

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA:
END OF AN ABERRATION?

by

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
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PREFACE

The aberration in American policy toward China came in the Cold War years when the United States reacted to the triumph of the Communists by refusing to recognize Mao Tse-tung's regime and by aligning itself instead with the defeated and discredited Nationalists on Taiwan. After more than two decades of mutual hostility, the United States and the People's Republic of China are gradually moving toward normalizing their relations. The Taiwan issue looms today as the major obstacle toward ending the aberration in American policy toward China. The United States cannot go on straddling the Taiwan issue indefinitely and is clearly faced with a dilemma. In order to upgrade and consolidate its relations with China, the United States must be prepared to redefine its ties with the Nationalists on Taiwan. The purpose, then, of this report is twofold: first, it illustrates the traditional basis for American policy in China from the wake of the Opium Wars until the fall of Chiang Kai-shek's regime; and secondly, it depicts the drift in recent years toward normalizing relations with Peking and ending the aberration in American policy toward China.

Chapter 1

A SURVEY OF AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA:

1844-1943

Beginning in the nineteenth century, as the United States gradually freed itself from concern with continental problems, it increasingly became concerned with the overseas expansion of American power, both political and economic. As interests in the outer world grew, Americans looked to Asia as well as to Europe.

The United States has a long interest in China. Despite broad differences in background which separate the U.S. and China, American friendship for China has always been supported by strong political and economic ties. Even in the years before the U.S. became a great power, it claimed to have a special relationship with China.

Beginning in 1844 and lasting until the fall of the Kuomintang (KMT) Government in 1949, American policy toward China was based on the "twin principles of: (1) equality of commercial opportunity; and (2) the maintenance of the territorial and administrative integrity and political independence of China."¹

The United States has also opposed the domination of China by any one nation or group of nations and, traditionally, has advocated a policy of non-interference in China's

internal affairs. It has taken the position that the Chinese should be given time to develop their political institutions in order to modernize. A backward China exploited by other powers held no promise for the U.S. However, a strong, modern China able to preserve its own territorial integrity could provide a stable balance of power in Asia.

During the nineteenth century, the U.S. policy toward China was expressed in treaties and by diplomatic procedures designed to secure equality of trading rights in China. The fundamental principle underlying American relations with China--equality of commercial opportunity--was incorporated in the first treaty between the two nations, the Treaty of Wanghia, signed on July 3, 1844. This treaty provided for a most-favored nation clause,² which guaranteed that whatever treaty rights other nations gained with respect to trade, residence, religious activity, tariffs or other commercial regulations would automatically accrue to the U.S. The principle of commercial equality worked well for the U.S. up until the late 1890's when new imperialistic pressures threatened a division of China into "spheres of influence" among European powers.³

The annexation of the Philippines in 1898 after the Spanish-American War introduced U.S. military power in the Western Pacific. Seen as the key to Asian markets, the Philippines did not in any automatic way secure the American position in China. It appeared that the United States would have to do something more to assert its principle of

commercial equality since the European powers were attempting by force to close the door to China trade to Americans.

Under increasing pressure as a result of European and Japanese adventurism, the U.S. resorted to a new approach in order to secure its objectives with regard to China. The first Open Door Note of Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 was an American expression of the principle of equality.⁴ Hay asked the Europeans and Japanese to guarantee that their respective "spheres of influence" would not interfere with the commercial rights of other countries. Although the replies were somewhat conditional and evasive, Hay announced to the world that the Open Door Policy had been accepted.⁵ It became the governing policy in China and the basis for the Sino-American relations for fifty years.

While negotiations in relation to the Open Door Note were still going on, the Chinese threatened to drive Westerners from their country. Foreign activities resulting from the "unequal treaties" of 1842, following the Opium Wars, and from the concessions granted them during 1895 and 1898, bred an acute sense of hatred and disgust among the Chinese. The process of modernization in a society patterned by over 3,000 years of its own civilization was no easy one. China was no match for Western imperialism. Its historic concern for the development of its hinterland had kept Western ideas on the periphery at its littoral areas. This retarded China's growth in the modern world. The impact of westernization was characterized by wars, revolution and foreign exploitation.

Belligerent Chinese, supported by the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, sought a solution to their hardships by driving "the foreign devils" into the sea.⁶ In the fall of 1899, a movement, known as the "Boxer Rebellion" spread throughout Northern China. The legations in Peking were besieged, many foreigners were killed and property damaged.

The foreign powers sought to use this movement as an excuse to gain more concessions in China. Realizing that the security of American interests in China was linked to the political integrity of that country, Secretary Hay sent a second set of notes, in July 1900, to other foreign powers. Hay asked them to preserve "China's territorial and administrative entity."⁷ Apart from trade interests, the U.S. desired in the words of John K. Fairbanks, to uphold the integrity of China "as a matter of political justice, self-determination and sovereignty of weaker nations."⁸

Since the turn of the century, the U.S. has consistently sought to maintain by diplomacy the twin principles of the Open Door Policy: equal commercial opportunity, and Chinese territorial and political integrity. In the wake of the Boxer Rebellion, this policy was helpful in achieving a solution of the difficulties between China and the imperialist powers arising from the loss of lives and destruction of property.

A few years after the Boxer Rebellion, the United States extended the Open Door doctrine by interpreting it to prohibit exclusive mining and railway privileges, and

commercial monopolies. These extensions were aimed initially at Russia, which was threatening Chinese control over Manchuria. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the Open Door Doctrine was turned more sharply against Japan, which had replaced Russia as the principal threat to Chinese territorial and administrative integrity in the southern half of Manchuria.⁹

Japan later subscribed to the "twin principles" of U.S. policy toward China. In the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 30, 1908, the U.S. and Japan mutually agreed: (1) to maintain the status quo in the Pacific; (2) to uphold the Open Door in China; and (3) to support the "independence and integrity of China."¹⁰

American policy also adjusted to significant events within China during this period. The inability of the Mandarin-Confucian system of government to deal either with internal difficulties or foreign encroachments led to a great ferment among China's intellectuals. Many liberals hoped to reform the imperial system; others, such as Sun Yat-sen, sought to overthrow it completely and establish a modern republic. The U.S. sympathized with the efforts of the Chinese to develop political institutions which would meet their needs in the modern world. Hence it followed a policy of strict neutrality on internal developments. When the Manchu Dynasty was challenged by the Republican revolution on October 10, 1911, the U.S. maintained its neutrality in the incipient civil war which followed by helping neither the

recognized government nor the revolutionaries. Following the abdication of the Manchus and the establishment of the Chinese republic on February 12, 1912, the U.S. extended de jure recognition on May 2, 1913. After the death in 1916 of Yuan Shih-kai, the Republic's first president, then later self-appointed emperor, the unstable government was all but shattered in what was known as the warlord era. Yet American policies in China remained rooted in their traditional political and economic basis even though China was fragmented into regional satrapies.

American policy did not go unchallenged. A year earlier in 1915, Japan used the excuse of World War I to move into Shantung and presented China with a stringent list of "Twenty-One Demands." These demands secretly presented by Japan to Yuan Shih-kai would have made China a virtual protectorate of Japan. Not only did the Japanese demand economic and political rights throughout China, but actually demanded control over Chinese social and political institutions, including schools, churches and even the government itself.¹¹ When the U.S. learned of these demands it reaffirmed its traditional policy of the Open Door. Despite expressed American views and Chinese resistance, Japan forced Yuan to accept a revision of these demands. The U.S. resorted to diplomacy, rather than take up military intervention to uphold its Open Door policies in China. A. Whitney Griswold notes in his book The Far Eastern Policy of the United States that American inaction during 1915 was the result of the

"Mexican situation, the British blockade and the submarine warfare launched by Germany."¹²

Moreover, during World War I, Japan managed through various treaties to obtain recognition of its dominant position in Shantung by China and its allies. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, China demanded the return of German leaseholds and German economic privileges in the province. Japan, however, insisted upon a treaty clause which would recognize Japanese succession to all German rights and privileges, including the railway in Shantung. The American Delegation at Paris supported China. President Wilson, in search of Japan's support for his League of Nations, could not hold out against these Japanese demands. A clause, therefore, was included in the Treaty of Versailles by which Germany renounced its rights in Shantung in favor of Japan.¹³ China thereupon refused to sign the treaty. This precipitated mass protests and demonstrations in China on May 4, 1919. This was commonly known as the "May 4th Movement," the "Chinese Renaissance" or what sinologists call the "intellectual origins of the Chinese Revolution."¹⁴

At the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922, the U.S. continued to pursue its objectives for China's well-being. At the Conference, Chinese and Japanese delegates met with British and American observers to consider the problem of China's rights in Shantung. As a result of these negotiations, Japan and China signed a treaty on February 4, 1922,

which provided for the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Shantung.

The nations participating in the Washington Conference also signed the Nine-Power Treaty on February 6, 1922, which provided that the signatories, other than China, would allow China to "develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."¹⁵ This was in accordance with the long-held view of the U.S. that China should be given time to progress toward national development.

While the foreign powers were adjusting their interests in China, developments of far-reaching importance were taking place inside that country. The first of these, already mentioned, had to do with the nationalism precipitated by the "May 4th Movement." Enlightened Chinese clearly saw the result of China's fragmentation and weakness relative to the modern world and moved to unite China once again. Moreover, in July 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established. The party grew rapidly and became affiliated with the Comintern set up in Moscow in 1919. The CCP considered the Kuomintang leadership of Sun Yat-sen the most promising means of achieving national revolutionary success and formed a united front with the KMT.

However, a rupture in this coalition appeared soon after the death of Sun in 1925 when a new leader, Chiang Kai-shek (a protege of Sun Yat-sen) began skillfully to piece together bits of the fragmented Chinese republic. Reorganized with the assistance of Soviet advisers, the KMT commenced to

increase its power and gradually brought regional warlords under their control.

The U.S. dealt sympathetically with the new regime. After China had achieved a degree of unity under the Kuomintang leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. recognized the Republic of China on July 25, 1928. It even concluded a treaty with it restoring tariff autonomy to China--the first nation to do so.¹⁶

Toward the close of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's, American policy was confronted with two threats in China--one from the CCP which was dedicated to making the country a land of communism and the other from Japan which was seeking to swallow the whole of China.

An increasingly uneasy association between the KMT and the CCP had continued until 1927. Chiang then drove the communists out of the government. He also destroyed most of their party organization and virtually decimated their ranks by his five "extermination campaigns."¹⁷

In their historic "Long March" of 1934-35 the communists--driven over 6,000 miles at a cost of nearly 200,000 casualties by the KMT--retreated to Shensi province in the Northwest. Despite continued hardship, they reorganized their party and forces under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. The bitter struggle between the KMT and CCP persisted even through increasing Japanese aggression. War in China was abated, finally, in 1937 when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by the "Young Marshall" Chang Hsueh-liang. In return for his

freedom, Chiang agreed to a "United Front" with the communists against the Japanese. Again, U.S. policy during this period of civil conflict remained committed to noninterference in the internal affairs of China.

Meanwhile, in the 1930's, American policy became increasingly anti-Japanese. The U.S. continued to assert its treaty rights in China in the face of growing Japanese activities. Despite American diplomatic pressure, however, Japan penetrated deeper into China. Its attempt later in 1935, to convert the five northern provinces of Chahar, Hopei, Suiyuan, Shansi, and Shantung into autonomous areas exacerbated tensions between the U.S. and Japan.¹⁸

Following Japan's "undeclared war" with China in 1937, the U.S. protested vigorously against violations of its treaty rights in China. These protests produced no positive results. But from the beginning of Japan's new invasion, the sympathies of the American people were with the Chinese. By way of moral and material support to China in its resistance to Japan's undeclared war, the U.S. gave notice to Tokyo officials on July 26, 1939 of its desires to terminate the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. As a result of this action, the U.S. was in a position to take economic measures against Japan.¹⁹ After the termination of the commercial treaty, the U.S. increasingly restricted the shipment of oil, scrap iron, machinery and other war materiel to Japan. President Roosevelt later took more drastic steps by freezing

Japanese assets in the U.S. on July 26, 1941, thereby virtually cutting off all trade with Japan.²⁰

The U.S. also supported China with positive measures in its resistance against Japanese conquest. American aviators on active duty were permitted to enter the reserves and to join the Chinese Armed Forces, popularly known as the "Flying Tigers." A military mission was sent to China and China was declared eligible for "lend-lease" assistance on May 6, 1941.²¹

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor catapulted the U.S. into World War II, the Chinese government declared war on Japan. The involvement of the U.S. in the global conflict created new problems of strategy and policy for Washington officials. President Roosevelt realized that China would be of vital importance to the allies during the defensive and, later, offensive phases of the Pacific War. China would contain Japanese divisions on the Asiatic mainland and offer bases from which air attacks could be mounted against Japan. But Washington officials also realized that the destruction of Japanese military power would leave a vacuum in the Far East. China presented to Americans the best prospect to take the place of Japan and thereby to assure stability in the post-war period.²² Realizing that China would play a significant role in the Pacific, both during and after the war, Roosevelt wanted to treat China as a Great Power.

At the Teheran Conference of November 28 to December 1, 1943 Roosevelt insisted that Chiang Kai-shek be included in discussing the question of setting up a world organization. Subsequently, through Roosevelt's efforts China took part as a great power in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, on August 21, 1944. Later, China became one of the sponsoring powers of the United Nations Conference held at San Francisco and Roosevelt also secured for China a permanent seat in the U.N.²³ The most significant gesture in according China the status of a great power occurred on January 11, 1943 when the United States renounced the "extra-territorial rights" it had enjoyed since 1844. It established in its place a formal treaty with Chiang's Nationalist Government.

Besides his fight to accord China the status of a great power, Roosevelt struggled from the beginning of the war to use Chiang's resources and manpower to contain Japan. American military observers in China reported that "the Chinese were not keeping significant Japanese forces in check and that they appeared to be lethargic and war-weary."²⁴ If the Chiang regime fell, a separate peace by China with Japan would bring serious consequences for the U.S. Realizing that the situation in Asia needed closer and fuller collaboration between China and the U.S., the War Department decided to send Major General Joseph W. Stilwell to China in February 1942. By an agreement between Washington and Chungking, Stilwell was to be one of the Generalissimo's chiefs-of-staff, commander of all U.S. troops in China, Burma and

India, and was also to command all Chinese troops Chiang might entrust to him.²⁵ The War Department directive assigned Stilwell the mission of increasing "the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to the Chinese government for the prosecution of the war and to assist in improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army."²⁶

But the assignment of General Stilwell and the renunciation of the Wanghia Treaty of 1844 symbolized American concerns to keep China within the war more than an effort to accord Chiang greater status. These two events marked the beginning of a new American involvement in Chinese affairs, and, perhaps, the beginning of the aberration in Sino-American relations.

Between 1943 and 1949, U.S. efforts to keep China in the war and to avert civil conflict were repeatedly frustrated. Despite its efforts to maintain its traditional policy of noninterference in China's internal affairs, the U.S. nevertheless found itself increasingly involved in them. This reversal of American policy was a result of President Roosevelt's aims of keeping Chiang Kai-shek's armies engaged against the Japanese. Japan no longer simply challenged American political and commercial interests in China, but threatened allied interests in the entire Pacific as well.

ENDNOTES

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Chapter 2

THE ABERRATION IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The defense of China during World War II was primarily the responsibility of the Chinese Government. Chiang Kai-shek was appointed Supreme Commander of the Allied China Theater by the "Big Three," but his participation in decisions on Allied strategy was limited to those matters involving the war in the Far East.¹

American policy makers in Washington believed that the Japanese presence in China could be contained more effectively if Chiang's Government worked in collaboration with forces under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Washington officials felt that the Chinese theater could be maintained successfully if there was peace and unity inside China.

As early as 1940, cracks appeared in the KMT-CCP "United Front" against Japan. As a result of communist expansion in northwestern China, there occurred large-scale armed conflicts with Kuomintang troops. By 1944, the split in the "United Front" had become clear. Both the communists and the Kuomintang accused the other of breaking the truce agreements of 1937.²

These signs of disunity disturbed officials in Washington. Stilwell, who was appointed the American Army

Representative in China and one of Chiang's Chiefs-of-Staff, was chosen because of his impressive record as a field commander and trainer of troops. He wanted essentially to remold the Chinese Army for use in the war against Japan. Stilwell's persistent and aggressive policies in China led to tense relations with Chiang Kai-shek.

The basic conflict arose over the role the Chinese forces were to play in the war against Japan. Since Stilwell was unable to obtain adequate men and materiel from the U.S., he urged Chiang to engage the large, well-equipped Japanese forces. However, Chiang felt that victory would be achieved against the Japanese anyhow, and that such a victory would be meaningless for him if the Communists remained powerful.³ He wanted to crush the Communist threat while the Soviet Union was still engaged in the European war. On instructions from Washington, Stilwell urged Chiang to institute military reform to devise some plan of military cooperation or unification with the CCP, and to entrust power to him over the Chinese and American forces.⁴

Chiang refused to place Stilwell in command of his country's armed forces and relations between he and Stilwell became very bitter. In September, 1943, Chiang's Foreign Minister, T. V. Soong, requested Stilwell's relief. However, General George Marshall, who believed that Stilwell's position was correct, dissuaded Roosevelt from recalling Stilwell.⁵

Meanwhile the KMT and CCP drifted further apart. Attempts to reconcile the two brought no rapprochement and the chances of widespread hostilities increased. In June 1944, Roosevelt sent Vice-President Henry A. Wallace to bring the two sides together against the Japanese. Wallace tried to convince Chiang that the CCP was sincerely interested in continuing the fight against Japan and that the Soviets considered Chiang the "best man" for China.⁶ But Chiang rejected Wallace's assurances. Realizing that the Chiang-Stilwell tension was not in the best interest of the war, Wallace recommended to Roosevelt that General Albert C. Wedemeyer succeed Stilwell. But instead of relieving Stilwell, Roosevelt asked Chiang in July 1944 to confer upon Stilwell full authority to coordinate all Allied military resources in China including the CCP forces.

Chiang agreed to make Stilwell his field commander "in principle," and to place CCP troops under his command, but suggested that all U.S. supplies be placed under the authority of his government.⁷ Sensing that Chiang would use these resources to equip only his nationalist troops, Stilwell urged Washington to deal firmly with the Generalissimo. Chiang was told by Roosevelt that he should utilize all his resources in fighting the Japanese "instead of frittering away his energies in containing the Communists."⁸

Uneasiness continued to be felt in Washington as the political and military situation in China deteriorated. It was impossible for Washington officials to evade the issue of

civil war in China. The Communists were fighting valiantly against the Japanese in North China. At the same time an undeclared civil war continued between the Communists and Chiang. The blockade line between Communists and government troops in North China absorbed the energies of about 200,000 of the best government troops and perhaps 50,000 Communist troops--a tremendous waste of manpower.⁹ Stilwell insisted that all Chinese troops everywhere be moved to the front and that political disputes be settled by peaceful means. The Communists declared that they were willing to submerge their differences by placing their troops at Stilwell's command, if Chiang would do the same for his Nationalist troops. To Stilwell, who was charged with defeating the Japanese on the mainland and with preparing for an eventual American landing in North China where Communist help might be vital, the unity of all Chinese seemed essential.

In the fall of 1944, Major General Patrick J. Hurley was sent to China as Roosevelt's personal representative. Hurley, whose main objective was to bring about some sort of compromise agreement between the Nationalists and Communists, began to work toward that end. On arrival in China, he found the relations between Chiang and Stilwell very tense. Under pressure from Roosevelt and Stilwell to carry on the war against the Japanese, Chiang bluntly asked Hurley to have Roosevelt relieve Stilwell. Hurley communicated this demand hoping to get Chiang to cooperate with his objectives.¹⁰

Stilwell was recalled and replaced by General Albert C. Wedemeyer.

Tang Tsou in his book America's Failure in China 1941-50 argues correctly that the recall of Stilwell meant a "defeat of the Stilwell-Marshall tactics of pressure" and that it entailed no change in the American policy of a peaceful unification in China.¹¹ General Hurley, in his capacity, first as Roosevelt's special representative and later as American ambassador to China, pursued this policy vigorously. In Hurley's scheme of priorities, political unification of China was made subordinate to the overall objective of sustaining the Nationalist Government. In his view, American policy was first to prevent the collapse of Chiang's Government and then to unify all military forces in China for the purpose of defeating Japan.¹²

As a means of sustaining Chiang, Hurley's plan consisted of two essential elements. First, Hurley would supply the Communists with American supplies only after an agreement had been reached between the KMT and CCP. Then he would refrain from applying pressure on Chiang either to compel him to offer the Communists better terms or to make changes in his regime or policies. In short, Hurley disagreed with the "Stilwell-Marshall tactics of pressure."¹³ He stated in his telegram to the President in October, 1944, recommending Stilwell's recall, that he believed Chiang reacted "favorably to logical persuasion and leadership."¹⁴

From the very beginning of his China assignment Hurley was optimistic that a solution to the question of unification could be found. The U.S. policy of peaceful unification was for Hurley a program under which the Kuomintang would obtain control of the CCP in exchange for Communist participation in a coalition government and for the recognition by Chiang of the CCP as a legal party. This was the basis of a five point draft agreement between the Nationalists and Communists which he worked out in November 1944.¹⁵ It was rejected by Chiang.

As Hurley's plan did not use the "Stilwell-Marshall pressure" to force Chiang to accept his ideas, he then was prepared to support Chiang's program for solving the Communist question. The Generalissimo's scheme aimed at the incorporation of all Communist forces into his armies in return for a political establishment which would not really alter the power position of the Kuomintang regime. For this reason many State Department officials and military observers in China pointed out that this program would not be acceptable to the Communists. Still Hurley spent his efforts toward achieving a Chinese unification on Chiang's terms. Hurley's key assumptions were that the Soviet Union would support America's policies of sustaining Chiang and that therefore the Chinese Communists would have to accept Chiang's terms.¹⁶

While Hurley was engaged in the task of bringing the KMT and CCP together under a coalition government and a

unified command, a political ploy unfavorable to Chiang was underway. During his stay in China, Vice-President Wallace reported that "Chiang did not have the intelligence to run post-war China" and that "at best he was a short term investment."¹⁷ He was not the only one to voice such opinions of Chiang.

Washington officials sent to Yen-an, the Communist base in China, in April 1944, an Army Observer Mission under Colonel David D. Barrett who had been Military Attache to the American Embassy in Chungking. This observer mission was urged by President Roosevelt and was called the "Dixie Mission." A Foreign Service Officer, John Stewart Service, who had been a political adviser to Stilwell, also accompanied the party. On October 10, 1944, Service sent a memo to Stilwell which stated that American dealings with Chiang Kai-shek continued "on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that he is China, and that he is necessary for our cause."¹⁸ Service argued for a more realistic line in China and noted that the United States need not fear a collapse of the Kuomintang regime. Later, he stated before a group of American officials that the "Communist activities were much closer to a government of, for and by the people than has ever existed in any part of China."¹⁹

John Paton Davies was another Foreign Service official who accompanied the Dixie Mission and shared similar views. He called Chiang's government a "politically bankrupt regime," and urged the State Department to tell the

Generalissimo to supply whatever forces he could contribute to the war against Japan.²⁰ He also recommended that Chiang be told that the U.S. would not supply any arms to any Chinese units, "whether Central Government, Provincial or Communist, which shows any inclination toward precipitating civil conflict."²¹

The Service-Davies reports advocated interference in Chinese internal affairs. They asserted the "democratic" nature of the Chinese Communist movement and stated that the Communists had their roots in the people.²² The two officials stressed the weaknesses of the Nationalists, pointed out the growing unrest in China, and made clear the economic instability of the KMT government. Service even went so far as to assert that any connection between the CCP and the Soviet Union which might have existed was no longer present. Both Service and Davies pointed out that the Communists were the "real fighters against Japan."²³ At a later time, both of these men were to become victims of McCarthyism for sharing these views.

Of great significance was the report made by George Atcheson in February 1945 who was in charge of the U.S. Embassy during one of Hurley's absences. Atcheson wrote to the State Department that "the supply of materiel exclusively to the National Government, the conviction that the United States would support only that government and the expectation that only the KMT representatives would take part in the San Francisco Conference had combined to make Chiang less

interested in reaching some accord with the CCP."²⁴ He further noted that because of this misperception Communist leaders were distrustful of American intentions and were increasing their forces actively. He recommended therefore that the U.S. cooperate with the Communists in order to save the military situation in China.

Other American specialists in Far Eastern Affairs, including such journalists as John K. Fairbank, and Edgar Snow whose book Red Star Over China (1936) was the first written by an American to have interviewed the Communists in Yen-an stressed these same views. Pointing out the weakness and failings of the Chiang regime, they eulogized the organizational and egalitarian virtues of the Communists.

It would be useful at this point to inquire why so many Americans shared similar views about Chiang and eulogized the Chinese Communists. The most obvious reason was that the immediate concern for Americans was the defeat of Japan. Since Japan was the more real and dangerous enemy of the U.S. they felt that Chiang should use all his resources to drive out the Japanese rather than to suppress the Communists. Since Chiang appeared to give precedence to Communists over Japanese, these Americans became disgusted with his government. Moreover, the unsatisfactory progress of KMT-CCP negotiations was seen by these knowledgeable Americans as the direct result of KMT intransigence. Lastly, most American officials who served as political advisers to Stilwell and later to Wedemeyer became aware of the corruption within the

KMT regime as opposed to the "orderliness" of the CCP.²⁵ They, therefore grew critical of Chiang while praising the organizational skills of the Communists.

After the resignation of U.S. Ambassador to China Clarence E. Gauss, General Hurley filled this vacancy in December 1944. In February 1945 he went to Washington to inquire about the line of policy to be adopted toward China in the face of KMT-CCP disunity. While in Washington, Hurley learned of the reports which Service, Davies, Acheson and others had made from Yenan and Chungking. Disturbed by them, he became convinced that these officials were out to undermine American policy in China. He complained to President Roosevelt about them, arguing that the CCP was in armed revolt against the legitimate government of China. Nevertheless, the reports convinced Roosevelt that cooperation of the KMT and CCP was essential to continuing the war against Japan.

Having been unsuccessful in accomplishing a coalition government in China, Washington now sought a solution through the military amalgamation of Chinese forces. Once again Hurley was asked to do the impossible.²⁶ Just at the time Hurley reached Chungking to resume his assignment, Mao Tse-tung addressed the Seventh National Congress of the CCP on April 24, 1945. Mao strongly denounced the KMT as a party of corrupt government officials and held Chiang responsible for tolerating the Japanese aggression in China. He also stated that the Soviet Union was the only nation that assisted China in her fight. Mao made no secret of his

defiance of American policies insofar as sustaining Chiang was concerned. But authorities in Washington, still concerned over the defeat of Japan, drew no adverse inference from these pronouncements.²⁷

Before the war in the Pacific ended the U.S., having realized that the cooperation of the Chinese armies--Nationalist and Communist--in the war against Japan was not forthcoming, resorted to the alternative of destroying Japanese strength through the support of the Soviet Union. A promise was obtained at Yalta in February 1945 with the understanding that three months after the surrender of Germany, Russia would join the war against Japan.²⁸ The surrender of Germany came in May 1945 and thus the only problem was how to bring about the collapse of Japan. On August 6, the U.S. dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Stalin quickly joined the war in the Pacific lest the U.S. should alone destroy Japan and put off Soviet claims in China. Soviet forces then swiftly moved into Manchuria to establish its former claims within this region as specified by the February agreements.

In August 1945, Japan surrendered. Shortly thereafter, the Kuomintang and CCP began a bitter struggle for the domination of China. In the absence of any fresh directives from Washington, Hurley continued to work for peace and unity. Despite his attempts to mediate the ensuing civil war, Hurley's efforts were futile. Washington, however, continued to hope that China's internal conflict would be resolved through peaceful means.

The situation in China was a precarious one for Chiang's regime in August 1945. There were about three million Japanese on Chinese soil.²⁹ The KMT government had to evacuate these Japanese, secure the area under their control, and keep the Japanese military equipment from the Communists. Additionally, the economic situation was deplorable. Trade was at a standstill and inflation was increasing at a rapid rate. Ninety percent of the railways were destroyed and government resources were nearly exhausted.³⁰ The condition of the common man was miserable. In short, everybody in China, except KMT officials, landowners and industrialists was frustrated and in a state of agony.

To make matters worse, the CCP had brought under their control 95,500,000 people and 950,000 square kilometers.³¹ Chu Teh, the commander of CCP forces, ordered his units to take over Japanese-occupied areas. Chiang was not only alarmed over the movement of CCP troops but also the entry of Soviet troops in Manchuria. Economically, Manchuria was rich in agricultural products and contained important minerals such as coal and iron. As an industrial base, Manchuria under Japanese exploitation had outstripped all of China. The Soviet intrusion into this region was quickly followed by the Chinese Communists.

With the introduction of CCP forces in Manchuria, Stalin's next objective was to hand over the region to them. Now that the war was over, the pre-war hostility and suspicion

between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers revived.³² Soviet forces therefore facilitated the entry of the Chinese Communists into Manchuria and blocked Nationalist forces from their entry.

American policy during this time was to assist the Chiang government in re-establishing its authority over all areas evacuated by the Japanese. When this objective was obstructed by the Soviet Union, Washington showed unwillingness to meet the challenge as some officials believed a large-scale military support to Chiang might involve the U.S. in a war with Russia.³³

Frustrated by his failures to bring about a peaceful unification in China, Ambassador Hurley resigned in November 1945. On his return to Washington he publicly attacked State Department officials, particularly Acheson and Service, for undermining American policies in China and working toward the destruction of Chiang's government. Hurley's resignation did not affect American policy and President Truman expressed his hope for "an early solution" of China's internal strife. He also declared that America would not intervene militarily in China's domestic affairs.³⁴

Truman then decided to send General George C. Marshall to achieve American objectives in China. Marshall was assigned the status of President's "personal representative." Despite the heavy odds against him, Marshall went ahead with his task. He was able to arrange agreements between the KMT and CCP on the cessation of hostilities, the

establishment of a political consultative conference, and a plan for reorganizing both Chinese armies.³⁵ However, the tentative political and military agreements sponsored by Marshall brought about no real meeting of minds.

Within two months after the January cease-fire, fighting again broke out as the CCP attempted to seize more areas. A second cease-fire was established in June, 1946. Marshall worked for a year trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Chinese problem. He used every political and diplomatic ploy possible to achieve U.S. objectives short of recommending armed intervention. The Communists on the other hand clearly utilized his mediatory efforts to acquire a firmer base throughout China.

Disappointed by these developments, Marshall recommended his own recall, which was done on January 6, 1947. Truman, in a public statement, admitted that despite Marshall's great efforts, the U.S. policy of establishing peace and unity in China had failed.³⁶

From 1947 to 1949, Chiang's own attempts to negotiate with the Communists failed repeatedly. After the failure of the Marshall mission, the U.S. withdrew from all active mediation and cut back its financial assistance to China although it continued to be interested in China's affairs. The goals of American policy continued to be peace, unity, democracy and reform. Only when those conditions were met would Washington consider giving more aid to the Chiang's Nationalist government. Chiang realized that without American

aid the Communists would win. As the KMT military stand in China deteriorated, the pro-Chiang element in the U.S. urged Washington to remove the embargo that had been placed on war supplies to the Chinese government.

The curtailment of American assistance to Chiang was lifted by the China Aid Act of April 1948 which provided for a loan of \$463 million. From this amount, \$125 million could be used by the KMT government as it saw fit. However, this aid did not arrive in time for Chiang to gain an advantage over the CCP. Demoralized government troops went over by the thousands to the Communists. Manchuria and the whole of China north of the Yangtze River passed under their control. The Nationalists were doomed. Toward the end of January 1949, the CCP took over Peking. In the spring, the Communists began an all out offensive against the KMT. On April 23, they took control of Nanking, the capital of the Nationalist regime. By December 1949, the Nationalists were fleeing across the Taiwan Straits. By the end of the year, the whole of China, except Tibet and Mongolia, had passed under the control of the Chinese Communists.

In Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, Lucien Bianco observes that the Chinese Communists simply "stepped into a vacuum. Nationalist China ended in such chaos," he argues, "that any organized opposition could have seized power in 1949--and the Communist movement was the only organized opposition on the scene."³⁷ What Bianco is saying is that the Nationalists contributed to the Communist triumph

and that in the closing days of the conflict the Chinese ruling classes simply stepped aside.

The defeat of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 brought on the aberration in U.S. policy toward China. But the first strains in the relationship between the U.S. and China began in the early years of World War II as American aims of keeping Chiang's regime in the war resulted in its increasing involvement with China's internal affairs. Only after Marshall's failure at a post-war unification of China did U.S. policy disengage America from Chinese politics. The fall of the Kuomintang regime in 1949 closed over a hundred years of Sino-American relations and shocked all but a few knowledgeable Americans, who abandoned their traditional support of Asian nationalism when threatened with a Communist takeover. The U.S. blinded by the fear of Communist aggression abandoned the political and economic basis of its traditional desire for China's well-being which had been long enunciated in the Open Door Notes. President Truman and his advisers committed the United States to a policy of containing communism throughout the world. In Asia, this practice became increasingly anti-Chinese and from 1949 to 1969 the United States became China's principal enemy.

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Chapter 3

UNITED STATES AND CHINA: END OF AN ABERRATION?

The decade that followed the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, witnessed the further development and hardening of Sino-American hostilities. After the fall of the Kuomintang, American diplomats remained in China to see what the new government's attitude would be toward the U.S. The new regime demonstrated no interest in an official American presence and all U.S. government officials were withdrawn from the Chinese mainland by April 1950.¹

Any lingering hope of improving relations was ended by the Korean Conflict. As a result of the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War, there was little opportunity throughout the 1950's to improve U.S.-PRC relations although some efforts were made. Truman's containment policies set the trend for American objectives in Asia which tended to isolate and encircle Peking for nearly two decades. Moreover, the U.S. recognized only one China, the Republic of China on Taiwan. It would recognize no other, nor would it tolerate the seating of Mao's regime in the United Nations. By 1954, the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and the

formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization led Mao to stiffen China's anti-American attitude.

However, in 1954 bilateral contacts between the U.S. and PRC were instituted, first between consular officials at Geneva, and then in 1955, at the ambassadorial level at Geneva and Warsaw. On September 10, 1955, China and the U.S. agreed jointly on the repatriation of some of its nationals. This was the only concrete arrangements reached by the two sides in these talks.²

While these ambassadorial talks failed to produce important changes in Sino-American relations, they at least served to provide both governments with a clearer understanding of each other's views. These talks also reduced the hazard of war by "miscalculation" during the 1954 and 1958 Quemoy and Matsu crises.³ From 1953-1967, a total of 132 ambassadorial meetings took place at Geneva and Warsaw. These ambassadorial meetings clearly represented the inability of Washington and Peking to circumvent each other in matters dealing with Asian affairs.

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy was determined to reduce the tensions of the Cold War. However, his policies with regard to Asia served only to antagonize Mao's regime. He and Secretary of State Dean Rusk concluded that China had become the more dangerous of the two leading Communist states, not only to the security of the U.S. but also to the peace of the world. While the Kennedy Administration worked toward a detente with the Soviet Union, it developed a "flexible

response" to meet the presumed Chinese threat in Southeast Asia.⁴

Persistent Chinese propaganda and border clashes with India in 1962 reinforced Washington's view of Peking's hostility. This precluded any American efforts to seek a modus vivendi with the Chinese Communists. Most of Kennedy's advisers believed that any steps toward improving relations with Peking would be suicidal in the face of Chinese belligerence and would be taken as "weakness" by the Asian mind.

Throughout the Kennedy years some Washington officials suggested that the U.S. should keep an open attitude toward China in the event that Mao would soften. Then on December 13, 1963, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Roger Hilsman, Jr. publicly stated that "American policy was no longer predicated on the assumption that Communist control of the mainland was on the verge of passing."⁵ He further implied that the U.S. was prepared to co-exist with Mao's China while retaining its commitments to Chiang's China on Taiwan. These suggestions, however, were acceptable neither to Peking nor to Taipei.

U.S. policy in the late 1960's was characterized by America's deep involvement, once again, in the internal affairs of an Asian nation--Vietnam. Washington officials consistently defended America's role in this imbroglio by claiming that Vietnamese communism was an extension of Chinese communism. By 1969, a vast amount of American resources were being poured into Vietnam with disastrous

effects on the Vietnamese as well as Americans. Nonetheless, before the decade of the 1960's had ended, Richard Nixon took steps toward ending the aberration of 1949 by reaching an accommodation with the People's Republic of China. This coincided with a noticeable change in the attitudes of the Peking government toward the western world.

Moreover, since 1960 sharp policy differences and a strong Chinese bid for leadership in the communist camp split the Sino-Soviet bloc of the 1950's. In the spring of 1969, the Sino-Soviet dispute broke out violently in a series of border clashes over Chen Pao Tao (Damansky Island) in the Ussuri River along the Sino-Soviet frontier. These clashes came shortly after the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moscow justified this invasion in terms of the Brezhnev Doctrine which authorizes the Soviets to keep their satellites in line. These developments clearly contributed to Peking's preoccupation with its own security.⁶

The rift over basic ideological and national issues continued to widen over the years. But some Chinese officials maintain that the Sino-Soviet controversies on ideological matters should not hinder the relations between two former allies. The basic split is over Peking's insistence that Sino-Soviet relations be based on "peaceful coexistence" instead of subservience to Russia under the guise of "international proletarianism." This has introduced "contradictions" into the communist camp and exacerbated Sino-Soviet tensions up to the present.⁷

Additionally, both countries have competed for influence throughout the Third World, particularly in local communist parties and other revolutionary movements. Peking officials have reaffirmed China's position in the Third World and are determined not to be subservient to the Soviet Union as are the Warsaw Pact nations.⁸ Consequently, the U.S. view of a multi-polar world in which China would rate as an equal appealed more to Peking than the Soviet model of relative subservience.

Most analysts agree, therefore, that the principal factor motivating China to seek a relaxation of tensions with the United States has been the Soviet threat. The Soviet response to this Sino-American rapprochement is the claim that the only factor bringing the two countries together is their mutual hatred for the Soviet Union.⁹ In turn, China has become something of an obsession with the Russians who appear to believe that China is ruled by an irresponsible group of anti-Soviet megalomaniacs. If tensions continue, there is always the fear of a thrust from a nuclear-armed China. Meanwhile, Soviet military precautions involve the creation of a balanced, highly mobile force along China's frontier of about 45 divisions, together with strategic missile sites and its Pacific fleet. For its part, China has been warning its population for nearly eight years of the dangers of a Soviet surprise attack.¹⁰

The current relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States is based on provisions

of the Shanghai Communiqué which was signed during President Nixon's historic visit to China on February 28, 1972.¹¹ The provisions of the Communiqué represent the basis for joint U.S.-PRC efforts toward normalization of relations or ending the aberration in Sino-American relations. Both the U.S. and China agreed that world conditions had changed so much since the close of the 1940's that nations of different ideologies could no longer afford to isolate themselves completely from one another simply because they had different beliefs. Both expressed disagreement over their respective interests in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, but expressed the hope that channels of communication would be opened through commerce and exchanges in science, technology, culture, sports and journalism.

The most critical and controversial part of the Shanghai Communiqué dealt with the Taiwan question. Since 1949 the U.S. recognized Taiwan as the "true" China, not the People's Republic of China. This basic foreign policy posture closed off all but very limited communication with the most populous country in the world until 1972. In the Communiqué, the PRC maintained that there is but one China and the U.S. did not challenge that position. Both sides further agreed that the Taiwan question should be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves. The U.S. then agreed to reduce its forces on Taiwan as tensions in the area diminished. Until the question of Taiwan is settled, however, the "normalization of relations" between U.S. and China

cannot be completed. Moreover, neither Peking nor Taipei will accept a "two China" solution.¹²

The most significant development since Sino-American relations were reopened in 1972 has been the return of the traditional political and economic interests between the U.S. and China. Although the difference of ideologies prevent a clearcut rapprochement between the two sides, there is evidence of growing interdependence in Asia both politically and commercially. A strong, independent and modern China has historically been an American objective. The United States far eastern policy reflected this from the issuance of the Open Door Notes in 1899 and 1900.

Some sinotologists speculate that until China achieves the technology that will establish itself as a superpower it desires American political influence in the Pacific to counter Soviet moves in Asia. This has also been enunciated in the anti-hegemony clause in the Shanghai Communiqué. Moreover collaboration between the Soviet Union and China over recent communist victories in Southeast Asia have been limited and strained. During 1975, each party reproached the other for seeking hegemony over Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union accused Peking of promoting efforts to subvert local governments. China charged that Moscow was attempting to "swallow Southeast Asia at one gulp." Chinese criticism was even aimed at Hanoi for North Vietnam's open gratitude to the Soviet Union for wartime assistance.¹³

As Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated, Sino-American relations have improved particularly with regard to commercial interests. America conducted trade with China as early as the 17th century. Sino-American trade was the basis for the Open Door Doctrine and the fundamental link in American ties with China up until the embargo of trade to the PRC in 1950.¹⁴ But since June 10, 1971, after a break of twenty-two years, direct trade with China became legal again. Since then, two way commerce has developed beyond most expectations. The economic prospects of the "Great China Market" or the lure of 800 million buyers have created a desire within the American business community to readjust U.S.-PRC policies.

Exposure of numerous wide Sino-Soviet differences in 1960 changed many facets of China's economic development. China turned from the Soviet bloc to Japan and to Western Europe for trade and, in particular, for supplies of industrial machinery and equipment. By 1965, less than one-third of its trade was with the Communist bloc countries where it had been about 70 percent in 1959. In 1965, the Soviet Union's shares of China's foreign trade was down to 11 percent.¹⁵ (See Table 1.)

Between 1960 and 1965, China bought from Japan products previously purchased from its former socialist allies. These included general machinery, fertilizer, iron and steel, electric machinery, and organic chemicals. From West Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy, China purchased more of the same. By the beginning of 1966, Japan had clearly

TABLE 1
CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE^a
(U.S. Dollars in Millions)

	1959	1966	1971
China's Exports	2205	2170	2300
China's Imports	<u>2060</u>	<u>2035</u>	<u>2200</u>
	4265	4205	4500
Trade with Non-Communist Countries	1310	3105	3550
Trade with Communist Countries	2960	1100	950

^aLTC Sidney Klein, "China's Foreign Trade," Military Review, USACGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, June, 1972.

replaced the USSR as China's chief source of industrial equipment.

During 1969 Chairman Mao and Premier Chou decided to reformulate the Chinese strategy of coping with the Soviet threat by opening relations with the United States. In the long run their goal was to build a "powerful, modern, socialist state." According to Chou's "Report on the Work of the Government" in January 1975, this task was to be accomplished by the end of this century.¹⁶

In the process of their policy reassessment, Chinese leaders recognized that rapid development and modernization over the next decades would require accelerated technological progress and a much more open trade orientation. The Chinese have also reinterpreted the concept of "self-reliance."¹⁷ In the 1960's, it meant import minimization.

Now it allows a much more active and open foreign trade outlook.

American grain sales to China have fluctuated since their opening in 1971. The traditional grain suppliers to China have been Canada and Australia. Since they could not increase their grain exports by 2 to 4 million tons from one year to the next as required to meet China's needs, China turned to the U.S.¹⁸ But China's economic and trade considerations were reinforced by political factors as well. In 1972 and 1973, China was clearly interested in normalizing relations with the U.S. and the increase of Sino-American trade stood as a symbol of improved relations.

Compared to the boom in agricultural trade, U.S. nonagricultural trade with China increased very little since 1971 despite rising Chinese imports such as complete plants, machinery and transport equipment. Again a combination of political and economic factors were at work. Total U.S. exports to China of all types of industrial goods were about \$90 million in 1973, \$140 million in 1974 and about the same in 1975. During the same years, China's imports of these types of goods amounted to about \$3.5 billion.¹⁹ This means that the U.S. supplied only 3 to 5 percent of China's imports of industrial goods, with Japan assuming by far the leading role in China's foreign trade. No doubt Japan's geographic and cultural proximity to China helped it to enjoy these advantages. However, Japan has accomplished an important diplomatic inroad which the U.S. has yet to do--it established

formal diplomatic relations with China and broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

There are other obstacles to Sino-American trade besides the Taiwan issue. Japanese corporations and industrial firms are in a position to provide export-import bank financing while U.S. Exim-banks are barred from undertaking such financing. The Jackson-Vanik amendment, including the recent Trade Act of 1974 precludes credits to countries which restrict the freedom of immigration. This provision applies to China as well as to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, until the claims-frozen assets issue is settled, which involves \$196.9 million of U.S. private claims in China and \$76.5 million of Chinese assets in the U.S., direct commercial banking relations with China seems to be precluded.²⁰

However, exports of Chinese oil are one means of increasing Sino-American trade which may speed up normalization of relations between Washington and Peking. China exported about 6 million tons of oil in 1975 and is projected to ship about 10 million tons in 1976. By 1980 it might supply 30 to 50 million tons. However, the bulk of this oil has gone to Japan, and it seems unlikely that over the next few years any significant quantity would be shipped to the U.S.²¹

American trade with China decreased considerably in 1975 and for Sino-American trade to be restored to its peak of 1974 or beyond will require either a supreme political leap leading to full diplomatic relations or a step by step

approach gradually removing the technical, institutional and economic barriers standing in the way such as Most-Favored-Nation status and the claims-frozen assets problem. (See Table 2.) Apparently, Washington officials have decided to follow a gradual approach which might lead to full normalization. On the other hand, the Chinese will not permit a rise in trade with the U.S. short of formal diplomatic relations.

TABLE 2
U.S.-CHINA TRADE^a
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
U.S. Exports	0	62.5	739.7	820.5	300
U.S. Imports	4.9	32.4	63.9	114.7	140
Total Trade Turnover	4.9	95.9	803.6	935.2	440

Note: Grain sales to China have dominated the whole course of U.S.-PRC trade since its opening in 1971.

^aCongress, House IntRel Hearing, 94th Congress, February 1976, p. 21.

Still, some China analysts proclaim that the prospects for future booms in Sino-American trade are as unpredictable and inscrutable as a Chinese merchant. They claim that the Chinese, a shrewd class of buyers, are in a good position to buy and that there are no guarantees that they will find the American market to their advantage. Others argue that U.S. trade with China since 1971 has not reached the same

proportions as the U.S. trade with Japan and Taiwan, thereby justifying the slow pace of normalization. (See Table 3.)

TABLE 3

U.S. TRADE IN JANUARY-MARCH 1976^a
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)

	Japan	Taiwan	China
U.S. Imports	3963	610	48
U.S. Exports	<u>2338</u>	<u>397</u>	<u>84</u>
Total Trade	6301	1007	133

^aU.S., Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports, "U.S. Foreign Trade by Quarters," July 1976, pp. 28-30, 32-37.

Sinotologists have used China's trade with Japan to justify a faster pace of normalization. In his book Uncertain Passage, A. Doak Barnett argues that the American position of a gradual approach to normalization not only endangers the close U.S.-Japan relationship but also threatens ties between Japan and China in the event the latter may revert to anti-American policies. Barnett further argues that a faster U.S. pace toward normalization would encourage cooperation instead of conflict.²²

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Chapter 4

CONCLUSION

United States-China relations today are in a holding pattern. The aberration in American policy since 1949 seems likely to continue at least until 1977, that is, until the inauguration of the new U.S. president. By then, over three years will have passed with little forward movement in U.S.-China relations. The key question now is whether or not it will be possible in 1977 to move the relationship forward. The U.S. cannot move toward normalizing relations with China by straddling the Taiwan question. Domestic political factors on both sides will affect what is possible.

The world is currently waiting in anticipation of what leaders emerge in China during the post-Mao succession. There was evidence prior to Mao's death of an internal debate in China over foreign policy toward both the U.S. and Soviet Union. Some Chinese leaders have argued that because Washington has not yet fulfilled all pledges made in the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, Peking should not agree to any broadening of bilateral U.S.-China relations until full normalization is achieved. There is recurring evidence that there are some who favor a less hostile and more compromising policy towards the Soviet Union. However, the rejection of Moscow's condolence messages at Mao's demise implies that Peking, at least

for the time being, will remain more anti-Soviet than anti-American.

If there is to be a prolonged period without forward movement in the U.S.-China relationship, Chinese leaders may reassess the value of this relationship. One cannot assume that U.S.-China ties can be maintained at the current minimal level indefinitely. Nixon's visit to Peking in 1976 and Ford's cool reception in 1975 are danger signals that Chinese officials are not too happy with Washington's step by step approach. Uncertainties may increase during this post-Mao era, and even if the current officials in Peking do not alter main lines of Chinese policy, they may find it more difficult than Mao and Chou on addressing Sino-American issues.

Therefore, should the United States not take positive steps to upgrade and consolidate its relations with Peking, a retrogression and deterioration in Sino-American relations may reappear. Full normalization of relations is the prerequisite to any serious efforts in dealing with many problems in the immediate future--problems such as insuring peace and stability in Asia.

The main obstacle in achieving full normalization of relations with Peking is the Taiwan issue. The U.S. must accept the fact that to upgrade and consolidate its relationship with China, it must redefine its ties with the Nationalists on Taiwan.

Since the aberration of 1949, Peking's basic argument is that for full normalization of relations to occur, the U.S.

must do three things: (1) cut formal diplomatic relations with the Nationalists; (2) withdraw all U.S. forces from Taiwan; and (3) end the formal defense treaty of 1954 with Taiwan. Out of the 132 U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial meetings held in Geneva and Warsaw between 1953-1967, the Taiwan issue was invariably the key problem to the Chinese.¹ To the Chinese on both sides of the straits, the Taiwan issue remains an internal affair. It also represents more than America's major stumbling block to achieving full normalization of relations with China. It is a contradiction of America's traditional policies of noninterference in China's internal affairs and respect for the "territorial integrity" of China, long expressed in the Open Door Notes.

It seems highly unlikely that Washington is prepared to make a drastic change in its policy toward the Nationalists on Taiwan. On October 6, 1976, during the presidential debate in San Francisco, President Ford announced that the United States would continue to move for normalization in the "traditional sense." Moreover, President Ford stated that the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 did not establish a time schedule to achieving normal relations and that the U.S. would continue to seek a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. Furthermore, both he and President-elect Jimmy Carter stated that future U.S. policies with China would not interfere with the present policy toward Taiwan.

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THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA:
END OF AN ABERRATION?

by

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As the United States freed itself gradually from concern with continental problems, beginning in the nineteenth century, it increasingly became concerned with the overseas expansion of American power, both political and economic. As these interests in the outer world grew, Americans looked to Asia as well as to Europe to develop their markets and political influence.

Even in the years before the United States became a great power, it claimed to have a special role in China. Americans quickly perceived that China was weak and its weakness invited European and Japanese intervention. The role of America was different from that of the imperialists--America became the voice defending Chinese independence, seeking to protect it from European and Japanese imperialism. Nevertheless, from the treaty system of the 1840's until World War II, Americans sought and enjoyed the commercial privileges that other nations had wrested from the Chinese. Moreover, because of its weakness, China provided an opportunity for Americans to enhance their self-esteem by perceiving themselves as champions of an oppressed nation.

Central to American desires in Asia even before the issuance of the Open Door Notes of 1899 was the existence of a strong, modern, and independent China. Americans believed that if the expansion of their trading interests was to be realized, China would have to modernize. A backward China,

dominated by other powers held no promise for the United States. However, a strong, modern China able to preserve its own territorial integrity could provide a stable balance of power in Asia. This aim, firmly expressed in the Open Door Notes, persisted for fifty years.

The aberration in United States policy toward China began with the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. Blinded by the fear of communist aggression Americans forgot the political and economic assumptions underlying their traditional desire for China's well-being. The fall of the Nationalist government in 1949 shocked all but a few knowledgeable Americans, who abandoned their traditional support of Asian nationalism when threatened with a Communist takeover. With the full support of the American people, President Truman and his advisors committed the United States to a policy of containing communism throughout the world. In Asia, this practice became increasingly anti-Chinese, and, from 1949 to 1969, the United States became China's principal enemy.

For over two decades Sino-American relations were based on mutual hostility and suspicion. Gradually, both sides came to realize that this posture served neither party's interests. Since 1971, the United States and China have worked toward overcoming these hostilities by normalizing relations and relaxing tensions in Asia. Today, the trend of Sino-American relations is slowly drifting toward ending the aberration in American policy toward China.

Current Sino-American relations are based on the Shanghai Communiqué signed by the United States and the People's Republic of China on 28 February 1972. Both parties have agreed that neither should seek hegemony in Asia and that each is opposed to efforts by any country to establish such hegemony. Each side has also reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. Additionally both sides have agreed to facilitate bilateral exchanges in such fields as science, culture, sports and journalism as well as the progressive development of trade. Thus, the United States and China are attempting to re-establish relations based on traditional political and economic interests.

However, the Taiwan issue remains the main stumbling block to achieving full normalization of relations with Peking and ending the aberration of American policy toward China. The United States is clearly faced with a dilemma in this regard. Recognizing that China could bring monumental gains by insuring Asian stability, the United States is also aware that abandoning an old ally, such as Taiwan, could result in a global re-assessment of American alignments and commitments. Thus uncertainty still remains in the relations of the United States with Communist China, a dilemma which needs to be resolved before the aberration in American policy toward China can be eliminated.