THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY OCCUPATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Although the military are subordinate to civilians in the United States, military control of civilian populations in foreign countries has been an acceptable policy during periods of occupation. This phenomenon can be analyzed variously from its political, economic, social, ideological, and military aspects. Historians in the United States, however, have paid relatively little attention to the study of military occupations. Americans who have respected the civilian control of military as a traditional principle have felt uncomfortable with military occupations, regarding them as abnormal. So have historians. Yet, the large scale of American participation in occupations stemming from World War II and the development of the Cold War have promoted the writing of the actual history of occupations. Hence, in the postwar period, some historians and other social scientists have come to regard military occupations as one of the important phenomena in American history.

The purpose of this report is to examine what Americans have written about occupations, and how they have written about them. This will be useful to a fuller understanding of American history and the history of occupations. For this purpose, the report provides a profile of the American experience in military occupations and then an analysis of the American historiography pertinent to occupations.
AMERICAN EXPERIENCES IN MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

In American experience military occupations followed such major wars as the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. Also such "little wars"\(^1\) as the China Relief Expedition in 1900, the Mexican Interventions in 1914-17, and the Caribbean Interventions of 1915-34, involved military occupations. The occupations linked to the major wars have loomed more significant in the American experience than have those tied to lesser military actions. Let us examine to what extent the United States military forces exercised control over civilian populations in occupied areas.

It is usually said that the United States had its initial military occupation experience during the Mexican War. However, a form of occupation can be detected in the early Indian Wars. Following the Revolutionary War and War of 1812, the U. S. Army fought against the Indians in the South and in the West. Although the United States military occupied Indian areas, they did not gain any practical knowledge of modern problems in governing occupied people, because they occupied areas, not people, by pushing the Indians into reservations in undesirable regions. Nevertheless, how to manage the Indians was one of important political concerns in the 19th century.

In the Mexican War in 1846, General Zachary Taylor, who had not been given guidelines for an occupation, permitted his men to deal with the Mexicans as they saw fit. This resulted
in many cases of atrocities by American soldiers. Due to the
dominant national mood, which was represented by the famous
slogan "Mexico or Death"² the U. S. Army sought victories at
the expense of the Mexican civilians in areas of operation.

General Winfield Scott, who succeeded Taylor as primary
commander in the war, adopted a bold plan of striking directly
for Mexico City. The success of this strategy depended on the
relationship between the marching army and the Mexican civil
populations, as well as on the security of his base of
communications and supply at Vera Cruz. In other words, the type
of overall occupation policy would be the key to the American
expedition. However, President Polk and Congress vacillated
in making occupation policy because the United States lacked
experience in occupying a belligerent enemy state. Consequently,
Congress and the Administration allowed Scott a broad scope of
powers in dealing with occupation problems. So Scott developed
the famous General Order No. 20 in 1847, which became the basis
for policy in later United States military occupations as well.

Scott defined the treatment that the occupying troops were
to accord the local population. First of all, he distinguished
between civilians who were merely citizens of the enemy states
and those who were officials of the enemy government. He
declared: "Mexicans: Americans are not your enemies, but the
enemies for a time of the men who, a year ago misgoverned you."⁴
And he ordered his forces not to disturb civilians in their
peaceful customs, traditions, and institutions. Second, Scott
established the rules governing the relationship between American troops and Mexican civilians very strictly. Scott's rules bound both his own troops and the local inhabitants under identical legal and moral restraints. Such atrocities as murder, rape, robbery, destruction of property, and so on were not tolerated, whether committed by Mexicans or Americans. Scott emphasized that under martial law the armies in the hostile country were not only to insure their own safety, but also to protect the occupied people.5

In this way Scott developed for the first time in the history of the United States a model policy for military occupations. Scott was a brilliant combat commander who also believed firmly in the value of military government. He stressed that properly conducted military government would guarantee military success. For this reason he exercised various functions of military government even by using cooperative native personnel and working through existing civilian agencies of government.

At the time of the Civil War, the U. S. Army had not fully digested the lessons of Scott's military government in Mexico as a basis for future action. Moreover, due to the nature of a civil war, there was confusion and lack of uniformity in military government in the Civil War years 1861-65. Much of this confusion was caused by the difference between the conservative viewpoint and that of Union radicals concerning the legal status of the southern states. The conservative argued that the South should be extended full belligerent rights and that military government
should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. On the other hand, radicals and abolitionists wanted to treat all Confederates as criminals and to confiscate their property. The South viewed itself as a separate nation. This conflict in views led to military government in southern states that did not follow the pattern used in Mexico by Scott.⁶

During the Civil War, however, the Army formalized for the first time in United States history occupation law. Francis Lieber's code as embodied in General Order 100, "Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field" in 1863 formed a framework for a comprehensive legal statute which was applicable in both combat and post-combat situations. The Lieber code, although it justified the rights of the occupier over the occupied, strongly emphasized that the status of inherent human rights could not be ignored by the Southern slave-holder or by the Northern military occupier.⁷

The Civil War pattern was also characterized by the distinction between military commanders and governors. President Lincoln appointed five military governors for Tennessee, North Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas. One was a senator, one was a lawyer, and the other three were congressmen. Although commissioned as brigadier generals of volunteers, they were separated from the military chain of command. Only one among them, Senator Andrew Johnson, the military governor for Tennessee, continued in office and proved himself an excellent military
governor, while others gave up their positions mainly because of troubles with military commanders. In fact the powers of the governors were subordinated to military commanders of the areas.

The President in the beginning of the Civil War attempted to govern through the local civil authorities, in spite of the military commanders' opposition. However, once finding the attempts unsuccessful, he eliminated the civilians appointed as military governors, and assumed direct control by the military through military courts. General Ulysses S. Grant, the supreme commander of Union armies, said: "Leave Sherman to treat all questions in his own way, the President reserving his power to approve or disapprove of his actions." Grant's remark anticipated views that would affect later military occupations conducted by the United States.¹⁸

In the Spanish-American War, 1898-99, the U. S. Army again faced new problems. With the popular mood favoring the possible purchase or annexation of the Spanish colonies, the U. S. military fought the war and occupied Cuba and the Philippines. However, they faced serious cultural differences and the unusual guerrilla warfare; both military and civilian officials became pessimistic about occupation. Surprised by the so-called "cultural shock," military governors constantly asked Washington to send a group of skilled diplomats to adjust the differences. Moreover, atrocities by local troops against U. S. troops led Americans to concern for the welfare of the occupied people being replaced by contempt.⁹ However, since the United States at the turn of the century was strongly interested in the islands in the Pacific
and Caribbean, it continued to occupy them.

Military occupations after the Spanish-American War were political rather than military. While Congress debated whether the United States had any right to govern the islands, military governments faced more difficulties in the islands politically, economically, socially, and culturally. In Cuba, for example, General Leonard Wood encountered political struggles between natives and Spaniards, both of whom claimed authority in a given district. Wood used Cubans in government jobs to train the future officials of the Cuban Republic, in spite of their unpreparedness for self-government. This led to criticism in the United States. Moreover, political parties in the United States affected the occupation policy in the Philippines. The Democrats wanted to withdraw from the islands as soon as stable government could be established. The Republicans argued that the islands were not yet ready for independence. Economically, the military needed substantial expenditures to suppress uprisings and guerrillas, in spite of the earlier belief that the occupation would be profitable. Mass starvation, epidemics, and the brutal ways of the primitive life led to far more difficulties.¹⁰

After the Allied victory in World War I in November of 1918 the U. S. Third Army under Brigadier General H. A. Smith took charge of occupation of the Rhineland. In the spring of 1919, however, President Woodrow Wilson sent Pierrepont B. Noyes to Europe as his personal representative in Allied negotiations
for a final occupation settlement. Objecting to a harsher occupation, Noyes suggested a formula for civilian control under which the military would be restricted to the sole duty of standing ready for an emergency. Noyes' idea was adopted and the United States became responsible for the establishment of a civilian occupation in the Rhineland. The Rhineland High Commission, which consisted of Allied and German civilian representatives, decided the main occupation policies and rejected the continuation of martial law. Under the Commission German authorities carried out occupation policies. This U. S. idea for the government of the Rhineland by a civil commission instead of military agencies rested on such reasons as a popular drift toward isolationism, the disillusionment with experiences in Cuba and the Philippines, and the general assumption that the Germans were a civilized people. 11

World War II marked a significant change from previous experience in military occupations. In contrast to earlier practice, much preparation for occupation was done beforehand. The U. S. Army understood the important role which military government operations would play in conditions of total war. Moreover, the Army was aware that it had previously lacked a systematic technique for dealing with problems in occupied areas. To provide a special training program for military government affairs, the Army established in 1942 the School of Military Government in Charlottesville, Virginia, on the campus of the University of Virginia. It also created a
Civil Affairs Division in 1943, on a high War Department level, to coordinate all planning as well as training. Moreover, as the war progressed and more military government officers were demanded, the Army decided to enlarge the program by establishing the Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) on ten university campuses during 1943.\textsuperscript{12}

There is no doubt that these preliminary steps in the field of military government were very significant in World War II. The establishment of a Civil Affairs Division and civil affairs staffs, recruitment of specialists, and their training at the various military government schools certainly produced the favorable result of reasonable treatment of civilians in occupations. The specialists' achievements in dealing with enemy populations as well as friendly civilians helped combat operations decisively.

However, relatively few preparations were made for the job of military government that would arise after hostilities. Thus, in the postwar period many occupation problems emerged, which did not have any precedent. United States policy while occupying Germany, Japan, Korea, and Austria in the postwar period lacked uniformity. Because the occupation of these areas was basically an allied operation and because of the impact of the Cold War, the United States made many changes in occupation policy and took different approaches in different countries.

The United States began with a harsher policy toward enemy countries than toward liberated countries over which occupations
were basically temporary. As time passed, however, the growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union brought about a change in U. S. policy from strict control to greater freedom. Moreover, there were big differences between the policy applied in one country and that in another. While General Douglas MacArthur used the Japanese government for the occupation of that area, General Dwight Eisenhower created a new structure of government in Germany although both were principal enemy countries. United States policy-makers did not decide until the last moment whether to make the occupation of Japan an allied or a strictly American activity. By contrast, a considerable amount of discussion took place in the State Department with respect to the allied occupation of Germany.

In Japan the Emperor and Japanese government still remained after the war as MacArthur adopted an indirect method of occupation. In Korea, however, a direct occupation was conducted by General John Hodge's troops. Even though Korea was a liberated nation, the United States could not avoid instituting a direct occupation because there was no formally-established government. In the Korean case, the most important fact was that there had been no planning at all for any kind of occupation.

Thus, U. S. occupations in the postwar period showed a lack of order, unevenness in planning, and a lack of consistency in structure. While admitting that this was a way of being adaptable in changing circumstances, we may well analyze the historical precedents with a view towards making a model for future study of occupation policy.
Prior to 1890

From the American Revolution to the 1880's American historiography was dominated by a "Whig" interpretation accepting the nation's liberal democracy as natural and desirable. Because the United States stayed in comparable isolation from the rest of the world geographically and diplomatically, there was no general attempt to see American history as dependent on the outside world. American historiography in the 18th and 19th centuries expressed nothing but approval of the new nation, albeit different forms of this patriotism showed themselves in different decades.

In 1785 Thomas Jefferson published *Notes on Virginia*. Although he wrote the book originally in answer to a series of questions from François Marbois, a French diplomat, it has become a classic in American historical literature. The book includes Jefferson's ideas about the future of the new nation. Extremely patriotic about the free institutions that the Revolution produced, Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, emphasized the distinctiveness of America from European countries. His dream for the future American society was a pastoral community in which all people would be happy. The Jeffersonian pastoral ideal became almost an American ideology and greatly influenced American historiography.  

George Bancroft, the most representative historian of the
19th century, wrote his ten-volume History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent between 1834 and 1874. Deeply involved in political life, he spent over 40 years in writing American colonial and revolutionary history. And, his service in such high positions as Secretary of the Navy and as a diplomat in England and Germany helped him have access to many primary documents. 14

Faced with the serious political conflict of the Jacksonian era and the military conflict of the Civil War, the patriotic Bancroft reminded the Americans that they were a united people conducting themselves according to God's master plan. He argued that Americans were fundamentally idealistic and religious and would continue to be leaders in fulfilling God's plan to spread democracy to the whole world. He saw in the Declaration of Independence and the history of the United States the moral laws which governed the universe.

Although Americans did not abandon Bancroft's idealistic and moral spirit, a significant change began in American historiography late in the 19th century. The rise of professional historians and the impact of Darwinism influenced the writing of American history. In the van of historians who came to think of history as a science, Henry Adams believed that historians could apply Darwin's scientific method to the facts of human history. He wrote his nine-volume History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison in 1889-91, a classic in the literature of the 19th century.
This work marked the shift of American historiography from Bancroft's idealism to Adams' rationalistic pragmatism. Adams argued that the United States, committed to Jefferson's policy of national decentralization in 1801, was forced, by domestic as well as foreign affairs, toward unity for its national survival until it held off England in the War of 1812. For Adams, the individual or the nation was to be evaluated in terms of real strength but not in absolute terms of good and evil according to a divine plan. Stressing pragmatic rationality, Adams judged the character of many human figures whose ideas greatly influenced American history.  

Adams' pragmatism and relativism, in fact, reflected ideas widespread in late 19th-century America. In the era of European imperialism Darwinian ideas were so popular that national survival was seen to depend solely on strength and only fit nations seemed likely to survive. The formation of the New Navy in the 1880's was a good example of the United States policies that followed the pattern of European imperialism.

Since Adams was more faithful to the scientific approach than previous historians and placed greater emphasis on documents as historical evidence, he is usually regarded as much superior to Bancroft in his use of historical methods. However, each represents a prominent idea prevalent in the mid-19th and late 19th-century, respectively, idealism and pragmatism. Moreover, their histories influenced Americans in the twentieth century.
1890-1910

Prior to 1890 no historian paid attention to military occupations or even to diplomacy, since the actual instances of both were seen only in terms of the country's domestic development. However, once the United States became largely involved in relations with other countries at the turn of the century, a new group of historians who wrote from a global perspective emerged. Among them were Alfred Thayer Mahan, Frederick Jackson Turner, Brooks Adams, John Kasson, and Homer Lea.

Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1890) was so influential on American naval thought at the turn of the century that he is known as a great naval strategist. This book, which provides the guidelines for a naval power, soon became a manual for naval policies. However, he was more a historian than a strategist. As a naval officer, he had no more originality or imagination than any other officer. Yet, luckily, he had the opportunity to write a book only in the sense that he had been selected officially by his superiors to synthesize the naval philosophy of his colleagues and his generation. The historian Mahan expressed his concepts of sea power best in exploring the record of British history. In the process he supported an expansionist foreign policy.

The increasing United States industrial production in the late 19th century made America's leaders seek foreign markets. Pointing to the United States alleged overproduction and the supposed disappearance of the American frontier, Mahan believed
that the American people had to become a powerful sea-faring nation. He also advocated Social Darwinism and argued that nations must expand if they are to achieve and keep their greatness.

The first and most influential of historians at the turn of the century was Frederick Jackson Turner. In his famous essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," in 1893, Turner revealed a basic 19th century American attitude. He argued effectively that the frontier was the most significant element in the development of American democracy. With a strong belief that man and nature interacted harmoniously, Turner thought that United States history was characterized by an ever expanding frontier through man's exploitation of wilderness.

Although his essay did not directly mention foreign affairs, Turner implied, in some sense, that the United States would transplant popular domestic values into the frontier overseas. "The people of the United States have taken their tone from the incessant expansion which has not only been open but has even been forced upon them. He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased. Movement has been its dominant fact, and, unless this training has no effect upon a people, the American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise."17

The view of history as a natural science and the assumption about the existence of a system of evolutionary laws were evident particularly in The Law of Civilization and Decay (1896)
by Brooks Adams. Influenced by the positivist movement, Adams saw in world history a scientific law ruling social development. He said, "The facts relating to successive phases of human thought, whether conscious or unconscious, constitute history; therefore, if intellectual phenomena are evolved in a regular sequence, history, like matter, must be governed by law." Adams discovered the scientific principle in human society in "its oscillations between barbarism and civilization."

Adams' world view received clear statement: "Whenever a race is so richly endowed with the energetic material that it does not expand all its energy in the daily struggle for life, the surplus may be stored in the shape of wealth; and this stock of stored energy may be transferred from community to community, either by conquest, or by superiority in economic competition. ...When a highly centralized society disintegrates, under the pressure of economic competition, it will remain inert until supplied with fresh energetic material by the infusion of barbarian blood." Thus, Adams, who, like Mahan, was largely influenced by Social Darwinism, warned the American people in the 1890's that they become a strong power in the world.

The Spanish-American War in 1898 is often seen as the divide in United States history between isolation and world power. However, it is better to say that the strength of the United States was not visibly apparent to outsiders until May 1898 when Admiral George Dewey beat the Spanish at Manila Bay, since the United States from its outset was already a world power
with the potential to affect the balance of power of the world. The 1898 war led other powers to realize the United States as a strong power. After the war, the United States emerged not only as a Caribbean but as a Pacific power as well.

Moreover, in 1899 Secretary of State John Hay declared the Open Door in China. Hay's Open-Door policy, which insisted on equal opportunity in trade with China, was based on traditional U. S. free-trade policy. However, it was a challenge to the great powers with already established spheres of influence in China. Furthermore, Theodore Roosevelt, a champion of Mahan's sea power theory, led the United States to build a more powerful navy during his presidency from 1901 to 1909.

In the first decade of the 20th century historians who reflected the transitional period very well were John Kasson and Homer Lea. An international lawyer, Kasson wrote *The Evolution of the Constitution of the United States of America and History of the Monroe Doctrine* in 1904. Besides reminding the American people of the greatness of the American system of government and of its constitution, Kasson emphasized the importance of the Monroe Doctrine in foreign affairs. He regarded the Monroe Doctrine as a principle in the making of United States foreign policy and concluded: "We must maintain the Doctrine...The time is most favorable. Our foreign relations are universally amicable. Our domestic prosperity and contentment free the government from anxious interior cares. ...The United States could not witness with indifference the
establishment on American continents, or on any island of their borders, of any new European military or naval position.... If not now formulated and declared, it should be accepted by our statesmen, not as a topic for academic discussion, but as a basis for firm and decisive action."20 Facing the dangers of European involvement in Americas as in the Alaska Boundary Dispute and the Anglo-German Blockade of Venezuela in 1902, Kasson argued that the United States needed a strong policy against European powers to preserve national interest and international peace.

An even stronger policy than Kasson suggested was taken in less than two months by Theodore Roosevelt. In December 1904, in his annual message to Congress, Roosevelt declared the so-called "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine in which he used the Monroe Doctrine not only to prevent intervention by the European powers but also to justify intervention by the United States. Roosevelt declared: "The adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, in flagrant cases of chronic wrongdoing in America, to the exercise of an international police power."21

In The Valor of Ignorance (1909) Homer Lea pointed out the public ignorance of the value of armies to nations and warned that the weak situation of military defense on the coast would cause peril to the United States. Lea asserted: "to the average American, as to Monroe, the Atlantic and Pacific are still vast seas that no enemy will have the temerity to cross them, hence
this nation, without navies proportionate to its new responsibilities and their concomitant dangers, hopes to remain secure and immune, without effort, from foreign invasion. By drawing lessons from the campaigns conducted by such great captains as Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon Bonaparte, he also warned that distance is not measured simply in miles.

Considering the possibility of war between Japan and the United States to be serious, Lea concluded that the United States should be strengthened by armaments, especially for the Army, to protect its national security and for international responsibilities, which had already been assumed. Lea argued the state of preparedness for war in Japan was better than that in America and warned that the probable result would be similar to the cases of the Chinese-Japanese War of 1898 and Russo-Japanese War of 1904.

Homer Lea was the first historian who deeply considered military occupation problems in United States history. In dealing with conquered peoples, Lea suggested that the United States should regard them according to different criteria: the manner of their subordination, their racial character, and their geographical location. Facing the continuous insurrection of the Filipinos against the United States, Lea suggested ways to lessen their spirit of revolt. "The expenditures of the United States to improve the education of the people and the administration of the government have in no way diminished the
spirit of revolt.... The hatred of the conquered is the most enduring of all human passions, and it must never be forgotten by a conquering nation that, whatever they get by force, by force they must continue to hold."\textsuperscript{23} Even though he understood the Philippine point of view, Lea believed that, since the Filipinos were capable of provoking war, the United States should hold strong military forces necessary to suppress insurrections and to prevent further war.

As noted above, some historians during the 1890-1910 period discussed what were actually military occupations in terms of United States foreign policy. They accepted military occupation as a necessary policy for a strong power. Moreover, there was a pioneer study of military government. A lawyer, William E. Birkhimer wrote \textit{Military Government and Martial Law} in 1892.

Especially interested in the fact that the legal obligations of the military were tested by a quite different rule when operating on foreign soils from that when within their own territory, Birkhimer distinguished military government from martial law—a distinction still effective today. "The former is exercised over enemy territory," he wrote: "Military government is placed within the domain of international law, while martial law is within the cognizance of municipal law.... With rare exceptions the military governor of a district subdued by his arms is amenable, according to the laws and customs only, for measures he may take affecting those found there whatever their nationality; whereas he who enforces martial law, as here
understood, must be prepared to answer, should the legality of his acts be questioned, not only to his military superiors, but also before the civil tribunals when they have resumed their jurisdiction."\textsuperscript{24}

Although Birkhimer's definitions are not accepted as absolute, it is true today that military government gives more power to the military governor than martial law. Military government is not defined so rigidly by law as martial law, because the former does not affect the people of the home government so much as the latter. The latter is but a development of the common law, which is not suited for the maintenance of order and the preservation of society in turbulent times of invasion or insurgency. As a necessity, without which neither insurrection nor invasion could be driven back, martial law is more acceptable to people than military government.

\textbf{1910-1950}

Many of historians from about 1910 to 1950 were influenced by the ideas developed in the Progressive movement at the beginning of the 20th century. In sympathy with the purposes of the Progressive movement toward the industrialization of American society, they saw American history as developing through economic and social forces. Committed to the idea of progress, Progressive historians saw themselves as providing knowledge for the construction of a better world. Turner's epochal essay on the frontier in 1893 guided the progressive school. Turner also
saw American history as the development of conflict between sections as the East against West in *The Rise of the New West, 1819-1829* (1906).

Turner influenced many historians to look at the class and sectional conflicts in American society. One of the great historians among the Progressive school, Charles A. Beard combined Turner's ideas and Marx's theory.\(^{25}\) In *The Rise of American Civilization* (1927), Beard saw American history as showing the progress through the economic conflict between creditors and debtors. Concerning foreign policy he rejected idealism and attacked moralists like Woodrow Wilson. The League of Nations suggested by Wilson, Beard said, "would involve America in European entanglements, by binding the government to cooperate with other powers...It would erect a superstate that might invade the domestic interests of the United States; it would impose a moral obligation on our government to take part in the disturbances, conflicts, settlement, and wars of Europe and Asia."\(^{26}\)

In his earlier *American Government and Politics* (1910) Beard paid attention to foreign policy and pointed out lack of coordination between armed forces and diplomacy in American history. He said: "The degree of military preparedness needed by a nation is determined by its geographical location, the power of its potential enemies, and by the character of the foreign policy which it pursues....It is military business to determine what engines of war are necessary for defense and offense under
certain circumstances. It is the business of the American people to decide what kind of foreign policy is to be pursued. Unfortunately there has never been and is not now a coordination of armed forces with diplomacy.\textsuperscript{27} Beard also supported the occupation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines. According to him, the issue on the islands had more meanings economically and strategically rather than politically. "Large amounts of American capital are invested in them and there are great opportunities for economic development ahead. Porto Rico is an important element in the maintenance of American naval power in the Caribbean. The Philippines occupy a similar position in the Far East. They afford a base for the protection of American enterprise in China."\textsuperscript{28}

Among Progressive historians, the most interested in occupation policy were Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman. In Dollar Diplomacy: The Classic Study in American Imperialism (1925) they argued that economic interests dominated in United States military occupations of undeveloped countries in the Caribbean and Pacific. The United States, like Japan and Europe, passed through the stages of commercial and industrial revolutions and reached the stage of imperialism. Basically they accepted Lenin's theory that "imperialism is the final stage of capitalism."\textsuperscript{29} They pointed to the action of the American people who pursued economic interests abroad: "The United States had travelled a long distance since the days of isolation and no entangling alliances. In addition to the territory which this government controls is the
steady penetration of American finance into the highly developed countries of Europe....State Department support for these investments expressed itself through the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, the Open Door in Asia, and the various forms of Dawes Plan in Europe."30

In 1927 Vernon L. Parrington, a professor of English at the University of Washington, published the first volume of Main Currents in American Thought (3 vols., 1927-30). Parrington saw American history as a conflict between Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian principles. Unlike other Progressive historians, however, he did not see in American history since the Civil War any progress of the Jeffersonian ideals. Foreseeing the rise of Nazism and Communism in the 1930's and 40's, as early as 1927 Parrington felt disillusioned with his times and said: "Liberals whose hair is growing thin and the lines of whose figures are no longer what they were are likely to find themselves today in the unhappy predicament of being treated as mourners at their own funerals."31

Moreover, in the 1930's and 40's some historians, influenced by the disillusion that followed World War I, doubted that the idea of progress was a valid basis for history. Among Progressive historians many different interpretations emerged. Because of America's difficulties such as postwar disillusionment, depression, and the threat of totalitarian power, some historians emphasized the preservation of traditional values while others still believed in progress through reform.
During World War II the United States set up a specialized military government program and paid attention to military government operations. Because of the great size of populations which would come under United States military occupation and because the United States was involved in complex international situations, it adopted better techniques in dealing with occupied areas than ever before. Moreover, some people began to write about the actual history of military occupations for the first time in American history.

Facing the complex problems of military government, John Hersey, a war correspondent in the Mediterranean theater in 1943, wrote *A Bell for Adano* (1944). The novel told much of the historical truth about Americans in Italy. Hersey implied that the quality of military governors determined success or failure in administering occupied countries. First of all, according to Hersey, to understand the occupied country is the key to success. In military occupations, Hersey said, "Neither the eloquence of Churchill nor the humaneness of Roosevelt, no charter, no four freedoms or fourteen points, can guarantee anything. Only the behavior of men under pressure can guarantee."^32

In 1944 during the war another important work on military occupation was *Military Occupation and the Rule of Law* by Ernst Fraenkel. It was about the Rhineland occupation after the First World War. To provide a framework for the next occupation of Germany, after World War II, Fraenkel surveyed the Rhineland occupation of 1918-23. Thus, by writing on the actual occupations,
people in the wartime tried to find practical solutions for occupation problems which they faced.

While the United States substantially demobilized after the war, occupation troops still remained in Germany and Japan to restore stability. Hajo Holborn, working on the staff of the Office of Strategic Services during 1943-45, wrote the story of the growth of the American military government organization and its problems in *American Military Government* (1947). Sensitive to the coming of the Cold War, Holborn pointed out that military government officers had made a notable achievement in a difficult situation, especially concerning the growing Soviet-American confrontation, when Washington policy-makers took too long in sending out a clear policy to their officers. To support his theme, in the appendix of the book, Holborn revealed some of the key documents of American military government 1943-46.

1950-1960

In the 1950's a new generation of historians appeared to challenge the Progressive historians. In the Cold War era the so-called consensus school of historians saw the United States as the leader of the free world against the other world of communism. Instead of the idea of progress from social change, consensus historians stressed the thesis of historical continuity. To them common principles and national traditions dominated American history.

One of the most representative of the consensus group was the Harvard political theorist Louis Hartz. In his book, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955), Hartz pointed to the absence
of feudalism in America and of the so-called ancien régime and pronounced this a defining characteristic of American society. He argued that America was a unique society because of its consensus in a liberal tradition. There was, according to Hartz, a continuity of John Locke's political principles no matter what confrontations existed between the "Federalists" and "Jeffersonians."

Another major consensus historian was Daniel J. Boorstin. In The Genius of American Politics (1953) and The Americans: The Colonial Experience (1958), Boorstin argued that America from its birth flourished without any European influences. Both Hartz and Boorstin reflected the 1950's in which the United States assumed the role of the leader of the free world and they brought many changes in American historiography. Moreover, they affected writings concerned with American diplomatic history and military experiences abroad.

The consensus historians were in general agreement that United States military occupations were successful in establishing democracy in occupied countries. However, the historical study of occupations in the 1950's declined somewhat. The development of nuclear weapons, Eisenhower's promulgation of "mass retaliation" doctrine, and changes in military strategy, technology, and organization, raised many problems in civil-military relations. Also, the controversy between MacArthur and Truman accelerated the debate on civil-military relations. The most common question was: what pattern of civil-military relations is the best to maintain both American liberal democratic values and the security
of the United States? So the interpretation of occupations in terms of civil-military relations became most prevalent.

Philip E. Mosely, who served as political advisor to the U. S. Representative at the European Advisory Commission during 1944-45, revealed the conflict between the State and War Departments over occupation matters in 1950. The Civil Affairs Division in the War Department insisted that the occupation of Germany was purely a military matter and so there was no job for the State Department. Mosely argued that the Western Allies failed to make provision for their access to Berlin for future Allied control because the War Department inflexibly insisted on negotiations only at the military level. 33 Also, in *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (1958), Harold Stein argued that the establishment of a Civil Affairs Division was initially devised to control the military, but the Division turned out to be still less responsive to policy views of the State Department and other civilian agencies. 34

On the other hand, Alfred Vagts, one of the most influential military historians, distinguished between the military way and militarism in *A History of Militarism* (1959). While the military way implies techniques directly concerned with winning wars, militarism presents "every system of thinking and valuing and every complex of feelings which rank military institutions and ways above the ways of civilian life, carrying military mentality and modes of acting and decision into the civilian sphere." 35 In Vagts' view, most of United States military occupations have
seemed to demonstrate militarism. Militarism was acceptable in occupied countries in United States history, but never at home.

Since 1960

Although the consensus school in American historiography continues to this day, it has had opponent groups such as the "New Left" and the "realists." In the decade of the 1960's and 70's there were many critical issues in foreign relations: the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam War, the rise of the Third World, the development of Sino-Soviet-US relations. Each of these issues affected the national mood, and the idea of consensus in American history declined from its greatest strength in the 1950's.

William Appleman Williams saw United States foreign policy as expansionism in his books, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959) and *The Contours of American History* (1962). Williams argued that the Open-Door policy was the basis for America's foreign policy. The Open Door, according to Williams, was intended to achieve two objectives: advantages of economic expansion and the avoidance of expenditures in a colonial system. William's theme was extended to a more radical interpretation by Gabriel Kolko, a typical New Left historian. In *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (1968), Kolko argued that the United States used military power in World War II in order to gain its political and economic power in the postwar world.36

On the other hand, the realist school tended to view U. S. foreign policy on the side of pragmatic politics. In the middle
ground between the consensus school and the New Left, the "realists" were less concerned with moral responsibility for foreign relations and focused instead on the pragmatic political problems facing policy-makers. Hans J. Morgenthau represented the realist point of view in *The Purpose of American Politics* (1960) and *A New Foreign Policy of the United States* (1969). In the conclusion of the 1969 book, Morgenthau said, "No change in American foreign policy is always at the mercy of accidents and, more particularly, of the foreign policies of other nations. However, America will discharge its responsibilities toward itself and mankind only if it maximizes the chances for success by putting into practice the principles on which a sound foreign policy must rest."\(^3\)

The critical issues in foreign relations in the 1960's also affected historians' attention to military occupations. To one group of historians United States military occupations seemed successful, while the other group considered them failures.

Looking back to the occupation of the Philippines at the turn of the century, in *Little Brown Brother* (1961) Leon Wolff argued that the United States annexation of the Philippines was morally wrong because the insurgents led by Emilio Aguinaldo had popular support from the Filipinos. Also, John Gimbel argued in his book *A German Community under American Occupation* (1961) that although the vacillations of military government policy were influenced by the Cold War, American military government failed to convince Germans of the reasons for the frequent changes in occupation policy. Gimbel also pointed out that Americans in Germany after
1945 were technically wrong because they did not use a local leadership sympathetic toward the American occupation policy. "The effect of American efforts was to disillusion the occupation's most loyal supporters and to bring forth people who disagreed with Americans." 38

On the other hand, Allan R. Millett in The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 (1968) revealed the differences of opinions between the occupation officers and political leaders in Washington. Millett said the Army's activities were restricted to the minimum tasks because the Washington policy-makers were too conservative. According to Millett the Army believed that American national policy would be best served if basic changes were made by a reform in Cuba.

In contrast to the group which was negative in its analysis of U. S. military occupation policy, another group believed that the occupation troops did an excellent job. In 1962, Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg wrote Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors as a volume for U. S. Army in World War II series. Coles and Weinberg, who dealt with Army's civil administration in Italy, France, and Northwest Europe in World War II, illustrated certain basic problems of civil affairs. Why did soldiers rather than civilians become governors despite the fact President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisors initially tried to entrust the conduct of civil affairs to civilian agencies? Coles and Weinberg argued that it was not because of the Army's ambition but because civilians were unready to go into battle areas. Also, conditions
during and immediately after hostilities might give serious trouble to civilian agencies because these civilians might be still in military operations. Coles' and Weinberg's thesis was that although civilian agencies might theoretically be strong, they were weak in real military situations. Coles and Weinberg concluded that American soldiers did a fine job in viewing and handling political problems not too differently from civilians.

Moreover, Clarence C. Clendenen, an expert on the 1916 intervention in Mexico, talked about the achievements of American soldiers in his *Blood on the Border: The U. S. Army and the Mexican Irregulars* (1969). Rejecting the common view that the 1916 punitive expedition in Mexico was a failure, Clendenen pointed out that the expedition contributed to changes in armament and provided valuable experiences for future field commanders in World War I.

Probably the best work on military occupations is *Military Occupation and National Security* (1968) by Martin and Joan Kyre. Martin Kyre was the founder and director of the Peace Corps Training Center in 1965-1966. The Kyres examined all cases of occupation comprehensively for the first time in American historiography. The Kyres as "realists" saw a military occupation as the consequence of a national security policy. While analyzing the U. S. Army's successes and failures in various occupations, they suggested that Americans think of their soldiers as governors when they used soldiers in governing foreign countries.

Behind the United States decision to use military government was a civil-military debate which has often been made to focus on
the question of whether the use of army personnel as civilian governors is efficient or not. However it seemed to the Kyres that the military were more practical candidates to govern occupied areas. First, the military must remain even after formal hostilities cease, primarily to enforce the terms of the surrender. Second, there are always possible dangers such as a state of anarchy among the occupied people or threat from organized guerrillas. Third, the responsibility of supply and transport even to civilian agencies would be assumed by the military to avoid unnecessary duplication. Fourth, the Army can keep its same organizational structure for the occupation zone. 39

A military occupation was not only a bridge between the defeated regime and the new government but also a vehicle for returning to peace. Thus, it basically accompanied the mission of establishing future relationships between the former conqueror and the conquered. However, the U. S. Army traditionally disliked to assume policy-making responsibilities in the diplomatic field because it thought that diplomacy was the function of the State Department. Thus, the ambiguous line of responsibilities between Departments led to the lack of a clear-cut policy, too frequent amendment of major guidelines, and lack of a long-range policy. The Kyres maintained that this conflict accelerated negative reactions to military occupations and hurt the interests of the United States. 40

The Kyres categorized the United States national interests into territorial and economic expansion, maintenance of the status
quo, and self-defense. Unlike the traditional historians who thought that the primary mission of the United States in occupied countries was to create a democratic society, they argued that the most important national interest in military occupations was to maintain a superiority of power to carry economic and ideological factors to their necessary ends.

Although the Kyres accepted the common view that national principles played a part in occupation policy, they said that national mood worked much more importantly. With their focus on the relation between national principles and mood, they also grouped U. S. occupations into three categories: opposition, unintentional support, and public indifference. In an occupation of opposition, such as the U. S. Civil War, national principles and local mood clashed. However, in occupations of Mexico, Cuba, the Philippines, the Rhineland, and World War II, the American public provided unintentional support to policy-makers who exercised national principles overseas. According to the Kyres, the Siberian intervention 1918-20, the Korean War 1950-53, and Vietnam War 1964-73 were examples of public indifference. Public mood appeared not to be a critical factor in minor or limited wars.41

In the 1970's there has been a tendency toward realist approach in studying military occupations. Earl F. Ziemke may be the representative historian on military occupations in the 1970's. Ziemke wrote The US Army in the Occupation of Germany in 1974 as a part of the Army Historical Series, which is in effect a
continuation of the volume of the U. S. Army in World War II series, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (1962) by Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg. Ziemke said that the U. S. Army was successful in the occupation of Germany in difficult situations where neither the commands nor the personnel had adequate precedents from which to make judgements. Also, in "Military Government: Two Approaches, Russia and Africa," one chapter of *New Dimensions in Military History* (1975) edited by Russell F. Weigley, Ziemke compared United States military government with that of the Soviets after World War II. Ziemke pointed to the weakness of United States military government because it lacked strategic objectives, because of the reluctance of the United States civilian authorities to assign to the military a more than temporary responsibility for civil affairs, and because of the reluctance of the military for political responsibility.

In the 1970's the tendency to study occupations increased. There were many conferences of scholars to discuss the American experience in the administration of occupied areas during and right after World War II. The conference held at the Harry S. Truman Library Institute in 1970 was a start, airing many occupation problems and suggesting possibilities for research.

Furthermore, the 1970 conference encouraged future conferences at research institutes. Following the Truman Library conference, the MacArthur Memorial conducted an annual session on the occupation of Japan during 1975-77, while the George C. Marshall Research Foundation held a seminar on the occupation of Germany
in 1976 and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute sponsored a
conference on aspects of the occupations of Germany and Japan in
1977. The conferences of the 1970's concerning military
occupations led many scholars to review the occupation experiences
of the United States.

Military Manuals of Occupations since 1940

To what extent the United States forces actually exercised
their power over civil populations in occupied areas can be examined
through military manuals as well as historical writings. Military
manuals reflect the consciousness of the U. S. military.

There was the consistent shift of terminology for titles of
the field manuals related to military occupations published between
1940 and 1969. In 1940 the U. S. Army Judge Advocate General
published a field manual, FM 27-5, with the title Military
Government. This was the first U. S. field manual on military
occupations. But the words "military government" gave way gradually
to the more indefinite "civil affairs." In 1943 the Manual of
Military Government and Civil Affairs, FM 41-5 (US Army) was
published. It was followed by the Manual of Civil Affairs and
Civil Affairs/Military Government, FM 41-5 (Departments of the Army,
Navy, and the Air Force) in 1958, Civil Affairs Operations, FM
41-10 (US Army) in 1962 and its revision with the same title in 1969,
and the Joint Manual for Civil Affairs, FM 41-5 (Departments of the
Army, Navy, and the Air Force) in 1966. Thus, the term "civil
affairs" started behind, took precedence, and then swept over the term "military government."

The United States Army Institute for Military Assistance provided a special text for United States Army civil affairs students with the title *Historical Development of Civil Affairs from the Romans to the Korean Conflict* in 1972. This text reflected the most recent field manual, *Civil Affairs Operations* (1969), and defined civil affairs as: "matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military force of certain functions of the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government." On the other hand, it defined military government as "the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory." The text obviously rated military government as subordinate and instrumental to civil affairs.

In the *Joint Manual for Civil Affairs* (1966) circumstances which may lead to military occupations are defined as:

a. Show of force through mobilization or deployment.
b. Counterinsurgency operations.
c. Peacetime military activities in U. S. territory.
d. Territory of a friendly power during peacetime on the basis of an agreement.
e. Disaster relief or invitational emergency intercession within the jurisdiction of a foreign power.
f. Assistance in civil defence, emergency, or disasters in both foreign and domestic territory.

g. Territory of a friendly power during wartime generally on the basis of an agreement.

h. Wartime activities in the United States.

i. Occupation of enemy territory.

j. Occupation of liberated territory, with or without a civil affairs agreement.

This manual gives an order to the circumstances from peacetime activities to wartime under the term "civil affairs" which sounds very smooth, even though it covers all possible cases. However, the cases i. and j. are the most significant for a study of the history of the United States military occupations, as seen above.

CONCLUSION

In the period prior to 1890 Americans did not pay attention to military occupations, because not only military but also diplomatic affairs were seen only in terms of the nation's development. However, George Bancroft, the most representative historian of the 19th century, anticipated that America had a manifest destiny to lead the whole world.

Once the United States largely involved itself in world politics at the turn of the century, a new group of historians influenced by Social Darwinism wrote about occupations as part
of a power system. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Frederick Jackson Turner, Brooks Adams, John Kasson, and Homer Lea saw that occupation policy was needed to be a strong power. Moreover, the Progressive historians such as Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles A. Beard, Scott Nearing, and Vernon L. Parrington interpreted occupations in terms of economic factors under the assumption that history was based on the progress of materialistic forces.

However, there was no work on the actual history of occupations until World War II. Many people had experience in military occupations and governments during and right after World War II. Furthermore, the development of the Cold War motivated scholars' writing of actual occupations. Especially, there were many historians who paid attention to occupations in the 1960's and 70's. Facing unrest and tensions in world affairs, they looked back to what experiences the United States had in its military occupations. There were various interpretations. Such historians as Leon W. Wolff, John Gimbel, and Allan R. Millett, thought that the United States made many mistakes. By contrast, Harry L. Coles, Albert K. Weinberg, and Clarence C. Clendenen believed that U. S. occupations were successful. Another group represented by Martin and Joan Kyre, the so-called "realists," analyzed occupations in terms of national interests and attempted to draw useful lessons for the future.

Finally, discussions of historical works on military occupations provide not only valuable knowledge of occupations, but also a suggestion that Americans may learn more useful lessons from past experiences in occupations from a systematic study with a typological approach.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

It should be noted, here, that United States military occupations have not had so much attention as such issues as war and diplomacy in American historiography. Although war and diplomacy were more important issues to Americans, military occupations played a significant role in the result of war and diplomacy. Theoretically, military government is a transitional machinery from war to peace in foreign relations. Therefore, a correct retrospect of military occupations will contribute to a better understanding of United States foreign relations.

For a better understanding of how Americans dealt with foreign populations during military occupations, historians should examine: (a) What did the occupied people think of the United States military government? (b) What did the low-ranking agents of military government perceive their jobs in an occupation to be? (c) How did military government deal with civilian affairs politically, socially, economically, and ideologically? (d) Was there any long-term policy in terms of United States foreign policy? (e) What kind of occupation is the most feasible in a certain area which may be conditioned distinguishably by such factors as culture, language, history, size of populations, and so on? (f) What problems did the military government have depending on the time phase of occupation: immediate, intermediate, and garrison phase? (g) What sources are available for research on military occupations?


4. Kyre, p. 51; U. S. Army Institute for Military Assistance Special Text, Historical Development of Civil Affairs from the Romans to the Korean Conflict, 1972, p. 22.


10. U. S. Army Institute for Military Assistance Special Text, pp. 36-49.

11. Kyre, pp. 60-62; Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and Rule


22. Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance (New York: Harper and
23. Lea, pp. 120-122.
24. William E. Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law
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29. Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy: The Classic
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31. Gerald N. Grob and George Athan Billias, From Progressivism
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32. John Hersey, A Bell for Adano (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
33. Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany," Foreign Affairs,
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36. Grob and Billias, pp. 343-345.


41. Kyre, pp. 45-98.


43. Ziemke, p. 292.

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THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY OCCUPATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

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A comprehension of the historiography of military occupations is useful in understanding the actual history of occupations. Neither has been studied systematically by scholars. The purpose of this report is to examine how and what Americans have written about occupations.

In the period prior to 1900 few people paid attention to occupations. Nevertheless, George Bancroft, the most representative historian of the 19th century, saw America as the product of God's plan and thought the American people had a destiny or mission to spread their democracy to the rest of the world.

Once the United States began to involve itself in world politics in the late 19th century, such historians as Brooks Adams, A. T. Mahan, John Kasson, and Homer Lea, who had grown up in a society influenced by Social Darwinism, were concerned about occupations as part of a power system. However, the Progressive historians dominating the field of American historiography in the beginning half of the 20th century interpreted occupations largely in terms of economic factors. Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles A. Beard, Scott Nearing, and Vernon L. Parrington emphasized materialistic forces in history.

After the end of World War II, however, the so-called consensus school of historians rejected the Progressive approach and argued that there was a continuity of stable principles and traditions in American history. Facing the Cold War, such historians as Louis Hartz and Daniel J. Boorstin produced an image of unity and strength in the United States. Yet, the historical
conditions of the 1960's and 70's produced various schools of interpretation. Such critical issues in foreign relations as the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam War, the rise of the Third World, and the development of Sino-Soviet-US relations influenced the New Left and "realists."

Today, historians may well ask themselves how much they have dealt with the actual history of occupations. There have been relatively few works on occupations, while there have been many on major wars in United States history. However, there have been some useful publications on occupations themselves since the end of World War II. The large scale of American participation in occupations in World War II and the development of the Cold War motivated the writing of the actual history of occupations.

During and right after World War II some people who had been involved in military governments began to write about occupations. They tried to provide a better technique in dealing with the problems of civilians in occupied areas. John Hersey and Hajo Holborn represented this kind of writing in the 1940's. In the 1950's, however, some scholars like Philip E. Mosely, Harold Stein, and Alfred Vagts, interpreted occupation matters in terms of civil-military relations. These scholars were influenced by the end of mass armed forces and the controversy between MacArthur and Truman.

In the 1960's and 70's scholars paid more attention to military occupations. Facing unrest and tensions in world affairs, they looked back to what experiences the United States had in its
military occupations of foreign countries. Three different groups came out. The first group represented by Leon W. Wolff, John Gimbel, and Allan R. Millett, thought that the United States made many mistakes. In the second group, who believed that US occupations were successful, were Harry L. Coles and Clarence C. Clendenen. The third group, the so-called "realists" like Joan and Martin Kyre, and E. F. Ziemke, analyzed occupations in terms of national interests and attempted to draw useful lessons for the future. Probably the Kyres' *Military Occupation and National Security* (1968) is the best analysis on military occupations.

Discussions of publications on military occupations provide not only valuable knowledge of occupations but also a suggestion that Americans may learn more useful lessons from past experiences in occupations by a more systematic study with a typological approach.