

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL STABILITY:
SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

by *6408*

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CHAPTER I

Introduction: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis

Along with the victory of the Allied Forces the turbulent years of anti-colonialist struggle did finally come to an end. But, unexpectedly, liberation from Japanese colonialism brought about another unwelcome present to Korea-- the partition of the peninsula into the northern and southern halves. In 1948 North Korea adopted the totalitarian political system. On the other hand, South Korea accepted the democratic model of the participatory state, the great ideas of which are the freedoms and dignities of the individual and the principle of government by consent of the governed. The hope that colonial government would be replaced by free democracy did not progress smoothly in South Korea. Instead of peaceful progress toward stable political institutions, the South Korean regime has been experiencing anomic violence, riots and the military take-over, whereas political stability has been well maintained in North Korea.

The question of political stability and development has been studied in many different approaches. Some of these examples are the analyses of political stability and development in terms of

- (1) socio-economic variables;¹
- (2) the level of structural-functional differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and mass participation;²
- (3) personality and behavioral attitudes;³
- (4) the level of legitimacy and efficiency;⁴
- (5) political culture;⁵
- (6) the level of political communication;⁶
- (7) the relationship between the level of institu-

tionalization and mass participation. Pointing out that modernity means stability and modernization instability, S. P. Huntington attempts to answer what is responsible for political violence and instability: it is the product of rapid social change and rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions. Thus political stability can be maintained where there is an equilibrium between the level of expansion of mass participation and that of institutionalization.⁷ Especially, Huntington, Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner have paid special attention to the role of one of the most important political institutions-- political party⁸ as a major determinant for political development and stability.

Out of those above-mentioned approaches leading to explanation of political stability, I would like to choose the analysis of the role of political parties of North and South Korea. Some of my major reasons for the selection of political party system to compare the stability of North and South Korea are as follows: (1) both North and South Korea are characterized by linguistic, regional, religious, ethnic, and cultural homogeneity; (2) form of government is not sufficient explanation of difference in stability; and (3) difference in available natural resources is not sufficient reason for the explanation of economic development and its subsequent political stability. Let us consider each of the above variables a little more in detail.

First, there have been no linguistic and regional conflicts in both North and South Korea. The peninsula, four-fifths

mountainous, with high ridges separating different quadrants of the country, sizable rivers, and with many large and small islands along the coasts brought about different characteristics, dialects and accents. And yet compared to most nations of similar size, the Korean peninsula has remarkably few such divisions. One language is generally intelligible throughout the peninsula. Dialects are close to the national tongue, with the comparatively minor exception of that on Cheju Island. Throughout Korean history, there has been no revolt and insurrection caused by linguistic or regional differences. Furthermore, ruling through relatively standardized institutions and uniform means, a strong centralism was one of the major determinants for obliteration of any decentralized activities. Not only political but also economic activities that would have encouraged regional growth, or diverse influence from abroad through trade were forbidden or rigidly controlled. Regional differences which originally existed were therefore steadily eliminated. Gregory Henderson summarizes the regional

10

homogeneity of Korea as follows:

... the smallness of the country, certain fluidities in its social system, the rapid appointments and exiles of its officials, the far-flung chain of regional markets, and the lack of internal obstructions as a result of the absence of local or feudal power tended to homogenize the culture. Thus, ... one finds in Korea remarkably few 'pockets' of people with deviant ways, living in isolation from the general society...

Second, there has been no religious conflict. Deep religious differences, which have influenced political development of such

nations as Burma, Indonesia, India and Nigeria, have had less effect on Korea. Shamanism has been overlaid first by Buddhism from the fourth century on and then by Confucianism from the ¹¹fourteenth century on. The mixture of these three-- Shamanism, Buddhism and Confucianism has not been entirely even, but they have, by and large, been applied nation-wide. Although Buddhist and Confucian influence is slight in most islands and is less strong in the northeast and northwest than in areas to the South, such differences have never been articulated in major political ways to trouble the unity of the country. For over a century from the founding of the Yi dynasty in 1392, the Confucian aristocracy pushed hard for extreme anti-Buddhist measures. However, royal ¹²influence slowed these excesses.

Catholic and Protestant missionaries entered the country in late eighteenth century. There were 4,000 Catholic in 1794, and over 12,000 in 1883. In 1945, there were somewhat less than 100,000 Catholics in Korea. Protestant missionaries entered Korea as permanent residents in 1884, first a Presbyterian and then Methodists the following year, the English Church adding to the Japanese annexation in 1910: it is estimated that there were two hundred thousand converts under the guidance of about four ¹⁴hundred and fifty foreign leaders. When Christianity was first introduced into Korea, there was a good deal of acrimony and tension between the existing Buddhist and Confucian believers and those of Christianity. However, there were no religious revolts or insurrections. Quite often the Tong-hak rebellion is considered

as religious revolt. Tong-hak developed an institutional hierarchy throughout the South, spread rapidly among the rural poor, and by 1894 numbered 400,000 members.¹⁵ Because of desperate economic conditions, rampant government harshness, and growing persecution, spokesmen for rural grievance to local government and at court were at first docile and devoted to monarchy in their petitions. But, when petitions and delegations were not heeded, representatives tried to launch a full-scale rebellion¹⁶ was not religious but a socio-political movement.

Especially during the period of the Japanese colonial totalitarianism from 1910 to 1945, there was enormously close cooperation among the Buddhist monks, Confucian scholars, and Christians of both Catholic and Protestant persuasion in the pursuit of the common cause of national independence and subsequent freedom of religion. Korea has enjoyed throughout most of its history relative religious concord.

Third, ethnic homogeneity is another characteristic Korea has had. The Korean peninsula was settled by various ethnic groups entering from the interior of northwest Asia probably during and after the third millennium B.C. As the first minority groups, the Tungusic peoples entered in various waves shortly¹⁷ before the Chinese domination of 108 B.C. Different ethnic or tribal groups did, however, coexist there, some being more closely related to the Manchurean peoples of that time, but with the unification of the peninsula under Silla dynasty from 660-668 A.D.¹⁸ the less powerful were either expelled or absorbed. The Jurchen,

who controlled the northeastern strip of Korea until the fifteenth century, seem to have exerted a fairly marked effect on the character of population of Ham-gyong province (for northeastern province in Korea). Even this has been absorbed, however.¹⁹

Furthermore, until about 1890, Koreans very rarely went abroad and, when they did, even more rarely did they return with foreign spouses. During the Japanese Annexation, a Japanese population that varied from about 150,000 in 1910 to some 700,000 by 1944-45 lived in Korea. Nevertheless, admixture was exceedingly small. Since 1945, for security reasons, no ethnic minority of significance has been admitted. Resident aliens numbered only 24,000 in 1960²⁰ and almost all are Chinese. However, the Chinese population is certainly one of the smallest in any Asian country. It is today impossible to tell from what part of Korea a Korean comes merely by his physical appearance.

In short, the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean people is attributed to the following factors: (1) political control over the unified territory from the early Silla dynasty in 660-668 A.D. encouraged the different ethnic groups to be assimilated or absorbed into relatively powerful groups; (2) another factor for absorption of the different groups is the fact that Koreans are strongly exogamous; (3) since the early 19th century, no ethnic groups have been permitted, because the Korean people tended to have feeling of supremacy over the alien peoples in terms of prejudiced moral and/or religious viewpoint. Therefore, ethnic heterogeneity, which is one of the major determinants for political instability in

some Asian and African countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sudan, Burma, Ceylon, Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, has not existed in Korea.

Fourth, cultural homogeneity is another characteristic Korea has had. Political centralism had been strengthened from the Silla society (300-935 A.D.) through the Koryo (918-1392) down to Yi dynasty. Along with the development of political centralism, Confucianism (adopted as the state-supported religion) was the major political and philosophical guideline for 500 years of Yi dynasty. Confucianism was built around the "Five Relationships" or "Bonds": father and son, husband and wife, ruler and subject, ²¹ elder and younger brother, friend and friend. All except the last relationship between friend and friend involve perfect obedience and inequality. The obedience of son to father was the core of the system. Thus attitudes toward the ruler, toward authority and government were based upon the home and subject to parental discipline. Rebelliousness to political authority was equated with rebelliousness to father.

Confucian political philosophy encouraged the bureaucracy to be the highest career: its power over all others was growing. Obedience was deeply ingrained in the heart of the masses. The citizens were perfectly socialized as subject participants. There was only one way of political communication between the ruler and the subject-- a downward allocation of values and resources from the ruler to the masses. Interest articulation and aggregation upward from the masses were not imaginable.

Fifth, some students of politics attribute the stability of North Korea to the dictatorial political system whereas the instability of South Korea is supposed to result from the democratic political system. However, the First Republic of Korea under the Rhee regime displayed a good many autocratic features. Over the 13 year period of the Rhee regime, two Constitutional Amendments were passed. The main purpose of the first Constitutional Amendments which was passed on July 5, 1952 was to adopt a provision for a direct and popular election of the President and Vice-President. Since President Rhee's Liberal party was far short of the necessary majority in the House of Representatives, a provision for the election of the President and Vice-President in the House of Representatives had to be replaced by direct and popular vote. The main purpose of the second Constitutional Amendments on November 27, 1954 was to eliminate the two-term restriction on presidential tenure-- an obvious reflection of Rhee's desire for life tenure.

Whenever the Constitutional Amendments were attempted, the democratic principle of majority will was suppressed by the threat of the police: Constitutional Amendments were followed by the round up of assemblymen by police and the proclamation of martial law without its post-approval from the House of Representatives according to the Constitution.

The principle of free and secret election by the will of the voters at the time of elections of president and the members of the House of Representatives was discarded. The National Security

Law, whose main purpose was to protect South Korea from the Communist threat, was applied to any criticism against the Rhee regime and his Liberal party. The National Security Law could prevent all the opposition parties and academic scholars and journalists from contributing any constructive criticism against the government. Freedom of speech, press, and meeting was extremely controlled under the Rhee regime. Many leaders of opposition parties were assassinated or illegally arrested: Song Chin-u, Senior Secretary of the Hankuk Democratic party, was shot to death on December 30, 1945; Yo Un-hyung was murdered on July 19, 1947; Chang Duk-su, a prominent nationalist political leader and Chief of the Political Bureau of the Hankuk Democratic party, was killed on December 2, 1947 by Pak Kwang-ok, a police sergeant of the Chong-no Police Station in Seoul; Kim Ku, a top nationalist leader and former Prime Minister of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, was killed; So Min-ho, an Assemblyman, narrowly escaped from shooting; on September 28, 1956 John M. Chang, who had just been elected Vice-President after defeating Syng-man Rhee's running-mate, Lee Kee-poong, was shot at by a would-be assassin; Cho Pong-am, the president of the Korean Progressive party, and ten leading members of the party, were arrested on January 11, 1958. Furthermore, on April 31, 1959, the Kyung-hyang Shinmun, an influential daily newspaper in Seoul was closed down. In short, South Korea under Rhee regime was more dictatorial than its ostensibly democratic structure would indicate.

Sixth, too often economic development is related to the amount of the available natural resources and the favorable ratio of manpower to the size of arable land and level of industry. With respect to the above two aspects, South Korea is far more unfavorable than North Korea. From the very beginning of the partition of the Korean peninsula, North Korea stopped providing the South with electric power and chemical fertilizers, of which the entire Korean production was located in the North. The exchange of foodstuffs, resulting from greater specialization of the South in agricultural products, was disrupted. The North possessed the greater part of Korea's mineral wealth (though the South had important reserves, especially in tungsten). Heavy industry was also largely concentrated in the North, as was almost all the hydro-electric power and over half of the thermal plants. When supplies were cut off in 1948, the South was facing an acute power crisis. The North had also supplied timber to South and most of the coal for the railways. On the other hand, the South which possessed about three-quarters of Korean production capacity in light industries, covering a wider range of products, became deprived of northern market outlets for certain consumer goods.

Coupled with all these dislocations, there was the influx of some two and half million refugees from North Korea and Japan such that, by the time of the outbreak of the Korean war, the total population of South Korea had risen from about 15 million

in 1945 to over 20 million.²⁴ Thus political instability in South Korea is often attributed to the slow pace of economic development due to lack of natural resources coupled with the more rapid increase in population. Of course, natural resources and the size of population are in part related to economic development. However, that is not the whole story.

From the study of twenty-six countries as to the effect of rates of population growth (1920-1924) on rates of economic growth (1925-1950), David McClelland introduces the hypothesis that "rapid net reproduction rates in low-density countries and slow net reproduction rates in high-density countries both tend to speed economic development, and vice versa."²⁵ From the study of twenty-five countries-- twelve Protestant and thirteen Catholic, McClelland concludes that "as of 1950, Protestant countries are economically more advanced on the average, even taking their differences in natural resources into account, than are Catholic countries. The question as to why the difference exists is another matter."²⁶

Let us consider, for example, how American non-military aid was spent in South Korea. From the beginning of the reconstruction period in mid-1953 (immediately after the end of the Korean war) to 1960, the United States Government had spent the large sum of approximately \$1,800 million on bilateral aid to Korea (excluding military aid). But non-military aid to Korea for the seven years did not bring about satisfactory results. It might partly be related to the policy of "Buy American Products". But failure

in the effective application of the foreign aid funds and the subsequent slow economic development were mainly the responsibility of the government of South Korea: (1) President Rhee²⁷ mainly emphasized capital city reconstruction; (2) the Government was anxious to get popular support from those engaged in the small-scale business enterprises such as the project of the "Small Business Revolving Loan Fund" which was adopted and emphasized rather than the long-range development plans. The former was a

Table 1. U. S. Non-Military Aid to Korea for the Seven Year Period: July 1953-June 1960

| | \$m. |
|---|-------|
| (1) Net International Cooperation and Administration Expenditures | 1,505 |
| (2) Other U. S. Expenditure under MSP | 30 |
| (3) Development Loan Fund Expenditures | 2 |
| (4) Agricultural Commodity Sales under PL 480: Deliveries | 150 |
| (5) Total U. S. Aid other than Relief | 1,687 |
| (6) UNKRA Deliveries | 122 |
| Total approximate | 1,800 |

Source: The table is based mainly on ICA, U.S. Foreign Assistance Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945, through June 30, 1960, p. 33; for items 4 and 5: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Review, vol. xv, no. 11, p. 66.

method of employing aid funds which, with the cooperation of local banks, was simple and inexpensive to administer but at the same time brought about quick and satisfactory results. An official UNKRA (United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency) report²⁸ says of it:

Some 700 small businesses have been assisted with dollar and/or hwan funds. As of 30 June 1955, 310 dollar loans totalling \$1,318,608 and 397 hwan loans amounting to 329,039 hwan had been approved... to provide equipment, raw materials and working capital for small and medium-sized industrial units... Plants manufacturing ceramics, chemicals, and drugs, optical goods, paper, ice, wire net, rubber, soap, matches, starch, glass, paint and canned goods have been aided.

One of the most conspicuous failures was the lack of the long-range development programs, especially in developing the experts. For example, approximately the four-fifths of a total

Table 2. ICA Aid Received to the end of 1960
(\$ million)

| Project Aid: 1954-60 | | Non-Project Aid: 1953-60 | |
|--------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|--------|
| Transportation | 176 | Fertilizer | 304 |
| of which: Railways | 151 | Raw Cotton | 167 |
| Industry & Mining | 136 | Petroleum, Coal & other fuels | 150 |
| of which: | | Wheat, Barley & other foodstuffs | 111 |
| (1) Power Plant | 45 | | |
| (2) Fertilizer Plant | 39 | Sub Total | (632) |
| (3) Small Industry | 23 | All other | 511 |
| Agriculture and Natural Resources | 28 | | |
| Social Service | 80 | | |
| Other | 24 | | |
| Total | 444 | Total | 1,143 |

Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Review, Nov. 1965, pp. 67-68.

International Cooperation Administration Aid during the period of 1953 to 1960 were spent on the procurement of non-project consumption goods.


Economic development, therefore, does not necessarily and simply depend upon the amount of available natural resources and industrial man-power. As McClelland points out, economic development is partly related to the achievement motivation. Insofar as economic development is related to the achievement motivation, political parties and party leaders, especially in case of modernizing countries, must play an important role of ideologizing and initiating economic development. The North Korean Workers' party initiated economic development in 1947 whereas in South Korea economic development planning started in 1962.

Furthermore, as LaPalombara and Weiner point out, whether in a free society or under a totalitarian regime, the organization called the political party is expected to organize public opinion and to communicate demands to the center of governmental power and decision. ²⁹ Somehow too the party must articulate to its followers the concept and meaning of the broader community even if the aim of party leadership is to modify profoundly or even to destroy the broader community and replace it with something else. Whether the country is relatively democratic or relatively undemocratic, the political party is likely to be intimately involved in political recruitment-- the selection of the political leadership in whose hands power and decisions

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will in large measure reside. Thus when we consider the model of Talcott Parson's A-G-I-L, the political party plays an important role to connect G (Goal Attainment) and L (Pattern Maintenance and Maintenance of Recruitment)³⁰.



S. P. Huntington also accepts the significant contribution of political party to political stability and development:

The stability of a modernizing political system depends on the strength of its political parties. A party, in turn, is strong to the extent that it has institutionalized mass support. Its strength reflects (1) the scope³¹ of that support and (2) the level of institutionalization.

Suppose we accept Huntington's theory that political stability depends upon the level of institutionalization and the scope of support, one important question can be raised: does the number of political parties have anything to do with the above two major determinants for system stability? According to Huntington, any number of parties in modernized countries may be compatible with strong parties. However, at lower levels of modernization, the one-party system tends to be strong and the multi-party system³² is invariably weak.

In this paper, I am going to test a null hypothesis that in modernizing countries there is no difference between one-party and multi-party systems with respect to political stability.

CHAPTER II

Methodology and Cross-cultural Hypothesis Test

I would like to take two preparatory steps leading toward the study of political stability in the North Korean one-party system and the South Korean multi-party system. The first step is to clarify which countries in the world are really considered as 'modernizing' countries, because, unless this is identified, the hypothesis will be unlikely to be tested. The second step is to test the null hypothesis on the basis of cross-national data. Finally, I would like to elaborate this hypothesis by investigating the cases of North and South Korea.

Modernization has been defined in many different ways with different perspectives. Martin Needler, in his article on Mexico, notes the development from the "vicious circle of dictatorship, misery, and revolution" to a system that is developed, stable, and democratic.¹ Thus, Needler's definition is mainly based on democracy and stability. According to Orthodox Marxists, a feudal state is less developed than one with an established bourgeoisie, and both are less developed than one that has achieved socialism. C. E. Black attempts to classify political modernization in the "historical" and "periodizational" perspectives.² James S. Coleman points out another attempt to measure political modernization in terms of structural-functional perspective.³ Sometimes, modernization is based on a variety of factors that must be met in whole or in part. Some of these

factors are: national consensus, political communication, national integration and the secularization of politics. Political modernization is also associated with certain geographical areas. For example, most of the countries in the Afro-Asian and Latin-American regions are classified as underdeveloped or modernizing, whereas the countries in Europe and North America as modernized. Sometimes, political modernization is also measured in terms of socio-economic development. Since none of these approaches is wholly satisfactory, the test of the null hypothesis is applied to each of four different typologies of the modernizing countries differently classified by (1) C. E. Black (historical and periodizational perspectives), (2) James S. Coleman (structural-functional perspective), (3) Fred R. von der Mehden (political and economic, combined with geographical one)⁴ and (4) Paul Samuelson (per capita GNP)⁵.

In establishing his historical typology, Black is interested in the characteristics and problems that modernizing leaders have faced in gaining political power and in implementing their programs. Thus, Black classifies political modernization into five categories: (1) "early European" or "early European derived" (political leaders, in order to modernize, had to find solution to their problems without the assistance of outside models, but they were favored by an essential continuity of political and territorial structure); (2) "later European" or "later European derived" (The seizure of power by modernizing leaders involved in a fundamental reorganization of political structure and of

territory. In these cases the establishment of national identity was a predominant issue for several generations, relegating to a secondary place the intellectual, economic, and social aspects of modernization); (3) "non-European autochthonous" (Those later-modernizing societies which, by virtue of a long tradition of effective central government, never came under the direct rule of more modern societies. In these societies the struggle between traditional and modernizing leaders took place within the established framework of territory and institutions, but under great pressure from the example of the more modern societies); (4) "developed tutelary" (where the traditional institutions of a society were well developed, modernization resulted from an interaction between these institutions and those of a tutelary society); and (5) "underdeveloped tutelary" (where the societies under tutelage did not have well-developed institutions, the influence of the tutelary society was correspondingly much greater).⁶

With respect to periodization of political modernization, Black is concerned with the three principal phases: (1) "pre-transitional" (modern ideas first begin to have an impact on a traditional society, without as yet causing a profound upheaval); (2) "early transitional" and "mid-transitional" (societies entered transitional phase in 1945 or later, and prior to 1945 respectively. Black's "transitional" phase is the phase of active struggles, consisting of three essential features. The first is the assertion on the part of political leaders of the determination to modernize-- either by means of a revolution by disaffected members of the


traditional oligarchy, by modernizing leaders representing new political interests, or by the initiatives of traditional oligarchy itself. The second feature is an effective and decisive break with the institutions associated with a predominantly agrarian way of life, permitting the transition to an industrial way of life. Finally, the creation of a politically organized society in those cases where one did not exist in the initial phase is also essential); and (3) "advanced" (transitional phase is completed. All the principal groups of elites are agreed that modernization is desirable and the political struggle is now engaged between the supporters of rival groups of modernization rather than between modernizers and traditionalists.⁷

Thus, I have attempted to classify (1) the countries falling into the intersection area of "early European" (or "early European derived") and "advanced" as modernized countries; (2) the countries falling into the intersection of area of "later European" (or "later European derived") and "advanced" as moderately modernized countries; (3) the countries falling into the intersection area of "non-European autochthonous" and "advanced" are also considered as moderately modernized; and (4) the countries falling into the area of (both developed and underdeveloped) "tutelary" and the countries of "later European" (or "later European derived"), which have not yet reached the stage of "advanced" as modernizing countries.

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Chart 1.1. Political Modernization: Historical and Periodizational Perspectives



- : Periodizational
- : Historical
- ▨ : Modernized (10 countries)
- ▧ : Moderately Modernized (33 countries)
- ⬆ : Modernizing (72 countries)

Chart 1.2. Black's Typology of Political Modernization and the related countries n= 115

| Modernized | Moderately Modernized | Modernizing | |
|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Australia | Albania | Algeria | Lebanon |
| Belgium | Argentina | Afghanistan | Libya |
| Canada | Austria | Bolivia | Malaysia |
| France | Brazil | Burma | Malagasy R. |
| Luxembourg | Bulgaria | Burundi | Mauritania |
| Netherlands | Chile | Cambodia | Mongolia |
| New Zealand | China R.R. | Cameroun | Morocco |
| Switzerland | Costa Rica | Cent. Afr. Rep. | Nepal |
| United Kingdom | Cuba | Ceylon | Nicaragua |
| United States | Czechoslovakia | Chad | Niger |
| | Denmark | Colombia | Nigeria |
| | Finland | Congo (Bra.) | Pakistan |
| | Germany E. | Congo (Leo.) | Panama |
| | Germany Fr. | Cyprus | Paraguay |
| | Greece | Dahomey | Peru |
| | Guatemala | Dominican Rep. | Philippines |
| | Hungary | Ecuador | Rwanda |
| | Iceland | El Salvador | Saudi Arabia |
| | Ireland | Ethiopia | Senegal |
| | Italy | Gabon | Sierre Leon |
| | Japan | Ghana | South Afr. |
| | Mexico | Guinea | Somalia |
| | Norway | Haiti | Sudan |
| | Poland | Honduras | Syria |
| | Portugal | India | Tanzania |
| | Rumania | Indonesia | Togo |
| | Spain | Iran | Trinidad |
| | Sweden | Iraq | Tunisia |
| | Turkey | Israel | Uganda |
| | Uruguay | Ivory Coast | U.A.R. |
| | U.S.S.R. | Jamaica | Upper Volta |
| | Venezuela | Jordan | Vietnam N. |
| | Yugoslavia | Korea N. | Vietnam S. |
| | | Korea S. | Yemen |
| | | Laos | |
| 10 | 33 | 72 | |

Source: A. S. Banks and R. B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Massachusetts: the M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 80.

As the second step, I have rearranged both 'modernized' and 'modernizing' countries in terms of one-party and multi-party system (eliminating countries with non-party, one-party dominant and two-party systems). And then modernized and modernizing countries under one-party and those under multi-party system are reclassified in terms of stable and unstable. Here, political stability is also defined in many different ways with different perspectives. To some 'stability' depends upon the duration of the government in days either headed by the same leader or supported by the same party or parties' coalition in the Chamber.⁸ To others 'stability' may mean the maintenance of a particular system of government, a particular constitutional order. Yet another definition might be concerned with the frequency of political violence: an unstable system would be one⁹ marked by frequent riots, coups, assassinations or rebellions. Another might be concerned with the basic economic relationships of the country: an unstable state would be one in which ownership of the means of production changed sharply. No one indicator is by itself adequate as a means to define the terms stability. Faced with a conceptual problem of this nature there is little point in trying to isolate a single meaning of 'stability' as as to use it exclusively.

I have considered three indices to define political stability in this paper. They are: (1) whether or not in a given system a Chief Executive has been illegally ousted from his legal position; (2) whether or not violence, riot, and/or military coup have overthrown

a legal political system or impinge upon the welfare or lives of a significant number of people in a given society; (3) whether or not national constitution has been illegally suspended. All these indices were measured from the period of independence of the modernizing countries up to 1970. However, the modernizing countries which became independent in 1965 or thereafter were arbitrarily excluded as 'too early to judge their political stability yet'.

Chart 1.3. Multi-party System (based upon Black's Perspective)

| Modernized | | | Modernizing | | |
|-------------|-----------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Stable | Unstable | Unascertainable | Stable | Unstable | Unascertainable |
| Belgium | Argentina | Italy | Israel | Ceylon | Jordan |
| Denmark | Brazil | | Costa Rica | Congo (Leo) | |
| Finland | Chile | | | Domin. Rep. | |
| Iceland | Guatemala | | | Ecuador | |
| Ireland | Turkey | | | Indonesia | |
| Luxembourg | Venezuela | | | Korea S. | |
| Netherlands | | | | Laos | |
| Norway | | | | Lebanon | |
| Sweden | | | | Nigeria | |
| Switzerland | | | | Panama | |
| | | | | Peru | |
| | | | | Sierre Leon | |
| | | | | Togo | |
| | | | | Uganda | |

1

Fighting between guerrillas and the Government forces fourth consecutive day; dead total at least 100 and wounded 250. see New York Times, June 10, 1970, 15:2 and June 11, 1:1. But so far the Government has maintained stability.

Chart 1.4. One-party System (based upon Black's perspective)

| Modernized | | | Modernizing | | |
|----------------|----------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| Stable | Unstable | * Unascertainable | Stable | Unstable | * Unascertainable |
| Albania | | Cuba | Guinea | Algeria ¹ | Centr. |
| Bulgaria | | | Ivory Coast | Cambodia ² | Afr. Rep. |
| China P.R. | | | Korea N. | Congo (Braz) ³ | Chad |
| Czechoslovakia | | | Liberia | Dahomey ⁴ | |
| Germany E. | | | Mauritania ⁵ | | |
| Hungary | | | Mongolia | Mali | |
| Poland | | | Niger | | |
| Portugal | | | Tanzania | | |
| Rumania | | | Tunisia | | |
| Spain | | | Upper Volta | | |
| Yugoslavia | | | Vietnam N. | | |
| U.S.S.R. | | | | | |
| 12 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 6 | 2 |

* The countries that have had experience of neither suspension of constitution nor of being overthrown but have had abortive rebellions against legal regimes are classified as 'unascertainable'.

¹ President Ben Bella was ousted in a bloodless coup by army forces led by Boumedienne; Council of Revolution was formed. see New York Times, January 20, 1965, 1:8.

² The Congo (Brazzaville) army staged a coup while Massamba-Debat was out of the country at the end of June 1966, but failed; Massamba-Debat of country's sole political party took the post of Prime Minister in January 1968, but the army removed his government in August. Ngouabi, now in control, forced Massamba-Debat from the presidency in September and became president himself in January 1969. see Americana Encyclopaedia, vol. 7, p. 558 (1970).

³ Army Chief General Soglo staged bloodless coup for the second time in 25 months; General Soglo dismissed President Apithy and Ahomadegbe and took over as Chief of State. see New York Times, November 30, 1965, 11:1.

⁴ President Nkrumah, while on a visit to Hanoi, was ousted by an army coup supported by police, composed of police and army officers. Constitution was suspended. see New York Times, February 25, 1966, 1:1.

According to the above charts, in modernized countries both one-party and multi-party systems may be compatible with political stability, since a greater majority of the modernized countries under multi-party system maintains political stability similar to those under one-party system. On the other hand, in modernizing countries, the above charts read that eleven out of seventeen one-party countries are stable, whereas fourteen out of sixteen multi-party countries are unstable.

Table 3. Modernizing Countries classified in terms of C. E. Black's Perspective

| | One-party System | Multi-party System |
|----------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Stable | 11 | 2 |
| Unstable | 6 | 14 |

5

On November 19, 1968, President Keita and his government were overthrown in a bloodless coup by junior army officers. see Americana Encyclopaedia, vol. 18, p. 167a (1970).

Sources for Charts 3 and 4: Merle Kling, "Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," John H. Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 123-166; A. A. Castagno, Jr., "Somali Republic," James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1964), pp. 512-559; William J. Foltz, "Senegal," James S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, ibid., pp. 16-64; Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 49-59; Banks and Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Mass.: the M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 84-85 and 101; New York Times Index (New York, 1960-70).

The above 2x2 table was applied to Chi-square in order to test a null hypothesis that in modernizing countries there is no difference between one-party and multi-party systems with respect to political stability. For 1 d.f., we find that $\chi^2 \leq 7.9$ has probability of .005 when the null hypothesis is true. Thus, the probability of $\chi^2 \leq 9.409$ is much greater than .005. Therefore, we may decide to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, there is a difference between one-party and multi-party systems with respect to political stability.

James S. Coleman has described the properties of a 'modern political system' as follows:

The most general characteristic of such a system is the relatively high degree of differentiation, explicitness, and functional distinctiveness of political and governmental structures, each of which tends to perform, for the system as a whole, a regulatory role for the respective political and authoritative function.

According to Coleman, the structural-functional properties of political modernity can be summarized as follows: (1) in the political socialization process, the manifest, secondary, system-wide structures serve to create a distinct loyalty to the general

| | | | $\chi^2 = \frac{N(ad-bc)^2}{(a+b)(c+d)(a+c)(b+d)}$ |
|--------------------|--------------------|----|---|
| * One-party System | Multi-party System | | |
| S. 11 | 2 | 13 | $\chi^2 = \frac{33(11 \times 14 - 6 \times 2)^2}{13 \times 20 \times 17 \times 16}$ |
| Uns. 6 | 14 | 20 | $= \frac{665412}{70720}$ |
| 17 | 16 | 33 | $= 9.409$ |

$$\alpha_{.005}(1d.f.) = 7.9 < 9.409$$

$\therefore H_0$ is rejected.

political system, not only by their direct impact upon the individual citizen, but by their penetration and regulation of primary structure; (2) in political recruitment, ascriptive elements are present, but they tend to be contained within or limited by general achievement criteria; (3) in interest articulation, associational interest groups perform a system-wide regulatory role by processing raw claims and directing them in an orderly way and in aggregable form through the party system, the legislature, and the bureaucracy-- thus helping to maintain the boundary between the society and the polity; (4) in interest aggregation, a party-system-- characterized by competing, pragmatic, and bargaining parties-- regulates and gives order to the performance of the aggregative function by other structures in the system; (5) political communication is performed by autonomous and specialized media which tend to penetrate all other structures and to transmit a steady flow of information within the polity; (6) finally, in the performance of authoritative functions by governmental structures, boundaries between the latter tend to be more sharply delineated and more effectively maintained, and informal particularistic structures throughout the system tend to be penetrated and acculturated to the secondary formal structures.

11

Coleman further points out that the Anglo-American polities most closely approximate the above-mentioned properties of a modern political systems. On the other hand, in 74 underdeveloped countries classified in terms of the degree of competitiveness (competitive, semi-competitive, and authoritarian) and the degree

of political modernity (modern, mixed, and traditional), three common features are as follows: (1) one is the 'mixed' character of their social, economic, and political processes. Most of the countries are still overwhelmingly rural and the majority of the populations are illiterate. Per capita GNP in these countries remain very low. The subsistence problem persists as an important factor in most of these societies, and industrialization is either just getting underway or remains only an aspiration. The central structures of government are in most instances modern in form, but the authoritative as well as the political functions tend to be performed through a variety of 'mixed' structures embodying both modern and traditional elements; (2) a second common feature is their lack of integration. This is largely due to the ethnic, religious, racial, and/or cultural pluralism characteristic of the societies. The critical factor, however, is not that these societies are pluralistic. Pluralism is one of the key attributes of most modern societies, but interests still tend to be defined predominantly in terms of tribe, race, religion, or communal reference group; (3) a third characteristic is the wide gap which exists between the traditional masses and the essentially modern subsociety¹² of the Westernized elite.

Thus, I attempted to classify Coleman's 74 underdeveloped countries in terms of one-party and multi-party system (eliminating countries with non-party, one-party dominant, and two-party systems). And then the countries of one-party and multi-party system were reclassified in terms of political stability.

Chart 2.1. Classification of Political Systems in Underdeveloped Areas (based upon Coleman)

| Classification Criteria | | Countries by Area | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|------------|
| Degree of Development | Political Modernity | Southeast Asia | Near East |
| Competitiveness | Modern | Malaya | Ceylon |
| | | Philippines | India |
| | | Burma | Turkey |
| | | Indonesia | |
| | | Thailand | |
| Semi-competitive | | Algeria | Morocco |
| | | Iran | Tunisia |
| | | Jordan | |
| | | Cameroon | |
| | | Central Africa | |
| | | Chad | |
| | | Dahomey | |
| | | Gabon | |
| | | Guinea | |
| | | Ivory Coast | |
| | | Mali | |
| | | Fed. Union of Mauritania | |
| | | Niger | |
| | | Nigeria | |
| | | Angola | |
| | | Belgian Congo | |
| | | Liberia | |
| | | Mozambique | |
| | | Ruanda-Urundi | |
| Authoritarian | Mixed | Cambodia | Pakistan |
| | | Laos | |
| | | Iraq | |
| | | Libya | |
| | | Sudan | |
| | | U.A.R. | |
| | | Afghanistan | |
| | | Saudi Arabia | |
| | | Yemen | |
| | | Chile | Uruguay |
| | | Argentina | Costa Rica |
| | | Brazil | |
| | | Colombia | Panama |
| | | Ecuador | Peru |
| | | Rep. of Congo | |
| | | Sierre Leon | |
| | | Tanganyika | |
| | | Togoland | |
| | | Uganda | |
| | | Upper Volta | |
| | | Union of So. Africa | |
| | | Bolivia | Haiti |
| | | Cuba | Honduras |
| | | Domin. Rep. | Nicaragua |
| | | El Salvador | Paraguay |
| | | Guatemala | Venezuela |

Source: G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman (ed.), The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 534.

Chart 2.2. One-party vs. Multi-party System
of Coleman's Underdeveloped Countries

| One-party | | | Multi-party | | | |
|-------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------|
| Stable | Unstable | Unascertainable | Stable | Unstable | Unascertainable | |
| Tunisia | Cambodia | Centr. | Israel | Indonesia | Chile | Jordan |
| Ivory Coast | Algeria | Afr. Rep. | Costa Rica | Laos | Argentina | |
| Mauritania | Dahomey | Chad | | Ceylon | Brazil | |
| Niger | Ghana | Cuba | | Lebanon | Ecuador | |
| Liberia | Mali | | | Turkey | Domin. Rep. | |
| Tanzania | Congo (Braz) | | | Nigeria | Guatemala | |
| Upper Volta | | | | Congo (Leo) | Panama | |
| Guinea | | | | Sierre Leon | Peru | |
| | | | | Togo | Venezuela | |
| | | | | Uganda | | |
| 8 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 19 | 1 | |

Table 4. Underdeveloped Countries classified
in terms of Coleman's structural-functional
perspective

| | One-party System | Multi-party System |
|----------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Stable | 8 | 2 |
| Unstable | 6 | 19 |

According to the above table, eight out of fourteen one-party countries are stable whereas nineteen out of twenty-one multi-party countries are unstable. When this 2x2 table was applied to the Chi-square test, the null hypothesis was also rejected

at $\alpha = .005$ level. In other words, according to the typology made by Coleman, there is also a significant difference between one-party and multi-party systems with respect to political stability.*

Fred R. von der Mehden selects 84 countries as underdeveloped on the basis of economic and political factors, combined with an area concept. Von der Mehden points out that:¹³

Two avenues of speculation have been considered (in the selection of 84 countries as underdeveloped). The entire area of Latin America, Africa and Asia has been surveyed in an effort to ascertain if, in fact, it has characteristic political processes. The political usefulness of the term underdeveloped, as used by other disciplines, can then be tested...

He further mentions that few would describe as politically developed a state that is unable to provide for its citizens both physical safety and the necessities of life (enough food to prevent starvation and sufficient housing to stop exposure).¹⁴

| * One-party System | | Multi-party System | | |
|-----------------------|----|--------------------|----|---|
| S. | 8 | 2 | 10 | $x^2 = \frac{35(8 \times 19 - 2 \times 6)^2}{(10)(25)(14)(21)}$ |
| Uns. | 6 | 19 | 25 | |
| | 14 | 21 | 35 | $= 9.333$ |
| | | | | $\alpha_{.005} (1 d.f.) = 7.9 < 9.333$ |
| | | | | $\therefore H_0$ is rejected. |

Chart 3.1. Developing Countries and the Related Number of Political Party Systems (based upon von der Mehden)

| One-party | Multi-party | Two-party | One-party dominant | Non-party | Unascertainable |
|--------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Algeria | Argentina | Colombia | Bolivia | Afghanistan | Burma |
| Cambodia | Brazil 2 | Jamaica | Burundi | Ethiopia | Iran |
| Centr. | Cameroon | Kenya | El Salvador | Saudi Arabia | Iraq |
| Afr. Rep. | Ceylon | Morocco | Gabon | Haiti | Pakistan |
| Chad | Chile | Nicaragua | Gambia | Libya 4 | Sudan |
| China (Nat) | Congo (Leo) | Paraguay | India | Korea S. | Syria |
| China P.R. | Costa Rica | Philippines | Malagasy | | Yemen |
| Congo (Braz) | Guatemala | Trinidad | Malaysia | | Thailand |
| Dahomey | Indonesia | Union of | Mexico | | |
| Ghana | Israel | S. Africa | Rwanda | | |
| Guinea | Jordan | Uruguay | Senegal | | |
| Ivory Coast | Lebanon | | Vietnam S. | | |
| Liberia | Nigeria | | | | |
| Mali | Panama | | | | |
| Mauritania | Peru | | | | |
| Niger | Sierre Leon | | | | |
| Korea N. | Somalia | | | | |
| Vietnam N. | Turkey | | | | |
| Tanzania | Uganda | | | | |
| Togo | Venezuela | | | | |
| Tunisia | | | | | |
| Upper Volta | | | | | |

21 20 10 12 6 8

1 In Togo there were four political parties: the UDPT, Juvento, CUT, and MPT. In 1967 the army deposed Grunitsky. See Encyclopaedia Americana: International Edition (1970) (New York: American Corporation), vol. 26, p. 668.

2 In Cameroon there were three major parties: UPC, DC and UC. But since independence on October 1, 1961, the UPC has been dominant. See ibid., vol. 5, pp. 282-86.

3 The first Assembly elections after independence were held in 1965. The Somali Youth League held 90 seats, the Somali National Congress 15, and other 18. Thus, Somalia has been a one-party dominant state. See ibid., vol 25, pp. 250-51.

Chart 3.2. One-party vs. Multi-party System
of von der Mehden's Developing Countries

| One-party | | | Multi-party | | |
|--------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Stable | Unstable | Unascertainable | Stable | Unstable | Unascertainable |
| China (Nat.) | Algeria | Central | Costa | Argentina | Jordan |
| China P.R. | Cambodia | Afr. Rep. | Rica | Brazil | |
| Guinea | Congo (Braz.) | | Israel | Ceylon | |
| Ivory Coast | Dahomey | Chad | | Chile | |
| Liberia | Ghana | | | Congo (Leo.) | |
| Mauritania | Mali | | | Guatemala | |
| Niger | | | | Indonesia | |
| Korea N. | | | | Lebanon | |
| Vietnam N. | | | | Nigeria | |
| Tanzania | | | | Panama | |
| Tunisia | | | | Peru | |
| Upper Volta | | | | Sierre Leon | |
| | | | | Korea S. | |
| | | | | Turkey | |
| | | | | Uganda | |
| | | | | Venezuela | |
| 12 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 1 |

Table 5. Developing Countries classified in terms of
von der Mehden's Political and Economic Factors, combined
with an Area Concept

| | One-party | Multi-party |
|----------|-----------|-------------|
| Stable | 12 | 2 |
| Unstable | 6 | 16 |

4

In South Korea under the military junta from 1961 to 1963, there was no political party. But during the whole period from 1948 to 1970, South Korea had a multi-party system.

Source: Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 141-42.

When von der Mehden's 84 developing countries were classified in terms of (1) either one-party or multi-party system by eliminating countries with non-party, one-party dominant and two-party systems and (2) political stability, twelve out of eighteen countries under one-party system are stable whereas sixteen out of eighteen multi-party systems are unstable. When the above 2x2 table were applied to the Chi-square test, the null hypothesis was rejected at the $\alpha = .001$ level. In other words, there is a difference between one-party and multi-party system with respect to political stability.*

According to Paul Samuelson, the term underdeveloped is defined as follows:
15

An underdeveloped nation is simply one with real per capita income that is low relative to the present-day per capita incomes of such nations as Canada, the United States, Great Britain, and Western Europe generally.

| * One-party System Multi-party System | | | |
|---|----|----|----|
| S. | 12 | 2 | 14 |
| Uns. | 6 | 16 | 22 |
| | 18 | 18 | 36 |

$$\chi^2 = \frac{N(ad-bc)^2}{(a+b)(c+d)(a+c)(b+d)}$$

$$\chi^2 = \frac{36(12 \times 16 - 2 \times 6)^2}{(14)(22)(18)(18)}$$

$$= \frac{1166400}{99792}$$

$$= 11.68$$

$$\chi_{.001(1 \text{ d.f.})} = 10.827 < 11.68$$

Thus, H_0 is rejected.

Chart 4.1. Countries grouped by Level of Economic Development (based upon Samuelson)

| Highly developed | Intermediate | Underdeveloped | |
|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Australia | Argentina | Africa | Domin. Rep. |
| Belgium | Austria | Algeria | Ecuador |
| Canada | Bulgaria | Angola | El Salvador |
| Czechoslovakia | Chile | Cameroon | Guatemala |
| Denmark | Costa Rica | Chad | Hiti |
| Finland | Cuba | Congo | Honduras |
| France | Greece | Dahomey | Nicaragua |
| Germany | Hungary | Ethiopia | Paraguay |
| Israel | Ireland | Ghana | Peru |
| Japan | Italy | Guinea | Asia |
| Kuwait | Jamaica | Ivory Coast | Afghanistan |
| Netherlands | Lebanon | Kenya | Burma |
| New Zealand | Libya | Liberia | Cambodia |
| Norway | Mexico | Malagasy Rep. | Ceylon |
| Sweden | Panama | Malawi | China |
| Switzerland | Poland | Mali | Formosa |
| U.S.S.R. | Portugal | Morocco | India |
| United Kingdom | Puerto Rico | Mozambique | Indonesia |
| United States | Rep. of So. Africa | Niger | Iran |
| | Rumania | Nigeria | Iraq |
| | Singapore | Rhodesia S. | Jordan |
| | Spain | Rwanda | Laos |
| | Uruguay | Senegal | Malaysia |
| | Venezuela | Sierre Leon | Nepal |
| | Yugoslavia | Sudan | Korea N. |
| | | Tanzania | Pakistan |
| | | Togo | Philippines |
| | | Tunisia | Saudi Arabia |
| | | Uganda | Korea S. |
| | | United Arab Rep. | Syria |
| | | Upper Volta | Thailand |
| | | Zambia | Vietnam S. |
| | | | Yemen |
| | | | Europe |
| | | America | Albania |
| | | Bolivia | |
| | | Brazil | |
| | | British West Indies | |
| | | Colombia | |

Source: Paul Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 741-45.

Chart 4.2. One-party vs. Multi-party System
of Samuelson's Underdeveloped Countries

| One-party | | | Multi-party | | |
|-------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Stable | Unstable | Unascertainable | Stable | Unstable | Unascertainable |
| Guinea | Algeria | Chad | | Niger | Jordan |
| Ivory Coast | Congo (Braz.) | | | Sierre Leon | |
| Liberia | Dahomey | | | Uganda | |
| Niger | Mali | | | Brazil | |
| Tanzania | Cambodia | | | Domin. Rep. | |
| Upper Volta | | | | Ecuador | |
| China | | | | Guatemala | |
| Formosa | | | | Peru | |
| Korea N. | | | | Ceylon | |
| Albania | | | | Indonesia | |
| | | | | Laos | |
| | | | | Korea S. | |
| | | | | Turkey | |
| 11 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 1 |

Table 6. Underdeveloped Countries classified in
terms of Samuelson's per capita GNP

| | One-party | Multi-party |
|----------|-----------|-------------|
| Stable | 11 | 0 |
| Unstable | 6 | 13 |

When the similar approach was applied to Samuelson's underdeveloped nations, the null hypothesis was also rejected at the $=.001$ level.*

In short, the Chi-square test which was applied to each of the above four different cases brought about the same result, namely, that the null hypothesis was rejected. Thus, one can see that in modernizing countries there is a difference between one-party and multi-party system with respect to political stability.

| * One-party System Multi-party System | | | | | |
|---|----|----|----|---|--|
| S. | 11 | 0 | 11 | $\chi^2 = \frac{30(11 \times 13 - 0 \times 6)^2}{(11)(19)(17)(13)}$ $= \frac{613470}{46189}$ $= 13.281$ | |
| Uns. | 6 | 13 | 19 | | |
| | 17 | 13 | 30 | | |

$$\chi_{.001}(1 \text{ d.f.}) = 10.82 < 13.28$$

Thus, H_0 is rejected.

CHAPTER III

Analysis of Institutional Strength of Political Parties of North and South Korea

A. Criteria for Institutional Strength

In terms of political stability, what really counts is not simply number of political parties but rather the level of institutionalization which the party system maintains or strengthens. From this viewpoint, the number of political parties is important insofar as it affects the ability of the system to maintain its institutional strength. Here, institutionalization refers to the process by which political organizations and procedures acquire values and stability.¹

In order to operationalize the idea of institutional strength, we need to consider two important steps, namely, to specify the political institutions and to provide some key indicators for measurement of the level of institutional strength. According to both S. P. Huntington and M. C. Hudson, political institutions include bureaucracies, political parties, legislatures, elections, military organizations, ruling councils, and leaders.²

The second and more complex step is to provide some key indicators in order to measure institutional strength. One approach is to consider Talcott Parsons' four functional imperatives of the social system as criteria for the performance of political institutions. These functions are (1) pattern maintenance and tension management; (2) adaptation; (3) integration; and (4) goal achievement and goal gratification.³

Another approach is to follow S. P. Huntington's formulation of the dimensions of institutional strength. These dimensions are (1) adaptability; (2) complexity; (3) autonomy; and (4) coherence. The more adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent a state's political institutions, the more likely it is to cope effectively with the tensions and stresses of modernization.⁴

David Apter also deals with the institutional strength in terms of the structural and functional requisites of governments in modernizing situations. He sees information and coercion as the two functional requisites and suggests that "a government's use of the two must somehow be harmonious."⁵ The structural requisites are a structure of authoritative decision-making and a structure of accountability. The former is a pattern for making decisions which the members of the unit regard as legitimate; the latter means that government, as a decision-maker, must be answerable to a group other than itself. In short, the greater the legitimacy and accountability, the greater the institutional strength.⁶ Further insights into the question of institutional strength is found in M. C. Hudson's four concepts: (1) responsiveness; (2) differentiation; (3) stability; and (4) capability.⁷

In this paper, the specific political institution (political parties) is already selected. Therefore, we may consider the second step: institutional strength of political parties is partly measured with the criteria suggested by Hudson, Huntington, Parsons, and Apter. For example, political parties, like other

institutions, should be 'responsive', 'adaptable' or 'accountable' to the ever changing external demands. Otherwise, maintenance of political parties is questionable. In order to maintain institutional strength, political parties, like other institutions, should also perform 'differentiated functions' such as (1) expansion of party membership, (2) multiplication of organizational subunits of political parties, and (3) interrelationship with other organizations and associations. Furthermore, the establishment and manipulation of party ideology are of great necessity for the achievement of long-range goals. Here, 'responsiveness' and 'functional differentiation' are largely related to 'external institutionalization'.

Strength of political parties, on the other hand, is also attributed to 'internal institutionalization'. Authoritative decision-making should be made to the same extent and applied to all party members in order to maintain party discipline. Party discipline and partisan loyalty of the party members are major determinants for 'internal institutionalization'. In order to measure party discipline, for example, we may consider how horizontal and/or hierarchical conflicts are resolved. In order to measure partisan loyalty, we may consider (1) whether members have strong party identification and do not shift their party membership from one to another, or from party membership to independent status over a certain time period, (2) whether members are willing to pay their membership dues to parties, and (3) whether leadership change processes are flexible without sacrificing continuity of a political party. A similar rationale can be applied to all the other criteria.

Chart 5. Institutional Strength Concepts

| | M. C. Hudson | S. P. Huntington | T. Parsons | D. Apter |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Internal Strength | | | | |
| Party Discipline | | Coherence | Pattern Maintenance | Authoritative Decision- making |
| Party Loyalty | Stability | Autonomy | | |
| External Strength | | | | |
| Responsi- veness | Responsi- veness | Adaptability | Adaptation | Accountability |
| Differenti- ated Function | Differen- tiation | Complexity | Integration | Information Coercion |
| Capability | Capability | | Goal Achievement | |

Certain strength concepts of political parties and the evaluation criteria are listed in Chart 5 and 6. Further, I have attempted to apply these by looking at the historical period from 1945 up to this year with special attention to how the North Korean one-party system and the South Korean multi-party system have met these indicators.

Chart 6. Institutional Strength of Political Parties

| Institutional Strength Indicators | The North Korean One-party system | The South Korean Multi-party system |
|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| A. Internal Strength | | |
| 1. Party Discipline | | |
| <u>Party Loyalty</u> | | |
| 2. Frequency of Membership Change | | |
| 3. Payment of Party Membership Dues | | |
| B. External Strength | | |
| 4. Responsiveness | | |
| <u>Differentiated Functions</u> | | |
| 5. Expansion of Party Membership and Recruitment | | |
| 6. Interrelationship with other Institutions and Organizations | | |
| <u>Capability</u> | | |
| 7. Distinct Party Ideology and its Manipulation for Goal Achievement | | |

B. North Korea

As a beginning step to the analysis of political stability of the North Korean one-party system, it is worthwhile to consider how and why a one-party system was established and consolidated in North Korea.

The political situation in North Korea at the time of independence was complicated by the political power struggle among the leaders of domestic factions coupled with those coming with great expectations from the Soviet Union and Mainland China where they had long been exiled because of their active involvement in their national independence movement against the Japanese occupation forces. Amid the confusion of the North Korean political scene in 1945, we can largely identify four main factional forces: (1) the non-Communist nationalist group; (2) the domestic Communist group; (3) the returnees from the Soviet Union who entered Korea with the Russian forces; and (4) the returnees from China who¹ were subsequently identified as the Yenan faction.

The political group that seemed to have the most vitality and potential in North Korea in 1945 was the non-Communist nationalist group. Along with the declaration of Japanese surrender and subsequent independence of Korea in 1945, the Japanese governor in Pyung-an Nam-do (the province that includes the capital city of North Korea, Pyung-yang), who had the best information on the distribution of power among Korean political figures, transferred his authority to one of the non-Communist nationalist leaders,

2
Cho Man-sik. Even the Soviet Army which moved into North Korea and which had established its authority over the entire area by September 1945, found it expedient to appoint Cho as Chief of the Provisional Political Committee and later the Five Provinces Administration Bureau, a native governing body over the entire Soviet zone of occupation, that is, the northern half of the Korean peninsula.³

Cho Man-sik, a Christian teacher, derived his power from the organized strength of the Christians. It must be realized that the religious groups were the only non-Japanese sponsored organization of any significance, tolerating the Japanese government suppression. Christian influence was particularly strong in North Korea because of the intensive missionary activities there since the late nineteenth century. The Japanese persecution of Korean Christians, particularly in connection with their refusal to worship at shinto shrines, had heightened the political consciousness of the Christians far above that of the average North Korean. The Christian leaders in various provinces allied with other prominent nationalist and community leaders and formally launched the Korean Democratic party in November 1945.⁴ But Cho Man-sik inevitably clashed with the Russian authorities because: (1) he reportedly opposed the Russian grain purchase and land reform programs in North Korea; and (2) he was adamant in opposing the decision of the foreign ministers' conference in Moscow (December 1945) to place Korea under the trusteeship of the United Nations for five years. Not being able

to get Cho to change his views, and realizing the effect his defiance would have if he were outside the government, the Soviet Command interned him in January 1946. Cho's arrest did give a fore-warning to the non-Communist nationalist groups that open protest or resistance against the Communist approach would be treated harshly. However, by replacing the head of the Korean Democratic party, Cho Man-sik, with Choi Yong-gon, the Communists maintained the skeleton of that party in North Korea rather than completely suppressing it. Thus the Korean Democratic party was maintained in North Korea up until late 1958, when it was officially prohibited.⁵

The second major group was the domestic Communist faction, which had suffered from both internal divisions and Japanese police suppression. For those members the liberation and the Russian occupation of North Korea were a golden opportunity. They were now able to organize a movement without fear of suppression. They could not fail to build a strong force under the aegis of the Russian Army. Park Hon-yong, a Communist since the 1920s and one of the founders of the Korean Communist party in 1925, established a new headquarters in Seoul and proceeded to organize local branches throughout Korea. Although the indoctrinated Communist core was very minute, the Party encountered little difficulty⁶ in multiplying its membership.

The third major political group consisted of the returnees from the Soviet Union. Kim Il-song and his followers were reported to have arrived in North Korea early in September 1945, along

with the Russian troops. They evidently spent a month analyzing the political situation and making plans. On October 3, 1945, Kim was first introduced by Cho Man-sik to the Public. On October 10, the 'Conference of the North Korean Five Provinces Party Representatives and Enthusiasts' were summoned in Pyung-yang to organize the 'North Korean Central Bureau of the Korean Communist Party' which was the first Korean Communist party organization established on the principle of Marxism-Leninism. The establishment of the Central Bureau, which elected Kim Il-song First Secretary, was the first step toward Kim's consolidation of power. The Soviet faction under Kim was evidently beginning to be assured of its position by the middle of December 1945.

While Kim Il-song was consolidating his power under the aegis of the Soviet authorities, the Yen-an group which consisted of the returnees from the Mainland China was also actively engaged in establishing itself. The Yen-an group largely consisted of two factions. The first faction was made up of those of scholarly educated background. One of the prominent figures in this faction was Kim Tu-bong who had been the head of the Korean Independence League in Yen-an which was organized in Yen-an, China in 1942. Kim Tu-bong also had had the experience of working closely with the Chinese Communist leaders. The second faction consisted of those of military background. The Korean Volunteers' Corps (later Army), established under the guidance of the Chinese Nationalist government and later developed under the aegis of

the Chinese Communists, had at least three to four hundred veteran officers at the time of the Japanese surrender. Since then it had multiplied its forces by enlisting a large number¹¹ of young Koreans in China and Manchuria. In March 1946, the above two factions-- the Korean Independence League and the Korean Volunteers' Corps-- were redesignated as the New People's¹² party.

In spite of these different backgrounds and factions, the leaders of the above different Communist groups somehow maintained a minimum cooperation at least in their outward manifestations. For example, when the North Korean Provisional People's Committee was established in Pyong-yang in February 1946, as a precursor of the regime to be established later, the three groups shared the leading positions as follows: (1) Kim Il-song, head of the Korean Communist party occupied the Chairmanship; (2) Kim Tu-bong, head of the Yen-an group held the Vice-Chairmanship; and (3) the second Vice-Chairmanship went to a member of the Korean Democratic¹³ party.

Detailed facts regarding the negotiations especially between the two most powerful groups in North Korea-- (1) Kim Il-song and his Korean Communist party and (2) Kim Tu-bong and his New People's party-- were not known, but these groups seemed to have reached an agreement on the leadership sharing and the mutual benefit that the separate existence of these groups would be unlikely to bring about.

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Kim Il-song pointed out that:

At this kind of historical stage, the power of our working masses must not be splintered... In order to accomplish the great democratic tasks laid before the Korean people, a united power of the working masses is necessary.

Because of this necessity, according to Kim Il-song, the leaders of the New People's party proposed the merger of the two Parties, to which the Korean Communist party leadership agreed with enthusiasm. Soon officials of both Parties at various levels began to have joint conferences regarding the merger, and the entire membership approved the plan. The inaugural conference of the North Korean Workers' party (NKWP) was held at the end of July 1946.¹⁵

However, an interesting aspect of the three-day conference concerning selection of the leadership is as follows: in view of the fact that Kim Il-song already occupied the foremost position in the government mechanism in North Korea and Kim Tu-bong was the second man in line, it would have been logical to expect the same order to be maintained in the amalgamated party. But in the new party the order was reversed. Kim Tu-bong held the Chairmanship and Kim Il-song was relegated to the Vice-Chairmanship. We have no access to the official record of the conference and the more recent documents do not explain this rather odd turn of events. But there seemed to be several important factors for Kim Il-song's concession of the Party Chairmanship to Kim Tu-bong: first, according to Kim Il-song, party unity was a prerequisite to political stability. Kim Il-song

asserted at the inaugural conference of the Workers' party
 16
 that:

... the Workers' party is a combat unit and the vanguard of the working masses. We must fight with our utmost to maintain the Party's unity and iron discipline. If we were to fight against enemy without these conditions within our ranks, it would be nothing less than folly.

Thus the merger of these two most powerful parties into the Workers' party was a sound political tactic.

Second, greater proportion of the Communist Party members led by Kim Il-song represented peasants and labor workers whereas the New People's party had a significant proportion of intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie, and the educated. By merging all of them into one political party, a strong unity of these classes was made possible. Furthermore, by absorbing the more literate and educated elements, the Communist camp as a whole acquired a degree of respectability: intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie, and office workers who were absorbed into the North Korean Communist party were particularly important, because these elements could be rapidly becoming leaders of public opinion.
 17

Third, although the New People's party was known to be milder on the issues of treatment of the middle classes, land reform, and religious activities than were the doctrinaire Communists, Kim Il-song believed that it might not be much of an obstacle, so long as the country was under Russian occupation at least
 18
 for the following few more years (actually until the end of 1948).

Besides the leadership sharing and mutual accomodation resulting from the merger of the two most powerful groups, one can speculate on the role of the Soviet Union occupation forces as a major factor in the integration of these groups into a single party. Kim Il-song's new company, composed of Koreans living mainly in Siberia, Khazakstan and Uzbekistan, had participated in the encircling operation on Stalingrad in January 1943. For this, Kim had been honored with the 'Stalin Medal' and the rank of major in the Red Army.¹⁹ Later he served in the Russian Army under General T. F. Shtykov, the commanding general of the 28th military group, which occupied North Korea.²⁰ In addition, neither the domestic Communist leaders nor the leaders of the Yenan group attempted to work with the Russians in the North or even conferred with them. The choice of Kim was most satisfactory for the Russians.

Institutional strength of North Korean Workers' party was further augmented by the infusion of new blood in the form of South Korean Communists who fled to the North after December 1, 1948 when the Communist movement was outlawed in South Korea. Finally at the Second Plenum of the Workers' party in September 1948, Kim Il-song became the Party Chairman and the Premier of the Democratic People's Republic.²¹

Now let us first consider 'internal' institutionalization of the North Korean one-party system. With respect to the party discipline, the Workers' party organizations are formed at the provincial, district, county, and city levels. The highest body

Chart 7. Development of the One-party System of North Korea





Chart 7. (Continued)




at all levels is the Party Conference, which elects a Party Committee. The Party Committee in turn forms an Executive Committee. The Provincial Party Conference elects delegates to the Party Congress, while the city, district, and county Party Conferences elect delegates to the Provincial Party Conference. This herarchical channel reaches the lowest and basic unit, which is called the Primary Party organization. A Primary Party organization is formed by three or more members in factories, cooperatives, military units, government's institutions, and similar places of work. One of the significant characteristics of the Workers' Party is that party groups obey the appropriate party committee: the Party is organized on the principle of the strict subordination of members to party organizations and of lower bodies to higher bodies which guide and inspect the work of the former.²²

Concerning party membership. all working people may apply for it. However, the application for admissions to the Workers' Party requires the recommendation of the two Party members of more than one year's standing. Furthermore, Philip Rudolph²³ writes that:

Part of the duty of Korean Party members is to fight for the preservation of the ideological and organizational unity of the Party; strive persistently to study the theory of Marxism-Leninism; take the initiative in carrying out Party decisions and assignments; strive for the growth of labor productivity and the intensification of labor discipline; observe Party discipline...

In addition, all Party members pay membership dues and have to meet the required attendance at Party meetings.²⁴

Chart 8. Organization of the Korean Workers' Party



Source: Byung-chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 28.

This does not mean, however, that there were no internal conflicts and/or attempts to revolt or protest against the regime. As John Kautsky points out, like any other totalitarian regimes, resort to the use of terror, propaganda and purge has often been made in order to rid the Party of undesirable individuals. In August 1953, ten prominent North Korean Communists were sentenced to death and two to long prison terms. They were convicted of anti-state espionage and terrorist activities: Li Syng-eup, former Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party, was named as the head of the ring. At about the same time, Park Hon-yong was removed from his post as Foreign Minister and replaced by Nam Il.

Professor Byung-chul Koh has written about the significant example which was the first and last abortive rebellion in North Korea up until today: in August 1956, Kim Il-song was confronted with the first challenge to his leadership. The abortive rebellion was staged against the backdrop of the famous Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, in which Premier Khrushchev initiated the de-Stalinization and anti-personality cult campaigns. The leading actors in the abortive rebellion were Choe Chang-ik, Pak Chang-ok, and Yun Kong-hum. Choe and Yun were known as leading members of the Yenan group and Pak enjoyed the same reputation among the members of the Soviet faction. While Kim Il-song was on a two-month tour of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in search of the cooperation and assistance of the Socialist bloc for North Korea's developmental efforts, Choe and Pak published a

series of articles in various journals and periodicals, suggesting that "the NKWP had been guilty of practicing personality cult" and that, in keeping with the decision of the Twentieth CPSU, "it must substitute democratic party management and collective leadership for one-man dictatorship."²⁷ The anti-Kim faction was, however, outnumbered by those loyal to the Premier. The revolt was crushed.

Here we may consider some important aspects of the abortive rebellion initiated by Choe, Pak, and Yun: (1) it was characterized by a limited confrontation and only among the relatively top-level leaders in the NKWP; (2) Yun pointed to the stark contrast between the distressingly low wages and incomes of workers and peasants, on one side, and the disproportionately high salaries of North Korean army officers, on the other.²⁸ Nevertheless, neither Choe, Pak nor Yun attempted to mobilize the masses with the relatively low wages and incomes, by articulating and aggregating their interests; and (3) they strongly opposed the personality cult and Kim Il-song's manner of dictatorship. However, they never mentioned that they would destroy the existing political system.

Judging from the above three characteristics, it may be concluded that, so long as they accepted the existing political party and the party system, the future leadership changes within the Workers' Party itself would still continue to maintain the NKWP even with the possible partial adjustment in some perspectives.

Now let us look at the 'external' institutionalization.

The North Korean Workers' Party apparently initiated land reform for the purpose of gaining popular support. Though 74.1 percent of the North Korean population in 1946 were engaged in agriculture, only 6.8 percent of the farmers held 54 percent of the tilled land whereas 56.7 percent were classified as poor farmers and held only 5.4 percent of land. By 1948 the land reform program was successfully accomplished and had the backing of a great majority of the people.²⁹

Some critics have argued that North Korea's national power, of which economic power is the core, may be said to have grown at the expense of individual freedom and comfort. According to Dong-jun Lee, a former writer for Pravda in Pyung-yang, who³⁰ escaped to South Korea in 1959:

... ever since the Chollima Movement got under way the exploitation of peasants has reached a new height. Shackled to a stifling life of servitude which defies imagination, North Korean peasants, along with the rest of our brethren in the North, are sick and tired of living under the Communist regime of Kim Il-song. They are desperately hoping to escape from the Communist dictatorship at the earliest possible date.

Also, Japanese journalists who visited North Korea in 1960-61, although impressed by its rapid industrial growth, nevertheless reported that the living standards of the North Korean masses³¹ were pitifully low. The living standards of the North Koreans had been deliberately depressed in order to divert more and more funds and resources to the task of industrialization. The North Korean people, however, had been compelled to work with

intensity and dedication solely for national strength and development.

More recently, however, the NKWP leadership has become increasingly sensitive to the needs of the masses. Here, we may consider several reasons. First, political purges against some top-level leaders within the NKWP itself over the different policies and the more recent abortive rebellion in 1956 made Party leaders more sensitive to the demands of the masses. Second, by the end of 1956, the First Two-Year Plan and the Three-Year Plan, whose major concentration was on the establishment of heavy industry, were completed. Thus, the NKWP loosened the tightened control and could provide the people with the basic necessities. Third, rapid progress of industrialization caused a serious gap between the urban and rural people. The NKWP urged the leaders of a group to make on-the-spot inspections, to invite suggestions from the rank-and-file farmers and to enhance their sense of participation in a common and mutually beneficial enterprise. Kim Il-song emphasizes that "guidance and management of the rural economy should steadily be brought closer to the advanced level of industrial enterprise management.³²

From the First Five-Year Plan onward, the general living standards of both farmers and labor workers began to be enhanced. At the same time the NKWP has attempted to decrease the gap between the living standards of peasants and industrial workers.³³

Besides the NKWP's responsiveness to the external demands, the Workers' party has expanded the interrelationship with the masses and the various functional organizations. If size is a correlate of organizational power, then the following table suggests that the NKWP has been growing in ability to act upon North Korean society. One significant aspect is that even after the time of 1948 when North Korean one-party system was once in power, the NKWP still continued to maintain a high level of mobilization and organization. At the Fourth Congress in 1961, the NKWP membership reached 1,311,563, about 12 percent of a total population estimated at 10,700,000.

Table 7. North Korean Workers' Party Membership

| Year | Alleged Party Members | Remarks |
|---|-----------------------|---|
| 1945 | 4,000 | |
| 1946 at the time of the First Congress | 360,000 | |
| 1948 at the time of the Second Congress | 750,000 | |
| 1956 at the time of the Third Congress | 1,164,695 | |
| 1961 at the time of the Fourth Congress | 1,311,563 | About 12% of a total population estimated at 10,700,000 |

Source: Glenn D. Paige and Dong-jun Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), North Korea Today (Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 17

Another aspect of party strength is organizational complexity and depth, particularly revealed by the linkages between the party and socio-economic organizations such as labor unions and peasant associations. The following two sets of figures introduce some of the functional organizations in North Korea in 1946 and 1947. According to Professor Chong-sik Lee, the leadership of unions and other functional groups was subordinated to the leadership of NKWP. Thus, Peasants' Federation, Workers' League, Democratic Youth League, and Women's League all were mobilized for the purpose of economic development, especially for the collectivization, which was planned and initiated by the Party.

Table 8. Functional Organizations subordinated to the leadership of NKWP and their Strength *

| Organizations | April 1946 | July 1947 |
|-------------------------|------------|-----------|
| Peasants' Federation | 800,000 | 1,800,000 |
| Workers' League | 350,000 | 350,000 |
| Democratic Youth League | 500,000 | 1,000,000 |
| Women's League | 350,000 | 600,000 |

*

For lack of data, these and some other functional organizations and their strength which may cover the whole period from 1948 to 1970, are not introduced in this paper.

Source: Chong-sik Lee, "Land Reform, Collectivization and the Peasants in North Korea," R. A. Scalapino, ibid., p. 71.

Now let us turn to the party ideology. Ideology is largely considered in two ways-- dependent variable and independent one. S. M. Lipset³⁴, Clifford Geertz³⁵, Joseph LaPalombara³⁶, and H. Pierre Secher³⁷ mainly consider that latent or manifest ideology depends upon the level or intensity of psychological, socio-economic, and/or cultural dimensions. Here ideology is used as a dependent variable. K. Manheim³⁸, C. B. MacPherson³⁹, Lasswell⁴⁰ and Kaplan, on the other hand, consider ideology as an independent variable which contributes to either preservation of the existing system or reform, although they have conflicting views as to whether ideology should be rational and practical or whether 'transcendental' ones should also be included. In this paper, I will consider party ideology as an independent variable: whether political parties have manifest ideology, and, if they have, how their ideologies have played the roles of manipulating the masses for the accomplishment of their goals and objectives.

It is generally accepted that the common people have little interest in political ideas, because they are exclusively concerned with their own personal affairs. This is not because they are selfish, thoughtless, or morally deficient, but because they are relatively remote from public affairs. One can scarcely expect ordinary men to respond to them as intensely as they respond to the more palpable stimuli in their own daily lives, which impinge upon them directly and in ways they can understand and are able to do something about. Therefore, C. Wright Mills⁴¹, Herbert McClosky⁴², and Suzanne Keller⁴³ assert the significant though not

absolute role of elites in major decisions. Especially in modernizing countries, owing to ignorance, lack of education and lack of exposure to mass media, political apathy is widespread among the population. Regardless of how men feel about it, as Keller points out, the fact that "their lives, fortunes, and fate are and have long been dependent on what a small number of men in high places think and do"⁴⁴. Here we can find the significant role of the leaders of political parties in ideologizing and manipulating the masses for the pursuit of certain goals.

From the beginning of its foundation, the Workers' Party initiated the ideology of nation-building, the core of which was national economic development. For the attainment of this aim the Workers' Party set forth long-range economic development plans: the first two One-Year Plan (1947-48); the first Two-Year Plan (1949-50); the Three-Year Plan (1954-56); the first Five-Year Plan (1957-61); the first Seven-Year Plan (1961-67) and its extension to three more years up until 1970.⁴⁵

During the period of the first two One-Year Plans, rudimentary forms of economic planning such as land reform and nationalization of almost all of the industrial enterprises were accomplished. The task of land reform was to abolish the land ownership of Japanese and Korean landlords as well as land tenancy and to give the right of the use of the land to those who till it. No provision was made for compensation to those whose land was confiscated, and the land was to be distributed free to the peasants.

The results of the land reform program were reported as follows:

Table 9. Land Reform in North Korea

Confiscated Land (in Chung-bo)

| | |
|--|---------|
| a. Land owned by Japanese Government and Japanese nationals | 100,797 |
| b. Land owned by Landlords who possessed more than 5 Chung-bo | 285,692 |
| c. Land owned by those who rent all of their land | 338,067 |
| d. Land owned those who continuously rent their land | 239,650 |
| e. Land owned by churches, temples, and other religious groups | 14,401 |
| f. Land owned by national traitors | 21,718 |

Total 1,000,325


Distribution of Land (in Chung-bo)

| | |
|--|---------|
| a. Farm Laborers | 22,387 |
| b. Peasants with no land | 603,407 |
| c. Peasants with some land | 345,974 |
| d. Landlords who migrated from other countries | 981,390 |
| e. Land reserved by the People's Committee | 18,935 |

Total 1,000,325

Source: Philip Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959), p. 48.

Chart 9. Conomic Development Plans



According to the law of August 10, 1946 which was adopted by the Provisional People's Committee, all industrial enterprises, mines, electric stations, railroads and different kinds of transportation, means of communication, trade enterprises and banks that belonged formerly to the Japanese government and Japanese individuals were confiscated. As a result of this law, more than 1,000 industrial enterprises, comprising 90 percent of all the industry of North Korea, were nationalized.⁴⁶

The first Two-Year Plan and the Three-Year Plan were concentrated on heavy industry. The first Five-year Plan of 1957-61 sought to solidify the base of a socialist economy and to provide the people with the basic necessities and successful completion of agricultural collectivization. The First Seven-Year Plan started in 1961 and was extended to three more years until 1970.

Along with industrial development, we may consider the following important aspects. First, the mobilization of laborers from

Table 10. The Percentages by Occupation Division and Total Population of North Korea

| | 1946 | 1947 | 1953 | 1956 | 1960 |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Workers and Office Employees | 18.7% | 26.0% | 29.7% | 40.9% | 52.0% |
| Farmers | 74.1 | 69.3 | 66.4 | 56.6 | 44.0 |
| Others | 5.0 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 3.3 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Population (thousands) | 9,257 | 9,022 | 8,491 | 9,359 | 10,789 |

Source: Chong-sik Lee, op. cit., p. 75.

rural areas was initiated. According to official statistics, the proportion of peasants in the population declined from 74.1 percent in 1946 to 44.4 percent in 1960. Second, in order to match the rapid industrial development, the educational system had to be rapidly expanded. An eleven-year compulsory educational system including two years of technical senior school was adopted. Universities and technical schools were increased. In 1961, for example, there were 97,000 students in 78 universities in North Korea, of whom 65 percent were either technical or engineering students. The population of North Korea in 1961 was 10,789,000. This indicates that the total university student body comprises ninety students per 10,000 population.* By 1970 it is planned to increase the number of higher educational institutions to 227,000 students in 128 universities. The final goal is to obtain 230,000 senior engineers and experts, and 600,000 junior engineers and experts in all fields. As a result, the number of engineers, technicians, and specialists per 1,000 working men and women will be increased from 33 in 1960 to 110 in 1970.

*

The number of university students per 10,000 population in other countries as of 1962 (see R. A. Scalapino, op. cit., p. 136) is as follows:

| | |
|-------------------|-----|
| Communist China | 13 |
| South Korea | 57 |
| Japan | 73 |
| North Korea | 90 |
| The Soviet Union | 107 |
| The United States | 180 |

In order to manipulate mass support for the above economic development plans, the Workers' Party, as previously mentioned, mobilized a number of mass organizations. Among them were the Peasants' Union, the Democratic Union of Women of Korea, and the Union of Democratic Youth. The Workers' Party numbers more than one million members. In 1954, there were said to exist 30,000 mass organizations and some 800,000 members were said to have taken part in 37,000 political schools. For the purpose of the effective manipulation of those members, according to Rudolph, the semi-military regimentation of their lives was one of the major determinants for the attainment of the economic plans.⁴⁸ Obvious limitations upon individual liberties in a totalitarian state is likely to stimulate discontent among some North Koreans. On the other hand, the Communist system can satisfy the material needs of the people and safeguard the rights of workers by providing an eight-hour working day, special rules for pregnant women, prohibition of dangerous work for children, equal pay for equal work regardless of age or sex, and a comprehensive social security system. Compared to South Korea, whose unemployment rate reached 24 percent in the latter stages of the Rhee regime and the first nine months of the Chang regime, choice of liberty or bread is not a simple matter of judgement.

C. South Korea

Prior to the analysis of the institutional strength of political parties in South Korea, let us briefly consider why a multi-party system was possible.

The political situation in South Korea at the time of liberation from Japanese colonialism was no less complicated than that of North Korea. Amid the confusion of the South Korean political scene in 1945, we can largely identify four major groups: (1) the leftist and Communist groups; (2) the conservative Po-song group; (3) Syng-man Rhee's Association for the Rapid Realization of Independence; and (4) the Korean Independence party.

Perhaps the best established mechanism for achieving cohesion in Korea in 1945 was the leftist and Communist movement. No group rivaled it in discipline and hierarchy. The leading members of the leftist group are Lyuh Woon-hyung and Pak Hon-yong. Lyuh Woon-hyung, who visited the residence of Endo, the Japanese governor-General, made an agreement to assume administration conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the granting by the Governor-General of freedom of speech and the press, and non-interference with Korean political movements or with the organizing of laborers and youth. In return, Lyuh promised that the existing government structure would not be dissolved and that the greatest restraint on violent reprisals against Japanese life and property would be provided. Given the necessary authority, Lyuh drafted a tentative plan for the preparation of Korean independence, which would include rightist and leftist

nationalists and Communists, But gradually the Lyuh group drifted further left. By August 28, 1945, Pak Hon-yong, a leading Communist, was assuming ever more power within Lyuh's group. On September 17, 1945, Lyuh himself was attacked and assassinated. Furthermore, challenged by the American occupation forces and the rightists, the Communist movement was gradually weakening. In the 1948 general election for the National Assembly, neither leftist nor Communist groups could join the election campaigns.

The second major political force was the Po-song group. The leader and the core of the group was Kim Song-su (1891-1955). Kim's family had long enjoyed a comfortable income, lending money and increasing his land. With his wealth he assembled a circle of loyal friends, helped them when needed, added younger students through a private scholarship program, and profited from the financial advice of his associates. He and his brother, using their landed wealth, founded or strengthened in succession several of the most significant enterprises; the Tong-a Il-bo, from 1920 until today the nation's largest and most respected Korean-language newspaper; Kyung-song Textile Company; Po-song High School (now Koryo University); and Chung-ang Primary and Middle schools. On September 16, 1945, for the first time, the Po-song group formed a political party, the Korean (Hankuk) Democratic party (KDP).²

The third major group is the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (NARRKI) led by Syng-man Rhee

Since Syng-man Rhee was a graduate of Princeton University and had lived in the United States longer than any other political leaders in Korea at that time, he was accorded almost unlimited access to the United States Occupation Forces. Rhee's Association had recommended General John R. Hodge to form the Representative Democratic Council as Hodge's new advisory group on February 14, 1946 and Syng-man Rhee was selected to be a senior advisor to General Hodge.³

The Korean Independence Party led by Kim Ku, the President of the Korean Provisional Government became one of the two major rightist parties, the other being the Korean Democratic Party, after absorbing the Nationalist Party and the New Korean Party founded by Kwon Tong-jin and O Se-chang respectively.⁴ Among the several minor parties then on the scene were: Tae Dong Youth Corps led by Yi Chon-chon, a leader of the Provisional Government and the Korean Restoration Army; the National Youth Corps led by Yi Pom-sok, a former commander of the Second Branch Unit of the Korean Restoration Army in China; Chong Min Dang; the Korean Independent; and Labor Federation.

The formation of these non-Communist groups into separate political parties were facilitated through the democratic principle of 'freedom of speech, press and assembly' which was maintained by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and the United States Occupation Forces from 1945 until the Republic of Korea was established in 1948. The democratic principle guaranteeing these basic freedoms was further expanded in the Constitution of

of the Republic of Korea and other related laws.

The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was established by Resolution No. 112 of the General Assembly on November 14, 1947. On March 1, 1948, in response to the question asked by the Commission, the Chairman of the Interim Committee of the United Nations answered that:⁵

1. The elections to be observed by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea should be held in a free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected...
2. The National Assembly to which representatives are to be elected would be a stage in the formation of a Korean people themselves... The National Assembly would be entirely free to consult with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and to carry on such negotiations as they wished with any Korean groups...
3. ... the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea itself has the authority and direction to discharge its duties in Korea...

Finally, the Commission drafted a public statement on February 28, 1948⁶ and released it publicly on March 1:

In conformity with the views expressed by the Interim Committee of the General Assembly in its resolution adopted on 26 February 1948, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea will discharge its duties-- that is to say, observe elections in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission, not later than 10 May 1948.

On the same day, General John R. Hodge, the United States Commander in South Korea, issued a proclamation to the Korean people in which he announced that election of representatives of the Korean people under the observance of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, would be held in South Korea

on May 9, 1948. The Commission's active participation in maintaining the democratic principle of freedom of speech, press and assembly enabled various factional groups to form their own political parties. When the Republic of Korea was established in 1948, freedom of speech and press, and freedom of assembly and association were guaranteed by the Constitution⁸ and other related laws.

In other words, according to the leaders as well as followers of various groups and factions, the formation of political parties was not necessarily based upon ideology, a certain degree of party discipline, or responsibility and sensitivity to the demands of either particular groups and/or the masses. Rather, whenever a few people gathered together, they could form a political party; whenever internal conflicts occurred among themselves, the party was easily split and subdivided on the basis of factional or personal relations.

Now, let us turn to our major interest in this paper-- the institutional strength of the multi-party system of South Korea. As one of the indicators to measure 'internal' institutionalization, we may first consider the level of party discipline.

In April 1951, President Rhee, for the first time, attempted to form a political party, replacing his Association for Rapid Realization of Independence established in 1948 and his Il-min Club established in 1950 which had functioned as a semi-political party until 1951. President Rhee encouraged his supporters within the Assembly to organize a new political party and at the same

time prodded pro-Administration groups outside the Assembly to form their own party. But these two groups failed to merge as a single party. In December 1951, the Assembly group founded the Liberal party; a second Liberal party was organized by Rhee's supporters outside the Legislature. In other words, owing to the lack of party discipline, there existed two political parties with the same name, dedicated to the proposition of supporting Rhee but divided by clashing personal ambitions among their members.

When the 1960 election rigging and manipulation finally caused many spontaneous demonstrations culminating into a demand for resignation of the entire government, the President on April 26 had to make a statement to resign "if the people so desire." In the afternoon of the same day, a motion demanding Rhee's immediate resignation was discussed in the National Assembly where the great majority of the members belonged to the Liberal party. However, the motion was passed without even a debate. All the Liberal party members did forsake their party boss, Syng-man Rhee.

Following the collapse of the Rhee regime, the political stage became again crowded with the birth and rebirth of a dozen or more political parties. Among the parties that sought power during the period of the caretaker government and the national elections of July 29, 1960 in order to establish the Second Republic, the most prominent was the Democratic party, the only opposition group during the last years of the Rhee era.

In the July 29 elections the Democratic party secured 175 seats out of 233 in the House of Representatives and became the¹² majority party.

Along with the overwhelming election victory, the internal factional conflicts between the Old and New groups, which had been more or less dormant under adverse conditions during the Rhee period, began to emerge. In fact, the election victory intensified the factional strife between the Old and the New concerning the question of who should occupy the Presidency, Premiership, Cabinet posts, and other important positions in the government of the Second Republic. There had been persistent talk of formally splitting the Democratic party even during the July election campaign, but it was generally hoped that the Democrats would somehow remain in a single party to continue to command a working majority in the Legislature. On December 18, 1960, the New Democratic party split from the Democratic party. The only thing Premier Chang could remain in the office was through frequent reshuffles of his cabinet members in agonizing attempts to meet the demands of different factions in the Assembly as well as within his own Democratic party.¹³

The bickering and virulent attacks and counterattacks among all these different factions continued throughout the existence of the regime. In short, Premier Chang, during nine months of his tenure, could not maintain the discipline of his Democratic party: his split party could not provide him with any power to pass through the Assembly any significant policies.

Political parties in the Third Republic are no exception. The built-in weakness of the opposition parties is that it is an amalgam of diverse groups organized after the ban against political activity was lifted by the military government in early 1963. In general, however, the opposition forces of this period revolved largely around the two major parties, the Democratic party (DP) and the Civil Rule party (CRP).

The DP, which was briefly in power under the Chang regime, was revived under a leadership weakened by the ban on the political activity of many of its key members. Former President Yun Po-sun formed the CRP based upon the old guard of the DP, the main opposition during the Democratic regime. These two major opposition forces remained divided until mid-1965, when they merged to form the People's party (PP). The merger was simply an attempt to form a united front in the Assembly to oppose the Korea-Japan treaty then under negotiation. The merger lasted for only a few months: a heated dispute arose over the tactical question of how to prevent passage of the treaty by the DRP-dominated Assembly. The so-called extreme faction within the party was willing to resign en masse from the Assembly as a protest against the treaty, while the moderate faction insisted upon a parliamentary opposition. Angered by the position taken by the moderates, the extreme faction led by former President Yun withdrew from the party and established early in 1966 a party known as the New Korea party (NKP). The moderate faction¹⁴ remained in the PP.

As the 1967 general election approached, however, a Democratic Republican party victory appeared a foregone conclusion in the absence of a merger between the NKP and the PP. The well-financed and well-organized DRP backed up by administrative power was too formidable to be beaten by a fragmented opposition. Under the circumstances, the two major opposition parties had to work together to achieve their common goal-- the defeat of President Park. The opposition New Democratic party (NDP) in its present form dates from February 1967, when the NKP and the PP were finally into a single party.

As a compromise solution, Yun Po-sun of the NKP was made the presidential candidate of the NDP, while Yu Chin-o of the PP became the party chief. The point to be emphasized is that the circumstances in which the NDP arose were similar to those in which the DP arose as a unified opposition party which was formed against the Liberal party: first, both were formed as a reaction against the ever-growing power of the ruling group; second, the NDP, like the DP, is a loose and uneasy coalition of several opposition factions in and around the Assembly, holding together primarily by the tactical requirements of effective campaigning and not by mutual agreement on the major policies and ideologies. The New Democratic party has been so preoccupied with internal strife that it has been unable to direct its four major factions, each represented by one of the party's four Vice-Presidents. It is perhaps meaningless to identify members of each faction, since they are constantly

changing their positions for personal rather than policy reasons. In the end, any individual's decision to join or to leave a certain faction is determined by the offers of the party's positions made to him.¹⁷

The real issue is whether there are in the party enough positions of influence to be distributed. The recent dispute over the question of collective versus single leadership among the major factions of the NDP is a case in point, although once again the issue was settled temporarily in favor of single leadership at the party's third national convention held in May 1969 in preparation for the 1971 general election.¹⁸

The Democratic Republican, the Government party of the Third Republic, also remains deeply divided internally and is faced with multiple problems. These factions can be divided into two major groups, although there are many refinements and subdivisions. The first major group, known as the 'Main Current', included ex-colonel Kim Chol-pil and his former South Korean CIA associates who secretly initiated formation of the DRP during the military rule. Kim set up a permanent administrative secretary of the party in every election chapter and staffed it with his men. This was an attempt to subordinate each of the party's Assemblymen to the secretary of his constituency, which was responsible only to the central administration of the party controlled solely by Kim's faction.¹⁹

This action by Kim's faction alienated many neutral army officers as well as some of those who had engineered the coup

with Kim. These officers openly denounced Kim's underhanded tactics and helped in a variety of ways to strengthen the anti-Kim front within the party. Some anti-Kim officers subsequently became the core of the 'anti-Main Current Faction'. Having been left out of the mainstream of the party, the anti-Kim factions tried to expand their influence through the Presidential Secretary and Administration rather than the DRP party. Their effort to consolidate administrative power was greatly strengthened by President Park's policy of separating the party and administration. As a means of maintaining a proper balance between the two major factions, Park let Kim's faction control party organization while permitting the anti-Kim factions to dominate the administration.

Meanwhile, the 'Main Current Faction' suffered another serious setback when its five leading assemblymen were expelled from the party on April 15, 1969. Their expulsion was directly caused by the fact that they had played a leading role in urging some forty DRP assemblymen to side with the opposition in voting for the resolution calling for the dismissal of the then minister of education. ²⁰ However, the real reason for expulsion of the five members was their strong disapproval of a projected constitutional revision. Moreover, sensing that Kim's chances of becoming president in 1971 were virtually nill, many members of Kim's faction have already shifted their positions and are now found with the anti-Kim faction, though there are still believed to be some twenty members of Kim's faction out of a total of 107

Democratic Republican assemblymen.

As another indicator to measure the level of 'internal' strength, we may consider membership affiliation. Party candidacy in the beginning was decided not by parties but by individual application: there were no primaries. Furthermore, in early elections, parties could neither repudiate those individually registering as their candidates nor conversely even force their own candidates to declare party affiliation. The politician feels free to shift allegiance as he views his chances for access to power altering. The internal wall of parties is weak. There has been no serious condemnation of the betrayal of the members by either the group or by the individual. The myriad schisms of the post-liberation period thus continue in the Assembly. Soon after the 1948 elections, thirty members of the National Society shifted into a new pro-administration group called the Il-min Club: hardly had the new Korean Nationalist party been formed in late 1948 when one section split away to join the KDP; in 1952 'inside' Liberals crossed over and became 'outside' Liberals. Immediately after the Rhee regime was overthrown by anomic violence and demonstrations in 1960, the Liberal party rapidly disintegrated. Already in May 1960, observers noted that the only men still identifying themselves as Liberals were those members of the National Assembly whose political labels were too well known. On June 1, 1960, even within the Assembly, 105 out of 126 Liberals publicly and

Chart 10. The Multi-party System of South Korea

| | 1948 | 1950 | 1954 | 1958 |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| | | elected Candidates | | |
| Rhee's Association for the Rapid Realization of Independence | 55 seats (25.2%) | 12 → (5.7%) | 368 → | 136 → (62%) |
| | | | 'Outside' Liberal Liberal Party | |
| | | | 'Inside' Liberal | |
| The Tae-Dong Youth Corps | 12 (6.1%) | 11 → (5.2%) | 61 → | |
| The National Youth Corps | 6 (3.1%) | → 0 | 0 → | |
| The Korean Democratic Party | 29 (14.6%) | 23 → (11%) | 158 → | 15 → (7.6%) |
| Independents | 85 (42.9%) | 126 → (60%) | 1,218 → | 82 → (32%) |
| Other Conservative Elements | | | | 67 → (34.4%) |
| Chong-min Dang | 1 party | Taehan Nat'list (11.4%) | 149 → | 12 → (6%) |
| Korean Independent | 1 Nat'list | 12 party (5.7%) | 115 → | Unification party 1 |
| Labor Federation | 1 | | | |
| Others | 8 | Taehan Labor Union (1%) | 43 → | |
| | | Socialist party 0 | 27 → | |

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
210

2,237

203

221

Chart 10. (continued)



simultaneously broke with the Liberal party.²⁴

Furthermore, when the Third Republic was established in 1963, all parties presented a complex picture, as reorganization of political circles was in full swing and politicians frequently switched allegiance. The composition and genealogy of major political parties are shown in the following table:

Table 11. Composition and Genealogy of Political Parties in South Korea

| | Civil Rule Party | Democratic Party | of the People | Liberal Democra- tic Party | Democra- tic Republic- can |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Former Sinmin Dang | 67.7% | --- | --- | 34% | 2% |
| Former Democratic Party | 6.5 | 91.4 | 18 | 15.8 | 2 |
| Former Liberal Party | 6.5 | -- | 19 | 12.6 | 8 |
| Former Unification Party | -- | -- | -- | 6.3 | -- |
| Independents | 12.8 | -- | 45 | 6.3 | -- |
| Military | -- | -- | -- | 6.3 | 26 |
| Others | -- | -- | 2 | -- | 2 |
| New Comers | 6.5 | 8.6 | 16 | 18.7 | 30 |

Source: Kyung-hyang Shinmun (Daily Newspaper), Nov. 1, 1963.

From this table one can easily see that only the Democratic Republican party was constituted by military officers and a large number of new entrants under a new structure. On the other

hand, all the other new political parties were largely composed of the members of the various former political parties: the Civil Rule party and the Democratic party were near kin in composition and genealogy. That is, more than 80 percent of the Civil Rule party members consisted of the members of former Sinmin Dang (New People party), former Democratic and former Liberal party; more than 90 percent of the Democratic party members were made up of nearly all of the former Democratic party members; the party of the People comprised mainly former Independents; and the Liberal Democratic party was composed in a most complex manner.

Furthermore, during the whole period of the First and Second Republic, a significant number of candidates for the Assembly did not have party identification. One can see from chart 10 that nearly half the members of the first National Assembly, 85, were independent and 55 more were semi-independent, belonging to the National Association, which did not nominate candidates officially. In the second election, the number of the independent assemblymen sharply increased from 85 to 126, reaching approximately 60 percent of total assemblymen. And then independent members rapidly decreased and only 12 members remained in 1958. In the 1960 election for the Second Republic of Korea, 49 independent members appeared again. Independent members in the Assembly had been opportunistic in their attitude and decision-making, shifting their membership from independent status to one specific party and then returning back to independent status again.

Furthermore, many splinter parties easily appeared when a few people gathered together and then disappeared when they had conflict among themselves.

Finally, the military junta promulgated the Political Party Law: ²⁵ a political party could be launched, according to the Law, only when a central chapter in the capital city and local chapters in more than one-third of election districts of the country had been formed. Since each chapter had to have more than fifty members, and since the election districts were to number about 120, the law made it mandatory for a political party to achieve over 2,000 registered members to engage in political activities.

Unlike the practice of the North Korean Workers' party, no political party in South Korea has required membership dues from all the members. Since parties in South Korea did not become mass parties, there was no other way but to depend on contributions by a few people for political funds. The main duty of the central party organization was to raise funds for both presidential and congressional elections. Therefore, the party, once in power, usually disposed of government property, arranged for large sums of government subsidies or bank credits to certain individuals or corporations, shared in profit, and lifted or alleviated the governmental control on certain business transactions to permit a privileged dealing which could yield an unreasonable amount of profit to be shared by the Government party. Chung Chong-sik, who was the Cultural Editor of Kyung-hyang daily newspaper, points out that "every scandal of corruption in

the past was connected with the political funds for use by the Government".²⁶

*

Some of the salient examples are as follows: (1) just before the 1952 presidential election the Government under President Syng-man Rhee released government-held foreign exchange earned through export of tungsten for import of grain and fertilizer which were then in critical shortage. The Government allocated a total of \$3,153,000 for import of grain to fifteen firms. The sale of imported grain and fertilizer netted the few business firms an exorbitant profit, allegedly about five billion hwan.^{**} A considerable part of the profit was shared by the Liberal party for use in financing the presidential election of August 1952; (2) another notorious scandal was reported just before the presidential election of January 1956. Some \$500,000 worth of raw cotton, imported under an FAO program to be processed into winter uniforms for military service men, was all diverted to the civilian market for sale except 0.3 percent. How much of the profit was shared with the Government party is not clearly identified; (3) again in the general election of May 2, 1958, the Government instructed the Korean Reconstruction Bank to lend a total of 7.4 billion hwan to a few selected enterprises.

*

Chong-sik Chung says that the evidence of these scandals involving political funds is available in the record of court trials on the illegal acts committed by the Liberal party. But at present the data are not available to me. Thus, they are mainly based on Chong-sik Chung's article, "Political Parties and Funds," in Korean Affairs, vol. 111, no. 3, Dec. 1964 (Hunkuk Moonwha Printing Co., 1964), pp. 288-93.

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Exchange rate between U.S. dollar and Korean hwan in 1960 was \$1= hwl30.

Since this amount exceeded the total cash reserves that the Reconstruction Bank then had, it had to ask other commercial banks for cash. If each firm paid the Liberal party nearly twenty percent of the loan received, as it was allegedly reported, the Liberal party must have accumulated nearly 15 billion hwan; (4) in 1960 the Liberal party gave ten to fifty million hwan to each opposition party member of the House who would withdraw his affiliation with the opposition party and become a member of the Government party which consequently secured two-thirds of the floor seats.

Chong-sik Chung further enumerates the scandals involving the Democratic Republican party, the Government party of the
 27
 Third Republic:

... there were also reports of scandal after scandal, namely the scandals involving the construction of the mammoth tourist hotel 'Walker Hill', import of Japan-made cars, import of gambling machines, the collapse of stock market, import of properties by Korean residents in Japan, illegal quota allocation by the Ministry of Commerce-Industry, the profit accrued from the sale of propane gas...

No one, however, has yet successfully produced any tangible evidence. Open transaction and proper management of political funds are prerequisite to a fresh reorientation of party politics. Therefore, professor Kim Sung-hi, member of the Democratic party
 28
 in charge of policy deliberation, points out that:

No party activities without political funds are imaginable; what we need is an institutionalized system whereby each party member pays his share of dues and discontinue present methods of fund-raising which usually accompanies corruption of one kind or another...

With respect to 'external' institutionalization, let us first consider the responsiveness of political parties in South Korea. How the Government party under Rhee regime was not responsive to the needs of the masses is partially and yet clearly observed from Secretary Acheson's aid-memoire:²⁹

It is the judgement of this Government that the financial situation in Korea has already reached critical proportions and that, unless this progressive inflation is curbed in the none too distant future, it can not but seriously impair Korea's ability to utilize effectively the economic assistance...

Table 12. Average Annual Price Indexes in Seoul

| Year | Wholesale (1947=100) | Retail (1955=100) |
|------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| 1950 | 334 | 3.31 |
| 1951 | 2,194 | 15.27 |
| 1952 | 4,751 | 28.38 |
| 1953 | 5,951 | 43.29 |
| 1954 | 7,629 | 59.36 |
| 1955 | 13,816 | 100.00 |
| 1956 | 18,623 | 122.80 |
| 1957 | 22,070 | 151.30 |
| 1958 | 20,619 | 146.70 |
| 1959 | 22,077 | 152.80 |

Source: W. D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 136.

Table 12 tells us how the average annual wholesale and retail price indexes in Seoul, the capital city, had been rapidly skyrocketing from 1947 to 1959. The inflation brought about the devaluation of the Korean currency which was first devaluated in December 1953 from 60 hwan to 180 hwan per U.S. dollar. In August 1955 the official exchange rate was fixed at 500 hwan per dollar.³⁰ When the Second Republic was established, the Chang regime had to adjust the exchange rate from 650 hwan to 1,300 hwan per dollar.³¹ Prices of practically all goods rapidly increased, while the purchasing power of the Korean hwan abroad declined drastically. It goes without saying that many small and medium businesses collapsed. Automatically, there was rising unemployment, estimated in 1960 at one-fifth of the total labor force-- some 2 million people.³²

Requested by the Secretariat of the State Affairs Council in 1960, survey groups of eight South Korean universities asked three thousand South Koreans about, among other things, their most urgent request to the government. Over 70 percent of those surveyed named the solution of economic problems as their most urgent request to the Government.³³

Lack of responsiveness to the demands of the masses was one of the major determinants to cause demonstrations, general anomic violence, and the military coup. The masses felt that political parties thought of them once in four years-- at election time. Once the election is over, not even a single party attempts to respond to the needs of the people. Therefore, ~~to the masses~~, the

only possible way to aggregate and demand their interests is through demonstrations, riots and anomic violence.

Instead of responsiveness to the demands of the masses, the main function of the Government parties has generally been to maintain the status quo at any cost and at any risk-- either through Constitutional amendments, resort to the police and military forces, election riggings and manipulation or bribery for membership change of assemblymen from the opposition to the ~~Government~~ ^{opposition} parties. In reaction to the Government parties, the opposition parties' supreme goal was to take power from the existing Government parties. They frequently attempted to boycott the Assembly meetings, to spark demonstrations, or to initiate impeachment proceedings against government officials. For them, Seoul was the only political arena.

One can see a similar pattern in the New Democratic party of the Third Republic. According to the article by Choi and Park, the NDP normally operates in big cities and among circles limited almost exclusively to the professional politicians. Although the most recent report indicates a total party membership of over 380,000 with local chapters organized in all electoral districts throughout the country, this figure seems to have little meaning beyond the period of election campaigns.³⁴ Many of its local branches stay virtually closed during off-election years, and the party engages in contact with the masses only during election campaigns. Because of financial and other difficulties, the party cannot

strengthen local branches; nor can it establish large training centers for the purpose of training local leaders. In any case, the party's activities are centered in and around the National Assembly and dominated by its assemblymen. For this, one may be tempted to generalize that the opposition has some positive functions to perform in the Assembly but the fact is that even in the Assembly the role of the opposition is extremely limited. The ruling DRP, with nearly a two-thirds majority, has not hesitated to enact whatever policies or laws it pleases.

Concerning the level of interrelationship between political parties and other institutions and associations, let us consider the two most significant example. The first example is the inter-relationship between the Liberal party under the Rhee regime and the military forces, one of the largest out of various organizations and associations in South Korea.

According to Article 75(1) of the Korean Constitution, the President shall, in time of war, armed conflict, or similar national emergency when there is a military necessity or when it is necessary to maintain the public safety and order by mobilization of the military forces, proclaim state of siege in accordance with the provisions of law. Furthermore, Article 72(1) states that "the President shall exercise supreme command of the National Forces in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and law".³⁵ Now, one interest question can be raised: how could a Commander-in-Chief of 600,000 armed forces be subject to three thousand students' anomic riots and demonstrations?

What is then the adequate answer to the collapse of the Liberal Party-Rhee regime following student riots?

Student spokesmen at first wanted to present a petition to President Rhee, but the police ordered them to disperse at once. The student demonstrators continued to stampede toward the Presidential mansion after crushing two barricade. The police fired tear-gas shells. The angry crowd became angrier and pressed forward. Police then fired. Enraged students turned to other targets: they began to burn five police stations in Seoul, sacked the office of the administration organ of the Seoul Daily newspaper, and broke into the Seoul Liberal Party Headquarters. Then many policemen simply fled their posts, took off their uniforms and went into hiding. The hated police force that had been loyal to Rhee was demoralized. Finally, President Rhee declared martial law and made it retroactive to the moment when the police guarding his mansion fired against the demonstrators. President Rhee had just taken the ultimate military measures when he found his position challenged from an unexpected source. Heavily armed soldiers were moved into Seoul. The United Nations Command in Korea allowed the Martial Law Command of the Korean Army the use of tanks (without live ammunition). However, the army under the martial law commander, Lieutenant General Song Yo-chan who seemed to be highly loyal to Rhee showed no intention of shooting at demonstrating students approaching the Presidential mansion. The Martial Law Commander did not want to obey his Commander-in-Chief. In fact, the army seemed to maintain strict neutrality

between the Rhee Administration and the demonstrators. As smiling soldiers freely mingled with crowds, the panic-stricken Presidential entourage became convinced that the army would³⁶ refuse to fire on any crowd seeking Rhee's resignation.

The military forces had similarly weak interrelationships with the Government party of the Second Republic. While political parties were struggling for a share of governmental offices and positions, the coup forces struck the heart of the Second Republic, Seoul, in the pre-dawn of May 16, 1961. The only physical force needed to topple the Democratic party regime was about 1,600 men. Although the army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Chang To-yong, who was reputed to have been hand-picked for the post by Premier Chang himself, allegedly knew for many hours about the final timetable of the coup forces. Yet the total military strength that was actually mobilized in an attempt to block the revolutionary troops at the Han River bridge was only about fifty military policemen. Only a handful of these military policemen were wounded, as the coup forces quickly overpowered the half-hearted and feeble opposition. This was the extent of the armed resistance mustered up in defense of the government of the Second Republic, which supposedly commanded one of the world's largest armies.³⁷

The Democratic Republican party, the Government party of the Third Republic, appears to be the only one to attempt a close relationship with other organizations including the military. Judging from the past nine years, the Democratic Republican party has also attempted to expand its membership. As of 1967,

its membership reached 1,500,000 (5 percent of the total population) with local branches in all constituencies throughout the country. ³⁸ As shown in table 11, the DRP recruited a great majority of the candidates for the Assembly from the relatively young educated people including the military elites whereas almost all the other parties recruited a great majority of the candidates from the members of the various former political parties.

Unlike the North Korean Workers' party, neither the Government nor the opposition parties under the First and the Second Republics had initiated any significant party policies and ideologies, with which the parties attempted to articulate and aggregate specific interest groups and/or mass support. During the same period of 15 years when the North Korean Workers' party accomplished various stages of economic development through successful manipulation and its consequent mass support, the main function of the political parties in South Korea appears to have been a series of confrontations over two main issues-- Constitutional amendments and preference of either the Presidential or Cabinet system. In other words, it was not the problem of how to establish a long-range national development plan but rather that of what power structure should be more preferable in order to obtain political power and to become a government party. As previously mentioned, non-military foreign aid was spent not for the long-range national development plans but for election campaigns. Every election year, an enormous amount of national resources

and government funds were spent for the election campaigns, which, if properly used, might have made a great contribution to the national economic development.

The economic condition in South Korea has been one of endless despair, despite sizable American economic aid: (1) the agrarian half of the divided peninsula could not even produce enough foodstuff for South Koreans and numerous refugees from the North; (2) the land reform measures, which were intended to improve the economic conditions of farmers constituting nearly three-fourths of the population at that time, were a serious of failure; (3) inflationary trends were so serious that Secretary Acheson threatened to review the entire Korean aid program unless vigorous anti-inflationary measures were forthcoming; and (4) in 1959, there were 1,400,000 unemployed. Neither the Government party nor the opposition parties had paid any attention to the needs of the masses.³⁹

The ultimate survival of the regime and indeed of the Republic itself, depends on the outcome of economic policies designed to cope with the grave problems of unemployment and underemployment, and the poverty and indebtedness of peasants. The Democratic Republican party, for the first time, initiated the national economic development plans. The main plans for dealing with these problems were worked out with the mobilization of the domestic civilian economic experts, including the Assistant Director of the American Aid Mission who was appointed economic adviser to the Korean Government. The DRP's ideology of 'national modernization'

is characterized by a free enterprise system but with the Government's direct or indirect participation and guidance in developing basic key industries and other important projects.

Taking into consideration the relatively fixed amount of natural resources as well as the relatively more rapidly increased rate of population and the sharp decrease of grant-type aid from the United States under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, it is interesting to see how the DRP's manifest ideology and its successful manipulation made more rapid economic development than those of the previous regimes.

During the period of 12 years from 1948 to 1960 Korea's economic diplomacy placed major emphasis on obtaining American aid as much as possible. Virtually no attention was paid to the need for foreign capital inducement and trade promotion among nations. The Democratic Republican regime, for the first time, attempted to make an earnest endeavor to get rid of its excessive dependency on American aid and revamp its economic structure in such a way as to obtain economic self-sufficiency at the earliest possible time. For the construction of essential industrial plants, such as fertilizer, cement, iron-and-steel plants, power, an increase in farm productivity and strengthening the existing industries, the 'economic diplomacy' program was initiated.


As a result of this concerted effort, as of September 1964, approximately \$270 million in loans were obtained from friendly nations. Seven countries have thus far extended loans to South Korea, namely, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany,

Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland. Among the international financing organizations that have extended loans to this country is the IDA, which helped South Korea finance a railway-car import program.⁴⁰

The last several years have seen that country actively conclude trade agreements with friendly nations. In 1960, South Korea entered into a trade agreement with the Philippines, the Republic of China and Thailand. In 1962, she concluded trade agreements with Malaya and Vietnam. In 1963, a trade agreement was made with Brazil and customs tariff agreement with France. In 1964, South Korea concluded trade pacts with India and Burma.⁴¹ In 1964, similar agreements were concluded with Italy and Germany. The conclusion of these agreements has made the Republic of Korea better able to do business with friendly nations profitably without suffering from discriminatory treatments. It also has provided the country with greater opportunities for conducting trade conferences with friendly nations to improve its trade imbalance.


As a result, the nations's exports rose from \$33 million in 1960 to \$41 in 1961, to \$55 million in 1963, and to a whopping \$120 million in 1964. This shows an unprecedented 360 percent increase in exports. Although it may be still too early to judge the accomplishment of the Democratic Republican government, its manifest ideology gives the people hope and ambition that they will soon achieve economic prosperity.⁴² Here one can see the important role of the political party's ideology.

Chart 11. Increase Rate of GNP in South Korea



Source: Ministry of Culture and Information Republic of Korea, Korea: 1970, p. 97.


Chart 12. Growth Rates of Basic Industries in South Korea



Source: Ministry of Culture and Information Republic of Korea, Korea: 1970, p. 99.

— : Fertilizer
 : Electricity
 — : Petroleum Products
 - - - : Cement

Chart 13. Growth of Export in South Korea



Source: Ministry of Culture and Information Republic of Korea, Korea: 1970, p. 100.

CHAPTER IV

Conclusion

In terms of the institutional strength of political parties, (1) the one-party system of North Korea has been maintaining party discipline well, whereas the political parties of South Korea could not maintain party disciplines at all. The parties of South Korea were easily formed and disappeared, easily coalesced and then split; (2) the North Korean Workers' party has made relatively strict control over the admission of its members and all the party members are required to do their duties earnestly, pay membership dues and join a minimum number of meetings, whereas political parties in South Korea have not made a strong control over the admission of their membership. Party members are free to switch their affiliation from one to another party. Neither is change in party affiliation accompanied by condemnation of their betrayal. Membership dues are unthinkable; (3) the one-party system of North Korea has not considered suppression the supreme means of system maintenance. The Workers' party has been responding to the possible instability caused by modernization and social mobilization, attempting to perform political socialization and to decrease the gaps between the haves and have-nots, urban and rural peoples. On the other hand, not a single party under the First and the Second Republic of South Korea had paid any attention to the needs of the masses. If chronological age

is a function of the effective response to the new demands, for more than 20 years the North Korean Workers' party has been surviving whereas all the political parties of South Korea disappeared along with the regimes; (4) the one-party system of North Korea has been rapidly increasing party members. Its membership had already reached 12 percent of the total population in 1961, whereas the parties in South Korea did not attempt to expand party members; (5) the one-party system of North Korea, furthermore, has made complex and deep linkages with the other institutions and organizations, such as the military forces, labor union, peasant associations, whereas the parties in South Korea could maintain only loose or weak linkages with the other institutions; (6) the Workers' party has concentrated on modernization; The various economic stages have been targeted and rapidly progressing. The Party has often articulated and aggregated the support from the masses in order to perform the party policies and the interests of the party as well as those of the masses. On the other hand, the parties in South Korea were struggling for power and government offices and positions; the task of modernization was not their main responsibility.

The hypothesis that in modernizing countries a one-party system tends to be more stable than a multi-party system is validated both in general as well as when it is applied to the cases of North and South Korea.

Chart 14. Institutional Strength of Political Parties

| Indicators | North Korean One-party System | South Korean Multi-party System (1st, 2nd & 3rd) Republic | Democratic Republican Party of the Third Republic |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|--|
| Internal Strength | | | |
| 1. Party Discipline | Strong | Weak | Weak |
| 2. Frequency of Membership Change | Seldom | Very Often | Often |
| 3. Payment of Membership Dues | Yes | No | No |
| External Strength | | | |
| 4. Responsiveness | Responsive | Not Responsive | Responsive |
| 5. Expansion of Party Membership & Recruitment | Yes | No | Yes |
| 6. Interrelationship with Other Institutions & Organizations | Strong | Weak | Relatively Strong |
| 7. Distinct Party Ideology & its Manipulation for Goal Achievement | Yes | No | Yes |
| Institutional Strength of Party | Strong | Weak | Internal-- Weak ? External-- Strong |

Another important finding in this paper is the study of the institutional strength of the Democratic Republican party. When the indicators of the above institutional strength of political parties are applied to the DRP, the following conclusion can be made: with respect to the 'internal' strength, the DRP is suffering from a lack of party discipline similar to other political parties because of the internal conflict between (1) Kim Chong-pil and his 'Main Current Faction' and (2) 'anti-Main Current Faction'; in addition, party members do not pay membership dues. Therefore, it is difficult to predict correctly whether the political funds needed for the Government party will in the future be the source of more scandals besides the previous ones mentioned by the editor Chong-sik Chung.

On the other hand, with respect to the 'external' strength, the Democratic Republican party has increased the party membership, reaching 1,500,000 (5 percent of a total population) in 1967; the Party also has responded relatively well to the needs of the masses with the successful accomplishment of the First and Second (two years shortened) Five-Year Economic development plans, subsequently decreasing the number of the unemployed; the DRP initiated the manifest party ideology of 'self-sufficiency economy', mobilized economic experts for the economic development plans, adopted 'economic diplomacy' to obtain the capital investment and expand trade promotion with many foreign countries. Furthermore, the Party is giving the people great expectation and confidence in the DRP for its successful accomplishment of the above economic

plans.

In other words, the Democratic Republican party is relatively weak in the 'internal' institutionalization whereas its 'external' strength is rather remarkable. It is still too early to make a judgement as to whether the DRP will continue to maintain institutional strength. But if 'internal' institutionalization is strengthened, the survival of the DRP is likely for a relatively long time period in the future. Apparently, irrespective of the number of political parties, political stability is greatly enhanced through institutional strength-- both 'internal' and 'external'.

Let me finish this paper with a critique of my own analysis of the institutional strength of political parties. Confronted with the institutional strength of the Democratic Republican party, we can see some of the theoretical shortcomings: (1) does the institutional strength of political parties depend upon both 'internal' and 'external' institutionalization?; (2) if yes, then where can we find an equilibrium point between the 'internal' and 'external'?; and (3) how can we assign the proper weight to each of the above seven indicators, the combination of which can maintain institutional strength of political parties? These questions will further encourage students of politics to develop the study of institutional strength of political parties.

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL STABILITY:
SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS
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The purpose of this study is first to find out whether in modernizing countries there is any difference between one-party and multi-party systems with respect to political stability and secondly, if the answer is positive, to find out why a one-party system is better able to maintain political stability than a multi-party system.

Thus, the first half of this study has attempted to test a null hypothesis that in modernizing countries there is no difference between one-party and multi-party systems with respect to political stability. Modernization has been defined in many different ways with different perspectives and, therefore, the test of the null hypothesis is applied to each of four different typologies of the modernizing countries differently classified by (1) C. E. Black (historical and periodizational perspective), (2) James S. Coleman (structural-functional perspective), (3) Fred R. von der Mehden (political and economic perspective, combined with a geographical one), and (4) Paul Samuelson (per capita GNP). The Chi-square test which was applied to each of the above different cases brought about the same result, namely that the null hypothesis was rejected. In other words, there is a difference between one-party and multi-party systems with respect to political stability.

The second half of this study deals with the question of why it is that in modernizing countries a one-party system is better able to maintain political stability than a multi-party system. In terms of political stability, what really counts

is not simply the number of political parties but the level of institutional strength which the political party or parties can maintain.

In order to test whether a one-party or a multi-party system is better able to maintain institutional strength, an attempt has been made to consider seven indicators for measurement of institutional strength: three indicators for 'internal' institutional strength such as party discipline, frequency of membership change and payment of membership dues; and four indicators for 'external' institutional strength such as responsiveness, expansion of party membership and recruitment, interrelationship with other institutions and organizations, and distinct party ideology and its manipulation for goal achievement.

In order to compare the one-party and multi-party systems with respect to institutional strength, the above seven indicators were applied to the North Korean one-party state and the South Korean multi-party system. The finding from this study is that the North Korean one-party system has met all of these seven indicators well whereas the South Korean multi-party system has been unable to do so.

The hypothesis that in modernizing countries a one-party system tends to be more stable than a multi-party system is validated both in general as well as when it is applied to the cases of North and South Korea.