

SEX-RELATED DIFFERENCES AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR

by

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
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PREFACE

During recent years there has been a rapidly accelerating trend toward the blurring of the traditional lines between the individual social sciences. This intermixing of disciplines has occurred both in name and in practice. The appearance of such courses as Political Sociology, Social Psychology and The Psychology of Politics attests to the at least nominal recognition of the inadequacies of some long established separations. This change, however, runs much deeper than simply a new fashion in assigning course titles. This transformation goes to the very heart of what is happening in the social sciences today. One need only scan the leading journals and new book titles to find ample evidence of the incursion of those trained in sociology and psychology into political science and vice versa. In fact, it is generally, though often grudgingly, recognized that some of the classic works in political science were written by those trained in these sister disciplines.¹

Despite this tendency for the social sciences to integrate with one another, there are still those who see value in maintaining the traditional distinctions between realms of

¹For examples see C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956) or Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963).

academic enterprise. These scholars do generally recognize the value of work in other areas but feel that one should call a spade a spade and call a psychological study--psychology. There is most certainly an unavoidable reasonableness to this sort of thinking. Therefore it seems only proper that those calling themselves political scientists and yet working in areas that have been traditionally the purview of other disciplines to provide the information and reasoning needed to integrate this type of research into political science.

Since the research to be presented in this paper is of the type which attempts to expand the study of political science into an area which has been traditionally the academic territory of psychology, namely the study of attitude formation, it is felt that the burden for integrating this type of research into political science must fall upon the researcher. Therefore the remainder of this section will be devoted to providing the information and reasoning which will tie this research to the study of politics and aid the reader in fitting this study into the matrix of political science as a whole.

Any such effort to tie a study to political science should consider the question, "What is political science?" One rather glib answer to this question is that political science is what political scientists do. This answer has the virtue of making excellent cocktail party repartee and also is useful in ridding oneself of pesky undergraduates who have the painful habit of asking meaningful questions. This response is, in spite of the aforementioned virtues, clearly inadequate. An

apparently more valid method would seem to be to look at the way some other political scientists have answered this question.

Some of the more famous characterizations of political science are, a "polyglot army"¹, "a Gothic cathedral, built over many centuries, with its turrets, spires, balconies, nooks and crannies"² and "a mountain of data surrounding a vacuum."³ It seems that this type of definition suggests the futility of this approach and indicates that another direction must be followed if there is any hope of connecting this study to such an amorphous field as political science appears to be.

Although there are no concise definitions of what is or is not political science, there are certain problems which are generally recognized to be the proper subject matter for the discipline. Central among these problems is the question of how social conflicts are to be resolved. Man has devised innumerable answers to this question which range from absolute dictatorship to absolute democracy. Despite this plethora of alternatives, a common characteristic of all of these alternatives is that public opinion plays a role in each. The role played by public opinion ranges from the rather negative

¹Charles S. Hyneman, The Study of Politics: The Present State of American Political Science (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 173.

²Heinz Eulau, "Political Science," A Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences, ed., Bert F. Hoselitz (New York: Burns & MacEachern, 1959), p. 91.

³E. E. Schattschneider, Two Hundred Million Americans in Search of a Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 8.

function of setting the limits of public toleration within which a dictator may safely operate to that of being the sole guide to public policy--as in an absolute democracy. Therefore, it seems that since public opinion appears to have an effect upon public policy formation, be it the limited role in a dictatorship or the overriding role in a democracy, it is clearly a legitimate and important subject for study by those interested in social conflict resolution.

Even though nearly all, if not all, political scientists would accept the general argument just presented to link public opinion to political issues, many would argue that public opinion as it affects political questions is a group phenomenon and need not, or even should not, be approached from the individual point of view. Many would further argue that to study public opinion in the microcosm or individual case is an error for a political scientist, since public opinion is a group phenomenon and has characteristics which can not be explained in individual terms. This position is an operationalization of the philosophical position known as metaphysical holism. The opposing philosophical position, methodological individualism, which is the point of view taken here, holds that social phenomena can be explained in individual terms and there is no reason to believe that there is some emergent property which occurs between the individual attitude and public opinion.¹

¹For a detailed explanation and discussion of "methodological individualism," "metaphysical holism" and "emergence" see May Brodbeck, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1968), Chapter 4.

This belief that understanding of a group phenomenon, public opinion, can be gained through the study of its components, attitudes, is the critical link which connects the type of analysis to be presented in this paper to political science. It is further thought that this link, which forms the major philosophical underpinning of the Behavioral Approach, is sufficiently well established to preclude the need for a lengthy defense of it in this paper. Suffice it to say that the study of individual behavior in an effort to better understand political phenomena is a firmly established methodological approach, the usefulness of which is recognized by the vast majority of political scientists.

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INTRODUCTION

The war in Vietnam is, without question, the most important foreign policy issue in the United States today. This war has occupied this primary position for a number of years and gives all indications of continuing to do so for some time to come. This conflict already ranks as the most protracted war in American history and has given rise to domestic disturbances which have affected nearly all segments of American society. There have been draft card burnings, teach-ins, moratoriums and strikes. Students have been killed by National Guardsmen. These incidents, plus many others, have caused internal conflict over the propriety of this war to take on unusual and far-reaching ramifications. The seriousness of these ramifications has seldom been equaled in America.

Public opinion has played a central, yet confusing, role in this internal conflict. This centrality is dictated by the important role which public opinion plays in an open political society such as the United States. This is particularly so in relation to issues which hold a prominent place in the public's mind over an extended period of time. The confusion about what constitutes the public opinion results from the fact that those who favor continued American involvement in Vietnam claim to have the support of the so-called silent majority while those who oppose the war accuse the government of failing to

heed the peaceful desires of the people. This heated disagreement concerning the nature of public opinion regarding the Vietnamese war has resulted in many attempts to resolve the issue. The more systematic of these efforts have taken the form of survey research studies.

These survey research studies, popularly labeled public opinion polls, vary considerably in results and quality. The more sophisticated and reliable of these surveys have demonstrated results which have been interpreted by both sides to support their position.

However, besides providing a reasonably accurate profile of the distribution of public opinion about the Vietnamese war, these surveys present an unusually fertile field for secondary analysis. It appears that the information collected by these surveys may be useful not only in identifying the distribution of public opinion, but may also contain the potential for yielding insights into how attitudes are formed and the conditions under which they are susceptible to changes. It is hoped that if we are able to reach a fuller understanding of how political attitudes are formed and the influences that change them this may lead to a new and broader understanding of public opinion.

However, before entering into more specific research, it seems that it is highly useful to examine some of the previous studies which have dealt with attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. This will serve the purpose of acquainting the reader with the general state of knowledge of public opinion relating to the Vietnamese war and also serve as a convenient jumping off

point for the subsequent analysis.

A REVIEW OF SOME PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND
ANALYSIS ON ATTITUDES TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR

The use of survey research techniques to identify the distribution and character of public opinion related to the war in Vietnam has reached nearly epidemic proportions. It is difficult to open a current newspaper or magazine without being confronted with the results of some poll or another. Unable to resist the temptation to jump onto the bandwagon, television networks and even private groups have entered into the game of opinion polling. In view of this fact, it seems almost unnecessary to say that these polls tend to range from the superficial to the prejudiced.

The more reputable opinion sampling concerns, namely the Gallup and Harris groups, are recognized as following generally accepted sampling and interviewing techniques. Their results, however, tend to be superficial since they are concerned with presenting a commercially marketable product and are not generally concerned with the kind of in-depth analysis which interests social scientists. As for the other opinion polls, they vary so greatly as to the integrity of their samples, interviewing methods, and interpretations, that the only safe course is to either spend considerable time and effort in analyzing their research techniques or to reject them as unreliable. The latter course has been generally found to be the

more effective.

Fortunately, however, there have been efforts to solve these problems. Social scientists have found it possible, and highly productive, to engage in survey research projects which do provide them with the kind of reliable and in-depth survey information which they require. The results and analyses of two such surveys have been published. A relatively detailed examination of them will lay necessary groundwork for this paper.

The first of these studies was published in June of 1967 and has come to be referred to as the Stanford Study.¹ This study will be examined in considerable detail because it provides the kind of underlying orientation necessary for an understanding of basic issues. This study is also important because it provides support for some of the findings which form the basis for later analysis.

The second study appeared in the June, 1970, Scientific American.² It is useful because it demonstrates a somewhat different approach and also presents an analysis of some important areas not covered in the Stanford Study. This study is particularly important because it provides support for certain findings which are critical to later parts of this paper.

¹Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," The American Political Science Review, LXI (June, 1967), 317-33.

²Philip E. Converse and Howard Schuman, "'Silent Majorities' and the Vietnam War," Scientific American, Vol. 222 No. 6 (June, 1970), 17-25.

The Stanford Study

This study was initiated because of a general dissatisfaction with newspaper surveys and commercial polls. The authors felt that the misleading phraseology and poor construction of the questionnaires were giving an erroneous view of public opinion. In addition, the Stanford group was interested in seeking information concerning background explanatory variables. It is, as a matter of fact, these same background explanatory variables which represent the major concern of this paper.

The first finding of the Stanford group was that public opinion (about the Vietnamese war) was relatively orderly. They found the public concerned, relatively well informed, and exhibiting generally consistent opinion patterns. This orderliness they interpreted to indicate that attitudes toward the war were much more salient and reasonable than is generally the case on foreign policy questions.¹ The evidence seemed to very clearly suggest that they were not dealing with a mere random phenomenon. In sum, it seemed safe to assume that most respondents had a relatively clear understanding of the questions, and their responses indicated they had formed relatively definite attitudes toward the issues involved.

¹See Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation," Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. by J. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 51-110.

A second finding was that even though the attitudes of respondents seemed to have a certain internal structure, they were not directly related to many of the social and political variables around which attitudes often cluster. The group found that occupation, income, education, religion, region and party identification were not related to policy preferences on the Vietnamese war. However, some of the data to be presented later in the present paper may suggest reasons why this interpretation may not be entirely accurate. Whatever the result, this finding does considerable violence to what very often passes for "common sense" understanding of political attitudes.

There were, however, two striking exceptions to this lack of relationship between social variables and attitudes toward the war. These exceptions were sex and race. It was clearly demonstrated that women are much more in favor of de-escalation than are men. This is important because it provides support for similar findings to be reported later and also because it provided the major impetus for this study, the major goal of this paper being to investigate the sources of differences in attitudes between males and females. The other social group difference found by the Stanford group was between whites and Negroes. The difference showed Negroes to be much more in favor of de-escalation than were whites.

The study also demonstrated a startling similarity between the informed and articulate population and the rest of the population. Previous studies have made a sharp distinction

between the attitudes of these two groups.¹ No such distinction appeared in this survey. It was felt that this was the result of the absence of group cues for the interested to identify with. As a result, there was little to distinguish the articulate from those less so. The study concluded with the judgment that, in the case of attitudes toward the Vietnamese war, because preferences are not structured along class or party lines, public opinion is not likely to be taken into account in making policy calculations.

The Scientific American Study

This study began, as did the Stanford Study, with an expression of general dissatisfaction with commercial public opinion polls. The authors noted that, even though the reputable polling services, specifically Gallup and Harris, did use proper sampling and interview techniques, they often failed to pay adequate attention to the phraseology of their questions. It was these subtle differences in phraseology, they suggested, which often led to conflicting results. Several examples were given to demonstrate that subtle differences in the wording of a question may lead to dramatic differences in the responses it elicits. This is the major reason, they believed, that both sides of the internal controversy over the war seemed to be able to find support for their positions in popular survey data. It

¹See Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," The American Political Science Review, LIX (June, 1965), 321-23.

was with the intention of clarifying some of the resultant confusion that they offered their analysis.

With an eye toward picking out some of the broader trends in American public opinion, they noted that Americans had become increasingly aware of the Vietnamese war and also increasingly disillusioned with the correctness of the United States commitment. They stated that ". . . it is clear that the public mood about the Vietnam war is now rather firmly negative, . . ." ¹ They did warn, however, against interpreting this negative attitude as opposition to specific government policies. They found that this negative attitude was highly susceptible to change by such things as pleas for support from national leaders.

This study also noted that ". . . attitudes toward the Vietnam war have consistently shown less-distinct differences among various standard groups of the population than is true of many other political attitudes, . . ." ² They also noted the same two exceptions to this general trend--sex and race. They found that, "Blacks and women have shown more disenchantment with the involvement in Vietnam than white males over the entire period when relevant samplings have been made." ³ They indicated no surprise at these exceptions and noted that, "Women have traditionally be unenthusiastic about war involvement, and the

¹Converse and Schuman, "'Silent Majorities' and the Vietnam War," p. 19.

²Ibid., p. 22.

³Ibid.

largest sex differences in responses emerge when policies involving strong military initiatives are at stake."¹ This statement is undoubtedly accurate but it provides little insight into the reasons for this "traditional" difference. It is the plan here to provide an explanation for this difference.

The rest of this article was devoted to a relatively in-depth analysis of the effects of college education on attitudes toward the war. The writers found that even though there is considerable support for a "hard-line" position among the college educated this seemed to be strongly affected by the general "quality" of the college attended. They found that this "hard-line" support was located primarily in the junior and small colleges and that the strong anti-war movement was mostly located in the major universities and graduate schools.

It seems clear that both of these survey research studies tended to arrive at very similar conclusions regarding American public opinion toward the war in Vietnam. These conclusions can be summarized as follows:

1. Most commercial survey research efforts do not lend themselves to the kind of in-depth analysis desired by social scientists.

2. Americans exhibit a degree of awareness, information and interest concerning the Vietnamese war which is greater than

¹Converse and Schuman, "'Silent Majorities' and the Vietnam War," p. 22.

generally expected for a foreign policy issue.

3. Generally speaking occupation, income, age, party identification, religion, region, level of information, level of interest and education are not related to attitudes toward the Vietnamese war in any direct way. There was some disagreement over the role of education, largely resulting from the more detailed analysis undertaken in the Scientific American Study.

4. Sex and race are definitely related to attitudes toward the Vietnamese war.

5. Anti-war protests have little effect on policy decisions regarding the conduct of the war.

These two studies have served to provide a general picture of American public opinion toward the Vietnamese war at the time they were conducted. This should give the reader the general view needed to see this study's more specific and narrow analysis in its proper perspective. It is now time to turn to this specific problem. The issue with which the balance of this paper will concern itself is an effort to explain why there are sex-related differences in the attitudes of men and women toward the Vietnamese war.

PERSONALITY FUNCTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR

A theoretical framework is necessary to explain why there are sex-related differences in the attitudes of men and women toward the Vietnamese war. It is not sufficient to simply collect and report data concerning these attitudes. This may prove interesting, but the task is more than just observation. The goal must be to understand and explain. In order to facilitate understanding and suggest possible explanations for sex-related political differences, a theoretical framework is necessary. This section seeks to provide this theoretical framework.

The first concern is to develop an explanation for differences between male and female attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. Since this is only one of many politically relevant differences between men and women, an examination of explanations offered for these other attitude differences is helpful. Studies of the politically relevant differences between men and women have shown that women are less likely to support aggressive policies, less likely to participate in political activities, less tolerant of nonconformity, less interested in politics, less well informed about political

matters and less issue-oriented.¹

Even though these observed differences represent a broad spectrum of attitudes, studies have generally explained these differences in terms of the same source--the socialization process. Fred I. Greenstein has shown, in an excellent article on sex-related political differences, that these adult sex-related differences in political attitudes arise in early childhood and are carried into adulthood.²

The most convincing evidence that the socialization process is the source of sex-related political differences is found by examining the political attitudes of children. This is particularly thought to be the case with very young children. Very young children are useful in this regard because evidence seems to indicate that these children are not capable of developing political attitudes by independent means. Therefore, it seems reasonable that sex-related political differences in very young children must be the result of either genetic differences or differences in the socialization process undergone by each sex. The idea that political attitudes are transferred genetically is rejected as contrary to all that is currently known about attitude formation. Therefore, if very young males display different political attitudes than very young females,

¹For detailed discussions of these differences see Fred I. Greenstein, "Sex-related Political Differences in Childhood," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (May, 1961), pp. 353-71 and Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 209-16.

²Fred I. Greenstein, "Sex-related Political Differences in Childhood," pp. 353-71.

it seems reasonable to assume that these differences are being produced by differing socialization processes.

An example of such a sex-related political difference among very young children was reported in a study conducted during World War II.¹ Using a small sample of first grade children (twelve boys and nine girls) it was found that boys were strikingly more interested in war pictures than were girls. When asked which of a series of pictures they preferred nine of the boys and none of the girls selected war pictures. Although the sample was very small this study supports the belief that the socialization process produces sex-related political differences. Another politically important sex-related difference is that, "At every age boys are more pugnacious and quarrelsome than girls. Even among two to four-and-a-half year old nursery-school children boys exceeded girls 'in all forms of aggressive behavior with the exception of verbal bossing.'"²

A final example of how very young children exhibit politically relevant differences was reported by Meyer Rabban.³

¹Leanna Geddie and Gertrude Hildreth, "Children's Ideas about the War," Journal of Experimental Education, XIII (1944-45), pp. 92-97.

²LaBerta A. Hattwick, "Sex Differences in Behavior of Nursey School Children," Child Development, VIII (1937), pp. 343-355.

³Meyer Rabban, "Sex-Role Identification in Young Children in Two Diverse Social Groups," Genetic Psychology Monograph, XLII (1950), pp. 81-158.

He found that, "Sometime between the age of three and four children begin concentrating on "sex appropriate" toys as preferred playthings; within a year or two there is almost no deviation from choice by girls of toys symbolic of home and femininity (e.g., a doll, a bathinette and a purse) and by boys of toys reflecting male activities out of the home (e.g., soldiers, a steam roller and a fire engine).

These examples indicate that there are sex-related differences in the political, and politically relevant, attitudes of very young children. The only reasonable explanation for these sex-related differences appears to be a differing socialization process. It seems reasonable to suspect that if the socialization process produced sex-related differences in the political attitudes of very young children then the socialization process probably affects the political attitudes these children carry into adulthood.

If the socialization process does produce these sex-related differences in political attitudes--and the evidence suggests that it does--then it seems reasonable to suspect that sex-related differences in policy preferences toward the Vietnamese war also arise from this socialization process. Particular encouragement is given to this belief because of the obvious links between attitudes toward the Vietnamese war and the aforementioned female tendency to be less likely to support aggressive policies. It seems that these other sex-related political differences can be attributed to the differences in the male and female socialization processes as Greenstein

does. It is then reasonable to assume that the differences between male and female attitudes toward the Vietnamese war are also a product of these differing socialization processes.

Even though sex-related differences in attitudes toward the Vietnamese war are most probably a result of the different socialization processes undergone by males and females, this does not by itself define how male and female attitudes will react under different conditions. The fact that the different socialization processes undergone by male and females account for the differences in the content of male and female attitudes does not explain all that is of interest. Later evidence will show that not only are male and female attitudes toward the Vietnamese war different in content but that male and female attitudes respond differently to similar stimuli.

An understanding of why male and female attitudes respond differently to external stimuli can be gained from the functional approach to the study of attitudes. Simply stated, the functional approach is based on the belief that people hold attitudes because they serve a psychological need. The functions which attitudes perform for personality have been categorized by Daniel Katz according to the motivations they serve.

1. The instrumental, adjustive, or utilitarian function based upon recognition of the fact that people strive to maximize the rewards in their external environment and to minimize the penalties. Attitudes acquired in the service of the adjustment function are either the means for reaching the desired goal or avoiding the undesired one, or are

affective associations based upon experience in attaining motive satisfaction.

2. The ego-defensive function in which the person protects himself from acknowledging the basic truths about himself or the harsh realities in the external world. The mechanisms by which the individual protects his ego from his own unacceptable impulses and from the knowledge of threatening forces from without, and the methods by which he reduces his anxieties created by such problems, are known as mechanisms of ego defense.

3. The value-expressive function in which the individual derives satisfaction from expressing attitudes appropriate to his personal values and to his concept of himself.

4. The knowledge function based upon the individual's need to give adequate structure to his universe. The search for meaning, the need to understand, the trend toward better organization of perceptions and beliefs to provide clarity and consistency for the individual, are other descriptions of this function.¹

It should be noted that the same attitude may perform different functions for different individuals. Also, attitudes may perform several functions for the same person.

This functional framework can be applied to the attitudes with which this paper is primarily concerned, that is, attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. It is clear from what was stated in the previous paragraph that attitudes toward the Vietnamese war may be performing any of these four functions. There is reason to believe, though, that for most people these attitudes will tend to perform certain functions more often than others. It is this general tendency which is of concern.

¹Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV, No. 2 (Summer, 1960), pp. 170-76.

The specific groups which are of concern are men and women. Therefore, the questions become, "Are there reasons to believe that attitudes toward the Vietnamese war have a tendency to perform different functions for men than women?" and if this is the case, "What does this tell us about the probable effects of certain types of stimuli on these attitudes?" The answers to these questions provide the key to understanding why there are sex-related differences in the attitudes of men and women toward the Vietnamese war and how external factors affect these attitudes.

The statement that, "Women have been shown to have greater 'moralistic orientation' than men; . . ." ¹ clearly implies that the political attitudes of women are serving more of a value-expressive function than are the political attitudes of men. Value-expressive attitudes are those which Katz defines as attitudes which ". . . have the function of giving positive expression to central values, . . ." ² This tendency to be moralistic seems to strongly suggest that these attitudes are fulfilling a need to express internal values. It is further suggested that this tendency for female political attitudes to serve a value-expressive function is also a product of the socialization process. Not only does the

¹Greenstein, "Sex-related Political Differences in Childhood," p. 354.

²Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," p. 173.

socialization process teach women that certain kinds of attitudes are sex-appropriate, but it also teaches them that these attitudes are to be related to the expression of their central values. This importance of value expression is probably connected to their role as moral guide for the family. Men, however, are not only socialized into a somewhat different set of sex-appropriate attitudes but also they learn an understanding of the world and a capacity to adjust to it is central to their needs. Therefore they learn to relate their attitudes more to these functions than a value-expressive function. Men and women will therefore have different attitudes towards the Vietnamese war and these attitudes will be performing different functions for them. In the case of the Vietnamese war men will tend to be more aggressive and their attitudes are more likely to be performing primarily adjustive and knowledge functions for them. Female attitudes toward the Vietnamese war will be less aggressive and will most likely be performing primarily a value-expressive function. These two differences, resulting from the socialization process, may be used to explain why women display different attitudes toward the Vietnamese war and why they react differently to such stimuli as information, education and other variables.

That political attitudes tend to perform different psychological functions for women and men is important because this helps account for certain sex-related differences to be reported later. As has been noted, it is fairly easy to account for the different distributions of attitudes toward the Vietnamese

war displayed by men and women. This can be done by noting that it is a fairly well established doctrine that the socialization process provides men with a different set of attitudes than it provides women. This difference in socialization has been used to account for many other political attitude differences between the sexes. There is good reason to believe that this socialization process accounts for at least most of the sex-related differences toward the Vietnamese war. However, if male and female attitudes react differently to the same stimuli, such as information, education, and income, an understanding of the functions these attitudes are performing may provide an explanation.

Since it seems reasonable to claim that female attitudes tend to serve a value-expressive function and that male attitudes tend to serve adjustive and knowledge functions, a look at the factors which influence attitudes performing these functions is enlightening.

Katz states that two conditions are relevant in changing attitudes performing a value-expressive function, they are:

1. Some degree of dissatisfaction with one's self-concept or its associated values is the opening wedge for fundamental change.
2. Dissatisfaction with old attitudes as inappropriate to one's values can also lead to change.¹

It seems quite clear that situational variables are not

¹Katz, pp. 188-9.

likely to produce either of these conditions. The simple fact that one has a higher level of information, for example, would not seem to be conducive to changes of the type noted by Katz. A look at other possible test variables suggests that few of them appear capable of producing the kind of fundamental change required to cause substantial modification of value-expressive attitudes. Such situational variables then should not affect female attitudes toward the war. Therefore, if this analysis is correct, female attitudes toward the Vietnamese war should be generally resistant to changes caused by situational variables. In sum, female attitudes are thought to be held because they give women an opportunity to express their central values, a value-expressive function, and it should not be expected that stimuli such as information, education and age, which are unrelated to this function, should cause much change in female attitudes.

On the other hand, Katz states that the factors which are conducive to change in attitudes performing knowledge functions are, ". . . inadequacies of the existing attitudes to deal with new and changing situations."¹ The primary factor likely to change attitudes performing an adjustive function is that, ". . . the attitude and the activities related to it no longer provide the satisfaction they once did . . ."² Since it has been argued that male attitudes are predominantly in the service of the knowledge and adjustive functions, such

¹Ibid., p. 190.

²Ibid., p. 177.

inadequacies should influence male attitudes toward the war.

It is therefore expected that changes in the external situation within which males find themselves will produce changes in their attitudes. This must happen if their attitudes are serving to accommodate them to the world within which they live. It is therefore expected that changes in the male environment will produce changes in their attitudes. It is also expected that factors which cause men to change their perception of the environment will affect their attitudes. This occurs because a change in the perceived situation will precipitate appropriate adjustments in male attitudes regardless of whether or not the environment has in fact changed. Attitudes are formed on the basis of how the world is perceived even if this perception is faulty.

This analysis of the different functions attitudes perform is important because the social and demographic variables which are commonly used to study political attitudes are almost exclusively situational. That is, they are variables which attempt to compare the attitudes of respondents in differing situations or under conditions which are likely to affect their perception of the environment.

An example of the kind of variable which is used to study the effect of environmental changes on political attitudes is region of the country. Region of the country reflects an actual difference in environment. Different sections of the country have different histories, traditions, ethnic compositions and economic bases. These are all the sort of things which can

be expected to cause changes in male attitudes. These are not the sort of factors likely to change attitudes performing a value-expressive function. Therefore it is expected that male attitudes will be much more responsive to geographical influences than will female attitudes.

An example of a variable affecting the perception of the environment is level of information. The amount of information a man possesses is expected to affect his attitudes because this information is used to evaluate the environment. Therefore, as the amount of information possessed by a man changes, his perception of his environment will change and consequently his attitudes will change. Since female attitudes are performing a value-expressive function, changes in the level of information are not likely to get at the kind of core values their attitudes are expressing. Consequently, female attitudes will not be greatly affected by factors which change the environment or their perception of the environment. In other words, male attitudes are expected to display marked changes as differences occur in social and demographic variables; female attitudes, however, are expected to display less change as differences occur in these variables. The next section will present and analyze data to determine if this hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence.

THE DATA CONCERNING ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR

The data used in this paper are from a 1968 survey of a national random sample of 1557 adults in the United States.¹ Since attitudes toward the war in Vietnam were of central importance, it was felt that great care and consideration must be given to the questions which were chosen to measure these attitudes. It was necessary that the questions used to ascertain attitudes toward the Vietnamese war actually measure these attitudes and not be badly distorted by other factors. If this were not the case, it could not be determined if these questions were ascertaining the respondent's attitude toward the Vietnamese war or measuring some other attitude. Therefore, two distinct questions were used to measure attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. Even though it was thought that each question used to get at attitudes toward the war in Vietnam is relatively free of this damaging peripheral distortion the results for two measures were used. This double measuring

¹The data utilized in this study were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The data were originally collected by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. Neither the Survey Research Center nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

procedure was used because it was felt that this variable was critical to the analysis and that more confidence could be placed in the analysis if the results from each were the same.

The first question used to measure attitudes toward the Vietnamese war was:

Q. 38b.* Which of the following do you think we should do now in Vietnam?

1. Pull out of Vietnam entirely
2. Keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting
3. Take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam

It seemed clear that this question was directly aimed at attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. It was also thought that these alternative answers fairly well represented what are generally considered to be the major positions regarding the Vietnamese war. The first alternative was thought to represent the Dove position because it proposed a policy which suggested a departure from the present government policy in the direction of reduced United States involvement in Vietnam. The second response was considered Moderate as it generally represented the official government policy toward the war. Alternative three was considered Hawkish as it clearly proposed a policy in Vietnam which was more aggressive than any undertaken to that point.

The second question used to measure attitudes toward

*This number identifies the question in the 1968 SRC Election Study Codebook.

the Vietnamese war was:

Q. 67e. There is much talk about "hawks" and "doves" in connection with Vietnam, and considerable disagreement as to what action the United States should take in Vietnam. Some people think we should withdraw completely from Vietnam right now, no matter what results. And, of course, other people have opinions somewhere between these two extreme positions. Suppose the people who support an immediate withdrawal are at one end of this scale at point number 1. At what point on the scale would you place yourself?

1. Immediate withdrawal
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Complete military victory

The form of this question presented certain difficulties not present with Question 38b. Contrary to that case, where policy divisions were relatively clear, this question provided a scale which did not clearly define policy choices. The requirements of manageability demanded that this seven point scale be reduced to three policy positions. This was done by categorizing responses one through three as favoring the Dove position. It was thought that these choices represented dissatisfaction with the current situation and unwillingness to take more aggressive action. Respondents selecting alternative four were considered Moderate because this choice seemed to represent general satisfaction with the current situation. Answers five through seven were labeled Hawk because they seemed to represent dissatisfaction with current policies and inclinations toward more aggressive actions in Vietnam.

The use of two completely different questions,

designed to measure the same attitude, made it possible to compare the results obtained by these two questions. It was thought that if these two separate questions yielded similar results it would add support to the belief that they were measuring the same attitude. It was found that these questions did yield a very similar pattern of results. This similarity in results was interpreted to indicate that the questions were measuring the same general attitude--attitude toward the Vietnamese war. Since the results obtained from these two measures of attitudes toward the Vietnamese war were so similar, it was thought unnecessary to present both sets of data. Therefore only the results obtained from question 38b will be reported.

It should be noted that the use of such terms as Dove, Moderate and Hawk was recognized to present certain problems. It was realized that such terms tend to be oversimplistic and lead to compartmentalized thinking which does not accord with reality. However, because of the clarity these terms lent to the discussion, it was decided they could be used. The reader should, therefore, keep clearly in mind that these are names of convenience and not meant to carry value connotations.

Since the main undertaking in this study was to explain why there are sex-related differences in attitudes toward the Vietnamese war, it seemed that the first task was to demonstrate that such sex-related differences did, in fact, exist. Previous studies have consistently noted significant sex-related differences in attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. These studies have reported that females displayed a tendency to be

less favorably disposed toward aggressive action in Vietnam than males. The data presented to demonstrate this relationship, as all data presented in this paper, were collected by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan for their 1968 Election Study. Table 1 shows this influence of sex on policy preferences toward the Vietnamese war.

It is quite clear, from examining this table that a different distribution of responses was displayed by each sex group. The tendency for women to express less aggressive policy choices seems undeniable. The high level of significance displayed seemed to remove any doubts as to whether men and women hold different attitudes toward the war. However, establishing that there were differences still provided few clues as to the sources of these differences. Insights of this type began to appear when test variables were introduced.¹

The first test variable which was introduced was Level of Information. The answers recorded for the following question were used to determine levels of information.

P31* Respondent's general level of information about politics and public affairs seemed:

1. Very high
2. Fairly high

¹When it is thought that an additional variable may be influencing the relationship between two other variables, it is often useful to examine this relationship under varying conditions of this additional variable. This additional variable, under different conditions of which the original variables are examined, is called the test variable.

*This was based upon the interviewer's estimate.

TABLE 1.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SEX AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
VIETNAMESE WAR

	Male	Female
Dove	17.7%	24.9%
Moderate	37.0	44.0
Hawk	45.4	31.3
	100% (N=617)	100% (N=779)
	p<.001*	

*p is the probability that the relationship appearing between the two variables of a table could have occurred by chance alone. Obviously if this value is large we are not justified in inferring that a relationship exists between the two variables in the general population. A probability of about .10 or smaller is generally felt to be needed before the relationship in the table is treated as statistically significant. All p values in this paper are based upon Chi-square.

3. Average
4. Fairly low
5. Very low

In order to facilitate the presentation of this information, the responses were recategorized into groups titled Low Information, Medium Information, and High Information. This was done by combining the original levels one and two into a category called High Information, original level three was called Medium Information and original levels four and five were called Low Information.

Since women generally have less information about political and foreign affairs, it was hypothesized that sex-related differences in attitudes toward the Vietnamese war might be a product of this lower level of information. This idea was encouraged by the data which seemed to indicate a positive relationship between a low level of information and the Dove position. It was thought that this difference in level of information might account for the differences in Table 1 and that the sex-related differences might be spurious. As can be seen from Table 2 this did not turn out to be the case.

An examination of Table 2 quickly revealed that the results were not entirely as anticipated. If the previously noted sex-related differences had indeed been a product of differences in information, then these differences should have largely disappeared at each level of information. However, the only real decline in contrast appeared in the Low Information group. At both the Medium Information and High Information levels the sex-related differences remained very strong.

Efforts to discover an explanation for this fact led to the uncovering of a pattern which forms the empirical base of this analysis. It was noted that the sex-related differences in policy preferences toward the Vietnamese war were slight at the Low Information level. However, these differences were greater among those displaying a Medium level of information and even greater at the High Information level. Further examination of the table led to the realization that the distribution of policy preferences among males was markedly

TABLE 2.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR AT THREE
LEVELS OF INFORMATION

	Low Information		Medium Information		High Information	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	28.8%	29.0%	13.0%	21.2%	15.7%	23.4%
Moderate	36.4	41.9	38.5	48.2	36.7	42.2
Hawk	34.8	29.0	48.4	30.6	47.6	34.4
	100% (N=132)	100% (N=272)	100% (N=192)	100% (N=255)	100% (N=286)	100% (N=244)
	P=.438		p<.001		p=.005	

different at each level of information (See Table 3). In order to verify this observation, it was checked statistically using the Chi-square test. It was found that the differences in distribution of policy preferences among women, due to differences in information, could well have been due to chance ($p=.180$), whereas the results among males were not likely to have been due to chance alone ($p=.003$). All of this suggested that the level of information was not a very relevant variable in the determination of the policy preferences among females, but that it was relevant for males.

In order to elaborate and examine this pattern a series of additional test variables was introduced. This was done to

TABLE 3.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male			Female		
	Lo Info	Med Info	H1 Info	Lo Info	Med Info	H1 Info
Dove	28.8%	13.0%	15.7%	29.0%	21.2%	23.4%
Moderate	36.4	38.5	36.7	41.9	48.2	42.2
Hawk	34.8	48.4	47.6	29.0	30.6	34.4
	100% (N=132)	100% (N=192)	100% (N=286)	100% (N=272)	100% (N=255)	100% (N=244)
	p=.003			p=.180		

determine if this pattern persisted or if it was idiosyncratic to Level of Information. It was thought that if this pattern could be found across a broad spectrum of variables, then support would be gained for the idea that this pattern was indeed meaningful. Also, it seemed that if the pattern were apparent with a number of variables and yet absent with a number of others, the character of the patterned variables might suggest reasons for this patterning.

The next test variable was Level of Interest. The answers recorded for the following question were used to determine Level of Interest.

P30* Respondent's general interest in politics and public affairs seemed:

1. Very high
2. Fairly high
3. Average
4. Fairly low
5. Very low

This data was recategorized into three levels in the same manner as was the level of information data. The influence of this variable may be seen in Tables 4 and 5.

The same pattern displayed itself with Level of Interest. It was found that the difference between males and females were relatively small among those respondents exhibiting a low level of interest. The sex-related contrasts between the policy preferences regarding the Vietnamese war became much more pronounced at the higher levels of interest. It was again

*This was based upon the interviewer's estimate.

TABLE 4.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR AT THREE LEVELS OF INTEREST

	Low Interest		Medium Interest		High Interest	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	29.2%	29.6%	19.5%	22.7%	13.5%	23.2%
Moderate	36.5	41.8	35.6	46.6	38.1	43.7
Hawk	34.4	28.6	44.8	30.8	48.4	33.1
	100% (N=96)	100% (N=213)	100% (N=174)	100% (N=247)	100% (N=341)	100% (N=311)
p=.552		p=.012		p<.001		

TABLE 5.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male			Female		
	Lo Int	Med Int	H1 Int	Lo Int	Med Int	H1 Int
Dove	29.2%	19.5%	13.5%	29.6%	22.7%	23.2%
Moderate	36.5	35.6	38.1	41.8	46.6	43.7
Hawk	34.4	44.8	48.4	28.6	30.8	33.1
	100% (N=96)	100% (N=174)	100% (N=341)	100% (N=213)	100% (N=247)	100% (N=311)
	p=.006			p=.381		

found that the policy position distribution for females remained largely unchanged regardless of the level of interest displayed; whereas, males showed a clear tendency to take more aggressive positions at the higher levels of interest. It seemed that the distribution of female policy positions was largely unaffected by the level of interest displayed. Males, however, were affected by their level of interest. This fact can be most clearly seen by comparing the p statistic for the significance of the differences at different levels of interest (See Table 5). The difference in attitudes toward the Vietnamese war among males at three levels of interest was highly significant ($p=.006$) but not significant among females ($p=.381$). Therefore, it may be inferred that male attitudes are affected by their level of interest in some way that female attitudes are not.

Because of the great explanatory power often accorded to it, an examination of the effects of education seemed in order.¹ Women as a group are known to generally receive less formal education than men. There is also a correlation between greater formal education and a more aggressive position toward

¹For examples of such claims of explanatory power see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 39 or Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 76-7 or Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 379.

the Vietnamese war. This suggested that the sex-related differences in attitude might, in fact, be the result of different levels of formal education. In order to test this hypothesis, an examination of the effects of formal education on the distribution of policy preferences among males and females was undertaken. To facilitate this examination, the various levels of educational attainments were reduced to three groups. These three categories were established so that all respondents with eight grades or less of formal education were placed in the Low Education group. Respondents with more than eight grades of education, but no college training, were placed in the Medium Education group. Those having attended college were considered to be highly educated. Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate the results of this examination.

The same general pattern again appeared with the education variable. The sex-related difference in the case of Low Education was slight. Again at the Medium Education level the sex-related difference became greater. This was, as previously noted, largely a product of a marked male change in attitude and a basically stable female attitude.

There was a slight variation in that both males and females exhibited a slight tendency to move away from the Hawk position at the High Education level. This did not, however, importantly affect the observation that the contrast between males and females at these higher levels was slightly greater than the contrast between males and females at the Low Education level. The general tendency for the education variable was to

TABLE 6.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR AT THREE LEVELS OF EDUCATION

	Low Education		Medium Education		High Education	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	25.7%	32.5%	13.4%	22.2%	16.2%	25.1%
Moderate	34.5	41.1	38.1	45.7	38.1	42.6
Hawk	39.9	26.5	48.5	32.1	45.7	32.3
	100% (N=148)	100% (N=151)	100% (N=265)	100% (N=433)	100% (N=197)	100% (N=195)
	p=.048		p<.001		p=.013	

TABLE 7.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male			Female		
	Lo Ed	Med Ed	H1 Ed	Lo Ed	Med Ed	H1 Ed
Dove	25.7%	13.4%	16.2%	32.5%	22.7%	25.1%
Moderate	34.5	38.1	38.1	41.1	45.7	42.6
Hawk	39.9	48.5	45.7	26.5	32.1	32.3
	100% (N=148)	100% (N=268)	100% (N=197)	100% (N=151)	100% (N=433)	100% (N=195)
	p=.034			p=.153		

reinforce the pattern found with the other variables observed to this point.

So far, the relationship between sex and position on the Vietnamese war has been examined for varying levels of information, interest and education. These results were presented prior to the introduction of other test variables because they demonstrate most clearly the pattern which plays a critical role in the analysis. That pattern is, generally stated, that there was relatively little difference between the distribution of responses for males and females at low levels of information, interest and education, but that at higher levels of information, interest and education there was a distinct tendency for males to move to a more aggressive response distribution. This change in response distribution under conditions of higher levels of information, interest and education was slight for females.

The distribution patterns resulting from these three variables represent the paradigm cases. It is important to realize that this pattern was much less pronounced when certain other variables were tested. In order that a more complete picture of the phenomenon with which we are dealing can be seen, the results from all variables which were tested will be presented. This should lead to a relatively thorough picture of the phenomenon and give the reader information which will be useful when evaluating the analysis to be offered in the next section.

The next variable which was tested was Region of the Country. Respondents in different regions of the country are known to display different distributions of characteristics. This being the case, it seemed possible that respondents from these differing sections might well display distinctive response patterns. In order to attempt to remove the generalized effects of these known regional differences and to determine if sex-related differences in attitudes maintain themselves across regional lines Tables 8 and 9 were constructed.

Region of the Country clearly brought out the response pattern which has been previously noted. The pattern can be seen by observing the raw percentages in the tables. Consider the percentage of males taking the Dove position. For males there was a variation of from 23.5% in the Northeast to 12.3% in the Far West. This represented a substantial change of 11.2%. However, the female response, with the same variables, showed a variation of from 28.0% in the Northeast to 23.4% in the Midwest. This represented a change of only 4.6%. The range of variation was clearly much smaller for females. A more detailed inspection of this table supported this pattern. This table seemed to suggest that female attitudes were somehow more resistant to change related to geographic location than were male attitudes.

The Age variable, even though it was highly interesting in view of the unexpected picture it drew of position distributions on the Vietnamese war, represented only mild support for the

TABLE 8.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
VIETNAMESE WAR IN FOUR REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY

	Northeast		Midwest		South		Far West	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	23.5%	28.0%	19.2%	23.4%	14.5%	24.4%	12.3%	24.3%
Moderate	38.6	47.8	37.2	43.9	33.9	42.9	39.6	40.5
Hawk	37.9	24.2	43.6	32.8	51.6	32.8	48.1	35.1
	100% (N=96)	100% N=213)	100% (N=174)	100% (N=247)	100% (N=186)	100% (N=238)	100% (N=106)	100% (N=111)
	p=.552		p=.012		p<.001		p=.039	

TABLE 9.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGION OF THE COUNTRY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male				Female			
	NE	MW	S	FW	NE	MW	S	FW
Dove	23.5%	19.2%	14.5%	12.3%	28.0%	23.4%	24.4%	24.3%
Moderate	38.6	37.2	33.9	39.6	47.8	43.9	42.9	40.5
Hawk	37.9	43.6	51.6	48.1	24.2	32.8	32.8	35.1
	100% (N=96)	100% (N=174)	100% (N=186)	100% (N=106)	100% (N=213)	100% (N=247)	100% (N=238)	100% (N=111)
	p=.103				p=.441			

sex-related distribution pattern under discussion. It is important to note that the same general trend was, however, present. An examination of the data itself should clarify this matter. This data was categorized by calling those 20 to 30 years of age--Young, those 30 to 60 years of age--Middle Aged, and those 60 years of age and above as--Older. This data is presented in Tables 10 and 11.

It was again found, as in the previous table, that there was a clear tendency for the distribution of female attitudes toward the Vietnamese war to remain quite stable regardless of age group. Whereas, male position distributions demonstrated a marked tendency to vary considerably between age groups. Females, it seemed, were in some way more resistant to age-related changes than were males. This again supported the general pattern under discussion and is helpful in understanding the analysis which was offered to explain sex-related differences in attitudes toward the Vietnamese war.

The sex-related response pattern, which the preceeding examples have displayed, was found in studies of additional variables. Since the reader should now be thoroughly familiar with this pattern, the results obtained from these additional patterned variables will be presented with only the few remarks which seem necessary to identify unusual features.

The next variable introduced was Income. It was thought that the level of income might be influencing attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. Since it seemed unlikely that income levels

TABLE 10.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR THREE AGE GROUPS

	Young		Middle Age		Older	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	14.2%	16.8%	13.5%	26.8%	31.4%	27.7%
Moderate	30.8	46.7	40.2	42.2	34.3	46.5
Hawk	55.0	36.5	46.3	31.0	34.3	25.8
	100% (N=120)	100% (N=167)	100% (N=356)	100% (N=455)	100% (N=137)	100% (N=155)
	p=.006		p<.001		p=.094	

TABLE 11.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male			Female		
	Young	Mid Age	Older	Young	Mid Age	Older
Dove	14.2%	13.5%	31.4%	16.8%	26.8%	27.7%
Moderate	30.8	40.2	34.3	46.7	42.2	46.5
Hawk	55.0	46.3	34.3	36.5	31.0	25.8
	100% (N=120)	100% (N=356)	100% (N=137)	100% (N=167)	100% (N=455)	100% (N=155)
	p<.001			p=.051		

were equal between the sexes, level of income was tested to determine if sex-related differences in attitudes remained at different levels of income. The levels of income used were distinguished by calling \$0 to \$5,999 per year--Low Income, \$6,000 to \$9,999 per year--Medium Income and \$10,000 or more per year--High Income. Tables 12 and 13 show the results of this test.

It was apparent from Tables 12 and 13 that testing income produced the same pattern noted with previous variables. The pattern was not, however, as clear-cut as in many of the previous cases. Female attitudes, even though they varied less than male attitudes, did not display quite the resistance that they had shown to other variables. Nevertheless, the general pattern did obtain.

The final variable that clearly displayed the pattern which has been discussed was Sense of Political Efficacy. This variable was measured by constructing a scale from four questions thought to be related to Sense of Political Efficacy. These questions were Q57, Q58, Q59, and Q60.

Q. 57. Would you say that most public officials care quite a lot about what people like you think, or that they don't care much at all?

1. Care
2. Don't care

Q. 58. Would you say that voting is the only way that people like you can have any say about the way the government runs things, or that there are lots of ways that you can have a say?

1. Lots of ways
2. Voting only way
3. No way to have a say

TABLE 12.---RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR AT THREE LEVELS OF INCOME

	Low Income		Medium Income		High Income	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	23.8%	29.8%	13.9%	23.3%	16.0%	19.4%
Moderate	33.1	43.1	33.0	40.4	42.7	49.1
Hawk	43.1	27.1	53.1	36.3	41.3	31.5
	100% (N=181)	100% (N=295)	100% (N=194)	100% (N=245)	100% (N=225)	100% (N=216)
	p=.002		p=.001		p=.097	

TABLE 13.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male			Female		
	Lo Inc	Med Inc	H1 Inc	Lo Inc	Med Inc	H1 Inc
Dove	23.8%	13.9%	16.0%	29.8%	23.3%	19.4%
Moderate	33.1	33.0	42.7	43.1	40.4	49.1
Hawk	43.1	53.1	41.3	27.1	36.3	31.5
	100% (N=181)	100% (N=194)	100% (N=225)	100% (N=295)	100% (N=245)	100% (N=216)
	p=.013			p=.022		

Q. 59. Would you say that politics and government are so complicated that people like you can't really understand what's going on pretty well?

1. Can understand
2. Can't understand

Q. 60. Would you say that people like you have quite a lot of say about what the government does, or that you don't have much say at all?

1. Have a lot of say
2. Don't have much to say

The responses of each respondent were totaled by adding together the numbers preceeding each answer. Respondents with total scores of seven through nine were considered to have a Low Sense of Political Efficacy and those with total scores of four through six were considered to have a High Sense of Political Efficacy. The results from this test variable may be seen in Tables 14 and 15.

Although the sex-related differences in policy preferences were significant at both levels of Sense of Political Efficacy, the pattern which was pointed out earlier was clearly evident. Male preferences did shift more than female preferences when the sense of political efficacy changed. Even though this difference in susceptibility to influence was not as marked as with some of the previous variables, Sense of Political Efficacy was definitely patterned in the same general manner as those previously discussed variables. Female attitudes toward the war are clearly more resistant to change caused by feelings of political efficacy than are male attitudes.

TABLE 14.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR AT TWO LEVELS OF SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

	Low Efficacy		High Efficacy	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	21.6%	29.1%	14.6%	21.3%
Moderate	29.3	40.5	42.6	46.9
Hawk	49.0	30.4	42.9	31.8
	100% (N=259)	100% (N=358)	100% (N=357)	100% (N=418)
	p<.001		p=.003	

TABLE 15.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY
AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male		Female	
	Lo Eff	H1 Eff	Lo Eff	H1 Eff
Dove	21.6%	14.6%	29.1%	21.3%
Moderate	29.3	42.6	40.5	46.9
Hawk	49.0	42.9	30.4	31.8
	100% (N=259)	100% (N=357)	100% (N=358)	100% (N=418)
	p=.002		p=.037	

It should be noted that, despite the demonstrated tendency for male and female attitudes to form a distinctive pattern when tested for a number of variables, not all variables elicited such a patterned response. Four variables produced results which could only be classified as inconclusive. These variables were Party Identification, Strength of Party Identification, Occupation and Religion. The results from these test variables are presented in Appendix I. All of these variables demonstrated tendencies toward the aforementioned patterning, but the presence of certain contradicting instances made it seem prudent to exclude them because additional data was needed to verify this trend.

This data has shown that males tend to express more aggressive attitudes toward the Vietnamese war than females. It was also found that when this difference in attitudes was examined with the help of test variables a pattern began to appear. This pattern indicated that male attitudes toward the Vietnamese war changed markedly with most test variables whereas, female attitudes changed very little. These differences seemed to suggest that female attitudes toward the Vietnamese war were, in some way, more resistant to the influence of outside factors than were male attitudes.

The theory presented earlier suggested the socialization process tends to produce different political attitudes in males and females. In addition to affecting the attitudes of males and females, the socialization process affects the functions

which these attitudes perform for their personalities. The tendency is for the political attitudes of women to perform a value-expressive function and for the political attitudes of men to perform adjustive and knowledge functions. Because of this difference in function, these attitudes are influenced by different factors. Attitudes which are performing a value-expressive function are influenced by variables causing some fundamental change in central values. Attitudes which are performing knowledge and adjustive functions change when they are found to be inadequate for an understanding of the existing situation.

The data concerning sex-related differences in attitudes toward the Vietnamese war can be readily integrated into this framework. It has been observed that men and women display different attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. This is a result of the different socialization processes undergone by men and women. Each sex is taught a different set of sex-appropriate attitudes and these general differences lead to differences in their attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. Also the socialization process causes women to tend to use their attitudes toward the Vietnamese war to fulfill the psychological need of value-expression. Men, because of a different socialization, are more likely to use their attitudes toward the Vietnamese war to fulfill knowledge and adjustive functions. As a result of this difference in psychological function, male attitudes will tend to change with the situation but female attitudes are likely to only be changed by factors which influence

their values. Since nearly all of the factors which have been tested are likely to change the individual's situation but not his basic values, it is quite clear why female attitudes appear to be much more resistant to change than male attitudes. It would seem that if major changes in female attitudes are to be found, it will be necessary to test factors which are likely to change central values. This would require data beyond that available for this study. As long as primary consideration is given to situational variables, as was the case in this study, it can be expected that females will tend to display a seemingly irrational resistance to the influence of external stimuli.

In conclusion, it seems prudent to re-emphasize that it would be invalid to apply these findings to an individual case. This study is statistical in that it finds that women tend to display different attitudes than men, and that these attitudes tend to perform a different function for them. This statistical tendency can say nothing about the individual case. However, since political science deals primarily with groups, this framework can be very useful in identifying the sources of attitudes for different groups toward the most important political question in America today--the Vietnamese war.

APPENDIX I

TABLE 16.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR AT THREE LEVELS OF STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION

	No Party I.D.		Weak Party I.D.		Strong Party I.D.	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	15.8%	21.7%	18.7%	23.9%	18.2%	29.2%
Moderate	30.5	43.9	39.0	44.1	41.4	43.6
Hawk	53.7	34.4	42.3	32.0	40.3	27.2
	100% (N=190)	100% (N=221)	100% (N=241)	100% (N=306)	100% (N=181)	100% (N=243)
	p<.001		p=.040		p=.005	

TABLE 17.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male			Female		
	No I.D.	Weak I.D.	Strong I.D.	No I.D.	Weak I.D.	Strong I.D.
Dove	15.8%	18.7%	18.2%	21.7%	23.9%	29.2%
Moderate	30.5	39.0	41.4	43.9	44.1	43.6
Hawk	53.7	42.3	40.3	34.4	32.0	27.2
	100% (N=190)	100% (N=241)	100% (N=181)	100% (N=221)	100% (N=306)	100% (N=243)
	p=.080			p=.296		

TABLE 18.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS

	Protestant		Catholic	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	14.8%	23.8%	18.3%	25.7%
Moderate	38.1	44.2	37.7	45.8
Hawk	47.1	32.0	43.8	28.5
	100% (N=433)	100% (N=350)	100% (N=130)	100% (N=179)
	p<.001		p=.018	

TABLE 19. --RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male		Female	
	Protestant	Catholic	Protestant	Catholic
Dove	14.8%	18.5%	23.8%	25.7%
Moderate	38.1	37.7	44.2	45.8
Hawk	47.1	43.8	32.0	28.5
	100% (N=433)	100% (N=130)	100% (N=550)	100% (N=179)
	p=.577		p=.667	

TABLE 20. --RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR AT TWO LEVELS OF OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

	H1 Occupational Status		Lo Occupational Status	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	14.9%	24.2%	18.8%	25.0%
Moderate	40.6	42.9	35.5	44.2
Hawk	44.6	33.0	45.7	30.8
	100% (N=175)	100% (N=91)	100% (N=442)	100% (N=688)
	p=.084		p<.001	

TABLE 21.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL STATUS AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male		Female	
	H1 Occ. Stat.	Lo Occ. Stat.	H1 Occ. Stat.	Lo Occ. Stat.
Dove	14.9%	18.8%	24.2%	25.0%
Moderate	40.6	35.5	42.9	44.2
Hawk	44.6	45.7	33.0	30.8
	100% (N=173)	100% (N=442)	100% (N=91)	100% (N=688)
	p=.369		p=.917	

TABLE 22.--RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR THREE PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS

	Republican		Democrat		Independent	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Dove	20.1%	21.9%	17.5%	28.4%	15.4%	20.2%
Moderate	38.3	46.0	41.0	42.7	30.2	46.0
Hawk	41.6	32.1	41.4	28.9	54.4	33.8
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=154)	(N=187)	(N=268)	(N=363)	(N=182)	(N=198)
	p=.184		p<.001		p<.001	

TABLE 23. --RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR FOR MALES AND FEMALES

	Male			Female		
	Rep.	Demo.	Ind.	Rep.	Demo.	Ind.
Dove	20.1%	17.5%	15.4%	21.9%	28.4%	20.2%
Moderate	38.3	41.0	30.2	46.0	42.7	46.0
Hawk	41.6	41.4	54.4	32.1	28.9	33.8
	100% (N=154)	100% (N=268)	100% (N=182)	100% (N=187)	100% (N=363)	100% (N=198)
	p=.055			p=.219		

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SEX-RELATED DIFFERENCES AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE WAR

by

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Since public opinion is important in an open political society such as the United States, an understanding of how political attitudes are formed and what causes changes in these attitudes is very useful. The specific political attitudes with which this thesis is concerned are attitudes toward the Vietnamese war.

Previous studies have indicated that the attitudes of men toward the Vietnamese war differ from those of women. The effects of this difference in attitudes toward the Vietnamese war were examined by performing secondary analysis of data collected by Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. This analysis reaffirmed that the attitudes of men and women toward the Vietnamese war were different. The difference was that women tended to favor less aggressive policies in Vietnam than men.

The introduction of social and demographic variables into the analysis resulted in the appearance of a recurring pattern. The pattern was that male attitudes toward the Vietnamese war tended to differ under varying social and demographic conditions while female attitudes tended to remain relatively unchanged under the same conditions.

In order to provide an explanation for this pattern, the functional approach to the study of attitudes was introduced. This approach is based on the hypothesis that people hold attitudes because they serve a psychological need. This

functional approach was helpful in explaining this recurring pattern. The approach suggested that male attitudes respond to social and demographic influences because they influences are related to a specific function which attitudes toward the Vietnamese war perform for men. For females, however, attitudes toward the Vietnamese war serve a different psychological function. This difference in psychological function accounts for the observation that male attitudes tend to respond to these social and demographic variables differently than women. It is believed that this knowledge concerning the functions that specific attitudes perform can be extremely helpful in providing understanding of how political attitudes are formed. Furthermore, ability to identify those factors likely to cause changes in public attitudes toward the Vietnamese war should facilitate the explanation of public opinion.