

Essays on political violence in autocracies

by

Ghashia Kiyani

M.A., Western Illinois University, 2014
M.PA, Kansas State University, 2016

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

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Department of Political Science
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Abstract

The first essay examines the impact of coup-proofing on political violence while a leader is in power and during the leader's regime transition. To explain this phenomenon, this study focuses on Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule between 1979 and 2003 and including the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion which led to Hussein's removal from power. The significance of Hussein's coup-proofing strategies provides a window into the nature of human rights violations through all stages of a rule, invasion, regime transition, and the violence that endures beyond transition.

This second essay asks the question of how a state's military institutions can affect whether a regime transition is violent or not. Specifically, it examines the relationship between counterbalancing and violence during regime transition in authoritarian regimes. The main argument is that counterbalancing is more likely to increase violence during regime transition. Further, this relationship differs across autocracies, and military regimes are more likely to experience violent regime transition than their civilian counterparts. I test these hypotheses by using cross sectional and time series data on autocratic regime transition and counterbalancing from 1970 to 2010. The results suggest a curvilinear relationship between counterbalancing and violent regime transition. Further, it appears that counterbalancing in military regimes is more likely to lead to violent regime transition than in other autocratic regimes.

This third essay analyzes how U.S. aid affect the human rights abuses. Particularly, it examines the relationship between U.S. aid and substitution effect of rights violation in authoritarian regimes. The main argument is that as a rational actor, the autocratic leader does not want to lose aid, and at the same time cannot completely stop violation of rights because such leaders come into power through force. In such a situation, leader act strategically by substituting the visible rights violation to invisible ones (killings to forced disappearances). However, substitution behavior depends on the strategic nature of relationship between the U.S. and the recipient. If the recipient is strategically unimportant then we expect substitution, otherwise substitution of rights violation may not exist, thus making autocratic regimes to violate all rights irrespective of their type. Further, when donor is under intense pressure from its public or

international community to act against the recipient that is strategically important then the donor may choose to punish recipient by cutting economic aid rather than military aid. I test these hypotheses by using cross sectional and time series data on U.S. aid and human rights from 1980 to 2010.

The fourth essay examines how regime type (democracy or autocracy) shapes the terrorism effect on human rights violations. Specifically, it studies how democracies are also willing to violate certain types of human rights when threatened by terrorism. I argue that autocracies are often already engaging in human rights violations, thus terrorist attacks have a smaller effect on human rights violations in autocratic states. In contrast, democracies usually have a better record of human rights but terrorist incidents can place democratic regimes in an emergency. Under this setting, democracies will increase human rights violations. I argue that in this setting, democracies will violate physical integrity rights, not empowerment rights. Physical integrity right violations allow governments to repress vulnerable groups while signaling to most citizens that they are not vulnerable to repression. Thus, democracies are able to protect themselves from internal threats while maintaining the support of their selectorate. In this particular situation, the public become tolerant mainly because the government signal its citizens that it is only going after the terrorists not the general citizens. I study the conditioning effect of regime type on the relationship between terrorism and human rights during the period from 1980 to 2010 using data on regime type, terrorism and human rights.

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Approved by:

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Table of Contents

List of Figures	x
List of Tables	xi
Acknowledgments.....	xii
Dedication	xiv
Chapter 1 - Introduction.....	1
1.1. Causes of Repression	4
1.2. Internal and External Factors affecting Political Violence in Autocracies.....	10
Chapter 2 - Coup-Proofing and Political Violence: The Case of Iraq	15
2.1. Saddam Hussein’s Rise to Power: Coup-proofing and Political Violence.....	18
2.2. The US Invasion of Iraq, Response of Hussein’s Coup-Proofed Regime, and Legacies of Violence	24
2.3. Conclusion	35
Chapter 3 - Civil-Military Relations and Regime Transition: The Effect of Counterbalancing on Violence.....	37
3.1. Why Counterbalancing	38
3.2. Regime Transitions	40
3.3. Counterbalancing and Violent Regime Transition	42
3.4. Research Design	50
3.4.1. Model	50
3.5. Analysis	55
3.6. Conclusion	63
Chapter 4 - U.S. Aid and Substitution of Rights Violations.....	66
4.1. Foreign Aid and Human Rights	68
4.2. Foreign Aid and Substitution of Rights Violation	70
4.3. Research Design	78
4.3.1. Dependent Variable.....	79
4.3.2. Independent Variables.....	79
4.4. Model Selection	83
4.4. Results.....	86

4.5. Conclusion	95
Chapter 5 - The Effect of Terrorism on Human Rights Violations in Democracies	98
5.1. Literature Review: Internal and External Threats as Causes of Repression.....	100
5.2. Terrorism and Rights Violation	102
5.3. Research Design	112
5.3.1. Dependent Variable.....	112
5.3.2. Independent Variables.....	113
5.4. Results.....	116
5.5. Robustness Checks	125
5.6. Conclusion	126
Chapter 6 - Conclusion	129
References	138
Appendix A - Chapter 3 Tables and Figures	153
Appendix B - Chapter 4 Tables and Figures.....	165
Appendix C - Chapter 5 Tables and Figures.....	172

List of Figures

Figure 2.1.Documented yearly civilian deaths from violence from 2003-2018	33
Figure 2.2.Documented civilian deaths from all anti-government/occupation forces from 2003 to 2017.....	33
Figure 3.1.Coefficient plot of outcome equation showing level of significance at 95% CI.....	58
Figure 3.2.Impact of Very Low and High Levels of Counterbalancing on Violent Regime Transition	59
Figure 3.3.Coefficient plot of outcome equation showing level of significance at 95% CI.....	61
Figure 3.4.Violent Regime transition in Military Regime at Different levels of Counterbalancing	63
Figure 4.1.Coefficient plot of ordinal logit regression equation of Model 1 showing level of significance at 95% CI.....	87
Figure 4.2.Marginal Effect of US aid (ln) on Disappearances (95 percent confidence interval). 90	
Figure 4.3.Marginal Effect of US Aid (ln) on Disappearances, Low Strategic Importance, and High strategic Importance (95 percent confidence interval).....	94
Figure 5.1.Theoretical Framework	111
Figure 5.2. Marginal effect of terrorism on government respect of physical integrity rights.....	121
Figure 5.3. Marginal effect of terrorism on government respect of empowerment rights.....	124

List of Tables

Table 3.1. Low and High Levels of Counterbalancing and Violent Regime Transition, Heckman Selection Model	56
Table 3.2. Impact of Counterbalanced Military Regime on Violent Regime Transition, Heckman Selection Model	60
Table 4.1. Provision of US Aid and the substitution of killing on the level of forced disappearance for autocracies	89
Table 4.2. Provision of US Aid and the substitution of killing on the level of forced disappearance based on strategic Importance	93
Table 5.1. The Effect of Terrorism on Physical Integrity and Empowerment Rights at Different levels of Democracy	119
Table 5.2. Error Correction Model	123

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to all women and minorities living under fear and enduring violence every day with a hope for freedom.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Leaders around the world have engaged in repression throughout history. Repression refers to the actual or threatened use of force against individuals within the state jurisdiction to deter activities perceived to be challenging to the leader (Goldstein 1978, p. 27). Engaging in repression by relying on various repressive strategies has benefitted leaders. It allowed them to increase their office duration and continue receiving the political and economic rewards associated with such powerful positions. For example, Hosni Mubarak, a military dictator of Egypt, engaged in repression by employing various strategies, including police brutality, persecution of minorities, restricting political dissent, and arresting journalists (Dickinson 2013). Such acts of violence helped Mubarak maintain power for three decades and allowed him to amass immense wealth. According to a report published in Al-Khabar, the Mubarak family fortune reached \$70 billion. It indicated that business ventures from his military and government services attributed to its wealth (The Guardian 2012). Exploiting political position to receive economic benefits is not limited to Mubarak. According to Amnay Jamal, a Middle Eastern expert, other dictators in Gulf countries received comparable financial gains from their political positions (Jamal 2012).

Human rights violation has become a concern for International Non-Governmental Organization and countries promoting human rights. It's mainly a security concern because violation of human rights weakens the state internally and eventually leads to outcomes including rebel group formation, civil war, and citizen engagement in terror-related activities. Such outcomes are likely to affect neighboring states and undermine their security, thus embroiling the whole region into chaos. Due to national and international security concerns, scholars in the field of international relations started examining repression. Despite the fact, the study of political violence has gained attention, there are still many questions yet to be answered regarding repression. This

dissertation offers an analysis of repression in the context of environmental factors and institutions. Environment refers to domestic and international factors affecting state behavior, whereas institutions refer to the political system or organizational structure through which political power is exercised. In particular, the research fills a gap in the international relations literature by examining the interaction of environment and institutions. Though both these factors, environment and institutions, have been studied independently, much work is to be done on their interaction. As such, the dissertation examines how internal and external environments affect leaders' choice of repression in autocracies and how institutional variation leads to a different outcome from the same forms of repression. These questions are examined using historiography and large-N, quantitative analysis. Finally, this research aims to provide insights into how political violence needs to be explicitly analyzed by focusing on environment and institution interaction.

In this dissertation, I argue that it is essential to examine political violence as an outcome of an interaction between the environment and institutions. Leaders in autocratic regimes always rely on repression because they come to power through force and strengthen their rule by crushing dissent. Also, they are not held accountable since the accountability mechanism is absent in autocratic regimes. Despite authoritarian leader's incentive to repress, their interaction with internal and external factors is likely to affect their repression choice. It may vary based on the type of autocratic regime. For example, authoritarian leaders signing Convention against Torture (CAT) treaty are less likely to engage in torture to avoid shaming by the international community. However, some autocratic leaders may continue to engage in torturing than their counterparts. This example indicates that an external factor, signing the CAT treaty, alters leaders' repressive behavior, and the outcome varies depending on regime type. The dissertation focuses explicitly on physical integrity rights and empowerment rights violations. Physical Integrity Rights are "the

entitlements individuals have in international law to be free from arbitrary physical harm and coercion by their government'' (Cingranelli and Richards 1999, p. 407). Empowerment rights are about government respect for assembly and association rights, foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, electoral self-determination, and workers' rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2014, p.4). In the following chapters, I argue that authoritarian regimes' leaders always want to stay in power, and their interaction with domestic and international factors can negatively affect political violence. However, this negative relationship changes based on institutional variations. Overall, I find support for this argument using counterbalancing datasets, US aid, terrorism, and political violence.

1.1. Causes of Repression

What does existing research tell us about repression? Previous scholarly work on repression primarily focuses on political and economic causes of repression. Studies indicate institutional differences affect state use of violence towards its citizens (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Whitten-Woodring, 2009; Hendrix and Wong 2013). Findings of notable work suggest repression is more common in autocracies than democracies for different reasons. First, autocratic leaders come into power without the consent of the majority of the public. Later, to protect their regime from being ousted either through mass uprising, protest or coup rely on repression, which helps create fear among the masses and submits them to the regime (Davenport 1999). Autocracies' repressive strategies include restricting freedom of speech, freedom to move, free exercise of religion, forced disappearance, torture, killings, and political imprisonment (Cingranelli, Richard, and Clay, 2014).

In addition to that, autocrats repress the citizens due to the absence of an accountability mechanism. In any political system, there are three players, along with a leader and a challenger. It includes all residents of a state, and within the residents' group, another group expresses a preference to select a leader and is called a selectorate. Each member of the selectorate can become a supporter of the incumbent by forming a winning coalition. Support of a winning coalition is crucial because it controls the resources essential for the incumbent's political survival, and losing the winning coalition's loyalty means the challenger is welcomed. So, to keep the support of the winning coalition leader provides incentives such as public and private goods. The provision of incentives also depends on the winning coalition's size. The smaller the winning coalition, the more likely it will get benefits, and as the size increases, the provision of incentives decreases (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2002). Autocracies have a smaller winning coalition, making it easier

for an autocratic leader to provide resources to its loyalists and maintain their loyalty to the regime, which allows the leader to engage in repression.

Democracies behave differently because the leaders come into power through a proper channel, i.e., free and fair elections, and not threatened to be overthrown, making them less likely to use repression for survival. Moreover, concerning accountability, the institutions in democracies are powerful, helping maintain check and balance over the leader. Also, the winning coalition's size is larger in democracies, making it impossible for incumbent leaders to provide incentives and gain their loyalty. That, in turn, makes it less likely for the leader to be protected by its winning coalition for its wrongdoings (Poe and Tate 1994; Gleditsch and Ward 1997; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2002).

Previous scholars have examined the institutional differences by only focusing on democracies and autocracies (Poe and Tate 1994). However, Weeks (2014) argues that not all autocratic leaders behave similarly because of the institutional differences within dictatorships. Davenport (2007) examining repression among autocracies indicates that single party regimes are less repressive than other autocratic counterparts. It further shows that end of the Cold War has a varied effect on repression in different authoritarian regimes.

In addition to political explanation, economic underdevelopment is another critical cause of repression. Studies on economic reason produce mixed findings. Some find countries facing financial crises, including high inflation, low growth rate, foreign direct investment, and trade, are likely to cause conflict among societal members because of scarcity which eventually pushes leaders to engage in repression to contain societal disputes. However, others find no significant effect (Poe and Tate 1994; Young 2009; Conrad and DeMeritt 2013; Janz 2018; Hafner-Burton 2005; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Minkler and Sweeney 2011).

Scholars also focused on leaders' decision calculus when explaining repression (Duvall and Stohl 1988; Moore 2000). In such a framework of decision-calculus, leaders weigh the costs and benefits of engaging in repression. Such studies indicate that leaders carefully weigh the cost and benefit of repression and look at other available options for maintaining control before engaging in repression. Moreover, it suggests that as the opposition demands increases from minor to extreme, leaders' likelihood of engaging in repression decreases (Gartner and Regan 1996).

Moving beyond the causes of repression, scholars have also examined whether leaders are more likely to violate certain types of human rights. If it is so, what determines the violation of one right over the other right? There are two major types of globally recognized human rights, and the CIRI project (Cingranelli and Richards 2014) divides them into physical integrity and political empowerment rights. Physical integrity rights include torture, disappearance, killings, and political imprisonment that focus on the individual's physical harm. In contrast, the political empowerment rights such as freedom of speech, religion, domestic and foreign movement, association, electoral self-determination, worker's rights, women's economic, political and social rights, and independence of the judiciary focus on social and political freedom to individuals. The rationale of distinguishing human rights is that human rights are not only about just protecting physical life but allowing people to exercise social, economic, and cultural freedom.

The findings of rights violations indicate that various factors affect the leaders' choice of repressing certain rights. The leader's decision to choose a specific repressive strategy is based on a challenge to the leadership or the status quo. For example, when the opposition party challenges a leader, a leader can respond through varied options, including accepting opposition demand or eliminating opposition by violating their physical integrity rights. The leader will weigh the cost and benefit of all available options and adopt a strategy with the highest expected utility (Gartner

& Regan, 1996). For instance, if the opposition does not threaten the status quo, leaders will rely on non-violent means such as banning organizations, restricting freedom of assembly and association instead of killing or torture (Escriba-Folch, 2013).

In addition to that, international pressure plays a vital role in leaders' choice of repression. The international community may accept the level of repression that is in line with opposition tactics, but the tolerance of international community die down as the repression becomes excessive (Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 1985). An example of such behavior is reflected in the U.S. response to El Salvador's use of repression. On October 15, 1979, military officers overthrew Humberto Romero and created Revolutionary Junta Government. The justification of the coup was equitable resource distribution, increasing respect for human rights, and promoting democratization. However, within few months of the coup, right-wing elements in the military started controlling power. This control of power resulted in terror against all society segments; in particular rural areas were hard hit. One of the notable incidents of this period is the assassination of human rights activist Monsignor Oscar Romero, who was shot dead during a mass search in the 1980s. The violations didn't stop here, such as a bomb was set off at his funeral, and the military responded by opening fire on the crowd, killing dozens of people, and wounding hundreds of civilians. Major Roberto D'Aubisson was involved in the Romero assassination and was arrested but later released by the government. During that time, leftist guerilla groups joined to form Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The group engaged in insurgency and the counter-insurgency by the government targeted civilians leading to indiscriminate violence, mass migrations, and death squads. The indiscriminate violence fueled rebellion and lead to a full-blown civil war between FMLN and the military (Endings & Leone, 2015).

The United States tolerated El Salvador's ruling coalition repression towards the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN); once the ruling elite exceeds the limit and targeted civilians, the USA responded with cut-offs of both economic and military-related aid in 1983 (Gartner & Regan, 1996). As a result, death squads and rural massacre declined suggesting international pressures affects leader's choice and level of repression (Endings & Leone, 2015). In 1984, the first democratic elections were held, and civilian president, Jose Napoleon Duarte, was elected in five decades. After the elections, the U.S. approved massive military aid for El Salvador to strengthen military capability to fight FMLN and reduce the lethality of violence for civilians (Endings & Leone, 2015).

Transnational terrorism is another example of an external threat to the regime and plays a crucial role in affecting a leader's choice to violate a specific right over other. For instance, in the wake of terrorist attacks, democracies restricted the political rights of non-citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Also, many countries passed counter-terrorism legislation that immensely affected human rights protections. The government restriction of human rights is more of a security-liberty trade-off that suggests government cannot let have both at the same time because it interferes with the government's ability to develop a counter-terror policy. Apart from counterterror policy to handle security issues, at times, the government uses terrorist threat to achieve its agenda, i.e., tightening political control by repressing people in the name of terrorism (Piazza & Walsh, 2009). To illustrate, since 9/11, Pakistan witnessed increased terrorist attacks, and to tackle militancy, the government of Pakistan increased violation of physical integrity rights (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Pakistani leadership justifies the violation of physical integrity right by arguing that the nature of crime is so intense that it could not be controlled or punished merely through controlling

political association or other non-violent tactics. Further, strict punishment, like torture and killing, quickly delivers a message to the perpetrators, reducing terror-related activities.

Visibility is also crucial to leaders for choosing to violate one form of rights over another. Visibility means something that could be easily observed, such as torture, killings, etc., by the citizenry, international community, or human rights watch (Conrad et al. 2018). International pressure is crucial for leaders to determine which rights to violate to avoid global community repercussions. To avoid naming and shaming in the international community, leaders choose to violate the less visible rights. For instance, leaders choose extra judicial killings and disappearances because such violations are less likely to be detected. Also, even if the government is torturing, it will prefer clean torture such as waterboarding, sleeplessness over beating, or amputation since clean torture is difficult to detect (Walsh & Piazza, 2009; Conrad et al. 2018). For example, to avoid reputational damage, autocratic leadership in Argentina in the 1970s pushed victims out of aircraft over the sea so their bodies could not be recovered (Walsh & Piazza, 2009).

Similarly, military dictators in Iraq's personalist regime killed and buried dozens of people in mass graves to hide their atrocities (Walsh & Piazza, 2009; Sassoon, 2011). Even though Saddam was sanctioned and politically isolated, after targeting civilians, it prefers to bury hundreds of people in mass graves that United Nations Human Rights Commission is still discovering (Sassoon, 2010). The use of invisible human rights violations by the leader blindfold the international community and human rights watch to protect it from the consequences of rights violations, such as the aid sanctions (Nielsen 2013).

The plethora of literature on repression indicates that autocratic leaders engage in repression for political and economic gains. As noted earlier in this chapter, leaders maintained an office for decades through repression and made a financial fortune. Likewise, scholars indicate

that based on cost and benefit analysis, leaders engage in selective rights violations. The study of repression in autocracies is a critical matter. World leaders have stressed tackling human rights abuses because it leads to other problems. For example, President Barack Hussein Obama (2008) stated on Human Rights Day,

“When the United States stands up for human rights, by example at home and by effort abroad, we align ourselves with men and women around the world who struggle for the right to speak their minds, to choose their leaders, and to be treated with dignity and respect. We also strengthen our security and well-being because the abuse of human rights can feed many of the global dangers that we confront—from armed conflict and humanitarian crises to corruption and the spread of ideologies that promote hatred and violence.” (Statement on Human Rights Day 2008)

1.2. Internal and External Factors affecting Political Violence in Autocracies

Though scholars try to examine factors affecting repression in different capacities, various issues need to be addressed. This dissertation is driven by the fact that researchers studying repression in autocracies overlooked some critical factors that affect autocracies' repression. This dissertation examines three crucial questions related to dictatorships' repression by looking at the interaction of environment and institution to unfold the pattern of repression. In particular, Chapter 1 examines the impact of coup-proofing on political violence while a leader is in power and during the leader's regime transition. It is crucial to understand how domestic policies such as counterbalancing affect repression because it has broader consequences, such as a threat to international security. Suppose the goal of the international community is to promote human rights. In that case, it is essential to pay close attention to counterbalanced regimes and hold paramilitary organizations equally responsible for the rights violations. To explain the phenomenon, this chapter focuses on Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule between 1979 and 2003 and including the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion, which led to Hussein's removal from power. Scholars currently

examine the causes behind repression, violent and non-violent revolutions, protests, and regime transition across autocratic regimes. However, to date, not much scholarly work exists that addresses coup-proofing as a central factor connected to political violence while a leader is in power and violence that occurs during and beyond regime transition. The findings contribute to scholarship focused on political violence and regime change by adding a new and more nuanced level of analysis connecting human rights abuses to Hussein's rule and the protracted violence in the aftermath of 2003.

The research relies on local and international newspapers, United States National Security Archives, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, memoirs of Iraqi military personnel, and oral history collections of Iraqis living in the United States who endured Hussein's rule. Additionally, it utilizes official Iraqi documents recovered from Northern Iraq after the Gulf War that shed light on the bureaucratic apparatus of Hussein's regime by providing information on the regime's control tactics. These documents offer a myriad of perspectives about life under Hussein and shed light on the dark years plagued by violence following the removal of Hussein.

Moving beyond the case study of Iraq, it is essential to test the impact of coup-proofing, a domestic factor, on political violence. Chapter 2 attempts to analyze the effect of counterbalancing on violent regime transitions using cross-sectional and time-series data. It argues that counterbalancing is more likely to increase violence during regime transition. However, this relationship varies across autocracies. Military regimes are more likely to experience violent regime transitions than their civilian counterparts. Examining this question is important from an international security standpoint. Even though leader coup-proof for domestic reasons, such as deterring coup threats, coup-proofing could lead the country to civil war through a prolonged violent transition and threatening international security. This information allows policy makers

working towards peaceful regime transition to focus on regime-specific policies. In particular, the findings help determine and generalize the impact of counterbalancing on violence during regime transition. It further helps to determine how institutional differences within autocracies affect the outcome.

Beyond domestic factors, i.e., coup-proofing, international factors can affect repression. Chapter 3 examines improvement and deterioration in respect for rights (or rights violations) due to foreign aid (an international factor) through an overarching theory of U.S. aid, strategic interest, and rights abuse substitution. I mainly focus on visible (killings and torture) and invisible (disappearance) rights violations. The chapter relies on the foreign policy substitutability literature to better understand repressive leaders' substitution behavior. This is an essential question because substitution of rights violations is an important policy choice leaders make in autocratic regimes to get away with the accountability of rights violations. This study informs policy makers interested in improving human rights to focus on all types of rights violations, thus not allowing leaders to take advantage of substitution behavior.

More recently, scholars have argued that leaders act strategically and substitute the rights violations (Payne and Abouharb, 2015). Chapter 3 tests this proposition with cross-sectional and time-series empirical data to determine whether substitution of human rights violations occur in autocracies. The main argument is that as a rational actor, the autocratic leader does not want to lose aid, and at the same time, cannot completely stop violation of rights because such leaders come into power through force. In such a situation, leaders act strategically by substituting the violation of the visible rights to invisible ones (killings to forced disappearances). However, substitution behavior depends on the strategic nature of the relationship between the U.S. and the recipient. If the recipient is strategically unimportant, then we expect substitution; otherwise, the

substitution of rights violation may not exist, making autocratic regimes violate all rights irrespective of their type.

Aside from purely domestic or international factors, at times, leaders face a challenge that could have domestic and international attributes, such as terrorism. Considering the dual characteristics, Chapter 4 examines how regime type (democracy or autocracy) conditions the effect of terrorism on human rights violations. It is an important question because it allows us to see how leaders address such challenges and balance domestic threats and respect for rights. Also, the work has policy implications for international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that wish to improve human rights.

This chapter bridges the gap between two strands of literature by examining whether democracies are willing to violate human rights when facing terrorist attacks using cross-sectional and time-series data on regime type, terrorism, and human rights. The main argument is that autocracies are often already engaged in human rights violations. Thus terrorist attacks have a smaller effect on human rights violations in autocratic states. In contrast, democracies usually have a better record of human rights, but terrorist incidents can place democratic regimes in an emergency mode. Under this setting, democracies will increase human rights violations. I argue that in this setting, democracies will violate physical integrity rights, not empowerment rights. Physical integrity right violations allow governments to repress vulnerable groups while signaling to most citizens that they are not susceptible to repression. Thus, democracies can protect themselves from internal threats while maintaining the support of their selectorate. In this particular situation, the public becomes tolerant because the government signals its citizens that it is only going after the terrorists, not the general citizens.

Overall, to examine domestic and international factors (coup-proofing, U.S. aid, terrorism), the dissertation employs historical (primary and secondary sources) and quantitative methods for a nuanced understanding of political violence in autocracies. Political Science and History research tended to study repression either through case studies or quantitative analysis. Though those methods have increased our knowledge of political violence, this dissertation attempts to bridge the gap between two approaches and produce an in-depth analysis and generalizable results that predict the situation where the interaction of environment (domestic and international factors) and institution (autocracies) increases the likelihood of repression.

Finally, because of the study of the diverse environment (internal and external factors) and theory being tested, each chapter is designed as an independent research piece. Consequently, each chapter contains its introduction, literature review, theoretical framework, research design, and result section. This approach is advantageous because it allows an in-depth analysis of literature related to the theoretical framework and differentiates the impact across autocracies and different human rights types.

Chapter 2 - Coup-Proofing and Political Violence: The Case of Iraq

In 2014 Nadia Murad, a twenty-two-year-old Yazidi, a religious minority, from northern Iraq was taken into captivity along with 6,500 other women by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). She was gang raped and forced to change her religion. After the US invasion of Iraq, ISIS killed Murad's entire family and treated the captured women brutally.¹ ISIS's inhumane treatment of women was not limited to Yazidis. According to a Human Rights Watch report, areas under ISIS control saw increased detainment, torturing, forced marriages, and the rape of women from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds.²

Similarly, troops and secret forces loyal to the Ba'athist³ regime of Saddam Hussein raped and sexually assaulted women and children to punish their families for speaking out against the government.⁴ According to Al-Suddani (2018), no one ever wanted to express opposition to Hussein regime because people witnessed the abuse of female family members. Such level of violence continued until Hussein's forced removal by the US in 2003.⁵ The ouster of the Hussein was meant to bring a sigh of relief to Iraqis, but it did not. Instead the US invasion that deposed Hussein exposed Iraqis to another era of political violence that endures to this day.

This paper argues that much of this violence, which continued even after the ouster of the regime was related to the institutional set-up of the military. It further suggests that coup-proofed autocratic regimes are more likely to engage in human rights abuses that culminate in violent

¹ Nadia Murad: I was an ex ISIS sex slave. I tell my story because it is the best weapon I have, The Guardian (6 October. 2018), available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/06/nadia-murad-isis-sex-slave-nobel-peace-prize>

² United Nations Human Rights Office of High Commission, Staggering civilian death toll in Iraq (2016), available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16964&LangID=E>

³ Ba'ath party is a political party founded by Michel Aflaq and Salah al- Din al-Bitar in Syria based on the ideology of Arab nationalism and anti-Imperialism. For details see, Devlin 1991. In this paper, Ba'athist regime is interchangeably used with Iraqi government, and Saddam Hussein's regime.

⁴ The White House, *Saddam Hussein repression of the Iraqi people*, (n.d.), available at : <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/decade/sect4.html>

⁵ Al-Sudani is an Iraqi currently living in the USA.

regime transition and to protracted violence. The paper evaluates violence by focusing on three inter-related themes to demonstrate how the legacy of violence in Iraq is connected to coup-proofing strategies implemented prior to Hussein's removal in 2003. First, coup-proofing helps leaders implement political violence against real and imagined enemies of the state second, coup-proofing makes regime transition extremely violent, and helps violence to endure beyond regime transition, thus creating landscape of terror.⁶ This study is organized into two thematic sections; first Hussein's rule between 1979 and 2003, and regime transition from 2003 onwards. Analysis in the first section draws upon Hussein's use of political violence throughout Iraq. The second section highlights regime transition through the US invasion of 2003. This research is informed by local and international newspapers, United States National Security Archives, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, memoirs of Iraqi military personnel, and oral history collections including interviews with Iraqis living in United States who endured Hussein's rule. Additionally, the research relies on the official Iraqi documents recovered from Northern Iraq after the Gulf War (1991) that shed light on the bureaucratic apparatus of Hussein's regime by providing information of the regime's control tactics. These documents provide a myriad of perspectives about life under Hussein and shed light on the dark years, plagued by violence following the removal of Hussein.

Some scholars argue coup-proofing is meant to protect a regime from internal threats such as a military coup, thus examination of political violence during regime transition, particularly when ousted by a foreign power does not qualify as a test of effectiveness of coup proofing. This article contends that such a restrictive model is insufficient for understanding the dynamics between internal and external threats. Hussein clearly expected protection from his coup-proofed

⁶ Political violence is referred as government abuse of physical integrity rights, such as killing, torture, imprisonment, and disappearances. Also, violating civil-political liberties, freedom of speech, association, religion etc. For details see (CIRI 2014).

entities against internal and external threats, when he said, “Special Guards who do not fight in defense of Iraq in Sulaymaniyya, Basra and the Misan borders, cannot defend the regime in the Presidential Palace”.⁷ Moreover, invading forces take into account the threat posed by paramilitary forces or loyalists. For instance, the US estimation of Iraq’s fighting capabilities prior to 2003 focused on challenges from the Iraqi Republican Guard, and the paramilitary forces Hussein created to coup-proof his regime. Those estimations were confirmed when the US forces faced significant resistance from paramilitary forces in Iraq.⁸ These examples indicate that efforts deployed to coup-proof a regime produce similar results when a regime is faced with foreign invasion, as they do in case of internal threats. Thus, regime change via foreign invasion merits the use of new and expanded methodological constructs to examine existing more narrow definitions of coup-proofing that exclude foreign invasion.

Currently, scholarly work examines the causes behind repression, violent and non-violent revolutions, protests, regime transition, and emergence of identities across autocratic regimes. For example, Lisa Blaydes in *State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein* argues that it was difficult for Saddam Hussein to monitor “culturally distant” communities and as a result these communities were policed indiscriminately. Collective punishment of culturally distant communities allowed shared identities and tight networks to emerge because the targeted population realized their shared fate. In other words, collective punishment of certain groups by Ba’athists paved the way for ethnic and sectarian identities to emerge. These identities were further reinforced due to external shocks to economy. As such, the weak economy due to oil shocks and Iran-Iraq war weakened Ba’athist capacity to monitor different factions of Iraqis and as a result

⁷ Ibrahim Al-Marashi & Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History* 168 (2009).

⁸ Amatzia Baram, *Who will fight for Saddam?* Brookings (2003) .), available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/who-will-fight-for-saddam/>

Ba'athist regime further relied on coercive measure to maintain political hegemony. Lisa Blaydes' worked highlight an important aspect of how collective repression and economic shocks allowed the emergence of identities and repression against ethnic and sectarian identities. However, neither Lisa Blaydes nor any other scholarly work addresses how coup-proofing as a central factor is connected to political violence while a leader is in power, as well as violence that occurs during and beyond regime transition. The findings contribute to scholarship focused on political violence and regime transition by adding new and more nuanced level of analysis connecting human rights abuses to Hussein's rule, and the protracted violence in the aftermath of 2003.

2.1. Saddam Hussein's Rise to Power: Coup-proofing and Political Violence

Hussein's most significant challenge remained retention of power. For that he paid close attention to all successful and failed coup attempts in modern Iraq's history aimed at overthrowing his predecessors' regimes.⁹ Hussein's rise to power followed the deposition of his predecessors under British colonial rule in Iraq between 1917 and 1932. Colonial policy and the management of the colonial army included a military campaign in Iraq to protect British oil interests during the World War I. However, the British found it difficult to control and hold areas surrounding oil wells. Subsequently, the British moved to indirect rule under a mandate system and installed King Faisal I in 1921 as Iraq's first monarch.¹⁰ During Faisal I's reign, the Iraqi government faced many obstacles including socio-economic and political problems related to the rise of Pan-Arabism¹¹. The Iraqi government also had a troubled relationship with the British over the terms

⁹ Marashi & Salama, Iraq's, supra note 7; James T Quinlivan, Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East. *International Security*, 24(2) 131-165 (1999).

¹⁰ Joseph Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein's Ba'ith party: Inside an authoritarian regime*, Cambridge University Press, 17 (2011).

¹¹ Pan-Arabism is about negating the Iraqi national identity over Arab nationalism; Bashkin, Orit, *The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq*, Stanford University Press, (2008).

of the mandate, especially over the scope and mission of the Iraqi military which ultimately led to the emergence of Independent Iraq in 1932.¹²

After independence, the Iraqi military lacked professionalization, internal cohesion, and could not adopt model of public service. Instead the Iraqi military focused on gaining political power. After four years of independence the first coup by Bakr Sidqi took place in 1936 replacing the prime minister, subsequently multiple coup attempts followed. Eventually one of the coups by Abd-al-Karim Qasim ended the monarchy in 1958, and Iraq emerged as an independent republic. The series of coups did not end at Qasim's independent Iraq, though as he was also replaced in a coup by the Ba'athist run Iraq in 1963 which laid the foundation for Hussein's Ba'athist Iraq in 1979.¹³ Hence, Iraq became a praetorian regime in which "interventionist officers, who are the major or predominant political actors by their actual or threatened use of force" were the power wielders.¹⁴

This history of coups impressed upon Hussein the necessity of coup-proofing his regime.¹⁵ Hussein developed measures to establish hegemony over the military including exploitation of tribal, ethnic, and religious loyalties. He also incentivized the loyalists, thus creating paramilitary organizations and security agencies to help keep the regular military in check.¹⁶ Hussein relied heavily on his tribal links as well as familial and ethnic loyalties. Hanna Batatu, a historian specializing in the history of Iraq, reflected on his use of such loyalties stating, "it would not be going too far to say that the Tikritis rule through the Ba'ath party, rather than the Ba'ath party through the Tikritis".¹⁷ In addition to exploiting loyalties, Hussein focused on creating paramilitary

¹² Marashi & Salama, Iraq's, supra note 7, at 13-14.

¹³ Sassoon, Saddam Hussein's, supra note 10; Phebe Marr, *The modern history of Iraq*, Routledge, (2018).

¹⁴ Marashi & Salama, Iraq's, supra note 7, at 2-6.

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ Ahmed Hashim, Saddam Husayn and civil-military relations in Iraq: The quest for legitimacy and power, *The Middle East Journal*, 9-41 (2003).

¹⁷ 0 Hanna Batatu, *The, Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, Princeton ,1088 (1978).

forces including the Popular Army, the Republican Guard, and the Special Republican Guard.¹⁸ Combined, these forces reduced the influence of the regular armed forces with continuous surveillance emanating from these groups.¹⁹

Hussein's coup-proofing strategies were mainly aimed at counter balancing the regular armed forces, but his strategies equally terrorized citizens and violated their physical integrity rights and civil-political liberties. Execution, torture, confiscation of property and kidnapping of family members, village elimination, civilian surveillance, and use of chemical weapons was widely reported.²⁰ Hussein's coup-proofing affected all segments of society in some manner, whether it was the oppression of political opposition, bias against specific minorities, or condemnation of religious minorities, women, and children.²¹ Documents from Iraq Documentation and Research Project: Northern Iraq Dataset show Hussein violated the integrity and civil-political liberties of Iraqi citizens, particularly those outside his circle of ethnic and religious favor.

In addition to military surveillance exercised through paramilitaries, the regime fixated on providing extra levels of security through Ba'athists party members and loyalists.²² Since attendance at Party meetings provided a way to demonstrate full commitment to the party and the leadership. Low meeting attendance was interpreted as a sign of involvement in opposition activity. Thus, Ba'athists party members collected reports to evaluate the loyalty of local police officers, and the one with low attendance at party meetings were kept under tight surveillance.²³

¹⁸ Marashi & Salama, Iraq's, *supra* note 7.

¹⁹ James T Quinlivan, Coup-proofing, *supra* note 9.

²⁰ United States Security Council. *Resolution number 1441*, (2002), available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf>.

²¹ The White House, *supra* note, 4.

²² Iraq Research and Documentation Project North Iraq Dataset (IRDP NID), 322006: Box 2171.

²³ *Id.* 321622: Box 2171.

Political parties not aligned with Ba'athist ideology also constituted a threat to Hussein's regime. Hussein's top priority was to establish control over the political opposition in northern and southern Iraq. These areas saw violent opposition movements among Kurdish and Shiites communities who staged a rebellion against Hussein in 1991. To suppress political opposition, the Republican Guards killed civilians indiscriminately in residential areas associated with Kurdish and Shiites values and family ties. Hussein's administration executed people in streets, in their homes, and in hospitals. Equally alarmingly, the Iraqi forces used helicopters to attack civilians fleeing from cities under attack. Military operations by Hussein's army indiscriminately killed thousands of Shiites and indigenous marsh dwellers for their suspected assistance (alliances) to the Shiites.²⁴

Human rights abuses were not limited to opposition members; the regime also targeted opposition members' families.²⁵ For example, the demolition of Kurdish neighborhoods coincided with the forced relocation of Sunni and Shiite Arab populations from central and southern Iraq to northern Iraq in an effort to replace or drive out the Kurds.²⁶ Hussein's forces bombed villages loyal to the Kurdish political party, including members of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), destroying their headquarters and burned PUK villages to the ground.²⁷ In Southern Iraq, thousands of Shiites were imprisoned without any formal charges filed while the Shiite political opposition took shelter in local marshes close to the Iranian border.

Besides abuse of physical integrity rights, the Hussein regime devised ways to abuse the civil and political liberties of residents in northern and southern Iraq. Hussein imposed restrictions

²⁴ Watch Middle East, Endless torment: The 1991 uprising in Iraq and its aftermath. *A Human Rights Watch Report*, (1992).

²⁵ IDRP NID, supra note 22, 867843, Box 0056.

²⁶ With regards to the population in geographical division, Kurdish dominates the Northern Iraq, Shiites are mostly in Southern Iraq and Sunnis are scattered everywhere, but mostly dominates western or central Iraq.

²⁷ IDRP NID, supra note 22, 868436: Box 0056.

on agricultural production, and levied penalties for any violations. Moreover, the regime did not allow members of the same tribe to live together and thus forced them to live in separate complexes in Northern Iraq.²⁸ To further tighten control over civilians, Hussein's forces recruited people from residential complexes to spy on communities and micromanage loyalty to Hussein.²⁹

Hussein also ordered the strict surveillance over all Iraqis, irrespective of their religious, ethnic, sectarian, and tribal identities. Surveillance at the micro level achieved two purposes for the Hussein regime; first looming knowledge that surveillance extended everywhere created widespread fear, and deterred the populace into silence. Secondly, those bold or trusting enough to voice their protest in a casual conversation with the barber or at the restaurant were sure to be reported due to the extent of the regimes reach at every level. Thus, the masses had no option other than to align themselves with the dominant party agenda, or risk detainment, torture, and death.

Surveillance at such micro level started at learning institutions where strict scrutiny of school teachers supplied the regime with data about teachers with no Ba'athist affiliation.³⁰ Iraq Moreover, the regime closely observed teacher union elections and obtained detailed reports for each member who won election.³¹ Also, Hussein's loyalists held the power to bar students and teachers found to be potential threats to Hussein's government.³²

In the case of autocratic and totalitarian regimes, learning environments free of political agendas pose a threat to the survival of the leader.³³ As the populace become more aware of the regime's intimate level of power through education, they also become attuned to their fundamental

²⁸ *Id.* 632921: Box 2369.

²⁹ *Id.* 632922: Box 2369.

³⁰ *Id.* 322093: Box 2171.

³¹ *Id.* 321849 Box 2171.

³² *Id.* 326661: Box 2174.

³³ For education in the Middle East, see Akkari 2004.

rights, thus making residents more likely to challenge the regime. In these settings, leaders seek tighter control over ideologies disseminated to students by teachers and other educators.

Beyond learning institutions, the members of the internal security services spread throughout the local population to collect information about threats to Hussein's regime. The government investigated every resident's background from all corners of the country and systematically updated their information. The information collected included on every aspect of everyday life of Iraqis including the ownership, management, and operation of restaurants, barbershops, taxi drivers, other businesses, and gypsies.³⁴ Hussein's regime was particularly bent on tracking gypsies throughout the region because the semi-nomadic life of the gypsies in the region and the resulting likelihood of spread of information to foreign agents provoked Hussein to target their communities for persecution.³⁵ Civil liberties abuses committed by Hussein's coup-proofed regime also included the surveillance of places of religious worship and activities. Imams posed a great danger to Hussein especially the Shiite Imams because as a Sunni Muslim, Hussein was afraid that Iran might use Iraqi Shiite Imams to wield influence. The sectarian nature of Iraqi state (65% Shiite and 35% are Sunni Muslims respectively) along with a multi-religious society inspired Hussein to conduct deep background checks on all religious figures. Hussein's loyalists consistently ordered background checks on Masjid's Imam.³⁶ Repression against children also factored into Hussein's coup-proofing tactics. Hussein began a compulsory weapon training program for boys between the ages of fourteen and fifteen and required children to take three weeks of training program for fourteen hours a day. The regime denied food ration cards for

³⁴ IDRP NID, *supra* note 22, 327042: Box 2174.

³⁵ *Id.* 327033: Box 2174.

³⁶ *Id.* 330567: Box 2176; Masjid in Arabic word for Mosque or a worship place for Muslims. And an Imam is a figure who is a community leader and who provides religious guidance on any number of issues. In Islamic countries like Iraq, separation of religion from politics does not exist which makes it likely for Imam to guide politics according to religious principles. However, Saddam did not permit Imam's to talk of a political leadership.

families who did not send their children to weapons training programs. In addition, their children were not allowed to take academic exams, thus effectively ending their education.³⁷

A glimpse into Hussein's regime suggests a high level of insecurity which led him to coup-proof his regime not only as a counterweight to the regular military force, but to also exploit communal ties throughout the country's citizenry in a way that pitted tribes against each other. Further, coup-proofing efforts made rights abuses so commonplace, that eventually it turned the population towards passive acceptance of a leader they feared more than they admired. To illustrate, Shayyma an Iraqi American, residing in the US said, "out of the fear of Hussein, we as a family glorified Hussein to our kids even though we knew he was evil but we just did it for the sake of our lives".³⁸ Similarly, Al-Suddani states, "We never think of opposing Hussein, because we knew walls have ears and even our whispering will be reported and will bring death to us".³⁹

2.2. The US Invasion of Iraq, Response of Hussein's Coup-Proofed Regime, and Legacies of Violence

This section shows that US invasion of Iraq to end Hussein's regime did not terminate the political violence the Iraqis bore of the coup-proofed regime. However, the disintegrated coup-proofed regime exposed Iraqis to a new era of political violence primarily lead by the ISIS, other non-state, and state actors with a key interest in Iraq.

The world governments and human rights organizations equally observed Hussein's grave violation of his citizens' rights to live freely. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed various resolutions to condemn repression in Iraq, and one of the resolutions stated, "I urge the

³⁷ The White House, *supra* note, 4.

³⁸ Shayyma is an Iraqi currently living in the USA.

³⁹ Al-Sudani, *supra* note, 7.

Iraqi leadership . . . to seize this opportunity and thereby begin to end the isolation and suffering of the Iraqi people”.⁴⁰ No action proved effective in deterring Hussein to change his mindset, however the international community continued condemnation of his regime and his practices.

Similarly, the United States condemned Hussein for its violations of physical integrity and civil-political liberties and had long tried to remove Hussein, but the US needed a reason to justify invasion of Iraq.⁴¹ Within seconds after the attacks on September 11, 2001 by Al-Qaeda, US President George W. Bush assumed Hussein’s involvement.⁴² In pursuit of Hussein and his alleged attack against the US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to find evidence to warrant an attack on Hussein and his regime.⁴³ The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) dismissed Iraq’s involvement in 9/11 and determined Al-Qaeda guilty of these heinous acts of violence in its report to President Bush.

President Bush expressed extreme irritation during a National Security Council (NSC) meeting in which he asked the CIA to once again look for potential Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 incident.⁴⁴ However, all reports submitted to the Executive Branch by the CIA showed no evidence of Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks.⁴⁵ Despite the absence of evidence, President Bush signed an order directing the Pentagon to prepare for war in Afghanistan and a subsequent invasion of Iraq.⁴⁶ The US war in Afghanistan is a response to 9/11 terrorist attacks on US. However, Iraq was not directly involved in terrorist attacks, but the US claimed Iraqi government indirectly supported

⁴⁰ United States Security Council, *supra* note, 20.

⁴¹ The Iraq Project : Documenting US policy towards Iraq for two decades, National Security Archives, (2001), available at : <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/project/iraq-project>

⁴² *Id.* Document 14 :334.

⁴³ *Id.* Document 7.

⁴⁴ *Id.* Note 17.

⁴⁵ *Id.* Note 22.

⁴⁶ *Id.* Note 20.

the terrorist groups. Also, Hussein regime is developing weapons of mass destruction which if it shared with the terrorist groups may have ended up used in a deadly attack against the US.⁴⁷

The US invaded Iraq in 2003 to overthrow the Hussein regime and to root out all traces of Hussein's power structure. In the aftermath of Hussein's removal, the United States established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by US State Department official, Paul Bremer between May 2003 and June 2004. Tasked with the objective of creating a new government and restoring the Iraqi economy the CPA implemented two important measures. First, recognizing that Iraqis suffered an enormous amount of harm at hands of the Ba'ath party, the CPA issued an order of De-Ba'athification of Iraqi society. Second, the presence of the Ba'athist network throughout Iraq and the high level of Ba'athists in government positions threatened Iraq and the coalition forces, the CPA issued an order of dissolution of these government entities.⁴⁸

To tackle the threat posed by the Ba'athist network, the CPA ordered to disestablish the Ba'ath party by terminating party structure and removing members in positions of authority. In addition, full members of the Ba'ath party who held high ranks such as Regional Commander Member, Branch Member, Section Member, Group Member, and Senior Party Members were removed from their positions and their future employment in the government sector restricted. Evaluated for their criminal conduct, the CPA considered whether these members posed a threat to the coalition's security. Moreover, any Ba'ath party member who served in the top three layers of management, including the national government ministry, or any government related institution for that matter, was removed from their post.⁴⁹ Secondly, CPA dissolved the entities because of their oppression of Iraqis. The dissolved entities included the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of

⁴⁷ Esther Pan, Iraq: Justifying the War, (2005), available at: <https://www.cfr.org/background/iraq-justifying-war>

⁴⁸ James P. Pfiffner, US blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and disbanding the army. *Intelligence and National Security*, 25(1), 76-85 (2010).

⁴⁹ Iraq Project, National Security Archives, *supra* note, 41, document 9a.

Information, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the National Security Bureau, and the Special Security Organization. In addition to the removal of the ministries, the CPA also dissolved regular military services, Hussein's bodyguards, and paramilitary forces including the Army, Air force, Navy, Special Guard, as well as The Republican Guard, The Special Republican Guard, Hussein's Fedayeen, and Ba'ath party Militia. Finally, the CPA dissolved and subordinated all organizations and entities.⁵⁰ The US decision to disband Hussein's coup-proofed regime demonstrated that the punishment to Hussein's loyalists opened the window for new opportunities for marginalized and aggrieved groups.

The CPA's disbanding of the Ba'ath party and military organizations won the confidence of many Iraqis by demonstrating that Hussein's influence over the country ended and a new post-Hussein era had emerged. This era promised a focus on access to physical and personal rights, civil-political liberties, prosperity, and equal representation. But instead of building a peaceful Iraq, the CPA's decision to break up Hussein's forces left those loyalists without privileges they enjoyed during Hussein's reign.⁵¹ This disenfranchisement brought a sense of collective humiliation to the former military men, evidenced by their public demonstrations of anger, outrage, and betrayal.⁵² For instance, many former Iraqi soldiers protested outside the US occupation headquarters in Baghdad and one of their banners read, 'Dissolving the Iraqi army is a humiliation to the dignity of the nation'.⁵³

In another instance of resistance, a Ba'ath party member stated, "We were on top of the system. We had dreams. Now we are the losers. We lost our positions, our status, the (economic)

⁵⁰ *Id.*418: document 9b.

⁵¹ Marashi & Salama, Iraq's, *supra* note 7.

⁵² Isaiah Berlin, The bent twig: a note on nationalism. *Foreign Affairs*, 51(1), 11-30 (1972).

⁵³ Marashi & Salama, Iraq's, *supra* note 7, 53.

security of our families, stability. Curse the Americans. Curse them”.⁵⁴ In addition to the humiliation and attack on their honor, the CPA’s orders also deprived soldiers of their income fundamental to their, and their family’s survival. An estimated 1.6 million Iraqis including soldiers with an average family size of four went without livelihood, suggesting the disbanding of regime forces aggravated an already tense situation between the CPA and those segments of Iraqi society who received favor under Hussein’s leadership.⁵⁵ The sense of shame and humiliation, coupled with the loss of income, incentives, privileges, and power in Hussein’s Iraq pushed Hussein’s loyalists to join insurgency movements and eventually created an environment ripe for the rise of ISIS and heightened violence.⁵⁶

ISIS as an organization did not exist during Hussein’s regime, having no presence in Iraq nor in neighboring Syria. The origins of ISIS go back to the early 2000s, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, moved to Northern Iraq.⁵⁷ Zarqawi established his own militant organization in Iraq under the name Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (Unity and Jihad group) and organized their first operation in Jordan in 2002. However, because of Zarqawi’s active role after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the fact that the CPA disbanded the Ba’athists, Zarqawi was able to recruit many

⁵⁴ Donald P. Wright & Timothy R. Reese, with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, *On Point II: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003–January 2005: Transition to the New Campaign*, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: Combined Studies Institute Press, 96 (2008).

⁵⁵ Marashi & Salama, Iraq’s, supra note 7.

⁵⁶ Ahmed Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq*, Cornell University Press, (2006).

⁵⁷ PBS, *The Secret History of ISIS*, (2016), available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/the-secret-history-of-isis/>; Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a jihadist from Jordan, travelled to Afghanistan in the late 1980s to join the fight against the Soviets. Al-Zarqawi returned home to Jordan with a steadfast allegiance to Salafist ideology, a branch of Sunni Islam that focuses on pious predecessors and challenges un-Islamic styled leadership. Subsequently, the Hashemite ruling family in Jordan imprisoned Al-Zarqawi for plotting against their dynasty, but later the King Abdullah II granted amnesty to Al-Zarqawi to contain spread of Salafism which was becoming an existential threat to the regime. After his release from prison in 1999, al-Zarqawi flew back to Afghanistan to meet Osama bin Laden and established a training camp. The camp quickly filled with an estimated 2000 to 3000 terrorists from all over the world (The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism 2017). In the wake of 9/11, America initiated strikes against Afghanistan that led Zarqawi and his militants on a path toward Northern Iraq. For details see Felter and Fishman 2007, Oxford Research Encyclopedia, <http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-255>, and The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism 2017.

Ba'athists by offering them leadership positions they had come to expect under Hussein's rule.⁵⁸ Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi analyst and senior researcher at al-Bayan Center for Studies and Planning, suggests that out of 40, more than 25 top ISIS leaders were Hussain loyalists and served in top military positions.⁵⁹ By exploiting loyalist's military expertise, Zarqawi's organization expanded enough to formally join Al-Qaeda in 2004 because it provided a platform to outsource their expertise, and eventually changed the name of its militant organization to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) which later became ISIS.⁶⁰ ISIS launched suicide attacks in religious places, markets, schools, and hospitals. This amplified violence successfully asserted ISIS control over several regions in northern Iraq including Sinjar where minority religious communities like Yazidi became a prime target for ISIS attacks because of their religious differences to the ISIS. Women like Nadia, living in a Yazidi community were raped, tortured, and silenced under ISIS leadership.⁶¹

In the post-Hussein era, his coup-proofed regime disintegrated and emerged in a new form bringing escalated violence and strict enforcement of social and religious mores advanced by ISIS, as opposed to the legitimate government of Iraq. During Hussein's reign, violent acts protected his rule from collapse at the hands of any external or internal threats. The level of violence under ever-expanding ISIS increased religious and sectarian bloodshed that proved more devastating to Iraqis than during Hussein's rule.⁶² The marginalization of religious segments in Hussein's military

⁵⁸ Ahmed S. Hashim, The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate, *Middle East Policy*, 21(4), pp.69-83 (2014).

⁵⁹ Davide Mastracci, How the catastrophic American decision to disband Saddam's military helped fuel the rise of ISIL, *National Post* (2015).

⁶⁰ Richard Boucher, Foreign Terrorist Organization: Designation of Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al Jihad and Aliases. *Archive, US Department of State*, 15 (2004); Isabe Coles & Ned Parker, The Baathists: How Saddam's Men Help Islamic State Rule. Reuters (2015); The United States declared Zarqawi's organization and its affiliates a terrorist organization and launched a mission targeting Zarqawi which ended with his death in a 2006 US airstrike. Before Zarqawi's death, he chose Abu Ayub al-Masriw (an Egyptian) as his successor. As a foreigner, al-Masriw received significant backlash from Iraqi Sunnis and Ba'athists serving in AQI because of the fear of foreign domination. To tackle resentment among members of AQI, al-Masriw started convincing smaller existing organizations to merge with AQI by providing an opportunity to gain power in the post-Hussein era. Later, the merger resulted in the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), operating under strict Sharia law and code supervised by Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (an Iraqi) as the head of ISIS. For details see, Boucher 2004.

⁶¹ PBS, ISIS, supra note 57.

⁶² Marashi & Salama, Iraq's, supra note 7.

established one platform upon which the escalation of sectarian savagery and brutality fully evolved during the post-Hussein era. Another reason for an increase in hostile activities in Iraq after removal of Hussein can be directly linked to the Iraqi army. Without any national objectives to pursue, or a leader to follow, many ex-Iraqi military men feared rival tribes like the Shiites and Kurds who would obtain powerful positions in a new military complex. Thus, they may sideline former members of Hussein's military from participation in the reconstruction of their own nation-state. In fact, their fear translated into reality when the US Security Advisor, Stephen J. Hadley, accused the Maliki government of removing effective military Commanders based on ethno-sectarianism.⁶³ ISIS then took advantage of this opportunity to propagate their following and incite Ba'athists and other Sunnis to retaliate against the injustice they endured.

ISIS attacked groups rejecting their core ideology and interpretation of Islam. ISIS's views of Kurds, Yazidis, Christians, and Shiites as infidels led to indiscriminate bombings, kidnappings, beheadings, and the rape of women throughout the region.⁶⁴ The US Secretary of State at the time, John Kerry, declared ISIS guilty of genocide against the Yazidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims.⁶⁵ John Kerry's statement confirms that when left without an incentivizing regime structure, former members of a coup-proofed regime, particularly military loyalists, are more likely to encourage cruel forms of violence and instigate chaos as they attempt to prevent peaceful government transition.

ISIS's reliance on ex-Ba'athist leadership was not limited to sectarian violence. Brutality expanded to other minorities including the captivity and rape of Nadia and of several thousand

⁶³ *Id.*

⁶⁴ Behtan McKernan, Scale of Iraqi civilian casualties inflicted by Isis revealed by UN. *The Independent*, 3 (2017); For details on different religious and ethnic groups in Iraq see; <https://www.britannica.com/place/Iraq/Arabs>.

⁶⁵ States News Service, *State Department Recognizes Mid-East Genocide*, (2016), available at: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-446540969.html?refid=easy_hf. [5 November 2017].

more women who remain silenced to this day. Such demonstrations of cruelty as seen in the rape of Nadia, suggests ISIS did not accept Yazidis as a legitimate religion and forced those members of the populace to reorganize their religious teachings, and to at least appear to accept ISIS doctrine.⁶⁶ Despite the efforts of the minorities to adapt and survive, horrific incidents continued, linking ISIS to the brutal treatment to Sunni women, including 26-year old Hanan, a Sunni Arab woman from Hawija (north of Baghdad). In 2016, at Hawija ISIS fighters raped Hanan in front of her children and forced her to marry an ISIS fighter.⁶⁷ Although ISIS targeted other religious, sectarian, and ethnic groups throughout Iraq and Syria, but the continued instances of sexual violation of Sunni women demonstrates ISIS's inhumane tactics towards all segments of society.

Following the removal of Hussein's coup-proofed regime in 2003, perpetrators of violence in Iraq not only targeted ex-Ba'athist to join ISIS, but ISIS also created an environment for other violent organizations to grow. For instance, to tackle ex-Ba'athist insurgency, Shia militias and Kurdish forces surfaced and their bloodthirsty retaliation also contributed widespread murder. To illustrate, when Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, fell to ISIS in 2014 Shia militias stepped in to fight against ISIS. Their involvement in governance isolated some of the Sunni population and increased sectarian tensions. Some Shia militias tortured and executed Sunnis, the leader of the Badar organization (a Shia militia) stated, "I don't claim there are never violations that occur during war. This is a war, and in a war, there are violations".⁶⁸

Trained and backed by Iranians, some militias had access to other finance streams. This access to outside funding made it possible for Iranian-backed militias to contribute to violence in

⁶⁶ Nadia, ISIS, *supra* note, 1.

⁶⁷ UNHCR, Iraq, *supra* note, 2.

⁶⁸ PBS, *What a political alliance between two Iraq War-era militia leader means for the U.S.*, (2018), available at: <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-a-political-alliance-between-two-iraq-war-era-militia-leaders-means-for-the-u-s/>.

Iraq and raised the stakes as outside actors threatened the fledgling post-Hussein government. It is also important to consider the possibility that the US empowered Kurdish Peshmergas to resist ISIS by paying salaries, and providing them weapons, vehicles and other equipment.⁶⁹ There are also several recorded instances of clashes between Shia militias and Kurdish Peshmerga leading to numerous deaths in the US-backed fight against ISIS.⁷⁰


The loss of 110,000 civilian lives suggests that Iraq became entangled in a multi-layered world of violent upheaval emanating from several different factions including state, international, and non-state actors.⁷¹ Figures 1 and 2, respectively, show casualty patterns for civilians due to the US intervention and anti-government force activity. Such heightened levels of violence show a direct link between the disbanding of Iraqi forces to the rise of ISIS and their malicious reign of terror in the region. Such levels of violence raise two important questions; the first speaks to whether disbanding Hussein's coup-proofed regime leads to an increased violence after his removal. Secondly had the CPA avoided disbanding Hussein's regime would ground realities be different today?

⁶⁹ PBS, ISIS, *supra* note 57.

⁷⁰ Muhammad Tawfeeq and Tim Humes, Kurds and Shiite militias, uneasy allies in ISIS fight, clash in northern Iraq, CNN (April 24, 2016), available at; <https://www.cnn.com/2016/04/24/middleeast/iraq-shiite-peshmerga-clashes/index.html>.


⁷¹ For details on civilian killings, see Appendix I.

Figure 2.1. Documented yearly civilian deaths from violence from 2003-2018



Source: Iraq Body Count

Figure 2.2. Documented civilian deaths from all anti-government/occupation forces from 2003 to 2017



Source: Iraq Body Count

Since Hussein coup-proofed his regime based on familial, tribal, ethnic, and religious or sectarian grounds which lead to emergence of shared identity in relation to a regime that ultimately creates a distinct and unique society indelibly loyal to the leader.⁷² As a loyalist, they are more vulnerable to brutal retaliation and threats by a new regime because their loyalty to the ousted regime draws into question their motives once their leader is removed. Moreover, their presence in the public sphere is not just consequential for their personal interests in perpetuating the rule of power figures, but entire communities and extended family networks by association are threatened if these figures lose power. Hence, eventually, the loyalists are pushed out after the regime is dismantled—their anger then takes on the form of extraordinarily cruel and brutal resistance tactics and takes shape of violent right abuses and protracted violence.

Also, crucial to regime loyalty, political and economic incentives provided the backbone of a system of governance inherently built on exclusion. Since Hussein's loyalists maintained loyalty through incentives, a disbanding of such an administration led to chaos and increased bloodshed. The loss of incentives also fosters uncertainty about one's position in a new regime, leading to violent upheaval as uncertainty breeds contempt and fuels a strong will to survive.

Whether the choice of an alternative policy by the US rather than disbanding of regime forces would have resulted in different outcomes is a counterfactual question that would remain unanswered. This analysis of coup-proofing mechanisms demonstrates the likelihood that violence would not have spiked in the absence of top leadership. In fact, Hussein's loyalists would have secured a place in the new winning coalition and continued to gain political and economic incentives if the US CPA had not implemented a full uprooting of Hussein's government.

⁷² Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press Berkeley, (1985).

However, if the CPA had dissolved only the paramilitaries, not the regular army, it's still likely Iraq would have become consumed by violence since paramilitary groups had weapons and were well-trained to resist and create their own militias. Overall, it suggests coup-proofed regimes train their loyalist and paramilitaries in a way to evoke fear among the masses by violating human rights while in power and culminates in violent regime transition that is intimately connected to protracted violence.

2.3. Conclusion

The case of Iraq during and as well as the post-Hussein regime shows coup-proofing as a key element in severe human rights violation. Hussein faced both internal and external threats to his power and opted coup-proofing to contain threats. His coup-proofing strategies involved the exploitation of communal ties to gain loyalties from ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups. The creation of paramilitary groups by Hussein, and the creation of multiple internal security agencies also served as checks to monitor one another. To maintain these loyalties, Hussein provided political and economic incentives to his loyalists to ensure their allegiance. These incentives worked so well that Hussein found it easy to violate the physical integrity rights and civil-political liberties of all his citizens in its extreme. The political violence became the hallmark of Hussein regime cementing his power for three decades till the regime ouster by US in 2003.

Iraqis expected a sigh of relief in the post-Hussein era, however, it never happened. Violence in post-Hussein Iraq stemmed from the resistance of Hussain's loyalists by joining ISIS. Aggrieved at losing their incentives and privileges, members of ISIS deeply engaged in severe human rights violation as exemplified by the story of Nadia Murad, was raped and forced to change her religion. ISIS' severe abuses paved the way for other actors, such as Shia militias, Kurdish

Peshmerga, and US forces to counter ISIS but ended with protracted violence, violence which ultimately targeted innocent civilians. In early 2013, Amnesty International reported more than 110,000 violent civilian deaths in Iraq attributed to the US forces, Iraqi forces, or by the members of private military and security companies. Also, the greatest number of killings came from ISIS, armed militias linked to political parties including Shia militias, and Kurdish Peshmerga (Amnesty International 2013).

Chapter 3 - Civil-Military Relations and Regime Transition: The Effect of Counterbalancing on Violence

How does military counterbalancing affect violent regime transition? Counterbalancing, a coup-proofing strategy that relies on subordinating military to prevent it from seizing power can have effects that go beyond its influence on coup probability. It can also influence the military's willingness to engage in violence. A prime example is that of Iraq, which has been in turmoil since the removal of Saddam Hussein. Brooks (2013) argues that as of August 2014, democratization in Iraq failed with the rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq and later the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a regional power. The reason for such failure is because of the de-Ba'athification of Saddam's counterbalanced regime, though the policy was aimed at establishing democracy by dismantling the military from top to bottom. The US strategy of de-Ba'athification of Saddam's counterbalanced military did not bring peace in Iraq, but instead created a backlash. Saddam's disbanded counterbalanced military collaborated with al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2003 to fight back the US and the newly established government, resulting in a violent regime transition (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d; Coles and Parker, 2015).

The case of Iraq illustrates this project's attempt to understand the relationship between counterbalancing and violent regime transitions. This paper argues that counterbalancing increases violence because it creates paramilitary forces or designs a military structure based on loyalty, ethnic ties, and incentives that in turn increase the military's willingness to protect the leader at almost any cost (against any threat, not just a coup). It further argues that both very high and low levels of counterbalancing can in fact make a transition less likely to be violent in different ways, by reducing the military's ability to cause violence. Moreover, counterbalancing in different regimes may perform differently because of variation in autocratic regime structures. Among

autocracies, military regimes that engage in counterbalancing are even more likely to experience a violent regime transition, since military regimes have a better understanding of the military structure and are more connected to the military personnel. These factors help military regimes to counterbalance more effectively than their civilian counterparts.

This paper adds to the civil-military relations literature by explaining counterbalancing's effect on violence during all regime transitions, not just coups. In other words, the paper not only examines the impact of counterbalancing on violent regime transition brought about through coups, but investigates the effect on other transitions as well. The findings suggest that counterbalancing has a curvilinear relationship to violent regime transitions. Further, among counterbalanced autocracies, military regimes are more likely to experience violent regime transition than non-military regimes.

3.1. Why Counterbalancing

Leaders use various strategies to hinder the military from taking hold of power. The military seizing power is not a new phenomenon, especially in the developing world, which often lacks strong institutions. Coups and coup attempts not only threaten the leadership, but may drag the country into conflict and civil war. For instance, Powell (2012) identifies fifty cases of coups causing enough casualties to classify as armed conflict, whereas nine cases of coups are categorized as civil war in the Uppsala/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch, 2002). Specifically, coups are defined, and differentiated from other political phenomena, by the removal of the leader through small portion of the state apparatus, and their taking control of power (Quinlivan 1999; Powell and Thyne 2011).

Given the risk to developing states of coups, leaders of high coup risk countries create structures to reduce their chances of being overthrown (Quinlivan, 1999). Leaders use different

strategies such as exploiting family, ethnic, and religious loyalties, providing political and economic incentives, and relying on counterbalancing by dividing a military into rival organizations (Quinlivan, 1999). For example, the Ministry of Interior in Saudi Arabia has multiple layers of security: The Public Security Police, the Special Security Force, the Coast Guard, and the Frontier Force. All these agencies have different security roles that help to detect suspicious activity against the Saudi regime (Quinlivan, 1999). Studies suggest that regime stability in many autocracies in the 1960s and 1970s may be attributed to the division of the military into various paramilitary organizations (Powell 2012; Böhmelt & Pilster 2015).⁷³

Autocracies are more likely to rely on counterbalancing mainly because autocratic institutions are not strong enough to protect incumbent leaders from a military coup (Biddle & Zirkle 1996; Belkin & Schofer, 2003; Sudduth, 2017). Thus, counterbalancing helps reduce the chances of coups by creating coordination hurdles for the militaries through the provision of political and economic incentives to its loyalists (Powell 2012, Quinlivan, 1999). In contrast, mature democracies may not need counterbalancing, as they have strong democratic institutions in place, significantly reducing the probability of coup attempt. Counterbalancing also affects military effectiveness in warfare, and leaders losing a war in mature democracies are more likely to pay higher political cost such as removal from office etc. (Pilster & Böhmelt 2012; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2002). Another important factor that determines the different behavior towards counterbalancing is the presence of third parties, news media, and think tanks that keep an eye on

⁷³Though counterbalancing is effective most of the time, at times the regime strategy of fragmentation increases the efforts of the military to overthrow the regime before it can counterbalance the military. For instance, the President of Ivory Coast was ousted by the Ivoirian military in 1999 before the President started removing civil and military officers considered a threat to the regime (see, Thyne & Powell 2016).

military behavior and alert authorities to correct their problematic behavior through sanctions, whereas such a mechanism is absent in autocracies (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2012).⁷⁴

3.2. Regime Transitions

Before discussing the relationship between counterbalancing and violent regime transition, it is important to examine the causes of violent regime transition. A regime transition is defined as “an interval between one political regime to another” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986 p. 6). According to Geddes et al. (2014) a regime transition is the time period between a regime failure and its replacement with a subsequent regime. Regime failure occurs for a variety of reasons, including a competitive election, the government being ousted by a coup, rebellion, civil war, and foreign invasion (Geddes et al. p. 9). There are various factors that can increase the probability of a violent transition, such as popular mobilization, the role of elites, and regime type.

Regime transitions are usually accompanied by popular mobilization, but some cases of popular mobilization lead to violence for various reasons. For example, a popular mobilization that seeks immediate results, lacks discipline among organized workers, and experiences a prolonged and intense wave of demonstrations can lead to a violent regime transition (Przeworski 1986; Valenzuela, 1989). Also, mass mobilizations threatening the structure of the armed forces, the integrity of a country, or a country’s position in international politics are more likely to face repression and result in violence (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Similarly, the new regime will be unstable when mass actors gain control of the ruling class, suggesting that democratic regimes that survive are rarely established through popular mobilization (Karl 1990; Huntington 1984).

⁷⁴However, democratizing states may opt for counterbalancing more than more mature democracies and many infant democracies often go back to autocracy due to weak political institutions. Also, the military in democratizing states is less likely to face governance costs due to the absence of mass political participation, and strong civil society (Staniland 2008; Huntington, 2006).

In addition to popular mobilization, the role of political elites is a crucial factor in explaining peaceful or violent regime transitions. Political elites are central to the transition process because they make the conscious choice of choosing democracy or any other political system (Rustow, 1970). Their unity produces a stable and non-violent regime transition; however, a disunited political elite can cause an unstable, violent, and repressive regime transition (Higley & Burton, 1989). Furthermore, the distribution of power among political factions also plays an important role in transition. Unequal distribution of power between the incumbent regime and opposition group will lead to a stable transition because the dominant group will eventually take control of the regime. In contrast, equal distribution of power between the incumbent and opposition often ends up in a prolonged engagement causing violence and unstable transition (McFaul, 2005).

Further, change towards democracy and within democracies is less likely to be violent and repressive because democratic institutions allow citizens to elect their representative through popular vote and increase the cost of violence against citizens (Zanger 2000; Huntington 1984; Diamond et al. 1989; Davenport, 1999). In contrast, changes away from democracy are likely to increase violence because autocracies are perceived as violent due to a lack of respect for the rights of their citizens (Howard and Donnelly 1986; O'Donnell et al. 1986). Also, unlike democratic leaders, the autocrats do not come to power through free and fair elections, hence are not responsible to a large portion of the citizens (Davenport, 1999). Thus, these factors make autocratic leader more likely to crush the dissent through violent means.

3.3. Counterbalancing and Violent Regime Transition

Beyond all these determinants, I will argue that counterbalancing is an important factor in explaining violence or non-violence during the regime transition. Counterbalancing is meant to address regime failure through coups, but it can influence all regime transitions, not just transition through coups.⁷⁵ Counterbalancing can affect the probability of a violent regime transition by influencing the probability of defection of paramilitary and regular armed forces. For instance, a military that has defected away from the leader is unlikely to resist popular protest, leading to a non-violent regime transition. To illustrate, during the Arab Spring, Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali called upon his highly counterbalanced military to repress demonstrations against his regime, but the military refused to intervene to protect the leadership. This eventually ended Ben Ali's rule in the country and paved the way for non-violent transition towards a democratic political order (Makara 2013; Lutscher, 2016). In contrast, in 2011 at the time of popular protests to oust Ali Abdullah Salih in Yemen, the counterbalanced military resisted to protect the regime thus leading to unprecedented levels of violence in the country (Gaub, 2013). Thus, I will argue that different forms of counterbalancing can have different effects on the probability of a violent regime transition.

Counterbalancing can also incorporate elements of exploiting communal ties, and incentivizing certain members of the military through private rewards. These tactics can then lead to violent regime transition. First, some regimes recruit members of the military for parallel security by exploiting communal ties (family, tribal, ethnic, and religious or sectarian), suggesting that these regimes use a communal counterbalancing strategy (Quinlivan, 1999). In a communal

⁷⁵ However, democratizing states may opt for counterbalancing more than mature democracies and many infant democracies often go back to autocracy due to weak political institutions. Also, the military in democratizing states is less likely to face governance costs due to the absence of mass political participation, and strong civil society (Staniland 2008; Huntington, 2006).

counterbalancing strategy, the leader recruits most of the security apparatus personnel from trustworthy communities and aims to unite the political and military elites, thus increasing the defection cost. If the security apparatus personnel recruited based on communal ties defect, this behavior will create further mistrust and stereotypes towards them and their community. This will be true not only of the current regime, but also of a new regime that will consider them disloyal and will often engage in ethnic reshuffling within the security apparatus (Horowitz 1985, cited in Makara, 2013). Due to the communal counterbalancing, there is a shared identity with the regime that makes them different from the remaining society, and therefore loyal to the regime (Horowitz, 1985).

At this point, the question is what happens where there is a threat to a regime? In a situation of a communally counterbalanced regime, a threat to regime is indeed a threat to the military's own existence, because of the uncertainty of a new regime. This is especially true when a military belongs to a minority group and shares an identity with the regime. In this case, the military is more vulnerable to brutal treatment by the new regime. Moreover, the consequences are not limited to the personnel serving to protect the regime; a transition is a threat to their whole community. This will thus push the loyalists within the military to resist the change against a new regime, and be more willing to engage in violence against the opposition.

One possibility to consider is whether the communal counterbalancing is causing violence or whether the violence is due to an ethnically heterogeneous society. Literature on ethnic heterogeneity and onset of civil war suggests mixed findings on the relationship (Kalyvas, 2008). For instance, studies suggest ethnolinguistic heterogeneity does not affect the onset of civil war, (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002) whereas others suggest ethnolinguistic heterogeneity significantly affects ethnic wars (a subset of civil war) (Sambanis, 2001). I argue

that even if ethnic fragmentation in and of itself leads to violence, communal counterbalancing has an additional effect to it, because communal counterbalancing institutionalizes ethnic fractionalization, suggesting increased violence during the regime transition⁷⁶.

Political and economic incentives are also crucial to regime loyalty. This is particularly true for counterbalanced militaries in which elite units are tasked with defending the regime itself, not the country. To further maintain the loyalty of these soldiers, the leader will often offer material incentives. This argument is further supported by Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (2005) Selectorate Theory, suggesting loyalty is crucial to remain in power. Leaders gain loyalty by recruiting military members from a trustworthy community (one which has tribal, ethnic, and/or religious ties). Once loyalty is gained the aim is to maintain it. To maintain the loyalty of recruited members, the leader provides the military with political and economic incentives, private goods, as referred to by Selectorate Theory, that motivate them to remain loyal⁷⁷. Moreover, De Bruin (2017), in the study of counterbalancing and coups, finds that counterbalancing decreases the chances of successful coups primarily due to political and economic incentives offered to the soldiers.

To illustrate, Siaka Steven, Sierra Leone leader in 1970, established a paramilitary unit by exploiting tribal loyalties known as Internal Security Unit later known as Special Security Division (Bangura, 2018). The sole purpose of Special Security Division was regime protection. He incentivized Special Security Division by diverting the funds and military privileges from regular army and police force to Special Security Division personnel (Kposowa, 2006). Such incentives

⁷⁶ As a robustness check, to consider the possibility that ethnic fractionalization is in fact contributing to the violent regime transition itself, in Table A3 of the online appendix I re-run my analysis including ethnic fractionalization as independent control variable (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Results remain similar.

⁷⁷ The literature in business and marketing examines the effect of incentives on loyalty, and indicates that selective incentives do increase the loyalty of customers. Further, loyalty of valuable and special clients is attained through personalized relations and special privileges (Kumar & Shah 2004; Meyer-Waarden 2006; O'Malley, 1998).

increased the Special Security Division willingness to support the incumbent regime, because it assured the continuity of benefits, whereas regime failure put their incentives at stake. Similarly, Saddam Hussein in Iraq counterbalanced the military by allocating military privileges to the Republican Guard and providing them with other material benefits (Al-Marashi & Salama, 2008). In this case, receiving extra rewards increased their willingness to fight the opposition and protect Saddam Hussein for their own benefit. Both of these cases suggest that the provision of incentives helps to maintain loyalty. A threat to the regime causes resistance among the winning coalition, because of the fear of losing incentives and the uncertainty of their position in a challenger's winning coalition. This resistance and willingness to fight the opposition will in turn lead to violence.

Counterbalancing based on communal ties and provision of political and economic incentives creates competition among the armed forces through the creation of multiple paramilitary organizations with separate command lines (Quinlivan 1999; Huntington 1957; Bou Nassif, 2015). A negative consequence (for the regime) is that increased group size reduces the efficiency of the counterbalancing technique. According to collective action theorists, members of large groups contribute less efforts to pursue their goal, thus leading to free-riding problems within an organization (Olson 1965; Oliver and Marwell 1988; Esteban, 2001). Based on a collective action approach, the chances of violent transition are low if a very large number of armed organizations are involved, because a larger size increases the organizational cost, i.e. it becomes difficult for the leader to monitor whether the large number of armed groups are resisting regime failure or not (Pilster & Böhmelt 2015; Lutscher, 2016). Also, the cohesiveness of the security apparatus decreases as the size of group increases, ultimately leading to a heterogeneous apparatus and varied interests among the forces (Lutscher, 2016). For example, Pilster and Böhmelt (2015)

contend that a highly polarized military (with two equally powerful factions) reduces the probability of a coup, however a highly fractionalized military increases the likelihood of coup and its success, suggesting a curvilinear relationship between coup-proofing and regime protection. Though, again, this paper studies violence in general, not only coups, this finding has implications for the effectiveness of highly fragmented militaries in protecting the regime from all threats.

Large numbers of armed groups are also more likely to free-ride on the efforts of other units (Fearon 1998). Thus, when there are large numbers of military sub-groups, some of these groups are likely to “sit out” the violence involved in protecting the regime and reduce the risk they expose themselves to. This again translates to less violence during a transition. Such behavior could also be attributed to intra-security apparatus competition, e.g. individual members or units of armed organizations receiving less benefits are likely to either desert or join the opposition groups. In contrast, armed organizations units receiving benefits will continue to remain loyal (Gaub 2013; Makara, 2013). This indicates that level of loyalty and collective action problem are interrelated and affect violence during transition.

When counterbalancing levels are extremely high, loyalty should also be high. However, the intra security apparatus competition (resource allocation to different military and/or paramilitary organizations) effect, which leads to free-riding and collective action problems, undermines the loyalty effect. Such a situation of high loyalty and high collective action problems, cancels out the effect of each other thus lead to less violence during a transition. Likewise, at low levels of counterbalancing (for example, when there is only one military organization), regime faces loyalty and strength issues. For example, when there is only one paramilitary organization, it has lower loyalty to the specific regime compared to cases with many paramilitary forces. This

is primarily because of the fear of punishment associated with the regime change. As such, when only one paramilitary organization exist and a new regime comes into power, it is likely to punish the loyalists and punishment will be harsh if the loyalists resisted the challenger. So, to avoid the harsh punishment, loyalists are more likely to surrender to the challenger.⁷⁸ In addition to that, at lower levels of counterbalancing, the regime is weak and has lower strength to fight back as opposed to higher levels of counterbalancing. The higher number of paramilitary organizations reflect greater power and strength to secure the leader.⁷⁹ So, in this case of lower level of counterbalancing, the military despite not suffering from a collective action problem, is less likely to resist the opposition, thus lead to less violence during the transition.

However, at the medium levels of counterbalancing, the regime has several powerful military or paramilitary forces that do have loyalty to the specific regime, and not as high of a collective action problem as the highest levels of counterbalancing. In such a situation, each security force would like to maximize its benefit by keeping the regime in power and will strongly resist the opposition, thus leading to more violence during the transition. It is also possible that two or more strong paramilitary forces can start fighting each other when facing a challenger. For example, in 2011 during protests the counterbalanced regime of Abdullah Saleh in Yemen split up into two equal powerful factions where one supported the regime and other supported opposition leading to a violent transition.

This discussion suggests that counterbalancing may simultaneously increase the military's loyalty and willingness to defend them regime and weaken it and decrease its effectiveness. Hence, for different reasons the regimes with low counterbalancing, and regimes with high levels of

⁷⁸ The outcome may vary based on whether paramilitary organization is communal or acommunal in nature. The expectation is communal paramilitary organization is more likely to push back as opposed to acommunal paramilitary organization because of the ethnic association with the leader. Unfortunately, there is no global data available on nature of counterbalanced regime other than one on Africa. So, due to data unavailability I can't test the argument.

⁷⁹ Here the number reflects the strength of the paramilitary organizations. For example, one paramilitary organization has lower strength compared to 10 paramilitary organizations. Higher numbers of paramilitary personnel indicate more loyalists, more weapons, and higher capability to fight back the challenger.

counterbalancing will lead to less violent transitions than the ones in the middle level. From the given proposition, I derive this hypothesis:

H1: Regimes with very low or high levels of counterbalancing are less likely than medium levels of counterbalancing to lead to a violent regime transition.

A further question to consider is whether counterbalancing's effect on violent transition varies across different regimes. For instance, democracies (which are not studied in this paper) perceive counterbalancing as less important than autocracies do (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2012). Beyond this, substantial differences in counterbalancing behavior among autocracies exist, which are attributed to institutional differences i.e., a regime governed through a single political party compared to a regime run by the armed forces (Wilson & Martinez Machain 2016; Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014).⁸⁰ For example, military regimes are inclined to international conflict because they derive their legitimacy through their role as protector of national defense, and have no institutional constraints and are backed by the armed forces. In contrast, in single party regimes political legitimacy is derived through elections, and accountability exists to punish the leader, and such mechanisms change the behavior of the leader when it comes to conflict involvement (Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014; Wilson & Martinez Machain 2016; Weeks, 2008). Besides being involved in international conflicts, these studies suggest that military regimes are also more likely to get involved in domestic conflicts, because of the disconnect from society and reliance on the use of force to resolve domestic disputes (Wilson and Piazza 2013; Fjelde, 2010). Institutional explanations suggest that military regimes are more aggressive than their civilian-led

⁸⁰ Egypt between 1967 and 1973, an autocracy, underwent changes in its civil-military relationship. Further, techniques used for air defense technology by North Vietnam and Iraq to prevent military takeover suggest the variation between two autocratic states. For a more detailed discussion, see Biddle & Zaka 1996; Brooks 2008 and Pilster & Böhmelt, 2012.

counterparts. Likewise, military regimes' different behavior towards counterbalancing could be attributed to their organizational experience.

Experience is crucial to effective performance, and an organizational experience in terms of achievement, decision making, and tenure leads to effective management of an organization (Geddes 2003, Tesluk & Jacob, 1998; DiMaggio 1997; Detert et al., 2000).⁸¹ Military leaders' experience and training, coupled with motivation, increases organizational performance in multiple ways. First, experienced and effective military leadership encourages their soldiers to die for their unit by employing various strategies including brutal punishment and showing concerns for the soldiers' well-being. Second, experienced leaders are experts in combat and achieve multiple tasks under complex situations (Geddes 2003; Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014; Nordlinger 1977). Finally, quality leaders choose talented subordinates, that in turn enhance the military's performance (Reiter & Wagstaff, 2017).

Literature across various disciplines suggests a positive relationship between organizational experience and performance. Similarly, when military leaders engage in counterbalancing, that task is similar to performance in warfare, as the goal is survival.⁸² In that case, military regimes or leaders are better able to effectively use all strategies available to them, such as brutal punishments, exploiting loyalty, providing incentives, effectively handling multiple threats, and choosing talented and loyal subordinates, that makes them more effective than their

⁸¹ Literature in political science examines the effect of military institution and conflicts and on regimes incentive to have violent regime transitions. (For details see Geddes 2003, Magaloni 2003, Weeks 2008). Literature in Business, Sociology, and Industrial Organization has examined the impact of leadership on performance, and suggests that leadership does affect performance (Hackman 2002; Hambrick & Finklestein 1987; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986). Similarly, scholars in International Relations have examined military effectiveness and discussed various explanatory factors for it, such as regime type, technology, terrain, ethnicity, civil-military relations, alliances, and leadership (Biddle & Long 2004; Grauer & Horowitz 2012; Quinlivan 1999; Brooks 2007; Reiter & Wagstaff, 2017).

⁸² This relates to the long standing argument that when military runs itself rather than being overseen by the civilians, it falls prey to its own interest including budget maximization and job security than maximizing fighting effectiveness (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Feaver 2003)

counterparts that lack organizational experience. Thus, we should expect them to be able to counterbalance more effectively (due to their better organizational understanding of the military) and build militaries that are more loyal to the regime. This would in turn lead to militaries more willing to fight for the regime, which in turn leads to more violence during the regime transition. This argument leads me to derive the next hypothesis:

H2: Counterbalancing leads to more violence in military regimes than others during the regime transition.

3.4. Research Design

To examine the effect of counterbalancing on both regime transition and the level of violence during regime transition, I rely on Geddes et al.'s (2014) autocratic breakdown and regime transition dataset, which covers the period from 1970-2010, includes 71 autocracies and includes non-failure cases as well (those cases that did not have a regime transition in a given year). The unit of analysis in this dataset is the country year, including years with and without a transition. I am using this dataset for two reasons. First, it is a comprehensive dataset of autocratic breakdown. It also includes information on how a regime is replaced. The types of failures included in the dataset are: Coups, foreign invasion, popular uprising, civil war, the incumbent losing an election, and the incumbent not participating in competitive elections won by opponent. Secondly, the dataset lists whether regime failure causes violence or not, which directly relates to my hypotheses.

3.4.1. Model

It is possible that the sample of states that experience a violent regime transition is not a random one, and counterbalancing is likely to affect the probability of there being a regime

transition in the first place. To account for this possibility, I use a Heckman selection model.⁸³ The Heckman maximum likelihood estimator helps to model regime failure and violent regime transition simultaneously. The analysis proceeds with a Heckman selection model which processes the two-equations jointly; selection (regime failure) and outcome (violent regime transition) and produces a consistent estimate to deal with the selection bias (Blanton 2000: 127). Simultaneously modeling the selection and outcome equations allows me to consider a relationship between the two stages, making a Heckman model a relevant estimator for this analysis (Heckman, 1979).

At the selection stage, I consider all the autocracies in the international system and analyze whether the regime failed or not. Between the years of 1970-2010, the data includes 3,183 observations (autocratic country-years).⁸⁴ The dependent variable in the selection stage is a dichotomous measure that is coded one if the regime fails in that year and zero otherwise.⁸⁵ The possible options for regime failure are: regime insiders changing the rules of the regime; the incumbent losing elections; the incumbent not running, competitive elections won by opponent; popular uprising; military coup; insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants fighting a civil war; foreign intervention; new leader changes government rules and remains in power; and regime ends because government fails to control most of the territory (Geddes et al. 2014 codebook p. 15).⁸⁶ The second stage of the Heckman model (outcome stage) consists of all country-years that

⁸³ I am using selection model to address selection bias. It does not solve the potential endogeneity problem. It is possible that the leader decision to coup proof through counterbalancing is endogenous to their expectation of how they may lose power. Specifically, those leaders that fear being overthrown by a coup are more likely to coup-proof. To address this possibility, I control for regime transition through coups through a robustness check included in Table A2 of the Appendix. I thus am able to focus control for cases in which violence is coming from the military itself.

⁸⁴ For details, see summary statistics in Appendix.

⁸⁵ Regime is defined by Geddes et al based on “the rules that identify the group from which leaders can come and determine who influences leadership choice and policy.” (Geddes et al. 2014, p.4). Thus, there can be a change in the actual leader without there necessarily being a regime change. A regime failure occurs when these rules change. An example of regime failure is that of “Yahya Kahn's resignation in December 1971. He handed power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the party that had won the most recent parliamentary election in West Pakistan, all that remained of Pakistan after Bangladeshi independence” (Geddes et al. 2014, p.32). In this case, this is coded as a regime transition, because the rules changed from autocratic to democratic ones.

⁸⁶ In this case, this is coded as a regime transition, because the rules changed from autocratic to democratic ones.

experience violent regime transition.⁸⁷ The dependent variable is an ordinal one that measures the level of violence in that year. Geddes et al. (2014) operationalize violent regime transition as a categorical variable that marks the level of violence during autocratic regime transition. It ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 represents a non-violent transition involving no deaths, 2 suggests few deaths (1-25) occurred during regime transition, 3 indicates many deaths (more than 25 but less than 1000) occurred during regime transition, and 4 represents more than 1000 deaths.

Further, at both the selection and outcome stages, the main independent variable is counterbalancing, which is defined as the number of rival military organizations and their strength. It is drawn from Böhmelt and Pilster's (2015) piece on the impact of institutional coup-proofing on coup attempts and outcomes. I choose to use this dataset for two reasons: First, it includes information about both number of rival military organizations and their strength to capture the degree to which a leader divides military power into rival organizations, which is crucial in influencing the violence during the regime transition (Böhmelt and Pilster 2015, p. 168). Secondly, the dataset excludes organization related to ports, maritime, and air police that have no ground-combat compatibility and are thus unlikely to affect levels of violence. In this dataset, counterbalancing is operationalized as an interval-level measure that ranges from 1 to 4.5 with a mean value of 1.7 (Pilster & Böhmelt 2011; Pilster & Böhmelt, 2012). To be able to test hypothesis 1, which states that at extreme levels of fragmentation, counterbalanced regimes are less likely to be violent during regime transition, I re-centered the counterbalancing variable at its median value and squared it so both low and high levels of counterbalancing are represented by higher values. I thus use the squared term as an independent variable. The re-centering will allow me to move its

⁸⁷ A violent regime transition is where a regime is replaced by a different regime and had deaths occur during the transition (Geddes et al. 2014, p.32).

mean to 0 and obtain both negative and positive values. Standardizing adjusts the scale of magnitude that allows me to capture the curvilinear relationship. However, if I do not re-center the variable at its mean and transform counterbalancing variable, it will only result in exponential increase and that does not allow me to capture the curvilinear relationship. For example, if the values are 2, 3, and 4 then squaring will yield 4, 9, and 16 which is an exponential increase. However, recentering 2, 3, and 4 at their mean (i.e. 3) will provide -1, 0, 1 and squaring them will yield 1,0,1 and this allows to capture the curvilinear relationship which I could not do so simply with the squared term.

In addition, I control for GDP (ln), mass instability, elite instability, military expenditure (ln), duration, intervention, elections, intra-conflict, and type of regime military, party, and personalist; all variables that I believe influence the probability of regime failure. Mostly the controls variables are derived from Geddes et al. (2014) and Pilster and Böhmelt (2015). Change in GDP, measured here as the natural log of GDP in constant US dollars, is predicted to negatively affect the likelihood of regime failure. The GDP data is from the World Bank (World Bank, 2017). From a theoretical standpoint, better economic conditions are less likely to cause regime failure, because better economic conditions legitimize the regime and decrease demand for regime change. In contrast, a declining economy causes people to voice dissent against the government, causing regime failure and in some cases, leading to violent regime transition (Powell 2012; Gleditsch, 2002).

Secondly, instability is another important factor that affects the probability of regime failure. Instability refers to the presence of assassinations, purging of government officials, guerilla activity, protests, riots and strikes (Banks, 2001). To control for instability, I relied on Pickering and Kisangani's (2009) method of capturing instability that divides instability into elite instability

and mass instability; elite instability includes purges and government crises, whereas mass instability incorporates riots, strikes, and protests. The use of this measure helps capture the true effect of instability at different levels. Previous literature controls for instability because it increases the likelihood of regime failure, especially through coups because it signals to coup plotters the loss of regime legitimacy (Powell 2012; Thyne, 2010). Further, I consider military expenditures as they indicate the strength of the military, which is likely to affect regime failure (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2015).

In addition, the study controls for the duration of a regime, which is defined as the consecutive years of a particular autocratic regime in power (Geddes et al. 2014). I expect longer regime duration to increase the likelihood of regime failure because leaders who have been in power for longer are more likely to engage in predatory behavior (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Chang and Golden, 2001), which after a certain time span causes resentment among the masses, eventually leading to regime failure through revolt. Next, I control for intervention (at both the regime failure and violent regime transition levels) because intervention increases the likelihood of regime failure, but may also increase elite and citizen resentment against the intervening party, eventually causing violence during regime transition. I follow Kisangani and Pickering (2007) and use IMI data to control for intervention (Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering, 2008). I also control for elections at because elections are likely to affect regime failure (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014). Finally, I control for intra- state conflict at the selection stage because civil war increases the probability of regime failure. The data for intra-state conflict is from the Uppsala-PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

At the outcome stage of the model, I again include the control variables that are likely to influence the violent regime transition. At this stage, I control for the change in military

expenditures as the percentage of year to year change in a country's military's expenditures (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2015). As Powell suggests (2012), change in military expenditure can either make armed forces respect the status quo and reduce the chances of regime failure, but in the case of a regime transition the increased military expenditure is likely to cause violence, because the military is better trained and equipped to resist. Further, I control for mass instability, elite instability and interventions that are more likely to affect the violent regime transition.

3.5. Analysis

Table 1 shows that the coefficient on the extreme level of counterbalancing variable in the selection equation is positive but not statistically significant, implying that extreme levels of counterbalancing may not necessarily cause regime failure. The control variables in selection equation generally behave as expected.⁸⁸

Further, as expected, the coefficient on the extreme levels of counterbalancing variable in the outcome equation is negative and significant. It thus shows support for the hypothesis that very low and high levels of counterbalancing reduce the likelihood of violent regime transition.⁸⁹ This suggests a curvilinear relationship between levels of counterbalancing and violent regime transition. It is so because a military in a regime with only one effective organization and less fragmentation may not be able to effectively protect the regime, and is less likely to resist regime failure. Similarly, highly counterbalanced militaries may face a collective action problem making them less likely to resist the challenger and eventually leading to a non-violent regime transition.

⁸⁸ I also tested for non-squared levels of counterbalancing and results did not change. Also, non-squared term is not statistically significant. Tables A2a and A3 (Model 1 CP & CP robustness) showing the results are attached in appendix.

⁸⁹ As a robustness check (see Table A2a in Appendix) I also control for successful coups to distinguish the impact of coups on violence from the impact of counterbalancing on violence. It is very possible that regime failure through a military coup ends up in violence because the purpose of counterbalancing is to protect against the coup. Thus, I estimated the model by including successful coups as an independent variable in all the three models (Marshall and Marshall 2010). Results remain similar. Table A2b presents bivariate correlation between coup-proofing and violence. Significance level is in parentheses.

However, as previously discussed, counterbalancing at moderate levels, more towards the center, makes it more likely for there to be violence during a regime transition.⁹⁰ Figure 3.1 presents the coefficient plot showing the coefficients and levels of significance for the variables included in the outcome equation of the Heckman model (where the dependent variable is violent regime transition).⁹¹

Table 3.1. Low and High Levels of Counterbalancing and Violent Regime Transition, Heckman Selection Model

Violent Regime Transition	(Outcome)
Counterbalancing (squared)	-0.165** (0.0797)
Elite Instability	-0.781** (0.365)
Mass Instability	-0.0548 (0.319)
Change in Mil Expenditure (ln)	0.441** (0.222)
Interventions	0.230 (0.351)
Year	0.000439 (0.0167)
Constant	2.001 (33.22)
Regime Failure	(Selection)
Counterbalancing (squared)	0.0187 (0.0650)
Mass Instability	0.673*** (0.130)


⁹⁰ For ease of presentation and as a robustness check, I also re-run the model without re centering the squared counterbalancing term and calculate predicted levels of violence at different levels of counterbalancing. Table A4 and Figure 1 and in appendix show that, as predicted, medium levels of counterbalancing are associated with the highest levels of violence during transition.

⁹¹ As a robustness check, I use an alternate dependent variable where number of deaths are scaled by population size. Results are shown in Table A1 and findings are consistent with main results. Coefficient plots showing the coefficients and levels of significance for the variables included in the selection equations for both tables are presented in appendix. For details, see figure 2 and 3.

Elite Instability	0.558** (0.247)
Change in GDP (ln)	-2.570*** (0.753)
Military Expenditure (ln)	-0.159*** (0.0351)
Interventions	0.0940 (0.178)
Elections	0.892*** (0.139)
Duration	0.00342 (0.00246)
Military Regime	0.597 (0.541)
Personalist Regime	0.126 (0.508)
Party Regime	0.0719 (0.466)
Intra-state Conflict	0.314* (0.178)
Year	-0.00365 (0.00746)
Constant	6.542 (14.74)
ρ	-0.574 (0.467)
σ	0.101 (0.183)
N uncensored	1776
N censored	76


Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level at *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.

Figure 3.1. Coefficient plot of outcome equation showing level of significance at 95% CI



In figure 3.2, I present the marginal effect on violent regime transition that different levels of counterbalancing can have. In the graph, the x-axis represents the squared levels of counterbalancing (high values on the x-axis represents both very low or very high level of counterbalancing) and the y-axis denotes the effects on the linear prediction of the level of violence during regime transition, with the lines representing the 95% confidence interval around that mean value and dots showing point estimates. Figure 2 shows that the effect of counterbalancing on violent regime transition is negative at the extreme ends (high values on the x-axis), suggesting more of a curvilinear relationship.

Figure 3.2. Impact of Very Low and High Levels of Counterbalancing on Violent Regime Transition



Hypothesis 2 suggests that counterbalancing leads to more violence in military regimes than others during regime transition. I further investigate the relationship between counterbalanced military regimes and violent regime transition. To test this, I interacted the counterbalancing variable (which is not a squared term) with a dichotomous military regime variable and included this variable in the outcome equation of the Heckman selection model. I use the same controls included in the previous model. The results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 shows the coefficient of the interaction between counterbalancing and military regime in the selection equation is negatively correlated with the regime failure, but is not statistically significant. However, the coefficients of counterbalancing and military regime are positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the control variables in the selection equation perform similar to how they do in previous models.


Table 3.2. Impact of Counterbalanced Military Regime on Violent Regime Transition, Heckman Selection Model

Violent Regime Transition	(Outcome)
Counterbalancing	-0.367 (0.227)
Military Regime	-2.361*** (0.785)
Counterbalanced Military Regime	0.886** (0.410)
Elite Instability	-0.966*** (0.355)
Mass Instability	0.00675 (0.239)
Change in Military Expenditure (ln)	0.452** (0.207)
Interventions	0.303 (0.300)
Year	-0.0125
Regime Failure	(Selection)
	(0.0153)
Counterbalancing	0.179* (0.0963)
Military Regime	1.195** (0.545)
Counterbalanced Military Regime	-0.305 (0.211)
Mass Instability	0.618*** (0.128)
Elite Instability	0.548** (0.242)
Change in GDP (ln)	-2.722*** (0.615)
Military Expenditure (ln)	-0.158*** (0.0361)
Interventions	0.0771 (0.185)
Elections	0.871*** (0.122)
Duration	0.00317 (0.00230)
Personalist Regime	0.0655

	(0.448)
Party Regime	0.0162
	(0.411)
Intra-state Conflict	0.331**
	(0.144)
Year	-0.00158
	(0.00726)
Constant	2.138
	(14.36)
ρ	-0.877***
	(0.290)
σ	0.183
	(0.142)
N uncensored	1776
N censored	76

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level at * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Figure 3.3. Coefficient plot of outcome equation showing level of significance at 95% CI




In the outcome equation, the interaction term between counterbalanced and military regime has a positive and significant coefficient, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, suggesting that counterbalanced military regimes are more likely to experience violent regime transition than their civilian counterpart (Figure 3 represents the coefficient plot showing outcome equation's level of significance at 95% confidence interval). To determine whether the impact of counterbalanced military regime and violent regime transition is meaningful, it is important to further analyze the relationship between a counterbalanced military regime and violent regime transition by plotting them graphically (Brambor et al. 2006).

In figure 4, I present the effect of counterbalancing on the probability of a military regime's violent regime transition.⁹² In the graph, levels of counterbalancing are represented on the x-axis, going from the lowest to the highest level of counterbalancing. The effect on the probability of violent regime transition is on the y-axis. Figure 4 shows that less counterbalancing decreases the probability of violent regime transition in military regimes.

⁹² Figures 4 and 5 showing the interaction effect of coup-proofed personalist and party regimes on violent regime transition are presented in the online appendix.

Figure 3.4. Violent Regime transition in Military Regime at Different levels of Counterbalancing



3.6. Conclusion

This article has sought to increase our understanding of the relationship between civil-military relations and violent regime transition by arguing that counterbalancing can lead to violent regime transition, even if that transition does not involve a military coup. It particularly explains the phenomenon in autocracies because autocratic regimes are more involved in counterbalancing to prevent regime change than democracies. Also, autocracies gain more benefits and face less costs from counterbalancing because of a lack of accountability and smaller winning coalitions.

More specifically, I have argued that counterbalancing increases the likelihood of violent regime transition because counterbalanced regimes recruit the military and paramilitary personnel by exploiting ethnic, religious, sectarian, and tribal ties based on loyalty and trustworthiness. To further maintain the loyalty of communal ties, the counterbalanced regime provides political and economic incentives which in turn cause fear among loyalists of being punished for their betrayal, losing incentives, and uncertainty of their position in a new government. Consequently, it pushes the loyalists to resist and fight back against a potential challenger. This culminates in violent regime transition. This is evident from the case of Iraq, where Saddam's loyalists resisted and fought back regime change by dragging Iraq into a state of violence and chaos. Though counterbalancing can lead to violence during transition, this may not happen in all cases. Regimes at very low and high levels of counterbalancing are less likely to experience violence because of the military's willingness to resist and collective action problems. Further, I expect that among autocracies, military regimes are more likely to experience violent regime transition because of their effectiveness at counterbalancing their militaries due to their military organizational experience. Both hypotheses received strong and robust empirical support in the empirical analysis.

This project's theoretical reasoning and empirical results contribute to the literature in various ways. First, the study develops an argument that connects civil-military relations to the violence that can occur during regime transition. Secondly, it differentiates the impact of counterbalancing among various autocracies, which provides support to the argument that institutional differences among autocracies makes them behave differently in conflict (Weeks 2008; Pickering and Kisangani, 2012). In addition to that, this study contributes to work examining the implications of counterbalancing by demonstrating its broader consequences, such as

potentially leading a country to civil war through a prolonged violent transition (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; De Bruin 2017).

Regarding future research, this study can be expanded to examine the impact of counterbalancing on violent regime transition in a broader sample including democracies and anocracies. Moreover, it would be interesting to examine how the differences between a counterbalanced military regime run by a group of high ranking officers versus rule by a military strongman affect violent regime transition, similarly to how Geddes et al. (2014) suggest that strongman military regime behavior differs from that of those led by a group of high ranking officials.

Chapter 4 - U.S. Aid and Substitution of Rights Violations

The September 11, 2001 attacks launched renewed U.S. interest in Central Asia. After the attacks, the United States reached out to Uzbekistan for its cooperation to target Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the two states signed an agreement granting the U.S. the use of an air base near Khanabad. Later, the U.S. established an additional airbase in Bishkek, capital of Kyrgyzstan, and concluded agreements with other states, including Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, to secure their permission for conducting refueling stops. In exchange for their cooperation, the U.S. offered military aid to Uzbekistan and economic incentives to the Kyrgyz president and his family, such as attractive fuel contracts to suppliers owned by the President. At the time, U.S. leaders expected that aid would improve the respect for human rights among these autocratic regimes (Foust 2011, 2012). However, things did not turn out as expected. As a matter of fact, the Uzbek President, Islam Karimov used the U.S. war on terror to justify targeting political opponents and civilians for dissent. In the 2005 Andijan massacre the Uzbek government killed 180 civilians (Colley, 2012).

We might expect that U.S. foreign aid would encourage respect for human rights in host countries, since human rights improvement is a condition of aid (though of course not a prime objective) (Gibler, 2008). This follows from the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which links U.S. foreign aid to better human rights practices in the recipient countries (Goderis and Versteeg 2012,). Moreover, language in the 2003 Millennium Challenge Act indicates the link between US aid policy and human rights. This law conditioned US aid on various indicators for human rights in recipient nations and the top indicators are the scores on the Freedom House measures of civil and political liberties (Section 102 of Millennium Challenge Act of 2003). However, US threats to remove aid from human rights violators may not always be credible, especially when the recipient is strategically important to the U.S. In that case the recipient is very aware of its importance and

is less concerned about losing aid. The recipient is thus less likely to alter its repressive behavior as a result of receiving aid. The case of Uzbekistan illustrates how the strategic importance of the recipient to the donor can be a hindrance in the promotion of respect for rights. It is an example of a case in which the recipient nation continues to violate different types of human rights while still benefiting from foreign aid.

However, the absence of a strategic relationship between the donor and recipient can prompt the recipient to behave more strategically. This does not mean that non-strategically important countries will stop violating human rights. Rather, non-strategically important recipients are more likely to shift tactics from visible rights violations, such as killings, to “invisible” ones, like clean torture or forced disappearances. To illustrate, in 2016 in Myanmar, clashes broke out between Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya Muslims which eventually led to security forces killings more than 10,000 Rohingya Muslims. The international community, along with the U.S., threatened Myanmar with economic sanctions for its killings of Rohingyas. Since Myanmar is neither a strategic partner to the U.S. or major European powers, the threat of losing aid was credible. Thus, to avoid accountability through naming and shaming, loss of aid, and sanctions, security forces in Myanmar shifted their strategy of abuse to forced disappearances, an action which was previously not used by the security forces (The New York Times 2017; The Guardian 2017).

This example illustrates that Myanmar, a non-strategically important partner to the U.S. shifted human right violation strategies to avoid costly consequences like sanctions. However, if Myanmar were a strategic U.S. ally the outcome would likely have been different, as in the case of Uzbekistan. Though the strategic shift did not end up being effective in hiding the abuses since

the international community learned about it and eventually the US cut military aid, this still illustrates that strategically unimportant states engage in substituting rights violations.

In this article, I argue that it is possible to explain both the improvement and deterioration in respect for rights (or rights violations) as a consequence of foreign aid through an overarching theory of U.S. aid, strategic interest, and rights abuse substitution. I especially focus on visible (killings and torture) and invisible (disappearance) rights violations. I argue that on the one hand a rational autocratic aid recipient will not want to lose aid due to their human rights abuses. On the other hand, they have an incentive to repress their citizens because autocrats survive through force. Such a use of force helps to contain political challengers which otherwise threaten the regime through mass mobilization (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2009). A Two Stage Predictor Substitution (2SPS) approach is used to determine whether substitution of rights violations occurs and how the strategic importance of a recipient state conditions this effect. This approach is borrowed from the health economics and health science literature and is novel in addressing human rights related questions. The result indicates that an autocratic recipient will substitute visible rights violations for invisible ones. That is, killings and torture would decrease whereas disappearances will increase. However, such a substitution effect does not exist when a recipient is of strategic interest to the donor because the recipient enjoys bargaining leverage and does not face a credible threat of losing aid.

4.1. Foreign Aid and Human Rights

Foreign aid constitutes resources such as goods, financial grants, and loans at concessional rates transferred from donors to recipients, and is allocated to countries to address their development and security needs. For instance, development aid helps to resolve humanitarian issues such as reducing poverty or fulfillment of the population's basic rights (Riddle, 2007).

Security assistance (or military aid), in contrast, helps countries to defend themselves from external or domestic threats. For instance, in the 1990s the U.S. allocated a \$200 million aid package to Colombia that helped train the Colombian military in counter narcotics operations (Dube & Naidu, 2015). Similarly, Pakistan has received military aid from the U.S. since 9/11 to fight the war on terrorism (Cohen & Chollet, 2007).

Scholars have examined the effect of aid on various policies including democratization, economic development and human rights (Meernik et al 1998; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Hafner-Burton 2014; Lai 2003; Lebovic 1998; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Knack 2004;). Studies addressing the relationship between aid and human rights particularly examine the effectiveness of aid in improving human rights in recipient nations. In general, results regarding the effectiveness of aid in improving respect for human rights are mixed. Some studies suggest a positive relationship between aid and human rights (Bermeo 2016; Dunning 2004; Carnegie and Marinov 2017), whereas other argue for a negative or null effect (Lee 2011; Sikkink 2004; Knack 2004; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Dreher et al. 2013). Beyond that, some have argued that a conditional relationship exists between aid allocation and respect for human rights; that the effect of aid on human rights depends on donor intentions and target states' interest (Krasner and Weinstein, 2014).

These findings remain inconclusive, and this paper attempts to analyze the impact of aid on human right violations by formulating a theory arguing that as a strategic player, leaders prefer to keep aid. At the same time, the leaders are unwilling to stop human rights violations, as autocratic leaders hold power through force. In this case, leaders will substitute visible rights violation for invisible ones. However, that substitution effect is not consistent across all recipients.

Strategically important recipients are less likely to substitute rights violation than less important ones.

4.2. Foreign Aid and Substitution of Rights Violation

For any regime, whether it is democratic or autocratic, the leader's primary aim is political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Regimes rely on various techniques to consolidate power, and which one they choose often depends on the type of threat they face. Autocratic leaders face two types of threats to consolidation of power: One from the political elite, and the other from the masses. To deal with the political elites, the autocratic leaders establish narrow institutions, e.g. juntas and consultative councils, and often rely on nominal democratic institutions, such as partisan legislatures to reduce the threat from both elites and masses. Further, to deal with the masses, autocratic leaders rely on the monopoly of force to control their population. Thus the use of repression by autocratic leaders often secures them a long tenure (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). For example, Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq for 27 years, Hosni Mubarak ruled Egypt for 30 years, and similarly Muammar Gaddafi presided over Libya for 42 years. All these leaders were responsible for the killing of hundreds and thousands of their civilian citizens.⁹³

Despite the common occurrence of repressive behavior among autocracies, repression remains contrary to international norms. The international community thus stresses respect for human rights through different means; one of them is by attaching conditionality to foreign aid. Donors of foreign aid often formulate policies to encourage respect for rights across regimes types,

⁹³ Though all these leaders engaged in repression, at the same time, not all leaders repress at the same level. Military regimes tend to be more repressive, whereas single party regimes tend to be the least. Such difference among autocratic repression is attributed to the institutional differences among autocracies. For instance, single party regimes' least repressive behavior is due to the presence of some democratic characteristics such as including the population in the political process, which eventually reduces state repression (Davenport, 2007).

especially by autocracies. For instance, the Leahy amendments to the 1961 'Foreign Assistance Act' linked the United States' foreign economic aid policy to the practices of human rights in the recipient countries. Also, the United States Congress passed almost twenty pieces of legislation regarding human rights in connection to the aid policy between 1976 and 1979 (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985). In addition to this legislation, the U.S. passed the 'Millennium Challenge Act' of 2003 according to which the distribution of aid is conditioned by various indicators of human rights in the recipient nation based on the scores on Freedom House measures of civil and political rights (Section 102 of Millennium Challenge Act of 2003). Furthermore, the joint strategic plan of the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) promotes human right values for a safer world (Gibler, 2007).

Similarly, since 1986 some European states started stressing the importance of human rights and passed various declarations on this topic. These European Union declarations include the 1986 'Declaration on Human rights and Foreign Policy', the renewed declarations of 1991 and 1992, which that have special clauses declaring human rights as their most important element. This in turn allowed the European Union to take tough measures against countries violating human rights standards. Recently, the European Union as a whole as well some individual European countries created policies that made development aid conditional on human rights in the recipient nations (Carey, 2007). For instance, the criteria for German development aid lists respect for human rights as a non-negotiable factor. Similarly, for the United Kingdom and France, respect of human rights is fundamental to development aid (Stokke 1995a; BMZ, 1998 in Carey, 2007).

The preconditions of respect for human rights in the aid policies of Western countries are meant to increase the respect for citizen's rights in the recipient nations.⁹⁴ This is especially true for autocracies that have higher human rights violations than non-autocracies (Riddle, 2007; Davenport, 2007). Thus, the donor expectation is improvement in respect for human rights, but that does not necessarily mean aid is always going to be effective because of its potential side effects (negative externalities) and variation in recipient strategic importance.⁹⁵

Similarly, aid might not be effective in reducing repression, especially in a faltering regime (Wright 2008; Gibler, 2008). Here, a leader who sees their political survival threatened will look for a short-term benefit and is highly motivated to use any revenue including foreign aid to repress his (her or their) citizens or political elite even if they lose aid in the long run. To illustrate, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC) started receiving aid since independence in 1971. Aid continued during the period of instability in the 1990's when Mobutu Sese's regime started stumbling. To tackle the faltering regime, Mobutu relied on aid to buy off the opposition members and repress political elites along with citizens. For instance, Mobutu bought the opposition parties including the PRI-Fenadec and UFERI, and named UFERI leader Nguza as a new prime minister. Upon expulsion from the opposition coalition, Nguza, the new prime minister, suspended the National Sovereign Conference which had helped Mobutu to co-opt key opposition members and repress other political factions for his survival. In the meantime, Mobutu sent his

⁹⁴ Though human rights improvement is a condition of aid, it is not necessarily a prime objective for these states. Moreover, this condition, that only states with high respect for human rights receive aid, makes it important to account for reverse causality when studying aid's effect on human rights.

⁹⁵ One way in which aid can generate negative externalities is by making the recipient leader less reliant on the population. Not only does this make the leader more willing to repress the population, but he may even use this money to repress citizens. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) suggest that monetary incentives through aid help leaders to buy loyalty and maintain winning coalition, which in turn can prop up the brutal dictatorial regimes. This suggests that aid generates a negative externality by making leader less reliant on its population and is a valuable resource for an autocrat to survive longer through the provision of incentives to their winning coalition. Given this, aid is a way of indirectly supporting the regime and allowing for its survival and the use of repression.

troops to kill and threaten citizens as well (Askin and Collins 1993 in Wright, 2008). Clearly in this case aid was not effective in reducing repression since the cost of losing aid was less than the benefits of repression.

The above discussion indicates that aid can fail in its aim to improve human rights. However, the vast literature examining the impact of aid on repression is inconclusive. Empirical work by Regan (1995) and Meyer (1996) found no impact of aid on human rights, whereas Gibler (2007) argues that aid decreases the violation of human rights. Though there is an expectation that foreign aid improves human rights, it is suspected that the relationship between foreign aid and human rights is more complicated than one in which aid always increases or decreases respect of rights. A rational leader of a recipient nation would look for a possible way to continue receiving aid while committing rights violations, as both are crucial to a regime's survival. As such, aid helps leaders to satisfy its winning coalition, and rights violation helps to repress opposition, and both these factors eventually help leaders to stay in power.

In this situation, one option that the leader has in order to not lose aid, while also being able to defend himself from domestic threats, is to act strategically by substituting visible rights violations with invisible rights violations. First, visible rights violations are easily identifiable and leave marks on the body (such as killings and torture), while invisible rights violations are committed more quietly and leave no marks on a victim's body or the victim's body cannot be found.⁹⁶ This helps a leader or regime maintain plausible deniability if questioned by NGOs, donor states, etc. (Conrad et al. 2014). Invisible violations serve the same purpose as visible ones; the

⁹⁶ In the human rights literature, scholars have discussed clean torture in which rights violations are committed cautiously, leaving no visible marks on body (Conrad & Moore, 2010). However, there is not enough data available to test it as a measure of invisible rights violation. Therefore, I chose to focus on disappearances as a measure of disappearances.

killing or disappearance of political opponents puts an end to their opposition (Payne and Abouharb, 2016).

For example, Pakistan has been one of the top recipients of U.S. aid. At the same time, it has continued to carry out forced disappearances of journalists including women, bloggers, advocates of peace between India and Pakistan, and political activists for their opposition. According to Human Rights Watch, from August to October of 2017 alone, three hundred cases of forced disappearances were reported. (Human Rights Watch, 2017). This is not limited to Pakistan; the autocratic leadership in Argentina in the 1970's was involved in violating physical integrity rights through acts such as extra-judicial killings and disappearances. To avoid accountability and maintain plausible deniability, the leadership had victims thrown out of aircraft over the sea so their bodies could not be recovered. Up until November 2011, the United Nations Group on Disappearances reported 53,778 cases of disappearances, and another 42,759 cases are under consideration (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2012).

Secondly, substituting visible human rights violations with invisible ones protects leaders from criminal accountability (Payne and Abouharb, 2016). For much of history, leaders involved in the killing of their civilian citizens went unpunished. However, since the end of World War II, and the Nuremburg Trials, states started using mechanisms including trials, truth commissions, lustrations, museums, and oral history projects to address past human rights abuses. (Jelin 2003; Lutz and Sikkink 2001; Sriram, 2003; Nalepa 2010). This allows for accountability of those accused of human rights abuses through the active involvement of the international community which provides states, international organizations, and human rights-based transnational advocacy networks an opportunity to place human rights on the international legal agenda.

Invisible forms of repression such as disappearances are a deliberate strategy pursued by leaders to prevent human rights monitoring, and escape accountability from both national and international legal obligations (Brysk,1994). Such a tactic of substituting visible for invisible rights violations makes it harder for donors to attribute rights violations to the recipient, and it becomes difficult for NGO's to force the recipient to take responsibility for it. In some cases, invisible rights violations may allow the donor to "turn a blind eye" to the recipient, especially if the recipient is of high importance to the donor. Hence, the recipient leader is less likely to incur higher external costs like losing aid (McCormick and Mitchell, 1997). To illustrate, on October 2, 2018 a dissident Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, disappeared from the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. There was an international outcry on Saudi Arabia's involvement in Khashoggi's disappearance but the Saudi government was initially plausibly able to deny it because of the absence of the Khashoggi's body. International community, NGOs, Human right organizations demanded that the United States to take a tough stance on Saudi Arabia, a key US strategic partner, for Khashoggi's disappearance. However, President Donald Trump was able to turn a blind eye to Khashoggi's disappearance, and instead supported Saudi stance of plausible deniability (Landler,2018).⁹⁷

Further, prosecutors always face difficulty in trying cases of invisible form of repression, and many of the cases remain unresolved (Sikkink 2011). For instance, the U.N. Committee on Missing Persons identified 26,000 missing persons through DNA testing. Similarly, the U.N. sponsored truth commission in Guatemala puts the number of missing persons in the country's civil war at approximately 45,000. Though the commissions made significant progress in identifying missing persons, most perpetrators of these invisible rights violations could not be

⁹⁷ This illustration does not necessarily fit the case of aid allocation, but indicates how countries turn a blind eye to the human rights violations of strategically important partners.

punished because of insufficient evidence (Scovazzi and Citroni, 2007). This discussion suggests that as a rational actor the recipient leader would not like to lose aid because of the monetary incentives attached to it. At the same time, to fulfill aid conditions of respecting human rights, the leader is likely to substitute visible forms of human rights abuse to invisible rights violations to plausibly deny the rights violations and survive longer. From this proposition, I derive the following hypothesis;

H1: In states receiving aid, greater the amount of aid, the more likely recipient leaders are likely to substitute violations of invisible rights for violations of visible rights.

As the above discussion demonstrates, a strategic leader of a recipient nation substitutes invisible rights violation for visible rights violations. However, I suspect a more complex relationship than one in which a leader always substitutes invisible rights violations for visible rights violations. In particular, the substitution may not occur if the recipient is strategically important to the donor. Strategic importance is defined by a set of interests the donor has in the recipient nation which include development, economic, power-politics, and security interests. Empirical studies suggest that aid is mostly driven by security concerns (McKinley and Little 1977, 1978; Hook and Zhang 1998). The question I address is how the presence of strategic interests influences respect for human rights in the recipient nation, and why strategically important states are less likely to substitute for invisible rights violations.

First, when a donor allocates aid in a way to maximize their key strategic interests they give bargaining leverage to the recipient. That leverage exists because the donor is potentially reliant on the recipient due to its security value to the donor. The recipient knows this, which in turn makes the threat of losing aid less credible. Thus, the recipient is under no pressure to fulfill the aid condition of improving human rights (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Allesina and

Dollar; 2000; Lebovic, 1998). For example, Egyptian President Abd al- Fattah al-Sisi's government is actively involved in violating physical integrity and political empowerment rights, and civilians are killed, arrested, and tortured for political dissent. Also, civil society is openly targeted for raising the issue of human rights abuse and is subject to travel bans (Human Rights Watch, 2017). While the Egyptian government has a zero-tolerance policy towards dissent and brutally attacks civilians, the U.S. continues to provide a large amount of aid to Egypt. This is due to the strategic relationship between the two countries. Egypt is an important to United States national security for various reasons. First, it controls the Suez Canal, an important route of the world Oil supply. Second, it plays an important role in Middle East peace process since it is one of the two countries that made peace with Israel. Finally, it has a strong influence in the Arab world and any cultural or political change in Egypt will spread to the region (Rogin 2014; Dougherty 2013; Dunne and Kagan, 2011).

Similarly, Israel is another strategically important country for the United States. It is important to US for reasons including its shared democratic values. It is a weak states that is surrounded by enemies mainly dictatorial regimes, it has a strong Israeli lobby in the United States and more importantly, it provides intelligence sharing to the US regarding Middle Eastern affairs (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006; Lockie 2017) . Such a strong U.S.-Israeli strategic partnership allows for continued aid allocation to Israel in spite of its repeated human rights abuses (Sharp, 2014). In both Egypt and Israel's cases, the leaders are fully aware of their strategic importance to the U.S. and have no or few incentives to substitute invisible rights violations for visible ones (White House 2017, 2019). Hence, they are likely to violate rights and there is no substitution effect.

In contrast, when a recipient is strategically less important to the donor they have little or no bargaining leverage and aid sanctions remain a credible threat. So, upon violation the recipient is likely to be targeted for their repressive policies. A good example is that of post-genocide Rwanda where the key donor, the United Kingdom (U.K.), was disappointed with Paul Kagame's human rights records and the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) suspended its support and eventually curtailed foreign aid as a consequence for Kagame's repression of his citizens (McDoom, 2013). With respect to the Rwandan aid suspension, Esarey and De Meritt (2016) concluded that the United Kingdom's reaction to Kagame's rights violations would have been different and there would not have been aid suspension if the Kagame's regime had been strategically important to the United Kingdom. Thus, by this logic, I expect that US aid recipient leader of states that are of less strategic importance to the US are more likely to substitute invisible rights violations for visible rights violations. However, aid recipient leaders of high strategic importance are less likely to substitute human rights abuses. Overall, this leads me to posit:

H2a: In states of lower levels of strategic importance to the aid donor, there is a lower probability of visible human rights abuses (killings) and a higher probability of invisible human rights abuses (disappearances).

H2b: In states with higher levels of strategic importance to the aid donor, there is no differential effect across types of human rights abuses.

4.3. Research Design

To empirically test the relationship between aid and substitution of rights abuse, I analyze a cross-national, annual time-series dataset of autocracies that contains information on aid, rights abuse, and control variables from the years 1981-2010. I examine the effect of US aid on strategic shifts from visible (killings) to invisible (forced disappearances) rights violations.

4.3.1. Dependent Variable

The key dependent variable is the level of forced disappearances. Though other rights violations such as political imprisonment and torture are equally important to examine, the reason I chose disappearances is because of the (lack of) accountability mechanism associated with them. As such, leaders are likely to engage in disappearances because with this the leader faces a lower risk of criminal or political accountability for their involvement in disappearances compared to torture and imprisonment.

To measure disappearances, I used data from the CIRI human rights dataset (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The disappearances variable ranges from 0 to 2. Zero (0) represents frequent instances (50+) of forced disappearances in that country in a given year. One (1) represents occasional instances (1-49) and two (2) represents no instances occurring in that country in a given year. As a robustness check, I use change from previous year in forced disappearances as an alternate dependent variable. Following Payne and Abouharb (2016), the variable “change in forced disappearances” ranges from -2 to +2. Negative two (-2) indicates change from full respect to frequent violations (50+), which I define as major worsening in disappearances. Negative one (-1) indicates change from no violations (0) to some violations (1-49), which I define as minor worsening of disappearances. Zero (0) indicates no change in disappearances. Positive One (+1) indicates a change from frequent to occasional or occasional to no violations, which is defined as minor improvement of disappearances. Positive two (+2) indicates change from frequent violations to no violations and is defined as major improvement of disappearances.

4.3.2. Independent Variables

The main independent variable is the interaction of the following two variables: Amount of aid received by the recipient in millions of constant 2016 U.S. dollars and the change in killing.

An interaction term is a good way to test the substitution argument because the leader as a rational actor not only assesses the cost and benefit of repression but acts strategically in choosing the type of repression. Aid conditions for human rights improvements or human rights norm proliferation affect the leader's repression calculus (Payne and Abouharb, 2016 p.164-165). Thus, this measure provides a clear test of the argument that US aid affects the cost and benefit analysis of states' choice of repressive instruments: Killings versus forced disappearances. Based on this argument, I expect that both the presence of US aid and an observed decrease in killings are correlated with increases in forced disappearances.

The data on U.S. aid comes from the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Green Book), which is a standard source for this data. It contains both military and economic assistance. Military assistance is "foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability" (USAID, 2016, p. 7). Economic assistance is "foreign aid for programs with a development or humanitarian objective (USAID, 2016 p.2). There is a high variation in amounts of U.S. aid received by the recipients which causes skewness. Following others, I deal with this by using the natural log of total aid received (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007).⁹⁸

The variable "change in killing" is from the CIRI human rights dataset (CIRI et al. 2014). To create this variable, I used the same method as for change in forced disappearances. The variable Change in Killing ranges from -2 to +2, and is similar to the change in disappearances variable. Negative two (-2) indicates change from full respect to frequent violations (50+), -1

⁹⁸ In addition to the variable of total aid used in the paper, I run models using only military aid and only economic aid. The reason for running separate models for military and economic aid is that I expect that military aid should never lead to substitution, because military aid is almost always going to a strategically important place. On the other hand, economic aid might go to both strategically important and not strategically important states so there is more likely to be substitution when aid goes to not strategically important recipients. The results are presented in the Appendix.

indicates change from no violation (0) to some violations (1-49), +1 indicates a change from frequent to occasional or occasional to no violations, and +2 indicates change from frequent violations to no violations and is defined as major improvement of rights.

Next, to capture the strategic importance of the recipient to the U.S., I rely on Bell et al.'s (2016) measure of salience. Bell et al. (2016) identify four factors crucial to security salience, including whether a state: (1) is located near a U.S. rival, (2) is a location of leftist rebellions, (3) is a location for a Marxist government, or (4) is the location of a conflict in which the U.S. is directly involved. They then create a measure of salience by using minimum distance to any of these cases using data from the C-Shapes data set (Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch, 2010). This helps to determine the absolute minimum distance between each state in the system and the nearest U.S. rival, Marxist state, leftist rebellion, or U.S.-involved conflict. This distance, which is labeled as strategic distance, is used as a proxy for strategic importance of the state. Countries with low strategic distance are highly important to the U.S., whereas countries with high strategic distance are of less strategic importance to the U.S. If a state has any of the four attributes of salience (U.S. rival, Marxist state, leftist rebellion, and U.S. involved conflict), its strategic distance is 0, otherwise the number is greater than 0. I use strategic importance to split the sample between high and low strategically important countries. I split the sample to avoid a three way interaction term, which is difficult to interpret. As such, I use 0 as a cut-off indicating that countries with a value of 0 are of high strategic importance to the US and countries with a value greater than 0 are of low security salience. Based on hypothesis 2, I expect that U.S. aid to recipients with low strategic salience is more likely to result in substitution compared to aid recipients with high strategic salience.

Finally, following the literature on both aid and repression, I add a set of controls that may affect both human rights abuses and aid. First, I control for population and GDP per capita since both indicators affect human rights abuse. Leaders in populous countries have a higher likelihood of targeting civilians (Henderson, 1993). Similarly, economic development affect welfare and human security (Chang and Raza 2018).⁹⁹ As such, developed countries are less likely to violate civilian's rights because civilians in such countries are more satisfied, thus elites are less likely to rely on repression (Poe and Tate, 1994). I use the World Bank data to measure both population and GDP per capita. Further, to avoid skewness of both variables, I use the natural log of both of these variable in the analysis. I also control for political instability because it is likely to increase human rights abuses (Wintrobe, 1998). For political instability, I use the Arthur Banks cross-sectional time-series data on dissent (Banks, 2011). In addition to that, I also control for civil war using UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data set (Gleditsch et al. 2002). I start with the conflict-year data set, identifying all civil wars with more than twenty-five battle death, and generate a dummy variable to show whether a country in that year experienced a civil war or not.

Similarly, I control for interstate war using UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data set (Gleditsch et al. 2002). I start with the conflict-year data set, identifying all interstate wars with more than one thousand battle related deaths, and generate a dummy variable to indicate whether a country in each year experienced an interstate war or not. Furthermore, the presence of terrorism is likely to increase the leader's choice of abusing human rights (Piazza and Walsh, 2009). To control for that I measure the number of terrorist attacks in each country in a given year using the Global Terrorism Database data (START, 2013). The Global Terrorism Database measures terror

⁹⁹ Economic development affects welfare that includes human security. For some economic policies and their effect on social welfare, please see Chang and Raza (2021a) and Chang and Raza (2021b).

attack events, and includes both domestic and international terror attacks in a state. US troop deployment is another factor that may affect human rights violations. Bell et al. (2016) suggest US troop deployments decrease the likelihood of rights violation in host countries. The data for US troop deployment is from Bell et al. (2016). Further, controlling for other types of rights abuses (torture and political imprisonment) is important, since previous studies show countries violating one type of rights are likely to violate other type of rights as well (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999). Finally, I included a lagged dependent variable in all the models and expect that previous year's rights respect is positively related to the current year's level.

4.4. Model Selection

Given the possibility that allocation of US aid might depend on the recipients' respect for human rights, I utilize an instrumental variable estimator. Following Bell et al. (2016), I instrument aid with two variables. First, I use the distance of the recipient from the U.S., using data from C-Shapes (Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch, 2010). Secondly, I measure whether the state is a U.S. ally or not in that year, based on the information from the Correlates of War International Military Alliance data (Gibler, 2009). These two variables, as important predictors of U.S. aid, should not be related to human rights abuse (Bell et al. 2016). Before using the instruments, I run Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests in the first-stage model and based on the results (significant Durbin and Wu-Hausman) I reject the null hypothesis that US aid is exogenous and suggest that the use of instruments is valid. Further, the first-stage model with both instruments has a high eigenvalue statistic indicating that the instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous variable, US aid. Finally, insignificant Saran and Basman tests indicate that the instruments are not correlated with the error term. Overall, this suggest that instruments are valid.

A common instrumental variable estimator approach used is a two-stage least square (2SLS). The two-stage least square approach is mainly used for models where both the outcome and explanatory variables are continuous. The first stage in two-stage least square is a linear regression of the explanatory variable on the instrument variables, whereas the second stage is the linear regression of the outcome variable on the predicted values from explanatory variable from the first stage. This approach works best for causal effects when all relationships are linear (Palmer et al. 2008). It is not accurate to use the linear regression when an outcome variable is binary or ordinal. As such, an outcome variable in this paper (human rights violations) is ordinal and a more accurate model is needed to address endogeneity.

The health economics and health services literature provides guidance to deal with an endogeneity bias for various reasons. First, research questions in the health economics field mainly rely on observational data which could potentially lead to omitted confounding variables, simultaneity between explanatory and outcome, and errors in regression covariates. Secondly, health economics often uses non-linear regression models because these models are appropriate for limited dependent variables (Terza et al. 2008; Palmer et al. 2008, Palmer et al. 2017). For example, the research in health economics seeks to answer the following questions: What is the effect of treatment (number of visits to the hospital) on substance abuse? In this case substance abuse (Y) is an ordinal variable (did the drug abuse get worse, stay the same, get better but did not stop, or get better by quitting drug use). The instrumental variable approach (two-stage predictor substitution) is used in such studies because of selection issues. As such, studies examining substance abuse treatment find clients improve over the course of treatment and improve more if stay longer. However, other studies suggest sick clients starting treatment improved over time without treatment. So, in that case motivated patients continue to receive treatment and it is the

motivation of the patient not the length of treatment that has an effect on the substance abuse treatment (Lu and McGuire, 2002). Besides the omitted confounding variable, others have discussed the simultaneity between the explanatory and outcome variable. For example, Wells et al. (1992) argue that clients who are severely sick are also likely to get more treatment.

This paper raises a similar question: How has US aid affected human rights violations? The parallel with drug abuse and treatment cases regards the presence of endogeneity and the ordinal nature of the outcome variable. To answer this question, standard logistic instrumental variable estimators, often called two-stage predictor substitution (TSPS), are applied in this paper. The specification detailed in Palmer et al. (2017) is as follows:

$$\text{Stage 1: } X = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Z + \varepsilon_1, \quad \varepsilon_1 \sim N(0, \sigma_1^2) \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Stage 2: } h(E[Y]) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \hat{X} \quad (2)$$

X is the endogenous variable, the allocation of US aid, Z is the instrument and ε is the error term which is normally distributed with the variance σ_1^2 . Y represents the outcome variable and is a link function which connects the mean of dependent variable to the linear predictors in the model. This function helps to make the expected values of a response linear and expected variance homogenous (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989; Bolker et al. 2008; McCullagh 1980, p.115-116). $\hat{X}$ is the predicted values from the first stage. α_0 and β_0 are the models estimated parameters. (Palmer et al. 2017, p. 1104-1105).

In order to estimate the two-stage predictor substitution (TSPS), in first stage I estimate a linear regression model regressing the endogenous variable (US aid) on the instrumental variables (US ally, US distance) and generate predicted values. In the second stage, I run the ordinal logistic regression of the outcome (Human rights violations) on the predicted values of the explanatory variable (US aid) from the first stage as an independent variable and all other exogenous variables.

This model allows us to control for potential endogeneity and produce unbiased and efficient estimates which otherwise would not have been done with the linear regression instrument variable estimation.


4.4. Results

Overall, the results support Hypothesis 2. In general, autocratic regimes do not appear to substitute visible rights violations for invisible ones upon receiving aid. However, it appears that the substitution effect does occur in countries that are less strategically important to the US.

In all the models, as explained earlier in the research design, I am using an interaction term (US aid and change in killings) to analyze the substitution of rights violations. Table 1 presents the results for the first set of models that test the first hypothesis, examining the substitution effect in aid recipients by using the level of forced disappearances (Model 1-3), and the change in forced disappearances (Model 4) as dependent variables. Model 1 presents the results of a model without any controls. As shown here, the interaction term has no significant effect on the level of disappearances. Model 2 adds some conventional controls and results remain the same. Model 3 includes all variables from Model 2 and adds other controls which are likely to affect the hypothesized relationship. The results of this model do not provide support for the hypothesized relationship either. Model 4 presents the results where the dependent variable is change in disappearances and the results are consistent with the main findings. The results of all these models do not provide strong support for Hypothesis 1, that US aid recipients are more likely to substitute extrajudicial killing for forced disappearances. The coefficient of the interaction term of Model 3 indicates that aid recipients are likely to substitute extrajudicial killings for forced disappearances, however it is not statistically significant. Figure 1 presents a coefficient plot

showing the coefficients with 95% confidence intervals around them for the variables included in Model 3 (where the dependent variable is levels of disappearances).

Figure 4.1. Coefficient plot of ordinal logit regression equation of Model 1 showing level of significance at 95% CI



In these models, change in killings coefficients are positive but not statistically significant. The US aid coefficients are positive but not statistically significant, while the interaction term is negative and not statistically significant at the 5% level. To interpret the substitution between killings and forced disappearances in aid recipients, it is important to plot the marginal effects, which is done in Figure 2 (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).¹⁰⁰ In this figure, the x-axis is the change in killings variable, where low values such as -2 indicate worsening of killings (more

¹⁰⁰ It is difficult to plot the marginal effect in an ordinal logit model of 2 stage predictor substitution where the outcome variable is an ordinal, thus I am plotting the marginal effect using OLS. The results of both ordinal logit model and OLS are same and are presented in appendix.

killings) and high values such as +2 indicate improvement in killings (less killings) in an aid recipient nation. The y-axis is the marginal effect of one unit increase in the natural log of US aid on the levels of disappearances. The solid line plots the marginal effect across different levels of killings, and the shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval around the marginal effect. The figure indicates that, when a state sees an improvement in killings, then an increase in the US aid leads to increased disappearances. Though the marginal effect of US aid is negatively associated with the levels of disappearances, this effect does not attain statistical significance.


Table 4.1. Provision of US Aid and the substitution of killing on the level of forced disappearance for autocracies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Levels of Dis	Levels of Dis	Levels of Dis	Changes in Dis
	Excludes	Adds Conventional	Adds All	
	Controls	Controls	Controls	
Change in Killing* Aid	-0.127 (0.261)	-0.138 (0.257)	-0.596* (0.309)	-0.0973* (0.0589)
Change in Killings (lagged)	2.205 (4.400)	2.323 (4.317)	9.910* (5.205)	1.612 (0.992)
US Aid	0.261 (0.345)	0.0639 (0.369)	-0.846* (0.438)	-0.156* (0.0940)
Population		-0.0234 (0.0496)	0.210*** (0.0752)	0.0480*** (0.0175)
GDP		0.0319 (0.0619)	0.153** (0.0773)	0.0297* (0.0176)
Civil War		-2.228*** (0.135)	-0.929*** (0.192)	-0.337*** (0.0630)
Interstate War		-0.258 (0.317)	0.575 (0.534)	0.145* (0.0860)
Strikes			0.357* (0.193)	0.101* (0.0579)
Demonstration			-0.0785 (0.0485)	-0.0196* (0.0118)
Guerilla Warfare			-0.580*** (0.224)	-0.196*** (0.0652)
Government Crises			-0.564* (0.324)	-0.157 (0.105)
Terrorism			0.298* (0.169)	0.0698* (0.0364)
Oil Rent			-0.00424 (0.00635)	-0.00171 (0.00138)
Strategic Distance			-0.0000376 (0.0000466)	-0.00000701 (0.0000107)
US troops			0.0000755 (0.00946)	-0.000150 (0.00178)
Change in Killings			-0.311* (0.164)	-0.0594 (0.0380)
Political Imprisonment			0.542*** (0.142)	0.103*** (0.0277)
Killings			1.484***	0.368***

			(0.210)	(0.0517)
Torture			0.422**	0.0509*
			(0.167)	(0.0295)
Disappearances (lagged)			-0.0871	-1.013***
			(0.158)	(0.0326)
Constant	0.0404	0.0185	0.0139	2.766*
	(0.0412)	(0.0547)	(0.0963)	(1.618)
N	1644	1417	901	901
ρ				0
Log Likelihood	-1427.1	-1037.4	-583.0	
χ^2	2.767	320.3	414.3	3119.4

Standard errors in parentheses * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Figure 4.2. Marginal Effect of US aid (ln) on Disappearances (95 percent confidence interval).



As for controls, most of the control variables are consistent with previous studies. Civil war and political instability increase forced disappearances. States with higher GDP are less likely to be repressive. For integrity rights, it is consistent with previous research that shows

improvement in one type of rights improving other type of rights as well. For the strategic distance variable, it shows that as the country become less strategic important it is likely to perform better in rights since it is likely that the international community may intervene or impose sanctions for humanitarian reasons. The US troop deployment variable indicates that countries with US troops are likely to perform better in terms of human rights and this finding is consistent with Bell et al. (2016) suggesting US troop deployments increase respect for human rights. However, few controls behaved unexpectedly such as presence of terrorism, and interstate war indicate that people are less likely to be disappeared, however none of these are statistically significant. One possible explanation is that countries experiencing terrorist attack and interstate war are more likely to experience killings than disappearances. Also, increased population indicate improvement in disappearances and the coefficient is statistically significant. This finding does not support previous literature.

Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 in Table 2 allow me to assess whether the strategic importance of the recipient nations conditions the substitution effect. To test hypothesis 2, I split the sample into two categories, one with low strategic importance and another one with high strategic importance. I place the countries with strategic distance of zero in a category of high strategic importance and other countries with strategic distance greater than zero are in a sample of low strategically important countries. I split the sample to avoid a difficult to interpret three-way interaction. Models 5 and 6 (levels of disappearances and change in disappearances as dependent variable) suggest aid recipients of less strategic importance are more likely to substitute forced disappearance for extrajudicial killings. Particularly, it indicates that US aid in less strategically important countries improves killings records, but the likelihood of disappearances increases. As described earlier, the substitution in repression helps the repressive regime to continue benefiting

from disappearances while avoiding the cost of international shaming and sanctions. In these models, the coefficients for the change in killings variable are positive and statistically significant. The US aid coefficients are negative and statistically significant. As for the interaction term, it is negative and statistically significant. Models 7 and 8 (levels of disappearances and change in disappearances as dependent variable) representing the substitution effect of extrajudicial killings for disappearances in high strategic importance countries indicate the absence of substitution. The coefficients of both models are not statistically significant.


Table 4.2. Provision of US Aid and the substitution of killing on the level of forced disappearance based on strategic Importance

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Low Strategic Importance		High Strategic Importance	
	Levels of Dis	Changes in Dis	Levels of Dis	Changes in Dis
Change in Killing* Aid	-1.041** (0.515)	-0.230** (0.114)	-0.347 (0.398)	-0.040 (0.053)
Change in Killings (lagged)	17.49** (8.656)	3.868** (1.907)	5.577 (6.715)	0.617 (0.907)
US Aid	-1.241** (0.627)	-0.251* (0.153)	-0.493 (0.552)	-0.035 (0.104)
Population	0.224** (0.090)	0.044** (0.019)	0.107 (0.125)	0.029 (0.029)
GDP per capita	0.119 (0.097)	0.031 (0.022)	0.207 (0.158)	0.028 (0.034)
Strikes	0.186 (0.214)	0.043 (0.073)	1.487** (0.612)	0.214*** (0.067)
Demonstrations	-0.037 (0.055)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.164 (0.146)	-0.040 (0.028)
Guerilla warfare	-0.515* (0.279)	-0.163** (0.081)	-1.409** (0.615)	-0.320** (0.154)
Government Crises	-1.417*** (0.403)	-0.481*** (0.123)	1.056 (0.848)	0.147 (0.103)
Civil War	-0.885*** (0.269)	-0.346*** (0.083)	-0.907** (0.422)	-0.282** (0.120)
Interstate War	0.462 (0.595)	0.123 (0.093)	0.765 (0.612)	0.234* (0.121)
Terrorism	0.328 (0.226)	0.090** (0.044)	0.254 (0.322)	0.010 (0.068)
Oil rent	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.003* (0.001)	0.008 (0.010)	0.001 (0.002)
Strategic Distance	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
US Troops	0.004 (0.020)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.002)
Change in Killings	-0.336* (0.201)	-0.043 (0.041)	-0.161 (0.309)	-0.042 (0.065)
Political Imprisonment	0.610*** (0.188)	0.106*** (0.033)	0.580** (0.253)	0.106** (0.047)
Killings	1.525*** (0.232)	0.352*** (0.053)	1.427*** (0.413)	0.349*** (0.093)

Torture	0.551** (0.226)	0.057 (0.035)	0.111 (0.281)	-0.003 (0.054)
Disappearances (lagged)	-0.156 (0.212)	-1.005*** (0.041)	0.043 (0.241)	-1.010*** (0.046)
Constant	0.171 (0.195)	4.454* (2.550)	1.70e-31 (7.28e-31)	1.065 (1.987)
N	591	591	310	310
Log Likelihood	-372.2		-190.1	
χ^2	273.4	1839.4	183.6	2116.6

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure 4.3. Marginal Effect of US Aid (ln) on Disappearances, Low Strategic Importance, and High strategic Importance (95 percent confidence interval)



Further, to interpret the substitution effect and statistical significance of killings for forced disappearances in aid recipients of low and high strategic importance, it is important to present the results graphically, which is done in Figure 3 (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). In this figure, the x-axis is the change in killings variable, where low values such as -2 indicate worsening of killings (more killings) and high values such as +2 indicate improvement in killings (less killings) in an aid recipient nation. The y-axis is the marginal effect of one unit increase in the natural log of US aid on the levels of disappearances. The solid line plots the marginal effect across different

levels of killings, and the shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval around the marginal effect. The figure indicates that when a state is showing an improvement in killings, an increase in aid leads to increased disappearances for strategically less important countries and the effect is statistically significant. However, US aid recipients of high strategic importance show no substitution effect. Hence, these findings support Hypothesis 2 that in states with lower levels of strategic interest, leaders receiving aid are more likely to substitute rights violations.

As for controls, they behave similarly to the way they do in Models 1 and 2. As such, civil war and instability increases forced disappearances. Increase in GDP, presence of US troops, and improvement in other rights decreases forced disappearances. Unexpectedly, increases in terrorism and interstate war suggest that forced disappearances decrease but coefficients are not statically significant. Also, increase in population suggest that likelihood of disappearances decreases which is contrary to previous literature.

4.5. Conclusion

Human rights violations, specifically visible rights violations, in autocratic regimes are highlighted both by domestic human rights organizations and the international community, thus pressuring repressive governments to decrease their human rights violations. The US and the international community are involved in improving human rights violation through different mechanisms including aid; despite this fact rights violations are still a concern. There is a theoretical reason to believe that an aid recipient is likely to improve rights abuses, since it does not want to lose free resources. However, an autocratic leader who comes to power through force is also not going to fully respect human rights at the cost of his position. As a rational actor, the recipient leader does not want to lose aid because it helps to provide benefits to its winning coalitions so as to retain their support, and thus to avoid aid sanctions a rational leader shows

improvement in rights violation. In such a situation, the recipient is likely to substitute rights violations, particularly from visible right violations to invisible ones. However, the substitution of rights violations gets complex when the strategic importance of a country is considered. In this case, only those recipients that are less strategically important to the US will be substituting rights violations and substitution effect does not occur in strategically important countries.

The empirical findings suggest an interesting relationship between the aid recipient and the substitution of extra-judicial killings for forced disappearances. As such, the findings of the overall sample do not provide strong support for the argument that in states receiving aid, the recipient leaders are likely to substitute violations of visible rights for violations of invisible rights. However, splitting the sample to strategically less and more important countries indicate that when strategically less important countries are substituting extra judicial killings for forced disappearances. Whereas, in strategically important ones, aid has no effect on the substitution of rights violations. These findings contribute to the literature on interaction between US foreign policy and human rights particularly aid and human rights literature. Previous studies examined the mechanism of aid allocation based on human rights and the changes in rights abuses, and this work brings the substitution effect in rights violations and more specifically considering recipient strategic importance. Besides contribution to literature, this study could help policy makers to consider more nuanced behavior of autocratic regimes.

Further work on this issue is needed. A study should be conducted that examines how differences among autocratic regimes respond to substitution effect since literature on autocracies suggest differences exist among autocracies and single party regimes are better in human rights than military and personalist regimes. So, for example, we may also find single party regime are less likely to substitute than its counterparts. Also, it could be extended to a global sample of aid

recipients including democracies, and anocracies to examine how differences occur across different polities. This paper did not study democracies and anocracies because it requires a different theoretical framework to study the use of aid. Besides that, another possible extension is to examine whether substitution effect exist in the OECD aid recipient or is limited to US aid recipients.

Finally, there should be some research done on the invisible rights violation since such violations are rising in the world and has been report by human rights activists. However, the problem is only one indicator of invisible rights violation (forced disappearances through CIRI) is available, but further work could be done on creating invisible human rights index by taking in account a broad measure including disappearances, clean torture, and rape etc. Data on this index could be collected through the collaboration of non-governmental organizations and human right activist working on each country. Such an effort to create a broad measure of invisible rights index will help scholars of political violence to analyze and unfold the improvement of both visible and invisible rights.

Chapter 5 - The Effect of Terrorism on Human Rights Violations in Democracies

Since 2001, in the pursuit of the “War on Terror,” Pakistan (under the autocratic leadership of President Pervaiz Musharraf) has seen an increase in the violation of human rights, ranging from physical integrity to empowerment rights. For instance, forced disappearances of Baloch Nationalists, Sindhi parties and Shia Muslims have become commonplace. Moreover, members of the political opposition are detained, arbitrarily arrested, or killed, and their families threatened when seeking out information about them. On top of this, political parties, media, and civil society are not allowed to raise concerns regarding human rights violations. Journalists and civil society members are abducted and threatened for reporting disappearances (Amnesty International, 2006).

Similarly, India, the world’s largest democracy, passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2002 and uses POTA as justification for violating the human rights of its citizens. For instance, Vaiyapuri Gopalsamy, known as Vaiko, an opposition leader from Tamil Nadu, became the target of political victimization and was arrested for over a year without any charges being filed against him. Similarly, women and children in tribal areas such as Jharkand were detained without any charges and many Muslims in the Gujrat state became the victims of POTA as well through anti-Muslim riots (Mehta, 2004).

These two examples show how terrorism can lead to repression, since leaders can use it as a key motivation to control citizens; however, domestic institutional factors affect the shape that repression takes. Given the established link between democratic institutions and human rights practices, many scholars argue that democratic institution discourage human rights violations because of the accountability mechanism, however autocratic regimes are more likely to engage in repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport and Armstrong 2004).

Surprisingly, despite a plethora of research on human rights, regime type's conditioning effect on leader uses of repression in response to terrorism has received very limited theoretical attention from human rights scholars and practitioners; there are no empirical studies examining regime type's conditioning effect on leader uses of repression in response to terrorist attacks.¹⁰¹ Does regime type, democracy versus autocracy, condition the effect of terrorism on human rights violations? The literature fail to address this question and thus provides little guidance to scholars and practitioners interested in improving human right conditions in the wake of terrorism.

This paper seeks to fill this gap in the human rights literature and offers an answer to this question. It argues that regime type is an important determinant of how states will achieve their goal of repressing citizens in the wake of terrorism. Whether a leader curtails all rights or specific rights in response to terrorist attacks truly depends on the institutions of the country, as seen in the above two cases. In particular, I argue that autocracies already engage in rights violations, thus terrorist attacks do not make a big difference in terms of their engagement in rights violations. In contrast, democracies usually have better human rights records, but terrorist incidents make it possible for democratic regimes to curtail physical integrity rights because it is a policy that can be targeted towards a particular group. Democratic leaders are not punished by their publics for their physical integrity rights violations because their policies signal to the masses that repression is aimed at a certain group.

As an example, Israel, a consolidated democracy in the Middle East, has been engaged in the integrity rights violations of the Palestinian minority (Amnesty International 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2019). On March 30, 2018 the Palestinians arranged a protest referred to as “Great March of Return and the breaking of the siege” in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and during

¹⁰¹ An exception of such work in human rights literature is by Blankenship, 2016.

the protests Israeli soldiers violated physical integrity rights by killing Palestinian protesters. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights Council's report indicates that Israeli soldiers killed 183 protesters using live ammunition and hundreds were injured, including children and disabled people (UNCHR, 2019). The Israeli leadership did not face significant backlash from its citizens because violating the physical integrity rights of Palestinians does not threaten the physical integrity rights of Israelis, and in fact, the Israeli population sees itself as being threatened by Palestinian terror.

I further argue that when it comes to empowerment rights, leaders in democratic regimes are unable to violate empowerment rights with impunity because their citizens are often intolerant of empowerment rights violation. This is mainly because empowerment violations are more likely to directly affect all citizens (unlike minority repression) by taking away their freedoms. Overall, I find support for this argument using a data set that covers terrorism and government respect for human rights from 1980-2010.

5.1. Literature Review: Internal and External Threats as Causes of Repression

Scholarly work on repression has analyzed various factors, including internal and external, contributing to repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Keith 1999, Davenport 2000; Walsh and Piazza 2009, 2010; Hafner-Burton and Shapiro 2010; Dreher et al. 2011; Finch 2016). One of the internal factors affecting repression is institutional constraints. Regimes with fewer institutional constraints are more likely to engage in repressive behavior because of the absence of accountability mechanisms. This is particularly true in autocratic regimes where leaders come into power through force and often stay in power for decades. Autocratic leaders face less accountability and thus are likely to use repression to deter elite and mass dissent (Davenport, 2000). In contrast, democratic

leaders come to power through elections and face more accountability for their actions. To prevent punishment, democratic leaders are less likely to engage in human rights violations (Poe and Tate, 1994). Besides that, states are willing to violate the norms of respecting human rights when the stakes are higher. For example, studies find a strong relationship between government involvement in war and repression. As such, during both interstate and civil wars, the government is likely to be repressive to contain internal challenges (Rasler 1986; Stohl 1975; Poe et al. 1999).

In addition to that, states facing terrorist threats are likely to violate human rights. Repression helps to prevent terrorism in two ways; first, reducing civil liberties such as protection against surveillance decreases the hurdles anti-terrorist agencies face while involved in domestic intelligence activities to uncover terrorist activity. Secondly, infringement of civil liberties makes it harder for the terrorists to conduct the attack. Most terrorists find less restrictive environments more conducive to the spread of terrorism because it allows them to recruit more people and better organize. For instance, it is much easier for terrorist groups to recruit people who are aggrieved, poor, and are politically alienated through various platforms when there is freedom of movement, association, and expression.

Moreover, such freedom allows terrorists to easily coordinate attacks and target large populations (Schmid 1993; Dragu, 2011; Freedman et al. 1986; Freeman 2003; Brinkley 2003; Stone 2004; Piazza and Walsh 2009; Chenoweth 2013). The legal and policy literatures argue that the government restriction of human rights in response to terrorist attack is based on the security-liberty trade-off that shows the ‘contestability of rights’ where liberties conflict with other values (Holmes 2001; Ishay 2004; Rosen 2004; Ignatieff 2004; Walsh and Piazza 2010; Sniderman et al. 1996). The state may sincerely believe in protecting and committing to human rights, but the state is also committed to providing protections to its populace (Davis and Silver, 2004). For example,

to provide security, state rely on counter-terror measures that are preemptive in nature but at the same time, the counter-terror measures undermine promotion of human rights. (Posner, 2006a).

Besides that, government use of harsh repression in response to terrorism affects terrorist incidence. In particular, through a backlash effect, potential terrorist group sympathizers are more likely be radicalized and easily recruited when they receive information about government counterterrorism uses of scarring torture, which is both visible and less deniable than stealth torture (Daxecker, 2015). Besides scarring torture, government reliance on gendarmerie forces (police forces with military characteristics) to deal with terrorism is likely to affect terrorist attacks. In countries where gendarmerie forces engaged in repression, local communities are more likely to feel alienated from the government. This thus causes an anti-state sentiment and allows terrorist groups to recruit people thus increases terrorist incidents (Kirisci 2019).

Scholars argue that regime type condition the effect of government repression on terrorist incidents. Democratic regimes using coercive techniques to deter terrorism are more likely to cause backlash thus lengthen the duration of terrorist organization and decreases government success in countering terrorism. This occur in democracies because harsh measures use by government reduces regime legitimacy and decreases support from local communities thus allowing terrorist to engage in recruitment and radicalization of potential supporters (Daxecker and Hess 2013).

5.2. Terrorism and Rights Violation

The literature on human rights violations is clear that regime type affects human rights violations. As such, the scholarly work points out that autocracies are more likely to violate human rights than their democratic counterparts (Davenport 1999, 2004, 2007b, Davenport and Armstrong 2004, Poe and Tate 1994, Poe et al., 1999). One of the main reasons for such autocratic

behavior is the regime's winning coalition size. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) argue that an autocratic regime has a smaller winning coalition, and in order to stay in power, the leader buys off the winning coalition by providing private goods. When an autocrat pursues a policy of repression he or she has no one to hold them accountable because members of the winning coalition do not want to lose their incentives. Further, through repression the incumbent leader is not only protecting the regime but is also protecting the winning coalition's interests, so they have no incentive to hold the leader accountable. However, such a mechanism of buying off the winning coalition is absent in democracies for various reasons. First, winning coalitions in democracies are usually larger, which makes it impossible for the leader to incentivize them through private good provision because of limited resources. Secondly, leaders in democratic regimes come to power through free and fair elections, suggesting that most of the population is not excluded from the decision making process and thus can hold the leader accountable if he or she engages in repression. This in turns makes it costly for the leader to engage in human rights violations.

Now, the question is whether democratic regimes always respect human rights or whether their respect for rights varies based on the circumstances. As such, this project explores how democracies respond to human rights in the wake of terrorism. There are anecdotal reasons to suspect that terrorist attacks in democratic regimes are likely to affect human rights practices. For instance, less than a month after the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1373 (conventions on terrorism), the Bush administration submitted draft legislation to Congress to expand its power to surveil, investigate and detain suspected terrorists.¹⁰² On October 26, 2001,

¹⁰² UN Security Council Resolution 1373 is a counter-terror measure, which urged all states to collaborate to combat terrorism and called countries to adjust national laws to ratify international terrorism conventions. It also stressed respecting and protecting human rights and humanitarian law. For details, see UN Security Council Resolution 1373 https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf

the US congress passed the USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act of 2001. The PATRIOT Act permits the government to conduct surveillance and searches of citizens without satisfying a probable cause, thus justifying state repression through the breach of civil liberties for national security or counter-terrorism purposes (The US department of Justice, 2001). The passing of this act indicates that international terrorism incentivizes leaders to violate human rights, an action that in turns helps them to contain terrorist attacks (Liptak, 2011). Similarly, France in the wake of terrorist attacks engaged in physical integrity rights abuses. Human rights organizations reported that French security and military personnel were engaged in torturing terror suspects after November 2015 Paris attacks (US Department of State, 2018; Human Rights Watch 2016).

Anti-terror legislation affecting human rights protections is not limited to democracies in the developed world. According to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, after the September 11 attacks, democratic and autocratic regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America introduced counter-terror legislations. This legislation provided governments the justification to violate human rights. As such, anti-terror laws help leaders to silence their political opponents and label anyone who poses a threat to the leadership as a terrorist (Whitaker, 2007). For example, India, the largest democracy in Asia, passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2002. This act allowed the Indian government to curtail individual rights by giving the government powers to restrict rights, and respond to terrorist attacks by increasing physical integrity right violations (Krishnan, 2004).

The above-mentioned cases suggest that the presence of terrorist attacks in democracies leads to the violation of physical integrity rights. But the question is why do democracies, which generally respect human rights, engage in human rights violations in the aftermath of terrorist attacks? There are several parts to the answer.

First, terrorist attacks, a national security concern, can create a state of emergency in the country. For instance, on April 22, 2019 deadly terrorist attacks killed around 250 people in Sri Lanka, a democratic regime in Asia. After the incidents, Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena declared an emergency and announced that Sri Lanka was facing a security threat from terrorist organizations. To counter the challenge, through regulation 19 of the Emergency regulations the government allows for detaining people for suspicious activities without trial for up to one year. Also, during detention, the safeguards provided under the Prisons Ordinance ensuring the health and safety of prisoners are suspended (Amnesty International, 2019). Moreover, Emergency Regulation 20 permits government not to specify where people are being detained and allows the government to engage in torture (Amnesty International, 2019). This shows how emergency declarations provide a way for governments to engage in physical integrity rights abuses, including imprisonment and torture. This is also an illustration of the securitization of the state, where leaders make claims about threats and present them in a form that is accepted by the population. The population's acceptance creates a sense of tolerance for physical integrity right abuses in wake of terrorism. Thus, it allows the leader to move out of the normal politics, where they have to follow rules and regulations, and allows them to address the situation outside of the democratic rules of policy making (Waever, 2004).

This argument is further evidenced by the empirical analyses that examine the effects of terrorism on repression (Piazza and Walsh 2009; Robison 2009; Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2010; Shor et al. 2014; Conrad et al. 2016). Existing work finds that terrorism reduces government respect for physical integrity rights (Walsh and Piazza 2009, Dreher et al. 2010; Robison 2010). Walsh and Piazza (2009) further indicate that among physical integrity rights, disappearances and killings increase more than torture and political imprisonment, because political imprisonment and

torture are visible whereas killings and disappearances are invisible.¹⁰³ Similarly, Conrad et al. (2017) indicate that security institutions, particularly the military, in democratic regimes engage in torture when confronted with terrorism. This discussion indicates an empirical reality that physical integrity rights violations increase in the wake of terrorism.

Secondly, autocratic regimes are usually more likely to engage in human rights violations, both physical integrity rights and empowerment rights violations. Given that they already violate human rights, we are less likely to observe a change in their human rights record after a terrorist attack. However, in the wake of terrorist attacks physical integrity rights violations in democracies become visible because democratic regimes are usually not engaged in physical integrity rights violations.

When it comes to the repercussions of repression, I argue that all governments know that the use of repression in response to terror may actually increase retaliatory terrorism. However, scholarly work indicates that when democracies engage in repression to deter terrorism, it creates a backlash that makes counter terror measures ineffective. The government's reliance on repressive measures reduces its legitimacy and decreases support from local communities. This in turn allow terrorists to engage in recruitment and radicalization of potential supporters (Daxecker and Hess 2013).

Democratic regimes may diminish the size of such a backlash effect, by curtailing of physical integrity rights in a way that targets a particular group. As such, it signals to the majority of citizens that they are not likely to be affected by such a policy. In this situation, the public is less likely to constrain the leader from opting for physical integrity rights violations and thus lead

¹⁰³ Walsh and Piazza (2009) argue that killings are more of an invisible rights violation because killings are hard to detect. In particular, governments engaged in killings are more likely to hide the bodies to avoid blame.

to physical integrity rights abuses in democratic regimes. There are plenty of cases of integrity right violations in democracies where the majority of citizens accept such violations, since they do not pose a direct threat to them.

One example of a democracy reacting not to terrorism, but to another external threat (in this case illegal immigration) is the United States' President Donald Trump's administration detaining immigrant children. The Associated Press reported "Inside an old warehouse in South Texas, hundreds of children wait in a series of cages created by metal fencing. One cage had 20 children inside. Scattered about are bottles of water, bags of chips and large foil sheets intended to serve as blankets" (The Atlantic, 2018). This example indicates how the most powerful democracy of the world, and a human rights champion, is putting the lives of many children at risk by torturing them and by imprisoning them in cages. The United Nations condemned Trump's policy of detaining migrant children in "baby cages" and called such treatment of migrants a form of torture (The Guardian, 2018). As for the reaction of the public, certainly, a specific segment of the population raised concerns for the policy, but many supported it. Those who see illegal immigrants as a threat to them also know that the policy will not affect them because they are not at risk of finding themselves included in this group.

Such integrity rights violations are not limited to the United States; other democratic leaders have engaged in physical integrity rights violations without being punished electorally by their publics because their policies signaled to the masses at large that repression is aimed at a certain group. These targeted groups cannot not hold the leader accountable because in most cases they are not part of the winning coalition or at least not a crucial part of the selectorate (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2012). For instance, India, the largest democracy in the world, has been engaged in the integrity rights violations of Kashmiris (Amnesty International 2018). Indian counter-terror

measures in Kashmir began by restricting political participation and civil liberties, but later counter-terrorism measures focused instead on violating physical integrity rights, including torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and harassment of people living in high-terrorism areas (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Indian leadership did not face significant backlash from its citizens because violating the physical integrity rights of Kashmiris does not threaten the physical integrity rights of the broader Indian population, and in fact, Indians see themselves as being threatened by Kashmiri terror (Beer and Mitchell 2006; Piazza, 2009).

Taken together, these two points, emergency declarations and the government targeting specific groups, imply that terrorist attacks in democracies increase the likelihood of physical integrity rights violations. In general, democracies have always had greater respect for integrity rights. However, after terrorist attacks, the leader's explicit or implicit declaration of a national emergency leads to the securitization of the state. Under this phenomenon, leaders present the reaction to the threat in a way that is acceptable to the citizens by targeting specific outgroups. This thus creates a sense of tolerance, which allows leader to deal with the situation by violating physical integrity rights. In addition to the emergency politics, leaders' focus on targeting only a subgroup of the population through repressive tactics signals to the majority of citizens that they will not be the target of the integrity abuses. This in turn makes them less concerned about violations. This gives a sense of protection to the leader that they will not be held accountable for their abuses. From this argument, I derive the first hypothesis:

H1: In democratic states, as terrorism increases, respect for physical integrity rights will decrease.

The above discussion suggests that democratic regimes are likely to violate physical integrity rights in the wake of terrorist attacks. We also need to consider how regime type,

particularly democratic regime, affects the relationship between terrorism and empowerment rights. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, states, regardless of their institutional nature, have curtailed empowerment rights. For instance, in countering terrorism the Pakistani government restricted freedom of expression and the funding of civil society groups. All international non-governmental organizations and domestic organizations receiving foreign funds were required to obtain prior permission to carry out activities. Further, the media was restricted in its ability to report on human rights violations by the military in its counter-terrorism efforts and the government used a cybercrime bill to censor online content and access users' data without judicial review (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Likewise, after the 9/11 attacks the United States National Security Agency (NSA) spied on and collected data of millions of Americans. The UK's spy agency, MI5, has engaged in tapping fiber-optic cables after the 7/7 London bombings (BBC 2014).


These illustrations suggest that democracies do indeed try to and sometimes succeed in violating empowerment rights along with physical integrity rights. However, democracies tend to be punished by their publics for such actions. It is important to know that many of these surveillance practices remained unknown to the public until a former CIA contractor, Edward Snowden, leaked this information to the media (BBC 2014; The Guardian 2013). Once the information on surveillance became available, it caused furor among citizens and eventually challenged government practices of privacy rights violations (The New York Times, 2017). Later, the European Court on Human Rights ruled that UK practices were unlawful and violated freedom of expression (Amnesty International, 2018). Similarly, the US Supreme Court in *Carpenter v. United States* case rejected the idea that people should surrender their privacy even in times of threat (The Washington Post, 2018).

This indicates that leaders in democratic regimes are unable to violate empowerment rights with impunity because of the broad nature of rights violations and citizens are often intolerant of empowerment rights violation (Cope et al. 2018). This is mainly because empowerment rights violations directly affect everyone in the society by taking away their freedoms (Dreher et al. 2010). Given this intolerance for empowerment rights violations among the citizens and the likelihood of disagreement about restricting these rights arising among policy makers, the leader is more likely to face accountability and be at a higher risk of losing power than one engaged in selective physical integrity rights violation. In the latter case, the public is more likely to be tolerant because of emergency politics and a broader segment of the population being exempted from it. Keeping these consequences in mind, democratic leaders are less likely to engage in curtailing empowerment rights in the wake of terrorism (Dreher et al., 2010, Walsh and Piazza 2009).

The discussion indicates that leaders are willing to engage in curtailing empowerment rights. However, this is not a feasible strategy for the leaders because such a policy choice directly affects all citizens by threatening their privacy and freedom of expression. This in turn makes them hold the leader accountable and is therefore likely to face grave consequences. To avoid consequences like losing power, democratic regimes will be less likely to curtail empowerment rights in response to terrorism. From the given proposition, I derive the following hypothesis:

H2: The effect of terrorism on empowerment rights violations is larger in autocracies than in democracies.

Figure 5.1.Theoretical Framework



The figure indicates that a terrorist attack in a democratic regime leads to two different outcomes in terms of human rights violations. In the wake of terrorist attack, a democratic leader's choice to target a particular group signals to the population at large that repression is aimed at a certain group leads to physical integrity rights violations. However, a democratic leader's choice of targeting all citizens would create a sense of chaos among citizens and thus challenge the leadership. This thus deters the leader from violating empowerment rights.

5.3. Research Design

To test the above hypotheses, I use a time series data set with the country year as the unit of analysis that includes information on integrity and empowerment rights, terrorism, level of democracy, and a set of control variables. The estimation sample consists of country-years for 207 states (3183 observations) from 1980-2010. I chose this temporal domain because availability of data on physical integrity and empowerment rights. Table 1 reports the summary statistics from the variables used in the analysis.

5.3.1. Dependent Variable

The dependent variables in the study are levels of physical integrity rights and empowerment rights. Government respect for physical integrity rights is measured using the Physical Integrity Rights index from the CIRI (Cingranelli-Richards) data set on human rights (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014). This variable provides a measure of government respect for rights, specifically citizens' right not to be killed, disappeared, imprisoned and/or tortured. Each of these four rights are coded on a scale of 0-2 and then added to create an index that ranges from 0 to 8, where (0) represents low respect for human rights (high repression) and (8) indicates countries with high respect for integrity rights (low repression).

Similarly, the CIRI empowerment rights index provides a measure of level of government respect for rights of assembly and association, foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, electoral self-determination, and workers' rights. These seven indicators are coded on a scale of 0-2 and then added to create an index ranging from 0-14 in which (0) represents no government respect of empowerment rights (high repression) and (14) represents high respect of empowerment rights (low repression; Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014).

5.3.2. Independent Variables

The key independent variable in the study is the number of domestic and transnational terrorist attacks that occurred within a country in a given year. To measure this, I use terrorism data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (Global Terrorism Database, 2018). It is a count variable that provides information on domestic and transnational terrorist attacks such as terrorist attacks by a domestic group/individual or by a foreign or unidentified group against domestic or foreign target in a given state and year.¹⁰⁴ Another independent variable is regime type. To capture regime type, I use the Polity (IV) dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2014). The polity score ranges from -10 (indicating a highly autocratic regime) to 10 (a highly democratic regime).

In addition to these variables, following previous work, I control for population, GDP, civil war, interstate war and political instability, and empowerment rights when testing physical integrity rights model and vice versa (Poe and Tate 1994). Countries with larger populations are more likely to engage in repression compared to the one with smaller populations (Poe and Tate, 2004). As for development, economic development has a positive effect on human rights

¹⁰⁴ I have also conducted a robustness check using casualties/severity of the attack and findings are consistent with the number of terrorist attacks.

improvements (Richards, Gelleney, and Sacko 2001; Chang and Raza 2018).¹⁰⁵ The data for both of these variables is from the World Bank (2019). I used the natural logarithm for both population and GDP to account for the large positive skewness.

I control for interstate and intrastate war because countries engaged in such wars are more likely to repress their population (Poe and Tate, 2004). For intrastate war, I use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2010) and generate a dummy variable by identifying an intrastate conflict having more than twenty-five battle-related deaths. The variable takes on a value of one if a country is involved in an intra-state conflict and suffered more than twenty-five battle related deaths and otherwise takes on a value of 0. Finally, I also control for political instability because countries facing instability are more likely to repress their citizenry than ones that are politically stable (Wintrobe, 1998). For political instability, I rely on the Banks (2000) political dissatisfaction dataset's mass instability variables. This dataset provides information on government crises, purges, riots, strikes, and anti-government demonstrations. For mass instability, riots, strikes and demonstrations are combined to produce an annual count variable. Following previous studies (Piazza and Walsh 2009; Walsh and Piazza 2010) all the models in the study are reported using ordered logistic regression.

It is possible that terrorist attacks are affected by respect for human rights, indicating an endogenous relationship between terrorism and repression. One of the best ways to deal with endogeneity is the use of an instrumental variable or two-stage least square approach that helps in dealing with the reciprocal relationship between variables. In order to employ the instrumental

¹⁰⁵ Chang and Raza's other work on trade policies including import tariffs, anti-dumping duties, and price undertaking explains economic development in the context of welfare. This work is important as it highlights policies that affect development which in turn effect human security. For details, see Chang and Raza (2021a) and Chang and Raza (2021b).

variable approach, we need to find an instrument that is correlated with terrorism but not with other human rights violations. After trying various possibilities, I could not find a strong instrument to deal with the endogenous relationship. Following other studies, I therefore utilized a different approach to deal with endogeneity and temporal persistence (Walsh and Piazza 2010; Piazza and Walsh 2009).

First, I lagged the key independent variable, terrorism, by one period to make sure that the measure of terrorism precedes physical integrity rights and empowerment rights. Second, I lagged all of the explanatory variables by one period. All these variables are lagged for one period because it takes some time for the changes in these variables to affect repression. Moreover, I also added a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable. Lagging the dependent variable helps to deal with autocorrelation, and much of the human rights literature follows the practice of including a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable (Murdie and Peksen 2013; Bell et al. 2017).

Finally, following Hendrix and Young (2014), and Rubin and Morgan (forthcoming), I estimate an error correction model for the terrorism measure which is presented in Table 2.¹⁰⁶ The error correction model helps to model both long and short-term effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. If endogeneity is indeed a significant issue, we expect both changes in and past human rights violations (physical integrity rights and empowerment rights) to be correlated with changes in the interaction term between terrorism and level of democracy.

¹⁰⁶ For instance, the Error correction model for terrorism: $Terrorism*Polity = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Terrorism*Polity_{i,t-1}) + \gamma\Delta X_{it} + \lambda X_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{it}$. ΔX_{it} is a vector of annual change (first difference) in explanatory variable. $X_{i,t-1}$ is a vector of all lagged explanatory variables. γ and λ are vectors of coefficients for first difference and lagged independent variables.

5.4. Results

In this section, I discuss the results from the analysis. In summary, the results support the argument that democracies experiencing terrorist attacks are more likely to violate physical integrity rights than ones that do not experience these attacks. Further, they support the idea that terrorist incidents in democracies are less likely to make democracies (as compared to autocracies) violate empowerment rights. The results of analyses are provided in Table 1.

The ordered logit regression models estimated and presented in Table 1 allow me to examine whether regime type particularly conditions the effect of terrorism on physical integrity rights and empowerment rights. Model 1 presents the results of the model with all control variables along with the key independent variable, an interaction between terrorism and democracy, and its constituent terms. In Model 1, the lagged terrorism coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant. The lagged democracy coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 10% confidence level. Since an interaction term should not be interpreted on its own, to interpret the conditional effect (and statistical significance) of regime type on the relationship between terrorism and physical integrity rights it is important to present the effect graphically (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).

Economists, statisticians and sociologists argue that interpreting an interaction term when the effect of interest is nonlinear is difficult to do, and can mostly lead to misinterpretation in the non-linear models. As a result, it can lead to incorrect conclusions (Ai and Norton 2003; Mize 2019; Long and Freese 2014; Torres-Reyna 2014; Agresti and Tarantola 2018). Mize (2019) suggests that continuous-by-continuous interaction effects are trickiest to interpret. However, one of three methods can be used to interpret an interaction term's effect on a non-linear outcome: Ideal types, marginal effects, and contour plots. I use marginal effects because this method helps

to illustrate how the effect of one variable differs at different levels of second variable, and makes results easier to interpret (Williams 2019). In a non-linear model, Ai and Norton (2003 p.124) indicate that when the dependent variable is a dummy or ordinal, the conditional mean of the dependent variable is as follows:

$$E[y | x_1, x_2, X] = \phi(\beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_{12} x_1 x_2 + X\beta) = \phi(.) \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

Here $E[y | x_1, x_2, X]$ represents the conditional mean of the dependent variable which is physical integrity and empowerment rights violations; x_1 and x_2 are independent variables (terrorism and level of democracy); $\beta_{12} x_1 x_2$ represents an interaction term (terrorism*level of democracy); X indicates a vector of additional independent variables that includes a constant term which is independent of x_1 and x_2 . β s are unknown parameters and Φ represents a standard normal cumulative distribution. In this case, the interaction is the cross derivative of the expected value of the dependent variables which is written as follow (see Ai and Norton 2003, p.124-125);

$$\frac{\partial^2 \phi(.)}{\partial x_1 \partial x_2} = \beta_{12} \phi'(.) + (\beta_1 + \beta_{12} x_2)(\beta_2 + \beta_{12} x_1) \phi'(.) \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

Following Ai and Norton (2003), I plot the marginal effects of the interaction term in Figure 2, indicating the interaction across all outcome categories for the dependent variable, which are physical integrity rights and empowerment rights violations. In this figure, the x-axis is the level of democracy variable, where low values indicate a state being an autocratic regime and increasing values indicate a democracy. The y-axis is the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in terrorist attacks on the level of government respect for physical integrity rights. The long-dash line plots the marginal effect at various levels of democracy, and the dotted lines demonstrate the 95 percent

confidence interval around the marginal effect. Figure 1 indicates that, at high levels of democracy, increases in terrorist attacks lead to decreasing government respect for physical integrity rights. However, as the level of democracy decreases, the effect diminishes to the point where the relationship between terrorism and physical integrity right violations becomes statistically insignificant. Further, it suggests that at high levels of democracy, the increase in terrorist attacks decreases government respect for physical integrity rights, and the relationship is statistically significant. This provides support for Hypothesis 1, which states that increases in terrorist attacks in democracies are likely to reduce respect for physical integrity rights.

Table 5.1. The Effect of Terrorism on Physical Integrity and Empowerment Rights at Different levels of Democracy


	Model 1	Model 2
	Physical Integrity Rights	Empowerment Rights
Terrorism	-0.002* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Democracy	0.093*** (0.021)	0.209*** (0.029)
Terrorism *democracy	-2.028e-3* (0.000)	-1.716 e-3 (0.000)
Population	-0.418*** (0.085)	-0.196** (0.098)
GDP	0.401*** (0.125)	0.063 (0.131)
Mass instability	-0.066** (0.026)	0.033 (0.034)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.297*** (0.106)	0.180 (0.109)
Civil war	-1.758*** (0.267)	-0.191 (0.219)
Physical Integrity Rights (lagged)	0.565*** (0.056)	0.127*** (0.044)
Empowerment Rights (lagged)	0.034 (0.036)	0.717*** (0.062)
Year	-0.082*** (0.016)	-0.035** (0.015)
cut1		
Constant	-170.167*** (30.628)	-76.116** (29.955)
cut2		
Constant	-168.763***	-74.168**

	(30.646)	(29.970)
cut3		
Constant	-167.436***	-73.031**
	(30.624)	(29.970)
cut4		
Constant	-166.113***	-71.843**
	(30.642)	(29.964)
cut5		
Constant	-164.499***	-70.555**
	(30.631)	(29.975)
cut6		
Constant	-163.000***	-69.289**
	(30.632)	(29.968)
cut7		
Constant	-161.452***	-68.034**
	(30.630)	(29.970)
cut8		
Constant	-159.342***	-67.066**
	(30.560)	(29.980)
cut9		
Constant		-66.034**
		(29.988)
cut10		
Constant		-64.968**
		(29.976)
cut11		
Constant		-63.914**
		(29.962)
cut12		
Constant		-62.777**
		(29.946)
cut13		
Constant		-61.109**
		(29.963)
cut14		
Constant		-59.087**
		(29.932)

sigma2_u		
Constant	1.295*** (0.329)	1.222*** (0.419)
N	1437	1436
chi2	603.722***	802.639***
Log Likelihood	-2050.665	-2270.383

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Figure 5.2. Marginal effect of terrorism on government respect of physical integrity rights



In model 2, I test Hypothesis 2: The effect of terrorism on empowerment rights violations is larger in autocracies than in democracies. Model 2 indicates that the terrorism coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant. The democracy coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The interaction term is negative and statistically insignificant. To better understand the interaction term, I present the results using marginal effects in Figure 3. The marginal effect of terrorism on empowerment rights at different levels of democracy suggests that democracies do not increase their violation of empowerment right in the wake of terrorist attacks. The effect seems to be similar in both democracies and autocracies; however, the effect is statistically insignificant. Based on this, I cannot claim support for Hypothesis 2, but it does further support the idea that after terrorist attacks, democracies will focus their human right violations on physical integrity rights rather than empowerment ones.

Across all models, the results of the controls are consistent with the existing literature. An increase in population decreases respect for physical integrity and empowerment rights and states with higher GDP per capita are more likely to respect physical integrity rights. In addition, states facing political instability are more likely to experience violation of physical integrity rights and the same is true for states experiencing civil wars. As expected, a state's bureaucratic quality is positively related to the physical integrity and empowerment rights (Cole 2016; Cingranelli and Richards 1999). It is interesting to note that US alliances reduce respect for integrity rights, however they increase respect for empowerment rights. One possible explanation is allies' strategic importance to US military might. Bell et al. (2016) find that countries strategically important to the US are more likely to engage in repression (Bell et al. 2016). US troops positively affect the respect of integrity rights and this finding is consistent with studies examining the impact

of US troops on human rights violations (Bell et al. 2016). Finally, an increase in respect for integrity rights is positively correlated with empowerment rights.

Table 5.2. Error Correction Model¹⁰⁷


	Model 3
DVt-1	0.603*** (0.034)
Δ Terrorism t	4.030*** (0.395)
Δ Democracy t	1.680*** (0.253)
Δ Empowerment Rights t	0.180 (0.169)
Δ Physical Integrity Rights t	-0.043 (0.204)
Δ Population t	34.490 (36.861)
Δ GDP t	-2.547 (3.553)
Δ Mass instability t	0.007 (0.126)
Δ Bureaucratic Quality t	0.526 (1.006)
Terrorism t-1	2.045*** (0.320)
Democracy t-1	0.496*** (0.083)
Empowerment Rights t-1	-0.038 (0.110)
Population t-1	0.170 (0.205)
GDP t-1	0.199 (0.311)
Mass Instability t-1	-0.186 (0.143)
Bureaucratic Quality t-1	0.174

¹⁰⁷ I also run error correction models by removing the empowerment rights measure from the physical integrity rights model and vice versa. The results remain the same.

	(0.269)
Physical Integrity Rights t-1	0.024
	(0.177)
Civil War	-1.652*
	(0.936)
Year t-1	-0.135***
	(0.047)
Constant	261.770***
	(93.657)
N	1321
R-Squared	0.7638

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Figure 5.3. Marginal effect of terrorism on government respect of empowerment rights



The results in in Model 3 do not lend support to the idea that past physical integrity right and empowerment violations (or changes in the level of them) are strong determinants of terrorist attacks. Coefficient estimates for both changes in Physical Integrity and changes in Empowerment rights (Δ Physical Integrity Rights t, Δ Empowerment Rights t) are statistically insignificant.

Likewise, past levels of Physical Integrity Rights (t-1) or Empowerment Rights (t-1) violations are insignificant across both models. These findings thus address the concern that an endogenous relationship between human rights violations and terrorism may be driving the results.

5.5. Robustness Checks

I also conducted additional analyses to examine how robust the findings are to by comparing it to alternative model specifications and variables. I summarize the findings here, and present the result of each analysis in the appendix.

The first robustness check begins with using an alternate measure of terrorism. In both models of Table 1 the terrorism variable is a count of the number of terrorist attacks for each country-year. However, some scholars measure terrorism as the number of victims of terrorist attacks to examine its effect on policymaking. I thus re-ran Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 using terrorist killings as a key variable. The results are included in appendix Table A3. The results are consistent with the main findings reported in Table 1.

The second robustness considers an alternative measure of the dependent variable. For that, I use Fariss's (2014) latent human rights mean. This composite measure is based on many different human rights indicators, some of which focus more broadly on violence within the country (Cingranelli and Filipov 2018). This indicator varies between -2.8 to 4.70 in the sample, with a higher score indicative of more respect for human rights. Findings are presented in Table A4 and figure 1A of the appendix section. Overall, I find the results robust to these modifications. I also conducted robustness check using the Ill-Treatment & Torture (ITT) dataset (Conrad, Haglund, and Moore 2014). This dataset is only available for a decade, 1995 to 2005,

and is coded based on allegations in Amnesty International annual reports, press releases, and urgent actions alerts. The dataset only focuses on torture, as opposed to the CIRI and Farris's latent mean indicators, which focus on a broader set of physical integrity rights abuses. The scale I use varies from 0 to 30, a higher score here is indicative of more torture allegations. Findings (Table A5 in appendix) remain consistent to the main models.

Government ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has an effect on rights practices (Payne and Abouharb, 2016). Thus, I run a robustness check by controlling for ratification of the ICCPR. Again, I find results (Table A6 in Appendix) are consistent with the main models. Moreover, I tested the relationship using an alternate measure of integrity and empowerment rights. As such, I used killings to measure integrity rights and freedom of speech for empowerment rights. The findings remain consistent with the main findings suggesting democracies violate integrity rights while experiencing terrorist attacks. The results are presented in Table A7 in the Appendix.

5.6. Conclusion

As mentioned previously, it is generally believed that regime type affects state behavior in response to terrorism. As such, autocracies are more likely to violate human rights than their democratic counterparts. This is mainly because democratic regimes have higher human rights standards and accountability mechanisms. However, there is a reason to suspect that democracies experiencing terrorist attacks are not always going to respect physical integrity rights. The reason is that democracies facing terrorist attacks can get into an emergency politics mode. This allows the leader to move out of normal politics where one has to follow rules and regulations and into dealing with the situation without democratic rules of policy making (Waever, 2004).

In addition to that the above reasoning, physical integrity rights violations can be focused on a specific group, which signals to most citizens that they will not be the target of physical integrity abuses, thus allowing the leader to engage in physical integrity rights violations. But does that mean that a democratic leader violating integrity rights is also engaged in empowerment rights violations, which may be perceived as less severe in nature? I argue democratic leaders do not engage in increased empowerment rights violations because these violations affects all citizens, who are intolerant to such violations and are more likely to hold the leader accountable. The fear of retaliation from the population puts the leader's political survival at risk and thus the leader is less likely to engage in such violations. The empirical findings support the argument, showing that democracies experiencing terrorist attacks are more likely to violate physical integrity rights than empowerment rights.

This study contributes to the terrorism and human rights literature by examining the conditional effect of regime type on the relationship between the two. The findings are contradictory to much of the literature examining the relationship between terrorism and human rights. As such, these findings indicate that even though democracies champion human rights and follow higher normative standards, when democracies confront a situation which threatens their national security, then the respect for rights appears to decline. In particular, democracies will engage in the type of human rights violations that will affect only certain members of the population, not the selectorate as a whole.

This work has policy implications for international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that wish to improve human rights. As such, instead of only focusing on certain regimes i.e. autocratic regimes, NGOs should broaden their focus to include all other regimes. With this, they can push democracies to stick to their standards of human rights by using

various tactics including naming and shaming. Besides these implications, there is room for further study on this topic. As such, further research could examine how such an effect holds when parliamentary democracy is compared to presidential democracy. It is possible that significant differences arise in their behavior because of their structural variation. Previous work examining initiation of international conflict, diversionary use of force, and human rights violations has shown differences in the behavior of parliamentary and presidential system (Reiter and Tillman 2002; Richards and Gelleny 2007; Kisangani and Pickering 2011). Likewise, it is equally important to examine how the relationship varies based on the strength of democracy i.e. mature democracy versus weak democracy. Such an examination will help us to understand a more nuanced relationship between terrorism and human rights.

Chapter 6 - Conclusion

This dissertation highlights the importance of the interaction between the environment and institutions in examining political violence in international relations. Though previous international relations literature has examined causes of political violence, there is still much nuance to be added to these findings. Particularly, there is a need to focus on how the interaction of environment, which is about institutions referring to domestic and international factors, and political system affect political violence. Scholarly work identified various factors affecting political violence including economic development, population, interstate conflict, intrastate conflict, regime type etc. (Poe and Tate 1994; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Davenport 1999; Davenport 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2007; Buneo De Mesquitia et al. 2007). Even though these factors are correlated with political violence, there is variation in the relationship. One factor that can explain this variation is differences in institutional settings. As a result, this dissertation aims to fill the gap by studying how the interaction of the environment and institutions affect political violence. This approach provides scholars and policymakers with a more nuanced picture of factors affecting political violence and allows them to pursue foreign policy goals accordingly. With that objective in mind, this dissertation has investigated three important questions.

The first question focuses on how civil-military relations (a domestic factor) affect political violence. To address this question, I rely on a case study and an empirical global analysis of autocracies. Chapter 2 opens with the case of Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule between 1979 and 2003. I argue that coup-proofed autocratic regimes are more likely to engage in human rights abuses because this behavior helps them to stay in power longer. Also, coup-proofed regimes are more likely to face violent regime transition because of loyalist resistance. I evaluate this theory by focusing on Saddam Hussein's coup-proofing strategies and their effect on violence.

To conduct this study, I rely on local and international newspapers, United States National Security Archives, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, memoirs of Iraqi military personnel, and oral history collections of Iraqi citizens living in the United States. Moreover, I rely on the official Iraqi documents recovered from Northern Iraq after the Gulf War. I use the qualitative method because it offers some advantages. In particular, it allows you to establish causality by seeing how exactly decisions were made and (in reaction to what), something that can't really be done with quantitative methods (Levy, 2008).

The results indicate that coup-proofing as a key element in severe human rights violation. Hussein faced both internal and external threats to his power and opted for coup-proofing to contain threats. His coup-proofing strategies involved the exploitation of communal ties to gain loyalties from ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups. The creation of paramilitary groups by Hussein, and the creation of multiple internal security agencies also served as checks to monitor one another. To maintain these loyalties, Hussein provided political and economic incentives to his loyalists to ensure their allegiance. These incentives worked so well that Hussein found it easy to violate the physical integrity rights and civil-political liberties of all his citizens in its extreme. The physical integrity and empowerment rights abuses became the hallmark of the Hussein regime cementing his power for three decades until the regime's ouster by the US in 2003. The coup-proofing strategies are not only limited to rights abuses during Hussein's rule. Hussein's loyalists resisted ouster by engaging in violent activities including killing, torturing, imprisoning civilians and other actors engaged in transition thus making a regime transition violent.

Chapter 3 quantitatively analyzes the second half of the argument by using cross-sectional and time series data on autocratic regime transition and counterbalancing from 1970 to 2010. I use a quantitative approach because of various advantages associated with this approach. As such, it

allows me to compare across states, control for confounding factors, and deal with simultaneity bias (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). In particular, it examines how does counterbalancing/coup-proofing leads to violent regime transition in autocracies. The literature on violent regime transition argues that popular mobilization, elite role, and regime type affect violence during regime transition. In all such studies, scholars found domestic factors positively affect violence during regime transition (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Karl 1990; Huntington 1984; Rustow, 1970; Higley & Burton, 1989; McFaul 2005; Zanger 2000; Huntington 1984; Diamond et al. 1989). This chapter seeks to determine whether another internal factor, counterbalancing, increases violence during the regime transition. Interestingly, as suggested by my theory, the results indicate that counterbalancing has a curvilinear relationship to violent regime transitions. Furthermore, among counterbalanced autocracies, military regimes are more likely to experience violent regime transition than non-military regimes.

The theoretical reasoning and empirical results of both these chapters contribute to the literature in various ways. First, to date not much scholarly work exists that addresses coup-proofing as a central factor connected to political violence. Secondly, the study develops an argument that connects civil-military relations to the violence that can occur during regime transition. Moreover, it differentiates the impact of counterbalancing among various autocracies, which provides support to the argument that institutional differences among autocracies makes them behave differently in conflict (Weeks 2008; Pickering and Kisangani, 2012). Finally, the study contributes to work examining the implications of counterbalancing by demonstrating its broader consequences, such as potentially leading a country to civil war through a prolonged violent transition (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; De Bruin 2017).

Where the first two chapters focused on how a domestic factor (civil-military relations) can influence repression, Chapter four focuses on international factors. It analyzes the impact of international factors on political violence in autocracies. In particular, this chapter seeks to determine the consequences of US foreign aid for recipient human rights. U.S. foreign aid encourage respect for human rights in host countries, since human rights improvement is a condition of aid, though of course not a prime objective (Gibler, 2008). This follows from the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which links U.S. foreign aid to better human rights practices in the recipient countries (Goderis and Versteeg 2012). Recent studies examining the impact of US aid on human rights have mixed findings. Some scholarly work indicates a positive relationship between US aid and human rights whereas other suggest either a negative or a null effect (Bermeo 2016; Dreher et al. 2013; Lee 2011; Carnegie and Marinov 2017). Some argue for a conditional relationship depending on donors' intentions and target state interest (Krasner and Weinstein, 2014). The findings remain inconclusive. This chapter seeks to fill the gap by formulating a theory arguing that as a strategic player, leaders prefer to keep aid from being removed. At the same time, the leaders are unwilling to stop human rights violations, as autocratic leaders hold power through force. In this case, leaders will substitute visible rights violation for invisible ones. However, that substitution effect is not consistent across all recipients. Strategically important recipients are less likely to substitute rights violation than less important ones.

The empirical results show an interesting relationship between the aid recipient and the substitution of extra-judicial killings for forced disappearances. As such, the findings of the overall sample do not provide strong support for the argument that in states receiving aid, the recipient leaders are likely to substitute violations of visible rights for violations of invisible rights. However, splitting the sample to strategically less and more important countries indicate that when

strategically less important countries are substituting extra-judicial killings for forced disappearances. In strategically important states, aid has no effect on the substitution of rights violations.

The findings of Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on the interaction between US foreign policy and human rights, particularly the aid and human rights literature. Previous studies examined the mechanism of aid allocation based on human rights and the changes in rights abuses, and this work brings the substitution effect in rights violations and more specifically considering recipient strategic importance. Interestingly, adding strategic importance can have a significant impact on the findings. In the future, human rights scholars should add strategic importance of a country in their analysis to capture a broader picture. Scholarly work on foreign policy substitutability indicate that leaders have different means to deal with an outside threat. While making foreign policy choices, leader engage in substitutability. For example, leader facing security threat may substitute alliance for defense expenditure. This may help leader to misrepresent its capabilities (Morgan and Palmer, 2000). Likewise, leaders facing international pressure or threat of losing aid are likely to engage in substitutability since it allows them to engage in plausible deniability and misrepresent the real picture of rights violations. Besides considering substitutability in human rights literature, there is a policy importance of considering substitution effects. If substitution is not considered, then leaders might misperceive the effects of a policy. In this case it can seem like aid is improving human rights violations if you only look at killings, but if you also consider disappearances, then you will see that violations are simply being shifted to another expression.

Additionally, this study could help policy makers to consider more nuanced behavior of autocratic regimes. Moreover, this will allow policy makers to come up with strategies that can

hold leaders accountable for engaging in invisible rights violation and getting away with accountability.

The fifth chapter examines the impact of terrorism on political violence. Terrorism in this chapter incorporates both domestic and international factors, as terrorist attacks include both domestic and international terrorism. Moreover, this chapter examines the impact of terrorism on rights abuses in both democracies and autocracies. The literature fails to address how regime type conditions the effect of terrorism on human rights violations?

The main argument of the chapter is that regime type is an important determinant of how states will achieve their goal of repressing citizens in the wake of terrorism. Which rights a leader curtails in response to terrorist attacks truly depends on the institutions of the country. Usually we think of autocracies when we talk about repression, and that is why the literature has focused on autocratic repression so far, but under certain circumstances, democracies will sometimes behave in ways that are more like autocracies specifically when they find themselves under threat. In this chapter, I argue that autocracies already engage in rights violations, thus terrorist attacks does not make a big difference in terms of their engagement in rights violations. In contrast, democracies usually have better records of human rights but terrorist incidents makes it possible for democratic regimes to curtail physical integrity rights because it is targeted towards a particular group. Democratic leaders are not punished by their public for their physical integrity rights violations because their policies signaled to the masses at large that repression is aimed at a certain group. The chapter further argues that when it comes to empowerment rights, leaders in democratic regimes are unable to violate empowerment rights with impunity because their citizens are often intolerant of empowerment rights violation. This is mainly because empowerment violations directly affect all citizens (unlike minority repression) by taking away their freedoms. The

empirical findings support the argument, showing that democracies experiencing terrorist attacks are more likely to violate physical integrity rights than empowerment rights.

Much like previous chapters, chapter 5 produces novel results and add to the literature on terrorism and human rights by examining the conditional effect of regime type on the relationship between the two. The findings that democracies act like autocracies when under threat are contradictory to much of the literature examining the relationship between terrorism and human rights. As such, these findings indicate that even though democracies champion human rights and follow higher normative standards, when democracies confront a situation which threatens their national security, then the respect for rights appears to decline. As such, this change is likely to occur when a certain group is targeted; however we are less likely to see a violation when the whole population is involved. Additionally, this work has policy implications for international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that wish to improve human rights. As such, instead of only focusing on certain regimes i.e. autocratic regimes, NGOs should broaden their focus to include all other regimes. With this, they can push democracies to stick to their standards of human rights by using various tactics including naming and shaming. If such measures are not taken, then people will lose trust on democratic institutions. Moreover, unaccountability will allow leader to continue engaging in rights violations. Furthermore, it will justify the use of violence and undermine democratic institutions.

A qualitative and three empirical chapters provide unique insight into the threats to human security across the world. The chapters add to the history of political violence by focusing on how autocratic regimes have used military structures to violate the integrity and empowerment rights of their citizens. Moreover, the chapters highlights the fact that leaders engage in violence to pursue certain policy goals. A prime example is of the US President Donald Trump administration

ill treatment of immigrant children at US-Mexico border. The Associated Press reported that “Inside an old warehouse in South Texas, hundreds of children wait in a series of cages created by metal fencing. One cage had 20 children inside. Scattered about are bottles of water, bags of chips and large foil sheets intended to serve as blankets.” (The Atlantic, 2018). This example indicates that President Trump’s administration engage in putting the lives of people at risk to show its support base that it is fulfilling the campaign promises about immigration and thus should be reelected. Besides that, though there had been some anecdotal evidences indicating how these particular domestic and international factors affect political violence. This dissertation adds to the literature on human security by theoretically and empirically examining these anecdotal evidences and suggesting policy measures.

As mentioned earlier, this dissertation fills the gap in political violence literature by examining the interaction of environment and institutions, however additional research is needed to gain a comprehensive understanding of issues related to human security. For example, there is a need to research issues related to invisible rights violation since such violations are rising in the world and has been report by human rights activists. However, the problem is only one indicator of invisible rights violation (forced disappearances through CIRI) is available. We need to work on data collection to create invisible human rights index by taking in account a broad measure including disappearances, clean torture, rape, sexual harassment etc. Data on this index could be collected through the collaboration of non-governmental organizations and human right activist working on each country. An example of such type of collaboration is Human Rights Measurement Index (HRMI) project by Chad Clay. HRMI project is collaborating with non-governmental organizations and human rights activists in each country and is quite successful. Likewise, an effort to create a broad measure of invisible rights index will improve our

understanding of political violence and will unfold the improvement of both visible and invisible rights.

Finally, by using the different theoretical foundations and empirically testing them, this dissertation provides an enhanced perspective on factors affecting political violence. Further work could be done by collecting data on invisible rights violations and by focusing on how internal and external factors affect the leaders' choice of engaging in invisible rights violations. Increasingly, human security is becoming a twenty first century security challenge, and hopefully this dissertation will help scholars and policy makers see a nuanced picture of political violence. In particular, how crucial is the interaction of environment and institutions in shaping political violence.

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Appendix A - Chapter 3 Tables and Figures

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Fail Violent	3,183	.0898523	.4718014	0	4
Coup Proofing	2,891	1.724528	.6311195	1	4.577271
Coup Proofing Square	2,891	.4053191	.6947393	1.13E-07	8.627561
Elite Instability	2,056	.0286965	.1669927	0	1
Mass Instability	2,056	.2373541	.4255646	0	1
			.4073678	-	
Military Expenditure	2,817	.0756951		3.452491	7.583905
Interventions	3,183	.1021049	.3526927	0	3
Regime Failure	3,183	.0477537	.2132781	0	1
			.7404798	-	
GDP	1,942	.0850055		1.022935	14.19232
Election	2,163	.2302358	.421081	0	1
Duration	3,183	23.74584	30.63858	1	269
Military Regime	3,913	.1101457	.3131112	0	1
Personal Regime	3,183	.2726987	.4454172	0	1
Party Regime	3,183	.4882187	.4999397	0	1
Civil War	3,183	.2067232	.4050188	0	1

Robustness Checks

A1. Robustness Check with Violence (Violence/pop*100) as an alternate measure of Violent Regime Transition

Violent Regime Transition (Outcome)		
	Model 1	Model 2
	Extreme level CP	CP Military Regime
Coup Proofing Square	-2.255** (-0.913)	
Elite Instability	-9.338** (-4.554)	-10.807** (-4.479)
Mass Instability	-3.538 (-3.791)	-2.009 (-2.923)
Military Expenditure (ln)	5.761** (-2.495)	5.585** (-2.502)
Intervention	1.66 (-3.751)	2.592 (-3.196)
year	0 (-0.191)	-0.147 (-0.179)
Coup proofing		-5.939** (-2.812)
Military Regime		-29.430*** (-9.013)
Military Regime* Coup proofing		10.360** (-4.181)
Constant	37.316 (-379.144)	347.823 (-358.913)
Regime Fail (Selection)		
Coup Proofing Square	0.012 (-0.067)	

Mass Instability	0.660*** (-0.129)	0.601*** (-0.127)
Elite Instability	0.558** (-0.245)	0.557** (-0.239)
GDP	-2.582*** (-0.695)	-2.660*** (-0.594)
Military Expenditure (ln)	-0.163*** (-0.036)	-0.163*** (-0.036)
Intervention	0.101 (-0.175)	0.088 (-0.181)
Election	0.870*** (-0.14)	0.862*** (-0.122)
Regime Duration	0.003 (-0.002)	0.003 (-0.002)
Military Regime	0.515 (-0.509)	0 (.)
Personalist Regime	0.13 (-0.474)	0.066 (-0.412)
Single Party Regime	0.074 (-0.434)	0.012 (-0.378)
Civil War	0.335** (-0.168)	0.332** (-0.143)
year	-0.005 (-0.008)	-0.003 (-0.007)
Coup proofing		0.169* (-0.097)
Military Regime		1.163** (-0.517)
Military Regime*Coup proofing		-0.306 (-0.211)

Constant	9.656 (-14.895)	4.072 (-14.553)
athrho(ρ)	-0.770* (-0.449)	-1.003*** (-0.281)
	-0.218	-0.162
N	1774	1774
Rho(ρ)	-0.647	-0.763

Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *p<.10, **p<.05, *p<.01level.**

Table A2a. Robustness Check with Coups

	Model 1 Coup Proofing	Model 1 CP Robustness	Model 2 Extreme level CP	Model 2 Extreme Level CP Robustness	Model 3 CP Military	Model 3 CP Military Robustness
Violent Regime Transition (Outcome)						
Coup-proofing	0.00103 (-0.194)	-0.0415 (-0.178)			-0.367 (-0.227)	-0.361 (-0.224)
Extreme CP			-0.165** (-0.079)	-0.169** (-0.074)		
Coup Proofed Mil					0.886** (-0.41)	0.734** (-0.374)
Military Regime					-2.36*** (-0.78)	-1.97*** (-0.76)
Elite Inst	-0.750** (-0.373)	-0.619 (-0.4)	-0.781** (-0.365)	-0.649 (-0.397)	-0.96*** (-0.355)	-0.826** (-0.36)
Mass Inst	-0.135 (-0.328)	-0.0125 (-0.337)	-0.0548 (-0.319)	0.059 (-0.342)	0.00675 (-0.239)	0.111 (-0.251)
Change in Mil Expenditure (ln)	0.456** (-0.221)	0.368 (-0.242)	0.441** (-0.222)	0.355 (-0.246)	0.452** (-0.207)	0.379* (-0.225)
Intervention	0.272 (-0.35)	0.273 (-0.359)	0.23 (-0.351)	0.234 (-0.359)	0.303 (-0.3)	0.306 (-0.317)
Coup		-0.394 (-0.694)		-0.364 (-0.743)		-0.666 (-0.536)
Year	0.0009 (-0.016)	0.0005 (-0.0167)	0.0004 (-0.0167)	-0.0003 (-0.0168)	-0.0125 (-0.0153)	-0.0108 (-0.0157)
Constant	1.014 (-32.75)	1.502 (-33.19)	2.001 (-33.22)	3.159 (-33.4)	29.07 (-30.72)	25.34 (-31.47)
Regime Failure (Selection)						
Coup proofing	0.103 (-0.0886)	0.122 (-0.101)			0.179* (-0.0963)	0.188* (-0.113)
Extreme CP			0.0187 (-0.065)	0.0569 (-0.0716)		
CP Military					-0.305 (-0.211)	-0.243 (-0.215)
Military	0.609 (-0.52)	0.54 (-0.579)	0.597 (-0.541)	0.528 (-0.599)	1.195** (-0.545)	0.987* (-0.587)
Personalist	0.0998 (-0.497)	-0.0839 (-0.547)	0.126 (-0.508)	-0.0754 (-0.555)	0.0655 (-0.448)	-0.111 (-0.511)
Party	0.0717 (-0.453)	-0.0676 (-0.489)	0.0719 (-0.466)	-0.0739 (-0.499)	0.0162 (-0.411)	-0.11 (-0.46)

Mass Inst	0.658*** (-0.128)	0.691*** (-0.145)	0.673*** (-0.13)	0.702*** (-0.146)	0.618*** (-0.128)	0.656*** (-0.144)
Elite Inst	0.552** (-0.248)	0.564** (-0.269)	0.558** (-0.247)	0.576** (-0.267)	0.548** (-0.242)	0.565** (-0.262)
Chng. GDP (ln)	-2.696*** (-0.754)	-2.86*** (-0.993)	-2.57*** (-0.753)	-2.751*** (-1.028)	-2.722*** (-0.615)	-2.976*** (-0.763)
Mil Exp (ln)	-0.164*** (-0.0361)	-0.13*** (-0.0398)	-0.15*** (-0.0351)	-0.128*** (-0.0396)	-0.158*** (-0.0361)	-0.132*** (-0.039)
Intervention	0.0878 (-0.182)	0.134 (-0.214)	0.094 (-0.178)	0.135 (-0.215)	0.0771 (-0.185)	0.121 (-0.216)
Election	0.891*** (-0.135)	1.035*** (-0.153)	0.892*** (-0.139)	1.039*** (-0.157)	0.871*** (-0.122)	1.010*** (-0.145)
Regime Duration	0.00338 (-0.0024)	0.0025 (-0.0026)	0.00342 (-0.0024)	0.0025 (-0.002)	0.00317 (-0.002)	0.00242 (-0.0025)
Intra-conflict	0.303* (-0.17)	0.155 (-0.205)	0.314* (-0.178)	0.161 (-0.225)	0.331** (-0.144)	0.2 (-0.168)
Year	-0.0031 (-0.00744)	0.00158 (-0.0077)	-0.00365 (-0.0074)	0.00151 (-0.0077)	-0.00158 (-0.0072)	0.00264 (-0.0076)
Coup		2.088*** (-0.347)		2.095*** (-0.348)		2.004*** (-0.333)
Constant	5.361 (-14.73)	-4.419 (-15.26)	6.542 (-14.74)	-4.164 (-15.32)	2.138 (-14.36)	-6.638 (-15.06)
Athrho (ρ)	-0.59 (-0.446)	-0.418 (-0.556)	-0.574 (-0.467)	-0.379 (-0.611)	-0.877*** (-0.29)	-0.688** (-0.349)
Lnsigma (σ)	0.119 (-0.18)	0.0788 (-0.173)	0.101 (-0.183)	0.0597 (-0.177)	0.183 (-0.142)	0.117 (-0.151)
N	1776	1746	1776	1746	1776	1746
rho (ρ)	-0.53	-0.396	-0.518	-0.362	-0.705	-0.597

Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ level.

Table A2b: Bivariate Correlation between Violence and Counterbalancing

	Fail violent	Coup proofing square	Coup Proofing
Fail Violent	1		
Coup proofing square	-0.0013 (0.9448)	1	
Coup Proofing	-0.0058 (0.7571)	0.6505 (0)	1

Fig 1a. Scatterplot between Coup Proofing Square and Violent Regime Transition




Fig 1b. Scatterplot between Coup Proofing and Violent Regime Transition




Table A3. Robustness Check with Ethnic Fractionalization

	Model 1 Coups Proofing	Model 1 CP Robustness	Model 2 Extreme level CP	Model 2 Extreme Level CP Robustness	Model3 CP Military	Model3 CP Military Robustness
Violent Regime Transition (Outcome)						
Coup-proofing	0.00103 (-0.194)	0.00798 (-0.192)			-0.367 (-0.227)	-0.35 (-0.217)
Extreme CP			-0.165** (-0.079)	-0.163** (-0.0797)		
Coup-proofed Mil					0.886** (-0.41)	0.849** (-0.402)
Military Regime					-2.361*** (-0.78)	-2.267*** (-0.755)
Elite Inst	-0.750** (-0.373)	-0.688** (-0.373)	-0.781** (-0.365)	-0.720** (-0.364)	-0.96*** (-0.355)	-0.930** (-0.358)
Mass Inst	-0.135 (-0.328)	-0.0987 (-0.308)	-0.0548 (-0.319)	0.0198 (-0.295)	0.00675 (-0.239)	0.181 (-0.235)
Change in Mil Expenditure (ln)	0.456** (-0.221)	0.433** (-0.214)	0.441** (-0.222)	0.419* (-0.214)	0.452** (-0.207)	0.443** (-0.206)
Intervention	0.272 (-0.35)	0.307 (-0.359)	0.23 (-0.351)	0.263 (-0.358)	0.303 (-0.3)	0.315 (-0.306)
Ethnic Frac		0.631 (-0.532)		0.619 (-0.541)		0.267 (-0.458)
Year	0.0009 (-0.016)	0.0005 (-0.0167)	0.0004 (-0.0167)	-0.0005 (-0.0175)	-0.0125 (-0.0153)	-0.0145 (-0.016)
Constant	1.014 (-32.75)	13.77 (-33.6)	2.001 (-33.22)	14.37 (-34.83)	29.07 (-30.72)	32.95 (-32.06)
Regime Failure Selection						
Coup proofing	0.103 (-0.0886)	0.101 (-0.0886)			0.179* (-0.0963)	0.176* (-0.0955)
Extreme CP			0.0187 (-0.065)	0.0178 (-0.0639)		
CP Military					-0.305 (-0.211)	-0.3 (-0.211)
Military	0.609 (-0.52)	0.598 (-0.521)	0.597 (-0.541)	0.581 (-0.542)	1.195** (-0.545)	1.180** (-0.546)
Personalist	0.0998 (-0.497)	0.109 (-0.501)	0.126 (-0.508)	0.136 (-0.512)	0.0655 (-0.448)	0.0727 (-0.453)
Party	0.0717 (-0.453)	0.0707 (-0.456)	0.0719 (-0.466)	-0.0692 (-0.469)	0.0162 (-0.411)	-0.0183 (-0.415)

Mass Inst	0.658*** (-0.128)	0.652*** (-0.129)	0.673*** (-0.13)	0.668*** (-0.13)	0.618*** (-0.128)	0.615*** (-0.127)
Elite Inst	0.552** (-0.248)	0.535** (-0.247)	0.558** (-0.247)	0.539** (-0.246)	0.548** (-0.242)	0.539** (-0.241)
Chng. GDP (ln)	-2.696*** (-0.754)	-2.703*** (-0.725)	-2.57*** (-0.753)	-2.578*** (-0.723)	-2.722*** (-0.615)	-2.722*** (-0.611)
Mil Exp (ln)	-0.164*** (-0.0361)	-0.16*** (-0.0378)	-0.15*** (-0.0351)	-0.161*** (-0.0368)	-0.158*** (-0.0361)	-0.159*** (-0.037)
Intervention	0.0878 (-0.182)	0.092 (-0.183)	0.094 (-0.178)	0.098 (-0.178)	0.0771 (-0.185)	0.079 (-0.187)
Election	0.891*** (-0.135)	0.889*** (-0.132)	0.892*** (-0.139)	0.889*** (-0.135)	0.871*** (-0.122)	0.871*** (-0.122)
Regime Duration	0.00338 (-0.0024)	0.0033 (-0.002)	0.00342 (-0.0024)	0.00342 (-0.0024)	0.00317 (-0.002)	0.00317 (-0.0023)
Intra-conflict	0.303* (-0.17)	0.302* (-0.164)	0.314* (-0.178)	0.315* (-0.171)	0.331** (-0.144)	0.329** (-0.143)
Ethnic Frac		-0.145 (-0.248)		-0.166 (-0.247)		-0.076 (-0.242)
Year	-0.0031 (-0.00744)	0.002 (-0.0074)	-0.00365 (-0.0074)	-0.0034 (-0.0074)	-0.00158 (-0.0072)	-0.00158 (-0.00731)
Constant	5.361 (-14.73)	5.163 (-14.75)	6.542 (-14.74)	6.319 (-14.72)	2.138 (-14.36)	2.199 (-14.45)
Athrho (ρ)	-0.59 (-0.446)	-0.418 (-0.614)	-0.574 (-0.467)	-0.601 (-0.439)	-0.877*** (-0.29)	-0.873*** (-0.285)
Insigma (σ)	0.119 (-0.18)	0.118 (-0.169)	0.101 (-0.183)	0.101 (-0.172)	0.183 (-0.142)	0.179 (-0.139)
N	1776	1767	1776	1767	1776	1767
rho (ρ)	-0.53	-0.547	-0.518	-0.538	-0.705	-0.703

Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 level.

Table A4. Marginal Effect on Predicted Probability of Violent Regime Transition at Different Levels of Counterbalancing (without recentering Squared Counterbalancing)

	Margin	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
1	1.410251	1.025005	1.38	0.169	-.5987207	3.419224
2	2.77587	.8142239	3.41	0.001	1.180021	4.37172
3	3.332215	.8782208	3.79	0.000	1.610934	5.053496
4	3.079285	.8837333	3.48	0.000	1.3472	4.81137
5	2.017081	.8728168	2.31	0.021	.3063917	3.727771
6	.1456033	1.203224	0.12	0.904	-2.212673	2.50388

Figure A4. Marginal Effect of Violent Regime Transition at different levels of Coup-Proofing




Figure 2. Coefficient plot of Selection Equation (Extreme levels of coup-proofing)




Figure 3. Coefficient plot of Selection Equation (coup-proofed Military)




Figure 4. Probability of Violent Regime Transition in Personalist Regime





Figure 5. Probability of Violent Regime Transition in Party Regimes



Appendix B - Chapter 4 Tables and Figures

Table 3. Provision of Military and Economic Aid and the substitution of killing on the level of forced disappearance based on strategic Importance

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	US Military Aid		US Economic Aid	
	Low Importance	High Importance	Low Importance	High Importance
Change in Killing* Mil Aid	-0.262 (0.178)	0.0725 (0.226)		
Change in Killing* Eco Aid			-1.334** (0.664)	-0.396 (0.534)
Mil Aid	-0.338* (0.197)	0.0999 (0.266)		
Eco Aid			-1.594** (0.796)	-0.558 (0.717)
Change in Killing (lagged)	3.544 (2.428)	-1.288 (3.115)	22.29** (11.09)	6.356 (8.960)
Population	0.220** (0.0910)	0.107 (0.127)	0.224** (0.0909)	0.106 (0.125)
GDP	0.109 (0.0970)	0.223 (0.150)	0.119 (0.0970)	0.209 (0.157)
Strikes	0.186 (0.213)	1.464** (0.602)	0.186 (0.214)	1.484** (0.611)
Demonstrations	-0.0413 (0.0553)	-0.158 (0.142)	-0.0376 (0.0552)	-0.164 (0.146)
Guerilla warfare	-0.501* (0.274)	-1.383** (0.626)	-0.514* (0.279)	-1.406** (0.615)
Government Crises	-1.410*** (0.408)	0.979 (0.885)	-1.417*** (0.404)	1.048 (0.850)
Civil War	-0.903*** (0.270)	-0.890** (0.420)	-0.886*** (0.269)	-0.906** (0.422)
Interstate war	0.410 (0.609)	0.908 (0.609)	0.458 (0.596)	0.773 (0.612)
Terrorism	0.327 (0.227)	0.159 (0.326)	0.328 (0.226)	0.248 (0.322)
Oil Rent	-0.00981 (0.00847)	0.00793 (0.0105)	-0.0110 (0.00871)	0.00842 (0.0104)
Strategic Distance	-0.0000650	-0.00192**	-0.0000736	-0.00192**

	(0.0000510)	(0.000872)	(0.0000523)	(0.000882)
US Troops	0.00693	0.00236	0.00431	-0.00294
	(0.0212)	(0.0136)	(0.0208)	(0.0122)
Political Imprisonment	0.614***	0.571**	0.610***	0.579**
	(0.186)	(0.249)	(0.188)	(0.253)
Killings	1.498***	1.451***	1.524***	1.427***
	(0.231)	(0.399)	(0.232)	(0.413)
Torture	0.545**	0.0572	0.550**	0.108
	(0.223)	(0.283)	(0.226)	(0.281)
Disappearances (lagged)	-0.162	0.0470	-0.156	0.0441
	(0.214)	(0.239)	(0.212)	(0.241)
Change in Killings	-0.321	-0.181	-0.336*	-0.161
	(0.199)	(0.304)	(0.201)	(0.309)
Constant	0.169	5.02e-31	0.171	2.77e-31
	(0.196)	(3.42e-29)	(0.195)	(8.12e-30)
N	591	310	591	310
Log Likelihood	-373.1	-190.3	-372.3	-190.1
χ^2	288.1	217.6	273.8	187.8
Standard errors in parentheses * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01				

Figure 4. Marginal Effect of US Military Aid (ln) on Disappearances, Low Strategic Importance, and High strategic Importance (95 percent confidence interval).




Figure 5. Marginal Effect of US Economic Aid (ln) on Disappearances, Low Strategic Importance, and High strategic Importance (95 percent confidence interval).




Table 4: Provision of US Aid and the substitution of killing on the level of forced disappearance for autocracies (with OECD Aid as a control)

	Model 1	Model 2
	Levels of Disappearances	Change in Disappearances
Change in Killing* Aid	-0.613*	-0.101*
	(0.324)	(0.0586)
Change in Killings (lagged)	10.19*	1.670*
	(5.462)	(0.987)
US Aid	-0.946**	-0.169*
	(0.460)	(0.0987)
Change in Killings	-0.291	-0.0504
	(0.179)	(0.0399)
Population	0.174**	0.0434**
	(0.0767)	(0.0170)
GDP	0.248***	0.0463**
	(0.0940)	(0.0215)
Civil War	-0.935***	-0.329***
	(0.200)	(0.0638)
Inter State War	0.522	0.136
	(0.533)	(0.0849)
Strikes	0.378*	0.101
	(0.222)	(0.0656)
Demonstrations	-0.108**	-0.0269*
	(0.0517)	(0.0142)
Guerilla Warfare	-0.573**	-0.187***
	(0.233)	(0.0656)
Government Crises	-0.813**	-0.236*
	(0.402)	(0.123)
Terrorism	0.253	0.0582
	(0.176)	(0.0373)

Oil rent	-0.00309 (0.00647)	-0.00129 (0.00135)
Strategic distance	-0.0000419 (0.0000488)	-0.00000701 (0.0000110)
US Troops	-0.00129 (0.00972)	-0.000183 (0.00184)
Political Imprisonment	0.470*** (0.152)	0.0899*** (0.0293)
Killings	1.506*** (0.232)	0.368*** (0.0560)
Torture	0.507*** (0.178)	0.0598** (0.0298)
Disappearances (lagged)	-0.145 (0.172)	-1.016*** (0.0341)
OECD Aid	0.111 (0.0873)	0.0194 (0.0159)
Constant	0.0460 (0.110)	
N	831	831
ρ		0
Log likelihood	-533.9	
chi2	388.8	3001.2

Standard errors in parentheses * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 5: Provision of US Aid and the substitution of killing on the level of forced disappearance based on strategic Importance (with OECD Aid as a control)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Low Strategic Importance		High Strategic Importance	
	Levels of Disapp	Change in Disap	Levels of Disap	Change in Disap
Change in Killing* Aid	-1.032*	-0.222*	-0.517	-0.0610
	(0.544)	(0.117)	(0.444)	(0.0512)
Change in Killings (lagged)	17.32*	3.730*	8.471	0.980
	(9.131)	(1.966)	(7.480)	(0.864)
US Aid	-1.447**	-0.288*	-0.896	-0.0856
	(0.670)	(0.156)	(0.627)	(0.123)
Change in Killings	-0.357*	-0.0485	-0.108	-0.0208
	(0.205)	(0.0418)	(0.363)	(0.0689)
Population	0.222**	0.0472**	0.0171	0.0155
	(0.0928)	(0.0190)	(0.131)	(0.0301)
GDP	0.231*	0.0493*	0.283	0.0376
	(0.122)	(0.0274)	(0.209)	(0.0414)
Civil War	-0.927***	-0.364***	-0.854**	-0.243**
	(0.284)	(0.0893)	(0.433)	(0.118)
Inter State War	0.430	0.111	0.375	0.240
	(0.591)	(0.0914)	(0.857)	(0.155)
Strikes	0.212	0.0481	1.515**	0.222**
	(0.224)	(0.0758)	(0.627)	(0.0951)
Demonstrations	-0.0457	-0.0140	-0.244	-0.0535
	(0.0590)	(0.0102)	(0.217)	(0.0362)
Guerilla Warfare	-0.547*	-0.165**	-1.442**	-0.307*
	(0.287)	(0.0833)	(0.698)	(0.162)
Government Crises	-1.394***	-0.476***	1.046	0.203
	(0.418)	(0.127)	(1.113)	(0.217)
Terrorism	0.266	0.0737	0.332	0.0124

	(0.244)	(0.0477)	(0.359)	(0.0717)
Oil rent	-0.00766	-0.00259	0.0104	0.00172
	(0.00886)	(0.00175)	(0.0114)	(0.00221)
Strategic distance	-0.0000859	-0.00000941	-0.00205**	-0.000284***
	(0.0000540)	(0.0000111)	(0.000818)	(0.000108)
US Troops	0.00407	0.00160	-0.00595	0.0000926
	(0.0212)	(0.00282)	(0.0131)	(0.00258)
Political Imprisonment	0.610***	0.103***	0.334	0.0688
	(0.210)	(0.0368)	(0.275)	(0.0499)
Killings	1.530***	0.350***	1.647***	0.370***
	(0.240)	(0.0551)	(0.486)	(0.103)
Torture	0.535**	0.0493	0.453	0.0470
	(0.229)	(0.0347)	(0.319)	(0.0554)
Disappearances (lagged)	-0.158	-0.999***	-0.146	-1.029***
	(0.224)	(0.0432)	(0.316)	(0.0491)
OECD Aid	0.0974	0.00980	0.233	0.0441*
	(0.110)	(0.0188)	(0.150)	(0.0262)
Constant	0.219		0.136	
	(0.207)		(0.306)	
N	560	560	271	271
ρ		0		0
Log likelihood	-349.9		-163.7	
chi2	274.3	1925.9	156.3	1851.2

Standard errors in parentheses * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Appendix C - Chapter 5 Tables and Figures

Table I. Summary Statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Physical Integrity Index	4702	4.914717	2.334995	0	8
Empowerment Index	4718	8.281687	4.248599	0	14
Terrorism	6319	12.7699	52.68406	0	713
Democracy Index	5107	2.197936	0.7489538	0	2.990142
Population	5741	2.97E+07	1.15E+08	7597	1.34E+09
GDP per capita	5061	10449.43	15866.14	115.7941	144246.4
Mass Instability	5354	0.7840867	2.063733	0	28
Elite Instability	5354	0.1882705	0.9027247	0	27
Trade Openness	4922	82.42852	48.24291	1.959203	453.4373
ICCPR Ratification	5389	0.6750789	0.4683888	0	1
US Ally	5371	0.2690374	0.4435007	0	1
US Troops	4107	2164.464	15358.08	0	256391
IGO's Present	5372	322.3233	18.45128	279	348
INGO Present	5224	647.3076	719.4525	4	3551
Civil War	4912	0.1742671	0.3793776	0	1

Robustness Checks

Robustness Check 1: Terrorism as a Dummy Variable

	(1) PHYSINT	(2) NEW_EMPINX
Terrorism	-0.761***	0.256
	(0.254)	(0.346)
Democracy (Lagged)	0.371***	1.709***
	(0.136)	(0.219)
Terrorism*Democracy	0.154	0.042
	(0.101)	(0.132)
Population	-0.418***	-0.564***
	(0.061)	(0.146)
GDP per capita	0.274***	-0.351*
	(0.073)	(0.201)
Mass Instability	-0.045***	0.013
	(0.017)	(0.036)
Elite Instability	-0.027	0.028
	(0.027)	(0.062)
Trade Openness	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)
ICCPR	-0.351**	0.645*
	(0.153)	(0.342)
US Ally	-0.512***	2.178***
	(0.154)	(0.468)
US Troops	0.089**	0.049
	(0.038)	(0.060)
IGO's joined	-3.503***	3.842**
	(0.838)	(1.551)
INGO Present	-0.008	0.212
	(0.089)	(0.209)
Civil War	-1.298***	0.011
	(0.173)	(0.237)
Empowerment Index	0.171***	
	(0.020)	
Integrity Rights Index		0.358***
		(0.052)
Constant	27.802***	-10.394
	(4.540)	(8.562)
N	3183	3183
Wald- χ^2	1025.407	314.904
Rho	0.259	0.477
R-Squared	0.61	0.62

Standard errors in parentheses* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01


Robustness Check 2. With Lagged Dependent Variable (Lagged Physical and Empowerment Rights Index)

	(1)	(2)
	PHYSINT	NEW_EMPINX
Terrorism	-0.001	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Democracy (Lagged)	0.038	0.417***
	(0.064)	(0.062)
Terrorism*Democracy	-0.000	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Population	-0.162***	-0.069***
	(0.024)	(0.024)
GDP per capita	0.161***	-0.044
	(0.035)	(0.031)
Mass Instability	-0.034***	0.046***
	(0.012)	(0.015)
Elite Instability	-0.010	0.026
	(0.020)	(0.029)
Trade Openness	-0.000	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
ICCPR	-0.132**	0.068
	(0.063)	(0.076)
US Ally	-0.284***	0.545***
	(0.077)	(0.072)
US Troops	0.047***	-0.020
	(0.017)	(0.014)
IGO's joined	-1.402***	0.873**
	(0.392)	(0.406)
INGO Present	0.002	0.057**
	(0.032)	(0.029)
Civil War	-0.589***	0.178*
	(0.097)	(0.098)
Empowerment Index	0.093***	
	(0.010)	
Integrity Rights Index (Lagged)	0.594***	
	(0.023)	
Integrity Rights Index		0.160***
		(0.022)

Empowerment Index (Lagged)		0.811***
		(0.013)
Constant	10.655***	-4.152*
	(2.166)	(2.246)
N	3151	3152
Wald- χ^2	10494.332	26548.738
Rho	0.000	0.000
R-Squared	0.75	0.88

Standard errors in parentheses* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Figure 4. Marginal effect of terrorism on government respect on physical integrity and empowerment rights (Lagged DV as IV)




Robustness Check 3: Without ICCPR

	(1)	(2)
	Physical Integrity Rights	Empowerment Index
Terrorism	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)
Democracy (Lagged)	0.396*** (0.135)	1.791*** (0.224)
Terrorism*Democracy	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Population	-0.448*** (0.063)	-0.539*** (0.149)
GDP per capita	0.290*** (0.075)	-0.372* (0.197)
Mass Instability	-0.046*** (0.017)	0.019 (0.038)
Elite Instability	-0.006 (0.024)	0.020 (0.063)
Trade Openness	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)
US Ally	-0.445*** (0.159)	2.119*** (0.508)
US Troops	0.085** (0.042)	0.065 (0.062)
IGO's joined	-4.295*** (0.846)	4.754*** (1.613)
INGO Present	-0.029 (0.092)	0.244 (0.219)
Civil War	-1.240*** (0.175)	0.042 (0.246)
Empowerment Index	0.161*** (0.020)	
Integrity Rights Index		0.339*** (0.053)
Constant	32.442*** (4.526)	-15.616* (8.927)
N	3183	3183
Wald- χ^2	1013.746	265.404
Rho	0.272	0.482
R-Squared	.60	.61

Standard errors in parentheses* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Figure 5. Marginal effect of terrorism on government respect of Physical Integrity Rights and Empowerment Rights (Without ICCPR)




Robustness Check 4. With Killings and Freedom of Speech as a DV

	(1)	(2)
	Killings	Freedom of Speech
Terrorism	-0.001*	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Democracy	0.127***	0.278***
	(0.037)	(0.040)
Terrorism*Democracy	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Population	-0.149***	-0.098***
	(0.023)	(0.023)
GDP per capita	0.129***	-0.040
	(0.030)	(0.032)
Mass Instability	-0.018***	0.009*
	(0.007)	(0.005)
Elite Instability	-0.001	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Trade Openness	0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)
ICCPR	-0.166***	0.032
	(0.057)	(0.055)
US Ally	-0.172**	0.370***
	(0.068)	(0.088)
US Troops	0.039**	0.017
	(0.016)	(0.013)
IGO's joined	-1.525***	0.821***
	(0.323)	(0.282)
INGO Present	-0.032	0.038
	(0.030)	(0.038)
Civil War	-0.428***	-0.061
	(0.060)	(0.038)
Freedom of Speech (lagged)	0.095***	
	(0.025)	
Killings (lagged)		0.078***
		(0.022)
Constant	11.410***	-2.949*
	(1.759)	(1.565)
N	3199	3199
Wald- χ^2	756.244	237.040
Rho	0.226	0.325
R-Squared	0.42	0.39

Standard errors in parentheses* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Figure 6. Marginal effect of terrorism on Killings and Freedom of Speech



Robustness 5. Victims of Terrorism as an alternate Independent Variable

	(1)	(2)
	PHYSINT	NEW_EMPINX
Terrorism	-0.105	0.087
	(0.090)	(0.166)
Democracy (Lagged)	0.629***	2.048***
	(0.179)	(0.260)
Terrorism*Democracy	-0.064	-0.015
	(0.040)	(0.065)
Population	-0.373***	-0.516***
	(0.064)	(0.155)
GDP per capita	0.283***	-0.310
	(0.091)	(0.229)
Mass Instability	-0.044**	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.039)
Elite Instability	-0.015	0.020
	(0.024)	(0.060)
Trade Openness	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.004)
ICCPR	-0.292	0.452
	(0.189)	(0.356)
US Ally	-0.806***	2.532***
	(0.215)	(0.800)
US Troops	0.214***	-0.015
	(0.050)	(0.077)
IGO's joined	-1.863	-0.267
	(1.224)	(1.911)
INGO Present	-0.069	0.260
	(0.095)	(0.161)
Civil War	-0.840***	-0.646**
	(0.187)	(0.266)
Empowerment Index	0.155***	
	(0.026)	
Integrity Rights Index		0.289***
		(0.061)
Constant	17.146**	12.402
	(6.948)	(10.638)
N	1204	1204
Wald- χ^2	742.283	250.294
Rho	0.192	0.509
R-Squared	0.61	0.60

Standard errors in parentheses* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Figure 7. Marginal effect of terrorism (no of victims) on government respect on Physical Integrity Rights and Empowerment Rights

