. Development in all classical development theories was closely tied to Western superiority and industrialization. Development via the lens of classical theories of development such as modernization theory, dependency theory, and world-system theory will bring industrial advancement and civil society. Thus, modernization changes the culture, demographic characteristics, and occupational structure of society. Modernization provides more educational and occupational opportunities for citizens during the transition. In the analysis of development, the new theories of development considered not only the economic advancement of societies but also the organizational changes of the societies.

New class growth theorists such as Zeitlin (1984) and Page (1998) analyze the transformation in social, political, and economic contexts of class relations in societies in their model of development. Sen (1999), the new growth theorist, believed that development would enhance health, education, civil rights, and security in societies. The expansion of human capacities is the absolute goal of development that will be reached through the expansion of real income (Evans, 2005). New growth theorists believe that these changes will bring more opportunities for women and enhance women's opportunities to participate in the labor market through reduced fertility rates and household responsibilities and improved educational opportunities for women.

Brewster (2000), in light of previous studies, discussed that the decrease in national fertility rates is followed by higher rates of FLFP and economic development. De Jong, Smits, and Longwe (2017) also stated that investment in family planning leads to an increase in women's labor force participation. Thus, national unemployment rates are critical indicators of egalitarian gender ideology, and nations with a lower level of unemployment hold a more supportive attitude toward WLFP than nations with a high level of unemployment (Raphaeli, 2006; Noland & Pack, 2008). The studies also show that women with higher education express more significant support for gender equality in the labor market (Cazes & Verick, 2013; Klasen, 2017).

Despite previous studies, the HLM modeling for this study indicates that the national fertility rate is a positive and significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. In other words, individuals residing in the MENA nations with a higher fertility rate are more likely to hold a supportive attitude toward women's equal rights to employment. This outcome rejects the first hypothesis of this study that "the higher the fertility rate of a nation within

the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment.”

Besides, regarding the national unemployment rate, previous studies suggested that the national unemployment rate is a significant indicator of egalitarian gender ideology, and countries with lower levels of national unemployment also expressed more significant support for gender equality in the labor market. There is evidence that a high national unemployment rate negatively affects women's probability of being employed (Pattit & Hook, 2005; Van Ham & Bucher, 2006). The high rate of unemployment results in discrimination against women in employment because they may have lower human capital than men. Based on those studies and theories of development, I also hypothesized that “the higher the unemployment rate of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment.” However, the HLM analysis of this study indicates that the unemployment rate is also a positive predictor of supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. Based on this outcome, individuals from nations with a higher unemployment rate are likelier to hold a supportive attitude toward women's equal rights to employment. Thus, the HLM outcome leads us to reject the study hypothesis of the unemployment rate.

Besides, despite previous studies and theories of development, the HLM outcome also indicates that female's tertiary education rates are not a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. This outcome leads me to reject my third hypothesis of “the higher the women's tertiary education rate of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment.” Thus,

I have to accept the null hypothesis in which there is no significant relationship between the female's tertiary education rate and attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Furthermore, previous studies indicated that people in societies that legally protect women's economic rights hold a more egalitarian attitude toward those rights than those who live in societies that impede women's economic opportunities (Yu & Lee, 2013). The HLM outcome of this study also indicates that women's economic rights are a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The outcome suggested that individuals residing in the MENA nations with a higher level of women's economic rights are more likely to hold a supportive attitude toward women's equal rights in employment. According to the analysis outcome, we can accept the fourth hypothesis of the study in which "the higher the women's economic rights of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights in employment."

Theories of development, gender, and development theorists argued that economic development is empowering women through enhancing women's access to education and economic opportunities. The development benefits women because there is a significant relationship between gender inequality and poverty. Thus, nations with a higher level of poverty are assumed to have a higher level of gender inequality, as well. However, socialist feminist theorists argued that economic development might not benefit men and women equally. From this perspective, the patriarchal system oppresses women in all societies, and there is an unbalanced distribution of wealth and power among men and women.

Development is supposed to bring about not only economic advancement but also political democracy and civil society. A higher level of democracy as a result of development is expected

to improve gender equality and elevate support for women and men's equal rights in society (Kelly, 2010). Besides, women's presence in the government is an influential factor in shaping gender ideology. Female members of parliament are political modes for younger females (Childs & Withey, 2004; Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2007). Women-friendly attitudes also have higher chances of getting approved when women's government executives are involved (Dolan, 2000).

Based on the analysis of political indicators of attitude toward women's equal rights to employment for this study, it is designated that women's presence in the national parliament is a significant predictor of attitude toward women equal right to employment. The analysis shows that individuals residing in the MENA nations with a higher number of women in the national parliament are more likely to hold a supportive attitude toward women's equal rights to employment. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the fifth study hypothesis in which "the higher the number of women in parliament of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment." However, when it comes to the the democracy level, the outcomes of this study show that the democracy level is a negative predictor of attitude toward women's equal rights to employment. Put another way, individuals from MENA nations with a higher level of democracy are more likely to hold a conservative attitude toward women equal right to employment. Hence, the analysis does not support the sixth hypothesis of this study, and it shows an opposite direction from the hypothesis that "the higher [the] level of democracy of a nation within the MENA region, the more likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment."

According to previous studies of the MENA region, oil revenue plays a crucial role in determining development outcomes in the region. Considering the central role of oil revenue in the economies of some MENA nations, oil wealth is expected to be another determinant of gender ideology, in which the economic environment in nations with a high level of oil wealth is not conducive to women's presence in the economic realm (Ross, 2008). Petroleum revenue increases female unearned income as well as the prevailing women's wage that encourages women to enter the market for wage labor that leads to a reduction in women's willingness to be active in the labor market (Mammen & Paxson, 2000). Besides, Norris's (2006) study showed that oil wealth is an influential factor in attitudes toward gender equality, and higher levels of oil wealth negatively impact attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment.

Despite previous studies on the negative effect of oil wealth on attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment, the analysis for this study indicates that oil wealth positively predicts attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. To put it differently, individuals from MENA nations with high oil wealth are more likely to hold supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. Consequently, the analysis does not support this study's seventh hypothesis that "the higher the oil wealth of a nation within the MENA region, the less likely individuals residing in the nation will be to support women's equal rights to employment."

Recall that Islamic feminism, as a combination of post-colonial feminism and Islamic theology, draws upon the Kuran's concepts of equality, which are different from the Western concept of equality. Islamic feminists are trying to liberate Muslim women by promoting gender equality through an Islamic revival. Mernissi (1997) argued that capitalist development promotes patriarchy in the region. Post-colonial feminists also believed that the concept of equality varies

among nations. They argued that societies' different cultural and historical characteristics need to be considered when analyzing women's status in developing countries. Post-colonial feminist theorists such as Chandra Mohanty (1988) state that close attention to social, economic, and political differences between developing nations is necessary to understand women's problems in a nation's culture. Thus, each nation needs different strategies to enhance gender equality. Thus, each nation needs different strategies to enhance gender equality.

In this way, the attempt to rank or categorize countries in the MENA region according to women's status is complicated. There is an apparent variation among MENA nations regarding the individual and national indicators of gender ideology that, in turn, results in different statuses of women in each nation. The countries in the MENA region have different cultures, economies, and political systems, which results in a variation of their attitudes toward the role of women in society. The legal status of women in each nation is also an indicator factor in determining attitudes toward women's rights.

For instance, gender inequality was the immediate aftermath of the Islamic revolution (1978) through imposing Shari'a law. The gender segregation in education and politics led to the institutionalization of gender inequality that confined women's access to well-paid jobs and limited their political representation (Kyan, 2007). The 1980–1988 war between Iran and Iraq changed women's status in both countries. During the war, women's employment increased in both countries due to the shortages of male laborers. However, after the war, a higher birth rate was encouraged to make up for wartime death, which led to lower women's representation in the labor force. Political leaders in Iran “actively encourage women to take up fields of study they deem both socially necessary and appropriate for women, especially medicine and teaching”

(Moghadam, 2003, p. 27). A similar process in Iraq changed the perception of women's role in society, which led to a more conservative attitude toward women's representation in politics and economy.

Moreover, studies show that Egyptian women enjoy significantly higher public freedom than Saudi Arabian women. For example, Kucinskas (2010), in a study of religiosity and gender equality, compared the mosque attendance among women in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. She stated that mosque attendance among women in Egypt is an acceptable way to express their religious affiliation, while Saudi Arabian women are expected to pray at home rather than attending mosques to pray. Le Renard (2008) also argued that the strong gender segregation in Saudi Arabia creates more obstacles for women's representation in the political and economic realm regardless of Saudi Arabia's progress in women's education over the last 50 years.

Economic differences in the selected nations may also play a key role in shaping attitudes toward women in the labor market. Economic concerns and the high rate of unemployment, along with the expectation of men as the primary breadwinners of the household, may shape ideas about gender equality in the labor market. Katulis (2004) showed that men believe in giving priority to men over women in employment because of the social expectation of men to be the providers of the family.

The analysis of this study across the MENA region indicates that nations cannot be unified regarding egalitarian gender ideology and their attitudes toward women's rights in the labor market. Different factors are associated differently with attitudes toward women among nations. Overall, the analysis for this study shows that the association between individual religiosity and individuals' socio-demographic characteristics and gender ideology varies among nations. The

finding shows that the MENA nations are not the same, and there are differences in egalitarian attitudes, cultural norms, and socioeconomic representation. Therefore, we cannot uniform them all in terms of women's status and the determinants of egalitarian attitudes toward women's social and economic representation.

The MENA region is a rapidly changing area. Social, political, and economic aspects are undergoing significant transformation. These changes are even pronounced for women. For example, the level of education, the average age of marriage, economic opportunities, and governmental opportunities have increased for women. The result of these changes has been increased earnings, social interaction, and participation in the labor force by women. These transformations have benefited women, and further developments are occurring. Nonetheless, although these modifications are varied and pronounced, more adjustments are needed.

First, gender equality is a prominent issue in the MENA region. Initially, the presumption was that religion, in this case, Islam, exerted a stultifying force upon women. A review of the religions showed that they are male-dominated. Men founded Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Men are the essential personages of history, and men tend to control these religions in the present. As for the practice of religion, men are in positions of authority. Men interpret the tenets of the religions, and men set statutory rules. It is through these filters that one forms religiosity.

The term "religiosity" indicates the degree of the belief and practice of men and women. Initially, research indicated that the more active one was in one's religion (religiosity), the more likely that women would be denigrated; however, there was not a study to show the influential factors on shaping the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. Therefore, to determine the degree of the effect, a cross-level interaction showed that

the interaction between religiosity and attitudes toward women's equal opportunity to employment vary by nations. In only five of the sixteen MENA countries, a significant relationship between religiosity and egalitarian attitudes toward women appeared. In the remaining countries, religiosity was not a significant indicator of attitudes toward women's equal opportunity to employment. Curiously enough, in two of the countries with negative significance, individuals with higher religiosity were more supportive of women equal right to employment. It is not clear what caused this variation, but further research in the effects of culture, politics, and development indicators is warranted. A review of religiosity revealed that although it affects women, the effect is not as significant as anticipated. It appears that the shift from an agricultural society to a postmodern, technologically advanced society is giving women more opportunities. Consequently, this change is also benefiting women, as gender inequality is shifting.

This analysis is conducted within the parameters of gender and development. As a reminder, both of these constructs have multiple definitions, and both are relatively new concepts. Consequently, there is limited research that directly supports this analysis.

For example, development has myriad definitions, and there is not a universal formula for it. The concept appeared after the Second World War, and it was a theory promulgated by Western societies. During this time, a development referred to developing countries. Some theorists emphasized comparing developing countries with Western nations. Unfortunately, this perspective did not address a wide range of issues. It is for that reason that a new theory addressed development through political transformation.

The modernization theory is another theory used to explain the dynamics of an ever-changing world. This theory holds that underdeveloped nations must evolve in the same way

Western nations did. It also suggests that underdeveloped countries should follow the experience of Western countries in the modernization process.

Once again, there were limitations to this view. The theory tended to be male centric; it also advanced an exploitative relationship between the haves and have-nots of the world. Consequently, a new theory came into being. It is known as the dependency theory.

This theory is based upon the idea that the third world will remain underdeveloped within the global capitalist system because the global capitalist system operates actively to prevent development in the third world through transnational corporations. Although this theory presented a new view, it also did not adequately explain the world situation at the time. Unfortunately, none of these theories satisfactorily explain the dynamics of the MENA region. Therefore, to examine the effect of development on women's social presence in the MENA region, it is essential to provide a theoretical interpretation of feminist theories of development. For the MENA region and for this study, the women in development theory will suffice. In this approach, women are integrated into development projects. Issues such as gender and poverty, gender and politics, and gender and employment are core issues to study in the MENA region. These elements were critical in this study.

Additionally, the role of gender is an essential issue in the rise of women's political power in the MENA region. As has been demonstrated, the gender gap adversely affects women in education, employment, and socio-political changes. For example, as has been demonstrated, religious traditions influence gender inequality. These traditions present an obstacle to democracy in Muslim countries. The analysis shows that there are structural and demographic variables such as the literacy gap between men and women, the sex ratio (mean number of males per 100 females)

and the percentage of women in government at all levels, and gender empowerment as measured by the United Nation's Human Development Program (UNDP) cross-nationally. These religious traditions permeate all aspects of society, too. Consequently, one may find that the gender system is a determinant factor in both the rate of women's participation in the labor market and their success in finding a job.

Another factor of consequence is the effect of oil production upon gender relations. This effect tends to exaggerate gender inequality by discouraging women from entering the labor force and reducing women's labor force participation. It came as a surprise to the researcher that oil production and oil income tended to boost women's progress in achieving equality in these countries. Thus, oil production seems to impact women positively by providing more opportunities for them. One of the reasons may be that the nature of development provides more educational and employment opportunities for all individuals of the nation, even though it may benefit men more than women. In any event, further research is needed to determine the full impact of oil production on women in the MENA region. What is clear is that, as a new economic condition emerges in countries that discover oil, the economy is characterized by a rise in the real exchange rate and an economic transformation from a decline in the "traded sector" (agriculture and manufacturing) toward expansion in the "nontraded sector" (construction and services) (Corden & Neary, 1982). This economic model of oil-rich nations also affects women's labor force participation rate. Mammen and Paxson (2000) identified two main factors that affect women's labor force participation in oil-rich nations. However, the pattern of growth is a significant factor in shaping gender egalitarianism that, in turn, impacts the women's employment rate.

There is a bit of irony in these social changes because although in the modern era, women are enjoying expanded opportunities, there is a rich history of the role of women in the MENA region society. Numerous attempts have been made to explain the salient factors that contribute to the condition of women and the issue of gender. Although many of the well-known theories, such as development, Neo-Marxism, and capitalism, have been used to explain these issues, all these theories have limitations. Therefore, this study has sought to identify the issue and limitations, and it uses a novel approach to analyze the critical factors.

Previous researchers took a similar approach to the MENA and have created a monolithic approach to study the MENA region. Many of the Western researchers presume that Islam is a uniform religion, and all people in the MENA region practice it in the same manner and believe in the same gender ideology. However, this perception of Islam in the west is inaccurate, as Islam is not an invariable religion. Although the homogeneous approach toward the MENA region has some validity, this research demonstrates that the MENA region is heterogeneous. For example, different cultures, political systems, economic contexts, and family laws have created different and distinct nations in the region. As a result of this diversity, this study shows that there are variations in attitudes toward women equal right to employment for women,

The outcome of this study shows that national economic, political, and demographic characteristics are relevant for women's statuses and attitudes toward the WLFP. As Gender and Development (GAD) scholars argued, women have been systematically subordinated in all societies over time (Moser, 2012). Therefore, economic development may reduce gender inequality by empowering women through improving their access to the main components of development, such as health, education, economic opportunities, and political participation

(Greenwood et al., 2005). Consequently, changing the perception of gender roles may happen as a result of empowering women and providing them with more opportunities in the social and economic realm.

Considering the culture that defines men as the primary breadwinners of the family, the outcome of this study suggests that economic security is a significant indicator of an individual's gender ideology, and may trump individual religiosity. Thus, an individual's religiosity may not be a significant predictor of egalitarian gender ideology as long as tradition considers men the household breadwinners in an economic context with a high rate of unemployment. Thus, this study contributes to the understanding that culture may play a particularly important role in shaping attitudes toward gender equality in the labor market.

This study also has implications for the debate over oil wealth and if it is a significant variable in explaining women's status in the MENA region. The findings of this study show that nations with a higher level of oil wealth and GDP are more supportive of women's equal rights to employment. Most of the previous studies looked at the correlation between oil wealth and WLFP, such as Ross's study. However, this study contributes to the body of studies that are looking for the association of oil wealth with attitudes toward WLFP. Thus, this study suggests that economic development is a substantial element in shaping attitudes toward gender equality.

Surprisingly, despite previous studies, this study indicates that even though the presentation of women in parliament positively predicts supportive attitudes toward women's equal rights in the labor market, the level of democracy is not a significant predictor of egalitarian attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment. The political system is a significant predictor of attitudes toward women's equal rights to employment as nations with a higher number

of women in parliament are more supportive of gender equality in the labor market. The political system may also affect other individual-level indicators of gender ideology. For instance, individual religiosity is not a significant predictor of egalitarian attitudes toward gender equality in the labor market in countries such as Saudi Arabia, and Qatar with a monarchical state in power. Furthermore, As Yu and Lee (2013) discussed, this study also indicates that nations with a higher level of women's economic rights hold more egalitarian attitudes toward women equal right to employment.

In other words, the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward gender equality interacts with macro-level indicators across nations. This study suggests that the cultural, economic, and political differences of the study nations have a significant effect on their support for women equal right in the labor market. Consequently, individual socio-demographic predictors of egalitarian gender attitudes may also have different predictive power across nations.

Each country in the MENA region has its unique social, economic, and political system that determines the association of the individual level indicators and egalitarian gender ideology. As this study demonstrates, national-level indicators such as women's economic rights, the number of women in parliament, and oil wealth significantly predict the individual's support for women equal right to employment. This study shows how different social, economic, and political systems can define the association of the individual level indicators such as religiosity toward gender equality in the labor market. Thus, it is critical to study each country separately in more depth and take into account the effect of national-level indicators of attitudes toward women's equal rights in each country.

In discussing the implication of this study, it is crucial to be aware of several notable limitations of this study. The sample used in this study is limited. For example, there is no data on Arab Emirate, Oman, and Bahrain. Moreover, the dataset on the nations discussed in this study is not consistent, as the WVS covers different nations in different waves.

Consequently, this study could not use that dataset to conduct a longitudinal analysis and provide an analysis of the changes in attitudes and indicators of gender ideology over time. However, this study does include nations with diverse social, political, and economic systems. It includes both Arab and non-Arab countries, semi-democratic and monarchical states, as well as economies based on oil wealth and those agricultural economies.

Another limitation of this study is the absence of access to firsthand data and the use of secondhand sources. Primary sources are firsthand accounts of a topic from those who had direct contact with the topic. In this case, primary sources may be responses, comments, or interviews with men and women in the MENA nations. On the other hand, secondary sources are one step removed from the primary sources, and although they may address the same subject matter, they add a layer of interpretation and analysis. As of this writing, secondary data is a valid and reliable source.

In a related matter, there is also a limitation based upon the origin of the researchers. Historically, Westerners conducted this research on the MENA region. Even the acronym MENA is a Western contrivance. Consequently, there has been a tendency to interpret the MENA region through a Western filter. Western researchers may have interpreted the data through and make judgments about the causes of behavior and through their Western worldview. In this case, researchers relied upon their own experiences to understand the relationship in the MENA region.

This attitude resulted in a Western bias that became the foundation of research. A Western bias may be endemic to the research in the MENA region. Therefore, more attention needs to be directed at the sociocultural and socioeconomic context in which these studies have been performed.

There is also political and social volatility in the MENA region, and this volatility also influences the limit of the accuracy of the world values survey since the region experiences under a rapid change. Conflict and tension are a persistent threat in the region. It is not clear how these threats may affect women's equal opportunities when countries are busy in conflict and war, but economic opportunities are limited for all people of a nation when assets and resources are directed to a war effort.

For example, the effect of economic sanctions on Iran is not reflected in this study since the dataset is from the year before the economic and political sanctions. As an example, the World Bank estimated that the Republic of Iran would have an annual growth of 4% in 2018. However, the imposition of sanctions in 2019 resulted in a new prediction. The economy is expected to decline sharply in SH 2019 as U.S. economic sanctions continue to decimate crude oil exports. Within one year, Iran's economy went from riches to rags. Although this study is reviewing attitudes that are shaped over decades, the effect of such tumultuous changes cannot be ignored. It is the degree of effect that is yet to be determined.

Finally, the MENA region is not composed of a monolithic culture. The term "Arab" refers to the language, and this language is spoken in many countries in which there are unique cultures, but there are unique dialects in the region. As previously stated, there are also different forms of

government and laws within the countries. Consequently, culture must be considered in future research.

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Appendix A - Tables

Table 6-1 Years * attitudes toward women equal right to employment Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.059 ^a	.004	.003	.44843
a. Predictors: (Constant), Year				

Table 6-2 Year * Individual Religiosity

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.030 ^a	.001	.001	.4982

a. Predictors: (Constant), Year

b. Dependent Variable: Religiosity

Table 6-3 Countries

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Algeria	2482	5.3	5.3	5.3
	Azerbaijan	1002	2.1	2.1	7.4
	Egypt	7574	16.1	16.1	23.5
	Iran	5199	11.1	11.1	34.6
	Iraq	6226	13.2	13.2	47.8
	Jordan	3623	7.7	7.7	55.5
	Kuwait	1303	2.8	2.8	58.3
	Lebanon	1200	2.6	2.6	60.8
	Libya	2131	4.5	4.5	65.3
	Mali	1534	3.3	3.3	68.6
	Morocco	3651	7.8	7.8	76.4
	Qatar	1060	2.3	2.3	78.6
	Saudi Arabia	1502	3.2	3.2	81.8
	Tunisia	1205	2.6	2.6	84.4
	Turkey	6352	13.5	13.5	97.9
	Yemen	1000	2.1	2.1	100.0
	Total	47044	100.0	100.0	

Table 6-4 When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree or neutral	33842	71.9	71.9	71.9
	Disagree	13202	28.1	28.1	100.0
	Total	47044	100.0	100.0	

Table 6-5 Individual Religiosity

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not religious	12861	27.3	27.5	27.5
	Religious	15318	32.6	32.8	60.3
	Very religious	18587	39.5	39.7	100.0
	Total	46766	99.4	100.0	
Missing	System	278	.6		
Total		47044	100.0		

Table 6-6 Sex

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	23148	49.2	49.2	49.2
	Female	23896	50.8	50.8	100.0
	Total	47044	100.0	100.0	

Table 6-7 Marital status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Others	30540	64.9	64.9	64.9
	Single	16504	35.1	35.1	100.0
	Total	47044	100.0	100.0	

Table 6-8 Highest educational level attained

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No formal education	8102	17.2	17.4	17.4

	Incomplete primary school	4084	8.7	8.8	26.2
	Complete primary school	6906	14.7	14.9	41.1
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	2427	5.2	5.2	46.3
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	5232	11.1	11.3	57.6
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	2962	6.3	6.4	64.0
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	7029	14.9	15.1	79.1
	Some university-level education, without degree	3135	6.7	6.7	85.8
	University - level education, with degree	6574	14.0	14.2	100.0
	Total	46451	98.7	100.0	
Missing	System	593	1.3		
Total		47044	100.0		

Table 6-9 Employment status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Unemployed	25136	53.4	53.4	53.4
	Employed	21908	46.6	46.6	100.0
	Total	47044	100.0	100.0	

Table 6-10 Country * When jobs are scarce; men should have more right to a job than women Cross tabulation

		Agree or neutral	Disagree	
Country	Algeria	64.0%	36.0%	100.0%
	Azerbaijan	76.5%	23.5%	100.0%
	Egypt	88.1%	11.9%	100.0%
	Iran	71.0%	29.0%	100.0%
	Iraq	77.8%	22.2%	100.0%
	Jordan	83.4%	16.6%	100.0%

	Kuwait	63.3%	36.7%	100.0%
	Lebanon	41.8%	58.3%	100.0%
	Libya	70.4%	29.6%	100.0%
	Mali	62.6%	37.4%	100.0%
	Morocco	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
	Qatar	69.5%	30.5%	100.0%
	Saudi Arabia	69.8%	30.2%	100.0%
	Tunisia	72.9%	27.1%	100.0%
	Turkey	56.7%	43.3%	100.0%
	Yemen	76.9%	23.1%	100.0%
	Total	71.9%	28.1%	100.0%

Table 6-11 Algeria Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	.297	.062		4.817	.000	.176	.418
Religiosity1	-.019	.004	-.099	-4.493	.000	-.027	-.011
Sex	.210	.022	.219	9.769	.000	.168	.252
Age	.000	.001	.005	.186	.852	-.002	.002
Marital status	-.006	.022	-.006	-.257	.797	-.048	.037
Highest educational level attained	.016	.004	.092	3.923	.000	.008	.025
Employment status	.044	.020	.046	2.203	.028	.005	.084

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-12 Azerbaijan Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
	B	Std. Error				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 (Constant)	.160	.086		1.862	.063	-.009	.328
Religiosity1	-.010	.006	-.051	-1.638	.102	-.021	.002
Sex	.113	.028	.133	4.072	.000	.058	.167

Age	.001	.001	.041	1.263	.207	-.001	.003
Marital status	.059	.030	.065	1.978	.048	.000	.117
Highest educational level attained	.000	.008	.001	.041	.967	-.016	.016
Employment status	.007	.029	.008	.254	.800	-.049	.064

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-13 Egypt Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	-.004	.022		-.170	.865	-.047	.039
	Religiosity1	.002	.002	.012	1.022	.307	-.002	.005
	Sex	.087	.010	.133	8.918	.000	.068	.106
	Age	.391	.000	.003	.243	.808	.000	.001
	Marital status	.040	.008	.056	4.844	.000	.024	.057
	Highest educational level attained	.009	.001	.079	6.449	.000	.006	.012
	Employment status	.016	.010	.023	1.589	.112	-.004	.035

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-14 Iran Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.320	.042		7.607	.000	.237	.402
	Religiosity1	-.021	.003	-.100	-7.081	.000	-.027	-.016
	Sex	.127	.014	.139	8.830	.000	.098	.155
	Age	.000	.001	-.007	-.406	.685	-.001	.001
	Marital status	.033	.015	.035	2.157	.031	.003	.063
	Highest educational level attained	.016	.003	.091	5.858	.000	.011	.022

Employment status	-.021	.015	-.023	-1.444	.149	-.050	.008
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a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-15 . Iraq Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.130	.030		4.351	.000	.071	.188
	Religiosity1	-.009	.002	-.054	-4.061	.000	-.013	-.005
	Sex	.129	.013	.156	9.806	.000	.103	.155
	Age	.744	.000	.003	.239	.811	-.001	.001
	Marital status	.067	.012	.073	5.454	.000	.043	.091
	Highest educational level attained	.012	.002	.077	5.776	.000	.008	.016
	Employment status	.043	.013	.051	3.236	.001	.017	.069

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-16 Jordan Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.077	.039		1.965	.050	.000	.154
	Religiosity1	.001	.003	.004	.215	.830	-.005	.006
	Sex	.078	.015	.105	5.130	.000	.048	.108
	Age	.000	.000	-.012	-.637	.524	-.001	.001
	Marital status	.039	.015	.049	2.661	.008	.010	.068
	Highest educational level attained	.009	.003	.064	3.630	.000	.004	.014
	Employment status	-.014	.014	-.018	-.948	.343	-.042	.015

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-17 Kuwait Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.223	.098		2.268	.023	.030	.415
	Religiosity1	-.008	.006	-.037	-1.302	.193	-.019	.004
	Sex	.176	.029	.175	6.120	.000	.120	.232
	Age	.578	.001	.001	.035	.972	-.002	.003
	Marital status	.082	.032	.082	2.605	.009	.020	.144
	Highest educational level attained	.001	.007	.004	.123	.902	-.013	.015
	Employment status	.148	.034	.133	4.417	.000	.082	.214

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-18 Lebanon Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.666	.093		7.151	.000	.483	.848
	Religiosity1	-.022	.006	-.103	-3.506	.000	-.035	-.010
	Sex	.097	.030	.099	3.276	.001	.039	.156
	Age	-.003	.001	-.096	-2.803	.005	-.005	-.001
	Marital status	.022	.034	.022	.655	.512	-.044	.089
	Highest educational level attained	.022	.006	.108	3.535	.000	.010	.035
	Employment status	.030	.031	.030	.978	.328	-.030	.090

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-19 Libya Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.170	.067		2.535	.011	.038	.301
	Religiosity1	-.004	.005	-.019	-.877	.380	-.013	.005
	Sex	.176	.021	.193	8.335	.000	.135	.218
	Age	.000	.001	-.007	-.291	.771	-.002	.001

Marital status	.039	.023	.042	1.751	.080	-.005	.084
Highest educational level attained	.016	.004	.091	3.772	.000	.007	.024
Employment status	-.037	.022	-.040	-1.684	.092	-.080	.006

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-20 Mali Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.049	.080		.608	.543	-.108	.205
	Religiosity1	.022	.007	.089	3.241	.001	.009	.036
	Sex	.207	.028	.214	7.422	.000	.152	.262
	Age	-.001	.001	-.042	-1.426	.154	-.003	.001
	Marital status	-.027	.032	-.025	-.848	.397	-.089	.035
	Highest educational level attained	.029	.006	.147	5.148	.000	.018	.041
	Employment status	-.042	.029	-.042	-1.450	.147	-.099	.015

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-21 Morocco Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	-.156	.046		-3.354	.001	-.247	-.065
	Religiosity1	.022	.003	.114	6.916	.000	.016	.028
	Sex	.238	.015	.253	15.539	.000	.208	.268
	Age	.000	.001	-.004	-.236	.813	-.002	.001
	Marital status	.031	.017	.033	1.837	.066	-.002	.065
	Highest educational level attained	.026	.003	.138	8.181	.000	.020	.032
	Employment status	.110	.020	.092	5.653	.000	.072	.149

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-22 Qatar Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.187	.093		2.015	.044	.005	.370
	Religiosity1	-.010	.006	-.052	-1.649	.099	-.022	.002
	Sex	.046	.031	.049	1.465	.143	-.015	.107
	Age	.002	.001	.063	1.855	.064	.000	.005
	Marital status	.105	.033	.106	3.200	.001	.041	.169
	Highest educational level attained	.005	.006	.026	.768	.443	-.007	.017
	Employment status	.049	.033	.053	1.501	.134	-.015	.114

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-23 Saudi Arabia Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.196	.088		2.217	.027	.023	.369
	Religiosity1	.002	.006	.011	.410	.682	-.009	.014
	Sex	.157	.031	.172	5.117	.000	.097	.218
	Age	-.001	.001	-.015	-.492	.623	-.003	.002
	Marital status	-.012	.028	-.013	-.424	.672	-.068	.044
	Highest educational level attained	.002	.007	.010	.378	.706	-.010	.015
	Employment status	.036	.032	.039	1.138	.255	-.026	.098

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-24 Turkey Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.318	.039		8.172	.000	.242	.395
	Religiosity1	-.027	.003	-.139	-9.953	.000	-.032	-.022
	Sex	.113	.015	.114	7.399	.000	.083	.143

Age	.001	.000	.014	1.061	.289	.000	.001
Marital status	.034	.014	.031	2.317	.021	.005	.062
Highest educational level attained	.043	.003	.217	15.355	.000	.038	.049
Employment status	.026	.014	.026	1.798	.072	-.002	.054

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-25 Tunisia Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.116	.071		1.628	.104	-.024	.256
	Religiosity1	-.015	.005	-.094	-3.262	.001	-.024	-.006
	Sex	.239	.026	.268	9.282	.000	.188	.289
	Age	.001	.001	.022	.582	.561	-.001	.003
	Marital status	-.006	.031	-.007	-.200	.842	-.067	.055
	Highest educational level attained	.028	.005	.172	5.304	.000	.018	.039
	Employment status	.058	.026	.064	2.214	.027	.007	.109

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

Table 6-26 Yemen Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	.121	.112		1.080	.280	-.099	.341
	Religiosity1	-.011	.010	-.074	-1.168	.243	-.030	.008
	Sex	.215	.057	.255	3.769	.000	.103	.327
	Age	.001	.001	.045	1.377	.169	-.001	.003
	Marital status	.024	.032	.024	.754	.451	-.039	.088
	Highest educational level attained	.007	.005	.048	1.333	.183	-.003	.017
	Employment status	.032	.036	.037	.896	.370	-.038	.102

a. Dependent Variable: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women