

ATTITUDE CHANGE IN MOHAMMED ALI JINNAH: A CASE STUDY  
IN DEPRIVATION AND COMPENSATION

by

ANAND P. SHRESTHA

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A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree


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Table of Contents

	Page
I. Introduction. . . . .	1
II. Methodology and Research Design . . . . .	13
III. Roots of Deprivation in Jinnah's Early Life and Adulthood . . . . .	20
IV. Patterns of Attitude Change in Jinnah's Political Communication . . . . .	38
V. Deprivation and Compensation. . . . .	57
VI. Conclusion. . . . .	78
References. . . . .	82
Bibliography. . . . .	97

## Lists of Figures and Tables

1. Figure 1: Schema for Lasswell Paradigm. . . . .	4
2. Table 1: A Chronology of Jinnah's Life. . . . .	22
3. Table 2: List of Speeches Analyzed. . . . .	42
4. Table 3: Attitude Variables . . . . .	43
5. Figure 2: Graphs for Data from Table 3. . . . .	44
6. Table 4: Variable Data - Interphase Figures . . . . .	45
7. Table 5: T-Test Results - Interperiod Figures . . . . .	46
8. Table 6: T-Test Results - Conclusions . . . . .	47
9. Correlation - Regression . . . . .	51
10. Figure 3: Graphs for Table 7. . . . .	52



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Anand P. Shrestha

## I. INTRODUCTION

In an effort to explain the powerseeking behavior of political leaders, a whole range of theory exists today. The political behavior of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of the Pakistan Movement, presents certain aspects that may be clearer in the light of psycho-political analysis. Jinnah's attitude-change from a former unitarian nationalist to a doctrine of two nations has been the object of many a guess and explanation. Was he a naked powerseeker? Was his powerseeking behavior related to his change of attitudes on the nation-concept?

A major attempt to explain this type of behavior of political leaders is Lasswell's power paradigm. A key hypothesis of this paradigm says:

A powerseeker pursues power as a means of compensation against deprivation.<sup>1</sup>

Power serves a functional role in that it is expected to overcome low estimates of the self by changing either the traits of the self or the environment in which it functions. In other words, accentuation of power is a compensatory reaction against low self-estimates, especially when low self-estimates coexist with high self-estimates. Lasswell also sets forth the steps in the emergence of the political man:

He displaces his private motives onto the public objects and rationalizes them in terms of public interests.<sup>2</sup>

In the transformation of the common citizen into the political man (Homo politicus) the two factors that play vital roles are displacement

and rationalization, which Lasswell considers functions of historical accidents and patterns of environment at critical phases of growth. This displacement-rationalization postulate is, in reality, an extension of his value-institution-resources premise.<sup>3</sup> Compensatory reactions occur when opportunities exist both for the displacement of ungratified cravings (in other words, failure in the intimate sphere) from the primary circle to public targets, and for the rationalization,<sup>4</sup> these displacements in the public interest and, finally, when skills are acquired appropriate to the effective operation of the power-balancing process.<sup>4</sup> The variable responsible for the development of a subject's dispositional response will be the character relational consistency in the family. Parental instability in behavior, harshness, overindulgence and performance demands can cause internalization and externalization of the child's aggressive impulses. The former inhibits his rage and tension and turns his aggressive drives against his own self; the latter may bring on indulgence-fixation or violent form of delinquency.

In summary form the functional attributes of a political man are:

- a. accentuation of power
- b. demand of power and other values for the self
- c. accentuation of expectations concerning power
- d. acquisition of at least minimum proficiency in the skills of power<sup>5</sup>

The conditions for compensatory activities are thus set forth:

- a. His deprivations should not be overwhelming (deprivations are not overwhelming when the lost or denied indulgences are not demanded absolutely; the deprivations are not attributed wholly to the self; and they are accompanied by some indulgence).
- b. He expects power to yield more net values than can be obtained by the use of other alternatives.<sup>6</sup>

The self in this paradigm includes two egos: the primary (I, myself) and the secondary (family, group, community, nation or any other

identify with which an individual identifies himself). The boundaries of the self thus incorporate together the symbols of what Lasswell calls the primary ego and the other symbols of identification.<sup>7</sup>

Deprivation of the self with regard to values bears all three time dimensions: the past, the present and the future. Deprivations are thus, "endured or threatened losses, and endured or threatened obstructions to an improved value position."<sup>8</sup> Any one of the eight values described by Lasswell may be deprived, and any component of the self may be involved.<sup>9</sup> The impact is to arouse unconscious fears of further loss that induce various efforts in the individual to allay the anxieties.<sup>10</sup>

Finally the skills of powers are defined as a 'minimum degree of mastery which permits some measure of survival in the arena of power.'<sup>11</sup> It is what Charles Merriam has called 'facility in group combination,' that is a facility in 'selection of procedures by which favorable power-balances are maintained' by either retaining crystallized support or winning over or neutralizing the indifferent and the hostile.'<sup>12</sup>

The schema in Figure 1 presents the main points and postulates of Lasswell's power-paradigm concisely.


#### Applying Lasswell's Model to Jinnah

Although the biography of the political leaders of South Asia has not suffered in the historical tradition, attempts to probe into their personality variables have been few. Except for the classical psychological tradition of Freud, Adler and Jung, political psychoanalytics is a relatively new venture. Although it is more than three decades since Lasswell initiated his studies,<sup>13</sup> the slow awareness is obvious, both in the notes authors like McConaughy<sup>14</sup> and Glazer<sup>15</sup> have taken, and in the recent start of journals related directly with the discipline.<sup>16</sup> Partly, this

Figure 1: A Schema for Lasswell Paradigm.

Schema a outlines the development of personality types in different situations.

Schema b outlines how the psychic and behavioral patterns of the last category from Schema a - the Compulsive-Obsessive - unfold under specific conditions.



slow acceptance was due to the disciplinary sophistication which was deemed prerequisite, the operational difficulty of the model, and problems in data collection. Partly, it was also due to the psychopathic color clinging to the image of the Homo-politicus, for all of Lasswell's cases came from clinics.

Recently, a number of sociological and psychological studies have tended to focus on the political in man. Etheredge gives a summary view of some of them in his recent article.<sup>17</sup> Running through these models is what Etheredge called the 'Hardball Politics.'<sup>18</sup> In many ways, it is very similar to the characterization of the 'Compulsive' rendered by Lasswell.<sup>19</sup> Besides these, one may mention the case-histories of Erik Erikson,<sup>20</sup> George and George,<sup>21</sup> Freud and Bullitt,<sup>22</sup> Mazlish,<sup>23</sup> and the analyses of Lane,<sup>24</sup> Browning,<sup>25</sup> McConaughy,<sup>26</sup> Elms,<sup>27</sup> Eyesenck,<sup>28</sup> Gurr,<sup>29</sup> Knutson,<sup>30</sup> Katz,<sup>31</sup> Hitschmann,<sup>32</sup> and Kelman.<sup>33</sup>

Except for Erikson's work on Gandhi,<sup>34</sup> most of the politically important personality studies in South Asia have been limited to articles. Khalid B. Sayeed,<sup>35</sup> Nayantara Sahgal,<sup>36</sup> and Henry Hart<sup>37</sup> have contributed in the latter capacity and deserve some mention. Most of the personography has followed, however, the traditional historical approach. Jinnah presented difficulties specific to him. Contact with him was not easy; his own reluctance to write compounded it further. Unlike most of his contemporary luminaries in Indian politics, he had no taste for autobiography or even for keeping a diary. The nature of his affect-articulation limited the quality of his communication both personal and public; parleys on his personal life are few and far between and his personal virtually do not exist. The importance of such materials in implementation and testing of hypotheses is hard to exaggerate. In

view of what is extant in Jinnah's case, the scope is obviously limited, yet materials available so far present considerable evidence to test Lasswell's postulates.

Of these materials, Hector Bolitho's Jinnah<sup>38</sup> stands as a basic reference. It bears scant reference to psychology, but its anecdotes afford rich evidential material. M. H. Saiyid's Mohammed Jinnah: A Political Study<sup>39</sup> is another frequently quoted work. However, despite its details, the stress on political history is obvious. J. Ahmad's work<sup>40</sup> is an anthology of anecdotes. Besides these works, there is an array of personal sketches and impressionistic images of Jinnah. Quite a few of them reveal the passions and prejudices of the authors; they either extol or excoriate him. Jinnah emerges in other works either as a Messiah of the Muslims or as a vendor of political violence bargaining for power. The admirers adulate him, his critics stifle the essence in his persons. Sayeed's analysis is both interesting and balanced, though it stresses mainly the development of Jinnah's political strategy. The deprivation theme has not been developed to the stage of compensation. Jinnah's communal attitude attracted attention also from a very diverse range of authors. The sketches by Joachim Alva,<sup>41</sup> B. R. Ambedkar,<sup>42</sup> M. A. Beg,<sup>43</sup> E. A. Brown,<sup>44</sup> Roy Chaudhury,<sup>45</sup> T. V. Parvate,<sup>46</sup> the study of S. K. Majumdar,<sup>47</sup> and the in-between references made by Jamnadas Akhter,<sup>48</sup> William N. Brown,<sup>49</sup> Collins and LaPierre,<sup>50</sup> Louis Fischer,<sup>51</sup> John Gunther,<sup>52</sup> Khaliqzaman,<sup>53</sup> Sri Prakasa,<sup>54</sup> M. Shahabuddin,<sup>55</sup> Moin Shakir,<sup>56</sup> Vincent Sheeah,<sup>57</sup> and Sir Francis Tucker<sup>58</sup> render additional explanatory evidence on Jinnah. Two others that should not escape mention are: The Partition of India (eds. Philips C. H. and Mary D. Winwright)<sup>59</sup> and the Jinnah Centennial Issue of The Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society.<sup>60</sup>

### Importance of Jinnah to the Lasswell Model

To begin with, Jinnah was a historical figure to whom the notions of actor and action and the power postulates of Lasswell can be adequately applied. Neither his contemporaries nor later commentators question the significance of his actions on historical outcome and the high personal character of those actions. He believed in ways, one would not expect other comparably placed actors to believe in. He acted in ways significantly different from how his political peers acted when they faced the same situation as he did. In ways, more than one, he was unique, in his stubbornness, his opposition to authority, his resistance to persuasion, his incorrigibility and his paradoxical conversion to the Pakistan theme. To most of his contemporaries Jinnah remained an enigma. The ambivalence that often appeared in his behavior has escaped the attention of analysts. Jinnah's political behavior invites an analysis that goes beyond common sense and traditional history. Even the closest of his colleagues could hardly penetrate the veil of mystery that hung over him. Thus, his personality still awaits a systematic probe.

Despite agreement on the historic importance of Jinnah, there is little consensus on the whys and hows of his conversion. The absence of a powerful theoretical model makes the guesses and impressionistic judgments on this issue inadequate. Lasswell's paradigm was chosen here with the hope that its hypotheses could afford meaningful explanations and interpretations relevant to Jinnah's often ambivalent actions. Besides the rich potential that the paradigm offers, it presents probably the most systematically developed synthesis of concepts, variables and premises relevant to the three domains of psychology, sociology and politics. Lasswell not only postulated, but further defined and illustrated his



variables with case materials and specified the conditions for the fulfillment of his predictions. Adoption of the Lasswell model, however, is not meant to deny the utility of other models. One cannot also ignore the danger of reductionism, a criticism frequently directed at personality studies, and often deservingly. The man-milieu, nature-nurture or what Levinson terms the mirage versus sponge debate<sup>61</sup> continues to rage. It is not the intention here to afford any one of them place of priority. Indeed, they need not compete for a place, for one can agree with Fred Greenstein that psychological and situational variables are equally important. Kurt Lewin combines the role of the two in his equation  $B = f(P, E)$ , that is almost identical to Davies' work.<sup>62</sup> Lasswell himself defines response as a function of predisposition and environment despite his preoccupation with the former.<sup>63</sup> Hence to accomodate the situational factor as an intervening variable is to broaden the explanatory matrix of a paradigm. The burden of this analysis, however, will rest on personality variables.

The principal objective of this study are in brief: to document attitude-changes in Jinnah and trace these changes to perceptions of deprivation, to trace his alienation and conversion, to explain the changing definition of his self-symbol and his pursuit of power. Finally the conditional events that became historically relevant to this process of attitude change and to the solution of his behavior will be traced to their logical end of compensation.

The significance of Jinnah's conversion hardly needs emphasis. While it was not the only factor, it certainly was more important than others, in creating a new nation on the map of South Asia. The uniqueness lay in the way the movement was pressed. History hardly offers

another example of successful creation of a nation within less than a decade after the decision was made for the demand. The impact of Jinnah's political behavior - his decision to demand Pakistan on the political history of South Asia can thus be interpreted as a function of his conversion and hence of his power-seeking behavior. The Jinnah personality interferes as a mediating variable here to explain why he strove for power during his old age. There surely were other converts among the Muslims, leaders like Khaliquzzaman and Maulana Mohammad Ali; there were ideologues, more imaginative than was Jinnah; one may name Dr. Iqbal and Rahmat Ali; there were devotees too, to the cause of Pakistan, whose commitments to separation came earlier than his and was more profound than his in some ways. Indeed he even scorned the very idea at first of a separate Pakistan.<sup>64</sup> His significance lay in his success and the way he brought the idea to fruition. Mere commitment and demand were not enough. The role that Jinnah's personality variables played in his historical call for Pakistan and in its eventual success represent the paradoxical, but polar conversion that he underwent during the thirties.

Communal conflict has been historically chronic in South Asia. The case of a single individual often mirrors the mind of many. To recognize the influence of an individual personality on political events and his political behavior is not to argue its commonality in real life situations. But, still the fact remains that Jinnah, although different in several ways from most of the Muslim mass, shared many features with them, both organic and social-systemic. The change in his psyche was a response to the crisis - a crisis syndrome of values, identities,

interests, confidence, power and parity, but the same crisis, albeit in slightly different forms of deprivation brought a congruency between the need of the leader and the need of the led, that made Pakistan possible. Personality themes thus ran as a common denominator between the man and his followers.

### Elaboration of the Model

Before proceeding to the hypotheses the concepts and variables that frequently have been used defined and in some cases explained in order to make their usage more precise and clear.

- Alienation - Following Olsen, it is defined as an attitude of separation or estrangement between the self and the polity.
- Attitude - A relatively long-held belief-pattern.
- Community - Refers to one of the socio-religious and partly ethnic groups including the Hindus, Muslims and British. Each community includes within its boundary of meaning particular individuals such as leaders or incumbents, organizations, political parties, institutions such as bureaucracy, and particular overlapping segments such as the Anglo-Indians.
- Compensation - A phenomenon with a functional role in the conscious or sub-conscious efforts of an individual to make up for the loss of a value by the substitution or enforcement of other or the same value or values.
- Conversion - Means the polar shift in Jinnah's attitude from his former unitarian pro-Congress leadership to bi-nationalist Muslim separatism.
- Deprivation - The Lasswell definition stated before is maintained.
- Perceived Deprivation - The subjective deprivation as seen by a group or its members.
- Relative Deprivation - Ted Curr's definition is maintained: deprivation compared to another group with reference to the past, present or future.
- Salience - Is the extent to which a particular object or class of objects is central in the everyday concern of an individual.
- Self - Lasswell's definition is maintained.<sup>68</sup>

Jinnah's political career has been divided into four main periods:

- |                |             |  |
|----------------|-------------|--|
| a. cooperation | 1911 - 1920 | pro-unity and pro-Congress stand of Jinnah   |
| b. crisis      | 1921 - 1936 | power displacement from Congress; and his failures in political and familial circles |
| c. conflict    | 1937 - 1946 | pro-separation attitude; call for Pakistan; period of mass politics                  |
| d. fulfilment  | 1947 - 1948 | separation of Pakistan and Governor-Generalship                                      |

### Hypotheses

The analysis has two stages. The first main hypothesis is:

H1 In order to compensate for the low self-estimate that Jinnah developed through his compulsive nature and perceived deprivation, he pursued power through public displacement and rationalization of his personal motives.

As this hypothesis was, in a way, paraphrased from Lasswell's postulates, it has more than one component. Hence, in order to test it, it was broken into five sub-hypotheses:

- I. Jinnah's was a compulsive character.
- II. Jinnah's low self-esteem was a product of his perceived deprivation.
- III. Jinnah showed an intense striving for power.
- IV. The personal motives were displaced onto public objects and rationalized in terms of public interests.
- V. The achievement of power served a compensatory function.

The second hypothesis attempts to establish attitude-change and identify its main trends.

H2 Greater perceived deprivation in the second and third phases of Jinnah's political career were associated with significant levels of changes in his attitudes toward the Hindu community and the concept of Pakistan.

This main hypothesis bears the following five sub-hypotheses:

- SH I The nature and intensity of perceived deprivation (PD) differed significantly between period I and III.
- SH II Jinnah's perceived deprivation from Hindus during the third period was significantly greater than that perceived from the British. (In other words, salience of PD from the Hindus increased significantly compared to that from the British.)

- SH III The greater the level of perceived deprivation, the lower the level of affect expressed for a community. (In other words, the effect variable is negatively correlated with PD).
- SH IV Increases in perceived deprivation were associated with a significant rise in the level of binational references.
- SHV The intensity of affect expressed for the Hindus was significantly lower during the third phase than during any previous one.

## II. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In the third section, an effort will be made to present the familial and historical background of Jinnah to give a perspective for his later political behavior, and to identify his compulsive traits. Data materials for this background and the further analyses in the fourth section were collected from various biographical and historical sources and journals. In course of the development and interpretation of the first main hypothesis an attempt will be made to identify and test the following concept with regard to Jinnah:

- compulsive nature
- perceived deprivation
- low self-esteem
- displacement and rationalization
- power-pursuit
- compensation

The operationalization of personality variables is not easy. The challenge is a major discouragement to research workers in this type of analysis. Apart from this, Jinnah's case presents two specific problems: the total absence of autobiographical and personal materials has been already noted. Moreover, data on his early life scarcely exist; for none of the materials extant provide resources sufficient for the present purpose. However, existence of variables such as power-accentuation and rationalization can be identified in the historical descriptions. Deprivation, attitude change, displacement and partly rationalization can be developed in and through the content analysis stage. Ego-development, personal motives, displacement, public objects, public interests can be identified and elucidated in course of interpretation of the political events and event-impacts. The last part of this variable inventory is the most important: compulsive nature, low self-esteem, power-seeking and

compensation. Fortunately, the efforts of A. L. George on the traits of compulsive character<sup>66</sup> can be helpful here. George has set forth five indicators of low self-estimates:<sup>67</sup>

- a. feelings of unimportance
- b. feelings of moral inferiority
- c. feelings of weakness
- d. feelings of mediocrity and
- e. feelings of intellectual inadequacy

As possible indicators of striving for power gratification, he cites the following behavior patterns:<sup>68</sup>

- a. unwillingness to permit others to share power
- b. unwillingness to take advice
- c. unwillingness to delegate tasks to others
- d. unwillingness to consult others
- e. unwillingness to inform others on one's functioning and
- f. desire to devise or impose orderly systems on others

Lastly, for evidence of compensatory gratification, George maintains there must be evidence of satisfaction of a special kind appropriate to the subject's low self-estimates - in the form of euphorias that should correspond to the five indicators of low self-estimates. The euphorias should be expected in a character in cases where power was exercised in a manner that the subject could represent to himself as being successful. The euphorias are:<sup>69</sup>

- a. sense of uniqueness
- b. sense of superior virtue
- c. sense of superior strength
- d. sense of superior ability and
- e. sense of intellectual superiority

Following the line of argument of A. L. George, Lasswell's hypothesis will be held as supported to the extent that Jinnah demonstrates presence of these indicators in his political behavior. Surely the indicators of any one of these traits cannot be expected to occur with a mechanical regularity. But to the extent that they do in Jinnah's case, Lasswell's compensation hypothesis will be held as supported. The compensatory euphoria have been modified by including as compensatory evidence all expressions made by Jinnah that tend to show his gratification with regard to any of the eight values, especially power and deference.

The second part of this study is a content-analysis of the major political speeches of Jinnah between the years 1912 and 1947. The objective is to identify the evidence of deprivation and its impact on Jinnah's political communication and attitude change toward the three communities and nation-concept through the four phases of Jinnah's political career. The range of the themes selected to represent the political speeches are the issues and developments related to the evolution of All India Muslim League, the policies of the Congress Party, nation-concept, and Jinnah's community articulations among others. The time span covered is thirty-six years, the locale a number of places from Madras to Quetta and from Dacca to London.

#### Data-base and Sampling

A number of books were used in collecting the speeches.<sup>70</sup> It was decided to limit the number to one speech per year. The first criterion for selection was issue context. Relevance demanded here only political speeches -- those that bore on themes related to nation, community, independence, etc. Another criterion was length. Some of the speeches touched the issues peripherally, but as they were very short, they were omitted, as they would add little, if any, to data generation. The unit of measurement was the sentence. All of the



Muslim League speeches of Jinnah's delivered as its President were included as standardized speeches, for these he delivered on formal occasions and could be view as valid representation of values and attitudes.<sup>71</sup> Others he delivered on formal occasions in organizational gatherings and mass meetings. Table 2 lists these speeches.

Winter and Stewart<sup>72</sup> have set forth the issues relevant to evaluating the usefulness and explanatory power of any procedure for psychological content analysis of political communication. The problems they raise need some explanation in terms of the steps taken here. In the present selection, nonrelevant themes were omitted and a consistent criterion was maintained. One speech per year was deemed enough for the longitudinal representativeness of Jinnah's verbal output. Frequency counting was adopted, for it makes possible the use statistical techniques to establish validity and make confident inferences. The categories for the analysis have been selected and operationalized in a way to facilitate replication. The reliability coefficient was .88, a relatively high figure.<sup>73</sup> The variables are related to theories of politics and psychology: deprivation and affect to the deprivation-frustration model, compensation to Lasswell's power paradigm. The next issue bears on model fitting. Although a question has often been raised on the applicability of Lasswell model to western democratic systems, and to normal political personalities, the time and nature of the present case does not make applicational invalidity a problem. Also, more than one single dimension - community affect and cognition (belief toward nation-concept) was chosen to permit a fuller expansion of attitude change, than would be possible by limiting the study to a single dimension. The quantitative character of the categories adopted in this analysis renders it necessary and helps to eliminate the problem often

facing qualitative analyses. As most of the speeches were chosen from formal occasions, they can be regarded as sources of standardized verbal behavior that occurred in reasonably standard situations. The behavior of pursuit of power for compensation predicted by the model variables such as deprivation and attitude change are relevant for the explanation of the subject's political behavior and constitute important themes in political psychology. Lastly, provision was also made for the operation of moderator variables in order to avoid reductionism and improve the breadth and validity of the final explanation.

#### Categories and Coding

Altogether there are five main attitude categories. The first three are affect-related, while the other two belong to the belief dimension. There are: affect toward Muslims, Hindus and British communities. Belief patterns include nation orientation and perceived deprivation. The affect variables bear a positive-negative dichotomy with the former as high and the latter as low affect for a community. As to nation concept, the dichotomy is one versus two nations (along a corresponding high-low scale). The PD category comprises two subcategories: DH (perceived deprivation from the Hindus) and DB (perceived deprivation from the British). Thus the total number of categories came to ten. A coding sheet with twelve columns altogether was used to tabulate the relative frequency of each item. The first column entered the date of speech, the second the total number of sentences in a speech and the next ten the raw frequency of each item total. For each sentence an item was counted only once, irrespective of its total frequency in the sentence. Moreover, all direct narrations and indirectly reported references were omitted from count.

### Operationalization

The speech was made the unit of analysis. The counting unit was sentence. The items defined as attitude indicators were counted in terms of the following sub-themes:

- a. Community affect - feelings toward a geographical ethnically or culturally distinguishable human group.
  - I. Low - negative, critical, hostile or oppositional references, usually in adjectives; reference to the attitude object as lacking any one of the eight value categories of Lasswell.
  - II. High - positive, appreciative and optimistic expressions for the attitude object, usually adjectives.
- B. Belief dimension
  - I. Nation - cognitive reference to a geopolitical and cultural area with specific attributes.
  - II. Deprivation - attribution mainly in verbs; action-related perception of an attitude object.

#### Definition of the categories:

Muslim	the Muslim League; Muslim organization, Muslim community; individual or leader.
Hindu	Congress Party; Hindu organization; Hindu society; party leaders and individuals.
British	British government and people; U.K., the Viceroyalty and the Imperial bureaucracy, the Anglo-Indian community; office incumbents and individuals.
N1	'India'; 'Indian'; 'my people'; 'my nation'; 'country'; 'countrymen' (these references and the ones like these)
N2	Muslim India; Pakistan; two nations. Official denominations such as the 'Government of India' and 'The Secretary of State

for India' were left out.

DH        Deprivation attributed to the Hindus as a community.

DB        Deprivation attributed to the British as a community.

Deprivational references counted were with regard to the past, present or future on threat, domination, discrimination, exploitation, oppression or any other intended, potential or actual action or event was coded as a category of PD.

Techniques: t-tests and correlation-regression analysis.

### III. ROOTS OF DEPRIVATION IN JINNAH'S EARLY LIFE AND ADULTHOOD

The same year that Lasswell was working on his model political man, Jinnah was, on the other side of the globe, approaching the finale of his life-drama. That Jinnah should make a close fit to Lasswell's model of the power-seeking character is not just a historic accident; it was one more case that historically preceded Lasswell's behaviorology of the political character, but theoretically followed his predictions. While the Jinnah case differs in some details from the power-paradigm of Lasswell, in most others it approaches it; it is in this closeness that Jinnah's political behavior becomes relevant for the application of the model and in testing Lasswell's hypotheses. Further, such a testing should reveal patterns of Jinnah's behavior that defied a rational explanation.

#### Early Life and Adulthood

What could be called characteral needs of Jinnah appeared early in his life. There were trends in his behavior that continued from his adolescence to his old age. Jinnah's ambition for greatness, his need for achievement, his quest for deference - through all this - one cannot fail to see his ultimate motive - the need for what one scholar has called 'personal control', and another the 'effectance need.'<sup>74</sup> This was to lead to his ultimate bid for power whose faint beginnings emerged while he still was a child. On seeing his first advocate, in gown and bands, his solemn reaction was, "I want to be a barrister."<sup>75</sup> The boy's fantasy would long have been forgotten, but for the

fact that he not only succeeded in his goal, he surpassed it, for he became the founder of a nation. Those traits of character that helped in his success were forged in his early childhood as were his compulsive traits that, more than once, brought him to the verge of failure. It is then, to Jinnah's early years, the genesis phase of his personality traits that one must look first for the origins of his sustaining strength and his near-fatal weaknesses.

Muhammed Ali Jinnah was born in Karachi. His birth-date remains uncertain, but it fell somewhere between 1875 and 1876.<sup>76</sup> Jinnah's ancestors, like those of his close colleague and a revered poet-ideologue Dr. Iqbal, came from Hindu stock converted to the Khoja Ismailia sect of the Aga Khan, a mercantile community. The forefathers had migrated from Multan through Sindh to Kathiawar and then to Karachi where Jinnah's father had established himself as a hide-merchant. The financial status of his family, like the issue of his birth, is not very clear; opinions have tended to depict it from fabulous riches to miserable poverty. However the fact that Jinnah was able to attend a school in far-off Bombay and later to travel to England on the insistence of a sympathetic English friend of the family<sup>77</sup> points toward a relatively well-off condition of his family economy; however, financial pressures at home during his stay in London have been noted.<sup>78</sup>

From the chronology in Table 1, Jinnah is seen to rise early in his life to positions of prestige and public fame. In view of his middle-class background, and the state of the Muslims in those days of Imperial India, his rise looks remarkable, if not outstanding. For, most of his political contemporaries came from an elite status: Gandhi from a state minister's, Nehru from a famous barrister home, Dr. Rajendra Prasad from a prestigious Bihar family and Bose from a Rai Bahadur's. On the Muslim side, this was no less obvious: the Aga Khan, Mr. Liaqat Ali, Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman, each had

Table 1: A Chronology of Jinnah's Life

Source: Ahmad, op cit. Journal of Pakistan Historical Society,  
Jinnah Centennial Issue, 1976, pp. 282-311.

- 1876 Born in Karachi
- 1892 Departure to England
- 1895 Called to bar as the youngest Indian student
- 1900 Presidency Magistrate-Bombay
- 1903 Legal Adviser, Municipal Corporation, Bombay; becomes a successful lawyer
- 1906 Private Secretary to D. Naoroji; joins the Indian National Congress (INC)
- 1909 Elected to Imperial Legislative Council by the Muslims of Bombay
- 1910 Elected to Bombay Provincial Assembly
- 1913 Joins All India Muslim League (AIML)
- 1915 Inaugurates Bombay Muslim Union
- 1916 Presides over (P) Lucknow Session-AIML; success of Lucknow Pact
- 1917 Elected President-Bombay Branch of Home Rule League
- 1918 Married Rattanbai; Jinnah Hall founded in Bombay
- 1919 Resigns from membership of Legislative Council
- 1920 Resigned from Home Rule League and INC
- 1923 Elected unopposed as independent candidate to Imperial Legislative Assembly
- 1924 Appointed in the 4-member chairmen panel of Legislative Assembly
- 1926 Re-elected to Imperial Legislative Assembly
- 1927 Presides over Conference on Delhi Muslim Proposals
- 1930 Attended Round Table Conference as one of 58 Indian delegates in London (RTC)
- 1931 Settled in London; attended 2nd RTC
- 1933 7 Muslim leaders request to return to India
- 1934 Returned to India; elected leader Independent Party to Assembly
- 1935 Legislative Assembly approves his resolution on Communal Award vs. Federation
- 1936 Badshahi Mosque Issue; his call is followed by the Lahore Muslims
- 1937 Presides over AIML Session-Lucknow
- 1938 Presides over AIML session-Patna
- 1940 2-Nation theory (Time & Tide); presides AIML session-Lahore
- 1941 Presides AIML Session-Madras
- 1942 Criticizes Chiang Kai-shek for his comment on 2-Nation theory; P-AIML-Allahabad
- 1943 Pakistan Day Message; P-AIML - Delhi; Murder attempt by Sabir foiled
- 1944 Pakistan Day Message; P-AIML - Delhi
- 1945 Pakistan Day Message
- 1946 P-Convention of central and provincial assemblies in Delhi; Direct Action
- 1947 Nominated Pakistan's first Governor-General and President-Constituent Assembly
- 1948 Death

a background Jinnah lacked. His rise then can be explained mainly in terms of his personality variables -- his ego-strength, and his predispositions as also the situational factor.

As a boy Jinnah was different from most of the children of his age in his temperamental reserve, ambition and perseverance.<sup>80</sup> On being warned by Fatima, his sister, that his keeping late hours for study might make him ill, his reply was, "Bai, you know I cannot achieve anything in life unless I work hard."<sup>81</sup> Even in play he preferred cricket to marbles, the reason being "it spoils your clothes and dirties your hands." He induced his peers to 'stand up and play cricket.'<sup>82</sup> His choice came not because it was his passion, but as the game of the ruling elite, it came a la mode, as a status symbol.

Jinnah's need for achievement, quest for status and habits of perseverance thus foretold the man in the child. While one cannot always look to the intuition of the Karachi astrologer who once, it is said, predicted a fabulous position for the child, the traits of his faith, his community, his parents and the roles of his filial relations and birth can help explain a few, if not all, of these characters in him.

The role of the religious faith in Jinnah's nature stands clear. While he never became a fanatic in the real sense and turned to learning Quran late in life, his frequent references to the faith and activity to safeguard the interests of his community give a clear indication of the symbolic identification that he had early achieved. Far from a puritan, he seemed a fallen believer to many of his co-religionists, for his pork eating, and drink habits, and his non-observance of the sacred rituals. However, keeping aside the ceremonials, it is still possible to observe the influence of Islam on his personality in at least three ways. Islam lays great stress on uniformity,



and unity of God, egalitarianism of mankind and the value of justice. In each of these, it stands distinctly different from Hinduism's heteroformity and polytheism, caste-based hierarchy and its traditionally hallowed and socially practised discriminatory definition of justice. In Jinnah's political articulation and action, one can observe, he stressed organizational unity, highlighted the need for equality between the two communities - Hindu and Muslim - and on certain demands of his community that he believed were demands for justice. His stress on the faith, however, grew during the third period, when mobilization of the masses called for a more articulate symbolization of the needs of the Muslims.

The Khojas do not enjoy a puritanical reputation. While Jinnah's liberal faith may in part have been a function of this, there are two more ways in which the effect of the community became evident to him. The Khojas are famous as traders; the hint of the bargainer does not disappear in Jinnah. It is not difficult to trace it in his deft moves and maneuvers in the third period when he was able to bide his chance and win time to consolidate his position and gain strategic points for the party. To look for the negative in him, there is a proverb K. B. Sayeed cited: "For hate a Khoja; for pain a boil."<sup>83</sup> Jinnah's attacks on the Congress reached the proportions of a paranoid in the forties. Once his aggressive drives were let loose, the hate and the hostility that had been dormant received a free rein. In so far as he symbolically was able to identify himself with the mass, his unvented feelings became theirs. In releasing his tension, he released theirs too. Functionally, it maximized the net effect of his rallying rhetoric.

Parentally, Jinnah is said to have inherited the good looks of his mother and the stature and sturdiness of his father, who was likewise tall and thin. Whether there was anything else, it is not clear. For the materials

available are silent on it. However, three features emerge as important. Jinnah is never reported to have responded violently to the family-demands. With his early development of achievemental ambitions and perseverant habits, there was perhaps no scope for it. There is no evidence, either, of any Wilsonian trauma from either of his parents. This does not give one a reason to believe that his ego suffered a severe damage as did Wilson's. Never is there any mention of his even once having consulted either his parents or his siblings or his elders. In most of his important decisions in life, he appears as an independent decision-maker. The third trait related to his family is his aloofness and distance from his close relatives, that persisted in the future; the only exception - importantly for him - being his extreme affection for his youngest sister Fatima whom he sent to a mission-school in Bombay. She was later to return his affection with his exclusive devotion to him, forsaking her skills and profession as a dentist for good.

An explanation of his rigidity and aloofness on one hand and his intense affection for one sister on the other can be found in theories related with birth. Jinnah as a child reveals the features of what has been termed inhibited rage; it is a situation in which the subject child learns to internalize his aggressive drives and turns his tension inward. The inhibition, however, is not total. Such a type is a potential one for agitators in social movements, where their pent-up drives get a free rein in the externalization and projection function. The childhood passivity in aggressive reaction comes from an uncertain fate, the product of an ever-existing fear of failure and the possibility of withdrawal of love, indulgence or rewards by the elders. That Jinnah learned early to direct his energy and emotions toward achievement and task-oriented goals is clear. Even in London,

his hard study brought him success earlier than usual. In fact, he was the youngest Indian barrister ever to have passed the law examination and had to wait one additional year owing to the prematurity of his age.

Jinnah was the first son of his family; the first child for his parents. Alfred Adler believed the first child in a family was likely to receive all of parental affection until the second's birth, which thus creates feelings of insecurity throughout his life.<sup>84</sup> Was this the clue to Jinnah's call for security of his community later? Whether or not it was so, it seems reasonable to see a relation between his birth-order in the family and his perpetual effort to prove himself, to achieve, to be a doer. Even to extend his conscious or subconscious sibling rivalry against his three brothers and three sisters to his later aggression against the Hindus, with whom his family was organically related in the distant past, is psychologically not untenable. Moreover, his unbound love for Fatima may have come from his feelings of guilt over such a rivalry and the fact that as the eldest and the first son, his education in Karachi, Bombay and London was perceived by him as responsible partly for the financial failure. It is possible to see a superego in Jinnah troubling his self for the deprivation this possibly brought to his brothers and sisters.

Whatever the reality behind these, there are more theories on birth-order that perceive relation between birth and the type of man one becomes. Investigations such as Fishman and Soloman (1946), Schiff (1964) and Watt and Whittaker (1966) support a link between first-born sibling status and activism.<sup>85</sup> According to Stewart the first-born male has the greatest experience of dominance and of successful intervention in the affairs of others.<sup>86</sup> As the first-born of a past society, and the first citizen of an expanding society all the members of which are of lower rank than himself, the first-born would

be uniquely in touch with the demands of the expanding (here Muslim) society. While also inheriting responsibility for the weaker members of society. This experience prepares such a first-born for leadership in times of territorial expansion and confrontation.<sup>87</sup> The evidence of expansion and confrontation phenomena, one may see in the modernizing and mobilized Muslim society and in its confrontation with the Hindu majority. Hetherington (1965) suggests a relation between father-dominance and tendency for father identification.<sup>88</sup> Bossard's (1956) findings suggest further that a large family places a high value on hierarchical organization, leadership and conformity.<sup>89</sup> There is also the Levine study (1965) to show the differential impact of the Kipsigis and the Gusii socialization systems in South Kenya.<sup>90</sup> The pattern in South Asia is usually to confer a special seniority status to the first born, especially the male child, who faces specific responsibility demands and Lasswell regarded middle-classes as hothouses of ambition.<sup>91</sup> In Jinnah's being sent to Bombay and overseas, it is not difficult to see the ambitious demand in the form of expectation put forth by his father.

In London, Jinnah joined Lincoln's Inn after he saw the name of Muhammed, the Prophet, in the list of the great law-givers of the world on its main entrance.<sup>92</sup> In emulation of Sir Austen Chamberlain, a monocle was bought, his funny long yellow coat was given up, as was also the last part of his name; English clothes were bought, and excessively fastidious habits developed in sartorial matters and personal appearance. It was the latter that was to earn him the epithet of "the most elegantly dressed man of Asia." Success in the colonial days demanded western values; Jinnah was quick to realize it and to adapt to it.

In London, Jinnah frequently visited the House of Commons to listen to the debates. Laski's study<sup>93</sup> shows most of the political figures in Britain came

from aristocratic families; the lawyers contributed some 15% to the total. In India the case was not very different. Here too most of the public luminaries started from law as their first step. In Jinnah's choice, one sees a plan to achieve power and deference through a legal career. Moreover, as suffrage was not broadened yet, the quickest road to power conceivably was through a lawyer's career that could bring one public recognition and fame, the keys to gain political office. Jinnah appears to those days as preparing himself step by step for political power. He associated himself with Naoroji, helped him in his elections. He knew with the broadening of the Executive Council, Indian government and politics had opened avenues for political career. After returning home, Jinnah continued his association with Naoroji and served for a time as his Secretary. Despite his father's plea, he left Karachi for Bombay, which alone, he knew, could give scope for his ambitions. The first three years in Bombay were hard days. He worked without a brief. The majority of the Bombay lawyers and advocates were non-Muslims; it was a difficult challenge for him to establish a practice there. However, the help of John Molesworth who invited him to work in his chambers was considerable relief. As his father's business had failed, it was a hard time for Jinnah. Even in London, he had to postpone a year and work as a prompter in a theater to sustain himself there.

Temporarily, he also entered administration as a Presidency Magistrate<sup>94</sup> but his taste was in the public field. He soon acquired skills as an advocate and an expertise in criminal and constitutional laws. He was soon earning a vast income and was able to refuse the offer of Sir Charles Olivant.<sup>95</sup> His advocacy of the "caucus case" of Mehta and the "Keshari" made his name widely known too.

In his activities of these days, we see Jinnah preparing himself for a career that became his ultimate choice. The skills were learned slowly. His

legal practice became a steppingstone to the political office. Although his childhood does not show a Woodrow Wilson type of trauma, his drive for political power appears early. His entrance into politics was not an accident like that of Nixon, for he is seen preparing himself with all the earnestness of a determined man. The formal entrance came in 1906 when he joined Congress. In 1910 he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Assembly; in 1913, he was persuaded to join the Muslim League and in 1917 the Home Rule League. He became the President of the Bombay branch of the latter. But, amid these activities, the two events that brought national fame were his initiative for bringing cooperation between the League and the Congress. It earned him the title of "the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity."<sup>96</sup> Jinnah's clash with Lord Willingdon over the issue of war recruitment culminated in the creation of the "Jinnah Hall."<sup>97</sup>

By the end of the first phase, Jinnah is seen to rise swiftly. Within three years of joining the League, he presided over the League sessions -- in Lucknow in 1916; in Calcutta in 1917 and again in Calcutta in 1920. He became an important member not only of the League, but also of the Council, the Congress and the Home Rule League. His participation in these bodies were full of activity and enthusiasm; he introduced and helped pass the Waqf bill; pleaded for bills on such issues as the Indianization of the services and self-government and opposed the Rowlatt Bill. Amid all this success Jinnah was also able to win the heart and hand of Ruttie Petit in 1919. His association in Bombay with the top circles, his integrity and activity made him a national figure. Mr. Edwin S. Montague, the Secretary of State for India, entered his observation of Jinnah: "...it is, of course, an outrage that such a man should have no chance of running the affairs of his own country." Years later, in 1929, a British lady was also writing home: "...He is a future Viceroy..."<sup>98</sup>

His interest and participation in the communal issues, however, seems muted. He entered the League on specific conditions that loyalty to the Congress in no way would be compromised. In 1917 he is found dismissing the threat of Hindu domination as a bogey raised to scare off cooperation between the two communities. Compared to his aggressive rhetoric later, it is interesting that there never was any hostile criticism of the Congress and the Hindus as a community; his cooperative efforts were not only obvious, but very pronounced.

#### Jinnah's Political Crisis

With the year 1921, Jinnah's political career is seen to go into a sudden and swift decline. With the return of Gandhi and his rise in Congress, there was a radical change in the aims and policies of both the Home Rule League and the Congress. The name of the Home Rule League was changed on Gandhi's suggestion; its constitution too he proposed to change and he put forth his famous concept of civil disobedience movement.<sup>99</sup> For Jinnah, whose stay in London and association with the British values had rendered him liberal, augmented by his close friendship with men like Naoroji, Mehta, Banerjee and Gokhale, such radicalism was an anathema. At the personal level, Gandhi's rebuff earlier in 1915 when he had just returned on the eve of his reception gave Jinnah little reason to like him.<sup>100</sup> With rise of the radicals in Congress, came also the call for Khilafat, the establishment of the Hindu Mahasabha, a communal group with an irredentist call for Hindu nationalism, the rise of Hindus in Congress leadership and Hindu nationalism. Events later gave Jinnah ample reason to believe that his optimism for cooperation between the two communities was illusory. The Congress was financed by the banyas and merchants of Bombay; partly it could not afford not to serve their interests; it had a certain obligation to them. Gandhi's admission on the point<sup>101</sup> and the alarm of leaders such as Maulana Muhammed Ali were not coincidental.



Jinnah faced a crisis - in fact, it was a crisis syndrome of situation and values in this period. With the personal threat to his political influence came threat to his values, too, values he had long nurtured: order, constitutionalism and discipline. The communal color that the rise of leaders from the Hindu majority gave to the national politics compounded the problem. The history and the social structure of the nation bore evidence of deep communal conflict for a long time. This left scars of traumas hard to be forgotten in the minds of people from both communities. To the Muslims, the fear of domination by the majority was a genuine fear, as Gokhale had realised. The sense of division was observed by several noted figures, such as Lala Lajpat Roy, Lala Har Dayal and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. This was felt even more acutely on the other side. Leaders from Sir Syed Ahmad down to Dr. Iqbal had proposed a separate territorial entity for the Muslims.<sup>102</sup> The sense of deprivation was pervasive in the Muslim community. It had its own roots in history, the social structure and the economy. The power displacement of Jinnah made the deprivation a political one at the personal level. His stern and almost lonely opposition to Gandhi and his policies meant not only resistance to personal threat, but also opposition to deprivation at the political level. Jinnah's response to the crisis was typical of him -- he resigned from the Home Rule League; he resigned from the Congress; he resigned also from the Council on the issue of the Rowlatt Act.

Before attempting an explanation of why he resigned -- this trait again and again in his dealing with opposition in the League in the forties -- it is pertinent to proceed with the deprivations that Jinnah suffered and the impact these made on his personality. We have already noted his family and community background. Note has also been taken of the possible role of faith in his character. Besides this the sibling rivalry and the birth-order were found as



factors potentially influencing rage inhibition in Jinnah. The early death of his mother, of his first wife while he was in England, the financial deprivation that Jinnah suffered for a few years before his rise seem to have played an influential role in his personality development. To these family related deprivations, there already was another more diffuse one that consciously or subconsciously influenced Jinnah's behavior. It was what may be termed for our purposes "community deprivation." It played an intervening role in intensifying the more personal sense of deprivation that Jinnah suffered in the twenties and thirties in his dealings with Congress. He failed in his opposition to Congress and Gandhi; he failed in his opposition to Khilafat; his calls for cooperation were either rejected or simply ignored; the Nehru Report refused to implement the provisions of separate electorate, weightage, decentralization of power from the center and the double vote clause that were accepted in the Lucknow Pact in 1915 to safeguard the interests of the minority.<sup>103</sup> Jinnah met further deprivation with the refusals of the points forwarded in the Delhi proposals; his fourteen points were rejected;<sup>104</sup> on one occasion, he faced a personal affront in Calcutta; on another, he was even told (during the Calcutta conference) that "he had no right to speak on behalf of the Muslims - that he did not represent them."<sup>105</sup> This brought the "parting of the ways."<sup>106</sup> The refusal of Congress to form a coalition with the League<sup>107</sup> and the rumors of domination confirmed in the Peerpur report, Sharif report and Kewal Jar Jung Report made the parting permanent. The peak of Jinnah's personal deprivation came finally in the late twenties, when his quarrels with his wife started; she left home to live in the Tajmahal hotel and later went to Europe. Her sudden death on the heels of Jinnah's political defeat made the deprivations acute, and, in a sense, almost complete.<sup>108</sup>

In order to understand the why of Jinnah's withdrawal and later conversion as also the how of his success, the role of community deprivation needs some

explanation. Politically, the roots lay in the history of the last two centuries. The battle of Plassey and the great rebellion of 1857 brought the fall of the Muslim rule in India. The disarmament of the general population following the mutiny deprived the Muslims of their military strength. With events such as Lord Clive's takeover of the Diwani from Shah Alam in 1765, Lord Cornwallis's "Permanent Settlement of Bengal" in 1793 deprived the Muslim elite and mass of economic opportunities they had so far enjoyed; the Hindus were preferred to them and displaced Muslims virtually in all fields. E. C. Bailey's survey in 1871 shows scarcely a government office in Calcutta where a Muslim could hope for any post above the rank of a menial.<sup>109</sup> Lord Ellenborough's note in 1842 to the Duke of Wellington shows the clear policy of the British to ignore the Muslims. In 1837 Urdu was replaced by English in the Company's offices; within a very short period the number of Muslim newspapers dropped from 35 to 1 in Delhi vis-a-vis 12 of Hindi. This reflected a phenomenon that existed and developed elsewhere. The displacement and status deprivation of the traditional elite was followed by deprivation in the cultural areas, and growing Hindu nationalistic movements. Hindi renaissance started in 1867 in Benares. From Raja Rammohun Roy to the Congress activities of the forties, events such as the activities of Arya Samaj, the Shuddhi and Sangathan movements, the Nav Mela of Bengal, the Ganapati Festival and Shivaji Mela of Maharashtra, the activities of R.S.S. and Hindu Mahasabha, and the opposition to the Bengal Partition by Congress, intervened. The policies of Congress and its schemes such as the Vidya Mandir Scheme, national anthem, replacement of Urdu by Hindi, and the basic education scheme caused alarm in the Muslim community, confirmed further by the intention of UP congress to raise a provincial force as national army.

The threats in the community domain were aggravated by a demographic disparity in economy that had developed and was growing. With the inception

of the western technology that deprived the weavers and craftsmen of Bengal, followed a pervasive growth of Hindus in almost all sectors; in education, in administration, and in trade and industry, even in those areas that had a large Muslim majority. In the northwestern provinces Hindus were moneylenders, Muslims peasants; in Bengal Hindus were landowners, Muslims tenants (in E. Bengal 80% of trade and commerce came in Hindu hands and 90% of the professionals came from Hindu stock); in the Sindh area where Muslims formed 75% of the population, they were employed mainly as menials; the same state prevailed in the Punjab, too, with a Muslim majority.<sup>110</sup> Muslims whose middle class had shrunk swiftly relative to the growth of the Hindus faced another challenge in the Land Reform policy of Congress. It was perceived as a threat to deprive the Muslim class of its only means of sustenance.<sup>111</sup> Ispahani's data make the disparity more obvious. Sacred taboo against usury prevented Muslims to rise in trade and banking; their cultural hostility to the western values brought inertia and gave advantage to the more mobile and flexible Hindus; the geographical position of the ports where westernization first started gave Hindus still another lift, for they dominated these areas; still another barrier was political. As a people deprived of power, they had reason to doubt the motives of the British, as had the latter to suspect a potential of rebellion in the vanquished people.

Besides the cultural and economic factors, there were more personal reasons too. It was the social desegregation that existed from the days of Al-Beruni.<sup>112</sup> Mohammed Shahabuddin<sup>114</sup> and Mukhatar Zaman<sup>115</sup> have described their bitter and humiliating experiences. Jinnah himself was acutely conscious of this.<sup>116</sup>

This however, was not all. The separate electorate provisions failed to bring full justice to the Muslims, for it did not give them the seats proportionate to their percentage in Bengal and the Punjab. In the twenties,

franchise was not on an adult basis, but on property and educational features that gave a distinct advantage to the majority.<sup>117</sup> The dominance that had started economically thus began to show up also in politics at the levels of both the leaders and the led. The state in Sindh, where both the provincial Congress Committee and the Local Hindu Mahasabha were presided over by two Hindu brothers who lived under the same roof<sup>118</sup> shows the compromise Congress seemed to have made with Hindu rightist groups. Beni Prasad depicted the situation when he said: "It was the fear of the future that hung heavily in the Muslim mind."<sup>119</sup>

In such circumstances, the community deprivation of the minority can be explained in terms of Aberle's three reference points, past versus present, present versus future and one's own versus others and also the four types of deprivation -- possession, status, behavior and worth.<sup>120</sup> Deprivation in possession and status with regard to the British was more keenly felt against Hindus for they were close. New interaction between these groups brought also a change in their behavior patterns expected from each other and in the response expected from the lower strata of the Muslim society. In the realm of worth, which Aberle defines as a personal experience of others' estimations of him on ground over and above his alterable characters -- of possession, status and behavior -- Muslims felt distinct traumas aroused and abetted by the existent discrimination behavior of the Hindu hierarchy; this lessened their sense of total worth.

In the expanding society of the Muslims, the net effect of these events was to increase their value capabilities and increase their value expectations. The intensity of relative deprivation in a direct function of the value opportunities with which interference is experienced or anticipated.<sup>121</sup> What the minority experienced may be called, to borrow Gurr's term, "progressive deprivation." Deprivation added to the sense of isolation and separatist

movements because with the mobilization of the differentiated population, the minority was growing in rate and intensity. As the ratio of this section to the total population increased, the scope for a nationalistic movement began to emerge.<sup>122</sup>

In fact, long before Jinnah's historic call to national separation came, there existed a feeling of deprivation among the Muslims. As early as 1869, one can see a publication referring to it.<sup>123</sup> Shah Wali-ullah's Mujahidin movements (1821), Titu Mir's rising against the Bengal zamindars (1831), the Fairaizi movements through much of the 19th century in East Bengal, Deobands Dar-ul-ulum (1867), Ahl-ul-Hadis revival in north India during the later part of the 19th century, Karamat Ali's long campaign from a flotilla of boats in the Bengal river system, the Mopla rising and the Hijra migration, were some of the manifestations of this awareness.<sup>124</sup> In a more fragmented form this was manifested in the continuous history of communal riots. The partition of Bengal in 1905 and the separation of Sindh from the Bombay province in 1935 were political efforts at solution of the issue. There were also more apolitical movements limited to religious revival such as the Ahmadiya. Numerical weakness and heterogeneity have precipitated apathetic movements in other parts of the world, for instance, the Ghost Dance of the U.S.A. (1890) and the Alianza movement.<sup>125</sup> The numerical strength, communal solidarity and compact geographical distribution of the Muslims gave them advantage that many minorities lacked. These factors made the idea of a separate homeland not only attractive, but also highly probable.

### Conclusion

Evidence from Jinnah's background, early life and adulthood were analyzed above to trace his important personality traits, and to look into the historical factors that contributed to his sense of deprivation. Jinnah's early success

presents a contrast to his latter failure. The plight of the Muslims added greatly to sharpen his sense of deprivation. His own frustrations came to be symbolized as the frustrations of the community. This symbolization was later to become his best political tool in the struggle that lay ahead.

#### IV. PATTERNS OF ATTITUDE CHANGE IN JINNAH'S POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Although the purpose of this content analysis has been set forth before, it needs some explanation. A controversy still continues over whether or not Jinnah underwent a change in his political attitudes<sup>126</sup> toward the issues that engaged the attention of contemporary India, whether it was an out-and-out demagoguery that he was practising in order to win political power. Mr. Khalid B. Sayeed maintains there was no change in his views.<sup>127</sup> Mr. M. Saiyid holds a similar view. Mr. J. N. Sahní who knew him admits too that he did not change essentially.<sup>128</sup> Further, Jinnah himself declared in 1936 that "there has been no change in him, not the slightest."<sup>129</sup> Others, however, noted a radical turn in him. Gandhi believed so. Sarojini Naidu who once hailed him as an 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity' regarded him as a Lucifer, a fallen angel.<sup>130</sup> There were others who believed the change in him was due to his unsatisfied ambition, his bid for power. Before proceeding to an analysis of his attitude change, it is, therefore, pertinent to define what is meant by the term change here. The term refers not to a wholesale transformation of the subject, but a set of specific predispositions toward the relevant political issues of the day and his increased bid for power. The salience of power rose high while he was in his mid-forties. Although, Alexander L. George maintains that there must be an evidence of early power-seeking, a childhood rooted need for power, which serves to compensate a damaged self-esteem,<sup>131</sup> Jinnah's childhood fails to show the sort of self-damage one would expect such as in the case of

Woodrow Wilson. Niemi has questioned the permanence of childhood socialization.<sup>132</sup> Moreover, there are hundreds of cases when longstanding habits have undergone drastic change under behavior modification, some within a few months.<sup>1</sup> In place of assuming a childhood trauma as a must or the permanence of childhood socialization, our stand will be closer to that of Dawson and Prewitt who advocated a synthetic approach on the issue,<sup>134</sup> in their combination of the primacy, intermediacy and recency models. According to them, the most basic attitudes (with the broadest scope) are formed early, but specific dispositions come later in the life of an individual. Erikson's extension of the childhood modes to adult supports this line of argument.<sup>135</sup> Lasswell has cited the case of radical changes in Frederick and John Bright at a late age.<sup>136</sup> Hence it is maintained that a childhood trauma need not always precede power-seeking behavior at a late age; rather, a more dynamic model is assumed; a later deprivation or trauma of personal nature can damage the self-esteem of an individual and this can generate power-need in him or intensify bid for power is a compensation for the loss of his self-esteem and deprivation.

By change in Jinnah's attitude, then, is meant the category of issues and values that came to be more salient to him with his growing deprivation in his adulthood. To be more clear, his attitude toward communities, and nation-concept and the value of power underwent substantial change between the first and the third phases. Whether it was really so, and if yes, how, will be the purpose of this action to show. If there was a change, then it should show up in his political communication. Jinnah's third phase was preceded by a period of intense deprivation, of internal and external conflict, of family traumas and of career crisis. The events in the third period enforced the deprivations. If deprivation as a variable played a consequential role -- our hypothetical assumption -- then, it should be evident in his speeches, not only occasionally,



but one should expect a consistent recurrence of the theme, our term for it being here, PD (perceived deprivation), in his speeches. If it fails to occur, then the relation of deprivation to attitude change and other variables such as displacement and compensation will be hard to establish empirically.

Another point is in order. By the third phase of his career, Jinnah was sixty years old. If a change is established, it will also be another evidence to support Lasswell's postulate on the possibility of late change, mentioned above.

Mr. K. Sayeed relates Jinnah's deprivation to his family tragedy, the sudden death of his wife.<sup>137</sup> It no doubt influenced his mood and future behavior, but the question is how much. Jinnah no more was to be the same man. Such traumas frequently occur in life, but to look for a cause and consequence relation between them and power seeking behavior is perhaps to expect too much and to miss the real roots of such change. For a single family trauma can hardly be expected to make anyone a political creature. Jinnah's own childhood, if one is to believe his biographers, fails to show up the Wilsonian traumas that would permanently damage his ego. There is not a single incident, or anecdote, that points toward any such possibility - neither his father nor his mother appear as dominantly dictating to him. Contrary to Wilson's late learning (he started reading when he was eleven) Jinnah showed his intelligence much earlier and is observed to be devoted to his study and achievement-oriented. One instinct that shows in him from his early childhood throughout his life was the need for deference; his need for deference seems later to have given way to and served instrumentally for his need for power. If one accepts the argument of relative changeability of saliency of value-needs in an individual's life, then the point raised above does seem tenable.

In view of all this, Jinnah's case appears as a combination of what Gurr terms progressive deprivation<sup>138</sup> in his socio-political life and the perceived

social deprivation of his Muslim community. The trauma may have aggravated Jinnah's sense of deprivation, but could hardly be called a direct cause, for at least two reasons. Jinnah took nearly a decade to respond to it; his powerseeking behavior appeared in its intense form much later. Moreover, his speeches that show a distinct evidence of perceived deprivation in his status and power -- both personal and social -- followed concrete instances of critical losses for him in the social/political arena. Hence, unless evidences appear otherwise, it seems more reasonable to relate his behavior to those event variables whose connection can be theoretically established. The personal deprivation came when he was displaced from the power-configuration of Congress in 1920 by the Hindu leaders and his growing isolation and failure thereafter. The second was a symbolic process of ego-identification with the Muslims who came more and more to believe, were being threatened by the Hindus, bent on dominating and exploiting them.

#### Data Analysis



Table 2 (2.1; 2.2; 2.3; 2.4) lists the speeches analysed. There are forty of them, ten for each period. As it was not possible to trace for each year a significant political speech, some years were made to carry more than one. Moreover, for some there were none relevant. It will be interesting to note for any change in his attitude after the achievement of Pakistan, hence a test-phase in the form of the fourth period was separated. The third table, subdivided into parts, gives the frequency of each indicator (attitude-items in percentages). For correlational analysis and scattergramming purpose, counts in each of the first four categories were combined to calculate the total net category percentage.<sup>139</sup> Table 4 presents the means for each item for the periods, the standard deviations, the interperiod differences between the means and the pooled standard deviations (marked by the subscripts to denote the respective periods). Table 5 bears the main t-tests and the results.

Table 2: List of Speeches Analyzed

Period	No.	Date	Place	Title & Theme or Occasion
I	1.	April 1912	Bombay	Elementary Education Bill
	2.	1913	Karachi	Council of India Reforms
	3.	1914	London	Congress Deputation
	4.	11 Nov 1915	Bombay	All India Muslim League
	5.	30 Dec 1916	Lucknow	AIML
	6.	21 Oct 1916	Bombay	Bombay Provincial Conference
	7.	Dec 1917	Calcutta	Congress-League Scheme
	8.	7 Sep 1918		Resolution on Reform Proposals
	9.	6 Feb 1919	Bombay	Criminal Law Bill
	10.	Oct 1917	Allhabad	Home Rule
II	11.	24 May 1924	Lahore, Globe Theater	AIML-15th Session: Presidential Address
	12.	14 Mar 1925	Bombay, Assembly	Demand for Executive Council and Reforms
	13.	8 Mar 1926	Bombay, Assembly	Demand for Executive Council and Reforms
	14.	22 Sep 1928	Calcutta	All Parties National Convention
	15.			General Budget & Constitutional Reforms
	16.	28 Nov 1930	London	Plenary Session, Round Table Conference
	17.	7 Jan 1931		Federal Executive
	18.	26 Nov 1931		Future Constitution & the Muslims
	19.	2 Apr 1934	Delhi	Statement on AIML Council Meetings
	20.	7 Feb 1935	Legislative Assembly	Joint Parliamentary Committee Reform on Constitutional Reforms
III	21.	Oct 1937	Lucknow	AIML - Presidential Address
	22.	29 Dec 1938	Patna	AIML - Presidential Address
	23.	1939		
	24.	Mar 1940	Lahore	AIML - Presidential Address
	25.	Apr 1941	Madras	AIML - Presidential Address
	26.	4 Apr 1942	Allhabad	AIML - Presidential Address
	27.	24 Dec 1943	Karachi	AIML - Presidential Address
	28.	30 Jul 1944	Lahore	AIML - Council meetings
	29.	10 Oct 1945	Quetta	Muslim League-Baluchistan meeting
	30.	14 Dec 1946	London	Muslim League-UK Branch meeting
IV	31.	Oct 1947	Karachi	Address to civil, naval, military and Air Force officers
	32.	30 Oct 1947	Lahore	Pakistan Radio: Broadcast Speech
	33.	4 Feb 1948	Sibi Durbar	
	34.	21 Mar 1948	Dacca	Public Meeting
	35.	24 Mar 1948	Dacca	Dacca University Convocation
	36.	26 Mar 1948	Chittagong	Public Reception
	37.	28 Mar 1948	Dacca	Radio Broadcast before departure
	38.	12 Apr 1948	Peshawar	Address to the students of Islamia College
	39.	27 Apr 1948	Karachi	Address to Karachi Chamber of Commerce
	40.	14 Aug 1948		The First Anniversary of Pakistan

Table 3. Attitude Variables: Totals and Mean Percentages

Period	Letters	Date	Sentences	-M	+M	-H	+H	-B	+B	N <sub>1</sub>	N <sub>2</sub>	D <sub>H</sub>	D <sub>B</sub>
1	1-10	1912- 1917	N 1091	4	13	3	11	109	52	251	0	3	115
			%	0.4	1.3	0.3	1.1	1.1	5.2	25.1	0	0.3	10.5
2	11-20	1924- 1935	N 1360	2	3	41	20	108	19	173	0	23	98
			%	0.14	0.22	3	1.4	7.9	1.3	12.7	0	2.1	7.2
3	21-30	1937- 1946	N 1658	22	81	157	23	71	12	153	107	237	44
			%	1.3	5	9	1.3	4	0.7	9	6	14	3
4	31-40	1947- 1948	N 776	11	44	25	0	4	0	-	-	69	12
			%	1.4	5.6	3.2	0	0.5	0	-	-	8.8	1.5



Graphs for data from Table 3

Table 4: Variable Means, Interphase Differences  
Between the Means, Standard Deviations and  
Pooled Standard Deviations

S.No. Item	$X_1$	$X_2$	$X_3$	$X_4$	$X_2 - X_1$	$X_3 - X_1$	$X_3 - X_2$	$X_4 - X_2$	$X_4 - X_3$	$X_4 - X_1$	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$	$s_4$	$s_{12}$	$s_{13}$	$s_{14}$	$s_{23}$	$s_{34}$	$s_{34}$
1. -M	.40	1.14	1.3	1.4	-.26	.90	1.16	.1	1	.4	.47	2.6	4.16	.43	1.87	2.95	1.86	3.46		
2. +M	1.2	.22	5	5.4	.98	3.8	5.68	-.5	4.4	6.36	4.47	3.72	5.88	5.5	5.2	6.1	4.1	4.9		
3. -H	.3	3	9	3.2	-2.7	8.7	6	-5.8	2.9	.33	3.7	6.9	4.4	2.6	3.4	3.1	5.5	5.8		
4. +H	1	1.4	1.3	0	-0.4	.3	-.1	-1.3	-1.	6.3	1.5	2.6	0.0	4.6	4.8	4.5	2.1	1.8		
5. -B	10	7.9	4	.5	-2.1	-6	-3.9	-3.5	-9.5	13.5	6.1	3.8	1.2	10.5	9.9	9.6	5.1	2.8		
6. +B	5	1.3	.7		3.7	-4.3	-.6	-.7	-5	3.5	1.4	2.2	0.0	2.63	2.8	2.5	1.8	1.6		
7. $N_1$	24.8	12.7	9		12.1	-15.8	-3.7		2	17.7	9			12.6	6.5		14			
8. $N_2$	0.0	0.0	6		0.0	6	6			0.0	0.0	3.8			2.7		2.7			
9. $D_H$	.3	2.1	14	8.8	1.8	13.7	11.9	-5.2	8.5	.3	6.7	6.1	9.6	4.7	4.3	6.8	6.4	8		
10. $D_B$	10.5	7.2	3	1.5	-3.3	-7.5	-4.2	-1.5	-9	7.1	4.4	2.5	6.9	5.9	5.3	7	3.6	5.2		

Table 5: T-test Results - Inter-period Figures

While  $t_{1-3}$  is the most important set of tests here, the other tests were made in order to observe trends of change between the different periods in the indicators.

No.	Indicator	$t_{1-2}$ a	$t_{1-3}$ b	$t_{1-4}$ c	$t_{2-3}$ d	$t_{3-4}$ e
1.	-M	1.36	1.09		1.43	0.06
2.	+M	.4	1.65	1.63	2.92	.11
3.	-H	2.34	5.91	2.11	2.46	2.28
4.	+H	.2	.14			
5.	-B	.45	1.38	2.25	1.74	1.62
6.	+B	3.21	3.40	4.62	.75	1.02
7.	$N_1$	2.18	5.4		.6	
8.	$N_2$	0.0	3.09		5.08	
9.	$D_H$	2.18	7.24	2.86	4.23	1.47
10.	$D_B$	1.27	2.3	3.08	2.69	.29

Table 6: T-test Results and Conclusions

a. In period hypotheses and results						b. Interperiod hypotheses and results					
No.	subhypotheses	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_{\text{pooled}}$	t	conclusion	No.	subhypotheses	t	conclusion	
1.	I $H_1$ $-M > -H$ $H_0$ $-M > -H$	.4	.33	.36	.63	$H_0$ not rejected	1.	$H_1$ $-M_1 < -M_3$ $H_0$ $-M_1 < -M_3$	1.09	$H_0$ not rejected	
2.	III $H_1$ $-H > -M$ $H_0$ $-H > -M$	2.6	6.9	5.2	3.28	rejected	2.	$H_1$ $+M_1 < +M_3$ $H_0$ $-M_1 < -M_3$	1.65	"	
3.	I $H_1$ $-B > -H$ $H_0$ $-B > -H$	13.5	.33	9.55	2.26	rejected	3.	$H_1$ $-H_1 < -H_3$ $H_0$ $-H_1 < -H_3$	5.91	$H_0$ rejected	
4.	III $H_1$ $-H > -B$ $H_0$ $-H > -B$	3.82	6.9	5.58	1.99	rejected	4.	$H_1$ $+H_1 < +H_3$ $H_0$ $-H_1 < -H_3$	.14	$H_0$ not rejected	
5.	I $H_1$ $N_1 > N_2$ $H_0$ $N_1 > N_2$	2	0.0	1	54.7	rejected	5.	$H_1$ $-B_1 < -B_3$ $H_0$ $-B_1 < +B_3$	"	"	
6.	III $H_1$ $N_1 > N_2$ $H_0$ $N_1 > N_2$	9	3.8	6.9	.96	$H_0$ not rejected	6.	$H_1$ $+B_1 < +B_3$ $H_0$ $-B_1 < -B_3$	1.38	$H_0$ rejected	
(2-tailed test; t crit. = 2.1)							7.	$H_1$ $N1_1 < N1_3$ $H_0$ $N1_1 < N1_3$	5.4	$H_0$ "	
7.	I $H_1$ $D_B > D_H$ $H_0$ $D_B > D_H$	7.1	.33	5	5.03	rejected	8.	$H_1$ $N2_1 < N2_3$ $H_0$ $N2_1 < N2_3$	3.09	$H_0$ "	
8.	III $H_1$ $D_H > D_B$ $H_0$ $D_H > D_B$	2.5	6.1	6.63	3.69	rejected	9.	$H_1$ $DH_1 < DH_3$ $H_0$ $DH_1 < DH_3$	7.24	$H_0$ "	
							10.	$H_1$ $DB_1 < DB_3$ $H_0$ $DB_1 < DB_3$	2.3	$H_0$ "	

$$t = \frac{X_1 - X_3}{s \sqrt{\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2}}}$$

all tests at  $p < .05$   
 $n_1 = 10$  d.f = 18  
 $n_2 = 10$  t critical = 1.73



Table 6 is a part and elucidation of tests made for the first versus the third periods, and shows the hypotheses tested. Two series of tests were done: (a) within period, and (b) inter-period. As the first and the third periods were most relevant for our analysis, more attention was given to them. An attempt was made to find if there was a statistically significant level of difference between the various indicators within each of the periods first and third and between these two periods. Altogether ten tests were made in the first part, eight in the second. The level of significance throughout was ( $p < .05$ ) with a critical  $t$  value as 1.73 except for the sixth test in part b (table 5) where for the two-tailed test, it is higher (2.1). The results of correlation-regression analysis are summarized in the sixth table.

#### Results:

Convenience calls for the explanation of Table 6 first, as results relate to the main table can follow it when relevant. A look at Table 3.1 shows a number of empty cells -- the N2 column is a total blank. Most of -M, +M, -H, +h and DH enter null figures. Jinnah's speeches during the first period fails thus to show positive or negative comments on Muslims, Hindus and also on Hindu induced deprivation. This can be interpreted as his unawareness of indifference to these issues during the first period. As null figures do not allow us to infer a positive attitude on his part, it seems more reasonable to suppose that either his attitude was dormant or inhibited, whether consciously or unconsciously. In any way, if his sense of security and safeguard for the Muslim community that pervades throughout his speeches from the beginning and his anti-caste speech in London bring out the unconscious fear of the Hindus, his vocal repudiation of the threat of Hindu domination as a bogey in 1917<sup>140</sup> tends to show that it, at the least, was inhibited, not aroused.

As verbal articulation or action is the only clue to affect and belief, in the absence of both, one has to assume verbal neutrality, that is a state without a positive or a negative affect.

Returning to the tabulated figures, the overall mean on + Hindu is found to exceed the mean on -H (1 vs. .3). The mean DH is an almost insignificant .3 and indicates that Jinnah's sense of subjective deprivation by the Hindus was almost mute (better, verbal neutral) during the first phase. Compared to it, DB (10.5) is quite high, in percentage terms, the difference is one or thirty-five times. -B is double +B (10 vs. 5). There is no mention of or hint of separational theme, not even once; the one-nation idea dominated the content of all Jinnah's speeches during the first period with a high mean of 24, that is, almost a quarter of the total speech content.

The results on the subhypotheses of Table 6a show that the percentages of -M and -H do not differ significantly, but test 2, on the other hand, shows -H exceeding -M in the third period. Criticism of the Hindus thus was found to increase significantly between the two periods and differed significantly from the criticism of the Muslims. In the third test -B overtakes -H; this meant criticism of the British was more frequent than that of the Hindus. By the third period, it gets reversed and the Hindus received more criticism than do the British. Going further, the fifth test shows N1 as the only nation orientation but the sixth hypothesis that assumes a significant difference between N1 and N2 is not found to stand the test. In fact N2 comes to occupy as much as 2/3 of the N1 percentage in the third period, this is ample evidence of the shift toward the 2-nation concept. In the seventh test we find DB greater than DH, but in the third period, DH overtakes DB: Jinnah concentrated more on the Hindus than on the British as perceived source of deprivation. The shifts that were significant were these: (a) his decreased affect for the

Hindus both with reference to the Muslims and the British between the periods I and III, and (b) his increased PD from the Hindus. In brief, these shifts empirically support our point that salience of the Hindus for Jinnah as a community and as a source of perceived deprivation changed and increased significantly between the two periods I and III.

A further look at Table 6b shows that six of the hypotheses were supported and the null hypothesis on equality rejected. To be specific, these tests do not show the pairs of (-M1, +M3); (-M1, +M3); (-H1, +H3) and (-B1, -B3) as differing within themselves, but (-H1, -H3); (-B1, -B3); (N1 1, N1 3); (N2 1, N2 3); (DH1, DH3) and (DB1, DB3) differed significantly. To make the point more clear in terms of Jinnah's affect-behavior between the two phases I and II, he criticized Hindus more in I than in III, pro-British communication increased significantly during III with regard to 1;<sup>141</sup> attention on one nation received less attention in I than in III and reference to the 2-nation theme increased significantly in III from the former zero level. Another category, PD by the Hindus (DH) increased substantially, but DB, on the other hand declined. Perceived deprivation of Jinnah thus is seen to have undergone a substantial change between these two periods; the changes in other indicators can be assumed to be related to this one change.


To see whether this really was so, that is, to see whether effect variables could be predicted or seen to be correlated to the deprivation variable a correlation-aggression analysis was done. Table shows the results. Indeed, a change in PD is found to be correlated with affect toward the Hindus ( $r = -.55$ ) and toward the British ( $r = .33$ ). The (DH N) correlation was found to be  $-.24$  ( $p < .10$ ). Although the significance level is less than .05 the figure appropriate for social science analysis, the direction is toward a negative correlation, although not a quite strong one. The (H N) correlation is higher,

Table 7: Correlation-Regression

X Independent Variable	Y Dependent Variable	r	r <sup>2</sup>	p	stdd error of estimate	a	b
D <sub>H</sub>	H	-.57	.32	.001	5.49	.53	-.42
D <sub>B</sub>	B	-.33	.11	.01	7.48	-1.7	-.5
Multiple (M,B,H,D <sub>N</sub> ,D <sub>B</sub> ) Partial	N	.48	.23	F 1.49 (5.24) p .01	14.38		
H	N	.41	.17	F 2.91 p .01	.50 13.94	19.1	.85
B	N	-.28	.08	.06	14.65	14.29	-.48
D <sub>H</sub>	N	-.24	.06	.1	14.82	19.66	-.4
D <sub>B</sub>	N	.1	.01	.29	15.17	15.20	.28


Figure 3: Graphs for Table 7

Fig. Perceived  
D<sub>H</sub> - Hindu  
Affect  
Correlation



$$\begin{aligned} 5xy &= 1215.45 \\ 5xx &= 3171 \\ 5yy &= 1744.77 \end{aligned}$$

Fig.  
Net Hindu  
Affect-Nation  
Orientation  
Correlation



$$Y = 19 + (.85)x$$

$$\begin{aligned} 5xy &= 1283 \\ 5xx &= 1499 \\ 5yy &= 6731 \end{aligned}$$

a .41 (with  $a=19.13$  and  $b=.85$  at  $p<.01$ ). The corresponding  $r$  coefficients for (B N) and (DB N) are respectively  $-.28$  ( $p<.06$ ) and  $.1$  ( $p<.29$ ). The correlations of N with the Hindu related categories are high, an indication of the strong influence that Hindu related factors had on Jinnah's nation-related ideation.

Results of Table 5 make it clear that four hypotheses were confirmed in the first series of tests (column I), five in the third, six in the fourth and only one in the fifth. To make the explanation a concise one:

- a. between I and II, indicators -H, B, N1 and DH changed significantly
- b. between I and IV, -H, -B, +B, Dh and DB changed
- c. between II and III, +M, -H, -B, N2, DH and DB and
- d. between III and IV only -H changed

When the results of each column are compared it becomes evident that the greatest change occurred between the periods I and III (in both the number of indicators that changed and the intensity). This was not unexpected too. For, the deprivation of the second period continued to the third and, given the complexity of the political nature of both man and his milieu and the slow differentiation of his alienation forms, the effects of perceived deprivation can most acutely be expected to be seen sometime in the phase following deprivation and not immediately.

But, while the great shift emerges so clearly during the third period, a trend toward that is already obvious in the second period. Criticism of the Hindus started to increase; affect for the British declined and DH also grew considerably high. Between the second and the third periods, affect for the Hindus reached a rock bottom; focus on the separate identity theme rose to a peak; DH continued to rise up while DB declined. The point that his tilt toward the Pakistan theme was not an overnight decision immediately right after the disillusionment from the Congress's refusal to form coalition, but was a gradual and systematic evolution taken in the previous section. The

shift in Jinnah came slowly, but step by step which is evident from this analysis too.

Affect for the Hindus was the only category that changed between III and IV. Its decrease indicates a possible effect of the achievement of Jinnah's national demand. The relevance of criticism had certainly changed with the achievement. During the former years, such criticism vented his aggressive drives, there can be no doubt toward the externalization and projection role of his criticism of Hindus during the second and the third periods. But more important, perhaps, was the role in maximizing the rationalization and displacement of his private affect onto the public. The Hindus became a target, their values became the focus of his attack; this greatly had facilitated the task of symbolization of the Muslim affect and concentration in one direction. The attainment of Pakistan and with it the acquisition of extensive powers in the position of the Governor-General, the Head of the state and the President of the League attenuated the role of criticism in period IV. But there still was a significant level of perceived deprivation and for significant reasons. For the events before and following the massive exodus, the great massacre, the boundary award, the affairs of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir and no less importantly, the blockade by the Indian government of the cash due to Pakistan were recalcitrant factors that still gave cause to Jinnah to feel deprived and threatened, although less personally than before. His statements after independence are clear testimony to this. As Head of the state he helped to create, his needs and deprivations now were symbolized by those of the nation.

Returning to the original subhypotheses, it is clear that the inter-period differences between DH and DB and the within period differences in DH and DB confirm the first subhypothesis (SHI): Jinnah's perceived deprivation

did undergo a significant change between the two phases both in its nature and intensity. Obviously, Hindus dominated as the target of his polemics in the third period, while in the first, it was the British. The second one SHII too was thus confirmed. Further, the Hindus, seen more frequently as sources of deprivation are also attacked more often than are the British in the third period, whereas in the first there is a correspondence between a weak DH and a negligible negative affect (criticism), just as there stands a similar correspondence between DB and the criticism of the British. The negative correlation of  $-.55$  between DH and H and of  $-.33$  between DB and B support this point. The figures in Tables 5 and 6 show an increase in PD associated with a corresponding increase in N2 reference. The (DH N) correlation coefficient is  $-.24$  although at a less than significant level and not quite strong, it still tends to confirm the hypothesis. Finally, it was also seen that affect for the Hindus reached a rock bottom (the lowest mean 9.00) among all the figures in the third period). Jinnah's deprivation preceded historically the decline in his affect toward the Hindus, but that it was not to be instrumental for his personal purposes was also clear. Hence, the  $-H$  figures did not remain as high in the months between 1947-48. This also tends to point toward the role of his criticism in rationalization.

### Conclusion

The observations made so far can now be summed up. Jinnah underwent a definite attitude change between different periods in his political career, the most obvious of which were those occurring between the first and the third. As a long period of intense personal deprivations intervened in the form of the second phase of crisis and was enforced by the succeeding events in the third period which was to manifest their effect in the form of changes in his affect and belief and as nearly all of these were carried on to the fourth



period (test 4-5 showed the persistence of these changes), it seems logical to assume that the change was an effect of the deprivations that Jinnah suffered during the second, and partly, the third period. His two-nation concept, his pervasive attack on the Congress as the arch-symbol of Hindu chauvinism his shifting attention from the British as targets of his vitriolic rhetoric, and his greater attention to the Muslim community that formerly was almost absent, all of these changed and changed quite significantly. If expression can be any criterion of the state of an individual's attitude, even if by the phrase attitude, the meaning is kept limited to verbal expression of attitude, this analysis has showed empirically Jinnah's conversion. It is interesting to see that during the third period, more than one-sixth of the total speech-content bore deprivational themes, compared to the earlier one-ninth. The fact that DH grew almost five times that of DB is in itself a telling figure, on the change phenomenon, a compelling evidence to the role that deprivation variable played in Jinnah's political articulation during the third period. That deprivational awareness in Jinnah grew is thus evident, but politically and historically, its importance lay in changing the patterns of his political communication and behavior and through these two factors in arousing the Muslims for the attainment of power, both his and theirs.

## V. DEPRIVATION AND COMPENSATION

In the third section, materials from Jinnah's biography and history were analyzed to trace out his important personality traits and identify his character type. Content analysis in the fourth section established the attitude change in him, its facets and directions. It is in order here to relate Jinnah's personality traits and character to his attitude change with the help of an intervening variable -- his low self-estimate -- and then proceed toward testing the compensation hypotheses.

Features in Jinnah's character do not fail to remind one of what Lasswell calls Compulsive.<sup>142</sup> The integrity, uprightness, reserve, orderliness and moralization of Judge X compare so well with Jinnah's features that it almost looks like Lasswell were writing on Jinnah himself. There are differences though. The Judge never faced a crisis of values, as Jinnah did, and the ultimate success of Jinnah stands differently from the fate of Judge X. But their overall similarity does outweigh their differences. Like the Judge Jinnah hardly identified himself with the people, at least during his two first periods; and Jinnah like the Judge nurtured the values of the upper circles. The compulsive in the Judge brought him failure when he faced crisis; Jinnah's conversion and his new power strategy saved him from a similar failure. He came to realize that achievement first needed power and that power follows mass politics, not sheer constitutionalism. The experiences during his critical phase turned him from an advocate of nationalism to separatism. In Jinnah's

deprivational phase one can even see a shade of the "exile period" that an author finds common in most of the historical figures with charisma. It is a period that steels them for the task they set for themselves. Thus, as in the case of personalities such as Herzl, Malcom X, the Zulu king Shaka and many others, the deprivation phase may be said to have intervened in the life of Jinnah to change him.<sup>143</sup>

Compulsivity has been interpreted as a way to resolve stresses of inhibition. As Jinnah shows more than one of the compulsive traits, inhibition as a product of his early years, of his personal deprivations, can be assumed. Besides the features of ambition, reserve and perseverance noted in his childhood days, his later age shows many more of the traits of the Compulsive. Alexander George has enumerated a number of these: cleanliness, regularity, plannedness, norm-conformity and conscientiousness (this may be said to include single-track-mind, drive, concentration, pedantism, reliability, punctuality, punctiliousness and thoroughness).<sup>144</sup> Orderliness and stubbornness are said to be related to the need for self-esteem, rooted in the desire for power and domination. The Compulsive expects compliance from others, is sensitive to interference, exhibits negativeness, secretiveness, vindictiveness and finds it difficult in delegating work to others. Most of these come up in Jinnah's case more than once. Anecdotes of Beg, Parvate and Alva are full of such instances.<sup>145</sup> Jinnah's discipline and orderliness get reflected in his care of the flows, his personal cleanliness and sartorial style that became an object of distinction and a topic of comment on him. It comes up in various incidents, in his interactions with various people, especially during his legal career. Theoretically, his stress on constitutionalism, antipathy for violence and rebellion and his early apathy for mass politics manifested

this. There were other features remarkable in him: integrity, sensitivity, stubbornness, deference-need and ambivalence. There are the Lady Willingdon affair, Jinnah Hall, relations with Mountbatten and several other cases to illustrate the point. Jinnah's refusal to yield to the demand of the public in the Nagpur meeting to address Mohammed Ali as Maulana, to accept the politics of civil disobedience and radicalism, even after most of the people and politicians followed Gandhi's line, and the policy debate in the Home Rule Committee all point to the stubborn in Jinnah. But most dramatic of them was his resistance to Mountbatten. The 'Operation Seduction' lay endangered<sup>150</sup> and Mountbatten would hardly forget his failure in the common Governor-Generalship affair.<sup>151</sup>

Jinnah's deference-need can be explained as a form of his status anxiety. If the common status of the Muslims, his own stay in Britain, his family situation, the intense competition in Bombay and the diehard struggle in the Congress influenced this need, his later political deprivations must have greatly intensified it. His dealings with the Congress leaders, especially Gandhi and Nehru, bear ample evidence of this trait. With juniors, it was obviously easy to adjust, for there was no question of precedence. He expected unquestioned obedience from them and often did get it. However, with others who were equal or more, it was otherwise. Jinnah spared no occasion to assert in words or behavior his intense concern -- which often reached the obsessive proportions -- with status. His reluctance to show his wish to meet Gandhi,<sup>152</sup> his insistence on Gandhi's coming to his place,<sup>153</sup> his reluctance to receive Nehru,<sup>154</sup> his curt reply to the Secretary of Bombay's Governor<sup>155</sup> and refusal to receive the British Admiral<sup>156</sup> attest to the seriousness with which Jinnah took his status. More than one person has noted the narcissist in him too.<sup>157</sup> Sahni reports, he loved to see himself in the

mirror for hours.<sup>158</sup> Jinnah's punctiliousness appears often too; his rebuff to Mountbatten on a minor slip he made in his speech during a Cabinet Mission meeting is only one of these.<sup>159</sup> Planning with intricate care and good organization before making a decision was habitual with him. As he himself said once: "Think a hundred times before you make a decision, but never go back once you have made it."<sup>160</sup> The very time it took for him to consider the feasibility of separatism is an indication of his love of care and consideration.

Besides above given traits, Jinnah's work pattern and decision making habits often brought problems. A sense of uniqueness may have been there in him. Motilal Nehru had prophesied, that Jinnah might emerge as a Robespierre hating to share power with any Danton or Marat.<sup>161</sup> Jinnah's independent decision-making from both his colleagues and competitors isolated him while his refusal to delegate tasks to others may have influenced decision-making history in Pakistan.

Jinnah's arrogance, aloofness and haughtiness were topics of comment in his own days. His own daughter almost admitted it once.<sup>162</sup> Mir Laik Ali,<sup>163</sup> Beg<sup>164</sup> and Parvate<sup>165</sup> tell more than once of these traits and of his reserve. One even compares his pride to the nose of Cleopatra;<sup>166</sup> and there is another writer who once compared his arrogance to that of the Pharaohs. Jinnah himself called himself a "Rolls Royce" on one occasion.<sup>167</sup>

To summarize the points noted so far, Jinnah's attitude and behavior show the Compulsive in him. Political psychologists hypothesize that a compulsive interest in order and power is often to be found in strong political leaders who were great institution builders and who made it their task to transform society. Jinnah's personality needs were such that in the sphere of competence which he regarded often as unique to himself, he had to function free of interference and on his own, in order to gain the compensatory gratification that

would result, especially in the political arena. This explains some of the underlying dynamics of his autocratic style of leadership to which many have called attention. Most of these traits, even the 'anosognosic',<sup>168</sup> in him tended to maximize his concentration on power and through power the attainment of the new life-mission that he set for himself.

To go to typology, Jinnah shows various features of personality types described by different analysts under different names. His orality is evident in his need for affection and deference; his stubbornness and tenacity show the anal part of his personality. A number of these traits are common to the Mach scales of Christie and Geis, the toughmindedness of Eysenck, authoritarianism of Adorno, dogmatism of Rokeach, the pragmatism of Holsi Type B, the active-negative of Barber, the narcissistic of Ethereadge, and the revolutionary personality of Mazlish. There is also the insecurity paranoia and rebelliousness to authority (Friedland Cohen), sensitivity to insult, pursuit of prestige and display of wealth (Slater) and loneliness, self-proving effort and idealized self-image (Tucker). But of all these, he comes closest to the 'phaeton complex' of Iremonger-Berrington -- there is ambition, vanity, hypersensitivity, shyness, loneliness, aggressiveness and ambition for total love and admiration, evident from the description of his close observers.<sup>169</sup> Finally, one can also note Erikson's 'innovator'.<sup>170</sup>

#### Jinnah's Self-Estimate

It is relevant here to explain the relation of self-estimate to Jinnah's deprivation and attitude change in order to explain his compensatory power-seeking behavior. Self-estimate is usually a function of 'personality' and 'deprivation' variables. While the basic nature of a man shapes his self-estimate, it is constantly developed and moulded by his achievements and deprivations. There have been various attempts to define and explain self-estimate. Most perceive it as a dichotomy. Lasswell speaks of the low

self-estimates tending to stay with one's high self-estimates.<sup>171</sup> Etheredge,<sup>172</sup> William Stone<sup>173</sup> and William James<sup>174</sup> speak of this dichotomy too, but Cooley believes it is largely founded upon the opinion of others.<sup>175</sup> While the relative importance of self versus other conceptions in total self-estimate of a person is not quite clear, both seem to play their part. There are also studies on the role of self-estimate on attitude and political activity. Some, like Lasswell, relate low self-estimate to political activity,<sup>176</sup> while there are others who take the reverse position like Barber.<sup>177</sup> McGuire takes a middle position between the two groups. According to his inverted U-curve relationship, a moderate level of self-estimate leads to greatest attitude change.<sup>178</sup> Conversely, Rosenberg and Lane argue that political activity enhances self-estimate.<sup>179</sup> Despite the controversy that surrounds self-estimate and its relations to deprivation and political activity, it is not unreasonable to assume some correlation between the two variables -- political behavior and self-estimate and political behavior, both when the latter is high and low. When high, it tends to reinforce itself through continued political activity; when low, activity may follow to restore the equilibrium to self-estimate. As for the relation between self-estimate and attitude change, it is likely that when one's self-confidence and aspirations are high against a low recognition by others and low capability level, attitude change may follow. This is also in line with the U-curve argument.

As for Jinnah's self-estimate, his relational anecdotes reveal a very high self-perception. His status and deference need followed from this. Conceiving himself in a second place was unimaginable for him.<sup>180</sup> R. G. Casey, the Governor of Bengal, once noted: "...He is dogmatic and sure of himself; I would believe that it does never occur to him that he might be wrong..."<sup>181</sup> His refusal of the offers of Sir Charles Olivant and Ramsay MacDonald show it.

The early public successes, popularity with the national leaders of the day such as Gokhale and Naidu,<sup>182</sup> praise of several public luminaries<sup>183</sup> and the encouragement of Iqbal<sup>184</sup> played no minor part in boosting his morale.

A series of failures and frustrations set in after these bright days -- days of deprivation and of great personal crisis. This would greatly offset his previous image of self. The first, of course, was the political displacement after Gandhi came back from South Africa and initiated his Civil Disobedience. After a decade and years of family quarrels his wife died.<sup>185</sup> This brought a sense of self-guilt.<sup>186</sup> for he felt himself partly responsible for the family quarrel and her death. Mr. Sayeed has tried to attribute Jinnah's deprivation to this marital tragedy. However, it is difficult to attribute the development of the powerseeking behavior in him to this single factor alone. For, there were at least two other major and very obvious deprivations -- both personal and both political. One was the sudden displacement of status mentioned above, another was his isolation from the political arena, that became almost complete by the early thirties. The elections in 1937 and the subsequent policy of Congress, of course, were to become coup de grace. Most of Jinnah's basic traits preceded his marital trauma, and his role as a powerseeker emerged only a decade after it. Besides his sense of self-guilt on Ruttie's death, he had also disowned Dina later, his own daughter, for marrying against his wishes.<sup>187</sup> Before the attempt on his life,<sup>188</sup> the failure of his plans in England where he had wanted to create a respectable place for himself, the rebuffs of Lord Willingdon and Lord Sankay, and the indifference met at the Round Table Conference<sup>189</sup> were bound to take their toll on his self-estimate. Evidence, much later, shows the change from unitarianism to separatism and from constitutionalism to mass politics, from secularism to fanaticism had not spared his superego.<sup>190</sup> Jinnah's often



apparent ambivalence, manifest most clearly in his love-hate relationship to India<sup>191</sup> shows the struggle going within him.

Jinnah's low level of other components in his self-estimate is reflected in the imagery he uses to describe his state during this crisis.<sup>192</sup> Letters to Nehru and statements after 1936, but not before, bear references to such terms as 'beg,' 'beggar,' 'bow', 'dogs' and 'petition'; this points to the fact that the low level of the self-estimate followed and was rooted in the deprivations that preceded.

As a result of political events -- his successes and failures, and his personal frustrations, it is logical to assume that two sets of feelings were fighting to control Jinnah's mind. One was a very strong perception of himself; another was the negative counterpart; a low self-perception, that depended on the estimate and response of others. Despite all reports on Jinnah's reserve and self-control, his intense affect has also been noted.<sup>193</sup> Hence, it will be difficult to assume or to argue that he was in any way immune to the response of others.

Besides these very obvious factors, there were others more subtle. References to Jinnah's intellectual background made by Naidu,<sup>194</sup> Nehru,<sup>195</sup> Gauba<sup>196</sup> and others indicate his sole claim to intellectual competence remained limited to law -- to the advocacy of criminal and constitutional issues. Although he seemed not to care very much for it, there were also occasional hints of his self-awareness of this issue.

The frequency of ambivalent behavior in Jinnah is an interesting part of his self. His professions for the poor and the underdogs were in contrast to the fastidious demands on his culinary habits, his refusal on one occasion to lend his plane to rescue the refugees, and the elite living.<sup>197</sup> His sudden change to the mass strategy appeared paradoxical to some<sup>198</sup> observers. The

continuous reference to the cause of the poor may be the indication of an acute sense of self-consciousness. Jinnah's self-conflict was to take its toll. For, ultimately, he found himself, as Pyarelal says, "...at the mercy of self-seeking opportunists and reactionaries who having helped to bring Pakistan into being demanded their pound of flesh. A liberal and progressive by temperament, he was fated to father a Shariat-based theocratic state."<sup>199</sup> Consequently, writes Margaret B. White, "...he was showing symptoms of that deep physical and spiritual ailment which ... had robbed him of his debonair self-assurance and stamped him with ... a spiritual numbness concealing something close to panic underneath."<sup>200</sup> During the last years of his life, it was even reported that he had lost his nerve and was fast losing his temper.<sup>201</sup>

Reviewing Jinnah's early gains and later losses, it is clear that both played their part on his attitude and behavior. His setback in the working committee of the Home Rule League,<sup>202</sup> the rebuff of Muhammed Ali<sup>203</sup> during the Nagpur meeting of the Congress Part, the opposition at the Calcutta conference, and other personal affronts,<sup>204</sup> failure at the Khilafat front, stay in London, and the Round Table Conference were setbacks he could scarcely ignore. His sense of self-ability, of efficacy, was seriously undermined. He admitted the Hindus to be 'incorrigible' and the Muslims to be 'timid,' and that "he could do nothing."<sup>205</sup> His sense of dejection became so deep that he did not even bother to come back to India to sell his property. Indeed, Jinnah's notes on this period indicate his sense of ability had reached the rock bottom. This is a clear case of the 'overwhelming deprivation' of Lasswell; Jinnah's self-exile in London for more than five years came as a consequence, as a withdrawal response.

#### Attitude Change in Jinnah

In view of this disparity of Jinnah's two levels of the self-estimate, his attitude change becomes clearer. Although one writer attributes his

suspicion of Hindus to the influence of theosophy on Ruttie, his wife,<sup>206</sup> there was much more for his new attitude. The one case that affords a very close historic parallel to call for Pakistan is the Ibo case of Nigeria.<sup>207</sup> As in the Ibo case, it was a function of the situation. For unless Jinnah was to adjust to the new circumstances, his very political survival seemed doomed. His identification with the League and the Muslim community dictated his beliefs and behavior toward consonance. According to dissonance theory, when dissonance occurs, an individual tends to change his belief so as to achieve consonance with his actual behavior.<sup>208</sup> Studies indicating a negative relation between social status and alienation,<sup>209</sup> the work-addiction of Jinnah<sup>210</sup> and several empirical generalizations on the role of factors such as participation, decision-making in a group, low self-estimate, active role-playing and the nature of group one identifies with in the process of attitude change<sup>211</sup> help one's understanding why and how Jinnah's attitude change.

In view of the role of his new situation, his personal needs for deference and power, and his role as a League leader, Jinnah's attitude change is not surprising. An empirical evidence of that change can be a comparison of his political activities (forms of participation such as speeches, visits, comments, meetings etc.) during the three periods before 1948. In percentage, the frequency of Jinnah's participation in various kinds of political activities related with nation, Muslim, pronoun, proseparation, League, student and other issues for these three periods. The first and the third form of participation (national and pronoun) declined steeply by the third period, while the activities related to Muslim community rose to a peak. Jinnah's political mibility is also clear from the figures in the eighth row. In the first period he is shown to limit himself to less than one-fifth of the total number of places of his visit during the four

periods, but the third period alone comprises more than half of these places. Jinnah's political strategy is thus seen to have changed almost totally -- a new set of political skills, distinctly apart from his early professional skills of the bar, begin to appear<sup>212</sup> -- skills of negotiation, bargaining, adjustment, diplomacy, gaming and optimizing that again show Jinnah at his best -- skills through which he survived his crisis, outdid his Congress opponents, defeated the Muslim rivals, wooed the British, won the Muslim mass, and ultimately achieved what he once thought impossible.

His attitude thus did not change suddenly. It took a course of several years. He did wait for more positive response from Congress, at least for some years, before the ultimate call was made. Even that call did not come overnight. It is often assumed that Jinnah's article in 1940 and his speech in Lahore were his first public declarations of a Muslim nation. Even a very close associate, Mr. Beg, is seen to entertain this view.<sup>213</sup> However, evidence from Jinnah's speeches suggest otherwise. For as much as three years before the Lahore declaration, Jinnah is seen to profess a national entity of the Muslims, that is, in 1937. His speech in 1938 in the League meeting continues with that theme. Between 1937 and 1940 Jinnah underwent a radical switch from his traditional 'minority' concept to the 'nation' concept of the Muslims. Although opinions differ on whether he would have really withdrawn his separatist demands in face of strongly negative factors such as the imperial rejection, and the rigidity of Congress (some of his moves right till 1946 seem to support the view that his demands were oriented only toward maximization and bargaining, that he himself was not sure of the feasibility), it sounds natural to assume that given Jinnah's decision-making pattern, his rigidity and irreversability and also the incompatibility of Hindu and Muslim interests, the change of attitude in Jinnah on the nation concept could very

well have been, in a more or less way, final by 1937. The ideas of his League predecessors, the Imperial support coming through Colonel Muirhead and Lord Zetland,<sup>214</sup> the support of Iqbal and domicile Muslims, and the successes of the Sudeten landers worked as strong stimuli; the setbacks of the League at the polls and the Congress policy serves as a coup de grace.

#### Power as a Need for Compensation in Jinnah

Lasswell's paradigm predicts an accentuation of power relation to other values in the political type. Lasswell rejected the success postulate, for its political type was a Hobbesian Homo politicus, an intense power-seeker who is without a secondary self-symbol structure and is a total ego-centric.<sup>215</sup> The modified type of power-seeker seeks power opportunities in every situation in preference to other opportunities that are available.<sup>216</sup> He has a special concern with expectation about power-related behavior by others: non-interference, deference, autonomy, dominance, nondelegation of tasks, subservience, distance, stress on winning, stubbornness, rigidity, constitutionalism, orderliness, discipline, distrust, and finally twin transference of power-related behavior of others. Usually this stress on power is a via media to other values—deference, status, wealth, etc. Despite the later modification of stress on power,<sup>217</sup> the studies of Rufus Browning and some others underline a positive relation between power and political activism.<sup>218</sup> Keeping in view the modification, it is still possible to say that Jinnah's role as a power-seeker should be taken as a political actor who strove for power for both of the end and means purposes. The relegation of other values such as wealth, affection, and enlightenment is clear from his activities. Rectitude received some stress, especially in his projection of his own deprivational feelings on the community (he speaks quite frequently of the oppression and injustice perpetrated against his community). Deference came up often as an

important need in the form of his intense and almost pervasive competition for status with his colleagues and competitors, but out of all his behavior, power emerges as the basic instinct, especially after 1936. As mentioned before, his early choice of a public profession and almost immediate involvement in politics indicated he had probably nurtured a taste for political power quite early in his life. His later expectations about power-related behavior of others consistently follow the features mentioned above with reference to an ideal power-seeker. But before proceeding on to the evidence of power-gratification in him, it is relevant to see whether and how he increased his power.

For a perspective, one has to go back to the late thirties. For it was then that Jinnah began to feel his real urge for power. The policy of Congress included noncooperation, representation of the Muslims, and dissolution of the League. The elections of 1937 brought the realization that mobilization was the dire need of the hour, if the League was to survive. To the statements of Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the attitude of most of the Congressites, the rebuff received by Kher in his initiative for cabinet inclusion of two Muslims in Bombay, was added the stiff statement of Nehru to Jinnah.<sup>219</sup> Thereafter, Jinnah's constant aim came to be to build up League strength. Mass mobilization started through various measures. The basic purpose was to create an awareness and attitude of alienation, to change the existent apathy of the mass to discredit their belief in the union, and to increase the intensity of alienation of those who already had some of it.

With an underlying differentiated mass of Muslims as a potential target for the new goals, and with each of the six balancing factors for national assimilation (that Karl W. Deusche names, similarity of communication habits, learning, contact, material reward, values, and national symbols)<sup>220</sup> working for the persistence of a large section of the alienated mass, the next thing

that was needed was a clear strategy. The target was there. Jinnah developed the strategy.

Thus by the end of the fourth decade, one sees a clear awareness of power-need in Jinnah reflected in his various speeches. He is seen switching from his earlier optimism, cooperation and unitarianism to a 'power' and 'game' imagery. For instance, in the annual session of the League, he is once seen declaring:

Politics means power and not relying only on cries of justice, or fair play, or goodwill.

Again,

...honorable settlement can only be achieved between equals...all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper unless they are backed by power.<sup>221</sup>

In 1946, during the Cabinet session:

If there is no sufficient power, create it.

And on July 29, 1946 in the League Council:

Today we have also forged a pistol and are in a position to use it.<sup>222</sup>

The power consciousness is present not only in his political communication, but in the whole series of actions that he took in the League and later after independence. One sees at least two waves of his power-concentration; the first preceded the mobilization of the League; the second followed his succession to the role of Governor-Generalship of Pakistan.

The first wave started in the late thirties. Double membership in provincial parties was disallowed. Central authority grew and disciplinary action was reinforced. Jinnah became the sole decision-maker in the League who threatened to resign in the face of challenge or disagreement and concentrated enormous power in his hands by centralizing the League's power and processes. By abolishing the fifteen provincial vice-presidents emphasis was shifted from



the provinces to the center. A 1940 amendment empowered the working committee to control the growing provincial branches and take disciplinary action against the offenders. In 1941 the President was allowed to nominate twenty members to the Council from the provinces; it brought Jinnah still more control over the body. Further, in 1943, the President was also allowed to appoint a committee of action for disciplinary purposes. All this trend toward centralization led finally to the grant of full powers to the President during the intervening periods between the sessions to continue negotiations and also take necessary actions.<sup>223</sup> The net effect of these steps was to increase enormously Jinnah's power in the League.

The second wave of centralization that came in 1947, once more shows the power-seeker in Jinnah. One of his first acts as the new Governor-General was to induce the Viceroy to issue an order under the Independence Act that gave him the power to dismiss any minister or provincial cabinet member for any reason whatsoever.<sup>224</sup> Indeed, the Frontier cabinet was dismissed soon after the Dominion was set up. The special authority of the Governor-General which was to expire on March 31, 1948 was extended by the Constituent Assembly by one year. Jinnah also acquired power to amend provisions of the Constitutional Act (Government of India Act, 1935), to modify any rule or instrument thereunder, to vary the constitution, the powers, or jurisdiction of any legislature, court, and authority in Pakistan, and also to create new legislatures, courts, and other authorities. If and when he saw it expedient, he could exercise these powers by issuing orders. Secondly, as the Head of the State, he presided over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. The Cabinet established a convention through which his opinion became the cornerstone of the governmental policy. Thirdly, as the President of the League, Jinnah continued to influence decision-making in the party. Multi-party activity was not very



greatly encouraged. Thus by law and by convention, the authority that accrued to Jinnah brought power almost unrestricted in its scope.<sup>225</sup>

#### Displacement and Rationalization

While Jinnah's displacement of his private values, goals and attitudes onto the public is obvious in his attitude change and mass strategy, his rationalizations are not always very clear. However, his constantly occurring concerns for the poor, and the underdogs, especially the minority, can be interpreted as rationalizations. Criticism of the British was displaced on the Hindus; and Perceived Deprivation was similarly displaced. These displacements themselves were a subtle form of rationalization -- intended to optimize the effect of the new strategy. Jinnah's strategic efficiency lay in mobilizing both the elite and the mass of the Muslim community. The former saw in him a leader who could represent their interests, and could help them toward status, and power. For the latter, Jinnah symbolized their fears and frustrations. Often they felt themselves discriminated against socially, imposed on culturally, disadvantaged educationally, and lagging behind in industry and commerce. They saw their relief in the doctrine of two nations, the myth of separation and the political formula of Pakistan, for it provided an ideology with a sense of direction and an anchor of logic. Jinnah's own personal value needs -- power, deference and rectitude -- were rationalized as the objectives of national power. As for the objects of public displacement, there were two of them: one, the Muslim community, the other, the Hindus symbolized by Congress. His rationalizations were mainly based on a fear of future domination, the present activities of Congress and the past history. Thus private motives came to be the base from which the Muslim national movement derived its vitality.<sup>226</sup>

The level of tension among the mass greatly favored this process, for the two conditions that Lasswell considers essential for a successful symbolization of

values and goals were present in this case -- the desire and effort of an intimate circle to perpetuate their relationship (the Muslim elite), and the emotional identification of the social movement group (the League) with a group member (Jinnah).<sup>227</sup> A state of susceptibility of the mass to the Jinnah proposals was thus created which helped displacement of affects, released by disturbing changes in the Muslim society, from the private objects to public ones, onto all sorts of symbols and slogans. Examples were: 'Islam,' 'Qaum,' 'Millat,' 'Hindu Raj,' 'Deliverance Day,' 'Direct Action,' 'Pakistan Day,' 'Jinnah Day,' and the flag. As a result of this dichotomy of master-symbols emerged<sup>228</sup> which the lay Muslim could easily understand and respond to. Jinnah directed himself to the task of this affect-displacement, to the maximization of that effect and to the mobilization of the mass to read their private meaning into it. This was achieved by: first, the advocacy of the prestige groups -- the regional landed and religious elite; secondly, the inclusion in League programs of objectives that fired the imagination and aroused the aspirations of the elite and the mass (partition, national liberation, cause of the poor); and, lastly, appeal to the unconscious drives-arousal of fear, domination and deprivation, and hate for the past suppression. Both personal deprivation and ideational conflicts were thus combined to maximize the goal.

Jinnah's symbolic self-identification with the Muslims grew mainly as a function of the two conflicts in him. His breach from Congress in 1920 represented a conflict of values -- values both personal and ideological. The conflict of values such as principles, constitutionalism, order and moderation combined with his struggle for political primacy. In Gandhi's rise he saw the threat to his deference and power. Taking it another way, his very political survival was in question -- his eclipse following Gandhi's rise pointed to what

worse could come. The majority principle of democracy could be hardly counted on, for the only gainers would be the Hindus, not the Muslims. This became yet another point of political rationalization for Jinnah. For his slogan of 'No' to majoritarian democracy could directly hit its target, both those for whom it was meant (the Muslims) and those against whom it was launched (the Hindus). The resultant theme of security pervaded most of his speeches. This concern with community security, in a way, rationalized Jinnah's concern for his own political security. A major substitution occurred in Jinnah's self-structure: the League replaced Congress as the center of his activity, and the Muslims replaced the Indians as the object of his political pursuits.

To achieve his more personal goals, however much he considered he deserved them, he could not pursue naked power over others. Rationalization eased this pursuit by subliming the process, that is, by committing to it values and goals that embodied something greater -- the public will. Rationalization, thus, was a medium for congruence between the psychic needs of the leader and the social needs of his people. A conflict of conscience in such a conversion is a usual occurrence. Equilibrium between his ego (that pushed him toward his power goals) and his superego (that evoked memories of the past) called for a device that could relieve his anxieties and free him from pangs of conscience. This device came to be his appeal for the Muslim cause. It both freed him from anxieties and relieved him of the need of compromise.

Obviously, Jinnah's success in his new efforts were related to his time, a time that favored attitude-change in him and called for a strong leadership. But no small role was played by his own ability to adjust, and develop rapidly the skills of a leader of the moment, and to rationalize the type of leadership he offered his people in terms of the doctrine of two nations, his theory of League organization, and his focus on the national interest of the Muslims.

### Evidence of Power-gratification

In looking for the indicators of a striving for power-gratification in Jinnah, his behavior on various occasions can be sources of reference. To take an example, there was his unwillingness to share power with others. No interference in party affairs was brooked. When the Viceroy nominated the League leaders of the Punjab and Bengal members of his National Defence Council, Jinnah compelled them to resign from it, for his acceptance had not been sought.<sup>229</sup> Feroze Khan Noon, who is said once to have questioned his command, never got an appointment. No one who challenged him in the party would be spared. His rebuff of Suhrawardy,<sup>231</sup> rejection of the Bhulabhai-Liaquat Ali Pact,<sup>232</sup> the joint Governor-Generalship issue,<sup>233</sup> Muhammed Ali's note,<sup>234</sup> disciplinary actions against Khizar Hayat Tiwana, Fazlul Huq and Begum Shahnawaz,<sup>235</sup> Alva's comments,<sup>236</sup> his refusal in 1946 to join the cabinet of Nehru as a Vice-Chairman<sup>237</sup> all attest to this trait. During his last days, Jinnah gathered all strings of power into his frail fingers. He was, Colonel Birnie, his personal secretary, noted in his diary, "like a child who by some miracle has been given the Moon and he would not lend it to anyone even for a moment."<sup>238</sup>

Jinnah's unwillingness to take advice came up often in his response to other people's suggestions. It is evident from several of the anecdotes extant on him that he rarely took advice from others in making decisions. Even in his choice of a profession, of politics as a career, settlement in Bombay, marriage with Ruttie and his stay in London, one wonders whether he ever cared to consult any one of his elders, peers or even parents. His resentful repartee to Lady Willingdon, his curt dismissal of Parvate's suggestions are typical of him. Beg refers to his switch from 'minority' to the 'nation' concept of Muslims in an article for 'Time and Tide.' No colleague

was consulted, not even Beg himself, who was close to him for years. Many including his close colleagues and the Urdu press were suprised at this move.<sup>239</sup>

As a unique instance of the stress Jinnah put on his disciplinarian habit, there is the Sikandar Hayat incident. Hayat, himself no minor leader from the Punjab, had to yield to Jinnah's will under his single stern gaze.<sup>240</sup> His onetime reference to the behavior of a group of monkeys to their leader, strict stress on disciplinary action against the party offenders, the Admiral issue,<sup>241</sup> the incident with Sister Dunham,<sup>242</sup> and his chronic concern for status reflect his need to impose an orderly system upon others. Even in his petty household affairs he could be demanding.

### Euphoria

With Jinnah's reserve, it is not unnatural to assume his affect-articulation to be not very frequent. Also, he survived little more than a year after independence. Still, it is possible occasionally to find in his statements evidence of euphoria, of gratification. In some of his speeches, he is found referring to the achievement of Pakistan in superlative terms. He considered it unique, as an event unparalleled in history. The role that Jinnah came to envisage for himself was that of the founder of a nation. To him his uniqueness lay in such a role. This may have very well been the source of his dogged devotion to the new goal. The facts of his severe illness were kept secret, because he may have believed, he alone could deliver Pakistan from the hands of the Hindus, hence, to quote Collins and Lapierre, "he would not let anyone cheat him out of his rendezvous with history, not even death."<sup>243</sup> On one occasion, he is seen telling Mr. S. N. Baksar: "I am going on even if it kills me."<sup>244</sup> The praise of several of his contemporaries, the devotion of the mass, the symbolic events such as 'Jinnah Day,' 'Jinnah Week',<sup>245</sup> and the conferment of titles such as 'Quaid-e-Jinnah,' and 'Quaid-i-Azam' must have

boosted his morale. In his speech at Lahore, his euphoria comes up clearly: the Viceroy's recognition of his position was no minor triumph after years of political haggling.<sup>246</sup> Gandhi's recognition came later, in 1944, but this too was another feather in his cap. His satisfaction was quite obvious in his remark when reaching Karachi as Governor-General.<sup>247</sup> There were still others that indicate Jinnah's gratification.<sup>248</sup>

In the analysis so far made of Jinnah's personality variables and his behavior patterns, he emerges as a compulsive character. As a result of the low self-estimate born of his personal failures, he was led first to a virtual withdrawal from the public affairs. However, the leadership opportunities in the League and the Congress bickerings helped him greatly in combining his own deprivations with the community deprivation of the Muslims. The displacement and rationalization of Jinnah's values and goals brought him once lost success with immense power in his hands. Yet, it is quite possible that despite all his drive and diplomacy, absence of any one of the three situational factors, Congress attitude, leadership vacuum and British support, that success might never have come.

## CONCLUSION

This study attempted to investigate the role of Perceived Deprivation on the political behavior of Jinnah. The dynamics of a person's political behavior are complex and multi faceted and require much more than a single variable analysis. To quote Bruce Mazlish, "A political leader is necessarily far more than the sum of his childish hangups." Still, personal deprivation often plays a very important part in the changes in behavior patterns and decisions of a political character -- a factor often forgotten, ignored or given less attention than is due. Jinnah's response toward his political crisis offer compelling evidence of the significant role that his deprivation came to play on his political activities and through them in the formation of Pakistan. Admittedly, there is always a risk of overdrawing the argument of deprivation; also, one single case does not fully test the validity of a premise. But the validity and relevance of Lasswell's paradigm to Jinnah's political behavior should lie in the extent it can explain that behavior rationally.

Following the introduction of the theme and paradigm, and the explanation of the methodology, the historical material in the third section attempted to give a social-personal perspective on Jinnah's formative phase. The roots of his deprivation were traced and the development of the two components of his personality (self) - the primary and the secondary - was explained. It was seen how his family, birth, early years and adulthood came to play their roles in shaping his overall personality and how Jinnah's personal trauma combined

with his community and power deprivation to intensify his drive for power.

Results in the fourth section, drawn from the content analysis of Jinnah's political speeches bring out a consistent pattern, a significant level of change in his political attitude over the successive periods of his life. His attitude toward the Hindus, the Muslims, and British was seen to have changed. One sees the difference clearly if a comparison is made of the speeches from the first and the third periods: there is the emergence of a strong tilt toward the Muslims; hostility toward the Hindus grows and the British get relatively less attention. By the beginning of the third period, he achieves identification of his self with the Muslim community; his statements bear more and more an acute sense of having been a victim of injustice and deprivation. There occurs almost simultaneously a split in the nation-idea: the sudden growth of the reference to the two separate nations is an empirical indicator of his attitudinal change. Interestingly, the reference to deprivation from the British dwindles. This may be interpreted as a result of the growing salience of his new objectives -- to mobilize the Muslims in order to achieve power by displacing the hostile drive of his own and others on Congress, the enemy object. For, Congress came to symbolize, for Jinnah, an easy target for his attack on the Hindu community.

There is enough evidence from Jinnah's behavior patterns analyzed in the fifth section, to fit him into the classic Compulsive character. The traits of this syndrome-- rigidity, reserve, stubbornness and ambition (orderliness traits) - that are said to be attending an ideal power-seeker come up with a certain consistency in this case. Whether Jinnah showed his power-drive from his earlier days is difficult to establish conclusively. However, three factors seem to point to it: his early decision to take up law, a public profession; his involvement in politics; and his drive and undaunted efforts for



status and public acclaim. To the success of his early days were added the failures of the second period, but the opportunities that followed changed the scenario and offset his trauma. Jinnah's attitude-change came as one consequence; his reactivation through mass politics was another.

It may be usual to compare Jinnah with other leaders of national movements -- for instance, Cavour, Bismarck, and Kemal. However, he stands differently in more than one way from others. Unlike most of his predecessors his fight was mainly of words unlike most of his contemporaries, he never became a subject of regime coercion (persecution, imprisonment or exile that is often the fate of nationalist leaders under colonialism); and also, unlike most of his Pakistani successors his traits and role-behavior fit into a compulsive model. Of interest here is the brief duration between his call for the national home and its consummation -- which was less than a decade. It was relatively much less than the usual time taken for the success of nationalist secessions. Besides his own role, there were at least three other factors: the role and response of the Congress Party which alienated him; the reception of the Muslims as their leader; and the overt and covert support strategy of the Imperial Government. The usual components of Lasswell's paradigm -- deprivation, alienation, attitude-change, power-drive, displacement, rationalization and compensation, attend this case clearly and in the usual order.

While Jinnah's values, goals, strategy and role-behavior shifted radically the essential Jinnah -- the Compulsive in him remained. However, unlike Mr. X, Lasswell's dreamer Judge, Jinnah became a realpolitik, and attained a success that was almost lost for him. In such a course, and given his circumstances, the new passions, perceptions and predilections that he came to acquire were bound to change his whole politics. As a consequence, the hatred and hostility, that had remained so far submerged in his psyche, surfaced. To take just one

issue, before 1928, it is almost impossible to find his criticism of the Hindus; it is equally difficult to get instances of his invectives on Congress and its leaders in a continuous and consistent pattern, even till 1935. But after that year, it is a different scene. Most of his statements from then on, bear consistently evidence of his anger and alienation. The new Jinnah that emerged out of all this process, came to be a troublesome spectre for the Congress and a threat to his League competitors, but to the Muslims in general, his new role symbolized the vindicator of their rights. Although his rigid reserve, cynical comments and ascetic aloofness may show faint traces of a paranoid, on closer examination, there emerges an ideal Compulsive in him. Vitriolic statements, unbending decisions, tireless energy and dogged devotion to his new mission were his key to the attainment of a role unique in the twilight hour drama of Imperial India. In that drama his deprivations played no minor role.

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- <sup>117</sup>Safdar M. Zafar, Foundations of Pakistan (Lahore: Publishers United, 1968), p. 176.
- <sup>118</sup>Abdul Q. Khan, op. cit., p. 376.
- <sup>119</sup>Beni Prasad, India's Hindu Muslim Questions (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1946) p. 74. In his entry of the day, Lord Wavell speaks of the genuineness of the situation, that is, the fear of the minority, see Penerel Moon, Wavell, the Viceroy's Journal (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).
- <sup>120</sup>David Aberle article, "A Note on Relative Deprivation Theory as Applied to Millenarian and Other Cult Movements," in William A. Lessa, and Evon Z. Vogt, eds., Reader in Comparative Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 527-31.
- <sup>121</sup>Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: Center of International Studies, 1971), p. 73.
- <sup>122</sup>Karl W. Deutsche, Nationalism and Social Communication (Mass. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966), pp. 156-62.

- 123 Safeed Ahmad, "Quaid and the Press," in J. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 269.
- 124 J. E. Schwartzberg, A Historical Atlas of South Asia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 219.
- 125 David Aberle, op. cit., p. 530.
- 126 Attitude is here taken to mean the cohort of beliefs, values and predispositions toward the nation and the three communities - Hindus, Muslims and British.
- 127 K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 180.
- 128 J. N. Sahni, "Pakistan's Quaid-e-Azam," in The Illustrated Weekly of India, Dec. 26, 1976, p. 9.
- 129 S. R. Mehrotra, op. cit., p. 250.
- 130 P. Moon, Wavell, the Viceroy's Journal, p. 349.
- 131 George and George, op. cit., p. 265.
- 132 See reference to Niemi in Stanley Renshon, Handbook of Political Socialization, p. 438.
- 133 Ibid.
- 134 R. Dawson, and K. Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969). For the analysis of different models, see the new edition, 1977.
- 135 See comment on Erikson's psychosocial theory in Philip S. Holzmann, Psychoanalysis and Psychopathology (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), pp. 162-63.
- 136 Lasswell, op. cit., p. 51.
- 137 K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 180.
- 138 T. Gurr, op. cit., pp. 46, 52-6, 60.
- 139 For correlation purposes, the net category percentage in each case was obtained by adding together the counts for each category type, e.g., -M and +M were added to get net.
- 140 M. Saiyid, op. cit., p. 81.
- 141 This may have been a side-effect of his extending hostility and focusing attention on the Hindus away from the British.
- 142 Lasswell, op. cit., pp. 65-72.
- 143 Ernest Lewy, "Historical Charismatic Leaders and Mythical Heroes," in Journal of Psycho-History 6, No. 3 (1979), pp. 383-5.

<sup>144</sup>A. L. George, "Some Uses of Dynamic Psychology in Political Biography: Case Materials on Woodrow Wilson," Greenstein and Lerner, A Sourcebook for the Study of Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham), pp. 78-98.

<sup>145</sup>Bolitho, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>147</sup>Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>148</sup>Collins and Lapierre narrate various instances of Jinnah's responses to Mountbatten's overtures, op. cit., see pp. 119-20, 122-25, 187-89.

<sup>149</sup>E. Brown notes his mind 'strangely impervious to others,' op. cit., p. 34; Wavell writes of his 'unyielding and uncompromising nature,' P. Moon, op. cit., pp. 368, 442; Note also Jinnah's verbal refusal to the demands of the crowd in the historical Nagpur meeting, 1920: "I refuse to be dictated by you." Parvate, op. cit., 92.

<sup>150</sup>On 'Operation Seduction' a Mountbatten initiative during the transfer of power in 1947, see Collins and Lapierre, op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid., pp. 216-17.

<sup>152</sup>Bolitho, op. cit., pp. 136-37.

<sup>153</sup>Louis Fischer, op. cit., p. 399.

<sup>154</sup>J. N. Sahni, op. cit., pp. 8-13.

<sup>155</sup>Bolitho, op. cit., p. 161.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid., pp. 202-3.

<sup>157</sup>J. N. Sahni, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>158</sup>Ibid.

<sup>159</sup>Bolitho, op. cit., p. 186.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid., on the Somjee Jinnah issue, p. 18, stand with Mountbatten, p. 185, pp. 82-3, and also p. 115 ("Think one hundred times before you make a decision, but once a decision is taken, stand by it as one man").

<sup>161</sup>R. H. Andrews, A Lamp for India: The Story of Madam Pandit (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 63; Motilal Nehru to his son Jawaharlal Nehru for his comment: "...My guess is he (Jinnah) would like to be India's Robespierre but only if he could be absolutely certain no Danton or Marat will bob up to share the glory."

<sup>162</sup>Bolitho, op. cit., p. 212; cf. Alva, op. cit., p. 222 (comment of a former Home Member of the Government of India, the late Sir William Vincent: You always attacks us I.C.S. officers as being arrogant. My dear fellow, I wish you to point to a single I.C.S. officer who can approach Mr. Jinnah in arrogance, offensiveness and insulting treatment to others; also Fischer, op. cit., p. 399. ("Jinnah is arrogant to the point of discourtesy").

<sup>163</sup>Mir L. Ali, *Reminiscences of the Quaid*, J. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 61.

<sup>164</sup>Beg, op. cit., In his chapter on Jinnah, cf. references.

<sup>165</sup>Parvate, op. cit., pp. 94-6. It is interesting to note, by the way, here, that out of fifteen questions put forth by Parvate in his interview with Jinnah, only two received positive responses.

<sup>166</sup>L. Rischer, op. cit., p. 398 (his note: "To Cleopatra's nose as a factor in history, one should add Jinnah's pride.").

<sup>167</sup>Gauba, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>168</sup>, 'anogsonosic' - a person with a condition in which the physical manifestations and consequences of illness and incapacity are separated from the real self and given meaning in context of the principles and values of the subject; more obviously, a lack of care for one's health see for the anosognosic in Woodrow Wilson, A. L. George in Greenstein and Lerner, op. cit. Notes of both Dr. Jal Patel (Bolitho, op. cit.) and Dr. Ilahi Bakhs (M. A. Majeed, "The Quaid-i-Azam in Pakistan Review, 14 (Dec., 1966), p. 19) testify to this.

<sup>169</sup>See for an explanation of these concepts: E. Etheredge, op. cit.

<sup>170</sup>Erikson notes the unusual energy, rare concentration and total devotion of political innovators. Herman and Melburn op. cit., p. 203.

<sup>171</sup>Lasswell, op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>172</sup>Etheredge, op. cit.

<sup>173</sup>W. F. Stone, op. cit., p. 96.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>175</sup>Ibid.

<sup>176</sup>Ibid., p. 98.

<sup>177</sup>Barber (1965); Milbraith and Kane (1962); Riesman (1952) "Political Attitudes" Knutson, op. cit., pp. 57-82.

<sup>178</sup>Robert A. Baron, et. al, Social Psychology (Boston: Allen and Bacon, 1974), p. 209.

<sup>179</sup> Rosenberg (1951; Lane (1959), "Political Attitudes" Knutson, op. cit., pp. 57-82.

<sup>180</sup> Edwin S. Montague, Secretary of State for India, 1917-22, is said to have commented: "At the root of Jinnah's activities is ambition," K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 277; cf. Ambedkar's comment: He is unable to reconcile himself to a second place and work with others in that capacity for a public cause, Parvate, op. cit., p. 94; also Alva: "If you want him you must put him at the top....He will prefer to eat his heart away in the wilderness and retire into frigid silence than pay second fiddle to anybody," op. cit., p. 211.

<sup>181</sup> Bolitho, op. cit., p. 166; Sir Fazlul Huz once spoke of him as more haughty and arrogant than the proudest of the Pharaohs, Alva, op. cit., p. 218.

<sup>182</sup> Sarojini Naidu's appreciation in her introduction to the early published speeches of Jinnah, Madras.

<sup>183</sup> Cf. tributes to Jinnah on his sixty-fourth birthday by eminent figures of the day, Bolitho, op. cit., p. 133; For Lord Simon, he was 'the embodiment of the highest standards of the bar,' Alva, op. cit., p. 225; Kailashnath Katju: "an outstanding figure of the century;" Aga Khan: "The greatest man I have ever met," Beg, op. cit., p. 134. The whole line of viceroys from Harding, Chemsford and Reading to Willingdon and other British luminaries, such as Sir Patrick, Beverly Nichols, Col. Wedgerwood, Sir Stafford Cripps, Clement Attlee and Sir Pethick Lawrence expressed their admiration of Jinnah. Jinnah's self-righteousness and dogmatism is clear from his occasional comments. For instance, during the Nagpur Congress session, Jinnah's protest to Gandhi was: "Your way is the wrong way: mine is the right way - the constitutional way is the right way." Bolitho op. cit., p. 85; cf. K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 277 (to a rival politician you try to find out what will please people. I first decide what is right and I do it....") also Louis Fischer, op. cit., p. 397 (note to him in an interview: "You are an idealist, I am a realist. I deal with what is.").

<sup>184</sup> Waqr-ur-Rahman, op. cit.

<sup>185</sup> Bolitho, op. cit., pp. 91-2.

<sup>186</sup> Kanji Dwarka Das, a friend of Jinnah wrote: "Something I saw had snapped in him....Jinnah took her death 'as a failure and personal defeat in his life.' He never recovered from his loneliness, and this loneliness added to the bitterness of his life, and I must add that this bitterness born out of this personal loss and disappointment travelled into his political life." quoted in K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 280.

<sup>187</sup> L. Fischer, op. cit., p. 397.

<sup>188</sup> On July 26, 1943 Rafiq Sabir Mazangani stabbed him in an unsuccessful attempt of murder, Bolitho, op. cit., pp. 144-5.

<sup>189</sup>Alva, op. cit., p. 226 (Manchester Guardian commented: ...none wanted him) p. 209 (Lord Sankey, the chairman of the conference challenged Jinnah with the words that he was a better lover of India than this lost leader of Indian nation as his allegiance to his country was sacrificed for his community.) Cf. Sir Samuel Hoare remarks on Jinnah: "He never seemed to work with anyone." also Jinnah's own comments on his state at that time: "...I was perhaps the most individualist member of the conference...Within a few weeks I did not have a friend there." Waqr-ur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 15. Lord Willingdon even left Jinnah out of the third Joint Parliamentary Committee.

<sup>190</sup>Cf. Jamma Das Akhtar, op. cit., on his concern for the minorities, p. 75; also p. 80.

<sup>191</sup>Jinnah to Ismail, leading Muslim delegation from India, "I still consider myself to be an Indian. I am looking forward to a time when I would return to India and take my place as a citizen of my country." Jamma Das Akhtar, op. cit., p. 90.

<sup>192</sup>A number of references are available to throw light on Jinnah's mental state at that time. In 1938, he told a group of Aligarh students that it was not because he did not love India passionately, but because he was feeling so utterly helpless, that he thought of the desperate remedy of leaving the country. Moin Shakir, op. cit., p. 201. Cf. his statement before he left: I want to be in London and enter Parliament where I hope to wield some influence. There I shall meet British statesmen on a footing of equality....They will be accessible to me not in the sense that I shall seek them and beg for interviews. They shall want me and shall want them more." Alva, op. cit., p. 211; cf. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 38-9 ("...at that time there was no pride in me and I used to beg from the Congress....I felt that neither I could help India, nor could I make the Mussulmans realize their precarious position. I felt so disappointed, so depressed that I decided to settle in London. Having no sanction behind me, I was in the position of a beggar and received the treatment that a beggar deserved); also A. H. Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India (1950), p. 209, quoted by K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 281 (to S. M. Ikram visiting Jinnah in 1932 in London: "But what is to be done? The Hindus are shortsighted and I think incorrigible. The Muslim camp is full of spineless people, who whatever they may say to me will consult the Deputy Commissioner about what they should do. Where is between these two groups, any place for a man like me?").

<sup>193</sup>Jinnah's emotional bursts have been noted by Mir L. Ali, op. cit., p. 71; Bolitho, op. cit., p. 95; Jamma Das Akhtar, op. cit., p. 81.

<sup>194</sup>Barojini Naidu, op. cit.

<sup>195</sup>Dorothy Norman, Nehru: The First Sixty Years (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965), v. I, pp. 506-7, 547-9.

<sup>196</sup>Gauba, Inside Pakistan (Delhi: Ahkamal, 1948), p. 68; cf. Alva, op. cit., p. 212; also Beg, op. cit., p. 135.

<sup>197</sup>Sri Prakasa, op. cit., p. 87; cf. Collins and Lapierre, op. cit., p. 429

<sup>198</sup>Ambedkar, op. cit., pp. 358, 406-7.

- 199 Pyarelal, op. cit., p. 483.
- 200 Margaret B. White, Halfway to Freedom (New York, 1949), p. 98.
- 201 Alan Campbell Jones, Mission with Mountbatten (London, 1951), p. 217.
- 202 Jammad Das Akhtar, op. cit., p. 73.
- 203 Bolitho, op. cit., p. 85.
- 204 Parvate, op. cit., p. 94.
- 205 K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 281.
- 206 S. D. Thirumala Rao, Illustrated Weekly of India, Dec. 26, 1976.
- 207 Ibos in Nigeria fervidly advocated a united nation cause before returning to separatism after a backlash; Journal of Psychohistory, Fall, 1978, pp. 6-7.
- 208 Dean Jaros, and Lawrence V. Grant, Political Behavior: Choices and Perspectives (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), p. 268.
- 209 McCloskey (1969); Templeton (1966).
- 210 cf. work-addiction of Nixon, James W. Hamilton, "Some Reflections on Richard Nixon in the Light of His Resignation and Farewell Speeches," in the Journal of Psychohistory 4 (Spring, 1977), p. 500.
- 211 "Political Attitudes" (pp. 87-92), and section on attitude change (pp. 4-5), Knutson, op. cit.
- 212 Adapted from the chronology in The Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, Jinnah Centennial Issue, (1976).
- 213 Beg, op. cit., p. 137.
- 214 Khaliquzzaman, op. cit.; cf. A. K. Majumdar, "British Attitude to Communal Politics," in Bharatiya Vidya v. XXX, No. 51-4, pp. 95-128.
- 215 Lasswell, op. cit., p. 56.
- 216 Ibid., p. 21.
- 217 Jacob (1962); Rosenzweig (1957).
- 218 S. Renshon, Handbook of Political Psychology, p. 425.
- 219 Philips and Wainwright, op. cit., p. 35, introduction.
- 220 K. Deutsche, op. cit., pp. 128-30.
- 221 E. Brown, op. cit., p. 35.



- <sup>222</sup>B. R. Nanda, "Nehru and the Partition of India, 1935-47," Philips and Wainwright, op. cit., p. 183.
- <sup>223</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>224</sup>Gauba, op. cit., p. 65.
- <sup>225</sup>K. A. Afzal, op. cit., p. 109.
- <sup>226</sup>Lasswell, "Politics of Prevention," in Greenstein and Lerner, op. cit., p. 539.
- <sup>227</sup>Ibid., pp. 545-6.
- <sup>228</sup>Ibid., p. 546.
- <sup>229</sup>K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 287.
- <sup>230</sup>Alan Campbell, Unbind Your Sons (New York: Liveright: 1970), p. 67.
- <sup>231</sup>Pyarelal, op. cit., p. 480.
- <sup>232</sup>P. Moon, Wavell, the Viceroy's Journal, p. 114.
- <sup>233</sup>Waheed-uz-Zaman, "Quaid-e-Azam and Mountbatten Clash: The Question of Joint Governor Generalship for India and Pakistan," in Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, p. 195; also K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., .277 (cf. Mountbatten's note. "I have never been treated in all my life like this.")
- <sup>234</sup>Choudhury Mohammed Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 384; Beg, op. cit., p. 382.
- <sup>235</sup>Parvate, op. cit., p. 92.
- <sup>236</sup>Alva, op. cit., p. 211; cf. L. Fischer, op. cit., p. 397 (Jinnah's note to Nehru in an interview: "Nehru worked under me in the Home Rule Society. Gandhi worked under me.").
- <sup>237</sup>Humayun Kabir, "Muslim Politics, 1942-7", in Philips and Wainwright, op. cit., p. 399 (on Jinnah's refusal to join the cabinet as vice-chairman), and his later agreement to enter the government as a colleague, p. 400.
- <sup>238</sup>Collins and Lapierre, op. cit., p. 428; Even in the League, Jinnah is credited with ruling the working committee with rod of iron. He is said to tell them what is what and that they fell into line. At any sign of intransigence, on what he considered a major point, he was said to threaten a resignation after which the debate ceased (shades of Woodrow Wilson?); also cf. p. 429 on his refusal to lend his plane for the rescue of refugees.
- <sup>239</sup>Beg, op. cit., p. 137.
- <sup>240</sup>Ibid., p. 134, cf, p. 216.



<sup>241</sup>Bolitho, op. cit., pp. 202-3.

<sup>242</sup>Ibid., p. 222; cf. 1967.

<sup>243</sup>This may partly explain his curt refusal of the offer of Rajgopalachari in August 1940 to lead a national cabinet when he is said to have said: "What contemptible ambition to abandon a historic position for a portfolio!" Alva, op. cit., p. 22. Possible the growing consciousness of his potential historic role led him to refuse similar other offers, from Subhas Chandra Bose in 1942, and from Gandhi in 1946 and 1947. His scepticism is evident in his response to Gandhi's offer: "If they are sincere, I should welcome it. If the British Government accepts the solemn declaration of Mr. Gandhi and by an arrangement hands over the government of the country to the Muslim League, I am sure that under Muslim rule non-Muslims would be treated fairly, justly, nay, generously; and further, the British will be making full amends to the Muslims by restoring the Government of India to them from whom they have taken it." B. R. Nanda, "Nehru, The Indian National Congress and the Partition of India," Philips and Wainwright, op. cit., p 185; cf. also his reference to his return to India as a 'grand mission,' Bolitho, op. cit., p. 106.

<sup>244</sup>Bolitho, op. cit., pp. 158-9.

<sup>245</sup>Ansar Zahid Khan, "The Reorganization of the All India Muslim League under the Quaid-e-Azam," J. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 265.

<sup>246</sup>Jinnah's speech at Lahore session of the League in 1940: "The Viceroy never thought of me, but of Gandhi and Gandhi alone....Therefore when I got this invitation from the Viceroy along with Mr. Gandhi I wondered within myself why I was so suddenly promoted and then I concluded that the answer was the 'All India Muslim League' whose President I happen to be. I believe that was the worst shock that the Congress High Command received because it challenged their sole authority to speak on behalf of India. And it is quite clear from the attitude of Mr. Gandhi and the high command that they have not recovered from that shock." M. H. Saiyid, India's Problem of Her Future Constitution (Bombay: M. S. Saiyid, 1940), pp. 2-3.

<sup>247</sup>To Lieutenant Ahsan, Jinnah said: "Do you know I never expected to see Pakistan in my life time?" Bolitho, op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>248</sup>Cf. K. Ali Afzal, "The Quaid as Parliamentarian," in J. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 113 on Afzal's proposal to call him by the title Quaid-i-Azam conferred by the Assembly. In the various speeches that Jinnah made during his brief period after August 1947, there is evidence of his sense of achievement and of satisfaction. Cf. Dr. Inamul Haq Kausar, "Glimpses of Quaid-i-Azam's Two Visits to Baluchistan," in Journal of Palistan Historical Society, Jinnah Centennial Issue (1976), pp. 277-81; on the welcome his response was that even a royal potentate would have felt proud of such a procession and welcome.

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ATTITUDE CHANGE IN MOHAMMED ALI JINNAH: A CASE STUDY  
IN DEPRIVATION AND COMPENSATION

by

ANAND P. SHRESTHA

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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## ABSTRACT

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Founder of the Pakistan Movement, showed traits in his personality common to the compulsive character described by Harold Lasswell. Jinnah's role as a powerseeker in the forties was a reaction to his personal deprivation and the situation of the Muslim community at that time. His deprivations brought him a low self-estimate followed by a radical change of his attitudes. Jinnah's attitudes changed toward each of the three communities of contemporary India - Hindus, Muslims and British. This changed his values, political goals and strategies and resulted in his historical call for a national homeland for the Muslims of India. Power emerged as his supreme value; Pakistan became his main goal, and mass mobilization became his most important strategy. The attitude of the Indian National Congress, the leadership vacuum in the League, and British support also helped his cause. But Jinnah's own role as an intense powerseeker was vital. His ultimate success symbolized the compensation stage of the Lasswell paradigm.