

EGYPT: POLITICALLY VULNERABLE?

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CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL THREAT

It may be argued that there is little or no attempt on the part of the U.S.S.R. to penetrate Egypt to achieve a socialist state in the communist sense. On the other hand, a strong case for the reverse can be derived from a report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union delivered by Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary on March 30, 1971:

He said that the international working-class movement continued to play, as it had played in the past, the role of the time-tested and militant vanguard of the revolutionary forces... [I]mperialism was being subjected to ever greater pressure... above all, by the young independent and anti-imperialist states of Asia and Africa... Success in the struggle against imperialism largely depended upon the cohesion of the anti-imperialist forces, and above all, of their vanguard, the world communist movement.¹

Thus it can be seen that "above all" the highest emphasis still remains on the "vanguard," the world communist movement. Oleg Penkovskiy in his Penkovskiy Papers stated unequivocally that the Soviet diplomatic corps was mostly K.G.B. and G.R.U. agents (equivalent

¹"Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from the 24th Party Congress", Soviet Life, No. 6 (177) (Moscow: Moscow Editorial Board, June 1971), p. 3.

to the C.I.A. and military intelligence, respectively.) It has been estimated that in excess of 15,000 Soviet advisors are presently in Egypt. It may be expected that all these "advisors" are not solely involved in technical work as the recent expulsion of approximately twenty percent of the Soviet Mission in England demonstrated.²

Returning to the other argument, let us see how the Egyptian leadership looks at this situation. President Anwar El Sadat, observing May Day in Helwan on the advent of Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny's visit stated:

"Politically, militarily, and economically, the Soviet Union has stood, and is standing by us unconditionally. There are rumours abroad that it is seeking to Sovietize our country and its economy. That is all false. The Soviet Union is an honest and true friend."³

A fact stands out in the preceding paragraph that cannot be ignored-- that the President of the U.A.R. himself acknowledged the question of "Sovietization." That he took a public statement to deny it provides further reason to evaluate the vulnerability of the nation.

What can the Soviets gain in Egypt, or the Middle East for that matter? The region's geographical proximity to the U.S.S.R. makes it vital to her military security and access routes for world trade. The area is one of the world's great energy sources with one-third

²Kansas City Star (Kansas City: Star, 3 Oct., 1971), Col. 3, p. 16A.

³New Times, No. 22 (Moscow: Trud, May, 1971), p. 8.

of the entire world's oil reserves.⁴ Although the U.S.S.R. has nearly sufficient oil for her needs, the mere denial of this resource to the West or uncommitted nations gives her great international leverage. Further, the U.S.S.R. has become more dependent than the West on the Suez Canal due to Sino-Soviet deteriorated relations, and her continuing support to North Vietnam. The Russians view Egypt as a keystone to ascendancy in the Indian Ocean and the surrounding land areas. Influence over South Africa with its vast industrial machine and mineral resources could decisively alter the world balance of power. The U.S.S.R. learned in the early 1960's when the Congo was in a state of disorder that it could not achieve political objectives without bases. Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean, represented by a squadron in March 1971, enables the U.S.S.R. to draw India closer into its embrace as a counter to Communist China. Soviet Sea forces as they gain in strength could dominate Indian Ocean shipping lanes used by West Europe and Japan. "The Possession of Egypt opens the way to conquests worthy of Alexander. Whoever has Egypt will have all the coasts and islands of the Indian Ocean."⁵ Thus the U.S.S.R. has much to gain in the area, and in Egypt.

⁵Aaron S. Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 52-54. See also "Soviet Objectives in the Indian Ocean" in Washington Report (Washington: American Security Council Press, April 26, 1971).

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROACH

Large sums of money and great efforts have been expended by the United States in appraising "National Power" in the attempt to predict various national strengths or weaknesses for use in problems of international relations. Morgenthau relied upon a virtual smorgasbord of "elements of national power" to which the analyst would have to then apply intuition to relate the many factors for a prediction.¹ A more precise way and a more time-saving process would appear to be the application of a set of predetermined variables to the political situation.

The present international system has suffered a lessening of the secure boundaries formerly known to the nation-states due to greater communications and a relative standoff in the use of absolute power due to massive nuclear weaponry. Great concern for mutual destruction has resulted in increasing reliance on other means to

¹Herbert J. Spiro, World Politics: The Global System (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1962), p. 11. Also see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), pp. 93-152 for his measurements of national power.

achieve national goals ranging from political subversion to limited war.² As for the former, political subversion or penetration appears insidious in nature and distasteful to the average Westerner. However, it is a fact, and is an ever-present factor in the achievement of national goals.³ This is particularly so when two parties do not subscribe to the same standards of diplomatic, ideological, and international order.

Thus, while a diplomacy which governs relations between members of a common ideo-social order must rely upon a fund of good will and a reservoir of trust which transcends their conflicts, the diplomacy which governs relations between different ideo-social systems often ignores the factors, since the ultimate issue at stake is the existence of this or that civilization itself. A triumphant ideological bloc will write its own history and pass ethical judgement on its own conduct independently of the standards or values of the vanquished order.⁴

Further, Aspaturian tracing the development of Soviet diplomacy from the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution to Brezhnev, has pointed out that their diplomatic concept is "inextricably linked to the general socio-historical categories of Marxism,"⁵ and that the entire structure of the Soviet image of reality and international politics rests upon a dialectical analysis."⁶

²Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning of the International System (London: The Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 24-25.

³Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), pp. 19-29.

⁴Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 382.

⁵Ibid., p. 358.

⁶Ibid., p. 359.

The so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" is, in effect, the latest operational manifestation of both "proletarian internationalism" and "socialist diplomacy." Duplicity, perfidy, deceit, chicanery, and cruder forms of dishonesty have characterized Soviet diplomacy in the past, and both the Cuban and Czechoslovak episodes betray a distressing continuity in behavior.⁷

The Soviet crushing of the October 1956 Hungarian uprising, which was ignored by the Soviet Press while lambasting the Suez crisis, adds credence to Aspaturian's view.

Thus a political threat to Egypt appears not only realistic but identifiable. A wide range of "national strengths or weaknesses" might be evaluated using Egypt as a target with the U.S.S.R. as a penetrator by applying predetermined operational factors or functions of penetration to the Egyptian polity to observe and analyze the effect. The hypothesis selected is: Egypt's present political system is vulnerable to potential political penetration by the U.S.S.R. The weakness or strength of a nation is qualified by systematic evaluations. Political weakness or vulnerability (weakness and vulnerability will be used interchangeably in this study) will be defined as any degree of political action not primarily self-determined within the target political system--Egypt. The political system is considered to include the "political culture, structure, capabilities, conversion processes and system maintenance and adaptation functions."⁸ The present time is considered to be now and

⁷Ibid., p. 393.

⁸Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, pp. 27-30. See also Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, ed., Political

the immediate future months until such changes occur which significantly alter or eliminate the basic situation or relationships described. For the purposes of this study it must be assumed that the Soviet Union has the resources with which she can politically penetrate the United Arab Republic.

The functions of the target polity will be investigated to see if there are vulnerabilities which would facilitate the functions of penetration. The functions of penetration appear distinct from structures, resources, and outcomes of penetration, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Culture and Political Development (Princeton: University Press, 1965), for a discussion of elite and mass political cultures which create another division--modern and traditional political cultures. This is considered decisive in national development. See also Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), for a discussion of political development which includes change over time, and that the guardians of tradition in Egypt are not the elite, but the masses.

Fig. 1
Relationships

<u>Structures</u>	<u>Resources</u>	<u>Functions</u>	<u>Outcomes</u>
Soviet Missions	Agents	Transformation	Formulation or
Soviet Advisors	Armed Forces	Replacement	revision of idea,
Employees	Money	Leverage	value, policy or
Amtorg	Goods	Deceit	position
Intourist Agency	Airwaves		Coup D'Etat
Aeroflot	Time		Insurgency
Tass News and	Allies		Treaties
others	Opinion		Activity or Inac-
Presidium	Nature		tivity
Politbureau	Goodwill		War
Ministry of Defence			Peace
KGB			Structural Change
GRU			
Party			
Unions			

The four functions of penetration in Figure 1 are not all-inclusive, but each represents a description of closely-related functions that can be described by a central single title. Transformation in this case is the transferral of ideas, values, or ideology from or by a resource to people or groups in a target political system. Replacement is the substitution of personnel, groups, or systems in the target political system by agents, treason, bribery, organization and assassination. Leverage is the use of aid, censure, sanctions, threat, or aggression to change the actions of the target political system. Deceit is the use of such things as slander, treachery, perfidy, and propaganda to exploit weakness in beliefs, values, and the like.

There are vulnerability indicators within the political system and its functions which are closely related to the functions of penetration.

Transformation - is primarily concerned with political culture orientations and socialization. Ideological coincidence with the threat ideology; lack of popular identity with and loyalty and commitment to the present government and its programs; conflicts between classes; evasion of social responsibility; conflict of the regime with traditional values and with sub-cultures; need for reforms but failure of the government to meet them; limited or poor education and socialization capabilities--all these are indicators of vulnerability.

Replacement - seems particularly useful against political structures and processes. One man rule with unclear succession; constitutionally weak executive; organizations that are mainly regulative; limited interest aggregation; frustrated interest articulation; limited, inefficient, corrupt or alienated bureaucracy; strong organizations in existence that coincide with the threat ideology or structure; and insufficient repressive capability--all these would show vulnerability.

Leverage - would involve economic needs not met or withdrawal from support of needs being fulfilled. Traditional society aware of requiring modernization; need for armed forces training and equipment; limited resources such as capital, skills, natural resources; and low health and sanitation standards--all these are indicators.

Deceit - is the most difficult to determine of the four penetration functions as it is highly speculative. However, it deals with the psychology of the target people and can be assessed by looking for significant values, habits, or emotional issues that could be exploited.

In order to determine the vulnerability of a country, Egypt in this case, observers' reports will be searched for the described vulnerabilities. This report will deal only with the conversion and replacement functions of penetration.

CHAPTER III

TRANSFORMATION

Subtle changes have occurred in the old Marxian symbolism: "capitalism" is now "imperialism," "the proletariat" become "the masses" and "the people", and the "revolution" is now called "national liberation". Although the old symbols are cherished, "the policies of Communism in underdeveloped countries have become outright anti-revolutionary ones in everything but name."¹ The appeals of Marxian philosophy are more applicable to the intelligentsia in the under-developed countries who are educated, and evaluate the various books, texts, and periodicals. The masses, on the other hand, would be more concerned with their immediate well-being and way of life. Therefore, more will be said about the intelligentsia and ideology. The masses will be viewed more from their support of the intelligentsia, and the masses' outlook on life.

¹John H. Kautsky, "The Appeal of Communist Models in Under-developed Countries" in Willard A. Beling and George O. Totten, ed., Developing Nations: Quest For a Model (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970), p. 108.

Coincidence, Identity and Conflict

To determine vulnerability to transformation, a multi-level view by class needs to be taken. This is particularly so when Marx's "class struggle" depends upon conflict between class viewpoints. Class views must be examined to look for conflicts and relationships to identity, loyalty and commitment to the national ideology and programs to establish a proper perspective before subjecting each of the views or combination of views to penetration by communist ideology. Therefore, these three indicators will be examined together.

It must be borne in mind that the intellectuals did not participate in the revolution of 1952. As Abdel-Malek reveals, a "crisis" arrived that consisted of two parts. The first: What was the Egyptian man of today, and what goals for the future should he set for himself? The second: What should be the interaction of the intellectuals and the revolution? As for the first part, the intellectuals, always on the philosophical plane, dealt with the "cultural duality" between the effort to bring Islamic ideas back, or to select "Western" ideas, either Fabian or Marxist as the basis for national existence and "the source of all things, all thinking, and all direction." On the second part, the intellectuals rose from the same economic lower middle class as the army who took the leadership. Basically the intellectuals felt the army

was right, but felt that they should formulate a certain amount of criticism, freely expressed, nevertheless.²

Professor Wahid Raafat, a famous jurist, toured the universities after the revolution and advocated a return to monarchy and a privileged class. The intellectuals, in dislike of this potential regression to vice, corruption and privilege identified with the Farouk reign, began to fully reconcile themselves to the revolution. This was reenforced by the Suez crisis in 1956, and strengthened by the National Charter of 1962 which installed a specific trend toward Arab Socialism and a middle of the road, pragmatic path. The intellectuals as a group therefore began to rid themselves of reactionaries on both the right and the left. However, this pragmatic character with practical triumphs, has allowed rather shabby speculative, analytical and critical thought in the fields of politics, economics, sociology and moral philosophy. This criticism is true of other revolutions such as those of Cromwell in England, and Napoleon in France where the great thinkers produced significant revolutionary tracts in advance of the period. "Once a revolution installs a regime, it is the before and after that counts. A revolution may be judged by its practical achievements rather than by its speculative contribution."³

²Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society, Translated by Charles Lam Markham (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 194-195.

³Louis Awad, "Cultural and Intellectual Developments in Egypt since 1952" in P.J. Vatikiotis, ed., Egypt Since the Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968), pp. 156-157.

With impetus initiated by formation of the Ministry of Culture in 1957, a demonstrable new creativity is in fields of the arts. A genuine revolt against the former formalism is seen. In political reaction to socialism, however, there developed in the sixties the Egyptian right who rallied around the theocratic ideals from Islam and openly called for a Jihad (Holy War) against "pagan western twentieth century civilization." They opposed population control, any occidental, cultural, political or social views, and female suffrage. They declared that healthy socialism could be found in the tenets of Islam and Arab culture. This reaction to the right (or traditionalism) failed to evoke widespread support despite strong and sustained appeals.⁴

"It confirms the theory that the Egyptian intelligentsia has been and will always remain predominantly secular and that the theocratic ideal is a concept foreign to the Egyptian mind which from times immemorial could deify his Pharaoh but never humanized God. It also attests to the fundamentally moderate temper of the Egyptians who, whether in their conservatism or in their progressive urge, look with suspicion on all forms of extremism, fanaticism, and intoxication. They have worked their way through history by tenacity and not by passion and violence. This is what gives the stamp of permanence and indeed timelessness to our life and institutions. It is an approach which may be lacking in poetry and imagination; but it is a highly civilized approach that has served to preserve us as a nation in the darkest of days."⁵

The increased influence of Egypt in world affairs, interest in Egypt by the world powers, and the discomfiture of France and England in the Middle East have been a source of pride to the educated.⁶ It appears

⁴Ibid., pp. 160-161.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Leonard Binder, "The Integrative Revolution" in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, ed., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1965), p. 400.

that the intellectual will not only absorb the innovations by the military regime, but will provide a certain continuity to the pragmatic approach of that regime. Therefore it is necessary to analyze the orientation of the political elite within the intelligentsia to determine the current path of the intellectual.

In the first stage of the revolution (1952-56), the established political elites, influenced by French and British liberal traditions, were gradually replaced by a new type of official--officers, economists, technocrats and engineers who have been largely influenced by American and German traditions. In the second stage (1956-61), a coalition developed between the military government and the financial and industrial sectors due to the state obtaining the necessary resources by nationalizing the former British and French holdings, i. e. the Suez Canal, and business firms. In the third stage (1961-67), the government leaders adopted "scientific socialism" as the way to progress. When Nasir broadened the base of support in 1962, the Charter of National Action was developed by a National Congress of Popular Forces made up of national capitalists, peasants, workers, professionals, civil servants, professors, students, women, and the army.⁷ This charter provided for long range freedoms, socialism, and unity. It promoted individualism, harmony, cooperation and social unanimity.⁸ After the 1967 war

⁷Abdel-Malek, op. cit., pp. xiv-xvi.

⁸Emile A. Nakhleh, "The Egyptian Charter: A Critique", The Arab World (New York: The Arab Information Center, Aug.-Sep. 1971), pp. 39-46.

the March 30th program was initiated to eliminate the traces of aggression by mobilizing all military, economic and intellectual capabilities. Specifically, the program provided for free elections at all levels of the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.), complete judiciary independence, the establishment of a supreme court, and fixed terms for executive positions to guarantee new ideas.⁹ Along with these reforms by the new political elite the following characteristics of the regime emerged. The economy of Egypt is still capitalistic--land is privately owned although wider distribution has been made. The public sector of economics is still regulated by demand and profit, and the remaining private sector as nationalized only strengthens the power of the technocrats.¹⁰

"Although there are considerable difficulties in assessing, with a high degree of accuracy, the extent to which different leading social groups are reaping benefits from the new economic course, two groups stand out: The medium and large landowners (but not the old landed aristocracy), and the new power elite."¹¹

The old Egyptian bourgeoisie has been replaced by a new state capitalist class that controls the strategic and dynamic sectors as well as society as a whole. This power elite includes the armed forces, security service, upper scale civil and foreign services, publishing, arts and the mass media. This power elite has been recruited mostly from lower and middle bourgeois strata: senior officers, technical experts, administrators and organizers. The corps of officers is integrated with

¹⁰Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), p. xix.

¹¹Ibid.

the leading economic, administrative and political groups. Between 1952 and 1964 about 1,500 officers left the ranks for appointments in the non-military sphere of government. This technocracy sits astride the large bureaucracy already in existence.¹² This is where the policy and decisions are made, and the "goals have been the promotion of a popular-democratic, independent national state."¹³

Association with the Soviet Union during the last few years has provided a formula whereby national elites can promote Western social and technical values at home while opposing the West on the international scene. This anti-Western, anti-colonial attitude is a disappearing asset for the Soviets. As they pursue their expansionist aims more openly, the Middle Easterners will come to view imperialism as originating not only from the West, but from the East as well. Not only did Nasir dismay the Soviets by taking Soviet aid while suppressing Communists in Egypt, but Sadat has followed the same line. Next to the bitter memory of relations with the West, the most important factor which enhances the appeal of Communism is the frustrated unity of the Arab world. This is not likely to change since experience over the last decade has confirmed that political leadership in the Arab world is composed of individuals dedicated to strengthening their power position and enhancing the stature of their own countries in the world.¹⁴

¹²Ibid., pp. xix-xx.

¹³Ibid., p. xxi.

¹⁴Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Appeal of Communism to Islamic Peoples" in J. Harris Proctor, ed., Islam and International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. 56-59.

A reorientation of cultural policy took place within the military. They opposed the previous rationalists represented by the British and European-oriented Wafdists and the Marxists who were influenced by East European and Russian thought. In their rejection of these "Western" cultures and values they denounced all imperialism. What remained was a revised Islam and a determination to restore life and power to a humiliated Egypt, i. e. Islam and national socialism. Islamic traditionalism which would justify those in authority with contempt for discussion and factions, was modified under the military regime in 1961 when the Islamic University of Al-Azhar was reorganized to include the reform proposals of Sheik Mohammed Abdu, first suggested at the start of the century. Four new faculties were created: Islamic Law; Foundations of Religion; Arab Studies; and General Relations and Administration, thus separating religious and pedagogical functions. Socialist reforms implemented by the government reflect the power elites' value: reorganization and control of the press, land to the fellah, education expansion, health care extension, nationalization of major industry, and incorporation of the science and technology of Europe and Russia.¹⁵ Also, bans on inflated salaries were implemented.¹⁶

Because of the authoritarian nature of the regime, the outlook of the decision-maker at the very top of the power elite requires scrutiny.

¹⁵Abdel-Malek, op. cit., pp. 212-221.

¹⁶Stephen H. Longrigg, The Middle East, A Social Geography (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970), p. 144.

Sadat, born of a devout Moslem family, is known as an Arabic scholar.¹⁷ During the revolution he served as Liaison Officer to the Moslem Brethren,¹⁸ a religious group espousing a return to traditionalism. Mansfield says that Sadat (about 1951) was impetuous and much less methodical than Amer or Nasir,¹⁹ but World Leaders states that as President, he is pursuing a considered, deliberate approach in developing respect for his authoritative leadership and describes him as a listener and consultant, encouraging his advisers to speak openly. President Sadat told a recent interviewer: "Nasir could deal with many problems at a time. He had a computer for a brain. I can only deal with one problem at a time."²⁰ Sadat says of himself in Revolt on the Nile that while in charge of the popular group (non-military portion of the revolution) he

¹⁷"Anwar El Sadat, President United Arab Republic", Current World Leaders, Biography and News, Vol. XIV, No. 1-B (Pasadena, Almanac of Current World Leaders, Apr. 1971), pp. 4-5. See also The International Who's Who, 34th Edition (London: Europa Publications, Ltd. 1970-71). The President, Anwar El Sadat, was quickly named successor to Gamal'Abd el-Nasir in October 1970. He was nominated within seven days of Nasir's death (law allows 60 days) by the executive committee of the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.), then approved by the A.S.U. central committee within hours, and by the National Assembly in two days. Eight million voters approved the choice of Sadat in a national plebiscite on October 15. Sadat is one of the two remaining men in power (the other is Hussein Shafei, also a member of the Supreme Executive Committee of the A.S.U.) of the original "Free Officers" who participated in the 1952 Coup.

¹⁸Anwar El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile (New York: The John Day Co., Inc., 1957), p. 32.

¹⁹Mansfield, op. cit., p. 37.

²⁰World Leaders, loc. cit.

was "always eager to step up the pace" but that Nasir was a restraining influence.²¹ The month before expiration of the Arab-Israeli cease-fire on February 5, 1971 Sadat said that the nation's armed forces were ready for all out battle against Israel after the Suez Canal cease fire expired.²² Yet the cease fire has come and gone, but no all out battle has ensued.

Sadat's attitude toward religion and politics is summed up in his statement: "If a religion is turned into a political system, then fanaticism is born. This confusion of temporal power with the spiritual has been the downfall of many Oriental societies."²³ Apparently his connection with the Moslem Brethren had a negative effect on his outlook on religious bases for politics. His view of communism is that of a "new fanaticism."²⁴ Thus it appears that Sadat is pragmatic, relatively open, eager, and popular with the people. To be sure, he is a nationalist and an Arab as well, with no desire for communism.

A few generalizations can be drawn to determine the impact of communist ideological penetration on the more educated outlook of the intelligentsia. Egyptian socialism, like communism, rejects the tenets of capitalism. Both seek to transfer in some degree private property to

²¹Sadat, op. cit., p. 64.

²²The New York Times, January 3, 1971, p. 1, col. 2.

²³Sadat, op. cit., p. 79.

²⁴Ibid., p. 91.

public ownership. Both appear to reject inequities resulting from income distribution in a free society. Communism appeals to a changing society which is anxious to regain and enlarge a sense of community. The U.S.S.R. is attractive on the outside as a model of order with its single party, but Yugoslavia appears more of a nationalistic model for Egypt.²⁵ Yet there are more and significant differences. National socialism as the result is the end, not a dialectic on the path to communism. Private enterprise is still allowed. Collectivism is limited. Harmony, cooperation, and social unity is sought, not class struggle. The Communist view that society would be emancipated by the middle class intelligentsia as the vanguard, finds the lower middle class already in command of Egypt with their own brand of socialism. The power elite's support of Islam also militates against the atheism of Marx.*

As we have seen, the power elite sprang from the lower middle class, but the power elite are not the holders of all the opinion representing that class. The agricultural middle class that exists above the fellah in the countryside has been steadily declining due to migration

²⁵ Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: University Press, 1965), p. 160. See also Emile B. Ader, Socialism (Woodbury, New York: Barrons Educational Series, Inc., 1966), p. 73 for a discussion of similarities between Communism and Socialism. See also Walter Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East (Washington: The Macmillan Co., 1969), pp. 162-165 for a discussion of the effect of polycentrism on Arab views of Communist ideology.

*[More will be said of Islam later as a traditional force.]

to the cities and the splitting up of inheritance. In the cities they now join the huge gulf between town and country, an ancient, impassable division. This modern lower middle class has a frustrated social mobility due to training in the classics that do not meet modern needs. Their discontent is likely to offer a major potential for political action.²⁶ But it appears that the cities, principally Cairo, have recognized the regime, and are emotionally involved in the nationalistic fervor.²⁷ The cities contain the bulk of what would represent the middle class artisans, shopkeepers, tradesmen, merchants, and lower bureaucracy. The latter represent over 300,000 who owe their very jobs to the regime; hence one could assume that they support the regime at least passively. However, like any sizeable bureaucracy, changes move slowly. Firmly entrenched ideas and methods are a habit. "It is immediately clear that Egypt's public bureaucracy has been moving from the model of traditional authority to that of a legal authority and that vestiges of the older model persist to this day."²⁸ More recently the middle class has entered government posts which had been the preserve of the upper

²⁶Henry Habib Ayrout, S. J., The Egyptian Peasant (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 1. Although Ayrout's observations were taken mainly in a much earlier period of Egypt, they were extensive and over a number of years. Also, this latest edition was revised by the author for more recent viewpoints. See also Halpern, op. cit., p. 73.

²⁷Longrigg, op. cit., p. 145.

²⁸Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 17.

class. "Although the middle groups stand between the classes above and below them, they are much nearer the upper class in education, economic interest, goals and aspirations, and general attitude and taste."²⁹ Also, one of the results of the revolution has been to make the city dweller feel that the cities belong to him.³⁰ Thus it appears that the rest of the middle class presently follows or takes on the outlooks of the power elite within the intelligentsia for various reasons. The noted frustrations do, however, offer a future potential for penetration.

The bulk of the population of Egypt are the fellahin or soil toilers. They represent the lowest class stratum. They are the ones whose attitudes, beliefs and values must be moved if the new ruling class is to achieve its objectives by virtue of the number of fellahin alone. The fellahin's social environment limits their intelligence and initiative to a routine life of tilling the soil and everlasting repetition. It is a very old and conservative way of life. Ayrout says that the fellah has an aptitude for art and for calculating figures, and copying and repeating. Learning by heart the whole Koran while illiterate is not uncommon. He seldom saves for increasing his earning, but for greater prestige. He doesn't store provisions against bad days. He reacts to pressures of the moment and seldom thinks of superstition. He is like a primitive

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Mansfield, op. cit., p. 119.

or a child; his intellect is controlled by the things he is feeling and doing. Therefore, he looks for causes and effects not in the rational, but in the visible order. Life is a succession of todays. His wisdom is entrusted to pithy sayings and proverbs. Several of the more significant are:³¹

"Patience demolishes mountains."

"Nothing is lost with patience."

"Patience is beautiful."

"A patient man sees freedom."

"Greed is a humiliation, but satisfaction with one's lot is a full purse."

Ayrout further says that today the fellahin play no part in the movement for progress. They have changed their masters, their religion, their language and their crops, but not their way of life. Additionally, he states that Egypt has had its share of wars and revolutions, but the people have taken no part in them. There has been little political violence in the rural areas of the Middle East. The fellah who might migrate to the cities joins the largest group of urban workers who are the unemployed and the unskilled. But the possibility of these workers becoming a unified political force is inhibited by traditional hiring practices of kinship over class solidarity.³²

Returning to the fellah as a whole: "His mind is passive and fatalistic; he accepts things as they are."³³ He owes his astonishing stability

³¹Ayrout, op. cit., p. 140, 145.

³²Halpern, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

³³Ayrout, op. cit., p. 143.

and uniformity to [his] association with the soil of Egypt."³⁴ Further:

Since Egypt is essentially agricultural, it follows that almost every organization of government in the long run gives orders to the fellah. In industry and in the town, public services are entrusted to private enterprise; but in agriculture, on the contrary, the government assumes functions which in other countries are often carried on by private persons. The result is that the peasant looks to the government as the Providence which manages and regulates all things, while government traditionally regards the fellah as a helpless child who must be ordered about to protect him from his own ignorance.³⁵

His identity with or loyalty and commitment to the government, however, is rising since Ayrout made his observations, as evidenced by progressive and broadened voting. In the March 1965 elections Nasir drew 6,950,098 votes with 65 opposed and 489 blank ballots.³⁶ The March 30th Program was ratified by a national plebiscite on May 2, 1968 by an overwhelming vote.³⁷ The elections held on January 8, 1969 returned 319 of the 330 A.S.U. candidates to their seats.³⁸ The October 15, 1970 plebiscite approved Sadat as president with eight million votes.³⁹ Thus it distinctly appears that participation by the masses is on the increase, though little conflict can be expected with the masses' traditional proclivity to passivity and fatalism.

³⁴Ibid., p. 3.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶World Strength of Communist Party Organizations, loc. cit.

³⁷Nakhleh, loc. cit.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹World Leaders, loc. cit.

Conflicts of the Regime With Tradition and Subcultures

It was mentioned previously that the monotheism of Islam militated against the atheism of Marx. Perhaps the greatest traditional element in Egypt is Islam which has had a profound influence throughout the last 1,300 years of Egyptian history. More than 90 percent⁴⁰ of the population today are muslims. The fact that Islam is significant as a political influence in the traditional sense is due to its being "not only a moral imperative but of that imperative embodied in the norms and way of life of a Community."⁴¹ Gibb further states in particular that Islam embodies the laws of the social order.⁴² However seriously weakened politically and militarily, "the moral authority of the Law was but the more enhanced and held the social fabric of Islam compact and secure through all the fluctuations of political fortune."⁴³ Islam, a way of life and the predominant religion, a virtual theocracy, was a discipline of the soul and not merely a collection of external rituals. It condemned celibacy, decried spiritual priesthods, and above all it compromised with the exigencies of politics.⁴⁴ Consensus has been

⁴⁰Longrigg, op. cit., p. 143.

⁴¹H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 191.

⁴²Ibid., p. 10.

⁴³Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 129. Se also Halpern, op. cit., p. 132.

the strongest moral imperative. Islam has modified itself where necessary throughout its history. It even incorporated some Christian ideas and the person of Jesus. Christian festivals survived alongside feasts of Islam until the latter part of the Middle Ages. Both Islam and Judaism trace their history to the house of Abraham. Many passages are similar in holy scriptures. Hence, a trait of Islam is tolerance, though not necessarily equality with other religions. Islam has gone through several stages of change from liberalization to traditionalism and return. The Moslem Brethren in Egypt represented a return to traditionalism. A force that grew to an estimated one and one-half million by 1950, they harkened back to the old virtues in order to wipe out corruption and vice, to set up the scales of justice, the improvement of society, the just treatment of the oppressed, striking the hand of the oppressor and counseling with purity of will.⁴⁵ Supporting the army coup in 1952, they later disagreed with the military rulers and were banned from Egypt in 1954 following an attempt on Nasir's life. Modern Islamic thought is one which deplores the commissioning of saints, or deifying of Mohammed. "Mohammed is presented as the embodiment and exemplar of human virtue in its most exalted manifestations... The teachings of Mohammed are presented in terms of contemporary social ideals."⁴⁶

⁴⁵Ishak Musa Husaini, The Moslem Brethren (Beirut, Khayat's College Book Co-op., 1956), p. 58. See also Halpern, op. cit., p. 142.

⁴⁶Gibb, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

Christianity grew alongside, and with some independence of, the legal states. Out of this grew a secular framework for society based on function and contact which greatly influenced Western concepts of law and legislative institutions. By contrast, Islam arose in a society whose only notion of law was established custom and tradition sanctioned by public opinion. Islam added divine ordinance and substituted prophetic for tribal custom. It then combined all three in its Sacred Law, the Shari'ah. The Koran as theory does not include all the legal and political type questions that are bound to arise, and this is provided in the "kitab" (the book).⁴⁷ Interpretations required by changing society are accomplished even today by the Ulama (clerics) who are charged with the interpretation of the Koran. They have taken a moderate but generally conservative point of view of change, and represent the traditional element of the force of Islam. The secular state has had to legislate in the sphere of the Sacred Law to keep pace with the forces of modernization. Modern business and labor such as insurance, transportation, factories, advertising, and unions have had an impact. Ancient family laws of marriage, divorce, and inheritance need new interpretations. The old punishments such as cutting the hand off a thief and prescribing 100 lashes for adultery are out of date.⁴⁸ To some

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 92. Also see Gibb's "Religion and Politics in Christianity and Islam" in J. Harris Proctor, ed., Islam and International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965).

⁴⁸Bayard Dodge, "The Significance of Religion in Arab Nationalism" in J. Harris Proctor, Ibid., p. 107.

extent, this is circumventing the authority of the Ulama, and "if the Sacred Law is wholly dethroned the link with the historic community is broken." Yet the Ulama have "never yet as a body failed to serve the major religious interest of the community."⁴⁹

This traditional link with past customs and values which acts as a brake upon hasty reform, by the same token can provide the political system time to develop its capacity to meet new demands. Unquestioned obedience by the masses to the tenets of Islam will ease transitions required by reform and support the acknowledged leadership through various crises both internal and external. This was seen following the 1967 war. When disaster struck, Nasir remained in power by acclaim. On the other hand, it is also recognized that people generally rally around a leader in time of trouble, though Islam helped to reinforce this tendency. "From its long inner history Islam has acquired both the adaptability and the toughness needed to meet the challenge of modern philosophical thought."⁵⁰ Overall Islam is a grim prospect for Soviet political penetration in itself. Further, it strengthens the other aspects of the political culture.

The strongest of the subcultures are the two million Copts, who are nevertheless very much Egyptian and nationalistic.⁵¹ Their last uprising

⁴⁹Gibb, op. cit., pp. 190-191.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 188.

⁵¹Ayrout, op. cit., p. 90.

happened over a thousand years ago. Although there may be some conflict with Islam from the Copts, the tolerant nature of Islam and the more secular views of the government in all probability will subdue most conflicts. The small Egyptian Communist Party contributed nothing to the national movement and came almost exclusively from the minorities. The lessons of Marx were for his own time. He knew nothing about central planning and the welfare state. Arab Nationalism has been accused of being bourgeois and selfish with fascist content. Further, experience has shown that international solidarity espoused by the Arab Communists means subordination to Soviet strategy. The forces of Nasirism provided the revolutionary elite which the Communists failed to do. The Arab Communists have been discredited in the eyes of the masses. They have failed to meet the needs of a society in transformation, primarily due to adherence to Marxist dogmas which are irrelevant to the Arab world.⁵² The smallness of the minorities and the illegality coupled with repression of any party other than the A.S.U. will most likely prevent any open political conflicts from subcultures.

Reform and Social Responsibility

As reform can only be carried out through the exertion of social responsibility, the two are linked closely together and will be treated as such in the following discussion.

⁵²Tareq Y. Ismael, "The Crisis of the Communist Parties in The Arab World" in Middle East Forum, Vol. XLV, No. 4, 1969, pp. 15-23.

An M.I.T. Study Group stated that the defeat of a traditional form of organization in war tended to lower the prestige of the traditional rulers such as the opening of China and Japan to the West.⁵³ This was certainly true of the Farouk monarchy in Egypt after 1948, which was followed by the "Free Officers" coup in 1952. It did, in fact strengthen the hand of the army and the Moslem Brethren who already felt responsible to move toward reforms. From civil servant and army officer training abroad, contact with more modern societies demonstrated that Egypt was clearly behind, but that modernization could be achieved with considerable reform. Since the coup, great emphasis has been placed on carrying out ambitious programs designed to bring a better life for that three-fourths of the population, the fellahin, who had been denied for so long.

Today, gradually, like a warming radiation from Cairo, the influence of a new regime is being felt even in the furthest reaches of Upper Egypt.

The Agrarian Reform undertaken in September 1952 did not succeed in fixing the wages of agricultural workers. It has also not set in order the systems of cooperatives (about 200 in 1954, with only 74,000 members). But by expropriating 565,000 feddans, or some 9 percent of all the cultivated lands, it has already made landowners of 200,000 families of cultivators--about 1,200,000 individuals, the same who tilled the land for others in the past...

But it is chiefly in directly fixing land rents by law (at seven times the taxes) that the peasant laborer has been given a slight but incontestable security.⁵⁴

⁵³M.I.T. Study Group, "The Transitional Process" in Claude E. Welch, ed., Political Modernization (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), p. 27.

⁵⁴Ayrout, op. cit., pp. 154-155.

Ayrout goes on to tell of the increases in available hospital beds and a growth of 200 Rural Health and Social centers annually, training of midwives and education for children that has quintupled. He asks, rhetorically, if the fellah associates himself with these efforts and has entered the movement whose goal is his awakening, and answers that he has, albeit slowly.⁵⁵ Mansfield says, "The whole question of family planning and the effort to raise social and educational standards is intimately bound up with the status of women."⁵⁶ In 1962 Egypt's first woman minister was appointed, Dr. Hikmat Abou Zeid, and several women have been in the National Assembly. This growing acceptance has been due primarily to the right of equal educational opportunities.

In that the U.A.R.'s government is a centralized bureaucracy headed by authoritarian military officers, it has been and is penetrating the society down to the very "grass roots" with its many socialist reforms. The apparent initial success of these programs is expected to eventually develop attitudes of true loyalty and commitment. Caution is in order, however; doctors and civil servants shun jobs in the countryside, the fellahin dislike military service and are disinterested in motherland, liberty, and politics;⁵⁷ and 80 percent of them are stricken with endemic diseases.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 156-157.

⁵⁶Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1965), p. 115.

⁵⁷Ayrout, op. cit., p. 110.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 73-78.

A problem of differing rural and urban orientations exists: "Contempt for the fellah has become so deeply rooted in the mind of the townsman that the very word has become the worst of insults."⁵⁹ Also, there is some aversion to secularism as was manifested in the teachings of the Moslem Brethren, which could detract from the necessary legislation for social reform. Economically, there are wide variations between the income of the rural peasant and the urban worker. The average peasant lives on approximately \$238-280 annually,⁶⁰ while the urban worker in the various trades lives on approximately \$238-572 annually.⁶¹ The suffocating impact of the police apparatus⁶² indicates the authoritarian manner of the regime. Strong security police networks insure governmental control. Even the lowest level of local government is headed by a constable, appointed by the central government. Only in the village is the head official elected. In this village chief reposes all the laws as far as the fellahin are concerned. Considering that many of the social laws are applied through religion there is a division in rule application and adjudication. The strength of Islamic tradition provides senior members of the family with the power of life and death,

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 19.

⁶⁰Gabriel S. Saab, The Egyptian Agrarian Reform 1952-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 120.

⁶¹American University, Area Handbook for the United Arab Republic (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964).

⁶²Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 350.

with which the civil courts are indulgent.⁶³ There is both a formal (civil) and an informal (religious) set of laws. Conflicts arise particularly at the central government level when progressive motivations conflict with traditional elements. Communications of the system are primarily downward from an authoritarian center. The lines going upward are available through the A.S.U. committees at various levels. However, it appears that these upward channels are not presently designed for voicing dissenting opinions or the gathering of consensus from the low levels. Also, the mass media are presently under control of the government. On the other hand, Egypt's large standing army provides for greater integration of the fellahin in the nation. The new class of men in power have effected changes in every sphere of life. "It has changed the faces of Cairo and Alexandria, and contributed to the creation of a sensible and orderly urban life. And at the same time, it has not forgotten the listless, paralyzed provincial towns and the villages."⁶⁴

Principally through success in the agrarian reform programs, coupled with population control, regulations on leasing land for cultivation;⁶⁵ improvements of health standards and expanding education,

⁶³Ayrout, op. cit., p. 122.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 154.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 27-28. Detrimental subdivision had occurred from population increases to the point where now 2 to 3 feddans (acres) is the smallest fragmentable parcel allowed by law--acquisition is limited to 100 feddans plus 50 if the acquirer has children. Also see Hisham B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1962), p. 212.

the government's reform programs will have an impact upon the people. Nonetheless, population control programs have been unpopular and, though rural medicine is increasing, it is not comprehensive and is generally avoided by the doctors, and the rapid educational expansion has caused a drop in quality. Expectations not satisfied for reform will in all probability not serve as a point of penetration. This view is substantiated by the masses' willingness to accept things as they are and the increasing votes given to the regime and its programs. This view should hold unless the reforms fail miserably.

Education and Socialization Indicators

Early, the new regime undertook to provide free education for all citizens, and has nearly succeeded with a great deal of effort devoted to this goal.

But owing to the breakneck speed of expansion, classes are far too large at all levels, while many of the teachers are quite unqualified for their jobs. Moreover, the shortage of teachers is made much worse by the export of many to other Arab countries; in 1964 there were about 5,000 in Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. Cases are recorded of children who after six years primary education are still illiterate; far too much learning is memorized undigested. Examinations, which are all-important in the Egyptian system are rigid and unimaginative.⁶⁶

Entrance of children to school during 1955-1965 has risen 35 percent in Egypt. Illiteracy of adults, however, was still high (74 percent

⁶⁶Mansfield, op. cit., p. 122.

of those 15-24 years of age) in 1965.⁶⁷ Even though Egypt's goal is 100 percent literacy, it is not likely that the goal will be met in the near future. There are high rates of repetition and dropouts which result in continuing adult illiteracy. An offshoot of the education expansion is its effect on the heretofore secluded woman, particularly of the middle class. Berger relates:

This present generation of middle-class girls enjoy more personal freedom to move about, to leave the house alone, and to stay out later, and to choose their own clothing. Their amusements, too, are less sedentary and secluded...Also:

The rising status of women and their emergence into the world of affairs is one of the most powerful forces for change not only in the Arab family but in Arab society in general. If forces already set in train are permitted to work out their potentialities or, as likely, even to become more pronounced, there is no doubt that women's aspirations, demands, and successes will transform Arab society profoundly and permanently.⁶⁸

It appears that education is expanding at a rapid rate which to a certain extent alleviates the lack of quality. The fact that the Egyptians are going through the motion of attending schools in great numbers is a visible improvement. Quality is rather an invisible quantity which only the more elite will be able to see when attending foreign schools which would then serve as a basis for comparison. In the rush to obtain more teachers, training in the Soviet Union of Egyptian nationals or in special courses in Egypt by Soviet instructors might serve as an ideological

⁶⁷ Michel Iskander, "Can We Plan for the Future? The Prospects and Problems of Arab Children and Youth" in The Middle East Forum, Vol. XLVI, Nos. 2 and 3, pp. 13-15.

⁶⁸ Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962), pp. 152-153.

training ground. Indications of this were seen when V. Yelyutin, Soviet Minister of Middle and Higher Education visited Egypt in 1969. An announcement was made that 600 Egyptian students would be trained at the Aswan Professional Training Center-University of Labor with Soviet experts helping. Further, 75 Egyptian industrial training instructors were to go to the U.S.S.R. to improve their quality.⁶⁹

The intent of the political system to maintain itself is manifested in the rapidly expanding schools throughout the nation. The curriculum⁷⁰ includes the history of the revolution and the ideals of the "Free Officers"-- "justice, morality, and reason."⁷¹ Political recruitment is through various channels, primarily the army, the A.S.U., the National Assembly, and the Civil Service. The latter has been gaining in actual numbers at quite a pace from less than 50,000 before World War II to over an estimated 380,000.⁷² In fact, only a third of the students (male and female) with primary education or higher, can be absorbed into the civil service annually.⁷³ Although the civil servant is precluded from political activity by law, he is a pliant tool in the hands of the power center. Also,

⁶⁹"Soviet and Chinese Reports on the Middle East and Africa" in Mizan Supplement A Nov.-Dec. 1969, pp. 14-15.

⁷⁰Student Thesis, Education and Political Development in Tanganyika and Egypt, by K. Griffin (unpublished, 1968), pp. 26-28.

⁷¹Sadat, op. cit., p. 136.

⁷²Berger, op. cit., p. 82.

⁷³Ibid., p. 83.

the civil servant's strong concern for job protection further induces him to support the regime in power.⁷⁴ The army has also been used as a tool of political socialization. Any fit man can be drafted from 19 to 30 years of age and must serve three years in the regulars or nine months in the reserves. "When he leaves the army the fellah has lost his uncouthness and becomes a gentleman. The fellahin are not unaware of the changes that have taken place in the young men who return, and this realization also is helping break down the resistance to recruitment."⁷⁵

Summary of Transformation

We have seen several potential vulnerabilities for ideological transformation. Some coinciding values of Arab socialism with Communism exist. Yet, England is a socialist country and she has not become communist. There appears to be rising identity, loyalty and commitment to the present government on the part of the masses due to the charisma of the leadership, the various reforms in progress, and the increased voting participation. Although the needs for reform are great, the awareness of the fellah is very low, and he is fatalistic and will tend to accept things as they are. The intelligentsia, and middle class generally subscribe to the policies of the military regime. Thus the various classes have little need or desire to change their present beliefs in the current system. National socialism with its emphasis on modernization

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 5.

⁷⁵Ayrout, op. cit., p. 110.

somewhat challenges the political traditions of Islam. However, Islam has always adjusted and is a main strength itself against communism.

Ideologically Egypt seems strong enough at the present time to ward off attempts at political penetration by transformation.

CHAPTER IV

REPLACEMENT

Political penetration by replacement can be characterized as a situation in which actual key people and groups are replaced in the political structure by various means, or they are "bought" and become in effect the penetrator's men. It is not sufficient only to study the structure, but a study of the process or functioning of the structure also sheds light on what truly are the key posts and organizations that need to be held by the penetrator's men. By viewing the performance of the political structures that are internal to the political system or the conversion processes¹ it can be determined how Egypt is ruled. For analytical purposes it is necessary to know more than there is a President and an Assembly. One must examine how the structures actually operate to determine if penetration by replacement can be effective in the system.

The President

Several of the vulnerability indicators are related and will be treated together. The first of these deals with the executive or president. Any country which relies solely upon one leader for all major

¹Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 28-30.

decisions might well be penetrated by the replacement of just one man. Where decision-making is diffused among various branches of the government, the replacement requirement should increase proportionately. Also, if the process of leadership succession is not clearly delineated, then conflicting claims for succession could open wide the possibilities of penetration. Furthermore, a constitutionally weak executive may allow competitive branches to make the decisions, thereby providing another channel of access to decision-making.

From the start, Nasir was the sole theoretician and executive of the Egyptian Revolution. There had been no party other than a secret group of officers in the army dedicated to overthrowing the monarchy.²

The new constitution presented on January 16, 1956 and ratified by referendum on June 23rd, asserted the people's sovereignty and the democratic character of the republic. It proclaimed a series of inviolable rights: the franchise and the right to criticize the Government. A National Assembly was to be freely elected. Although consultative in character it had, nevertheless, to approve Government bills and the budget. The Assembly could therefore oppose the Government nominated by the President. The latter was elected by the Assembly and the elections ratified by the nation. The President, however, had the power to dissolve the Assembly.³

Nasir dissolved the National Assembly in 1958 and governed without any means of consulting the people. In January of 1962 he reinstated the Assembly and condemned excessive executive power. The government (after the Constitutional Bill of September 27, 1962) consisted of a first

²Mansfield, op. cit., p. 195.

³P. J. Vatikiotis, Egypt Since the Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), pp. 102-103.

Vice President, three Vice Presidents (presently only two) and now a cabinet of thirty-two ministers.⁴ The President has the power to appoint the Vice Presidents and Ministers.⁵ Little space was left for political struggle. Today, the decision-making process at the very apex is, in all probability, similar to other regimes of this type and consists of a very small number of officers.⁶ The recent purge in May 1971 by President Sadat of a small group of officers supposedly sympathetic to the Soviets indicates that if there is disagreement at the top the President is presently strong enough to eliminate competition. The President derives his power from the constitution. "According to article 113, the President in collaboration with the Government lays down the general policy of the State in all political, economic and social and administrative fields and supervises its execution. He has the power to initiate, oppose, and promulgate laws. If he opposes a draft law...the Assembly by a two-thirds majority [can make] it...law. If the Assembly is not in session, the President can promulgate laws by decree, but they must be referred to the Assembly within fifteen days of the opening of its next session...the Assembly has the right to withdraw confidence from the Government or any one of its members."⁷

⁴"Developments of the Quarter", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Washington: Middle East Institute, Spring 1971), p. 243.

⁵Mansfield, op. cit., pp. 203-204.

⁶Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 101.

⁷Ibid.

Recently President Sadat formed a National Defense Council (N. D. C.) of eleven members with the Vice Presidents, Premier, Chief of Staff, and Chief of Intelligence as members. This council will have authority over all decisions and activities in the war with Israel.⁸ Similar to the U.S. National Security Council, this N.D.C. would broaden Presidential advice along more formal lines.

Precedents can be cited for one-man authoritarian rule in Egypt. Nasir dissolved the Assembly in 1958. The Constitution itself provides the President this power, and the President can rule by decree when the Assembly is not in session. Rule by decree is attenuated by the mandatory referral of decrees within the specified fifteen days of opening of the Assembly. Also, the Assembly by two-thirds majority can overcome the President's opposition. The most dangerous aspect of the Constitution is the authority of the President to dissolve the Assembly. If done, the President would rule alone and by decree as Nasir did in 1958, thus providing the penetrator opportunity to replace but one man to achieve the sole decision-making authority. The recent formation of the National Defense Council may broaden somewhat the decision-making on security affairs.

Vice Presidents have been designated. Although there are several, one has been designated as first Vice President, thus delineating succession. In fact the several other Vice Presidents provide for immediate

⁸"Developments of the Quarter", The Middle East Journal, loc. cit.

succession in the event that both the President and first Vice President are removed from office simultaneously. Should they both be removed at the same time, however, without the next first Vice President being designated, it is possible for the three remaining Vice Presidents (if all jobs are filled) to squabble over the right of succession. Therefore, a remote potential exists for replacement close to the top.

Constitutionally the Presidency is strong, particularly with the right to dissolve the Assembly. The President can initiate, oppose, and promulgate laws. Additionally, he has the right to arrest anyone in a state of emergency as specified in Law 119 of 1964.⁹ Little room is left for competitive groups at the apex. Hence, the Presidency is not weak, but conversely quite strong in relation to the other branches of government. It provides very limited opportunities for political penetration using the other competitive branches of the government. Should the penetrator's man assume the Presidency, a one man replacement would be all that is necessary to gain control due to the very strength of that office. The strength of the President was dramatically portrayed when Sadat imprisoned his Vice President and head of the A.S.U., Ali Sabr and up to 800 members of the A.S.U.,¹⁰ dismissing all but three of the original 150 in the central committee who voted against Sadat in the election.¹¹

⁹Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 350.

¹⁰The New York Times, May 18, 1971, p. 3, Col. 1.

¹¹Ibid., May 20, 1971, p. 11, Col. 1.

Capability Balance of the Political System

The internal "regulative", "extractive", "responsive" and "distributive"¹² characteristics of the system will be examined to determine if the government is primarily regulative and extractive which would provide a potential point for penetration by replacement. A new structure or process may be demanded by the people to replace what exists if the system is overly regulative and extractive due to the coercion and suppression necessary to maintain these two characteristics. A combination of the above five characteristics should show the inputs and outputs of the system. If the people must continually make inputs and receive few outputs, fertile ground for penetration exists by demands for replacing the system.

The regulative capability¹³ appears quite strong in Egypt with a civil service of over 300,000 well educated, and relatively technically trained personnel. The unpopularity of government programs on population control, agrarian reform and crop control,¹⁴ religious laws, and civil laws which are omnipresent and pervasive all point toward a highly regulative nature of government. Following the coup in 1952, the military temporarily allowed civilian rule but later took complete rule themselves in the form of a Revolutionary Command Council (R. C. C.).

¹²Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 195-212.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ayrout, op. cit., p. 52.

However, this takeover did not transform into a military dictatorship in Egypt. Here the military has tried to legitimize its rule by obtaining popular support. The suspension of civilian rule carries with it its own weaknesses. Although efficient and just it tends to be oppressive, and the military dominates the political scene and tends to perpetuate itself.¹⁵ Sadat, a soldier, followed Nasir who was also a soldier which indicates the tendency to keep the military in power. A crisis of legitimacy is always around the corner when popular support for the regime begins to wane or when the army's reputation falls.

Most dangerous of all seems to be the difficulty in persuading the military to delegate power to a wider circle of supporters. By its very nature, military training requires obedience and lack of responsibility [which] are the very [keystones] not of democracy--but of authoritarianism. Obedience discourages responsibility, creativity, and free expression of opinion and leads to submission and servility--qualities inconsistent with the ways of bringing up a new generation. As a result, the military's ultimate purpose of serving the people's interest--improving their morale and preparing them to govern themselves--is defeated by depriving the people of the opportunity to learn how to assume responsibility. Obedience and lack of responsibility are the very negation of the qualities requisite for democratic procedure, and the people may remain deprived of these qualities as long as they live under military rule.¹⁶

Theoretically, the A.S.U. is supposed to provide the conditions necessary for a democracy. However, in practice it has proved less useful in mobilizing popular support than in accepting new socialist principles

¹⁵Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 140.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 1-142.

declared by the military leaders.¹⁷ It is in fact a regulative agency rather than a responsive one; regulative in that it carries out the ideas and programs primarily determined at the top. Unless the A.S.U. becomes a two-way organization, responsiveness in the truest sense will be hampered.

The distributive capability appears to be on the increase, with the government actively shifting resources. Comparing national education expenditures as percentages of national income, Egypt ranks seventh highest of forty-three developing countries. She has had a four-fold student enrollment growth between 1955 and 1963. This four-fold increase of enrollment is compared to the other developing nations on a scale from one to thirteen increased enrollment.¹⁸ In total figures the education enrollment has more than doubled since the 1952 revolution, from less than two million students to over four million students¹⁹ in the period up to 1965. Now the enrollment approaches 100 percent.*

The land reform program shows the distributive character of the new government. From the Revolution to June 1966, 735,307 feddans**

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 145-146.

¹⁸United Nations, World Economic Survey (New York: United Nations, 1968), p. 76. See also Fahim I. Qubain, Education and Science in the Arab World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), for additional statistics on education.

¹⁹Mansfield, op. cit., p. 120.

*See Chapter III for a mention of the literacy levels.

**One feddan is approximately equal to an acre.

were distributed among 303,624 families, or approximately 1.5 million persons. Progress of the regime can be seen in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Distribution of Holdings According to Size²⁰

Size of holding (feddans)	1950				1956			
	Area		Holders		Area		Holders	
	X1,000 fedd.	%	X1,000	%	X1,000 fedd.	%	X1,000	%
Under 1	112	1.8	314.3	21.4	142	2.3	405.3	32.3
1 to under 5	1,311	21.4	572.5	57.1	1,427	22.9	619.8	49.4
5 to under 20	1,524	24.8	174.9	17.4	1,681	27.1	187.7	15.0
20 to under 50	792	12.9	26.5	2.6	707	12.8	28.7	2.3
50 to under 200	1,142	18.6	12.4	1.2	1,040	16.7	11.0	0.9
200 and over	1,263	20.5	2.4	0.3	1,125	18.2	1.9	0.1
Total	6,144	100.0	1,003.0	100.0	6,212	100.0	1,254.4	100.0

It can be noted that by 1956 nearly one-quarter million more families became land holders, and nearly all the large land holdings were redistributed. Multipurpose cooperative societies were established throughout the country. Land was taken from the few who had monopolized it and the fellah was provided his own private ownership in the socialist framework of greater social equality.²¹ This incorporation of socialist principles in nationalist programs may be regarded as a healthy approach to social reform without the need of adopting a fully communist or capitalist system.²² Since 1963, about 25 percent of the

²⁰Gabriel S. Saab, The Egyptian Agrarian Reform 1952-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 14.

²¹Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 71-72.

²²Khadduri, op. cit., p. 128.

members of the National Assembly have been elected from among the beneficiaries of land reform.

Distribution is further identified in the major sectors of employment and the level of net savings. Egypt with a population increase from 1947-1960 of 2.4 percent showed a total annual employment growth of 1.4 percent in the same period. Thus population is outgrowing employment at the rate of one percent per year.²³ The level of average net savings from 1963-1965 is relatively balanced in its distribution with five percent of the gross domestic product (G.D.P.) saved by the government; 4 percent saved by the corporate sector; and 4 percent saved by the individual household.²⁴ Thus the distribution of net savings offers little space for propaganda attacks on the distribution of net wealth, but the growing gap in employment provides opportunities to a penetrator to offer a better system to tackle that gap.

This indicates that the U.A.R. political system can be viewed at the present time as a highly distributive system oriented toward that three-quarters of the population who previously were denied any privileges. The pressure from the top is providing the impetus toward greater distribution. Until such time, however, that the government replaces determination from the top with consensus from the bottom, the regulative capabilities will overshadow the responsive. As the

²³United Nations, World Economic Survey, Ibid., p. 77.

²⁴Ibid., p. 81.

memory and inspiration of the revolution fade, however, it is possible that the distributive character of the regime, now very strong, might be channeled in the wrong directions due to the failure of responsiveness to new needs. Thus a potential for penetration by replacement does exist, but not at the present time, except in the growing rate of unemployment.

Channels for Interest Aggregation and Articulation

Interest aggregation and articulation are intertwined, as aggregation is a method of combining articulations. Hence, they will be discussed together in this section. Political organizations aggregate interest for an orderly articulation of interests which alleviate conflict as the interests ascend to the decision-maker. The news, mass demonstrations, and direct influence groups such as the army, bureaucracy or a single party structure impose powerful and direct demands upon decision-makers.²⁵ The reverse could also be true where the decision-maker may obtain a pliant tool in these groups for control by the regime.

The only political party now legal in Egypt is the Arab Socialist Union which is controlled by the President. There were about five million members in 1965. The Union's basic units are found in the towns, factories, work-shops, companies, government ministries, and business firms. These basic units elect a twenty man committee for two years. The committee elects two of its members to the district which in turn elects a council from which two elected members go to the governorate

²⁵Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 88-91.

level. Again a council is elected. Members go to the national echelon of the A.S.U. which has representatives of the army, police, women's groups and others. It is not assured that all the organizations are complete as above. It is required that half the seats on the elected bodies at all levels be filled with farmers and workers according to the National Charter, as they form the majority of the people who have been deprived the longest from shaping their future.²⁶ As previously mentioned, however, the A.S.U. is now mainly used to carry out the orders of the leadership. The structure is available, though to provide for some aggregation and articulation of interest. Since it is the only legitimate party in Egypt, and not unlike similar situations in other countries, "it is difficult for all groups to achieve adequate articulation."²⁷ "Demands... may be distorted and shaped by the interests of the dominant groups."²⁸ Herein lies a serious vulnerability. Almond and Powell cite the Mexican and Guinean political situations which failed to balance various group and sub-group interests. This led to internal conflicts. The conflicts lead to unrest which can serve as a springboard for replacement of institutions desired by the penetrator.

The National Assembly consists of 350 members representing 175 constituencies. Twenty-nine additional members are appointed by the

²⁶Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 199-201.

²⁷Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

²⁸Ibid., p. 90.

President. One of the two members of each constituency has to be a worker or a farmer over 30 years of age, able to read and write. A potential difficulty will be the demarcation of authority between the National Assembly, the various organs of the Arab Socialist Union, and other bodies in the state such as the nationalized industries and the trade-unions.²⁹ On the other hand, the requirement to fill one half the seats of the Assembly with fellahin or workers does provide a large voice for the majority of the population that had not been heard from before. Coupled with a similar set-up in the A.S.U. this reenforces and broadens considerably the channels of access to decision-making. This is a strength against penetration in that decision-making is diffused, and replacement would require a considerable effort on a broad scale.

The local level of government consists of 24 sections: five urban governorates, namely Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said, and Suez; four frontier districts: Red Sea, Sinai, Western Desert, and Southern Desert; and fifteen agricultural provinces. Six of these are spread over the Nile delta, and eight stretch along the Nile River. The head of each province is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. His authority is extended through a constable, who heads a police district of which three to twelve make up a province. There are several villages in each police district. The village chief is the only official in this chain who is elected by the fellahin, who look at him as the administration and

²⁹Mansfield, op. cit., pp. 206-207.

the repository of the laws.³⁰ Little opportunity exists for articulation by the people unless it meets with the interests of this chain of leadership. There is no requirement for this chain to answer to the people, but rather to please those above them who put them into office. If the people had the leverage of the vote, the higher officials would be more inclined to listen. For the general outlook of these officials and their staffs, a cross-section of the civil service would provide some insight.

Berger's study³¹ on the civil service brought out the weaknesses in general, namely that there were too many positions, improper classification, improvisation, corruption, and inefficiency. Perhaps the greatest insight relates to the 1,556 civil servant interviewees themselves, and their attitudes. Over three quarters were born in urban areas--precisely the converse of the population in general.³² Thus 88 percent had a B.A. degree or higher,³³ 83.9 percent came from families whose fathers were other than peasants, i. e. predominantly upper middle class groups. With this background, they would most likely take on the attitudes, beliefs and interests of their own social class and concentrate their efforts in support of the urban, educated, middle to upper class, not the fellahin or bulk of the population except when directed from above.

³⁰Ayrout, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

³¹Berger, op. cit., pp. 32-36.

³²Ibid., p. 42.

³³Ibid., p. 43.

Although there have been spontaneous mass demonstrations such as that for Nasir when he announced his resignation following the 1967 debacle, the present regime has instigated public demonstrations to exhibit solidarity of the people with the government. Mass demonstrations become forums for the leadership to announce policy and arouse mass support.³⁴ Control of these demonstrations can be relatively assured by the extensive repressive base discussed in the next section. The degree of spontaneous articulation in these demonstrations is questionable at best when the government organizes and controls the demonstrations.

Traditional influence is primarily articulated and aggregated by the thousand year old Al Azhar, the Islamic University. No blocs or parties have appeared as yet in the National Assembly to exert their full potential on the executive.³⁵ Intellectuals and elites have formed various groups such as the Arab Socialist Association, the Political Science Association, National Education Committee and the like. However, these were in the main presided over by government ministers in

³⁴American University, Area Handbook for the United Arab Republic (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 204. See also Enver M. Koury, The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), pp. 41-75, for a discussion of the relative ease with which the young Egyptians are manipulated and propagandized by the government and their psychological frame of mind. A penetrator would have to overcome the extensive and pervasive security apparatus prior to reaching the masses.

³⁵Khadduri, op. cit., p. 206.

their area of interest.³⁶ The mass media are presently under control of the government.³⁷ Therefore aggregation of interest appears to be directed strongly from the top.

The legitimacy of only one political party, the upward orientation of the civil service, and the pervasive control by the government of channels of access provide the grounds for dissatisfaction and potential demands for replacement of the channels. Conversely, the machinery is available for considerable aggregation and articulation of interests through the A.S.U. and the National Assembly. Further, these institutions provide a voice for the bulk of the population which had been previously denied. The direction of these institutions from the top shows the authoritarian nature of the regime which constricts the articulation and aggregation of interest from below. Yet, Robert E. Ward found that authoritarian forms of political organization can be extraordinarily effective for the marshalling of national resources in the early stages of the modernization process.³⁸ This dual situation of creating channels of access, but then using the channels primarily for the downward flow of interest, needs to be viewed in the context of reality. As a revolutionary government achieves greater power and legitimacy, it can provide for more channels

³⁶Abdel-Malek, op. cit., pp. 216-218.

³⁷Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 111.

³⁸Robert E. Ward, "Modernization and Culture in Japan" in Claude E. Welch, ed., Political Modernization (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), p. 98.

of access and lessen the restrictions on those interests that are opposed to it. If the lessening of restrictions keeps pace with the increasing strength of the Egyptian regime then this potential source for penetration by replacement will be negligible.

Repression Capability

In order to maintain a regime in the face of any illegal activity, the regime must have the means to repress dissidence. This means or force must be able to handle everything on a scale from illegal criticism to insurgent war. The size of the force would increase as the upper end of the scale, i. e., insurgency or revolution, is reached. The forces must also be reasonably well equipped and trained. We have seen that control over the media handles the lower end of the scale--that of criticism. For greater force, Copeland states that the Egyptian Army is the bulwark of the repressive base.³⁹

In Chapter I it was mentioned that the Soviet advisory force in Egypt has now grown to over 15,000 since the 1967 war. This powerful advisory effort has most assuredly improved the training of the Egyptian army over the last five years, and acquainted the troops with the many new items of equipment provided through Russian military aid. The total army strength is 250,000 organized into three armored, four mechanized, and four infantry divisions, fifteen artillery and two parachute

³⁹Copeland, op. cit., p. 100.

brigades, and eighteen commando battalions.⁴⁰ This force is equipped with just over 1,000 tanks ranging from light to heavy and 900 armored personnel carriers.⁴¹ The army is backed by a 14,000 man navy and 20,000 man air force, both well equipped.⁴² Additionally, a National Guard force of 90,000 troops is available.⁴³ Strong security police networks insure governmental control. Abdel-Malek has noted "the suffocating impact of the police apparatus."⁴⁴ With the Egyptian proclivity to patience and the lack of a pattern of uprisings in Egypt, it is doubtful that this sizeable repressive base would be necessary. But it has the means to physically control the population of Egypt. Strength rather than vulnerability is evidenced here.

Organizations Coinciding With the Threat

The A.S.U. as the single legitimate party and with its representatives from the various mass organizations--military, farmers, workers, police and the like--is a ready-made vehicle for the transformation into a communist party. The resemblance is striking, even to the basic units in the towns, factories, businesses and government ministries. The A.S.U.'s

⁴⁰The Military Balance 1970-71 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), pp. 45-46.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 350.

use today as a means of disseminating the leadership's policies also shows the capability of that organization to do what the communist party in the Soviet Union does. This coincidence is a potential vulnerability for direct replacement.

The Egyptian Communist Party had a total of 800-1,000 until April 25, 1965 when its members officially dissolved their organization and as individuals joined the A.S.U. They remain active from within the A.S.U. which maintains "fraternal" relations with Eastern European Communist Parties. Some Egyptian Communists gained positions in the regime-controlled press and since the 1967 war they have endorsed closer Egyptian relations with Moscow. Meanwhile, Communist front organizations such as the Cairo-based Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and the U.A.R. branch of the World Peace Council continue to attack the U.S. as an enemy and the Zionists as aggressors.⁴⁵ It appears that either the party has gone completely underground since the A.S.U. is the only legal party, or that its members have been assimilated. In either case a strong organization does not seem to be present in Egypt now.

⁴⁵World Strength of Communist Party Organizations, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research 22nd Annual Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 139.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Weaknesses of the U.A.R. are manifold: it is essentially agricultural in a world dominated by industrial societies; is behind in industrialization; manifests some gaps between classes and some traditional forces hindering modernization; shows authoritarian and pervasive control; has been defeated thrice in war; indicates a growing unemployment situation and has no competing active channels for popular expression of opinion. Additionally, some similarities with the threat ideology and organization was noted. Some evasion of social responsibility, and inefficiency in the civil service were detected. The executive was found to have excessive power and the political process is mainly regulative.

Yet the U.A.R. presently manifests greater strength. Although agriculture is the bulk of production and effort, the land reform programs have begun to introduce ownership to the fellahin which provides a strong psychological bond. The strong executive powers ensure the development path directed by the leadership. The acceptance and provision of Soviet economic assistance is paradoxical: It provides greater agricultural and industrial resources which will strengthen the nationalist impulse though the U.S.S.R. hopes for an eventual communist revolution. The defeats in war have brought about a stronger, better

trained army which is producing greater integration of the society. Little class conflict was noted with a growing identification of the bulk of the population with the regime due in part to greater distribution of the resources. This integration is partially closing the gap between the fellahin and the other classes and is culminating in an integrative revolution.⁴⁶ Traditions of Islam and the Arab heritage militate strongly against atheism and the principles of Marx. Even though education quality has suffered, millions more are receiving the benefit, and greater nationalistic socialization occurs. Finally, the authoritative lower middle class leadership has provided a reform vehicle of their own brand for Egypt to attain a socialist democracy through pragmatic "guidance," rather than adopting the communist model. Politically-- it appears that Soviet penetration by conversion and replacement is not likely to succeed at the present time.

⁴⁶Binder in Pye and Verba, op. cit., p. 446.

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EGYPT: POLITICALLY VULNERABLE?

by

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EGYPT: POLITICALLY VULNERABLE?

Under the "balance of terror" the emphasis has shifted to lesser means of influence among countries. One of these means is political penetration.

It was the purpose of this research report to systematically evaluate the political vulnerability or strength of Egypt. The assumption selected was that Egypt's present political system is vulnerable to potential political penetration by the U.S.S.R. Four functions of political penetration were identified: (1) ideological transformation, (2) personnel or group replacement, (3) leverage, and (4) deceit. The paper covers only the first two. The U.S.S.R. was used as an example of a penetrator.

Egypt showed some weaknesses: behind in industrialization; gaps between classes and traditional forces hindering modernization; few channels for interest aggregation; some coincidences with the threat ideology and organization; and authoritarian control.

The main strengths were identified as land reform and industrial development programs, with greater income and distribution of resources; increasing integrative and nationalistic socialization through broad educational endeavors; traditions of Islam and Arabism that transcend communism; and the authoritarian nature of the regime which has made it possible for the leaders to guide the country toward a socialist democracy.

Although various weaknesses were found in the Egyptian polity, greater overall strength was manifested. U.S.S.R. assistance was determined to be a paradox, strengthening the nationalist feeling in Egypt while the U.S.S.R. hopes for an eventual communist revolution.