

War or peace journalism: How international news agencies framed the initial stages of the  
Russia-Ukraine conflict

by

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B.A., Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City, 2017

A THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF SCIENCE

A.Q. Miller School of Media and Communication  
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY  
Manhattan, Kansas

2023

Approved by:

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## Abstract

This study applied the war and peace journalism framework to examine how four international news agencies framed their news coverage of the initial stages of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. A content analysis of 1,062 headlines (N = 1,062) from AP, Reuters, Xinhua, and TASS suggested that the four international news agencies were statistically different in employing the war and peace journalism framework in their coverage, especially when comparing Western to non-Western agencies. Moreover, international news agencies tilted towards peace journalism rather than war journalism during the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with Xinhua being the news organization with the strongest peace journalism framing. In contrast, the agency that employed the strongest war journalism framing was TASS. The most salient indicators of the peace journalism frame were language-based indicators, including avoiding victimizing language, avoiding demonizing language, and avoiding emotive words. Meanwhile, reporting the here and now, reactive reporting, and focusing on elite sources were the three most prominent indicators of the war journalism frame. Moreover, the study found that the dominant tone toward Ukraine and Russia, the two main actors involved in the conflict, was neutral. Western agencies tended to employ a negative tone toward Russia and a positive tone toward Ukraine.

*Keywords:* peace journalism, war journalism, conflict reporting, Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia, Ukraine, international news agencies

# Table of Contents

List of Figures .....	v
List of Tables .....	vi
Acknowledgements .....	vii
Dedication .....	viii
Chapter 1 - Introduction .....	1
Chapter 2 - Literature Review .....	4
Framing theory .....	4
War and peace journalism .....	5
Framing a war .....	9
International news agencies .....	12
Chapter 3 - Research questions and hypotheses .....	17
Chapter 4 - Method .....	19
Sampling method .....	19
Data collection .....	21
Peace journalism indicators .....	21
War journalism indicators .....	22
News tone .....	24
Intercoder reliability .....	24
Chapter 5 - Results .....	26
Chapter 6 - Discussion .....	45
Peace journalism as the dominant frame .....	46
Salient indicators of peace and war journalism .....	48
Neutral as the dominant tone .....	50
Chapter 7 - Limitations and future research .....	52
References .....	54
Appendix A - Codebook .....	69

## **List of Figures**

- Figure 1.* Q-Q plot of the peace journalism indicators of four international news agencies ..... 37
- Figure 2.* Q-Q plot of the war journalism indicators of four international news agencies ..... 40

## List of Tables

<i>Table 1</i>	Distribution of peace journalism and war journalism across the total sample .....	26
<i>Table 2</i>	Distribution of peace journalism and war journalism across four international news agencies .....	27
<i>Table 3</i>	Distribution of peace journalism and war journalism across Western and non-Western international news agencies .....	28
<i>Table 4</i>	Indicators of peace and war journalism among the total sample in order of salience ....	30
<i>Table 5</i>	Indicators of peace and war journalism among the four international news agencies ...	32
<i>Table 6</i>	Indicators of peace and war journalism among Western and non-Western international news agencies.....	34
<i>Table 7</i>	ANOVA test for peace journalism indicators.....	36
<i>Table 8</i>	Descriptive figures (mean, SD, and N) for peace journalism indicators of four international news agencies .....	37
<i>Table 9</i>	Kruskal-Wallis Test .....	37
<i>Table 10</i>	Post Hoc Comparisons – International news agencies (Peace journalism indicators) .	38
<i>Table 11</i>	ANOVA test for war journalism indicators .....	39
<i>Table 12</i>	Descriptive figures (mean, SD, and N) for war journalism indicators of four international news agencies .....	39
<i>Table 13</i>	Kruskal-Wallis Test .....	40
<i>Table 14</i>	Post Hoc Comparisons – International news agencies (War journalism indicators) ....	40
<i>Table 15</i>	Independent Samples T-Test for peace journalism indicators of Western and non-Western international news agencies .....	41
<i>Table 16</i>	Descriptive figures (N, mean, SD, and SE) for peace journalism indicators of Western and non-Western international news agencies .....	42
<i>Table 17</i>	Distribution of positive, negative, and neutral tones towards Russia across Western and non-Western international news agencies.....	43
<i>Table 18</i>	Distribution of positive, negative, and neutral tones towards Ukraine across Western and non-Western international news agencies .....	44

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Raluca Cozma, my major professor. I cannot thank you enough for all the advice you have provided me and all your support and time to keep this thesis on track and become fruitful. You don't know how meaningful your words, "I have confidence in you," were to me during this challenging journey. It was my honor to work under your guidance.

I would like to thank Professor Jacob Groshek and Professor Sam Mwangi for being my committee members. This thesis would not have been possible without your valuable ideas, comments, and suggestions.

My thanks should also go to all the professors and colleagues at Kansas State University whom I have had the chance to learn from and work with. The knowledge gained from you has helped my academic journey a lot.

Moreover, I would like to extend my thanks to my supervisors and colleagues at Thanh Nien Newspaper. The time spent working with you and our experiences have helped me to realize what my research interests were and encouraged me to keep learning and doing research.

Last but not least, my sincere appreciation should go to my family and friends, who have always been with me through ups and downs and who believed I could accomplish this achievement. I deeply appreciate your love. Additionally, to all other people, who once expressed their care for me, thank you so much for your support!

## **Dedication**

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, who always love me for who I am and never question my life choices. It is with your unconditional love and support that I have been able to achieve this milestone.

To Minh Huy and Minh Kien, my little brothers, who never hesitate to show your pride for your big sister. To show you that 'I can do it, and so do you' is my strongest motivation to pursue higher education.

To other family members, who never lose trust in me and always wish me the best during this journey.

To dd, my soulmate. Your 'service' is like a treasure to me. Without our conversations, I could never believe in myself as I do now. I am truly thankful to have you as my soulmate.

To my significant other, who is always there for me, loves me deeply, and lends me your enthusiasm and confidence. Words cannot express my gratitude to you, especially for your time during the final phase of this thesis.

To Uyen, my alter ego and my dearest colleague, both professionally and academically. You are the one who introduced me to this fantastic academic journey. Also, the peer pressure from you has inspired me to work harder and accomplish more. Thank you!

To Vi, the only person who knows all my secrets and has put up with all my hardships over the last two years. I am deeply grateful for your presence in my life.

To all my friends, especially Tu, Dat, Trung, Think, whose encouragement and support have made this journey much easier.



## Chapter 1 - Introduction

On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin ordered Russian armed forces to enter the neighboring nation of Ukraine, resulting in a prolonged conflict. The ongoing conflict has been predicted to be one of the bloodiest and deadliest conflicts of the past 200 years, with a dying rate of the involved soldiers being significantly higher than in a typical modern war and the overall fatalities increasing day by day (Poast, 2022). The conflict claimed at least 441 Ukraine civilians' lives and displaced more than 10 million people during the early phase (Ellerbeck, 2023; Giordano, 2022).

However, the conflict is not limited to the battlefields. There exist significant differences in how different media systems make reference to the conflict, which can be deemed as attempts to shape public opinion. Particularly, Russian media, supporting the Russian government, called the conflict “a special military operation in Ukraine” with the sole purposes to “denazify and demilitarize” Ukraine (TASS, 2022a). On the other hand, media organizations in Ukraine and Western countries referred to the event as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and condemned Russia's operations in its neighboring country (Reuters, 2022a). For maintaining objectivity, this study will refer to the situation as the Russia-Ukraine conflict or the conflict in Ukraine.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has received more public attention than any other recent wars (Gharib, 2022). Through several news sources, including traditional newspapers, television, radio, online news sites, social networking sites, etc., individuals around the world have been following the conflict (Newman et al., 2022). Based on the gatekeeping theory, intense coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is to be expected. Indeed, according to Galtung and Ruge's (1965) study about news values, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is worth media

attention, as it meets several of the criteria for newsworthiness, such as conflict, unexpectedness, negativity, and concentration on elite nations, among others.

When the media are covering a conflict, they have a propensity to support one side of the conflict, support military actions, use discourse that praises the military defeats, and provide little historical information or context to their stories (Katiambo, 2019; Knightley, 2000). This concept is named war journalism, in which advocating for violence is seen as a solution to the conflict (Galtung, 1990). The opposite notion of war journalism is peace journalism, and both are types of issue-specific framing (Fahmy & Eakin, 2014; Lee, 2010). Known practices of peace journalism include focusing on informing the public about the root causes of the conflict, centering on the people and humanity side, using non-violent language, and giving voice to all involved parties (Ciftcioglu & Shaw, 2021; Demarest & Langer, 2021; Galtung, 2003). Previous scholars deemed peace journalism as a tool to foster a more peaceful approach to war and conflict coverage, a solutions-journalism approach that has been favored by modern journalists (Maslog et al., 2006).

There has been scholarly research on the topic, most of which employs content analysis to examine how different media organizations frame conflicts as war or peace journalism (Ersoy, 2016; García-Perdomo et al., 2022; Maslog et al., 2006). Additionally, the literature also recommends investigating the same frame sets, i.e., the war and peace journalism sets of frames, to better understanding framing theory's implications in a broader context (Borah, 2011). Based on the validity of the research approach, this study aims to analyze whether war or peace journalism is applied in the coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, one of the most recent wars (and ongoing as of this writing). International news agencies are of particular interest in the investigation. Although many news organizations have recruited foreign correspondents to cover

international news (Cozma, 2021; Otto & Meyer, 2012), the practice's expense has led many other news organizations to rely on international news agencies for their foreign coverage (Segev, 2021). Consequently, the news content of international news agencies provides a good opportunity to investigate war and peace journalism practices, as their coverage has been one of the most influential sources of global information, impacting many national and regional news organizations (Alleyne & Wagner, 1993; Boyd-Barrett, 1980).

By comparing how Western and non-Western international news agencies presented the Russia-Ukraine conflict to the public, this study provides theoretical contribution to war and peace journalism research. Furthermore, this study answers the question of whether international news agencies employ peace journalism to advocate for peace during a conflict period, tests the applicability of peace journalism in different global media systems, and investigates how specific characteristics of media systems can impact war and peace journalism practices.

## **Chapter 2 - Literature Review**

### **Framing theory**

The framing theory was first enunciated by Goffman (1974) based on the sociology notion that by interpreting life experiences in certain frames, which enables individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number” of information pieces (p.21), they develop a personal perception of different issues, or more generally, the world. Similarly, journalists implement the process in their work of selecting information and turning it into complete products with certain news frames (Camaj, 2010). In other words, the media use news frames to first provide context to daily events, and second, to advance certain interpretations for those occurrences by highlighting specific aspects of one issue while omitting others (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Gandy Jr, 2001). The media also offer an implicit and explicit presentation of the reasons and the solutions to a given problem (Kitzinger, 2007). More specifically, Entman (1993) defined the term “framing” and its function from the communication perspective by stating: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p.52). News frames are constructed via the processes of selection, emphasis, and exclusion (Gitlin, 1980; Ryan et al., 2001).

Literature on media framing has identified two approaches to framing studies, including the inductive and deductive approaches (Matthes, 2009). While the inductive approach is considered more objective because it aims to identify all the possible frames and does not pre-specify specific news frames, the deductive approach predefines certain frames and applies the framework to examine the news content (Matthes, 2009; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Vreese,

2005). Based on the empirical findings from previous studies, there are two sets of frames to study news content, including generic frames (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Vreese et al., 2001) and issue-specific frames (Entman, 1993; Terkildsen & Schnell, 1997). Based on news values, journalistic conventions, and norms, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) listed five generic news frames that can be used to study different coverage topics: “conflict, human interest, attribution of responsibility, morality and economic consequences” (Vreese, 2005, p.56). Other particular coverage topics require frames that are only applicable to them, known as issue-specific frames, for example, women’s movement (Terkildsen & Schnell, 1997), a flight crash’s investigation (Durham, 1998), a refugee crisis (Vincze et al., 2021). Conflict coverage also lends itself well to issue-specific framing, namely peace or war journalism (Galtung, 1986).

Analyzing the media’s production of frames is beneficial in understanding how the media create messages that influence the public’s attitude and perception (Borah, 2011). Particularly in the case of war and conflict, specific frames adopted by the reporters can impact how the public perceive the causes of the war, each party of the war, and the progression of the war (Roman et al., 2017). As the practices of war and peace journalism are to embed certain frames within the media coverage, the framing theory is applicable to the examination of the two concepts of war coverage (Fahmy & Eakin, 2014; Ha et al., 2022).

### **War and peace journalism**

Peace journalism was developed as a countertype of journalism to war journalism by Johann Galtung, a well-known scholar in the field of peace studies. War and peace journalism are seen as two competing frames when a war or a conflict is reported on by the media (Galtung, 1986, 1998). Galtung (2003) compared peace journalism and war journalism to a good reporter in covering health issues. In his comparison, a reporter employing peace journalism is akin to a

health reporter highlighting how the patient would overcome the disease and how medical cures would assist the process, and how to prevent the disease by particular measures. In lieu of describing how violent the war between the human body and medical disease would be, a good health reporter would choose to report the battle objectively.

Generally, there are four main differences between war and peace journalism (Galtung, 1998, 2003). First, while peace journalism presents news in the win-win orientation, provides historical and cultural contexts to the conflict, gives voices to all parties, chooses a proactive approach of preventing before the conflict occurs, humanizes of all sides, focuses on violence's invisible effects; the violence-orientated of war journalism gives attention to zero-sum orientation, presents only the conflict's real-time data, focuses on the dominating side, gives voice to one side that the media chooses to support, considers the other side as the problem, dehumanizes of the other side, waits for the conflict's occurrence to cover, and emphasizes the visible damages of the conflict. Second, in contrast to war journalism, which Galtung (2003) describes as propaganda-oriented, focusing on hiding one side's falsehoods and exposing the other side's lies, peace journalism, with the characteristic of being truth-oriented, enables journalists to reveal lies and untruths from all sides. Therefore, peace journalism may serve as a framework for the media to avoid propaganda reporting, which allows their audience to generate their own views on conflict based on facts and knowledge (Lynch, 2006). Third, peace journalism lists all individuals who suffer from the conflict, denounces all wrongdoers, and highlights people as peace makers. Oppositely, war journalism emphasizes the dominating side's sufferings, focuses on males, elite peace makers, and condemns the other side's wrongdoers. Fourth, while peace journalism is solution-orientated, war journalism pursues victory-orientated. Notably, although the indicators for war and peace journalism vary, the dual nature of the two

types of journalism measurement permits one news story to incorporate both war and peace frames.

Following Galtung (1998)'s first classification of war and peace journalism, there have been efforts to conceptualize the two kinds of journalism and how to practice the peace one. The core idea behind peace journalism is about which way journalists will choose to cover war and conflict that has a direct impact on the society's ability to envision and attempt to pursue peaceful resolutions to the specific war and conflict (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2006). Furthermore, when it comes to the establishment of international norms and the improvement of professional ethical standards when covering violent conflicts, peace journalism is regarded as a crucial contribution (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2015). Given the significance of the mediator role of the media, Galtung (1986) advocated for the employment of peace journalism. The media has the ability to shape public opinion because it shapes conflict images, and individuals tend to behave in accordance with these images rather than reality. Moreover, peace journalism, according to Galtung (1986), is a way of increasing pressure on the journalists and the profession so that they "better live up to our demands and expectations" (p.11). Regarding transferring the theoretical concept into action, McGoldrick and Lynch (2006) suggested seventeen peace journalism practices for journalists to follow. Based on the central tenets of peace journalism, Howard (2009) proposed a training course for journalists named conflict-sensitive reporting, which include detailed training segments for avoiding stereotypes and narrow viewpoints on the conflict's causes and developments while maintaining other journalistic standards, such as accuracy, fairness and balance, and responsible conduct. Examining six elements impacting conflict coverage, Bläsi (2004) concluded that more recommendations for implementing peace

journalism were needed to improve its practice under varied political, historical, cultural, and geographical conditions as well as different structures and procedures of news corporations.

Although numerous scholars, including Lynch (2006), Keeble et al. (2010), McGoldrick and Lynch (2006), have endorsed the peace journalism concept, its underlying assumptions have also been challenged. Loyn (2003) criticized Galtung's work in peace journalism as a misunderstanding of journalistic responsibility and standards, which can lead journalists to "compromising their integrity and confusing their role" when covering conflicts (p.2). He argued that objectivity is the only goal journalists should pursue; hence, journalists report news as what is happening without adding interpretation or imagination. Taking a more constructive perspective, Hanitzsch (2004) argued that although journalists may influence public opinion, the problem of not fulfilling their peace responsibility ties with the society and the culture rather than with the journalists. By practicing peace journalism, journalists take on a role that traditionally falls within the responsibility of government and other institutions. He thus advocated that the journalists should expose the reporting conditions and have a critical perspective on sources to attain more transparency and reflexivity. Additionally, Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al. (2016) proposed a new framework to analyze conflict news stories, addressing the dualistic approach of the peace journalism model by treating news stories as narratives and focusing on the context of each conflict or war, to address the specific issue when analyzing conflict news stories. However, due to the complexity of its coding scheme, the framework was only extensively tested in three Middle Eastern conflicts and the Israel media. Nevertheless, researchers have found a positive attitude towards peace journalism among journalists in various countries. Journalists subscribe more to the tenets of peace journalism than to war journalism,



and they have considered reporting based on peace journalism as a tool to promote peace (Adegbola & Zhang, 2022; Prager & Hameleers, 2021; Rodny-Gumede, 2016).

Although there are still opposing views towards applying peace journalism when covering a war or a conflict, there is a general consensus that relying on peace journalism with an emphasis on journalistic principles will benefit the quality of reporting as a “suitable alternative to contemporary journalistic practices” (Irvan, 2006, p.34). Especially in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, peace journalism can be a complement to traditional journalism, as long as it maintains its dedication to both the quality requirements of journalistic reporting and the de-escalation and peace perspective (Schäfers, 2021).

### **Framing a war**

There has been academic investigation into how journalists frame a war or a conflict, influencing the public’s perspective, based on war or peace journalism. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, the majority of related investigations have employed a quantitative approach of content analysis to examine the news content. Based on the analysis of three peace processes, Wolsfeld’s (2004) posited that although the media’s role in peace-making and peace-keeping could significantly be impacted by the variations in the political and media environment, the news media have a tendency to use war journalism because of the fundamental contradiction between news values and the nature of a peace process. Wolsfeld (2004) claimed that the default operation mode of the news media is “to cover tension, conflict, and violence” (p.156).

In an examination of media coverage of the incident of Turkish and Syrian jet planes being hit by Turkey’s and Syria’s armies in 2012 and 2014, Ersoy (2016) discovered that Turkish journalists were heavily influenced by ownership structure, political pressure, regulations, mainstream news values and market conditions, and thus tended to use war journalism frames of

blaming and directing suspicions towards the other side. The Star, a Malaysian daily newspaper with the largest circulation in the country, relied on war journalism to report the South China Sea Dispute with the top three strongest indicators were elite-oriented, differences-oriented, and focusing on here and now (Fong & Koon, 2019). Despite a neutral valence toward China, The Star lacked background information when covering the dispute. Two leading Western media organizations, namely the New York Times and the Washington Post, were found to be more tilted toward war journalism, with the most frequent frame being ‘here and now,’ when covering the Pakistan-India conflict during the peak time from January 2001 to December 2002 (Siraj, 2008).

Taking the same approach based on Galtung’s (1986, 1998) classification of peace and war journalism, Lee and Maslog (2005) conducted a content analysis of 1,338 stories from ten Asian newspapers, which revealed that the war journalism frame dominated all the newspapers’ coverage. Specifically, war journalism’s three most salient indicators included here and now, elite-oriented approach, and the dichotomy of good and bad, whereas the avoidance of demonizing language, the non-partisan approach, and the multiparty-oriented approach were most salient among the peace journalism’s indicators. Among peace journalism quantitative analyses, Fahmy and Neumann’s (2012) study was the first analysis to apply the visual quantitative analysis of news photographs in the AP, Reuters, and AFP/Getty Images coverage of the Gaza War from 2008-2009. News photographs provided by Reuters and AFP/Getty Images focused more on the war than on peace-related figures and actions, whereas AP covered fewer war-related circumstances and more peace-related actions and individuals.

An analysis on peace journalism adoption in nonmilitary conflicts and different media systems found that when covering the US-China trade conflict, US media were more likely to

employ war journalism and less likely to employ peace journalism than Chinese media (Ha et al., 2020). Lichtenstein et al. (2019) conducted qualitative research to analyze Ukraine-crisis-related content of 10 German and 10 Russian television political talk shows. The results indicated talk shows in both countries presented the coverage of the situation in Ukraine and international tensions between Russia and the West in either peace journalism frames or destructive frames.

The tone of media content in conflict coverage has also been researched. Haigh (2014) found that when covering the Afghanistan war, U.S. media tended to adopt a neutral tone during the initial stages of the war, but the coverage tone became more negative as the war protracted. Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) conducted a study examining the news tone that elite newspapers in Sweden and the U.S. adopted in their coverage of the 2003 Iraq War. The findings revealed that the majority of news stories in both countries were dominated by a neutral tone; however, the Swedish newspaper tilted more towards negative tone than the U.S. newspaper.

Overall, the literature indicates lack of consistency in how media in both Western and non-Western countries tend to cover conflicts, as some favor a war journalism lens (see García-Perdomo, 2022; Lee et al., 2006; Lee & Maslog, 2015; Zaheer, 2020), while others engage in peace journalism framing (such as in the cases of Ha et al., 2020 and Maslog et al, 2006). These conflicting findings are one of the reasons the present study employs exploratory research questions rather than formulate predictive hypotheses. As one of the news agencies under scrutiny is located in one of the combatant nations in the Ukraine-Russia conflict (namely, Russia's TASS agency), it's possible the tone and framing of its news coverage will differ from those of organizations operating in nations not directly involved.

## **International news agencies**

News agencies are the oldest electronic media organizations, which date back to 1835 when the first world news agency was established (Rantanen & Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Rantanen & Kelly, 2021). The larger scope of international operations and general activities distinguish international news agencies from regional and national news agencies, as the latter usually focus on a small number of geographic areas (Boyd-Barrett, 1980). Further, in reporting international events, news agencies' reach and influence outweighs local news organizations (Welbers et al., 2018).

Arguably, international news agencies are the most important international information sources as they fulfill an indispensable role in both collecting news from most countries and territories and distributing regional and international news content to a myriad number of audiences (Boyd-Barrett, 1980; Rampal, 1995). Another reason explaining why international news agencies are indispensable is the limited resources that national and local news organizations have to assign foreign correspondents to cover international events, forcing them to depend on international news agencies as the main sources of foreign news (Camaj, 2010). Indeed, according to Boyd-Barrett (1980), only a few news organizations from Western countries possess sufficient means and resources to establish bureaus and designate correspondents internationally, thereby being dependent on the news services provided by international news agencies. Hence, the significance of international news agencies in the distribution of current affairs news cannot be understated, though there are only a few of them worldwide (Rantanen & Boyd-Barrett, 2004).

Thanks to the aforementioned function of distributing foreign news, international news agencies have influenced their clients' judgments regarding news and news practices, as well as

played a significant role in being the world's media agenda shapers, particularly in exercising an intermedia agenda-setting role across the media systems around the world (Breed, 1955; Camaj, 2010). For instance, Haynes (1984) discovered that the existence of international news agencies is one of the factors leading to a similarity of foreign news' topic selection. The findings of a study by Camaj (2010) were also in favor of the perspective supporting the global similarity of global news coverage.

There are "Big Seven" international news agencies nowadays, including AFP, Anadolu, AP, EFE, Reuters, TASS, and Xinhua, which have dominated the global information flow due to their available resources, independence from governments, strict editorial traditions, wide coverage, and high-quality products with relatively high reliability (Boyd-Barrett, 1980; Rantanen & Kelly, 2021).

Four international news agencies were of particular interest in this investigation, namely Reuters, AP, Xinhua, and TASS.

Reuters is a Canada-based private enterprise owned by Thomson Reuters Corporation with 200 locations worldwide (Reuters, 2022d). Since 1851, Reuters has claimed to deliver more than 2,000,000 unique news stories, 1,500,000 news alerts, 129,000 video stories, 814,000 pictures and images, and 100 investigative reports annually, with more than 2,000 customers in 128 countries (Reuters, 2022c). According to Boyd-Barrett (1980), in its long history of operating as an independent news agency, Reuters has remained free from state interference due to the agency's limited involvement in disseminating local news; nevertheless, the agency did serve as a propaganda tool for foreign nations during and between global conflicts. A study by Watanabe (2017b) discovered an unexpected finding that Reuters, a Western agency, disseminated Russian narratives during the 2014 Ukraine crisis in its reporting, which were

republished by multiple online news sites, such as Yahoo News and Huffington Post, revealing the weakness of the current system of international news distribution. In covering war or conflict, Reuters staff attempted to remain objective by following the consensus, which was reached between its headquarters and offices, on language and terms usage (Goodman & Boudana, 2019).

AP, a non-profit news agency with headquarters located in New York (U.S.), has 248 news bureaus, 9 regional editing hubs in 99 countries (Swartz & Pruitt, 2019). AP reported that in 2019, the agency produced 2,000 stories, 3,000 photos, 200 news and sports videos, and 50 live videos across 5 live channels per day (Swartz & Pruitt, 2019). The connection between AP and the U.S. has been established through its owners and clients, and the agency's leadership has expressed mutual interests with the government (Boyd-Barrett, 1980; Watanabe, 2017b). In comparison to other international news agencies when covering a war or conflict, AP is found to adopt a peace journalism approach, which has the potential to facilitate peace by prioritizing non-elite sources, international negotiations and meetings over focusing on the two conflict parties (Fahmy & Neumann, 2012).

Xinhua, the New China News Agency, has been operating as a state-controlled agency (Horvit, 2006). Especially on sensitive topics, Chinese news outlets are instructed to exclusively republish or disseminate Xinhua's coverage (Keck & Tiezzi, 2015). Nevertheless, Xinhua has attempted to improve its quality and has significantly increased its amount of daily news while also striving to increase its credibility and unbiasedness (Chen 1996; Faison, 1996). Through an analysis of Xinhua's reports on the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Keck and Tiezzi (2015) found that overall, the tone of Xinhua's news articles was fairly neutral, conveying various involved parties' voices, while the agency's opinion-based commentary and news analysis articles tilted

more towards supporting Russia and opposing Western actors. Moreover, one noteworthy feature of Xinhua is that although the news agency practices censorship on domestic matters, Xinhua's bias decreases when the news is unrelated to China (Fish, 2010). However, the strong political ties between China and Russia have led to Chinese media's attention, particularly Xinhua, the official spokesperson for the Chinese Communist Party, being drawn to the protracted conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In order to resolve the dilemma between the strategic relationship with Russia and China's own principles of fiercely opposing to separatist movements, believing in sovereignty, and refraining from meddling in the internal affairs of other countries, China has chosen to support Russia but to be less than enthusiastic in doing so, which in general, China has endeavored to reduce its involvement in the crisis, while continuously advocating for "dialogue and peaceful resolution" (Keck & Tiezzi, 2015, p.165). And this perspective has also influenced Xinhua in its coverage of the conflict.

TASS, a non-Western news agency, that originates in Russia, is considered a counter-voice to the West (Rantanen & Vartanova, 1995). As the official news agency of the Russia Federation, which is owned and administered by the government, TASS has had unique access to official information. Although TASS still be considered the major voice of the Russian government, the agency is "expected to operate in an objective and professional manner" (Rantanen & Vartanova, 1995, p.214), and reforms in the late 1980s "meant a new role for TASS, more approaching that of the Western agencies" (Alleyne & Wagner, 1993, p.41). However, as a state-owned news organization, how TASS report and cover international events may be influenced by the Russian government's political ideology, especially when Russia is a direct actor involved in this specific conflict (Gehlbach & Sonin, 2014).

Overall, previous studies have revealed that Western international news agencies heavily concentrated on reporting violence and conflict and lacked coverage of other news topics from developing countries (Kirat & Weaver, 1985; Lee et al., 2006). Moreover, they point to differences between Western news agencies and non-Western news agencies in the framing of international news, especially conflict and war news, in part as a reflection of national bias (Bardhan, 2001; Camaj, 2010; Horvit, 2006; Zeng et al., 2015; Watanabe, 2017b). The present thesis sets out to compare how Western and non-Western news agencies framed the Russia-Ukraine conflict and what indicators of peace and war journalism they relied on.



## Chapter 3 - Research questions and hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework and the literature review, the study proposes the following research questions and one hypothesis.

RQ1a: What is the dominant frame – war or peace journalism – of the four international news agencies' headlines when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

RQ1b: How do the four international news agencies differ in the dominant frame – war or peace journalism – when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

RQ1c: How do Western and non-Western international news agencies differ in the dominant frame – war or peace journalism – when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

RQ2a: What are the salient indicators supporting the war and peace journalism frames across the four agencies?

RQ2b: How do the four international news agencies differ in their use of salient indicators supporting the war and peace journalism frames when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

RQ2c: How do Western and non-Western international news agencies differ in their use of salient indicators supporting the war and peace journalism frames when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

RQ3: How do the four international news agencies differ a) in number of peace journalism indicators they use and b) in number of war journalism indicators they use when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

H1: Western international news agencies will use more peace journalism indicators in their headlines in comparison to non-Western international news agencies' headlines when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

RQ4: What is the dominant tone a) towards Russia and b) towards Ukraine used by Western and non-Western international news agencies in their headlines when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

## **Chapter 4 - Method**

This study adopted the quantitative approach, which allowed “greater precision in reporting results” (Wimmer & Dominick, 2013, p.49), to identify the overall frame – war or peace journalism – in the news content of four international news agencies, including Reuters, AP, Xinhua, and TASS. Among the selected four international news agencies, Reuters and AP are Western-based agencies (Boyd-Barrett, 1980), while Xinhua, a China-based agency, and TASS, a Russia-based agency, are considered non-Western international news agencies. Along with being among the “Big Seven” international news agencies around the world (Rantanen & Kelly, 2021, p.359), Reuters, AP, Xinhua, and TASS were selected because collecting their English news versions was more easily achievable than doing so with the three remaining agencies, including EFE, AFP, and Anadolu.

### **Sampling method**

News stories from Reuters, AP, TASS, and Xinhua are the target population for the content analysis, and the unit of analysis is the individual news headline. The examination of news headlines was based on three major considerations. Firstly, when approaching a news story, the readers see the headline first; in some cases, they only read the headline instead of reading the whole story (Gabiolkov et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2019), which can influence how they perceive the following news content (Tankard Jr, 2001). As noted by Groshek and Clough Groshek (2013), Pan and Kosicki (1993), and Yang (2003), the analysis of news headlines is pertinent due to their ability to capture the audience’s attention and enable the first interpretations of the whole news stories. Secondly, according to Pan and Kosicki (1993), the news headline is “the most powerful framing device” in news writing following the syntactical structure (p.59). Thirdly, an additional rationale for utilizing news headlines in this content analysis is that it has been

employed in prior research to examine the war and peace journalism framework (Ersoy, 2016), as well as media framing (Ebrahim, 2022; Liu et al., 2019).

An online keyword search using Google search engine with “Ukraine” over one-month period, from February 22, 2022, to March 22, 2022, i.e., the first month of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, was conducted on the websites of four international news agencies. The specific conflict began on February 24, 2022, when Vladimir Putin, Russian president, launched the so-called “special military operation” and Moscow started to mobilize its forces across Ukraine (Zinets & Vasovic, 2022). The sample of the study was collected two days before the official start date of the conflict in order to provide an opportunity for the inquiry to identify whether four international news agencies employed one indicator of peace journalism frame, which is proactive reporting, i.e., anticipating and reporting the conflict long before it actually occurred.

According to Dunaway and Graber (2022), the media play different roles at specific times in a crisis situation. Particularly, there are three stages of a crisis situation’s media coverage that correspond with the media’s roles. In order to lessen the public’s uncertainty and anxiety, the media would disseminate up-to-date and factual information about what has happened during the initial stage. In the second phase, the media would identify root causes and develop strategies to mitigate the crisis's effects, and in the third phase, they would present information on the problem from a long-term perspective. Nonetheless, Ungar (1998) noted that the media may switch framing strategies from providing frightening information to a soothing approach, thus the three phases are not always strictly adhered to. Therefore, the current study focuses on analyzing the news stories during the initial stages of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in order to identify whether four international news agencies adopted the peace journalism, which would provide a soothing, reassuring approach to the public during the particular time frame.

After duplicated and irrelevant news stories were removed from the sample, the remaining stories were data used for the content analysis. Eventually, a total of 1,062 news stories were used in this study as follows:

Western international news agencies: Reuters (296), AP (294)

Non-Western international news agencies: Xinhua (178), TASS (294)

### **Data collection**

Based on the classification of Galtung (1986, 1998), the study constructed the initial codebook of 13 indicators of war journalism and 13 peace journalism indicators. Many other researchers also employed similar tactics in studying war and peace journalism, demonstrating the high reliability of the approach (García-Perdomo et al., 2022; Ha et al., 2020; Lacasse & Forster, 2012; Maslog et al., 2006). Two major criteria within the thirteen indicators of each type of journalism were adopted from Maslog et al. (2006) and Ha et al. (2020). However, as the Russia-Ukraine conflict has not ended yet, one indicator of continuing to report the conflict's aftermath or stopping after the peace treaty is signed was eliminated. As a result, the approach-based criteria included 9 indicators, and the language-based criteria included 3 indicators, as follows:

#### **Peace journalism indicators**

1. Win-win orientation: the conflict has many goals and issues with an emphasis on solution-oriented
2. Reporting on both visible (number of deaths and injuries, property damage) and invisible effects of war (psychological and emotional damage, societal and cultural damages)

3. Proactive reporting: anticipating the conflict
4. Focusing on non-elite sources: utilizing normal people as actors and information sources
5. Reporting the agreement areas that might lead to the conflict's solution
6. Reporting the conflict's causes and consequences
7. Avoiding labeling good and bad actors in conflict
8. Multi-party orientation: giving voice to many parties in conflict
9. Non-partisan: not advocating for any sides in conflict
10. Avoiding victimizing language: reporting on what has been done and what could be done
11. Avoiding demonizing language: using more precise descriptions, names, titles that people give themselves
12. Avoiding emotive words: using objective and moderate wording; not exaggerating

### **War journalism indicators**

1. Zero-sum orientation: the conflict has only one goal: to win
2. Reporting mainly on the visible effects of war: number of deaths and injuries, property damage
3. Reactive: waiting for the conflict to occur or about to occur before starting reporting

4. Focusing on elite sources: leaders and elite people are reported as main actors and information sources
5. Reporting the differences that lead to the conflict
6. Reporting the here and now: present events and happenings
7. Dichotomizing good and bad actors in conflict
8. Two-party orientation: one party wins and, one party loses in conflict
9. Partisan: advocating for one side in conflict
10. Using victimizing language, for example, devastated, pathetic, tragic, etc.
11. Using demonizing language, for example, vicious, cruel, inhuman, extremist, etc.
12. Using emotive words, for example, genocide, assassination, massacre, etc.

The coders coded whether each news headline employed war journalism or peace journalism framing based on the above twenty-four indicators. One (1) was coded for war journalism, two (2) was coded for peace journalism, and three (3) was coded if the headline did not demonstrate either peace or war journalism. The specific indicator used to support peace or war journalism in each news story's headline was also recorded.

A news story headline was labeled as employing peace journalism framing when the number of peace journalism indicators outweighed the number of war journalism indicators. Likewise, a news story headline was labeled as employing war journalism if the number of war journalism indicators outweighed the number of war journalism indicators.

## **News tone**

To examine headline valence toward the two parties in the conflict (Russia and Ukraine), the coders coded tone as follows: positive (focusing on positive or favorable aspects), negative (focusing on negative aspects), and neutral (focusing on both positive and negative aspects). The analysis of news tones towards Russia and Ukraine used by international news agencies during the initial stages of the Russia-Ukraine conflict provided an understanding of the position of each news agency in the conflict. For example, AP and Reuters might have adopted a positive tone towards Ukraine and a negative tone towards Russia due to their support for Ukraine, which followed the political affiliation of the Western governments, which have clearly backed Ukraine in the crisis (Baczynska & Renshaw, 2022). On the other hand, Xinhua and TASS, two non-Western international news agencies, might use a positive tone towards Russia and a negative tone towards Ukraine, which was in alignment with their states' position on the conflict.

## **Intercoder reliability**

Two coders, including the researcher and another graduate student, coded the sample to enhance the reliability and validity of the results after the coding scheme and rules were developed and unified. Krippendorff's  $\alpha$  was used to check the intercoder reliability on approximately 10% of the whole sample, with 30 news stories randomly selected from AP, 28 news stories randomly selected from Xinhua, 28 news stories randomly selected from TASS, and 31 news stories randomly selected from Reuters. The intercoder coefficients (Krippendorff's  $\alpha$ ) demonstrated high reliability. Regarding peace journalism indicators, the intercoder coefficients were 0.965 for win-win orientation, 0.742 for reporting both visible and invisible effects of the conflict, 0.792 for proactive reporting, 1 for focusing on non-elite sources, 0.8 for reporting the agreement areas that might lead to the conflict's solution, 0.844 for reporting the conflict's



causes and consequences, 0.88 for avoiding labeling good and bad actors in the conflict, 0.861 for multi-party orientation, 0.915 for non-partisan, 1 for avoiding victimizing language, 0.929 for avoiding demonizing language, and 0.905 for avoiding emotive words.

In terms of war journalism indicators, the intercoder coefficients were 0.885 for zero-sum orientation, 0.944 for reporting only visible effects of the conflict, 0.966 for reactive reporting, 0.888 for focusing on elite sources, 0.919 for focusing on the differences that lead to the conflict, 0.858 for reporting the here and now, 0.875 for dichotomizing good and bad actors in the conflict, 0.932 for two-party orientation, 1 for partisan and using victimizing language, 0.825 for using demonizing language, and 0.909 for using emotive words. Regarding tones, the intercoder coefficients were 0.909 for tone towards Russia and 0.877 for tone towards Ukraine.

## Chapter 5 - Results

This section reports the results of the descriptive and statistical analyses that were conducted to answer the study's research questions and test its hypothesis.

**RQ1a** asked what the dominant frame was – war or peace journalism – in the headlines of the four international news agencies when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Among the total sample of 1,062 news headlines from the four international news agencies, 742 headlines (69.87%) employed the peace journalism frame, 240 headlines (22.6%) were framed as war journalism, and the remaining 80 headlines (7.53%) were neutral (Table 1). Peace journalism was the dominant frame of the four international news agencies when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The number of peace journalism headlines of the examined international news agencies was approximately three times more than that of war journalism headlines and roughly nine times more than that of neutral ones.

**Table 1 Distribution of peace journalism and war journalism across the total sample**

Frame	Frequency	Percentage
Peace journalism	742	69.87 %
War journalism	240	22.6 %
Neutral	80	7.53 %
Total	1062	100 %

**RQ1b** asked the four international news agencies differed in the dominant frame – war or peace journalism – when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

To answer RQ1b, a Chi-square test was conducted to examine the difference between the four international news agencies, specifically, AP, Reuters, Xinhua, and TASS, and their use of the dominant frame, which is peace and war journalism, when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict. There was a statistically significant association between them,  $\chi^2(6) = 62.237, p < .001$ , Cramer's  $V = 0.171$  with a small effect size.

**Table 2. Distribution of peace journalism and war journalism across four international news agencies**

International news agency	Frame			Total
	Peace journalism	War journalism	Neutral	
AP	188 (63.51%)	72 (24.32%)	36 (12.16%)	296 (100%)
Reuters	220 (74.83%)	52 (17.68%)	22 (7.48%)	294 (100%)
Xinhua	156 (87.64%)	17 (9.55%)	5 (2.80%)	178 (100%)
TASS	178 (60.54%)	99 (33.67%)	17 (5.78%)	294 (100%)

The percentage of headlines framed as peace journalism of each of the four international news agencies accounted for the majority of the number of headlines each agency had. The strongest peace journalism framing was in the coverage by Xinhua, followed by Reuters, AP, and TASS. As many as 88% of Xinhua's headlines were framed as peace journalism, while the percentage of peace journalism headlines from Reuters, AP, and TASS, was 74.83%, 63.51%, and 60.54%, respectively (Table 2).

In terms of war journalism framing, the strongest framing was found in the coverage by TASS, followed by AP, Reuters, and Xinhua. About a third of the TASS headlines (33.67%)

used war journalism framing. Meanwhile, AP had a quarter (or 24.32%) war journalism headlines, and the number of war journalism headlines of Reuters and Xinhua was 17.68% and 9.55%, respectively (Table 2).

**RQ1c** asked how Western and non-Western international news agencies differ in the dominant frame – war or peace journalism – when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

To answer RQ1c, the researcher categorized Reuters and AP as Western international news agencies, Xinhua and TASS as non-Western international news agencies, and conducted a Chi-square test to determine the difference between Western and non-Western international news agencies and their use of dominant frame when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict. There was a statistically significant association between them,  $\chi^2 (2) = 10.87, p = 0.004$ , Cramer's V = 0.101 with a small effect size.

**Table 3. Distribution of peace journalism and war journalism across Western and non-Western international news agencies**

Frame		International news agency		Total
		Western	Non-Western	
Peace journalism	Count	408	334	742
	Expected count	412.22	329.77	742
	% within column	69.15 %	70.76 %	69.86%
War journalism	Count	124	116	240
	Expected count	133.33	106.66	240
	% within column	21.01 %	24.57 %	22.59 %
Neutral	Count	58	22	80
	Expected count	44.44	35.55	80
	% within column	9.83 %	4.66 %	7.53 %
Total	Count	590	472	1062
	Expected count	590	472	1062
	% within column	100 %	100 %	100 %

Peace journalism was the dominant frame used by both Western and non-Western international news agencies in their coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the proportions of such framing was similar. About two thirds of headlines (or 69.15%) used peace journalism framing among a total of 590 headlines of the Western international news agencies. Meanwhile, 70.76% of non-Western international news agency headlines employed the peace journalism framing (among their total headlines of 472). Regarding war journalism frame, 21.01% of the Western international news agency headlines and 24.57% of the non-Western international news agency headlines employed the specific frames. In terms of the neutral frame, Western international news agencies had more neutral headlines (9.83%) than non-Western international news agencies (4.66%) (Table 3).

**RQ2a** asked what salient indicators supporting the war and peace journalism frames were used across the four agencies.

Among a total of 5,403 indicators of the peace journalism frame, the three most salient indicators were language-based indicators: avoiding victimizing language (1,013, or 18.7%), avoiding demonizing language (1,002, or 18.5%), and avoiding emotive words (982, or 18.2%) (Table 4). By avoiding victimizing language when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the journalists of the four international news agencies did not use words that only told what had been done to people, but reported what had been done and could be done by people, and how they had been coping with the conflict. Specifically, the international news agencies avoided words such as devastated, defenseless, pathetic, tragic, and demoralized in their headlines. The majority of examined headlines also refrained from using demonizing language. Instead of giving nicknames to actors participating in the conflict, the international news agencies put more precise descriptions, names, and titles of them in their headlines. By using objective and moderate words

to describe a situation and avoid exaggerating words such as genocide, assassination, massacre, etc., the international news agencies avoided using emotive words in their headlines.

**Table 4. Indicators of peace and war journalism among the total sample in order of salience**

<b>Peace journalism indicators</b>	<b>Frequency</b>
Avoiding victimizing language	1,013 (18.7%)
Avoiding demonizing language	1,002 (18.5%)
Avoiding emotive words	982 (18.2%)
Non-partisan	840 (15.5%)
Avoiding labeling good and bad actors in the conflict	708 (13.1%)
Multi-party orientation	389 (7.2%)
Win-win orientation	116 (2.1%)
Reporting the conflict's causes and consequences	100 (1.9%)
Reporting the agreement areas that might lead to the conflict's solution	87 (1.6%)
Focusing on non-elite sources	83 (1.5%)
Proactive reporting	69 (1.3%)
Visible and invisible effects of the conflict	14 (0.3%)
Total	5,403 (100%)
<b>War journalism indicators</b>	<b>Frequency</b>
Reporting the here and now	823 (23.1%)
Reactive reporting	617 (17.3%)
Focusing on elite sources	562 (15.8%)
Visible effects of the conflict	300 (8.4%)
Dichotomizing good and bad actors in conflict	289 (8.1%)
Partisan	267 (7.5%)
Two-party orientation	265 (7.4%)

Focusing on the differences that lead to the conflict	210 (5.9%)
Zero-sum orientation	130 (3.7%)
Using demonizing language	46 (1.3%)
Using emotive words	38 (1.2%)
Using victimizing language	12 (0.3%)
Total	3,559 (100%)

Based on the frequency count of 3,559 indicators of the war journalism frame, the three most salient indicators were focusing on reporting the here and now (823, or 23.1%), reactive reporting (617, or 17.3%), and focusing on elite sources (562, or 15.8%). Focusing on reporting the here and now, the international news agencies presented mainly events and happenings at a specific time during the conflict, but did not mention or explore the causes and consequences of the conflict. For example, TASS reported: “Donetsk People’s Republic forces advance 9 km forward; take control of 2 residential areas” (TASS, 2022c). By applying the reactive reporting indicator, international news agencies’ journalists waited for the conflict to occur or about to occur before starting reporting. Furthermore, the investigated headlines also had a tendency to focus on elite actors, i.e., national leaders, politicians, officials, as news sources and main players of the conflict while forgetting non-elite actors who also played critical roles in the conflict such as civilians. For instance, Reuters reported: “Putin orders Russian forces to "perform peacekeeping functions" in eastern Ukraine's breakaway regions” (Reuters, 2022b).

**RQ2b** asked how the four international news agencies differed in their use of salient indicators supporting the war and peace journalism frames when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Among the four international news agencies, Xinhua had the largest percentage of peace journalism headlines (87.64%). These headlines were dependent on four major indicators, including avoiding victimizing language (178, or 16.7%), avoiding demonizing language (178, or 16.7%), avoiding emotive words (178, or 16.7%), and non-partisan orientation (149, or 14%) (Table 5).

**Table 5. Indicators of peace and war journalism among the four international news agencies**

<b>Peace journalism indicators</b>	<b>AP</b>	<b>Reuters</b>	<b>Xinhua</b>	<b>TASS</b>
Win-win orientation	8 (0.6%)	30 (1.8%)	40 (3.8%)	38 (2.5%)
Visible and invisible effects of the conflict	10 (0.7%)	3 (0.2%)	1 (0.1%)	0 (0%)
Proactive reporting	12 (0.8%)	33 (2%)	9 (0.8%)	15 (1%)
Focusing on non-elite sources	49 (3.4%)	13 (0.8%)	21 (2%)	0 (0%)
Reporting the agreement areas that might lead to the conflict's solution	4 (0.3%)	21 (1.2%)	34 (3.2%)	28 (1.8%)
Reporting the conflict's causes and consequences	12 (0.8%)	59 (3.5%)	27 (2.5%)	2 (0.1%)
Avoiding labeling good and bad actors in the conflict	179 (12.5%)	256 (15.2%)	154 (14.4%)	272 (18%)
Multi-party orientation	94 (6.6%)	140 (8.3%)	97 (9.1%)	58 (3.8%)
Non-partisan	208 (14.5%)	254 (15.1%)	149 (14%)	232 (15.3%)
Avoiding victimizing language	284 (19.8%)	293 (17.4%)	178 (16.7%)	294 (19.4%)
Avoiding demonizing language	292 (20.4%)	293 (17.4%)	178 (16.7%)	287 (18.9%)
Avoiding emotive words	279 (19.6%)	291 (17.1%)	178 (16.7%)	293 (19.2%)
Total	1,431 (100%)	1,686 (100%)	1,066 (100%)	1,519 (100%)
<b>War journalism indicators</b>	<b>AP</b>	<b>Reuters</b>	<b>Xinhua</b>	<b>TASS</b>
Zero-sum orientation	13 (1.2%)	42 (4.5%)	10 (2%)	65 (6.1%)



Visible effects of the conflict	89 (8.5%)	84 (9%)	62 (12.2%)	65 (6.1%)
Reactive reporting	208 (19.8%)	158 (16.8%)	108 (21.2%)	143 (13.5%)
Focusing on elite sources	91 (8.7%)	122 (13%)	87 (17.1%)	262 (24.7%)
Focusing on the differences that lead to the conflict	84 (8%)	81 (8.6%)	24 (4.7%)	21 (2%)
Reporting the here and now	242 (23%)	212 (22.6%)	147 (28.9%)	222 (21%)
Dichotomizing good and bad actors in conflict	109 (10.4%)	82 (8.7%)	26 (5.1%)	72 (6.8%)
Two-party orientation	105 (10%)	42 (4.5%)	12 (2.4%)	106 (10%)
Partisan	76 (7.2%)	101 (10.8%)	29 (5.7%)	61 (5.8%)
Using victimizing language	10 (1%)	2 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Using demonizing language	7 (0.7%)	4 (0.4%)	3 (0.6%)	32 (3%)
Using emotive words	17 (1.5%)	9 (0.9%)	1 (0.1%)	11 (1%)
Total	1,051 (100%)	939 (100%)	509 (100%)	1,060 (100%)

TASS’s coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict exhibited the strongest war journalism framing, with the support of four major war journalism indicators, including focusing on elite sources (262, or 24.7%), focusing on reporting the here and now (222, or 21%), leaning towards reactive reporting (143, or 13.5%), and two-party orientation (106, or 10%) (Table 5). The two-party orientation indicator was detected when headlines implied that one side of the conflict should prevail while the other should lose. For instance, TASS published a story with a two-party orientation indicator: "Russian troops completing defeat of Donbass nationalist battalion — defense ministry" (TASS, 2022b).

**RQ2c** asked how Western and non-Western international news agencies differed in their use of salient indicators supporting the war and peace journalism frames when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Both Western and non-Western international news agencies exhibited peace journalism framing based on four similar major indicators: avoiding victimizing language, avoiding demonizing language, avoiding emotive words, and focusing on a non-partisan orientation. The frequency counts of four mentioned peace journalism indicators of Western international news agencies were 577 (or 18.5%), 585 (or 18.8%) , 570 (or 18.3%), and 462 (or 14.8%), respectively, while those of non-Western international news agencies were 472 (or 18.3%), 465 (or 18%), 471 (or 17.56%), and 381 (or 14.7%), correspondingly (Table 6).

**Table 6. Indicators of peace and war journalism among Western and non-Western international news agencies**

<b>Peace journalism indicators</b>	<b>Western international news agencies</b>	<b>Non-Western international news agencies</b>
Win-win orientation	38 (1.2%)	78 (3%)
Visible and invisible effects of the conflict	13 (0.4%)	1 (0.04%)
Proactive reporting	45 (1.4%)	24 (0.9%)
Focusing on non-elite sources	62 (2%)	21 (0.8%)
Reporting the agreement areas that might lead to the conflict's solution	25 (0.8%)	62 (2.4%)
Reporting the conflict's causes and consequences	71 (2.3%)	29 (1.8%)
Avoiding labeling good and bad actors in the conflict	435 (14%)	426 (16.5%)
Multi-party orientation	234 (7.5%)	155 (6%)
Non-partisan	462 (14.8%)	381 (14.7%)
Avoiding victimizing language	577 (18.5%)	472 (18.3%)
Avoiding demonizing language	585 (18.8%)	465 (18%)
Avoiding emotive words	570 (18.3%)	471 (17.56%)
Total	3,117 (100%)	2,585 (100%)

<b>War journalism indicators</b>	<b>Western international news agency</b>	<b>Non-Western international news agency</b>
Zero-sum orientation	55 (2.8%)	75 (4.8%)
Visible effects of the conflict	173 (8.7%)	127 (8.1%)
Reactive reporting	366 (18.4%)	251 (16%)
Focusing on elite sources	213 (10.7%)	349 (22.3%)
Focusing on the differences that lead to the conflict	165 (8.3%)	45 (2.9%)
Reporting the here and now	454 (22.8%)	369 (23.5%)
Dichotomizing good and bad actors in conflict	191 (9.6%)	98 (6.2%)
Two-party orientation	147 (7.4%)	118 (7.5%)
Partisan	177 (8.9%)	90 (5.7%)
Using victimizing language	12 (0.6%)	0 (0%)
Using demonizing language	11 (0.6%)	35 (2.2%)
Using emotive words	26 (1.2%)	12 (0.8%)
Total	1,990 (100%)	1,569 (100%)

In terms of war journalism framing, Western international news agencies focused on employing four major indicators: focusing on reporting the here and now (454, or 22.8%), reactive reporting (366, 18.4%), focusing on elite sources (213, or 10.7%), and dichotomizing good and bad actors in conflict (191, or 9.6%) (Table 6). In the Russia-Ukraine conflict context, by dichotomizing good and bad actors in conflict, journalists either blamed one side, i.e., Russia or Ukraine, or gave moral judgment about any parties involved in the conflict. For example, AP reported: “Russia facing sports isolation over invasion of Ukraine” (Dunbar, 2022). Non-Western international news agencies used four major indicators when they applied the war journalism frame, including focusing on reporting the here and now (369, or 23.5%), focusing on

elite sources (349, or 22.3%), reactive reporting (251, 16%), and highlighting the conflict’s visible effects (127, or 8.1%) (Table 6). Solely reporting the visible effects of the conflict, journalists forgot to mention the invisible effects which were recommended by the peace journalism framework, such as one headline from Xinhua reported: “Russia-Ukraine conflict leads to fall in Indian stock market” (Xinhua, 2022).

**RQ3a** asked how the four international news agencies differed in number of peace journalism indicators they use when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

The ANOVA test’s results indicated that there was statistically significant difference between the four international news agencies and the number of peace journalism indicators used when reporting the Russia-Ukraine conflict,  $F(3, 1058) = 49.056, p < .001$  (Table 7). The data was not normally distributed since, according to the Q-Q plot visualization, the plotted points did not follow the straight line representing the normal distribution (Figure 1). Also, the equality of variances could not be assumed because according to the Levene’s test for equalities of variances,  $F(3, 1058) = 3.503, p = .015$ ; therefore, it should be best to use the Welch test or the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 7 and Table 9). However, since all the tests’ results were statistically significant, the choice of test had no bearing on the results.


**Table 7. ANOVA test for peace journalism indicators**

Homogeneity Correction	Cases	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p	$\eta^2$
None	International news agency	215.269	3.000	71.756	49.056	< .001	0.122
	Residuals	1547.587	1058.000	1.463			
Welch	International news agency	215.269	3.000	71.756	44.667	< .001	0.122
	Residuals	1547.587	532.144	2.908			

*Note.* Type III Sum of Squares

**Table 8. Descriptive figures (mean, SD, and N) for peace journalism indicators of four international news agencies**

<b>International news agency</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>N</b>
AP	4.834	1.094	296
Reuters	5.364	1.154	294
Xinhua	5.854	1.307	178
TASS	4.602	1.310	294



**Figure 1. Q-Q plot of the peace journalism indicators of four international news agencies**

**Table 9. Kruskal-Wallis Test**

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Statistic</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>p</b>
International news agency	131.789	3	< .001

Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test (Table 10) indicated that the average number of peace journalism frame indicators of Reuters (M = 5.364, SD = 1.154) was significantly higher than that of AP (M = 4.834, SD = 1.094) and TASS (M = 4.602, SD = 1.310)

( $p < .001$ ). Moreover, the mean of peace journalism indicators Xinhua used ( $M = 5.854$ ,  $SD = 1.307$ ) was also significantly higher than the average number of peace journalism indicators employed by AP ( $M = 4.834$ ,  $SD = 1.094$ ), Reuters ( $M = 5.364$ ,  $SD = 1.154$ ), and TASS ( $M = 4.602$ ,  $SD = 1.310$ ) ( $p < .001$ ).

**Table 10. Post Hoc Comparisons – International news agencies (Peace journalism indicators)**

		Mean Difference	SE	t	$p_{\text{tukey}}$	$p_{\text{bonf}}$
AP	Reuters	-0.529	0.100	-5.317	< .001	< .001
	Xinhua	-1.019	0.115	-8.887	< .001	< .001
	TASS	0.232	0.100	2.334	0.091	0.119
Reuters	Xinhua	-0.490	0.115	-4.266	< .001	< .001
	TASS	0.762	0.100	7.638	< .001	< .001
Xinhua	TASS	1.252	0.115	10.899	< .001	< .001

*Note.* P-value adjusted for comparing a family of 4

**RQ3b** set out to examine how the four international news agencies differed in number of war journalism indicators they used when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Another ANOVA test was performed to compare the difference in number of war journalism indicators that the four international news agencies used when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict,  $F(3, 1058) = 9.030$ ,  $p < .001$  (Table 11). Due to the Q-Q plot visualization (Figure 2) and the Levene's test's result that  $F(3, 1058) = 19.992$ ,  $p < .001$ , the data's normal distribution and the equality of variances could not be assumed, so the Welch test or the Kruskal-

Wallis test should be used (Table 11 and Table 13). However, as the p-values of the three tests were statistically significant, the choice of test did not influence the results.


**Table 11. ANOVA test for war journalism indicators**

<b>Homogeneity Correction</b>	<b>Cases</b>	<b>Sum of Squares</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Mean Square</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>p</b>	<b><math>\eta^2</math></b>
None	International news agency	81.085	3.000	27.028	9.030	< .001	0.025
	Residuals	3166.909	1058.000	2.993			
Welch	International news agency	81.085	3.000	27.028	11.610	< .001	0.025
	Residuals	3166.909	560.286	5.652			

*Note.* Type III Sum of Squares

**Table 12. Descriptive figures (mean, SD, and N) for war journalism indicators of four international news agencies**

<b>International news agency</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>N</b>
AP	3.551	1.574	296
Reuters	3.194	1.884	294
Xinhua	2.860	1.348	178
TASS	3.605	1.915	294



**Figure 2.** Q-Q plot of the war journalism indicators of four international news agencies

**Table 13.** Kruskal-Wallis Test

Factor	Statistic	df	p
International news agency	27.212	3	< .001

Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test demonstrated the average number of war journalism indicators that TASS employed ( $M = 3.605$ ,  $SD = 1.915$ ) was significantly higher than that of Reuters ( $M = 3.194$ ,  $SD = 1.884$ ) ( $p = 0.024$ ) and Xinhua ( $M = 2.86$ ,  $SD = 1.348$ ) ( $p < .001$ ). The mean of war journalism indicators of AP ( $M = 3.551$ ,  $SD = 1.574$ ) was significantly higher than Xinhua ( $M = 2.86$ ,  $SD = 1.348$ ) ( $p < .001$ ) (Table 15).

**Table 14.** Post Hoc Comparisons – International news agencies (War journalism indicators)

		Mean Difference	SE	t	p <sub>tukey</sub>	p <sub>bonf</sub>
AP	Reuters	0.357	0.142	2.505	0.060	0.074



		Mean Difference	SE	t	p <sub>Tukey</sub>	p <sub>bonf</sub>
	Xinhua	0.691	0.164	4.212	< .001	< .001
	TASS	-0.055	0.142	-0.384	0.981	1.000
Reuters	Xinhua	0.334	0.164	2.035	0.176	0.253
	TASS	-0.412	0.143	-2.884	0.021	0.024
Xinhua	TASS	-0.746	0.164	-4.540	< .001	< .001

*Note.* P-value adjusted for comparing a family of 4

**H1** predicted that Western news agency headlines will employ more peace journalism indicators than their non-Western counterparts. T-test analysis revealed that on average, Western international news agencies generally used more peace journalism indicators (M = 5.098) than their non-Western counterparts (M = 5.074) (Table 16). However, the p-value was > .05, so the results were not statistically significant and the effect size was also very small. Moreover, according to the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality's results with the p-value was < .001, and the Levene's test of equality of variances' result with the p-value was < .001, the data was not normal and equality of variances could not be assumed, so it was best to use the Mann-Whitney test. However, the choice of test did not matter the results as all of them were statistically insignificant (Table 15). H1 was not supported.

**Table 15. Independent Samples T-Test for peace journalism indicators of Western and non-Western international news agencies**

	Test	Statistic	df	p	Location Parameter	SE Difference	Effect Size
Peace journalism indicators	Student	0.303	1060.000	0.762	0.024	0.080	0.019
	Welch	0.296	890.637	0.767	0.024	0.082	0.019

Test	Statistic	df	p	Location Parameter	SE Difference	Effect Size
Mann-Whitney	140573.000		0.782	3.712e-5		0.010

*Note.* For the Student t-test and Welch t-test, effect size is given by Cohen's d. For the Mann-Whitney test, effect size is given by the rank biserial correlation.

*Note.* For the Student t-test and Welch t-test, location parameter is given by mean difference. For the Mann-Whitney test, location parameter is given by the Hodges-Lehmann estimate.

**Table 16. Descriptive figures (N, mean, SD, and SE) for peace journalism indicators of Western and non-Western international news agencies**

	Group	N	Mean	SD	SE
Peace journalism indicators	Western international news agencies	590	5.098	1.154	0.048
	Non-Western international news agencies	472	5.074	1.441	0.066

**RQ4a** asked what was the dominant tone towards Russia used by Western and non-Western international news agencies in their headlines when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The study conducted a Chi-square test to examine the difference between the Western and non-Western international news agencies and their tone towards Russia in their headlines when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict (Table 16). There was a statistically significant association between them,  $\chi^2(2) = 103.378, p < .001$ , Cramer's  $V = 0.312$  with a small effect size. The majority of headlines of both Western (355, or 60.17%) and non-Western (376, or 79.66%) international news agencies were neutral towards Russia. Western agencies tended to employ a negative tone towards Russia (222, or 37.63%) more than non-Western organizations (22, or 4.66%). Regarding positive tone towards Russia, while Western agencies had 13 (or 2.2%) headlines, non-Western agencies had 74 (or 15.68%).

**Table 17. Distribution of positive, negative, and neutral tones towards Russia across Western and non-Western international news agencies**

Tone towards Russia		International news agency		Total
		Western	Non-Western	
Positive	Count	13	74	87
	Expected count	48.333	38.667	87
	% within column	2.2 %	15.68 %	8.19 %
Negative	Count	222	22	244
	Expected count	135.556	108.444	244
	% within column	37.63 %	4.66 %	22.98 %
Neutral	Count	355	376	731
	Expected count	406.111	324.889	731
	% within column	60.17 %	79.66 %	68.83 %
Total	Count	590	472	1062
	Expected count	590	472	1062
	% within column	100 %	100 %	100 %

**RQ4b** asked what was the dominant tone towards Ukraine used by Western and non-Western international news agencies in their headlines when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

There also was a statistically difference between the Western and non-Western international news agencies and their tone towards Ukraine in their headlines when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict,  $\chi^2 (2) = 196.624, p < .001$ , Cramer's V = 0.43, with a moderate effect size. Overall, the dominant tone towards Ukraine that Western and non-Western international news agencies was neutral. Western agencies had 487 (or 82.54%) neutral headlines towards Ukraine, while the number of neutral headlines of non-Western agencies was 328 (or 69.49%). The following dominant tone towards Ukraine of Western agencies was positive, with 82 (or 13.9%) headlines, whereas negative tone was the second dominant tone towards Ukraine of non-Western agencies, with 112 (or 23.73%) headlines (Table 17).

**Table 18. Distribution of positive, negative, and neutral tones towards Ukraine across Western and non-Western international news agencies**

<b>Tone towards Ukraine</b>		<b>International news agency</b>		
		<b>Western</b>	<b>Non-Western</b>	<b>Total</b>
Positive	Count	82	32	114
	Expected count	63.33	50.66	114
	% within column	13.9 %	6.78 %	10.73 %
Negative	Count	21	112	133
	Expected count	73.88	59.11	133
	% within column	3.56 %	23.73 %	12.52 %
Neutral	Count	487	328	815
	Expected count	452.77	362.22	815
	% within column	82.54 %	69.49 %	76.74 %
Total	Count	590	472	1062
	Expected count	590	472	1062
	% within column	100 %	100 %	100 %

## Chapter 6 - Discussion

Using the classification of peace and war journalism frames of Galtung (1986, 1990, 1998) and their operationalized indicators of Maslog et al. (2006) and Ha et al. (2020), this study analyzed the framing of news coverage during the initial stages of the Russia-Ukraine conflict by international news agencies, which provided a comparative perspective of the news coverage of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine by foreign news agencies with distinct geopolitical viewpoints. The present study conducted an analysis of news headlines from four international news agencies, including two Western agencies: Reuters and AP, and two non-Western agencies: TASS and Xinhua. The findings revealed disparities in their framing of the Russia-Ukraine conflict news coverage and in their use of salient indicators of peace and war journalism. To the author's best knowledge, this study was one of the limited investigations to test the applicability of the peace and war journalism frames and their indicators on examining news headlines, providing a different approach that can be helpful to guide future research of peace and war journalism studies, specifically in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

By comparing news coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict during the very initial stages, this study's findings may contribute to the efforts to assess the media's role in shaping public opinion during wartimes, especially the peace versus war journalism frames, in terms of their ability to influence the public's perception of the ongoing conflict since the media may alter their framing strategies during the beginning period of a conflict to alleviate the public's uncertainty and anxiety (Dunaway & Graber, 2022; Ungar, 1998).

Moreover, the dominant tone adopted by the four international news agencies towards Russia and Ukraine, the primary actors in the conflict, was neutral. A significant difference

between Western and non-Western international news agencies in their respective tone towards each actor involved in the conflict was also revealed.

### **Peace journalism as the dominant frame**

Overall, the news headlines were framed more as peace journalism than war journalism, and the number of peace journalism indicators was higher than that of war journalism indicators; hence, peace journalism was the dominant frame used by AP, Reuters, Xinhua, and TASS during the very first month of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This finding, although unexpected, is consistent with the results from a study by Ha et al. (2020) that the U.S.-China trade conflict news coverage by both U.S. and China news outlets was dominated by peace journalism and a study by Maslog et al. (2006) that more Iraq war news stories from eight Asian news organizations were framed as peace journalism than war journalism.

Notably, it supports the idea of the media fostering a more peaceful approach to promote peace and corresponding resolutions by using the peace journalism framework in their coverage of a war or conflict, especially during the initial stages (Lee, 2010; Maslog et al., 2006). Indeed, the use of peace journalism at the outset of a conflict, particularly by applying the win-win approach indicator, may be more promising since it can provide early options to resolve disputes (Sadiq & Hassan, 2017).

Furthermore, despite the prevalence of the peace journalism frame in the headlines, it is possible that the remaining content of the news articles or the visual elements utilized to illustrate the news stories may exhibit a greater number of war journalism indicators than the headlines. Previous studies discovered similar results. For instance, Fahmy and Neumann's (2012) analysis revealed that images depicting the Gaza War (2008 – 2009) from three international news agencies, namely, AP, Reuters, and AFP, tilted more towards war journalism

than peace journalism. Additionally, other peace and war journalism studies, in which the unit of analysis was a news story, found contradicting findings that war journalism dominated the news coverage of many military conflicts (Fahmy & Eakin, 2014; Lee & Maslog, 2005; Lee, 2010; Siraj, 2008; Siraj, 2010) and English news stories were more likely to be framed as war journalism than peace journalism (Lee, 2010). It also contradicts to the dominant notion that the media are more likely to promote war and conflict than they are to promote peace (Bratić, 2006; Lynch & Galtung, 2010). Given the potential differences in framing across news headlines, entire news stories, and graphic representations, which may be due to the rewriting practice of news headlines by editors, who are less exposed to the realities on the ground than the foreign correspondents, future studies could explore the comparative framing of these three components of war news coverage.

It would be challenging to determine the precise reasons why, during the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, in comparison to other international news agencies, Xinhua's coverage was markedly more dominated by the peace journalism frame and why TASS tilted more toward the war journalism frame. A possible explanation for the peace journalism frame valence of Xinhua could be attributed to the influence of its government's position, i.e., supporting Russia to a certain extent, minimizing China's participation in the conflict, and persistently promoting peace through dialogues and peaceful resolutions. Keck and Tiezzi (2015) observed that Xinhua had a tendency to refer to statements and report viewpoints of foreign governments and officials that were aligned with China's stance, including content that advocated for restraint or dialogues between major parties involved in the conflict. Indeed, the neutral tone that Xinhua employed when covering the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which will be

further elaborated on in the next section about the dominant news tone, also conveyed a conciliatory and ameliorative position.

In the case of TASS, the news agency exhibited a higher likeliness to employ the war journalism frame than the remaining three agencies. The stance of the Russian government, under which TASS operates, was conveyed by the news agency, which in accordance with the findings of Pasitselska (2017) and Watanabe (2017a), suggesting that a nation's media is unlikely to remain neutral in a conflict involving its government. As anticipated, for Russia was the initiator of the ongoing conflict since Russian President Vladimir V. Putin ordered the Russian military to enter Ukraine on February 24, 2022 (Zinets & Vasovic, 2022), Russian media were more eager to support the nation to be the winning actor of the conflict, blaming Ukraine and the country's supporters for provoking the conflict; thus, it might be more likely to use war journalism practices than other international news agencies.

### **Salient indicators of peace and war journalism**

Three language-based indicators, including avoiding victimizing language, avoiding demonizing language, and avoiding emotive words, were the most salient indicators supporting peace journalism. This finding suggested that during the initial month of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, instead of producing sensational news headlines that could capture more attention from the audience, the four international news agencies exhibited caution in their language usage, indicating by their avoidance of victimizing, demonizing, and emotive language. The other two most prominent indicators of the peace journalism frame were non-partisan orientation and avoiding labeling good and bad actors in the conflict. Pursuing the non-partisan orientation, journalists did not advocate for any sides involved in the conflict, and in adherence to avoid labeling good and bad actors in the conflict, journalists maintained an equal, balanced treatment



of all parties involved. Moreover, since the significant indicators of the peace journalism frame that can affect audience's perspective were three language-based indicators, Ha et al. (2020) discussed that it would be most beneficial to train journalists and editors to carefully consider their choice of language when covering war or conflict.

The finding that the three language-based indicators were most salient in peace journalism frame, while consistent with prior research, also revealed the same limitation of the peace and war journalism framework. Specifically, while language-based indicators may be present in every news headline, other context-specific indicators, such as win-win orientation or focusing on the conflict's visible effects, cannot be applied to all the news headlines; as a result, the language-based indicators may inflate the number of peace and war journalism indicators, which potentially impact the outcome of the investigation (Ha et al., 2020).

In terms of the salient indicators of war journalism frame, similar to what Ha et al. (2020) and Lee and Maslog (2005) found, the focusing on the here and now, as well as the focusing on elite sources dominated the war journalism indicators in the four international news agencies. The prioritization of the here and now indicator in war journalism frame is a commonly observed phenomenon, whereby journalists tend to report on the primary events and occurrences while neglecting to address a conflict's underlying causes and consequences. This tendency is reflected in the provision of timely and factual news updates pertaining to the initial stages of the conflict (Ungar, 1998). Moreover, it is worth noting that the short nature of news headlines poses a challenge in effectively communicating the underlying causes and consequences of a conflict.

Regarding the elite orientation indicator, when examining the news headlines, it was found that only a few of them considered non-elite actors as the information source, despite the fact that ordinary people also witnessed, had their own perspectives about, and played important

roles in the conflict. Instead, journalists emphasized the viewpoints of elite actors, such as authoritative sources from the government and high-ranking personnel related to the conflict. Consequently, the opinions of non-elite actors were disregarded in favor of those of elite actors. However, despite the excessive usage of the elite orientation indicator in war journalism frame, it is understandable given how extensively journalists rely on government sources that they perceive as authoritative, knowledgeable, and powerful (Lee, 2010; Sigal, 1973). Likewise, Hussain and Ahmad (2022) posited that in times of violent conflicts, people tend to look to elites and officials to manage the situation.

### **Neutral as the dominant tone**

In general, the dominant news tone of headlines from both Western and non-Western international news agencies, when they covered the first month of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, was neutral. This finding was consistent with previous literature on war coverage's tone that during a conflict's beginning phase, the news tone tilted more toward neutral (Haigh, 2014).

Moreover, it could imply that political affiliation and states' positions, as well as ideologies, might not affect the framing of news tones toward Russia and Ukraine of the international news agencies. The present discovery may appear unexpected; however, previous literature demonstrated that the relationship between state influence and the media's position has been changing, and for some Western international news agencies, "national boundaries are becoming almost meaningless" (Watanabe 2017b, p.16).

Moreover, it is possible that the neutrality towards both actors directly involved in the conflict exhibited by international news agencies is motivated by market forces and the desire to sell news content to a vast audience worldwide. Specifically, international news agencies cannot sell news which portrays Ukraine negatively to news organizations located in countries

supporting Ukraine in the ongoing conflict. Similarly, news outlets that are in favor of Russia would not purchase negative news about Russia from international news agencies. In other words, the exhibition of neutral tone in news reporting potentially illustrates the commercialization of news content. It is reasonable to assume that international news agencies would exhibit neutral tone toward both Russia and Ukraine in order to avoid alienating their global consumers, as these clients represent a significant source of profit.

Although the four international news agencies maintained a generally neutral tone toward Russia and Ukraine, a closer examination of the news tone revealed disparities among them in the adoption of positive and negative tones toward each of the two major actors involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It can be argued that although the majority of news headlines produced by four international news agencies during the early stages of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine were neutral toward Russia and Ukraine, to some extent, there existed a discernible degree of bias in their tonality. For example, Western agencies exhibited a tendency to adopt a pessimistic stance toward Russia while adopting an optimistic stance toward Ukraine. Conversely, non-Western agencies tended to adopt an optimistic stance toward Russia while adopting a pessimistic stance toward Ukraine. Especially in the case of TASS, the agency was unlikely to avoid tonality bias when its government was a party involved directly in the conflict.

## **Chapter 7 - Limitations and future research**

This study had several limitations, which can guide future research. First, the investigation solely concentrated on analyzing news headlines and did not examine the remaining content of news articles. The examination of news headlines was pertinent due to their characteristic of capturing audience attention; however, it still is essential to identify the dominant frame and tone of the international news agencies' news stories to provide a comprehensive understanding of the peace and war journalism framework in the coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Future research should address this limitation by conducting a similar content analysis on the whole content of news stories. Moreover, as mentioned in the discussion section, future studies could also compare the framing of news headlines to the framing of the remaining news stories and the framing of visual elements.

The second limitation of the study was the chosen timeframe, i.e., the first month of the conflict. One objective of the study was to examine whether, in the early phases of a conflict, the media employ different framing techniques to adjust the potential impact on the audience. Nevertheless, a comparative perspective on the role of news organizations during three phases of a crisis, as posited by Dunaway and Graber (2022), could be obtained by extending the timeframe, dividing the news coverage into three stages, and analyzing them.

Third, the choice of four international news agencies, namely, AP, Reuters, Xinhua, and TASS, was another significant limitation of this research. The author rationalized the aforementioned choice based on the fact that they are among the “Big Seven” worldwide international news agencies (Rantanen & Kelly, 2021, p.359) and the convenience of collecting English-language news stories from the four agencies. Considering that the remaining international news agencies, namely AFP, Anadolu, and EFE, also fall within the Western and

non-Western categories, forthcoming investigations may include all seven international news agencies in their sample. Additionally, the study's findings were limited due to the use of only English-language news stories; future research may explore media content in other languages, for example, Chinese news stories from Xinhua and Russian news stories from TASS.

Finally, the fourth limitation of the study was produced by the structural limitations of the peace and war journalism frameworks, as well as the indicators employed for measurement, as highlighted by Ha et al. (2020). Future peace and war journalism studies could pursue to establish a more refined framework.

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## Appendix A - Codebook

Coder: \_\_\_\_\_

International news agency: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Story #: \_\_\_\_\_

Headline: \_\_\_\_\_

Location (country of reporting): \_\_\_\_\_

### **Peace journalism indicators:**

1. Does the headline have a win-win orientation? (Does the headline show the conflict has many goals and issues and emphasize ways to resolve the conflict?) 1. Yes / 2. No

2. Does the headline report both visible (number of deaths and injuries, property damages) and invisible effects of war (psychological and emotional damages, societal and cultural damages)? 1. Yes / 2. No

3. Does the headline report the conflict proactively? (the headline anticipates and reports the conflict long before it actually occurs) 1. Yes / 2. No

4. Does the headline focus on non-elite sources (common people) 1. Yes / 2. No

5. Does the headline report agreements, resolutions, or orders that might resolve the conflict? 1. Yes / 2. No

6. Does the headline report both the causes and consequences of the conflict? 1. Yes / 2. No

7. Does the headline avoid labeling good and bad actors in the conflict? 1. Yes / 2. No

8. Does the headline have a multi-party orientation? (Does the headline mention multiple parties involved in the conflict and give voices to these parties?) 1. Yes / 2. No

9. Is the headline non-partisan? (Does the headline not advocate for any sides involved in the conflict?) 1. Yes / 2. No

10. Does the headline avoid victimizing language? (Does the headline avoid words such as devastated, defenseless, pathetic, tragic, and demoralized, which only tells what had been done to people, but report what has been done and could be done by people and how people have been coping with the conflict?) 1. Yes / 2. No

11. Does the headline avoid demonizing language? (Does the headline avoid labeling people with nicknames and use more precise descriptions, names, and titles that people give themselves?) 1. Yes / 2. No

12. Does the headline avoid emotive words? (Does the headline use only objective and moderate words, use the right word to describe a situation, and avoid exaggerating or does the headline use exaggerating words such as genocide, assassination, massacre, etc.?) 1. Yes / 2. No

**War journalism indicators:**

1. Does the headline have a zero-sum orientation? (Does the headline demonstrate that the conflict has only one goal, which is to win?) 1. Yes / 2. No

2. Does the headline report mainly on the visible effects of war (number of deaths and injuries, property damages) and forget to mention the invisible effects of war (psychological and emotional damages, societal and cultural damages)? 1. Yes / 2. No

3. Does the headline report the conflict reactively? (Does the headline wait for the conflict to occur or about to occur before starting reporting?) 1. Yes / 2. No

4. Does the headline focus on leaders and elite people as news sources and main actors in the conflict? 1. Yes / 2. No

5. Does the headline report mainly the differences that led to the conflict? 1. Yes / 2. No

6. Does the headline report the here and now? (Does the headline present mainly events and happenings and forget to mention the causes and consequences of the conflict?) 1. Yes / 2.

No

7. Does the headline dichotomize between good and bad actors in the conflict? 1. Yes / 2.

No

8. Does the headline have a two-party orientation? (One side wins, and the other side loses in the conflict?) 1. Yes / 2. No

9. Is the headline partisan? (Does the headline advocate for only one side in the conflict?) 1. Yes / 2. No

10. Does the headline use victimizing language? (Does the headline use words such as devastated, defenseless, pathetic, tragic, and demoralized, which only tells what had been done to people?) 1. Yes / 2. No

11. Does the headline use demonizing language? (Does the headline give nicknames that are usually bad to people and avoid using precise descriptions, names, and titles that people give themselves?) 1. Yes / 2. No

12. Does the headline use emotive language? (Does the headline use exaggerating words such as genocide, assassination, massacre, etc.?) 1. Yes / 2. No

**Peace or war journalism:** 1. Peace journalism / 2. War journalism

**The headline's tone toward Russia:**

1. Positive

2. Negative

3. Neutral

**The headline's tone toward Ukraine:**

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral



