In-store referrals on the internet

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Show simple item record Cai, Gangshu Chen, Ying-Ju 2012-03-21T15:20:59Z 2012-03-21T15:20:59Z 2012-03-21
dc.description.abstract In the contemporary e-business, a retailer may display the links to the competing retailers directly (direct referral), or display the referral link provided by a third-party advertising agency (third-party referral), and these referrals may be either one-way or two-way. In this paper, we show that the referrals may align the retailers’ incentives and facilitate implicit collusion, and one-way referral may result in a win-win situation, thereby providing an economic rationale for these seemingly puzzling phenomena. Using third-party referrals may enhance the retail-ers’ collusion despite the potential disutility and revenue leakage, and referral services may be detrimental for the consumer welfare. en_US
dc.relation.uri en_US
dc.subject Retailer referral en_US
dc.subject Third-party referral en_US
dc.subject Channel competition en_US
dc.subject Game theory en_US
dc.title In-store referrals on the internet en_US
dc.type Article (author version) en_US 2011 en_US
dc.citation.doi doi:10.1016/j.jretai.2011.09.005 en_US
dc.citation.epage 578 en_US
dc.citation.issue 4 en_US
dc.citation.jtitle Journal of Retailing en_US
dc.citation.spage 563 en_US
dc.citation.volume 87 en_US
dc.contributor.authoreid gcai en_US

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