

RESTORING ORDER: THE US ARMY EXPERIENCE WITH OCCUPATION
OPERATIONS, 1865–1952

by

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B.S., United States Military Academy, 1981
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AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the influence of the US Army experience in military government and occupation missions on occupations conducted during and immediately after World War II. The study concludes that army occupation experiences between the end of the Civil War and World War II positively influenced the occupations that occurred during and after World War II. The study specifically examines occupation and government operations in the post-Civil War American South, Cuba, the Philippines, Mexico, post-World War I Germany, and the major occupations associated with World War II in Italy, Germany, and Japan. Though historians have examined individual occupations, none has studied the entirety of the American army's experience with these operations. This dissertation finds that significant elements of continuity exist between the occupations, so much so that by the World War II period it discerns a unique American way of conducting occupation operations. Army doctrine was one of the major facilitators of continuity. An additional and perhaps more important factor affecting the continuity between occupations was the army's institutional culture, which accepted occupation missions as both important and necessary. An institutional understanding of occupation operations developed over time as the army repeatedly performed the mission or similar nontraditional military tasks. Institutional culture ensured an understanding of the occupation mission passed informally from generation to generation of army officers through a complex network of formal and informal, professional and personal relationships. That network of relationships was so complete that the World War II generation of leaders including Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, Clay and MacArthur, and Secretary of War Stimson, all had direct personal ties to individuals who served in key positions in previous occupations in the Philippines, Cuba, Mexico, or the Rhineland. Doctrine and the cultural understanding of the occupation mission influenced the army to devote major resources and command attention to occupation operations during and after World War II. Robust resourcing and the focus of leaders were key to overcoming the inevitable shortfalls in policy and planning that occurred during the war. These efforts contributed significantly to the success of the military occupations of Japan and Germany after World War II.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	ix
Dedication.....	x
CHAPTER 1 - US Army Occupation Operations, 1865–1952.....	1
CHAPTER 2 - The Roots of American Military Government: Reconstruction.....	20
Initial Occupation Policy.....	21
Initial Operations and Presidential Reconstruction.....	23
Congressional Reconstruction and Army Rule.....	33
Redemption and Failure.....	46
A Blueprint for the Future.....	59
CHAPTER 3 - The Frontier Army.....	62
The Frontier Army.....	63
The Army and Indian Policy.....	67
Border Operations.....	77
The Frontier Economy.....	80
Army Exploration.....	83
Passing on the Experience.....	88
CHAPTER 4 - Military Government in Cuba, 1899–1909.....	98
Leonard Wood in Santiago.....	99
First Year of the Occupation.....	102
Military Government Under Major General Wood.....	112
The Army Returns: Occupation 1906–09.....	122
Another Failure.....	132
CHAPTER 5 - Military Government in the Philippines, 1898 to 1913.....	138
Limited Governance Operations.....	139
Extending Military Government.....	150
The Moro Era.....	158
A Defining Experience.....	170
CHAPTER 6 - Occupation and World War, 1914–1923.....	177
Vera Cruz, 1914.....	179

Initial Operations	179
Conduct of the Occupation	181
Resolution of the Crisis.....	185
Occupation of the Rhineland, 1918–1923	186
The Armistice Occupation	195
Post Peace Treaty Occupation.....	206
Legacy.....	213
CHAPTER 7 - Preparing, Planning, and Testing Occupation Operations, 1919–1945	217
Institutional Training and Civil-Military Missions.....	218
Doctrine	226
North Africa and the Civil Affairs Division	229
Military Government Training.....	239
Operations in Italy	243
Preparing for Victory	251
CHAPTER 8 - Direct Military Government: Germany, 1944–1949	255
Germany Policy	257
Operational Planning	264
Organization.....	268
Rolling Carpet 1945.....	269
ECLIPSE 1945.....	270
Operations.....	275
Conduct of the Occupation 1946–47	281
Policy Change.....	290
End of the Army Occupation 1948–49	292
Success in Germany.....	296
CHAPTER 9 - Indirect Military Government: Japan, 1945–1952	304
Japan, August 1945.....	304
Plans and Policy.....	310
Organization and Command and Control	313
Conduct of the Occupation	321
End of the Occupation	339

Success in Japan.....	342
CHAPTER 10 - The American Way of Occupation.....	347
Institutional Culture	347
The American Way of Occupation	353
Challenges Not Met	361
Conclusions.....	365
Bibliography	367
Government Publications, Reports and Documents	367
Primary Source Books	372
Primary Source Articles	378
Manuscript Collections	379
Secondary Source Books	380
Secondary Source Articles	389
Internet Sources	390
Unpublished Sources	390

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my parents, Louis Savino DiMarco and Anna Maria DiMarco. My parents grew up during the great depression and World War II. My mother, who is German, experienced the American occupation of her home from the perspective of the occupied population. My father participated in the occupation of Japan as a member of the U.S. Air Force during the Korean War. They are the source of my fascination with this subject and history in general.

CHAPTER 1 - US Army Occupation Operations, 1865–1952

A much-researched aspect of the history of World War II is the two major military occupations that occurred because of the war: the occupations of Germany and Japan. Hosts of specialists in Japanese and German history have examined these operations. Cold War historians have also looked at the operations. However, except for Earl Ziemke's official history of the first years of the occupation of Germany, military historians have tended to avoid the tedious and nontraditional area of World War II military government and occupation.¹ Occupations are, however, critical to both the history of the US Army and to a complete understanding of war. For example, the generally accepted decisive victory of the Union over Confederate forces in the American Civil War is much less clear when viewed through the prism of the failure of Reconstruction. Similarly, General William T. Sherman's place in army history must also consider his staunch opposition to employing army troops in defense of the rights of freed slaves and Republican state governments during Reconstruction. The army was an important part of the history of Reconstruction, and the army's actions during Reconstruction are an important part of the army's history. Other army occupation missions, including Cuba and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War and the Rhineland after World War I, are also important to understanding and analyzing those conflicts. Post-conflict military operations are a critical and often ignored aspect of military history, particularly American military history.

No history has comprehensively examined the record of the US Army in occupation operations. This dissertation examines the US Army experience conducting post-conflict operations from 1865 to 1949. It argues that linkage exists between the success of the post-

¹ Earl Ziemke, *The US Army Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975).

World War II operations and the eighty years of US Army experience with military government and occupation prior to that success. Historians have examined the individual army efforts in occupation operations but most have failed to identify the continuity between those operations and the other important occupations in the army's history. No history has comprehensively examined US Army occupation operations (and only one has tried) across this period. This work looks at the history of the US Army occupations, beginning with Reconstruction and identifies several lines of continuity among the operations. The continuity is sufficiently explicit that it constitutes an American Way of Occupation. The American Way of Occupation focuses on forming democratic government, accepts civilian-led political policy, appreciates indigenous culture, supports public education, stresses law and order, and emphasizes the health and welfare of the population. Also characteristic of American occupations, but in a negative way, were the consistent lack of strategic political guidance and the lack of appreciation of the importance of economic development to political stabilization. This continuity in American occupation operations played an important role in the success of the World War II occupation in Germany and Japan. Among many other things, the early experiences focused the World War II military leadership on the issue and ensured adequate planning and robust resourcing of occupation operations.

How the army internalized the occupation experience as a part of its institutional culture is another important aspect of the history of occupations from 1865 to 1952. Military institutional culture, and its historical impacts are another subject that has not received the attention it deserves from military historians. The US Army entered World War II with an institutional culture that recognized the strategic importance of occupation operations based on the army's historical experience. The army's doctrine and military education system helped pass

the culture to the World War II generation of leaders. More importantly, previous generations of army leaders who were the veterans of occupations during Reconstruction, on the frontier, and after the Spanish-American War, passed their knowledge to the next generation of army leaders through a complex network of personal relationships. Those veterans, Generals Arthur MacArthur and John Pershing among them, mentored and coached the leaders of World War II, sharing their experiences, and therefore their understanding of the links between occupation operations and strategic success.

Only one author attempts to address the American experience with occupation operations and military government comprehensively and that is Stanley Sandler in *Glad to See them Come and Sorry to See them Go: A History of US Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991*.² His is the only attempt to describe the broad history of army civil affairs and military government. However, Sandler differs from the present work in two important respects. First, as the title indicates, Sandler focuses on tactical civil affairs and military government. Thus, his work does not approach the subject at the strategic and operational level nor does it consistently address key aspects such as doctrine, planning, training, organization and execution of occupation operations. Because the focus is tactical, the continuity of the American army's institutional approach to occupation operations remains unexplored. In addition, Sandler covers a much broader time period than this project. Sandler begins with an examination of civil-military operations during the 1775 American invasion of Canada and ends with operations in the early 1990s. Such a broad survey limits the depth in Sandler, causes him to cover the incidental operations as well as the strategically critical occupations, and thus fails to highlight

² Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See them Come and Sorry to See them Go: A History of US Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775–1991* (Privately Published, no date, probably 1997).

the critical operations from 1865 to 1949. Still, Sandler ably makes the point that civil-military operations are an important part of the US military experience.

During the post-Civil War Reconstruction, the US Army executed its first large-scale post-conflict occupation. Reconstruction established the basic pattern of operations and identified many of its salient challenges linking the American experience over several decades. During Reconstruction, the army occupied all of the former Confederate states. One of the strategic goals was permanent and important political and social transformation. The experience of army leaders in the process became part of the army tradition that informed and guided army officers who conducted subsequent occupation operations. *The United States Army and Reconstruction*, by James E. Sefton, is the only look at army operations in support of the Reconstruction in all of the Southern states.³ Sefton argues that despite the army's presence throughout the South for more than a decade, the failure of Reconstruction was inevitable. His view is that President Johnson's Presidential Reconstruction policy, which essentially turned over control of the South to former Confederates, was the only realistic solution to the chaos in the postwar South. The title of Sefton's final chapter, "The Only Possible Ending," represents how closed he is to any possibility of Reconstruction success. Unfortunately, Sefton's analysis is both shallow and wrong. To Sefton, politically moderate Union Generals George Meade, William Sherman, and John Schofield were wise army officers who recognized the hopelessness of using the military to enforce the unrealistic radical policies of Reconstruction. His analysis is very incomplete: he does not examine the impact that Johnson's major change in national policy had on the army's ability to be effective, he does not address the issues of moral right or wrong during Reconstruction, and he does not link Reconstruction to the Union war aims. Sefton also

³ James E. Sefton, *The United States Army and Reconstruction* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967).

makes no issue of the completely different approaches toward Reconstruction of the two Commanding Generals of that period, Ulysses Grant and William Sherman. Those differences, arguably, had a significant impact on the manner and effectiveness of the army in Reconstruction. Sefton concludes that Reconstruction was a hopeless task without which the army was better off without. Sefton misses much that is essential regarding the army's role in Reconstruction, most importantly, that the US Army, if properly guided by policy and leaders dedicated to the mission, was much more capable transforming the former Confederate states than it was in practice.

The biggest shortcoming of Sefton's work is the explicit contention that there is no connection between the army's experience during Reconstruction and subsequent army history. This is not only not true, but also not possible. It is true that the occupation of the South was an unpleasant duty for many officers, and that the General Sherman did not think occupation operations were the appropriate role for the army. Still, a large portion of the army served in the South and the mission lasted twelve years. The intensity of the mission and the length of the army occupation presence had to have effects. The use of General Order 100 to control violence in the South after the war, and its publication and use by the army in the Philippines thirty-five years later is only one of the many links between the army in Civil War Reconstruction and later events in army history.⁴

The army's history on the frontier is important for several reasons. It was the formative period for many officers such as Generals Arthur MacArthur, Elwell Otis, Hugh Scott, J.

⁴ A book that attempts to provide context to the army's Reconstruction experience is Robert Coakley's 1988 history, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders 1789–1878*. The Reconstruction era is only one of several topics Coakley addresses over the period of time he covers. His focus is exclusively on the use of force and therefore only addresses issues such as command and control, military government, organization, policy and politics in terms of the incidents when the army was likely to use force on a large scale. Robert Coakley, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders 1789–1878* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1988).

Franklin Bell, Leonard Wood, and John Pershing —important leaders of military government operations and the men who led the army into the twentieth century. It was also an important period because the army performed numerous missions on the frontier that did not involve fighting. The major aspect of the army's frontier history that military historians have focused on is the army's guerrilla war with the Indians. However, the amount of fighting that actually occurred in the twenty-five years after the Civil War was very small and involved only a small portion of the army. Much more important is the influence that performing other tasks on the frontier had on the army self-image and culture.

Robert Utley's *Frontier Regulars: the United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891* makes the case that for all of its interesting campaigns, the frontier experience retarded the professional development of the US Army.⁵ Utley's analysis however, is flawed. Utley concludes that the frontier caused the army to devolve into something akin to a large constabulary force. He explains that the frontier mission caused the army to ignore the writings of Emory Upton and to fall behind its contemporaries in Europe. Utley's analysis is accurate as far as it goes, but it ignores two points. First, the frontier experience prepared the army perfectly for the complex operations required of the army in Cuba, the Philippines, and on the Mexican border. The frontier created in the army the governance and infrastructure building capability that the nation needed as the United States took over Spain's island possessions. Second, Utley entirely misses the point that the frontier missions created a culture in the army not focused exclusively on the army as the nation's war-fighting tool. Rather, it created an army culture and self-image in which the army was a multi-faceted tool of national policy; capable of performing a variety of diverse missions in the support of the national interest. Political scientist Samuel P.

⁵ Robert Utley, *Frontier Regulars: the United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973).

Huntington's classic *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations* captures the point that Utley misses.⁶ Huntington contends that the great legacy of the frontier army was the army's role as a tool of the national interest beyond war fighting. Huntington identifies the critical influence of the frontier as the point in the army's history when, combined with the increased professionalization and the experience of Civil War, including Reconstruction, the army officer corps developed a Clausewitzian view of war, i.e., an understanding of war as a function of politics rather than of battle. In other words, Huntington properly identifies the American army's recognition that its proper role was to achieve the political purpose of the government.⁷

Unlike the frontier, where most of the written history focuses on the fighting army, top-notch histories exist on the American military occupation of Cuba after the Spanish-American War. The first is the very thorough history of the American occupation of Cuba under General Leonard Wood, David F. Healy's *The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy*.⁸ Healy argues that the major characteristic of the first occupation of Cuba, 1898–1902, was the internal political battles between various US Army generals and various factions of the Congress over Cuban policy. He maintains that once Secretary of War Elihu Root and Military Governor General Leonard Wood settled most of those issues, the army quickly prepared Cuba for independence. Healy is particularly effective describing the complex

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).

⁷ Few books address the non-combat missions of the army on the frontier. The only work that specifically takes on the army's non-combat role on the frontier as its central thesis is Michael L. Tate's *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West*. Tate's work examines a wide range of tasks the army engaged in on the frontier but it is dissatisfying because it does not place the army's role in context. Tate fails to make a case for how important the army's role was to the nation and to the expanding frontier. He also fails to enter the argument of the value of frontier experience expressed in the works of Huntington and Utley. As a work breaking new ground, Tate's book is important. In terms of deeper insights into the history, culture and contributions of the US Army, it is limited. Michael L. Tate, *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999).

⁸ David F. Healy, *The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963).

arguments between the military governors as they wrestled with Cuban economic and social problems. Healy's analysis is incomplete however, because the legacy of the 1898–1902 occupation was the American return to Cuba in 1906. Allan Millett covers the weaknesses of Healy in *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906–1909*,⁹ and ably describes how the short-comings of Wood's occupation policies, though small, inevitably led to the break-down of indigenous government in Cuba and thus the second US occupation. Millett focuses on the intervention as a product of US domestic policy, describing how politics set its boundaries and limitations. Millett also makes the point that the short-cuts that the 1906 occupation took, particularly the decision to form a Cuban army without ensuring that it was raised and trained as a professional, apolitical force, ultimately led to continued instability and future American interventions. The combined Millett and Healy efforts provide a complete history of the two most important American interventions in Cuba. They are unique in that they represent a political-military history of US Army operations and not a history of conventional military topics. Thus, they accurately represent the complex issues that were central to the US Army's operations prior to World War I, but unfortunately Healy and Millet leave their studies unconnected to the greater history of the US Army in occupation operations, including the simultaneous operations in the Philippines.

Many histories of the American military experience in the Philippines make the point that American operations in the Philippines were bungling and poorly conceived.¹⁰ John M. Gates' *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines* takes a different view.¹¹

⁹ Allan Millett, *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906–1909* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968).

¹⁰ See for example Stanley Karnov, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989).

¹¹ John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: the United States Army in the Philippines* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973).

Gates argues that American success against the Philippine insurgency was the result of a well-conceived combined strategy that included military operations and a campaign to bring effective governance to the islands. As the title suggests, education was a major portion of the civil-military campaign. Gates describes how the campaign also included democratic local governance, infrastructure building, a professional police force, and a fair and effective legal system. Gates persuasively argues that such aspects of US military operations in the Philippines were critical to the destruction of the Filipino insurgents because they provided the population a clear and more positive alternative to the insurgents. Yet like similar treatments of civil-military operations, Gates makes no connection to the army history in similar missions. In addition, Gates only examines the policy during the period 1898–1902, while active military operations were ongoing against the Philippine insurgents. He misses the role the army continued to play in the Philippines after major hostilities were over, especially governing the Moro tribes of the southern islands. Gates' conclusion that the American army in the Philippines was actually a very effective force, is reinforced in the recent important history of the Philippine War, Brian Linn's comprehensive *The Philippine War, 1899–1902*. However, like Gates, *The Philippine War* ends with President Theodore Roosevelt's declaration of the end of operations in July 1902.¹² It also pays scant attention to American political policy in the islands. Though civilian governors led that policy, the governance of the Philippines remained a War Department responsibility, and governance of the large Moro province remained the responsibility of an army commander until 1911. Thus, the Philippine War histories ending in 1902 are insufficient to understand the story of the army governance experience in the Philippines. Robert A. Fulton captures the rest of the story in the Philippines in his excellent *Moroland: The History of Uncle*

¹² Brian Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000).

Sam and the Moros, 1899–1920 (Bend Oregon: Tomalo Creek Press, 2009).¹³ Fulton completely covers the period to 1911 when administration of Moro Province was the responsibility of military governors General Leonard Wood, General Tasker Bliss, and General John Pershing.

None of the histories of the Philippine histories attempt to make connections to the broader army experience in governance. Some, including Linn and Gates, correctly link army Philippine tactics and policy to the frontier experience, but none makes a broader connection or analysis of civil-military affairs operations. Because of this, the efforts of key officers such Colonel Enoch Crowder, member of the Philippine Supreme Court and military secretary to General Arthur MacArthur, remain unconnected to Colonel Crowder's later contributions to governance in Cuba and American diplomatic history in the 1920s. Likewise, no historian links the efforts of Major Henry Allen, commander of the Philippines Constabulary, to Allen's experience on the frontier, as an attaché in Europe, or his later achievements in the occupied Rhineland.

The American army experiences with governance and civil-military operations in Cuba and the Philippines continued to influence US military operations for many years. The immediate influence was on US occupation operations in Mexico and in Germany's Rhineland provinces. In general, historians neglect the military operations that occurred along the volatile Mexican and American border during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century. Almost everything written about army operations on the border focuses on John Pershing's punitive expedition in 1916.¹⁴ The most important civil-military operation of the period was General

¹³ Robert A. Fulton, *Moroland: The History of Uncle Sam and the Moros, 1899–1920* (Bend Oregon: Tomalo Creek Press, 2009).

¹⁴ See for example, Joseph Stout, *Border Conflicts: Villistas, Carrancistas and the Punitive Expedition, 1915–1920* (Texas Christian University Press, 1999), John S. D. Eisenhower, *Intervention!: The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913–1917* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), and Eileen Welsome, *The General*

Frederick Funston's nine-month occupation of the Mexican city of Vera Cruz. The only study of the occupation of Vera Cruz is Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz*.¹⁵ As the title implies, Quirk focuses on how the operation fit within Woodrow Wilson's overall policy toward Mexico. Quirk provides an adequate, if short, description of army operations in the city. Quirk only mentions in passing the participation of Captain Douglas MacArthur, a member of Funston's staff. He also does not examine in any detail, the experience of army troops or officers. This omission is of some importance given that a number of junior officers of the 19th Infantry Regiment in Vera Cruz would later serve in key army leadership positions during and after World War II.¹⁶

Historians have also neglected the post-World War I Rhineland occupation. The Rhineland occupation greatly influenced the army's understanding of occupation operations during the interwar years and the early years of World War II. The only recent treatment of the Rhineland occupation was Keith L. Nelson's *Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918–1923*, published in 1975.¹⁷ Nelson focuses primary on the policy role of the Rhineland Commission and the influence of the occupation as a brake on French designs on the Rhineland and the Ruhr. In the thirty-five years since Nelson published, the army history in the

and the Jaguar: Pershing's Hunt for Pancho Villa: A True Story of Revolution and Revenge (New York: Bison Books, 2007).

¹⁵ Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1962).

¹⁶ Leonard Gerow (USMA 1911), Walton Walker (USMA 12), and Wade Haislip (USMA 1911) would achieve significant military success in their career. Gerow commanded the V Corps, Walker commanded XX Corps, and Haislip commanded the XV Corps in the Northwest Europe Campaign in World War II. All three corps were solid fighting organizations. Gerow retired from the army in 1950 as a Lieutenant General, Walker was killed in Korea commanding the 8th Army in 1950, and Haislip retired in 1951 as a full general and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army under Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins (USMA 17). Most important, all three men were very close life-long friends of Dwight Eisenhower (USMA 15) who arrived in the 19th Infantry Regiment in 1915 after they returned from Vera Cruz. Gerow was Eisenhower's study partner when both attended the Command and Staff College at Leavenworth.

¹⁷ Keith L. Nelson, *Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918–1923* (published in 1975).

Rhineland has not been the focus of any other historian. This omission exists despite the four-year occupation's important influence on World War II civil affairs policy and doctrine.

Only Peter Schifferle's history of the staff college at Fort Leavenworth, *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II*, addresses the influence of professional military education on operations in World War II.¹⁸ However, Sheferlee does not specifically look at occupation operations nor does he cover the Army War College experience in any detail. The official institutional history of the Army War College, George S. Pappas's *Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College 1901–1967* discusses the committee system method of instruction but does not describe the detailed occupation operations studies conducted by the G-1 Staff committees in the 1920s and 1930s.¹⁹ Henry G. Gole's *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940* mentions the importance of the War College committees in general to army planning.²⁰ The official army histories, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, by Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, and Earl Ziemke's *The US Army Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946*, both briefly mention the importance of the War College to developing not just plans but also the doctrine for occupation operations and military government in World War II.²¹ Like the interwar years, historians have largely ignored the early occupation operations of World War II in North Africa and Italy. Only two official histories address the occupation of Italy. The American army official history is Coles and Weinberg's *Civil Affairs*, mentioned above; an excellent compilation of over 800

¹⁸ Peter J. Schifferle, *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2010).

¹⁹ George S. Pappas, *Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College 1901–1967* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1967).

²⁰ Henry G. Gole, *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003).

²¹ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964).

pages of primary sources gleaned mostly from the army Civil Affairs Division records, but it is not a narrative and includes little analysis. The other official history relevant to Italy is the British Army official history by C.R.S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943–1945*.²² Harris focuses on the British efforts in Italy but includes American participation in operations. What it does not cover, however, is the relationship of the occupation in Italy to the US War Department, or the Italian experience's considerable influence on operations in Germany and Japan.

Germany became the focus of historical study beginning in the 1950s as the United States and Soviet Union confronted each other in the Cold War. Three examples of the early work on Germany are Harold Zink's *The United States in Germany, 1944–1955*, Alistair Horne's *Return to Power: A Report on the New*, and Eugene Davidson's *The Death and Life of Germany*.²³ All three are relatively straightforward discussions of German history beginning with the end of World War II. They all focus on Germany's successful economic rebuilding and attribute it largely to enlightened democratic and economic action on the part of the United States and its allies. All three broadly view the rehabilitation of Germany through the perspective of the Cold War. The two most important academic books on the military occupation of Germany are John Gimbel's *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949*, and Edward N. Peterson's *The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory*.²⁴ Both are critical of the army's role in post-World War II Germany. Of the two, Gimbel's is the more

²² C.R.S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943–1945* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957).

²³ Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944–1955* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1957); Alistair Horne, *Return to Power: A Report on the New Germany* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956); and Eugene Davidson *The Death and Life of Germany* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

²⁴ John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968); and Edward N. Peterson's *The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory* (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1977).

complex and nuanced, focused primarily on the political policy development and execution. Gimbel, like earlier historians of the occupation, views policy as largely influenced by the Cold War. Edward Peterson's view of the occupation, *Retreat to Victory*, makes the case that the primary agent in the American occupation of Germany was the Germans themselves. Peterson argues that American occupation forces did not contribute to the post-war recovery and may have actually hindered it. Hence, Peterson's title, which embodies the thesis that success in Germany, was proportionate to the disengagement of the American occupation forces. Neither Peterson nor Gimble see the US Army as an important agent in occupation policy. Peterson does not recognize that quick disengagement from direct government was the clearly articulated policy of not just the American occupation of Germany, but also of all American occupation operations. The "retreat to victory," was actually the army's master plan.²⁵ These histories fail to recognize the policy linkage between the army's history, personified by the experiences of American Secretary of War Henry Stimson and codified in army military government and legal doctrine, as well as in the curriculum at the School of Military Government, and the operations in post-World War II Europe. The linkage to army history was as important to occupation policy and practice as any other factor.

²⁵ The last important work on the occupation of Germany is Earl Ziemke's official army history written in 1977, *The US Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946*. Ziemke's is an exceptionally clear and concise examination of US Army occupation policy, organization, planning, and practice. However, it is not a complete history because it ends with the end of tactical occupation operations in 1946. The two strongest points of Ziemke's book are its clear explanation of how policy translated into actual occupation practice at the tactical level, and its description of the organization, planning, and training the army conducted for the military government mission in Germany. Ziemke clearly and carefully illuminates the linkages between national level policy and the actions and challenges of the tactical military government teams. It is the best of the histories of occupation of Germany but ends in 1946 when the tactical missions were largely over but operational management and strategic policy oversight were still required. Ziemke's conclusion is that the military government detachments were successful executing the tactical military government function. Peterson and Gimbel, with much less evidence, disagree. See John Gimbel's first book, *A German Community Under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945–1952* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), which makes that case that incompetent tactical military government operations inhibited German democratization. Peterson's conclusion is similar to Gimbel's. This issue is worthy of further detailed study.

Numerous historians have thoroughly examined the history of the occupation of Japan. There were several major differences between the histories of the occupation of Japan and Germany. Many of the histories of the occupation of Japan focus on leaders: General Douglas MacArthur, the leader of the American occupation forces, and Japanese leaders Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. Several well- documented histories fall into this category including Robert Harvey's *American Shogun: MacArthur, Hirohito and the American Duel with Japan*, Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson's *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur*; and Herbert P. Blix's *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*.²⁶ These books see the major events of the occupation as products of the personalities of the key players. In this respect, the authors implicitly acknowledge the linkage between the army's history and the occupation of Japan through MacArthur's personal and family association with almost all of American occupations from Reconstruction through the end of World War II. The histories of Japan are also much more recent than the histories of the occupation of Germany. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union influenced much of the written history of Germany. In contrast, histories of the US occupation of Japan reflect scholarship that is more contemporary. The two major histories on the occupation of Japan are John W. Dower's Pulitzer Prize winning *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* and Eiji Takemae's *The Allied Occupation of Japan*.²⁷ The depth of the scholarship and unbiased perspective of the authors make these two books far superior to any

²⁶ Robert Harvey, *American Shogun: MacArthur, Hirohito and the American Duel with Japan* (London: John Murray, 2006); Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson's *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Herbert P. Blix's *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2001).

²⁷ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); and Eiji Takemae, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (New York: Continuum, 2002),

of the works in English on the German occupation.²⁸ However, the authors do not examine the continuity of the occupation of Japan, even through MacArthur, to the army's history of occupation operations.²⁹

The concept of continuity in operational approach is central to this examination of American occupation operations. Two military historians have addressed continuity in American operations and doctrine. Russell Weigley provides an analysis of American military doctrinal continuity at the strategic level in his 1973 classic *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. As the title suggests, his focus is largely on conventional warfare at the operational and strategic level, and the work is thus not very relevant to the subject of civil affairs and military government. However, Weigley makes the important point that from the time of the American Civil War, continuity existed in how the US military approached operations. Andrew Birtle's *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941*, thoroughly covers army doctrine for counterinsurgency operations, a type of operation closely associated with military government and civil affairs.³⁰ Birtle completely covers the history of the relevant doctrine for civil affairs including General Order 100, the rules of land warfare doctrine, and ultimately the development of the first military government manuals. Weigley and Birtle conclude that continuity exists in American army

²⁸ Though the work of Takemae and Dower is excellent and superior to similar works on the occupation of Germany, there is no examination of army tactical military government operations in Japan that is the equivalent of Ziemke, Gimbel, or Peterson.

²⁹ For all of Takemae's accuracy and lack of bias in his history of the occupation of Japan, his short description of Arthur MacArthur's military career demonstrates no deep understanding of US Army history. He describes the frontier experience as "the bloody annihilation campaigns waged against Native Americans," and relates how Arthur MacArthur "suppressed with extreme cruelty a major insurrection... against US colonial rule" in the Philippines. Eiji Takemae, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 4.

³⁰ Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); and Andrew Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998).

operations and counterinsurgency doctrine. This study tests the ideas of Weigley and Birtle against the mission of occupation operations and finds a similar continuity.

Unlike doctrine, adequately described in the literature, army institutional culture, and its impact on operations are neglected by historians. The only systematic attempt to describe army institutional culture is Morris Janowitz's important *The Professional Soldier: A Social and political Portrait*.³¹ Janowitz focuses on the officer corps of the 1950s but is still relevant to this study in that most of his population of professional officers, particularly army officers, began their careers long before World War II and participated in the post-World War II occupation operations. The senior army officers described by Janowitz studied at the army's professional schools in the interwar years, were mentored by the Philippine and World War I veterans, and led the post-World War II occupations. Janowitz's study identifies a recognizable military culture and enumerates some of its primary characteristics. Janowitz, however, does not address the history or the operational impacts of culture. Two other social histories of the army before World War II are Edward M. Coffman's *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*, and *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941*.³² Though Coffman provides a very vivid description of life in the army, he does not address critical aspects of institutional culture: kinship relations, and mentorship. Historians have yet to map the complex network of personal relationships that characterized the social and professional life of the army. Hints of the network are anecdotally revealed in autobiographical accounts such as Lucien Truscott's *The Twilight of the US Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917–1942* and Dwight Eisenhower's *At Ease: Stories I Tell To Friends*, but no historian or political scientist has taken

³¹ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960).

³² Edward M. Coffman's *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898* (New York: Oxford Press, 1986), and *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).

on the subject explicitly from an academic point of view.³³ A number of recent management, anthropological, and sociological texts address the somewhat ill defined concept of institutional culture. Edgar H. Schein's *Organization Culture and Leadership* and Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron's *Analyzing Cultures, An Introduction and Handbook* both provide a working definition of institutional culture and describe its important characteristics and effects.³⁴ These works, combined with Janowitz and Coffman, support the conclusion that the army's institutional culture accepted and understood the strategic necessity of occupation missions. That cultural acceptance was critical to the success of occupation missions during and after World War II.

This dissertation demonstrates the continuity of the American army experience with occupation operations and military government from Reconstruction immediately after the Civil War through the post-World War II occupations of Japan and Germany. None of the histories written about the individual operations recognizes the continuity between them. Each occupation experience built on and refined the lessons of the previous. Written army doctrine was also remarkably consistent throughout the period. The examination of the history also reveals a human continuity that is note-worthy. Individual leaders, military families, and personal and professional relationships connected the early Reconstruction experience directly to World War II. The doctrine and the actual operations combine to illustrate a uniquely American way of conducting occupation operations, one that emphasized building democratic institutions, was conscious of cultural norms, rapidly transitioned to civil rule, and established a social foundation based on law and order, education, and the health and welfare of the population. In no

³³ Lucian Truscott, *The Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917–1942* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989); and Dwight Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967).

³⁴ Edgar H. Schein, *Organization Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1997); and Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron's *Analyzing Cultures, An Introduction and Handbook* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

small way, the success of occupation operations in World War II Germany and Japan was a result of the experiences gained, lessons learned, and understanding achieved by the US Army as an institution and by individual officers during post-conflict operations from 1865 to 1952.

CHAPTER 2 - The Roots of American Military Government: Reconstruction

The US Army's first experience with large scale military occupation was the occupation of "Secessasia,"¹ the former Confederate States, after the American Civil War.² During the twelve years of operations in the South, 1865–1877, the US Army and its officers engaged in a variety of occupation and reconstruction duties with varying degrees of success. The army's participation in Reconstruction marks the beginning of the formulation of the US Army's conceptual approach to military occupation —essentially an American way of conducting occupations. This conceptual approach characterized US Army occupations beginning in 1865 and continued, with some additions and changes, through the World War II occupations. During the post-Civil War reconstruction period the army demonstrated the ability to establish democratic government, an emphasis on rapidly turning governance responsibility to civil authorities, and an inclination to emphasize education. However, Reconstruction highlighted issues that the army and the national government did not address well. These included establishing clear national policy, establishing the rule of law, and reestablishing the economic viability of the region. Operations in the post-Civil War South also demonstrated the

¹ The term "Secessia" is used by historian James E. Sefton to refer to the former Confederate states in *The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865–1877* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). The term is an attractive designation in that it implies that the approach toward the occupation of the South be viewed as an occupation of a foreign enemy. However, disappointingly, Sefton does not follow-up on this intriguing idea.

² The major previous American experience with occupation of foreign territory was the occupation of portions of Mexico during the Mexican-American war. That occupation experience is not used as a starting point for this study, as the American government and the US Army did not engage in national governance of the occupied area. See Stephen A. Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico, May 1846–July 1848* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2006).

dependence of army success on civil domestic policy and politics. Without the commitment and support of the national government the mission could not succeed.

Ultimately, Reconstruction failed and the army's shortcomings contributed to that failure. The accepted historiography of Reconstruction is that the American government failed to achieve the political and social transformation of the South envisioned during and immediately after the Civil War. As historian Eric Foner observed, "whether measured by the dreams inspired by emancipation or the more limited goals of securing blacks' rights as citizens and free laborers, and establishing and enduring Republican presence in the South, Reconstruction can only be judged a failure."³ The army's shortcomings were part of the host of circumstances that led to the failure of Reconstruction. Despite the army's role in that failure, Reconstruction served as the starting point for the development of the army's institutional approach to occupations.

Initial Occupation Policy

The army did no serious planning for post-conflict operations after the Civil War. Union General Philip Sheridan, one of General Grant's most competent commanders and destined for high command in the occupied South, put it bluntly: "At the time of Kirby Smith's [commander of the last active Confederate field army] surrender the National Government had formulated no plan with regard to these or the other States lately in rebellion, though a provisional Government had been set up in Louisiana as early as 1864."⁴ Thus, the army's active participation in the occupation of the former Confederate states was essentially an ad-hoc effort that reacted to the changing, conflicting, and often less than clear direction of the national government. The army was not solely, or even perhaps primarily, to blame for the lack of planning for post-war

³ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), 603.

⁴ P.H. Sheridan, *The Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1992), 413.

operations, which depended largely on political policies. In the absence of clear political policy, the army's execution of post-conflict operations in the former Confederate states became problematic. When the Civil War ended, President Lincoln had not articulated any specific thoughts on post-war political policy. In addition, Congress did not enact any legislation governing the post-war circumstances.⁵ However, there were several indicators of what Lincoln envisioned for post-war policy, these included the president's limited comments on the subject, written army policies and orders, the most important of which was General Order 100, and the wartime experience in occupied Southern states. Wartime actions, however, were imperfect predictors of future policy. Lincoln intended his wartime proclamations and orders to meet the contingencies of the war rather than serve as permanent policy for post-war reconstruction.⁶ For instance, the spirit of Lincoln's Amnesty proclamation and the Emancipation proclamation, both issued during the war, were contradictory. The former implied a return to the ante-bellum political order, while the latter implied dramatic social and economic change.⁷ Though wartime

⁵ In 1864 Congress proposed more detailed and stringent guidance for the readmittance of states and the role of provisional governors. The major points of this legislation, sponsored by Ohio Senator Ben Wade and Maryland Congressman Henry Winter Davis, were that states would not be considered for readmission until after the rebellion was suppressed; that a majority of the state's citizens (not just 10 percent) had to take the oath of allegiance; and that suffrage was denied to all who held civil or military office in the Confederacy or who willingly bore arms against the union. It also required the states to outlaw slavery in their new constitutions. On July 4, 1864 President Lincoln refused to sign the bill, thus instituting a pocket veto. Because of this, when the war ended, no law governed the readmittance of the succeeding states into the union. A detailed recounting of the congressional debate over the readmittance bill as well as Lincoln's rationale for the pocket veto is contained in a variety of sources including Charles H. McCarthy, *Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction* (New York: AMS Press Inc., 1966), 224–285; Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperback, 2006), 639–640; David Herbert Donald, *Lincoln* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1995), 510–512; and William B. Hesseltine, *Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1963), 111–120.

⁶ Foner, 36–37.

⁷ In September 1862, President Abraham Lincoln issued the first of two executive orders collectively known as the Emancipation Proclamation. The proclamation was effective on January 1, 1863 and freed all slaves in ten specific Confederate states. The proclamation was an indication of the Union's future, but was not yet a post-war policy abolishing slavery. A year after the Emancipation Proclamation, on December 8, 1863, Lincoln issued the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, which set policy for wartime occupation. This proclamation offered full pardon and rights to all ex-confederates "except as to slaves," upon the declaration of an oath of loyalty to the federal government. After ten percent of the 1860 voting population of a Confederate state took the oath, the federal government would support the reestablishment of a state government. The new state governments had to

occupation policy set a precedent for post-war policy, that was not the intent: the president intended wartime policies to meet specific wartime conditions and no more.

In addition to the President's proclamations, the army had written orders regarding operations in the territory captured from the Confederate States. On April 24, 1863 President Lincoln issued General Orders (GO) 100, written under the direction of General in Chief Henry Halleck and based on the pamphlet "Guerrilla Parties," by legal scholar Francis Lieber. It was formally entitled "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field." The order was to guide commanders in identifying partisans and fighting insurgency. The order admonished federal troops to operate within the scope of the law, to be moderate if not considerate of the civilian population's rights, and to use force commensurate with the activities of the guerrillas. GO 100 gave the commander full authority and wide latitude. The order technically applied only during hostilities, so after the surrender of the Confederate field armies, GO 100 was legally void. All of these indicators were just hints to what Lincoln may have envisioned, because the president never stated a clear post-war policy for the South before his assassination on April 14, 1865. Thus, one of the first problems encountered by the army as it began occupation operations was a complete lack of strategic policy guidance from the national leadership.

Initial Operations and Presidential Reconstruction

The army's involvement in Reconstruction and the occupation of the secessionist states occurred in five phases. The first phase was a short period of direct military government

recognize the abolition of slavery. The proclamation also specifically stated that seating members of Congress from the state was purely a matter for the US Congress to decide. Both the Emancipation Proclamation and the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction can be found at University of Maryland History Department, "The Freedmen an Southern Society Project"; available from <http://www.history.umd.edu/Freedmen/chronol.htm> (accessed 30 November 2007).

immediately after defeat of the Confederate forces and before the organizations established by presidential reconstruction policies assumed control. The second phase was Presidential Reconstruction supported by the army but led by President Johnson and appointed civilian state provisional governors. Presidential Reconstruction lasted almost two years, until Congress ended it in March 1867. Phase three of army involvement was another period of direct military rule while the states were prepared for civil government according to congressional mandate. Phase four was the period of Republican Party state government rule in the bulk of the Southern states. The final period of Reconstruction occurred when Democratic Party governments replaced Republican state governments. This final period ended in 1877 with the Presidential compromise that awarded the 1876 Presidential election to Rutherford P. Hayes. After assuming office, President Hayes ended the army's post-conflict missions in the secessionist Southern states.

In the immediate post-war period, the army reorganized its jurisdictional structure into five geographic military divisions, which included nineteen military departments. The military divisions that included former confederate states were the Military Division of the Atlantic under Major General George G. Meade, including the departments of Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina; the Military Division of the Mississippi commanded by Major General William T. Sherman, including the Department of Arkansas; the Military Division of the Gulf commanded by Major General Philip H. Sheridan, including the departments of Louisiana, Texas, and Florida; and the Military Division of the Tennessee commanded by George H. Thomas, including the departments of Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. The only military division that did not have a requirement to be involved in the Southern occupation was the Military Division of the Pacific under Major General Henry W. Halleck. The major focus of

the divisions of the Mississippi and the Pacific was frontier security. This was also a major concern of the Division of the Gulf forces in Texas, though occupation duties were an equal priority.⁸ The reorganization of the wartime army copied the American army's traditional geographic peacetime organization and was accomplished quickly. It facilitated focusing commanders on regional issues, and gave the army flexibility to demobilize or move tactical units without disrupting the regional command structure.

On May 29, 1865, the new president, Andrew Johnson, issued his guidance for the occupation which made the army's role in post-conflict administration relatively simple. He announced that he would continue President Lincoln's post-war plan. Since, as discussed previously, President Lincoln in reality did not have a plan for post-war operations; President Johnson's policy was the first articulation of post-war policy and plans beyond mere conjecture. President Johnson envisioned a very rapid transition to complete civilian state control. A presidentially appointed civilian provisional governor facilitated the quick transition. Under the conditions of Presidential Reconstruction policy, the army's rule in the South was to be short and simple. The army was to reestablish law and order, ensure the public health and welfare, and supervise the return to normal economic activity. The army had the additional responsibility of protecting the well-being of the Freedmen through the newly created Bureau of Freedmen and Abandoned Lands that Congress created and mandated that the War Department operate. The army pursued all but the last of these tasks only until the restoration of civil authority. Appointment of the provisional governors defined the beginning of reestablished civil authority; at that point the army would support that authority as requested. The Freedmen's Bureau's duties were separate and congressionally mandated, and therefore the reestablishment of civil

⁸ *Annual Report of the Secretary of War* (henceforth ARSW), 1865 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1866), 22–23.

authority did not affect the bureau. The army's role in the transition to civil authority was minor in the months after the war because President Johnson very quickly appointed civilian provisional governors. The War Department ordered departmental commanders to provide military force to back up the orders of these provisional governors, however, such support proved unnecessary.

A significant institution designed specifically for the occupation mission was the Freedmen's Bureau. Congress understood that conditions in the post-war South would be unprecedented in the history of the nation and that the existing institutions were ill equipped to handle them. Congress formed the bureau on March 3, 1865, and the War Department appointed Union General Oliver H. Howard to head it. The bureau was intended to facilitate integrating the over one million Freedmen into the population of the Southern states. The impact of the bureau was more symbolic than material. Historians generally agree that the bureau did not accomplish much of lasting importance for three reasons.⁹ First, presidential opposition restricted the bureau. President Johnson thought the bureau violated the concept of states' rights. Second, the bureau was undermanned relative to the sweeping social reform that was its unstated mandate. In its first year of existence, there were no monies or personnel allocated to its operation. Funding and people had to come from the War Department and its budget. At its peak, there were no more than 900 field agents of the bureau in the South. The average agent had

⁹ William McFeely's revisionist view in *Yankee Stepfather: General O.O. Howard and the Freedmen* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968) is the exception. The bulk of the work grant the Bureau limited and short-term influence but few lasting achievements, outside public supported education. See George R. Bentley, *A History of the Freedmen's Bureau* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955), Howard Ashley White, *The Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), Paul A. Cimbala, *Under the Guardianship of the Nation: The Freedmen's Bureau and the Reconstruction of Georgia, 1865–1870* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), and Barry A. Crouch, *The Freedmen's Bureau and Black Texans* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992).

responsibility for 40,000 Freedmen.¹⁰ Finally, the bureau was an important institution of Reconstruction for only three years and spent most of the first year organizing its administration and grappling with its duties. After 1868, the congressionally reconstructed states began to assert their authority, which superseded that of the bureau. As Congress recognized the new states most of the bureau's functions ceased. Thus, though able to have some lasting effects, notably in the area of education, the bureau did not have a major impact on the course of the occupation of the South. The emphasis on education, where the Bureau set the precedent of free public education in the South, however, became an important aspect of future American occupations.

Though President Johnson provided very clear and direct policy regarding the disposition of the former Confederate states, most of Congress and much of the army leadership strongly disagreed with President Johnson's policies. Thus, a policy war ensued within the government that completely disrupted the course of army occupation operations in the South. Most of the nation was familiar with President Johnson's statement, made in 1864, that "treason must be made odious to the traitors."¹¹ In 1865, most people expected President Johnson's policies to be more punitive than those President Lincoln may have endorsed. The broad outline for Presidential Reconstruction policy became apparent in two proclamations issued on May 29, 1865. The first proclamation contained an amnesty and pardon policy that excused all participants in the rebellion, except senior officials, upon their taking an oath pledging loyalty to the Union and support for emancipation. The second proclamation appointed and gave instructions to a provisional governor of North Carolina to facilitate that state's return to the

¹⁰ Foner, *Reconstruction*, 143.

¹¹ Andrew Johnson, speech made in Nashville, TN, June 9, 1864, *Documentary History of Reconstruction*, Walter L. Fleming, Editor (Cleveland, OH: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1906), 116.

Union. Over the next months, the President appointed provisional governors in all those former Confederate states that had not begun the process during the war.¹² According to the Secretary of War, by the end of 1865 the state governments were “organizing... in subordination to the federal authority.”¹³

Presidential Reconstruction was about rebuilding institutions. It ignored the more difficult causes of the Civil War and the post-war objectives of the Congress. As army general Carl Schurz reported to President Johnson in late 1865: “If nothing were necessary but to restore the machinery of government in the States lately in rebellion in point of form, the movements made to that end by the people of the south might be considered satisfactory. But if it is required that the southern people should also accommodate themselves to the results of the war in point of spirit, those movements fall far short of what may be insisted upon.”¹⁴ President Johnson’s reconstruction policy was not a reconstruction policy at all, rather, it was a *reconstitution* policy that had as its logical conclusion the reconstitution of the Union in essentially the same form that existed in 1860 minus the formal institution of slavery.¹⁵

Though appearing to be moving quickly and efficiently toward effective reunion, Presidential Reconstruction was a flawed policy in the minds of many union men, particularly those in Congress and the senior leadership of the army.¹⁶ Signs that the policy was flawed appeared early as events unfolded in the Southern states. Through the summer and fall of 1865,

¹² Senior officials included major Confederate government and military officials and owners of taxable property worth more than \$20,000. Individuals in these categories had to apply personally for pardons directly from the President. Foner, 183; Hans L. Trefousse, *Andrew Johnson, A Biography* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1989), 217–219.

¹³ *ARSW, 1865, 2.*

¹⁴ “Report of Carl Schurz on the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana,” *Message of the President of the United States*, December 18, 1865.

¹⁵ Andrew Johnson preferred the word “restoration” to “reconstruction” as the best description of his policy. Eric L. McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 161.

¹⁶ A very succinct critique of the Johnson’s Reconstruction policy, its fatal flaws, and Johnson’s rationale is contained in Trefousse, Chapter XII, “Presidential Reconstructionalist,” 214–233.

and with increasing frequency in 1866, reports from army officers in the South, as well as commissions sent to investigate conditions by Congress, indicated the resurgence of traditional conservative Southern leaders. One of the earliest damning reports regarding conditions in the South came from General Carl Schultz. Schultz's report made several points. One was that the Freedmen were not really free, but rather, Southern whites, aided by the President's generous amnesty and lack of Black suffrage, were working steadily to impose slavery in all but name. He also pointed out that Southerners had no compunction about taking the loyalty oath if that was what was necessary to get out from under the yoke of Yankee military authority. General Schultz's report was very pessimistic regarding the prospects of Southern loyalty.¹⁷

Army leaders stationed in the South also saw that there were serious issues with Presidential Reconstruction.¹⁸ General Jefferson C. Davis reported from Kentucky that "Bands of 'guerillas' and negro regulators soon increased in numbers and audacity, and many lawless acts have been perpetrated by them...." General Sickles, commander of the Department of the South stated, "In some parts of ...South Carolina, a freedman has little security for life, limb or property apart from the presence and protection of a garrison of United States troops." The more serious indictment of Presidential Reconstruction was not the general lawlessness in much of the South, but rather the conscious refusal of state law enforcement and judicial officials to extend the protection of the law to the Freedmen or Unionists. Sickles commented, "Instances of much gravity are too frequent, however, of the most reprehensible neglect to arrest and prosecute notorious malefactors and outlaws. Inquests in case of homicide, especially if the victim be a

¹⁷ "Report of Carl Schurz", 45.

¹⁸ Annual War Department reports for 1865 were largely focused on down-sizing of the army and documenting the final months of Civil War combat operations. *ARSW, 1865*.

negro, seldom result in a verdict which points out the guilty.”¹⁹ The state governments created by President Johnson were more than willing to tolerate the abuse and intimidation of both Freedmen and Unionists. The governments, in several instances went even further –enacting “Black Codes” that severely limited Freedmen rights.

Army commanders were in a position to recognize and report state legislative action aimed at controlling the Freedmen. In October 1866, Brevet Major General Thomas J. Wood, Commander of the Department of Mississippi reported, “Several of the statute laws of this State in reference to the negroes are very objectionable.” He claimed numerous statutes, including those that precluded Negroes from bearing arms, purchasing or leasing real estate and requiring contracts or licenses before doing work, to be unconstitutional. Wood recognized that the Mississippi legislature was attempting to recreate conditions as close as legally possible to the condition of slavery for the Freedmen.²⁰

The reports of the field commanders sent to Washington in the last months of 1866 merely verified the Northern public perception of the post-conflict environment in the South. The public was aware that all was not well because of two major incidents that occurred in 1866: the massacres in Memphis and New Orleans. The army senior leadership closely investigated both events, and they were widely reported in the Northern press. Both incidents contributed to Congress and General in Chief Ulysses S. Grant’s impression that Presidential Reconstruction was failing.

The massacre in Memphis occurred over 1-4 May 1866. It was the result of an altercation between discharged colored soldiers and white police. Rioters killed forty-six

¹⁹ “Report of Major General Jefferson C. Davis,” November 14, 1866, *ARSW, 1866* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1867), 58; “Report of Major General D.E. Sickles,” *ARSW, 1866*, 63–64.

²⁰ “Report of Thomas J. Wood,” *ARSW, 1866*, 55–56.

Freedmen, injured over seventy-five, robbed over one-hundred persons, raped five women, and burned four churches, eight schools, and over ninety homes. The official Freeman Bureau investigation of the riot concluded that the riot reflected the overall lack of respect of the white citizenry for the rule of law: “No public meeting has been held by the citizens, although three weeks have now elapsed since the riot, thus by their silence appearing to approve of the conduct of the mob.”²¹ The riot indicated that in Tennessee, the President’s home state, the success of Presidential Reconstruction was in doubt.

The violence in New Orleans that occurred in July and August 1866 was even more notorious than Memphis. The commander of the Department of the Gulf, General Phil Sheridan, concluded that the initial cause of the riot was the assembling of an unofficial constitutional convention convened in opposition to the state convention authorized by Presidential Reconstruction. However, Sheridan also believed that the New Orleans police instigated the violence with the passive concurrence of the city Mayor. He stated in his report that the police gunned down members of the convention, both white and black, and then arrested many of the survivors who were “were wounded by the police while in their hands as prisoners, some of them mortally.” General Grant and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, with the approval of the President, authorized Sheridan to impose martial law “so far as might be necessary to preserve the public peace,” and gave Sheridan the authority to over-rule any action by a public official that might endanger public safety.²²

²¹ T.W. Gilbreth and Charles F. Johnson, “Report of an investigation of the cause, origin, and results of the late riots in the city of Memphis,” May 22, 1866, *Teaching American History* website, 2006–08, <http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1921> (accessed October 10, 2010).

²² Report from Sheridan to Grant, August 1, 1866 and Report from Sheridan to Johnson, August 6, 1866 reproduced in Phil Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of Phil Sheridan, General United States Army*, Vol. II (New York: Charles M. Webster and Company, 1888), 235–240; Ulysses S. Grant, John Y. Simon, Editor, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant* (henceforth PUSG), Vol. 16 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press), 292–294.

The most influential report on conditions in the South was the 1866 congressional report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, whose task was to “inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called Confederate States of America, and report whether they, or any of them, are entitled to be represented in either house of Congress.” The committee conducted a comprehensive study of affairs in the ten southern states still out of the Union in the spring of 1866. Their conclusions were unambiguous. They determined that the Southern white population was unrepentant regarding secession and harbored no remorse over the resulting hostilities, except as to the result. The Committee determined that an immediate readmittance of the former Confederate states in the summer of 1866 would permit the South “through their representatives, [to] seize upon the government, which they fought to destroy.” The Joint Committee’s conclusion was completely at odds with the conclusion of President Johnson and the president’s policy. The Joint Committee recommended and proposed to Congress the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. It also recommended conditions for readmittance of the former Confederate States to the Union. The recommendations of this committee became the basis for Congressional Reconstruction legislation in 1867.²³

General in Chief Grant closely monitored the events of Reconstruction throughout 1865 and 1866. Grant formed the perception that the policy was not working based on his communications with his commanders in the South, press reports, and the Joint Committee report which was published in August, 1866. The President’s actions toward Reconstruction and the politicalization of the army also influenced Grant’s position on policy, and his assessment of the situation. In the fall of 1867 President Johnson made a not very subtle attempt to remove Grant from leadership of the army by sending him on a diplomatic mission to Mexico. This

²³ *The Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction at the First Session thirty-ninth Congress* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1866), III – XXI.

direct attempt by Johnson to remove Grant as head of the army firmly placed Grant in opposition to the President's post-war strategy, to the point that he counseled with Republican legislators on legislation to overturn Presidential Reconstruction.²⁴

As the year 1866 ended, policy toward the former Confederate states was in disarray. The President's policy was firmly in place but considered a total failure by both the Congress and much of the army leadership. The rule of law did not exist, at least as applied to Freedmen and Unionist, in much of the South. Congress was determined to make a change; however, it was too late to mitigate many of the adverse effects of the ineffectual presidential policy. Southern leadership was materially and psychologically recovered from the decisive defeat by the Union army on the battlefield. The window for the best opportunity to effect permanent and effective political and social reform in the South was closed. It remained for Congress, with the advice of the army leadership, to pursue a policy that aimed at recovering the strategic goals for which the Union had fought the Civil War. However, they were beginning their policy process almost twenty-four months after the end of hostilities.

Congressional Reconstruction and Army Rule

Congress expressed its disagreement with the president over Reconstruction policy through legislation. In 1866 that legislation was the Civil Rights Act, the renewal of the Freedmen's Bureau authorization, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. That legislation challenged what appeared to be the growing assertiveness of the former Confederate states as they reformed under Presidential Reconstruction. However, the legislation was not an

²⁴ A series of correspondence documents Johnson's attempt to send Grant to Mexico: Grant to W.T. Sherman, Washington D.C., October 18, 1866, PUSG, Vol. 16., 338; W.T. Sherman to Mrs. Sherman, Washington D.C., October 26, 1866, PUSG, Vol. 16, 339; Grant to Johnson, Washington D.C., October 21, 1866, PUSG, Vol. 16, 346; Grant to Stanton, Washington D.C., October 27, 1866, PUSG, Vol. 16, 357–358; Johnson to Stanton, Washington D.C., October 30, 1866, PUSG, Vol. 16, 359.

outright challenge to the president's policy. That challenge came in 1867 in the form of legislation that fundamentally changed the course of Reconstruction, the Reconstruction acts of 1867. The Reconstruction acts were the response of Congress to the apparent failure of the president's policy to achieve the strategic goal of the Civil War: the political and social transformation of the South. The First Reconstruction Act did not mince words regarding reconstruction of the South almost two years after the war. In Congress' view, "no legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property exists in the rebel States"²⁵ The preamble to the acts was a clear statement of the failure of Presidential Reconstruction to establish the rule of law in the South. The Reconstruction Acts directed the army to establish law and order, recreate the system of democratic governance in the states, and then turn over democratic governance to lawfully elected civil leaders.

Congress passed the first Reconstruction Act on March 2, 1867, over President Johnson's veto. Congress, prepared for the veto, immediately over-ruled it. The act divided the ten unreconstructed Southern states (exempting Tennessee, which had rejoined the Union on July 24, 1866) into five military districts: the First District, under Brigadier General Schofield, included only the state of Virginia; the Second District, under General Daniel E. Sickles, included the Carolinas; the Third District, commanded by General John Pope, included Florida, Alabama, and Georgia; the Fourth District commanded by General Edward O.C. Ord, included Arkansas and Mississippi; and the Fifth District, under General Phil Sheridan, included Texas

²⁵ The Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867 is reproduced in Sheridan, 421. All the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and 1868 are posted online in numerous websites and easily found through a common search engine. Two prominent websites that contain the original acts are the *Texas State Library & Archives* website in "Narrative History of Texas Secession and Readmission to the Union," <http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/secession/Reconstruction.html> (accessed March 21, 2007); also see the *Wikipedia* website in "Reconstruction Act," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reconstruction_Act (accessed March 21, 2007).

and Louisiana.²⁶ The key provision of the First Reconstruction Act was Section 3, which stipulated the District Commander's responsibilities and authority "to protect all person in their rights of person and property, to suppress insurrection, disorder, and violence, and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers of the public peace and criminals... and all interference, under cover of State authority, with the exercise of military authority under this act, shall be null and void."²⁷ This provision of the act effectively made the Military District commander the supreme authority in the state, with the power to ignore or overrule all civil officials and to substitute military tribunals for civil courts whenever warranted. Thus, the primary mandate of the district commanders was to ensure the rule of law.

General Sheridan, in the 5th Military District, was enthusiastic about implementing Congressional Reconstruction: "It was, therefore, my determination to see to the law's zealous execution in my district."²⁸ Despite his enthusiasm for Congressional Reconstruction, Sheridan recognized that civil authority was the preferred jurisdiction for governance: "...I laid down, as a rule for my guidance, the principle of non-interference with the provisional State governments, and though many appeals were made to have me rescind rulings of the courts, or interpose to forestall some presupposed action to be taken by them, my invariable reply was that I would not take cognizance of such matters, except in cases of absolute necessity." Soon after the passing of the Reconstruction Act, Sheridan replaced the mayor of New Orleans, the Louisiana state attorney-general, and the judge of the first district court. The commander removed the officials

²⁶ General Order (G.O.) No. 10, Headquarters of the Army, Washington D.C., March 11, 1867. Later Adjutant General Townsend issued G.O. No. 18, adding General Pope as Thomas' replacement, PUSG, Vol. 17 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press), 80-84, 292-294.

²⁷ First Reconstruction Act, March 2, 1867.

²⁸ P.H. Sheridan, Jeffrey D. Wert, Introduction, *The Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1992 (Originally published New York: C.L. Webster, 1888), 428.

for “acts of omission and commission, ignoring the law....”²⁹ Sheridan was the strictest practitioner of Congressional authority among the district commanders, but Generals Pope and Sickles also did not hesitate to use the power given them by Congress to curb the influence of the state officials who came into office under Presidential Reconstruction, and to ensure the rule of law.

Congress provided further guidance on the reconstruction process to commanders in the form of the Second and Third Reconstruction Acts. The President vetoed both, and Congress again immediately overruled both vetoes. These acts provided detailed information on the tasks of the military commanders and what standards the commanders were to use for registering voters. The Third Reconstruction Act empowered the district military commanders to “suspend or remove from office, or from the performance of official duties and the exercise of official powers, any officer or person holding or exercising ... any civil or military office or duty in such district under any power... under, any so-called State or the government thereof.” The third act boldly stated, “no district commander ...or any of the officers operating under them shall be bound in his action by an opinion of any civil officer of the United States.” In sum, the three acts of 1867 gave very powerful authority, unprecedented in peacetime, to the district military commanders.³⁰

The reestablishment of democratic governance was the top priority of the district commanders after ensuring law and order. The military commanders had specific objectives imposed on them by the Reconstruction Acts. The Acts ordered them to register voters, supervise the election of a constitutional assembly, supervise creation of a state constitution, and

²⁹ Sheridan, 428–429.

³⁰ Second Reconstruction Act, March 23, 1867; Third Reconstruction Act, July 19, 1867, Sec. 2 and Sec.

oversee the election of state officials and a legislature. Essentially, the acts required commanders to follow the same state government formation process as President Johnson's provisional state governors, however, the military closely monitored the process to ensure universal suffrage and maximum participation by the Freedmen. Also, the registration process carefully screened out former rebels. The substantial victories of Republican candidates in the 1866 national elections reaffirmed Congress in its opposition to the President's Reconstruction policy. Many in the North and in Congress expected the President to accede graciously to the popular will in support of more forceful terms for Southern readmittance to the Union.³¹ President Johnson's response to the Republican electoral victory was not, however, conciliatory. Instead, he redoubled his efforts to prevent, obstruct, or disrupt the Republican-led Congress from imposing a new occupation policy on the Southern states. The President's tactics included using his power as the Commander in Chief of the military, using the authority of the Attorney General's office, and finally advising and encouraging the opposition of Southern leaders.

As army commanders in the South began to register voters for a constitutional assembly in accordance with the First and Second Reconstruction Acts, they were required, by the vagueness of the acts, to use their best judgment regarding various details of the process. In most cases, the commander's interpretation of the acts was such that it denied suffrage to as many former Confederates as possible. In addition, commanders put in place provisions to challenge the veracity of Southerners who took the oath of loyalty but remained suspect. On June 20, 1867, President Johnson issued orders that commanders could not challenge oaths, give former Confederates the maximum participation in elections, forbade commanders from

³¹ Both McKittrick and Trefousse agree that after the 1866 elections moderate Republicans, met halfway by Johnson, might have been content to limit Congressional action to the passing of the 14th Amendment. McKittrick, 448–451; Trefousse, 272–276.

removing civilian officials, and prohibited them from issuing proclamations that carried the force of law in their districts.³² In effect the President, as the Commander in Chief, took away from the district commanders the power given to them by Congress, thus undermining the First and Second Reconstruction Acts. These actions by the President had only a short-term impact, as Congress designed the Third Reconstruction Act specifically to return supreme authority in the military districts to the commanders.

Though the district commanders were interested in promoting the success of Unionist forces, they did not overtly influence the outcome of elections. Generals Sheridan and Pope both stationed troops in the various parishes and counties to ensure Freedman and Unionists had access to the polls. Pope specifically requested and the army provided cavalry troops to operate in northern Georgia and Alabama for this purpose. Sheridan pulled troops back from frontier duty to ensure a fair registration. While doing his best to ensure a fair vote, Sheridan also reported that he did not think that the pro-union forces in Texas would carry the day.³³ Though the laws were pro-union, army commanders did not influence the election except in accordance with the law.

Johnson continued to use his constitutional military authority to undermine the Congress's actions. In the six months after passage of the first Reconstruction Act, Johnson relieved and reassigned four of the five Reconstruction district commanders. In each case, he ordered the reassignment over the advice and judgment of the General in Chief of the Army, and each replacement commander was an individual who Johnson knew or believed to be of Democratic political leanings. In addition to the generals, Johnson also effectively removed Secretary of War Stanton. All of these actions infuriated the Congress, and the Stanton action

³² McKittrick, 493.

³³ Sheridan to Grant, April 1, 1867, PUSG, Vol. 17, 92.

led to impeachment proceedings against Johnson in February of 1868. Congress had no power, however, to challenge Johnson's orders regarding army assignments.

Another tactic used by the President to circumvent the Congress's legislation was to obtain a narrow legal interpretation of the law from the Attorney General, conservative Ohio Republican Henry Stanbery.³⁴ It severely curtailed the power of district commanders to challenge the eligibility of former Confederates attempting to register to vote. It also precluded removal of civil officials and required that they defer to the President in their actions as district commanders. The subterfuge of the legal opinion fooled no one. *Harper's Weekly* reported: "The Attorney-General has given an interpretation of the law which is intended to defeat its purpose."³⁵ The district commanders understood the impact of the Attorney General's opinion. Sheridan's analysis was that the Attorney General opened "a broad macadamized road for perjury & fraud to travel on."³⁶ Grant was not fooled nor impressed, and promptly advised the district commanders, "The shape in which the views of the Atty. Gen. have been communicated to district commanders is such as not to entitle them to the force of orders." Grant told commanders to "Enforce your own construction of the Military Bill until ordered to do otherwise."³⁷ Grant's advice proved necessary only until Congress passed the Third Reconstruction Act.³⁸

³⁴ Stanbery would later resign as Attorney General and head President Johnson's impeachment defense team.

³⁵ Editorial, *Harper's Weekly*, July 29, 1867, 402, "Finding Precedent: The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson Website," *Harp Week Exploring History Website*, 2007, available from <http://www.impeach-andrewjohnson.com/08OvertObstructionOfCongress/v-4.htm>, (accessed on 3 December, 2007).

³⁶ Telegram, Sheridan to Grant, June 22, 1867, PUSG, Vol. 17, 198.

³⁷ Grant to Sheridan, June 24, 1867, PUSG, Vol. 17, 195–196, 200; Grant to Pope, June 28, 1867, PUSG, Vol. 17, 204. Brooks D. Simpson, *Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861–1868* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 182–189.

³⁸ In addition to active opposition that President Johnson directed against Congressional Reconstruction, he also provided moral support to the active opposition at the local and state level by Southern leaders. This was most evident in his activity opposing the 14th Amendment. He sent numerous letters and telegrams to key leaders encouraging them to reject the amendment. He was successful in this regard and all the former confederate state

In addition to the district commanders, the President was also concerned with another opponent of his policy: Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. Stanton was the only radical Republican in the Johnson cabinet —Lincoln appointed him to his position in 1862 largely because of his demonstrated efficiency running a large organization. He was an abolitionist and staunch Unionist. Stanton was politically close to the radical Republicans, and he advised them on the preparation of the Reconstruction acts. Congress passed the Tenure Act of 1867 specifically to prevent his removal from office by President Johnson. On February 21 1868, President Johnson appointed Lorenzo Thomas Secretary of War. On February 24, 1868, the House impeached President Johnson for violation of the Tenure Act.³⁹

Despite incomplete guidance from Congress, a Secretary of War who was suspended, commanders who were relieved, the passive and active opposition of local Southern whites, and ultimately, a president under trial for impeachment, the army commanders in the South doggedly proceeded with their mission to enforce the law and establish democratic government in the South. Over the course of 1867 and 1868, they registered voters, supervised elections, organized constitutional assemblies, formed state legislations, and finally transferred power from the military authorities to legitimately elected state governments. Throughout the summer of 1867,

legislatures formed under Presidential Reconstruction rejected the amendment to the Constitution. President Johnson's actions in this regard included telegraphing state legislatures encouraging them to reject the amendment on the eve of voting. Trefousse, 275; McKittrick, 450–455.

³⁹ The authoritative scholarly biography of Edwin M. Stanton is Benjamin P. Thomas' *Stanton: the Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War* (New York: Knopf, 1962). Of all the secondary sources, Simpson's *Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861–1868* gives the most detailed account of the interaction between Grant and Johnson leading up to the impeachment action by Congress. Strangely, Grant's relationship with Johnson regarding impeachment is barely discussed in Trefousse's biography of Johnson. Simpson's analysis, 225–236, indicates that Johnson intentionally sought a breach with Grant on the issue of the return of Secretary of War Stanton as a calculated move intended to humiliate Grant and damage him as a potential rival in the 1868 Presidential election. Grant's backing of Stanton's position to remain Secretary of War and his forceful letter to Johnson accusing Johnson of attacking his honor made Grant a hero to the Republicans and greatly increased his attractiveness as the Republican candidate. Ultimately Johnson survived impeachment by one vote in the Senate, but his further influence on Reconstruction policy was greatly curtailed. After Johnson was found innocent by the Senate, Stanton resigned and was replaced as Secretary of War by General John Schofield who was acceptable to both Democrats and Republicans. Schofield's tenure as Secretary of War was uncontroversial.

registration of voters proceeded apace. Generals Sickles, Pope, and Sheridan, commanders of the Second, Third, and Fifth Military Districts respectively, were aggressive in eliminating former Confederates from the process, despite knowing that this would bring about presidential wrath. Sheridan reported, “the registration throughout the state [Louisiana] has been harmonious. The boards having been kindly received everywhere.”⁴⁰ Sickles reported “all the indications point so far to the successful administration and execution of the recent Acts of Congress for the reorganization of the States.”⁴¹ In general, commanders accomplished registration with little difficulty, though General Sickles had to deploy several companies of cavalry to ensure completeness of registration in remote parts of his district. General Schofield had no problems in his district and reported from the First District (Virginia) that registering boards “with few exceptions, [did] their duty in the most satisfactory manner.”⁴² By the end of September 1867, much of the registration work was complete.

With eligible voters identified and registered, the next phase of Congressional Reconstruction was voting for delegates to write a state constitution. The task was to write a constitution and then forward the constitution to the Congress for approval, and then to the voters for acceptance. In most of the military districts the voting and constitution writing was done under a new reign of district commanders, men who President Johnson perceived would be more supportive of his policy view point: General Winfield S. Hancock replaced Sheridan, General George Meade replaced Pope, General Edward Canby replaced Sickles, and General Alvan Gillem replaced Ord. However, there was very little immediate change in the direction of Congressional Reconstruction under the new commanders. In some cases, the new commanders

⁴⁰ Telegram Sheridan to Grant, June 18, 1867, PUSG, Vol. 17, 197.

⁴¹ Letter Sickles to Grant, 18 April 1867, PUSG, Vol. 17, 167

⁴² “Report of General John M. Schofield, Commanding the First Military District,” 6 October, 1867, *ARSW, 1867, Part I* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1868), 241.

were stricter on Southerners than their predecessors had been. Major General Meade removed the governor of Georgia, Alfred Jenkins, as well as the state attorney general and the state treasurer, for refusing to release funds to support the constitutional convention.⁴³ Thus, the initiation of Congressional Reconstruction was relatively unaffected in the short-term by the President's relief of key commanders.

Over the course of 1868, the registered voters of the former Confederate states elected delegates and assembled state constitutional assemblies. In the Second Military District (North and South Carolina), the new district commander, Major General Canby, efficiently supervised elections and conventions. Congress readmitted these states to the Union on July 9 and 4, respectively. In the Third District, Alabama voted on the constitution in February, and, though the voters rejected the proposed constitution, Congress accepted it. The state legislature convened, and Congress readmitted the state to the Union on July 13. In Florida, the district commander had to mediate after the convention members split and deadlocked over the content of the constitution. The commander helped work out a compromise, voters accepted the new constitution, and Congress readmitted Florida to the Union on June 25.⁴⁴ In the Fourth District, Arkansas held a convention, approved a constitution, and rejoined the Union on June 22. Elections to ratify the constitution in the Fifth District state of Louisiana also occurred without a serious problem due to very thorough preparations by army troops under the command of Major General Robert C. Buchanan, who noted "this election [was] the most peaceful, quiet, and

⁴³ General Pope, who had a much more radical reputation than Meade, had resisted similar action regarding Jenkins for months. "Report of Major General G.G. Meade," October 31, 1868, *ARSW, 1868, Part I* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1869), 75.

⁴⁴ "Report of Major General G.G. Meade," 1868, 76–78.

orderly of any that have taken place in the State of Louisiana for a great many years, if not ever before.”⁴⁵ Louisiana returned to the Union on July 9.⁴⁶

The readmittance process did not go smoothly in all of the former Confederate states. In Virginia, despite a state constitution assembly that developed a constitution, disagreement regarding funding prevented a ratification vote in 1868. In the Third District, although Georgia approved a new constitution and elected a Republican governor and legislature, later in the year the state removed elected Freedmen from the legislature, giving Democrats a majority. This resulted in Congress refusing to seat Georgia representatives, even though they had initially approved readmitting the state to the Union. It also resulted in reinstatement of military rule in 1869.⁴⁷ In the Fourth District, Mississippi voters rejected the proposed constitution and remained unreconstructed. In the Fifth District, Texas’s civil situation was so chaotic that the state could not convene a constitutional convention.

By the end of 1868 and the first year of military rule in the South under Congressional Reconstruction, six of the ten former Confederate States subject to Reconstruction had rejoined the Union. The remaining four states, Virginia, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas, would remain

⁴⁵ “Report of Major General Robert C. Buchanan,” October 1, 1868, *ARSW, 1868, Part I*, 313–314.

⁴⁶ In the Fifth District the tenure of General Sheridan’s replacement, Major General W.S. Hancock, a known active Democrat, was not as routine as that of the other district commanders. General Hancock removed the aldermen of the city of New Orleans for holding an election to appoint a new city recorder in violation of an order previously issued by General Sheridan banning elections. General Grant, upon investigating the matter, determined that Hancock improperly removed the aldermen and ordered their reinstatement. Because General Grant revoked his order, General Hancock requested his own relief from command. Grant granted his request: he was relieved of his duties on March 14, 1868 and assigned to the Department of the Atlantic. Major General Reynolds, the senior subordinate commander, temporarily replaced Hancock. The controversy did not slow down the reconstruction process. The short Grant Hancock feud is documented in *PUSG*, Vol. 18, 185–187. General Horace Porter investigated Hancock’s actions and in a letter to Grant on March 7, 1868 clearly outlined the facts and came to the conclusion that Hancock’s actions were not justified. *PUSG*, Vol. 18, 186, 200. Hancock was very popular in the South during Reconstruction and afterward. His name was floated as a potential Presidential nominee in 1868 and 1876. He ran as the Democratic nominee in 1880 and lost by an extremely small margin to Republican James Garfield. Hancock died still on active duty as commander of the Division of the Atlantic in 1886. Izra Warner, *Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 204.

⁴⁷ “Annual Report of Brigadier General Terry,” October 10, 1870, *ARSW, 1870, Part I* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1871), 39.

under or return to military rule through 1869 and not gain readmittance to the Union until 1870. In each of the four remaining states, state internal politics delayed readmittance. In Texas a strong conservative coalition existed that rejected the 14th Amendment, passed black codes to control Freedmen rights, attempted to have former secessionists admitted to Congress, refused to recognize federal authority, attempted to form its own state militia, and aimed to thwart the efforts of the Freedmen's Bureau and the military department commander, General Sheridan, at every turn.⁴⁸ Under army control after March 1867, Texas only very slowly met the requirements for readmission. This was partly due to disunity among the state's Unionists, who divided themselves into opposing radical and moderate factions. The radicals advocated a harsh disenfranchisement of former Confederates as well as division of the state into two or more new states. The moderates were willing to align with the Democrats and conservatives to enfranchise as many white voters as possible. These internal squabbles resulted in a very lengthy constitutional convention that had to convene in two separate sessions before finally, after the intervention of the army department commander General Canby, agreeing on a constitution.⁴⁹ On March 30, 1870, Texas rejoined the Union.⁵⁰ Virginia and Mississippi had preceded Texas

⁴⁸ William L. Richter, *The Army in Texas During Reconstruction* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 73–75.

⁴⁹ General Canby is referred to by his biographer Max L. Heyman as “the great reconstructor” because of his remarkable record of supervising four states into successful reconstruction. Though President Johnson considered Canby a reliable conservative his record indicates that he was a fair administrator of the Congressional Reconstruction laws. As Sickles replacement, he oversaw the readmittance of North and South Carolina in 1868. In November 1868 he was assigned to command Texas in the Fifth District and by February 1869 had organized the state sufficiently to have a constitution written. In April, before the Texas constitution could be ratified, he was reassigned to Virginia where the constitution was already approved. Canby successfully supervised the election and seating of the legislature and governor. Max L. Heyman documents Canby's contributions to Reconstruction in *Prudent Soldier: A Biography of Major General E.R.S. Canby, 1817–1873* (Glendale, CA: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1959), 305–348.

⁵⁰ Richter details the complex and dynamic internal politics and disagreements that delayed Republican action in the state of Texas, despite the enthusiastic and largely unencumbered support of the Fifth District commander, General J.J. Reynolds, through 1868 and 1869, in Chapters 7–10, 119–186.

into the Union, gaining admission on January 26 and February 23, respectively. Georgia was the last of the Confederate states to permanently rejoin the Union, which it did on July 15, 1870.

Congressional Reconstruction required the army to ensure the rule of law, govern the former Confederate states, supervise the transition to civil rule, and ensure compliance with the conditions identified by Congress in the three Reconstruction acts. The army carried out the tasks of Congressional Reconstruction effectively, gaining readmission for six of the ten states within eighteen months of receiving the mission. The four remaining states required another eighteen months to rejoin the Union. In concept, Congressional Reconstruction differed very little from Presidential Reconstruction; the difference between the two approaches was in the details. Military supervision and a detailed strict registration process enforced the law and ensured maximum participation by white Unionist and Freedmen, and minimized the influence of former Confederates. This coalition of very different participants produced significantly different state constitutions and very different legislatures than had existed under Presidential Reconstruction. The Republican Party, supported by Freedmen and Unionists, gained control of all of the Southern states except Virginia. Freedmen not only participated in great numbers, but also won leadership positions in the new Republican state governments.⁵¹ Congressional Reconstruction, combined with army electoral supervision, resulted in a dramatic political transformation of most of the South. By the summer of 1870, the Union was whole, and the army had apparently concluded its mission. It remained to be seen if Unionists and Freedmen could sustain their political coalition and if the Reconstruction acts could foster social change.

⁵¹ Over the period of Reconstruction sixteen Freedmen were sent to Congress, one served a brief tenure as Governor of Louisiana, six served as Lieutenant Governors, dozens served in other appointed positions and over 600 served as state legislators, Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), 351–355.

Redemption and Failure

The removal of military district commanders by President Johnson did not appear to have an immediate impact on the tempo and success of Congressional Reconstruction, but disagreements regarding policy in the South remained both within the army and within Congress. The disagreements became progressively more pronounced and negative over time. As President Johnson's tenure approached its end in 1868, the impeachment proceedings against him absorbed most of his energy. In the fall of that year the country elected General in Chief Grant to be the new President. Grant became President on March 4, 1869, and on March 8 General William Tecumseh Sherman became the new General in Chief. General Phil Sheridan moved from department commander in Missouri to replace Sherman as the senior Indian fighting commander as the head of the Division of the Missouri.⁵² Much of this shuffling of personal and responsibilities had little impact on operations. However, particular key individuals in critical positions had a great impact on the nature of army operations in the former Confederate states after 1869.

With Grant as President in 1869, it appeared that the Republican forces advocating a strong Southern policy were never more powerful. President Johnson leaving office removed the largest obstacle to Congressional Reconstruction policy. Grant's actions as General in Chief were supportive of Congressional policy, and the indications were that he would continue his support from the White House. In fact, Grant indicated that his motivation for running for President was specifically to not "lose to us, largely, the results of the costly war which we have gone through."⁵³ However, Grant's influence as the Commander in Chief was more than offset by General Sherman's selection to be the new General in Chief.

⁵² PUSG, Vol. 18, 143–144.

⁵³ Letter from Grant to Sherman, June 21, 1868, PUSG, Vol. 18, 292.

Grant's presidency coincided with a new phase of the Reconstruction process. By the time Grant took office, most of the former Confederate states had been readmitted to the Union. This change in status precluded the army from interfering in the political and legal affairs of these states. As General Terry noted from his command in Atlanta, "the complete restoration of ... the States which compose the command to their original relations to the general government...have withdrawn from the province of the department commander many subjects with which he formally had to do."⁵⁴ However, the Republican state governments in all six states owed their existence to the significant involvement of the district commanders in state political affairs. The sudden withdrawal of army support for these relatively weak governments created a situation in which, absent vigorous army support, the traditional Southern political apparatus had an opportunity to reassert itself. In this situation, the views of the new General in Chief, William T. Sherman, were key.

Throughout two critical years of Presidential and Congressional Reconstruction, from the summer of 1866 to the summer of 1868, General in Chief Grant kept a careful eye on the political and military developments relating to the occupation of the South. Though President Grant occasionally focused on Southern policy, after 1868 his attention would never return to Reconstruction with the same type of sustained interest and participation that he had given the issue during his period as General in Chief. Unlike Grant, General William Tecumseh Sherman as General in Chief did not view the army mission in the South as particularly important. He felt it was a major distraction from the army's primary mission on the frontier. Sherman's experiences and his personal conservatism strongly influenced his views. His pre-Civil War experiences living in South Carolina and as the President of the Louisiana Military Seminary

⁵⁴ "Report of Major General Alfred H. Terry," October 31, 1869, *ARSW, 1869, Volume I* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1869), 88.

gave him a strong affection for the South and the Southern intellectual elite, despite the notoriety he gained through his marauding Civil War campaign from Atlanta to the sea.⁵⁵ Sherman's conservative ideology was second only to his strong convictions regarding the sanctity of the Union.

Sherman observed the early years of Reconstruction from his headquarters in St. Louis, where he commanded the Division of Missouri and was largely responsible for protecting the expanding western frontier. He had no desire to serve in the South and wrote that he was "perfectly willing to take a Regt [regiment] of cavalry and go to fight Indians, but to hold an indescribable office of mixed jurisdiction, impossible of logical execution and sure to result in curses from both sides."⁵⁶ Sherman viewed the Reconstruction battles between Congress and President Johnson as a clash of wills and egos and not fundamentally about ideology. In 1868 he wrote his brother, Ohio Senator John Sherman, that if outsiders would leave Southern whites alone to reorganize their society all would be well.⁵⁷ Writing his brother in 1875, he was unequivocal in both his view of the army's role in the South and unrepentant if it clashed with those of his friend and commander, President Grant: "I have always thought it wrong to bolster up weak State governments by our troops. We should keep the peace always; but not act as bailiff constables and catch thieves. That should be beneath a soldier's vocation."⁵⁸ Sherman did not believe that the army had a role in enforcing law in the South. Sherman's conservatism effected the army support to the mission in the South. Within days of taking command in

⁵⁵ The Louisiana Military Seminary later became Louisiana State University.

⁵⁶ John F. Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 372. From Sherman to Philemon Boyle Ewing, Philemon Boyle Ewing Papers, Ohio Historical Society March 8, 1867.

⁵⁷ Marszalek, *Sherman*, 375. From a letter from Sherman to John Sherman, February 28, 1868, Library of Congress Sherman Papers.

⁵⁸ Sherman to John Sherman, St. Louis, MO, January 7, 1875, Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor. *The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), 342.

Washington, he ordered the deployment west of most of the cavalry companies, the most effective enforcement forces in the South.⁵⁹ Though his father-in-law, Thomas Ewing, and brother, John Sherman, were prominent Senators, he firmly believed in a complete separation of the army from politics.⁶⁰ In his office as General in Chief of the army, Sherman was in a position where his actions, or passive inaction, had disastrous consequences for the new Republican governments born out of Congressional Reconstruction.

Other figures also played a role in the army's support for the fledgling Republican state governments. At the level of division and department commanders, officers could also have an influence on state affairs even though the supreme authority of the military district commander no longer existed. Here the replacement officers appointed by President Johnson or General Sherman began to effect the course of Reconstruction. The actions of General Henry W. Halleck, who took command of the Division of the South in June 1869 and commanded until November 1871, represent this influence. Halleck's division contained the greatest number of former Confederate states, and he was therefore in a position to greatly effect the political fate of the new Republican state governments.

Halleck's personal political views were similar to Sherman's ideas. While serving as the division commander of the Pacific in 1867, he wrote that it was "improper for officers of the

⁵⁹ On March 24, 1869 the army ordered all cavalry (two 5th Cavalry companies) out of Mississippi, even though things were so unsettled in that state that the army Chief of Commissary had been murdered on the streets of the state capital. "Report of Brevet Major General Adelbert Ames," October 28, 1869, *ARSW, 1869*, 100. On March 30, 1869 Sherman ordered all cavalry out of Louisiana (two companies of the 4th Cavalry). "Report of Brevet Major General J.A. Mower," October 15, 1869, *ARSW, 1869*, 96.

⁶⁰ Thomas Ewing Sr. was the foster father of General William T. Sherman as well as his father in law. He served as a Senator from Ohio 1831–1837 and 1850–1851. He was also Secretary of the Treasury in 1841 and Secretary of the Interior 1849–1950. John Sherman was the younger brother of William Sherman. He served as a Ohio Congressman 1855–1861; a Senator from Ohio 1861–1877 and 1881–1897; as Secretary of the Treasury 1877–1881; and as Secretary of State 1897–1898. "Ewing, Thomas, (1789–1971)," and "Sherman, John, (1823–1900)," *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774–Present*, available on <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000281> and <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000346>, accessed on 3 December 2007.

Army to take, under ordinary circumstance, active part in political party contests.” In his first report as commander of the South in 1869, he wrote, “In regard to the interference of military officers in local difficulties under the pleas of maintaining peace and good order, I think that no such military interference should be permitted, except on the requisition of the governor of the State, and by the order of the President, as provided by law.”⁶¹ This overly legal mindset, combined with an ideological conservatism unsupportive of Freedmen suffrage, explains Halleck’s inaction in state affairs. Thus, in the critical years of his command, as white supremacy groups killed hundreds of Freedmen and Unionists and intimidated thousands more throughout his division, Halleck took no action in support of local law and order and maintained that “official investigations have generally proved the reports to be either unfounded or greatly exaggerated.”⁶²

Halleck’s conclusions regarding the state law and order within his division indicate complete detachment from the reality of conditions within his command in 1869 as reported by his four very experienced subordinates: Generals Alfred Terry in the Department of the South, P. St. George Cooke in the Department of the Cumberland, J. A. Mowler in the Department of Louisiana, and Adelbert Ames commanding the Department of Mississippi. Terry reported that in Alabama “the middle and northern parts of the State... are in a very disturbed condition,” and in much of Georgia “there is practically no government;” Cooke stated “in the interior of Kentucky and Tennessee... freedom of negroes is a mockery;” Mowler reported that parts of

⁶¹ John F. Marszalek, *Commander of All Lincoln’s Armies: A Life of General Henry W. Halleck* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 244. From Halleck to H.J. Tildon, June 21, 1867, RG 94, NARA; “Report of Major General H.W. Halleck,” *ARSW, 1869*, 78.

⁶² In his 1870 report to the Secretary of War Halleck made a similar recommendation, and in that report General Sherman highlighted and endorsed Halleck’s view and stated the civil authorities “often expect more than can be rightly or lawfully done.” Report of the General of the Army,” *ARSW, 1870*, 4; “Report of Major General Halleck,” *ARSW, 1870*, 37. Marszalek makes the point that Halleck’s antagonism towards black suffrage was noted in pre-war California, his early war service in Missouri, and his initial post-war command in Richmond Virginia, *Halleck*, 247.

Louisiana were “invested with desperadoes and thieves who defy and ignore the local civil authorities entirely,” and in Mississippi Ames reported, “A prevailing sentiment in many sections of the State has been that the whites who entertain political sentiments different from the community [Unionists] should be driven therefrom, and that the blacks should be, if not deprived of rights undeniably theirs by law, at least seriously curtailed in the exercise of them.”⁶³

Halleck’s mindset limited the freedom of action of these subordinates and ensured that the new Republican state governments and their Unionist and Freedmen supporters could not rely on army support.

Although some of the department heads did what they could to support the state governments, others such as Canby in Virginia and Rousseau in Louisiana remained uninvolved or actively supported the conservative forces. In North Carolina, Freedmen’s Bureau Chief and future General in Chief of the Army Nelson Miles’s disagreements with General Terry’s predecessor, General George Meade, over Meade’s reluctance to authorize the use troops to support the state government, finally led Meade to request Miles’s relief from command.⁶⁴ Passive nonsupport of the occupation objectives by some army officers aided the opponents of Republican rule in the South. A friend and supporter of President Johnson, General Lovell H. Rousseau commanded in Louisiana during the 1868 election.⁶⁵ He refused to take action against violence that resulted in the deaths of as many as 200 Freedmen prior to the election. In fact, Rousseau advised Freedmen to stay away from the polls for their own self-protection. He stated

⁶³ “Report of Major General H.W. Halleck,” 78; “Report of Major General Alfred H. Terry Report,” 88–89 ; “Report of Brevet Major General P. St. George Cooke,” 81; “Report of Brevet Major General J.A. Mower,” 98; “Report of Brevet Major General Adelbert Ames,” 100, all in *ARSW, 1869*.

⁶⁴ Peter R. DeMontravel, *A Hero to His Fighting Men: Nelson A. Miles, 1839–1925* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998), 58.

⁶⁵ Rousseau was part of the history that resulted in General Sheridan’s relief in 1867. Earlier, in 1867 he had visited the command at the direction of President Johnson without the permission or knowledge of Grant or Sheridan. He then made an unfavorable report to Johnson recommending Sheridan’s relief. Sheridan formally complained that Rousseau had breached professional conduct and courtesy and Grant concurred. Rousseau was appointed commander in Louisiana after Hancock’s relief.

that the “ascendance of the negro in this state is approaching its end.”⁶⁶ Passive non-support to Congressional Reconstruction by army leaders after 1869 denied the new Republican state governments the support they needed to survive, removed the force of Congressional legislation, and emboldened and encouraged Southern resistance. Without army involvement in state affairs, lawlessness descended on much of the South.

As the new state governments took power in 1868 and as army support diminished at the same time, a significant threat to law and order and the state governments came to the nation’s attention in the form of the Ku Klux Klan. As indicated by the department commanders above, politically inspired violence swept through most of the South beginning in 1868. Intimidation and terror against Unionists and Freedmen existed before the war ended and continued after the peace. Violence increased noticeably after 1866, when former Confederate soldiers founded the Ku Klux Klan as a Tennessee social club. By 1868, the Klan had spread to every Southern state and had launched a deliberate reign of terror intended to intimidate the Republican vote, black and white, in the Southern states.⁶⁷ General Halleck was technically correct when he stated in 1869, “Although there may be special organizations of outlaws in particular localities under the name of Ku-Klux, I am of the opinion that no such general organization now exists in the Southern States,” but his analysis was incomplete and demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the threat.⁶⁸ Though they did not have a central command and control apparatus, the Klan had a common ideology and purpose and a common set of tactics that united the various local Klan groups. Public acclaim for their activities reinforced their effectiveness, encouraged their boldness, and encouraged the formation of similar groups practicing similar

⁶⁶ Foner, *Reconstruction*, 342.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 342.

⁶⁸ “Report of Major General H.W. Halleck,” *ARSW, 1869*, 78.

activities in other regions. Historian Eric Foner did not exaggerate when he concluded, “In effect, the Klan was a military force serving the interests of the Democratic Party, the planter class, and all those who desired restoration of white supremacy.”⁶⁹ Thus, while one faction, the Democratic Party, had an effective military force supporting its political activity, the other faction, the new Republican state governments, did not.

Although the third phase of Reconstruction was largely successful, after commanders turned over authority to civil leaders, disgruntled whites increased the use of criminal terror and intimidation to erode Freedmen and white Unionist political power. The Southern white population was defiant in the face of the army’s initial success imposing Reconstruction policy and then more so after the noticeable change in the army leadership’s aggressive attitude toward law enforcement. A Democratic newspaper vowed, “These constitutions and governments will last just as long as the bayonets which ushered them into being, shall keep them in existence, and not one day longer.”⁷⁰ The Klan and like groups were effective at discouraging blacks and Republican whites (carpetbaggers and scalawags) from voting, especially after the army stopped aggressively employing the bayonets that protected those rights.

Local army commanders, after turning power over to elected civil officials in 1867–68, were aware of what was happening. When General Terry took command in Georgia, he recommended to Halleck that “all orders recognizing Georgia as a state of the Union be revoked, and that the military authority of a district commander under the Reconstruction laws, with authority to try citizens by military tribunals, be restored or resumed in that state.”⁷¹ He further reported, “There can be no doubt of the existence of numerous, insurrectionary organizations

⁶⁹ Foner, *Reconstruction*, 425.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, *Reconstruction*, 332–333.

⁷¹ “Report of Major General H.W. Halleck,” *ARSW, 1869*, 77.

known as the ku-klux klans, who shielded by their disguises, by the secrecy of their movements, and by the terror which they inspire, perpetrate crime with impunity.”⁷² General Halleck, his superior, did not concur. In the critical year of 1869 senior army commanders were unwilling to take action. General Sherman was determined that the army be as removed from politics as possible.

There is no debate as to the effectiveness of the Klan. The Klan and other supremacist organizations, such as the White League in Louisiana, were almost unchallenged wherever army troops were absent. Historian Eric Foner described a “wave of counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts of the South between 1868 and 1871 [that] lacks a counterpart either in the American experience or in that of the other Western Hemisphere societies that abolished slavery in the nineteenth century.” One out of every ten black members of the 1867–68 state constitutional conventions became the victim of Klan violence, and seven were murdered. It was no surprise that in the 1868 Presidential election the two southern states that Grant did not carry were Louisiana and Georgia, where army leadership was least aggressive and where violence decimated the Republican organizations and made it impossible to get out the black vote.⁷³

The army response to the terrorist threat was haphazard. During the Johnson administration, commanders who acted decisively against terrorists were relieved. After Grant became President in 1869, conservative commanders installed by Johnson still were in key positions and had strong influence. General Sherman’s influence restrained others from acting aggressively. In 1871, Sherman insisted that what lawlessness existed was a function of corrupt Republican state governments and that “If Ku-klux bills were kept out of Congress, and the army kept at their legitimate duties, there are enough good and true men in all Southern States to put

⁷² Ibid., 89–90.

⁷³ Foner, *Reconstruction*, 425–426; 343.

down all Kuklux or other bands of marauders.”⁷⁴ Clearly, the Klan threat did not impress the senior leader of the army.⁷⁵

The Southern governments were at a disadvantage trying to subdue terrorists until Grant and his Administration finally made a priority of reestablishing the rule of law. This occurred in 1871 when the federal government determined to pursue the Klan through the offices of Attorney General Amos T. Akerman, and Solicitor General Benjamin H. Bristow.⁷⁶ Grant established a new organization, the Department of Justice, and district attorneys, marshals, and the army began a campaign to eliminate the Klan. Army headquarters at last recognized the extent of the Klan challenge. The Secretary of War, William W. Belknap, reported in 1871 “indisputable evidence establishes the fact... that an armed rebellion of regular organization and great strength in parts of those States [east of the Mississippi].”⁷⁷ Using a variety of tools, including the army, the Federal government made progress fighting the Klan. In North Carolina troops helped make arrests. In Mississippi federal authorities obtained nearly 700 indictments against Klan and other insurgent group members. However, most cases that went to trial resulted in suspended sentences. South Carolina was the only state where authorities used troops, including six companies of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, on a large scale. The President suspended the writ of

⁷⁴ Quoted in Marszalek, *Sherman*, 426. From a speech in New Orleans reported in the *New York Times*, April 29, 1871.

⁷⁵ At the state level, absent a major army effort, the more aggressive of the Republican state governors used state resources to attack the terrorist with success. Texas and Arkansas were able to launch very effective anti-Klan campaigns without significant army support. Arkansas Governor Powel Clayton put ten counties under martial law and used the state militia made up of blacks and scalawag whites to enforce the law. General Joseph A. Mower, commander of the Division of the South, reported that as a result of aggressive action by the governor “the civil authorities of that State [Arkansas] have made themselves respected, and the laws can be executed without much difficulty.” “Report of Brevet Major General J.A. Mower,” *ARSW, 1869*, 99. By early 1869 state authorities eliminated the Klan as a force in Arkansas politics. In Texas Governor Edmund J. Davis organized an elite 200 member state police of which 40 percent were black. Between 1870 and 1872 they made over 6,000 arrests and effectively suppressed the Klan. Similar tactics in North Carolina, however, failed to achieve the desired result because of indecisive leadership and an inadequate legal foundation for the action. Foner, 440–441.

⁷⁶ The Force Act of 1870 and the Civil Rights Act (Klan Act) of 1871 were designed to protect Freedmen’s voting rights and to suppress efforts to obstruct Freedmen voting.

⁷⁷ “Report of Secretary of War,” undated, *ARSW, 1870, Volume 1* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1871), 17.

habeas corpus in nine South Carolina counties. As many as 2000 Klansmen may have fled South Carolina to avoid arrest. The army and prosecutors arrested and imprisoned most of the leadership.⁷⁸ The legal offensive of 1871 broke the organized Klan's back in South Carolina and drastically reduced violence everywhere.

However, the 1871 campaign came too late. Major Lewis Merrill leading the 7th Cavalry against the Klan in 1871 and 1872 recognized the Klan's lasting influence: "the tyranny of that organization over public opinion was so nearly perfect that its effect will be for a long time very great. So strong is this effect still that it is idle to expect for a long time to come that the State laws will be enforced in any Ku-Klux cases."⁷⁹ By 1871 the terrorists had succeeded in undermining several state governments and reestablishing white political dominance in much of the South. The Unionist and Freedmen vote was substantially intimidated. Violence had proven an effective tool of the conservative political movement, and in 1874 and 1875 it was key to the destruction of the last Republican state governments.⁸⁰

In 1870, the remaining former Confederate states entered the Union, but unlike the earlier states, these states entered with either bipartisan civil governments or governments controlled by the Democratic Party. Disengagement by the army leadership combined with an effective terrorist campaign contributed to the gradual undermining of the Republican civil governments

⁷⁸ Grant's proclamations declaring his intention to use the army in South Carolina, suspending habeas corpus, and detailed correspondence between the Adjutant General and General Terry coordinating support for the Justice Department are contained in PUSG, Vol. 22, 161–187. General Sherman's participation in this effort is noteworthy in its absence. It does not appear that Sherman took any active part in the plan to support the Force or Klan Acts. The effective South Carolina campaign is described in J. Michael Martinez, *Carpetbaggers, Cavalry, and the Ku Klux Klan: Exposing the Invisible Empire During Reconstruction* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007).

⁷⁹ "Report of Major Lewis Merrill," September 23, 1872, *ARSW, 1871, Volume 1* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1872), 90.

⁸⁰ In September of 1874 General Irvin McDowell, Commander of the Division of the South, reported widespread rioting in several states: Georgetown and Edgefield, South Carolina; Lancaster, Kentucky; Hurlbolt and Trenton Tennessee; Sumter County, Alabama; and New Orleans, Louisiana. The army was ineffective deterring any of these actions; only responding after they occurred. "Report of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell," September 30, 1874, *ARSW, 1874, Volume 1* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1874), 47–53.

created by Congressional Reconstruction and contributed to the willingness of southern Republicans to compromise with Democrats. National events, the increasing power of northern Democrats, the increased strength of moderate Republicans uninterested in Reconstruction, as well as economic recession, all weakened support for strict enforcement of Congressional Reconstruction policy and the strength of Republican governments in the South.

The political will to achieve the goals of Congressional Reconstruction was never higher than after the elections of 1868, when General Grant became President. However, it began to decline even before the 1870 mid-term election. Though Grant won the presidency, the election of 1868 saw major Democratic gains in northern states. The Democrats picked up twenty new seats in the House. One Ohio politician remarked on the future focus of national politics, “The Negro will be less prominent for some time to come.”⁸¹ In the 1870 House elections the Democrats picked up thirty-seven seats while the Republicans lost thirty-five. In 1872, many Republican supporters of Reconstruction moderated their views in order to retain their seats. After 1871, a coalition of moderate Republicans and Democrats toned down the vigorous support of Reconstruction in the Congress. In addition, by 1872 three Southern states, Georgia, Tennessee and Virginia, reverted to Democratic control. The President’s interest and ability to continue to support Reconstruction in the South waned. In the 1874 mid-term elections, the Democrats, spurred by an economic depression for which the public blamed Republicans, crushed the Republicans. Grant’s party lost ninety-six seats while the Democrats gained ninety-four, and control of the House for the first time since the beginning of the Civil War. As important, the Democrats regained control in Alabama, Texas and Arkansas, giving them effective control of six of the eleven former Confederate states.

⁸¹ Foner, 314–316.

In December 1874, White League gangs in Vicksburg, Mississippi, prevented blacks from voting. When confronted by a black sheriff, the whites, with superior firepower, dispersed the black posse and then went on a rampage. As many as three hundred blacks may have been murdered in the area before federal troops restored order in January 1875. The Vicksburg events became the Democratic blueprint for redeeming the state in the fall elections of 1875.⁸² Similar tactics occurred in Louisiana. The most violent and publicized event in Louisiana occurred in New Orleans on September 14, 1874, when over five thousand White League members, organized into military units, attacked and dispersed over three thousand men, mostly Freedmen, protecting the Republican state governor. The riot resulted in over one hundred wounded and twenty-five killed; mostly on the Republican side. Army commanders were restrained by General Sherman's guidance "not to call for force from without unless in case of manifest necessity." The Democrats installed their own governor for three days until army units arrived in sufficient force to reinstall the elected Republican.⁸³ President Grant, acutely aware of declining political and popular support of Reconstruction policy, responded, "The whole public are tired out with these annual autumnal outbreaks in the South . . . [and] are ready now to condemn any interference on the part of the Government." In 1876, the Republican governor of Mississippi, Adelbert Ames, resigned, saying, "A revolution has taken place—by force of arms—and a race are disfranchised."⁸⁴

Grant's failure to act to ensure proper elections in Mississippi and to prevent the usurpation of power by Democrats, along with the presidential election of 1876 and the contested returns in the states of Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina, spelled the death-knell of

⁸² *Ibid.*, 558.

⁸³ Sherman's quote and a detailed description of the events in New Orleans in Joseph G. Dawson, *Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 1862–1877* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 164–182.

⁸⁴ *Foner*, 560, 562–563.

Reconstruction. Democrats won clear control of Mississippi and North Carolina. The contested returns caused a compromise, brokered by moderate Republicans and Democrats, that conceded Democratic control of South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana in return for electoral votes for Republican presidential candidate Rutherford P. Hayes. By the summer of 1877, all of the Southern secessionist states were back firmly under Democratic Party control, as they had been prior to the Civil War.

A Blueprint for the Future

Modern historians see the occupation of the South as a failure because the South successfully undermined or blocked most of the political objectives of Reconstruction policy. By 1877, the leadership of the Southern states, governors, congressmen and other notable state and local officials, was predominantly of the same class and ideology that had led the South into rebellion in 1861. Even more disheartening was the undermining of abolition. Though the slaves were free, the resurgent Southern leadership, and their political Allies in the North, restricted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the point that most Southern Freedmen were unable to vote, did not have equality of opportunity, and were legally and socially relegated to a subservient class. Thus, the social status of the Freedmen and the political structure of the South, though altered from the antebellum form, fell far short of the objectives envisioned by the American government at the end of the Civil War.⁸⁵ The failure of Reconstruction was more a political failure than a military failure, but that political failure was at least in part due to the performance of the US Army.

⁸⁵ It would require a second Reconstruction period—the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s—to complete the political, social, and economic transformation of the South envisioned by the liberal Republicans of the Civil War era.

By the time that President Rutherford Hayes ordered the army in the South confined to military garrison duties, the army had experienced the complete cycle of an occupation experience. The army's participation in Reconstruction marks the beginning of a pattern that would come to define the US Army's conceptual approach to military occupation.⁸⁶ Army officers oversaw an attempt to remake completely a society both politically and socially. The variety of non-traditional tasks required of them was immense. They successfully transitioned from a conventional war footing to focus on occupation operations. Army leaders demonstrated how to create democratic government. Military leaders learned to defend their efforts from enemies who attacked them using diverse asymmetric means such the media, the legal system, politics, and terrorism. These positive lessons regarding occupations became part of the legacy of the Civil War occupation experience.

Army leaders also learned from their failures. They witnessed how the lack of a secure environment and the rule of law could undermine political successes. Officers learned that the type of social tasks assigned to them were time-consuming and reliant for success on many factors that were beyond their ability to control. Army leaders learned that one of the major factors impacting the conduct of military occupation activities was the national political policy, and they learned that they had only limited influence over that policy. Without timely, clear, and consistent strategic policy, successful military occupation operations became problematic. During Reconstruction, the failure to define a politically acceptable national policy resulted in lost time and opportunities, dramatic policy changes, undermined law and order, and ultimately contributed to conditions of resistance that the US government was not able to overcome. These

⁸⁶ This conclusion, that will be expanded upon in subsequent chapters, is completely different from that of James E. Sefton, who determined that "the role of the Army in the South from 1865 to 1877 was unique," and that "the same factors which made Mexico in 1847 a poor precedent for Reconstruction made 1900 and 1945 poor sequels." Sefton, 252.

conditions contributed significantly to the failure of Reconstruction and the failure of the occupation of the South. These failures were also part of the legacy the Reconstruction experience left the army.

CHAPTER 3 - The Frontier Army

The American army turned its primary focus to duty on the frontier soon after the Civil War ended. General John Crooke described the nature of service on the plains: “Indian warfare is, of all warfare, the most dangerous, the most trying and the most thankless. Not recognized by the high authority of the United States Senate as war, it still possesses for you the disadvantages of civilized warfare, with all the horrible accompaniments that barbarians can invent and savages execute. In it you are required to serve without the incentive to promotion or recognition; in truth, without favor or hope of reward.”¹ Army officers serving on the frontier experienced a hard life, hard campaigning, but little fighting. Though fighting was uncommon, the frontier period provided a rich set of experiences for the army officer corps that reinforced the lessons of the occupation of the South, and would served the army well as it entered into occupation operations in the twentieth-century. In the process, the small officer corps built strong ties among themselves and their families. These strong personal ties, combined with the intense but isolated conditions of service, created a strong shared institutional culture among the officer corps and facilitated passing the lessons of one generation of officer on to the next. A part of that shared cultural identity was a shared concept of the role of the army in the life of the nation.

General Sheridan, commanding the Division of the Missouri in 1873 expressed how army officers viewed the service the army provided to the nation during the frontier years: “the army’s task [on the frontier] was to do generally all that is constantly required ... in the way of helping and urging forward everything which tends to develop and increase civilization upon the

¹ Charles King, *Campaigning with Crook: And Stories of Army Life* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1890), 167.

border.”² Army resources on the frontier were devoted to a variety of non-combat tasks. As the most effective arm of the government in what was often a vacuum of lawlessness the army was deeply involved in Indian relations and policy, and supervised and assisted the transformation of the American western frontier into a viable partner in the Union. Advancing the frontier included interacting with the various tribes and their diverse cultures, dealing with foreign powers on the nation’s borders, assisting economic development, and exploration. These experiences and activities, though not occupation operations, were important unconventional military tasks that reinforced the experience of Reconstruction, and expanded the experiential knowledge and intellectual horizons of American army officers in ways that prepared them for later military government roles.

The Frontier Army

The army’s post-Civil War frontier experience began immediately after the Civil War and continued long after Reconstruction. Officially, the last campaign against the American Indian tribes was the Ghost Dance uprising which culminated in the battle at Wounded Knee in 1890. The Plains Indian wars were not a single war but a series of wars fought almost continuously from 1866 to 1890, against different tribes, across the depth and breadth of the western plains. These wars were only the highlights of continuous small scale patrolling, policing, raiding, and engagements, which kept the regular regiments of US Army in a constant state of operations throughout the period.

The frontier army was a small tightly knit force. Throughout its life, its total size never exceeded about 25,000 men, of which approximately 2000 were officers. As indicated in the previous chapter, during the years 1866 to 1877 a large portion of the frontier army was not on

² Philip H. Sheridan, “Report of General Philip H. Sheridan,” *ARSW*, 1873, part 2 (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1874), 40.

the frontier, but rather was committed to occupation duty in the former Confederate States. Additionally, coastal garrisons also accounted for a significant force. Some historians question whether the army was an army in fact. Historian Robert Utley observed, “The special conditions of the Indian mission made the US Army not so much a little army as a big police force.”³ The army’s primary purpose on the frontier was to provide security for US citizens and interests. This was the reason for its presence on over 200 small cantonments across the frontier.

The army showed great flexibility in organizing for the conditions of the frontier.⁴ Above regimental level, the army organized geographically into regional divisions and subordinate departments. This organization generally followed established political state and territory boundaries that facilitated the army coordinating its activities and operations with the civil representatives of the local government. Army organization was adapted to the conditions of the frontier and bore little resemblance to the conventional war organization of the Civil War.⁵ The leadership of the army understood that the army was a tool of government policy and in the post-Civil Wars years, it had to organize for a variety of governmental tasks in addition to

³ Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 47.

⁴ The army completely abandoned the formal army organization above regimental level, brigades, divisions, and corps, which was standard during the Civil War. In its place it relied on the regimental structure for administration, leadership, and training. It was willing to break even the regimental structure down into its component parts as it established company and battalion size garrisons to provide security to the frontier. In field operations, the army formed task forces which typically consisted of elements of multiple regiments, infantry and cavalry, artillery, logistics, and often, sizable Indian scout components. To make up a shortage of cavalry, the army was willing to mount infantry regiments on horses appropriated from hostile Indians.

⁵ The army adapted tactics to the frontier. The army quickly abandoned the linier formal infantry tactics of the Civil War. Those tactics relied upon disciplined ranks and fire power. On the frontier, commands employed their artillery units, if at all, primarily in infantry roles. Cavalry, relegated to a supporting role in the Civil War, became the arm of decision and while infantry company strength withered, all effort was made to keep the cavalry troops at close to full strength. Open order dismounted skirmishing with breech loading rifles and carbines was the favorite tactic of the army, including the cavalry. Though over-stating their case, American officers believed that their soldiers were the finest skirmishers in the world. Extensive use was made by the army of Indian scouts. Though army leaders disagreed on the ratio of scouts to regulars, there was no disagreement over their critical value to war fighting on the frontier

frontier security. Geographic organization facilitated command of a wide variety of disparate missions.

While engaged in frontier duties, the officer corps did not lose the knowledge and experiences gained in the occupation of the South. Most of the senior army commanders, and all of the Commanding Generals of the army through the beginning of the twentieth Century had both direct experience with the frontier and the occupation of the South. Many important mid-grade officers also did substantial duty in the South. Veterans passed the knowledge gained in Reconstruction on to younger officers through a variety of venues including the budding army education system. More effectively, soldiers informally handed down the experiences of Reconstruction through the professional, social, and personal connections between officers. The small post-Civil War army officer corps included West Point classmates, regimental comrades, campaign partners, relatives, and often combinations of these relationships. This informal network preserved the knowledge gained in Reconstruction, and also the relevant experiences of the late nineteenth century frontier army, for the next generation of officers.

Reconstruction experience was common in the frontier army.⁶ It was only the most junior officers in the frontier regiments who lacked any experience in the occupation of the

⁶ The most important senior officer in the west for most of the history of the post-Civil War frontier period was General Phil Sheridan. After President Johnson removed him from command of the Fifth Military District in the fall of 1867, Sheridan assumed command of the Department of Missouri. The Department was the largest of the military departments and included the greatest responsibilities for Indian management. After Grant's election in 1868, the army promoted Sheridan to Lieutenant General and to command the Division of the Missouri, which had responsibility for virtually all the active operations on the frontier. He commanded frontier operations for sixteen years. In 1884, Sheridan took command of the army upon General Sherman's retirement. He remained in that position until his death in 1888.

Of the other two military district commanders relieved by President Johnson in his attempt to thwart Congressional Reconstruction, John Sickles, commander of the Second Military District, left the army soon after he left the Carolinians. John Pope, commander of the Third Military District (Georgia and Alabama) returned to the West where he had served during the bulk of the Civil War. He would remain on the frontier for the rest of his army career. General John Schofield moved from the military governorship of Virginia and commander of the First Military District to the Department of Missouri in 1869. In 1870, he took command of the Division of the Pacific where he was primarily responsible for Indian problems in New Mexico, Arizona, and the northwest Pacific. General Alfred Terry moved from command of the Third Military District in Atlanta where he supervised army

South. Units and senior commanders rotated regularly to new assignments throughout the frontier period. This ensured that most senior frontier commanders commanded in the South and many frontier regiments rotated into garrisons in the South during the course of Reconstruction. The army's policy of transferring units wherever there was a need, partly a consequence of its small size and partly a conscious decision to equitably distribute the most arduous duty, resulted in much of the army experiencing some aspect of the occupation of the South. Even elements of the very valuable cavalry regiments saw service in the South. Because of this the Southern occupation was very much a part of the character of the frontier army. Through the end of the frontier army in 1890, if an army officer had not served on occupation duty, he was in contact with a commander, a peer, or a subordinate who had.

Despite being a force primarily designed for combat, the frontier army was involved in a host of activities not related, or only indirectly related to fighting Indians. The army was the single most important and influential government institution on the frontier. An army wife, describing her experiences traveling the frontier commented, "I never realized what a potent influence that uniform wielded in those troublesome times."⁷ Activities other than fighting

operations against the Klan in South Carolina, to the frontier in 1872, and remained commander of the Department of Dakota until 1886 when he replaced General Schofield as commander of the Division of Missouri. General O.O. Howard led the Freedmen's bureau until 1872. From that position, he moved to command the Department of the Northwest. During eighteen years of service on the frontier he was most famous for being the leader of the pursuit of the Chief Joseph's band during the 1877 Nez Perce' war. Other senior officers with significant Reconstruction experience included Generals O.C. Ord who served in the 4th Military District and Texas, and General Edward Canby who had important assignments in the Carolinas, Virginia and Texas.

The senior officers were not the only ones who brought their occupation experience to the frontier. Numerous field grade and company grade officers also served in the South and then transferred to frontier service. Perhaps the most famous of these was Colonel Nelson Miles. Miles transferred in 1868 from his position of Military Governor of North Carolina to command the 5th Infantry Regiment in the Department of Dakota. During the frontier period, his regiment became the most prominent of the Indian fighting infantry regiments, and Miles one of the army's most respected combat commanders. Over the next twenty years, Miles rose to command the Department of the Dakota and later the Department of the Northwest. He achieved the command of the prestigious Division of the Missouri in 1890 and as commander supervised the last Indian campaign, the Ghost Dance war in 1890-91. In 1896 Miles replaced General Schofield as general in chief of the army. He would remain in that position, and the center of much controversy, until his retirement in 1902.

⁷ Katherine Gibson Fougera, *With Custer's Cavalry* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 201.

Indians, in fact, took up the bulk of the army's time and resources in the years 1866 to 1890.

These diverse activities included service in support of Indian relations, encouraging economic development, and scientific research and exploration.

The Army and Indian Policy

Though the Indian tribes of the plains were the army's primary adversary in the years after the Civil War, actually fighting with the Indian took less of the army's efforts than a host of other activities that required the army to interact with the Indian. Though the Indian tribes of the frontier were the army's primary focus between the years 1865 and 1890, the army was not the government's lead agency for Indian relations. The lead agency for Indian policy, much to the frustration of the army leadership, was the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the Department of the Interior.⁸ The army did not fundamentally disagree with the government's general Indian policy. Rather, the major army concern was with its effective implementation. The army was frustrated first with the corruption and ineptness of the Indian Bureau, and second with the disinterest and lack of funding of Congress. Army officers were in accord with the broad outlines of the policy: the removal of Indians from the path of westward expansion. They also agreed the best way to accomplish this was to concentrate the Indian tribes on reservations where they were away from

⁸ Throughout the frontier years, 1865 to 1890, the army leadership waged a continuous and unsuccessful battle within the various Presidential administrations and Congress to win control of Indian policy. General Sherman summarized the army position in 1866, when he commanded the Division of Missouri: "The entire management of the Indians should be controlled by the military authorities, and that the commanding officers of the troops should have not only the surveillance of these Indians, but should supervise and control the disbursement of moneys and distribution of presents to the tribes under past and future treaties. Indians do not read, and only know of our power and strength by what they see, and they always look to the man who commands soldiers as the representative of our government. The complaints of short payment by agents are universal, and the Indians themselves would be more likely to receive the ample annuities appropriated by Congress if the agents were required to make the semi-annual payments subject to the inspection and control of the military commanders, who, as a rule, are not so liable to be corrupted by the chances of gain and speculation as temporary appointees." William T. Sherman, "Report of Lieutenant General Sherman," *ARSW, 1866*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1867), 20.

the path of the frontier immigrants and where there was little in the way of agriculture and mining to interest frontiersman.⁹

Army officers also agreed with the government policy of assimilation. Army leaders, along with the Department of the Interior and eastern reformers, believed that for Indians to survive they would have to survive not as distinct tribes, but rather as individuals assimilated into American society.¹⁰ Where the army parted ways with many Indian Bureau agents and eastern reformers was the manner of assimilation. The civilian view was that the process of assimilation consisted of first, conversion to Christianity, and second, the establishment of the individual Indian as a farmer. Most army officers were less concerned with the Indian's spiritual conversion. In fact, many officers respected the Indian's unique religious views. Many army officers also did not agree with forcing the Indian to adopt an agricultural life-style. Army officers believed that establishing the Indian as a rancher was more reasonable given the geography of most reservations and the abilities and cultural inclinations of the tribes.¹¹ In general, army officers were sympathetic to the motivation of the Indians to retain their traditional way of life. General Sheridan explained that "We took away their country and their means of support, broke up their mode of living, their habits of life, introduced disease and decay among them, and it was for this and against this they made war. Could any one expect less?"¹² Captain Richard Pratt of 10th Cavalry echoed the General's conclusions, "It was perfectly human for the Indians to attempt to maintain their freedom and to hold on to their primitive life and

⁹ Paul Andrew Hutton, *Phil Sheridan and His Army* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 181.

¹⁰ Some army Indian experts such as Lieutenant Hugh Scott disagreed strongly with the assimilation policy.

¹¹ John Pope "Report of Brigadier General John Pope," *ARSW, 1877* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1877), 60.

¹² Hutton, 182–183; Philip Sheridan, "Report of Lieutenant General Sheridan," October 25, 1878, *ARSW, 1878* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1878), 36–38, quote on 36.

resources...”¹³ Nonetheless; officers believed that Indian removal was necessary for the development and civilization of the frontier.

Rather than use force to gain the cooperation of the Indians, in most cases the army preferred to talk to the tribes and chiefs. Negotiating with the Indian leaders required significant cultural and political skills. Many senior army officers had extensive experience actively engaged in political negotiations in the South and in the halls of Washington. Virtually all the senior commanders on the frontier carried out important negotiations. In addition, all army officers, regardless of rank and experience, could find themselves in the position of representing the government to Indian leaders. Negotiating with American Indians placed army officers in the position where they were essentially negotiating with foreign sovereign powers as the representatives of the United States. Negotiations commonly took place within the context of constant danger and vastly different languages, culture, and worldviews.

Sometimes leaders negotiated as part of a deliberate pre-arranged process, while on other occasions negotiations occurred spontaneously. Such was the case when Colonel George Randall, Colonel T.H. Stanton, and Captains W.P. Clark and John Bourke negotiated with Sioux Chief Crazy Horse for his surrender at the conclusion of the 1876–1877 winter campaign.¹⁴ These negotiations ended with Crazy Horse’s band surrendering peacefully to the army officers. The success of army officers under these spontaneous circumstances required that they demonstrate a degree of political savvy, mental flexibility, and cultural sensitivity.¹⁵

¹³ Richard Henry Pratt, *Battlefield and Classroom: Four Decades with the American Indian, 1867–1904* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), 33.

¹⁴ John F. Finerty, *War-Path and Bivouac, or, The Conquest of the Sioux* (Chicago, IL: Press of Donohue and Henneberry, Printers and Binders, 1890), 294. Described in detail by John G. Bourke, *On the Border with Crook* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1892), 396–414.

¹⁵ Even junior leaders, with little notice, could find themselves in the midst of sensitive political interaction with Indian leaders. Such was the case with army Lieutenant Fayette Roe of the 21st Infantry who was in charge of a remote mail relay station in Kansas in 1873. Unexpectedly, he and his wife entertained Powder-Face, Chief of the

The other common form of negotiations in which army officers participated were formal missions aimed at resolving or forestalling hostilities. The army usually assigned these diplomatic missions to senior commanders who had reputations within the army, the government, and among the Indians. Such missions could be physically arduous and often dangerous. The Modoc leader Captain Jack murdered General Edward Canby, commander of the Department of the Northwest, during negotiations to end hostilities between the tribe and government in 1873.¹⁶ The problems the army assigned these officers to resolve were often quite complex. General Howard described his task as the President's representative to resolve Arizona Indian problems in 1872:

The instructions [from the Secretary of the Interior] revealed a host of complaints and grievances on the part of various tribes: for example, by the Umas, the Pimas, the Maricopas, the Arivipas, the Mojaves, the Tontos, and the White Mountain Apaches. There were also lively disturbances in the Warm Spring tribe, recently moved to Tularosa, a disagreeable region in the western part of New Mexico; and feuds of all sorts existed between the Navajos and their neighbors. There were Indians at Fort Stanton who were breaking out from their reservation and depredating upon the scattered settlements. All these surrounding tribes were to be quieted by my expedition, but the main thing was to make peace with the warlike Chiricahuas under Cochise.¹⁷

Howard's complex and politically sensitive mission was successful. He established the disaffected tribes on reservations under army observation. However, Howard's negotiations also revealed that there was almost always a constituency dissatisfied with the results of army

Arapahoe. Mrs. Roe recalled that she was "almost speechless from horror at the very thought of sitting at a table with an Indian, no matter how great a chief he might be." The dinner however, went well as the lieutenant and his wife adapted and entertained the Chief despite what they considered crude and foreign behavior. Roe's behavior was a result of his understanding that the mission of the frontier army required that soldiers accommodate the culture and customs of the native Indians. Francis M.A. Roe, *Army Letters from an Officer's Wife, 1871-1888* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 90-92.

¹⁶ Canby was the only general officer killed during service on the frontier. A detailed account of his death is contained in Jeff C. Riddle, *The Indian History of the Modoc War* (San Francisco, CA: Marnell & Co., 1914), 77-98.

¹⁷ O.O. Howard, *My Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians* (Hartford, CT: A.D. Worthington and Co., 1907), 124.

negotiations. Western newspapers decried Howard's efforts and the leniency of the agreement.¹⁸

The army was not only willing to talk to the Indian tribes but was often a strong advocate for their just treatment. As mentioned above, for their own reasons as well as the Indian's welfare, army officers were vocal and public critics of the Indian Bureau. In addition, leaders such as Generals Crooke, Miles, Pope, and Sheridan wrote private humanitarian leaders as well as public officials advocating for support of various tribal causes. After the defeat of the southern tribes in 1874, incompetence in the Bureau of Indian Affairs threatened starvation for the tribes. General Pope, commanding the Department of the Missouri, was one of the first to sound the alarm as his inspectors found the tribes starving and much of the meat supplied by the Bureau of Indian Affairs spoiled or of poor quality. Pope warned of renewed hostilities if conditions were not improved: "Who can blame them if, rather than starve to death and see their women and children suffering the pangs of hunger in slow process of starvation, they break away and get food for them in any manner and as soon as they can." The government averted starvation by releasing army supplies to the Indian agents and permitting Indians to hunt off the reservations. Conditions did not improve in future years, and agents and army officers frequently worked together to keep the tribes fed.¹⁹

Army leaders also sponsored trips by tribal leaders to Washington to make the tribes' case in person. For these trips, they arranged transportation, army officer escorts, made appointments, and provided translators for the Indian leaders. Such was the case in 1883 when Brigadier General Nelson Miles arranged for three chiefs of the Okinagan tribe to travel to

¹⁸ Utley, 201.

¹⁹ Richard N. Ellis, *General Pope and US Indian Policy* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970) documents General Popes efforts to protest the treatment of the Indians in the Indian Territory and his efforts to prevent hunger in the years 1875 to 1882, 199– 206.

Washington escorted by Captain Frank Baldwin of the 5th Infantry. In Washington, they met personally with the Secretary of the Interior and renegotiated the boundaries of their reservation and other issues. Both Miles and Baldwin concluded, “great good had been effected by the visit of the three chiefs to Washington.”²⁰ Trips such as these, however, would not have occurred without the initiative and support of army officers on the frontier.

The rule of law was a constant guide to Army actions in relation to the Indian tribes. When authorized, the army used troops to protect Indian land from trespassing miners, settlers, and ranchers. Army officers also attempted to ensure that unscrupulous businessmen and Indian agents did not cheat the Indians in contracts and other business activities. After newspapers declared that the Black Hills of Dakota contained “Gold Bearing Quartz in Mountain Piles,” army units were required to turn back hordes of prospectors. General Sheridan went so far as to have a telegram published in frontier newspapers such as the *Bismarck Tribune*, in which he ordered General Terry to “use the force at your command to burn the wagon trains, destroy the outfits and arrest the leaders.”²¹ Protecting the Indian’s country from trespassers was the dominant mission of the 10th Cavalry from 1869 to 1873. During that time, the regiment was essentially on occupation duty in the Indian Territory where its major mission was “frequent scouting for marauders and trespassers.”²² After the defeat of the Southern tribes, General Sheridan urged “Congressional action to keep out intruders from the Indian Territory.”²³ The mission became more important over time. Throughout the summer and fall of 1880, elements

²⁰ Nelson Miles, *Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles* (Chicago: The Werner Company, 1896), 407.

²¹ *Bismarck Tribune*, Bismarck, Vol. 2, No. 9, D.T., Wednesday, September 9, 1874, 3, 2; Donald Jackson, *Custer’s Gold: The United States Cavalry Expedition of 1874* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 107.

²² John Bigelow, “The Tenth Regiment of Cavalry,” in Theodore Rodenbough, Editor, *The Army of the United States: Historical Sketches of Staff and Line with Portraits of the Generals-In-Chief* (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1896), 292–294.

²³ Sheridan quoted in Hutton, 340.

of the 23rd Infantry Regiment sparred with frontier immigration advocate David Payne and his followers who were seeking to establish settlements in the Indian Territory. Troops evicted Payne and his followers from the territory twice during the summer. After the last arrest, the army turned them over to US Marshals. In October 1880, the army stationed a company of infantry and supporting Indian scouts outside Wichita Kansas to intercept any further attempts by Payne.²⁴ Enforcing treaty boundaries and Indian rights was frustrating duty. Soldiers did not have the power to arrest and were limited in most cases to merely escorting the offenders beyond the reservation boundary. Officers were often in peril of personal prosecution by biased local civil courts and suit by civilians arrested for trespassing on Indian land or attempting to defraud Indians in business deals.²⁵

To deal effectively with the diverse Indian tribes required that army officers understand the cultures with which they interacted. This understanding was encouraged by the senior army leadership and was an expected characteristic of competent frontier officers.²⁶ Young lieutenants who wanted to be a success followed the example of Hugh Scott of the 7th Cavalry who began to learn Indian language and culture from Indian scouts on his very first expedition in 1876.²⁷ It was essential that officers understood simple facts about dealing with a foreign culture. For example, leaders were schooled to take whatever food an Indian provided and eat it heartily even

²⁴ Wayne R. Kime; "Afterword: Missions Accomplished," Richard Irving Dodge, Wayne R. Kime, Editor. *The Indian Territory Journals of Colonel Richard Irving Dodge* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 406–407; In August 1884 President Cleveland authorized troops in the Indian Territory to arrest and hold illegal settlers.

²⁵ Lieutenant Charles Gatewood described in detail his futile attempts to ensure fair treatment of White Mountain Apaches when he was commandant of the White Mountain reservation in 1884–85. Not only were the defendants who defrauded the Indians acquitted but Gatewood himself was arrested for false arrest. Ultimately Gatewood was cleared of wrong-doing but only after the hardship of two trials. Charles Gatewood, Louis Kraft, Editor, *LT. Charles Gatewood & His Apache Wars Memoir* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 84–101.

²⁶ Hutton describes Sheridan's enthusiastic sponsorship of the work of both Bourke and Clark, 341–342. Hutton also makes the point that Sheridan took a personal interest in any man who "could open channels of communications with the Indians and deal effectively with them." These included future chief of Staff Hugh Scott, and Carlisle School director Richard Pratt, 254.

²⁷ Hugh L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier* (New York: Century, 1928), 31–32.

when they were personally unfamiliar with it or found it distasteful.²⁸ Army officers knew that understanding the culture, not fighting, was the key to successful interaction with Indians. One frontier army veteran astutely observed that the term “Indian fighter” was inaccurate: “It would be better and more truthful to call us [frontier officers] ‘Indian thinkers’ rather than ‘Indian fighters.’”²⁹

Many of the army’s best officers, certainly some of its brightest minds, were recognized experts on Indian culture. These included Lieutenant William P. Clark of the 2nd Cavalry, who published a comprehensive book on Indian sign language, *The Indian Sign Language, With Brief Explanatory Notes*.³⁰ Possibly the foremost army expert on Indian culture was Captain John G. Bourke of the 3rd Cavalry. Bourke was an aide to General George Crook and became one of the army’s most experienced Indian experts. He wrote extensively on campaigning in the West but his anthropological works on the Indians of the Southwest garnered the most academic respect.³¹ Although junior officers such as Clark and Bourke were most closely associated with the Indians

²⁸ Howard, 132.

²⁹ This individual was probably Captain James W. Watson of the 10th Cavalry though Frederic Remington does not completely identify him in, “How an Apache War Was Won,” in Harold McCracken, Ed., *Frederic Remington’s Own West* (New York: Dial, 1960), 49. See Powell, 625.

³⁰ Clark’s book was important for a number of reasons. First, it was more than a pocket guide to Indian sign language. It included a history of the language, noted tribal differences, and it went beyond sign language to explain other aspects of Indian culture including the Sun-dance, scalping, and Indian religious concepts. Another reason the book was important was that Department of Missouri commander, General Phil Sheridan directed Clark to write it. He was relieved from duties for four years to complete the project. Sheridan’s personal involvement underscores the senior army leader’s recognition of the practical importance to the army of cultural understanding. Clark graduated from West Point in 1868 and became a sign expert after six years of continuous service on the plains. His service included commanding a company comprised of 300 Indian scouts in the 1876–77 Sioux campaign. The members were from six different tribes with six different vocal languages so that the command’s common language, by default, was sign. William P. Clark, *The Indian Sign Language, With Brief Explanatory Notes* (Philadelphia, PA: L.R. Hamersly & Co., 1885), 6; Hutton describes in detail Sheridan’s sponsorship of both Clark and Bourke, 341–342.

³¹ These included *The Medicine Men of the Apache* (1892), *The Snake-Dance of the Moquis of Arizona* (1884), and *Scatalogic Rites of All Nations* (1891). Bourke contributed ten papers to the prestigious journal *American Anthropologist*. Bourke’s work on Indian culture led to his election to the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Bourke served as a sixteen year old enlisted cavalry trooper in the Civil War and was awarded the Medal of Honor. He was appointed to West Point in 1865 and graduated in 1869. After graduation he branched into the cavalry and served the bulk of his career on the frontier with the 3rd Cavalry. From the introduction. John G. Bourke, J. Frank Dobie, *An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 5–16; Hutton, 341.

as scout commanders, senior officers also understood Indian culture and used that knowledge to attempt to influence Indian policy. General Oliver O. Howard wrote extensively about the Indian and his ways including *Nez Perce Joseph* (1881), and *My Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians* (1907). Colonel Richard Irving Dodge was another senior officer with a keen interest in Indian culture. The army command supported and encouraged Dodge's writing which was very comprehensive and included detailed analysis of the geography of the west, Indian culture, and a strong critique of government Indian policy.³²

The army employed Indian warriors extensively as scouts and auxiliaries. Beginning in 1866, the Congress formally authorized the army to recruit Indians as scouts. Typically, the army enlisted Indians as scouts for a period of one year but usually they only served for the duration of a specific campaign. Indian scouts gave the army several important capabilities: field craft that regular soldiers lacked, knowledge of the terrain and tracking skills essential to pursue fleeing Indians and locating Indian camps, and language and cultural understanding necessary to perceive Indian intentions, negotiate with leaders, and interrogate prisoners. Another reason the army employed Indian scouts and auxiliaries was because army officers believed that employment by the army provided a viable cultural outlet for young male warriors that diverted them from hostile activity against settlers.

In 1891, the army drastically reduced the recruiting of scouts and, instead, recruited Indians to serve in special segregated companies in selected regular regiments. The Indian companies were different from the scouts. The army considered these units part of the regular establishment and enlisted the Indians for five years under exactly the same conditions as all

³² Colonel Richard Irving Dodge served with the frontier army in the 23rd and 11th Infantry regiments and for a short time as aide-de-camp to General Sherman. He recorded his knowledge of the Indians and the country in which he operated in three volumes: *The Black Hills: A Minute Description of the Routes, Scenery, Soil, Climate, Timber, Gold, Geology, Zoology, etc.* (1876); *The Plains of the Great West and their Inhabitants* (1876); and *Our Wild Indians: thirty-three Years' Personal Experience Among the Red Men of the Great West* (1882).

other enlistees.³³ Scout company officers benefited greatly from the experience. Leading Indian soldiers developed “self-reliance, coolness, and woodcraft” and opened another means of exposing young officers to Indian culture.³⁴ Officers who commanded Indian Scouts, including future Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Lieutenants Hugh Scott and John Pershing, had to lead the Indians on the Indian’s terms and could not rely on the authority of their army commissions. Personal bravery, physical endurance, and a thorough knowledge of Indian culture were the prerequisites of successful command. Commanders of Indian soldiers often encouraged the Indians to prepare themselves spiritually through dance and prayer for their missions. In some cases, the Indians treated army commanders as chiefs and the officers participated in the social and religious activities of the scouts.³⁵ Close interaction with the American Indian tribes through negotiations, advocacy, as policy makers and as leaders of Indian scouts and soldiers created with the army officer corps a general understanding of Indian culture and an intellectual acceptance of cultural diversity. These traits were essential to successful operations on the frontier and were a key to future occupations. Cultural understanding became a characteristic of the army.

While many army officers embraced Indian culture, others, in accordance with government policy, saw Indian culture as an obstacle to the humanitarian goal of assimilation. The army considered close association with the army, army discipline, and supervision by army

³³ In 1891 the Army published General Orders No. 28 which directed specific Infantry and Cavalry Regiments to recruit Indians into their L companies. This action was taken at the urging of the Interior Department and the Indian Bureau specifically to encourage Indians to assimilate by adopting White customs and manners. Simultaneously the army drastically reduced the number of Indian scouts it employed. Don Rickey Jr., “Warrior-Soldiers: The All-Indian ‘L’ Troop, 6th US, Cavalry, in the Early 1890s,” *Troopers West: Military & Indian Affairs on the American Frontier* (San Diego, CA: Frontier Heritage Press, 1970), 44, 58; Ron Field, *US Army Frontier Scouts, 1840–1891* (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2003), 52–53.

³⁴ W.H. Carter, *From Yorktown to Santiago with the Sixth US Cavalry* (Baltimore, MD: The Lord Baltimore Press, The Friedenwald Company, 1900), 251.

³⁵ Thomas W. Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers. Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860–90* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 93, 105.

officers very positive steps toward the civilizing of the Indian tribes.³⁶ Some army officers were deeply involved in assimilation efforts. Captain Richard Pratt of the 10th Cavalry was a leader of Indian scouts throughout his early career in the 1860s and 1870s. By 1879, Pratt had transitioned from managing Indian prisoners to heading the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, one of the single most powerful expressions of the assimilation ideal. Pratt expressed the intent of the school and the vision of the assimilation reformers when he described his intent to the Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz in 1879. The school would “give Indian youth the English language, education, and industries that it is imperative they have in preparation for citizenship.”³⁷ Pratt became one of the national leaders of the assimilation movement as he directed the school for twenty-five years. During his duty at Carlisle, Pratt was still on active service but on detached duty to the Indian Bureau. Though the humanitarian impulse toward assimilation was in many respects misguided, Pratt’s efforts represent the fact that the army fully embraced the concept, and contributed significantly to its implementation. Most important, army support of the Carlisle School represented recognition by the army that education was as a key component of the improving the social and economic status of populations subject to army control.

Border Operations

Another important aspect of the frontier experience was the independence of action allowed and required of officers. The requirements of frontier service dispersed the army among hundreds of small encampments ranging from the most austere temporary cantonments of tents to large permanent establishments with brick buildings and modern plumbing. In 1870, the total number of organized military posts was 203, and this number did not include temporary

³⁶ Dunlay, 187–198.

³⁷ Pratt, 215–216.

cantonments, stations, and camps.³⁸ Lieutenants and captains commanded most of the small garrisons. Campaigns took the army even further afield. This dispersal of the army required that young, relatively junior commanders, operate on their own. Messages and guidance from higher commanders could take days or weeks to receive. Relatively junior officers often had to make decisions that could cause or avert war. Typical of these situations were the experiences of Colonel Nelson Miles on the Canadian frontier in 1877–78 and later in 1879–80. Miles' mission was to secure the northern border to prevent the migration and raiding of Canadian Sioux into the United States. Successful completion of the mission, while avoiding an international incident, required careful supervision of limited troops, coordination with state and local civil government, and close coordination and cooperation with Canadian authorities.³⁹

The most politically sensitive area on the frontier was the American southern border with Mexico. Many Indian tribes used Mexico as a sanctuary for raiding into Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The army prohibited commanders along the southern border from crossing the border into Mexico and the Mexican government was usually hostile to US military operations along the border. Despite these conditions, cross border operations occurred. Commanders had to carefully balance using force, negotiations, and cooperation with Mexican officials to facilitate their pursuit of Indians across the border. Usually American forces honored the border, however, commanders had the freedom to selectively ignore it when they deemed circumstances warranted. In 1874, Colonel Randall MacKenzie led elements of the 4th Cavalry on a raid into Mexico to destroy Lipan and Kickapoo bands that were using Mexico as a sanctuary.⁴⁰ The raid broke the back of Indian raiders in south Texas and brought portions of the tribes back to US

³⁸ *ARSW, 1870* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1871), iii.

³⁹ Robert Wooster, *Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 82–95, 122; 1879 Sherman Report, 5.

⁴⁰ Charles M. Robinson, *Bad Hand: A Biography of General Ranald S. MacKenzie* (Austin, TX: State House Press), 125–144.

reservations. The decision making process used to justify such action was described by Lieutenant Colonel George Forsyth who led elements of the 4th and 6th Cavalry across the border after Apaches in the Spring of 1882.

After thinking the matter over, I decided to follow the Indians. They had murdered and plundered our citizens, believing we dare not follow them into Mexico, and that once they were there they were safe.... Furthermore, we were in wild country, and might possibly find this band, and completely scatter it, and get back to our own side of the line without the knowledge of the Mexican government.⁴¹

Forsyth's excursion had mixed results. His force did not destroy the Apache but instead forced them into an ambush laid by Mexican forces. The Mexican army then confronted Forsyth who, having killed or captured the Indians, led his force back to the United States. Forsyth fully understood that his commander might discipline him for disobeying orders, and made a full report of the incident. His department commander, ironically General Mackenzie, admonished him but stated that unless the State Department became involved he would let matters lie.⁴² Virtually all officers of the army were cognizant of the challenges of operations along the nation's international borders. Though militarily insignificant in the grand history of the American military, operations along the nation's northern and southern borders required junior army commanders to be cognizant of strategic and political policies and the relationship between their tactical actions and strategic effects. Young officers learned to analyze their tactical means against the strategic ends of the senior leaders, and take responsibility and make decisions independently. Successful frontier army commanders navigated this complex matrix of issues, often with incomplete or no guidance from superiors. In fact, General Sheridan, the senior army

⁴¹ George Forsyth, David Dixon, Introduction, *Thrilling Days in Army Life* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 114.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 121.

field commander during most of the period of Indian engagement, made the point that commanders needed wide discretion in their orders.⁴³

The Frontier Economy

On the frontier, army officers were keenly aware of the importance of the frontier to the national economy. The key to the economic prosperity of the United States after the Civil War was the railroad. The most important of the railroad projects was linking the east and west coasts by a transcontinental railroad. The transcontinental railroad not only politically tie the west coast to the east, but also enhanced the military defenses and capabilities of the nation. In 1865, Secretary of War Stanton argued “the vigorous prosecution of the works of the railroads to connect the Mississippi Valley with the Pacific coast, was a military precaution and a measure of economy, deserving the fostering care of the government.”⁴⁴ The army played a major role in building the railroads: it surveyed the routes, provided much of the technical engineering expertise, advocated for government subsidies, and provided protection during construction.⁴⁵

Civil War Generals Sherman and Sheridan had ample experience with the military value of the railroad for operational mobility and logistics.⁴⁶ However, the railroads also had an

⁴³ Hutton, 305.

⁴⁴ *ARSW, 1865* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1866), 40.

⁴⁵ Railroad companies laid three great transcontinental rail lines during the period of the frontier army. The first and most important was the central line, which joined the Union Pacific Railroad coming from the east and the Central Pacific Railroad building from California. Construction of the line began in 1863 in California and Omaha, and the two ends met in Utah in 1869. In 1870, work began on the Northern Pacific railroad, the longest and most difficult of the three lines. The railroad did not complete the line until 1883. In the mid 1870s, the Southern Pacific line began building east from southern California. In 1881, it linked up with the Texas and Pacific at Sierra Blanca, in Hudspeth County Texas, to form the second transcontinental line.

⁴⁶ The transcontinental railroads had a distinct military purpose. As early as 1866, General Sherman identified that one of the top priorities of the army was “to make the progress of the construction of the great Pacific railways that lay in this belt of country as safe as possible.” A year later, he articulated a succinct argument for the investment of the limited army resources into protecting the railroads that highlighted the national interest in the endeavors: “These Roads, although in the hands of private corporations, have more than the usual claim on us for military protection, because the general government is largely interested pecuniarily. They aid us materially in our military operations by transporting troops and stores rapidly....” To ensure the completion of the line the army devoted two cavalry regiments and three infantry regiments to its protection. In exchange for protection, supplies,

important civilizing effect on the frontier. With the railroad lines came commerce, towns, government, and most importantly, people. The civilizing impact of the railroads was not lost on the senior army leadership. Sherman noted that the railroads were the “newest and greatest of civilizers.”⁴⁷ Sheridan also was aware of the social influence of the railroads calling them “our staunchest Allies in the march of civilization on the frontier.”⁴⁸ Army commanders realized that the success of the army’s military role on the frontier, providing security, influenced the speed with which the frontier was civilized.

Because of the civilian importance of the railroads, the army’s commitment to supporting the railroads was significant. In 1868, more than 4,600 troops —almost twenty percent of the army, had some role in guarding the railroad. In 1866, the railroads laid 568 miles of track. By 1869, the Union Pacific railroad had completed 1,086 miles of track. The Union Pacific teams met the Central Pacific building crews at Ogden, Utah on May 10, 1869. As officials drove the final spike connecting the east and west coasts of the continent and forever changed the economic and social dynamics of the nation, several companies of the 21st Infantry Regiment and the Regimental band added pomp to the ceremony and symbolized the army’s role in the railroad’s conquest of the American frontier.⁴⁹

The army not only actively supported the railroads with protection; they also assisted the railroad’s lobbying efforts for government financial support. The Quartermaster of the Army, General Montgomery C. Meigs, made a strong case for the Northern Pacific Railroad to

and police services, the army received lower transportation costs, priority of movement, and special consideration for officers when they traveled by railroad. Robert G. Angevine, *The Railroad and the State: War, Politics, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 165.

⁴⁷William T. Sherman, “Report of the Commanding General,” *ARSW, 1880*, part 2(Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1881), 4.

⁴⁸ Philip H. Sheridan, “Report of General P.H. Sheridan,” *ARSW, 1879*, part 1(Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1880), 45.

⁴⁹ Young, 123; Angevine, 186; John H. Williams, *A Great and Shining Road: The Epic Story of the Transcontinental Railroad* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 264.

Congress in 1866. Meigs' argument went beyond just military needs. He also highlighted economic benefits, and social and political change. He argued that the northern railroad would assist the army guarding the Canadian border, reduce army transportation expenditures, link the commerce of the northwest with the nation, inspire the growth of large cities, and increase the nation's access to Asian markets.⁵⁰

Another important, but not as financially or publically dramatic, infrastructure capability that the army was instrumental in bringing to the West was the telegraph. The army built military telegraphs throughout the frontier area of operations. Typical of the army telegraph projects was the completion of 540 miles of military telegraph connecting San Diego, California with Tucson and Prescott, Arizona in 1873. The military telegraph was open to paid private use, and in 1873 the \$757 average monthly revenue from private messages partly offset the \$906 monthly cost of maintenance and operations of the San Diego line.⁵¹ General William Carter described the work of troops building the telegraph structure in the Southwest in 1877:

The necessity for telegraphic communication in Arizona had become apparent before the regiment arrived in the department, and troops had begun the construction of a military line. The duty was taken up by a number of lieutenants in charge of detachments, and a really great work completed by connecting the Pacific Ocean at San Diego with the Gulf of Mexico, with lateral branches to all semi-permanent military posts. ... The difficulty of supplying working parties with water was, alone, enough to discourage any corporation, yet this great public improvement was accomplished without any blare of trumpets by the men of the regular army, working in harmony in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona, that when the moment arrived for the last connection to be made on the high plains of southern New Mexico, the instruments in all the modest frontier offices acknowledged the call through several thousand miles of wire.⁵²

⁵⁰ Letter from Montgomery C. Meigs to George Gibbs, 16 April, 1866, in *Northern Pacific Railroad Memorial of the Board of Directors* (Hartford, CT: Press of Case, Lockwood and Company, 1867), 2–12.

⁵¹ *ARSW, 1873*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1874), x.

⁵² Sherman, *ARSW, 1866*, 20.

With the knowledge gained putting the wire in, army posts throughout the frontier were technically capable and expected to “repair the line whenever raiding parties or the elements caused a break.”⁵³

The interaction of the army with infrastructure requirements of the western frontier, in particular the building of the transcontinental railroad system and the regional telegraph system, exposed the army to several important characteristics of governmental policy. First, economics were an incredibly important driver of policy. Second, army officers observed first hand that often the economic interests of the country could best be furthered, sometimes only furthered, through the application of the unique military capabilities of the army. Finally, the impact of railroads and other infrastructure improvements on the West demonstrated to army officers that modern technology and knowledge could transform a wilderness into a first rate economic and political community much more effectively than military power alone.

Army Exploration

The railroads and telegraph represented scientific progress and the army’s enthusiastic support for those technologies demonstrated the whole-hearted support of science and progress by the officer corps. This enthusiasm for science also manifested itself in the army’s support of exploration and scientific discovery. One of the significant contributions of the frontier army to the western expansion of the nation was in the area of exploration and science. These activities had an egalitarian aspect, as well as a very practical military value. Future economic considerations were also an important aspect of the government's, and hence the army's, interest in exploration. Exploration further demonstrated to the army the close relationship between

⁵³ W.H. Carter, *Sixth US Cavalry*, 192–193.

military capability, economics, and social and political progress. It reinforced the idea that the army played a role in American policy and politics beyond mere war fighting.

Exploration and mapping had been virtually the sole prerogative of the military prior to the Civil War. The army established its role in exploration during the early years of the nation, most famously by Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark. In the 1850s, the army focused on reconnoitering a variety of possible rail routes from the Mississippi River to the west coast.⁵⁴ During the war, the army disbanded its elite Corps of Topographical Engineers, which had been responsible for most exploration activity. After the war, Reconstruction and demobilization contributed to the lack of immediate emphasis on exploration. However, Joseph S. Wilson, the US government's Commissioner of the General Land Office, stressed in his 1866 annual report the economic necessity of geological information relating to the mineral wealth of the nation. This prompted a renewed interest in exploration by the army Corps of Engineers.⁵⁵

The military returned to leading major expeditions in 1871 when Engineer Corps Lieutenant George M. Wheeler convinced the army to support the United States Geographical Surveys West of the One Hundredth Meridian.⁵⁶ The army justified its own military led surveys on the grounds that the civilian surveys, though they included topographers, did not focus on the

⁵⁴ The authoritative source for the pre-Civil War exploratory efforts of the army and the history of the Topographical Engineers is William H. Goetzmann, *Army Exploration of the American West, 1803–1863* (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1991).

⁵⁵ Mary C. Roberts, "The Four Great Surveys of the West," *US Geological Survey Circular 1050, The United States Geological Survey: 1879–1989*, found online at <http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/c1050/surveys.htm>, accessed 3 July 2008.

⁵⁶ Prior to the military expeditions of Lieutenant Wheeler, several civilian led expeditions renewed exploration of the West. In 1869, the army Corps of Engineers hired Yale geologist Clarence King to lead a geological expedition that would explore a hundred miles strip along the 40th Parallel and the route of the Union Pacific railroad. The survey's focus was geological although it included other types of scientists and a powerful military escort. At the same time, the Land Office hired Ferdinand Vandeveer Hayden to explore and map Nebraska. John Wesley Powell also led a survey in 1869. His was a privately funded expedition, mostly by boat, down the Colorado River. These three civilian led expeditions brought attention to the potential wealth and beauty of the frontier, and fame and Congressional appropriations to the expedition leaders. They also prompted the army Corps of Engineers to renew efforts to conduct military exploratory expeditions. Frank Schubert, *Vanguard of Expansion: Army Engineers in the trans-Mississippi West, 1879–1879* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1980), 136; Roberts, "The Four Great Surveys of the West."

mapping needs of the army. Congress approved 2.5 million dollars for the Wheeler surveys to systematically map over 6.8 million square miles of the frontier over a period of fifteen years.⁵⁷

Wheeler's operation was quite extensive. The letter of instruction to Wheeler from General A.A. Humphries, the Chief of Engineers, gave sweeping directions:

The main objective of this exploration will be to obtain correct topographical knowledge of the country traversed by your parties, and to prepare accurate maps of that section. In making this the main objective, it is at the same time intended that you ascertain as far as practicable everything relating to the physical features of the country, the numbers, habits, and disposition of the Indians who may live in this section, the selection of such sites as may be of use for future military operations or occupation, and the facilities offered for making rail or common roads, to meet the wants of those who at some future period may occupy or traverse this part of our territory.

In ascertaining the physical features, your attention is particularly called to the mineral resources that may be discovered, and, where the indications would seem to justify it, you should have minute and detailed examinations made of the locality and character of the deposits.⁵⁸

Humphrey's orders indicate that commercial civil interests were as important to the expedition as were military requirements. Wheeler specifically acknowledged that one of the major motivations for the survey was increasing "enthusiasm to emigration and to the legitimate establishment of the great industries."⁵⁹ Thus, Wheeler's task, besides the technical task of map-making, included an analysis focused on future commercial economic development.

Wheeler's various expeditions operated for eight years; 1871–1879. They typically launched their annual missions in mid-summer and completed their tasks for the year by late fall or early winter. The Wheeler surveys made great progress toward mapping the United States

⁵⁷ Schubert, 140; Roberts, "The Four Great Surveys of the West;" Richard A. Bartlett, *Great Surveys of the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), 350–351.

⁵⁸ Letter of Instruction from General Humphries to Lieutenant Wheeler in George M. Wheeler, *Preliminary Report Concerning Explorations and Surveys Principally in Nevada and Arizona* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1872), 11–12.

⁵⁹ George M. Wheeler speech to the New York Geographic Society as reported in "Western Explorations," *New York Times*, December 24, 1874.

west of the 100th Meridian. The numerous expeditions mapped approximately one third of the country west of the 100th meridian including the first mapping of the infamous Death Valley. They collected over 61,000 samples of plant and animal life and sent them to the Smithsonian Institute in Washington.⁶⁰ When the government terminated the Wheeler surveys in 1879, they were still well short of their long-term goal but had accomplished much, including demonstrating the ability of the army to make significant national contributions aside from warfare.

The major survey expeditions of Lieutenant Wheeler, though the most extensive and important, were not the only army exploratory expeditions organized on the western frontier. The army conducted many other expeditions that had much more limited objectives than Wheeler's mandate. These expeditions included the numerous expeditions into the Yellowstone and Black Hills regions. Typically, these expeditions had a smaller scope and related more directly to operations or other pressing issues.⁶¹

As Americans mapped and settled the west, and the frontier quieted, army officers looked for new frontiers in which to exercise their talents and contribute to American progress. The last of the American frontiers was north in the new Alaskan territory. Alaska became the focus of

⁶⁰ William H. Goetzmann, *Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 485.

⁶¹ The 1874 Black Hills expedition was typical of the type of expedition that had a scientific dimension but whose primary purpose was other than scientific inquiry.⁶¹ The orders to the expedition issued by General Terry, the department commander, were very general: reconnoiter "the route from that post [Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory] to Bear Butte, in the Black Hills, and exploring the country south, southeast, and southwest of that point."⁶¹ The major purpose of the expedition was to locate a position for a future army fort to help control Indians raiding from Dakota into Nebraska. An unofficial purpose was to determine the extent of gold deposits in the Black Hills as a means of putting to rest rumors of gold that were enticing miners to trespass onto Indian reservations and thus causing problems for both the army and the Indians. Jackson, 14–15.

The Black Hills expedition was a significant force. With teamsters and other support personnel, it numbered about a thousand men and included 110 wagons and ambulances. Captain William Ludlow of the Corps of Engineer was responsible for the scientific aspects of the expedition.⁶¹ Colonel George Custer commanded the expedition and pushed it hard. On some days it covered thirty miles. The scientists and engineers moved throughout the day with the expedition and at night had to carefully make their recordings and complete their written records. At the conclusion of the 60-day expedition Colonel Custer announced that prospectors with the expedition had discovered gold in the Black Hills, though the scientific work of Captain Ludlow and Professor Winchell would not backup the claim. Custer's unsubstantiated claim set off a Black Hills gold rush. Goetzmann, *Exploration and Empire*, 419–421.

army exploration in the 1880s. Serious exploration of the territory began in 1881 when Brigadier General Nelson Miles became commander of the Department of Columbia, which included the Alaskan Territory. Miles was very interested in promoting the development of his new command and became the sponsor of numerous forays into the Alaskan unknown by a group of young officers who would become the last of the noteworthy army explorers.⁶²

The most important of the Miles' sponsored Alaska explorations was the third and last expedition led in 1885 by Lieutenant Henry Allen of the 2nd Cavalry. Allen's six-month expedition, though not as widely publicized as an earlier expedition led by Lieutenant Frederick Swatka of the 3rd Cavalry, was much more important in terms of opening new territory and gaining scientific insights into the region. It was widely acclaimed within the scientific community. Its success validated General Miles' interest in the territory and established a bond between the Miles and Allen that lasted throughout their careers. Noted geologist and historian Alfred Brooks observed, "No man through his own individual explorations has added more to our knowledge of Alaska than has Lt. Allen." Historians of exploration have endorsed General Miles' view that Lieutenant Allen's mission was "the major exploration on the continent since Lewis and Clark."⁶³ Allen subsequently went on to important command positions in the Philippines, on the Mexican Border, and in Germany after World War I.

The exploration efforts of the frontier army were important to nurturing a culture in the army that viewed the army's role in society as much larger than a narrow focus on war fighting.

⁶² Miles sponsored three expeditions into the Alaskan interior. Lieutenants Frederick Swatka, William Abercrombie, and Henry Allen were the expedition leaders. For details of Swatka's expedition see Richard C. Davis, "Frederick Swatka (1849–1892)," *Arctic* (Vol. 35, No. 2, June 1982), 302–303, and Frederick Swatka, *Report of a Military Reconnaissance in Alaska made in 1883* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1885). Morgan Sherwood, *Exploration of Alaska, 1865–1900* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965), 98.

⁶³ Wooster, *Miles*, 135–136. Quote from Brooks in Jonathan Nielson, *Armed Forces on the Northern Frontier: The Military in Alaska's History, 1867–1987* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), 51. The details of Allen's expedition are vividly described in Henry Allen, *Report of An Expedition to the Copper, Tanana, and Koyukuk Rivers in the Territory of Alaska in the Year 1885* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1887); Sherwood's chapter "The Remarkable Journey of Henry Allen," 106–118, puts Allen's journey in context.

Exploration complimented the army endeavors to culturally interact and understand American Indians, to advance science and technology, and to encourage and promote economic development. It also reinforced the trust and confidence that senior leaders put in junior officers exercising good judgment in important independent commands. Thus, relatively junior officers such as Charles Wheeler and Henry Allen represented a broad definition of the professional competence of the army officer, and through their successes and example, extended that definition throughout the army officer corps.

Passing on the Experience

The army's years of work on the frontier reinforced the Reconstruction experience. There were a number of reasons for this. First was the fact that the much of the frontier experience occurred concurrently with Reconstruction. Many officers experienced both missions. Second, the army's small but important professional education efforts captured and passed on the Reconstruction experience. Third, and most important, the frontier experience facilitated informally passing of the Reconstruction experience to the next generation of leaders. The regimental system, and the professional and personal associations formed through army social structures enabled this informal transmission of lessons learned and experiences."

Formal army education took important forward steps in the last decade of the frontier army. The Generals in Chief of the army, Sherman, Sheridan, and Schoefield were all strong advocates for increased education. Prior to the Civil War, the army's primary education institution was the Military Academy at West Point. Formal education ended upon commissioning. In 1882, General Sherman directed the establishment of the School of Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth. Though it would be many years until the school at Fort Leavenworth developed into a full-fledged staff college, it quickly became an important source

of formal military education for army officers. Significantly, a portion of the Leavenworth education in the 1880s and 90s included occupations and military government experience.

Post-conflict operations were not part of the strategy and tactics instruction at the School of Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth. However, Leavenworth did focus on an officer's knowledge of the law and legal responsibilities. Toward this end, the Department of Law focused on military, constitutional, and international law. A major emphasis of the legal instruction was issues relating to post conflict operations and military government. The military and international law aspects of the curriculum highlighted experiences and lessons learned from the Civil War and Reconstruction. Specifically, the curriculum investigated and discussed the relationship between the army and the opposing civil population. Leavenworth based its instruction on the leading texts on international law —Theodore Woolsey's *Introduction to the Study of International Law*, and George Davis' *Outlines of International Law: With an Account of Its Origin and Sources*. Military Law utilized Lieutenant Colonel W. Winthrop's text, *Military Law*, which focused on the mechanics of the military court martial system as well as the relationship between the law of war and combatants and non-combatants. Winthrop specifically addressed many of the issues of Reconstruction in a chapter entitled "Military Authority and Jurisdiction under the Reconstruction Acts of 1867."⁶⁴ In 1897, the army added the study of the first five articles of the Geneva Convention to the curriculum, which in total included 35

⁶⁴ Theodore D. Woolsey, *Introduction to the Study of International Law* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1879) includes over 200 pages of text devoted to the Law of War; George Breckenridge Davis, *Outlines of International Law: With an Account of its Origin and Sources* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1887) addresses issue of Military law in just over 80 pages; W. Winthrop, *Military Law* (Washington D.C.: W. H. Morrison, 1886). William Birkhimer's important and comprehensive work *Military Government and Martial Law* (Washington D.C.: J.J. Chapman, 1892), would not become a standard text a Leavenworth until after the Philippine Insurrection when the course resumed in 1904.

recitations devoted to military law.⁶⁵ The intent of the study of international law was immensely practical. In 1898, the law examination included a fictional scenario placing the student in the position of "the Colonel of a regiment of infantry sent to Nicaragua with instructions to protect the lives and property of American citizens."⁶⁶ Reconstruction, as well as the influence of frequent legal treaties with Indian tribes, and operations on the Mexican and Canadian border, informed the army's understanding of the need for a practical knowledge of law, and the curriculum of the army's foremost educational institution reflected that understanding.

A number of prominent historians have criticized the post-civil war officer corps, charging that the ambition and petty rivalry between commanders, inordinate ambition for glory and promotion, prejudices against Indians as both enemies and Allies, and an unwillingness to adapt to the unique operational circumstances of frontier warfare were all detrimental to the operational functioning of the army.⁶⁷ Though the critique is valid as it relates to some individuals, it is overstated. Despite the internal politics characteristic of any bureaucratic organization, the army was also a closely-knit kinship of officers who shared hardships, danger, and isolation. This experience encouraged a familial relationship between officers, which, though sometimes petty and dysfunctional, was also loyal and supportive. Like families, army officers not only shared a contemporary experience, they also shared a common history. The frontier army's immediate history was the Civil War and the associated Reconstruction years. This history was passed down through the regiments, around the campfires, from mentor to subordinate, and from father to son.

⁶⁵ H. A. Greene, "Appendix D, United States Infantry and Cavalry School, Department of Law," H.S. Hawkins, *Annual Report, Infantry and Cavalry School* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Infantry and Cavalry School, 1897).

⁶⁶ W. B. Reynolds, "Enclosure, United States Infantry and Cavalry School, Department of Law," J.A. Augur, *Annual Report, Infantry and Cavalry School* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Infantry and Cavalry School, 1898).

⁶⁷ See Utley, 22–23,

For many army officers their military experience began at the United States Military Academy at West Point. At West Point, cadets lived and worked in a stressful competitive environment with their social contact limited to peers and faculty. Relationships and impressions formed at West point were strong and lasted a lifetime. The faculty, most with Civil War and frontier experience, had important influences on them. John Pershing graduated from West Point in 1886. The Civil War and frontier army, in the person of General Wesley Merritt, the Superintendent of Cadets, strongly influenced Pershing's ideas about officership. Merritt was superintendent during Pershing's four years as a cadet. Pershing, as First Captain of the cadet battalion in 1885–86, had frequent contact with Merritt. Avery D. Andrews, Pershing's classmate, opined that Merritt had a lasting impact on Pershing's views of officership.⁶⁸ Many faculty left similar developmental impressions on cadets attending the Academy.

Once the new lieutenant arrived on the frontier, the small garrison and his regiment became the center of his life. Months and years at isolated frontier posts inspired a unique relationship among army officers. George Forsyth, a veteran of the occupation of Louisiana and a former member of Sheridan's staff, wrote about frontier garrisons: "Social intercourse, on account of their isolation and peculiar experiences, was without formality; companionship begot friendship and affection. To have lived a season together in a frontier post weaves a bond that is never loosened....Oh, the tales those old abandoned forts could tell... —tales of love, tales of war, tales of the hunt, of red men and white men, tales of danger and of death, of peace and of life!"⁶⁹ The circumstance of the frontier caused the relationship between officers, even those of greatly different ranks, to be close. For example, Lieutenant Colonel George Custer of the 7th

⁶⁸ Don E. Alberts, *General Wesley Merritt: Brandy Station to Manila Bay* (Columbus Ohio: The General's Books, 2001), 283–290; Donald Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 13.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Oliver Knight, *Life and Manners in the Frontier Army* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 111; Forsyth, *Soldier*, 109.

Cavalry and his subordinate, Captain Frederick Benteen, were not only widely separated by rank but also personality. Benteen despised Custer's flamboyant ego. However, this strong personal animosity did not prevent Benteen from routinely playing poker with Custer and relishing his frequent trouncing of his superior.⁷⁰ In fact, close socializing and association between senior and subordinate was very common even when a close personal relationship did not exist between them. Officers on the frontier were forced to depend on each other for companionship, "day after day, month after month." They knew the intimate details of each other's lives.⁷¹ James Parker of the 4th Cavalry recalled the camaraderie: "We were a band of brothers, often deeply devoted to one another."⁷² Under such social circumstance, the operational experiences of the Reconstruction veterans passed to the young officers of the regiment and preserving it as a reference for the next generation of army officers.

Charismatic leaders and heroes of the Civil War inspired and served as models for the new lieutenants arriving from West Point in the late 1860s through 1890. A subordinate in the 4th Cavalry recalled, "[Colonel] Mackenzie had an unusually magnetic influence on his officers, his personality impressing itself upon them. This influence was lasting with all those who served under him or with him. Thus the Mackenzie spirit reigned long after his death."⁷³ The operational experiences of leaders like Randal Mackenzie, who had extensive experience in Reconstruction Texas, inspired the future decision making of their subordinates.

Months of marching through what was essentially wilderness in often-brutal conditions of heat and cold characterized the campaign experience on the frontier. These conditions, in the

⁷⁰ Jules C. Ladenheim, *Custer's Thorn: The Life of Frederick W. Benteen* (Westminster, MD: Heritage Books, Inc., 2007), 72–73.

⁷¹ Quote from Merrill J. Mattes, *Indians, Infants, and Infantry: Andrew and Elizabeth Burt on the Frontier* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 103; Knight, 131–132.

⁷² James Parker, *The Old Army. Memories, 1872–1918* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003), 43.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 45.

same way as garrison operations, caused officers to share their personal histories, thoughts, and pass down lessons to future generations. John F. Finerty, a newspaper reporter, described how officers shared their experiences, thoughts and aspirations during a typical evening on the march with the 3rd Cavalry during the 1876 Sioux campaign: “Schwatka’s mind, then, as since, ran on science. He had no love for light literature, and he lay awake of nights thinking of the north pole and Sir John Franklin’s bones.... Bourke, always entertaining, occasionally condescended to tell about his Arizona experiences, while brave old Lieutenant Lawson, eccentric, but beloved, would nod drowsily over the camp fire.”⁷⁴ Finerty, though not a fellow officer, nonetheless gleaned much from his campmates including Schwatka’s aspirations for arctic exploration and Bourke’s expert knowledge of Indian culture.⁷⁵

On the frontier, veteran officers took on the role of mentor and educator to young officers. They passed on their experiences of all types. This mentoring covered the spectrum from local culture to tactical deployment. Lieutenant John Bigelow described introducing one young officer to campaigning on the Mexican border: “The Doctor, a youngster from Boston, Mass., recently joined from Harvard College, had never been at a Mexican ball, or baile; so it was with certain feelings of a chaperone that I went with him....”⁷⁶ When Bigelow introduced contract surgeon Leonard Wood to the experience of a Mexican ball he was sharing the type of

⁷⁴ Finerty, 144.

⁷⁵ Schwatka was a member of the West Point class of 1871, a veteran of the 3rd Cavalry, and had distinguished himself in the centennial campaign of 1876 against the Sioux.⁷⁵ Schwatka was an extraordinary intellectual. While serving as an active officer he studied law and joined the Nebraska Bar in 1875 and graduated from the prestigious Bellevue Hospital Medical College the following year. His first experience as an explorer was while on leave of absence from the army in 1878. Schwatka led a private American Geographic Society of New York expedition for eleven months and 3251 miles by sled to determine the fate of the lost Franklin expedition. In 1883 Miles dispatched him to reconnoiter the Yukon River for the army. During that mission he led a small party of men from the headwaters of the river by raft more than 1,300 miles to its mouth –the longest raft journey of that time. Schwatka’s subsequent writings about his travels in Alaska did much to promote the region. Davis, 302–303.

⁷⁶ John Bigelow, *On the Bloody Trail of Geronimo* (Los Angeles, CA: Westernlore Press, 1968), 29.

cultural knowledge essential to operational success in the ambiguous environment of the frontier where cultural and other non-military factors were important.

Frontier posts often did not have the facilities for entertainment and many army officers therefore turned to reading.⁷⁷ Captain Arthur MacArthur, another veteran of the occupation of Louisiana, represented the type of officer who took up the opportunity for self-education through reading. He also illustrated the influence that a senior officer mentor could have on a junior. In MacArthur's case his superior was retired General of the Army and former President Grant. Captain MacArthur struck up a friendship with former President Ulysses Grant in 1882 through the Captain's father, a federal judge in Washington. Grant and MacArthur shared ideas regarding relations with China and Grant encouraged MacArthur to seek an assignment there. MacArthur subsequently educated himself on Asian history and on his own initiative provided to the army a forty page well constructed analysis of the strategic importance of Asia and China.⁷⁸

Operations brought officers of different regiments together for extended periods and expanded their social and professional contacts beyond their regiment. The 1874 Black Hills expedition brought together Lieutenant Colonels George Custer and Sandy Forsyth, Engineer Captain William Ludlow, and 1875 West Point graduate Lieutenant Frederick Grant, son of the President. The army assigned young Grant as a member of Sheridan's Division of Missouri staff, and tasked him to observe and support a variety of field operations. A year earlier, he accompanied Lieutenant Colonel James Forsyth on an exploration of the Yellowstone River.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ In the 19th Infantry regiment, its commander, Colonel Philippe Regis de Trobriand, required that the regimental companies subscribe to the popular journals and magazines of the day including the *Army and Navy Journal*, *Harper's Weekly*, *Puck*, *Appleton's Weekly*, *North American Review*, the *New York Herald*, and the *San Francisco Examiner*. Kenneth Ray Young, *The General's General: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 127.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁷⁹ See Jackson, and James W. Forsyth, and F.D. Grant, *Expedition up the Yellowstone River* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1876).

The 1886 Geronimo campaign included Reconstruction veterans such as Nelson Miles, Sandy Forsyth, Eugene Carr, and Arthur MacArthur; and young promising officers such as Henry Lawton, James Parker, Leonard Wood, Joseph Dickman, and Robert Bullard. The Ghost Dance campaign of 1890–91, similarly brought together elements of many regiments including Miles and fellow Civil War veterans Wesley Merritt, William Shafter, Eugene Carr and James Forsyth; among the promising lieutenants were John Pershing, Robert Lee Howze, Hugh Scott, and Franklin Bell. Participation in campaigns did not guarantee a tutorial in Reconstruction history but they did intensify the interaction between Reconstruction veterans and junior officers.

The son of President Ulysses Grant, Lieutenant Frederick Grant, served on the on the frontier for almost ten years. His service was representative of how for many the army was very much a family profession. It was not uncommon for the son's of officers to follow their father's career and carry the father's experiences into the next generation. Families were an important part of transmitting the army's history and experiences from one generation of officers to the next. Nelson Miles, Adna Chaffee, and Charles Gatewood, are just a few of the more well-known frontier officers whose sons followed them into the army through West Point. Between 1871 and 1890, the relatives of alumni made up more than twenty-eight percent of the graduates of West Point.⁸⁰

Marriage also perpetuated the family connections between generations of officers. An example from lieutenants of the 7th Cavalry illustrates how prevalent inter-army marriage was

⁸⁰ Sherman Miles, USMA 1905, Adna Chaffee Jr., USMA 1906, and Charles Gatewood, USMA 1906 – from *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the US Military Academy at West Point, New York. Supplement, Volume IX 1940–1950*, Charles N. Branham, Editor (The Association of Graduates US Military Academy, 1950). These three cadets, along with Cadet Calvin P. Titus, USMA 1905 (famous for winning the Medal of Honor for climbing the gates of Peking as an enlisted man serving under Chaffee in China), were General Chaffee's honorary aides during President Roosevelt's inauguration in 1905. "Inauguration Preparation," *Washington Post*, January 19, 1905. Of 1015 graduates in the classes 1871 to 1890, 293 were descended from alumni. Trustees of the Association of Graduates, "The Classes: 1802 –1915," found online at <http://www.westpointaog.org> (accessed 6 September 2008).

and how regimental relations could grow into family relations, thus further strengthening the bond between officers: Lieutenant Hugh Scott of the 7th Cavalry married the daughter of Major Lewis Merrill of the same regiment. Marriage connected Scott to the Civil War and the army's campaigns against the Ku Klux Klan in South Carolina and Louisiana. Similarly, Lieutenant J. Franklin Bell of the 7th Cavalry married the sister of the wife of one of his comrades, Lieutenant Ernest A. Garlington. Both Scott and Garlington had sons that followed them into the army. All three officers went on to extensive army careers and achieved general officer rank in the Twentieth Century. These relations are a small sample of the extension of army family ties through matrimony.⁸¹ Family relations represent especially strong bonds between individuals and were another important avenue through which lessons and experiences of the Civil War, Reconstruction and the frontier passed between officers and on to future generations.

Though western historian Robert Utley viewed the army of frontier as a rather incompetent police force, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington saw the years of the frontier army as the birth of military professionalism in the army. He believed this occurred because the army officer corps was physically isolated from the anti-military and pacifists views of American society and because of the influence of foreign military reform, notably the Germans, and progressive army thinkers such as Upton: "the nineteenth century produced the high standards of professional excellence essential to national success in the struggles of the twentieth century."⁸² Large scale conventional warfighting capabilities certainly waned in the frontier army, however,

⁸¹ The Arlington National Cemetery website is an invaluable source to detecting the familial connections between officers and includes significant biographical information. The home of the website is at <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/>. Specific information on J. Franklin Bell and Ernest Garlington is at <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jfbell.htm> and <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/garling.htm>. Like many other officers, Garlington's son, Cresswell Garlington, followed him to West Point and the army. He is also buried at Arlington and his career information is at <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/cresswell-garlington.htm> (accessed April 14, 2007).

⁸² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 229, 233.

frontier commanders astutely recognized that the problems and tasks they were assigned on the frontier were not going to be solved through drill and military technology. The Indian was not just a military problem, but also a vexing political and social issue. The frontier army's intellectual resources were therefore focused on solving it. Frontier officers recognized that understanding and operating within the context of Indian culture was a key to success. Other challenges of the frontier such as furthering economic development and scientific discovery also did not fall within the realm of conventional military tasks. Frontier commanders were, correctly, as focused on policy, culture, economics, and politics as they were on fighting. That wide-ranging focus and their success in a variety of roles, as well as their military strategy, were the keys to winning the West. Samuel Huntington describes the mature frontier army's self-image "as the government's obedient handyman performing without question or hesitation the jobs assigned to it."⁸³ Though analysts and historians disparage the frontier army's conventional military capabilities, its operations, leaders, and experiences made it an effective tool of national policy and an exceptional school for future military governors.

⁸³ Ibid., 261.

CHAPTER 4 - Military Government in Cuba, 1899–1909

Following victory in the Spanish-American War, American military forces occupied the former island colonies of Spain. For the first time American forces had fought for, won, and then retained responsibility for lands not contiguous to the continental US. It also placed them in control of populations with a disparate languages, cultures, political histories, and religions. The government and the army both groped for policies and methods to deal with the situation. The occupation of Cuba became the US government's first experience in military occupation as a post-conflict operation after the conclusion of formal hostilities with a sovereign power since the war with Mexico. The occupation demonstrated continuity with ideas formed during Reconstruction and on the frontier as well as new aspects of the American approach to post-conflict operations. In Cuba the army continued to demonstrate that it understood how to create democratic institutions, that the rule of law was central to the American occupations, and that the army could quickly and effectively transfer power to civil authorities. The army also continued its increasing interest in public education. Other, negative characteristics of the previous occupation experiences also continued: the national government continued to demonstrate a reluctance to give specific clear policy guidance to the occupation command and an inability to deal with economic issues. The army also encountered the problems associated with trying to apply foreign concepts to systems the population regarded as legitimate, such as the legal system. The army showed new occupation capabilities in Cuba, displaying a very effective medical capability that protected both the occupation forces and indigenous population from disease and famine. Importantly, a new generation of army officers, schooled on the western plains and too

young to serve in Reconstruction, experienced the challenges of military governance and occupation operations.

Leonard Wood in Santiago

The first occupation of Cuba revolved around the personality and actions of General Leonard Wood who took command of the occupied Cuban city of Santiago in 1898.¹ As Wood took command of the occupation of the city, he reflected on the path he had traveled since he was a young army surgeon on the frontier in 1885 and Lieutenant Bigelow introduced him to Mexican culture in the Department of Arizona: “In these strange changes, here I am Military Gov. of Santiago, stuck up in an old Palace opposite the picturesque old cathedral with the whole town under military law, including all in the harbor and the Spanish prisoners, some 12,000.... And the whole thing seems like a dream.”² Leonard Wood was uniquely qualified to take command of the occupation of Santiago. He had a diverse military background and personal relationships and contacts that facilitated his operating simultaneously in the military and the political spheres. His army career started in 1885 when, after graduating from Harvard Medical School and finishing an internship at Boston City Hospital in 1884, the army hired him as a contract surgeon. While accompanying troops in the field against Geronimo in 1886 the command appointed him as a provisional company officer. During this period, he established close relationships with Captain Henry Lawton, his commander during the Geronimo campaign, and with the Department Commander, Brigadier General Nelson Miles. When William McKinley won the Presidential election in 1896, Wood became the personal physician to the

¹ Hostilities between American and Spanish land forces in Cuba ended on July 17, 1898 with the surrender of Santiago to the American expeditionary forces under Major General William R. Shafter.¹ The laborious negotiations and communications between the American generals and the War Department are described in detail in David F. Trask, *The War with Spain, in 1898* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 299–319.

² Jack C. Lane, *Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 56.

President's ailing wife, and was in almost daily contact with the President and became close friends with Theodore Roosevelt, then Under-Secretary of the Navy. When war broke out in 1898, he left the army medical corps and with Theodore Roosevelt formed a regiment of volunteer cavalry. During operations in Cuba, the army promoted him to brigadier and then major general of volunteers for gallantry in action.³

Wood took command of the city of Santiago on 20 July 1898 and immediately began to set a standard for American military government operations. He became the military governor of the department of Santiago on 12 October 1898 and continued in that position as the United States and Spain negotiated the treaty ending the war. The city of 40,000 under Wood's charge was in a dismal state. Like most cities in the Spanish Empire, the city's sanitary system was non-existent. Streets were unpaved, sidewalks did not exist, and no sewage system served the city. Animal and human corpses lay openly in the city, as did excrement of all kinds. General Wood gave a detailed description in a letter to the Secretary of War: "There were a great many dead in the houses, between 2000 and 4,000 Spanish wounded and sick, and a great horde of half-famished and sick people, nearly 20,000 in number, who had just returned from El Caney, where they had gone during the siege. The water supply of the city had been cut off; there was no water to be obtained except from cisterns and a few wells and the streets were full of dead animals and all sorts of filthy materials."⁴ One American reporter called Santiago the dirtiest city in the world. In August, the death rate was over 100 people a day.⁵ Wood's job was to establish order from the chaos.

³ William Bell, *Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775–2005* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005), 104.

⁴ Quote from Woods letter to Alger reported in *The New York Times*, "Conditions at Santiago," October 1, 1898, 3.

⁵ Wood's early career is summarized from Lane, 1–25; Jack McCallum, *Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 1–60, 110.

Wood quickly set to work attempting to gain control of the city and create a healthy environment. He divided the city into five districts and then placed each district under the command of an army surgeon. Wood hired Cuban doctors educated in the United States to staff clinics and hospitals. They also visited the sick in their homes. The army provided medicines and food. The districts organized central dispersing centers where food was distributed. The army was issuing approximately 15,000 rations a day through October and doctors were giving 600–700 medical prescriptions daily. The American created a city police force that worked within the district commands and with the doctors to maintain daily lists of those who were sick. Work parties removed and burned dead bodies, and an army led sanitation department enforced sanitation regulations. Over 170 employees worked in shifts to move filth from the city streets, courtyards, and clear outhouses. The command punished, and in at least one case, horse whipped, those who did not comply with the army’s sanitation regulations. By the end of August, the immediate crisis was averted and the city was relatively clean. By October, the command reduced the overall death rate in the city by seventy-five percent. By the beginning of November, there had not been a case of yellow fever reported in sixty days and the army reduced overall disease and illness in the city by ninety percent.⁶ In the meantime, the American expeditionary forces redeployed to the United States, leaving only eight regiments under Wood’s command.⁷

Wood’s independent command of Santiago lasted for five months. During that time, Santiago and the surrounding area were the only portions of Cuba under American control, and

⁶ *The New York Times*, “Conditions at Santiago,” and “Santiago Healthful Now,” November 2, 1898, 5; Lane, 66–79.

⁷ Leonard Wood, “Report of Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, US Volunteers, Commanding Department of Santiago,” August 9, 1899, in John R. Brooke, “Report of Maj. Gen. J.R. Brooke on Civil Affairs in Cuba,” *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1899* (henceforth *ARWD, 1899*), Vol. I, Part 6 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 300–301.

were the only areas of Cuba where order and health prevailed. After the official end of the war, Wood remained the military governor of Santiago until becoming the commander of the Division of Cuba in December 1899. The belligerents signed the treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898 officially ending the war. As part of the treaty, Spain passed responsibility for Cuba's sovereignty to the United States. On December 13, 1898, the army formed the Division of Cuba to command the military occupation of the island, and on January 1, 1899, the US Army officially took responsibility for the entire island of Cuba. General John R. Brooke took command of the American army of occupation and included Wood's command within the occupation forces.⁸

First Year of the Occupation

As Major General Brooke took command in Cuba, his mission was not clear. The treaty between Spain and the United States did not grant independence to Cuba. The terms of the treaty intentionally granted the United States responsibility for Cuban sovereignty but did not specify Cuban independence. Confusing the matter further was that fact that the other possessions of Spain, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, were "ceded" to the United States while Cuba was

⁸ John R. Brooke, "Annual Report of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, US A., Commanding the Division of Cuba," October 1, 1899, *ARWD, 1899*, Vol. I, Part 3 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 122–123.

In 1898 General Brooke was a sixty-year-old distinguished Civil War veteran who had been on continuous active service since he joined the 4th Pennsylvania Infantry regiment as a Captain in April 1861. He served on the frontier almost continuously from 1866 to 1895. The only exception to his frontier service after the Civil War was almost three years duty in Reconstruction Louisiana from September 1874 to June 1877. At the beginning of the Spanish-American War the army promoted him to Major General and placed him in command of I Corps. Brooke led troops under General Miles in the short campaign in Puerto Rico and immediately after the war served as the Military Governor of that island until ordered to Cuba. Brooke's career is reconstructed from a variety of sources the most important of which are William Powell, *Powell's Records of Living Officers of the United States Army* (Philadelphia, PA: L.R. Hamersly & Co., 1890), 88–89, and Ezra J. Warner, *Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 45–46.

merely “relinquished.” This choice of words indicated the different but unclear status of Cuba.⁹ The McKinley Administration was uncertain whether sovereignty was the best course for Cuba. The President gave his guidance to General Brooke in a confidential letter in which he emphasized that the conduct of the occupation and government of Cuba should be “in the interest of order and peace and for the preservation and promotion of the rights of liberty and property and the protection of the people.” McKinley made it clear that the occupation and control of Cuban sovereignty was “temporary,” but he did not give any indication of how long the temporary situation might last. McKinley was obtuse on this point, stating, “This authority must continue until Congress provides otherwise, or until such time as the people shall have established a firm and stable government of their own.”¹⁰ This guidance hinted at self-government for the Cuban people. It also reflected the strength of popular sentiment by some Americans for the annexation of Cuba, and thus left the door open on that sensitive subject. Annexation was a possibility if the “Congress provides otherwise.”¹¹ Like the Reconstruction experience, there was no clear policy guidance to the army and thus the initial occupation was limited in scope.

⁹ See the complete “Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain, December 10, 1898,” online at Yale Law School, *The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp (accessed 10 October 2008).

¹⁰ William McKinley, quoted from confidential letter to Major-General John R. Brooke, December 22, 1898, in Charles S. Olcott, *The Life of William McKinley, Volume II* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), 196–202.

¹¹ Numerous letters to the editor and articles in American newspapers in 1898 demonstrated the not insignificant support for annexation in the United States. Examples include J.A. Wood’s letter stating “Our commercial and manufacturing interests will soon recognize the necessity for the purchase of Cuba.” J.A. Wood, “Letters from the People, Cuba to be one of the United States,” *New York Times*, March 25, 1898, 5; and former Confederate General James Longstreet commented that “The annexation of Cuba... will follow the expulsion of Spanish forces from the island,” quoted in *New York Times*, “Gen. Longstreet on the War,” June 1, 1898, no page. A Congressional Commission that traveled to Cuba in early 1898 reflected the popular sentiment when it reported that “The future of Cuba is American,” quoted in David F. Healy, *The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 19.

Cuba's complex society presented numerous challenges to the occupying army command. When General Brooke took command of the Division of Cuba, he became responsible for an island territory of 43,124 square miles —roughly the same size as the state of Pennsylvania. The civil population under his control numbered approximately 1,500,000, of which approximately a third were an especially poverty stricken black or mulatto minority. The balance of the population was mostly recent immigrants from Spain —over 700,000 immigrants arrived from that country between 1868 and 1894. The only significant non-Hispanic minority was between 30,000 and 40,000 laborers imported from the Philippines. Over sixty percent of the population was illiterate. It was a society distinguished by rigid economic division and ethnic differences. In contrast to these differences, the population shared a common Hispanic culture, the Spanish language, and the Roman Catholic religion.¹²

With no definitive guidance regarding US long-term policy toward Cuba, General Brook, as commander of the occupation, focused on the short term. His priorities were to establish the organization of the military government, assert the rule of law, and ensure the health and welfare of the population. This latter issue was the top priority in 1899 as the Cuban insurrection and the Spanish-American War had left the country's economy in ruin, and famine threatened the population. The occupation of Cuba followed the pattern of US Army organization in the continental United States. The army designated the island as the Division of Cuba and the division reported directly to the War Department. The division contained four departments. Three of the departments followed the traditional political provincial boundaries of Cuba and contained two provinces each: Major General James H. Wilson commanded the Department of

¹² Military Information Division, Adjutant General's Office, War Department, *Military Notes on Cuba* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), 24–26; José M. Hernandez, "Cuba in 1898," *The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War*, Hispanic Division, Library of Congress, <http://loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/hernandez.html>, (accessed December 3, 2008).

Matanzas and Santa Clara , Major General Fitzhugh Lee commanded the Department of the Province of Havana and Pinar del Rio, and Major General Leonard Wood commanded the Department of Santiago and Puerto Principe. Major General William Ludlow commanded the city of Havana, which constituted a department in itself, designated the Department of Havana.¹³ The army organization had a parallel civil organization with General Brooke was the overall military governor of the island. Each subordinate department commander governed two provinces. The military staffs provided support to the generals in both their roles as military commanders and governors. The Americans left the Spanish civil administration mostly intact. At the division level, they organized the administration into five departments, each headed by a Cuban, most of whom had held the position under Spanish rule. American officers served as assistants to the department heads and in some cases operated key bureaus within the departments.

In 1898 General Brooke was a sixty-year-old distinguished Civil War veteran who had almost three years duty in Reconstruction Louisiana from September 1874 to June 1877. Brooke's immediate staff was very experienced. His Chief of Staff was the veteran cavalryman and scourge of the east Texas criminal gangs, Major General Adna Chaffee.¹⁴ Possibly the least experienced of Brooke's staff, but arguably one of the most talented, was the division quartermaster, Lieutenant Colonel Tasker H. Bliss. Bliss's superiors recognized him as one of the sharpest minds in the army and his intellect more than made up for his lack of field

¹³ Initially the division was organized into seven departments but by July 1899 the original seven had been consolidated into four. Brooke, "Annual Report of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, USA, Commanding the Division of Cuba," 1899, 123–124.

¹⁴ William Harding Carter, *The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1916), 134–137; "William Vigors Richards," *Arlington National Cemetery Website*, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/wvrichards.htm>, (accessed Oct 10, 2008); Obituary, "Lieut. Col. William V. Richards," *The New York Times*, December 10, 1901; "Francis Safford Dodge," *Arlington National Cemetery Website*, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/fsdodge.htm>, (accessed Oct 10, 2008).

experience. He was fluent or conversational in five languages including Spanish and came to Cuban service from the position of Military Attaché to the US legation to Spain.¹⁵

Most of Cuba's problems were either systemic issues never addressed or resolved by the Spanish, or were problems that were a result of the insurgent war waged between the Spanish military forces and the insurgent army of Cuba. Little damage resulted from the Spanish-American War itself. The Cuban-Spanish War, in contrast, caused the destruction of Cuban agriculture. When the US occupation force arrived in Cuba, famine was widespread and near starvation conditions existed in much of the country. This was the immediate and top priority of Brooke's new military government. Brooke's command used the army of occupation organizational structure to immediately issue rations. Brooke directed subordinate commanders, "In all cases where you may find destitution, you will immediately relieve it."¹⁶ The command issued over 1,000,000 humanitarian rations and over 5,000,000 individual army rations in the first months of the occupation to relieve starvation and bring the population in general to a minimum level of nutrition. By the spring of 1899, the food crisis had largely passed and the army focused on avoiding a similar situation the following winter by addressing the needs of Cuban agriculture.¹⁷

¹⁵ Tasker Bliss received his commission from West Point in 1875 into the artillery branch. Bliss was the aide to General John Schofield during Schofield's tenure as commander of the army, 1888–1895. Bliss's relationship with Schofield was much more than an aide: he was a trusted companion, advisor, and friend. At the completion of his tour as aide to Schofield, the Secretary of War, Daniel S. Lamont, made Bliss a personal assistant, a job he carried out until the end of the President Cleveland Administration in 1897. After leaving the War Department, the army tasked Bliss to be the Military Attaché to the US legation to Spain. Bliss's service in Spain impressed the US Minister, Stewart L. Woodford, who wrote the Secretary of War that Bliss's "services have been simply invaluable. An admirable linguist, cultivated gentleman, a trained officer and a most thorough and wise man, he has been my trusted adviser." Bliss returned from Spain in time to participate in the short Puerto Rico campaign and then in 1898 served as the commissary officer on General Brooke's new Cuba Division staff. Quote in Frederick Palmer, *Bliss Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1934), 44. This summary of Bliss's career is largely from Palmer, 18–59.

¹⁶ Letter from General Adna Chaffee to Commanding General, Department of Pinar del Rio, January 7, 1899, in Brooke, "Report of Maj. Gen. J.R. Brooke on Civil Affairs in Cuba," 1899, 127.

¹⁷ Brooke, "Report of Maj. Gen. J.R. Brooke on Civil Affairs in Cuba," 1899, 8.

Sanitation and health issues were also a top priority of the military government. The army knew that Cuba was the heart of the yellow fever region and disease was a major concern. Typhoid and yellow fever were the two main fears. Science did not know the transmission method of yellow fever, but military doctors understood the relationship between unsanitary conditions and disease. The threat of yellow fever, and the sanitation related disease problems the army encountered in the 1898 mobilization camps ensured the command's focus on these two related issues.¹⁸ General Wood's sanitation program in Santiago set the standard for the rest of the country as each of the occupation departments published and enforced rigorous and mandatory sanitation regulations. In addition, there was a demanding need for increased and improved hospital capability to support the civilian population. The army provided funds and supervised the revitalization and creation of hospitals and asylums throughout the country. In Havana, General Ludlow ensured sanitation and hospital operations were two of the few positions that remained under the control of American army officers. By July of 1899, American health reforms reduced the death rate in the city to below the 1890–95 average (before the arrival of large numbers of Spanish troops).¹⁹ Major Tasker Bliss, the division commissary officer, and the Collector of Taxes for Cuba, reported that the single biggest use of tax revenue through June 1899 was for sanitation (thirty-four percent), while the second biggest cost to the military government was charities and hospitals (eight percent).²⁰

After health and welfare issues, law and order was the focus of command priority. Major Edgar S. Dudley, Brooke's staff judge-advocate, supervised law and order activities. He had a

¹⁸ Detailed analysis of the mobilization disease issues is in Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1994), 247–278.

¹⁹ William Ludlow, "Report of Brig. Gen. William Ludlow, Commanding Department of Havana and Military Governor of the City of Havana, Cuba," August 1, 1899, Brooke, "Annual Report of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, USA., Commanding the Division of Cuba," 1899, 242–245.

²⁰ Tasker Bliss, "Annual Report of the Collector of Customs for Cuba, Fiscal year Ending June 30, 1899," August 1, 1899, in Brooke, "Report of Maj. Gen. J.R. Brooke on Civil Affairs in Cuba," 1899, 391.

monumental task given that the Spanish legal system in Cuba was completely different from that practiced in the United States and, as he observed, “the courts were said, and appeared from satisfactory indications, to be corrupt.”²¹ The American officers showed a mature understanding of the difference between essential changes, and changes that were merely more in accord with American traditions but not necessarily linked to Cuban or Spanish traditions. Though the Cuban system was different, it was not inherently corrupt. The system, which paid judges and employees of the court through fees collected from defendants, caused widespread and endemic corruption. Over time, fees became associated with verdicts, and the fees were the major portion of judicial pay. The fee system was so embedded in the culture that the bulk of the population did not recognize it as corrupt. The American government installed centrally controlled salaries for all judicial officials and eliminated the most corrupt aspect of the Cuban judicial system. Unresolved during Brooke’s tenure as commander, was the procedural clumsiness of the Spanish system that in many cases incarcerated individuals for months at a time while awaiting trial.²²

The Cuban police structure dissolved with the departure of the Spanish army. American troops initially took over the police function in many areas including the city of Havana. In other areas, particularly remote rural locations, until the arrival of American troops, the Cuban insurrection army maintained order.²³ Building a police took place without the benefit of central

²¹ Edgar S. Dudley, “Report of Maj. Edgar S. Dudley, Judge-Advocate, USV., Judge-Advocate Division of Cuba,” September 30, 1899, in Brooke, “Report of Maj. Gen. J.R. Brooke on Civil Affairs in Cuba,” 1899, 163.

²² This mature understanding of the nature and challenges of the task of imposing foreign culture and traditions on an occupied land is reflected in the following passage: “Radical changes in the law which might be made in territory wholly subject to the United States, with a view to the Introduction of American systems of law or procedure, cannot well be made in a country which we are holding, as a friendly territory, under belligerent rights acquired through our war with Spain, with the objective of enabling a stable government to be established.” “Report of Maj. Edgar S. Dudley, Judge-Advocate,” 164, 165, 166.

²³ Ludlow, in Brooke, “Annual Report of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, USA., Commanding the Division of Cuba,” 1899, 227–228.

direction from General Brooke's headquarters.²⁴ The result was effective but different police organizations in each of the four occupation departments and sometimes within different provinces within the same department. For example, General Wilson organized three types of police in the Province of Santa Clara: municipal police in the towns, rural police for the non-urban areas, and Governor's police with general jurisdiction and for special missions. In contrast, in the Province of Matanzas, also under Wilson, the force consisted of Governor's police and municipal police but no rural police. Both provinces combined fielded a force 1322 men in the summer of 1899. Under General Wilson's command, the direction of the police force was entrusted to local Cuban leaders and officered by Cubans. There was virtually no direct American participation.²⁵

In his role as military governor, General Brooke had to create or absorb the capacity for government administration. In most cases, the preferred solution was to absorb the existing Spanish appointed officials. However, in some cases no Spanish officials existed, in other cases the need for new operational methods or honesty were so dominant that American officials, usually army officers, were appointed to operate that portion of the bureaucracy. This was the case in the critical government run telegraph services, customs and treasury operations, education, and the postal service. The Military Governor modified Spanish law to accord with the new more efficient administrative organization.

²⁴ As of September 16, 1899, a full nine months after assuming control of the island Brooke's administration had failed to determine a police policy. The police were a bureau under the government section of the military government's Department of State and Government headed by Domingo Mendez Capote. He reported that the bureau was "working on a complete plan for policing the island" but had not published one by September 1899. Somingo Mendez Capote, "Report of the Department of State and Government," September 16, 1899, in Brooke, "Report of Maj. Gen. J.R. Brooke on Civil Affairs in Cuba," 1899, 177.

²⁵ James H. Wilson, "Report of Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson, US Volunteers Commanding the Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara," August 1, 1899, in Brooke, "Annual Report of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, USA., Commanding the Division of Cuba," 1899, 137-138;

Though the Americans placed Cubans at the head of the major bureaucratic departments of the military government, there was no real movement toward actual civil rule in Cuba during the command of General Brooke. Other more pressing matters distracted the McKinley Administration and the American civil leadership gave no directives or guidance to Brooke. For its part, the command demonstrated no inclination to go beyond the limited instructions that it had.²⁶ Brooke did not consider policy part of his responsibility as the military governor. Brooke stated, "The kind of government to be established, and when, is not a subject which the military governor believes to be a matter which can be discussed in this report, if at all. Obviously, this must be determined by higher authority, to whom such matters properly pertain."²⁷ Brooke was unconcerned with the future, and he believed the Cuban people should focus on accomplishing the immediate tasks necessary to make the country better under the control of the military government.

General Brooke's command of the military government was competent but uninspired. Because of this, little of a permanent nature was accomplished during the first year of the occupation. General Wood was unhappy with the selection of General Brooke as the military governor of Cuba from the very beginning. Initially, Wood felt that no one general officer should be in command of all of Cuba.²⁸ The subordinate generals' fundamental complaint with General Brooke was that he was too conservative. Brooke maintained that the future of Cuba was a political problem and that professional soldiers had no role in determining political policy.

²⁶ Two major issues fully occupied the attention of the Administration. First was a crisis within the War Department involving Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, General in Chief of the Army Nelson Miles, and the President. The mobilization for the war was badly managed and Congressional committees were investigating the reasons for the problems. Second, as 1899 progressed the United States found itself embroiled in a very complex and controversial occupation of the Philippines where Philippine nationalists waged a dangerous conventional and guerrilla war against the US Army. These two major challenges contributed to the Administration's reluctance to push detailed occupation policy on General Brooke.

²⁷ Brooke, "Report of Maj. Gen. J.R. Brooke on Civil Affairs in Cuba," 1899, 15.

²⁸ Healy, 90.

The other occupation commanders could not have disagreed more. The main controversial issue was annexation.

Though Brooke was decidedly neutral in his views of Cuba's political future, his subordinates were not. Leonard Wood hinted strongly that annexation was the best solution in an interview with *the New York Times* in June 1899. Wood said, "All the foreigners, including the Spaniards, and the property holding Cubans, favor annexation to the United States, because they realize that we can give them a stable government.... They [the Cubans] are rapidly realizing that annexation is the best thing for them." He also insinuated that the Brooke military government was not aggressive enough when he said, "The Cuban problem can easily be solved. With the right sort of an administration everything could be straightened out in six months. Just now there is too much 'tommyrot.'" ²⁹ Wood also criticized Brooke in private correspondence with Theodore Roosevelt and directly to President McKinley. ³⁰ General Brooke did not ignore Wood's agitation against him. Brooke dispatched General Adna Chaffee, his Chief of Staff, to Wood's headquarters specifically to dress Wood down for criticizing the military governor in public.

In July 1899 Elihu Root became the US Secretary of War and his influence greatly changed the course of the Cuban occupation. ³¹ As soon as Root took office, both Generals Wilson and Wood used their political contacts with Theodore Roosevelt and various Senators to provide negative information regarding their commander to the new Secretary of War. Root,

²⁹ Leonard Wood quoted in *The New York Times*, "Gen. Wood on the Cubans," June 24, 1899.

³⁰ Healy, 89; Lane 77–79.

³¹ Russell A. Alger was asked to resign by President McKinley in July 1899 not for incompetence, for which there was ample evidence, but because of political disloyalty. Healy, 107–109. Root had no military experience but in contrast with his predecessor, Russell A. Alger, he possessed an exceptionally sharp mind demonstrated in a brilliant career as a corporate lawyer in New York. When offered the position of Secretary of War by President McKinley in July 1899, Root replied to McKinley's representative on the phone "I know nothing about war, I know nothing about the army." McKinley's response was that he cared nothing of knowledge of war but needed a "lawyer to direct the government of these Spanish islands." Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root, Volume 1, 1845–1909* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1938), 215.

however, was a methodical operator and he carefully studied the Cuban issue before making his own judgment regarding Brooke's future. After careful study of all the facts, Root concluded that Cuban policy was not progressing and that Brooke was at least partly responsible. He then made the decision to relieve Brooke and replace him with Major General of Volunteers Leonard Wood. Major General Wood took command of the Division of Cuba and assumed the office of Military Governor on December 13, 1899.³²

Military Government Under Major General Wood

The arrival of Leonard Wood as military governor, combined with the energy and effectiveness of Elihu Root as Secretary of War, marked the beginning of aggressive governance in Cuba and a second and final phase of the first occupation of the island.³³ The first change in the American approach to Cuba was style. Root was an accomplished lawyer with a brilliant mind. He told a friend, "The first thing I did after my appointment was to make out a list of a great number of books which cover in detail both the practice and the principles of many forms of colonial government under the English Law, and I am giving them all the time I can take from my active duties."³⁴ Root's intellect combined with his dedication to efficiency ensured that he addressed the military problems facing the United States with a straight-forwardness that was unusual for the War Department. Wood, carrying an ego much larger than that supported by his military record, came to his new position with no option but to produce results or invite incredible criticism. He took command of the Cuban division still only holding a regular commission as a captain assistant surgeon. Wood's rank did not change until his political Allies

³² Healy, 107–125; Jessup, 226–230, 286.

³³ None of the Wood or Root biographies make a definitive case for who it was that got Wood the governorship of Cuba. It was likely President McKinley who ensured that Wood got the Cuban governor position.

³⁴ Quoted in Jessup, 300.

got him promoted to brigadier general in the regular army in February 1901.³⁵ Thus, compared to 1899, vigorous action characterized the American occupation from 1900 on.

As General Wood took command, US policy toward Cuba was no more clear than it was under General Brooke. Root favored guaranteeing Cuban sovereignty. Wood preferred to drag his heels and prolong military government with some vague idea of possible US annexation in the future. The President made no policy decisions. Ultimately, three events decided American policy and accelerated the movement toward independence: the unrest caused by rumors of annexation, the Philippine war, and scandal in the military government.³⁶

Just before Wood took control in Cuba, in November 1899, the Cuban and American press was full of speculation regarding the future of American rule in Cuba. One of the rumors was that the Americans would replace Brooke with a civil governor. To the Cubans, such a decision indicated long-term American rule and thus an effort to delay or thwart Cuban independence. Riots and rallies broke out all over Cuba protesting American rule. These protests, though nonviolent, demonstrated the underlying unease of the population with American rule. Secretary Root was concerned that a wayward policy step could provoke the Cubans and result in a popular insurrection similar to that which broke out in February 1899 in the Philippines.³⁷ In December, the McKinley Administration put to rest the idea of creating an American civil government.³⁸

³⁵ *The New York Times*, "Miles is Made A Lieutenant General," February 6, 1901, 5.

³⁶ Cuban independence was guaranteed by the Teller Amendment to the 1898 joint war resolution passed by Congress. However, many felt that a determined Congress could find a way to nullify the amendment.

³⁷ Healy, 120.

³⁸ A variety of articles in *The New York Times* and other newspapers hinted at the disaffection of the Cuban population and gave Secretary Root reason to be concerned. For example: *The New York Times*, "Ask Independence for Cuba," October 24, 1899; *The New York Times*, "Unrest is felt in Cuba," November 28, 1899; and *The New York Times*, "No Civil Rule for Cuba," December 1, 1899.

In the spring of 1900, General Wood and Secretary Root became aware of irregular accounting within the Cuban postal department. Americans supervised and operated this department, but it was one of the few departments that the army did not staff or control. US Postal Service appointees manned and administered the department. Root, after some deliberation, ordered a complete investigation and rigorous prosecution of those found guilty. Though the postal scandal did not directly implicate the military government, it became part of the partisan domestic political argument during an election year, and was another signal to Secretary Root that the military government of Cuba was rife with potential political traps.³⁹ The postal scandal, coming after the outbreak of war in the Philippines, and combined with the obvious dissatisfaction of the Cuban people, all convinced Root that the sooner Cuba was granted its independence from the United States the better.

While the case for political independence was building, Major General Wood was very busy continuing the social and economic reconstruction projects begun or identified as necessary by Major General Brooke. These included education reform, economic reform, legal and police policy, and health and sanitation reform. As part of the process, Wood gradually reorganized the Division of Cuba. Under Brooke's command the Division of Cuba was divided into four departments, each with a general officer commander. This organization had proved to be very contentious with constant bickering over policy and three of the subordinate department commanders (Generals Wood, Wilson, and Ludlow) actually maneuvering to oust Brooke and take his job themselves. As division commander, Wood used his influence to have most of his

³⁹ The impact of the postal scandal was largely on the domestic political balance during an election year. It was a negative news story for the administration almost daily from May to July 1900, and on the front page of *The New York Times* at least seven times. See for example: *The New York Times*, "Cuban Postal Frauds," July 26, 1900, and "Neely Again Arrested," May 23, 1900. The political debates over the scandal are described in *The New York Times*, "Senate Discusses the Frauds in Cuba," May 24, 1900. For a discussion of the impact of the scandal on the military government see Healy, 139–142, and Jessup, 290–292.

subordinate commanders transferred and then eliminated the subordinate headquarters. Soon after taking command, all of Cuba was under the direct command of the Military Governor of Cuba and the Commander of the Division of Cuba, Major General of Volunteers Leonard Wood.⁴⁰ With his command firmly under his control, Wood embarked on a vigorous campaign to reform Cuban society.

Wood believed the long-term reform of Cuba required a focus on education. He directed Lieutenant Matthew E. Hanna to write a national school policy based on the education program in Hanna's home state of Ohio. Under Hanna's direction, the Americans organized the school system into six provincial school boards headed by a superintendent. In total the army established more than 2,600 new schools in Cuba in the first three months of 1900.⁴¹ Most important, the Americans emphasized quality teachers and established a robust teacher-training program in cooperation with Harvard University. The government sent 1175 of Cuba's approximately 3,500 teachers to Harvard for a summer training program in 1900.⁴² They also dramatically increased teacher salaries to attract educated women. In 1901, the occupation administration paid Cuban teachers better than virtually any teachers in the United States. By the end of 1901 the new system dramatically reduced truancy and the average daily school attendance was 140,000 students. The Americans laid a solid foundation of policy, and the education reforms implemented under the military government had the potential to completely transform Cuba both socially and economically in the long term.⁴³

⁴⁰ McCallum, 175.

⁴¹ Healy, 180.

⁴² Alejandro Maria Lopez, "Report of the Superintendent of Schools, January 1 to September 14, 1900," March 8, 1901, in Leonard Wood, "Report of the Military Governor of Cuba on Civil Affairs, Volume I, Part 4," *ARWD, 1900, Volume I, Part 11* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 218–219.

⁴³ Hanna had been a school teacher in Ohio prior to attending West Point. Matthew E. Hanna, "Report of the Public Schools of the Island of Cuba for September, October, November, and December 1900," February 26, 1901, in Wood, "Report of the Military Governor of Cuba on Civil Affairs, Volume I, Part 4," 1900, 98. Healy,

Though the military government was successful in building the foundation of a progressive education system, it was not as successful in the critical arena of economic policy. The major economic problem faced by the military government was the nature of the Cuban economy. Two major cash crops, sugar and tobacco sustained the Cuban economy. Over half of the Cuban population was dependant on the success of the sugar industry for their livelihood. The war had devastated the sugar plantations but during Wood's first year as governor the security, stability, and infrastructure improvements the military government provided allowed the sugar plantations to recover. By the middle of 1901, one hundred and fifty-seven sugar plantations were in operation producing over 800,000 tons of sugar. This was almost three times the production in 1899.⁴⁴ With the plantations operating, the problem then became markets. Prior to the Cuban-Spanish war, Cuban sugar was in high demand in the United States. During the war, as Cuban sugar became unavailable, markets in the United States turned to domestic beet-sugar as an alternative. In 1901, when Cuban sugar returned to the marketplace, American protectionism blocked it from many of its former markets.⁴⁵ Wood realized that Cuba would never be economically viable without a market for its sugar. However, he was unable to overcome the protectionist sentiment in the American Congress. Eventually, it took a direct order from Secretary Root to cease lobbying for a reduced Cuban tariff to convince Wood that

140. Most of the school reforms implemented in the occupation were eroded over the decade after American supervision ceased as a result of poor administration, mismanagement, and lack of enforcement of rules and standards. *The American Review of Reviews*, "Cuba's Educational Vicissitudes," Volume XLI, No. 5 (May, 1910), 608–609.

⁴⁴ Elihu Root, "Report of the Secretary of War," November 27, 1901, *ARWD, 1901, Volume I, Part 1* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 39. Jessup, 296–298.

⁴⁵ Root, "Report of the Secretary of War," 1901, 51–52.

the effort to reintroduce Cuban sugar to the US market was in vain. This defeat left Cuba's economy weak and unstable.⁴⁶

General Wood's efforts in the area of law enforcement were much more successful than his economic policies. The Military Government modified police policy to create a standardized police force for the entire island. By the end of the occupation, a professional rural police force of 1,300 mounted men, armed with carbines enforced the law outside of municipalities. They were not a military force but a branch of the central government. The municipal police, who by the end of the occupation the local municipal governments funded and controlled, provided additional law enforcement within towns and villages.⁴⁷ Wood's administration was very successful creating conditions of law and order enforced by a professional, apolitical police force.

Comprehensive reform of the legal system proved to be a more difficult task than creating a police force. In 1899, Brooke made reforms that took the approach of making Cuba's Spanish based legal system less corrupt, while not changing it fundamentally. Under Wood's direction, the American government tried to convert the Cuban system, fundamentally based on Roman law, to a system based on Anglo-Saxon legal concepts. This proved difficult to do in the short run, and impossible in the long run. In the second year of the occupation, the Americans introduced the jury system and the concept of habeas corpus. Wood believed that fundamental change was essential because it was not possible to "establish a liberal government under Spanish laws." However, educated Cubans, upon whom the system had to rely, were satisfied with the existing system and more important, considered it a part of their cultural heritage. Thus,

⁴⁶ The Administration's inability to achieve a reciprocity agreement between the United States and Cuba had the potential to cause the economic ruin of Cuba after independence. However, changes in the sugar market factors caused the United States to agree to a treaty with the new Cuban government in 1903. Root, "Report of the Secretary of War," 1901, 51-53. Healy, 193-206; Lane, 109-111.

⁴⁷ Root, "Report of the Secretary of War," 1901, 36.

though army lawyers eventually wrote Cuba's legal code, there was no intellectual buy-in by the Cuban legal profession or the people.⁴⁸ This was one of the most significant failings of the Wood regime.

One of the successes of the occupation was in the area of health and sanitation. The vigorous sanitation efforts begun by Wood in Santiago and initiated by General Ludlow in Havana continued apace through Wood's tenure as Military Governor of the island. As independence approached Wood was very concerned that the Cubans would not continue the program after the Americans left. He felt its continuation was essential for two reasons. First, the army reduced the mortality rate in Havana by half during the occupation. Second, Wood believed that Havana was the source of many diseases that occurred in the southern United States port cities. Wood's concerns were such that he required that the Cuban constitutional assembly include a sanitation clause in the Cuban constitution.⁴⁹

Another very successful aspect of the occupation was the construction of and transition to Cuban civil rule. By the spring of 1900 General Wood was under orders to transition to civil rule as quickly as possible. This required a thorough understanding of the Cuban political situation. Cuban politics were quite complex after four-hundred years of Spanish colonial rule. Local political views divided into two ideological groups: liberal and conservative. The Cuban National Party represented the liberal movement. The poorer elements of society, the illiterate, and the veterans of the insurrection army were the major constituents of this group. The former officers of the Cuban insurrection army led it. The second group formed the Union Democratic Party made up of the planter class of Cubans, and the small middle class. This group was well

⁴⁸ Healy, 182–183; McCallum, 156–157;

⁴⁹ Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, Editors, *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916), 186–187.

educated, relatively prosperous, and favored close relations with the United States. The major important issue that separated the two groups was independence. The liberals favored total independence as soon as possible with no restrictions. The Union Democrats favored close ties to the United States, a slow controlled movement toward independence, and some advocated outright annexation by the United States. The dilemma that US officials had was that the best administrators, best educated, and most supportive of US policy were the Union Democrats. They were also the least popular. The occupation addressed the dilemma of how to guarantee American interests in a democracy that might not have the same interests in two ways. One was by controlling suffrage criteria. The other was through the Cuban constitution. The military government and the McKinley administration hoped that by including American priorities in the Cuban constitution and by managing the right to vote they could safeguard American interests in Cuba.

General Wood and Secretary Root understood that the fundamental ideology of the Cuban National Party was Cuban independence.⁵⁰ The American Administration did not believe that the Cubans as a political body were mature enough to handle independence and the great fear was that Cuban self- government would disintegrate into chaos similar to what had befallen the Haitian government after independence. Thus, American interests and those of the National party did not coincide. A technique used to control the strength of the National party was suffrage restrictions. The Americans unilaterally declared that the suffrage in Cuba was limited to adult males, 21 years or older, and who were Cuban natives or Spanish immigrants who choose Cuban citizenship. In addition, voters had to meet one of the following criteria: able to read and write; own more than 250 dollars worth of property; or had served honorably in the

⁵⁰ *The New York Times* "Manifesto Issued in Cuba," February 25, 1900.

Cuban insurrection army.⁵¹ The Americans hoped that these restrictions were sufficient to control the power of the National Party while at the same time remaining sufficiently democratic.

The first free elections in Cuba proved the Americans wrong. The military government supervised the first Cuban post-war elections, for municipal officers, on June 16, 1900. In the elections 110,816 of a pool of 150,648 registered voters participated. The 1899–1900 census located approximately 365,000 males over twenty-one years old, thus, about forty-one percent of adult males were eligible and about thirty percent participated.⁵² The elections were sufficiently democratic, but the election results did not go in favor of American policy. The National party won the bulk of the municipal leadership positions. Though there were isolated cases of fraud allegations, all provinces reported the elections peaceful.⁵³ The results of the election indicated to the Americans that a truly independent Cuba might not be submissive to American policies. Thus, to achieve the goal of the occupation, a Cuba aligned with US policies, required that the Americans influence the writing of the Cuban constitution.

Planning for the municipal elections of 1901 and the election of a constitutional assembly began immediately after the 1900 municipal elections. The Cuban people elected a constitutional assembly in the summer of 1900 and it began meeting that fall. General Wood gave the Cuban constitutional convention three objectives: frame and adopt a constitution, establish the relations to exist between the United States and an independent Cuba, and provide

⁵¹ Root stated his view plainly, insisting that “any people three quarters of whom are contented to remain unable to read and write, cannot for any long period maintain a free government.” Root quoted in McCallum, 158. Leonard Wood, “Civil Report of Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, United States Volunteers, Military Governor of Cuba, For the Period From December 20, 1899, to December 31, 1900,” January 1, 1901, in Leonard Wood, “Report of the Governor of Cuba on Civil Affairs, Volume 1, Part 1,” *ARWD, 1900, Volume 1, Part 11* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 36.

⁵² Based on the voting participation in Diego Tamayo, “Report of the Secretary of State and Government,” August 2, 1900, in Leonard Wood, “Report of the Governor of Cuba on Civil Affairs, Volume 1, Part 2,” *ARWD, 1900, Volume 1, Part 11* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 36; and McCallum, 164–165.

⁵³ *The New York Times* “Asks Cubans Not to Vote,” May 21, 1900; Wood, “Civil Report of Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, United States Volunteers, Military Governor of Cuba, For the Period From December 20, 1899, to December 31, 1900,” 52–53.

for the election and formation of a sovereign government. The Cuban assembly was not enthusiastic about the requirement to define the relationship between the United States and Cuba so the Americans took the lead in that area. The War Department, President McKinley, and the Congress consulted and agreed upon the desired relationship between the United States and Cuba. Secretary Root communicated the resulting policy to General Wood, and Congress codified it in the Platt Amendment.⁵⁴

The U.S. Congress passed the Platt Amendment as part of the War Department appropriations bill in February 1901. The amendment stipulated the relationship with Cuba and required its inclusion in the future Cuban constitution. The important part of the amendment allowed the United States to intervene in Cuban domestic affairs under conditions of unrest.⁵⁵ On June 12, 1901, the Cuban convention agreed to include the Platte amendment verbatim into the Cuban Constitution. National elections occurred in accordance with the constitution on December 31, 1901, and the people elected Tomas Estrada Palma President of Cuba. He took office on May 20, 1902 as the US military government disbanded. American occupation troops began reducing their presence in the country in the fall of 1901 and the last of the troops left in the summer of 1902. The only remaining troops after the summer of 1902 were those that were training Cuban artillerymen to operate the various coastal defenses.

⁵⁴ Bacon, 185–188.

⁵⁵ Although the amendment was credited to Senator Thomas C. Platt of New York, the policy it represented was really the agreed upon policy of the Republican congressional leadership, Secretary Root, and the President and his cabinet. The amendment had eight provision including: Cuba would not enter any treaties which might impair its independence; it will not incur and public debt; that the United States had the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence and protect “life, property, and individual liberty;” the acts of the military government would be ratified and maintained; that sanitation and disease control would continue; and Cuba would sell or lease to the United States property to establish a permanent naval base. “The Platt Amendment,” in *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949*, vol. 8, ed. C.I. Bevans (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), 1116–1117. The Platte Amendment and guidance to the military governor in Root, “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1901, 47–48.

At the end of the first American occupation, the Americans left after achieving some impressive results. The army supervised the establishment of the rule of law, including a completely reformed legal system and professional police force. Under army supervision, Cubans wrote a Constitution, held elections, and then installed a democratically elected President. In addition, impressive gains were made in health and sanitation and army doctors virtually wiped out yellow fever. Yet, some aspects of the occupation remained incomplete. Though the legal system appeared comprehensive, many Cuban legal professionals did not believe in its legitimacy. Also significantly, American protectionism prevented quickly revitalizing the Cuban economy, and Cuba's cash crop economy was not substantially altered leaving Cuba economically unstable. In addition, education reform had barely made any progress toward alleviating Cuban illiteracy which was inherently a long-term process. Thus, though it appeared as the Americans left that Cuba was a safe and functioning democracy allied to the United States, that appearance was merely a facade

The Army Returns: Occupation 1906–09

Soon after the American's departure, Cuba's situation deteriorated and the government bureaucracy began to fail. The Cuban government constructed under American occupation did not complete a single presidential term before it was beset by crisis. Cuban politicians focused on lining their pockets and rewarding their supporters. Individual leaders were more important than party unity. Within the municipalities, politicians used their authority and loopholes in the law to purge members of the opposition from positions of responsibility. Politicians replaced non-elected public officials, including trained teachers and police, with people who were politically loyal regardless of qualifications. Partisan politics and political favoritism took

precedent over public policy. Cuban politicians demonstrated almost no ability to compromise and arbitrate political differences.⁵⁶ The country steadily descended into political turmoil.

In 1905 Cuban President Palma stood for reelection in Cuba's first national election since the end of the US occupation. In preparation for the elections, Palma and his key advisors used the authority and control of the government to ensure Palma's reelection.⁵⁷ Corrupt government actions had the effect of pushing the opposition liberals into open revolt with the support of much of the population. Over six thousand rebels took to the field against the government. By September 1906 it was clear that the insurgents in Cuba had the initiative and that the only forces of the government, the Rural Guard police force, were insufficient to stop them. US President Theodore Roosevelt, partly based on the military advice of the army, was not inclined to support the Cuban government with American troops.⁵⁸ Both the insurgents and the Cuban government pursued strategies designed to encourage US intervention. The insurgents hoped to use the threat of military force to prompt US intervention and new elections; given fair elections, they were sure they could win.⁵⁹ President Palma hoped the US military would protect the government from attack. In September, President Roosevelt received an urgent message that the Palma government was about to fall. He ordered two US Navy ships

⁵⁶ Allan Millett, *The politics of intervention: The military occupation of Cuba, 1906–1909* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968), 44–53.

⁵⁷ Palma's Allies used violence, intimidation and threats, to ensure key election officials were loyal to the government. At election time, in both the fall municipal elections and the national elections on December 1, 1905, ballot stuffing was rampant. One moderate newspaper conceded that 432,000 Cubans had voted when the voting eligible population was not more than 300,000. Charles E. MaGoon, *Annual Report of Charles E. MaGoon, Provisional Governor of Cuba to the Secretary of War, 1907* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908), 10, 14; Millett, 51–52.

⁵⁸ President Theodore Roosevelt asked the War Department for its views and General J. Franklin Bell, the Army Chief of Staff, made it clear that intervening to support the government would require a massive military effort on the part of the army. *Ibid.*, 65–67.

⁵⁹ General Wood had envisioned that the Platt Amendment would serve as a tool to discourage instability in the Cuban government. Wood letter to Root, February 19, 1901, in Bacon, 187. Other observers had predicted just the opposite including Senator Joseph B. Foracker who predicted that political “outs” could rise in rebellion whenever an election did not work to their advantage and thereby ensure US intervention in the political process. In fact this is exactly what occurred in 1906. *Ibid.*, 42–43.

into Cuban waters. This action committed the United States to a military intervention in Cuba. Both sides of the Cuban conflict appeared to achieve their objective of US intervention.⁶⁰ The failure of the reforms of General Wood to actually create stable civil governance in Cuba resulted in the intervention by US troops four years later.

As political chaos developed in Cuba, President Theodore Roosevelt's first priority was avoiding involvement in a Cuban insurgency. Thus, along with the initial contingent of US Navy and Marine Corps troops he also sent a peace commission consisting of Secretary of War William Howard Taft and acting Secretary of State Robert Bacon. The peace commission's leaders were newcomers to Cuban politics. Secretary of War Howard Taft had previously served as the first civil Governor of the Philippine Islands before President Theodore Roosevelt selected Taft to replace Elihu Root in the War Department. Robert Bacon was the acting Secretary of State and an experienced businessman, but not an experienced diplomat. Veteran army Captain Frank McCoy, the former senior aid to General Wood, assisted the two secretaries. McCoy spoke fluent Spanish, and had significant experience in the Philippines and was an expert on Cuba.

Taft's initial analysis of the situation in Cuba was accurate: ideology was not an issue but rather the crux of the problem was the 1905 elections. He quickly determined that the Liberals who were revolting against the government were correct in that the Moderates had rigged the election. The peace commission found that the belief that the government under Palma took "recourse...to unlawful exercise of power and perpetration of gross injustice to the extent as to vitiate the elections ... was well founded." Even some Moderates admitted to the accusation.⁶¹ The motivation of the Moderates, as well as the Liberals, was not ideology but quite simply

⁶⁰ Ibid., 74–82.

⁶¹ McGoon, 1907, 8.

wealth and power that accrued to those who controlled the government. Taft's compromise was to void all election results, and conduct new elections under the supervision of a commission consisting of three moderates, three liberals, and one American. The moderates did not accept Taft's plan.⁶² On September 29, 1906, President Palma resigned from the office of President of Cuba. That night US Marines of the First Expeditionary Brigade under Colonel I.W.T. Waller landed and dispersed in company size units throughout the island to establish order, separate the insurgents from government forces, and protect American lives and interests.⁶³ Secretary Taft, as the senior representative of the United States and under the authority of President Roosevelt, proclaimed the provisional government of Cuba with himself as the governor of the island.⁶⁴

The second American occupation of Cuba and the new provisional government were quickly and effectively organized. The US military quickly disarmed the insurgent army and within weeks the army's twenty-five thousand members had returned to their homes. A handful of American army officers and the Marine brigade accomplished this sensitive task without encountering any problems. By the end of October, 1906, the 2,000 US Marines were augmented by the American Army of Cuban Pacification's seven army regiments totaling 5,000 troops. Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, the army Chief of Staff, came from Washington to be the initial commander, and 1,000 Marines remained under army command bringing the final total occupation force to 6,000 men. General Bell remained in Cuba until December 31, 1906, when

⁶² Ibid., 9.

⁶³ Thomas H. Barry, "Report Army of Cuban Pacification," August 31, 1907, *ARWD, 1907, Volume III* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907), 1907, 351.

⁶⁴ Taft claimed authority over all branches of the Cuban government as well as the rural guard and militia forces. He also suspended the Cuban congress and assumed all legislative power. The revolutionary Cuban Constitutional army and the Liberal political party supported the American move. The Moderate political party had no choice but to acquiesce to the American action MaGoon, 1907, 18.

he returned to his position as the army Chief of Staff. The command fell to Brigadier General Thomas H. Barry who took over February 16, 1907.⁶⁵

The goal of the second Cuban occupation was to reestablish Cuban civil government as quickly as possible. The mission of the Army of Pacification was to ensure the security required by the provisional government to achieve the United States' objective of political stability. Since there were no active hostilities when the army arrived, implicit in its mission was to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. The US national leadership put significant restrictions on the army executing its mission. The army's orders explicitly prohibited troops from engaging directly with the Cubans except in the extreme circumstance. Secretary Taft's orders to the army were very clear: "The President of the United States deems it of the utmost importance that the American forces do not engage in conflicts with Cubans, but that disorder by Cubans be suppressed by Cubans." General Bell later echoed this guidance directly to the troops "Troops are...not expected to take part in an active way in the suppression of disorder unless an extreme emergency arises ." The army expected local police and the Rural Guard to handle routine law enforcement.⁶⁶

On October 13, 1906, Charles E. MaGoon assumed the duties of provisional governor and Taft returned to his position of Secretary of War. MaGoon came to Cuba from his position as

⁶⁵ Barry was a very experienced campaigner. He graduated from West Point in 1877, and began his career with Hugh L. Scott and Franklin Bell, as a lieutenant on the frontier in the 7th Cavalry. He later transferred to the infantry branch and saw service as a brigade commander under Adna Chaffee in the China Expedition and then again under Chaffee as his Chief of Staff in the Philippines. Barry remained in command until the army left Cuba in the spring of 1909. Barry, "Report Army of Cuban Pacification," 1907, 313; *The New York Times* "New Yorker Takes Charge at West Point," August 28, 1910, SM9; "General T.H. Barry Dies in Washington," December 31, 1919; Barry retired in 1920 after achieving the rank of Major General and commanding all of the major US continental departments, serving as Superintendent of West Point (1910–1912) and commanding the Department of the Philippines (1914–1916), George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of US Military Academy at West Point New York Since Its Establishment in 1802*, Supplement, Volume VI-B, 1910–1920, Wirt Robinson, Editor (Saginaw, MI: Seemann & Peters, Printers, 1920), 236–237.

⁶⁶ Taft's order quoted in *The New York Times*, "Full Amnesty Granted to the Cuban Rebels," October 10, 1906, 3. Bell quoted in Millett, 123–124.

Governor of the Panama Canal Zone.⁶⁷ Though the *New York Times* reported MaGoon “will exercise all the power which was vested in Gen. Leonard Wood when he ruled Cuba under the title of Military Governor,” in fact he would not. The difference was that Leonard Wood was simultaneously the military governor and the military commander of the division of Cuba. In 1906, the Army of Cuban Pacification reported directly and separately to the Secretary of War. The army had the mission to support the efforts of the governor but the governor was not in the military chain of command. The only military forces that the governor commanded were the US Army officers detailed to his staff, the Cuban Rural Guard forces, and the small group of Cuban artillery forces. Fortunately, both General Barry and MaGoon were accommodating personalities, had a cordial relationship, and coordinated their activities. Most important, the military officers who were MaGoon’s senior assistants had personal and professional relationships with the leaders of the army forces and these relationships formed a strong bridge to General Barry and his staff.⁶⁸

When President Palma resigned so did all of his cabinet secretaries. As the Americans formed the provisional government, they promoted the chief clerks of the departments to acting secretaries. They also assigned a US Army officer as an advisor to each department. The

⁶⁷ MaGoon was a lawyer from Nebraska. He had served as a Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer in the Nebraska National Guard and that position brought him to the attention of the War Department. He left private practice and served in the law office of the War Department’s Bureau of Insular Affairs. There he became an authority on colonial law, and made a deep impression upon Elihu Root. He published the authoritative text on the subject entitled *Reports on The Law of Civil Government in Territories Subject to Military Occupation by The Military Forces of the United States* (1902). In 1905, Roosevelt appointed him both Governor of the Panama Canal Zone and Minister to Panama. The President summoned him from that position to Washington in September 1906 for an interview prior to appointment to his new position in Cuba. MaGoon, 1907, 9; *The New York Times*, “C.E. Magoon Dies; Once Ruled Cuba,” January 15, 1920; Charles E. MaGoon, *Reports on The Law of Civil Government in Territories Subject to Military Occupation by The Military Forces of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903).

⁶⁸ *The New York Times*, “MaGoon’s Powers Plenary,” October 6, 1906, 10. The shared West Point and regimental associations between the professional army officers was a key to this relationship. For example H.T. Slocum, supervisor of the rural guard, had been a fellow lieutenant with General Barry in the 7th Cavalry in the early 1880s; Colonel W.M. Black, Chief of the of the public works department was a USMA 1877 classmate of General Barry.

advisors were the de facto department heads and were a very experienced group of officers: Colonel E.H. Crowder supervised the Department of State and Justice,⁶⁹ Lieutenant Colonel E. St. J. Greble oversaw the department of government, Colonel W. M. Black supervised the department of public works, army doctor Major J.R. Kean headed the department of sanitation, Major H. J. Slocum supervised the police and armed forces; and Mr. J.D. Terrill of the US Treasury oversaw the treasury department. All of these officers were aggressive reformers and knowledgeable if not expert in Spanish language and culture. They had the dual tasks of administering their department's responsibilities while at the same time implementing administrative reforms and efficiencies.⁷⁰ The army detailed a total of twenty-nine officers to serve on the provisional government staff.⁷¹ From the standpoint of the long-term effects they

⁶⁹ MaGoon, 1907, 77. As under Wood's military government, the men chosen to fill the key billets on MaGoon's staff were some the best the army had to offer. Colonel Crowder, the most senior and probably the closest to MaGoon, was representative of the expertise and experience of the staff. Crowder graduated from West Point in 1881 and served on the frontier as a cavalry officer for the first ten years of his career. As a troop officer in the 8th Cavalry he participated in the Geronimo campaign as well as the Ghost Dance war in the Dakotas. During that time he became interested in law and educated himself well enough through self study to pass the Texas bar. Subsequently, he achieved a law degree from the University of Missouri. In 1891 he transferred to the judge advocate general (JAG) corps. In 1898 he was assigned to the American expeditionary force sailing to the Philippines. In the Philippines, he was tasked with reestablishing a civil legal system. He wrote the initial legal code of the Philippines and served as a member of the Philippine Supreme Court. In the process, he became an expert in Spanish law. When General MacArthur took command in the Philippines, he assigned Crowder as his military secretary. Crowder's responsibilities made him essentially the deputy military governor of the Philippines. In February 1904 he joined Captains Peyton March and John Pershing as a three man US observer group of the Russo-Japanese War. The group located with the Japanese command in Siberia. He returned from this 18 month mission in the summer of 1905 for a year's duty in Washington before going to Cuba. Crowder's military career would end at the rank of Major General and in the position of the Army's Staff Judge Advocate General. Prior to World War I, he served on a diplomatic mission to the Fourth Pan American Conference in 1910. One of his major responsibilities in World War I was designing and supervising the writing and execution of the selective service act. General Crowder retired in 1919 after twelve years as the army's Staff Judge Advocate General. He returned to Cuba as US minister in 1920 and remained in that post until he retired from public service in 1927. See David A. Lockmiller. *Enoch H. Crowder, Soldier, Lawyer and Statesman* (Columbia, MO: The University of Missouri Studies, 1955).

⁷⁰ H.J. Slocum had been a senior advisor had an extensive frontier career with the 7th Cavalry where he served with Merrill, Benteen, Bell, and Scott. He was General Wood's senior advisor to the rural guard from 1900–1902. He was infamously the commander of the 13th Cavalry which was raided by Pancho Villa at Columbus New Mexico in 1916. Kean would be promoted to the rank of brigadier general and head the US ambulance service in World War I.

⁷¹ Barry, 1907, 352.

may have had on Cuban administration, they may have been too competent because after their departure no Cuban official would match their zeal and expertise.

Economic improvement reflected the effectiveness of the overall American response to the Cuban revolt. There was a fear that the revolt would cause a credit crisis that would be fatal to Cuba's agricultural economy. A drought added to the potential ill effects of the revolt, as did a devastating hurricane that hit the island in late October 1906. Surprisingly, the sugar crop of 1907 was good. In addition, the treasury receipts of 1907 were significantly higher than those of 1906. Though the provisional governor attributed the solid economic performance to "the marvelous productiveness of the island," the lack of an economic impact was more likely the result of the real and perceived stability and the elimination of bureaucratic corruption that followed the robust US military intervention.⁷²

The major economic issue that faced the provisional government was that of unemployment. This problem was the same that had faced the Spanish colonial government and the previous military government of General Wood. The labor cycle of the sugar industry that left 75 percent of sugar workers unemployed for six months of the year, June to November, caused the chronic unemployment. American leaders recognized that the high unemployment was not only an economic issue but also a political stability issue. The solution, as it was under Wood, was a robust public works program. The army officer who was the supervisor of the public works department was Colonel William M. Black. Colonel Black had been the chief of public works in Havana under General Ludlow and then the Chief Engineer in the division of Cuba under General Wood. He was intimately familiar with all aspects of engineering work on the island, knew what needed doing and how to do it. Under his supervision, the provisional

⁷² MaGoon, 1907, 31–35.

government pursued a vigorous public works program. The central focus of the program was road building. Black and the officers and men of the army's 2nd Engineer battalion planned, organized and supervised this work.⁷³

The top priority of the American Administration was fixing the flaws in Cuba's governmental structure. One of the causes of the corrupt 1905 elections and the 1906 revolt was flawed laws or lack of laws. After the departure of the US Army in 1902, the Cuban legislature failed to pass many of the laws necessary to implement the 1902 Cuban constitution. In addition, the Cuban Congress failed to pass routine laws necessary for the government to operate. In three of the five years between 1902 and 1906 it failed to pass a budget. Much of the limited legislation that did pass was nothing more than government handouts to important constituencies. The constitution allowed, in the absence of law, that the President could issue decrees with the force of law. This was an aspect of the constitution that was exploited by President Palma, and combined with the ineffective legislature, effectively gave the President legislative power. Palma exploited this legal power to facilitate his reelection and it was one of the key causes of the revolt of 1906.⁷⁴

To fix the systemic problems in the Cuban system of government MaGoon formed an "advisory law commission" headed by army Colonel E.H. Crowder. It consisted of eight Cubans and three Americans. The mission of the commission was extensive. Governor MaGoon ordered it to prepare new electoral law, municipal and provincial laws, judiciary law, civil service law, law covering national administration and the executive organization, and laws covering the armed forces. The intent was to compensate for the lack of laws produced since

⁷³ Colonel Black achieved the rank of Major General and was the army Chief of the Engineers during World War I. He was a recognized expert on engineering waterways and harbors. As the Chief of Engineers, he supervised the growth of army engineers to a force of over 300,000 men during the war. He retired from the army in 1919. Cullum, 1920, 224–225; MaGoon, 1907, 85–86; Barry, 1907, 315.

⁷⁴ MaGoon, 1907, 21–22, 60–65.

1902, create an apolitical civil service, and to facilitate the effective functioning of the legislature in the future. Crowder's committee produced the required codes in a timely manner and Governor Magoon then activated them through proclamation.

Prior to the new scheduled provincial government elections, the terms of officials elected in 1903 and 1905 ended. Because no Cuban citizens were acceptable to all of the Cuban political parties, Governor MaGoon appointed army officers as provincial governors for the last several months of the occupation. These army officers were Captain George W. Read in Pinar del Rio, Major Frederick S. Foltz in Havana, Captain Edmund Wittenmyer in Matanzas, Major William Beach in Santa Clara, Major Wallis O. Clark in Camaguey, and Captain Andrew J. Dougherty, Oriente. Most of these officers came from the group advising the Rural Guard. Once again, the military government was fortunate in recognizing administrative and leadership talent and putting it in positions of responsibility. Of the six provincial governors, four would serve as generals commanding army divisions in the American Expeditionary Force in France during World War I.⁷⁵

The government held municipal elections on August 1, 1908. The results were successful from an American point of view. The elections went smoothly and no violence occurred. The government prohibited military forces, Cuban or American near the polls except one police officer who had to remain 25 meters from the poll and direct traffic. In the national elections in November, 1908, Liberal Party presidential candidate Jose Miguel Gomez and vice-president candidate Alfredo Zayas won approximately 60 percent of the popular vote and all 107 electoral

⁷⁵ Charles MaGoon, *Report of the Provisional Governor of Cuba, From December 1, 1907 to December 1, 1908* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), 41. Frederick Foltz (USMA '79) commanded the 91st Division; William D. Beach (USMA '79) commanded the 88th Division; George Read (USMA '83) commanded the 30th Division and the II Army Corps; and Edmund Wittenmyer (USMA '87) commanded the 7th Division. Cullum, 267, 270, 364, 481.

votes.⁷⁶ On January 28, 1909, the provisional governor turned over control of the government to the newly elected President Gomez. That afternoon Charles MaGoon sailed back to the United States on the battleship *USS. Maine*. The Army of Cuban Pacification returned to the United States over the next few months with the last troops of the 27th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Engineer battalion sailing on US Army transports on April 1, 1909.⁷⁷ The US Army viewed Cuba as a mission accomplished. Most parties were content with the results of the occupation. American politicians viewed Cuba as a political problem solved to the satisfaction of US, not Cuban, politics. The army officers serving in Cuba were not as optimistic. They recognized as historian Allen Millet noted, “stability without reform and institutional change brought no peace at all.”⁷⁸

Another Failure

The mission of the first US occupation of Cuba was to set up a stable function democracy supportive of US interests. That mission required an economic, a social, and a political transformation. What the United States did not want was an unstable strife-torn country that would require constant US attention. To achieve these goals the United States had to transform Cuban society. The country needed to eliminate the widespread illiteracy, clean up and sanitize the cities, eliminate corruption, and establish acceptance of the rule of law. Of equal importance was the economic transformation of the country. The United States had to solve the problems of

⁷⁶ The Moderates did very well in the municipal elections because two different liberal factions proposed candidates and divided the liberal vote, allowing moderates to win 28 of 82 mayor positions, and three of six province governorships. National elections occurred on November 14, 1908. The liberal parties, learning from their earlier mistake, united and dominated the national elections. MaGoon, 1908, 34–36, 45–51.

⁷⁷ Thomas H. Barry, “Report of the Army of Cuban Pacification,” April 1, 1909, *ARWD, 1909, Vol. III* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), 231–235.

⁷⁸ Millet, 267.

systemic unemployment and trade relations with the United States. As part of these solutions, the economic infrastructure of the country required dramatic improvement.

Given these goals for the first US occupation, the occupation was a failure. Had the occupation been a success US troops would not have reoccupied the country in 1906. General Wood's regime put in place many of the systems necessary to eventually achieve success: they built a robust school system with qualified staff, they created an apolitical police force, the country was rigorously sanitized and the threat of yellow fever was virtually wiped out, they reorganized the legal system to eliminate much of the graft, they dramatically improved the economic infrastructure by building roads and railways and improving ports, and they oversaw the writing of a fair constitution and overseeing free and fair elections. However, their failures were more important than their successes.

Several shortfalls of the military government contributed to future Cuban instability. The Americans failed to ensure that the Cuban legal system backed up the constitution. This contributed directly to the revolt and occupation of 1906. More importantly, the Americans reinforced Cuba's single crop economic system with its cyclic labor requirements. A single source economic system was not catastrophic if it was part of a larger cooperative economic system, however, a single source economic system for a nation state, particularly a source as volatile and vulnerable to fluctuation as the sugar market, could not help but have important negative political impacts. Thus, one of the most important failures of the military government was not moving Cuba toward economic diversity, and not recognizing the future political problems associated with the sugar industry. The occupation actually reinforced the strength of the industry within Cuba.

Time also contributed to the American failure. The Americans based their reform efforts on a vision of a liberal, well educated, and economically diverse society that did not exist in Cuba. The Americans put in place the systems necessary to execute the processes of democratic society but the social and economic structures that were necessary for those systems to function were lacking. The first American occupation of three years was not sufficient time for new social norms to develop. The second occupation operated under similar and even more stringent time constraints. The result was a veneer of liberal democracy, represented in the institutions and laws created by the Americans that covered the corrupt socially segregated culture developed under Spanish colonial rule. Therefore, given the time circumstances, it is unlikely the American army could have done more than it did.

The American government did not envision the second occupation of Cuba as anything more than band-aid designed to eliminate an issue that had the potential to cause US domestic political problems. The objectives of the second occupation were to correct aspects of Cuban public administration that had resulted in the revolt of 1906 and to prevent civil war. It accomplished these objectives very well without delving into the deeper systemic problems of Cuban governance.

Regardless of the long-term success or failure of the American occupations of Cuba, in the short-term both occupations were viewed as successful missions and had a powerful impact on the army's view of occupations. They confirmed lessons learned in Reconstruction and on the frontier. The occupations of Cuba also taught the army new elements to consider when conducting occupation operations.

The occupation of Cuba illustrated the importance of several ideas and concepts regarding occupations learned in the occupation of the South or on the American frontier:

building democracy, law and order, education, respect for local institutions and culture, the primacy of civil policy, and the transition to civil rule. Wood and later MaGoon followed almost exactly the same process for building the Cuban government used in reconstructing democracy in the South. The priority placed on law and order created the emphasis on legal reform during both the first and second occupations. Army priority to school policy in Cuba reinforced the importance of education to building stable and lasting institutions in a post-conflict environment. While attempting to reform Cuban governance, the army often did not work within the cultural boundaries of Cuban society. This contributed to the lack of success in several instances. A major driver of Cuban policy was the US domestic scene. Cuban economic policy, annexation, and length of the occupation all were fundamentally influenced by US domestic policy. Finally, the desire for a quick transition to civil rule strongly influenced both occupations. In the first occupation, Secretary Root insisted on a quick road to Cuban independence. During the second occupation, military occupation occurred under the supervision of an appointed American civil governor. The emphasis on speedy transition may hurt the effectiveness of the occupation. The American's quick departure in 1902 occurred before any effort to validate the ability of the Cuban government to function. These six characteristics of the occupation of Cuba, though not universally successful in Cuba, became a model for an American way of occupation that persisted through the first half of the twentieth century.

Cuba illustrated the critical role of economics to occupation and governance mission accomplishment. The Cuban experience made clear the relationship between economic structure (the sugar industry and tariffs), labor, and political stability. The inherent instability of the sugar based economy was a direct contributor to political instability. Cuba demonstrated the

importance of synchronized and comprehensive military, political, and economic policy. Neither occupation command made an effort to fundamentally reform the Cuban economy.

Finally, the Cuban occupation, along with the concurrent Philippine experience, fundamentally changed the nature of American military service. Occupations required experienced officers willing to devote long years of service overseas to achieve the army's and the nation's objectives. Major Slocum, supervisor of police operations and the rural guard spent seven years in Cuba between 1899 and 1909. Colonel Crowder spent nine years overseas in that same period and would devote the bulk of the remainder of his professional life to the issues surrounding Cuban-American relationships. These types of overseas commitments by the American officer corps were a completely new requirement of the officer profession as it entered the twentieth century and were essential to success. Most of the key army leaders until the beginning of World War I were heavily involved in the Cuban occupations. General Chaffee, Brooke's chief of staff, and General Wood both left Cuba for important military government assignments in the Philippines and later became Chiefs of Staff of the army. Two of Wood's key staff officers, Tasker Bliss and Hugh Scott, also went on to service in the Philippines and served as Chiefs of Staff of the army. Chief of Staff General Franklin Bell personally led the initial troops of the second occupation. Thus, the Cuban occupations involved five future army Chiefs of Staff: Chaffee (1904–1906), Bell (1906–1910), Wood (1910–1914), Scott (1914–1917), and Bliss (1917–1918). Wood's aide, Lieutenant Frank McCoy also continued involvement in military occupation and governance assignments, served through World War II, and played an important role in the occupation of Japan. Partly through the experiences of these very senior leaders, Cuba became an important model for future army occupations.

Cuba represented a continuation of American army's professional experience in the unconventional post-conflict environment of military occupation operations. It confirmed many of the experiences of Reconstruction and the frontier while adding new requirements and new levels of complexity. Successful in the short-term, and the ultimate failure of the Cuban missions became apparent decades after the occupation ended. However, Cuban operations, for all their complexity and importance, were not the major focus of the Army in the first decades of the twentieth century. That focus was on another occupation operation also stemming from the Spanish-American War but posing greater physical and operational challenges a half a world away. That operation was the occupation and governance of the Philippine Islands.

CHAPTER 5 - Military Government in the Philippines, 1898 to 1913

The American military government experience in the Philippines exposed the majority of the US Army to occupation operations. It was an extremely complex and difficult governance mission because it required the army to govern and fight simultaneously. Many of the characteristics of the occupation of the Philippines were common to the army experiences in Reconstruction, on the frontier, or in Cuba. These included the lack of clear strategic guidance, emphasis on building democracy, quick transition to civil rule, an emphasis on education policy, a focus on health and sanitation, and the requirement to adapt to local cultural norms. Also, like the other army experiences, operations in the Philippines neglected economic development. The Philippine occupation also revealed some unique aspects of military governance. One unique characteristic was the length of the army's involvement, which at fifteen years was considerable. Another unique aspect of the Philippine experience was that the army fought a skillful and determined insurgency at the same time as it was attempting to govern, and therefore the military government operations became part of the strategy to overcome the insurgent.

The army's governing experience in the Philippines divided into four distinct phases: limited governance during the occupation of Manila prior to the Treaty of Paris, governance during the conduct of the war under Generals Otis and MacArthur, military governance support of Governor Taft and the Philippine Commission, and military government of the Moro Province from 1903 to 1913. The purpose of military governance was in every case to create conditions such that the army could turn over the governance mission to the American civil authorities.. Operations began upon the arrival of US ground forces in the summer of 1898, and continued

with greater and lesser US military involvement until 1913 when the US military's involvement in the civil rule of the islands ceased. During this time the military governors frequently commanded combat operations at the same time they conducted the governance mission.

Limited Governance Operations

The army's occupation prior to open hostilities with the Philippine Revolutionary Army set the pattern for the governance after the war began. On May 4, 1898, President McKinley ordered the American army to deploy to the Philippines in response to Admiral George Dewey's request for reinforcement. Within days, the force began assembling and training at the Presidio in San Francisco.¹ The army ordered Major General Wesley Merritt to lead the American Expeditionary Force to the Philippines and organized his command as the Department of the Pacific.² Like the Reconstruction experience and General Brooke in Cuba, Merritt received little guidance from President McKinley regarding his mission in the Philippines. He met with President McKinley as he traveled from his old headquarters in New York to his new command assembling in California. The President's instructions to Merritt were to destroy Spain's military capability in the Philippines and to ensure order and stability in the island areas under American control.³ At the time, though active operations in Cuba were over, Spain and the United States were still formally at war. Thus, Merritt's only obvious mission was to defeat Spanish land

¹ Correspondence from President McKinley to the Secretary of War, May 4, 1898, *Correspondence Relating to The War With Spain, Volume 2* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1993), 635.

² Merritt was an old cavalry officer who had been one of the boy generals of the Civil War and though he had no experience with Reconstruction, he was a protégé of Phil Sheridan. After the Civil War he served briefly on General Sheridan's staff in Chicago before assuming command of first the 9th and then the 6th Cavalry during frontier operations. As the commander of the 6th Cavalry he was on intimate terms with men such as Charles King, Adna Chaffee, and William Carter. His other assignments included commanding the United States Military Academy at West Point from 1882 to 1887, command of the Department of the Missouri, and command of the Department of the East. He had been in this latter command only a few weeks when the army ordered him west to lead the expedition to the Philippines. *The New York Times*, "General Wesley Merritt," May 29, 1898.

³ Charles Burke Elliot, *The Philippines To the End of the Military Regime* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1916), 423.

forces in the Philippines. McKinley had not established short or long-term policy regarding the final disposition of the Philippines and so Merritt sailed with little useful political guidance.

The first American army forces arrived in the Philippines on June 30, 1898 under the command of Brigadier General Thomas Anderson and they immediately became involved in the political affairs of the islands. These troops were part of the 2nd Division of the VIII Corps—a subordinate command of the Department of the Pacific. Over the next two months, additional troops arrived and by the end of August the total US Army strength in the Philippines was over 15,000 troops.⁴ General Anderson, the first senior army commander on the scene, met with Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the Philippine revolt against Spanish rule, soon after arriving. Anderson avoided making any formal commitments toward the rebels or articulating any policy on behalf of the US government. General Merritt arrived in late July and established his department command as the senior army command in the Pacific. US troops joined the Philippine Revolutionary Army surrounding the Spanish army garrison defending Manila. On August 13, after secret negotiations with the Spanish commander of Manila, which did not include Filipino participation, US troops attacked by themselves and captured the city. The Spanish offered only token resistance. US troops occupied Manila and the Spanish-American war in the Philippines was essentially over. The relationship of the American military to the Filipino population and the Philippine Revolutionary Army remained at issue. While Americans occupied Manila, Aguinaldo's army surrounded them.

Two weeks after the fall of Manila, on August 29, 1898, General Merritt was relieved of command of the Department of the Pacific at his own request by his deputy Major General

⁴ Elwell S. Otis, "Annual Report of Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, USV., Commanding Department of the Pacific and Eight Army Corps, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands," August 31, *Report of Major General E.S. Otis on Military Operations and Civil Affairs in the Philippine Islands. 1899* (Henceforth, Otis, 1899) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 3.

Elwell S. Otis. Otis had served as the deputy to the Department Commander and as the commander of the VIII Corps. Otis became the new Department Commander but did not relinquish his command of VIII Corps. Merritt may have believed as he left the Philippines that the major fighting portion of the war was over and that all that remained was the inglorious task of setting up the US administration. If he did, he was very wrong.

Though a decorated Civil War veteran, the new commander General Otis had a strong scholarly bent.⁵ After graduation from Harvard law school, he specialized in army Indian policy and in 1878 outlined his views in a book, *The Indian Question*.⁶ After assuming command of forces in the Philippines, he directed military operations on the islands and constructed the initial framework of military government. Historian Stuart Miller described him as a “fastidious, pompous, and fussy man who inspired few of his subordinates.”⁷ Though recognizing his faults, historian Brian Linn was more charitable when he described the commander having “formidable intellect, legal training, reforming interests, and managerial experience.”⁸ Otis proved to be a cautious but competent commander to whom no detail was too small to warrant his personal attention. He was a frustration for his more aggressive field

⁵ General Elwell S. Otis, like Merritt, began his career in the Civil War where he received two awards for gallantry and was wounded. After the war, he spent the bulk of his service on the frontier. Unlike Merritt, Otis was not a West Point graduate, but had graduated from the University of Rochester and then Harvard Law School. He had risen to command the 20th Infantry Regiment in 1880 and in 1893, the army promoted him to brigadier general. From 1881–1885 he was the first commandant of the army’s new School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1893, he commanded the Department of Columbia and then prior to his assignment to the Philippines, the Department of Colorado. General Otis’ career is summarized from William H. Powell, *List of Officers of the Army of the United States from 1779 to 1900* (New York: L.R. Hamersly & Co., 1900), 514; Stuart Creighton Miller, “Elwell S. Otis (1838–1909),” Benjamin R. Beede, Editor, *The War of 1898 and US Interventions, 1898–1934: An Encyclopedia* (New York: Taylor and France, 1994), 390–393; Thomas F. Burdett, “A New Evaluation of General Otis’ Leadership in the Philippines,” *Military Review* (Vol. LV, January 1975, No. 1), 79–90.

⁶ Elwell S. Otis, *The Indian Question* (New York: Sheldon and Company, 1878).

⁷ Stuart Creighton Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 46.

⁸ Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 29. Former Philippine Commission member Charles Elliot supports Linn’s view writing in 1916 “but when all the difficulties are taken into consideration every fair-minded and unprejudiced person will now concede that his administration was reasonably successful.” Elliot, 481–482.

commanders, but gave them sufficient guidance and support, and allowed them enough freedom of action that their military operations were generally very successful. He rarely left Manila, and devoted the greater portion of his energies to the management tasks required of his role as Military Governor of the Philippines—a role for which his legal training and study of native American issues uniquely qualified him.

The situation that Merritt left Otis was very complex and volatile. Military opposition aside, the characteristics of the Philippine archipelago presented a significant challenge to military occupation operations. The geographic size of the islands, about 115,000 square miles—similar to the state of Arizona, was not particularly daunting to the American army. The most obvious geographic challenge was that the Philippines consisted of over 600 individual islands. Of these, eleven were of geographical importance and two, Luzon and Mindanao, together were larger than the rest of the archipelago combined. Both Luzon and Mindanao had significant mountain ranges and all the major islands had mountainous interiors. Thick forests covered most of the mountains and highlands. Virtually no road networks existed on the islands and the only railroad was a hundred and twenty-five mile track from Manila north to Malolos.⁹ The climate also challenged the Americans. It varied significantly depending on location but was generally tropical and therefore hot and wet. Typhoons, earthquakes and floods were a constant threat. Weather and the potential for natural disasters were obstacles to economic development and army efforts to govern the islands effectively.¹⁰

⁹ John Foreman, *The Philippine Islands: A political, geographical, ethnographical, social and commercial history of the Philippine Archipelago* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906), 13–14.

¹⁰ As the 1903 handbook for the Philippine Exhibition stated: “almost any statement concerning climate and health conditions of the Philippines is untrue.... Altitude ... exerts a greater influence on temperature than latitude, and while the cities and towns on the tidewater suffer from the debilitating influence of heat and humidity, the highlands of the interior enjoy a clear, cool, bracing climate. The climate of the Philippines as a whole is tropical, [and] no tropical islands in the world enjoy a better climate than do the Philippines.” Most of the archipelago was subject to southwest monsoons that created a wet season that lasted for six months from the end of

The most significant challenge to occupation operations was the island's large and very diverse population. It took the army over a year to acquire a general idea regarding the population size and composition, and several years to form an accurate accounting.¹¹ It was not until 1903 that conditions permitted the Philippine Commission to conduct a detailed formal census. The results of that census indicated that the population of the Archipelago was 7,635,426, more than four times the size of Cuba. Of that number, the Americans considered approximately seven million "civilized," while they classified the remaining as "wild people." The bulk of the population considered civilized was foreign born or Roman Catholic natives. Roman Catholic natives made up 91 percent of the population. The wild people were either aboriginal tribes or, in the case of about three-fifths of the total, tribal Muslims. The Muslim population, known collectively as Moros, totaled approximately 278,000, or less than four percent. The vast bulk of the population, Christian and Moro, shared a common Malaysian ethnicity. Forty-six percent of the adult male population was literate or partially literate. The three largest tribes were the civilized Visayan (central islands), Tagalog (southern Luzon and Mindoro), and Ilocano (northern Luzon) tribes who made up forty-two, nineteen, and eleven percent of the population respectively. Spanish was the language of the educated classes and the

April 1 through November. This season could completely preclude major military operations. The rainy season turned rivers into raging torrents that were unfordable and could destroy bridges. Travel overland in the rainy season was difficult at best. The average number of rainy days on Luzon in the years 1881 to 1883 was 203. With the monsoons came regular typhoon storms that could cause significant damage to agriculture and infrastructure as well as result in the loss of life. Other natural geographic threats also existed in the islands including volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. Major earthquakes took place in 1892, 1894, and 1897. The 1897 quake caused a tidal wave that caused great destruction on the island of Leyte and swept away a major portion of Tacloban, the capital of the island. The Philippine Exposition Board, *Official Handbook of the Philippines and Catalogue of the Philippine Exhibit*, vol. 1 (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1903), 57. Foreman, 22–23.

¹¹ General Merritt was under the impression that the population was about fourteen million while General Miles, Commanding General of the Army, thought it was about half that number. Merritt to Adjutant General, May 17, 1898, and Miles to the Secretary of War, May 18, 1898, in *Correspondence*, 648–649.

American census estimated that less than ten percent of the population could speak Spanish.¹² Based on ethnicity, customs, and linguistics, the Philippine Commission expressed the initial impression of the Americans when it noted, “the masses of the people are without a common speech and they lack the sentiment of nationality. The Filipinos are not a nation, but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and peoples, and their loyalty is still of the tribal type.”¹³ The assessment was essentially correct and complicated the task of governing the islands immensely.

When General Merritt left, Otis faced a large and potentially dangerous enemy, a precarious military position, and had only vague guidance from the President regarding ultimate US policy. Otis walked a diplomatic and legal tightrope throughout the fall of 1898, attempting to remain on cordial relations with the revolutionary government of Emilio Aguinaldo, while at the same time making no commitments or rendering any opinion on future US policy. General Otis described this period before the ratification of the Treaty of Paris as a “period of quiet, in so far as strictly military affairs were concerned, [but] the labors of civil administration were very exacting.”¹⁴ During this period, the United States established administration over the city of Manila and implemented many of the policies that would later characterize US government operations throughout the islands.

After the capture of Manila from Spanish forces in August 1898, the American command assumed the responsibility under the laws of war for the administration, health, and well-being of the population of over 200,000. The military command had no specific preparation for this

¹² J.P. Sanger, *Census of the Philippine Islands*, vol. II (Washington, D.C.: United States Bureau of the Census, 1905), 15–16, 49, 46, 78.

¹³ Among the population in 1903 the census identified twenty-four major tribes distinguished by different customs and language. Within the major tribal divisions were numerous sub-divisions, each speaking their own dialect. The census counted literacy regardless of which language the individual had capacity in. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, Volume. I* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), 189.

¹⁴ Otis, 1899, 44.

significant responsibility. In assuming control of Manila, the command faced the immediate problems of law and order, sanitation, and commerce. During the initial occupation, until February 1899 and the ratification of the Paris Peace Treaty, the American military considered Filipinos to be Spanish Citizens whose citizenship was in abeyance.¹⁵

The law and order problems of Manila were significant. There was no police force and no court system. In addition, elements of Aguinaldo's revolutionary army had a presence inside the city, as well as the sympathy of the city populace. General Otis responded by placing the VIII Corps Provost Marshal, Major General Robert Hughes in command of the city.¹⁶ Hughes commanded three volunteer infantry regiments that formed the city provost guard. Otis ordered the three-thousand man guard "to check the demonstration of the natives and preserve order within Manila."¹⁷ They also monitored access to the city, policed the streets, and administered the prison. The guard proved its effectiveness as it helped to quell any possibility of an urban uprising when Aguinaldo's forces and the Americans went to war in February 1899.¹⁸

By October 1898, courts were again operating in Manila. These were Spanish courts, operating under US supervision and enforcing Spanish laws in accordance with traditional local rules of jurisprudence. However, the Spanish judges gradually refused to work under the US military government and the local courts closed. Initially, the military government replaced them with military commissions.¹⁹ Eventually, the army reorganized the entire judiciary system and staffed it using a combination of American officers and native Filipinos.

¹⁵ Letter from Henry Cabell, Military Secretary to General Otis, to Major R.B.C. Bement, Collector of Internal Revenue, September 21, 1898, *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1899, 93.

¹⁸ On February 22, 1899 Aguinaldo's sympathizers inside the city sponsored a riot against American control. It was quickly and efficiently put down by the provost guard. *Ibid.*, 108–110.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 36.

A major concern of the American command was health and sanitation. The American command viewed Manila, because it had no sewer system, as particularly susceptible to disease. Army Chief Surgeon Major Frank S. Bourns established and led a city Board of Health. It was composed of both prominent Filipino and American health experts. The Board appointed municipal health boards and established a free clinic staffed with doctors and midwives for the poor.²⁰ The provost guard backed up sanitation inspectors who rigorously enforced health and sanitation regulations. The sanitation department operated under the supervision of the Provost Marshall and immediately began a general clean up of the deplorable conditions in the city. The department increased its employees from 240 to 520.²¹ Small pox broke out among the Spanish army prisoners and the Board of Health vaccinated all of the 13,000 prisoners in three weeks. By January 1899, the vaccination of the command against small pox was complete and the medical officers began a program to vaccinate the civil population.²² The army also tackled venereal disease. Army doctors inspected prostitutes weekly and issued certificates if they were disease free.²³ The effective work of the sanitation board, supervised by the Provost Marshal, ensured both the health of the command and the city population. Manila became the model for health and sanitation policy wherever the army subsequently established garrisons in the islands.

General Otis recognized that the Manila school system was an important stabilizing and legitimizing organization within the city. It was not operating when the Americans occupied the city. The command gave Captain William D. McKinnon, chaplain of the 1st California Volunteer Regiment, responsibility for operating the schools. Chaplain McKinnon was a Roman Catholic priest who had experience with school systems having managed a 500-pupil orphanage

²⁰ John Morgan Gates, *Schoolbooks and Kraggs: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 58.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

²² Otis, 1899, 93.

²³ Gates, 58.

and school in California before volunteering for military service. His status as an American Roman Catholic priest created a bridge for him to reach out to the former sectarian Spanish school officials and employees, and allowed him to separate his new secular school system from the influence of the Spanish friars. McKinnon, with Otis's strong support, sanitized and repaired school facilities, reorganized the administration, recalled old faculty and recruited new teachers (including American soldiers), and revised and updated the curriculum. In ten months, McKinnon created a school system that included 32 separate schools and enrolled 4,800 children. Both McKinnon and Otis understood that the creation of the democratic institutions in the Philippines relied on the creation of an educated electorate.²⁴ Manila served as model for the expansion of the American school system as the control of the military government expanded.

The army's provost marshal governed the city of Manila for three years very effectively. By the time the army returned the city to civil control it had a functioning judiciary, was one of the most sanitary cities in Asia, operated effective municipal police and fire departments, and was the center of commerce for the archipelago. On August 7, 1901, the army provost marshal-general turned over responsibility for the approximately 250,000 people of the city to a civilian municipal board appointed by the Philippine Commission. General George W. Davis, then the Provost Marshal, also passed the board a draft charter for administration of the city, modeled after the charter used to administer Washington D.C.²⁵

While the American Provost Marshal focused on securing and governing the occupied city, General Otis focused on controlling the strained relationship with the Philippine revolutionary government and Aguinaldo. The tense situation culminated in December 1898

²⁴ V. Edwin McDevitt, *The First California's Chaplain* (Fresno, CA: Academy Library Guild, 1956), 101. Gates, 60–61.

²⁵ Philippine Commission, "Report of the Philippine Commission, in Two Parts, Part 1," *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901* (Henceforth *ARWD, 1901*), Volume I, Part 8 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 28.

when the US government announced the results of the Paris Peace Treaty formally ending the war between the United States and Spain. This treaty relinquished Spain's sovereignty over the Philippines to the United States and confirmed that President McKinley's intent was to annex the islands. To the Filipino revolutionaries this policy was a declaration of war. Aguinaldo's forces did not immediately attack US forces, though Aguinaldo commented that the Philippine "government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands."²⁶ Aguinaldo's restraint was at least partly due to the fact that the ratification of the treaty by the US Senate was far from certain.²⁷ From the beginning, American domestic politics had a large influence on the actions of the Filipino revolutionaries.

The President's guidance to Otis as ratification of the treaty approached was very clear: avoid war. McKinley hoped to avoid war and wait out the insurgents. The President said:

Time given the insurgents can not injure us, and must weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent purpose and recognize that before we can give them good government our sovereignty must be conceded and unquestioned. Tact and kindness most essential at this time.²⁸

Though Otis understood McKinley's intentions, avoiding war proved to be impossible, and reconciling the Filipinos to American rule was problematic. Though McKinley was giving clear guidance, annexation and avoid war, the guidance was not attuned to the reality of conditions in the Philippines and of little use to Otis.

There was a sharp contrast between the President's guidance and military and geographic realities in the Philippines. The military shared part of the blame for the state of

²⁶ The details of how and why the President's proclamation of his intentions to annex the Philippines was mismanaged by the Philippine command are described in Otis, 1899, 65–67. For Aguinaldo's reaction see Otis, 1899, 76–78; Elliot, 446.

²⁷ A detailed description of the debate inside Congress over ratification is in Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at Century's Turn* (New York: History Book Club, 1960), 191–199, 230–231. See *The New York Times*, "Peace Treaty Opposition," January 19, 1899, "Debate in the Open Session," February 4, 1899, and "Senate Ratifies the Peace Treaty," February 7, 1899.

²⁸ Telegram McKinley to Otis, in Otis, *Report, 1899*, 79.

political affairs in the Philippines in February 1899. General Otis did little to diplomatically engage the opposing Filipino leadership on the peace treaty issue. He appears to have been completely ignorant of the fact that war was likely after ratification of the peace treaty. His communications to Washington were imprecise and vague. Overall, they gave the impression that although there was a radical group of insurgents that would oppose the United States, the vast majority of the people would not.²⁹ He also did little to make his superiors aware of the shortage of troops needed to accomplish his assigned tasks. Even if Aguinaldo's army did not declare war on the United States, there were not enough troops in Otis's command to relieve the Spanish garrisons and occupy the islands.³⁰

War came to the Philippines in February 1899 and greatly complicated the task of governing the islands. On the night of February 4, 1899, an altercation occurred between Philippine soldiers and US guards that produced a nightlong exchange of gunfire. By morning, the two armies were at war. On February 5, *The New York Times* declared "GAIN FOR THE TREATY; The Battle at Manila Expected to Aid Its Ratification." On February 7, 1899, the US Senate ratified the treaty and the Philippines became officially a part of the United States. The treaty was not overwhelmingly popular: the Senate approved the treaty by a margin of one vote.³¹ For the eight months following the San Juan bridge incident, the US Army's VIII Corps pursued the military forces of Aguinaldo throughout Luzon and the other islands —defeating them in every pitched battle. Finally, with his forces defeated and routed everywhere, Aguinaldo

²⁹ Otis sent an important telegram to the Adjutant General on January 8, 1899, describing the reception of the President's proclamation and the situation in the Philippines. The telegram sends mixed messages, but overall the tone was positive: "Peace maintained here and business active...." He followed up two days later with another message to Washington: "If peace kept for few days, immediate danger will have passed." Otis to Adjutant General, January 8, 1899, and Otis to Adjutant General, January 10, 1899, in *Correspondence*, 872, 876.

³⁰ Otis, *Report*, 1899, 61–62.

³¹ *The New York Times* "Gain for the Treaty," February 7, 1899. The complete treaty found in Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, Editors, *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916), xvii–xxiv.

issued orders in October 1899 to change tactics. Rather than meet the Americans in conventional combat, henceforth the Philippine Revolutionary Army would rely on hit and run guerrilla tactics and the ability to blend in with the population. The Philippine insurgents determined to make the occupation of the islands as difficult as possible and cause as many casualties as possible. This change in Filipino tactics was not immediately apparent to the US command. Otis returned to the United States in May 1900 thinking he had won the war against the Philippine Revolutionary Army, but in fact, he left his replacement, General Arthur MacArthur, with an unchecked insurgency.³²

Under Otis' command, US military forces in the Philippines had two separate missions. First, was the defeat of the insurgent forces resisting US government sovereignty over the islands. The second was governance operations designed to establish US sovereignty in practice throughout the islands. The first mission was the primary mission of the US military and was an absolute requirement for the success of the second mission.

Extending Military Government

The US Army officially began combat operations against the Filipino revolutionaries on February 7, 1899. Otis focused his initial military operations on Luzon. Almost immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, he launched his forces north to destroy the revolutionary army. Through the spring of 1899, the Americans pursued and defeated the revolutionary forces throughout northern and southern Luzon. By October of 1899, it appeared the campaign was over, and the Americans set about setting up a framework of government. The army divided the Philippines into four geographic district commands: Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayan,

³² It is not the intent to describe the military operations in the Philippines. Numerous accounts are available the best of which is Linn, *The Philippine War*.

and Mindanao and Jolo.³³ Each command was responsible for establishing local government, with the district commander also serving as the area military governor. Below the district level, subordinate military commanders became the military governors of towns and villages.

The major challenge for the commanders of Northern and Southern Luzon districts was that while they were attempting to establish governance, the Philippine Revolutionary Army began a dedicated insurgent campaign. This campaign complicated the governance task throughout 1900 and into the spring of 1901. The army effectively eliminated resistance in Northern Luzon, by early 1901. The capture of Philippine leader Aguinaldo in February 1901 greatly contributed to the end of resistance in the north. In Southern Luzon, the insurgents were not effectively pacified until the brutal Bentagas campaign led by Brigadier General Franklin Bell in the spring of 1902. By the summer of 1902 Luzon, the center of resistance to American rule, was under the effective control of the American army and President Theodore Roosevelt declared the end of active military operations in the Philippines.

American commanders recognized the relationship between their two mission tasks in the Philippines, pacify the country and establish governance. The insurgents had to be subdued in order for the work of governance to progress satisfactorily. To accomplish these two tasks the command under MacArthur pursued a two-pronged strategy. One aspect of the strategy was the policy of chastisement. This policy required the vigorous pursuit of guerrilla bands by the US Army. The other aspect of the strategy was the policy of attraction. The goal of this policy was to win the loyalty of the Filipino population through the demonstrated benefits of American governance.

³³ *Correspondence*, 1077, 1154.

Throughout most of 1900, the efforts of the American command to put their strategy in effect achieved only mixed results. The policy of chastisement suffered partly because initially the command put priority on the policy of attraction.³⁴ Local government by Filipinos was a central tenant of the policy of attraction.³⁵ As part of the attempt to reconcile with the insurgents, General MacArthur issued a general amnesty declaration in June 1900. It elicited little response from the insurgents who were in the midst of escalating their guerrilla campaign.³⁶ Throughout 1900, commanders found it exceedingly difficult to establish local government. There were several reasons for this. Despite establishing over 550 separate outposts, commanders did not have the resources to impose American rule everywhere.³⁷ A second reason was that not all commanders agreed that the Army's role should be to establish governance and therefore did not give the mission the priority it required. Finally, and most important, the guerrillas used violence and intimidation to actively frustrate the integration of the local population into the American government scheme.

The guerillas used a variety of methods to undermine American local governance and the policy of attraction. The local guerrilla commanders established shadow governments that used intimidation as well as the appeal of nationalism to gain support from the local population. The

³⁴ Military operations designed to eliminate the guerrilla forces faced numerous other challenges including terrain, the monsoon season that virtually stopped all campaigning, a shortage of troops, the loss of the experienced volunteer troops and their replacement with inexperienced regular army troops, and perhaps most frustrating, the inability to distinguish guerrilla fighters from civilians.

³⁵ President McKinley dispatched a group of distinguished civilians to the Philippines in 1899 to evaluate the situation and make recommendations to him regarding future policy toward the islands. The commission described an early vision for governance after annexation under the Treaty of Paris. The commission recommended that the Filipino people essentially rule themselves at the local level with centralized guidance provided by an American dominated central government in Manila. American civil servants were to coach the Filipinos into local government. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, Vol. I* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), 97–122.

³⁶ Text of Amnesty Message in *Correspondence*, 1177.

³⁷ David Prescott Barrows, *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines, 1903–1913* (New York: World Book Company, 1914), xii.

shadow governments built upon the existing Philippine social structure of relationships.³⁸ The leadership of the guerrillas was often well educated and had close personal ties to the local civil government leaders appointed by the Americans. Sometimes the shadow government used the same villagers placed in leadership positions by the Americans. This gave the guerillas phenomenal intelligence ability. It also allowed the guerrillas to use the civil population for logistic support and sanctuary. Insurgent control of the population facilitated continued attacks against American forces. The guerrillas ruthlessly dealt with villages that hesitated to support them, and leaders that appeared to favor working with the Americans.

The military governance mission, however, was not without some important successes in 1900. General Otis issued General Order No. 43 in 1899 directing commanding officers to establish municipal government as quickly as possible in all towns and villages under American control. That order was followed in 1900 by General Order No. 40, which gave more detailed instructions on forming municipal organization in larger towns and cities. Municipal organization occurred at a rapid pace throughout 1900. The Philippine commission, upon activation of its legislative authority, incorporated the army municipal plans, with additional adjustments into Act No. 132 in 1901. By the summer of 1901, over six hundred towns had functioning democratic municipal governments.³⁹

Education efforts expanded in 1900. General MacArthur, like Otis, believed that educating Filipinos was a critical step in the governance process as well as integral to the anti-guerrilla campaign. Education, according to MacArthur, was “an adjunct to military operations,

³⁸ Stanley Karnov, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 20–22.

³⁹ E.H. Crowder, “Appendix AA,” (Report of the Office of the Secretary to the United States Military Governor in the Philippines), September 26, 1900, “Report of the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands on Civil Affairs,” *ARWD*, 1900, Volume 1, Part 10 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), 28–30. *Philippine Commission Report, 1901*, 30–31; Gates, 131–133; Elliot, 519–520.

calculated to pacify the people and procure and expedite the restoration of tranquility throughout the archipelago.” Where Otis had encouraged schools, MacArthur more formally organized the educational effort under army Captain Albert Todd. During 1900, Todd enrolled over 100,000 students in almost one-thousand public schools, and distributed over \$100,000 for school supplies and materials.⁴⁰

Another important step in the governance task was the organization of a pro-American political movement by Filipinos. The establishment of the Federal Party represented this movement. Filipino intellectuals, some who had favored the Americans since 1898 and others who were former insurgents, populated the party. They organized the party formally in December 1900, and adopted a platform that unconditionally recognized US sovereignty while continuing to advocate for self-governance for the Philippines. Throughout 1901, they were a key element in convincing insurgents to surrender and in continuing the organization of local and provincial government.⁴¹

The counterinsurgency and governance missions did not achieve many noticeable successes in 1900, but that changed in 1901. Several factors came together in the fall of 1900 and the spring of 1901 that permitted the Americans to overcome the guerrilla hold on the population and gradually establish effective and loyal local government. General MacArthur recognized that the campaign in early 1900 had put too much emphasis on attraction and not enough on security operations.⁴² The reelection of Republican President McKinley over anti-imperialist Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryant in November 1900, eased pressure on

⁴⁰ Gates, 199. A comprehensive description of the army’s efforts organizing education in 1900 is in US Congress, Senate, Letter to Senate from the Secretary of War, *Education in the Philippine Islands*, January 26, 1901.

⁴¹ Arthur MacArthur, “Annual Report of MAJ. GEN. Arthur MacArthur, USV., Commanding Division of the Philippines, Military Governor in the Philippine Islands,” July 4, 1901, “Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, In Four Parts, Part 2,” *ARWD, 1901, Volume I, Part 4* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 114 – 125.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 91–92

the command to avoid controversial battles and casualties. MacArthur determined to cut off the relationship between civilian supporters and insurgents. He reissued the Civil War era General Order No. 100, which strictly regulated the behavior of civilians in time of war. As the first American civil governor of the islands, Howard Taft, later reported, “it ceased to be regarded as an innocent amusement to enjoy life within American garrisons and assist the guerrillas in the woods and mountains.”⁴³ McKinley’s reelection was a severe blow to the strategy and the morale of the insurgents whose leadership had declared that a Democratic victory was certain and would force a change in US policy. Finally, in March 1901 General Frederick Funston led a daring raid that captured the insurgent military and political leader Emilio Aguinaldo.⁴⁴ These factors led to unprecedented surrenders by insurgent forces, particularly in northern Luzon.

MacArthur’s more aggressive military campaign destroyed most of the guerrilla capability by the summer of 1901. All of northern Luzon, and much of southern Luzon was pacified, and pacification enabled commanders to focus even more on effective local government. The army pacified thirty of thirty-five provinces (the exceptions were Batangas, Samar, Cebu, Bohol, and Mindoro) by the time of MacArthur’s departure in the summer of 1901. As MacArthur left, the President appointed a civilian governor to replace him: William Howard Taft. Governor Taft’s priority was establishing civil government in the newly pacified regions.⁴⁵

During the two years when the army focused on operations in Luzon, it did not ignore the Visayan Islands. The Visayan Islands were a mixed collection of quiet islands and islands harboring determined insurgents. From the perspective of the command in Manila, it was a secondary theater. Many of the islands had virtually no insurgent movements. The Americans

⁴³ Andrew J. Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1945* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998), 136. Philippine Commission, 1901, 7.

⁴⁴ Messages relating to Aguinaldo capture in *Correspondence*, 1262–1263.

⁴⁵ Philippine Commission, 1901, 7–8.

governed the islands of Cebu and Negros with only slight and easily controlled interference from insurgents. On the island of Panay, the insurgents fought fiercely and the army responded with an equally brutal counterinsurgency campaign led by the department commander General Robert Hughes. By the end of 1900 the army completed the pacification of Panay. The two remaining main islands were Leyte and Samar. Governance and military operations on Samar, after it was determined that a significant insurgency existed, were set aside until after the pacification of Luzon. Leyte however, was the focus of an extensive and successful counterinsurgent campaign that balanced strict military operations and punishment of insurgents and their supporters, with democratic municipal government, schools, and material aid in towns and villages that supported the Americans. Major Henry T. Allen established himself as an effective administrator and combat leader in that campaign. Another officer described Allen's strategy as "treating the good man very well indeed and treating the bad man harshly."⁴⁶ The majority of insurgents on Leyte surrendered by May 1901.⁴⁷ Allen's abilities demonstrated in the campaign contributed to his later selection to organize and command the Philippine Constabulary —the new indigenous national police force.

American operations in 1900 and 1901 in the Sulu Archipelago were relatively limited. They consisted primarily of garrisoning the island of Jolo as well as the coastal region of northern Mindanao. The major population of the department was 300,000 Moro tribesmen. The Moros were traditional enemies of the Christian Filipinos and were not part of the anti-American insurgency led by Aguinaldo and his lieutenants. The Sultan of Sulu nominally governed the Moro population of the island of Jolo. The army pacified this portion of the population through

⁴⁶ Gates, 200.

⁴⁷ General Hughes' campaign on Panay is described in Linn, 241–254. The Samar insurgents were ultimately defeated in the difficult campaign of 1901–1902 under General Smith. Linn, 306–321. Linn describes the successful campaign on Leyte, 234–240.

the device of perpetuating the Spanish agreement with the Sultan.⁴⁸ The problem of the Mindanao Moros was more complex because their location was more remote and they did not share allegiance to a single sultan. The American solution to governing the northern Moro was relatively simple—ignore the problem until after the pacification of the Christian portions of the archipelago.⁴⁹

William Howard Taft arrived in the Philippines with the second Philippine Commission on June 1, 1900. An earlier commission served in the islands in 1899 as a fact-finding organization to make recommendations on policy to President McKinley. The new second commission, headed by Taft, had a different purpose. Taft's mission was to assume control of the governance task from the army and establish American civil government in the Philippines. The Americans accomplished this in two phases. In September 1900 the Commission assumed legislative authority over the islands. During this phase, executive power continued to reside with the military governor, General MacArthur. Over the next two years, the Commission, in its legislative capacity, passed 449 laws.⁵⁰ In the summer of 1901, as MacArthur departed, the president of the commission, Taft, took over executive responsibility from the army as well.

⁴⁸ The two sides agreed on this new American understanding with the Sultan of Sulu, known as the Bates Agreement, on August 20, 1899. It essentially permitted the Sultan to continue as the leader of the southern Moros. It allowed him authority over all internal Moro matters and identified him as the sole representative of the Moro population on Jolo. It also, similar to his agreement with Spain, paid him a stipend for his loyalty and service to the American government. Brigadier General John C. Bates, later Commander of the Military District of Mindanao and Jolo, negotiated the agreement with the Sultan of Sulu. President McKinley approved the agreement October 27, 1899. See *Correspondence*, 1058, 1074–75, 1117–1118. A complete discussion of the Bates agreement negotiated by General J.C. Bates is contained in Robert A. Fulton, *Moroland: The History of Uncle Sam and the Moros, 1899–1920* (Bend Oregon, Tomalo Creek Press, 2009), 41–70.

⁴⁹ The bulk of the Mindanao Moro population lived in the interior of Mindanao. Mindanao was the second largest island in the archipelago and the Spanish had made little effort to penetrate into the island's interior. The Moros on Mindanao did not share recognition of a single Sultan. Instead, numerous tribes existed. Each tribe owed its allegiance to a datu, or local chief. Datus vied with each other for power and formed temporary local alliances. Tribal affiliations were relatively loose and broke apart and reformed based on the dominant personalities of the datu.

⁵⁰ In the first year the Commission passed numerous appropriation bills, a municipal code, a provincial law, a school law, an accounting system law, acts organizing the various bureaus of the commission, acts organizing the civil service corps, and a code of civil procedure for the islands. Philippine Commission, 1901, 9; Barrows, xiii.

General MacArthur's replacement, General Adna Chaffee, veteran of Reconstruction, the frontier and Cuba, became the commander of the Philippine Division. Chaffee reported directly to the Secretary of War, as did Taft, and had the mission of supporting Taft and the governance mission. On July 4, 1902, coinciding with President Roosevelt's declaration of the end of hostilities, the Philippine Commission reorganized under the general provincial government plan. As Governor Taft described it, "all the territory occupied by the Christian Filipinos, except a small district of Dapitan, the town of Zamboanga, the town of Cottabato, and the town of Davao, all in the island of Mindanao, was brought under civil government."⁵¹ As of the summer of 1902, the only responsibility the army had for governance in the northern islands was to support the civil constabulary when called upon. However, the army continued to have significant responsibilities for governance in the southern islands.

The Moro Era

The army and the Philippine Commission addressed the Moro population of the Philippines in a manner completely different from the policies enforced with the Christian population. The American Congress, while approving increased Filipino participation in governance and ultimately a Philippine Assembly, was skeptical of placing the non-Christian Filipinos under the control of the Christians. Thus, throughout the first decade of American governance, the largest non-Christian population, the Moros, remained exclusively under the supervision of the Philippine Commission, and largely, the army.⁵²

⁵¹ Howard Taft, "Report of the Civil Governor," November 1, 1902, Philippine Commission, "Report of the Philippine Commission, Part 1," *ARWD, 1902, Volume X* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), 14; text of the President's declaration in *Correspondence*, 1350.

⁵² In addition to the Moro Province, this applied to numerous small pagan populations the most important of which were the Igorot in central Luzon. The Igorot tribal lands were formed into the Mountain Province and had a population of several hundred thousand. The Philippine Commission took particular pains to protect the pagan tribes of the interior of Luzon, Mindanao and other locations from exploitation by both Christian Filipinos and Moros. Philippine Commission, 1901, 33–35; Barrows, 57–58.

The Philippine Commission understood that with the cessation of insurrection and the beginning of American civil rule in 1902, it was necessary to confront the control of the Moros issue. The Americans could not indefinitely neglect policy toward the Moro because of the Moro practice of slavery and their proclivity to raiding and piracy. The Americans all agreed that the practices had to be terminated. However, differences existed between the Americans in regards to strategy. Two camps existed: one advocated a “soft” approach that envisioned outlawing slavery, purchasing the freedom of existing slaves, and curbing piracy and raiding through alliances with the Sultan of Sulu and important datus on Mindanao. Taft articulated that strategy in 1901 when he indicated that “if...the taking or acquiring of new slaves is prevented, the question will settle itself in a generation without bloodshed or the bitterness necessarily engendered by an armed strife.”⁵³ Most army officers concurred with this view. The other, “hard,” strategy advocated using the army to free existing slaves, disarm the tribes, and arrest any group or individual who resisted or persisted in raiding and piracy.

The areas that were not incorporated into the civil structure established by the Philippine Commission in July 1902 were the largely Moro inhabited region of the Sulu archipelago. This included the important islands of Jolo and Mindanao. This area remained without a Filipino province governor and was controlled by the commander of the 7th Separate Army Brigade. In April 1902, President Roosevelt gave very specific instructions to the War Department that violence would be an absolute last resort in relations with the Moros.⁵⁴ Governor Taft

In June 1903 the Philippine Commission passed an act based on a draft by General George W. Davis, commander of the Mindanao-Jolo District. The act placed governance of the province under a six member commission headed by a governor. The province was divided into six sub-provinces, each headed by its own governor. The act also allowed that detailed army officers could fill executive positions. Barrows. 56–57.

⁵³ Philippine Commission, 1901. 37.

⁵⁴ *Correspondence*, 1330–1331.

considered the Moro issue too difficult to tackle given the problems facing the Americans building governance in the rest of the islands:

Meanwhile, I think it is wiser on the part of the Commission to postpone the consideration of the Moro question until we have passed legislation to meet needs that are more pressing throughout the northern part of these possessions of the United States. For a great many years to come there will be no question of popular government in the Moro country; the Moros do not understand popular government, do not desire it, and are entirely content with control of their dattos.⁵⁵

Taft was uncomfortable with the Moros. In his three years in the Philippines, he only visited the southern islands once. The Muslim tribesmen's culture was alien to the Americans and living conditions in the district were harsh. The lack of an educated Christian Filipino cadre upon which to build an indigenous administration made the prospects of quick progress in the district unlikely. Thus, the Philippine Commission largely focused its attention on the northern islands, and the southern Philippines remained a uniquely army problem.

During the insurrection period, to 1901, a series of officers commanded the army military district of Mindanao and Jolo and took a low-key approach to the Moro issue. Guided by the Bates Agreement, which left Moro upon Moro issues to the resolution of the Sultan of Sulu and the datus, and limited by military resources, the various commanders were content to curb piracy and raiding, eliminate such small elements of the Philippine Revolutionary Army that existed, and protect the non-Moro pagan tribes from exploitation.⁵⁶ The only situation where the Moros directly confronted the Americans and the US Army was on Mindanao in 1902, when the army

⁵⁵ Taft, 1902, 15.

⁵⁶ William A. Kobbe, "Operations in Department of Mindanao and Jolo", May 10, 1901, in "Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, In Five Parts, Part 5," *ARWD, 1901, Volume 1, Part 7* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 261–262.

attempted to open access into the interior of the island and the Lake Lanao region. This task entailed significant engineering and military challenges.⁵⁷

Efforts to open access to the Lake Lanao region were achieving only marginal success until the department commander, General George W. Davis, turned the operations over to Captain John J. Pershing, the commander of the garrison at Iligan on the north coast of the island of Mindanao. Davis gave Pershing, who for the previous two years served as adjutant of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo, the mission of establishing an American presence in the interior of the island on the north shore of Lake Lanao. Pershing determined not to march into the interior unannounced, but rather to talk to and solicit the cooperation of the datus in the area. Over several months, from November 1901 to February 1902, Pershing consulted with, negotiated with, rewarded, and cajoled the datus into supporting the movement of American troops into the region. On February 16, 1902, one of the more powerful Datus invited Pershing to visit the lake region. Pershing completed this dangerous mission accompanied by just his interpreter and three scouts. The mission opened the way for pacification of the northern lake area with almost no violence.⁵⁸ Because of his success, Davis, with General Chaffee's support and approval, gave Pershing operational control of all American units in the Lake Lanao region, even though he was only a captain.

Pershing could not persuade all the datus to tolerate the American presence. Under these circumstances, Pershing was willing to fight. This happened in the spring of 1903 when

⁵⁷ The lake datus were fiercely protective of their tribal areas and resisted any incursion into the region. In addition, no decent roads existed to support an expedition to the lake. Thus, movement into the region required a sizeable force to discourage armed resistance, and, a sizeable engineering effort to build roads to support the force. Fierce fighting was required for the army to move forces along the southern axis to Lake Lanao in early 1902 under Colonel Frank Baldwin. In attacks to capture Moro defensive positions the Americans lost ten killed and over forty wounded while inflicting several hundred killed on the Moros. George W. Davis, "Report of Brig. Gen. George W. Davis, USA., Commanding Seventh Separate Brigade," August 1, 1902, in "Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army and Department Commanders," *ARWD, 1902, Volume IX* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), 488–489.

⁵⁸ "Captain Pershing's Report on Moro Affairs," May 1902, *ARWD, 1902, Volume IX*, 556–557.

Pershing reported to his commanders that attacks against Americans were escalating. Pershing recommended, “we should...punish some of these renegades, it will help us very much in the pending peace negotiations and bring openly to our support many Moros who yet cling to what appears to them to be the stronger side.”⁵⁹ Using the strategy of persuasion backed by force, Captain Pershing was able to gain American access to the interior of Mindanao and the Lake Lanao region, establish relations with all the important tribes and datu, and gained recognition of US sovereignty with a minimum of fighting.⁶⁰ Pershing’s success with a minimum of fighting brought him the first widespread recognition of his career and included messages of congratulation from the Secretary of War.⁶¹ Pershing’s success was due to his willingness to work with the native leadership to achieve as much as possible. The Moros were a warrior culture and they respected him because he was willing to take risk, demonstrated personal bravery, respected their cultural values, and fought when necessary. Pershing also took the time to learn the native language and was willing to operate to the extent possible, within the same cultural framework of the Moros. Pershing’s approach reflected his long service among Indians on the frontier. In an unprecedented sign of respect the Moro leaders appointed Pershing an honorary datu.⁶²

⁵⁹ With his commander’s permission, Pershing carefully planned and controlled the military effort to achieve the result he intended and no more. He kept collateral damage to a minimum, and always allowed the adversary an escape route so that he could choose to cease his. As biographer Donald Smythe described Pershing’s strategy, “always it was effect Pershing sought, never revenge. He was out to convince Moros of the futility of resistance, not out to spill blood.” Smythe, 86, 88.

⁶⁰ Pershing’s efforts to secure American control of the Lake Lanao region of Mindanao are described in detail by George W. Davis “Report of Maj. Gen. George W. Davis, US Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines” July 26, 1903, “Reports of the Department and Division Commanders,” *ARWD, Volume III* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903), 153–156; by the Mindanao department commander, Brigadier General Samuel S. Sumner in his annual report for 1903, Appendix III, June 30, 1903 and Appendix IV, June 13, 1903 to Davis’ report, 299–303, and in the several individual reports written by Captain John J. Pershing in 1903 contained in the report of General Sumner, 322–328, 332–335, 338–341, 342–346, and 348–352.

⁶¹ Davis “Report of Maj. Gen. George W. Davis, US Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines,” July 26, 1903, 154.

⁶² Smythe, 92.

In 1903, the Philippine Commission considered all of the Philippines pacified, and instituted rule through Filipino and American civilian provincial governors appointed by the civil government. The only significant exception was the Sulu archipelago, for which the Philippine Commission created a special law. This law, among other special provisions, permitted army officers to hold the position of governor of the Moro Province.⁶³ Pershing returned to the United States in July 1903, and did not serve under the new commander, Brigadier General Leonard Wood, who arrived in Moro Province in August 1903. Wood was the first officer to serve as both the governor of Moro Province and the military commander of all forces in the military Department of Jolo and Mindanao.

Leonard Wood came to the Philippines from the highly successful military governorship of Cuba. He arrived in the midst of campaigning for his permanent promotion to major general.⁶⁴ General Wood was the governor of Moro Province from 1903 to 1906. Though initially promised command of the entire Philippine Division, his orders changed and he would not gain that command for three years. The army promoted Wood to permanent major general in March 1904, despite his perceived lack of qualifications. Wood was not happy with his assignment or with the struggle over his promotion to major general, and complained about it

⁶³ Howard Taft, "Report of the Civil Governor," November 15, 1903, Philippine Commission, "Report of the Philippine Commission," *ARWD, 1903, Volume V* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903), 76–79.

⁶⁴ President Roosevelt, Wood's close friend and former executive officer from the First Volunteer Cavalry, supported his promotion, but there was significant opposition from the Congress as well as from inside the army. There were numerous arguments against Wood's promotion including the fact that his Medal of Honor, won for actions during the Geronimo campaign, was undeserved, he had no formal military education, his command experience was almost non-existent, and he was the most junior brigadier general in the army. In short, the argument ran, General Wood's only qualification for promotion was his friendship with the President. *The New York Times* "Attacks on Gen. Wood. Charges That His Rapid Advance is Due to Favoritism," July 12, 1903, 11; Jack C. Lane, *Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 125–126.

bitterly directly to the President.⁶⁵ Wood's career qualifications, and the criticism the promotion process highlighted, affected his strategy for dealing with the Moro issue.⁶⁶

General Wood approached the Moro situation much more aggressively than any of the previous Army commanders. All of Wood's predecessors in the Southern Philippines, Generals George Davis, Samuel S. Sumner, and William A. Kobbe, and Captain Pershing, had extensive frontier experience. They all consciously or intuitively understood that they could not bend Moro culture to an American model of governance. They agreed that civil governance of the Moro had to be a balance of force and gradual cultural adaptation. As General Chaffee indicated in 1902, "Probably no civil process can be enforced in Moro communities for a long time without the presence of a military force adequate to the occasion, whatever that may be." In 1903, General Sumner commented, "For the present at least military control seems about the most practical government for the Moros... it seems to be the general opinion that we should control them through their sultan and datos. We can not assume complete personal supervision, and to remove their natural leaders and leave them without any control would add to, rather than decrease the already existing anarchy... by careful and just management the way may be gradually opened for some form of civil government at a later day."⁶⁷ General Wood had no tolerance for a gradual approach, did not respect the authority of the datos, and planned to force the American civil process directly on the individual tribesmen.

⁶⁵ President Roosevelt wrote to Wood "your confirmation was due only to the straining of every nerve by the Administration to putting forth our strength in a way in which it had been put forth for one or two great crises since I have been President, and never in behalf of any other individual." Letter, Roosevelt to Wood, quoted in Lane 130.

⁶⁶ Biographer Jack McCallum asserts that Wood's rough handling by critics in the process of achieving his permanent appointment to major general turned "the most adroit colonial administrator America had ever had" into an officer who was "sour on nation building." Jack McCallum, *Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 211–212.

⁶⁷ Adna R. Chaffee, "Report of Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, US Army, Commanding The Division of the Philippines," September 30, 1902, 194; Samuel S. Sumner, "Appendix III," 302.

Wood determined to interject the American colonial government into the internal affairs of the Moro by force. He intended to establish American authority and establish his reputation as a fighting general.⁶⁸ His major focus was the elimination of slavery and raiding, and breaking the governing influence of the datu. He also attempted to directly tax the individual Moros. To pursue this strategy Wood had to eliminate the Bates Agreement between the US government and the Sultan of Sulu. Within a few months of arriving in the Philippines he convinced Governor Taft that the Sultan had not kept his part of the agreement and that justified its unilateral abrogation. President Roosevelt supported the policy, which freed Wood to pursue his own governance strategy throughout the province.⁶⁹

For three years General Wood used the force of the American army to impose his will on the Moros. He mounted numerous major expeditions against various datos on both Mindanao and Jolo. Often these campaigns resulted in hundreds of American troops deploying and marching through the jungles without any decisive effect. Occasionally, an outlaw datu and his band were cornered and a sharp fight resulted. After each campaign Wood declared success and sent the US troops back to their barracks leaving the surviving Moros in the area alienated and hostile, and without really reducing the Moro capability or will to resist. Wood then left his subordinate district governors with the responsibility of trying to govern a hostile population.

Wood's tenure as governor of Moro Province culminated with the battle of Bud Dajo on the island of Jolo in March 1906. In that battle, tax-resisting Moros suffered between 600 and 800 killed. Estimates indicated that more than two-thirds of the Moro dead were women and children. Wood's troops suffered eighteen killed and fifty-two wounded. These were high

⁶⁸ Lane, 124–125.

⁶⁹ Wood put together a very compelling case that the Sultan could not or would not control the illegal activity of the Moros on Jolo and based on that case recommended that the Bates Agreement be vacated. Philippine Commission, "Report of the Philippine Commission," *ARWD, 1903, Volume V*, 489–544.

casualties for military operations after 1902. Wood declared the fight a great military victory and the highlight of his military career. In the opinion of other army officers, it was an unnecessary and poorly conducted battle that did nothing to advance the American cause in the Southern Philippines. Critics derided Wood in Congress and his career hung in the balance. It was largely through the positive testimony of his former subordinate and known friend of the Moro, Major Hugh Scott, that Wood escaped any adverse effects on his career.⁷⁰ The victory at Bud Dajo permitted Wood to declare his policy of using force to impress American control on the Moro a success. It was his last significant action as the governor of the province, and at the end of March 1903, Wood departed for Manila and his new assignment as commander of the Philippine Division.

After Wood's departure major military operations against the Moro ceased and the datu continued in their traditional role as tribal leaders. Wood's replacement as the governor of Moro Province was his former subordinate in the Cuban command, Brigadier General Tasker Bliss.⁷¹ Bliss entered his new position with great hopes for progress in the Moro province. However, after his initial optimism, Bliss realized that the complex situation had no easy or quick solution. Bliss understood that in the Moro he was dealing with not only a religious ideology, but also a

⁷⁰ *The New York Times* printed numerous articles relating the details of the battle and the controversy, including *The New York Times*, "Wood's Battle Called Murder in Congress," March 16, 1906. Major Hugh Scott had served very effectively as the district governor of Jolo under Wood (and previously in Cuba), and returned to the United States just before the battle (see Hugh Lenox Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier* (New York: The Century Co., 1928), 373–410. Though Scott was privately critical of Wood's actions, historians believe Scott's testimony was motivated by loyalty to the army, Secretary of War Taft, and Wood. The San Francisco earthquake, which happened on April 18, 1906, also helped Wood's defense by diverting the press away from events in the Philippines. *The New York Times*, "Ide Acquits Troops of Killing Moro Women," March 21, 1906; Fulton 297–320.

⁷¹ The army promoted Bliss to brigadier general after his service in Cuba, largely in recognition of his expert duty as the customs director. Bliss came to the Philippines after two years as the first president of the new Army War College in Washington. Upon arrival, he commanded the Department of Luzon for eight months. In January 1906, he received orders to replace Leonard Wood as the Commander of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo, and as the Governor of the Moro Province. Both Bliss and Wood were present at the Bud Dajo battle. Bliss, however, was an observer while Wood commanded the operation. Fulton 289; Frederick Palmer, *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1934), 80–83.

complex tribal culture. His analysis that “the Moros are in a state of savagery where they know a man but know or care nothing about a government” was accurate. However, unlike Pershing and Bliss’s West Point classmate, Hugh Scott, Bliss did not have the benefit of years of experience on the American frontier that allowed him to appreciate the Moro leaders within the context of their own culture. Understanding the issues and making progress in over-coming them are two different things. Major Peter Borseth, who reported directly to Bliss as a district governor, described Bliss’s policy in the almost three years he was in command:

The governor and department commander General Bliss is gradually transferring the onus of maintaining peace more and more upon the shoulders of the constabulary; and even when active hostilities are afoot in Lanao, the military almost invariably act in support of the constabulary (if they take the field at all), and the latter have consistently borne the brunt of any opposition shown by the outlaws.⁷²

Bliss consistently emphasized that force was the tool of last resort, but insisted that there would be no backsliding on the acquiescence to American rule achieved by his predecessor. Thus, Bliss opposed the reduction of American army garrisons in the province while at the same time eschewing their employment. The Philippine constabulary was Bliss’s tool of choice and he employed it often throughout his almost three years of governance.⁷³ Like many previous commanders, Bliss believed that American policy in the Moro province had to be low-key. Bliss recognized that since the issues could not be resolved quickly, his best course was to keep the peace and let the relationship of the Moro to the government gradually evolve. In his report of 1908, Bliss stated that “Peace has been preserved by letting him [the Moro] alone and at the

⁷² In addition to being a district governor for Bliss, Borseth was the director of the 5th District of the Philippine Constabulary, made of native Moro tribesmen. Philippine Commission, *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1907 (In Three Parts), Part 3* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907), 327.

⁷³ Palmer, 90–93; Fulton 338.

same time letting him see some of the evidences of the Government's power."⁷⁴ When Bliss left the province in January 1909, with the exception of some progress in building roads and school enrollment, it was essentially in the same condition as when he inherited it in 1906. Bliss did however, avoid large scale confrontation between the Moro and the army.

The last and most effective military governor of the Moro was Brigadier General John Pershing. Pershing was surprised when he returned to the Department of Mindanao and Jolo in November 1909 that he was not received as enthusiastically upon his return as when he left. The esteem Moros had for Americans had eroded significantly in the six years since he left in 1903. Despite his unease with where he was starting, Pershing's more than three year assignment as the governor of Moro province would advance the agenda of the American government significantly. Pershing determined to firmly assert American rule in the province by disarming the Moros. He also had as an objective the transition of the province from military to civil rule.⁷⁵

The policy of disarming the Moro warriors dramatically changed the nature of government's relationship to the tribesmen. The only thing more central to the Moro culture and self-identity than Islam was the Moro warrior's weapon.⁷⁶ Pershing announced his policy to

⁷⁴ Tasker H. Bliss, "Report Department of Mindanao," 30 June 1908, "Report of the Philippines Division," *ARWD, 1908, Vol. III* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908), 294.

⁷⁵ As Pershing evaluated the conditions in the province he concluded that the American administration was detached from the issues facing the half million inhabitants of the Sulu archipelago. Undoubtedly, some of Pershing's evaluation was the difference between his vigorous action oriented personality and General Bliss's more academic focus. However, some of the difference was a basic difference between the two men's evaluation of the future. Bliss believed, like many previous Army officers, that changing the Moro was a decades long time-consuming process. Pershing came into his position as governor with a similar view, but this changed in the summer of 1911 when Pershing determined on a policy of disarming the Moro. Another possibility is that Pershing was looking for a way to distinguish his tenure from the relatively unsuccessful tenure of General Wood and the stagnant period under Bliss. Frank E. Vandiver's view is that popular indignation in the northern islands with the Moro province murder rate convinced Pershing to reevaluate the effectiveness of his policies in the province during his first two years. Pershing was not happy with the murder rate and concluded that expeditions to capture and punish murders were an ineffective reactive strategy. Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing, Volume I* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1962), 530-531.

⁷⁶ W. A. Kobbe, "Provisional report of field Operations in northern Mindanao in December 1900, and January 1901" January 22, 1901, "Report of the Lieutenant-General and the Department Commanders," *ARWD, 1901, Part 6* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 274.

disarm the Moro warriors in September 1911 and allowed three months for the turn in of all weapons. His ban on weapons not only included firearms, but also all edged weapons.

Collecting the weapons of the Moros was difficult. By December, it was obvious that few Moro were willing to turn over their weapons. Thus, confiscating weapons became a major focus of police and army action and largely defined the remaining two years of Pershing tenure as governor.

The weapons issue gave Pershing a reason to confront datu who continued to oppose American governance. The weapons issue attacked the datu system in two ways. Those datu who nominally complied, even if they in fact hid many weapons from the Americans, lost prestige in that they publically acknowledged American authority and did not resist. For example, the Sultan of Sulu submitted to the weapons ban, further reducing his diminished authority. The datu who actively resisted compliance opened themselves to attack by the army. In 1912 and 1913 Pershing led campaigns against Moros resisting the disarmament decree.⁷⁷ Throughout the disarming campaign Pershing demonstrated an ability to adroitly mix negotiations with force to achieve acquiescence without significant casualties. Like Bliss, he

⁷⁷ In December 1912, Pershing led an expedition of over a thousand soldiers against Moros on Jolo Island defying the weapons ban and sniping at US Army barracks. Over the course of the month, he fought several skirmishes and eventually the renegade Moros took up a defiant defensive position on the formidable extinct volcano Bud Dajo. The Moros occupied the same position Leonard Wood assaulted in 1903 with tragic results. Pershing could not afford a repeat of that episode. Patiently, although constantly skirmishing, Pershing negotiated the Moros off the mountain.

In the summer of 1913, the situation repeated itself when Moros on Jolo left their villages and occupied a stronghold on Bud Bagsak. Again, Pershing assembled a field force of over a thousand troops as between six and eight hundred Moro built cottas (redoubts) and trenches on the mountain. This time, however, the Moros choose to fight rather than surrender. In a three-day assault, Pershing's force of mostly native Philippine Scouts captured the position. Over five hundred Moro warriors died during the battle while Pershing's force lost fifteen dead and twenty-five wounded. Fortunately, Pershing had skillfully maneuvered his force such that few Moro women and children were involved in the battle and little controversy was associated with the battle. The battle for Bud Bagsak was a turning point in American-Moro relations. It was the last large scale confrontation between the army and the Moros. It was also the last large scale defiance of American authority by the Moros. Estimates were that women and children comprised between five and ten percent of the Moros on the mountain. Casualties among this group would have then been twenty-five to fifty killed –significantly, less than the several hundred killed by Wood's men in 1903. Smythe, 186–200.

also used a minimum of force and relied on native Philippine Scout army units and the Philippine Constabulary rather than US troops.⁷⁸

The disarming of the Moro, though incomplete when Pershing left in the fall of 1913, dramatically changed the nature of the relationship between the Americans and the Moro. Pershing engineered another dramatic change during his time as governor of Moro province. Quietly, over time, Pershing replaced his district governors with civilians or constabulary officers, and completely removed army officers from roles with the civil administration of the province. Pershing also moved American army troops out of the province and replaced them with native Philippine Scout companies officered by Americans. By the summer of 1913, all the province level officials were civilians. Thus, when Pershing officially departed in September 1913, his replacement as the province governor was a civilian civil servant of the Philippine Commission. Pershing's departure ended the fifteen-year army role in governing of Philippine Islands.

A Defining Experience

Operations in the Philippines validated the importance of ideas and concepts regarding occupation operations learned in previous experiences: building democracy, law and order, education, respect for local institutions and culture, the primacy of civil policy, and the transition to civil rule. Because of US annexation of the islands and the resistance to that annexation, building democratic institutions in the Philippines did not follow the same model as previous occupation operations. Still, there was an early emphasis on elections at the local level. The priority placed on law and order created the emphasis on legal reform. Unlike Cuba, however,

⁷⁸ Philippine Scouts were native Filipinos who were enlisted into special Scout units of the US Army. The units were considered part of the American army, they were organized and equipped like regular US Army units. The soldiers in the unit were all Filipinos and the officers were all American. Philippines Scout units only served in the Philippines.

early significant involvement of Filipino jurists in the reform process gave the reforms legitimacy. Army priority to schooling contributed to the long-term legitimacy of American governance while at the same time undermined the legitimacy of the Philippine insurrectionists in the short term. While attempting to establish American governance, authorities worked patiently within the bounds of local traditions. The relationship between the army and the Moros illustrated the careful balance the army sought between local customs and the needs of governance. A major driver of Philippine policy was US domestic politics. In the long term, the lack of significant domestic support for a US colony in the Philippines led to steady transition of governance from American to Filipino control ultimately culminating in a plan for Philippine independence in 1944. Finally, the desire for a quick transition to civil rule strongly influenced the occupation. The army relinquished executive control of the occupation to civil governor Howard Taft in 1901, a full year before President Roosevelt declared military operations against Filipino insurgents complete. Because there was no domestic pressure to quickly quit operations in the Philippines, army governance continued in the islands in some form for fifteen years. The characteristics of the occupation, combined with the length of time that the army influenced events, allowed many of the characteristics of American occupation to have a lasting influence on the islands and contributed to the Philippines relative political success over the course of the twentieth century.

During the course of the army's experience in governing the Philippines, 1898 to 1913, five important commanders carried the title of military governor: Elwell Otis, Arthur MacArthur, Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss, and John Pershing. The first two governors had responsibility for the entire archipelago and its more than seven million residents. They also had responsibility for waging an intense conventional and guerrilla war against a skilled and

determined enemy. The latter three governors had the more limited responsibility of direct governance of the Sulu Archipelago and the island of Mindanao. Otis operated for five months with almost no specific guidance from Washington. Later, civil control and guidance gradually increased though the Philippine Commission was never deeply involved in the affairs of the Moro Province. The governance efforts of the first two commanders, despite the challenges of continually fighting insurgents, were successful. The efforts of Wood and Bliss, despite a smaller area, smaller population, longer tenure, and only nominal organized military resistance, were less influential. Pershing, the last military governor, demonstrated an ability to patiently use force and negotiation to create the conditions for the transition to civil control of the Moro province.

Otis and MacArthur were successful for several reasons. First, they had the support of the entire US government and the US Army behind their efforts, including the dedicated support of the Philippine Commission. Though both commanders resented civilian intrusion by the commission on their prerogatives of command, the commission, especially once it began to exercise its legislative function in September 1900, ensured that there was a constant and serious focus on the problems of governance, regardless of the military situation. The commission also, by purposely identifying itself as a civil institution not controlled by the military, was able to disassociate itself with military operations and establish legitimacy as a governing organization separate from the military. Finally, both early military governors, Otis and MacArthur, were extremely talented in the areas of administration and law. They also had frontier experience, and MacArthur had Reconstruction experience as well. Additionally, MacArthur had an unusually strong academic interest in Asian affairs. Their military experiences and academic interests gave both officers an understanding of the larger, long-term strategic interests of the United States, the

mission of the army, the nature of the environment, and the type of policies necessary to shape the Philippines into a strategic ally of the United States.⁷⁹ The early years of military government set the tone for subsequent successful government by the Philippine Commission. The military governors established the Philippine legal system, created police forces, created the school system, designed and supervised local democratic government, and encouraged and supervised local infrastructure improvements. They accomplished this while fighting and defeating a skillful and numerous native insurgency. The quick transition to civil governance under Governor Taft in 1901, and the important requirement to defeat the Filipino insurgents prevented either of the military governors from focusing on economic issues. The military governors left the task of creating an indigenous Filipino national governing apparatus to the American civil governor. Still, in just three years both Otis and MacArthur, despite their individual shortcomings, demonstrated the strategic vision necessary for success.

Operating on a smaller scale, Generals Wood and Bliss brought a different focus to their terms as military governors of the Moro Province. Wood saw the position of military governor as an opportunity to make up for the lack of combat experience in his military qualifications. Thus, his relationship with the Moros was confrontational. He showed none of the institution-building drive that he demonstrated in Cuba. Bliss, on the other hand, was not a field soldier and showed no inclination to be a field soldier. To make changes or advance an agenda in the Moro Province required time in the field engaging in dialog with Moro leaders and the people. Despite a keen intellect, Bliss was content to spend most of his time in his comfortable headquarters and

⁷⁹ Otis was a graduate of Harvard Law School. MacArthur also studied law, was a member of the Wisconsin bar, and was the son of a prominent Wisconsin Judge, who later was a member of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for seventeen years. Kenneth Ray Young, *The General's General: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 124–125.

allow his subordinates to deal with Moro issues as they arose. The net result of both Wood and Bliss's six-year tenure was no significant positive change in the Moro situation.

John Pershing demonstrated himself to be both a highly competent combat soldier as well as an effective administrator. He recognized that little progress had occurred in the Moro province. He also understood that even with three years in office, his ability to effect change during his tenure was limited.⁸⁰ Still, he achieved important results as military governor on his own initiative—the Philippine Commission did not direct disarmament. This policy, though it was never completely effective and caused several large-scale violent confrontations between the army and various datus, was the first necessary step toward bringing the province under civil control. Thus, though little else changed under Pershing's tenure, the disarmament policy was the cornerstone of future governance efforts in the province. Disarmament of the Moros was the reason that Pershing was the last military governor in the Philippines and subsequent issues with Moro resistance were successfully resolved as police incidents.

Colonel Bentley Mott served in the military government of the Philippines under both General MacArthur and Governor Taft. Thirty years afterward he reflected on the importance of Philippine service to the American army officer corps:

Our occupation of Cuba during the years following 1898, and the Philippine insurrection of about the same date, had a profound influence upon the commissioned personnel. Service in these distant islands taught our officers nothing about the conduct of operations in a great war, but they had new problems and big responsibilities thrust upon them and as a character-forming school nothing could have been better for the generation of men who became the instructors of our army in 1917 and occupied most of the important posts in the oversea forces. What service in Africa did for Joffre and Mangin and Gouraud

⁸⁰ Both Smythe and Vandiver highlight Pershing's recognition of laxity in the Moro province without directly commenting on Bliss. Vandiver and Fulton attribute some of the problem to the fact that almost a year went by between when Bliss departed and Pershing arrived. Smythe, 144–145; Vandiver, 478; Fulton, 361.

and Gallieni, service in Cuba and the Philippines did for Pershing, Funston, Wood, Bell, McCoy, Harbord, Bundy, Bullard, and hundreds of others.⁸¹

The hundreds of others that Mott refers to included a host of junior officers who served in World War I, and continued to prominent positions after the war.

The Philippines, from 1898 to 1913, was a complex military melting pot where the experiences of what historian Edward M. Coffman called “The Old Army” of the frontier mixed with the young blood of Coffman’s new generation of twentieth-century “Regulars.” In the jungles, swamps, officer’s mess, on the island steamers, and the polo fields of the Philippines, the experiences of the American frontier and Reconstruction mixed with the new experience of American military government in Asia, and passed to the men who would lead the American army through the first half of the twentieth century. Among the young officers serving their first army assignment in the Philippines was Lieutenant George Marshall who arrived on the island of Mindoro in the spring of 1902. Marshall, assigned to the 13th Infantry Regiment, spent considerable time among the local Philippine people in command of a small detachment of troops. In that experience he saw firsthand soldiers teaching school to young Filipino children, chasing bandits, and interacting with local Filipino leaders.⁸² In 1903 another young army lieutenant arrived in the Philippines. Second Lieutenant of Engineers Douglas MacArthur spent his two year tour supervising the building of roads and harbor facilities vital to the economic growth of the islands, and worked closely with the Philippine Constabulary.⁸³ Among the officers who served in the islands in the years after the Philippine War and before World War I, were every future Chief of Staff of the army from 1921 to 1945. Every American theater commander in World War II had experience serving with the American forces that remained in

⁸¹ Bentley T. Mott, *Twenty Years as Military Attaché* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), 62.

⁸² Larry I. Bland, Editor, *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue* (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Center, 1996), 120–144.

⁸³ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 35–41.

the Philippines after the governance mission was complete. Before the next generation of soldiers took the reins of the army, however, the Philippine veterans had several important challenges to meet. As General Pershing left the Philippines in September 1913, turmoil reigned across America's southern border with Mexico, and Europe was in the midst of unprecedented unrest.

CHAPTER 6 - Occupation and World War, 1914–1923

Through the first two decades of the twentieth century, the practice of military government operations became central to the experience of many young army officers. It was the rare career officer who did not have practical experience with some aspect of civil affairs. Cuba and the Philippines were the two major government operations in terms of duration and size of the military effort. Less well known was the relatively quiet role the army played in Puerto Rico. Also important, and a major event in American foreign policy before World War I, was the temporary occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico. In many ways, the most important and unique operation was the American participation in the occupation of the Rhineland after World War I. The occupation of Vera Cruz continued to demonstrate the pattern of American military occupation operations as the command focused on health and sanitation, education, and law and order. The occupation of the Rhineland after World War I was the American army's first experience with occupation of a fully developed civilian society. The Rhineland experience was also unique because it was the first experience the army had with occupation operations as part of a coalition of allied nations. In the Rhineland the army adapted its traditional pattern to the new unique circumstances eliminating aspects of the occupation model which did not apply. Thus, in the Rhineland there was little emphasis on democratization and education. The army governed indirectly through the existing German bureaucracy. The command, however, remained focused on law and order, and sanitation and health. Additionally, the Rhineland also continued to demonstrate the close linkage between American domestic political policy and occupation operations.

By 1914, the army officer corps was thoroughly inculcated to the idea of army officers not just serving as military governors, but also conducting the myriad of tasks associated with government: writing laws and constitutions, administering justice, collecting and dispensing revenue, policing, managing health and sanitation, building roads and railroads, and managing education and economic development. The military governor was merely one, albeit the highest, level of civil military responsibility. The military governor was the civil military equivalent of the commander and success in that position carried with it the career making influence of command in war. Beginning in 1903 with the first officer to serve as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Samuel B. Young, each of the subsequent chiefs until 1926, had substantial experience as a military governor or as a key military government staff officer. Most had multiple experiences.¹ This is indicative of two attitudes toward the position of military governor in the American army: first, that the position had the requisite responsibility and authority to qualify an officer for higher command; and second, that the army assigned only the very best officers to the position of military governor. The army continued this pattern in 1914 by assigning Major General Frederick Funston, probably the most promising general officer in the army at the time, to command the American occupation of the Mexican city of Vera Cruz in 1914.²

¹ Samuel Young, Chief of Staff (CoS) 1903–04, was Military Governor of North Luzon; Adna Chaffee, CoS 1904–06, was Chief of Staff for Military Governor Cuba; John C. Bates, CoS 1906, was District Commander Mindanao and Jolo, and Military Governor South Luzon; James Franklin Bell, CoS 1906–10, was Provost Marshall Manila, Military Governor First District Luzon, and Commander Army of Cuban Pacification; Leonard Wood, CoS 1910–14, was Military Governor Santiago, Military Governor Cuba, and Military Governor of Mindanao and Jolo; William Wotherspoon, CoS 1914, was Chief of Customs at Iloilo Philippines, and Chief of Staff of Cuban Army of Pacification; Hugh L. Scott, CoS 1914–1917, was Chief of Staff for Military Governor Cuba, and Military Governor of Sulu Archipelago Philippines; Tasker Bliss, CoS 1917–18, was Chief of Customs for Cuba, and Military Governor Mindanao and Jolo; Peyton March, CoS 1918–21, was a provincial in Governor Philippines; John Pershing, CoS 1921–24, organized the Bureau of Insular Affairs, was Adjutant and Collector of Taxes District of Mindanao and Jolo, and Military Governor of Mindanao and Jolo; and John Hines, CoS 1924–26, was Assistant Quartermaster, Military Government Cuba, and Commander III Corps, Occupation of the Rhineland. William Gardner Bell, *Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775–2005* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005), 96–116.

² General Funston may have commanded the American Expeditionary Force to France if he had not died unexpectedly of a heart attack on February 19, 1917. Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (McGraw-Hill Book

Vera Cruz, 1914

The occupation of Vera Cruz was one of the most prominent and aggressive actions that the American government took in regards to Mexico during the decade of the Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1920. In 1913, Victoriano Huerta and his followers murdered President Madero and Vice-President Suarez. The Taft Administration, defeated in the election of 1912 by Democrat Woodrow Wilson, did not recognize the Huerta regime despite the urging of the American Ambassador, and left the problem of Mexican relations to the new President.³ President Wilson established a policy of non-recognition of governments that obtained power by unconstitutional means, refused to recognize the Huerta regime, and demanded the protection of US property and citizens in Mexico. A confrontation between Mexican authorities and the US Navy in Tampico, Mexico, led to the apprehension of several US sailors by Mexican soldiers. Though the sailors were quickly released, the Congress authorized President Wilson to impose an arms blockade against the Mexican government in reprisal.⁴

Initial Operations

Almost simultaneous with the approval for action by Congress, the Americans became aware of a German ship carrying arms for Huerta, and bound for the Mexican port of Vera Cruz, the most important port controlled by the Huerta government. The Navy ordered Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, commander of naval forces in Mexican waters, to seize the customs house and port facilities of the city to prevent off-loading the weapons. On April 21, 1914, over 700 sailors and

Company, 1964), 54; Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing*, Volume II (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 671–672.

³ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States, Fifth Edition* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), 544–545.

⁴ Summary of the events leading to the landing of forces at Vera Cruz is from the detailed daily diplomatic and military message traffic in State Department, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 443–496.

Marines disembarked from naval ships and landed in Vera Cruz unopposed. The Mexican military forces in the city chose not to resist and evacuated the city. The American forces secured the immediate port facilities and then moved to secure other key locations in the city including the telegraph office, cable office, post office, the railroad yards, and the Mexican naval school. During the first night, Admiral Charles J. Badger, Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, reinforced the forces in the city, bringing the total Marines and sailors ashore to approximately 6,000. The force ashore was under the command of Marine Colonel F.N. Waller who had made his combat reputation in the brutal fighting against Philippine insurgents on the island of Samar. In the first three days ashore, the Americans consolidated their position, created a continuous perimeter, secured the water pumping station, and cleared out armed resistance within the areas they controlled. Meanwhile, the army assembled the Fifth Separate Brigade under Brigadier General Frederick Funston, at Galveston, Texas, for movement to Vera Cruz.⁵

The War Department alerted General Funston and his brigade for movement to Vera Cruz on April 23, 1914.⁶ His orders were to “relieve the Navy of its duties ashore incident to the occupation and control of the city of Vera Cruz and its environs.”⁷ The purpose of Funston’s operation was to put pressure on Huerta and his government to either reform or resign by cutting the Huerta government off from its source of imported arms and the revenues of the city’s

⁵ Total casualties suffered by the American force in the fighting in the first three days ashore were fifteen killed and 56 wounded. Victor Blue, “Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,” November 1, 1942, *Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year, 1914* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915), 141–142.

⁶ The army considered Funston one of its top officers in 1913. Though not a West Point graduate, Funston was in the midst of a very active career. As a civilian, he fought with the Cuban insurgents against the Spanish. He came into the American army as the commander of a volunteer regiment from Kansas. He won the Medal of Honor in the Philippines, and then captured Aguinaldo in a daring raid deep into northern Luzon. Subsequently, he served as a military governor in the Philippines and commanded army relief operations after the San Francisco earthquake of 1906.

⁷ Frederick Funston, *Report of Operations of US Expeditionary Forces*, undated (Unpublished, Copy in the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), 2.

customs house.⁸ For this purpose Funston had the over 4,000 soldiers of the army's Fifth Brigade, as well as 3,052 men of the First Marine Brigade. The total force commanded by Funston was over 7,000 troops. Funston's brigade disembarked at Vera Cruz on April 28, and he formally took command of all forces ashore on April 30. He also took responsibility for the city's 40,000 inhabitants. His immediate supervisor was General Tasker Bliss, commander of the Southern Department. In reality, he reported directly to the War Department and took his orders directly from the Secretary of War and the President.

Conduct of the Occupation

When the navy initially occupied the city, the navy command quickly became aware of a Mexican law that prohibited Mexican citizens from lending aid to an occupying power. This prevented the navy from administering the city as planned, through the existing city officials. In response, Admiral Fletcher declared martial law and established an American civil government, appointing American civilians residing in Vera Cruz to various positions. General Funston inherited this situation from the admiral and continued to occupy the city with the American civil government in place. The Wilson Administration soon decided, however, that a pure military government was more appropriate to the situation in Vera Cruz, and General Funston assumed the position of governor as well as that of military commander. Military officers assumed control of all municipal government functions. Funston noted that "The fact that Army officers were available, who could speak and read Spanish and had acquired a knowledge of Spanish law

⁸ None of President Wilson's official reasons for the occupation, three supposed insults to American honor, were legitimate. The Wilson administration was determined not to recognize Huerta's government because Wilson believed it was morally illegitimate. The three reasons, the Tampico incident, the supposed arrest of an American sailor in Vera Cruz, and the delay of an official government telegram in Mexico City, were all matters of individual mistakes by low-level officials and all quickly corrected and explained by the Mexican government. The inaccuracy of Wilson's claims in his address to Congress (see State Department, *Papers*, 474) is easily verified by the official correspondence (see note 2).

and administration in similar work in the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico and elsewhere, simplified what would otherwise have been an almost impossible situation.”⁹

With no Mexican civil officials willing to work for the Americans, Funston was free to establish the military government as he thought best. His guidance to his staff was that “The Government hereby established will continue the system which the people of Vera Cruz are accustomed to in so far as is consistent with military control.” General Funston proclaimed himself the Military Governor, and appointed an officer in charge of civil affairs. That officer, a member of the Judge Advocate Corps (JAG), served as the primary advisor to the governor on civil affairs and as the commander’s legal advisor. Funston also appointed a provost marshal who, as in Manila under army occupation, was responsible for most municipal government functions. Funston designated a variety of other civil administrators necessary to control and administer the city effectively including an administrator of customs (a naval officer), post master (American civilian of the US Postal Service), and a treasurer (an army officer).¹⁰

By 1914, the army was expert at operating in former Spanish colonies and in tropic climates. The army, as an institution, understood from its experience, the absolute importance of sanitation and this subject was of prime concern to General Funston. By Mexican standards, Vera Cruz was a typical city, but by American standards, it was a filthy epidemic waiting to happen. There were numerous opportunities for disease. The city’s market place was uncontrolled, dirty, and infested with flies and other insects. The city garbage disposal system was virtually nonexistent and relied on vultures and wild dogs to remove waste. No sewer system existed in much of the city, and what did exist was in poor repair. Mosquitoes carrying malaria were common and tolerated. Other diseases including tuberculosis, cerebral-meningitis,

⁹ Funston, 38–39.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.

malaria, and dysentery were also common throughout the city. The water supply, though potable, was inadequate for the size of the population.¹¹

Against the city's challenges, the army put its very knowledgeable medical corps, its considerable experience in equally squalid conditions in Cuba and the Philippines, and its very complete sanitation regulations. The navy brought two doctors of the US Public Health Service to Vera Cruz specifically to use their "expert knowledge of public-health matters ...in organizing and operating the health department of the city." The Americans vaccinated the population, attacked the problems of mosquitoes and flies, repaired the sewage system, expanded the water supply, created a garbage collection system, and rebuilt and eliminated the unsanitary conditions in the public markets.¹² By the end of the seven month American occupation, Vera Cruz was easily the healthiest city in Mexico and probably all of Latin America.

Funston paid for the operation of the city government, with the exception of \$40,000 allocated by Congress for sanitation improvements, through the operation of the municipal, state, and federal tax laws of Mexico. The army collected the taxes that would normally be due the Mexican government and applied them to the costs of operating the city. The American presence reduced the city's overall tax income because the Americans banned bull fighting, cock fighting, and gambling which were important sources of Mexican government revenue. The American presence also reduced the amount of imports moving through the port and thus import taxes paid to the revenue house. Still, by carefully moving money between the local, state, and national revenue accounts, and by eliminating corruption, the military government was able to meet all expenses without special support from Congress.¹³

¹¹ Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1962), 78–85; Funston, 33–34, 43

¹² *Ibid.*, 42–44.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 44–45.

Policing and the rule of law in the occupied territory were essential to the peaceful occupation of the city, the coexistence of the military and civil population, and to the resumption of civil life under occupation. The Americans organized two police forces to enforce order in the city. The first was a municipal police force, which the brigade had to recruit, equip and train from among the Mexican population because the original city police disbanded upon the arrival of the Americans. The role of the municipal police was purely to police the civilian population. Theft was the primary crime that occupied police activity. Backing up the municipal police was a provost guard of three companies of Marines and a battalion of army infantry. The provost guard also had the responsibility of policing major disturbances and all incidents that involved US military personnel.¹⁴

Because Mexican officials would not cooperate with the occupation, Funston ordered the military government to establish military courts. The intent was that the military would only operate criminal courts. Army and Marine officers presided over the courts. The army did not hear civil court cases, but did arbitrate civil disputes. During the course of the occupation there was very little need for criminal trials, but the army adjudicated over 3,000 civil disputes and over 6,000 financial claims. In all cases, army lawyers and officers conducted legal proceedings “under the letter and spirit of the Mexican law.”¹⁵

Several other issues were important for the military government to deal with. One was an initial food shortage that occurred as the occupation began. The Mexican forces surrounding the city turned back supplies of food meant for the city markets. In response, the military governor eliminated import duties on food products. This eased importing food and eventually resolved shortages. The other issue that was unique to the Vera Cruz occupation was a large number of

¹⁴ Ibid., 46–47.

¹⁵ Ibid., 41.

refugees, at times more than 15,000, who entered the city to escape pursuing revolutionary military forces. Over the course of the occupation, civilian ship lines transported an average of 2,000 refugees a month from Vera Cruz, mostly to the United States. A final issue was the city school system. The military government cajoled Mexican teachers back to their jobs and encouraged children to go to school. It also helped to establish a teacher's school in the city that operated during the annual school vacation. More children attended Vera Cruz's public schools when the Americans left the city, than before US forces landed.¹⁶

An aspect of the occupation that greatly eased the challenge that the army and Marine forces faced, was the general lack of interference by Mexican military forces. Mexican officers took a cordial and appropriately courteous tone dealing with their American counter-parts. Under those positive conditions, officers worked out numerous small agreements to smooth the occupation operations and lessen the impact on the civil population. Examples of this included the resumption of mail service to and from Vera Cruz through the military lines, and the resumption of train service between Vera Cruz and Mexico City. During the entire seven-month occupation, after the initial fighting, there was only one case of conflict between the American and Mexican forces and neither side incurred casualties.¹⁷

Resolution of the Crisis

Mexican President Huerta lost control of the Mexican government in September 1914, and the Americans immediately made plans to withdraw from Vera Cruz. However, it took more than two months to get the victorious Mexican revolutionaries to agree to not punish residents of the city who cooperated with the American army. On November 20, 1914, the brigade at Vera Cruz received orders to evacuate the city. The War Department told General Funston to "get out

¹⁶ Ibid., 57–59, 48.

¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

in the best practical fashion, leaving things in as good shape as possible....”¹⁸ The occupying forces managed a very orderly withdrawal from the city, leaving it the best-administered municipality in Mexican history. All troops and Marines departed the city on November 23, 1914.¹⁹

The nature of the occupation of Vera Cruz was unusual because the mission was not part of a larger general war. Though a short and limited action in terms of the number of troops and the length of the operation, the occupation of Vera Cruz served to make the point that conventional war with Mexico was a realistic possibility and that substantial military government operations were likely to be part of any general military action. The occupation of Vera Cruz also indicated that, whatever the shortfalls of American military capability in the areas of conventional combat, mobilization, command and control, or logistics, the US Army and its leaders were extremely capable of quickly and efficiently establishing control over hostile civilian populations. The Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison, summed up the performance of the American military forces in the occupation operation: “The character of this duty in each instance was similar and was of an exceedingly difficult kind, in some respects even more difficult than actual warfare. It called for patience, self-control, discretion, and good judgment under very trying conditions, and required implicit obedience to orders—a prime military necessity.”²⁰ General Funston’s command executed the occupation portion of the Vera Cruz operations with superb professional skill.

Occupation of the Rhineland, 1918–1923

¹⁸ State Department, *Papers*, 625.

¹⁹Lindley M. Garrison, “Report of the Secretary of War,” November 15, 1914, *War Department Annual Reports (WDAR), 1914, Volume I* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), 152.

²⁰ Garrison, 1–2.

Just four years after the withdrawal of General Funston's occupation force from Vera Cruz, the US Army was committed to another important military occupation. On November 17, 1918, the American Third Army of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France under the command of General John J. Pershing began marching to its assigned occupation zone within the Allied occupied German Rhineland. The American army settled into its occupation zone in Germany by Christmas of 1918. In the course of the four-year American occupation of the Rhineland the occupation command adapted to the unique conditions of post-World War I Germany, and showed flexibility in melding American occupation policy and traditions with the unique conditions in Germany and the need for inter-Allied cooperation. Over the next four years, the command evolved into an important component of American foreign policy in Europe. The occupation also served as a practical exercise in military government for many officers who later served in senior leadership positions during the inter-war years and World War II, and as a model for future occupation policy and doctrine.

The American participation in the post World War I occupation of Germany was much more complex as a strategic action than any previous occupation. There were many reasons for this but the most important was that the occupation was an Allied effort and thus all policies and decisions were subject to inter-Allied debate and compromise. International debate and compromise was in addition to the internal US domestic policy debate that accompanied all previous occupation experiences. The occupation scheme divided into two distinct phases. The first phase of the occupation was under the authorization of the armistice. There was little debate that enforcement of the armistice required Allied occupation of German territory. The US Congress almost unanimously supported this phase of the occupation.²¹ The second phase of the

²¹ *The New York Times*, "Congress Hails Armistice Terms," November 12, 1918, 4.

occupation was under the terms of the peace treaty. This phase was more problematic. President Wilson agreed to US participation in a post peace treaty occupation in negotiations directly with French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. On June 28, 1919, the United States representatives signed the Rhineland Agreement that articulated the framework of the post-treaty occupation. The Allies, however, predicated the Rhineland agreement on Article 432 of the peace treaty. Since the United States never ratified the peace treaty, the Rhineland Agreement never went into effect for American forces. Thus, for the duration of the post-treaty occupation, the legal status of the American occupation was ambiguous. Until the United States agreed to a separate peace with Germany in 1921, the legal justification for the US Army presence in the Rhineland was still the 1918 armistice agreement. After the signing of a separate peace treaty with Germany there was no legal justification for the presence of the US Army on German soil. However, the occupation continued another fifteen months.²²

Another problem that complicated the American occupation was France. France insisted that an occupation of the Rhineland was necessary during the armistice period to ensure that the Germans proceeded with the peace treaty process. The US government agreed with this view. After December 1918, a debate occurred over US participation in an occupation after the signing of a peace treaty. The main arguments were over the rationale for the presence of Allied forces after signing a peace agreement. The French argued first for the necessity of national defense against a renewed belligerent Germany. The British and the United States responded with the offer of a trilateral defense treaty instead of an occupation. The French argument then changed and justified the need for an occupation force to enforce reparations. The United States and

²² Keith L. Nelson, *Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918–1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 66–67. See the Rhineland Agreement, and the Treaty Between the United States and Germany, both reproduced in Henry T. Allen, *The Rhineland Occupation* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1927), 299, 306; *New York Times*, “War Ended with Germany July 2, 1921,” November 15, 1921, 18.

Great Britain reluctantly acceded to that point, but the real French intent for the occupation of the Rhineland was to facilitate the permanent separation of the Rhineland from Germany and either make it an autonomous nation under French protection, or incorporate it directly into France. As US General Henry T. Allen observed, “the French authorities...were resolved to hold the Rhineland, regardless of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.”²³ France’s real purpose for the occupation influenced the strategic issues upon which the occupation commanders focused, continually created friction between French forces and the Americans and British, and ultimately contributed to the withdrawal of the US forces from Germany.

Little planning was done for the initial occupation of the Rhineland. The reason for this was the quickness with which the armistice occurred. AEF General Headquarters (GHQ) established the Third Army on November 7, 1918, for the purpose of commanding U.S. occupation forces. The belligerents declared the Armistice on November 11, and the formal organization of the Third Army took place on November 15. On November 17, 1918, the advance elements of the Third Army began crossing the armistice line and began the long march to the occupation zone in the Rhineland. Occupation planning fell into two categories. First was operational planning that had to do with the zones of occupation and the routes of march into the Rhineland. The march to the Rhine River covered as much as 250 miles over very difficult terrain. It took three weeks to execute and the lead units reached the Rhine River on December 9. The entire army closed to the bank of the river in the American sector by December 11. On December 13, elements of the army crossed the Rhine River to occupy a bridgehead zone on the east bank.²⁴ The second part of the planning was the conduct of the occupation itself. The AEF

²³ Allen, *Occupation*, 185.

²⁴ US Army Center of Military History, *United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919, Volume 11: American Occupation of Germany* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1988), 1, 66–78. The first part of this history, pages 1 to 144, is a compilation of extracts from a variety of Third Army reports related to the conduct

Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs (OCCA) as well as the Civil Affairs chief of the Third Army did this part of the plan. The civil affairs officers did much of their work as the army moved forward into its occupation zone, and relied heavily on guidance from the Supreme Allied Command.

From the start there was confusion regarding the responsibility for military government and civil affairs within the occupation forces. General Pershing's original intent was to keep much of the responsibility and decision making in regards to military government at his level of command. Pershing designated Brigadier General H.A. Smith as the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs (OCCA) at GHQ. General Smith assigned Colonel Irvin L. Hunt to accompany General Joseph T. Dickman, the Third Army commander, as his "advisor to the Commanding General in civil matters."²⁵ At the beginning of the occupation, it was unclear if General Pershing, General Joseph T. Dickman, General Smith, or Colonel Hunt would ultimately have the dominant role in the conduct of military government and civil affairs operations within the American occupied zone. As it developed over the eight months of the Third Army's mission, Colonel Hunt played the primary role regarding interaction with the German civil officials.²⁶

of operations through June 19, 1919. There is no narrative associated with this portion of the history. General Dickman indicated some divisions marched between 225 to 250 miles. Joseph T. Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), 223.

²⁵I. L. Hunt, *American Military Government of Occupied German, 1918–1920. Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, undated), 29

²⁶Regarding his two months in command of the Third Army, General Liggett commented "At our Headquarters a special bureau of the Staff [the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Colonel Hunt] handled all questions arising where civil authority was concerned, so that I personally never had anything to do with the German Civil authorities." Hunter Liggett, *Commanding an American Army: Recollections of the World War* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925), 138. Pershing's remaining time in Europe in 1919 were primarily spent in ceremonial functions, inspecting units, and supervision the deployment of a million men back to the United States. General Smith, though specifically assigned with Civil Affairs policy execution, was located in at GHQ forward headquarters in Treves, far away from the bulk of the occupation troops, and he did not have immediate access to either Dickman or Pershing. Thus, most of the duty fell to Hunt who reported directly to Dickman, and was probably the most qualified, next to Pershing himself, to handle the civil affairs responsibilities.

Colonel Hunt came to the position of OCCA for the Third US Army from wartime duty as the JAG officer for the II Corps and liaison duties with the Second and then the Fourth British armies. He served as the OCCA from November 1918 through the deactivation of the Third Army in July 1919, and continued as the OCCA in the American Forces Germany (AFG) until his departure from Germany in April 1920. He brought significant experience to the position. Hunt was an 1899 graduate of the United States Military Academy and originally commissioned in the Infantry. He served as an infantry captain, construction officer, and company commander under Pershing's command on Mindanao from 1910 to 1913. He was an expert on US military civil affairs and military government having served in the Bureau of Insular Affairs from 1913–1916, and was also a trained lawyer, transferring to the JAG Corps in 1916.²⁷

The occupation orders called for four Allied armies and a total of 750,000 Allied troops to occupy the Rhineland. The occupying powers were France, the United States, Great Britain, and Belgium. The AEF established a forward GHQ at Treves (Trier) to supervise the American occupation. The occupation command, Third Army, located its headquarters in Coblenz on the Rhine River. The southern boundary of the American zone was with the Tenth French Army, and generally followed the line of the Moselle River. The northern boundary of the command was with the British Second Army. General Dickman reported directly to the commander of the AEF, General John J. Pershing. Pershing in turn, reported to the commander of the occupation forces, the Supreme Allied Commander, French Marshall Ferdinand Foch.²⁸

²⁷ Secretary of War, *Official Army Register, January 1, 1922* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 30; George W. Cullum, Wirt Robinson, Editor, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of US Military Academy at West Point, New York, Since Its Establishment in 1802, Supplement VOL. VI-A, 1910–1920* (Saginaw, MI: Seemann and Peters, Printers, 1920), 870–871.

²⁸ The Third Army, commanded by Major General Joseph T. Dickman, included three corps and a total of eight divisions (the 2nd, 32nd, 42nd Divisions made up III Corps; the 1st 3rd, and 4th Divisions comprised IV Corps; and the 89th and 90th Divisions were in VII Corps). Hunt, 27.

General Joseph T. Dickman had a strong background in military government. He graduated from the United States Military Academy, and later earned a law degree from the University of Vermont. He brought a very impressive resume to the command of the Third Army. He had a long frontier career as a cavalryman serving in the 3rd Cavalry and participated in the Geronimo campaign. He served in Cuba during the Spanish-American war and during the first occupation. In the Philippines he distinguished himself serving as a lieutenant colonel in a volunteer infantry regiment on the island of Panay. Later, he was part of Pershing's staff on Mindanao from 1909 to 1911. Dickman was an accomplished linguist: fluent in German, very good in French and Spanish, and during service in the Philippines he taught himself the Visayan dialect. During World War I Dickman commanded the 3rd Infantry Division and the I Corps. Similarly, Dickman's deputy commander, the Third Army chief of staff, Brigadier General Malin Craig, West Point class of 1898, had almost six years service in the Philippines. Craig served as a lieutenant in the China Expedition, then as the aide to General Thomas H. Berry, while Berry was the executive to the military governor, General MacArthur, from 1900 to 1901. He then served as the aide to General Franklin Bell from 1902 to 1904. In his second tour in the Philippines, 1906 to 1908, he served with the 1st Cavalry Regiment and as a construction quartermaster.²⁹ Thus, the senior leadership of the American occupation army, with Dickman, Craig, and Hunt in charge of Civil Affairs, was very experienced in military government.

²⁹The army considered Dickman to be one of its foremost tacticians. His peers believed his service in Europe was tainted by allied suspicions regarding his German heritage. Dickman's biographical information from George W. Cullum, Charles Braden, Editor, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the US Military Academy at West Point New York Since Its Establishment in 1802, Volume VIA, 1910 – 1920* (Saginaw, MI: Seeman & Peters Printers, 1920), 319–320; and Robert Lee Bullard, *Fighting Generals: Illustrated biographical Sketches of Seven Major Generals in World War I* (Ann Arbor, MI: J.W. Edwards, 1944), 1–10. Craig would end his career in 1940 as the Chief of Staff of the Army—passing on that position to General George C. Marshall. Craig biographical information from George W. Cullum, Charles Braden, Editor, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the US Military Academy at West Point New York Since Its Establishment in 1802, Volume V, 1900 – 1910* (Saginaw, MI: Seeman & Peters Printers, 1910), 605.

The area of the Rhineland that the Americans occupied was 5587 square miles, somewhat larger than the American state of Connecticut, and well within the capability of the occupation force to control. The western boundary was the border with Luxembourg and Belgium, and the eastern boundary was the west bank of the Rhine except for a nineteen mile (30 kilometers) deep bridgehead across the river at Coblenz. The southern boundary followed the trace of the Moselle River as it flowed northeast from the Luxembourg border to its confluence with the Rhine at Coblenz. The only industrial area in the region was the Neuwied urban area just to the north of Coblenz.³⁰ Though the total population of the American zone was almost 900,000, the area was not densely populated. The majority of the population was Roman Catholic, and was concentrated in the few urban areas and the great river valleys. The two dominant urban areas were Coblenz and Treves. Coblenz was the regional capital city for the German Coblenz *Regierungsbezirke* (district), situated in the southeast corner of the sector on the Rhine. It was primary an administrative center and had a population of 65,000 in the city itself and another 69,000 in the surrounding county. Treves was center of the Treves *Regierungsbezirke*, and was at the opposite end of the sector, in the southwest corner astride the south bank of the Moselle. Its population was approximately 55,000 with almost 100,000 in the surrounding county. The other important population center was Neuwied with a population of 69,000. The three population centers accounted for forty percent of the region's population.³¹

³⁰ In between Luxembourg and Coblenz, the terrain north of the river was the low mountains of the Eifel region. Although heavily forested in some places, particularly in the western part of the zone, the area was a mixture of agricultural and forested areas, and produced sufficient product to export food to the more industrialized population centers to the north. Hunt, 1–4.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 3. As Coblenz became the headquarters for the US occupation operation and later the location of the Inter-allied Rhineland High Commission, the population of the city increased significantly. General Henry Allen estimated that the normal population of the city indicated above increased by approximately 20,000. Allen, *Occupation*, 101.

The occupying armies governed the Rhineland indirectly through the German government's appointed officials. The armistice, and later the peace treaty, stipulated that the occupation forces govern through the existing indigenous government. This arrangement was agreeable to all parties in the interest of order and stability. All of the area occupied by the American army was part of the Rhine Province, one of the twelve provinces of the German state of Prussia.³² The American zone included parts of two of the five *regierungsbezirke* of the Rhine Province. About half of the Coblenz and about half of the Treves *Regierungsbezirke* were under American jurisdiction. The central German government, before November 1918, administered the Rhineland Province through a hierarchy of appointed German civil servants at the top of which was the province *oberpräsident* (president) and below him the *regierungsbezirke regierunspräsidenten* (district presidents). These officials were generally policy makers. The executors of policy were the *landkreis* (county) *bürgermeistereien* (mayors), who directly supervised the *stadt* and *land* (town and rural) subordinate *bürgermeistereien*. The military government dealt directly with these German officials. The German civil servants had little in common with the people they governed, and were not always popular. Additionally, although having the German officials in place relieved much of the occupation force's administrative burden, the fact that many mid-level German officials responded to several different authorities, two different occupation commands as well as the provincial German government, created numerous potential conflicts.³³

³² Though the Rhineland was a province of Prussia, it was physically separated from Prussia proper and historically had little connection to Prussia. Unlike predominantly Protestant Prussia, the Rhineland was mostly Roman Catholic. During the Napoleonic period, the province was incorporated into France. After the defeat of France, the Allies awarded the Rhineland to Prussia as a reward for Prussia's contribution to the defeat of Napoleon. Though the Rhinelanders considered themselves loyal Germans, they did not consider themselves Prussians. Hunt, 8–9.

³³ The policy of the German government was to appoint civil servants to positions outside of their native state. Most of the civil servants, particularly the higher-level ones, were from the eastern provinces of Prussia.

The Armistice Occupation

The mission of the American troops as they occupied the Rhineland in 1918 was not, as in previous military occupations, to restore governance or to build institutions. The primary mission of the occupation force was to be available if necessary to ensure the compliance of the German government with the armistice agreement. This mission greatly reduced the army's responsibilities in comparison with previous occupation experiences. Still, as the supreme governing authority, and in accordance with the recognized law of war, the commanders understood they had legal responsibilities for the population. They also had a strong tradition of military governance that guided them through the mechanics of the occupation.

The Allied commanders made clear to the German population the expectations of the command. General Foch, as the Supreme Allied Commander, declared his guidance to the occupation armies and to the civilian population in a proclamation. Key declarations in Foch's proclamation included:

The Allied military authority herewith assumes command of the country.

It demands strictest obedience from all.

The laws and regulations in force at the moment of occupation will be continued insofar as they do not affect our rights or our safety.

Public officials will be held responsible for the conscientious and honest discharge of the duties with which they are entrusted. The courts will continue to dispense justice.

The inhabitants must abstain in word and deed from any act of hostility, direct or indirect, toward the Allied authorities. They must obey the requisitions which may be made of them in conformity with law.³⁴

Junkers, the traditional Prussian aristocracy, who used their association with the king to secure advancement in the civil service, dominated the higher levels of the civil service. *Ibid.*, 9–14.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

Foch's proclamation was essentially an outline of the Allied authority as described in the Hague Convention as well as the US Army's published rules of land warfare.³⁵ Both Generals Pershing and Dickman followed up with proclamations of their own that essentially echoed Marshal Foch. General Pershing's proclamation indicated the philosophy of the American occupation: "All that lawfully and peacefully abide by the regulations laid down by the military authorities may count on protection for their persons, homes, property and belief."³⁶ General Dickman gave specific guidance to his commanders in the form of a memorandum that made clear several points: American officers would immediately contact German officials "when stopping in a town for the night or a longer period," and would order, not request, compliance with the laws of war. The army commander ordered commanders to direct the *bürgermeister* to prohibit the sale of liquors, except beer and light wine, produce maps of the town; inform the people to avoid assembling, furnish billets for troops and animals, and forbid the sale and carrying of weapons. Commanders could requisition supplies from the population as needed, but were encouraged to do this through the local officials and were required to issue vouchers for any supplies requisitioned. Commanders could not requisition food.³⁷ General Dickman's guidance, based on the laws of war, sufficed to govern civil-military relations for the march into the Rhineland. Formal orders, called "*Anordnungen*," issued by General Pershing's headquarters on December 9, 1918, superseded the army commander's guidance. The *Anordnungen* went into effect once units

³⁵ War Department: Office of the Chief of Staff, "Chapter VIII, Military Authority Over the Territory of a Hostile State," *Rules of Land Warfare* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), 105–117.

³⁶ Hunt, 31.

³⁷ The *Anordnungen* included the requirement for every person above the age of twelve to carry identification; a prohibition on movement between zones or to the unoccupied territory of Germany; prohibition against carrying arms or deadly weapons, and the collection of all private weapons and ammunition; prohibition of the sale of alcohol except light wines and beer, and the limit of the sale of wine and beer to five hours a day; prohibition of the gathering of crowds or assembly of persons; censorship of all newspapers and periodicals; censorship of the mail and prohibition against use of the telegraph, long distance telephone or wireless radio; prohibition against the use of carrier pigeons; prohibition against taking photographs out of doors; and any disturbance that impedes or disturbs American troops. *Ibid.*, 33–34.

arrived at their assigned occupation stations. General Pershing's headquarters developed the *Anordnungen* without a thorough understanding of German culture or the environment of the occupation. Initially the population viewed them as unnecessarily harsh and in many cases nonsensical. Over the first months of the occupation, the command recognized some of the problems with many of the *Anordnungen* and granted exceptions and made adjustments. Colonel Hunt noted in his history of the occupation that the experience of the *Anordnungen* demonstrated that "military regulations in an occupied territory are extremely difficult to enforce if they run counter to long-established customs."³⁸

The *Anordnungen* were the basis for law and order under the occupation forces. On December 10, 1918, the AEF GHQ issued General Order (G.O.) No. 225, which established the procedures for enforcing the *Anordnungen*. It also set up the framework of military government organization for the first part of the occupation. The order invested the Commander in Chief's (Pershing) authority for civil affairs in his representative, General Smith at AEF GHQ forward in Treves. Smith had the authority to modify the existing *Anordnungen* and issue additional orders relating to civil affairs for the Commander in Chief. G.O. 225 also established the division commanders as the commanders primarily responsible for administration of civil affairs. Corps and army commanders had civil affairs responsibility only within the areas controlled by the corps or army headquarters troops. G.O. 225 authorized each commander to issue special orders to the civil population in his area based on local circumstances. G.O. 225

³⁸ The rules controlling travel changed such that the process to gain permission to travel was automatic. The command modified arms regulations to allow police, foresters, and customs officials to carry weapons. In addition, the army exempted hunting weapons. The army extended hours for the sale of beer and wine to match German dining hours. Restrictions on assembly were quickly relaxed. The army began permitting assembly for parades and political meetings as early as January 1919. Censorship of the press was limited to that which might incite violence against the American army. The military government quickly restored access to long distance telephone and telegraph though the army retained censorship and the right to censor throughout the occupation. The German civilian population showed no interest in carrier pigeons and thus that regulation was moot. Similarly, the military government quickly lost interest in regulations against photography and that regulation was not enforced. The *Anordnungen* are discussed in *Ibid.*, 103–122, the quote is from Hunt, 111.

also authorized the establishment of military tribunals to adjudicate violations of the *Anordnungen*. Within each jurisdiction, there were two types of tribunals: Superior and Inferior Provost Courts. Only the commanding generals could establish Superior Provost Courts. They were empowered to administer punishments up to six months in prison or a fine of 5000 marks. The commanding officer of each garrisoned city, town, or other occupied place established Inferior Provost Courts. They could administer punishments up to three months confinement or fines up to 1000 marks. Army, corps, and division commanders could also appoint military commissions to try inhabitants for serious offenses against the military government or the laws of war. These commissions did not have any limit on penalties imposed. The review of all court findings rested with General Smith as the Commander in Chief's representative. In March 1919, the Third Army commander received review authority for all courts operated by elements of his command.

Critics complained about the lack of uniformity in the military court system. The *Anordnungen* were vague enough that many German citizens had no clear idea what actions might be violations of the *Anordnungen* and what were not. In addition, there was no coordination of standards between the various commands convening courts. Thus, interpretations of the *Anordnungen* and punishments varied widely across the occupation zone. The establishment of permanent civil affairs officers in each *kreis* and appointment of a Provost Court to support each of them eventually solved the problem of inconsistency in the court system. These officers then met weekly at either Treves or Coblenz to discuss cases and develop a consensus regarding interpretations of the *Anordnungen*.³⁹

³⁹ Ibid., 90–95.

An issue that became increasingly important as the occupation progressed was the German police. The *Anordnungen* permitted the German police to remain armed, and under the armistice, the German judicial law enforcement system continued to operate enforcing German law upon the civil population. The military government strictly prohibited German police from interacting in any way with military personnel. The German police were not a very robust or prestigious organization. This was the result of neglect and German reliance on German army military police to support them during the war years. American military police were the most important law enforcement capability in the first few months of the occupation. As American troops returned to the United States, the military government placed increasing requirements on the German police to enforce not only German law but also occupation regulations. The army also created a trained police reserve that backed up the relatively small regular German police force. To improve the quality of the police the army ordered the provost marshal, who operated under the staff supervision of the G-1, with inspection, training, and supervision of German police operations. This greatly improved the performance of the German police but created confusion between the provost marshal's officers and the civil affairs officers responsible for supervising all German government activity. The solution to this situation was to confirm authority over police operations to the civil affairs officers, and require the military police officers from the G-1 staff to assist the OCCA at the *kreis* level.⁴⁰ By fall of 1919 law enforcement in all parts of the occupied territory except the city of Coblenz was solely the responsibility of the German police.

In the area of government, the terms of the armistice called for the German civil administration of the Rhineland to remain in place. The American military government fully

⁴⁰ Ibid. 280–282.

recognized that the terms of the armistice requiring supervision of the Germans greatly simplified the ease of military government. Colonel Hunt's report summarized the American approach to governance:

Supervision requires tact and judgment rather than the display of constructive Genius.... In Cuba and the Philippines we had striven to revise native methods, and with results which fully justified the amount of labor expended. During the whole occupation of Germany, legislatures, executives, judges, customs officials, the most complicated and reputedly most effective civil organization in the world, were placed under the direction of American military government.⁴¹

The structure and quality of the German civil administration, and the requirements of the armistice rendered the supervisory tasks of governance relatively easy to accomplish.

Complementing the cooperation of the German government officials at every level was the overall attitude of the officials and the population in general. All the Americans who participated in the occupation, particularly the march to the Rhine in November and December 1918, commented on the unusually positive attitude of the population to the American occupation army. They attributed this positive attitude to at least three factors: relief that the war experience was over and a return to normalcy; the belief that the Americans, particularly because of President Wilson's fourteen points, were a different type of conquering army; and finally, the fear of bolshevism and the promise of stability that the occupying army represented. All three of these reasons in fact influenced the positive cooperation between the population and the occupying army that existed at every level from citizen to the province *oberpräsident* throughout the more than four years the army was in Germany.⁴²

As the army arrived in the occupation zone, army surgeons coordinated with the German civilian doctors who were the civil servants in charge of health and sanitation, the *kreisartz*

⁴¹ Ibid., 267.

⁴² Ibid., 41, 205–206.

(county doctor). In general, the Americans found the sanitary state of the territory satisfactory. Typhoid infected the water supply of some small communities. The command quickly and effectively identified and resolved these situations. The cause was the poor inspection procedures of the *kreisartz*, and the Americans removed the offending officials. Though the Americans, in keeping with their traditions, investigated the state of health and sanitation thoroughly, no issues caused more than temporary and local concern.⁴³

Upon entering Germany, the Allies expected, and German officials confirmed, that the civilian population was on the verge of famine. Thus, the Allies were prepared to intervene with food support if necessary. Subsequent careful investigation by civil affairs officers revealed that the German official accounts as well as those published by the German press greatly over-stated the food shortage. The Allies concluded that although German food supplies were at approximately half their pre-war level, and that there were acute shortages at particular times and places and with certain items, overall there was no food crisis. Still, the Allies initially prohibited troops from eating in German restaurants, Allied supply officers purchased only fresh vegetables (of which there was no shortage), and the command prohibited all Allied troops and civilians from buying any items listed on the German ration list. The army also sold surplus food supplies, mostly flour, to the Germans through the German officials. The province rationed food in the winter of 1919–1920, but rations were sufficient to meet the needs of the population.⁴⁴

There was a definite difference in the tenor of the American occupation from that of the French. France's unstated objective for the Rhineland, discussed above, influenced this different

⁴³ The American report on sanitation and health issues for 1918 to 1920 very thoroughly describes the German health and sanitation system, but does not make a case for any need for significant intervention by the occupation authorities. *Ibid.*, 123–153.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 162–166.

tone. The French army was openly hostile to the German population and the attitude of French officers and men was belligerent and superior. The French army's more aggressive approach to the occupation also reflected the French authoritarian approach to military government in their overseas colonies, the stress of the long and costly war just completed, and the French experience with German occupation in 1871. In contrast, the US command's view of the occupation was through the prism of its relatively progressive occupation experiences in Philippines, Cuba, and Mexico. Indications of inter-Allied friction based on the different national doctrines were quick to appear. After the Third Army arrived in Luxembourg, on its march to the Rhine, the French led high command proposed breaking up the American occupation forces and distributing them among the other Allied armies. This course ensured an American presence throughout the occupation area, but deprived the Americans of high command in the occupation. Of course Pershing refused and threatened to take the issue to the President. Foch and Pershing compromised and agreed to place two French divisions under command of the Third Army.⁴⁵

Before the Americans arrived at Coblenz General Dickman was alert to the different attitude of the French toward the German civilians as compared to that of American soldiers and officers. One of the few cases of abuse of civilians during the Third Army march to the Rhine was a case of a French liaison officer beating a German mail carrier. The officer was removed from his duties and returned to the French command. Later, the Americans removed two other French officers for also physically assaulting German civilians. In addition, American military police were necessary on several occasions to control groups of French troops in the American sector. The senior French liaison officer to the Third Army headquarters protested formally to

⁴⁵ Dickman, 207–208.

General Dickman that the Americans were entirely too lenient with the German civilians. In response, Dickman formally chastised the French officers as he recalled in his memoirs:

The French officers were told that the American Army had a larger and more varied experience in the military government of occupied territory than any European army, and that the record made in Cuba, the Philippines and China was creditable to that army and satisfactory to the American people. My remarks then continued about as follows “The Third Army is not granting exceptional favors to the people of the territory it now occupies, but is only carrying out what has been the policy of the American government for over 100 years.... This policy has remained the same, whether dealing with the savages of the Great West, the Malays of Luzon and the Visayas, the Moro Fanatics of Sulu and Mindanao, or the strangely different people of North China, and will not be changed now when we are in a civilized country, unless orders are received to the contrary, which are not expected.”⁴⁶

Dickman also had concerns about the French taking advantage of the civilian population through requisitions without pay, which he firmly rejected in the American zone.⁴⁷

In April 1919, General Foch requested that General Pershing replace General Dickman because of the inability of the French command to work with him. Recognizing that the end of the occupation was fast approaching, General Pershing complied without prejudice to General Dickman, and replaced him with General Hunter Liggett. General Dickman passed command of the Third Army to General Hunter Liggett on April 28, 1919. Though Dickman gives no hint of it in his memoirs, General Robert Lee Bullard believed that the numerous French complaints about Dickman’s supposed lenient behavior to the Germans, and his German ancestry, contributed to his leaving two months before the deactivation of his army.⁴⁸ General Hunter Liggett graduated from West Point in 1879 and had extensive frontier and Philippine experience.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 218–219, 229–230.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 231.

⁴⁸ General Bullard also points out that General Allen, who the French greatly respected personally, later reported more problems with French cooperation than Dickman experienced. The evidence does not support any overt prejudice in favor of the Germans on Dickman’s part. Bullard, 10. General Hunter Liggett alludes to the American-French tension in his memoir: “I soon found that owing to certain misunderstanding the feeling existing between our people and the French was not as cordial as it should have been.” Hunter Liggett, *Commanding an American Army: Recollections of the World War* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925), 136.

During the Philippine war, he was a district commander and military governor on Mindanao from 1899 to 1901. During the world war, he commanded the American I Corps under the French during the second Marne campaign in the summer of 1918. It was not long before Liggett also had a confrontation with the French army. In June 1919, French officers tried to engineer a coup by Rhenish separatists. Liggett firmly rejected French army efforts to get him to recognize the revolutionaries and the coup attempt failed miserably. The change of command from Dickman to Liggett had almost no effect on the operations of the Third Army or the American occupation.⁴⁹

The biggest challenge to the American military government in the spring of 1919 was not the Germans or the French, but rather, demobilization. The American public had little enthusiasm for a large overseas presence and continuance of the World War I alliance after the war ended. With the war over, the priority of the American army in Europe was not the occupation of Germany but rather bringing the boys home. The US Army had over two million men overseas during the war, most of them in Europe. Beginning on November 12, 1918, the primary focus of the AEF's energy was transporting those men home. By the spring of 1919, the ten divisions of the Third Army were the last remaining US combat troops in Europe, and the War Department issued orders for the redeployment of the bulk of the occupation force.

In March 1919, the 42nd division moved back the United States. By the time the peace treaty was signed in June, three other divisions had followed. This reduced the strength of the Third Army by over 100,000 troops. The flow of troops to the states in itself did not have an operational impact on the occupation, but it did reveal the most significant flaw in the American organization for occupation. As described previously, the AEF GHQ had given primary

⁴⁹Cullum, *Volume VI*, 275–276. Liggett, 142–144; Hunt, 300–304.

responsibility for civil affairs to the division commanders. In accordance with G.O. 225, each division created its own military government structure in its assigned geographic zone. This included its own local civil military regulations, the civil military court system, and a variety of relations its civil affairs officers created with local German officials. When the first division moved back to the United States, the remaining units assumed its zone. This required the geographic shuffling of dozens of unit boundaries and the adjustment of all of the military government associations constructed by the departing division. As more divisions departed for the United States, the shuffling of military government responsibilities threatened to cause chaos in the entire military government structure.

The OCCA at Third Army, Colonel Hunt, recognized the potential problems caused by departing tactical commands as early as February 1919. The solution to this problem was to detach the military government organization from tactical units and organize a permanent military government structure based on the existing political geography. This was exactly how all previous American occupations were organized: in the former Confederate States, Cuba, the Philippines and Vera Cruz the army organized the senior military command structure based on the local geographic political boundaries. This was even the case for the army command system in the United States. Rather than change things immediately, the Third Army determined to transition to a permanent military government organization under the army OCCA as divisions departed. Thus by the time of the signing of the peace treaty on June 30, 1919, the military government capabilities of the departed 42nd, 89th, 90th, and 32nd divisions had been reorganized as *kreis* civil affairs sections under a *kreis* OCCA who reported directly to the Third Army OCCA, Colonel Hunt. By the end of the September 1919 all the remaining divisions in the

occupation zone had returned to the United States and the reorganization of military government was complete.⁵⁰

The other organizational flaw that inhibited military government in the American occupation zone was the position of the AEF GHQ OCCA, General Smith. General Smith was General Pershing's representative with ultimate authority for military government. The directors of local military government were the division commanders through their staff OCCA. Corps and Army commanders had little command authority for military government. Thus, the military government command circumvented the tactical command system and created significant opportunities for confusion and miscommunication. In addition, General Smith, located in Treves, was 120 miles from Third Army headquarters in Coblenz, the hub of the American command system, and even further from many of the divisions that executed military government functions. His ability to supervise the functioning of military government was significantly less than that of the army and corps commanders. This flaw did not significantly harm the functioning of military government only because General Smith, General Dickman, and Colonel Hunt, as long serving regular army officers, had strong personal ties that allowed them to overcome the poorly designed system. The deactivation of AEF GHQ forward headquarters at Treves and the AEF OCCA position on June 1, 1919 corrected this flaw in the command system. After that date, command authority for military government passed to the commander Third Army and through him to Colonel Hunt.⁵¹

Post Peace Treaty Occupation

On June 28, 1919, the Germans and the representatives of the Allies signed the peace treaty at Versailles. Though the various governments still needed to ratify the treaty, Europe was

⁵⁰ Ibid., 80–85.

⁵¹ Ibid., 79–81.

at peace. On July 2, 1919, the Third Army deactivated, General Liggett departed, and General Henry T. Allen assumed command of the new occupation organization, American Forces Germany (AFG), on July 3, 1919. Major General Allen came to the command of the AFG from distinguished command of the 90th Division during the war and command of VIII Corps as the war ended. Pershing called Allen “exactly the right man in the right place” to command the AFG and his resume supported that assessment. Allen graduated from West Point in 1882 and earned early fame as one of the first explorers of the Alaskan frontier. Allen was unusual, even among the best and most successful American army officers, because he had extensive experience in Europe as a military attaché. Allen served in the US embassy in St. Petersburg from 1890 to 1895, and as the US military representative at the Berlin embassy from 1897 to 1898. Allen operated with ease in both diplomatic and military circles and was completely fluent in Russian, German, and French. Allen, however, was not just an embassy soldier. In 1899, he went to the Philippines as the lieutenant colonel of the 49th Volunteer Infantry Regiment and quickly earned a reputation as both an aggressive combat commander and a competent military governor. In 1902, Governor William Howard Taft selected Allen to create the Philippine Constabulary. Allen built the constabulary into a force of over 6,000 men and a reputation as an aggressive, reliable, and professional paramilitary police organization perfectly suited to the needs of governance in the islands. After leaving the Philippines, Allen commanded a cavalry regiment with Pershing’s forces in Mexico. Allen’s extensive experience in Europe, linguistic skills, his knowledge of civil military affairs and governance, natural intelligence, and his combat record made him the obvious choice to handle the army’s role in the complex post-war European political situation.⁵²

⁵² See Chapters 3 and 5 for references to Allen’s career on the frontier and as a commander in the

When Allen took command of the AFG it was still a robust force of over 100,000 men. However, the drawdown of forces through the summer and fall of 1919 continued. By August, the Allies reduced the US sector for occupation to the eastern half of the former territory and by September, the size of the force was down to 11,000 men. AFG built its headquarters staff around the remaining members of the Third Army headquarters. General Malin Craig remained as the Chief of Staff and Colonel Hunt remained as the OCCA. The change of command caused almost no disruption in the conduct of military government and the new organization of the military government on a geographic basis gave it increased stability and more consistency in its interaction with German officials.⁵³ The command relationships also changed with the deactivation of the Third Army. The AEF GHQ itself was preparing to return to the United States. General James Harbord, Pershing's Chief of Staff, told General Allen that he should not refer issues to GHQ but solve them on his own.⁵⁴ The AEF headquarters and Pershing sailed for the United States on September 1, 1919. From that point forward, Allen reported directly to the War Department. Despite the deactivation of the Third Army and the departure of the AEF, the leadership of the American occupation forces continued to be officers skilled and experienced in military governance.

Though there was great continuity in the headquarters of AGF, that continuity did not extend to the occupation troops. Over the course of the fall of 1919, the last of the veteran divisions sailed back to the United States. The army recruited a special force of volunteers to replace the veterans. The new recruits formed the 8th Infantry Regiment, which was the core of the 7,500 reinforced brigade occupation force that remained in Germany. The new men began to

Philippines, in the authoritative Allen biography by Heath Twichell, *Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer, 1859–1930* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974). Quote from Twichell, 216.

⁵³ Nelson, 126. Allen, *Occupation*, 52–53.

⁵⁴ Henry T. Allen, *My Rhineland Diary* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923), 10.

arrive in Germany in the summer of 1919 and by the fall made up the bulk of the occupation forces. In November 1919, an additional brigade, equally inexperienced, arrived in the American zone destined for duty in Upper Silesia during the plebiscite after ratification of the peace treaty. This brigade, consisting of two infantry regiments, never deployed to Silesia, and remained as part of the occupation force until the end of 1921. At the end of 1919, the occupation force strength was 18,828. The AFG organized its forces into two brigades, each commanded by a brigadier general. With the departure of the veteran World War I divisions, the quality of the force changed dramatically and training and disciplining the new soldiers of the AFG was the major focus of the command from the fall of 1919 on.⁵⁵

Unlike General Pershing, whose higher military headquarters in Europe when the war ended was the Supreme Allied Commander, French Marshal Foch, General Allen reported directly to the US War Department. Though the Allied national leaders agreed that the Allied occupation of the Rhineland would continue after the peace treaty was signed to ensure French security and German compliance with reparations payments, they rejected a military led occupation under Marshal Foch. Instead, they created a civilian agency, the Inter-Allied High Commission of the Rhineland, to oversee the occupation and all occupation policy. The official army history of the occupation explained that the High Commission “was made the supreme representative of the Allied and Associated Powers within the occupied territories, except insofar as the Treaty provides others.” Military forces of the occupation moved into barracks and were restricted in their actions without the approval of the commission. The Allies set forth the commission’s responsibilities in an annex of the Versailles Peace Treaty —the Rhineland

⁵⁵ The 1st Brigade consisted of the 8th Infantry, a battalion of the 6th Artillery, an engineer company and a cavalry squadron. The 2nd Brigade commanded the 5th and the 50th Infantry Regiments. This force remained unchanged until the War Department deactivated the 2nd Brigade in November 1921 and reduced the AFG strength to 8,710 men. American Forces in Germany, *American Representation In Occupied Germany, 1920–1921, Volume II* (Coblenz, Germany: American Forces in Germany, 1923), 240–242, 245. Allen, *Occupation*, 127–141.

Agreement.⁵⁶ On November 19, 1919, the US Senate rejected the Versailles Peace Treaty.⁵⁷ Because the Senate failed to ratify the treaty, the Rhineland agreement had no impact on the American forces in the Rhineland. Thus, alone among the occupying armies, the AFG remained in occupation status after January 1920 based on the armistice agreement of November 1918, and outside the authority of the Rhineland Commission.⁵⁸ General Allen mitigated the problem of Allied unity by agreeing to publish the proclamations of the Inter-Allied High Commissions as orders of the American military governor in the American occupation zone. In this way, the Allies maintained the unity of policy in the Rhineland despite there not being a formal unity of command.⁵⁹

While General Allen focused on the issues of foreign policy through the High Commission, the mechanics of German–American interaction within the occupied zone required adjustment. In January 1920, General Allen and Mr. Pierrespont B. Noyes, the American civilian observer to the Allied Commission, agreed that the civil affairs officers of the AFG, who supervised the German civil authorities in the American zone, should be replaced by the American civilian staff members of the High Commission. Thus, in the spring of 1920, the military civil affairs officers in the *kreis* gradually transferred their responsibilities to agents of

⁵⁶ Under the agreement, French Marshal Foch lost his command of allied military forces and the military commanders all reported separately to their national authorities and took their orders regarding occupation matters from the commission. However, the commission's authority did not go into effect until the peace treaty came into effect on January 10, 1920. On that date, according to the Colonel Hunt, "the supreme authority of the Allied armies in the Rhineland virtually came to a close." Hunt, 355–359. First quote, Allen, *Occupation*, 118. Second quote, Hunt, 347. See the text of the Rhineland Agreement in Allen, *Occupation*, 299–305.

⁵⁷ *The New York Times*, "Lodge Resolution Beaten," November 20, 1919, 1. The treaty also failed a second ratification attempt in March 1920. *The New York Times*, "Lack 7 Votes to Ratify," March 20, 1920, 1.

⁵⁸ Hunt, 359–361

⁵⁹ This agreement also gave the American government leverage within the High Commission discussions, despite the fact that the US representative, Mr. Pierrespont B. Noyes, was not a member of the commission but an official observer. Though it rarely occurred, if the United States strongly disagreed with a decision of the High Commission, General Allen had the option of not endorsing its execution in the US occupation zone. Thus, though the United States was not a member of the High Commission, the desire for unity of action among the Allies was sufficient to ensure that they always considered the American viewpoint. Because of this consideration, the General Allen consistently cooperated with the actions of the Commission. Allen, *Occupation*, 119–126.

the American Representative to the High Commission. In October 1920, the AFG discontinued the position of the OCCA at the *kreis* level. The Americans maintained the continuity of the relationships built up by the *kreis* OCCA with the German authorities by demobilizing the army civil affairs officers in Germany and then the US Department of State hired those same individuals back as civilians in the same role. In addition, General Allen assigned the new AFG OCCA (Colonel Hunt's replacement), Colonel David L. Stone, to also serve as the military assistant to the American Representative at the Allied High Commission.⁶⁰ Thus, the transition from military government under AFG to civil administration under the High Commission was well coordinated and did not significantly affect the German officials who continued to conduct the day-to-day governance of the occupation area.

Within the context of transition to the authority of the Inter-Allied High Commission, one other change occurred which effected the nature of the AFG's relationship with the Allies and the High Commission. In June 1920 Mr. Noyes, the US Representative to the High Commission, was relieved of his duties and General Allen was designated as his replacement. General Allen then appointed Colonel Stone as the deputy US representative.⁶¹ The appointment of General Allen, and the redesignation of Colonel Stone's position, consolidated all American governance functions, civil and military. Thus, similar to military governors in Mindanao and Cuba, General Allen simultaneously occupied a position as the American representative to the civil

⁶⁰ Allen *Occupation*, 125–126; Hunt, 361–364. *American Representation, 1920–1921, Volume II*, 8–36. Colonel Stone replaced Colonel Hunt as the AFG OCCA. Stone graduated from the USMA in 1898 and saw combat service in Cuba and the Philippines. On his second tour of duty in the Philippines, he was wounded in combat against the Moro. Because of wounds, he was transferred from the Infantry to the Quartermaster Corps. Stone served in World War I as the G-1 and Quartermaster of the 3rd Division, and as the G-1 of 2nd Army. After his service with the AFG, he served in a wide variety of command and staff position culminating with Command of the V Corps in 1940. Stone retired in 1940 at the mandatory age. Cullum, *Volume V*, 613, and *Volume VI*, 855–856; “General David L. Stone (1876–1959),” *The Free Encyclopedia of Washington State History*, http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=pf_output.cfm&file_id=9100 (assessed September 2009).

⁶¹ American Forces in Germany, *American Representation In Occupied Germany, 1920–1921, Volume I* (Coblenz, Germany: American Forces in Germany, 1923), 257–258.

administration of the occupied territory, and the position of the commander of US military forces in the occupied territory. As the US Representative to the High Commission, General Allen reported directly to the State Department. As the commander of the AFG, he continued to report directly to the War Department.

The AFG and the occupation of the Rhineland were not significant issues in the 1920 presidential elections, although there was some public sentiment for bringing the troops home from Europe after the failure to ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty. The Republican candidate, Warren G. Harding, made public statements advocating bringing the troops home but the main foreign policy issue was the League of Nations.⁶² Once Harding took office in 1921, he considered bringing the troops back several times. In August 1921, representatives of Germany and US signed a peace treaty between the two countries, which both countries ratified and accepted on November 11, 1921.⁶³ In November 1921, the government reduced the size of the force to its originally conceived size of 7,500 men.⁶⁴ The peace treaty normalized relations between Germany and the United States, but also ended the armistice justifying the occupation. In January and February, 1922, the War Department ordered another 4,500 men home, leaving the strength of the occupation at 2,500 men. Additional reductions in 1922 left Allen with a force of about 1,200 troops. With the 1922 reductions, the US occupation presence was only slightly larger than one infantry battalion, and therefore the Allies reduced the US occupation

⁶² *The New York Times*, "Harding Rejects the League Outright; Wants troops Back After Peace Vote;" October 8, 1920, 1; *The New York Times* "Gov. Cox Recites 'Fourteen Wabbles' Against Harding," October 21, 1920, 1.

⁶³ From 1920 on, though General Allen and the High Commission were busy with overall US policy in Europe and particularly with relations with the French and German governments, the interaction of American army forces and the German civil authorities was limited and routine. On July 2, 1921, President Harding signed a Senate resolution declaring a state of peace with Germany. *The New York Times*, "Our Formal Peace A Nebulous Status Without a Treaty," July 4, 1921, 1; *The New York Times*, "War with Germany Ended July 2, 1921," November 15, 1921, 18.

⁶⁴ The AFG accomplished this by deactivating the 2nd Brigade as discussed previously.

area to garrisoning the city of Coblenz. The French army assumed responsibility for the entire former US zone except Coblenz.⁶⁵

At the close of 1922, the American government had to determine if the deterrence value of the small AFG force was sufficient to warrant its cost financially and politically. On the one hand, there was a domestic political price to pay for having the troops stationed in Europe — particularly without a legal mandate. Also, the mere presence of troops, and their relationship to the High Commission, enmeshed the US government inextricably in European politics. On the other hand, the occupation force gave the US government some advantage in protecting US political and economic interests in Europe, and some ability to mitigate French aggression. In January 1923, as the Harding Administration was debating continuing the occupation, the French army occupied the German Ruhr industrial region over the objections of both the American and British governments. General Allen had consistently counseled that “possibly the greatest restraint to complete French domination [of the Rhineland] was the independence of the American representative in his authority over a large section of the controlled territory.”⁶⁶ The French occupation of the Ruhr on January 11, 1923, demonstrated that the small US presence no longer had the ability to restrain the French. Thus, the President ordered the army to withdraw from Germany. By the end of the January 1923, the AFG had turned over Coblenz to the French army and embarked for the United States, ending a forty-nine month occupation.

Legacy

The occupations of Vera Cruz and the Rhineland perpetuated the experience in occupation operations to several new generations of American army officers. At Vera Cruz,

⁶⁵ American Forces in Germany, *American Representation In Occupied Germany, 1922–1923*, (Coblenz, Germany: American Forces in Germany, 1923), 21, 24, 52–57; *New York Times*, “Our Stay on Rhine A Change in Policy,” June 6, 1922, 16.

⁶⁶ Allen, *Occupation*, 152.

Captain Douglas MacArthur and Lieutenants Leonard Gerow, Walton Walker, and Wade H. Haislip, all destined for high command in World War II, saw military government operations executed by an expert.⁶⁷ MacArthur, Walker, and Haislip also participated in the Rhineland occupation. Five future army chiefs of staff, John Hines, Douglas MacArthur, Malin Craig, George C. Marshall and J. Lawton Collins served in key staff or leadership positions during the Rhineland occupation. Other officers who would play an important role in the interwar and World War II army also saw service in the AFG including Lieutenant Colonels Jonathan Wainwright and John K. Herr, both of whom served as the AFG G-3 under General Allen.⁶⁸ All of the key leaders who would lead the occupation operations during and after World War II were in the army throughout the Rhineland occupation, and could not help but be aware of how the postwar presence of American troops impacted the politics of the region. As the next chapter describes, the Rhineland occupation became the major focus of occupation studies during the interwar years at both the Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and at the Army War College.

Both the Vera Cruz and Rhineland experiences validated the approach to occupation operations developed in Cuba and the Philippines. Generals Funston, Dickman, and Allen specifically mentioned the value of previous occupation experience in the Philippines and Cuba to the conduct of their operations. Both operations are remarkable for their relative effectiveness given the limited time and guidance that the 5th Brigade and the Third Army had to prepare for

⁶⁷ Leonard Gerow (VMI 1911), Walton Walker (USMA 12), and Wade Haislip (USMA 1911) would achieve significant military success in their career. Gerow commanded the V Corps, Walker commanded XX Corps, and Haislip commanded the XV Corps in the Northwest Europe Campaign in World War II. All three corps were solid fighting organizations. Gerow retired from the army in 1950 as a Lieutenant General, Walker was killed in Korea commanding the 8th Army in 1950, and Haislip retired in 1951 as a full general and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army under Chief of Staff. Most important, all three men were very close life-long friends of Dwight Eisenhower who arrived in the 19th Infantry Regiment in 1915, soon after they returned from Vera Cruz. Gerow was Eisenhower's study partner when both attended the Command and Staff College at Leavenworth.

⁶⁸ Wainwright would achieve world fame as a Lieutenant General and the commander of US forces in the Philippines in 1942. John K. Herr was a Major General and the last Chief of Cavalry in 1942.

their operations. Certainly, General Funston, General Dickman and Colonel Hunt's previous military government experiences were a major part of their success despite a lack of detailed planning and preparation.

Vera Cruz, in particular, demonstrated the army had the ability to directly operate the complex systems necessary for a large urban area to function. The description of Funston's operations in Vera Cruz mirrors those of Wood in Havana and Otis in Manila. All of the army's experience with administering justice, policing, finances, engineering, and sanitation and health regulations were required to make the Vera Cruz occupation successful. At the end of the occupation, Vera Cruz was the most efficiently operated city in Mexico and possibly all of Latin America.

The Rhineland experience validated the army's strict reliance on the law of war for guidance in the conduct of the post conflict operations. It also validated the army's general philosophy of occupying areas with a firm but benevolent hand. Both General Allen and Colonel Hunt, in their histories of the occupation of the Rhineland explicitly make the connection of the success in the Rhineland to the legacy of the previous sixty years of American army experience in occupation operations by referring to the Civil War era General Orders 100 to describe the US Army principles applied to the occupation of Germany after World War I. General Allen explained:

There are two distinct conceptions of the purposes of an occupation: to compel compliance with war decisions and inflict penalty on the population, or simply to compel compliance with war decisions. The policy of the United States has been founded always upon the latter and our practice was clearly set forth in orders as early as 1863: "As military government is carried out by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of

justice and humanity —virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.”⁶⁹

The recitation of General Order 100 is a clear expression of the linkage in the minds of the US Army’s leadership between the American Civil War experience, the occupation of Spanish possessions at the turn of the century, and the United State’s first experience with occupation operations in Europe in the 1920s. That linkage would remain firm through the interwar years and continue to guide the United States Army in its major military occupation operations during World War II.

⁶⁹ Allen gets the quotation slightly wrong but it he is definitely quoting Article 4 of General Order 100, issued by President Lincoln (and reissued in the Philippines by General Arthur MacArthur in 1901) April 24, 1863. Allen, *Occupation*, 89. A longer quote from General Order 100 that includes this phrase is also in Hunt, 101.

CHAPTER 7 - Preparing, Planning, and Testing Occupation Operations, 1919–1945

The World War I experience with occupation operations from 1918 to 1923 drove home the importance of occupation operations to the American army. Though the American army was very experienced in occupation operations prior to World War I, the interwar years gave the army an opportunity to reflect and codify its experience. The occupation history of the army became the subject of command and staff training and of doctrine. As the United States entered World War II the army leaders, many with direct connections to the history of army occupation operations, quickly recognized the essential requirement to conduct occupation operations. General Allen W. Gullion, Provost Marshal General of the Army, remarked to Secretary of War Henry Stimson in February 1942, “No doubt about it. If we’re going to win this war, we’re going to have to occupy some countries.”¹ The army recruited and trained a cadre of specialized civil affairs officers for the task. Early operations reinforced the need for the army to be fully engaged in occupation operations and the War Department responded by adjusting its organization, and refining the doctrine necessary to execute occupation operations on a global scale in very diverse theaters. The army tested organization, doctrine, and training in the Allied Military Government (AMG) operations in Italy from 1943 to 1945. These experiences demonstrated consistency with the history of army occupations operations and provided valuable practical lessons that informed later operations in Germany and Japan.

¹ Telecon, Gullion and SW Henry L. Stimson, 5 Feb 42, in Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Hereafter cited as *Governors*) (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964), 11. General Allen W. Gullion was the Provost Marshal General of the army from 1941 to 1945. Prior to serving as the PMG, Gullion served as the army JAG from 1937 to 1941. He gained national recognition in 1926 as the lead prosecutor in the Brigadier General Billy Mitchell Court Martial.

Institutional Training and Civil-Military Missions

The World War I leadership, who became masters of conventional warfare, started their careers as the young officers who thrived in the complex and unorthodox operations on the frontier, and in the Philippines and Cuba. The senior leaders of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), and the occupation after the war, Generals John Pershing, Robert Bullard, Henry Allen, Hunter Liggett, Joseph Dickman, Hanson Ely, and Preston Brown were all veterans of the Philippines.² Their influences dominated the army in the interwar years. The army passed their legacy on to the World War II generation of leaders during the interwar years through the professional education system, and the missions that the army performed in the years before World War II. They also personally mentored many of the World War II leaders. One of the legacies that they passed was that of the army's self-image. Despite the focus on World War I style conventional operations, the army's self-image remained an image of a multi-functional tool of the nation and many of the tasks required of it in the interwar years were not strictly military.

Although West Point was an important introduction to the culture of the army, its academic and military focus was correctly on the knowledge and skill required of junior officers. Other than an introduction to international law, West Point gave little formal attention to occupation operations. In contrast, the army's premier education institutions, the General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, and the War College in Washington, both devoted significant time to the issues of military government, occupation operations, and associated tasks. Virtually all of the senior leadership of World War II were graduates of those two institutions.

² See Robert L. Bullard, *Fighting Generals: Illustrated Biographical Sketches of Seven Major Generals in World War I* (Ann Arbor, MI: J.W. Edwards, 1944), for a short but comprehensive biography of some of the lesser known key leaders of World War I who also reflected the military government experience.

At Leavenworth, the curriculum continued to teach the subject of military government and occupation operations in the law courses, as was the practice before World War I. The amount of time the curriculum devoted to law varied considerably over the interwar years.³ Two areas of the law curriculum covered military government and occupation operations: military law and international law. Most of the instruction was in the form of lectures. The faculty at Leavenworth wrote and published two outstanding texts on military government. The faculty published the first text, entitled *Military Government*, in 1920. This work covered the history of the occupation of Germany, and the history of the army's military government experiences in the Mexico. The author of the text was General H.A. Smith, the AEF officer in charge of civil affairs (OCCA) in the Rhineland in 1919.⁴ In 1925, the General Service School Press at Leavenworth issued another more comprehensive text entitled *Military Aid to the Civil Power*. That text served as a "practical guide for officers of the Army of the United States in administering the Laws of War, and in the application of correct legal principles to situations involving Military Government, Martial Law, and Domestic Disturbances." Over a third of the text's 317 pages were devoted specifically to military government.⁵ During the 1930s when the course was two years in length, students at Leavenworth also demonstrated a continued interest in the subject of military government in their individual research papers under the directed topic "Practical Problems in Military Government."⁶

³ In 1920 the law portion of the School of the Line curriculum included 10 hours of lecture, 2 hours of conference and a 1 hour map problem. *Annual Report of the General Service Schools, 1920* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: General Service Schools Press, 1920), 18;

⁴ H.A. Smith, *Military Government* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service School Press, 1920).

⁵ *Military Aid to the Civil Power* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service School Press, 1925), iii.

⁶ For example two papers that focused explicitly on issues confronting military government operations were Major Julian Cunningham's 1933 paper "Critical analysis of the methods and means adopted by the British forces in Mesopotamia, to control the civil population during the occupation of the region," May 12, 1933, *Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library*, http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll14&CISOPTR=574&CISOBX=1&REC=5 (accessed 24 June 2009); and Major Joseph N. Dalton's "Food supply for the civilian population in the American

The Army War College in Washington also addressed military government and occupation duties. The War College's teaching philosophy was that students learned to be senior staff officers and senior commanders by doing. Therefore, the College assigned students projects that focused on anticipated strategic level staff problems and worked on solutions in student committees.⁷ The problems were coordinated such that the sum of solutions together produced a comprehensive war plan. The college linked the work to real potential adversaries designated by colors. Although the War College academic exercises were not official plans, there was a close relationship between the Army General Staff and its War Plans Division and the work done at the college.⁸

Between 1926 and 1940, students in the G-1 Course of the War College worked on aspects of war planning focused on military government of occupied areas. The committee studies, though titled differently and focused on different color adversaries, followed a similar format. First, the students examined facts relating to the problem of military government and occupation operations. This produced a written analysis of historical military occupation operations. The cases studied by the War College students included the German occupation of Belgium during World War I, the Allied occupation of the Rhineland after World War I, and the US occupations of Cuba, Vera Cruz, and Puerto Rico. The students drew general conclusions regarding occupation operations from the case studies and made recommendations to the War Department. The students then used the analysis of history to develop and propose a doctrinal

area during the military occupation of Germany by the armies of the allied and associated powers," March 16, 1934, *Combined Arms Library Digital Library*, http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll14&CISOPTR=855&CISOBX=1&REC=6 (accessed 24 June 2009).

⁷ The committee system and the teaching philosophy at the War College are described by George S. Pappas, *Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College 1901-1967* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1967), 41-45. 97.

⁸ The close relationship between the academic planning done at the War College and the actual war planning done in the General Staff War Plans Division is documented in Henry G. Gole, *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 18-19, 142-143.

manual to provide guidance to the War Department and theater commanders regarding civil-affairs operations in occupied territory. Finally, the students prepared a plan for military government intended as a component of a general theater operations plan.⁹ The War College academic work reflected several important characteristics of the interwar army: first, the army's approach to teaching war planning was extremely comprehensive; second, the interwar army recognized that the inevitable consequence of successful theater level operations was occupation operations; and third, that there existed a critical requirement for detailed planning of occupation operations.

Some of the most important tasks assigned to the army in the interwar years reinforced the educational institution's attention to the occupation and military government missions. Those tasks were not actual military government missions, but were the type of complex civil-military tasks common in military government missions. The army characterized the tasks as support to civil authorities controlling civilian populations. Riot duty was a major concern of the army and eruptions of labor and racial unrest were frequent enough in the interwar years to keep the mission in the thoughts of army leaders and in the curriculum of the army's officer schools. The most famous of the population control missions was the dispersing of the war Bonus Marchers in Washington in 1932.¹⁰ Riot duty was the most onerous of the army's peacetime

⁹ See "Course at the Army War College 1934–1935, G-1, Preparation for War, 1st Part, Supplement No. 2 to Report of Committee No. 6. Subject: Military Government Civil Affairs," November 1, 1934; "Course at the Army War College 1936–1937. G-1, Report of Committee No. 4. Subject: Provost Marshall's General Plan, Military Government," November 13, 1936; and "Course at the Army War College 1939–1940, Supplement No. 1 to Report of Committee No. 5. Subject: The Administration of Civil Affairs in occupied Alien Territory and Preparation of Manual for Conduct to Same," November 4, 1939, Army War College Curriculum Archives, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

¹⁰ A complete discussion of the Army's role in civilian population control, as well as a detailed description of major civil disturbances is in Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997). A detailed discussion of the Bonus March events is on pages 367–390. Chief of Staff of the Army, General Douglas MacArthur, and his aide, Major Dwight Eisenhower, were both deeply involved in the bonus march response. Also involved in the Bonus

domestic missions, but the economic depression of the 1930s caused the army to become closely involved with civil government and the civilian population in other ways. One of the most important tasks the army performed in support of economic recovery was public works. The creation of public works projects and their supervision fell to the army Corps of Engineers.¹¹ The army also organized, administered, and supervised the work of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Over the time of its existence, the CCC recruited and employed over three million civilians in a workforce organized along military lines and supervised by army officers and non-commissioned officers.¹² These diverse missions, riot control, economic infrastructure maintenance and construction, and labor management, were not military occupation missions, but they put army leaders in close contact with the concerns of the civil community and they reinforced the cultural notion that the army was not just a fighting force. The diverse tasks encountered by the army in the interwar years made it plain that the army's mission was to perform whatever tasks were required in support of the interests of the national government.

During the interwar years the army not only engaged with the domestic civil population and government, but it also engaged with populations and governments overseas. The interwar army's overseas missions were primarily in Panama, the Philippines, and China. The missions of the army units in these areas were primarily defensive. However, peacetime operations required that the commanders and other leaders in these locations closely coordinate their operations with the American diplomats, as well as with the indigenous government and the local

March response were Major George Patton and Captain Lucian Truscott of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, both destined to be military governors in Germany after World War II.

¹¹ US Army Engineer Corps, *History of the US Army Engineer Corps* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1998), 51. Major Lucius Clay, future military governor of Germany, was deeply involved in the Engineer Corps public works projects in the interwar years.

¹² Richard W. Stewart, General Editor, *American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army in the Global Era, 1917–2003* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2003), 63–64.

population. This required politically engaged and culturally aware leaders able to surmount the challenges of language.

General George C. Marshall was a product of both the interwar army experience and the mentorship of the pre-World War generation of army leaders. Marshall's career consistently exposed him to the experiences, doctrine, and history of army occupation operations. In 1906, Marshall attended the Infantry and Cavalry School of Application at Fort Leavenworth. He received extensive instruction on military government, learned French, and finished first in his class.¹³ Marshall left Leavenworth with a thorough theoretical knowledge of military government operations. Marshall's operational army experience was diverse. Marshall was frequently involved with tasks in operational environments closely associated with military government and occupation. His experiences began in first assignment as a lieutenant in the 13th Infantry in 1902 in the Philippines. Stationed initially on the island Mindoro, he participated in many of the type of tasks typical of army's role in pacifying and governing the islands: his soldiers taught school, he worked closely with clergy and other native leaders, and he spent months in remote locations completely out of communication with higher command. Marshall dealt regularly with the challenges of confronting foreign languages, multiple foreign cultures, and tropical diseases.¹⁴ Both through experience and study, Marshall had a thorough understanding of the army's role in the pacification of the islands. During World War I Marshall made his reputation as one of the

¹³ Though he was the junior man in rank in his class of fifty-four students, he finished first in his class, and qualified to stay for the second Staff School Year. In the second year, Marshall took sixty-six days of instruction in law—half of it dealing with the law of war and martial law, wrote an individual research paper on the subject of military government, and to studied French (the army judged him already fluent in Spanish). Again, he finished first in his class and earned a two-year assignment to the faculty. *Annual Report of the Commandant US Infantry and Cavalry School, US Signal School, and Army Staff College* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Staff College Press, 1907), 29–31. *Annual Report of the Commandant of the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Ks.* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Staff College Press, 1908), 79–85. Larry I. Bland, Editor, *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue* (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Center, 1996), 151–157.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 120–144.

top staff officers in the army.¹⁵ After World War I, Marshall followed General Pershing from France to Washington as his aide. In 1924, the army assigned Marshall as the executive officer of the 15th Infantry Regiment in China. There he learned Chinese, and commanded the regiment as it protected American interests and property during frequent outbreaks of civil war.¹⁶ In 1936, the army promoted him to Brigadier General and assigned him as the Chief of the Army War Plans Division on the army staff. He held that position until his selection to be Chief of Staff and promotion to full General in September 1939.¹⁷ Marshall's rich assignment history not only put him in positions of great responsibility, it also placed him in the midst of diverse cultures, repeatedly demonstrated to him the importance of language proficiency, placed him in the midst of civil-military operations, and showed him how the army can have a major influence on political situations short of conventional war.

Marshall was an exceptionally gifted officer who excelled at all tasks assigned him. However, even an officer with brilliant qualifications needs a mentor—Marshall had two who became his close friends: J. Franklin Bell and John J. Pershing. Marshall came to General Bell's attention several times but the close relationship between the two men began in 1916 when Bell, serving as the Commander of the Division of the East, chose Marshall as his aide. As his aide, Marshall and Bell became close and Marshall became the heir to Bell's vast frontier and

¹⁵ Marshall initially served as the G-3, Operations Officer, of the 1st Infantry Division, then in the Operations Section of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) General Headquarters (GHQ). From GHQ he moved to the First Army where he was again a G-3, Chief of Operations. Marshall ended the war as the Chief of Staff for General Henry Allen, commander of the VIII Corps, a position he held briefly before returning to the operations section of Pershing's GHQ.

¹⁶ Though officially the executive officer, Marshall commanded the 15th Infantry for several months in the absence of an assigned commander. He also was given a great deal of latitude to run the regiment in his last year in China. Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Education of a General, 1880–1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 228–245.

¹⁷ Marshall's military biography summarized in William Gardner Bell, *Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775–2005* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005), 124; Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Education of a General, 1880–1939*, 271–291.

Philippine War experience.¹⁸ As the United States entered World War I, Bell released Marshall to join the 1st Infantry Division staff deploying to France. During the war, Marshall impressed Pershing with his self-confidence and competence and Pershing picked him as his senior aide. In four years of stressful, challenging and close service, Marshall became one of Pershing's most trusted subordinates and a close friend. Pershing occasionally joined Marshall and his wife for informal dinners at their quarters and came to know the family well. In 1930, General Pershing was the best man at Marshall's second wedding.¹⁹ In subsequent years, Pershing used his influence on behalf of his favorite subordinate. In 1938, Pershing helped Marshall gain a position on the General Staff, and in 1939, Pershing recommended Marshall as Chief of Staff of the Army to President Roosevelt. On April 23, 1939, the President informed Marshall that he would be the new Chief of Staff.²⁰ Marshall's close, almost familial, relationship with Pershing over many years put him in a superb position to glean the lessons Pershing learned on the frontier, among the Moros, and as head of the AEF.

Marshall's personal experiences and mentors gave him a strong appreciation for the importance of military government and the chaos that resulted from not preparing for a post-conflict environment. He recalled of his experiences in the Philippines and post World War I Germany:

¹⁸ Marshall first came to General Bell's attention in 1907 when Bell was the Commandant at Leavenworth and Marshall graduated first in his class. In 1910, Marshall added to his reputation by running the division maneuvers in the Philippines during the time Bell commanded the Philippine Division. Bell's experience on the frontier began in 1876 when he arrived in the 7th Cavalry as a replacement for casualties suffered in the Little Big Horn battle. Bland, *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, 159–160, 172, 181–182; Larry I. Bland, Editor, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: Volume 1. The Soldierly Sprit, December 1880 – June 1939* (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Center, 1981), 98–99.

¹⁹ Marshall was widowed in 1927 after twenty-six years of marriage. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Education of a General 1880–1939*, 226–227, 268. Sally Chamberlin was responsible for all of Marshall's personal correspondence throughout World War II. She was Bell's niece and daughter of Brigadier General Ernest Garlington, a Medal of Honor winner, and Inspector General of the army from 1906 to 1907.

²⁰ Bland, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: Volume 1. The Soldierly Sprit, December 1880 – June 1939*, 712–713.

I had gone in myself as a second lieutenant with no instruction of any kind whatsoever—no schooling of any kind whatsoever —and not even an Army regulation. A storm had destroyed practically all the papers, and what I could find in a barrel [were] rain-soaked, and I had to make up my own returns —I was the only officer there —and [some] of my early returns for property I had to deal with and supplies I had to issue —were made up almost [wholly] out of my imagination. But I was given no instructions at all and I was practically governor in effect of quite a large territory, about half an island.

In the First World War it was not until after the actual fighting [began] that they started in to try to get officers that had been trained —some by [Major General Frederick] Funston in the [Mexican intervention —and began circulating [requests] to get any copies of the regulations which had been [issued] at that time.²¹

Marshall's professional judgment was not just a product of his own experiences.²² Marshall's professional military education, his unique and challenging assignments and experiences, and his close contact with Generals Bell and Pershing, all connected him to the army's rich history of military government and occupation duties. Those personal experiences influenced the emphasis Marshall placed on the War Department staff providing the priority, guidance, resources, and the support necessary for the theaters to conduct the military government mission properly.

Doctrine

The studies conducted at the War College discussed above were not merely filed away. In 1939, the G-1 (Personnel Officer) of the Army Staff proposed to the Army Staff G-3 (Operations Officer) that, in accordance with the recommendations of the War College student committee, the G-1 produce a manual that covered military government. The JAG did not concur, arguing that the JAG *Rules of Land Warfare* manual covered military government activities. Ultimately, the army G-3 determined that military government required more detail than the legal discussion in the JAG manual and directed the G-1 to publish a new manual. The

²¹ Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 455.

²² *Ibid.*, 61.

result was in fact two new manuals, *FM 27-5, Military Government*, and a new version of *FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare*, both prepared by the office of the JAG and published in 1940.²³

A strong direct link existed between the army's military government doctrine developed for World War II and the written guidance and doctrine used in all previous American occupation operations. The army's first written guidance regarding occupying enemy territory and dealing with belligerent civil populations was published in General Order 100 in 1863. In 1914, the War Department published its first version of the *Rules of Land Warfare*. That manual, subsequently published again in 1917 with no changes, included "everything vital contained in G.O. 100 of A.G.O. of April 24, 1863," and "wherever practicable the original text has been used herein, because it is believed that long familiarity with this text and its interpretations by our officers should not be interfered with if possible to avoid doing so."²⁴ The army revalidated the doctrine in 1934 when the army published the new *Rules of Land Warfare* manual. The chapter on "Military Occupation and Government of Enemy Territory," remained virtually identical to the 1914 version, which included much of G.O. 100. In 1940 and in 1944 new versions of the manual were prepared. The 1940 version of the manual, designated *FM 27-10*, made only minor changes to the chapter on occupation, while the 1944 update only changed two paragraphs in the entire manual and made no changes to the occupation chapter.²⁵ Thus, the basic legal doctrine guidance to US forces regarding occupation responsibilities and operations in World War II descended directly with almost no changes from the guidance derived for occupation operations during the American Civil War and used in all subsequent occupations.

²³ *Governors*, 7–8.

²⁴ War Department, *Law of Land Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), 7.

²⁵ War Department, *Basic Field Manual, Volume VII, Military Law, Part II, Rules of Land Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934); War Department, *FM 27–10, War Department Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940).

The major change in occupation doctrine that occurred prior to World War II was the 1940 publishing of *FM 27-5, Basic Field Manual, Military Government*. That manual was a much more comprehensive treatment of the subject than contained in *FM 27-10*, which only allocated thirteen pages to occupation operations. The major difference, however, was not detail but rather focus. The previous treatments of occupation operations focused on legal issues. *The Rules of Land Warfare* manuals stipulated what commanders must, could and could not do from a legal point of view. In contrast, *FM 27-5* described how to conduct military government. Some of the important directions in the new manual included: not tasking combatant units with military government responsibilities; leaving indigenous government institutions, officials, and laws in place; and requiring a separate civil affairs staff section in each theater staff. The manual also stated the major functional responsibilities of military government as public works, fiscal issues, public health, education public safety, legal, public welfare, economics, and communications. *FM 27-5* described three phases of military government: during active hostilities; before the official declaration of peace but after combat had ceased in a given area; and after peace was officially agreed upon but before the organization of civil government. The manual also provided detailed guidance on the operation of military tribunals and on proclamations to the population.²⁶ Much of the content in *FM 27-5* came from the recommendations of the War College committee —recommendations based on the army history in occupation operations.

In December 1943, the War Department issued a new version of *FM 27-5* far superior to the 1940 version. The new manual covered the same topics as the original but provided much more detail in the content. The bulk of the original manual, thirty-nine of sixty-three pages, was

²⁶ War Department, *FM 27-5, Basic Field Manual, Military Government* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), 5–8, 10, 12–21.

appendices covering example forms, proclamations, and ordinances. The new manual eliminated these appendices and replaced them with detailed content. The new manual covered all the same major topics as the old, but in greater detail. In addition, it addressed topics not covered in the previous manual including joint army and navy planning and policies, likely conditions in occupied territories, treatment of political prisoners, operational versus territorial civil affairs organizations; employment of Military Police, Marines, and Shore Patrol; procurement, classification and training of civil affairs personnel; and planning. One of the most important characteristics of the new manual was that as a joint publication of both the War Department and the Navy Department, it provided comprehensive guidance for military government operations by all the US military services. The 1943 *FM 27-5* was a solid manual, clearly written and practical. It was also a practical extension of the legal guidance to military occupations contained in the companion doctrine in *FM 27-10*, and thus built upon the principles established over the long history of army occupation operations.²⁷

North Africa and the Civil Affairs Division

General Marshall recognized, and army doctrine as discussed above made clear, that the army had an important role in occupation operations. However, the extent of that role was not well defined when the war began. Nonetheless, Marshall gave guidance to the army staff to prepare to participate in occupation operations and toward that end, the army staff organized itself to accomplish the occupation mission. Secretary of War Henry Stimson strongly supported Marshall in his efforts to organize and give priority to the army's civil affairs capabilities. Stimson was a key figure not only for his support of the army military government efforts, but

²⁷ Navy and War Departments, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943). The measures of this manual's effectiveness are the very evident parallels between the directives in the manual and conduct of the actual occupation operations in Italy, Germany, and Japan.

even more important, because he championed the army's prime role in occupation missions to President Franklin Roosevelt. Stimson was an unusual figure in the Roosevelt cabinet and in the history of American government. Stimson, a Republican, became part of the Roosevelt cabinet in June 1940 as the President created a bipartisan organization tailored to fighting a world war.²⁸ Stimson graduated from Yale in 1888, Harvard Law School in 1890, and was a partner in the law firm of Root and Clark on Wall Street in 1893. He became close friends with the senior partner, Elihu Root. Stimson also developed close personal and professional ties to President Theodore Roosevelt who appointed him US Attorney General for the Southern District of New York in 1906. In 1911, President Howard Taft appointed Stimson as Secretary of War, largely based on Elihu Root's recommendation. Stimson was Secretary of War from 1911 to 1914, supervising Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood. During World War I, Stimson enlisted in the army, received a commission in artillery, and served in France as a staff officer. In 1927 Stimson returned to public service as a special envoy for President Calvin Coolidge to Nicaragua and then as Governor General of the Philippines from 1927 to 1929. President Herbert Hoover appointed him Secretary of State in 1930. After leaving office in 1933, Stimson became a leading spokesperson for the Republican Party on foreign affairs and a strong advocate of opposition to Japanese aggression in China. Over his long career Stimson developed strong personal views on the role of the War Department in the government of occupied territories. He felt so strongly about the issue that he intimated to President Roosevelt that he was prepared to resign rather than consent "to the liquidation of the great historic powers of my office." Stimson's strong feelings regarding the army's role in military government stemmed from his own extensive experience,

²⁸ At the same time Stimson was joined in the cabinet by fellow Republican Frank Knox, who became Secretary of the Navy. The two men were the Republican Party's leading foreign policy experts. Edward Jean Smith, *FDR* (New York: Random House, 2007), 449–451.

and close associations with the army military governors of the early part of the twentieth century.

In a letter Stimson prepared for the President in 1944, he described the history of American military government and the roles of men such as Elihu Root, Leonard Wood, and Frank McCoy.

He ended the letter with the following conclusions:

1. The authority of the military governor in each [historic] case has stemmed from the military power of the United States exercised by the President as Commander in Chief.
2. In each case the military governor has been compelled to employ agents for the solution of civil administrative problems of government. In each case these agents have been in the first instance composed of Army officers although many of them have been men of high civilian experience; for example, Tasker Bliss who conducted the customs of Cuba with consummate skill and success; Gorgas and Walter Reed who constructed its sanitary system; and many others like them.
3. These Army officers continued until they were replaced by competent local native administrators.
4. The administrators thus set up have been so successful as to constitute a bright page of American history, free from scandal and, in such difficult communities as Cuba and the Philippines, have laid the foundation of permanent good relations between those countries and the United States.

In the history of the War Department, no Secretary of War brought as much personal experience with, or understanding of occupation operations to the War Department as Henry Stimson.²⁹

President Roosevelt posed a significant problem for Secretary Stimson. Unlike Stimson, Roosevelt had limited experience with military government. His natural inclination was that all things political should be the province of civilian leadership. He also had a proclivity to personally manage details of foreign affairs. Stimson noted in his diary that Roosevelt “takes a

²⁹ The letter written by Stimson for Roosevelt was never delivered. Instead, Stimson, after writing the letter, concluded that a personal discussion with the President was the better approach and more likely to win the President to his views. The letter, nonetheless, clearly makes the point that the army’s history with military government had the greatest impact on Stimson opinions regarding the role of military government operations in war. McGeorge Bundy and Henry L. Stimson, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 553–561; quotes from 556–557. For a very thorough and well researched biography of Stimson see the award winning Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960).

thoroughly Rooseveltian view of what historic good administrative procedure has required in such a case as we have in North Africa. He wants to do it all himself.”³⁰ Both of Roosevelt’s tendencies conflicted with the army’s and Secretary Stimson’s views of effective military government. In the short term, in 1943, Stimson was able to win Roosevelt’s support for the army’s requirement to have unchallenged authority in occupied areas during hostilities. However, Stimson revisited military government policy several times with the President during the course of the war.

Given that the Secretary of War was a firm backer of the army’s leading role in occupation operations, the army required an organization to create the capability to conduct military government. The Provost Marshal General of the Army took the initiative dealing with the military government issue as discussed below. That effort was sufficient to organize the School of Military Government, but the Military Government Division within the Provost Marshal’s office was at too low a level to impact War Department policy, much less national strategy or theater operations. This became evident during Operation TORCH, the invasion of French North Africa.

One of the important leaders that Marshall supported for promotion was Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander of Operation TORCH. Eisenhower was the field commander who had the greatest influence on the conduct of army occupation operations in Europe. Because he did not see service overseas during World War I, Eisenhower did not have a strong wartime bond with the preceding generation of officers. He was more of the generation of officers that matured after World War I. By 1922, Eisenhower’s military assignments were singularly unimpressive. Two events occurred in the 1920s that created the conditions for Eisenhower to

³⁰ Bundy, 555.

distinguish himself from his peers. The first was meeting Brigadier General Fox Conner. Conner graduated from West Point in 1898 and as a young officer had served in the occupation of Cuba. During World War I, he was Pershing's Chief of Operations for the AEF, and was part of Pershing's inner circle of professional and personal confidants. Conner met Eisenhower while on his way to command an infantry brigade in Panama, was impressed with him, and arranged for Eisenhower's assignment to his staff in 1922. Eisenhower and Connor became close friends, and Connor took responsibility for Eisenhower's development as an officer. Connor carefully guided Eisenhower's professional development, and Eisenhower later recalled that of all the people he would meet in his distinguished career, Connor was the "one more or less invisible figure to whom I owe an incalculable debt." Eisenhower's association with Connor connected him to the Pershing circle of world war veterans. After his assignment to Panama, Connor used his influence to get Eisenhower a coveted selection to the Staff School at Leavenworth.³¹ His relationship with Fox Connor and his outstanding work at Leavenworth opened doors for Eisenhower.³² After Leavenworth, the army assigned him to work with General Pershing on the American Battle Monuments Commission. He began this work in 1926, but in 1927 he left to attend the War College. After the War College, Eisenhower returned to the Battle Monuments Commission in France, and worked in Paris directly for General Pershing until 1929.³³ Returning to Washington, the army chose Eisenhower to be a military assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War. He remained in this position until Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur picked him as an aide in 1933.

³¹ William B. Lee, *Major General Fox Connor, November 2, 1874 –October 13, 1951* (unpublished , undated manuscript, at the Military History Institute Library, Carlisle, PA); Dwight Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1967), 178–182, 186, 198–200. See also Bell, 126.

³² At Leavenworth Eisenhower graduated first in his Leavenworth class of 245. *Annual Report of the Commandant of the General Service School, 1925–1926* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: General Service Schools Press, 1926), 6.

³³ Eisenhower, *At Ease*, 204–210.

Eisenhower worked for MacArthur as his aide and military assistant for seven years — four in Washington and three in the Philippines. The assignment started out beneficial to both officers and greatly expanded Eisenhower’s intellectual horizons.³⁴ During his seven year association with MacArthur, Eisenhower was in the midst of national and international politics. He personally influenced army policy when MacArthur was Chief of Staff. During his time in the Philippines, he developed a close personal friendship with President Manuel L. Quezon of the Philippines, and immersed himself in the strategic issues of Asia.³⁵ Eisenhower, because of long personal contact with MacArthur, was also subject to MacArthur’s long conversational monologues. These, though somewhat self-centered, exposed Eisenhower to all of Douglas MacArthur’s professional history, and undoubtedly to that of Arthur MacArthur as well. Thus, when Eisenhower left the Philippines in December 1939 Eisenhower was a fundamentally different officer than before he began working for MacArthur.³⁶ In those seven years, he gained insights into the issues of national defense policy, domestic and foreign politics, and the seventy years of the MacArthur family’s military service beginning in the Civil War, and including Reconstruction, the frontier, the Philippines, Vera Cruz, and World War I.

On November 8, 1942, Allied forces under Eisenhower’s command landed in North Africa and defeated Vichy French forces under the command of French Admiral Francois Darlan. The Allies left the Vichy government under Admiral Darlan in charge of civil administration of the territory. They also left various Vichy racial laws in place. Eisenhower

³⁴ By end of that period however, whatever mutual respect the two once had for each other did not exist. Eisenhower’s son John indicated the “love-hate relationship is well known; the degree of admiration and loyalty that Eisenhower felt for him (MacArthur) in the early days of the War Department is not.” Daniel D. Holt and James W. Leyerzapf, Editors, *Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 1905–1941* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), xxvi. Interestingly, Eisenhower’s account of his time in the Philippines in *At Ease* is a relatively neutral treatment of MacArthur with little trace of bitterness. MacArthur’s account of the same period in his *Reminiscences*, does not mention Eisenhower at all, though Eisenhower was his principle assistant.

³⁵ President Quezon was a former Philippine insurgent leader.

³⁶ Eisenhower, *At Ease*, 196–243.

justified his accommodation with the Vichy French as military necessity. The situation created a huge fervor in the Allied press and highlighted the unpreparedness of Allied forces to conduct military government operations. Civil military problems plagued Eisenhower's command throughout operations in North Africa. The problems included the question of supreme Allied authority in the captured territory, responsibility for feeding the civil population, responsibility for civil economic policy, and the role of Eisenhower's civil affairs staff. As Eisenhower described it, "Politics, economy, fighting—all were inextricably mixed up and confused one with the other." Eisenhower's reports from North Africa prompted the War Department to increase the priority given to civil affairs in early 1943.³⁷

The various staff divisions of the War Department, G-1, JAG, Provost Marshal General (PMG), the Operations Division (OPD), as well as the Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff all agreed on the importance of civil affairs and military government operations. Stimson believed, based on his experience as the Secretary of State, that the State Department was completely incapable of administering occupied territory. He felt strongly that the proper roles in occupied areas was that the State Department, with army support, determined policy, and the army, with State Department support, administered policy.³⁸ However, in 1943, there was no concerted effort by any one department of the government to lead occupation policy, and that was a problem. In North Africa the army learned that a myriad of civilian agencies all saw pieces of occupation operations as part of their responsibilities. Each of the agencies wanted to coordinate their efforts separately with the various responsible War Department staffs, and each of the agencies formed its own policy in respect to occupied areas. In addition, each agency also

³⁷ *Governors*, 30–62. See also *The New York Times*, "Speedy Shipments for Africa Urged," December 31, 1942, 3; W. H. Lawrence, "President Upholds Deal with Darlan," *The New York Times*, November 18, 1942, 1; and *The New York Times*, "London Weeklies Condemn Darlan," November 21, 1942, 5; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 127–132, quote on 129.

³⁸ Bundy, 561.

coordinated directly with the theater commander, or in some cases, did not coordinate with the theater commander at all. In either case, the other governmental agencies presented problems for the theater commander as well as the army staff. These various agencies included the State Department, Treasury Department, Office of Economic Warfare, Office of Foreign Economic Coordination, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Office of Lend-Lease Administration, and the North African Economic Board. No single agency was responsible for coordinating the civil affairs tasks and issues that occurred in occupied territory after major combat operations were over.

To solve this problem the War Department established a clearly articulated and published policy for occupation operations in February 1943. It stated, "In any military operations which results in occupation of substantial areas of inhabited territory, provision must be made as part of the military plan of attack for the welfare of the civil population over which jurisdiction is thus obtained." After the situation stabilized, at the determination of the theater commander, the military would relinquish its control of the occupied territory to either the native population or civil agencies of the occupying forces. Thus, the War Department firmly declared itself solely responsible for initial occupation operations.³⁹

The next issue the War Department confronted was establishing a single agency within the department to coordinate occupation tasks and issues, and to represent the War Department in policy. A review by the Office of the Under-Secretary of War (OUSW) in January 1943 confirmed that occupation responsibilities "are scattered within the War Department, and delimitations of authority are not clear."⁴⁰ The War Department addressed this problem by creating the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) on March 1, 1943, as part of the army General Staff.

³⁹ WD Statement of Policy, 1 Feb 43, *Governors*, 64–65.

⁴⁰ Memo, Neff, OUSW, for Patterson, 26 Jan 43, *Governors*, 66.

On April 7, 1943, the army appointed Major General John H. Hilldring the chief of the Civil Affairs Division.⁴¹ Major General Hilldring was an infantry officer who served as the G-1 of the army staff before moving to head the CAD. He was both an impressive staff officer and combat leader. The army saw Hilldring as a good fit for the CAD position because as the G-1 he was involved in the initial writing of FM 27-5.⁴²

When Hilldring took over the CAD, General Marshall called him to his office and gave him guidance:

I'm turning over to you a sacred trust and I want you to bear that in mind every day and every hour you preside over this military government and civil affairs venture. Our people sometimes say that soldiers are stupid. I must admit at times we are. Sometimes our people think we are extravagant with the public money, that we squander it, spend it recklessly. I don't agree that we do. We are in a business where it's difficult always to administer your affairs as a businessman can administer his affairs in a company, and good judgment sometimes requires us to build a tank that turns out not to be what we want, and we scrap that and build another one....But even though people say we are extravagant, that in itself isn't too disastrous....

But we have a great asset and that is that our people, our countrymen, do not distrust us and do not fear us. Our countrymen, our fellow citizens, are not afraid of us. They don't harbor any ideas that we intend to alter the government of the country or the nature of this government in any way. This is a sacred trust that I turn over to you today.... I don't want you to do anything, and I don't want to permit the enormous corps of military governors that you are in the process of training and that you are going to dispatch all over the world, to damage this high regard in which the professional soldiers in the Army are held by our people, and

⁴¹ In April, the CAD moved from the General Staff to the Special Staff of the War Department. AG to Haskell, OPD, 1 Mar 43, *Governors*, 68; *The New York Times*, "Civil Affairs Unit is Set Up for Army," April 8, 1943, 12.

⁴² Hilldring graduated from Columbia University and received a commission in the infantry in 1917. He served with the 38th Infantry Regiment of the 89th Division during World War I. The army awarded him the Distinguished Service Cross for bravery in action in France as the commander of Company K, 38th Infantry Regiment. Hilldring attended the Infantry Advanced Course in 1932 when General Marshall was the deputy commandant, and he graduated from the Command and Staff College in 1936. In 1943 General Douglas MacArthur selected Hilldring for division command in the Pacific theater but doctors discovered he had a heart condition that precluded combat command. The Infantry Journal, *Infantry in Battle* (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal Inc., 1939), 212; Adjutant General's Office, *US Army Register* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), 432; *The New York Times*, "Gen. Hilldring Heads Unit," April 16, 1943, 10.

it could happen, it could happen, Hilldring, if you don't understand what you are about.⁴³

Marshall's guidance reflected not only the importance he placed on the CAD and its leader, but also his understanding that CAD was going to be a highly visible, potentially politically sensitive, and strategically critical organization.⁴⁴

CAD was the army's single point of contact on issues regarding post-conflict operations, civil affairs, and military government. One task of the CAD was to translate political policy into army directives, plans, and orders. However, formulating national policy was still an ad-hoc process in 1943. In Secretary Stimson's view, the President's Cabinet with its more than twenty members was not the appropriate venue for policy making. National occupation policy was determined through a series of formal and informal meetings between the President, Cabinet officers, and assistants. The result was confusing and sometimes contradictory policy statements. The ineffectiveness of this situation became embarrassingly evident in the fall of 1944 as German occupation policy became a priority. To meet the requirement for policy the service secretaries and the Secretary of State created a formal organization for formulating post-conflict policy: the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).⁴⁵ The assistant secretaries of the State, War, and Navy departments were the members of the committee. The committee formed in December 1944—too late to have a major impact on initial German policy but in time to take the lead in formulating occupation policy for Japan. The committee formed sub-committees of experts from the three departments to prepare policy recommendations on all

⁴³ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945*, 458–459..

⁴⁴ Hilldring more than fulfilled Marshall's expectations as the chief of CAD. In 1946, Hilldring followed General Marshall to the State Department where Marshall appointed him Under-Secretary of State for Occupied Areas. Hilldring later took on State Department responsibility for refugees and became an important advocate for Israel within the State Department and with President Truman.

⁴⁵ The SWNCC concept for the inter-departmental formulation of national security policy eventually evolved into the National Security Council (NSC) created in July 1947.

issues that effected occupation operations and US foreign policy. The SWNCC staffed its recommendations on policy with each of the departments, and then forwarded them to the President for approval. Once approved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) transformed the policy into directives for theater commanders.⁴⁶

Military Government Training

Much of the American leadership outside of the military assumed that the task of occupation administration was the responsibility of American civil authorities. This included President Roosevelt. Even the army's own experience in World War I, and the report of Colonel Hunt which described it, indicated a preference for civil leadership of post-conflict operations.⁴⁷ One of the major findings of Colonel Hunt, based on his experience in the Rhineland, was that regular army officers did not have the special training or expertise required to conduct civil affairs operations in occupied territory.⁴⁸ In December, 1941, the army staff looked closely at the military government doctrine, and the G-1 of the army, at the time responsible for military government occupations, raised the issue of civil affairs and military government training. The army staff tasked the army PMG, General Allen W. Gullion, to be in charge of the training using the facilities of the Military Police School. The staff selected the PMG to set up the course of instruction because the PMG had the resources, and General Gullion, in his previous position as the Army JAG, had supervised the writing of FM 27-5. In late February 1942, the Provost Marshal General's Office determined that the military police schools were not sufficient to meet

⁴⁶ "Establishment of The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," *Foreign Relations*, Vol. I, 1944, 1466–1470; See also, Harold W. Moseley, Charles W. McCarthy, Alvin F. Richardson, "The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XIII, No. 333, November 11, 1945, 745-747.

⁴⁷ *Governors*, 4–6. I.L. Hunt, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 333–334. This is a reprint of the original report: Office of Civil Affairs, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920* (Coblenz, GE: Headquarters American Forces in Germany, 1920). The army reprinted the report in 1943 to make it available as a text for civil affairs officer training.

⁴⁸ Hunt, 63–65.

the civil affairs training requirements and selected the University of Virginia as the site of a dedicated School of Military Government (SMG). The first class reported for duty in May 1942.⁴⁹

The PMG selected an army reserve JAG lawyer, Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, as the first commandant of the School of Military Government.⁵⁰ The course of instruction at the SMG was sixteen weeks long and intended for field grade officers. It prepared graduates to serve on senior level policy and planning staffs, or for leadership positions in military government organizations. Each session could accommodate up to 150 students (later expanded to 175). The *New York Times*, in a special feature on the school, described its purpose:

Since the officers are in most cases already equipped for their specialized jobs, the training by the Army is largely a matter of familiarizing them with the military setting in which they will work and with the country to which their experience and skill will be applied. Not the least of the problems is to train these essentially civilian experts to fit into the framework of Army organization and methods. Then they must translate their American technique into the environment of a foreign land and, to some extent into a foreign idiom.

The school focused on two areas: US military government doctrine and history, and the countries subject to likely occupation. The curriculum included ten major subject areas: organization and operation of the War Department, international law and military government, American regulations, American experiences in military government, other nation's military

⁴⁹ "Memo, Maj Gen Myron C. Cramer, JAG, for ACoS, G-1, 23 Dec 41," "Memo, Jesse I. Miller, PMGO, for PMG, 10 Jan 42," AG to PMG, 9 Feb 42, *Governors*, 9–11, n9.

⁵⁰ Wickersham was the son of a former Attorney General of the United States under President Howard Taft, George Wickersham. He was a 1906 graduate of Harvard Law School. He worked as partner in the oldest and one of the most prestigious law firms in New York City prior to World War II. He enlisted in the New York National Guard in 1915 and served on active duty on the Mexican border in 1916. He remained on active duty through the end of World War I serving in a variety of staff positions ending on the war on the AEF staff. With mobilization in 1941 he returned to active duty and served as the G-2 (Intelligence) Officer for the First Army and then Eastern Defense Command before summoned to lead the SMG. Wickersham later served as the SHAEF representative to the European Advisory Committee (EAC) and after the war as General Lucius Clay's deputy commander of the United States Group Control Council (USGpCC). James Clark Fifield, Editor, *The American Bar, Contemporary Lawyers of the United States and Canada* (Minneapolis, MI: Byron Printing Company, 1925), 452–453; Earl Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), 7; *Time*, "International: Phase One," May 28, 1945; *The New York Times*, "State Guard Loses Gen. Wickersham," September 4, 1948, 26.

government experiences, public administration, political-military issues, geographic special topics (relating to Germany, Italy, or Japan), and liaison with friendly governments. The foreign country expertise of the school's faculty was impressive. Major Henry Rowell, Professor of Latin at Johns Hopkins University, was the Italian expert. He had studied and taught in Rome. Professor Arnold Wolfers of Yale was the German expert. Wolfers was a former director of the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin. The Japanese expert, Professor Hugh Borton of Columbia University, had been a missionary in Japan and then studied at Tokyo Imperial University. Borton specialized in Japanese government and history.⁵¹

The SMG was the top tier of a three-tier military government school system. The system could produce up to 6,000 military government officers for the army field forces by the end of 1944. The second tier of the system and the part that trained the bulk of the company grade officers was the Custer-College program. This program trained in two phases similar to the two major portions at the SMG. The first phase was four weeks of basic military training, military government doctrine and War Department procedures. The military government training faculty at the Provost Marshall Military Police School at Fort Custer, Michigan conducted this phase. The second phase of training focused on country specific topics and language training. It lasted three months and gave students the country training they needed to operate as military government officers in villages, towns, and counties. This phase, known as CATP (Civil Affairs Training Program) occurred at contracted civilian universities known as Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS). The army initially enrolled six civilian universities in the program and later expanded it to ten. The third program that was part of the military government training system

⁵¹ Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, for Actg Dir, CAD, April 2, 1943, in *Governors*, 80–81; Outline of Curriculum, First Course (May–Aug 42) submitted by Comdt, SMG to TAG [The Adjutant General], May 13, 1942, *Governors*, 11–12; Harold Callender, “Trained to Govern,” *The New York Times*, May 2, 1943, SM10–SM12; Hugh Borton, *Spanning Japan's Modern Century: the Memoirs of Hugh Borton* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 82.

was an occupation police program that trained public safety officers, police specialists, and military police officers and noncommissioned officers. The Provost Marshal's office administered this program at Fort Custer as well.⁵²

Captain Robert M. Hill, a lawyer from Alabama, went through the CATP and attended the CATS at Yale University in the summer and fall of 1943. His area specialty was Italy. Hill reported:

At New Haven we studied Italian culture —language, history, geography, demography, sociology, folklore, art, government, and politics. We struggled with the language. Our instructors were native Italian women who were residents of the New Haven area. We had two oral drill periods a day and a weekly lecture on grammar. This method required us to memorize whole phrases, mimic the instructor's pronunciation, and try our scraps of Italian in different situations. We were expected then to be able to compose our own sentences. For some this method worked, despite grammatical gender and those baffling irregular verbs.

Hill indicated that some officers excelled in the language instruction and went on to become fluent, most had a working knowledge and were able to communicate, and some never got it. The CATP system took men who had valuable expertise and gave them the basic knowledge necessary to apply their skills within a military framework in a foreign land. Hill's subsequent positive experiences as a military government officer for more than two years in occupied Italy validated the applicability and the effectiveness of the training he received in CATP.⁵³

The army selected a variety of different types of individuals to attend the School of Military Government. Officers came from two sources, volunteers from within the already commissioned ranks, and volunteers recruited straight from civilian status. Among the

⁵² Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, for Actg Dir, CAD, 2 Apr 43, *Governors*, 80–81; Ziemke, 17–20; Joseph P. Harris, "Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 7, 1943, 694–706; Charles S. Hyneman, "The Army's Civil Affairs Training Program," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2, April, 1944, 342–353. Joseph Harris was a Colonel and a member of the faculty at the SMG, he was also Professor of Political Science at the University of California. Charles Hyneman was a civilian employed by the Provost Marshal General's office as the Chief of the Training Branch; he was also Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University.

⁵³ Robert M. Hill and Elizabeth Craig Hill, *In the Wake of War: Memoirs of An Alabama Military Government Officer in World War II Italy* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 1–2.

volunteers coming from within the army there was a constant concern over quality as army field commanders discouraged volunteers from among their best officers. The quality of those coming from civilian life was generally very high. The civilian applicants were older and tended to be much more skilled and experienced than those from within the army. The average age of the students going through the SMG in 1943 was forty-five years. Older and more experienced officers went to staff positions while younger officers went to the field teams. The various skills of the civil affairs officers included business executives (for supervisory positions), public health specialists, engineers, lawyers and judges, elected government officials, law enforcement professionals, political scientists, economists, agricultural specialists, and finance and banking experts. Overall, the recruiting process for civil affairs officers (CAOs) was successful in attracting the high quality personnel needed for the mission. Among the army's CAOs were several former state governors, members of Congress, city mayors and managers, university presidents, federal and state judges, deans of law schools, and many others prominent in civil professions.⁵⁴

Operations in Italy

The US Army tested military government on a large scale for the first time during World War II in the Mediterranean Theater in 1943. On July 9, 1943, Allied forces invaded Sicily and secured the island on August 17. The Allied invasion of Sicily created a crisis within the Italian government and on July 24, 1943, the Italian Cabinet revolted and overthrew the Fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini. On October 13, the Italian King declared war on Germany and the Allies recognized Italy as a co-belligerent. The Germans continued to support a Fascist government in the northern part of Italy that they controlled. Thus, Allied Military Government (AMG)

⁵⁴ C.R.S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943–1945* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957), 701–705.

conducted military government operations in Italy in the midst of a highly unstable local political situation.⁵⁵ After the surrender of the Italian government, the Allies set up a military government structure to administer operations in occupied territory. Because of the complex political situation in Italy, the organization of military government was also complex. There were essentially three phases of governance operating simultaneously during the Italian campaign. The first phase was tactical military government conducted by the CAOs of the tactical formations. Initially, the highest tactical civil affairs organizations were the army level AMG groups commanded directly by the theater AMG headquarters in Palermo, Sicily. The AMG headquarters established liaison officers at the 15th Army Group headquarters. As the Allied armies advanced north, the distance to Sicily became too great for effective command. In October 1943, the 15th Army Group established its own AMG HQ (later G-5, 15th Army Group). The army group AMG HQ commanded all AMG organizations in the army group area of operations. Below 15th Army Group were AMG sections in both the Fifth US Army and the Eighth British Army. In both armies, all corps and division headquarters also had AMG sections. All AMG organizations were combined organizations staffed with both British and American officers.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ The first civil affairs officers deployed in Italy were those supporting Operation HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily. They operated within the structure of the allied tactical commands and had no organizational structure outside of the tactical commanders. Their role in the operation was first, to support the tactical combat operations of the army, and second, to coordinate and administer the basic needs of the civilian population. There was virtually no Italian governance structure in place in Sicily and the fighting severely damaged most of the occupied areas. Governance operations had to focus all of limited resources on meeting the basic needs of the population.

The Italians ceased fighting the Allies under an armistice signed on September 8, 1943. A new Italian government under King Victor Emmanuel III, and Prime Minister Pietro Badoglio, established itself in southern Italy in the areas already occupied by the Allies. On September 28, 1943, the Italian government formally surrendered to the Allies and recognized allied military authority over the Italian government. The status of co-belligerent, however, did not “affect the [surrender] terms recently signed, which retain their full force and could only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford to the United Nations.” Robert W. Komer, “The Establishment of Allied Control in Italy,” *Military Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring, 1949, 24–25, quote on 25.

⁵⁶ G-3 Section, 15 Army Group, *A Military Encyclopedia Based on Operations in the Italian Campaigns, 1943–1945* (Italy: Headquarters 15 Army Group, 1945), 535–540.

The military government apparatus at the theater level operated the second phase of governance in the Mediterranean theater. At the theater level within Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ), a special Military Government Section (MGS) coordinated civil affairs and military government issues. The MGS's responsibilities were planning, procuring and training personnel, and advising the commander in chief on civil affairs policy. In May 1944, the MGS reorganized as AFHQ G-5.⁵⁷ In October 1943, there were four major theater level military government organizations under the MGS: a military mission to the Italian Government in Brindisi, administrative AMG headquarters in Sicily, operational AMG headquarters with 15th Army Group in Bari, and an independent AMG organization in Sardinia. On November 10, 1943, AFHQ combined the four separate organizations under the Allied Control Commission (ACC). All elements of the ACC were combined British and US organizations and included personnel in equal numbers from both countries. The ACC was technically subordinate to AFHQ, but had direct access to both Allied national governments and the Italian government. AFHQ deemed the 15th Army Group AMG redundant, reduced it to two liaison officers, and ordered the AMG elements of the Fifth and Eighth armies to report directly to the ACC. The Commander in Chief of Allied Forces, General Eisenhower, was the President of the ACC but the organization operated under Deputy President, US Major General Kenyon W. Joyce and his Chief of Staff, US Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor.⁵⁸ At the end of the summer of 1944, the ACC converted to a civilian organization called the Allied Commission (AC) and the AMG at 15th Army Group again reorganized as a G-5 staff section. The AC President was a British civilian,

⁵⁷ Robert W. Kromer, *Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1950), Chap VII, 1–3, 27–28.

⁵⁸ G-3 Section, 15 Army Group, 535; Kromer, “The Establishment of Allied Control in Italy,” 26. The concept of ACC command was that the Deputy President be the same nationality as the President. When General Eisenhower left the Mediterranean theater in January 1944; he was replaced by British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. Consequently, General Joyce was replaced by British Lieutenant General Sir Noel Mason-MacFarlane. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy*, 111–112, 117–118.

Harold Macmillan, and as its Chief Commissioner was British Lieutenant General Mason-MacFarlane.⁵⁹ The AC operated AMG on a regional basis centered on Italian provinces, which supervised communes (municipalities). As the tactical AMG commands moved north with the tactical situation, AMG responsibility transferred from the 15th Army Group to the ACC/AC and its provincial commissioners.

The third phase of governance in the Mediterranean theater was the transfer of governance to indigenous authorities. The ACC/AC gradually returned local administration to the Italian government as conditions permitted. Thus, at any given time after the Fall of 1943, three separate and generally independent governance authorities (not counting the Fascist government in enemy territory) operated simultaneously in occupied Italy, geographically from north to south: tactical AMG (15th Army Group), theater AMG (ACC/AC), and the Italian government.

Several conditions facilitated effective military government operations in Italy. First was the availability of an Italian government. The Allied governments gave Eisenhower the authority to determine that military necessity required that the Allies work with the Italian Badoglio government despite its faults and residual Fascist connections. Having a functioning national government available permitted the use of the doctrine of indirect military government and a quick return of large portions of Italy to civil administration under the Italian government. This greatly reduced the manpower requirements of AMG. It also greatly eased the task of supplying and administering the civilian population. The civil government became a vehicle through which the AC could dictate Allied policy and have those policies disseminated to the population and enforced.

⁵⁹ G-3 Section, 15 Army Group, 535; Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy*, 234–235.

Law and order was a concern of the AC and towards that objective they had a great resource in the Italian *Carabinieri*. The *Carabinieri* (*Carabinieri Reali* —CCR) were the national police force of Italy. They were a paramilitary organization with both military and civilian police functions. The decision to use the CCR was made early in the planning for the invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY. Initially, Civil Affairs Police Officers (CAPO), specially trained in public safety operations, closely supervised the CCR. The CAPOs serving in the theater included sixty-five veterans of the London Metropolitan Police specifically recruited to oversee the CCR. From the beginning in Sicily, the CCR proved to be a major asset to AMG. The *Carabinieri* brought cultural awareness, language and professional police skills, and legitimate authority that the Italian people recognized to the AMG teams operating among the population. The ability to use the CCR under AMG supervision resulted in the quick establishment of law and order in occupied areas and saved the Allies untold manpower.⁶⁰

Another law and order priority of CAOs in occupied territory was to reestablish the judicial system. CAOs quickly set-up summary courts to enforce occupation laws declared in posted proclamations. They emphasized swift, fair, and open proceedings, and punishment. CAOs were not typically trained lawyers or judges, but all provincial level AMG teams included trained legal specialists. AMG administered justice swiftly and then, if CAOs made mistakes, amended them upon review. Higher headquarters automatically reviewed all CAO court procedures. The AMG restored the Italian judicial system relatively quickly. It was not uncommon to have civilian courts operating within three weeks of the occupation of a province. Many local lawyers and judges were not Fascist and their availability to serve in the judicial system contributed to the speed with which civil courts began to operate. By 1944, the AMG

⁶⁰ Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy*, 5, 37, 41–42, 365; G-3 Section, 15 Army Group, 577.

policy was to open Italian courts in all areas to the rear of the tactical army corps.⁶¹ Overall, the AMG was very effective establishing and maintaining the rule of law in Italy.

Because Italy was a large agricultural country, planning assumed that the civilian population would need little food support. Temporary food shortages proved to be politically embarrassing to the military government because of Allied propaganda promising a better life under Allied occupation, and they damaged Italian civilian morale. The poor urban populations were the most affected. In response, the Allies developed plans to provide wheat or flour to fifty percent of the population south of Rome and planned to provide up to seventy percent to the population north of Rome. These requirements strained AMG resources. Distribution was the major challenge to the AMG. The Fifth US Army civil affairs officer reported in January 1944 “at present there are insufficient trucks to distribute the flour ration which is laid down by Headquarters ACC.” With the road network damaged and the competing transport requirements of other missions and the tactical commands, AMG had a significant challenge ensuring that the food that was available, including military stockpiles and that produced by Italian farmers, could reach the populations most in need. Efforts to distribute the food stocks were successful. Italians were not overfed and hunger existed at critical periods in particular locations, but overall the food situation was well in hand after the first year of occupation operations.⁶²

The organization of the military government apparatus in the Mediterranean theater caused problems for the military commanders. The major problem was determining who had command authority over various AMG teams. Part of the problem was the unclear definitions of administrative and operational control. The rapidly changing location of units also contributed

⁶¹ Ibid., 570–571

⁶² *Governors*, 313–318; quote from Gen Hume, SCAO, AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for Jan 44, *Governors*, 317; G-3 Section, 15 Army Group, 554, 558; Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy*, 37–40, 43–44, 313–314.

to confusion. All AMG elements were under the administrative control of the ACC/AC. Administrative control did not mean just administrative support, it also meant guidance regarding administering the occupied area. The exact policies that AMG administered were the responsibility of the ACC/AC. Tactical commanders had operational control of the AMG elements in their area of operations. Operational control included logistics responsibility, determining when AMG began operations, and directing where AMG based their operations, but did not include policy. Thus, some ACC/AC policies were not in tune with the particular tactical situation of the local commander, and some AMG teams received conflicting guidance from two different headquarters. Back in Washington, the CAD staff officers took from this confusion the lesson that a separate territorial organization for military government was ineffective and distracting to the tactical command.⁶³

The fact that AMG and the ACC/AC were combined British and American organizations also caused some inefficiency and strain. A reporter had the impression that “the whole set-up [the AC] is unbalanced by differences of ideas between Washington and London.”⁶⁴ General Eisenhower’s view was that he did “not pay much attention to the nationality of the military officers serving in the Allied Forces and [made] their assignments as required by efficiency and economy of personnel.” When Eisenhower left the theater, however, British officers replaced senior Americans in the ACC. This tipped the composition of the AMG leadership heavily in favor of the British. Both junior and senior US leaders in Italy felt strongly that British personnel and policy dominated the ACC. US Major John Boettiger reported to the War

⁶³ In May 1945 General Hilldring wrote General Clay, Deputy Military Governor of Germany that “Whatever the theoretical justification, if in practice the military government officer (a Lt. col.) sitting in the same time as a division commander (maj. Gen.) is independent, God help the Lt. col. and your military government.” Ziemke, 273.

⁶⁴ Herbert L. Matthews, “Allied Commission in Italy has Crisis,” *The New York Times*, December 14, 1944, 4.

Department Civil Affairs Division “in AMG-Fifth Army there were most serious differences between American and British officers.” American civilian Henry F. Grady serving on the ACC staff, informed British General Mason-MacFarlane directly that “collaboration for the peace shows signs of breaking down.” Eventually the sensitive issue became important enough for US Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, to tactfully request that US General Jacob L. Devers, the deputy theater commander, address the issue.⁶⁵ Command awareness of the issue prevented a lack of inter-Allied cooperation from becoming an operational obstacle, but the Americans took away from the experience the lesson that separate national occupation operations were preferable.

The complex and fluid governance organization of Italy was also confusing to the Italian population. As the *New York Times* reported, “they [the Italian people] are bewildered by the bureaucratic system set up in place of the Fascist octopus.” Civilians were often frustrated by policies announced by the Italian government but not applicable to the population living in the areas under the control of AMG. This circumstance was the result of the complex and impossible to anticipate situation caused by Italy’s surrender and then declaration of war on Germany. Nonetheless, competing government administrations within the same country created problems for local AMG teams and hurt the legitimacy of AMG authority.⁶⁶

As the war ended in Italy in 1945 all governance functions quickly reverted to either the AC or the Italian government —AFHQ quickly phased out tactical AMG. Post-war AC activities focused on stabilizing borders and politics in northern Italy, particularly in regards to

⁶⁵ Msg, Eisenhower to McNarney, 15 Nov 43, *Governors*, 271; Major John Boettiger, Chief, Public Info Branch, CAD, formerly ExecO, Hq AMG, Fifth Army, Rpt to Dir, CAD, 2 Mar 44, *Governors*, 272; Henry F. Grady, Vice President Econ Sec, ACC, to Gen Mason-MacFarlane, 14 Apr 44, *Governors*, 273; McCloy to Devers, DSAC, Mediterranean Theater, 7 Jun 44, and Devers to McCloy, 12 Jun 44, *Governors*, 273–274.

⁶⁶ Anne O’Hare M’Cormick, “Abroad. Complicated Allied Regime in Italy Disturbs People,” *The New York Times*, August 23, 1944, 18.

the Yugoslavian forces that occupied parts of the northeast. By December 1945, all of Italy except the disputed portions of the north was under control of the Italian government. An Allied governance presence remained in the disputed territory until the issues were resolved in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.⁶⁷ The AMG operations in Italy were the key element in transitioning the Fascist government of Mussolini into the functioning democratic republic that emerged after the war. Perhaps as important, AMG in Italy was a valuable testing ground of policies and procedures for the difficult governance missions in Germany and Japan that followed.

Preparing for Victory

As soon as the United States entered World War II, before the great 1942 victories at Stalingrad and Midway in 1942 broke the string of Axis successes, the United States Army was already planning and preparing for victory and the conduct of post-conflict military government operations in occupied enemy territory. This fact is indicative of two aspects of the culture of the American army in World War II: the army assumed it would win the war, and anticipated conducting extensive occupation operations. In some respects, planning for victory began as soon as World War I ended more than twenty years previously. The interwar education and staff training conducted at Fort Leavenworth and at the War College began giving officers formal exposure to the army's history, thinking, and doctrine regarding military government operations even before conclusion of the occupation of the Rhineland. That education, combined with the influence and mentoring of the veterans of the Philippines, Cuba, Vera Cruz, and the Rhineland, facilitated the understanding among the interwar generations of officers that post-conflict operations were an integral and critical aspect of military planning and operations.

⁶⁷ In June 1946, the population of Italy rejected the continuation of the Italian monarchy and opted for a republican form of government. Italy signed a formal peace treaty with the United Nations forces in February 1947, and various belligerents ratified it by September. Allied troops withdrew from Italy in December 1947. The Italians developed a constitution that went into force on January 1, 1948.

Doctrine, combined with professional military education gave the army an institutional understanding that detailed planning as well as execution of military government operations were theater command responsibilities. Doctrine required the army staff to provide the theater commanders the necessary resources to conduct those operations. One of the key requirements was trained personnel. Another was strategic planning and policy. The Civil Affairs Division and the various military government schools and training programs fulfilled those requirements. The preparation that the army did in the interwar years and the first years of World War II demonstrated that the institution clearly understood what Colonel Joseph Harris, a chief instructor at the SMG, stated in 1943: “the success with which these [military government] tasks are accomplished will determine in large measure whether the war will have been fought in vain. It will likewise affect the length of time necessary before the world can recover from the disastrous destruction of the war, and will have a mighty influence on the preservation of the future peace of the world.”⁶⁸

A weakness in the preparation for post-conflict operations was the national policy making apparatus. The approach to civil affairs in the North African campaign indicated that regardless of the status of army preparations, there was no system for forming or coordinating policy at the national level. In addition, President Roosevelt was inclined, based on intuition, not to trust the military regarding occupation operations. The US government did not adequately address the policy coordination problem until late in the war with the formation of the SWNCC. President Roosevelt’s unease with military government remained an issue until his death.

The American experience in Italy informed the army regarding the conduct of later occupation operations. The military government operations in Italy demonstrated the difficulty

⁶⁸ Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy*, 696–697.

of inter-Allied coordination and cooperation. This drove the CAD to prefer US only military government. It also highlighted the problems of a military government command interfering with tactical commanders. CAD's solution was to clearly prioritize the prerogatives of the tactical commander. CAD's conclusions regarding operations in Italy significantly influenced the American approach to the occupations of Germany and Japan.

The military government experience in Italy reflected several characteristics consistent with the army's history of occupation operations. First, law and order was a top priority of the command as attested to by the rapidity with which the CCRR and Italian lawyers and judges were incorporated into the military government scheme. The rapid activation of civil law enforcement and the cooperative attitude toward the Italian government, as well as the civilianization of the military government mission under the AC while the war was still in progress all reflect the American army's preference for a rapid transition to civil control. Unclear national strategic guidance to the theater and no national plan for economic development were negative aspects of the occupation which were also consistent with the historical American approach.

An important factor compensating for the lack of a policy making system at the national level were the senior War Department leaders who recognized the strategic importance of occupation operations, and the intermediate leadership who could identify, effectively plan for, and organize the resources necessary to conduct post conflict operations. At the senior level, the broad strategic vision of leaders like Stimson, Marshall, and Eisenhower was critical to the success of the preparation for and execution of World War II military government. All three had a direct connection to the army history of military government through the turn of the century generation of army military government practitioners. In Stimson's case he was a participant, as

the Secretary of War, in the last years of army governance in the Philippines. These connections helped them to visualize the scope and complexity of the post-war occupation tasks. The senior leadership recognized that occupation operations were the critical strategic link between combat operations and a successful peace. As General Marshall stated, “I don’t suppose that any war in history has more clearly shown the truth of Clausewitz’s old dictum than this one. The politico-military aspects of the war are so apparent that they do not need any enumeration. Whether it is in China, [the] Southwest Pacific, the Mediterranean or E.T.O., the political side is all tied in with the military, and the soldiers have to do most of the political work.”⁶⁹ The senior leadership passed its strategic understanding to its subordinates. They empowered subordinate leaders like General Gullion and General Hildring to recruit, train, and deploy the civil affairs specialists who provided the advice, planning, and technical expertise necessary to the success of theater military governors. Other key subordinates, like Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. John J. McCloy represented the vision of the army leadership to the other government agencies and Allies. This eventually led to the development of SWNCC to coordinate strategic political-military policies such as those relating to occupation operations. The senior leaders and their staffs were the key element that translated the army’s history, interwar training and preparation, and doctrine, into resources, organizations and policy. Those robust resources and the close attention of the army’s leadership underpinned the successes of military government operations in post-war Germany and Japan.

⁶⁹ Pogue, *Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945*, 460.

CHAPTER 8 - Direct Military Government: Germany, 1944–1949

The American army entered German territory on September 11, 1944, when a patrol of the V US Corps crossed the Luxembourg-German border. The patrol did not stay long but the next day US forces occupied a German village in the same area and stayed. On October 21, 1944 the US XIX and VII Corps, under the First US Army, seized the city of Aachen. Aachen became the first major German city to come under occupation by the western Allies in World War II, and in Aachen the US Army began to put into effect the years of planning and preparation for the occupation of Germany. The occupation of Germany was a very successful army operation—it helped create an economically prosperous, democratic government in place of the Nazis. It also created a solid Cold War partner to counter communist influence in Europe. However, success did not come easy to the occupiers. The President delayed and obfuscated on occupation policy, initial occupation policy was debilitating, and the requirement to coordinate all issues with Allies made decision making slow and often impossible. The army achieved success because the basic US occupation tradition, captured in doctrine, understood by the army leadership, and trained in the civil affairs schools, established the conditions for success: democratic governance, law and order, health and welfare for the population. Those actions provided the opportunity for the military government, working with a new administration in Washington, to formulate new political and economic policy, and transition from military to civilian rule.

As the American army established its governance of Germany, it took partial responsibility (with the other Allied militaries) for a sophisticated urban society that numbered

fifty-four million people in 1938.¹ Germany in the spring of 1945, however, was not the same country that went to war in 1939. The most dramatic effects were a result of the Allied combined bombing offensive. The Allies waged a massive strategic air bombing campaign against Germany beginning in the fall of 1943. The bombing attack significantly affected the German economy, and more important, the bombing had a major impact on the German people.² The strategic bombing campaign against German cities had much more than just economic consequences. The attacks killed 305,000 civilians, foreigners, and members of the armed forces, and wounded another 780,000. They caused massive general damage to Germany's cities. The attacks destroyed 485,000 residential buildings and heavily damaged another 415,000. This accounted for forty percent of residential buildings in the fifty cities that were primary targets of strategic air attack. Overall, the strategic air attack rendered 7.5 million German civilians homeless.³ Over six million Germans died in the six years of conflict

¹ In 1938 Germany had a population of seventy-eight million. The country encompassed 181,000 square miles and was about the size of the states of Kansas and Colorado combined. Seventy percent of the fifty-four million population lived in urban areas with a population of 2,000 or greater, and of that number approximately half lived in the sixty-two Reich cities of over 100,000 inhabitants. Before the war, Germany had three cities with populations over one million, and nine with populations between 500,000 and one million. The three large urban complexes, Berlin, Hamburg, and Vienna comprised approximately ten percent of the total national population. The populations of Berlin, Hamburg, and Vienna were 4.3, 1.7, and 1.9 million respectively in 1939. Eugene Fodor, Editor, *1938 in Europe. The Entertaining Travel Annual* (Norwich, GB: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938), 665; Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, *Army Service Forces Manual, M356-1, Civil Affairs Handbook, Germany, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 1944), 40, 48.

² The strategic air attack, particularly that prosecuted by the US Army Air Force in daylight, was aimed at Germany's industrial capacity. The two primary targets were oil production and steel production. Though the attacks reduced production, they did not decisively effect the steel industry. Indigenous oil production capability was entirely synthetic. Before the air campaign the synthetic plants were producing 316,000 tons of fuel per month. By November and December 1944, that production was down to 17,000 tons. The heart of the attacks against the economy was the destruction of the German transport system. Germany entered World War II with perhaps the finest railway system in Europe. An excellent inland water system complimented the railways. Air attack reduced freight car loadings from 900,000 in August 1944 to approximately 200,000 in March 1945. Attacks against shipping on the rivers and canals completely stopped the flow of coal by water from the Ruhr to south Germany. By February 1945, air attack also effectively stopped all rail traffic of coal. The German economy ran on coal and attacks against the transportation system effectively interdicted all coal and thus effectively shut down the economy three months before the war ended. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War)* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 8, 13.

³ *Ibid.*, 15.

beginning in 1939. As the Allied ground forces moved into Germany in the spring of 1945 they entered a modern European state utterly destroyed and encountered a population deeply in shock.

Germany Policy

Formulating American policy for post-war Germany was a highly complex and ultimately only partly successful endeavor. As the official army historian, Earl F. Ziemke observed regarding the problem developing policy: “the Hunt Report had been absorbed only into Army doctrine, not into United States strategic policy. Elsewhere, specifically in the White House, other lessons were drawn from the two world wars.”⁴ The army recognized the necessity for clear unambiguous policy and began to campaign for strategic guidance as early as 1942. However, President Franklin Roosevelt was not willing to focus on the details of post-war policy for a variety of domestic and foreign policy reasons. Once the leadership focused on the issue, disagreements and a cumbersome Allied command system made it difficult to provide timely guidance to the theater commander. Policy toward Germany did not receive Presidential attention until August 1944 when, at the urging of General Eisenhower, commanding Allied forces in northwest Europe, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, planning coordination began between the War, State, Navy and Treasury Departments. During these meetings War Department officials noted the influence the views of Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, had with the President, particularly in the area German policy.⁵

The Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau’s friendship with the President dated from 1913, and the two men were neighbors for many years in Dutchess County, New York. Morgenthau was a staunch Semite, and during the August 1944 cabinet meetings on post-war

⁴ Earl F. Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1975), 60–61.

⁵ Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), 604–611.

policy, his view that Germany deserved a harsh peace quickly became apparent. Morgenthau's strong views regarding post-war Germany, and his access to the President, permitted him to have a powerful influence on national policy.⁶ The President was open to Morgenthau's German view not only because of their friendship, but also because he shared many of his friend's perceptions of the German people. Roosevelt's view of the Germans greatly complicated the development of post-war policy for Germany. In 1943 he stated in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A somewhat long study and personal experience in and out of Germany leads me to believe that the German philosophy cannot be changed by decree, law, or military order. The change in German philosophy must be evolutionary and may take two generations. To assume otherwise is to assume, of necessity, a period of quiet followed by a third world war."⁷

Roosevelt had a predisposition to treat Germany harshly after the war because of his youthful experiences in Germany. At a meeting in Quebec in September 1944, Morgenthau got both Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to agree to a harsh peace. The written agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill specifically stated, "this program for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character."⁸ Churchill claimed Morgenthau used Britain's lend-lease debt and the prospect of post-war loans as inducements to get his agreement. He told British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, "When I have to choose between my people and the German people, I am going to choose my people." The Quebec agreement occurred without

⁶ Morgenthau described his plan for Germany in a memorandum to the President entitled "Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany," which he presented to the President in early September 1944. In it he advocated that the military "destroy all plants and equipment which cannot be removed," and "the Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems." Undated memorandum, *Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum* website; <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/t297a01.html> (accessed October 10, 2009); Morgenthau further elaborated his views in Henry Morgenthau, *Germany is Our Problem* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1945); Morison, 604–611.

⁷ Franklin Roosevelt quoted in Ziemke, 61.

⁸ Agreement reproduced in McGeorge Bundy and Henry L. Stimson, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 577.

consultation with the State and War Departments and contravened the prevailing views in those departments.⁹

Colonel Hunt's report on the World War I occupation of Germany strongly influenced the War Department's, and in particular the CAD's, view of post-war policy. The Hunt report quoted General Pershing's order regarding relations with the German population "You [American soldiers] have come not as despoilers or oppressors, but simply as the instruments of a strong, free government whose purposes toward the people of Germany are beneficent. During our occupation the civil population is under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army." A harsh peace violated one of the central themes of military doctrine expressed in FM 27-5:

Proper treatment [of the civil population] will be of direct benefit to the occupying forces in preventing chaos, promoting order, and in the procurement of labor, services, and supplies. It will have a favorable influence upon the present and future attitude of the population toward the United States and its Allies. It will provide incentive to populations of other territories to accept, our future occupation.

Such plans as may be practicable should be laid in advance for the resumption of production, especially in agriculture, fishing, and manufacture, but also in mining, forestry and the service trades.¹⁰

Secretary of War Henry Stimson was the strongest advocate for an unemotional and just post-war treatment of Germany. Stimson was astonished that he was initially "a minority of one," with a progressive view of post-war German policy among Roosevelt's close advisors. Quickly though, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and presidential advisor Harry Hopkins came to agree with Stimson. In a memorandum challenging the Morgenthau view Stimson told the President "I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we

⁹ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), 5; Jean Edward Smith, *FDR* (New York: Random House, 2007), 623–624. Quote on 623.

¹⁰ War and Navy Departments, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, FM 27-5, OPNAV 50E-3* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 7, 11.

hope to attain by a complete military victory, that is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.” Thus, as American forces entered Germany in the fall of 1944, the American strategic leadership did not have an agreed upon vision of post-war Germany. The different strategic visions at the national level retarded policy making and planning at the theater operational level.¹¹

Another issue that negatively affected planning was not the President’s policy, but rather his timing. As late as October 1944, after US forces had entered Germany, Roosevelt wrote Secretary of State Hull:

It is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for the treatment of Germany, but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe that speed on these matters is not an essential at the present moment. It may be in a week, or it may be in a month, or it may be several months hence. I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.¹²

The implication in Roosevelt’s memorandum was that on some issues Roosevelt was content to wait until the war was over before determining policy. The Presidential election in the fall of 1944 had an influence on Roosevelt’s willingness to commit to a definite policy on Germany. Though he was inclined toward Morgenthau’s view, strong reaction from the press, Stimson and Hull’s protests, and attacks by the Republican presidential candidate caused him to back off from Morgenthau’s view. He told Hull that in October 1944, “no one wants to make Germany a wholly agricultural nation again.”¹³ Ultimately, however, the Quebec agreement, Roosevelt’s

¹¹ Morison, 605; Memorandum Stimson to the President, September 15, 1944, *Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum* website; <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/t297j06.html> (accessed October 10, 2009).

¹² Quoted in Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors: The Unique World of a Foreign Service Expert* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), 227–228.

¹³ *Time*, “The Policy of Hate,” October 2, 1944, characterized the plan as “a Carthaginian peace.” Roosevelt quote from Memorandum for the Secretary of State, from Franklin Roosevelt, September 29, 1944, *Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum* website, <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box32/t298d02.html> (accessed October 10, 2009).

private views, and Morgenthau's influence had the effect of causing the planners to place strict policy restrictions on German economic recovery.

Organization of the military command and staffs also caused problems creating policy and planning for operations. The military command that would defeat Germany in northwest Europe was the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Within SHAEF, the G-5 staff section was responsible for civil affairs. The command was a combined Allied command whose two largest components were British and American. SHAEF and General Eisenhower got their strategic policy guidance from the Combined (British and American) Chiefs of Staff (CCS). The CCS got their civil affairs policy from the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) located in Washington, or its overseas extension, the CCAC(L) located in London. Once the US leadership determined US policy, US strategic views were reconciled with British views in the CCAC before forwarding to the CCS for approval. Once the CCS approved civil affairs policy it became Allied policy. This cumbersome system required negotiation and compromise at every level. After the CCS determined Allied policy, the policy went back to the national governments for approval before forwarding to the theater commander for execution. This meant that often simple policy issues could take months of coordination before the CCS issued guidance to Eisenhower and his staff.¹⁴

The combined command system, because of disagreements within the US command, different national visions of the post-war environment, and the slow and awkward policy process, gave little policy guidance to SHAEF regarding post-war Germany. Most of SHAEF's strategic guidance came in CCS Directive 551. CCAC in Washington drafted CCS 551, entitled "Directive for Military Government in Germany prior to Defeat or Surrender," had it approved

¹⁴ A detailed description of the functioning and issues surrounding the CCAC and CCAC(L) is found in Ziemke, 35–36, 40.

by the CCS, and provided it to SHAEF in April 1944. This guidance, though useful, was insufficient because it did not address many of the likely contingencies tactical military government efforts would encounter.¹⁵ Also, CCS 551 provided no guidance regarding post-surrender policy.

American policy was of limited formal use to SHAEF because it was not approved Allied policy. However, Eisenhower was also commander of the United States Army, European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA), and in that role it was proper for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide him guidance. Based on meetings between cabinet officers and deputies from State, War and Treasury, the JCS conceived a preliminary plan for the occupation of Germany. This preliminary plan reflected a very harsh tone and its economic provisions were particularly severe, reflecting the influence of Secretary Morgenthau. The American JCS issued the plan as JCS Directive 1067. First drafts of the plan were available in the fall of 1944, but coordination and debate regarding the contents of the plan continued in several drafts through the winter of 1944–45 and into the spring.¹⁶ Just prior to the Yalta conference in February 1945, the State Department indicated that it remained highly dissatisfied with the JCS directive, viewing it as too punitive in general. Over the course of the spring of 1945 the State Department succeeded in getting President Roosevelt to issue new guidance on the post-war Germany. In the new guidance the President was less emphatic regarding the economic dismemberment of Germany. The three departments, State, War, and Treasury, revised and created a new version of the

¹⁵ CCS 551 indicated that the SHAEF commander had supreme authority for military government, it directed that military government would be indirect through reliable German officials, government would be entirely supervised by the military, it suspended all German political, police and judiciary authority except as specifically authorized by the supreme commander, and it specified that the Allies would augment food resources only to prevent disease and unrest. The purpose of military government was foremost to aid military operations. To this end, CCS 551 directed military government to maintain law and order and restore normal conditions. European Command, *Planning for the Occupation of Germany* (Frankfurt am Main, GE: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), 44–46; Ziemke, 99–101.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 103–108.

directive that modified the original in slight but important ways. Eisenhower, in his US role as commander ETOUSA, received a draft of the plan in March 1945. The final approved JCS 1067 arrived in the theater in April—a month before Germany’s formal surrender. JCS 1067 was a compromise between the various department philosophies. The stern tone of the directive reflected President Roosevelt’s view of the occupation:

It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany’s ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.

Except for its economic policy, however, Morgenthau’s harsh ideas toward Germany did not greatly affect the substance of the directive. In accomplishing objectives of the occupation the directive advised the commander that the aim was “not oppression,” while it directed him to be “just but firm and aloof.”¹⁷

The economic portion of the directive was harsh in tone and substance: “you will take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.” Specifically, it directed the US commander to:

take no action that would tend to support basic living standards in Germany on a higher level than that existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations and you will take appropriate measures to ensure that basic living standards of the German people are not higher than those existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations....¹⁸

General Lucius D. Clay, Eisenhower’s deputy for military government, first saw the report in April 1945. Clay’s reaction was “we were shocked... at its failure to grasp the realities of the financial and economic conditions which confronted us... it had been drafted before Germany

¹⁷The major provisions of JCS 1067 included the elimination of Nazism, apprehension of war criminals, industrial disarmament and demilitarization, decentralization of political and economic institutions, care for prisoners of war and displaced persons, and enforcement of reparations and restitution. The entire directive was published in Carl E. Friederick and Associates, “Appendix A: JCS 1067,” *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948), 384.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 384–385.

surrendered and without knowledge of the conditions we should find.”¹⁹ Mr. Robert Murphy, Eisenhower’s political advisor, Brigadier General William H. Draper, the economics advisor, and Lewis Douglas, the financial advisor, all studied the document. They agreed with Clay that JCS 1067 was fundamentally flawed. Douglas’s evaluation was that “this thing was assembled by economic idiots!”²⁰ Not only was JCS 1067 flawed, it was also late. The late issue of the guidance hurt the ability of the SHAEF G-5 and subordinate tactical and military government units to prepare detailed plans for the occupation. President Roosevelt’s poor health, personal attitudes, and disagreement at the national level caused the delay. Morgenthau’s influence affected the economic guidance. Thus, the war ended with strategic planning guidance that was late and that the leadership of the occupation of Germany felt was fundamentally and seriously flawed.

Operational Planning

While national policy lurched forward subject to interdepartmental and international negotiation and disagreement, theater level planning attempted to make progress without strategic policy guidance. Theater planning began in earnest in the summer of 1943 when the Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), British Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, prepared contingency plans in the event of a sudden German military or political collapse. General Morgan quickly discovered that no civil affairs or military government planning, staffs, or capability existed either within the British army or the deployed forces of the US Army in Great Britain. Planning and developing the forces for civil affairs and military government became a top priority for COSSAC beginning in August 1943. By the end of 1943, General Morgan’s staff produced a contingency plan, Operation RANKIN C, in which a large

¹⁹ Clay, 18.

²⁰ Murphy, 251.

combined military government organization established governance of Germany in the event of the sudden collapse of the Nazi government. However, at the time COSSAC published RANKIN C, no military government organization existed to execute it. To execute the plan, the US Civil Affairs Division (CAD) began to deploy its German civil affairs specialists from the United States as quickly as possible. The first personnel arrived in Great Britain in January 1944.²¹

In December 1943 the COSSAC staff became the SHAEF staff. As detailed planning for Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of France, progressed, planning for the occupation of Germany remained limited to Operation RANKIN C. SHAEF began requesting occupation policy guidance from the CCS and CCAC as early as April 1944, but no guidance was forthcoming for the reasons discussed previously. Thus, as the Allies invaded France in June 1944, there was no plan for occupation operations in Germany beyond RANKIN.

Though they lacked guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the planners in the SHAEF G-5 (Civil Affairs) staff were not idle. Early in the spring of 1944 the G-5 Country Unit for Germany began work on a Civil Affairs Handbook for Germany. The purpose of the handbook was to provide guidance to civil affairs officers specifically tailored to occupation operations in Germany. It included general guidance for each of the sixteen primary functions for which civil affairs officers were responsible.²² Supplementary handbooks contained even more detail for each civil affairs function. Preparing the handbook was an important but routine

²¹ Ziemke, 29–33.

²² The Germany Handbook lists sixteen functions for military government in Germany: Civil Administration, Eradication of Nazism, Finance and Property Control, Public Safety, Legal, Public Health, Public Welfare, Displaced Persons and Refugees, Labour; Education and Religious Affairs, Agriculture, Food, and Food Distribution; Supply; Industry, Trade, Public Utilities; Rationing, and Price Control; Posts, telephone, Telegraph, and Radio Services; Transportation; and Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives. Allied Expeditionary Force, *Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender* (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 1944), iv.

task. Country Units for the other European countries where civil affairs and military government operations were expected prepared similar handbooks.²³

SHAEF was able to produce the handbooks without detailed strategic guidance because staff officers accurately assumed the occupation would occur in three phases. SHAEF then prepared tentative plans based on the first two phases of occupation. The first phase was the mobile phase. During that phase military government teams occupied parts of Germany as the Allied forces captured territory (if Germany resisted) or as Allied forces moved in (if Germany surrendered). Planners referred to this phase as the carpet phase, describing how a carpet of civil affairs teams would roll out to cover Germany. CCS 551 provided strategic guidance for this phase. The G-5 prepared a variety of versions of plans for this phase based on different possible variations of the future zone boundaries between the occupying armies. In September 1944 SHAEF approved with modification the “1186 South Plan.” This plan was a version of the carpet plan and described the organization of each military government detachment and their pinpoint assignments assuming southern Germany was the US zone. The 1186 South Plan described the employment of over 1,400 military government officers organized into 213 military government detachments. It was issued before the US zone was formally announced and was based on SHAEF’s estimate of where the zone would be and the deployment of tactical units in the late summer of 1944. It served as the basis for the deployment of the detachments within Germany as the army advanced. In November 1944, planners modified the basic plan to more accurately reflect the tactical situation and the zones the planners expected to occupy after hostilities.²⁴

²³ Ibid., 9–21.

²⁴ Joseph R. Starr, *The Planning Stage* (Karlsruhe, GE: European Command, 1950), 109–110, 114.

The complete occupation of Germany started the second phase of occupation operations. It was a transitory static phase during which the occupation forces conducted essential tasks, such as disarming the Germany military forces. This phase lasted until the Allies organized the permanent governing apparatus for Germany. The Operation ECLIPSE plan guided this second phase. The civil affairs handbooks included guidance for use during the carpet phase and the ECLIPSE transition phase of occupation operations.²⁵

The ECLIPSE plan was essentially a list of conditions for the transition from the rolling carpet mobile phase of military government to the static phase. ECLIPSE also emphasized the accomplishment of critical tasks during the transition phase including enforcing the terms of surrender, disarming and disbanding the German military forces, arresting and bringing to justice war criminals, disarming and controlling the police and other paramilitary organizations, establishing law and order, repatriating and caring for displaced persons and prisoners of war, controlling public information, and establishing military government. In March 1945 SHAEF

²⁵The Germany Handbook caused some controversy and inadvertently contributed to the inability of the army to do more detailed planning for the occupation. In September 1944 Secretary Morgenthau made a trip to London to coordinate fiscal issues. While there he inquired into the state of occupation planning and got a draft copy of the German handbook. He annotated the book and then passed it to President Roosevelt referring the President to the portions he had marked. The President focused on the areas of the handbook Morgenthau highlighted; areas that alluded to the just treatment of Germans and the rehabilitation of Germany in a variety of ways. The President immediately sent a memorandum to Secretary of War Stimson articulating his displeasure with the handbook: "This so-called Handbook is pretty bad. I should like to know how it came to be written and who approved it down the line. If it has not been sent out as approved, all copies should be withdrawn and held until you have a chance to go over it." The President made clear that his policy was that Germany was to know it was a defeated nation. In the President's view the handbook was not harsh enough. SHAEF overcame the controversy by getting the CCS to approve a draft handbook that had a qualifying forward and modified language regarding the relationship between the occupying force and the Germans. The controversy delayed the issue of the handbook until December 1944, well after civil affairs teams entered Germany. Also, as a result of the handbook controversy, in which tactical guidance was construed to be in conflict with strategic policy, the army was loath to take the initiative to do more detailed tactical planning given the unclear policy situation that lasted until the almost the end of the war. The handbook controversy is described by Ziemke, 83–90; Roosevelt's quote, 86.

The introduction to the handbook stated it "sets forth basic policy governing the organization and administration of Military Government in the period prior to the defeat or surrender of Germany." However, in actual fact the handbook's policies were required to continue after surrender when the ECLIPSE plan was in effect as no other guide existed and all other aspects of the military government policy remained in effect until SHAEF authority was deactivated. Allied Expeditionary Force, *Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender*, introduction; Ziemke, 84.

reviewed the November ECLIPSE plan and determined that an update was not necessary.²⁶ The ECLIPSE plan, along with the Germany Handbook, were the primary guides for occupation operations at the tactical level from the arrival of American forces in Germany until the German surrender in May 1945, and continued to be the guides to standing operating procedures for the occupation forces in the first year of the occupation.²⁷

Organization

The highest organization of military government in Northwest Europe was the SHAEF general staff section G-5 (Civil Affairs). The G-5 section at SHAEF organized on February 15, 1944. Thirty-five officers formed the staff. The G-5 contained six sections: Fiscal, Legal, Supply, Economics, Civil Affairs Operations, and Staff Duties. The mission of the G-5 was to advise the Supreme Commander on civil affairs policy, issue policy directives, and supervise execution of plans and policy. In May 1945 the SHAEF G-5 reorganized in preparation for operations in Germany. The G-5 established functional branches for Supply, Displaced Persons, Legal, Public Health, Finance, Economics, Public Relations, and Administration.²⁸ The European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD) was subordinate special staff element within the G-5, but located separate from the SHAEF headquarters. Among the ECAD responsibilities was organization and operation of the country teams, planning, training personnel, and organization of a German section. As initially organized, the G-5 and the ECAD were combined British and American organizations. Country teams were teams formed of specialists on specific European countries to do specific planning and assist in training civil affairs and military government

²⁶ *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, 84–94, 103

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 111–112.

²⁸ *Civil Affairs*, 6, 26.

teams.²⁹ The ECAD also commanded three regiments of military government or civil affairs detachments.³⁰ The ECAD tasked 1st Civil Affairs Regiment with civil affairs duties in liberated Allied countries. The 2nd and 3rd Regiments conducted military government in Germany under the carpet plan. By May 1945, the civil affairs regiments and their assigned detachments all operated under control of various tactical units. At that time the ECAD headquarters deactivated and its remaining special staff functions, including the country teams, organized directly under SHAEF G-5.³¹

Rolling Carpet 1945

The carpet plan called for military government units to provide civil affairs support to army tactical units as the tactical units executed their combat missions. In this role, the priority of military government detachments was to establish control of the civil population and ensure their non-interference with army tactical operations. Aspects of these operations included evacuation of the civil population, refugee control, disarming the civil population, and civil law and order in the immediate rear area of the army combat units. Military government detachments attached to the tactical commands in the local area for the purposes of the carpet concept. However, as the front advanced and the tactical unit moved on, the military

²⁹ Ibid., 6–8.

³⁰ During World War II the US Army differentiated between military government of enemy territory and civil affairs operations in liberated territory. See War and Navy Departments, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, FM 27-5, OPNAV 50E-3*, 1–3.

³¹ Each regiment consisted of nine companies which served as administrative and support headquarters for a varying number of organic civil affairs or military government detachments. The detachments organized, based on preplanned pin-point missions, into five types from largest to smallest E to I. The E and F detachments were the largest and designed to govern large districts (states) and large urban areas. A typical E or F detachment in the spring of 1945 consisted of 26 officers and 35 enlisted soldiers. The G, H and I detachments were designed to occupy small cities, county size districts, and villages. The smaller detachments varied in size from four officers and six enlisted soldiers to nine officers and fifteen enlisted soldiers. During operations E and F detachments tended to remain under army level control, G and H detachments were located a corps and division level, and the I detachments (the smallest and most numerous) often moved with the rear elements of the forward regiments. *The Planning Stage*, 114–120; *Civil Affairs*, 26.

government team remained in place and continued to control the assigned geographic area and its civilian population. A new military government detachment attached to the moving tactical unit based on the tactical unit's next geographic objective. The stationary military government unit subsequently attached to the next tactical unit to arrive in the area.³² Thus, within the army's tactical commands there was a constant attachment and detachment of military government teams during offensive combat operations.³³ The evaluation of the performance of the military government teams during the combat phase of operations was very positive. Harold Zink, a member of the SHAEF G-5 staff and later critic and historian of the American military government efforts, concluded, "the accomplishments of military government during the combat phase were of a high order... there has been a pretty widespread verdict that military government performed very well."³⁴

ECLIPSE 1945

As the Allied ground offensives rolled deep into Germany, military commanders were aware that the political leaders of the various allied countries had already determined at their

³² Orders were constantly published realigning the command relationships between pinpointed military government detachments and tactical units. Boundary changes, moving detachments, and moving tactical units kept much of the military government apparatus in a state of flux until July 1945 when the final static phase of ECLIPSE was realized. *Ibid.*, 43–52.

³³ Military government of a city, small town or county was a major task that involved a variety of diverse challenges. The military government detachments were tasked with responsibility for local government affairs; public safety, welfare, and health; management of utilities and communications; supervision of labor, traffic, and salvage; supervision of industry, commerce, resources and agriculture; legal administration; fiscal policy and supervision; and supply. All military government detachments had the same responsibilities. In the large cities the detachment organization included officers with specialized civil training in each of the areas for which the detachment was responsible. All of these tasks, and many miscellaneous smaller tasks such as identifying and safe guarding cultural and historical artifacts, had to be accomplished initially without the use of German civilians, and later without Germans associated with the National Socialist Party (Nazis). Since virtually all of the German civil service administration were Nazi party members, identifying reliable civilian supporters was extremely difficult. Zink, *American Military Government* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), 79–87.

³⁴ Zink served on the German Country Team in SHAEF G-5. He was one of the authors and editors of the SHAEF Handbook for Military Government in Germany, later he was chief of the German government reorganization section in the Office of Political Affairs of OMGUS. He also served as consultant to OMGUS in 1948, and to the State Department on German issues in 1950. He was the chief historian of the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany 1950–1951. Zink was also a distinguished academician with a PhD from Harvard University and a position as Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. *Ibid.*, 86.

conference in Yalta in February 1945 to divide the country in occupation zones. The US occupation zone was the southern portion of Germany. The Allies designated British and Russian zones in northwest and eastern Germany respectively. Belatedly, in July 1945, the Allies assigned the French their own occupation area along the western border encompassing portions of the British and American zones. The American zone itself was 47,000 square miles and included a population of approximately nineteen million civilians for whom the American army was directly responsible. It was mostly an agricultural and forested area. One fourth of the land was arable, one fourth was mountains and forests, and one-half was swamps or pasture. The two most important cities in the American zone were Frankfurt and Munich. Frankfurt was sixty percent destroyed while Munich was eighty percent destroyed.³⁵

Despite the ambiguity regarding the French, the withdrawal of the military government attachments to the US occupation zone began almost immediately after the end of hostilities on May 8, 1945. It was a gradual process and not completed until July 10, 1945. Final designation of national zones occurred on July 12. Upon relief by British, French, or Soviet forces, the American military government teams moved to pinpoint assignments in the American zone. The US zone included *Land* (state) Bavaria; *Land* Hessen, east of the Rhine River; Provinz Hessen-Nassau, as it existed prior to 1938; the northern portions of *länder* (states) Baden and Wurttemberg, including the major population centers of Ulm, Wurtingen, Boblingen, Leonber, Pforzheim, and Karlshruhe; and the Bremen harbor enclave in north Germany. On July 10, 12th US Army Group prepared to redeploy and responsibility for the US armies in Germany and for military government detachments passed to the new Headquarters US Forces European Theater

³⁵ Oliver J. Frederiksen, *American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945–53* (Darmstadt, GE: United States Army Europe, 1953), 12–13; Historical Division, European Command, *Military Government in Munich 1945–1947* (Historical Division, European Command, 1951), 1.

(USFET). On July 12, the command designated *Land* Bavaria as the Eastern Military District and it placed under the control of the Third US Army, with its headquarters in Munich. The rest of the US zone, including the Bremen enclave but not Berlin, was designated the Western Military District and placed under the control of the Seventh US Army, headquartered in Heidelberg.³⁶ The Americans set up the USFET headquarters in Frankfurt.

In April 1945, the American command selected an obscure major general to be the commander of the occupation of Germany, Major General Lucius D. Clay. The army selected Clay to serve as the Deputy Commander for military government, USFET under General Eisenhower who was the commander and the military governor. Clay's job, as the deputy military governor, was to handle the day to day governance activities in Eisenhower's name. Clay was an Engineer officer and graduated from West Point in 1918. From 1937 to 1938 Clay served in the Philippines, his only overseas assignment prior to World War II. During that assignment he worked closely with Major Dwight Eisenhower, the aid to retired General Douglas MacArthur, military advisor to the Philippine government. Eisenhower and Clay worked well together and the two majors established a life-long friendship. Clay's first major assignment during World War II came in 1940 when the army selected him to supervise the national airfield building program whose goal was to build five hundred airports in two years. Once the United States entered the war, Clay served as the Chief of Material, for the Army Services of Supply. In his role as Chief of Material Clay served on the important Combined Munitions Assignment Board which exposed him to the complex organization of the American economy at war. In 1944, Clay briefly went to Europe to take charge of the port of Cherbourg. After straightening out the port congestion problems, Clay returned to Washington to work as the

³⁶ European Command, *Civil Affairs* (Frankfurt, GE: Office of the Chief Historian, 1947), 47–54.

Chief of War Production, in the Office of War Mobilization under James F. Byrnes. Byrnes stated he selected Clay for that important civilian position because he knew “no army officer who had as clear an understanding of the view of the civilian.”³⁷ In the spring of 1945 President Roosevelt personally selected Clay for the post of deputy commander for military government in Germany on the recommendations of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and Byrnes. The War Department did not consult with Eisenhower, but Eisenhower approved of the choice as he was well aware of Clay’s abilities and had indicated he wanted Clay involved in post-war civil affairs.³⁸ Clay’s initial role was translating strategic policy into theater level organization and action.

Two important theater level occupation related events occurred after the surrender of Germany. One was the Potsdam meeting between the Allied leaders which contributed to evolving strategic policy toward Germany. The other major strategic event was the implementation by the Allies of the machinery for Allied control in the form of the Allied Control Council in Berlin. The implementation of the Control Council operations effectively began the third phase of the occupation wherein another authority gradually replaced US Army control under ECLIPSE.

From July 17 to August 2, 1945, Allied national leaders met outside Berlin at Potsdam Germany. One of the purposes of the meeting was to establish the way forward to peace treaties.

³⁷ Quoted in Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay, An American Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), 190.

³⁸ Clay’s father, Alexander Clay, was a US Senator from Georgia from 1896 to 1910. Lucius Clay served the bulk of his career as a Corps of Engineers officer working on various large engineering projects across the United States. During the depression Clay worked in the Corps offices in Washington organizing a variety of major national engineering programs and coordinating engineer operations with the White House. During the 1930s Clay’s activities in Washington brought him a great deal of visibility though he was only a major. Through his duties, he made numerous important and close political contacts including House Majority Leader and later Speaker, Congressman Sam Rayburn from Texas, and Harry L. Hopkins, President Roosevelt’s head of the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Clay established a reputation as a first class administrator and expert in working the army’s relations in the capital. Clay’s career is described in the biography by Smith (see note 37) as well as in Jean Edward Smith *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974).

The Potsdam agreement produced by the leaders of the three allied nations, President Harry Truman, General Secretary Joseph Stalin, and British Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and later Clement Attlee, established the principles for interim government of Germany until the establishment of a more permanent government. The Potsdam agreement established that “for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by state secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.”³⁹ Two of the most important aspects of the Potsdam agreement were the freedom it gave to the national military commanders to administer their zones independently and the statement regarding economic issues. On economic issues the Potsdam leaders agreed that Germany would be treated as an economic unit, and “allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy, but only to the extent necessary.” The Potsdam economic guidance was much less severe and restrictive than the JCS 1067 statements on economics. Potsdam, different from JCS 1067, required the occupation force to become involved in German economic development. Overall, General Clay’s assessment was that the addition of the Potsdam guidance to JCS 1067 removed the onerous economic restrictions of the latter and made the governance mission in Germany achievable.⁴⁰

On August 30, 1945 the Allied Control Council formally met for the first time in Berlin. The council’s authority and mandate derived from an Allied agreement achieved and signed in November 1944 by the European Advisory Commission (EAC). At its initial meeting the

³⁹ Leland M Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, Editors, “Appendix II. Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, July 17–August 2, 1945. Department of State Press Release, March 24, 1947,” *Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. VIII, July 1, 1945 – December 31, 1946* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948), 928.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 925–938, quotes on 928, 929; Clay 41–42.

council consisted of Marshal Georgy Zhukov of the Soviet Union, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery of Britain, General Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States, and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny of France. The primary purpose of the Council was “to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole, on the basis of instructions received by each Commander-in-Chief from his Government.” The council’s authority would be in effect until replaced by an unspecified organization designated “by a separate Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”⁴¹

Operations

As the war ended the immediate operational tasks for military government multiplied. In July the *New York Times* reported “The United States Army in Europe this week has presented a picture of darting, seething motions, some of it in circles, as reconversion of a great war machine progressed.”⁴² Staff work immediately increased. Eisenhower quoted an overworked army staff officer who commented, “I always thought that when the Germans finally surrendered I would celebrate by going on a big binge. Now I’m taking aspirin every day –without the fun of looking back on the binge!”⁴³ The first task was disarmament of the German military forces. Another key task was reorganizing for military government in accordance with the ECLIPSE plan. The

⁴¹ See the minutes of the European Advisory Commission, November 14, 1944, which include the “Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany,” at the *Franklin D. Roosevelt Library* website, President’s Secretary File (PSF), Box 32, “Great Britain / Germany Diplomatic Files,” Folder, “Germany: Oct. 1944–45 (298i) Index,” <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box32/t298f01.html> (accessed October 1, 2009). During the first year of the occupation the council was relatively successful passing a variety of laws and orders that effectively dismantled the political, economic, and social structure built since the fall of the German Weimar government to support the rule of the Nazis. Supporting the American presence on the Allied Control Council was the US Group Control Council (USGpCC). On April 18, 1945 the army officially appointed Major General Lucius Clay as the Deputy Military Governor and the US representative on the Control Council’s Coordinating Committee. On April 25, the army announced Clay as the Commander of the USGpCC. *Civil Affairs*, 60–61.

⁴² Gladwin Hill, “SHAEF Becomes USFET, An All-American Outfit,” *The New York Times*, July 22, 1945, *The Week in Review*, 65.

⁴³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Doubleday Company, Inc., 1948), 432.

military government continued, on a larger scale, responsibility for caring for the health and welfare of the German civilian population as well as the millions of displaced Allied civilians located in Germany. Another complex task that effected military government was the redeployment and demobilization of troops not needed for the occupation. Additionally, the Allied occupation commands focused on developing unified strategic policy towards Germany.

Through the months of May, June, and July the US military forces were extremely busy. Tactical forces and military government teams pulled back from the positions they seized in the last weeks of the war and reassembled within the national occupation zone agreed upon at Yalta. In the southwestern parts of Germany many of the military government teams were already in position. These teams had to contend with the turbulence of frequently changing higher headquarters as tactical headquarters moved as part of the demobilization and redeployment process. Though the military government detachments themselves were part of the permanent force remaining in Germany, the military government system had to contend with the turbulence of individual redeployment. Early recruitment, and the deployment of military government specialists to Great Britain in early 1944 gave many team members a high number of demobilization points. This caused many critical and experienced civil affairs officers to leave the army early in the occupation. The loss of many of the specially recruited and trained military government specialists challenged effective military government at the tactical level throughout the first year of the occupation.⁴⁴

As military government teams arrived in their pinpoint assignments they immediately confronted the challenge of a large civil population with virtually no indigenous governance structure. Throughout the last year of the war, beginning when the first parts of Germany fell to

⁴⁴ Zink, *American Military Government in Germany*, 62.

the Allies in 1944, the German government practiced a policy of scorched earth as they retreated in front of the Allied advance. The German government, within its ever decreasing ability in 1945, attempted to remove everything of military or even civil value as they pulled back. The Germans destroyed or disbanded most elements of civil government. Government officials, including mayors, police, fire fighters, tax collectors, railroad and postal workers, and many other skilled government employees evacuated away from the advancing Allies. This was particularly true in the large urban areas. This created a huge challenge to military government teams who expected to supervise German officials in their jobs, not do the jobs themselves.⁴⁵

In late September 1945, General George Patton caused a major publicity embarrassment to the American military governor of Germany, General Eisenhower. Patton was the commander of the Third Army and the military governor of the Western Military District. In a press conference with US reporters, the press asked Patton about the number of former Nazis working for and with the military government. Patton replied to the effect that the Germans who had been Nazi party members were the only Germans who possessed the many technical skills critical to the administration of military government. In addition, Patton made a comparison of the German Nazi party membership to membership in the American Democratic and Republican political parties. Patton's statements made instant headlines in the United States and created charges that the army was being "soft" in its prosecution of the occupation. The incident resulted in Patton's removal as commander of the Third Army and demonstrated that the Morgenthau view of occupation policy still had a powerful popular following in the United States.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Ibid., 63, 88–89.

⁴⁶ *Time*, "Foreign News: Patton & the Devil," October 1, 1945; *Time*, "International: You Don't Know What you Want," October 8, 1945.

Although Patton's comment reflected the difficult reality of occupation administration, General Clay viewed Patton's removal as an opportunity to advance the organizational effectiveness of the occupation. General Clay had made clear to General Eisenhower soon after his selection as deputy military governor that he considered it a necessity that the entire military government apparatus be under his command. General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, preferred that the occupation organization remain as it had been under the carpet plan, with military government conducted through the tactical commanders to the senior headquarters, USFET. Eisenhower sided with Clay, but delayed implementation of the organizational change until occupation operations were established and much of the initial post-war chaos subsided. Clay used the occasion of Patton's indelicate remarks to recommend to Eisenhower that it was time to reorganize the force for occupation.⁴⁷

On October 8, 1945, the reorganization of the USFET began. Changes occurred at the highest level as the US Group Control Council (USGpCC) became the Office of Military Government US (OMGUS) and the G-5 of the USFET became the subordinate Office of Military Government (US Zone). Both were under General Clay's command as the deputy military governor. General Clarence Lionel Adcock, the USFET G-5, became Clay's deputy and the head of OMG (US Zone) located in Frankfurt Germany in the I.G. Farben building with the rest of the USFET headquarters.⁴⁸ In November Military Government commands were created from the Third and Seventh Army G-5 organizations to supervise German civilian administrations set up in three *länder* organized in the American zone: Bavaria, Wurttemberg-Baden, and Gross

⁴⁷ Smith, *Lucius D. Clay*, 226–228.

⁴⁸ Like Clay, General Clarence L. Adcock was a 1918 graduate of West Point and Engineer Officer. He was a long time personal friend of Clay's. Adcock spent the bulk of World War II working as a logistics expert in North Africa, Italy and then Northwest Europe. He ended the war as the 6th Army Group G-4 in southern Germany. He was then assigned as the USFET G-5. His biography is at "Clarence L. Adcock," *Arlington National Cemetery Website*, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/cladcock.htm> (accessed October 15, 2009); also see Smith, *Lucius D. Clay*, 226–227.

Hessen. These *länder* commands reported directly to OMG (US zone). General Clay remained in Berlin where he personally supervised the staff of the OMGUS and participated in the various activities related to the Allied Control Council. After the reorganization, American tactical units and the USFET staff had no direct role in military government except in support of and coordinated with OMGUS.⁴⁹

An important policy change occurred as the OMGUS reorganization took place. On October 5, General Clay ordered military government detachments to withdraw from any direct role in local and municipal government. From that point forward, military government detachments at the local and municipal level only advised and supervised appointed German officials in their tasks. When the Germans failed to properly carry out OMGUS policies and directives, military government officers were to report the discrepancy to the *länder* commanders. OMGUS directed policy to the German officials through its German administration set up at the *Land* level, and instructed German officials at the zone level through the *Länderrat* (zone Council of German leaders).⁵⁰

The military government closely monitored the danger of disease and famine during the first two years of the occupation, particularly during winter of 1945–46. Fortunately, military government had the services of an exceptionally able officer in Major General Morrison C. Stayer, the Chief Surgeon of USFET.⁵¹ Stayer immediately understood that the occupation forces had three challenges. The first challenge was standing up the German health services as quickly as possible. The second challenge was combating disease. The final challenge was

⁴⁹ USFET was redesignated European Command (EUCOM) on March 15, 1947. *Civil Affairs*, 80–85.

⁵⁰ J.F.J. Gillen, *American Influence on the Development of Political Institutions* (Karlsruhe, GE: European Command, 1950), 99–100..

⁵¹ Stayer was an exceptional army doctor who, like many regular army physicians, had wide experience. Stayer served in the first occupation of Germany in 1919. In addition, he had wide credibility throughout the army and the War Department. He was a personal friend of General Marshal having served as his chief of logistics instruction at the Infantry School at Fort Benning in the early 1930s.

ensuring an adequate diet and preventing famine among the German population. As early as the fall of 1945 Stayer was working to have German medical schools reopened in order to begin to meet the need for medical specialists.⁵²

The major concern regarding disease was typhus transmitted by lice. To combat the spread of the disease the occupation command established control points at all major access points into the American zone, and a cordon sanitaire along the Rhine River to protect areas to the west from the disease. The army deloused all civilians, displaced persons (DPs), and former prisoners of war (POWs) traveling west with DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) before crossing the Rhine. Reception centers at the crossing points into the US zone inspected all persons and anyone suspected of having a communicable disease was isolated for observation. Tuberculosis was another dangerous threat to the occupation zone. The army fought the disease by providing an extra food ration to those who self identified themselves and submitted to treatment. Through proactive preventive measures, including a massive civilian inoculation program, the occupation experienced no major outbreaks of disease in the US zone.⁵³

Famine was also a major concern of the occupation command. In 1945, the German official daily ration was 1150 calories per day. This was not enough to prevent disease caused by malnutrition. Military Government nutritional survey teams confirmed that 60 percent of all Germans were on a diet leading to starvation, and Stayer promptly raised the issue of “disease and unrest” authorizations in JCS 1067 to General Clay. This allowed the military government to begin direct food deliveries to the Germans from army and international stocks, despite restrictions in JCS 1067. German authorities supervised distribution of food to the needy.

⁵² James F. Tent, “Mission on the Rhine,” *Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 58.

⁵³ Office of the Chief Historian, *The First Year of the Occupation, Parts I-IV* (Frankfurt, GE: European Command, 1947), 203; Frederiksen, 109.

Prompt action by the command prevented starvation during the occupation's first winter.⁵⁴ In the winter of 1946–47 famine was again a threat. The previous winter the issue was food stocks, in the second winter the problem was inadequate transportation to move food to market. The army stepped in to support German efforts to feed the population through Operation SPUD. This operation was an effort to ensure that German farmers could get their potato crop to market in a timely manner. Between October 1946 and January 1947 thirty-one army tactical truck companies and twenty percent of the trucks of forty-six army communities participated in the moment. Again, army support to the new German administrations averted famine.⁵⁵

Conduct of the Occupation 1946–47

Within a year of the war ending, the army, fulfilling the mandate of its doctrine and its history, sponsored democratic elections across the US occupation zone. Until 1946, the American military government, even at the local level, operated through appointed German officials. The highest form of appointed government in the US zone was the state *landrat*. It was the equivalent of a state assembly. The Americans set up one *landrat* for each of the three German *länder* (states) in the American zone. The Americans appointed prominent Germans with impeccable anti-Nazi credentials to these positions. The *landrat*'s purpose was to advise the district commander and to disseminate military government directives to local German government officials who the military government detachments operating in the *städten* (towns) and *landkreis* (counties) appointed.

⁵⁴ *The New York Times*, "German Diet Called Inadequate in Most of the Occupation Zones," July 15, 1945, 8; Herbert L. Matthews, "Bevin Voices British Horror At Germany Misery, Asks Aid," *The New York Times*, October 27, 1945, 1; *The New York Times*, "German Health Studied," November 7, 1945, 7; Tent, 58; *The First of Year of the Occupation, Parts I-IV*, 171–172.

⁵⁵ Office of the Chief Historian, *The Second Year of the Occupation, Vol. I* (Frankfurt, GE: European Command, 1947), 98.

As the occupation entered 1946, its focus turned to transitioning greater responsibility for administration to the Germans. This was essential for reducing the size and cost of the occupation forces, and for laying the foundation for transition from military government to civil authority. However, giving greater control to the German officials also required elections to democratically select those officials. General Clay determined that democracy had to start at the grass roots and thus scheduled *gemeinde* (village or small town with a population less than 20,000—the smallest German political organization) elections for January 1946. Senior appointed German politicians and senior American officers such as General Lucian Truscott, new commander of Third Army and the Eastern Military District, opposed Clay. The arguments against the election were that winter weather, lack of time to organize political parties, and inadequate voting organization and apparatus would combine to keep participation low. Voter qualifications included being a German citizen, at least twenty-one years of age, one year's residence in the *gemeinde*, and no Nazi party membership before May 1, 1937 or membership in any of the major Nazi organizations or affiliates. The elections were held as scheduled and *The New York Times* reported that “Predictions that political apathy among the Germans would result in a fiasco in the first free elections held in this country in thirteen years were knocked flat today as voters converged on the polling place in great numbers.”⁵⁶ The final returns showed that eighty-six percent of eligible voters participated. General Clay was very satisfied with the results.⁵⁷

The next step in the process was *landkreis* (county) elections. These elections took place in April 1946 using the same processes used in January. Turn out for the election was down

⁵⁶ Kathleen McLaughlin, “Germans Turn Out Heavily to Ballot,” *The New York Times*, January 21, 1946, 1.

⁵⁷ Gillen, 15–21; Clay, 88; Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany: 1944–1955* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1957), 174–175.

from January, but was still significant. In Wuerttemberg-Baden and Bavaria the two Christian parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union (CSU), dominated. In Grosse Hesse, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was most successful. The occupation held *stadtkreis* (large city) municipal elections in May and the results followed the pattern established in the *gemeinde* and *landkreis*.⁵⁸

Establishing state level government was critical because the numerous refugee, communications, transportation, and economic issues confronting the military government required coordination at the highest governmental level possible. In June 1946, the process of forming elected *länder* governments began. The occupation authorities held elections in the three American zone *länder*, Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Hesse, for *länder* constitutional assemblies. Suffrage requirements were essentially unchanged except that the occupation permitted former Nazis, classified as followers or whom tribunals exonerated, to vote. The elections created constitutional assemblies that completed their work by the end of October 1946. Popular referendums approved all three *land* constitutions by the beginning of December 1946. Basic provisions in all the state constitutions included an individual bill of rights, a constitutional court, and *landtäge* (state assemblies) —bicameral in Bavaria, unicameral in the other two states. General Clay approved all three constitutions against the advice of his own political experts and the State Department. General Clay's reasoning was not that the constitutions were perfect, but rather that they represented the will of the people and if the United States wanted to demonstrate the importance of democracy to the Germans, the Germans had to have ownership of the institutions that governed them.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Gillen, 22–24.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 27–44; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 180–181.

The establishment of *land* governments was a major step toward democracy and returning civil governance to the Germans. However, it was not an efficient way to govern the entire US zone. For zonal administration, the Americans established the *Länderrat* in October 1945 in Stuttgart. Initially, an appointed Council of Minister-Presidents met to consider issues affecting all the *länder* and coordinate those issues with the leadership of military government. A small permanent secretariat coordinated administration and policy between the *länder* and the military government. The *Länderrat* met monthly and General Clay attended the meetings. As the elected *länder* governments came into being, the elected officials of the *länder* replaced the appointed officials in the *Länderrat*. General Clay always made informal remarks at the monthly meeting and heard the views of the minister-presidents, and then the group adjourned for informal discussions over coffee. An open press conference occurred after each meeting. General Clay's intent was not only to accomplish the business of zonal governance but also to set an example of the role of the press in democracy. The *Länderrat* was the primary interface between General Clay and representatives of the German people. The *Länderrat* remained the highest expression of German governance until the formation of the West German government in 1949.⁶⁰

The military government believed that the key to the success of democracy in post-war Germany was eliminating Nazis from participation in the democratic process. This was necessary, as General Clay indicated, to permit a new generation of leaders to emerge. Clay also recognized that running the complex civil government system of a modern nation required that the government employ skilled individuals: "All too often it seems that the only men with the qualifications ... are the career civil servants... a great proportion of whom were more than

⁶⁰ Gillen, 92–107; Clay 94–95; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 182.

nominal participants (by our definition) in the activities of the Nazi Party.”⁶¹ Despite this dilemma, the American occupation vigorously pursued the identification, and if warranted the punishment of former Nazis. Nazi affiliations were determined through several means. The Americans required all Germans in the US zone to fill out a questionnaire focused on an individual’s past political affiliations and activity, known as the *frägeboden*. Intentionally submitting false data was a crime. Nazi party records and interviews with other Germans were also sources used to identify Nazi party members. Over the course of the occupation the US Army processed thirteen million *frägeboden*. Approximately one quarter indicated some affiliation with the Nazi party. Military tribunals evaluated the individuals affiliated with the Nazi party to determine the degree of guilt. Individuals were subject to one of five classifications: major offender, offender, lesser offender, follower, or non-offenders.⁶² As tensions increased with the Soviets, the emphasis on the program decreased. On Christmas Eve 1946, the US authorities granted blanket amnesty to 800,000 Germans identified as followers. Though often rocked by scandal, the German administered tribunals continued to steadily evaluate all former Nazis through 1949. The tribunals found approximately two million Nazis chargeable and tried some 930,000. Of these, tribunals found more than 1,500 who were major offenders, and 21,000 to be offenders. Another 580,000 were determined to be lesser offenders or followers.⁶³

⁶¹ Quote from Clay, 67; Ziemke, 386–389; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 162–163.

⁶² The main Nazi party records files, identifying in detail all twelve million members, was located and saved from destruction in Munich. Clay, 68; Ziemke, 380.

The result of the strict American policy was that by the end of 1945 over 100,000 Germans were in internment camps for dangerous Nazis awaiting resolution of their cases by military tribunals. In addition, the occupation authorities disqualified over 300,000 Germans from any employment other than common labor. This represented approximately four percent of the adult population of the American zone –and in many respects the most skilled four percent. The four percent figure is based on a population of nineteen million of which approximately 9.5 million were adults. Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 159–161; Clay 69.

⁶³ *The Second Year of the Occupation, Vol. I*, 47; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 162–164.

A mission that was separate but related to denazification was establishing and enforcing law and order. Upon occupation of an area or town, the military government teams posted proclamations announcing the fundamental expectations of military government. Military courts tried violators of occupation proclamations. Local military government officials tried minor offenses and punished offenders with fines. Local officials referred more serious offenses to military tribunals or courts martial. Within four months of the end of the war, by the end of August 1945, German courts reopened for crimes involving Germans violating German law and committing offenses against other Germans. Military tribunals continued to hear cases of violations of occupation directives and cases involving Germans and Americans or other foreigners.

Control of the DPs living in Germany was another issue related to law and order and a major concern of the command. When the war ended, the American command estimated that there were approximately 2.3 million DPs in the American zone. This number did not include Allied prisoners of war or German refugees. The command created special military government detachments to care for DPs. Even before the war ended, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) officials worked closely with military government officers as well as the tactical commands coordinating policy and programs for DPs. From January 1946 to July 1947, UNRRA ran the DP camps in the US zone. In 1947, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) took over from UNRRA and increased international responsibility for the camps and DPs. Populations in the DP camps increased in 1946 and 1947 as civilians fled Eastern Europe. In 1948, the U.S government passed the Displaced Persons Act, which permitted 205,000 DPs to immigrate to the United States. The new state of Israel also began

accepting DPs in 1948 and approximately 100,000 emigrated from the US occupation zone. By 1950, the DP population in DP centers in the US zone was down to approximately 100,000.⁶⁴

Displaced persons posed several problems for the military government. First was the general requirement to care for them. The occupation forces opened large camps to house DPs and used army and UN food sources to maintain them. Army engineers assured the camps were serviceable and as comfortable as possible. The army also provided food and medical care. Another responsibility of the military government was to document the DP population; toward this end, the military government officers worked with Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) officers and with Allied liaison officers. Initially military government officers supervised the DP camps and organized the camp populations to make them self-administering as much as possible. Once documented, the primary goal of the military government was to repatriate the DPs as quickly as possible to their original countries. Between VE Day and October 1945, the US zone repatriated more than 2.3 million DPs. However, many DPs, particularly those from Eastern Europe, were not willing to return to their native country. In October 1945, the US zone retained 474,000 DPs, of whom half were nonrepatriable. Most of the remaining DPs were from eastern European countries under Soviet control. Military government was responsible for these individuals while assisting in arranging immigrations. Military government officers also organized the DPs as a temporary source of labor. They were particularly useful repairing critical infrastructure damaged in the war and serving under US supervision, as equipment guards. A segment of the DP population was also a source of organized crime. The US Constabulary had responsibility for law and order in DP facilities.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Frederiksen, 75–76, 80.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 73–75.

Initially, US policy dictated that military government would not establish German police organizations. This policy changed on July 10, 1945, when the establishment of German police became one of the highest priorities for the military government public safety officers. The military government developed a systematic plan for reconstituting the German police. First, all Nazi police organizations, of which there were dozens, were abolished. The occupation authorities established decentralized police organizations of two types. Urban areas established municipal police. Policing of all other areas was the responsibility of rural police who eventually came under the control of the *land* governments. Later, the Americans also established a border police to control the borders of the US zone. Numerous problems beset the establishment of the new police forces but the biggest was keeping Nazis out of the force. In some cases, such as the major police forces in Frankfurt, Munich, and Wiesbaden, former anti-Nazi police presidents were located who were more than capable of reestablishing a new reformed force with little supervision. In most cases however, it was a slow process of establish police schools, training programs, and carefully vetting recruits. By the end of December 1945, almost 25,000 police were trained and operating in rural and municipal police forces throughout the US zone. Though organized relatively quickly, German police suffered from transportation and communications shortages, as well as a lack of weapons. In September 1945 the army authorized weapons for the police, but it was not until the summer of 1946 that the army provided most police forces revolvers and carbines. Also by the summer of 1946, public safety officers had released impounded German vehicles for police use, and in Bavaria, the Third Army made over 300 army jeeps available to the German police. With improved telephone systems and the beginnings of police radio nets, by the end of the summer of 1946 the German police were completely functional. By that time, also, they were operating in close coordination with American Military

Police, and U.S Constabulary units. Such cooperation was essential because the German police lacked jurisdiction over Displaced Person camps and occupation personnel.⁶⁶

As indicated above, the German police capability disintegrated in the chaotic last weeks of the war. The Allies disbanded any semblance of police cohesion that survived the war because it represented the Nazi regime. Thus, in the first year of the occupation the task of policing fell squarely on the occupation tactical forces and military police. The problem with using tactical units for police tasks was training. In addition, the tactical and military police units were in a constant state of turmoil as they deployed out of the theater, deactivated, and adjusted to the massive individual redeployment of high point soldiers. The problems with the tactical units, the lack of German police, and indications that crime was on the upswing as the effects of food shortages increased, caused General Eisenhower to request permission from the War Department to organize a permanent American military police force for Germany, the US Constabulary.

With the War Department's authorization, General Eisenhower ordered Major General Ernest N. Harmon to organize a constabulary force for Germany. Harmon, known as one of the top combat leaders in the army, was determined to create an elite, specially trained, and highly visible combat police force. By January 1946, Harmon had organized a constabulary training school and fielded the first of thirty 800 man constabulary squadrons organized into ten regiments (three squadrons each) in three brigades (three regiments each and one assigned to Austria). A brigadier general commanded each of the three brigades, each located with the military government commands of the three German *länder*. The headquarters of the constabulary officially activated on July 1, 1946. At its high point, the Constabulary strength

⁶⁶ Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, *Public Safety* (Frankfurt GE: Headquarters European Command, 1947), 39–50, 53–55, 61–68.

was almost 35,000 troops. Fortunately, a major increase in crime did not occur and as the German police force effectiveness improved through 1946 and 1947, the constabulary squadrons quickly decreased their direct involvement in local law enforcement. Their primary tasks became border control, transportation supervision, and back-up support to local German police forces. By the end of 1947, designated constabulary squadrons discarded their police role and became part of the tactical army occupation force. The army deactivated most of the constabulary squadrons by 1950. The last two constabulary squadrons deactivated in 1952.⁶⁷

Policy Change

As the US military government proceeded with the process of establishing control over its zone of Germany, it became increasingly obvious that the tone of JCS 1067 was not compatible with the cooperation required between the Germans and the American occupation in order to successfully establish democratic institutions. Also, US policy makers were increasingly aware of the harsh nature of the Soviet occupation and the aggressiveness of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. The first major break from the tone of JCS 1067, and a clear expressive of how important Europe and Germany were within US foreign policy, took place in September 1946 in a speech in Stuttgart by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. The important elements of Byrnes speech were its endorsement of the economic unity of the British and American zones, and its proclamation that “German people throughout Germany...should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs.” As General Clay observed, “the German people were promised the opportunity and assistance to rejoin the family

⁶⁷ Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, *The United States Constabulary* (Frankfurt, GE: Headquarters European Command, 1947), 39, 42; “The US Constabulary in Post-War Germany (1946–52),” *US Army Center of Military History* website, <http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/constab-ip.html> (accessed October 21, 2009).

of nations.”⁶⁸ The speech set a new tone of German-American cooperation that continued through the remainder of the occupation.

Despite and improved tone in US-German policy, the need for Allied cooperation continued to limit US efforts to pass responsibility to the Germans. The process of breaking away from the post-war construct of the Allied Control Council began with the efforts to reestablish the German economy to make Germany self-sustaining and thus reduce the burden of the occupation on the American taxpayer. By the summer of 1946, General Clay recognized that without economic unification of the national zones, Germany would remain a drain on the US budget. None of the zones was economically self-sufficient. In his report on conditions in the summer of 1946, General Joseph T. McNarney, who replaced Eisenhower as the USFET commander in December 1945, stated that the German economy was almost stagnant because there was no common economic policy. On August 9, 1946, General Clay and Lieutenant General Brian Robertson, Deputy Military Governor of the British zone, agreed upon the broad principles of economic unity between the two zones. These principles included the creation of German run executive agencies responsible for agriculture, finance, trade and commerce, industry, transportation, and communications. Britain and the United States invited France and the Soviet Union to join the zonal union in accordance with the provisions of the Potsdam agreement, but they declined. On September 13, 1946, German, British, and American officials signed the agreement to fuse the economies of the two zones. An executive committee made up of the German economic ministers of the three US *länder* and three representatives of the British zone supervised the economic fusion. The occupation authorities tasked them with

⁶⁸ J.F. Byrnes, “Restatement of Policy on Germany Stuttgart,” September 6, 1946, *US Diplomatic Mission to Germany* website, <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga4-460906.htm> (accessed October 18, 2009); Clay, 80–81, quote on 81.

implementing economic policy declared by the Allied Control Council, as well as coordinating and supervising economic policy among the *länder* in the US and British zones. By March 1947, the transportation and communications executive had taken full responsibility for telephone and postal service between and within the two zones. In May, German rail authorities assumed control of all railways. A popularly elected German Economic Advisory Council was set up in May 1947 to give German *Land* government more direct say in economic policy. The British and Americans ensured German officials kept the Allied Control Commission completely aware of the activities toward economic fusion and restated the invitations for French and Soviet participation frequently. This was to avoid charges that the British and Americans were instigating a political union and thereby establishing a western German state.⁶⁹

End of the Army Occupation 1948–49

The Achilles heel of four-power control over Germany was the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Through 1945, the US leadership, particularly the army leadership in Germany, was unaware that their vision of a free democratic Germany was incompatible with the future Germany envisioned by the Soviets. Initially it appeared that the Soviets were reasonably cooperative within the Allied Control Council.⁷⁰ The Allies first detected Soviet reluctance in the political arena. The concept of rule by the four powers called for the Allied Control Council to jointly make policy decisions. Initially, the intent was for each individual Allied commander to then execute those policies within the national occupation zones. The Allies intended this situation to be a temporary measure. One of the most important political tasks of the Control Council was to organize national German institutions under the control of

⁶⁹ *The Second year of the Occupation Vol. I*, 1, 18–19, 62, 95, 103–104; Clay, 169.

⁷⁰ Experts on the Soviet Union, such as George Kennan, dissented from this view. Kennan observed in his memoirs that “it was clear to me... that no tripartite collaboration for the governing of Germany would be workable. George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 39.

the council. The intent was for these institutions, run by appointed reliable and loyal Germans, to execute and supervise Control Council policy at the national level. The goal was that national German institutions would be the first step toward rebuilding a democratic, nonthreatening German government. The French and Soviets balked at setting up German national institutions. Though the Soviet forces ostensibly promoted democracy, they severely restricted the ability of German political parties to form and operate in their zone. They intimidated, arrested, and harassed any German who peacefully protested Soviet policy or the activities of the Soviet sponsored German Communist Party. Soviet harassment was not limited to Germans. Beginning in 1946 a pattern of harassing American and Allied military and civilian personnel began. Most often this harassment occurred in Berlin or when traveling to Berlin. Harassment also occurred along the US zone boundary with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet zone of Germany. Occasionally, such harassment became violent as in the summer of 1946 when Soviet troops attacked a US Constabulary patrol along the zonal border. In an exchange of fire, one Soviet soldier died.⁷¹

By November 1947, economic integration of the British and US zones was proceeding well. However, political cooperation with the Russians continued to deteriorate. When the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers met in London in November without any agreement on further achievement of the Potsdam objectives or even agreeing to meet again, Generals Clay and Robertson agreed the time had come for the last step in bizonal economic integration. With the approval of the British Foreign Minister, and US Secretary of State George Marshall, the two military governors proclaimed further Bizonia integration in February 1948. The reorganization added a framework for German governance by expanding the Economic Advisory Council to

⁷¹ *The Second Year of the Occupation, Vol. I* (Frankfurt, GE: European Command, 1947), 3.

104 members. It also established the equivalent of an upper house in the form of a *Länderrat* composed of two representatives from each of the eight German *länder* that comprised the British and American zones. The occupation authorities gave the *Länderrat* authority to initiate legislation and to veto Economic Council legislation. The military governors established a high court in March 1948 to interpret and enforce legislation across both zones. Though not intended as a two state government, and completely subject to military government control, the new bizonal administration provided valuable administrative and governance experience to the Germans.⁷²

The center of the US and Soviet competition in Germany was Berlin. Beginning in January 1948, as bizonal integration increased, the Soviet forces stepped up harassing and impeding travel and supplies into the city of Berlin from the western zones. Harassment of western Allies increased steadily through the first months of 1948. Propaganda against the western Allies also reached unprecedented levels in the Soviet controlled press. On March 20, 1948, the Soviets abruptly adjourned the Allied Control Council meeting without setting a date for its next meeting.⁷³ On June 22, 1948, the Soviet command in Berlin closed the highway and railway between Helmstedt and the British sector of Berlin, effectively cutting off all land and sea transportation into western Berlin. To sustain the city and its population of 2.2 million civilians the Allies responded by airlifting the two necessities of survival in Berlin: food and coal. On June 28, 1948, the military governors of the western zones formally initiated an airlift to supply the city. The city required 7,250 tons of cargo a day to sustain it. During the summer months the requirement was only 4,500 tons. Initially, it was difficult meeting the requirements of the city, but by January 1949 the airlift achieved ninety-six percent of its food goal and one

⁷² Clay, 175–176, 180–181, 184.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 353–356;

hundred and thirteen percent of its coal objective. This rate of supply was sufficient to maintain the city indefinitely. Through the spring of 1949, the airlift increased its effectiveness achieving a record tonnage of 12,849 tons on April 16, 1949. On that day, an aircraft landed at one of the three Allied airfields in Berlin every 63 seconds. Faced with the success of the aerial resupply through the winter of 1948–49, the Soviets raised the blockade of the city on May 12, 1949.⁷⁴

The importance of the blockade cannot be understated. It demonstrated that combined Allied control of Germany and integration of the western and Soviet national zones was highly unlikely in the near future. This realization brought increased unity to the western Allies as well as the western population of Germany. The blockade helped eliminate whatever opposition remained to the integration of the western zones. During the blockade, France joined its zone to the economic integration that already existed between the zones of the United States and Great Britain. Most important, the blockade reinforced the Allies commitment to politically empowering the Germans of the western zones. In the American zone, German political control progressed according to a systemically executed plan.⁷⁵ The first phase of the plan was local governance. The second phase was the economic unification of the British and US zones. This occurred due to economic necessity. The third phase was the complete political unification of the western zones. The major rationale behind the last phase was the security threat of communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular.

The success of the bizonal economic fusion and the failure of the minister's conference in November 1947 influenced France to integrate its zone with other two western Allies. In April

⁷⁴ *Time*, "The Nations: Victory at Berlin," May 16, 1949; For a detailed analytical account of the military operations that supported the Berlin airlift see Elizabeth S. Lay, Editor, *The Berlin Air Lift* (Karlsruhe, GE: Historical Division European Command, 1952). Lay, Part II, 54, 64, 117; Office of the Military Government, Berlin Sector, *A Four Year Report. Office of Military Government US Sector, Berlin, July 1 1945 – September 1, 1949* (Berlin, GE: Deutscher Verlag, 1949), 29–32.

⁷⁵ Clay, 395.

and May 1948, Allied delegations met in London with the objective of agreeing upon guidelines to provide to the German constitutional assembly. The conference produced a report which included three important annexes: instructions for the minister-presidents of the German *länder*, a guide for the military governments to use to measure success of the constitutional assembly, and principles to use developing an Occupation Statute defining the continued occupation of Germany after the establishment of a West German government. On September 1, 1948 the delegates elected by the *länder* arrived in Bonn and formed a Parliamentary Council to create a constitution which the Germans preferred to call the “Basic Law.”⁷⁶ The negotiations to form the German Basic Law were long and difficult. The central issue of disagreement was over the extent and power of a future German central government. The Germans made the first draft of the Basic Law available to Allies in January 1949. The Allies made adjustments to decrease the power of the central government and increase the independence of the states. Despite the Allies’ recommendations, the Germans returned a second draft that made few changes. On April 25, 1949, the military governors met again with representatives of the German Parliamentary Council. At this meeting, General Clay obtained agreement on the extent of federal government power. This agreement was the necessary breakthrough that resulted in the Parliamentary Council agreeing on the Basic Law on May 8. On May 12, 1949, the Allies accepted the Basic Law.⁷⁷ On the same day, the blockade of Berlin ended.

Success in Germany

⁷⁶ Clay, 404–411; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 186; Konrad Adenauer, Beate Ruhm von Oppen, Translator, *Memoirs 1945–53* (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1966), 123–124.

⁷⁷ Jack Raymond, “3 Powers Warn Germans to Speed Constitution for New Government,” *The New York Times*, April 1, 1949, 4; *The New York Times*, “Progress Implied on German Regime,” April 15, 1949, 9; Lawrence Resner, “Way is Held Clear,” *The New York Times*, April 29, 1949, 1; Kathleen McLaughlin, “German Assembly, 53 to 12, Approves New Constitution,” *The New York Times*, May 9, 1949, 1; *Time*, “Germany: A Good European,” December 5, 1949; Clay, 420–421, 431–436; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 186–188.

Many problems challenged the American occupation of Germany but ultimately the occupation was an important part of creating an economically strong and democratic West Germany. Overall the occupation was successful, but success came despite cumbersome coordination with Allies, lack of clear strategic guidance, dysfunctional economic policy, and a poorly managed transition from combat to occupation operations in the summer of 1945. The American army overcame these challenges because of the initiative and planning of the G-5 staffs and the military government detachments, the solid doctrine, robust resources devoted to the occupation mission, and the leadership of Eisenhower and Clay. Throughout the occupation the traditional tasks of democratization, law and order, and health and sanitation guided operations. The success in the traditional American occupation tasks of occupation stabilized the American zone and permitted the command the time to adjust political and economic policy to correct the initial misguidance of JCS 1067, and to confront Soviet intransigence regarding the Eastern German zone,

The Americans naively believed that they could effectively govern Germany jointly with three Allies. Prior experience with France in World War I, and the difficulty the American government and military had dealing with the various French factions during World War II, should have warned the American senior leadership that making France an equal partner in the occupation would raise many problems while enhancing the operation very little. The Soviets represented a similar problem except Soviet war efforts made their involvement in post-war Germany impossible to avoid. Additionally, President Roosevelt had made a deliberate decision that personal diplomacy between himself and Marshal Stalin could alleviate Soviet security concerns. Even the British, with whom the United States had generally good relations and who shared similar post-war strategic objectives, could occasionally be difficult partners. Thus, the

Allies could not avoid the slow, cautious and often indecisive decision-making coming from the various Allied command and policy organizations. In the face of the inherent difficulties of the situation, what is surprising, and a testament to the diplomacy and leadership of General Clay, is that Americans were able to keep the western portion of the alliance intact, nurse the American zone to recovery, ultimately lead the unification of the western zones, and not start a war with the Soviet Union over Berlin.

No one in the US government could change President Roosevelt's assessment of his influence with Soviet Union. Similarly, army training and doctrine could only have a limited impact on the national leadership's policy toward Germany. Thus, the President's reluctance to give early definitive guidance regarding post-war Germany policy, and the tendency on the part of the President and some of his advisors to favor a harsh peace, contrary to army doctrine, was difficult for the army and its leaders to influence. Further, in the American tradition, the army leadership had little role influencing national political policy. The lack of detail and the lateness of operational planning are all largely attributable to problems among the civilian political leadership at the strategic level.

To his credit, General Clay recognized early the necessity, in accord with military government doctrine, for a clear direct military government chain of command. He also understood that the tactical commanders, with years of combat behind them, were unlikely to be attuned to the political nuances of military government and give it priority. Eisenhower agreed with Clay, yet it was a full six months into the occupation, and then only spurred by the Patton incident, before Clay was given direct control of military government and the tactical commanders removed from the chain of command. Because of this, issues such as the

redeployment of tactical units to the Pacific and demobilization were much more disruptive than they should have been.

The army chain of command, beginning with General John H. Hilldring, the chief of the Civil Affairs Division at the War Department, to the men of the civil affairs detachments, was thoroughly schooled in the army civil affairs doctrine contained in FM 2-37. They all clearly understood that the mission of military government was to “assist military operations, to further national policies, and to fulfill the obligation of the occupying forces under international law.” They also understood that doctrine stated that, “International law requires and military necessity dictates just and reasonable treatment of inhabitants of occupied territory to minimize their belligerency and obtain their cooperation...Proper treatment...will have a favorable influence upon the present and future attitude of the population toward the United States and its Allies.”⁷⁸ The doctrine pervaded virtually all aspects of military government and prevailed in circumstances where policy was absent or ambiguous. Because of the clear and well-understood doctrine, the harsh tone that dominated the strategic guidance did not translate into harsh practice at the tactical level. Military government doctrine, ingrained in the army’s approach to occupation operations, kept the occupation from failing in its first year. This allowed enough time for President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes to reorient the strategic political policy in 1946.

One reason the doctrine was so effective was the very deliberate training and high quality of military government personnel as described in the previous chapter. Extensive training in the United States continued once the military government teams arrived in Britain and continued on the continent until the time they deployed to their assignments. The army recruited most of the

⁷⁸ *Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, FM 27-5, 3, 6-7.*

military government personnel in important positions specifically because of the expertise they acquired as civilians. General Eisenhower's evaluation was that "the military government group of Americans did a remarkable job –one that reflected their sincerity and intelligence as well as the soundness of their special training."⁷⁹ At the theater level, General Clay and the other senior commanders had immediate access to some of the top experts in literally dozens of critical skill areas. At the tactical level, a thorough knowledge of the way things were suppose to be allowed military government officers to act in the absence of detailed guidance and to adjust to unforeseen circumstances. The expertise and training embodied in the military government personnel, facilitated success despite poor or insufficient guidance.

Poor decisions, lack of planning, bad assumptions, and unexpected circumstances were all part of the military government experience in Germany. Another factor that enabled the American military government effort to prevail despite adversity was resources. Beginning in 1944 the American army in the European theater had available thousands of civil affairs officers and enlisted men. When the manpower requirements proved insufficient in the last months of the war, the theater authorized the conversion and retraining of tactical units to support the military government mission. The individual teams were also well equipped and completely mobile. Each team was authorized vehicles and radios. Military government teams were also not on their own. Army engineers and logistics units in particular, often worked in direct support of the military government. The theater created ten regiments of the US Constabulary specifically to support the law and order aspects of military government. Finally, when the Soviet leadership directly challenged the military government mission during the blockade of the Berlin, the entire resources of the United States Air Force supported the Military Governor in

⁷⁹ Dwight Eisenhower, *Crusade In Europe* (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 434.

order to execute US policy in Berlin. Throughout the war the army staff placed significant emphasis on the resources needed to execute the military government mission. Though on several occasions the estimates of personal requirements were inaccurate, there was always a priority to provide the resources necessary to get the governance mission accomplished.

One aspect of the occupation of Germany that helped its success was the lack of pressure to finish operations quickly. Although the American occupation leadership was well aware that the length of the occupation equated to costs to the US government, there was no significant pressure to end the occupation quickly. American leaders moved events along as fast as they could without jeopardizing the mission. The manner in which the occupation command dealt with the Soviets was indicative of the ability of the command to be patient regarding occupation policy. General Clay worked sincerely with his Soviet counterparts for two and half years before concluding that there was no hope for effective Control Council governance of a united Germany. The reason Clay worked so hard to find common ground with the Soviets and kept at it so long was that he understood that a break with the Russians guaranteed a divided Germany. It was only when Clay concluded that his choice was between a divided Germany and a Germany under Soviet domination, that he began to change the focus of military government to developing the self-sufficiency of the US zone in 1947. The American government's investment in time in Germany permitted the military government to empower and organize a new generation of German politicians, protect the young democratic institutions from external and internal subversion, and supervise the rebuilding of Germany's economic capability.

Probably the factor that most influenced the success of the occupation in Germany was leadership. The army leadership in Washington, Generals Marshall and Hildring and Secretary Stimson, worked to ensure policy toward Germany remained consistent with army doctrine. In

the European theater, General Eisenhower and the men of the SHAEF G-5 staff were proactively seeking guidance and creating theater policy for subordinate commands. General Clay provided the most critical leadership. General Lucius Clay's ability to deal directly with tactical commanders, Allies, Germans, and Washington proved to be superb. Clay demonstrated himself to be a leader capable of accomplishing a critical national mission despite the fact that within his army experience he had never commanded more troops than an engineer company. Clay did not inspire Germans with his charisma; rather, he impressed them with his competence.⁸⁰ In 1948, as the Berlin crisis developed, *Time* magazine said "No other American at this moment has the authority and responsibility for so many on-the-spot decisions that can determine whether or not the US this year finds itself in World War III. A man less sure of himself than Clay would break under such conditions. But Clay eats well, likes to take walks in his flower garden, and is mildly contemptuous of insomniacs ("If they'd work harder they could sleep all right")." Eisenhower considered Clay "forceful and thorough and tactful... you would assume I am one of Clay's admirers –which I am."⁸¹ Historian Harold Zink concluded, "had the United States not had an officer like General Clay in Germany during 1945 and 1946, when there was little or no direction coming out of Washington, a heavy price might have been paid."⁸² Most important, Clay understood that the occupation operation was not just a mopping up operation after the war. He realized that it was the key to ensuring that the sacrifices made during the combat phase of the war translated into strategic victory. General Clay lived the experience of how a mismanaged peace after World War I contributed to the start of World War II, and was determined not to let that history repeat itself.

⁸⁰ Jack Raymond, "Germans' Respect Accorded Clay," *The New York Times*, May 8, 1949, 5.

⁸¹ *Time*, "The Nations: The Siege," July 12, 1948; Dwight Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), 311.

⁸² Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 71.

Of the occupations conducted in the history of the American army, the circumstances of the occupation of Germany were some of the most difficult. Germany's economy was destroyed, millions had been killed, large portions of the population were homeless and refugees, and no political leadership existed anywhere. Even more challenging was the lack of cogent strategic guidance and a Soviet ally determined to thwart US occupation objectives. Despite these conditions, four years after the occupation began, a functioning democratic government was in place in the former western occupation zones. A decade later, in 1955, the western zone achieved sovereignty and a place in the United Nations as the Federal Republic of Germany. By 1960, West Germany was thriving and much of the world viewed its recovery as an economic miracle. These outcomes were no accident. Army occupation doctrine, the civil affairs training program and expert personnel, the resources provided to support the occupation, and most importantly, leadership, were important factors that created the success in Germany under American army occupation.

CHAPTER 9 - Indirect Military Government: Japan, 1945–1952

The occupation of Japan, conducted primarily by the military forces of the United States, bore little resemblance to the occupation policies and operations conducted simultaneously by US military forces in Germany. The differences between the two occupations were primarily because of the unique military and political circumstances in the two theaters of war. The occupation of Japan was an even greater success than Germany. The occupation of Japan benefited from much more effective planning and strategic guidance than any previous occupation operation. It was easier because the Japanese government bureaucracy was available to assist the occupation forces after surrender. The presence of the Japanese government did not divert the occupation forces from following a pattern of activities in accordance with the history of US Army occupation: the occupation forces quickly worked to establish democratic government, they reformed the health services and avoided disease and famine, they reformed the school system, and they instituted individual liberties. Similar to Germany, the immediate actions of the army ensured enough stability to provide the time for more complete policy to develop in response to the Cold War and other post-war events. Finally, the success in Japan could not be separated from the influence of the personality and leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, the military governor. His vision, explicitly informed by the army's history of occupation operations was the key force shaping the general nature of the occupation and the relationship between the army and the Japanese.

Japan, August 1945

Japan's surrender in many ways was similar to that of Germany in 1918. Like Germany in 1918, much of the Japanese military capability was intact, the homeland uncompromised, the government was completely functional, and the surrender negotiated. However, some things were different. Though Americans did not invade the homeland, there was no doubt in the Allied or Japanese mind that invasion was inevitable and Japan was defeated. Further, though some Japanese die-hards believed otherwise, Japanese senior military and government officials understood that they could not withstand an Allied invasion. The only difference of opinion was over whether a strategy of bloody defense of the homeland might cause the Allies to offer better surrender terms than were offered in July 1945. Another difference between post World War I Germany and Japan in the late summer of 1945 was the effects of Allied air attack. Unlike the German economy in 1918, which the Allies disrupted, but did not destroy, with a very effective sea blockade, the Americans virtually destroyed the Japanese economy by air attacks in 1945. Moreover, the American attacks, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians and destroying millions of homes, caused physiological effects on the civilian population. The American air attacks culminated in the two atomic attacks on August 6 and 9, which together killed approximately 200,000 people and destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese also knew that the atomic attacks were just a prelude to the invasion of the home island of Kyushu in November. That knowledge, the loss of Okinawa, and the atomic attacks convinced the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War and Emperor Hirohito to agree to surrender in accordance with the Potsdam terms. Another difference was that the Japanese in 1945 dealt with an alliance completely dominated by the policy of a single adversary, the United States, rather than a coalition of equal Allies as existed in World War I. A final and most important difference between Japan in 1945 and Germany in 1918 was that subsequent to the

surrender, Allied forces completely occupied Japan under conditions of unconditional surrender. Thus, unlike Germany in 1918, after the war ended the occupying power completely controlled Japan's future.

The war devastated Japan. Most of Japan's population of 72 million resided on the four large home islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaido. Japan had a large urban population with 23 percent of the population living in the many large cities. The largest urban areas were Tokyo, population 2.8 million, Osaka, population of 1.1 million, and Kyoto, population 870,000. Japan had seven additional urban areas with populations over 200,000.¹ Japan was a very class-conscious society not long removed from feudalism. A small aristocratic elite ruled Japan, and though legally the only class distinctions that existed were between the nobility and commoners, many other social and economic distinctions existed in Japanese society.² Approximately seventy percent of the population was tenet farmers. The balance of the population was industrial workers. Roughly, one-quarter of the urban population fled or evacuated from the cities because of the American air attacks. This mass migration from the cities included as many 8.5 million people. Tokyo's population reflected the scale of the exodus: in 1940, Tokyo's population was 6.7 million; after the US air attacks of 1945, more than half the

¹ Statistics Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, *Population of Japan: Final Report of the 2000 Population Census* (Statistics Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2001). *Ministry of Internal Affairs Website*, 2008, <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/2000/final/hyodai.htm> (accessed December 22, 2009).

²Some were holdovers from the pre-Meiji period. The traditional classes included nobles, the daimyo (feudal lords), and the samurai (armed retainers of the lords). The major class distinctions after the Meiji restoration were the nobility, business magnates (the zaibatsu), the middle classes, technicians, farmers, the urban proletariat, and the Eta. The Eta were traditional outcasts of Japanese society. They may have numbered as many as three million. The Eta were officially commoners, their traditional outcast status and prejudice against them continued into the post-war era. The ruling elite consisted of individuals who belonged to one or more of the upper classes: nobility, daimyo, samurai, or business magnates. Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, *Army Service Forces Manual M354-1, Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 1944), 98–100.

population fled the city. The evacuees helped spread discouragement and disaffection for the war throughout the islands.³

Allied air attacks destroyed much of the Japanese economy by the end of the war. However, air attack was not the only weapon used against the economy. Japan was also subject to a very effective American submarine campaign against the Japanese merchant fleet. The US strategic bombing survey concluded after the war that “by August 1945, even without direct air attack on her cities and industries, the over-all level of Japanese war production would have declined below the peak levels of 1944 by 40 to 50 percent solely as a result of the interdiction of overseas imports [by submarine attack].” Still, the results of the unrelenting air attacks, particularly the firebomb attacks, were devastating. “In the aggregate some 40 percent of the built-up area of the 66 cities attacked was destroyed. Approximately 30 percent of the entire urban population of Japan lost their homes and many of their possessions.” In addition, the bombing survey reported:

physical productive capacity [was reduced] by roughly the following percentages of pre-attack plant capacity: oil refineries, 83 percent; aircraft engine plants, 75 percent; air-frame plants, 60 percent; electronics and communication equipment plants, 70 percent; army ordnance plants, 30 percent; naval ordnance plants, 28 percent; merchant and naval shipyards, 15 percent; light metals, 35 percent; ingot steel, 15 percent; chemicals, 10 percent.

The survey concluded that overall, “the physical destruction resulting from the air attack on Japan approximates that suffered by Germany.”⁴ The attacks not only affected the economic capability of the country but also the psychology of the people. In the last nine months of the war, Japanese civilian casualties from air attack were approximately 806,000. Approximately 330,000 of these were fatalities. By the time of surrender sixty-four percent of the population

³ War Department, *United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War)* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 21; *Ministry of Internal Affairs Website*.

⁴ War Department, *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, 17–20. Quote from 18.

stated they had reached a point where they felt they personally could no longer continue to support the war effort. These feelings manifested themselves in loss of faith in both the military and civilian leadership.⁵ The civilian population was psychologically ready for the war to end in August 1945.

When the war ended, Japan still retained significant military capability. The army and navy together contained 6.9 million men. About 3.5 million men occupied the home island defenses, and the Japanese command dedicated 950,000 men to defend Kyushu, the first American objective. Another 3.4 million men were part of the Japanese armies fighting in China, or scattered throughout Asia and the Pacific in various Japanese garrisons. Unlike the Japanese army, little was left of the Japanese navy in the summer of 1945. The US Navy destroyed most of the Japanese navy through four years of war. However, the Japanese air forces, both army and navy, though thoroughly outclassed by the aviation might of the United States and its Allies, still retained over 12,000 aircraft and over 18,000 pilots. The Japanese high command carefully hoarded these resources to defend the homeland and they represented a significant capability to do damage to an invading force, particularly through kamikaze suicide tactics. Thus, though beaten and surrendering, Japan had a significant military capability when it surrendered. The occupation force had to account for that capability until the task of disarming and dispersing the Japanese military was complete.⁶

⁵ These numbers include the atomic bomb attack casualties known in 1946. The principal cause of civilian death or injury was burns. Of the total casualties, approximately 185,000 occurred in the initial attack on Tokyo of 9 March 1945. Individual Japanese did not hold the Emperor responsible for the adverse war situation. Approximately 65 percent of the population attributed their attitudes to the air campaign while twenty-five percent viewed the naval blockade as the major cause of their negative war view in the summer of 1945. War Department, *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, 20–21.

⁶ Eiji Takemae, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 38–39; Giangreco, xviii, 247; Supreme Commander Allied Powers, *Reports of General MacArthur. MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Volume 1 Supplement. Reports of MacArthur* (hereafter *Reports of MacArthur*) (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 117.

Japan had a unique government. It operated under the Meiji constitution, which essentially organized the country as a democratic constitutional monarchy patterned loosely after the nineteenth-century Prussian model. However, the constitution was vague on several key points, particularly the power distribution between the Emperor and the Diet. The conservative interpretation of the constitution was that the supreme power resided in the Emperor. The liberal interpretation was that ultimate power was invested in the Diet through its ability to make laws. Thus, at the top of the political hierarchy was the Emperor, who potentially wielded great power. Also included in the government were a prime minister and cabinet. The Emperor appointed the prime minister who then recommended cabinet ministers to the emperor for appointment. The prime minister was one of the key advisors to the Emperor. Other key advisors were the Privy Council, a permanent group of distinguished statesmen appointed by the Emperor; the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals; and Imperial Headquarters, consisting of the chiefs of the army and navy general staffs. The most influential advisory group to the Emperor in 1945 was the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. The council, created as an advisory group in early 1945, consisted of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Ministers of the Army and Navy, and the Chiefs of the Army General Staff and Navy General Staff. These six critical figures advised the Emperor on war policy. In August of 1945, they were deadlocked three to three regarding whether to accept the Potsdam conditions for surrender. It was the only the intervention of the Emperor Hirohito that broke the tie and permitted Japan to agree to surrender after the atomic attacks of August. As described above, the design of the government placed the Emperor at the center of decision-making and in reality, Emperor Hirohito was in fact the central decision maker in Japan.⁷

⁷ Controversy exists over the exact role of the Emperor Hirohito in the prosecution of Japan's aggressive

Plans and Policy

The Allies outlined general post-war considerations for Japan at the Cairo conference in December 1943. The three Allies involved in the Pacific war, China, Great Britain, and the United States determined the general conditions for the surrender of Japan:

Japan shall be stripped of all islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies... will continue to persevere in serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.⁸

With the Cairo declaration, the planners of the occupation operations understood two facets of the occupation. First, the declaration defined Japan's boundaries as the four main home islands, and second, it stipulated that the occupation occur under the conditions of unconditional surrender.

A key assumption regarding the planning for the occupation of Japan was that it would follow the invasion of the home islands led by General Douglas MacArthur. The American plan to seize Japan, Operation DOWNFALL, consisted of two phases. Phase one was the occupation

military policy during World War II. The popular image of Hirohito was as a puppet for the aggressive military officers who dominated the position of Prime Minister, the Supreme War Council, and the Cabinet. However, this popular view is the result of the deliberate efforts of the post-war Japanese officials to protect the Emperor, and the American desire to minimize the political and military challenges of the occupation by tolerating the Emperor. The ability of the Emperor to interject himself into the surrender debate, and in that instance to make a controversial decision opposed by most of his senior military leaders, demonstrated that he was no mere puppet of the military. Additionally, the fact that the military commanders were willing to obey his decision, despite their profound disagreement, speaks to the great authority his position carried among the Japanese ruling class, and the nation at large. The description of the Japanese government is from the American wartime research contained in Military Government Division, Provost Marshal General Office, *Army Service Forces Manual, M354-2. Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan, Section 2: Government and Administration* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 1945); Herbert P. Bix, makes a strong case for Hirohito's active war-time decision making in his well researched volume *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000).

⁸ The Cairo Declaration, reproduced in Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government, Its Organization and Policies* (Washington D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 131.

of the island of southern Kyushu; codenamed Operation OLYMPIC. The army planned OLYMPIC to occur on November 1, 1945. The second phase was the invasion of the main island, Honshu, codenamed Operation CORONET. The projected date for CORONET was March 1, 1946.⁹ Operation DOWNFALL was the highest planning priority. In July, the army assigned Brigadier General William E. Crist to MacArthur's headquarters from his duty as the chief of military government operations on the island of Okinawa. Crist took charge of building the military government organization and planning occupation operations for DOWNFALL. Crist understood he had about six months to get his plans and organization prepared. However, the fast changing situation in August that resulted in peace, made all Crist's plans efforts irrelevant.¹⁰

General Crist had barely formed the military government section of MacArthur's headquarters when the army began preparing to move to Japan. Fortunately, initial planning for a short-notice occupation predated the formation of the military government section. In response to the JCS directive to begin planning in case of a sudden collapse of the Japanese government,

⁹In June 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) informed theater commanders in the Pacific that, as a contingency, they were to prepare plans "to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as a sudden collapse or surrender, to effect entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes." However, there was no particular emphasis on this planning. The War Department saw "no evidence that sudden collapse or surrender of Japan is likely." Message from the JCS to General MacArthur, General Arnold, and Admiral Nimitz, June 14, 1945, quoted in Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), 344.

¹⁰General Crist was a 1920 graduate of the Military Academy. He was the Chief Military Government officer for the invasion of Okinawa. He was a trained Chinese linguist and served as the Chief of Staff of the US military mission to Moscow from January to September 1944. Crist was an able administrator but poor leader. His leadership style was lampooned in the novel on the occupation of Okinawa by Vern Sneider, *Teahouse of the August Moon* (New York: Putnam, 1951). The novel subsequently became a Broadway play and a Hollywood movie. Nicholas Sarantakes, *Keystone: The US Occupation of Okinawa and US – Japanese Relations* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 29. Arthur D. Bouterse, Philip H. Taylor, and Arthur A. Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan," Carl J. Friedrich and Associates, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (Hereafter cited as *American Experiences*) (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948), 324.

MacArthur's planners developed the Operation BLACKLIST plan.¹¹ The purpose of Operation BLACKLIST was to guide American forces in the event that the Japanese government surrendered either before or during the conduct of Operation OLYMPIC. The relatively simple plan called for the complete occupation of the four home islands of Japan, and Korea in a systematic phased manner by US forces: XXIV Corps to occupy Korea; Sixth Army to occupy Kyushu, Shikoku, and southern Honshu; and Eighth Army to occupy northern Honshu, including Tokyo, and Hokkaido. The plan called for the initial phase one forces to be in country and occupy their assigned areas, four key lodgment areas, within thirty days of the order to execute the occupation. Troops allocated to phase one were primarily from the Operation OLYMPIC troop list and the plan assigned an army or Marine corps to each of the four phase one objectives. Phase two and three of BLACKLIST anticipated adding additional corps and expanding the occupation throughout the four islands. The tasks of the initial corps occupations were to destroy any military opposition to imposition of the surrender, disarm and demobilize the Japanese armed forces, control communications routes, institute military government and ensure the maintenance of law and order, and recover Allied prisoners of war. Of these tasks, disarmament and control of communications were the two primary missions.¹² The command disseminated BLACKLIST to subordinate units on August 8, 1945, seven days prior to the announcement of the surrender agreement by the Japanese government. Thus, when the Japanese surrendered, MacArthur had completely reasonable and workable plan for physically occupying Japan on hand. It became the basis for the occupation of Japan and the initial activities of the occupation army forces. Though BLACKLIST provided guidance for the military operations necessary to

¹¹ MacArthur's staff produced a draft of this plan in July 1945, and on July 16, they used the first version of the plan as a basis of discussion with Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas staff who had their own naval focused occupation plan, code-named Operation CAMPUS. AFPAC, *Basic Outline Plan For "Blacklist" Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea After Surrender or Collapse*, August 8, 1945, 1; *Reports of MacArthur*, 3-4.

¹² AFPAC, *Blacklist Outline Plan*, 1-25.

physically occupy Japan, its policy guidance was sparse. Washington provided the policy guidance for governance of Japan.

Organization and Command and Control

General Douglas MacArthur was the commander of the occupation of the Japan and designated the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) by President Harry Truman. In addition, he was the commander of US Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC).¹³ MacArthur had wide-ranging powers to implement the occupation, but he received considerable guidance from Washington. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) determined US national policy regarding Japan. Ensuring Allied input to policy was the responsibility of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), made up of the eleven countries that were at war with Japan. The Commission met in Washington and thus its input was mostly through the SWNCC. The American member of the Commission was Major General Frank McCoy whose long experience with diplomatic missions, military government, and occupation operations began as a military aide to General Leonard Wood in Cuba.¹⁴ The Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) represented the Allies directly to the SCAP. It consisted of four members, the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, and China. However, the ACJ had no formal authority over the

¹³ AFPAC was to command the US invasion of Japan. MacArthur was designated commander on April 4, 1945. *Reports of MacArthur*, 67–69; *American Experiences*, 322.

¹⁴ Frank R. McCoy was General Leonard Wood's aide during the occupation of Cuba as well as during Wood's tenure as governor of Mindanao. He worked closely with Hugh Scott and Tasker Bliss when they were all staff officers under Wood. McCoy commanded a combat brigade during World War I. After the war, between routine military assignments, he served on a variety of diplomatic missions including the US mission to Armenia in 1919; in 1928 he was President of the commission overseeing the Nicaraguan elections; in 1929 he was chairman of the Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation that helped settle the Gran Chaco War (between Paraguay and Bolivia); and in 1932 he was a member of the Lytton Commission investigating the Japanese seizure of Manchuria. His last military assignment was as commander of the 1st US Army and the II Corps area. He retired in 1938 as a major general. He was the President of the Foreign Policy Association from 1939 to 1949. He was also the Chairman of the commission which tried and convicted German saboteurs captured in the United States during World War II. He was Chairman of the Far East Commission from 1946 to 1949. See Andrew J. Bacevich, *Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1949* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989).

SCAP and its actions were strictly advisory and therefore ineffective. SCAP headquarters received orders through directives from the JCS, then created specific implementing instructions, and supervised execution.¹⁵

Two general headquarters (GHQ) had responsibilities for occupation policy and execution: GHQ SCAP and GHQ AFPAC. MacArthur commanded both, they were collocated in Tokyo, and many of the staff sections were simultaneously part of both organizations. The major difference between the two headquarters was that the Allies confined SCAP activities and authority to Japan, though they included all services as well as Allied forces; AFPAC had authority of all US Army resources in the Pacific. The AFPAC staff was responsible for the supervision of Japanese compliance with SCAP occupation directives through the subordinate military government apparatus assigned to occupation units. It also had responsibility for counter-intelligence, censorship, public safety, military police, and provost marshal operations.¹⁶

Under General MacArthur, in his role as commander of AFPAC, the army formed a Military Government Section to plan and conduct the military government of Japan as part of the overall invasion plan. The organization formed in Manila and deployed to Tokyo in September. However, it never received guidance as to its role and mission in the occupation from MacArthur or his Chief of Staff.¹⁷ As the circumstances of the occupation became evident through August and September, it was obvious that the elaborate organization necessary for direct military government by the army was not going to be necessary. On September 26, 1945, AFPAC

¹⁵ The eleven countries were: China, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines. Because of its size and location, the FEC was a slow operating organization. Also, because China, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviets all had veto authority, it was not very effective at providing guidance on critical issues. ACJ had no formal relationship with the FEC. MacArthur rarely attended the ACJ meetings. *Reports of MacArthur*, 69–71; *American Experiences*, 323; and Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publication, Inc., 1964), 333–334.

¹⁶ *Reports of MacArthur*, 71–73.

¹⁷ *American Experiences*, 323–324.

disbanded the military government section. GHQ dispersed the military government personnel among the subordinate command military government sections or absorbed them into the new SCAP non-military staff sections. The SCAP staff was officially established on October 2, 1945 and aside from appropriate military sections such as G1, G2, G3, and G4 (working as both the SCAP and AFPAC staff), SCAP was set up to mirror the functions of the Japanese civil government.¹⁸ The SCAP non-military staff consisted of fourteen functional staff sections the most important of which were the Economic and Scientific Section, the Civil Intelligence Section, the Government Section, Public Health and Welfare Section, and the Civil Information and Education Section.¹⁹

The SCAP staff communicated with the Japanese government through written memorandum known as SCAPINs (short for SCAP index). The Japanese government organized a special ministry level organization called the Liaison and Coordination Office whose only function was to facilitate communication between SCAP and the Japanese government. This office worked directly for the Japanese Prime Minister. The command transmitted SCAPINs to the liaison office, which then transmitted the memorandum to the proper Japanese ministry or agency. The SCAPINs had the force of law to the Japanese government, which often translated them directly into Imperial Decrees or laws for execution by the Japanese people and government.²⁰

¹⁸ *Reports of MacArthur*, 75.

¹⁹ The term non-military denotes that the staff was not part of the doctrinal military staff structure. All fourteen sections were headed by military officers and had a core of commissioned officers who were generally specialists in the field commissioned as part of the military government recruitment program. However, most of the sections were largely made up of American and Japanese civilians employed by the US military. The remaining sections were Natural Resources, Legal, Civil Communications, Statistics and Reports, Office of the General Procurement Agent, Civilian Personnel, International Prosecution Section, General Accounting Section, Civil Property Custodian, Diplomatic Section, and Civil Transportation Section. *Ibid.*, 78–82.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 71–73; Takemae, 114–115.

Below the level of SCAP and AFPAC were the two occupying armies: the Eighth US Army commanded by Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger and the Sixth US Army commanded by General Walter Krueger.²¹ In accordance with the BLACKLIST plan, Eighth Army occupied the northern part of the main island of Honshu, as well as the sparsely populated northern island of Hokkaido. The Eighth Army included eight combat divisions and several separate regimental combat teams, organized into three corps, totaling over 230,000 troops. The Sixth US Army began landing on September 25. It also consisted of eight combat divisions in three corps (including the V Marine Amphibious Corps) totaling approximately 250,000 troops. The Sixth Army had responsibility for the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, and southern Honshu. These troop strengths reflected the high-water mark of the occupation at the end of October 1945. The major responsibility of the occupying armies was ensuring compliance with the disarmament directives of the surrender documents. The armies also had the responsibility for the ensuring compliance by the Japanese government with SCAPINs. This was primarily the responsibility of the military government sections of the armies and their subordinate commands.

By early 1946, the Eighth Army supervised an extensive military government system in Japan. At the time of the surrender, the army possessed thousands of military government

²¹ Both Generals Eichelberger and Krueger had experience in occupation type operations and experience in Asia. General Robert Eichelberger spent two years operating in close proximity with the Japanese army during the US Army Siberia expedition from 1917 to 1919. He worked extensively with the Japanese army during his service in Siberia. During that period Eichelberger was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for valor and the Japanese awarded him the Imperial Order of Meiji, the Order of the Sacred Treasure, and the Order of the Rising Sun. After Siberia, Eichelberger served in the Philippines as chief of intelligence. In 1920 he was sent to China for ten months to set up an intelligence network in that country. See Paul Chwialkowski, *In Caesar's Shadow: The Life of General Robert Eichelberger* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). General Krueger was born in Prussia and immigrated to the United States at the age of eight. He was commissioned from the enlisted ranks during the Philippine War and served in operations on Luzon and on the small island of Marinduque. Krueger served as a German and Spanish instructor at the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. He was also fluent in French. He served as an assistant corps chief of staff during the first year of the occupation of the Rhineland. See Kevin Holzimmer, *General Walter Krueger. Unsung Hero of the Pacific War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). Though highly accomplished and experienced officers, both served during the occupation as they did during the war, in the shadow of MacArthur. Neither Krueger or Eichelberger had any significant influence on occupation policy.

specialists trained specifically for Japan. A minority were already in Asia, the army deployed the remaining personnel to the theater as quickly as possible in the late summer and fall of 1945.²² At Eighth Army, headquarters military government was initially a staff officer within the G1 staff but subsequently reorganized as a special military government staff section reporting directly to the army commander. The head of the military government organization in Eighth Army was Colonel Rex W. Beasley, who was not a military government trained officer but served as the commander of the 81st Infantry Division artillery during the Pacific campaign. The Eighth Army controlled two military government staff sections working in I and IX Corps headquarters. Below Eighth Army and the two corps, eight regional military government districts controlled forty-six teams allocated one to each Japanese prefecture. The task of this military government infrastructure was to observe and inspect compliance with SCAP directives. They were to report any violations of policy. The command permitted them to make suggestions to local officials but specifically prohibited them from exercising any authority. Unlike Germany, “team commanders were in no sense military governors.”²³

One of the additional tasks of the occupying units was demobilization of American units. This began almost as soon as the commands arrived in Japan. Demobilization accelerated as the occupation progressed and the competence and reliability of the Japanese government and police forces became obvious. The Sixth Army officially relinquished its occupation responsibilities to Eighth Army on December 31, 1945. By the end of 1945, several divisions had returned to the

²² On August 10, 1945, over 2,000 army and navy CA officers, trained for duty in Japan, were available in the United States. Over 1,000 were at the Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) in Monterey, California. Some 500 were in Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS), and 250 were at the School of Military Government. In addition, about 4,000 enlisted men with training for CA duty in Japan were available. By September 1945, 800 officers and 900 enlisted men were in the Theater with 1,250 officers and 3,000 enlisted men enroute. By October 1945 155 officers and 200 enlisted CA troops were assigned to GHQ; 150 officers, 180 enlisted men in Sixth Army; 125 officers and 60 enlisted men in 8th Army; and 350 officers and 465 men in XXIV Corps. As peace rapidly approached CASA rushed 297 military government officers to Manila by air as a top priority. The bulk of the CASA personnel followed the advance element by sea. *American Experiences*, 320–321.

²³ *Reports of MacArthur*, 200–203, Quote from 203; *American Experiences*, 344.

United States. Equally significant, most of the units remaining in Japan were grossly under strength. An example of this was the 42nd General Hospital in Tokyo. Though authorized 594 personnel, the actual strength of the unit at the beginning of 1946 was 301 personnel, or fifty-one percent. By the end of January 1946, even though the Eighth Army had absorbed the bulk of remaining Sixth Army's units, the total troop strength of the occupation force was 194,061—less than half of what it had been just three months previously.²⁴

While the military government apparatus at the SCAP level appeared to be functioning smoothly and was well on its way to making a lasting impression on the Japanese government and people, it was not the same for the military government organizations in the occupation armies. The command ordered them not to get involved directly with policy formulation or execution. The Japanese soon realized that because they lacked authority, military government teams could not deliver consequences for non-compliance with SCAP directives. The only way to correct non-compliance at the local level was for the military government teams at the local level to report through the many layers of command to SCAP. Then, GHQ SCAP protested directly to the Japanese civil government at the national level. This was an extremely time consuming and frustrating process for the teams and affected their morale and effectiveness.²⁵ Another major problem with the early military government apparatus at army level and below was that it had no connection to the SCAP non-military staff sections, either formally or informally. Information from the SCAP staff sections passed through the SCAP Chief of Staff, to the AFPAC staff, then to 8th Army, then through the tactical chains of command at several levels, and then from the tactical commanders to the military government staff officers. This

²⁴ *Reports of MacArthur*, 58, 60.

²⁵ Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (New York: William Sloane Associates, inc., 1948), 53, 78–80, quote on 53; *American Experiences*, 345; Chwialkowski, 164; Takemae, 119–120.

ineffective command system further eroded the prestige and effectiveness of the local military government teams.²⁶ The lack of any direct connection and the complicated traditional tactical linkage between SCAP staff and the military government apparatus was such that SCAP operated without much consideration of the military government operation.²⁷ Often, the official chain of command did not even inform the military government elements of new SCAP directives to the Japanese government. That these problem did not become a major issue during the occupation, except among the military government officers who felt misused and disrespected, is a testament to the general degree of conscientious cooperation on the part of the Japanese and to the extent that the objectives of SCAP and the Japanese government coincided. Ultimately, the military government organization withered away from disuse. By 1948, little significant military government activity occurred except at the SCAP level, and the occupation army's primary focus was garrison duty and training.²⁸

The key figure in the occupation of Japan was US Army General Douglas MacArthur whose education, career, mentors and family relationships uniquely prepared him for assuming responsibility for military government and occupation duties after World War II. MacArthur had a direct connection to the army's earliest large-scale occupation experience through his father's career and his parent's courtship in occupied Louisiana during Reconstruction. Immediately after graduation from West Point in 1903, the army assigned him as an engineer officer in the Philippines working on infrastructure projects. He also developed texts on engineering and reconnaissance for the Philippine Constabulary. Soon after his tour in the Philippines, he joined

²⁶ Quote from Gayn, 117; *American Experiences*, 344.

²⁷ MacArthur's staff had already developed a reputation for ignoring trained military government detachments in the Philippines. *Ibid.*, 319, 348–349.

²⁸ In July 1949, the army eliminated the military government infrastructure and renamed military government tasks as civil affairs. By January 1950 only the eight regional civil affairs teams remained and they reported directly to SCAP as it assumed corps and Eighth Army civil affairs responsibilities. *Ibid.*, 319; Takemae, 120.

his father, Major General Arthur MacArthur, as an aide for the period that the general served as an observer of the Russo-Japanese war. In that position, he traveled extensively in Japan, China, and Europe. While traveling with his father, he attended an audience with the Japanese Emperor. Returning to the United States, MacArthur served as an aide to President Theodore Roosevelt, participated in the Panama Canal construction, and was army Chief of Staff Leonard Wood's representative with Brigadier General Frederick Funston during the occupation of Vera Cruz.²⁹ During World War I, he spent the entire war with the 42nd Infantry Division, ending the war as the division commander during the occupation of the Rhineland. MacArthur became the youngest Chief of Staff of the army in 1932, and remained in that position until his retirement in 1935. Upon retirement from the army, he became the special military advisor to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth. He held that position until called back to active service in 1941 as a Lieutenant General and commander of army forces in the Far East.³⁰ MacArthur was the beneficiary of a strong system of mentors, particularly during the crucial early part of his career. The most important of these was his father, Arthur MacArthur. Douglas MacArthur was very close to his father, who was his role model. He was very aware of his father's history as military governor in the Philippines, and hoped to emulate him as much as possible. In 1945, Douglas MacArthur was perhaps the most experienced officer in the United States Army; he had personal experience with military government; and had a direct link through his mentors, Arthur MacArthur, Funston, and Wood, to virtually every American military government experience since the American Civil War. Though he did not speak Japanese, he had lived for years in Asia

²⁹MacArthur moved to the General Staff in Washington under Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood the former military governor in both Cuba and the Philippines. During his time in Washington, MacArthur was close to Wood who knew the MacArthur family when Arthur MacArthur and Wood were both captains in Arizona. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 42–56.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 34–125.

and traveled extensively throughout the region. He was immensely qualified for the role of SCAP in post-war Japan.

Conduct of the Occupation

Douglas MacArthur's personal history and philosophies had a large impact on the occupation of Japan. Equally, important was the guidance he received from the SWNCC through the JCS. The JCS provided their initial guidance to MacArthur on August 29, 1945 in a "Statement on United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." Part II of the initial guidance stated, "In view of the present character of the Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese government machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives."³¹ The decision to govern Japan through the Japanese government was the defining policy of the entire occupation as described by the SCAP official history:

On August 30, GHQ, AFPAC issued an amendment to Operations Instructions No. 4, which materially altered the missions assigned to the Army commanders who soon would be arriving on the Nippon homeland. Instead of actually instituting "military government," Army commanders were to supervise the execution the policies relative to government functions which GHQ AFPAC, was to issue directly to the Japanese Government; likewise the functions of the Armies with respect to the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces were changed from "operational control and direction to "supervision of the execution" of orders transmitted to the Japanese by GHQ AFPAC.

The army called this "passive" military government, in contrast to "active" military government practiced in Germany.³² This policy guidance from Washington was based on the Japanese surrender and fundamentally changed the approach to military government in Japan —making it

³¹ Department of State, "Statement on United States Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan," August 29, 1945, *Bulletin*, Vol. XIII (1945), 423–427.

³² *Reports of MacArthur*, 25–27, n.68.

radically different from what was happening simultaneously in Germany. It also rendered much of the military government organization in AFPAC less critical, as discussed above.

More formal and specific guidance came in JCS Directive 1380/15 published on November 15, 1945. This very clear and complete document more definitively stated US policy but did not fundamentally alter the initial policy guidance. It also strongly recommended some courses of action to pursue. It became a checklist of the tasks SCAP had to accomplish in Japan. However, the document did not dictate to SCAP how to achieve goals. It gave SCAP objectives, and almost unlimited powers. It only required that MacArthur report his actions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The initial guidance issued in August, and the formal JCS Directive issued to MacArthur in November, gave the SCAP a very clear mission statement:

The ultimate objective of the United Nations with respect to Japan is to foster conditions which will give the greatest possible assurance that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world and will permit her eventual admission as a responsible and peaceful member of the family of nations.... The United States desires that the Japanese Government conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government, but it is not the responsibility of the occupation forces to impose on Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.³³

Within his clear mission statement and the specific guidance of JCS Directive 1380/15, MacArthur had free rein to achieve the objectives of the United States government the best way that he knew how.

The major mission of the occupation armies was the disarmament of the Japanese military forces. Again, MacArthur's guidance was unequivocal: "Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out

³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper," November 3, 1945, *National Diet Library* website, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/036/036tx.html> (accessed September 8, 2009).

promptly and with determination.”³⁴ The Japanese military in Japan had over two million men under arms. In addition, “ninety-seven percent of Japan's stocks of guns, shells, explosives, and other military supplies were thoroughly protected in dispersed or underground storage depots.” As indicated earlier, the Japanese military chain of command executed the disarmament supervised by the American occupation units. Between August 15 and November 1, 1945, the Japanese War Ministry demobilized approximately 2.3 million active troops in the home islands. This was 97 percent of the entire force. The ministries also had responsibility for demobilizing the millions of troops returning from foreign assignments. As the scale of demobilization decreased over time, the ministries became bureaus in June 1946, and were eventually abolished in October 1947. The Japanese government transferred lingering responsibilities for demobilization and disarmament to existing civilian ministries.³⁵

The initial guidance to SCAP, issued in August 1945 and reiterated in JCS 1380/15, was somewhat vague on the specifics of post-war Japanese government:

To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.³⁶

This guidance did not specifically address the Emperor in post-war Japan issue, nor did it make a judgment regarding the status of the Japanese Meiji constitution. It implied, however, that those two related tasks were the responsibility of SCAP. SCAP tasked the mission of supervising democratic government in Japan to the Government Section (GS) of the SCAP staff, headed by

³⁴ Department of State, “Statement on United States Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan,” 424.

³⁵ General Headquarters, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, *Final Report Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces*, December 31, 1946, 1–4, 11–12; *Reports of MacArthur*, 126–127.

³⁶ This wording in JCS 1380/15 and the post surrender policy statement are identical. Department of State, “Statement on United States Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan,” 423.

Brigadier General Courtney Whitney. Whitney was an army air corps reserve pilot, World War I veteran, and civilian lawyer.³⁷ Unlike all of the previous American experience with occupations, the Japanese government remained functioning through the US occupation of Japan. Thus, the military governor's task was not to build a capacity to govern, but rather to adjust the prevailing organization and policies of government to ensure alignment with US post-surrender policy. The Japanese surrender documents invested the authority to adjust the Japanese government in General MacArthur as SCAP. SCAP made his adjustments to Japanese government by working with and through the Japanese government. Still, though this arrangement was unique in American occupation history, many of the characteristics of the American occupation experience were evident in the process. Continuity with previous occupation experiences appeared in the decision to write a new Japanese constitution, and to establish basic individual freedoms.

In the first year of the occupation the Japanese government focused its greatest energy on saving the position of the Emperor in the post-war government. The United States made no promises regarding retention of the Emperor in the surrender terms.³⁸ Given this situation, it was the unpublicized objective of successive Japanese governments after the surrender to protect the place of the Emperor within Japanese politics. In general, the Americans and General MacArthur supported this position because American Japanese experts recognized the central role that the Emperor occupied in Japanese history, culture, and politics. More practically,

³⁷ Whitney was a pilot in the Army Air Corps when he obtained a law degree from George Washington University in 1927. He then left the army to go into private practice in Manila. Whitney met MacArthur when the general returned to the Philippines in 1935. Whitney returned to active duty in the army in 1940 and served in Air Corps intelligence assignments in Washington and China. In 1943, he joined MacArthur's staff as the chief of guerrilla operations in the Philippines. In 1945, as MacArthur organized SCAP GHQ, Whitney became the chief of the government section (GS), the most powerful of the various non-military staff sections. Geoffrey Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 368–370; MacArthur, 223.

³⁸ Both quotes from notes reproduced in Dennett, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, 107.

American policy makers recognized that the cooperation of the Emperor made occupation operations significantly easier from the standpoints of policy, cooperation, and cost. War Plans Division in Washington recognized this fact as early as May 45 and it was a position strongly advocated by Secretary of War Henry Stimson.³⁹ Thus, American policy was to use the Emperor to facilitate occupation policy.

Though both the Japanese moderate politicians and SCAP wanted to protect the Emperor, their visions of the future role of the Emperor in Japanese government was fundamentally different. The Americans believed that Japanese militarism that had led to World War II was a function of flaws in the Meiji constitution.⁴⁰ Thus, the Americans understood that the only way to fundamentally change Japanese politics and to democratize Japan was to change the constitution. This was a point of conflict with Japanese officials because the Meiji constitution was also the source of the Emperor's political power. MacArthur assigned the task of supervising the revision of the Japanese constitution to the Government Section.⁴¹ MacArthur directed Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara to democratize the constitution on October 11, 1945. At the end of January 1946, the Japanese returned their recommended draft ideas for a new constitution to the SCAP staff. The Japanese recommendations were a disappointment to the staff and to MacArthur. The Japanese revision did not substantially altered the core of the Meiji constitution. MacArthur and his staff concluded that the Japanese were not capable of creating a significantly new political document. MacArthur and General Whitney determined that the GS,

³⁹ Cline, 343.

⁴⁰ As indicated earlier, the Meiji constitution granted significant real political power to the Emperor and empowered unelected officials appointed by the Emperor. The reality was that Emperor, because of the power granted him directly and indirectly thorough the Meiji constitution, shared a great deal of responsibility for Japanese policy during World War II. Further, the powers granted the Emperor were fundamentally undemocratic. See note 9.

⁴¹ The Meiji constitution, prepared in 1889, was based on the Prussian constitution and was prepared with Prussian guidance. The Meiji constitution was designed to create a constitutional democracy on the Prussian model and endowed a Prime Minister, Privy Council, and Cabinet, none of which were required to be elected officials, with significant political power.

working in complete secrecy, should rewrite the document. In six days, under the direction of Harvard trained lawyer Colonel Charles L. Cades, the GS created a new document. The staff presented that document, which became the basis of the future “Peace constitution,” to MacArthur and he approved it on February 12. On February 13, the GS gave the draft to the Japanese government for their consideration. Occupation officials directed the Japanese officials to propose the document to the Diet as if it was their own product. The Japanese took the GS draft, translated it, and subtly altered it. The changes made by the Japanese were not fundamental but made the document more authentically Japanese.⁴² On March 5, the Emperor endorsed the new constitution. The Japanese newspapers published an outline of the proposed constitution on March 6. The Japanese Diet debated the new document April to August, and approved the document on November 3, 1946. It went into effect six months later and it became the basis of all Japanese law. The new constitution articulated a position for the Emperor that was a clear break from the political role he played during the war, yet retained his person and image as a unifying national symbol.⁴³

The new constitution created the legal tools to make Japan a true functioning democracy. Among many traditional democratic and liberal concepts, the constitution established absolute equality under the law regardless of sex, race, social status or family origin; it abolished the Japanese nobility, guaranteed universal adult suffrage, freedom of religion; freedom of assembly, speech and the press; equality of the sexes in regards to all aspects of marriage; and freedom from arbitrary arrest, search, and the right to counsel. It also established the Diet as “the highest organ of the state power,” and organized it with two houses. The constitution vested all

⁴² The final product still contained many distinctly American characteristics as *Time* magazine pointed out in “Japan: We, the Mimics,” March 18, 1946.

⁴³ Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History* (New York: Alfred A. Kopf, 1956), 246–262; Takemae, 240, 271–284; Bix, 568–579.

executive power in the Prime minister and the Cabinet. The constitution also established an independent judiciary with a supreme court as the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act. The most controversial aspect of the constitution was Article 9, known as the peace clause. The article stated in part “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation,” and “land, sea, and air forces... will never be maintained.”⁴⁴ Many observers thought this last clause was unrealistic. Others believed that it still preserved the right to self-defense. Article 9 was controversial and has remained the subject of debate since 1946. It has, however, not been revoked or amended.

Two reasons motivated MacArthur to move quickly in creating a new Japanese constitution. One was that the Far Eastern Council scheduled its first meeting in late February 1946 and MacArthur did not want the Council, in which the Soviet Union had a veto authority, in any way involved in the constitution writing process. The second reason was that MacArthur had scheduled national elections for a new Diet in April 1946. He wanted prospective legislators to campaign on the proposed new constitution. In effect, MacArthur wanted the first post-war election to be an unofficial plebiscite on the constitution. The Japanese government held its first post-war national elections on April 10, 1946—twenty-six million Japanese voted at over 21,000 polling places in the first elections. The military government teams of Eighth Army mobilized to carefully observe for any disturbance or discrepancies in the carefully planned voting procedures. Military government officers also closely watched Japanese procedures for securing the completed ballots. SCAP concluded that,

The arrangements by the Japanese officials for handling voters in the polling places were worked out in great detail and remarkably efficient. The Japanese

⁴⁴ “The Constitution of Japan,” Articles 14, 15, 20, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 76, 81, 9 respectively. Government Section, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), 315–323, quote on 318.

people were orderly at the polls; there were no recorded instances of misconduct or disorder. Women, voting for the first time, appeared to have no difficulty with the voting procedure.

Candidates who ran in favor of the new constitution won overwhelmingly. Radical parties such as the Japanese Communist party got only a small portion of the vote. Women candidates, running for public office for the first time in Japanese history, won 38 of 466 seats in the Diet. Over thirteen million women voted in the election —approximately sixty-six percent of those eligible. Overall, new candidates won 375 seats, and the new diet represented thirty-three different political parties, indicating that the election resulted in a significant change in the individuals making up Japan’s government.⁴⁵ Less than a year after the end of the war the Japanese had democratically endorsed a new constitution and elected a new government.

To facilitate true democratic opportunities, including elections and the new constitution, SCAP took action to ensure the rights of individual Japanese. MacArthur did this early in the occupation and it facilitated the first elections and the constitutional debate. On October 4, 1945, SCAP issued a directive to the Japanese government that became essentially the Japanese bill of rights. Many of the provisions of the directive later appeared in the Japanese constitution, but importantly, the actions that MacArthur directed went into law almost immediately. The directive ordered the Japanese government to abrogate all laws that “establish or maintain restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor,” or “by their terms...operate unequally in favor of or against any person by reason of race, nationality, creed or political opinion.” It also abolished all secret police organizations and ordered the release of all political prisoners. As of result of this decree the government removed over 5,000 police officials, the Japanese communist party

⁴⁵ Whitney, 248; . Government Section, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), 315–323, quote on 318.

emerged in public, and the cabinet of Prime Minister Naruhiko Higashikuni resigned in mass. MacArthur followed up this directive by ordering the new Prime Minister, Kijuro Shidehara, to immediately implement five additional reforms: the enfranchisement of women, the encouragement of labor unions, the reform of education, the elimination of secret inquisition, and the promotion of wider distribution of ownership of the means of production and trade.⁴⁶ These reforms were in accordance with pre-surrender planning and began the process of economic and cultural reform discussed below.

The military government also used purges to forward the democratic process in Japan. Purges occurred in several waves as the occupation authorities identified different categories of individuals who posed a threat to occupation policies or the stability of Japanese government. The first purge occurred soon after the surrender with the goal of eliminating the worst of the conservative and military factions who supported the war from key public positions. The second purge aimed at eliminating centralized control of business activity. A final significant purge occurred in 1947 and 1948 as the occupation identified an increasing threat of Soviet backed communist activity. This last purge eliminated communists and affiliated persons from key public positions, especially in organized labor.⁴⁷ These purges facilitated the SCAP working through the Japanese government, eliminated opposition to SCAP policies, and intimidated potential opposition to SCAP policies and directives. With the exception of the purge of the communists, the purges were one of the most unpopular and covertly resisted SCAP policies.

The US occupation authorities met little resistance implementing health and sanitation reform. In accordance with their history, the Americans made securing the occupation forces

⁴⁶ Department of State, "Directive from General MacArthur to the Imperial Japanese Government," October 4, 1945, *Bulletin*, Vol. XIII (1945), 730–732.; Takemae, 238–240.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 295–297, 330–337, 349–352 367–368.

and the indigenous population against the outbreak of disease, and preventing famine a top priority. Disease and malnutrition were the responsibility of the Public Health and Welfare Section of the SCAP staff under brigadier General Crawford Sams.⁴⁸ The Japanese police ran the Japanese health department and when US authorities abolished the national police, they also abolished much of the national health organization. Sams used the power of the SCAP to build a completely new national medical system. He organized a national health ministry, prefecture and local health organizations, and a national medical school and nursing school system. He took control, literally, of all Japanese medical professionals in the country, and placed them within the new organizations he constructed. He modeled the Japanese medical system on the major medical reforms that took place in the United States in the early twentieth century. While reorganizing the entire medical system, Sams simultaneously dealt with a host of diseases threatening the population. He organized over 360,000 Japanese into sanitation teams across Japan. The teams decontaminated individuals and locations, supervised sanitation regulations, assisted with insect control, and provided education. Sams instituted mandatory national immunization projects that had immediate effects on the spread of disease. In the first three years, the revamped health system saved over five million Japanese lives. Opposition to the US medical efforts was not significant but what there was came from within the Japan doctor associations who resisted the professionalization efforts of the Americans. After a meeting with the Emperor's uncle, Sams gained the royal family's support for his efforts and that eliminated

⁴⁸ Sams enlisted in the army for World War I and later received a commission in the artillery. In 1925, he resigned from the army and entered medical school. He graduated from Washington University School of Medicine in 1929 and became a first lieutenant in the army Medical Corps. General Sams had extensive experience in the European theater and General John H. Hildring, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division at the War Department, handpicked him to be the senior medical officer for the occupation forces in Japan. Sams was destined to end his career as the Surgeon General of the Army except that he was caught up in the scandal of MacArthur's relief. President Truman refused to approve Sams appointment merely because he was associated with MacArthur. Crawford Sams, Zabelle Zakarian, Editor, *Medic, The Mission of an American Military Doctor in Occupied Japan and War Torn Korea* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 1998).

all significant resistance. The US medical efforts increased life expectancy significantly, reduced the mortality rates, controlled epidemics, and essentially and most importantly, provided the Japanese government and society a modern professional medical system that could sustain the policies implemented under General Sams into the future.⁴⁹

In 1945, a combination of typhoons and flooding destroyed one third of Japan's rice crop. In addition, the end of the war cut off the normal imports of rice from the Empire. These conditions, combined with the reduction of food rations during the war placed ten million Japanese on the brink of starvation. The Allied command did not anticipate this condition and although occupation plans had no requirements to support occupation troops with Japanese rations, there also were no plans to supplement the Japanese food supply. SCAP initially fed the population with Japanese military reserve rations. At the same time, SCAP requested emergency relief from Washington. It was not until January 1946 that Allied emergency food supplies began to reach Japan. The relief was not too soon as deaths were occurring due to malnutrition. One estimate attributed over a thousand deaths in Tokyo during the first three months of the occupation to malnutrition. American food supplies arrived at irregular intervals from 1946 on, but issues related to diet and famine remained a concern in Japan until 1949.

One of the major breakthroughs of Sams' section was in the area of nutrition. The Health and Welfare section set up national diet surveys to monitor nutrition. The section discovered a national protein shortage among children. The Americans set up a specific program to attack nutrition deficiencies through the school system. Sams arranged a demonstration of his program

⁴⁹ Under the American occupation life expectancy among Japanese males increased from 42.8 to 60.8 years and among females from 51.1 to 64.8 years. Crawford F. Sams, *Oral History*, Darryl Podoll, interviewer, May 3, 1979, Bernard Becker Medical Library, Washington University School of Medicine, 660 S. Euclid, Campus Box 8132, St. Louis, Missouri. Online at *Washington University School of Medicine Oral History Project Website*, <http://beckerexhibits.wustl.edu/oral/interviews/sams.html> (accessed September 10, 2009); See also Sams autobiography and Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, *MacArthur, 1941–1951* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), 343–345.

in the Tokyo school system for Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The demonstration program showed such a dramatic change in the health of children that the Japanese government immediately and enthusiastically implemented a national school lunch program.⁵⁰

JCS economic guidance precluded the SCAP from taking “any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy.” The guidance did not preclude the Japanese from improving their economic condition, but it made clear that it was a Japanese not occupation force responsibility. The American occupation’s concern with economics in Japan was primarily as economics related to security, and health and welfare. Security aspects of economics had to do with reactionary elements within the labor movement, dismantling the arms industry, reparations, and unemployment that could lead to unrest. Health and welfare concerns had to do with improving the agricultural capacity of the country to lessen the threat of famine and disease.⁵¹

The occupation directive specifically required SCAP to break up the large industrial and banking magnates that controlled much of the Japanese economy: “You will require plans for dissolving large Japanese industrial and banking combines or other large concentrations of private business control.” The Allies believed that these organizations, known as the *zaibatsu*, had a strong influence, for business reasons, on Japan’s expansionist war policy. American economic experts on the SCAP staff also saw them as undemocratic monopolies. Therefore, the SCAP Scientific and Economic Section developed a plan to break up several dozen of the largest *zaibatsu* into component companies that had no formal or informal relationships. This program was unpopular with most segments of Japanese society because it threatened jobs, retirement

⁵⁰Over subsequent generations since the occupation, the average height of Japanese has increased two to three inches. This positive indication of health is attributed to the diet and nutrient research introduced by Sams’ section. Sams, *Oral History*; Takemae, 77–79.

⁵¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper.”

pensions, and the rapid economic recovery. Breaking up the *zaibatsu* occurred at a slow but steady pace beginning in 1946, but ended uncompleted in 1948. A change in US policy toward Japan contained in National Security Council Paper (NCS) 13/2 (see below) caused the end of the anti-*zaibatsu* program. In 1948, the occupation economic priority changed to building up Japanese industrial capability.⁵²

In the years immediately after the surrender in 1945, the Japanese economy made little progress toward recovery. In 1949, the Secretary of Defense appointed American economics expert, Joseph Dodge as a special advisor to the SCAP for economic issues. Dodge was specifically appointed to address the Japanese economy issue and soon announced the “Dodge Line” policy for economic recovery. This policy firmly established Japanese industrial recovery as a top US priority. Dodge’s policies imposed severe fiscal limitations on the Japanese government and were hugely unpopular. By 1950, the new economic policies had curbed Japanese inflation and balanced the government budget, but at the cost of dramatic budget cuts in education, welfare, and public works programs. The Dodge plan’s results were ambiguous at best: unemployment steadily rose, and observers of the Japanese economy sensed a coming economic depression. Japan averted an economic disaster only because of the beginning of the Korean War in the summer of 1950. The war created a market for Japanese goods, and cash flow for Japanese industry beginning in 1951. In total, the war brought in 2.3 billion dollars into the Japanese economy between 1951 and 1953. The US military spent an additional 1.75 billion

⁵² In addition to being monopolies, SCAP considered the *zaibatsu* to be a corrupting influence in Japanese society. The corporations were tied to corrupt police and politicians, as well as to organized criminal groups. Immediately after the peace seventy percent of Japanese military supplies and over a billion yen worth of Japanese construction material controlled by SCAP GHQ disappeared into private hands. Most of it was controlled by the *Zaibatsu* groups with the knowing of the police and government bureaucrats. This economic cache allowed the *Zaibatsu*, to resist SCAP anti-monopoly efforts, survive and even flourish in the early occupation years. Takemae, 76–77.

dollars in the three years after the war ended. These vast expenditures were the impetus required to begin Japan's economic recovery.⁵³

A great occupation success was agriculture reform. Non-owners worked over half of the land under cultivation in Japan in 1945. Roughly seventy percent of all farmers were involved in some sort of tenancy. Despite the almost feudal organization of agriculture, land reform was not one of the tasks assigned to SCAP by the JCS guidance. The origins of the land reform idea were the writings of prewar Japanese university intellectuals. SCAP saw land reform as a solution to two problems: food shortages and radicalization of the large rural peasant population by subversive groups. MacArthur was personally in favor of the idea because it was a concept that his father had advocated but not been able to implement during the Philippine War. In October 1945, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to develop legislation for land reform. In January 1946, SCAP rejected the legislation as too conservative and developed its own land reform plan. The land reform legislation developed by SCAP, with input from the ACJ, became law in October 1946. Implementation of the land reform was largely complete by 1948, and by 1949, it had reallocated two million hectares of arable land. The reform reduced the number of landless tenant farmers to seven percent, fifty-seven percent of rural families were farm owners, thirty-five percent were part owners part tenant farmers, and independent farmers cultivated ninety percent of all cropland.⁵⁴ The joint staff guidance to SCAP specifically addressed labor reform: "Require the Japanese to remove, as rapidly as practicable, wartime controls over labor and reinstate protective labor legislation. Require the removal of all legal hindrances to the

⁵³ Dodge recommended to the Japanese government five major economic reform policies: balancing the national budget to reduce inflation; more efficient taxation; dissolving the Reconstruction Finance Bank; decreasing government intervention in the economy; and fixing the exchange rate of the yen to the US dollar to promote exports. John Dower, *Embracing Defeat. Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 540–543.

⁵⁴ Takemae, 339–344; Perret, 521; MacArthur, 358–359;

formation of organizations of employees along democratic lines.”⁵⁵ Steps toward increasing organized labor in Japan began soon after the occupation forces arrived. Within a short time organized labor surged. By 1947, 25,000 different unions had a combined membership over five million. By 1950, there were seven million union members. With the large growth in organized labor came the danger of increased communist influence in the country. General MacArthur was not overly concerned with communist influence, but both Japanese government officials and the SCAP G2 counter-intelligence section were. The Japanese and the G2 both monitored the increasing influence of communist in the labor movement. MacArthur remained uninterested in communist labor efforts until January 1947 when a group of labor organizations threatened a national general strike. MacArthur encouraged the Japanese government to deal with the unions and avoid a strike. Radical labor leaders considered the strike a major demonstration of their national political power and were determined that it go forward despite the government offering pay increases up to forty percent. On the eve of strike, SCAP got directly involved and MacArthur prohibited the strike, and notified the unions that he would use the power of the occupation forces to break any effort to strike. The unions backed down, the workers received their pay increases, and communist influence in labor organization diminished greatly. Attempts by the Japanese communists to influence the labor movement through Japanese army veterans converted to communism in Soviet prisoner of war camps also proved unsuccessful and created a backlash against communism among the Japanese population. Because of the problems with radicals, communists in particular, SCAP permitted the Japanese government to exert more control over labor organizations. MacArthur later, however, admitted

⁵⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper.”

that the reorganization of Japanese labor, to make it a progressive and positive aspect of society and the Japanese economy, “was only partially successful.”⁵⁶

The occupation authorities understood that to fundamentally change Japan they had to accomplish more than changing the mechanics of the political apparatus. The Japanese could easily undermine such changes once the occupation period was over. One way to do this was to fundamentally change the economy. Land reform was a success toward this end —effecting the largest portion of the population. However, the other economic reforms, organizing labor and decartelization, were only partly successful. Success of the occupation therefore, hinged on the occupation’s ability to directly effect the attitudes and outlook of the population. The SCAP addressed policy in three major areas in its efforts to erase the militarization of Japanese society and substitute liberal democratic values. These areas were education, religion, and the media.

Japanese education reform was an example of how occupation policies did not change Japan directly, but instead indirectly empowered Japanese reformers to make changes that otherwise would have been difficult or impossible to achieve. Reforming education was the primary mission of the Civil Information and Education (CI&E) Section. The earliest reforms in education came in the fall of 1945 as the SCAP staff, in accordance with occupation policy, ordered the Japanese Education Ministry to implement policies to remove militaristic and nationalistic instruction and text from schools, screen teachers to remove ultra conservative militarists, and end military training. In 1946, SCAP began to research progressive policies necessary to improve the Japanese education system and make it more supportive of democratic ideals. The recommended education reforms included simplifying written Japanese; shortening the school week to five days; adding electives; integrating core subjects such as social studies,

⁵⁶ *Reports of MacArthur*, 216; Willoughby, 332; MacArthur, 353–354; Takemae, 318–324.

science and math; discouraging rote memorization; decentralizing school control from the national government to local elected school boards; introducing the concept of home rooms; formation of student councils; and adding sports and school extra-curricular clubs. The new national constitution included three education clauses: separating religion from state education; guaranteed academic freedom; and established the right to universal, compulsory, and free public education. Screening committees and policies screened over 700,000 individual teachers to remove those with militarist backgrounds, but by 1948 the committees removed only 3,000. However, the threat of screening induced many to resign, and the process eliminated approximately twenty-five percent of Japan's professional educators.⁵⁷ Overall, using mostly the ideas of liberal Japanese reformers, SCAP transformed the Japanese education system into a bulwark for democratic ideas.

As indicated above, the new Japanese constitution eliminated religion from the public education system. The new constitution also eliminated any state support for the Shinto religion, which the Meiji constitution proclaimed as the official state religion. However, before the approval of the constitution SCAP issued SCAPIN 448, the subject of which was "Abolition of Governmental Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto." The directive prohibited state sponsorship or financial aid to shrines and any participation in any Shinto practices by government officials acting in their official capacity. It also directed the Japanese government give all religions the same legal status. SCAPIN 448 became the basis for

⁵⁷ A working knowledge of 2,000 ideographs was necessary to read a Japanese newspaper. The average Japanese citizen in 1945 did not have that knowledge. Hence the agreement between US and Japanese educators on the need to radically simplify the writing system. The State Department, *Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 33–36, 156–163; Takemae, 352–371; "The Japanese Constitution," Articles 20, 23, and 26; *Reports of MacArthur*, 80, 206.

constitution Articles 20 and 89, guaranteeing freedom of religion and prohibiting public funding of religion.⁵⁸ SCAP's efforts effectively made Japan a secular state.

The occupation used the media as a third technique to eliminate militarism from Japanese culture and implant in its place a respect for democracy. Control of information during the occupation took two forms. One form was censorship designed to limit the distribution of information. The other form was a pro-occupation and pro-democracy propaganda campaign designed to market democratic ideals and incite Japanese public approval of occupation policies. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) of the G2 Counter-Intelligence Section was responsible for civil censorship and used two different tactics, precensorship and monitoring. The occupation normally punished violation of censorship guidelines by the suspension of publication or broadcast privileges. At the beginning of the occupation most censorship took the form of monitoring. CCD discovered as early as September 1945 that this was not effective. Japanese media outlets were asserting anti-occupation news that was factually suspect. Controversial news items included alleging that Japan did not surrender unconditionally, challenging the facts of Japanese atrocities, and highlighting the indiscipline of Allied occupation troops. To stop what the occupation authorities considered misleading news, censorship restrictions gradually increased through the fall of 1945. By 1946, strict precensorship was in place on most large media outlets. Censorship of Japanese media began to phase out in 1947 and SCAP mostly eliminated precensorship of materials by the end of that year.⁵⁹ William Coughlin, a SCAP critic who focused on SCAP's relationship with the Japanese

⁵⁸Takemae, 374–379. “The Japanese Constitution,” Articles 20, and 8.

⁵⁹Marlene J. Mayo, “Civil Censorship and Media in Early Occupied Japan: From Minimum to Stringent,” Robert Wolfe, Editor, *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Illinois University Press, 1984), 269, 293–295, 312–313

media and overall press policy, concluded, “the SCAP censorship of the press for nearly three years was an unfortunate but necessary evil.”⁶⁰

CCD told the Japanese press what they could not do. SCAP tasked the mission to influence the public’s attitudes to the CI&E Section. The CI&E Section told the Japanese media what it should publish. The section’s main mission, the reform of Japanese education, partly addressed this issue. However, the command influenced the larger adult population using the tools of mass media. The CI&E fed news stories to the Japanese press, broadcast its own radio shows, and imported US media such as newspapers, books and movies toward meeting this objective. Though its initial efforts were clumsy, over time the CI&E section developed several effective techniques to connect to the Japanese population, including some very popular radio shows. The CI&E also opened American information centers that included large libraries throughout Japan. By 1949 seventeen such centers were open, included one located with each major Japanese university.⁶¹

End of the Occupation

In late February and March 1948 George Kennan, a senior State Department official and its most influential strategist, made an assessment visit to Japan. By 1948, much had changed since the SWNCC and the JCS provided initial policy guidance to SCAP after the surrender of Japan. Relations with the Soviet Union had steadily deteriorated and the two nations and their Allies were on the verge of the Cold War. Most important, China was falling apart and it was apparent that the nationalist government was not going to be a strong ally for stability in Asia, if it survived. As Kennan reflected later, Japan was the key to American national security issues in

⁶⁰ William J. Coughlin, *Conquered Press: The MacArthur Era in Japanese Journalism* (Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books, 1952), 144.

⁶¹ Mayo, 307–308, 315–316.

Asia: “if at any time in the postwar period the Soviet leaders had been confronted with a choice between control over China and control over Japan, they would unhesitatingly have chosen the latter.” Thus, in Kennan’s mind, Japan was the Cold War prize in Asia and the objective of US policy had to be to keep it in the American camp. Kennan also believed that Japan was politically ready for sovereignty. What concerned Kennan was that at the end of 1947, a sovereign Japan had no obvious defensive capability relative to potentially aggressive communist states in North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union.⁶²

Soon after his return to Washington, Kennan wrote National Security Council paper 13/2, which outlined a plan for the incorporation of Japan into US national security strategy. In particular, NSC 13/2 outlined the necessity of transforming Japan to resist internal communist threats without US support. Kennan’s view was that the new goal of the occupation should be to “achievement of maximum stability of Japanese society, in order that Japan may best be able to stand on her own feet when the protecting hand is withdrawn..” Kennan’s paper provided new guidance for the occupation forces in Japan: relax SCAP involvement in Japanese internal affairs, mandate no further reform legislation, reduce occupation costs, stop reparations, the priority of SCAP should be economic recovery, gradually cease political purges of militarists, develop a centralized Japanese police capability, focus long term US infrastructure development on Okinawa, and delay a final peace treaty until the Japanese government demonstrated sustainable stability. The President, the State Department, and the Department of the Army all approved of Kennan’s paper with only minor changes. SCAP policies beginning in late 1948 and throughout 1949, showed the influence of Kennan’s proposals.⁶³

⁶² George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston, MA: Little , Brown and Company, 1967), 374–377.

⁶³ Kennan quote in Walter L. Hixon, *George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast* (New York: Columbia University press, 1989), 63; Kennan, 391–392.

Kennan's visit and his policy writings, in conjunction with the SCAP's own assessment of the status of the occupation in the light of the developing Cold War with the Soviet Union, mark a distinct shift in occupation priorities. The Japanese refer to this shift as the "reverse course" period. However, it was not a reverse of occupation policies, but rather a shift in priorities. Kennan's view was that General MacArthur was "largely in agreement" with the shift in US priorities in Asia and occupation policies. In the economic sphere, the priority shifted from decentralizing and democratizing the Japanese economy, to economic development. Politically, the emphasis changed from eliminating conservative tendencies to encouraging pro-American policies. SCAP control of Japan gradually loosened as the command achieved initial occupation objectives, military resources declined, and Japanese governance and administration steadily improved. A purge continued in Japan, but from 1949 on the emphasis of the command was on eliminating communists in public positions. In the spring of 1950, the process of developing a peace treaty with Japan began. Events culminated in the summer of 1950 with the communist invasion of South Korea. That event absorbed the bulk of SCAP resources and attention. By the early fall of 1950 SCAP was completely focused on the Korean War and SCAP's main concern with Japan was leveraging Japanese resources to aid the war effort in Korea. Japan became the main American base for waging the Korean War. It was the center of US air and naval operations against Korea and it was the strategic logistics base for ground operations. Because of the Korean War, Japan's economy finally began to improve. The Korean War added more urgency to creating a national Japanese Police reserve force –the precursor of Japan's national defense military forces. Finally, the Korea war set the conditions for the San Francisco peace treaty between the United Nations and Japan.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Kennan, 392. Takemae 's analysis agrees that policy after Kennan's visit reflected a "change in

On September 8, 1951, the United States and 49 other UN members and Japan signed the San Francisco peace treaty ending the US occupation of Japan. The treaty came into force on April 28, 1952. The treaty was a non-punitive treaty. Concurrent with the signing of the peace treaty the United States and Japan signed a treaty of mutual cooperation and security between the two countries. This treaty insured Japan's external security despite Article IX of the Japanese constitution. The non-punitive spirit and letter of the treaty was in no small measure attributable to the strong mutual respect developed between the two nations through the shared occupation experience.

Success in Japan

Overall, the occupation of Japan succeeded. The Allies achieved virtually all of their initial occupation goals. The Japanese constitution fundamentally and permanently altered the nature of Japanese government. It successfully created a democratic and demilitarized state. The Japanese people were satisfied with occupation policies and results. As early as May 1946 American intelligence sources were confirming "Japan's cities are in ruins and its people are threatened with starvation, yet the Japanese outwardly welcome their conquerors with smiles and sincere offers of assistance."⁶⁵ The acceptance of the constitution, democratic government, and cultural reforms, particularly in the area of education, demonstrated the acquiescence of the Japanese people to occupation goals and policies. Finally, most historians, both Japanese and American, agree that the positive accomplishments of the occupation outweigh the unavoidable mistakes, misguided policies, and conservative actions that occurred. Japanese occupation historian Eiji Takemae, while warning that conservative forces continue to chip away at

emphasis," 473.,

⁶⁵ Military Intelligence Division, War Department, *Intelligence Bulletin*, May 1946 (Washington D.C.: Military Intelligence Division, 1946), 51.

progressive ideals established in the occupation period, concluded, “Japanese can take pride in the peaceful, prosperous and democratic society they have constructed since then from the ashes of the Old Order.”⁶⁶ The most prominent American historian of the period, John W. Dower, critiqued “the binational bureaucratic cult, the old-style corporatism that survived the passage from war to peace, the mystique of nonaccountability symbolized by the sovereign, [and] the stunted aspects of the new imperial democracy,” but conceded “MacArthur was quite accurate when he spoke of a society that had undergone significant change. Postwar Japan was a vastly freer and more egalitarian nation than imperial Japan had been. Its people had become chary of militarism and war to a degree matched by few other societies in our world.”⁶⁷ Adequate resources, solid but flexible planning, sufficient time to achieve its objectives, and decisive and enlightened leadership made the occupation a success.

The amount of planning and resources devoted to occupation operations during and after the war were significant. The thousands of Japanese specialists trained by the army’s Civil Affairs Division and deployed into theater were exactly what the mission required. Additionally, the army and the state department augmented the military government specialists with American civilian employees, and hired thousands of Japanese once the occupation forces arrived in Japan. As important, though there was a definite shortage of Japanese expertise in the United States overall, the government identified the very best experts on all aspects of Japanese society and arranged for them to contribute to the occupation effort.

The level that planning occurred was also important. Though President Roosevelt was not intimately involved in occupation planning for Japan, the Cabinet consulted with President Truman regularly and he approved the occupation policy. Secretaries of State and War were

⁶⁶ Takemae, 516.

⁶⁷ Dower, 561.

closely involved in policymaking and the interdepartmental staffs and working groups, particularly the SWNCC, were key to ensuring a unified governmental approach to the issue. The US government did not neglect Japan occupation policy at the strategic level. Different from the army's history, clear strategic guidance and an abundance of tactical resources permitted the occupation to succeed even though the speed of surrender precluded detailed tactical planning.

The occupation of Japan lasted six years. General MacArthur from his earliest comments on occupation policy understood that the occupation could not run too long. However, there was also an understanding within SCAP and the American government that the post-war policies in Japan had to be successful in order to justify the sacrifices made during the war. Therefore, there was no rush to reach a peace treaty, and no significant political pressure to end the occupation before it did. Awareness of the importance of time was implicit in George Kennan's observation that a demonstration of "sustainable stability" was necessary before signing a peace treaty. Sufficient time allowed the SCAP to implement policy, supervise and evaluate policy, and make adjustments. Many SCAP policies, such as censorship and education reform, may have made lasting negative impressions or may not have lasted beyond the occupation as policy. However, with time to observe compliance with policies, phase out unnecessary restrictions, and reinforce effective ideas, most SCAP reforms were eventually embraced by the Japanese population.

General MacArthur's leadership was an important aspect of the success of the occupation. In many ways, he personified the American occupation authority as *Time* magazine described him in 1948: "brilliant soldier and administrator, great showman, benevolent dictator, steadfast egoist."⁶⁸ In many ways he resembled two of his mentors, Arthur MacArthur and

⁶⁸ *Time*, "Japan: One or Many?" May 31, 1948.

Leonard Wood. MacArthur was a controversial figure; nonetheless, his decisions and his personality were directly responsible for a large part of the success of the occupation. Former military government officers, who were highly critical of their role in Japan, still concluded that credit for “the unexpected success of the entire operation ... belongs to General MacArthur.”⁶⁹ MacArthur’s decision to disregard much of the military government apparatus upon arrival in Japan and to run the occupation through a special non-military staff was unorthodox but effective. Many considered his decision to release political prisoners, particularly communists, dangerous and it did cause some problems with organized labor, but it undoubtedly established his legitimate sincere interest in true reform. SCAP’s ability to balance the need for censorship and control of information with the requirements for freedom of expression and press met the needs of Japan in both the short and long term. MacArthur’s decision to push hard for a dramatic new constitution, including Article 9, the peace clause, and the elimination of the Emperor’s political power, unequivocally demonstrated that the new democratic Japan would have no significant political ties to militaristic Imperial Japan. MacArthur’s personality and his personal history also undoubtedly contributed to his effectiveness. MacArthur’s flexibility in responding to George Kennan’s new priorities in 1948 demonstrated a willingness to adopt new ideas when they represented well thought-out solutions to identified problems. Though he was no linguist, his long history of living in Asia, combined with his unusually long service in high command (in 1945 he had been a general officer for twenty-seven years) gave MacArthur an unusual instinctive understanding of the role of symbolism. He often struck just the right cord in critical situations. Japanese historian Kawai Kazuo’s description of the impact of MacArthur’s decision to fly into Atsugi airfield on August 30, 1945 and then to travel essentially unarmed into

⁶⁹ *American Experiences*, 350.

Yokohama, illustrates the role that MacArthur's unique personality often played during the occupation:

It was an exhibition of cool personal courage; it was even more a gesture of trust in the good faith of the Japanese. It was a masterpiece of psychology, which completely disarmed Japanese apprehensions. From that moment, whatever danger there might have been of a fanatic attack on the Americans vanished in a wave of Japanese admiration and gratitude.⁷⁰

Throughout the course of the occupation, MacArthur demonstrated just the right empathy with Japanese values, but at the same time never compromised his mission or his supreme authority. MacArthur's unique leadership was an important element in the SCAP's overall mission success.

⁷⁰ Kawai Kazuo, quoted in Robert Harvey, *American Shogun: MacArthur, Hirohito and the American Duel with Japan* (London: John Murray, 2006), 309.

CHAPTER 10 - The American Way of Occupation

In the eighty-seven years, between 1865 and 1952, the US Army engaged in occupation and military government operations at least seven times covering a span of forty-one years — forty-seven percent of the period. Before World War II, the army conducted occupation and military government operations for twenty-eight of the seventy-six years, 1865 to 1941 —thirty-seven percent of the period. These calculations do not include the fourteen years, 1877 to 1890, when active operations on the western frontier continued. No other mission, including combat operations, was as consistently required of the US Army as occupation and military government. Beginning in 1865, American army occupation operations demonstrated a continuity of actions and approach. Each occupation operation built upon the experiences of preceding operations. During the period, the important mission of military government became a part of the army's institutional culture. The army's culture came to understand that successful occupation operations were essential to strategic victory. The post-World War II occupations of Japan and Germany were a success partly due to the institutional culture that anticipated the mission, planned and allocated resources for it, and focused the army's leadership on it both during the war and for several years afterward. The occupations of Germany and Japan embodied the American approach to occupations that had evolved over the years. However, there were several aspects of occupation operations that were unsuccessful.

Institutional Culture

Army doctrine was a consistent contributor to the success of military occupation operations and provided an important direct connection between early experiences and World War II.¹ However, there was another factor that directly linked the World War II generation of leaders with the history of the army's occupation experiences: institutional culture. The US Army that entered World War II had a distinct culture, most dramatically represented by the regular army officer corps. The institutional culture was a product of personal experiences passed from generation to generation through formal officer education and a vast interpersonal network of mentors, friends and family. Culture is a complex concept. British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor proposed one of the first and simplest definitions of culture in his 1871 book *Primitive Culture*, "a complex whole including knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capability or habit acquired by human beings as members of society."² A more specific and comprehensive definition used by the GLOBE research study of the relationships between culture, leadership and organizations is "shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations and meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations."³ Many factors influence culture; one of the most important is kinship relations among the organization's members. Another factor is the particular nature of the organization.⁴ The history, education, structure, and missions of the army defined it as an organization. The living conditions, social and political atmosphere, and attitudes and priorities of the organization's members and leaders affected the kinship relationships within the organization. Leaders, in particular, set the tone, imposed their

¹ See Chapter Seven.

² Marcel Denesi and Paul Perron, *Analyzing Cultures: An Introduction and Handbook* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 3.

³ Robert J. House, Paul J. Hanges, Mansour Javidan, Peter W. Dorfman, and Vipin Gupta, Editors, *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The Globe Study of 62 Societies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2004), 57.

⁴ For a discussion of how culture is defined and how cultures can be organized see Denesi, 22–29.

own values and assumptions, and acted as role models.⁵ In the case of the culture of the regular army officer corps, which led the army in World War II, kinship relations and the nature of the organization reinforced each other to produce an institutional culture that understood and accepted the importance of post-conflict operations to strategic military success.

Social anthropologists struggle to define the term kinship and its relationship to culture. All generally agree that there is a biological component to kinship relations, but relationships related to environment also fall within the scope of the term kinship. The small core of regular army officers on active service in 1922 was less than 12,000 and as the United States approached World War II, active officers still numbered less than 15,000.⁶ This small group was a tightly knit cadre of professionals with very strong personal ties to each other and to the organization. Most had social and professional connections that were as strong as family relations, including many who were direct family relatives. This group of career professionals, more than any other, defined the army's institutional culture.

West Point was central to the sense of community among army officers. Military sociologist Morris Janowitz in his classic study of the military profession, *The Professional Soldier*, noted, “[T]he academies set the standards of behavior for the whole military profession. They are the source of the pervasive...sense of fraternity which prevails among military men.”⁷ Except for the period of mobilization for World War I when the army expanded greatly, the

⁵ See Edgar H. Schein's discussion of the interrelationship of leaders and culture in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Second Edition (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 1, 211–253.

⁶ Robert W. Stewart, Editor. *American Military History Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2003* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005), 59. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History, 2003), 91.

⁷ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), 127.

majority of officers entering the army between 1900 and 1939 were graduates of West Point.⁸ Between 1900 and 1939, West Point contributed an average of 181 officers per year to the Army. The highest number of commissioning occurred in 1939 when West Point commissioned 456 cadets as second lieutenants, and the lowest number was in 1921, when the academy commissioned only seventeen. From 1898 to 1940, two-thirds of all general officers of the regular army graduated from West Point.⁹ Assimilation into the army culture began at West Point. The academy experience tied the cadet closely to his classmates; he also came to know well the other classes attending the academy at the same time. In four-years at the academy the cadet was likely to share the experience with over 1200 other cadets.¹⁰ The bonds formed at West Point represented the type of strong kinship relationships that the army fostered and which occurred outside the traditional family. Faculty members were also an important influence on the cadets as well.

Actual family kinship relations were also an important contributor to the strength of army culture. Janowitz noted that families in the pre-World War II military were “deeply involved in the transmission of military tradition.”¹¹ Of the graduating West Point cadets between 1900 and 1939, twenty-six percent were direct descendants (sons, grandsons, or both) of graduates.¹² Numerous other cadets married into army families. Janowitz observed that “a proper marriage by a young officer to the daughter of a high-ranking officer was a relevant step in building a

⁸ After World War I, Congress mandated that half of the officers retained on active duty in the expanded post-war army be from sources other than West Point. Stuart, 57.

⁹ Richard C. Brown, *Social Attitudes of American Generals, 1898–1940* (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 34–35.

¹⁰ George W. Cullum, Charles N. Branham, Editor, *Biographical Register of the officers and Graduates of the US Military Academy at West point, New York* (United States: The Association of Graduates US Military Academy, 1950), 76–1040.

¹¹ Janowitz, 189.

¹² “Genealogical Succession,” extract from the 2005 *Register of Graduates and Former Cadets* (West Point, NY: Association of Graduates, 2005), 9–26.

career, and service wives worked hard to screen potential candidates.”¹³ Lieutenant (later brigadier general) Harry Chamberlin (USMA 10) is an example of how marriage connected officers. Chamberlin married Sally Garlington, daughter of General Ernst Garlington (USMA 76), niece of General J. Franklin Bell (USMA 76), and sister of then Lieutenant Creswell Garlington (USMA 10). Sally Garlington was the personal secretary for family friend General George C. Marshall throughout World War II.¹⁴ Though Chamberlin did not come from a military family, marriage integrated him into one of the most distinguished families in the army. Kinship relations were an especially powerful vehicle for perpetuating attitudes regarding the army and its mission to subsequent generations of officer. The transmission of attitudes occurred through direct interpersonal interaction. Army officers, in the 1920s and 1930s, like all previous generations of professional army officers, spent most of their professional and personal lives together in very close and often isolated communities. They spent months and sometimes years together in remote parts of the world, on field exercises, or on missions. The isolation and forced interaction of the army officer began for cadets at West Point and continued throughout the career of the regular officer. In those isolated settings, interaction including the sharing of life stories was unavoidable. A great body of anecdotal evidence indicates that this was the case. General Hamilton Howze (USMA 30) described how his father’s (Robert Lee Howze, USMA 88) house at Fort Bliss after World War I was frequently visited by old comrades including General John Pershing (USMA 86) and Colonel Billy Mitchell. The senior Howze and Pershing’s relationship included shared service at West Point, the Ghost Dance War, the Spanish

¹³ Janowitz, 188.

¹⁴ The Garlington family relationships are documented at *The Arlington National Cemetery website*, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/garling.htm> (accessed 1 March 2009).

American War, the Philippine War, and World War I.¹⁵ George Marshall's house at Fort Benning in the 1930s was the location of late Friday night gin games and informal study groups that regularly included future army leaders Joseph Stillwell, Omar Bradley, Courtney Hodges, and J. Lawton Collins.¹⁶ Shared service created additional kinship ties similar to family relations.

The major source of ideas about occupation operations was the experiences of the army's leaders, their friends and mentors, and their families. In the seventy-six years prior to 1941 every generation of American regular army officers engaged in major military government occupation operations, or closely associated tasks. They passed these experiences on to subsequent generations of army officers who took ownership of them.¹⁷ World War II leader, General Lucien Truscott, recalled how as a young officer his commanders were a constant source on the army's history. Truscott remembered one, Colonel George H. Morgan, winner of the Medal of Honor in action against the Apache in 1882, who "was always entertaining us with tales of the frontier and the "Old Army." Another, Colonel Arthur Poillon, had served in a variety of military attaché positions and "shared his knowledge of both the early history of the regiment and of the area with all on many pleasant expeditions and picnics."¹⁸ It was the rare regular officer in 1940 who was not aware of the army's history, including the occupations and large-scale civil-military operations that were part of the army's history. All of the senior leaders

¹⁵ Hamilton H. Howze, *A Cavalryman's Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army General* (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1996), 9–18. Hamilton Hawkins Howze (USMA 1930) is himself also a great example of the interwar kinship relations: His father was General Robert Howze (USMA 1888), his mother's father was General Hamilton Hawkins (attended but did not complete USMA, Civil War and S&A War veteran), his brother was Major General Robert L. Howze Jr. (USMA 1925), and he married the daughter of Major General Guy V. Henry (USMA 1898).

¹⁶ Omar Bradley, *A General's Life* (New York: Touchtone, 1984), 68; J. Lawton Collins, *Lightning Joe, An Autobiography* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1979), 51.

¹⁷ Organizational Psychologist Edgar H. Schein indicates that stories about important events and people are one of the most important ways leaders pass on culture to subordinates. Schein, 251.

¹⁸ Lucian Truscott, *The Twilight of the US Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917–1942* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 9, 63.

of the World War II occupations, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Clay, Marshall, and thousands of others were immersed in the army's institutional culture through their personal kinship relations and their professional experiences. Through them and the complex web of interpersonal relations that linked them, the army's institutional culture influenced the army's understanding of, and therefore its success executing occupation operations.

The American Way of Occupation

American army occupation operations through World War II share some general characteristics that comprise a unique American approach to such operations: an American way of conducting occupation operations, an American way of occupation. Such characteristics include the primacy of installing democratic government, transitioning government to civil control as quickly as possible, an understanding of the limits of imposing foreign ideas on native populations, a reliance on the civilian leadership for strategic policy, and an emphasis on public education, the rule of law, and the health and welfare of the civilian population. These characteristics typified American occupation from the Confederacy to Japan.

The American army made establishing democratic government its top priority when conducting occupation operations. The army employed a set pattern: create the rules of suffrage, organize local elections and elect constitutional assemblies, guide the writing of a constitution, and supervise electing a democratic government according to the approved constitution. The army followed this pattern beginning in the former Confederate States and remained consistent with it through the occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II. The only major exceptions were the occupations of the Vera Cruz, the Rhineland and Italy. In those cases indigenous government systems predated the occupation and did not have to be constructed.

Interestingly, in addition to following a consistent political formation pattern, the army also consistently manipulated the suffrage laws in order to influence to the greatest extent possible the post-occupation government. In the former Confederate states the suffrage laws built into the state constitutions ensured Freedmen's rights and state Republican Party governments. In post-World War II Germany, and to a lesser extent in Japan, the exclusion of former Nazis and militarists from voting was an effective means of destroying the political power of the wartime regimes. In Japan, enfranchising women also changed the nature of the indigenous political system. However, using suffrage as a means to control future policy was not always successful. In Cuba, for example, post-occupation Cuban politicians and policy were frequently at odds with those of the United States.

The American army's occupation approach featured an emphasis on turning the occupied territory over to civil authorities as quickly as possible. General Marshall told General Hilldring when he took over the Civil Affairs Division "Your mission is to start planning from the day you go into business, how you're going to get out it as fast as possible."¹⁹ Demilitarizing occupation operations was because of military necessity but rather the unique civil-military environment in which the US Army traditionally operated. Part of that was the American population's insistence on dramatically reducing army forces immediately after the cessation of hostilities. This occurred in all wars and greatly influenced post-conflict operations. In all the occupations prior to World War II, army governance operated under severe manpower constraints. This was particularly evident after the Civil War and in the Philippines where geography and indigenous opposition made the need for manpower acute. In Cuba and the Rhineland, opposition was nonexistent and governed area was small so manpower was not a major problem. After World

¹⁹ Quoted in Edward N. Peterson, *The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1978), 33.

War II, the occupation forces also quickly demobilized. However, demobilization only occurred after the occupation command assured itself that there was no armed resistance. In addition, though occupation forces after World War II demobilized, very robust civil affairs capability remained to facilitate the transition to civil rule.

Demobilization was one reason that American occupation commanders were anxious to end military governance as quickly as possible. Another reason was the general American distaste for military rule. Generals Ulysses Grant, and Lucius Clay were both uncomfortable with the military role in governance and wanted to end it as quickly as possible. Clay pursued a rigorous program of civilianizing the military government in Germany.²⁰ Even Douglas MacArthur, who was very comfortable in his role as SCAP, understood that if not withdrawn in a timely manner, occupation forces could become a strategic liability.²¹ In all American military government missions, except the Philippines, not only did the army quickly and dramatically reduce military forces after hostilities, they also pursued a very aggressive timeline for creating constitutions, holding elections, and turning over governance to civilian authority. In all cases, except the Philippines, the army quickly and efficiently set up a civil authority representing the native population.²² The process used was virtually identical in all cases and considered legitimate by the bulk of the population.

Also laudable was the American sensitivity to local culture, language, religion, and politics. The tolerance of the army leadership is attributable to two factors. First was the army's

²⁰ In December 1945 military government personnel in Germany numbered approximately 12,000. In April 1946 the number was 7,600. In January 1947 total strength was 5,000, of whom fifty percent were civilian. When General Clay left Germany in the Spring of 1949 the total personnel within the military government organization was 2,500 of whom only 94 were soldiers. Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), 65–66.

²¹ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1964), 323.

²² Even in the Philippines, the United States installed an American civil governor in 1901, before hostilities were over, and greatly reduced troop strength after major combat operations ceased in the summer of 1902. John Pershing's major contribution to governance in the Philippines was the transition of the Moro province to civil rule.

frontier experience. The close relationship between army officers and the Native Americans accustomed generations of army officers to non-Christian peoples and culture. Duty on the Mexican border, as well as the minorities in the army's own ranks, introduced most army officers to the Catholic religion and Hispanic and African-American culture before many of their peers in the American social elite. These associations tended to make army officers more tolerant of the people and institutions they encountered in the Philippines, Cuba, Italy, Germany and Japan.

The army's sensitivity to native culture and tradition was reflected in the occupation institutions the army created. In the American South, the state governments did not differ substantially in form from their pre-war (and Presidential Reconstruction) predecessors. In Cuba and the Philippines, which had no previous history of government, the government systems were largely patterned on the US model. However, in Germany, Italy and Japan, parliamentary systems, completely different from the US model, were permitted to function because that was the national tradition. Sensitivity to local traditions led to a high priority for relations with the Catholic Church in the Philippines and Italy, and influenced the legal systems created in Cuba and the Philippines, and recreated in Germany, Italy, and Japan. In all cases, the army permitted the retention of the bulk of the legal traditions of the occupied country. The army's endorsement of the Japanese Emperor demonstrated the considerable degree that the American military ignored wartime attitudes and prejudices in the interest of occupation success.

The army's emphasis on linguistic ability also contributed to its ability to adapt to the environment of the occupied nation. Language ability was highly valued on the American frontier. Command of Spanish proved invaluable to operations on the Mexican border, particularly against the Apache, as well as in Cuba and the Philippines. Generals Bliss, Pershing,

Scott, and Allen were all outstanding linguists. Scott was the one of the foremost authorities on Native American sign language. General Pershing, though not fluent, had a working knowledge of Tagalog, Spanish, French, and Japanese. Generals Bliss and Allen were both fluent in French and Spanish, while Bliss was competent in German and Allen was fluent in that language as well as Russian. Before World War I and after, language was a mandatory component of the army education system, particularly the staff college at Fort Leavenworth. Until World War I, the language for operations within the army was Spanish, while the languages for professional education and development were German and French. Acquiring language skills fostered cultural understanding and often produced cultural empathy. Thus, a byproduct of the army's emphasis on linguistic skills was an officer corps that was both culturally aware and largely empathetic with the situations of native populations.

One historian of the German occupation noted that none of the key American general officers could speak German. However, it would be wrong to conclude from that fact that language proficiency was not an important aspect of the occupation's success. The army in fact continued to recognize the importance of language ability during World War II. General Marshall himself was competent in Spanish and French and had a working knowledge of Chinese. Language was perhaps the most emphasized component in the World War II military government school system and was highly prized in the army's Civil Affairs Division. Thus, though senior commanders such Lucius Clay and Douglas MacArthur, may not have had a personal knowledge of German or Japanese, many of the officers who dealt daily with the Germans and Japanese did.

During the occupation, army officers were aware of US domestic politics and communicated with the civilian leadership. They always recognized the principle of civilian

primacy over operations, but they did not hesitate to consider domestic political issues or consult with civilian leaders when forging policy. The nature of occupation operations thrust military governors into the midst of American foreign policy. Once he was satisfied that he understood President Johnson's Reconstruction program, General Grant was very vocal criticizing it. He used several devices, including general officer assignments, to mitigate what he perceived as the damage the President was inflicting on the recent military victory. However, Grant never directly challenged the President's authority. He ultimately registered his disagreement by running against Johnson for President in 1868. Several decades later, General Arthur MacArthur curtailed his military operations in the Philippines to support President McKinley's 1900 reelection bid. The military governors also monitored the attitudes and policies of the Congress. General Leonard Wood was not shy about advocating tariff exemptions for Cuban sugar to Congress. General Clay was equally ardent arguing for Germany's inclusion in the Marshall plan.

Military governors thus attempted to influence policy but did not challenge civilian primacy. Sometimes the civilian leadership had to define what conduct of the military government was acceptable. This was the case when Secretary of War Root constrained General Leonard Wood's lobbying to Congress on Cuba's behalf. Nevertheless, in the history of American military government, there were no cases of army officers operating in open defiance of the national civilian authorities or policy.

Education was one facet of occupation in which the army consistently demonstrated a strong and unique interest. This began with the occupation of the South, where the Union army, through the Freedmen Bureau, established publicly supported schools for the children of former slaves, ultimately leading to public education throughout the region. In all subsequent

occupations, the American command gave education significant priority. The army's support of the Carlisle Indian School demonstrates the army's commitment to education during its operations in the American West. In the Philippines and Cuba, not only did the command quickly reestablish and improve the school systems, but the occupation authorities put great emphasis on teacher training, education and pay. The army sent Cuban teachers to the United States for training, and urged recruitment of large numbers of American teachers for the Philippines. Education policy garnered much attention in the occupations of Germany and Japan as well where officials examined the indigenous education systems to ensure liberal curricula and eliminate militaristic teachers. The army saw education as a fundamental requirement for stable democratic government. Thus, for the army education reform reinforced the number one occupation priority, democratization.

Another army occupation priority was reestablishing a sound legal system. Sociologist Richard Brown in his study of early twentieth century senior army officers made the point that respect for law and order was a cornerstone of the social beliefs of the army leadership before World War II. Further, he identified General Order 100, and the *Rules of Land Warfare* manuals that followed, as a critical component of that belief system.²³ Many of the army's military governors, Generals Halleck, Otis, Arthur MacArthur, Pershing and Dickman among them, had strong academic backgrounds in law. Beginning in Cuba and the Philippines, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) corps was always a key component in army governance. Colonel I.L. Hunt, who established the army's occupation system in the Rhineland was a JAG officer, as was General Enoch Crowder, a key advisor to Arthur MacArthur in the Philippines and to Charles E. MaGoon (himself a lawyer) in Cuba. Until 1940, the JAG office was the proponent of army

²³ Brown, 41–47.

military government doctrine and army lawyers taught the subject in the army school system. It was also no coincidence that the three Secretaries of War who had the greatest influence on US military government overseas, Elihu Root, Howard Taft, and Henry Stimson, were noted lawyers. The result of the American emphasis on the importance of law in occupation operations was legitimacy in the eyes of the native population, the international community, and the American public.

Related to the reestablishing the rule of law in post-conflict operations was forming indigenous police forces. The one notable failure of the American army to do this was during Reconstruction and it was likely a contributing factor to the general lawlessness of much of the South and in the slow response of federal forces to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan. The importance of indigenous police had its precedent on the American frontier, where Native American scouts notably assisted army regular forces defusing confrontations between settlers and Indian tribes. The Philippine Constabulary and the Cuban Rural Guard were important to the rule of law, legitimization, and political stabilization in those occupations. The *Carabinieri* in Italy and the rehabilitated German and Japanese police forces were also important aspects of controlling crime and preventing anarchy in post World War II Europe and Japan. In many cases, the army employed civilian police experts to help create the new force and instill the vital ethics of service, professionalism, and political neutrality.

In all occupation operations after Reconstruction, the US Army demonstrated a strong concern for the health and welfare of the civilian population. This characteristic emerged after the Spanish-American War. The army medical corps led the medical efforts in Cuba and the Philippines. Army doctors instituted modern vaccination programs, researched local diseases, established local health care professional standards, and designed sanitation regulations wherever

the army went. In Germany, the army supervised the rebuilding of the shattered medical institutions. In Japan, General Sams oversaw the rebuilding and modernization of the entire health care system. The success of army health care programs reflected in dramatically improved civilian mortality statistics in all areas where the American army located. Despite unprecedented destruction from unrestricted strategic bombing and atomic attack, army doctors prevented widespread famine and pestilence in all the post-World War II occupations. Army medical programs saved lives and resources, and legitimized the occupation force in the eyes of the civilian population. Medical programs were a major contributor to occupation success.

Challenges Not Met

Though the history of American postwar occupations is one of increasing success, the US Army systemically failed to anticipate or correctly address several facets of the operations. Foremost among these failures was the inability of the national leadership to anticipate post-conflict occupation, develop suitable policy, and provide the army clear guidance. Additionally, the United States consistently failed to understand the relationship between economics and political stability. The army also consistently failed to manage the transition from combat to post-combat operations posture. These failures threatened to undermine strategic success and at the least increased the duration of the occupation.

One of the most consistent themes throughout the history of American military occupation operations was the lack of clear political guidance. After the Civil War President Johnson's guidance to the army was clear but it did not match what the army leadership and the Congress thought were the strategic objectives of the war. This disunity was fatal to the mission. In Cuba and the Philippines, the army's problem was the almost total lack of guidance from the President. In the case of Cuba, fortunately, the Congress had made clear before the Spanish-

American War that the strategic objective was Cuban independence. In the case of the Philippines, neither the President nor Congress had a clear idea what the national policy was or should be. Even after the United States annexed the Philippines, the American national leadership hinted to the Filipinos that the annexation was not permanent. Policy in the Rhineland was equally obscure. No plan existed to occupy the Rhineland as late as two weeks before the war ended. After the American army initially occupied the Rhineland, the United States did not agree to a permanent occupation until just before signing the Versailles Peace Treaty. Finally, the failure of the US government to ratify the treaty placed the US Army in midst of an Allied occupation disconnected politically from the other occupying armies.

The American record of engaging in occupation operations without either long-term or short-term national strategic guidance continued in World War II. Henry Stimson, the experienced Secretary of War, understood this history but given President Roosevelt's personal style of governance, he was almost powerless to stop it. Thus, General Eisenhower, the theater commander, made the major decisions regarding occupation policy in North Africa and Italy. He made the two crucial decisions to work with the Vichy government in North Africa, and to cooperate with the Italian government after it surrendered. In the case of Germany, Roosevelt's style again prevented timely, coherent, systematic planning, resulting in late dissemination of policy and flawed economic guidance in the final strategic directive, JCS 1067. The US government had a better organized process for the planning of the occupation of Japan. This was despite the fact that the surrender of Japan came months before the Americans anticipated it. Policy for the occupation of Japan, as outlined in JCS 1380, was clear and comprehensive and complemented the occupation plan, Operation BLACKLIST. This was because President Truman did not interfere significantly with the process and the new inter-departmental planning

organization, the SWNCC, provided the needed strategic perspective, expertise and interdepartmental coordinating capability. The occupation of Japan also required little detailed coordination among the Allied powers, being mainly an American operation. Still, JCS 1380 contained flawed economic guidance for the commander.

A major shortcoming in the history of the American occupation operations was the continual failure of the senior leadership to recognize the indispensability of progressive economic development to occupation success. The Achilles heel of every major US Army occupation was the failure to remedy the economic weakness of the occupied area. There was no meaningful economic revitalization plan for the occupied Confederate states. Congress stymied Cuban economic revitalization despite the best efforts of General Wood and Secretary Root. In the Philippines, the Americans made little effort to support the Philippine economy. Economic comprehension was completely absent in the World War II approach to occupation operations. During the war in Italy, and in both JCS 1067 and 1380 after the war, government policy specifically prohibited the army from engaging in the rehabilitation of the Italian, German, and Japanese economy. In Germany, this occurred despite widespread understanding among economists and business executives within the US government of the interdependence of the European national economies, both friendly and enemy. In Germany, the steps taken by General Clay toward zonal economic integration and revitalization of the Ruhr industrial area occurred despite JCS 1067. The Marshall plan happened only after the war was over and US officials, struggling to stabilize Europe politically and economically, demonstrated to the Congress that massive economic support to Europe, including Germany, was critical to political stability. However, the United States did not decide to implement the Marshall Plan until fully two years

after the war ended, and the plan did not begin to have an impact until 1949, fully four years after the war ended, and after the military occupation of Germany was essentially over.

Economic policy toward Japan, like initial policy toward Germany, precluded occupation support to the Japanese economy. Unlike Germany, there were no strong links between the Japanese economy and that of major American Allies in the region, so no Marshall plan rescued it. By 1948, however, US occupation officials recognized the close relationship between Japanese political stability and economic stability and prosperity. The growing Soviet threat in Asia and the fall of China also caused a reevaluation of Japan as a potential allied partner. Ultimately, however, the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 rescued the Japanese economy. The Korean War fully engaged the American military in Asia and Japan became the strategic logistics base for US forces fighting in Korea. This resulted in the United States spending billions of dollars in Japan for goods and services necessary to support the war. American spending for the Korean War provided the necessary capital to revitalize Japanese industry. This occurred despite the occupation plan rather than because of it. Ironically, during World War II the US military and government demonstrated a laudable strategic understanding of the relationship between national industrial capacity and warfighting, but only belatedly realized that that same strategic link existed between post-conflict success and economic policy.

One of the American army's historical lessons about occupation was the need to organize the occupation forces along local political boundaries. Colonel Hunt made this recommendation explicitly after World War I. In Cuba, the army organized its forces based on the Cuban provincial organization from the beginning of the occupation. In the Philippines, the complexity of the guerrilla war made the transition from operational organization to territorial organization more difficult. In the Rhineland, the army was slow to adapt its occupation organization to

German political organization. Despite Hunt's advice, the army mismanaged the transition from tactical organization to territorial organization during and after World War II in both Germany and Italy. In Germany, tactical commands governed the occupation for too long after the end of hostilities. This not only violated the necessity of aligning the military command with the political organization of the country, but it also placed tactical headquarters, untrained and unfocused on occupation operations, in charge of military government. This directly contradicted the doctrinal guidance in *FM 27-5*.

Conclusions

Over its history from the American Civil War to World War II, the US Army engaged in several large-scale military government and occupation operations. Over that period the army learned from its experiences and developed an unofficial, yet systematic approach to occupation operations. That systematic approach focused on developing democratic institutions, quickly transferring control to civil authorities, respecting local cultural traditions, enforcing law and order, and facilitating education the health and welfare of the population. The army captured this approach to occupation operations in doctrine but also informally through an institutional culture that passed the experiences of occupation operations from generation to generation. The leaders of occupation operations in World War II were in most cases only two generations removed from the army experience in Reconstruction, and in cases such as Douglas MacArthur, only one. Thus, in World War II, the army adequately planned and robustly supported occupation operations. This mitigated the effects of defective policy and uncooperative Allies, ensuring relative stability and buying time for policy corrections. To a significant extent, these actions by the army contributed to the success of the occupation of Germany and Japan after 1945.

In planning and executing occupation operations during and after World War II, US forces made many mistakes, and in many cases failed to recognize and correct systemic mistakes made in similar operations in the army's history. However, particularly in the World War II era, the understanding of the strategic importance of occupation operations pervaded all levels of the American army. By World War II, the American army had inculcated the strategic importance of occupation operations in the army's culture. Doctrine reinforced the intuitive cultural acceptance of the mission. In the World War II era, the army recognized the need for occupation operations early. There was no debate within the army about the importance of the occupation operations and the requirement for large-scale dedication of assets to them. This understanding, however, was not evident in just World War II. General Grant and his perceptions of the Reconstruction set the precedent for future generations of army leaders sensing the Clausewitzian relationship between strategic political policy, war, and post-conflict occupation success. That sensing ensured that army leaders such as Grant, Arthur MacArthur, Wood, Bell, Pershing, Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, Clay, and Marshall personally engaged the occupation mission and made certain their staffs allocated the resources necessary to make those missions successful.

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