THE KANSAS SCHOOL CRISIS ALERT:
A CASE STUDY OF AN EFFORT AT PRESSURE GROUP KOBILIZATION

by

SUSAN E. HERBEL

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Approved by:

Louis H. Douglas
Major Professor
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been an increase in teacher militancy and involvement in the political processes of this nation. The financial dilemma of teachers is well publicized. Teachers' salaries have not kept pace with rising costs of living. Furthermore, the teaching profession falls short of other occupations in fringe benefits.

Other frustrations inherent in the occupation are not so obvious. A shortage of facilities and materials is common in the schools. Student discipline is a constant source of harassment to the classroom teacher. Perhaps the outstanding cause of recent teacher activism is a result of lack of organized influence in matters concerning the formation of educational policy and lack of prestige in the community.

This paper is a study of teachers associations, the Kansas State Teachers Association (KSTA) in particular, and its attempt to use pressure group tactics. A case study of the KSTA, with special emphasis on the 1968 Kansas School Crisis Alert program, provides insight into the possibilities, limitations, and shortcomings of teachers organizations acting as pressure groups. Some recommendations and conclusions at the study's completion provide suggestions for teachers in their attempt to influence educational policy and to mobilize public support on behalf of improvement in the public school systems of America.
CHAPTER I

RECIPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL PRESSURE GROUP

Increased involvement of teachers in politics and pressure group activities is becoming a nationwide phenomenon. Teachers seek basically two objectives. They want a voice in influencing and establishing educational policy. Secondly, they are striving for better working conditions, including higher salaries and expanded fringe benefits.

The 1968 Kansas School Crisis Alert movement was an attempt to use pressure group techniques in order to influence legislation and mobilize the public bias in favor of KSTA policies.

One of the primary difficulties in the analysis of pressure groups is that the label covers a variety of types of institutions. An interest group is defined here as, "...a group of individuals who are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage, and who have some awareness of these bonds."¹

The effectiveness of the KSTA pressure group effort in the Crisis Alert program can be analyzed according to three basic categories. The first concerns the opinion of the public, in general, and decision-makers, in particular, toward the group's membership and ideology before the effort begins. Information concerning public opinion of education and teacher image was gathered from a variety of secondary texts by such authors as Harmon Zeigler, Robert Hutchins, Richard Hofstadter, and Leslie Kindred.
The second category determining a group’s success is internal organization. Important elements for consideration are: political resources such as wealth, numbers and kinds of members, leadership, cohesion or lack of internal friction, and degree of participation or involvement of the membership.

A detailed account of internal organization and political resources employed by the KSTA during the Crisis Alert came from a variety of KSTA publications. These included The Kansas Teacher and periodic newsletters which were sent to association members. Interviews with active participants in the Crisis Alert movement also provided information concerning the availability and allocation of political resources. Those interviewed included Dr. Joe McFarland, associate executive-secretary of the KSTA; Rose Ann Barrington, a Topeka teacher; Garry Smith, a Lyons teacher; and Bill Moore, a McPherson teacher. Mr. Moore contributed notebooks in which he had organized various materials pertaining to the movement and a diary which he kept throughout the time he was employed by the KSTA to serve as a coordinator of the effort. Finally, a variety of mimeographed materials, sent by the KSTA to the coordinators and volunteers participating in the program, included information concerning resources and instructions for the successful use of them.

The third category is a group’s strategy. Group activities are generally aimed at specific persons or groups of persons. These may be divided into three basic categories: the electorate, the public, and the decision-makers, including both legislators and administrators.
Several interviews were conducted in order to provide more detailed information concerning the actual KSTA activities during the Crisis Alert. Another purpose of the interviews was to determine the effectiveness of these activities with respect to improved teacher image and legislation passed by the 1969 legislative session. The attempt was made to survey both the opinions of persons involved in the effort and those not directly involved. The active participants interviewed have already been mentioned. Educators interviewed, who were not directly involved in the Crisis Alert, included Willis Heck, a Hutchinson teacher; Paul Klotz, a Lyons teacher; and Dr. Roy Bartel, a Kansas State University professor in the Department of Education. Also, the effort was discussed with several other classroom teachers. However, upon finding a void in a teacher's awareness that a "movement" was taking place, this activity was dropped. Professional politicians contacted included Jack Janssen, a Kansas State Senator; Bill Low, executive-secretary of the Kansas Republican Party; and Paul Pendergast, executive-secretary of the Kansas Democratic Party.

Finally, educational legislation passed during the 1969 session of the state legislature was analyzed in an attempt to determine the success of the Crisis Alert in influencing the legislative decision-makers.

PUBLIC OPINION

Since the days of Madison, interest groups have become increasingly more accepted. Even though the public continues to
view certain groups with suspicion, it is generally aware of their existence and, in some cases, their legitimacy. Richard Gable says, "Policy originates and results from the actions of interested groups.....Administrative agencies and private interest groups have come to be the principal originators of policy."²

The amount of influence an interest group has, however, will depend to some extent on its public image. An individual legislator will inevitably consider the group's social status within his constituency before he considers altering his policies in order to conform to a group's demands.³

The public bias toward a pressure group's ideals weighs heavily upon the final gains resulting from the group's efforts. If the group's demands are in accord with the general ideology of the public and their representatives, the gains will be more substantial than if the public views the group's goals as inimical to the public interest. Finally, a group's gains will usually be significant only when the legislators and administrators are in agreement with their basic philosophy before any group activity takes place.⁴

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

Political resources can be categorized in any number of ways but, for this discussion, they are classified as to wealth, numbers and kinds of members, leadership, cohesion, and member participation.

In Who Governs?, Robert A. Dahl discusses political resources. He argues that money is generally used to gain influence in three
ways; financial pressure, corruption, and political contributions. He further states that, according to his findings, political contributions constitute the most important use of wealth.\(^5\)

It goes without saying that the more money a group or an individual has at his disposal, the more influence he will have; provided, of course, the money is used skillfully in the effort to gain influence. Mr. Dahl concludes that, "...money and influence have a certain interdependence. The poor man is not likely to gain high influence; but if he does, somehow along the way he is no longer a poor man."\(^6\)

The group with the largest number of members at its disposal, has, ceteris paribus, the greatest potential in terms of the numbers factor in gaining influence.

Numbers provide the raw materials for organization and leadership and can supply wealth through dues. Sometimes numbers provide near monopolies of certain services. Electricians unions and the American Medical Association are examples.\(^7\)

The element of social status must here again be taken into account. In determining a group's potential influence, it is necessary to ask, "Who are these numbers?"

Dahl's study of New Haven politics found that groups with middling social membership tend to be the most influential in the policy-making process. He claims that those below the threshold dividing white-collar from blue-collar occupations are severely handicapped in their attempts to gain influence over governmental decisions.\(^8\)
A third element under the heading of political resources is that of leadership.

Powerful leaders must have a variety of skills. They must gauge their members' potential unity and use ideals and symbols (ideology) to inspire enthusiasm and loyalty. They must define objectives, choose weapons, develop public relations and intelligence services, nurture every source of power, build alliances, and negotiate the final compromises. 9

The group's leaders must possess an amount of political expertise both in planning group strategy and in personal contact. Leaders who have access to policy-makers are sometimes capable of enhancing group influence. Truman suggests that this access might have been established before an individual becomes a pressure group leader. He gives examples of pressure groups hiring leaders who had formerly been members of Congress, Washington newspaper-correspondents and newspapermen stationed in State capitols, officials and employees of executive departments and agencies, and prominent political party members. 10

Personality characteristics connected with effective leadership are, "...persuasiveness, vitality and endurance, decisiveness, intellectual capacity, and responsibility." 11

Cohesion within the group is another important internal organization factor in group effectiveness. Harmon Zeigler and V.O. Key, Jr. agree that in most cases the leaders of a mass interest group cannot automatically guarantee the deliverence of a bloc vote during elections. "It is beyond the abilities of an organized group to guarantee with any degree of certainty, that
its members will automatically respond to the suggestions of the leaders. 12

Therefore, the pressure group not only attempts to influence the public bias in its behalf but it must also use persuasion tactics upon its own members.

The successful interest group will strive to create the image of representing policies which are supported by a large membership. The legislator will be more sensitive to a group's demands if he believes the group to be an influential force within his constituency. When a particular interest group represents a clearly defined membership, a congressman generally welcomes its opinions. After all, this eases his job of deciding what the majority desires. 13

Finally, pressure group success may depend partially upon the willingness of its members to participate in group activities. Harmon Zeigler stresses the importance of voter mobilization as a group activity. The ability of a group to increase the voting of people who are in agreement with a candidate's position may weigh heavily on the candidate's attitude toward a particular group. Zeigler stresses informal and personal contact as powerful group activities. 14 Obviously, such activities require large numbers of workers. In order to carry out this type of effort, a group's members must give more than merely passive support to the group goals and objectives. They must be willing to become involved and take an active part in the programs initiated by the group's leaders.
STRATEGY

The final category concerning group effectiveness is the strategy a group uses in the various types of activities it undertakes. The type of effort and the manner in which an effort is to be carried out will depend upon the strategy the group's leaders decide to use. Image and internal organization factors can reasonably be discussed as pro or con elements for success. On the other hand, strategy depends upon a great many variables in determining success or failure of a particular activity.

Activities are directed toward three general groups of people; the electorate, the public, and the decision-makers. There is an obvious overlap among these categories, but the division is made for purposes of clarity in the classification of group activities.

Group efforts directed toward the electorate constitute activities within the electoral process. One of these is to obtain donations to a political party or to a particular candidate.

Regardless of the way money is spent, one cannot argue that the candidate who has the most money will invariably win, although this argument was once fashionable. There are, of course, basic campaign costs to be met, and the organization which provides money for the distribution of literature, appeals through mass media, and the various types of appeal to the voters might hope to gain the favor of the recipient of such funds.  

A second activity in the electoral process is providing volunteer workers. Zeigler's emphasis on the importance of this effort has already been mentioned. Duties which campaign volunteers perform include: canvassing citizens with the hope of
convincing then of a candidate's worth; encouraging citizens, who favor a candidate's position, to vote; addressing envelopes and other secretarial duties; distributing materials and publicity signs; and participating in political rallies, coffees, dinners, cocktail parties, and other social and fund-raising functions given on behalf of a particular candidate.

A third electoral function of a pressure group is putting its representatives in public office. This is not generally considered a primary group activity; nevertheless, it is sometimes attempted.

Along with this, a final group effort in connection with political campaigns is trying to influence the political parties in their choice of candidates and party platforms.

The relationship of pressure groups to political parties poses a particularly difficult situation for the groups. Pressure groups are sometimes viewed as dictators of party platforms. E.E. Schattschneider vividly portrays the fallacies of such an assumption. He says of this notion:

1. It underestimates the consequences of the fact that we have a two-party system. The parties compete with each other; they do not compete with pressure groups. The amount of bargaining that they have to do with special-interest groups is limited by the fact that each party must cope primarily with its party opposition. Neither party can afford to make excessive concessions to any pressure group.
2. A much better explanation of the process of majority formation is that majorities result automatically from the fact that we have a two-party system. In a two-party election one or the other of the parties is almost certain to get a majority. To win elections it is good strategy to appeal to the general public broadly on matters of general interest and above all to keep an eye on the opposition party.
3. The scope and bias of the pressure system do not fit easily into the calculus of party politics. First, the pressure system is much too small to play the role sometimes assigned to it. Secondly, the supposed party neutrality of the pressure groups is largely a myth.17

In other words, interest groups are too small to play the party game. Generally, they align themselves to one party or the other and are not, therefore, in a position to play one party against the other. Finally, it must be remembered that pressure groups are traditionally unpopular. Consequently, a party cannot afford to become aligned too closely with a particular group for fear of alienating a large segment of the public as a result.

In the final analysis, the party reigns supreme. Schattschneider views the interest groups as the captives of political parties. He says political alignments are not really flexible and in most instances, the group has no choice as to which party candidates they support. If one party ideology is in accord with the group's philosophy and the other party's is not, then the group is automatically captured and, consequently, partisan in nature.18

On the other hand, it is extremely advisable, wherever possible, for the group to at least feign neutrality. The doctrines of federalism and separation of powers make this so.

The existence of the federal system means that a nation-wide group may have to be concerned with as many as forty-nine different jurisdictions, perhaps even more, since some major cities exercise significant powers under constitutional provisions for 'home rule.' If at the national level the group becomes completely identified with one national party, not only is it handicapped when the opposition comes to power in Washington, but it may deny itself access
to the other party in the States in which the latter is dominant.

The separation of powers has a similar significance at the various governmental levels. Where the party designation of the executive is not shared by the majority of both houses of the legislature, a group ordinarily will have little to gain from casting its lot with one major party. ¹⁹

Another danger involved in partisanship is "political isolation." Backing a candidate who loses can produce an unsympathetic attitude toward the group on the part of the victor. ²⁰

Finally, a pressure group may find it difficult to draw a cross section of support for legislative proposals if it has backed one candidate or the other openly.

In summary, although a pressure group may not, in reality, have a choice as to partisanship because of its ideology, it is the wise group that avoids becoming permanently (and hence inescapably) identified with any particular political party.

The second group toward which pressure groups direct their activities is the public. This attempt is made through propaganda efforts and community involvement.

Propaganda techniques have not proved always successful for pressure groups although many of them spend enormous sums of money through the mass communications media in an attempt to prejudice public thinking in their favor. Both Zeigler and Gable point out in their studies that, "...it is a mistake to assume that wide use of the various media of communications, broad coverage of various audiences, and ingeniously prepared material are indicators of sure success." ²¹
Community involvement by the membership of an interest group is a more influential method of influencing the general public than the use of propaganda. Again, this point is related to Zeigler's emphasis on personal contact.

Leslie Kindred points out that a member's constructive involvement in community affairs can improve the image of a group and the attitudes of citizens toward the group's membership and activities. Involvement may give a group's members increased opportunity to discuss their objectives with the public and, as a result, enhance the public awareness and concern for its programs and goals.22

Finally, pressure group activities are directed toward the decision-makers including both legislators and administrators.

In a study of lobbying techniques, Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson established three categories of techniques. These are: means of direct communication, such as personal presentation of viewpoints, presentation of research results, and testifying at hearings; communication through intermediaries, such as contact by constituents, contact by a close friend, letter and telegram campaigns, public relations campaigns, and publicizing voting records; methods of keeping channels open, such as entertaining, giving a party, bribery, campaign work, and contributing money.23

The authors rated these various techniques according to the viewpoints of the lobbyists themselves. The lobbyists indicated that direct communication is by far the most effective method of achieving influence. The second most effective category was communication through intermediaries, particularly contact
by constituents and public relations campaigns. The social lobby was viewed as the least effective activity engaged in by the lobbyists.

In drawing conclusions concerning lobbying techniques, the authors said:

To the extent that we can talk meaningfully about lobbying in rather general terms, it is fair to say that lobbying in American legislative systems is not very effective in the sense of conventional popular conceptions of the shrewdness and manipulative ability of lobbyists. Lobbying activity is, in the main, directed at legislators who sympathize with the policy positions of the group or groups involved; lobbyists depend very substantially on their friends—those who sympathize with their cause. Much of lobbying involves the reinforcement and activation of sympathetic legislators, rather than the conversion of legislators from one policy position to another.24

SUMMARY

As a result of the analysis of the variables which ultimately determine the effectiveness of pressure group efforts, the following assumptions can be made concerning teachers organizations, in general, and the KSTA, in particular.

1. In order for a pressure group activity to be effective, the public must view its goals and operations as legitimate.

2. A decision-maker will take the social status of a group's membership into account when he considers the group's proposals.

3. The success of group efforts will depend to a great extent upon the bias of the public and the decision-makers with respect to a group's proposals.

4. Wealth, and the political expertise with which it is used, will affect the outcome of pressure group activities.
5. The membership of a group will be influential in determining a group's success with respect to volume, social status, cohesion, and willingness to participate.

6. The skill and ability a group's leaders possess will have a bearing on its success or failure.

7. The success of a group's strategy will depend upon the available political resources, such as money and volunteer workers, and the political expertise with which these resources are used.

8. A pressure group will remain more flexible and in a better position to achieve its objectives if it does not align itself with a particular political party.

9. Community involvement proves more successful than propaganda techniques in the attempt to influence public opinion.

10. Direct communication with decision-makers based on quality research is the most successful lobbying technique applied by pressure groups.


3 Ibid., p. 314.


6 Ibid., p. 245.


9 Monsen and Cannon, loc. cit.


11 Monsen and Cannon, loc. cit.


14 Ziegler, op. cit., p. 244.

15 Ibid., pp. 243-4.

16 Ibid.

18Ibid., p. 56.


20Ibid., p. 274.

21Gable, op. cit., p. 314.


24Ibid., pp. 297-8.
CHAPTER II

A PRESSURE GROUP EFFORT

THE KANSAS SCHOOL CRISIS ALERT

During the last six months of 1967, the KSTA and the National Education Association (NEA) joined forces in promoting a study of the public school system in Kansas. Dr. William McClure, director of educational research at the University of Illinois headed the investigation team. The team pointed out the following weaknesses in the Kansas public school system:

1. many districts without kindergartens, and almost all districts without experimental programs in pre-kindergarten education—the new and best frontier in education.
2. few programs for exceptional children, including slow learners, physically handicapped, and gifted.
3. few teachers in elementary schools who are specialists in music, physical education, science, or the practical arts.
4. junior highs floundering for a purpose.
5. completely inadequate vocational programs.
6. few supportive services such as guidance and counseling, libraries, psychological services, research and curriculum development.
7. shortage of instructional materials.
8. inflexible and often dangerous buildings.
9. limited programs in many high schools.
10. little in-service teacher education.
11. few summer or remedial programs.
12. inability of districts to attract and hold highly competent staff in all fields.
13. underdeveloped programs for dropouts and adults.

In a news release on July 4, 1968, the KSTA offered a public explanation of the root causes of the "Crisis":
1. The local property tax is bearing the major school finance burden--60 percent of operating costs in 1967-68. Resulting justified resistance by property owners is stifling progress in our school.
2. Property is not located where the children are, causing great inequities for children in property-poor districts, and to the taxpayers.
3. State support of education, raised from 20 to 37 percent of operating costs with passage of the School Foundation Finance Act in 1965, already has fallen to 30 percent and will drop annually under the present formula. Kansas today ranks 37th in state support of schools.
4. Complete reliance on the property tax to finance school construction annually widens the gap in school plant investment between Kansas and the rest of the nation. Sixty percent of school bonds were turned down by voters last year.
5. Though the Unification Act of 1963 cut the number of school districts from 1,847 to 335, many districts still are much too small to finance a well-rounded, modern educational program. Two-thirds of Kansas high schools enroll fewer than 200 students--half enough to support a program which serves all students.
6. The Foundation Finance Act does not achieve the primary purpose of such an act--equal educational opportunity for all Kansas children with each school district making an equal effort to provide this. Rich districts often get more state aid than poor districts.
7. Kansas is not in the national teacher market--ranking 32nd in salaries and lacking any career incentive (less than $1,000 between the beginning and career average salaries). School administrators say they are accepting teachers this year they would not have interviewed a few years ago.
8. Kansas teachers are not recognized in law as a profession, with the responsibility to set and enforce standards for getting in and staying in the profession, a responsibility given all other learned professions.
9. Locally teachers do not have the legal right to a voice in developing school policy they must implement.

Despite the McClure Committee findings in 1967, the 1968 session of the state legislature failed to provide relief for the educational dilemma in Kansas. Consequently, the KSTA State
Representative Assembly, which is the policy-making body of the Kansas State Teachers Association, declared a School Crisis Alert in March of 1968. The obvious purpose of the Alert was to mobilize the KSTA resources into the formation of an effective pressure group.

PUBLIC OPINION

Americans have traditionally been sympathetic toward the ideal of free public education for all citizens. The necessity of a public education system in America has been known since the beginning of this nation's history. Wise men have written for hundreds of years that a democratic system of government depends, for its very existence, upon an educated public. The public has realized that:

Democracy could not work without an enlightened electorate. The various states and regions could not achieve unity without a sentiment of nationalism. The nation could not absorb tens of millions of immigrants from all parts of the globe without rapid and effective Americanization. Economic and social distinctions and privileges, severe enough to corrode democracy itself, had to be fought. To our schools went the momentous responsibility of inspiring a people to pledge and hold allegiance to these historic principles of democracy, nationalism, Americanism, and egalitarianism.3

Education as an institution, then, presents no problem. It has always been recognized as a public "good." The public image of teachers, however, is a different matter.

The public image of the average classroom teacher has traditionally been of a negative character. The teacher in America carries with him a certain stereotype or image. Regardless of
what an educator says or does, the average citizen views him through a filter of prejudice because of this stereotype.

In order to understand the overall image attached to the present day teacher, it is necessary to refer back to the beginning of education in this country. The United States has been forced to deal with the problem of teacher shortage since its infancy as a nation. In the early stages of her history, there were so few educated people in the country that those who had received an education sought more rewarding positions or greater opportunities than those offered by the teaching profession. Consequently, communities had no choice other than to settle, "...for what they could get, and what they got was a high proportion of misfits and incompetents." As a result, citizens were reluctant to pay attractive salaries, feeling that such persons were undeserving. Obviously, this situation perpetuated itself and became a vicious circle at an early stage in the game.

Although the dilemma of teacher shortage has varied in the amount of acuteness from era to era, it has always been a problem. As long as some areas must hire unqualified personnel on occasion, the average citizen will continue to believe that such an individual is not worthy of a higher status or salary.

Leslie Kindred suggests that another reason for the prevailing teacher image is satirical treatment from authors. He and others give Ichabod Crane as an example.

Still a third factor in the poor public image of teachers is that the members of the profession are often their own worst enemies. The teacher feels he has reason to complain and complain
he does—to any individual who will listen to him and to the community at large.

Laboring under heavy classroom and extra classroom assignments, seldom receiving recognition for outstanding service or encouragement to experiment with new ideas; harassed daily with financial troubles in trying to make ends meet, they become discouraged and disappointed with their lot in life. No attempt is made to hide these sentiments from the public.⁶

Finally, the teacher's image is often damaged by administrators. Principals and superintendents are often in the position of having to cope with irate parents when teacher-pupil friction occurs. All too frequently, the teacher ends up on the losing end of the battle when the administrator fails to speak on his behalf and the teacher is not present to defend himself.

The result of all this is, of course, that when a teacher speaks out, the public is guided, not by what he says, but by his image. Consequently, what he says is unlikely to have any great amount of influence on public opinion. In other words, the public will judge a teacher's ideas by the way they judge the profession and its personnel as a whole. Most people judge men rather than ideas.⁷

The goals established by the KSTA School Crisis Alert did not conform to the public's thinking. For example, the basic issue of the 1968 campaign and the 1969 legislative session was tax reform. Property owners were bearing 60 per cent of the state's finances. Feeling the weight of such financial stress, these citizens have reached a point where they tend to be against
any tax increase, regardless of its purpose. The public viewed the KSTA pressure group efforts as primarily a demand for more money, thus increased property taxes.

According to Senator Janssen, his constituents are not against education but they are against tax increases. Consequently, he feels that the public attitude in his district is antagonistic toward more than 40 per cent state support of schools.\(^8\) The KSTA originally asked for 60 per cent.

Another factor influencing the public bias is the fear of state control. Local constituents want their schools locally controlled and feel that 60 per cent state support of schools would put primary control in the hands of the state.

Janssen further pointed out the lack of public sympathy for teachers. He explained that the public views all teacher efforts as a demand for salary increases and the public feels that since the teacher works only nine months of the year, he does not deserve a higher salary.\(^9\)

**INTERNAL ORGANIZATION**

Internal organization of the School Crisis Alert was established by the KSTA. The state was divided into eleven Political Action Districts. (PAD's). The districts were the same as the State Board of Education Districts except PAD #11 which was created by taking parts of board of education districts #4 and #5. The size of the PAD's ranged from seven and one half counties in District Seven to twenty-four counties in District Five. The PAD's were further divided into local organizations known
as Political Action Committees or PAC's. There was to have been a PAC established by every local organization throughout the state.

The PAD's and the PAC's constituted the machinery through which the KSTA hoped to influence the 1968 election. It must be remembered, however, that these groups were in their infancy and lacking in political expertise. They were factions of organizations geared to educational matters, not political processes.

WEALTH

The available information regarding the actual amount of money put into the Alert program is incomplete. Political contributions were extracted from and donated by the local PAC's. All teachers were given pledge cards requesting a minimum of ten dollars or ten hours of volunteer effort. Bill Moore's records show that, in some areas, a large percentage of the teachers made such pledges. His diary and notebooks show further that many of the pledges were not kept.  

The local PAC's decided upon the distribution of funds. Teachers had the opportunity, at the time of making a donation, to specify where or to whom the money was to be given. If they asked that it be contributed to the local PAC, the leaders of the organization used the donation as they saw fit.

It is difficult to evaluate the importance of wealth in this group effort because of incomplete reports and conflicting viewpoints. Mr. Low said contributions were an important factor
in the group's activities, as many Republican candidates benefited from them.\textsuperscript{11}

On the other hand, Mr. Pendergast said the effect of contributions to the Democratic Party from the Crisis Alert movement was negligible.\textsuperscript{12}

**NUMBERS**

According to a study, conducted by the Republicans in 1966, the teaching profession could become a powerful influence in the political arena. This is true not only because education is becoming an issue in which there is a growing public concern but also because of the numbers involved in the teaching profession. The Republican study included the following findings and opinions:

Successful parties and politicians pay attention to statistics on group occupations.

While many of the older occupations are declining in numbers, teachers have become the largest single occupational group in the United States and their numbers are, of necessity, increasing more rapidly.

The teaching profession, as much as any single group, will influence and stimulate the young majority in this Nation. Youthful minds provide powerful and much prized forums for the consideration and discussion of the values of our civilization.

By 1974 -- 8 years away -- we'll have 3,083,000 teachers in elementary, secondary schools, and colleges.

And to realize that in less than 10 years we'll have more teachers voting than farmers.\textsuperscript{13}

There are approximately 30,000 teachers in Kansas and the vast majority of them belong to the KSTA. Most teachers belong to the middle class, supposedly the most influential class po-
Since there exists a voting public of approximately 800,000 in Kansas, it is not unrealistic to believe that total mobilization of the teaching force in politics could result in personal contact with every voter in the state. This would mean that every teacher would only have to contact approximately twenty-five voters, seemingly a reasonable proposal.

The fallacy here lies in the apathy of the typical school teacher. This problem will be more thoroughly discussed under the heading of member participation.

**LEADERSHIP**

KSTA leadership is centralized in the association headquarters in Topeka. The personnel in Topeka apparently are dominated by persons whose primary training has been in education.

The leadership has a twofold obligation to the members. It constitutes the political arm or lobby of the association. Also, it is responsible for providing leadership in professional educational matters, such as modern teaching methods.

The suggestion was made by several of those interviewed that the leadership function should be divided and the lobbyist activities be assumed by hired professionals. However, the association policy remains that of using educators rather than professionals in this endeavor.

During the summer of 1968, Crisis Alert leadership in each PAD was assumed by a co-ordinator employed by the KSTA. Application forms were sent to the local associations instructing
them to seek members who were qualified and interested in applying for summer positions as PAD co-ordinators. Fifteen KSTA members from across the state were employed. These co-ordinators served throughout the summer as full-time liaison men between the local organizations and the state association.

Bill Moore, co-ordinator of PAD #6, was not aware of the process by which his name was selected from the applicants of his district. As a matter of fact, he apparently was not even knowledgable as to how many applications there were or who had applied.16

Leadership of the local PAC's in PAD #6 seemed to have been more or less a volunteer situation. These people were not paid for their efforts. It is apparent that the major standards applied to the selection of local leadership were willingness to participate and association membership. Apparently, there was little or no emphasis placed on the attempt to select leaders who had been involved in past political campaigns.

On the whole, the leadership of the entire movement was lacking in political expertise. This was the major criticism of the Crisis Alert voiced by Bill Low.17

COHESION

With the exception of teachers organizations connected with the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), which is AFL-CIO affiliated, the associations usually have heterogenous membership. They attempt to include all segments of the educational process; consequently, subjecting themselves to internal conflict.
Another factor concerning the general lack of cohesion in the KSTA, and other sister associations, is the evidence of administrative domination of organization policies and activities. Many teachers refuse to participate when they become aware that the association is not, in fact, representative of the classroom teacher.

A third situation which contributes to lack of cohesion is that there is evidence available showing the associations, in many areas, to be not at all voluntary. Administrative pressure is often the predominant reason for joining. Therefore, many teachers are more than merely passive toward the association. They are actively negative because of the pressure they have been forced to withstand.

MEMBER PARTICIPATION

The majority of the members in such associations are not active. They are generally rather apathetic toward the policies and activities of the organization. A study by Harmon Zeigler on the political life of teachers in Oregon points out that only thirty-three per cent of the men and fifteen per cent of the women teachers are well informed as to association policy.18

Along with apathy, teachers have not in the past thought political activities appropriate for the profession's members. Although there is some indication that the trend is changing, teachers associations have traditionally held that political involvement at the local level is not in line with their best interests. Teachers as individuals and as members of an asso-
cation, cannot hope to influence a system in which they refuse to participate.

The School Crisis Alert is an indication that teachers are beginning to realize the responsibility for reshaping their public image through involvement. The only way to attack this dilemma is by getting involved in public affairs. It is imperative that teachers become politically conscious. Teachers are apolitical by choice. Most feel that politics and education do not mix. They want the system to be above "shady politics."

What the profession has failed to see is that, only through an understanding of the prevailing political system--its imperfections and how it works--can the teacher hope to have any influence on public opinion. He must learn that mere talk, followed by a void in action, is not going to further his goals. He must become conditioned to accept partial fulfillment of his demands. Being involved provides him with a sense of realism and helps him understand that he is not going to achieve the impossible the very first time he ventures forth into the game of politics. First, he is going to have to learn how political success is achieved. 19

Political involvement constituted an important category in the Crisis Alert activities. Many Kansas teachers gave their time to the effort. In PAD #6, mailings were handled for Robert Dole and Bill Avery, Republican candidates for the Senate, as well as for other local candidates. At the McPherson County Fair, in early August, the McPherson teachers handed out School Crisis Alert balloons and helped in the Republican booth. Mr.
Moore organized three carloads of volunteers to participate in a caravan for Lloyd Ruppenthal, a candidate for the state board of education. Many other such activities took place.

Generally, teacher involvement was a significant result of the Crisis Alert. Many teachers joined the political game for the first time. Whether or not they will remain involved, however, cannot be determined until the next election. The involvement was "spotty" throughout the state. Some PAC's mobilized a large and active force while others never were organized. Both Rose Ann Harrington and Garry Smith complained of apathy on the part of KSTA members.20

STRATEGY

THE ELECTORATE

The first activity mentioned in Chapter I in regard to activities within the electoral process was to obtain financial donations. This subject has been discussed previously in relation to political resources and internal organization. The strategy of providing volunteer workers was referred to in the same section. In addition to the already mentioned activities, various types of meetings were arranged for interviewing candidates and giving them an opportunity to express their viewpoints. For example, on May 15, a meeting was held in Lyons. Local candidates were invited to attend and explain their positions on educational issues. Teachers, as well as interested citizens, were encouraged to attend. Similar meetings were held in McPherson and in Hutchinson.
In summary, concerning the effectiveness of these two strategies, the evidence available pertaining to the School Crisis Alert shows donations were contributed and workers were provided. The amount of effort, however, varied throughout the state and the effectiveness of the activities depended upon the local enthusiasm of each respective PAC.

Since there are only three educators in the Kansas State Legislature and all were in office before the Crisis Alert took place, it is evident that the KSTA did not place major emphasis upon the attempt to place its own members in office. Paul Klotz, a teacher and candidate for state representative, said he received very little support from the local PAC as a group effort.\(^\text{21}\)

Candidates for public office were, however, contacted. In PAD #6, Moore sent questionnaires to all local, state, and national candidates. These questionnaires, in effect, asked for a statement of the candidate's position on educational issues. After gathering this information, the results were printed and distributed to the locals, giving teachers an opportunity to study the positions so that they could see which candidates were most nearly in accord with the KSTA's position.

Apparently, the effort to contact all candidates was not completed throughout the state. According to Paul Pendergast, the Democratic Party published Governor Docking's position on the educational issues and sent copies to all schools. There were some schools, however, who refused to distribute the publication.\(^\text{22}\)
The final electoral activity mentioned was the attempt to influence political parties and their platforms. A study of the Crisis Alert movement reveals that another major purpose was the defeat of Robert Docking and the election of Rick Harman in the Kansas gubernatorial election.

Mr. Pendergast has the opinion that this objective constituted the primary goal of the movement. An influential Republican leader in the state, who asked not to be named, agreed with Pendergast's opinion and further said his opinion was that the movement in general was guided and dominated by his party. The obvious partisanship of the movement presents a dilemma which future KSTA efforts must try to alleviate.

The Kansas teachers can expect little sympathy for their proposals from Governor Docking and the Democratic legislators. On the other hand, since the KSTA has lent its support so completely to the Republican Party, that party need not pay particular attention to KSTA demands. A pressure group cannot easily switch its support once committed. The KSTA appears somewhat trapped at this point.

Pressure group history shows that, on occasion, the group has no choice in the matter of partisanship. However, it is not so in this case. Liberal Democratic philosophy has traditionally been strong in the area of educational improvement. The teachers had only to consider Governor Docking's proposals on the subject with an unbiased eye to see that they would not have proved inimical to the cause.
THE PUBLIC

A major purpose of the Crisis Alert was to publicize the fact that a "crisis" existed and point out to the citizens of Kansas in general, and the legislators in particular, what steps should be taken in order to alleviate the situation. Public information was a key element in the program.

In June, 1968, a position paper was approved by the KSTA Board of Directors. It became the basis for a leaflet outlining the causes of the "crisis" and suggesting avenues for its alleviation. At least 185,000 copies of the leaflet were distributed by late July. Twenty-five thousand yard signs, 2,000 fence signs, 40 billboards, and nearly 100,000 window stickers proclaiming the Alert were placed throughout the state. This propaganda effort cost the KSTA more than $50,000.

In addition, local PAC's were encouraged to obtain press coverage of their activities and buy advertising space in order to publicize the School Crisis Alert. In PAD #6, the radio stations at Salina (KSAL), Russell (KRSI), Newton (KIRG), and McPherson (KNEX) were contacted and provided with a two minute tape explaining the Alert.

Senator Janssen and others interviewed believed that the propaganda effort was, at most, minimally successful. The public probably realized that a threat was being posed but the matter of salary increase was generally the main aspect of the program which reached the public. This situation, of course, was more detrimental than helpful to the effort.
Although teacher involvement in the political process has been mentioned as a significant element in the program, the evidence available tends to show that the teachers were not particularly successful in educating the public as to the nature of educational problems in Kansas. In fact, after discussing the effort with fellow teachers, the author is convinced that most teachers are not even aware of the precise nature of the state's educational dilemma.

Low, Pendergast, and Janssen all pointed out that the nature of the public information distributed might possibly have been a major drawback. The request for additional money might have reached a more receptive public if it had been accompanied by proposals aimed at economy and efficiency in the area of education.²⁴

DECISION-MAKERS

Strategy with respect to influencing the state's decision-makers portrays the most concrete example of failure in the Crisis Alert.

The KSTA lobby has been mentioned previously under the topic of leadership. This apparently is the only method of direct communication employed. These leaders, specifically Dr. Melvin Neeley, the KSTA Executive-Secretary, contact the policy-makers and present the association viewpoints and research ideas. Low, Pendergast, and Janssen agreed that the KSTA lobby lacks political expertise and is not generally effective.²⁵
Dr. McFarland said he felt the Crisis Alert was successful in the endeavor to influence legislation because the cause of education gained far more in 1969 than it had in 1967 or 1968.\textsuperscript{26} A closer look at the KSTA demands together with the actual legislation passed proves somewhat illuminating.

A primary objective of the School Crisis Alert was to achieve certain legislative goals during the 1969 session. In general, the KSTA was demanding three innovations.

*Greatly increased state support of public education distributed through a new formula which stresses equalization of educational opportunity and of taxpayer effort.
*A revision of the Kansas School Retirement Act to make the retirement program for public school employees competitive with programs in other states and with the system established by the Kansas Legislature for Kansas college employees.
*Recognition of teaching as a profession with the rights and responsibilities of other professions in this state.\textsuperscript{27}

The results of the KSTA effort to influence the legislators were minimal. In its School Crisis Alert Position Paper, the KSTA recommended doubling the amount of state financial support to education.\textsuperscript{28} The recommendation would have meant an increase of 60 per cent state aid and an appropriation of approximately \$35 million from the 1969 legislative session. The legislature voted \$27 million in funds which increased state support from 30 per cent to 40 per cent. Obviously, the KSTA goals were not fulfilled. However, the point can be made that a 10 per cent increase is superior to no increase at all.

It is difficult to determine what influence, if any, the Crisis Alert had on the state legislators in achieving this
legislation. As mentioned before, according to Kansas State Senator Jack Janssen, the percentage of state support was increased because the need was apparent and the citizens of Kansas were prepared and willing to accept such an increase. Again, he further expressed the opinion that 40 per cent represents a limit to state support and that his constituents are unwilling to accept another increase regardless of the KSTA demand for 60 per cent. 29

It must also be pointed out that the tax structure was not changed in providing this appropriation. The $27 million was to be extracted from the state cofferes because no legislation was passed making provision for the money. Obviously, this situation cannot continue and the legislature will eventually have to pass laws providing the necessary revenue or the aid will cease.

The retirement question was not dealt with during the 1969 session. Consequently, no advancement whatever was made in regard to this issue. However, Kelvin E. Neeley, assured the KSTA members in a newsletter on April 17, that the Legislative Council would include teacher retirement as one of its studies during the coming months. Mr. Neeley said that this study should greatly increase the chances of favorable legislation on the subject of retirement during the 1970 legislative session. 30

In the same newsletter, Mr. Neeley commented on the passage of SB 140--The Professional Teaching Practices Act. He said;

At last teaching has a legal voice in setting standards for itself and for education in this
state. The potential for improvement of education is in our hands. What we make of it will be up to us. The enacted bill did not sacrifice a principle we sought. Every teacher can hold his head more proudly today.31

The School Crisis Alert Position Paper stated that the Professional Teaching Practices Act should recognize teaching in this state as a profession and establish the machinery through which the profession would be able to exercise self-government and to work with the lay state board of education and other responsible agencies towards improved educational opportunity in the state.32 In other words, the KSTA position is that educators should establish professional policy and should have a voice in the adaption of educational policy in the state.

SB 140 hardly fulfills these goals, at least on the surface. (See Appendix I) Section 1 of the bill says, "Teaching is hereby declared to be a profession in Kansas with similar rights, responsibilities, and privileges accorded other legally recognized professions." The "rights, responsibilities, and privileges" are not, however, enumerated. Also the inclusion of the word "similar" leaves immeasurable room for alteration of the "rights, responsibilities, and privileges" if clarification of them is ever attempted.

Section 2 of the act establishes a professional teaching standards advisory board or standards board to be composed of thirty-one members.

If the standards board is to be truly representative of the classroom teacher, it seems imperative that the membership of the
board be designated and appointed by the teachers themselves on some sort of democratically contrived, representative basis. Members of the board are to be appointed, in fact, by the state board of education, a group of laymen. Section 2 further provides, in detailing the membership, that merely eleven of the appointees must necessarily be classroom teachers. Nevertheless, the number represents a greater percentage than were serving on the governor's advisory board for education before this act was passed.

The duties and responsibilities of the standards board are defined in Section 5 of SB 140. In general, the board is to act as an advisory council to the state board of education on all educational matters. More specifically, the standards board is given power to develop and recommend for adoption; "...the rules and regulations for professional standards governing teacher pre-training selection, teacher preparation, admission to and continuation in the practice of teaching."

Obviously the power to set one's own house in order is prerequisite to any group's achievement of professional status. This bill, however, makes no such grant of authority. It states specifically, "Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the state board of education from initiating and adopting rules and regulations on the matters specified in this section, irrespective of any action or lack thereof by the standards board."

The final blow in Section 5 is the statement that the state board of education need not even consult with the standards board if it, "...finds that an emergency exists..."
The act establishes also a practices commission to which is designated the power of disciplinary and advisory functions. Closer scrutiny of the section, however, reveals that the practices commission stands as naked of power as does the standards board.

The finale of SB 140 is found in Section 9 wherein the state board of education is given power to remove any member of either the standards board or the practices commission. Although grounds for removal are categorized—"...misconduct or malfeasance in office, incompetence or neglect,"—they are so vague that little protection is afforded a member of either group who has come into disfavor.33

Without belaboring the point further, the School Crisis Alert program failed in its effort to influence the Kansas legislators in its behalf. Referring back to Jewell and Patterson, it appears accurate to surmise that not many of the state legislators are in sympathy with KSTA goals and objectives.34
FOOTNOTES


5 Kindred, op. cit., p. 31.

6 Ibid., p. 33.


9 Ibid.

10 Bill Moore, personal notebooks, McPherson, Kansas.

11 Bill Low, private interview, Topeka, Kansas, June, 1969.

12 Paul Pendergast, private interview, Topeka, Kansas, June, 1969.


15 Janssen, Low, and Pendergast, loc. cit.


17 Low, loc. cit.


20 Rose Ann Harrington and Garry Smith, private interviews, Topeka and Lyons, Kansas, May-June, 1969.


22 Pendergast, *loc. cit.*

23 Ibid.


25 Ibid.

26 Dr. Joe McFarland, private interview, Topeka, Kansas, June, 1969.


29 Janssen, *loc. cit.*


31 Ibid.


CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the general assumptions drawn at the conclusion of Chapter I, the following statements and recommendations summarize the analysis of the 1968 Kansas School Crisis Alert.

1. The Kansas public's main legislative concern at present is the tax structure. When the KSTA asked for more than $30 million and an increase in state support of education from 30 per cent to 60 per cent, the public did not view the proposal as legitimate. There is much waste in the Kansas educational system. Emphasis on economy and efficiency within the schools would be viewed as a vastly more legitimate demand and would receive public sympathy to a much greater degree.

2. The public does not sympathize with teacher demands or proposals. Therefore, a legislator does not consider teachers as influential members of his constituency.

3. Although political involvement on the part of teachers is an increasing phenomenon, the public apparently hesitates in its commitment to teachers as educational policy-makers. This hesitancy is not surprising considering the long history of teachers keeping out of politics. The public bias is strongly in favor of education as an institution. However, it is prejudiced
against the teacher. This prejudice results from the prevailing teacher image and the aloofness of teachers which sets them apart from the general community.

The answer to this situation is increased involvement on the part of teachers and a widespread public relations program. The association is responsible for interpreting to the public the role played in American life by the teaching profession. Most educational organizations are beginning to realize the value of good public relations and are doing something about it. However, the resources and technical skills being used to create an improved public image are, to date, inadequate. The KSTA has hired a public relations firm from Wichita, "Psyche Incorporated," to advise the organization as to how it can improve its image—with respect to both the public and its own membership. This may well be the most significant step taken by the KSTA, to the present, in its endeavor to improve the public education system in Kansas.

4. The KSTA cannot be viewed as a wealthy professional group. Obviously, teaching is not a lucrative profession. Nevertheless, the organization collects dues every year from a large percentage of 30,000 people. Money is available to the organization but the political expertise with which such funds are used could be improved.

5. Although the KSTA is supported by a broad base of potential power as far as numbers are concerned, the average teacher lacks an influential voice in the community, the KSTA's heterogenous membership causes internal friction, and the majority of the members are not willing to be active participants in the
association's programs.

6. The School Crisis Alert, a political effort, was not guided and directed by persons possessing political knowledge, skill, background, and expertise.

7. Although the available political resources were not used to the fullest extent and with the greatest dexterity, the fact that they were used at all, in the attempt to influence the political process, might possibly be a giant step toward future success.

8. One of the most calamitous events of the entire movement was its failure to remain nonpartisan. The KSTA has unnecessarily created for itself a dilemma which it must correct if it is to be effective.

9. The funds spent in advertising the educational problems in Kansas would be better used in providing literature and workshops for teachers with the purpose of educating them as to the nature of such problems, and encouraging them to take part in community affairs in order to educate the general public in the same direction.

10. The KSTA lobby obviously fails in its attempt to influence the state's decision-makers. The association's research facilities should be expanded and personnel with a thorough knowledge of political processes should be hired. Due to the traditional lack of teacher involvement in politics, it may well prove difficult to find people with both a political and an educational background but the effort to seek them out would prove worthwhile. The association's cause would undoubtedly be advanced in the
political arena if it were led by personnel who have had experience in dealing with American political institutions and know "the name of the game."
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APPENDIX I

SENATE BILL NO. 140

By Committee on Education

Session of 1969

An Act concerning education, declaring the practice of teaching and related services to be a profession; providing for the professional teaching standards advisory board and the professional teaching practices commission; teacher preparation, certification, performance, and employment; and providing for adoption and enforcement of professional teaching standards relating thereto; providing penalties in certain cases.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Kansas:

Section 1. It is the intent and purpose of the legislature that the practice of teaching and its related services, including administering and supervisory services, shall be designated as professional services. Teaching is hereby declared to be a profession in Kansas with all the similar rights, responsibilities, and privileges accorded other legally recognized professions.

Sec. 2. (a) There is hereby established the professional teaching standards advisory board, herein called "standards board." The standards board shall have thirty-one (31) members, who shall be appointed by the state board of education.

(b) Members of the standards board shall be appointed not more than ninety (90) days after the effective date of this act.

(c) Candidates for the standards board shall have the following qualifications:

(1) Either (A) be certificated and actively practicing in Kansas, or (B) be a member of the faculty of an institution of higher learning; and

(2) have at least five (5) years' professional educational experience; and

(3) have been in active practice the immediately preceding three (3) years and at the time of appointment.

(d) The state board of education shall obtain nominees for the standards board from the segments of the profession to be represented on the standards board, as specified in subsection (f) of this section, according to rules and procedures established by the
state board of education, except for ex officio positions.

(e) In the event that a full membership to the
standards board is not appointed by the state board
of education within ninety (90) days after the effective
date of this act, the members of the standards board
shall be promptly appointed by the governor.

(f) The appointments made by the state board of
education shall reflect due consideration for representa-
tion of the various elements of the teaching pro-
ession, and shall include at least the following:

(1) Eleven classroom teachers (three from elementary
schools, three from junior high schools, three from
high schools and two from junior colleges).

(2) Three chief school administrators from the public
schools.

(3) Three principals (one high school, one junior
high, and one elementary).

(4) One person employed in an area vocational school.

(5) One representative of the faculty or administration
of a public community junior college.

(6) One superintendent of a nonpublic school system.

(7) Three persons employed in church-related colleges.

(8) Four deans or heads of schools or departments
of education of the public supported colleges and uni-
versities.

(9) Two persons chosen from segments of the profes-
sion not mentioned in this subsection (f).

(10) The state commissioner of education.

(11) The assistant commissioner having supervision
of the division of accreditation and certification.

(g) The assistant commissioner of the division of
accreditation and certification shall serve the standards
board as secretary.

Sec. 3. (a) There is hereby established a profes-
sional teaching practices commission to be comprised
of seventeen (17) members appointed by the state board
of education as provided in subsection (d) of section 2.

(b) Members of the practices commission shall be
appointed not more than ninety (90) days after the
effective date of this act.

(c) Candidates for the practices commission shall
have the following qualifications:

(1) Either (A) be certificated and actively prac-
ticing in Kansas, or (B) be a member of the faculty
of an institution of higher learning; and

(2) have at least five (5) years' professional
educational experience; and

(3) have been in active practice the immediately
preceeding three (3) years and at the time of appoint-
ment.

(d) In the event that a full membership to the
practices commission is not appointed by the state
board of education within ninety (90) days after the
effective date of this act, the members of the practices commission shall be promptly appointed by the governor.

(e) The appointments made by the state board of education shall reflect due consideration for representation of the various elements of the teaching profession, and shall include at least the following:

(1) Eight classroom teachers (elementary, junior high school, high school or junior college, including specialized nonadministrative personnel).
(2) One chief school administrator.
(3) One high school principal.
(4) One junior high school principal.
(5) One elementary school principal.
(6) One vocational administrator or teacher.
(7) Three persons chosen without regard to the qualifications specified in this subsection (e).
(8) The Assistant commissioner having supervision of the division of accreditation and certification.

(f) The assistant commissioner having supervision of the division of accreditation shall serve the practices commission as secretary.

Sec. 4. After appointment of the initial members, later appointments to full or unexpired terms of members to the standards board and the practices commission shall be made by the state board of education following the same procedure as that provided in sections 2 and 3 of this act.

Sec. 5. The standards board shall have the following responsibilities and duties:

(a) To develop through the teaching profession and recommend for adoption, or amendment and adoption, by the state board of education the rules and regulations for professional standards governing teacher pretraining selection, teacher preparation, admission to and continuance in the practice of teaching. Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the state board of education from initiating and adopting rules and regulations on the matters specified in this section, irrespective of any action or lack thereof by the standards board. However, in such instance, the proposed rule and regulation governing a matter specified in this subsection (a) shall be submitted to the standards board and without such waiting period.

(b) To confer on a professional advisory basis with the state board of education on all other matters concerning education and the teaching profession.

(c) To make recommendations to the state board of education, state board of regents, institutions of higher education, local boards of education, the legislature, state officials, and other individuals or groups regarding matters to improve education.

(d) To develop advisory guidelines with respect to professional employment practices.
Sec. 6. The practices commission shall exercise disciplinary and advisory functions and shall hear cases arising under rules and regulations adopted under subsection (a) of section 5 of this act involving the issuance, continuance, suspension, revocation, or reinstatement of teachers' and administrators' certificates and make recommendations to the state board of education for disposition thereof, and the state board of education shall determine such cases, with or without additional hearing. The practices commission may conduct investigations of departures from the advisory guidelines adopted under subsection (d) of section 5 of this act and report its findings thereon to the state board. The practices commission shall make recommendations to the state board of education on such other matters and measures as may be necessary to improve education.

Sec. 7. (a) The practices commission shall have responsibility, power and authority to investigate problems relating to the teaching profession, including the matters specified in section 6 of this act. Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the state board of education from initiating and adopting rules and regulations on the matters specified in this section, irrespective of any action or lack thereof by the practices commission, subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of section 5.

(b) The practices commission shall have the responsibility, power and authority to conduct hearings relating to any case arising under this act or the rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto.

(c) Rules and regulations relating to hearings by the practices commission shall be developed and recommended by the professional practices commission for adoption, or amendment and adoption, by the state board of education. Nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the state board of education from initiating and adopting rules and regulations on the matters specified in this section, irrespective of any action or lack thereof by the practices commission. The same shall provide for a reasonable notice. For the purpose of any investigation or hearing which the practices commission conducts, such commission shall have power to conduct such hearing, administer oaths, take depositions and by order of the state board of education to issue subpoenas, to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, documents and testimony. If any person shall refuse to obey any subpoena so issued, or shall refuse to testify or produce any books, papers, or documents, the state board of education or any member thereof may present a petition to the district court of the county in which any hearing or investigation is being conducted, setting forth the
facts, and thereupon such court shall, in a proper case, issue its subpoena to such person, requiring his or her attendance before such court and there to testify or to produce such books, papers and documents, as may be deemed necessary and pertinent by the practices commission or member of it. Any person failing or refusing to obey the subpoena or order of the said court may be proceeded against for contempt in the same manner as for refusal to obey any other subpoena or order of the court.

Sec. 8. Members of the standards board and practices commission shall be appointed for three (3) year terms, and no person shall be appointed to serve longer than two (2) full terms in addition to any term of a period shorter than three (3) years. The initial appointments shall be made for terms such that approximately one-third of the terms expire each year.

Sec. 9. The state board of education, either on its own initiative or on the recommendation of the standards board, may remove a member of the standards board or practices commission. Prior to removal of such member, the member shall be given reasonable notice and hearing before a committee of the state board, but removal of such a member shall be accomplished only by a majority vote of the entire membership of the state board. Grounds for removal shall be misconduct or malfeasance in office, incompetence or neglect.

Sec. 10. The standards board and practices commission shall each select a chairman and such other officers as shall be respectively determined by such board and such commission. The standards board and the practices commission shall meet independently, but may meet jointly by common consent of the members of both such board and such commission. Such board and such commission shall each provide for its own rules and procedure not in conflict with this act or rules and regulations adopted hereunder.

Sec. 11. The standards adopted pursuant to this act shall apply to all practicing teachers and administrators in schools and colleges under the general supervision of the state board of education, except that the provisions of this act shall have no application to Kansas technical institute or any teacher, administrator, or other officer or employee thereof.

Sec. 12. Members of the standards board and practices commission shall not be entitled to compensation but shall be paid their actual and necessary expenses out of funds appropriated for that purpose.


Sec. 14. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its publication in the statute book.
THE KANSAS SCHOOL CRISIS ALERT:
A CASE STUDY OF AN EFFORT AT PRESSURE GROUP MOBILIZATION

by

SUSAN B. HERBEL

B.A., Kansas State University, 1964

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

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MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

The shortage of public school teachers is one of the increasingly difficult problems which America faces each year. Young people who possess energy, ambition, talent, and intelligence are turning to other occupations and many, who are teaching at present, are looking for an escape from the profession.

Reasons for the lack of popularity of the teaching profession as a permanent occupation include; low salaries, lack of prestige within the school itself and in the community, shortage of modern facilities and current materials, student discipline problems, and lack of influence in the formation of educational policy.

It seems ironic that those people who are forced to cope with the problems of the educational institution daily have little or no voice in establishing educational policies. This situation is a result of the failure on the part of teachers and their associations to recognize and take part in the political processes wherein the policies are established.

Teachers have the power potential to form pressure groups which could effectively mobilize the public bias in their favor. Due to increased teacher militancy, such groups are beginning to appear. This paper is an attempt to analyze one such effort on the basis of established success variables for pressure group effectiveness. The case study tends to show that teachers are
still largely apathetic towards politics and the associations lack the necessary political expertise to be truly influential.

In its attempt to avert an educational crisis in Kansas, the Kansas State Teachers Association put forth a total effort known as the Kansas School Crisis Alert. The effort, in the final analysis, had little effect on the legislation passed by the 1969 legislative session. However, it is significant that a large number of teachers became involved in the game of politics for the first time.

The greatest criticism to be made of the effort was its failure to remain neutral. This failure resulted in the alienation of the elected governor, many legislators, and large segments of the public.

Another criticism is its lack of emphasis on economy and efficiency in the state's educational programs. The propaganda effort might have been vastly more successful if such emphasis had been placed. Instead, the public turned deaf ears on the clamor for "more" of everything.

Nevertheless, the fact that such activities are taking place in the state provides optimism for the future of teacher participation in forming educational policy.