The Army of the West and civilians: Mexican-American War military government in the southwest

by

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Abstract

Military history is filled with tales of battlefield glory and sacrifice. Occasionally, however, military historians find stories of peace during times of war. One of those instances in the history the U.S. Army is that of Brig. Gen. Stephen Kearny's Army of the West in the American Southwest in the years 1846-1847. In 1846, the Army of the West was dispatched to the northern provinces of Mexico called New Mexico and Alta California to establish military governments in preparation for the planned postwar administration of them as U.S. territories. Facing unprecedented logistical challenges in their march from Fort Leavenworth to the Pacific Coast, the Army of the West achieved the aims of the War Department. The basis for this success was the rapport that some members of the army and Kearny himself built with *Nuevomexicanos, Californios*, and Indigenous populations to compensate for oversights in the logistical planning of Kearny's campaign. The tolerance Kearny ordered his men to display towards the various local groups whom Kearny's soldiers encountered helped to make up for the flawed logistical support of Army of the West's enterprise. The ways in which Kearny and some in the army went about relating to civilians helped to cultivate respect and support for the invaders. Along with being able to obtain provisions from civilian populations to compensate for logistical shortcomings, Kearny's men in some circumstances went against contemporary views of race, gender, and religion when trying to "stay on the good side" of the non-combatants with whom they interacted. Kearny's campaign from Fort Leavenworth to San Diego in Alta California thus provides a unique episode little discussed in studies of the Mexican-American War, showing soldiers seeking to peacefully influence noncombatants into supporting military actions occurring around them.

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Some of the other graduate students at Kansas State Univeristy deserve credit for assisting in this project. I want to thank Michael Santana, Bryant Macfarlane, and Hannah Palsa, doctoral candidates in the Kansas State University Department of History. Michael and Bryant encouraged me to pursue examining U.S. Army logistics in the Mexican-American War with my thesis research. Hannah assisted me in finding sources about animal participants in Kearny's campaign and in the writing process by critiquing my work.

Finally, I would want to thank the various family members who, on several occasions, read portions of my work to add the views of non-historians into the final product.

Dedication

I want to dedicate this thesis to two groups of individuals, my friends and family. My family have been incredibly supportive of my dreams and of my pursuit of them. I also want to thank those friends whom I consider honorary members of my family who have encouraged, supported, and helped to shape this project and others I have undertaken. I specifically, in fulfillment of promises I once made to them both, want to dedicate this work to John Annen and Tanner Tucker, to whom I pledged to dedicate either my master's thesis or doctoral dissertation. All my friends and family, like the allies of the Army of the West, helped me through everything from the most difficult though the easiest portions of my research. All of you are dear to my heart!

I would be remiss if also did not dedicate this work to the mentors I have had throughout my life. Whether you knew it or not, I learned lessons from you and have applied them to my life.

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Chapter 1 - The Logistical Context

From June 1846 to January 1847, around 1,700 U.S. Army soldiers and volunteers marched from Fort Leavenworth along the westernmost border of the United States to the port city of San Diego in Mexican California. Although not discussed in detail in studies of the Mexican-American War, this expedition under the command of Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Stephen Watts Kearny captured the most important trading city in the Mexican province of New Mexico and helped establish a greater American presence in neighboring California. Kearny's men conducted the third of three military campaigns planned by the United States War Department when the US declared war on Mexico during the summer of 1846. Covering the Great Plains, mountains, and a desert, the almost 1,600-mile trek planned for Kearny's Army of the West challenged the logistical ability of the war planners of the Polk Administration. Advancing through miles of sparsely inhabited terrain, Kearny's men were aided by Mexican inhabitants, American traders, and Indigenous peoples throughout their advance. The only form of logistical assistance, the force received from the US military came from the U.S. Navy in the vicinity of San Diego. This thesis will show the methods the way in which the U.S. Army planned to supply Kearny's men and how its successes and failures in this process shaped the campaign. The term logistics utilized in this study refers to the sufficient sustainment of a military force on a campaign with adequate provisions, transportation, and other items that impact soldiers on campaign. What can be concluded is that the limits of the era's technology combined with pressure from the War Department to complete the expedition in a timely manner were the causes of the logistical issues the Army of the West endured. The deficiencies of the force's wagons compounded by the War Department's aims eventually led to Kearny and his army taking a tolerant approach in forming military governments in New Mexico and California.

Scholarly attention to this campaign rarely focuses upon the expedition's logistics. Kearny's feat, even its immediate aftermath, took a back seat to that of his subordinate Colonel (Col.) Alexander Doniphan of the First Missouri Mounted Volunteers, who led his men on a mission to reinforce Brig. Gen. John Wool's campaign to the south. Typically, however, authors of general histories of the conflict, such as Justin Smith, Jack Bauer, John Eisenhower, and David Clary rarely discuss the events in New Mexico preferring to examine the march in the context of John C. Frémont's actions in California and Zachary Taylor's advance towards Buena Vista. Of those historians mentioned, Smith and Bauer are the only ones who mention logistics, recognizing its importance given the vast country that the War Department ordered Kearny to traverse. Even then, however, both Smith and Bauer discuss the subject mainly in the analysis of tactics employed. Writing for the U.S. Army Center of Military History, historian James A. Huston wrote *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953* in which his analysis of the Mexican-American War favored Scott's and Taylor's forces. In Huston's work, Kearny's operation was essentially a sideshow that benefitted from the pre-war logistical planning of the Polk Administration. The strategic accomplishment of the goals set out by the Polk Administration for the expedition – the capture of Santa Fe and the reinforcement of pro-US forces in California – are what Houston, Bauer, and Smith focus upon when Kearny's campaign is discussed. However, there have been some studies solely devoted to the events witnessed by Kearny's men.

These few secondhand accounts of Kearny's trek through the West offer insights into how the campaign fit within the logistics of the overall grand strategy implemented by the War Department. Aside from veterans' accounts, the earliest detailed analysis of Kearny's march was published in 1961 by historian Dwight L. Clarke. Clarke's history of the campaign is found

within a biography of Kearny and is used to explain why the General quarreled with John C. Frémont, an explorer and fellow Army officer, over jurisdiction in California. Clarke drew upon the General's personal correspondence and records retained by the Kearny family. (Clarke's wife was a distant relative of General Kearny) Clarke spent some time discussing the logistical issues facing Kearny's men and the General's attempts to remedy them, but his source material did not allow for him to delve much deeper into the topic. Kearny's campaign also attracted attention from historian and historical fiction writer Winston Groom, who published a study of the campaign in 2011. Groom connected Kearny's push into the West and Frémont's Californian escapades with the migration of the Donner Party from Illinois, which began a few months earlier. Groom does not analyze the logistics of the campaign beyond stating that the men of Kearny's army almost starved to death, as many members of the Donner Party did. Groom's work has been criticized because of its faulty dating of events and its flawed interpretations of source material. Unlike Groom, Will and John Gorenfeld concluded that Kearny's success led to the birth of the U.S. Army's cavalry arm. Various logistical aspects of the march, the Gorenfelds concluded, later encouraged the Army to enlarge its number mounted units. What the Gorenfelds, Groom, and Clarke fail to do is give an account as to why the Army of the West was almost defeated by a limited supply of provisions.

Unlike many historical topics, the logistics of Kearny's expedition does not have a major historiographical debate surrounding it. The major scholarly debates about Kearny's campaign, as the General's biographer Dwight Clarke observes, surround the events of the Battle of San Pascual fought by Kearny's men on December 6, 1846, just outside San Diego.[1] The scarcity of

[1] Dwight L. Clark, *Stephen Watts Kearny: Stephen Watts Kearny* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961) 195-232

treatment of Kearny's efforts was true in 1961 and still prevalent today. The only semblance of a controversy over logistics comes in various statements in the secondary literature about the logistical support of US troops operating in the southwest from the 1840s to the 1860s. The judgment of a few historians that Kearny's men were not well supplied is the one this study addresses. Military historians such as K. Jack Bauer present Kearny's campaign as one that was inadequately provisioned and one that barely succeeded in reaching California.[2] Even some historians who disagree with Bauer in other respects agree that Kearny's expedition was undersupplied. Robert Frazer in *Forts and Supplies: The Role of the Economy in the Southwest, 1846-1860* also states that the Army of the West was undersupplied, showing that the force's poor logistics played into the U.S. Army presence in the Southwest.[3] How this study differs from previous ones is that it challenges an inadequately supported contention by looking more closely at the interaction of several key elements. Specifically, this study looks at the relationship between the distance and topography covered by Kearny's invasion, contemporary military thinking, political pressure, and limitations of the era's technology to explain the logistical issues rather than comparing it to later military operations.

Kearny's logistical challenges mainly resulted from the role imposed on his army by President James Polk's grand strategy. When Polk called on Congress to declare war on Mexico in the summer of 1846, he already had one army in the field under Major General (Maj. Gen.) Zachary Taylor. Taylor's Army of Occupation crossed the Nueces River in early 1846 to occupy some disputed territory claimed by both the Mexican and US governments during debates over

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[2] K. Jack Bauer, *The Mexican-American War 1846-1848* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1974), 130-131, 138.

[3] Robert W. Frazer, *Forts and Supplies: The Role of the Army in the Economy of the Southwest, 1846-1861* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1983), 5.

the annexation of Texas to the United States a year earlier. In a meeting hosted by Polk at the White House in May of 1846, Polk, Secretary of War William Marcy, and U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott decided that the US would raise two additional armies.[4] These newly formed forces were to invade and capture the provinces of California, New Mexico, and Chihuahua. Command of "the Center Division," the troops who were to invade Chihuahua by way of southwestern Texas, was given to Brig. Gen. John Wool. To split the attention of the Mexican authorities in California, Polk and Marcy chose to alter the mission of a mapping expedition led by John C. Frémont from charting California to instigating a rebellion among the *Californios* (the Mexicans living in California) and the establishment of a US client republic. Reinforcing Frémont by taking advantage of the withdrawal of Mexican troops to repel both Taylor and Wool to the south, an "army of the west" would be able to capture the key trading city of Santa Fe. This army was placed under then Col. Stephen Kearny. The U.S. Navy, meanwhile, would blockade key Mexican ports, thereby cutting Mexico off from any potential external sources of supply. Effects of the ongoing blockade, the loss of Mexico's northern provinces, and Taylor's men nearing the capital city would, on paper, cause the Mexican government to sue for peace.[5]

The U.S. Army was small on the eve of the Mexican-American War and mainly focused its efforts on maintaining the peace between settlers and Indigenous tribes. Even by nineteenth century standards it was considered undersized since the Army only numbered 5,300 effectives.

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[4] David Clary, *Eagles and Empire*: *The United States, Mexico, and the Struggle for a Continent* (New York: Bantam Books, 2009), 105.

[5] John Taylor Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition: Containing an Account of the Conquest of New Mexico, General Kearny's Overland Expedition to California, Doniphan's Campaign Against the Navajos, His Unparalleled March Upon Chihuahua and Durango, and the Operations of General Price at Santa Fe: With a Sketch of the Life of Col. Doniphan* (Cincinnati, OH: U. P. James, 1847), 13.

In this condition, the U.S. Army's primary responsibility was manning a series of forts guarding the western borders of the United States and fulfilling other duties throughout the country. The relatively small number of fighting men available in 1845 stemmed from a reduction of the Army following the Second Seminole War in 1842, as well as desertions, retirements, and recruitment issues. All told, within the span of a few years, the U.S. Army went from 12,500 men under arms (which was decreased to 7,800 by Congress) to 5,300.[6] Doctrinally the American army resembled the French army, for Winfield Scott began incorporating French military thinking into overall U.S. Army doctrine and into the curriculum of West Point after the War of 1812. Scott's reforms began to instill a sense of professionalism in both the officer corps and the enlisted men, leading to greater stability within the ranks.[7] Politically the U.S. Army supported both parties almost equally. Historian William Skelton has argued that the expansionist platform of the Democrats presented U.S. Army officers with the opportunity to obtain a rapid promotion and glory, while the conservatism of the Whigs in military affairs "felt more comfortable".[8] In a political move, Polk issued a call for 50,000 volunteers to be mustered into service during the war; however, volunteers from strongly Democratic states went into Mexico immediately. Units from Whigs states were designated to act as reinforcements.[9] Polk distrusted his Whig generals, appointing some of his allies as officers under them. The President did not put any of the political officers under Kearny, allowing Kearny to choose his own staff.

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[6] David Lavender, *Climax at Buena Vista: The Decisive Battle of the Mexican American War* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 49.

[7]William Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 136.

[8] Skelton, *An American,* 295-297

[9] James K. Polk, *The Diary of James K. Polk During His Presidency, 1845 to 1849* ed. Milo Milton Quaife (Chicago, IL: A.C. McClurg and Company, 1910), 1:404, 418; 2:150-152.

Despite this, Polk's choice to favor enlistees from Democratic states did impact Kearny's command.

To carry out Polk's plans for the West the logistical support for the armies needed to be able to fill the ranks, supply the soldiers, and assist in maintaining them for the duration of the conflict. Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, whose book *The Art of War* was a basis of U.S. Army doctrine at the time of the Mexican-American War, defined "logistics" as amassing needed provisions for a campaign, gathering intelligence for that endeavor, establishing a chain of command, keeping records, maintaining steady lines of communication and supply to an army, and other managerial duties.[10] All of this in Jomini's view fell under the jurisdiction of the general staff of an army. The U.S. Army's organization featuring various bureaus headed by officers overseeing the logistical support of field armies which reflected the influence of Jomini's book. In the field, however, the responsibility of gathering and maintaining supplies fell to the individual force commanders. At times, American officers could rely on the federal government's help to provide for their men. In the case of Kearny's campaign, the government provided arms, ammunition, and uniforms for his men, but the quartermaster in charge of supplying Kearny's army needed to procure all additional supplies. In the field, is was common for armies to gather supplies rely from local populations or from the land itself. This method of support often allowed an army to achieve its objective with great speed, but it could limit the amount of available provisions. Despite this risk, Kearny opted, throughout the campaign, to employ the practice of foraging to feed, clothe, and provision his soldiers.

Logistics had not been the U.S. Army's forte in previous wars, but the service had undergone changes to overcome its logistical woes. History records the predicaments

[10] Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War* (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 254-257.

experienced by the Continental Army during the days of the Revolution, but the U.S. Army in the War of 1812 did not fare much better than their forebears almost forty years before. When President James Madison asked Congress to declare war on Great Britain in June 1812, the Army was tasked with supplying itself. Ill-preparedness on the part of the officers leading the different organizations overseeing various aspects of the war caused disorganization and supply problems among the armies fighting the British.[11] Following the Treaty of Ghent and the victory at New Orleans, President Madison sought to reform the Army's logistical apparatus. By the Second Seminole War, U.S. Army logistics took on a more professional air. The reforms begun under Madison resulted in the establishment of a permanent General Staff which until that time had been only a wartime measure. This new institution was comprised of the commanders of the new nine military districts and other general officers tasked with supervising certain aspects of warfare, like supplies, ordinance, and military law. It was not the responsibility of the General Staff to develop strategy until a century later. William Crawford, Madison's second Secretary of War, believed that making the General Staff permanent would lead to the Army command structure becoming more effective. This also provided an agency to oversee the maintenance of the Army during peacetime.[12] John C. Calhoun, the Secretary of War from 1817 through 1825, cemented this idea in an act passed by Congress in 1818. Calhoun took Crawford's efforts even farther by establishing permanent Quartermaster, Medical, Ordinance, and Subsistence

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[11] Richard W. Stewart, ed., *American Military History Vol. I*: *The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation 1775-1917* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2009), 134; Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012* (New York: Free Press, 2012), 111-112.

[12] Bill for the Organizing of the General Staff and Making Further Provision for the Army of the United States of 1816, H.R. 68, 14th Congress (1816); Letter from William Crawford to Richard M. Johnson, February 6, 1816, in *American State Papers Military Affairs Volume I* (Buffalo, NY: H.C. Hien, 1998), 636.

Departments that reported directly to the General Staff supervised by the War Department.[13] Throughout the second war with the Seminoles in Florida, Brig. Gen. Thomas Jesup used his post of Quartermaster General to great effect which allowed for the troops under Zachary Taylor to eventually pacify the Seminoles living in Florida. Now the departments established by Crawford and Calhoun were called upon to supply armies across extreme distances and terrain that differed from those the Army covered in Florida.

Upon deciding on three invasion routes for Taylor's, Wool's, and Kearny's armies, Polk arranged Secretary of War Marcy to communicate the orders to the commanders slated to lead these three columns. Among those given out were those containing the goals set out before Col. Stephen Kearny. In his missive to Kearny, Marcy did not lay out an intended route of march, nor did he say that the War Department would contribute supplies to the expedition. Instead, Marcy said that the President himself was giving Kearny complete control over how his force proceeded to Santa Fe and ultimately to California. It was up to the colonel to consider the "practicability of procuring needful supplies for men and animals, and transporting baggage."[14] The supplies that Kearny would amass had to last until he and his men reached California, stated Marcy. There U.S. Navy ships would be waiting off the coast with food stores and other necessary equipment for Kearny's operations. Marcy did recommend to the dragoon commander that he seek volunteers from "a large body of Mormon emigrants en route to California" as they would be

[13] Capt. Oscar F. Long, "Quartermaster's Department" in *The Army of the US Historical Sketches of Staff and Line with Portraits of Generals-in-Chief*, ed. Theophilus Rodenbough and William L. Haskin (New York: Maynard, Merrill, and Co., 1896), 50-53.

[14] Letter from William Marcy to Stephen Watts Kearny, June 3, 1846 in Appendix A to *Stephen Watts Kearny: Stephen Watts Kearny* by Dwight L. Clarke (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 394-397.

willing to serve in U.S. Army detachment heading to that area.[15] Kearny was advised to procure his men and materiel quickly to reach California before the winter snows blocked passable trails over the mountains of New Mexico.[16] The colonel was also told to set up a government in the conquered territories and develop diplomatic relationships with the Native Americans his troops encountered. Despite possessing a professional military supply agency under Brig. Gen. Jesup, the US government gave Kearny the responsibility of providing for his army in a portion of the continent that the U.S. Army had little experience outfitting a force.

Col. Stephen Kearny of the First US Dragoons had experience in military ventures into the West. A War of 1812 veteran and career soldier, Kearny had begun serving along the western border of the US in 1819. In 1820, Kearny participated in an expedition along the Mississippi River that departed from Council Bluffs in the Iowa Territory and ended at St. Louis 428 miles away. Five years later, then Major (Maj.) Kearny and his fellow members of the First United States Infantry took part in the Second Yellowstone Expedition, following the Missouri River to the area of modern-day Montana along the Yellowstone River. During their journey, Kearny and fellow infantrymen established relationships with the Indigenous peoples of the area while also scouting potential locations of future U.S. Army installations.[17] Ten years later, after a promotion to Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) and a transfer to the First US Dragoons, Kearny took part in a major foray into the Great Plains in 1835 that was headed by (Colonel) Col. Henry Dodge.[18] Just

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[15] President Polk and Marcy had met with representatives of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints after the declaration of war. During this meeting, the President gave federal backing to the Mormon migration westward in exchange for Mormon volunteers serving the American war effort.

[16] Marcy to Kearny, 394-397 .

[17] Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, 28-33.

[18] Will and John Gorenfeld, *Kearny's Dragoons Out West: The Birth of the United States Cavalry* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), 73-75.

a year before the Mexican-American War commenced, Col. Kearny commanded a portion of his 280 dragoons from First US Dragoons on an expedition across the Great Plains and into the Rocky Mountains. Kearny observed as early as 1820 how important it was for an army to have adequate supplies during an expedition into unsettled territory.[19] Living off the land was crucial to the success of any expedition of the type that Kearny had played a part in many times throughout his career. An army, however, could not solely forage for all its provisions.

Kearny decided to divide procurement duties for the expedition between himself and two other officers on his staff. Filling the post of quartermaster for the Army of the West was the quartermaster of Fort Scott, Maj. Thomas Swords. Trained at West Point, Swords became a member of the Quartermaster Department in 1834 and oversaw the construction of the recently established Fort Scott from 1842 to 1846. Companies A and C of the First Dragoons were the first U.S. Army troops to garrison Sword's fort and the major had been a member of Kearny's dragoon outfit since 1833.[20] Captain (Capt.) Henry Smith Turner was a West Point alumnus who joined the First US Dragoons following his graduation in 1834, the same year Swords joined the Quartermaster Department. Turner's pre-war resume included a stint in France as an observer, which led to his introduction of new dragoon and cavalry tactics to the U.S. Army inspired by the French. He also spent time as a regimental adjutant and assistant adjutant general of the Third Military Department, with service as an aide-de-camp on an exploratory expedition, and he earned two promotions as well. Kearny knew Turner from the First Dragoons' expedition into the Rockies in 1845. This (and no doubt his military record) prompted Kearny to select Turner to

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[19] Stephen Watts Kearny "Journal of Stephen Watts Kearny," *Missouri Historical Society Collections* 3, no. 1 (January 1908): 24, 29.

[20] Leo Oliva, *Fort Scott: Courage and Conflict on the Border* (Topeka, KS: Kansas State Historical Society, 1984), 20, 83.

be his Chief of Staff during the upcoming campaign.[21] Although Turner and Swords assisted Kearny in his logistical planning, it was primarily Kearny who corresponded with the different sources of men, materiel, and other necessities.

To determine the number of men, the amount of materiel, and other things needed to accomplish the common vision of Scott, Polk, and Marcy, Kearny first needed to gather intelligence about the terrain and his enemy. The general's biographer Dwight Clarke remarks in his work that Kearny asked traders traveling along the Santa Fe Trail about the condition of the Mexican army guarding New Mexico.[22] Examples of this are found in Kearny's papers from the time. One letter written to Capt. Benjamin D. Moore of Company J of the First Dragoons alerted Kearny to the presence of a wagon train along the Santa Fe Trail. The source of the information was George Howard, a Santa Fe merchant aiding the colonel. (Howard, noted Clarke, was sent to Santa Fe by Secretary of War Marcy to gather intelligence.) This missive ordered Moore's company to seize any goods being hauled by the wagon train but the detachment failed to capture the wagon train. Despite this, Moore's men successfully kept over 400 wagons from passing Bent's Fort northeast of Santa Fe. The stopped vehicles contained supplies that could be used later by the Army of the West. [23] Volunteer Capt. David Waldo, who had resided and traded in Santa Fe before the conflict, also provided information about the governor of the province,

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[21] Clarke, "Introduction," in *The Original Journals of Henry Smith Turner* by Henry Smith Turner, ed. Dwight L. Clarke, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 10-13.; Turner was related to the future Confederate general, Robert E. Lee. He served with Lee at Jefferson Barracks in the 1830s and travelled to France with Stephen Kearny's nephew, Philip Kearny. Both Lee and Kearny later gained fame in the American Civil War.

[22] Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny,*105.

[23] Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, 106.

Manuel Armijo.[24] The true strength of the Mexican forces, a number around 5,000 men, along with knowledge of the Mexican government's poor approval among New Mexicans also reached Kearny by June 16, 1846. The colonel did not name the source of this intelligence in a missive to the adjutant general of the U.S. Army, though one could conclude that Kearny received it from either Howard, Waldo, or Moore's detachment.[25] Trader James Magoffin gained other valuable information for the army. It was Magoffin who leaked information to the Army of the West about New Mexico, and later helped to convince the governor of the province to hand it over without a fight.[26]

Kearny's choice to send some of his dragoons from Fort Leavenworth to Bent's Fort not only provided intelligence for the road ahead, but also proved to be a key to logistical support for his campaign. The wagons seized by Moore's men at Bent's Fort contained supplies bound for Armijo's defense forces could instead now help in supporting Kearny's campaign. Speed was of the essence to avoid the onset of winter and the depletion of supplies. In accordance with his orders from Washington to arrive in San Diego before winter, Kearny sent out the units assigned

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[24] Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to Benjamin Moore, June 5, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stehen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847,* eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 139-140.; Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to Benjamin Moore, June 6, 1846 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 140.; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, 106.

[25] Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to Roger Jones, June 16, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 144-145.; Some veterans recalled that they were told that 4,000 men defended Santa Fe, not 5,000.

[26] Letter from Philip St. George Cooke to James Magoffin, February 21, 1849, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 309-310.

to his command as soon as they were provisioned.[27] Once they were on the march, Kearny ordered them to make for Bent's Fort to rendezvous with the dragoons there as well as wait for the rest of the Army of the West to arrive. Bent's Fort, as Kearny's experience and intelligence indicated, was the only settlement between Ft. Leavenworth and Santa Fe that could resupply his army and serve as a defensible rendezvous point. Once assembled, Kearny's command would march on Santa Fe. Additional troops from Missouri being outfitted at Ft. Leavenworth were to reinforce those in Santa Fe and garrison the town when the westward advanced to California commenced.[28]

Fort Leavenworth had served as staging area and jumping off point for U.S. Army forays into the Great Plains before 1846. Kearny had been among the leaders of two such expeditions in 1835 and 1845. The installation was a mere twenty years old when Kearny began amassing his command in the opening days of the Mexican-American War. The namesake of the post, Col. Henry Leavenworth, established it on a bluff overlooking the Missouri River in 1827.[29] Known as Cantonment Leavenworth until its official designation as a U.S. Army fort in 1830, the instillation was situated a short distance from the starting point of the Santa Fe Trail at Independence, Missouri. Its location along the Missouri also allowed steamboats to bring supplies directly from the Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis, the main stockpile of firearms in the

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[27] Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, 113.

[28] Henry Smith Turner, *The Original Journals of Henry Smith Turner*, ed. Dwight L. Clarke (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 74-75.

[29] Lt. Col. Philip W. Childress, "Manifest Destiny, 1837-1858" in *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth*, ed. John W. Partin (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983), 14.; Leavenworth went against orders, establishing the camp across the river from the intended spot. The colonel defended his decision by citing the strategic bluff and the fertile land that the installation currently sits upon. It is the oldest active U.S. Army installation still in use.

West, about a four-day trip away. The Santa Fe Trail also passed by the installation providing a well-known route into New Mexico for an army to use. The Missouri River could also bring troops from northern posts directly to the fort, while military roads connected it to Fort Gibson and Fort Scott to the south.[30] The post also housed the headquarters of the First Regiment of US Dragoons and its commander, Stephen Kearny.

To find men for the expedition, Kearny looked to the state of Missouri to provide volunteers. Prominent Missouri politicians and their constituents openly supported Polk from the outset of his presidency. In response to this, Polk chose to federalize Missouri volunteer units for combat in the war. Kearny, receiving permission from Polk to use Missouri units, sent Capt. Turner to deliver a letter to the governor of Missouri, the Democrat John Edwards, calling for the enlistment of one thousand volunteers from the state for his army on May 27, 1846. Eight hundred of these men were to be mounted infantrymen with the remaining two hundred being trained as artillerymen.[31] Edwards obliged and sent word of Kearny's call out to each of the state's counties. Polk's call for 50,000 men earlier in the year had spawned the formation of numerous volunteer companies and several of Missouri's counties responded to Edwards' proclamation by sending a number of these volunteer units directly to Ft. Leavenworth. These included the Laclede Rangers from St. Louis County, the Platte County Infantry Company, the Cole County Infantry Company and eight others destined for service from Clay, Lafayette,

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[30] Oliva, *Fort Scott*, 3-7.

[31] Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to Roger Jones, May 28, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 131-133.; Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to John C. Edwards, June 16, 1846 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 145-146.

Callaway, Franklin, Howard, Jackson, and Cole Counties.[32] Rounding out the Missourians sent west were two companies of artillery from St. Louis County under Maj. Meriwether Lewis Clark, a West Point graduate and son of the famous explorer Capt. William Clark. In total, the number of Missourians sent to join Kearny was 1,026 men, 836 under the command of Col. Alexander Doniphan, 232 volunteered for Maj. Clark's artillery battalion, and an addition 52 were to serve as infantrymen during the campaign.[33] By the time these units left Ft. Leavenworth, the number of men in the Army of the West was 1,701, including around 1,317 Missourians. These companies began arriving at the assembly point at Ft. Leavenworth on June 5, 1846 and continued to come until June 18, 1846 when the First Missouri Mounted Volunteers was officially established and Col. Doniphan given command.[34]

Kearny's second order of business upon gathering intelligence was to follow Marcy's recommendation and recruit men from the "large body of Mormon emigrants." On June 19, 1846, (Marcy's orders were received by Kearny on June 3), Kearny sent orders to Capt. James Allen of the First Dragoons to recruit 500 "young and efficient" Mormon men to help fill the

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[32] Joseph G. Dawson III, *Doniphan's Epic March: The First Missouri Volunteers in the Mexica War* (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1999), 31.; Marcellus Ball Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards," In *Marching with the Army of the West* by Abraham Robinson Johnston, Marcellus Ball Edwards, and Philip Gooch Ferguson, ed. Ralph Bieber (Glendale, CA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1936), 113-114.

[33] George Rutledge Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier Under Kearny and Doniphan 1846-1847*, ed. Ralph Bieber (Glendale, CA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1935), 125-126.

[34] Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to J. Hendly, June 5, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 139.; Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to William Minor, June 17, 1846 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 147.

ranks of his army.[35] Kearny also stipulated that only four civilian laundresses were allowed to travel with the troops to help care for the men. Traveling to Mormon settlements in Iowa, Capt. Allen found hundreds of willing volunteers to join what came to be known as the Mormon Battalion. Contributing to this were two factors, a promise issued by the federal government of land in exchange for services rendered and an appeal from the head of the Church of Latter-day Saints, Brigham Young.[36] In his orders to Allen, Kearny told him to form only five companies of infantry out of the enlistees and to proceed to the staging area of Ft. Leavenworth for arms, uniforms, and other necessary supplies. In all, Allen spent twenty days in Iowa enlisting Mormons, constituting a recruiting trip that resulted in exactly 500 men under arms. Allen, however, went against Kearny's mandate of only four laundresses per company by allowing nine domestic servants and eighty-two family members of infantrymen to follow the Battalion into combat.[37] Allen's men took eleven days to trek overland from Council Bluffs, Iowa to Ft. Leavenworth, departing on July 20, 1846, and entering Leavenworth on August 1 after Kearny had already left the post.

Along with Doniphan's mounted men, Clark's cannons and Allen's Mormon infantry, the burgeoning Army of the West also included U.S. Army dragoons. The First Dragoon Regiment

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[35] Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to James Allen, June 19, 1846, in *Army of Israel: Mormon Battalion Narratives*, eds. David Bigler and Will Bagley (Spokane, WA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 2000), 41-42.

[36] Letter from Brigham Young to Samuel Bent, July 7, 1846, in *Army of Israel: Mormon Battalion Narratives*, eds. David Bigler and Will Bagley (Spokane WA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 2000), 47-49.

[37] Daniel Tyler, *A Concise History of the Mormon Battalion in the Mexican-American War 1846-47* (Chicago, IL: The Rio Grande Press Inc., 1964), 118-126.; Norma Ricketts, *The Mormon Battalion: U.S. Army of the West 1846-1848* (Logan, UT: Utah State University Press, 1996), 31-33.; Ricketts also mentions that other records not cited in this study mention that some slaves accompanied the officers and some of the Mormons. Names, ages, and other information, however, are hard to find and may indicate that since they were viewed as property, slaves were not recorded in lists of camp followers of the expedition.

was only thirteen years old when war came in 1846. It had been mustered into service specifically for frontier warfare.[38] The First Dragoons was originally headquartered at Ft. Gibson (in present-day Oklahoma) before it was moved in 1834 to Ft. Leavenworth, where Kearny took command of the dragoons in 1836. Rather than allowing them to serve together, the War Department dispersed the unit's companies between the garrisons of Forts Scott, Atkinson, Crawford, and Leavenworth on the frontier. The companies that greeted the Missourians were Companies B and K of the First Dragoons which were transferred from Ft. Atkinson and Ft. Crawford only a few weeks before.[39] Kearny had requested the five companies of the First Dragoons be assigned to his campaign and the War Department agreed. Two more, Companies C and G of the First, under the command of Capt. Moore, plus two 12-pound mountain howitzers, had attempted to overtake a Mexican wagon train containing $70,000 worth of military goods. The attempt resulted in altering the logistics of the campaign. Moore's companies and their artillery support, along with the wagons that they stopped, were then reinforced by Company J at Bent's Fort while awaiting the rest of the army.[40] The 300 dragoons not only brought regular army experience to the core of the Army of the West but also the ability to fight both on horseback and like infantry when dismounted.

The dragoons looked more like professional soldiers than recently enlisted recruits, for the volunteers often wore the same clothing that they did in civilian life. Kearny, the career officer that he was, chose to follow U.S. Army regulations by outfitting the volunteer portions of

[38] Gorenfeld, *Kearny's Dragoons*, 23.

[39] Gorenfeld, 223; Stephen Watts Kearny to Benjamin Moore, 140; $70,000 dollars in 1846 was equivalent to around $2.5 million dollars in cash in 2022.

[40] All other companies of the First Dragoons were sent to join Taylor's Army of Occupation.

his army only with firearms from Jefferson Barracks.[41] U.S. Army regulations stipulated that in wartime volunteers were responsible for their uniforms while the government provided their firearms, rations, pay, and other necessities needed on campaign. Typically, the U.S. Army gave a volunteer $42 to purchase a uniform before being mustered into service.[42] According to accounts of the buildup at Ft. Leavenworth, the allowance was handed out, but many of the soldiers pocketed the money instead of spending it on attire for the journey to Santa Fe. This resulted in men of the Mormon Battalion and assorted Missourians wearing no uniform.[43] One Mormon volunteer said that the lack of an official uniform for the Battalion raised the appeal to enlist and allowed more freedom for the citizen-soldiers. In his account of the exploits of the Army of the West, First Missouri veteran John Taylor Hughes included an illustration of what he and his comrades looked like. Titled "The Volunteer," the sketch shows a bearded man of slim build wearing what appears to be an early version of a Stetson hat, a bandana, a poncho over a woolen shirt, long wool pants, a sword belt, and boots. The soldier is armed with a U.S. Army regulation cavalry saber and single shot musket.[44] One of Hughes' fellow Missourians, Frank

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[41] Letter from Henry Smith Turner to W. H. Bell, June 25, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 152-153.

[42] James Huston, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics from 1775-1953* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History U.S. Army, 1966), 132.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New* Mexico, 21; United States War Department, *General Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1841* (Washington, DC: J. and G.S. Gideon, printers, 1841), 14, 204, 209-210, 364.; Elliot, *The Mexican War Correspondence*, 40.; - $42 in 1847 is equal to around $1,472.58 in 2022.

[43] David Gracy and Helen J. H. Rugeley, eds., "From the Mississippi to the Pacific: An Englishman in the Mormon Battalion." *Arizona and the West* 7, no. 2 (Summer 1965): 134.

[44] Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition,* 1, illustration "The Volunteer."

Edwards, included a butcher knife and a revolver to the ensemble, making the Missourians and Mormons resemble a collection of pioneers more than cavalry.[45]

The gun wielded by the soldier in Hughes' drawing used black powder which, in the 1840s, was usually transported in barrels. To fire their weapons, soldiers poured a few ounces of gunpowder into the firing mechanism and placed a bullet inside the gun's barrel. Artillerymen, likewise, put gunpower at the base of the barrel of artillery pieces to propel projectiles when the weapon fired. Gunpowder for both artillery and small arms often came to field commands in massive barrels weighing about 200 pounds. Other necessary supplies, such as food, also arrived in barrels. Food barrels often contained bread, meat, coffee, water, and occasionally alcoholic beverages, fruits, and vegetables.[46] In addition, stocks of soap and candles were carried to replenish each soldier's ration of each on campaign. These contents were in line with the following regulation daily food rations:

¾ pound of pork or 1¼ pounds of salt beef
18 ounces of flour (many times already baked into bread)
2 4/10 ounces of beans or 1 6/10 ounces of rice
1 6/10 ounces of coffee
1.92 ounces of sugar
5 1/10 ounces of vinegar
1¼ tablespoons salt[47]

Wooden crates included in supply shipments contained goods such as extra firearms, ammunition for artillery and other firearms, uniform components, and textiles. Wagons were

[45] Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 21-22.

[46] Frazer, *Forts and Supplies*, 4; War Department, *General Regulations*, 267.

[47] "Cooking Food Rations", Fort Scott National Historic Site, National Park Service, July 30, 2016, accessed March 23, 2022, https://www.nps.gov/learn/education/cookrations.htm.

used to transport these barrels and crates weighing thousands of pounds from Ft. Leavenworth to San Diego. With most of the nation's railroads located in the Northeast, and with no waterway fit for steamboats in the Southwest, wagons were the only source of transportation for the large amount of supplies needed by the Army of the West. Kearny, to provide his men another source of meat, also had acquired a herd of cattle that were to follow the army into New Mexico.

Clark and Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Philip W. Childress, author of a short work about Fort Leavenworth in the 1840s, found that the number of wagons used over the entire expedition by Kearny's force was around 1,650. This included wagons of two varieties; 1,550 were the famous covered wagons synonymous with westward migrations, and another 100 were uncovered wagons.[48] Five hundred pack mules also served the Army of the West during the campaign by transporting supplies. Oxen, horses, and additional mules were harnessed to the wagons to haul their massive loads across the terrain. Instead of the wagons forming a single wagon train, Kearny and his staff opted to divide them among the units of the Army of the West because of the plan to send units on to Bent's Fort in waves. Each unit, therefore, was to keep its wagons moving with the column and to maintain its rations over the course of the campaign. Kearny's men found that the wagons often lagged behind the column, compelling them to live off of the land.[49] Soldiers carried rations with them in their knapsacks or in bags attached to their saddles, but these often did not last beyond a few days. The stops at Bent's Fort and Santa Fe allowed for the wagon trains to catch up and resupply. Replenishing the supplies of food and other necessities at these locations did not make the wagons easier to navigate in mountainous

[48] Childress, "Manifest Destiny, 1837-1858", 22.; Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, 108-109.; Elliot, *The Mexican War Correspondence*, 32.

[49] Turner, *Original Journals*, 58-59.

areas. This development ultimately forced Kearny to divide his men sending some into desert environs with a wagon train in tow.

Kearny accompanied two companies of Maj. Clarke's artillery and several wagons to Bent's Fort beginning on June 30, 1846.[50] Kearny's detachment, along with the rest of men who departed Fort Leavenworth, quickly learned that the Great Plains in some ways provided ample support for a mounted force on the move. Men such as dragoon Abraham Johnston described the country as "well-watered" but barren of trees, making it hard to find firewood.[51] Streams, the Arkansas River, and other water sources that the army encountered along the route allowed for both men and animals to hydrate themselves. Buffalo herds, observed by some of the Mormons who followed Kearny's men in August, allowed the men to supplement their military rations with meat from the massive creatures.[52] Even the manure from the beasts was used to supplement the supply of firewood to cook food, warm the soldiers' camps, and provide light at night. The native grasses of the region allowed for the mounts of the men and the teams pulling the wagons to feed. The men took shortcuts at every opportunity to shorten the route of advance to not only expend less energy, but also to conserve provisions. There were few hills to traverse which only increased the rate of advance. The fertile countryside, the flat topography, and to live off the land allowed for Kearny's mounted units to average around twenty miles a day and his

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[50] Richard Smith Elliot, *The Mexican War Correspondence of Richard Smith Elliot*, eds. Mark L. Gardner and Marc Simmons (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 43-44.; Turner, *The Original Journals*, 58.

[51] Abraham Robinson Johnston, "Journal of Abraham Robinson Johnston" in *Marching with the Army of the West* by Abraham Robinson Johnston, Marcellus Ball Edwards, and Philip Gooch Ferguson, ed. Ralph Bieber (Glendale, CA: The Arthur H. Clarke Company, 1936), 79.

[52] Gracy, "From the Mississippi to the Pacific", 141-142; Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier Under Kearny and Doniphan*, 147.

infantry to march just a few miles less a day. These conditions lasted the first few weeks of the march to Bent's Fort, but within sight of the trading post the conditions changed.

As the columns got closer to Bent's Fort, the grass and buffalo herds became harder to find. Problems arose when the soldiers relied on the wagons to provide sustenance. Maj. Swords oversaw the distribution of food from the vehicles, but he could not remedy their shortcomings. The most obvious shortcoming of the wagons to the men was their tendency to outpace the wagon trains – the wagons arrived at campsites hours after the men established the bivouacs.[53] Many men in the columns noted how the wagons become bogged down in mud after fierce downpours from occasional thunderstorms. Even perfect campaigning weather produced its own difficulties. The wagons routinely experienced breakdowns in their wooden machinery which mechanics hired by Kearny repaired. Wagons overturning due to their size when they descended into deep ravines or when fording high-banked fords rivers contributed to the difficulties witnesses reported. Time devoted to repacking and repairing the recently overbalanced wagons contributed to the wagon trains' belated arrivals into encampments.[54] Delayed in receiving their supplies, men periodically went hours without any food or shelter because their main source of most of those amenities was the wagon train. The train also provided a way to get the sick much needed rest and medicine. With buffalo herds and water becoming scarce, the men relied on the wagons' stores to survive. Men who marched with Kearny, Doniphan, and Clark during this first part of the journey observed that Kearny and other officers decreased the soldiers' rations by half to prolong the food stores contained in the wagons.

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[53] Johnston, "Journal of Abraham Johnston", 81-82.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico,* 39.

[54] Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 16-17.

At Bent's Fort the different contingents of Kearny's command resupplied, rested, and united to form the Army of the West before marching on Santa Fe. Encamped around the trading post, Kearny's men reported to Capt. Benjamin Moore of the First Dragoons who waited at Bent's Fort with the over 400 captured wagons. All the Missouri volunteers, the mounted men, the infantry, and artillery, and the five dragoon companies had arrived by July 31, 1846.[55] Boasting a blacksmith, a gunsmith, stores of ammunition, food, and animals for westward migration, Bent's Fort afforded the Army of the West a perfect place to resupply. The men found food for themselves through trades with mostly native traders who had come to do business with other merchants in the area.[56] The country in which they camped, wrote the Missourian George Gibson, was a fertile land with grass to graze the men's mounts and to live off. During the days spent around Bent's Fort, Kearny interrogated three Mexican prisoners who informed him that Manuel Armijo, the governor of the province of New Mexico, planned to amass a force to Kearny's front to block his advance on Santa Fe. Kearny let his men rest for a few days (some men rested for more days than others because of the arrival dates) before commencing the advance upon Santa Fe on August 2, 1846. Thirteen days later, Maj. Swords notified Kearny that the War Department sent him a letter promoting the Colonel to the rank of Brigadier General.[57]

Other elements of Kearny's expedition did not use the logistical benefits of Bent's Fort to speed up the campaign. Delayed at the start, the Mormon Battalion originally planned to go to Bent's Fort before joining the rest of the army in Santa Fe. The wagons accompanying this contingent of the Army of the West encountered the same difficulties observed by the dragoons

[55] Turner, *Original Journals*, 66-67.

[56] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 168.

[57] Turner, *Original Journals*, 67, 71-72.

and Missouri volunteer units who marched under Kearny's direct supervision, slowing the advance even more. Along the way, however, Lieutenant (Lt.) Andrew Jackson Smith, the commander of the Mormons – Col. James Allen had taken ill and was left at Ft. Leavenworth to recuperate – decided to march his men southwest along the Cimarron River. Smith thought that by bypassing Bent's Fort he could hasten the march. Kearny, too, attempted to quicken the battalion's advance when, on October 3, 1836, he sent word to Lt. Smith that he wanted the Battalion to arrive in Santa Fe by October 10, 1846. This stretched the provisions that the men carried with them. Rations, though supplemented with bison meat and other game, were eventually cut in half to conserve food. Like their fellow soldiers who had marched ahead of them, the Mormons found that as they advanced further south, foraging became less successful. Slowed by the families that had come with the recruits from Iowa, the Battalion's food stores were increasingly strained. Veterans wrote later that the Latter-day Saints found that the New Mexico countryside and other lands through which they advanced did not provide as many opportunities to forage. [58] Disease also took a toll on the men, weakening the battalion's strength. Ultimately, the Mormons did reach Santa Fe earlier than expected, but in poor condition.

Before the rest of the army bypassed Bent's Fort later that summer, Kearny's men moved on Santa Fe. With his roughly 1,700 men assembled and ready to depart, Kearny ordered an advance on Santa Fe. Prepared to engage a force of 5,000 New Mexicans, Kearny's expedition instead captured Santa Fe without suffering a single casualty.[59] The local peoples'

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[58] Tyler, *A Concise History*, 163-164.; Gracy, "From the Mississippi to the Pacific", 141-142.

[59] Letter from Stephen Kearny to Roger Jones, June 29, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846- 1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 154-155.; Gibson, *A Journal of a Soldier*, 195-196.; Letter from Stephen Kearny to Roger

displeasure regarding the provincial administration, however, was apparent. What the Army of the West found in the territory between Bent's Fort and Santa Fe as well as the area around the city were farmers and other inhabitants willing to sell goods to them. Soldiers acquired milk, bread, mutton, cream, cheese, peppers, onions, apples, apricots, corn, and other necessities.[60] Mules and wagons were also purchased from the Mexicans. Kearny's men found, however, that although the food would help them get to California, the acquired mules were malnourished, prone to tiring quicker, and the beasts could not haul as much supplies as those from Ft. Leavenworth. Nevertheless, the newly acquired mules eventually carried supplies for not just one campaign, but for two. On August 22, 1846, Kearny wrote Brig. Gen. Wool that he would forward Col. Doniphan's regiment to Chihuahua to reinforce Wool's invasion whenever Price's men relieved Doniphan's of occupation duties in Santa Fe.[61] Doniphan's regiment did not depart for Chihuahua until November 1846, because of disputes with Native peoples who threatened to undermine American rule. Once on the road, Doniphan's Missourians headed for Chihuahua and a 3,598-mile adventure that took them from Santa Fe to El Paso, to Chihuahua, to New Orleans, Louisiana, and then back to St. Louis by 1848.[62] This left the Army of the West with only portions of the First Dragoons and the Mormons to supply.

Jones, August 24, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 161-162.

[60] Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards", 153.; Philip St. George Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California* (Chicago, IL: The Rio Grande Press, Inc., 1964), 41.

[61] Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to John Wool, August 22, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 161.

[62] Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to Roger Jones, September 24, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 168-169.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 102, 184.

For both Kearny's and Doniphan's troops, Santa Fe served as a supply base. To solidify control of the city and its environs, Kearny placed the city under the command of Col. Sterling Price of the Second Missouri Volunteers. Charged with providing military muscle behind the recently established pro-American territorial government, Price's regiment, around 1,260 strong, maintained the peace.[63] Raised at the behest of Kearny, Price's men, the Mormon Battalion, and an additional 400 supply wagons arrived in Santa Fe after the departures of both Kearny and Doniphan.[64] With Maj. Swords deciding to accompany Kearny's dragoons, quartermaster duties first fell to Col. Price's men, then to Maj. Edwin Sumner of the First Dragoons until he and Companies B, G, and J marched back to Ft. Leavenworth, when it once again fell to officers under Price's command.[65]

Kearny, Doniphan, and other commanders would find that relying on supplies coming from Santa Fe delayed their advances, forcing their soldiers to resort to foraging for food because of the delays. When supplies such as animals and food from Santa Fe arrived at the camps of the various detachments, observers thought the supplies were inferior and arrived in limited quantities.[66] Though there was a garrison in Santa Fe, Indigenous raiding parties also threatened the supply lines of the army. Despite these issues, the city of Santa Fe was the best supply base

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[63] Kenneth Weant, *The Mexican War: The Missouri Volunteers of the 1st and 2nd Regiment and Their Attached Units (3,386 names): Chronological Index to Selected Articles and Unit Rosters Volume I* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004), 159-172.

[64] Stephen Kearny to John C. Edwards, 145-146; John S. Griffin, *A Doctor Comes to California: The Dairy of John S. Griffin, Assistant Surgeon with Kearny's Dragoons, 1846-1847* (San Francisco, CA: California Historical Society, 1943), 19.

[65] Gorenfeld, *Kearny's Dragoons*, 233.

[66] Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 92 ; Letter from Henry Smith Turner to Edwin Sumner, October 9, 1846, in *Winning the West General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 172.

to the Army of the West, given that the city was the only settlement of consequence for miles. Companies C and K of the First Dragoons stayed in Santa Fe with their commander until September 2, 1846 when they, the other three companies of dragoons, four howitzers of Maj. Clark's artillery, and wagons carrying their supplies set out across the desert.

Two hundred miles outside of Santa Fe during the first week of October 1846, Kearny decided to take with him only two companies of dragoons and two mountain howitzers to "expedite our march to the Pacific."[67] Since leaving the city, Kearny's men not only had the issues of having to constantly fix wagons and helping wagons traverse country that was "broken" with "innumerable ravines", but problems finding adequate feed for their mounts.[68] Pressure from Washington also played a role in this decision. Kearny received word from the War Department while occupying Santa Fe that troop ships carrying a regiment of New York volunteers were nearing the Californian port of Monterrey. These men were being shipped to California to reinforce the Army of the West and start operations in support of Frémont's rebels. The dragoons and artillerymen undertaking the march to link up with the New Yorkers sustained themselves on food gathered from local native peoples and what rations the men carried in pack saddles strapped to mules. Before setting out, Capt. Turner sent word to Maj. Edwin Sumner to return to Santa Fe with Companies B, G, and J with Kearny's wagons and requested that Sumner forward 60 pack saddles along with 44 mules upon his arrival.[69] Despite exchanging their wagons and mounts for pack mules to increase mobility and speed, Kearny ultimately delayed

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[67] Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to Roger Jones, October 11, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 172.

[68] Turner, *Original Journals*, 81.

[69] Turner to Sumner, 172.

his advance into California by three days to allow the pack mules to catch up with his force. It then became the responsibility of the Mormon Battalion to convey the wagons across the desert.

On the Great Plains, they depended upon buffalo for food, but now the regulars supplemented their diets with food from local Indigenous peoples. Nations such as the Coyotero Apache (the identities of other helpful Apache bands went unrecorded), the Pima, the Maricopa, and others made treaties with the Army of the West that afforded the force safe passage through Indigenous lands and provided food.[70] These peoples, who had occupied the southwest for thousands of years, often lived in small villages that dotted the landscape near streams. These streams often watered fields of corn and other foods that the natives traded for items such as knives, blankets, handkerchiefs, shirts, and other goods.[71] Friendships with the Coyotero Apaches and Pimas, especially, were great assets to Kearny's dragoons, for they provided fresh mules.[72] Kearny's dragoons immediately put the mules into service as both mounts and pack animals, replacing dead or weak animals which had been acquired at Santa Fe. Other goods acquired from Native Americans included pumpkins, assorted melons (mainly watermelons), beans, corn, wheat, and other foods. Fresh meat was hard to come by in these parts, however. To solve this issue, Kearny's men eventually resorted to eating some of the pack mules as provisions began to run low. American reliance on Native hospitality continued until the dragoons reached California.

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[70] Letter Henry Smith Turner to Philip St. George Cooke, October 18, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847,* eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 173.; Turner, *Original Journals of Henry Smith Turner*, 96-97, 107.

[71] William Hemsley Emory, *Notes on a Military Reconnaissance, from Fort Leavenworth, in Missouri, to San Diego, in California, Including Part of the Arkansas, Del Norte, and Gila Rivers, Made in 1846-7 with Advance Guard of the "Army of the West"* (Washington, DC: Wendell and van Benthuysen Printers, 1848), 60.

[72]Turner, *Original Journals*, 108, 86.

Californians of both Mexican and Indigenous descent, the dragoons found, openly opposed the American incursion into their province, and few endeavored to assist Kearny's small contingent. Far from their Native allies and running low on sustenance, Kearny's men began to look to California's ranches for logistical support. This mainly came in the form of cattle eaten as part of the daily rations for the men, in fresh mules, and in horses to transport equipment. Kearny's detachment came across a ranch (the first they encountered on their march) owned by an American who the assistant surgeon of the First Dragoons, John Griffin, thought might be loyal to the Mexicans. The ranch owner did not want to help the dragoons, but his employees provided Kearny's men with "a supply of beef and mutton" before the column moved on to another ranch. Here the dragoons were also treated "with the most distinguished hospitality."[73] No other *rancho* employees or owners wanted to help Kearny's men. In response to their need, the dragoons promptly began seizing cattle from an abandon ranch the encountered. To find horses and mules, the men gathered some from a farm owned by a General José María Flores, one of the leaders of the resistance movement.[74] Mounted Mexican irregulars under Andres Pico, a relative of one of the Mexican provincial leaders, drove what cattle the dragoons had with them away within a few days. Pico's irregulars separated the herd from the advancing dragoons and harried the rear of the dragoon column. The dragoons then took up a defensive position to protect the remaining pack mules from harassment. The result of this action was the Battle of San Pascual, the first battle of the campaign, on December 6, 1846. The next day Kearny decided to burn any remaining baggage. Every man well enough to walk was ordered to assist in caring for the wounded. Heat, exhaustion, lack of food, and enemy forces cutting them off from the U.S.

[73] Griffin, *A Doctor Comes to California*, 42, 44.

[74] Emory, *Notes*, 106.

Navy forces in San Diego ultimately forced the advance to halt just three days later where a contingent of 80 US marines and 120 navy sailors rescued them on December 10, 1846.[75]

The logistical issues that Kearny's artillery and dragoons experienced were like those faced by the rest of the Army of the West. Comprising this force were the Mormon Battalion and the remnants of the Missouri artillery left in Santa Fe by Kearny. The leaders of these units decided not to follow directly in fellow Americans' footsteps through mountainous terrain, but to go on a southern route along the Gila River.

Arriving weeks after the main body of the Army of the West with Price's holding force, the Mormon Battalion also found Santa Fe to be a great place in which to resupply. The battalion had shown up in Santa Fe, as Philip Cooke observed, encumbered by "too many families", undisciplined, and clad in scant clothing.[76] Upon inspecting the men, Cooke and his surgeons declared only 86 of the volunteers fit for duty. This declaration complicated matters, for on Sunday, October 11, a dispatch rider had notified Lt. Cooke to take command of the battalion (Col. Allen had died of disease at Ft. Leavenworth weeks before) and hurry to California to rendezvous with Kearny. Cooke thus had little time in which to resupply and began to march his men to California. Cooke's preparatory measures started the next day when the Mormon Battalion began to stream into Santa Fe. To speed up the process, the responsibility of purchasing necessary materiel for the march fell to the individual soldiers. The Mormons received only 60 days' worth of rations for the journey and their officers told them to bid farewell to their families who had accompanied them.[77] Cooke sent the civilians north to the

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[75] Emory, *Notes*, 109.; Griffin, *A Doctor Comes to California*, 47-48.

[76] Cooke, *The Conquest*, 91.

[77] John D. Lee, "Diary of the Mormon Battalion Mission, John D. Lee" in *Army of Israel: Mormon Battalion Narratives*, eds. David L. Bigler and Will Bagley (Spokane, WA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 2000),134-138.

town of Pueblo to recover from their ordeal with other families sent there by the Battalion's officers earlier in the month. Those members of the Mormon Battalion declared too sick to continue were also sent to Pueblo before the men departed. All these preparations took a week, with the Mormons arriving on October 12 and then departing Santa Fe on October 19, 1846. Three hundred and ninety-seven men strong, with 30 mule-pulled wagons and twenty-eight cattle in tow, the Mormon Battalion began its arduous desert passage to Alta California.[78]

Cooke quickly found out why his commanding officer had sent the wagons back to Santa Fe. Two days after setting out for California, Cooke learned that several wagons flipped over while traversing a gulley and some of the oxen pulling the wagons showed wear.[79] Efforts to acquire new ones failed and purchasing more mules was a difficult undertaking owing to the "ill disposition of the citizens of property" according to Cooke. Cooke's troops eventually found animals, but they were almost worthless because they were emaciated and malnourished. This forced the wagon teamsters to employ twice as many animals to pull their vehicles and twenty men to assist the wagon teams in ascending hills.[80] Cooke's men occasionally stripped broken-down wagons of their supplies and abandoned them. The Battalion often encountered canyons that compelled wagon teamsters to ask the soldiers for additional assistance. Others proved too difficult for the wagons to navigate. By November 9, Cooke's men, experiencing food shortages, had only advanced 240 miles.[81] Cooke conferred with his guides and chose to divert his advance

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[78] Cooke, *The Conquest*, 92.; David L. Bigler and Will Bagley, "Cooke's Wagon Road" in *Army of Israel: Mormon Battalion Narratives*, eds. David L. Bigler and Will Bagley (Spokane, WA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 2000), 147.; Each company was given 3 wagons to use and the remaining 15 were for use by the entire Battalion during the march.

[79] Cooke, *The Conquest*, 95.

[80] Tyler, *A Concise History*, 181.

[81] Tyler, *A Concise History*, 187-189.

to the south. This, Cooke believed, might make his men's travels less strenuous and allow them to march through more bountiful country suitable for foraging.

Life on this new route proved to be not as difficult as on the course taken by the earlier detachment, but it presented its own trials that ultimately delayed the arrival of the second part of the army in San Diego. One of these trials was the lack of food. The men traded for food with members of the Apache and Pima Nations and attempted to live off the land. Despite this, the Mormons still primarily relied mostly on the food in their wagons.[82] Cooke, seeing the effects fatigue on his men, halted the march on a few occasions for the soldiers to rest and prepare what food they had acquired for the march. Some days saw Mormons searching for sources of water for themselves and their nearly dehydrated animals. Crossing over what one soldier dubbed "Brokeback Mountain," men emptied the wagons of their contents and placed both on the backs of mules for transport. Once the empty wagons traversed the summit, the enlisted men once again loaded the vehicles, which took some time. The men of the Battalion repeated this process whenever the column needed to surmount another peak. Traversing peaks such as "Brokeback Mountain," passing through deep ravines, and advancing through narrow canyons also conspired to slow the march. One officer attempted to lighten the wagons by "boating" (floating) some of the supplies down the Gila River ahead of the column, but this ultimately resulted in supplies sent with him being lost. Herds of wild cattle also charged the column on December 10, 1846, wounding at least two men and killing four mules pulling wagons. Exhaustion and hunger as they passed along the barren, strenuous terrain compelled Cooke to slow his rate of advance to account for the condition of his men. Still on the march in the second week of January 1847, the men under Cooke received help from Kearny, who sent some six Indigenous guides with

[82] Gracy, "From Mississippi to the Pacific", 147-149, 152.

captured wild horses and mules to escort the column into San Diego. Scattered along the trail for miles, as one veteran later described the state of the Battalion at this juncture, the Mormons and others with them did not reach the San Diego area until January 30, 1847.[83]

What these events show is that Stephen Watts Kearny and his Army of the West faced logistical issues brought on by a combination of a need the campaign to be quick and technological limitations of the time. This combination of factors caused the Army of the West to rely a great deal on foraging to survive, yet less so than one may imagine. To say that a military operation was fully supplied by living off the land implies that the force conducting the campaign did not put constant strain upon its supply lines. When Kearny's men crossed the Great Plains between Ft. Leavenworth and Santa Fe, the campaign fit this description for, in the most part, the units supplemented their rations with game. Although the advance through the desert showed that the two detachments subsisted on the crops of native peoples as well as food procured in Santa Fe, the threat of starvation persisted, especially for the men under Kearny atop the hill outside San Diego. The near defeat of the dragoons on that hill stemmed from their commander's choice to opt for speed in the face of pressure from the War Department instead of accounting for the limitations of wagons and his troops' need to rely on foraging to survive. Cooke's men, with ample access to wagons, did not need to forage as much, but delays caused by the slowness of the wagons forced the entirety of Cooke's to consume more of the rations contained within the baggage train. The supplies with the wagon train were limited and thus needed to be conserved. In the Mexican-American War experiences of Kearny and Cooke, the

[83] Samuel H. Rogers, "Journal of Samuel H. Rogers" in *Army of Israel: Mormon Battalion Narratives*, eds. David L. Bigler and Will Bagley (Spokane, WA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 2000), 164-166.

rate of advance and the desire to fulfill the War Department's orders played into the events of their treks from Santa Fe to the California coast.

The experience of the Army of the West is like that of other armies that campaigned across arid landscapes in different parts of the world. Two examples are the Imperial Russian expedition into Khanate of Khiva, south of the Aral Sea, and the incursion of the British Army of the Indus into Afghanistan. Both occurred in 1839 as part of the European efforts to colonize Asia. Each operation met with disaster brought on by hazardous environmental conditions and logistical problems. These two forces relied almost exclusively on camels to haul their supplies and accoutrements across barren, mountainous terrain, while Kearny's men relied on mules. As historian Alexander Morrison points out in a study of the logistics of both campaigns, the arid landscapes in their theaters of operations required that the Russians and British feed and water their animals before traversing mountain passes.[84] The Russians and British also purchased or rented camels and gathered food from civilians they encountered. The armies found themselves marching through landscapes not suitable for military operations, mountains and lands with few resources to provide for an army. The Russians returned home when all the camels that accompanied the army (around 10,000) died due to exposure and starvation. To the southeast, the British found that the desert conditions present in Afghanistan caused the camels in their force to die because of impassable road conditions, lack of feed, poor treatment by soldiers, and disease. The British did, however, make it to their intended destination of Kabul, but they were eventually forced to withdraw to present-day Pakistan due to issues in provisioning and

[84] Alexander Morrsion "Camels and Colonial Armies: The Logistics of Warfare in Central Asia in the Early Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 57, no. 4 (2014), 449.

transporting necessities to their forces around the city.[85] Unfamiliarity with the local topography and climate, the need to provide for their estimated 12,000 camp followers, and stiff Afghan resistance conspired to defeat the red-clad soldiers.

Looking at these international examples the question then becomes, why did Kearny's campaign succeed when others failed in similar situations? There are many possible answers to this inquiry. The obvious answer could be the fact that the American force, even when fully assembled, was small and relatively mobile. Except for the 52 Missouri infantrymen, the Mormon Battalion and the artillery, Kearny's men rode horses. The mostly mounted nature of Kearny's force made it possible able to traverse more miles than a force moving strictly on foot. It was the opposite for the Russians and British, who overlooked possible challenges in reaching their goals. Kearny, Swords, and Turner's efforts to supply the Army of the West exemplified a blend of both their own experiences and ideas employed by the planners of earlier European examples. For the Americans, wagons for obvious reasons were the main mode of transporting the needed provisions across the less mountainous terrain. When portions of the Army of the West traversed mountain passes, pack mules replaced the wagons. Kearny's men also did not abuse their animals and were aware of some environmental factors, such as heat. Foraging when it was feasible to do so is ultimately why the Army of the West succeeded while the Russians and the Army of the Indus failed. The need to find means to sustain themselves, and to strengthen a tenuous military situation, also compelled Kearny and his troops to take steps to avoid a situation like that of the British in Kabul, in which hostile partisans endangered their line of supply. There is little evidence, if any, to support the conclusion that Kearny, Swords, and Turner applied lessons taken from the Russian and British campaigns, but the reason for the later

[85] Morrison, "Camels and Colonial Armies", 457-476.

trio's success can be found in how they avoided the mistakes made thousands of miles away in Asia.

The distinction between a successful campaign and a failed one depends on whether one's effort has achieved its strategic goals while being adequately supplied. Compared to the Russian and British incursions in Asia a few years earlier, Kearny's men achieved their feat because they captured their intended objectives while being able to be continually supplied. The Russians never captured the capital of Khiva and lost around 3,346 men in their 5,000 men invasion force. The British suffered greater losses capturing their target, but poor logistics forced their withdrawal. Exhausting available methods of logistical support, in this case camels, contributed to both expeditions failing. Kearny succeeded because his army took and held its objectives while accomplishing the war aims set out in the overall US grand strategy. Part of this triumph, however, can be attributed to the impact of the General's military government practices in New Mexico and California upon the logistical situation of his army. Kearny also did not field a large force, which made it easier to supply the available manpower. Although Kearny's supplies were strained at times during his endeavor, his force was not encumbered by many camp followers or excess soldiers. All these factors play into why the Army of the West's trek to San Diego can be considered a victory for the U.S. Army.

Chapter 2 - The Army of the West in New Mexico

. What becomes clear when analyzing Kearny's march from Ft. Leavenworth to San Diego is that the Army of the West would have not succeeded without the assistance of New Mexicans and Native peoples. Kearny's decision to rely mostly on foraging to supply his army increased its chances of succeeding. The General's men benefited exponentially by seeking assistance from Indigenous peoples and friendly New Mexicans in these efforts. How was this collaboration brought about? It came into being through the rapport the Army of the West cultivated with noncombatants in New Mexico. Available sources show that the Army of the West accomplished this through diplomacy and observance of rights rather than through coercion. Before, during, and after the occupation of Santa Fe by the main body of the army, policies of its commander afforded the Army of the West opportunities to display the positive aspects of American governance while also providing logistical support for itself. Logistics, it can be said, provided the basis for the military government policies of the Army of the West in the opening months of American rule in New Mexico. Logistical concerns, such as the technological limitations, time constraints, and lack of provisions, led to the breaking down of different social barriers. The need for provisions provided the foundation for how U.S. Army officers governed New Mexico before the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.

Kearny's capture of Santa Fe is the event for which the General is historiographical remembered. Justin Smith, the first historian to publish a book-length study of the war, set the focus on Santa Fe's fall as the main contribution of the Army of the West to the American war effort. To this day, scholars looking at the bloodshed from a social, racial, or gender perspective continue to disregard Kearny' campaign. Military historians, such as K. Jack Bauer, go beyond

this and point out that Kearny's campaign played a role the negotiating table at the end of the conflict. The imposition of an American military government in New Mexico following the province's surrender usually takes up a few lines of text but little else. The significance of the formation of this government is most important when discussing Doniphan's expedition conducted in late 1846 and early the following year. Veterans' accounts of the First Missouri's Mexican adventure, such as *Doniphan's Expedition* by John Hughes and *A Campaign in New Mexico* by Frank Edwards, note that without Kearny's military government policies, Doniphan's success may not have occurred. By the turn of the century, though, Doniphan's expedition was relegated to the sidelines of the Mexican-American War. Joseph Dawson III, who published *Doniphan's Epic March: The 1st Missouri Volunteers in the Mexican War* in 1999, is the only scholar to publish a book–length work on the subject. Aside from Doniphan and his First Missouri, the Taos Rebellion also draws notice. The insurrection's origins are often said to be mismanagement by the American administrators and the infringement of *Nuevomexicano* rights. History tells us that these were two of the causes of the revolt, but another was the ways in which the U.S. Army received material support from the civilian population of New Mexico in the months preceding the rebellion.

Some scholars have focused how supplies were gathered from noncombatants in studies of American interactions with New Mexicans during the occupation. Ralph Emerson Twitchell's *The History of the Military Occupation of the Territory of New Mexico from 1846 to 1851* (1909), Sister Mary Loyola's *The American Occupation of New Mexico 1821-1852* (1939), and other studies produced before social history was more widely appreciated typically do not address this. Twitchell's and Sister Loyola's neglect of the American-New Mexican intercourse continues today in U.S. Army circles. In the brief overview of the service's experiences in

military government, now known as civil affairs, given in FM 3-57 field manual, Kearny's efforts are not mentioned. The U.S. Army and civilian historians alike, often disregard the *Nuevomexicano* and Native American views of the American takeover of New Mexico. Within the last thirty years, historians Thomas Chávez, Martín González de la Vera, and Andrés Reséndez have endeavored to tell the other half of the story. However, as Reséndez's *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850* and Chávez's *New Mexico: Past and Future* show readers, the Army of the West's incursion was the culmination of a two-decades long process which ushered in new social, political, and military changes into New Mexico. González de la Vera and similar minded authors show that though the process of "Americanization" gradually impacted New Mexico, many Indigenous nations and some *Nuevomexicans* did not desire to trade one distant government for another. The rebellion in Taos in 1847 may have been the only example of widespread revolt against the invaders, but there were individuals who opposed the new administration.[86] As for Kearny's efforts to avoid this and provide logistical support for his force, only Robert Frazer's *Forts and Supplies: The Role of the Army in the Economy of the Southwest 1846-1861* has touched upon this. Frazer's economic history of the military occupation of the Southwest before the American Civil War does devote a chapter to Kearny's expedition. Frazer concludes in his chapter on Kearny's occupation that logistical issues prompted the War Department to consider improving support to troops in the newly acquired New Mexico territory. Except for Frazer, historians typically progress from discussing the capture of Santa Fe to the Taos Rebellion rapidly without considering how the

[86] Some rebellious activities observed by witnesses including some *ricos* arming their own militia groups, others in New Mexico openly discussed plots to overthrow Bent's administration. Robert E. Shalope, who wrote a biography of Col. Price, mentioned in his work that some *Nuevomexicanos* defied American policy by not obeying stipulations of the martial law decree and at least one American was murdered by an angered New Mexican.

methods employed the American army to solve its logistical problems may have contributed to the 1847 rebellion. It is crucial that historians study the two months in which the main body of the Army of the West occupied Santa Fe to comprehend what later transpired.

The *Nuevomexicanos* whom the Army of West wanted to subjugate made up a small percentage of the 160,000 strong population of New Mexico by 1844.[87] Many *Nuevomexicanos* traced their lineages back to the Spanish conquistadores who first conquered New Mexico. Historians have noted that two social classes existed among these people, the so-called *ricos* (the wealthy elite) and the *peones* (poor farmers, laborers, or craftspeople). Both the *ricos* and *peones* lived in the valley around the Rio Grande del Norte (Rio Grande).[88] Members of both classes contributed to the agrarian economy of the area. Both *ricos* and *peones* invested in animal husbandry, raising herds of cattle and mules and maintaining flocks of sheep. Wool produced by sheep and mutton were the main exports of New Mexico. Local craftspeople also made goods that could be traded. Ongoing raids of New Mexican farms and villages heavily impacted individuals of all stripes living in the province. With little Mexican National Army presence in New Mexico, *peones* formed militias intent on defending *Nuevomexicano* property. Money for these units came from the *ricos'* wealth.

Since 1822, the *ricos'* social status and wealth improved with access to American goods arriving via the Santa Fe Trail. The establishment of the trail also increased the numbers and prestige of traders from the United States and elsewhere outside of New Mexico. Contemporary calculations show that by the 1843, around $500,000 worth of American goods made their way

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[87] Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 38-41.

[88] Janet Lecompte, *Rebellion in Río Arriba 1837* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1985), 3-7.

to Santa Fe's markets yearly in addition to almost a third of all Mexican exports being sent from the city to the US.[89] Despite the amount of goods going through Santa Fe, only the governor and the *ricos* benefitted trading with *Americanos*. New Mexican *peones* saw little payback from Santa Fe's commerce because little of the profits came their way. Trade with Chihuahua also filled New Mexican coffers but as much as commerce with America. These two trade connections allowed New Mexico, which was inhabited by at least 65,000 Puebloan and New Mexican individuals and over 100,000 from other nations by 1846, to not be significantly impacted with the economic difficulties of the rest of Mexico.[90] Any trade, whether with foreigners, other Mexican citizens, or Indigenous peoples, and wealth came with the downside of more Native attacks.

What *Nuevomexicanos* perceived as Indigenous aggression comprised part of a cycle of violence that began years earlier among the Native nations of New Mexico. Conflicts over land and resources periodically occurred among Puebloan peoples, the *Diné* (Navajo), and the *Tinneh* (Apache).[91] These predate the coming of the Spanish. Battle lines were fluid since all three people groups consisted of individual sub-nations; none were unified with a central authority. Friction among various peoples stemmed from differences between the more sedentary lifeways

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[89] Andrés Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 93-94.; Freeman Hunt, *The Merchants Magazine and Commercial Review Volume 10*, January-June 1844 (New York, n.p., 1844), 128.

[90] Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.- Mexican War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 288.

[91] I have chosen to use the terms *Diné* and *Tinneh* to denote the Navajo Nation (*Diné)* and Apache Nation (*Tinneh)*. Both words mean "the People". The various Apache peoples use a variety of terms that mean "the People", but I chosen *Tienneh* from the list of possible terms. During my research I found that members of the Navajo and Apache Nations prefer to be called by these terms. In accordance with this wish, I will use these words to refer to their ancestors.

of the Pueblos and the nomadic ones of their neighbors. Each group also claimed wide swaths of territory, citing approval of their deities, and their claims overlapped with one another. Spanish rule compounded the tensions among the groups in the 1500s when they began settling in the region. Spaniards, seeking to sustain Spanish settlements on traditionally Native lands, dealt violently with Natives. Shifts in the boundaries of Comanchería, the empire of the Comanche of the southern plains, as well as incursions by the Utes, complicated matters even further. Comanche hunting parties attempting to gather supplies for themselves and to trade with foreign merchants constantly threatened those inhabiting New Mexico. *Tinneh* and *Diné* peoples brokered trade deals with Spanish, American, and eventually Mexican traders to acquire goods in exchange for firearms and other items. Livestock, crops, and other things taken from enemy settlements comprised one side of these transactions. Mexican officials tried numerous times to curb this practice among the Indigenous people in the area, but lackluster enforcement of treaties and sporadic *Nuevomexicano* retaliatory raids only encouraged it to continue.[92]

The structure of the provincial government and poor leadership qualities of officials within it allowed these sorties to occur. Governors of New Mexico since the seventeenth century held most of the power in the province. Spain created the office of *Comandante General* in the eighteenth century as part of a reform designed to place an individual over the governors of all the provinces of New Spain. New Mexico, however, was not officially assigned to any of the

[92] Donaciano Vigil, *Arms, Indians, and the Mismanagement of New Mexico*, ed. and trans. David J. Webster (El Paso, TX: Texas Western Press, 1986), 1-2, 6-8, 19-21.; DeLay, *War*,50-56, 144-145, 167, 183.; Ralph A. Smith, "Indians in American-Mexican Relations Before the War of 1846," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 43, no. 1 (February 1963): 34, 36, 44.

comandante generales appointed by the Spanish crown.[93] The *comandante generales* of neighboring Durango considered New Mexico as part of their jurisdiction, but, as historian Marc Simmons observes, this claim was never made official.[94] New Mexico, thus, existed on the fringes of New Spain as its own province with little oversight from the Spanish government. Due to this, the governor of New Mexico assumed the same powers over the military forces and civil affairs in New Mexico as the *comandante general* in Durango. Simmons points out that, despite this, Durango's chief administrator occasionally interfered with the finances of New Mexico. All the intendants created by the Spanish were dissolved by the Mexican government in 1824.

With the intendants abolished, the only outside influence on the governance of New Mexico came from Mexico City. Beyond appointing the governor, the Mexican government did not meddle in New Mexican politics.[95] Under the auspices of gubernatorial control, New Mexico gained further freedom, in both the economic and political sense, from Mexico through its reliance on trade from Chihuahua and the United States over the next two decades. During this time until the Mexican-American War, another entity helped the governor oversee New Mexican affairs. *La junta departmental*, the legislative branch of the provincial government, was created to devise legislation and to advise the governor on certain issues. Despite the body's intended purpose, governors Alvino Perez and Mariano Martínez began the process of making *la junta departmental* a non-factor in government in the eleven years preceding the Mexican-American War. These two men angered the populace by raising taxes, practicing nepotism, not punishing

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[93] Marc Simmons, *Spanish Government in New Mexico* (Albuquerque, NM: The University of New Mexico Press, 1968), 9-11, 33, 35-41.

[94] Simmons, 36-37.

[95] The Mexican government wanted to be more involved in provincial politics but the distance between Santa Fe and Mexico City, internal turmoil, and other factors limited its influence in New Mexico.

corruption, spawning more native depredations against New Mexican settlements, mismanaging provincial finances, and increasing their power against the wishes of their constituents.[96] The failure of officials in Mexico City to sufficiently intervene in these matters only increased disaffection towards and distrust in the provincial government among *Nuevomexicanos*.

What the Army of the West endeavored to do in setting up a new government in Mexican–controlled New Mexico was unprecedented in American military history at the time. Baron Jomini does not discuss civil affairs or how to occupy enemy territory in *The Art of War*, just how to maintain civilian morale. Similarly, the civil and military laws of United States did not specify how a military government should look and operate.[97] The only experience the U.S. Army, and Kearny himself, had in military government was in maintaining peace between Native Americans and white settlers in the western territories. [98] The notion that the rights of noncombatants needed to be observed is all that many American military men, including Kearny, knew in this aspect of warfare. Both firsthand accounts and historians, like those by Paul Foos and Amy Greenberg, show that this concept did not fully apply to Mexicans during in the Mexican-American War. Some units in Maj. Gen. Taylor's Army of Occupation, which has been

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[96] Fredrick Adolph Wislizenus, *Memoir of a Tour to Northern Mexico, Connected to Colonel Doniphan's Expedition in 1846 and 1847* (Washington, DC: Tippin & Streeper, printers, 1848), 20, 27-28.; Donaciano Vigil, *Arms, Indians, and the Mismanagement of New Mexico*, ed. and trans. by David K. Webster. (El Paso, TX: Texas Western Press, 1986), 17-28.; Antonio José Martinez, *Exposición que el prebitero Antonio José Martinez cura de Taos en Nuevo Mexico, dirje al gobierno del exmo. Sor. General D. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna: Proponiendo la civilisacion de las naciones barbaras que son al contorno del departamento de Nuevo Mexico* (Taos, NM: Imprenta del mismo a cargo de J. M, B., 1843), 1-3, 10-11.

[97] Jomini, *The Art of War*, 60-65.

[98] Gorenfield, *Kearny's Dragoons Out West*, 21, 50-71, 199-202.; Francis Paul Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on Frontier, 1873-1846* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969), 81-102, 140-167.; US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2021), 125-126.

the focus of such research, perpetrated rapes, robberies, and massacres upon Mexican civilians in the opening months of the conflict.[99] John Charles Frémont's California Battalion also killed civilians and stole from others during its escapades in Alta California. Sources written about Kearny's time in Santa Fe and in California do not speak of this, however. That does not mean that contemporary racial attitudes, as well as the memories of some of the more controversial encounters between the U.S. Army and non-white noncombatants did not impact the Army of the West.

When the Mexican-American War began, the U.S. Army did not specialize in establishing relationships with civilian populations it encountered. Methods of dealing with unarmed populaces varied from war to war. Moreover, people of different ethnicities and races received different treatment. Continental Army commanders found that their forces often caused an uproar when they foraged throughout the countryside during the Revolution. The American armies during the War of 1812, especially those which invaded Canada, also found that noncombatants tried to help them, subvert their efforts, or wanted to be left alone. Logistical needs compelled U.S. Army personnel to deal with people of various mindsets about the soldiers' presence both with force and without it; however, fulfilling the needs of the soldiery took precedence. Commanders during the American Revolution and the War of 1812, frequently failed to understand aspects of life in the theaters of combat. Religious views, area politics, and effects of the foraging practices of both warring armies often received little consideration. The two Seminole Wars, the Black Hawk War, and the Creek War (generally considered part of the

[99] Amy S. Greenberg, *A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 132-133, 157.; Paul Foos, *Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict During the Mexican-American War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 113-114, 119, 121-122.; John Fabian Witt, *Lincoln's Code: The Laws of War in American History* (New York: Free Press, 2012), 118-121.

War of 1812) exhibited markedly different treatment of civilians than conflicts with Europeans and their descendants. Indigenous peoples, like the Seminoles, Creeks, Fox, and Sauk, were treated differently than whites. On many occasions, members of a nation that openly opposed federal policy were subject, whether armed or unarmed, to massacres, pillaging, and forced removals from war zones. Even the imperfect military protection afforded to Europeans and other white Americans did not apply to non-white noncombatants. Even though racism was likely served as the foundation for atrocities such as these, the desire of the perpetrators for retribution and traditional Native lands also played a role. Acting in this way did not endear Indigenous nations to the US government. Since the demographical makeup of the New Mexican population was comprised primarily of non-white *Nuevomexicanos* and Native Americans, Kearny needed to observe the rights of these groups to gain popular support of his new government.[100]

The logistical situation of the Army of the West, too, posed some challenges for Kearny and his staff. Santa Fe's distance from the nearest military supply stores posed the largest potential threat. Almost 300 miles separated the settlement from the closest American-controlled supply base, Bent's Fort. Over 500 miles separated Bent's Fort from Fort Leavenworth, the headquarters of First Dragoons and closest U.S. Army installation. In handling any uprising in New Mexico, the Army of the West had to depend on provisions coming from either of these places. Thus, Stephen Kearny needed to convince the majority of New Mexicans to allow his men to pass through their land without fearing that his army's sparsely protected line of supply could be threatened by the civilians who lived along its course. New Mexicans also needed to view their new American administrators as benefactors and liberators so that they would

[100] Millet, et al., *For the Common Defense*, 104, 126-128.; Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 88-93.

voluntarily support Kearny's campaign. Involuntary loss of farmland, crops, livestock, dry goods or any other material may spark an insurrection endangering incoming supply shipments and impel the small army to withdraw. Both the Mexican and Indigenous populations had access to necessary food, water, topographical information, and items the army needed to cross the desert to California. Good relations with the Native nations of the area, especially, boded well for the expedition since the various Puebloan, *Diné*, and *Tinneh* peoples controlled a large percentage of the natural resources.[101]

Kearny took these ideas into consideration as he began to establish American control of the province of New Mexico by issuing a series of proclamations as his army marched ever closer to Santa Fe. He first issued a preliminary proclamation at Bent's Fort on July 31, 1846 that outlined the goals of his expedition to the provincial governor and to various Pueblo communities north of Santa Fe.[102] On August 15, 1846, in a village the soldiers called Lower Moro, Kearny issued a second decree. Inhabitants of other settlements between Lower Moro and Santa Fe learned of both proclamations in the coming days as the invaders advanced. Kearny had the proclamations announced from atop adobe houses in these towns instead of publishing the text. The message, as Henry Smith Turner recalled, told the citizens of the town of Las Vegas,

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[101] Elliot West, *The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers & the Rush to Colorado* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 231-232.; Pekka Hamalainen "The Politics of Grass: European Expansion, Ecological Change, and Indigenous Power in the Southwest Borderlands", *The William and Mary Quarterly* 67, no. 2 (April 2010): 179-181, 185-186.; David Beyreis, " "Meat as a Matter of Form": Food, Exchange, and Power Along the Santa Fe Trail", *Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains* 44, no. 1 (Spring 2021): 38.

[102] Stephen Kearny, "Proclamation to the Citizens of New Mexico by Col. Stephen Kearny Commanding the United States Forces" in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, ed. Hans von Sachsen-Altenberg and Laura Gabiger (Booneville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 157-158.; Cooke, *The Conquest*, 6-8.; Johnston, "Journal of Abraham Johnston," 91; Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 187.

New Mexico to "henceforwards…regard themselves as citizens of the United States, &c. &c."[103] Other sources record similar versions of Kearny's speech, each implied that life in New Mexico was to continue as it had before Americans' arrival.[104] Later, as his army continued to advance, Kearny amended his announcement to include that the Army of the West would not harm any lands, buildings, or anything else that belonged the Catholic churches in the province. In addition, the American soldiers would bring an end to Native American raids on throughout New Mexico. American democracy was also to be introduced to the government of the territory to allow the voices of all New Mexicans to be heard in government. Any individual that rebelled against the *Americanos* could not participate in government and be subject to punishment. [105] Each town through which the column passed received the same decree in the same way.

News of the Army of the West's entrance into New Mexico caused Americans living there to became subjects of widespread violence. Manuel Armijo, the last Mexican provincial governor, determined to spawn anti-American sentiment in New Mexico upon receiving word of Kearny's advance. He composed and published a proclamation urging his fellow countrymen to take up arms to defend the "sacred independence" of Mexico.[106] Further along in this pronouncement, Armijo called for all New Mexicans to unite in opposing the U.S. Army invasion. Along with calling all the men living under his jurisdiction to defend their homes,

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[103] Turner, *Original Journals*, 71.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 41.

[104] Kearny, "Proclamation to the Citizens of New Mexico", 157-158.

[105] Kearny, "Proclamation to the Inhabitants of New Mexico" in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. ed. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger. (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1988), 159-160.

[106] Manuel Armijo, "The Governor and Commanding General of New Mexico," in *The History of the Military Occupation of the Territory of New Mexico from 1846 to 1851 by the Government of the United States* by Ralph Emmerson Twitchell (Chicago, IL: The Rio Grande Press Inc., 1963), 60-63.

Armijo saw to it, to encourage enlistments in defense forces, that rumors telling of American soldiers raping Mexican wives, pillaging villages, abducting civilians, and killing them *en masse* spread.[107] Fears of the size of the Army of the West also contributed to the formation of what resistance Armijo could muster. Kearny learned of the rumors when his men purchased goods from American trader from Taos. Abraham Johnston, a dragoon in the Army of the West, asked how the man heard of the accusations against the Americans and the trader responded by telling Johnston of violence committed against himself and other Americans in Taos.[108] Charles Town, the trader who spoke with Johnston, was one of at least four Americans who came to the army's camp to sell flour, butter, other foods, and to give information to their liberators. Stories of Americans "being robbed, mobbed, and murdered by the enraged populace" continued to be heard by the men of the army along the march.[109] The targeted businessmen and their fellow Americans responded to all the anti-American actions by waiting for Kearny's arrival locked in their homes and stores. Despite these outward signs of support for the Mexican government, Philip St. George Cooke of Kearny's army remarked in his account of the expedition that Armijo still doubted the loyalty of his troops and the rest of the New Mexican population.[110] The uncertain commitment of New Mexico's defenders was confirmed in the days to come.

By this time, Kearny had already issued his first proclamation at Bent's Fort and began the process of marching his troops to Santa Fe. *Nuevomexicanos* now had the opportunity to see if the rumors concerning the invaders were true. The first impressions formed by both sides came

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[107] Twitchell, *The History of the Military Occupation*, 57-60.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 45.; Emory, *Notes*, 21-22.

[108] Johnston, "Journal of Abraham Johnston", 96.

[109] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 187.; Emory, *Notes*, 21-22.

[110] Cooke, *The Conquest*, 32.

through the Army of the West's interaction with traders headed north from Santa Fe and with others who lived in the villages through which the army passed. The first of those the army encountered was the American trader, Charles Town. Other traders residing the villages met the men on the road as they marched, giving them food. When interacting with both American and New Mexican traders, Kearny ordered his men to "keep on the good side" of the individuals by respecting their property.[111] Through this practice, Kearny hoped that the Army of the West, contrary to what Armijo said of the *Americanos,* would be seen first as liberators and then attentive administrators. Instead of seizing goods from the population, the Missourians and dragoons bought or bartered for goods.[112] To encourage his men to comply with this policy, Kearny ordered that some goods, particularly unharvested corn, be placed under guard.[113] To New Mexican citizens, traders, and farmers who gave supplies to the expedition, Kearny promised reimbursement for their gifts to the soldiers. The American occupation was to be mutually beneficial— not an exercise in intimidation.

This decision by the leader of the Army of the West encouraged curiosity and kindness among the *Nuevomexicanos.* Marcellus Edwards, a Missouri volunteer, recalled that a woman came down to the Mora River when the Army of the West forded it just to catch a glimpse at the American forces.[114] The expedition's topographical engineer, Lt. William Emory, wrote in his official report to Washington that, as the column got closer to Santa Fe, the crowds addressed by

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[111] Marcellus Ball Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards", 153.

[112] Research into these transactions did not provide any examples of New Mexicans being forced into dealing with American servicemen.

[113] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier,* 194, 200.; Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards", 153.; Johnston, "Journal of Abraham Johnston", 98-99.

[114] Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards", 151-152.

Kearny grew larger with people wanting to see *Americanos*. Some in the column noted how awed the *Nuevomexicanos* were with American military equipment. After seeing the equipage of the soldiers and hearing the General's promises, American soldiers reported, New Mexicans were willing to help feed the invading force. The Army of the West also drew the attention of Mexican authorities. Scouts sent by Armijo to spy on local Indigenous peoples also wandered into camp on at least one occasion. (Lt. Emory later concluded that this may have been a poorly crafted excuse for gaining intelligence about the Army of the West.) In other situations, Mexican spies and soldiers captured by the Americans openly admitted that their purpose was to impede the Americans.[115] These individuals were promptly sent to the rear of the force as prisoners. Despite these interactions with members of Governor Manuel Armijo's defense forces, George Gibson's recollection of the inhabitants of Las Vegas, New Mexico sums up these early encounters the best. Gibson said the New Mexicans "showed themselves both about town and wherever they could have a good view of us…. We appear to have taken the country by surprise."[116]

While New Mexican civilians did not resist Kearny's advance, Governor Armijo attempted to defend the provincial capital. Governor Armijo assembled 5,000 (some sources say 4,000) men to check the American advance at Apache Canyon north of the city. All 5,000 fled, along with their commander, before the Americans reached this position afraid that Kearny would outflank them. Dreading the worst, the city's *alcalde* (town mayor), along with Lt. Governor Juan Bautista Vigil y Alarid, allowed the Army of the West to enter the city during the

[115] Emory, *Notes*, 23, 27.

[116] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 192-193.; Robinson, *Journal of the Santa Fe Expedition*, 14-15.; Kearny to Jones, August 24, 1846, 161.

evening hours of August 18, 1846. Both men surrendered the province and its capital to Kearny the next day. Within minutes of the capitulation the Stars and Stripes flew over the city. This occasion brought about varying degrees of excitement among the Army of the West and fear among the people of Santa Fe. Veterans of the 883–mile trek across the Great Plains and Santa Fe Mountains looked forward to the possibility of some much needed rest, while others wanted to explore the captured town.[117] Many Mexican inhabitants of the city believed American rule would usher in a time of looting and pillaging, prompting some to leave the provincial capital for other parts of New Mexico and for Chihuahua.[118] Others, like the small number of American expatriates living in the city, attempted to ingratiate themselves with the American arrivals by hosting receptions and feeding the soldiers. To assuage fears of American soldiers plundering Santa Fe, Kearny announced to an assembled crowd of Santa Fe residents that the Americans did not intend to do so. Kearny also promises that American soldiers would not physically harm any Santa Feans. Although Henry Turner stated that those listening to Kearny were "perfectly reconciled to the change", others in the Army of the West observed that not all Santa Feans were calmed by Kearny assurances. [119]

With Santa Fe captured, the Army of the West rested. Their first impressions of the city were not favorable. The diaries, journals, letters, and other primary source materials that survive tell of the disappointment that many in the Army of the West expressed when they first got to Santa Fe. For some, like Missourian Frank Edwards and John Lee of the Mormon Battalion, the

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[117] Kearny, "Proclamation to the Inhabitants of New Mexico", 160.; Turner, *The Original Journals*, 72.; Robinson, *Journal of the Santa Fe Expedition*, 15.; The number of miles given is based upon the calculations of Maj. Emory published in Edwards' *A Campaign in New Mexico*.

[118] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 209.

[119] Elliot, *Mexican-American War Correspondence*, 71-75.; Turner, *Original Journals*, 73.

city of Santa Fe was no more than a settlement of "scattered huts, surrounded by Indian corn" in "the valley… of the River Rio de Grand…where a stranger would conclude that there was not a room in the whole city that is fit for a white man to live."[120] Some officers were surprised to find furnished rooms in the settlement of between 2,000 and 4,000 souls (a rough estimate made by Lt. Emory), but they did.[121] However, the Missourian John Hughes noted that many enlisted men lived in the tents provided to them for the march instead of quartering with civilians. Kearny, meanwhile, took up residence in the abandoned governor's palace in Santa Fe.[122] The disgust with the appearance of the city and the surprise of the officers about finding "suitable" living arrangements also extended to the soldiers' opinions concerning the New Mexicans themselves. Overall, Kearny's men found the male New Mexicans to be "hospitable," "uncivilized," "treacherous," and "ignorant". Their female compatriots, meanwhile, were looked upon as "civilized" and beautiful to the eye. Generally, though, as Missourian George Gibson put it early in the occupation, the people of Santa Fe were "civil and well disposed, not being able to resist the force brought against them."[123] Within a year of the American takeover, however, this statement would be proven incorrect.

Santa Fe's charms began to win the soldiers over as time progressed, especially its mid-1800s nightlife. This mainly consisted of celebrations where one could find soldiers dancing the night away. General Kearny hosted a few balls for the U.S. Army officers present in the city

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[120] Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 45.; Lee, "Diary of the Mormon Battalion Mission", 133.

[121] Emory, *Notes*, 34.; Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 209-210.; Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 49,

[122] Cooke, *The Conquest*, 39.

[123] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 210.

(those of the Mormon Battalion had not yet arrived there).[124] These often followed American custom while incorporating some of the local culture. Typically, however, only prominent residents and members of the army's officer corps attended. Enlisted men found amusement in other gatherings. The gatherings that first drew the attention of the common soldiers marching with Kearny were the parties thrown by the Mexicans called *fandangos*.[125] Unlike the formal officer balls, people of all walks of life regularly came to *fandangos*. Of those that attended, the local women captured the soldiers' imaginations the most. New Mexican men who also were in attendance were often described as wearing gaudy attire, having swarthy complexions, and showing a treacherous temperament.[126] Festivities often began around 9:00 in the evening at one of the saloons in town and continued sometimes into the early hours of the morning. *Fandangos* not only offered American soldiers the opportunity to dance with the beautiful women of the city, but also to sample local cuisine, find souvenirs, take in Mexican music, and relax. What the men found most curious about the *fandangos* was the "Spanish dance" that blended the traditional waltz performed at American dances with Mexican and Indigenous folk routines.[127] Aside from *fandangos*, the soldiers also amused themselves by playing card games, hosting band concerts, and attending theatric productions with locals. Instead of the Americans of being the barbarians that they had been rumored to be, the New Mexicans appeared to find them friendly

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[124] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 215, 224.; Cooke, *The Conquest*, 49-50.; Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 41-42.; Susan Shelby Macgoffin, *Down the Santa Fé Trail and Into Mexico: The Diary of Susan Shelby Macgoffin, 1846-1847*. ed. Stella A. Drum. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1926), 118-127.; Cooke, *The Conquest of New Mexico and California*, 49-50.

[125] Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 64.; Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 214-216.; Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards", 165.

[126] Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 91-93.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 50-51.; Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 195, 200-201, 226-227.

[127] Gibson, 216; Hughes, 40-41., Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 59-60.

and not inclined to rape and kidnap civilians. These gatherings presented some, but not the only, ways in which the new arrivals acquainted themselves with the locals.

Catholicism did not elicit positive opinions among the invaders. The United States underwent a wave of Protestant religious fever and anti-Catholic sentiment in the 1840s. To many staunch American nativists, Catholicism was seen as a despotic form of Christianity. Dislike of the Catholic Church was a byproduct, not a main component, of expansionist ideals but it did lead to prejudice towards Catholics in the U.S. Army.[128] Nonetheless, Kearny and some of his men attended Catholic mass while in Santa Fe. Curiosity, as in many cases through this story, got the better of some men in Kearny's ranks, and some occasionally attended Masses conducted at the five Catholic churches in Santa Fe. Kearny himself also attended services held on religious holidays in some of the small towns in the countryside along with members of his staff.[129] Accounts left by the men often describe in detail the places of worship and the services themselves. These writings often focused on the gold ceremonial objects present in these places of worship, alluding to the alleged "riches" of the Mexican people sometimes mentioned in 1840s American literature.[130] In these observations, the men noted that the form of worship differed from that of many Protestant denominations. They were appalled that parishioners kissed the garments of the priest and that many of these same people were of "dissolute

[128] Greenberg, *A Wicked War*, 203-204.

[129] Turner, *The Original Journals*, 73.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 63-64.; Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 54.

[130] Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 46-47.; Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier Under Kearny and Doniphan*, 123.; Waddy Thompson, *Recollections of Mexico* (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1846), 100-109.; Brantz Mayer, *Mexico, As It Was*, Third Edition (New York: J. Winchester New World Press, 1847), 77-78.

character" when not in church.[131] Some soldiers were also taken aback when they listened to recitation of Catholic liturgy, congregational prayers, and the performing the Eucharist at Masses. Some of the Americans who went to Masses later questioned the piety of some of the *Nuevomexicano* worshippers they saw. Those parishioners that seemed to be considered the most pious were in many instances women. This does not mean the male New Mexicans did not sincerely believe in Catholicism, only that few members of the Army of the West deemed them to express genuine concern for the divine.[132] In any case, this showed that Kearny kept his promise to the people of New Mexico, that Catholic worship would not be suppressed in any way by the invaders.

Through attending church functions and local *fandangos*, Kearny's men wanted both to assuage their curiosity and to make it easier to obtain provisions from the citizenry. Both officers and enlisted men mention this in their accounts. The quality of the livestock, especially the mules and horses, was prioritized since the army planned on obtaining some to replace the worn-out animals from Fort Leavenworth. Food was the second most often discussed provision, particularly grains and corn. The men of the army wrote that textiles and pottery could be also found throughout the town.[133] Local artisans produced some of these wares, but much of what observers saw had been obtained through trade with the United States. The Army of the West needed supplies from the United States, as well as Santa Fe, to continue its advance across the desert into California. What was not already in the town could be transported from the United

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[131] Emory, *Notes*, 34.; Turner, *The Original Journals*, 75.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 62.; Gibson, *Journal of Soldier*, 227-228.

[132] After they participated in a few religious activities outside of Mass, some soldiers commented that they believed all New Mexican worshippers, men included, were genuine.

[133] Emory, *Notes*, 35-36., Edwards, *A Campaign in New* Mexico, 52-57.

States. To avoid alienating populace, Kearny's policy of buying necessities or trading for them from the civilian population required that the men also take heed of the price of what they bought, since, in most cases, the men procured food, animals, and other necessities themselves. The pocketbook and the available resources, not muskets or blades, would be the main instruments in finding provisions. Some assistance in these transactions came from above.

The ally that Kearny's troops relied on most was Brig. Gen. Kearny himself, the newly appointed governor. One of Kearny's first official actions as governor was to regulate the prices of crops in the city's markets and to reform taxes placed on various items throughout the city. In 1844, Armijo had imposed a series of duties on imports and on all other goods hauled through New Mexico from other places in Mexico. Material goods produced, purchased, and sold in the province were subjected to high taxes, raising the price on some crops by 20 percent over the going rate. The government also taxed stores, taverns, gaming halls, and other businesses but the enforcement of these taxes was not uniform. The lack of uniformity, however, did not prevent all forms of taxation during the governorships of Albino Perez, Mariano Martínez, and Armijo from causing resentment in New Mexico that plagued the relationship between the people and their governors.[134] This could also happen in response to any taxes levied by the General if he was not careful. One of the first endeavors undertaken by the new American governor, therefore, reformed existing taxes. Licenses for various establishments now ranged from $2 to $5. Taxes on wagons and carriages went from $500 to $4 per wagon and $2 per carriage. (If a wagon or carriage traveled into the public plaza, the fee increased to $25). Permits to host *fandangos* cost $1.50. A stamp tax on paper used in official capacities, akin to the one imposed on Americans by

[134] Vigil, *Arms, Indians, and the Mismanagement*, 19-20, 26.

the British before the American Revolution, was ended. Those who did not comply were strictly penalized.[135]

The purpose of the tax reforms and price regulation were twofold. It lowered the cost of living while also providing financial support for the new regime. Many in the army and Kearny himself observed how impoverished some of the *Nuevomexicanos* had become under Mexican rule. With prices regulated, the soldiers under the General's command could obtain provisions easier since the costs of the items were consistent throughout the city. Revenue made from what taxes remained then went to the treasury and allowed the territorial government to continue to operate. In making the taxes uniform, Kearny hoped to foster a feeling of egalitarianism among both the rich and the poor of New Mexico which had not been present before the arrival of the American army.

As the date for their departure for California drew nearer, Kearny's men used his tax reforms to their advantage. August and September were the months in which most of the maize, the species of corn produced in New Mexico, was harvested by local farmers. Maize was used in the manufacturing of molasses, sugar, tortillas, bread, and other products. Wheat and pepper harvest also occurred during these months, providing more food for the soldiers. Other edible commodities found in the markets of Santa Fe had been gathered earlier in the year and sold by the *fenga* (equivalent to 2 1/4 to 2 1/2 bushels in American measurements).[136] Prices for these

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[135] Stephen Kearny, Proclamation, August 27, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 162-163.; Emory, *Notes on a Reconnaissance*, 35-36.; Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 220.; Kearny even regulated taxes on items such as pool balls, games of chance, and admission prices for formal balls.

[136] The amount that constituted a *fenga* varied between merchants. Lt. Emory, who recorded this information, does not give a reason why the *fenga* appear not to have been a uniform form of measurement.

goods dropped both because of the new taxation policy and also because of the arrival of American soldiers. According to figures given to Lt. Emory, before the American arrival, one *fenga* of wheat sold for between $5 and $6. Once the *Americanos* came the price fell to around $4 because of the arrival of the foodstuffs in their wagons. The influx of Americans also coincided with the grain harvest, which also contributed to the lowering cost of grain in Santa Fe. The cost of milk, eggs, sugar, and coffee ranged from 6 cents to 75 cents. Animals fetched a great deal more, with mules being valued as high as $150 by some sellers, oxen around $25 each, and *burros* (donkeys) as cheap as $1. The price of horses probably ranged around $50 to $60.[137] Another provision in Kearny's new tax laws repealed a 20 percent tax on "dry goods and groceries."[138] The total daily intake of food by the 1,700-man Army of the West was about 5,447 pounds daily.

Cheaper prices of goods made acquiring provisions easier for the Army of the West, but they did not guarantee full stores. The men of the army quickly learned that, despite being a center for trade in New Mexico, Santa Fe had its logistical shortcomings. Santa Fe's location as the western-most terminus of the Santa Fe Trail meant that supplies coming from the United States took weeks to reach them. Frequent delays occurred, caused by broken axles, vehicles overturning, and poor road conditions. The increased demand for produce in Santa Fe rapidly depleted the available stock. It was also standard U.S. Army practice to feed horses through grazing and providing them with grain. The arrival of the Army of the West before the wheat harvest allowed for this policy to continue, but it added to the strain on the grain supply. Meat

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[137] Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards", 211-212.; Morgan, *As Far as the Eyes Could Reach*, 134, 145.; Sally Johnson Ketchum, "Stables-Historical Background" Fort Scott National Historic Site. National Park Service, July 25, 2016. Accessed December 12, 2022. https://home.nps.gov/fosc/learn/education/stablebackground.htm.

[138] Emory, *Notes*, 35.; Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 262.; Frazer, *Forts and Supplies*, 12.

from chickens, cattle, and pigs was a rarity. In the early days of the occupation, poultry had been easier to acquire, but it had quickly become difficult to come by. Swine and bovines were found in small numbers, and many had to be transported to Santa Fe from the United States. Animals not destined for meal plates but for work also proved expensive since the *Nuevomexicanos* also relied upon them to do farm work. These problems, said Missourian Richard Smith Elliot, contributed to the army "consuming everything… flour, grass, and corn" and anything else that could be of use.[139] Many officers and men in the ranks complained about these problems, while others took matters into their own hands.

The biggest issue facing the Army of the West beyond filling its members' stomachs was finding fodder for its oxen and horses. It is hard to obtain actual figures for the number of animals employed in the campaign, but historians have concluded that around 2,159 horses, 4,174 mules, and 14,904 oxen served the Army of the West in some fashion during its campaign. Kearny's force therefore would require around 47,760 pounds of feed daily for the horses, 447,120 pounds for the teams of oxen for the same amount of time, and 83,480 pounds for the army's mules.[140] With the army requiring amounts of feed close to these figures over the course of its time in New Mexico, its animals were bound to cause logistical issues. Oxen, though, can survive on less sustenance than horses and mules. The lack of foliage observed by some of the men marching with the army made attaining this daily total almost impossible while raising the possibility of parasitic infections among the animals. Historian Phyllis Morgan notes that this contributed to the small stature of the *burros* that abounded around Santa Fe. The affordability of

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[139] Elliot, *The Mexican War Correspondence*, 80; Frazer, *Forts and Supplies*,8-9., Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 43-48.; Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 312-314, 323.

[140] Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, 108-109.; Childress, "Manifest Destiny, 1837-1858", 22.

mules and *burros* in the city made it easy for the army to purchase them from their owners. [141] Eventually, Kearny's men traded in their steeds for mules and *burros*, but for now they chose to rely upon horses. Col. Doniphan initiated efforts to ease the hunger of his men's mounts by dispatching 500 men from his regiment to find areas in which to graze animals on August 19, 1846.[142] Later, this detachment advanced upon the town of Galisteo, which was known to be surrounded by fertile land. Neighboring towns like Santo Domingo, San Felipé, Algondones, Bernalillo, and San Tomé eventually hosted Americans on a few occasions, when they were looking for supplies to take back to Santa Fe. American detachments made it as far as Albuquerque with the aid of the Rio Grande del Norte (Rio Grande) that flowed through the province that served as a readymade route of march part of the way for Kearny's forces.[143] As time passed, men in these parties were given more responsibilities than just looking for logistical support.

These "grazing parties," as they became known, also served other official purposes. All of them were intended to consolidate power and to logistically prepare for the American advance westward. These detachments brought word of the policies of the new regime, which these

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[141] Phyllis S. Morgan, *As Far As the Eye Could Reach: Accounts of Animals Along the Santa Fe Trail, 1821-1880* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), 120, 134, 142-143.; Pennsylvania State University, "Feeding Horses", Penn State Extension, Pennsylvania State University, December 2, 2015, Accessed October 21, 2022, https://extension.psu.edu/feeding-horses.; Levi Alston, "How Often Do You Feed a Mule?", RideAble, 2022, accessed December 8, 2022, https://rideable.org/how-often-do-you-feed-a-mule.; Glen Selk, "How Much Hay Will a Cow Consume a Day?", IFAS Extension, University of Florida, November 18, 2016, accessed December 8, 2022, https://nwdistrict.ifas.ufl.edu/phag/2016/11/18/how-much-hay-will-a-cow-consume-in-a-day.

[142] Jacob S. Robinson, *Journal of the Santa Fe Expedition Under Colonel Doniphan: Exploration of Northern Mexico* (Torrington, WY: The Narrative Press, 2000), 16.; Elliot, *Mexican War Correspondence of Richard Smith Elliot*, 76-78.

[143] Robinson, *Journal of the Santa Fe Expedition*, 16-17.; Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards", 159-160.; Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 43-48.

"grazing parties" had the ability to enforce. In some towns the soldiers' presence was welcomed by the inhabitants, while residents of other settlements sometimes treated the Americans with indifference or even disgust. Kearny used these patrols to gather information about public opinion and the goings on in this new possession of the United States. The intelligence gathered helped in determining the best routes to California and the best ways in which to improve the new administration. Along with these duties, the members of these detachments seized weapons left behind by the fleeing Mexican officials. The confiscation of the weapons was meant to promote stability under the new government by deterring the rearming of militias that the Mexicans formed to combat Natives. Kearny believed that an unarmed population was easier to govern than one that was armed to the teeth. Assigning men to complete missions in remote areas of the province was a practice that Kearny's successor in Santa Fe, Col. Sterling Price, continued; and Kearny himself used it occasionally along the march to California.[144] As the range of the "grazing parties" expanded, the Indigenous peoples of the region, too, began to also feel the power of the new leaders of New Mexico.

Though most goods were acquired peacefully, the Army of the West did employ brute force to collect arms and ammunition for its upcoming advance. On August 19, 1846 Kearny ordered the construction of a fort to protect Santa Fe from Mexicans and rebels.[145] The stockpiling process for both the army's departure and for the erection of the fort began on the third day of the occupation and continued until the General's departure on September 2, 1846. Hearing of a possible return of Armijo, Kearny followed standard procedure and ordered his troops to seize artillery, powder, and ammunition found in Santa Fe. American servicemen used

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[144] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 218-219.

[145] Emory, *Notes*, 32.

some of the seized gunpowder, while the newly constructed Fort Marcy on the edge of town housed the balance. The guns for this position were captured by a group of soldiers sent by Kearny in August 1846. It was rumored that these weapons were sent to New Mexico by Armijo in preparation for an attack on the Americans. Armijo's campaign never materialized, so American soldiers transported the cannons to Fort Marcy. Ammunition and small arms for the post's occupants came from wagon trains coming from Bent's Fort and from recently disarmed militias in rural communities. By demilitarizing the populace, Kearny and his staff hoped to preempt any chance of an insurrection mounted by the *Nuevomexicanos*. Now the only perceived threat of revolution came from the *Diné, Tinneh*, Comanche, and other Indigenous peoples who continued the cycle of war that had begun years before. It could also be surmised that Kearny designed this action to inspire confidence in his soldiers. Named for the Secretary of War, its builders intended for Fort Marcy to serve as an armory and defensive position in case Santa Fe was attacked. The fort also projected American military might to the local inhabitants. Though begun when the bulk of the Army of the West conducted peacekeeping exercises from Santa Fe, the fortification was completed the following year.[146]

In his study of the economics of the U.S. Army's pre-Civil War control over New Mexico, Robert Frazer asserted that New Mexicans profited from the invasions through over charging American servicemen.[147] Frazer's assessment is accurate, but not to the extent that one might think. The amount of money made through financial transactions was likely small due to the lack of currency among Kearny's troops. The federal government had not planned on supplying payment for the troops, leaving it up to Kearny to acquire funds to pay his men with.

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[146] Elliot, *The Mexican War Correspondence*, 95-97.; Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 49.

[147] Frazer, *Forts and Supplies*, 6.

Before setting out from Fort Leavenworth, Kearny notified the paymaster of St. Louis' Jefferson Barracks that he requested large sum of both gold and silver coins to pay his soldiers.[148] The paymaster of the Army of the West, Maj. Benjamin Walker, failed to bring the requested precious metals promised to his comrades when he set out from Ft. Leavenworth. Four months went by without any man under Kearny receiving a cent of what the federal government guaranteed them when they enlisted. Thus, they bargained with their *Nuevomexicano* hosts using sundry things found in their tents such as needles, buttons, and knives.[149] To New Mexicans, these objects were luxuries that they had not seen before or that they had adapted to living without. Interest in these articles, however, eventually subsided, leaving New Mexicans wanting cold, hard specie instead of metal objects. The want of specie, livestock, and merchandise presented a quandary for the quartermasters of the army's units because the cost of provisions increased. Lt. Emory noted in his report to Congress filed after the war that, due to the abundance of silver mines in New Mexico, *Nuevomexicanos* grew accustomed to receiving silver coins in payments. No precious metals translated to no sales. Maj. Dunham Spaulding of the First Missouri secured some banknotes and $20,000 worth of gold from Missouri banks to help alleviate some stress, which arrived after Kearny departure from Santa Fe on September 23, 1846. New Mexicans only accepted payments of gold, exhausting Maj. Spaulding's store of the

[148] Letter from Henry Smith Turner to Benjamin Walker, June 21, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 151.

[149] Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards", 169-170.; William H. Richardson, *Journal of William H. Richardson, A Private Soldier in the Campaign of Old and New Mexico* (Baltimore, MD: John W. Woods, printer, 1848), 29.

metal.[150] Commerce resumed temporarily until the Americans were once again out of gold in the closing months of 1846. This posed a difficulty for latecomers to Santa Fe.

The specie problem possibly caused the Mormon Battalion's difficulty in obtaining animals mentioned in Cooke's account. Another contributing factor was the need for food by the *Nuevomexicanos* themselves. They sold what they thought they could spare to Kearny's and then Doniphan's detachments over the previous two months, selling any extra food stuffs they had. Historian Brian DeLay has observed that *Nuevomexicano* agriculturalists lived harvest to harvest, producing little extra food beyond what was needed to survive.[151] Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, who refined their growing techniques over generations, maintained fields which yielded enough crops to have surplus. Each year, excess crops from the year before were consumed before that year's crop, producing leftover, unused parts of harvest were destined to be eaten the following year.[152] Therefore, the Native peoples possessed excess to trade with the *Americanos*, while New Mexicans did not. By the time Cooke's new command reached Santa Fe, the countryside had been stripped of available supplies. Many New Mexicans who had little to give became apprehensive about allowing the new batch of *Americanos* to take any more supplies. Cooke's men were appalled at the prices they were being charged for various victuals and for animals, but at least they were, for the most part, able to track down supplies. Some in the column still had hard currency to pay for goods, and others bartered as their compatriots who

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[150] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier*, 245-246.; James Abert, *Abert's New Mexico Report, 1846-47* (Albuquerque, NM: Horn and Wallace Publishers, 1962), 66, 96.

[151] DeLay, *War*, 51.

[152] James F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 84-87.; Cynthia Redding, *Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700-1850* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 52-54.; Frazer, *Forts and Supplies*, 12.

come earlier had done. For Price's men garrisoning Santa Fe, though, supplies became difficult to come by. Promising to respect the rights of New Mexicans, then proceeding to exhaust their foodstuffs created tensions between the occupiers and the residents that the new American government needed to assuage.

By late August 1846, Kearny wanted to outline a civilian government to work alongside the Army in New Mexico. The process that led to the founding document of this new government started early in the occupation when Kearny called for a new constitution and law code to be composed. Colonel Doniphan of the First Missouri, who practiced law in St. Louis before enlisting, and Private (Pvt.) Willard P. Hall of the First Missouri, who was also an attorney, were tasked with creating both the law code and the constitution that Kearny wanted. The finished product combined Spanish civil law with concepts derived from the laws of Missouri and of Texas, the Livingston Code, and the laws of the Mexican state of Coahuila. Known as the "Kearny Code," Doniphan and Hall 's creation became basis for law in the territory on September 22, 1846. The text of the Kearny Code stipulated that the territorial government would consist of an executive (the governor), judiciary (a three-judge supreme court), a secretary of state, and a legislature of twenty-one representatives. The territorial marshal, attorney general, and two district attorneys performed law enforcement duties throughout the land. Other official offices created by the Code, such as a treasurer, prefects, and an auditor also helped in governing the area. Kearny, who served as the interim governor, appointed Charles Bent as the first territorial governor and oversaw the appointments of the other government positions. Most of the appointees were Americans serving with the army or drawn from the Anglo-American population living in New Mexico, although some Mexican officials did continue to fill certain positions. The only positions Kearny did not fill were those in the

legislature. Elections to fill the seats of the new legislative body were schedule for the following year.[153] With these institutions set to take over the governing of the territory, on September 2, 1846, Kearny left with the dragoons, artillery pieces, and the accompanying wagon train months before the elections planned for August 1847. Activities meant to bolster this new government continued unabated, although Kearny did not oversee them.

Some who served under the General later commented that in his appointment of Charles Bent and others to offices in the new regime, Kearny made an egregious error. None of the office holders selected came from the most prominent *rico* families-nor were they connected to them in any way. The pre-war governors, including Armijo, had built relationships with these clans by incorporating some of their members into their administrations. Being related to government officials increased *rico* influence upon domestic policy and access to wealth stemming from commerce with the United States. Historian David Beyreis notes that in snubbing these clans and other New Mexicans, Kearny went against directives from Secretary of State James Buchanan and Secretary of War Marcy to include *Nuevomexicanos* among the appointees.[154] The political backgrounds of those New Mexicans who were selected to take offices added to the furor. Kearny's actions only deepened divides formed between those in support of American influence and their detractors. New Mexicans who were incorporated into Kearny's government like

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[153] David Y. Thomas, *A History of Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of the United States* (New York: The Columbia University Press, 1904), 105.; Letter from Stephen Kearny to Roger Jones, September 22, 1846, in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846*-1847, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 167.; Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to William Gilpin, September 22, 1846, in *Winning the West*: *General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book, 1846-1847*. eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 166-167.

[154] David Beyreis, *Blood in the Borderlands: Conflict, Kinship, and the Bent Family, 1821-1890* (Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska Press, 2020), 79.; Marcy to Kearny, June 3, 1846, 396-397.

Tomas Rivera, Donacio Vigil, and Antonio José Otero were widely seen as traitors by fellow New Mexicans. Although benefiting directly from transactions with Americans over the years, many of the *ricos* opted to oppose the American takeover of New Mexico.[155] Some of these families even assisted in spreading Armijo's anti-American, pro-Mexican propaganda in New Mexico when Kearny invaded. These factors began to coalesce as the basis for the Taos Rebellion, but U.S. Army officers focused their efforts instead on ending the ever-present Native American "menace."

Kearny used armed coercion, not peaceful socializing and commerce, to compel the local Indigenous peoples to negotiate. Without making peace with the Indigenous nations of New Mexico, Kearny's army would fail in fulfilling one of the General's promises to the New Mexicans. Native nations who did not sign treaties with the Americans could also threaten supplies coming from New Mexico. The language of the orders sent from Kearny to Col. Doniphan and Capt. Woldemar Fischer, a Missouri artillery officer, that told them how to deal with Native marauders encouraged this belief. [156] The task of ending Native American raids could almost be declared a Herculean effort since the two nations that primarily conduct these sorties on New Mexican farms, the *Diné* and the *Tinneh*, consisted of numerous bands. *Diné* and *Tinneh* bands observed similar cultural practices, beliefs, and lifeways. But they did not form

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[155] Reséndez, *Changing*, 254-255.

[156] Letter from Henry Smith Turner to Alexander Doniphan, October 2, 1846, in *Doniphan's Expedition* by John T. Hughes (Cincinnati, OH: J.A. & U.P. James, 1848), 56.; Letter from Stephen Kearny to Woldemar F. Fischer, September 16, 1846 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenberg and Laura Gabiger (Booneville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 166.; Among Kearny's papers is a letter address to Doniphan's second in command, Charles Ruff, ordering him to also advance into *Dinétah* in September. It appears that this effort may have been diverted to quash a supposed rebellion or never materialized.

two distinct, united nations. The American General decided that focus of the peacekeeping efforts be centered on the *Tinneh*. Kearny sent Capt. Fisher with 50 mounted infantrymen into Apachería in September 1846 along with all their accoutrements, but the soldiers never fired their weapons. In the case of Fisher's detachment, the mere threat of force convinced several *Tinneh* chiefs to negotiate with Kearny.[157] The artillerymen who escorted the chiefs back to Santa Fe showed the Native leaders respect throughout the journey. Kearny continued to contact *Tinneh* bands during his advance into Alta California.

The *Diné* would not be cowed so easily. Maj. William Gilpin, one of Col. Doniphan's staffers, first tried to contact the *Diné* from September 18 through 25, 1846, with 180 men from the First Missouri. Instead, Maj. Gilpin reached the lands of the Utes (Utahs) and brought 60 of their leading men to Santa Fe negotiate with the Doniphan.[158] Doniphan and Maj. Gilpin then took two detachments consisting of 385 members of the First Missouri, one of 85 under Gilpin and the other of 300 under Doniphan, with them into *Dinétah*. To increase their strength, Maj. Gilpin promptly recruited 45 *Nuevomexicano* and 20 Puebloan volunteers to serve with his contingent. Between October 22 and November 19, 1846, Col. Doniphan and Maj. Gilpin persuaded fourteen *Diné* chiefs to attend a conference hosted by Doniphan in the mountains of southern New Mexico at a place known as *Ojo del Oso* (Bear Spring). On November 20, Col. Doniphan and the three chiefs opened negotiations. These talks continued for two days. Only after Maj. David Waldo arrived with an additional 150 men from Santa Fe did Doniphan accomplish the campaign's original goal with the signing of the Treaty of Bear Spring.[159] After

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[157] Edwards, *A Campaign*, 65-66, 69-70.

[158] Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 67.

[159] Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 67-72.

dealing with the Utes, *Diné*, and *Tinneh*, Doniphan's command also contacted Puebloan groups known as the Zuni and the Moquis, notifying them of the peace talks.[160] As the Puebloan involvement in these affairs illustrates, some Indigenous nations quickly made peace with the occupiers.

The Puebloans were the first Native nations in the region to introduce themselves to the American newcomers. As early as August 24, 1846, Puebloan representatives agreed to the first of a series of peace agreements with Kearny stating that the Puebloan nations involved (the name of which is not known) would be allies of the new regime. Other treaties with various Puebloan peoples followed throughout the rest of Kearny's occupation. Making peace with foreign occupiers was not a new concept to the Puebloans, and the motives behind this decision were complex. Under the Spanish the Puebloan peoples famously revolted in the 1680, in the aftermath of the uprising the Spanish compelled various Puebloan peoples to make peace with them. Through successive agreements with the Spanish and then the Mexican governments, various Puebloan nations were awarded special status in New Mexican affairs. The various Puebloan peoples became wards of the Spanish provincial government and received land grants so that they could cultivate their own crops without intervention. Due to the economic impact of the Santa Fe Trail, several Puebloan peoples also signed commercial contracts to provide food and animals to American settlers when they crossed into New Mexican territory. By cooperating with Stephen Kearny, the Puebloan peoples gained an advantage over their more obstinate Native neighbors. American soldiers could be dispatched to protect Puebloan interests and take part the Puebloans' struggles against the Utes, *Diné*, and *Tinneh*. These agreements became especially helpful for the Americans when their food stores became depleted and no other

[160] Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition* 72-75.

sources of food could be found.[161] On the surface, the Puebloans seemed disposed to assist the American newcomers, but this was not always the case. Fears of encroachment upon their lands and Pueblo folklore later caused some to eye Kearny suspiciously.[162] The Puebloan peoples of New Mexico were not alone in the suspicions of the *Americanos*, yet the Americans with whom they were collaborating were unlike others who followed in the wake of the Army of the West.

For one thing, members of the Army of the West seem to have viewed issues of gender differently for how most Americans did. The descriptions of *Nuevmexicano* men and women written down by members of Kearny's command present in the churches and at other social functions supports what Amy Greenberg asserts in her work *Manifest Manhood and Antebellum American Empire*. Greenberg wrote that American masculinity and femininity during the antebellum period were founded on the ability to have children, the ideals of republican motherhood, and a strong surge in Protestant fervor throughout the United States.[163] American conceptions of gender changed when the soldiers applied their preconceptions to Catholic Mexicans and Indigenous peoples. Literature of the time portrayed Mexican *hombres* as weak, immoral, cowardly, and lazy, while Mexican *senoras* were rendered as sexually attractive, kind, courageous, pious, and incredibly industrious. Native American men were seen in similar lights, but as savages that could undermine *Americano* rule.[164] Throughout the accounts of the initial

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[161] The exact identity of the Puebloan peoples that made these treaties is unclear in contemporary observations. Those named in later events include the Maricopas, the Maquois, the Pimas, and the Zunis, but these peoples contacted the Army of the West later in the occupation.

[162] Reséndez, *Changing*, 256-258.

[163] Amy Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7-12.

[164] Native American women very rarely appear in the sources or are mentioned briefly, in passing rather than described in detail.

phases of the American presence in New Mexico, commentators emphasized the physical beauty of New Mexican women. *Nuevomexicanos'* adherence, no matter their sex, to Catholicism continued to be frowned on. Soldiers in the Army of the West did begin to attribute positive qualities to individuals of *Nuevomexicano* heritage of both genders as the occupation continued. Those individuals that made peace with the Americans or willing conducted transactions with them were seen more positively than other who did not do either. Pragmatism seems to be the cause of this evolution rather than genuine change, though the latter may have had some influence.

As with American observers' understanding about Mexican womanhood and manhood, attributes about different ethnicities also evolved. Like the change in gender views, those of different races most likely were influenced by pragmatism rather than authentic progress in thought.[165] At the outset of the campaign, many in the Army of the West harbored sentiments towards their adversaries like those observed by Thomas Hietala in *Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire*.[166] The language in the journals by Frank Edwards, George Gibson, Lt. Emory, and Capt. Turner, as well as American literature of the era, demeaned all Mexicans as members of an "inferior race," "untrustworthy," "lazy," and much else. As the men began to interact with Mexican civilians, however, words like "agreeable," "courteous," and "hospitable" replaced the white supremacist rhetoric espoused earlier in their mission.[167] Characterizations of

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[165] Some men may have had genuine change. It is hard to determine exactly if this is true. Their writings imply that they were pragmatic rather than authentic about this.

[166] Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire*, Revised Edition. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 155-156.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 41.

[167] Gibson, *Journal of a Soldier Under Kearny and Doniphan*, 252.; Elliot, *The Mexican War Correspondence*, 100.; William H. Richardson, *Journal of a Private Soldier in the Campaign of New and Old Mexico* (Baltimore, MD: John W. Woods, Printer, 1848), 25, 34.

Native Americans depended upon the military situation between the American soldiers and the nation in question. When speaking of Puebloan peoples and Utes, soldiers express admiration and respect. More violent nations, like the *Diné*, *Tinneh*, and Comanche, were misunderstood as "thieves" and "murderers." Edwards, Gibson, Emory, Turner, and their fellow soldiers changed their racial views when they wanted to procure food and other necessities. Instances in which American soldiers recounted being famished and wanting rest, as in days after the city's capitulation, *Nuevomexicanos* and kind-hearted Natives alike were assigned positive traits.[168] stomachs were filled and bodies recuperated, the racist labels reappear sporadically or are couched in different terms when describing other New Mexicans and Native Americans.[169] Those that stole from the Army of the West directly or from farmers, allied Indigenous nations, or other groups providing the Americans food were referred to in derogatory ways.

Col. Sterling Price and his Second Missouri Volunteers did not see beyond conventional racial and gender views when they garrisoned New Mexico. The ability of Kearny's troops to see beyond conventional views of gender and race was not repeated by the Second Missouri Volunteers under Col. Price. Once the task of making peace with the various Pueblo, *Diné*, and *Tinneh* nations, as well as the Utes, was completed, Col. Doniphan set out on the expedition that made him a national celebrity in late November 1846. Charles Bent and Col. Sterling Price, who oversaw the territorial government in Kearny's and Doniphan's absence, can be held responsible for ineptly handling the situation left to them. Price's decision to continue sending out "grazing

[168] Edwards, "Journal of Marcellus Ball Edwards", 151-153; Emory, *Notes on a Reconnaissance*, 33; Robinson, *Journal of the Santa Fe Expedition*, 19.; Edwards, *A Campaign in New Mexico*, 63.

[169] Some sources do not use them at all. Though that does not mean the authors' views changed.

parties" in the countryside took more food from the inhabitants.[170] New Mexicans were increasingly frustrated with *Americanos* constantly asking for more supplies. The political implications of Kearny not including *ricos* in the new government. Col. Price and Second Missouri's open disdain for non-white civilians and the American soldiers' lack of discipline, the opposite of how the members of Army of the West behaved, fueled anti-American feelings even further. Price also curtailed the freedoms that Kearny had given to *Nuevomexicanos* when the Missouri colonel imposed martial law throughout New Mexico after learning of Doniphan's departure.[171] Puebloans were emboldened by folkloric belief in a new Aztec Empire inspired, according to historian Andrés Reséndez, by feelings of "resistance and tenacity in the face of extremely adverse conditions." Puebloans sought to rebel in order to preserve their culture and thier ties to Mexico.[172] Kearny and other officers heard rumors of possible uprisings during their stay in Santa Fe, but they conversations dealt with these potential problems with displays of force. In January 1847, a real rebellion began. Hunger experienced by *Nuevomexicanos*, American purchase of New Mexican goods and animals, white supremacy, and dissatisfaction with the new government culminated in Governor Bent's assassination on January 19, 1847. Government officials in Taos, where Bent was staying, were also killed including the sheriff of Taos, the district attorney, the prefect, and nine other Americans. The Taos Rebellion then briefly came to life. Bloody repression ensued and culminated in the slaughter of revolutionaries

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[170] Elliot, *The Mexican War Correspondence*, 98-99.; Lewis Garrad, "Lewis Garrad's Account" in *Toas 1847: The Revolt in Contemporary Accounts*, ed. Michael McNierney (Boulder, CO: Johnson Publishing Company, 1980), 66.

[171] George Fredrick Augustus Ruxton, *Adventures in New Mexico and the Rocky Mountains* (London: John Murray, Albermarle Street, 1847), 189.; Robert E. Shalhope, *Sterling Price: A Portrait of a Southerner* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 60-62.

[172] Reséndez, *Changing*, 261.

at the Pueblo de Taos by a 350-man force under Price on February 4, 1847.[173] Other detachments of mounted Missourians were sent to Mora where the remaining rebels were hiding, ironically in the vicinity where Kearny had first addressed New Mexicans the previous summer.

The Army of West fostered tolerance of the new American regime in New Mexico by observing the rights and gaining an appreciation for *Nuevomexicano* culture. By allowing New Mexican life to continue as it had before the coming of the *Americanos*, Brig. Gen. Kearny's troops defied expectations that the civilian population had of the occupiers. The measures taken by the American general during his stay in the provincial capital laid the groundwork for future efforts aimed at governing New Mexico. The logistical benefits of peacefully acquiring provisions encouraged both New Mexicans and their Indigenous neighbors to help the Army of the West achieve the goals set out for it by the War Department. The aid that Kearny and his men received from the civilians of New Mexico helped the expedition to compensate for the challenges posed by Army of the West's wagons and the speed required by the Polk Administration.

[173] Letter from Sterling Price to Roger Jones, February 15, 1847, in *Toas 1847: The Revolt in Contemporary Accounts*. ed. Michael McNierney (Boulder, CO: Johnson Publishing Company, 1980), 9-12, 45-53.; US Government, "Circular, Santa Fe, February 14, 1847, in *Taos 1847: The Revolt in Contemporary Accounts*. ed. Michael McNierney (Boulder, CO: Johnson Publishing Company, 1980), 43-45.; Emory, *Notes*, 30.; Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 31-32.

Chapter 3 - The Army of the West in California

While Price dealt with affairs in New Mexico, Kearny assisted Capt. John Charles Frémont and Commodore Robert Stockton in retaking California. Native Americans and *Californios* had rallied together in the latter half of 1846 in response the Frémont's and Stockton's actions in Alta California. The cities of San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Deigo, and others that were captured by the U.S. Army and Navy fell within weeks to resistance groups. When Kearny and his beleaguered command of dragoons entered the province, the resistance they encountered surprised them. Although the logistical situation differed from that in New Mexico, Kearny and his troops continued to win support for their invasion from the civilian population of Alta California through disciplined behavior. The policy regarding civilians and Indigenous peoples Kearny enacted while in California focused on providing logistical support for his army carrying out the mission given to them by the President. Due to the makeup of the army units in California and the civilian reaction to American involvement in the area, the men under Kearny used different methods to win the Californians over to their cause than their compatriots had used in New Mexico. In California Stephen Kearny found a people who were willing to openly oppose American control and had the means to do so. The situation made Kearny feel the need to employ some violence, but not much, to subdue the people of California. Ultimately, tolerance for the American occupiers grew among the civilian population of California because the invaders behaved in a respectful manner while soldiers showed interest towards their culture and lifeways.

How Kearny's men respectfully and for the most part peacefully convinced *Californios* to support the American occupation does not typically appear in the historiography of this period in California history. Historians have routinely focused their research efforts on discussing great

figures of the era rather than the common soldier. John C. Frémont composed and published the earliest American sources on the military actions in California. Frémont's memoir is one of the main sources of information on this period and is focused on the actions of leaders like, Commodore Robert Stockton, Frémont, and Kearny, instead of the men of their commands. General histories of the Mexican-American War, such as Justin Smith's *War with Mexico*, K. Jack Bauer's *The Mexican War: 1846-1848*, and David Clary's *Eagles and Empire: The United States, Mexico, and the Struggle for a Continent*, rely upon both Frémont's recollections and archival documents written by Kearny during his time as governor. Other studies in a similar vein include Hubert Bancroft's *History of California*, Thomas Grivas' *The Military Governments of California 1846-1850*, Neal Harlow's *California Conquered: War and Peace on the Pacific 1846-1850*, and Dale Walker's *Bear Flag Rising: The Conquest of California, 1846*. Kearny and Frémont are excellent sources of information pertaining to the Mexican-American War military actions in California, but the two men's papers cannot speak to the average soldier's and civilian's experiences during the tumultuousness of 1846 and 1847. Recent works on the *Californios* by Leonard Pitt, Douglass Monroy, and Lisbeth Haas, however, shed light on how the American invasion altered the lives of the Spanish-speaking population of the province. Oppression of the Native nations of California under the Spanish, the Mexican, and American regimes has come to be studied as an implication of the deeds of Stockton, Frémont, and Kearny during the Mexican-American War.

Kearny's contribution to California history, however, is sometimes overlooked. The works by Smith, Bauer, and Cary mention the General's efforts, but only in brief narrations about the transition of California from conquered territory to a U.S. state. Frémont, and subsequently Bancroft and Smith, maligned Kearny for his perceived "usurpation" of Frémont's

authority. Bauer, Clarke, Grivas, Harlow, and Walker also quoted Frémont but also investigated Kearny's side of the issue. Letters, government documents, and contemporary publications showed these researchers that Kearny rectified many of the issues that began under Frémont's and Stockton's stints as the ultimate military authority in the area. Earlier authors made Frémont a hero for his actions in Alta California, but Clarke, Grivas, Harlow, and Walker portrayed Frémont as a villain. The basis for Kearny's reforms and policy changes is said to be his desire to cement American control of California. Though true, this conclusion fails to get to the heart of the matter. Looking at the firsthand accounts left by men like Henry Standage and Daniel Tyler of the Mormon Battalion, James Lynch and Francis Lippett of the Seventh Regiment of New York Volunteers, and *The Conquest of New Mexico and California* by Philip St. George Cooke reveals a more nuanced picture. At the top, General Kearny tried to establish American dominance; however, at the regimental and company levels the peacekeeping measures and the displays of U.S. Army discipline centered on "winning the hearts and minds" of Native Americans and *Californios* to achieve logistical support. To get at the agendas of both Kearny and his soldiers, one must look at works of officers and enlisted men, environmental factors, and the social history of the conquest of California. To fully understand Kearny's need for logistical support, moreover, one must first understand needs the context in which the American occupiers operated.

As they did in New Mexico, the enlisted men under Kearny interacted mostly with the Spanish speaking population living on the fringes of Mexico. These people referred to themselves as *Californios*. Within this social class there were two groups– *el gente de razón* (the

people of reason) and *indios* (indians).[174] The total Spanish-speaking population in 1846, according to modern estimates, was 7,000 in all, with the number of Natives numbering over 100,000. [175] Individuals *de razón* comprised those considered civilized because of their Catholic faith and observance of Mexican cultural practices. *Indinos* were primarily Indigenous individuals who continued to practice Native religions and lived like their Native American ancestors. Native workers labored at the numerous *ranchos* that formed the backbone of the agricultural component of the Californian economy. Some enslaved *indios* also served the *Californios* in various capacities. The balance of the economy included trade with foreigners and the Native nations living around the *Californios*. Ships filled with goods from Alta California departed the province from the ports of San Diego, Los Angeles, Monterrey, and San Francisco, the largest settlements in the province at the time. Residents of inland towns like Sacramento travelled along roads connecting to the ports where they shipped their goods to outside markets. Many of these entrepôts began as Catholic missions designed to convert the Native peoples of the area to Catholicism. Some missions that did not become major trade centers continued to operate in the countryside ministering to Natives dwelling nearby. Contemporary estimates state that around 16,000 Natives lived near these facilities in the 1840s, thus making them wards of the provincial government that maintained the missions beginning in the 1830s.[176]

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[174] Antonio María Osio, *The History of Alta California*, ed. and trans. Rose Maries Beebe and Robert M. Senkewicz (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 55.; José María Amador, "José María Amador's Other Remembrances" in *Californio Voices: The Oral Memoirs of José María Amador and Lorenzo Asisara*. ed. and trans. Gregorio Mora-Torres (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2005), 221.

[175] Delay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*, 288.

[176] Osio, *The History*, 69-70.; Thomas O. Larkin, "California in 1846 and Its Resources as Then Known" in *California in 1846: Described in Letters from Thomas O. Larkin, "The Farthest West", E. M. Kern, and "Justice"* ed. Oscar Lewis (San Francisco, CA: The Grabhorn Press, 1934), 2-3.

These missions symbolized the attempts of the Spanish and Mexicans to "civilize" some of the Indigenous peoples of North America. Scholars estimate that 32 nations called California home when Franciscan monks first appeared in large numbers in California in 1769. Most of these Native peoples did not practice agriculture, resorting instead to hunting and gathering to sustain themselves. Archeologists have found that despite the lack of farming techniques among them, California's Native American population was one of the densest in North America. This provided Catholic priests with a plethora of potential converts. Spanish monks, assisted by soldiers, established 21 missions and several *presidios* (military posts) to proselytize the Indigenous peoples around them. Historians and archaeologists have observed that by forcibly removing Natives from their villages to make way for Hispanic settlers, the Spanish initiated a metamorphosis in how Indigenous Californians subsisted. The change in subsistence strategies came when the Spanish called for all Native nations living on or near the missions to learn agriculture. Fearing the imposition of new lifeways and of forced removal to other lands, some western Californian Natives escaped eastward. Some *indios* chose to revolt in 1775 but they failed to end the mission system.[177] Disease and war caused the extinction of some nations and a dwindling in numbers of others. Armed with the knowledge of sedentary farming methods, many "mission indians," as other *Californios* and Kearny's men called them, by 1846 worked on *ranchos* attached to the missions or on others owned by *Californios*. Along California's western reaches, Indigenous peoples continued to resist, inadvertently providing captives who were subsequently sold as slaves to *Californios*. Freed Natives could live in *Californio* cities, and

[177] Ian Barnes, *The Historical Atlas of Native Americans* (New York: Chartwell Books, 2015), 108-109.

many did.[178] Some of these Indigenous individuals participated in the political turmoil that rocked California before the outbreak of the Mexican-American War.

In the fifteen years before the war, California underwent a series of events that led to instability within the provincial administration. The original structure of the provincial government mirrored that of New Mexico, but unrest caused reforms within the administrative structure. Alta California existed on the edge of Mexico, resulting in the Mexican government giving it little attention. The provincial governor oversaw civil affairs, while *el commandante general* responsible for all military matters in the region. Intended to maintain law and order in Alta California, holders of the posts of Governor and *Commandante General* contributed to widespread violence beginning in 1837. Don Jose Antonio Carillo, who became governor in 1837, acquiesced to calls for reform by dividing Alta California into two jurisdictions overseen by different governors. Carillo's decision promptly ignited a civil war in the province. Violence continued under Carillo's successors until 1845.[179] If the U.S. Army and Navy were to establish American governance in Alta California, members of both services would need to end the near constant outbreaks of armed conflict in the province. The kind of behavior the members of the

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[178] Osio, *History of Alta California*, 56.; Alfred Robinson, *Life in California During a Residence of Several Years in the Territory* (New York: Wiley & Putnam, 1846), vii, 2-3.; Fr. Geronimo Boscana, *Chinigchinch: A Historical Account of the Origin, Customs, and Traditions of the Indians at the Missionary Establishment of St. Juan Capistrano, Alta California* (New York: Wiley & Putnam, 1846), 285-286.; Kent G. Lightfoot, Otis Parish, and Lee M. Panich, *Californian Indians and Their Environment: An Introduction* (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 2009), 3-5.

[179] Narciso Botello, *Narciso Botello's Annals of Southern California 1833-1847*, ed. and trans. Brent C. Dickerson. (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, LLC, 2014), 29-31, 54-55, 59-66; Osio, *The History of Alta California*, 179-199.; William Heath Davis, *Sixty years in California, a History of Events and Life in California Personal, Political and Military, Under the Mexican Regime; During the Quasi-military Government of the Territory by the United States, and After the Admission of the State into the Union, Being a Compilation by a Witness of Events Described* (San Francisco, CA: A.J. Leary, 1889), 130-133

Army of the West displayed in New Mexico, combined with reinforcement of their position by the U.S. Navy and other U.S. Army contingents, could end the cycle of upheaval. Kearny had yet to leave Fort Leavenworth with his army when John C. Frémont brought war, once again, to Alta California in May 1846.

Frémont commanded a company of frontiersmen sent into Alta California to map the province for the U.S. government beginning in 1845. On May 9, 1846, Marine Lt. Archibald Gillespie rode into Frémont's camp with missives informing Frémont that he was to instigate a rebellion in the province. The ensuing revolution culminated in Frémont's establishment of the famous, and short-lived, Bear Flag Republic. Frémont's band of 60 well-armed explorers became the nucleus of the California Battalion that also included English, Irish, and American immigrants living in Alta California. The Battalion's purpose was to fight for the Bear Flag Republic.[180] Frémont's men reported directly to Commodore Robert Stockton, commander of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Squadron, which anchored off the coast. Stockton outfitted Frémont's command for their mission. During its first months of existence the California Battalion drew the ire of many area Natives and *Californios* because of its hardline approach to both populations. Frémont ordered the massacre of over 300 Indigenous individuals in 1845 and in the early stages of his revolution. Along with these killings, Frémont also oversaw the executions of several *Californios* who opposed his men. Frémont's force also routinely stole horses and provisions from Californians of both ethnicities. Frémont's refusal to withdraw from Alta California following requests from the Mexican governor of the province, Pío Pico, further provoked

[180] Walter Colton, *Three Years in California* (New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1850), 72-73, 83-84.

Californians in all parts of the province to take up arms.[181] All of the port cities which Frémont and Stockton captured in July and August 1846 – San Diego, Los Angeles, Monterrey, and San Francisco – fell to forces comprised of *Californios* and Native Americans in September and October 1846.[182] Kearny's intended route of march took his men through southern California to San Diego. In all the chaos brought about by the behavior of Frémont and Stockton toward the civilian populations of Alta California, most of the available livestock and other goods that could be foraged by Kearny's dragoons were driven off or already commandeered. To make the situation worse, those who may have been willing to help Kearny, the owners of the *ranchos* of the area, were taking up arms against the invaders.

Kearny's men would soon learn, like members of the *Californio* resistance and Frémont's California Battalion before them, that warfare takes a toll on both men and farmland. In 1846, California's main exports, hides and tallow, came from livestock farmed at the *ranchos* throughout the province. Beef was not in high demand in California save only to provide *Californios* with meat for their diets. Grain did not prove to be profitable beyond feeding farmhands, the ranchers themselves, and city dwellers. *Rancho* owners also allotted some of their land to agriculture, most of them growing mainly grains, while a minority operated vineyards. Indigenous people living near one of the old missions also took part in the tallow trade, housing a combined total of 500,000 cattle, 321,000 sheep, goats, and pigs, and 64,000 horses around the

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[181] John Charles Frémont, *Memoirs of My Life*. (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001), 493-496, 517, 561-565.; Kit Carson, *Kit Caron's Own Story of His Life As Dictated to Col. and Mrs. D.C. Peters About 1856-1857 and Never Before Published*. ed. Blanche C. Grant (Taos, NM: Kit Carson Memorial Foundation, 1955), 68-71.; George Walcott Ames Jr. and Archibald Gillespie, "Gillespie and the Conquest of California: From Letters Dated February 11, 1846 to July 8, 1848 to the Secretary of the Navy", *California Historical Society Quarterly* 17, no. 2 (June 1938): 138-140

[182] San Diego was quickly recaptured by Stockton's squadron before Kearny's arrival.

reaming missions.[183] When war came to California, all these food sources became targets of U.S. Army foragers and Mexican partisans. Groups of irregulars raised by Andreas Pico and Jose María Flores began running cattle off in droves from *ranchos* in their line of retreat. Conversely, American forces also drove cattle and horses from *ranchos* to starve the *Californios*. Both contingents also targeted crops. Examination of grain crops between 1846 and 1861 show that some ranchos at the time of the invasion raised thousands of acres of wheat each year. Taking advantage of cattle's ability to consume range grasses and hay, most *ranchos* grew grains for human consumption. Denying their enemy both the cattle and grain raised at these ranches was a priority to men of both factions. Efforts by both sides to commandeer resources disrupted the harvest and displaced the cattle herds that each faction needed to supplement its food supplies.[184] These factors contributed to Kearny and his dragoons nearly starving atop a hill outside of San Diego in December 1846. Limited quantities of goods made it necessary for Kearny's men to gain the trust of civilians who were themselves trying to survive in the same conditions. Kearny and Stockton quickly learned that civilian cooperation was paramount if the American servicemen were to retake Alta California for the United States.

After their relief by Gillespie's 200 sailors and marines in mid-December 1846, Kearny and his dragoons sought rest and provisions in the city of San Diego. According to intelligence received by the dragoons, Stockton's fleet garrisoned the city. The Pacific Squadron's

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[183] Paul W. Gates and John Quincy Adams Warren, *California Ranchos and Farms 1846-1862 Including the Letters of John Quincy Adams Warren of 1861, Begin Largely Devoted to Livestock, Wheat Farming , Fruiting Raising, and the Wine Industry* (Madison, WI: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1967), 4-5.; Edwin Bryant, *What I Saw in California: A Description of Its Soil Climate, Productions, and Gold Mines, with the Best Routes and Latest Information for Intending Emigrants* (New York, 1848), 455.

[184] Colton, *Three Years in California*, 14.; Emory, *Notes*, 116.

occupation began earlier in the fall. The Army of the West also learned that the Navy had pacified the city's inhabitants after U.S. Navy personnel retook the port. The General's main worry was not civilians living in San Diego but those who had rebelled and recaptured the lands beyond the city. Kearny felt that his men did not pose enough of a threat to deter an assault upon the city or Frémont's men.[185] Likewise, as Dr. Griffin noted in his journal that many of the soldiers, both wounded and able bodied, displayed signs of paranoia towards the San Diegans and feared Pico's scouts seen observing the city. In this tense atmosphere, there appears to have been little talk about "staying on the good side" of the *Californios,* as in New Mexico. Supplies could now be furnished to the dragoons from the U.S. Navy ships anchored off the coasts rather than from the inhabitants, so currying favor with civilians was no longer a concern. Parties of dragoons went on missions to seize, not purchase, wares and livestock from *ranchos* in the country surrounding the port. These, especially one under the command of a Capt. Samuel Hensly, brought in hundreds of cattle and sheep. Other provisions were harder to obtain, with Dr. Griffin mentioning on many occasions in his account that there were no vegetables present in the soldiers' diets.[186] To get some of the much-needed vegetables and other necessities, the expedition's quartermaster, Maj. Swords, sailed aboard one of Stockton's ships to the Sandwich

[185] Letter from Stephen Kearny to Robert Stockton, December 22, 1846 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenberg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 180.; Letter from Stephen Kearny to Robert Stockton, December 23, 1846 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenberg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 180.

[186] Griffin, *A Doctor Comes to California,* 49-54.

Islands.[187] Fatigued and hungry, the *Americanos* waited for Maj. Sword's return. The men waiting in San Diego, however, found reinforcements from unlikely sources.

As soon as the General, his soldiers, and the U.S. Navy relief force reached San Diego, Mexican guerillas began surrendering themselves to the *Americano* forces and there were some defections as well. Ironically, men in the recently arrived dragoon column noted that some of those giving themselves up to Kearny's men were *Californio* veterans of the Battle of San Pascual. A small number of Native Americans also sought to join the Americans. These individuals were probably encouraged to join the Americans by their *Californio* masters or wished to fight with a force they saw as "liberators". The coming of Kearny caused a stir among the nations living in the countryside, for news quickly reached the American soldiers in San Diego that parties of warriors engaging Mexican irregulars at several points outside of town. Along with information about these skirmishes, rumors spread among the men in San Diego about Natives seeking to ally themselves with Kearny. Commodore Stockton proved these rumblings true when he came across a force of 370 armed Indigenous warriors encamped near the Ranch of St. Bernard on New Year's Eve, 1846.[188] Americans, too, swelled the General's ranks. Stockton assigned 340 U.S. Navy sailors and marines to act as both infantry and artillerymen when Kearny's men marched on the *Californios*. The total number of American military personnel swelled to just under 500 men, all of them needing supplies and equipment.

General Kearny had Commodore Stockton to thank for making the provisioning process easier. The General had been wounded twice during the engagement at San Pascual, and overall

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[187] Letter from Stephen Kearny to Mary Kearny, December 19, 1846 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenberg and Laura Gabiger. (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998) 297-301.; The title "Sandwich Islands" is a mid-19th century term for the Hawaiian Islands.

[188] Ibid, 52-55.

command of US military forces in San Diego temporarily fell to Stockton. Stockton had been in San Diego since October 30, 1846, and he had not remained idle.[189] Many of the actions the Commodore began before Kearny's arrival continued. U.S. Navy personnel wrote later that the Commodore took steps to help in pacifying San Diego and then in resupplying Kearny's men. The measures taken by Stockton included instituting martial law in the city, encouraging the use of forage parties, supervising the building of wagons, and adding men to the force. The first kept the anti-American elements of the city's population from joining Pico's men operating just beyond the city limits. The imposition of martial law in San Diego also provided legal grounds for the seizure of provisions from noncombatants. Part of the process of appropriating the goods included compensating those who lost food to the occupiers with U.S. military rations. Stockton also utilized tradesmen he found in the area to furnish the army with wagons made from components acquired from residents. The Commodore also devised drill and training regimens to maintain discipline among the troops.[190] Fortifications were also constructed to deter any *Californio* counterattacks. The men were so occupied with these routines and other preparations that they did not have time for carousing, drunkenness, or ill-treating noncombatants.

The combined U.S. Navy and Army contingent marched on Puebla de Los Ángeles on December 29, 1846 once Kearny fully recovered from his wounds. Once again the veterans of the Army of the West found themselves under Stephen Kearny. Through Stockton's efforts, the number under Kearny's command had grown to around 561 men serving as dragoons, makeshift

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[189] Neal Harlow, *California Conquered: War and Peace on the Pacific 1846-1850* (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 201.

[190] Joseph T. Downey, *The Cruise of the Portsmouth, 1845-1847: A Sailor's View of the Conquest of California* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Library, 1958), 175-177.

artillery units, and temporary infantry units.[191] One wagon and ten ox carts manufactured by the tradesmen commissioned by Stockton, with complete teams of animals pulling each vehicle, followed behind the column to provide logistical support. The barren countryside made foraging difficult, compelling enlisted men to forcibly seize provisions from settlements they came across. Many of the *rancho* owners and villagers fled before the advancing Americans, allowing the American soldiers to forage while facing no resistance. The only military opposition the men encountered was a hastily assembled force of approximately 305 men under José María Flores. The nearly 600 men of Kearny's command clashed with Flores' contingent in two battles outside Los Angeles at the Río San Gabriel and at La Mesa on January 8 and 9, 1847 respectively. Both contests resulted in Kearny defeating the Mexican garrison of the city. Flores, acting commander of the Mexican forces in the area, fled Los Angeles for Sonora, thereby surrendering the city to the Americans once again. [192] With Kearny leading the way, the Americans entered Los Angeles on January 10, 1847 and promptly set about restoring American control. It was during the process of reestablishing American governance of the area that the soldiers began, once again, to interact with *Californio* and Indigenous noncombatants.

The move to recapture La Puebla de Los Angeles, though it resulted in the men under Kearny marching through a mostly abandoned part of California, did afford the opportunity for the General to continue his practice of avoiding conflict with the civilian public. When they encountered unarmed civilians, the General's men treated them with the same decency as his men did in New Mexico the previous summer. On one occasion, the general's men received aid

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[191] Emory, *Notes*, 115.; Some sources say Kearny had 600 men under his command at this time. Emory mentions 31 additional men that were employed by the army as topographical engineers, guides, medical personnel, and in other support roles. That means that the general commanded at least 592 men.

[192] Emory, *Notes*, 116-121.; Carson, *Kit Carson's Own Story of His Life*, 83-85.

from the *alcalde* of a local Indigenous village, who kindly allowed them access to the gardens, fields, and wine cellar of the mission.[193] The majority of the soldiers present helped themselves to the provisions without causing an issue. Some in the ranks, however, took advantage of the *alcalde's* hospitality and robbed the Catholic chapel located on the grounds of all its gold ceremonial objects. Three days later they received fresh horses from a rancher whom the troops called Mr. Foster, who sold the Americans his best horses to equip their march. On the evening of January 7, 1847, a group of "California ladies" who chose not to flee from the invaders joined the Navy elements of the American force for a night of dancing and "amusement." Commodore Stockton apparently was "very fond of dancing," according to seaman Joseph Downey of the USS *Portsmouth*, and wanted to provide some relaxation for his sailors turned foot soldiers.[194]

Open warfare between *Californios* and *Americanos* ceased quickly after the recapture of Los Angeles. Frémont, going against orders and choosing not to notify Kearny and Stockton of his actions, negotiated a peace treaty with Flores. Though not formally condoned by Pico, Flores signed the treaty with Frémont. Word of negotiations reached Kearny, along with Frémont and 400 reinforcements, on January 14, 1847.[195] Two days later after more peace talks, Andreas Pico, the acting Mexican governor, agreed to the terms of the treaty. What became known as the Treaty of Cahuenga (or, among *Californios*, the Capitulation of Cahuenga) laid the groundwork for the new territorial government. In exchange for the soldiers under Pico and Flores giving up their weapons, they would be afforded the rights of American citizens and could live as they saw

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[193] Emory, 116.; Downey, *The Cruise*, 192-193.

[194] Downey, *The Cruise*, 201.

[195] Louis McLane, *The Private Journal of Louis McLane, U.S.N.* ed. Jay Monaghan (Los Angeles, CA: Dawson's Book Shop, 1971), 103-106.

fit.[196] The treaty, however, began a feud between Frémont and Kearny about who was the legitimate military governor of Alta California. The dragoon general eventually won, and Kearny promptly charged Frémont with insubordination and mutiny. Frémont remained in the province a short time afterwards, but in a limited military capacity.[197] Kearny now had the ability to regulate relations that U.S. Army units had with the *Californio* and Indigenous populations residing in Alta California. He abandoned Frémont's heavy-handed tactics in governing the province to foster a peaceful relationship between the new American regime and all Californians.

After he ascended to the governorship of Alta California, Kearny ordered his men to return to San Diego to await the Mormon Battalion's arrival. Earlier in the campaign, Kearny sent word to Cooke to bring the Battalion to reinforce his combined force at Los Angeles, but on January 25, 1847 the General ordered the Mormons to San Diego. Ocean views, which the Mormons daydreamed about since the outset of their adventure, greeted the command on January 27, 1847 when Cooke arranged for the Latter-day Saints to encamp around Mission San Luis Rey about fifty miles west of San Diego. There the men set about cleaning up their appearances and attempting to purchase clothing from the locals. The Mormons found that the merchants were unwilling to barter with the destitute volunteers and that they charged, as volunteer Daniel

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[196] 1847, January 12- Treaty of Cahuenga. US Government Treaties and Reports. California State University, Monterey Bay. 2016. Accessed September 9, 2022. https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=hornbeck_usa_2_b.

[197] Letter from Robert F. Stockton to James Polk, August 26, 1846 in *The Expeditions of John Charles Frémont Volume 2: The Bear Flag Revolt and the Court-Martial*. eds. Mary Lee Spence and Donald Jackson. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 193-195.; Letter from Thomas Benton and William Jones to Roger Jones, October 25, 1847 in *The Expeditions of John Charles Fremont Volume 2: The Bear Flag Revolt and the Court-Martial.* eds. Mary Lee Spence and Donald Jackson. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 435-444.

Tyler recounted, "extravagant prices" for all types of apparel.[198] Tyler and his comrades appear not to have stolen food from the mission, though Tyler later stated that there was an abundance of olives, grapes, peppers, oranges, figs, and other "tropical fruits" there. Days earlier, Tyler implies, men butchered cattle from herds they passed, hoping to sustain themselves, but now most chose to exhibit restraint in finding food. Some, however, did not, and they were subsequently court martialed for "killing an Indian's cow" in mid-February. Those who did not participate in the butchering of the cow chose to instead wait for Maj. Swords to send the Battalion some of the provisions he brought from the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii).[199]

Since their weeklong stay in Santa Fe, Col. Cooke endeavored to teach his men proper military decorum through training. One of the concepts that Cooke hoped his troops would take from the instruction was the value of congeniality toward non-combatants.[200] Except for the case of the murdered bovine, the Mormons took this idea to heart. An episode that attests occurred when Cooke decided that only one company of the Mormon Battalion, Company B, garrison San Diego proper against a possible uprising. This decision left the balance of his command to operate outside of the port for the rest of the campaign.[201] Companies A, C, D, and E advanced no closer to San Diego than the Mission San Luis Rey. On March 19, 1847, these four companies moved to the Los Angeles area to assist Frémont in enforcing the peace. Journals written by

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[198] Tyler, *A Concise History*, 251-252, 263-264.

[199] Tyler, *A Concise History*, 251-252, 267-268.

[200] Cooke, *The Conquest*, 132-133, 140, 147, 165.; Henry Standage, *The March of the Mormon Battalion From Council Bluffs to California*: *Taken from the Journal of Henry Standage*. ed. Frank Alfred Golder, Thomas A. Bailey, and J. Lyman Smith (New York: The Century Company, 1928), 209-217.; Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to Roger Jones, September 20, 1847 in *Army of Israel: Mormon Battalion Narratives*. Eds. David L Bigler and Will Bagley (Spokane, WA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 2000), 187.

[201] Philip St. George Cooke, "Orders No. 3" in *A Concise History of the Mormon Battalion in the Mexican 1846-48* by Sgt. Daniel Tyler (Chicago, IL: The Rio Grande Press Inc., 1964), 271.

veterans mention that many of the non-combatants encountered were of Indigenous origin. Many of these people were friendly towards the Mormons, offering them food and drink when they came upon elements of Cooke's column.[202] In no way do accounts imply that the Latter-day Saints took too much from, mistreated, or behaved in any unkind way towards Indigenous individuals. Soldiers purchased wares from Native American instead of receiving them like gifts. Cattle, liquor, corn, and other items were likely exchanged for knifes, blankets, and similar goods, as they were in earlier portions of the journey. Lt. George Stoneman, commander of Company C of the Battalion, was not so receptive to the Indigenous peoples. A detachment under the lieutenant killed four Native warriors who were said to have been stealing from the local Mexican population.[203] Stoneman's action did not go against orders, for the men were told to deter Native attacks as much as possible to convince the *Californios* of the benevolence of the United States. The ploy must have had the desired effect, for, on at least two occasions, Mexican civilians from Los Angeles ventured out of the city to review the ranks of the Battalion.

The Latter-day Saints found, however, that their faith engendered suspicious feelings among them towards the *Californios* and converted Indigenous peoples. Echoing the anti-Catholic sentiments in the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny, Jospeh Smith, the founder of the Church of Latter-day Saints, taught that of all the "false" Christian denominations the Catholic Church corrupted the original teachings of Christ to the largest degree.[204] Catholic tradition held that it is

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[202] Standage, *The March*, 214-215

[203] Standage, *The March*, 215; George Stoneman would go onto serve his country in the Civil War as a commander in the major theatres of the conflict.

[204] Joseph Smith, *The Book of Mormon* (Palmyra, NY: E.B. Grandin, 1830), 28, 40.; Orson Pratt, *Divine Authenticity of the Book of Mormon* (Liverpool, England: R. James, Printer, 1850), 21, 35-37, 39-47, 59.; The Church of Latter-day Saints no longer interprets Smith's words in this manner, yet still believes it's the true church of Christ.

only through the Catholic faith that one can be saved, thus creating tension with another belief system that claims the same.[205] This may have accounted for some of the "shyness" of the *Californios* that Mormon Daniel Tyler observed. Another reason may have been, as Tyler believed, a vicious rumor told by Frémont's California Battalion that Mormons practiced cannibalism.[206] Whatever the case, when one reads accounts of the Battalion's garrison duties, feelings of the superiority of the United States associated with Manifest Destiny seem to jump off the page. Mormon Battalion volunteers often wrote that they remained in their camps instead of choosing to interact with Catholic *Californios*. This did not deter members seeking provisions in San Diego and in Los Angeles or from Californians who came to the Mormons' encampments. Accounts left by members of the Mormon Battalion often show that encounters with *Californios* did not change the writers' notions of how deplorable, degraded, and uncivilized their Catholic hosts were.[207] Although the Mormon Battalion clearly held to the anti-Catholic teaching of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, they still abided by Kearny's orders to treat *Californios* with respect. Logistical support for the invaders did materialize because of this, but appreciation for the Californian way of life and religion did not appear.

Protecting the rights of *Californios* including the freedom of religion was at the center Kearny's new government. Kearny took the responsibilities of the office of governor as seriously as he had taken them in New Mexico. Even before he bested Frémont for the gubernatorial

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[205] Rev. Francis Spirago and Rev. Richard F. Clarke, *The Catechism Explained: A Practical Manual* (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1927), 69.; The Roman Catholic Church adhered to this theological concept until the Second Vatican Council held from 1962 to 1965. All pre-1964 editions of Catholic catechisms say something to this effect.

[206] Tyler, *A Concise History*, 276

[207]Standage, *The March*, 220-221.; Thomas James Dunn, "Private Journal of Thomas Dunn" in *Army of Israel: Mormon Battalion Narratives*. eds. David L. Bigler and Will Bagley. (Spokane, WA: The Arthur H. Clarke Company, 2000), 223.; Tyler, *A Concise History*, 282

office, he began preparing for his ascendency. The most important measure Kearny took was issuing a circular to all US military commanders in California that the *Californios*' allegiances to Mexico were abolished. This was done on March 1, 1847 in Monterrey. In some ways, the circular resembled the proclamation issued to New Mexicans in August 1846. It absolved all Californians of commitment to the Mexican government and promised the American provincial administration planned to combat all foreign foes that posed a threat to California, including the armies of Mexico. Where it differed was regarding the present military situation. The influence of Kearny's feud with Frémont can be sensed in the three paragraphs that comprise the document. The disdain felt by the General can simultaneously be felt as well. Within the text, Kearny explicitly states that the "commander in chief of the Naval forces" is responsible for the "regulation of the import trade…into the Ports of the Territory."[208] He also gave the commanding officer of the ground forces in California all the powers of a territorial governor, usually given to civilian officials, and those of the general in chief of the district. This move allowed Kearny not only to monitor the behavior of his men towards civilians. It also made it easier for him to take steps to engender greater respect for the Americans through government policies. Simultaneously in 1847, Kearny and Commodore W. Branford Shubrick, who replaced Stockton as commander of the Pacific Squadron on January 22, 1874, issued a public proclamation stating which rights would be observed. The prerogatives given to all Californians

[208] Stephen Kearny and W. Brandford Shubrick, "Circular" in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenberg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 190-191.

in the proclamation by Kearny and Shubrick included the enforcement of land claims, freedom of religion, and popular government.[209]

The inner workings of the new territorial government were modeled on those of the brief administration of Stockton, although the Commodore and the General did not agree on certain issues. One matter on which the two warriors did agree was that any new administration needed to observe American Constitutional rights and legal traditions. Stockton had increased the influence of the American military government by establishing a central government instead of relying on local authorities, as his predecessor, Commodore John Sloat, had done.[210] Both commodores wanted to make American governance appealing to the Californians through their utilization of Mexican administrative offices, such as that of *alcalde*, fulfilling their pre-1846 responsibilities to help govern the province. Stockton established a government that, in the words of historian Neal Harlow, consisted of "a legislative council with unprescribed duties" that oversaw the *alcaldes* posted throughout California.[211] Before this, *alcaldes* were assigned to look over towns and had been under the direction of sub-prefects who reported to prefects. Those who were prefects then alerted the governor and his cabinet of any disturbances or of any legal case that needed to be addressed.[212] Kearny's new system cut out the middlemen between local leaders and state-level officials. The *alcaldes*, however, would be appointed by the governor, not

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[209] Stephen Kearny, "Proclamation to the People of California", in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 200-201.

[210] Letter by Robert Stockton to George Bancroft, January 22, 1847 in *Memoirs of My Life* by John Charles Frémont (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001), 655.; George Walcott Ames Jr. and Archibald Gillespie, "Gillespie and the Conquest of California: From Letters Dated February 11, 1846 to July 8, 1848 to the Secretary of the Navy (Continued)", *California Historical Society Quarterly* 17, no. 3 (September 1938): 271.

[211] Harlow, *California Conquered*, 265-266.

[212] Davis, *Sixty Years*, 103, 105

by the people. Limited democracy allowed for whoever served as military governor of the province to assert authority over Californians and for the Californians to have some say in the laws passed by that regime. *Alcaldes*, along with overseeing the settlements in California, also served as the judges in their jurisdictions, which ensured that laws were upheld.[213] So, by controlling who held these seats, Kearny could influence the politics in the lower levels of authority and the judicial system throughout the territory. Kearny also had to control the officeholders once they were appointed.

The multifaceted role of the *alcaldes* made the loyalties of the appointees to this position of paramount importance to General Kearny. Stockton and Frémont also grasped the magnitude of this since their government, which Kearny was tailoring to fit his needs, relied heavily upon the *alcaldes* to enforce the law and assert American authority.[214] Many of *alcaldes* came from the small population of Americans who had backed Frémont's Bear Flag Revolt or from among the officer corps of Stockton's squadron. When Kearny replaced Frémont, all *alcaldes* already in office were retained save for those serving in the U.S. Navy. Kearny appeared to have some trouble, however, with those he retained. As Theodore Grivas later noted, the General replaced three during his governorship.[215] Despite these men holding the last legal word on any disputes in their jurisdictions, whoever held the post of military governor could still interfere with judicial rulings and dictate the policies that the *alcaldes* were to follow. There were also limitations placed on what judiciary and law enforcement capabilities the office retained. This was done, one can infer, to strengthen the central government while also hampering any efforts by more

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[213] Colton, *Three Years*, 230-242

[214] Robert Stockton, "Proclamation to the People of California", August 17, 1846, in *Military Governments in California 1846-1850* by Theodore Grivas (Glendale, CA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1963), 85-87.

[215] Grivas, *Military Governments in California,* 107-109

ambitious *alcaldes* to go rogue. Along with keeping the *alcaldes* in line, Kearny could make sure corruption and other possible misuses of power by *alcaldes* that could lead to the alienation of the civilian population were not condoned. By controlling this crucial office in every settlement in California, Kearny could expand the influence of the office of the territorial governor in a way that also would deter the possibility of another provincial civil war.

A major problem facing the General was the lack of reliable communications between southern California and northern California. When Spain controlled California, Spanish soldiers conveyed missives, packages, and other postage on a biweekly route between San Francisco and San Diego. The mail carried by these mail carriers mostly consisted of items relating to the Spanish military presence. Due to this, the *comandantes*' offices inside the *presidios* also acted as post offices for the soldiers and settlers in the area. The political unrest in California, however, did not mean an end to the mail service under Mexican rule. The widespread bloodshed, however, caused delays and a breakdown of the reliability of the mail service.[216] At some point in the chaos of the opening months of the Mexican-American War, all mail-carrying services were suspended. In March 1847, Kearny reinstated this institution and expanded it. A line of way stations between San Francisco and San Diego remained the main delivery route. This route also connected a few independent mail services. The first of these, established by the Seventh New York before Kearny's decree, connected Santa Barbara with the village of Nipomo 250 miles away.[217] American servicemen served as the mail carriers along these routes. As with other measures taken earlier in the reconquest, this was meant to give at least a small portion of the occupying forces something to do. These duties, Kearny and his subordinates hoped, would

[216] Nellie Van de Grift Sanchez, *Spanish Arcadia* (San Francisco, CA: Powell Publishing Company, 1929), 163-165.
[217] Lynch, *With Stevenson to California*, 16-17.

hinder any attempts at misbehavior among the troops assigned to mail duties. It also served as a way of alerting the administration to any misconduct going on in the territory.

Setting parameters upon *alcaldes* and providing a method of communication were not the only tasks that needed to be done to cement American control of California. Another matter that needed to be addressed by the new regime were Indigenous raids upon Mexican settlements and the Native Americans who had integrated themselves into *Californio* society. Mormon Henry Standage saw how one field officer dealt with raiders and how the Mormons acted kindly towards those Indigenous people who wanted to trade with them. Standage's account provides a model for how Kearny wanted to go about interact with the Indigenous population of California.[218] The General was hoping to build upon the measures of Stockton, who freed all Indigenous servants from servitude throughout the province on February 20, 1846.[219] All recently liberated servants, and all other inhabitants of Alta California, were to be seen as equals under American law. Included in this vision were the Indigenous nations that began to raid Alta California following Stockton's decree in February 1846. Violence would be the last resort to discouraging these depredations, although Kearny encouraged agents sent to administer Indigenous affairs in different areas to use any means necessary. Kearny wanted peace above all else with a race of people that had helped him to reach California. In New Mexico, Native raids on settlements was one of the largest concerns of the *Nuevomexicanos* that needed to be

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[218] Letter from Stephen Kearny to John Sutter, April 7, 1847 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenberg and Laura Gabiger. (Booneville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 213-215.; Letter from Stephen Kearny to Mariano Vallejo, April 14, 1847 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*, eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenberg and Laura Gabiger. (Booneville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 217-218.

[219] William H. Ellison, "The Federal Indian Policy in California, 1846-1860", *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 9, no. 1 (June 1922): 41.

addressed by the new American regime. By ending the threat of Native marauders, Kearny and his staff thought, American military power would be projected while also showing the policies the *Americanos* were willing to adopt to protect their new dominion. Written months later in California, the correspondence of the General and his officers about the Native Americans of the territory suggests that the same mindset was behind the appointment of, and orders to, the new agents to the Indigenous peoples, Capt. Sutter and Manuel Vallejo.

The detachments of Frémont, Kearny, and Cooke all benefited from Indigenous allies throughout their incursions into California. Frémont had enlisted the services of some Delaware and Paiute warriors the previous year to assist him in capturing Sacramento, Sonora, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Companies C and K of the First Dragoons called upon the natives working on *ranchos* to provide them sustenance during their journey to San Diego. Latter-day Saint accounts mention that members of the *Tinneh* and Pima nations joined their column, providing the Mormons food, friendship, geographical information, and intelligence about the state of affairs in Alta California.[220] Why, though, was this the case? In some cases, those who gave assistance may have been motivated by the Christian values practiced by those of the Indigenous population that had converted to Christianity. Many of those who interacted with the Mormons were a few of the Native Americans who labored at *ranchos* or other agricultural establishments throughout California. Those working at those locations, as well as those who lived in the vicinity of the Catholic missions, may have found inspiration to join the Americans, or at least help them, out of spite for their masters. American soldiers, however, observed that the

[220] Thomas S. Martin, *With Fremont to California and the Southwest 1845-1849*, ed. Ferol Egan. (Ashland, OR: Lewis Osborne Limited Editions, 1975), 7, 20.; Griffin, *A Doctor Comes to California*, 41-42,44.; Tyler, *A Concise History*, 250; Standage, *The March*, 190, 198

total number of "mission indians" living around the missions was probably no more than 100 (though this may be a low guess). Due to this, only a small minority of the estimated 125,000 Native Americans living in California from 1846-1847 can be said to have helped the *Americanos* because of disdain for the missions.[221] Many more "uncivilized" natives joined the American campaigns than did those who were influenced by Christianity and Mexican society.

Descriptions of the recruits from these backgrounds are rife with both contemporary racial notions and the American soldiers' contempt for those resisting American might. The time the *Americanos* spent in New Mexico dampened some of this, but it persisted. Many of the American servicemen continued to view all Mexicans as duplicitous and lazy. The population subject to the most comment are the Indigenous peoples of California. The circumstances in which authors record their opinions of Native Americans heavily influenced their views. For veterans of the Mormon Battalion, like Henry Standage, Daniel Tyler, and Charles Hancock, much of their initial impressions of Alta California's Indigenous population was based on accounts of victims of Indigenous marauders in the rural portions of the province.[222] When they came across these allegedly vicious, barbarous warriors, they found that the information given to them by Mexicans was mostly incorrect. Members of the US Dragoons such as William Emory and George Cooke, the latter of whom led Tyler, Standage, Hancock, and the fellow Mormons to California, likewise found that generalizations often lacked nuance and led to misjudgment of the Native nations of the area.[223] Both the Latter-day Saints' accounts and those of the dragoons

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[221] Ellison, "The Federal Indian Policy in California", 40; Larkin, "California and Its Resources", 2

[222] Charles Bent Hancock, "History of the Utah Indians as gleaned from a Spanyard in California July 1st, 1847" in *Army of Israel: Mormon Battalion Narratives*, eds. David L. Bigler and Will Bagley. (Spokane,WA: The Arthur H. Clark Company Company, 2000), 207-209.; Standage, *The March*, 198-199, 219; Tyler, *A Concise History*, 249-251

[223] Cooke, *The Conquest*, 296- 298; Emory, *Notes*, 116-117

often praise those Indigenous nations and individuals who endeavored to aid the American occupation, while displaying disdain for those that did not. Positive comments about their Indigenous supporters mainly pertained to the kindness shown to the invaders in a desperate hour; however, some still had condescending tones. Most of the aspects of *Californio* and Indigenous life that appalled men like Cooke and Tyler stemmed from the effects of Spanish colonialism and American anti-Catholic sentiments.[224]

The solution to what two scholars, William Ellison and Theordore Grivas, dubbed "the Indian Problem" was one of the central tenets of Kearny's brief governorship.[225] As in New Mexico, Natives dwelling on the fringes of Mexican jurisdiction often raided settlements and farms in Mexican territory to feed their people. Political instability caused by the California Battalion's actions in Alta California led to an increase in incursions of this nature during the early stages of American occupation. With his men now establishing connections with the Indigenous nations of western California, Kearny wanted to begin contacting those who lived in the eastern part of the territory. To achieve this, the General appointed Capt. John Sutter and Mariano Vellejo to act as agents to the Native Americans. Both men had ample knowledge of the peoples of the area and preexisting relationships with them. In letters to both Sutter and Vallejo, Kearny ordered both men to foster peace between *Californios* and Native Americans in their jurisdictions. The General's request implies a sincere desire to discourage violence between the two groups. Fresh from their troop transports, Company C of the Seventh Regiment of New York Volunteers was sent to support Sutter's efforts. Vallejo, on the other hand, did not receive much military support except when he requested it. Other troops, mainly a mounted unit,

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[224] Cooke, *The Conquest*, 296.; Standage, *The March*, 220-221.

[225] Ellison, "Federal Indian Policy in California", 40.; Grivas, *Military Governments in California*, 105.

patrolled the countryside to further deter another possible uprising. This did not fully deter Indigenous raiding parties from committing depredations on *Californio ranchos*. Parties of soldiers from the garrisons at Santa Barbara and Monterrey moved into Native territory on at least two occasions to stop Indigenous raiders from taking *Californio* property. The men of the Mormon Battalion, too, reported hearing of raiding parties driving off herds and taking crops in southern California. These sporadic instances of U.S. Army troops responding to Native American raids provided the only military action that many of the soldiers experienced in California.

The New Yorkers with Capt. Sutter in northern Alta California were just one of ten companies of volunteers from the Empire State under Kearny's jurisdiction. The Seventh Regiment of New York Volunteers, to which the ten companies belonged, came to California for not one, but two purposes. The first of the two was to aid in the conquering process. When the first mission was completed, the men of the Seventh then planned to take up residence in California. Upon arriving in the future Golden State, Stevenson's volunteers first disembarked at Monterrey and encamped around the city. From there the men were deployed to other strategic points. To help achieve the first of the two goals of their unit, the ten companies were split up between four locations, nine in the key population centers of California. The following detachments of Seventh were spread throughout Alta California: Company C went to support Capt. Sutter's dealing with Native Americans; Companies D, E, G, and I were in Monterrey; Companie H and K garrisoned San Francisco; and Companies A, F, and B occupied Santa Barbara.[226] The New Yorkers comprised the majority of Kearny's occupation force in California;

[226] Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to Johnathan Stevenson, March 12, 1847 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. eds. Hans Von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville,

thus they clearly had roles to play in the occupation. Analysis of how these newcomers related to both *Californios* and Native Americans sheds some light on the response of troops with no previous experience in military government, on Kearny himself, and to Kearny's policy of peaceful coexistence and foraging. The dispersal of the regiment's companies across California's coastline also gives a glimpse into how American soldiers who were stationed in different areas of the province differed and how they were alike in their approaches to interacting with the civilians around them.

The New Yorkers showed remarkable discipline during their time in California. Col. Jonathan Stevenson, commander of the Seventh New York, wanted to avoid angering the civilian populations among whom his men found themselves. The busier the soldier, Stevenson reasoned, the less likely the man was to anger civilians. Stevenson devised a daily routine that each contingent of his command followed which consisted of three meals, roll calls, guard duty, and drills. Once every week the soldiers' barracks, uniforms, and firearms were inspected. When soldiers were not on guard, officers expected them to keep their equipment ready in case it was needed and to be ever watchful for potential threats. Other times soldiers were dispatched to either convert abandoned buildings into barracks, repair existing barracks or buildings, and to restore those Spanish *presidios* which the Mexican authorities had allowed to fall into disrepair. Other New Yorkers assisted the Navy to offload supplies meant for the troops from the ships just

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MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 195-196.; Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to Henry Burton, March 12, 1847 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. eds. Hans von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitanoui Publications, 1998), 196-198.; Letter from Stephen Watts Kearny to James Hardie and Matthew Stevenson, March 12, 1847 in *Winning the West: General Stephen Watts Kearny's Letter Book 1846-1847*. eds. Han von Sachsen-Altenburg and Laura Gabiger (Boonville, MO: Pekitnaoui Publications, 1998), 198.

offshore. In addition to these actions, some soldiers went on patrols in response to news of Native raids on rural settlements. Regimental cooks relied on common soldiers to obtain provisions for their meals from *Californio* farms. Other soldiers purchased other supplies from locals who sought business from the Americans. Officers, meanwhile, served in courts-martial, oversaw the enlisted men's actions, and conducted surveys. Everything Stevenson's men did was necessary to maintain an American military presence in California, but it also kept them out of trouble. Though engrossed in these activities, the men did get bored, as many soldiers do, with garrison life. Yet this seems not to have led to much misbehavior since there are no records that any courts-martial were held during Kearny's time as overall military commander.[227]

"Our garrison life ran smoothly, and the more the natives became acquainted with us the better they liked us," wrote James Lynch of Company F in a book published years later.[228] The behavior that Lynch and his comrades displayed toward all Californians contributed to smoothness of the Americans' garrison life. With soldiers preoccupied with different tasks, there was little time for them to misbehave. Another factor that impacted the occupation was the logistical situation. The diaries and journals written by members of the Seventh New York do not mention a lack of supplies at any point during their time in uniform. Provisions acquired by the Pacific Squadron and civilians appear to have adequately supplied the various detachments of New Yorkers. What these soldiers regularly recalled, though, was what they did with *Californios*

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[227] Joshua S. Vincent, *The Josuha S. Vincent Diary*, ed. Chris D'Amanda (Exeter, NH: Philips Exeter Academy, 1951), 63-65.; Francis J. Lippitt, *Reminiscences of Francis J. Lippitt Written for His Family, His Near Relatives, and Intimate Friends* (Providence, RI: Preston & Rounds Co., 1902), 68-71.; James Lynch, *With Stevenson to California* (Oakland, CA: Biobooks, 1954), 14-15.; Donald Biggs, *Conquer and Colonize: Stevenson's Regiment and California* (San Rafeal, CA: Presidio Press, 1977), 96, 98.; War Department, *General Regulations*, 14

[228] Lynch, *With Stevenson*, 20.

when off duty. With most of the rural areas already pacified or currently being subdued by other units, the men of the First New York socialized with the *Californios*. It was not uncommon to see New Yorkers dancing the night away with some of the, in the words of one member of the Seventh, "really beautiful" Californian women at *fandangos* and formal balls or eating regional cuisine at dinner parties hosted by prominent citizens.[229] *Fandangos* were especially popular, particularly among the four companies guarding Monterrey who hosted weekly *fandangos* for citizens of the city.[230] In both Santa Barbara and Monterrey soldiers formed minstrel bands that gave regular performances of American folk tunes for their comrades and the inhabitants of city. Other soldiers, including some band members, occasionally became impromptu thespians entertaining mixed Americans and Californio audiences in comedic theatrical productions.[231] Men stationed at Monterrey, Santa Barbara, and San Franscisco also participated in cockfights, bet on horse races, and played drinking games with *Californios*. Given the frequency with which horses races, *fandangos*, band concerts, and other leisure activities appear in the sources, it can be concluded that the civilian populace enjoyed spending time with the American invaders.

Does this mean that *Californio* and Indigenous resistance ended once the Treaty of Cahuenga was signed? No, but the acts of defiance confronting the soldiers were comparatively small. One of the distinguished families of Santa Barbara, New York volunteer James Lynch noted, the De La Guerras, "never got reconciled" with the invaders. Don Pablo de la Guerra, the patriarch of the clan, protested the occupation of his city from the outset and apparently the rest

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[229] Lippitt, *Reminiscences*, 71

[230] John McHenry Hollingsworth, *The Journal of John McHenry Hollingsworth of the First New York Volunteers (Stevenson's Regiment) September 1846- August 1849* (San Francisco, CA: California Historical Society, 1923), 24-25.

[231] Lynch, *With Stevenson*, 20.; Hollingsworth, *The Journal*, 26-27.

of his kin followed his lead, though to what extent is unclear.[232] At a ball in Monterrey on April 18, 1847, Lt. John M. Hollingsworth of the Seventh spoke to a *Californio* lad that was twelve at the time who told Hollingsworth that he wanted to "fight the Americans and drive them from the country."[233] Rumors abounded of prominent *rancho* owners wanting to raise some forces to evict the Americans from Alta California. One such rumor reached the ears of Capt. Lippett of the Seventh New York, who, in advance of a rumored attack of 500 Mexicans, quickly made defensive preparations only to find that the impending assault was merely gossip.[234] Attacks from the Native nations continued to materialize forcing the *soldados estranjeros* (the Mormons and dragoons included) to deal with them.[235] These were not the only instances recorded by men under Kearny of armed *Californio* resistance and Mexican attempts to retake the province during Kearny's tenure as governor.

American soldiers present in California in noted that Indigenous attacks and reputed reports of possible partisan attacks almost paved the way to a renewal of violent resistance in late April 1847. Army officers remained suspicious of both the *Californios* and their Native neighbors. Enlisted men were suspicious as well, but not as much as their leaders. Then news arrived of a significate threat to the American control of Alta California. The newly reinaugurated mail service brought word of a force of 1,500 Mexicans moving against San Diego on April 25, 1847.[236] Information simultaneously obtained by the Mormon Battalion stated that

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[232] Lynch, *With Stevenson*, 14-15.

[233] Hollingsworth, *The Journal*, 25

[234] Lippett, *Reminiscences*, 74-75.

[235] Standage, *The March*, 219, Griffin, *A Doctor Comes to California*, 80, 82.

[236] Griffin, *A Doctor Comes to California*, 80; Charles Fredrick Benjamin, *Memoir of James Allen Hardie, Inspector General, U.S. Army* (Washington, DC: For Private Publication, 1877), 13-14.

this army was headed by General Anastasio Bustamente, a former president of the Republic of Mexico. The Mexican government allegedly spent $600,000 to outfit and equip Bustamente's expedition. Kearny and Cooke immediately set about securing southern California. Stacks of arms, presumed to be intended to aid Bustamente, became property of the U.S. Army and Navy. Some of the artillery pieces seized were used in the American efforts to repel the suspected invasion. The possibility that fifth columnists might reinforce the impending Mexican offensive heightened anxiety among Kearny's subordinates. Large gatherings of Mexican men generated the most worry. Potential rebellions were seen everywhere. Word of an armed group of citizens bearing Mexican standards roaming the countryside reached the newly designated capital of Monterrey. American soldiers in Los Angeles reported concerns about a horse race scheduled for the evening of April 25 which was assumed to be an assembly planning how to overthrow the Americans.[237] Neither the invasion nor a popular uprising materialized, since Army commanders reacted quickly to any alleged attempts. This near crisis marked the end of Kearny's governorship of California.

Accompanied by the remaining dragoons and some engineers from the Army of the West, an honor guard of Mormons, and Frémont, Kearny returned to Fort Leavenworth on August 22, 1847. Though Kearny went on to serve as the military governor of Vera Cruz, where he contracted a fatal case of yellow fever, his time in California provides an example of how an occupying force can logistically support itself while peacefully occupying an aera inhabited by a previously hostile civilian population.[238] In December 1846, the Army of the West encountered Californian civilians who resisted American military actions in their province. By early the

[237] Cooke, *The Conquest*, 300-302.; Lynch, *With Stevenson*, 15.

[238] Clarke, *Stephen Watts Kearny*, 325, 334-335, 378-382.

following May, the province was relatively peaceful. The policies that Kearny implemented as governor regarding civilian-military interactions had been tried in New Mexico and proved successful in *Alta California*. The disciplined, restrained behavior of the soldiers of the Army of the West helped to transform *Alta California* as well as to allow the invaders to receive support from those who had openly opposed them months earlier. The impact the Mormon Battalion, members of the First United States Dragoons, and the Seventh New York Volunteers following Kearny's policy of peacefully interacting with civilians can be fully understood when one looks at different aspects of the occupation. One aspect that comes to light is how Kearny's soldiers went against contemporary racial views to bring peace to California.

How did Kearny's military government policies and Kearny's troops behavior towards civilians in New Mexico and California impact the logistics of the Army of the West's campaign? The conduct helped the General and his men achieved their aims by allowing them to compensate for practical issues such as orders from the War Department and deficient wagons that plagued their force's logistical support. The wagons' broken axles, tendency to occasionally overturn, and slow the army on the march meant that Kearny's troops needed to supplement their rations. The best way to do this was by encouraging the men to show restraint towards non-combatants of different ethnicities. By doing so, Stephen Kearny and his troops found it easier to compensate for the logistical problems in a timeframe which allowed some of the army to reach California by winter. After arrival in *Alta California,* the tolerance the American soldiers continued to display impacted their ability to pacify a province in armed revolt. The approaches that Kearny and his troops took along the way to California allowed for them to see beyond some gender and racial concepts prevalent in the United States in the 1840s and also to sustain the campaign. In the end one could say that Stephen Watts Kearny's Army of the West helped to

alter the history of the North American continent through determination and willingness to be merciful to the civilians it encountered.

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