The non-existence of equilibrium in sequential auctions when bids are revealed.

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dc.contributor.author Cai, Gangshu
dc.contributor.author Wurman, Peter R.
dc.contributor.author Chao, Xiuli
dc.date.accessioned 2011-10-25T15:11:39Z
dc.date.available 2011-10-25T15:11:39Z
dc.date.issued 2011-10-25
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2097/12440
dc.description.abstract Sequential auctions of homogeneous objects are common in public and private marketplaces. Weber derived equilibrium results for what is now a classic model of sequential auctions. However, Weber’s results are derived in the context of two particular price quote assumptions. In this paper, we examine a model of sequential auctions based on online auctions, in which, after each auction, all bids are revealed. We show that a pure-strategic, symmetric equilibrium does not exist, regardless of whether the auctions are first- or second-price, if all bids are revealed at the end of each auction. en_US
dc.relation.uri http://www.csulb.edu/journals/jecr/p_i.htm en_US
dc.subject Sequential auctions en_US
dc.subject Online auctions en_US
dc.subject E-commerce en_US
dc.subject Nash equilibrium en_US
dc.title The non-existence of equilibrium in sequential auctions when bids are revealed. en_US
dc.type Article (publisher version) en_US
dc.date.published 2007 en_US
dc.citation.epage 157 en_US
dc.citation.issue 2 en_US
dc.citation.jtitle Journal of Electronic Commerce Research en_US
dc.citation.spage 141 en_US
dc.citation.volume 8 en_US
dc.contributor.authoreid gcai en_US

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