

COHESION IN LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS
THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS
AND
THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

by

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose

This paper will examine legislative coalition behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives in the first sessions of the 92nd and 93rd Congresses and the second session of the 94th Congress. This study focuses on the differences between two congressional legislative coalitions, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and the Conservative Coalition (Coalition).

The Problem

The existence of legislative coalitions in the House of Representatives has come to be a reality in the legislative process of this nation. The problem addressed in this research concerns whether or not different policy issues affect group cohesion.

Significance of the Study

The research undertaken here is significant from a number of perspectives. The importance of legislative coalitions in the political process should not be overlooked; legislative coalitions play a major role in shaping public policy. Moreover, surveys of relevant literature reveal a conspicuous absence of material related to the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition.

The enactment of voting rights legislation, the migration of Blacks¹ to the centers of our major cities, reapportionment of large metropolitan areas and the ever increasing numbers of Black voters in these areas has begun to have its effect; the number of Black representatives in the House of Representatives is increasing. Indications are that the trend toward increased Black voter participation will continue in the future. And barring any use of the many subtle institutional tools available to preclude these developments, it seems reasonable to assume that Black representation in the Congress will increase accordingly. On the other hand, the political activity and influence of the Conservative Coalition during the first session of the 97th Congress (1981) is evidence of the significance of this group and provides the basis for a closer look at this legislative coalition.

Perhaps there is justification for the absence of work on the CBC or the Coalition; such justification may be found in the fact that the Caucus and the Coalition are such small entities that any objective quantitative effort would result in statistical insignificance. Such may be the case; however, the significance of a study of the CBC is based on grounds that they (the CBC) are the only legislative group that consistently represents the interests of Blacks, the poor and other minorities; moreover, an examination of media reports and official documents relevant to its congressional activity during the early months of the 97th Congress clearly establishes the impact of the Conservative Coalition on

public policy. It was the Conservative Coalition which was at the center of the late President F.D. Roosevelt's problems --implementing his New Deal programs--in the 1930's.² Their part in shaping the direction of this country is of major significance; moreover, who they are and what holds them together provides justification for an examination of this legislative group. Finally, the impact of policy issues on the cohesion of both groups appears to be a relatively untouched area of study and as such, the significance of this study and its justification lay in the contribution to be made to that vast body of legislative inquiry which seeks to understand the political process of determining "who gets what, when and how".

Review of Literature

Literature relevant to congressional roll call analysis is probably more in abundance than any other area of study within the discipline of political science. Vladimir O. Key Jr. used legislative roll call analysis to examine the function of southern one-party democratic politics at the national level.³ Julius Turner utilized congressional roll call analytic techniques in his exploration of shifting party alignments in the 67th through 78th Congresses.

Key was among the first political scientists to concern himself with coalition voting. In his book Southern Politics, Key sought to identify what he considered the political problems of the South; "The South may not be the nation's

number one political problem, as some northerners assert, but politics is the South's number one problem."⁴ In his study Key notes that:

The importance of these roll calls is not, of course, to be judged by the relative insignificance of their number. Nevertheless identification of the issue the dealt with isolates matters provocative of strain within the Democratic ranks and productive of a communal feeling between Southern Democrats and Republicans.⁵

The relevance of this is Key's implicit conclusion that the nature of the issue(s) play a major role in the appearance of the Coalition.⁶

Julius Turner's Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress has been hailed for stimulating increased interest in roll call analysis by demonstrating the utility of quantitative methods.⁷ The relevance of the Turner study is to be found in the illustration of the way party lines become sharply drawn around different policy issue areas. Turner found that consistently sharp cleavages (between the parties) held in a number of areas of governmental policy and action. In the revised edition of Turner's study, Schneier adds that, "there is some evidence in our data that welfare programs are likely to be more partisan than health issues."⁸ These findings are relevant to the appearance of the Conservative Coalition, primarily because the same kinds

of issues not only sharply divide Congresspersons along party lines, they also tend to facilitate defections of Conservative Democrats.

In his book, How Congressmen Decide, Aage R. Clausen utilized roll call data to argue that a Congressman's legislative roll call voting behavior is consistent only within the framework of different policy domains. He argues that in general, elements of a representative's social, economic, educational and regional backgrounds are responsible for the perceptions one has of issues which fall into what are generally agreed upon policy categories. In this sense, a Congressperson's voting behavior across those categories will be inconsistent, that is, he or she may consistently vote in favor of social welfare policy, but against most civil liberties legislation.⁹ The relevance of Clausen's work is his notion that the nature of the issue determines whether or not the vote will be affirmative or negative.

Studies of the type mentioned above are numerous, indeed, however, these studies do not address either the Congressional Black Caucus or the Conservative Coalition as important sources of legislative activity. They continue to concern themselves with how and why Congresspersons vote as they do while ignoring the fact that voting decisions and actions by members of the Congress tend to manifest themselves in some form of coalition behavior that is influenced by the pressures of ideological perspective, similar special interests, or

partisanship¹⁰

From the standpoint of roll call analysis, literature regarding the Conservative Coalition is not only limited, there are those politicians, students and observers of the Congress who would deny the existence of the Coalition. In an essay entitled, "A Conservative Coalition Forms in Congress: 1933-1939", James T. Patterson suggests that the Coalition does exist. He makes a number of points which are relevant to this paper; points which are consistent with the with the above mentioned findings of Key, Turner and Clausen. Patterson notes that issues determined voting alignment in the Congress during the period 1933-1939:

. . . when the House recommitted the fair labor standards bill by a vote of 216-198 in December 1937, 81 of 99 Southern Democrats voted for recommitment, as opposed to but 51 of the remaining 250 Democrats in the House. . . The labor bill, by proposing to destroy Southern competitive wage advantages, upset southerners of all persuasions.¹¹

Patterson goes on to point out that during this period, the most vocal conservatives came from electorally safe districts in the South and that because most of the Southern Democrats were from rural areas there existed a sharp rural-urban split, particularly on economic issues. As a consequence of this combination of factors, Patterson emphasizes the point that the Coalition was not so much composed of Southern Democrats and Republicans as of rural Democrats and

Republicans.¹²

It should be noted at this point that the author has included some Northern Democrats as members of the Coalition. Northern Democrats included in the Conservative Coalition are those members of Congress who vote with the Coalition on 70 percent or more of Coalition oriented issues. The data source for the selection of Northern Democrats is provided from information available in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, (Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc.), for the Congresses studied in this paper. The term Northern Democrat includes those representatives from the five border states; Oklahoma, Missouri, West Virginia, Kentucky and Maryland. The decision to place them with Northern Democrats was made out of deference to their states being (often) referred to as "swing states" which implies freedom to place them into either regional category.

From examination of official public records, public and private statements made by key members of Congress, and from written biographies, Patterson was able to conclude that the Conservative Coalition existed; and in terms of formal organization, such that it was, happened to be no more than developed networks of personal communications across party lines--a point which enabled politicians, students and observers to deny the existence of the Coalition.

In the absence of an overwhelming consensus on either the need for or the precise form of Federal action, conflicts over policy are

represented in the congressional parties, splitting them into blocs and factions that have to be accomodated before Congress can make any decisions at all.¹³

These are the words of John F. Manley, taken from his essay, "Conservative Coalition in Congress". This statement is followed by the conclusion that "Majorities are built in Congress, not elected to it; hence Congressional politics is coalition politics."¹⁴

In his (Manley) essay, Manley raises three major questions that are of relevance to this paper; he asks:

- (1) "In what sense is it accurate to say that there is a Conservative Coalition in Congress
- (2) How often has the Coalition appeared and how successful have they been since 1933
- (3) How has the Coalition behaved during the presidency of Richard Nixon. . ."¹⁵

Manley's findings are based on the methods utilized by Patterson: "Important testimony on the existence and nature of the Conservative Coalition was gathered in an interview (August 19, 1970) with Howard W. (Judge) Smith. Judge Smith was first elected to the House in 1931. . . When asked if it is fair to say that a Conservative Coalition between Democrats and Republicans existed in the House, Smith replied: 'It's fair, but never in a formal way'." Hence, Manley concludes that the "Coalition exists as an informal, bipartisan bloc of conservatives with leaders who jointly discuss strategy

and line up votes."¹⁶ Manley's findings are consistent with the findings of key; he found that during Roosevelt's first three Congresses (1933-1939), Coalition votes made up less than ten percent of all roll calls and that this percentage did not exceed 20 percent until the Seventy-eighth Congress (1943-1944). Moreover; according to Manley, an upward trend in Coalition appearances--26 percent of the time in 1969. In summary, Manley concluded that; (a) the Conservative Coalition exists, (b) that while the percentage of appearances is low relative to the number of issues, they were very successful and that there is a trend toward an increase in their appearances and, (c) that during the Nixon years the visibility of the Coalition was highest (to that point in time). It is possible that the 97th Congress will produce a higher percentage of Coalition appearances.

Just as the literature on the Conservative Coalition is limited, literature on the Congressional Black Caucus is also conspicuously absent. There have been a small number of essays written, and papers prepared for delivery at various conferences and meetings; while not particularly rigorous undertakings, these essays and papers tend to touch only the surface of Caucus cohesion.

Marguerite Ross-Barnett attributes this lack of work on the CBC to "the lack of a theoretical framework from which to elucidate the black political experience."¹⁷ Barnett, while not elaborating, implicitly recognizes the existence of the CBC as a cohesive group in Congress. She states, "it is as

a collectivity that Caucus members have made their impact on national politics."¹⁸ Echoing Barnett's assertions, Bruce W. Robeck concluded that, "the small numbers of Negroes in Congress tended to vote alike . . ."¹⁹ Barker and McCorry suggest that the "force of blackness" stimulates in group cohesion among Caucus members.²⁰ On the other hand, Charles W. Dunn, in a 1973 study of black legislative caucuses, concluded that Black caucuses in legislative bodies tend to represent party and hence the implicit conclusion that cohesion is not the rule within Black legislative caucuses.²¹ Finally, from interviews of Black legislators at the state and local levels of government, Conyers and Wallace found evidence to support the position that the CBC was not a cohesive group.²²

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The foregoing differences in the opinions of the various authors and scholars cited above raise a number of questions; questions around which this research is based. The study proposed here will seek to determine the cohesiveness found in the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition during three sessions of Congress.

This study will seek to compare and contrast the CBC and the Coalition in terms of their in-group cohesion across three policy dimensions over three congressional sessions. To accomplish this task, it is necessary to determine if, (a) cohesion is existent in either or both groups under

analysis, (b) what is the level of cohesion for each group, (c) what kinds of patterns does either group display; are they cohesive from one policy dimension to the other and from one congressional session to another, (d) how do the CBC and the Coalition compare within and across all dimensions.

From these questions, a set of hypotheses obtain:

a) It is hypothesized that because of the socioeconomic condition of Caucus constituents, the representative interest of each Caucus member is fundamentally the same. As a result the nature of policy issues impact significantly upon the cohesion of the Congressional Black Caucus.

b) It is hypothesized that because of the socioeconomic diversity of Coalition constituents, the interest of Coalition members reflects this diversity; as a result, policy dimension as well as time impacts significantly on the cohesion of the Coalition.

Methods

To answer the major research questions raised above, roll call analysis was selected to measure cohesion within the two groups. Roll call data was selected from the first sessions of the 92nd and 93rd Congresses (1971, 1973), and the second session of the 94th Congress (1976); the data was collected from the U.S. House of Representatives Daily Journals, the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, and computer printouts furnished by the University of Michigan Social Research Center.

The data collected for both coalitions was separately analyzed, the findings were then compared and contrasted for their in-group cohesion in each policy dimension and for each congressional session respectively. The data is tabularly displayed for clarity and enhancement (see appendix) of the verbal explanations of the data.

Membership identity for the CBC presented no major research problem since those representatives who make up the Caucus are publicly on record as declared members of the group. The establishment of Coalition membership might have been an arduous research task; however, this was not the case. The information regarding membership in this group was provided by Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports.²³

The analysis is based upon the selection and classification of 268 roll call votes which were examined for this study. For the first session of the 92nd Congress, 98 roll calls were selected for analysis in the three policy dimensions. In the first session of the 93rd Congress, 90 roll call votes were examined, while the second session of the 94th Congress analyzes 80 roll call votes.

The selection and classification of roll calls, while based on likeness of content, was accomplished by the purely subjective choice of the author, that is, there were no overly rigorous statistically objective methods applied in the selection process. This choice, of course, subjects the methodology utilized here to question as well as raising questions about

the validity of what is being done here. But as Schneier notes, "Classification is based on the substance of the matter up for a vote as revealed in the remarks of the members in debate on the issue."²⁴ The author takes the position that statistically objective selection of roll calls is a near impossibility because many issues tend to overlap from one policy dimension into another. Riker suggests that roll significance can be determined by determining the degree to which members participate and the closeness of the outcome of the vote.²⁵ However, Turner and Schneier note that in large, measure, the Congress helps to solve the problem of which votes are significant and may be included for analysis, "because the shortage of time precludes a vote on all issues, Congressmen place a premium on an issue's importance in an election when deciding whether or not to hold a roll call."²⁶ In other words, that a roll call is requested and conducted may be construed as significant; the greater or lesser significance of a given roll call being determined by the difference between those opposing the bill and those voting for it. Schneier goes on to point out that Riker's method is highly commendable but adds that for studies (such as this one) using only a small number of recorded roll calls (100-150) in each Congress is very effective. Moreover, Schneier asserts that "by eliminating the unanimous and near unanimous votes, significant roll call selection may be accomplished additionally, this method avoids most of the subjectivity of choice on the part of the analyst."²⁷

The criteria for the selection of roll calls used in this study is a crude combination of Turner's and Riker's methods, that is, the Turner assumption that an issue is important enough in the eyes of those voting to conduct a roll call, and the Riker notion that the combination of participation and outcome are criteria for the selection of significant roll calls by which to measure the cohesion of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition.

Webster's dictionary defines cohesion as "the act or condition of cohering, the tendency to stick together."²⁸ Implied in this definition is the aspect of time, that is; cohering and remaining so over a period of time as a primary qualification for the existence of cohesion to be realized. It would be unreal--in the case of legislative coalitions--to consider a single instance of legislative coalescence as being cohesive. Moreover, the author recognizes that it is virtually impossible to get two or more human beings to agree on everything 100 percent of the time; it therefore follows that it would be just as unreal to expect legislators to agree all of the time on every issue set before them. From this realization, and for this study, cohesion is defined in terms of the coefficient resulting from Stuart A. Rice's index of cohesion.²⁹

While not one of the more statistically rigorous techniques, the Rice Index of Cohesion has as its greatest attribute, simplicity and functionality. It should be noted, however, that the probability assumptions underlying this particular

index are not beyond challenge.³⁰ With this in mind, the index was adopted for use because of its acceptance as a measure of cohesion as well as for its simplicity. The Index of Cohesion can be utilized to measure and compare inter-group likenesses and/or differences.³¹

The measure of cohesion is the difference between the percentage of group voting for an issue and that percentage of the same group voting against; a 50-50 split in voting yields an index of cohesion score of zero, while unanimity yields an index score of 100. The inclusion of a minus sign preceeding those values below zero reflect the inter-group differences (or opposition) existing between groups.³²

As used here, the term likeness is to be construed in terms of the degree of opposition between the CBC and the Coalition on any roll call measured.

The Succeeding Chapters

The succeeding chapters of this study continue with an historical sketch of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition in Chapter 2. Analysis of the data is undertaken in the third chapter of this paper. Chapter 3 is presented in three sections; Section A is concerned with the analysis of that set of roll calls which have been selected and categorized under the civil liberties dimension. Section B, examines congressional roll call voting for those issues related to the economic policy dimension; Section C, looks at social welfare policy related issues. The concluding

chapter (four) generally summarizes the findings of the preceeding chapters, posits some **general conclusions** and concludes with the speculative implications and unanswered questions which may be raised around the study.

NOTES

¹The author has chosen to capitalize the racial categories of Black and White. This is done because of the recent identification and tacit acceptance of the terms as being synomous with the Negroid and Caucasoid racial categories; unless used in a direct quotation, the author considers the terms Black and White to be proper nouns denoting two distinct racial categories and hence proper nouns.

²James T. Patterson, "A Conservative Coalition Forms in Congress: 1933-1939," in Journal of American History, Vol 52, No 4, (1966), p. 759.

³V.O. Key Jr., Southern Politics, (New York: Vintage Books, 1949).

⁴Key, p.3.

⁵Key, p. 374.

⁶Key, pp. 374-378.

⁷Julius Turner and Edward V. Schneier Jr., Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, rev. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, rev. ed., 1970), p. vi.

⁸Turner and Schneier, p. 91.

⁹Aage R. Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1973).

¹⁰An excellent discussion and critique of the more prominent theories of congressional decision-making is provided by Donald R. Mathews and James A. Stimson's essay, "Decision Making by U.S. Representatives: A Preliminary Model," in Political Decision Making, ed., Sidney Ulmer, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), pp. 15-17; see also Jerrold E. Schneider, Ideological Coalitions in Congress, (Westport, Conn Greenwood Press, 1979) for a study of the ideological aspects of legislative coalitions.

¹¹Patterson, pp. 760-763.

¹²Patterson, pp. 762-763.

¹³John F. Manley, "The Conservative Coalition in Congress," in American Behavioral Scientists, Vol 17, No 2, (November/December, 1973), p. 224.

¹⁴Manley, p. 224.

¹⁵Manley, p. 225.

¹⁶Manley, pp. 231-232, 235.

¹⁷Marguerite Ross-Barnett, "The Congressional Black Caucus: Symbol, Myth, and Reality," in The Black Scholar, Vol 8, No 4, (January/February, 1977), p. 17.

¹⁸Barnett, "Have You Heard From Your Congressman Lately," in Black Enterprise, Vol 8, No 6, (January, 1978), p. 27.

¹⁹Bruce W. Robeck, Representation of Black Political Interests: The U.S. House, p. 4. A paper presented to the

1964 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association; delivered under the title, The Congressional Black Caucus and Black Representation.

²⁰Lucius Barker and Jesse McCorry, Black Americans and the Political System, (Cambridge, Mass; Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1976), p. 298.

²¹For a complete discussion of the subject and its implications, see Charles W. Dunn, "Black Caucuses and Political Machines in Legislative Bodies," in American Journal of Political Science, (February, 1973), 148-158.

²²James E. Conyers and Walter L. Wallace, Black Elected Officials, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976), p. 149.

²³"Conservative Coalition: Dramatic Increase in 1971," in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol XXX, No 3, (Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., Jan 15, 1972), p. 77, and "Influence of Conservative Coalition Declined in 1973," in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol XXXII, No 5, (Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., Feb 2, 1974), p. 199, and "Conservatives' Success Rate Improved," in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol XXXIV, No 44, (Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., Oct 30, 1970), p. 3101.

²⁴Turner and Schneier, p. 47.

²⁵William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Call Votes in Voting Bodies," in

Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, eds., John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 378.

²⁶Turner and Schneier, p. 12.

²⁷Turner and Schneier, p. 45.

²⁸Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, ed., David B. Guralnik, (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1972), p. 276.

²⁹Stuart A. Rice, "Measuring Cohesion in Legislative Groups," in Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, eds., John C. Wahlke and Heinze Eulau, (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), pp. 372-377.

³⁰Warren E. Miller, "A Study of Some Statistical Techniques for Investigating Legislative Voting Behavior," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Oregon, 1950; the author provides an excellent analysis of the problems with this statistical technique.

³¹Rice, p. 373.

³²See Rice, op. cit., for complete explanation and discussion of the index of likeness.

Chapter 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Congressional Black Caucus

The Congressional Black Caucus is an organization composed of all Black elected representatives to the U.S. House of Representatives; as a group the CBC constitutes the only legislative coalition that consistently represents the interests of Blacks, the poor and other minority groups. Caucus membership has ranged from a minimum number of 13 in 1971 to a maximum number of 17 in 1974-1976. The CBC is one of the smallest of the many unofficial legislative groups that exist within the legislature; "while the CBC is the smallest of the unofficial groups . . . its staff of seven (including four professionals) is the third largest . . . [and] the CBC is one of the best financed groups."¹

The CBC's origins date back to the late 1960's when then Congressman Charles C. Diggs (D-Mich) formed what was called the Democratic Select Committee. This "committee" was initially conceived by Diggs as a way to bring the other Black members of the lower House together in an attempt to coordinate their legislative efforts in a common front.²

The Presidential election of 1968 marked a turning point for Black civil rights leaders and strategists--in and out of Congress.³ The election victory of Republican Richard M.

Nixon was perceived as a setback to the Black civil rights movement and the gains made in the Black drive for equality; moreover, the surprise showing of third party candidate George Wallace signaled a change in the mood of White America. This change was perceived as a rebuttal of earlier democratic liberalism.

In 1969, the Caucus made its first attempt at speaking as a collective voice by expressing opposition to President Nixon's nomination of Clement Haynsworth to the position of associate justice on the bench of the Supreme Court. In February of 1970, the Caucus sent a letter to the President requesting a conference on a wide range of issues that were of concern to the Black community. The meeting finally occurred some 14 months later; from this meeting the Caucus emerged from relative obscurity. Barnett notes that "in a short time, its members were caught in a transformation from a small, relatively powerless, and ignored group of junior representatives to a national cynosure."⁴ In the years succeeding its national recognition, the CBC with the aid of critical self-evaluation was able to transform itself into a highly sophisticated legislative coalition.

When Black members of the House of Representatives joined in 1971 to form the Congressional Black Caucus, there were 13 members. Membership reached a high of 17 during the 1974-1976 period. Generally speaking, Caucus members are a well-educated group. They are all recipients of an undergraduate degree while many hold advanced degrees in law and social work. A significant number of CBC members have

had legislative experience at the state and local levels of government prior to being elected to the House of Representatives; others have served in various public administrative positions and were associated with civic and civil rights organizations. With the exception of Charles C. Diggs Jr., Black congressional representatives come from the Black middle class--Diggs from the more affluent upper class. But with few exceptions, the members of the CBC were born and grew up within the boundaries of the constituencies they now represent. Caucus members represent constituencies whose demographic make up is predominately Black. The data provided in table 1 at appendix A is instructive; if we calculate the total percentages of Blacks within Caucus constituencies, we find that Blacks comprise 54 percent of the population while Hispanics make up seven percent with "all other" 37 percent. What the table does not reveal is that the constituencies represented by CBC members are mainly those "economically depressed" urban centers of America where poverty and deprivation are the rule, not the exception.⁵ Ideologically liberal, the Congressional Black Caucus is faced with the task of combating those powerful conservative elements in the Congress who would ignore the plight of underprivileged Americans--of all shades.

The Conservative Coalition

Coalitions in the political arena are by no means a recent phenomenon in the annals of legislative politics

Since man's beginning as a political being, he has maneuvered and mixed, in the interest of power and control. From the initial establishment of our legislative form of government members of Congress have at times joined to form powerful blocs whose ultimate goal is determining "who gets what, when, and how."

The group currently recognized as the Conservative Coalition appears to have contemporary origins that date back to the New Deal era of the 1930's.⁶ The Coalition is composed primarily of Southern Democrats and Republicans; it was formed as a reaction to the late President F.D. Roosevelt's New Deal programs. Its formation had a significant impact on the business of legislative politics. Historian James T. Patterson notes that:

Few political developments in recent American history have been more significant than the creation of a Conservative Coalition in Congress. Formed by Republicans and conservative Democrats to combat the new deal, the "unholy alliance" operated effectively as early as 1937, and by 1939 it was strong enough to block extensions of the administrations programs.⁷

As John F. Manley states, "the Conservative Coalition is an informal, bipartisan block of conservatives with leaders who jointly discuss strategy and line up votes . . . the Coalitions organization is one of well developed networks of personal communications across party lines . . . bonded

together primarily by agreement on policy.⁸ Over the years since its inception, the Coalition has consistently tended to oppose social welfare programs while favoring such things as de-regulation, non-governmental interference in the business community, and balanced budgets. They have been suspicious of organized labor while championing the cause of State's rights.

The year 1937 witnessed the early power of the Coalition. During that year the Coalition was responsible for the defeat of the fair labor standards bill.⁹ In 1947, the Coalition was able to protect itself by defeating a portion of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 which would have had the effect of making representatives more responsible to their parties.¹⁰ During the 1950's, the Coalition successfully blocked major civil rights legislation and continued to do so into the early years of the 1960's. The landslide victory of Lyndon Johnson in the 1964 presidential elections brought with it a wave of liberal democrats in the House; the result was a decline in the power of the Coalition which lasted through the Johnson years.

The success of the Coalition can be attributed in large measure to a number of things; e.g., the unwritten seniority rule, the democratic party dominance in the South, and the positions of those members in the House who sided with the Coalition. The consequences of these factors has been the dominance over time of the most important and powerful committees in the House. (Table 3, at appendix A, provides a list of Coalition members who served in the House during

the period 1971-1976).¹¹ From 1938, Southern Democrats chaired and controlled the most powerful committees; Edward C. Cox (D-Ga) chaired and controlled the powerful Rules Committee; he along with Virginia's influential representative Howard W. Smith, three other Southern Democrats and four Republicans formed the conservative majority on that committee. Smith was first elected to the House in 1931 and became the leading spokesman, strategist and opponent of liberal legislation on the Rules Committee. Smith eventually ascended to the chair of the Rules committee upon the death of Cox; he remained in that position until defeated in a 1966 primary election. On the Republican side, conservative representative Joseph W. Martin Jr. (R-Mass) occupied the House Minority Leader's chair from 1939-1959. Recently the chairs of the Ways and Means, the Appropriations, and the Armed Services Committees have been chaired by conservative members of the House. This should not be construed to mean that control of the powerful committees is the single source of Coalition power; Manley asserts that "Conservative strength in committee is matched by conservative strength on the floor . . ."¹² it would therefore be inaccurate to assume that the conservatives in the House are all veterans of many years in the U.S. Congress. (See table 3, appendix A).

Particularly misleading is the notion that Coalition membership is exclusively an alignment of Southern Democrats and Republicans. There are those Northern Democrats who

who vote consistently with the Coalition.¹³

Constituency characteristics for representative members of the Coalition are generally the same, that is, the districts from which they come are considered "safe". (see table 4, appendix A). On the other hand, conservative Southern Democrats come from both rural and urban areas while their Northern Democratic counterparts and Republican colleagues come from more rural and suburban areas. Moreover, Republican constituencies tend to be more affluent than those of their Democratic counterparts.

The Conservative Coalition has been a powerful force in the House of Representatives; it has been in decline for only a brief period during the Johnson years. Since the Nixon years, the Coalition's quest for control of the legislative process continues to progress.

NOTES

¹Marguerite Ross-Barnett, "The Congressional Black Caucus," in Congress Against The President, ed., Harvey C. Mansfield Sr., (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 45.

²Barnett, in Congress Against The President, p. 34.

³An in depth discussion of the circumstances surrounding the need for collective action is provided by Hanes Walton Jr., Black Political Parties: An Historical and Political Analysis, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 57-58.

⁴Barnett, in Congress Against The President, p. 36.

⁵Constituency and income and economic data can be found in Michael Barone, et. al., The Almanac of American Politics, (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972-1977), for the Congresses examined in this paper.

⁶An examination of relevant literature reveals a consensus of opinion on this point, though there are some differences in the actual year that the Coalition was organized. See Manley, Mansfield and Patterson.

⁷Patterson, p. 757.

⁸Manley, pp. 234-235.

⁹Patterson, pp. 760-761.

¹⁰John G. Stewart, "Central Policy Organs," in Congress Against The President, ed., Harvey C. Mansfield Sr., (New

York: Praeger Publisher, 1975), p. 25.

¹¹Because of the extended history of the Coalition, the list of members is exceedingly long. To list all of them in this paper would be cumbersome and boring. For this reason, I have chosen to provide the names of those representatives who were members during the period 1971-1976. Back issues of the Congressional Quarterly may be consulted to obtain a complete list of Coalition members.

¹²Manley, p. 235.

¹³The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report provides an excellent record of Coalition membership, which includes Northern Democrats who vote with the Coalition.

¹⁴Policy dimension is defined as a subset of roll calls, the content of which is similar and is generally recognized by students, politicians and observers of congressional activity, as belonging to a specific policy category. For a discussion of the concept see Aage R. Clausen and Richard E. Cheny, "A Comparative Analysis of Senate- House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy: 1953-1964," in American Political Science Review 64, (March 1970), p. 140. See also Clausen's How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1973), Chapter 2.

Chapter 3

ANALYSIS OF DATA

Chapter Overview

This chapter examines the data collected for the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition. The chapter is presented in three sections; the first section looks at the data pertaining to the civil liberties policy dimension over the three sessions of congress covered in this study. The following two sections contain data for the economic and social welfare policy dimensions respectively--for the same three congressional sessions.

The Civil Liberties Policy Dimension

First Session, 92nd Congress

In the first session of the 92nd Congress a total of 31 roll calls were selected for analysis in the civil liberties policy dimension. The data on the Caucus indicates an index of cohesion score of 52 for the 31 roll calls.

During this same session of Congress, the data for the Conservative Coalition infers that this group was, relatively speaking, more cohesive than was the CBC. After analysis of the 31 roll calls, the Coalition registers an index of

cohesion score of 57. The index score of the Coalition is 5 points higher than that recorded by the CBC. The index of likeness score indicates the presence of opposition between the groups where civil liberties issues were concerned. For the 31 roll calls examined, the CBC and the Coalition were alike in their behavior on only eight of 31 roll calls (see table 5, appendix A).

First Session, 93rd Congress

During the first session of the 93rd Congress, 27 roll calls in the civil liberties policy dimension were examined. The index of cohesion coefficient for the CBC rose dramatically during this session of Congress (71). The Conservative Coalition, during this session, increased their cohesion index score by 20 index points (77) indicating support for the hypotheses posited.

The distance between the CBC and the Coalition widened as indicated by the likeness indicator (see table 6).

Second Session, 94th Congress

A total of 24 roll calls were selected for analysis of civil liberties during this session of Congress. The cohesion index coefficient recorded for the CBC fell to 57. The mean index of cohesion score for the three sessions of congress was 60.

The data indicates a relatively minor loss of cohesion

cohesiveness within the Conservative Coalition. The index of cohesion was nine index points lower in the 93rd Congress but was higher during this session than in the 92nd Congress. Comparatively speaking, the CBC cast a total of 295 votes of a possible 360 while the Coalition recorded some 544 votes actually cast out of a possible 552; percentage-wise the CBC actually voted on 82 percent of the roll calls selected for analysis in this dimension while the Coalition recorded a 98 percent total. Patterns of fluctuating levels of cohesion are indicated by the index scores for both groups.

An examination of table 7 (appendix A) indicates that of the 24 roll calls examined during this session of congress, the Caucus and the Coalition were alike or agreed only 21 percent of the time; the distance between them ranged from a minimum of five index points to a maximum of 172. The mean index of likeness coefficient for this congress (94th) is greater than during the 92nd Congress, but less than in the 93rd.

Interpretive Summary

This chapter has attempted to analyze the legislative cohesion of the CBC and the Coalition. From the data presented above, an interpretive summary of the data is offered.

In the 92nd Congress, the Congressional Black Caucus appears to have been cohesive. One possible explanation for this may be found in the necessity of Black representatives to present a collective unified Black representative voice

in the Congress.¹ Moreover, the decline in the civil rights movement and the perceived change in the ideological mode of White America may, in part, explain CBC Cohesion.² Caucus cohesion may have simply been the manifestation of a more primordial instinct; that is, their Blackness and their small number stimulated unity among the Caucus membership--as suggested by Barker and McCorry.³

Cohesion increases in the 93rd Congress (for the C.C.). The data indicated that the CBC exhibited greater cohesion than in the previous session of Congress. Perhaps the experience factor is responsible; that is, in the 92nd Congress--with the exception of a few members--the majority of the Caucus were freshmen Congresspersons with very little knowledge of the ways of the House and its legislative procedures. After a year in the House it is possible that knowledge of House ways further necessitated the need for togetherness. A more significant possibility is reflected in the politics of then President Richard M. Nixon and the rising tide of conservatism fostered by this administration's policies. In the 94th Congress a higher incidence of collective absenteeism and no voting in opposition to administration policies appeared to be indicated during research and examination of the House journals for this period; this may also account for the lower cohesion index score noted during this session. It appears however, that the CBC managed to maintain themselves as a relatively cohesive group during the three sessions of congress analyzed.

By comparison, the Conservative Coalition appears to have been a relatively more cohesive group than the CBC. The data itself may contain the clue to explaining the level of cohesion during this (94th) session of congress. The analysis of frequency distribution data indicates that for the 31 roll calls examined during the 92nd Congress the Coalition voted yea more than they voted nay; the CBC voted no more than they voted yea. Examination of the House journals raise suspicions that the inverse voting patterns may be indicative of a condition where legislation during this period was less favorable to the CBC and more favorable to the interests of the Conservative Coalition. Moreover, this phenomenon coincides with the changing mood in America and the Congress in general necessitated the existence of a strongly organized conservative front. However, in the 93rd Congress, Coalition cohesion appears to have undergone a drastic change. One possible explanation for this change is that conservative elements within the House may have been shoring up opposition to an increased level of liberal opposition to conservative administrative policies. A second possibility may also include reaction to that period when liberalism again began to arise--in the form of abortion issues and the equal rights movement undertaken by women during this period. The Coalition appears less cohesive in the 94th Congress. It was also noted that while surveying the roll calls for this session of Congress, there were far fewer issues having to do with civil liberties than in the

previous two sessions of Congress. It may be concluded that civil liberties were "backburner" issues in that year.

Across the three congressional sessions, the CBC's group voting participation seems to have remained consistent while the lower cohesion index indicators suggest that there existed a measure of disunity within the group. The same may be said of Coalition behavior to some extent. What is suggested, however, is the presence of a "hard core" of non-defectors from the ranks of the Coalition and conservative ideology. The accumulation and analysis of likeness indicators was not an anticipated finding, however, the data produced some surprising results. Most interesting about the data was not so much that the two groups were not alike, this was more-or-less expected, but the existing distance between the two groups and the persistence of this chasm between them is surprising.

Conclusions

The results in this chapter seem to affirm the hypotheses. From the results some preliminary conclusions can be posited. The analysis of the civil liberties dimension leads the author to the conclusion that the Congressional Black Caucus appeared to be a relatively cohesive group, notwithstanding the fluctuations in index indicators across the three sessions of congress.

The Conservative Coalition appears to be more cohesive than the CBC. But like the CBC, the level of participation

hides the existence of changing levels of group cohesion. Moreover, the up and down pattern of cohesion over the three sessions seem to suggest that the 93rd Congress was the congress where civil liberties policy issues were more important for Coalition members.

In this dimension the likenesses in the behavior of the two coalitions approach absolute polarization; it is almost as though they take an adversarial stance--by design. At this point one thing clearly stands out; within this policy dimension the Conservative Coalition's internal cohesion is relatively more tenuous than cohesion within the Caucus. From all indications the nature of policy issues does have an impact on the cohesion of both groups under analysis in this study.

The Economic Policy Dimension

It was Harold Laswell who defined politics as the determination of "who gets what, where and how." This definition is probably more applicable to the economic policy dimension. The determination of how the proverbial economic pie is divided and distributed is a primary source of conflict in any society. Thus, in a representative government in which the legislature has the responsibility for the appropriation of the country's economic resources it follows that the economic policy dimension may provide the arena for the greatest test of coalition cohesion.

This section examines the cohesion of the CBC and Coalition respectively in terms of the impact of economic policy issues on the cohesion of the two groups. It is expected that issues in this category will impact to a greater extent on both groups than other kinds of issues. This expectation follows from the perceived assumption that economics are the key to equality in this nation. For this reason and because of the representative character of the CBC, this group will maintain a consistent level of cohesion. On the other hand, the Coalition will maintain an entirely different character based upon an assumption of the existence of disparate economic interests within the Coalition.

For this study, the economic policy dimension is defined as the subset of roll calls that concern themselves with government appropriations of funds, government ownership in and regulation of the nation's economy--to include domestic interstate and international trade, trade tariffs, subsidies, interstate commerce and transportation, conservation, ecology and taxation.

First Session, 92nd Congress

In the first session of the 92nd Congress a total of 36 roll calls were selected for analysis. During this session of Congress, the Caucus recorded a low index of cohesion score of 39; this is lower than the 58 index score recorded for the same period in the civil liberties policy

at a glance this would appear to be inconsistent with the perception that economic equity is the key to the achievement of full membership in this society.

The analysis of the data pertaining to the Coalition appears non supportive of the expectations posited at the beginning of the section. The Coalition index of cohesion score in this dimension increased by nine index points (68) over the recorded index score of 57 for the civil liberties policy dimension. This finding is somewhat surprising. This tends to lend support to the hypothesis that Coalition cohesion is affected across policy dimensions.

Comparatively, during the first session of the 92nd Congress, the data suggests that the Caucus continued to appear relatively less cohesive than the Coalition. For the 36 roll calls examined in the economic policy issue category the CBC recorded a lower index indicator while the Coalition recorded an increase.

The data from the likeness index continues to infer the presence of an adversary-like opposition between the two groups; the index of likeness indicator decreased, however, from 115 in the civil liberties dimension to 107 in the economic policy dimension.

First Session, 93rd Congress

For the first session of the 93rd Congress, 39 roll calls were examined. The CBC index score was up from the previously recorded score recorded during the 92nd Congress,

but considerably lower than the civil liberties index score for the 93rd Congress. The index score of 57 in this dimension is still reflective of the relative cohesiveness of the group and appears to support the hypothesis. CBC behavior appears to suggest issue salience; that is, it appears that some policy issues are more salient than others.

The data relevant to the Coalition during this session of the 93rd Congress indicates a consistency in group cohesiveness in this policy dimension when compared with their cohesion index score for the first session of the 92nd Congress (68). The data continues to support the hypothetical assumptions.

The Caucus appears relatively less cohesive than the Coalition during this Congressional session but more so than in the 92nd Congress. The data continues to suggest a pattern of opposition (see table 9). The index of likeness indicator reveals lessening of opposition between the two groups, however; the consistent pattern of near total opposition continues. From all indications, the analysis of the data for this congressional session appears to support the assumptions on which this study is based.

Second Session, 94th
Congress

Analysis of the 29 roll calls selected for the second session of the 94th Congress show a small increase in the cohesion of the CBC over the previous sessions (39 and 57). The relatively small increase in cohesion is contrary to the pattern of index indicators noted in the civil liberties dimension. The data indicates that the CBC actually cast votes on 79 percent of the total number of possible votes to be cast for the three sessions of Congress. This is approximately six percentage points lower than the actual percentage of votes cast for the three sessions in the civil liberties policy dimension; never-the-less, it appears that the CBC continues to vote together as a group, but not as much as they did in the civil liberties dimension (see mean index scores in table 14, appendix A). It appears however, that issues in the economic dimension were possibly a bit more salient than were civil liberties issues during this session of Congress.

Cohesion in the Conservative Coalition during this session increased one index point over the recorded index score noted during the 93rd Congress. Interest disparity continues to be suggested by the data--e.g., the Coalition casted votes on 91 percent of the 29 roll calls in this policy dimension while the index score indicates very little in the way of increased cohesion. This seems to (also) suggest that a number of the roll calls are of little salience, but the

"hard core" membership of the Coalition.

In the 94th Congressional session the CBC continues to maintain a consistent level of cohesion, as does the Coalition. The index of likeness between the two groups increased by approximately three points over the first session of the 93rd Congress. Only on three of the 29 roll calls was their any indication of likeness (see table 10, appendix A). The average likeness index score in this policy issue area increased by approximately 7 index points over the index score in the civil liberties dimension for the same period. This increase in the inferred opposition between the two groups may be a function of the policy dimension and the content of the issues therein. Moreover; the widening pattern of opposition from one policy dimension to the other suggest the presence of distinct ideological differences (liberal-conservative). This would seem to be so when it is noted that the members of the Caucus are all members of the Democratic Party and have been so rated by a number of special interest groups based in the Capital (see Barone, et al.) while members of the Coalition have been rated high by the more conservative interests in Washington. In short, the data suggests support for the hypotheses while introducing an ideological dimension into the equation. However, while present, the ideological dimension and questions arising from the presence of this variable will not be addressed.

Interpretive Summary

From the foregoing analysis of the data, it appears that the Congressional Black Caucus persists as the least cohesive of the two groups in both the civil liberties and the economic polity dimensions. Economic issues seem to be of greater salience to the Caucus during the 93rd and 94th Congressional sessions. Again, as in the 92nd Congress, the "newness" of Caucus members to the ways of Congress may account for the low recorded cohesion indicators during this session of Congress. Moreover, the mean index score of 52 may be interpreted as a measure of salience, that is, it would appear that economic issues were (across all congresses) of less importance to all members of the Caucus than they appear to have been during the same period for the civil liberties policy dimension. The Coalition, on the other hand, recorded an increase of a single index point across each succeeding session of congress --68, 69, and 70 respectively for each congressional session. The mean index score of 69 is three points over what it was for the civil liberties policy dimension, suggesting the importance placed upon economic issues vis-a-vis civil liberties policy issues.

Opposition appears to have increased from the 92nd to the 94th Congress (see table 15, appendix A). However, the data indicates that opposition was not as great as in the civil liberties dimension when the mean indicator scores are compared--129, and 121 respectively.

Conclusions

From the foregoing analysis, it appears that the CBC persists as the least cohesive of the two groups--in both the civil liberties and the economic policy dimensions. Economic issues seem to be of less significance to the CBC although the data suggests that the pattern of cohesion developed during the three sessions of congress was more consistent in the area of economic issues vis-a-vis the civil liberties dimension.

The Coalition appears to have been more consistent in their cohesiveness in the economic policy dimension leading to the conclusion that economic issues were of more importance to the Coalition membership than were civil liberties issues. The impact of economic policy issues appears evident on both groups, but more so on the Coalition than on the CBC; that is, economic issues appear to have impacted less positively on the

than on the Coalition as indicated by the comparative differences in the mean cohesion index scores between the civil liberties dimension and the economic policy dimension, (see table 14, appendix A). The conclusion that economic issues impact upon the cohesion of both groups appears to support the hypotheses posited earlier in this study.

The Social Welfare Policy Dimension

This section analyzes the data collected in the social welfare policy dimension. As with the two previous sections, this section seeks to determine the impact of social welfare policy issues on the cohesion of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition.

Before proceeding with the analysis of the data, it seems appropriate at this point to offer a definition of the roll calls categorized under the social welfare policy dimension for this study. The definition applied here is based on the assumption that the intent of social welfare policy is a more equitable redistribution of some of this nation's wealth and that the U.S. Government assumes the larger part of the responsibility in accomplishing this redistribution. Based on this assumption then, the social welfare policy dimension is defined as that subset of selected roll calls, the content of which concerns governmental intervention on behalf of those members of society considered to be among the underprivileged.

First Session, 92nd Congress

During the first session of the 92nd Congress, a total of 29 roll calls were selected for analysis. The Caucus recorded an index of cohesion score of 51. This compares to indicator scores of 58 and 39 for the civil liberties and the economic policy dimensions respectively, while the Coalition recorded an index score that was 18 points higher than the CBC score (69). Coalition indicator scores across

the three dimensions rise from the civil liberties dimension to the social welfare policy dimension.

The data measuring the similarities between the two groups reveals an index of likeness score of 120 for this session of congress; it is also the highest score recorded for any single policy dimension during this session of congress. Examination of table 11 indicates that opposition between the CBC and the Coalition was greatest where social welfare policy issues were concerned--during this session of congress.

First Session, 93rd
Congress

During this session of congress, the CBC recorded an index of cohesion score of 60 for the 24 roll calls examined, this is 9 index points above the index score noted for the 92nd congressional session but lower than the score recorded in the civil liberties policy dimension.

The Conservative Coalition recorded an index score of 60; this is the lowest score recorded for all three dimensions during this session of congress. The mean index score for the Coalition during this session is five index points above that indicated for the CBC (61 and 56 respectively).

An index of likeness score of 129 was recorded in this policy dimension (see table 12, appendix A). The Caucus and the Coalition were alike only once during this session--for the 24 roll calls examined.

Second Session, 94th Congress

For the second session of the 94th Congress, 27 roll calls were selected for analysis of Caucus-Coalition cohesion. The index of cohesion score of 56 recorded by the CBC is four index points lower than the score recorded in the 93rd Congress but five points higher than the score recorded for the 92nd Congress. This score is higher than the score noted for the Coalition in this session. The Coalition recorded a score of 55 which is five points lower than the score indicated for the 93rd Congress and 14 points lower than the indicated score recorded during the 92nd Congress.

An examination of table 13 reveals that for the 27 roll calls examined for this session, the Coalition and the Caucus were alike on just two rolls. The index indicates a decrease in the likeness index vis-a-vis the previous two sessions of congress--120 and 129 in the 92nd and 93rd congresses respectively.

The data for both groups suggests inconsistency and the presence of disparate interests which conflict within each group.

Conclusions

In this section we have examined the cohesion of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition in an effort to determine the effects of social welfare policy on each group. From the findings it appears that the Caucus

was less cohesive in this dimension than in the civil liberties policy dimension but, surprisingly they were more cohesive in this dimension than they were in the economic dimension. The findings suggest that the nature of the issue impacts upon the cohesion of the Caucus across policy issue areas presenting the appearance of inconsistency in their group behavior. It may also be concluded that social welfare policy issues were not as important for the Caucus as was assumed.

The Conservative Coalition presents a somewhat similar picture. The findings for this session of Congress suggest that cohesiveness in this policy dimension may possibly be at the mercy of disparate constituent interests which in turn partially accounts for the cleavage present among Coalition members.

Because of the differences in cohesion index scores across the three policy dimensions, it could be concluded that economic issues were of greater salience to the Coalition. When comparing the findings from the economic and civil liberties policy dimensions, issues in the social welfare dimension seem to have had the greatest impact on the Coalition in a negative direction.

Where issues of social welfare were concerned, the opposition between the groups decreased and is lower in this dimension than in either the civil liberties or the economic policy dimensions; the data suggests that the decrease may be the result of the lesser importance placed on social welfare

issues by the Coalition. In sum, the indications are that issues in the social welfare policy dimension impacted on the cohesion of both groups.

NOTES

¹Margureite Ross-Earnett, "The Congressional Black Caucus," in Congress Against The President, ed., Harvey C. Mansfield Sr. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 45.

²Hanes Walton Jr. provides an in depth discussion of the perceived need to organize Black Congresspersons in Black Political Parties: An Historical and Political Analysis, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 57-58.

³Lucius J. Barker and Jessie McCorry Jr., Black Americans and the Political System, (Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1976), p. 57.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Chapter Overview

The final chapter of this paper is written in three sections. In the first section, findings from the analysis of the data are summarized. Because of the more detailed analysis provided in the preceeding chapters, the summary provided in this chapter is general in scope.

Following the summary, some general conclusions are offered in the second section of this chapter; the chapter concludes with some speculations on the implications of the findings--implications for the legislative structure and process as it is known today.

Summary of Findings

From the data for the civil liberties policy dimension it would appear that the CBC was relatively cohesive. The data in table 14 indicates that the CBC was more cohesive in the 93rd Congress than in the other Congresses. Interestingly enough, the Conservative Coalition appeared to be more cohesive during the 93rd Congress also. Moreover, the Coalition was comparatively more cohesive than the CBC across the three sessions of Congress and in all policy dimensions as well. The extent to which the CBC and the Coalition were alike tended to vary from dimension to dimension and from Congress to Congress (see table 15, appendix A). Opposition between

the groups reached its peak in the 93rd Congress, with civil liberties policy issues recording the highest index of likeness score (148). Moreover, the data suggests that for the 82 roll calls covering three sessions of Congress, the Caucus and the Coalition were alike only 13 percent of the time.

In the economic policy dimension, the data indicates a general rise in cohesion for the CBC; this rise in CBC cohesion was accompanied by a rise in the cohesion indicators for the Coalition. This suggests the possible presence of traditional liberal-conservative ideological opposition between the Caucus and the Coalition--not to mention the possibility of traditional opposition along racial lines. Coalition cohesion in the economic policy dimension reached its highest level during the second session of the 94th Congress.

In the social welfare policy dimension there appeared to be less opposition between the two groups than was anticipated. The CBC continued to be comparatively less cohesive than the Coalition. The mean cohesion index score for the CBC was 56 while the Coalition recorded an index score of 61. Where issues concerned social welfare policy, the data suggests that neither group was as cohesive as was anticipated. It appears that social welfare issues had a greater effect on CBC cohesion than it did on the Coalition. What is suggested is that because of the fluctuating index scores lend support to the hypotheses, and that issues do impact on the cohesion

Conclusions

In this study the issue areas selected for roll call analysis were chosen for their more-or-less controversial nature. The results of the reasearch are far from conclusive. However; from the findings, some tentative conclusions about the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition can be offered.

The results of this study appear to suggest that the nature of policy issues impact upon the cohesion of the two groups examined. The findings further suggest that patterns of cohesion--across policy dimensions and congresses--tend to be inconsistent.

Ideologically liberal, the Caucus favors legislation in support of minorities and the poor across all policy issue dimensions. On the other hand, the Coalition appears to be cohesive to a greater of lesser degree depending upon the nature of the issue. What is indicated by this study is the predictability of both groups. Because of who they are and who they represent the CBC (it can be predicted) will vote in favor of more liberal programs while the Coalition cand be predicted to vote or act in a conservative manner, more so on some issues than on others. Moreover, the diverse interests within the Coalition seems to account for why different policy issue areas impact on the cohesion of the Coalition, and to some extent, the CBC.

The data suggests that the two groups were not alike in their group interests; that is, in terms of issue salience,

the Conservative Coalition appears to have found policy issues related to the economic dimension to be of greater importance while the Congressional Black Caucus seems to have placed greater emphasis on civil liberties policy issues. Perhaps the commonly held assumptions (among some Blacks) that economic equality will lead to the realization of civil liberties does not necessarily hold among those members of the CBC.

The unexpected findings of opposition between the two groups and the magnitude of their opposition is surprising. But given the relatively controversial character of the roll calls selected for analysis, such opposition should have been expected. The distance between the two groups is great enough to conclude that the opposition between them is ideologically based. This pattern of opposition was greatest where issues related to the civil liberties policy dimension, and lowest for social welfare issues (see table 15, appendix A).

In sum, it may be tentatively concluded that policy issues impact upon the cohesion of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition.

Implications

Since the formal organization of the Caucus in 1971, there has been a proliferation of like organizations in the House of Representatives. These caucuses are organized along racial and ethnic lines and in the case of the Congressional Women's

Caucus, along sexual lines.

On the conservative side, conservatives from both parties and all geographical regions openly participated as members of the Conservative Coalition for the first time beginning during the latter part of 1980 and continuing well into 1981. Moreover, the conservative elements of the Democratic party openly set about to formally organize themselves in defense of conservative interests. In almost outright defiance of the party leadership in the House, the newly formed Democratic Conservative Forum have been the measure of defeat for the majority democrats in the House during the first session of the 97th Congress.

The recent trends toward racial, ethnic and sexually organized groups coupled to a trend of increased representation of these groups in the House carries with it possible broad implications for the structure of the Congress and its time proven legislative process. Moreover, the continued proliferation of organizations similar to the Democratic Conservative Forum, the Conservative Coalition and other assorted interest coalitions threaten the foundation of American politics--particularly the two-party system. It is readily apparent at this point in time that the traditional weakness of party discipline in this nation has fallen to an all-time low level of impotence. If these trends continue at the current rate, the possibility exists that somewhere in the distant future, the U.S. legislature could resemble the chaotic impotent body of legislators who sit and preside over

the Italian people. Briefly stated, since the inception of the Conservative Coalition and the Congressional Black Caucus, the implications arising from their development impact strongly upon the future of the legislative process in this national--notwithstanding, the entire legislative structure.

Finally, it is realized that during the conduct of this study, a number of relevant and important questions were left unanswered. Some of the more obvious questions are:

What accounts for the cohesiveness of the CBC?

Is the opposition between the Coalition and the Caucus real; is it purely ideological?

What is the impact of constituency on CBC cohesion across the three policy dimensions?

What effect do special interests have on Caucus cohesion?

Does there exist a central "hard core" within the Coalition?

Is interest disparity a major factor in Coalition cohesion?

These are but a few of the important questions left unanswered by this study. Realizing this I must hasten to add that the lack of time and finances precluded a more in depth rigorous analysis--including examination of the above questions.

However, with this in mind, the study was designed leaving these questions open and as a point of departure from which to undertake a larger more rigorous analysis sometime in the near future.

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APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF TABLES

Table 1*

Congressional Black Caucus**
Membership

Name	Age	Party	State	District	Year Elected	As Members of Caucus
Yvonne E. Burke	48	Dem	Calif	28th	1972	1972 - 1976
Shirley Chisholm	56	Dem	New York	12th	1968	1971 - 1976
William L. Clay	49	Dem	Missouri	1st	1968	1971 - 1976
Cardiss Collins	48	Dem	Illinois	7th	1973	1973 - 1976
John Conyers Jr.	51	Dem	Michigan	1st	1964	1971 - 1976
Ronald V. Dellums	45	Dem	Calif	8th	1970	1971 - 1976
Charles C. Diggs Jr.	58	Dem	Michigan	13th	1954	1971 - 1976
Augustus F. Hawkins	74	Dem	Calif	29th	1962	1971 - 1976
Barbara Jordan	44	Dem	Texas	18th	1972	1972 - 1976
Ralph H. Metcalfe	70	Dem	Illinois	1st	1970	1972 - 1976
Parren J. Mitchell	58	Dem	Maryland	7th	1970	1971 - 1976
Robert N.C. Nix	75	Dem	Penn	2nd	1958	1971 - 1976
Charles B. Rangel	60	Dem	New York	19th	1970	1971 - 1976

Table 1 (Cont)

Name	Age	Party	State	District	Year Elected	As Members of Caucus
Louis Stokes	55	Dem	Ohio	21st	1968	1971 - 1976
Andrew Young	48	Dem	Georgia	5th	1972	1972 - 1976

*Sources: Michael Barone et al., The Almanac of American Politics, (Boston: Gambit, 1973, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc. , 1975, 1977), and Barker, Lucius J. and Jessie McCorry Jr., Black Americans and the Political System, (Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop Publisher, Inc., 1976).

**This table lists those representatives who served at some time during the period 1971 - 1976.

Table 2

Congressional Black Caucus
District Ethnic Distribution

Name	State	District	Major City in Distr.	Distr. Pop.	Black	Hispanic	All Other
Yvonne B. Burke	Calif	28th	Los Angeles	465,182	40%	12%	48%
Shirley Chisholm	New York	12th	NYC	467,726	54%	20%	26%
William L. Clay	Missouri	1st	St. Louis	460,056	54%	*	46%
Cardiss Collins	Illinois	7th	Chicago	464,283	55%	17%	28%
John Conyers Jr.	Michigan	1st	Detroit	467,636	70%	*	30%
Ronald V. Dellums	Calif	8th	Berkley	462,953	21%	7%	72%
Charles C. Diggs Jr.	Michigan	13th	Detroit	465,076	66%	2%	32%
Augustus F. Hawkins	Calif	29th	Los Angeles	464,125	59%	15%	26%
Barbara Jordon	Texas	18th	Houston	466,520	44%	19%	37%
Ralphe H. Metcalfe	Illinois	1st	Chicago	462,434	89%	1%	10%
Parren J. Mitchell	Maryland	7th	Baltimore	487,832	74%	*	26%
Robert N.C. Nix	Penn	2nd	Philadelphia	470,267	65%	*	35%
Charles B. Rangel	New York	19th	NYC-Harlem	466,876	59%	17%	24%

Table 2 (Cont)

Name	State	District	Major City in Distr.	Distr. Pop.	Black	Hispanic	All Other
Louis Stokes	Ohio	21st	Cleveland	462,584	66%	*	34%
Andrew Young	Georgia	5th	Atlanta	462,434	89%	1%	10%

Sources: Michael Barone et al., The Almanac of American Politics, (Boston: Gambit, 1973,
New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1975, 1977).

Table 3

Conservative Coalition
Membership 1971-1976

Name	Age	Party	State	District	Year Elected	As member of Coalition
William Archer	48	Rep	Texas	7th	1970	1971 - 1976
Wayne Aspinall	-	N. Dem	Colorado	4th	1948	1971 - 1972
Robin F. Beard	37	Rep	Tenn	6th	1972	1972 - 1976
Omar Burleson	70	S. Dem	Texas	17th	1946	1971 - 1976
Caldwell Butler	51	Rep	Virginia	6th	1972	1972 - 1976
Goodloe Byron	47	N. Dem	Maryland	6th	1970	1971 - 1976
Bob R. Casey	61	S. Dem	Texas	22nd	1958	1971 - 1976
Elford Cederberg	58	Rep	Michigan	10th	1952	1971 - 1976
Bill Chappel	54	S. Dem	Florida	4th	1968	1971 - 1976
James Collins	60	Rep	Texas	3rd	1968	1971 - 1976
R.W. Daniel	40	Rep	Virginia	4th	1972	1972 - 1976
W.C. Daniel	62	S. Dem	Virginia	5th	1968	1971 - 1976
James L. Delaney	75	N. Dem	New York	9th	1948	1971 - 1976
Samuel L. Devine	51	Rep	Ohio	12th	1958	1971 - 1976
William L. Dickenson	57	Rep	Alabama	2nd	1964	1971 - 1976

Table 3 (Cont)

Name	Age	Party	State	District	Year Elected	As Member of Coalition
Thomas N. Downing	57	S. Dem	Virginia	1st	1958	1971 - 1976
John James Duncan	57	Rep	Texas	2nd	1964	1971 - 1976
Jack W. Edwards	48	Rep	Alabama	1st	1964	1971 - 1976
O.C. Fisher	71	S. Dem	Texas	21st	1942	1971 - 1976
L.H. Fountain	63	S. Dem	N. Carolina	2nd	1952	1971 - 1976
William F. Goodling	49	Rep	Penn	19th	1974	1974 - 1976
James A. Haley	77	S. Dem	Florida	8th	1952	1971 - 1976
Sam B. Hall	52	S. Dem	Texas	1st	1976	1976 - ----
David N. Henderson	55	S. Dem	N. Carolina	3rd	1960	1971 - 1976
Edward Hutchinson	62	Rep	Michigan	4th	1962	1971 - 1976
Richard Ichord	45	N. Dem	Missouri	8th	1960	1971 - 1976
John F. Jarman	--	S. Dem	Oklahoma	5th	1950	1971 - 1976
Delbert L. Latta	56	Rep	Ohio	5th	1958	1971 - 1976
Alton Lennon	64	S. Dem	N. Carolina	7th	1954	1971 - 1972
John Y. McCollister	55	Rep	Nebraska	2nd	1970	1971 - 1976
Larry L. McDonald	41	S. Dem	Georgia	7th	1974	1974 - 1976

Table 3 (Cont)

Name	Age	Party	State	District	Year Elected	As Member of Coalition
George H. Mahone	76	S. Dem	Texas	19th	1934	1971 - 1976
William Mills	--	Rep	Maryland	1st	1971	1971 - 1973
Wilmer Mizell	46	Rep	N. Carolina	5th	1968	1971 - 1976
G.V. Montgomery	--	S. Dem	Mississippi	3rd	1966	1971 - 1976
John T. Myers	49	Rep	Indiana	7th	1966	1971 - 1976
Bill Nichols	58	S. Dem	Alabama	3rd	1966	1971 - 1976
W.R. Poage	77	S. Dem	Texas	11th	1936	1971 - 1976
Robert D. Price	49	Rep	Texas	13th	1966	1971 - 1976
William J. Randall	67	N. Dem	Missouri	4th	1959	1971 - 1976
Kenneth J. Robinson	60	Rep	Virginia	7th	1970	1971 - 1976
Harold R. Runnels	52	N. Dem	New Mexico	2nd	1970	1971 - 1976
Earl B. Ruth	60	Rep	N. Carolina	8th	1968	1971 - 1976
Charles Sandman	55	Rep	New Jersey	2nd	1966	1971 - 1976
David Satterfield	56	S. Dem	Virginia	3rd	1964	1971 - 1976
E.G. Shuster	44	Rep	Penn	9th	1972	1972 - 1976
Floyd D. Spence	48	Rep	S. Carolina	2nd	1970	1971 - 1976

Table 3 (Cont)

Name	Age	Party	State	District	Year Elected	As Member of Coalition
William A. Steiger	38	Rep	Arizona	6th	1966	1971 - 1976
Roy A. Taylor	66	S. Dem	N. Carolina	11th	1960	1971 - 1976
David C. Treen	48	Rep	Louisiana	3rd	1972	1972 - 1976
Joe D. Waggonner	58	S. Dem	Louisiana	4th	1961	1971 - 1976
Lawrence G. Williams	63	Rep	Penn	7th	1966	1971 - 1976
Roger Zion	55	Rep	Indiana	8th	1966	1971 - 1976

Sources: Michael Barone et al., The Almanac of American Politics, (Boston: Gambit 1973, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1975, 1977), and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol XXX, No 3, Vol XXXII, No 5, Vol XXXIV, No 43, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1972, 1974, 1976).

Table 4

Conservative Coalition
District Ethnic Distribution

Name	State	District	Major City in Distr	Distr. Pop.	Black	white	Hisp	All Other
William Archer	Texas	7th	Houston	466,366	27%	92%	6%	*
Wayne Aspinall	Colorado	4th	Fort Collins	422,024	*	90%	10%	*
Robin F. Beard	Tenn	6th	Memphis	472,341	14%	86%	*	*
Omar Burleson	Texas	17th	Abilene	466,432	4%	87%	9%	*
Caldwell Butler	Virginia	6th	Roanoke	464,356	12%	88%	*	*
Goodloe Byron	Maryland	6th	Hagerstown	491,839	4%	96%	*	*
Bob R. Casey	Texas	22nd	Houston	466,707	13%	77%	10%	*
Elford Cederberg	Michigan	10th	Muskegon	467,547	*	99%	1%	*
Bill Chappel	Florida	4th	Daytona Bea	452,076	15%	84%	1%	*
James Collins	Texas	3rd	Dallas	466,266	1%	86%	5%	8%
R.W. Daniel	Virginia	4th	Portsmouth	465,738	37%	60%	*	3%
W.C. Daniel	Virginia	5th	South Side	462,087	29%	70%	*	1%
James L. Delaney	New York	9th	N.Y.C.	476,202	2%	96%	2%	*
Samuel L. Devine	Ohio	12th	Columbus	463,120	10%	90%	*	*

Table 4 (Cont)

Name	State	District	Major City in Distr	Distr. Pop.	Black	White	Hisp	All Other
William L. Dickerson	Alabama	2nd	Montgomery	491,676	30%	68%	*	2%
Thomas N. Downing	Virginia	1st	Newport News	465,981	30%	64%	1%	5%
John James Duncan	Tenn	2nd	Knoxville	492,539	6%	93%	*	1%
Jack W. Edwards	Alabama	1st	Mobile	491,747	33%	65%	*	2%
O.C. Fisher	Texas	21st	San Antonio	466,656	2%	60%	24%	14%
L.H. Fountain	N. Carolina	2nd	Rocky Mount	457,601	40%	59%	*	1%
William F. Goodling	Penn	19th	York	467,999	2%	93%	*	5%
James A. Haley	Florida	8th	Sarasota	451,776	14%	84%	2%	*
Sam B. Hall	Texas	1st	Texarkana	466,545	22%	76%	1%	1%
David N. Henderson	N. Carolina	3rd	Goldsboro	458,000	2%	96%	*	2%
Edward Hutchinson	Michigan	4th	Benton Harb	467,140	6%	93%	1%	*
Richard Ichord	Missouri	8th	Columbia	467,532	3%	92%	*	5%
John F. Jarman	Oklahoma	5th	Okla City	426,484	11%	81%	2%	6%
Delbert L. Latta	Ohio	5th	Bwlng Green	463,727	*	93%	*	7%
Alton Lennon	N. Carolina	7th	Fayetteville	467,476	26%	63%	*	11%
John Y. McCollister	Nebraska	2nd	Omaha	495,095	7%	79%	*	14%

Table 4 (Cont)

Name	State	District	Major City in Distr	Distr. Pop.	Black	White	Hisp	All Other
Floyd C. Spence	S. Carolina	2nd	Columbia	446,267	34%	63%	*	3%
William A. Steiger	Arizona	6th	Oshkosh	490,934	*	86%	*	14%
Roy A. Taylor	N. Carolina	11th	Asheville	467,051	6%	92%	*	2%
David C. Treen	Louisiana	3rd	Jeff Parish	455,575	15%	78%	2%	5%
Joe D. Waggonner	Louisiana	4th	Shreveport	455,272	31%	65%	1%	3%
Lawrence G. Williams	Penn	7th	Chester	470,714	8%	71%	*	21%
Roger Zion	Indiana	8th	Evansville	472,175	3%	95%	*	2%

Sources: Michael Barone et al., The Almanac of American Politics, (Boston: Gambit 1973,
New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1975, 1977), and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
Vol XXX, No 3, Vol XXXII, No 5, Vol XXXIV, No 43, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Inc., 1972, 1974, 1976).

Table 5

Index of Cohesion-Likeness
Civil Liberties Policy Dimension
1st Session 92nd Congress

Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC
52	82	-39	256	64	-35	298	-64	58	356	27	-72
53	82	-67	257	100	- 2	299	45	-95	357	-64	72
84	-27	-26	261	- 82	72	312	9	-49	358	-45	-30
91	27	- 7	262	-100	77	313	82	40	360	-64	63
147	45	- 2	263	9	-21	346	-64	- 7	361	45	35
229	- 9	81	264	- 9	- 2	349	- 9	72	365	-64	86
255	-82	49	292	- 64	- 7	354	-64	67	366	-82	81
---	---	---	293	- 82	-12	355	-64	72	438	82	-77

$\bar{X}$ Index of Cohesion:

CBC CONSC

58 57

Index of Likeness:*

115

*The index of likeness is obtained by totaling the mean cohesion index scores for both groups.

Table 6

Index of Cohesion-Likeness
Civil Liberties Policy Dimension
1st Session 93rd Congress

Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC
208	87	- 52	247	87	-81	261	-60	100	487	60	- 62
209	-100	90	248	47	-81	262	-73	-100	505	-100	-100
210	- 73	62	255	-100	81	263	47	- 71	541	100	- 43
211	- 87	81	256	- 87	71	365	87	- 71	605	20	-100
212	73	- 71	257	- 87	100	369	-87	90	662	- 73	90
235	- 33	90	258	- 87	90	380	87	- 90	669	33	- 81
236	- 33	100	260	- 47	24	485	60	5	---	---	---

$\bar{X}$ Index of Cohesion:

CBC CONSC

71 77

Index of Likeness:*

148

*The index of likeness is obtained by totaling the mean cohesion index scores for both groups.

Table 7

Index of Cohesion-Likeness
Civil Liberties Policy Dimension
2nd Session 94th Congress

Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC
127	73	- 83	208	87	-91	511	73	-72	622	47	-91
128	-60	- 65	277	-87	72	527	- 47	72	623	-33	-56
129	73	- 72	264	7	39	552	33	-39	682	73	-83
143	73	- 91	367	- 7	-56	563	73	-39	692	7	0
162	73	100	369	33	-83	585	-100	-13	732	33	-48
177	-47	83	455	-73	72	614	100	-72	857	60	-91

$\bar{X}$ Index of Cohesion:

CBC CONSC
57 66

Index of Likeness:*

123

*The index of likeness is obtained by totaling the mean cohesion index scores for both groups.

Table 8

Index of Cohesion-Likeness
Economic Policy Dimension
1st Session 92nd Congress

Roll Call #	CEC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CEC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CEC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CEC	CONSC
34	27	-30	140	9	-72	240	-9	7	427	-27	44
98	-27	53	159	-27	-91	241	82	-49	427	82	-81
99	64	-72	160	82	-35	242	82	0	431	-45	58
105	-64	63	164	45	-81	282	45	-63	455	82	-67
129	-45	-12	208	45	-16	372	-64	-2	456	-9	72
130	-81	67	217	-9	44	384	45	-49	457	9	86
137	-45	21	225	-27	53	421	-45	95	458	-9	-86
138	9	-86	226	9	-7	422	9	-63	459	-27	49
139	27	-86	227	-27	0	426	-27	63	460	-27	67

$\bar{X}$ Index of Cohesion:

CEC CONSC

39 68

Index of Likeness:*

107

*The index of likeness is obtained by totaling the mean cohesion index scores for both groups.

Table 9

Index of Cohesion-Likeness
Economic Policy Dimension
1st Session 93rd Congress

Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC
21	73	43	95	47	-100	183	-60	81	326	47	- 5
41	-73	52	96	60	- 71	184	73	-90	329	60	- 14
42	87	-14	97	-33	71	186	-73	71	330	-100	- 5
50	60	-24	114	20	- 14	187	-60	81	331	- 7	5
88	60	-90	161	-33	14	188	-73	81	332	- 87	14
90	20	-90	162	-20	- 14	189	-73	90	335	- 60	14
91	47	-62	179	60	-100	190	73	-71	338	33	52
92	47	-81	180	-60	100	290	-87	43	357	47	-100
93	33	-90	181	-73	81	291	-87	71	406	60	-100
94	47	-81	182	-33	81	325	73	33	---	---	---

$\bar{X}$ Index of Cohesion:

CPC CONSC
57 69

Index of Likeness:*

126

*The index of likeness is obtained by totaling the mean cohesion scores for both groups.

Table 10

Index of Cohesion-Likeness
Economic Policy Dimension
2nd Session 94th Congress

Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC
26	-60	91	130	73	- 4	355	73	- 65	522	47	-83
34	73	-83	132	100	-91	357	100	- 91	534	60	-65
35	47	-91	134	73	-39	442	60	- 83	569	47	-91
37	20	-91	182	47	-91	478	- 73	91	570	-60	48
38	60	-91	196	47	-91	479	73	- 91	583	- 7	-56
51	-87	83	211	60	-65	520	- 87	100	587	- 7	22
60	60	-13	316	60	-91	527	87	- 91	719	0	4
62	73	-48	---	--	--	---	--	---	---	--	--

$\bar{X}$ Index of Cohesion:

CBC	CONSC
59	70

Index of Likeness:*

129

*The index of likeness is obtained by totaling the mean cohesion index scores for both groups.

Table 11

Index of Cohesion-Likeness
Social Welfare Policy Dimension
1st Session 92nd Congress

Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC
87	27	-72	161	-64	21	274	64	-63	327	27	-81
89	- 82	58	174	-64	53	275	-64	58	329	-64	63
90	- 9	49	207	64	-67	276	64	-65	344	-27	53
126	9	-49	209	64	-67	277	-64	67	345	-27	44
127	-100	63	271	45	- 2	277	64	-53	352	-45	35
142	82	63	272	-82	58	278	27	-26	353	82	- 2
156	- 64	-40	273	82	-67	302	- 9	-12	376	- 9	-49
157	- 64	53	---	---	---	---	---	---	377	45	-67
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	381	9	-49

$\bar{X}$ Index of Cohesion:

CBC CONSC

51 69

Index of Likeness:*

120

*The index of likeness is obtained by totaling the mean cohesion index scores for both groups.

Table 12

Index of Cohesion-Likeness
Social Welfare Policy Dimension
1st Session 93rd Congress

Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC
44	-60	71	292	87	- 81	368	73	-71	465	100	- 71
45	60	- 5	342	100	14	370	73	-90	476	- 20	5
172	20	- 5	354	- 73	100	371	87	-43	542	33	- 71
194	20	- 81	355	- 87	81	449	87	-24	591	- 33	90
269	33	- 81	356	- 73	81	450	87	-14	601	7	-100
270	20	-100	358	- 87	81	455	-60	24	697	73	- 62

$\bar{X}$ Index of Cohesion:

CBC CONSC
60 60

Index of Likeness:*

120

*The index of likeness is obtained by totaling the mean cohesion index scores for both groups.

Table 13

Index of Cohesion-Likeness
Social Welfare Policy Dimension
2nd Session 94th Congress

Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC	Roll Call #	CBC	CONSC
2	7	39	78	33	-56	193	87	-39	388	-47	91
3	47	-30	101	-47	-72	194	73	-4	450	-60	91
20	87	-65	123	73	-39	204	47	-56	451	33	-22
48	-87	30	124	-60	83	210	73	-83	452	47	-39
52	-60	72	125	87	-65	211	20	-91	456	60	-83
75	47	-22	136	-73	48	272	-87	83	634	0	13
77	-33	48	179	-60	83	307	73	-39	---	---	---

$\bar{X}$ Index of Cohesion:

CBC CONSC
56 55

Index of Likeness:*

111

*The index of likeness is obtained by totaling the mean cohesion index scores for both groups.

Table 14

Cohesion Index Summary

Session and Congress	Civ Lib Dim		Econ Pol Dim		Soc Wel Dim		$\bar{X}$	
	CBC	CONSC	CBC	CONSC	CBC	CONSC	CBC	CONSC
1st-92nd	58	57	39	68	51	69	49	64
1st-93rd	71	77	57	69	60	60	62	68
2nd-94th	57	66	59	70	56	55	51	63
$\bar{X}$	62	66	52	69	56	61	56	65*

*Denotes the mean cohesion index scores, calculated for the three policy dimensions with the three congressional sessions.

Table 15

Index of Likeness Summary

Session and Congress	Civ Lib Dim	Econ Pol Dim	Soc Wel Dim	$\bar{X}$
1st 92nd	115	107	120	114
1st 93rd	148	126	129	134
2nd 94th	123	129	111	121
$\bar{X}$	129	121	120	123*

Absolute Likeness 0.0

Absolute Opposition 200.0

*Denotes the mean index score calculated for all policy dimensions with the three congressional sessions.

COHESION IN LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS
THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS
AND
THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

by

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Legislative coalitions form for purposes of collective articulation and control of various kinds of legislation that is of mutual interest. The Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition are two of the many legislative coalitions that have formed in the U.S. House of Representatives.

This thesis examines the legislative voting patterns of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Conservative Coalition across a number of policy related issue areas in an attempt to assess the impact of a broad range of policy issues of different content on the cohesion of both of these groups.

Utilizing the method of congressional roll call analysis the author seeks to accomplish his task by addressing the following questions:

- (a) Does the content of legislative issues have any effect on the cohesion of the Congressional Black Caucus?
- (b) Does the content of legislative issues have any effect on the cohesion of the Conservative Coalition?
- (c) As the focus of legislative issues shifts from one policy content area to another over time, how does this impact upon the cohesion of either group?
- (d) How do the two groups compare with each other across all categories examined?

From these questions, a set of hypotheses obtain. It is hypothesized that; (a) as the legislative issues shift from one policy area to another cohesion in both groups will be

effected and, (b) that shifts in the legislative issues from one policy area to another results in comparatively greater impact on the cohesion of the Conservative Coalition vis-a-vis the Congressional Black Caucus.

Finally, the data collected and utilized in this study is obtained primarily from secondary sources. The sources of data have been obtained from official congressional documents and records, the resources of the University of Michigan Social Research Center, and the Kansas State University Library.