

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
AND NORTH KOREAN ARMIES, 1945-1950

by

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**THIS BOOK  
CONTAINS  
NUMEROUS PAGES  
WITH MULTIPLE  
PENCIL AND/OR  
PEN MARKS  
THROUGHOUT THE  
TEXT.**

**THIS IS THE BEST  
IMAGE AVAILABLE.**

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The Korean War, June 1950-July 1953, was not only an international conflict between the United Nations and the Communist bloc, but also the life-and-death struggle between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). After the Second World War, Communist bloc nations threatened Western interests in Berlin, Greece, Italy, Iran, Turkey, Indochina and Korea. The Communist North Koreans, supplied by the U.S.S.R. invaded South Korea and in November 1950, received support from Communist Chinese volunteers. The R.O.K. and the United Nations, led by the U.S.A., fought against this invasion. It was to counter the Communist threat in Korea that the Western nations acted, and it became a life-and-death struggle for the realization of the unification of their country for Koreans.

As a Korean Army officer, the writer is interested in the Korean War, especially during the initial stage when the South and North Korean Armies alone fought against each other. If there would be a next war in Korea, that will highly likely be the fight between the South and North, although the patron nations will probably supply the equipment. Since the Vietnam War in which the U.S. withdrew its forces unwillingly, American foreign policy has shifted under domestic pressure, from a commitment of its ground forces on Korean soil, although it would support the R.O.K. with its air and naval power. So, in any future war, the R.O.K. Army should expect to meet the challenge of its counterpart in the North alone, and be



powerful enough to resist its opponent's force if the R.O.K. is to survive. Of course, there are many differences in the national and combat strengths of both nations between 1950 and today. Also, it is very unlikely that the next war in Korea will follow the same courses as that of 1950, but it is still worthwhile for Koreans and historians in general to examine the course of events in the preliminary and initial stages of the Korean War. Such an examination can give South Koreans some valuable lessons: what measures they should take to prevent such future disaster; and what condition they should avoid.

During the initial period of the War, the North Korean Army was highly successful against its opponent; it broke through the South's defensive lines in a day; it defeated the piecemeal counterattack of Southern forces the next day; it drove southward continuously; and after four-days fighting it not only occupied Seoul, the capital city of the South, but also almost shattered all of the South Korean Army--the South Korean Army was almost non-existent at that time from the point of military command structure and equipment.

The success of the North Korean Army was not only due to the surprise attack but also to its superiority in the combat effectiveness in June 1950. How did it achieve such superiority over the South? This writer tries to solve this question by an examination of the history of both Armies' development before the outbreak of the war.

The study of the development of a nation's army can be approached in various ways; from the view-points of national objectives and policy; from that of available resources (the nation's economy, numbers of levying population, and technical development); from the purely military angle (the

degree of potential enemy's threat, violence, military policy, doctrine, military budget, education and training, and military organization and command structure); from the view of external assistance (supporting country's policy, doctrine, and amount of assistance); and others.

This thesis will concentrate on military points and only briefly discuss other ones because those are closely related to each other and because other aspects affected military ones, too. So, the thesis will examine the Korean situation of June 1950 from the military points of view. How did the situation happen? What made the military unbalance possible?

The development of both armies can be divided into three periods. First, the period from 1945 to 1950, both sides started to build up their armies and this period shows many differences between them. Second, during the Korean War, both forces experienced the feeling of a victory, defeat and stalemate. Many changes occurred rapidly and both Armies reached almost the same level of development by the end of the hostilities. After the war and until today, each side has struggled to achieve a military autonomy from its sponsoring country. Each has achieved some progress. The last two periods are however beyond the scope of this study. The thesis will deal with the first period: the infancy of both armies and their preparations for war.

The main objective of this thesis is to examine factors influential in the development of both armies. Many important factors outside and within the armies were decisive. Among these outside factors the writer has concentrated on the sponsoring country's contributions: their policy and interest in Korea, the equipment they supplied, and the transfer of veterans from without Korea. The thesis also treats the impact of the internal

political situations in South and North Korea. On the factors within the armies, the writer considers training, organization, and equipment. Both external and internal factors did not act independently; they interacted upon each other to affect the development of the military balance on the peninsula.

The other objective of the thesis is to discern the significant differences in the pattern of the development of each army. What were the main differences? What caused the differences--the sponsoring nations' policies or interests, advisors' activities, or trainee's attitude? What were the consequences of the differences and how did they affect the initial outcome of the military operations?

Since few readers know much Korean history in general, a substantial portion of the study has been devoted to this background of both states. Then follows a description of the relationships among the Korean states, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and China to provide an adequate appreciation of Korean affairs and of the patron countries' policies, and military conceptions. Following this introduction, the thesis discusses the development of both armies through an examination of organization, equipment, and training which the sponsoring countries provided and which the client states exercised.

In regard to bibliographical data, few studies have been done on the military background of the conflict, although many books about the Korean War have been published.<sup>1</sup> Among the U.S. official histories, one book (Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War) deals with the development of the R.O.K. Army and the other book (GHQ FEC MIS, GS, History of the North Korean Army, restricted documents) considers the North Korean Army. Some other books mention briefly the development of both

Armies. For instance, Roy E. Appleman, in his book, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950), deals with the development of both armies in one chapter and James F. Schnabel, in his book, Policy and Direction: The First Year, does so in one chapter.<sup>2</sup>

## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KOREAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIPS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT KOREAN GOVERNMENT<sup>3</sup>

Korea has a long history. Located on a peninsula with distinct boundaries but with the disadvantage of being at a crossroads of civilization, and peopled by a race which many centuries ago became unified as a distinct group with its own physical and cultural characteristics, Korea has grown to a nation-state.<sup>4</sup>

The size of Korea is overshadowed by its neighbors, though not diminutive within the present world community. Japan is almost 70 per cent larger, China almost 43 times Korea's size, the adjoining Russo-Siberian land-mass is beyond compare. However, protecting this overawed position are firm boundaries: the sea on three sides and on the other the long northern border formed by two great rivers, the Yalu and Tumen, whose west and east-flowing waters rise in the same mountain mass. They have defined Korea as a geopolitical unit since the fifteenth century. The nations around her have long been larger and, often, more aggressive. They have coveted her strategic position.<sup>5</sup> *carved*

The origin of the Korean people, like that of other old nations, is obscure. Tradition places the founding of Korean society in the year 2333 B.C. by a mythical personage named Tan'gun. Recorded Korean history begins with the period known as the Three Kingdoms, 57 B.C. to 668 A.D.<sup>6</sup> During this period the country was divided into three parts. The northern section occupied by the warlike kingdom of Koguryo, whose territory extended over

the greater part of Manchuria as well as over northern part of Korea, engaged in two great wars with China, in the seventh century, from which the Koreans were victors. But, Silla, allied with the T'ang dynasty of China, soon overthrew the two rival Kingdoms in 668 and pushed back the colonial T'ang's forces from the Korean Peninsula in 677.<sup>7</sup> The supremacy of Silla lasted for almost three hundred years.

Koryo (918-1392), the dynasty following Silla, was established as a result of the rebellion of Wang Kien. It was during this period that the name of Korea came to be applied to the country by Westerners. The last two centuries of this era were disturbed by the recurrent invasions of Mongols. The Koryo kingdom had also to wage constant warfare against Japanese piracy during most of the fourteenth century.<sup>8</sup>

General Yi T'aejo in 1392 finished the dissolution of Koryo by establishing his own dynasty in a new capital, Seoul. During Yi dynasty the Japanese invaded Korea in 1592 and overran most of the country. Seven years of conflict put an end to the prosperity of the country, and resulted in the withdrawal of Japanese troops by the aid of China.<sup>9</sup> The country never recovered from this blow. The twice Manchu invasions of 1627 and 1636 made quicker work of subjugation and added further weakening of Korea. From 1637 to 1875, Korea remained in isolation.<sup>10</sup>

#### Korea in Isolation (1637-1876)

In less than fifty years, Korea suffered from three great wars with the Japanese and Manchus. The King of Yi dynasty, although forced in 1637 to go through the formality of accepting the suzerainty of the Manchu emperor, began almost immediately to implement the policy of seclusion from the world which he and his predecessors had long desired to adopt. It was,

of course, possible for Korea to remain a hermit for nearly two and one-half centuries until 1876 only because neither the Manchus in China nor the Tokugawa in Japan were interested in further aggrandizement in the peninsula.<sup>11</sup>

From 1609 on contacts with Japan were officially limited to the southern port of Pusan. Except for this port, no Japanese were permitted to live in the country. Only forty Japanese junks a year were permitted to visit Pusan for purposes of trade. Official relations with Japan consisted of the dispatch of a congratulatory mission each time a new Shogun was appointed in that country. The last of these missions was received in 1811 on the islands of Tsushima.

Although the king observed his obligation to send an annual tribute mission to Peking and received an occasional ambassador from the Manchu emperor, the Chinese were generally excluded as strictly as any other foreigners. The greatest care was taken to prevent the Manchus from gaining intelligence of domestic developments connected with the execution of the exclusion policy; the king gradually adopted the custom of lodging the Manchu ambassador at a ceremonial pavilion outside the capital, where he could neither spy nor intrigue.<sup>12</sup>

In 1653 there occurred a small incident of interest to Westerners. A Dutch ship, the Sparrow Hawk, was wrecked on the island of Quelpart (Cheju-do in Korean) and the thirty-six survivors were brought to Seoul for investigation. They were forbidden to leave the country and were turned loose to earn their living as best they could. Thirteen years later eight of these men succeeded in escaping to Japan, and from there returned to Holland. On his return home, Hendrik Hamel wrote an account of his

adventures which provides the Western world the first authentic report of Korea.<sup>13</sup>

Adapting to the Western World and as  
Japanese Colony, 1860-1945

In 1860 Korea acquired a third powerful neighbor, Russia, when the latter obtained the Maritime Province from China.<sup>14</sup> After 1860 many powers showed a great interest in Korea, and a number of incidents arose because the Koreans were determined to keep out all foreigners. In 1861, 1866 and 1875, French, American, and Japanese gunboats, respectively, appeared off the Korean coast in reprisal for the persecution of Catholic missionaries and Korean converts and demanded trade with Korea. These ships were wrecked or repulsed by the Korean native forces. Only the Japanese acted swiftly and achieved decisive results. They regarded the opening of Korea as a vital interest and dispatched gunboats and military transports into Korean waters to enforce Japan's specific demands. The result was a Korean-Japanese treaty of commerce, signed on 26 February 1876.<sup>15</sup>

The treaty of 1876 was important in early Korean isolation. Korea had an unequal treaty with an Asian power, westernized Japan, and from this treaty on the country was soon opened to foreign trade. China, Korea's suzerain power, awed by Japanese power, advised the Koreans to conclude treaties with as many western powers as possible: the United States (1882), England and Germany (1883), Italy and Russia (1884), and France (1886).<sup>16</sup>

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there were power struggles between internal rivals as well as outside powers. Among the internal factions were: the Mins, who were backed by the Queen; the regent, who was the King's father; the progressives, and the conservatives. Those



four factions intermingled to gain power. Thus Korea was weakened further by the international contention. In 1894 a rebellion of the Tong Hak, a religious group, took place, and the Korean court asked the Chinese government for assistance to suppress the rebellion. While the Chinese troops arrived on Korean soil, the Japanese landed at Inch'on, also. Thus the Sino-Japanese War broke out in Korea. Japan quickly seized the King and organized a new Korean government. The war ended in a quick defeat of China, and by the treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on 20 April 1895, China recognized "the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea."<sup>17</sup>

Russia with Germany and France opposed the Japanese grab for spoils, and gained a foothold at Port Arthur and many concessions in Manchuria. After several abortive attempts to gain support from the U.S., the Korean court fled to the Russian Legation in Seoul and opposed the Japanese high handedness.<sup>18</sup> This Korean shift towards Russia aroused English anxieties over Russian expansion and sped up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Backed by England, Japan won the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and finally established a Japanese protectorate over Korea in 1905. The Korean Emperor sent a secret mission to the President of the United States, asking for help and pointing out the protectorate treaty was imposed by force of arms. But President Theodore Roosevelt ignored the appeal and most Westerners in Korea generally welcomed the Japanese entry.<sup>19</sup>

From 1905 on Japan gained a firm hand in Korea and annexed it in 1910, while the Western powers either abstained or acquiesced. Despite many nationalist insurrections in Korea, the nationalists were ignored by Westerners. After the First World War, along with a new spirit of nationalism the Korean independence movement forged a new chapter in Korean history.

A peaceful demonstration of thousands of unarmed citizens and students took place in 1919 in Seoul and many other centers throughout the country. The movement was, on the surface, brutally and completely suppressed. This unsuccessful demonstration led to the foundation of the Korean Provisional Government by the exiled nationalists in Shanghai in 1919. The members of the Provisional Government came from various social and regional backgrounds. The Provisional Government could not achieve a viable coalition of its divergent ideas and opinions, and its activities were not recognized by the Western powers.<sup>20</sup> The Korean Communist Party was admitted into the Comintern in 1926 and was directed by the latter. The joint activity of the Korean Communist and Chinese Communist in Manchuria was very successful before the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1937. The Manchurian Incident of 1931 and Sino-Japanese Conflict of 1937 gave motives to unite various nationalist and communist independence movements against Japan, the common foe. But they soon parted company and split within their ranks. Japanese arrested many leaders within their occupation area.<sup>21</sup>

Immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, exiled Koreans hopefully applied to the Allies for recognition of the Korean Provisional Government or at least for an official declaration looking toward the independence of Korea. But Korean efforts did not gain more than expressions of sympathy. The Chinese Government alone aided financially by indirect means and encouraged the Korean independence movement of the Provisional Government, but granted it no official recognition.<sup>22</sup>

At the Cairo Conference, President Roosevelt with Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made the first Allied commitment concerning Korea. They declared on 1 December 1943 that they were determined that in due course Korea should become free and independent.

Before the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin met at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. While territorial and other concessions to the U.S.S.R. were discussed, Roosevelt advocated a trusteeship for Korea administered by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China. Looking back at American experience in the Philippines, Roosevelt surmised that such trusteeship might last for twenty or thirty years. Stalin said that he believed that Great Britain should also be a trustee. No actual mention of Korea was made in the document recording the agreements at Yalta.<sup>23</sup>

When the Soviet Union declared war against Japan on 8 August 1945, it announced its adherence to the Potsdam Declaration which included reference to the Cairo Declaration. When the Russians launched their major attack into Korea, U.S. officials in Washington concluded that, unless they were checked, the Russians could occupy all of Korea before American troops arrived. So, in a hurry, Colonel Charles H. Bonsteel, the Chief of the Policy Section of the Strategy and Policy Group in War Department Operation Division, drew the dividing line along the 38th parallel as the Japanese surrender line to Russian and American troops in Korea. Bonsteel's prime consideration was to establish a surrender line as far north as he thought the Soviets would accept and, at the same time, prevent them from seizing all of Korea. His recommendation was approved by President Truman and also later accepted by the Soviets.<sup>24</sup>

Before the plans for Korean independence could be implemented, military occupation of Korea in two separate zones had already become an accomplished fact, with the entry of Russian combat troops into North Korea on 10 August and of American troops into South Korea on 8 September.<sup>25</sup>

Military Occupation and Establishment of the Governments  
of the R.O.K. and D.P.R.K., 1945-1950

On 13 August 1945, Washington designated General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers accepting the Japanese surrender in the Pacific and occupying Japan. General MacArthur, in turn, assigned XXIV Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, to carry out the terms of surrender in Korea and to occupy and administer South Korea on behalf of the United States. General Hodge became commander of the United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) on 27 August 1945.<sup>26</sup>

A small advance party from the XXIV Corps landed at Kimp'o Airfield near Seoul at noon on 4 September. Four days later, the bulk of the corps landed at Inch'on and entered Seoul. General MacArthur issued a proclamation to the people of Korea on 7 September establishing American military control over all Korea south of the 38th Parallel. He declared:

Having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and the determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. The Korean people are assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the Instrument of Surrender and to protect you in your personal and religious rights. . . . All persons will obey promptly all my orders and orders issued under my authority. Acts of resistance to the occupying forces or any acts which may disturb public peace and safety will be punished severely.<sup>27</sup>

General Hodge almost immediately ran into political difficulties in the South. Washington officials did not provide adequate policy for handling Koreans, neither had the occupation forces the skill to govern Koreans, nor had the Koreans any political and administrative skills. The occupation forces did not understand the Korean sentiment and passion to be independent. And the Koreans were very impatient. The USAFIK, at first, had to use Japanese to administer Koreans. This was very frustrating to the Koreans,

as no Koreans wanted to be governed by their former rulers. This insensitivity to Korean nationalism aroused strong protests. The USAFIK quickly abandoned this and, instead, tried to govern Koreans directly. This proved very difficult, too, because of the language problem. There were very few American soldiers who knew the Korean language, and so they relied upon interpreters. The USAFIK also tried to train Koreans for the civil administration and government. The Koreans wanted to acquire their independence, but lacked any political training and experience. Many Korean political parties sprouted. None of them had the widespread popular support from all elements of the population. The USAFIK, contrary to the Russians in the North, neither acknowledged nor supported any one of these political parties because U.S. tradition opposed such political favoritism.<sup>28</sup>

On 17 August 1945, with the approach of allied victory over Japan, Kim Koo, head of the Korean Provisional Government in exile in Chungking, petitioned President Truman, through the U.S. Ambassador to China, for permission to send representatives of his Provisional Government to Korea and sought to participate in "all Councils affecting the present and future destiny of Korea and Koreans." No immediate action was taken on this request, but General Hodge, a few days after arriving in Korea, suggested to General MacArthur that leaders of the Korean Provisional Government be returned to Korea under allied sponsorship to act as "figureheads" until the political situation stabilized and elections could be held.<sup>29</sup>

While this action was not taken in the manner Hodge had suggested, the USAFIK approved the return of members of the Korean Provisional Government individually, merely providing transportation. Each on returning to Korea was required to sign a statement agreeing to abide by the laws and )

regulations of the Military Government.<sup>30</sup> It was regrettable for both Americans and Koreans that the U.S. Government did not acknowledge the authority of the Korean Provisional Government during the war, and even after it. Further, it was unfortunate that the Military Government did not give necessary support to the organization that many Koreans thought rightfully deserved it. That the Provisional Government had great popularity and prestige was shown by the welcoming crowd on their return. They had fought more than twenty years in exile for the independence of Korea. They had not compromised with the Japanese, nor had they surrendered, although the manner which they chose to achieve their goal had been a brutal struggle against the Japanese imperialists; the only reasonable alternative for governing South Korea open to the U.S. Military Government lay with these nationalists. In Korea after severe Japanese rule for 36 years, Koreans lacked any democratic tradition, nor did they have governmental experience, nor was an existent organization able to gain broad conscious support. Such an organization within Korea had it had the capability would have been rejected as a collaborationist group. The organization had to be created after 1945 and needed the toleration and active support of the new occupation authority. Many of the Military Government's difficulties came about because it rejected the authority of the Provisional Government. Many Koreans regretted this, but not through outward hostility. They were accustomed to political repression and accepted the established authority. The American officials scarcely understood the Korean situation--the population's feelings and perceptions. The rejection of Korean Provisional Government by the U.S. Military authorities was in stark contrast to Soviet policy in North Korea. The Soviets knew much about Korea due to their geographical proximity and /

through their comintern contacts with Korean Communists. They chose one of these and supported his struggle for political power. They fostered the legend of Kim Il Sung and strongly supported him because of his record of loyalty to the Comintern.

Moreover, the individual entrance of the Provisional Government members into Korea affected the development of R.O.K. Army, too. The transportation provided by the USAFIK was applicable to high officials only. Other members and veterans could not use the transportation. Veterans of Korean Independent forces could enter Korea individually by land. They were screened at the China-Korean border by the Soviet forces as was the case with the forces of Kim Mu Chong in late 1945. These veterans were allowed to enter individually without arms. If they had returned to Korea as a unit, and had then been recognized by the USAFIK, they could have maintained their solidarity and hence easily transferred to the core of the R.O.K. Army.

When the foreign ministers of the U.S., Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. met in Moscow in late December 1945, a seemingly constructive plan of trusteeship for Korea was worked out among these officials. Under this plan a U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint commission was to be formed to recommend, after consulting with Korean political parties and social organizations, the creation of a provisional Korean democratic government for all of the peninsula. The ministers directed the commission to consult with this provisional Korean government and to draw up a program, which would be considered by their own governments. The object would be an agreement to form a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.<sup>31</sup>

When news of the trusteeship proposal with its "up to five years" clause reached South Korea, many Koreans reacted violently. In contrast,



the Korean Communists announced their support of the trusteeship proposals on 3 January 1946. They shifted their position almost overnight from anti-trusteeship to pro-trusteeship and alienated many Koreans.<sup>32</sup>

The conferences of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission in Korea began on 16 January 1947 and ran for many sessions through July 1947. The Russians insisted that only Korean groups, fully supporting the Moscow agreement, were eligible for membership in a provisional government. The only eligible political group was the Korean Communist Party which the USAFIK could not admit.<sup>33</sup>

The Russians brought back to North Korea thousands of Korean expatriates who had lived, studied and become completely communized in the U.S.S.R. On 3 October 1945, the Russians introduced into North Korea one of these Koreans, born Kim Sung Chu, but traveling under the alias of Kim Il Sung. Backed by the Russians, Kim Il Sung assumed control of the Korean Communist Party in late October 1945. At the same time other Russian-trained Koreans took over key posts in the North Korean regime. By 1946, Kim Il Sung ousted nationalists from the coalition party and executive posts, and consolidated powers in the Communist Party. While these actions were under way, the Soviets refused the return of Korean People's Volunteers from the Chinese People's Liberation Army at the end of 1945. These veterans were under the leadership of General Kim Mu Chong, a legendary Korean Communist general, and were the military power of the Yen-an faction of the Korean Communist movement. The Soviets apparently did not want to be interrupted for the establishment of the Kim Il Sung regime by these units.<sup>34</sup>

A central North Korean government--the Interim People's Committee-- was created on 12 February 1946. This committee along with the Korean



Communist Party functioned with marked initiative in social reforms. The Soviet occupation forces and the Korean Communist Party gained mass support among poor peasants by land reform. By mid-1946 the Soviet position in North Korea had become sufficiently secure to permit withdrawal of all but 10,000 occupation troops. The Russians suggested on 26 September 1947 that U.S. and U.S.S.R. troops be withdrawn simultaneously at the beginning of 1948.<sup>35</sup>

The U.S.A. had fallen into a dilemma because the American position in Korea was not secure enough to allow withdrawal of their forces due to the infancy of the R.O.K. Army. Americans feared the ill-effects on their allies of such a withdrawal. They also feared that Korea would fall into Communist hands. But the military officials in Washington wanted to withdraw American occupation forces from Korea because of budgetary pressure and redeploy them elsewhere where they were needed more. To try to solve the Korean problem, the U.S. placed it before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 23 September 1947. In a draft resolution on 16 October, the U.S. recommended that both zones of Korea hold elections before 31 March 1948 under observation of the U.N. A U.N. temporary commission would oversee the elections and supervise the formation of a national government. When a unified Korean government had thus been established, foreign troops were to withdraw. On 14 November 1947, the General Assembly approved the U.S. proposal and established the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea with the onset of the cold war. Russia refused to take part in the U.N. commission.<sup>36</sup>

Elections took place only in South Korea on 10 May 1948. The North Koreans did not participate, nor did they recognize the results of the elections. The U.N. commission was barred from North Korea. But the elections brought out an estimated 80 per cent of the eligible voters in the

south who chose representatives for their National Assembly, and the U.N. commission reported the results to be valid.<sup>37</sup>

The new assembly of the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) convened for the first time on 31 May 1948 and elected 73-year-old Dr. Syngman Rhee as its chairman. Rhee was the first Chief of the Korean Provisional Government in 1919 and afterwards the chairman of the Korean Commission in the U.S. until 1945. The assembly produced a constitution in July 1948 and on the 20th of the month elected Rhee President of the Republic. On 15 August 1948, during elaborate ceremonies at Seoul, General MacArthur proclaimed the new Republic of Korea, Rhee was formally inaugurated as President, and USAFIK's government authority came to an end. The United States formally recognized the R.O.K. on 1 January 1949, and over forty other nations followed the U.S. precedent.<sup>38</sup>

Meanwhile on 12 December 1948, the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) was created by a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. It superseded the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea, which had supervised the general election of May 1948. The UNCOK composed of seven member states and had field observers, who were military experts, to report on armed clashes along the 38th Parallel. By the time the Korean War broke out, only two Australian officers had reached Korea. They began their trip along the Parallel on 9 June 1950 and submitted their report to the UNCOK on 24 June. The report stated the general situation along the Parallel. The principal impression left on the observers after their field tour was that South Korea was organized entirely for defense and was in no condition to carry out an attack on a large scale against the forces of the North. This report affected the decision of the U.N. Security Council of 25 June 1950 to halt aggression in Korea.<sup>39</sup>

During the same period, 1945-1949, North Korea had been drawn into the Chinese Civil War. Relationships between North Korea and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were apparent to Koreans and Americans from as early as 1946. North Korea and the CCP had concluded a mutual assistance pact in the summer of 1946, when the Chinese Kuomintang gained control of the major city of Antung and the CCP was forced to retreat into North Korea. North Koreans supplied food and clothing to the CCP until they crossed back into Manchuria in 1947. In March and April of 1947, there were large-scale transfers of North Korean troops into Manchuria to help the Chinese Communists.<sup>40</sup>

A pact was concluded between the North Korean People's Committee Transportation Bureau and Communist China's Northeast Administration Transportation Committee concerning loading and unloading of Chinese cargoes passing through North Korea, dated 6 November 1947.<sup>41</sup>

After the R.O.K. was established on 15 August, the Korean Communists also formed a government, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 9 September 1948.<sup>42</sup> The Russians withdrew their occupation forces by the end of 1948, and the U.S. did the same by 29 June 1949.<sup>43</sup>

The tie between Communist China and North Korea blossomed into a bilateral defense treaty signed in March 1949 in Moscow under the watchful eye of Stalin. Soviet influence remained paramount in Korea, while, in the event of war, it would be the Chinese Communists who would be called upon to rescue the North Koreans. On the Chinese side, the treaty afforded an opportunity to maintain an interest in her former client state.<sup>44</sup>

In the atmosphere of cold war conflict the Truman administration sought the solution of a restrained military budget in air-atomic dominance.

The report of the Finletter Commission in January 1948 stated that the Russians would not possess atomic weapons until the end of 1952. This encouraged the belief that the Communists would not use force until they had a large nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it. If war came at any time, it would be a total war with a major Soviet invasion of Western Europe; and, in that case, the USAF's role would become the one instrument capable of bringing victory. Aircraft were assumed to be the most economic form of military power. Within the limited military fund the army was the chief victim of the 1948 defense budget.<sup>45</sup>

When the Soviets tested an atomic bomb in September 1949--three years before the date predicted by the Finletter Commission--it came as a shock to Americans. In January 1950, President Truman requested the joint State-Defense review of the overall national strategy in view of the fall of China, the Soviet atomic tests, and the anticipated American possession of a fusion bomb. Within six weeks the study group submitted the results to the President on 7 April 1950. This document, named NSC-68, was a policy recommendation, based primarily on the analysis of Soviet capabilities and intentions. The Nitze Committee estimated that the Soviet Union would not have an operational stockpile of atomic weapons that could effectively challenge the American monopoly until 1954. When this happened, it was anticipated that American atomic strength could no longer serve as a deterrent against the employment of superior Soviet conventional forces. Therefore, it was predicted that atomic stalemate would probably make limited conventional wars more likely. Consequently, the need for strengthening conventional forces for this kind of fighting was appreciated. When the Korean War broke out, the cost studies requested by the President were still in process.<sup>46</sup> The strengthening of

conventional forces had not yet had time to materialize. Such was also true in Korea where the U.S. aid program to Korea was closely connected with the Department of Army. The financial restraint on the Army thus affected the R.O.K.

The Truman administration had suffered a temporary defeat on 19 January 1950 when the House of Representatives failed to provide \$60 million in supplementary economic assistance to the Republic of Korea to be extended prior to the end of the fiscal year on 30 June 1950. After the invocation of Democratic Party discipline and the acceptance of a compromise whereby the additional aid for Korea would be coupled with the extension of the deadline for the expenditure of funds already allocated for nationalist China from mid-February to the end of June, the bill was revived and passed on 9 February as the Far East Assistance Act of 1950.<sup>47</sup>

The Soviet approach to security in Eastern Europe, their domination over the newly established Communist regimes, and their statements about the inevitability of a war between the capitalist West and the Communist East played a major role in American and Western European perceptions of the Soviet Union as an aggressive power, intent on conquering as much territory as possible. The Czechoslovakian coup in 1948 and the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949 strengthened Western convictions that the U.S.S.R. was indeed about to initiate a policy of conquest and led directly to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.<sup>48</sup>

The Communist victory in China in October 1949 was viewed in the U.S. as yet another part of the expansion of Soviet power and influence. But the relation between the Soviets and the forces of Mao Tse-Tung were not nearly as cordial during the Chinese Civil War as official statements of Chinese-Soviet friendship implied.<sup>49</sup>

The guidelines of American foreign policy had been set before the outbreak of the Korean War. By 1947-1948 the U.S., with the support of Western Europe, began laying the economic and military foundations for a policy of "containment." Large-scale economic assistance to reconstruct the Western European economies (in order to make the area less susceptible to internal Communist political activity), the creation of a common defense system in NATO, and a general effort to prevent additional Communist territorial expansion had already been initiated.

During the U.S. occupation of Korea, 1945-1948, the U.S. Government appropriated to the Department of the Army a total of \$356,000,000 under the GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) program for Korea. After the establishment of R.O.K., U.S. economic aid came under the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). In 1950, under the ECA program, a total of \$110,000,000 was under way prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. In military aid, the U.S. had delivered to Korea, prior to the North Korean attack, military equipment with an original value of over \$57,000,000 and a replacement cost as of the time of delivery of about \$110,000,000. In addition to this purely military aid, there had been turned over to the Republic \$85,000,000 worth of equipment and supplies of military origin and of considerable military value for defense purposes.<sup>50</sup> The Mutual Assistance Act of 1949 became law 6 October; and, for fiscal year 1950, Congress approved MDAP to Korea on 15 March 1950 in the amount of \$10,970,000. But by 25 June 1950, only approximately \$52,000 worth of signal equipment and \$298,000 worth of spare parts were en route to Korea; less than \$1,000 worth had arrived.<sup>51</sup>

In the years of 1949-1950, Korean population showed great disparity between the South and North (see Table 1) in the total 30 million on the

peninsula. Among them 20 million lived in South Korea and the rest, 10 million, did in North Korea. So, the population ratio between the South and North was two to one. The Communists feared the South's population, which could produce more eligible soldiers, and wanted to act before the South prepared to mobilize and train young men.

The Korean economy in 1949 was underdeveloped (see Table 1). Until 1945, the Korean economy was Japanese-owned and Japanese-directed and in no sense an entity in and of itself, but rather the geographical location of a portion of the wider configuration of Japan's economy. Japan built up the Korean economy for its own use, colonial and military. In 1945, the Japanese withdrew from Korea. To get the Korean economy back into operation required not only resumption of production, but redirection from Japanese military to Korean peacetime objectives. For this, both zones had to cooperate because both complemented each other agriculturally and industrially. South Korea was mainly a farming area, while the North was an industrial one. But the political development hindered the cooperation. Per capita income was about \$50 both in South and North Korea. Foreign trade of the South Korea was almost non-existent; it depended completely upon imports under the U.S. assistance programs. On the other hand, that of the North was about \$182.3 million. The main export items were minerals and fertilizer--the iron ore and coal mines located mainly in the North. Also, the North inherited the largest nitrogen fertilizer factory in Asia from the Japanese. The North produced 5,924 million KWH electric power in 1949, while the South had only 736 million KWH. From this economical situation, the North was in a slightly better position to provide arms than the South. But in the procurement of modern military equipment their economy was quite weak, like South Korea's. So both depended upon the outside assistance for building up their armies.



TABLE 1. Economical Data of R.O.K. and D.P.R.K. in 1949-50

	R.O.K.	D.P.R.K.
Population <sup>a)</sup>	20,188,641	9,740,000
Illiteracy <sup>a)</sup>	total pop. 78%	male pop. 43%
Age, 20-24	total pop. 62.7%	
Per capita income	about \$50 <sup>b)</sup>	\$50-73 <sup>c)</sup>
Foreign trade	import by the <sup>b)</sup> U.S. assistance	\$182.3 mil <sup>c)</sup>
Production		
Electricity	65 million KWH <sup>d)</sup>	5,924 million KWH <sup>c)</sup>
Coal	661,090 metric tons <sup>d)</sup>	4,005,000 metric tons
Iron ore	0 <sup>d)</sup>	680,000 metric tons <sup>c)</sup>
Fertilizer	620,120 metric tons <sup>d)</sup>	401,000 metric tons <sup>c)</sup>
	(import)	(production)
	in 1959	260,000 ton (use)

a) United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1949-1950, pp. 22 & 491.  
 Census conducted on 1 May 1949 only in South Korea. For illiteracy, see Parvez Hasan and D. C. Rao, Korea: Policy Issues for Long-Term Development (the report of a mission sent to the Republic of Korea by the World Bank) (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1979), p. 152.

b) South Korean per capita income could not easily be found in economy books. David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, in their book, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), write that per capita income in 1953 was \$80. (p. 124).

c) Data in 1949 are taken from Moseph Sang-hoon Chung, The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford Univ., 1974), pp. 48-49, 86-87, 121, and 146-147.

d) Economic Planning Board, ROK, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1963, pp. 83, 97, 160-161, and 195.



Korean infrastructure hindered the development of their economy and army too. Koreans had not been technically trained in large numbers under the Japanese. Withdrawal of the Japanese left many vacancies in the Korean industrial organization. These vacancies could not be filled in a short time by newly educated and trained Koreans. Koreans had not benefited by the Japanese education policy. Illiteracy in 1949 was 78 per cent and in case of age group 20-24 year-old male population was about 50 per cent (see Table 1). So, half of the soldiers could not read and write the Korean alphabet. These young men needed a long time for technical training.

### CHAPTER III

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF THE R.O.K. AND D.P.R.K. ARMIES, 1949-JUNE 1949<sup>52</sup>

##### R.O.K. Constabulary, 1946-1948

Until the U.S. occupation forces landed at Inchon on 8 September 1945, there arose many private quasi-military bands. These bands were composed of members of veterans from Japanese, Chinese, and Korean Independent forces. In November 1945, there were about 30 quasi-military bands listed in the U.S. Army Military Government file. None of these were recognized by the USAFIK, nor did they have much discipline in their ranks. But most of them contributed to keeping internal security and later after January 1946, many participated in the Korean Constabulary forces. On 21 January 1946, the USAFIK ordered the quasi-military bands to disband after Korean Constabulary recruiting began on 14 January 1946.<sup>53</sup>

On 13 November 1945 the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) created an office of the Director of National Defense with jurisdiction over the Bureau of Police and over a new Bureau of Armed Forces comprising the Army and Navy Departments. To solve language problems and to form cadres, the USAMGIK opened the Military Language School in Seoul on 5 December 1945. At first, 60 students were to be trained, but 200 students entered the school. Among these candidates 110 students were commissioned by 30 April 1946. The rest were transferred to the South Korea National Defense Constabulary Officers School (later renamed the Officers Training School after 1948).<sup>54</sup>

Among these 110 commissioned officers 12 came from former Imperial Japanese Military Academy graduates, 72 Korean student officers (similar to ROTC graduates), 18 Kwantung Army officers, 2 Chinese Army officers, and others. Most of them, except 2 Chinese Army officers and several others who fought against the Japanese on the side of the Korean independence forces from the beginning or later joined, were veterans from the Japanese Army. This bias was the result of the refusal to transfer power to the Korean Provisional Government and partly because of Korean outlook. Many Koreans were very politically oriented. Most of the veterans integrated themselves in the sphere of Korean politics, and declined to take part in the Army.

Most of the graduates of the Military Language School had the key role in the development of the R.O.K. Army. Sixty eight of them acquired general ranks and occupied, in turn, the position of the Chief of Staff of the R.O.K. Army until 1970.

Brigadier General Arthur S. Champeny, Director of National Defense, prepared the Bamboo Plan for the creation of the Korean Constabulary. Bamboo envisaged a constabulary-type police reserve established on a fixed post-camp-station basis under the Bureau of Police and which was to be used as a supporting force during periods of national emergency. Initially, one company would be formed in each of the eight provinces of South Korea and organized as infantry (U.S. style), less weapons platoons. Complements would consist of 225 Korean enlisted men and 6 officers, the latter to be furnished by a centralized officers' training school. The plan was to send out to each province a U.S. Army training team of two officers and four enlisted men who would select initial activation and training areas and begin recruiting and organizing. In each province, a company was to be

formed at an overstrength level of approximately 20 per cent. After a short period of training, a second company would be built around the surplus of the first. The new company would likewise be recruited overstrength, to provide a cadre for a third. At that time, a battalion headquarters and a headquarters company would be formed, and thereafter second and third battalions activated in a gradual expansion to one regiment of Constabulary in each province.<sup>55</sup>

Initial recruiting greatly exceeded American expectations. The recruitment started on 14 January 1946, and by the end of January nearly three companies had been formed in the Seoul area alone. The military government supplied limited amounts of clothing and equipment from abandoned and captured Japanese stocks.<sup>56</sup>

U.S. tactical forces in South Korea were in the midst of a program of destruction of Japanese armaments in the early part of 1946. Occupation Instruction No. 2, issued by General MacArthur's headquarters in September 1945, had directed that Japanese equipment appropriate only for warlike uses be destroyed, except for what might be used for intelligence and research purposes or desired by American troops for trophies. However, 60,000 Japanese rifles along with fifteen rounds of ammunition for each weapon had been set aside by the Americans in storehouses pending the time when a Korean Army and Navy might have use for them. From this reserve the Americans issued rifles to Constabulary units as they were activated. The Constabulary later obtained a few Japanese light machine guns from American troop units that had collected them as souvenirs.<sup>57</sup>

By the end of April 1946 eight regiments were activated, but the actual strength was slightly over two thousand men. While not impressive,

the force represented Korea's first national military effort in many years, and the National Police were assured of support if internal conditions got out of hand. Moreover, the Constabulary was to provide a nucleus for expansion.<sup>58</sup>

Along with the formation of the Constabulary, Americans helped the Koreans to establish a coast guard. Since a coast guard organization had existed under the Japanese in Korea, the military government transferred it on 14 January 1946 to the jurisdiction of the Director of National Defense as a framework for a Korean coast guard. American Army officers set up a training station at Chinhae on the south coast and on 8 February began recruiting in Seoul. At the end of November 1946, the strength of the Korean Coast Guard was only 165 officers and 1,026 enlisted men. The development of the Coast Guard was slower than the Constabulary since the equipment was not available until the fall of 1946 and qualified persons were scarce.<sup>59</sup>

The spring of 1946 was a period of instability within the military government in Korea, largely because of the U.S. Army's postwar readjustment policies and the consequences of rapid demobilization. New officers and enlisted men were assigned, accumulated sufficient points to make them eligible for discharge from the service, and then departed for home. In less than seven months, there had been five Directors of National Defense, and three of the changes occurred in the 11 April-1 June period. This rapid replacement hindered the effectiveness of the advisors and consequently the training of the Constabulary.<sup>60</sup>

In the spring of 1946, there occurred changes of organization in the military government. On 29 March the Department of National Defense became

the Department of Internal Security; the Bureau of Armed Forces with its subordinate Army and Navy Departments were abolished, and instead new Bureaus of Constabulary and Coast Guard were set up. These changes had been done to avoid the Soviet sensitivity to the use of 'National Defense.'"<sup>61</sup>

For one year (1945-1946) Koreans in all branches of the new government had been functioning under the close supervision of American counterparts. The Koreans learned quickly; and, with a year of instruction and observation behind them, General Archer L. Lerch, military governor, felt that they were ready to become less dependent upon American supervision. At General Lerch's direction the Koreans became responsible for administration on 11 September 1946, and Americans in military government were ordered to assume a strict advisory status.<sup>62</sup>

The Korean Director technically took over the power to make major decisions and the American Director assumed the role of advisor. Official correspondence was forwarded through the Korean chiefs in Korean, with English translation accompanying only the most important documents. Despite this encouragement to the Koreans to operate more independently, the American advisors actually had to maintain much of their direct control. Paper authority could not provide experience and technical ability overnight; and the Koreans had yet to shake the consequences of their long subservience to the Japanese, master staff procedures and organization, and acquire mechanical know-how before they could assume the task of exercising full control over their internal security.<sup>63</sup>

During 1946, training of the Constabulary was limited not only by the lack of American supervision, but also by restrictions imposed on the type of training the Constabulary regiments could conduct. Since the Constabulary

organization was officially but a reserve force for the National Police of Korea, training in weapons other than individual arms was prohibited by the Department of Internal Security. Members of the Constabulary were trained only in the use of small arms, basic drill, and "methods of internal security." But there were many differences in the training of the Constabulary units, according to the advisor's interpretation of "methods of internal security."

In the absence of American tactical training, Korean officers naturally employed principles learned elsewhere. Although their methods often conflicted with the doctrine later taught by the U.S. Army, as in banzai charges against an enemy position, the value of the officers was not wholly negative. They were not bound to road networks, nor did they expect much in the way of organic transportation; the Japanese- and Chinese-trained Korean officers were satisfied with horses or human carriers. In the rugged terrain, this attitude was important.

In principle, the Korean Constabulary remained a reserve force for the police during 1946 and 1947. But as it grew in strength and prestige, the Constabulary became seriously involved in a conflict with the police over jurisdictional matters. Ordinarily, the Constabulary had no authority to arrest lawbreakers; but it consistently ignored this lack of legal rights, making arrests at will and searching without warrants. Professional jealousy and politics fanned the fires of dislike and distrust. Also, a number of agitators and malcontents had entered the Constabulary--some Communists and other members of dissident parties, since the Constabulary did not screen those recruits for their political differences.

On 26 September 1947, the Russians suggested that U.S. and U.S.S.R. troops be withdrawn simultaneously at the beginning of 1948. They had

already withdrawn all but 10,000 occupation troops by mid-1946, because they felt that their position in North Korea had become sufficiently secure to permit the withdrawal. To meet the Soviet proposal of withdrawal, the State Department asked the JCS's view. The JCS appraised the U.S. military interest in Korea, saying that it had little strategic interest in Korea. They believed that the next war would be a global war and that the U.S. forces would land on the Asiatic continent by-passing Korea. In case of war, they judged, the U.S. forces in Korea would be trapped by large Russian forces. Further, they thought that the U.S. could block or neutralize the Russians in the Asiatic continent with its air force. So high U.S. military officials determined to withdraw the occupation forces as soon as possible.<sup>64</sup>

As the prospects for independence increased, interest in the future development of the Korean armed forces also mounted. The rapid demobilization of U.S. forces after World War II and the cutbacks in military expenditures had led to manpower shortages in the armed forces and a close scrutiny of U.S. commitments overseas. Thus, in October 1947, the Department of the Army asked Generals MacArthur and Hodge for their recommendations on Korean forces. Hodge proposed a South Korean army of six divisions, complete with headquarters and service troops, which could be equipped and trained by U.S. personnel within one year. But MacArthur felt that the establishment of Korean defense forces should be deferred until the U.N. General Assembly had an opportunity to express its wishes.<sup>65</sup>

Four months later, General MacArthur still considered the formation of a South Korean Army premature. On 6 February 1948, he informed the Washington policy makers that the lack of training facilities, the dearth of competent Korean military leaders, and the diminishing capabilities of



the XXIV Corps to provide the personnel and equipment for an army argued against such a move. Instead, he favored an increase in the Constabulary to 50,000 men and the provision of heavier-type weapons--though not artillery--from U.S. sources in Korea. Other items, if they were necessary, could come from American stocks in Japan.<sup>66</sup>

MacArthur's crucial recommendation at this important moment for the Korean army differed from that of General Hodge, who was charged with Korean affairs. Later, during the Korean War, evidence showed that the Far East Commander's recommendations had been far more influential upon Washington policy makers than those of the commanders in Korea. The former had usually been disinclined toward the increase of the Korean army, and the latter had usually been gone ahead of his superior in Tokyo. In this respect, Korean matters suffered from their physical closeness to Japan. For the U.S. policy makers, Japan was, and still is, more important than Korea. During the period of this discussion, the U.S. military commanders in Korea were under the direct chain of command from Tokyo. Most of the Japanese disliked the strong military presence in Korea, their former colony, where the anti-Japanese feeling was paramount. The U.S. Commander in Tokyo should have considered these ill feelings between the two U.S. protected nations under his direct responsibility. For him to protect the U.S. interests in this region was the first responsibility. But it was difficult for him to balance the conflicting interests of Japan and Korea. The significant effect of this conflict was in the time factor. South Koreans lost time for preparation. Later, when they tried by the U.S. approval it was too late for them.

With the South Korean elections scheduled for May 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the augmentation of 20,000 to 50,000 men on

10 March 1948 along with the issue of infantry small arms, cannon (from 37-mm. to 105-mm. inclusive), and armored vehicles (including the tank, M24, and armored cars), as deemed appropriate.<sup>67</sup>

While the American political and military leaders debated the wisdom of building up the South Korean armed forces, the Koreans, both North and South, were moving ahead with their own plans. On 8 February 1948, the North Korean Provisional Government announced the official birth of the Korean People's Army. And in South Korea, recruiting for the Constabulary was quietly stepped up in the expectation that independence would require larger defense forces. By the time the U.S. support for the increase of the Constabulary to 50,000 men was revealed in March, the strength of the force already approximated that mark. This created one more problem for the already overburdened American advisors.

Since the advisors scattered about the provinces in April 1948 were too few to carry out such a mission, General Hodge authorized the assignment of additional U.S. Army officers to the military government and directed XXIV Corps units to set up schools to train the Koreans in the use of American equipment. As more advisors became available to the Department of Internal Security, regular training inspections became possible, and the Constabulary entered its first standardized training program in July 1948. At the same time, the XXIV Corps units established a weapon school on 1 July at Taegu and two artillery schools on 10 July at Chinhae and Seoul. In this way Constabulary troops received valuable training in the use of the U.S. light and heavy machine guns, 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars, 57-mm. anti-tank guns, and 105-mm. howitzers (M2).<sup>68</sup>

Now the stage was set, though not sufficient for military and political independence in reality, for the transfer of authority from the

U.S. military government to the elected government of the Republic of Korea after its formal inauguration on 15 August 1948. As the American military command relinquished its control to President Rhee and his government, a new relationship had to be established between the two to provide for the maintenance of U.S. forces in South Korea and for their role in the defense of the country until final withdrawal could be effected.

Establishment of R.O.K. Army and  
Withdrawal of U.S. Forces

After the Republic of Korea came into being on 15 August, its Ministry of National Defense was established on 7 December 1948. Under the Ministry of National Defense were the Army and Navy, which had their roots in the Constabulary and Coast Guard.<sup>69</sup>

Right after the inauguration of the R.O.K. Government, General Hodge and President Rhee signed on 24 August a military agreement whereby the R.O.K. Government would gradually assume command of the nation's security forces. Until the task was completed and the American troops withdrew from Korea, the United States would retain operational control of Korean forces. In the meantime, the United States would continue to train and equip the Constabulary and the Coast Guard and would also continue to use the facilities and base areas required for the maintenance of its forces.<sup>70</sup>

President Truman appointed John J. Muccio as his Special Representative to Korea with the personal rank of Ambassador and gave him authority to negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Muccio arrived shortly after the inauguration and established the U.S. diplomatic mission in Korea on 26 August 1948, which shifted the channel of U.S. authority from military to civilian.<sup>71</sup>

During the remainder of 1948 and until 1 July 1949, the American military advisors worked under the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG). During the period, PMAG grew from 100 men to 241. The increase permitted slightly more than the former perfunctory coverage of Korean units by the advisors, but the Korean forces were also expanding at this time and the demands for advisory personnel continued to mount. Since the organization was a makeshift group chiefly for administrative purposes and occupied an anomalous position, it had little official status.

On 15 September 1948, the first units of USAFIK began to leave the peninsula. But the desire to end the Korean commitment and its drain upon manpower and resources now came into conflict with the political realities of the situation. In September, the North Koreans formed a government that claimed jurisdiction over all of Korea. Taking the title of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it became the direct rival of the UN-sponsored R.O.K. Government. The U.S.S.R. and its satellites quickly recognized the Communist dominated regime, and the Soviet Government announced on 19 September that it planned to withdraw all of its forces from Korea by the end of the year. The rise of the North Korean Communist state and the Russian eagerness to have all foreign troops leave the peninsula cast doubts upon the wisdom of the U.S. withdrawal program. The possibility of the Communists using force to unify the country while the R.O.K. Government was weak and conditions were unsettled argued against a quick evacuation of South Korea.<sup>72</sup>

In October 1948, a rebellion within the Constabulary sharply illustrated the domestic unrest in South Korea and focused attention on the internal agitation. Since the R.O.K. defense forces were not properly

prepared to resist invasion, the U.S. State Department came to the conclusion in November that the continued presence of U.S. forces would have a stabilizing effect upon the over-all situation. President Rhee sent a plea to President Truman, urging that the United States maintain an occupation force in Korea until the R.O.K. forces were capable of dealing with any internal or external threat and the United States establish a military and naval mission to help deter aggression and civil war.<sup>73</sup>

Domestic disturbances were common throughout South Korea from late 1947 to 1950; but the mutiny of the R.O.K. 14th Regiment at Yosu on 19 October 1948 represented a serious threat. The Yosu revolt appears to have been prematurely touched off by an order issued in October assigning the 14th Regiment to the island of Cheju-do to help quell disorders there. Additional U.S. M1 rifles were issued to the regiment, though it retained its Japanese 99's as well. Among the high-ranking noncommissioned officers of the regiment were a number of Communists, and they apparently planned to use the extra rifles to arm fellow-travelers in the surrounding villages. Then came a second order instructing the regiment to move at once, and the Communist leaders had to act hastily or lose the opportunity for concerted action and for arming their comrades. They fanned the anti-police sentiment among the troops of the 14th and incited an attack to take over the town. The uprising spread quickly to nearby towns. A counterattack by loyal Constabulary units won one of the rebel-occupied towns on 22 October, and five days later the opposition ended at the last town. But many of the mutineers slipped off to the rugged mountains to the north. Here, in the Chiri-san (mountain) area, the rebel remnants became guerrilla fighters and a constant thorn in the side of the government.<sup>74</sup> The rebellion was another

indication of the Communists' presence in the army permitted by the lack of screening recruits. Shortly after the fall of Yosu, a purge to eliminate Communist influence in the Constabulary got under way, and over 1,500 out of the total 50,000 Korean forces were uncovered and removed from the service. Except for a few occasions, the Constabulary remained loyal. In May 1949, two battalion commanders crossed the 38th Parallel with their troops under disguise of training. Later, one half of the troops escaped from the North.<sup>75</sup>

In January 1949, the National Security Council (NSC) conducted a thorough review of U.S. policy with respect to Korea. They reached the conclusion in March that complete withdrawal, preferably by 30 June, was politically and militarily desirable. They also advised the President to seek legislative authority for continuing military assistance for the fiscal year 1949-50 and, if developments warranted, thereafter. They recommended that a U.S. military advisory group be established. President Truman approved these recommendations on 23 March 1949. Along with these instructions the last unit of the USAFIK except military advisors left Korea by 29 June 1949.

As the U.S. troops left Korea during late 1948 and the first half of 1949, they turned over part of their equipment to the R.O.K. forces in accordance with the military agreement signed by Rhee and Hodge. By November 1948, 60 per cent of the Constabulary's small arms and automatic weapons were American, but there was a dearth of heavy mortars and machine guns. Although only 52 of an allotted 90 105-mm. field guns (M3) had been received, 173 57-mm. and 37-mm. anti-tank guns were on hand. Unfortunately, spare parts and all types of sighting and aiming equipment were in extremely short supply.

Despite the fact that the U.S. had only authorized the transfer of infantry weapons and equipment for 50,000 men, the R.O.K. forces in March 1949

totaled about 114,000--65,000 in the Army, 4,000 in the Coast Guard, and 45,000 police. Approximately one half of the Coast Guard and police were equipped with American side arms and carbines; the rest carried Japanese weapons.

On 2 April 1949, the Military Advisory Group received instructions to expand its organization. Washington officials established an over-all military ceiling of 500 spaces for the advisory group and directed that a Table of Distribution (T/D) be prepared on that basis. The intention was that a successful advisory effort in Korea would have to reach down to the battalion level. As submitted on 11 April, the proposed T/D called for 182 officers, 4 warrant officers, a nurse, 293 enlisted men, and 18 signal personnel. Since the strength of the group at that time was only 92 officers and 148 enlisted men, a board of three PMAG officers began screening the units still under USAFIK. The board experienced little difficulty in obtaining enlisted personnel, but finding officers proved to be a difficult task. Except for a few volunteers, they had to be ordered for duty as advisors.<sup>76</sup>

With the departure of Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, the Provisional Military Advisory Group emerged on 1 July 1949 as an official entity called the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). The group became an integral part of the American Mission in Korea (AMIK), along with the U.S. Embassy at Seoul, the local agency of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and a service organization called the Joint Administration Service (JAS). Since Ambassador Muccio had the responsibility for carrying out U.S. policy in Korea and KMAG was an element of AMIK, he was given operational control of the group. For administrative



purposes KMAG was established as an Army Administrative Area, Foreign Assignment Activity, directly under the Department of the Army. The Far East Command's responsibility was limited to the logistic support of KMAG to the water line of Korea and to the emergency evacuation of U.S. personnel from the country if the need arose. As the Far East Command was the only U.S. military command in the area, KMAG maintained close liaison with MacArthur's headquarters. KMAG representatives made periodic visits to Tokyo to discuss and co-ordinate evacuation plans and to keep the Far East Command informed on political and military developments in Korea.<sup>77</sup>

#### North Korean Constabulary, 1945-1948

When the Japanese surrendered on 15 August 1945, Cho Mansik, the educator and leading Korean nationalist set up a local government for the key province of South Pyongan, including the city of P'yongyang. The Russians, in advancing down the peninsula, took over Cho's organization and themselves founded local bodies. The Russians' contact with local Communists as well as nationalists established various police or security detachments.<sup>78</sup>

Such actions as these by Russians were important, especially when compared to American actions, because they did not arouse Korean's resentment and, thus, could easily obtain Korean's cooperation for internal security and civil government.

In early October 1945, the Russians unified those various provincial police and security detachments under a Department of Public Safety within which was established the Peace Preservation Corps. The Korean Communists assumed key roles in the Department and the Peace Preservation Corps. On 25 September Kim Il Sung and a group of Soviet-trained Koreans were landed at Wonsan. These men, former guerrillas who had fought against the Japanese



and had later fled to the Soviet Union, were assigned advisory tasks in various local governments. Their main mission at this time was the supervision of the Provincial Police Bureaus.<sup>79</sup>

The Peace Preservation Corps later developed into the Border Constabulary; and the nucleus of the Corps was constituted of anti-Japanese and Communist Koreans, guerrillas who had fled from Korea and Manchuria to Soviet territory. It numbered about 18,000 men and drew its personnel mostly from the Communist Youth Association. Its officers were usually active Communists. The Corps was organized, trained and supervised by Soviet officers.<sup>80</sup>

Under a program inaugurated in late 1945, the Russians gave at least 10,000 North Korean youths military-technical training in Siberia. Many of these youths stayed in the U.S.S.R. for three years. When they returned in 1949, some manned the new tanks and aircraft from the U.S.S.R. and others staffed the tank and ordnance schools.<sup>81</sup> The Russians clearly appreciated the social, technical and educational situation in Korea. The technical level in the Korean society was so low that it was impossible domestically to train pilots, airplane mechanics, and tank crews quickly, and not much remained before the Korean War. This is in sharp contrast with the U.S. training of technicians. No South Korean technicians were trained in the U.S., nor did they have training of comparable length.

In 1946 and 1947, a number of Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry who had been born in the Kazakh and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics were brought into North Korea. While the majority of these individuals assumed advisory posts in the civil actions of the government, many were assigned to the police forces.<sup>82</sup> For a central police training, the Russians

established the Central Party School for Police Officials at P'yongyang in January 1946.

As early as September 1945, the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools and the P'yongyang Military Academy were founded. These schools aimed at training police and government officials. Many of the young men completing the academy courses were assigned to military training centers in other areas of Korea.<sup>83</sup>

By December 1946, Soviet officers were assigned to North Korean units and the equipment of a number of Soviet units was designated for transfer to North Korean units. The number of Soviet advisors per Korean unit cannot be determined exactly, but the following can be given as a reasonably accurate guide. By 1948, there were as many as 150 advisors per division (one per company), but the number was reduced to 20 per division in 1949, and 3-8 per division in 1950.<sup>84</sup>

On 11 January 1946, for the security of line of communications, the Russians reinforced the Peace Preservation Corps with the establishment of the Railroad Guards. By July of the same year, the Railroad Guards directed thirteen companies in major cities in North Korea.<sup>85</sup> For the training of enlisted men, the Peace Preservation Corps Training Center was established in Gaech'on in June 1946.<sup>86</sup>

To take charge of all military units, a bureau (the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Bureau) was created with Choe Yong-gun, who had the same background as Kim Il Sung, as chief of the bureau on 15 August 1946. The bureau directed three battalions and four training camps for soldiers. Later the bureau developed into the Ministry of National Defense.<sup>87</sup>

Thus, the military structure in North Korea was organized under a unified command, the Peace Preservation Officers' Training Bureau; and the

Bureau directly controlled three battalions and four training centers, which could be easily transformed into combat units in an emergency. At first, the Constabulary was armed with Japanese rifles (approximately 20,000) and later supplied with Russian AK rifles in 1948.

By mid 1946, the Russians felt that their position in North Korea was secure enough to permit withdrawal of all but 10,000 troops. They proposed the simultaneous withdrawal of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. occupation forces from Korea through the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission. But the Americans declined. Thereafter, the Soviet occupation forces' responsibility was reduced to administrative and advisory functions. During the following years, the military organization systematically examined and improved administrative skills for the preparation of formation of the regular army.<sup>88</sup>

When the Chinese People's Volunteer (CPV) were forced to withdraw from Manchuria at the end of 1946, a plan for the large-scale transfer of Korean troops to Manchuria was formulated. Under this plan, approximately 30,000 Korean troops under the leadership of Kim Chaek moved into Manchuria. These Korean "volunteers" remained in China gaining combat experience in the successful offensives against the Nationalist Chinese until 1948.<sup>89</sup> These Korean volunteers not only gained combat experiences but also opened the way in which the Chinese volunteers would enter the Korean War on the side of the Communists.

#### Establishment of D.P.R.K. Army and the Withdrawal of Soviet Forces

On 7 February 1948, the North Korean People's Committee, the North Korean Government made public the establishment of the Ministry of National Defense. On the following day, the Committee officially announced the

existence of the People's Army and held a parade in celebration. The strength of the Army at the time was estimated at approximately 30,000.<sup>90</sup>

By the end of 1948, the strength of the North Korean People's Army was about 60,000. This was due to the return of those Korean units which had been assigned to Manchuria under the command of Kim Chaek in the previous year. This number did not include the para-military organizations such as the Border Constabulary and Railroad Guards, nor did it embrace the 170,000 men who had been conscripted into various training units. The 60,000 man nucleus of the D.P.R.K. Army was equipped with the weapons left behind by the withdrawing Soviet occupation troops and those shipped into Korea.<sup>91</sup>

Before the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces in Korea, at the end of 1948, the Russians had already established the North Korean government under the guise of the North Korean People's Committee early that year. And by February 1948, the Russians had established the People's Army long before their withdrawal. These actions show the Russians' accurate understanding of Korea, their well prepared occupation plan, their successful occupation, and smooth progress of their policy (the establishment of the North Korean People's Committee and D.P.R.K. Army).

## CHAPTER IV

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE R.O.K. AND D.P.R.K. ARMIES 1949-JUNE 1950

After the withdrawal of the United States and Soviet Union from the peninsula, in 1949, both R.O.K. and D.P.R.K. hastened to build up their forces. Although the R.O.K. Government was restrained by its own economy and by the lack of the U.S. support to arm its forces, it went far ahead of American expectations in forcefully expanding its military strength. On the other hand, the D.P.R.K. quickly outstripped the original expansion plan. In March 1949 the Soviets had agreed to furnish arms and equipment for six infantry divisions, three mechanized units, and eight battalions of mobile border constabulary. By June 1950 the North Korean forces contained eight infantry divisions at full strength, two infantry divisions at half strength, a separate infantry regiment, a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment, an armored brigade, and five brigades of Border Constabulary troops.<sup>92</sup> Both South and North Koreans were forced to do that because they could not ignore what the Korean people wanted. In both north and south Korea, the drive for national unification was a primary political force: neither area could be expected to be satisfied with the status quo. Another reason was security. Each side wanted to be secure from the other's aggression.<sup>93</sup>

#### The R.O.K. Army, 1949-June 1950

##### Organization and Equipment

By June 1950, the strength of the R.O.K. Army had expanded from the 65,000 of March 1949 to 95,000. The R.O.K. Army had a headquarters modeled

after that of the U.S. Army and eight infantry divisions--in various stages of organization. Of the eight divisions (the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital), only four divisions were close to the full strength of about 10,000 men each.<sup>94</sup> The artillery consisted of six battalions of 105-mm. M3 light howitzers and three battalions of 57-mm. anti-tank guns, all grouped at the Korean Army Artillery School near Seoul. For technical services, there were one signal, one quartermaster, and two ordnance battalions, and an engineer construction group, all at different levels of organization. The R.O.K. Army operated eight schools near Seoul.<sup>95</sup>

Four of the infantry divisions and one regiment of a fifth were located behind the 38th Parallel in late 1949; and three divisions were in southern Korea campaigning against guerrillas and guarding mines, railways, and other installations. Practically all of the Army was either on frontier duty or safeguarding internal security.

The military material delivered by the U.S. Army until 1949 included nearly 56,000 M1 rifles; over 49,000 carbines; over 2,000 machine guns and sub-machine guns; over 50 million rounds of ammunition for the rifles, carbines, machine guns, and sub-machine guns; nearly 7,000 pistols; 91 105-mm. M3 howitzers, with 108,000 shells; over 700 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars with over 600,000 rounds for them; 173 57-mm. and 37-mm. guns; 8,884 grenade rockets; 295,000 grenades; 150 bazookas with nearly 44,000 rockets; 19 armored cars; nearly 5,000 trucks, 50,000 mines and demolition blocks; and a large quantity of signal equipment.<sup>96</sup>

As indicated above, the U.S. Army did not provide the R.O.K. Army with tanks, and artillery heavier than 105-mm. howitzers. In October 1949, the R.O.K. Minister of National Defense asked for 189 M25 tanks. Colonel

William H. Sterling Wright, Acting Chief of KMAG, advised General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, against fulfilling the request. He argued that the rough terrain, poor roads, and primitive bridges militated against efficient tank operations. He urged that the R.O.K. Army be equipped with anti-tank weapons. The R.O.K. Army had, for its anti-tank weapon, 2.36" rocket launchers, but these proved dangerously disappointing against the North Korean's T-34 tanks.<sup>97</sup> The R.O.K. Army had the 105-mm. howitzer which could reach only 7,600 yards as against the North Korean 122-mm. howitzers which had a maximum range of 12,980 yards. The U.S. did not provide the modern 105-mm. M2 howitzers which could reach over 10,000 yards though the USAFIK had them.<sup>98</sup>

In a military sense, the R.O.K. Army (ROKA) of 1950 could not be called a modern army from the point of its organization and equipment. The ROKA organization was not a standard one. The strength of divisions varied. Only one division had full strength. The others were all below strength. The ROKA had no middle level command--army and corps headquarters which could direct and support the front line division. From the point of command and terrain features, it was evident that the ROKA should have had one field army and two corps headquarters at least. It was difficult to command and control eight divisions spread over vast areas. The R.O.K. Army had eight divisions, and had to defend a 150-mile front and preserve internal security in the rear area. To achieve these responsibilities, the ROKA Headquarters was too overloaded. One high command attempting to control eight subordinate commands in an emergency was beyond the span of control.

As for the equipment, the eight divisions had only six 105-mm. artillery battalions. This meant that each division could be supported by

less than one 105-mm. artillery battalion at best, and no more. No R.O.K. division had any tanks, nor did it have effective anti-tank weapons. The armament of the R.O.K. Army was below the minimum level that a modern army requires. For these reasons, the ROKA of 1950 only deserved to be called a constabulary.

While the Korean Constabulary had been expanding and evolving toward its ultimate role as the R.O.K. Army, the Korean Coast Guard had received little American assistance. To begin with, the ships and other equipment turned over to the Korean Coast Guard by the U.S. had been in poor condition. Many of the vessels had had to be towed to Korea and had required extensive overhauling before they became operable. A lack of spare parts and maintenance materials had made renovation a slow and difficult process. Then, delivery of the spare parts and materials authorized by the U.S. early in 1949 had not been satisfactory. This had been due partly to procurement difficulties in the U.S. and partly to inadequate American advice.<sup>99</sup>

The Korean Coast Guard had nine U.S. civilian advisors in the fall of 1949. These nine advisors worked at various institutions and bases. Three were in Seoul at Coast Guard headquarters, two at a Coast Guard academy at Chinhae, and four at the operating bases and shipyard. For equipment, the Korean Coast Guard had approximately ninety vessels, ranging from Japanese minesweepers to picket boats, of which less than one-half were operational. A Coast Guard officer candidate school and various service schools were in operation.

One problem arose from the status of civilian advisors. The administrative authority of the KMAG belonged to the Department of the Army which was unwilling to accept budgetary and fiscal responsibility for



civilian Coast Guard advisors. So the recommendation by Ambassador Muccio and the KMAG of the twelve additional positions in late 1949 and April 1950 went unheeded.<sup>100</sup>

Ambassador Muccio's recommendation of 19 October 1949 suggested how desperate the situation of the Korean Coast Guard was. He urged that the Korean Coast Guard be strengthened, at the least expense to the U.S., with obsolescent U.S. equipment, guns, ammunition, and planes. At the minimum, this reinforcement should include four patrol craft, five picket boats, five scout-observation seaplanes, and fifteen 3"/50-caliber guns to rearm certain vessels than equipped with 37-mm. guns.<sup>101</sup>

Fourteen liaison planes had been turned over to the Koreans in 1948. The U.S. intended that these planes be formed as an air liaison detachment for the Korean Army. Nevertheless, the Korean Government separated the liaison unit from the Army and established a separate Air Force in October 1949, against the strong advice of the KMAG. American opposition to this move was based primarily on the fact that the advisory group was not set up to advise an air force. The one officer and two (later five) enlisted advisors were inadequate for such an undertaking. Although the R.O.K. Government had contracted for purchase of ten AT-6 trainer aircraft from a private firm in the U.S., even with these there was not sufficient equipment to warrant a separate air arm. While the Soviet Union furnished in 1948 the North Korean Security Forces with 30 Yak-3 fighter planes, 5 IL-2 attack planes, and 30 training planes of miscellaneous types, the U.S. Army's reluctance was hard to understand. Brigadier General William L. Roberts, Chief of the KMAG, recommended on 7 December 1949 that the U.S. policy be reviewed and, if necessary, revised to include assistance to the Korean Air

Force. In addition, he requested 40 F-51 fighter aircraft, 10 T-6 trainers, 2 C-47 cargo planes, and nearly a quarter of a million dollars worth of supporting signal equipment for additional fiscal year 1950 Mutual Defense Assistance Program aid to Korea. Roberts made further efforts in May and June to secure aid for the R.O.K. Air Force. Through Muccio, he recommended that six officers and eleven airmen be sent to Korea.<sup>102</sup>

But the Koreans' ambitions for an effective, defensive Korean air force were doomed. With the meager assistance of the KMAG, the Korean Air Force expanded to a strength of but 1,865 officers and men during the first six months of 1950, organized into a single flight group. The ten AT-6 trainers purchased by the Korean Government arrived in April; and these, together with the 8 L-4 and 4 L-5 liaison aircraft constituted the Republic's air strength on 25 June 1950.<sup>103</sup>

### Training

In May and June 1949 KMAG survey teams were sent out by General Roberts, the Chief of KMAG, to assess the current training status of the ROKA units so that a program of development could be drawn up. From KMAG's inspections there emerged a clearer picture of the immensity of the training task ahead. In the opinion of one U.S. officer, the R.O.K. Army in June 1949 "could have been the American Army in 1775."<sup>104</sup> Except for its intense national enthusiasm, there was little to recommend the ROKA as a military force. While most combat units seemed to have completed a full cycle of basic training at one time or another, not all had participated in platoon and company problems. The technical service units were embryonic, having developed but little since their activation just over a year before.

Training facilities in general were scarce and inadequate, and at all levels

there were deficiencies, emphasizing a need for better trained officers and noncommissioned officers, more equipment, and all kinds of technical specialists. Furthermore, the inspections revealed that South Korean soldiers needed training in weapons and marksmanship.<sup>105</sup>

There were very few technicians in the peninsula. Even a vehicle driver had great privileges. He drove his car at his own will. No one could meddle in this matter and the users of the car had no voice in its use as General Dean had experienced during his captured days. Only the long and intense training could remedy the technician problem.<sup>106</sup>

In consequence of the KMAG inspection, from June 1949, the R.O.K. Army planned to train its troops according to the U.S. Army's Mobilization Training Program (MTP) 7-1. The MTP 7-1 was formulated in September 1943, and it provided for the progressive training of each type of unit within the infantry regiment, from individual training through battalion problems. The R.O.K. Army training program of 1949 extended over six months, divided into two phases: Phase I, from 21 June to 15 September 1949, for individual, squad, platoon, and company training; and Phase II, from 16 September to 31 December 1949, for battalion and regimental training. Korean Army artillery units would train as field artillery batteries and cannon companies in Phase I, and as battalions in the role of direct support artillery in Phase II. In July, engineer combat battalions were formed in the four infantry divisions along the 38th Parallel. These battalions would undertake an eight-week training program from early in August.<sup>107</sup>

General problems confronting training R.O.K. troops were the U.S. Army rifles and shortage of weapons and other equipment. The M1 rifle was long and heavy for the slightly built Koreans, although it was a good modern

rifle for Westerners. The activation of two additional ROKA divisions (the Capital and 8th Divisions) in early 1949 worsened an already critical shortage of weapons and other equipment. The U.S. materiel support for the R.O.K. Army was based on 65,000 men or six divisions, and the establishment of these additional divisions necessitated a wider distribution of that support. This meant that troops and units had to rotate in order to receive certain training, or that training in some subjects had to be omitted entirely. The Koreans tried to alleviate the situation by supplying 20,000 Japanese rifles which they had hidden when U.S. forces were destroying Japanese arms in 1945 and 1946. However, most of these weapons were unserviceable as well as without ammunition.<sup>108</sup>

While the training program got under way, border conflict began to increase. The artificial barrier between North and South Korea had long been the scene of incidents; but until May 1949 the clashes had been isolated and local in nature. On 3 May, however, North Korean troops made a sortie towards Kaesong and initiated a rash of armed actions. During the next six months, more than 400 separate engagements took place along the frontier. While the majority were small arms skirmishes between patrols, some actions (at Kaesong, Ch'unch'on, and the Ongjin Peninsula) resulted in heavy casualties on both sides.<sup>109</sup>

Concurrently, guerrilla activity was increasing in the interior of the country. Civil disorders and acts of sabotage had been common in South Korea since 1945, but after April 1948 such incidents gradually turned into an organized guerrilla movement. Trained guerrillas from the north who infiltrated down the mountain chains into South Korea formed guerrilla bands with deserters from R.O.K. Army who had taken part in the Yosu rebellion.

By late 1949 these dissident elements were attacking villages and installations and becoming a serious problem.<sup>110</sup>

Quite apart from constituting a grave threat to the internal security of the R.O.K., the hostile activities had a definite effect upon the training of the Korean Army. In the six-month period from July to December 1949 alone, Korean Army units were compelled to mount 542 separate counter-guerrilla actions, an average of nearly three a day.<sup>111</sup> The practical benefits of actual contact with an opponent insofar as tactics and field experience were concerned could not be denied. But, being in the field a great part of their time and thus away from the training areas, many units did not acquire the basic training they badly needed to cope with the foe on even terms.<sup>112</sup>

The disruptions in the training schedules caused by the border incidents and guerrilla activity, coupled with the R.O.K. Governments' removal of some key personnel through anti-Communist purges and the continuing expansion of the R.O.K. Army from 65,000 to 100,000 men during mid-1949, prevented the completion of Phase I by September. Phase II, therefore, had to be revised to include additional platoon and company training.

During the fall of 1949, KMAG unit advisors gave training in tactics and terrain appreciation to Korean officers to prepare them for battalion-level exercises. The training often took place at night, but the majority of Korean officers took on the extra work willingly and seemed to be enthusiastic about improving themselves and their proficiency in military skills.<sup>113</sup>

Only 30 of the R.O.K. Army's 67 battalions had completed company training by the end of 1949. ROKA's 6 artillery battalions had completed

Phase I of their training on 1 October, carrying units through battery tactics; Phase II, stressing the artillery battalion's role as a direct support arm, was under way. All technical services, though hampered by a lack of skilled personnel, tools, and equipment, were expanding slowly through training programs, schooling, and on-the-job training.

In January 1950, the R.O.K. Army issued the Army Training Directive No. 1 for 1950, which divided training into four phases, each of three month duration. If all went well, Korean Army units would have completed the battalion phase by 31 March 1950, including an eight-day series of field exercises, and the regimental phase by 30 June. Combined arms training, division problems, and finally maneuvers on a varying scale would follow. The execution of Army Training Directive No. 1 did not keep pace with the plan because of guerrilla activity in the South. On 14 March 1950 the R.O.K. Army published a second training memorandum. This was a concentrated, thirteen week schedule to bring all units through the battalion phase by 1 June and the regimental phase by late summer.<sup>114</sup>

But by 15 June 1950, only sixteen battalions out of 67 R.O.K. Army battalions had completed the battalion phase of training. Thirty others were through the company phase, and seventeen had not yet finished the platoon phase. Two battalions had had 75 per cent of their platoon training and 50 per cent of their company training. Seventeen battalion staffs and five regimental staffs had participated in command-post exercises. All Korean troops had fired for record with the M1 rifle, however; and qualification firing of other individual arms and of crew-served weapons was well along. The technical services were progressing. In sum, the R.O.K. Army units had generally received no more than company level training when the Korean War broke out.<sup>115</sup>

In 1949 the R.O.K. Army with the KMAG's advice reviewed the military school system and reorganized and operated thirteen military schools. Those were the Military Academy, a combat intelligence school, the Engineer, Signal, Ordnance, Artillery, a Quartermaster, a Medical, a Finance, and Infantry Schools, and the Command and General Staff College. These schools trained officers, officer candidates, noncommissioned officers, and various technical and administrative enlisted men for a period of four weeks to one year. By 15 June 1950, R.O.K. Army schools had graduated a total of 9,126 officers and 11,112 enlisted men, and had begun to produce graduates who could form an effective military organization. Nearly all officers in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or above had attained advanced course at the Korean Army Infantry School, the command and general staff course, or the senior officers' course. Besides attending Korean military schools, several Korean officers had attended the U.S. Army military schools. Six officers had been to the U.S., and another six officers were attending U.S. schools in June 1950. Also, thirty-three Korean officers were sent to observe the U.S. Eighth Army units in Japan for three months beginning 15 April 1950.<sup>116</sup>

#### The D.P.R.K. Army, 1949-June 1950

The great change in the actual combat strength as well as in the development of D.P.R.K. Army occurred in the period 1949-1950 when three D.P.R.K. divisions, composed of veterans from the Chinese People's Volunteer (CPV) Army, were formed in the North. This made a crucial military and political difference between the R.O.K. and D.P.R.K.

In July 1949, the CPV transferred all non-Koreans in the CPV 164th Division, then stationed in Manchuria, to other Chinese divisions and filled the 164th with Korean replacements. Near the end of the month, the division,



about 7,500 strong under the command of Major General Kim Chang Duk, moved by rail to Korea where it was reorganized into the 10th, 11th, and 12th Rifle Regiments of the North Korea (NK) 5th Division.<sup>117</sup>

At the same time, in July 1949, the CPV 166th Division moved, under the command of Major General Bang Ho San, to Korea and reorganized into the 13th, 14th and 15th Regiments of the 6th Division. The story of the Koreans in this division goes back to 1942 when the Chinese Communists formed a Korean Volunteer Army largely with deserters from the Japanese Kwantung Army. This division had a strength of about 10,000 men when it entered Korea; 800 replacements obtained there brought it to full strength.

In February 1950, all Korean units in the Chinese Manchurian Army assembled in Honan Province. They numbered about 12,000 men drawn from the CPV 139th, 140th, 141st, and 156th Divisions. Some of them had participated in the Chinese Communist advance from Manchuria to Peiping, and all were veteran troops. In the first part of April, these troops moved by rail to Korea under the command of Major General Chun Woo. In the Wonsan area these CPV veterans reorganized into the 1st, 2d, and 3d Regiments of the 7th Division.

In addition to these three divisions, the D.P.R.K. Army's 1st and 4th Divisions had one regiment of CPV veterans each. Upon arrival in North Korea, all the units from the CPV Army received Soviet-type arms and North Korean uniforms and were retrained in North Korean tactical doctrine, which closely followed the Russian.

Thus, the Korean veterans of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army made up about one third of the D.P.R.K. Army in June 1950 and gave it a combat-hardened quality and efficiency that it would not otherwise have had.



For example, the 6th Division achieved remarkable success during the Korean War.

At the outbreak of the Korean War, on 25 June 1950, the 13th and 15th regiments of the 6th Division delivered the attack on Kaesong, from whence one of the main approaches to Seoul started. While their artillery and infantry attacked frontally, a regiment moved into Kaesong by rail behind the R.O.K. troop dispositions. The NK 6th Division troops obviously had relaid the tracks during the night. This courageous infiltration was obviously the work of veterans and classic piece of guerrilla tactics.<sup>118</sup>

After the fall of Seoul, the 6th Division followed the 3d and 4th Divisions across the Han as far as Ch'onan. There the D.P.R.K. Army issued it new orders. Pursuant to these, on 11 July the 6th Division turned off the main highway toward the west coast. For the next two weeks, the division passed from the view of Eighth Army intelligence. The 6th Division was moving rapidly south over the western coastal-road net. Before long its shadow would cast a pall of gloom and impending disaster over the entire U.N. plan to defend South Korea. Its maneuver was one of the most successful of either Army in the Korean War. It compelled the redistribution of Eighth Army at the end of July and caused Tokyo and Washington to alter their plans for the conduct of the war.<sup>119</sup>

Later in the Masan area, the 6th Division ruined the counterattack of Task Force Kean, which was composed of the U.S. 25th Division (less the 27th Infantry Regiment and the 8th Field Artillery Battalion), the U.S. 5th Regimental Combat Team, and the U.S. 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The 6th Division, at that time about 7,500 strong along with the NK 83d Motorized Regiment, inflicted a great loss upon the artillery of the task force.<sup>120</sup>

These actions of the 6th Division give ample proof that the battle-hardened unit had great combat strength since nearly everyone from the Division Commander to privates were veterans. Their effectiveness depended on having transferred from CPV as a unit. If the Division had not had veterans as cadre, it could not have managed comparably successful achievements. These veterans exercised great teamwork in battle as they had done in Manchuria. And, in the event of casualties among the veterans, this did not arouse insurmountable difficulties because other veterans were usually available. Also, the transferred veteran units took little time to organize and train up to high level of training (battalion or higher level combined tactics). Certainly, despite the transferred units of late 1949 and of early 1950 having spent little time retraining until June 1950, they displayed great combat strength in the first three months of the war.

The transfer of these units marked a coalition of all Communist factions under the leadership of Kim Il Sung. Kim and his followers assumed key positions of the Communist Party, administrative government, and military organization by 1948. Furthermore, Kim made the Yen'an and native Korean Communist factions hold each other in check (political leaders of the Yen'an factions, such as Kim Du Bong, had already returned to North Korea by late 1945). With these preparations, he negotiated the transfer of Korean units in the Chinese People's Volunteer with the Chinese Communists. Kim's position was secure enough to admit the transfer of veteran units that the Soviets refused to allow in late 1945. But, Kim still suspected the personal loyalty of the troops and felt his position fragile with the presence of strong CPV units, linked originally to the Yen'an faction. He feared General Kim Mu Chong, the leading general of the Yen'an faction, and did not appoint the

latter the commandant of II Corps until after the first week of the war. He forbade generals to visit high Party members personally, and appointed native Korean Communists to key positions of occupation forces to check the Yen'an generals in the assault forces. Thus, he maintained a balance between those two factions.

Korean Communists knew that the relative combat efficiency of the veteran units could only decline with time. Veterans would grow older and lose their superiority over recent recruits. Kim's faction worried about its hegemony of political power because of the presence of strong Yen'an military power. These units should have been used against other targets as soon as possible. If they lost the chance to use these units in the near future, the R.O.K. Army would grow stronger while their units were losing strength. With the recent Soviet assistance in military equipment, they chose the optimum time to exercise their maximum relative combat superiority on 25 June 1950. In this sense, the Communists were compelled to attack the South or relinquish the opportunity that the veteran units represented.

#### Organization and Equipment

The North Korean ground forces--the D.P.R.K. Army and the Border Constabulary--numbered about 135,000 men as of June 1950. This estimated total includes 77,838 men in seven assault infantry divisions, 6,000 in the tank brigade, 3,000 in an independent infantry regiment, 2,000 in a motorcycle regiment, 23,000 in three reserve divisions, 18,600 in the Border Constabulary, and 5,000 in Army and I and II Corps Headquarters.<sup>121</sup>

The D.P.R.K. Army was in June 1950 composed of one frontal headquarters, two corps headquarters, ten infantry divisions, one armored

brigade, one independent infantry regiment, one motorcycle regiment, and five constabulary brigades. Characteristic of this organization was an effective command structure. The middle level headquarters--the Frontal Headquarters and I and II Corps Headquarters-- provided sufficient command and control of subordinate divisions.

The 1st and 2d NK Divisions were formed before February 1948, and the 3d NK Division was founded in October 1948. The 4th Division was formed late in 1949. The 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions were formed in August 1949, July 1949, and April 1950, respectively. In March 1950, the 15th Division was activated, ostensibly to serve as an occupation force. In that same month, the 10th Mechanical Infantry Division was formed near Sukchon, but was maintained in reserve until July 1950. In early June of that year, the 13th Division was activated from personnel of the 1st, 2d and 3d Democratic Youth Training Centers. The rate of formation reveals that most of them, except the 10th and 13th Divisions were formed in full strength from the beginning.<sup>122</sup>

In addition to these regular units, there were paramilitary formations. These semi-military organizations, the Railroad and Constabulary Brigades, were to be drawn upon after the invasion to provide cadres for additional units. The Railroad Constabulary became the nucleus of the Line of Communications troops which operated in the enemy-held portions of South Korea during the summer of 1950. The Border Constabulary Brigades, which had been stationed along the 38th Parallel prior to the invasion, were expanded into the 8th and 9th Divisions.<sup>123</sup>

The D.P.R.K. division contained thirty-six 76-mm. guns, twelve 122-mm. howitzers, eighty-one 82-mm. mortars, and eighteen heavy 120-mm.

mortars. Some divisions were also equipped with a number of SU-76's. Each division had approximately 189-214 vehicles (mostly trucks). From the figures given above, the D.P.R.K. Army was an extremely well equipped fighting force with a fire power potential and maneuverability. The NKPA deserved to be called a modern army.<sup>124</sup>

While it is impossible to state accurately the total number of heavy weapons and transport equipment received by the North Korean Army before and during the Korean War, a reasonable estimate can be made of the amount of material of this type supplied to those units activated prior to the outbreak of hostilities.<sup>125</sup> Resupply and the demands of newly formed units would, naturally, alter these figures significantly. The NK units which were in existence on 25 June 1950 were equipped with approximately the following heavy weapons: 242 T-34 tanks, 176 SU-76's, 132 combat aircraft, 380 76-mm. guns, 172 122-mm. howitzers, 1,142 82-mm. mortars, 226 heavy 120-mm. mortars, and 2,640 transport trucks.<sup>126</sup>

The D.P.R.K. division enjoyed greater superiority in fire support than the R.O.K. division (see Table 2). The artillery support of D.P.R.K. division in 1950 closely resembled that of Soviet division in World War II. A division had 12 122-mm. howitzers, 24 76-mm. guns, 12 SU-76 self-propelled guns, 12 45-mm. anti-tank guns, and 36 14.5-mm. anti-tank rifles. In addition, the regiments and battalions had their own supporting weapons. Each regiment, for instance, had 6 120-mm. mortars, 4 76-mm. howitzers, and 6 45-mm. anti-tank guns. Each battalion had 9 82-mm. mortars, 2 45-mm. anti-tank guns and 9 14.5-mm. anti-tank rifles. The companies had their own 61-mm. mortars. In sum, a North division could be supported by 18 122-mm. howitzers, 36 76-mm. guns, and 12 SU-76 self-propelled guns in

TABLE 2. Comparison of Major Equipment

24 June 1950

Equipment	R.O.K.A.		D.P.R.K.A.		Rate
	caliber	No	caliber	No	
Mortar			120-mm	226 (18)	1:1.8
	81-mm	384 (48)	82-mm	1,142 (81)	
	60-mm	576 (72)	61-mm	360 (36)	
Howitzer	105-mm	91 (15)	122-mm	172 (12)	1:6
			76-mm	380 (36)	
Anti-aircraft			85-mm	12	
			37-mm	24	
Anti-tank gun	57-mm	140 (18)	45-mm	550 (48)	1:3.9
Rocket Launcher	2.36-inch	1,900			
Tank			T-34	242	
Armored car		27		54	1:2
Self-propelled gun			SU-76	176 (12)	
Air craft	Liaison	12	Recon	10	1:9
	AT-6	10	Yak trainer	60	
			Yak fighter	40	
			Attack bomber	70	
Naval vessel	LST	1	Patrol craft	16	
	Mine sweeper	15			
	Mine layer	10			

Numbers in ( ) are under division organization.

Source: Yang-myung Kim, The History of the Korean War, p. 75,  
 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 11, 16, and  
 Stelmach, The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics, p. 305.

artillery, while a South division only had 15 105-mm. howitzers. For additional fire support, a D.P.R.K. division could have 18 120-mm., 81 82-mm., and 36 61-mm. mortars; meanwhile a R.O.K. division could have 48 81-mm. and 72 60-mm. mortars.

The first volume in the official history of the United States Army in the Korean War summarizes the D.P.R.K. Army's superiority over the Republic of Korea Army:

The North Korean Army in June 1950 was clearly superior to the South Korean in several respects: the North Koreans had 150 excellent medium tanks mounting 85-mm. guns, the South Koreans had no tanks; the North Koreans had three types of artillery--the 122-mm. howitzer, the 76-mm. self-propelled gun, and the 76-mm. divisional gun with a maximum range of more than 14,000 yards which greatly outranged the 105-mm. howitzer M3 of the ROK Army with its maximum range of about 8,200 yards. In number of divisional artillery pieces, the North Koreans exceeded the South Korean on an average of three to one. The North Koreans had a small tactical air force, the South Koreans had none. In the North Korean assault formations there were 89,000 combat troops as against approximately 65,000 in the South Korean divisions. Also, North Korea had an additional 18,600 trained troops in its Border Constabulary and 23,000 partially trained troops in three reserve divisions. . . .<sup>127</sup>

But such superiority in equipment and manpower does not tell the entire story.

### Training

All North Korean units except one division and certain battalions of the Constabulary Brigades had completed training that included the battalion sized attack, rifle firing at moving targets, assault on fortified positions, and road marches. Combined exercises up to the regimental level had been in progress since the beginning of 1950.<sup>128</sup>



The North Korean units achieved this level of proficiency because units other than the Border Brigades could concentrate on their training. While all of the R.O.K. Army units were hampered by the border engagements or by counter-guerrilla action, the North Korean units enjoyed uninterrupted training, mainly due to the tranquillity of the internal situation.

Moreover, the North Korean Army benefited from its veterans--veteran units (the NK 5th, 6th, 7th Division, one regiment of 1st and 4th Divisions each) and veteran cadres who participated in the Chinese Civil War of 1947-1948. These war-seasoned veterans elevated the level of training greatly, needless to say. Their excellent aggressive spirit and discipline were maintained, even at the most serious situation. For example, when the 4th Division was attacking east of the Naktong River during mid-August 1950, the Division was reduced to a third of its former strength. But the Division troops still tenaciously attacked, as long as they could count on the squad and platoon leaders, the men who had fought in China and Manchuria.<sup>129</sup>

In addition, the D.P.R.K. Army had many technicians who had been trained by the Soviets for nearly three years. These technicians improved the efficiency of the D.P.R.K. Army. They were assigned to the air force, tank and ordnance units, and technical schools.

The D.P.R.K. Army enjoyed exceptional treatment by its leadership. South Korea was a large and strong foe, outnumbering North Korea in population by two to one. To promote military efficiency, the military organization was given considerable freedom from the usual forms of outside bureaucratic interference. There were no Communist Party cells in the army. Many of the bureaus of the Ministry of National Defense and many staff functions were awarded to Soviet-Korean officers, while a large proportion



of the higher offices had been occupied by the Koreans returned from China. To compensate for this situation, so serious to Soviet-trained Kim Il Sung, all vice-commandant of the Corps were given political officers with authority to countermand the orders of the Corps commandant. (This probably served to countermand the powerful Lieutenant General Kim Mu Chong of the Yen'an faction.)<sup>130</sup>

Since special political treatment was given to military officers, many veteran officers remained in the Army. For example, Lieutenant General Kim Mu Chong maintained the same rank as he had held in the Chinese People's Volunteer. Kim Mu Chong (known as Mu Chong in China), a graduate of the Chinese Whampoa Military Academy, and a corps commander in the CPV, was returned to Manchuria in late September 1945 by the Soviet forces who apparently did not want interference in building up Kim Il Sung's regime. However, after Kim Il Sung's consolidation of power in the Korean Communist Party and the Korean People's Committee, Kim Mu Chong returned to Korea around 1948 when the Korean units in the CPV entered to Korea to strengthen the NKPA.<sup>131</sup>

The training of the tank crew gives some clue to the training of specialists generally.<sup>132</sup> Some high North Korean officers among tank, artillery and air commanders were trained at Soviet military academies between 1932 and 1945. Kim Il Sung, for example, resided in the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1945 and was commissioned a major in the Red Army. Nam Il, the North Korean Chief of Staff, attended the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow and retained his commission in the Red Army until his return to Korea in 1945. Lieutenant General Yu Kyong Su, commander of the 105th Armored Division, graduated from a Red Army tank school some time in 1938

and was assigned as a company grade officer to a Soviet tank unit during the Great Patriotic War. Many of Yu's compatriots also served with the Red Army during the Russo-German War. Major General Chang Pir-u, the 17th Armored Brigade Commander, for example, fought with the Russians up to the liberation of Berlin. This military elite with its long term intimate ties with the Soviets and Chinese was the key to the creation of a national command structure.

Once a combat-trained and experienced leadership was established, training operations were geared toward the instruction of junior officers in specialized arms. Between 1945 and 1948, this training was provided in the Manchurian Military District by Soviet, Chinese Communist and Russian-trained Korean officers. Many of these junior officers were then sent to academies within the Soviet Union for additional training.

While the U.S.S.R. began stockpiling some heavy weapons in North Korea in 1948, the third and final phase of specialized arms training commenced. Additional junior officers and potential tank crews were now assigned to numerous academies within North Korea itself. Approximately thirty Soviet-built tanks were allotted to these schools for training the crews in tactics, maintenance and gunnery. Meanwhile, in Manchuria, the Russians continued to build up secret tank reserves which were brought to North Korea at night in early 1950 and cached in strategically isolated areas to await the invasion of the South. So effective was the Soviet ruse that, while U.S. advisors and R.O.K. forces were aware that the North Koreans were equipped with heavy artillery and mortars, the presence of a large, well-trained armored force remained a secret until the actual assault across the Parallel.

The major tank training centers within North Korea were located at P'yongyang and Sung Ho Ri. The amount of actual training given varied with the rank of the individual. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, a junior lieutenant in the tank corps received approximately one year of instruction, while recruits and noncommissioned officers were given about eight weeks and five months of instruction respectively. Once the war had begun, however, the period of training declined substantially.

Nowhere was the North Korean superiority in equipment and training more clearly demonstrated than in the aggressor's skillful employment of armored vehicles along the main axis of advance in the opening weeks of the war. The use of tanks during this period proved to be one of the most tactically and psychologically efficacious ploys of the entire Korean War, causing considerable concern among American military leaders, who feared that the D.P.R.K. Army, spearheaded by its armored formations, would crush all resistance before substantial aid could be rushed to the Peninsula.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

Korea had, and still has in one sense, peculiar problems. Its history shows that it has been a nation-state for a long time, though it has suffered from various invasions by its neighbors. Koreans had a common history, tradition, ancestry and language. This one nation-state was unfortunately divided into two by the artificial lines set after the Second World War. Both parts were occupied by two superpowers which had completely different ideologies. Suffering from 36 years of Japanese rule, Koreans welcomed the occupation troops as liberators. But soon came disillusion as the Koreans faced cold reality. The liberation from Japan was not achieved by the expenditure of their own blood. Although many nationalists had worked for the independence of their nation, they played no significant role in the defeat of Japan. The liberation was given them through the Allies' victory over Japan. The liberation turned out to be an occupation. Furthermore, the temporary dividing lines appeared to be becoming a permanent boundary. As a result, Koreans of various ideologies added a new aspiration to one already existing and sought not only the independence but also the unification of their country. Although they were unsure about their ability to govern, they were impatient to achieve both independence and unification. Most Koreans shared the elites' aspirations, regardless of whether they lived in North or South Korea. Korean Communists alienated many Koreans when they changed their position from anti-trusteeship to pro-trusteeship in 1946.

After three years of occupation, Korea became independent, but as two different states--the R.O.K. and D.P.R.K. This fulfilled only half of Koreans' aspirations. Koreans moved toward the other objective--the unification of their country. In this sense, both the R.O.K. and D.P.R.K. governments could not stand aloof from this national desire. So, both sides made unification a paramount national objective. To fulfill this goal each government used a wide range of means. Peaceful means proved futile, because the two different ideologies and interests could not easily be compromised. Thus, both parties appealed to the other means, force. Both states built up their military forces.

The national economies of North and South Korea were underdeveloped because of a Japanese policy of economic exploitation. Each had an "aid-economy" which depended heavily on its sponsoring country's support. The North was in a slightly better position than the South, because Japan left behind some heavy industries, and because most of Korea's mineral resources were located in the North. This relative development does not mean that the North could arm itself, since it lacked necessary technological infrastructure. (The level of technology in society did little to support the development of technological sophistication in either army. On the contrary, military technology later contributed to the development of civilian technology.) The national economy of both countries had had little effect on the development of both armies. So, both countries depended solely upon outside assistance for their arms. In this sense, the U.S. and U.S.S.R.'s assistance to their sponsoring countries had a tremendous effect upon developing the R.O.K. and D.P.R.K. Armies.

Washington policy makers assumed that their atomic and air superiority could deter future war, and that the next war, should it come, would be

a global contest. In case of war, they could win by using their atomic and air power. So, the U.S. concentrated on the air-atomic build up. U.S. strategists saw that the U.S. had little interest in Korea from a military point of view. In a general war, they could by-pass Korea and land directly on the Asiatic continent. Furthermore, they thought that they could neutralize the opposing forces in Korea with their air power based in Japan. The U.S. maintained that Japan and the Philippines were the keystones to the defense of American interests in the Pacific. From the experience of World War II, American military thought inherited the "island hopping" tactics of the Pacific campaign. This tactic of by-pass is isolated enemy strong points to secure key bases for future operations. American military planners in the late 1940's thought that Japan and the Philippines were the springboards which they had to hold. From Japan, they could hop over Korea and land directly on the Asian mainland, a decisive theater. Secretary of State Dean Acheson approved this by announcing his famous Aleutian-Japan-Okinawa-the Philippines (A-J-O-P) defense line at the National Press Club in January 1950.

After World War II, the Russians rated security as the first priority, and defined it on the bases of their experience in the 20th century. They feared the U.S. military strength: its atomic, air and naval power. So they endeavored to transfer territories adjoining them into satellites or at least friendly buffer states. They assumed that Korea, too, should be a friendly nation or a buffer-state against capitalist aggression. The geopolitical balance in Asia appeared to show then when the Chinese Communists overran mainland China in 1949. The U.S. refused to intervene in Chinese affairs on behalf of the Nationalist Chinese as the State Department states

in its White Paper on China in early 1950. Secretary Acheson delivered the A-J-O-P defense perimeter announcement; and the U.S. sought a separate peace treaty with Japan without participation by the U.S.S.R. The Communist states seem to have misjudged the above-mentioned U.S. actions as marking the latter's withdrawal from the Asian mainland. Encouraged by the success of Chinese Communists and by the indications of the U.S. withdrawal, the Soviet Union stepped up its shipments of arms to the North Koreans sufficient to build up a modern army.

The American and Soviet actions in Korea revealed a sharp contrast in policies. Officials of the USAFIK scarcely understood their Korean clients. Nor were they prepared well for the task of occupation. The U.S. military tried to use Japanese colonial officials to maintain an efficient civil administration. But this insensitivity to Korean nationalism aroused strong protests. Officially State Department refused to recognize the authority of the anti-Japanese nationalist movement, the Korean Provisional Government, nor did the occupation forces choose to utilize Provisional members in the administration. They tried to be impartial in their dealings with all political parties, and exercised no political discrimination. Koreans lacked any democratic tradition, nor did they have governmental experience. After forty years of Japanese rule, they were accustomed to accept the established authority. At this critical moment, the U.S. could have guided Korean political development by selecting and supporting a reasonable and popular party. But U.S. tradition opposed such political favoritism.

By contrast to the American attitude, the Soviets knew much about Korea due to their geographical proximity and through their Comintern contacts with Korean Communists. They encouraged local Communists to take

charge of internal security from the beginning of their occupation and soon after handed the Korean Communist Party the power to govern all North Korea. The Soviets and the Korean Communist Party gained mass support among poor peasants by land reform in 1946. They fostered the legend of Kim Il Sung as a patriotic leader and supported him politically against all internal and external party rivals. Kim Il Sung ousted nationalists from the coalition party and executive posts and delayed the transfer of Korean Communist Volunteers from China until he had consolidated his position; then Kim could accept the Korean Communist Volunteers on his own terms.

The transfer of such veteran units was not only a political victory of Kim Il Sung but also enhanced the combat strength of the D.P.R.K. Army and changed greatly the relative military balance between the North and South Korean Armies--this was the most influential factor in the development of both armies prior to June 1950. After consolidating the power in his hands, Kim enhanced his position by holding the other two party factions in check--the national and pro-Chinese Communists. From this position of control and balance, he advanced to a position of political hegemony. He negotiated the transfer of Korean veteran units in the Chinese People's Liberation Army with the Chinese Communists. These veteran units needed little time to retrain because of their previous combat experience and integrations.

The Communists regime understood that the combat efficiency of these veteran units would be diminished relatively due to the passage of time, as the R.O.K. Army grew stronger and more competent. Furthermore, Kim Il Sung's hegemony was threatened by the senior commander of these units. So, the Communist leadership chose the optimum time for attack to exercise their relative combat superiority and to diffuse the political power of these Chinese-sponsored rivals in June 1950.



Another contrast appears in the U.S. and Soviet assistance to the build up of Korean forces. The Americans did not supply military equipment sufficient to equip a modern army. They equipped the R.O.K. Army only for a militia-level army. They gave Koreans 91 105-mm. howitzers for six artillery battalions. They did not provide combat planes, nor did they give tanks which constituted essential elements of a mechanized army. The Americans did not even train technicians adequately to deal with the limited modern equipment that they had sent by the outbreak of the Korean War. One reason for this was that they wanted a self-reliant R.O.K. Army which the Korean national economy could support. Another was that they did not want a war in Korea--they feared the adventurism of the Rhee government. Korea was also a low priority area in U.S. defense posture and the Korean terrain seemed ill suited to mobile warfare.

On the other hand, the Russians supplied the D.P.R.K. Army with a great deal of heavy equipment. They shipped the North with sufficient tanks for an armor brigade, combat aircraft, and medium artillery pieces for corps level operations. From the experience of World War II, Soviet military doctrine emphasized the mass army operations. The doctrine stressed combined arms operations and sophisticated conventional forces which possessed sufficient firepower and troop mobility. Especially, they concentrated on artillery support, mortars, and tanks. They trained technicians for three years so that the latter could handle the Soviet-designed equipment with ease.

The R.O.K. Army of June 1950 had no middle level command organizations which could handle subordinate divisions spread over vast areas responsibly, while the N.K.P. Army had one Front and two Corps headquarters.

The R.O.K. Army Headquarters was too overburdened to handle eight divisions. This shows that characteristics of R.O.K. Army's organization was rather "bottom up," while that of N.K.P. Army's was "top down."

Korea's location affected the development of both armies. The development of the R.O.K. Army was partly hampered by Japan's proximity. The Far East Command in Tokyo was the direct higher echelon command of the USAFIK. For important policy making about Korea, Washington officials usually followed MacArthur's recommendations rather than that of the USAFIK. MacArthur's main responsibility lay in the defense of Japan. Certainly, the USAFIK was better informed about Korea than the Far East Command. On the other hand, North Korea benefited from its closeness to Russia and China. North Korean technicians were trained in the nearby Soviet Maritime Provinces. The D.P.R.K. Army had three battle-hardened divisions transferred directly from the Chinese People's Liberation Army after its spectacular victory against the Kuomintang.

Both nations' domestic politics influenced the development of their armies, too. Since the R.O.K. maintained a democratic political system, veterans from the anti-Japanese forces sought political careers or what they wanted to return to civilian life. At first, most of the nationalist veterans did not participate in the South Korean Constabulary. Later, when they wanted to, it was too late because of the military hierarchy and because seniority in the Korean Army had already emerged. Communist guerrilla activity hampered the R.O.K. Army's training, and hence hindered the development of the Army, too. Battalions in division, which were undergoing training, found themselves distracted by anti-guerrilla operations. On the contrary, the D.P.R.K. developed a communistic political system. Since the

North Korean Communists had close relations between the Party and executive government, and preserved easy transfer of positions from military to civil administration, many veterans remained in the military. They maintained extensive internal security forces that freed the regular forces to pursue more vigorous training.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>For the bibliographical guide to the Korean War, see B. Franklin Cooling III, "The Army, 1945-1973," in Robin Higham, ed., A Guide to the Sources of U.S. Military History (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1975), pp. 487-488 and 495-513, and Richard W. Leopold, "The Korean War: The Historian's Task," in Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), pp. 209-229.

<sup>2</sup>Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) [a volume in the United States Army in the Korean War Series] (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), "Chapter II: Armed Forces of North and South Korea" pp. 7-18 and James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year [a volume in the United States Army in the Korean War Series] (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), "Chapter II: The House Divided," pp. 13-40, deal with the development of South and North Korean armed forces.

<sup>3</sup>For this chapter I used mainly Clarence Norwood Weems, ed., Hulbert's History of Korea (New York: Hillary House Publishers, 1962), 2 vols. There are still very few books about Korean history.

<sup>4</sup>George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Jr., Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), p. 8.

<sup>5</sup>Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), p. 13-14.

<sup>6</sup>There is much debate about Tan'gun and the substantial start of the Three Kingdom. I followed Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, Vol. 1, pp. ED 72-85 and McCune, Korea Today, pp. 9-10.

<sup>7</sup>Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, Vol. 1, pp. ED 104-109.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 113-116 and McCune, Korea Today, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup>Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, Vol. 1, pp. ED 120 and 375-383, McCune, Korea Today, p. 12, and Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944), pp. 24-25.

<sup>10</sup>Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, Vol. 1, pp. ED 121-127.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. ED 121.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. ED 121-123, McCune, Korea Today, pp. 12-13, and Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, pp. 24-25.

<sup>13</sup>McCune, Korea Today, p. 12.

- <sup>14</sup>Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, p. 25.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., and McCune, Korea Today, p. 12.
- <sup>16</sup>Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, vol. 2, pp. 189-228.
- <sup>17</sup>Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, p. 26 and William E. Henthorn, A History of Korea (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 125.
- <sup>18</sup>George M. McCune and John A. Harrison, ed., Korean-American Relations; Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, 2 vols. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951).
- <sup>19</sup>Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, p. 33 and the secret mission for Korea to U.S. and Hague, see Weems, Hulbert's History of Korea, Vol. 1, pp. ED 46-ED 54.
- <sup>20</sup>Henderson, Korea; the Politics of the Vortex, pp. 80-86 and McCune, Korea Today, p. 41.
- <sup>21</sup>For the Korean Communist movement (1918-1948) Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967) is most authoritative. pp. 103, 212, 215, and 239.
- <sup>22</sup>McCune, Korea Today, p. 41.
- <sup>23</sup>For the discussion of the division of Korea, see James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year. U.S. Army in the Korean War Series. (Washington: OCMH, 1972), pp. 7-11.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup>McCune, Korea Today, p. 43.
- <sup>26</sup>Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 13-14.
- <sup>27</sup>Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The British Commonwealth and the Far East, 1945, Dept. of State Publication 8451 (Washington, 1969) (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth and the Far East, 1945) Vol. VI, pp. 1043-44.
- <sup>28</sup>Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 13-23.
- <sup>29</sup>Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth and the Far East, 1945, Vol. VI, pp. 1036-37, 1053-54.
- <sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 1053-60.
- <sup>31</sup>Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, Department of State Publication 3305, Far Eastern Series 28 (Washington, 1948), pp. 3-4; McCune, Korea Today, p. 61.

<sup>32</sup>The Korean Communist Party changed abruptly its attitude toward trusteeship proposal from anti-trusteeship to pro-trusteeship. See Yang-myung Kim, Han'guk Chonchaengsa (The History of the Korean War) (Seoul: Ilshinsa, 1976), p. 13 and Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948, pp. 306-307.

<sup>33</sup>Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 22, 25.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 29. Dae-sook Suh, in his book The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948, argued that Kim Il Sung was not an original native Korean Communist Party member, and that Kim only gained power by the Russian backing. If the native Korean Communist Party had concentrated its power in North Korea, instead of doing so in South Korea, Kim could not have succeeded. pp. 324-325.

<sup>35</sup>Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, pp. 6-7.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 5-9.

<sup>37</sup>House Report 2495, Background Information on Korea, Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Congress, 2d Session, Union Calendar 889 (Washington, 1950), pp. 11-12.

<sup>38</sup>McCune, Korea Today, pp. 235-238.

<sup>39</sup>Harold Joyce Noble, Embassy at War, edited with an introduction by Frank Baldwin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), p. 239. For a critical assessment of this book, see Jon Halliday, "The Korean War: Some Notes on Evidence and Solidarity," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. XI, No. 3, 1979, pp. 2-18.

<sup>40</sup>New York Times, "Korea Skeptical on Soviet Exodus," by Richard J. H. Johnston, Jan. 1, 1949, p. 4.

<sup>41</sup>Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliances: Peking, P'yong-yang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975), hereafter cited as Simmons, Strained Alliances. An authoritative study of the relationships between the three Communist nations--the USSR, PRC and the North Korea--during the war. For this, see pp. 30-38.

<sup>42</sup>Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 14-29.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., and Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War [a volume in U.S. Army Historical Series, hereafter cited as Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea] (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), pp. 104-105. A good explanation of the KMAG's role and play to aid ROKA.

<sup>44</sup>New York Times, "China Reds Reported in North Korea Pact," May 6, 1949, p. 7. See also Han'guk Chonjang-sa (Korean War History), Vol. 1 (Seoul: War History Compilation Committee of the Ministry of National Defense, 1967), p. 711.

<sup>45</sup>David Rees, Korea: the Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), a very good analysis of the war. For this, see pp. 14-15.

<sup>46</sup>For the brief discussion of NSC-68, see Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (June 24-30, 1950) (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 58-61. More detailed study, see "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," by Paul Y. Hammond in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 271-378.

<sup>47</sup>Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 34.

<sup>48</sup>Roger E. Kanet, "Comments" on the war and U.S. foreign relations, in Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: The Regents of Kansas, 1975), pp. 80-86.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>50</sup>Department of State, The Conflict in Korea: Events Prior to the Attack on June 25, 1950, Dept. of State Publication 4266 Far Eastern Series 45 (Washington, 1951), pp. 7-10.

<sup>51</sup>U.S. Senate, 82d Congress, 1st Session, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East and the Relief of General MacArthur, 1951 (hereafter cited as the MacArthur Hearings), pt. 3, pp. 1992-1993.

<sup>52</sup>Unless otherwise indicated for this chapter, the author mainly used Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea.

<sup>53</sup>Yang-myung Kim, The History of the Korean War, pp. 41-42.

<sup>54</sup>Korea Military Academy, Daehan Minguk Yukgun Sagwan Hakyō Samsip Nyonsa (The Thirty Years History of the Korean Military Academy) (Seoul: Samwha Publishing, 1978), p. 65; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 11.

<sup>55</sup>Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 13-14.

<sup>56</sup>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea, No. 4, January 46, p. 285 and Ibid., No. 5, Feb. 46, p. 287.

<sup>57</sup>Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 16.

<sup>58</sup>Korea Military Academy, The Thirty Years History of the Korean Military Academy, p. 66.

<sup>59</sup>Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 17-19. JCS 1483/42, 19 Sept. 1947, JCS 1483/39, 9 July 1947, JCS 1483/48, 15 Jan. 1948 discussed the urgent need of Coast Guard advisors and replacement problem.



- <sup>60</sup>Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 20.
- <sup>61</sup>Ibid., pp. 20-21.
- <sup>62</sup>Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, p. 121.
- <sup>63</sup>Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 22.
- <sup>64</sup>JCS 1483/44, 24 September 1947.
- <sup>65</sup>JCS 1483/47, 24 November 1947.
- <sup>66</sup>JCS 1483/51, 10 March 1948, App. B.
- <sup>67</sup>JCS 1483/51, 10 March 1948, Apps. A and B, and memo, C of S, U.S. Army for JCS on augmentation and equipping of South Korean Constabulary, pp. 421-422.
- <sup>68</sup>Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 30-31.
- <sup>69</sup>Yang-myung Kim, The History of the Korean War, p. 48.
- <sup>70</sup>For complete text, see House Report 2495, Background Information on Korea, pp. 15-16.
- <sup>71</sup>Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, p. 20.
- <sup>72</sup>Ibid., pp. 21-22.
- <sup>73</sup>Schnabel, Policy and Direction, Chapter II.
- <sup>74</sup>For more detailed account of the Yosu incident, see Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 39-40.
- <sup>75</sup>Yang-myung Kim, The History of the Korean War, p. 69.
- <sup>76</sup>Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 42-43.
- <sup>77</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-47.
- <sup>78</sup>For the North Korean People's Army, see Daniel S. Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics on the North Korean Invasion of 1950," (hereafter cited as Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics") unpublished doctoral dissertation (St. Louis University, 1973), Chapter IV, The North Korean People's Army, pp. 115-139. Stelmach writes using mainly GHQ FEC MIS, GS, History of the North Korean Army (restricted document) and various Far East Command's Intelligence reports, that tank units of NKP Army equipped and trained by Russian and Russian doctrine. For this, see p. 118 and Yang-myung Kim, The History of the Korean War, p. 60. About nationalist Cho Mansik, see Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Take Over (hereafter cited as North Korea: A Case Study) Department of State Publication 7118, Far Eastern Series 103 (Washington, Jan. 1961), pp. 14-15.



<sup>79</sup> For Kim Il Sung, see Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, pp. 253-329. Especially for Kim's identification, pp. 258-59 and Roy S. Appleman, South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu, p. 7.

<sup>80</sup> Appleman, South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu, p. 8.

<sup>81</sup> Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study, p. 85.

<sup>82</sup> Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics," p. 120.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., pp. 121-122 and Yang-myung Kim, The History of the Korean War, pp. 60-61.

<sup>84</sup> Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study, p. 114, and Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliances: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975), an authoritative study of the relationship among the three Communist states before and during the Korean War. For this, see p. 120.

<sup>85</sup> Yang-myung Kim, The History of the Korean War, pp. 60-61.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., and see Appleman, South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu, p. 7 for Choe Yong-gun.

<sup>88</sup> Yang-myung Kim, The History of the Korean War, p. 61.

<sup>89</sup> Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics," pp. 126-128. For Kim Chaek, Dept. of State, North Korea: A Case Study, p. 14 and T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Pocket Books, 1964), p. 214. Kim Chaek later served as Chief of Staff, North Korea People's Army.

<sup>90</sup> Appleman, South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu, p. 9, and Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics," pp. 129-130.

<sup>91</sup> Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics," p. 130.

<sup>92</sup> Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 105.

<sup>93</sup> Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 575-76. The Kolkos write that both North and South Korea since mid-1949 were engaged in an arms race in the larger context.

<sup>94</sup> Appleman, South to the Nakdong, North to the Yalu, pp. 12-17.

<sup>95</sup> Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 67.

<sup>96</sup> Department of State, The Conflict in Korea: Events Prior to the Attack on June 25, 1950, p. 10.

<sup>97</sup> Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 36 and 84, and Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 10-12. Also, Noble wrote that General Roberts, the KMAG Commander, was against having tanks. The general believed that from his experience in World War II as an armored division commander in western Europe. See Noble, Embassy at War, p. 226.

<sup>98</sup> Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 36.

<sup>99</sup> Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 90-91.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., pp. 91-92.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 93-95 and Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 17.

<sup>104</sup> The U.S. officer was Major Eugene O. McDonald, the G-3 Training Advisor, see Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 69 and 69n.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> For detailed General Dean's experience, see Major General William F. Dean, General Dean's Story: As Told to William L. Worden (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), pp. 104-105 and 115-116. No date was given; it may be around the first week of September 1950.

<sup>107</sup> Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 70-71.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p. 73, and Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 38.

<sup>110</sup> Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 73-74.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 38.

<sup>113</sup> Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 75.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., pp. 76-78.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., pp. 79-91.

<sup>117</sup> For a detailed account of the Korean Unit transfer from the CPV, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 9-10 and Yangmyung Kim, The History of the Korean War, p. 63.

<sup>118</sup>Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 23. The observer of this movement was Captain Joseph R. Darrigo, the advisor to the ROK 12th Regiment, which was responsible for the defense of Kaesong area. Also, Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 115.

<sup>119</sup>Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 210-211 and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), pp. 28-29.

<sup>120</sup>For more detailed account, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 266-288.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., pp. 10-11.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., and Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics," pp. 130-133.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., pp. 135-36.

<sup>125</sup>The units, which had been activated and equipped prior to 25 June 1950 were: the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th 7th (later 12th), 13th, 15th, 10th Mechanized Infantry, and the 105th Armored Brigade (later renamed 105th Seoul Tank Division).

<sup>126</sup>The equipment given here is based on Korean sources, whose figures are slightly higher than those of the U.S. official sources. See Yang-myung Kim, The History of the Korean War, p. 75.

<sup>127</sup>Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 17-18. The different figure of the North Korean Army's equipment is based on the U.S. earlier sources. Stelmach writes that the North Korea People's Army was second only to that of the Soviet Union on the Asian mainland. Together with his interesting comparison with the Chinese Communist Forces, see Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics," pp. 133-136.

<sup>128</sup>This estimate is based on the KMAG report; see Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 105-106.

<sup>129</sup>Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, pp. 195-207.

<sup>130</sup>Department of State, North Korea; A Case Study, pp. 84-86.

<sup>131</sup>For Kim Mu Chong, see Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 214; Simmons, The Strained Alliances, p. 23.

<sup>132</sup>Following statement of the training tank crew is based on Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics," pp. 143-148.

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

A few official histories deal with the topic of this thesis. Among these, Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War [a volume in U.S. Army Historical Series] (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1962) deals with the development of R.O.K. Army from 1945 to 1953. This book was originally written as a guide to the activities of U.S. military advisors to Korea, but is the only official history that discusses the theme in detail. For the development of D.P.R.K. Army, the Far East Command published a book, GHQ FEC MIS, GS, History of the North Korean Army, but it is not available. Instead, the author uses Daniel S. Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics on the North Korean Invasion of 1950," which is an unpublished doctoral dissertation and based on History of the North Korean Army. Stelmach argues that tank units of the North were equipped and trained by Soviets and Soviet doctrine. Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Take Over, Department of State Publication 7118, Far Eastern Series 103 (Washington, Jan. 1961) deals with the political and social situation of North Korea during 1945-1950. The book contends that the D.P.R.K. was a satellite of the Soviets, and received special consideration by the Soviets. Two books of the U.S. Army in the Korean War series--Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) (Washington: OCMH, 1961) and James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: OCMH, 1972)--compactly deal with the development of R.O.K. and D.P.R.K. Armies in one chapter each.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
AND NORTH KOREAN ARMIES, 1945-1950

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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## ABSTRACT

The development of both ROK and NKP Armies closely follows the sponsoring countries' policies, assistance, and advice, since both South and North Korea were in the infancy of their politics, economy, and military arms. Both countries adopted the same political system as their sponsoring countries and were supported economically, technologically, and militarily.

The ROK Army developed to the level of a militia which could only deal with internal disturbances. This was done with American support which only the ROK could count on. An inadequate American understanding of Korean matters and the low priority of Korea in American policy were evident in occupation procedures, military training, and equipment provided.

On the other hand, the NKP Army reached the level of modern army which could exercise ground-air and armor-infantry-artillery combined tactics. This was attained with Russian support. The Russians, through their accurate understanding of Korean affairs, guided them to adopt the same Communistic political system and supplied sufficient military equipment to develop a modern army. The results appeared in the NKPA's successful execution of the war at the initial stage of the conflict.

Furthermore, the battle-hardened Koreans transferred from the Chinese People's Volunteer units, mostly by unit, contributed immensely to the development of the NKP Army. These veteran units enhanced not only the DPRKA's training, but also the efficiency of its combat strength - this was most influential in the development of DPRKA.

Both nations' domestic politics influenced the development of

their armies, too. Since the ROK maintained a democratic political system, veterans from the anti-Japanese forces wanted to enter politics or some other field of their own choice. At first, most of the nationalist veterans did not participate in the South Korean Constabulary. Later, when they were willing to join, it was too late because of the existing military hierarchy and seniority in the Korean Army. Communist guerrilla activity hampered the ROK Army's training and hence hindered the development of the Army. By contrast, many veterans in North Korea remained in the high military ranks, since the North Koreans kept close relations between the Communist Party and the executive government, maintaining easy transfer of positions from military to civil administration.

Since few understand Korean history in general, a substantial portion of the study has been devoted to familiarizing the reader with this theme. Then follows a description of the relationships among Korea, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China to provide an adequate appreciation of Korean affairs and of the patron countries' policies. Following this background information, the thesis discusses the development of both Armies through an examination of organization, equipment, and training which the sponsoring countries provided and which the client countries exercised.

In regard to bibliographical data, few studies had been done about the theme, although there are many books about the Korean War published in Western countries. Among the U.S. official history books, one book (Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War) deals with the development of the ROK Army and the other book (GHQ FEC MIS, GS, History of the North Korean Army, restricted documents) considers

the DPRK Army. Some other books mention only briefly the deveopment of both Armies. The writer refers to Korean sources.