TRANSITION TO VIOLENCE: AN EVALUATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR MOVE TO TERROR

by

ORLANDREW E. DANZELL

B.A., Cameron University, 2005
M.A., Kansas State University, 2007

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

School of Security Studies
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

2011
Abstract

The goals of this dissertation are two-fold. First is to investigate and explain the key variables responsible for the process whereby political parties form alliances with or create terrorist organizations. Second is to fill an important gap in the literature by offering a more precise conceptualization of the issues and a different theoretical view. Extant literature argues that institutional structural constraints, such as electoral systems, are more likely to lead political parties to create terrorist organizations. However, this dissertation hypothesizes that regime ideology is also an important factor explaining the creation of terrorist organizations by political parties regardless of structural institutional constraints. This dissertation seeks to illuminate existing fears and concerns about alliances between terrorist groups and political parties in states whose ruling party platform is based on leftist, rightist, centrist, or religious ideology. Using empirical methods, which includes both quantitative and case study approaches, this dissertation intends to show that particular kinds of party ideology is positively correlated with the formation of terrorist organizations even after controlling for institutional structural constraints. The implication of these findings is important for policymakers eager to create stable polities.
TRANSITION TO VIOLENCE: AN EVALUATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR
MOVE TO TERROR

By

ORLANDREW E. DANZELL

B.A., Cameron University, 2005
M.A., Kansas State University, 2007

A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

School of Security Studies
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

2011

Approved by:

Major Professor
Emizet Kisangani, PhD
Abstract

The goals of this dissertation are two-fold. First is to investigate and explain the key variables responsible for the process whereby political parties form alliances with or create terrorist organizations. Second is to fill an important gap in the literature by offering a more precise conceptualization of the issues and a different theoretical view. Extant literature argues that institutional structural constraints, such as electoral systems, are more likely to lead political parties to create terrorist organizations. However, this dissertation hypothesizes that regime ideology is also an important factor explaining the creation of terrorist organizations by political parties regardless of structural institutional constraints. This dissertation seeks to illuminate existing fears and concerns about alliances between terrorist groups and political parties in states whose ruling party platform is based on leftist, rightist, centrist, or religious ideology. Using empirical methods, which includes both quantitative and case study approaches, this dissertation intends to show that particular kinds of party ideology is positively correlated with the formation of terrorist organizations even after controlling for institutional structural constraints. The implication of these findings is important for policymakers eager to create stable polities.
# Table of Contents

List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... vii  
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... viii  
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ ix  
Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... x  

**CHAPTER 1 - Introduction** ............................................................................................................ 1  
1.1 The Question ........................................................................................................................ 1  
1.2 The Argument ....................................................................................................................... 2  
1.3 Competing Explanations and Significance ........................................................................... 4  
1.3.1 Plan of the Dissertation .................................................................................................. 8  

**CHAPTER 2 - Political Parties and a Turn To Terror** ................................................................. 10  
2.1 Conceptual Issues: Political Parties and Terrorism ............................................................ 10  
2.2 Literature Review ............................................................................................................... 19  
2.2.1 Structural Cause Approach .......................................................................................... 20  
2.2.2 Rational Choice Approach ........................................................................................... 24  
2.3 Theoretical Development: Ideology and Terrorism ............................................................ 26  
2.3.1 Religious Political Parties and A Turn to Terror ......................................................... 38  

**CHAPTER 3 - Cross-sectional Time Series Analysis** .................................................................. 45  
3.1 Research Design and Methods ............................................................................................ 46  
3.2 Empirical Analysis and Discussion .................................................................................... 50  
3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................... 50  
3.2.2 Statistical Analysis ....................................................................................................... 52  
3.2.3 Discussion of the Findings ........................................................................................... 58  

**CHAPTER 4 - Introduction to the Qualitative Approach** ........................................................... 66  
4.1 Research Design and Methods ............................................................................................ 67  
4.1.1 Qualitative Approach ................................................................................................... 67  
4.1.2 Structured Focused Comparison: ................................................................................. 71  
4.1.3 Case Selection .............................................................................................................. 73  
4.1.4 Process-Tracing/Historical Causation ......................................................................... 76
CHAPTER 5 - Colombia

5.1 Background

5.1.1 Critical Antecedents: From Two Party Dominance to La Violencia

5.1.2 Critical Juncture: From Constitutional Amendment and National Front to Terror

CHAPTER 6 - Turkey

6.1 Background

6.1.1 Critical Antecedents: The Development of an Exclusionary Party System

6.1.2 Critical Juncture: Political Ideology, Nationalism, Constitutional Barriers, and Radicalization

CHAPTER 7 - Japan

7.1 Background

7.1.1 Critical Antecedents: Malapportionment the creation of a single-party democracy

7.1.2 Critical Juncture: Political Ideology Constitutional Barriers and Radicalization

CHAPTER 8 - Costa Rica

8.1 Background

8.1.1 Critical Antecedents: Constitutional Changes and Centrist Governments Diverging Responses to Dissent

CHAPTER 9 - Conclusion

9.1 Findings

9.1.1 A Few Theoretical and Methodological Weaknesses

9.1.2 Policy Implications

9.1.3 Avenues for Future Research

References

APPENDIX A - Countries in Quantitative Sample
List of Figures

Figure 3.1 Total Terrorist Groups Formed by Political Parties 1960-2006 ............................... 60
Figure 3.2 Total Terrorist Groups Formed by Political Parties Under Right-leaning Governments
1960-2006 ........................................................................................................................................ 61
Figure 3.3 Total Terror Groups Formed by Political Parties Under Left-Leaning Governments 62
Figure 3.4 Total Terror Groups Formed When Religious Governments are in Power............... 63
Figure 3.5 Total Terror Groups Formed by Political Parties Under Centrist Governments....... 64
Figure 3.6 Frequency of Terrorist Groups formed by Political Parties 1960-2006............... 65
Figure 5.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Colombia........................................................................... 109
Figure 6.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Turkey ................................................................................. 128
Figure 7.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Japan.................................................................................. 147
Figure 8.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Costa Rica ........................................................................ 160
List of Tables

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics................................................................. 51
Table 3.2 Poisson Regression Estimates for Terrorist Group Formation 1960-2006............. 57
Table 5.1 Colombia Parties and National Factions, 1965............................................. 108
Table 6.1 Grand Assembly Elections Results, 1950-57: Political Parties of Turkey .......... 114
Table 6.2 Grand Assembly Elections Results, 1961-77: Political Parties of Turkey .......... 120
Table 7.1 The Liberal Democratic Party: Japanese Prime Ministers in the First and Second Party Systems ................................................................................................. 134
Table 8.1 Election Results, 1948-1998 Costa Rica.................................................... 154
Table 8.2 Structured Focused Comparison of Cases Between 1960-2006......................... 161
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the members of my committee for all of their diligent efforts in supporting me through this dissertation process. I appreciate the guidance and direction from my mentor and advisor, Emizet Kisangani, who has shaped my academic career into a success. Without his support this project would never reach completion.

I owe much appreciation to Jeffrey Pickering for the encouragement and enduring optimism. On many occasions he demonstrated to me what it meant to be a motivated scholar, inspiring me to continue this project.

I would like to give many thanks to Craig Stapley for our valuable conversations, which helped cultivate my interest in the field of terrorism and narrow my focus. I would also like to thank David Stone for his important insight on the topic, a crucial aspect of understanding the big picture more clearly. I also thank Theresa Selfa for her time and efforts.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the Department of Political Science for all of its support. To Dale Herspring, I greatly appreciate his advice and kindness. A special thank to my favorite graduate colleague, Melia Pfannenstiel, for being the most helpful classmate and loyal friend throughout my time at Kansas State.
Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my family. To my loving father, thank you for your support for all these years and without you none of this would have been possible. To the greatest mother thank you for your encouragement and prayers. To my beautiful fiancé Nicole John, thank you for your understanding and patience throughout the years. You all were the inspiration for this project. I hope my efforts have made you proud.
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction

“The terrorist seems to have a rather intimate understanding of our system”
Inspector Dominic, V for Vendetta

1.1 The Question

Studies of terrorism have evolved since the 1960s when the form of violence emerged as a significant feature of domestic and international political life (Chalk 1998; Crenshaw 2000). Terrorism has recently been thrust once more into the consciousness of citizens across the globe. A large number of books and articles have been published in the last decade that attempt to explain the causes of terrorism. As a result of sensational terrorist attacks such as 9/11, the Madrid train bombings, and the London attacks, most scholars have focused on a few well-known international terror networks such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and Hamas or on other issues such as bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings. While the aforementioned themes are cogent to the overall discussion of terrorism, what is missing in the extant literature on terrorism is why several well-known terror groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, originated from political parties.

Within the past forty years, various scholars and policymakers have noted an increase in the use of violence by quasi-political organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah (Pape 2003; O’Brien 1996; Cronin 2002). The literature illustrates that there has been a concerted effort by scholars and policymakers to understand the nexus between political parties and their use of terror (Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).

The guiding principle behind this emerging research program is the belief that terrorism remains a useful tool for some political parties. Terrorism is seen as a relatively inexpensive way
of making a statement before a broad audience (Vittori 2009, 445). Extant literature thus suggests that political parties and terrorist organizations sometimes form alliances to achieve organizational objectives (Crenshaw 1981; Hamilton 1978; Ranstorp 1996; Ross 1993; Vittori 2009; Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). While conceptually terrorist groups and political parties may appear to contrast, they often share many of the same goals, which make cooperation between the two possible (Weinberg 1991).

Weinberg (1991), and Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003) found that, in many cases, political parties create terrorist wings or organization to advance their causes. Conversely, in a few cases, terrorist organizations have moved in the opposite direction and created bona fide political parties\(^1\), such occurrences are minimal and even disputed by a number of observers (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003, 57). Despite numerous documented cases where terrorist groups and political parties have coalesced, scholarly research on the issue remains surprisingly minimal.\(^2\) In general, what scholars have failed to explain is why a political party would resort to terror even within democracies where there is an institutionally peaceful outlet to express grievances. Furthermore, extant literature fails to provide even minimal answers to the important question of whether a ruling regime’s political ideology functions as a catalyst for terrorism.

### 1.2 The Argument

Terrorism is a relatively inexpensive mechanism of making a statement before a broad audience (Vittori 2009). Any thorough analysis of terrorism must start with the recognition that

---

\(^1\) Among the terrorist groups to form political parties are the National Military Organization (IRGUN), the Stern Gang (in Israel) and Lebanese Amal in Lebanon. See Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003).

\(^2\) Among the documented cases are the Colombian Communist Party and the FARC in Colombia, Batasuna and ETA in Spain, and Sinn Fein and the IRA in Northern Ireland.
terrorism appears in various forms (Sprinzak 1991). Invariably, scholars recognize two broad types of terrorism, “old terrorism” and “new terrorism” which provide a way to explain the evident change in modes of operation, ideological motivation, and the intensity of attacks seen within the last twenty years (Laqueur 1999, 2000; Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006). Furthermore, variations of “culture, historical experiences, religious traditions, governments opposed and involvement of outside forces all make for plurality and multiplicity of terrorist action” (Sprinzak 1991, 51). At the core of most discussions about recourse to terror by groups, is the question of how once peaceful political organizations become radicalized to the point that they turn to violent methods. As the following chapters show, very few terrorist organizations were initially created to pursue terrorism (Sprinzak 1991; Weinberg 1991). Most modern political organizations that have evolved into terrorist organizations came about through a gradual process of radicalization (Crenshaw 2000). As Sprinzak (1991, 51) notes, “unprovoked people do not become brutal killers in the service of politics until they have experienced weaker methods of opposition and engaged in less intense forms of political action.” The use of terror is, therefore, not a decision that political organizations are eager to make but, rather, one that is utilized when other approaches seem useless or when they are unable to achieve organizational objectives through peaceful means.

Extant literature is divided on what conditions produces terrorism and more so on what factors explain political parties’ turn to terror (Sprinzak 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). The literature also shows that political parties turn to terror as a mechanism for achieving their goals. In general, the research program investigating the link between political parties and terror organizations has failed to examine the domain in which political parties that create terror organizations function. Moreover, minimal attention has been paid to how available political
space influences a party’s organizational objectives, which may have a critical impact on decisions to turn to terror. Instead, existing literature has focused on the outcomes--the terror group itself (Abrahms 2006; Bapat 2007; Harik 2004) -- or marginal issues such as the terror group’s political typology (Juergensmeyer 2003; Schmid and Jongman et.al 1988; Reich et al 1990).

The main argument of this study is that the ruling political party’s ideology produces institutional and organizational constraints for oppositional parties that account for the willingness of political organizations to engage in violent struggle rather than engage in peaceful, bona fide political processes. In other words, the nature of a ruling government ideology and the prevailing electoral system contribute greatly to how, when, and why some political parties create terrorist organizations. A common ideology is a critical factor for group mobilization. Simply stated, “an ideology is the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives--however ill-defined or tenuous-- by which a group defines its distinctive political identity and aims” (Drake 1998, 53). The purpose of this dissertation is thus to investigate the role of political ideology in explaining the process by which political parties form alliances with or create terrorist organizations.

1.3 Competing Explanations and Significance

Historically, there have been several instances where political parties vying for power and influence have turned to terror as a mechanism to achieve their political goals. Extant literature illustrates a significant level of inconsistency as it relates to the success of using terror as a mechanism to achieve political goals. One group of scholars argues that the use of terror does not work (Abrahams 2006, Rapoport 1992). Still other scholars suggest that the use of terror is successful in achieving certain political objectives (Laqueur 2001; Indridason 2008).
Rapoport (1992) contends that terror groups have, in general, a short life span. He notes “perhaps as many as 90 percent [of terrorist organizations] lasts less than a year. Nearly half of those that persist beyond the first year are out of existence by the tenth [year]” (Rapoport 1992, 1067). In particular, acts of terrorism may often have varied responses from the public and the state. Abrahams (2006) and Schelling (1966) proclaim that terrorism does not work to advance political goals. More specifically, Abrahams (2006, 76) suggests that terrorism “mis-communicates objectives because of its extremely high correspondence.” In most cases, governments infer the motives of terror groups “not from their stated goals, but from the short-term consequences of terrorist acts” (Abrahams 2006, 76). Moreover, governments that are the targets of terrorism, view the deaths of citizens and disruptions in the state caused by violence as proof that terrorist groups want to destroy their “societies, their publics, or both” (Abrahams 2006, 76). Hence, governments are reluctant to compromise with terrorist groups irrespective of the nature of their demands when violence has already been used by the group demanding some sort of concession. In general, this contention has some merit in that the success or failure of terrorists to achieve organizational objectives is dependent on two important circumstances.

The first condition relates to the urgency of some organizations to achieve their goals. This condition is critical for some types of political organizations where organizational continuity is highly dependent on quick success. Thus, failure by a group that uses terror in the aforementioned condition may occur when targets possess the ability to endure high levels of cost without capitulating to terrorists’ demands. Moreover, failure in such a situation often results because the use of terror is not sustained over a long period to exact sufficient cost or pain on a regime in order to cause that regime to comply with terrorist demands (Abrahams 2008).
The second condition occurs where terrorist organizations attempt to function in exceptionally repressive regimes, such as the Soviet Union or contemporary North Korea. In general, because the relationship between terrorism and political repression is not linear, differences in the intensity of repression may in fact condition the creation of terrorist organization in a state (Testas 2004; Blomberg et al. 2002). In those regimes that terrorism fails, the failure is usually the result of lack of political space to thrive. In their analysis of protest and oppositional violence, Gupta, Singh, and Sprague (1993) found that a high level of repression is effective in nondemocratic regimes in reducing opposition. Similarly, Crenshaw (1981), suggests exceptionally repressive regimes are more likely to crush fledgling terrorist organizations because in largely unconstrained, repressive military regimes, there is a general disregard for civil liberties. In contrast, various scholars contend that in democratic regimes, where repression is not systematic and institutionalized, repression can lead to violent forms of protest, and that repression spurs violence in democracies (Lichbach 1987; Piazza 2006). In general, where oppositional terrorism spurred by repression is successful is where the regime’s repression is not sustained and inefficient in such cases terrorism is doubly likely to result in gains (Crenshaw 1981, 384).

Nonetheless, the preponderance of evidence suggests that terrorism can influence domestic politics by altering the priorities of voters and politicians in some domestic settings (Indridason 2008; Laqueur 2001; Piazza 2010). In general, when a political group adopts terrorism as a tactic the central aim is usually to undermine the public perceptions of a government’s ability to uphold order and the safety of citizens within a state, which is in essence,  

\[ \text{__________} \]

3 While in some weak democratic or transitioning democracies rightwing and leftist ruling regimes exerts a tremendous level of repression, in general these regimes are less repressive than the classical communist or command societies such as the Soviet Union, North Korea, China and Cuba in their use of repression against oppositional groups. In almost every case, terrorists groups attempting to function in command societies failed to gain any considerable support and their members were prosecuted, executed, or fled the state. See Vittori (2009)
its primary security function (Chalk 1998). The inherent value of terrorism is that it can be used to “disrupt the normal course of social interaction […] its overall aim is not simply to cause immediate destruction but, more intrinsically, gradually to eradicate the solidarity, cooperation and interdependence upon which social cohesion and functioning depend” (Chalk 1998, 376).

The prevailing view in extant literature is that terrorism works and this fact has influenced many terrorist organizations and political parties to enter into alliances when other avenues seem less rewarding (Harik 2005; Piazza 2010; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).

Research on political parties that create terrorist wings or organizations appears to fall into two schools of thought. The first is the structural approach. Here political parties are usually constrained by various institutional factors such as the nature of the electoral system or judicial decisions that prevents some types of political parties from engaging in politics. Therefore, these structural impediments explain why some political parties utilize terrorist tactics and why some terrorist organizations never adopt mainstream approaches (Crenshaw 1981; Hamilton 1978; Ross 1993; Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). The second school of thought relates to the rational actor perspective. This perspective contends that the goals of terrorist groups determine whether they are willing to align themselves with a political party or remain outside the mainstream of political process.

Although the literature on domestic terrorism highlights the existence of close alliances between political parties and terrorist organizations (Cameron 1999; Harik 2005; Ross 1993; Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003), there seems to be no clear or conclusive evidence why some political organizations are more willing to utilize violence as a means of voicing their demands, while other groups continue to use existing political processes to achieve their political objectives. Weinberg (1991, 426) points out, “some influential observers believe
this phenomenon defies explanation, while others look to idiosyncratic events for the creation of terrorist groups.” Recent perspectives suffer from many of the same shortcomings; they fail to adequately explain and empirically test why certain political parties within certain types of polities create terrorist organizations or, as in some cases, terror wings. Most importantly, extant literature is silent about how the rightwing ideology of a ruling party in government may create organizational constraints for opposition parties and conditions whereby some political organizations feel compelled to use terror to achieve their organizational goals.

This dissertation is significant for a number of reasons. First, it intends to evaluate factors that contribute to political parties’ decisions to turn to terror. Thus, this research attempts to fill an important gap in the literature by offering a more precise conceptualization of the issue. Second, this dissertation attempts to fill a gap in the literature by developing a new theoretical perspective that links rightwing regimes to an increased propensity of political parties’ turn to terror. Third, unlike extant research that utilizes qualitative or small N approaches, this research combines both qualitative and quantitative methods. This study aims to provide a more nuanced and complete explanation for why in some regimes political parties are willing to turn to terror.

1.3.1 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of four additional chapters. The next chapter explores extant literature on political parties’ turn to terror. It also develops a new theoretical argument on why political parties adopt terrorist practices. Chapter 3 uses a Poisson random effect model for panel data of 31 states containing 105 political parties from 1960 to 2006 to tests the main hypothesis that rightwing regime ideology tends to produce greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror. This dissertation shows that rightwing regime ideology is positively correlated with the formation of terrorist organizations by political parties. Chapter 4 further analyzes the
predictions of the model by using four case studies. These cases are meant to evaluate the aforementioned hypothesis using three positive cases (Colombia, Japan, and Turkey), where political parties form terrorist organizations and one negative case (Costa Rica) with the same independent variables (Xs) to facilitate comparison. Chapter 5 concludes with a brief discussion of the importance of the model and a brief overview of further research related to the topic.
CHAPTER 2 - Political Parties and a Turn To Terror

The goal of this chapter is twofold. First is to examine and synthesize various theories that seek to explain political parties’ turn to terror. Second, this chapter also develops the theory that regime ideology is an important factor in the creation of terrorist organizations by political parties regardless of structural institutional constraints. This chapter starts with a few conceptual issues before moving to extant literature and theoretical development.

2.1 Conceptual Issues: Political Parties and Terrorism

Terrorism, and in particular domestic terrorism, remains a real and dangerous threat to states’ internal stability. Historically, some political parties have on various occasions aligned themselves closely with terrorist organizations or have created militant wings to espouse the group’s ideology or demands. As Weinberg (1991), Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003) and others have found, there is profound contrast in the number of political parties that choose terrorist methods and those that decide to continue with more legitimate peaceful “institutionalized” forms of political advocacy. In most cases, political parties that eventually turn to terrorist activities rarely revert to nonviolent political activities (see Abrahms 2008).

Before exploring the nexus between terrorist organizations and political parties, a definition of political party is warranted. Extant literature illustrates a profound level of inconsistency in the manner in which political parties are defined (Duverger 1954, Gunther and Diamond 2003). Gunther and Diamond (2003, 171) argue that the lack of conceptual and terminological consistency is partly the result of basing typology on one criterion, be it organizational structure, principal organizational objective or social basis of representation.
Notably, this has resulted in an excessive narrowing of the definition and focus of analysis, and the lack of systematic analysis of variations within each party type (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 171).

Following Gunther and Diamond (2003), this study emphasizes three criteria in defining a political party. The first criterion specifies the *formal organization* of the party (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 172). Invariably, no two political party bureaucratic command structures are the same. A number of political parties are organizationally thin, while others are organizationally complex and their objectives are well defined. Gunther and Diamond (2003, 171) write “while others develop large mass-membership bases with allied or ancillary institutions engaged in distinct but related spheres of social life; some rely on particularistic networks of personal interaction or exchange, while others are open and universalistic in membership and appeal.”

The second important classification criterion relates to the party’s *programmatic commitments*. In general, some political parties’ programmatic platforms are well developed and well articulated. These include “ideologies rooted in political philosophies, religious beliefs or nationalistic sentiment; [however] others are either pragmatic or have no well-defined ideological or programmatic commitment; still others are committed to advance the interests of a particular ethnic, religious or social-economic group, or geographically defined constituency” (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 171).

The third criterion specifies the strategy and behavioral norms of the political party; in particular, whether the political party is *tolerant and pluralistic* or *proto-hegemonic* in its objectives (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 171). Extant literature suggests that, “some parties are fully committed to democratic rules-of-the-game, are tolerant and respectful towards their opponents, and are pluralistic in their views of polity and society” (Gunther and Diamond 2003,
However, other political parties may be “semi-loyal to democratic norms and institutions, or explicitly anti-system, favoring the replacement of the existing pluralistic democracy with a regime that would be more uniformly committed to the achievement of their programmatic objectives” (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 171).

Admittedly, the process of defining a political party is problematic, “for virtually every definition of a political party produced by political scientists, it is possible to find some institutions that are recognizable parties but do not conform [to] the definition in some significant way” (Ware 1996, 1). As the case of Hezbollah illustrates, some political parties engage in violent activities but at the same time may provide social welfare services such as community aid and political representation for a large portion of the electorate. Moreover, the threshold for what is termed a political party may differ across polities. Following Ware (1996, 5), a political party refers to “an institution that (1) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (2) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to ‘aggregate interest’.” This definition represents the lowest threshold of what can be considered a political party.

Despite disagreements over what constitutes a political party, extant literature is consistent in regard to the importance of political parties (Lawson et.al 1988; Ware 1996; Ware 1998). Ware (1996) notes that it is difficult to imagine polities without political parties, he suggests that since the early 20th century there has only been two kinds of states where political parties were absent (Ware 1996, 1). The first were small traditional societies, predominately

---

4 Prior to 1992, Hezbollah could not participate in Lebanese elections and did not. Hezbollah during the mid to late 1990s transformed itself into a “political party with a resistant wing.” Although several scholars argue that Hezbollah is a political party—others do not. Various scholars argue that Hezbollah does not “use legitimate means for pursuing their ends.” Hence, the group does not satisfy an important criterion to be considered a political party. Furthermore, Hezbollah appears on various countries list of terrorist organizations, a reality that undermines the group’s assertion that they are in fact a bona-fide political party. See Ware (1996); Ayob (2004); Norton (2007).
ruled by royal families who were dominant in the regions they controlled long before the outside world recognized them as independent states (Ware 1996, 1). Second, are regimes where political parties were banned by very repressive military regimes or authoritarian rulers who had the support of the military (Ware 1996, 1).

The literature suggests that even in polities where a party system has been established, interludes of party-less politics can result because of repressive regimes that institute authoritarian rule (Lawson 1988; Ware 1996). Nevertheless, Ware (1996, 1) points out, “the suppression of parties has proved to be feasible only as a temporary measure. As military authorities relax their grip on power, or as unpopular policies stir discontent, so parties start to re-emerge from underground.” Among the paths taken by some political parties in an effort to reassert themselves is the use of terror (Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).

Similar to political parties, scholars have differed on what is terrorism and what constitutes a terrorist act. Defining terrorism has long been a tedious and frustrating task for scholars. Schmid and Jongman (1988) found 109 academic definitions of terrorism, leading one scholar to remark “there are roughly as many available definitions as there are published experts in the field” (Victoroff 2005, 4). Indeed, extant literature provides a host of definitions that are based on concerns such as targeting, type of conflict, and intent. Most classical definitions of terrorism highlight a political or ideological goal as a basis for the use, or threat of, violence. A classic illustration of such a definition is provided by Nieburg (1962). He defines terrorism as: Acts of disruption, destruction, injuries whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have a political significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system (192).
As a concept, terrorism has remained a difficult and subjective issue further complicated by its evolving nature (Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). Central to the incongruence on what constitutes an act of terror relates to whether there is anything “in the nature of a right to inflict such misery on others and, if so, in whom it inheres” (Cooper 2001, 885).

For a significant number of Western states, new terrorism has become the focus of policymakers and scholars. New terrorism is synonymous to the rise of radical religious fundamentalism, most of which is associated with radical Islam. Within the last decade, various scholars have thus attempted to refine the definition and the scope of issues that relate to terrorism to reflect current security realities (Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006; Indridason 2008; Laqueur 1999; Kydd and Walter 2006). Prior to the turn of the 21st century, scholars such as Crenshaw (1981) argued that terrorism should be considered a facet of secular modern politics principally associated with the rise of nationalism, anarchism, and revolutionary socialism (Crenshaw 1981, 380). Since the 1980s, perceptions of terrorism have changed. Notably, Laqueur (2001) points out that the world is now living in the period of new terrorism. He contends, “New terrorism is different in character, aiming not only at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population” (p. 81). Unlike “old terrorism,” the goal of new terrorism is not to change the system, but to destroy the system itself (Cronin 2002; Laqueur 1999, 2001; Hoffman 2006).

For Cronin (2002, 33), terrorism exhibits certain fundamentals. First, in addition to the political intent, terrorists are non-state actors who deliberately target the innocent. This distinguishes terrorism from state uses of force that inadvertently kill innocent bystanders. Second, “even when terrorists received military, political, economic, and other means of support
from state sources,” terrorist organizations are still considered separate from the state. “States can terrorize, but they cannot by definition be terrorists” (Cronin 2002, 33). Arguing along a similar line, Laqueur (1987, 1999) dismisses the idea of including the state as a perpetrator of terrorism. In general, while Laqueur concedes the idea of state-sponsored terrorism, he is less willing to call the state an agent of terror (Laqueur 1999, 158). Laqueur (1987, 146) argues that atrocities committed by the state and acts of terrorism are two distinct issues. He suggests that

The case in favor of obliterating the basic difference between a regime of terror exerted by a state and terrorist activities by a ‘non-state actors’ is a very weak one indeed. Both kinds aim at inducing a state of fear among the enemy. But beyond this, there are no important similarities, as they fulfill different functions and manifest themselves in different ways, such as mass arrests, concentration camps and mass executions in the case of state terrorism. A study of the functions and techniques of the Gestapo is important, but it will be of no more help understanding the Baader-Meinhof gang than the study of Auschwitz or of Pol Pot would be for comprehending the IRA (p. 146).

Invariably, several critics (Falk 2002; Cooper 2001) argue that any effort that excludes all forms of violence by the state is regressive and statist. Falk (2002) contends that the process of excluding government apparatus from the definitions of what constitutes terrorism illustrates a regressive and narrowing statist approach (299-300). He suggests that the “statist approach has been extended so far that it calls non-state attacks on military targets such as soldiers or warships terrorism, while not regarding state violence as terrorism even when indiscriminately directed at civilian society” (Falk 2002, 301). Cooper (2001, 882), in remarks about the current efforts to better define terrorism, notes that, “we ought not to confuse sophistry of refinement for the
process of definition.” Moreover, the inclusion of the state as an agent of terror in recent scholarly literature (for example Falk 2002; Cooper 2001; Kisangani and Nafziger 2007) illustrates an ongoing divide in extant research in regards to conceptualizing terrorism.

Given the discord that exists regarding the definition of terrorism, it is necessary to provide a conceptual definition of how the term is applied in this study. To this end, the contexts within which terrorism will apply pertain to the ideological or political motivations behind the act. Hence, terrorist organizations will be categorized as groups that are formed with the expressed intention of achieving political goals by violence, or threats of violence, outside of the monopoly on the use of violence assigned to sovereign states (Hoffman 2006, 40). Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003, 3) contend that, “Terrorism is not an ideology but an activity […] an activity that a variety of political groups and organizations may engage in fulltime or sporadically. […] On some occasions terrorist activity may be sustained over long periods of time and then suspended or displaced by other forms or political activity.”

Four types of terrorist organizations categorized mainly by their source of motivations currently operate around the world (Cronin 2002). They include “left-wing terrorist, right-wing terrorist, ethnonationalist/ separatist terrorist, and religious or ‘sacred’ terrorist” (Cronin 2002, 39). Admittedly, the above categories are not always well defined because terrorist groups often have varied objectives and nuanced ideologies.

Leftwing terror groups are motivated by communist ideologies or driven by idealist political concepts, they tend to be revolutionary, antiauthoritarian, and maintain anti-materialist agendas (Cronin 2002, 39). Terrorist organizations that have leftist ideologies most often target the elite or those in authority and direct brutal campaigns involving kidnappings, murders, bombings, and arsons (Crenshaw 1995; Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006; Laqueur 1999).
In part, the political ideology for rightwing terrorist groups is associated with fascism or an opposition to immigrants or other ethnic groups (Cronin 2002). Rightwing terrorist groups target minorities or immigrants whom they believe threaten in some way their traditions, or position in a society (Cronin 2002; Klaus et. al 1998; Laqueur 1999).

The objective of ethnonationalist or separatist terrorism is usually very distinct. Ethnonationalist/separatist terrorist groups most often have very clear political or territorial aims that are “rational and potentially negotiable, if not always justifiable in any given case” (Cronin 2002, 40). As is the case with other categories of terrorism, they can be very violent over extended periods. Because of their “focus on gains to be made in the traditional state-oriented international system, ethnonationalist/ separatist terrorists often transition in and out of more traditional paramilitary structures, depending on how the cause is going” (Cronin 2002, 41). Unlike other categories of terrorism, ethnonationalist or separatist terror groups usually have broad regional support from the local populace of the same ethnicity with whom their separatist goals resonate (Cronin 2002, 41).

Extant literature suggests that religious or ‘sacred’ terrorism poses the biggest threat to governments and the international system (Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006; Pape 2003; Ranstorp 1996). Religious or sacred terrorism is motivated by either dissatisfaction with the prevailing system or a fear that a favored system might be overturned (Long 1990, 65). Morgan (2004) describes the attitude of religious terrorism as indicative of the mindset of the “new terrorist.” Thus, religious or new terrorist “don’t want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it” (Morgan 2004, 30). With loose networks and a greater emphasis on religious radicalism, this form of terrorism is much more dangerous and far more difficult to stop or reason with. Cronin (2002) suggests that religious terrorists consider themselves to be
unconstrained by secular values or laws. They most often display “a complete sense of alienation from the existing social system. They are not trying to correct the system, making it more just, more perfect, and more egalitarian. Rather they are trying to replace it” (Cronin 2002, 41). What is important for many religious terrorist groups is to please the perceived commands or teachings of a deity.

Following Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003, 28), the parameters used to define political parties engaged in terrorist activities will include two groups. First, is a set of groups described as either “terrorist” or “urban guerilla.” Second, groups that are engaged in activities such as assassinations, bombings, kidnappings or skyjackings, either threatened or carried out, in order to achieve a political purpose or aim beyond harming the immediate target. This definition follows more recent efforts to refine what acts of violence are deemed terror (Hoffman 2006, Cronin 2002, Laqueur 1999).

To examine the relationship between terrorist organizations and political parties requires establishing the domain in which these entities operate. According to Enders and Sandler (2005), terrorist acts can be placed into two broad groups, domestic and transnational. They contend that “Domestic terrorism begins and ends in the host country: the perpetrators and targets are homegrown [...] Moreover, domestic incidents have domestic ramifications for only the host country” (p. 261). The authors argue that when a terrorist incident in one country involves citizens, targets, victims or institutions in another country, such acts are assumed to be transnational. According to this view, terrorism that involves political parties has historically occurred within domestic settings (Harik 2005; Indriadson 2008; Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). Yet, while political parties and terrorist groups tend to ally in domestic settings, it is not an exclusive situation. Many groups, such as Spain’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and
Ireland’s Irish Republican Army (IRA), conducted their operations across international borders during the 1970s and early 1980s, even though they had specific political goals, which pertained to their respective host countries.

Extant literature shows that there are distinct differences between the willingness or desire of one terrorist organization (for example, Provincial Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland) to end its pursuit of political objectives through violent measures and another (for example, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia)\(^5\) to continue armed struggle. Few approaches have been able to provide reasons for the above variation across polities as well as when political organizations are willing to use violent measures instead of continuing to utilize peaceful democratic processes. Furthermore, scholarly literature is silent on how political ideology of a ruling party within a given state, creates organizational constraints for opposition parties and conditions whereby some political organizations feel compelled to use terror to achieve their organizational goals.

### 2.2 Literature Review

Proponents of the rational choice and structural cause approach, offer several similar but insightful arguments aimed at illuminating the issue. In general, the rational choice approach provides various logical reasons why some political parties without access to the political process may at times create militant wings or transition into bona fide terrorist organizations. Moreover, rational choice approaches model the political party as an actor who chooses among the best options to achieve organizational goals. Similarly, structural cause approaches explain

\(^5\) The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is the Spanish translation for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia.
political parties turn to terror as the result of institutional and/or organizational constraints placed upon the political party that forces the organization to turn to other violent methods to meet organizational goals.

2.2.1 Structural Cause Approach

The structural cause approach provides three major arguments about the link between terrorist organizations and political parties. First, institutional barriers, such as regime types and electoral systems, create grievances in some democracies for individuals who belong to marginalized political organizations; these grievances cause them to ally with or create militant wings that engage in terrorist activities (Crenshaw 1981, 384). Second, leftist leaning parties are more susceptible to overtures by terrorist organizations (Ross 1993, 323). Third, the literature suggests that military interventions and/or domestic conflicts can influence the formation of terrorist groups (Li 2005; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003).

Terrorists in democratic polities tend to be elitists. In fact, they claim to know better than the masses what is best for them (Laqueur 1999, 91). In such cases, orchestrated acts of terror represent the displeasure of a fragment of the elite towards a political system who may take it upon themselves to act on the behalf of a majority whom they believe are unaware of their plight or unwilling to express dissent (Crenshaw 1981, 396). There appears to be great levels of elite discontentment within certain types of electoral systems.

Huber and Powell (1994) and Li (2005) argue that majoritarian systems create single-party majority governments, which ignore the interest of minority groups. In contrast, the proportional system produces cabinets and legislatures that often represent the interest of most citizens. In her analysis of the impact of democratic systems on the onset of civil wars, Reynal-Querol (2002) found that proportional systems have a lower probability of group discontent and
rebellion than majoritarian systems. In short, regimes with electoral systems that restrict access to power and the airing of grievances create dissatisfaction. Crenshaw (1981) contends that in situations where paths to legal expression of opposition are blocked, but where the regime’s repression is inefficient, terrorism is doubly likely, as permissive and direct causes coincide.

The type of electoral system, more so than any other permissive factor, is seen as important to how alliances between political parties and terrorist organizations occur (Abrahams 2006; Braithwaite and Li 2005; Hamilton, 1978). More generally, the inherent characteristics of democratic polities are thought to facilitate alliances between political parties and terrorist organizations Ross (1993) provides several reasons why this phenomenon occurs. He suggests that:

The legacy of a colonial or semi-colonial past that has not been adequately resolved […], nationalist, separatist, and ethnic conflicts that cannot easily be resolved (e.g. Basques in Spain) […], guarantees of fundamental civil liberties promoting freedom of movement, access to media, and the free expression of unrest and dissent thereby accommodating diverse political values and demands […] the proliferation of narrow based social issues; and the existence of police forces which are generally law-abiding (p. 322).

Thus, when political parties consider using violence within a democracy, they are usually cognizant that democracies have institutionalized guarantees and methods of political expression. Moreover, dissenters may express their policy preferences by seeking redress and accommodation (Ross 1993, 322; Chenoweth 2010). Intuitively, groups harboring grievances should be less likely to resort to terrorist violence in expressing their discontent where freedom
of expression is encouraged (Chenoweth 2010). However, checks and balances that are supposed
to serve as a normative reminder to disgruntled groups that there are alternatives to terror often
lead groups to seek other means such as violence to meet their organization objectives (Ross
1993, 322).

Finally, the structural literature argues that military activities influence levels of terrorism. Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003, 18) note that where there is a crisis of disintegration such as when a country deteriorates into civil war, a turn to terror by political parties increases. They suggest during civil wars, leaders of major political parties representing their respective community “play the roles of warlords.” In various cases, political parties utilize not only militias created by their own party, but also employ other militias to carry out terrorist attacks, assassinations and bombings (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003, 18). In contrast, Li (2005, 287) contends that military conflict involvement reduces the number of terrorist incidents in the country. He argues that while external military conflict creates grievances and opportunities for terrorists it often leads to tightened domestic security measures, raising the cost of terrorist activities (Li 2005, 287).

While the structural theory provides evidence of a close relationship between political parties and terrorist organizations, the theory does not offer a complete discourse on how the political ideology of a ruling regime influences political parties’ associations with terrorism. As a theory, structural cause fails to identify sufficient common features that explain a turn to terror by political parties across polities. Importantly, it ignores the role played by rightwing government ideology. At best, it only provides institutional explanations such as electoral types, conflict (external and internal) and that most political organizations that become or create terror groups have a leftist ideology.
An important issue that is seldom discussed within structural literature is the role the Cold War era had on political parties and their decisions to turn to terror. The structural cause theory argument on terrorism encompasses ideas based, in part, on Cold War rivalry in the international system. However, as a general approach to understanding political parties and terrorist organizations, Cold War influences on the formation of terrorist organization by political parties have largely gone untested.

Cold War politics and rivalries appears to have had immediate effects on the dynamics of political parties and terrorist organizations, which could explain the higher ratio of leftist parties turning to terrorist activities during the 1960s to early 1990s and a corresponding hard-line approach by right-wing governments. As other studies have shown, especially as it relates to democratic peace,6 the Cold War profoundly affected the political structure of several societies. Anecdotal evidence provided by Weinberg (1991) and Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003) suggests the creation of terrorist organizations by political parties reached its zenith during the period from 1960 to the late 1980s, a period when many new democracies were being created and during the height of the Cold War. It is conceivable that Cold War rivalry between the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, helped embolden groups in various states with political ambition to adopt terrorist tactics as a mechanism to achieve their goals (Long 1990). According to O’Brien (1996), it became customary during the Cold War in places such as Latin and Central America for groups with political ambition and groups who opposed a ruling government to create armed groups that perpetrated terrorist acts. He suggests that

The global landscape within which these struggles occurred [had] been conditioned by the impact of US-Soviet relations. Because the superpowers have

6 Several scholars have found varying evidence as it relates to the impact of the Cold War on the democratic peace theory (Cederman 2001; Gleditsch 1992; Ray 1997; and Walt 1998).
shaped the environment within which terrorists operate, the role they have played and the responses they have made (p. 322).

Cline and Alexander (1984) infer that with the support of the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, many political parties facing rigid and sometimes corrupt regimes, gradually adopted terrorism as part of their policy to achieve their goals. While there are a few scholars who appear to recognize the role of the Cold War, thus far, none has incorporated this dynamic in a quantitative study that illuminates its role in helping to explain why political parties transition into terrorist organizations.

### 2.2.2 Rational Choice Approach

Although it is often posed as an alternative to the structural perspective (Ross 1993), the rational choice or strategic approach can be thought of as a complement to the structural perspective. After all, non-state groups making the decision to use terrorist tactics make cost-benefit or strategic calculations against the backdrop of existing organizational barriers such as state institutional structures. The opportunities afforded and limitations imposed by these structures are a fundamental component of such strategic decision-making.

The rational choice approach argues that decisions to turn to terror are made based on prevailing cost-benefit calculations of the participants and on response to regime repression (Ross 1993, 317; Crenshaw 1981, 387). Second, when other less costly choices become available, groups (or political parties) will usually disband armed terrorist wings. According to Klitgaard et.al (2006, 291), contemporary rational choice perspectives argue that governments supply a number of private benefits and terrorists should be seen as interest groups pursuing benefits (i.e. as rent-seekers).
Rational choice proponents routinely employ the strategic model (a subset of rational choice) as a mechanism to explain the dynamics that prevails within terrorist organizations (Abrahms 2006). Abrahms (2006, 78) contends that the strategic model has been the “dominant paradigm in terrorism studies […]. [It] posits that terrorists are rational actors who attack civilians for political ends.” Moreover, the model assumes that terrorists are political utility maximizers. People use terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest action (Abrahms 2006, 78). The strategic model when applied to terrorism is guided by three core assumptions. First, terrorists are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political preferences. Second, terrorists evaluate the expected payoffs of their available options or at least the most obvious ones. Third, terrorism is adopted when the political return is superior to those alternative options (Abrahms 2006, 79).

The strategic model serves as a useful decision-making mechanism in regard to explaining how political parties at times end up as terrorist organizations or employ terrorism as a major tool. As noted above, a central assumption of the strategic model is that motivated individuals weigh their political options and resort to terrorism as it is in many cases the best preference when alternative political avenues are blocked (Abrahms 2006, 80). As is the case with political organizations such as Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, and IRA factions in Northern Ireland, the model suggests that choosing to develop a terrorist wing is a matter of last resort. Therefore, weighing the expected costs versus the expected benefits for many political parties becomes an easy decision when the alternative of not choosing violent measures does not produce any net positive payoffs. Based on the model, it is assumed that if a group or political party consistently fails to coerce policy concessions, or when superior political options arise, the
party most often abandons violent measures (Abrahms 2006, 81). In this regard, the model appears to provide plausible reasons why some political parties, when given access to the political process, may disband an armed wing or abandon the use of terror as a political tool.

In general, the strategic model has been heavily criticized by Abrahms (2006) on several grounds. First, it does not take into consideration evolving priorities that are inherent in volatile organizational structures. Abrahms (2006) argues that while the strategic model locates the motives of the terrorist organization and the tradeoff it makes, the model does not provide direct insights into members’ incentive structure. Second, as is the case with political parties, leaders within terrorist organizations already make tradeoffs by regularly prioritizing the maintenance of the group over the advancement of its official political agenda, which is a contradiction of the strategic model (Abrahms 2006, 102). Third, people’s political preferences are not always consistent and stable in the long-run. Often, people adjust their expectations in the context of events (Kisangani and Nafziger 2007). Despite its limitations, the strategic model provides plausible explanations about the decision-making process that individuals in political parties undergo before decisions to use terrorism are made.

2.3 Theoretical Development: Ideology and Terrorism

I argue that while both the structural and strategic perspectives add important insights into political parties’ turn to terror, they both overlook an important intervening variable: the political ideology of the governing party. Let it be clear that this analysis is not claiming that political ideology is the sole factor for why all political parties turn to terror. Importantly, this research merely posits that over the period covered by the data, there is evidence consistent with an explanation that incorporates this variable. While it might not seem crucial at first glance, this variable helps to explain why avenues of political participation are restricted from the structural
perspective and why excluded political parties may perform cost-benefit calculations supporting the use of violence. Put simply, when rightwing political parties gain political power, political freedoms and access to government tend to be curtailed, which fundamentally alters the strategic calculus of opposition parties. My analysis thus emphasizes a heretofore-overlooked variable that rests at the nexus between the structural and strategic approaches and that enriches our understanding of political parties’ turn to terror.

In general, when political parties contest elections, they construct platforms and develop “ideological signifiers that are most likely to successfully put them and keep them in office” (Piazza 2010, 105). While these ideological signifiers help to hardened support among party members and supporters they often can alienate and in some cases spur violent dissent by those in opposition.7 This is especially so when the party in power cuts off what had been legitimate political access for opposition parties.

Extant literature on political parties and their alliances with terrorist organizations focuses almost exclusively on leftist parties as the major proponents of terror and, as such, the ones most likely to create or ally with terrorist organizations (Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003). According to Weinberg (1991), regional political parties, especially those on the left, are most often willing to turn to terror or become a terrorist organization to serve the interests of those they represent (Weinberg 1991, 426). While there is some merit to this argument, (especially in light of data from the late 1960s to early 1980s that show a preponderance of leftist parties allied

7 One of the major issues this dissertation examines the impact that the governing political party’s ideology has on the propensity of opposition parties to use terrorist tactics. This could also be conceptualized as the ideology of the regime in power, or regime ideology. The critical argument in this dissertation follows Piazza (2010) in presuming that it is the ideology of the political party that takes power that shapes regime ideology and the policies adopted by an administration. Typically, the political party in power holds a set of ideological beliefs before taking office, and it carries these beliefs into government. Part of what this dissertation seeks to test whether it is this complex of beliefs that opposition parties respond to rather than variables inherent within the government that remain constant as governing parties enter and leave office.
with terrorist organizations) what most scholars overlook is the role played by the political ideology of a ruling regime and the effect it has on leftist leaning parties that turn to terror. Thus, the ideology of a ruling political party, and by extension the ruling government, has a profound impact on the likelihood that a political party will turn to terror.

In general, heuristic evidence, mostly in historical scholarship, points to the preponderance of violent oppositional groups residing mostly within regimes that have a rightist ideology (Goodman 1992; Pinkney 1990; Sprinzak 1991). In particular, there appears to be some correlation between right leaning regimes and the formation of terrorist groups, especially within anocracies and young democracies.

Extant literature suggests that understanding and classifying a political party as rightwing is done by reviewing “both their political ideology and the attitude toward the political system as reflected in the party’s manifestos” (Knigge 1998, 251). Most extreme right political parties “either openly or in subtle ways, advocate beliefs and procedures diametrical to established political culture and system [they] endorse an authoritarian and hierarchical governmental structure and aggressive nationalism. Further, they frequently adopt an ethnocentrist or racial outlook” (Knigge 1998, 251).

For the purpose of this dissertation, a definition of right-wing political party follows that provided by Eatwell and O’Sullivan (1990) and Pinkney (1990). Eatwell and O’Sullivan (1990) and Pinkney’s (1990) definition of right-wing regimes follows a checklist rather than a restrictive definition, mainly because of the fragmented nature of right-wing ideology. Therefore, the major

---

8 Anocracies generally fall between -5 and + 5 on the Marshall and Jaggers (2003) Polity Scale. In definitional terms, an anocracy is a regime that permits some means of participation through opposition groups, but has incomplete development of the mechanisms to redress grievances (Benson and Kugler 1998; Hegre 2002). Young democracies are polities that have recently undergone regime change in a democratic direction. They may have democratic institutions, but these may not be entrenched to prevent a reversal to autocratic forms of rule. See Pickering and Kisangani (2005).
characteristic of a right-wing regimes are: (1) appeals to traditional values extolling such institutions as the family, or past national glory; (2) claims to legitimacy based on the need for order without any reference to the social causes of disorder; (3) close links with civilian landed and capitalists elites, a preference to the private sector; (4) a free market economic policy, in the internal economy and/or in relation to foreign capital; and (5) the exclusion from power, or repression, of working-class groups or groups favoring greater equality (Pinkney 1990, 14).

In general, the literature on political parties that turn to terror has mostly pointed to leftist parties as the major linchpin for creating terror groups. Various scholars allude to an inherent characteristic present in leftist parties that makes them predisposed to creating terrorist groups. While such conclusions may be plausible, most scholars ignore the issue that certain types of cabinets and leaders within regimes create the conditions, which are intolerable for normal political process. However, what most scholars fail to recognize is that the formation of leftist terror groups may most likely be a reactionary response to the repressive nature of rightist governments.

As previously noted, the Cold War exerted a tremendous polarizing impact on the nature of politics within and across states. Cold War politics influenced the attitude of leftist parties and their leadership and provided an important explanation for why ideology became such a driving force for parties on both sides of the political spectrum. To most scholars of political conflict, violence perpetrated by political parties is seen as the “disordering side of politics” (Lawson et.al. 1988). Importantly, when violence occurs in democracies, the causes of such disorder are commonly regarded as “pathologies the most serious of which either reveal some kind of injustice or result from the malfunction of representative institutions” (Apter 1988, 196). In rare cases, leaders of some political parties who turn to terror are driven by pure lust for power and
monetary benefits. However, in most cases, “political groups are motivated by an ideology” (Drake 1998, 54).

As pointed out earlier, a common ideology is a critical factor for political parties’ mobilization. By far, most political parties that decide to create terrorist wings or transform into full-fledged terrorist organizations maintain their ideological bases (Drake 1998, Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). Drake (1998) suggests that while there may be distinctions between the professed ideology of a group and the actual beliefs of various members, the leaders of political groups tend to have specific ideologies with clear political objectives. Therefore, those persons and institutions whom the terrorist organizations “deem guilty of having transgressed the tenets of the terrorists ideological-based moral framework are considered to be legitimate targets which the terrorist feel justified in attacking” (Drake 1998, 53).

Importantly, where ideology may not always be the singular factor that serves as a basis for group mobilization, it generally provides an initial range of legitimate targets and means by which terrorists seek to justify attacks, both to the outside world and to themselves (Drake 1998, 53). Political ideology of the group identifies the “enemies” of the group by providing a measure against which to assess the ‘innocence or guilt of people and institutions’ (Drake 1998, 54).

The preponderance of literature on terrorism suggests that most terrorist groups come from the left (Cronin 2002; Cline and Alexander 1984; Waldman 2005: Weinberg 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). Historically, most 19th century and 20th century (old terrorism) terrorism originated from either nationalist-separatist motivations or groups that were ideologically leftist (for example, Marxist-Leninist). The period from the 1960s to late 1980s, saw the height of leftist political parties turning to terror. In part, many leaders of leftist leanings political parties, especially in the developing world, were influenced by a perception (sometimes
unfounded) that the capitalist system and rightist regimes were not sympathetic to the plight of the lower class (Sprinzak 1991, 1998).

However, Laqueur (1999, 81) contends that most individuals who form leftist political parties and later terror groups tend to come from higher social classes and are better educated than members of rightwing terror groups. They also see the world and politics in terms of deep ideological divides. Leaders and members of leftist leaning parties frequently contend that rightist government and especially those with capitalist driven economies exploit the lower classes (Cohrs et.al 2005). They also argue, that, within communist states, lower and middle class citizens attain more equitable economic and social rewards than their counterparts in states that had capitalist economic systems.

Extant literature provides two explanations for why leaders of various leftist political parties decide to turn to terror. First was the desire for revolution that was cultivated as part of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. This ideology fueled many left leaning political parties during the Cold-War period (for example Shining Path in Peru or the FARC in Columbia). The second and more important factor builds on the rational choice perspective of rewards and costs. To meet organizational objectives of the political party, the use of violence was perceived as necessary by many leftist party leaders who felt compelled to make the tactical decision to turn to terror in the face of repressive and, at times, economically insensitive policies of many right wing regimes.

The ideology for violent revolution to overthrow capitalist cabinets and governments during the 1960s and 1970s was for many leftist political parties and splinter groups a part of their mantra. Commenting on the rise of left-wing terror during the 1960-70s, Chalk (1998) notes

---

9 According to Chalk 1998; Sprinzak 1991; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003, most leftist leaning political parties in the 1960s to early 1980s were inspired by the political ideology of Marx and Lenin.
the following in describing the general attitude that prevailed in much of the leftist movements in Europe and much of the Western world:

In response to the inherent contradictions and perceived injustices of the post-World War II era, students had begun increasingly to identify with all-embracing anti-Western and anti-Nato ideals. Not only did these dogmas provide a sense of purpose for otherwise bored and undirected intellectuals, they also satisfied an idealism and need for prompt action that was derived from a youthful impatience [...] this atmosphere of protest and opposition reached critical proportions as hundreds of thousand participated in student-led marches against the Vietnam War, nuclear weapons, neo-colonization and what was seen as an exploitative Western capitalist order (p. 378).

For many left-leaning political parties, rightist leaning regimes (such as those in Italy 1969-74) were seen as the embodiment of the capitalist domination of the lower class. Rightwing government policies of stifling political opposition from the left, which were sometimes labeled as socialist or communist, forced many political parties to go through a metamorphosis that often resulted in a party creating a terrorist wing, or worse yet—becoming a terrorist organization. Sprinzak (1991, 52) refers to this radicalization of leftist political parties into leftist terror groups as a process of extensional delegitimation. In general, while Sprinzak (1991) does not specifically point to rightwing regimes as the catalyst for extensional delegitimation, many of the oppressive political, economic and social programs common in rightwing regimes help promote the identical circumstances described below. He outlines this process as follows:

---

10 According to Sprinzak (1991), the process of extensional delegitimation differs from the usual radicalization process. Importantly, because in the case the former the process occurs much faster and bears the hall-marks of deep opposing ideological differences that often lead to violence, there is often an inability of the opposing sides to compromise on their opposing ideological differences.
Extensional delegitimation—a process of radicalization which starts when an existing opposition movement, or an old dormant sentiment of opposition, is radicalized quickly against the ruling authority and reaches terrorism without many psycho-political inhibitions. [...] it may also appear in the context of a struggle against an autocratic and violent regime. It involves a radicalization of one or more segments of an existing nationalist or leftwing movement. The terrorism, which is produced by the abridged process of delegitimation, is often one strategy of combat among many non-terroristic ones.

The role that rightwing party ideology plays as a motivator for terrorism has not received considerable attention from scholars. Nevertheless, extant literature illustrates that the policies of rightwing governments tend to be associated with higher levels of prejudice, ethnocentrism (Altermeyer 1996; Lubbers et. al 2002) and support for interstate and intrastate conflicts (Cohrs and Moschner 2002 McFarland, 2005). In addition, in regimes where rightwing political ideologies prevail, there is greater support for the restriction of human rights than in other types of regimes (Altermeyer 1996) and “laws limiting civil liberties like freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the right of assembly” (Cohrs et.al 2005).

Pinkney (1990) expounds on the behavior of rightwing governments arguing that governments that govern along ideological right principles have historically placed great emphasis on blocking the demands of the working class and other groups demanding greater political participation and economic equality (Pinkney 1990, 2). In particular, in developing countries, the constituency for the left will often always be larger than for the right, hence it is in the interests of the right to shut off access to the political process in a way that is not true in the
same way for the left. An ideal example of such efforts by rightist governments to repress popular leftist parties was evident in Central and South America during the 1960s to the 1990s. The formation of Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemala (UNRG)\(^{11}\) in Guatemala in the late 1960s provides two examples where a repressive right-wing government created the circumstances where political parties felt compelled to turn to terror. In the late 1960s, the Guatemalan government (in concert with the military) had effective control over which parties could contest elections. This power was used in subsequent electoral cycles to suppress left-of-center reformist parties (Premo 1981; Malloy et al., 1987; Waldman 2005). These restrictions were employed in the 1966 election to restrict the number of participating parties to three: the extreme rightist National Liberation Movement (MLN), the president's own center-right Institutional Democratic Party (PID) and the centrist Revolutionary Party (PR) (Premo 1981; Malloy et al., 1987).

An important issue that must be highlighted relates to why many leftist political parties would resort to terror as their preferred method of violence. For many leftist political parties, especially those in Latin and South America, opposition towards their efforts came from authoritarian rightwing regimes (Premo 1981; Pinkney 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Malloy et al., 1987). Many right-of-center authoritarian governments viewed leftist parties as dangerous to their existence and attempted to curtail the activity of leftist organizations through repression and other forms of institutional barriers. In Chile for example, “before leaving office, Pinochet appointed supreme court justices, mayors, regional governors, and one-fifth of the new senate. These appointments [were designed] to block or delay the policies of the incoming democratic government” (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 271). The repression meted out by

\(^{11}\) Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (UNRG) is the Spanish translation for The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity.
rightwing regimes became a self-fulfilling prophesy: “it triggered crises of legitimacy and terrorism all over the sub-continent [of Latin America]” (Sprinzak (1991, 62).

In various cases, rightwing regimes at times can be more repressive than certain types of left leaning regimes and may negatively influence the functioning of leftist terror groups. As previously pointed out, several studies have suggested that the relationship between the level of terrorism and that of political repression may be nonlinear (Testas 2004; Blomberg et.al 2002). In general, studies show inconsistencies as per the relationship between repression and the incidence and intensity of terrorism (Piazza 2006). According to Piazza (2006, 167) “Repression and ‘Repression’ may be either positively or negatively related to terrorism.”

Invariably, as the inconsistency in the extant literature suggests, it may be plausible to conclude that repression by itself does not always equal terrorism. Rather, as Testas (2004) infers, while levels of terrorism may vary among regime types, it is important to note that while political repression initially decreases terrorism in the long term it increases it. Therefore, what separates a repressive rightwing regime from repression under left leaning regimes is not only the intensity of repression but also the nature of the repression and the target group. Importantly, in most polities, new and especially authoritarian emerging rightwing regimes, act on the behalf of a few wealthy elites. As part of their agenda, they promote economic and political policies that exclude large working-class groups or groups favoring greater equality from power (Pinkney 1990, 14). Invariably, for most left leaning political parties these groups form an important constituent of the party’s support base and they may exert tremendous pressure on left leaning

---

12 Many rightwing regimes have been known to wage systematic genocide and utilize death squads. However, extant literature is inconsistent as to how this may affect leftist political party’s willingness to turn to terror.
13 The ^ Repression measures follows that of Piazza (2006) and is the degree of change of a country’s political or civil freedom during the period 1960-2002. See Piazza (2006) for a detailed discussion of the Repression indices.
14 Testas (2004) examination of the nexus between repression and terrorism relates to terrorism in general and not specifically directed at political parties who turn to terror.
political parties to act in their interests. Hence, leaders within leftist political parties may feel compelled to act violently under the weight of this form of directed repression when other mainstream political avenues are closed. Commenting on economic and social class exclusion and its role in stimulating terrorism, Testas (2004, 260) notes “failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes may lead to their alienation from the political system which in turn may lead to terrorism.”

Unlike mass populist revolutions such as those that led to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia or the sustained guerrilla movement that brought Mao Zedong to power in China, leftist political parties facing opposition from rightwing regimes are often driven by elite level protest and as such then often fail to generate that mass level unrest that is sufficient to spur revolutions (Sprinzak 1991). Furthermore, in many cases, leftist political movements were not seeking nationalist goals: that is, they were not aiming to drive an imperialist power from their territory. Rather many political groups sought to remove regimes that were opposed to their movements (Sprinzak 1991). Therefore, mass support is not readily available for many leftist parties to conduct sustained levels of violence such as a guerrilla movement (Sprinzak 1991; Waldman 2005). According to Sprinzak (1991, 63), the main difference between nationalist terrorism and its anti-authoritarian variant is that “the latter rarely gets the support of the masses. It is, of necessity, less sophisticated and strategic.” He argues that while nationalist movements “can apply terrorism along with other strategies of combat, because it has the support of the masses, terrorism of a small anti-authoritarian group is usually its only remaining method of struggle” (Sprinzak 1991, 63). Moreover, a turn to terror is seen as the most viable mechanism for many leftist political parties with limited options that operate in repressive rightwing polities.
Indeed, what existing evidence seems to suggest is a greater propensity for political parties to form terrorist groups within right-leaning regimes. To this end, it is necessary to account for political ideology, especially in right-leaning regimes, when looking at the reasons why political parties, especially on the ideological left, turn to terror.

The preponderance of the theoretical evidence suggests that the existence of institutional and organizational constraints help create the conditions necessary for political parties to become terrorist organizations or form terrorist wings. In particular, a ruling government’s ideology appears to have a tremendous impact on how disgruntled groups choose to voice their dissatisfaction. However, while providing heuristic and anecdotal arguments about possible links between rightwing governments and oppositional violence, none of the aforementioned research (Goodman 1992; Pinkney 1990; Premo 1981; Sprinzak 1991; Weinberg 1991) has provided empirical evidence that links rightwing regimes to political parties turn to terrorism. In addition, no existing research has specifically examined the nexus between rightwing governments and terrorism beyond 1992. Importantly, unlike previous research this study aims to achieve these goals.

The working hypothesis of this dissertation seeks to understand and explain the causal parameters which encourage leftist political parties to turn to terror. My hypotheses follow:

H1: Regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position will expect to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes.

H2: Regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically left position will expect to have less numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes.
H3: Regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically centrist position will expect to have less numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes.

2.3.1 Religious Political Parties and A Turn to Terror

In their study, Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003, 31) proclaim, “It is uncommon for ties between parties and terrorism to emerge when the cause involved is religious in nature.” In general, the role played by political parties engaged in acts of terror in regimes governed by a religious ideology has been largely ignored. Historically, most scholars discount their activities as an aberration. Only recently has the issue become a concern to policymakers and scholars. However, what remains largely unexplained is whether religiously governed regimes promote a turn to terror more frequently than other types of ideological regimes.

In this dissertation, religious political parties fall into the category of proto-hegemonic religious party, or religious *fundamentalist* party (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 182). According to Gunther and Diamond (2003, 182), “the fundamentalist party seeks to reorganize state and society around a strict reading of religious doctrinal principles, while denominational-mass parties are pluralist and incremental in their agenda.” Invariably, this categorization eliminates a significant number of moderate Christian, Hindi, Buddhist, and Islamic political parties.

There are two reasons for the *fundamentalist* political party approach. First, extant literature on religious political parties does not provide a rich source of information on either the definition or the activities of religious political parties that utilize terror. Even more disappointing, there are very few consistent or reliable directions on what categories or types of parties qualify as religious political parties. In most cases, the literature focuses on party families
or classifications that exist in Western European states (Gunther and Diamond 2003). These classifications include divergent parties such as the Christian Democrats in Germany and other variations of “religious parties” that have plural interests and shared ideology with rightwing or some left-of-center parties (Duverger 1954, Gunther and Diamond 2003). As Rosenblum (2003, 25) points out, “merely vestigial reference to ‘Christian’, say, in party names does not suffice as a marker of religious parties. To count, parties must appeal to voters on religious grounds and draw their inspirations from religious values if not theology.” Therefore, to avoid conceptualization inconsistencies and coding problems among parties it was necessary to remove all *denominational-mass parties* from fundamentalist political parties because they do not have platforms or motivations that are singularly religious. Indeed, it would be difficult to argue that many of the current Christian religious parties with their pluralist interests and platforms decide to turn to terror because of anti-secular motives.

Second, much of the skepticism in regards to the peacefulness of religious political parties has not been directed at Christian political parties, but rather, towards those where Islam, Judea, Hindi, Buddhist and Sikh beliefs are the dominant theme of the party’s platform and used as the mechanism to appeal to voters (Rosenblum 2003, 24). Therefore, *fundamentalist* party will serve as the proxy for religious parties especially since they are largely the point of focus in regards to parties that utilize terrorism during the post Cold War era. However, by focusing on *fundamentalist* parties, this study does not imply that Western Christian parties do not engage in acts of terror. As Juergensmeyer (2003, xii) suggests “violent ideas and images are not the monopoly of any single religion. Virtually every major religious tradition-Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist-has served as a resource for violent actors.” Indeed, as the
case of Northern Ireland clearly points out, political parties with Christianity as their guiding ideology can, and do, engage in very violent acts of terror.

The decades following the end of the Cold War has seen the rise of issues concerning lifestyle, cultural diversity, nationalism, immigration, and religion across the international system (Robinson et.al 2006). Extant literature suggests that religious political parties provide important representation for their members in many societies (Rosenblum 2003). They play a role not just in expressing but also in constructing and mobilizing political identity (Rosenblum 2003; Kalyvas 1996; Zakaria 2004). With globalization, there has been an increase in the rate of secularization across societies. As a result, several traditionally powerful religious political parties and organizations in some societies now see their authority challenged by secular political parties and governments (Ranstorp 1996). Although “some religious nationalists have already achieved a great deal of political influence in their countries, others have not and never will” (Juergensmeyer 1993, 4). Consequently, a number of religious political parties find themselves less often as part of ruling governments and cabinets. In most cases, religious political parties that are in such precarious positions often form coalitions with other political parties, broaden their appeal or in some cases harden their fundamental positions to appeal to disillusioned intellectuals and those who oppose the secularization of society (Juergensmeyer 1993; Rosenblum 2003; Zakaria 2004).

Recent literature suggests that as other peaceful methods fail, religiously motivated political parties have increasingly reacted to their reduced influence in society by turning to other means such as terror to achieve their organizational objectives (Ranstorp 1996). Within the terrorism literature, there is a belief that since the end of the Cold War, incidents of religiously based terrorism have become more frequent than ever before (Cronin 2002; Juergensmeyer 1993,
2003; Ranstorp 1996). Hoffman (1997) reports that by 1995, over 50 percent of terrorist organizations were based on religion. More importantly, this belief has led various scholars to deduce that religiously based regimes (especially those that are non-Christian and non-Western) are more likely to turn be a hotbed for all forms of terrorism. Hence, it follows that some policymakers conclude such regimes create conditions whereby political parties, especially those that are secular in their organizational platform, may turn to violence to achieve their objectives.

The motivation for forming religious political parties bears many of the same similarities as those of secular political parties. At a minimum, religious political parties seek to advance the interests of their members or electorate. Religious groups, like many other groups, often create political organizations in reaction to perceived threats (Rosenblum 2003, 25). In most cases, when a religious group decide to form a political party, the impetus and “sustaining idea behind [the] religious party is not purely self-protective […] a necessary condition is the conviction that religious doctrine or more abstract religious values should guide every aspect of life” (Rosenblum 2003, 26). In addition, religious political parties are in most cases motivated by the belief that “public ideals may be defended more persuasively and obligations motivated more dependably on religious than secular grounds” (Rosenblum 2003, 26).

Interestingly, it is this rigid attitude held by various religious parties that they are the only viable panacea for society’s ills, which on many occasions leads to radicalization and friction between the organization and the state. While religion and politics in some polities may have a peaceful cohabitation, diverging ideologies are also the source of incipient violence. Zakaria (2004, 13) contends, “The combination of religion and politics has proven combustible. Religion, at least the religion of the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), stresses moral absolutes. But politics is all about compromise. The result has been ruthless, winner-take-all
attitude towards political life.” Moreover, when there is opposition from the state such as the banning of religious political parties in Algeria and Turkey, some religious parties may conceive such action as a direct affront to their cause and may undertake fanatic or radical means of achieving their organizational objectives.\footnote{On January 11, 1992, the Algerian military halted the country’s electoral process and deprived the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) an assured victory at the polls. Similarly, in 2001, Turkey’s high court banned the pro-Islamic Virtue Party-the main opposition to the government because of perceived anti-secular activities.}

Fundamentalist political parties do not all start their political life in opposition to the government (Ranstorp 1996). However, many of these parties may eventually turn to violence due to poor showings at electoral polls and/or institutional barriers such as court decrees mandating dissolution of the party. Their use of violence is aimed at continuing with a cause that the party believes is just. In part, decisions by extremists within the political party to utilize violence are conditioned by the political context within which the organization operates (Ranstorp 1996). According to Ranstorp (1996), “most active terrorist groups with a religious imperative were actually propelled into existence in reaction to key events. These events either served as a catalyst or inspirational model for the organization or gravely escalated the perception of the threat of foreign secularization, or for messianic […] groups, a heightened sense that time was running out” (p. 3). For many religious motivated groups that turn to terror, the decision to use violence is seen as necessary in their all-out struggle to resist secularization from within the state and from outside forces (Ranstorp1996, 3). Moreover, extant literature does not provide conclusive evidence that there are regime types or electoral systems that forestall religious political parties from engaging in acts of terror in a consistent manner.

As previously pointed out, religious terrorism does not share many of the same ideological motivations as leftwing, rightwing and ethnonationalist/separatist terrorism. Extant
literature suggests that religious political parties with extreme platforms and ideologies are unlikely to change their position even if they are democratically elected (Langohr, 2001). The argument also goes that they will use their newfound freedoms to subvert democracy (Langohr, 2001).

According to extant literature, what has become apparent in the post Cold War period is the upward trend of religious based terrorism across all types of regimes (Hoffman 2006; Cronin 2002; Enders and Sandler 2005; Juergensmeyer 2003). A number of scholars infer that religious based political organizations (for example Hezbollah and Hamas) are fast becoming major sources of terror (Cronin 2002, Enders and Sandler 2005). In general, there has been a noticeable upward trend of religious based parties aligning themselves with terror organizations. Cronin (2002) contends that there is an increasing hyper-religious motivation of small terrorist groups enabled by an environment of bad governance, non-existent social services and poverty (38). Thus, “sacred terrorism is becoming more significant” especially in young democracies (Cronin, 2002, 39). However, the literature on religiously based political parties allied to terrorist organizations has remained sparse.

Cronin (2002) suggests that religious based terrorism, and in particular, Islamic fundamentalism poses a tremendous threat to fledgling democracies. According to Enders and Sandler (2005), “by the 1990s the driving force of terrorism […] is religious based fundamentalist less constrained by norms” (262). Scholars contend that, since 1980 religious based terrorist groups have grown 64%. 16 Indeed, while there are no official figures to confirm the assessment that there has been an increase in religious based political parties engaged in terrorist activity, what is evident is the increasing visibility and impact of political parties with

16 Enders and Sandler (2005) report on the growth of religious groups based on data from Iterate data set.
ties to terror organizations. Political parties such as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, Shiv Sena (Army of Shiv) in India, and Hamas in Palestine have engaged in acts of terror.

Moreover, what is significant about religious political parties is their unpredictability. Unlike, leftists or rightwing parties, religiously motivated parties are highly unstable and often prone to abandon mainstream politics and use of violence in an effort to achieve goals. As Cronin (2002) points out, “religious terrorists may not be as constrained in their behavior by concerns about the reactions of their human constituents […] they are not trying to correct the system […] rather they are trying to replace it” (p. 42).

Despite prevailing opinions, there are no systematic empirical studies showing that religious political parties are more or less likely than rightist and leftist parties to turn to terror since the end of the Cold War. At most, what the scholarly literature reveals is a lack of insight in regards to the motivations of religious based political parties, and their willingness to utilize terrorism as a tool. In general, the literature is relatively silent on religious based political parties’ motivations, their targets, and the internal dynamics of religious based political parties.

The fourth working hypothesis of this dissertation seeks to understand and explain the causal parameters which encourage religious political parties to turn to terror. The fourth hypothesis follows:

H4: Regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs based on a particular religious ideology will expect to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes.
CHAPTER 3 - Cross-sectional Time Series Analysis

An empirical analysis is designed to test the above hypothesis. This dissertation uses both quantitative and case study approaches. Mahoney and Goertz (2006, 237) note that the scope and causal generalizations are greater using quantitative approaches than they are when qualitative methods are applied. Despite a historical disdain for using quantitative approaches to study terrorism by many within the field, quantitative approaches are fast emerging as vital tools in terrorism research. Silke (2001, 9) contends that, “social science researchers typically have to work with very ‘noisy’ data where there are potentially a vast number of factors exerting an influence on any one behavior, event, or trend.” Statistical analysis has emerged as a way for researchers to determine which factors genuinely are important. Thus, statistical approaches permit a broad picture of the relationship between multiple explanatory variables and allow for the evaluation of various variables and findings that can be replicated. In this chapter, a multivariate statistical approach will be used to test the two hypotheses.

This chapter proceeds as such: the following section details the process of operationalizing formation of terrorist organization (dependent variable) and regime ideological character (right, left, center, and religious regime). The first section also includes an overview of the data, the data generating process, and the unit of analysis. In the following section, an analysis and discussion of the methodology, empirical analysis, and statistical findings is presented. The findings of my regression analysis are presented in Table 3.2. The final section of this chapter provides a summary of the chapter as well as additional statistical support presented in the form of Figures 3.1 through 3.6.
3.1 Research Design and Methods

1. Cross-sectional-time-series design. This dissertation utilizes cross-sectional time series data of 31 countries from 1960 to 2006, (a list of countries used in this dissertation can be found in Appendix A). Data availability issues have restricted this research to 31 states. The choice of time, from 1960 to 2006 was selected for two reasons. First, the early 1960s to early 1990s, as the expanded literature points out, is the period when most political parties formed alliances with or created terrorist organizations. Figures 3.2 illustrate the trends in the formation of terrorist organization by political parties. Second, the choice of 1960 to 2006 allows sufficient time to measure Cold War and post Cold War effects that may account for changes in the link between legitimate political parties and terrorist organizations.

2. Operational definitions. This research analyzes the process whereby political parties create terrorist organizations. The dependent variable (Y) is the formation of terrorist organization and the independent variable is a regime’s ideological character (X).

   (a) Dependent Variable: As outlined in the literature, terrorism is not an ideology but an activity (Danzell 2011; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003). The operational definition of terrorism is a count variable that measures the following: any group formed by a political organization or acting on its behalf, or its members, and that deliberately engages in bombings, explosions, arson, fires, rocket attacks, killlings, attempted killlings, shootings, sieges, violent attacks, and similar violent actions is considered a terrorist group. It shows the number of terrorist groups formed per state each year.

   Because this study seeks to identify only terrorist organizations formed by political parties, existing datasets on terrorist incidents (such as ITERATE) are inadequate. Such extant
data do not provide information on whether the terrorist groups counted were directly connected to political parties. In addition, many existing datasets are constructed to measure transnational terrorist incidents and are thus ill-suited for this study, because the unit of analysis in this research is domestic terrorism per state year.

As a way of addressing these shortcomings, this research uses a newly created dataset\textsuperscript{17} that only counts cases where terrorist groups are affiliated with political parties. The dataset for the dependent variable was drawn from three sources. The first comes from the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) collected by the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB).\textsuperscript{18} The data contained in TOPs provides background information on more than 850 organizations that have been known to engage in terrorist activities around the world during the last four decades. Importantly, TOPs provides detailed information on bases of operations, organizational strength, ideology, goals as well as political organizations or governments tied to these terrorist groups.

The second source of data on terrorist organization formation by political parties is the RAND End-of-Terror Dataset (1968 to 2006). Unlike the ITERATE collection, the RAND End-of-Terror Dataset contains information on terrorist group formation and survival. The End-of-Terror Dataset includes data on 648 active groups between 1968 and 2006. The dataset also includes information on economic conditions, regime type, size, ideology, group goals, and affiliation that affect terrorist group survival. The third source is Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003). These scholars provide a list of more than 122 cases (from 1910-1990) where political parties and terrorist groups are affiliated.

\textsuperscript{17} This new dataset extends Danzell (2011) to cover the period 1960 to 2006. The dataset also improves on Danzell (2011) dataset by including several states that were not covered in the initial dataset used in his study.

\textsuperscript{18} The TOPs database is presently maintained by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) that also maintains the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). During the period 2004 through 2008, the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided support for the creation and ongoing maintenance of the Terrorism Knowledge Base. See START for a full discussion of the database.
From these sources, and as a way of identifying relevant cases, only terrorist organizations that were affiliated or formed by political parties were selected. Painstaking effort went into ensuring that the creation of political parties preceded the formation of terrorist organizations. Where possible this was done by tracing the order of the political affiliation between political parties and terrorist groups based on case write-ups in TOPs dataset and Weinberg and Pedahzur’s (2003) listings and write-ups.

(b) **Independent variable.** A regime’s ideological character is operationalized by creating an ideological variable. First, `gov_right` counts the total cabinet positions for members who come from right wing parties. The second coded, `gov_left`, measures the percentage of cabinet positions held by leftist political parties. The third variable coded `gov_cent` counts center parties in percentage of total cabinet posts. The fourth variable coded `gov_rel` counts religious political parties in percentage of total cabinet posts.

Six sources are used to create the independent variables. The first comes from the Comparative Political Data Set II and III 1960-2006 (CPDS) (Armingeon et.al. 2006). The CPDS I and II provide a collection of political and institutional data for 35 OECD and EU member countries. Among the contents included in the database are variables specifying governments, elections, party systems and the percentage of seats won by each party that make up the cabinet and their political ideology on the left to right spectrum. The second source comes from the Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of Political Parties by Ideological Group in Capital Democracies 1950-2006 (Swank 2006). This dataset is similar to the CPDS.

---

19 Party classifications are based on (Francis and Mair 1984; Pinkney 1990; Goodman 1992 and Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond 2003). The classifications are as follows: **Right:** far-right (e.g., neo-fascist, right-wing populist), classical liberal, European conservative Christian Democratic, and the other various right-wing parties; **Left:** communist; socialist; social democratic, and other various left-wing parties (e.g., left-libertarian parties); **Centrist:** non-conservative European Catholic parties, secular non-conservative parties of the center; **Religious:** Islamic, Sikh, Buddhist, and Hindu political parties.
The Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of Political Parties by Ideological Group provides a list of political parties from left to right and includes ideological variations such as left, right religious, centrist, and the percentage of seats and votes won by parties across 21 countries. The third source is Castles and Mair (1984), which provide a schema for countries as well as data on party activity for the years post-1980. The fourth source comes from Mallory (1960-1967). The fifth is collected from Banks et.al (1969-2006). Mallory, Banks and associates provide information on political parties and cabinet composition for various states. The final source is Tachau (1994). This source gives a comprehensive guide to the political activities, genealogy and electoral results of significant political parties in more than 23 countries in the Middle East and North African regions between 1949 to 1992.

(c) **Control variables.** Extant literature provides several variables that may foster the formation of terrorist organizations. This research uses four control variables identified in the literature to explain the creation of terrorist groups. First is the electoral system. It acts as a measure of institutional constraints on political parties (Li 2005). This dissertation uses three indicators for electoral system. According to extant literature, these measures include majoritarian, proportional representation, and mixed electoral system. These influence the dependant variable by creating varying levels of institutional constraints on political parties’ access to the political system. The second control is Cold War, a dummy variable, meant to measure the effect of the Cold War on the formation of terrorist organizations.

The period between 1960 to 1989 was coded 1 for the Cold War and coded 0 thereafter up to 2006. The third control variable is conflict, drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch 2009). Following Li (2005), conflict was coded 1 if a state is engaged in an interstate military conflict or war and 0 otherwise. The fourth control variable highlights the
strategic choice idea of cost. Repression operationalizes the cost of terrorist group formation (negatively correlated). Repression implies that abuses of civil liberties (rights such as executions, imprisonment and political murders/brutality) exists within the regime and provides a measure of the extent of governmental repression in a given regime. To measure repression, data from two independent sources are used. The dataset is based on human rights violations and follows Gibney, Cornett and Wood (2007). These are collected by two organizations, Amnesty International, available from 1962 onwards and the United States Department of State, available from 1976 onwards. Each of the variables has a political terror scale ranked 1 to 5. The maximum value of the two series was taken in any given country and year. A threshold of 3 and above was used to classify repression and coded as 1, and below 2 as 0.

### 3.2 Empirical Analysis and Discussion

#### 3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 3.1 provides the mean, standard deviation, and the range for each of the variables used in this paper. The dependent variable terrorist group has 1449 observations, with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum of 3. In terms of the frequency of terrorist groups formation by political parties in a given year, there were 216 cases where one terrorist group was formed by a political party, 35 cases where 2 groups were formed by a political party, and 5 cases where 3 terrorist organization were formed in a given year. The mean, which is the average or the common measure of tendency is .2077.

The key independent variable `gov_right` contains 1293 observations, with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum of 100. The variable had a mean score of 50.81. The independent variable representing government of the left (`gov_left`), has 1293 observations, with a minimum
score of 0 and a maximum of 100. The variable has a mean score of 23.6692. The other important variable that this research evaluates is governments whose ideology is based on religion. The variable `gov_rel` has 1293 observations, with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum of 100. Its mean score is 4.2379. The variable for centrist governments (`gov_cen`) has 1293 observations, with a minimum score of 0 and a maximum of 100. The mean measures 20.2371.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist group</td>
<td>1449</td>
<td>0.2077</td>
<td>0.4834</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov_right</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>50.8102</td>
<td>44.4511</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov_left</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>23.6692</td>
<td>36.6842</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov_rel</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>4.2379</td>
<td>16.7043</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov_cen</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>20.2371</td>
<td>34.4164</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2 Statistical Analysis

Before analyzing the statistical results, an assessment of the influence of multicollinearity is performed by estimating the variance inflation factor (VIF). When employing multiple regressions, it is desirable to have explanatory variables that are highly correlated to a response variable. However, to obtain reliable estimates, it is not desirable for explanatory variables to be correlated with each other (Wooldridge 2006). Where multicollinearity is present, the standard deviation of the regression coefficients may be disproportionately large, the coefficient estimates may also be unstable, and the regression coefficients may not be interpretable (Gourieroux et al., 1984; Wooldridge 2006; Long 1997). Multicollinearity is a concern when estimates average is above 1 and the VIF for the model is above 10. The VIF scores of the models suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue in the estimates. Multicollinearity is a concern when estimates average is above 1 and the VIF for the model is above 10. The VIF scores of the models suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue in the estimates. Because terrorist groups’ formation is in the form of a yearly count, a Poisson regression is used (Cameron and Tivendi 1998). The Poisson model estimates the probability of terrorist group formation from political parties in democratic and partly democratic regimes each year.

An important limitation of the Poisson model is that it may fail to account for overdispersion and can result in spuriously small standard errors of the explanatory variables (Gourieroux et al., 1984). The choice of the Poisson model used in this paper is based on a standard test of fit (Land, McCall and Nagin 1996). A significant alpha test indicates that there are no problems of overdispersion. The following descriptions of test statistics provide further guidance in choosing the best estimator fit. Random effect Poisson was chosen based on two factors. First, the fixed effect Poisson estimator is conditional, suggesting that observations in

20 The composite VIF score of 4.17 suggests multicollinearity is not a factor in the estimates
which the dependent variable is unchanged are not used for the estimation purposes (Wooldridge 2006). Eliminating observations reduces efficiency. Second, various specifications and model fit tests conducted (using STATA 10.0) confirmed random effect Poisson as the most suitable estimator based on fit.\textsuperscript{21} All four models presented in Table 3.2, have highly significant Wald chi-squares suggesting that the models fit the data well.

Table 3.2 presents the results of the statistical analysis. The first model listed in Table 3.2 represents the standard test of hypotheses 1. The hypothesis states that regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position will expect to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes.

The most notable result concerns the central hypothesis about an ideologically right government. The model includes the dependent variable (terrorist group formed) and four explanatory variables that the literature argues affect the formation of terrorist groups (majoritarian democracy, Cold War, conflict, and repression). The variable representing government of the right is statistically significant at the p<.01 level. The coefficient for Gov\_right variable is .0078, which suggests in states with decidedly right leaning cabinets the likelihood of political parties forming terrorist groups’ increases the mean by .78 percent, holding other variables constant. Additional evidence is shown in Figure 3.3, which provides a graphical illustration of the regression analysis. Figure 3.2 illustrates the intensity level of terrorist groups formed by political parties when there is a right-leaning government in power during the period 1960-2006. This figure shows that under right-wing government there was a significant level of terrorist groups formed especially during the early to mid-1970s. Figure 3.2 also shows a peak of about 13 terrorist groups being created during the early to mid-1990s. The

\textsuperscript{21} Tests for goodness-of fit diagnostics include log likelihood ratio chi-square –countfit, and Alpha test confirmed that random effect Poisson is an appropriate estimator (Long 1997;Long and Freese 2003).
results supports hypothesis one that regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position are likely to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes.

In general, most control variables behaved as predicted following the findings found in the extant literature. The variable representing majoritarian democracy in model 1 is statistically significant at the p<.05 level. The coefficient for the majdemoc variable is .6817. Thus, in countries with political systems that are majoritarian, the likelihood that political parties will create terrorist organizations increases by almost 68 percent holding other variables constant. This finding supports that of Crenshaw (1981) and Li (2005). The Cold War variable is also statistically significant and the coefficient for the Cold War variable is .5054. Thus, the Cold War environment increases the likelihood of terrorist group formation by political parties by 51 percent. The variable representing repression is statistically significant at the p<.10 level. The coefficient for this variable .3481, thus repression is shown to be significant in increasing the likelihood of terrorist group formation by political parties by 34 percent, holding all other variables constant. This finding follows the conclusion drawn by Testas (2004) and Blomberg et.al (2002) who found that repression’s effect on terrorism is indeterminate as it may sometime either positively or negatively relate to terrorism.

With the initial regression complete, the analysis shifted to determine whether leftist, religious, and centrist governments influence the formation of terrorist groups. A second regression, Model 2, was run specifying variables for left ruling cabinets. The coefficient for \texttt{Gov\_left} is -.0050 at the 05 level of significance. In interpreting these figures, political parties within left leaning regimes were .50 percent less likely to be associated with the creation of terrorist organizations. As in Model 1, the Cold War and majoritarian system variables are
positive and statistically significant at the .01%, and .05% levels respectively. As is the case in Model 1, repression was found to be statistically significant at the .10 level. The coefficient for repression is .3851 suggesting repression increases the likelihood of terrorist group formation by political parties by 39 percent, holding all other variables constant. All other variables were found to be statistically insignificant. Figure 3.4 illustrates the intensity level of terrorist groups formed by political parties when there is a left-leaning government in power during the period 1960-2006. As shown the overall incidence is significantly lower than that of right-wing governments. The mean incidence of political parties creating terrorist organization when a left-leaning political party is slightly over 4 incidence per year.

The third regression model tests hypothesis 2 that seeks to determine whether regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs based on a particular religious ideology will expect to have fewer numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes. Unlike the two previous models, the independent variable in this model (Gov_rel) is statistically insignificant. This finding appears to be consistent with other research (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003) that found no observable relationship between governments that have close ties to religion and a higher level of terrorist organization created by political parties. Thus, regimes with cabinets dominated by religious parties do not appear to have higher levels of terrorist groups’ formation by political parties. Consistent with the previous models, the Cold War variable is significant at the .01 % level, the variable representing majoritarian electoral system is statistically significant at the .05 % level, and the variable representing repression is statistically significant at the .05 % level. All other variables are statistically insignificant. Figure 3.6 illustrate the overall incidence of terrorist organizations when a government is in power and whose ideology is based on religion. As shown in the figure, except in the mid to late 1970s and
early 1980s when opposition political parties in Lebanon and Iran created terrorist wings, Figure 3.6 shows that political parties rarely create terrorist organization under governments that are religiously based. In Iran by the mid-1980s under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini regime almost political parties such as the leftist National Democratic Front and the moderate religious Muslim People’s Republican which had created terror groups were eventually silenced by the very effective and repressive state security apparatus (Hiro 2005).

The final estimates in Table 3.2, (Model 4) focus on the relationship between governments and ruling cabinets that are decidedly centrist. The variable for centrist leaning cabinets (Gov_cen) is statistically significant. The coefficient for Gov_cen is -.0052 at the .05 level. In interpreting these figures, political parties within centrist leaning regimes were .52 percent less likely to be associated with the creation of terrorist organizations. This is consistent with other studies on violent conflicts that show centrist governments are less likely to encourage violent upheaval by dissatisfied groups. This is consistent with the cases presented in previous models, the Cold War variable was highly significant as illustrated in the findings at the .01 level. The variable majoritarian electoral system is also statistically significant at the .05 level. Also consistent with the other models is the statistical significance of the variable specifying repression, which was found to be statistically significant at the .05 level. All other variables are insignificant. The results of the estimates in Table 3.2 lend considerable support to both hypotheses tested in this dissertation. Overall, all models behaved as expected and lend support to the key hypotheses that political parties create far more terrorist organizations when a right-leaning governments is in power than is the case with other types of governments.
Table 3.2 Poisson Regression Estimates for Terrorist Group Formation 1960-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov_right</td>
<td>0.0078***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0018)</td>
<td>(0.0021)</td>
<td>(0.0061)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov_left</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0050**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0021)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov_rel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0061)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov_cen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0052**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>0.5054***</td>
<td>0.5752***</td>
<td>0.5631***</td>
<td>0.5321***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1445)</td>
<td>(0.1422)</td>
<td>(0.1428)</td>
<td>(0.1434)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majdemoc</td>
<td>0.6817**</td>
<td>0.5352**</td>
<td>0.5423**</td>
<td>0.6552**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2931)</td>
<td>(0.2820)</td>
<td>(0.2783)</td>
<td>(0.2817)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>0.3481*</td>
<td>0.3851**</td>
<td>0.3964**</td>
<td>0.3850**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1924)</td>
<td>(0.1903)</td>
<td>(0.1895)</td>
<td>(0.1873)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>0.1671</td>
<td>0.1897</td>
<td>0.2184</td>
<td>0.1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2173)</td>
<td>(0.2164)</td>
<td>(0.2141)</td>
<td>(0.2141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.6864***</td>
<td>-2.1845***</td>
<td>-2.2861***</td>
<td>-2.2118***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2461)</td>
<td>(0.2311)</td>
<td>(0.2331)</td>
<td>(0.2264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>0.4711***</td>
<td>0.4462***</td>
<td>0.4471***</td>
<td>0.4253***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1541)</td>
<td>(0.1480)</td>
<td>(0.1517)</td>
<td>(0.1444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi-square</td>
<td>40.4400***</td>
<td>27.0800***</td>
<td>21.7200***</td>
<td>25.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-642.40171</td>
<td>-649.7082</td>
<td>-652.7103</td>
<td>-650.5281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>1234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the p<.10 p<.05 and p<.01 level. One tailed test. Note: standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
### 3.2.3 Discussion of the Findings

In general, political parties creating terrorist organization is most often a rare event as shown in Figure 3.1, however when faced with certain types of government policies, political parties are more likely to turn to violent means of protest action. As the statistical results indicate, random effect Poisson models provide empirical support for the hypothesis that regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position should expect to experience greater numbers of political parties turning to terror than other types of regimes. This finding holds even after controlling for the effects of Cold War, the country’s electoral system, state repression, and external conflict are controlled for in the estimates. Thus, the models suggest that decisions by opposition political parties to utilize terror are conditioned by the political ideology of the ruling cabinet. In particular, where leaders in a regime choose to adopt classical rightwing approaches and policies during their tenure in office, opposition parties at times turn may to terror. Interestingly, the influence of the variable repression showed dramatic improvements over those by Danzell (2011), Testas (2004), and Blomberg et.al (2002) who found the role played by repression to be inconsistent across types of political parties, type of governments, and levels of democratization. Given the extensive period under examination, this dissertation provides the most reliable examination of the role of repression on terrorist group formation by political parties.

This chapter addressed the role played by political parties’ ideology in the creation of terrorist groups. The statistical findings lend support to the hypothesis in regards to the activities of ruling rightwing political parties promoting the conditions that allow for the creation of leftwing terrorist groups by political parties with left leaning ideology. As noted in the literature, leftist terror organizations are not created in a vacuum (Danzell 2011). They require a catalyst. It
seems that the policies of conventional rightwing political parties in power create the conditions that spur left-leaning parties to form terror groups.
Figure 3.1 Total Terrorist Groups Formed by Political Parties 1960-2006
Figure 3.2 Total Terrorist Groups Formed by Political Parties Under Right-leaning Governments 1960-2006
Figure 3.3 Total Terror Groups Formed by Political Parties Under Left-Leaning Governments
Figure 3.4 Total Terror Groups Formed When Religious Governments are in Power
Figure 3.5 Total Terror Groups Formed by Political Parties Under Centrist Governments
Figure 3.6 Frequency of Terrorist Groups formed by Political Parties 1960-2006
CHAPTER 4 - Introduction to the Qualitative Approach

This dissertation uses a dual qualitative-quantitative approach to examine the explanatory power of rightwing regimes and their effect on political parties who turn to terror. Chapter two advances the hypothesis that regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position will expect to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes. Chapter three tested this hypothesis to see if this proposition holds as well as whether there was any similar relationship with leftist, centrist, and religions leaning cabinets. The statistical results presented in chapter three show a strong statistical relationship between rightist cabinets and greater number of political parties creating terrorist organizations than other types of ideological cabinets. As argued in the theoretical and quantitative chapter, the sometime harsh policies of traditional rightwing regimes often undermines sometimes more peaceful oppositional approaches used by left leaning and centrist political parties.

In this chapter, I detail the process for examining the micro-level factors that explain how some rightwing regimes influence leftist and centrist political parties to turn to violence. A “most different case” comparative design is employed to test the hypothetical implications of the model, the predictions made in the theoretical chapter, the initial findings of the quantitative chapter and to provide depth\textsuperscript{22} to the research.

The chapter uses a case comparison approach and examines whether my hypothesis about rightwing regimes and their impact on leftist and centrist political parties holds when using a more in-depth analysis. Although leftist political parties that operate within rightwing political

\textsuperscript{22} According to Gerring (2001: 104) depth fulfills a central goal of social science. It is able to tell us as much as possible about the empirical world—by peering deeply into small portion of that world. One might also call it informativeness, completeness, richness, thickness, or details.
party ruled polity do not always turn to terror, the policies of rightwing regimes often lead to a radicalization of political parties when there is a strong leftist ideology.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, an explanation of the utility of using case study approaches and the case selection process is presented. Second, an examination of the structured focused comparison method presented. Following this section, a third and fourth section discussing the case selection process and the process tracing using critical junctures approach (Slater and Simmons 2010) is discussed.

4.1 Research Design and Methods

4.1.1 Qualitative Approach

In general, quantitative and qualitative research is dissimilar. On one hand, quantitative research uses statistical methods. This approach focuses on numerical measurements of specific aspects of phenomena. It abstracts from particular instances to seek general description or to test casual hypothesis; it seeks measurements and analyses that are easily replicable by other researchers (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 3). On the other hand, qualitative research covers a wide range of approaches, but importantly, none of these approaches relies on numerical measurements (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 4). Instead, qualitative work tends to focus on one or a small number of cases and often relies on “intensive interviews or in-depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with rounded comprehensive account of some event or unit” (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 4). Despite utilizing a smaller number of cases, qualitative researchers generally unearth enormous amounts of information from their studies (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 4). Moreover, when applied
with precision, qualitative/historical research can be analytical and used to evaluate alternative explanations through a process of valid causal inference (King Keohane and Verba 1994, 5).

Overall, qualitative methods and, in particular, the case study approach has historically been the method of choice for most researchers in the field of oppositional terrorism (Schmid 1983; Ross 2004). As Ross (2004) notes, the amount of quantitative studies on oppositional political terrorism pales in comparison to the number of those that depend on qualitative methods. Interestingly, his observation about the ratio between quantitative and qualitative methods in the study of terrorism has not changed much in the past six years.

There are two major reasons a preference for qualitative approaches remains. The first lies in the unavailability of data. Statistical data, in particular data on political terrorism, are generally unavailable to the public, “dated, or limited to international or transnational events” (Ross 2004, 29). The second, and perhaps a more cogent reason, resides in the widely held belief by many within the field that qualitative approaches provide more in-depth explanation about the motivation and internal dynamics at play in terrorist groups. In addition, there is some concern that in complex dynamics such as what prevails in terrorist organizations, many of the volatile interactions cannot be meaningfully formulated in ways that permit statistical testing of hypothesis with quantitative data. In essence, the argument follows that statistical modeling cannot adequately capture certain micro features of terrorist organizations.

One of the qualities most often touted in regards to qualitative/historical approaches is the ability to flesh-out socio-psychological dynamics. Put simply, qualitative approaches are touted as offering unique mechanisms to help understand the psychology of participants and the social setting in which actors who engage in terrorism operate (Ross 2004, 26). Intuitively, qualitative research provides a useful dimension over that offered by quantitative approaches.
The approach provides what King Kehone, and Verba (1994) argue is “richness” and “thickness” of “depth” not offered by statistical approaches. King, Kehone, and Verba (1994) note that an advantage to “in-depth case study is that the development of good causal hypotheses is complementary to good description rather than competitive with it” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 45). Moreover, by employing the case study approach, it helps in contextualizing the material that is developed using quantitative methods (Ross 2004, 26).

As previously noted, by far, the bulk of terrorism research utilizes qualitative methods. However, what is noteworthy about this trend is that a large number of these studies have been largely descriptive accounts of terrorism, their targets, and measures used to combat these actions (Ross 2004; Silke 2002). Not often evident are qualitative studies that attempt to uncover the causal relationships that explain acts of terrorism. More often, research using qualitative approach has been marked by theoretical generalizations that are not based on solid cases or methods (Ross 2004).

In addition, even where extant qualitative studies have followed strict methodological practices, these studies often focus disproportionately on specific types of terrorist incidents. The most frequent areas of research utilizing case studies have been works on hijackings, hostage-taking, and nuclear/biological threats (Joyner 1974; Aston 1986; Allison 2004). In general, these works have largely been what Ross (2004, 25) refers to as “rich in details [but] is often too biased in the authors’ perspective.” More critically, where there have been significant criticisms in regards to the use of the case study approaches in the field of terrorism, these critiques have been made based on application of poor methodological practices. Noteworthy, examples are in the areas of establishing and testing casual links and relationships between the dependent variable (terrorism) and a host of independent variables advanced by various scholars. Indeed,
what is at fault is not the case study approach, but rather poor application of qualitative methods. Among the frequent problems evident in various qualitative works in the field of terrorism are a range of methodological problems such as tautological, circularity, and endogeneity.

Nevertheless, despite various ongoing methodological shortcomings in the field as it relates to the proper utilization of the case study approach, many scholars in the terrorism research program maintain that qualitative approaches offers more veracity than other approaches in understanding the complex dynamics at play in the topic of terrorism (Ross 2004).

Proponents of qualitative approaches within the field argue that because of the psychological, sociological, clandestine, and volatile dimensions of terrorism case studies and comparative approaches, especially those that utilize process-tracing, are critical in providing greater insights (Hackler 1976; Sprinzak 1990; Ferracuti 1981). Indeed, as pointed out in the theoretical chapter, the causes of terrorism and the structural, organizational, and ideological factors are complex and may differ across polities. Hence, there is a need to assess at the micro-level what are the causal factors at work. Comparative studies allow for more detailed analysis and comparison of cases (Bryman 2006, 108). Gerring (2006, 157) points out that “all knowledge is comparative […] In order to know one thing, we must know neighboring things, perhaps even things that are quite different from what we set to talk about.” Proponents of the case study approach have complained about the recent trend in terrorism research, which only utilizes quantitative techniques. Various scholars (Sprinzak 1990; Ferracuti 1982; Ross 2004) point to an absence of depth in quantitative research used by many within the field of terrorism as justification for why quantitative study is not sufficient by itself to examine behaviors that are related to terrorism.
4.1.2 Structured Focused Comparison:

To test the explanatory variable this dissertation uses a structured focused comparison design. As pointed out in the extant literature, an important facet of good qualitative research is that the approach illustrates the hallmarks of comparability. Structured focused comparison is important because the issue under investigation falls under the scope of “theory testing and development.” It thus requires a greater threshold of precision for establishing validity (George and Bennett 2005, 75). The method encompasses two main elements; it is “structured” and “focused.” Invariably, structure implies that the study of cases chosen should be undertaken with very specific objectives and a directed theoretical focus appropriate for that particular objective (George and Bennett 2005, 70). In applying “structure,” the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objectives; these questions are asked of each case under the study to guide and standardize the data collection (George and Bennett, 2005). It is “focused” because it deals only with certain aspects of the cases examined (George and Bennett 2005, 68). As a requirement for a structured focused comparison, both structure and focus should be applied equally to individual cases “since they may be joined later by additional cases” (George and Bennett 67, 2005). In addition to the previous two steps is the final but important component of comparison. In general, there are few convincing arguments that can be made for not comparing cases when there are comparable cases available (Gerring 2006, 172). Systematic comparison facilitates the cumulation of findings (George and Bennett 2005, 68). It provides a basis for assessing whether a phenomenon is not isolated to one particular instance or period. An ideal

---

23 Structured focused comparison mirrors closely qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The QCA main hallmarks are similar to structured focused comparison in that causes and outcomes must be coded dichotomously (present/absent, strong/weak, etc). This process allows the researcher to identify common variables that illustrate a positive effect on the dependent variable. See Gerring (2001) and Ragin (1992)

24 Comparability infers characteristics such as unit homogeneity, equivalence, and cross-case validity. See Gerring 2001 for a discussion of comparability.

25 At best, each case causes and outcome should be treated as a dichotomous variable. See Gerring (2001, 207).
comparative study using structured focus comparison should employ “standardized set of questions in a controlled comparison […] to assure comparable data from the several cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 62).

The advantage of structured focused comparison over other techniques lies in its level of standardization. The approach used in structured focused comparison fosters validity and reliability while allowing the variables to be assessed across cases. The decision to use structured focus comparison is an important one that sets this dissertation apart from other works in the field of terrorism research. As outlined earlier, many past qualitative studies in the field rarely applied sufficient methodological consistency across cases. Invariably, where cases are not guided by a well-defined theoretical and methodological process, they often do not contribute much in terms of theory development as they lack a clearly defined and common purpose (George and Bennett 2005, 70).

For this dissertation, questions formulated for structured comparison will emphasize four issues relevant to the research objective. First is the ideology of government. The theoretical and the quantitative chapters illustrate that a political party’s ideology is an important consideration that explains the attitude of government towards the electorate. However, extant literature only emphasizes left leaning ideology as a sufficient cause for terrorist group creation. Therefore, it is important to assess the role of ruling party’s ideology as rightwing ideology has been shown in the previous chapter as an important regressor that explains the creation of terrorist organization by political parties.

The second theme is the nature of the electoral system. Extant literature illustrates observable differences in the level of overall terrorist groups’ formation in polities that utilize majoritarian systems. As was illustrated in chapter three, a majoritarian system is positively and
statistically significant indicator that explains the creation of terrorist organizations by political parties. Based on this finding, it is critical that questions are geared towards investigating this particular theme.

The third theme is the influence of the Cold War. Li (2005) points to differences in overall terrorist groups’ formation during the Cold War. Based on his study and similar findings detailed in the quantitative chapter, this research will examine the cases based on this issue to ascertain whether the Cold War explains the nexus between political parties and terrorist organizations. The final question relates to the role of repression during the period under investigation. As pointed out in extant literature, repression has so far had an indeterminate impact on the onset of terror. The quantitative chapter also shows those shifting effects that repression has on terrorism. Therefore, it is important to assess whether at the micro-level there is any relationship between repression and the creation of terrorist organization by political parties. The next section will detail the cases and the selection process.

4.1.3 Case Selection

Selecting cases for a comparative study is a critical process as it determines theory building and ultimately how valid/reliable the findings are in a particular research (George and Bennett 2006; Gerring 2001). At best, cases should not be chosen simply because they are “interesting” or because ample data are easily available study (George and Bennett 2006, 69). In selecting cases, the researcher should above all else be wary of the persistent problem of selection bias\(^{26}\), in essence, the aim is to avoid the deliberate selection of cases. Ideally, cases

\(^{26}\) Selection bias is most often described as occurring when there is a deliberate selection of cases that results in inferences, based on resulting sample that are not representative of the universe of cases and which can produce indeterminate or unreliable results (Collier 1995).
should be selected that provide the necessary controls and variation required to address unique research questions (George and Bennett 2006, 83).

In an effort to examine the central issue of this research, this dissertation evaluates the hypothesis by using three positive cases (Y) where political parties formed terrorist organizations27 and one negative case with the same independent variables (Xs) was chosen to facilitate comparison. The cases satisfy various fundamental characteristics of goodness in case selection (Gerring 2006; King Kehone and Verba 1994).

An important methodological issue that must always be considered when choosing cases is that they be representative (Gerring 2001, 181). As extant literature points out, random selection of cases is not generally appropriate in small-N research (King, Kehone, and Verba 1994; Gerring 2006; Collier 1995). Nevertheless, disregarding the process of random selection altogether ensures some level of biasness. King, Kehone, and Verba (1994, 128) notes “the most obvious example is when we, knowing what we want to see as the outcome of the research […] subtly or not so subtly select observations on the basis of combinations of the independent and dependent variables that support the desired conclusions.”

Among the important issues that should be considered when choosing cases for a case study analysis is deciding on the ideal number of cases. Importantly, while single or “deviant” cases can be very useful for heuristic purposes of identifying new theory, single case research can more often suffer from selection bias or over-generalization of results (George and Bennett 2005). Importantly, very few theories can be extensively evaluated by studying one case. King et.al (1994, 210) surmise the following reason why:

27 George and Bennett (2005, 75) argue that for theory testing it is vital that the parameters of cases used be identified.
For three reasons we doubt that a crucial-observation study can serve the explanation purpose assigned to it: (1) very few explanations depend upon only one causal variable, the investigator needs more than one implication observed; (2) measurement is difficult and not perfectly reliable; and (3) social reality is not reasonably treated as being produced by deterministic processes, so random error would appear even if measurement were perfect.

Ideally, *plenitude* \(^{28}\) in a sample is desirable; the more cases there are to demonstrate a posited causal relationship the “more confidence we are likely to place in the truth of that preposition” (Gerring 2006, 165). To address the issue of plenitude, this dissertation uses four cases in assessing the role of the explanatory variable. The unit of analysis is states: the positive cases are Colombia, Turkey, and Japan the negative case is Costa Rica. The inclusion of four cases satisfies the criteria of plenitude as the number allows ample room for comparison of cases without falling into what Slater and Simmons (2010) term the process of “continual regress” where too many cases might inevitable reduce precision. In addition, the number satisfies the *plenitude* requirement without limiting the research design so that it becomes less distinctive and less precise (Gerring 2001, 207).

An important element in the case selection process involves choosing cases that provide substantial *variation* \(^{29}\) on the relevant positive cases (Y) and (Xs). Importantly, the cases in this dissertation (Colombia, Turkey, Japan, and Costa Rica) provide a host of areas in which they

\(^{28}\) The criterion of plenitude relates to how many cases are used in the sample. While plenitude is more often cited when conducting large-N research design, it is also important when conducting research using small-N designs to include as many cases within the parameters of the research objectives so as to maximize the possibility for variation and validity. Refer to Gerring (2006)

\(^{29}\) The concept of variance incorporates the range of variation in a sample. In this dissertation, it is important that variation is located on the outcome of interest and the relevant causal variable.
vary (population size and level of heterogeneity, wealth, and location). At most, the choice of cases bears similarities to other cases among other regions of the international system; hence, they can be used to postulate certain general principles. The cases also illustrate variation over time. The period for these cases is varied, 1960-1990s. This was done intentionally to reduce the findings being challenged from a temporal perspective; in essence, does the causation for the formation of terrorist groups of the 1960s resemble those of the 1970s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{30} To some extent, providing such a level of variation bears the hallmark of a most different system approach.\textsuperscript{31} The approach of this research design deliberately seeks cases of a particular phenomenon that differ as possible, “since the research is to find similar processes or outcome in diverse cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 165). For instance, Costa Rica represents one of many negative cases where there were several causal variables (i.e. positive cases) but where political parties did not create a terrorist organization.\textsuperscript{32} Importantly, all cases are chosen on the basis that they are theoretically useful cases as they can be used to replicate or extend existing theories by addressing conceptual categories (Eisenhart 1989, 553).

\textbf{4.1.4 Process-Tracing/Historical Causation.}

In qualitative research, as is also the case in quantitative studies, identifying the cause(s) that ultimately influence a particular outcome is essential for understanding and explaining that phenomenon. In an effort to define the causes of a phenomenon, it is critical that we “analyze

\textsuperscript{30} Gerring (2006, 145) suggests that a causal argument necessarily assumes a good deal about the world-namely, that it continues to revolve in about the same way over the temporal scope of the inference. In essence, variation across time may be as critical as across cases.

\textsuperscript{31} A most different system approach/design deliberately seeks cases of a particular phenomenon that differ as much as possible. Variation on the x values is prized. Ideally, one discovers a single x that remains constant across cases—signaling a causal relationship. See George and Bennett (2005, 165) for future explanation.

\textsuperscript{32} Negative cases are important for variation. However, the appearance of a single negative case is not sufficient to reject a given hypothesis. As Lijphart (1971, 686) points out, it is a “mistake to reject a hypothesis because one can think pretty quickly of a contrary case. Deviant cases weaken a probabilistic hypothesis, but they can only invalidate it if they turn up in sufficient numbers to make the hypothesized relationship disappear altogether.”
causal relations not only in terms of an event that constitutes the cause and event that constitutes the effect, but also in terms of a causal process that connects the two events and explains their relationship” (Simon 1979, 361). In qualitative research, a major hurdle faced by researchers is the process of specifying a causal sequence of some sort “connecting the punitive cause with the effect” (Gerring 2001, 195). Establishing a distinction between a cause and a particular outcome, (what Hume calls the cement of the universe) is often a “blurry” and difficult endeavor (Gerring 2001; George and Bennett 2005; King et.al 1994). As Simon (1979) points out:

Mechanisms and laws are theoretical constructs that are derived inductively from empirical evidence but are not derivable deductively from that evidence. We can never show that a particular mechanism did, in fact, cause certain mechanism; we can only show that a particular mechanism could have produced the phenomena--- that, if the mechanism had been at work, the phenomena would have appeared” (Simon 1979, 379).

Nevertheless, the ability to delineate the causal path or process that illustrates how an independent variable influences the dependent variable is critical in establishing and explaining a phenomenon beyond mere chance. For many studies that employ qualitative methods, the process of identifying a causal link is achieved via process tracing. Goldstone (1991) calls process-tracing a critical mechanism that can illuminate issues of confounding variables. He suggests:

To indentify the process, one must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple

33 Process tracing is sometime also referred to as discerning, process analysis, pattern-matching, microfoundations, causal narrative, congruence, colligation, contiguity, and intermediate process. See Gerring (2001; 195) for a further discussion or process tracing synonyms.
principles of the many that may be at work, would have *combined* to generate the observed sequence of events (Goldstone 1991, 57).

Most important, “process-tracing is a methodology well-suited to testing theories in a world marked by multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or three independent variables---precisely the world that more and more requires case studies and historical scholarship”(George and Bennett 2005; 206). George and Bennett (2005, 153) suggest “it seeks to uncover a causal chain coupling independent variables with dependent variables and evidence of the causal mechanisms posited by a theory.” Moreover, process tracing can be used to test whether the residual differences between two similar cases are causal or spurious in producing a difference in these cases’ outcomes (George and Bennett 2005). At best, process-tracing attempts to identify the causal chain and causal mechanism that exists between an independent variable or variables and that of the outcome ---the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005).

Process-tracing offers a critical mechanism within this dissertation. As previously noted, the theory advanced in this dissertation has largely gone untested in both quantitative and qualitative research. As is often the case with the testing of a new theory, there may be multiple rival explanations or paths that explain a particular phenomenon. Process-tracing provides an indispensable tool that helps to account for equifinality.34

---

34 Equifinality is common issue germane to theory testing, it implies the need to consider multiple paths through which an outcome could have occurred.
Within this study, the process of tracing the causal relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable will be couched in a *detail narrative*\(^\text{35}\) form. As pointed out in extant literature (Gerring 2001; Goldstone 1991; George and Bennett 2005; King et.al 1994), process-tracing takes several different forms. In this dissertation, process tracing will follow Slater and Simmons (2010), *critical antecedent* approach. Critical antecedents are “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine in a causal sequence with factors operating during that juncture to produce divergent outcomes” (Slater and Simmons 2010, 887). Interestingly, a significant number of “political scientists increasingly recognize that [the] biggest ‘why’ questions cannot be adequately answered without careful attention to the question of “when” (Slater and Simmons 2010, 887). Proponents of critical antecedents contend that causal inference, its path, and knowledge accumulation can be hindered when researchers truncate their casual analysis at a “crucial juncture” or a specific point in history when cases began to diverge in path dependent ways (Slater and Simmons 2010; Collier and Collier 1991). Importantly, researchers have come to recognize that by assigning all causation at the point of a critical juncture severely limits the causative possibilities. Indeed, what often occurs by limiting causal path to just the moment of critical juncture, is temporal truncation. Indeed, while most qualitative researchers attempt to trace an incident from its immediate departure or “critical juncture” the ideal process is perhaps to trace the causal path prior to the critical juncture. Slater and Simmons (2010) note:

> In many instances, factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture combine in a casual sequence with factors during a critical juncture to produce divergent long-term outcomes.

\(^{35}\) According to George and Bennett (2005), the detailed narrative is the simplest variety of process tracing. The style of process tracing involves a detail narrative or story presented in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about.
These critical antecedents shape the choices and changes that emerge during critical junctures in causally significant ways […]. Our point is not that critical junctures are not indeed critical. It is not everything that is causally critical takes place at the critical juncture [critical antecedents reduces] transcending debates over the timing of causal processes […] and establish a more realistic basis for controlled comparisons in a political world “where natural experiments” are few and far between” (887-88).

In general, most studies that include process tracing often ignore or lump together conditions preceding a critical juncture. However, by tracing factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture or perceived point at which a variable influences the dependent variable, the process of explaining what factors are crucial in explaining or producing a long-term divergence in outcome can be better predicted. In the four cases that would be compared (Colombia, Turkey, Japan, and Costa Rica), process tracing begins before the point of departure or critical juncture. Moreover, as part of the detail narrative the development of each case begins well beyond the point of departure and attempts to examine antecedents that may have later influenced the dependent variable. In the following four cases, (beginning with Colombia) in combination with a detailed narrative approach, each case will employ Slater and Simmons (2010) approach to help establish the causal chain and causal mechanism that led to the outcome in each case.
CHAPTER 5 - Colombia

“The FARC is a mouse that uses terrorism to try to roar like a lion. We are going to keep chasing that mouse until it no longer breathes.”

Juan Manuel Santos - Colombian Defense Minister

Chapter two developed a theoretical argument positing that—regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position would expect to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes. Chapter three supported this hypothesis. This chapter uses Colombia as the first case to evaluate the model’s accuracy using a qualitative design by examining the immediate period prior to 1900 up to the 1970s. This chapter demonstrates the evolutionary process leading to the formation of terrorist organizations by political parties. While the literature has focused on a few historical and social science studies that hinge terror affiliation to class and ecclesiastical dogma (Levine and Wilde 1977; Garcia 2004), the argument here is distinct from these views. Instead, this chapter focuses on a case study of extensional delegitimation, a catalytic process whereby opposition political parties undergo a process of radicalization ending in the use of violence when faced with hard-line policy promoted by ruling right-leaning governments.

In the following sections, I examine Colombia’s political and socioeconomic background, in particular, the freedoms allowed to political parties in the polity. In the next section, I examine the critical antecedents, factors that contributed to later outcomes of political party violence. The third section examines the critical junctures, where political parties because of a host of institutional barriers lead some parties to undergo radicalization and turn to terror. The final section concludes the chapter.
5.1 Background

Historians and political scientist specializing in the Latin American region have heralded Colombia as a standard for democracy and civilian rule in the Latin America region (Sanchez and Bakewell 1985, 789). This lofty and perhaps questionable characterization of Colombia’s political processes is borne out of a belief that despite the state’s history of internal violence, the ideals of democratic rule remain a constant aspiration among citizens (Martz 1968, 9). Indeed, more so than many of its neighbors, much of the violence in Colombia is akin to civil strife rather than the result of ruthless dictators (Williamson 1965). However, for a considerable part of its history Colombia has been plagued by internal violence (Sanchez and Bakewell 1985: Bergquist 1992). A former colony of Spain, the state possesses several crosscutting cleavages. Among the issues that divide the Colombian society are issues of race, class, religion, and most importantly political ideology (Henderson 1985; Dix 1967). In general, these characteristics are often synonymous to countries with a legacy of domestic upheaval. As the fifth most populous state in Latin America\(^{36}\), the country illustrates many of the same internal fissures that have destabilized many of its neighbors (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 112).

Since the mid-1970s, terrorist violence in Colombia has often been tied to the illicit drug trade (Steinitz 2002, 4). However, for much of the country’s early history, violence was akin to political parties’ activity. In particular, the period spanning the early 19\(^{th}\) to mid 21\(^{st}\) century marked some of the highest rates of politically motivated violence in Colombia (Payne 1968; Martz 1962; Dix; 1967; Henderson 1985). From the mid-1800s to the late 1960s, Colombia experienced dozens of examples of political violence, which were later acknowledged as terrorist

\(^{36}\) Invariably most states lying to the South of United States in the Western hemisphere are referred to as Latin America. The populations by states in descending order are ranked Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia.
activity. From the mid-1800s to the mid-1950s, “on a scale of political deaths per generation, Colombia had one of the highest levels of political conflict in the world; in nearly 190 years since independence, the country has been racked by ten national civil wars: 1830-31, 1839-41, 1851, 1854, 1860,-61, 1876, 1885, 1899-1902, and the covert guerilla war of 1949-53” (Payne 1968, 4).

In addition to the national-level acts of violence, there have been numerous acts of community-based political violence. The community-level violence stemmed from local election campaigns in 1922 and from 1946-48. As extant literature on Colombia shows, for most of its modern period the state has not experienced harmonious politics. However, it is evident that political violence before the 1960s mostly occurred at the mass-level and was often uncoordinated. Importantly, prior to the-1960s, political violence frequently took the form of sporadic uprisings and, in most cases, sudden reactions to unfavorable political developments (Payne 1968, 4-9). As Maullin (1973) demonstrates, the fanatic supporters of the two main political parties, known as the Liberals and Conservatives, carried out much of the violence during the pre-1960s period. He argues that in many cases simple party identification served as the pretext for violence. Often “national leaders [of political parties did] not always exercise close control over grass-roots caudillos, whose quasi-ideological followers sometimes acted in violent disregard of national directives” (Maullin 1973, 14).

37 The phrase “terrorism” used to describe political violence in Colombia only became popular at the later phases of “La Violencia” and more broadly used in the 1960s to describe violent leftist groups. See Bergquist, Penaranda and Sanchez’s Violence in Colombia.
38 Many of these are cited in German Guzman Campos “La Violencia en Colombia,” which was based on government data and first person accounts.
39 “Caudillo” is roughly translated to mean leader. In the Latin American context, Caudillos were local administrators or “leaders” who often took it upon themselves to institute laws and practices sometimes without the full knowledge of state leaders in their district or region of the state. In many cases, they utilized the local police force to carry out their objectives.
Political party violence between the Liberals and Conservatives revolved around issues of class, religion, ethnicity, and political ideology. Despite claims by many historians’ and political scientists about the history of democracy in Colombia, as one of the best in Latin America, the parties often found it difficult to cooperate on most issues. Overwhelmingly, Colombian political parties have been “reluctant to subordinate [their] singular individualistic philosophy to an acceptance of compromise and negotiation. The ruling political parties mirror the one-sided view of democracy. By-products have included an unwillingness to cooperate with one another” (Martz 1962, 11)

Violence between the two parties began early on when the two parties were created—the mid-19th century—and centered on the political elites’ desire to impose their opposing ideological beliefs on Colombia’s political system (Maullín 1973, 5). As is the case with many post-colonial Latin American countries in the 19th to 20th century, the initial cause of elite political conflict between the political parties originated from concerns about ecclesiastical powers. The sharp division over the role of religion pitted supporters of anti-clerical rationalists (Liberals) against the pro-clerical defenders of the church (Conservatives) (Maullín 1973; Martz 1962).

The issue of internal governance of the state served as another important divisive matter that crystallized the conflict between supporters of the two main parties. On the one side, the Liberals argued for local control of measures such as economic development and political patronage (Maullín 1973, 5-7). On the other side, Conservatives often favored central control of the economy and political patronage.\footnote{The issue of centralism or federalism shifted from party to party later in Colombia’s history (especially post 1902). In theory, there was only a slightly greater tendency for Liberals to favor a federalist and Conservatives to support a centralists type of constitutional organization. However, there were also Liberal centralists and} Up to the early 1880s, supporters of both political parties
routinely clashed, at times violently, over the ecclesiastical role of the government and over its economic policies. However, by the late 1880s under the leadership of Miguel Antonio Caro and Rafael Nunez, the Conservatives gained considerable ascendancy over the Liberals and held most of the important positions in government (Garcia 2005, 145).

Before coming to office, Caro had “long been an advocate of the Catholics' right to resist the secularizing policies of the parliamentary legislative state created by the Liberals” (Garcia 2004, 145). Not surprisingly, one of Caro’s first acts as president was to enacting legislations that ensured the church’s place in an administrative role in the state. Beginning with the amendment of the constitution in 1886 and the concordat the following year, the Conservatives were able to gain a stranglehold on Colombian politics. With this added strength, they enacted legislation that gave the church “an exalted, protected status in Colombian society” as well as placing in the hands of a few Conservative party elites enormous ability to control political patronage and therefore appoint their supporters to crucial administrative posts throughout the state (Levine and Wilde 1977; Maullin 1973). Importantly, these steps paid dividends, as the Conservative Party was able to remain in power almost uninterrupted until the early 1930s. Beginning with Caro and continuing with many of his Conservative successors, the Conservative Party adopted a decisively unrelenting policy of discouraging or, in some cases, denying the masses participation in the Colombian political process. Indicative of the party’s rightist policies, the ruling elites often took steps to limit the role of workers’ movements while at the same time moving to institutionalize the primacy of the Conservative party. The ruling party achieved these steps through several constitutional changes, which strengthened the powers of the presidency and

Conservative federalists. See Maullin 197 and Bushnell in Bergquist and Sanchez’s Violence in Colombia for a detailed discussion.

41 The 1886 constitution was drafted by the Conservative Miguel Antonio Caro in cooperation with the then president of the Conservative party Rafael Nunez.
centralized the state. More specifically, the Conservative government, added to the executive office almost unlimited domestic and foreign policy powers. Among the president’s new powers was the ability to “promulgate repressive legislations that allowed the president to declare, by means of his extraordinary faculties, who and what the state's foreign and domestic enemies were. Through the introduction of other far-reaching legislation, Caro and many of his successors used their newly acquired powers to stipulate an arbitrary criterion for democratic citizenship” (Garcia 2004, 146). While all these steps were seen as critical for the success of the Conservative Party, they had a chilling effect on opposition political organizations.

For the ruling elite within the Conservative Party and a few elites in the rival Liberal Party, there was an enduring fear of citizens in the lower socioeconomic strata becoming politically organized. In general, the ruling elites of the Conservative government believed that if the lower strata of society were allowed to participate in the electoral process they would surely make moves to undermine the social and economic policies of the right leaning regime (Garcia 2004, 163). Even during the first 50 years of Conservative rule, Caro differentiated between citizens who he believed were not worthy of being part of the political process mostly on the basis of education, class, and those who rejected his own exalted view of the role of the church. He disregarded the notion that lower class individuals and those with leftist or left of center beliefs could ever be a truly democratic body. Moreover, he did not believe them fit to rule:

“Neither has [they] been nor is an organized body, but a mass rabble [no ha sido ni es sociedad organizada, sino masal.]” So the appointment ["plebeians /plebeyos" to positions of responsibility would be illegitimate under the democratic regime [resulta ilegítimo bajo el regimen democrático]” (La libertad de imprenta 114).
In particular, Conservatives elites were concerned about the ambitions of groups with socialist sentiments (Martz 1962, 23). As is the norm with many conservative or right leaning political parties, there was immense opposition and even hostility towards labor movements or political organizations with platforms that included labor rights. The Conservative Party garnered much of its support from the ruling class, a group in Colombia traditionally “hostile [towards] labor organization; both government and employers have opposed the formation and evolution of trade-unionism” (Martz 1962, 21).

During the Conservative Party rule up until the 1930s, a dissatisfied Liberal elite and a growing communist minority increasingly attempted to challenge the authority of the ruling Conservative party. Most notably, the 1922 civil unrest was a result of growing resentment from opposition groups excluded from the political process because of economic, social, and institutional barriers put in place by the Conservatives (Levine and Wilde 1977). Unresponsive, the Conservative Party intensified measures (especially during the first twenty years of the 1900s and again when they regained power in 1946) aimed at reducing at least, the ability of political parties outside of the institutionalized establishment (two party model) from access to the political process (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 52).

Following the collapse of Conservative Party rule, which was in part due to internal differences among elites in the party, the Liberals came to power in 1930. Several factors played a role in the Liberals’ success at the polls. The major factor being splits among key Conservative leaders. However, societal problems also played a role in the Liberals’ victory. First, among these societal factors was an overall discontentment towards the state of the economy, alongside lower and middle class dissatisfaction with the failed promises made by the Conservatives for equitable land redistribution. For the most part, the Liberal Party claimed to advocate on behalf
of the poor in its electoral campaign. The Liberals targeted the working class with promises to adopt more socialist programs. Among some of the issues that were part of the Liberal Party platform were efforts toward land reform, and moderate changes in the repressive attitude of the state towards labor movements (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 52). However, once in office, the Liberals pursued economic and social initiatives with a closer penchant for right-leaning policies. As mentioned above, the Liberal party mostly differed with its rival in regards to the role of the church and federalism rather than the role of central government in the polity. Similar to the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party socioeconomic policies often favored the elites and very little was done to limit institutional constraints on third party participation in the state’s political machinery.

During its rule, the Liberal Party offered only a slight variation in its fiscal and political policies to those of the Conservative Party. Initially within the incoming Liberal Party, there were several socialist leaning members. Yet, because of the internal pressures generated by the Liberal Party, socialists eventually discarded many of their core beliefs or joined the Communist Party (Bergquist et.al. 1953). As Dix (1967, 89) points out, for many “the socialism of their youth gave way to the political realism of maturity and, perhaps, to closer examination of new doctrines. Their enduring importance was to launch […] several varieties of Colombian leftist thought, from Communism to rather mild reformist Liberalism.” Because of the Liberals’ continuance of conservative policies with only slight variations, fervent socialists felt that “the reformist Liberal leadership ‘betrayed the masses’ frustrating their aspirations for a more just social and political order” (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 52).

---

With overall growing resentment by many over the Liberal Party betrayal of the socialist platform, the political party lost a significant number of its base supporters going into the 1946 presidential elections. The dire situation of the Liberal Party in 1945-46 was compounded by a major split in the Liberal Party over its two presidential candidates who pursued contrasting programs. Critically, the Liberal Party’s instability led to a Conservative Party victory and control of the executive office in 1946 (Bergquist et.al. 1953). However, with the return of the Conservatives to power in 1946, many groups within Colombian society were apprehensive towards another period of rightwing policies that did not promote the development of the middle and lower classes.

5.1.1 Critical Antecedents: From Two Party Dominance to La Violencia

The period coming out of the mid-1930s had seen only modest positive labor policies aimed at easing the plight of the lower class facing a fall in coffee prices. However, as the global economic recession began to retreat, Colombia ruling party’s temporary sensitivity to the working class was replaced by decidedly right leaning policies that intended to cripple union movement and socialist objectives. In general the “recovery of the national and world economies by the late 1930s allowed Colombia’s […] ruling class to gradually reverse the reformist social policies with which it first had responded to labor militancy and the world economic crisis” (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 69). As part of a discernable and steady process towards a right leaning national government, between 1938 and 1946, Colombians experienced “first a halting of reform and then the actual reversals of the land and labor laws that had been passed in the early and mid-1930s” (Bergquist et.al. 1953, 69). The Liberal Party had fashioned policies that were reminiscent of the more hard-lined Conservative period under the Caro regime.
In 1945, despite harsh policies meted out by President Alberto Lleras Camargo against union workers and alleged communist sympathizers, the Colombian state was not in a revolutionary mood. However, the arrival of the left leaning Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on the political scene provided the spark that would later result in widespread violence. Gaitan promoted a populist platform and was supported by several members of the Partido Socialista Democratico (Colombian Communist Party or PCC) as well as left leaning members of the Liberal Party.\(^43\) His political stance created serious internal problems for stability in the Liberal Party. Various right leaning elites within the Liberal Party preferred to support the “safe” and “anticommunist” presidential candidate, Gabriel Turbay (Henderson 1985, 101).

Interestingly, the leftist Gaitan rhetoric and policy platform also worried many in Washington. Gaitan frequently called those in power in Colombia the “oligarchy”\(^44\) with repeated calls for their removal, though he did not advocate open violence. The U.S. and State Department officials and intelligence agencies often pressed their contacts in Colombia to monitor Gaitan associates, his growing popularity, and his ties with the Communist Party. In a memo sent from Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Frederick B. Lyon, Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation in the Department of State, by John Edgar Hoover Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hoover warned of Gaitan’s ties to the Communist Party in Colombia. In his memo dated April 18, 1946, Hoover stated:

As of possible interest to you, the following concerns information received from a reliable confidential source, relative to a recent decision on the part of the Partido Socialista Democratico (Colombian Communist Part) […] The elections are scheduled

\(^{43}\) Prior to joining the Liberal Party Gaitan had belonged to the Union Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionara (UNIR) a grassroots party that promoted the rights of peasants and small coffee growers in Tolima and Cundinamarca—states with large agriculture base in rural Colombia. See FB 1946 memo and Bergquist (1992, 78).

\(^{44}\) In a speech at the Bogota Bull Ring September 23, Gaitan repeatedly referred to the ruling elites as oligarchy. Dispatch No. 5 1108 of November 9, 1945, from the American Embassy, Bogota Colombia.
for May 5, 1946 and the opponents of Turbay are Marino Ospina45 (Perez) and Jorge Eleiciter Gaitan, conservative and independent candidates respectively […]. At the General Assembly of the Partido Socialista Democratico held in Bogotá, Colombia April 12, 1946, Carlos H. Pareja (Gamboa) opposed the Communist Party’s support of Gabriel Turbay. He described Turbay as ‘representative of the Bourgeoisie and of imperialism’ and urged support of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on the grounds that Gaitan told the Colombian people to be ready to take over the government (U.S. Department of State memo April 18, 1946).

Local members of the Conservative Party, who became increasingly concerned about the ambition and rhetoric of Gaitan and his movement, were just as alarmed as the American intelligences agencies. Nevertheless, many in the lower economic strata of Colombian society saw Gaitan as a champion of the middle and lower classes. Those who were frustrated in the far left ranks of the Liberal Party viewed Gaitan as the answer to a more democratic government. Many of the more radical party members saw Gaitan as the inheritor of democratic task postponed or left inconclusive (Maulin 1973; Bergquist 1992; Henderson 1985). The faction supporting Gaitan in the Liberal Party leading up to the 1946 Colombian Presidential election posed a serious threat to the party’s presidential hopes. The establishment within the party was fearful that Gaitan candidacy would split the votes among Liberal supporters and hand the Conservatives a victory reminiscent of their own victory over a divided Conservative Party in the 1936 elections. Therefore, elites in the Liberal Party tried in vain to convince Gaitan to withdraw from the presidential race (Henderson 1985, 101).

45 Various historians refer to Ospina Perez Gomez as he was often called in Colombia as Ospina.
As feared by many within the Liberal Party, it was announced on May 5th 1946 that the Conservative candidate Ospina won a plurality vote with just over 41% of the vote. Ospina gained 566,000 votes and the Liberal candidates Gaitan received 359,000 votes and Turbay 441,000(General control agency of the republic 1946)\(^{46}\). The Liberals were slow to accept defeat. In particular, many of Gaitan’s supporters refused to concede. Rather than serving in a Conservative ran administration, they resigned their posts.\(^{47}\) While the new Conservative government did offer some political positions to conservative Liberals to serve in the Conservative controlled government, the olive branch was not extended to Gaitan. For Ospina, Gaitan remained a constant threat because of his radical leftist policies. For his part, Gaitan continued to criticize the ruling government often referring to them as the illegitimate oligarchy.

From 1946 to 1948, the Conservative Party regained control of many of the institutional positions of power throughout the central government. However, the rural regions of Colombia, especially Tomlina, remained solidly behind Gaitan. This popularity and the constant criticism of the Ospina government began to weigh heavily on hard-line members of the Conservative government. There was an overall sense of uneasiness throughout the country, which came to fruition with a growing level of sporadic violence in Bogota and parts of the countryside (Henderson 1985).

Early April 1948, the Conservative government sponsored by the U.S. government planned to sign an anti-Communist declaration with other signatories from various Latin American heads of states. The Ospina led Conservative Party was determined to keep Gaitan and any other socialist or communist out of the conference. Just weeks before the conference,

\(^{46}\) This data was translated from its primary source—Contraloria General e la Republica Revista de la Contraloria General (Bogota, 1946). This agency provides statistical data on election results both at the provincial and presidential levels.

\(^{47}\) Turbay discontent with the outcome of the presidential elections burned his personal archives and left the country for Europe never to return. See Henderson (1985, 101).
several Liberal Party members who were loyal to Gaitan’s cause were removed from the Conservative government.48

Diplomats from the U.S. also had an unsavory and uncomfortable attitude towards Gaitan. In a telegram sent from a field intelligence agent to Secretary of State in Washington, dated March 22, 1948, there was a clear concern that Gaitan’s supporters and communists in general would try to sabotage the conference. The agent suggested:

There are numerous indications that communist and Left-Leaning Liberals will endeavor to sabotage [the] Inter-American Conference in order to embarrass Colombian [the] Govt […] A riotous group identified as Liberals last Friday attacked the Presidential auto in which the Ecuadorian Ambassador was riding. […] Recent replacement of [the] coalition cabinet by an [all]-Conservative cabinet may have effect of increasing overt opposition to the government and efforts to sabotage conference (U.S. Department of State memo March 22, 1948).

As shown above, there was clear uneasiness about the activities of the far left. Despite seemingly careful planning by the Conservatives to ensure a peaceful conference, the sudden assassination of Gaitan by “an obscure fellow named Roa Serra who was lynched on the spot, and his mutilated corpse dragged,” left many Colombians upset. Indeed, what was initially a slow burn of an angry lower class resentment sparked into a nationwide violent uprising (Bergquist 1992, 83). The pillage and physical attacks were further provoked by communists eager to usher in a revolution, angry peasants unhappy with the slow process of land reforms,

48 There is no evidence to suggest that these members were actually supporters or loyal to Gaitan, in fact most left leaning liberals had long resigned their positions in the government.
lower classes angry over the high cost of living, and Gaitan supporters’ belief that the rightwing Conservative government was responsible for his death (Bergquist 1992, 83; Henderson 1985; Maullin 1973; Martz 1962).

La Violencia, as the period of blood letting from 1948 to 1958 was called resulted in over 200,000 deaths and millions of dollars in damage to the country’s infrastructure (Bergquist 1992, 83-86). Towards the end of La Volencia, Colombia experienced the rise of military rule led by Gustavo Pinilla.49 Pinilla overthrew the Conservatives in 1953 and replaced the Colombian constitution with one that provided justification for his rule under the pretext of restoring order in Colombia. For the next four years, Colombia was governed by the military. After Pinilla’s rule ended, Rojas briefly controlled Colombia by a military junta, but the Catholic Church, business community, the Liberals and Conservatives ended his regime in 1957 (Dix 1980, 307). With Rojas’ removal from office, a military caretaker government ran Colombia for another year until ultimately democracy returned in the form of the National Front in 1958.

5.1.2 Critical Juncture: From Constitutional Amendment and National Front to Terror

By 1958, Colombian society and economy had endured years of sporadic violence. Throughout the countryside where much of Colombia’s large coffee plantations and the engine of the state’s economy existed was severely destroyed by almost a decade of incessant violence. According to Henderson (1985, 133), the “Bogotá riot of April 9, 1948 resolved any doubts

49 The rule of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was plagued with corruption and excessive military spending. Rojas himself personal fortune outside of Colombia was alleged to be $10, 000, 00. It is this backdrop that Liberals and Conservative worked to engineer his removal from office. For a more extensive discussion on Rojas, see Business Week, June 1, 1957, p10 “Fast Comeback in Colombia”
Conservatives may have entertained that subversion was a real and imminent danger.” Notably among the discourse in 1958 period was the belief that the assassination of Gaitan and subsequent decade of turmoil was the result of communist infiltration and instigation (Bergquist 1992; Payne 1968). Directly following the assassination of Gaitan there were immediate assertions that the Communist Party was at fault. As direct evidence from U.S. sources point to this assertion:

Conservatives and Liberals […] are seeking to discover some political motivation for the murder. The liberals, particularly the ardent Gaitanistas, are hoping to prove that the Conservatives were responsible, and the latter are attempting either to fix the blame on the Communists or to involve Gaitan and the Communists in a plot to overthrow the government” (Department of State Memo November 9th 1948).

Well into the 1950s, there was a concerted effort to blackball the Communist Party or factions of the Liberal party that are considered part of the radical left. As a memo from the U.S. State Department shows, there were still ongoing accusations in the early 1950s that the communist were responsible for Gaitan’s death. Other conspiracies entertained by the Conservatives were that a radical faction of Liberal Party members along with communist sympathizers had formed a pact with Gaitan to overthrow the Colombian government. Moreover, the Conservatives propaganda follows that it was because of Gaitan’s indecisiveness he was killed by other members of the pact. However, the State Department memo clearly finds no merit in this argument:
With reference to Embassy’s Dispatch No. 398 of April 10, 1950, entitled “Events and Press Comment Surrounding Observance of Second Anniversary of Gaitan’s Assassination,” I have the honor to report that Conservative EL Siglo continued to editorialized during the week following the anniversary on the importance of revelations by rear Admiral Hillenkoeter, made before Congressional Investigating Committee, concerning the Communist involvement in the assassination of Liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan […] in each of these articles there is developed the thesis that Gaitan was conspiring with ‘international agents of Moscow’ in preparation for a liberal uprising to take place in Bogotá during the Panamerican conference; that when Gaitan was forced to make public statement regarding the attack on the Ecuadoran Ambassador, he chose to repudiate this attack and any other attempt to disturb the Conference, and was eliminated by his own fellow Liberals and the Communists, who alone stood to gain from a popular uprising at that time (U.S. Department of State memo 426, April 17 1950).

Importantly, while the U.S. State Department and Admiral Hillenkoeter report demonstrated no evidence to substantiate the Conservatives’ claims, the aforementioned accusation during the mid-1950s became an almost a factual summary of events that were the cause of La Violencia (Henderson 1985, 133). As Henderson points out, although it was never proved that communists killed Gaitan, or planned the pillage that eventually lasted over ten years, the communists’ “conspicuous” absence at the moment of Gaitan’s death reinforced in the minds of many who were already suspicious of the communists that they were guilty. It is this wanton distrust for anything communist, and lessons learned from La Violencia, that fostered
what would have been considered before 1957 as an unholy alliance between Liberals and Conservatives.

As the apparent process of preventing at all costs a repeat of La Violencia gained momentum, the Liberals and Conservatives entered into dialogue about the political way forward for Colombia. Among the many ideas entertained during the early days of negotiation was amending the Colombian constitution that was discarded by Rojas. On July 1956, former president Dr. Laureano Gómez\(^50\) who had been forced into exile in Spain during the Rojas regime signed the Benidorm Pact with Alberto Lleras Camargo.\(^51\) The document became the first institutional step towards an exclusive power-sharing arrangement between Liberals and Conservatives (Martz 1962). However, initial disagreements among members of Gomez ultra-Conservative camp about serving on a bipartisan commission threatened to derail in finalizing of the terms of the new political arrangement. Several members of the Gomez faction were unhappy about their roles and wanted greater concession in the new political compromise.

During this critical period, various moderate members of the Communist Party now remerging from the yoke of Rojas regime and who had officially been banned along with other small political parties in 1956 lobbied for a seat at the table (Pizarro 1980). In light of a seeming return to democracy, it was believed by some among moderate communist members that they could finally achieve some semblance of recognition as part of the political process. Many believed that the new environment offered the “possibility of a peaceful road to revolution” (Pizarro, 1980, 172). However, whatever belief these more naïve communist members had about a future in Colombian politics was quickly dashed when they were altogether excluded.

\(^{50}\) Member of the Conservative Party and was initially opposed to signing any power-sharing agreement with the Liberals. See Dix (1980, 306-308) for an extensive discussion.

\(^{51}\) Moderate member and leader of the Liberal Party
from all politics within the state by a series of constitutional moves engineered by the more center-to-right Liberals and Conservatives.

Believing that a critical juncture was slipping away Camargo made a final overture to Gomez. To smooth things over, Camargo met with Gomez in Sitges Spain and the two men signed a new agreement on July 20th 1957 that would come to be known as the Sitges Agreement (Martz 1962, 259). The agreement was greeted with overwhelming popular affirmation in the plebiscite on December 1, 1957 (Dix 1980, 308). As part of the agreement, the following was enacted into law to guide the practices of the new Frente Nacional (National Front) government:

1. Seats in all "public corporations" in the nation (the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives, departmental assemblies, and municipal councils) were to be divided equally between the Conservative and Liberal parties, and only those parties. Within each party, seats were to be allotted by proportional representation lists that might be presented by various factions of the two parties.

2. All cabinet offices (with the exception of military appointees), as well as positions on the Supreme Court, were to be distributed according to the proportion of seats held by the parties in the national Congress (that is, equally).

3. All government officials and all employees in the various branches of the public administration (including the departmental and municipal levels) were to be appointed on the basis of parity between Liberals and Conservatives. Exceptions were those falling under career service regulations (in practice, very few) and military personnel.

4. The approval of nonprocedural measures within all elective bodies was to be by two-thirds vote (Dix 1980, 308).
In addition to the above conditions, further amendments made in 1958 between the two parties stipulated that the presidency would alternate between political parties and that the arrangement known as the National Front be extended to sixteen years (Dix 1980, 308). The immediate effect of the National Front is that the parties moved decidedly more to the right. Their economic and political policies illustrated a greater emphasis on satisfying the desires of the political elites, wealthy landowners and significant U.S. investors who now had a greater economic and political interest in the welfare of Colombia (Dix 1980). The National Front government illustrated a dramatic convergence of political ideology, one that tilted to the right. The dramatic swing to the right incensed many left leaning Liberals within the National Front government. As pointed out all seats in all public corporations as well as elected positions in government were only granted to members of the Conservative Party or the Liberal Party. In essence, this meant that members of opposing political parties including the communist were barred from government. As Jaramillo et.al (1999, 7) suggests, the National Front through the legislative process guaranteed a stranglehold on power by ensuring other political parties were virtually illegal entities.

Importantly, even within the National Front government, socialists’ platforms such as those that included land reform and expansion of economic programs were discouraged. Prominent left leaning members of the Liberal Party such as Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, who were continually opposed by the National Front’s predominately right leaning members, became disillusioned with the political climate and eventually broke ranks from the ruling National Front. A memo from a State Department field agent detailed Lopez split from the Liberal Party:

The recent statements of leftist Liberal leader Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, the pronouncements in the weekly La Calle, of which he is Director, and the Actions of the
handful of his followers in the House of Representatives, all serve to emphasize one important fact: the Liberal Party is now split, although the leftists appear to be in a definite minority, and the chances are not very great that the situation will be corrected in the near future. [...] At this point it is worth noting that CAS\(^{52}\) has received reports, which it considers probably true, to the effect that the Communist Party has decided to give López limited support; that is, the Communists plan to back López in his attacks on alternation, the National Front Government (this apparently representing some shift in Communist strategy) and on foreign capital they plan to use their machinery and know-how in organizing and publicizing his campaign. López, of course, backs a machine of his own. Tending to confirm these CAS reports are other CAS reports, plus a report from the Consulate in Barranquilla, that the Communists organized, and were much in evidence during a rally for López in that city (Department of State, dispatch 76 August 12 1959).

Paramount in his decision to leave the ruling faction was Lopez’s belief that Colombia was facing serious social, political, and economic problems and enough was not being done to address these issues. On July 15\(^{th}\) 1959 López openly criticized the National Front government “economic policy, and attacked it as a mechanism incapable of developing Colombia economically and socially, and criticized the government for trying to apply "northamerican" capitalism to an under-developed country such as Colombia” (Department of State July 26 1960).

\(^{52}\) CIA Covert Action Staff.
Lopez’s decision to leave the ruling Liberal faction meant that in theory the left leaning non-communist would not have a voice in the political process as only the two established parties had a constitutional seat at the political table. Contrary to most of the CIA and State Department reports there was no evidence in 1959 he had converted to being a member of the Communist Party. In 1960, Lopez prophetically warned his former colleagues in the National Front that the political and economic polices of the ruling regime that denied opportunity to a significant group of Colombians would ultimately lead to a return of violence. As he implored the members of the ruling coalition that the “the cause of social justice must not fall into Communist hands” (Department of State July 26 1960).

The glaring denial of other political parties, in particular, the far left factions and the more radical Communist Party from the political nexus did not go unnoticed by many of their members who immediately objected to having their democratic channels and status now constitutionally barred from the political process. Importantly, years of exclusionary policies directed at the far left and the Communist Party was testing the resolve of the leadership of these parties to maintain a peaceful approach. Critically, not only had their hopes of political opportunity following the removal of Rojas been dashed, but also the Liberals and Conservatives had in essence made a mockery of the political process. Indeed, while the 1958 and 1966 elections did include smaller parties such as the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), The Christian Social Democratic Party (PSDC), and Lopez’s Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL) these parties were in general factions of the Liberal and Conservative Party who still campaigned under Liberal and Conservative symbols (Dix 1967, 140-146).

Mirroring the earlier warnings of former Liberal Party member Alfonso LOPEZ Michelsen, some members within the Communist Party began to advocate violence as an
organizational approach. Part of this new vision was borne out of a rational organizational decision making process. Once the present institutional barriers remain, parties such as the Communist Party would continue to loose members. Indeed, other groups had already begun to challenge the Communist Party’s commitment to end whatever means the political monopoly enjoyed by the National Front. In response, to the more radical elements’ calls for the party to act, moderate leaders of the Communist Party struggled to maintain their non-violent stance. In a 1958 statement by the party’s leadership in the Tribuna, the party’s newsletter, the leaders of the party called for peace and nonviolent measures in the face of the National Front’s creation and a denial of peaceful political for the Communist Party. The statement suggested that:

Under these new conditions, when our party has declared at various meetings that it is decidedly in favor of the peaceful, constitutional, and legal route of development in the social struggle, it would be contradictory to maintain in the platform that we propose to overthrow the government by means of a revolutionary uprising by the Colombian people. On this matter, our platform must bring together the lessons given us by our people, learned at the cost of great sacrifice, and apply, to our concrete situation, the thesis of the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This means that we must consider the advantage of inserting into the Party platform, in place of the call to overthrow the government, *a call for peaceful revolutionary struggle through the progressive democratization of the country, the strengthening and unity of the workers’ movement and the worker-peasant alliance* (Viera, Gilberto 1959, trans Pizarro 1980, 173).

53 Italicized in the original version.
Unimpressed by the leadership of the Communist Party, rival left leaning groups mocked the Communist Party’s ineffectiveness. As Pizarro (1980, 173) points out, by 1959 “the radical urban groups denounced the Communist Party as a lame organization and advanced new political options that would end the Communist monopoly of the revolutionary opposition in the country.” During the early period of the 1960s, a few political parties/organizations voraciously voiced the end of peaceful means of political agitation. Several had gone through nearly two years of peaceful process with little rewards in terms of political representation. In addition, the rightwing National Front partly at the behest of the United States government had become even more brazen and had launched several military attacks in rural regions considered leftist strongholds\(^\text{54}\).

Several urban groups, partly fearing a loss of membership, took what seems a rational step to create armed or terrorist wings.

In essence, leading up to the early 1960s various parties underwent a gradual process of *extensional delegitimation* in part the likely outcome of the political, economic, and social programs of the National Front. Among the first groups to create a terrorist wing, was the Peasant-Student Workers Movement (MOEC), which was formed in the early 1960s. Initially, the group was oriented towards the task of urban political mobilization. The more moderate members of the group had called on the government to broaden the political process and reform conditions among workers in the state. Overtime some members within the political organizations such as the radical students Eduardo Aristizbal, Max Santos, Robinson Jimenez and Larotta advocated using violence to achieve their objectives (Maullin 1973, 29-31). Influenced by the successes of other movements such as in Cuba, the group began by 1960 to engage in violent attacks on government figures and their supporters. Larotta himself also

\(^{54}\) The rural region of Villarricia was frequently raided by government forces in the pretext that its inhabitant was seeking to subvert the government and initiate another civil war. See Maullin (1973, 28).
attempted to join forces in the department of Cauca with several political “bandits but was killed” (Pizarro 1980, 176)

Some hardliners within Communist Party by 1964 had become disillusioned and had already begun to take steps towards creating an organized violent response to the political climate. Indeed, while some members of the party had since the La Violencia period began to use violence as a tool, such activity was largely uncoordinated and rural in nature. Furthermore, as illustrated by statements in the Tribuna during the early 1960s most members of the Communist establishment still did not condoned violence.

In the case of the Communist Party, the final decision to turn to violence was the result of two issues. The first relates to some external factors in particular the Cold War. As outlined in the extended literature and tested in chapter three, the politics of the Cold War contributed greatly to social political movements. In particular, developments in the Soviet Union and more importantly, the successes of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in Cuba influenced hardliners in the Communist Party that violence could be an effective tool for regime change. According to Maullin (1973, 29) “the full political context of that period included much concern about the Cuban Revolution, both as a threat to conventional Colombian politics and as a model for violent, rapid socioeconomic change.”

The second issue relates to the central hypothesis of this dissertation, that is, rightwing government’s socioeconomic policies often provide the impetus for a violent transformation of political parties. The 1962 and 1964 elections had been particularly unfavorable for those Communist leaders who had taken the steps to run under the banner of the MRL.55 Unable to

------------------------

55 The MRL was in theory the left flank of the Liberal Party, while it members rarely received positions in Liberal control National Front governments, the party remained tied to the Liberal Party and listed candidates for various positions. These positions were often times in the rural districts or local departments. See Dix 1967, 257-259).
gain any institutional recognition, the Colombian Communist Party allied itself “tacitly to the MRL, although in contrast to the other groups it did not form an integral part of the movement. Rather the PCC gave its electoral and propagandistic backing to the MRL. A few PCC members were included on MRL electoral lists, the MRL and the PCC sometimes held joint rallies” (Dix 1967, 259). The MRL however performed badly in the 1962 and 1964 elections with some members of the MRL pointing fingers at the PCC for dragging the party down the party political opportunities (Dix 1967, 264). Indeed, Lopez often vacillating between support for and denial of the PCC, eventually and emphatically disavowed the Communist Party and opposed their further involvement under an MRL umbrella (Dix 1967, 266).

Almost immediately following the 1964 general elections in Colombia, members of the Communist Party in various rural and a few urban zones

As Guaqueta (2003) points out, the FARC aimed to break the rigid hierarchical socioeconomic structure of the Colombian society and construct a socialist one in its place. As Table 5.1 shows, the elections of 1965 only included parties with ties to the Liberal and Conservative parties. Under the agreement between the Liberals and Conservatives to alternate the presidency under four-year terms during 1958-76, and the passing of other restrictive legislations, the Frente Nacional, ensured that there was no avenues for participation in the electoral process by parties that advocated socialist and communist political ideologies.

56 The particular zones include Marguetalia, Riochiquito, and the South of Tolima where various government forces engaged peasant “guerillas agrarian groups who were dissatisfied with working conditions. The government often used the justification that these groups were aligned to Communist factions or were endeavoring to destabilize the state. See Pizarro (1992, 181) Maullin 1973, 29-36).
At most, the Colombian government and its security forces, was seen as proxies of U.S. hegemony by Communist Party affiliates such as the FARC (Guaqueta 2003). Stated simply, the FARC emerged as a direct response to the National Front sociopolitical and economic policies. Under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda, the group functioned as a direct proxy of the Communist Party.

As Maullin (1973, 27) points out, the changes in the PCC approach demonstrated efforts by the Colombian Communist party to become the tutor, coordinator, and finally patron of resistance activities. For the entire life of the National Front, the FARC carried out terrorists’ attacks and guerrilla styled warfare in urban and rural districts of Colombia. Under similar conditions other terrorist groups such as the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army or ELN) and the M-19 (April 19 Movement) were created by political organizations. Both groups had ties to the Communist Political party with ELN being formed by Victor Medina Moron regional secretary of the Communist Party in the Santander district, and M-19 being formed later in 1972 by factions of the Communist Party and ANAPO. Similar to the FARC, the groups argued for the end of the National Front, better working conditions, greater political inclusiveness and the setting up of a socialist political model. However, in contrast to the FARC, both the ELN and M-19 agitated for nationalistic policies instead of the more regional policies advocated by the FARC (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003, 127-129).

What is evident is that the formation of cohesive terrorist organization by political parties can be traced directly to the efforts by the elites to create a system of rule—conservative in form—that would enable that ruling class “to retain for itself the essential levers of power” (Dix 1967, 11). As pointed out by Brown (2001, 17), the decisions and actions of domestic elites often

57 FARC activities were especially concentrated in rural areas.
58 Marulanda also known as Tiro Fijo (sure shot).
determines whether political disputes veer towards war or peace. In the Colombian context, the rightwing policies of Conservative and Liberal governments who comprised the National Front, restricted political freedoms and access to government for its political opponents who held leftist and in some cases centrist ideology. As pointed out in the theoretical chapter, when parties on the left face the combination of the factors that are often akin to rightwing regimes and outlined above, they may often turn to violent measures.

It seems, that the right leaning policies of the Conservatives and Liberal political party created various institutional barriers that denied opposition parties any opportunities of a meaning chance of securing a position in government offices. In so doing, many of the political organizations went through a process of extensional delegitimization. Invariably, this process was of metamorphosis gained additional momentum by internal organizational conflict were hardliners won the arguments over the response of parties facing repressive policies by rightwing governments

In summary, as Figure 5.1 shows, under the rightwing party leadership, the constitutional amendments of 1958 put into place the institutional barriers that eliminated access for oppositional leftist political parties in the Colombian state. In essence, this decision served as a critical antecedent that set in motion what would lead to later violent outcomes. Critically, following the election to power of another National Front government in 1962 (critical juncture), greater limits were placed on leftist parties. In response and because of their own internal organizational discontent with leadership, many leftist parties began creating violent terror wings to challenge the state. In essence, the creation of groups such as the FARC, EPL, and M-19 can be traced back to the point at which the National Front took office and began disenfranchising parts of the electorate who supported leftist leaning political parties.
Table 5.1 Colombia Parties and National Factions, 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Type</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Votes in 1964 election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIBERALS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Oficialista*</td>
<td>Carlos Lleras Restrepo</td>
<td>752,527 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimiento</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolucionario</td>
<td>Alfonso Lopez Michelsen</td>
<td>284,952 (12.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal, Linea Blanda</td>
<td>Alvaro Uribe Rueda</td>
<td>96,895 (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independiente</td>
<td>Fernando Mazuera Villegas</td>
<td>7,129 (.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSERVATIVES:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservador</td>
<td>Alvaro Gomez Hurtado</td>
<td>802,282 (35.5%)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrinario</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Laura-alzatistas)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservador</td>
<td>Mariano Ospina Perez</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionista</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ospinista)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THIRD PARTY:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Nacional</td>
<td>Gustavo Rojas Pinilla</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from lists registered as Conservative</td>
<td>293,183</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from lists registered as Liberal</td>
<td>16,495</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ANAPO</strong></td>
<td>309,678 (13.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blank and Void Votes</strong></td>
<td>7,727</td>
<td>(.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Vote</strong></td>
<td>2,261,190 (100.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Payne (1968, 187)

*Includes 14,090 votes for independent Liberal candidates.
** Registered in the 1964 elections as Movimiento de Izquierda Liberal; existed only in Cundinamarca.
***Includes 8,282 votes for independent Conservative candidates.
Figure 5.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Colombia

Critical Antecedents

Critical Juncture

Divergent Outcome

Constitutional Amendment 1958

- National Front created as legitimate party
- Opposition parties formed “movements” to challenge state party

Political Opportunities under right wing

1960-1974 National Front imposes restrictions on labor movements
- Further move to outlaw or restrict parties with socialist platforms
- Members of Communist Party engages in dissident action - some members are forced into exile

Violent Action

- 1964 Communist Party of Columbia creates FBL, EPL, FARC
- 1972 M-19 created by members of National Popular Alliance
CHAPTER 6 - Turkey

“I don't think you will find any other people and organization that are as thirsting for peaceful methods as us.”

Abdullah Öçalan—Leader of the PKK

This quote provides a cogent summary of the motivation behind the Workers' Party of Kurdistan’s (PKK) decision to change its modus operandi of peaceful political dialogue and instead turn to violent terrorist activity against the Turkish state and people. As this chapter intends to show, for a significant segment of the Kurdish people and the PKK in particular, generations of Turkish governments ignored the rights of their group and political aspirations in favor of promoting a rigid Turkish rightwing nationalist agenda. Consequently, consecutive Turkish governments have intentionally created institutional barriers that reduce or in some cases exclude altogether the ability of left leaning, ethnic based, as well as a few religious leaning political parties from participating in the democratic process.

In the previous chapter, it was shown how the ruling rightwing governments of Colombia focused on imposing their rightwing political ideology on matters of class, economics, ecclesiastical issues, and constitutional interpretations. In this chapter, the ruling rightwing governments of Turkey especially from the early 1960s to early 1990s are examined. As was the case in the previous chapter, in response to classical rightwing policies such as banning workers unions and political parties with left leaning ideology as well as an uncompromising disregard for the rights of minority ethnic groups and those wishing to represent them several political parties created terror groups in Turkey.
In the subsequent section, I examine the history of Turkey paying special attention to its political and socioeconomic background. In particular, I examine the how the founding statist principles of Kemal Ataturk help influence early rightist principles. In the following section, I examine the critical antecedents, the various institutional factors that contributed to later outcomes of political party violence. The third section examines the critical junctures, where political parties because of a host of institutional barriers created by rightist regimes lead some parties to undergo radicalization and turn to terror. The final section provides a summary of the chapter.

6.1 Background

In chapter two, it was pointed out that rightwing governments and parties illustrate certain characteristics. Among these salient identifiers are appeals to traditional values extolling such institutions as the family, or past national glory, claims to legitimacy based on the need for order without any reference to the social causes of disorder (Pinkney 1990). In addition, most have close links with civilian landed and capitalist elites, a preference to the private sector, discouragement of popular participation in politics, repression of groups favoring greater equality, and importantly a willingness to pursue policies that lead to greater social inequality (Pinkney 1990, 96).

A major issue that ultimately led to various political parties turning to violence was the behavior of successive ruling regimes in Turkey, in particular the adoption of rightist policies that were stated as necessary for the security and protection of the state. Admittedly, asserting that the Turkish governments’ post 1960 were rightist in ideology is perhaps a less clear argument than those of the other cases in this study. This is an issue that Pinkney (1990, 96) also points out, “the left-right divide in Turkey is complicated by the country’s long history of
centralized state control.” In addition, Turkey’s political elite preference for rightwing policies was cultivated by an active military (Pinkney1990, 96-99). Unlike the other cases in this study, Turkey, especially post 1950s, illustrates consecutive ruling regimes where a:

- centralized, secular bureaucratic state which the military had done much to fashion
- might be considered as ‘conservative,’ while emerging groups of urban merchants,
- industrialists and market-oriented farmers, who were by-products of modernization but
- largely excluded from the military—intellectuals—bureaucratic elite and the patronage
  dispensed by it, might be called radicals (Pinkney 1990, 96).

The modern history of the Turkish state illustrates remarkable change in the political discourse and policies of the state. Following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the founders of the Turkish state were Ottoman intellectuals, military officials, and civilian bureaucrats (Ergil 2000). For the founders “aware of the multicultural nature of their society, they chose to call their new state the Republic of Turkey, referring to the geographical region in which all the peoples of Turkey lived, rather than to name it after the dominant ethnic group” (Ergil 2000, 124). From Ottoman times to the present, Turkey has enjoyed a remarkably high degree of ‘stateness’ and a strong state tradition (Ozbudun 2000, 5). However, by the mid-1980s, such stateness coupled with a strong rightist ideology would be challenged by a relatively small but militant Kurdish political organization under the banner of the PKK (Ozbudun 2000, 5). Beginning in 1923 under Mustafa Kemel Ataturk, the state took on a more nationalist tone, by the late 1920s, Armenians were driven out of Turkey and much of the Greek population of Anatolia fled to Greece (Ergil 2000).

Although under the leadership of Ataturk, the Turkish government had sought to promote the ideas of republicanism and secularism and “adopted a liberal nonracist definition of
nationalism,” in practice not all groups were treated fairly or evenly (Tachau 1984, 29). Within decades of the formation of the new republic, its multicultural, pluralist basis was beginning to be abandoned (Ergil 2000, 124).

During the post-Ataturk era\textsuperscript{59} the political dynamic within Turkey dramatically changed. In 1946, the Ismet Inonu government under the Republican People’s Party, which controlled Turkey under a one party rule, allowed other political parties to be formed and compete for power in general elections (Dodd 1979). However, several political parties such as the Party For The Defense of Islam (IKP) and Communist Party of Turkey (CPT) were banned, the former for mixing religion with politics and the latter for advocating policies that “threaten” the security of the state (Tachau 1994, 560-585). Unlike several states in Eurasia and Eastern Europe, Turkey has no totalitarian past (Ozbudun 2000, 5). Beginning in 1946, Turkey experienced its second-wave of democracy. During this period, the state had twelve free and mostly competitive general elections for several levels of governments (Ozbudun 2000, 13).

As shown in Table 6.1 by 1950, the opposition Democratic Party (DP) obtained a majority within the new multiparty proportional electoral system. Under the Democrats, economic development was fostered in the form of large amounts of foreign capital to the agricultural sector. Initially, the DP promoted economic and social policies that increased the economic disposition of almost all economic classes. The DP encouraged a policy of free enterprise and “the Democrats traditionalist populism plus exuberant slogans of ‘enrich yourselves’ found their expression in the charismatic leadership of Adnan Menderes” (Birand 1980, 10). However, as the party became entrenched, the level of authoritarianism increased.

\textsuperscript{59} Ataturk died in 1938.
Importantly, the “newly powerful Democrat Party government before long began to restrict various of the freedoms of its political opponents in questionable ways, but did not seek to abolish them” (Dodd 1979, 9). In practice, this was largely done by constitutional amendments to limit the number of parties that could participate in elections and to discredit candidates on a range of dubious and at times hastily enacted laws.

*Table 6.1* Grand Assembly Elections Results, 1950-57: Political Parties of Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTIONS</th>
<th>% of vote</th>
<th>DP</th>
<th>RPP</th>
<th>Inds and Other parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: The total number of seats varied from 487 (with twelve vacancies) in 1950, to 610 (with eight vacancies) in 1957.

In general, a critical indictment of the DP was a perceived shifting of the party’s economic and social policies from its right of center initial stance, to a more left of center on the political spectrum. In theory, the party was opportunistic in adopting rigid rightist policies to satisfy some of its base supporters, these included adopting social policies at times to gain support in the poor rural areas of Turkey where some upper class landowners resided. However,

---

60 Tachau (1994, 558-560) describes the DP as a moderate right of center to centrist party, while others (Ahmad 1977) suggest at least initially the party was slightly right of center in its policies. The origins of many of the party’s founding members were from within the RPP. However, the party attempted to fashion itself as a mass party promoting secularism, free enterprise and by the late 1950s religious expression in the public domain by allowing Muslim’s call to prayers sounded in Arabic, which had been forbidden under the previous RPP administration.
by the 1960s, the party frequently extended overwhelming financial support to peasantry in the form of massive farming subsidies to capture and secure this “reservoir of electoral support” (Birand 1980, 10). At other times, the party was able to maintain support from some wealthy elites by appointing several among the elites to plumb positions in the bureaucracy. The political and economic policies of the DP led to “mounting resentment within what could be broadly described as the ‘Kemalist coalition—the civil service, the academic and intellectual establishment and, more ominously, the armed forces” (Birand 1980, 10). Over time, the party’s earlier pledge to maintain democratic principles gave way to authoritarianism (Birand 1980). To compound the situation, the DP further alienated the country’s military by attempting to suppress the military’s hierarchy in various high-handed measures such as forcing older generals into retirement and appointing Chiefs of Staff that were regarded as weak and ineffective (Birand 1980, 10). Importantly, while the party allowed greater religious and ethnic minority’s expression in the public sphere, the DP used various authoritarian methods to suppress the formation of rival political parties that sought to represent the views of the more left of center groups. In particular, Kurdish and Muslim based political parties were suppressed.

Following the controversial elections of 1957, where the DP was accused of “rigging” elections by changing the electoral rules two days before the votes where cast, there was an escalation of bitter confrontation among members of various opposition parties towards the ruling regime. The May 1960 coup by junior officers was a forceful response by junior officers signaling their unhappiness with the discord in the country and the inherent weakness with the senior members of the Turkish military. Through a union with secular intelligentsia, Kemalist civil servants, RPP politicians, and wide public support the DP was forced out of power and a new “mildly social democratic” constitution was enacted in 1961 (Birand 1980; Tachau 1994).
Several of the top leaders and many of the senior members of the old Chiefs of Staff were tried, convicted, and jailed for “infringing the constitution,” and at least fifteen received death sentences (Birand 1980, 11). At best, the 1960 coup by the junior officers, although including other motivations, “might be regarded as an attempt to replace a petit bourgeois government committed to a market economy with one committed to left-wing virtues of centralized planning” (Pinkney 1990, 97). Importantly, “democracy was restored relatively quickly and smoothly, suggesting that the soldiers’ intention in 1960 as it would also be in 1971 and 1980 was more of a moderating coup rather than the creation of a lasting military regime” (Ozbudun 2000, 13).

The outcome of the 1961 constitution with all its new civil liberties now in effect, was a transformation of the political dynamic in Turkey. As Birand (1980, 11) points out, “one of the most important features of the decade was the emergence of trade unions and a Turkish left which gradually redefined the terms of the political debate.” However, the 1960s was to witness another period of violent radicalization, as the revamped DP now called the Justice Party (JP), under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel, won the 1965 elections. The new leadership complained, “that the 1961 Constitution made the country ungovernable,” and took steps to sidestep the efforts towards liberalization enshrined in the 1961 Constitution. The now left of center RPP, Marxists and a host of other left leaning politicians accused the “Demirel governments of reneging on the principles of social justice and reform enshrined in the same constitution” (Birand 1980, 12).

6.1.1 Critical Antecedents: The Development of an Exclusionary Party System

As previously mentioned, the party system of the post-1950 Turkey was mostly akin to a multiparty system. The representation of political parties in parliament was done along the lines
of a proportional representation model based on large constituencies (Gunes-Ayata and Ayata 2001). Nevertheless, despite having a proportional system which Reynal-Querol (2002) and Huber and Powell (1994) found to be not consistent with civil conflict, the post-1961 Turkey experienced increased levels of violence by political organizations (Harris 1985, 144). A major reason for the civil discord was the frequent and subjective banning of mostly left and religious leaning political parties from participating in the political process under the guise that such organizations threaten the security of the state.

Extant literature on Turkey suggests that while party competition existed in the state, there were many among the elites who attempted to discourage some forms of political parties (Tachau 1994). In almost in every instance, there were some elites in the ruling political parties whether these were members of the Democrat Party, Republican Party, Justice Party or other right of center political parties who were opposed to the deepening of the political process to include minority parties (Aydinli 2002, 211). In general, the argument presented by some elites involved debates between greater liberalization, on the one-hand, and state security concerns, on the other. Among the right leaning elites “any form of power relocation or diffusion to societal elements was determined to be fatal to the state and the regime owing to the fragmented nature of the society” (Aydinli 2002, 211). Indeed, while the Turkish state did experience occasional violence in the late 1960s, the approach of the ruling regimes\(^6\) to limit the creation of regional political organization was in most cases an overreaction. Indeed, as was customary during the Cold War period in many states, right leaning regimes implemented harsh policies to deter what they believed were leftist threats to the security of the state. From post World War I, various

\(^{6}\) Ruling regime here includes the military, who often applied a conservative approach to rule. See
conservative Turkish governments sought to disband various political parties that they believed threatened the security of the state.

Among the many casualties of Turkey’s right leaning governments was the Communist Party of Turkey (CPT). As early as 1927, \(^{62}\) “the CPT’s leaders and activists were either jailed or exiled from Turkey, and its publications were seized” (Tachau 1994, 556). Moreover, even following the 1960 and 1971 military coups the party remained a serious threat to state security in the eyes of Turkey’s right leaning governments (Tachau 1994, 556). During the early 1970s, most of the establishment leaders within the CPT rejected violence as a means of gaining access to Turkey’s electoral process. The more peaceful members of the party consisted of intellectuals “including some students and some workers; the intellectuals apparently predominated, at least in decision-making positions” (Tachau 1994, 556). The party’s activities occurred largely underground and involved the creation of party pamphlets, leaflets, and journals that were clandestinely distributed. As would be expected and given the numerous competing factions in the CPT, the party faced criticism from many, for its more radical members and from other leftist leaning party who believed the party was not taking enough robust action to achieve its organizational goals. As Tachau (1994) points out, “consistently fighting” \(^{63}\) other leftist groups in Turkey, the CPT argued that it was the only true Leninist group in the country and, as such, was the only party equipped to cure Turkey’s ills at all levels (Tachau 1994, 556).

In general, because the party remained banned by the Turkish government and many of its more senior members refused to use force as a mechanism for change, the party lost many of its younger members. However, as is the case with several cases in this study, not all members

---

\(^{62}\) While the Ataturk regime was influenced by military generals and technocrats, during this period the military establishment promoted a decidedly more conservative role than was the case with the younger generals who masterminded the 1960 coup. See Pinkney (1990, 96).

\(^{63}\) Fighting here for the most part did not seem to involve physical attacks.
within the party were content to continue along a peaceful path. Within the ranks of the party, several younger and radical members eventually created violent wings. In some cases, this was done with tacit approval by senior members of the CPT. Two of the outgrowths of this radical ideology were the terror groups Partizans and the PKK whose leader Abdullah Öçalan, an ardent Marxist-Leninist, who among other reasons wanted the party to take more robust action against the ruling regime.

By 1970, Turkey was mired in civil unrest (Jebb et.al 2006, 37). As shown in Table 6.2, although the JP had won the 1969 elections, the political landscape was as hostile as it had been since 1959. While the party policies did help stimulate economic growth by at least 7 percent throughout the 1960s, “little had been done to resolve such pressing socioeconomic issues as unemployment” (Tachau 1994, 571). Within weeks of returning to power, the JP party lost over forty deputies to a new more right-wing Democratic Party. Weakened by this and serious outbreaks of terrorism which they could not control, the military once again stepped to the fore and removed the Justice Party from government. However, in doing so the more senior “High Command, [to] avert a left-wing junta […] forced Demiral to resign [there were] mass arrests of leftist. The Workers Party of Turkey [was] banned, its leaders arrested and put on trial” (Birani 1987, x).

An assessment of the 1971 military intervention shows that second intervention differed greatly from the previous one. For many dissident members of the now outlawed political parties, the military appeared to be more interested in maintaining the status quo of rightwing government supremacy and nothing was done to reorganize the political dynamic in the state. At best, the

---

64 By the late1960s to early 1970s unemployment in Turkey hovered around 12 to 14%.
1971 military memorandum “changed nothing in either the political structures or party activity” (Birani 1987, xi).

Table 6.2 Grand Assembly Elections Results, 1961-77: Political Parties of Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTIONS</th>
<th>% of vote</th>
<th>NTP</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>RPP</th>
<th>Inds and Other parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats won</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of seats</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: There were 450 seats in the National Assembly between 1961 and 1980. The Senate is not considered here.

6.1.2 Critical Juncture: Political Ideology, Nationalism, Constitutional Barriers, and Radicalization

As pointed out earlier, the 1971 military coup did little to address the grievances of those parties forced outside the political process (Ahmad 1977, 293). In fact, while most political violence in the 1960s to the early 1970s was restricted to non-political party terror groups such as
the “June 16 Organization,” while destructive their grievances and aims were not motivated by efforts to create changes to the political process, rather their violence were anarchist in nature. The mid 1970s saw the development of a new and dangerous phenomenon—political parties creating or sponsoring militant wings. From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, the ruling political establishment in Turkey faced several violent challenges from political parties on all sides of the political spectrum. Critically, while rightwing terror groups such as the Gray Wolves were reactionary and focused their attacks on rival groups on the other side of the political spectrum (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004). Terrorist groups or wings created by religious parties and those on the left clearly targeted the ruling right leaning regimes, the public, and their supporters.

Put simply, the actions of the military banning most left leaning parties illustrated to many left and religious parties that the political dynamic would only be changed if the regime was overthrown through violent revolution. According to Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004, 40), developments in the international system in the form of violent revolutions also provided many on the left in Turkey clear alternatives to the peaceful approach that many had embraced.

The first wave of political parties creating terrorist groups saw the creation of the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU). The terror group was founded by dissatisfied Turkish students immediately following the 1971 military intervention. The MLAPU claimed to be representing the interest of the then banned Turkish People’s Liberation Party (THKP). In fact, many within the hierarchy of the group were members of the banned THKP. Like several other leftist parties, the THKP was not allowed to participate in the 1973 and 1975 general elections because the party had advocated Marxist ideology. While the MLAPU seemed initially to have been eliminated by the military, which raided and arrested many of the group’s
senior members, the group resumed violent activity just prior to the 1973 elections. Seemingly frustrated that political amnesty was not extended to the THKP as it was done for other previously banned right leaning political parties following the 1970 disturbances, the group kidnapped two British and one Canadian radar technician in an attempt to use foreign nationals as leverage to gain concessions from the government (Mango 2005, 17). As expected, the military responded with force, the group then began engaging in assassinations against supporters of the government and members of the military. The group frequently proclaimed itself as the “‘Hit Squad’ of the Turkish People’s Liberation Party” (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2003, 155).

Among a growing and more demonstrative Islamic political movement in the 1970s was the creation of the National Salvation Party (NSP). This group of Muslim politicians had long called for a greater role of Islam in society and it collectively voiced its concern in the form of the National Order Party (NOP). However, when in 1971 the Turkish Constitutional Court banned the party for using religion for political purposes, the more militant members under the banner of the NSP began carrying out attacks against the government and its supporters (Schmid and Jongman1988, 677).

The third challenge, which occurred after the 1971 decision to ban mostly leftist, religious, and separatist groups, came from the vocal Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) (Schmid and Jongman1988, 677). The Kurds represent the only large linguistic minority in Turkey.65 The majority of the Kurdish population resides mostly in large western cities and is relatively integrated into Turkish society, although to do so they have to give up many of their cultural identities (Ozbudun 2000). Many of the members who created the PKK had also been members

65 According to (Ozbudun 2000, 143) roughly 10 to 15 percent of the population.
of the Turkish Marxist-Leninist party (Kocher 2002, 4). The organization however, differed from several of the left leaning organizations that were mostly demanding that the state adopt more of a leftist ideology in its economic and social policies. While Abdullah Öcalan’s newly formed organization did embrace a decidedly leftist ideology, the group’s major demand was along ethnic and separatist orientation (Kocher 2002, 4). In 1971, the Kurdish movement, which had for several decades called for greater political involvement, expanded its demands to include greater recognition for Kurdish cultural understanding among the predominant anti-Kurdish right-leaning governments that had ruled Turkey for the previous 40 years (Ozbudun 2000, 141). Many Kurds who were tired of decades of failure by successive Kurdish political organizations threw their support behind a more militant organization. Unlike many of the other parties that created a front for violence, the PKK members engaged in acts of violence under the banner of the party’s official name (Kocher 2002, 4). According to Ozbudun (2000), the PKK aimed to “threaten the dominant position and ideology of state elites, Ataturkism” (Ozbudun 2000, 141). During its first years of activity, the PKK engaged in only low scale attacks and was mostly directed at “attacking landlords and rightist in the Siverek region in the 1970s” (Kocher 2002, 4).

During the mid to late 1970s, the Turkish government responded to the upsurge in political violence by using force. During the four years that followed the military intervention, nearly “180,000 persons were detained, some 65,000 were charged, 42, 000 sentenced, and 25 executed” (Mango 2005, 20). From 1973 to 1977, the Turkish government operated under chaotic and volatile political environment. During the 1973 presidential elections, “the president of Turkey was elected jointly by the two houses of the Grand National Assembly, [however] the en bloc vote of the Democratic Party forced the election of a compromise candidate” (Tachau
However, within months, infighting among members of the fragile coalition resulted in the calling of another round of elections. Unable to secure a clear majority or form a working coalition the JP, NTP, and RPP went back to the polls in 1977” (Tachau 1994, 562). During this period, the country slipped into economic and social turmoil, with parties on the outside of the political process occasionally venting their anger in the form of violent attacks.

Despite forming a coalition government in 1978 with the more left leaning RPP comprising the majority of members, the RPP led government failed to incorporate many social policies. For example, “party pressure exerted through Sukan, was believed to have prevented the government from abolishing articles 141 and 142 of the penal code (which outlawed the formation of Marxist political parties)” (Tachau 1994, 563). Furthermore, the RPP party program approved by the Ministry of the Interior in December 1970 had stressed social justice, equitable taxation, freedom of thought and religion (Tachau 1994, 563). An amendment to the ideology of the party in 1977 “emphasized right-of-center policies, nationalism and democracy […] free national economy, which, for them meant private enterprise, encouraging savings, and progressive technology” (Tachau 1994, 564). The economic, political, and social policies of the RPP government did little to calm the hostility towards the government by rival parties. On New Year’s Day 1978, the Prime Minister was forced to introduce Marital Law for twelve months following the worst incidence of “sectarian violence in modern Turkish history” (Birand 1987, xi). Two years later, the now firmly right leaning government was removed from office by the military on September 12th, following months of mass outrage including violence at the introduction of harsh “IMF-sanctioned austerity measures” (Birand 1987, xi).

---

66 Faruk Sukan was a very conservative member of the Democratic Party. He had been instrumental in nullifying a new law aimed at reforming land tenure in 1973. See Tachau (1994, 562).
The third military intervention in 40 years lasted three years and was aimed at ending the prevailing political structure that existed in the Turkish state (Tachau 1994). At best, the military hoped to root-out the elements of the political process that created tension and violence (Tachau 1994). Towards this end, “on October 16, 1981, all political parties were closed down by the military, and active politicians were barred from politics for up to ten years” (Tachau 1994, 552). When democratic government returned to Turkey in 1983, it did so under severe limitations imposed under the new 1982 constitution. This constitution limited the role of trade unions or organizations acting on behalf of workers, which in many ways was the backbone of almost all left leaning political parties. Article 33 lists the following restrictions:

Associations shall not… pursue political aims, conduct political activity, receive support from or give support to political parties, or take concerted action with labor unions, with professional associations having public functions or with foundations. Associations which depart from their original aims and conditions […] shall be considered disbanded (Tachau 1984, 85).

Stated succinctly, the 1982 Turkish Constitution effectively outlawed the development of the “type of social democratic party typical of western Europe, where such parties draw their primary base of support and leadership from the trade union movement” (Tachau 1984). The constitution, while providing for cases where unions may strike, limited these strikes to issues that were not “political” and if found to have some political motivation, unions are held responsible for any damages incurred by their members (Tachau 1984, 46). Importantly, political parties are also restricted from associations with trade unions. Article 69 suggests, “Political parties shall not have relations or have cooperation with associations, unions, foundations, cooperatives, and professional organizations in the form of public bodies and their superior
organs, in order to promote and further their party policies, nor shall they receive material aid from those bodies (Constitution, Article 69 trans Tachau 1984).

While these rules were created to limit the “excessive politicization” of the Turkish society emblematic of the 1960s and 1970s, most religious based political parties, and those on the left were mostly affected by these constitutional limits. Workers’ parties were not able to represent the rights of workers and/or associations. In such cases, workers’ rights were often ignored. When the WP was found to have violated the “spirit” of the law on January 16 1988, the Constitutional Court of Turkey banned the WP (Ozbudun 2000, 143).

The banning of a host of left leaning and religious parties during the 1980s to 2000s further intensified violent measures taken by banned political parties such as the PKK. As discussed in chapter 3, imposing institutional constraints can create a further radicalization of groups towards utilizing terrorist methods. Robbins (1993, 663) suggests that the Turkish right leaning government took unusual steps to deny any “special status or provisions for the Kurds in Turkey.” In addition, the Turkish government banned traditional Kurdish costumes and restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language. What is apparent from the literature is that politically and socially, the Kurds were denied conventional political access to the decision-making process. In essence, it is conceivable, and the literature does support the view that, government restrictions on the Kurds in democratic Turkey provoked hardliners during the 1980s within the Kurdish community to once more abandon mainstream political party formation. Indeed, Yavuz and Ozcan (2006) imply that initial attempts at using mainstream political agitation were discouraged by the institutional barriers instituted by the Turkish government in the forms of bans placed on several political parties.
By the late 1990s, there were bans placed on a host of Kurdish political parties for breaking laws that protected the solidarity of the state and “alleged” links to the PKK. These parties include People’s Labor Party also known as (HADEP) and in 1997 the Democratic Peoples Party (DEHAP). Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003) points out, if a political party that has turn to terror is given an opportunity to express its political goals, it will most often attempt to transition to into a peaceful political party. Importantly, while the PKK advocated Marxist ideas, many of its members had illustrated a willingness to use the medium of a political party to voice their grievances. However, the right leaning policies of the various Turkish governments stagnated the possibility of a change in approach by the PKK. From his prison cell, Ocalan has laid the blame on the political system that prevails in Turkey:

Their failure to analyze from a Kurdish point of view the fact of the Republic being a fundamental element and to develop an approach which is not separatist but seeks equality and freedom pushes them into the old state of affairs where even the smallest criticism is seen as separatism. With the accusations of extreme Turkish nationalism added to all this, the Kurdish Question, which is in fact a fundamental democratic problem, cannot as a rule even avoid being provoked. The branding of even a minimal democratic demand as separatism and treason led to its opposite, i.e. anti-democratic attitudes, becoming powerful as a result of the situation. Chauvinism and fascism grew strong. […] the failure, despite an oligarchic struggle and a quite serious conflict between the right and the left during this period, even to pose the question correctly was to be influential in the emergence of the PKK” (Ocalan 2007, 7).

67 Turkish governments since 1920s.
Figure 6.1 Tracing the Causal Path—Turkey

- **Critical Antecedents**
  - Junior Officer Coup 1960
  - Coup initially welcomed by some on the left
  - 1961 RPP and Marxist dissatisfied with the Demirel government

- **Critical Juncture**
  - 1962-1971 second military coup bans a host of left and religious based parties, many on the right only receive short bans
  - 1971-78 PKK, CPT formed.
  - RPP-now a coalition government moves to increase its right leaning policies.
  - 1979 Third military intervention bans all parties.

- **Divergent Outcome**
  - Violent Action
    - 1983- PKK and WP members step up violence following the dissolution of WP and DEHAP political parties
In conclusion, as Figure 6.1 shows, the process whereby various political parties in Turkey turned to violence was gradual. Simply stated, the policies of successive rightwing elected government as well as those of the military headed governments distorted the political process and denied political organizations on the left and those who had ethnic or religious platforms. The 1960 junior military coup that many on the left had hoped would deliver the change they desired ended up as a huge disappointment for many. Nevertheless, the actions of the young military officers had many outcomes, a major one being, it served as a blue print for groups that violence could be a viable option to secure their objectives. Critically, the 1971 coup and the denial of rights to left leaning political groups that followed, help radicalize already discontent sentiments by many including several religious and ethnic-based political parties. The 1979 military coup and the subsequent bans placed on political parties as well as constitutional amendments that followed separated workers unions and religion from political parties, ensured that parties on the left and religious oriented ones would continue to wage violence against the state.
CHAPTER 7 - Japan

“Disciples the time to awaken and help me is upon you. Let's carry out the salvation plan and face death without regrets”

Shoko Ashara— Spiritual leader of the Aum Shinrikyo

The statement above illustrates the extent to which the religious sect or “cult” the Aum Shinrikyo became radicalized in the 1990s within a relatively restrictive Japanese political system that offered few opportunities for political parties or movements outside the political establishment. At best, the activities of the Aum Shinrikyo pre-1995 illustrate many of the common features associated with a political party. The cult/ party had developed a clear manifesto, campaign strategy, and presented several candidates for the 1990 Japanese general elections. The Aum Shinrikyo’s decision to launch multiple violent attempts on Japanese citizens came after what their spiritual leader and some radicalized members of the cult believed was a shaming of their movement by the Japanese public and political system. They attributed this fact to the Aum’s poor showing in the 1990 Japanese general election (Metraux 1995, 1145).

Importantly, while the group had a doomsday ideology as part of its beliefs structure, this took on increasing momentum following their political defeats. Most notably, outside Japan where the group also had several branches, none of these groups believed it was prudent to turn to violence as a mechanism to achieve their belief structure.

The previous chapters showed how the ruling rightwing governments’ policies helped to contribute to the onset of terrorist activities by political parties. This chapter provides an example of a political organization operating in an advance majoritarian electoral system democracy. In particular, the focus of this section is on the period from 1980 to 1997. While the
Japanese political system, unlike several of the other cases in this dissertation, does not feature blatant political repression, successive Japanese rightwing governments created a single-party democracy where institutional constraints were rampant and which deterred and even blocked political parties outside of the political establishment political opportunity (Hrebenar 2000, 37-41).

The rest if this chapter is structured as follows. First, a historical background detailing the sociopolitical development of Japan is presented. Second, critical antecedents in the form of varying political and structural factors that resulted from the policies of successive rightwing regimes are discussed. Third, the point at which political parties created terrorist organizations or the critical juncture is examined. The final section provides a summary of the chapter.

### 7.1 Background

In contrast to the previous cases of Turkey and Colombia, Japan provides multiple internal differences that set it apart from those states. Among these differences is the lack of any significant ethnic, religious, or economic cleavages that in ranging degrees are features of the previous cases (Ward 1967; Hrebenar 2000; Dover 1999). On the surface, Japan appears as a model developed state with a mature democracy where there are consistent democratic elections and a well-educated, supportive, but largely uninvolved, electorate (Hrebenar 2000; Tetsuya 1992).

The modern political system that exists in Japan evolved out of a political system transplanted by the United States government following Japan’s defeat at the hands of the allied forces in WWII. The political system was unlike the U.S. presidential system but rather featured
multi-member, medium size election districts in a parliamentary system (Tetsuya 1992, 14). At worst, the political system immediately following the United States occupation of Japan was chaotic (Hrebenar 2000, 5). The post-war politics in Japan was a three-way division created by Douglas MacArthur’s purge program. The outcome of the purge of the old order created diverging groups representing complex views on opposing sides of the political system. The postwar political parties that comprised the Diet had been purged from the political process. In essence, “the purge, by labeling the Japanese government ‘ultranationalist,’ decimated the political and military part of it, and those who were purged in the military never returned to public life. The ensuing political vacuum in the government was filled by two major groups, one of which was the Socialist” (Tetsuya 1992, 3). By 1948, the United States who had advocated a purge of the Japanese political system enabled a “three-way of war between the bureaucrats, the Socialist, and the professional politicians” (Tetsuya 1992, 4). By the conclusion of the U.S. occupation, the three groups had come to represent radically differing policies (Tetsuya 1992, 4).

Marxism was popular in the post-1956 Japan for several reasons. Unlike many political organizations in post-World War II Japan, the Communist Party bore a clear conscience after the defeat of Japan. They were unlike the majority of those who had supported the ruling regime pre-1945. Hence, they were not complicit in war crimes, guilt, and the disgrace of defeat. In particular, “they had endured incarceration to prove their fidelity to the idea of overthrowing the emperor system” (Tetsuya 1992, 16).

---

68 It should be noted that parliamentary system are considered to be more representative systems and create less cleavages in polities. The systematic variance in the size of electoral constituencies—is a feature of the Japanese political system. Through the system of malapportionment rural voters get greater representation than those of urban voters. See Kabashima and Steel (2010, 34) for a detail discussion.

69 Diet is the name given to the Japanese bicameral legislature. As is the case with most parliamentary systems, the Diet is comprised of a lower house called the House of Representatives and an upper house called the House of Councilors.
Second, the Japanese left was initially supported by the United States whose policymakers saw the left as a useful mechanism to balance the hard right groups in the post-1945 Japan (Tetsuya 1992, 17). Third, most United States policymakers saw Japan surrender as “unconditional” and as such, an opportunity to remove what many U.S. policymakers considered to be feudal social structures in Japan. As Tetsuya (1992, 17) points out, “the struggle against feudalism brought together Marxism and the messianic doctrine of unconditional surrender.”

The 1955 system\textsuperscript{70} was a pivotal point in Japan’s political evolution. The year witnessed a standoff between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) majority and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) minority. Both parties had garnered a significant number of the electorate and approached rule from opposing ideological standpoints (Tetsuya 1992, 3). At most, the JSP was “radical, orthodox Marxist, anti-American, neutralist, and adamantly opposed to the U.S. military bases in Japan and the U.S.-Japan security treaty” (Tetsuya 1992, 3). In contrast, and based on the system of Zaikai\textsuperscript{71} the LDP had the support of the business community and clung to the American connection as the best mechanism for Japan’s future (Tetsuya 1992, 3). The conservative and right leaning LDP attracted other members of Minseito, the third party and conservative in policies. In 1955, there was increasing fractionalization among the weaker parties with members joining either the LDP or the JSP (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 11). Indeed, by the 1960s there was a solid turn towards a rightist form of government in Japan, which was supported since 1952 by John Foster Dulles who had replaced the policy of MacArthur (Dower 1999, 250-69). As Tetsuya (1992) points out “in 1952, then Dulles enlisted the State Department to set in motion a

\textsuperscript{70} With MacArthur removed from his role in shepherding Japan political system and the partial peace coming out of the Korean war the political atmosphere in Japan in 1955 was chaotic. See Kataoka (1992, 5-7)

\textsuperscript{71} Zaikai in formal feature of the Japanese political system where the corporate business pressure or influence political decisions. From the point of view of the business sector, continual turn over in the political situation was detrimental to the achievement of economic goals. Hence such uncertainty had to be rectified by any means. See (Hrebenar 2000, 96-99).
‘psychological program’ to combat Marxism” (Tetsuya 1992, 23). With the aid of the United States influence on the local political process, the LDP was able to create iron triangles, which all but ensured their victory for all of the 1960s to 1990s.

Table 7.1 The Liberal Democratic Party: Japanese Prime Ministers in the First and Second Party Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Party System</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatoyama</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>12/10/54~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>12/23/56~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>2/5/57~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>7/19/60~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sato</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>11/9/64~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanaka</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>7/7/72~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miki</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>12/9/74~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuda</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>12/24/76~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohira</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>12/7/78~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzuki</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>7/17/80~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakasone</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>11/27/82~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeshita</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>11/6/87~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uno</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>6/3/89~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaifū</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>8/10/89~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyazawa</td>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>11/5/91~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Party System</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosokawa</td>
<td>NJP</td>
<td>8/9/93~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hata</td>
<td>Shinseito</td>
<td>4/28/94~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murayama</td>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>6/30/94~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashimoto</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>1/5/96~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obuchi</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>8/30/98~</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Asahi Shimbun, Japan Almanac*, 1996, p. 58

Even during the early 1960s, Japan had already began to spurn opposition to the policies of the right leaning governments by groups allied to political organizations on the left. The
Senki-ha (Battle Flag Mainstream Faction), for example, was a radical communist faction that first represented radical elements in the JSP but ultimately split from the party. For most of its early existence (1958-1980), it concentrated on increasing its membership and opposed the United States and Japan alliances. However, as would be shown later in this chapter, the group gradually became further radicalized, and engaged in attacks on the government and against the United States interest. Most of these attack being directed at supporters of the Narita airport project undertaken by the United States and Japan (Schmid and Jongman et. al 1988, 595).

7.1.1 Critical Antecedents: Malapportionment the creation of a single-party democracy

Immediately following the creation of the 1955 system, almost all meaningful third parties disappeared from the Japanese political process. Illustrative of this phenomenon was the elections of 1958. The election results showed that the LDP and the JSP won 453 of the 455 of the seats in the lower house. The other two seats were shared between the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and a minority party. The two party systems lasted another two years until 1960 when there was another fragmentation of the JSP, which split into the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and another significant number of members joining the JCP (Hrebenar 2000, 6). Along with these parties was the Clean Government Party (CGP), a party created by the Buddhist sect. During the 1960s, the Japanese political system was emblematic of a multiparty system.

Despite the appearance of multiple political parties by 1972, the LDP, the ruling government since 1958, and the opposition JSP controlled over 87.5 of the seats in the lower house of the Diet (Hrebenar 2000, 6). The similar success of both large parties resulted from their similar origin and platform. Because conservatives had separated into the two largest political parties, the LDP and JSP policies were similar even up to the 1970s. Invariably, the two
parties were also equally influenced by the Zakai system and were closer to the center than many of the political parties that were created in the 1960s and the 1970s.

Continuing from the 1950s until the early 1990s, the LDP dominated the political process. In part, this dominance was due to several constitutional amendments that almost guaranteed LDP victories at successive elections. As the mid-1970s approached, many citizens within the LDP began to view Japan’s political system with some concern. While the LDP and their main rival had controlled 81.5 percent of the seats in the lower house of the Diet, this figure was well below the 99.5 percent of the seats the two main parties had controlled after the 1958 elections (Hrebenar 2000, 6). Part of the LDP reducing majority was credited to the party consistently denying broad scale welfare or environmental changes, which many of the electorate, especially in the urban areas, had demanded (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 31). However, most responsible for this degrading of the LDP percentage of the seats in the Diet was the issue of fragmentation of political parties. Fragmentation largely occurred when dissatisfied remembers of larger parties left and created powerful third parties (Hrebenar 2000, 6; Kabashima and Steel 2010, 38). In addition, there was a decline in the rural population which was the LDP’s “natural” constituency as many farmers migrated to urban centers in the mid 1970s (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 31). To address this growing concern, influential figures that made up the Zakai system helped to push along several constitutional changes that helped change the political dynamics in Japan.

Despite the marginal reduction in the LDP seats in the Diet, opposition far left parties such as the JCP did not capitalize much on LDP ‘s relative loss in popularity. While they went from 1 seat to 14 in 1969, this was much below the number of seats captured by other new parties appearing on the right and slightly left of center (Hrebenar 2000, 6). Many of the more
radical members of the JCP saw this less than stellar performance as a clear indication that robust measures needed to be taken. To this end, in early September 1969, several of the JCP radical members revived an earlier approach that the communist party had used following the creation of the 1955 system. The creation of the Association of Revolutionary Workers Council (Kakurokyo-Ha) was seen by its members as a direct challenge to the government and a rejection of many of the LDP economic, foreign, and social policies such as the LDP frequent indifference to criticize the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Schmid et.al 2010). While the group only made violent threats in the 1970s, it was only later in the 1980s and 1990s did the group carry out attacks. The increasing belligerent rhetoric by the group was symptomatic of the level of frustration from the left direct at the LDP government.

Two important innovations were advanced in late 1975, which created enormous changes in the political system of Japan and at the time strengthened the political opportunity of the LDP to maintain its grip on power. The first of these laws passed was the Public Offices Election Law. In advancing the law, the stated purpose was given as:

To establish an electoral system [...] based on the spirit of the Japanese constitution, to ensure that these elections are conducted fairly and properly according to the freely expressed will of the electors, and thus aim at the healthy growth of democratic politics” (Tokyo Ministry of Home Affairs). In practice, what the law did was to establish a complex and advantageous system for the LDP by creating “multimember/single-vote election districts and the national PR district for the House of Councilors (HC)” (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 38). As Kabashima and Steel (2010) point out, the law had two major features that benefitted the LDP. First was an “unworkable reapportionment provision” and second was a series of a comprehensive and stringent set of campaign
restrictions “both of which operated to preserve LDP majorities in the Diet” Kabashima and Steel 2010, 38). In general, the usual political outcome of single-member, single-ballot system has been a tendency to reward dominant political parties with many seats “in excess of their vote percentages (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 39).

In general, these modifications of the election system created massive disenfranchisement. This was especially true after 1986 when a very high threshold was placed on votes as part of the requirement under the PR system for parties to gain seats in the Diet (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 46).

Following the 1976 law, the LDP succeeded in passing another major electoral bill through the Diet (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 48). The law stipulated that beginning with the 1983 elections “100 constituency seats of the HC were—and continue to be—elected under the PR system” (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 48). Under the new PR system the electorate was required to cast its votes for the parties, hence, candidates running as independents were forced to join party slate to have a place on the ballot (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 49). These measures served once more to reduce the ability of nonaligned or independent candidates from entering the political fore.

Interestingly, following the passing of the 1976 act, a leftist communist group calling itself Commune Minkamo72 carried out a bomb attack in March of that year killing two people and injuring 95 others. As part of its reason for the explosions was what it called the “discrimination and the oppression of political groups;” the group also expressed its desire to replace the entire ruling political order (Schmid and Jongman et. al 1988, 595). In general, there

---

72 The Commune Mikoamo has never been conclusively tied to the Communist Party.
was a belief by some radical leftist organizations that the establishment in Japan as it was in the other cases could not be removed without violent uprising.

Despite growing resentment by parties on the left, the ruling LDP continued to benefit from enormous monetary aid from the corporate sector. As Blechinger (2000) points out, the LDP had been able to benefit from massive inputs from the corporate sector since 1958. He suggests that:

LDP Diet members founded their own private fundraising organizations in which companies that decided to "sponsor" a particular politician could become members. Monthly membership fees ranged between 5,000 and 20,000 yen on average, but could rise as high as 50,000 yen (Hirose 1993, 66). Since the Political Funds Control Law (Seiji Shikin Kiseihō) obliged Diet members to make public all donations over 1 million yen, but did not limit the number of fundraising organizations that one politician could found, companies often resolved to split their contributions into several smaller amounts that were paid to different fundraising organizations. Thus, neither the amounts received by a certain politician nor the names of the donors had to be made public […] The Far Eastern Economic Review (9 March 1989, 19), for example, quotes a young Diet member who was supported by about 300 companies that paid him 32 million yen per year. Former Prime Minister Takeshita, in contrast, could rely on a support network that included about 4,000 firms (Iwai 1992, 82). Problems arose from the combination of severe competition with other politicians from the same party within electoral districts on the one hand, and the high expectations for costly constituency among voters on the other hand (Blechinger 2000, 2).
In general, while other parties did receive some assistance from outside their party organization, the LDP remained one of the biggest recipients of corporate sponsorship. It was not until the mounting cost of campaigning that the LDP agreed to a PR system. The LDP efforts to reduce overall campaign spending brought some immediate successes for parties on the left. In particular, there was greater distribution of votes in the 1983 elections, an election which the LDP lost support and following which it sought to change the system in its favor again in 1993 and rid the political process of controls on campaign spending (Kabashima and Steel 2010, 49).

In addition to using fiscal and constitutional barriers to reduce opposition on the left, the LDP government also engaged in labor union smashing as a way of destroying political parties on the left. In 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro took steps towards the deregulating several government agencies, “cutting up, abolishing, and privatizing a host of government bureaucracies. The demolition of the Japan National Railway decimated the railway workers’ union, which had been the backbone of Sohyo, a labor federation that had in turn propped up the JSP” (Katakao 1992, 15).

7.1.2 Critical Juncture: Political Ideology Constitutional Barriers and Radicalization

The political and economic policies coming out of decades of rule under successive LDP governments created more than resentment towards the LDP by many political parties and dissatisfied members of the electorate. It eventually contributed to an environment where some political organizations believed it was impossible to gain political power by the ballot once the LDP was in office.

As pointed out in the theoretical chapter, a major feature of rightwing governments is their support for capitalism, discouragement of popular participation in politics, support for
elites, the exclusion of the working class groups or groups favoring greater equality (Pinkney 1990, 14). In the case of the Aum Shinrikyo and their more radical followers, the Japanese government and by extension its various bureaucratic arms and supporters were culpable in denying their political organization political opportunity. Unlike most political organization covered in this dissertation, the Aum is unique for merging militant religion with political advocacy. The group after failing at elections used its religious mysticism or Cult following as part of the process to organized political motivated violence.

For the most part, Japanese religious attitudes and persuasions have not historically had an appreciable influence on domestic politics in the state (Ward 1967, 39; Hrebenar 2000, 17). Historically, the Komieto Party had been one of the few relatively successful political left leaning but also religiously\(^\text{73}\) inspired parties to consistently seat its candidates in the Japanese Diet. The Komeito Party occupies a sensitive role because it takes a centrist position on a range of social and political issues (Hrebenar 2000, 201). Importantly, the party functions as a “bridge” between the two socialist parties, the JSP and the DSP, as well on various occasions working along with the LDP on a range of policies (Hrebenar 2000, 201).

As a rule, the party fashioned itself as a “watchdog” of government that focuses on excesses committed by Japanese politicians, especially corruption by leaders in the LDP and JCP (Hrebenar 2000, 201). Inevitably, because of its stance towards the LDP in the 1990s, the party came under pressure to reduce it criticism of the LDP. Powerful members of the LDP had hinted their desire to kill the 1951 Religious Corporations Law, which was essential for the legal status of raising funds for the party. This law granted very broad freedoms from official regulations for the 183/970 registered religious organizations in Japan (Hrebenar 2000, 199). In October of

\(^{73}\) Komeito has a heavy Buddhist influence. See Kabashima and Steel (2010, 50)
1999, the Komeito Party, under some pressure from LDP members, joined their old opponents to form a three party government headed by the LDP. Despite earlier pledges to “never to support the LDP,” the significant power wielded by the LDP at all levels of the political process proved to be too much for many members of the once rival Komeito Party.

However, not all religious or leftist leaning groups were eager to join or work with the LDP. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, several groups with religious and ethnic motivations began to agitate their demands in political forums. Among the most vociferous of these groups was the Aum Shinrikyo. The Aum was created in 1987 by Shoko Ashara, a mystical figure, who as a youth boasted that he would one day become prime minister of Japan (Poolos 2003, 11-15). Throughout the late 1980s, the Aum operated as a religious organizations or as some observers have characterized the organization—a cult. At the core of the groups’ beliefs were ideas of Buddhism and Hinduism (Metraux 1995, 1140). The group’s leader and founder—Shoko Ashara:

“Developed a spiritual message based on attainment of total consciousness […] this total enlightenment [is alleged to have] enabled him to have a series of visions. Most of these revelations were benign and involved ways that he could help others attain total enlightenment. However, some of the visions [especially after 1990] had other meanings. Ashara’s other visions were a series of apocalyptic revelations that convinced him he would lead God’s arm to victory” (Clinehens 2000, 4).

In recruiting new members to the movement, the Aum targeted mostly well-educated and high skilled but disenchanted individuals to the organization. The recruits were drawn from many top universities from areas such as medicine, biology, chemistry, physics, electronic engineering, and law (Poolos 2003 14; Kang 1995, 222). In most respects, the group, apart from
conducting public meditation practices and sometimes off remarks by the leader, the organization went largely unnoticed. As Metraux (1995, 1142) notes, “Initially, its refusal to compromise with mainstream societal values was passive but after 1990 it became an active oppositionist sect.” In most respects, the radicalization of the Aum coincided with the group’s failure at electing any of its members to the Diet in 1990. Importantly, unlike the complete religious movement that is often portrayed by some scholars when discussion Aum, the Aum brain trusts considered themselves as:

Elite intellectuals, revolutionaries dissatisfied with the stiffly stable world they saw around them. They were political technocrats, tired of a fat, lukewarm society. Possessed of hypertrophied imaginations, they were convinced they could change people and build a perfect state (Tetsuya 1995, 11).

The Aum leaders in some respects illustrated many of the familiar traits of the leftist groups discussed in the previous case studies. From their perspectives, the prevailing political system appeared to be at the source of many of the problems they saw in Japan in the late 1980s to early 1990s. Hence, they believed only a different ideology and approach could fix all that ailed society.

For members to the Diet in the 1990 elections the Aum ran for 25 seats. Ashara envisioned the election as an opportunity to change society as well as offering his organization an opportunity for legitimacy and to gain in foothold in a critical arm of the country’s highest decision-making body (Cameron 1999, 279).

Heavily funded by corporate interest, the 1990 elections was one where the LDP candidates spent exorbitant amount on their campaigns. Indeed, despite earlier legislation to
curtail out of control campaign spending, the LDP and a few other mainstream political parties found ways to circumvent such rules. As Blechinger (2000), report points out about the trend in Japanese elections:

During the legally prescribed campaign period of about two weeks, candidates could legally only spend a limited amount of money, depending on the number of registered votes per seat and the total voter population of the electoral district. In the 1990 Lower House elections, for example, the maximum legal spending was set at about 16 million yen on average. In reality, however, LDP candidates in national elections in the 1980s and early 1990s exceeded the legal limit by at least six times and as much as by thirteen times (Report on Recent Bribery Scandals, 1996-2000).

In comparison to the LDP, the Aum was poorly funded and the districts in which its members campaigned were largely contested by well-funded LDP candidates. While the organization did have significant access to funds mostly contributed by its members, as a political organization this was minuscule compared to the LDP.

Almost immediately after the public humiliation of losing the 1990 elections, the Aum began planning to utilize violence as its newest means of getting their political and religious message heard. Metraux (1995, 1152) suggests that after the 1990 elections, Asahara began declaring the arrival of a “massive war between the West, led by the United States, and the ‘Buddhist world’ led by Asia. The combatants would use nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons […] Aum developed these predictions only after 1990 […] after the 1990 national parliamentary elections.” The decision to turn to violence was aimed towards ridding system of the corruption and evil that the group saw had crept into Japanese political system. As Kang
(2009, 221) points out ultimately “the 1995 attack was the solution against inner and outer opposition. After the failure in the election, the cult was exposed to society, and the majority of the public saw the cult as strange form of a religious belief.” Simply stated, it was Asahara’s party failure to win an election that catalyzed the violence of the Aum Shinrikyo (Kang 2009; Cameron 2002; Olson 1999).

In years preceding the 1990 elections, the Aum gradually escalated its level of violence. The Aum’s defeat at the hands of the government illustrated to its leaders that power could not be gained by the ballot but only “through a violent confrontation with the government” (Metraux 1995, 1153). The radical leaders of the Aum not only blamed the prevailing system but the Japanese people for following the policies of the government (Metraux 1995, 1153). Indeed, the internal dynamic of the Aum also changed. The Aum Shinrikyo organized itself “like a para-state with a whole complement of ministers. Its leaders had official-sounding titles such as the Minister of Education, Minister of Health and Human services, and so on” (Metraux 1995, 1153). The group also maintained internal discipline by killing members or former members who criticized the groups such was the fate that befell Kiyoshi Kariya (Poolos 2003, 30). The Aum’s first attack was geared towards killing of the members of the Diet. The plan was to use botulinus toxin and for members to “drive in circles around the Diet building in a modified truck and spray the toxin in the air” (Clinehens 2000, 11). Unfortunately, for the group, the delivery system failed and the biotoxin was rendered ineffective (Clinehens 2000, 11). A second attempt to use biological agents to kill guests at the royal wedding of Prince Naruhito also failed. Several other attempts failed before the group’s use of Sarin to kill three judges in late 1994 instead resulted in the deaths of seven persons and over two hundred injured (Poolos 2003, 30). Months later on March the 20th 1995, the Aum attacked a busy Tokyo subway hoping to kill thousands and bring on Armageddon that would lead a removal of the political order. Despite 12 patches of Sarin
pouches being released during rush hour on the crowded subway, the death toll was 12 and 5,000 treated for injuries. Owing to the crude delivery mechanism of punching bags carrying the substance, more people were able to survive, as the Sarin did not fill the subway cars (Poolos 2003, 37-39).

While the leader of the Aum, Asahara, was not found complicit in the attacks, as other members claim responsibility, the Aum’s attacks illustrates another clear incident of a political organization attacking the government out of what it believes is a denial of access to the political process. While the Aum had varied causes for the attack on the government, what is evident is that they had a clear ideological opposing view to those of the Japanese government, a government that was run under the LDP and one that was clearly rightist in its policies. From 1955 to the mid-1990s and without much interruption, the LDP, in concert with corporations and its other benefactors was able to ensure that left leaning and other rival ideological parties did not gain a majority of seats in the Diet. In reality, such one party rightwing rule created deep resentment by leftist and some groups that were decidedly religious in their political motivation. For there to have been a more cordial relationship between political groups, the system had to change. As Katakoa (1992) points out:

The principle Diet supremacy will remain shackled until political parties begin to alternate in power. As long as the LDP, still made up of a substantial number of bureaucratic politicians, retains power, the bureaucracies will be kept on a long leash. If however, their political masters were to change periodically, the bureaucracies would be forced to retreat to strict neutrality. That last mile towards Diet supremacy has yet to be traveled (Katakoa 1992, 15).
Figure 7.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Japan

- **Critical Antecedents**
  - Fractionalization of political parties occur
  - LDP absorbs most of the other smaller political parties
  - JCP lost significant members due to new government imposed financial rules
  - Some members of the JCP advocate violence

- **Critical Juncture**
  - LDP uses the Zakai system to great effect rules for nearly 40 years.
  - 1980-1989 introduce right leaning economic political policies—breaks up many leftist workers unions.
  - LDP passes social and constitutional amendments—single members, single-party system
  - Komeito Party pressured into joining the LDP
  - LDP introduce a high PR threshold in the upper house
  - 1990—Aum members fail to win any seats

- **Divergent Outcome**
  - Aum carries out multiple attacks.
  - Aum Members claim political system is corrupt needs to be overthrown.
In sum, unlike the other positive cases in this dissertation, Japan does not exhibit any of the usual types of military or governmental physical repression associated with the other cases. Indeed, according to Amnesty International and the United States Department of State Japan exhibits positive traits in regards to civil liberties. However, as is evident in Figure 7.1, the LDOP right leaning government’s policies were directed in unfair and in some cases illegal ways\textsuperscript{74} to significantly block parties on the left from access to the political process. Over the course of its 40 year rule, the LDP continually passed legislation to break-up leftist supported workers unions, reintroduce legislations to eliminate spending on elections, and pressured smaller political parties to join their party under threats of removing legislation aimed to protect such parties.

\textsuperscript{74} As the Blechinger 2000 report shows significant members of the LDP were found guilty of engaging in bribery and other illegal acts aimed at maintaining their position in office. See Blechinger 2000
CHAPTER 8 - Costa Rica

A search of all terrorism databases illustrates that there has been no recent acts of terrorism in Costa Rica. This country is in contrast to the other cases presented in this dissertation. Unlike many of its neighbors in Latin America, Costa Rica has not experienced almost constant and bloody civil strife as is the case with Nicaragua and Guatemala (Carey 1997; Palmer and Molina 2004; Kelly 1998; Wilson 1998). As a credit to its leader’s foresight, the ruling elite especially after 1948 took steps to reduce growing internal divisions that may have resulted in the type of political party sponsored terrorism present in many of Costa Rica’s neighbors. Importantly, the state adopted an economic model that balanced socialist policies with Western capitalism. In doing so, the citizens of Costa Rica have not experienced the extremes of wealth and poverty akin to the country’s neighboring states (National Democratic Institute For International Affairs 1990). More importantly, while the state like so many in the Latin American region did experience a few incidents of terrorism, none of these acts of terror has been tied to political parties. Moreover, a thorough examination of the Costa Rican case shows that there have been no instances where political parties have created violent wings or a group representing political parties to challenge the ruling regime.

While in regards to acts of terror Costa Rica provides a clear contrast, the state in many other ways does not differ greatly from its neighbors in terms of its colonial past, religion, language, electoral system, wealth distribution, and ethnic demographics. Indeed, what is most

---

75 While Costa Rica did have brief civil war over the contentious 1948 elections, such an occurrence is rare in the history of the country.
76 While the country has a relative diverse population, ethnic diversity is less than in countries such as Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala.
cogent in regards to Costa Rica is the country’s long history of exceptional support for left leaning and centrist governments.

8.1 Background

The history of Costa Rica like so many other Latin American states evolved out of a break with its colonial master, Spain. Founded as one of the four provinces of the Captaincy General of Guatemala (along with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras)\textsuperscript{77} the region that became Costa Rica did not possess a strategic geographic advantage nor did the country have the natural resources such as silver or gold that other countries in the regions such as Mexico possessed (Kelly 1998). By the time Costa Rica gained independence in 1821, the state only had a total population of 60,000 (Stansifer 1998, 120). Despite much of its early history being in relative terms an “economically disadvantaged” country, the leaders of the state exhibited on various occasions extraordinary foresight in securing what was in the best interest for all the citizens of the state. Hence, when in 1834 the country’s leaders felt uneasy with the direction of the Central American Confederation, it was one of the first two members to withdraw from the organization (Stansifer 1998).

The immediate post-independence years in Costa Rica saw an evolving political system with irregular political elections and unstable governments (Stansifer 1998). However, unlike many of its neighbors, the first few illiberal ruling regimes did not hold office for a long period. The result was an institutionalization of corruption (Wilson 1998; Stansifer 1998). In addition, the post 19\textsuperscript{th} century Costa Rica possessed varied potential for volatile social and economic class

\textsuperscript{77} One representative from Spain governed the aforementioned regions that became independent countries. See Kelly (1998, 119) for an in-depth discussion.
arrangements that could easily have resulted in the kind of civil conflict that plagued Latin America during this period. As Bell (1971, 9) suggests:

In most of her sister states, the middle class of the cities were a mere extension of the landowning oligarchy, sharing its values and aspirations and almost invariably allying with it against the ‘pretensions’ and aspirations of the lower classes. The Costa Rican middle class traditionally has been strong and numerous, and it has possessed a sense of identity distinct from the oligarchy toward which it has been antagonistic.

However, by 1889, Costa Rican democracy made positive strides and during that year the country conducted “the first genuinely free elections in Central American history” (Stansifer 1998, 125). It was not until 1917 that Costa Rica experienced a reversal in its march towards becoming a mature democracy. Unlike the other cases in this study, almost immediately the ruling regimes following the 1889 elections instituted a range of social programs aimed to develop all social classes and facets of society (Bell 1971). Under the Liberal Party President José Joaquín Rodríguez Zeledón, the Costa Rican state benefitted from a range of social and economic policies aimed at creating some equality among the classes (Wilson 1998). However, from 1910 to 1917 and under the rule of consecutive leftist leaning National Republican Party (PLN), governments introduced various social programs aimed at helping the lower classes. While the middle and lower classes embraced these programs, the elites did not favor them as they included raising salaries and improving benefits for plantation workers. In response, elites helped engineer the 1917 coup that ended Gonzales Flores administration (Wilson 1998, 23). Similarly, when elites supported candidates, such as Presidents Rafael Calderon and Teodoro Picado of the PLN, turned their backs on the elites in support of the lower classes, elite outrage resulted in the 1948 civil war (Wilson1998).
Despite a growing contempt for left leaning political parties by many among the élites in the pre-1948 era, no far left political party was officially denied access to the political process. As Table 8.1 shows, there was an enduring legacy of Costa Rica as being a “Liberal Republic” as the country elected several left of center and centrist governments. Under centrist and left leaning governments, especially after 1948, there was a continual legacy of allowing all ranges of political voices to be part of the political process. This reduced the viability of using terrorism among members of political parties. Indeed, as would be shown in the following section, leftist leaning parties, including communist political parties prospered in the Costa Rican political landscape.

8.1.1 Critical Antecedents: Constitutional Changes and Centrist Governments

Diverging Responses to Dissent.

A major impetus to the creation of terrorist groups by political parties is the denial of access to other political parties in a polity, in particular, parties operating from left of the political spectrum. As was shown with several rightwing governments in the previous chapters, because of the ideological position of most solidly rightwing governments, they often seek by various means to ban or curtail the political access of political parties on the left and in some cases, the center and those at the religious spectrum. In contrast to these approaches, and as was shown in the quantitative section, ruling regimes of the center and left leaning such as Costa Rica generally maintain a policy of openness towards a range of political parties.

In general, while there are several prevailing theories, which attempt to explain Costa Rica’s relative peace, no study thus far, provides an ample explanation for why that state has not experienced terrorism from political parties. Among the theories used to explain Costa Rica relative absence of civil strife vis-à-vis its neighbors, is the more frequently presented “rural
democracy” thesis. The rural democracy thesis contends that the peaceful nature of Costa Rica’s contemporary democracy is a direct result of the colonial experience, which forms the social and political foundations that aided the stability of later democracy (Wilson 1998, 11). According Wilson (1998, 11), a major assertion of the rural democracy thesis is that due to the failure to find significant precious metals and an absence of a significant indigenous population, Spanish conquistador elites in Costa Rica were prevented from replicating the social and economic cleavages prevalent elsewhere in Latin America. While the above argument seems plausible, as number of scholars correctly and convincingly found in their various works, the thesis has many incongruent arguments (Fonseca 1984; Gudmundson 1986; Wilson 1998; Seligson 1980). In particular, even though the country was colonized relatively late, it was also relatively isolated, and had low numbers of native Indians. Thus, the social and political structure of Costa Rica was never “egalitarian but complex and highly structured” (Wilson 1998, 12).

Although the rural democracy theory may offer some keys towards a better understanding of some types of civil strife, it does not explain the absence of terrorism by political parties. As this dissertation has shown in the previous country cases and quantitative section, the political ideology of the ruling regime does provide answers to why some polities seem to witness higher incidences of political parties using terrorism.
Table 8.1 Election Results, 1948-1998 Costa Rica

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote (thousand)</th>
<th>Percentage Of Vote</th>
<th>Turnout as % of Populace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Otilio Ulate B.</td>
<td>Union Nacional</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.A Calderon G.</td>
<td>Republican Nacional</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Jose Figueres F.</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fernando Castro C.</td>
<td>Democratico</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Mario Echandi J.</td>
<td>Union Nacional</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Francisco Orlich</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Jorge Rossi Ch.</td>
<td>Independiente</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Francisco Orlich</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. R.A. Calderon</td>
<td>Republicano</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Otilio Ulate B.</td>
<td>Union Nacional</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Jose J. Trejos F.</td>
<td>Unificacion Nacional</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daniel Oduber Q.</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Jose Figueres F.</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mario Echandi J.</td>
<td>Unificacion Nacional</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Daniel Oduber Q.</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fernando Trejos E.</td>
<td>Unificacion Nacional</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jorge Gonzalez</td>
<td>Nacional Independiente</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rodrigo Carazo O.</td>
<td>Renovacion</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Democratica</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Rodrigo Carazo O.</td>
<td>Unidad</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luis A. Monge A.</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Luis A. Monge A.</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.A Calderon F.</td>
<td>Unidad</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Oscar Arias S.</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.A. Calderon F.</td>
<td>Unidad Social Cristiana</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>R.A. Calderon F.</td>
<td>Unidad Social Cristiana</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.M. Castillo</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>J.M. Figueres O.</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M.A. Rodriguez E.</td>
<td>Unidad Social Cristiana</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Salguero</td>
<td>Fuerza Democratica</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>J.M. Corrales B.</td>
<td>Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M.A. Rodriguez E.</td>
<td>Unidad Social Cristiana</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Figure 8.1 the ruling regimes in Costa Rica since 1948 have been predominately centrist or left leaning therefore this case does not provide any instance of terror groups being formed by political parties. In many ways, the post-1948 decisions by elites in Costa Rica staved off what might have ultimately been a critical juncture marked by terrorism by political parties. Instead, as this section shows, because of the left of center and more importantly centrist ideology promoted by ruling elites, political parties across the political spectrum found few reasons post-1948 to create terrorist organizations.

Simply stated, left leaning and centrist governments in Costa Rica have promoted conciliation and cooperation (Wilson 1998; Bell 1991; Diamond et.al 1999). As was detailed in the previous sections, the pre-1948 period in Costa Rica while relatively stable when compared to other regional states’ domestic political climate, was still not a shining example of liberal democracy. In at least two junctures since the pivotal 1889 elections (1917 and 1948), democracy and peace was interrupted with support from the wealthy coffee aristocrats, the traditional enemy of redistributive reforms (Booth 1999). Hence, in an effort to forestall future breakdowns of the political order following the 1948 civil war, policymakers and politicians took two important steps that were critical to understanding the peaceful nature of Costa Rican politics. First, the decision was made to amend the constitution and second, political parties moved closer to the center.78

The 1948 civil war led to a range of changes to the Costa Rican constitution that ensured it was the most liberal democracy in Latin America (Booth 1999). Despite efforts by coffee aristocracy and other conservative elements to block changes by the social democrats and thus preserve the 1871 constitution, the pro-liberal legislators through the 1949 constitution

---

78 As Bell (1971, 12-17) notes, immediately before the 1948 civil war there was pressure from the elites to move several traditionally left leaning political parties towards the rightist ideology that favored the wealthy landowners.
implemented several important changes. Among these were to strengthen “the independent judiciary, fortify the electoral branch of government (the National Electoral Tribunal became the Supreme Electoral Tribunnal), weaken the executive, provide for proportional representation, and limited the terms of both presidents and legislators” (Stanifer 1998, 127). Other changes included the decentralization of political power and increasing participation of regional administrators. Such steps were a major accomplishment in a region where centralization has such deep roots. By granting greater power to municipal government and by encouraging the establishment of autonomous agencies, regional parties believed that they could actively participate in the political process (Stanifer 1998, 127).

The Costa Rican 1949 constitution differed in many respects to those enacted by rightwing governments in the other cases. For example, the Conservative and Liberal party in the Colombian case cooperated in creating legislation aimed at increasing their control of the political system. In contrast to Costa Rica, the ruling parties in Colombia had enacted laws aimed at complete centralization of the state and reduction of political participation by other political parties. Such measures ensured that Colombia had a monopoly on access to higher office. In general such features were absent from the Costa Rican political system post-1948.

The second important change that occurred in Costa Rica and one that is cogent to the central argument of this dissertation was the conscious effort made by various political parties to move towards the center. As Stanifer (1998, 127) points out, “shocked by the temporary breakdown of order Costa Rican leaders gravitated to the political center and worked together to produce a document that they hoped would prevent future breakdown.” Thus, consecutive Costa Rican governments made efforts to distance themselves from conventional right leaning programs and policies. In practice, as seen in Table 8.1, the electorate most often elected centrist
and liberal minded governments. Unlike many of its neighbors, conservative institutions such as Catholic Church in Costa Rica were forced to reform and accept the supremacy of the state. Even before the 1949 constitution, liberal governments pressured the church to reform many of its more conservative policies, such as historical demands by the church to have a powerful influential role in the state. As Williams (1989, 3) points out “the move towards a reformist model occurred much earlier and paralleled the Church’s collaboration with the Calderon Guardia government in the implementation of a series of reform.” In general, there was relatively minimal friction between the Church and the state owing to the politically moderate governments generally allowed the Church some level of passive “collaboration vis-à-vis the regime” (Williams 1989, 4).

The Costa Rican government granted significant liberty to the Costa Rican Communist Party (Bell 1971, 9-11). This is further evidence of the difference in left and centrist political policies from those of the right in creating harmonious political dialogue. Despite significant pressure from the United States government for limits to be placed on the Costa Rican Communist Party, the Costa Rican government granted unprecedented access to the communists to participate in politics (Palmer and Molina 2004). In the mid to late 1940s, the communist movement, as it was in many areas of the international system, began to be presented to many poor and lower economic classes as an alternative to western style capitalism. In Costa Rica, especially in the rural districts where foreign American companies such as the United Fruit Company operated large banana farms, there was massive exploitation of the poor and uneducated class (Bell 1971, 24-27). Communist movements, similar to those in nearby Nicaragua, encouraged the lower and even some lower middle class citizens to challenge the government to create social programs (National Democratic Institute For International Affairs
1990, 27). As illustrative of the attitude of accommodation by regimes in Costa Rica towards communist movements, a frustrated and angry representative of the United Fruit Company approached agents from the United States Secretary of State about the issue of communist inspired strikes. As the memo to the Secretary of State showed, the United Fruit Company tried to get the United States intervene in Costa Rica by raising claims of communist diffusion:

Don’t you think that if a Communist Government would be established in Costa Rica that it would be very dangerous for President Ubico in Guatemala, who has succeeded heretofore in stamping out Communism in that country before it could get a start; for President Martinez in El Salvador who stopped Communism at a loss of three thousand lives; for President Carias in Honduras and for old man Sacasa in Nicaragua? Do you think it is possible to get word to them through your American Ministers in those countries and from you to their representatives (of other Central American countries) in San Jose to point out to them the grave danger which exists here and which would affect them if carried to its present conclusion in order that they might bring pressure upon President Jimenez to let him know that the Governments in these countries are watching the situation in Costa Rica with much concern (U.S. Department of State, 1944).

Unlike in Colombia, the Calderon Guardia government, as did many of its successors, responded to demands by the Communist Party and its supporters not by banning the Communist Party but instead sponsoring:

Comprehensive programs that included, among others, the Law for New Industries to encourage diversification of the economy; the creation of the Social Security System and the enactment of the Labor Code; the pragmatic Land Law, the so called Law of
Parasites, which allowed the landless to acquire title to land on the promise of cultivating it; and the simple but effective program of distributing free shoes to needy children in the first grade to protect their feet against parasites and to help abate the feelings of inferiority produced by the lack of such a basic item (National Democratic Institute For International Affairs. 1990, 29).

Under the leadership of Manuel Mora, the Communist Party candidates were frequently elected to the country’s parliament. For many communists, despite preferring a different economic model there was no need to challenge violently the state through arm conflict. Mora’s position was simple “violent revolution was not necessary or called for in Costa Rica, because the Communists participated in the democratic institutions of the nation and thus impel a peaceful transformation of systems and institutions” (Bell 1971, 24-27). For the ruling regimes, especially post-1949, liberal policies of dialogue over authoritarian policies helped ensure that the political atmosphere in Costa Rica did not become closed so as to precipitate violence as it had occurred in many of Costa Rica’s neighbors. Palmer and Molina (2004, 5) point out that one of the important liberal traits of consecutive Costa Rican governments has been to “resolve conflict by channeling it in a legal and institutionalized fashion.”

As Figure 8.1 shows, the access granted to opposing political organization in Costa Rica enabled almost all political organizations in the state to believe that they had a legitimate opportunity to vie for higher office. Hence, the chances of political parties turning to terror was significantly reduced in that polity.

79 The only exception here was the 1949 civil war when leaders of the coup who had taken control of government sought to rid the state of the communist, which was met with resistance from the party. See Bell (1971, 50-53). the state under the direction
Figure 8.1 Tracing the Causal Path–Costa Rica

Critical Antecedents

- 1917 PLN removed from power by right leaning elites
- 1948 Rafael Picado of the PLN removed from power
- 1948 short Civil War ensues—right leaning elites were dissatisfied with liberal policies
- 1948 Marxist dissatisfied with attacks on their rights to exists by elite factions

Critical Juncture

- Post 1948 constitutional amendments granting greater powers to local governments
- Leftist and centrist political parties flourish—wins all elections post 1949
- Members of Communist Party allowed to participate in elections
- No forms of political violence occur post-1949

Divergent Outcome

No Terrorist Group created by Political Parties

First Free National Elections 1889

1949 New Costa Rican Constitution
Table 8.2 Structured Focused Comparison of Cases Between 1960-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majdemoc</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional rep</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left wing gov’t</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist gov’t</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right wing gov’t</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious gov’t</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External conflict</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political repression</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party/terror groups</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three party coalition gov’t</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the absence of terrorism in the state along the lines of political party provides a clear indication of the role centrist and left of center ideology play in reducing terrorism by political organizations. It seems, Costa Rica represents one of many cases where countries that have adopted leftist or more often centrist ideology as a medium of rule.

As the structured focused comparison presented in Table 8.2 shows a centrist ideology more often than rightist ideology create harmonious environment where opposition political parties on the far left, religious and even right, are less motivated to use violence as a means to achieve their political aims. In fact, as shown in Table 8.2, the only consistent variable which explains political parties turn to terror is the existence of rightwing governments. While as a point of criticism, it can be argued that Costa Rica possesses various other factors that allow for peaceful cohabitation of political interest such as a proportional electoral system, a relative peaceful past and a thriving economy. It can also be shown that many of the other cases in this study also on
various occasion also possessed one or all of the mediating factors previously mentioned. Importantly, what this negative case shows is that an equitable centrist ruling ideology appears to be a key factor in polities that do not possesses incidents of political parties creating terrorist organizations.
CHAPTER 9 - Conclusion

This dissertation was framed around an important yet unanswered question—why do political parties turn to terrorism? More importantly, the dissertation sought to ascertain whether some types of political ideology by incumbent government creates an environment where opposition political parties are more willing to turn to terror. In answering the above question, this dissertation contributes to the extant literature in two important ways. First, this study investigated and examined key variables responsible for the process whereby political parties form alliances with or create terrorist organizations. Using both quantitative and qualitative research design, this dissertation shows that rightwing governments increase the numbers of terrorist organizations created by political parties in a given polity. Second, this dissertation also fills an important gap in the literature by offering a more precise conceptualization of the issues and a different theoretical view that was only implied in the conflict literature. In fact, while the extant literature argues that institutional constraints, such as electoral systems, are more likely to lead political parties to create terrorist organizations, this research provides another explanation of the issue. This dissertation shows that regime ideology is also an important factor explaining the creation of terrorist organizations by political parties.

This chapter reflects on the findings of my dissertation, a few methodological problems, and examines some areas of promise that it has uncovered. The next section presents the theoretical discussion and empirical findings from the quantitative section as well as conclusions drawn from the case comparison. The section that follows focuses on a few weaknesses with the research design and provides some suggestions for future refinement. The final section provides several applicable policy prescriptions that may emerge from this dissertation.
9.1 Findings

This dissertation investigated two important theories that could be used to explain why political parties turn to terrorism. It does not distinguish between the two, but rather it illuminates the importance of an underexplored variable that rests at the intersection between structural and rational approaches. As extant literature has shown, the type of electoral political system is critical in determining the level of stability in a given polity. Importantly, majoritarian systems are more likely to encourage political parties to turn to terrorism than proportional representation systems. As this dissertation shows, governing party ideology should be included in strategic perspectives as well since it is a crucial component of the structural framework. It is within this context that political parties make strategic choices to either stick with traditional political practices or turn to violence. Thus, as shown in the quantitative and qualitative sections, governing party ideology is another important structural factor because it conditions the type of policies the party will implement once in power. In other words, party ideology must be considered as an important explanatory variable that helps connect the structural and strategic perspectives while simultaneously adding to our understanding of political parties that use terrorist tactics.

Unlike extant literature that focuses on predominately structural and strategic perspectives to explain why political parties turn to terror, this dissertation used a mix methodology to provide another unidentified variable that explains why political parties turn to terror. In the quantitative chapter, the central hypothesis of this dissertation—regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet governs from a classical ideologically right position will expect to have greater numbers of political parties that turn to terror than other types of regimes—was empirically tested. Employing several random effect poission models that included samples from
31 countries covering 1960 to 2006, the statistical models supported the central hypothesis of the study. The findings showed that even after controlling for the effects of institutional factors, regimes whose leader or ruling cabinet govern from a classical ideological right position should expect to experience greater numbers of political parties turning to terror than other types of regimes.

Although the statistical analysis is excellent in providing macro analysis of conflict processes, it does not tell us the causal processes that lead to the development of terrorist organization by political parties under rightwing governments. To address this perceived shortcoming, this dissertation employed a most different case comparison using three positive cases—Colombia, Turkey, and Japan—and one negative case, Costa Rica. Process tracing approach outlined by Slater and Simmons (2010) was used to establish and trace the causal path connection from the independent variable to the dependent variable. As was the case with the statistical chapter, the qualitative analysis also supports the main hypothesis. In fact, the examination of the three positive cases also supports shows a clear causal path linking the independent variable to the dependent variable. Importantly, the negative case Costa Rica which can be considered to lie at the fault line of a region with significant terrorist activity by political party, provide no evidence of terrorism by any of its domestic political parties. Noteworthy in the Costa Rica case, is the consistent rule of centrist and left leaning government, which provides open access to all political party in the polity.

9.1.1 A Few Theoretical and Methodological Weaknesses

The argument presented in this dissertation provides an additional explanation to when political parties turn to terrorism. In fact, it presents a significant improvement over those of Weinberg (1991), and Weinberg and Pedahzur (2003), which do not empirically examine any of
the theories they advanced about political parties and terrorism. Nevertheless, this dissertation has two weaknesses that need to be addressed in future research. The first relates to data collection. A common complaint about terrorism research is that the data are often noisy, which invariably raises questions about reliability of findings. Since there was no readily available dataset to model the phenomena under investigation, a complete dataset had to be constructed in this study. For much of the aggregate data, multiple existing databases on terrorism were tapped. However, in doing so, there were at times problems associated with differentiating groups that were named and coded differently across different sources. In addition, in some cases terrorist groups date of formation ranged widely across existing sources. Despite tedious attention to reduce coding errors in the dataset\textsuperscript{80}, it is possible that in a few cases –mostly in the case of Lebanon—the year of terrorist group creation by political parties in this dataset may differ from some sources.

The second, issue of importance relates to the role of repression. In Danzell (2011), repression was found to be not statistically consistent with political parties creating terrorist groups. However, in this dissertation, which employed a significantly longer period of study, repression was found to be statistically significant. The inconsistency of repression as a predictor of terrorism has previously been identified in extant literature (Testas 2004; Bloomberg 2002 and Piazza 2006). In this dissertation, repression’s role was found to be significant only when additional data from the early 1960s was included.

\textsuperscript{80} Process tracing was used to track the formation of groups where there were doubts as it relates to the groups formation.
9.1.2 Policy Implications

A solution to the issue of terrorist groups and the direction they move may depend heavily on the type of regime they function within. Hence, as Li (2005) suggests, “improving citizen satisfaction, electoral participation, and political participation [...] democratic governments can reduce the number of terrorist incidents within its borders.” Furthermore, the more terrorist groups adopt mainstream non-violent methods of agitating their political views, the more peaceful would be the international system. It is the contention of this dissertation that an adjustment of institutional barriers and the approach of governments towards terrorist organizations that show a willingness to be part of the political process could significantly reduce the number of terrorist groups. As the case of Costa Rica shows, polities that follow a more centrist political ideology are less likely to witness transition of political parties towards violent terrorist organization.

9.1.3 Avenues for Future Research

Several avenues of research are evident from this dissertation. In particular, rightwing ideology variable can be used in other conflict studies that attempt to model the behavior of ruling regimes. First, the ideology of a ruling political party that takes office is important in understanding why some governments are beholden to certain ethnic and socioeconomic groups in a given polity.

Second, this dissertation provides the only extensive dataset on political parties, which create terrorist organization. Therefore, beyond the main variable—rightwing ideology—the dataset can provide researchers with data on the typology of parties that create terror groups, regions where political parties create terror groups, as well as how competing political parties create terror groups when they function in the same polity.
Finally, as the field advances, improved data collection and available databases that include more cases may provide alternative answers to the issue examined in this dissertation. To date, the dataset used in this research only covers 31 countries over 46 years and does not include recent data from the last five years, during which time various analysts have pointed to a noticeable increase in parties on the right creating terrorist organizations.
References


Li, Quan. (2005). Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (2): 278-297


# APPENDIX A - Countries in Quantitative Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>West and Unified Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>