

MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT AND RELATIVE
DEPRIVATION: NIGERIA AND GHANA

by

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
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Chapter 1

THE EXPLANATION OF MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT

Most studies of military coups d'etat in developing countries have examined specific factors leading up to or involving coups. Some research has emphasized the political conditions in the countries prior to coups; some has emphasized economic situations; some has focused on pre-coup positions of the militaries. Yet while stressing one factor over another, most observers acknowledge that a combination of elements usually stimulates a military takeover.

Military coups in developing countries usually are preceded by a variety of economic, political, social and military conditions. These factors do not occur in isolation but are intertwined to produce stresses on the existing government.

To date, these factors have not been brought together under a single conceptual umbrella. Relative deprivation can be used to bring together and examine all the elements mentioned. This theory focuses on perceived imbalances between what people expect they can achieve and what they, in fact, are able to obtain. The gap can result from economic, social and political stresses.

This thesis suggests that relative deprivation can be used as a conceptual framework to bring together pre-coup elements.

Relative deprivation is a general analytical concept which has been used to explain various forms of social violence, but which has not been systematically applied to an explanation of the military coup.

This thesis specifies some dominant patterns of relative deprivation which appear applicable to military coups, using classifications already recorded and examinations of which groups perceive relative deprivation.

This study reviews five cases of military coups in two countries, Ghana 1966 and 1972 and Nigeria 1966 and 1975. Since each country has been the site of more than one coup, the coups can be examined individually and can be compared. Because these countries are in the category of developing nations, examination of relative deprivation as a contributing factor to military coups in these states should aid future studies of military coups in other developing countries.

A Review of the Literature

In studies of military coups, several factors emerge as indicators of coups. There is a marked similarity in political, economic, social and military conditions prior to the coups. The diversity of conditions makes it difficult to isolate one factor as the cause of a particular coup.

Economic: Economically, these countries which came under military domination, had suffered. Economies generally were unstable, characterized by high rates of inflation (1) and unemployment (2), underemployment (3) and weak infrastructures (4). Often, just prior to a coup, the country experienced workers' strikes (5) and labor union unrest (6). The countries, too, often had developed large trade deficits which resulted in weak currencies (7).

In many studies, the economic policies of governments were cited as factors which produced the economic stresses. Weaknesses in the national economies made it difficult for governments to meet economic goals.

Because the economic policies failed to stimulate the countries' economies, economic stability was stifled and inflation, unemployment and strikes resulted (8).

Political: Politically, it is generally held that the government in power prior to a coup, be it civilian or military, has lost legitimacy (9) and authority to govern (10). These losses are attributed to the inability of leaders to resolve political, economic or social difficulties (11).

Also it has been noted that in countries which experienced military coups, the political infrastructures were weak (12). There were no outlets for political discontent (13) and no consistent method of political participation (14). Corruption was rampant among political leaders and anti-corruption campaigns were not effective (15).

The absence of a strong political structure designed to incorporate political diversity, effectively deal with economic and social problems and guide the country along a clear path of development, contributed to military coups. With no government able to meet its goals, or popular goals, the military intervened.

Social: Pre-coup governments also failed to relieve social problems which developed from modernization. Population shifts from rural to urban centers created social pressures which largely were ignored (16).

Education, which was viewed as the cornerstone of the path toward development, created social stresses, too. As more individuals attained higher levels of education, they discovered they could not find jobs commensurate with their training (17). The resulting underemployment led to social frictions which overlapped into the economy (18).

Perhaps the greatest social problem which faced governments was integration of ethnic groups (19). When colonial powers departed, they left behind states which encompassed several ethnic groups. Each group retained its own customs and beliefs and governments generally failed to draw these groups into society, thereby unable to create a nation (20). This failure led to political and social problems. As one group was left out of power in political and economic spheres, discontent was intensified which undermined the authority and legitimacy of the government (21).

Military: Several studies focused on the role of the military in developing countries and how the military's position contributed to coups. It was often the case that the military's role in society and the political system was unclear. Constitutionally, the military was to protect the country from external aggression. But in these developing countries, external threats were few. Therefore, military forces often were used for other purposes, including maintaining internal order and assisting with development projects (22). The military stood apart from government, yet was used as a vital tool of government control (23).

Some authors contend the professionalism of these armies was challenged (24), and their corporate interests threatened (25). In several cases, the governments had tightened budgets, cutting the military's allocation, just prior to the coups (26). This austerity brought the military out to protect its interests (27).

In most developing countries, the military possessed an absolute monopoly of force (28). No other institution in society could command so many men under arms.

All these factors become intertwined. Weak political systems often create economic difficulties, which, in turn, heighten social

conflicts. Without adequate authority and legitimacy, the governments can not resolve these stresses. All these elements contribute in some way to the military coups, although different factors were cited as the trigger which initiated the coup.

Variation in the literature occurs in which factors the authors chose to emphasize, with some highlighting economic conditions, some emphasizing political situations, some stressing social difficulties and some focusing on the military's condition.

Thus the work completed to date concerning the elements leading to and involved in military coups shows a variety of interlocking conditions. The addition of one more conceptual framework, relative deprivation, should add to the literature and generate further study.

Relative Deprivation as a Conceptual Framework: Since relative deprivation took its place alongside sociopsychological concepts, it has been growing in importance as a political science tool.

In short, relative deprivation is defined as the measurement of the gap between what people think they should have and what people can get.

Relative deprivation has its base in the frustration-aggression theory which holds that when a man reaches a specified level of frustration, he may or often will act aggressively, lashing out at the individual or institution he holds responsible for his frustration.

Relative deprivation notes this frustration and extends it to groups. A group, which has specific expectations and is forbidden from realizing those expectations, often perceives it is experiencing relative deprivation. Such a group sometimes will react violently against the societal group or governmental institution it holds responsible for that deprivation.

The deprivation becomes a political factor when the group perceiving relative deprivation believes political institutions cause the deprivation and proceeds to attack those institutions. In this way, relative deprivation has been used in studies of civil violence.

Several social scientists have noted the possibilities of relating relative deprivation and military coups, but no studies have been published which centered on relative deprivation as a conceptual tool used to examine military coups.

Implicitly, it seems that some factor resembling relative deprivation has been evident in the occurrence of military interventions into politics. Explicitly, this thesis will examine relative deprivation and its relevance to military coups in Nigeria and Ghana.

Nigeria and Ghana are interesting examples because of the similarities and contrasts in the coups in each country. In both cases, in 1966, the military took power to rid government of corruption and political and economic mismanagement. Also in both countries, political situations prior to the coups were alike; both had experienced breakdowns in the parliamentary political systems they inherited from the British.

The contrasts exist in the economic conditions prior to the coups in 1966 and in the social and ethnic situations before the military interventions.

In Nigeria, the military first came to power in January 1966. An attempted coup was thwarted by military men loyal to the government in power, but a power vacuum created by the aborted coup led the loyalists to put the country under military domination (29).

The attempted coup was undertaken, "to end corruption, nepotism, gangsterism and violence" (30). Leaders of the failed coup believed only the strength of the military could bring order to Nigeria.

Less than one month later, the Ghanaian military successfully seized control of the government headed by Kwame Nkrumah. These military men, too, wanted to end "corruption" and the economic mismanagement of Nkrumah's government (31). The coup leaders also believed only the military could exert enough authority to put Ghana on strong economic footing (32).

The next coup took place in Nigeria in July, 1966, when a faction of the military intervened to take control away from the military leaders who had been ruling since January. Yakubu Gowon emerged as Nigeria's new leader and explained that the group of officers who staged the coup did so to, "help the country from drifting into utter destruction" (33).

Although Ghana's military rulers returned the country to civilian rule in 1969, another coup put the military back in power in February of 1972. Col. I.K. Acheampong, the coup leader, stated the takeover resulted from "malpractices, corruption, arbitrary dismissals, economic mismanagement" (34).

In 1975, Gowon's government in Nigeria was overthrown by the military because "the government is insensitive to the people, corrupt, inefficient and Gowon is inaccessible" (35).

These reasons given for the military coups are like a tape recording being played over and over. The similarity of the explanations suggest that parallel factors may have been in play in these countries.

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16. Nelkin, "Economic and Social Setting," p. 231.
17. Ibid.
18. Nelkin, "Economic and Social Setting," p. 232; Zolberg, "Military Intervention," p. 78.
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22. Finer, Man on Horseback, p. 83; Pye, "Armies in the Process," p. 84.
23. Samuel DeCalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 12; Pye, "Armies in the Process," p. 85; Finer, Man on Horseback, p. 33; Janowitz, Military Institutions, p. 15.
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26. Bennett, "Motivation for Military Intervention," p. 667; Nordlinger, Soldiers, p. 68; Nelkin, "Economic and Social Setting," p. 233.
27. Nordlinger, Soldiers, p. 68; Finer, Man on Horseback, p. 47.
28. Welch, Soldier and State, p. 20; Nordlinger, Soldiers, pp. 63-65; DeCalo, Coups and Army Rule, pp. 14-16; Janowitz, Military Institutions, p. 109.
29. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 25.
30. Africa Report, February 1966, p. 16.
31. Afrifa, Ghana Coup, p. 54.
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35. West Africa, August 4, 1975, p. 83.

Chapter 2

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION IN COUPS D'ETAT

Military coups are a form of political violence because the use of armed force is either apparent or implied. Coups also can be categorized as politically violent activities because they are forms of political change which are not sanctioned and are actions taken outside the established channels of political processes. Many coups do not result in bloodshed, but the implicit threat of violence always exists.

One aspect of political violence which has been studied is relative deprivation. This theory holds that men are pushed toward violence if they believe violent actions will reduce the perceived gap between their expectations and their capabilities. Violence becomes political when it is aimed against the government in power.


There are several levels of violence associated with relative deprivation. These levels range from civil disturbances to bloodless coups to civil war. The scope and intensity of the perceived relative deprivation help determine what level of political violence will be reached. If the scope and intensity are broad and deep, a civil war could result. But if the scope and intensity are concentrated and shallow, the resulting outburst may be an isolated civil disturbance.

As politically violent activities, then coups lend themselves to analysis using the elements of relative deprivation that have been applied to other forms of political violence. Relative deprivation is applicable to coups since they are a form of political violence and have been used as a means of rectifying perceived imbalances between expectations and capabilities.

In his extensive work on this topic, Ted Robert Gurr has outlined three forms of relative deprivation. Each is represented by specific action in a group's value expectations and value capabilities. Decremental relative deprivation is perceived when a group's value expectations remain the same, but the value capabilities decline. Expectations are those things a group wants and can range from material values, such as pay and benefits of employment, to non-material values, such as justice or democracy. Capability is the ability of the group to achieve its expectations.

Aspirational deprivation occurs when expectations increase and capabilities remain static. If a group's desires increase, but its ability to meet those desires does not, aspirational relative deprivation occurs.

Progressive deprivation is manifested when a group's value expectations increase and its value capabilities decrease (1). (See graph below for visual explanation of these forms of deprivation.)



Relative deprivation has consequences for governments when that deprivation is blamed on the political system. Increasingly, as governments and societies become more complex, government involvement in the activities of different social groups can initiate relative deprivation (2). When the government controls value distribution, those groups directly affected by government actions will blame the government if there is a gap between expectations and those capabilities which the government controls.

Two factors which limit political violence need to be mentioned. Groups which have outlets for their dissatisfaction with government tend not to rebel against that government. If a group believes the gap between its value expectations and capabilities can be narrowed, it is not likely to instigate political violence (3).

Too, a group will not likely resort to violence if it believes the government is legitimate. An illegitimate government is more open to subversion or attack (4). Governments lose legitimacy when they are not able to provide values or capabilities to the extent desired.

The ideas which Gurr espouses about value expectations, capabilities and governmental illegitimacy in theories of political violence, are compatible with the works of authors who have studied military coups.

Perhaps the most notable work was completed by S.E. Finer. In his study, Finer examines the motives, mood and opportunity for military intervention in politics.

Finer proposes four motives for intervention, which are comparable to Gurr's definition of value expectations. First Finer states that a sense of "manifest destiny" of soldiers is a motive, that the military has a concept of itself as a providential savior of the state. Since the

military's charge is the state, the esprit de corps of the military is founded on the supposed national values and virtues. Military men are committed to uphold these virtues (5).

This sense of commitment to the nation and its ideals can be defined as a non-material value, which if challenged may initiate a response of political violence. Value expectations surrounding these non-material values, if challenged, bring about a decline in value capabilities and thus create decremental relative deprivation.

The second motive Finer defined was preservation of the national interest. Here, the military believes it should intervene to save the nation, from internal problems such as strife, economic mismanagement and corrupt politicians. This motive might involve either material or non-material values or a combination of both. A group's material values are threatened by economic strife, which can prevent a group from meeting its value expectations. For example, a group may rely on the government for its salaries. If the government is forced to tighten its belt and recommend salary cuts, that group may perceive progressive relative deprivation - value capabilities decline while value expectations increase.

The next motive Finer defines is sectional interest, which is divided into four sub-categories. The first of these is class interest. Here the military intervenes to protect the interests of the class with which it identifies, usually the upper class. This interest coincides with material values and would be inherent in relative deprivation.

The next sectional interest is regional interest. When regional interests provide the motive for intervention, the military is acting to protect a region with which it identifies. Most often it is a sub-group in the military with members from a specific region who intervene because

they believe the region is being deprived of benefits or because the region's interests are being ignored.

This motivation encompasses both material and non-material value expectations. A section of the military, whose members come from one region, will perceive relative deprivation if they see that their region is being slighted. This offence would challenge their non-material values, such as pride. Or they will perceive relative deprivation if they see *specific members of their region* being discriminated against. This offence could attack their material values if the sub-group in the military from that region is being denied access to certain values.

The third sectional interest is the corporate self-interest of the armed forces. The military in this case intervenes to protect its autonomy and allocation of resources. This motive, according to Finer, is the "most powerful motivating force in military coups" (6).

The last sectional interest is the individual self-interest of military officers. Here, military men see themselves gaining direct benefits by taking control of government.

Both the third and fourth sectional interests involve protection of material values of individuals and groups. If the government takes action to deprive the armed forces of its resources or seeks to deny resources to individuals within the military, it is denying them the ability to meet their material value expectations, and is creating a perception of relative deprivation.

Finer states it is most likely that coups result from a combination of factors. For example, if the military believes its corporate self-interest is threatened and sees a simultaneous threat to the internal stability of the state, intervention is highly motivated. The existence of a single motivating factor may not be enough to trigger a coup (7).

Closely associated with the motive to intervene is the mood to intervene. The mood triggers the takeover (8).

Moods which can instigate interventions are varied. When the military perceives itself as the only corporate body which can get things accomplished quickly and efficiently, this perception creates a mood of intervention. A similar mood is created when the military sees no obstacles to its intervention. If public discontent with the regime is high, there will be little resistance to a military coup (9). The final mood is created when the military holds some type of grievance against the regime. The grievance, in these cases, is perceived as resolvable only by intervention (10).

Finer related the mood of grievance to the relationship between frustration and aggression:

Frustrated, no matter how or why, by society or by the government of the day, the military will act predictably: 1) By the response of anger and humiliation, 2) By 'projecting' the blame on civilians and rationalizing the reactions, and, 3) By compensating for the frustration and humiliation by taking it out on the unfortunate objects of their censure (11).

Thus, Finer is basing his analysis of the mood of intervention on the same concept relative deprivation is based on: frustration-aggression. The frustration can result from a perception of relative deprivation brought about by a denial of material or non-material values. Then the frustration is expressed through some form of political violence, in this case, a military coup.

Finer also states that the opportunity to intervene must exist. Opportunities can arise when there is increased civilian dependence on the military because of external policies which lead the civilian government to defer to the military. Or when domestic circumstances, such as riot conditions, persist, or when a minority group tries to impose its will on the majority and a power vacuum exists (12).

In each of these instances, Finer is speaking to the issue of governmental illegitimacy and loss of authority, which, as Gurr noted, is apparent prior to the rise of political violence against the regime.

The concept of "protection of self-interest," which Finer discusses, has drawn an increasing amount of attention. Eric Nordlinger, states that the military is motivated solely by "the defense or enhancement of military interests" when it stages a coup (13).

Nordlinger defines organizational self-interest as follows:

Every public institution is concerned with the protection and enhancement of its own interests...adequate budgetary support, autonomy in managing internal affairs, the preservation of their responsibilities in the face of encroachment from rival institutions and the continuity of the institution itself (14).

In breaking down these elements of self-interest, Nordlinger notes that adequate budgetary support guarantees the material well-being of the members of the armed forces. If that budgetary support is cut, or not substantially enhanced, the military men believe their material welfare is threatened (15).

This idea too, coincides with Gurr's emphasis on the importance of material values. If budgetary support is not forthcoming for the military, they cannot meet their material value expectations.

Autonomy, Nordlinger says, also is an important aspect of self-interest. If the managers of a bureaucratic institution believe someone else is making decisions they should make, they feel threatened. In the military, these decisions can range from definition of the military's function to decisions about foreign policy (16).

Too, as a professional organization, the military prefers to decide who should be promoted and who should not. If politicians usurp this power, the military may feel undermined and threatened.

These decision making powers which the military wishes to keep to itself represent some non-material value expectations which the military officers may feel belong to them. Denied these expectations by the government, a faction of the military may perceive relative deprivation.

Next, Nordlinger discusses functional rivals of the military. The creation of functional rivals can initiate the perception of threat to the military's self-interest. Most often, these rivals are paramilitary units created to serve basically the same function as the military. In some cases, these pseudo-military organizations command either larger proportionate allocations than the military, or they may receive allocations of better quality. When this occurs, the military believes it is not getting what it deserves and military members can feel materially deprived. Or, as relative deprivation would hold, value capabilities would be perceived as declining, even if material value expectations remained static, resulting in decremental relative deprivation.

These examinations of the works of Finer and Nordlinger demonstrate how coup theory has implied the existence of relative deprivation in military coups. The works of Thompson, who quantified military motives for coups (17), and First, who studied African military interventions in detail (18), also point toward relative deprivation, but do not directly address the idea of using it as a conceptual tool in analyzing military coups.

While three forms of relative deprivation have been defined and illustrated, there is a need to examine the stages of relative deprivation in order to have a grasp on how this perceived gap can lead to violent behavior.

Four stages of deprivation have been identified. The first is a perceived deprivation of one group relative to other groups which appear to be getting greater benefits. This stage also is entered when groups believe their position in society has declined. The next stage occurs when groups identify the source of their deprivation - whether it be another group or the government. Next, groups do not find an alternate outlet for frustration and have no means of expressing discontent. This arises if political participation is blocked. The final stage occurs in two phases; the first occurs when groups realize they possess the ability to act against the source of their perceived deprivation and the second phase occurs when the groups actually undertake action to relieve their deprivation (19).

Perceived deprivation does not always result in violence. There are several important factors which accompany the final acts of political violence.

Gurr maintains that violence is most likely to occur when a group's most important values are challenged. These values involve material goals, such as the ability to provide food, shelter and clothing for oneself and one's family (20).

While non-material value expectations provide powerful motivation for political violence, material value expectations are more salient and if these are threatened, the response likely will be more intense and more violent.

Relative deprivation also is perceived when there exists an anticipated threat to value expectations or capabilities. This anticipation often increases the intensity of the deprivation in correlation with the salience of the values affected. If a group of men believe they will be

denied their material value expectations or capabilities in the future, they are likely to seek corrective action. If they anticipate a threat to their non-material values, corrective action may be delayed.

This thesis studies the coups in Ghana (February 1966 and February 1972) and Nigeria (January 1966, July 1966 and July 1975).

For each country, there is an overview of the political situation prior to the coups, an examination of the economic conditions before the coups and an outline of the state of the military forces prior to the coups.

The overview of the political situation includes a general look at the political system, a look at the level of political participation and a look at the leaders in each country. The economic conditions are examined by studying economic indicators, such as the inflation rate, unemployment rate, rate of growth and the trade deficit.

The examination of the military includes a look at the military budget, the degree of autonomy the military has been granted, the existence or non-existence of functional rivals to the military, who led the coups, if the military was split by ethnic or regional disputes and a general view of the military's position.

Next, the case studies are examined to see how relative deprivation could be used as a conceptual tool in examining the military coups.

Decremental relative deprivation - which occurs when value expectations remain constant but value capabilities decline - is used as an encompassing concept. Examining capabilities is possible with the data available. Aspirational relative deprivation and progressive relative deprivation, both of which are based on changes in value expectations, are not used because methods of determining fluctuations in value expectations were not available.

The case studies then are compared and contrasted to see if any factors of the coups were similar or dissimilar. This examination should indicate what, if any, elements were common to the coups in both states.

Finally, conclusions are drawn, specifically addressing the question: Can relative deprivation be useful in assessing the military coups d'etat in Nigeria and Ghana?

NOTES

1. Ted, R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 46.
2. Ibid., p. 179.
3. Ibid., p. 185.
4. Ibid., p. 182.
5. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), p. 33.
6. Ibid., p. 56.
7. Ibid., p. 39.
8. Ibid., p. 61.
9. Ibid., p. 65.
10. Ibid., p. 61.
11. Ibid., p. 62.
12. Ibid., pp. 72-79.
13. Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Mufti, (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 65.
14. Ibid., p. 65.
15. Ibid., pp. 66-68.
16. Ibid., p. 71.
17. William R. Thompson, "The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, No. 01-047, (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1973), p.5; Zolberg, "Military Intervention," p. 78.
18. Ruth First, Power in Africa: Political Power in Africa and the Military (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972), pp 207-406
19. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 13.
20. Ibid., p. 69.

Chapter 3

CASE STUDIES

Case Study: Ghana 1966

After decades of British colonial rule, Ghana gained independence in 1957. The country was believed by Western observers to be an oasis for democracy in Africa under the guidance of the charismatic leader, Kwame Nkrumah. But in February, 1966, a military coup d'etat ousted Nkrumah and Ghana was under military rule.

What had happened? Economically, Ghana was in strong shape when independence came. Politically, the country seemed on firm footing with its inherited parliamentary system. Nkrumah had given strong support to the military, an institution he was proud of and one which he wanted to remain strong (1).

Economic: Despite the fact Ghana gained independence with a healthy economy, by 1966, economic conditions were poor. A conventional development plan for rapid industrialization was implemented just after independence. However, the Western orientation of the plan, which emphasized heavy, capital-intensive industry, placed Ghana in a foreign deficit of £53 million by 1961. The second development plan, initiated in 1959 while the first development plan was still underway, relied too heavily on foreign investment to the exclusion of developing large in-country capital reserves (2).

In 1961, a new Seven-Year Plan was adopted which was to make Ghana economically strong by 1968. The failures of the plan became obvious (3). Ghana was, in Nkrumah's vision, going to be a true socialist state, but governmental mismanagement brought it close to economic ruin (4).

Part of the economic failure has been attributed to the sudden drop in cocoa prices. Ghana relied on cocoa for nearly 70 percent of its export revenue. Shortly after independence, in 1958, a ton of cocoa earned \$603; by 1965, the price had dropped to \$241 a ton (5). The Seven-Year Plan had been based on a static price for cocoa of about \$500 a ton. The precipitous decline in cocoa prices pushed Ghana further into debt. By 1964, the country was operating with a \$550 million external deficit (6).

This deficit, added to a burgeoning internal debt, drove Ghana currency values down and precipitated massive rounds of inflation (7). In 1965, a year before the coup, the consumer price index rose from 128 to 165 (base: March, 1963 = 100). The highest inflation rate hit food prices, which rose 36 percent nationwide (8) and topped out at 400 percent in some regions (9). The purchasing power of the Ghanaian ₵ declined 20 percent in 1965 alone (10).

Additional pressures were placed on the economy by a government which did not reduce its spending. In 1962-63, expenditures exceeded revenue by 60 percent: in 1965 expenditures outpaced revenue by 27 percent.

The gross national product of Ghana averaged a 4.8 percent rate of growth from 1955 to 1962. But by 1964, the GNP growth rate had dwindled to 2.8 percent and, just prior to the coup, the GNP growth rate was estimated at 0.2 percent (11).

Ghana's development plan did not drastically alter the rate of manufacturing nor did it expand the country's economy as it was designed to. As a share of the GNP, manufacturing contributed only 3.8 percent in 1962 and 4.4 percent in 1964 (12). The massive government outlays for

consumer and capital goods did nothing to improve the basic structure of Ghana's economy.

Although there was a steady decline in Ghana's economic health from independence through the early 1960's, the most rapid deterioration of the economy came just prior to the military takeover.

Political: Ghana suffered a political decline after independence, too. In 1957 when the British withdrew, Ghana was left with a multi-party parliamentary system of government. In pre-independence elections in 1954 and 1956, the Convention People's Party (CPP) won 72 of the 104 seats, with about 57 percent of the vote (13).

It is important to note that only one in six Ghanaians eligible to vote chose to vote for CPP candidates. The remaining political parties were vehemently opposed to CPP policies and partly because they did not gain any electoral victories, these groups became politically alienated (14). Most opponents of the CPP were motivated to their opposition by a single issue, and were "movements" rather than substantial political parties with well-developed platforms.

The CPP, and Nkrumah, made no attempt to incorporate diverse opinions within their party. There were few efforts to expand participation or seek variety in CPP membership. Because political factions were ignored and because political battles undermined the CPP's authority, Nkrumah's regime did not elicit legitimacy or loyalty.

Perhaps CPP leaders did not recognize the lack of legitimacy of their rule. They made no move to try to increase the party's legitimacy. Once in power, party members and Nkrumah moved only to ensure their continuing positions of power. As Kraus noted:

In the years following independence in 1957, the CPP, party and government, moved to employ measures to control the demand side of the political system: to control, restrict or suppress groups or institutions concerned with the articulation, aggregation and communication of interests. This did not occur at once, but was the consequence of a series of political and economic crises, in each of which the CPP felt threatened and applied restrictive measures (15).

One of these measures, passed in 1958, was the Preventive Detention Act. It was originally designed as a measure to exercise governmental authority by placing lawbreakers in jail. But by 1964, and especially in 1965, the Act was being used to place political dissidents in jail without benefit of trial and without hope of release. The use of the Act was perceived by the public as unconstitutional and a violation of every notion of justice which has been passed onto Ghana by the British. There was outcry against the arbitrary incarceration of individuals, but this dissent was viewed as illegal and the government jailed the dissenters. Almost all opposition to Nkrumah and his government was choked off and political participation dwindled (16).

To consolidate their power further, Nkrumah and the CPP managed to force a law through the National Assembly in 1964 which made Ghana a one-party state (17). By 1965, the CPP had lost all resemblance to a political party; it was instead the group of bureaucrats and cronies who retained absolute power over Ghana's political system (18). During this time Nkrumah became isolated from the people and from party leaders. The hostility toward Nkrumah manifested itself in several assassination attempts, after which the ruler retreated (19) and reportedly, "substituted security reports for contact," with other Ghanaians (20).

Into this political "system" came the elections of 1965. The vote was to be the first since 1957 and electoral districts had been expanded

from 104 to 198. But since Ghana was a one-party state, only CPP candidates were allowed to stand for the election. The party's Central Committee selected and approved all contenders. Prior to the election, Nkrumah had had himself appointed President-for-Life, but the CPP placed his name on the ballot anyway. On June 2, 1965, the government declared there was no reason to hold elections and announced all CPP candidates victors (21).

Nkrumah and the CPP had successfully strangled all political opposition and in so doing, choked all political participation. The moves made by Nkrumah's government were resented by the people, who came increasingly to view the rulers as illegitimate power-brokers.

Military: The military was directly affected by these situations. As the economy declined, military benefits declined. Nkrumah's grab for power and his fear of outsiders had a clear impact on the military's position in the country.

Nkrumah did want his military to be strong and so he did not deny them funding. As can be seen in Table 1, military spending as a percentage of the state's total budget did not decrease.

Table 1
Military Spending in Ghana as % of Total Budget (23)

1954-55	1.3%
1957-60	4.0% to 5.0%
1962-63	7.5%
1963-64	6.0%
1965-66	8.4%

If these budget figures are put into perspective, however, a truer picture of the military's position results. Inflation automatically devalued the allocation to the military and while the military's budgets from 1962 to 1965 grew approximately 12 percent, the total budget for Ghana grew 25 percent (24).

Detrimental economic conditions also took their toll on the individual military officers. Amenities normally granted officers were slowly withdrawn. Free electricity was no longer available; they were denied training allowances and they lost their traveling pay (25). There was a general feeling among officers that their situation would not get any better.

One of the coup leaders, A.A. Afrifa stated:

It was clear, too, at the time that the economic mismanagement of the country by the CPP government had affected the armed forces. Our clothes were virtually in tatters. We had no ammunition. The burden of taxation was heavy. The cost of living for the ordinary soldier was high. The Army was virtually at the mercy of the politicians who treated it with arrogance and open contempt (26).

Another coup member described his concerns:

The commanders were really hard put to it. They had known and had been accustomed to a high standard of turnout and cleanliness. What then, could they do with soldiers who turned out on parade in torn uniforms...with no polish or shine on their boots or with toes showing through their canvas shoes?...Even the officers went about in very unpresentable uniforms (27).

Afrifa also commented on the general condition of the Army:

The army was rendered incapable, ill-equipped, having virtually been reduced to a rabble. By Christmas, 1965, a number of our troops were without equipment and clothing, things essential for the pride, morale and efficiency of the soldier....It was shameful to see a Ghanaian soldier in a tattered and ragged uniform, sometimes without boots, during his training period (28).

Clearly, by 1965, the coup leaders within the Ghanaian officer corps believed Nkrumah's regime was doing all in its power to demoralize the armed forces (29). They considered staging a coup then, but did not want to usurp the authority of civilian rule (30).

But these officers did not base all their fears on the threat to their material well-being. They also watched as the government began stripping the military of its autonomy. Nkrumah became more involved in the military, making decisions which many officers believed would be better made by career military men.

The constitution of 1960 established the president as supreme commander of the armed forces, chairman of the defense committee and the chiefs of staff committee and gave him power to dismiss or suspend military personnel. Nkrumah exercised these powers and went beyond them, hand-picking military men who would be sent overseas for training (31). This discrimination outraged some career officers who believed Nkrumah was using his position to further the futures of those he believed loyal to him. The Army's sense of professionalism was damaged.

Nkrumah also encouraged members of the military to become members of his political party. He recruited cadets from the military academy to join the CPP. While this had been a standard practice in the militaries of totalitarian states, the British and American-educated officers did not believe their duties should be mixed with politics. As Afrifa stated, "If the Army were made to identify itself openly with the CPP and its ideology, it was bound to lose its self-respect and independence of outlook" (32).

Nkrumah, too, tried to get members of the army to reaffirm their loyalty to Ghana - and to Nkrumah personally - through yearly loyalty

oaths. Many were glad to announce their loyalty to the state; few wanted to align themselves with the personage of Nkrumah (33). This move was regarded similarly to the inducements to join the CPP; officers felt pledging allegiance to Nkrumah would be contrary to their position as officers of the state.

Nkrumah further alienated many officers in 1965 when he dismissed two popular generals. Major-Generals S.J.A. Otu and J.A. Ankrah were relieved of duty because of their supposed political views. One coup leader called their removal a blatant attempt to usurp the military of its power of appointment. And it was a factor in the 1966 coup:

The dismissal of our generals by Kwame Nkrumah was one of the major factors which led to the coup of 24 February. As a result of this action the Ghanaian officers and men felt that the profession of men-at-arms had been disgraced and that their generals, as well as they themselves, had been humiliated (34).

After the assassination attempts against Nkrumah, the president decided he needed special forces to act as bodyguards. The security was to be provided by the President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR), a unit which eventually shared power with the military and which drew harsh comments from military leaders.

The POGR had first been created when Ghanaian soldiers were withdrawn from the United Nations' Congo operation. Instead of demobilizing all the military forces which had been employed there, it was decided that many soldiers, instead of retiring, would be used in a ceremonial unit. Following an assassination attempt, Nkrumah decided to expand the POGR and new blood was injected into the group (35). In July, 1965, the POGR was enlarged to include 50 officers and 1,100 men. It was detached from the army and put under the direct supervision of Nkrumah. In secret, the unit was trained by officers from communist states (36).

Members were given weapons with firepower well beyond that of the weapons supplied regular army personnel (37).

Afrifa lamented:

We were also aware that members of the POGR were receiving kingly treatment. Their pay was higher and it was an open fact that they possessed better equipment. The men who had been transferred from the regular army no longer owed any allegiance and loyalty to the Chief of Defense Staff, but to Kwame Nkrumah, who had become their commanding officer (38).

General Ankrah in a post-coup broadcast stated:

Massive sums of money were spent every month to maintain an unnecessarily large force of so-called security officers whose duty ostensibly was to provide for the security of the state, but really to secure Nkrumah's personal safety. He established a private army of his own at annual costs of over ₵50,000 in flagrant violation of a constitution which he himself had foisted on the country, to serve as a counterpoise to the Ghana Armed Forces (39).

Many of the coup leaders believed it was Nkrumah's goal to replace the army with the loyal POGR and this they viewed as a serious and direct threat to the army's existence (40). The POGR drained revenue which could have gone to repair the army's torn uniforms and to supply regular forces with adequate equipment. The POGR not only threatened the material well-being of officers, but challenged the supremacy of the legally-based military forces.

The military did not act as a corporate body in overthrowing the Nkrumah regime. There was some opposition, although it was not strong. The men who led the coup were officers dissatisfied with the government's seeming inability to rule and with the deteriorating position of the army (41). This sub-group had become politicized by the Congo debacle (42) and by Nkrumah's acts against the military. They agreed the political system should be changed and they saw military force as the only means of

change. They also believed only the military's sense of discipline could rectify Ghana's decline (43).

If the coup leaders believed a military government would end the country's economic and political ills, they also felt the armed forces would be better served by military rule.

The Coup and Relative Deprivation: This case study shows the decline in economic and political health of Ghana prior to the 1966 coup. Too, the military's sense of alienation is discussed.

While it is difficult to measure the value expectations of the coup leaders, it is easier to examine their value capabilities. Thus, decremental deprivation, which is represented by a reduction in capabilities, can be viewed as a force in this military coup.

Inflation reduced the buying power of the average Ghanaian and it reduced the entirety of the military budget. Material values were reduced by poor economic conditions and, in the case of the army, hurt by the allocations granted the POGR. The statements of the coup leaders reflect the discontent and the desire for better conditions. The decline in amenities hurt individual officers, as they relied on these to supplement their pay. The coup leaders also suggested they did not believe their position would improve under Nkrumah.

Non-material value capabilities were damaged by the erosion of the political system. No one was able to participate in the political process as Nkrumah and the CPP kept power to themselves. This frustrated Ghanaians and had a profound effect on those coup leaders who preferred democracy.

So, although the value expectations of the people of Ghana, and the coup leaders, especially, may have remained the same, there was an

evident decline in the ability to fulfill those expectations.

Thus it can be suggested that perceptions of decremental deprivation contributed to the military's decision to intervene in Ghanaian politics. Once the perception was born, military officers were politicized, outlets for frustration were blocked and the military coup-leaders recognized they had the force to take over. So they did.

NOTES

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28. Afrifa, Ghana Coup, p. 97.
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30. Afrifa, Ghana Coup, pp. 103-04.
31. First, Power, p. 195-96.
32. Afrifa, Ghana Coup, p. 99.
33. Kraus, "Arms and Politics," p. 185.
34. Afrifa, Ghana Coup, p. 102-03.
35. Lefever, Spear, p. 55; Kraus, "Arms and Politics," p. 185; First, Power, p. 199.
36. First, Power, p. 199.
37. Lefever, Spear, p. 55.
38. Afrifa, Ghana Coup, p. 100.
39. First, Power, p. 197.
40. Ocran in Nordlinger, Soldiers, p. 37.
41. Afrifa, Ghana Coup, p. 35-41.
42. Lefever, Spear, p. 49.
43. Afrifa, Ghana Coup, pp. 95-99.

Case Study: Ghana 1972

While the military ruled from 1966 to 1969, Ghana's situation improved. The price of cocoa increased which gave the country needed revenue and which improved the economic conditions slightly. International loans were extended which relieved some pressure on the military government.

The military also worked to improve its situation. In 1965, prior to the coup, the armed forces (including the POGR) received 8.4 percent of the total budget. After the coup, in 1966, the military gave itself 9.4 percent of the budget and, in 1968, received 10.3 percent of the budget. Following the coup, the POGR was disbanded, so the resources previously appropriated to that unit were incorporated in the military budget, making the increase actually larger (1). A.A. Afrifa, a 1966 coup leader who became a brigadier general, justified the increases by lamenting the past neglect of the armed forces.

In 1969, the Ghanaian military supervised elections and returned the country to civilian rule, as it had declared it would when it took power in 1966. Kofi Busia came to power in 1969 with his Progress Party (PP) holding 105 parliamentary seats of a total of 140 (2). The military members of the ruling National Liberation Council resigned.

Busia's tenure lasted only three years. The military seized power again in 1972. While announcing the success of the 1972 coup, Lt. Col. Acheampong claimed that the same instances of corruption and economic mismanagement which were evident during Kwame Nkrumah's rule also were evident in the Busia government, and that it was the intention of the military finally to rid the state of these malpractices (3).

Economic: During the military's tenure from 1966 to 1969, the economy had stabilized. Though a sizable external debt still existed when Busia took office, the internal economic situation had improved (4).

But during the 27 months Busia held power, the economic conditions worsened. The trade deficit grew from NC15 million in 1970 to NC70 million in 1971. This decline was closely associated with another dip in cocoa prices and cocoa still represented Ghana's major export earnings. From a high of \$825 per ton, cocoa prices fell to \$487.50 per ton in 1971. Though this price drop was a major factor in the economic decline, it was the short-term external debt which provided the stifling factor. Because so many short-term loans had been rescheduled when Nkrumah was ousted and rescheduled again during the military's tenure, the time came, when Busia was in office, for the debts to be paid (5). Ghana did not have the money.

These difficulties were compounded by a rapid increase in the country's internal debt. By 1971, that debt totaled \$600 million, nearly \$80 million more than the external debt. Ghana's unemployment stood at 25 percent. A series of strikes also plagued the government and were precipitated by Busia's policies (6).

Inflation was fed by an increase in the amount of money in circulation and by shortfalls in supply (7).

So, when Busia announced his 1971-72 budget, few were happy. Even though the budget was to be increased by 18 percent, most of the additional spending was to service outstanding debts (8). In order to raise the extra revenue for the budget, Busia proposed tax increases and substantial price increases in the goods which were government-controlled, such as petroleum. Following through his economic policy, Busia also announced a ban on a wide range of imported goods. By December 1971, the Ghanaian economy was in

such poor shape that the government announced a devaluation of the cedi, dropping its worth by 44 percent (9). Busia admitted his economic measures would place hardships on a large number of individuals, but he said he believed the economy could be turned around.

Despite his statements, it soon became clear Ghana again was on the verge of economic collapse.

Political: Busia's political popularity declined until he was regarded much the same as Nkrumah was before his ouster. Almost every segment of the population was distressed by one or more of his policies.

Middle-class merchants were upset with Busia's economic bungling. Cocoa farmers were distressed by a series of scandals which rocked the Cocoa Marketing Board and the drop in cocoa prices. But the most disaffected groups were the trade unionists (10).

Busia viewed the unions as educational organizations rather than as institutions dedicated to improving the workers' situation. In 1970, the government attempted to elect a PP man to be Secretary-General of the Trade Union Congress (TUC). After a series of protest strikes, the government introduced a bill into the national legislature to disband the TUC, a move which launched even more strikes (11).

Political participation was considerably higher than during Nkrumah's reign, but the PP made a mistake similar to the CPP's error; they did not listen to the opposition. The Opposition Justice Party (JP) was gaining ground against Busia and the PP. The JP accused the government of legislating acts which violated the constitution. Though the JP had a sympathetic audience and had garnered some support, the PP continued its dominance, fearless of opposition.

A series of bad decisions rocked the political foundation of the Busia government. An "expulsion of aliens" act had devastating consequences. Though designed to rid Ghana of poaching workers, the act resulted in loss of life and did little to improve employment figures. Then, Busia undertook an operation dubbed "Apollo 568," which involved the dismissal of 568 civil servants. Following that, a scandal broke out when a cabinet minister was accused of violating the constitution by remaining as a director for a private corporation while he held political office.

Busia's government was constitutionally sanctioned and when Busia came to power in 1969, he did have the support of a majority of Ghanaians. But the political blows which it endured (and in some ways, instigated) weakened its authority and legitimacy. Busia was perceived as a weak leader who could not even talk back to his ministers (12).

Military: During Busia's term, the military did not fare well. The austerity budget for 1971-72 which Busia imposed on the country had especially severe consequences for members of the armed forces. After enjoying a budget of NC49.1 million in 1969, the military budget was cut to NC45 million in 1970 and to NC40.4 million in 1971.

The military was forced to eliminate such "nonessential," (13) expenditures as exercises, training and supplies of ammunition. The armed forces also were hit by increased import taxes, which cut into their funds for imported spare parts. It was estimated that at the time of the coup, only half the military's vehicles were operable.

As individuals, the officers were hurt by the new budget. A major who took home NC215 a month (a little above the national average for a professional worker) before the austerity budget would take home

NC125 after the budget was adopted. Individual amenities were reduced or eliminated. The government demanded that officers begin paying water and electricity bills, telephone allowances were cut and the percentage of salaries withheld for rent in government-owned housing increased from 7.5 percent of the paycheck to 15 percent.

Besides hitting these material benefits of the armed forces, the Busia government took other actions which alienated the military. In 1970, the army began supporting police units in anti-smuggling operations along the border. In September of that year, joint army-police exercises were instituted to curb the rising crime rate. The army medical corps was called on to aid the anti-cholera drive and the Air Force was called in to provide flood relief in the north. These activities did not coincide with the military's view of its role as protector of the state. They did not want to become involved in internal public works projects (14).

The coup de grace came when the economics minister stated:

It is possible to combine (military) training with substantial contributions to national development. Therefore, during this financial year it has been arranged that whenever units...go out on training exercises, they will seek to leave behind them some positive development project...by way of roads or sanitary buildings (15).

Few members of the military believed their role included building out-houses.

Some military men also were disturbed by a series of "retirements," among upper-echelon military leaders. Following unsubstantiated rumors of an impending coup, Lt. Gen. Michael Otu retired as Chief of Defense Staff. After his retirement, several officers found reason to leave the service (16). These retirements came in the wake of the leaving of the NLC leaders and the result was that, by 1970, half of those officers who had held the rank of lieutenant colonel and above in 1966 were unavailable

and the command structure of the military was severely weakened. Some military officers viewed the retirements with worry, wondering if they would be next.

Achaempong summed up the feelings of the coup leaders regarding Busia's government.

The first people Busia put his eyes on were the armed forces and the police. Some army and police officers were dismissed under the pretext of retirement. Some officers were put in certain positions to suit the whims of Busia and his colleagues. Then he started taking from us the few amenities and facilities which we in the armed forces and police enjoyed even under the Nkrumah regime. Having lowered morale in the armed forces and the police to the extent that officers could not exert any meaningful influence over their men, so that by this strategy coming together to overthrow his government was to him impossible, he turned his eyes on the civilians (18).

The sub-group of officers who led the 1972 coup were men who had witnessed the 1966 coup and who had seen the effectiveness of military rule. They were easily politicized; most had seen government and the military intertwined.

The Coup and Relative Deprivation: Although there was clearly little evidence of the perception of relative deprivation in the political sphere, the one group which wanted its demands heard had no political outlet: the military. The level of participation for the populace at large was greatly improved over the Nkrumah tenure and the military's tenure. The government in power had been popularly elected and could be turned out of office in another election. Expectations of political involvement could be met by the political system.

The military officers who staged the coup did not view the government as an arena for the exchanges of opinion. Rather, they believed government leaders were the enemy, bent on destroying the armed forces by cutting allocations and threatening the officers' material well-being.

While the coup leaders' value expectations may have remained constant, they believed their value capabilities had declined. The austerity budget reduced their ability to maintain a strong armed forces and the individual salary cuts reduced officers' abilities to improve their living standards.

Non-material value expectations also were reduced. The military was denied its ability to hold training exercises and was required to participate in so-called development projects. This hurt the image of the military as a fighting force.

Decremental deprivation, which is represented by stable value expectations and declining value capabilities, was a factor which contributed to this coup.

The value capabilities, material and non-material, of the coup leaders declined as a result of Busia's policies. Since there was no other outlet for their discontent and since a previous military coup had set a precedent and because they had a monopoly on force, they chose to intervene and place Ghana, again, under military domination.

NOTES

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Case Study: Nigeria, January 1966

Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in 1960, and like Ghana, the country established a parliamentary-democratic system of government.

Six years later, the representative government fell to military intervention. The military takeover did not result from a successful military coup d'etat, but from a failed coup. On January 14, 1966, a group of officers, mostly majors, attempted a military overthrow of the government. The majors assigned to secure some cities in the South failed, but Major C.K. Nzeogwu, who was to take control of the Northern city of Kaduna, succeeded.

During the attempted coup, the prime minister was murdered, and several other ranking politicians were killed. In order to deal with the renegade Nzeogwu and re-establish order, the Cabinet and the President of the Senate (acting for President Azikiwe who was in London) handed power over to General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, head of the Nigerian military (1). Ironsi convinced Nzeogwu to surrender and then kept control of the government in order to ensure no further uprisings.

Economy: In the early to mid 1960's, Nigeria had not yet reaped all the benefits of its oil wealth. The country was surviving by using its agricultural resources and working to develop an industrial base. Economic development was slow and areas pegged for development were drawn on regional lines.

Political: Nigeria's real difficulties lay with the political situation. Representation in Nigeria's legislature was based on population. A census conducted in 1963 was the basis for apportionment. The North had a clear

advantage in the assembly since it reportedly contained a majority of the population (2).

In essence, the country was divided into three regions; the North, the South and the West (3). These divisions represented not only geographical boundaries, but ethnic boundaries as well. The North was peopled with Hausa and Fulani; the South contained Yorubas and the East, Ibos. Although the Hausa-Fulani managed to control the most seats in the assembly, they often entered into coalitions with members of another region to strengthen their hand. This created a situation where one regional group was always out of power. The Northerners played this to their best advantage, ensuring their coalition partners remained subservient.

Scarce government resources were allocated by the assembly. Because of the North's dominance a disproportionate amount of appropriations were given to the North. The other two groups continually fought to increase their share of the spoils.

The North produced the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the political party which gained control of the government at independence. The party consisted primarily of traditional leaders and was regarded by Southerners as a proxy for British interests (4).

In the South, two political parties competed for power: the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG). Each developed a smaller party designed to draw Northern support, but these small parties could compete successfully against the powerful NPC (5). The Southern parties' leaders believed they were unjustly denied political power. Even in coalition, these parties could not sway NPC leaders and their policies. The NCNC, in particular, was bitter since its leaders had been among the most vocal advocates of nationalism and independence (6).

Soon after the NPC had control of the federal government, decrees favored the North. Revenue distribution was controlled by the federal government, guaranteeing privilege for the North. Banking acts set forth in Lagos favored the North. It soon became clear that Northern dominance was a Nigerian political fact and there apparently was nothing the Southerners or Westerners could do (7).

The political struggle continued, with the North emerging victorious in almost every clash (8). But a series of crises beset the government in 1964 and 1965 which seriously undermined the authority and legitimacy of the NPC and the federal government.

In March 1964, the Western Region government published a "White Paper" which accused Ibos of controlling major institutions. This set up the conflict between Ibos, Yorubas and Hausa-Fulanis which eventually led to the civil war of 1977 (9).

Also in 1964, the scheduled federal elections were besieged by violence and ended up creating a constitutional crisis. There was a realization among leaders of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), a consolidation of the NCNC, AG, and two radical Northern parties that they were unlikely to win re-election. Since the NCNC was, at that time, in coalition with the NPC, its party leader was president of the country. As president, he called in military leaders and suggested a coup. The military leaders refused (10).

The coup suggestion was occasioned by the announcement that nominations had closed a large number of seats in the North. And it was reported many seats were uncontested. The UPGA was suspicious of this move because they had put forward candidates for all Northern seats. The election proceeded as scheduled on December 30, 1964, but a boycott called

to protest the unfairness of the campaign only resulted in securing more power for the NPC and its Northern ally, the NNDP.

With its defeat in the national elections, the UPGA turned its hopes on winning the Western Region election of 1965. The campaign was violent and, in the end, the election was a farce. Contesting for power in the West, the NPC's ally party, the NNDP, put up candidates for election in the Western Region. The election eventually was openly rigged by NNDP party members and hired thugs, assuring candidates of victory by stuffing ballot boxes and keeping opposition supporters from voting (11). The AG refused to recognize the outcome and widespread rioting resulted. The army was called in to quell the disturbances, but the violence continued sporadically (12).

Into this scene of shifting regional power and political chaos, the army entered. The failed coup in January was undertaken to bring control to the government and Nigeria and although the majors failed, the military did succeed in bringing some order to the scene.

Military: The military forces were radically altered after independence. Prior to 1960, the army, in particular, was viewed as an extension of the colonialist occupiers and was accorded little prestige or loyalty (13).

When power was handed to the Nigerians, a transformation took place within the military. The officer positions which had been held by Britons were turned over the Nigerians (14). Most of these privileged ranks went to Ibos, who were the favored group of the colonialists; they had had greater educational opportunities and were viewed as generally successful (15).

But the North's domination of the political scene quickly permeated the military. The Minister of Defense was a Northerner and he

announced that, henceforth, military promotions would be granted only to military men from the North.

In the early 1960's, the government set up recruitment quotas. These quotas were to guarantee that the military was properly balanced according to region, and the region with the highest quota was the North. Northerners were given favorable treatment at the time of admittance to the armed forces and many standards were lowered so more Northerners could enter the military (16).

As Luckham observed, the Easterners (Ibos) in the military were wary of this Northern exercise of control:

The efforts of the NPC to achieve a regional balance in the officer corps through a quota in recruitment was widely regarded by (other) officers as undue political interference in the military corporation, and raised acute suspicions that similar principles might be applied to the appointments and promotions of officers already in the army (17).

Too, individual officers worried that the influx of Northerners who had graduated from the military academy would take their jobs:

In the particular case of the army, Eastern officers were well aware that places would have to be found for about 50 new officers when the entrants to the Nigerian Military Academy had completed their three-year course of training and were commissioned at the end of 1966. Since the army was not to be expanded, room could only be found for them by thinning out officers in the higher ranks. There were fears that this could give the NPC Minister of Defense the opportunity he needed to adjust the regional balance in the senior ranks of the officer corps (18).


During the political upheavals in Nigeria, the military forces had become increasingly politicized (19). In 1962, army forces were first called in to calm political disturbances in the Western Region. They were activated again in 1964-65. It was rumored, just before the coup attempt in 1966, that the military again would be sent into the Western Region to maintain peace (20). The military officers did not want to be forced to take sides in the political dispute, especially since many did not agree with the government's position (21).

Government intervention in the military's own system of promotion and recruitment, combined with the politicians' need for military force to control political disruptions in the Western Region, served to politicize the Army, which itself was being split by the same regional and ethnic antagonisms which affected the entire country (22).

The military also had not fared well in budgetary matters. Although defense spending increased, the percentage allocated for the army actually declined from 1962 through 1965 [See Graph 1] (23). And the Nigerian military did not receive allocations commensurate with the militaries in similar developing countries (24).

Graph 1

Percentage of
Total Budget



In order to free more funds for development projects, there was a freeze on spending for the army in 1961-62 and again in 1963-64 (25). Military officers' salaries had not been increased for six years before the military takeover (26).

The officers who led the attempted coup primarily were Ibos. As Luckham stated, the Ibos in the military were concerned about their position:

Within the army, the Ibos were among the groups most likely to be adversely affected by the interference of the Northern Minister of Defense. If the blockages in promotion that were building up in the army were to lead to redundancy and political interference in promotion - as many officers feared - the Ibos believed they would be the first group affected...Thus concern among Eastern and Mid-Western officers for their own career security became tied up both with distaste in principle for particularistic restrictions on occupational mobility, and with hostility towards the political regime for its political conservatism and its domination by the North (27).

General Ironsi, who took control after the failed coup, was an Ibo, too. He therefore may have held the same fears other Ibo officers expressed (28). Yet, according to all evidence, Ironsi did not have a role in the failed coup, nor was he actually aware of the level of discontent among the Ibo officers who led the aborted coup.

Despite Ironsi's protestations that he did not know about the coup attempt, the actions which his government took created fears that Ironsi would discriminate against the Northern officers remaining in the armed forces.

The Ibo officers involved in the coup attempt were jailed, but did not receive immediate punishment. Although they had murdered several Northern politicians and several Northern military officers, they did not receive severe punishment and there was no talk of a trial.

The Ibos who remained in the military and served under Ironsi did quite well. A number of officers were promoted to replace those who were killed during the aborted coup. A majority of those promoted were Ibos. These actions by the Ironsi government planted a seed of hostility in some Northern officers and it was these men who engineered the counter-coup in July. (For a breakdown of promotions, see Tables 3 and 4.)

Table 3

Comparison of Ethnic/Regional Origins of 50 Most Senior Officers
Before and After Coup of January 15, 1966

	Number in Each Ethnic/Regional Group							
	<u>Before January 15</u>				<u>After January 15</u>			
	Ibo	Non-Ibo East or Midwest	Yoruba	North	Ibo	Non-Ibo East or Midwest	Yoruba	North
1-10 most senior	2	1	5	2	4	2	2	1
11-20 most senior	4	2	1	3	8	2	1	0
21-30 most senior	7	2	0	1	6	1	2	1
31-40 most senior	8	0	1	1	5	2	3	0
41-50 most senior	4	1	5	0	4	1	2	3

Table 4

Increase of Ibo Percentage Share of
Senior Officers in Military

Number of most Senior Officers (cumulative)	Percent Ibo in Each Cumulative Group of Officers		
	(a) Before January 15	(b) After January 15	Change (b - a)
10 most senior	20%	40%	+20%
20 most senior	30%	60%	+30%
30 most senior	43%	60%	+17%
40 most senior	52.5%	57.5%	+ 5%
50 most senior	50%	54%	+ 4%

Source: Luckham, R., The Nigerian Military, p. 55.

The Coup and Relative Deprivation: Decremental relative deprivation as a contributing factor in the January coup attempt is not based, as in the Ghana cases, on visible declines in the coup leaders' value capabilities. Rather, decremental deprivation is based more on the potential decline in value capabilities.

Politically, the Ibos were being persecuted and it was generally feared among the Ibo population that the government, dominated by Northerners, would attempt to remove Ibos from positions already attained or the government would block the way for advancement of Ibos. The chaotic political environment did nothing to alleviate these fears. Although it was the Western Region which was wracked by political violence, the Yorubas of the West as well as the government leaders from the North, had contributed to the Ibos' plight. In every sense, the Ibos were becoming increasingly isolated.

The ethnic cleavages which divided the country spilled over into the military. Ibo officers perceived that the Northern Minister of Defense was trying systematically to oust Ibos from their positions. Northerners were given preference in recruitment and, it was believed, eventually would be given promotions in the military which would shortchange Ibo officers.

The government lost authority and legitimacy not only by its blatant pursuit of power consolidation and favoritism, but also when it came increasingly to rely on the military to sustain its position. The allocation of scarce resources was unfairly made, intensifying the regional and ethnic conflicts which already were present.

Thus even if the Ibos in the military did not sustain an increase in their value expectations, they did perceive a potential decline in

their value capabilities. Material and non-material expectations could not be met.

With an influx of Northern officers, the Ibo coup leaders believed their material well-being was threatened. Officer positions were limited. And the pattern of preference for men from the North indicated the Ibos soon would be squeezed out.

Political cleavages did not allow for participation by all opposing groups. Elections rigged by Northerners to benefit the North's dominance kept dissidents at bay. The Ibos did not have an opportunity to express their political desires and the system became so clogged with political petty-arguments that little or nothing could be accomplished.

With no recourse to seek political participation, the Ibo officers attempted a coup.

NOTES

1. Ruth First, Power in Africa: Political Power in Africa and the Military (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 287.
2. Ibid., p. 158.
3. N.J. Miners, The Nigerian Army 1956-1966, (London: Methuen and Co., 1971), p. 9.
4. First, Power, p. 153.
5. Miners, Army, p. 10.
6. First, Power, p. 145.
7. Ibid., p. 149.
8. Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 215.
9. Ibid., p. 214.
10. Ibid., p. 215.
11. Ibid., p. 218.
12. Ibid., p. 219.
13. Miners, Army, p. 9.
14. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 227.
15. Ibid., p. 228.
16. Ibid., p. 231.
17. Ibid., p. 227.
18. Miners, Army, p. 211.
19. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 203.
20. Miners, Army, p. 215.
21. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 143.
22. First, Power, p. 161.
23. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 235. Figures derived from statistics given.

24. Ibid., p. 236.
25. Miners, Army, p. 95.
26. Ibid., p. 175.
27. Luckham, Nigerian Military, pp. 48-49.
28. Miners, Army, p. 158.

Case Study: Nigeria, July 1966

During the six months of military rule under Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, some substantial military changes led to the bloody coup in July, 1966.

Political: Ironsi did little to affect the economic conditions in Nigeria, but he did alter the political situation and the condition of the armed forces.

The fact that Ironsi took control of the government and was an Ibo reinforced speculation that he had been privy to the January coup (1). This belief did little to relieve regional antagonisms. Ironsi reinforced the rumors when, in May 1966, he announced Decree No. 34 of the Federal Military Government which stated that, henceforth Nigeria would be a unitary state. Following the decree announcement, riots broke out in some Northern cities and the violence was directed against Ibos there. The resulting bloodbath left scores of Ibos dead amid tales of horror (2).

The government contemplated sending the army in to halt the violence, but Ironsi decided that such an action would intensify feelings of regional and ethnic hatred.

Just prior to Decree No. 34, Ironsi had appointed three study groups to examine Nigeria's political and economic future. Of the 24 members of the committee, only five were from the North. None of the committee's heads was from the North (3). These appointments were perceived as a slight. Many Northerners felt that, because of the region's preponderance of population, it should have had greater representation on the committees (4).

To replace several senior officers who had been murdered during the coup attempt in January, Ironsi made 25 appointments. Though the murdered officers had been primarily from the North, Ironsi replaced them with non-Northerners; 11 majors were promoted to substantive lieutenant colonels, and 14 others were given the rank of acting lieutenant colonel. Of the 25, 18 were Ibos from the East and Midwest, five were Northerners, one was a Yoruba and one was a Midwesterner (5). These promotions were regarded with suspicion by the Northerners who perceived they were now out of power.

To the government, these were simple examples of promotion on 'merit.' But to the Northern rank and file it appeared that an Ibo government was doing what it was expected to do - promote Ibos to senior posts - and they naturally assumed that this pattern would be followed for promotions in the lower ranks in the future (6).

Military recruitment also presented Northerners with a different view of Ironsi. The quotas which had been established by the NPC government apparently were being disregarded. It appeared Northerners were to be kept out of the military.

In that month (July), a new draft of army recruits was enrolled at the depot in Zaria. A large number of potential recruits from the North were turned down and preference seemed to be given to Southerners. It had been customary for each province in the North to send a pre-selected batch of recruits to the depot for their medical and intelligence tests. In July, the squad sent by the provincial office in Sokoto were practically all rejected on the tests, a thing that had not happened before. If the same thing happened to the recruits sent by other Northern provinces, it is easy to understand the fears that, in the name of 'merit' for former regional recruitment quotas were to be disregarded and the army packed with Ibos (7).

In fact, though, the government was attempting to achieve a more nearly perfect regional balance. Prior to the coup attempt, the regional quotas had created an imbalance in the military, with the Northerners dominating the rank and file and the Ibos dominating officer ranks. By allowing more Southerners to enter as recruits, the government hoped to

even out the imbalance in the lower levels of the military (8).

Instead, the Northerners feared they were being purposely left out of military opportunities.

In April, the Air Force dismissed over 30 cadets, mostly Northerners, who had been admitted with low educational qualifications under the civilian regime, but had already gone through two years of training (9).

Northern officers within the military were embittered by the relative inaction against the men who attempted the January coup and who had killed a number of Northern officers and political leaders. The conspirators were confined in jail, but the Ironsi government did not make any statements about the conspirators' future. Ironsi had not suggested a trial or punishment of the coup leaders and it even was rumored they still received their military paychecks (10).

Eventually, the Northerners' fears of Ibo domination gave way to another military coup - this one far bloodier and more divisive than the January attempt. As Luckham reported:

The conspicuous position of Ibo officers in the hierarchy also fitted in with the Northerners' understanding of the new political position, namely that the North had lost power and the East had gained it. Thus, it was easy to believe that conspiratorial design rather than the demographic characteristics of the officer corps itself had placed Ibos in command...Similarly, after the first coup, the Northern junior officers were more likely to feel their career advancement would suffer because of the dominance of the Ibos in the command hierarchy and Maj. Gen. Ironsi's military government (11).

The Coup and Relative Deprivation: In the six months that Ibos led the government of Nigeria, those Northerners in the officer corps began believing they would attain no advancements or benefits from Ironsi's government. They also perceived their region of the country would be short-changed in allocations of resources.

Just as decremental deprivation attempts to measure the decline in value capabilities, the theory also provides for potential declines in capabilities. When perceived potential declines are understood, the same kind of action which results from measurable declines in capabilities can result.

So while the Northern military officers who led the July coup may not have perceived an established decline in their ability to achieve their expectations, they could have perceived a potential decline in their capabilities.

Since these officers had seen the January military coup attempt, it was not difficult for them to justify military intervention. They already were politicized; by the January aborted coup and by their own view of an Ibo government. With the power already in the hands of military men, there was no alternate means for them to ensure that power would be returned to the hands of Northerners - unless they staged a coup.

NOTES

1. Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 58.
2. Ruth First, Power in Africa: Political Power in Africa and the Military (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 311.
3. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 265.
4. Ibid., p. 269.
5. N.J. Miners, The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966 (London: Methuen and Co., 1971), p. 210.
6. Ibid., p. 211.
7. Ibid., p. 212.
8. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 267.
9. Ibid., p. 268.
10. Miners, Army, p. 209.
11. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 58.

Case Study: Nigeria 1975

In 1975, after nine years of military rule under Gen. Yakubu Gowon, a faction of the military seized the reigns of power while Gowon was in Kampala, Uganda at an Organization of African Unity meeting. The coup was bloodless and its leaders promised the routines of daily life would not be interrupted. The men who assumed power did not promise any sweeping governmental changes. Rather, in their statements to the public, they stated they decided to oust Gowon in order to rectify prevailing economic and political problems (1).

Economic: Nigeria faced economic troubles in 1975 despite its vast oil wealth. Oil revenue actually declined during the first months of 1975 despite increases in production (2).

Instead of solving Nigeria's economic woes, oil actually did some economic damage. Because the oil revenue jumped during 1973 and 1974, Gowon assigned a commission to examine the possibility of giving public servants pay increases. After careful study, the Udoji Commission recommended government employees (except the police and military) should receive 30 percent pay boosts. The proposal also suggested the pay boost be retroactive to April 1974. When the Udoji "awards" were given, public workers received about nine months worth of pay hikes in one lump sum (3). The recipients of the rewards were delighted, but the results were far from welcome (4).

Inflation, which had not been a major economic problem in Nigeria, began soaring. By some estimates, the inflation rates on some goods hit 70 percent to 300 percent. The national average for the first quarter of

1975 was 27 percent (5). There was a severe shortage of many consumer goods because the public workers spent their windfalls for previously unattainable items. The port congestion in Lagos became so severe some ships had to wait months before they could dock (6).

While the public workers were enjoying greater salaries, the private workers were dissatisfied and the country was plagued with strikes (7). Most strikers were eventually granted pay raises averaging about 30 percent, the same pay hike the public workers received. Unfortunately, these pay increases only aggravated the inflation rate.

Gowon had decided to instigate a massive development plan, but inflation and misguidance made the plan virtually unworkable. Thus, economic conditions were tumultuous and there appeared to be no clear plans for economic revival (8).

Political: The year 1975 began on a tenuous note for Nigeria. During his Independence Day address on October 1, 1974, Gowon had made some statements which startled the country and some promises which later plagued him. Nigeria had been working toward a resumption of civilian rule, which was supposed to culminate in elections in 1976. But Gowon decided to postpone indefinitely the turn to civilian government and his announcement stimulated suspicion he wanted to retain office (9).

In order to quiet these suspicions, Gowon promised he would oust the state governors, who were generally viewed as corrupt and he promised he would create more states, a move desired by many of Nigeria's ethnic groups (10). During his next few months in office, Gowon did nothing to indicate he was thinking of creating more states, and it was this lack of action which was cited as one motive for the coup.

Politically, Nigeria was dominated by a few individuals who were believed to be corrupt. Corruption and bribery extended from the highest ranking military officers down to postal clerks and local law enforcement officers (11). It was well-known that nothing in the country could be accomplished unless some palms were greased. Gowon's government, while speaking out against corruption, did little to halt it. Even Ayo Fasanmi, General Secretary of the National Anti-Corruption of Nigeria campaign claimed the government's efforts to stem bribery and corruption were "ineffectual" (12). Many honest Nigerians were tired of the corruption and blamed it on Gowon's lack of concern.

Another political event which Gowon did not handle well was the 1973 census. The first national census was taken in 1963. Since the plan to return to civilian rule was to be based on representation by population, it was decided another census should be undertaken, but the results were far from satisfying (13).

The census results showed a massive increase in population in a decade, 43.5 percent. This increase occurred while similar developing countries in Asia were registering only about 2.5 percent to 3 percent population growth rates (14). The Nigerian 1973 census cost the government more than \$50 million. The population totals showed a substantial increase in the North (see Table 1), which created fears that Northerners would again dominate the government. There were even cries from some Southern politicians that the census-takers in the North had counted cows in order to preserve Northern dominance.

Table 1

	1973	1963	% Increase
Northeastern	15.38m	7.79m	+97.3
Kano	10.90	5.77	+88.9
Western	8.92	9.49	- 5.1
North Western	8.50	5.73	+48.3
East Central	8.06	7.23	+11.4
Benue Plateau	5.17	4.01	+28.9
North Central	6.79	4.10	+65.6
Kwara State	4.64	2.40	+93.3
South Eastern	3.46	3.62	- 4.4
Mid Western	3.24	2.54	+27.5
Lagos	2.47	1.44	+71.5
Rivers	2.23	1.54	+44.8
	79.76	55.66	+43.5

Military: The military was not in a state of disarray. Gowon had spent millions of dollars training and equipping his armed forces, but there was evidence of some dissatisfaction. Just after the coup, its leader, Gen. Murtala Muhammed, accused Gowon of neglecting the administration of the military and claimed that the military had tried to deal with Gowon but could not continue to do so (15).

Following the Udoji awards, the police and military had received significant pay boosts, but these additional salaries came after inflation already had decreased the individual officer's buying power.

The military also was unhappy with the lack of promotions given during Gowon's tenure (16). In fact, many observers noted that there were precious few officers overseeing a growing number of enlisted men. The observations included speculation that some higher ranking officers may

have been unhappy with the lack of increase in the officer corps (17). In fact, after the coup, a number of officers were purged (along with many public servants) and a new, larger cadre of officers surfaced (18). Although this was not an unusual event to accompany a new military regime, it was generally viewed as significant (19).

Muhammed and the other leaders of the coup planned to reduce the size of the military, claiming Gowon had allowed the organization to get too large. Yet it is interesting to observe the growth of the defense budget in the years preceeding and following the 1975 coup (Table 2).

Table 2
Capital Expenditure - Defense

1974-75	\$ 548,000,000
1975-76	\$1,200,000,000
1976-77	\$1,131,000,000
1977-78	\$1,333,000,000

The Coup and Relative Deprivation: As with the 1966 coups in Nigeria, relative deprivation can be viewed as a force in the 1975 military action. The entire country was dissatisfied with Gowon's regime, although he at one time had been popular.

Inflation had made it almost impossible for working men and women to expect a significant increase in their standard of living. The high inflation was attributed to Gowon's regime and the granting of the Udoji awards. The resulting shortages and port congestion meant families were not able to purchase even the most common goods. Thus, even for the average Nigerian, relative deprivation was prevalent. Value expectations exceeded value capabilities.

Politically, Gowon's regime had lost credibility when it renounced civilian rule and when Gowon could not fulfill his promise to create a greater number of states. Though these factors did not affect the individual's material expectations, it did challenge many people's non-material desires.

The men in the military had their own particularistic sense of deprivation. It is worth noting that the 1975 coup was conceived and executed by the same core of officers who had participated in the July 1966 coup. Although there is no indication they were feeling individually wronged, there was in evidence a general feeling of dissatisfaction with Gowon and his programs.

The post-coup promotions of a number of officers and the sizable increase in defense expenditures indicates there was a sense of deprivation which was rectified with the ousting of Gowon. Certainly, the men who took power from Gowon believed their actions would benefit society as a whole, and if the military benefited, too, that was all right.

The perception of relative deprivation (decremental) permeated all of Nigerian society at the time of the 1975 action, and the military would not have been excluded from this perception. As has been the case before, the military is not isolated from the problems of the whole society. But when those problems are seen to hamper or denigrate the military, often military men will act.

NOTES

1. Africa Diary, September 3-9, 1975, p. 7586.
2. Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76, B750.
3. Africa Report, October 1975, p. 10.
4. Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, B800.
5. West Africa, March 31, 1975, p. 380.
6. Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, B781.
7. Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, B800.
8. Ibid.
9. Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75, B733.
10. Africa Report, September-October 1975, p. 9.
11. West Africa, August 4, 1975, p. 913.
12. Nigerian Tribune, April 23, 1975, pp. 4-9.
13. Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75, B739.
14. Ibid.
15. West Africa, August 4, 1975, p. 913.
16. Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, B783.
17. West Africa, August 4, 1975, p. 887.
18. Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, B786.
19. West Africa, August 4, 1975, p. 888.

Chapter 4

CONCLUSION: RELATIVE DEPRIVATION IN ANALYSIS OF COUPS

Military coups are a form of political change which have become increasingly common in the developing countries during the past two decades. In Africa, many countries came under military rule within a few years of gaining independence from colonial rulers.

This thesis examines relative deprivation and how it may be applied to military coups in Ghana and Nigeria. It has been demonstrated that relative deprivation, in general, and decremental deprivation, in particular, provide a framework for bringing together the disparate elements of the military coups of the 1960's and 1970's.

Relative deprivation is defined as an individual's or group's perception of a void between value expectations and value capabilities. Decremental deprivation exists when value expectations remain on a stable level while value capabilities decline.

In Ghana, in 1966 and 1972, the economic, political and military conditions were similar. Prior to both coups, the economic troubles in that country included rising inflation, growing trade deficits, chronically unbalanced domestic budgets and weaknesses in the local currency.

Politically, the regimes which held power had lost authority and legitimacy. Kwame Nkrumah's grab for absolute power and his inability to rectify economic deficiencies eroded his legitimacy. Kofi Busia experienced similar failures in solving Ghana's economic ills.

Before both coups, the military expressed dissatisfaction with the regime. In 1966, the leaders of the coup voiced hostility toward Nkrumah and were particularly insulted by his Palace Guard. The coup leaders of 1972 were unhappy with Busia's austerity budget, especially since it cut so deeply into the military's material well-being.

Thus, prior to both coups, decremental deprivation was present and was perceived by those members of the military who staged the coups. Although value expectations may have remained the same, value capabilities declined.

While in Ghana, decremental deprivation was the result of a visible decline in material value capabilities, the 1966 coups in Nigeria involved non-material decremental deprivation.

In Nigeria in 1966, political troubles stemmed from a breakdown in the multi-party political system which was established by the British prior to Nigeria's independence in 1960. Regional and ethnic tensions had split the country. As the North seemed to consolidate its dominant position, other regions feared Northern power. This fear extended into the military, and the leaders of the aborted coup of January 1966, expressed their perceived alienation from government and society.

The situation in July 1966 was paralleled to the situation in January. The Northern officers who led the coup feared the government had been taken over by Ibos and acted to stave off potential harm.

Nigeria in 1966 differed from Ghana in that decremental deprivation was not quite so obvious. The men who led the coups were not materially deprived, but they did believe their non-material value capabilities (i.e., ability to affect governmental order and governmental fairness) were reduced and they did perceive their material well-being would be affected adversely

if governmental changes (i.e., dominance by members of a specific region) did not occur. They did perceive themselves as experiencing decremental deprivation.

In 1975, the coup leaders in Nigeria again perceived relative deprivation - affecting both material and non-material value capabilities. Economic decline led to a reduction in the material position of the military officers who instigated the coup. Inflation was rampant and the government did not appear able to cope with it. Then, too, the political situation had deteriorated. Gen. Yakubu Gowon had made promises which he could not keep. He did nothing to halt corruption, he did not move to create more states and he refused to allow the government to be turned over to civilians.

The ability of the military leaders to work with Gowon and change perceived governmental errors decreased as Gowon isolated himself from the military. Value capabilities, (i.e., ability to renew the economy and ability to rectify political problems) declined.

Three forms of relative deprivation have been studied. These coup case studies focused on decremental deprivation rather than aspirational or progressive deprivation. This came about because with progressive and aspirational deprivation, there must be a method for determining value expectations. In both forms of relative deprivation value expectations increase. In decremental deprivation, value expectations remain stable. With the limited data available about the individual coup leaders and what they wanted, there was no way to determine if value expectations had increased. By theorizing that expectations had remained stable, the existence of decremental deprivation became apparent.

Research into this area needs to be expanded. If value expectations can be more accurately determined, perhaps through interviews with coup leaders, as more definite link between relative deprivation and military coups might be forged. This thesis has merely explored the surface of this possibility and has examined decremental deprivation as relevant to military coups.

It should be noted that relative deprivation is a perceived problem and one which, without significantly more information, cannot be proved. In the case studies of Nigeria and Ghana, it has been suggested that decremental deprivation existed in society as a whole as well as existing within the military groups which led the coups.

Deprivation and its effect on the military cannot be isolated from deprivation's effect on society as a whole because the military organization is not divorced from those forces which affect the society. The military is unique in that if politicized members of the military perceive deprivation, hold the government responsible and decide to act, they have a monopoly on arms which permits them to act. In many developing countries, the division between the military and the government which is instilled in most Western militaries, is not so apparent. Whereas most Western military leaders ascribe to notions of military non-intervention, the militaries of developing countries have not yet fully developed that non-interference standard.

Those military men in developing countries who act against the government may not represent the military as a group; rather they represent a disaffected group within the military body. They do not always act in concert with the entire military or in concert with the public will.

They are not isolated from society, but experience the same deprivations. However, the military men who lead coups have the ability to correct perceived deprivations.

In this way, the theory of relative deprivation can act as an umbrella for other coup theories. Theorists who believe coups result from economic dissatisfaction, political alienation, social injustices or military self-interest may find that relative deprivation theory encompasses all those motivations and provides a reference point from which to proceed.

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MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT AND RELATIVE
DEPRIVATION: NIGERIA AND GHANA

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS
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ABSTRACT

Analyses of military coups d'etat in developing countries focus on the variety of elements at work prior to the coup. Economic, political, social, ethnic or military facets of coups have been explored.

What is needed is a conceptual framework which allows all elements to be brought together and examined with the realization that the particular factors do not work in isolation, but are intertwined.

Relative deprivation can be used as a reference point from which the elements of military coups can be brought together. Once the conceptual umbrella is established, it is used in case studies of military coups in Ghana (1966, 1972) and Nigeria (1966, 1975). The individual examinations are united with relative deprivation and it is demonstrated that relative deprivation has a variety of possible applications for use in analyzing military coups.

Specifically, decremental relative deprivation is isolated and used in assessing forces at work in Ghana and Nigeria before the coups. It was determined that, as economic, political and military positions declined, decremental relative deprivation was perceived. This perception was well developed prior to the military interventions.

In the two Ghana coups, particularly, the data was extensive enough to specify the decline in value capabilities which preceeded the perception of decremental relative deprivation. Specific documentation of Ghana's economy, political troubles, plus accounts of the coup leaders helped establish relative value positions prior to the coups.