

NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE

2115-5374R

by

DAVID ALAN RENSCH

B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University, 1972

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree


MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1974

Approved by:



Major Professor

LD
2668
T4
1974
R45
C.2
Document

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
LIST OF TABLES	iv
INTRODUCTION	1
THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW	8
Definitions	
Rights and Obligations in	
International Law	
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Austria	
NEUTRALITY, STRATEGY AND MILITARY SECURITY	37
Detente and Northern Europe	
Detente and Switzerland - Austria	
NEUTRALITY AND RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS	65
Swiss Relations with the U.N.	
Swiss Participation in U.N. Activities	
Austrian, Finnish and Swedish Relations	
with the U.N.	
U.N. Disarmament Issues	
U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations	
Monetary Contributions	
International Crisis Situations in	
the U.N.	
NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION.	100
Finland	
Austria	
Switzerland	
Sweden	
Free Trade Agreements	
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	133
FOOTNOTES.	139
BIBLIOGRAPHY	147

ILLEGIBLE

**THE FOLLOWING
DOCUMENT (S) IS
ILLEGIBLE DUE
TO THE
PRINTING ON
THE ORIGINAL
BEING CUT OFF**

ILLEGIBLE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. T. Alden Williams for his professional guidance throughout this study, and to Dr. H. P. Secher and the instructional staff of the Political Science Department for their contributions to my education.

I am indebted to the staff of Farrell Library for their cooperative response to every request for assistance; to Mrs. Bonnie Thompson for her help in preparing the final copies of this thesis; and to my parents, whose faith in me and whose financial support have sustained my efforts every step of the way.

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table	
1. EEC/EFTA PERCENT OF TOTAL FINNISH TRADE, 1958-60	103
2. FINNISH TRADE WITH EAST AND WEST EUROPE, 1968-1973	105
3. AUSTRIAN TRADE WITH EAST AND WEST EUROPE, 1968-1973	114
4. SWISS TRADE WITH EAST AND WEST EUROPE, 1968-1973	121
5. SWEDISH TRADE WITH EAST AND WEST EUROPE, 1968-1973	126
6. THE FOUR NEUTRALS' TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1968-1973	127

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

State neutrality, long a position of aloof separation from international politics, re-emerged after the second World War with more clearly positive functions. In a world setting of collective security, economic cooperation, and strategic military interests, neutrality has come to play an active and important role in world politics and European stability.

From 1815 to 1914 there existed a congenial setting for the practice of state neutrality. During this time the option of neutrality was a clear-cut one which was normally respected by belligerents. It was a legal status with its own rights and obligations. One of the major causes of this situation was the wide spread balance of power which existed throughout this period. In 1879 Germany and Austria joined to form the Dual Alliance, which emerged into the Triple Alliance with the inclusion of Italy in 1882, and France was allied with Russia from 1894 onward. Great Britain, although not committed to any alliance, formed ententes in 1904 and 1907 with France and Russia respectively. Thus, the situation was one in which "the politics...were free from the rigid bloc structure which had developed by 1914. Today's ally might be tomorrow's enemy, and vice versa. The wars were limited; there were always at least two major powers on the sidelines. Thus a small neutral could be guaranteed by a great neutral, as Belgium was by

Britain in the Franco-Prussian war."¹

Since 1914, however, neutrality has been confronted with two world wars and the expansion of international political organizations. Collective and dependent interstate relationships are in the ascendancy. Both sides disregarded rights of neutrals during the two world wars, and the orientation of the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization toward collective security tended to project neutrality as incompatible with the structure of international politics. In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson told Congress that neutrality was failing as a viable foreign policy for the United States and other neutral countries, especially Belgium and Norway:

When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable.²

Following the first World War the establishment of the League of Nations, with its intent on collective security, suggested that individuality in foreign policies was not suitable for maintaining a world order, and in this respect neutrality was no longer looked upon as a desirable concept in international politics. Roderick Ogley notes,

As enthusiasm for world organization gained ground, neutrality began to be thought of as a betrayal of the common interest; neutrals were seen as indifferent to the mortal dangers in which others were placed, too timid to fight for the cause of world order, heedless of latent threats to themselves, and perhaps as prospering unjustly by selling the sinews of war to the belligerents.³

The same feeling prevailed in San Francisco in 1945, and there still is a lively political and legal debate as to whether neutrality is indeed compatible with membership in the United Nations as neutral members claim. In 1956, at the height of the creation of new and independent states, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles attacked the whole concept of neutrality:

...but because veto power makes United Nations action undependable, many nations have made with each other treaties which embody the principle of the Monroe Doctrine. Within the last 10 years the United States, always acting in a bipartisan manner, has made such treaties with 42 countries of America, Europe, and Asia.

These treaties abolish, as between the parties, the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception. The free world today is stronger, and peace is more secure, because so many free nations courageously recognize the now demonstrated fact that their own peace and safety would be endangered by assault on freedom elsewhere.⁴

From about the middle 1960's, however, East-West detente enhanced the feasibility and the positive functions of neutrality for at least the four European neutrals: Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Europe was past the Adenauer era and Hallstein doctrine in Germany and survived the first NATO review in 1969. The Vienna Summit had been held in June, 1961, and the limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in August, 1963. In the atmosphere of detente which has prevailed over the past fifteen years, neutrality has been able to establish itself as a progressive aspect of international politics, and if neutral states

are still looked on with indignation and scorn by some, they at least have become an accepted and, likely, a permanent aspect of world politics.

The world is fast approaching a multipolar or "polycentric" political arrangement whereby the established restraints and the existing status quo of the bipolar, bloc system will no longer operate. The rather stable, although uncomfortable, configuration of the free world and NATO balanced by world Communism and the Warsaw Pact no longer exists as it did in the 1950's. Europe is emerging as a power to itself, industrial countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan are exercising ever more autonomy in world affairs, and Third World countries are discovering new areas of wealth and power which all countries, big and small, must reckon with. Even the implications of nuclear weapons have changed. The "nuclear ceiling" promotes non-nuclear means of conflict resolution, including neutralization in many forms. The superpowers have cooperated on the neutralization of space, the sea bed, and Antarctica. The Latin American countries have used the concept of neutrality to establish the area as a de facto neutral zone in international politics, and the Rapacki Plan in Europe was an attempt to maintain military neutrality in central Europe.

What exists in the 1970's, whether one calls it a balance of power or a balance of terror, deters the expansion of armed hostilities throughout the world, and especially in Europe where the two superpowers come face to face. Neutrals benefit just as much as aligned countries, making membership in

alliances questionable. Roderick Ogley notes in this respect that

When two powers dominate the world, in military terms, to the extent to which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. do today, allies matter much less. No accretion of allies will enable one of these two powers to force the other to surrender. The choice, for the foreseeable future, is not between co-existence and victory for one side, but between co-existence and catastrophe. Neutrals, as mediators, have an important⁵ role to play in averting that catastrophe.

The neutrals' role as mediators emerges directly from their strategic importance to the security interests of both super-powers. The European neutral countries--Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland--compose two geographic corridors which form one important aspect of the status quo in Europe. This status quo supports East-West detente, and how these neutral countries have attempted to maintain continuity in their foreign policies bears directly on the stability of the status quo and therefore detente.

A definition of neutral policies relating to the political conditions of Europe and the interests of the superpowers can best be achieved by looking at the military and security aspects of the neutral countries, their international political behavior, and their international economic behavior, although neutrality is not necessarily limited to these areas. Within these areas the neutrals have had to maintain the credibility of their neutral status against external pressures of both systemic and theoretical origin. The East-West division of Europe and the

broader political and ideological division among the super-powers has put pressure on neutrality by limiting the areas of feasible action by the neutral countries in their efforts at presenting neutrality as a viable foreign policy. This pressure is no doubt reinforced by increased mass communication and the close involvement it encourages in world affairs. Another pressure on neutrality arises from the question of neutrality's relevance in a nuclear war. Neutrality prior to World War II was a concept related to war, and that view has carried over into the post 1945 era. With the total destructiveness of nuclear weapons and their possession, as well as possession of a credible defence against nuclear weapons, limited to a few nation states, neutrality no longer appears as a viable foreign policy. Yet, neutrality becomes more relevant and credible as deterrence becomes more stable and war less likely. Therefore, neutrality is not a policy which has been put on the level of preparing for war. To the contrary, neutral countries have attempted to acquire relevance and credibility through positive contributions in world affairs which will help to strengthen East-West detente. Detente and neutrality are interdependent factors of European stability, each reinforcing the other.

This study looks in depth at neutrality in Europe. The European continent has seen national aspirations and divergencies lead to two world wars, the Cold War begin, and attempts to transcend nationalism occupy so much time and effort. In this setting the European neutrals have striven for a lessening of

tensions and greater cohesion in Europe, but as a result have been faced with European cooperation and integration which does not lend itself to full neutral participation. Although each of the four European neutrals has its own form of neutrality and its own international setting, they are now faced with the task of conducting their foreign policies to support detente while, at the same time, establishing their neutral credibility in a world with alliances, political and economic organizations, and conflicting ideologies. How this is done, as well as whether or not it will remain possible in the future, has direct implications for the future stability of Europe.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The way other countries view neutrality as a concept of diplomatic posture and as a policy for one particular country affects the choices neutral countries make as well as the success which any one neutral country might experience in achieving its foreign policy goals. The views which non-neutral countries form of neutrality emanate largely from the established practices of international law, and international law emerges as a consequence of the interaction among nations and intellects over the years. Consequently, any concept and associated practices in world affairs which appear contrary to international law and the past processes of international interaction are often viewed as incompatible with the ongoing process of world affairs.

Neutrality as a concept belongs to the era of classic international law which dominated world affairs until World War I and lingered as a prominent concept until World War II. Following the second World War, however, the practice of collective security became an important factor of international affairs, and as such constituted the beginning of a new era of international law. Neutrality appears anomalous in current international law since it is a concept which defies the requirements of a system of collective security. Yet, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland still deem a policy of

neutrality to be in their best interests. The manner in which they present their neutral policies in international affairs is important to the credibility of their neutral status, and only by grasping the essentials of the relationships between neutrality and international law can the international position of these neutral countries be understood.

DEFINITIONS

Much diversity and ambiguity surrounds the meaning and understanding of the concept of neutrality. One country might refer to itself as following a policy of neutrality while another country refers to itself as belonging to the non-aligned group of nations. Thrown in here and there is the term, neutralism, which some countries use as analogous to nonalignment and which other countries give a slightly additional meaning to. Added to this is neutralization in all its various forms, plus self-neutralization which is sometimes the same as neutrality. Complicating the matter still further is the wide assortment of qualifying additions to the basic terms in attempts by countries to define their policies more explicitly, the results being such terms as "constructive neutrality", "positive neutralism", "active neutrality," and "active formal neutralism" to mention just a few.⁶ The consequences of this wide variety of definitions are obvious: no standard, acceptable definition can be used by foreign countries attempting to understand and deal with the foreign policies of those countries which interact in the international sphere according to neutral guidelines. Nevertheless, there

does seem to be a prevailing consensus which has served as the definitional foundation for this study. In order to discuss countries which claim neutrality as their international position it is necessary to have a single definition from which to precede, but it should be kept in mind that the lack of uniformity of terms is widespread.

As generally used, concepts of neutrality fall into three basic categories -- neutrality, nonalignment or neutralism, and neutralization. In most cases, nonalignment and neutralism are used interchangeably, although there may be exceptions, and nonalignment is the term most often used of the two. A policy of nonalignment implies the absence of any alliance with either East or West in the context of the Cold War. Such countries refrain from participating in military pacts and dissociate themselves from the struggle for influence between the Communist powers on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the other. Nonaligned countries are nonaligned only with respect to this East-West antagonism, and are free to follow any diplomatic action they choose regarding Cold War contestants. A state can also be involved in a local hot war while remaining neutral in the Cold War.⁷

Neutralism is sometimes an extension of a policy of nonalignment. It "involves a further commitment to participate in cold war issues, to play leading roles in neutralist conferences, to offer advice to the great powers, especially the West, to exert influence, diplomatic, psychological, and

especially moral, and to display... 'a positive attitude toward bloc conflicts'." ⁸ In this sense neutralism is being reserved as a term to be applied to the countries of Africa and Asia, which form a neutralist movement exclusive of Europe. But the general practice is for the two terms, nonalignment and neutralism, to be used interchangeably, and countries with such policies are said to have an international orientation which is neutralist.

Neutrality means non-involvement in war. It is similar to nonalignment in that it describes the orientation of a country in reference to a conflict between other states. But in contrast to nonalignment, neutrality is generally taken to include the restraint from entering into disputes involving the power blocs. Also in contrast to nonalignment, neutrality is a legal concept whose status is recognized in international law. In some instances neutrality is defined as no more than non-participation in ongoing wars, and as such is a term which applies only in time of war. Defined in this manner, a paradox is said to inhere in neutrality during peacetime. But it must be remembered that countries in the past have desired to remain outside of conflicts and have found it impossible to do so. If success in this respect is to be achieved, a country must establish in time of peace an international posture which will better enable it to maintain an outside role in time of war. Therefore, neutrality generally involves refraining from entering into big power disputes, and, like non-alignment, neutrality is a policy of non-involvement in alliances.

Neutralization refers to the process whereby a country's "political independence and territorial integrity are guaranteed permanently by a collective agreement of great powers, subject to the conditions that the neutralized state will not take up arms against another state, except to defend itself, and will not assume treaty obligations which may compromise its neutralized status."⁹ Neutralization, like neutrality, is recognized by international law, and is often referred to as permanent neutrality to signify that it is valid both in times of peace and in times of war. Post-World War II examples are Austria, neutralized in 1955, and Laos in 1962. The arrangements and commitments imposed by neutralization vary from case to case, but "the distinctive characteristic of a neutralized state is that it is not neutral by choice (though it may be perfectly content with its status) and does not have the legal right to abandon its neutrality when it wishes."¹⁰

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Theoretically, neutrality as a legal concept could be said to have thrived until the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco in 1945. Up until this time, even during the years of the League of Nations, war as a means of achieving a country's ends was internationally justified, although the prerequisites for being legally engaged in war differed from time to time. Within this international framework neutrality functioned as an acknowledged and acceptable policy for individual countries to follow. It is now widely

believed, however, that the fundamental principle of neutrality has been eliminated by the provisions put forth in the United Nations Charter which, on paper if not in practice, require nonbelligerents to discriminate against aggressors, labeled as such by the United Nations, and in favor of the victims of aggression. Yet, the present norms which govern neutrality are still largely the product of the events and experience of the nineteenth century. They refer to a period when law was designed to localize and minimize the destructiveness of war, rather than to outlaw it entirely. "Belligerents were allowed to take extraordinary measures in order to wage war successfully,..."¹¹ although they were restricted from interfering with the activities of neutral states beyond those actions legally granted to them in cases of conflict. And with the existence of powerful neutrals in the nineteenth century, usually at least two of which were outside any given conflict, the norms of war and neutrality were given constant support. Thus, Morton Kaplan and Nicholas Katzenbach point out that "the law of neutrality of the nineteenth century reflects the 'balance of power' system and the basic premise of flexibility of alignment. It assures the interaction of a minimum of great states that have relatively equal strength and are able to assert and defend their neutral rights by the threat of participation. This system permitted and encouraged non-participation as a function of 'balancing'."¹² This "threat of participation", at the same time of defending the rights of neutrals, also served to limit the action of belligerents.

This situation changed as the twentieth century progressed. During this stage of international interaction, Kaplan and Katzenbach state that "decentralization of the international decision-making process, the fact that states put their own security and self-interest ahead of the preservation of less-important community norms, and the difficulty of appraising facts and circumstances made the system ineffective."¹³ The emphasis placed on "security and self-interest" had led previously to the emergence of national doctrines which had made it difficult for states to judge the merit of conflicts, and thus encourage them to remain neutral. During both World Wars, however, the rights of neutrals were all but obliterated, and the pressure to make a judgment as to merit was not overcome in most cases. The balance of power was upset from the very outset of the second World War, and although the balance remained, for the most part, through the first World War, the position of neutral countries was precarious since all the major powers capable of defending neutrality were eventually involved in the war. During both World Wars the United States prolonged its neutrality until it remained as the sole important neutral. The U.S. never retained its neutrality indefinitely, however, and when the country entered each war, there was no state capable of asserting the rights of neutrals.

In addition to the situations resulting from the wars themselves, the events following the wars also had a significant impact on neutrality. No longer could neutrals be satisfied with remaining outside of military conflict, for the peace

arrangements following the conflicts had come to have just as much effect on their countries as the conflicts themselves. Previously, according to Kaplan and Katzenbach, the rules of neutrality of the "balance of power" period rested upon the premise that the neutral states had no real stake in the outcome; that is, they rested upon the assumption that the war would not produce a predominant coalition and that fixed alignments would not persist as conditions changed.¹⁴ Both World Wars drastically changed this outlook. Yet, perhaps the single most important factor which helped to insure the deterioration of classical neutrality was the United Nations Charter. But in order to discuss this factor, the written foundations of neutrality prior to the establishment of the United Nations Organization need to be reviewed.

The Hague Conventions

The first real attempt at defining the rights and obligations of neutrals came in the Hague Conventions of 1907. These Conventions were for the expressed purpose of defining the legality of war in all its variants, and neutrality, as a related topic, is referred to as a war time policy and not as a continuous foreign policy. Yet, these Conventions served as the basis from which countries later based their continuous policies of neutrality on. Most significant of these Conventions was Convention (V) Respecting The Rights And Duties of Neutral Powers And Persons In Case of War On Land, signed at the Hague, October 18, 1907.¹⁵ Article 1 of this Convention states simply:

"The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable." Neutrality had been a respected concept throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but never had any legal justification been available to neutral states -- it had never been necessary. With the beginning of the twentieth century and the changing conditions in Europe, a need was felt for legal restraints on war, and neutrality, having been somewhat institutionalized over two centuries, was included in the discussions on war as a natural course of events.

The fifth Convention went on to explain the position of neutral countries with regard to belligerents. Two further articles are of particular interest: Article 2 which prohibits belligerents from moving troops or supplies of any kind across the territory of a neutral country, and Article 10 which gives neutral Powers the right to resist aggression by force. The stipulations of Article 20, however, held that the provisions of the Convention applied only to disputes where all the belligerents were parties to the Convention. Of the twenty-six countries which attended the Conventions, fourteen European countries ratified the fifth Convention:

Austria-Hungary	Luxembourg	Russia
Belgium	Netherlands	Spain
Denmark	Norway	Sweden
France	Portugal	Switzerland
Germany	Rumania	

The United States also ratified the Convention, and four European countries signed but failed to ratify -- Great Britain, Greece, Italy, and Turkey. Finland at this time was not an independent country. This list includes all of Europe except

for a few small Baltic states,¹⁶ and thus rendered Article 20, except for the four countries who signed but did not ratify, of no consequence as far as European neutrals were concerned.

The 1907 Hague Conventions also included Convention (XIII) Concerning The Rights And Duties Of Neutral Powers In Naval War.¹⁷ The basic provisions of this Convention are to the effect that belligerents are to respect the sovereignty of ports and territorial waters of neutral countries, except for Article 10 which allows belligerents the right to pass through the territorial waters of neutral countries. This Convention was signed by all the aforementioned countries except for Spain and the United States. The U.S. announced its adhesion to the Convention, but did not sign, and again Great Britain, Greece, Italy, and Turkey signed but failed to ratify.

Thus, as early as 1907 most of the countries of Europe, as well as the two countries which were later to lead two rival blocs, had joined in displaying their concurrence with the idea of neutrality as a legal and inviolable concept in the conduct of interactions between nations. The effort and precedent have proved significant, but the results of the first World War cast a dubious shadow over the results achieved in 1907. The status of neutrality was never again to reach the level of acceptance it had obtained in the Hague Conventions, as the League of Nations took the lead in what was to be a continuous shift to a new approach to the interaction of nations.

The League of Nations

The League of Nations Covenant was the first step toward

making war illegal. War was not entirely outlawed, however, and "the plain meaning of the Covenant was that in most cases, when a war occurred, League members had a duty not to stay on the sidelines, but to join in upholding whoever was in the right -- an almost complete reversal of the position under the Hague Conventions."¹⁸ This meaning was clearly spelled out in Articles 8, 10, and 16 of the Covenant.¹⁹ Article 10 states the strongest provision in opposition to the tenets of neutrality.

The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Thus, as is stated in Article 8, the Covenant holds members to "common action" which, under Article 16, could include the severance of all relations with Covenant-breaking states, including financial, verbal, and commercial contacts. Within this context neutrality was far from free to function as the requirements for a truly neutral state demand.

In addition, Article 20 added another limitation to the adherence to the behavior of neutrality. It prohibited member countries from entering into any "obligations or understandings" which were "inconsistent" with the provisions of the Covenant, and held members responsible for terminating all such foreign arrangements which had been agreed to prior to membership in the League. Under these circumstances, even though neutrality did persist, it was not acknowledged and encouraged as an acceptable policy for member countries to adopt.

With the failure of the United States to join the League, however, neutrality could not be said to be obsolete. Furthermore, Richard Swift, in his treatise on current and classic international law, notes that "under the League of Nations Covenant, war was not actually illegal. States Members of the League could resort to war legally once they had exhausted the League's mediation machinery and waited a specified three months after an arbitral or judicial decision."²⁰ In this set of circumstances, less pressure was put on neutral countries in the way of collective security. And with the failure which occurred in regard to League sanctions against Italy following that country's attack on Ethiopia, neutrality experienced a reemergence. Added to the failure of the League as a cause of this reemergence was the fact that the Spanish Civil War, the Anschluss by which Austria was incorporated into Germany, and Munich were events not even brought before the League and no effort was made by countries not concerned to protect the victims of these events. As a result, in 1936 Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and Norway declared in Geneva that for the future they denounced the obligation to participate in sanctions, and thus returned to full neutrality.

The League of Nations, therefore, was a significant legal venture in several ways. Perhaps most important is the fact that the League Covenant introduced the idea of collective security which was to play a continuing role in the United Nations. From the signing of the Covenant up to the present, neutral countries have had to deal with this totally new approach

to international interaction, one which is not conducive to the growth of neutrality. Also of importance is the fact that the League paved the way for the United Nations. The basic idea of collective security is present in the U.N., and there is no doubt that the almost universal agreement with respect to collective security (although this agreement has never been fully tested) has all but invalidated the philosophy of the Hague Conventions. Yet, the failure of the League had the effect of boosting the determination of neutral countries to maintain efforts at a neutral policy in international affairs. By 1945, neutral countries were reluctant to again place their neutrality aside and put the security of their country in the hands of an international organization. The final draft of the United Nations Charter seems to have taken cognizance of this fact.

The United Nations

The low ebb of the international outlook on neutrality following the second World War has already been mentioned. And it was noted that the United States, especially in the person of John Foster Dulles, was perhaps the most outspoken country in regard to the inappropriateness of neutrality in world affairs. Yet, it was not the United States which was responsible for the push against neutrality at San Francisco in 1945. It was France who introduced the inclusion of the incompatibility of neutrality into the Charter of the United Nations. The amendment proposed by France to carry out this view involved an addition to the article on membership, reading as follows:

'Participation in the organization implies obligations which are incompatible with the status of neutrality.'²¹ By the time this proposal emerged from 'Sub-Committee A' of 'Committee I/1' the result was what is now Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Charter which reads:

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

Apparently the subcommittee which reviewed the proposal was in agreement with the French, but was not willing to state the matter as directly as the French desired. In this regard, Jean-Flavien Lalive, a Swiss lawyer, wrote in 1947 that "...the amendment as drafted was somewhat vague" which "...explains the interpretation, given by some writers, to the effect that the non-adoption of the French amendment was probably due to the fact that the Charter in several cases admitted of neutrality."²²

Article 43, paragraph 1²³ holds members responsible for making available to the Security Council "armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security," which leaves no room for neutral actions. Yet, in paragraph 3 of the same article, agreements for assistance with member countries are to be made by "the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members...." Similarly, paragraph 1 of Article 48 states that "...action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be

taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine." It is thus possible for neutral countries to maintain their neutrality, provided the Security Council allows them to remain free from U.N. duties which run contrary to neutral practice. At present there seems to be an understanding between neutral countries and the Security Council that this is to be the case. Yet, should the Security Council ever use its full authority in designating aggressors in conflicts and in calling for "mutual assistance" from U.N. members, neutrality would be unquestionably restricted.

The fact is, however, that the Security Council has never taken the liberty afforded it in the Charter, although opportunities presented themselves in Korea, the Middle East, and the Congo. Troops were placed in Korea on the basis of provisions in the U.N. Charter, but "the United States Government acted as the United Nations Command and only in a limited sense were the troops under U.N. direction."²⁴ The forces which were placed in the Middle East, Gaza Strip, area were a product of UNEF, but were only an "observers corps" and functioned with the consent of both Egypt and Israel.

United Nations actions in the Congo came closest to those envisioned when the Charter was drafted. As Oscar Schacter noted in his article on "Legal Issues at the United Nations," "For the first time, the Council asserted Article 49 of Chapter VII, which is couched in obligatory language. It also referred, although not for the first time, to the application of Article

25, which stipulated that Council decisions must be carried out."²⁵ But this was as far as the Security Council went in binding member countries to the provisions of the Charter. It was the view of the Secretary-General that U.N. action was being undertaken in the Congo in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter which "in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation [threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression]," gives the Council the right to "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable." Yet no mention was made to Articles 41 and 42 which give the Security Council the power to call upon members to apply various economic, communication, diplomatic, and military sanctions in an effort to achieve or maintain world order. As a result, although the U.N. did supply military force in the Congo, it did not apply the force in connection with the sanctions provided for in the Charter. It was the general view in the U.N. that the Congo situation did not warrant sanctions against any particular government, but simply an attempt to maintain peace and stability according to the provisions of Article 40.

Thus, neutral countries have never had to appeal to the loopholes in Articles 43 and 48 in order to maintain their neutral status. Nevertheless, the conclusion cannot be that neutral states are free to reap the benefits of U.N. membership while maintaining virtual aloofness. Neutrality may be able to survive U.N. membership, "but nonparticipation would seem to run unequivocally contrary to Charter obligations."²⁶ Only one situation might pass as an exception. Neutralized states

such as Austria, and perhaps Switzerland if she chose to join the U.N., could perhaps make a case to the effect that their admission to U.N. membership was an acceptance of their neutrality.

Regardless of the supposed incompatibility of neutrality with U.N. membership, it is somewhat significant that the United States, foremost of the Western bloc countries, seems to, at least symbolically, respect neutrality among U.N. members. Both the army and navy manuals clearly note the continued existence of neutral states within the United Nations. Section 232 of the United States naval manual, Law of Naval Warfare includes these sentences:

In sum,...although members [U.N.] may discriminate against an aggressor, even in the absence of any action on the part of the Security Council, they do not have the duty to do so. In these circumstances neutrality and complete impartiality both remain distinct possibilities.²⁷

Similarly, the United States Department of the Army Field Manual, entitled the Law of Land Warfare, states the following in section 513:

...Although these provisions of the Charter (articles 39-42) have not made it impossible for a State to remain neutral, the obligations which the Charter imposes have to a certain extent qualified the rights of States in this respect. For example, if a state is called upon, under Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter, to take military action against an aggressor, that State loses its right to remain neutral but actually loses its neutrality only to the extent that it complies with the direction of the Security Council.

A military commander in the field is obliged to respect the neutrality of third

States which are not allied with the United States in the conduct of hostilities and are not violating their duty of neutrality toward this country, except to the extent that the State concerned has expressly qualified its neutrality.²⁸

Much confusion and ambiguity still surrounds the status of neutrality in the modern structure of world politics. And Kaplan and Katzenbach doubt whether the "loose bipolar system can sustain a definite body of international law governing the rights and obligations of neutrals that applies to all armed conflicts, regardless of how they originate or regardless of who participates in them."²⁹ Neutral countries today may not be so concerned with reconciling their neutral status with any moral obligation with respect to international conflicts, but within the collective security context of the United Nations an attempt at such a reconciliation is necessary if for no other reason than to maintain a certain degree of continuity in the country's neutral practices.

SWITZERLAND

Switzerland is best classified with the term neutrality, although occasionally it is termed a neutralized state. The latter term is not totally incorrectly applied here, but Switzerland was not neutralized in the general sense of the term, and is not generally referred to as a neutralized state. It is a self-neutralized state whose neutrality has been recognized in international law. This recognition came in the Act of Paris, November 20, 1815:

...the Powers who signed the Declaration of Vienna of the 20th March declare, by this present Act, their formal and authentic

Acknowledgment of the perpetual Neutrality of Switzerland; and they Guarantee to that country the Integrity and Inviolability of its Territory....³⁰

The initiative for this action came not from the guaranteeing Powers, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, but from Switzerland itself.

In addition to any definitions given above, Switzerland is designated as a traditional neutral. Switzerland bases its neutrality on "principle and tradition", and since the nineteenth century has maintained this neutrality free from military alliances and Cold War alignment. In order to retain its neutral credibility which has been built up over more than 140 years, Switzerland can almost assuredly be trusted to remain outside of any conflicts, excluding of course an attack on the country itself.

Swiss neutrality has been recognized by the great powers at the Congress of Vienna and again in the Versailles Treaty. Its three basic tenets are: the renunciation of military intervention in foreign wars; a refusal to make alliances with foreign states; and the belief that neutrality is essentially a means for maintaining the independence of a small state that has long since renounced any territorial enlargement.³¹ However, Swiss neutrality is an armed neutrality and the country will make all attempts to defend its neutrality and its territorial integrity. The Swiss realize that successful maintenance of their neutrality depends on the confidence of other countries and therefore must be reliable and trustworthy. Accordingly, in international controversies Switzerland endeavours to adopt a reserved attitude and to preserve an impartial and

objective judgment.³² It has been said of Switzerland that they are "outside the truth; neutral on paper, never neutral in practice, aware that it should be either truly neutral or truly the contrary, but unable to take up a position", or that it is "hard to credit what illusions the Swiss generally harbour about the role they have to play in Europe."³³ These statements may be true, but Switzerland's peculiar situation rather justifies the country's behavior. The Swiss national economy depends to a great extent on international trade, and the country thus has no alternative but to accomodate itself to the world as it happens to be. Switzerland's relations are universal which requires a foreign policy with an international, universal orientation, open in all directions. Such a policy has not always been easy, however, as in regard to the EEC. To maintain its neutrality the Swiss stayed outside the Common Market even though its principal European trading partners, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, were members. Until recently, Switzerland has had to remain content with participation in EFTA.

Regardless of its chosen foreign policy, Switzerland is a part of Europe and that is a fact it can never escape. Yet the country's geographical position necessitates a cautious approach to European involvement. What makes this position so vulnerable is the East-West division of Europe. The Swiss believe that the existence of nuclear weapons makes it impossible for either superpower to attempt aggressively to change the European structure, thus leaving the status quo as the likely situation

for the future. Furthermore, the Swiss do not place great faith in the feasibility of a United States of Europe and are not anxious to break their neutrality by joining in the European Community which will not in the future be able to fend for Switzerland's independence. As a result, Switzerland is unwilling to cede any essential powers of legislation and economic policy to a supra-national group. This does not mean, however, that the Swiss have not made great efforts, and achieved considerable success, at integration into the European and international economy short of official membership in supra-national organizations. Also, Switzerland does not allow her neutrality to impede the country's efforts at international collaboration. A policy of neutrality can allow considerable freedom in this regard, and Switzerland belonged to the League of Nations, takes part in the International Court of Justice in the Hague, and is a member of a number of specialized U.N. agencies. In addition, the Swiss have increasingly involved themselves in diplomatic concerns around the world. Switzerland, however, alone of all the countries which had the possibility of joining the U.N., did not do so because this would have been against her concept of the country's neutral status. Nor is Switzerland in the Council of Europe. Abstention from these organizations follows from Switzerland's long practice of caution in international affairs. The Swiss feel that such caution has been beneficial since it allowed them to be one of only five countries which preserved their neutrality throughout World War II, and consequently the Swiss feel that perhaps they

are on the right course and should continue in the same direction.

SWEDEN

Sweden, also a traditional neutral, has a history of neutrality since 1815, although the Swedes did not declare neutrality until August, 1914. Even though Sweden's policy is most often referred to as one of neutrality, nonalignment is a more fitting term and the one the Swedes themselves prefer. Sweden has made no attempt to camouflage the fact that the country is Western oriented and that no "ideological neutrality" exists. The Swedish parliament has said that "a usual misconception is...that a neutrality programme means a duty to 'spiritual neutrality'....Neutrality as a political concept and as a concept of international law does not mean that a nation desists from the right of its citizens to participate in debates on international questions or to speak up on behalf of democracy and liberty."³⁴ Also, there are no grounds for asserting that Sweden's neutral status forces the country to a policy of aversion with respect to participation in internationally organized cooperation. Sweden was a member of the League of Nations, and is currently in the Council of Europe, the European Free Trade Association, and the United Nations Organization. As a member of the Council of Europe the Swiss protested the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and as a member of the United Nations they have consistently condemned the United States for its policies in Southeast Asia. Thus the Swedes' attitude toward a neutral status, as summarized by Donald Hancock, is that of an "independent stand

on world events that adds credence to its neutrality and expresses the hope that 'the language of power' will become less strident."³⁵ Nonetheless, Sweden is seen by many as a de facto member of the Western Cold War bloc.

According to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Swedish policy is simply that of remaining out of alliances, and from time to time adopting "a passive, occasionally mediatory, attitude toward questions relating to the 'cold war' between East and West."³⁶ Unlike the positions of Finland and Austria, as will be seen, Sweden's neutral status is not enforced or guaranteed by international treaties. Its status is similar to that of Switzerland in that the policies of both countries are sustained by national tradition. The two differ, however, in that Sweden has never proclaimed permanent neutrality and its neutral status is not a constitutional principle. Neither is it recognized officially by foreign powers. Finally, like the other European neutrals, Swedish nonalignment is an armed nonalignment and the country has invested heavily in defense throughout the twentieth century.

FINLAND

Finland's policy of neutrality has been termed as that of an "equidistant neutral" in contrast to Sweden and Austria which are termed "Western-oriented neutral".³⁷ This is obviously associated with Finland's geographical position between NATO countries and the Soviet Union, which encourages the country to stay out of alliances and, according to Max

Jakobson, a noted Swedish statesman, to maintain a "determination to stay outside the conflicts and controversies between the Big Powers, not only in time of war but also in time of peace."³⁸ Finland's policy has been that her "independence depends on maintaining good relations with the U.S.S.R., by keeping outside the conflicts between the great powers and by avoiding suspicion in any quarter."³⁹

In the 1930's, when faith in the League of Nations had turned to disillusion, the search for security became the leading theme of Finnish foreign policy. The security which the Finns sought, they felt could only be founded in a sincere policy of neutrality. Such an approach to foreign policy has continually been dependent on one major factor--relations with the Soviet Union. And within this context, the touchstone of Finland's neutrality is her attitude to the German question. In Finnish-Soviet exchanges, Soviet concern over Germany has not only been expressed with remarkable consistency over a period of more than thirty years, but time and again has also been translated into action. Consequently, the two occasions on which Finnish-Soviet relations have become strained, in 1958 and in 1961, have coincided with international crises over Berlin. In an attempt to avoid damaging the credibility of Finnish neutrality in Soviet eyes, Finland has refrained from recognizing either the Federal Republic of Germany or the German Democratic Republic. This stand is totally in line with Finland's neutrality.

A unique feature of Finland's neutrality is the Treaty

of Mutual and Economic Assistance which the Finns signed with the Soviet Union beginning in 1947. This treaty does not detract from the credibility of Finnish neutrality since it does not commit Finland to anything beyond the defence of her own territory, an act which all neutral countries proclaim as their right, and duty. By the commitment to defend her own territory Finland is assuring the Soviet Union that no aggressor will be allowed to attack Russia through Finland. Looked at in this light, the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of 1948 serves to make Finnish neutrality credible in Soviet eyes. This fact is sometimes overlooked, and it is often wondered how a country who adheres to a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union can claim neutrality. Jakobson notes, however, that the "Finnish concept of neutrality, like the Swiss or the Austrian for that matter, is the result, and part, of a historical process, rather than the product of abstract thought; it is designed to meet the realities of power, rather than the precepts of international law."⁴⁰

Finland's neutrality has caused her to remain outside the European Community even though the majority of Finnish trade is with European countries. Finland is, however, although far from adequate for Finnish needs, associated with the European Free Trade Association and is in the Nordic Council. And Finland is taking an increasingly active role in international conciliatory actions. The hosting of the SALT negotiations and the Conference on European Security and

Cooperation are two recent examples. Summed up by Peter Lyon in Neutralism, "Clearly, Finland is neither a Soviet satellite nor wholly dependent on Western support but genuinely non-aligned, even though there is no doubt that all major foreign policy moves must secure at least tacit Soviet approval."⁴¹

AUSTRIA

Austria is a neutralized state as a result of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. The neutrality resulting from this treaty is an armed neutrality, however, and Austria has had no limits set for the size of its army. Following a switch in Soviet policy, which had previously been against Austrian neutralization, Austria "agreed to make a declaration 'in a form imposing upon Austria an international obligation, that Austria will maintain permanent neutrality of the same type as that maintained by Switzerland'; agreed to delivery of goods to the U.S.S.R. in payment of the value of the Soviet enterprises in Austria to be transferred in accordance with the Austrian State Treaty; agreed that Austria should pay (one million tons of crude oil annually for ten years) for the transfer of oil properties belonging to the U.S.S.R. in Austria, and in United States dollars for the transfer of the assets of the Soviet-held Danube Shipping Company in eastern Austria; and, agreed that the two countries should conclude trade, barter and payments agreements to last, in the first

instance, for five years."⁴² One month later, in May, 1955, the four powers which had occupied Austria since 1945 (France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union) signed the Austrian State Treaty. It should be noted, however, in reference to the comparison between Switzerland and Austria, that Austria's neutrality is not along the same lines as that practiced by the Swiss. Switzerland's neutralization was a chosen course, and as a result, that country suffers no constitutional or international limitation on the kind of armaments it can possess, while Austria is restricted from acquiring guided missiles or nuclear weapons.

On November 5, 1955 the Austrian government put into force the Constitutional Law of Neutrality which contained the following statement:

For the purpose of the lasting maintenance of her independence externally, and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria declares of her own free will her perpetual neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend this with all means at her disposal. For the securing of this purpose in all future times Austria will not join any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on her territory.⁴³

Austria's neutrality may have been an imposed posture, but it certainly was not one which was unacceptable to them. Considering the country's geographical and historical situation, neutralization was the safest course of action, as was attested to in 1959 by the then Austrian Foreign Minister, Bruno Kreisky.

To venture out into the open without having sought shelter with one of the blocs seemed fraught with grave consequences. Whatever the merit of this argument, it had the flaw of pre-supposing a choice between neutrality and the status quo. At no time could we choose between neutrality and alignment with a bloc. And in fact what did the status quo amount to? Was it not itself a form of passive neutralization--neutralization by occupation? Under the circumstances, what alternative was open to a nation which longed to be master once again of its own destiny?⁴⁴

Neutralized Austria is recognized as such by the United States, but the U.S. is not a guarantor of Austrian neutrality. The United States "recognizes" the neutrality of Austria, which, defined, means the U.S. will "...refrain from taking those actions with regard to the other state which might violate the accepted concepts of a neutral state in the international community,"⁴⁵ and nothing more. In regard to the Soviet Union, however, Khrushchev made a statement in Vienna on July 8, 1960 stating that the Soviet Union would not allow Austrian neutrality to be freely violated, and, in the event of aggression against Austrian territory, would make a decision on what course of action to follow as the events of the time dictate. In response, the Austrian Cabinet reminded the Soviet Union that "Austria's rights...in carrying out its sovereignty, which remains unrestricted, include determining for itself and itself alone when and how its neutrality might be threatened or violated and in the event of a possible threat or violation to decide in what way the threat or violation should be countered."⁴⁶

Since neutralization was the price of independence for Austria, it entailed a much greater limitation in the policy alternatives open to the state than a neutral status under different circumstances. Nonetheless, Austria is a member of the United Nations Organization, the Council of Europe, and the European Free Trade Association. Austria has also openly demonstrated its affinities with the West. The country never loses sight, however, of the fact that they must maintain diplomatic neutrality between East and West in order to assure Austria's international position.


These straightforward, textbook definitions are helpful in distinguishing the basic differences between the neutral orientations of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, but they do not give sufficient clues to these neutral countries' behavior and to the types of behavior they are likely to exhibit in the future. In the 1970's it is not enough to analyze neutral policies simply in light of their historical and legal aspects because these aspects are not sufficient to explain the substance and directions of current neutral policies. Present day neutrality must operate within the structure of detente which has emerged between the superpowers in relation to their confrontation on the European continent, and within this context the neutral countries must be examined in order to understand their position and importance to the stability of Europe.

CHAPTER 3

NEUTRALITY, STRATEGY, AND
MILITARY SECURITY

Movement toward detente in Europe has grown much stronger during recent years, and has found expression, for instance, in the Federal Republic of Germany's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, the treaty between the two German states, the negotiations on force reductions between the two military alliances in Europe, and the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. The European neutrals cannot avoid involvement in considerations of East-West detente in Europe, simply because all are European countries. These countries' neutral policies, however, have a more significant effect on European detente, since these policies have come to form a part of the existing structure of detente. As a result, the whole scope of the neutrals' political and economic activities reflect on these countries' policies toward the superpowers.

Of central importance in the relationship of the concept of neutrality to the concept of detente is the existence of a status quo which functions as an intervening variable. The model shown below represents the basic relationship of the essential variables involved.



The reverse order of the model also holds implications. In either direction, an alteration in one variable will disturb the succeeding variable(s). If the orientation of any one or all of the European neutral countries were to change, the status quo would also change. Since European detente depends on the present status quo, this detente would be seriously threatened, and consequently so must the stability of Europe be threatened. The four European neutral countries must exhibit a status quo reinforcing behavior so that the basis for detente will not dissolve. Detente, however, is not static. Its characteristics vary as world events evolve and fade, and neutral countries must constantly adapt to every new situation as it presents itself.

A maintenance of the status quo in Europe depends on the maintenance by each individual country of the existing national security policy. This would hold true especially for the neutral countries of Europe whose geographical positions give them added significance in European and international policies. Even in peacetime the credibility of neutrality depends in part on the capability of a neutral country to guarantee its neutrality in times of international tension and conflict. Neither of the alliance systems, then, should attempt to persuade countries, especially neutrals, to change the fundamental direction of their national security policies which have produced a status quo suitable enough to allow the present cooperation between the superpowers, nor should any European country attempt to exploit the situation with the possible

effect of upsetting the stability which the status quo represents.

National security policies, however, do not only include military arrangements, but political doctrines and economic relations as well. For neutral countries, these political and economic aspects of foreign policy form the most relevant aspects of their neutrality as far as third countries are concerned, and are thus of considerable importance for these countries whose security policy has the task of maintaining the reliability and credibility of neutrality as a foreign policy.

The remainder of this chapter will deal with the strategic and military aspects of neutrality in Northern Europe and in Western Europe that have developed with respect to the geographical position of Sweden and Finland in the North and Switzerland and Austria in the West of the European continent. The main purpose will be to show the position of these countries within the European structure, both as a result of historical circumstance and as a result of individually chosen directions, and the importance of these positions to European stability.

DETENTE AND NORTHERN EUROPE

Any study of Sweden and Finland in relation to the more general scope of Europe must include Denmark and Norway. These four countries have steered their foreign policies with such delicate concern for the interests of all Scandinavia that there now exists a "Nordic balance" which binds the entire region with almost inseparable cohesive arrangements. Any one

country deciding to alter its foreign policy orientation could drastically effect the stability of the entire region as well as upset the relative calm which presently exists between the superpowers in regard to Northern Europe. The Nordic balance derives importance from the reduced involvement of the superpowers in Northern Europe, and from the lack of incentives for superpower initiatives which could lead to tensions in the area.

The directions pursued by Sweden and Finland differ substantially concerning European and Scandinavian defence matters. Despite the differences, both countries are alike in the fact that both are pursuing a course designed to maintain their position as neutral countries and to assure the superpowers that no actions will be undertaken which could threaten their interests in Northern Europe or in Europe as a whole. The main external factor has been, and is likely to be in the future, the Soviet Union, since she appears to have more at stake in Northern Europe than the United States, which rests somewhat easier having Norway and Denmark in NATO and not being geographically situated next to Europe. Neither Sweden nor Finland has ever indicated any desire to bind themselves to the East, and now, with the achievement of at least partial detente, it is imperative that they not bind themselves to the West.

Northern Europe is an example of reduced tensions and partial disengagement with respect to the superpowers. Certainly, some of the reasons for this can be attributed to historical circumstances rather than the fruits of specific Nordic policies, for throughout the post World War II period

superpower interest in the area has been primarily military rather than political and ideological, which has resulted in Soviet and U.S. restraint in the Nordic region.⁴⁷ As a consequence, a situation exists in which both superpowers are relatively satisfied with their defensive posture in the Nordic region. Both powers have been able to exercise restraints without forfeiting any strategic concerns.

In this situation, the role of the Nordic countries has been to make sure that these U.S. and Soviet policies of restraint were not relaxed or abandoned. Maintaining the Nordic balance has been crucial. According to Erik Moberg, research associate at the Research Institute of Swedish National Defence, the Nordic balance concept has three operational factors.⁴⁸ First, is the absence of foreign military bases in Norway and Denmark, called the Norwegian and Danish base policy, later supplemented by reservations on stationing of atomic arms. Second, is the recognized Swedish policy, made credible by a substantial defence effort, of freedom from alliances, complemented by, third, the special Soviet restraints in dealing with Finland, allowing her to pursue a policy of "neutrality and friendly relations with the Soviet Union."

Both Sweden and Finland have taken active parts in efforts at maintaining the Nordic balance, most notably in the area of denuclearization. In 1961 Sweden expanded on previous Polish proposals (Rapacki Plan) for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, by proposing a "club" of countries not having nuclear weapons at their disposal. This proposal was put forward by

Swedish Foreign Minister Osten Unden, and implied the application of the Polish Plan on a universal scale. Two years later Finnish President Urho Kekkonen put forth his own plan which was much more specific for the Nordic countries. The Kekkonen Plan proposed the legal establishment of a denuclearized zone in Northern Europe. In the Finnish President's view,

...the Scandinavian states already in fact form a nuclear-free zone. This, however, depends at present merely on unilateral declarations on their part. The act of confirming the present state of affairs through mutual undertaking in the manner envisaged in the Unden plan would not require a change in the policies adopted by the Scandinavian states nor impair their security. It would not affect the present balance of power in the world; thus it could not damage the interests of any outside powers. But I am convinced that the Scandinavian states, by declaring themselves a nuclear-free zone, would significantly consolidate their own position. This would remove them unequivocally from the sphere of speculation caused by the development of nuclear strategy, and ensure that this area will remain outside international tension.⁴⁹

To date, no formal action has been taken on either the Unden or Kekkonen plans. Finland and Sweden, however, have made additional proposals to increase Nordic solidarity and security. One interesting proposal which has been put forward in Finland in an attempt to stabilize the Nordic region's position in the East-West conflict, and therefore ease some of the tensions in the superpower struggle, has also received some recognition in the United States. It calls for Norway to leave NATO and join a bilateral assistance pact with Great Britain

and/or the United States along the same lines as the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of 1948. Aimo Pajunen, author of this proposal and lieutenant and teacher at the Finnish Defence College, sums up the advantages as follows:

Such a pact would safeguard the Western Powers' vital strategic interests in Norway. At the same time Norway would have the opportunity of receiving military assistance if the country were subjected to an external attack. The risk of war would diminish moreover, because the automatic system built into military alliances would no longer be applicable to Norway. Norway would achieve a neutral status, which for many could seem more appealing than an alliance which includes countries such as Greece and West Germany.⁵⁰

Pajunen also states that with Norway out of NATO, the Soviet fleet would no longer feel itself threatened on the flank by way of Norway's Arctic Ocean.

Another proposal calls for Denmark and Norway to withdraw from NATO and conduct their foreign policies as neutrals. This proposal has gained more support in the Soviet Union than in Scandinavia.

Still another proposal suggests a separate Nordic defence alliance whereby Norway would be disengaged from NATO and Finland from the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of 1948. Denmark would not join the alliance, but would also leave NATO. In this approach it was assumed that both the United States and the Soviet Union would find it in their interests to be able to reduce the confrontation of the superpower blocs in the Nordic region.

The Soviet Union appears to have no intention of giving up what it has already won in Northern Europe, especially in

the form of trading the Friendship Treaty with Finland for Norwegian withdrawal from NATO. Nor, is the Soviet Union willing to approve of any neutral Scandinavian defence pact. The Soviets do not take the view that such a pact would be beneficial by decreasing Western influence in the north of Europe and making more likely an effective Soviet control of the strategic variables--the exists of the Baltic and the Norwegian Sea. Such a defence pact would be a strong attraction to Finland, and should that country join with her neighbors, in a move which could be considered nonaggressive and neutral, any retaliatory actions by the Soviet Union might cause the other Scandinavian countries to view the Soviets in less favorable light, a situation which could drive these countries closer to the West. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would have no guarantee that a Scandinavian defence pact would remain neutral. It could conceivably work to bring Sweden into the Atlantic Alliance by the "Danish-Norwegian backdoor." All indications are that Sweden would never submit to this, but Russia will take no chances. The Soviets continue to want isolated neutral states in Northern Europe, and will maintain policies directed toward this end. According to Johan Holst of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Soviet policies vis-a-vis the Nordic area have been conceived primarily in the context of system preservation. Thus, the Soviet Union has pursued a policy of no experiments and accepts the status quo as tolerable. The preferred Soviet model is that of a neutralist and fragmented Nordic system.⁵¹

As long as the status quo in Northern Europe remains

unchanged, Soviet aggression in this part of Europe would be unlikely unless connected with events unrelated to the political situation in the area. Egil Ulstein, Norwegian diplomat with The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notes that "Soviet strategic interest in the Nordic area is more likely to reflect the possibilities of conflict in Central Europe, the super-power confrontation, developments in weapons technology, and the defensive rather than offensive requirements of the Soviet Union."⁵² This last area of strategic interest is especially relevant to present trends in Northern Europe. The Soviet Arctic Fleet has nuclear-powered submarines, carrying SS-N-5 and SS-N-6 missiles (of at least 700 and 1,500 miles range respectively), due by 1975 to comprise a fleet of 35 to 50 submarines capable of carrying from 560 to 800 missiles.⁵³ These missiles, together with additional or replacement SLBMs with ranges above 3,000 miles, would allow the Soviet Union to push its deterrent forward--a likely move in view of the decreasing emphasis on static land-based missile systems--in which case the Nordic area may find itself behind a major element of the Soviet deterrent.

First analysis of this strategic development seems to suggest a favorable trend for the strategic and neutral concerns of the Nordic neutrals. However, the development of multiple independently targetable vehicles (MIRV), by rendering the earliest possible interception even more desirable, may increase the importance of the Nordic area for the forward defence of both superpowers. The Nordic area also holds strategic interest

for American naval and air (from Thule in Greenland and Keflavik in Iceland) activity. Soviet and American interest in the North for warning and surveillance possibilities could cause conflicts between the two superpowers. Under these competing circumstances, the importance to Sweden and Finland of continued and increased detente is evident, and these two neutral countries have an active role to play in maintaining the status quo which underlies the current detente.

Finland: Finland has been greatly restrained in the past from freely taking initiatives in world affairs due to the country's political relations with the Soviet Union. There is some indication, however, that Finland is moving toward greater participation in European affairs. A hint of movement in this direction was given in a speech by President Kekkonen in Vaasa, Finland in 1967:

We Finns must manage our own foreign policy in such a way as to remove tension from Europe with lasting effect. We know that our influence on the course of events is small, but inactivity cannot be justified.⁵⁴

There is no doubt that the Finnish Government would like to participate as much as possible in any attempts to increase the possibilities of European detente, since improved East-West relations would help Finland's neutral status. One visible result of this intensified approach has been the Finnish hosting in Helsinki of the SALT negotiations and the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.

It is only logical that Finland should opt for influencing the European powers, since the prospects for achieving success

with these smaller powers are brighter than with the Soviet Union. The hopes of the Finnish Government are to receive responses to proposals for concrete measures to relieve tension in Europe, especially safeguards which will prevent the European powers from taking various military measures which they might consider defensive, but which may be perceived as threatening by the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union feels the political situation in Europe is a threat to their security interests, Finland is immediately affected. Finland is the Soviet Union's front door to Europe, and Russia will not rely on Finland's own sentry efforts in the case of a perceived threat from Europe. Finland's interest is to prevent a development of events in Europe which might cause the Soviet Union to feel uneasy.

Such a vital interest in Europe, however, does not extend to the extent of cooperation in European defence matters. Any such actions would surely force the Soviet Union to take countermeasures. Russia is acutely sensitive to its situation in Northern Europe. The Nordic region is the only area on her western border which is not buffered by a satellite country. A small portion of Norway, a NATO member, already shares a common border line with the USSR, and the Soviet Government is not likely to allow Finland to extend this line. Thus, Finland is not a member of NATO, and the Finns take no initiatives for collective security. To the contrary, Finland's interest has been in discouraging other European countries from participating in any form of European defence cooperation.

Due to the breakup of the Nordic region between NATO countries and neutrals, Finland was able to join the Nordic Council in 1955, the only security organization to which Finland belongs. Rather than defence, however, the Nordic Council was formed to bring about some cohesion in the divisive security pattern brought on the Nordic region by the Cold War. With NATO on its doorstep, the Soviet Union had no objections to Nordic unity once it was satisfied that the Nordic Council was not aimed at an expansion of NATO influence in the Nordic region.

Taking this discussion of defence one step further, it can also be said that Finland does not take a favorable attitude toward military preparations in Europe, and especially in the Nordic region. This stand refers mainly to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Finland maintains that small states, which would include all of the Nordic states and most of Western Europe, are in no position to challenge the capabilities of the superpowers, and that military measures of any kind provoke rather than deter. The Finns fear that military preparations will thus cause great concern on the part of the superpowers, especially the Soviet Union whose central objective is to see to it that Finland's territory is not under any circumstances used by foreign powers as a base of operations against Russia. Especially in the case of nuclear weapons in other Nordic countries, Finland's credibility in assuring its eastern neighbor of its secure neutral position would be seriously decreased. Under the 1947 peace treaty signed in Paris, Finland was restricted to an army of 34,400 men, a navy of

4,500 men and a total tonnage of 10,000, and an air force of 3,000 men and 60 combat planes. Finland has managed since 1962 to procure defensive anti-tank missiles,⁵⁵ but the 1947 treaty banned nuclear weapons. These provisions, along with radar stations for air and coastal surveillance, provide the bulk of Finland's defence apparatus, hardly an arsenal capable of allowing the country to project credible neutrality against a militarily prepared Europe. If Finland were to lose the credibility of her neutrality, the status quo in Europe could begin to crumble. The Soviet Union would tighten its grip on Finland, and this could invoke a reaction on the part of the other Scandinavian countries, possibly for closer defence cooperation. Actions of this type would damage the stability of the Nordic region which currently serves as the most receptive area for East-West detente.

Sweden: Sweden's attempts at contributing to the maintenance of the balanced state of affairs in Northern Europe have been guided by her position directly in the midst of Norway and Denmark, NATO members, to the West, and Finland, who combines with her policy of neutrality a special relationship with the Soviet Union, to the East. Sweden occupies an important political and strategic position between these two extremes, and any abandonment of the Swedish policy of neutrality would inevitably have increased tension throughout Northern Europe. Should Sweden begin to strengthen her ties with the West, especially in the area of defence arrangements, then the Soviet Union would likely attempt to strengthen her defences, including

infringing on Finland's political integrity by way of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet Treaty. Under such circumstances the existing status quo would no longer be in existence to facilitate European stability.

As long as the situation remains in the present stable position, Swedish territory does not seem to be of great strategic importance. Nevertheless, the country occupies an exposed position between the Arctic area and the Baltic Sea outlets which has caused the Swedes to work for a further reduction of tension in the Nordic region, specifically in the area of nuclear weapons. The arms race between East and West has prompted Sweden to take various diplomatic initiatives in the field of disarmament. The maintenance of the status quo in Europe depends on the absence of disruptive tensions and conflicts between East and West. An increase in armaments by the superpowers will likely lead to suspicions and a lack of trust by both. Increased cooperation between the superpowers increases the prospects for neutrality. Since 1962, when the 18-nation disarmament conference in Geneva was established, Sweden has been a member of that conference, now called the Conference of the Committee for Disarmament. The main task of this body has been to negotiate agreements intended to limit and, ultimately, put an end to the development, procurement, and stockpiling of nuclear arms, and chemical and biological weapons.

Mainly in collaboration with the other non-aligned members of that body, Sweden has continuously put forward concrete

suggestions, aimed at breaking the frequent deadlocks between the major powers in these matters. After a treaty was signed in Moscow in 1963 prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, Sweden proceeded to work for agreement on more comprehensive arms control measure. Agreeing in principle to a draft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation submitted in 1967 by the United States and the Soviet Union, Swedish Ambassador Alva Myrdal submitted a series of amendments with the intent of strengthening the document. Specifically she moved that the major powers permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to supervise their peaceful uses of atomic energy and that the transfers of fissionable material not subject to international safeguards relating to peaceful uses be banned between states.⁵⁶

At the same time the country is helping negotiate control of nuclear weapons, Sweden is also continuing to pour millions of dollars into national military defence. Only Great Britain and West Germany among the West European states spend more annually, in absolute figures, on military defence than does Sweden. Appropriations for the 1972/73 fiscal year were estimated at Skr 7,100 million (approximately \$1,480 million).⁵⁷ At present Sweden maintains an army which numbers more than 600,000 men in wartime, reinforced by almost 100,000 volunteers of the Home Guard. In addition to being well equipped and heavily armored, the Army is in possession of Hawk surface-to-air missiles. The composition of the Navy includes 8 destroyers, 22 submarines, 33 torpedo boats, and 40 minesweepers, while the Air Force comprises about 40 squadrons, mostly all-weather

fighter and attack units. The Air Force also has Bloodhound 2 surface-to-air missiles.⁵⁸ These armaments present quite a contrast to those of Finland. Finland's neutrality, however, is essentially guaranteed by the Soviet Union by way of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of 1948, and the country is therefore in less of a need for strong defence capabilities. Sweden on the other hand must maintain exceptional military credibility to prevent infringements on her territorial integrity, due to the country's vital position in the overall Nordic balance. Since Swedish military production and procurement is not restricted by the 1947 treaty of Paris, the Swedish government has taken advantage of the possibilities of arming Sweden like a "hedgehog."

Public opinion in Sweden has not backed this armament policy one-hundred percent. A contrasting view was put forth in Sweden as early as 1948 and still shows signs of receiving support today. A widely read Swedish newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, introduced the idea of a "gap-defence."⁵⁹ This policy calls for a considerable reduction in defence expenditure by way of deliberately allowing gaps to exist in Sweden's defence arrangements. The reasoning behind such a policy is that it was felt the superpowers, or one of them, would supply the necessary support in the event of an attack on Sweden. Furthermore, it was felt that no efforts at preparing Sweden militarily would be sufficient to resist an attack from major military powers, particularly the Soviet Union. Although not directly stated as such, the Soviet Union was viewed as the most likely aggressor

of the two superpowers due to its position as a European state.

The "gap defence" policy, although never gaining much ground in Sweden in recent years, remains as a respectable proposal, and one considered to be within a consistent neutral policy. Due to the importance of Sweden to the Nordic balance, it is highly unlikely that either of the superpowers would initiate aggressive action against her. Any act of aggression would surely not go unopposed. Furthermore, the superpowers have everything to gain by maintaining the Nordic balance as it presently stands. Sweden, however, still harbors memories of her successful actions at maintaining neutrality throughout two world wars, partly the result of circumstances, but also partly the result of the ability to make credible counterthreats against belligerents.

In attempts to relieve some of the pressure regarding defence matters, Sweden has willingly participated over the years in negotiations on a Scandinavian defence pact. These negotiations have proved far from fruitful since the joining in NATO of Norway and Denmark. Sweden insists that the members of a defence pact should have no alliance memberships or commitments, and that the pact should be entirely independent from bloc affiliation. In contrast, the Norwegians insist that a Scandinavian defence pact would be too weak to maintain itself without military assistance from the West. Hope for such a pact now seems to be out of reach in view of Sweden's staunch neutral stand. It is debatable in the first place, however, whether or not a Scandinavian defence pact would enhance Nordic

stability, and the Soviet Union presumably does not regret the failure of Nordic agreement on defence arrangements.

Sweden's participation in the United Nations will be dealt with in the following chapter, but it is of interest here to note that, unlike Finland, Sweden is a leading advocate of collective security. Sweden endorsed the U.N. operations in South Korea in 1950, supported the Security Council resolution urging the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary in 1956, and contributed volunteer soldiers and economic assistance to U.N. programs in the Middle East in 1956, the Congo in 1960, and Cyprus in 1963.

DETENTE AND SWITZERLAND - AUSTRIA

The neutral zone comprising Switzerland and Austria lies in an environment quite different from that surrounding the Scandinavian neutrals. Aside from the de facto East-West "balance" in Europe, no cooperation intended to support a power balance exists; Austria and Switzerland are in the midst of countries which are not operating under the same concerns. This neutral zone is completely landlocked, bordered on the East by Czechoslovakia and Hungary, both Soviet satellites, and Yugoslavia which is closely guarded by the Soviet Union, and on the West by West Germany, France, and Italy, all Western democracies.

For the Soviet Union, the significance of the Austrian-Swiss neutral zone may lie in the hopes of an extension to France which has already withdrawn militarily from NATO. In 1955 when the negotiations for the Austria State Treaty were

being held, the immediate objective of the Soviet Union was to use the Austrian example to woo those in Italy and West Germany who for ideological or practical reasons were hesitant about NATO. This objective was evident in articles and editorials put forth in Moscow at the time. The New Times of Moscow attacked Italy while Pravda chastized West Germany in two isolated statements:

The proponents of [Italy's] 'Atlantic' policy realize only too well what a defeat they sustained with the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. The fact is that Italy's northern neighbor by adopting a status of perpetual neutrality conclusively exposes the false argument that participation in pro-American blocs is the only possible course open to Italy.⁶⁰

It is no accident that people in Western Germany are beginning to ponder this example more and more. There the following question is being asked more and more often: If little Austria with its 7,000,000 inhabitants not only did not lose its independence but on the contrary strengthened it, why must the German Federal Republic reject such a policy? Why must it contribute vast sums to the arms race and restrict its sovereignty for the benefit of the military bloc of the Western powers?⁶¹

Ultimately, the Soviet Union perhaps envisioned a wall of neutral states running from Sweden and Finland in the north through West Germany, Austria, and Switzerland to the center, and continuing to Italy and Yugoslavia in the south. The advantage to the Soviet Union of such a corridor would have been enormous, particularly for strategic considerations, in pushing the West's military forces back from the Warsaw Pact frontier.

It appears as though the United States has much less interest in a neutral zone on the European continent. The U.S.

has always recognized Swiss neutrality, but has never officially acknowledged it, and the neutralization of Austria was undertaken as a suitable compromise considering the Soviet Union's firm intentions to remain in Eastern Europe. This is not to say, though, that the U.S. is not willing to accept the present situation. The combination of Swiss-Austrian neutrality results in a military vacuum in the center of Europe which aids America's containment policies. The Brezhnev Doctrine is a clear sign of Soviet intent to retain control over East Europe, and the U.S. would certainly not welcome Communist penetration westward by way of Austria and Switzerland. The Soviet Union feels, however, that the Czech-Hungarian border is a more defensible line, and desires only to see to it that the Western alliance is not extended to the Alpine region. Thus, the Swiss-Austrian neutral zone serves purpose for both East and West, forming a status quo which both neutral countries must work to maintain.

Austria: According to Article 13 of the Austrian State Treaty on "Prohibition of Special Weapons," Austria may possess no atomic weapons, no guided missiles, no submarines (perhaps of little consequence), and is subject to numerous restrictions with respect to conventional weapons.⁶² These arrangements can only be altered by agreement between the Security Council of the United Nations and Austria. Perhaps, much like Finland, however, Austria does not need a large defence capability, since her neutrality is guaranteed by the signators of the Austrian State Treaty--the Soviet Union, France, Britain, and the United

States. Furthermore, a defensive buildup would greatly alarm the Soviets who have had to use force on two occasions since the second World War concerning two of Austria's neighbors. Russia is committed to the defence of Austrian neutrality, not only as a condition of the Austrian State Treaty, but also with respect to the Soviet Union's own concerns in the area. If the Soviets felt Austrian neutrality was threatened, either by external aggression or by Austria's own actions, such as a threatening military buildup, they would likely consider countermeasures. In such a case, however, diplomatic measures would probably suffice.

While a large defence force is perhaps an unnecessary and unwise policy for Austria, the security of a neutral state, even a neutralized state such as herself, depends on a credible military backing. The country is certainly in no position to offer such backing, and as a result has followed a similar approach to that taken by Finland in foreign policy. Dr. Rudolf Kirchschlager, Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, notes that Austria, like Finland, has appealed to outside powers for cooperation. Yet, unlike Finland, which appealed to the other Scandinavian countries specifically and Europe in general, Austria approached the United Nations, and, unlike Finland, which worked for a reduction in European military preparations, Austria called for an increase in military arrangements in the form of collective security in Europe. This course of action is not to imply that Austria favors a militarily prepared Europe, a situation which would

be as much in conflict with Austria's interests as it would be to Finland's. Austria has in mind a system of collective security based on the United Nations Charter to be applied on a smaller scale within Europe.⁶³ This system would best be achieved, the Austrians feel, through the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, although a more suitable approach for the Austrians would be to incorporate a system of collective European security in an international treaty obligatory upon all nations who participate in the conference. Kirchschrager has stated that "such a treaty would be of inestimable importance especially for a country like Austria because, as a state which has proclaimed its permanent neutrality, it cannot shelter behind the shield of the two major military alliances."⁶⁴

Austria is unlikely to abandon her neutrality in the future, since she is bound to it by international treaty arrangements, and since both the wellbeing of Austria and the strategic interests of the superpowers require the maintenance of Austrian neutral status. Also unlikely would be the event of aggression initiated toward Austria in light of the pledged maintenance of Austrian status by four major powers. Nevertheless, Austria has a role to play in maintaining the stability of Europe, and only sincere and consistent policies on the part of Austria will suffice to allow the country to serve as a stabilizing factor in the European status quo which the existing detente depends on.

Switzerland: Austria's standing in a European collective security

system would perhaps be enhanced if Switzerland were also a member. With both neutrals working for collective security, both could more easily maintain the claim that their individual neutrality had not been compromised. Switzerland, however, is not a likely candidate for such collective participation. Unlike Austria, Sweden, and Finland, Switzerland is not a member of the United Nations, for the major reason that it was felt the collective security participation required of all members adhering to the Charter was contrary to neutrality. Apparently for the same reasons Switzerland refrains from the same sort of obligation in Europe. Switzerland, however, is currently undergoing a re-evaluation of its relationship with the U.N. which could possibly produce a new orientation in Swiss foreign policy.

Since the Swiss attitude has been to go it alone, great attention has been focused on national defence. Currently, Switzerland's expenditures on its armed forces represent 24.7 percent of the total expenditure of both the Confederation and the individual cantons (districts). This expenditure amounts to 2.4 percent of the gross national product, and the amount per capita of the population is 285 francs (approximately \$66).⁶⁵ The country's purpose is to ensure its independence by maintaining a defence strong enough to make any attempt at taking over its territory too costly to be tempting. Switzerland maintains universal military training, and as a result can mobilize about 400,000 of its citizen-soldiers in one day. This rapid mobilization is possible because the Swiss, by tradition, are well organized in a militia system which

encompasses a large portion of the population.⁶⁶ Compulsory military service is four months initial basic training followed by regular reservists' training of about three weeks a year for eight years, two annual weeks for three years, and one annual week for two years. All reservists keep their uniforms, equipment, guns, and ammunition at home. In two days, by calling upon the "Landwehr" (age 33 to 42) and "Landsturm" (age 43 to 50) the country can have about 750,000 men under arms--more than 11 percent of the population.

Switzerland manufactures nearly all its own armaments, ammunition, and equipment. When necessary it imports vehicles, jet fighters, and heavy equipment. The country is currently negotiating with several foreign governments for the purchase of jet fighters to replace the dated British planes now in service, and in 1970 the Swiss Department of Defence installed a \$47.2 million early-warning system purchased from the United States. Switzerland does not, however, have any nuclear weapons nor does she have any bomber aircraft.

These armaments do not provide Switzerland with a strong military capability, either with respect to repelling an attack on the country itself or with respect to the ability of Switzerland to project the maintenance of its neutral status as credible, and other avenues of achieving security have been sought to complement national defence. In November 1972, the Swiss put forth a two-part plan for settling disputes between nations.⁶⁷ The plan proposes setting up a European counterpart to the present International Court of Justice in The Hague,

and the creation of a European commission of investigation, mediation, and conciliation. All disputes between two states that involved interpretations and rulings on existing international law would fall under the jurisdiction of the proposed court, and would be settled by a judicial process. Political disputes not covered by international law would be referred to the commission, which would seek to find a suitable compromise. Any decisions by the commission were not to be given the status of automatic law and were not to be imposed on sovereign states. The Swiss plan was to apply to all countries which eventually participated in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation and who so desired. All nations subscribing to the plan would be obligated to submit to the outlined procedure in the event another participating country filed a complaint against them. In this manner the Swiss hoped to avoid possible threats to European stability which might arise from a preoccupation by European countries with national interests, and to avoid forcing the country to rely heavily on its armament capacity to maintain credible neutrality.

An abandonment of neutrality on the part of the Swiss government would perhaps have the greatest effect on the Swiss themselves. Assuming, in light of Switzerland's ideological and traditional attachment to the West, that any such abandonment would result in the country's absorption into the Western camp, the effect on the strategic concerns of the United States and its Western allies would be small. The same limited effect might also obtain with the Soviet Union since Switzerland is

entirely engulfed within Western Europe and of no immediate strategic importance except as part of a neutral corridor to the Atlantic. A significant effect, however, would also be in store for Austria whose neutrality and security would be jeopardized, not due to strategic conditions but merely to the loss of a neutral neighbor who is part of a mutually reinforcing coexistence. Perhaps of greatest concern, though, is the fact that the Swiss-Austrian neutral coexistence is an integral part of the European status quo, and any change in Swiss policy would threaten the structure of detente.

Such can be said to be the case with all four countries--Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Switzerland. Based on the concept of neutrality and the relationship of that concept to the international stability of Europe, a change in policy on the part of any one of these countries would upset the status quo in Europe, regionally if not in the entire European continent. In either event, the stability serving as the foundation for East-West detente in Europe will have been weakened. These countries realize that their geographical and resulting political positions in Europe must be maintained, and that this requires a significant degree of credibility for their individual policies. This holds true even for neutralized Austria. All four countries can be labeled as Western societies, but the mistake should not be made of assuming that they are an inherent part of the Western political camp. Their location on the border between East and West in Europe requires of them a restraint in the exercise of international political freedom,

both for the sake of their own country's welfare and for the sake of European stability. All actions by these countries must therefore be directed toward the maintenance of the present situation in Europe, which involves the maintenance of their individual security positions.

Perhaps the two most important areas in which the European neutral countries have had the greatest opportunity, and the greatest difficulty, in maintaining the status of their neutral policies, while remaining active in international affairs has been United Nations participation and international economic relations. Both of these areas are becoming more and more central to the interactions of sovereign states, making it essential, both for reasons of national welfare and international solidarity, that all nations participate in the worldwide efforts at cooperation within the U.N. and the various economic communities and associations. This task has not been an easy one for any of the neutral countries of Europe. How they have approached the task reflects their concern for continued recognition of their neutral status. The degree of success which has been attained, and the likelihood for continued success, in the retention of neutral status has a direct consequence to the status quo in Europe and to the structure of detente. Neutral behavior need not be antagonizing to the superpowers or to members of their respective blocs with which the neutrals must interact. Cautious participation in these areas is imperative, as is the participation itself. Participation is difficult, however, with the variety of restraints

on modern European neutrality in the areas of United Nations participation and international economic relations.

CHAPTER 4

NEUTRALITY AND RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED NATIONS

European neutral countries must maintain their policies of neutrality while, at the same time, participating in often controversial international issues, a task which often conflicts with a neutral posture. In answer to this problem, these countries have been able to establish a reputation for taking an independent stand on world events, avoiding pressure from East and West for ideological consistency in foreign behavior. With foreign policies recognized as following the dictates of national interests and community stability rather than the dictates of big power pressure, overall foreign policy trends can be established by the neutral countries to shield particular short term foreign policy deviations. Neutral countries have found that they cannot modify the behavior of the major powers, but, by maintaining an active independence in foreign affairs, they can help reduce tensions between the major powers. Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland have all tended to follow the same path in striving to achieve credible independence in foreign affairs. All four countries have based their foreign policies on the principles of freedom, fundamental rights, and humanitarian welfare of all peoples, and have maintained strict adherence to the guidelines implied by these principles. These countries have endeavored to structure their policies to encompass these

principles, along with the political and economic principles specific to each country's national interest.

Switzerland has chosen to play her part outside the framework of the United Nations, although, as will be seen, lack of membership far from implies Swiss isolation from the U.N. family of organizations. Austria, Finland, and Sweden on the other hand chose to become U.N. member states and have guided their foreign policies in conjunction with the collective nature of that Organization. Austria, while recognizing the need to defend specifically Austrian neutrality on various occasions, feels a paramount need to project the role of neutrality into a status of constructive statesmanship, which contributes to world peace and thereby indirectly promotes the legitimacy of neutrality as well as the independence of small states.⁶⁸ The Austrian Government has proceeded to fulfill this need by asserting its independence pertaining to U.N. activities. The Finnish attitude has been that "her participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission traced the first outline of a new image of Finland as a nation with an independent position outside military blocs and trusted by all concerned...to carry out her self-assumed duties impartially and effectively."⁶⁹ Sweden's attitude has been similar. In a radio debate on January 28, 1952, Swedish Foreign Minister Osten Unden stated,

Our policy in the United Nations is dictated neither by fear of displeasing nor by a desire to please. My experience, at any rate, has been that by openly professing our own ideas we are more likely to be respected than if we swim with the current from sheer fear of becoming embroiled with influential powers.⁷⁰

Each neutral country, in projecting its neutral status in international affairs, must act in relation to its own political and geographical position, which necessarily differs from that of other neutrals. The Swiss reasons for refraining from becoming a member nation of the United Nations, and their alternative actions are significant in light of the country's particular neutral orientation and its efforts at retaining the credibility of this neutral policy. Since Switzerland's relations with the U.N. differ from those of member countries Austria, Finland, and Sweden, they require special treatment. Important topics such as possible future U.N. membership for Switzerland and the current Swiss representation at the U.N. are matters specific to Switzerland's relations with the United Nations. In the remainder of this chapter Switzerland will be treated alone from the joint treatment of Austria, Finland, and Sweden.

SWISS RELATIONS WITH THE U.N.

Although not a member of the United Nations, the Swiss have established close relations with the non-political organs of that organization and with almost all the specialized agencies. The Swiss Government has followed this course largely out of necessity due to the fact that, despite the implications of the incompatibility of neutrality to U.N. membership, Switzerland cannot safely ignore the operation and output of a world organization which is fast approaching universality. Under Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter, which states that the United Nations shall ensure that non-member states act in

accordance with the principles of the organization so far as is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, a non-member state may be invited to refrain from assisting any state which the U.N. has ordered enforcement measures against, and to give the U.N. every assistance that may be required in terms of the Charter. Such an invitation would be offered in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Charter which states that all members are to provide the United Nations with every assistance in actions taken in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the organization is taking preventive or enforcement action. The opinion which prevailed at San Francisco with regard to the compatibility of paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2 with the status of permanent neutrality was that a non-member could not invoke a neutral status to evade specific obligations deriving from the joint provisions of these two paragraphs.⁷¹ A state which is not a member of the U.N. may, of course, dispute the legal restrictions of the Charter, that is to say, of a treaty to which it is not party. However, depending on the circumstances in which a non-member is invited to contribute to the application of sanctions, it is often difficult for a non-member to disregard the decisions of the world organization in view of the relative weight of forces involved and the predominant climate of world opinion.

Both Austria, which is a member of the United Nations, and Switzerland considered that they could not abstain from participating in the application of sanctions against Rhodesia.

Acting autonomously within the scope of actions requested by the U.N., Switzerland subjected imports from Rhodesia to a system of permits issued only for imports not exceeding annually, for each category of merchandise, the average for the period 1964-1966. Imports were thus held at the level of the normal trend. This measure, though not constituting full participation in the U.N. sanctions, did ensure that their effectiveness was not compromised by the attitude of Switzerland. The Swiss attempt to avoid any situation in which their neutrality would favor a state which has been made the object of U.N. sanctions. Switzerland continues to invoke her neutral status to justify her refusal to submit to sanctions decided upon by the Security Council, but because of concern for international solidarity, she has deemed it legitimate to associate herself with the world-wide trend reflected in the measures taken by the United Nations.

This view toward association has especially been the case over the past two years since a new development has recently confirmed what has been said on the subject of non-member states in relation to Article 2, paragraph 6. By its resolution of October 20, 1971 concerning Namibia, the Security Council adopted the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice affirming that it is incumbent upon states not members of the United Nations to lend their assistance, within the limits identical to those applicable to member states, to the action undertaken by the United Nations in the case.⁷² The United Nations is continually creating a body of law which is

to be universally applied. Thus, the Swiss are being subjected to the implementation of laws without being able to participate in their formulation or elaboration. As the Swiss note themselves, "we are thus, without being a Member, becoming, to a considerable extent, subordinate to the United Nations--the very thing which, in not joining, we sought to avoid."⁷³ Accordingly, in the present process of studying the problem of maintaining neutral status as a possible U.N. member, the Swiss must bear in mind that their neutrality can be affected, even without joining the United Nations, through the operation of the system of collective security. If the country's neutrality must be subjected to U.N. actions, it might be advantageous for Switzerland to obtain membership and thereby secure a vote in the operations of that organization.

The Swiss note consequences both pro and con with regard to the question of future membership in the United Nations. To begin with they point out the similarity of purpose of collective security and neutrality. Both, they claim, have the same goal, that being the maintenance of peace which both regard as the fundamental target for relations between nations. The Swiss feel that it can therefore be contended that the one and the other--collective security and neutrality--as instruments in the service of peace, can be reconciled, even though they appear at first glance to be incompatible. This is further corroborated when we reflect that a neutral State, though refraining from participation in measures of collective security, must, in observance of its neutrality take steps to

obviate a situation in which its abstention ends by favoring the State against which sanctions have been decreed.⁷⁴ The claim of similar purpose is perhaps a bit weak and stretched to the extreme, since the same end is being sought with incompatible means, but the unavoidability of participation by neutral countries in world collective action is fast becoming a fact which cannot be denied.

The Swiss put forth a further argument in support of the proposition that permanent neutrality is compatible with United Nations membership. Article 103 of the Charter stipulates that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members under the Charter and any other international obligations, even if the latter precede the Charter's entry into force, the member's obligations under the Charter shall prevail. The Charter contains no provision such as Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations under which some earlier agreements were reconcilable with the Covenant if they served the cause of peace. Nevertheless, the Swiss hold that even the United Nations and its members must comply with the rules of customary international law so long as they are not changed by treaty. Accordingly, Switzerland's neutral status, which has, since 1815, assumed the nature of a treaty, may justifiably be deemed to be well established in customary international law. Such, in any case, was the view adopted by the United Nations International Law Commission.⁷⁵ If Swiss neutrality is held to have acquired the characteristics of customary law over the last 150 years, and not merely since 1945, there is every reason to

agree with the International Law Commission that the United Nations Charter cannot invalidate Switzerland's status. This point holds importance for Switzerland's neutrality both as a member or as a non-member of the United Nations.

Even if, by becoming a member of the United Nations, Switzerland were not obliged to lend support to any of the existing blocs, it may be feared that she would have to abandon the cautious and prudent foreign policy that she has always attempted to follow when faced with problems not affecting her interests, and that the country would run the risk of having to sacrifice some part of the advantage which the nature of its policy represents. This consequence might in turn shake the confidence in Swiss neutrality which could weaken the status quo and therefore damage the stability of detente. Furthermore, as a member of the United Nations, Switzerland would, in certain cases, be called upon, under the Charter, to adopt an attitude that might appear to be open to criticism in relation to the strict observance of neutrality. It may therefore be argued that membership in the United Nations would, in one way or another, damage Switzerland's reputation for political integrity, since as a member of the organization the country faces the possibility of being swept along by the currents and cross-currents of world politics. To what extent the Swiss would be able to avoid these currents will be easier to comprehend when compared with the past behavior of the other European neutrals in the United Nations.

Aside from any arguments pro or con in relation to Swiss

membership in the United Nations, it can perhaps be said that the Swiss are actually de facto members. In the summer of 1946 the Swiss Federal Council set up, in the Swiss Consulate General in New York, an office for liaison with the United Nations. Initially it consisted of only two officials whose main task was to obtain documentary material on the activities of the United Nations. On November 5, 1948 the Federal Council decided to convert the liaison office into an autonomous mission headed by a permanent observer of Switzerland accredited to the Secretariat. Neither the permanent observer nor his mission has a clearly defined status.⁷⁶ The Charter, in Article 105, paragraph 2, recognizes only the permanent representatives of the member states. But in practice contacts with the Headquarters of the United Nations are the same for observers as for permanent representatives. The observer likewise enjoys facilities for attending the public discussions in United Nations organs and bodies. In 1965 Switzerland was granted the right to post a second observer at the United Nations Office in Geneva whose tasks are similar to those of the observer in New York.

Switzerland also has representation in the way of membership in most of the bodies and specialized agencies open to non-member states. Thus, the country is a member of almost all organizations having direct or indirect relations with the United Nations. The Swiss feel that their position as a medium-sized economic power, coupled with the fact that an increasing number of important technical and economic tasks are entrusted to international organizations, requires their

broad participation. Switzerland is also a member of the International Court of Justice as provided for in Article 93, paragraph 2 of the Charter which gives non-member states the right to adhere to the Statute of the Court.

SWISS PARTICIPATION IN U.N. ACTIVITIES

On various occasions Switzerland, though not a member, has rendered services to the United Nations.⁷⁷ In so doing she relied on the law of neutrality in general as well as on the First Hague Convention of 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which grants every state the right to offer its good offices free from inimical interpretation. Swiss participation was felt necessary in view of the close interdependence of continents and states. Five such instances have presented themselves since the founding of the United Nations: the Suez operation in 1956-1957; the Congo operation in 1960-1961; the commission of inquiry in Viet-Nam in 1963; the intervention in Cyprus beginning in 1964; and the Middle East crisis in 1967. Swiss participation in the armistice commissions in Korea has been omitted due to the fact that Switzerland's services were offered at the request of the United States and not the United Nations, although the importance of Swiss involvement in this particular case is not intended to be dwarfed.

With regard to the Suez case, on November 8, 1956, following the penetration of Israeli troops into Egyptian territory, the Secretary-General asked Swissair whether it could undertake the transport of 3,800 men from Naples to

Egypt. An agreement was concluded on November 12 and the transport of the men was carried out between November 15 and 25. The Swiss Political Department requested the Federal Council to defray the transport costs, stating that

there is no political reason and no reason in international law that is adverse to a contribution on the part of Switzerland to the action of the United Nations; a state of war does not exist between the United Nations and Egypt, and the mission of the United Nations forces does not have the character of sanctions against an aggressor: it is, on the contrary, typically a mission of peace, with which Switzerland can associate herself without hesitation, if not by the dispatch of troops, at least by a financial contribution.⁷⁸

Swiss participation was much the same in the Congo case. Following the start of the United Nations intervention in the Congo, the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed himself to the Swiss Federal Council with an appeal for Swissair to transport foodstuffs from Pisa to Leopoldville. This appeal was met as was a further appeal for the dispatch of a team of civilian doctors and the supply of various Swiss experts and technicians. Once again the Political Department stated the Swiss position:

From the outset Switzerland recognized that the action undertaken by the United Nations in the Congo served the interests of peace and international security. Our country also benefits indirectly from the positive results of the measures taken by the United Nations in the Congo. In the past, Switzerland has often stated that she is conscious of her humanitarian duties and of her special position

as a neutral State. What is now at issue is to carry out that particular role in a matter of high importance...many countries have responded to the Secretary-General's appeal through the despatch of experts, foodstuffs, medical supplies or by making air transport available for the carriage of goods. It is therefore in the context of an international action that Switzerland's contribution should be reviewed.⁷⁹

As in the Suez operation, the Swiss held the view that the United Nations was carrying out an essentially peaceful activity and that a state of war did not exist. Switzerland was cautious enough however, to refrain from lending aircraft for the purpose of troop transport.

In 1963, at the request of the South Viet-Nam President, Ngo Ainh Diem, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to send a mission of inquiry to Saigon. The cabinet of the Secretary-General asked the Swiss observer in New York whether the Swiss Consulate-General in Saigon could offer its good offices for the transmission of communications. The Swiss Consulate-General then undertook the task of telegraphic liaison between the Commission and New York at the expense of the Swiss Government.

At the outset of United Nations intervention in Cyprus, the Secretary-General asked the Swiss Federal Council whether Switzerland was prepared to take some part in the Cyprus action. The Council decided to contribute to the financing of the operation and submitted a sum of \$75,000. Over the next four years this sum was added to on several occasions. The Swiss felt it appropriate in the Cyprus case to demonstrate the international solidarity of a neutral state that was not

a member of the United Nations, especially since an essentially humanitarian task was involved in a country which, forming part of Europe, could be said to count to some extent on Swiss solidarity at the European level. Furthermore, the Swiss viewed the U.N. action in Cyprus as a peace-keeping action not directed against any state and which met with the approval of all interested parties. Thus, Switzerland's participation was not seen as implicating the country's neutrality.

The fifth instance of Swiss involvement in U.N. peace-keeping activities came in the course of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the event of Israel's decision to assume direct responsibility for the administration of the formerly Jordanian part of Jerusalem. This situation gave rise to a request by the General Assembly for the Secretary-General to submit to it, as well as to the Security Council, a report on the situation in Jerusalem. The Secretary-General in turn invited the Swiss observer to the United Nations to inquire of the Swiss Federal Council whether Switzerland was willing to nominate a person who, in the capacity of his representative in Jerusalem, could carry out an observation mission. The Federal Council proceeded to comply with the request.

The actions taken by the Swiss Government in these cases point out the cautious approach Switzerland has taken in its participation in U.N. activities. The line which the country must follow between an isolated neutral and a totally independent nonaligned U.N. member is a fine one indeed. Neither extreme would lend credibility to Swiss neutrality and therefore any change in Switzerland's policies toward the United

Nations would not be suitable for European stability.

AUSTRIAN, FINNISH, AND SWEDISH RELATIONS
WITH THE U.N.

Austria, Finland, and Sweden all realize that their national security is closely related to international political stability. The less the amount of world conflict the less the status of neutrality will be challenged or threatened. As a result, all three countries have a direct and vital interest in the strengthening of international security and have thus directed their initiatives in this direction. This is the basic reason, above all others, that the three countries chose to become member states to the United Nations. They have each expressed their belief that the United Nations is the primary means available to states for the maintenance of international peace and security, and further that it is the immediate duty of the U.N. to work toward this end.⁸⁰

For their part, Austria, Finland, and Sweden have played active roles, within the limits that their neutrality will allow, in the debates within the U.N. concerning international issues, and in the execution of international U.N. initiatives. The great majority of their participation of these countries has been in the areas of disarmament, peace-keeping operations, and crisis situations arising out of Cold War conflicts, since in these three areas, more than any other, is the status of their foreign policies most affected.

All three countries have taken an unwavering stand on the issue of nuclear disarmament, issuing support for initiatives

in the areas of non-proliferation and the cessation of nuclear tests. There are really no limits hindering the neutrals' actions relating to issues of disarmament since this area of international debate is not a controversial one, and a strong stand in favor of nuclear disarmament will not jeopardize a neutral country's status. Consequently, the neutrals, having assessed the continued stockpiling of nuclear arms as harmful to world peace and their own security, have not been hindered by considerations of neutral status in their efforts at achieving non-proliferation.

In other areas of U.N. activity the neutral countries have generally felt it advantageous to take a more subdued approach in their involvement, although there are significant exceptions. All three countries participated in sanctions against Rhodesia, but the added participation of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union made the neutrals' actions collaborative rather than deviant. Austria, Finland, and Sweden also made contributions to United Nations involvement in the Suez and Cyprus. Following a cautious vein, however, these contributions were mostly concerned with supplying medical aid and observers, and rarely with military equipment or personnel. Yet, each country maintains a stand-by force composed of both officers and combat personnel whose only duties are to assist in U.N. peace-keeping operations. The individual neutral countries retain the final decision as to whether or not their stand-by force will be actively engaged in any

particular U.N. operation. Through participation, however reserved, in these peace-keeping activities, Austria, Finland, and Sweden have displayed considerable support for collective security.

Cautious participation within the United Nations, however, is no indication that Austria, Finland, and Sweden have avoided outspoken issue positions. Each country issued its opinions with regard to the Soviet invasion of Hungary--opinions which were not blanketed in conciliatory language. Only Finland refrained from verbally attacking Soviet actions, although the Finnish position regarding the crisis indicated that the country felt the Soviet maneuver to be detrimental to world peace and stability. In all areas of international participation, Sweden is the most active state, and adheres to the strongest policies, most certainly a result of her shielded position within the Scandinavian grouping. Austria's actions do not lag far behind, supported by that country's position as a guaranteed neutral state by both East and West bloc countries. Finland's attitude toward international participation is much more reserved than the policies of either Sweden or Austria, and understandably so. Finland's neutrality is not guaranteed; neither is the country free from direct pressures resulting from Soviet interests. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the participation of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in U.N. activities in the areas of disarmament, peace-keeping operations, and crisis situations.

AUSTRIAN, FINNISH, AND SWEDISH PARTICIPATION
IN U.N. DISARMAMENT ISSUES

The governments of Austria, Finland, and Sweden have all strongly favored world-wide disarmament, and have used the United Nations General Assembly as an effective forum to express their views and concerns on the issue. None of these countries has a nuclear capability, and, as mentioned earlier, Austria and Finland have restrictions as to the type and amount of military hardware which they can procure. Sweden of course desires to be a part of a nuclear-free Northern Europe, and harbors no intentions of acquiring nuclear weapons. Consequently, these countries would find themselves in a more stable position if the stockpiling of nuclear weapons by other countries could be halted and an agreement reached on the use of such weapons. As a start in this direction, Austria, Finland, and Sweden have been co-sponsors of joint draft resolutions in the General Assembly regarding the use of nuclear weapons. In 1966 the three countries joined with 29 others in sponsoring a draft resolution calling on all states to take all necessary steps to facilitate and achieve the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to refrain from any actions conducive to proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.⁸¹ The three joined forces again in 1971 in sponsoring a draft resolution along with 12 other countries which stressed the need for the suspension of nuclear weapons testing. This

draft resolution urged all states that had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.⁸²

In addition, several other joint draft resolutions have been co-sponsored by two of the three neutral countries. In 1970 Austria and Sweden joined with twenty-five other countries in sponsoring a draft resolution which drew attention to the economic and social consequences of the armaments race. The sponsors of this resolution, wishing to promote the elaboration and implementation of a comprehensive program for disarmament, which would also facilitate the United Nations development program during the 1970's, called upon all states to take effective steps for the cessation and reversal of the arms race and for the achievement of a steady progress in the field of disarmament.⁸³

Three draft resolutions have been co-sponsored jointly by Austria and Finland. The first of these, submitted on May 1, 1968, endorsed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and requests the ENDC (Eighteen Nation Committee On Disarmament) to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.⁸⁴ The other eighteen sponsors of this draft resolution included all the Scandinavian countries as well as the United States and Russia. This draft resolution was followed seven months later by a second in which Austria,

Finland, and ten other countries urged the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles.⁸⁵ The third draft resolution came in 1971 and was generally a re-emphasis of the May 1, 1968 draft resolution mentioned above.⁸⁶ Twenty-three additional countries joined Austria and Finland as sponsors.

Swedish Participation: Of the three European neutral U.N. members Sweden is perhaps the most critical of the postwar arms race and has taken more initiative within the organization in efforts to bring about international disarmament. In addition to the draft resolutions mentioned above, Sweden has co-sponsored several draft resolutions to which Austria and Finland were not participants. These draft resolutions dealt with complete disarmament and nuclear testing, and were supplemented by Sweden's work as a member of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission in Geneva. A 1970 draft resolution urged the governments of the nuclear-weapon powers to bring about an immediate halt in the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing as well as deployment of nuclear-weapon systems, offensive and defensive,⁸⁷ and a 1971 draft resolution reaffirmed the responsibility of the United Nations in the fundamental goal of the attainment of general and complete disarmament.⁸⁸ In another draft resolution of November 11,

1970 Sweden joined in urging all states which had not done so to adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, and called upon all nuclear-weapon states to suspend nuclear weapons tests in all environments.⁸⁹ Sweden had made similar proposals in 1969 and, along with Finland, in 1967, 1966, and 1965.

Austrian Participation: Sweden's U.N. initiatives have not dwarfed actions taken by Austria whose realization of the importance of universal disarmament is perhaps greater than that of Sweden. Austria's concern has been wider in scope and has involved the question of nuclear weapons and outer space among others. Austria's activities in this respect were recognized by their election to the Outer Space Committee on December 12, 1959.

Much of Austria's U.N. participation in this area has been in relation to testing of nuclear weapons. In addition to the draft resolutions mentioned above, Austria co-sponsored the so-called "test-ban resolutions" in 1958 and 1959 which urged the atomic powers to discontinue the testing of nuclear weapons, and voted in favor of the two 1959 resolutions directed against the French nuclear tests in the Sahara. This latter action was offset on November 6, 1961 when Austria voted for a resolution expressing grave concern and regret at the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

Finally, aside from nuclear testing, and in addition to

draft resolutions jointly co-sponsored with other European neutrals, Austria co-sponsored a draft resolution in 1971 expressing the conviction that it was most desirable to take immediate steps in order that careful consideration be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all states.⁹⁰ Twenty-six other countries joined Austria in this proposal.

Finnish Participation: Finland has been the least active in U.N. disarmament activities. In fact, the Finns have taken little initiative in the past, not only in the area of disarmament, but in all areas of U.N. work. In addition, in the past Finland has led all countries in abstentions from voting in the United Nations General Assembly when great power issues were involved, with a 50% abstention rate.⁹¹ Austria and Sweden were not far behind, however, with abstention rates of about 40% and 25% respectively.

None of these draft resolutions to which Austria, Finland and Sweden have been co-sponsors compromises these countries' neutrality in any way. Disarmament and the cessation of nuclear testing are essentially universal goals, including the superpowers, although technical and political problems have blocked progress toward cooperation between the latter. By strongly supporting and taking initiatives toward disarmament, the neutral countries have neither favored East or West, nor have they endangered their relations with the surrounding European countries.

AUSTRIAN, FINNISH, AND SWEDISH PARTICIPATION
IN U.N. PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Austria, Finland, and Sweden have all taken active parts in U.N. peace-keeping operations regardless of these countries' commitment to neutrality and their skepticism of collective security. In fact, they all have displayed considerable support for the process of collective security. The best example of this occurred with respect to the case of Southern Rhodesia and associated U.N. resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970).⁹² These resolutions condemned the "illegal" proclamation of republican status by the "illegal" regime in Southern Rhodesia, and stipulated that U.N. members should refrain from recognizing the regime or from rendering any assistance to it. They further stipulated that, in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter and in furthering the objective of ending the rebellion, member states should sever all diplomatic, consular, trade, military, and other relations that they may have with the Southern Rhodesian regime, and terminate any representation they maintain in the "territory". Member states were also to interrupt any existing means of transportation to and from Southern Rhodesia.

The restraints imposed by these resolutions were quite extensive, and implicated in certain ways the position of those countries which participated. Yet Austria, Finland, and Sweden adhered to their context. This situation was not, however, one likely to jeopardize the political positions of these neutral countries since both the Soviet Union and the

United States, as well as all the Nordic countries, also supported these resolutions.

The support these countries have shown for collective security also emerges with respect to the Suez crisis and the Cyprus case. In both instances each country contributed either men, money, materials, or services. These cases will be taken up below in the discussion of each individual country.

Swedish Participation: Sweden's approach within the United Nations to achieve a stable world setting for its neutral policies has been to support measures and international efforts to sustain the right of national self-determination. In this line Sweden has endorsed United Nations operations in South Korea in 1950 and contributed volunteer soldiers and economic assistance to UN programs in the Middle East in 1956, the Congo in 1960, and Cyprus in 1963.

The Swedish Government expressed its full agreement with the resolutions of the Security Council which stated that North Korea had committed a breach of the peace, and felt it of great importance that the attack should not succeed.⁹³ Since Sweden did not previously have diplomatic, commercial, or maritime relations with North Korea, they easily met the provisions of the resolutions which called upon all members of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities. Sweden was not, however, able to immediately comply with the recommendation of the resolution

which called on members to furnish such assistance to South Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the Korean area. The Swedish Government did not find it possible to make any armed forces available, but it subsequently equipped and sent out a field hospital to South Korea at Swedish expense and manned by Swedish personnel.

Within Sweden there was far from universal support for the Government's actions in the Korean case. Especially in the press of opposing political parties, the Government was accused of taking up alliance with the West, an action which was seen by the Dagens Nyheter newspaper as "mercilessly [revealing] the emptiness of the official policy of neutrality."⁹⁴ Other newspapers, however, supported the Government's policies, such as the conservative Svenska Dagbladet which found Sweden's actions "in accordance with the obligations of the Charter."⁹⁵ Foreign Minister Osten Unden expressed the Government's views in a speech on August 30, 1950.

He pointed out that Sweden had always maintained the right to make reservations where the obligations involved by membership in the United Nations might be concerned, obligations which, for instance, might lead to the need for participation in sanctions. In the case of Korea the decision of the United Nations had been in the nature of a recommendation, and participation in the military measures was voluntary. The humanitarian contribution which Sweden had decided to make was, however, 'not merely an expression of our human sympathy, but also of our own desire to support the United Nations in its reaction to aggression.'⁹⁶

Accordingly, Sweden voted against the Soviet proposals which suggested that the United Nations force should withdraw from Korea. Quite to the contrary, Sweden voted with the majority in favor of the proposal authorizing the United Nations forces to cross the thirty-eighth parallel in order to achieve stability and free elections in the "sovereign State of Korea." The Swedish Government went no further, however, and remained in the background of discussions for the remainder of 1950 and throughout 1951. When China entered the conflict Sweden abstained from voting on a United States proposal condemning China as an aggressor. Instead, Sweden served as a link between the U.N. and China since the Swedish Government had diplomatic relations with the latter. Following the end of hostilities, Sweden was chosen to serve on the commission appointed to supervise the armistice terms and consequently sent large contingents of control officers to Korea.

Despite the failure of Sweden to supply requested troops for U.N. service in Korea, Swedish volunteer forces played an active part in subsequent U.N. peace-keeping operations. Swedish military units or observers were supplied to the U.N. operations in the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus. In Cyprus both a battalion group and police personnel were provided. The Swedish Government provided these volunteers as participation in an effort to achieve the end of hostilities. No partisan opinions were expressed as was the case with respect to Korea.

These forces were supplied on an ad hoc basis and not

until 1964 did Sweden establish a permanent stand-by force. Up until that time the Swedish Government had sent 27,153 volunteer officers and men to take part in peace-keeping operations, and the need was felt for a more permanent legal and administrative basis for Swedish participation in such operations. Consequently, in the Spring of 1964, after extensive consultations with Denmark, Finland, and Norway, a Government Bill was introduced in the Swedish Parliament concerning the establishment of a permanent stand-by force. The Bill was approved and the Force now numbers 1,600 volunteers. In addition to this Force, Sweden served as a member of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations from 1965, when the Committee was established, until 1969 when the country withdrew in order to give other countries an opportunity to participate in the work of the Committee.

It is also important to note that Sweden served as a member of the Security Council for two consecutive years, 1957 and 1958. Until Austria was elected to the Security Council in 1973, Sweden was the only European neutral to have been represented on the Security Council. During those two years the Security Council held three votes on resolutions concerning the India-Pakistan question, three votes on the admission of new members, one on the Palestine question, one concerning the International Court of Justice, one concerning a complaint by Lebanon, and one concerning complaints by Lebanon and Jordan. In these ten votes Sweden was in agreement with all other members of the Council except the Soviet Union, including the U.S., Britain, and France.⁹⁷ The

Swedish position clashed with that of the Soviet Union on the three votes concerning the India-Pakistan question and on the vote concerning the complaint by Lebanon. The lines of Sweden's votes in the Security Council note a trend toward adherence to widely accepted political positions, although the country's several votes in contrast to the Soviet Union's position show the controversial situations Sweden has had to place herself in to fulfill her responsibility for participation in international affairs.

Austrian Participation: Austria has made every effort to disassociate its form of neutrality from the terms "noncommitted" and "unaligned." The country's greatest efforts in this respect have occurred within the United Nations where Austria has taken stands which, although not compromising to its neutral status, are of a sufficiently involved nature as to constitute assertions of an active neutrality. A relatively early example of such a position was the Austrian vote in favor of a General Assembly resolution of October 21, 1959 condemning the People's Republic of China for its activities in Tibet. The overall vote of 45 in favor, 9 against, and 26 abstentions did not overwhelmingly shield Austria's position.

In 1963 Austria voted against one of the major Western signatory powers of the State Treaty. The resolution condemning British policy in Oman found Austria among 96 supporting votes, but the United Kingdom voted against it, and the United States and France abstained. Aside from being signatory powers of the State Treaty, Britain was a partner of Austria in EFTA, and

France holds one of the keys for Austrian association with the European Common Market which was then being vigorously sought.

Austria, like Sweden, has a permanent stand-by force, in battalion strength, reserved exclusively for peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. Austrian military and police units were sent to the Congo, Cyprus, and the Suez. In 1960 the Secretary-General of the United Nations called on Austria to provide contingents for the setting up of a Health Service, a Supply and Logistics organization, and a Postal Service for the United Nations Force in the Congo. Austria provided the Health Service. A medical unit was also supplied, along with a police contingent, to the United Nations Force in Cyprus at the request of the Secretary-General. In 1967 Austria provided eight officers as observers for the Suez operation, as well as a medical assistant.

In addition, on September 21, 1965 the Secretary-General of the United Nations asked Austria to reply whether it could provide ten officers for the supervision of the cease-fire on the India-Pakistan border. Ten officers were made available for this service and seventeen more were kept in reserve. However, the officers were never deployed because the United Nations already had a sufficient number of officers at their disposal and the request was withdrawn.

As of 1973 the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defense reported there were 349 Austrian soldiers serving in U.N. peace-keeping efforts. Most of them serve with the Austrian U.N. contingent in Cyprus, including five officers at the U.N. command post in Nicosia and a team of 54 army medics. Ten Austrian observers

serve on both sides of the lines in the Middle East.

Finnish Participation: Mention has already been made of Finland's participation in the U.N. activities in Southern Rhodesia in 1970. Finnish actions in this case were part of an active campaign since 1956 to end hostilities through U.N. initiatives. The country's first venture into peace-keeping operations did not come until the U.N. involvement in the Middle East in 1956, but despite this slow start, the Finnish Government has committed voluntary men and financial backing to additional U.N. peace-keeping activities in Lebanon, Kashmir, Cyprus, and Laos. In Lebanon and Kashmir, officers serving as observers represented Finnish participation, and Finnish officers are currently on duty as observers in the Suez. Finland's participation in Cyprus was in the form of a battalion which served as part of the United Nations force in Cyprus, commanded by a Finnish general.

When the United Nations set about forming an emergency international force, Finland agreed to the suggestion and was willing to authorize and facilitate recruitment, on a voluntary basis, of Finnish military personnel for such a command and preferably for a unit consisting of troops from the Northern countries of Europe. As a result, the Finnish Government put a contingent of some 250 men at the disposal of the United Nations. Finland has also, in close cooperation with the other Scandinavian states, set up a stand-by force to serve the U.N. Emergency Force when necessary, and has made voluntary contributions to help the Organization to overcome financial

difficulties caused by disputes over paying for peace-keeping operations.

MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Not only Finland, but Austria and Sweden as well, have contributed significant amounts of money to U.N. organizations, agencies, and various programs. In 1969 Austria's regular budget to the U.N. was \$670,000, Finland's was \$612,345, and Sweden's, \$1,562,104. In 1970 all three figures rose respectively to \$843,972 (a 21 percent increase), \$699,141 (a 9 percent increase), and \$1,758,012 (an 11 percent increase). In addition, all three countries have contributed to some twenty additional U.N. organs, bringing the totals to \$3,254,935 for Austria in 1969 and \$4,001,189 in 1970, \$3,415,428 in 1969 and \$4,270,863 in 1970 for Finland, and \$31,538,374 for Sweden in 1969 plus \$35,602,924 in 1970.⁹⁸ For comparison purposes, the GNP of these countries for 1970 was, in millions of U.S. dollars, 14,510 for Austria, 10,200 for Finland, and 32,580 for Sweden.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS SITUATIONS IN THE U.N.

Hungary Invasion: Several incidents which have occurred outside of possible United Nations participation have also held considerable significance for the European neutrals, simply because they were issues which could not be ignored altogether. One such incident was the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. On this particular issue the Soviet Union and the United States could

not be reconciled which rendered U.N. intervention in the matter impossible. Nevertheless, debate within the U.N. General Assembly was vigorous, pressuring all members to take a position.

Of the three European neutral members, Austria took the lead in this respect when, on October 28, 1956, the Austrian representative addressed a letter to the Secretary-General informing him that the Austrian Government had sent an appeal to the Soviet Government requesting it to cease military actions and stop bloodshed. The Austrian letter to the Secretary-General also stated Austria's position. The Austrian Government felt, in view of the freedom and independence of Austria secured by its neutrality, that its verbal intercession was an attempt for a normalization of the conditions in Hungary with the aim that by restoring freedom, understood as a human right, the peace in Europe could be strengthened and secured.⁹⁹

Sweden followed the Austrian example by co-sponsoring two draft resolutions in December, 1956. The first resolution expressed concern that the Soviet Union had failed to comply with U.N. resolutions calling for an end to the Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary and to withdraw its armed forces from Hungary, and reiterated the call for Soviet compliance with these resolutions, as well as to permit United Nations observers to enter Hungary.¹⁰⁰ A second resolution a week and a half later took a more firm stand. In addition to again calling for Soviet dissociation from the internal affairs

of Hungary, the resolution declared that the Soviet Union was violating the political independence of Hungary, and condemned the Soviets for their violation of the U.N. Charter with regard to Hungarian independence and fundamental rights.¹⁰¹ The United States was also a co-sponsor of this resolution.

Finland, on the other hand, went no further than to express their hope that Hungary and the Soviet Union would be able to agree on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of the Hungarian people in a way that would correspond to their traditions of freedom. The Finns accordingly abstained from voting on the resolutions condemning the Soviet action and demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Here again, Finland's geographical position played an important role. The country decided to put good relations with the Soviet Union above the freedom of a desired stand in the United Nations. It could also be argued that a Finnish vote to condemn the Soviet Union would have achieved nothing in the way of helping the Hungarians. Max Jakobson justifies this viewpoint on a comparison with the actions of the League of Nations following the 1930 Soviet invasion of Finland:

The Finnish Government had appealed to the League in the hope of resuming negotiations with the Soviet Government. It was in vain. In the end the League by majority vote declared the Soviet Union guilty of aggression and expelled it. But the vote revealed the depressing fact that the courage of member nations, as expressed in their willingness to punish the Soviet Union through sanctions or render assistance to Finland, was in direct proportion to their distance from the scene of action. The end result helped Finland neither to make peace nor to defend herself.¹⁰²

Subsequent events: In addition to the Hungarian issue, Sweden and Austria have taken active parts in disputes involving the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam war, and the entry of Communist China into the U.N. In 1968 Sweden rebuked the Soviet Union for its occupation of Czechoslovakia, stating on one occasion that the incident was a "shattering defeat for freedom and the forces of democracy."¹⁰³ Sweden has played the other side of the fence also, however. The Swedish Government strongly condemned the United States military involvement in Southeast Asia. Initially Sweden had in effect supported Western policies in Southeast Asia, voting in 1957 in favor of admitting both South Vietnam and South Korea to the United Nations. By 1965, however, Swedish policy had changed, and in 1967 Sweden suspended relations with South Vietnam. The Swedish Government became increasingly vocal in its opposition to American policies, a stance culminated by Sweden's establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the Hanoi regime in January, 1969. Due to economic pressure from the U.S. Government and private U.S. businesses, Sweden was forced to take a more subdued course on the Vietnamese issue. Nevertheless, the significant point remains unaltered, that being that Sweden did not hesitate to follow her own foreign policy in a controversial setting.

Austria likewise has taken some strong, outward stands in additional international issues, but with less enthusiasm than Sweden. Especially with regard to Cold War issues, Austrian diplomacy has taken the position of defending neutrality.

The outstanding example of this position is offered by the votes which indirectly determined the question of United Nations membership for Communist China. Austria abstained on each of the votes taken on this question from the thirteenth through the eighteenth session of the General Assembly. As this issue became less controversial, however, Austria took a stand more in line with its own feelings on the matter. In 1970 the Austrian delegation cast its vote in the General Assembly for the proposition that the People's Republic of China should occupy the seat of China in the United Nations, and on May 28, 1971 the Republic of Austria and the People's Republic of China established diplomatic relations. Austria based its 1970 vote on the conviction that "the high goals and purposes of the United Nations can only be reached on the basis of universality. It is in this spirit that the Austrian Government firmly supports all measures conducive to bring about...the participation of the People's Republic of China in the work of the United Nations."¹⁰⁴

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis put pressure on Austria's foreign policy. On February 20, 1962 Austria voted for the rejection of a Cuba-sponsored resolution directed against the United States, and helped defeat the Communist bloc move by 45 to 37, with 18 abstentions. Sweden and Finland abstained on this vote, and the Soviet Union bluntly attacked Austria for the vote, threatening that necessary conclusions would have to be drawn.

From this review of the neutrals' behavior regarding United Nations participation, the trend that these countries are

adhering to begins to form a definite pattern. That pattern appears as independence in the area of foreign affairs, although Finland and Austria are inclined to exercise a great deal of caution, especially with respect to Cold War issues. All four neutral countries seem to be convinced that credibility for neutrality can only be maintained by refraining from giving the appearance of being swayed in their foreign policy decisions by one or more foreign power. Yet this only presents part of the total picture. International economic relations and dependence are also areas of international participation which cannot be avoided by the neutrals. The growing economic collaboration in Europe has forced the neutrals into a situation of either participating in the structured economic activities of the EC or suffering economically due to a lack of competitiveness with the EC member countries. Neutrality often conflicts with the necessities of the small European neutrals which are all significantly dependent on foreign trade, yet these countries cannot allow their adherence to a neutral status isolate them from the economic relations which are vital to their welfare. To establish a policy of neutrality for the political purpose of obtaining national security, and then to threaten the welfare of that same country by failing to maintain economic competitiveness in world markets is a paradox which holds grave consequences. By looking at the international economic policies of the European neutrals, a more complete understanding can be derived as to how these countries interact with the European continent, and how they affect European stability.

CHAPTER 5

NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION

On January 1, 1973 Britain and Denmark, having withdrawn from EFTA, become members of the European Communities. On the same day, the Free Trade Agreements between the Communities and five other EFTA countries--Austria, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland--came into effect. Norway began negotiations slightly later, and Finland followed by concluding an agreement a year later. This final Free Trade Agreement took effect January 1, 1974.¹⁰⁵

The non-candidate neutral countries to the EC have had to reconcile participation in Western economic structures with the framework of neutrality. For these countries a decade earlier, the idea of Europe limited to trade policy matters would have been appropriate, for in such a setting neutrality could have avoided economic activities which threaten the credibility of neutral status--that is, the maintenance of a foreign policy which gives preference to neither the activities nor the structures of one bloc over those of the other. Now, however, questions of economic policy came to the forefront. As integral parts of Europe, the non-candidates, especially Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria which have the strongest and most varied links with the EC, could not avoid dealing with the economic aspects of European integration. Yet, at the same time, they also had to safeguard the credibility of their established neutral orientations in order to preserve

not only European stability, but their own national welfare as well. The signing of the Free Trade Agreements was the culmination of attempts to reconcile national economic interests with neutrality.

FINLAND

The road which led to these Free Trade Agreements was not always a smooth one. The situation has not always been conducive for neutral association with the European Communities whenever necessity seemed to dictate it, especially in the case of Finland whose trade with Eastern Europe has been greater than that of any other EFTA country except Great Britain. The Soviet Union, in particular, does not want to see Finnish trade shift toward the European Communities, and has tightly controlled Finland's trade expansion.

Remarkably, however, Finland has managed to remain economically stable and competitive in the European markets without forsaking the interests of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Finland's success in this respect has come slow and with a high price. At the time when Finland perhaps needed economic assistance the most, the country was forced to say no to the Marshall Plan. Pressures stemming from the Soviet desire for Finland to refrain from participating in any Western oriented programs were sufficient to keep Finland out of such programs, even within the Scandinavian grouping. Sweden, on the other hand, did participate in the Marshall Plan with no apparent damage to that country's neutrality. In the case of Finland, though, it must be remembered that following the Second World War, the Soviet Union was extremely concerned with the security of

its borders, especially with respect to Germany. Finland obviously occupied a central role which Sweden was more easily able to escape.

Finland remained an outsider to organized economic cooperation in Europe until 1961. The real trial came in 1959. With the emergence of EFTA Finland faced the possibility of severe economic isolation and trade inequality, since the country had previously refrained from approaching the EEC due to the Soviets objection to the political nature of that organization. Finnish exports were now subject to duty while goods from EEC and EFTA countries could be transferred duty free among member countries. The figures in Table 1 show the significance of this situation to Finnish trade. Close to two-thirds of Finnish imports came from EEC and EFTA countries during 1958 to 1960 when these two organizations were in their early stages. Roughly two-thirds of export trade was also with EEC/EFTA countries. The hardest blow to Finnish trade by the emergence of EFTA was the loss of equal trade status with Great Britain, Finland's biggest customer, purchasing up to a quarter of all Finnish exports. It was more than obvious to the Finnish Government that it would have to take immediate steps to secure similar advantages for Finnish goods as those enjoyed within the EFTA.

There were large barriers standing in the way, however. Finnish exports to the Soviet Union amounted to about 15 to 20 percent of total Finnish exports, compared with about 2 to 3

Table 1. EEC/EFTA percent of Total Finnish Trade, 1958-60

		<u>EFTA</u>	+	<u>EEC</u>	=	<u>TOTAL</u>
IMPORTS	1958	34%		31%		65%
	1959	34%		29%		63%
	1960	35%		28%		63%
EXPORTS	1958	25%		26%		51%
	1959	29%		30%		59%
	1960	32%		35%		67%

SOURCE: OECD Statistical Bulletin on Foreign Trade, Series A (February, 1962), pp. 40, 66; and U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969, p. 274.

percent for the other Scandinavian countries. In addition, Finland maintained a most-favored-nation status with Russia.

The Soviet Union was not a party to GATT and not obliged to waive application of the MFN principle in the event of Finland's joining EFTA. The Finns could not abandon their economic commitments to the Soviet Union, yet at the same time it was essential to establish economic ties in Western Europe. Credibility from all international sectors had to be maintained while allowing Finland the economic necessities for its national wellbeing. Association with Western Europe at the expense of previous commitments to the Soviet Union would have destroyed Finland's delicate balancing act between East and West which is so essential to the country's neutral success. As a result, in November of 1960, a Finnish-Soviet treaty on tariffs was signed, to come into force in the event that Finland reached an agreement with EFTA. In it Finland agreed to reduce duties on manufactured goods imported from the

Soviet Union by the same amount and at the same rate as she was to reduce duties on goods from EFTA. This agreement paved the way for Finnish membership in EFTA on March 27, 1961.

Finland thus maintained a fairly acceptable trading position among its European neighbors until the enlargement of the EEC was voted on in 1971. Unless the Finns had associated themselves in some manner with the enlarged Community, they would have found themselves in severe economic isolation when the enlarged EEC membership took effect in 1973. In fact, despite Finland's attempts to maintain its high level of trade with the East European countries, trade statistics show that the country was becoming increasingly involved in West European trade at the expense of trade with Eastern Europe. Table 2 gives export and import statistics for Finland's trade with both East and West Europe since 1968. Finnish imports from EEC/EFTA countries increased roughly 53 percent from 1968 to 1972, while imports from CMEA countries increased only 35 percent approximately. At the same time, Finnish imports from the Soviet Union in 1972 accounted for 11.6 percent of Finland's import trade, down from 16.9 percent in 1968.¹⁰⁶ In the export category, Finland's trade with West Europe increased by about 48 percent over the same period, and 32 percent with East Europe. Soviet trade percentages accordingly decreased from 15.5 percent of Finland's total export trade in 1968 to 12.3 percent in 1972.¹⁰⁷

Table 2. Finnish Trade with East and West Europe, 1968-1973

		EEC/EFTA*	CMEA	
		\$ mil.	\$ mil.	Soviet % of total
IMPORTS	1968	1,015.0	324.3	81%
	1969	1,336.3	327.2	79%
	1970	1,740.6	425.3	78%
	1971	1,873.2	501.6	78%
	1972	2,152.6	498.5	77%
	First half 1973	1,335.8	277.1	78%
EXPORTS	1968	1,044.6	303.5	83%
	1969	1,276.5	345.4	80%
	1970	1,535.5	361.3	78%
	1971	1,608.6	329.4	77%
	1972	1,999.4	448.7	81%
	First half 1973	1,132.7	245.0	78%

* An individual analysis of EEC statistics and EFTA statistics over the period 1968 to 1972 is not useful because trade statistics for both Great Britain and Denmark, beginning in 1973, were listed as part of the EEC total trade and no longer as part of EFTA trade. For this study EEC and EFTA statistics have been combined to represent Western European trade. (Trade with other West European countries which are OECD members, but not EEC and EFTA members, are not included.)

SOURCE: EFTA Bulletin, Vol. X (April, 1969), p. 7, Vol. XI (April, 1970), p. 4; Vol. XII (April, 1971), p. 4; Vol. XIII (April, 1972), p. 3; Vol. XIV (April, 1973), p. 3; Vol. XIV (Sept.-Oct., 1973), p. 13; and OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series A (October, 1972), pp. 54, 56; (October, 1973), pp. 54, 56.

Regardless of the dislike for this trade situation among Soviet officials, the Finnish Government proceeded with negotiations with the European Communities in order to safeguard Finnish economic interests. Here, as in the country's U.N. behavior, Finland has maintained an independent stand. With regard to economics, however, the imperative nature of

Finnish economic association leaves the country with few choices. Economic participation in Western Europe economic organizations is just as essential to Finnish stability and growth as is the maintenance of a credible neutral status --one cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the other if Finnish interests are to best be served. Perhaps no other area of Finland's interaction on the international scene has threatened the country's neutrality more than foreign trade matters. Yet, Finland's adherence to neutrality does not obligate the country to economic deprivation and isolation. Her present situation with respect to foreign trade, East and West, is more a consequence of the country's specific resource needs and its sense of security in established trading patterns than it is of deliberate preference for trading partners.

All the same, Finland recognizes its need, in keeping its neutrality, of maintaining credibility from all sectors of the international sphere. Consequently, Finland is still making efforts to contribute to a harmonious development of foreign trade which will increase growth and cooperation in all directions. The most recent measure is the treaty on cooperation with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance of the Socialist countries, which was signed in May, 1973. The parties to this treaty hope that it will serve as a framework for subsequent detailed arrangements of a multi-lateral nature between Finland and the CMEA, and at present is expected to open new possibilities in various

sectors of economic life, including industry, science and technology, as well as to give further impetus to trade between Finland and the individual CMEA member countries.

AUSTRIA

Austria finds itself in a position similar to that of Finland in its attempts at economic participation in Europe. Austria is bound by the 1955 State Treaty to uphold its neutral policies, and the country is highly dependent on foreign trade. Also, like Finland, Austria has faced its economic dilemmas with determination and independence from bloc pressures. Yet, the Austrian approach to economic expansion and integration in Europe has been cautious as well.

Unlike Finland, which has had to deal with its Soviet neighbor ever since World War II, Austria's restricted international position really dates from 1955. Prior to this time, Austria's international position afforded a broader foreign policy which allowed the Government the necessary latitude for joining with fifteen other Western European nations on April 16, 1948 in signing the convention concerning the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. The OEEC was to serve as a basis for European reconstruction under the Marshall Plan, and in 1948 Austria had no reason to refrain from participation.

By the time the EEC had come into existence, however, Austria's international position had changed, and association with the surrounding economic forces in Europe was no longer merely a matter of desire and initiative. The EEC countries

had begun to cement a long process of economic integration which threatened to damage the economic stability of all European countries outside that organized grouping. Austria was placed in an awkward position by this development. The country was now a neutralized state, which not only wanted to maintain that neutrality as a matter of national interest, but was responsible for doing so as a matter of international law. Austria's international status as a perpetual neutral state had to be reconciled with the requirements of her trade policies by achieving a form of association with Western Europe which would not be viewed so inconsistent with the tenets of neutrality. Such a task was a formidable one for Austria, especially since there was no agreement with the Soviet Union as to the status of Austria's neutrality. Austria needed to forge a credibility based on independence with respect to Cold War politics, which would allow the country to appease the Soviet Union while avoiding isolation from Western European markets. The emergence of the EEC thus elicited demands for coordinated action. At first, the Austrian Government attempted to form an all-European free trade organization (including the EEC) within the framework of the OEEC. This having failed, Austria was forced to look for a more regional solution to the problem.

Just as Finland's concern for her economic welfare following the formation of the EEC was spurred by that country's heavy trading interests with Britain, so Austria's concern was spurred by her trading interests with Germany and Italy.

These two countries are Austria's leading trade partners, and more than half of Austria's foreign trade is carried on with EEC countries. Nevertheless, the Austrians viewed EEC membership as conflicting with the tenets of the country's neutrality. The political integrative aspect of the organization was inconsistent with Austria's obligation to maintain its national independence. Association with the EEC at the expense of trade with CMEA countries would have jeopardized Austria's neutral credibility in the Soviet bloc.

Austria was thus forced to accept membership in EFTA, which had no objectives of permanent integration. This step, however, was made less than adequate following the application in 1961 by Britain for EEC membership. When Denmark also filed an application and it was apparent that Norway similarly would do so, Austria was forced to re-examine the matter since more than half the country's trade was being threatened with tariff discrimination. Under pressure to consider the matter, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Bruno Kreisky, and the Federal Minister of Commerce and Reconstruction, Dr. Fritz Bock, joined with ministers from Sweden and Switzerland in September of 1961 to discuss the position of neutral countries with respect to the EEC. Finland had joined EFTA just six months before, after two years of difficult negotiations with the Soviet Union, and was not in a position to enter into discussions relating to the EEC. During these talks the ministers agreed that association with EEC was not contradictory to neutrality, provided a suitable

form of association could be negotiated.¹⁰⁸ In November the three neutrals informed their EFTA partners of this view and that each proposed to present some roughly identical form of association to the EEC.

The advantages of such unified action on the part of the neutrals has been nicely summarized by Thomas Schlesinger of Plymouth State College:

The three neutrals jointly determined that associate membership under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, properly hedged with provisions barring political integration and reserving abstention from policies inconsistent with neutrality, would not compromise their status. The joint nature of the action expressed their need for the safety proverbially found in numbers. Sweden and Austria are both vulnerable to Soviet pressures, and Austria derives benefit from joint action with Switzerland because the Moscow memorandum* calls for a 'neutrality modeled upon that of Switzerland.' As the obligations derived from that memorandum are of current practical interest largely to the Soviet Union, Austria hoped to secure itself against Soviet objections by pointing at the parallel Swiss action.¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless, Soviet objections were issued to the Austrian Government. On August 27, 1961 Austria was requested to give the Soviet government an explanation of her intention of entering into negotiations concerning participation in the

*The Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955 was, in essence, a declaration of intent by the Austrian government delegation in their negotiations with Moscow preceeding the 1955 State Treaty. With regard to Schlesinger's statement, the Moscow Memorandum gave assurance to the Soviet Union that Austria would always adhere to the international obligations of observing a neutrality such as that of Switzerland.

Common Market. A second objection on December 12, 1961 argued that Austria's association with the EEC was incompatible with her status of permanent neutrality and the obligations arising from the 1955 treaty. Austria replied that their form of neutrality had established Austria as the sole judge and interpreter of its content, and that all its action with regard to European integration would be designed to safeguard that neutrality.¹¹⁰ More specifically, Austria informed the Soviet Union that the Austrian Government was interested in maintaining the best possible economic relations with all countries regardless of their political regimes, and for this reason Austria could not remain inactive in the face of certain economic developments in Europe. This approach to relations with European countries and organizations reaffirms Austria's policy of independence in foreign affairs, a policy which, as stated earlier, the four European neutrals feel is the best way of maintaining credible neutrality. The extent of the Austrian adherence to Soviet views went no further than assuring the Soviet Union that Austria would attempt to achieve only such European economic arrangements as were essential to the particular interests of her trade policy, and would only enter into obligations which were in line with her international status.¹¹¹

Thus, despite Soviet objections, in December 1961 the Austrian National Assembly approved a proposal to the EEC for the opening of negotiations with a view to coming to an exclusively economic arrangement that would take account of

Austria's permanent neutrality and international agreements and would enable her to discharge at any time the obligations arising from them.¹¹² This proposal was presented to the secretary-general of the EEC Council of Ministers on December 15, 1961, and in November 1962 Austria concluded an agreement with the EEC within the so-called Dillon Round of GATT which provided reciprocal common tariff concessions of about 20 percent on approximately 100 items. Austria still desired some sort of a "special economic arrangement" with the EEC, and expressed such a desire in 1963. The first round of talks began in April of 1965, and eventually led to the Free Trade Agreement which took effect January 1, 1973.

Austria, however, has not abandoned economic initiatives with Eastern Europe. In fact, by 1964 exports to COMECON member countries had risen to 17.5 percent of Austria's total foreign trade. This share of trade is not merely an appeasement tactic deployed by the Austrian Government, but rather the consequence of Austria's position between two integrating movements. The Austrians feel, therefore, that their efforts to intensify the ties with Eastern Europe should be viewed as legitimately designed to prevent isolation.¹¹³

The result has been that in 1972 Austrian exports to Eastern Europe accounted for 11.8 percent of Austria's total exports, while 8.4 percent of the country's total imports came from Eastern European countries. Both these figures, however, show a decrease in trade from 1960. Yet, of all the EFTA

countries, only Austria and Switzerland avoided trade deficits with the Eastern bloc--Austria showing a \$17 million surplus and Switzerland a \$124 million surplus. It is not surprising, therefore, that of total EFTA exports to the Eastern bloc in 1972, Austria accounted for the largest share with 18.4 percent, and the second largest share of imports with 15.8 percent.¹¹⁴

The figures in Table 3 show roughly a 51 percent increase in exports to EEC/EFTA countries, compared with only about a 35 percent increase in exports to CMEA countries. Similarly, Austrian imports rose about 52 percent from EEC/EFTA countries compared with about 44 percent from CMEA countries. Despite Austria's large and increasing trade with Eastern Europe, trade is decreasing in relation to Austria's trade with Western Europe. What Austria must now do is to assure the Soviet Union that this trend is a result of economic necessity and that Austrian-CMEA trade will continue to increase at a significant rate in the future. The Soviet Union must be assured that Austria's economic ventures are not part of a trend to establish the country as a Western neutral. Soviet fear of Austrian movement in this direction could possibly bring repressive measures by the Soviet Union, which believes, as was mentioned earlier, that it retains a judgment as to whether or not Austria is adhering to its neutralized status. Soviet actions against Austria would neither enhance the credibility of Austrian neutrality, nor contribute to the structure of detente and the stability of Europe.

Table 3. Austrian Trade With East and West Europe, 1968-1973

		EEC/EFTA*	CMEA	
		\$ mil.	\$ mil.	Soviet % of total
IMPORTS	1968	1,892.3	243.6	24%
	1969	2,145.3	271.9	24%
	1970	2,684.2	331.9	24%
	1971	3,125.6	377.6	28%
	1972	3,967.6	437.1	26%
	First half 1973	2,397.9	246.6	23%
EXPORTS	1968	1,272.5	294.6	23%
	1969	1,590.2	325.9	21%
	1970	1,885.7	367.4	22%
	1971	2,088.0	383.5	18%
	1972	2,607.4	453.7	21%
	First half 1973	1,515.2	253.7	15%

* See single asterisk note for Table 2.

SOURCE: EFTA Bulletin, Vol. X (April, 1969), p. 7; Vol. XI (April, 1970), p. 4; Vol. XII (April, 1971), p. 4; Vol. XIII (April, 1972), p. 3; Vol. XIV (April, 1973), p. 3; Vol. XIV (Sept.-Oct., 1973), p. 13; and OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series A (October, 1972), pp. 42, 44; (October, 1973), pp. 42, 44.

SWITZERLAND

Both Switzerland and Sweden behave substantially differently from Finland or Austria. This fact has resulted from the buffered geographical position of Switzerland and Sweden with respect to the Soviet Union, which in turn has resulted over the years in close economic participation and dependency with Western Europe by both countries.

If Austria has been adamant in its dealings with the Soviet Union on Western economic participation, then Switzerland has sought nothing less than equal preferential treatment with the EEC countries. Two factors account for this Swiss attitude. These two factors are 1) the dependency of Swiss foreign trade on the West European economic structure, and 2) their insistence that participation in such trade is not in conflict with the country's role as a neutral European state.

Economically the Common Market is of utmost importance to Switzerland, France and Germany being the country's principal European trading partners. In 1972 almost 60 percent of the country's imports came from EEC countries, while the Swiss exported over 35 percent to the EEC.¹¹⁵ Since the expansion of the EEC in 1973, Swiss import figures for EEC trade stand at about 75 percent and export figures at roughly 60 percent. Much of the Swiss imports category is accounted for by agricultural products. Switzerland is less than 60 percent self-sufficient in this area, and, percapita, imports more agricultural products from the EEC than any other third country.¹¹⁶ Adding EFTA figures to the EEC statistics show that approximately 77 percent of Swiss imports and 59 percent of Swiss exports currently result from trade with Western Europe. (See Table 4).

Profitable foreign trade is indispensable to Switzerland. The country made little hesitation in joining the OEEC, the European Payments Union, and EFTA. Perhaps the most important

factor associated with membership in these organizations was the efforts at the multilateral settlement of transactions. As a small, hard currency country, Switzerland has been subject to past trade discrimination due to bilateral agreements. For the Swiss, perhaps more than any other European peoples, European trade on a footing of equality was impossible without membership in the appropriate European organizations.

The second factor affecting the Swiss view toward Western economic participation is the country's insistence that such participation is not in conflict with its role as a neutral European state. The Swiss Government insists that its efforts to achieve trade agreements with the EEC are not primarily for the sake of obtaining short-term advantages. An attempt of this nature could easily be viewed by the Soviet Union as compromising the tenets of neutrality for the sake of national gain. Such a view would tend to blemish Switzerland's neutral status. As noted in the EFTA Bulletin,

Switzerland seeks to establish special links with the Communities because it is a European country, because its economy is part of the European economy, because the challenges of the future--whether it is a matter of solving the problems relating to monetary questions, to technology, to environmental health--face all European countries and can be solved only through common action.¹¹⁷

These are the reasons which the Swiss Government posits as the fundamental purpose of Switzerland's actions, with the further conviction that such efforts at European solidarity and unification are not in contrast to the structure and needs of the Swiss state and therefore not in violation of Swiss

neutrality.

In further defense of their actions, the Swiss note that initiatives toward collaboration with Brussels and the EEC are no longer justifiably linked with an association with NATO. The basis for this argument stems from the premise that it can no longer be assumed that a uniform economic policy automatically leads to political unity. Despite Switzerland's determined attitude toward West European economic participation, the country's desires do not preclude the need to avoid political involvement in the EEC, and the Swiss have based their involvement in Western European economics on the contention that political involvement for their country does not exist or loom as a possibility for the future. For the Swiss there is no ideological matter involved, but rather the necessity for their country--which lacks raw materials, access to the sea, and an adequate capability of feeding its population--to trade with foreign powers in order to safeguard Switzerland's national wellbeing.

Quite in contrast to Finland and Austria, and in contrast even to Swedish policy, the Swiss desire and need to participate in the trade programs of the EEC is sometimes referred to in the degree of possible membership. Dr. Walter Renschler, who has served on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Swiss National Council and with the Swiss Delegation to the Council of Europe, is one advocate of such a possibility. He considers Swiss membership in the EEC "...possible and, in certain circumstances, absolutely compatible with neutrality."¹¹⁸

His reasoning holds that,

At present, and probably also for the near future, the Community is hardly likely to agree on a common political denominator. A margin on foreign policy for the member states is thus safeguarded. The possibility also exists, at least in theory, that the EEC will finally turn towards a political concept designed to hold the balance of power in the world. Such a trend would create certain analogies to the function of neutrality.¹¹⁹

At present this sort of support for Switzerland's European economic participation is of little practical significance. Renschler does not define "a margin on foreign policy," but the overall freedom and credibility of Swiss foreign policy is certainly dependent on more than the level of political activity within the EC. All situations throughout the entire international sphere, and Switzerland's actions regarding them, are factors influencing neutral country initiatives and participation in world affairs. Furthermore, Switzerland cannot afford to direct her foreign policy on the basis of theoretical possibilities. The country must continually relate to the present. Nevertheless, Renschler's comments are important in positioning Switzerland in its attitudes towards European economic relations and integration.

Judging, then, from the generally unrestrained Swiss attitude leaning toward full and active association with West European economic interests, it is of no surprise that the country took part in the early attempts at the creation of a large European free trade area in 1957-1958, and played an active role in the founding of EFTA. As early as 1961 the

Government presented its desire to enter into negotiations with the EEC, and in November of 1970 Switzerland accepted the Community's offer of the establishment of special links. The offer came in an official communique issued at The Hague summit in 1969 in which the EEC noted its desire to arrive at special relationships with those countries which desired them.

The EEC, however, was not willing to offer so much as the Swiss surprisingly hoped to achieve. The Swiss Government's idea of special relations included the central element of industrial free trade--qualified by autonomy in questions of tariffs and trade agreements with outside countries--, but it also encompassed participation and closer cooperation in broader realms such as overall economic and monetary policy, and industrial and research policies.¹²⁰ The Swiss have some consolation, however, in the fact that such cooperation could be agreed upon in the future provided there is mutual interest among all concerned. Such a possibility stems from the so-called "development clause" in the agreements with the Communities. Yet, there are no provisions for automatic increases in the scope of cooperation.

To Switzerland this situation holds both favorable and unfavorable implications. It guarantees on the one hand that any new obligations toward the Communities will be a matter of Swiss decisions, thus safeguarding the country's national independence on international policy issues. On the other hand, many Swiss view the European Community as an entity

leading toward mighty status, and which will have a powerful voice in economic and monetary policy, in corporate concentration and the social order, and in economic legislation and technology.¹²¹

Despite Switzerland's lack of large scale participation with Eastern Europe, however, the Swiss trade volume with the CMEA countries has increased rather steadily with that of Western Europe. Table 4 shows an appropriate increase of Swiss imports from EEC/EFTA countries of about 48 percent from 1968 to 1972, and a 44 percent increase in imports from CMEA countries. For the same period, exports to EEC/EFTA countries increased approximately 43 percent, and roughly 50 percent to CMEA countries. As mentioned earlier, Switzerland is also one of only two EFTA countries showing a trade surplus with the Eastern bloc in 1972. Switzerland has not altogether abandoned its trade with Eastern Europe, but on the contrary has strengthened it. This fact combined with the obvious situation of the country's dependency on foreign trade as a whole, has convinced the Swiss, and at least somewhat satisfied their European neighbors, that Switzerland's international economic policies are not an exception to the guidelines for neutrality. Not only, as mentioned earlier, does Switzerland want to avoid giving the impression of compromising the tenets of neutrality for the sake of national gain, but the country's international economic policies must satisfy all areas of the international sphere which hold judgment on Swiss neutrality. This acceptance in the economic realm is essential

Table 4. Swiss Trade With East and West Europe, 1968-1973

		EEC/EFTA*	CMEA	
		\$ mil.	\$ mil.	Soviet % of total
IMPORTS	1968	3,416.4	89.9	16%
	1969	4,008.5	107.8	19%
	1970	4,955.3	133.9	20%
	1971	5,549.8	143.4	20%
	1972	6,617.5	159.5	19%
	First half 1973	4,173.5	107.0	23%
EXPORTS	1968	2,308.8	140.4	19%
	1969	2,689.9	172.8	20%
	1970	3,007.1	209.6	24%
	1971	3,424.5	214.0	22%
	1972	4,020.6	283.5	24%
	First half 1973	2,549.4	187.0	27%

* See single asterisk note for Table 2.

SOURCE: EFTA Bulletin, Vol. X (April, 1969), p. 7; Vol. XI (April, 1970), p. 4; Vol. XII (April, 1971), p. 4; Vol. XIII (April, 1972), p. 3; Vol. XIV (April, 1973), p. 3; Vol. XIV (Sept.-Oct., 1973), p. 13; and OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series A (October, 1972), pp. 102, 104; (October, 1973), pp. 102, 104.

if the Swiss hope to maintain a high level of credibility for their status of traditional neutrality, and to lend support to the credibility of Austrian neutrality. Without Swiss neutrality as an additional buffer state against the West, the status of Austria's neutrality could be seriously threatened from East Europe. European stability depends in part on the maintenance of the Austrian-Swiss neutral corridor, and Swiss neutrality is perhaps the key factor in the continuation of the present status of this corridor.

SWEDEN

Like Switzerland, Sweden has taken a bold and independent approach to relations with the EC. This approach is nothing new for the Swedes who previously demonstrated their intentions of participating in West European economic matters by joining the Council of Europe, and by maintaining active membership in the OECD and EFTA. Now, like the other European neutrals, Sweden has obtained an arrangement with the EEC.

The reasons for such an arrangement are clear enough. Sweden's dependency on foreign trade is no less than that of Switzerland. The volume of exports and imports is roughly equivalent to one-fifth of the total domestic production volume, and in the export category alone, between 40 and 50 percent of the manufacturing output is sold abroad.¹²² The increasing importance of manufactured goods in the export picture has entailed a sharp rise of sales to industrial countries. By 1971 Europe was absorbing about 80 percent of the total export value, EFTA countries accounting for 46 percent and EEC countries accounting for 27 percent.¹²³ Accordingly, Britain and West Germany are the major markets for Swedish goods, claiming more than 24 percent of Sweden's exports. The importance of these two countries for Swedish trade, however, has been slowly decreasing since the early 1960's.

Europe is likewise important to the Swedish import trade. By 1971 Sweden's total imports from Europe amounted to 78 percent, with West Germany and Britain again being the major

trading partners. Together these two countries supply more than 33 percent of Sweden's total imports.¹²⁴

The slow decline in trade with Sweden's major trading partners is the result of the country's trade growth with EFTA countries at the expense of trade with EEC countries. A comparison of the 1969 Swedish trade figures with those of 1959 show that the EEC share of Swedish imports fell from 41 percent to 34 percent, whereas Sweden's EFTA partners increased their share from 24 percent to 33 percent. Likewise, the EEC share of Swedish exports fell from 31 percent to 28 percent, while EFTA trade increased from 34 percent to 37 percent.¹²⁵ Sweden does not view this trend in its foreign trade as a favorable development, especially since the country is dependent on the highly developed countries--EEC countries heading the list--for the marketing of her quality industrial products.

These figures indicate that Sweden must make an all out effort to foster progress in its relations with Western Europe. Regardless of the need, however, Sweden has not been without reservations regarding participation in EEC programs. Sweden rejects as unrealistic the idea that the country could systematically coordinate its foreign policy actions with those of the Western Powers and at the same time internationally maintain the credibility of its policy of neutrality, and the Swedes refuse to combine their policy of neutrality with stated or implied undertakings on systematic foreign policy cooperation or consultations with a certain Power

bloc.¹²⁶ The Soviet Union would certainly associate any Swedish action of full association with West Europe as an abandonment of the country's neutrality and as a preference for Western political, and perhaps military, affiliation. Russia still maintains that the EEC is dominated by U.S. influence, and would make no hesitation at linking EEC membership of an ideologically Western oriented country such as Sweden with support for Western bloc international policies. Just as Switzerland's neutral status is important to the continued success of Austrian neutrality, and thus to the maintenance of that entire Alpine neutral corridor, so too is Sweden's neutral status important to the continued success of Finnish neutrality and to the maintenance of the entire Scandinavian neutral corridor. Without this neutral corridor, detente could be jeopardized and the stability of Europe threatened.

In Sweden's view, the communique issued after the Hague summit in December, 1969 indicated that the political aims attached to the EEC still linger as a prominent feature of that organization. The Swedish Government feels that even if several of the governments which entered the enlarged EEC reject thoughts of federation, it is evident that member states are expected to show a high degree of solidarity, which, among other things, is of assistance in working out common stand-points in vital international quests.¹²⁷

The Swedish definition of solidarity is somewhat more specific than this, however. In the case of the EEC the

Swedes identify political solidarity very closely with military solidarity. They note that,

All of the EEC countries...(except Iceland) have signed the Atlantic Treaty. Even if the military cooperation may primarily take effect by means of other organs than EEC, the intention to achieve political, economic and defensive integration has so often been announced by leading representatives of the states which are or which wish to become members of EEC, that we have absolutely no alternatives but to attach importance to their declarations.¹²⁸

Thus, if Sweden intends to take no part in any system of alliances, it cannot at the same time accept solidarity in respect to foreign policy and defence matters with a group of states already allied with one another, and with the United States.¹²⁹ As a result, Sweden, unlike the Swiss, harbors no contemplations of full membership in the EEC.

Therefore, Sweden, like the other European neutrals, accepted the offer from the EEC to enter negotiations for special relations. The Swedish goal in these negotiations was to make Sweden a participant in a stable duty-free market for Swedish industry. A continued active participation in the Western European economic integration is of vital importance for the development of the Swedish economy, and the country views its acceptance for participation as a significant recognition of its neutral role in Europe.

What effect Sweden's West European trade policies had on the country's East European trade is hard to determine. Swedish trade with CMEA countries has fluxuated considerably over the past five years, and no clear trend can be deciphered.

Table 5 shows that the import figures have risen steadily except for what appears to be a recent decline in imports from the Soviet Union over the past year and a half. Exports to CMEA countries also show a steady increase, about 20 percent, from 1965 to 1970,¹³⁰ but fell by 9 percent in 1971.

Table 5. Swedish Trade With East and West Europe, 1968-1973

		EEC/EFTA*	CMEA	
		\$ mil.	\$ mil.	Soviet % of total
IMPORTS	1968	3,537.2	231.7	46%
	1969	4,205.7	275.5	46%
	1970	5,023.6	330.7	47%
	1971	5,034.2	335.3	48%
	1972	5,798.4	354.7	45%
-----		-----		
First half	1973	3,424.5	202.3	38%
EXPORTS	1968	3,483.6	223.0	35%
	1969	4,021.3	271.2	41%
	1970	4,892.2	337.7	39%
	1971	5,328.2	310.5	28%
	1972	6,156.4	324.4	26%
-----		-----		
First half	1973	3,914.2	252.0	27%

* See single asterisk note for Table 2.

SOURCE: EFTA Bulletin, Vol. X (April, 1969), p. 7; Vol. XI (April, 1970), p. 4; Vol. XII (April, 1971), p. 4; Vol. XIII (April, 1972), p. 3; Vol. XIV (April, 1973), p. 3; Vol. XIV (Sept.-Oct., 1973), p. 13; and OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series A (October, 1972), pp. 98, 100; (October, 1973), pp. 98, 100.

The following year, however, 1971 to 1972, showed an increase again of approximately 4 percent, and export figures for the first half of 1973 look favorable in this respect. Neverthe-

less, the Soviet Union is Sweden's largest trading partner among the CMEA countries, and Swedish exports to that country have decreased by 38 percent since 1970. Then again, however, export figures for the first half of 1973 indicate that trade with the Soviet Union might be picking up. (See Table 6). It remains to be seen what Sweden's trading patterns will be in the future, and what the Soviet reactions will be.

Table 6. The Four Neutrals' Trade With the Soviet Union, 1968-1973, in \$ millions*

		<u>Austria</u>	<u>Finland</u>	<u>Sweden</u>	<u>Switzerland</u>
IMPORTS	1968	58.4 (3%)	262.8 (20%)	106.8 (3%)	13.6 (.4%)
	1969	66.1 (3%)	257.3 (15%)	125.9 (3%)	19.8 (.5%)
	1970	79.6 (3%)	331.2 (15%)	155.4 (3%)	26.6 (.5%)
	1971	106.4 (3%)	392.5 (17%)	162.4 (3%)	27.7 (.5%)
	1972	112.6 (3%)	383.8 (14%)	157.7 (3%)	30.4 (.4%)

First half	1973	57.5 (2%)	215.5 (13%)	76.0 (2%)	24.8 (.6%)
EXPORTS	1968	68.4 (4%)	251.4 (19%)	78.8 (2%)	27.1 (1%)
	1969	68.6 (4%)	275.4 (17%)	111.1 (3%)	34.8 (1%)
	1970	82.1 (4%)	282.5 (15%)	131.4 (3%)	49.8 (2%)
	1971	68.9 (3%)	254.0 (13%)	87.0 (2%)	47.3 (1%)
	1972	93.5 (3%)	364.0 (15%)	82.6 (1%)	68.9 (2%)

First half	1973	37.2 (2%)	191.2 (14%)	67.6 (2%)	50.8 (2%)

* Figures given in parentheses indicate the percent the preceeding figure is of total European trade for that country during the year indicated. Countries included in European trade are those belonging to the EEC, EFTA, and CMEA.

SOURCE: OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series A (October, 1972), pp. 42, 44, 54, 56, 98, 100, 102, 104; (October, 1973), pp. 42, 44, 54, 56, 98, 100, 102, 104.

FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

The four European neutrals are now part of a sixteen nation free trade area in Western Europe whose proposed schedule calls

for 100 percent free trade in most industrial goods by July 1, 1977. For the most part, the individual Agreements signed by the neutral countries are identical, and hold the same safeguards for each state's neutrality. Perhaps the two most important of these safeguards involve the aspects of decision-making and trade with third countries. The countries which have Free Trade Agreements will not take part in the decision-making in Brussels. This suits the neutral parties since it exempts them from any political connections or obligations which could be detrimental to their foreign policies, and it also suits the Community since their cohesion, decision-making machinery, and thereby its future prospects have all been protected. Also, the Free Trade Agreements are based on the concept of industrial free trade, and contrary to a customs union, there is no common external tariff. Partners to the Agreements are free to fix their own customs tariffs for imports from third countries.

Austria and Finland have added an additional safeguard by way of avoiding the possibility of giving the impression of being totally dedicated and committed to the ongoing process of West European integration. The opening paragraph of the Preamble to the standard Agreement states the following:

Desiring to consolidate and to extend, upon the enlargement of the European Economic Community, the economic relations existing between the Community and [particular country] and to ensure, with due regard for fair conditions of competition, the harmonious development of their commerce for the purpose of contributing to the work of constructing Europe,....¹³¹

In the Agreement with Austria, the phrase "for the purpose of contributing to the work of constructing Europe" is omitted, and in the Finnish-EEC Agreement the entire paragraph was reworded. The Finnish Agreement reads,

Desirous of contributing appropriate solutions to the economic problems facing Finland as a result of the enlargement of the European Economic Community and of developing the commerce between them, while retaining their autonomous power of decision and preserving, with due regard for fair conditions of competition, a satisfactory balance of trade.¹³²

Considering the Soviet Union's interest in these countries, and the latter's position as Soviet neighbors, the desire to omit such phrases as "to consolidate and to expand," and "for the purpose of contributing to the work of constructing Europe" is certainly within understandable limits.

Finland's Free Trade Agreement also differs from the standard form in that the "evolutionary clause" does not apply. This clause allows for the possibility of further cooperation not covered by the Agreements. Obviously the Finnish rejection of this clause was a concession to the Soviet Union which is already expressing some grave doubts about Finland's freedom of association with Western markets.

Of final importance to the European neutrals is Article 21 of the Agreements, part of which states that nothing in the Agreement shall prevent a Contracting Party from taking any measures which it considers essential to its own security in time of war or serious international tension.¹³³ This Article is enough to assure Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland

that their special relations with the EC will not choke the freedom and independence which these countries need and have founded their foreign policies on in order to maintain their neutral status.

In all their varying forms, these Free Trade Agreements form part of a general realignment of relations between sixteen West European countries which constitute a new element in world-wide trading patterns. For each of the European neutral countries, the Agreements are the logical conclusion of a process set in motion by the creation of the Common Market and the resulting formation of EFTA. To them, in the light of their similar situations, the division in the European market which resulted from this parallel movement constituted a major problem for which it was imperative to find a solution. The problem, however, was not confined to the neutrals. As stated by Ambassador Paul Jolles, Director of the Division of Commerce of the Federal Department of Public Economy of Switzerland, "It was the opinion of all the European countries that a general solution became essential at the time when Denmark and Great Britain joined the European Communities. It was necessary to press forward to avoid slipping backwards."¹³⁴ Aside from this general concern, however, the European neutrals were alone in dealing with their sensitive situations.

Trade with a monopolistic economic system is not the same as trade with similar market economies which permit the play of supply and demand on an international scale. The East

European economic system's subjection to a rigid collectivist system of planning is not natural or favorable to Western democracies, and only by liberalizing this system will the Eastern bloc be able to competitively attract trade from West European countries. One neutral state, Austria, was officially offered COMECON membership, but the invitation was not sufficient to meet the challenge of West European integration.

The Soviet Union is not so dependent on Western foreign trade as the rest of the East European countries, and thus not willing to release its hold on economic construction in East Europe. GATT, with the admission of Poland and subsequently of Rumania and Hungary, opened a first multilateral channel with Western trading interests, but this event is far from setting a trend. And eventually, East-West solutions in the realm of foreign trade will require Soviet participation. Therefore, just as the neutrals were forced to establish their relations more concretely in Western economic matters in order to avoid critical economic isolation, so also must they not abandon their Eastern trade relationships so as not to isolate themselves from future association which seems essential to the status of the neutral countries' foreign policy concepts. These concepts, which basically call for independent foreign policies as the best road to maintaining credible neutrality, must include a pragmatic and objective consideration of the overall possibilities for the future growth and wellbeing of the neutral countries. Such a consideration cannot ignore increased commercial and politically integrative relations with East Europe.

The Free Trade Agreements have not closed the door to East Europe. In fact, in one sense, the Eastern bloc has been handed a somewhat unexpected favorable situation in the fact that, with the association of several non-Atlantic allied countries with the EEC, that organization is now no longer a highly NATO dominated or oriented group as was so widely claimed previously. The decision-making representatives in Brussels come only from the nine full members, though. This consequence is perhaps also considered as a justifying aspect for the neutral states' new relations with West Europe. It cannot and should not be assumed, however, that this situation is sufficient to stabilize the neutrals' international position or to stabilize European politics. Promoting East-West association, and avoiding alienating either, requires a continuous, full-time effort.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

European neutrality clearly exists in a hostile environment. Not only are the physical realities of political and economic international activities in conflict with the concept of neutrality, but the general international attitude toward neutrality is not conducive to the growth and full participation of neutral countries in international affairs. Neutral status consequently projects itself as contrary to the entire scheme of mid-twentieth century international structure. In such a setting, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland are well aware that the stability of their foreign policies depends on the stability of international politics in general, and on the achievement of detente between East and West. In order to contribute to the attainment of these conditions, the four European neutrals have refrained from following a line of foreign policy which might tend to benefit one superpower at the expense of the other. Since each neutral country occupies a position of geographical, and in some cases economic, importance to both Cold War blocs, preferential programs and goals directed toward either East or West could bring about the instability which the neutrals are trying to ward off.

Yet, neutrality continues to persist in establishing its credibility in world affairs, as in the case of Finland's neutrality, Sweden's nonalignment, Austria's neutralized status, and Switzerland's traditional neutrality. These four countries

have come to realize that the great powers are not likely to make real sacrifices for the sake of a small, neutral buffer, even though each neutral occupies a position of strategic importance to both East and West. These countries are on their own in establishing a blueprint for survival, yet the boundaries of the foundation of foreign policy initiatives are apparent in that the interests of both East and West must not be abandoned. In an attempt to maintain a central position between East and West, each neutral has stressed independence in foreign policy as a way to survive. Underlying this is the fact that survival depends on maintaining the status quo. The credibility of neutrality in the eyes of foreign governments originates from within the neutral country itself, and only sincere and consistent policies on the part of each neutral will suffice to allow them to serve as a stabilizing factor in the European status quo which the existing detente depends on. For the European neutrals, in dealing with such divergent interests as exist between East and West, the only way to project sincere and consistent policies to the satisfaction of all was to act independently within the bounds of neutral obligations, while not forsaking the interests of any country or Cold War bloc.

Independent actions have not violated the neutral's international positions, but have actually reinforced the status quo. Thus, politically a status quo reinforcing behavior between East and West is beneficial to European state neutrality. Yet, these countries have suffered economically. Restraint in East or West full-scale association has kept these countries

from full participation in economic activities which are vital to their economies, and has impeded economic progress. A status quo reinforcing behavior, although not a static policy, is certainly not the progressive foreign policy of most countries, especially Western, which are not hindered by such overriding concerns of political orientation. If the desire to act independently in world affairs is to be a credible demonstration of adherence to neutrality, then sacrifices, both with respect to freedom of actions and to material wealth from trading growth, must be made. These countries embraced neutrality for the benefit of their own security, but only because it appeared as a necessity, and sacrifices are an unfortunate consequence of this necessity. It remains to be seen whether or not neutrality can survive the pace of economic expansion in the 1970's and 1980's. It may be somewhat ironic that the bridging of strong nationalism in Europe with the formulation of strong economic, and possibly political, cohesion may bring about a lessening of stability in that area. If such a process of cohesion approaches the level of incompatibility with neutrality, the neutral countries might be forced, for the sake of national welfare, to abandon their staunch adherence to the status quo. This in turn could change the international situation in Europe which so far has been conducive to East-West detente.

Even though the European neutrals have benefited from their status quo reinforcing behavior between East and West, this political situation has also caused the neutrals to channel their foreign policies to fit the boundaries of neutrality.

Their need was to project the role of neutrality into a status of constructive international involvement which would contribute to world peace, and thereby promote the legitimacy of neutrality. The approach to achieving this status of constructive international involvement included support for measures and international efforts to sustain the right of national self-determination, which is essential to a policy of independence in foreign affairs, but which has never taken the neutral countries beyond the limits of their own neutral status. The very nature of neutrality embodies the need for international restraint, and however independent the European neutrals succeed in becoming, their interaction in world affairs will always be subject to the confines of their neutral status. Their own security depends on this confinement, since European detente, and thus the stability of Europe, depend on it.

Present trends in European politics seem favorable for the continued existence of neutrality as it now operates in international politics. The European neutrals have succeeded in forging acceptable relations with the European community which do not implicate their neutral orientations, and East-West detente appears strong even though recent progress has been slow. Present trends in world politics, however, point to increasing difficulty for the maintenance of a neutral status. Ever increasing interaction in world politics and the emergence of young nations to a position of bargaining prominence will, in all probability, lead to continued conflicts in international relations. Assuming the United Nations will continue to function

in this atmosphere, the demands for collective security will not decrease, leaving the neutrals to face the same dilemmas of neutrality and international participation and obligations which they have faced since the formation of the United Nations in 1945. The countries of the world, especially the European states, must come to realize the importance of the European neutrals to the stability of Europe, and that the maintenance of their neutral status is just as much a part of their international obligations as is participation in collective security.

Under present circumstances, the European neutrals have no other choice for the future but to continue to establish the credibility of their foreign policies by assuring their European neighbors and the superpowers of their sincerity to maintain the status quo. No alternative seems available without significant changes in the structure of the international system. Increased and strong detente between the superpowers would certainly be a necessary first step in allowing the neutral countries in Europe to broaden their foreign policy outlooks. A second important factor would be further developments toward polycentrism which would overshadow the struggle within the still dominate bi-polar international structure and thus perhaps lessen the importance of the two neutral corridors in Europe.

Further research directed at establishing the relationships between neutrality and a polycentric international system could be useful in providing a possible scenario for the neutral countries. Another possible area of useful study might be to look at any arrangements which might allow the four European

neutrals to abandon their neutrality. Neutrality is no longer primarily a policy directed toward avoiding involvement in conventional wars. It has evolved to a policy directed toward avoiding political intervention and crippling sanctions from neighboring countries and the superpowers who have a direct interest in the neutrals' strategic geographical positions. Within this framework, it seems possible that neutrality could be abandoned if a stable and lasting detente were achieved between the superpowers. Such a detente is nowhere at hand at present, however. Any further research which would avoid being speculative in nature would have to deal with the present orientation of neutral policies whether it be along the lines of the independent attitudes of the neutrals discussed in this study, or along some other course of action which might be open to the neutrals.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1

1. Roderick Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1970), p. 2.
2. Ibid., p. 82.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
4. John Foster Dulles, "The Cost of Peace," Bulletin, XXXIV, Department of State Publication 886 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 999-1000.
5. Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality, p. 7.

Chapter 2

6. For further examples, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 4; Peter Lyon, Neutrality (The Leicester University Press, 1963), pp. 15-21; Peter Lyon, "Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutrality," Review of Politics (April, 1960), pp. 255-68; and Cyril E. Black, et al., Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. xi-xiv.
7. Peter Lyon, Neutrality (The Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 20.
8. T.L. Shay, "Nonalignment si, Neutrality no," Review of Politics, XXX (April, 1968), p. 228.
9. Cyril E. Black, et al., Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. xi.
10. Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality, p. 2.
11. Edward Collins, Jr., (ed.), International Law in a Changing World (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 385.
12. Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of International Law (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961), p. 218.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 223.

15. See James Brown Scott, (ed.), The Hague Conventions of 1799 and 1907 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1915), pp. 133-40.
16. See map in J.M. Roberts, Europe, 1880-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), p. 18.
17. Scott, The Hague Conventions, pp. 210-15.
18. Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality, p. 98.
19. See "The League of Nations Covenant," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, VII (July, 1919), 485-512.
20. Richard N. Swift, International Law: Current and Classic (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969), p. 517.
21. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, XI, Department of State Publication 8354 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 146.
22. Jean-Flavian Lalive, "International Organization and Neutrality," British Yearbook of International Law, XXIV (1947), p. 78.
23. See Charter of the United Nations Together With the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Department of State Publication 2353, Conference Series 74 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 1-36.
24. Oscar Schacter, "Legal Issues at the United Nations," in Annual Review of United Nations Affairs: 1960-1961, ed. by Richard N. Swift (New York: Oceana Publications, 1960), p. 142.
25. Ibid., p. 143.
26. Kaplan and Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of International Law, p. 222.
27. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, XI, p. 145.
28. Department of the Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare, No. 27-10 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 184.
29. Kaplan and Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of International Law, p. 225.
30. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, I, Department of State Publication 7403 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 345. (Parties to the Act were Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia.)
31. J.-R. de Salis, Switzerland and Europe (London: Oswald Wolff, Ltd., 1971), p. 36.

32. Ibid., p. 37.
33. Ibid., p. 40.
34. Nils Andren, Power-Balance and Non-Alignment (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1967), p. 71.
35. M. Donald Hancock, Sweden: The Politics of Post-industrial Change (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1972), p. 255.
36. Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1956), p. 170.
37. See Shay, "Nonalignment si, Neutralism no," pp. 228-45.
38. Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War (London: Hugh Evelyn Limited, 1968), p. 52.
39. Lyon, Neutrality, p. 98.
40. Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality, p. 49.
41. Lyon, Neutrality, p. 98.
42. Ibid., pp. 168-69.
43. Ibid., p. 169n.
44. Bruno Kreisky, "Austria Draws the Balance," Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (January, 1959), 273.
45. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, I, p. 350.
46. Ibid., p. 352.

Chapter 3

47. Arne Olav Brundtland, "The Nordic Balance," Cooperation and Conflict, II (1966), p. 30.
48. Erik Moberg, "The 'Nordic Balance' Concept," Cooperation and Conflict, 3 (1968), p. 212.
49. Urho Kekkonen, "The Creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in Scandinavia," in Neutrality: The Finnish Position, Speeches by Dr. Urho Kekkonen, ed. by Tuomas Vilkkuna (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1970), p. 145. Speech delivered to the Passikivi Society in Helsinki, 28 May, 1963.
50. Aimo Pajunen, "Finland's Security Policy," Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy, published by the Finnish Political Science Association (Vammala, Finland, 1969), p. 28.

51. Johan Jorgen Holst, "The Soviet Union and Nordic Security," Cooperation and Conflict, 3/4 (1971), p. 137.
52. Egil Ulstein, "Nordic Security," Adelphi Papers, No. 81 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 14.
53. The Military Balance, 1970-1971 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 35.
54. Urho Kekkonen, "Finland's Path In A World of Tensions," in Neutrality: The Finnish Position, p. 197. Speech given at the General Church Meeting in Vaasa, Finland on 6 January, 1967.
55. See, The Military Balance, 1970-1971, p. 34.
56. Hancock, Sweden, p. 250.
57. "The Swedish Defense," Fact Sheets on Sweden, published by The Swedish Institute (August, 1972).
58. Ibid.
59. See Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden and the United Nations, pp. 49-50.
60. E. Ambartsumov, "The Political Situation in Italy," New Times (Moscow), No. 23 (June 4, 1955), p. 13.
61. Pravda, April 16, 1956, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VIII, No. 16, pp. 17-18.
62. See "Austrian State Treaty, May 15, 1955," American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, I, Department of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117 (July, 1957), p. 649.
63. See Dr. Rudolph Kirchschlager, European Security Conference, A New Field of Experiment in European Collaboration (Press and Information Department, Federal Ministry For Foreign Affairs [Austria], pp. 3-4. An address by Dr. Rudolf Kirschschrager, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 25 May, 1972 within the framework of the 13th European Discussion of the City of Vienna.
64. Ibid., p. 4.
65. All figures taken from H.R. Kurz, Analysis of the Swiss Military, I/71 (Pro Helvetia Press Service), p. 20. Speech by H.R. Kurz, Chief of Information and Documentation for the Federal Military Department, Berne.
66. See, Erwin Hackel, "Military Manpower and Political Purpose," Adelphi Papers, No. 72 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), pp. 20-21.
67. See "Talks On Europe To Get Swiss Plan," The New York Times, November 19, 1972, p. 6.

Chapter 4

68. Thomas O. Schlesinger, Austrian Neutrality in Post-war Europe: The Domestic Roots of a Foreign Policy (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1972), p. 90.

69. Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality, pp. 103-4.

70. Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden and the United Nations, p. 199.

71. Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning Switzerland's Relations with the United Nations (June 16, 1969), p. 105.

72. See "International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion concerning Nanibia," Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1970-1971, Florence Renz, ed. (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972), pp. 183-88. Also in UN Monthly Chronicle, VIII (July, 1971), p. 60.

73. Report of the Federal Council, p. 127. Originally taken from the Bulletin stenographique du Conseil National, session d'ete 1968, p. 241.

74. Supplement to the Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning Switzerland's Relations with the United Nations (January, 1972), p. 9.

75. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, I, p. 204.

76. See discussion on "Relations between states and inter-governmental organizations," in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1968, I, pp. 244-49.

77. See discussion of Swiss activities in, Report of the Federal Council, pp. 66-72.

78. Report of the Federal Council, p. 67.

79. Ibid., p. 68.

80. See UN General Assembly Document (Hereafter referred to as Document) A/7922 and A/7922/Add. 2, "Consideration of Measures For the Strengthening of International Security," United Nations Publications (Hereafter referred to as UNP), May 15 and September 22, 1970.

81. UNP Document A/C. 1/L. 368/Rev. 1, "Renunciation By States of Actions Hampering The Conclusion Of An Agreement On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons," October 25, 1966.

82. UNP Document A/C. 1/L. 585, "Urgent Need For Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests," November 22, 1971.

83. UNP Document A/C. 1/L. 535/Rev. 1, "Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Extremely Harmful Aspects on World Peace and Security," November 24, 1970.

84. UNP Document A/C. 1/L. 421, "Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons: Report Of The Conference Of The Eighteen-Nation Committee On Disarmament," May 1, 1968.

85. UNP Document A/C. 1/L. 462, "Conference On Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document Of The Conference," December 13, 1968.

86. UNP Document A/C. 1/L. 593, "Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and Its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security," November 30, 1971.

87. UNP Document A/C. 1/L. 532, "Question of General and Complete Disarmament: Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament," November 13, 1970.

88. UNP Document A/C. 1/L. 589, "General and Complete Disarmament," November 30, 1971.

89. UNP Document A/C. 1/L. 530, "Urgent Need For Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests: Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament," November 11, 1970.

90. UNP Document A/L. 659, "World Disarmament Conference," December 15, 1971.

91. Jaakko Kalela, "The Nordic Group in the General Assembly," Cooperation and Conflict, III-IV, 1967, p. 166.

92. See UN Security Council Documents S/8786 and S/9853, "Report of the Secretary General in Pursuance of Resolution 253 [277] Adopted by the Security Council At Its 1428th [1535th] Meeting on 29 May 1968 [18 March 1970] Concerning the Situation In Southern Rhodesia," United Nations Publications, August 28, 1968 and July 1, 1970.

93. See UN Security Council Document S/1564, "Cablegram dated 3 July 1950 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Sweden to the Secretary General concerning the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950," July 3, 1950.

94. Quoted from the newspaper Dagens Nyheter in Sweden and the United Nations, p. 73.

95. Quoted from the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet in Sweden and the United Nations, p. 73.

96. Sweden and the United Nations, p. 73.

97. See Sydney D. Bailey, Voting In The Security Council (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), p. 229.

98. Figures calculated from UNP Document A/8411, Supplement 11, "Report Of The Committee On Contributions," October 6, 1971.

99. See UN Security Council Document S/3697, "Letter dated 28 October 1956 from the representative of Austria addressed to the Secretary-General," October 28, 1956.

100. See UNP Document A/3414, "Question Considered By The Second Emergency Special Session Of The General Assembly From 4 to 10 November 1956," December 2, 1956.

101. See UNP Document A/3436/Rev. 2, "Question Considered By the Second Emergency Special Session Of The General Assembly From 4 to 10 November 1956," December 12, 1956.

102. Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality, p. 103.

103. Sweden, Royal Ministry For Foreign Affairs, Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1968 (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 1969), p. 180.

104. Austrian Information, published by The Austrian Information Service, XXIV (November, 1971), p. 3.

Chapter 5

105. For tests of the Agreements see, EFTA Bulletin, Vol. XIII (November, 1972), pp. 1-23; and EFTA Bulletin, Vol. XIV (November, 1973), pp. 3-6.

106. See Bank of Finland Monthly Bulletin, Vols. 44-47 (March, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, December 1973), p. 11. (Same page in each volume.)

107. Ibid.

108. Kurt Waldheim, The Austrian Example (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 102.

109. Schlesinger, Austrian Neutrality, p. 95.

110. Ibid.

111. Substance of specific Austrian reply taken from Kurt Waldheim, The Austrian Example, p. 103.

112. Ibid., p. 104.

113. Schlesinger, Austrian Neutrality, p. 115.

114. All figures taken from EFTA Bulletin, XIV (Sept.-Oct., 1973), p. 13.

115. Union Bank of Switzerland, Switzerland in Figures, 1973.

116. EFTA Bulletin, XII (Jan.-Feb., 1971), p. 15.
117. Ibid.
118. Switzerland's Neutrality, Pamphlet III/71, issued by the Pro Helvetia Press Service, Zurich, pp. 12-13.
119. Ibid., p. 13.
120. Willy Zeller, "Free Trade in Europe," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XII (August, 1972), pp. 13-14.
121. Ibid., p. 14.
122. "Sweden's Foreign Trade," Fact Sheets on Sweden, published by The Swedish Institute (May, 1972).
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. "Sweden in the EEC," Common Market, X (July, 1970), p. 148.
126. Swiss Ministry For Foreign Affairs. Government Statement on the Riksdag Foreign Affairs Debate, March 23, 1972, p. 6.
127. Krister Wickman, Minister for Foreign Affairs, "Sweden's Policy of Neutrality Also A European Policy," Viewpoint, released by The Swedish Information Service (November 17, 1971), p. 3.
128. "Sweden's Policy of Neutrality," A speech by H.E. Krister Wickman, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Paasikivi Association on 27 November, 1971 (The Ministry for Foreign Affairs Press Department), p. 4.
129. Wickman, "Sweden's Policy of Neutrality Also A European Policy," p. 3.
130. "Sweden's Foreign Trade," Fact Sheets on Sweden.
131. EFTA Bulletin, XIII (November, 1972), p. 4.
132. EFTA Bulletin, XIV (November, 1973), p. 4.
133. EFTA Bulletin, XIII (November, 1972), p. 10.
134. EFTA Bulletin, XIV (July-August, 1973), p. 19.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. General Sources

- Andren, Nils. "The Special Conditions of the Baltic Sub-region." Europe and the Superpowers. Edited by Robert S. Jordan. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971.
- Birnbaum, Karl E. "The Nordic Countries and European Security." Cooperation and Conflict, 1 (1968), 1-17.
- Bjøl, Erling. "A Soviet View of Northern Europe." Cooperation and Conflict, 2 (1967), 112-15.
- Black, Cyril E.; Falk, Richard A.; Knorr, Klaus, and Young, Oran R. Neutralization and World Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.
- Brodin, K.; Goldmann, K., and Lange, C. "The Policy of Neutrality Official Doctrines of Finland and Sweden." Cooperation and Conflict, 1 (1968), 18-51.
- Brundtland, Arne Olav. "The Nordic Balance." Cooperation and Conflict, 2 (1966), 30-63.
- Collins, Edward, Jr., ed. International Law in a Changing World. New York: Random House, 1970.
- Crabb, Cecil V., Jr. The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965.
- Department of State. Charter of the United Nations Together With the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Publication 2353, Conference Series 74, 1945.
- Department of the Army Field Manual. The Law of Land Warfare, No. 27-10. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956.
- Dulles, John Foster. "The Cost of Peace." Bulletin, XXXIV, Department of State Publication 886. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956, 999-1000.
- EFTA Bulletin, X (April, 1969); XI (April, 1970); XII (January-February, 1971), (April, 1971); XIII (April, 1972), (November, 1972); XIV (April, 1973), (July-August, 1973), (September-October, 1973), (November, 1973).
- Hadik, Laszlo. "The Process of Debate In Europe." Orbis, XIII (Winter, 1970), 1008-28.
- Hirschman, Albert O. "The Stability of Neutralism: A Geometric Note." Economic Theories of International Politics. Edited by Bruce M. Russett. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968, 292-303.

- Jacobsen, Kurt. "Voting Behavior of the Nordic Countries in the General Assembly." Cooperation and Conflict, 3-4 (1967), 139-57.
- Kalola, Jaakko. "The Nordic Group in the General Assembly." Cooperation and Conflict, 3-4 (1967), 158-69.
- Kaplan, Morton A., and Katzenbach, Nicholas deB. The Political Foundations of International Law. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961.
- Korbel, Josef. Detente In Europe: Real or Imaginary. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Lalive. "International Organization and Neutrality." British Yearbook of International Law, XXIV (1947).
- Lidstrom, Jan-Erik and Wiklund, Claes. "The Nordic Countries in the General Assembly and its two Political Committees." Cooperation and Conflict, 3-4 (1967), 171-87.
- Lyon, Peter. Neutralism. Leicester University Press, 1963.
- Mates, L. "Nonalignment and the Great Powers." Foreign Affairs, XLVIII (April, 1970), 525-36.
- Moberg, Erik. "The 'Nordic Balance' Concept." Cooperation and Conflict, 3 (1968), 210-14.
- OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series A (October, 1972; 1973), 42, 44, 54, 56, 98, 100, 102, 104. (Same pages in both sources.)
- Ogley, Roderick. The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1970.
- Perala, Ratnam. "Non-Alignment in the Seventies." India Quarterly, XXVI (July-September, 1970), 258-68.
- Pravda, April 16, 1956. Translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VIII, No. 16.
- Riste, Olav. "The Great Powers and the Northern Cap, 1940-45." Cooperation and Conflict, 1 (1972), 1-12.
- Roberts, J.M. Europe, 1880-1945. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967.
- Schacter, Oscar. "Legal Issues at the United Nations." Annual Review of United Nations Affairs: 1960-1961. Edited by Richard N. Swift. New York: Oceana Publications, 1960.
- Scott, James Brown, ed. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. New York: Oxford University Press, 1915.

- Shay, T.L. "Nonalignment si, Neutralism no." Review of Politics, XXX (April, 1968), 228-45.
- Swift, Richard N. International Law: Current and Classic. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969.
- Tarschys, Daniel. "Neutrality and the Common Market: the Soviet View." Cooperation and Conflict, 2 (1971), 65-75.
- "The League of Nations Covenant." Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, VIII (July, 1919), 485-512.
- Tornudd, Klaus. "A New Contribution to the Theory of Neutral Foreign Policy." Cooperation and Conflict, 4 (1970), 282-85.
- U.N. General Assembly Document A/C. 1/L. 368/Rev. 1. "Renunciation By States Of Actions Hampering The Conclusion Of An Agreement On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons." United Nations Publications, October 25, 1966.
- _____. A/C. 1/L. 421. "Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons: Report Of The Conference Of The Eighteen-Nation Committee On Disarmament." United Nations Publications, May 1, 1968.
- _____. A/C. 1/L. 462. "Conference On Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document Of The Conference." United Nations Publications, December 13, 1968.
- _____. A/7922 and A/7922/Add. 2. "Consideration of Measures For the Strengthening of International Security." United Nations Publications, May 15 and September 22, 1970.
- _____. A/C. 1/L. 535/Rev. 1. "Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Extremely Harmful Aspects on World Peace and Security." United Nations Publications, November 24, 1970.
- _____. A/8411, Supplement 11. "Report Of The Committee On Contributions." United Nations Publications, October 6, 1971.
- _____. A/C. 1/L. 585. "Urgent Need For Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests." United Nations Publications, November 22, 1971.
- _____. A/C. 1/L. 593. "Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security." United Nations Publications, November 30, 1971.

U.N. Security Council Document S/8786. "Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Resolution 253 Adopted by the Security Council At Its 1428th Meeting On 29 May 1968 Concerning the Situation In Southern Rhodesia." United Nations Publications, August 28, 1968.

_____. S/9853. "Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Resolution 277 Adopted by the Security Council At Its 1535th Meeting On 18 March 1970 Concerning the Situation In Southern Rhodesia." United Nations Publications, July 1, 1970.

Whiteman, Marjorie M. "Neutralized and Neutral States." Digest of International Law, I (1963), 342-64.

_____. "Neutrality in a Changing World." Digest of International Law, XI (1968), 139-461.

Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.

Zeller, Willy. "The Neutrals and European Integration." Swiss Review of World Affairs, XX (December, 1970), 7.

B. Sources Specific To Austria

Ambartsumov, E. "The Political Situation in Italy." New Times (Moscow), No. 23 (June 4, 1955).

Bader, William B. Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966.

Department of State. "Austrian State Treaty, May 15, 1955." American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, I, Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117 (July, 1957).

Kirchschlager, Rudolf. "Reflection On Austrian Foreign Policy In 1970." Address given by Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Rudolf Kirchschlager, on 17 November, 1970 to the Austrian Society for Foreign Affairs and International Relations, Vienna. Federal Ministry For Foreign Affairs, Press and Information Department, 1970.

_____. "Thoughts On Austrian Foreign Policy, 1971." An Address delivered by Dr. Rudolf Kirchschlager, Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, on November 25, 1971 to the Austrian Association for Foreign Policy and International Relations. Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Press and Information Department, 1971.

- _____. "European Security Conference: A New Field Of Experiment in European Collaboration." An Address by Dr. Rudolf Kirchschlager, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 25 May, 1972 within the framework of the "13th European Discussion" of the City of Vienna. Federal Ministry For Foreign Affairs, Press and Information Department, 1972.
- _____. "Austria And The United Nations." An Address by Dr. Rudolf Kirchschlager, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 24 October, 1972 to the Austrian United Nations Association. Federal Ministry For Foreign Affairs, Press and Information Department, 1972.
- Kreisky, Bruno. "Austria Draws the Balance." Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (January, 1959), 269-81.
- Schlesinger, Thomas O. Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe: The Domestic Roots of a Foreign Policy. Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1972.
- The Austrian Information Service. Austrian Information, XXIV (November, 1971).
- _____. "OECD: Economic Survey On Austria." Austrian Information, XXV (December, 1972), 3-4, 13-15.
- The New York Times, November 14, 1971.
- U.N. General Assembly Document A/L. 659. "World Disarmament Conference." United Nations Publications, December 15, 1971.
- U.N. Security Council Document S/3697. "Letter dated 28 October 1956 from the representative of Austria addressed to the Secretary-General." United Nations Publications, October 28, 1956.
- Verdross, Alfred. "Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization." American Journal of International Law, L (January, 1956), 61-68.
- Waldheim, Kurt. The Austrian Example. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971.

C. Sources Specific To Finland

- Bank of Finland Monthly Bulletin, Vols. 44-47 (March, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973; December 1973).
- Finnish Political Science Association. Finnish Foreign Policy: Studies In Foreign Politics. Vammala, Finland, 1963.
- Forster, Kent. "The Finnish-Soviet Crisis of 1958-59." International Journal, XV (Spring, 1960), 47-50.

- Harto, Hakovirta. "Western European Integration and Finnish Neutrality." Cooperation and Conflict, I (1970), 129-36.
- Holst, Johan Jorgen. "The Soviet Union and Nordic Security." Cooperation and Conflict, 3-4 (1971), 137-45.
- Holsti, K. J. "Strategy and Technique of Influence in Soviet-Finnish Relations." The Western Political Quarterly, XVII (March, 1964), 71-74.
- Jakobson, Max. Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War. London: Hugh Evelyn Limited, 1968.
- The Finnish Political Science Association. Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy. Vammala, Finland, 1969. Especially: Pajunen, Aimo. "Finland's Security Policy"; Maentakanen, Erkki. "Finland and Regional Economic Integration in Western Europe"; Vesa, Hannu. "The Problem of Germany in Current Finnish Foreign Policy"; and von Bonsdorff, Goran. "Finland As A Member of the Nordic Community."
- The New York Times, April 27, November 25, December 3, 1969; March 16, June 2, December 11, 1970; January 5, May 23, 1971.
- Tornudd, Klaus. "Finland and Economic Integration in Europe." Cooperation and Conflict, I (1969), 63-71.
- Vayrynen, Raimo. "A Case Study of Sanctions: Finland-The Soviet Union in 1958-59." Cooperation and Conflict, 2 (1969), 205-33.
- Vilkuna, Tuomas, ed. Neutrality: The Finnish Position. Speeches by Dr. Urho Kekkonen. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1970. Especially: "The Creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in Scandinavia." and "Finland's Path In A World of Tensions."
- Wahlback, Krister. "Finnish Foreign Policy: Some Comparative Perspectives." Cooperation and Conflict, 4 (1969), 282-98.
- Wuorinen, John H. A History of Finland. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965.

D. Sources Specific To Sweden

- Andren, Nils. Power-Balance and Non-Alignment. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967.
- Bailey, Sydney D. Voting In The Security Council. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969.

Dagens Nyheter. Translated in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs publication, Sweden and the United Nations. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956.

Hancock, M. Donald. Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1972.

Palme, Olof. "A Strategy For Survival." Viewpoint. The Swedish Information Service. (October 20, 1970), 1-8.

_____. "Statement by Prime Minister Olof Palme in the Plenary Meeting, June 6, 1972." Swedish Delegation to the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment.

Royal Swedish Embassy. "Interview with Mr. Krister Wickman, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, published in the Government Executive magazine, August 1972." Washington, D.C., 1972.

_____. "Interview with Mr. Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden, on WETA-FM Radio in Washington, D.C. and other Public Broadcasting Stations all over United States, on January 3, 1973." Washington, D.C., 1973.

_____. "Government statement made at the Foreign Affairs Debate in the Riksdag on March 21, 1973." Washington, D.C., 1973.

Ryding, Goran. "Speech by Ambassador Ryding at the General Debate of the Multilateral Preparatory Talks in Helsinki on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe." Ministry For Foreign Affairs [Sweden], (November 30, 1972), 1-8.

Svenska Dagbladet. Translated in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs publication, Sweden and the United Nations. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956.

"Sweden in the EEC." Common Market, X (July, 1970), 148-50.

Sweden, Royal Ministry For Foreign Affairs. Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1968. Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet 1969.

Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Sweden and the United Nations. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956.

The Swedish Institute. "Sweden's Foreign Trade." Fact Sheets on Sweden, (May, 1972).

_____. "Swedish Foreign Policy." Fact Sheets on Sweden, (September, 1972).

- _____. "The Swedish Defense." Fact Sheets on Sweden, (August, 1972).
- U.N. General Assembly Document A/3413. "Question Considered By The Second Emergency Special Session Of The General Assembly From 4 To 10 November 1956." United Nations Publications, December 2, 1956.
- _____. A/3436/Rev.2. "Question Considered By The Second Emergency Special Session Of The General Assembly From 4 To 10 November 1956." United Nations Publications, December 12, 1956.
- _____. A/C. 1/L. 530. "Urgent Need For Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests: Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament." United Nations Publications, November 11, 1970.
- _____. A/C. 1/L. 532. "Question of General and Complete Disarmament: Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament." United Nations Publications, November 13, 1970.
- _____. A/C. 1/L. 589. "General and Complete Disarmament." United Nations Publications, November 30, 1971.
- U.N. Security Council Document S/1564. "Cablegram dated 3 July 1950 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Sweden to the Secretary-General concerning the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950." United Nations Publications, July 3, 1950.
- Wickman, Krister. "Speech by Mr. Kirster Wickman, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the General Assembly of the United Nations, on October 11, 1972." Ministry For Foreign Affairs, Press Department, 1972.
- _____. "Sweden's Policy of Neutrality." The Ministry For Foreign Affairs, Press Department, 1971.
- _____. "Helsinki--A Promise For Cooperation." Viewpoint. The Swedish Information Service, (July 26, 1973), 1-5.
- _____. "Sweden's Policy of Neutrality Also A European Policy." Viewpoint. The Swedish Information Service, (November 17, 1971), 1-4.
- Wiebel, Robert. "Neutral? Yes. Indifferent? No." Sweden Now, III (April, 1969), 22-23, 49-50.

E. Sources Specific To Switzerland

- de Salis, J.-R. Switzerland and Europe. London: Oswald Wolff, Ltd., 1971.

Fueter, Eduard. Switzerland, Small-Scale Model Of Europe.
Pro Helvetia Press Service, Zurich, Pamphlet x/70.

"International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion concerning
Namibia." Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1970-
1971. Edited by Florence Renz. Dobbs Ferry, New York:
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972.

Kurz, H.R. Analysis of the Swiss Military. Pro Helvetia Press
Service, Zurich, Pamphlet I/71.

Renschler, Walter. Switzerland's Neutrality. Pro Helvetia
Press Service, Zurich, Pamphlet III/71.

Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning
Switzerland's Relations with the United Nations, June
16, 1969.

Supplement to the Report of the Federal Council to the Federal
Assembly concerning Switzerland's Relations with the
United Nations, January, 1972.

Swiss Ministry For Foreign Affairs. Government Statement in the
Riksdag Foreign Affairs Debate, March 23, 1972.

Swiss National Tourist Office. Switzerland. Zurich, 1969.

The New York Times, November 19, 1972.

Union Bank of Switzerland. Switzerland in Figures, 1973.

Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, I (1965).

_____, 1968, I (1969).

Zeller, Willy. "Free Trade in Europe." Swiss Review of World
Affairs, XII (August, 1972), 13-14.

NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE

by

DAVID ALAN RENSCH

B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University, 1972

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1974

State neutrality, long a position of aloof separation from international politics, re-emerged after the second World War with more clearly positive functions. In a world setting of collective security, economic cooperation, and strategic military interests, neutrality has come to play an active and important role in world politics and European stability.

Within the areas of military and security aspects of the neutral countries, their international political behavior, and their international economic behavior, the European neutrals-- Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland--have had to maintain the credibility of their neutral status against external pressures of both systemic and theoretical origin. The East-West division of Europe and the broader political and ideological division among the superpowers has put pressure on neutrality by limiting the areas of feasible action by the neutral countries in their efforts at presenting neutrality as a viable foreign policy. Another pressure on neutrality arises from the question of neutrality's relevance in a nuclear war. Neutrality prior to World War II was a concept related to war, and that view has carried over into the post 1945 era. With the total destructiveness of nuclear weapons and their possession, as well as possession of a credible defence against nuclear weapons, limited to a few nation states, neutrality no longer appears as a viable foreign policy. Yet, neutrality becomes more relevant and credible as deterrence becomes more stable and war less likely. Therefore, neutrality is not a policy which has been put on the level of preparing for war. To the contrary, neutral

countries have attempted to acquire relevance and credibility through positive contributions in world affairs which will help to strengthen East-West detente. Detente and neutrality are interdependent factors of European stability, each reinforcing the other.

In order to contribute to the attainment of these conditions, the four European neutrals have refrained from following a line of foreign policy which might tend to benefit one superpower at the expense of the other. Attempting to maintain a central position between East and West, each neutral has stressed independence in foreign policy as a way to reconcile neutrality with international politics. Underlying this approach is the fact that neutral credibility depends on maintaining the status quo. The adherence to independence in foreign affairs has not released the four European neutrals from the necessity of channeling their foreign policies to fit the boundaries of neutrality. Their need has been to project the role of neutrality into a status of constructive international involvement which would contribute to world peace, and thereby promote the legitimacy of neutrality.

Although each of the four European neutrals has its own form of neutrality and its own international setting, they are now faced with the task of conducting their foreign policies to support detente while, at the same time, establishing their neutral credibility in a world with alliances, political and economic organizations, and conflicting ideologies. How this is done, as well as whether or not it will remain possible in the

future, has direct implications for the future stability of Europe.