A ways and means analysis of sub-state political violence

by

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B.A., University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2005
M.A., Kansas State University, 2010

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

This project examines the choices that rebel groups make between different types of sub-state political violence campaigns. I argue that rebels will choose a specific campaign type based on variations in the levels of state actions that cause grievances (referred to as coercion), and the capacity of both the state and the rebel group. This project develops a framework to explain the rebel decision-making process. The rebels seek to change the political behavior of the state by undertaking some form of violent campaign. Rebel campaigns are the ways in which rebels seek to obtain their ends; this project delineates between terrorist, insurgent, and civil war campaigns. However, rebels' choice of campaign is affected by several factors: coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity. I hypothesize that the different types of campaigns are affected differently by these factors. Additionally, I hypothesize that levels of coercion are more strongly related to the initial year of the campaign than subsequent years, regardless of campaign type. These hypotheses are analyzed via quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, this includes the development of novel latent variables for coercion and capacity prior to empirical testing of the hypotheses. Qualitatively, two case studies of rebel groups are examined; the Mau Mau in Kenya and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The research finds limited support for the hypotheses regarding the relationships between coercion and capacity, and the rebels' choice of campaign.

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Approved by:

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This project examines the choices that rebel groups make between different types of sub-state political violence campaigns. I argue that rebels will choose a specific campaign type based on variations in the levels of state actions that cause grievances (referred to as coercion), and the capacity of both the state and the rebel group. This project develops a framework to explain the rebel decision-making process. The rebels seek to change the political behavior of the state by undertaking some form of violent campaign. Rebel campaigns are the ways in which rebels seek to obtain their ends; this project delineates between terrorist, insurgent, and civil war campaigns. However, rebels' choice of campaign is affected by several factors: coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity. I hypothesize that the different types of campaigns are affected differently by these factors. Additionally, I hypothesize that levels of coercion are more strongly related to the initial year of the campaign than subsequent years, regardless of campaign type. These hypotheses are analyzed via quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, this includes the development of novel latent variables for coercion and capacity prior to empirical testing of the hypotheses. Qualitatively, two case studies of rebel groups are examined; the Mau Mau in Kenya and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The research finds limited support for the hypotheses regarding the relationships between coercion and capacity, and the rebels' choice of campaign.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

The historical record provides us with numerous examples of one type of political violence coexisting or transitioning into another type of violence. For example, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan has been described as terrorism, insurgency, and/or civil war—depending on the time, the location, and the perspective of the observer. What is true of Afghanistan is also true in research that looks at these phenomena; while terrorism, insurgency, and civil war all refer to forms of sub-state political violence, they are often studied in isolation from each other.

This is an important omission; research that focuses only on one type of violence tends to explain the rebel group choice in terms of a choice between non-violence and the one type of violence under study.[1] Such research does not address the fact that rebel groups may be making choices between different types of sub-state violence, rather than only facing a choice between non-violence and a given type of violence. While several scholars have pointed out the need for research that links types of sub-state violence together (Findley and Young 2012; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Carter 2016), little work has been done to develop a framework to tie together multiple types of sub-state violence, which, in turn, would permit better analysis of the factors that affect rebel choice of a specific type of political violence. This research seeks to offer a new framework which provides just that.

[1] Significant fields of literature exist that examine the relationship between any one type of sub-state violence and explanatory factors. Listing all research done in each field is beyond the scope of this project, however, some examples are as follows. Researchers studying terrorism in isolation include Laqueur (1987), Pape (2005), Jongman (1988), Crenshaw (1981), Victoroff (2005), Abrahms (2008), and Hoffman (2006). Researchers studying insurgency in isolation include Galula (2006), Kilcullen (2010), Muller and Seligson (1987), Metz and Millen (2004), and Fowler (2005). Researchers studying civil war in isolation include Hironaka (2005), Sambanis (2004), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Hegre (2001), Buhaug and Gates (2002), and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002).

The problem with examining each type of violence in isolation is that we may be missing the interplay between choices. For example, how much does state coercion affect a rebel choice to respond with terrorism? With an insurgent campaign? Is this choice of terrorism or insurgency predicated on rebel capacity? What about the state's capacity to retaliate against violent rebel action? I argue that coercion, as well as state and rebel capacity, need to be examined together, in relationship to the different sub-state violence types that are available to rebels, in order to have a more complete picture of when rebel groups will choose a specific type of violence. Without considering the choice that rebel groups have among these three options, we will not have the complete story as to how groups will elect to choose a specific type of violence. This is a question that has not yet fully been addressed in the literature.

There is a small field literature that includes the quantitative analysis of choices between different types of sub-state violence, however, this extant literature does not provide a comprehensive framework that encompasses terrorism, insurgency, and civil war.[2] Findley and Young (2012) look at the incidence of terrorist events within civil war. Carter (2016) distinguishes between strategies of terrorist and insurgent attacks. Fearon and Laitin (2003) discuss the differences between insurgency and civil war. Several other authors identify that there are multiple types of sub-state violence that rebels can choose between, but these frameworks remain more abstract, and do not rigorously identify and address how the issues of capacity and coercion can serve as explanatory factors.[3]

Developing a theory that links specific configurations of structural factors with specific violence types would allow for greater precision in explaining sub-state violence choices, and

[2] See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of the choices rebels make between different types of sub-state violence.

[3] See Chapter 2 for a full discussion of these theoretical frameworks.

that is what this project does in the following pages. In doing so, this research advances the literature by providing a better understanding of rebel choices between types of violence, which has implications for the study of terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and sub-state violence more broadly.

In order to address these issues, and to add to our understanding of why rebel groups may choose different types of violence, this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I argue that, instead of looking at discrete conflict events, political violence can better be understood as the *ways* by which rebel groups seek to change the political behavior of a state. This concept of *ways* draws on two fields of literature. The first, from military and strategic studies, describes *ways* in relationship to *ends* and *means* in terms of strategy development (Gray 2014; Yarger 2012). In this framework, the *ways*, or actions, are constrained by the *means*, or limiting conditions, available to the rebel groups. Utilizing the ends-ways-means framework means that acts of political violence can be placed in their larger context, understood as elements of a strategy of violence chosen by the rebel group. The first advantage of this ends-ways-means framework is that the types of rebel violence—terrorist, insurgent, and civil war—can then be understood as a set of options that rebel groups choose between, rather than as isolated phenomenon.

This concept of a set of options, or *ways*, dovetails neatly with political science literature on the phenomenon of 'policy substitution'. Introduced in Chapter 2, and discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, policy substitution research focuses on how different conditions facing an actor may change the behavior that actor chooses to employ in order—the choices it can substitute between—to achieve its goals (Most and Starr 1984). The policy substitution research field is focused on the choices that states make, vis-à-vis other states (Levy and Thompson 2010; Morrow 1993; Lake 1996; Clark and Reed 2005) or vis-à-vis non-state groups (Moore 2000;

Enterline and Gleditsch 2000). However, the substitution literature has only rarely examined how rebel groups may make substitutions; a search of the literature found only three similar usages of the substitution framework when looking at rebel groups. [4] In perhaps the application closest to this project, Bueno de Mesquita (2013) looks at rebel group choice between conventional or unconventional tactics. Cunningham et al. (2005) looks at the choice of duration in civil wars, and Frisch (2009) looks at the choice of target: attacking the state versus another rebel group. Therefore, a second advantage of this approach is the extension of the policy substitution literature further into studies of rebel group choices by expanding the menu of choices of sub-state violence types that rebel groups have.

Chapter 2 also introduces the concept of a *campaign*, which is a time-constrained series of actions focused on achieving a specific objective. A campaign can encompass multiple types of violent events, and the same type of event may be present in multiple campaign types. However, differentiating between campaign types is still possible, since this classification scheme is focused on the aggregate characteristics, or overarching *ways*, rather than individual events. By grouping events into campaigns, it becomes easier to answer the question raised in the opening paragraph of this chapter; an insurgent campaign may include an *act* of terrorism, but it will also include other criteria that differentiate it from a terrorist *campaign*.

This differentiation between campaign types is the focus of Chapter 3, which delineates three *ways* of rebel campaigns: terrorist, insurgent, and civil war. In order to do so, this chapter first reviews the multiplicity of definitions and descriptions of each phenomenon, and then

[4] There is also some literature on tactical substitution in rebel groups, such as the type of terrorist attack (kidnapping/bombing/etc.) to be used given a certain counterterrorism policy (Enders and Sandler 1993, Enders and Sandler 2006, Brandt and Sandler 2009, Faria 2007).

addresses the theoretical defensibility of understanding that phenomenon as a campaign. A review of previous research on civil wars reveals that this type of violence is already often implicitly understood in campaign-style terms (e.g. Sambanis 2004; Chenowith and Lewis 2013). Insurgency is sometimes—when it is viewed as a subset of civil war—also treated in this manner (e.g. Byman 2008; Connable and Libicki 2010). While references to terrorist campaigns exist in descriptive literature (e.g. Pape 2005; Crenshaw 2008), terrorism is typically measured in terms of the occurrence and frequency of discrete events. Chapter 3 argues, however, that terrorism should be understood as a campaign, and that doing so may permit for a better understanding of why terrorism occurs, relative to other types of sub-state violence.

Chapter 4 delves into how the structural conditions of the state and the rebel group, as the means that influence rebel choice, are linked to the onset and occurrence of campaigns. The variations between these different structural conditions are therefore expected to correlate with different campaign types. Drawing from an organizational structure proposed by Bell et al. (2013), this chapter identifies three casual groups of factors for sub-state political violence: coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. Utilizing an approach of coercion and capacity as the primary predictors of sub-state violence agrees with much of the extant research in this area.[5]

However, the lacuna in this area is not so much what the major causal factors are, but instead how changes in those causal factors might co-vary with different types of sub-state violence. Previous research into the causes of generalized sub-state political violence has tended toward binary measures of conflict occurrence or at rough measures of magnitude of conflict,

[5] There is a vast literature on the causes of sub-state violence (cf. Gurr 1970, Tilly 1978, Lichbach 1994, Gurr 2000, Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Regan and Norton 2005, Weinstein 2007, Kalyvas 2006).

rather than the *type* of conflict, which is the focus of this project. Research in the specific fields of terrorism, insurgency, and civil war have also identified predictors for a specific type of violence, but these predictors typically do not take into account the incidence of other types of violence, which they may also predict. Chapter 4 combines the findings from these multiple research areas, developing hypotheses as to how the variations between coercion and capacity help explain the onset and incidence of different types of sub-state political violence.

Once generated, these hypotheses undergo rigorous testing in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. Chapter 5 utilizes latent variable techniques to develop novel measures of coercion and capacity. Latent variable modeling, new to social science literature, captures a measure of the shared variance of multiple observed variables, which provides information on the unobservable, or inferred, variable of interest. This chapter extends previous efforts to use latent variables to capture aspects of state capacity, and also provides a first attempt at generating latent variables for aspects of rebel capacity, something that has not previously been attempted in the literature. Chapter 6 quantitatively analyzes rebel campaigns across multiple countries and years in order to empirically test the hypotheses on rebel campaign choice. In order to do so, this chapter develops a novel methodology for measuring terrorist campaigns (as opposed to terrorist events). In so doing, this project makes a contribution to research in sub-state violence by developing a standardized, replicable campaign classification scheme for terrorism, generating unit commensurability between terrorist campaigns and insurgent or civil war campaigns. Chapter 6 incorporates this campaign data with the latent variables generated in Chapter 5, alongside other widely used and accepted preexisting data sources, to develop this project's dataset. Multinomial probit analysis is performed on this dataset. Results from the empirical testing provide some support for the hypotheses.

Chapters 7 and 8 test the hypotheses by qualitatively examining two historical case studies of sub-state politicized violence in Kenya and Sri Lanka. Each case study provides an in-depth look at the onset and occurrence of different types of rebel campaigns, with a particular focus on how campaign choices were affected by changes in coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. The results of these case studies generally support the hypothesis, but also provide a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between these factors in specific contexts. Chapter 9 reviews the results of the quantitative and qualitative hypotheses testing, and discusses how framing sub-state violence as campaigns chosen by rebels offers a better way of understanding the onset and occurrence of specific types of sub-state violence. The chapter ends by describing the implications of this project on future research on this topic.

Chapter 2 - Ends, Ways, Means: A Framework

One of the challenges of study of political violence is that events—battles, bombs, and massacres—are easier to observe and record than the larger strategies that drive these events. This is logical, but unfortunate. The observation of discrete phenomenon is easy to record, since it is part of the public record. However, the motivation behind these discrete events is of more import, since understanding the overarching goals of the rebel group offers a clearer picture of why certain violent activities are undertaken. As Friedman (2014, 27) notes, "Tactics are the currency used to buy strategic effect and they are far more tangible than the item that they are intending to purchase. Observers tend to focus on the tangible at the expense of the intangible."

I argue that, not only are the violent actions taken by rebels are driven by these underlying, less tangible goals, but if we can identify the broader courses of action rebel groups choose to take in pursuit of these goals, we should also then be able to better understand what structural factors explain those courses of action. The focus of this project, therefore, is to broaden the frame of analysis and look at relationships between multiple types of sub-state conflict, and to do so not by studying the happenstance of discrete events, but rather to categorize the broader actions of sub-state rebellion into specific types and then determine which type is most likely to occur, given observable structural conditions. In order to do so, I utilize an ends-ways-means framework originally proposed by theorists of military strategy, but which also incorporates political science theories of policy substitution and rationality.

The framework of ends, ways, and means is used to understand military actions within a larger context (Clausewitz 1976, 87). This ends-ways-means framework is still in wide use today as a method of understanding national security strategy, and the tradeoffs that occur between

what a state would like to achieve strategically, and what is possible, given current conditions.[6] This framework provides a basis for explaining how different types of rebel activities can be understood as options, substitutable for each other based, with the choice of violence type made by a rational actor. I argue that the framework proposed here offers three benefits. First, this framework explicitly lays the substitutable nature of campaigns of sub-state violence. Though, as discussed in the next chapter, identifying campaigns is not new to the literature, however, the framework that delineates between comparable campaigns is. Second, using this framework permits individual events to be nested underneath those campaigns. In doing so, it organizes and makes clear the delineations between specific events and larger, more sustained choices, or courses of action, taken by a rebel group. Again, this explicit delimitation of the relationship between tactical actions and larger campaigns, which permits events of one type to be subsumed into larger categories that may be of the same or a different type, is an addition to the methodologies currently at use. Though there are examples of interpreting events within larger campaigns or wars (Findley and Young 2012), this project draws up on this previous research to formalize a more encompassing methodology that ranges across multiple event and campaign types. Finally, while drawing from policy substitution and rationality literature, this approach is unique in that it incorporates these political science fields with the ends-ways-means concept from the field of strategic and military studies. By combining these two fields, the findings from the political science fields are tied into a specific unit of analysis, the campaign, which is strictly delimited, whereas in the larger literature in these fields, the unit of analysis can vary widely.

While the ends-ways-means framework comes from the fields of military and strategic studies, it relates to a similar concept that exists within the political science field, in the concept

[6] For examples of modern usage, see Friedman (2014) or Hammes (2011).

of 'policy substitution'. Policy substitution, in its original sense, focused on the different foreign policy choices that a state could make in response to a give situation (Most and Starr 1984). This substitution argument is extended in Chapter 4 to help explain how rebels might choose between different types of violent sub-state campaigns. In this way, the ends-ways-means framework provides an overarching approach to understanding the expression of rebel violence, and the substitution literature provides additional insights into the choices that rebels make in choosing between different ways, based on variations in the means.

The primary assumption required to use the ends, ways, means framework is that of the rational actor. Actors—in this case, the state and the rebel group—are assumed to act rationality. In this sense, actors are considered to be utility maximizers who are capable of critically considering their options for action, and then undertaking the option which appears to be the most likely path to bring about success. This is not to imply that rebel campaigns will always be successful, but rather that, among a limited choice of options, the onset and occurrence of different types of rebel campaigns is the product of a rational calculation by the rebel group actor. Such an approach is related to, and consistent with, extant literature (cf. Crenshaw 1981; Sandler et al. 1983; Lichbach 1987). The rationality assumption is critical to utilizing an ends-ways-means framework for understanding rebel violence. Without some form of rationality assumption on the part of the actors, there would be no logic to a causal relationship between the means and the ways of violence, as the actors would not seek to understand, or be constrained by, their—or their opponents'—capabilities (*means*) prior to choosing a course of action. Yarger (2012, 45) supports this argument when he notes that the "underlying assumption" of an ends-ways-means approach is that "competitive entities have interests that they will pursue to the best of their abilities. …Strategy is fundamentally a choice." Without the assumption of rationality,

actors cannot be assumed to make choices that are in their own best interests; as Gray (2014, 53) notes, "it is sensible to define rational behavior as that which seeks purposefully to match ends, ways, and means."

Additionally, this ends-ways-means framework provides an extension of political science research on conflict that acknowledges similar relationships. Such an outlook can be seen in research put forward by Findley and Young, who state that:

> Different varieties of violence may actually fit within a similar strategic approach. Thus, whereas the key actors in conflict are variably referred to as dissidents, rebels, insurgents, terrorists, and revolutionaries, among others, and are often treated separately, they may follow a similar strategic logic in their choices to use violence. (Findley and Young 2012, 287)

Findley and Young (2012) provide support to two key arguments in this project, when they note that actions should be separated from actors, and that different types of civil conflict actions should be studied in relationship to each other. Additional support for this argument comes from Chenowith and Lewis (2013), who also argue for the use of the campaign as the unit of analysis, and indeed contribute their own campaign-based dataset to the literature.

However, there are some limitations to both Findley and Young (2012) and Chenowith and Lewis (2013). First, Findley and Young (2012) do not establish a broad theoretical framework to explain how different types of violence start or change in relationship to each other. This is because their research is focused solely on terrorism that occurs in pre-, ongoing-, and post-civil wars; they do not analyze terrorism when it occurs outside of intrastate wars. Also, while they note that a range of other sub-state violent actions should be included in research that looks at relationships between violence types, they themselves do not include these other types of violence in their research. Similarly, Chenowith and Lewis (2013) provide a single category of

'violent' campaign that is primarily built upon civil war data (it also includes a few instances of insurgency). Their focus is on the difference between violent and nonviolent campaigns; choices between different types of violent campaigns are identified as being beyond the scope of their research (Chenowith 2011, 6-7).

The ends-ways-means framework can provide an overall context for understanding the strategic direction a rebel group chooses to take. Though this framework is not new, I propose a novel application of the framework in order to better analyze the actions of rebel actors, one that also incorporates research on policy substitution and rationality. Though there are some historical case studies of specific groups which do utilize an ends-ways-means framework for analysis, to the best of my knowledge no formalized broad theory, applicable to all states over an extended period of time, exists which takes into account the ends, ways, and means of rebel groups as the starting point for understanding which causal factors are linked most closely with a specific course of rebel action. By filling this research lacuna, this project provides a more comprehensive overview of what factors explain the campaign choices that rebel groups make than has previously been available. By understanding how shifting factors are related to the choice of violence, and the tradeoffs between different types of rebel violence become clearer. Thus, this project furthers research on how rebel groups make choices, and what factors may help shape those choices. The first step in applying the ends-ways-means framework to sub-state political violence is to clarify what exactly we mean by ends, ways, and means. The sections below cover each term in detail. Before further discussion of this framework, however, the term rebel, as used above, should be defined.

Rebels

For this project, a rebel is defined as a sub-state actor who is undertaking or contemplating undertaking violent politicized action against the state, its institutions, its security forces, or its population, with the goal of changing the political behavior of the state; in short, a rebel is someone who is a politically-driven insubordinate of the state. This follows with the standard dictionary definition, as "a person who opposes or fights against a government."[7] Rebel is thus a value-neutral term; it makes no judgment on the legitimacy of the actor, their actions, or the state against which they are rebelling. A corresponding definition of rebellion is offered by O'Neill (2005, 15), as "a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources… and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."[8]

There are two important caveats to this definition. First, while this definition of rebel stresses the political motivations of such actors, it can encompass actors who also partake of what are traditionally thought of as criminal activities. Such activities can be a necessary component of resourcing for rebel groups, and states have a vested interest in criminalizing, and thus delegitimizing, groups whose main goals may actually be political in nature (Williams 2009; Naim 2005). Second, this definition does not imply a specific course of action that is pursued by the rebel. Some theorists, use the term rebel interchangeably with the term insurgent—that implied course of action is excluded from this definition (Salehyan 2009; O'Neill 2005; Galula 2006). It is in the context of ways that the delineation between activities and actors becomes

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[7] *Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online*, s.v. "rebel," accessed January 30, 2014.

[8] O'Neill is actually defining insurgency, but his definition of insurgent is interchangeable with this project's definition of rebel. This interchangeability is common in the literature; see the paragraphs that follow this quote in the text.

vital. Much social science literature succumbs to the fallacy of conflating activities with actors. For example: What is a terrorist? The easiest, though tautological, definition would be: one who commits acts of terrorism. But what if that terrorist is also engaged in developing alternate governance institutions? Is the shadow governor of a province a terrorist, or an insurgent? This lack of definitional clarity comes back to the basic conundrum that those who participate in sub-state violence can (and do) participate in more than one course of violent action, which is why this research utilizes the non-activity-specific term rebel. Having thus defined the rebels, I now turn to the framework of ends-ways-means to explain the context in which rebel activities occur.

Ends

As noted above, a rebel is defined as a sub-state actor who is undertaking or contemplating undertaking violent politicized action against the state, its institutions, its security forces, or its population, with the goal of changing the political behavior of the state. By virtue of this definition, all rebels therefore have a prespecified end: to affect the political behavior of the state in way that is favorable to the goals of the rebels. Salehyan (2009, 19) argues for this most basic aim of rebel groups when he notes that, "Rebellion is a strategy for winning concessions from the government. It is used when conventional politics fails. …Whatever the demand, disputes between rebels and the state are part of a bargaining process in which actors threaten one another with violence." Clausewitz (1976, 75) puts the ultimate aim of armed conflict even more succinctly; he states that "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."

While endstates can vary based on what action the rebel group is trying to force the government to do, a discussion of the differentiation of these desired endstates is beyond the scope of this project. Disaggregating the ends of rebellion would ultimately come down to a discussion of the magnitude of success both aimed for, and achieved, by rebel actions. Since this

project is concerned with explaining the onset and occurrence of rebel activities, a focus on the achievement of ends is outside of the research foci. Such a disaggregation would be a potential path for future research, but will not be covered here in more detail—the assumption hereafter is that all rebels seek to affect state behavior via politicized violence, and that the specific way in which that behavior is to be shifted is not necessary to theory development. In essence, the ends are held constant, in order to measure changes in the ways and means.

Ways

Delineating between different categories of activities incorporates the idea of policy substitution, which argues that agents chose from a menu of options in order to address a given situation (Most and Starr 1984). For example, a state has several options if it wants to respond to aggression by another state: diplomatic outreach, economic sanctions, or military actions. Within each of these broad categories, there are further options. Military action could encompass the stationing of troops at the border, unconventional skirmishing or guerilla-style warfare, or direct force-on-force large battles. The policy substitution literature argues that, instead of focusing specifically on one type of option, the menu of options should be studied in relation to each other (Most and Starr 1984). This policy substitution literature, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, helps to explain how the different means available to rebel groups will shape their choices, or substitutions, that they make between different types of violence. But what are these different types of violence that rebels engage in?

Four Ways

For the purposes of this research, the ways that rebels can act are broken down into four choices. The first three choices are different types of sub-state violence: terrorist, insurgent, and civil war courses of action. A full discussion of these three courses of action, their definitions

and causal factors, comprise Chapter 3. This tripartite classification scheme is drawn from the writings of Colin Gray (2007), Renard and Taillat (2008), and Bard O'Neill (2005).

Gray lays out an escalatory schematic for understanding how the ways of rebel violence may change:

> Terrorism is a mode of irregular combat, and it may or may not accompany guerilla warfare. It is simply a tactic, as is guerilla fighting. …If their cause prospers, terrorists will become insurgents. Should they continue to gain in strength they will mutate from insurgents into regular soldiers able to confront the forces of the state in open battle. Because of the political context of irregular warfare, one needs to be careful in the use of terms. (Gray 2007, 247)

Renard and Tailliat (2008) and O'Neill (2005) provide similar explanations of these three ways of violence, though the words they use are slightly different. O'Neill, like Renard and Taillat, defines 'insurgents' similarly to this chapter's definition of 'rebels,' and utilizes the term 'guerilla warfare,' which is synonymous to this chapter's definition of insurgency. Renard and Taillat propose a model:

> …based on three operational poles: the terror pole, the guerilla pole, and the conventional warfare pole. The three poles create a triangle of tactical possibilities, in which every insurgent action takes place. Concretely, this means that a group closer to the terror pole will mainly rely on acts of terrorism, while maintaining a more or less pronounced aspect of guerilla warfare, or even of conventional warfare, depending on its proximity to the other poles. This is to say – most groups do not rely on a single pole. …The dynamic oscillation between the poles can be caused either by internal or external pressures. (Renard and Taillat 2008)

Bard O'Neill (2005, 33) identifies three 'forms of warfare' that insurgents practice: terrorism, guerilla warfare, and conventional warfare, and notes some distinguishing features of each; "A form of warfare may be viewed as one variety of organized violence emphasizing particular armed forces, weapons, tactics, and targets."

To be sure, this tripartite division of the ways of rebel violence is not the only way in which sub-state violence can be organized, but, as seen in the writings of Gray, Renard and Taillat, and O'Neill, some scholarly support does exist for this typology. Other scholars who separate out these three types of violence in their research include Sambanis (2008, 174), Bueno de Mesquita (2013), and Fearon and Laitin (2003). Sambanis (2008) argues that terrorism is distinct from other forms of sub-state violence, and follows a different causal logic. Bueno de Mesquita (2013) lays out the differences between conventional (civil war) and unconventional (an amalgam of insurgency and terrorism), though he notes the presence of all three as types of sub-state violence. Fearon and Laitin (2003) delineate between insurgency and civil war, and briefly note that terrorism, as a separate phenomenon, also occurs.

Beyond these three choices of violence, however, there is also the choice to not undertake a violent action. Such a choice is not uncommon; one example is presented later in this paper in the case study of the LTTE. During the course of the LTTE conflict, which lasted from 1983 to 2009, there was a caesura from most fighting from about 2001 to 2005. Though things were fairly calm on the surface, both sides actually used this time to build their capabilities to prepare for what they saw as inevitable future conflict. The LTTE could have staged attacks during this time period, but instead chose not to. Therefore, while this project is focused on tradeoffs between types of sub-state violence chosen by rebel groups, it also recognizes that those rebel groups may choose to refrain from violent action at certain points.

In sum, the ways in which rebel groups conduct their activities can be understood as different options, substitutable with each other. This project delineates between four different ways: terrorist, insurgent, civil war, and the choice to not undertake violent action. The advantage of using this four-category typology is that it is both sufficiently detailed to

differentiate between the major categories of sub-state violence, while simultaneously retaining a parsimonious number of categories. These ways are distinct from the means; the ways are the methods of action chosen by rebels in order to achieve an end, a change in the political behavior of the state. As discussed below, the means are the constraints that may inform the choice that rebels make when deciding on what way they will pursue.

Means

While the ways of sub-state violence are concerned with the courses of actions rebels choose to take, those choices are limited by the environment. Gray (2007, 246) supports this framing, when he argues that rebels choose specific ways of fighting, constrained by the context in which they operate; "Irregulars fight irregularly because they cannot succeed, or even survive, in any other way." In other words, there is an interrelationship between desired ends, courses of action taken to achieve those ends, and the resources and capability of the actors to pursue those actions. Kem describes this interrelationship as follows:

> The ends (or end state) drive the purpose of the campaign. The means determine how that can be accomplished and have to be considered before you can realistically determine the ways. Put another way, to be able to accomplish certain ways of approaching the campaign requires you to have resources; the resources, or means, determine just how ambitious or constrained you will be in determining the ways to accomplish the mission. (Kem 2012, 27)

Thus, the means are the capabilities and drivers of rebellion available in the context in which a specific rebel group operates. The means refer not only to rebel capability, but also to the capability of the state the rebels are fighting. Rebels typically have less total means to operate than do their opponent, the state. But these disadvantages may be dynamic—there may be geographic or technical capabilities that form physical or operational areas of relative rebel advantage. When a rebel group does take action in some way, that act of rebelling implies that

some means to act, whatever they are, are available. This is not a static measure; changes in the means available may lead to a change in the course of action a rebel undertakes. Of course, if rebels lose all means, they may cease to be a functioning group. Since this project is focused on the choices of rebel groups between different types of sub-state violence, the research is scoped with an emphasis on rebel groups that have some level of organization and, and some point, choose violence. Within this universe of rebel groups, the means available to a rebel group should affect both the initial choice of rebellious activity as well as choices to sustain or switch the type of rebel campaign. As Hammes (2011, 10) notes, "lack of resources to achieve goals via a specific way does not mean one automatically gives up all strategic goals. When the means are insufficient, the first step is to evaluate alternative ways."

Gray (2007, 247) argues that that, not only are alternative ways chosen based on a calculation of the means, but that, for a rebel group, "To choose to fight in irregular modes, with guerilla warfare and terrorism, is always a forced choice." In accordance with this claim of Gray's, the means can be seen as the primary limitation on both rebel and state actions, and consequently, that an understanding the means available within a specific strategic context will provide a window into the types of action available to rebels at that time. As noted above, the means available may be so limited that rebels choose not to undertake any violent action for a period. Therefore, the means should be key to understanding why rebels act the way they do. If the primary means affecting the strategic context can be observed and measured, rebel activity should then be able to be explained.

Building on the theoretical configuration proposed by Bell et al. (2013), this research breaks down the means available into three basic concept areas: coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. The major advantage of this configuration is that these three concepts tie together

much of the social science research findings on the major causal factors of multiple types of sub-state violence; the use of this configuration allows multiple variables already known to be significant to be arranged and indexed in a systematic way under the three concepts.

While each of these three concepts is briefly described here, a full discussion of their definitions and component parts are the foci of Chapter 4. Coercion, which is directed at the rebels from the state, are those actions which the state takes in order to punish, smother, or repress rebel activities. Coercion can directly affect the means available to rebel groups, both directly, by the imprisonment or execution of rebel group members, or indirectly, if the effects of coercion serve to suppress or encourage popular support for the rebel group. Capacity refers to the ability of actors to carry out their chosen activities.[9] In this project, capacity is split into two sub-areas, state capacity and rebel capacity, since the relative capabilities of both actors matter in determining most likely courses of action.

In sum, the means are established via coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity, which are the primary constraints on rebel actions. Rebel endeavors are categorized into three ways: terrorist, insurgent, or civil war. Informed by the means, these ways are pursued in order for the rebel group to achieve its ends, which are directed at changing the political behavior of the state. Thus, the ends-ways-means framework provides the theoretical basis for understanding and explaining what type of action rebels are most likely to take given a specific context. However, in order to make sense of the observed event phenomena of sub-state conflict, we need one other concept—the campaign—which is nested in this larger framework (Kem 2012).

[9] *Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online*, s.v. "capacity," accessed March 7, 2015.

Campaigns

Clausewitz (1976) identified two levels to war: the strategic and the tactical. The tactical level is concerned with the events of conflict, while the strategic level is concerned with achieving the overall goals of the war. Later military theorists added to this model a third level, the operational level, where strategy is linked to tactics. The strategic level is concerned with the overarching, broad national goals, and its output is broad guidance on the employment of the military. This is the 'big picture' view. The tactical level is concerned with the execution of specific actions. At this level, the focus is on the particulars of the events of conflict: the emplacement of troops in a specific disposition, the planning of ambushes or explosives detonations. The operational level is where broad strategic goals are taken and translated into plan of action, a campaign, which is comprised of the deliberate arrangement of the conflict events at the tactical level in order to achieve a strategic goal (Dupuy 1992, 65; Naveh 1997, 9-10). Figure 2.1 illustrates these three levels of war and their associated actions.

Campaigns are intricately tied to the ends-ways-means framework, for without a proper understanding of what ends are sought and what means are available, practicable ways, or campaigns, could not be created. This concept of campaigns is not limited to military or strategic studies; it is also present in political science literature.[10] In both fields of study, the concept is similar. This research uses Chenoweth's definition of campaign:

> We define a campaign as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics used are overt and documented. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are also purposive, meaning that they are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic regime. Campaigns

[10] cf. Gurr 1970; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; Cunningham et al. 2013; Abrahms 2014; Pape 2005; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994.

have discernible leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts. (Chenoweth 2011, 3)

Figure 2.1 The Levels of War



As noted in the definition, campaigns are time-delimited. Classifying campaigns as time-delimited allows a series of conflict events to be aggregated into a theoretically defensible temporal unit. Once conflict events are so organized, the events that happen in a particular campaign can be analyzed in order to determine what type of campaign the rebels were pursing in a specific year. This exercise of interpreting a campaign based on a time period is necessary, because the campaign plans of rebels are not otherwise necessarily clear. Indeed, campaign plans of rebel groups are often confidential; a public discussion of the means available and the ways to be pursued would open a rebel group to specifically targeted countermeasures (Fearon 2008; Hendrix 2010). However, once a rebel group has taken violent action, it is usually no long a secret to the state or to the general public. These specific conflict events are a matter of historical record, and, if a series of these events is assumed to form a campaign, the type of campaign chosen by the rebel group can be reasonably deduced ex post facto. As further discussed in Chapter 3, the categorization of conflict events

into campaigns is a methodological technique already commonly used in the study of civil war; I argue that such a methodology is also valid in the study of terrorism and insurgency.

Conclusion

As described above, the ends-ways-means framework offers a way to conceptually organize the options available to rebel groups. The rebels themselves are assumed to be rational actors, with the assumption that the ends that rebels seek are some affect to the political behavior of the state. The ways in which rebels seek to change state behavior consist of a number of potentially substitutable options, encompassing everything from a choice not to act to a choice to undertake civil war. Rebel choice is constrained by the means available to the group, which may include both resources available the group, and state actions to suppress group activities. Finally, the concept of the campaign, as a specific temporal unit, is introduced. Campaigns provide a methodology to collate conflict events in order to identify comparable ways that a rebel group might choose.

Chapter 3 develops definitions for each type of campaign, and identifies the key factors that signify a specific type of campaign. Chapter 4 discusses the concepts of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity, generating hypotheses on how they influence sub-state violence choices. Chapters 5 through 8 are dedicated to testing these hypotheses, and the final analysis and conclusion are presented in Chapter 9.

Chapter 3 - The Ways of Rebellion

As discussed in Chapter 2, one way of understanding why rebel violence occurs is to frame rebels as rational actors who make choices to carry out specific courses of action, based on certain limitations, in order to affect the political behavior of the state. These courses of actions, or campaigns, are divided into three types: terrorist, insurgent, and civil war. The focus of Chapter 3 is to understand and define those campaign types; the chapter assesses the extant literature that describes each of the three phenomena, and discusses how these phenomena can be understood as campaigns, with a focus on differentiation between the types of campaign.

While it is possible to develop a methodology for differentiating between campaign types, one problem that arises is that multiple types of violent events may take place within a single campaign. As Findley and Young (2012) point out, terrorist events often occur within civil wars. Such overlap need not derail this chapter's attempt at categorization, however. As Davis (2005, 184) notes, "Because typologies are nothing more than complex concepts—analytical constructs defined in terms of configurations of other scientific concepts—and because the borders of most scientific concepts are fuzzy, we should not expect that the borders of type-concepts will be distinct." I argue that the overall pattern of events (within a given time) should point towards a specific campaign. This is not to say that the distinction is always perfectly clear-cut, but a focus on the overall objective of the campaign (e.g. do the rebels engage *mainly* in large battles or civilian attacks?) should provide enough clarity that the rebel choice of action can be estimated.

Prior to approaching the definitional debates that surround each of these terms, one semantic point must be raised and addressed. This is the difference between the way that sub-state violence types are understood in this research project, and the way that they are more

commonly perceived in social science literature. While military theorists such as Gray (2007) and Renard and Taillat (2008) are in agreement with this project's categorization of terrorist, insurgent, and civil war activities as campaigns, the majority of social science literature on the subject does not discuss or analyze these phenomena as campaigns. Despite the use of different lenses of analysis, this preexistent literature does provide a number of definitions for each type of phenomena, and is a good starting point to attack the problem of definitional clarity. Therefore, in the paragraphs below, the noun forms—terrorism, insurgency, and civil war—are often used, instead of the adjective forms—terrorist, insurgent, and civil war campaign—because this is how the majority of social science literature is written. However, the focus when drawing from the extant literature in these fields is on what the key distinctions are between the overall goals or objectives of the violence. These distinctions are then used to help understand and delineate between campaigns, rather than events.

Terrorism

The historical roots of the word terrorism go back to the French Revolution (1793-1794), where "it was more or less a synonym for 'reign of terror.' Subsequently it acquired a wider meaning in the dictionaries as a system of terror. A terrorist was anyone who attempted to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation (Laqueur 2011, 6)." This is not to say that terrorism as a phenomenon per se did not exist prior to the French Revolution, but rather that the Reign of Terror marks the origination of the etymology. The idea of terrorism as an act by rebels, rather than governments, evolved over time. In the latter half of the 1800s, radical Carlo Pisacane developed the theory of 'propaganda by deed,' which argued that violence "was necessary not only to draw attention to, or generate publicity, a cause, but also to inform, educate, and

ultimately rally the masses behind the revolution" (Hoffman 2006, 5). It was from this idea, rather than its French namesake, that the modern conceptualization of terrorism originates.[11]

Contemporary discussions of terrorism offer a profusion of competing definitions. Schmid and Jongman exhaustively examined 109 different definitions of terrorism, from which they identified twenty-two concepts. From their examination and analysis, they provide the following synthesized definition:

> Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid and Jongman 1988, 28)

This all-encompassing definition provides a broad overview of anything that could be considered terrorism, but lacks conciseness and a degree of clarity. A shorter, more precise definition is offered by Crenshaw (1995, 4), who describes terrorism as "a conspiratorial style of violence calculated to alter the attitudes and behavior of multitude audiences. It targets the few in a way that claims the attention of the many. …Terrorism is not mass or collective violence but rather the direct activity of small groups." Tilly (2004, 5) defines terrorism as a strategy of "asymmetrical deployments of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime."

[11] The concept of 'state terrorism,' on the other hand, follows far more closely with the theories of the authors of the Reign of Terror.

Sandler's (2003, 780) definition stresses the nature of the violence; "Terrorism is the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to gain a political objective through intimidation or fear of a targeted audience." Stern (2003, xx) defines terrorism as "an act or threat of violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience." This emphasis on the targets of terrorism is also seen in Daase's (2007, 187) definition; "Terrorism… can be seen as a situation in which a non-state actor uses organized violence against civilian targets (means) in order to spread fear and terror among the public (aim) to compel a state government actor (actor B) to change its policy." O'Neill (2005, 33) concurs, noting that, "Terrorism is herein defined as the threat of use of physical coercion, primarily against noncombatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political objectives." In sum, then, the key distinctions for terrorism appear to be a focus on acts of violence, usually directed against civilians, intended to cause or inspire fear in a larger audience. Terrorists do not typically focus on attaining a military objectives, such as control of territory or the defeat or destruction of forces, or attempt to provide governance over an area.

As a rebel strategy that emphasizes extranormal violence against civilian targets, terrorism can also be seen as a campaign; this claim is backed up by both history and modern theory on the phenomena. The French Revolution's 'reign of terror' is interesting primarily because it was seen as a system of intimidation—multiple events, over time, were to combine in order to achieve the effects desired by the Reign. The word 'system' has a remarkable similarity to the concept of campaign as used by this research; it implies that a number of activities were coordinated over time to be part of a larger project. As the standard dictionary definition puts it, a system can be defined as "an organized set of doctrines, ideas, or principles usually intended to

explain the arrangement or working of a systematic whole."[12] Switching from history to the present, the number of contemporary theorists who, in describing terrorism refer casually to 'terrorist campaigns,' is quite large.[13] Some examples include Pape (2005, 4), who notes that "suicide terrorist campaigns are directed toward a strategic objective. From Lebanon to Israel to Sri Lank to Kashmir to Chechnya, the sponsors of every campaign have been terrorist groups." Crenshaw (2008, 24) remarks that "the benefits of a successful terrorist campaign would presumably be shared by all individual supporters of the group's goals." Sandler and Enders (2008, 17) describes the "costs from a sustained terrorist campaign as greater than that of conceding to terrorists' demands." Thus, the concept of terrorism as a campaign, as part of a strategy which links ends, ways, and means is not at all foreign to social science literature; as Tilly (2005, 27) reminds us, "When it comes to terror, the beginning of wisdom is to recognize it as a strategy."

Insurgency

Insurgency, like terrorism, suffers from a surfeit of definitions. There is also considerable overlap in the usage of the word insurgency with that of guerrilla. Insurgency comes from the Latin roots *surgere* ('to rise') and *in* ('on') (Skeat 1993, 396). Insurgency and guerilla warfare can, and often are, used interchangeable in contemporary literature, as can be seen in the following discussion of the etymology of the term guerilla:

> The term guerilla warfare, is derived from the Spanish word for war or guerra, and "guerrilla" literally means "little war." Military historians date the use of the term to the popular insurgency by Spanish resistance forces against the invasion of Napoleon and his French troops in 1808. (Morales 2006, 728-729)

[12] *Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online*, s.v. "system," accessed February 10, 2014.

[13] Such theorists do not typically define what they mean by a 'campaign,' however.

Due to this common exchangeability, in the following paragraphs I provide and analyze literature on both insurgency and guerrilla warfare, as well as other variants.

British Army officer and military theorist Charles Callwell wrote an entire work devoted to 'small wars'. From the point of view of the state, he notes the differences between 'regular' (civil war) warfare and 'small war'(insurgency):

> …it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field… Whenever a regular army finds itself engaged upon hostilities against irregular forces …the conditions of the campaign become distinct from the conditions of modern regular warfare. (Callwell 1996, 21)

Contemporary scholars offer similar descriptions. Military historian Max Boot (2013, xxii) distinguishes guerilla warfare from criminal activity; "the use of hit-and-run tactics by an armed group directed primarily against a government and its security forces for political or religious reasons. Bandits in search of nothing more than lucre are excluded; they are usually not interested in shaking up the established order, just in profiting from it." O'Neill describes it in comparison to terrorism:

> In contrast to terrorism, guerilla warfare is more complex and requires more resources. In essence, guerrilla warfare is highly mobile hit-and-run attacks by lightly to moderately armed groups that seek to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will and capability. …[activities] consist of relatively modest engagements followed by withdrawal and dispersal rather than large positional battles designed to seize and hold the territory. (O'Neill 2005, 35)

In a similar vein, political scientists Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75) offer a specific definition of insurgency, "a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas."

Given this broad consensus on the term 'guerrilla warfare,' why then does there also exist in the literature the term 'insurgency'? Military theorist David Galula, a French Army officer

who served in Algeria in the 1950s, is credited with being the writer "who popularized the concept of 'insurgency'" (Freedman 2013, 189). Galula (2006, 2) defines insurgency as "a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order." This definition seems to simply reiterate a basis similar to that of guerilla war, and as such is not particularly helpful.

Clarity on this issue is offered Bernard Fall, a scholar of Indochina, who wrote an article entitled "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" (Fall 2015). In this article, Fall proposes a formula to illuminate how insurgency—or, as he refers to it, revolutionary war—differs from guerilla warfare:

> This formula for revolutionary warfare is the result of the application of guerilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system. This is the *real* difference between partisan warfare, guerrilla warfare, and everything else. "Guerrilla" simply means "small war,"… Political action, however, is the difference. … any sound revolutionary warfare operator… most of the time used small-war tactics… to establish a competitive system of control over the population. Of course, in order to do this, here and there they had to kill some of the occupying forces and attack some of the military targets. (Fall 2015, 41)

Thus, Fall (2015) makes the point that guerrilla warfare is a style of military tactics, and insurgency is the overarching political strategy, one focused on competing for political control, that utilizes those tactics. This corresponds with Lyall's (2010, 175) definition, "a violent, often protracted, struggle by nonstate actors to obtain political objectives such as independence, greater autonomy, or subversion of the existing political authority."

In this light, the definition proposed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency in its *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, provides additional detail on what exactly insurgency is.[14]

> Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity – including guerilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization, and international activity – is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country. (Central Intelligence Agency c. 1980)

Drawing on these definitions, insurgency is a rebellion which may utilize guerilla or terror tactics, but not large-scale, high-magnitude force-on-force violence; it is focused on political, rather than military, control over people or territory. Insurgency is different than terrorism in that insurgency seeks to provide governance or offer control over an area or population; terrorism does not. Further, while insurgents may attack military targets (unlike terrorists), they tend toward subversion rather than focusing their efforts on large battles against the military, which would be more the case in civil war, as described below.

As with terrorism, a preponderance of scholars writing on the subject of insurgency seem comfortable with conceiving this phenomenon as a campaign. Recall Galula's (2006, 2) definition, which requires "a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step," in other words—a series of actions taking place over time. The term campaign is very common in

[14] I use the widely cited undated (c.1980) version of the definition because it provides more descriptive detail about possible insurgency identifiers, which are of value for this discussion. The 2012 version of this guide offers an updated definition. Refer to Appendix B of the 2012 version for a discussion of why and how the definition was revised.

histories of rebel groups; Connable and Libicki (2010, 32) describe the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in this way: "The LTTE was formed in the 1970s and began fighting an aggressive and efficient insurgency campaign circa 1983." Beckett (2001, 86) points out that, in southeast Asia, "the United States, France and Britain, respectively, encountered Maoist-style insurgency campaigns." In social science literature, Byman (2008, 169) points out that a rebel group's "actions would not be terrorism if they were a byproduct of a military campaign and thus not intended to send a broader political message." Thus, there appears to be sufficient support in the literature to make the claim that insurgent campaigns are a recognized phenomenon.

Civil War

To describe the history of civil wars is far beyond the scope of this project; civil wars have presumably been around since the establishment of civilizations in which to wage them. Civil wars are arguably part of the gestalt of humanity; their discussion ranges from the philosopher Plato (2013, 527), in *The Republic*, who distinguished between factional strife and war, with the former referring to conflict against those known personally, and the latter referring to conflict against outsiders or foreigners, to the eponymous song by the rock band Guns N' Roses (1991) which questions, "What's so civil about war, anyway?"[15]

Small and Singer, in their seminal work *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (1982, 210), define civil war as "any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides." This definition is similar to a definition proposed by Kalyvas and Kenny (2010, 284): "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign unit

[15] For a further discussion of the influence of Plato and his contemporaries on modern understandings of civil war, see Kissane (2016).

between organized entities subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities." However, both of these definitions, while emphasizing the distinction between interstate war and conflict internal to the state, lack clarity on how civil war differentiates itself from insurgent activities.

Sambanis (2004, 829-830) provides further detail, articulating nine component principles of a civil war: the war occurs inside of a state's territory; both sides in the war are politically and militarily organized; the government of the state is a combatant; the rebel group should be comprised (at least in part) of within-state actors, and should control territory within the state; the first year of the war should cause 500-1,000 deaths; the war should show sustained violence over time; the weaker side should be strong enough to inflict 100 deaths per year; wars end with effective peace treaties that cause a caesura of hostilities; if rebels win the war and start a new regime, but fighting continues, this is considered a new civil war. However, Sambanis does not make any concessions for the size of the state population, and thus the numbers he provides are minimum thresholds that do not control for the size of the state experiencing conflict. But this is not an uncommon problem, and the use of minimum thresholds does provide a way of differentiating between different magnitudes of sub-state violence; as Fearon (2007, 4) points out, "Everyday usage of the term 'civil war' does not entail a clear threshold for how much violence is necessary to qualify a conflict as a civil war, as opposed to terrorism or low-level political strife." Hironaka (2005, 3) also addresses the issue of magnitude, defining civil war as "large-scale, organized, and sustained conflict between a state and domestic political actors. …civil wars are defined as high-intensity conflicts. They involve major casualties and significant amounts of resources, in contrast to less deadly forms of social conflict."

What Sambanis (2004) and Hironaka (2005) seem to be offering in their definitions is that the power relations between the opposing sides in the conflict, though they may not be

absolutely symmetric, are at least more symmetric than that of other forms of sub-state violence. Stathis Kalyvas (2006), a noted civil war expert, explicates on this point in his widely cited book, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*:

> Civil war is defined here as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities. …"Armed Combat" (implying a degree of organization on both sides and violence of a certain magnitude) serves political aims when it challenges existing authority, even when also serving additional goals. …The key intuition is the violent physical division of the sovereign entity into rival armed camps. This entails a de facto territorial division. At the war's outset, the rivals are subjects to a common sovereign or authority. (Kalyvas 2006, 17)

In common with Kalyvas, Galula (2006, 5) defines civil war as a war between two or more groups, all of which control territory and organized armed forces, and where "[t]he war between these groups soon resembles an ordinary international war except that the opponents are fellow citizens, such as in the American War Between the States and the Spanish Civil War."

All of these civil war definitions appear to coordinate well with each other, though some definitions stress certain aspects—administrative, territory, violence magnitude—more than others. There seems to be a general consensus that civil war is, in effect, the exact same form of violence as war in the general sense of conflict between two states; the only difference is the pre-conflict allegiance of both sides to the same government. As such, civil war can be seen as distinct from insurgency; civil wars have a greater focus force-on-force confrontation and outright defeat of or division with the state, whereas insurgency focuses on political control measures such as shadow governments, and typically does not engage in large force-on-force battles with the state.

Civil wars can be characterized as campaigns, and they lend themselves to that categorization quite easily. A number of histories comment on the presence of campaigns in a

variety of civil wars. Ash (2009, 95), writing on the Roman Empire, mentions that "Vespasian's civil war campaign is hijacked by the rogue Flavian general Antonius Primus." In the American Civil War, historian Rowena Reed notes that "Despite the lack of dramatic results, no Civil War campaign better demonstrates the superior advantages of water communications than the Peninsular operations" (Reed 1993, 187). In El Salvador, "By late 1980, the opposition had committed itself to civil war. The disparate guerilla groups unified to become the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), which waged an increasingly successful military campaign against the government" (Stanley 1996, 2). In Africa, the "DRC has been torn by civil war since 1996 when Laurent Kabila started a rebel campaign that ousted President Mobutu one year later" (Ngoie and Omeje 2008, 137).

Theorists of civil war as a conflict phenomenon also identify the presence of campaigns. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) argue for a greater usage of the campaign as the unit of analysis for both violent and non-violent campaigns, and utilize civil war data to identify their 'violent' campaigns. Mattes and Savun (2009, 739), note that, in civil war, "The government cannot trust the rebels to end their military campaign once they have been granted concessions." DeRouen Jr. and Sobek (2004, 308) state that the civil war definition provided by Doyle and Sambanis implies the use of "rebels who launched a campaign that opposed the state."

As these examples demonstrate, both civil war theorists and historians appear to agree that the campaign is an integral component of intrastate war. Ultimately, the capstone argument as to why campaigns exist in civil wars is due to the primary definition of the campaign as an aspect of the operational level of war. If civil wars are simply a type of war, and the concept of a campaigns is drawn from war-focused military theorists, then it follows that if interstate wars have campaigns, intrastate wars also experience that phenomenon.

Conclusion

The above review of the literature provides broad theoretical support for conceptualizing terrorism, insurgency, and civil war as campaigns of violent activity, and provides a starting point for delineating between these campaigns. Civil war campaigns are rebel violence of the largest magnitude within a state, and such campaigns tend toward larger-scale battles, though smaller attacks and terrorist events may also occur. Insurgent campaigns can be seen as smaller-scale conflicts that may mix elements of guerilla warfare with elements of terrorist activity. Terrorist campaigns typically do not encompass in military battles, but emphasize violence against civilian targets. In sum, by distinguishing between campaigns, this project offers insight into the specific types of ways in which rebel violence is organized. But what causes rebels to choose a specific type of campaign? That question is addressed in Chapter 4, which focuses on the means, or structural conditions that influence choices of campaigns.

Chapter 4 - The Means of Rebellion

In the preceding chapter, I developed a typology of rebel campaign types. This chapter seeks to develop hypotheses that explain how rebels might choose between campaign types based on structural, causal factors. Drawing on the theory of policy substitution (Most and Starr 1984), this project claims that rebels can, and do, make choices between the different types of political violence campaigns they will pursue. Building on Bell et al. (2013)'s organizational structure, I argue that there are three causal factors that explain rebel choice: coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. This chapter reviews extant literature on these concepts and how they relate to rebel choices, and then develops hypotheses as to how those factors influence rebel choices between campaign options. Unlike previous literature, which typically analyzes a specific type of rebel violence in isolation from other choices rebels could make (or, in a few rare cases, selects between two types of violence), this project makes a theoretical contribution to the literature by identifying a full spectrum of choices that a rebel group could make, and developing novel predictions as to when a rebel group may choose one type of violent campaign rather than another.

Structural Approaches and Substitutable Options

The study of the causes of political violence has been approached via many different paths.[16] This project focuses on structural conditions; the goal is to identify causal factors in the environment that may shape rebel choices. As opposed to other sub-state conflict research paths, this structural approach emphasizes the means that are permissive or limiting factors for rebel

[16] These include including structural, psychological, ideological, biological, environmental, and criminological models (cf. Gurr 1970; Ross 1993; Tilly 1978; Jurgensmeyer 2008; Romano 1984; Skocpol 1994; Turk 1989; Sanín and Wood 2014; Keenan 1987; Jo 2015).

group choices. This approach argues that certain observable factors are correlated with the onset and occurrence of political violence. These factors can include state coercion, which causes population grievances against the state; the state's ability to respond both administratively and militarily to the rebels' actions; the resources of the rebel group and the population in which it operates, including administrative and military ability; and the involvement of external actors (Gurr 1970; Tilly 1978; Lichbach 1994; Gurr 2000; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Regan and Norton 2005; Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas 2006).

By looking at these structural causal factors, this project focuses on preconditions rather than precipitant factors. Preconditions are underlying factors that shape the environment that rebels operate in, and may be permissive or enabling (Eckstein 1965; Thompson 2003; Saxton and Benson 2006). In contrast, precipitant factors tend to occur immediately prior to an event, and may be seen as the direct, or inciting, cause (Eckstein 1965; Thompson 2003; Crenshaw 1981, 381).[17] The advantage to studying structural, preconditional factors is that such factors are more generalizable across time and space, which allows researchers to identify broad trends and relationships. The disadvantage, of course, is that such a broadly applicable approach by necessity cannot go into the details of the precipitant causes of individual conflict events (Eckstein 1965, 140-143). However, since the focus of this research is to develop of theory of the

[17] For example, in 1969, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) planned to hijack a TWA flight at the same time as President Nixon was scheduled to meet with the Zionist Organization of America (Khaled 1973, 128-31). The Nixon meeting was the precipitant factor in this case; but the reason the PFLP existed, had undertaken their strategy of rebellion, and had decided that terrorist tactics would serve their ends, could be explained by preconditional factors.

overall relationships between means and ways in rebel campaign choice, the choice of focus on preconditional rather than precipitant factors is supported by this project's scope.

Numerous researchers have already analyzed different structural conditions that lead to civil conflict, but this extant literature does not usually specify the type of conflict events most likely to occur. Instead, it typically focuses on binary measures of conflict occurrence (conflict/no conflict) or on rough measures of magnitude of conflict (high-medium-low, actual/expected). [18] In contrast, this research develops novel hypotheses that address a range of distinct conflict types. Drawing from the theory of policy substitution, it argues that rebel groups can substitute different types of violence in for one another.

The majority of the extant literature in the field of policy substitution argues that states are actors who use different options as substitutes, depending upon environmental conditions.[19] However, this concept of policy substitution has only rarely been applied to rebel actors or other non-state groups.[20] When it has been applied to rebels, the majority of this subfield is focused on the choice between violent and non-violent actions, or tactical choices between attack types (e.g. hostages versus bombings).[21] To the best of my knowledge, the only research that looks at rebel

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[18] For binary measures, cf. Hegre and Sambanis (2006); for measures of magnitude, cf. Regan and Norton (2005); Gurr (1968); Bell et al. (2013).

[19] The policy substitution field is large; major articles in this field include the seminal work by Most and Starr (1984), as well as Bennett and Nordstrom (2000), Morgan and Palmer (2000), Moore (2000), Cioffi-Revilla and Starr (1995), Most and Starr (1989), Starr (2000), Palmer and Bhandari (2000), Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan (2002), and Regan (2000). Literature that identifies state domestic (rather than foreign) policy substitution also exists; such substitution efforts still focus on the state, rather than the rebel, as the actor who is doing the substitution (Davies 2016; DeMeritt et al. 2015; Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014; Shadmehr 2014).

[20] Such non-state actor literature includes minority groups (Martinez Machain and Rosenberg 2016), ethno-national groups (Saxton and Benson 2006, 2008), and dissident groups (Moore 2000).

[21] The same violent/non-violent substitution choice for rebels is argued, most notably by Lichbach (1987), but also by Moore (1998), Demirel-Pegg (2014), Dahl et al. (2014), and Eyerman (1998). Additional literature looks at the

choices in a similar style are: conventional (civil war) versus unconventional (an amalgam of insurgent and terrorist) (Bueno de Mesquita 2013); duration-based (short civil wars versus longer-lasting guerilla-style civil wars) (Cunningham et al. 2005); and target-based (attacks against the state versus against another rebel group) (Frisch 2009).

In line with this literature, I apply such substitution theories to rebel actors, noting that rebels are a collective, policy-choosing organization that must interact with its external environment in ways similar to a state.[22] I argue that rebels choose between multiple types of violent campaigns (as well as having a non-violent option). By developing hypotheses that look specifically at the substitutable choices between terrorist, insurgent, and civil war campaigns, this project sheds light on previously unexamined relationships, and furthers research in this field.

What are these structural conditions that serve as causal factors of political violence? I draw upon the organizational structure proposed by Bell et al.:

> [W]e identify three main conceptual factors that affect the degree of political violence within a state: coercion, coordination, and capacity. We argue that coercion, defined as violations of physical integrity rights, makes citizens more willing to commit acts of political violence. Coordination, defined as the availability and ease with which domestic groups can cooperate, organize, and mobilize, increases the ability of citizens to commit acts of political violence. Conversely, capacity, typically thought of as the ability of a state to project its power throughout its territory, decreases the opportunity of citizens to engage in political violence by raising the costs for potential rebels. (Bell et al. 2013:241)

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substitutability of rebel group tactics within a specific type (e.g. different types of terrorist attack) (Landes 1978; Enders and Sandler 1993; Enders and Sandler 2004; Enders and Sandler 1995; Clauset et al. 2010; Im et al. 1987; Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Bueno de Mesquita 2008; Sandler et al. 1983).

[22] Rebels often, though not always, seek to form 'pseudo' or 'proto' states; in this sense, a rebel group is a state actor in potentia, and would presumably practice behavior quite similar to that of a state (Middleton 2015; Lia 2015; Coggins 2014).

These three concepts are very useful, since they tie together much of the social science research findings on the major causal factors of sub-state violence. While Bell et al. (2013) look specifically at violent protest, I argue that these conceptual categories can be easily extended to explanations of violent campaigns, as well. I follow the conceptual approach outlined by Bell et al. (2013) by utilizing three similar explanatory variables: coercion, the ability of states to accommodate dissenters and discourage, suppress, or resist rebellion, and the ability of rebel groups to rebel.

Coercion, discussed more fully below, refers to measures taken by the state against its population.[23] However, instead of differentiating between state capacity and rebel coordination as Bell et al. (2013) do, I view capacity as a key factor for both rebel groups and states. This approach is in line with Buhaug (2010, 116), who argues that "[d]eterminants of rebel strength are not radically different from those of the state." Within this larger concept of capacity, however, I incorporate variables that are also related to coordination for both the rebels and the state.

Such an aggregation of coordination and capacity is theoretically defensible because, as discussed in the sections below, the literatures on both topics tends to overlap in terms of what coordination and capacity mean in terms of what a state or rebel group can do. Indeed, disaggregation of the concepts of capacity and coordination may be less justifiable, as state or rebel actors that are able to coordinate well are also probably groups that have some level of capacity. Looking at the capacity of both actors is important, because the power relationship

[23] The coercive actions taken by the rebels in response to state coercion would be the rebellious *ways* of violence outlined in Chapter 3, and are thus the outcome in this model; therefore, they are not also be included as a causal factor, as this would present a serious endogeneity problem.

between the two can affect the way a conflict plays out. Further, in cases where multiple rebel groups are operating in one state, capacity can vary between the different rebel groups. Both state and rebel capacity can also change over time, affecting not only campaign choice at onset, but also changes in campaign choice over the span of rebel activity.

In the following sections, I establish definitions for coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity, and review the extant research surrounding each concept. I highlight literature on terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars that describe the relationship between the specified phenomenon and its associated levels of coercion, rebel capacity, and state capacity. Drawing from this literature review, I develop novel hypotheses that take into consideration the full range of choices available to a rebel group, and describe how coercion and capacity explain the choices rebels make.

Coercion

Coercion refers to actions taken by the state that lead to grievances against the state by members of its population. While the term coercion is used in this chapter to signify deliberate actions taken by the state, the expectation is that such coercive actions will lead to grievances in that state's population (Bell et al. 2013; Gurr 1968). However, as discussed in detail below, it is also important to remember that states typically have a reason for committing coercive acts. States may wish to extract more resources from their populations than the populace would prefer. Further, states may use their coercive power to punish what they perceive to be criminal acts—though that perception may not be shared by the population. In both cases, the state's coercive actions may lead to grievances that, in turn, may provide a rationale for members of the populace to rebel.

States face a dilemma when it comes to the use of coercive action (Martinez Machain et al. 2011). Coercive action may encourage an aggrieved population to rebel, but states are also expected to use coercive actions to keep the peace and control their populations – otherwise, they abdicate the Weberian dictate that states retain a "monopoly of legitimate physical violence" (Weber 1994, 310-311). Thus, states are in a quandary when choosing to use coercive action, since either using or not using coercive actions could potentially spark grievances. Byman discusses this dilemma in detail:

> If they crack down too hard, they risk alienating the population and creating support for organizations where none previously existed. Failure to crack down, however, can decrease confidence in the state and make it easier for proto-insurgent groups to mobilize would-be followers, since they need not fear that they will be arrested. In addition, a weak crackdown may lead rival communities to act on their own. If a group is singled out for repression because of its ethnicity, religion, or other features, the salience of that identity increases. Similarly, state repression can politicize a community that previously was wary of politics. …In using such measures, the state validates the cause the proto-insurgents espouse. (Byman 2008, 192-193)

Based on this dilemma, coercion is expected to be a significant causal factor in explaining violent campaign choices.

In line with previous literature on this topic (Ross 1993; Crenshaw 1981; Bell et al. 2013), this chapter identifies three areas of coercive action that may lead to grievances and willingness to rebel: physical security, economic security, and societal security. Physical security refers to actions taken against the corporeal bodies of people within the state. Such actions include torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. In this case, grievances arise due to pain or physical suffering caused by the state, and these physical security transgressions pave the way for rebellion to occur by increasing incentives to rebel (Kalyvas 2006; Bell et al. 2013). Economic security refers to actions taken by the state to provide or limit its citizens' access to economic opportunities. In this case, grievances can arise when people

perceive insurmountable economic inequalities within the state, where differences in economic opportunity between groups or individuals are vast (Regan and Norton 2005; Collier 2003). Sources of economic grievances can include inequalities in both income (Muller and Seligson 1987) or land rights (Midlarsky 1988). Finally, societal security refers to the marginalization or prosecution of different social groups within the population of the state. Coercive actions taken by the state could include supporting an official state religion while limiting the expression of non-sanctioned religious beliefs, or denying suffrage to specific groups, thereby excluding women or minorities from government participation. Grievances arise as marginalized groups with fewer social protections see state as a threat to their societal security (Caprioli 2005; Fox 2000; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003).

Terrorist Campaigns and Coercion

As Crenshaw (1981, 388) describes it, "some [terrorist] groups are weak because weakness is imposed on them by the political system they operate in, others because of unpopularity." This quote offers insight into two different relationships between terrorism and coercion. Some rebel groups may choose terrorist campaigns because they operate in a state with democratic processes by which the grievances of most of the population can be addressed, thereby limiting the numbers of rebel supporters and recruits (Weinberg and Eubank 2007; Sandler 2008). If the state takes low levels of coercive action, it is likely that the majority of the population perceives the state as legitimate, and has no reason to participate in rebellious activities; thus, only a few members of the population are likely to have reason to rebel (Gurr 1970; Crenshaw 1981; Schmid 2007). Alternatively, some rebel groups may choose terrorist campaigns because the state is so highly coercive that any larger-scale rebel groups—or even groups perceived as potentially being rebellious—are crushed as soon they come to the

knowledge of the state (Findley and Young 2011). In such an environment of high coercion, only the smallest of groups are likely to be able to survive. Whether or not the population as whole is sympathetic to the goals of the rebel group, they are unlikely to be able to offer little in the way of help, due to fears of the consequences of such actions.

Insurgent Campaigns and Coercion

As counterinsurgency expert Kilcullen (2010, 7-8) notes; "Insurgents tend to ride and manipulate a social wave of grievances, often legitimate ones, and they draw their fighting power from their connection to a mass base." Indeed, some level of grievance-causing coercion appears to be a strong indicator that rebels will choose insurgency (Peceny and Stanley 2010). Yet too much coercion may decrease the likelihood of an insurgent campaign. Muller and Seligson (1987, 444-445) note that increasing coercion will lead to increased impetus for an insurgency, but that very high levels of coercion will have a dampening effect on insurgency. This decrease in insurgent activity at high levels coercion is also supported by Jenkins et al. (2014, 470), who find that insurgency is likely in areas "a history of social and political marginality and opposition" but that as coercion intensified, insurgent activity in these areas decreased. Therefore, insurgent campaigns appear more likely at intermediate than high levels of coercion. On the other hand, as discussed in the previous section, at very low levels of coercion, support for rebellion is also likely to be low. Rebels who choose an insurgent campaign often capitalize or highlight state coercive action in order to build support for their activities (Davis et al. 2012; O'Neill 2005). Thus, too few grievances against the state may mean too few supporters to make an insurgent campaign likely.

Civil War Campaigns and Coercion

In general, mass grievances caused by high levels of coercion are expected to lead to widespread civil conflict (Gurr 1968), and in particular civil war (Rost 2011). As grievances caused by coercion diminish, fewer members of a state's population are likely to commit to the rebel actions that could be potentially costly. As Kalyvas and Kocher (2007, 182) note, there appears to be no lack of 'political entrepreneurs' willing to *lead* rebel groups, but it is rather more difficult to find "a mass of followers willing to take the necessary risks" by *joining* those groups. Since civil war tends to require a significant amount of population mobilization, it follows logically that widespread coercive action would be expected to have a positive effect on the occurrence of civil war campaigns, since such coercion would increase incentives to rebel (Olson 1965; Tullock 1971; Lichbach 1995; Lichbach 1987; Muller and Opp 1986; Gurr 2000; Goodwin 2001). As Regan and Norton (2005, 16) put it, "highly repressive states have a far greater probability of experiencing a civil war."

Coercion Theory

How would the level of coercion affect rebel campaign choices? At high levels of state coercion, the population may be highly aggrieved. At first glance, this would suggest that widespread rebel mobilization and violence would lead to a civil war campaign, and this would be likely. In some instances, this is probably exactly what happens; the state is highly coercive, a large part of the population rebels *en masse*, and a civil war breaks out. Correspondingly, as coercion decreases, popular support and willing rebel recruits are also both likely to decrease. Without numerous fighters or high levels of support, civil war campaigns become less likely. Therefore, I argue that the relationship between coercion and civil war campaigns will be a positive and linear, with relatively more occurrences of civil war campaigns when coercion is high.

However, civil war is not the only option that rebels have when coercion is high. If the state, in addition to being highly coercive, also has high levels of capacity, there may be too high a cost for most of the population to rebel. For example, in an efficient, effective police state people may have a reason to rebel, but the punitive expected costs of rebellious activity in such a state would discourage most from becoming rebels. Additionally, in such a state, if the military were strong, choosing to fight it in force-on-force major battles would be a suicidal undertaking. In sum, the ability of rebels to take effective action against the state would be limited, and it is more likely that you would see rebels substitute small groups instead of mass action, and undertake extremely limited violent action, probably against 'softer' civilian targets. In this case, even though coercion is still high, rebels would be more likely to choose a terrorist campaign. But terrorist campaigns are not only likely when coercion is high; they may also be likely when coercion is low. If the state is not very coercive, the majority of the population may be happy with the state, and not choose to rebel. Terrorist campaigns do not require much in terms of recruits or materiel; therefore, if only a few people in a state want to rebel and there is little to no popular support for rebellion, terrorist campaigns are also highly likely. Given these two differing reasons for action, the primary relationship between coercion and terrorist campaigns is expected to be a positive nonlinear relationship, with a U-shaped distribution, as relatively more occurrences of terrorist campaigns are expected to occur when state coercion is at either very low or very high levels.

At intermediate levels of coercion, there are probably still enough grievances that there are some rebel recruits and some level of popular support, but not enough of either that the rebel group is able to achieve a high magnitude of violence against the state. Rather, with such intermediate support a rebel group may choose a more protracted, more undercover approach; an

insurgent campaign is more likely. When coercion is low, however, too few people have grievances at the government, so rebels lack a support base of recruitment and resources for an insurgent campaign. When coercion is high, as discussed above, either civil war or terrorism is more likely. Interestingly, the insurgent campaign's relationship to coercion is almost the exact opposite of that of terrorism, as the relationship between coercion and insurgent campaign onset is expected to be an inverted U-shaped distribution, with relatively more occurrences of insurgent campaigns occurring when coercion is at intermediate levels.

HYPOTHESIS 1: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at low or high levels.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at intermediate levels.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is high.

Capacity

While grievances may provide the raison d'etre for rebellion, the viability of such rebellion is also constrained by the capacity of the state to prevent rebellion, and the capacity of rebels to take action. These structural factors are captured in the concepts of rebel and state capacity. Tilly (2003, 41) defines government capacity as "the extent to which governmental agents control resources, activities, and populations within the government's territory," and Bell et al. (2013, 241) define capacity as "as the ability of a state to project its power throughout its territory." Hendrix (2010, 273), one of the preeminent researchers on state capacity, notes that for states, capacity assessments should consider both the ability to repress via coercive power

and the ability to accommodate via resource redistribution. Correspondingly, rebels similarly have a critical requirement for institutional resources as well as personnel with coercive ability (Buhaug 2010).

In terms of defining capacity, this chapter draws upon Hendrix's (2010) two-part delineation, which encompasses bureaucratic/administrative capacity and military capacity. However, while Hendrix (2010) specifically talks about state capacity, this chapter, in line with Buhaug (2010), extends similar measures of capacity to rebel groups as well. For both the state and the rebels, capacity is defined as the ability of an actor to enact and implement activities via administrative and military means across its sphere of control. With limited capacity, actors are expected to retain only fragile control of their spheres, and may be unable to adequately or appropriately respond to changes in their environments.

Additionally, both states and rebels may receive external help from other actors, which means that measures of capacity are not dependent only on resources held internally by either actor. Salehyan (2009) argues that intrastate conflict cannot be fully understood without looking at external actors, either singular or multiple, and who may be supporting either side in a conflict. External groups which provide such help may be other states or extrastate groups, such as diasporas. Such external help may encompass bureaucratic support such as programs to assist with governance, development, conflict resolution; or military support; or some combination of both. Therefore, it is important to measure both external and internal variables that may affect state capacity.

State Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity

As described in the following paragraphs, the concept of state bureaucratic capacity can encompass different aspects, including the state's ability to extract financial resources as well as

the institutional effectiveness of the state's government. The financial resources of a state can include both internal funding through taxation and resource extraction rent, while the institutional resources of a state involve aspects of governance. Additionally, a state may also receive external assistance that may support its internal bureaucratic and administrative capacity.

Internal financial resource extraction across a population base is typically undertaken via some form of taxation. Herbst (2000), Hanson and Sigman (2013), and Besley and Persson (2009) all use tax revenue to measure the effectiveness of government bureaucracy; the higher tax revenue, the higher the ability of the state to make itself administratively present and exert its will across its territory. As Herbst (2000, 113) notes, "If a state does not effectively control a territory, it certainly will not be able to collect taxes in a sustained and efficient manner."

Rentier states, on the other hand, possess a different type of fiscal resource and are correspondingly expected to have a different form of state apparatus. Mahdavy (1970, 428) defines rentier states as "countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country." One of the most predominant forms of rentier states is that of countries which are oil-rich but lack a strong industrial base. Unlike states that rely upon tax revenue to fund activities, rentier states can possess large fiscal reserves without effectively penetrating into and administering their societies. However, rentier states may be able to buy the happiness of their populations, meaning that such states may still be able to discourage rebellion, even if they lack the bureaucracy and administrative capacity of states with high taxation (Mahdavy 1970).

State bureaucratic and administrative capacity can also vary in terms of institutional effectiveness. Limitations in such effectiveness may imply serious constraints on the ability of

states to effectively carry out activities such as accommodating dissidents or repressing rebellion. States are expected to be less effective when there is high corruption and other forms of inefficient bureaucracy, and when factionalized elites are present (Feigenbaum et al. 1993; Sacks and Levi 2010; Le Billon 2001).

Corruption limits the ability of the government to act by increasing the cost of state action, as well as potentially decreasing the amount of the action carried out. Corruption may also decrease the ability of the state to respond by skewing resources towards favored sectors at the expense of other programs (Sacks and Levi 2010, 2328-2329). Inefficient bureaucracies slow the pace of government response, for example, in equipping or transporting military or administrative personnel (Weber 1994). As Feigenbaum et al. (1993, 48) note, "characteristics of the bureaucracy may also influence coordination: for example, bureaucracies at the ministry level may be highly autonomous from central leadership and committed to their own goals." Such divisive bureaucracies make it more likely that a government is only weakly able to respond in a timely manner to population grievances.

Beyond corruption, another marker of institutional ineffectiveness is the presence of factionalized elites. When the governing elite is composed of competitive factions, infighting between or within sections of the government can result. This can lead to a situation of deadlock, wherein orders to action are never implemented. In very polarized situations, certain segments of the political elite may actually support rebel actors either as a way to take power in the state, or to use rebel activities as a leverage for effecting policy change (Cederman et al. 2010; Le Billon 2001, 573-574). Rotberg (2010, 9) points out that the presence of favored elites may itself encourage conflict; once states are "devoted almost exclusively to the fortunes of a few or to a

favored ethnicity or community, there is every reason to expect less and less loyalty to the state on the part of the excluded and disenfranchised."

Finally, state capacity may also be influenced by external support. While revenue extraction variables emphasize the extent of the transactional relationship between state and its internal population, a state is not only limited to the financial resources that it can provide for itself. States may also receive assistance from international organizations or other states; these outside actors may find that it is in their best interest to provide assistance either as part of a foreign policy or in hopes of preventing conflict which could then spread (Brown 1996). Additionally, these foreign assistance programs may also encompass support to institutional effectiveness (Dollar and Levin 2006; Alesina and Dollar 2000).

Terrorist Campaigns and State Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity

Currently, there is a debate in the literature over how state administrative capacity could affect the occurrence of terrorism. High levels of state economic resources do not appear to have that much of a negative effect on the ability to carry out a terrorist campaign (Chenoweth 2010). Overall levels of poverty or the financial resources of the state only have an indirect bearing on levels of terrorist activity, as it is elites, not the poor, who typically stage such campaigns (Krueger and Malečková 2003; Piazza 2006; Malečková 2005; Crenshaw 1981). Piazza (2011, 537) "suggests that wealthy countries are more likely to experience terrorism than poorer countries—a finding consistent with some of the empirical literature and with the theoretical argument that wealthy countries afford more targeting opportunities for terrorist movements." Alternatively, Hendrix and Young (2014) find that terrorist activity is less likely in higher bureaucratically capable states, an argument which is supported by Tikuisis (2009), who finds higher levels of fatal terrorism in failing or failed states, but challenged by Sánchez-Cuenca and

de la Calle (2009), who argue that terrorism is more likely in developed countries. How can these competing claims on the relationship between state administrative capacity and terrorist campaigns be squared?

This disparity in the literature on the relationship between terrorist campaigns and state administrative capacity is perhaps best explained by Newman (2007) and Coggins (2015). Newman (2007) exhaustively examines the issue of the relationship betweens state capacity and terrorism, and notes that such a relationship is complex; he finds that terrorism can occur in states across the range of capacity, and that this is due to a number of interrelated factors that may affect the occurrence of terrorism, including the presence of other forms of sub-state violence, or the presence of state coercion. In effect, Newman (2007) makes an argument in line with this project; that multiple factors influence the expression of terrorism, of which state bureaucratic capacity is only one. Coggins (2015) agrees with Newman (2007), noting that many of the indicators used to identify weak capacity states (including the presence of armed conflict and state coercion) are probably also related to terrorism. Drawing from this literature, then, it appears that much of the previous research on this topic does not clearly delineate the differences between the effect of state bureaucratic capacity, coercion, or the presence of a larger rebel campaign (unlike this study, all of the research cited above looks at terrorist attacks, rather than the aggregate campaign of violence). Therefore, all else being equal—in the absence of coercion or other armed sub-state conflict—I argue that states with higher administrative capacity are more likely to experience terrorist campaigns because, in line with the understanding of terrorism as a weapon of the weak, states with higher administrative capacity are likely to be a more permissive environment for terrorist than for insurgent or civil war campaigns. In low capacity

states, the state may not be able to counter rebel activity effectively, leaving rebels with far more options.

Insurgent Campaigns and State Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity

Byman (2008, 165) identifies the problems an insurgent campaign has when facing a state, which, in contrast to the rebel group's resources, "is relatively rich, has thousands or even millions of administrators, policemen, and soldiers, and enjoys considerable legitimacy." When state bureaucratic capacity is high, the state may be more able to effectively administer its territory and quash any rebels residing within it. Indeed, there appears to be a general scholarly agreement that weak governments breed insurgent campaigns; scholars that posit this view include Fearon and Laitin (2003), Jones (2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2006). Findley and Young (2007) find that states that pursue a 'hearts and minds' strategy—which includes good governance measures—are more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency. This apparent consensus in the literature, that high state capacity leads to a lower chance for insurgent campaigns, appears to hold not only for insurgent campaigns, but, as discussed below, for civil war campaigns as well.

Civil War Campaigns and State Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity

States with weak capacity are expected to experience a far greater likelihood of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis 2002; Fjelde and de Soysa 2009). Hegre and Sambanis (2006) point out that two aspects of state administrative capacity, political instability and 'inconsistent' institutions, are quite robustly linked to civil war. Thies (2010), when looking at the fiscal strength of the state, finds a similar result; states with high fiscal capacity are less likely experience civil war. Overall, there is strong scholarly support for a relationship between state administrative/bureaucratic capacity and civil war incidence.

State Administrative/Bureaucratic Theory

States with ineffective governance, due to issues such as corruption or poor institutions, may find it difficult to provide adequate government services to their populations. Or, if the services they are providing are unpopular, they may lack the ability to change or improve those services. States that have poor fiscal health have fewer resources to draw on in order to change their institutions or their policies. States with factionalized elites may be so wrapped up in institutional infighting for power that the population's relationship with the state is marginalized.

How does the level of state administrative/bureaucratic capacity affect rebel campaign choices? First, with low capacity, states may be providing reasons for their population to rebel. A state that is unable to effectively govern its territories, or to provide basic services to its population, may leave a gap that rebel organizations can fill. Second, when states have low levels of administrative capacity, they are poorly equipped to deal with the reasons their citizens might choose to rebel. Thus, at low levels of state administrative capacity, if a population has a reason to rebel, the state is both unlikely to be able to change its own behavior in order to lessen support for rebellion, and at the same time, its own ineffectiveness makes for a highly permissible environment in which rebellion may be seen as less costly.

Given these problems, it makes sense that states with low capacity are more likely to experience civil war and insurgent campaigns. For both of these campaign types, a state with weak capacity is not that much of a threat to rebel activities, which may flourish in a permissive environment. Popular mobilization for rebels is also likely to be easy, given the lack of state governance which would otherwise be able to deter rebel recruitment or change policies to make the rebels look like a less attractive option. Conversely, when state bureaucratic capacity is high, the state is able to better 'see' and understand its population, provide government services, and

take actions such as policy changes when necessary to respond to the needs of the state's population. Therefore, I expects there to be a negative, linear relationship between state bureaucratic/administrative capacity and the likelihood of both insurgent and civil war campaigns. In this instance, the effect of state bureaucratic capacity does not differ between rebel choice for insurgent and civil war campaigns; the chances for both are expected to increase as state capacity decreases. The literature is fairly clear on this; both campaign choices are more likely in weak states and less likely in states with high capacity.[24]

However, the effect of state administrative capacity on terrorist campaigns is the opposite of that hypothesized for insurgent and civil war campaigns. For rebel groups facing a highly capable bureaucratic state, a terrorist campaign may be their best, if not only, violent option. Since states with weak capacity are unlikely to be able to effectively stop rebel activity or recruitment, the costs for civil war and insurgent campaigns go down, so terrorist campaigns are probably less likely as insurgent and civil war campaigns become more easy to undertake, and therefore more easily substitutable. In states with high capacity, however, where the population may not support the rebels and the state may be able to effectively govern its territory, terrorist campaigns are a far more feasible undertaking. Therefore, the relationship between state administrative capacity and terrorist campaigns is expected to be a positive linear correlation, with relatively more occurrences of terrorist campaigns occurring when state capacity is at high levels.

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[24] As noted in previous chapters, the advantage of this project's research methods are such that multiple explanatory factors can be used to understand when a certain campaign type is more likely; while the effects of state administrative capacity may be quite similar for insurgent and civil war campaigns, the effect of the other causal factors varies between the two campaign types.

HYPOTHESIS 4: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative capacity is at higher levels.

HYPOTHESIS 5: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative capacity is at lower levels.

HYPOTHESIS 6: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative capacity is at lower levels.

State Military Capacity

The state's military capacity is considered the sine qua non of state capacity by some authors, given its assumed ability to squelch rebellion. As Kocher (2010, 143) points out, "This view of strength is highly intuitive: big, expensive armies win wars and deter would-be aggressors. …Domestic groups that might otherwise see opportunities to capture the state or detach territories from it are likely to be deterred or defeated quickly before large-scale challenges can develop." Thus, the military is perhaps the most important state tool that potential rebels evaluate prior to deciding whether or not to take action. As Hendrix (2010, 274) explains, "Rebellion is an inherently militarized act that entails the risk of capture, injury, imprisonment, and death, and we assume potential rebels factor the size, strength, and skill of state forces into their decision to rebel. Ceteris paribus, a smaller or less organized army should pose less threat than a larger or more organized one."

Terrorist Campaigns and State Military Capacity

Minimal research has been done on the relationship between the state's military and terrorism. This may be because, in general, terrorism does not typically directly confront the state's military forces. In the research which most directly addresses the issue, Hendrix and

Young (2014, 336) find that increases in the state's military capacity will lead to an increase in the amount of terrorist attacks, noting that "military capacity may incentivize terror tactics because it makes other means of violent contestation relatively more costly." Similarly, Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009) note that terrorism is chosen over guerilla warfare when states are stronger; in weak states rebels are more likely to choose guerilla (insurgent) warfare. Lake (2002) also concurs, arguing that the goal of the terrorist campaign is to use the state's strengths against it. In sum, then, it appears that high levels of state military capacity appear to be linked to a higher likelihood of a terrorist campaign.

Insurgent Campaigns and State Military Capacity

As Buhaug (2006) notes, rebels in an insurgent campaign still have to fight state military forces, even if their goal is area denial or hit and run attacks, rather than annihilation of the state's forces. However, given the 'shadow government' nature of an insurgent campaign, very high levels of state military capacity may not be necessary or effective to adequately counter an insurgency. Sepp (2005) argues that military forces typically play only a supporting role in successful counterinsurgencies, with the burden of effort falling instead on other areas of the state apparatus. Lyall and Wilson III (2009) also find that the military capacity of the state may not matter all that much to insurgents, who are more likely to avoid than seek out direct, conventional battles with military forces. Jones and Johnston (2013, 7) go even farther, stating that guerilla strategies are "the most difficult for a large, conventional military force to counter." Given this literature, it would appear that high levels of military might have little effect on the choice of an insurgent campaign. However, a strictly negative relationship between state military capacity and the likelihood of an insurgent campaign is also unlikely, for if the military is very weak, the rebel group may choose instead to undertake a civil war campaign and directly

confront such weak state military forces in more conventional combat. Indeed, in states with such weak military capacity that there exists at state of 'contested sovereignty' between multiple actors, civil war is likely ongoing or soon to start (Florea 2012).

Civil War Campaigns and State Military Capacity

As noted in the previous section, Florea (2012) argues that as state military capacity decreases, civil war becomes more likely. This view is supported by other literature. Collier and Hoeffler (1999) find that increases in the government's military strength is negatively associated with civil war. Hendrix (2010, 274) concurs, noting, "Ceteris paribus, a smaller or less organized army should pose less threat than a larger or more organized one," and this deterrent effect of high state military capacity is also noted by Gibler and Miller (2014). Overall, it appears that a larger state military force is seen as a greater threat to potential rebels, and will therefore depress the incidence of civil war campaigns.

State Military Capacity Theory

When state military capacity is high, it serves as a powerful deterrent to rebel groups. At high levels of capacity, the military can defend itself effectively against any potential rebel attack, and threaten harsh reprisals should an attack occur. Yet this dampening effect on rebellious violence varies based on the type of rebel campaign.

Recall from Chapter 3 that civil war typically includes major force on force battles between the rebel group and the state. Of the three campaign types, in civil war the rebels are most likely to be directly challenging and confronting the forces of the state. It follows, then, that the state's military capacity has a very direct effect on rebel forces during a civil war; a higher level of state military capacity would make it more difficult for rebel military forces to

effectively combat their state equivalents. Therefore, increases in state military capacity are expected to result in lower levels of civil war campaign incidence.

Unlike civil war campaigns, insurgent campaigns are not likely to have the same negative relationship with military might. Rather, insurgent campaigns may be more likely at moderate, rather than low or high levels of state military capacity. Insurgent campaigns tend to focus on setting up alternate governance institutions and taking on military actions that avoid directly engaging the state's forces in major battle. Implicit in these calculations is the expectation that the state can and will choose to oppose the rebel group, so high levels of state military capacity are expected to decrease the likelihood of an insurgent campaign. However, at very low levels of military capacity, the state's forces may pose such a weak threat—or no threat at all—rebels may see no need for an insurgent campaign. Instead, the rebels would be more likely to pursue a civil war campaign given that the cost of direct confrontation of the state is minimal. Therefore, the relationship between state military capacity and insurgent campaigns is expected to be nonlinear, with relatively more occurrences of insurgent campaigns occurring when state military capacity is at moderate levels, and fewer occurrences when state military capacity is at low or high levels.

Finally, state military capacity may have a different effect of the choice of terrorist campaigns. For rebels who what to pursue violent action, when state military capacity is high, terrorist campaigns may be the best bet for two reasons. First, the high level of capacity may limit the feasibility of insurgent or civil war campaigns, as discussed above. Second, as Lake (2002) noted, a very strong state may also encourage terrorist campaigns, due to the hope that a poorly-conceived or disproportionate military response to that terrorist campaign might serve to push more of the population to support the rebels. Therefore, it appears that high levels of state military capacity are unlikely to have a dampening effect on terrorist campaigns; rather, there

appears to be a positive relationship between state military capacity and the rebel choice of terrorist campaign.

HYPOTHESIS 7: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at higher levels.

HYPOTHESIS 8: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at intermediate levels.

HYPOTHESIS 9: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at lower levels.

Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity

While rebel capacity and state capacity are both analyzed in terms of bureaucratic and military capacity, some of the aspects of these concepts may vary, due to their different circumstances. In particular, rebel bureaucratic effectiveness can perhaps best be evaluated by not only looking at the ability of the rebel organization itself, but also by assessing resources that indirectly provide the rebel organization the ability to undertake rebellious activity. This is because rebels operate in, and develop their support from, a population. Therefore, this project looks at both internal and external aspects of rebel bureaucratic/administrative capacity. These aspects include the ability of the rebel group to extract financial resources, the cohesiveness of the rebel organization, and the ability of the state population as a whole—in which the rebels operate—to assemble and communicate.

As described above in the state bureaucratic/administrative capacity section, one aspect of bureaucratic effectiveness is the ability to extract financial resources. For rebels, successful

financing implies extant administrative ability and rebel coordination, as well as the presence of an income stream that provides the resources to undertake operations. Such financial support can come from donations by sympathetic members of the population, imposed taxation or extortion on areas under rebel control, or links to or facilitation of organized crime (Weinstein 2007; Mampilly 2011; Ross 2003a; Ross 2003b). Another source of financial resources are the extraction and sale of so-called 'lootable' resources. Literature looking at this subject has typically focused on the presence and amount of exploitable resources within a state that rebels could utilize (Ross 2003a; Ross 2003b; Buhaug et al. 2009). As Thies (2010) points out, such natural endowments may provide financial resources to both the state and the rebel group. Yet, lootable resources are important specifically for rebel groups, since the capture of such loot may result in personal gain for the rebels who take possession, as well as providing financing for the larger rebel organization (Lujala 2010; Weinstein 2005; Ross 2004).

In addition to measures of potential internally-controlled economic resources, external financial support to rebel groups is also important (Salehyan 2009; Byman et al. 2001). Diaspora groups are one notable supporter (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Diaspora groups "often feel a genuine sympathy for the struggles of their brethren elsewhere," and rebels can "actively play on this sympathy and guilt to secure critical financing" (Byman et al. 2001, xv). Such diaspora groups may provide financial support in the form of remittances, host state-in-exile administrators, publicize the rebel's movement and rally the international community's support. Similar forms of external support may also be provided from governments hostile to the state in which the rebels are operating (Salehyan 2009; Salehyan 2010).

Administrative and bureaucratic effectiveness in rebel organizations can also be linked to the overall ability of a state's population to assemble and communicate. Since the state typically

either does not know the identity of the rebels in its territory, or cannot access known rebels due to limitations or constraints on its use of power, the state tends to struggle with precisely targeting rebels with countermeasures. Instead, what the state can do is to implement broad controls on assembly and civil society for the entire population, on the assumption that population-wide controls will hinder any rebels operating within that population (Bell et al. 2013). Given this logic, the ability of a population to communicate and coordinate its actions is part of rebel administrative capacity, as such communication and coordination permits rebel operations. This communication and coordination capacity can take many forms. Two aspects discussed below are population's access to communications technology, and the social constraints on a population's ability to communicate with itself.

The focus on access to communications technology, such as mobile phones and the internet, is based on argument that such technology increases the ability of population to contact others (Bell et al. 2013, 248; Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010). It enables physical coordination and assembly efforts as well as creating virtual environments where geographically separated rebels can interact and communicate (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013). As Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010, 231) note, internet access both "facilitates and supports (traditional) offline collective action in terms of organization, mobilisation and transnationalism" as well as permitting "new forms of online protest activities."

However, having the technology to communicate and coordinate does not necessarily mean that such activities are taking place; societal divisions may limit inter- and intragroup coordination (Gates 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These divisions, such as ethnic and religious group rivalries and different languages, can all affect rebel administrative capacity. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) explain this linkage, noting that "Rebel

coordination would be more difficult both in societies in which the entire population was from the same group, so that there was no obvious distinction between government and rebel supporters, and in societies which were so highly fractionalized that rebellion required coordination across multiple distinct groups (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 567)."

Terrorist Campaigns and Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity

As the 'weapon of the weak', terrorism has long been associated with rebellious activity carried out on the cheap, and therefore rebel groups with smaller levels of administrative capacity are likely to still be able to organize a terrorist campaign, even if they are unable to support an insurgent or civil war campaign (Gray 2007, 247). Hendrix and Young (2014, 335) note that choices between different types of rebellion "are informed both by the organizational capacity and resources available to dissidents... On the organizational side, terrorism is an appealing tactic for relatively small, newer groups and for groups whose conventional strength has waned." Rebel bureaucratic capacity may serve to limit rebel choices; as capacity increases, the ability to undertake an insurgent or civil war campaign also increases. In this way, higher levels of rebel bureaucratic capacity offers rebels more options, whereas low rebel bureaucratic capacity may limit options.

Insurgent Campaigns and Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity

At low levels of rebel bureaucratic capacity, limits in personnel and funding may restrict rebel groups from undertaking insurgent campaigns; Byman (2008, 169) notes that "small groups cannot effectively wage guerrilla war and conduct widespread political mobilization. …Other things being equal, larger size is a great benefit in insurgent war." Kilcullen (2010, 7) argues that rebel 'connectivity' is the key to understanding rebel group power, noting, "The center of gravity of an insurgent movement—the source of power from which it derives its morale, its physical

strength, its freedom of action, and its will to act—is its connectivity with the local population in a given area." Kilcullen's 'connectivity' bears a close resemblance to this chapter's description of rebel group administrative and bureaucratic capacity; therefore, based on Kilcullen's construction, the primary relationship that would imply a greater likelihood of the rebel choice of an insurgent campaign is a high level of rebel administrative capacity. Additionally, Fearon (2008, 295) argues that rebel group ability to limit information about themselves is perhaps the most important aspect of success in an insurgent campaign, noting that "the central problem of counterinsurgency is not to marshal adequate forces to defeat rebel units, but to gain good intelligence on who and where the active rebels are." Thus, the capability of a rebel administration to conceal its actions from the state appears to be necessary for an insurgent campaign to occur (Hendrix 2010, 274). Finally, Ahmad (1982, 246) argues that rebel administrative capacity matters far more than military capacity in insurgent campaigns, stating that, "popular support is essential because the disparity of military strength rules out a clear-cut victory by the insurgents." Given these descriptions, rebel administrative capacity appears to play an important role in insurgent campaigns, with higher levels of capacity encouraging a greater likelihood of insurgent campaign.

Civil War Campaigns and Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity

In terms of the relationship between rebel administrative capacity and the incidence of civil war, DeNardo (2014) argues that the ability for rebel groups to strategize effectively may help rebel groups undertake civil war campaigns, as good strategy may reduce the danger or cost of rebelling on such a scale; such rebel strategy is understood as a function of the administrative strength of the rebel group. In a similar vein, Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød, (2008) find that the exclusion of ethnic minorities will increase the risk of civil war, due to the ability of the

ethnically excluded groups to politically mobilize. Buhaug (2010) notes that more organized, administratively capable groups are more likely to challenge the government in larger conflicts which are closer to the government's base of power. In sum, it appears that, as with insurgent campaigns, higher levels of rebel administrative capacity will lead to a greater likelihood of civil war campaigns.

Rebel Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity Theory

When rebel administrative/bureaucratic capacity is low, the rebel group appears to be simply not capable of undertaking insurgent or civil war campaigns. This makes intuitive sense: with low bureaucratic skills and weak or nonexistent coordination and communication, any organization would struggle to be effective. An inability to coordinate or communicate is perhaps especially critical for rebel groups, as their illicit nature means they must usually be covert in their administrative actions. Without a functioning bureaucracy, managing personnel or building up resources is a difficult, if not impossible, task. Because of this, when rebel bureaucratic/administrative capacity is low, it would seem that options for the rebel group become limited. Terrorist campaigns, which of all three violent campaign types appear to require the least in terms of administrative ability or organization, thus become most likely. Therefore, relationship between rebel administrative/bureaucratic capacity and terrorist campaigns is expected to be a negative linear correlation for both administrative and military capacity, with the likelihood of onset decreasing as the level of rebel capacity increases.

When rebel administrative/bureaucratic capacity increases, so do the options for rebel groups. At high levels of capacity, the rebels can much more effectively operate, and therefore have a wider range of options. Indeed, insurgent campaigns are predicated on the idea that rebels can out-govern, rather than militarily defeat, the state. As described above, in choosing an

insurgent campaign, rebels seek to subvert the state, setting up their own 'shadow' governance institutions. This requires a high level of administrative capacity; the rebels must not only oversee their own members, but also, if they are successful, govern part of the population. Rebel bureaucratic capacity is thus critical to the implementation of an insurgent campaign. Accordingly, this project expects there to be a positive relationship between rebel administrative capacity and the choice of an insurgent campaign; as capacity increases, so too will the chances for such a campaign.

This same argument, that bureaucratic capacity is critical to effective rebel operations, also applies to civil war campaigns. Civil war campaigns are focused not only on governance, but also on direct conflict with state forces. In order for such conflict to occur, a great deal of rebel organization is required. Personnel must be recruited to fill rebel ranks, and war materiel must be found, maintained, and moved to the location of battle. These are large demands to make of an organization, and therefore the incidence of civil war campaigns is likely to require high levels of rebel bureaucratic/administrative capacity. Thus, rebel bureaucratic capacity is hypothesized to have the same relationship for both insurgent and civil war campaigns; as capacity increases, the likelihood of both of these campaigns also increases.

HYPOTHESIS 10: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at lower levels.

HYPOTHESIS 11: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels.

HYPOTHESIS 12: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels.

Rebel Military Capacity

The capacity of the rebel military is important because ultimately rebel specialists in the use of force carry out the violent campaigns. Further, the size of the group may also inform the type of activities they are capable of carrying out. Buhaug (2010, 115) notes, "[c]ontenders that are able to muster scores of soldiers clearly constitute a greater threat to the government than do tiny bands of rebels." The number of rebel personnel by itself, however, is not necessarily highly correlated with the chosen campaign type, as the ratio between rebel and state forces is probably of far more importance to choice of campaign; Byman (2008, 170) explains that "A force of 500 fighters would be quite large against a weak government like that of Tajikistan or in a tiny country such as Brunei, but it would be rather small in a country as large as China."

Rebel forces are comprised both of local fighters and the foreign fighters who battle alongside. Local forces are important, as foreign fighters may be more likely to lack support, be isolated from, or inflict violence on, a civilian population, whereas local fighters, coming from the population, can more easily garner its support (Weinstein 2007). Yet, at the same time, foreign fighters can grow the size of the rebel force, and may offer specialized knowledge in combat operations, to the benefit of less-trained local rebels (Malet 2010).

Terrorist Campaigns and Rebel Military Capacity

In general, the expectation is that rebel groups that lack military capacity typically undertake terrorist campaigns. Crenshaw (1981, 388) argues that rebels undertaking terrorist campaigns do not have high levels of military capacity, though they may hope to achieve higher levels of capacity by undertaking the campaign, becoming popular, and subsequently mobilizing a larger portion of the population. This reasoning is in line with Wood (2014, 462), who states

that “Relatively weak groups may therefore more frequently rely on terrorism as a substitute for more conventional strategies of war specifically because they lack the resources necessary to engage their adversary directly.” Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009, 35) concur, noting that, “In the continuum between military power and the power to hurt… terrorists can only employ the power to hurt.”

Insurgent Campaigns and Rebel Military Capacity

In terms of military capacity, Buhaug (2006, 694), drawing on Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) and Horowitz (1985), notes a difference in the aims of rebel groups that seek smaller conflict goals (regional autonomy) rather than large conflict goals (taking over the state). These different goals are roughly aligned with this project’s differentiation between the conflict type of an insurgent campaign versus that of full-blown civil war. Buhaug (2006, 694) claims that the difference between these aims is the ‘amount of force’ the rebel group possesses. Therefore, Buhaug (2006) would seem to suggest that insurgent campaigns would be more likely to happen when rebels possess moderate or medium levels of force, compared to the forces of the state. This view concurs with that of Crenshaw (1981, 387), who places guerilla-style warfare in the middle of a spectrum of rebel military capacity, between ‘weapon of the weak’ terrorist activity and ‘conventional’ war, an argument that Gray (2007) would agree with. Overall, the literature suggests that insurgent campaigns are more likely at moderate levels of rebel military capacity.

Civil War Campaigns and Rebel Military Capacity

Hironaka (2005, 3) points out that civil war is resource-intensive; the scale of conflict, greater than that in terrorist or insurgent campaigns, requires more inputs from the rebel group. She notes; “Regardless of the intensity of the grievance, however, few groups acting alone have

access to sufficient resources to wage large-scale civil war over long periods of time" (Hironaka 2005, 3). Correspondingly, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009, 5) note that the creation and deployment of a standing rebel military is "both prohibitively expensive and extremely dangerous." Lidow (2016) suggests that civil war campaigns, rather than insurgent campaigns, are more likely when the military forces of the rebels and the state are near parity (as opposed to the rebels having far fewer personnel). Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød (2006) find similar results to Lidow (2016), though they look specifically at ethnic civil wars. All of these authors appear to be in agreement that when rebel military capacity is high, civil war is more likely.

Rebel Military Capacity Theory

The level of rebel military capacity should have a strong relationship with the choice of violent rebel campaign. When rebel military capacity is low, rebels are less able to undertake violent actions, and also less able to defend themselves should they face action from the military forces of the state. However, even as rebel military capacity increases, rebels may still face significant opposition from the state's forces. This project argues that at different levels of rebel military capacity, different types of campaigns become more likely.

At low levels of rebel military capacity, the rebels are most constrained in what actions they can carry out. Due to a lack of capability, a direct or indirect confrontation with state military forces is likely to prove catastrophic. Even if rebels have the capability to carry out a few indirect attacks, it is unlikely that they would be able to pursue an entire campaign of this sort; with fewer personnel to put at risk, minimizing losses becomes a concern, for if enough rebels are lost the rebel organization may simply cease to exist. Because of this limitation, at low levels of rebel military capacity, this project expects rebels will be more likely to choose terrorist campaigns. Such campaigns offer perhaps the most 'bang for the buck', as terrorist attacks may

require only one or few rebels to carry out attacks, and these attacks, often at civilian targets, offer less risk of confrontation with the military forces of the state.

At moderate levels of military capacity, the rebels still may not wish to directly challenge the military forces of the states in large battles. However, at these intermediate levels of capacity, rebels may see some options for more limited military actions. In line with Buhaug (2010), rebels with some military forces may be able to challenge the government's forces in certain areas, or at certain times. For instance, rebels may be able to ambush a small patrolling unit of state forces, even if they would not directly attack the home base of that patrol. That ambush would be less likely if rebel forces were so weak they could not either find the means to challenge the patrol, or if they were so strong that they could challenge the home base of the state's forces. Thus it appears that there may be a 'sweet spot' in terms of rebel military capacity; too much capacity may encourage rebels to undertake larger or more direct challenges to the state's forces, while too little capacity may limit rebels from undertaking much of anything in terms of challenging state forces. Accordingly, it appears that insurgent campaigns are more likely when rebel military capacity is at moderate levels.

When rebel capacity exceeds those intermediate levels, rebels may switch to a preference for civil war campaigns. Civil war campaigns are focused on large-scale violence, typically involving force on force battles. In order to carry out such a campaign and directly confront the might of the state, rebel military capacity will need to be quite high. If rebel capacity were low, the state forces could easily crush them; this is why, as argued above, rebels are likely to choose terrorist campaigns when their military capacity is limited. Therefore, the relationship between rebel military capacity and civil war campaigns is expected to be a positive and linear, with relatively more occurrences of civil war campaigns when rebel military capacity is high.

HYPOTHESIS 13: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at lower levels.

HYPOTHESIS 14: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at intermediate levels.

HYPOTHESIS 15: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at high levels.

Campaign Onset

The hypotheses presented above provide a novel explanation of when specific types of rebel campaigns are most likely to occur, and are tested in the following chapters. But are conditions different in onset—the first year of a rebel campaign—as opposed to changes when a rebel activity is already underway? This research also examines the question of whether or not the onset of a new campaign of rebel violence is predicated differently than the overall incidence of violence. In other words, is there a different decision calculus at work for when rebels choose to start any form of sub-state violence, versus the decision of remaining in conflict?

Extant literature suggests that a change from nonviolence to a violent campaign might have different requirements than simply remaining in either activity. First, such a change to violence, or campaign onset, can be seen as a 'phase transition' between two states (violent/nonviolent). In social science literature, such transitions mark a distinct change in the behavior of a group of actors (Ball 2003; Levy 2003; Samet 2012). Though the concept of phase transitions is still relatively new within literature on political violence, there are a few articles that do specifically identify the change between political nonviolence and violence as 'phase

transitions'; these include Ferguson (2010), Cioffi-Revilla and Midlarsky (2004), Farley (2007), Johnson et al. (2013), and Galam and Mauger (2003). One key aspect of a phase transition is that some form of energy is required to shift the actors (Ball 2003; Samet 2012). This would imply that rebels need an impetus to switch to violent campaigns.

Campaign Onset Theory

What would such an impetus be? I hypothesize that state coercion may serve as the impetus that is needed to shift a rebel group to a violent campaign. As Gurr (1970) and Arena and Hardt (2014) point out, because rebellion is a costly undertaking with very high downside risks for the potential rebel, grievances must be high enough to make the cost of rebellion comparatively less than it would be otherwise. This claim is supported by Regan and Norton (2005), who find that increased levels of repression by the state discourage nonviolent protest, but are a strong predictor of both 'rebellion' and civil war.

Once a rebel campaign has started, however, the rebels may face a lower requirement for the level of coercion required to continue in that campaign. For instance, once a rebel group has committed to a violent campaign, they are an enemy of the state, and will face prosecution (and even death) if they are caught—even if the group later decides to cease their violent activities.[25] Therefore, drawing together the literature on phase shifts and coercion, I argue that the onset of any type of rebel campaign will require a higher level of coercive activity by the state than that required for the overall incidence of that campaign type.

[25] An example of this phenomenon is described in the case study of the LTTE in Chapter 8. Scholars argue that the reason the LTTE turned down a very conciliatory peace offer by the Sri Lankan government, one that addressed the majority of rebel grievances, was because, while the rank-and-file rebels might have approved, their leadership faced not only a loss of despotic power, but also potential punishment for war crimes. Thus, the LTTE continued to fight even though it might have been in the group's best interests to switch back to nonviolent political activities.

HYPOTHESIS 16: The onset year of any given rebel campaign type will have a stronger positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that same type of rebel campaign.

Conclusion

In the following chapters, I test these hypotheses by both quantitative and qualitative means. Quantitative testing is described in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 describes the process by which the independent coercion and capacity variables are generated and tested using a latent variable methodology. Chapter 6 further describes the development of the multi-state, multi-year dataset used in this project, and then discusses the methodology and models used to test the hypotheses, and assesses the results of those models. Qualitative testing is performed in Chapters 7 and 8, which look at two case studies of rebel campaigns in Kenya and Sri Lanka. The use of mixed-methods to test the relationships between ends and means provides challenges to both the breadth and depth of the applicability of the hypotheses. Chapter 9 concludes by providing an overall analysis of the theory proposed in this project, a review of the hypotheses' performance under testing, and a description of paths for further research on this subject.

Chapter 5 - Constructing Coercion and Capacity

While Chapter 4 defined the terms coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity conceptually, in order to carry out empirical testing of the hypotheses it becomes necessary to define these terms operationally. One of the difficulties of doing so, however, is that these terms can encompass a number of measurable phenomena.[26] While each of these measures may capture part of overall state capacity, no one measure is definitely better than the others. Further, some measures may actually overlap with each other in terms of the actual effect they are trying to proxy. In order to incorporate multiple measures of each of these concepts, I draw on statistical techniques for measuring latent variables. The term 'latent variable' refers to a variable which cannot be directly captured, but which can be indirectly measured via other variables. Little (2013, 103) defines the latent variable as "the unobservable 'thing' or 'entity' that gives rise to the observed measurements represented by the manifest indicators."

In latent variable methodology, measurements of a theoretical construct (e.g. state capacity) are inferred from multiple variables that are more easily measured. Latent variable modeling aggregates of a number of observed variables that all capture some aspect of the latent variable. The shared variance, or the amount in which these observed variables 'hang together', is assumed to be from the underlying latent variable. Once generated via confirmatory factor analysis and evaluated for model fit, estimates of this latent variable can then be used in statistical analysis.

In the following sections, I lay out a methodological approach for generating a latent variable measure of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. I first describe the advantages of

[26] For example, in the extant literature, state capacity has been measured using a broad array of proxies, everything from gross domestic product to rough terrain.

a latent variable approach, and explain why this novel approach is complimentary to existing approaches in the literature. Next, I describe why confirmatory factor analysis is the most methodologically appropriate way in which to develop the latent variables for this project. Following the description of the methodological approach, I describe the construction of the latent variables, and analyze the results of that construction.

The Advantage of a Latent Variable Approach

There are no observable overall measures of state coercion, rebel capacity, and state capacity. Rather, researchers interested in these, or related, concepts typically operationalize proxy variables with which to capture some aspect or aspects of the underlying theoretical variable. As Loehlin (2011,1) notes, "the variables they [researchers] directly manipulate and observe are typically not the ones of real theoretical interest but are merely some convenient variables acting as proxies or indexes for them." While the use of a proxy variable (e.g. using GDP as a proxy for state capacity) offers one way to measure the theoretical variable of interest, latent variables offer another, arguably more comprehensive construct for this measurement. As Hendrix and Young (2014, 340) note, the use of latent variables is preferable when competing measures of a specific phenomenon are expected to be highly correlated (thus leading to problems if they are included in a model simultaneously) but when using a single measure may not capture the full spectrum of the phenomenon.

Thus, instead of using one proxy variable, latent variables are constructed by drawing information from several potentially related observable proxy variables that may each capture aspects of the theoretical variable of interest. Once these proxy variables are identified, they are grouped as a 'factor', and then that factor is analyzed to see if those proxy variables do indeed share variance with each other. If they do share variance, this suggests that the factor is capturing

the theoretical variable of interest better than the group of proxies—as individual variables—can. Once this shared variance factor is identified, the next step is to generate an estimate of the latent variable. Once generated, this latent variable is then subjected to further analysis to check for the goodness of fit of the model, or if modifications to the model are in order. Following this process, the final estimate of the latent variable is generated; this estimated latent variable, which incorporates information from all of the included proxy variables, can then be used as a variable in further quantitative models that test the hypotheses (Bentler 1980). A further description of the standards used to check for shared variance and model fit is described in the following section.

The usage of latent variable techniques is not novel in social science literature writ large.[27] However, its use in research related to international relations and security studies is far more limited. To the best of my knowledge, only one extant article uses this methodology in a manner directly in line with that of this project: Hendrix and Young (2014) use latent variable modeling for independent variables dealing with state capacity. Other, less closely-related works in the field of international relations and conflict studies include the following. Fearon (2010) notes, within a summary article on governance, that the concept of state governance might be better understood as a latent variable, though he does not perform that analysis. Andvig (2008) utilizes a latent variables construction of corruption and analyzes its effect on civil wars. D'Orazio (2012) argues for the use of latent variables when considering foreign policy similarities, which is in some ways related to state capacity. Fariss (2014) develops latent variables that measure human rights practices. Treier and Jackman (2008) develop latent variable measures of democracy. Overall, however, the application of latent variables to better understand

[27] Latent variable techniques are especially common in the field of psychology, where they are used to capture feelings such as 'love' or 'depression'

concepts related to sub-state conflict, while theoretically justifiable, is still a somewhat novel methodology in this area of research.

In line with this research, this project utilizes latent variable construction for its independent variables, and notes that this methodology provides distinct advantages in the area of conflict-studies research. Such latent constructs capture, perhaps more accurately, holistic measurements of the concepts of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. Instead of including proxies which may capture only certain facets of coercion, such as torture or income inequality, the use of latent variable techniques permits multiple observed variables, each measuring different aspects of state coercion, to be amalgamated, and the shared variance between those variables to be captured, generating a broader, multi-faceted measurement of vital concepts. Such a methodology addresses the theoretical discussion in Chapter 4, which describes the multiple facets within the concepts of coercion and capacity. In particular, measures of capacity may be informed by both administrative and military efficacy, and a latent variable methodology can help capture these different aspects of the concept.

While latent variable modeling is of use for more holistic representations of coercion and state capacity, it is of particular value for quantitative analysis of rebel capacity. In this project, the data used in developing latent variable measures of coercion and state capacity are measured at the state level; there are relatively good data sources for these variables. However, data at the rebel group level, which is used for developing latent variable measures of rebel capacity, are far more limited in scope and availability.[28]

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[28] The original dataset is built using the rebel group-year as the unit of analysis. The rebel capacity latent variables are generated using this level of analysis. However, the data was compressed to the state-year level of analysis when the state level latent variables (coercion and state capacity) are generated. Once all of the latent variables are generated, the state level variables are added back into the rebel group-year dataset.

In general, there are two major issues that rebel capacity data face. First, there are multiple incentives for rebels to misrepresent or conceal their true capabilities from the public writ large, as that public includes the state, which is very interested in suppressing and destroying the rebel force. Thus, rebels may wish to 'fly under the radar' and reveal as little as possible about their capabilities. Conversely, rebels may wish to appear more capable than they actually are when attempting to recruit personnel from the public or convince the government of the size of their popular support, so rebel groups may also broadcast inflated estimates of their own capabilities. Given these dual incentives to misrepresent, any rebel data collected via public sources is prone to issues of under- or over-reporting. Second, the overall amount of data on rebel capacity is, at the time of this writing, simply less available than that of data on states, in terms of the quantity of measures, the number of groups measured, and the time scale over which data is available. There are also significant problems with missing data on rebel groups, far more so than with state data. This can be due either to successful secrecy measures by the rebel group, or simply the lack of good public reporting on that group by the sources that are mined for rebel data collection efforts (Eck 2012).

Due to these issues with data on rebel capacity, latent variable modeling offers distinct advantages. Primarily, the capturing of shared variance between multiple discrete observations from separate data sources on rebel groups means that latent measures of rebel capacity are likely to be much more robust than the inclusion of a single specific measure. Since latent variable methodology captures shared variance, issues of under- or over-reporting of rebel capability in a specific data source may be less likely to skew an overall measure of capacity that draws from multiple sources (though, of course, such issues still remain problematic).

Furthermore, by meshing multiple data sources together, the odds of having at least some data for a given rebel group dramatically increase, which decreases the problems associated with missing data, and increases the universe of observable groups. For example, the most comprehensive datasets of non-state actors are focused on active groups, and provide data only for years in which the group chose an active campaign (i.e. groups are listed in the Global Terrorism Database or the Armed Conflict Dataset only in years that they are violently active). Other data sources, such as those that provide rebel finance information, provide some information on rebel capacity even in years in which the rebel group does not undertake a violent campaign. By combining these data, a better picture of rebel group capacity variation across time can emerge.

To the best of my knowledge, no other research has utilized latent variable methods in order to capture measures of rebel capacity. Therefore, the method outlined in this chapter may provide a new, more efficacious way of approaching old issues associated with the quantitative analysis of rebel group data, as well as the larger study of sub-state conflict. While this method, as with all others, still faces issues with missing or underreported data, the use of latent variable methodology provides new approach that may help to mitigate these issues when studying rebel groups.[29] In sum, then, the latent variable methodology utilized in this project provides a method for more holistically capturing measures of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. Such a methodology may be especially helpful in addressing extant issues with data on rebel groups. The particulars of how the concepts of coercion and capacity are operationalized are described in the following section.

[29] Missing data issues are discussed further in the following section.

Latent Variable Construction

Given the above-described, theoretically-determined sets of observed variables for coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity, the next step is to develop latent variables from these observed variables. Within the broader methodological approach of latent variable modeling, there are several statistical approaches that can be taken, including factor analysis, item response theory, latent profile analysis, and latent class analysis. All of these methodological approaches are non-controversial; the choice of a specific method simply depends on the type of variables under analysis.[30] Bartholomew et al. (2002, 145-146) distinguish between these statistical approaches and identify which approach is best suited to a particular endeavor, based upon the classification of the observed and latent variables. Following their guidelines, this chapter utilizes factor analysis since both (some of) the observed and (all of) the estimated latent variables are continuous. Given the continuous nature of variables, then, factor analysis is the most appropriate technique for generating measures of the latent variable. While factor analysis is perhaps less common than item response theory for the construction of latent variables, use of this technique does exist in previous literature; Hendrix and Young (2014) utilize factor analysis when they look at measures of state capacity.

[30] For example, Treier and Jackman (2008) develop both binary and continuous latent variable measures of democracy, using, respectively, an ordinal item response model and a latent class analysis. Similarly, item response theory models are used when data are ordinal. D'Orazio (2012) uses graded response models, a form of item response theory, because the majority of his data is coded into ordinal categories. Similarly, Fariss (2014) uses item response theory models for human rights measures. However, Fariss, as with D'Orazio, uses only ordinal and binary observed variables (Fariss 2014, 305). It is this use of specific types of indicator variables that makes item response theory models less applicable for this project's data.

There are two types of factor analysis: exploratory and confirmatory. While exploratory factor analysis is atheoretical in approach and seeks to search within data for potential latent factors, confirmatory factor analysis is utilized to determine if an a priori theoretical construct is supported by analysis of the empirical data (Brown and Moore 2015). In this chapter, the observed variables that contribute to the latent variables of coercion and capacity are drawn from the theoretical discussion in Chapter 4, and therefore confirmatory factor analysis, rather than exploratory factor analysis, is used in testing the development of the latent variables in this chapter.

In order to test the latent variable models hypothesized in Chapter 4, the following goodness of fit measures were used, in line with generally accepted standards for this methodology.[31] The measures used include: Cronbach's alpha, the Kaiser criterion, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sampling adequacy, the root mean square error of approximation, the p-value test of close fit, the comparative fit index, and the coefficient of determination. The first set of measures—Cronbach's alpha, the Kaiser criterion, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test—are pre-estimation checks of the shared variance between the theorized set of observed variables. These checks should ensure that the variables to be included in the latent variable estimation do appear to share variance as theorized.

First, Cronbach's alpha is used to determine the inter-item covariance for a given set of variables, and provides a test scale that is a standard measure of the internal consistency of the variables as a set (Cronbach 1951). The use of this measure helps to ensure that all of the items included in the latent variable are correlated with each other, showing that there is, indeed, shared variance between all of the variables that can be captured in the construction of the latent

[31] Statistical analysis in this chapter was performed using STATA 13.1.

variable. Following George and Mallery (2003), Cronbach's alpha is considered to be adequately fitted if the test scale falls between 0.5 and 1.[32] Once the observed variables set meets the Cronbach's alpha requirement, the next goodness of fit check is the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser 1960). This is done by running a factor analysis on the observed variables set, which generates a number of potential factors (potential latent variables) and denotes the Eigenvalue, or measure of the total variance accounted for by each factor. The Kaiser criterion requires that at least one of the potential factors should have an Eigenvalue equal to or greater than 1 to ensure that the factor is capturing a large-enough share of the variance of the set (Kaiser 1960). Basic factor analysis commands provide Eigenvalues for each identified factor, as well as the proportion of the total variance among the observed set of variables for all identified factors. While there is no established standard for the proportion of variance that a factor should capture, this proportional measure does offer further information as to how much variance the proposed factor is actually capturing from the set of observed variables. The third measure of goodness of fit is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sampling adequacy (Kaiser 1974; Cerny and Kaiser 1977; Dziuban and Shirkey 1974). This statistic checks to see if the set of observed variables is measuring a common factor among all variables, or, instead, if there are shared variances between some, but not all, variables within the set. Again, in developing a latent variable, ideally all observed variables in the set have some common variance, as this shared variance is what the latent variable is capturing. For the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test, the common shared variance is considered adequate if the overall score ranges between 0.5 and 1 (Kaiser 1974).

Once the set of observed variables appears to be a good set based on shared covariance, the next step is to generate the initial estimate of the latent variable. The basic latent variable

[32] All variables were standardized.

model estimation utilizes maximum likelihood with listwise deletion of observations with missing values.[33] Such deletion is problematic, since this project's dataset has numerous missing values, due in part to its nature as a compilation of data from a variety of sources.[34] Instead, for this chapter, latent variables were estimated using a form of maximum likelihood estimation that incorporates observations that have missing values; this provides for a far more inclusive use of the available data. This maximum likelihood multiple imputation model is considered to be the best estimation model possible for dealing with missing values, as it is unbiased and more efficient than the alternatives (Enders and Bandalos 2001; Soley-Bori 2013).[35]

The missing values inclusion version of maximum likelihood estimation requires two assumptions about the data: joint normality and 'missing at random' missing values (Acock 2015). The 'missing at random' assumption means "either that the missing values are scattered completely at random through the data or that values more likely to be missing than others can be predicted by the variables in the model (Acock 2015, 4)." In this chapter, the missing values are assumed to meet these requirements. While it might be difficult to determine that this data is missing at random, because there could conceivably be bias, for example, in what the press chooses to report (which is the basis for most observations in datasets), the state of the field is such that this assumption is routinely made.[36]

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[33] All models were run with standardized errors.

[34] The P>|z| and coefficients for the model are substantively the same between the listwise deletion and missing values incorporated versions of the maximum likelihood estimation.

[35] Multiple imputation is alternatively called full imputation; the terms are interchangeable.

[36] There is no test to determine whether or not data is missing at random; Enders (2010, 17-21) notes that it is not possible to test missing at random versus missing not at random since the information that is needed for such a test is missing. However, if this assumption is not true, the results of the latent variable estimation are likely to be biased.

Once the latent variable is estimated, a number of standard post-estimation checks for goodness of fit of the overall latent variable model are run, including root mean square error of approximation and associated *p*-value test of close fit, the comparative fit index, and the coefficient of determination.[37] The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is an absolute measure of model fit; adequately fitted models should have a RMSEA value between 0.01 (excellent) and 0.08 (adequate) (MacCallum et al. 1996). Computation of the RMSEA also includes information about the *p*-value test of close fit (pclose) for specification error; adequately fitted models should have a pclose that is not statistically significant, with a value greater than 0.05 (Browne and Cudeck 1993). The comparative fit index (CFI) compares the chi-square of a null or baseline model to that of the hypothesized one; the CFI in an adequately fit model should be equal to or greater than 0.95 (Hu and Bentler 1999). Finally, the coefficient of determination is a pseudo-R^2 measure which provides information on the proportion of variance explained by the model (StataCorp 2011).

After this initial estimate is generated, modification indices are checked to see if, alongside the common shared variance among all observed variables in the set, there are also instances of shared covariance among only specific pairs of variables within the set.

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[37] Some other standardized goodness of fit tests were not utilized, for the following reasons. The chi-squared test statistic was not used as this statistic is problematic when applied to large (N>200) datasets, as appropriate models tend to be rejected (Gatignon 2010). The Akaike and Bayesian information criteria were not included, as these statistics only provide information on different variations of the same model (i.e. if more than one latent variable for coercion was created, and the two needed to be compared). Finally, STATA does not report the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) for models which estimate missing values, as this chapter does. As a robustness check, some of this chapter's models were run without the estimation of missing values in order to generate the SRMR (very few of the models would actually compile without missing). In all models that met the goodness of fit criteria outlined above (RMSEA, pclose, CFI, CD), the SRMR was also within adequate bounds (per Hu and Bentler (1999), a SRMR value less than .08 is a good fit).

Unsurprisingly, given the nature of the data included, such specific covariances do exist in this dataset.[38] Once the appropriate modification indices are identified, the latent variable model, including those modifications, is estimated again, and the post-estimation checks are repeated. The results of the latent variable estimates and goodness of fit statistics are detailed below.

Operationalizing the Concepts

In the following paragraphs, I describe the observed variables that are included in the development of the coercion and capacity latent variables. Each of the three subsequent sections lays out what observable variables were chosen for inclusion in the latent variable, and explains the basis for their selection. While coercion is captured in a single latent variable which includes measures of physical, economic, and social security, the state and rebel capacity variables are split into administrative and military capacity subsections. This is line with the theoretical discussion in Chapter 4, which notes that some states may have a strong administrative capacity but simultaneously retain a weak military capacity, or vice versa. Such disaggregation permits more fine-grained analysis of the processes that may influence rebel campaign choice.[39]

Additionally, such a division of capacity into two separate variables is in line with Hendrix and Young (2014). Hendrix and Young (2014) develop a state capacity variable is roughly comparable with this chapter's state capacity variable, but they look at data from a limited sample of country-years, using elite surveys which capture only bureaucratic quality and

[38] More information on the specific theoretical underpinnings for the inclusion of covariance modifications in the model is described for each latent variable in the results section, below.

[39] As a robustness check, one latent variable for overall capacity (combining administrative and military variables) was also created for states and rebel groups. Results were not widely disparate from those for the split capacity variables. While single capacity variable creation remains an option, the disaggregation of administration and military capacity provides a more nuanced understanding of the interactions between different types of capacity in conflict processes.

law and order. Their state military capacity variable looks at forces and money spent on those forces (Hendrix and Young 2014, 340-342). This project's state capacity variable encompasses a larger set of variables that capture additional aspects of bureaucratic capacity, including the way in which states fund themselves, as well as attempting to capture additional nuances about the capability of state military. Hendrix and Young (2014) do not develop latent variables that address rebel capacity; this project does develop rebel capacity latent variables, built along the same lines of administrative and military capacity. Therefore, this chapter serves to extend research in the development of latent variables for both state and rebel capacity.

Coercion

The coercion variable measures the actions taken by a state that can cause grievances. In order to capture the multiple ways in which a state may seek to exert control or force over its population, the latent coercion variable is comprised of three sub-areas: physical security, economic security, and societal security. The specific variables used in each sub-area are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Physical security is measured utilizing the physical integrity rights variable from the Cingranelli and Richards (2010) Human Rights Data Project (CIRI). The physical integrity rights variable is "an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators (Cingranelli et al. 2013, 13)."[40] Utilizing the CIRI

[40] As a robustness check, an alternate construction of this latent variable included the four separate variables from the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project—torture, political killings, disappearances, and political prisoners—rather than the single index variable. However, these four variables are so highly correlated to each other that the alternate specification model did not compile due to collinearity issues. This makes theoretical sense; a government that is likely to torture its citizens is also likely to 'disappear' them. In order to overcome this collinearity issue, the additive index of these four variables, the physical integrity rights variable, was utilized

physical integrity rights variable as a credible measure for state coercion is in line with much previous research in the field; the CIRI dataset is one of the top two commonly cited human rights-issues dataset (Schmitz and Sikkink 2013, 828). The other human rights dataset, the Political Terror Scale, is not an additive index of different discrete types of human rights violations, but only offers an overall assessment of the level state terror (Wood and Gibney 2010). Given the additional clarity provided by the CIRI data disaggregation of different types of human rights violations—physical harm, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, etc—this chapter utilized CIRI data in order to be certain that only physical security issues were being captured, a level of detail that the PTS data did not offer.[41]

Economic security is measured via two observed variables. The first is the Gini index, which is a measure of "the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy [which] deviates from a perfectly equal distribution (World Bank 2015a)." The second economic security variable is the land Gini, an inquality measureument of for land distribution from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). The Vollrath and Erickson (2007) data extends the widely used dataset of Deininger and Squire (1996) to additional countries, though for most countries (in both datasets) this measure includes only one observation, and is thus time-invariant. Despite this single-observation limitation, the Vollrath and Erickson (2007) datset is the best-available dataset for land Gini measures; unfortunately no other broad multi-country survey of this measure of inequality exists.

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instead. This index variable permits information from all four physical coercion variables to included, and provides additional information on cumulative overall levels of physical coercion.

[41] The CIRI and PTS datasets are the two most widely-cited datatsets used in the social sciences to capture aspects of state coercion. Additionally, these two datasets offered the best available coverage over the time series used in this data.

While the World Bank Gini index is focused on income distribution, the land Gini is focused on measures of the distribution of land ownership. The inclusion of both income and land distribution equality variables ensures the capture of a greater scope of economic inequalities; including both measures is standard for research on economic inequality and growth (Alesina and Perotti 1994, 363). Both Gini variables range from zero (perfect equality) to one (perfect inequality). These variables are included because they measure the ultimate outcome on the population when state economic policies on taxation, welfare, job creation, and land ownership laws are implemented.[42]

The third type of coercion, societal security, encompasses three different variables, each of which focuses on a specific type of social equality. As described in Chapter 4, societal coercion may be captured by looking at how free a society is to practice religious expression, provide rights for the typically disenfranchised, and permit free expression, to include government criticism, by a population. In order to capture these aspects, this chapter utilizes the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). As described above, the CIRI data is disaggregated by type of human right, which enables the capture of specific measures.

[42] While these measures are imperfect, government actions on economic policies typically are focused on benefitting certain group(s) in that state; for example, a state which is more socialist is more likely to try to address income inequality through wealth redistribution programs (i.e. higher levels of taxation, the funds from which are used to provide social programs such as food aid, education, jobs training, medical care, home and land ownership focused on improving the lot of the poorer levels of society). The benefit of using measures of inequality, rather than direct measures of state policy (such as taxation levels) is that the measures of inequality more directly capture the effect of state policies on the population (whereas measures of state policy may provide information about the intent of the state, but not how well that intent is being implemented, or what its actual effect is on the population).

Other data on societal rights and coercion are also available, which include the Freedom House Freedom in the World data, the Minorities at Risk data, and the World Bank Human Development Index (which includes a gender inequality variable). CIRI data was utilized due to fact that it had the most in-depth data available covering the time for which data on rebel groups was also available.[43]

Therefore, using the CIRI data, the three specific variables included in the coercion model are freedom of religion, women's political rights, and freedom of speech. Freedom of religion measures the ability of a population to practice whatever religion they so choose. Women's political rights measure the ability of females to actively participate in politics, and freedom of speech measures the amount of government censorship on overall expression.[44]

Thus, the overall coercion latent variable was created to capture physical, economic, and societal coercion. In order to do this, the following observed variables are included in the creation of the latent variable: physical integrity rights, Gini, land Gini, freedom of religion, women's political rights, and freedom of speech. This collection of variables captures multiple aspects of state coercion of its population, including physical, economic, and social security areas.

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[43] Further research in this area could certainly utilized other sources for this data, but such research would be limited by the fewer years available for Freedom House and Minorities at Risk (MAR) datasets. The Minorities at Risk dataset, in particular, would be a useful addition. However, the MAR dataset implemented a significant change in their collection methodology, so that their current dataset only covers the years from 2004-2006. The older version of the MAR data runs ends at 2003 (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Given that this project's dataset runs from 1996-2011, the MAR data would not have been of great use due to the number of missing years.

[44] A general measure of whether or not all people, regardless of gender, can participate in politics is included in this dataset via the polyarchy control variable. Governments that allow only male suffrage may still be considered democratic (e.g. the United States before 1920). Thus, this variable is intended to capture social equality for women rather than measuring democracy.

Capacity

There are multiple, sometimes conflicting or overlapping, ways to measure for capacity. As described in Chapter 4, this project subscribes to the following two theoretical underpinnings for understanding, and then operationalizing, capacity. First, following Buhaug (2010), both state and rebel capacity are understood to be similar, as both groups require analogous capacity in order to undertake actions. Second, the state and the rebels both specifically require coercive mechanisms and administrative institutions (Buhaug 2010; Hendrix 2010; Hoeffler 2002). Therefore, measuring the capacity within a state or controlled territory should be a similar process for both states and rebel groups (though the specific variables included will differ somewhat), and this capacity can be measured by looking at two areas: 1) the administrative apparatus of bureaucratic institutions or apparatus, and 2) the military or paramilitary personnel and equipage.

Thus, the concepts of state and rebel capacity are broken down into two parts: administrative and military. This disaggregation of capacity is not unique to this project, drawing as it does on work on state capacity by Buhaug (2010), Hendrix (2010), and Hoeffler (2002). However, this argument is somewhat more unique in literature on the rebel side of the concept, though Mampilly (2011) discusses the variation in types of rebel government, nothing that rebels are often as much concerned with governance as with violent activities.

It is easy to conceptualize a state which has a high level of administrative capacity but a chooses as a matter of policy low level of military capacity than administrative-peer states. Perhaps more theoretically difficult is a rebel group with a similarly high level of administrative capacity but low level of military capacity. Yet, as Galula (2006) notes, an insurgent campaign may be far more focused on winning the population through the creation of public support for the

rebels than in generating a high level of militarized forces. Similarly, states such as military dictatorships may have high levels of military forces and capabilities with minimal levels of bureaucratic apparatus; certain rebel groups may function in much the same way.

In order to capture these different mechanisms, capacity is disaggregated into state, and rebel, administrative and military capacity, and four latent variables are developed to measure these areas. The following sections outline the operationalization of state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity. Though the state and rebel measures are intended to capture similar conceptual ideas, the differences in data available at the state- and rebel-group levels mean that the concepts are not operationalized identically (the data used are described in detail below). To the best of my knowledge, such measures provide a first attempt at large scale, cross-sectional measurement of the comparable administrative and military capacity of rebel groups and states. As better data become available on rebel groups, such measures will undoubted become more refined. Yet, as described above, the latent variable methodology utilized in this chapter offers perhaps the strongest available method to capture these underlying and difficult to measure concepts.

State Administrative Capacity

State administrative capacity is measured by looking at observed variables of state bureaucratic and administrative effectiveness. Such institutional effectiveness is measured by looking at the manner in which states receive funding, the effectiveness of state apparatus, and divisiveness of the functioning body of the polity.

The first two observed variables are measures of the extractive capability and processes of the state. The first, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, comes from the World Bank (World Bank 2015a). Tax revenue indicates the level of government effectiveness and societal

penetration in extracting resources from its constituents (Herbst 2000; Besley and Persson 2009). The World Bank data is used as it offers the most thorough data available in terms of both breadth of countries and depth of time. The second measurement, total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, also comes from the World Bank, and captures the amount of a state's GDP that is provided by rentier activities (World Bank 2015a). This data source was chosen not only for its scope, but also because it offers a more comprehensive coverage of potential rent-generating activities; it includes oil, natural gas, coal, mineral, and forest rents.[45] Other rentier datasets available tend to focus only on oil rents, and emphasize the countries of the Middle East. While high levels of tax revenue indicate high levels of bureaucratic penetration, governments that receive high levels of rents from natural resources are more likely to not need an efficient bureaucracy with which to extract taxes, as they can fund state activities from these rents. Some states, of course, may receive both rents and taxes, so the two variables are not rigidly dichotomous; both, then, are included in this latent variable.

The variables which are used to capture the overall effectiveness of the apparatus and institutions of the state are also from World Bank data, for the same reasons of scope and coverage breadth as outlined above. Four variables from within the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators are utilized. They are: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (World Bank 2015b).[46] These indicators describe multiple

[45] The World Bank datasets are nonpareil in their scope and breadth of coverage of state-level economic variables; they are widely accepted as the first choice for economic data.

[46] The other two Worldwide Governance Indicators, Voice and Accountability, and Political Stability and Absence of Violence, were not included in the state capacity variable for the following reasons. First, the Voice and Accountability variable is capturing similar information to that already included in the coercion latent variable (in the freedom of speech variable), Similarly, the Political Stability and Absence of Violence variable is actually a

facets of state governance, and are therefore ideal to be included in this latent variable construction.

The final measurement variable for state administrative capacity, factionalized elites, approaches the issue of governance by looking at the level of divisions within the governing class. The theoretical argument is that, in states with greater political factionalization, the political elites are less likely to be able to work cooperatively, increasing the incidence of political stalemates and feuds, rather than efficient, effective policymaking. Such factionalization can arguably occur in states across the spectrum of capacity; Goldstone et al. (2005) note that there is not a correlation between factionalized political competition and instability, and that all types of states—from developed democracies to strong autocracies—can develop polarized politics. This variable is taken from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. 2013). Within the Polity IV data is the variable, competitiveness of participation, of which one of the five coding categories is 'factional'. This category denotes "Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas" (Marshall et al. 2013, 27). States coded as factional in the Polity IV data are coded as having factionalized elites in the data; all other categories in the Polity IV data are coded as non-factional. The Polity IV data was chosen over the only other alternative data source on

different measure of this project's outcome variables that are measuring rebel political violence. Thus, including either of these variables in the construction of this latent variable would cause problems with endogeneity.

factionalized elites, the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index Data, due to the greater year range of data availability in the Polity IV data (Fund for Peace 2016).[47]

State Military Capacity

The state's military strength is measured via five variables, all of which attempt to capture different aspects of military capability. The first two variables capture different aspects of military personnel. The first, a count variable, is the total number of military personnel, captures the objective size of the military, following Clausewitz's (1976, 194-195) dictum that quantity has a quality all its own. The size of the military force, overall, may offer indications as to what it can and cannot do. However, since the size of the population of the state also varies, a second variable of military personnel is also included; this variable captures the ratio of military personnel to that of the overall labor force in a country. Military personnel as percentage of labor force is used, rather than as the percentage of total population, as different states have different demographic signatures. States with a larger elderly population and smaller youth population (such as Japan, currently), may have a smaller overall percentage of population in the military, but a larger percentage of the appropriate-age population in service. Conversely, states with a youth bulge may find it far easier to contribute larger numbers of younger members to the military, while not majorly affecting the availability of non-military labor force personnel. These two variables, armed forces personnel, total, and armed forces personnel, percentage of labor force, come from the World Bank (World Bank 2015a).

[47] The Fragile States Index data only goes back to 2005; Polity IV data starts in 1800 (Fund for Peace 2016, Marshall et al. 2013), therefore, Polity IV data were chosen for inclusion based on their greater availability for the time period under study.

While the first two variables deal with the state's military forces in isolation from the internal threat they face, the third variable captures the relative strength of state military versus the internal threats it is currently facing. Thus, this variable captures a different aspect of military capacity; two state militaries with the same strength may be facing widely different threats from rebel groups, and the existence and level of the current threat is expected to have an effect on the state's overall military capability.[48] Data for the relative strength of the state is developed from the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et al. 2012; Cunningham et al. 2013). The NSA data provides an ordered measure of relative strength for each rebel group, (and is used in that manner in developing the rebel military capacity latent variable, detailed below). However, the variable included for the state military capacity measure, instead of looking specifically at a rebel group, instead notes the maximum level of fighting capacity posed by any rebel group active in the state in that year. This maximum value is then assigned to the state, with an obverse ranking (i.e. if the maximum fighting capacity of any rebel group arraigned against the state is relatively high, the state's relative capacity over rebel groups in general is coded as being relatively low).[49]

[48] A military that is currently employed fighting rebels (or expects to be so employed in the near future) is likely to be preoccupied with that threat, and therefore have a differing capability from an umemployed or unthreatened force in many ways, such as: the ability to train (or type of training); ability to recruit forces, and the quality of recruits; the retention of forces (who many not wish to fight, or who may desert in support of the rebels); the procurement of medical care for combat-wounded troops; and so forth.

[49] For instance, in a given state, there may be three rebel groups that are active. In year one, all three groups have low capacity; therefore the relative state military capacity for that year is coded—conversely, since this is the state's relative strength that is of interest—as high. In year two, however, one of the rebel groups attains a high level of military capacity; in this year, the state's relative strength is coded as low, since it is facing at least one competitor that is operating at a high level. Thus, this measure is not directly correlated with any given rebel group active in the state; it instead looks at the overall threat level posed by the aggregate of rebel groups in the state.

The final two variables included in the state military capacity construct focus on the military materiel available to its personnel for use. The argument here, in line with Mumford (2009), is that better equipped troops will be better able to combat rebel groups, or to discourage rebels from initiating conflict. This materiel advantage is captured by looking at the military expenditure of the state, as well as the value of arms imports. The variables, military expenditure as percent of GDP and arms imports, are from the World Bank (World Bank 2015a).

Rebel Administrative Capacity

As with state capacity, the latent rebel capacity variable measures the bureaucratic and administrative ability of a rebel group. However, rebel institutional effectiveness is somewhat harder to measure than that of states. While some information is available on rebel financing, government effectiveness, and intra-group cohesion, the proxy variables outlined below are not exact matches with those outlined for states above. Hopefully, as research on rebel groups continues, better data on the way in which these groups organize themselves and administer their constituents will become more available. The data listed below are rougher approximations, but they are the best data available at the time of this writing.

Rebel financing, as described in Chapter 4, may come from a number of sources, including 'taxes' paid by supporters, the sale of natural 'lootable' resources, and international support from both states who are supporting the rebels as a form of foreign policy, as well as individual remittances from co-ethnics or coreligionists living abroad. Unfortunately, good cross-sectional data on these variables is not widely available.[50] The two variables included are a

[50] In general, there is extremely limited knowledge available on rebel groups' financial resources. There are multiple instances of rebel groups receiving remittances from overseas, or taxing the population under their control. However, at the time of this writing there is no available dataset on rebel taxation. The World Bank does provide data on remittances; however this data is extremely problematic because the recipients are not disaggregated. The

variable measuring overall natural resource financing of rebel groups, and international administrative or organizational (non-military) support to those groups.

In order to capture any natural resources that might be financing the rebel group, data from Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) were utilized. The variable, finance, used from this data captures "whether the conflict episode had a natural resource financing mechanism. All types of natural resources may finance rebel groups, including illegal commodities such as drugs" (Rustad and Binningsbø 2012, 4). This dataset has the advantage over others that seek to capture so-called 'lootable' resources in its inclusivity and scope. Other datasets, such as Fearon's (2004), provide information on far fewer rebel groups over a smaller series of years. The Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) data has the additional advantage in that it provides data on rebel finance even in years when the rebels were not in active conflict.[51]

The second source of data is somewhat less loosely connected to finances, as it is a measure of all 'non-military' support given to a rebel group by both foreign state and non-state

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inclusion of such a variable would be in line with Collier and Hoeffler (2004), who argue that diaspora support may be linked to higher incidence of intrastate conflict. However, there are two problems with including remittances as a financial measure of rebel capacity. First, remittances are not disaggregated in terms of the recipient; those receiving money may as easily be pro-state rather than pro-rebel, and therefore the level of overall remittances may be confounding as the money could be supporting all sides in a conflict. Second, the assumption that remittances will be used to support a cause, rather than pay for non-political personal necessities of the recipient, such as food and housing, is also questionable. The robustness check version of this latent variable that included remittances did not compile, possibly for these two problems. Should better-disaggregated data become available on the identity of the recipients or senders of remittances, this variable should absolutely be reintroduced into measures of rebel capacity; current data is simply too uninformative.

[51] Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) follow the Gates and Strand (2004) coding rules for including conflict years that do not meet the ACD defined 25 battle-deaths minimum, if those years are associated with a conflict. Because the Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) data includes finance information for these non-active conflict years, their dataset provides information on rebel finance even when no campaign is identified. See Rustad and Binningsbø (2012, 12-13) for details.

actors (Cunningham et al. 2012). While this data, from the Non-State Actor Data project, is capturing non-military support, this support is not delineated in terms of financial support versus training or technology transfer. However, since the overall latent variable being captured is rebel administrative capacity, the inclusion of this observed variable is still very much in line with the overall goal for the latent variable.[52]

There are several additional measures this chapter uses in an attempt to capture the organization and institutional effectiveness and cohesion of a given rebel group. In particular, rebel group cohesion is difficult to measure, as rebel groups can, and often do, simply split if the factionalization between the leaders of a group becomes to great (Christia 2012). However, the Non-State Actor Data do provide two measures of effectiveness of rebel groups, effective centralized control and effective territorial control (Cunningham et al. 2012). The measure of the strength of centralized control "indicates the extent to which a central [rebel] command exercises control over the constituent groups" (Cunningham et al. 2012:4). In additional to the level of centralized control, those rebel groups that control territory are also measured on the effectiveness of their territorial control. Extending the arguments of Herbst (2000) and Besley and Persson (2009), those groups with higher levels of control over territory are also expected to be more likely to control the resources flowing from that territory. NSA data was used for these two variables as it is the only available cross-national time series source for such data; this is regrettable, as it would be useful to have data on rebel groups that control territory but are not in conflict, but no such data is available. However, as described in Chapter 6, the NSA data is split

[52] The Non-State Actor Data is, at the time of this writing, the only dataset that offers this type of data on rebel groups, which is why it was used.

into different types of rebel campaigns, so the information on territorial control is at least available across various campaign types.

As described above, the Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) and NSA data may be skewed to measures related to larger rebel groups.[53] Therefore, the rebel administrative capacity latent variable also includes other measures of rebel capability that may better capture capability across a broad spectrum of rebel groups. As discussed above, this ability to include multiple variables in a measure of rebel capacity is one of the benefits of the latent variable methodology. These additional variables are: political representation, potential untapped community support, and ability for a group to communicate both internally and externally. The additional advantage of the following variables is that they are not dependent upon the presence of ongoing rebel conflict; the values are available across all years, both conflict and non-conflict.

The link, even if only alleged or tenuous, between a rebel group and a political party or movement can provide a form of support for smaller rebel groups, perhaps most notably those groups engaged in terrorist campaigns (Kydd and Walter 2006; Ross 1993; Cederman et al. 2010). Such political support can permit the effective advertising of the rebel group's political objectives. This variable is captured in the presence, acknowledged, alleged, or explicit, of a political wing linked to a rebel group, and comes from the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et al. 2012).

A further measure of potential supporters for a rebel group is the labor force participation rate, as a percentage of the total population (World Bank 2015a). While this measure does not

[53] While the measures for effective central and territorial control imply a group large enough to administer territory and have constituent sub-groups, these measures may not adequately capture the organizational ability of smaller rebel groups.

capture manifest supporters, in line with Gurr (1970) and Tilly (1978), the presence of high unemployment may indicate dormant dissatisfaction with the current political order, and an easier path for the recruitment of potential rebels.

Finally, two variables from the World Bank are included to measure the ability of rebel groups to electronically communicate and coordinate with each other. Bell et al. (2013) note that the ability to coordinate across a society may make it easier for rebels to organize and stage political violence. Such societal communication capability is captured by looking at the numbers of mobile phone and internet subscribers; the number of mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people, and the number of internet users per 100 people (World Bank 2015a).

Rebel Military Capacity

As with estimates of state military capacity, several aspects of rebel military capacity are captured in the creation of the latent variable.[54] These variables are relative overall rebel strength, relative mobilization capacity, relative arms procurement, and relative fighting capacity, all of which come from the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et al. 2012).[55] And additional variable, rebel military support, measures external, explicitly military, aid to rebel

[54] The notable absence of a variable capturing rebel military personnel is regrettable but necessary. While there are some counts of rebel personnel available (NSA and GTD), the numbers were obviously inaccurate to the point where they strained credulity. For example, in 2003, the GTD mean estimate of the Filipino Moro Islamic Liberations Front forces is 39 whilst the NSA estimate is 15,000. Even when looking only the NSA data, there is a distinct lack of variation across years for the same rebel group; despite a huge level of political violence and several histories which remark on the massive attrition of rebel forces during the final years of violence, the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are coded as having the same exact number of personnel in every year from 1996 to 2011. Given these issues, data about the number of rebel forces were deemed to be too unreliable to be included.

[55] As discussed above, and in Chapter 6, the NSA dataset is broken down into multiple rebel campaign types, so that the information it provides is not tied directly to a specific type of campaign.

groups; this variable is not relative to the state, but simply captures the presence and level of external support (Cunningham et al. 2012).[56]

A summarization of the descriptive statistics of the observed variables to be included in the latent variable constructions of coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity, as outlined above, are provided in Table 5.1 through Table 5.3. In the next section, these observed variables are used to construct latent variables, which are then tested via confirmatory factor analysis.

[56] As with the rebel administrative capacity variable, there is unfortunately very little data (perhaps none) available on the military capacity of rebel groups that are not actively engaging in conflict. As discussed above, this project acknowledges the deficiencies of current data, attempts to develop the best measures available given the paucity of data, and expects that, as better data becomes available, these measures will be revised.

Table 5.1 Coercion: Descriptive Statistics of Observed Variables

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Coercion					
Physical Integrity Rights	2837	4.967219	2.285969	0	8
Gini Coefficient	778	40.62456	10.02189	16.23	69.17
Land Gini Coefficient	1504	.8280638	.1293444	.311	.996
Freedom of Religion	3033	1.316848	.8118737	0	2
Women's Political Rights	2836	1.923484	.5868626	0	3
Freedom of Speech	2840	1.006338	.7297546	0	2

Table 5.2 State Capacity: Descriptive Statistics of Observed Variables

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
State Administrative Capacity					
Taxes, % GDP	1740	16.95466	7.819827	.0205501	65.90292
Natural Resource Rents, % GDP	3424	8.491154	14.48186	0	89.22044
Government Effectiveness	2628	-.0079851	1.002954	-2.450038	2.429652
Regulatory Quality	2628	-.0084197	1.00074	-2.675439	2.247345
Rule of Law	2689	-.0121907	.997595	-2.668873	1.99964
Control of Corruption	2634	-.0067718	1.003256	-2.057458	2.585616
Factionalized Politics	2631	.2113265	.408327	0	1
State Military Capacity					
Military Personnel, Total*	2634	10.55889	1.892224	3.912023	15.235
Military Personnel, % Labor Force	2603	1.751948	2.01348	0	16.22963
Relative State Strength	2634	.0440546	.2802242	0	6.083333
Military Expenditure*	1465	1.966493	.7848329	-.9604086	6.545068
Arms Imports*	1613	17.7568	1.938795	13.81551	22.02672

**Denotes natural log of variable*

Table 5.3 Rebel Capacity: Descriptive Statistics of Observed Variables

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Rebel Administrative Capacity					
Rebel Finance	697	.3242468	.4684289	0	1
External Administrative Support	920	.4402174	.4966832	0	1
Rebel Centralized Control	924	1.827922	.78006	0	3
Rebel Territorial Control	345	1.953623	.5371598	1	3
Rebel Political Wing	965	1.027979	1.3794	0	3
Labor Force Participation, % Total Population	1693	62.23703	12.0786	37.8	86.8
Cellular Mobile Subscriptions	1677	22.29676	33.67839	0	180.4453
Internet Users	1571	6.32365	12.62375	0	75
Rebel Military Capacity					
Relative Rebel Strength	1394	1.418938	.6094141	1	4
Relative Mobilization Capacity	946	1.442918	.5514939	1	3
Relative Arms Procurement	926	1.237581	.4408005	1	3
Relative Fighting Capacity	947	1.243928	.458249	1	3
External Military Support	834	.5779376	.4941847	0	1

Results and Analysis

Coercion

As described above, the observed variables that were utilized to construct the proposed latent variable for coercion are physical integrity rights, Gini, land Gini, freedom of religion, women's political rights, and freedom of speech. The Cronbach's alpha test for this set of variables provides a coefficient of 0.6787, which is within the acceptable range. Principal factor analysis provided six factors, of which Factor 1 met the Kaiser criterion, with an Eigenvalue of 1.27921. This factor, as a potential latent variable, accounts for about 78 percent of the proportion of the shared variance of the observed variables. The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO)

test, which measures sampling adequacy, is also satisfactory, at 0.6112. These results are displayed in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 Coercion Pre-Estimation Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha				
Scale Reliability Coefficient	0.6787			
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion				
Factor	**Eigenvalue**	**Difference**	**Proportion**	**Cumulative**
Factor 1	1.27921	0.34427	0.7857	0.7857
Factor 2	0.93494	0.97411	0.5743	1.3600
Factor 3	-0.03917	0.06838	-0.0241	1.3359
Factor 4	-0.10755	0.06069	-0.0661	1.2699
Factor 5	-0.16824	0.10291	-0.1033	1.1665
Factor 6	-0.27115	.	-0.1665	1.0000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(15) = 453.35 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000				
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy				
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy	0.6112			

After an initial estimation of the model, a check for modification indices was run, and several modifications were found to be of interest. The physical integrity rights variable is correlated with both economic discrimination and land use discrimination. This is in line with research by Landman and Larizza (2009), who specifically look at this issue, and find a robust relationship between inequality and human rights. The measurements for Gini and land Gini are also correlated; again, this is unsurprising given that ownership of land—or lack thereof—has some relationship with income, as ownership may drive some forms of income (Deininger and Olinto 1999). Given this theoretical support for the inclusion of these modification indices, those three indices were included in the final estimation of the latent variable.

Table 5.5 Coercion Modification Indices

Covariance	Modification Indice	df	P>MI	Expected Parameter Change
cov(e.physint,e.gini)	122.987	1	0.00	-8.106988
cov(e.physint,e.landgini)	130.957	1	0.00	-.0775146
cov(e.physint,e.relfre)	13.608	1	0.00	-.1992328
cov(e.physint,e.wopol)	10.774	1	0.00	-.0720329
cov(e.physint,e.speech)|	7.858	1	0.01	.1591091
cov(e.gini,e.landgini)	112.124	1	0.00	.661509
cov(e.gini,e.relfre)	89.380	1	0.00	2.423767
cov(e.gini,e.speech)	15.508	1	0.00	.9200491
cov(e.landgini,e.relfre)	22.517	1	0.00	.0111499
cov(e.landgini,e.speech)	19.645	1	0.00	.0095849
cov(e.relfre,e.wopol)	24.363	1	0.00	.0385372

As shown in Table 5.6, below, the latent variable, constructed with the inclusion of these modification indices, appears to have an overall good model fit, with all measurement variables significant at the 0.001 confidence level, and a model Prob>chi2 of 0.0000. The model goodness of fit statistics are also all within the acceptable range; RMSEA is at 0.050 and the pclose is not statistically significant, and CFI is at 0.982. The coefficient of determination (CD) of 0.789 suggests that this model does well at explaining the variance in the model. Overall, statistical analysis appears to support the theorized version of a latent variable for coercion.[57]

[57] For example, in the estimates, the five states that have the highest level of coercion are Pakistan (2010), Iraq (2007), and Myanmar (2003, 2006, and 2007). The five states with the lowest levels of coercion are New Zealand (1997 and 2001), Panama (2006), Uruguay (2008), and Lesotho (2002).

Table 5.6 Coercion Latent Variable Estimation

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|
Physical Integrity Rights	.643927	.0154432	41.70	0.000
cons	2.189394	.0341962	64.02	0.000
Gini Coefficient	.2586988	.0425253	6.08	0.000
cons	3.892981	.1069852	36.39	0.000
Land Gini Coefficient	-.1814993	.0298552	-6.08	0.000
cons	6.407797	.1184734	54.09	0.000
Freedom of Religion	.6959722	.0148547	46.85	0.000
cons	1.62194	.0276327	58.70	0.000
Women's Political Rights	.2817613	.020295	13.88	0.000
cons	3.285879	.0473106	69.45	0.000
Freedom of Speech	.739009	.0144673	51.08	0.000
cons	1.400581	.0259795	53.91	0.000
cov(e.physint, e.gini)	-.5184525	.0350962	-14.77	0.000
cov(e.physint, e.landgini)	-.3253517	.0264565	-12.30	0.000
cov(e.gini, e.landgini)	.5697756	.0329753	17.28	0.000
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(6) = 52.44				
Prob > chi2 = 0.000				
Number of observations: 3075				
RMSEA:0.050				
pclose: 0.463				
CFI: 0.982				
CD: 0.789				

State Administrative Capacity

The observed variables that were utilized to construct the proposed latent variable for state administrative capacity are taxes, natural resource rents, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, and factionalized politics. The Cronbach's alpha test of this latent variable was 0.8723, which is very good. Factor analysis provided seven factors, of which one had an Eigenvalue well above the minimum threshold for meaningful correlation, at 4.09339. This factor also accounted for over 98 percent of the proportion of variance, which is quite high; the data appear to be strongly supportive of this potential factor.

The KMO test, at 0.8760, is also well above the minimum standard for sampling adequacy. These results are detailed in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7 State Administrative Capacity Pre-Estimation Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha				
Scale Reliability Coefficient	0.8723			
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion				
Factor	**Eigenvalue**	**Difference**	**Proportion**	**Cumulative**
Factor 1	4.09339	3.93604	0.9873	0.9873
Factor 2	0.15735	0.11416	0.0380	1.0252
Factor 3	0.04319	0.05517	0.0104	1.0357
Factor 4	-0.01198	0.00547	-0.0029	1.0328
Factor 5	-0.01746	0.03233	-0.0042	1.0286
Factor 6	-0.04978	0.01883	-0.0120	1.0165
Factor 7	-0.06862	.	-0.0165	1.0000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 9907.50 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000				
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy				
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy	0.8760			

Following initial estimation of the model, a check of the modification indices for the latent state administrative capacity variable was run, as seen in Table 5.8. This revealed high levels of covariance between government effectiveness and regulatory quality, and between rule of law and corruption. These modifications are theoretically unsurprising, as governments that are able to provide regulation are also likely governments that are in general effective, and those states enjoying a strong rule of law are also likely to have a lower incidence of or need for corruption. A covariance structure was specified between these two sets of variables, and included in the final version of the latent state capacity model.

Table 5.8 State Administrative Capacity Modification Indices

Covariance	Modification Indice	df	P>MI	Expected Parameter Change
cov(e.tax,e.rents)	9.442	1	0.00	-7.417459
cov(e.rents,e.effective)	25.225	1	0.00	.3740715
cov(e.rents,e.law)	34.030	1	0.00	-.5239158
cov(e.rents,e.faction)	7.198	1	0.01	-.2899004
cov(e.effective,e.regulate)	431.849	1	0.00	.0569902
cov(e.effective,e.law)	273.665	1	0.00	-.0475693
cov(e.effective,e.corrupt)	10.822	1	0.00	-.0094206
cov(e.effective,e.faction)	10.645	1	0.00	.0076444
cov(e.regulate,e.law)	20.722	1	0.00	-.0125913
cov(e.regulate,e.corrupt)	285.106	1	0.00	-.0470884
cov(e.regulate,e.faction)	8.184	1	0.00	.0091317
cov(e.law,e.corrupt)	364.550	1	0.00	.052052
cov(e.law,e.faction)	16.026	1	0.00	-.0114038
cov(e.corrupt,e.faction)	9.987	1	0.00	-.0090512

The final version of the latent variable, displayed in Table 5.9, shows overall good model fit, with all measurement variables significant at the 0.001 confidence level and a model Prob>chi2 of 0.0000. The model goodness of fit statistics are excellent, with a RMSEA at 0.058 and not statistically significant pclose, and a CFI of 0.992. The coefficient of determination, at 1.006, is actually over the high end of the expected scale, but this is due to the inclusion of the modification indices, which, when included, permit CDs over 1 to be calculated. Given these results, this model appears to support the theorized latent variable construct for state administrative capacity.

Table 5.9 State Administrative Capacity Latent Variable Estimation

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|
Taxes, % GDP	.3674167	.0218189	16.84	0.000
cons	2.118451	.0441406	47.99	0.000
Natural Resource Rents, % GDP	-.3270856	.0164319	-19.91	0.000
cons	.579991	.0185043	31.34	0.000
Government Effectiveness	.9432927	.0065213	144.65	0.000
cons	.0254287	.0189678	1.34	0.000
Regulatory Quality	.8905187	.0070835	125.72	0.000
cons	.0229294	.0190277	1.21	0.000
Rule of Law	.9854175	.0067161	146.72	0.000
cons	.007382	.0189032	0.39	0.000
Control of Corruption	.985687	.0065025	151.59	0.000
cons	.0292587	.0189273	1.55	0.000
Factionalized Politics	-.2928565	.0190651	-15.36	0.000
cons	.4728996	.0210267	22.49	0.000
cov(e.effective, e.regulate)	.6093049	.028332	21.51	0.000
cov(e.law,e.corrupt)	-1.399477	1.065418	-1.31	0.189
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(12) = 153.94				
Prob > chi2 = 0.000				
Number of observations: 3543				
RMSEA:0.058				
pclose: 0.054				
CFI: 0.992				
CD: 1.006				

State Military Capacity

To create the state military capacity latent variable, military personnel, military personnel as a percentage of the labor force, relative state strength, military expenditures, and arms imports were the set of observed variables utilized. The Cronbach's alpha for this set of variables is 0.5412, which is within the acceptable range. One factor, of the five generated by factor analysis, met the Kaiser criterion, with an Eigenvalue of 1.49967. This factor, as a potential latent variable, accounts for about 99 percent of the proportion of the shared variance of the observed

variables. The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) test, which measures sampling adequacy, is also satisfactory, at 0.5985. These results are displayed in Table 5.10.

Table 5.10 State Military Capacity Pre-Estimation Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha				
Scale Reliability Coefficient	0.5412			
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion				
Factor	**Eigenvalue**	**Difference**	**Proportion**	**Cumulative**
Factor 1	1.49967	1.07986	0.9977	0.9977
Factor 2	0.41981	0.36695	0.2793	1.2770
Factor 3	0.05286	0.26537	0.0352	1.3121
Factor 4	-0.21251	0.04416	-0.1414	1.1708
Factor 5	-0.25668	.	-0.1708	1.0000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10) = 1011.19 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000				
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy				
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy	0.5985			

The check for modification indices following initial model estimation found some indices of theoretical interest. As seen in Table 5.11, the measure of military expenditure appeared to have a strong relationship with both overall state strength relative to rebel groups, as well as with the percentage of the overall labor force employed by the military. This makes sense; defense spending is typically focused on increasing the capability of the military, and is also easily linked to personnel increases, as the military can then pay for their personnel's salaries. Interestingly, arms imports appear to be correlated with the overall size of the military. This linkage may be due to underlying choices by the state as it attempts to develop military capacity by increasing the size of the force, and the materiel available for the force to use; both may signal such a choice by the state (Silverson & Starr 1991; Spear 1996). Therefore, these three indices are included in the final estimation of the latent variable, as described below.

Table 5.11 State Military Capacity Modification Indices

Covariance	Modification Indice	df	P>MI	Expected Parameter Change
cov(e.logmil,e.logmilex)	32.998	1	0.00	-.386729
cov(e.logmil,e.logarmsimports)	102.308	1	0.00	3.479959
cov(e.logmil,e.millabor)	4.507	1	0.03	-.281544
cov(e.logmil,e.rel_state_strength)	19.452	1	0.00	-.0531678
cov(e.logmilex,e.millabor)	131.958	1	0.00	.4425954
cov(e.logmilex,e.rel_state_strength)	136.726	1	0.00	.0612433
cov(e.logarmsimports,e.millabor)	35.158	1	0.00	-.5766982

As shown in Table 5.12, the estimated state military capacity latent variable, constructed with the inclusion of these modification indices. Overall model fit is within the acceptable range, with four variables significant at the 0.05 confidence level, and one variable, relative state strength, significant at the 0.10 confidence level, and the model Prob>chi2 at 0.0179. The model goodness of fit statistics are also all within the acceptable range; RMSEA is at 0.034 and the pclose is not statistically significant, and CFI is at 0.996. The coefficient of determination (CD) of 0.741 suggests that this model does well at explaining the variance in the model. Overall, statistical analysis appears to support the theorized version of a latent variable for state military capacity, though the model is perhaps not quite as strong as that of the model developed for state administrative capacity.

Table 5.12 State Military Capacity Latent Variable Estimation

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|
Military Personnel, Total*	.8265169	.3600871	2.30	0.022
cons	5.577456	.0792587	70.37	0.000
Military Personnel, % Labor Force	.4267861	.1864819	2.29	0.022
cons	.8583006	.0230503	37.24	0.000
Relative State Strength	-.0497048	.0291052	-1.71	0.088
cons	-.0497048	.0196011	8.06	0.000
Military Expenditure*	.5689201	.2503613	2.27	0.023
cons	2.377583	.0519427	45.77	0.000
Arms Imports*	.4442365	.1974009	2.25	0.024
cons	8.410049	.1649906	50.97	0.000
cov(e.logmil, e.logarmsimports)	.5245928	.0965265	5.43	0.000
cov(e.logmilex, e.millabor)	.336115	.1883157	1.78	0.074
cov(e.logmilex, e.rel_state_strength)	.2793689	.0832244	3.36	0.001
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(2) = 8.04				
Prob > chi2 = 0.0179				
Number of observations: 2677				
RMSEA:0.034				
pclose: 0.837				
CFI: 0.996				
CD: 0.741				

**Denotes natural log of variable*

Rebel Administrative Capacity

The rebel administrative capacity latent variable was constructed with the following observed variables: rebel finance, external administrative support, rebel centralized control, rebel territorial control, rebel political wing, labor force participation as a percentage of the total population, cellular mobile subscriptions, and internet users. The Cronbach's alpha test of this latent variable was satisfactory, at 0.6225. Factor analysis provided eight potential factors, of which two had Eigenvalues greater than one; Factor 1 at 2.35485, and Factor 2 1.04448. Proportionally, Factor 1 explains about 63 percent of the variance, while Factor 2 only accounts

for about 28 percent of total variance. The KMO overall measure of sampling adequacy is 0.5533, within range. Results from the factor analysis are provided in Table 5.13.

Table 5.13 Rebel Administrative Capacity Pre-Estimation Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha				
Scale Reliability Coefficient	0.6225			
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion				
Factor	**Eigenvalue**	**Difference**	**Proportion**	**Cumulative**
Factor 1	2.35485	1.31037	0.6350	0.6350
Factor 2	1.04448	0.29643	0.2816	0.9166
Factor 3	0.74805	0.71399	0.2017	1.1184
Factor 4	0.03406	0.02956	0.0092	1.1275
Factor 5	0.00450	0.08256	0.0012	1.1288
Factor 6	-0.07806	0.04073	-0.0210	1.1077
Factor 7	-0.11879	0.16185	-0.0320	1.0757
Factor 8	-0.28064	.	-0.0757	1.0000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(28) = 503.23 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000				
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy				
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy	0.5533			

Modification indices for the latent state capacity variable revealed three sets of covariances, as seen in Table 5.14. External rebel administrative support was correlated to the presence of a political wing with ties to the rebel group; this makes sense, for the external support is likely due to some sort of aligned political consideration on the part of the intervening actor. Unsurprisingly, rebel central control and rebel territorial control covary; groups that are able to control their constituents effectively are probably also able to effectively control territory. Finally, access to mobile phones and the internet covary; this can be easily understood, as cellular data service on a phone may serve as the route by which the internet is accessed. All three modification indices were included in the final estimation of the latent rebel administrative capacity model.

Table 5.14 Rebel Administrative Capacity Modification Indices

Covariance	Modification Indice	df	P>MI	Expected Parameter Change
cov(e.finance,e.reb_terr_control)	9.905	1	0.00	-.2755356
cov(e.finance,e.reblabor)	27.529	1	0.00	.1992912
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.reb_control)	6.327	1	0.01	-.0850469
cov(e.rebel_admin_support, e.reb_terr_control)	4.100	1	0.04	.1106563
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.reb_polwing)	40.388	1	0.00	-.2102424
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.reblabor)	26.119	1	0.00	-.1699572
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.cell)	28.375	1	0.00	-.8100791
cov(e.rebel_admin_support,e.web)	12.908	1	0.00	.1381503
cov(e.reb_control,e.reb_terr_control)	39.756	1	0.00	.3436988
cov(e.reblabor,e.cell)	10.157	1	0.00	-.5776471
cov(e.reblabor,e.web)	21.080	1	0.00	.2033346
cov(e.cell,e.web)	44.424	1	0.00	18.34133

The final version of this latent variable, shown in Table 5.15, indicates an acceptable model, with a model Prob>chi2 of 0.0000. However, two of the observed variables, rebel central control and rebel territorial control are not statistically significant. All other observed variables are significant at the 0.01 confidence level. When looking at the goodness of fit statistics, the RMSEA of 0.042 was adequate, with a statistically insignificant pclose. The CFI, also in range, was 0.973. However, the coefficient of determination, at 0.549, suggests that this model, while it is adequate, does not explain all of the variance in the model. This is perhaps unsurprising, however, given the lack of specificity in the available proxy variables for rebel capacity. While this project does include this latent variable as estimated, the development of further data on issues related to rebel governance, such as shadow government corruption or adherence to rule of law, would undoubtedly help serve to refine this latent variable.

Table 5.15 Rebel Administrative Capacity Latent Variable Estimation

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|
Rebel Finance	.317893	.0556969	5.71	0.000
cons	.6471937	.0433359	14.93	0.000
External Administrative Support	-.3334941	.0510035	-6.54	0.000
cons	.900701	.0384332	23.44	0.000
Rebel Centralized Control	.078437	.0512792	1.53	0.126
cons	2.341132	.0512792	36.72	0.000
Rebel Territorial Control	-.0259211	.0754896	-0.34	0.731
cons	3.627001	.148333	24.45	0.000
Rebel Political Wing	.1196294	.0464009	2.58	0.010
cons	.7390867	.0364738	20.26	0.000
Labor Force Participation, % Total Population	.6600215	.0790031	8.35	0.000
cons	5.15453	.0918453	56.12	0.000
Cellular Mobile Subscriptions	-.4016499	.0527484	-7.61	0.000
cons	.6623251	.0269021	24.62	0.000
Internet Users	-.2817377	.0521158	-5.41	0.000
cons	.4768146	.0262061	18.19	0.000
cov(e.rebel_admin_support, e.reb_polwing)	-.2014483	.0341226	-5.90	0.000
cov(e.reb_control, e.reb_terr_control)	.3409928	.0450075	7.58	0.000
cov(e.cell,e.web)	.7515673	.0140275	53.58	0.000
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(17) = 66.75				
Prob > chi2 = 0.000				
Number of observations: 1695				
RMSEA:0.042				
pclose: 0.900				
CFI: 0.973				
CD: 0.549				

Rebel Military Capacity

The last latent variable, rebel military capacity, was developed using the observed variables of relative rebel strength, relative mobilization capacity, relative arms procurement, relative fighting capacity, and external military support. The Cronbach's alpha test for this set of variables provides a coefficient of 0.6704, which meets the standard. Factor analysis provided

five factors, of which Factor 1 met the Kaiser criterion, with an Eigenvalue of 1.85145. This factor, as a potential latent variable, at first glance appears to account for more than all of the proportion of the shared variance of the observed variables. However, this is due to the way that proportion is calculated, as the relative weight of each factor in the total variance; since some of the smaller factors are negative, the proportionality of the positive factors can be greater than 1 (Vincent 1971). The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) test, which measures sampling adequacy, is also satisfactory, at 0.6253. These results are displayed in Table 5.16.

Table 5.16 Rebel Military Capacity Pre-Estimation Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha				
Scale Reliability Coefficient	0.6704			
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Kaiser Criterion				
Factor	**Eigenvalue**	**Difference**	**Proportion**	**Cumulative**
Factor 1	1.85145	1.56445	1.0127	1.0127
Factor 2	0.28700	0.23416	0.1570	1.1697
Factor 3	0.05284	0.17207	0.0289	1.1986
Factor 4	-0.11923	0.12455	-0.0652	1.1333
Factor 5	-0.24378	.	-0.1333	1.0000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10) = 1116.61 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000				
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy				
Overall Measure of Sampling Adequacy	0.6253			

Subsequent to initial estimation of the model, a check for modification indices was run. The modification selected was the covariance between relative rebel strength and relative mobilization capacity. For a rebel group, this makes particular sense; many of the groups included in this data may not have access to or need heavy armaments, and may be fairly small organizations. However, popular support, as described in Chapter 3, is absolutely necessary; if rebels cannot mobilize the personnel they need, they are unlikely to pose any sort of grave threat to the state. Therefore, this modification indice was included in the final model.

Table 5.17 Rebel Military Capacity Modification Indices

Covariance	Modification Indice	df	P>MI	Expected Parameter Change
cov(e.rel_reb_strength2,e.rel_arms)	78.283	1	0.00	-.1485701
cov(e.rel_reb_strength2,e.rel_mob_cap)	141.651	1	0.00	.1024394
cov(e.rel_arms,e.rel_fight_cap)	127.316	1	0.00	.2025748
cov(e.rel_arms,e.rebel_mil_support)	12.530	1	0.00	.0202288
cov(e.rel_mob_cap,e.rel_fight_cap)	69.951	1	0.00	-.0511671
cov(e.rel_fight_cap,e.rebel_mil_support)	7.380	1	0.01	-.0159906

The final version of the latent variable, constructed with the inclusion of this modification indice, is displayed in Table 5.18, below. This model appears to have an overall good fit, with all measurement variables except external military support significant at the 0.001 confidence level, and a model Prob>chi2 of 0.0001. The goodness of fit statistics are also all within the acceptable range; RMSEA is at 0.058 and the pclose is not statistically significant, and CFI is at 0.985. The CD of 0.857 suggests that this model does fairly well at explaining the variance in the model. Overall, statistical analysis appears to support the theorized version of a latent variable for rebel military capacity.

Table 5.18 Rebel Military Capacity Latent Variable Estimation

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|
Relative Rebel Strength	.6823277	.0208063	32.79	0.000
cons	2.3292	.0516068	45.13	0.000
Relative Mobilization Capacity	.7531187	.0191703	39.29	0.000
cons	2.702123	.0726997	37.17	0.000
Relative Arms Procurement	.1327204	.0342638	3.87	0.000
cons	2.529148	.0692938	36.50	0.000
Relative Fighting Capacity	.8882736	.0178202	49.85	0.000
cons	2.599847	.0690013	37.68	0.000
External Military Support	.0686858	.0365939	1.88	0.061
cons	1.156923	.0456779	25.33	0.000
cov(e.rel_reb_strength2, e.rel_mob_cap)	.3950457	.0291751	13.54	0.000
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(4) = 22.93				
Prob > chi2 = 0.0001				
Number of observations: 1394				
RMSEA:0.058				
pclose: 0.243				
CFI: 0.985				
CD: 0.857				

Conclusion

The confirmatory factor analysis described above lends support to this chapter's argument that state coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity are cohesive concepts. Statistical analysis of the theorized measurement variables show that, overall, there is indeed some statistically significant shared variance. However, while this chapter demonstrated empirical support for the creation of latent variables that measure these concepts of coercion and capacity, it did not test the hypothesized relationship between these concepts and the onset and occurrence of sub-state political violence choices. The testing of the hypotheses of the relationship between these latent variables and rebel campaigns is performed in the following chapter.

Chapter 6 - Empirical Models Testing

This chapter focuses on quantitative testing of the hypotheses, utilizing a large-N dataset to see how well the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4 explain political violence choices over a broad spectrum of rebel groups, countries, and years. The latent variables of coercion, state administrative and military capacity, and rebel administrative and military capacity, developed in Chapter 5, are put to the test in this empirical analysis.[58] While the latent predictor variables were outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter describes the operationalizion of the dependent variable, rebel campaign type, as well as the control variables. Following this description of the data, I then describe the methodology used to empirically analyze my dataset, and report the results. These results are then discussed and analyzed in light the hypotheses. The chapter draws to a close with an assessment of what the quantitative testing can reveal about the potential validity of this project's hypotheses.

Measuring the Concepts

As described in Chapter 5, the population of this chapter's dataset encompasses information both on rebel groups as well as the countries in which they operate. Data for this dataset is compiled from a number of commonly used, widely accepted social science datasets.[59]

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[58] Chapter 5 described the creation of the state-focused latent variables, which were developed using state level data. Once developed, these observations were then copied to every rebel group listed as occurring in a specific state and year (so that all rebel group-year observations contained the appropriate state data). The rebel-focused latent variables were created at the rebel group-year level; these latent variables were included without modification into this chapter's dataset.

[59] Datasets include the Non-State Actor Data, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the Global Terrorism Database, and the World Bank. While combining conflict data from different datasets does pose some problems as coverage can vary and thus limit the total number of observations, this methodology is common in social science

The unit of analysis is the rebel group-year. Within the limitations in coverage provided by these originating datasets, this project's dataset encompasses 281 rebel groups active from 1996 to 2011. These rebel groups were active in 68 of the 234 total countries included in the data; about 29% of all possible countries. There are a total of 833 active rebel campaign-years recorded, out of a possible 1,714 years; active rebel campaign-years comprise 48.6% of all years.[60] Table 6.1 provides the frequencies of rebel campaign types by year. Figure 6.1 displays the overall disposition of campaign type, and Figure 6.2 provides the frequencies of rebel campaign types by country.

Table 6.1 Rebel Campaigns by Year

Year	No Campaign	Terrorist	Insurgent	Civil War	Total
1996	86	8	43	8	145
1997	75	6	49	7	137
1998	67	1	42	11	121
1999	59	3	38	11	111
2000	56	4	44	7	111
2001	65	5	43	7	120
2002	62	1	41	5	109
2003	52	1	38	4	95
2004	54	2	38	7	101
2005	55	2	37	5	99
2006	54	0	45	3	102
2007	38	5	42	4	89
2008	38	9	42	5	94
2009	36	7	41	6	90
2010	41	7	39	4	91
2011	43	3	48	5	99
Total	**881**	**64**	**670**	**99**	**1,714**

literature that seeks to analyze more than one type of conflict event (cf. Findley and Young 2012; Lai and Larson 2008).

[60] A state can have zero or multiple active rebel groups within a given year; the number of rebel groups is not a one-to-one match with the number of states or years. Rebel groups may have more than one active campaign coded per year if the group had an active campaign in more than one country in one time period. The percentage of multiple campaigns by a single rebel group, as a percentage of all active campaigns ranges between 0% and 10.9% per year. For the total 16 year period, the overall percentage of multiple campaigns by a single rebel group is 5.4% of all active campaigns.

Figure 6.1 Total Dataset Distribution of Campaign Types



Figure 6.2 Active Rebel Campaigns by Year



Table 6.2 Rebel Campaigns by State

State	Terrorist	Insurgent	Civil War	Total	State	Terrorist	Insurgent	Civil War	Total
Afghanistan	0	9	13	22	Mexico	1	1	0	2
Algeria	0	20	3	23	Myanmar	0	43	0	43
Angola	0	10	4	14	Namibia	1	0	0	1
Azerbaijan	0	1	0	1	Nepal	3	7	4	14
Bangladesh	1	4	0	5	Niger	0	3	0	3
Burundi	3	21	0	24	Nigeria	4	4	0	8
Cambodia	0	4	0	4	Pakistan	4	14	4	22
Central African Republic	1	6	0	7	Papua New Guinea	0	1	0	1
Chad	0	16	0	16	Peru	0	8	0	8
China	1	1	0	2	Philippines	2	44	1	47
Colombia	3	28	2	33	Russia	1	16	4	21
Comoros	0	1	0	1	Rwanda	1	7	3	11
Congo	0	7	2	9	Senegal	0	6	0	6
Cote d'Ivoire	0	6	0	6	Sierra Leone	0	10	2	12
Democratic Republic of Congo	2	9	5	16	Somalia	1	8	5	13
Djibouti	0	1	0	1	South Sudan	0	2	0	2
Egypt	0	3	0	3	Spain	9	2	0	11
Eritrea	0	3	0	3	Sri Lanka	1	2	10	13
Ethiopia	0	32	0	32	Sudan	1	31	9	41
France	2	4	0	6	Syria	0	1	0	1
Georgia	0	2	0	2	Tajikistan	0	7	1	8
Greece	2	0	0	2	Thailand	2	9	0	11
Guinea	0	2	0	2	Turkey	0	13	4	17
Guinea-Bissau	0	2	0	2	Uganda	0	24	2	26
Haiti	0	2	0	2	United Kingdom	2	2	0	4
India	2	99	7	108	United States	3	10	1	14
Indonesia	1	9	0	10	Uzbekistan	0	3	0	3
Iran	0	16	0	16	Yemen	0	2	0	2
Iraq	5	14	8	27	Yemen Arab Republic	0	2	1	3
Israel	4	40	0	44	Yugoslavia	0	0	2	2
Kenya	0	1	0	1	**Total**	**64**	**670**	**99**	**833**
Lebanon	2	2	0	4					
Lesotho	0	1	0	1					
Liberia	0	4	1	5					
Libya	0	1	1	2					
Macedonia	0	1	0	1					
Mali	0	4	0	4					
Mauritania	0	2	0	2					

Dependent Variables: Rebel Campaign Types

The dependent variables identify three rebel campaign types, terrorist campaign, insurgent campaign, and civil war campaign, as well as marking when there is no active rebel

campaign. The first two dependent variables are both categorical codings of rebel campaign type. The first, *rebel campaign type*, encompasses all years of rebel activity, while the second, *onset campaign type*, encompasses only the first year of every non-contiguous bout of rebel activity within a country. In addition, two binary variables mark the occurrence of, respectively, the presence of any type of rebel campaign over all years, named *campaign dummy*, and the presence of any type of rebel campaign in onset years, labeled *onset dummy*.[61] Another set of six binary dependent variables are generated that identify only the presence of a specific campaign type, respectively called *terrorist dummy*, *terrorist onset dummy*, *insurgent dummy*, *insurgent onset dummy*, *civil war dummy*, and *civil war onset dummy*.

Information on rebel group campaigns comes from two sources. The first is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The ACD dataset is focused on instances of conflict and war, with a minimum inclusion threshold of 25 battledeaths per year (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The ACD measures conflict, defined as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25-battle-related deaths" (Themnér 2013, 1). However, while conflicts must meet the minimum of 25 battledeaths per year to be included in the dataset, there is also an 'intensity' level variable included in the dataset which codes the difference between 'minor armed conflict' and 'war'. This distinction is also based on battledeaths; a 'minor armed conflict' is a conflicts with 25 to 999 battledeaths per

[61] These dummy variables are used to determine if the independent variables affect the overall occurrence of rebel activity, without differentiating between the type of campaign chosen.

year, while a 'war' has 1,000 or more battledeaths per year (Themnér 2013:9).[62] The intensity variable was utilized to distinguish between 'minor armed conflicts', which were coded in this project's dataset as insurgent campaigns, and 'wars', which were coded as civil war campaigns. There is another dataset on insurgency, that of Lyall and Wilson III (2009). However, the Lyall and Wilson (2009) data code entire multi-year wars as insurgencies, rather than breaking down these wars into discrete campaigns. Therefore, their data does not provide the level of specificity necessary for inclusion in this project's dataset.[63]

The second data source for campaign type is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), housed at the University of Maryland/START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2013). While the ACD was already formatted in a conflict-year scheme, inclusion of GTD data into this chapter's dataset required additional reworking, as GTD data is formatted in an event-date scheme; observations in the GTD are focused on specific terrorist actions.[64] In order to compile this data into a usable format, the following steps were taken in order to identify year-long terrorist campaigns.

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[62] For this project's dataset, only ACD data of the type 'internal armed conflict' and 'internationalized internal armed conflict' were selected. The primary non-state actor listed for each of these conflicts was identified as the rebel group undertaking the campaign.

[63] Additionally, the Lyall and Wilson III (2009) data pulls most of the observations included in its dataset from the ACD data; there is a great deal of overlap between the two datasets, so the ACD data was used in this project.

[64] For an event to be included in the GTD, it must meet the following three mandatory criteria: 1) "The incident must be intentional"; 2) "The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence"; and 3) "The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors" (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2014, 8).

First, to be included in this dataset, each event was required to meet several criteria focused on ensuring that the events included were actually terrorist in nature.[65] Then, the perpetrators of these events were examined.[66] All events with unclear perpetrator attributions were excluded from this analysis, as identification of who the rebel group was that undertook the action is a critical prerequisite to identifying discrete rebel campaigns. Next, the number of events by a specific perpetrator group in a specific year was counted. Only perpetrators who had committed at least 12 events (attacks) per calendar year in a specific country were kept; all others were dropped. The inclusion of the requirement for 12 events per year is based on this project's discussion in Chapter 2 regarding what the term 'campaign' implies; the repeated use of terrorist tactics over the course of a year suggests a greater level of intentionality and goal-seeking behavior than a single, one-off attack. Therefore, only perpetrator groups which committed 12 attacks per country-year were coded as having a terrorist campaign in that year.[67]

Finally, the campaigns identified in the GTD data were coded as either insurgent or terrorist. Drawing upon a method by Carter (2016), the rebel campaigns identified in the GTD were classified as terrorist or insurgent according to the type of target attacked. Terror attacks on civilian targets are coded as terrorist events, and attacks on military and police forces are coded as insurgent attacks. For this project's dataset, all attacks in a specific rebel campaign-year were

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[65] See Criterions 1, 2 and 3 in the GTD codebook (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2014, 8).

[66] Many events listed in the GTD are attributed to 'individual,' 'unknown,' 'anonymous,' or otherwise unattributable perpetrators.

[67] To the best of my knowledge, no other attempt has been made to organize the GTD data in such a way as to determine the presence of a terrorist campaign; while terrorist campaigns are discussed in the literature there is no extant definition of what level of activity is implied by a 'campaign'. I argue that a rate of twelve attacks per year averages out to one attack per month, and an activity level of one attack per month implies that a rebel group is definitely not engaged in one-off violence, but rather has the resources to carry out a sustained series of violence.

examined, and if over 50 percent of the attacks were on police or military targets, the campaign was coded as an insurgent campaign; otherwise campaigns were coded as terrorist.

After campaigns were identified in the ACD and GTD datasets, these campaigns had to be compared and merged together. Unsurprisingly, many rebel group campaigns appear in both the GTD and ACD datasets as active in the same country and year. Due to this overlap, for groups that were identified in both datasets, the highest level intensity campaign was coded for that rebel campaign-year. For example, if Rebel Group A is coded as having a terrorist campaign in Country X for Year 1 from the GTD data, but is also coded as having an insurgent campaign in Country X, Year 1 from the ACD data, that group is coded as having an insurgent campaign for that country-year.

As detailed in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3, of a total of 833 active rebel campaign-years, there were 153 campaigns which were present in both the GTD and ACD datasets, representing 18.4% of all campaigns. Such a large degree of overlap supports my argument that violent campaigns of different types are best studied comparatively, rather than in isolation. This is particularly true when researching insurgent campaigns, where GTD data provided information on 24 insurgent campaigns that were not identified in the ACD data. Further, those using the GTD dataset to research terrorism may be led astray by the classification of groups included in that dataset as ‘terrorists’, for a large percentage of those groups listed in the GTD are were actually functioning as participants in larger insurgencies or civil wars. Based on the coding rules used in developing this dataset, of the 241 campaigns identified in the GTD data, 177 campaigns,

or about 73.4%, were ultimately classified as insurgent or civil war, rather than terrorist, campaigns. [68]

Table 6.3 Rebel Campaign Overlap Between Extant Datasets

	Number of Campaigns	Percent of Total Campaigns**
Civil War Campaigns		
ACD Civil War	55	55.6%
GTD Insurgent → ACD Civil War	17	17.2%
GTD Terrorist → ACD Civil War	27	27.3%
Total Civil War Campaigns	**99**	**100%**
Total Civil War Switched Campaigns	***44***	***44.4%***
Insurgent Campaigns		
ACD Insurgent Only*	537	80.1%
GTD Insurgent Only*	24	3.6%
GTD Insurgent Matched ACD Insurgent	35	5.2%
GTD Terrorist → ACD Insurgent	74	11.0%
Total Insurgent Campaigns	**670**	**100%**
Total Insurgent Switched Campaigns	***74***	***11.0%***
Terrorist Campaigns		
GTD Terrorist	64	100%
Total Terrorist Campaigns	**64**	**100%**
Total Terrorist Switched Campaigns	***0***	***0%***
Overall Switched Campaigns		
Civil War	44	5.3%
Insurgent	74	8.9%
Terrorist	0	0%
Total Switched Campaigns	***118***	***14.2%***
Overall Campaign Overlap		
Total Switched Campaigns	118	14.2%
Total Matched Campaigns	35	4.2%
Total ACD-GTD Overlap	**153**	**18.4%**

**Campaign uniquely identified in only one of the datasets.*
***Based on the final identification of 64 terrorist campaigns, 670 insurgent campaigns, 99 civil war campaigns, for a total of 833 violent rebel campaigns.*

[68] There were 241 total campaigns identified in the GTD data, which, after comparison with the ACD data, were ultimately coded as: 64, terrorist; 133, insurgent; and 44, civil war.

Figure 6.3 Rebel Campaign ACD-GTD Overlap in Dataset



Independent Latent Variables: Coercion, State Capacity, Rebel Capacity

The predictor variables are the latent variables developed in Chapter 5 that measure the concepts of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity. For more information on the development of these variables, see Chapter 5. All latent variables are continuous in nature.

Control Variables

The control variables discussed below are an attempt to make sure that this research is taking into account environmental factors that might otherwise affect the processes under study. Drawn from extant conflict literature, these control variables, if not included, might otherwise have unmeasured effects on the empirical models.[69] For this model, the control variables included are three measures of societal fractionalization; population density; polyarchy; gdp; and two measures of rugged terrain.

[69] Further, incorporating these control variables into the quantitative model permits the comparison to contextually similar cases in which violent processes occurred.

Measures of *ethnic*, *linguistic*, and *religious fractionalization* may help to capture tensions inherent within a society, as well as variations in the ease of societal group interaction (cf. Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Gates 2002; Piazza 2011). Data on ethnic, language, and religious fractionalization come from Alesina et al. (2003), and range on a scale of zero to one.[70] While this dataset provides the broadest coverage using the most recent sources available, it is still somewhat limited, covering 215 countries but only providing one observation per country for each of the three (ethnic, linguistic, and religious) variables. It is thus a time-invariant variable, but no better variable is commonly accepted or available in the scholarly literature.

The total population of a state has been found to have a positive correlation with the incidence of sub-state politicized violence (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). However, as noted by Sambanis (2004, 821), this may be due more to the minimum battledeath threshold for coding instances of violent conflict rather than something inherent about large population states.[71] In order to control for any effect of gross population size, I include the variable, *population density*, from the World Bank (World Bank 2015a). This variable measures the number of people per square kilometer of land and is a more sensitive measure of population than simply total numbers.[72]

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[70] The indices are computed as one minus the Herfindahl index, the same method used in the seminal ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable provided by the 1964 Atlas Narodov Mira (Alesina et al. 2003, 5). While the computation is the same, the Alesina et al. data utilize newer sources of information to create their indices.

[71] Other researchers (Alesina and Spolaore 2003) have argued for a more sophisticated causal path to violence than simply the size of a population; they note that larger populations may contain a more heterogeneous mix of ethnic, religious, or otherwise differentiated groups, and that the presence of multiple minority groups could increase the chances that some of these groups are both likely to be aggrieved by the state, and large and cohesively organized enough to successfully rebel against the state. Such heterogeneity effects are included in the fractionalization measures that are part of the rebel coordination latent variable.

[72] As Buhaug (2010) notes, states with larger areas tend to also have larger populations.

This project utilizes the Vanhanen (2000, 2014) Measures of Democracy data to capture the type of government in a state. While Polity IV data also measures polyarchy, as multiple scholars have noted (Strand 2007; Gates et al. 2006; Vreeland 2008), use of Polity IV is problematic in studies of sub-state conflict due to endogenity between the coding factors in the Polity scale and the presence of such conflict.[73] In order to avoid this potential endogenity problem, I utilize the Vanhanen (2014) *Index of Democracy* variable, which does not include sub-state conflict in its coding, and is therefore better suited for inclusion in this project's dataset.

GDP per capita is perhaps the most overused and theoretically vague variable in conflict studies; besides being utilized as a proxy for capacity, it has also been used as a proxy for military power, grievances, and so on (cf. Hendrix 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003). There is a broad agreement among the scholarly literature that GDP per capita should be included, but an equally broad disagreement as to the concept that this variable is actually measuring. Since this chapter has developed different operationalized measures for capacity and coercion, I include GDP as a control variable. The GDP per capita variable comes from the World Bank (World Bank 2015a).

Finally, I include two variables to capture measures of the ruggedness of terrain within a state. The first, *mountainous terrain*, comes from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and provides one time-invariant observation per country; it provides a percentage measure of the amount of total land area that is covered by mountains. The second, a measure of *forested terrain*, comes from the World Bank; it measures the percentage of land within a state that is covered by forest, and

[73] Polity IV data codes anocracies, in part, by the presence of violent in-state challenges to the government; such challenges are strongly correlated to the onset of civil war (Marshall et al. 2002; Vreeland 2008).

does vary by year (World Bank 2015a). Table 6.4 provides the descriptive statistics these variables.[74]

Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
All Campaigns	1714	.9924154	1.066089	0	3
Campaigns - Onset Only	1714	.3162194	.7394359	0	3
Coercion*	4703	-.2405658	1.208445	-3.010786	2.434133
State Administrative Capacity*	4703	-.4155433	2.584186	-6.780252	6.615726
State Military Capacity*	4703	.2651668	1.223435	-4.697795	3.923528
Rebel Administrative Capacity*	1714	0.0000000137	.1070523	-4.697795	.2049727
Rebel Military Capacity*	1714	0.00000000137	.3205931	-.2448765	1.768986
Ethnic Fractionalization	1674	.553376	.2240285	0	.9302
Linguistic Fractionalization	1647	.5600579	.2747855	.008	.9227
Religious Fractionalization	1677	.3739663	.2173561	.0023	.8241
Population Density	1693	139.3617	148.4432	2.305327	1112.919
Polyarchy	1671	12.27588	10.82772	0	39.2
GDP per Capita**	1515	7.029812	1.34088	4.871513	10.72365
Mountainous Terrain	1678	23.9449	23.76064	0	82.20001
Forested Terrain	1689	25.08192	19.97991	.0532423	76.07397

** Denotes latent variable estimation.*

***Logged*

[74] As seen in Table 6.4, the total number of observations varies between rebel-level data and state-level data, This is due to the issues discussed above; there is simply less information available for rebel groups than there are for states, and data is particularly scarce for rebel groups that are not active, though, as described in Chapter 5, some data was available and included.

Empirical Methods

To empirically test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4, this chapter primarily utilizes multinomial probit models. Multinomial probit models break out the specific relationship between each predictor variable and each campaign type. All independent variables were lagged one year in order to check for the theoretically proposed causality, that coercion and capacity changes lead to rebel campaign choices. (Additional models, including multinomial logit, and alternate specification multivariate probit, are presented in the Appendix A.[75])

Multinomial probit is a version of a probit model, however, unlike a basic probit model, which has a binary dependent variable, multinomial probit is used when there are more than two possible categories for a dependent variable (Crown 1998). Thus, the use of this model, which has four categories in the dependent variable (no active campaign, terrorist campaign, insurgent campaign, and civil war campaign), is appropriate. Multinomial probit, unlike multinomial logit, does not require the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The IIA requires that any addition of another category in the dependent variable would not affect the preferences between the categories currently in the variable (Alvarez and Nagler 1994). The IIA requirement is

[75] Multivariate probit models, while considered, were deemed inappropriate due to the theory of campaigns developed in this project. This project made the assumption that rebels would only pursue one campaign in a given time period. Theoretically, a rebel group in a single year is expected choose the type of campaign it will pursue, but is not expected to simultaneously pursue two or more campaigns. Following this theory development, the dataset developed in this chapter has only one observation for campaign type per rebel group year.

Multivariate probit models require the actor to be able to have correlated actions. In this vein, an example would be a rebel group might be more/less likely to choose a terrorist campaign if they were simultaneously choosing an insurgent campaign (Chib and Greenberg 1998). Because this assumption about simultaneous choices that an actor has was not in line with this project's theoretical development, multivariate probit models were not used. This type of correlated, simultaneous choice is beyond the scope of this project's research, but is a potential area for future research.

problematic in this dataset, as there are conceivably categories—such as different types of non-violent civil protest—that could affect preferences between the violent campaign categories identified in the independent variable.[76] Therefore, multinomial probit, which does not require the IIA, was chosen over multinomial logit as a better estimation method for this project.[77]

The raw output of multinomial probit estimation results are provided in z-scores, with the base outcome set to no active campaign, which means that outcomes for all three of the rebel campaign types can be contrasted relative to no campaign occurring (Long and Freese 2014). Models were estimated with Huber-White robust standard errors (Huber 1967; White 1980) to ensure heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The model output coefficients, recorded below, provide information on the direction of the relationship via their sign, and the significance of the independent variables to the model via their p-values. However, the log-odds coefficients provided in the initial estimation are somewhat unintuitive to interpret in terms of size of effect, so the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable are also provided.

Standard goodness-of-fit measures for these models are included: the Wald chi-square statistic and associated p-value, the count R-squared (base and adjusted), and the Akaike information criterion (Long & Freese 2014; Herron 1999). The Wald statistic checks to see if the

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[76] The 'no violent conflict' category could conceivably contain both a condition of 'total peace' and a separate condition (or conditions, based on type of protest, e.g. riots, strikes, demonstrations, write-in ballots) of 'nonviolent civil conflict'. However, since the focus of this project is on violent campaign choices, the parsing of subcategories within the 'no violent conflict' category was not undertaken.

[77] There is not consensus in the literature on the ability of multinomial logit to provide accurate models when the IIA assumption is violated, however, Kropko (2008) argues that multinomial logit can, even without the IIA, provide models which are more accurate than that produced by multinomial probit. To address this possibility, the models described in the multinomial probit section were also run as multinomial logit models. The results from the multinomial logit models are provided in Appendix A; results were similar to those produced by the multinomial probit models.

variables included in the model should be included; if the p-value is not significant, this indicates that the independent variables should not be incorporated in the model. The generally accepted criteria for the Wald p-value is that, if the value is less than 0.05, the test is significant and the independent variables included in the model should be so included (Fox 1997; Long and Freese 2014).[78] The count R-squared denotes the proportion of observations in the data which were correctly classified by the model; the adjusted count R-squared identifies the most common outcome makes that common outline the baseline, and then measures the proportion of observations beyond this baseline that were correctly predicted (Long and Freese 2014). Since the adjusted R-squared ignores the most common outcome predictions this number tends to be smaller than that of the unadjusted count R-squared. This is particularly the case for this project's data, as the base outcome, no active rebel campaign, comprises 51.4% of all observations. Therefore, the adjusted R-squared will, at best, correctly predict less than half of all possible outcomes. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is not an absolute measure of model fit; rather, the AIC measures the relative quality of comparable models. As such, the AIC can be used to compare the basic model to a model containing additional variables; the model with the smaller AIC statistic is considered to be the better model (Burnham & Anderson 1998; Yang 2005).[79] All four hypotheses are tested via these multinomial probit models, and the results are discussed in the following sections.[80]

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[78] An alternative to the Wald test is the likelihood ratio test; per Rothenberg (1984) and Greene (2003), both tests are substantively similar, however, the Wald test only requires that one model (rather than two) is estimated.

[79] Following Burnham & Anderson (2002) and Yang (2005), the Akaike information criterion was chosen over the Bayesian information criteria.

[80] Given the nature of Hypothesis 4, a Heckman probit model was also considered. Heckman models are two stage estimation models, which allow for an initial sample selection to correct biases in non-randomly selected samples (Heckman 1979). For this project, the application of a two-step model would permit, first, the estimation of the

Results

Table 6.5, below, provides the results of the multinomial probit models. Models 1 and 3 estimate a base model for all rebel campaign years and all onset campaign years, respectively. Model 2 provides estimations for the expanded version of Model 1, which includes the control variables outlined above. Model 4, which was to be the expanded version of the onset Model 3, did not converge during estimation after over one thousand iterations. Therefore, an expanded version of the onset model is not included in the estimation results provided below. Alternate specification models (presented in Appendix A) were also run for Model 4; these failed to converge as well.

overall probability of a violent campaign onset, and then, second, an estimation of the determinants of violent campaign choice. By running such a model, the overall effect of coercion on onset of any campaign type could first be determined, and then the effect of the predictor variables on each campaign type, outlined above and in Chapter 5, could be estimated. Unfortunately, all attempts at Heckman probit models did not converge, and are therefore not displayed. This lack of convergence is likely due to the limitations of the overall dataset, specifically the limited number of onset cases, and the even more limited number of cases with data on rebel capacity in the years preceding onset case. Recall that the independent variables are lagged a year, so that the years prior to onset years are used when running onset year models. Unfortunately, the lack of convergence is likely due to a lack of observations for which data are available. While the lack of a two-stage selection models is a limitation of the quantitative analysis of this chapter, the qualitative analysis provided by the case studies in Chapters 7 and 8 serve to address this issue in a different manner.

Table 6.5 Multinomial Probit Models

	Variables	Model 1: All years, base	Model 2: All years, full	Model 3: Onset only, base	Model 4: Onset only, full
Terrorist	Coercion	0.4558888 (0.038)**	0.6999954 (0.037)**	-2.164233 (0.053)*	*Model did not converge.*
	Coercion^2	0.1209088 (0.163)	0.2823611 (0.025)**	-1.317285 (0.009)***	
	State Administrative Capacity	-0.0320118 (0.632)	-0.0788487 (0.479)	0.3069065 (0.008)***	
	State Administrative Capacity^2	-0.0054241 (0.698)	-0.0064269 (0.75)	0.0812818 (0.004)***	
	State Military Capacity	0.4609196 (0.018)**	0.4855203 (0.149)	1.153706 (0.199)	
	State Military Capacity^2	-0.1424742 (0.147)	-0.27746 (0.037)**	-0.0259824 (0.920)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity	-2.093313 (0.147)	-4.510391 (0.085)*	-10.55759 (0.447)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity^2	13.55092 (0.292)	31.96654 (0.026)**	-46.35024 (0.632)	
	Rebel Military Capacity	-5.014672 (0.015)**	-32.02971 (0.02)**	1.06828 (0.613)	
	Rebel Military Capacity^2	3.633653 (0.004)***	-72.62454 (0.21)	-0.2569697 (0.919)	
	Ethnic Fractionalization		0.9100504 (0.514)		
	Linguistic Fractionalization		0.0318643 (0.973)		
	Religious Fractionalization		1.187872 (0.117)		
	Population Density		0.002975 (0.014)**		
	Polyarchy		0.0401364 (0.113)		
	GDP per Capita†		-0.1975969 (0.389)		
	Mountainous Terrain		0.0068698 (0.415)		
	Forested Terrain		0.0148711 (0.149)		
	Constant	-3.035661 (0.000)***	-6.541821 (0.005)***	-6.445964 (0.000)***	
Insurgent	Coercion	-0.1499687 (0.175)	-0.0617201 (0.639)	-0.145642 (0.468)	
	Coercion^2	-0.0216043 (0.63)	-0.0104499 (0.855)	-0.0709283 (0.39)	

Table 6.5 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Models

	Variables	Model 1: All years, base	Model 2: All years, full	Model 3: Onset only, base	Model 4: Onset only, full
Insurgent	State Administrative Capacity	0.1169716 (0.003)***	0.1383648 (0.015)**	0.0095177 (0.896)	
	State Administrative Capacity^2	-0.0049638 (0.561)	0.0091033 (0.432)	0.000768 (0.956)	
	State Military Capacity	0.0601594 (0.493)	0.1299702 (0.245)	-0.0181498 (0.873)	
	State Military Capacity^2	-0.0014085 (0.969)	-0.0317161 (0.484)	0.0637101 (0.211)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity	2.790924 (0.000)***	2.965471 (0.004)***	2.63807 (0.001)***	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity^2	9.18415 (0.054)*	14.60889 (0.017)**	0.0256893 (0.997)	
	Rebel Military Capacity	-3.372204 (0.000)***	-2.933861 (0.000)***	1.413227 (0.022)***	
	Rebel Military Capacity^2	2.368605 (0.000)***	2.326829 (0.000)***	-3.700304 (0.003)***	
	Ethnic Fractionalization		-0.2380755 (0.621)		
	Linguistic Fractionalization		1.809232 (0.000)***		
	Religious Fractionalization		-1.03221 (0.001)***		
	Population Density		0.000362 (0.652)		
	Polyarchy		-0.0145657 (0.177)		
	GDP per Capita†		0.1624125 (0.088)*		
	Mountainous Terrain		0.0070855 (0.022)**		
	Forested Terrain		0.0018939 (0.666)		
	Constant	-0.5629137 (0.000)***	-2.286863 (0.005)***	-2.103746 (0.000)***	
Civil War	Coercion	-0.5798075 (0.004)***	-0.3332844 (0.209)	-0.3664196 (0.561)	
	Coercion^2	-0.1333125 (0.086)*	-0.0700651 (0.516)	-0.3931579 (0.152)	
	State Administrative Capacity	0.0564765 (0.257)	0.125977 (0.114)	-5.942488 (0.000)***	
	State Administrative Capacity^2	0.0250599 (0.027)**	0.0339347 (0.06)*	-0.8875362 (0.000)***	

Table 6.5 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Models

	Variables	Model 1: All years, base	Model 2: All years, full	Model 3: Onset only, base	Model 4: Onset only, full
Civil War	State Military Capacity	-0.0880095 (0.455)	0.2121922 (0.265)	-0.0066828 (0.991)	
	State Military Capacity^2	-0.0151252 (0.755)	-0.0914182 (0.218)	-0.4029145 (0.059)*	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity	-0.6960079 (0.342)	-5.267944 (0.000)***	-1.317589 (0.468)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity^2	-0.4971674 (0.943)	21.11043 (0.013)**	40.3167 (0.036)**	
	Rebel Military Capacity	-0.609051 (0.256)	0.1477596 (0.804)	2.09427 (0.000)***	
	Rebel Military Capacity^2	-0.1570627 (0.812)	-0.1426276 (0.866)	-1.876002 (0.073)*	
	Ethnic Fractionalization		1.184874 (0.128)		
	Linguistic Fractionalization		0.2911674 (0.610)		
	Religious Fractionalization		-1.010525 (0.015)**		
	Population Density		0.0024684 (0.020)**		
	Polyarchy		-0.0122942 (0.411)		
	GDP per Capita†		-0.3844237 (0.006)***		
	Mountainous Terrain		0.005237 (0.220)		
	Forested Terrain		0.019847 (0.000)***		
	Constant	-1.958928 (0.000)***	-0.7370183 (0.509)	-12.72692 (0.000)***	
	N	1309	1108	1309	
	Wald chi^2 (df)	241.584 (30)	316.422 (54)	213.768 (30)	
	Prob>chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.000	
	R^2 Count	0.616	0.596	0.936	
	R^2 Count (adjusted)	0.189	0.181	0.000	
	AIC	2299.139	1948.493	699.192	

**p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01*

†Logged variable

The results of the multinomial probit models are in line with the goodness of fit criteria discussed above. The Wald test p-values are at 0.0000 for all three models, supporting the inclusion of the coefficients in the models. The base count R-squared for Model 1 is 0.616; for Model 2, 0.596; and for Model 3, 0.936. Therefore, all three models appear to be classifying over 50 percent of observations correctly. As expected, the adjusted count R-squared shows a marked decrease in the number of observations correctly classified; the adjusted count R-squared is only identifying correctly classified observations outside of the base case. Since the base case in this chapter's dataset, no campaign, is by far the largest category, at over 51% of all observed campaign years, removing this category from the count of correctly predicted decreases the number of campaigns under analysis. The adjusted count R-squared shoes that Models 1 and 2 are correctly classifying just under 20% of non-base cases. Perhaps more concerning is Model 3, in which no non-base cases are correctly classified. However, Model 3 is the onset model, so the number of non-base cases available for analysis is even more limited than in Models 1 and 2. However, this lack of correctly predicted adjusted cases may also imply that the relationship between the predictor variables and the onset of a violent campaign may need to be further examined. Overall, the adjusted count R-squared statistics appear to provide more support for the appropriateness of Models 1 and 2 than for Model 3. This may imply that the relationships that influence campaign choices during ongoing conflict are different than those that initiate a new conflict. The Akaike information criteria (AIC) statistic can be compared between Model 1 and Model 2.[81] Model 2, with an AIC of 1948.493, has a lower AIC than that of Model 1, at 2299.139; this suggests that Model 2, which includes the control variables, may provide a better

[81] Since Model 4 did not compile, the AIC for Model 3 cannot be compared with a corresponding full model.

fit than Model 1. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that some of the control variables are significant for some of the campaign types.

Only some of the proposed hypotheses were supported by the multinomial probit models. These results are presented in Table 6.10. For Hypotheses 1-3, which focus on coercion, only Hypothesis 1 is supported (in Model 1 but not Model 2); terrorist campaigns do appear to be more likely at low and high levels of coercion. For Hypotheses 4-6, which focus on state administrative capacity, neither model supported any of the hypotheses. For Hypotheses 7-9, which focus on state military capacity, only Hypothesis 7 is supported (in Model 1 but not Model 2); terrorist campaigns do appear to be more likely when state military capacity is at higher levels. For Hypotheses 10-12, which focus on rebel administrative capacity, Hypothesis 10 was partially supported (in Model 2 but not Model 1); terrorist campaigns do appear to be more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at lower levels. Hypothesis 11, that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels, was supported by the results of both models. Neither model provided support to Hypothesis 12. For Hypotheses 13-15, which focus on rebel military capacity, only Hypothesis 13, that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at lower levels, was supported by the results of both models. Finally, the models did not provide any support for Hypothesis 16, that onset years of rebel campaigns would have a stronger positive relationship with coercion than non-onset years.

Table 6.6 Summary of Results of Hypotheses Testing

Hypothesis	Finding
HYPOTHESIS 1: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at low or high levels.	Mixed
HYPOTHESIS 2: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at intermediate levels.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 3: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is high.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 4: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative capacity is at higher levels.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 5: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative capacity is at lower levels.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 6: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative capacity is at lower levels.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 7: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at higher levels.	Mixed
HYPOTHESIS 8: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at intermediate levels.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 9: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at lower levels.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 10: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at lower levels.	Mixed
HYPOTHESIS 11: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels.	Supported
HYPOTHESIS 12: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 13: Terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at lower levels.	Supported
HYPOTHESIS 14: Insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at intermediate levels.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 15: Civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at high levels.	No Support
HYPOTHESIS 16: The onset year of any given rebel campaign type will have a stronger positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that same type of rebel campaign.	No Support

Overall, the quantitative models analyzed here provided some limited support for this project's hypotheses. Additionally, as seen in Table 6.5, in several models there were significant results that were opposite to those hypothesized by this project, as well as by previous research in the field; such findings may indicate support the arguments made in previous chapters, that rebel campaigns should be studied in relationship to each other, not in isolation, and that current research does not adequately address the substitutability of rebel campaigns. Further, this project

represents a novel attempt to capture measures of rebel capacity, and the rebel capacity variables were significant for some campaign types. It is possible that the inclusion of rebel capacity variables, not previously widely used in quantitative research on sub-state violence, may help to explain the discrepancies between the models' results and the hypotheses. These results are examined in more detail in the discussion and analysis section, below.

While the coefficients in provided in Table 6.5 offer information about the significance and sign of the relationship between the predictor and outcome variables, they are unintuitive to interpret in regards to the size of the effect. Table 6.7, below, provides the predicted probabilities for overall campaign choice for Models 1 through 3, in order to better understand the effect of the independent variables on this choice. For Model 1, the base model for all campaign years, the average probability of a terrorist campaign is about 0.02, the average probability of an insurgent campaign is about 0.39, and the average probability of a civil war campaign is about 0.06, and for rebels to choose not to have a violent campaign, about 0.53. When the control variables are included, in Model 2, the average probability of a terrorist campaign remains around 0.02, the average probability of an insurgent campaign nudges slightly higher to 0.41, and the average probability of a civil war campaign remains around 0.06, and for rebels to choose not to have a violent campaign, there is a slight decrease to 0.51. Model 3, the onset model, differs significantly from the first two models. The predicted probability of no campaign jumps to about 0.94. This is as hypothesized, since rebellion is costly, and therefore the status quo is likely to be choice to not rebel. The predicted probabilities of all of the three violent campaign choices decrease dramatically; the average probability of a terrorist campaign is about 0.003, the average probability of an insurgent campaign is about 0.06, and the average probability of a civil war campaign is about 0.003.

Table 6.7 Multinomial Probit: Predicted Probabilities for Overall Campaign Choice

Probability of Choosing:	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	95% Confidence Interval	
Model 1: All years, base						
No Active Campaign	0.5258175	0.0129285	40.67	0.000	0.5004781	0.5511568
Terrorist Campaign	0.0191093	0.0036941	5.17	0.000	0.0118689	0.0263497
Insurgent Campaign	0.3933814	0.0125272	31.4	0.000	0.3688286	0.4179343
Civil War Campaign	0.0616918	0.0065165	9.47	0.000	0.0489197	0.074464
Model 2: All years, full						
No Active Campaign	0.5068654	0.0139152	36.43	0.000	0.479592	0.5341387
Terrorist Campaign	0.0212145	0.0040787	5.2	0.000	0.0132203	0.0292087
Insurgent Campaign	0.4117965	0.0135927	30.3	0.000	0.3851554	0.4384376
Civil War Campaign	0.0601236	0.0068219	8.81	0.000	0.0467529	0.0734944
Model 3: Onset years, base						
No Active Campaign	0.9358039	0.0067088	139.49	0.000	0.922655	0.9489529
Terrorist Campaign	0.0030025	0.0014957	2.01	0.045	0.0000709	0.005934
Insurgent Campaign	0.0581272	0.006418	9.06	0.000	0.0455482	0.0707062
Civil War Campaign	0.0030664	0.0014287	2.15	0.032	0.0002662	0.0058666
Model 4: Onset years, full						
No Active Campaign	*Model failed to converge.*					
Terrorist Campaign						
Insurgent Campaign						
Civil War Campaign						

While Table 6.7 is useful for an overview of the predicted probabilities of different campaign choices, further information is provided by looking at the predicted probabilities and average marginal effects of each independent variable in the three models. Tables 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 provide the average marginal effect, with confidence intervals, for each of the independent variables overall. However, given the continuous nature of the independent variables, instead of simply providing a discrete number that represents the average marginal effect, Figures 6.4 to 6.33 break out these marginal effects by decile for each variable, providing a more in-depth look

at how the variables respond across values.[82] Table 6.8 and Figures 6.4 through 6.13 present estimates for Model 1. Similarly, Table 6.9 and Figures 6.14 through 6.23 present estimates from Model 2, and Table 6.10 and Figures 6.24 through 6.33 present estimates for Model 3.

Table 6.8 Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 1

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: No Active Campaign						
Coercion	0.0537752	0.0278759	1.93	0.054	-0.0008606	0.108411
Coercion^2	0.0094811	0.0112996	0.84	0.401	-0.0126657	0.0316278
S. Admin Cap	-0.0273986	0.0096729	-2.83	0.005	-0.0463572	-0.00844
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.0003427	0.0020819	-0.16	0.869	-0.0044232	0.0037377
S. Mil Cap	-0.014651	0.0211363	-0.69	0.488	-0.0560775	0.0267754
S. Mil Cap^2	0.0016154	0.0088959	0.18	0.856	-0.0158203	0.019051
R. Admin Cap	-0.5070056	0.1274834	-3.98	0.000	-0.7568684	-0.2571427
R. Admin Cap^2	-2.061495	1.188147	-1.74	0.083	-4.390221	0.2672306
R. Mil Cap	0.7980294	0.0920419	8.67	0.000	0.6176306	0.9784282
R. Mil Cap^2	-0.5483124	0.1143811	-4.79	0.000	-0.7724953	-0.3241296
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
Coercion	0.0190555	0.0073937	2.58	0.01	0.004564	0.033547
Coercion^2	0.0047205	0.0027733	1.7	0.089	-0.0007151	0.0101561
S. Admin Cap	-0.0008405	0.002068	-0.41	0.684	-0.0048938	0.0032127
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0001622	0.0004379	0.37	0.711	-0.0006961	0.0010205
S. Mil Cap	0.0144829	0.0070318	2.06	0.039	0.0007009	0.0282649
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0046834	0.0032538	-1.44	0.15	-0.0110608	0.0016939
R. Admin Cap	-0.10627	0.0475255	-2.24	0.025	-0.1994182	-0.0131217
R. Admin Cap^2	0.3114024	0.4138944	0.75	0.452	-0.4998157	1.122621

[82] Per Williams (2012), an alternative way to develop estimates for margins is to use cross-operator notation for all variables to be squared, rather than squaring variables prior to model estimation. While overall model predicted probabilities are exactly the same, the advantage to this approach is a slightly better estimation of the model when graphing out the predicted probabilities at specified percentiles. The disadvantage to this method, however, is that the variables that were squared via cross-operator notation are unable to be graphed at percentile; detailed information on how these variables respond is therefore lost. The results of the Williams (2012) approach, using cross operator notation, as an alternative to the results provided in this chapter, are presented in Appendix A.

Table 6.8 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 1

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
R. Mil Cap	-0.1128794	0.0638952	-1.77	0.077	-0.2381117	0.0123528
R. Mil Cap^2	0.0838581	0.0381337	2.2	0.028	0.0091174	0.1585988
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0242802	0.0270243	-0.9	0.369	-0.0772468	0.0286864
Coercion^2	-0.0025248	0.0108743	-0.23	0.816	-0.0238382	0.0187885
S. Admin Cap	0.0274157	0.009196	2.98	0.003	0.0093919	0.0454395
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.0022382	0.0020413	-1.1	0.273	-0.006239	0.0017626
S. Mil Cap	0.0118413	0.0214867	0.55	0.582	-0.030272	0.0539545
S. Mil Cap^2	0.001161	0.0089485	0.13	0.897	-0.0163777	0.0186997
R. Admin Cap	0.7681239	0.1193531	6.44	0	0.5341962	1.002052
R. Admin Cap^2	2.168503	1.142572	1.9	0.058	-0.0708972	4.407902
R. Mil Cap	-0.767497	0.0890651	-8.62	0	-0.9420613	-0.5929326
R. Mil Cap^2	0.5471043	0.1065875	5.13	0	0.3381966	0.7560119
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0485511	0.0180175	-2.69	0.007	-0.0838649	-0.0132374
Coercion^2	-0.0116769	0.0067909	-1.72	0.086	-0.0249868	0.0016331
S. Admin Cap	0.0008234	0.0040908	0.2	0.84	-0.0071945	0.0088413
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0024188	0.0009677	2.5	0.012	0.0005221	0.0043154
S. Mil Cap	-0.0116738	0.0103529	-1.13	0.259	-0.0319651	0.0086176
S. Mil Cap^2	0.0019072	0.0041939	0.45	0.649	-0.0063126	0.0101271
R. Admin Cap	-0.1548456	0.0616562	-2.51	0.012	-0.2756896	-0.0340016
R. Admin Cap^2	-0.4184272	0.5967427	-0.7	0.483	-1.588021	0.7511669
R. Mil Cap	0.0823535	0.0447259	1.84	0.066	-0.0053076	0.1700146
R. Mil Cap^2	-0.0826547	0.0555669	-1.49	0.137	-0.1915638	0.0262544

**Standard error calculated using Delta method.*

As seen in Figure 6.4, the effect of coercion on different types of campaigns not only varies by type of campaign, but also by the level of coercion. At a 95% confidence level, coercion does not appear to have a substantive effect on the choice of terrorist or insurgent campaign.

Figure 6.4 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion, Model 1



However, while the overall effect of increased coercion is a decreased probability for a civil war campaign, as coercion increases from about the 35th percentile to the 90th percentile, this dampening effect appears to lessen as coercion increases. The effect of coercion has an almost opposite effect on the choice of no campaign; as coercion increases from the 10th to the 35th percentile, the probability of no campaign decreases while still remaining above zero.

Figure 6.5 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion^2, Model 1



As seen in Figure 6.5, the average marginal effects of the squared coercion variable are not substantively significant for terrorist, insurgent, or no campaign. For civil war campaigns, an increase in the squared coercion variable from the 80th percentile and up has a slight negative effect on the probability of a civil war campaign.

Figure 6.6 Predicted Probabilities of State Administrative Capacity, Model 1



Figure 6.6 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of state administrative capacity. These are not significant for terrorist or civil war campaigns. For insurgent campaigns, the average marginal effect of state administrative capacity is positive and surprisingly stable; state administrative capacity, at any level, increases the probability of an insurgent campaign by about 0.025. Similarly, the average marginal effect of state administrative capacity on the probability of no campaign is negative and stable; state administrative capacity, at any level, decreases the probability of no campaign by about 0.025.

Figure 6.7 Predicted Probabilities of State Administrative Capacity^2, Model 1



Figure 6.7 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared state administrative capacity variable. There is no significant effect for terrorist, insurgent, or no campaign. The average marginal effect of the squared state

administrative capacity variable on the probability of a civil war campaign, however, is significant from about the 10th percentile to the 85th percentile. This effect is positive; as the square of state administrative capacity increases, the probability of a civil war campaign increases slightly, from about 0.002 to 0.003.

Figure 6.8 Predicted Probabilities of State Military Capacity, Model 1



Figure 6.8 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of state military capacity. These effects are not significant for insurgent, civil war, or no campaign. The average marginal effect of the state military capacity variable on the probability of a terrorist campaign, however, is significant from about the 10th percentile to the 25th percentile. Within this percentile range, an increase in state military capacity slightly increases the probability of a terrorist campaign.

Figure 6.9 Predicted Probabilities of State Military Capacity^2, Model 1



Figure 6.9 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared state military capacity variable. As with Figure 6.8, these effects are not significant for insurgent, civil war, or no campaign. The average marginal effect of the squared state military capacity variable on the probability of a terrorist campaign, however, is significant above the 80th percentile. In this case, the effect is negative; as the square of state military capacity increases, the probability of a terrorist campaign, though negative, increases slightly, from about -0.003 to -0.002.

Figure 6.10 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Administrative Capacity, Model 1



Figure 6.10 showcases a number of interesting effects. For a terrorist campaign, the average marginal effect of an increase in rebel capacity, from the 55th percentile through the 90th percentile, while negative overall, decreases as rebel administrative capacity increases. For insurgent campaigns, the effect of rebel administrative capacity is

positive and stable; any amount of rebel administrative capacity appears to increase the probability of an insurgent campaign to about 0.8. For civil war campaigns, the effect of rebel administrative capacity is similar to that of terrorist campaigns; the relationship is negative overall, but decreases as rebel administrative capacity increases, from about the 35th percentile on. For the choice of no campaign, the effect of rebel administrative capacity decreases from about -0.4 at the 10th percentile to -0.6 at the 90th percentile.

Figure 6.11 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Administrative Capacity^2, Model 1



Figure 6.11 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared rebel administrative capacity variable. None of the average marginal effects displayed are significant for any of the campaign types.

Figure 6.12 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military Capacity, Model 1



Figure 6.12 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of rebel military capacity. As rebel military capacity increases from about the 10th percentile to the 40th percentile, there is a slight increased probability of civil war campaign, though this effect becomes insignificant at a 95% confidence level after the 40th percentile. The average marginal effects for insurgent and no campaigns both demonstrate an interesting shape, as they veer sharply at about the 80th percentile. As rebel military capacity increases, the probability of an insurgent campaign remains at about -0.8 until the 80th percentile; above the 80th percentile, the probability of an insurgent campaign, while still negative, increases from about -0.8 to about -0.3. Similarly, as rebel military capacity increases, the probability of no campaign remains at about 0.8 until the 80th percentile; above the 80th percentile, the probability of no campaign decreases to about 0.3. There appear to be no significant effects displayed for terrorist campaigns.

Figure 6.13 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military Capacity^2 , Model 1



Figure 6.13, displays the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared rebel military capacity variable. The squared rebel military capacity variable has a positive relationship to the probability of an insurgent campaign. This probability remains at about 0.5 up to the 80th percentile, and then drops to about 0.4 at the 90th percentile. The effect of the squared rebel military capacity variable on no campaign is also fairly flat; the probability on no campaign remains around -0.5 across the percentiles. There is no significant effect from the squared rebel military capacity variable on terrorist or civil war campaigns.

The estimations from Model 1, the base model for all campaign years, can also be compared to the estimations from Model 2, the full model for all campaign years. Table 6.9 and Figures 6.14 through 6.23, which describe Model 2, are reviewed in the following paragraphs.

Table 6.9 Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 2

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: No Active Campaign						
Coercion	0.0188319	0.0325083	0.58	0.562	-0.0448833	0.0825471
Coercion^2	0.0016491	0.0139638	0.12	0.906	-0.0257195	0.0290176
S. Admin Cap	-0.033325	0.0137855	-2.42	0.016	-0.060344	-0.0063059
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.0033573	0.0028329	-1.19	0.236	-0.0089096	0.0021951
S. Mil Cap	-0.0430282	0.0272948	-1.58	0.115	-0.0965251	0.0104686
S. Mil Cap^2	0.0144286	0.0109853	1.31	0.189	-0.0071022	0.0359594
R. Admin Cap	-0.3099567	0.2511058	-1.23	0.217	-0.8021149	0.1822016
R. Admin Cap^2	-4.411191	1.479972	-2.98	0.003	-7.311882	-1.510499
R. Mil Cap	1.022612	0.211675	4.83	0.000	0.6077364	1.437487
R. Mil Cap^2	0.4868982	0.8028646	0.61	0.544	-1.086687	2.060484
Ethnic F.	-0.0174559	0.1177179	-0.15	0.882	-0.2481789	0.213267
Linguistic F.	-0.3873567	0.0845421	-4.58	0.000	-0.5530562	-0.2216571
Religious F.	0.243931	0.0763021	3.2	0.001	0.0943817	0.3934803
Pop. Density	-0.0002278	0.0001854	-1.23	0.219	-0.0005911	0.0001355
Polyarchy	0.0030424	0.0025895	1.17	0.24	-0.0020328	0.0081177
GDP**	-0.0132124	0.0234634	-0.56	0.573	-0.0591998	0.032775
Mountain T.	-0.0017949	0.0007444	-2.41	0.016	-0.003254	-0.0003358
Forest T.	-0.0015018	0.0010514	-1.43	0.153	-0.0035626	0.000559
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
Coercion	0.0233339	0.0104105	2.24	0.025	0.0029297	0.0437381
Coercion^2	0.0090176	0.003942	2.29	0.022	0.0012915	0.0167437
S. Admin Cap	-0.0048	0.0033783	-1.42	0.155	-0.0114214	0.0018214
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.000427	0.0005967	-0.72	0.474	-0.0015966	0.0007425
S. Mil Cap	0.0123955	0.0105447	1.18	0.24	-0.0082717	0.0330627
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0077904	0.0042514	-1.83	0.067	-0.016123	0.0005422
R. Admin Cap	-0.1666814	0.0808973	-2.06	0.039	-0.3252373	-0.0081256
R. Admin Cap^2	0.7073553	0.4375282	1.62	0.106	-0.1501842	1.564895
R. Mil Cap	-0.940486	0.4396646	-2.14	0.032	-1.802213	-0.0787591
R. Mil Cap^2	-2.262237	1.799335	-1.26	0.209	-5.788868	1.264394
Ethnic F.	0.0280214	0.0423647	0.66	0.508	-0.0550118	0.1110546
Linguistic F.	-0.0262756	0.0287305	-0.91	0.36	-0.0825864	0.0300352
Religious F.	0.0544122	0.0241821	2.25	0.024	0.0070161	0.1018082
Pop. Density	0.000079	0.0000402	1.96	0.05	0.00000009.28	0.0001578
Polyarchy	0.0014795	0.0007973	1.86	0.064	-0.0000832	0.0030422

Table 6.9 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 2

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
GDP**	-0.0073382	0.0068822	-1.07	0.286	-0.020827	0.0061507
Mountain T.	0.0000924	0.0002549	0.36	0.717	-0.0004071	0.0005919
Forest T.	0.000372	0.0003153	1.18	0.238	-0.000246	0.00099
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0149859	0.0325632	-0.46	0.645	-0.0788087	0.0488369
Coercion^2	-0.0044841	0.0140561	-0.32	0.75	-0.0320336	0.0230653
S. Admin Cap	0.0321434	0.013535	2.37	0.018	0.0056154	0.0586715
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0012942	0.0027555	0.47	0.639	-0.0041065	0.0066949
S. Mil Cap	0.0189517	0.0276001	0.69	0.492	-0.0351435	0.0730469
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0010067	0.0112135	-0.09	0.928	-0.0229848	0.0209713
R. Admin Cap	0.9906637	0.2435088	4.07	0.000	0.5133952	1.467932
R. Admin Cap^2	2.549973	1.450534	1.76	0.079	-0.29302	5.392967
R. Mil Cap	-0.2815664	0.2321255	-1.21	0.225	-0.7365241	0.1733912
R. Mil Cap^2	1.65574	0.8660116	1.91	0.056	-0.041612	3.353091
Ethnic F.	-0.1124525	0.117088	-0.96	0.337	-0.3419407	0.1170357
Linguistic F.	0.4491257	0.0840059	5.35	0.000	0.2844772	0.6137743
Religious F.	-0.2462365	0.0779422	-3.16	0.002	-0.3990004	-0.0934726
Pop. Density	-0.0000323	0.0001987	-0.16	0.871	-0.0004218	0.0003572
Polyarchy	-0.0038803	0.0026028	-1.49	0.136	-0.0089817	0.001221
GDP**	0.0566711	0.0224278	2.53	0.012	0.0127134	0.1006288
Mountain T.	0.0015264	0.0007476	2.04	0.041	0.0000612	0.0029917
Forest T.	-0.0003856	0.0010497	-0.37	0.713	-0.0024431	0.0016718
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0271798	0.0212097	-1.28	0.2	-0.06875	0.0143904
Coercion^2	-0.0061825	0.0085836	-0.72	0.471	-0.023006	0.010641
S. Admin Cap	0.0059815	0.0060352	0.99	0.322	-0.0058473	0.0178103
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0024901	0.0013904	1.79	0.073	-0.0002351	0.0052153
S. Mil Cap	0.011681	0.0152872	0.76	0.445	-0.0182815	0.0416434
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0056315	0.0059576	-0.95	0.345	-0.0173081	0.0060451
R. Admin Cap	-0.5140239	0.1205735	-4.26	0.000	-0.7503436	-0.2777042
R. Admin Cap^2	1.153855	0.6348171	1.82	0.069	-0.0903633	2.398074
R. Mil Cap	0.1994407	0.0589246	3.38	0.001	0.0839506	0.3149307
R. Mil Cap^2	0.1195991	0.184446	0.65	0.517	-0.2419084	0.4811065
Ethnic F.	0.1018866	0.0602121	1.69	0.091	-0.0161269	0.2199002

Table 6.9 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 2

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Linguistic F.	-0.0354935	0.0438125	-0.81	0.418	-0.1213644	0.0503774
Religious F.	-0.0521063	0.0323124	-1.61	0.107	-0.1154375	0.0112249
Pop. Density	0.0001811	0.0000834	2.17	0.03	0.0000177	0.0003446
Polyarchy	-0.0006416	0.0011563	-0.55	0.579	-0.0029079	0.0016247
GDP**	-0.0361204	0.0109076	-3.31	0.001	-0.0574988	-0.014742
Mountain T.	0.0001761	0.0003313	0.53	0.595	-0.0004732	0.0008254
Forest T.	0.0015153	0.0004554	3.33	0.001	0.0006228	0.0024079

**Standard error calculated using Delta method.*

Figure 6.14 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion, Model 2



As seen in Figure 6.14, the average marginal effect of increasing levels of coercion, from the 10th to the 35th percentile, is and increasing probability of the choice of a terrorist campaign, though the increase in probability is very slight, perhaps 0.01. High levels of coercion, above the 75th percentile, have a negative effect on the probability of a civil war campaign choice, though again this is very slight, perhaps -0.01. Coercion does not appear to have a significant effect on the choice of insurgent or no campaign.

Figure 6.15 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion^2, Model 2



Figure 6.15 shows the average marginal effects of the squared coercion variable, which is not substantively significant for insurgent, civil war, or no campaign. For terrorist campaigns, an increase in the squared coercion variable up to the 45th percentile has a slight positive effect on the probability of a terrorist campaign.

Figure 6.16 Predicted Probabilities of State Administrative Capacity, Model 2



Figure 6.16 provides the effects of state administrative capacity. For insurgent campaigns, the average marginal effect of state administrative capacity is positive and surprisingly stable; state administrative capacity, at any level, increases the probability of an insurgent campaign by about 0.035. Similarly, the average marginal effect of state administrative capacity on the probability of no campaign is negative and stable; state administrative capacity, at any level, decreases the probability of no campaign by about 0.025. There are not significant effects for terrorist or civil war campaigns.

Figure 6.17 Predicted Probabilities of State Administrative Capacity^2, Model 2



Figure 6.17 shows the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared state administrative capacity variable. The average marginal effect of the squared state administrative capacity variable on the probability of a civil war campaign is significant up to the 45th percentile; as squared state administrative capacity increases, the probability of a civil war campaign is stable and positive, at about 0.0025. The effects of the squared state administrative capacity variable are not significant for terrorist, insurgent, or no campaign choices.

Figure 6.18 Predicted Probabilities of State Military Capacity, Model 2



Figure 6.18 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of state military capacity. None of the average marginal effects displayed appear to be significant for any of the campaign types.

Figure 6.19 Predicted Probabilities of State Military Capacity^2, Model 2



Figure 6.19 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared state military capacity variable. As with Figure 6.18, these effects are not significant for any campaign type.

Figure 6.20 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Administrative Capacity, Model 2



Figure 6.20 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the rebel administrative capacity variable. For terrorist campaigns, rebel administrative capacity between about the 60th and 80th percentiles is barely significant at the 95% confidence level; between these percentiles, as rebel administrative capacity increases, the probability of a terrorist campaign is slightly below zero. For insurgent campaigns, as rebel administrative capacity increases, there is a corresponding slight decrease in the probability of an insurgent campaign; at the 10th percentile of rebel administrative capacity, the probability of an

insurgent campaign is at about 1, at the 90th percentile, the probability has decreased to about 0.8. Rebel administrative capacity, at any level, decreases the probability of a civil war campaign; at the 10th percentile this probability is at about -1, and decreases linearly to the 90th percentile, where this probability is at about -0.2. For the choice of no campaign, an increase in rebel administrative capacity above the 80th percentile has a slight negative effect on the probability of a civil war campaign; at the 80th percentile, the probability of no campaign is at about -0.5, and at the 90th percentile, this probability has decreased to about -0.6.

Figure 6.21 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Administrative Capacity^2, Model 2



Figure 6.21 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared state administrative capacity variable. The average marginal effect of the squared rebel administrative capacity variable on the probability of a terrorist campaign is slightly significant only around the 10th percentile; at this percentile, the probability of a terrorist campaign is about 1. Similarly, the average marginal effect of the squared rebel administrative capacity variable on the probability of a civil war campaign is slightly significant only around the 10th percentile; at this percentile, the probability of a terrorist campaign is about 2. There appears to be no significant effect for insurgent campaigns.

Figure 6.22 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military Capacity, Model 2



Figure 6.22 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of rebel military capacity. The effect of weaker rebel military capacity, up to the 30th percentile, has a negative effect on the probability of a terrorist campaign, with a probability at the 10th percentile of about -4, increasing slightly to the 30th percentile, with a probability of about -3.5. For insurgent campaigns, the effect of increasing rebel military capacity, above the 50th percentile, has a negative effect on the probability of an insurgent campaign, though this effect decreases slightly, from about -1 at the 50th percentile to about -0.5 at the 90th percentile. Rebel military capacity has a significant effect on the probability of a civil war campaign up to the 45th percentile; this effect is slightly positive and stable. Rebel military capacity has a positive, significant effect on the probability of a choice of no campaign up to about the 85th percentile. However, this probability decreases as rebel military capacity increases; at the 10th percentile, the effect of rebel military capacity on the probability of no campaign is at about 3, decreasing to a probability of about 0 at the 85th percentile.

Figure 6.23 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military Capacity^2, Model 2



As seen in Figure 6.23, none of the average marginal effects for the square of military capacity, displayed above, are significant for any of the campaign types.

Having finished with the two models that provide estimates for all campaign years, this chapter now turns to the estimates from the onset model, Model 3. Table 6.10 and Figures 6.24 through 6.33, which describe Model 3, are reviewed in the following paragraphs. While Models 1 and 2 can be compared to each other to see the effect of the addition of the control variables to the model, unfortunately Model 4, the full onset model, did not converge during estimation; therefore, no comparison between the base and full onset models is possible.

Table 6.10 Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 3

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: No Active Campaign						
Coercion	0.0231084	0.0178482	1.29	0.195	-0.0118733	0.0580902
Coercion^2	0.0134276	0.0077535	1.73	0.083	-0.0017689	0.0286241
S. Admin Cap	0.0241312	0.0147147	1.64	0.101	-0.0047091	0.0529716
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0034907	0.0022721	1.54	0.124	-0.0009624	0.0079439
S. Mil Cap	-0.0039063	0.0107736	-0.36	0.717	-0.0250223	0.0172096
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0030962	0.0044442	-0.7	0.486	-0.0118066	0.0056143
R. Admin Cap	-0.152167	0.0940863	-1.62	0.106	-0.3365727	0.0322388
R. Admin Cap^2	0.0348781	0.7866925	0.04	0.965	-1.507011	1.576767
R. Mil Cap	-0.1251527	0.0508383	-2.46	0.014	-0.2247939	-0.0255115
R. Mil Cap^2	0.2999212	0.0999873	3	0.003	0.1039497	0.4958928
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0115249	0.0080743	-1.43	0.153	-0.0273502	0.0043004
Coercion^2	-0.0070264	0.0043019	-1.63	0.102	-0.015458	0.0014052
S. Admin Cap	0.0016927	0.0009631	1.76	0.079	-0.0001951	0.0035804
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0004438	0.0002516	1.76	0.078	-0.0000493	0.000937
S. Mil Cap	0.0062161	0.005928	1.05	0.294	-0.0054025	0.0178347
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0001834	0.001396	-0.13	0.895	-0.0029195	0.0025527
R. Admin Cap	-0.0586977	0.0794515	-0.74	0.46	-0.2144198	0.0970244
R. Admin Cap^2	-0.2495478	0.5322182	-0.47	0.639	-1.292676	0.7935807
R. Mil Cap	0.0046822	0.0116661	0.4	0.688	-0.018183	0.0275474
R. Mil Cap^2	0.0013667	0.0136057	0.1	0.92	-0.0253	0.0280334
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0097842	0.0159361	-0.61	0.539	-0.0410185	0.02145
Coercion^2	-0.0044193	0.0065168	-0.68	0.498	-0.0171921	0.0083534
S. Admin Cap	0.0047159	0.0060786	0.78	0.438	-0.0071979	0.0166296
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0006259	0.0011334	0.55	0.581	-0.0015956	0.0028474
S. Mil Cap	-0.0022983	0.0090823	-0.25	0.8	-0.0200992	0.0155026
S. Mil Cap^2	0.005395	0.0040619	1.33	0.184	-0.0025661	0.0133561
R. Admin Cap	0.2195839	0.0660113	3.33	0.001	0.0902041	0.3489636
R. Admin Cap^2	0.0079237	0.6206202	0.01	0.99	-1.20847	1.224317
R. Mil Cap	0.1106941	0.0498577	2.22	0.026	0.0129748	0.2084134
R. Mil Cap^2	-0.2942497	0.1001837	-2.94	0.003	-0.4906061	-0.0978934

Table 6.10 (cont.) Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 3

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0017562	0.0033071	-0.53	0.595	-0.008238	0.0047257
Coercion^2	-0.0019529	0.0017051	-1.15	0.252	-0.0052949	0.0013891
S. Admin Cap	-0.0304494	0.0153404	-1.98	0.047	-0.060516	-0.0003827
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.0045476	0.0022641	-2.01	0.045	-0.0089851	-0.0001101
S. Mil Cap	-0.0000312	0.0029423	-0.01	0.992	-0.0057981	0.0057356
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0021085	0.0015008	-1.4	0.16	-0.00505	0.0008329
R. Admin Cap	-0.0085164	0.008829	-0.96	0.335	-0.025821	0.0087882
R. Admin Cap^2	0.2068943	0.1117762	1.85	0.064	-0.012183	0.4259716
R. Mil Cap	0.0097242	0.0053615	1.81	0.07	-0.0007842	0.0202326
R. Mil Cap^2	-0.0070036	0.0060884	-1.15	0.25	-0.0189366	0.0049295

**Standard error calculated using Delta method.*

Figure 6.24 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion, Model 3



Figure 6.24 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of coercion. None of the average marginal effects displayed are significant for any of the campaign types.

Figure 6.25 Predicted Probabilities of Coercion^2, Model 3



Figure 6.25 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared coercion variable; these effects are not substantively significant for terrorist, insurgent, or civil war campaign choice. For the choice of no campaign, the effect of squared coercion variable is significant up to the 20th percentile; up to this percentile, increases in the squared coercion variable are positive, though they decrease slightly, from a probability of about 0.11 at the 10th percentile to a probability of about 0.10 at the 20th percentile.

Figure 6.26 Predicted Probabilities of State Administrative Capacity, Model 3



Figure 6.26 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of state administrative capacity. These are not significant for terrorist or insurgent campaigns. For civil war campaigns, while the overall effect on probability is negative, the average marginal effect of state administrative capacity displays an interesting pattern. As state

administrative capacity increases, up to the 20th percentile, the probability of a civil war campaign decreases, though only slightly. From the 20th to the 40th percentile, as state administrative capacity increases there is a more marked decrease in the probability of a civil war campaign, from a probability of about -0.2 at the 20th percentile to a probability of about -0.5 at the 40th percentile. Then, at the 40th percentile, the probability starts to head back closer to zero; at the 50th percentile of state administrative capacity, the probability of a civil war campaign is at about -0.05. The average marginal effects of state administrative capacity are also interesting for the choice of no campaign; these effects demonstrate two humps, one which ranges between the 1st percentile, at about a 0.1 probability, up to the 40th percentile, at about at 0.4 probability, and then back down to zero (and a lack of significance at the 95% confidence level) at the 50th percentile. Between the 50th and 70th percentile, there is another hump; peaking at the 60th percentile with a probability of about 0.1.

Figure 6.27 Predicted Probabilities of State Administrative Capacity², Model 3



As seen in Figure 6.27, the average marginal effects of the squared state administrative capacity variable not significant for terrorist or insurgent campaigns. For civil war campaigns, the average marginal effect of the squared state administrative capacity variable is negative and significant. The effect of the squared state

administrative capacity variable increases from a probability of about -0.03 at the 10th percentile to a probability of about -0.002 at the 90th percentile. For the choice of no campaign, the effect of the state administrative capacity variable is positive and significant up to the 85th percentile. The effect of the squared state administrative capacity variable decreases from a probability of about 0.03 at the 10th percentile to a probability of about 0.01 at the 85th percentile.

Figure 6.28 Predicted Probabilities of State Military Capacity, Model 3



Figure 6.28 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the state military capacity variable; there is no significant effect for any campaign type.

Figure 6.29 Predicted Probabilities of State Military Capacity^2, Model 3



Figure 6.29 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared state military capacity variable. These effects are not significant for any of the campaign choices.

Figure 6.30 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Administrative Capacity, Model 3



Figure 6.30 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the rebel administrative capacity variable. These effects are not significant for terrorist, civil war, or no campaign choices. For insurgent campaigns, the effects of rebel administrative capacity are positive, and the probability of an insurgent campaign increases slightly as rebel administrative capacity increases, from a probability of about 0.2 at the 10th percentile, to about 0.4 at the 90th percentile.

Figure 6.31 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Administrative Capacity^2, Model 3



Figure 6.31 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared rebel administrative capacity variable. None of the average marginal effects displayed are significant for any of the campaign types.

Figure 6.32 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military Capacity, Model 3



Figure 6.32 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of rebel military capacity. There appear to be no significant effects for terrorist or civil war campaigns. For insurgent campaigns, the effect of rebel military capacity is significant at the 95% confidence level up to about the 45th percentile. This effect is positive and flat; up to the 40th percentile, increases in rebel military capacity increase the probability of an insurgent campaign by about 0.1.

Figure 6.33 Predicted Probabilities of Rebel Military Capacity^2, Model 3



Finally, Figure 6.33 provides the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the squared rebel military capacity variable. As with Figure 6.32, there appear to be no significant effects for terrorist or civil war campaigns. For insurgent campaigns, as the squared rebel military capacity variable increases, the probability of an insurgent campaign, though always negative, rises from about -0.4 at the 10th percentile to about -0.1 at the 90th percentile. Conversely, for the choice of no campaign, which is positive and significant, the probability of no campaign decreases from about 0.4 at the 10th percentile to about 0.1 at the 90th percentile.

Discussion and Analysis

Coercion

Hypothesis 1 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at low or high levels; this is supported by the results of Model 2, but not Model 1. This finding suggests that the control variables are playing a role in determining when the squared coercion variable is significant.[83] Further, there appears to be some baseline requirement for ongoing

[83] The only significant contributing control variable in Model 2 is population density; this is an intriguing finding, as Newman (2006, 758-759) specifically examines the relationship of population density (and the related factors of

coercive action by the state, as there is also support in both Models 1 and 2 for a positive linear relationship between the probability of a terrorist campaign and overall levels of state coercion. This intuitively makes sense in terms of the general requirement that rebels, as defined above, are seeking to change in some way the political behavior of the state; such change can infer some level of grievance.

In terms of the size of the effect of the significant variables, an increase in one unit of coercion leads to a corresponding 1.9 percent (Model 1) or 2.3 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign as the means address its grievances. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, coercion appears to have a significant effect as it increases from low to intermediate levels in Model 2, but is not significant in any decile in Model 1. An increase in one unit of the squared coercion variable leads to a corresponding 0.5 percent (Model 1) or 0.2 percent increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, coercion appears to have a significant effect as it increases from low to intermediate levels in Model 2. The overall effect of both the linear and quadratic versions of the coercion variable on terrorist campaigns appears to be minimal.

Hypothesis 2 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is at intermediate levels. However, based on the data analyzed here, the level of coercion does not appear to matter much for insurgent campaign choice; coercion and the square of coercion are not significant across any of the models. The results of the models appear to suggest that, overall, the level of state coercion is simply not that important to the choice of insurgent campaign.

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urbanization and age of population) and finds 'no clear correlation' between these variables and terrorism. This suggests further research in this area may be warranted.

While this is an unexpected result, it may suggest that those variables that were significant in the model—state administrative capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity—may matter far more than any grievances caused by state coercion. This result would appear to support, and extend to insurgencies, the 'viability' argument that Collier and Hoeffler make about civil wars, i.e. that opportunity may matter more than grievances for such campaigns (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75), who argue that grievances, especially those caused by weak governments, may lead to rebel recruitment, also note that "conditions that favor insurgency" are not 'ethnic' or 'cultural' grievances. Perhaps what the models are showing, with the introduction of new, more micro-level data, is a clarification of exactly what those 'conditions' are, though even so the results do not entirely match those suggested by Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Hypothesis 3 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when coercion is high. The models tested here do not support this; in Model 1, if coercion increases, then the probability of rebels choosing a civil war campaign over no campaign decreases, ceteris paribus. Further, the squared coercion variable is negative and significant, suggesting that civil war campaigns are more likely at intermediate levels of coercion. Neither coercion variable is significant in Model 2. Again, this is a surprising result, given the predominance in civil war literature of ascribing higher levels of civil war incidence with higher levels of coercion (c.f. Regan and Norton 2005). Given that both coercion variables lose their significance in Model 2, this may suggest that the control variables included in that model are having some sort of intermediating effect; however, this still does not explain the distinct departure from most models of civil war. As with some of the results from the multinomial probit models of insurgent campaigns, the suggestion here may be that, in the 'greed versus grievance' debate, viability

matters more than grievances, though it is still surprising that grievances appear to matter not at all in the data analyzed here (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009).

In terms of the size of the effect of the significant variables, an increase in one unit of coercion leads to a corresponding 4.9 percent (Model 1) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a civil war campaign. For the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, coercion has a significant, slightly decreasing effect starting at the 35th percentile, in Model 1. An increase in one unit of the squared coercion variable leads to a corresponding 1.2 percent (Model 1) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a civil war campaign. For Model 1, in the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, the quadratic coercion variable has a significant effect, but only above the 80th percentile.

State Administrative Capacity

Hypothesis 4 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative capacity is at higher levels, however, both the regular and squared versions of this variable were not significant in either Model 1 or 2. While this result implies that state administrative capacity may not have any straightforward relationship with terrorism, perhaps instead, as discussed in Chapter 4, there are simply several simultaneous and potentially confounding factors that attenuate the relationship between state administrative capacity and the probability of a terrorist campaign.

Hypothesis 5 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative capacity is at lower levels. However, this is not supported by the results, for both Models 1 and 2 indicate that if state administrative capacity increases, then the probability of rebels choosing an insurgent campaign over no campaign also increases, ceteris paribus. Again, this is quite a surprising result, as the consensus among the scholarly literature would have

predicted the opposite relationship (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). This result may suggest that, instead of having a deterrent effect, increasing state administrative capacity in some way acts as an accelerant for insurgent campaigns, though the pathway for such a relationship has not been theorized in any literature reviewed in this research. Certainly, given this result, further research in this area is strongly suggested.

In terms of the size of the effect of the significant variables, an increase in one unit of state administrative capacity leads to a corresponding 2.7 percent (Model 1) or 3.3 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose an insurgent campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, state administrative capacity appears to have a very stable significant effect across the entire range of percentiles in Model 1 and Model 2. Thus, the overall effect of state administrative capacity on insurgent campaigns appears to be fairly strong, significant, and unchanging in its effect across percentiles.

Hypothesis 6 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state administrative capacity is at lower levels. This is not supported by the results in Models 1 and 2, which find instead that when state administrative capacity is at very high and very low levels the probability of civil war is higher, ceterus paribus. The incidence of higher levels of civil war when state capacity is at lower levels is not surprising, based on the extant literature. However, the incidence of higher levels of civil war when state capacity is at very high levels is unexpected and not explained by previous literature.[84] Perhaps civil war is more likely in states with high

[84] The polyarchy control variable is not significant in Model 2, so it is unlikely that the incidence of civil war in a state with high administrative capacity could be explained away by a highly efficient but very unpopular autocratic state.

levels of administrative capacity simply because rebels, if they are to combat such an administratively strong state at all, may have little choice but to engage in heated conflict.

An increase in one unit of the squared state administrative capacity variable leads to a corresponding 0.2 percent (Models 1 and 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a civil war campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, the quadratic state administrative capacity variable has a significant effect, but only in a mid range from the 10th to the 85th percentile in Model 1, and only up to the 45th percentile in Model 2. Therefore, the overall effect of the squared state administrative capacity on civil war campaigns, while slight, is significant, and the effect appears to be strongest in the mid range of percentiles.

State Military Capacity

Hypothesis 7 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at higher levels. As expected, Model 1 shows a significant relationship between state military capacity and the choice of a terrorist campaign; if state military capacity increases, then the probability of rebels choosing a terrorist campaign over no campaign also increases, ceteris paribus. The squared state military capacity variable, which was not hypothesized to have an effect, is significant in Model 2, and the relationship is negative. Therefore, something about the inclusion of the control variables changes the expression of the relationship between state military capacity and the probability of a terrorist campaign. Model 2 would imply that the probability of rebels choosing a terrorist campaign over no active campaign, decreases, ceteris paribus, at low and high levels of state military capacity, but increases at intermediate levels. The results from the models appear to counter the arguments of Hendrix and Young (2014) and Crenshaw (2007); perhaps these results tie into the argument about the relationship between coercion and terrorism, as military forces may be—or are perceived as—an instrument of

coercion (Crenshaw 1991), and therefore, the state military capacity variable may be capturing further coercive measures or the potential for such further measures, not captured by the coercion variable. If so, that would explain the similar, positive linear relationship that both coercion and state military capacity have with terrorist campaigns.

An increase in one unit of state military capacity leads to a corresponding 1.5 percent (Model 1) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, coercion appears to have a significant effect in low levels, from about the 10^{th} to the 25^{th} percentiles, in Model 1. An increase in one unit of the squared state military capacity variable leads to a corresponding 0.8 percent (Model 2) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, the effects of the quadratic do not appear to have a significant effect in Model 2. In sum, the overall effect of state military capacity on terrorist campaigns appears to be fairly minimal, though significant.

Hypothesis 8 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at intermediate levels. Neither state military capacity variable tested here is significant across any of the models; it does not appear that changes in the capacity of a state's military have a significant effect on the choice to undertake an insurgent campaign. As discussed in Chapter 4, while the expectation was that state military capacity would have an effect on insurgent campaign choice, overall, rebels may not be that concerned about state military capacity since they are more interested in avoiding than confronting state forces (Sepp 2005; Lyall and Wilson III 2009). While the state military capacity results do not support the hypothesis, the relatively minor effect of state military capacity on rebels undertaking an insurgent campaign does appear to be in line with extant literature.

Hypothesis 9 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when state military capacity is at lower levels. However, the state military capacity variable, and its squared version, are not significant across all models. This suggests that state military capacity has little overall effect on the decision by rebels to undertake a civil war campaign. This finding does not support Hypothesis 9, which suggested that there would be a negative linear relationship. One issue here may be that of the geographic dispersion of state military forces within a given state; rebels may focus their efforts against a specific part of the state's forces, which are deployed to a specific region, rather than attempt to face the entirety of the state's forces (Buhaug 2010). If such sub-state issues of troop placement versus rebel location are affecting rebel campaign calculations, then the overall strength of the state's military may well be insignificant (Mack 1975).

Rebel Administrative Capacity

Hypothesis 10 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at lower levels. For both rebel administrative capacity variables, the only significant relationships are in Model 2. For the full model, if rebel administrative capacity increases, then the probability of rebels choosing a terrorist campaign over no campaign decreases, ceteris paribus. This result supports Hypothesis 10. However, the model also found that, if the squared rebel administrative capacity variable increases, then the probability of rebels choosing a terrorist campaign over no campaign also increases, ceteris paribus, at low and high levels of rebel administrative capacity. While the low end of this relationship does not disagree with the hypothesis, the finding that high levels of rebel administrative capacity are linked to the choice of a terrorist campaign is less explainable. This may be explained by the methodology used in this project, where rebel capacity is split into two parts, administrative and military, and examined separately; the extant literature generally tends to combine them (Gray 2007; Wood

2014). This suggests that there may be more to rebel administration and its effect on campaign choice than previous literature would imply.

An increase in one unit of rebel administrative capacity leads to a corresponding 16.7 percent (Model 2) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, rebel administrative capacity appears to have a significant effect as it increases from mid to high levels in Model 2. An increase in one unit of the squared rebel administrative capacity variable leads to a corresponding 70.7 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, the quadratic rebel administrative capacity variable appears to have a significant effect at low levels in Model 2. The overall effect of rebel administrative capacity on terrorist campaigns is of a greater magnitude than that of coercion. The linear effect appears to be more pronounced as rebel administrative capacity is in its midpoint to high levels, while, conversely, the quadratic version of the variable is significant at low levels.

Hypothesis 11 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels. As hypothesized, if rebel administrative capacity increases, then the probability of rebels choosing an insurgent campaign over no campaign also increases, ceteris paribus. Though not hypothesized, the squared rebel administrative capacity variable also has a significant and positive relationship; the probability of rebels choosing an insurgent campaign over no campaign increases, ceteris paribus, at low and high levels of rebel administrative capacity. This implied nonlinear relationship does not support Fearon's (2008) claim that very large rebel groups will be less likely to pursue insurgent campaigns, but perhaps

instead lends support to arguments by Kilcullen (2010), Hendrix (2010), and Ahmad (1982) which argue that the *summum bonum* of insurgencies are the rebels' administrative capabilities.

An increase in one unit of rebel administrative capacity leads to a corresponding 76.8 percent (Model 1) or 99.1 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose an insurgent campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, rebel administrative capacity appears to have a stable significant effect across the entire range of percentiles in Model 1, and while it is also significant across the range of percentiles in Model 2, it has a slightly decreasing effect as rebel administrative capacity increases. An increase in one unit of the squared rebel administrative capacity variable leads to a corresponding 216.9 percent (Model 1) or 255.0 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose an insurgent campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, however, the squared rebel administrative capacity does not appear to be specifically significant in any decile in Model 1 or Model 2. The overall effect of rebel administrative capacity on insurgent campaigns appears to be quite strong in terms of magnitude, and significant in its effect across the range of percentiles. While the quadratic version of the variable has an even stronger effect, it does not appear to have the same significance across deciles.

Hypothesis 12 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels. Neither of the rebel administrative capacity variables are significant in Model 1, but both are significant in Model 2. For Model 2, if rebel administrative capacity increases, then the probability of rebels choosing a civil war campaign over no campaign decreases, ceteris paribus. This is the opposite of the hypothesized relationship. Model 2 also suggests that the probability of rebels choosing a civil war campaign over no campaign also increases, ceteris paribus, at low and high levels of rebel administrative

capacity. Again, the results here may point to sub-state level interactions and variations between rebel groups. Both Weinstein (2007) and Mampilly (2011) suggest that there are a variety of types of rebel group governance, presumably some of which are more or less bureaucratically capable than others. It may be that certain groups have a high administrative capacity, and are thus better able to successfully prosecute a civil war campaign. Conversely, some rebel groups may be more loosely organized, with several more or less independent groups organized around strong military leaders (who may even be competing with each other). Unfortunately, this is an issue where cross-national time series data is simply to scarce too determine if this is the case. However, the case studies presented in the following chapters provide examples of this type of issue occurring.[85]

An increase in one unit of rebel administrative capacity leads to a corresponding 51.4 percent (Model 2) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a civil war campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities in Model 2, rebel administrative capacity is significant across the entire percentile range, with a slight lessening of effect as capacity increases. An increase in one unit of the squared rebel administrative capacity leads to a corresponding 115.4 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a civil war campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, the quadratic rebel administrative capacity variable does not appear to have a significant effect across percentiles. While the overall effect of rebel administrative capacity on civil war campaigns appears to be fairly strong and significant across percentiles, the quadratic version, though it has a stronger magnitude of effect, does not appear to have the same significance across deciles.

[85] See the discussion of the Mau Mau organization in Chapter 7, and of Colonel Karuna of the LTTE in Chapter 8.

Rebel Military Capacity

Hypothesis 13 stated that terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at lower levels. Rebel military capacity, as hypothesized, has a significant negative linear relationship with the incidence of terrorist campaigns across both Model 1 and Model 2. For both models, if rebel military capacity increases, the probability of rebels choosing a terrorist campaign over no campaign decreases, ceteris paribus. As with the rebel administrative capacity variable, there is also an unanticipated relationship that appears in the model; the squared rebel military capacity variable is significant in Model 1, and the relationship is positive. This result would suggest that at low and high levels of rebel military capacity, the probability of rebels choosing a terrorist campaign over no campaign increases, ceteris paribus. While the probability of rebels selecting a terrorist campaign at low levels of their own military capacity is not controversial, the probability that rebels would select a terrorist campaign at high levels of military capacity is, as such a relationship is not supported by most of the extant literature.

An increase in one unit of rebel military capacity leads to a corresponding 11.3 percent (Model 1) or a 94 percent (Model 2) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, rebel military capacity does not appear to be specifically significant in Model 1, but does have a more concentrated effect in Model 2, as it increases from low to mid levels. Given the magnitude of the effect and the concentration of the effect to below about the 30^{th} percentile, it appears that there is a very strong negative effect on the likelihood of a terrorist campaign, but only as rebel military capacity rises from low to mid levels, after which the effect wears off. An increase in one unit of the squared rebel military capacity variable leads to a corresponding 8.4 percent (Model 1) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign. In the decile

breakdown of predicted probabilities, rebel military capacity appears to have no significant effect in Model 1. Thus, the overall effect of rebel military capacity appears to have a much stronger affect on rebel choice of terrorist campaign than that of the quadratic variable.

Hypothesis 14 stated that insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at intermediate levels; this is not supported by the data analyzed here. Instead, the models show, first, a negative, linear relationship between rebel military capacity and choice of insurgent campaign. While not as hypothesized, this is somewhat uncontroversial, as, if rebels are too strong militarily, they may switch preferences to a civil war campaign, which is in line with the discussion in earlier chapters and Gray's (2007, 246) claim that rebels will choose their fighting style based on military capacity. However, the negative linear relationship would also suggest that very militarily weak rebels would be very likely to pursue an insurgent campaign, which is not entirely in line with extant literature. However, what the model may be capturing here is the overriding importance of rebel administrative capacity; simply put, rebel administration may matter far more than rebel military strength when rebels choose to undertake an insurgent campaign.

Models 1 and 2 also show a positive nonlinear relationship between rebel military capacity and choice of insurgent campaign, which is the opposite of what Hypothesis 14 proposed. Rather than rebel groups choosing insurgent campaigns when they are intermediate levels of military capacity, the results would suggest that rebels are more likely to undertake insurgent campaigns when they are militarily very weak or very strong. This result is not in line with extant literature, and, again, it may suggest that there is some sort of intermediating effect between rebel administrative capacity and rebel military capacity.

An increase in one unit of rebel military capacity leads to a corresponding 76.7 percent (Model 1) or 28.2 percent (Model 2) decrease in the chance that a rebel group will choose an insurgent campaign. For the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities in Model 1, rebel military capacity has a slight significant effect as it increases from low to high levels, and then the effect becomes sharply stronger in the high ranges, above the 80th percentile. In Model 2, rebel military capacity is significant from the mid to high percentiles, but the effect does not share the dramatic shift in slope of Model 1, though there is a clear shift to significance right around the 50th percentile. An increase in one unit of the squared rebel military capacity variable leads to a corresponding 54.7 percent (Model 1) or 165.6 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose an insurgent campaign. In the decile breakdown of predicted probabilities, the quadratic rebel military capacity variable has a significant effect across the percentiles, but with a slight drop off above the 80th percentile in Model 1. In the decile breakdown for Model 2, the effects of the quadratic do not appear to have a significant effect.

Hypothesis 15 stated that civil war campaigns are more likely to occur when rebel military capacity is at high levels. This was not supported; neither of the rebel military capacity variables was significant in the models. Therefore, there is no support for the hypothesized positive linear relationship between rebel military capacity and the incidence of civil war. This null result may be due to the same reason that there is no support for the hypothesized negative linear relationship between state military capacity and the incidence of civil war; simply, rebel-state military comparisons and calculations may be driven by sub-state geographic location rather than state-wide total military capacity (Buhaug 2010).

Campaign Onset

Hypothesis 16 stated that the onset year of any given rebel campaign type will have a stronger positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that same type of rebel campaign. However, this claim was not supported, given the null results for coercion from Model 3 presented in Table 6.10 and Figure 6.24. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter does not support Hypothesis 16, as coercion does not appear to have a significant effect, much less an effect of greater magnitude, in the onset of any type of campaign. While statistical analysis of the data here does not support this hypothesis, the case studies in the following chapters also examine the role of coercion prior to the onset of a violent sub-state political campaign, and do appear to offer some support for the hypothesis.

Broken down by campaign type, when looking at the average marginal effects across incidence models, an increase in one unit of coercion leads to: a corresponding 1.9 percent (Model 1) or 2.3 percent (Model 2) increase in the chance that a rebel group will choose a terrorist campaign; a not significant response for insurgent campaigns for either model; and a corresponding 4.9 percent chance (Model 1) or a not significant response (Model 2) for civil war campaigns. Unfortunately, the overall average marginal effect of coercion on any type of campaign, as seen in Table 6.10, is not significant across all campaign types; therefore, there is no way to compare the effect of coercion between the onset model and the incidence models. Figures 6.4, 6.14, and 6.24 provide predicted probabilities of coercion at deciles. Very little of the coercion graphed in these models is significant. In Figure 6.4 (Model 1), there is a slight decreased probability of a civil war campaign as coercion increases from about the 35th percentile to the 90th percentile. Figure 6.14 shows a slight increase in the probability of a terrorist campaign as coercion increases from about the 10th to 35th percentile, and a slight

decrease in the probability of a civil war campaign as coercion increases above the 75th percentile. Figure 6.24 (Model 3) does not show any significant relationship for any decile of coercion.

One of the more interesting results from the multinomial probit models are the differences in the directionality of the relationships between onset years and all years. For terrorist campaigns, coercion had a positive linear relationship over all years, but a negative linear relationship in onset years. Further, the squared coercion variable had a positive sign in Model 2, but a negative sign in Model 3. This change in the direction of the relationship implies that there are different mechanisms at work in terms of the relationship between coercion and terrorist campaign onset and incidence. For insurgent and civil war campaigns, there is a significant relationship between coercion and overall incidence, but neither type of campaign has a significant relationship between coercion and onset. Again, this difference between models suggests that different processes, or at least variations on the same process, are operating prior to, versus within, an ongoing conflict. While the overall hypothesis on the effect of coercion does not appear to be supported, these results suggest that more research is needed to understand what difference exits between onset and incidence processes of violent sub-state political campaigns.

Campaign Choice

In addition, when looking at the overall results of the predicted probabilities of the models, Models 1 and 2 suggest that, once a conflict is underway, the most likely campaign choice, by far, is insurgent. However, Model 3 suggests that the choice of campaign at the start of an episode of intrastate conflict is far less differentiated. Instead of a difference between a predicted probability of about 0.02 for a terrorist campaign and the much higher predicted probability of about 0.40 for an insurgent campaign, at the onset of a conflict, the predicted

probability for a terrorist campaign at less than 0.01 compares to a predicted probability of an insurgent campaign at 0.06.

As predicted, a higher incidence of terrorist campaigns is more likely when coercion is at low or high levels; and when rebel administrative and military capacity is at lower levels. However, there also appears to be some nuances that the hypotheses missed, most notably the positive linear relationship between coercion and the incidence of terrorist campaigns, but also the negative quadratic relationship with state military capacity and the positive quadratic relationship with rebel administrative capacity. There appears to be no support from either model that state administrative capacity has any bearing on choice of terrorist campaign. In terms of magnitude of effect, most variables are modest, except for rebel administrative and military capacity; these variables appear to have a far greater influence on the choice of a terrorist campaign.

Insurgent campaigns were the most consistent of campaign types across the two models; all of the five significant relationships identified were the same across models. In addition to the positive linear relationship with rebel administrative capacity, the models also identified the following as significant: a positive linear relationship with state administrative capacity; a positive quadratic relationship with rebel administrative capacity; a negative linear relationship with rebel military capacity; and a positive quadratic relationship with rebel military capacity. There appears to be no support from either model that coercion or state military capacity has any bearing on the choice of an insurgent campaign. In terms of magnitude of effect, the state administrative capacity variables' effect was far more modest than that of the rebel administrative and rebel military capacity variables. Similar to the results for the terrorist

campaign, these variables appear to have a far greater influence on the choice of an insurgent campaign than any others proposed.

There was no direct support for the hypotheses concerning civil war. There were, however, some significant relationships between the predictor and outcome variables, though they were unexpected. The only variable that was significant across both models was the negative quadratic relationship between state administrative capacity and incidence of civil war campaigns. Coercion in both its negative linear and negative quadratic forms was significant in Model 1, and rebel administrative capacity in both its negative linear and positive quadratic forms was significant in Model 2. There appears to be no support from either model that state military capacity or rebel military capacity has any bearing on the choice of civil war campaign. In terms of magnitude of effect, coercion had a modest effect, state administrative capacity had a slight effect, and rebel administrative capacity had a far greater magnitude of effect on the choice of a civil war campaign.

Conclusion

While, as hypothesized, the variables of coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity were all, in various models, found to be significant predictors of sub-state violent campaign types, the relationships between those predictor variables were only rarely in the direction that extant research in the field would suggest. In fact, the multitude of ways in which the predictor variables did not follow what previous scholarly literature would suggest is perhaps one of the most intriguing findings in this chapter. For terrorist campaigns, neither model supported extant research which argues that state administrative capacity does have an effect on the choice of terrorist campaigns. Rather, the results of this chapter's model seem to suggest that rebel administrative and military capacity

may have more of an effect on rebel choices. Next, insurgent campaigns surprisingly appeared to not be affected by levels of coercion or of state military capacity. Finally, for civil war campaigns, none of this project's hypotheses—all of which were based on extant research—were supported.

Why do this project's models offer such contradictory findings to current research in the field? As discussed in the preceding chapters, in some instances, the partition of state capacity into bureaucratic and military capacity might confound prior research that examined state capacity only in an aggregated manner. Further, while quantitative data, especially on rebel groups, remains somewhat limited, research ignoring rebel capacity and focusing only on the state appears to be insufficient to explain rebel choices. Rebel capacity, both administrative and military, matters; to ignore it is to omit critical pieces of the puzzle. Perhaps one of the strongest findings of this chapter is that the magnitude of effect that rebel administrative and military capacity has on campaign choice often dwarfs other factors. While the processes by which rebel groups choose a specific campaign type definitely need to be subject to more research and testing, what this chapter has demonstrated is that rebel groups do appear to make choices as to what type of sub-state violent campaign to undertake based on the consideration of several factors, both of their opponent, the state, as well as their own capacity.

Overall, the relationship between these structural factors and the type of campaign rebel groups choose is intriguing, and it appears that there are clear, traceable differences between the expression of these factors and choice of campaign. However, the results of the empirical testing in this model suggest that further detail on how the campaign choice processes occur is needed. Therefore, in order to examine these processes in greater detail, the next two chapters assess the hypotheses via historical case studies of two different rebel groups. The examination of these

case studies of the Mau Mau in Kenya and the LTTE in Sri Lanka provide a different avenue of approach for evaluating this project's hypotheses.

Chapter 7 - Case Study: The Mau Mau

While Chapter 6 tested the breadth of applicability of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4 via statistical analysis, the following two chapters are focused on examining in depth how well the hypotheses serve to explain rebel campaign choices in a specific set of circumstances. This chapter examines the case of the Mau Mau in Kenya, and Chapter 8 examines the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. These two cases were chosen in an effort to look at conflicts that took place at different times and places. The Mau Mau rebellion was a colonial-era rebellion, focused on combatting a foreign superpower. Geographically, the rebels were isolated in one country in Africa. Conversely, Sri Lanka had already gained independence and was a post-colonial democratic state in South Asia. Rather than being isolated, the LTTE had ties to a large population of co-ethnics in southern India, as well as a global diaspora network. Therefore, these case studies provide instances of rebel group conflict in two variated geopolitical backdrops. However, there are also some similarities. Both conflicts did occur in nations which had experienced British colonial rule, and both occurred in the second half of twentieth century (though the LTTE conflict did extend into the twenty-first century).

The methodology used for examining these conflict histories is that of the structured, focused case study (George and Bennett 2005). Structured, focused case studies are used "to analyze phenomena… in ways that would draw the explanations of each case of a particular phenomenon into a broader, more complex theory" (George and Bennett 2005, 67). Since their goal is to yield cross-case knowledge, the methodology of structured focused case studies compliments this project's hypotheses, which also seek to identify broad themes that contribute to rebel choices, regardless of the country of the rebel. The primary requirements of this method are the use of a series of standardized questions across each study in order to facilitate

comparisons between cases, and a focus on a specific theoretical focus within the historical narrative (George and Bennett 2005, 60-70). The theoretical focus of this project's case studies flow from the hypotheses generated above; instead of a broad narrative, I am primarily concerned with how changes in the means of rebel groups changed the type of violence they carried out. In line with this focus, the three standardized research questions I will use are tied to the means outlined in Chapter 4, and are as follows:

- How did the coercive action of the state—and the way it changed over time—affect rebel campaign onset and occurrence?
- How did state administrative and military capacity—and the way it changed over time—affect rebel campaign onset and occurrence?
- How did rebel administrative and military capacity—and the way it changed over time—affect rebel campaign onset and occurrence?

While these structured questions shape the way in which historical inquiry was carried out, the results of this research are organized into four parts ; an introduction and a brief narrative of the rebel group's actions in the course of the conflict, a discussion and analysis of how coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity affected conflict onset, a similar discussion and analysis of how coercion and capacity affected changes in rebel campaign choice, and a summary of the implications of that case study to the overall arguments of this research project.

Overview: The Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya

The case of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya offers an historical example of the roles that coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity played in affecting rebel campaign choice. The Mau Mau rebels, primarily composed of members of the Kikuyu tribe, had some support from other

indigenous Kenyan tribes but were primarily on their own as they faced off against the colonial British administration which was backed up by the might—and military—of the British Empire.

The British Empire established the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, which became the Kenya Colony in 1920. In this colony, the agriculturally productive land of the Rift Valley and the Central Highlands were reserved for white ownership, and the farms there depended upon the indigenous labor force to work the land (Morgan 1963). This indigenous labor force was mainly comprised of the Kikuyu, and related Embu and Meru tribes.

The Kikuyu, one of the major ethnolinguistic groups in Kenya, comprised around 30 percent of Kenya's five million indigenous population (Barnett and Njama 1966, 24). They resisted British rule to a greater or lesser extent throughout this period, though this resistance, while occasionally violent, was not of a high intensity. In World War II, Kikuyu took part on the Allied side as members of the King's African Rifles; some scholars argue that participation in the Rifles led to a greater political consciousness among indigenous Kenyans (Brands 2005).

In Kenya after 1945, the Kikuyu (and the related Embu and Meru tribes) faced an increasingly dismal outlook. A quickly increasing population meant that the indigenous reservations in the Highlands were overcrowded, with land in extremely short supply. The poorest had no land and were forced to go elsewhere to find work. For those 'squatter' Kikuyu who were traditionally employed as laborers on the European farms, the increase in mechanized agricultural equipment replaced a great deal of the requirement for laborers. Those left without a job could either go back to the reservations, which offered little opportunity, or as with the poor from the reservations, could go to Nairobi to seek work, though the plentiful supply of labor in Nairobi meant that employers there could pay very little (Branch 2009, 5-8).

Also following World War II, a number of nationalist organizations arose, which sought a greater voice for indigenous Kenyans in the government of Kenya. The organization with the greatest prominence was the Kenyan African Union. Though the Union was an organization purporting to represent all indigenous Kenyans, it was dominated by members of the Kikuyu. The main policy goal of the Union was to increase indigenous land rights at the expense of white landowners via non-violent political pressure. When the Union failed to achieve any significant success, indigenous support shifted to more militant and radical individuals and organizations (Berman 1991).

As a resistance organization, the Mau Mau in its proto-form started sometime between 1943 to 1945. Though drawn predominantly from the Kikuyu tribe, the Mau Mau rebels encompassed members of the Embu and Meru tribes as well, who were also from the Central Highlands. In order to join the Mau Mau, recruits were required to take a ceremonial oath of loyalty. One scholar posits that the first oathing ceremony to induct Mau Mau members occurred in 1944 at Olenguruoune in the Rift Valley when some 11,000 Kikuyu squatters were expelled (Throup 1985, 415). Oathing ceremonies were common by 1947, and the colonial administration was enough aware of the organization to proscribe both it and its oathing ceremonies on 12 August 1950 (Corfield 1960; Elkins 2005; Percox 2003, 122-129). Oathing became widespread; one contemporary estimate states that by 1953, 90 percent of the Kikuyu were oathed, either voluntarily or by force (Langford-Smith 1953). For those Kikuyu oathed under duress, the problem was not so much their willing support for the Mau Mau, but rather fear of both Mau Mau and supernatural repercussions if they broke the oath of support (Green 1990).

Though the Mau Mau are more often remembered as being active in the agricultural areas of the Central Highlands and Rift Valley, they also had a presence in the cities, particularly

Nairobi. Certainly, the majority of Mau Mau fighters would use the forests as a staging ground for attacks, but Nairobi, as the capital city, offered much in the way of intelligence on government activity. Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu were also present in Nairobi, where those who had been dispossessed, evicted, or simply unable to find work in the agricultural areas made their way (Elkins 2005, 24).

At first, the Mau Mau were not seen as a particular threat; a Kenyan internal security working committee, established in August 1950, dismissed the Mau Mau in its November 1950 report as an organization responsible only for some "minor acts of sabotage on farms" (Internal Security Working Committee 1951). The Kenya Police Annual Report in 1951 also describes the Mau Mau in terms that seem out of line with what 1952 would bring: "Prosecutions against members of the proscribed Mau Mau organization for administering oaths continued… No subversive action, apart from the actual administration of the oath, could be attributed to its members during the year" (Throup 1992, 139).

The violence perpetrated by the Mau Mau that would become the Emergency started to grow in intensity throughout 1952, with arson attacks on European settler properties as well as intra-Kikuyu violence (Branch 2013). Even from the start of what would become the Emergency, there were two distinct rebel targets of violence: European settlers and Kikuyu colonial loyalists. On 3 October 1952, the Mau Mau killed what was probably their first European victim, and on 9 October, the Mau Mau killed an important loyalist Kikuyu tribal chief (Elkins 2005, 32; Anderson 2005, 54-61). As a result of these two high-profile attacks, in combination with the general upswing of violent activity, on 20 October, the British Colonial office declared a state of Emergency in Kenya, and that evening launched Operation Jock Scott to round up a number of suspected Mau Mau (Bennet 2013).

The Onset of the Mau Mau Rebellion

The onset of the Mau Mau rebellion, though it took contemporary European observers by surprise, can be seen as a logical extension of sustained and growing grievances by the Kikuyu as their economic situation deteriorated following World War II. On first glance, it would appear that the Mau Mau had very little in terms of administrative or combatant force capacity, but this is not exactly the case. The Mau Mau had numerous recruits, thanks in part to the large-scale evictions; a better intelligence system than the government it was opposing; and several leaders that were capable of staging attacks. Recruits were made more trustworthy via the oathing ceremonies, and even if not all of those oathed were willing to fight, the cultural inhibitions against breaking the oath meant that the Kikuyu had developed a large base not only of fighters but also of friendly neutrals who were unlikely to provide intelligence to pro-state forces. Operation Jock Scott, intended to destroy the leadership and thus the organizational capability of the Mau Mau, was mostly a failure. The Mau Mau received warning from friendly Kikuyu in government service, and the majority of the leaders, including Stanley Mathenge and Dedan Kimathi, escaped (Anderson 2005, 63).

The Mau Mau received further support as non-violent attempts to change the political behavior of the colonial Kenyan administration, such as the formation of the Kenyan African Union as a political pressure group, were met with failure. Instead, the Kenyan administration undertook increasingly coercive measures towards the indigenous Kenyan populations, all of which were designed to support the status quo arrangement of European landowners served by cheap indigenous labor. While the British officially declared a counter-rebellion campaign with the declaration of Emergency in October 1952, the Mau Mau as a rebel group, as described above, had been active prior to this time period.

Coercion

Prior to the onset of the Emergency, the Kikuyu were experiencing high levels of both economic and societal insecurity. One scholar describes their plight, noting that as they were "[d]enied access to education, land, state institutions, and public services, Kenya's African communities were socially alienated, economically marginalized, and politically disenfranchised" (Branch 2009, 7). Physical insecurity, in terms of political imprisonment, was also occurring. Even prior to the Emergency, Kenyan police were routinely arresting groups of Kikuyu. For example, the police arrested approximately 550 Kikuyu in September 1952 as a 'deterrent' rather than because they had committed a crime (Furedi 1989, 116-119). Immediately following the declaration of the Emergency, Operation Jock Scott, implemented on the night of 20 October in both Nairobi and the Central Highlands, detained approximately 150 suspected Mau Mau leaders, imprisoning six after a show trial. Some of the detainees were targeted because they were members of the Kenyan African Union; the Union did not have ties to Mau Mau, but the colonial administration assumed that it did (Branch 2009, 13).

The longstanding grievances against the Kenyan colonial administration, combined with the post-World War II increased economic stresses, provided ample grievances for the Kikuyu peoples. When non-violent attempts to change Kenyan policy toward indigenous populations failed, low-level violent activity started to take place. The initial colonial response of indiscriminant and widespread detentions, arrests, and imprisonments, served more to incite violence than repress it, while the underlying conditions encouraging discontent were left smoldering.

State Capacity

The colonial governors, assigned from Great Britian, supposedly oversaw both civilian and military affairs in the colony. In that role, they were able to draw upon the resources not only of the agriculturally productive Kenya colony, but also of Great Britain herself. However, following World War II, Britain found itself overextended among its colonies, particularly in the matter of manpower available to police the Empire (Bennet 2013, 94). This, in part, may explain the lag between the beginning of the rebellion and the employment of the forces of Great Britain.

Kenya itself came into the conflict with at least a moderate level of capacity; Kenya had been a prosperous colony for many years. However, a large proportion of that wealth was due to agricultural production, which typically came at the expense of indigenous Kenyans (Leys 1975, 40-43). The administration it had, however, would be nothing compared to the capacity it would reach during the Mau Mau rebellion; one author describes notes that, by "1952 to 1956, when the fighting was at its worst, the Kikuyu districts of Kenya became a police state in the very fullest sense of the word" (Anderson 2005, 5).

While the colonial administration did have control over a police force and the ability to request military forces from the British Empire, what the administration lacked was a good understanding of who the Mau Mau were, and in particular the ability to differentiate between those who were committed cadres and those who had simply taken the oath. Not only was colonial intelligence about the Mau Mau bad, but counter-intelligence was also lacking. News of Operation Jock Scott was leaked prior to the arrests, enabling the majority of the hardcore Mau Mau to escape into the forests (Anderson 2005, 62-63).

The military and polices forces available initially were also quite small, and their ability to penetrate into the forests and indigenous reservations mainly limited to temporary sweeping

operations. There was no committed, long-term presence, so when sweeps occurred in the forest, Mau Mau rebels hiding there simply moved deeper into the forest, out of the range of patrols. Sweeps in the reservations faced similar problems. “At the Emergency’s declaration, the police Special Branch, responsible for political policing, comprised only four officers and a handful of rank and file” (Bennett 2013, 15). As Bennett (2013, 13) notes, “Military operations in the first months were quite seriously flawed. The initial arrests failed to halt the violence, but generated complacency in the government, which was subsequently sluggish in mounting offensive operations… [that] achieved no tangible results.”

Rebel Capacity

Similar to the colonial administration, the Kikuyu were also not originally prepared for sustained large-scale conflict. Though capable of scattered terrorist attacks against settlers and loyalists, the Mau Mau were not particularly well organized. The rebel leaders, including Kimathi, Mathenge, and Itote, were each able to control their own gang, but the gangs rarely coordinated actions with each other. Had Operation Jock Scott not been compromised by leaked information, it is possible that enough of the Mau Mau leadership would have been captured, completely disorganizing the rebels, who would then have been unable to achieve much more than a continued effort along the same lines of scattered attacks.

While the Mau Mau initially lacked much in the way of a coherent organizational structure, it did have a strong recruitment pool comprised of disaffected youths. Societally, the Kikuyu were organized around a patron-client system whereby the patron, usually a chief or elder, was supposed to ensured that their clients were able to have the minimum standard of living required by society in order to start a family. Faced with a burgeoning indigenous population and increasing limitations on available employment due to the coercive actions of the

colonial administration, this system was put under severe stress as patrons were no longer able to help their clients (Kershaw 1997: 212-247). The young men and women who were unable to find employment as clients also found themselves unable to start or support families, and move up the societal ladder towards elderhood. These youths were therefore isolated from participation the patronage system. As noted by Hudson and den Boer (2004), the generation of a large group of disaffected youth who have no reason to support the status quo and dim prospects for the future is likely to lead to increasing resistance, both non-violent and violent, against the status quo system. These disaffected youths, unemployed and without family responsibilites, have fewer constraints against joining rebel groups. Such was the case in Kenya, where the circumstances led to an increasing pool of potential Mau Mau rebels.

The large pool of potential recruits included both these disconnected youths as well as members of the Kikuyu who, even if they were part of the patronage system, suffered from the widespread coercive actions of the colonial administration. One organizational advantage the rebels had was the fact that the pool of recruits, coming from three related tribes, the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru, shared a common culture. A significant feature of this culture was the tradition of oathing ceremonies used to create binding agreements. The Mau Mau utilized traditional oathing ceremonies, transforming them into a pledge of allegiance to the rebels, which enabled them to build a rebel network. While some Kikuyu freely took the Mau Mau oaths, others were forced to on threat of retaliation. However, even if oaths had been administered under duress, fear of the consequences of breaking the oath resulted in at least passive complicity with Mau Mau across wide swaths of the population.

Along with these oathing ceremonies, the fact that the Mau Mau both came from and depended upon local communities for recruits, war material, and intelligence meant that they had

a far clearer picture of who was aligned for and against them. The Mau Mau also took advantage of colonial blindness to the role of women in supporting the rebellion. Women were able to move more freely than men, which made them ideal liaisons between colonial-controlled and rebel-controlled areas; they supplied both war material and intelligence to Mau Mau fighters in the forest (Presley 1992).

Thus, the Mau Mau at the onset of conflict had both advantages and disadvantages. In terms of personnel and intelligence, they were far superior to the colonial administration, and though loosely organized, the widespread oathing ceremonies helped to create a supportive network. However, unlike the administration, they lacked any form of external support and were limited in terms of resources. The onset of formal hostilities by the administration took the Mau Mau by surprise; their organizational transformation into more tightly woven 'gangs' lead by different Mau Mau leaders happened on the fly in the forests following the first attempts by colonial forces to eradicate the rebellion.

Campaign Choices During the Mau Mau Rebellion

The Mau Mau rebellion lasted from approximately 1952 to 1956, and went through three distinct phases, preceeded by a proto-rebellion phase that started in approximately 1944, in which discontent was obvious but violence was sporadic. This project identifies distinct terrorist, insurgent, and civil war campaigns. This identification is in line with Anderson (2005, 250), who notes that, "Even for the forest armies the Mau Mau war was not a single strategic campaign."

The Terrorist Campaign, January – October 1952

While not typically classified as such, I argue that most of 1952, including the lead-up to the declaration of the Emergency, should actually be considered a terrorist campaign. The Mau Mau rebels committed violent acts that were certainly intended to send a political message to a

larger audience. As Anderson (2005, 118) notes, “Each settler killing had an impact upon white consciousness in Kenya that far outweighed its actual significance in the context of the war.” Indeed, the number of European settlers killed during the entire span of the Emergency is astonishingly low; one estimate places the total number of European civilians killed at 32, with another 26 wounded (Corfield 1960, 316). Yet it was the attacks on the European settlers that directed the military response to the Mau Mau; “[a]ttacks on Europeans initally exerted a disproportionate influence on deployment decisions, with small units scattered throughout the Rift Valley to protect the settlers” (Bennett 2013, 13-14).

Government orders intended to isolate and punish Mau Mau through 1952 served to incite rebellion, as the coercive actions of the administration increased indigenous grievances (Bennett 2013, 19). After each attack on European settlers, widescale evictions of thousands of Kikuyu in the area surrounding each attack took place, further delegitimizing the colonial administration and leading to the radicalization of evicted Kikuyu due to the destruction of their homes and livelihood. Sir Evelyn Baring, the Kenyan colonial governor during this time period, noted in a message to the British administration that such government action “has probably led to a further facilitation of [Mau Mau] gang recruitment and some diversion of effort on the part of the forces of law and order” (Baring 1953). These evictions, combined with those on the run who had avoided the Operation Jock Scott round up, precipitated the move to the forests of up to 10,000 individuals by early 1953 (Anderson 2005).

As the number of disaffected individuals grew, I argue that the Mau Mau gained the capacity it needed, via recruits to the forest gangs as well as a network of supporters both in Nairobi and the Central Highlands. Thanks to the actions of the colonial government, the Mau Mau had a huge forest army with which to stage attacks. However, organizing the mass influx of

recruits is probably one of the reasons that full-scale civil war did not break out until mid-1953; as discussed below, both sides appear to have been focused on building their administrative capacity while attempting to simultaneously undertake violence. The dual demands of capacity building and campaigning probably served as a limiter of sorts.

The Insurgent Campaign, October 1952 – March 1953

Early 1953, as with late 1952, was not marked by a high level of conflict. Some scholars refer to this time period as a 'phoney war' in which both sides, unprepared for conflict, were more focused on organizing for, rather than committing, violence (Branch 2009). Yet, even though both sides were still organizing, violence continued. For the Mau Mau, I argue that this violence took the form of an insurgent campaign, and that this was because the British forced this option upon them:

> Mau Mau's recourse to insurgency was not at time of its choosing but instead a reaction to the commencement of the Emergency. Beyond a vague and ill-defined commitment to land and freedom, Mau Mau's own discussions of aim, purpose, and legitimacy of violence were therefore left unresolved. The forests became the location for debate, factionalism, and contestation rather than the base for a unified rebel army. (Branch 2009, 7)

The Mau Mau experienced a vast upsizing of their combatant forces and non-combatant supporters, as the estimate of 10,000 fighters above makes clear. With such a popular mobilization, the limits of the terrorist campaign, which made political statements but little else, expanded into potentially the ability to wage a civil war. Given the fact that the means of the Mau Mau increased dramatically during this time period, why did civil war not break out? I argue that, though the Mau Mau forces increased, the rebel group capacity needed time to adjust to its sudden popularity. When it did so in mid-1953, then civil war did break out.

On the other side of the fight, the colonial Kenyan administration was having problems of its own. While the colonial Kenyan administration was quite good at coercion of the Kikuyu population, it did not, at least initially, have good intelligence on the Mau Mau. As Galula (2006) notes, such intelligence is vital to effective counterinsurgency. Early efforts at countering the Mau Mau in Kenya were weakened by the critical lack of information on the rebels. Perhaps blinded by racism, "[t]he inability—or unwillingness—of the colonial government to distinguish between active Mau Mau fighters and those swept into the net by dint of fear and vulnerability fundamentally weakened the counter-insurgency campaign" (Anderson 2005, 219).

Colonial coercion, focused on the physical, economic, and societal security of the Kikuyu as a whole, rather than specifically on the Mau Mau, ensured a growing number of radicalized individuals, and the forests offered a safe haven from which to plan and stage attacks. Had the persecution been less severe, the rebel capacity in terms of manpower might never have reached the levels that it did. The influx of recruits into the forests continued throughout this time period. New recruits came in not only to escape colonial persecution, but now also to escape the actions of the indigenous Home Guard units.

These Home Guard units were designed to increase the state's capacity to administer, protect, and isolate loyalist Kikuyu from the Mau Mau. The origins of the Home Guards lie in Kikuyu resistance movements formed to combat the Mau Mau. These ad hoc groups, comprised of loyalist or non-aligned Kikuyu, had existed unofficially prior to the emergency. The decision to mobilize these groups into militias was taken by the colonial administration in November 1952, and less than a month later recruitment into the Home Guards was well underway (Anderson 2005, 240-241). By March of 1953, there were over 18,000 Home Guard personnel

(Branch 2005, 83-84). The Home Guard were typically organized alongside local power structures, with the chief of a community also serving as the leader of the Home Guard unit.

Despite being organized to combat Mau Mau violence, the Home Guards were responsible for large-scale violence against not only committed Kikuyu but also to any political challengers seen as a threat by the Home Guard leaders; it was not uncommon for the Home Guards to settle scores with other non-aligned or loyalist Kikuyu that had nothing to do with the Mau Mau (Anderson 2005). While, as Kalyvas (2006) points out, such hyperlocal, non-conflict-related score-settling is common in intrastate conflict, the abuses of the Home Guard had a further repercussion in that Home Guard actions led many to take refuge from their persecution by fleeing to the forests and joining the Mau Mau (Anderson 2005).

With the steady flow of recruits into the safe haven of the forests, the Mau Mau now had the personnel to undertake activities. What the Mau Mau lacked, however, was better organization. This organization gradually occurred, as the Mau Mau formed 'gangs' around specific rebel leaders, such as General China, Stanley Mathenge, and Dedan Kimathi. The leaders were responsible for the activities and support of their gang, and each leader had a general geographic region within the forests as a basing area. While rebel leaders could and did communicate with each other, coordination between gangs was not high (Jackson, Jr. 2003, 179-185). Nevertheless, coalescence around rebel leaders allowed the Mau Mau to more effectively carry out activities. During this time, the attacks staged by the Mau Mau shifted from a focus on civilians, notably European settlers and loyalist Kikuyu, to security force units such as the Home Guard, police, and army (Jackson, Jr. 2003, 179-185; Branch 2009).

Thus, by the spring of 1953, both sides were embroiled in a conflict neither had originally been particularly well prepared for, though both sides had spent the last year rapidly developing

capacity. The colonial forces were struggling with developing intelligence on the Mau Mau, as well as undertaking police and military actions and setting up the Kikuyu loyalist Home Guards. In the forests, the Mau Mau were organizing themselves into a structure able to withstand the increased attention from Kenyan security forces whilst still carrying out violent actions.

The Civil War Campaign, March 1953 – October 1956

The precise date of the transition from insurgent to civil war campaign by the Mau Mau is typically marked by a terrorist attack on the community of Lari in March 1953. This attack offers an instance of the problematic nature of categorizing events, rather than campaigns, of violence. Analyzed in isolation, the attack targeted civilians and was certainly intended to send a larger political message to loyalist Kikuyu; it was a terrorist action. Yet, in the context of the Mau Mau rebellion, this terrorist event may have actually marked the start of a full-scale civil war campaign (Anderson 2005). In mid-1953, the capacity building done by both rebel and state, while operations were ongoing, had come to fruition. Both sides now had the fighters and the administrative capacity to wage civil war (Bennett 2013). Though there are not good records on the Mau Mau side, Kenyan government forces were engaged in "almost continuous attacks" for much of mid-1953 on" (Bennett 2013, 20-27). In response to the continued violence in Kenya, in June of 1953 General Sir George Erskine was sent in as the new General Officer Commanding, East Africa Command. Erskine would be in charge of colonial state's response to the Mau Mau.

I argue that 1953 marked the start of the heightened civil war violence. Under Erskine's command, military operations in the reserves and forests increased in intensity, size, and scope, leading to an ongoing series of battles between the two combatants. In September, the arrival of additional British Army units provided reinforcement and additional capability for operations. British Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft also arrived, and provided an new means of access to the

Mau Mau in the forests; “because the army was preoccupied with providing security in the reserves until January 1955, [the RAF] was the only service capable of both psychologically influencing and inflicting considerable casualties on the Mau Mau in Kenya’s vast, inaccessible forests” (Chappell 2011, 64). The effect of the increase in military personnel numbers and operations meant that the Mau Mau were pushed deeper into the forest, and faced increasing difficulty in both staging attacks from the forest and maintaining lines of communication and supply from the reserves (Bennet 2013:20-23).

Perhaps more importantly, Erskine knew that a military-only solution to the conflict would not be enough, and, while he did improve the military tactics and intelligence gathering, Erskine also worked with the European elites and civilian administration to craft a political strategy. Erskine is generally credited with having a better understanding of the rebellion than his predecessor, since “[w]hatever previous politicos might have wanted to call the crisis, Erskine knew this was a rebellion; and he knew that unless it was fought as professionally as any other campaign it would not be defeated. Counter-insurgency tactics were required, and there would have to be political concessions as well as military successes” (Anderson 2005, 285). These political concessions consisted, in the main, of the proposals of the Swynnerton plan, a land-reform effort that at least in part addressed the primary grievance that had led to the start of the Emergency.

The year 1953 also saw the start of development of the Swynnerton Plan, an effort to, at least minimally, address the political question of indigenous land ownership rights. Developed by a Kenyan Department of Agriculture official, Roger Swynnerton, the Swynnerton Plan was a reversal previous of land-ownership and production policies for indigenous peoples in Kenya. It was not, however, any sort of plan for decolonialization. Rather, its focus was on ending the

conflict in the colony and stabilizing the colony (Percox 1998). The focus of the Swynnerton Plan was a land redistribution policy, whereby the scattered, tiny holdings of the indigenous population would be consolidated—a process helped by the massive Pipeline and later villagisation efforts which removed the indigenous population from their lands. Holdings of land would then be consolidated and distributed to loyalist Kikuyu, and these loyalists would be allowed to grow cash crops, which had been previously prohibited (Harbeson 1971). While benefitting some loyalists, the land redistribution policies actually served to disenfranchise and permanize the landlessness of Kikuyu tenant farmers—approximately one-third of the Kikuyu peoples—who were expected to become craftsman, instead (Odhiambo 1995). The Swynnerton Plan was thus not a direct or fair response to the political grievances of the Mau Mau; "convicted Mau Mau rebels were usually excluded from land re-allocations and many others were unfairly treated in the distribution of holdings decided by the local land committees" (Anderson 2005, 294).

The actions taken by Erskine in this year would set up the colonial administration for the ultimate suppression of the rebellion. These programs included the introduction of more military and police personnel; the increase in operations intended to separate the forest rebels from supply lines; the organization and expansion of the detainment, interrogation, work camp, and imprisonment system; and the development of a limited land-ownership reform plan.

While the colonial administration had been screening, detaining, and arresting suspected Mau Mau sympathizers since before the declaration of the Emergency, the prison system in Kenya was vastly expanded during the Emergency. The bar for evidence required to be detained or arrested was extremely low, and civil rights violations were omnipresent. Once detained, indigenous peoples were sorted into and held in various prison and work camps. In the camps,

assault, torture, and forced labor were ubiquitous. This system of detainment, arrest, imprisonment and forced labor would come to be known as the Pipeline; the massive size of the Pipeline, and the sheer numbers of people it processed, demonstrated the huge administrative and bureaucratic capacity that could be mustered by the colonial administration and its imperial backer (Anderson 2005, 311-327).

In contrast to the organization of the colonial forces, the Mau Mau rebels were hindered by internal conflict over command and control issues. There were two major forested areas that the rebels operated in. In the Mount Kenya forests, the three main gang leaders managed to operate with some communication, but each gang answered to its own leader. One scholar attributes the better command and control in this region to the previous British military experience of one of the leaders, General China. In the Aberdares forests, however, eight different gang leaders jockied for preeminance. In August of 1953, one of the Aberdares leaders, Dedan Kimathi, proclaimed himself to be the supreme commander of the Mau Mau, but this was not accepted by all of the other eight leaders, and led to serious rifts between the gangs (Anderson 2005, 248-249).

1954 saw the further development of the political and military programs instituted in 1953. Military operations continued apace, and the Home Guard units grew in size and efficacy. The Pipeline, now fully operational, continued to detain and incarcerate thousands of Kikuyu. In addition, 1954 saw the introduction of further measures to isolate the Mau Mau, and the growth of the colonial intelligence service.

In June of 1954, a villagisation program in the reserves was announced. This program forced the relocation of indigenous peoples in the reserves from scattered farmsteads and settlements into villages that resembled armed camps. Villagisation of the scattered settlements

of Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu proceeded throughout 1954, with all of the major districts completed by August (Elkins 2005, 234-235; Newsinger 1981, 176). This forced population consolidation had serious downsides; overcrowding led to malnourishment and widespread disease, and residents of the villages were often forced to labor on infrastructure projects. On the other hand, villigisation, though unpopular with the indigenous peoples, did help the Home Guard and Kenyan security forces to better provide security from Mau Mau attacks. This security enabled—or forced—those Kikuyu who had previously been supporting the Mau Mau to stop working with the rebels, increasing the isolation of the Mau Mau units in the forest (Bennett 2013).

In addition to working to isolate the Mau Mau from their support lines in the reserves, in April of 1954 a major operation was staged in the capital city of Nairobi. Operation Anvil quarantined the city, swept it for Mau Mau, and succeeded in drastically reducing the flow of recruits, funding, and war material from the city to the Mau Mau (Furedi 1973). This operation served a major blow to the capacity of the Mau Mau by shutting off a key support line (Branch 2009:104). General Erskine later remarked that this operation was "the turning point in the Emergency" (Erskine 1955). The operation in Nairobi also resulted in a massive wave of new detainees in the Pipeline. By December of 1954 there were over 71,000 in confinement. Official British figures estimated that one-eighth of Kikuyu males were located within the Pipeline (Anderson 2005, 313).

While the isolation measures sought to remove support from reaching the Mau Mau, intelligence efforts attempted to identify and locate the Mau Mau in the forests. In April of 1954, in a coup for the intelligence services, General China, one of the Mau Mau leaders, was captured and successfully interrogated, providing a wealth of information (Anderson 2005, 232-235). The

capture of General China, in combination with a May 1954 restructuring and expansion of the military's intelligence capabilities, led to increased coordination with the police Special Branch and improved intelligence on the Mau Mau (Bennett 2013, 18-19). In addition to intelligence collection, 'pseudo gangs,' groups of captured turncoat Mau Mau that were sent back into the forest, offered an effective means of going after the rebel gangs and their leaders (Anderson 2005, 285-286).

As the year drew to a close, the Mau Mau found themselves increasingly isolated from support:

> By the end of 1954 the combination of military operations and villagisation had largely driven the Mau Mau out of the Reserves, inflicted heavy casualites and prevented access to logistical and manpower reinforcements. Ther rebels found themselves mainly confined to the forests of the Aberdares and Mount Kenya. Not only did the security forces manage to inflict losses of over 600 per month on the Mau Mau between October and December, but the operational intelligence situation greatly improved. (Bennett 2013, 26)

While 1954 saw gains by the colonial administration, the Mau Mau rebels still retained their forest safe havens. Therefore, the main thrust of the colonial administration in 1955 focused on reducing these safe havens though a series of large military sweeps through the forests. The last major offensive, a massive sweep in July of 1955, broke up the remaining gangs, leaving only remnants in the forests. From the the latter half of 1955 to October of 1956, smaller special-forces style units worked in the forest to track down remaining Mau Mau; large-scale operations were no longer necessary at this point. Dedan Kimathi, the last prominent rebel leader, was captured on 21 October 1956, and all forest operations ended a few weeks later (Bennett 2013; Anderson 2005).

1956 saw an end to the active Mau Mau rebellion, but those who had been fighting the rebels did not think the problem had been resolved. Lieutenant General Lathbury, General

Erskine's successor, wrote that he had "no illusions about the future. Mau Mau has not been cured: it has been suppressed. The thousands who have spent a long time in detention must have been embittered by it. Nationalism is still a very potent force and the African will pursue his aim by other means" (Lathbury 1955).

As with earlier phases of the conflict, during the civil war campaign the rebels of the Mau Mau did have not have to look very hard to find evidence of widespread and severe state coercion. The Pipeline system of detainment, imprisonment, and forced labor proccessed an immense amount of the Kikuyu population. Within this system, abuses were so widespread that one scholar referred to it as 'Britain's Gulag' (Elkins 2010). The villagisation scheme, while it did eventually improve security for those located inside the fortified villages, also disrupted the traditional system of Kikuyu society. The Swynnerton Plan for land redistribution and production further affected societal and economic security by empowering some indigenous loyalists whilst simultaneously permanently disenfranching approximately a third of all Kikuyu.

However, even though coercion was widespread, with the gradually improving intelligence on the rebels coercive activity was at least somewhat more likely to be focused upon Mau Mau rebels or sympathizers. Correspondingly, incentives increased for those Kikuyu who were considered to be loyalist. While the combination of harsh punishment for rebels and rewards for loyalists served to help smother the flames of the rebellion, even this very intense coercion was not enough to put out the embers, as those intimately involved in fighting the Mau Mau understood.

The scale of coercive action undertaken by the state was enabled by the high level of the colonial Kenyan administration. The creation and expansion of the Pipeline required a fair amount of administration, as did the system of villagisation. The Sywnnerton Plan required a

complete overhaul of land redistribution. This effort included assessments of who originally owned what piece of land, the location and size of the new consolidatied holding, the selection of the loyalist who would be granted the new holding, and the associated paperwork involved with all of the above. The Swynnerton plan would not have been possible without a highly functioning bureaucracy.

In combination with high state administrative capacity, the colonial administration oversaw an increase in military and police capacity during the civil war campaign years. The increase in British military ground forces and the introduction of aerial forces were critical in securing the reserves and penetrating into rebel strongholds in the forests. The vast increase in Home Guard units, in combination with the villagisation program, meant fewer villages which grew more and more secure from Mau Mau attacks as the conflict progressed. Military and police intelligence also improved dramatically with the capture of General China and the creation of effective pseudo gangs.

In contrast to the very high levels of state capacity by the end of the rebellion, rebel capacity peaked and then decreased as the conflict wrapped up. While military 'mopping up' actions against the rebels were necessary to ultimately defeat the gangs, the destruction of the supply and communication lines between the forests and the reserves and Nairobi crippled the capacity of the Mau Mau. Separated from the population, the Mau Mau experienced increasing scarcities of intelligence, food, war material and new recruits. Without the ability to replenish these items, the Mau Mau fought a losing battle against a foe whose supply lines were never threatened. The loss of new recruits, in combination with the casualties from ongoing skirmishes with the colonial forces meant that the numbers of Mau Mau personnel were steadily decreasing from about 1954 on.

The rebels also lost the battle for public support. In part, this was due to their own actions, as the massacre at Lari provoked outrage among the Kikuyu population. Some of those who were in agreement with the political goals of the Mau Mau felt that such violence in pursuit of those goals was unacceptable. In addition, the rewards available to loyalists and severe punishments meted out to rebel sympathizers made it harder for sympathizers to continue to provide support to the Mau Mau. By late 1954, Mau Mau popular support was in decline across all of Kenya; one scholar describes it as "a tangible difference in public attitude" (Branch 2009, 94). With their supply lines cut, their safe haven invaded, and their popular support decreasing, the overall effectiveness of the Mau Mau also decreased. Indeed, it is perhaps a testament to the ability of the Mau Mau that, though the initial implementation of the military and civilian programs which would ultimately lead to the end of the rebellion were instituted in 1953, the rebellion itself would last until 1956.

The Mau Mau Rebellion: Implications

At the start of the Kenya Emergency, state capacity was much greater than rebel capacity. This, in part, appears to support this project's hypothesis that terrorist campaigns are more likely when state capacity is high. The onset of the Mau Mau rebellion marks something that in hindsight appears obvious; the growing Kikuyu dissatisfaction with the status quo in post-World War II Kenya combined with a land scarcity that threatened not only the economic but also the societal security of a large number of Kikuyu. The coercive actions of the state predate the eruption of rebellion, in line with this project's hypotheses which posits that grievances are far more important than capacity at onset.

Because the state had such capacity, it was able to implement broad-scale coercive actions that affected vast swaths of Kikuyu. The massive evictions and resettlement programs,

alongside widescale detention, imprisonment, and torture, all provided grievances that served to encourage aggrieved Kikuyu to radicalize. However, state capacity also served to eventually destroy the rebellion. The colonial administration's intelligence on the Mau Mau, initially miniscule, was grown into a potent force. Effective, though not necessarily humane or legitimate, bureaucracy enabled the implementation of resettlement villages, work camps, and prisons. In this light, state capacity, both bureaucratic and military, does appear to have a dampening effect on the later stages of the Mau Mau rebellion.

Yet, even the broad-scale imprisonment and military defeat of the Mau Mau was not enough to ultimately stop the movement towards greater indigenous rights. By 1954, the sprawling incarceration system had over 52,000 Kikuyu detainees (Elkins 2010, 131). As General Erskine noted, these efforts were not enough to end indigenous rebellion in Kenya, they rather served only to suppress it: "Mau Mau is not like a town riot which can be brought under control by a show of force… Unless we deal with the fundamental causes which allowed Mau Mau to grow up and prosper we shall get further trouble in a different form" (Erskine 1953).

Thus, this case study begs the question: can coercive action alone ever truly end a rebellion? Even given the huge capacity overmatch the colonial administration enjoyed over the Mau Mau, this does not appear to be the case in Kenya. For those in the colonial administration who understood that the grievances which had sparked the rebellion were still unanswered, the end of the Mau Mau did not mean the end of nationalist violence; the administration had achieved suppression but not resolution.

Rebel capacity, on the other hand, was initially not that high—though there was enough capacity that the group could stage attacks—and the Mau Mau struggled to keep supply and information lines open during the course of the conflict. In the opening years of the conflict,

rebel intelligence was far superior to that of the colonial administration, but this overmatch was gradually reduced due to the bureaucratic effectiveness of the state. Rebel bureaucratic effectiveness was never high, and the rebels formed into gangs that were only loosely associated with one another. Attempts by rebel leaders to consolidate power led to intra-group friction and were mostly unsuccessful. The resulting Mau Mau organization structure meant that several rebel leaders had to be separately defeated, but also that there was no effective centralized control which might have been better able to counter colonial moves or drive overall strategy. The forested safe havens offered an advantage at the start of the rebellion, but an effective cordon around the safe havens, as well as the villigasation of the reserves, resulted in increasing isolation of the Mau Mau fighters. Lacking external supporters, the Mau Mau had no alternative sources of support, so when the population either chose or was forced to support the colonial administration, the Mau Mau lost significant capacity. In this case study, the hypotheses that rebel capacity is likely lower when rebels choose terrorist campaigns, moderate when rebels choose insurgent campaigns, and higher when rebels choose civil war campaigns appears to be mostly supported. However, it is worth noting that as the rebellion ended, rebel capacity dropped precipitously. Such a capacity drop, however, was the predecessor to the end of the rebel group as an organization.

The Kenyan Emergency lasted about five years, from 1952-1956. Yet repercussions from the Emergency, most notably the political organization of indigenous Kenyans and the political concessions in agricultural and legislative affairs they gained as a result of the Emergency, would have lasting effects past the violence. Seven years after the end of the Emergency, under the Independence Act of 1963, Kenya became an independent country. Even though the land-rights concessions generated by the Swynnerton Plan during the Emergency were focused on

rewarding loyalist indigenous peoples, this limited enfranchisement would eventually lead to calls for a more generalized enfranchisement of indigenous Kenyans. The Mau Mau lost in the short term, but their objectives were realized less than a decade after their defeat. As Percox (2003, 122) notes, the decolonization "policy reversal came a good two years after the apparent defeat of the Mau Mau forest fighters" yet, had the Mau Mau not undertaken their rebellion, Kenya would have probably remained a colony until 1975.

Chapter 8 - Case Study: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

As with Chapter 7, Chapter 8 follows the research methodology of the structured, focused case study outlined by George and Bennet (2005). Chapter 8 examines the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) conflict in Sri Lanka, and asks the following questions:

- How did the coercive action of the state—and the way it changed over time—affect rebel campaign onset and evolution?
- How did state administrative and military capacity—and the way it changed over time—affect rebel campaign onset and evolution?
- How did rebel administrative and military capacity—and the way it changed over time—affect rebel campaign onset and evolution?

An analysis of these questions shows that, even in a very different historical context from that examined in the last chapter, coercion and capacity affect the strategic calculations of the actors in similar ways.

As with Chapter 7, Chapter 8 is organized into four sections, which provide an overview of how the conflict arose, a more in-depth look at how coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity influenced conflict onset and campaign evolution, and a summation of the significance of the case study to the hypotheses proposed by this project.

Overview: The LTTE Rebellion in Sri Lanka

When the British arrived in the 18th century, the island of Ceylon already had a long history of conquest, kingdoms, and colonialism. Situated off the southern tip of India, the island had numerous South Asian ethnolinguistic groups dating to various invasions and kingdoms. Previously partially colonized under the Portuguese, and then the Netherlands, the British occupied the Dutch colony in 1796, officially took ownership of the colony in 1802, and then

took over the non-colonized parts of the island, known as the Kingdom of Kandy, via military force in 1815. By the time of British colonization, the Tamils and Sinhalese had already both been on the island of Sri Lanka for thousands of years. These two ethnic groups tended, though not exclusively, to follow different religions; the Tamils were mostly Hindu, and the Sinhalese, mostly Buddhist (de Silva 1981; Marks 2007, 485-486).

The Sinhalese were the majority on the island, comprising approximately 80 percent of the total population. The Tamils were a minority at 17 percent, but retained cultural and economic ties to the millions of their co-ethnics in southern India (Marks 2007, 485-486). The Tamils could be further divided into two groups. The indigenous Tamils were located mostly in the northern and eastern sections of Sri Lanka, as well as the capital city of Colombo. The Indian Tamils, more recent immigrants to the island, had been brought over to labor on the colonial tea and rubber plantations in the central Hill Country (de Silva 1981). During the British colonial period, from 1815-1948, English-language education via state and missionary schools was the best path to secure civil service and white-collar employment. Yet the English-language primary and secondary schools were heavily concentrated in Tamil areas of the island, and Tamils were also disproportionately represented at universities. These educational attainments meant that Tamils were more likely to have professional success, so much so that, "by the time Ceylon gained independence, all major civil services and military were dominated by Tamils" (Hashim 2013, 59). The majority Sinhalese were correspondingly underrepresented in education and the government. While Tamils were definitely overrepresented, a small elite, comprised of both Sinhalese and Tamil leading families, were active in the colony's governance, while the majority of the indigenous population was completely disenfranchised (de Silva 1981).

When Ceylon was granted independence in 1948, the political order was changed drastically. The British-advised Soulbury Constitution, implemented upon Sri Lankan independence from British rule, provided for a universal suffrage, a move that would make politics in Sri Lanka dictated by majoritarian rule (de Silva 1981). The Constitution contained only one safeguard for minority rights, Section 29. Section 29(2)(b) and (c) stated that Parliament could not restrict or privilege "persons of any community or religion" (de Silva 1981, 511-512). Unfortunately, Section 29 would prove no match for the exigencies of xenophobic political parties.

While the Sinhalese and Tamil elite continued, at first, to govern peacefully, the desire for increased political power, in combination with the new enfranchisement of Ceylon's population, eventually led to the involvement and manipulation, of the population in an effort to further the political power of Sinhalese-based parties. This occurred, at least in part, because due to demographics on the island the promotion of universal suffrage strongly favored the Sinhalese majority (Hashim 2013, 64). In order to encourage Sinhalese voter support, some Sri Lankan politicians attacked the long-standing overrepresentation of Tamils in sectors of Sri Lankan society, and embarked on a policy of discriminatory practices towards Tamil speakers. While these policies were supposedly created in order to rectify the imbalance in Tamil-Sinhalese opportunities instituted by the British, they quickly devolved into retributive practices which systematically disenfranchised Tamils (Marks 2007, 485-486).

Further complicating the situation were the geopolitical mindsets of each group. The Tamils saw themselves as a minority on the island of Sri Lanka, persecuted by the Sinhalese majority. The Sinhalese, however, were quite aware of the millions of co-ethnic Tamils living just across the Palk Straits in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The Sinhalese also saw

themselves as the minority, with hostile Tamils both on the island and poised for attack in nearby India. This led to a situation one historian described as "the unusual situation of the majority in the country subscribing to a deeply ingrained minority complex and acting as if the whole country were its sole preserve" (Hashim 2013, 17).

Sinhalese domination of Ceylon's political sphere continued apace, year after year. In 1956, the Official Language Act No. 33 instituted Sinhalese as the only official language in Ceylon. This, unsurprisingly, provoked Tamil protests and riots. The year 1957 saw an agreement, the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, on regional autonomy for the Tamil northern and eastern provinces. However, the failure to implement the Pact in 1958 led to further Tamil riots, and, in 1959, a Sinhalese Buddhist monk assassinated Bandaranaike. In 1965, the Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, which was to increase Tamil language rights, remained unimplemented due to Sinhalese political pressure. In 1971, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a radical communist and ethnocentric Sinhalese movement that was strongly anti-Tamil, staged an armed revolt against the government that failed, but led to approximately 6,000 deaths. In 1972, the new Republican Constitution was instituted, changing the name of Ceylon to 'Sri Lanka,' which referenced an ancient Sinhalese name for the island. The Constitution reinforced several discriminatory policies against Tamils, including that of university admissions (O'Duffy 2007; Hoffman 2006).

In May 1978, the LTTE and other Tamil resistance organizations were proscribed by Perhaps the most important piece of legislation in the conflict, passed in July 1979, was the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Initially a temporary measure, the Act was made permanent in 1982 and is still in effect at the time of the writing of this case study. This Act provided the

police the ability to arrest suspects without a warrant and to detain them for up to 18 months (Marks 2007, 488; Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1979).

The economic situation in Sri Lanka reached a crisis stage in the 1970s, as the government was unable to meet the obligations of consistently expanding socialist policies. The historian Ahmed Hashim sums up the bleak situation facing Sri Lanka, noting, "[t]he nation was bankrupt, and by the end of the 1970s around 25 percent of the population, irrespective of ethnic or religious origin was unemployed. The Sinhalese blamed the Tamils and vice versa" (Hashim 2013, 77-78).

While educational opportunities for Sri Lankans had been expanded post-independence, this expansion did not keep pace with the population growth. Ironically, the increased opportunities in education led more Sinhalese and Tamil students to compete for, and feel entitled to, postsecondary education. This increased expectation of education far outpaced the increase in available seats at educational institutions (Kearney 1975).

Expectation surpassed supply following graduation, as well; even those youths who did get into a university were not guaranteed employment, as the increase in the number of university graduates was far greater than the number of available employment opportunities. This led to a growing number of educated, under- or unemployed youths who faced a challenging post-university environment (Kearney 1975). In the face of such heightened competition both for education and employment, the disenfranchisement of Tamils was particularly pointed. While in the past Tamils had received preferential treatment, the pro-Sinhalese policies reversed that trend, and started what amounted to an affirmative action policy whereby the number of Sinhalese receiving spots was related to their percentage as a population, not their test scores.

A number of Tamil student groups formed in the 1970s to protest what they viewed as discriminatory practices. Most members of these groups had participated at some point in either the Tamil Youth Movement, the youth wing of the Federal Party, or the Tamil Student Union, the student wing of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). Both the Federal Party and the TULF were legitimate, legally-recognized pro-Tamil political parties, but the radicalization of the younger members of these parties was common; it was from these organizations that an "entire strand of Tamil guerilla activity was nurtured and fostered" (Samaranayaka 2008, 216).

In the early 1970s, one radical group, the Tamil Student Movement, became particularly well known for political acts that included arson and vandalism. The Tamil New Tigers (TNT) broke away the Tamil Student Movement in 1974. Following the split, the TNT quickly became known as one of the more extremist student groups. The TNT was established "for the purpose of silencing pro-government Tamils, eliminating Tamil police informants and their Sinhalese police handlers, and staging armed demonstrations against the Sinhalese government" (Hoffman 2006, 139). Most notably, the TNT assassinated the mayor of Jaffna, a major Tamil city, in 1975. When the original leader of the TNT was arrested in 1976, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the second-in-command, assumed leadership of the organization and renamed it the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Samaranayaka 2008; Hoffman 2006). As the 1970s drew to a close, the LTTE under the leadership of Prabhakaran had become "the preeminent political and military force within the Tamil community (Hoffman 2006, 139)."

The Onset of the LTTE Rebellion

While the LTTE did undertake a few violent attacks in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the start of the LTTE rebellion is generally dated to July 1983, when they killed 13 Sri Lankan Army

personnel in an ambush. The attack sparked widespread rioting and the onset of greater hostilities.

Coercion

The increasing discrimination of the Tamil ethnic group from the end of colonization up into the 1980s produced a great deal of resentment in the Tamil population. While some rebalancing was perhaps necessary, given the preferential treatment Tamils received under British rule, the Ceylon government was unable to assure the Tamils that their rights as a minority group would be protected. The massive population growth post-independence led to a greater scarcity of educational and employment opportunities overall, and the combination of greater competition and discriminatory treatment led to powerful Tamil grievances against the state. The old guard political elite, comprised of both Tamils and Sinhalese, attempted to develop different pacts that would have reaffirmed minority rights on the island, but these attempts were unsuccessful due to political pressure from the newly enfranchised Sinhalese majority. The Sinhalese-only language policy further served to remove Tamils from civil and military service. Thus, the Tamils increasingly faced a situation where their political, economic, and societal rights were threatened.

The Vaddukkoaddai Resolution, the TULF response to the implementation of the 1972 Constitution, lays out in no uncertain terms how the Tamils felt:

> The Republican Constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave nation ruled by the new colonial masters, the Sinhalese, who are using the power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil Nation of its territory, language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and education, thereby destroying all the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people. (Tamil United Liberation Front 1976)

State Capacity

Upon independence from British rule in 1948, Ceylon appeared to be set up for success; it "was by far the most prosperous country in South Asia, and much more prosperous than most other Asian countries. Per capita income was a fifth higher than the south Asian average" (Sally 2006, 3). The indigenous component of the civil service was well developed under colonization, but the policy goals of post-independence Ceylon were unsustainable. Welfare state politics, while wildly popular with the voting public, required increasing amounts of state funding, and eventually led to the bankruptcy of the government. In the scarcity environment, politicians and the public bought into a blaming of the 'other'—the Tamils blamed the Sinhalese, and the Sinhalese blamed the Tamils (Hashim 2013, 76). This led to an increasingly factionalized state, where compromise was unacceptable. This factionalization drastically limited the ability of the government to implement policies that would have decreased tensions between the ethnic groups.

Militarily, the Sri Lankan security forces were ill-prepared; "[t]he armed forces of Sri Lanka were small, ill-equipped and ill-conditioned for a counter-insurgency role" (O'Ballance 1989, 28). In 1971, for a population of 12.5 million, there were 10,605 police, 6,578 army, 1,718 navy, and 1,397 air force personnel (Marks 2007, 486-487). Both the military and the police were further hamstrung in their efforts to control Tamil areas by the fact that, due to the 1956 Official Language Act, the vast majority of security personnel, including those in the intelligence branches, spoke Sinhalese and not Tamil (O'Ballance 1989, 29). By the time of the LTTE's attack in July 1983, less than 5 percent of the military was Tamil (Tambiah 1986, 15).

Rebel Capacity

Widespread Tamil discrimination, the impotence of moderate Tamil politicians to affect the political behavior of the state, and a large number of underemployed, radicalized youths meant that mobilization for Tamil rebel groups was widespread. One scholar estimates that there were over thirty different Tamil extremist groups in the late 1970s (Gunaratna 1987, 27). Initially a group of radicalized students, the LTTE distinguished itself from other rebel groups by a commitment to professionalism, discipline, and ruthlessness. The LTTE's leader, Prabhakaran, also insisted on a tightly controlled, hierarchical command structure; the result was a well-organized, highly committed group (Hoffman 2006, O'Duffy 2007).

While the numbers of the LTTE are not well established at this point, more general estimates of Tamil 'terrorists' by the Sri Lankan police placed that number at 200 in 1983, with a growth to somewhere between 5,000 to 10,000 by 1984 (Marks 2007, 483). Though Sri Lankan police figures are a problematic source due to the probable anti-Tamil bias, they at least illustrate the establishment concern with the rapid growth of the potentially radical Tamil nationalist cause. As Marks (2007, 482) points out, "The significance of the number, whether five thousand or ten thousand, lay in the fact that until Sri Lanka could mobilize its manpower pool, the combined insurgents matched, if not exceeded, the strength of the army."

The presence of a mobilized support base in the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka meant that financing and other support for the LTTE could easily be accessed. Furthermore, the Tamil-dominated eastern and northern provinces provided, if not a complete safe haven, at least large areas of relative safety in which to plan and train. The Indian state of Tamil Nadu also provided safe haven for militant Tamils. Located just across the Palk Straits, the sympathetic co-ethnic population offered money and support (Furtado 2007, 74).

Campaign Choices During the LTTE Rebellion

Lasting for over twenty-five years, the LTTE rebellion is commonly organized into a number of 'wars.' Summarized below, these periods of higher and lesser conflict tended to be punctuated by attempts at negotiation, none of which were successful. The ebbs and flows of violence in this long-running conflict have direct relationships to the coercion and capacity of the actors, as described below.

Eelam War I, 1983-1989

Eelam War I, from 1983 to 1989, marks the first shift to higher levels of violence, though by this point, as described above, the LTTE had been undertaking sporadic terrorist attacks for a number of years. The LTTE burst onto the national stage with a quite literal bang in 1983, by attacking a Sri Lankan Army patrol and killing 13 Sinhalese soldiers. Underscoring the deep grievances and distrust already present in Sri Lankan society, this attack let to organized, and probably state-supported, anti-Tamil riots across Sri Lanka which, in the course of two weeks, killed somewhere between 400-2,000 Tamils and destroyed many more Tamil homes and businesses (Hashim 2013, 88; Hoffman 2006, 139-140). Off and running following the 1983 ambush, the LTTE's insurgent campaign increased in intensity in 1984, where an August offensive saw the LTTE "began operating in larger groups and making sustained attacks" (O'Ballance 1989, 41). Thus, by the start of the officially recognized Eelam War I, I argue, the LTTE already had obtained enough recruits and capacity to stage attacks (notably ambushes) on government forces, as opposed to only targeting civilians. They also had what at the moment was a sympathetic area in the Tamil regions in Sri Lanka, which would later grow into a safe haven, and eventually their own Tamil proto-state.

The LTTE committed their first massacres of civilian Sinhalese in November 1984 and again in May 1985. An attempt at peace talks in Bhutan in 1985 proved unsuccessful, and fighting continued (Alexander 2006, 155). Tamil support for resistance remained strong. By 1986, one scholar estimates that, in the Tamil stronghold of Jaffna, 70% of Tamil youth belonged to one of the Tamil rebel organizations (O'Ballance 1989, 60).

In 1987, India, exerting a high level of diplomatic pressure, arranged a ceasefire; an agreement, the Peace Accord, on devolution of power in the north and east of Sri Lanka; and the reintroduction of Tamil as a national language. In addition to these measures, India attempted to guarantee the peace by sending in the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to replace the predominantly Sinhalese Sri Lankan Army forces stationed in Tamil areas. The Sri Lankan government, while it accepted the plan, was not overly enthused, rather, "[a] main factor in persuading [President of Sri Lanka] Jayawardene to accept the Peace Accord so tamely was that his armed forces were too weak to beat Tamil insurgents into surrender" (O'Ballance 1989, 92).

Unfortunately, the introduction of the IPKF to Sri Lanka provided a common enemy that generated what must have been an uncomfortable arrangement between the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government, and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a Sinhalese-nationalist extremist group. The LTTE, suspicious of India's interference, soon began to attack the IPKF. The Sri Lankan government hoped to use the IPKF presence in the north as a means by which it could reallocate its own forces south to face the JVP rebels. However, the JVP was able to withstand the increase in Sri Lankan focus, and soon this ultra-nationalist group was threatening the government itself. While the xenophobic JVP hated both the Tamils and the Indians, it decided that the Indians were the primary threat, and focused its efforts on pressuring—to the point of threatening a takeover of—the government of Sri Lanka in order to force the removal of

Indian troops. In order to calm the Sinhalese majority that supported the JVP, the Sri Lankan government began covertly arming the LTTE, in the hopes that the LTTE could attrit the IPKF forces to the point that political considerations would force India to recall them (Hashim 2013, 88-98).

Further complicating issues, the LTTE had for the past few years been undertaking training in Tamil Nadu sponsored by India's intelligence agency. India had provided the support in order to attempt to have some control over the actions of the LTTE, and to politically appease ethnic Tamil Indians (Furtado 2007, 73-74). By 1987, approximately 20,000 Tamil rebels had participated in Indian training (Hashim 2013, 89). This meant that the LTTE was well trained in Indian military doctrine, and thus "the LTTE knew the standard psychology, combat strategies, and weaponry of the Indian soldier, while the IPKF had no notion of the LTTE's strategies" (Alexander 2006, 159).

> What the IPKF intervention did was to destabilize Sri Lanka rather than bring peace. …Deployment of the IPKF in Sri Lanka proved to be a total failure of Indian foreign policy. Renowned Indian defense analyst Ravi Rikhye estimates that the IPRK at its peak numbered as many as 150,000, including paramilitary forces. However, it failed to disarm the LTTE and destroy its fighting capabilities while the LTTE continued to use safehouses in Tamil Nadu during the entire IPKF assignment in Sri Lanka. (Alexander 2006, 159-160)

Elections in 1989 in brought about new leadership in both India and Sri Lanka; the new leaders both supported the withdrawal of the IPKF, which had done little to the help the situation. The IPKF started withdrawing in 1989, and its departure marked the end of Eelam War I (Hashim 2013, 97-98).

High levels of state coercion throughout Eelam War I continued to add fuel to the flame of the Tamil rebellion. The state was widely assumed to be complicit in what was essentially an anti-Tamil pogrom in the riots of 1983, and the performance of the Sri Lankan army left much to

be desired. In 1984, TULF complained that 'Tamil-speaking people are being harassed, humiliated, and murdered by the armed forces" (O'Ballance 1989, 40). The addition of Indian forces, instead of initiating peace, only served to intensify conflict.

The bureaucratic capacity of the Sri Lankan government was definitely challenged, as it sought to deal with a number of simultaneous threats to the state. The xenophobic JVP Sinhalese radicals grew so strong that, in order to accede to their demands for the removal of the IPKF, the Sri Lankan state started covertly supporting the LTTE's efforts to fight the IPKF. At the same time, Sri Lanka felt that it had to cooperate on some level with India; India's military might vastly overweighed that of Sri Lanka, and India, very concerned about the effect a successful Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka would have on Indian Tamils, cared a great deal about the ongoing conflict in its southern neighbor. India, too, was playing both sides, as it simultaneously trained Tamils in India while attempting to demobilize them in Sri Lanka.

The LTTE, then, was ultimately supported in Eelam War I by both the Indian and Sri Lankan governments. Indeed, it would have been hard to lose a conflict in which both of the nominative enemies facing the rebel group were actually supporting it. Due to this, LTTE capacity remained high, even in the face of ongoing conflict. Support for the LTTE among the Tamil population was also strong, as the ascendance of the JVP in southern Sri Lanka ensured that Tamils continued to feel threatened by extremist Sinhalese nationalism, while the poor behavior of the IPKF troops, including raping and looting of Tamil civilians, ensured that the LTTE was still seen as the best guarantor of security for the Tamil peoples (Hashim 2013, 98). By the end of Eelam War I, the LTTE had at least partial control over Tamil-speaking areas, delineated by the IPKF. They also had the military capacity, given to them by both India and Sri Lanka, of combating the IPKF forces. Though I argue that Eelam War I was, at the start, more of

an insurgent campaign, the introduction of the IPKF and the resulting increased conflict escalated the conflict; by about 1986-87, given the amount of violence, the number of forces on both sides, and the common occurrence of battles between these forces, the LTTE's campaign had probably escalated into a civil war.

The peace negotiations in 1985 brought a hiatus to all LTTE campaigning temporarily, but the LTTE also took advantage of the Bhutan peace talks in order to build their capacity, for, as "talks proceeded, LTTE cadres laid land mines and erected barriers on roads leading from the encampments, severely limiting the army's mobility. When the truce and talks ended unproductively, LTTE hit squads were in a much stronger position to attack" (Richardson 2005, 530). However, the presence of these talks raises an interesting question not covered by the hypotheses I proposed in Chapter 4. Breaks, or pauses in conflict for negotiations seem to register as non-violent activity while simultaneously offering and advantage to those groups who would use peace to prepare for war.

Eelam War II, 1990-1994

While the IPKF started withdrawing in 1989, the last Indian troops left in 1990. This withdrawal marked the start of Eelam War II, from 1990-1994. With the protective buffer between LTTE-dominated areas and the rest of the Sri Lankan state removed, violence spiked. The LTTE simply took over the bases left by the departing Indian Army and proceeded to attack Sri Lankan targets, in part with weapons recently received from the government. The violence started in June 1990 with the LTTE execution of approximately 600 surrendered Sri Lankan police personnel. LTTE operations also included multiple instances of ethnic cleansing, including the expulsion of 30,000 Muslims (regardless of ethnicity) from the LTTE-controlled city of Jaffna in October 1990 (Hashim 2013). The removal of the IPKF did little on the overall

type of LTTE campaign; given the prior capacity building by both India and Sri Lanka, the LTTE was well positioned continue its civil war campaign.

On the Sri Lankan side, state capacity, which had been strained by the JVP insurrection, could start to recover, but the LTTE did their best to at least interrupt the smooth functioning of the state. The year 1991 saw an increase in LTTE political assassinations, as well as the start of large-scale military operations. LTTE assassinations included the Sri Lankan defense minister in March of 1991, Rajiv Ghandi, the former Indian prime minister responsible for the IPKF deployment in September 1991, and the current Sri Lankan president in May 1993. In 1991, the 5,000 LTTE troops staged a conventional attack on the large Elephant Pass army base in an operation lasting 53 days. Though the assault was unsuccessful, the size of the operation meant that the LTTE's forces, by this point, were probably close to comparable with that of the Sri Lankan Army. Though the Sri Lankan won the battle of Elephant Pass, it lost a naval base to the LTTE in November 1993 (Hashim 2013).

After three years of conflict, Sri Lankan presidential elections in 1994 brought forth a new president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, who campaigned on promises of peace. Kumaratunga seemed to understand that political concessions to the Tamils were necessary for lasting peace when she stated that "[t]he first task is, therefore, a new approach predicated on unqualified acceptance of the fact that the Tamil people have genuine grievances for which solutions must be found" (Little 1999, 52). While peace negotiations did occur in 1994, the promises of peace lasted only briefly, for when talks faltered, LTTE naval units sabotaged and sank two Sri Lankan gunboats in the spring of 1995. President Kumaratunga then reversed her message, and announced a new premise for dealing with the LTTE, that of 'war for peace' (Hashim 2013, 102).

This serious attempt by the Sri Lankan government to actually address the grievances that led to Tamil rebellion met with failure, not on the part of the government, but via action by the LTTE. The Kumaratunga government, by attempting to address some of the grievances of the Tamil population, threatened the popular support for the LTTE, which was dependent upon aggrieved Tamils for a support base. As with the Indian Peace Accords, the LTTE chose to sabotage agreements that might have ended the fighting. Some researchers lay the cause of the continued LTTE fighting despite overtures from the Sri Lankan government on the character of Prabhakaran, who could accept nothing less than a completely independent Tamil state (Pratap 2001, 94-97; Schaffer 1999, 139).

However, I argue for a somewhat different interpretation; that the LTTE had the capacity that, it thought, could garner itself further concessions from the Sri Lankan state. Prabhakaran could not have fought alone; others—many others—in the LTTE must have also supported the continuation of the civil war campaign. Another issue with the government offer is potentially a lack of trust in the government. Given the pograms of 1983, such a distrust seems reasonable. Accepting the offer, and giving up the capacity to carry out violence, may have seemed the bigger risk than simply fighting on. Such a possibility is outside of the scope of this project's hypotheses, but it does add nuance to why some rebel groups would continue to choose to fight as long as they had the capacity.

The Sri Lankan state capacity was further strained during Eelam War II, but the economy, at least in non-conflict, areas, actually grew. This overall growth, however, may have underreported the Tamil-held areas, for:

> Sri Lanka averaged a growth rate of 5 per cent during the 1984-2001 period. This was mainly due to the fact that the key growth-generating areas… were minimally affected by the war. Moreover, the bulk of these activities were concentrated in the Western Province that accounted for 50 per cent of the country's GDP. Some have challenged this

> viewpoint, arguing that since 1990 there has been an non-inclusion of the North-East Provinces… which would have most probably incurred negative growth rates during the post-1990 period. (Kelegama 2008, 133).

Though the state economic situation was adequate, the heavy military operations took their toll not only on the ability of the army, but also on the will of the population. The elections that brought Kumaratunga into power in 1994 represented the desire of the Sri Lankan population for peace, but that peace, as described above, was sabotaged by the efforts of the LTTE.

The LTTE took advantage of the ceasefire provided by the Bhutan peace talks to build its capacity to undertake action in Eelam War II. Militarily, the LTTE found itself able to undertake, and even win, large-scale operations against the Sri Lankan army. Support from Tamil Nadu in India also provided safe haven at the beginning of Eelam War II, but the LTTE's decision to assassinate Rajiv Ghandi, the ex-prime minister of India who, when in power, had chosen to send in the IPKF to Sri Lanka, was perhaps the biggest long-term blow to the LTTE's capacity. Killed in 1991, "Rajiv's assassination turned Indians hostile to the Tigers. They were seen as dangerous and untrustworthy. A decade later, sitting in his London suburban house, A.S. Balasingham, chief ideologue of the Tamil Tigers, admitted to me that in assassinating Rajiv Gandhi, the LTTE had committed 'a historical blunder'" (Pratap 2001, 126). Though co-ethnic Tamils in southern India would still support the LTTE, state support from India was drastically decreased.

I argue that the majority of Eelam War II can be considered a civil war campaign; the force on force battles, and control of territory seem to make this the logical distinction. However, the peace negotiations of 1994 did lead to at least some level of decreased violence, and that year could perhaps be considered an insurgent campaign, as the violence certainly did not stop, but did continue at levels below that of the previous year (Hashim 2013). The assassination of Rajiv

Ghandi by the LTTE appears to be the first serious blow to LTTE capacity; though it did not affect them so badly that they could not wage civil war, the lack of a friendly, and regionally powerful, neighbor no doubt decreased their capacity, though perhaps more in the long term than in the short term. The Sri Lankan state appeared still capable to continue battling the LTTE; their task was probably made easier given India's coldness following the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Ghandi.

Eelam War III, 1995-2000

A surprise sabotage attack by the LTTE that destroyed two Sri Lankan Navy gunboats signaled the end of negotiations and the start of Eelam War III, which lasted from 1995 to 2000. The fighting featured a series of major operations in Tamil areas, as the Sri Lankan army attempted to retake control of territory administered by the LTTE. The LTTE kept itself busy not only with these major conventional operations, but also a series of terrorist attacks in non-Tamil areas. One problem that the Sri Lankan army faced was the "manifest inability to undertake more than one offensive at any one time—due to lack of personnel and the complexity of commanding and coordinating large numbers of units at once—[which] allowed the LTTE almost always to guess correctly where and when an offensive was coming" (Hashim 2013, 103).

Eelam War III demonstrates the danger in classifying terrorist tactics as indicative of a terrorist group. The LTTE was definitely undertaking terrorist activities, but this is not all they were doing; force on force battles with the Sri Lankan army, including battles over territory, as described below, make all of Eelam War III arguably a civil war campaign.

The Sri Lankan government was able to retake the LTTE 'capital' of Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka in the latter half of 1995. The LTTE response to the loss of Jaffna was, in early 1996, to bomb the Central Bank in Sri Lanka's capital city, Colombo, a terrorist-style attack that killed

80 and wounded more than 1,000. The LTTE was also able to bounce back by handing the Sri Lankan army a serious defeat when it took control over the Mullaitivu army base in 1996. The town of Kilinochci was taken by government forces in 1996, and retaken by the LTTE in 1998. Battles for control of different areas of the jungle of Wanni, a LTTE safe haven, lasted from May 1997 through November of 1999. The LTTE staged a terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan Trade Center in 1997, and on a major Sinhalese shrine in 1998 (Hisham 2013).

The fighting came to a head with the battle for control of Elephant Pass, a major Sri Lankan army base which blocked LTTE routes from the city of Jaffna to the jungles of Wanni. Starting in December 1999, the LTTE eventually took control of the base in April 2000, where 15,000 Sri Lankan army troops were defeated by 5,000 LTTE fighters. The intense fighting that characterized Eelam War III eventually ground to a pause in 2000, as both sides, having taken massive casualties and losses of war material, needed a breather (Saez 2001; Hisham 2013). As one scholar put it, "Eelam War III showed signs of being a stalemate from the beginning, but it took six years of bloody fighting for both sides to exhaust themselves before a ceasefire was possible. The LTTE lacked the numbers to hold the towns they captured, and the government forces were too small and undisciplined to occupy the countryside" (Peebles 2006, 168).

The magnitude of state coercion did not change significantly throughout Eelam War III, though both sides continued to perpetrate war crimes against civilians. In 2000, Kumaratunga introduced a Constitutional Reforms Bill into the Sri Lankan Parliament. "The bill aimed to replace the existing Constitution by providing an increase in regional power sharing and administrative decentralization. The controversy over the bill arose because of the tenuous balance between increased decentralization and autonomy" (Saez 2001, 118).

These Reforms failed to be passed, and yet another attempt at resolving the political grievances of the Tamils failed.

In terms of state capacity, the Kumaratunga government, reversing from a peace policy into a renewal of conflict, retained power, but elections in 2001 would weaken that government's efforts. Despite the turmoil caused by the civil war, Sri Lanka continued both to hold elections and provide a functioning government, demonstrating a continued level bureaucratic and administrative capability, but the problems and limitations caused by the presence of xenophobic Sinhalese parties ensured that efforts to address Tamil grievances continued to stall.

The Sri Lankan government was still overseeing a functioning economy; "a review of the economic data show that Sri Lanka's economy continued to grow at rates which are surprising in the context of a civil war—an average rate of real growth of just over 5 percent in the six years 1995-2000 (Shastri 2004, 73). Yet indebtedness continued to grow; "by 1995 interest payments to service government debt were themselves 29.9 percent of current expenditures, with a figure close to 48 percent if amortization and interest payments were considered as a combined figure of true debt cost" (Marks 2007, 510). In addition, military spending by the Sri Lankan state continued to increase. In 1985, spending was 1.61 percent of GDP, by 1996 it was 6.02 percent (Winslow and Woost 200, 8).

Rotberg (1999:2) described the Sri Lankan army as lacking both intelligence and the necessary infrastructure to develop that intelligence, concluding that "the Sri Lankan army fights a committed, even fanatic, cadre of guerillas with overwhelming numbers but with insufficient training, knowledge, and motivation." Indeed, an estimate of LTTE forces in 1995 places them at about 16,000 total, while for a single major operation, the Sri Lankan army was able to assemble 40,000 troops (Peebles 2006, 168; Hashim 2013, 103). Yet numbers did not seem to hold the key

to military victory over the LTTE. In 1999, “despite numerical superiority, the 143,000 person government army had still not managed to gain battlefield superiority over the LTTE, whose troops number fewer than 10,000” (Rotberg 1999, 1).

As with the Sri Lankan state, the LTTE had significant capacity in Eelam War III, enough so that the two sides were forced to a draw. The end of Eelam War III saw the LTTE try to focus rebuilding capacity with an eye toward the future fight. Eelam War III proved to both sides that currently, neither could win – they were too evenly matched. The bloody stalemate, then, was a chance for both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state to attempt to out-capacitate the other before hostilities began again. Interestingly, this project’s hypotheses proposes that civil wars are more likely when state capacity is low, yet in the LTTE conflict, the Sri Lankan state appears to have maintained adequate capacity throughout the conflict. What is interesting, however, is that the Sri Lankan capacity, at least in economic terms, was focused on non-conflict regions. This suggests that a more micro-level understanding of state capacity is called for; when the conflict started, the state’s ability to provide desired educational resources to Tamil youth was limited. Perhaps state capacity, therefore, is something that should be examined in terms of geographical location within a state.

Caesura, 2001-2005

From 2001 to 2005, the antagonists engaged in negotiations that accomplished little, but gave both sides a chance to prepare for further conflict. An initial ceasefire, called by the LTTE in December 2000, was canceled in April 2001, and military activity and terrorist attacks were briefly resumed. However, the 11 September 11 2001 attack on the United States cast a worldwide pall on the tolerance of terrorist-style activities, and in December of 2001 a somewhat less precarious ceasefire was called by both sides. By February 2002, Norway had been selected

as the primary mediator and monitor of the peace negotiations (Hassan 2009, 8). Peace talks started in September 2002 and broke down in 2003, yet violence did not yet return. In part, this was due to the expressed desire of the government to continue with peace negotiations, and was also due in part to the desire of the LTTE to gain more time in which to rebuild capacity to continue to wage war. As one LTTE participant in those talks recounted, "What we were told by him [Prabhakaran] was to drag these talks out for about five years, somehow let the time pass by, meanwhile I will purchase arms and we'll be ready for the next stage of fighting" (Buerk 2007).

In 2004, two separate incidents combined to weaken the LTTE. That spring, the LTTE was rocked by internal strife when Colonel Karuna defected from the organization. The LTTE were headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, while Colonel Karuna had been tasked with command over eastern Sri Lanka. Backed by eastern Tamils, who felt that they had suffered more for the cause, yet lacked the political sway of the northern Tamils, Karuna posed a serious threat to Prabhakaran and the northern LTTE. The LTTE was able to militarily defeat Karuna's forces, but a large number Karuna's followers escaped into the jungle. Following his defeat, Karuna, backed by the Sri Lankan government, pursued a low-level guerilla war against the LTTE in the east (Hashim 2013, 119-131). Then, in December 2004, a major tsunami hit Sri Lanka, killing 30,000 people, including 3,000 LTTE military personnel. Between Karuna's defection and the tsunami, the numbers military personnel of the LTTE suffered a severe decline. Further, the tsunami destroyed massive amounts of infrastructure in LTTE-controlled regions.

Though the LTTE was weakened by the events of 2004, as 2005 began the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government both started breaking the terms of the ceasefire with regularity. The Norwegian-led monitoring commission counted 3,000 infractions by the LTTE and 300 by the Sri Lankan army. By the fall of 2005, direct clashes between LTTE and army personnel were

occurring. It was clear that another round of conflict was about to break out (Sengupta 2006). The LTTE surprised the Sri Lankan state with a peace proposal in 2003, the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). However, this proposal backfired by going too far; the ISGA basically called for the creation of a separate Tamil state, and it doing so, it provoked outrage among Sinhalese hardliners, and ultimately to an increase in coercion by the state, as Kumaratunga declared a state of emergency and took direct control of the ministries of Media, Interior, and Defense (Hashim 2013, 117-118).

In Sri Lankan elections in 2002, the United National Front won an overwhelming majority of seats. However, their pledge of unconditional negotiations with the LTTE was seen as going too far by President Kumaratunga. Kumaratunga declared a state of emergency, dissolved Parliament, and held new elections in 2004. Another series of elections in 2005 kept Kumaratunga in power but brought in a new prime minister. Though Kumaratunga was able to stay in power, the "frequent elections and shifting political alliances undermined the government's ability to implement policies" (Peebles 2006, 167).

Economically speaking, the ceasefire was necessary in order to help the economic situation. By 2001, both internal and external financial support to the state was struggling, as "the IMF package started falling apart and macroeconomic management had gone haywire. Budge deficit was 10.8 per cent of the GDP and the rate of inflation was 14.2 per cent, with the economy receding to negative growth (-1.5 per cent) for the first time since Independence. …A peace package was worked out with the LTTE with the hope of providing an economic dividend through aid mobilisation and revival of the economy" (Kelegama 2006, 25). In 2005, international relief funds to help rebuild after the devastation of the tsunami arrived, providing a much-needed inflow of cash (Kelegama 2006, 31).

The LTTE took advantage of the ceasefire period in the early 2000s to strengthen its own position. As members of the Sri Lankan government pointed out, "The LTTE was using negotiations as a form of warfare to march closer to its true goal of creating an independent state. …The LTTE continued to levy taxes, smuggle in arms and ammunition, recruit child soldiers, and kill members of rival Tamil groups and government personnel" (Hashim 2013, 116). In effect, the LTTE solidified its position as a proto-state. It also solidified the impression externally that the only solution to the LTTE would be defeat, since the idea of Tamil region in which the Sri Lankan government had no authority was not politically feasible. All was not well militarily with the LTTE. The defection by Colonel Karuna meant that the LTTE's control over the eastern province was weakened. Karuna later claimed, to a reporter, that his defection meant that the LTTE lost 70 percent of its fighting force (Buerk 2007). Given the source, this percentage may be suspect, but the defection certainly did decrease the LTTE's fighting capacity, especially in the eastern regions. Combined with the losses from the tsunami, the LTTE's military might was less than it had been during Eelam War III.

Perhaps the greatest change to rebel capacity came from the September 2001 attacks by al Qaeda on the United States. Though completely unrelated to the Sri Lankan crisis, these attacks led to an increasing international lack of tolerance towards violent rebels. The terrorist attacks of the LTTE would no longer be excusable in the eyes of the world community, and increasing international restrictions on money flows meant that the LTTE's smuggling, trafficking, and diaspora funding were all under increased scrutiny (Hashim 2013; United States Department of the Treasury 2009).

As with earlier LTTE peace negotiations and ceasefires, both sides used the time away from conflict to engage in capacity building, which would appear to support the general

argument I outline in this project about the importance of capacity on rebellion. Such a buildup of capacity is what then enabled the last outbreak of violence, Eelam War IV.

Eelam War IV, 2006-2009

Following a steady escalation of small attacks, Eelam War IV unofficially commenced in April 2006, when the LTTE closed the gates of a dam in the eastern province in order to threaten the security of 15,000 families in a government-controlled area (BBC News 2006). The gates were eventually reopened, though whether via state coercion or LTTE choice is unclear. What is clear is that a military battle for control of the dam eventually spread throughout the eastern province. In a reversal from previous Wars, the Sri Lankan army was able to gained several victories in key towns, and by July 2007, all of the eastern province was under government control (Hashim 2013, 133-143).

Once the eastern province was secured, the Sri Lankan army focused its efforts in the northern province, which was the heart of Tamil resistance and the headquarters of the LTTE. The LTTE controlled area at this time was bounded by Sri Lankan government areas of control to the north and south, and by the island's coastline on the east and west. The Sri Lankan army attacked along three simultaneous fronts, seeking to squeeze and eventually trap the LTTE. Starting in September 2007, the mass of Sri Lankan forces along the three fronts forced the LTTE was to commit troops to fighting on multiple fronts. The LTTE simply did not have the personnel to carry out the fight, and was forced to withdraw repeatedly through 2007 to 2009 (Hashim 2013, 143-163).

The Sri Lankan navy, which had been trying to counter the Sea Tigers since the start of hostilities, changed tactics during Eelam War IV. Instead of seeking out the multiple small fast craft the Sea Tigers possessed, the navy instead focused on building intelligence about the larger

ships used as floating storage for LTTE war material. In order to attack these larger ships, the Sri Lankan navy had to outfit itself with 'blue-water' capable ships, which it did, starting in 2000. This proved invaluable in Eelam War IV, when in "a 13-month period in 2006-7, SLN [Sri Lankan navy] forces tracked down and destroyed all eight Sea Tiger logistical freighters" (Hashim 2013, 176). As the effectiveness of the Sri Lankan navy increased, the LTTE were faced not only with the loss of collected supplies, but also the inability to replenish their land forces.

After three years of heavy fighting, Eelam War IV ended on May 19, 2009, with the final defeat of the remaining LTTE cadres and the death of their leader, Prabhakaran. Though the death of Prabhakaran did not end all support for Tamil autonomy, it did mark then end of organized military resistance to the Sri Lankan state. Neither side came out of the final battle with clean hands. The LTTE had used unwilling human shields in an effort to stop army attacks, and the army apparently announced civilian safe zones that were then the target of army fire (Human Rights Watch 2008, 2009, 2010).

While in previous iterations of the Eelam Wars the Sri Lankan army had lacked the personnel to stage multiple simultaneous offensives against the LTTE, or to police, hold, and stabilize territories it did recover, Eelam War IV saw a huge increase in the numbers of troops; "Between 2005 and 2009 the [Sri Lankan] armed forces increased from 125,000 men and women to around 450,000" (Hashim 2013, 188). This allowed the army to constantly harass the LTTE, and the LTTE, with fewer troops, could not successfully defend against the number and simultaneity of attacks.

Conversely, at the restart of hostilities in 2006, the LTTE was struggling to find the military personnel necessary for ongoing operations. Recruitment changed into forced

conscription of adults and children; such conscription did not help popular support for the LTTE (Human Rights Watch 2008). The increasingly war-weary Tamil population had fewer resources to give to the LTTE, and the effects of the Global War on Terror meant that overseas resources were also more difficult to come by. The LTTE also had poorer intelligence on the Sri Lankan military. Hashim (2013, 192) argues that this situation came about because, at the start of hostilities in 2005, the LTTE had to split its attention between a focus the situation in the eastern province following Colonel Karuna's rebellion and a focus on how the Global War on Terror had affected overseas resupply of war material.

As with previous Eelam Wars, the height violence, force on force battles, and control of territory by both sides means that this War should also be considered to be a civil war campaign. The end of hostilities was brought about, in part by the destruction of the LTTE's capacity; it was simply unable to fight any more. The changes in international support for the LTTE, most notably since 2001, further decreased the ability of the LTTE to reconstitute itself. Decades of war had reduced available conscripts due to attrition, and made war-weary the Tamil population, leading to a lack of new recruits for the LTTE. On the governmental side, military capacity had increased, and combined with the LTTE's decrease in external support, the Sri Lankan state was able to end the conflict.

The LTTE Rebellion: Implications

Both the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE were organizationally resilient; unfortunately, this meant that the conflict between the two combatants would drag out for over a quarter-century. The case study of the LTTE offers multiple insights into how the factors of coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity all influence choices of rebel campaign type. While the LTTE

undertook multiple years of civil war campaigns, not every year of every conflict reached that level of violence.

As described above, I argue that at the start of the conflict, Eelam War I had insurgent levels of violence from 1984-1986, with the first upswing to civil war in 1987 with the introduction of the IPKF forces, and then a decrease in violence back to insurgent campaigns in 1988 and 1989. Eelam War II started out at a higher level of violence; the first three years, from 1990 to 1993, were characterized as civil war. In 1994, the LTTE switched to an insurgent campaign with the propagation of the peace talks. All years of Eelam War III, from 1995 to 2000, were civil war. The caesura between Wars III and IV shows significant variation; 2001 was a civil war, while the implementation of the ceasefire in 2002 led to quite a decrease, with the LTTE not participating in an active campaign of civil war, terrorism, or insurgency, perhaps due to the new international situation following the September 2001 attacks. 2003 saw an insurgent campaign, but 2004, with the defection of Karuna and the tsunami, appear to have been enough of a distraction that, while the LTTE might have wanted to start again with conflict, all it was capable of was a terrorist campaign. The violence and infractions of the ceasefire ticked back up in 2005, as the LTTE started a new insurgent campaign. In the final Eelam War IV, all years from 2006 to 2009 were civil war campaigns.

Looking at these campaigns, the breaks in violence appear to have been deliberate choices, made in response to the capacity of the LTTE to carry out a campaign. Recall that scholarly analysis of the end of Eelam War III was that both sides had simply beaten each other to a bloody pulp and did not have the capacity to keep fighting. This is reflected in the only actual complete stop of LTTE campaigning, in 2002.

Again, coercive actions taken by the state which aggrieved the Tamil population appear to have provided the initial incitation to violence. Chosen state policies of Tamil discrimination, however, were exacerbated by a deepening economic crisis that encouraged radicalization by both Tamil and Sinhalese youth. Even the differences in religion between Sinhalese Buddhist and Tamil Hindus were present in this conflict.

The non-violent pro-Tamil political parties attempted to resolve grievances through political negotiations such as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam and Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pacts, but these pacts were never implemented. The impotence of attempts at political resolution, in combination with employment and educational discrimination, succeeding in radicalizing large numbers of Tamil youths. Coercion increased as the conflict went on. The Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1979 (originally temporary, made permanent by the Sri Lankan legislature in 1982) granted the state wide latitude in detaining, arresting, and trying Tamils (Marks 2007; Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1979). Once full-scale civil war broke out, both the Sri Lankan and Tamil forces routinely participated in acts of torture and civilian killings (Human Rights Watch 2008).

> What could have arrested the process, of course, was addressing the grievances of the insurgent mass base early on. Although insurgent leaders and followers were spurred by the same injustice, they responded in dissimilar fashion. Leaders sought structural change, revolution, as the route to liberation; followers looked for redress of immediate issues. Had the state early on driven a wedge between the two, what became a profound threat to the security of the state would likely have remained a law-and-order problem. (Marks 2007:515)

The Sri Lankan state started the conflict with moderately low capacity in both the bureaucratic and military fields. While historically the political elites in Ceylon had been comprised of both Tamils and Sinhalese who were able to cooperate, the opening the political establishment to majority rule meant that both Tamil and Sinhalese politicians pandered to their

ethnic bases in order to gain political power. By the time the LTTE came to power, the government was deeply factionalized. Any attempts to broker negotiated solutions to the conflict were invariably overthrown as the majoritarian politics of the state were dictated by Sinhalese nationalists. Overall, the Sri Lankan government was able to maintain capacity throughout the conflict, but the capacity of the LTTE was enough that, at least in the Tamil regions, the two sides were fairly evenly matched.

Though initially the actions of the radical Tamil youth movements were more along the lines of hooliganism, the inability of the central government to control a volatile situation, and even of encouraging anti-Tamil riots and pogroms following Tamil attacks led to rising popular support for Tamil rebels. The LTTE emerged from a crowded field of contenders to become the primary violence-oriented Tamil resistance organization with a high capacity for both violence and the creation of a proto-state. Growing from a small group of disaffected students, at its height the organization exercised at least partial control over significant parts of the northern and eastern territories of Sri Lanka and had a military branch that was large enough to challenge the Sri Lankan army in multiple conventional, force-on-force battles. Again, this case study provides evidence that the onset of sub-state violence tends to be predicated primarily by state coercion.

International support figured strongly in the LTTE's rebellion, as the group was able to finance its operations through a number of different tactics. "Its transnational network was huge and capable of raising as much as $300 million a year from a web of fake charities and international arms and drug smuggling, among other means" (Hashim 2013, 190). Yet the effects of an international crackdown on rebel group financing hurt this network, as did the increasing effectiveness of the Sri Lankan navy. The LTTE also received support from co-ethnics in southern India, as well as training. This support was long-lasting, "From the July/August riots of

1983 until the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the LTTE's main external refuge and support base had been in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu" (O'Duffy 2007, 272). However, their choice to assassinate a Indian ex-prime minister led to a decline in this area of international support as well.

In terms of military capacity, "[w]ith a troop strength estimated at twenty thousand, the Tamil insurgency was arguably one of the best organized nonstate military forces ever assembled, with the capacity to fight on land, at sea, and in the air" (Mampilly 2011, 94). Yet the activities of the LTTE, including forcible child conscription, harsh taxes and penalties imposed on Tamil populations under its control, and Prabhakaran's insistence on his role as the dictatorial, highly autocratic leader of all Tamils (and corresponding intolerance of any other resistance movement or rapprochement effort, despite the wishes of the population) all combined to undermine support for the LTTE, and the movement fell apart following his death.

As one scholar sums up the end of the LTTE, "By the time a quarter century of unceasing bloodletting passed, more than 90,000 people lay dead, many thousands were injured and maimed, the Tamils were in ruins, and there was no trace of Tamil Eelam" (Swamy 2010, 175). Yet, even though Tamil Eelam was never achieved, this does not mean that Tamil resistance is yet dead. Whether rebellion starts again may be more linked to the coercion—or lack thereof—practiced on Tamils by the Sri Lankan government, as well as the relative capability of Tamils and the state; "the violent exit strategy [the creation of a Tamil state] collapsed with the defeat of the LTTE. This does not mean aspiration for an independent state is not still there… it means that capability is no longer there. It is the government's task to ensure that both aspiration and capability to exit the state do not rear their heads again" (Hashim 2013, 47-48).

Chapter 9 - Conclusion

This research project sought to answer two questions. First, how do changes in state coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity affect the choices rebels make when choosing the type of campaign they will undertake? Second, how do the structural conditions that encourage the start of a rebel campaign differ from the conditions that affect rebel campaign choice in ongoing campaigns? In order to answer these questions, this project utilized theories on policy substitution and the linkage between ends, ways, and means in order to understand how the structural conditions facing a rebel group would serve to constrain their actions. This project also looked at how the relationship between these structural conditions could vary between the onset of rebel campaigns, and campaign choices made while conflict was already underway.

Ends, Ways, Means, and Campaigns

This research project argued that current conceptions of rebel activity which varied in length from multi-year civil wars to single-day terrorist events were in need of a theoretical underpinning that could generate unit commensurability and enable the comparison between the campaign choices that rebel groups made. In order to place acts of political violence into their larger context, I used policy substitution theory and the ends, ways, means framework provided by military science theory. These theories explain why actors are constrained by the means they have available to them to act, and develop ways to use those means in order to achieve their desired endstate. Applying those theories to rebel groups, therefore, would mean that explanations of rebel group action would first look at the constraints groups face on accomplishing action of any sort. Once those constraints are understood, the group then looks at the different options it has to affect the political behavior of the state in order to reach the

group's goals, or endstate. Within this framework, the rebel campaign is understood as the 'ways,' the different paths of activity it can take.

The advantage to understanding rebel choices as campaigns is that, as a standardized unit of analysis, organizing violence into campaigns permits comparisons between different types of rebel activity. Since, unfortunately, a large deal of conflict literature has to this point focused only on a specific type of conflict (and this may be in part due to the above-noted issue of how to compare multi-year wars to single day attacks), the development of the campaign unit of analysis provides a novel way for conflict researchers to understand how rebel groups make choices between several options, rather than only analyzing choices between one type of rebel violence and no violence at all.

The campaign concept is then applied to three types of sub-state violent activities: terrorism, insurgency, and civil war. Terrorist campaigns tend to be primarily focused on attacks which have little military significance but have a great deal of propaganda or shock value, and which target civilians rather than the security forces of the state. Insurgent campaigns tend to target security forces, and may utilize both terrorist and more war-like battle tactics. Civil war campaigns tend toward larger-scale battles and direct confrontation with the security forces of the state.[86] The advantage of using a campaign concept of rebel violence is that it provides insight into the overarching trend of the rebel way, rather than not seeing the civil war forest due to the terrorist attack trees.

[86] As discussed in previous chapters, however, the delineation between types of violence is not necessarily all that clear; as Findley and Young (2012) note, there can be terrorist acts of violence in the midst of a civil war.

Coercion and Capacity

Following the conceptualization of rebel campaigns, this project noted that there are basic structural conditions that can serve as predictor variables for the types of rebel campaign to come. In explaining how state coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity all contribute to rebel group campaign choice, this project offers a parsimonious categorization scheme into which much of the current theoretical literature on the causes of rebel activity can be placed.

Coercion refers actions taken by the state that lead to grievances against the state by members of its population. Capacity refers to the ability of an actor to enact and implement activities via administrative and/or coercive means across its sphere of control, and is sub-divided into state capacity and rebel capacity. While coercion, or grievances caused by coercion, are typically understood as one of the primary causes of sub-state political violence, the role of capacity is less well understood. Drawing from extant literature, the concept of capacity was disaggregated into administrative and military subcomponents, as both states and rebel groups may have capacity that varies by each subcomponent.

These five structural conditions, once identified, were then examined in terms of how they might affect rebel campaign choices. I hypothesize that the relationship between these variables and rebel campaigns is as follows. When coercion is at low or high levels, terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur; when coercion is at intermediate levels, insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur, and when coercion is high, civil war campaigns are more likely to occur. When state administrative capacity is at higher levels, terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur, and when state administrative capacity is at lower levels, insurgent campaigns and civil war campaigns are more likely to occur. When state military capacity is at higher levels, terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur, when state military capacity is at intermediate levels,

insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur, and when state military capacity is at lower levels, civil war campaigns are more likely to occur. When rebel administrative capacity is at lower levels, terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur, when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels, and insurgent campaigns and civil war campaigns are more likely to occur. When rebel military capacity is at lower levels, terrorist campaigns are more likely to occur, when rebel military capacity is at intermediate levels, insurgent campaigns are more likely to occur, and when rebel military capacity is at high levels, civil war campaigns are more likely to occur.

Finally, this project looked at potential differences in the means between rebel campaign onset and occurrence. I hypothesized that, given the high costs of rebelling, which potentially include death or imprisonment for the rebel, the onset year of any given rebel campaign type will have a stronger positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that same type of rebel campaign. In other words, the cost to start violent rebellion may be higher than the cost to continue in rebel action, once undertaken.

Latent Variable Development

This project developed a new, unique dataset that combined multiple data sources on both states and rebels. In order to better measure the variables of coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity, this project utilized latent variable techniques. Extant research on capacity and coercion typically is operationalized by simply selecting one or a few proxy variables, but this risks only capturing part of the larger underlying concept. By using latent variable techniques, which are still quite new to the field of conflict studies, this project was able to include several competing measures for each specific phenomenon, and better capture the full spectrum of that phenomenon. For each of the five constructs, latent variables were generated and tested. Confirmatory factor analysis

suggests that the latent variables, as created, are indeed capturing the underlying concept, and that these coercion and capacity variables do each appear to be a cohesive concept, with statistically significant shared variance. With the generation of these latent variables, the hypotheses proposed on the relationship between rebel campaign choice and these structural factors could then be examined.

Research Findings

Empirical Models

The hypotheses were quantitatively tested using multinomial probit models.[87] The results of this quantitative testing were mixed. The relationships found in the models provided only limited support for the hypotheses. Some of the results were quite surprising, in terms of their lack of support for relationships that previous research has found regarding rebel group choice and measures of capacity and coercion. Overall, it appears that including disaggregated measures of both rebel and state capacity in a model of sub-state conflict may offer new insights or paths for research on the relationship between these structural variables and the occurrence of different types of rebel campaigns. In particular, rebel administrative and military capacity, which, due to less-available data, has been less incorporated into quantitative research in this field, appears to have a large effect on rebel campaign choice. However, given the limited nature of rebel group data, more research, perhaps as more or better data becomes available, seems to be called for, in order to better understand the relationship examined in this project. What results this research did find are summarized below.

[87] Additional models were also generated; these models are presented in the Appendix A.

Terrorist campaigns were hypothesized to be more likely to occur when coercion is at how or high levels; when state administrative capacity is at higher levels; when state military capacity is at lower levels; when rebel administrative capacity is at lower levels; and when rebel military capacity is at lower levels. The expected U-shaped relationship with coercion was present and significant in Model 2, but not Model 1. Unexpectedly, there was also a significant positive linear relationship between coercion and terrorist campaigns for both Models 1 and 2. For state administrative capacity, the hypothesized positive linear relationship was not present in either Model 1 or 2. For state military capacity, the hypothesized negative linear relationship was not present in either model. In Model 1, there was significant positive linear relationship, and in Model 2, there was a significant negative quadratic relationship. The hypothesized negative linear relationship between rebel administrative capacity and terrorist campaigns was significant in Model 2, as was an unexpected positive quadratic relationship. The hypothesized negative linear relationship between rebel military capacity and terrorist campaigns was present and significant across both Model 1 and 2. Unexpectedly, there was also a significant positive quadratic relationship in Model 1.

Insurgent campaigns were hypothesized be more likely to occur when coercion is at intermediate levels; when state administrative capacity is at lower levels; when state military capacity is at intermediate levels; when rebel administrative capacity is at higher levels; and when rebel military capacity is at intermediate levels. The hypothesized negative quadratic relationship with coercion was not present in either Model 1 or 2. For state administrative capacity, the hypothesized negative linear relationship was not present in either model, but there was an unexpected significant positive linear relationship for both models. For state military capacity, the hypothesized negative quadratic relationship was not present in either model. The

hypothesized positive linear relationship between rebel administrative capacity and insurgent campaigns was significant in both models, as was an unexpected positive quadratic relationship. The hypothesized negative quadratic relationship between rebel military capacity and insurgent campaigns was not present in either model. Unexpectedly, there was a significant negative linear relationship and a significant positive quadratic relationship in both models.

Civil war campaigns were hypothesized to be more likely to occur when coercion is high; when state administrative capacity is at low levels; when state military capacity is at low levels; when rebel administrative capacity is at high levels; and when rebel military capacity is at high levels. The hypothesized positive linear relationship with coercion was not present in either Model 1 or 2. In Model 1, there were two unexpected significant relationships: a negative linear relationship, and a negative quadratic relationship. For state administrative capacity, the hypothesized negative linear relationship was not present in either model, but there was an unexpected significant positive quadratic relationship for both models. For state military capacity, the hypothesized negative linear relationship was not present in either model. The hypothesized positive linear relationship between rebel administrative capacity and civil war campaigns was not present in either model. However, Model 2 had both an unexpected significant negative linear relationship and an unexpected significant positive quadratic relationship. The hypothesized positive linear relationship between rebel military capacity and civil war campaigns was not present in either model.

Finally, the onset year of any rebel campaign was hypothesized to have a stronger positive relationship with levels of coercion than the overall incidence of that same type of rebel campaign. However, this claim was not supported by Model 3. This is a very counterintuitive

finding, and is not supported by majority of the extant literature, or by the qualitative case studies researched for this project.

Case Studies

Given the limited support for the hypotheses in the empirical analysis, this project turned to case studies to further examine the relationships between rebel choice and coercion and capacity. Thus, hypotheses were also examined via structured, focused case studies on the Mau Mau and LTTE rebel groups. Interestingly, when examining rebel group choices on a more detailed level, the relationships proposed by the hypotheses do appear to be present at times in both the Mau Mau and LTTE conflicts. The case studies also suggest some possible new approaches to future empirical research.

Within the case studies, some general trends stand out. In line with theories by Tilly (1978) and Gurr (1970), grievances arising from coercive actions by the state appear to have been the driving force behind the choice to rebel in both cases. Though quantitative analysis was unable to support this project's hypothesis that higher levels of coercion are required for the onset (rather than occurrence) of a rebel campaign, the case studies show how states' inability to appease aggrieved sub-populations appeared to be one of, if not the primary factor leading to the outbreak of violence, while state and rebel capacities influenced the specific expression of that violence.

State capacity, however, may have also contributed to the onset of rebel activity in the case of the LTTE, as it was a perceived discrimination in the provision of a limited government service, higher education, which led to grievances. Had the Sri Lankan state had more capacity with which to increase the availability of higher education, perhaps grievances would not have reached the point of rebellion. However, it is difficult to determine precisely how good Sri

Lanka's state capacity was prior to the onset of the LTTE rebellion. Despite its inability to provide higher education to all who wanted it, by other measures, such as per capita income, and overall governance structures, it was better off than neighboring countries (Sally 2006; Hashim 2013). The Kenyan state is similarly difficult to determine; Kenya was a prosperous colony prior to the rebellion, but had to build up a huge administrative and security apparatus during the rebellion in order to defeat the Mau Mau.

Both Kenya and Sri Lanka both had lower levels of state military capacity at the start of their rebellions, but both countries also managed to build local forces, and, in the case of Kenya, receive external forces as well. Alongside state military capacity, state administrative capacity appears, on the whole, to have increased in Kenya and been maintained at a moderate level in Sri Lanka during the course of their respective rebellions. This would appear to not support the hypothesis regarding civil war, which expects state capacity to be lower when insurgent or civil war campaigns are chosen. Instead, the case studies suggest that state capacity can be at moderate to high levels and rebels may still choose a civil war campaign.

Coercive actions were also involved in the continued occurrence of violence; higher levels of coercive state activity appeared to continue to inflame grievances throughout the course of the conflict, leading to increased popular support and rebel recruits. However, these effects of coercion were somewhat mitigated by other efforts of the state. For example, during the Mau Mau rebellion, the huge Pipeline imprisonment system was highly coercive, but the Swynnerton Plan, implemented about the same time, offered at least a little relief to the pressing problem of indigenous land rights.

Rebel capacity appeared to have a great effect on the choice of campaign once violence had started. Neither the Mau Mau nor LTTE were at particularly high capacity prior to onset,

though both groups had practiced smaller-scale violence. Once their respective rebellions had started, however, both groups were able to build capacity on the fly, thanks in part to sympathetic co-ethnic populations that provided support. In both cases, rebel capacity in terms of both bureaucratic and combatant forces grew, though not always steadily, throughout the conflict, but fell precipitously right before the rebellion ended. My hypotheses on the relationship between rebel capacity and campaign type appear to be generally supported by the case studies, for as rebel capacity grew in both cases, the scope of the violence generally progressed from terrorist to insurgent to civil war campaigns.

In both case studies, external actors were heavily involved in the conflict. For the LTTE, both the government and the rebels received external support. The Mau Mau in Kenya did not have international allies, but the Kenyan colonial government received substantial support from Great Britian, which funded and supported the colonial Kenyan administration in their massive counter-rebellion operation. The main effect of external support appeared to be an increase the capacity of whatever side was receiving that support. The last battles against the Mau Mau were fought with British troops and airforce. The LTTE, once a receiver of largess from India, made a political misstep with the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, after which it lost most of its Indian support. The LTTE was able to continue its rebellious activity following this loss of support, but eventually the Sri Lankan government was able to attrite the LTTE's capacity to fight.

Research Limitations

Though this project does offer a novel approach that provides conflict researchers with a new way of organizing rebel violence, there were limitations to the research presented above. First, the quantitative hypotheses testing was limited in terms of the data available. In particular,

information on the capacity of specific rebel groups was minimal. Unfortunately, data on rebel groups is difficult to come by; far better data exist on states than on non-state actors. Yet the available data on rebel groups, despite its weaknesses, do provide valuable comparability across multiple types of campaigns and countries. Hopefully, as better data on rebel groups becomes available, rebel administrative and military capacity can be measured more accurately.

The findings provided via qualitative analysis of the LTTE and Mau Mau are also somewhat limited. Geopolitically, both rebellions took place in countries that had experienced British colonial rule. Temporally, both rebellions took place in the latter half of the twentieth century. Due to these parallels, it is possible that certain of the conflict processes traced in these rebellion case studies shared similarities that other rebellions would not. For example, in both Sri Lanka and Kenya, the initial grievances towards the state arose in part, either directly or indirectly, from British colonial policies. Further case studies, perhaps more distant in time, and unrelated to the British Empire or colonialism more generally, might provide different nuances to our understanding of how coercion and capacity influence rebel activity.

Further Research

The results of the quantitative and qualitative analysis offer several suggestions for future research. First, coercion may not be as simple as looking to what coercive actions the state took in the year prior in order to understand what rebels will choose to do in the current year. Rather, the case studies suggest that coercion may be a longer-term process. The memory of coercive actions from many years past, as well as expectations about future coercion, may both affect the perceived level of current coercion. Thus, cumulative effects and future expectations may need to be incorporated into empirical models of the relationship between coercion and rebel group campaign choice. Also, the case studies suggest that rebels are acutely aware of their own

capacity, but may be somewhat less well informed about state capacity. Therefore, as well as actual capacity, the level of information states and rebel groups have vis-à-vis each other may need to be included when analyzing rebel group choices. Finally, geographic dispersion of capacity within a state may also matter; rebel capacity may match the capacity of the state, in a limited, given area, even if overall levels of state and rebel capacity are not equal. Though this sort of sub-state level disaggregated data is difficult to come by, both for state and rebel data, it might be possible to look at a small number of cases where this sort of data is available.

Additionally, analyzing rebel activity by utilizing an ends, ways, and means framework offers several promising avenues of future research. Within the framework, the concept of a campaign can be extended to include other forms of rebel activity. Further, the rebel ends, held constant in this project, could bear more scrutiny and perhaps further disaggregation.

This project examined only three types of violent rebel campaigns. Non-violent political protest campaigns were not differentiated from instances of peace. Yet non-violent forms of political protest by organized groups, such as marches, strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts, can both precede and exist concurrently with violent political protest. Further, there are other violent rebel actions that may reflect different campaign types, such as coup d'états, which seek to overthrow the government without prolonged violence.[88] Thus, one area of further research would be the expansion of the categorization of sub-state political protest activities into a larger spectrum of activity. Once this typology was generated (and if available cross-national data were sufficiently detailed), the effect of coercion, rebel capacity, and state capacity on all of these types of political protest could then be examined.

[88] Coup attempts which are not quickly successful, though, can evolve into more prolonged and mass-mobilized forms of violence.

In this project, the ends were held constant in order to focus on the relationship between the campaigns and means available for rebellion. The ends of rebellion were assumed to be focused on, in some way, changing the political behavior of the state. However, the ends could be further disaggregated. Some rebel groups may simply wish to change current discriminatory policies of the state, as the Mau Mau did; separatist rebel groups may wish to carve out a new state from territory taken away from the current state, as the LTTE as some points did; and some may wish to take over control of the state as a whole. While all of these ends do require a change in the political behavior of the state, the specific desired end sought could affect rebel campaign choices. On problem with such a disaggregation, however, is that the rebel group's desired endstate could conceivably change over time,

Conclusion

If we seek to understand rebellion, then we must, as preeminent military theorist Carl von Clausewitz suggested, also seek to understand why, and it what situations, rebellion arises. Rebellions, whether they are forces for positive or negative change, are likely be a recurrent form of conflict on the world stage for the foreseeable future, and rebel leaders who are able to maintain that role for any length of time will develop strategies in order to help them achieve their goals. Those strategies, translated into campaign plans of action, are ultimately expressed via violent acts. This project represents an attempt at better understanding how those acts are linked together into coherent campaigns, and how coercion, state capacity, and rebel capacity inform the campaign choices that rebel leaders make.

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Appendix A - Additional Empirical Models

As a robustness check, the results of two alternate versions of the quantitative models presented in Chapter 6 are provided below. The first set of results utilizes a slightly different methodology for multinomial probit, following a method outlined in Williams (2012). The second set of results utilizes multinomial logit modeling, following a method outlined in Herron (Kropko 2008). Results from these alternate specification models can be compared to that of the models presented in Chapter 6; results do not vary significantly.

Alternate Specification: Multinomial Probit Models

Following Williams (2012), the alternate specification multinomial probit models presented below provide results based on a slightly different way of calculating the squared variables. In the following models, the values of the squared terms of the independent variables—coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity—are not calculated prior to running the multinomial model. Rather, the squared terms are calculated during the actual model run itself, via cross-notational methods. This is a minor adjustment to the model, and overall estimates for the independent variables are the same as with the multinomial probit model provided in Chapter 6. These estimates can be seen in Table A.1. However, the estimates and confidence intervals calculated for each independent variable do vary slightly, as can been seen in Tables A.3 through A.6.

While squaring the variable within the model may provide a slightly more accurate measure of the effect of the independent variables across percentiles, the downside, as Williams (2012) notes, is that percentile estimates cannot be generated for the squared terms, only for the unaltered independent variables. Therefore, Figures A.1 through A.6 only provide percentile estimates and confidence intervals for coercion, state administrative capacity, state military

capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity, but not the squared terms for each of these variables.

Table A.1 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Models

	Variables	Model 5: All years, base	Model 6: All years, full	Model 7: Onset only, base	Model 8: Onset only, full
Terrorist	Coercion	0.4558888 (0.038)**	0.6999954 (0.037)**	-2.164233 (0.053)*	*Model did not converge.*
	Coercion^2	0.1209088 (0.163)	0.2823611 (0.025)**	-1.317285 (0.009)***	
	State Administrative Capacity	0.0320118 (0.632)	-0.0788487 (0.479)	0.3069065 (0.008)***	
	State Administrative Capacity^2	0.0054241 (0.698)	-0.0064269 (0.75)	0.0812818 (0.004)***	
	State Military Capacity	0.4609196 (0.018)**	0.4855203 (0.149)	1.153706 (0.199)	
	State Military Capacity^2	-0.1424742 (0.147)	-0.27746 (0.037)**	-0.0259824 (0.920)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity	-2.093313 (0.147)	-4.510391 (0.085)*	-10.55759 (0.447)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity^2	13.55092 (0.292)	31.96654 (0.026)**	-46.35024 (0.632)	
	Rebel Military Capacity	-5.014672 (0.015)**	-32.02971 (0.02)**	1.06828 (0.613)	
	Rebel Military Capacity^2	3.633653 (0.004)***	-72.62454 (0.21)	-0.2569697 (0.919)	
	Ethnic Fractionalization		0.9100504 (0.514)		
	Linguistic Fractionalization		0.0318643 (0.973)		
	Religious Fractionalization		1.187872 (0.117)		
	Population Density		0.002975 (0.014)**		
	Polyarchy		0.0401364 (0.113)		
	GDP per Capita†		-0.1975969 (0.389)		
	Mountainous Terrain		0.0068698 (0.415)		
	Forested Terrain		0.0148711 (0.149)		
	Constant	-3.035661 (0.000)***	-6.541821 (0.005)***	-6.445964 (0.000)***	

Table A.1 (cont.) Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Models

	Variables	Model 5: All years, base	Model 6: All years, full	Model 7: Onset only, base	Model 8: Onset only, full
Insurgent	Coercion	-0.1499687 (0.175)	-0.0617201 (0.639)	-0.145642 (0.468)	
	Coercion^2	-0.0216043 (0.63)	-0.0104499 (0.855)	-0.0709283 (0.39)	
	State Administrative Capacity	0.1169716 (0.003)***	0.1383648 (0.015)**	0.0095177 (0.896)	
	State Administrative Capacity^2	-0.0049638 (0.561)	0.0091033 (0.432)	0.000768 (0.956)	
	State Military Capacity	0.0601594 (0.493)	0.1299702 (0.245)	-0.0181498 (0.873)	
	State Military Capacity^2	-0.0014085 (0.969)	-0.0317161 (0.484)	0.0637101 (0.211)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity	2.790924 (0.000)***	2.965471 (0.004)***	2.63807 (0.001)***	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity^2	9.18415 (0.054)**	14.60889 (0.017)**	0.0256893 (0.997)	
	Rebel Military Capacity	-3.372204 (0.000)***	-2.933861 (0.000)***	1.413227 (0.022)**	
	Rebel Military Capacity^2	2.368605 (0.000)***	2.326829 (0.000)***	-3.700304 (0.003)***	
	Ethnic Fractionalization		-0.2380755 (0.621)		
	Linguistic Fractionalization		1.809232 (0.000)***		
	Religious Fractionalization		-1.03221 (0.001)***		
	Population Density		0.000362 (0.652)		
	Polyarchy		-0.0145657 (0.177)		
	GDP per Capita†		0.1624125 (0.088)*		
	Mountainous Terrain		0.0070855 (0.022)**		
	Forested Terrain		0.0018939 (0.666)		
	Constant	-0.5629137 (0.000)***	-2.286863 (0.005)***	-2.103746 (0.000)***	

Table A.1 (cont.) Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Models

	Variables	Model 5: All years, base	Model 6: All years, full	Model 7: Onset only, base	Model 8: Onset only, full
Civil War	Coercion	-0.5798075 (0.004)***	-0.3332844 (0.209)	-0.3664196 (0.561)	
	Coercion^2	-0.1333125 (0.086)*	-0.0700651 (0.516)	-0.3931579 (0.152)	
	State Administrative Capacity	0.0564765 (0.257)	0.125977 (0.114)	-5.942488 (0.000)	
	State Administrative Capacity^2	0.0250599 (0.027)**	0.0339347 (0.06)*	-0.8875362 (0.000)	
	State Military Capacity	-0.0880095 (0.455)	0.2121922 (0.265)	-0.0066828 (0.991)	
	State Military Capacity^2	0.0151252 (0.755)	-0.0914182 (0.218)	-0.4029145 (0.059)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity	-0.6960079 (0.342)	-5.267944 (0.000)***	-1.317589 (0.468)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity^2	-0.4971674 (0.943)	21.11043 (0.013)**	40.3167 (0.036)	
	Rebel Military Capacity	-0.609051 (0.256)	0.1477596 (0.804)	2.09427 (0.000)	
	Rebel Military Capacity^2	0.1570627 (0.812)	-0.1426276 (0.866)	-1.876002 (0.073)	
	Ethnic Fractionalization		1.184874 (0.128)		
	Linguistic Fractionalization		0.2911674 (0.610)		
	Religious Fractionalization		-1.010525 (0.015)**		
	Population Density		0.0024684 (0.020)**		
	Polyarchy		-0.0122942 (0.411)		
	GDP per Capita†		-0.3844237 (0.006)***		
	Mountainous Terrain		0.005237 (0.220)		
	Forested Terrain		0.019847 (0.000)***		
	Constant	-1.958928 (0.000)***	-0.7370183 (0.509)	-12.72692 (0.000)***	
	N	1309	1108	1309	
	Wald chi^2 (df)	241.584 (30)	316.422 (54)	213.768 (30)	
	Prob>chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.000	
	R^2 Count	0.616	0.596	0.936	
	R^2 Count (adjusted)	0.189	0.181	0.000	
	AIC	2299.139	1948.493	699.192	

**p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01*

†Logged variable

Table A.1 provides the overall results of the factor-variable notation version of the multinomial probit models. As with Model 4 presented in Chapter 6, Model 8, the full model for onset years, did not converge. The results presented in Table A.1, above, and Table A.2, below are identical to those of Table 6.5. This is as expected; the small differences caused by the introduction of cross-notational operators, however, can be seen below in Tables A.3, through A.5.

Table A.2 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit: Predicted Probabilities for Overall Campaign Choice

Probability of Choosing:	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	95% Confidence Interval	
Model 5: All years, base						
No Active Campaign	0.5258175	0.0129285	40.67	0.000	0.5004781	0.5511568
Terrorist Campaign	0.0191093	0.0036941	5.17	0.000	0.0118689	0.0263497
Insurgent Campaign	0.3933814	0.0125272	31.4	0.000	0.3688286	0.4179343
Civil War Campaign	0.0616918	0.0065165	9.47	0.000	0.0489197	0.074464
Model 6: All years, full						
No Active Campaign	0.5068654	0.0139152	36.43	0.000	0.479592	0.5341387
Terrorist Campaign	0.0212145	0.0040787	5.2	0.000	0.0132203	0.0292087
Insurgent Campaign	0.4117965	0.0135927	30.3	0.000	0.3851554	0.4384376
Civil War Campaign	0.0601236	0.0068219	8.81	0.000	0.0467529	0.0734944
Model 7: Onset years, base						
No Active Campaign	0.9358039	0.0067088	139.49	0.000	0.922655	0.9489529
Terrorist Campaign	0.0030025	0.0014957	2.01	0.045	0.0000709	0.005934
Insurgent Campaign	0.0581272	0.006418	9.06	0.000	0.0455482	0.0707062
Civil War Campaign	0.0030664	0.0014287	2.15	0.032	0.0002662	0.0058666
Model 8: Onset years, full						
No Active Campaign	*Model failed to converge.*					
Terrorist Campaign						
Insurgent Campaign						
Civil War Campaign						

The differences between the alternate specification and original multinomial probit models become evident when looking at the average marginal effects of each independent variable in the three models. This can be seen in Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5, which provide the overall average marginal effects for each independent variable. As discussed above, due to the

limitations of using the cross-notational operators, only average marginal effects for the original (not squared) variables were calculated and are presented below.

Table A.3 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 5

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: No Active Campaign						
Coercion	0.0304533	0.0145845	2.09	0.037	0.0018682	0.0590385
S. Admin Cap	-0.023782	0.0066393	-3.58	0	-0.0367947	-0.0107693
S. Mil Cap	-0.0097479	0.0150283	-0.65	0.517	-0.0392028	0.0197071
R. Admin Cap	-0.5073993	0.1265135	-4.01	0	-0.7553612	-0.2594375
R. Mil Cap	0.858392	0.1041942	8.24	0	0.6541752	1.062609
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
Coercion	0.0100574	0.0056144	1.79	0.073	-0.0009466	0.0210615
S. Admin Cap	-0.0010588	0.0016123	-0.66	0.511	-0.0042188	0.0021012
S. Mil Cap	0.0013043	0.0050149	0.26	0.795	-0.0085248	0.0111335
R. Admin Cap	-0.1485751	0.0515737	-2.88	0.004	-0.2496577	-0.0474924
R. Mil Cap	-0.1361287	0.079571	-1.71	0.087	-0.292085	0.0198276
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0225382	0.0142947	-1.58	0.115	-0.0505552	0.0054788
S. Admin Cap	0.0355357	0.0061922	5.74	0	0.0233992	0.0476721
S. Mil Cap	0.015651	0.0144757	1.08	0.28	-0.0127208	0.0440228
R. Admin Cap	0.7893635	0.1222061	6.46	0	0.5498439	1.028883
R. Mil Cap	-0.8190294	0.1053034	-7.78	0	-1.02542	-0.6126386
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0179728	0.0064029	-2.81	0.005	-0.0305222	-0.0054234
S. Admin Cap	-0.0106949	0.0042329	-2.53	0.012	-0.0189912	-0.0023986
S. Mil Cap	-0.0072076	0.0072645	-0.99	0.321	-0.0214457	0.0070305
R. Admin Cap	-0.1333853	0.0563039	-2.37	0.018	-0.2437389	-0.0230316
R. Mil Cap	0.0967735	0.0442642	2.19	0.029	0.0100172	0.1835298

**Standard error calculated using Delta method.*

Table A.4 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 6

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: No Active Campaign						
Coercion	0.0134768	0.0200724	0.67	0.502	-0.0258644	0.0528179
S. Admin Cap	-0.0201986	0.0111712	-1.81	0.071	-0.0420938	0.0016967
S. Mil Cap	-0.0084248	0.0184973	-0.46	0.649	-0.0446789	0.0278293
R. Admin Cap	-0.2097889	0.2550041	-0.82	0.411	-0.7095878	0.29001
R. Mil Cap	0.7127066	0.1562008	4.56	0	0.4065587	1.018854
Ethnic F.	-0.0174559	0.1177179	-0.15	0.882	-0.2481789	0.213267
Linguistic F.	-0.3873567	0.0845421	-4.58	0	-0.5530562	-0.2216571
Religious F.	0.243931	0.0763021	3.2	0.001	0.0943817	0.3934803
Pop. Density	-0.0002278	0.0001854	-1.23	0.219	-0.0005911	0.0001355
Polyarchy	0.0030424	0.0025895	1.17	0.24	-0.0020328	0.0081177
GDP**	-0.0132124	0.0234634	-0.56	0.573	-0.0591998	0.032775
Mountain T.	-0.0017949	0.0007444	-2.41	0.016	-0.003254	-0.0003358
Forest T.	-0.0015018	0.0010514	-1.43	0.153	-0.0035626	0.000559
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
Coercion	0.0053252	0.0077874	0.68	0.494	-0.0099378	0.0205882
S. Admin Cap	-0.0036126	0.0025621	-1.41	0.159	-0.0086343	0.001409
S. Mil Cap	-0.0088685	0.0041411	-2.14	0.032	-0.0169848	-0.0007522
R. Admin Cap	-0.2578324	0.0973072	-2.65	0.008	-0.448551	-0.0671138
R. Mil Cap	-0.1026762	0.2589742	-0.4	0.692	-0.6102563	0.4049038
Ethnic F.	0.0280214	0.0423647	0.66	0.508	-0.0550118	0.1110546
Linguistic F.	-0.0262756	0.0287305	-0.91	0.36	-0.0825864	0.0300352
Religious F.	0.0544122	0.0241821	2.25	0.024	0.0070161	0.1018082
Pop. Density	0.000079	0.0000402	1.96	0.05	9.28E-08	0.0001578
Polyarchy	0.0014795	0.0007973	1.86	0.064	-0.0000832	0.0030422
GDP**	-0.0073382	0.0068822	-1.07	0.286	-0.020827	0.0061507
Mountain T.	0.0000924	0.0002549	0.36	0.717	-0.0004071	0.0005919
Forest T.	0.000372	0.0003153	1.18	0.238	-0.000246	0.00099
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0085978	0.0197839	-0.43	0.664	-0.0473736	0.030178
S. Admin Cap	0.0294978	0.0109354	2.7	0.007	0.0080649	0.0509308
S. Mil Cap	0.0181861	0.0185791	0.98	0.328	-0.0182283	0.0546005
R. Admin Cap	1.03456	0.2473771	4.18	0	0.5497101	1.519411
R. Mil Cap	-0.7350903	0.1709733	-4.3	0	-1.070192	-0.3999887
Ethnic F.	-0.1124525	0.117088	-0.96	0.337	-0.3419407	0.1170357
Linguistic F.	0.4491257	0.0840059	5.35	0	0.2844772	0.6137743
Religious F.	-0.2462365	0.0779422	-3.16	0.002	-0.3990004	-0.0934726
Pop. Density	-0.0000323	0.0001987	-0.16	0.871	-0.0004218	0.0003572
Polyarchy	-0.0038803	0.0026028	-1.49	0.136	-0.0089817	0.001221
GDP**	0.0566711	0.0224278	2.53	0.012	0.0127134	0.1006288
Mountain T.	0.0015264	0.0007476	2.04	0.041	0.0000612	0.0029917
Forest T.	-0.0003856	0.0010497	-0.37	0.713	-0.0024431	0.0016718

Table A.4 (cont.) Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 6

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0102041	0.0103448	-0.99	0.324	-0.0304796	0.0100715
S. Admin Cap	-0.0056866	0.0057083	-1	0.319	-0.0168747	0.0055014
S. Mil Cap	-0.0008927	0.0083549	-0.11	0.915	-0.0172681	0.0154826
R. Admin Cap	-0.5669375	0.1387632	-4.09	0	-0.8389083	-0.2949666
R. Mil Cap	0.1250599	0.0464487	2.69	0.007	0.0340221	0.2160977
Ethnic F.	0.1018866	0.0602121	1.69	0.091	-0.0161269	0.2199002
Linguistic F.	-0.0354935	0.0438125	-0.81	0.418	-0.1213644	0.0503774
Religious F.	-0.0521063	0.0323124	-1.61	0.107	-0.1154375	0.0112249
Pop. Density	0.0001811	0.0000834	2.17	0.03	0.0000177	0.0003446
Polyarchy	-0.0006416	0.0011563	-0.55	0.579	-0.0029079	0.0016247
GDP**	-0.0361204	0.0109076	-3.31	0.001	-0.0574988	-0.014742
Mountain T.	0.0001761	0.0003313	0.53	0.595	-0.0004732	0.0008254
Forest T.	0.0015153	0.0004554	3.33	0.001	0.0006228	0.0024079

**Standard error calculated using Delta method.*

Table A.5 Alternate Specification Multinomial Probit Average Marginal Effects, Model 7

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: No Active Campaign						
Coercion	0.0001534	0.0069089	0.02	0.982	-0.0133878	0.0136946
S. Admin Cap	-0.0004865	0.0039628	-0.12	0.902	-0.0082535	0.0072804
S. Mil Cap	-0.0139626	0.0084544	-1.65	0.099	-0.0305329	0.0026077
R. Admin Cap	-0.2051229	0.0686744	-2.99	0.003	-0.3397222	-0.0705235
R. Mil Cap	-0.1462935	0.0544604	-2.69	0.007	-0.2530339	-0.0395531
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0007989	0.00111	-0.72	0.472	-0.0029746	0.0013767
S. Admin Cap	0.0018734	0.0015612	1.2	0.23	-0.0011864	0.0049333
S. Mil Cap	0.0054653	0.0031156	1.75	0.079	-0.0006412	0.0115717
R. Admin Cap	-0.0154028	0.0162781	-0.95	0.344	-0.0473072	0.0165016
R. Mil Cap	0.0044283	0.0119042	0.37	0.71	-0.0189035	0.0277601
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0004407	0.0067583	-0.07	0.948	-0.0136867	0.0128053
S. Admin Cap	0.0005686	0.0035275	0.16	0.872	-0.0063451	0.0074824
S. Mil Cap	0.0098466	0.0078541	1.25	0.21	-0.0055471	0.0252403
R. Admin Cap	0.2111032	0.064872	3.25	0.001	0.0839563	0.33825
R. Mil Cap	0.1358456	0.0537625	2.53	0.012	0.0304731	0.2412182
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Coercion	0.0010815	0.0011663	0.93	0.354	-0.0012045	0.0033674
S. Admin Cap	-0.0019541	0.0010208	-1.91	0.056	-0.0039548	0.0000467
S. Mil Cap	-0.0013617	0.0013602	-1	0.317	-0.0040277	0.0013043
R. Admin Cap	0.0094304	0.0182195	0.52	0.605	-0.0262791	0.04514
R. Mil Cap	0.0059788	0.0031976	1.87	0.062	-0.0002885	0.012246

**Standard error calculated using Delta method.*

Alternate Specification: Multinomial Logit Models

As discussed in Chapter 6, multinomial probit models were chosen as the main model to be presented over multinomial logit models due to the lack of a requirement for the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. This project limits its scope to providing hypotheses about three types of violent rebel campaigns—terrorist, insurgent, and civil war—and one other category, the absence of a violent campaign. Since this absence of violence is not further parsed into types of civil protest campaigns, or the lack thereof, there is a possibility that civil campaigns not captured in this project's theoretical model could affect

preferences for violent campaign choice. Thus, multinomial probit, which does not require the IIA, was used as the primary modeling choice for this chapter.

However, Kropko (2008) argues that, even when the assumption of IIA is violated, multinomial logit models may still provide estimation as, or even better, than multinomial probit models. Therefore, as a robustness check, the models—as described in Chapter 6, with no changes other than switching the estimation from multinomial probit to multinomial logit—were run, and these estimates can be seen in Table A.6. While the estimates from the multinomial logit models are slightly different (as would be expected by a different estimation methodology), the sign and significance of the variables is similar to that of the multinomial probit models presented in Chapter 6. The estimates and confidence intervals calculated for each independent variable also vary slightly, but also remain roughly in line with the Chapter 6 models. These estimates can be seen in Tables A.7 through A.10.

Table A.6 Multinomial Logit Models

	Variables	Model 9: All years, base	Model 10: All years, full	Model 11: Onset only, base	Model 12: Onset only, full
Terrorist	Coercion	0.9573912 (0.013)**	1.290855 (0.037)**	-4.124041 (0.139)	*Model did not converge.*
	Coercion^2	0.2597726 (0.089)*	0.5039265 (0.029)	-2.473622 (0.038)**	
	State Administrative Capacity	-0.0017479 (0.988)	-0.1806413 (0.326)	0.594157 (0.010)**	
	State Administrative Capacity^2	0.0018876 (0.939)	-0.0119711 (0.743)	0.1486094 (0.014)**	
	State Military Capacity	0.6959919 (0.103)	0.7394223 (0.386)	2.110118 (0.362)	
	State Military Capacity^2	-0.2654476 (0.225)	-0.452844 (0.131)	-0.0575401 (0.933)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity	-5.189742 (0.123)	-7.72334 (0.215)	-18.83561 (0.463)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity^2	19.84958 (0.517)	51.53015 (0.079)*	-81.806 (0.675)	
	Rebel Military Capacity	-10.67934 (0.038)**	-58.77888 (0.027)**	1.608751 (0.715)	
	Rebel Military Capacity^2	7.417685 (0.013)**	-140.7398 (0.201)	0.0286368 (0.996)	
	Ethnic Fractionalization		1.671614 (0.607)		
	Linguistic Fractionalization		-0.2189392 (0.910)		
	Religious Fractionalization		1.825242 (0.225)		
	Population Density		0.0042958 (0.035)**		
	Polyarchy		0.0719755 (0.119)		
	GDP per Capita†		-0.3376232 (0.429)		
	Mountainous Terrain		0.0059045 (0.751)		
	Forested Terrain		0.0218979 (0.285)		
	Constant	-5.120962 (0.000)***	-10.54288 (0.020)**	-10.68168 (0.000)***	

Table A.6 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Models

	Variables	Model 9: All years, base	Model 10: All years, full	Model 11: Onset only, base	Model 12: Onset only, full
Insurgent	Coercion	-0.1557139 (0.239)	-0.080995 (0.612)	-0.2104546 (0.513)	
	Coercion^2	-0.0224845 (0.674)	-0.0229005 (0.745)	-0.1060557 (0.424)	
	State Administrative Capacity	0.1357461 (0.004)***	0.1675655 (0.016)**	0.0045921 (0.971)	
	State Administrative Capacity^2	-0.0070091 (0.490)	0.0103437 (0.458)	-0.0000682 (0.998)	
	State Military Capacity	0.082771 (0.449)	0.1627951 (0.249)	-0.0535837 (0.749)	
	State Military Capacity^2	-0.0068324 (0.882)	-0.0422291 (0.463)	0.1038049 (0.170)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity	3.233585 (0.000)***	3.334763 (0.008)***	4.005962 (0.002)***	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity^2	11.25988 (0.050)**	16.67508 (0.027)**	-2.134785 (0.860)	
	Rebel Military Capacity	-4.172116 (0.000)***	-3.527031 (0.000)***	2.037299 (0.024)**	
	Rebel Military Capacity^2	2.896129 (0.000)***	2.823427 (0.003)***	-5.707332 (0.006)***	
	Ethnic Fractionalization		-0.2813544 (0.632)		
	Linguistic Fractionalization		2.15019 (0.000)***		
	Religious Fractionalization		-1.212426 (0.002)***		
	Population Density		0.000311 (0.761)		
	Polyarchy		-0.0164172 (0.251)		
	GDP per Capita†		0.1840222 (0.116)		
	Mountainous Terrain		0.0090335 (0.017)**		
	Forested Terrain		0.0022159 (0.682)		
	Constant	-0.6802238 (0.000)***	-2.65243 (0.008)***	-2.60564 (0.000)***	

Table A.6 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Models

	Variables	Model 9: All years, base	Model 10: All years, full	Model 11: Onset only, base	Model 12: Onset only, full
Civil War	Coercion	-0.9538861 (0.004)***	-0.5852344 (0.155)	-0.7617366 (0.610)	
	Coercion^2	-0.2235323 (0.074)*	-0.1225565 (0.466)	-0.7788121 (0.248)	
	State Administrative Capacity	0.0605669 (0.436)	0.1936433 (0.149)	-11.2568 (0.000)***	
	State Administrative Capacity^2	0.0385814 (0.024)**	0.0452305 (0.117)	-1.659933 (0.000)***	
	State Military Capacity	-0.1657487 (0.354)	0.2643258 (0.426)	-0.0097024 (0.994)	
	State Military Capacity^2	0.0390471 (0.596)	-0.0942361 (0.448)	-0.7395961 (0.075)*	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity	-1.596605 (0.187)	-8.460622 (0.001)***	-2.793023 (0.356)	
	Rebel Administrative Capacity^2	-1.805408 (0.880)	34.59906 (0.007)***	71.57672 (0.008)***	
	Rebel Military Capacity	-0.3522915 (0.705)	0.8775174 (0.409)	3.641582 (0.011)**	
	Rebel Military Capacity^2	-0.149756 (0.892)	-1.095381 (0.496)	-2.989295 (0.025)**	
	Ethnic Fractionalization		2.380135 (0.059)*		
	Linguistic Fractionalization		-0.1782673 (0.850)		
	Religious Fractionalization		-1.148923 (0.085)*		
	Population Density		0.0041253 (0.012)**		
	Polyarchy		-0.0180442 (0.456)		
	GDP per Capita†		-0.6571758 (0.009)***		
	Mountainous Terrain		0.0047552 (0.479)		
	Forested Terrain		0.0293302 (0.001)***		
	Constant	-2.871533 (0.000)***	-0.5734196 (0.763)	-23.01554 (0.001)**	
	N	1309	1108	1309	
	Wald chi^2 (df)	229.623	313.261	449.458	
	Prob>chi^2	0.0000	0.000	0.000	
	McFadden R^2	0.1055	0.139	0.080	
	R^2 Count	0.618	0.601	0.937	
	R^2 Count (adjusted)	0.194	0.192	0.012	
	AIC	2296.996	1950.396	698.675	

***p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01*

†Logged variable

Table A.7 Multinomial Logit: Predicted Probabilities for Overall Campaign Choice

Probability of Choosing:	Margin	Delta-method Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	95% Confidence Interval	
Model 9: All years, base						
No Active Campaign	0.526356	0.0129424	40.67	0	0.5009894	0.5517226
Terrorist Campaign	0.0190985	0.003669	5.21	0	0.0119074	0.0262897
Insurgent Campaign	0.3926662	0.0125755	31.22	0	0.3680187	0.4173136
Civil War Campaign	0.0618793	0.0065471	9.45	0	0.0490472	0.0747114
Model 10: All years, full						
No Active Campaign	0.5063177	0.0139689	36.25	0	0.4789392	0.5336962
Terrorist Campaign	0.0216607	0.0041449	5.23	0	0.0135368	0.0297845
Insurgent Campaign	0.4115523	0.0137174	30	0	0.3846667	0.4384379
Civil War Campaign	0.0604693	0.0068889	8.78	0	0.0469674	0.0739713
Model 11: Onset years, base						
No Active Campaign	0.9358289	0.0066869	139.95	0	0.9227228	0.948935
Terrorist Campaign	0.0030558	0.001515	2.02	0.044	0.0000865	0.006025
Insurgent Campaign	0.0580596	0.0064102	9.06	0	0.0454958	0.0706234
Civil War Campaign	0.0030558	0.0013784	2.22	0.027	0.0003542	0.0057573
Model 12: Onset years, full						
No Active Campaign	*Model failed to converge.*					
Terrorist Campaign						
Insurgent Campaign						
Civil War Campaign						

Table A.8 Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 9

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: No Active Campaign						
Coercion	0.0524635	0.0277922	1.89	0.059	-0.0020082	0.1069352
Coercion^2	0.009519	0.0112658	0.84	0.398	-0.0125616	0.0315997
S. Admin Cap	-0.0261324	0.0095954	-2.72	0.006	-0.044939	-0.0073259
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.0000976	0.002048	-0.05	0.962	-0.0041115	0.0039164
S. Mil Cap	-0.0147242	0.0215178	-0.68	0.494	-0.0568983	0.0274498
S. Mil Cap^2	0.00206	0.0091708	0.22	0.822	-0.0159144	0.0200344
R. Admin Cap	-0.4756772	0.1298488	-3.66	0	-0.7301761	-0.2211783
R. Admin Cap^2	-2.098056	1.217105	-1.72	0.085	-4.483538	0.2874253
R. Mil Cap	0.8398766	0.100761	8.34	0	0.6423887	1.037365
R. Mil Cap^2	-0.5695096	0.1241768	-4.59	0	-0.8128916	-0.3261276
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
Coercion	0.0195269	0.0073385	2.66	0.008	0.0051437	0.0339101
Coercion^2	0.0050902	0.002776	1.83	0.067	-0.0003507	0.010531
S. Admin Cap	-0.0012474	0.0019697	-0.63	0.527	-0.005108	0.0026131
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0000476	0.0004352	0.11	0.913	-0.0008053	0.0009005
S. Mil Cap	0.0119234	0.0080893	1.47	0.14	-0.0039314	0.0277783
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0047279	0.0039842	-1.19	0.235	-0.0125367	0.0030809
R. Admin Cap	-0.1180741	0.0618431	-1.91	0.056	-0.2392844	0.0031362
R. Admin Cap^2	0.2615516	0.5445523	0.48	0.631	-0.8057514	1.328855
R. Mil Cap	-0.155076	0.0919144	-1.69	0.092	-0.3352249	0.0250728
R. Mil Cap^2	0.1081904	0.0535753	2.02	0.043	0.0031848	0.2131961
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign						
Coercion	-0.020339	0.0269721	-0.75	0.451	-0.0732034	0.0325254
Coercion^2	-0.0021715	0.0108397	-0.2	0.841	-0.0234168	0.0190739
S. Admin Cap	0.0267963	0.0090732	2.95	0.003	0.0090131	0.0445795
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.0022693	0.0020253	-1.12	0.263	-0.0062388	0.0017002
S. Mil Cap	0.0146886	0.0224479	0.65	0.513	-0.0293085	0.0586856
S. Mil Cap^2	0.0000128	0.009439	0	0.999	-0.0184873	0.0185129
R. Admin Cap	0.7451776	0.1214102	6.14	0	0.5072179	0.9831372
R. Admin Cap^2	2.196557	1.163923	1.89	0.059	-0.0846891	4.477804
R. Mil Cap	-0.7645276	0.1035354	-7.38	0	-0.9674532	-0.5616019
R. Mil Cap^2	0.5388987	0.1152859	4.67	0	0.3129426	0.7648549

Table A.8 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 9

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0516525	0.0188984	-2.73	0.006	-0.0886927	-0.0146122
Coercion^2	-0.012438	0.0070488	-1.76	0.078	-0.0262534	0.0013774
S. Admin Cap	0.0005836	0.004158	0.14	0.888	-0.007566	0.0087331
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0023193	0.0009562	2.43	0.015	0.0004451	0.0041934
S. Mil Cap	-0.0118885	0.0101345	-1.17	0.241	-0.0317518	0.0079748
S. Mil Cap^2	0.0026553	0.0041282	0.64	0.52	-0.0054358	0.0107464
R. Admin Cap	-0.1514207	0.0662405	-2.29	0.022	-0.2812498	-0.0215916
R. Admin Cap^2	-0.3600738	0.6628683	-0.54	0.587	-1.659272	0.9391242
R. Mil Cap	0.0797384	0.0505617	1.58	0.115	-0.0193608	0.1788375
R. Mil Cap^2	-0.0775874	0.059248	-1.31	0.19	-0.1937113	0.0385364

**Standard error calculated using Delta method.*

Table A.9 Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 10

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: No Active Campaign						
Coercion	0.0220249	0.0326844	0.67	0.5	-0.0420353	0.0860851
Coercion^2	0.0037558	0.0141315	0.27	0.79	-0.0239414	0.0314531
S. Admin Cap	-0.0342661	0.0139862	-2.45	0.014	-0.0616786	-0.0068536
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.0031442	0.0028619	-1.1	0.272	-0.0087534	0.002465
S. Mil Cap	-0.0431417	0.0288458	-1.5	0.135	-0.0996784	0.0133951
S. Mil Cap^2	0.0141239	0.0115067	1.23	0.22	-0.0084288	0.0366766
R. Admin Cap	-0.2649313	0.2597383	-1.02	0.308	-0.7740091	0.2441464
R. Admin Cap^2	-4.455257	1.501967	-2.97	0.003	-7.399057	-1.511456
R. Mil Cap	1.078702	0.2467173	4.37	0	0.5951453	1.56226
R. Mil Cap^2	0.683954	0.9545063	0.72	0.474	-1.186844	2.554752
Ethnic F.	-0.0378466	0.1198375	-0.32	0.752	-0.2727239	0.1970306
Linguistic F.	-0.3739781	0.0851957	-4.39	0	-0.5409585	-0.2069977
Religious F.	0.2358484	0.0772548	3.05	0.002	0.0844318	0.3872651
Pop. Density	-0.0002187	0.0001884	-1.16	0.246	-0.0005879	0.0001505
Polyarchy	0.0028846	0.0026289	1.1	0.273	-0.0022679	0.0080371
GDP**	-0.0094213	0.0243539	-0.39	0.699	-0.0571541	0.0383115
Mountain T.	-0.0017983	0.0007541	-2.38	0.017	-0.0032762	-0.0003203
Forest T.	-0.0014848	0.0010755	-1.38	0.167	-0.0035928	0.0006231
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
Coercion	0.0257982	0.0119602	2.16	0.031	0.0023566	0.0492399
Coercion^2	0.0098534	0.0044836	2.2	0.028	0.0010656	0.0186411
S. Admin Cap	-0.0052153	0.0035409	-1.47	0.141	-0.0121553	0.0017248
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.0003802	0.0006857	-0.55	0.579	-0.0017242	0.0009638
S. Mil Cap	0.0120496	0.0163015	0.74	0.46	-0.0199006	0.0439999
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0080041	0.0058291	-1.37	0.17	-0.019429	0.0034207
R. Admin Cap	-0.1656245	0.1174896	-1.41	0.159	-0.3958998	0.0646509
R. Admin Cap^2	0.76907	0.5526478	1.39	0.164	-0.3140998	1.85224
R. Mil Cap	-1.074078	0.5261909	-2.04	0.041	-2.105393	-0.0427628
R. Mil Cap^2	-2.673055	2.111529	-1.27	0.206	-6.811575	1.465465
Ethnic F.	0.0310216	0.0610677	0.51	0.611	-0.088669	0.1507122
Linguistic F.	-0.0240021	0.0360673	-0.67	0.506	-0.0946927	0.0466884

Table A.9 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 10

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Religious F.	0.047161	0.0293302	1.61	0.108	-0.0103252	0.1046472
Pop. Density	0.0000726	0.0000417	1.74	0.081	-9.06E-06	0.0001543
Polyarchy	0.001531	0.0008982	1.7	0.088	-0.0002294	0.0032914
GDP**	-0.0072283	0.0079157	-0.91	0.361	-0.0227427	0.0082861
Mountain T.	0.0000205	0.0003458	0.06	0.953	-0.0006572	0.0006981
Forest T.	0.0003536	0.0003855	0.92	0.359	-0.000402	0.0011091
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0171957	0.0332536	-0.52	0.605	-0.0823716	0.0479802
Coercion^2	-0.0070126	0.0146192	-0.48	0.631	-0.0356658	0.0216405
S. Admin Cap	0.032456	0.0138538	2.34	0.019	0.005303	0.0596089
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0013512	0.0027747	0.49	0.626	-0.0040871	0.0067896
S. Mil Cap	0.0214631	0.0300818	0.71	0.476	-0.0374961	0.0804223
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0026168	0.0121894	-0.21	0.83	-0.0265076	0.021274
R. Admin Cap	0.928741	0.2539406	3.66	0	0.4310265	1.426456
R. Admin Cap^2	2.275687	1.506942	1.51	0.131	-0.6778661	5.22924
R. Mil Cap	-0.1960283	0.2893947	-0.68	0.498	-0.7632316	0.3711749
R. Mil Cap^2	1.921261	1.072858	1.79	0.073	-0.1815019	4.024023
Ethnic F.	-0.1209439	0.122265	-0.99	0.323	-0.3605789	0.118691
Linguistic F.	0.4496523	0.0871329	5.16	0	0.278875	0.6204296
Religious F.	-0.2446848	0.0795838	-3.07	0.002	-0.4006661	-0.0887034
Pop. Density	-0.0000578	0.0002165	-0.27	0.79	-0.000482	0.0003665
Polyarchy	-0.003706	0.0027003	-1.37	0.17	-0.0089984	0.0015865
GDP**	0.054196	0.0230722	2.35	0.019	0.0089753	0.0994167
Mountain T.	0.0017161	0.0007761	2.21	0.027	0.000195	0.0032372
Forest T.	-0.0003288	0.0010928	-0.3	0.763	-0.0024707	0.0018131
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0306272	0.0215234	-1.42	0.155	-0.0728122	0.0115578
Coercion^2	-0.0065965	0.0087588	-0.75	0.451	-0.0237635	0.0105704
S. Admin Cap	0.0070254	0.0067157	1.05	0.296	-0.0061371	0.0201878
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0021731	0.0014652	1.48	0.138	-0.0006987	0.005045
S. Mil Cap	0.0096288	0.0174885	0.55	0.582	-0.0246481	0.0439057
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0035029	0.0065258	-0.54	0.591	-0.0162932	0.0092874
R. Admin Cap	-0.4981824	0.1356015	-3.67	0	-0.7639565	-0.2324084
R. Admin Cap^2	1.410489	0.6404568	2.2	0.028	0.1552164	2.665761
R. Mil Cap	0.1914035	0.0603672	3.17	0.002	0.0730859	0.3097211
R. Mil Cap^2	0.0678403	0.1742579	0.39	0.697	-0.2736989	0.4093794
Ethnic F.	0.1277682	0.0647498	1.97	0.048	0.0008609	0.2546755
Linguistic F.	-0.051672	0.047923	-1.08	0.281	-0.1455993	0.0422553
Religious F.	-0.0383243	0.0341954	-1.12	0.262	-0.1053461	0.0286974
Pop. Density	0.0002038	0.0000877	2.32	0.02	0.0000319	0.0003757
Polyarchy	-0.0007097	0.0012401	-0.57	0.567	-0.0031401	0.0017208
GDP**	-0.0375461	0.0127027	-2.96	0.003	-0.062443	-0.0126493
Mountain T.	0.0000617	0.0003449	0.18	0.858	-0.0006142	0.0007376
Forest T.	0.0014601	0.00048	3.04	0.002	0.0005193	0.0024009

**Standard error calculated using Delta method.*

***Logged variable*

Table A.10 Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 11

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: No Active Campaign						
Coercion	0.0248617	0.0200451	1.24	0.215	-0.0144261	0.0641494
Coercion^2	0.0146667	0.0087168	1.68	0.092	-0.002418	0.0317514
S. Admin Cap	0.027242	0.0171826	1.59	0.113	-0.0064353	0.0609193
S. Admin Cap^2	0.003885	0.0025568	1.52	0.129	-0.0011262	0.0088962
S. Mil Cap	-0.0030578	0.0119811	-0.26	0.799	-0.0265404	0.0204247
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0034755	0.0047741	-0.73	0.467	-0.0128326	0.0058816
R. Admin Cap	-0.1539832	0.1041163	-1.48	0.139	-0.3580474	0.050081
R. Admin Cap^2	0.1594478	0.8601643	0.19	0.853	-1.526443	1.845339
R. Mil Cap	-0.122971	0.0511541	-2.4	0.016	-0.2232312	-0.0227109
R. Mil Cap^2	0.3130203	0.1161375	2.7	0.007	0.085395	0.5406456
Outcome: Terrorist Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0121793	0.0101202	-1.2	0.229	-0.0320146	0.0076559
Coercion^2	-0.0073077	0.004993	-1.46	0.143	-0.0170938	0.0024784
S. Admin Cap	0.0017797	0.0010803	1.65	0.099	-0.0003376	0.0038971
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0004432	0.0002765	1.6	0.109	-0.0000987	0.0009851
S. Mil Cap	0.006257	0.0076067	0.82	0.411	-0.0086518	0.0211657
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0001848	0.0020439	-0.09	0.928	-0.0041907	0.0038211
R. Admin Cap	-0.0563826	0.0803385	-0.7	0.483	-0.2138432	0.101078
R. Admin Cap^2	-0.2420651	0.5862734	-0.41	0.68	-1.39114	0.9070097
R. Mil Cap	0.0044477	0.0132995	0.33	0.738	-0.0216188	0.0305141
R. Mil Cap^2	0.0009578	0.016054	0.06	0.952	-0.0305076	0.0324232
Outcome: Insurgent Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0105813	0.017237	-0.61	0.539	-0.0443651	0.0232026
Coercion^2	-0.0052145	0.0070904	-0.74	0.462	-0.0191113	0.0086824
S. Admin Cap	0.0017924	0.0067793	0.26	0.791	-0.0114948	0.0150796
S. Admin Cap^2	0.0002149	0.0012094	0.18	0.859	-0.0021554	0.0025852
S. Mil Cap	-0.0032038	0.0090046	-0.36	0.722	-0.0208526	0.0144449
S. Mil Cap^2	0.0057009	0.0040842	1.4	0.163	-0.002304	0.0137058
R. Admin Cap	0.2188014	0.0707066	3.09	0.002	0.0802191	0.3573837
R. Admin Cap^2	-0.1127506	0.6506677	-0.17	0.862	-1.388036	1.162535
R. Mil Cap	0.1088295	0.0494858	2.2	0.028	0.0118391	0.20582
R. Mil Cap^2	-0.3066188	0.1156356	-2.65	0.008	-0.5332604	-0.0799771

Table A.9 (cont.) Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects, Model 11

Variable	dy/dx	Std. Err.*	z	P>|z|	95% Conf. Interval	
Outcome: Civil War Campaign						
Coercion	-0.0020374	0.0041232	-0.49	0.621	-0.0101186	0.0060439
Coercion^2	-0.0021023	0.0020535	-1.02	0.306	-0.0061272	0.0019226
S. Admin Cap	-0.0306811	0.0165974	-1.85	0.065	-0.0632113	0.0018492
S. Admin Cap^2	-0.0045243	0.0023699	-1.91	0.056	-0.0091692	0.0001206
S. Mil Cap	-0.0000229	0.0035036	-0.01	0.995	-0.0068898	0.0068439
S. Mil Cap^2	-0.0020306	0.0015627	-1.3	0.194	-0.0050934	0.0010322
R. Admin Cap	-0.0081532	0.0079564	-1.02	0.305	-0.0237474	0.0074411
R. Admin Cap^2	0.1955474	0.0916468	2.13	0.033	0.015923	0.3751719
R. Mil Cap	0.0096271	0.0059907	1.61	0.108	-0.0021143	0.0213686
R. Mil Cap^2	-0.0073223	0.0048126	-1.52	0.128	-0.0167548	0.0021101

**Standard error calculated using Delta method.*