A PROPOSED POST-CONFLICT PLANNING MODEL FOR US ARMY
RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

by

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Abstract

As effects of social and environmental conflicts perpetuate globally, fewer nations in the world appear to be at settled peace. The on-set of natural disasters and socio-political conflicts continue to force the United States Government to be increasingly called upon to provide resources that secure instable regions during times of conflict. One method the government uses to securing its international neighbors is through the deployment of US Army reconstruction teams. These teams assist in transforming a negatively impacted foreign nation into a peaceful and functioning sovereignty within itself and its region; however, in order to begin reconstruction and engage in long term stability for the best interest of the host-nation, the Army must scrutinize current decision-making techniques to assure that basic human rights are instilled and local inhabitants have a means to sustain those efforts.

This research sets out to define a planning model which supplements Army doctrine concerning post-conflict reconstruction, mainly FM 3-07 Stability Operations. It looks to incorporate academia, professional experience, and government resources with indigenous leadership in order to define a process to reconstruct infrastructure for a foreign nation during a time of need. More importantly, it looks to enforce those measures which endorse the basic human rights of society to instill security in post-conflict regions.

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Acknowledgements

This study goes to my family, and especially my wife. Thanks for your patience and support in helping me achieve my goals. I also acknowledge the honor and integrity of those who willingly surrender their comfort to create a more secure and healthy world – civilian and military alike.

CHAPTER 1 - Introduction

"The world of suffering people looks to us for leadership. Their thoughts, however, are not concentrated alone on this problem. They have more immediate and terribly pressing concerns where the mouthful of food will come from, where they will find shelter tonight, and where they will find warmth. Along with the great problem of maintaining the peace we must solve the problem of the pittance of food, of clothing and coal and homes. Neither of these problems can be solved alone."

-George C. Marshall, November 1945

As effects of social and environmental conflicts perpetuate globally, fewer nations in the world appear to be at settled peace. The on-set of natural disasters and socio-political conflicts continue to force the United States Government (USG) to be increasingly called upon to provide resources that sustain and enhance the livelihood of the international community during detrimental times. One method the USG uses to securing its international neighbors in these circumstances involves deploying US Army reconstruction teams. The names given to these units have evolved throughout the years, but all are centered on assets of trained personnel who have the ability to exploit various resources to reconstruct social and infrastructure needs in order to reinstate an incapacitated post-conflict society.

As of now, the primary methods to initiate reconstruction efforts through US Army organizations are implemented by policy; and consist of programs such as Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to units such as Civil Affairs (CA), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), and US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). These methods contribute to reconstruction efforts with a principal mission to uphold – provide stability to a

region which is experiencing decentralized authority as a result of some type of conflict (US Army, 2007). As part of the techniques for stabilizing post-conflict areas, reconstruction teams initiate tasks that restore and improve dysfunctional social and infrastructure conditions. These efforts are mitigated through political policy and are accomplished through the provision of materials, trained personnel, land development, human-rights improvement, economic development procedures, and government empowerment. The assessment and reconstruction of infrastructure accomplishes these provisions by reconstituting broken transportation networks, education systems, building medical clinics and providing services, creating community centers, and reconstructing government buildings (US Army, 2008).

While the goals of reconstruction teams were developed to support national security objectives, global development, and the welfare of international inhabitants, the decision-making methods they employ are considered, by some, to be overtly deficient. As a result, criticisms by internal, foreign, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) plague the reconstruction community and challenge their effectiveness. In fact, criticisms of the Department of Defense (DOD), a key player in the post-conflict reconstruction community, is perceived as inadequate to adapt to changes in the 'conflict landscape' of the 21st Century (Federovich, 2009). Without the ability to adapt and be flexible, the resources the DOD employs are not effectively utilized, and fall short of accomplishing reconstruction effort objectives. Furthermore, sources point out that NGOs criticize that the utilization of reconstruction teams, specifically PRTs, are not clearly mandated, and personnel are untrained on how and what types of assistance to deliver (Stapleton, 2003). Therefore, when organizations such as the US Army are deployed, they lack an effective planning process and cannot instigate appropriate reconstruction measures. Their primary objectives of stabilization become increasingly difficult tasks because the source of leadership is

not reasonably proficient in deliberating needed agendas. In turn, their efforts may further complicate post-conflict situations, and especially so when host-nation inhabitants perceive that redevelopment of critical infrastructure is not prioritized or evenly and fairly balanced.

But criticism of reconstruction teams is only the first step towards changing how the US Army conducts reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies; and defining who is responsible for leading that change becomes an entanglement of governmental bureaucracy beyond the scope of this work. Arguably, criticisms of reconstruction teams are not as important as the criticism of the planning model these teams employ (or the lack of a planning model).

In defense of the Army, Army doctrine is routinely examined and assessed for effectiveness. US Army advanced military schools, such as The Army War College and The Command and General Staff College, task students to reproach current doctrine for modernity. As so, doctrine for restoring foreign nations is highly criticized by academia professionals and subject matter experts, in order to create information about the environments reconstruction teams may expect if deployed. This doctrine generally supports the characteristics of rebuilding the physical and social environment of a post-conflict society for the primary intention of securing and stabilizing a region. None-the-less, what is missing from US Army doctrine are not the characteristics of international reconstruction, but a coherent international reconstruction planning model which invests in the best interest of the host-nation and can be transposed through rotating leadership.

If such a model existed, it would consist of a planning process that is focused upon assessed needs, one which is flexible and adaptable, that is political and culturally oriented, inclusive of local leadership, and 'fair and balanced' among the host-nation population. The

guiding doctrine the Army uses to accommodating these characteristics can be found in the Field

Manual (FM) 3-07 Stability Operations[1]. As documented in Appendix C of FM 3-07, the Army

utilizes the characteristics of *USAID's Principles for Reconstruction and Development*[2]doctrine

for considerations when reconstruction efforts in host-nations occur. However, a concern is that

Appendix C is only referenced one time in the main body of the manual, of which the importance

of implementing 'ownership' is implied. Therefore, if during the rebuilding of a post-conflict

society these principles do not mesh with leadership decision-making processes, US Army

reconstruction teams can expect challenges and criticism to continue to degrade the value of their

efforts *and* the external perception that their presence contributes to further instability.

Recent overview of the Reconstruction Team

The September 11, 2001 attacks on America has etched into history books a point in

which USG policies and methods have been through an exorbitant cycle of examinations,

modifications, and updates. Until recently, in-depth looks into doctrine for international aid and

reconstruction seems to have taken a "back seat" to the priority of reorganizing the intelligence

field and making it more effective. Evidence of this comes from the 911 National Commission

report, *Organizing America's Defenses in the United States.* This prime objective entails

reorganizing the intelligence community in such a way as to protect the American people

(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004) through better

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[1] FM 3-07 is a' new approach' to how the US Army conducts operations which are devised to stabilize and secure a nation in conflict. This approach is associated by a 'whole of government' collaborative process. The manual is designed to embrace the doctrine and resources of other USG organizations in order to create a 'unity of effort' to stabilizing a nation.

[2] The USAID principles are as follows: Accountability, Partnership, Assessment, Sustainability, Selectivity, Flexibility, Ownership, Results, and Capacity Building. A brief, and official, description is offered in Appendix A - USAID Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development.

processes and flow of information and policy. It emphasizes the immediate need to creating and restructuring organizations, military included, to enforce domestic protection; which, understandably, surpassed the need to overhaul strategies for distributing reconstruction and aid to international communities during a post-conflict event.

In any case, reconstruction would eventually become a major component into the global perspective of how the US Army would shape global security. Beginning in 2002 after major social, political, and combative conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US became increasingly tasked to reconstitute functioning government organizations and rebuild the physical infrastructure. Reconstruction teams, in these theaters of conflict, evolved through many labels before being coined the popularized Provincial Reconstruction Team[3]. As with a majority of reconstruction teams, PRTs consist of joint civil-military personnel. They were first deployed to Gardez, Afghanistan in 2002 and operated as a function to: 1) improve security; 2) extend the reach of the [Afghan] government; and 3) facilitate reconstruction in the provinces (USAID, 2010). These functions are known as operational boundaries and were adopted to increase stability in the region and initiate host-nation empowerment. They are considered the fundamental components in which reconstruction teams still operate around the world today.

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[3] According to a 2005 Report to Congress entitled *The Coalition Provisional Authority* (CPA): *Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities*, in JAN2003 National Security Presidential Directives #24 developed a temporary reconstruction team, known as the Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance, controlled by DOD leadership. By MAY 2003, the OHRA would become the CPA; however, by JUN2004 all CPA operations stopped, making way for Commander Emergency Response Funds and PRTs to function as the main mechanisms for rebuilding. Thus, the PRT has carried many names, but remains true to the function of reconstituting post-conflict societies.

While the security objectives of reconstruction missions have been consistent, there have been major transitions in deciding the best civil-military balance of these teams. Challenges in political leadership arises in deciding who is the more capable resource for rebuilding – civilians or the military. What resulted was the National Security Presidential Directive #36 of 11MAY2004, which transitioned Iraqi reconstruction team efforts from DOD control to Department of State (DOS) control. With this policy, all US Army reconstruction teams become influenced by civilian experiences, resources, and knowledge. The method of using civilians is most likely a result of the vast assets the USG employs to accomplish its goals. Civilians provide expertise and perspectives unique of non-combatant oriented professionals. Since the PRT is currently the most common vehicle to large-scale reconstruction in post-conflict situations, understanding its composition and leadership hierarchy provides a background in the operational environment and the utilization of the civil-military approach for other reconstruction teams. A thorough look at the PRT gives a glimpse of what the organizational environment looks like and prepares an overview of reconstruction team management.

Formation of a PRT

As previously mentioned, the DOD to DOS switch in leadership has trickled mainly into the functions of PRTs; however, there is a much more significant impact of this change than just organizational development. Mission objectives of PRTs are now created through civilian subject matter experts in humanitarian aid, reconstruction and international development, community development, host-nation empowerment, and supplemented with military professionals. This change in leadership offers a perspective which is not militaristically based, but rather steers decision-making based political policy and US national objectives. This change has produced how elements of PRTs operate within a society and have evolved their actions to

be more inclusive of host-nation representation. In fact, given this new organizational model,

USAID has listed three major operational components of PRTs, as follows (USAID, 2010):

1. A PRT typically consists of 60-250 military personnel, a
    USAID field officer and a DOS political officer.   Many also
    have a USDA advisor.

2. PRTs do not engage in combat operations; however, they
    retain robust force-protection capabilities that are used to
    facilitate the work of civilian representatives.

3. PRT projects include: community and government
    buildings, clinics, schools, capacity building for
    government, radio stations, gender activities, agriculture,
    water/irrigation projects, energy (micro-power), and roads
    projects.

These components offer an official summary of the composition of a PRT and some of

their main efforts. The first component illustrates the formation of the key players, while the

second emphasizes operational boundaries, and the third specifies PRT construction projects.

Combined, these efforts are designed to help shape and empower host-nation communities for

long term, stable, effects.

The composition of a PRT is not only formed through various civilian and military

personnel, it consists of inter-agency personnel, and contractors. FM 3-07 breaks the force

structure of a typical PRT into distinguishable organizational responsibilities, as demonstrated in

Table 1-1.

Table 1-1: PRT Organizational Structure.

PRT Occupational Title	USG Organization
PRT Team Leader	DOS
Deputy Team Leader	DOD - Senior Military Officer
Multinational Force Liaison Officer	DOD - Senior Military Officer
Rule of Law Coordinator	Dept. of Justice
Provincial Action Officer	DOS
Public Diplomacy Officer	DOS
Agriculture Advisor	USDA
Engineer	DOD - Army Corps of Engineers
Development Officer	USAID
Governance Team	USAID Contractors
Civil Affairs Team	DOD - US Army Civil Affairs
Bilingual Biculture Advisor	DOD - Contractors

Source: FM 3-07.

The occupation titles and their descriptions have been briefed in *Appendix B - PRT Occupational Functions* per guidance from FM 3-07 and the PRT Playbook SEP 07. The PRT Team Leader has inclusive authority, followed by the Deputy Team Leader; all other positions are equivalent in authority. This organization creates a 'whole of government' approach which is routinely emphasized in FM 3-07. The whole of government is fostered through FM 3-07 as the current method to reconstructing post-conflict societies. It emphasizes multi-disciplinary, inter-agency, and civil-military joint operations and represents current allocated leadership per Presidential guidance.

Operational Setting

US Army reconstruction teams do not function as conventional combat forces, but are still considered force multipliers which promote stability through the guidance from FM 3-07. These teams compliment defensive/offensive operations by utilizing the resources needed to improve the capacity of the host-nation to provide internal security through the reconstruction of infrastructure which may be needed for force protection[4] (Baker, 2007). It can be shown that infrastructure projects improve community empowerment by validating host-nation government which can create methods for local assets to be exercised.

A recent example of this process is illustrated through a community in a mountainous region of Afghanistan, which was coexisting with an insurgency (Taliban) stronghold. In 2010, the only route which leads to this community was blocked by a severe snow drifts. Community leaders were prohibited from exercising local authority because they were cut off from the support needed from the provincial government. Reconstruction teams, specifically the PRT, assessed the situation and began to employ local workers to re-establish the transportation network which led to the community. This project cleared the blocked route and allowed coalition and Afghan forces to reconnect with the community and reinstate the governing body. The efforts of the PRT resulted in the locals' claiming that they will "…no longer tolerate a Taliban presence in the valley and would fight to protect future reconstruction and development efforts" (USAID, 2010c).

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[4] DOD Joint Publication 1-02 defines force protection as "Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease."

This simple endeavor illustrates how a reconstruction team functions progressively and in favor of the host-nation population. These types of actions are aligned with the reconstruction team mandate "…to pave the way for a gradual transition from an environment where international military forces are necessary to an environment in which Afghan national and sub-national government institutions are soundly established and fully functioning, with PRTs in turn progressively becoming unnecessary" (Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee, 2008). The mandate does not proclaim the use of reconstruction team efforts to overpower enemy forces with the use of combative firepower; but to reconstitute local governance through community empowerment. Even though these reconstruction teams are comprised of military assets which are needed to protect themselves and host-nation counterparts during attacks, part of their main efforts are to prevent hostilities that challenge the future of stability operations in the host-nation (US Army, 2007). The PRT mandate, mentioned above, is an example of policy which guides the fortitude of reconstruction teams. It emphasizes the use of methods to "pave the way" to host-nation interdependency while setting the groundwork for reconstruction operations.

Examples of a Reconstruction Team's Assignments

As a result of the immeasurable reconstruction team impact, Table 1-2 was created to illustrate one PRT operation. Located in Zabul, Afghanistan, the operations of this team are current as of JUN2010. It is chosen for this study because of the dynamic nature of the social and physical projects with which it is involved. The team, known as the Zabul PRT, embraces reconstruction principles and mandates by implementing projects which represent interests of human-rights, community development, and local government empowerment. This team attempts to revitalize Zabul Province by combining planning, security, and social techniques

with principles that tie in the best interest of the area. Health, safety, and welfare considerations can be found in these projects, and more importantly, they appear to be well balanced among the population.

Table 1-2: Zabul Afghanistan Current PRT Projects.

Province, Country	PRT Project
Zabul, Afghanistan (current as of 16JUN2010)	Creating a Women's Park for local women to commune and mentor children
	Bridge Reconstruction
	Trash Services
	Hospital Improvements
	Perimeter Wall Repairs
	School Construction
	Emergency Road Repairs
	Irrigation Wells
	Nursery Security Upgrades

Source: Tech. Sgt. Oshawn Jefferson, U.S AFCENT Combat Camera Team (2010).

The Zabul projects are clear mechanisms into reconstituting a local host-nation government. The progress and outcome of the projects can yet be determined; however, it appears that principles of assessment are in line with the PRT leadership's decision-making and planning process. Future studies into the methods of assessment, selectivity, and results would be needed for conclusive results. The example provided is only offered to give the reader context into how reconstruction teams operate in post-conflict societies and what sorts of projects are occurring.

Primary Research Question

Does policy oriented US Army post-conflict reconstruction efforts sustain the well-being and security of the host-nation population?

Secondary Research Questions

1. Does the US Army need a model for reconstruction efforts in foreign nations?

2. How does FM 3-07 compare to the rational comprehensive planning process?

    a. What aspects of FM 3-07 and the comprehensive planning process can be adapted to construct a post-conflict reconstruction planning model?

3. What are the key reconstruction challenges for local host-nation communities emerging from a conflict?

4. What would a post-conflict reconstruction planning model look like to supplement current US Army doctrine FM 3-07?

Significance of this Study

The significance of this study has evolved from a desire to positively impact the lives of those who struggle during difficult times, to developing a framework the US Army uses to ensure appropriate methods are employed for positive impacts in post-conflict societies. In as much, the significance can be categorized into altruistic reasoning and rational reasoning; but in both, this study examines the requirement for reconstruction teams to act decisively for the well-being of a suffering population.

Altruistic Reasoning

First and foremost, the significance of this study is founded in humanistic values[5]. The altruistic nature of this assertion suggests that furthering advancements in US Army post-conflict reconstruction efforts will primarily benefit the host-nation populace, with residual effects of

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5 Psychologist Abraham Maslow has defined the five Humanistic Values. As relevant to this study, two of the values are described below:

- A belief in the worth of persons and dedication to the development of human potential.
- A recognition of the profound problems affecting our world and a responsibility to hope and constructive change

benefiting the global community in security measures.   It declares that all life deserves respect and has the inherent right to live without the constraints of oppression. To further the point of altruism, investigating ways to improve the impact of reconstruction in post-conflict environments will save lives. It provides the means to rebuild the infrastructure necessary to protect occupants of the host-nations health, safety, and welfare. It is in hopes that proper planning models will account for protecting ethnic minorities, women and children, the elderly, and the disabled. A final altruistic explanation involves the military's ethical obligation to understanding the importance of compassion and the pursuit of excellence. **Table 1-3** is a synopsis of the DODs Joint Ethical Regulations and describes these characteristics. They can be seen as the motivational source to a leader's duty. While each leader is bounded by his or her leadership and mission objectives, these codes provide the foundational characteristics for concern about the welfare of the foreign nations and their inhabitants. These codes also signify why accomplishment is measured by positive impacts, rather than monetary investments and expenditures. This altruistic significance, therefore, is based upon the US Army's leadership ability to enhance and protect the livelihoods of those who are limited in means to fend for themselves during times of conflict.

Table 1-3: Joint Ethical Regulations Synopsis.

Department of Defense Joint Ethical Regulations	
Code	Definition
Ch12, Sec5, f - Caring	Compassion is an essential element of good government. Courtesy and kindness, both to those we serve and to those we work with, help to ensure that individuals are not treated solely as a means to an end. Caring for others is the counterbalance against the temptation to pursue the mission at any cost.
Ch12, Sec5, j - Pursuit of Excellence	In public service, competence is only the starting point. DOD employees are expected to set an example of superior diligence and commitment. They are expected to be all they can be and to strive beyond mediocrity.

Source: DOD Joint Ethical Regulations (2010).

Rational Reasoning

While altruism plays a significant impact into this study, there are other meaningful reasons to why a planning model for post-conflict reconstruction efforts is valuable to the US Army. Chiefly, this is because there are no standardizations that guide how reconstruction teams operate (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008). To reinforce this claim, Abbaszadeh et al. states, "While pragmatically accepting the necessary variance in PRT operations across nations, greater standardization is needed to provide international partners with common goals and objectives, as well as examples of best practices" (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008). Abbaszadeh et al. acknowledges the support needed to create doctrine with consistency. Part of the solution to this claim is to support a planning model which guides the actions of reconstruction teams and can be revisited

through rotating leadership. In this argument, a planning model for reconstruction efforts would become a foundational source in which the US Army and reconstruction team community can create guidelines. It would be a model based on the ethical charge to support host-nation interests, and exercise measurable progress.

In conjunction with standardization issues of reconstruction teams, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) George P. McDonnell points out that the US Army's current FM 3-07 Stability Operations doctrine, of which the PRT is outlined in Appendix F, is insufficient to build a common source of operating guidelines (McDonnell, 2009). Specifically LTC McDonnell quotes:

> "Unfortunately, as a doctrine to establish 'a common frame of reference including intellectual tools that Army leaders use to solve military problems,'[6] the appendix falls short. In promoting a 'mutual understanding and in enhanc[ing] effectiveness,'[7] the appendix is weakened by omissions and ambiguity. Shortcomings appear in <u>both</u> principal sections of the appendix."

This statement emphasizes further evidence of the need for standardization, but also provides constructive criticism of current doctrine. While standardization is a relevant issue, the need to examine and improve current US Army doctrine should become a priority in order to improve operational effectiveness and the commander's intent.

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[6] Quoted from: U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 2008), D-1.

[7] Quoted from: U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 2008), D-1.

While the significance of this study embraces the need for standardization, the most empowering effect is to begin rectifying a well-known issue through-out our government. In 2008, the US House of Representative – Committee on Armed Services (HASC) investigated reconstruction team services. In this report are listed several justifications to examining reconstruction efforts, specifically the PRT. Among the items for reconstruction teams to address are (US House of Representatives, 2008):

- PRT planning and operations started in an *ad hoc* manner and remain decentralized.

- There have not been articulated clear reconstruction objectives.

- There are no measures to effectively evaluate [reconstruction teams] performance.

- CENTCOM has not actively provided PRT guidance.

- Major issues acquired by HASC include:
    - Mission objectives
    - Leadership
    - Funding
    - Staffing
    - Measuring effectiveness
    - Leveraging partnerships

- There is no clear definition of the PRT mission, concept of operations or doctrine, and no standard operating procedures.

- There is no comprehensive strategy or common framework.

The importance of the report signifies a need to centralize the USG reconstruction objectives. This can be done by unifying standard doctrine and creating frameworks for actions on objectives. Objectionably, CENTCOM, which falls under DOD authority, is perceived as not promoting the needed guidance from which PRTs operate. Therefore, exploring a decision-

making model for reconstruction efforts to supplement US Army doctrine is deemed as

necessary by Congress.

Assumption

The assumption of this study suggests that future USG reconstruction efforts will require

the support of US Army assets.

Acronyms

Table 1-4: Acronyms.

ANA	Afghan National Army
CENTCOM	Central Command
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response Program
CPA	Coalition Provincial Authority
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
ETT	Embedded Training Team
FM	Army Field Manual
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
HASC	US House of Representative Armed Service Committee
IHRC	Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
IMS	Interagency Management System
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LST	Logistic Support Team
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NOW	National Organization for Women Foundation
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OEF	OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
OHRA	Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance
OIF	OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SWOT	Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threats
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USDA	Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
WWII	World War II

Limitations

The chief limitation of this study relies on conclusions which are dependent upon theories and doctrine of social organization, the urban planning model, and principals of reconstruction and foreign assistance. This limits the ability to rely on logical and practiced theories which are inherent to post-conflict international reconstruction efforts. Also, because of the extreme complexity, array, and lack of reconstruction guidelines, developing an international planning model for reconstruction efforts can only be speculative. There has been very modest documentation into planning models of this nature, as the primary focus seems to be on international reconstruction criticism.

CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review

"Plans are nothing; planning is everything."
        -General Dwight D. Eisenhower

While today's soldiers are much more sophisticated then what the highly popularized term "grunt" allures, there will always be situations in which soldiers endure intellectual challenges more so than physical challenges . US Army soldiers are better trained, better equipped, and more capable of handling the collection of dynamic and challenging environments in which they operate then they have ever been. This preparedness is a direct result of the doctrine used to train and guide decisions during operations. While an ill-prepared soldier will create ill effects, the professional soldier will accumulate the skills necessary in order to reproduce the desired results of his or her leadership. With that being said the soldier who doesn't apply himself physically and academically, will be the one who compromises the safety of his team and those who are associated with him. In this, the need to understand current post-conflict reconstruction doctrine and methods reflects the matter of achieving progressive reconstruction objectives and having a positive impact on the welfare of the host-nation.

The primary doctrine for reconstruction efforts of US Army leadership is FM 3-07 Stability Operations. It provides the "operational guidance for commanders and trainers" and is the "Army's approach to the conduct of full spectrum operations in any environment across the spectrum of conflict" (iv). In summary, FM 3-07 is the Army's "bible" to conduct reconstruction training exercises and missions, in describing operational environments during the efforts of rebuilding a post-conflict "at-risk" community in a foreign nation, and is the source of

which other US army reconstruction doctrine evolves. FM 3-07 was released to the US Army in

2008 and represents a collection of methods to transition a nation of conflict to one of peace;

specifically, it embodies basic procedures to rebuilding physical and social infrastructure. Being

that this doctrine is a recent release, there are no studies of how guidelines from FM 3-07 have

been applied to post-conflict areas, or comprehensive studies to its effect; however, it is the point

of this literature review to provide a summary of noteworthy actions of historical and recent

efforts to illustrate four objectives: 1) the dynamic environment and challenges in the atmosphere

of which reconstruction teams operate; 2) the impact of transforming reconstruction policy and

descriptions of FM 3-07 methodologies; 3) issues of culture, and social and physical

infrastructure and their impact on development; and 4) the assessment of basic human rights[8] and

the conditions required to improve them.

     This literature review exemplifies the reconstruction team process, its historical and

current context, and acts as a reference for the process of conducting reconstruction efforts. It

surveys government, academic, public, and military documentation in order to set-up conditions

for a potential reconstruction planning model on which US Army doctrine can be based upon. It

begins by analyzing post WWI reconstruction and the influence of USG policy as the decision

making factor for these efforts. It further investigates the impact of USG policy of Somalia

reconstruction intentions of the 1990s, and follows by illustrating current USACE reconstruction

efforts in Haiti. Finally, an in-depth review of the impact of reconstruction policy on

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[8] The United Nations has created the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which can be found in Appendix C - United Nations Declaration of Human Rights). This declaration is added to give context to the most basic and fundamental description of what all people deserve has human beings, as agreed upon by the UN.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) will be explained to give the reader an impression of current reconstruction methodologies.

The assessment of these historical and present efforts will correlate policy guided post-conflict reconstruction with the local US comprehensive planning model, in Chapters 4 and 5. The literature review sets an environment to illustrate that policy oriented reconstruction planning and implementation is not always conducted in the best interests of the host-nation, and a rational planning process, such as the ones used in local US comprehensive planning departments, is a possible solution to reorganizing US Army planning efforts and tying them with professional urban planning ethics which are focused on societies health, safety, and welfare. Where FM 3-07 emphasizes stability and security operations in no set method, this literature review seeks to provide evidence that a method and ethical influence are needed as the prime vehicles to secure some post-conflict region.

Reconstruction Operations in the Past and Present

Post World War II Reconstruction Efforts

Those who are familiar with reconstruction efforts of the USG know that post World War II[9] (WWII) Germany and Japan remain the emblems of successful reconstruction up to this day. While these were not overnight successes, in time they accomplished reconstruction missions and objectives by eventually reintegrating each nation into the global circuit through means of interdependency. Current literature attempts to compare successful measures in Germany and

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[9] Post WWII begins in 7 MAY 1945 in Germany and 14 AUG 1945 in Japan.

Japan with current reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan[10]; however, WWII's Germany and Japan, as opposed to Afghanistan's OEF and Iraq's OIF, are considerably different situations – culturally, politically, environmentally, historically, and in the way of combative and peacekeeping operations. Regardless, there are certain experiences of planning processes in Germany and Japan which may be carried over to functions of today's US Army reconstruction efforts; but these have to be correlated and implemented in FM 3-07 doctrine.

In today's reconstruction efforts, policies are created to guide leadership decisions. It is questionable as to if these policies are capable of compensating a legitimized planning process which develops the host-nation with the populations best interest in mind. As we will see, Germany and Japan reconstruction policies are reviewed to compare the value of following a model to forming decisions rather than following prescribed and sometime unaffiliated USG policy.

In *The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq*, Ray Jennings, a Senior Consultant to the US Institute of Peace, reports that post WWII efforts were allotted sufficient assets to begin reconstruction in the two countries (Jennings, 2003). Overthrown political leadership eventually became the most indispensable asset in securing and stabilizing each of these countries. Ultimately, however, it was US military commanders who laid the groundwork and responsibility for devising a workable model in which to rebuild the post-conflict areas. In Germany, General Lucius Clay, an Engineer Officer,

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[10] Examples of literature that correlates Germany/Japan reconstruction efforts to Afghanistan/Iraq PRT missions are: 1) Neeson, Kieran. (2008). *Lessons in nation-building: the American reconstruction of Germany and Japan*. 2) Jennings, Ray S. (2003). *The Road ahead: lessons in nation building from Japan, Germany, Afghanistan for post war Iraq*. 3) Dobbins, James. (2003). *America's role in nation building: from Germany to Iraq*.

would be installed by President Roosevelt as the US Viceroy to postwar reconstruction; whereas, General MacArthur would command Japanese reconstruction efforts headquartered from Tokyo. Jennings paints an apparent dichotomy between the Germany and Japan situations based upon reconstruction efforts which entailed building social capital (in most ways synonymous with USAID's Partnership principle) to facilitate cooperation and coordination between occupying forces and the host-nations (Coyne, 2005). Jennings shows that social capital becomes a reconstruction principle that is put into effect in different ways depending on the operational environment. In Germany, social capital was considered an afterthought, while in Japan it was the foundation to reinforcing new reconstruction objectives.

Early Germany reconstruction efforts would see General Clay appoint three German nationals as Regional Administrators. These men did not have ties to the Nazi party, nor any criminal record (Coyne, 2005). In the events that would unfold, they became a significant part of General Clay's administration team by operating as advisors to drafting and implementing new policy to reinstitute required leadership and infrastructure decisions. It is supposed that Clay's intention were that these advisors could carry the aptitude to represent the German people's interest and advise their US superiors on German expectations and daily activities which could influence reconstruction efforts.

Unfortunately, the policy to rebuild Germany went through many changes, and the initial guiding policy, Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) 1067[11], created an unstable foundation for partnering with Germans and forming long-term impacts. The three Germans identified as the liaisons to German interest would have to wait before their opinions could carry any sort of weight. In

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[11] As of 3JUL2010, JCS 1067 can only be accessed through the US Embassy of Germany website at: http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-450426.pdf.

1945, this military guidance provided the policy decision-making framework in which German post-conflict reconstruction (known as 'post-defeat' in this policy) occurred. JCS 1067 limited German influence in reconstruction planning and "…strongly discourage[d] fraternization with German officials and population". Bounded by this document, General Clay could only provide for Germans the "…minimum extent required…" for emergency repairs and shelter. Without collaborating with the German population he would have limited access to know where those needs are or how to employ his assets to meet them. In all certainty, JCS 1067 appeared to be a framework for oppression techniques, rather than policy for progressive and long-term reconstruction. Part of JCS 1067s objective was to reinforce the USGs position to Germans that "…Germany's ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves." This policy does not formulate comprehensive methods toward assessment, ownership, flexibility, or social capital that favored the German population, nor approaches which would lead to progressive reconstruction planning. Rather, it guided lackadaisical planning efforts by emphasizing a command presence of the occupiers. In as much, JCS 1067 did not lay out a progressive framework for reconstruction as much as it did obtrusive "do's and don'ts" of military leadership and activity.

Another social capital factor that limited reconstruction progress in Germany centered on depriving Germans of a governing body which had their health, safety, and welfare interests represented. Without professional ethical ties to reconstruction impacts, the US Army could not comprehensively rebuild post-conflict Germany with the best interest of the population. The three Germans allowed to be part of General Clay's team carried no authority under JCS 1067, and by this policy were limited in contact with their US counterparts. Instead, German

representation would be enforced through *The Potsdam Agreement.* This agreement, created

2AUG1945*,* was formed in Potsdam, Germany between the United States, the United Kingdom,

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the ultimate guiding policy which laid out

operational guidelines to redevelop Germany after is surrender. Its main objective was to

fragment German reconstruction into four sections, each section being governed by a different

ally force (see *Map 2-1: Division of Germany Governance 1945*). This confounded German

interests in reconstruction by endorsing representation that is removed from societal interests and

emplacing it with motives of international governments. It wreaked havoc on reconstituting a

unified Germany because independent leadership self-regulated reconstruction objectives and the

methods required to reach them. Therefore, while *The Potsdam Agreement* attempted to unify

efforts, it unconstructively introduced various cultural backgrounds and segmented independent

into reconstruction planning methods which could not be standardized. In other words, JCS

1067 did not account for neighboring functions; instead it prioritized the occupying leadership

efforts and created an imbalance of empowerment among German leadership.

Map 2-2: Division of Germany Governance 1945.

Source: Progress Monitoring Online (2010).

In fact, much of the constraining and distorted reconstruction directives that General Clay received would be reciprocated across ally objectives in *The Potsdam Agreement*.   In the document it states: "…supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole."

The details to this international reconstruction planning policy inhibited community approach and community discretion as part of its method. It embraced a planning process through policy that primarily goes against all current reconstruction and development principles laid out from the USAID. Furthermore, it provided no direction in coordinating a unity of effort with corresponding international and indigenous leadership. This policy based planning model did not seek to empower Germans, but establish international governance authority in segmented regions. It did not prove a model to embrace stability and security, but rather a division of control.

JCS 1067 and *The Potsdam Agreement* did not offer constructive measures to insuring the welfare of Germans. Both documents took for granted the contribution of Germans to deciding how they wanted to redefine their country under direction of USG leadership. Instead of building a planning model that embraced local participation, the international community, and commitment, these policies focused on isolated and abstract leadership who were removed from neighboring efforts and from German influence. While the policies attempted to unify Germany, they only did so by encouraging a bi-lateral division of democratic and socialist forms of government[12], and left little control of the country's immediate future in the hands of its own patriots. As a direct result of lacking local German discretion, JCS 1067 and *The Potsdam Agreement* provided little legitimacy to US efforts. If Germans were not allowed their discretion, the selection of reconstruction projects could not be prioritized to fit their need. This

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[12] *The Potsdam Agreement* would frame Germany's future. Because the Soviets occupied the eastern portion of Germany it is believed that this reconstruction agreement lead to the formation of the Iron Curtain and the division of Germany by communist means. *The Potsdam Agreement* can be found at Yale Law School Library: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp

brings to question, *'would a bonafide reconstruction planning model provide superior US guidance to reconstruction efforts, as opposed to policy making?' If such a model existed, could it be catered to enforce health, safety, and welfare standards upon the host-nation? And, could such a model fin into decision making processes from the international community?*

It took two years and a change in leadership from General Clay to General George C. Marshal before JCS 1067 would be amended to JCS 1779. This change in policy included centralizing international efforts, while primarily focusing on the German population's health, mainly through the provision of food rations and dismantling the two-class system of the underprivileged and privileged (Jennings, 2003). In 1947, General Marshall renounced the methods of JCS 1067 under support of President Truman and replaced it with JCS 1779 (Jennings, 2003). However, JCS 1779 wasn't the solution to planning Germany's reconstruction efforts; it was more of a method to prohibit continuing the detrimental effects of JCS 1067. It would be the infamous Marshall Plan which provided more liberated polices that achieved a new focus on constructive measures for the German people. While this plan was largely oriented towards the viability of improving the European economic situation, it was largely embraced by the international community because it refocused USG policy to efforts which were "… directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."[13] The fundamentals of General Marshall's plan, *a posteriori*, embraced current principles of international reconstruction by endorsing reconstruction planning policies that openly included partnerships with European nations (Germany included), the strengthening of local institutions

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[13] As of 6JUL2010, the transcript of the Marshall Plan, as given to the graduating Harvard class of 1947, can be found at: http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=82&page=transcript.

and education facilities, long-term development impacts, and would be measured by unified results.

While Germany post WWII reconstruction policies slowly evolved through the transitions of fragmented leadership combined with a unique subdivision into four independent German provinces, Japan reconstruction took an abruptly different route. This route followed a more concise and planned "top down" approach. Specifically, the reconstruction efforts of Japan embraced host-nation leadership, but primarily as tools for social re-organization to support reconstruction efforts. All new policy, and even the new Japanese Constitution of 1947, would be "handed" to the Japanese government for endorsement by MacArthur's aides (Jennings, 2003). By using Japan's own leadership, social capital would enhance Japanese-US ties and act as a mechanism which reinforced new and alienated USG policies, of which the Japanese would be forced to embrace. By this method, Japan's defeated leadership became molded into symbols of new direction, control, organization, collaboration, and commitments to invest in the best interests of the Japanese people (all actions that are characteristic of appropriate planning models). USG policy did not become the mitigating control of reconstruction efforts, but rather part of the planning model that looked for long-term development impacts. It looked to incorporate Japanese leadership to establish community identity.

In fact, General MacArthur received counsel from General Elliot Thorpe, MacArthur's lead intelligence expert, to utilize Japan's highest governing body, Emperor Hirohito as a mechanism to achieve US objectives. General Thorpe is recorded as explaining "[If Emperor Hirohito were convicted of war crimes] we would have had nothing but chaos. The religion was gone, the government was gone, and he was the only symbol of control. Now, I know he had his hand in the cookie jar, and he wasn't any innocent little child. But he was of great use to us, and

that was the basis on which I recommended to the Old Man [General MacArthur] that we keep him" (Dower, 2000). This single important factor played a significant role in helping post-conflict Japanese cities to rise from utter destruction with "astounding speed" (Hein, 2003). It did so by giving a familiar face to Japanese reconstruction efforts and proving that the people were the priority in redevelopment.

However, this was a very controversial approach as considered by the American general public. Thirty-three percent of the American public wanted Emperor Hirohito hanged, 37% wanted the emperor brought to justice on war crimes[14], and only 7% saw fit for the emperor to be used as a "puppet under UN supervision" (Grew, 1989). Regardless, General MacArthur, and ultimately President Truman, embraced Thorpe's recommendation. General Thorpe's statement, would in turn, yield a framework to international reconstruction that embraced current USAID's Principles of Reconstruction and Development. Particularly, it created a secure and functioning Japan by strengthening institutions through the perspective of legitimized leadership. It accommodated partnership, capacity-building, and ownership. It utilized policy to complement reconstruction methods. The emperor legitimized US reconstruction efforts through promoting cooperation and goodwill and showed little opposition to new reforms (Jennings, 2003). Jennings expresses that the functions of Japanese government, by themselves, were powerless. They only played the roles of which General MacArthur used or consulted them for (Jennings, 2003). In any case, it was the realization that the host-nation must be involved with its redevelopment. It was the adherence to flexible reconstruction policies, which include discretion of the host-nation people, which makes Japan appear to be more successful than Germany.

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[14] The most heinous war-crime charge was that against the attacks on Pearl Harbor on 7DEC1941.

By understanding the most prevalent post WWII reconstruction policies, we should be able to form ideas about what methods worked well and which prohibited progress. What comes to question is if there could have been an post-conflict reconstruction planning model which would be useful in both situations *and* what experiences can be taken from each country to create a model that would benefit other nations in similar conditions. Certainly, any reconstruction efforts in a host-nation would require indigenous representation, but *'what does that representation look like and where does it fall in the decision-making and planning process?' How will organization within the US Army weigh the impacts of policy oriented planning and construction with method and ethical models of reconstruction?*

Somalia Reconstruction Efforts

One may believe that transitioning from 1952 to 1993 would entail tremendous progress in stability operations and reconstruction efforts of the USG and the US Army. Unfortunately, this may not be the case. While some lessons learned might have evolved from earlier reconstruction efforts, by 1993 humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Somalia would show that the US Army still could not learn from policy impacts it accrued during Germany and Japan reconstruction. This gap in military education, experience, and lack of effort to apply previous lessons learned has been the source of difficult decision-making concerning the methods to accomplish mission objectives, and enforce the security of incapacitated regions. As a result, since the mid 1990's, Somalia has been considered by the US and United Nations (UN) as a complete failure to rebuilding a functioning state and providing humanitarian assistance (White, 2009).

Ever since gaining its independence from Britain and Italy in 1960, Somalia has been the chasm for US and UN humanitarian relief. The main efforts of this relief were to securely distribute food rations to the much deprived Somalis. But these efforts were lucratively prohibited by violent civil-warlords who decimated the civilian population and tore apart validated government authority. The effort of the humanitarian assistance, however, was to sustain the host-nations welfare by providing the basic necessity of life - nourishment. This was to be the first step into rebuilding the country. Distributing food required a combination of USG and UN assets and unified efforts and an approachable plan. Providing food would also be the first step in building social capital to enable reconstruction teams to provide much needed assistance and resources elsewhere in the country. By improving social capital, the US and UN sought to gain the trust of the Somalia nation and assess the rebuilding efforts needed for social and infrastructure improvements. But, since the scrutiny of providing food rations was taken too lightly, the reconstruction assignments of Somalia never had a chance to be implemented. Instead, the US and UN found themselves unprepared to deal with the consequences of underestimating the environment and impeding effects of Somali warlords.

Between 1991 and 1992, over 300,000 Somalis would die of starvation as a result of civil war, an incapacitated functioning government, and lack of international effort to effectively organize and provide security (Jones et al., 2006). The results of these situations lead to heavy criticism of US and UN efforts and the devise of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (1992-1994). This operation was considered by the DOD an operation other than war (OOTW) and a "simple" US military task to support the UN in delivering food to Somali people (Baumann, Yates, & Washington, 2003). Historically, the DOD has considered OOTW as peaceful and humanitarian missions; however, what turned out in this occurrence was an unexpected path of combat

between US Army forces and Somalia warlords which left 27 US Army soldiers dead, 1 US

Army prisoner of war, and numerous Somalia casualties[15].

While reconstruction efforts were in the interest of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

objectives, they were not the specified task[16]; rather, they were implied, and as so distracted from

the main effort objectives (Burlingham, 1994). This brings into question how reconstruction

teams operate under implied task while maintaining a unity of effort that matches specified tasks.

Seemingly, if implied reconstruction tasks negatively impact the specified tasks, or the primary

mission objective, then the policy or planning method has not been well thought out and may

prove counterproductive. In turn, any negative consequence of the reconstruction effort will be

an unexpected blow to leadership and accomplishing its goals; thus further making it difficult to

achieve specified tasks.

Just as with early reconstruction efforts in post WWII Germany and the lack of specified

reconstruction planning objectives, Somalia proved to be driven by inconspicuous policy. This

lack of policy and preparation plagued the Somalia missions in the following ways (Jones et al.,

2006):

> • Policymakers and aid workers did not fully appreciate the
> magnitude of the humanitarian crisis upfront.
>
> • From the beginning, there was no central government to
> serve as the focal point for nation-building efforts.

[15]Casualties of American Wars and Military Operations are historically documented by the US Navy.
Further study can be viewed at: http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/american%20war%20casualty.htm.

[16] The DOD doctrine *Universal Joint Task Lists* explains that military operations fall under three tasks:
1) Specified: a task explicitly stated 2) Implied: a task not stated but necessary to accomplish the mission
3) Essential: tasks based on mission analysis and approved by the commander as absolutely necessary to accomplish
the mission.

• The Somali warlords did not support the relief efforts or subsequent development efforts.

• UN Operations in Somalia I[17] was inadequately resourced to meet its broad mandate.

• The absence of security was a major problem and, along with resource constraints, limited the ability of international relief agencies to provide humanitarian aid and to reach many parts of the country.

• UN Operations in Somalia II mandate kept evolving and was open to a number of different interpretations by key participants.

The focus on fluent policy, standardization, unified international efforts and preparation, and well thought out reconstruction planning processes would, intermittently, shift after President Clinton and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali met after President Clinton's inauguration in 1993. These world leaders created an extensive mandate for Somali nation building efforts between January and February 1993 (Canestrini, 2004). However, this new mandate did not last long. As the US sent home most of its military forces after a battle in Mogadishu which left 18 US soldiers dead and one Prisoner of War, what was left behind was a large presence of UN forces (25,000), a small US combatant force (1,300 soldiers), and US logistics and intelligence personnel (totaling 3,000) (Canestrini, 2004). Without major US military occupation to provide security, the UN found itself in significant clashes with Somali

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[17] UN Operations Somalia I (APR1992 - MAR1993) and Somalia II (MAR1993 - MAR1995) are differentiated by their objectives. Somalia I empowered the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to monitor cease-fires in Mogadishu, provide security for UN resources, and insure safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. Somalia II transitioned UNITAF authority to UN Operations Somalia II, better known as UNOSOM II, to assist the Somali people in developing a functioning government. An depth overview can be reviewed at: http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm.

warlords and unable to provide security, implement reconstruction efforts, or distribute aid. The clashes challenged the legitimacy and the opportunity to build social capital for the Somali population. Given the situation and the toll of loss of American lives, the Clinton administration decided the US was not willing to accept greater risks by supplementing more resources. Instead, the US would completely withdrawal by 31MAR1994. What was left behind was a Somalia state that "…degenerated into a basic state of civil war without any appreciable degree of security" (Fishel, 1997). The nation building policy implemented in 1993, collapsed with astounding consequences for the Somali people.

The reconstruction efforts in the Somalia show the calamity for relying on reactive decision-making processes and imprudent policy implementations. Any attempts to reconstruct a fragmented society must incorporate an understanding of the cultural and physical environment alongside infrastructure assessments. Somalia proves this point by implicating that reconstruction efforts were fruitless because of the lack of understanding the USG and UN had of tribal warlord power. At the time of this study, The CIA World Factbook reports that Somalia is still involved in civil conflict. There is no permanent national government, and it is rated as having the thirteenth highest death-rate of the world. *If US Army and international planning efforts centralized objectives and resources, developed and abided by a planning model rather than unassuming policy, would there be a different environment in which Somalis live today? One which is more progressive and interdependent? One which could be a testimony to the influence of planning and international reconstruction efforts? Is USG policy to blame for this travesty?*

Haitian Earthquake Response

Up to this point, this study has shown how US Army reconstruction efforts have corresponded with post and concurrent combative conflicts. It has attempted to show that relying on policy for decision-making of reconstruction efforts may not foster effective rebuilding methods, nor does it always maintain the best interest of the host-nation populace. Instead, the dependency to exclusively use policy in reconstruction efforts can cause further detrimental effects to the host-nation, and the region. Reconstituting an incapacitated nation requires time-sensitive actions and a programmable model; and especially so when the social dynamics of the host-nation are interrupted by extenuating conflict.   However, not all US Army reconstruction missions are in response to wartime conflicts. Many missions are solely concerned with humanitarian response and relief. In fact, the DOD requested $89.2 million for FY 2011 to support the international community in OOTW for times of political and humanitarian crises[18]. These efforts focus on the same principles as wartime reconstruction: increase regional stability and reconstitute infrastructure. A response to utilizing resources for OOTW is the recent Haitian earthquake. This example of reconstruction efforts exemplifies current leadership and organizational processes. It attributes the very latest methods of reconstruction of which the US Army is enthroned.

On the evening of 12JAN2010, the US Army was called to assist in a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti which, according to Haitian government, left 230,000 people dead. Efforts to

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[18] This information is taken from the Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid, which can be found at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_V OL_1_PARTS/OHDACA_FY11.pdf

provide food and shelter were distributed by DOD personnel from the US Southern Command[19] the following day. As part of the initial response, the USACE sent engineers to begin urban search and rescue operations and assess infrastructure damages. The scope and international assessment of the damage was profound. The map and images of *Appendix D - Haiti Reconstruction Mapping Efforts* attempts to illustrate the ramification of this earthquake, while providing a glimpse of the magnitude of reconstruction efforts[20]. Obviously, the most devastated area was that of the Port-au-Prince, the highest-density area and capital of Haiti.

Since the earthquake, immediate shock and mass hyper-critical circumstances of the earthquake have dissipated. Six months later, the rebuilding processes "slowly trickle[s] in" (Jordan, 2010). What the international community reconstruction efforts contend with are 105,000 destroyed homes, 208,000 damaged homes, 1,300 schools and 50 hospitals deemed unusable, and almost all of public administration buildings destroyed (Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, 2010a). This is a devastating impact, but even more so considering Haiti is comparable in size to the state of Maryland.

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[19] "The United States Southern Command, located in Miami, Florida, is one of ten unified Combatant Commands in the Department of Defense. It is responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean (except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions), Cuba; as well as for the force protection of U.S. military resources at these locations. SOUTHCOM is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal and canal area." Source: http://www.southcom.mil.

[20] While the consequences of the Haitian earthquake can be approached through many aspects, this study will continue to focus on physical reconstruction efforts. It should be noted that most literature on the topic has focused on humanitarian relief.

Figure 2-1: Living conditions in Port-au-Prince, Haïti.

A planning issue? Tent shelters for displaced Haitians living in the median
of a major street in downtown Port-au-Prince. The NY Times reports only
28,000 of 1.5 million displaced Haitians moved into new homes.
Source: Ruth Fremson/New York Times (2010).

But even by 12JUL2010, the reconstruction efforts look dismal at best. Since
its six month mark, reporters have flocked to Haiti to monitor and report progress of the
earthquakes damage. What has been found is a shocking reminder that Haitians still cannot
acquire proper medical treatment, are starving to death, and living in unsanitary condition. As of
13JUL, the UN reported that 135,000 temporary shelters made of metal and wood are needed for
the homeless and of those only 5,660 have been built (Porter, 2010). Furthermore, as of 13JUL,
Catherine Porter, a Canadian reporter for The Star, reported:

> "Some 1.6 million people are still displaced, most crowded into
> impromptu camps along the sides of the road with no hope of a
> real home. Landowners squabble over the rubble removal, many
> demanding to be compensated. So, the roads remain clogged."

The question for any rational person, who understands the value of life, is '*what's going on?*' For those in-tune with leadership principles or reconstruction efforts, a more deliberate question might be '*who's in charge?*' Or '*what's the leadership basing their decision-making factors from in rebuilding Haiti?*' These types of questions can easily lead to criticism. But, as outlined in Chapter 1, the main objective of this study is getting to the root of reconstruction efforts – a model to provide standardization and direction. With a displacement of 1.6 million people, priorities should be arranged to provide a basic staple of life – i.e. shelter; but without the lack of a reconstruction model this becomes a complicated and inefficient task.

Congruently, Haitian reconstruction efforts appear to be deficient in direction (leadership), unity of international effort, prioritization, and Haiti is still considered in the "emergency stage" (Conan, 2010). While US Army engineers are prioritizing the building of schools, most Haitians live in communities where "protection" is plastic sheets, sanitation is almost non-existence, and there is an epidemic of hygienic diseases (Van Hove, 2010). The priority of Haitian reconstruction efforts have been laid out through the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), led by President Bill Clinton and Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive. This commission attempts to provide a document for unifying the reconstruction efforts of the international community. It provides a vision statement that declares (Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, 2010b):

> We will rebuild Haiti by turning the disaster on 12 January 2010
> into an opportunity to make it an emerging country by 2030.

While a vision statement is a prudent measure for morale, identity, and unifying efforts, this statement leaves a sense of undefined precedence. There is little coordinating direction or

sense of urgency to rebuild. Vision statements, such as this one, leave organizations such as the

US Army ignorant as to where to apply resources. Seemingly, in this circumstance, a vision

statement should complement the reconstruction model and instigate efforts. Still to this day,

there cannot be found a workable model to rebuild Haiti. In fact, the official IHRC

reconstruction plan, known as the *Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti*,

states very little in the reconstruction process, coordination, and international unity of effort

endeavors.

For example, the plan identifies infrastructure reconstruction necessities, but simply

states these are dependent on the urban plan. The IHRC reconstruction plan states (Interim Haiti

Recovery Commission, 2010b):

> The basic infrastructure such as rainwater drainage, wastewater
> treatment, drinking water supply and the electricity network are
> directly dependent on the planned use of land. It is therefore
> from the urban plan that the final design of the work required can
> be carried out.
>
> It is important to plan the necessary funds to carry out this work
> which is preliminary to or concurrent with reconstruction work.

Given this doctrine to guide reconstruction efforts, there does not appear to be tasking,

priority, or essential functions. The plan loses detail and defers critical items, such as shelter and

sanitation, as solely dependent on funding. How would a reconstruction model change this? Is

the IHRC plan operating in the best interest of the Haitian community? Could the plan

unintentionally be causing more harm than help? Would a model provide more focus and

direction?

As of 10JUN2010, a US Army Colonel is tasked with reconstruction and providing medical services, in a mission known as New Horizon-Haiti 2010. In the first week of his duties he blogs (McCluney, 2010):

> "The fact is, we can't wait to start building schools and providing
> medical services to the folks here in Haiti."

The Colonel ensures in other blogs that *partnership* with the locals is the key factor for a successful mission in Haiti. While there is validity in this assessment, if the dependency on decision-making is clouded by that partnership, and the host-nation population suffers, then changes should be assessed. In other words, if 1.5 million people are without homes and living in shantytown's that breed disease, construction of schools may not be a top priority, even if host-nation leadership declares so. This brings forth the question, '*who is the professional in reconstruction matters?*' Is it the host-nation (who is traumatized, suffering, and incapacitated to the point it requires foreign assistance) or is it the occupiers (abundant in resources, trades, skills, education, and leadership)?

Context of OIF/OEF Reconstruction

Impact of Rebuilding

US Army reconstruction teams exercise their resources through numerous command units. As discussed in Chapter 1, the most well-known reconstruction teams are the PRTs. PRTs have considerable funding, play an integral part in unified reconstruction efforts alongside international community organizations during conflicts and disasters, and operate with a significant workforce (generally 60+ personnel). In Chapter 1, the perspective of the PRT was offered to illustrate the composition and environment of how reconstruction teams operate.

Much emphasis was provided of the civilian and military relationship needed to accomplish reconstruction efforts in the best interests of the host-nation, while focusing on OOTW. While other US Army units operate in reconstruction efforts for stability operations as well, they do so in considerably smaller scales. Even so, all US reconstruction teams will influence the progress of incapacitated nations, and therefore have a significant impact on development and security of decimated regions.

Probably the most well-known and spectated post-conflict reconstruction efforts are currently occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan. These nations share a violent history of civil war, international conflicts, civil and political conflict, inter-social clashes, and oppression. While the world anticipates an end of US presences, and speculates outcomes, reconstruction teams continue to operate in dangerous environments for the better. They do so as patriots, as constituents of peace, and as compassionate world neighbors. The historical impact of their efforts may not be realized for years down the road, but their labors are the instruments which outline the layout of a nation's future.

The assessment of OIF and OEF reconstruction planning efforts will help better speculate the impact of development in the Mid-East, while testing the reconstruction team's capabilities. Just as the social (insurgent) leaderships have not withstood the powers of the US and UN, the infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan has suffered from the calamities of war. Therefore, these considerations are of special interests to reconstruction efforts. As infrastructure is rebuilt, it will inevitably alter each countries future; it is, after all, the infrastructure which lays the foundation to a nation's capacity to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.

Afghanistan

The onset of 11SEP2001 has lead US and UN military forces into the core of Afghanistan, readied and willing to disperse an oppressive governmental regime which has deep ties to the culprit Al-Qaeda network, responsible for attacks on the US. In 2002 multi-national forces expunged the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and brought an entourage of support personnel prepared to "put back together" a dismantled political environment *and* repair decades of neglected social and physical infrastructure. The efforts of these reconstruction teams continue today, and their presence has expounded multifold in order to meet the demands of key USG, UN, and Afghan leaders.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the first US reconstruction team came to Gardez, Afghanistan in 2002 (Map 2-2); but before its deployment, came multifaceted directions on conditions of how these teams would operate. In an explosive manner, direction poured in from USG agencies into how and who would play a role in Afghanistan redevelopment. One of the earliest known reconstruction organization meetings was formed on 20NOV2001, as a co-hosted function between the DOS and Japan's Afghan Assistance Program. This meeting, known simply as *Reconstruction of Afghanistan*, put into perspective the grandeur challenges of overthrowing the Taliban, reconstituting a democratic-type government, and "rebuilding" Afghanistan (US Dept. of State, 2001). But what did the Afghanistan landscape look like during the Taliban control? What were the livelihoods and liberties of Afghan civilians and how well was the infrastructure intact?

Map 2-2: Gardez, Afghanistan, the first reconstruction team in Afghanistan since 2001.

Source: GoogleEarth (2010).

Understanding the historical context gives US Army reconstruction teams a 'situational awareness' of the civilian and cultural situation on behalf of whom teams are exercising development efforts. It provides insight into societal capabilities and presents an assessment which may prioritize social or infrastructure needs. In comparison, US Army reconstruction teams would not anticipate creating nuclear reactor power plants to supply the electrical infrastructure in an incapacitated country such as Afghanistan, without first assessing the proper indigenous resources (technology, education, skill, experience, learning capacity, materials).

Instead, US Army reconstruction teams would approach these types of efforts through understanding the recent historic context of the nation involved. The team would hypothesize the building capacity of the nation, and match development efforts based on assessments. In other words, in ideal circumstances, the teams would create an evaluation of the nation's qualifications and potential; which, in turn, helps to develop appropriate agenda items relative to capability. Thus, in the case of Afghanistan, instead of a nuclear reactor power plant, possibly a hydro power plant is more suitable to distribute new or repaired power infrastructure.

In any case, for many, the first thought of the Taliban controlled Afghanistan era (1996-2001) brings mental images of a dismal and oppressive regime attacking the social and physical infrastructure of an already suffering population. During the past few recent decades, international and civil conflict, coupled with Taliban control, have created stifling effects by expunging personal developmental paths which embrace modernity in Afghanistan. This has left the country without "… a critical mass of workers, middle-class intellectuals and professionals, or even a modern bourgeoisie" (Moghadam, 1999). Through understanding this environment and the workforce composition of Afghanistan's general population, areas of interests are created which prompt needs for addressing by reconstruction teams. If Afghanistan lacks a middle-class, then it is comprised of an incapable and technologically decanted population. This may indicate to US Army reconstruction team's areas in which to address literacy and vocational infrastructure needed to improve adulthood aptitudes for obtaining, and maintaining, demanded and long-lasting technical skill-sets. This method, in turn, becomes a tool which supports reconstruction efforts by initiating the means towards an industrious environment. It centralizes a focus on the construction of instructional infrastructure facilities, as a part of an economic developmental plan. By establishing the ground roots of a middle-class, the population can look

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towards paths of trade and industrial progress. This is significant because a country without a middle-class loses its viability, stability, and growth (Aho, 2009). Therefore, if a country has no middle-class, then the fundamental resources for maintaining stability are lost, and civilians may find themselves subjected to undesirable domineering factions.

Another aspect of Taliban controlled Afghanistan, is the colossal abuse of women and girls human rights. For example, on 09AUG2010 Taliban commander Mohammad Yousuf was responsible for lashing a pregnant widowed woman 200 times before shooting her in the head three times for charges of adultery (Mati, 2010). According to the National Organization for Women Foundation (NOW) during the Taliban regime women's human rights were oppressed in the following ways (National Organization for Women Foundation, 2007):

- Women and girls are forbidden to go to school or work outside of the home.

- Women and girls may not leave their homes without a male relative.

- Women are forced to wear a head-to-toe covering called a "burqa" with only a small mesh opening through which to breathe and see.

- Women have been beaten and killed for not being properly covered or escorted.

- The windows of homes occupied by women must be painted to prevent women from being seen.

- Health care for Afghan women and girls is virtually non-existent since male doctors may not care for female patients.

- Women are forbidden from speaking in public.

- Pubescent girls and women are prohibited from speaking to males who are not close relatives.

Since the Taliban era, these oppressive measures have *slowly* subdued. As recently as the 20AUG2009 Afghanistan Presidential elections, two women ran for presidency, five ran for vice presidency, and around 300 ran for provincial council membership (Burton & Erickson, 2009). Even so, the results of these efforts are less than celebratory. All women face severe tyranny of basic human rights. Current Afghan women in parliament are divided, inexperienced, and lack the common amount of respect shared among men parliamentary members (Schweikardt, 2010). This lack of women parliamentary power has been globally illustrated on MAR2009, when Afghan President Hamid Karzi instituted Muslim Shiite Personal Status Law. This law, among other things, allows women to be denied food and water if they do not sexually perform for their husbands and prohibits women from leaving their homes unless given explicit permission from their husbands (Wahdat, 2010). While President Karzi's Shiite Personal Status Law is a process of the legitimatized Afghan governance, it continues to give US Army reconstruction team's context into social, civil, and human rights issues.

Much more can be expressed about the damaging and harmful effects of the Taliban and how it continues to influence culture, but this section of Chapter 2 has only provided a glimpse into the oppressiveness measures and effects the Taliban has forced on the Afghan population. Among other Taliban regime characteristics were the outlaw of television, imprisonment of men who kept beards to short, destruction and intolerance of religions not Islamic (i.e. the organized destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamiyan), the exploitation of farmers to harvest and produce opium, and the establishment and brutal enforcement of an unsupported Islamic judiciary system (Bruno & Kaplan, 2009). The importance of this historic environment may foster a complex relationship between reconstruction and encouraging human rights. These

events do not suppose that US Army reconstruction teams can create measures to solve human rights issues, but it does suggest areas of concentration where teams can focus efforts.

US Army reconstruction team professionals in Afghanistan, as well as across the globe, must analyze the definition of 'dwelling' as it relates to specific areas. What does dwelling mean and how does it apply to the composition of the population? What does dwelling mean to an Afghan adult versus a child? A woman versus a man? The elderly versus Afghan children? Sunni versus Shiite? Islamist versus other religions versus secularism? Where the NOW organization focuses' on social projects for the sole benefit of women's human rights, US reconstruction teams can implement social and physical infrastructure development to instill human rights for all, with focus for women, children and the elderly. They can address these questions, and should do so for lasting effects of development for which the Afghan culture can embrace and understand. These teams should understand how the community emphasizes appropriate dwellings; and foster insight into the importance of acting decisively and cognately in respects to historic and present cultural, social, and physical dwelling environment when implementing reconstruction efforts. For example, in areas where women's rights are scant, reconstruction teams can offer public services, such as healthcare, secure community buildings and public spaces, and vocational training institutes, within a community to primarily focus on women's needs in order to instigate better quality of life agendas.

But what is happening in Afghanistan reconstruction efforts and how is the US Army utilizing FM 3-07 and Government Policy? The first half of the question is as complex as the second half. US Army reconstruction efforts continue to embrace a streamline of criticism. As demonstrated in Chapter 1 the HASC has reported the reconstruction discrepancies pertaining deficiencies in guidance, leadership, and objectives. The analysis and disapproval by HASC of

current reconstruction teams operations in Afghanistan, and Iraq appears to undermine change. The point should be emphasized that the implementation of reconstruction teams continues to mystify the leadership which put them into effect. But are the effects of US Army reconstruction teams really as unconstructive as criticism suggest?

Afghanistan has seen numerous entitlements of US and UN efforts to re-establish the legitimacy of the Afghan government while ousting Taliban control. Whether these entitlements are the solitary results of US Army reconstruction teams is unlikely; however, their part as a whole of government approach plays a vital role into the development of the region. Regardless, it's worth listing some improvements in Afghanistan in order to gain a measure of reconstruction effects. It's even more valuable if one considers the historic context as mentioned above, and uses it as a baseline to correlate the quality of life from Afghanistan past to Afghanistan present.

As of DEC2009, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported a$51 billion US contribution for Afghan relief and reconstruction (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2010). *Figure 2-2: US Afghanistan Reconstruction Assistance Funding* illustrates the breakdown of how this money was distributed. Notice that contributing to Security develops to be the primary intent. This graph appears to support the USs monetary investment into creating stability in the region by investing in security measures. It can be concluded that this investment has been distributed to empower the capability of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

Figure 2-2: US Afghanistan Reconstruction Assistance Funding.

While the distribution of funding show's area of concentration for US reconstruction teams, they literal breakdown provides context into what efforts are being emplaced. USAID has reported improvements of Afghanistan reconstruction efforts in a constructive manner; just a few of these developments are as follows (USAID, 2010d):

- Afghanistan elected its first democratic government [in 30 years] in 2004.

- Afghanistan government has established Provincial and District levels of authority.

- US reconstruction teams have implemented more than 1,900 community stabilization activities.

- Eighty percent of the "Ring Road" has been developed and reconstructed[21].

- 17,000 Afghans are employed by USAID for infrastructure projects.

- Reconstruction teams continue to improve the distribution of electrical power through the construction of power transmission lines.

- Reconstruction teams have rehabilitated two turbines at the Kajaki hydropower facility which has doubled its capacity compared to recent times.

- The construction of the Tarakhil Power Plant now provides electricity to more than 600,000 Afghan resident of the city of Kabul.

- Afghanistan has its first commercialized utility company, *Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat*, in recent times.

- Healthcare is now provided to more than 625,000 women and children on a monthly basis, who had no health care option in the past.

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[21] A map of Afghanistan's "Ring Road" is illustrated as Appendix D.

- Special skill sets are now offered to women.

- Reconstruction teams have provided more than 54,000 women with USAID community based education.

- A women's dormitory has been created at Kabul University to house 1,000 females.

- Seventy-eight women have been officially trained as judges and 670 females have been trained as journalist.

In conjunction with these developments reconstruction teams continue to rebuild the Afghanistan defense infrastructure, mainly by employing a capable workforce. In particular is the Afghan National Army, who has reached its aim of 134,000 members two months ahead of its OCT2010 goal (Raddatz, 2010). This national fighting force requires a plethora of logistical requirements, which include housing/dining facilities, medical facilities, and access to water/wastewater infrastructure, to name just a few. In fact, the USACE has conducted business conferences for Afghan contractors to bid work for these types of logistical requirements, and other reconstruction projects (Giblin, 2010). This portrays the cyclical effects that projects have on the Afghan community in regards to exchanges of goods and services for money.

These reconstruction team developments can be correlated to 'cause and effect' relationships. For example, one 'cause' of the Taliban regime has created a sever lack of healthcare provision of certain Afghan populations (mainly women); in 'effect', reconstruction teams can deploy necessary immediate medical professionals to provide assistance, while forecasting long term needs for healthcare infrastructure.

This point can be shown through Afghan reconstruction team as operations that embraced historic events to play an integral part in how planning measures are approached for

redevelopment. The historic and cultural composition of a nation provides insight into opportunity in prioritizing needed construction for social matters, as well as basic quality of life improvements. However, what lacks from current US Army reconstruction teams is an assessment process that monitors post development. This plays a significant role because US Army reconstruction teams are assembled to promote security and stability and their effectiveness is not documented.

In depth looks in post developments may reveal a significant conundrum. The infrastructure and facilities put in place by US Army reconstruction teams may actually be conducive to some forms violence. For instance, the USG's unruly support of rebuilding and creating educational infrastructure may have produced pockets of known targets of which insurgents' assault. If US Army reconstruction teams do not account for their vacancy as part of their international planning process, then horrific consequences, such as the targeting of girls schools, are brought upon the population who is left to support the facility.

To illustrate, in recent times Taliban insurgents have made great efforts to attack education facilities of children, and especially so for girl schools. Nick Meo, from the United Kingdom's *The Times*, reports that Taliban have returned to target schools in a deadly manner (Meo, 2008). Mr. Meo explains, "The security situation is now so bad in Kandahar province that nearly half of all schools are closed some or all of the time. Girls' classes have been particularly badly hit…" He continues by reporting of the 2006 girl's school bombing in which the Taliban claimed 16 young innocent lives; and after an interview with an Afghan teacher, an illustration of the fear of "…explosions, kidnappings, and assassinations…" is shown as daily concerns of children and adults.

While the claim of young innocent lives is heart-wrenching, they are not the only victims of unsecured reconstruction development progress. Consistently, Afghan road crews are targeted as supporters of the Afghan Government and Coalition Forces, a deed strictly prohibited by Taliban insurgency; in one attack as recently as 19AUG2010, as many as 30 Afghans were killed and others abducted (Shoaib, 2010). In similar instances, road workers are targeted through attacks and kidnappings. On 08APR2008 the Taliban killed 17 road workers and of JAN of the same year beheaded four workers in eastern Nuristan Province (The New York Times, 2008) and on 27OCT2008 the Agence France-Presse reported fourteen road crew workers were abducted by suspected Taliban groups (Agence France-Presse, 2008).

In conclusion of Afghan reconstruction, on 10AUG2010 the UN Assistance Missions in Afghanistan held a press conference which released data that 76% of Afghan casualties are a result from anti-government elements (de Mistura & Gagnon, 2010). To US Army reconstruction teams, the major anti-government element is the offending Taliban; who have created an environment of "oppressive" security in which human rights are suppressed in order to maintain order. The challenge for reconstruction teams is to abide by their leadership directives and create new and sustainable environments in which comprehensive security is enforced by legitimate local authority. The question then becomes, *"If given these circumstance, are we making progress in Afghanistan?"* Conceptualizing progress in Afghanistan is circumstantial. Reconstruction efforts show progress in areas, but criticism continues to illustrate a dismal future for Afghanistan and the US.

Iraq

"I have no idea what CENTCOM was planning, and I have absolutely no idea what the Joint Chiefs of Staff were planning. I do know that the political guidance they were getting from Rumsfeld, the NSC, and the White House was, 'You got about three months to get [the postwar Iraqi government] up and running.'"

-General Colin Powell, Secretary of State (2001-2005)

While the exact reasons for the proliferation of OIF remains questionable for some, US interests to rebuild the fallen Iraqi regime were rooted in early USG policy soon after 11SEP2001. The above quote from General Collin Powell sets the tone for the reconstruction, stabilizing, and security tempo of which the DOD would be forced to accommodate following the invasion of Iraq on 19MAR2003. In much of the same manner that criticism shows of current reconstruction efforts, there appeared to be an *ad hoc* in the initial organization and tasking of how Iraq would be rebuilt after its regime was conquered. However, unlike Afghanistan, US Army reconstruction teams in Iraq had a different social and physical environment to encounter for efforts there.

Where Afghanistan was ruled by an outlawed regime, Iraq entailed a "functioning" government which was responsible for recorded events of genocide. In similarities with Afghanistan, Iraqis have seen a violent history within past decades which has influenced its present culture. Recent history shows Iraq has been involved in clashes with Kurdish and Shia factions, and the countries of Israel, Kuwait, Iran, Britain and the US (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2010). This gives US Army reconstruction teams a perspective which emphasizes the sensitivity of transitioning from a history of violence to one of peace and security. However,

while these clashes were the focus of abhorrent leadership, nothing compares to the mass

genocide conducted by the Iraqi government onto the Kurds during the 1980s.

In 1988, after years of torture and murder, an estimated 200,000 Kurds were killed in a

single year through the use of poisonous gas (US Marine Corps, 2003) on behalf of a religious

enforcement as documented in the 8th chapter of the Quran, known as Anfal (Human Rights

Watch, 1993). The directions of these attacks were orchestrated by Saddam Hussein and were

not the only acts against humanity with which he has been charged. The Human Rights Watch

organization lists major violations of human rights, as follows (Human Rights Watch, 1993):

- Mass summary executions and mass disappearance of many tens of thousands of non-combatants, including large numbers of women and children, and sometimes the entire population of villages.

- The widespread use of chemical weapons, including mustard gas and the nerve agent GB, or Sarin, against the town of Halabja as well as dozens of Kurdish villages, killing many thousands of people, mainly women and children.

- The wholesale destruction of some 2,000 villages, which are described in government documents as having been 'burned,' 'destroyed,' 'demolished' and 'purified,' as well as at least a dozen larger towns and administrative centers.

- The wholesale destruction of civilian objects by Army engineers, including all schools, mosques, wells and other non-residential structures in the targeted villages, and a number of electricity substations.

- Arbitrary arrest of all villagers captured in designated 'prohibited areas', despite the fact that these were their own homes and lands

- Arbitrary jailing and warehousing for months, in conditions of extreme deprivation, of tens of thousands of women, children and elderly people, without judicial order or any cause other than their presumed sympathies for the Kurdish opposition.

- Many hundreds of them were allowed to die of malnutrition and disease.

Supplementary, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office of UK reported the following social and oppressive environmental conditions for Iraqis (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2002):

- Saddam has, through the Revolutionary Command Council, issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties (amputation, branding, cutting off of ears, or other forms of mutilation) for criminal offences.

- There is first-hand evidence that the Iraqi regime tortures children.

- A 1990 decree allows male relatives to kill a female relative in the name of honor without any punishment.

- According to Amnesty International, in October 2000, dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded without any judicial process, together with men accused of pimping.

- Executions are carried out without due process of law.

- Shia community leaders are killed when their presence become too imminent.

While this is not an inclusive list of human rights violations, it sets the tone for what US Army reconstruction teams may encounter culturally when conducting operations to entice security in the region. Given the recent past of Iraq, it is likely that fear and distrust of large organizations (which include the US Army and efforts of empowering a new Iraqi government) have been conceived by certain Iraqi populations. This happens because fear can be developed

through a reaction to some circumstance (Miller, 2007). Where an organized institution mutilates, tortures, rapes, embezzles, and murders innocent lives because of ethnicity (Human Rights Watch, 1993), feelings of despair, distrust, and anger may evolve against new organizations who emerge and set out to remedy those actions. By recognizing potential fears host-nation communities might have developed, US Army reconstruction teams can begin to reconstitute broken infrastructure in a manner that is perceptive and insightful of community needs.

Furthermore, understanding cultural context allows US Army reconstruction teams to recognize potential and fundamental communication barriers. During reconstruction efforts, intertwining cultures, such as the occupiers and the host-nation, are unfamiliar with each other's cultural and social behavioral skills (Ward, Bochner, & Furnham, 2003). The onset of this unfamiliarity can create a cycle of "…misunderstanding, friction, and hostility" (Ward et al., 2003). These teams must be sensitive to preserving cultural heritage and conducting reconstruction projects where human rights are not violated. Positive cultural heritage has the power to promote hope and optimism and entice creativity (Kreimer, Eriksson, Muscat, Arnold, & Scott, 1998), which could be very favorable attributes during a time of post-conflict reconstruction. Instigating measures where reconstruction does not benefit the health, safety, and welfare of the entire population may come across as signs of favoritism and distrust, and prolong sustainable efforts.

While the host-nation cultural perspective of any reconstruction process is worth evaluating for the reasons mentioned above, assessments of physical infrastructure in post-conflict lays the foundation of where resources can immediately be applied, granted the correct security measures are provided. When the country assessment was completed by Bechtel

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Corporation, following the initial invasion in 2003, reconstruction assessment teams found themselves in the midst of a monumental task. In the 2003 *Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program Assessment Report*, Bechtel comprehensively assessed selective infrastructure of seaports, airports, water and wastewater facilities, irrigation, power, roads, railroads, bridges, and buildings. This 151 page document provides explicit information which describes the discrepancies of infrastructure networks. The layout of each infrastructure entity was divided into chapters which provided: 1) Existing Conditions 2) Requirements for Restoration of Critical Services 3) Needs Assessment 4) Challenges 5) Existing Operation & Maintenance Organization 6) Recommendations. Each infrastructure entity, such as buildings, was geo-tagged with photos and added to a database to be referenced for reconstruction efforts at a later time. Examples of common discrepancies can be found in the figures of *Appendix F – Physical Infrastructure Discrepancies in Iraq*.

The drawing conclusion of the Iraq infrastructure assessment which Bechtel expressed explained the difficulties in rebuilding this country; "The Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program faces *unprecedented* programwide challenges" (Bechtel Corporation, 2003). In this assessment report, power distribution, major transportation networks, and water/wastewater facilities are expressed as needing immediate attention. **Table 2-1: Bechtel Synopsis of Iraq Infrastructure Assessment 2003** provides a synopsis of Bechtel's findings. While this table does not list all physical infrastructure repairs needed, it emphasizes areas needed for reconstruction teams to start reconstituting a functioning modern society[22]; mainly power distribution, transportation, and water/wastewater treatment.

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[22] In his book *"Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and WHY NO ONE SAW IT COMING"*, Paul Hawken explains that a modern society is one in which people "…move along

streets…move freight by rail, ships, and airfields… [are] powered by electricity… must be kept clean by water and wastewater facilities as well as garbage disposal… and [communicate] through landlines, cell phones, and the postal service." He further states that "The sum total of all these working parts and the system itself is called "infrastructure". Infrastructure is considered by many to be the most important driving force in community economic development… In developing nations, roads, electricity, and water and wastewater infrastructures are the highest priorities" (page 284).

Table 2-1: Bechtel Synopsis of Iraq Infrastructure Assessment 2003.

Infrastructure Assessed	Brief of needed rehabilitation
1 Seaport	In need of 3-4 million cubic meters of material removed to make way for large vessels. Also in need of removal of wrecks and sunken objects.
2 Airports (International Gateways)	Completely inoperative air-ground/ground-ground communication systems. Also in need of comprehensive rehabilitation of airport infrastructure requirements; such as passenger terminal, fuel depot, power, and water/wastewater.
Power Substations	75% of major power substations are destroyed, mainly through extensive looting.
21 Generating Units	The *total* normal capacity of all generating units' equals 8,660MW, as of the assessment the total approximate output equaled 3, 545MW. Existing units are unreliable and posed to frequent breakdown.
Transmission Lines	Are mostly damaged post-conflict through looting.
21 Water Facilities	Generally, water facilities are not effectively functioning due to large amounts of entering wastewater.
7 Sewage Treatment Plants	Most wastewater treat plants bypass waste treatment and deposit directly into a river.
1 Sludge Treatment Plant	Inoperable.
11 Pump Stations	Many pumps are operating beyond the usefulness of their intended life.
89 Potable Water Pump Stations	No potable pump station is operating to full capacity.
Road and Railway Network	The entire road/railway system network has deteriorated due to conflict, neglect, low quality construction methods and materials, and incompletion of projects
49 Bridges	Thirty-three were assessed, with 30 requiring immediate attention, and three being completely destroyed.
5,425 Structures	Of the schools, medical facilities, and public service (police & fireman) buildings, 1,345 needed immediate rehabilitation.

Source: Author (2010).

Interestingly, the largest culprit which crippled and weakened infrastructure did not occur

during the US led invasion in 2003, but instead was a result of looting which occurred afterward

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(Bensahel et al., 2008). Without a functioning government and amidst combat operations, security of infrastructure was non-complacent, thereby allowing the people opportunity to exploit and amass perceived valuable commodities, such as the metal attained from transmission lines, valuables and artifacts from public buildings, and components from machinery, to be sold as merchandise. The tribulation with looting could possibly play a significant role into efforts of reconstruction if it were taken into account as an ordeal which impedes efforts. In other words, if components to key infrastructure equipment were intact, then one may conceive there may require less time, money, and effort to repair existing components, rather than the difficult logistical process of identifying, acquiring, transporting, and installing new components. Congruently, when asked about looting in Iraq weeks after the liberation, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that these things are "part of the price" of war and are part of Iraqis "pent up feelings" concerning the years of oppression (Loughlin, 2003). Even so, as part of stabilizing an incapacitated nation, paths of least resistance in infrastructure rebuilding could allow for more fluid efforts.

While the issues of looting remained a tremendous difficulty for reconstruction teams, Bechtel suggested that the greatest challenges lie in security measures and access to facilities for reconstruction teams and contractors; where protection for teams is a primary concern and protection against looting would help prevent substantial additional costs. Among other challenges are the integration of the whole of government approach along with international players; these conditions create difficult challenges in communication, cultural exchange and organizational characteristics (Bechtel Corporation, 2003). It is perceived that if co-existing governments cannot work with each other, that the fundamental international development principle *Partnership* is unattainable. If one of the fundamental principles is lost, than

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reconstruction efforts could become increasingly difficult. In short, there are many concerns US Army reconstruction teams had, and should have, considered as initial stability operations began in Iraq. But since that time, what has been achieved? What are some progressive milestones that have been met, and are these being sustained?

Recent assessments conducted by USAID[23] and the USACE[24] show how reconstruction teams have pieced together post-conflict Iraq. While it is beyond the scope of this work to provide a comprehensive list of achievements, the following items provide a testimony that changes have been made. It should be understood that organizing these achievements has been a daunting task. In line with the *ad hoc* nature of organizing reconstruction teams, there has not been found a comprehensive study into the assessment of individual reconstruction team efforts; instead, what exists are discombobulated reports to congress, inter-agency reports, and independent studies of mostly generalized improvements. Regardless, the reconstruction items listed here are provided for context:

- The first ever introduction of Kurds into Iraq political system occurred in 2003.

- Increasing power availability to more than 7 million people.

- First time in 40 years that International Oil companies have returned to Iraq.

- Rehabilitation of 2,962 schools.

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[23] Information obtained from USAID was found by thoroughly investigating the *USAID Assistance for Iraq*, found at: http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/. Accessed SEP2010.

[24] Information obtained from USACE was found by investigating the USACE Gulf Region District *Cumulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet,* found at: http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/factsheets/docs/June_2010.pdf. Accessed SEP2010.

- Provided skills training to more than 3,200 primary health care professionals.

- Constructed six new primary health care facilities.

- Established five mobile medical units, capable of servicing 25,000 people.

- Completed 313 village road projects and expressways.

- Rehabilitated waster facilities to accommodate an extra 2.3 million Iraqis and rehabilitated wastewater facilities to accommodate over 5.1 million Iraqis.

- Repaired power distribution to accommodate 8.5 million people with dependable and consistent service.

- Absolute complete renovation of two international gateway airports, to include construction of security checkpoints and luggage x-ray units.

- Absolute reconstruction of Iraq's seaport to allow for larger vessels, total renovation of grain-receiving facility, and an establishment of port tariffs for seagoing operations.

- Completed 72km of railway between seaport and closest urban area, and 112 railroad renovations across the country.

- Reconstructed three key bridges necessary for transportation, and assessed, repaired, or demolished 36 subsequent bridges.

- Initiated a 1,200km national fiber optic network as the backbone of communications.

- Nearly 60% of USAIDs small business grants have been awarded to women.

- Assisted to get 68 women elected in Iraq's new National Assembly.

Juxtaposed to Afghanistan, Iraq reconstruction efforts must also contend with attacks, in addition to looting, on physical infrastructure (Clancy, Dion, Hardy, & Jackson, 2007). To give

context to the importance of security operations during reconstruction, the US taxpayers have contributed a total of $53 billion into Iraq reconstruction efforts from 2003 to 2009 (Tarnoff, 2009), of which $20.4 billion was spent on security measures alone (M. Kelly, 2010). *Figure 2-3: US Iraq Reconstruction Assistance* Funding provides a breakdown of how money was distributed in support of reconstruction efforts. The highest appropriations of funds are distributed to Security – Equipment and Training. This investment was created to enhance the Rule of Law as set by the new Iraqi Government. The next highest appropriations fell into the category of Infrastructure - Electricity. $4.86 billion has been spent in rehabilitation and construction of power infrastructure.

Investments such as this help ensure that efforts of partnership and governance are legitimatized in the perception of the local populace. If the local populace perceives that their government, alongside occupying forces, cannot instill and maintain basic infrastructure elements, then authority and control maybe be further challenged by the onset of illegitimate factions.

In conclusion, *"Are we making progress in Iraq?"* is difficult to answer. US reconstruction teams continue to impact the health, safety, and welfare of Iraqis; but the perception of US capabilities and the magnitude of the issue continue to fuel criticism. As with the reconstruction of Germany and Japan, perhaps years down the road we will have a better understanding of our reconstruction implications.

Figure 2-3: US Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Funding.

US Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Funding 2003-2009

Source: Created by author from data obtained from Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction:http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January2010.html(2010).

CHAPTER 3 - Methodology

"There is a quality even meaner than outright ugliness or disorder, and this meaner quality is the dishonest mask of pretended order, achieved by ignoring or suppressing the real order that is struggling to exist and to be served."
    -Jane Jacobs

Introduction

Up unto this point, there should be a good understanding of the complexity of the reconstruction team composition, examples of historical and present efforts, and the occupational environment that dictates their actions and control. Reconstruction teams are comprised of multi-government organizations as dictated by a whole of government approach. In this manner, the huge availability of resources from the US Army makes them a prime candidate for playing a significant part in these efforts. Reconstruction teams are responsible to reconstitute, in a positive manner, the effects of a fragmented society after some post-conflict event. Their actions are primarily dictated by USG policy and developmental principles as laid out by FM 3-07; but evolve around social issues, cultural issues, human rights issues, the physical and social conditions of post-conflict environments, and the ability to set into place actions which promote a self-ruling government.

The host of criticism that challenges the reconstruction team's effectiveness mainly proclaims a lack of organizational effort and defined objectives. The concept of organizing and defining objectives is a difficult concept for these teams, given that the reconstruction planning process is based on policy. When policy is politically motivated it may be inconsistent, flawed,

and biased; thereby foregoing the basic needs of a society (such as current US Army's efforts to rebuild schools in Haiti, as 1.5 million Haitians struggle through life in shantytowns). Therefore, the reason for writing this thesis is to explore the validation of these criticisms and provide a proposed model to the US Army's approach to reconstruction.

The intent of the literature review was to provide a synopsis of reconstruction efforts in the past and present, to understand their effect on human rights and the development of social and physical infrastructure, to become familiar with the operational environment of post-conflict reconstruction agendas, and to justify if criticism to these efforts ascertains truth. Effort was applied to illustrate how policy and political decision making (such as JCS 1067 reconstruction policy of WWII, the Presidential directive to abandon Somalia before reconstruction efforts could begin, and the US Army's efforts to reconstruct schools before improving dilapidated living conditions in Haiti) may create negative consequences upon host-nation reconstruction when it does not adhere to sustaining ethical values, such as the enforcement of health, safety, and welfare of the population.

Research Design and Validation

Determining that policy may implement different results than an post-conflict development model relies on theoretical and empirical evidence. Since international development models are not used in the US Army, it is impossible to accurately address their potential effects. Therefore, in order to validate a proposed post-conflict development model for US Army reconstruction teams, this thesis implements a non-experimental design research approach. As demonstrated in the literature review, validation occurs in the analysis and correlational study between policy and post-conflict construction to suggest that policy driven

reconstruction efforts are not always applied in the best interest of the host-nation. While policy is the only method which drives the reconstruction planning process of US Army reconstruction teams, there are no methods to alter this variable. Also, since the occupational environment entails innumerous variables, both social and physical, it is not feasible to hypothesize that a proposed post-conflict development model will replicate specific expected results. Instead, the non-experimental research design validates this thesis by enforcing four conceptual ideas: 1) Policy oriented planning processes *are not* the only method for US Army reconstruction teams to instigate in reconstruction efforts for a post-conflict society; 2) Juxtaposed to the US Army's Military Decision Making Process[25] (MDMP), local US planning models follow a similar rational path of problem solving; therefore, interconnecting familiar concepts to draw conclusions in reconstruction is a logical approach; 3) Correlational evidence of policy oriented reconstruction processes *versus* international development models, for US Army efforts of reconstruction in post-conflict societies, cannot be effectively and accurately fabricated in quantitative measurements; and 4) Phenomenological approaches to post-conflict reconstruction models are valid elements toward achieving progress.

Emphasizing the use of phenomenological approaches, this thesis is subjected to inspection by senior military leader (retired). Congruently, personal experience as an Engineer Officer for reconstruction efforts in support of OEF will be expressed; as well as exposure to academic leadership involved with international affairs and community planning disciplines.

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[25] The MDMP is a seven step process: 1) Receipt of Mission 2) Mission Analysis 3) Course of Action Development 4) Course of Action Analysis 5) Course of Action Comparison 6) Course of Action Approval 7) Orders Production. A complete overview is found in FM 3-21.20 Infantry Battalion.

In essence, this thesis is validated through multi-faceted perspectives, colleague reviewing, and qualitative and historical evidence. It is enthralled on social, cultural, and organizational issues that are recognizable through multi-party collaborative participation. It endorses a systematic approach to providing a progressive alternative to post-conflict reconstruction methods set forth by US Army reconstruction teams.

Process

Inadvertently, the research process for this thesis began in 2008 as I deployed to Afghanistan as an Engineer Officer in the US Army. Tasked to help rebuild infrastructure for the Afghan National Army and recon areas to apply CERP[26] funds, I became enthralled with how US taxpayer's money was applied to reconstruction efforts and if the desired impact was being achieved. Key observations instigated the inquiry of this thesis, chiefly being: 1) Hearing the concern of Afghan Brigade Commanders not being offered opportunity to provide input into the planning process, design, and implementation of reconstruction measures on "their turf"; 2) Lack of US cultural consideration in the design of structures and use of furniture and appliances, and how these integrate with Afghan lifestyles, specifically concerning hygienic conditions; 3) Lack of US support after construction occurs, specifically the security for protecting children after an education facility is built; 4) Lack of women and children social care, specifically women sitting on the ground in traffic begging for charity; and 5) Lack of US Army organization and leadership to understand where, how, and who needs specific reconstruction efforts.

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[26] CERP funds provide military commanders a process to initiate stability tasks which includes agendas such as reconstruction of infrastructure and humanitarian relief. Depending on circumstances, funding cannot exceed $500,000 per project unless authorized by the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller. CERP funding at the Brigade Commander levels do not exceed $200,000 per project.

These observations began as unstructured data collection of personal reconstruction planning experiences as an US Army Engineer Officer in the post-conflict Afghanistan society, in which was found inordinate methods to increase the stability and security of an area. The measures I observed to reconstruction planning involved two approaches. The first approach was a lackadaisical cultural approach, in which the host-nation Afghan interpreters were asked to identify areas on a map that could be set up for reconnaissance to further investigate, or deliver, specific humanitarian or reconstruction needs. The second approach was to collect empirical information from US Army field combat units which had access to various areas within the country and could report recommendations for humanitarian or reconstruction efforts (i.e. needed water access points, hygienic improvements, and medical services).

The methodology of creating this thesis occurred in consecutive steps, illustrated below:

1. A problem was identified through personal experience concerning US Army methods into post-conflict reconstruction.

2. An observation process occurred, in which the problem was validated through reflection of further post-conflict experiences and processes.

3. Learning objectives about the US community planning discipline where achieved to further investigate alternatives to post-conflict planning experiences.

4. Analyses of recent criticisms of post-conflict reconstruction teams were researched for validation and context of a broader issue.

5. Historical research into WWII, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq post-conflict and policy analysis were compared to recent criticisms expressed by HASC.

6. Graduate level education and personal experiences were intersected with research into current US Army reconstruction team operations, guiding policy, and methodologies.

7. Framework for supplementing guiding policy (FM 3-07) was created through in-depth research of local US comprehensive planning models and investigated post-conflict criticisms, policy, and methods.

In summary, personal experience began the process of this thesis and was coupled with exposure to comprehensive planning as instructed through graduate work. Planning concepts and theories were studied to lay the ground work for a post-conflict planning model to supplement FM 3-07 and provide a tool to US Army leadership to better equip them to subdue future Congressional criticism.

CHAPTER 4 - Analysis

"To every man there comes in his lifetime that special moment when he is figuratively tapped on the shoulder and offered a chance to do a very special thing, unique to him and fitted to his talents. What a tragedy if that moment finds him unprepared or unqualified for the work which would be his finest hour."
> *- Sir Winston Churchill*

The analysis of this thesis is to examine the current methodology into planning reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies for US Army reconstruction teams who adhere to guidelines of FM 3-07 and provide a supplemental reconstruction method through a proposed post-conflict planning model. This analysis is broken into two segments in order to clarify the complexity of reconstruction learning objectives. First, a study of the nature of whole of government planning reconstruction efforts as indicated in FM 3-07 will be studied for it effectiveness; and second, a study of the nature of comprehensive planning processes as supplemental guidance to reconstruction efforts as laid out in FM 3-07 will be studied for a possible solution to criticism of reconstruction teams operating in a *ad hoc* manner.

FM 3-07 is a unique approach to writing US Army doctrine. It encompasses a whole of government approach to the ideas and curriculum needed to reconstitute broken physical and social infrastructure while incorporating supplemental information and experiences from the international community. In fact, according to a panelist reception of FM 3-07 of which

Lieutenant General William Caldwell[27] co-hosted, there was only one US Army Officer,

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Leonard, who authored its publication on behalf of the US Army (The

Brookings Institution, 2009). This indicates that the comprehensive approaches to stability

operations are majorly comprised of different organizations from civilian authorities.

Understanding the nature of FM 3-07 guidance gives US Army reconstruction team leaders a

unique perspective which is intended to fill the gap of military resources in order to implement

civilian knowledge, experiences, and background (The Brookings Institution, 2009).

Where the origin of FM 3-07 was enveloped from civilian organizations which were

experienced with post-conflict reconstruction, the nature of the comprehensive planning process

originated from the City Beautiful Movement in the 1890s. The City Beautiful Movement

instilled preliminary comprehensive planning approaches to improve social conditions and the

physical environment by upholding civic priorities, which were ethically oriented toward the

common good of the people (Peterson, 2003). It also began a process to "…develop a sense of

civic responsibility…"(Rosen, 1958) which instilled a democratic approach that encouraged

society to be a part of the development of its physical and social environment. Understanding

the nature of the comprehensive planning process provides an alternative method to

reconstituting and developing infrastructure in international post-conflict societies. The analysis

for comprehensive planning model can be of value to military personnel as a supplement to FM

3-07 because it retains the characteristics of incorporating public leadership with public opinions,

a method comparable to the whole of government approach. In this manner, a comprehensive

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[27] Lieutenant General Caldwell was the Commander of the US Army's Combined Arms Center from JUN2007 to MAY2010. His position is the Officer in Charge for approving the publication of US Army Field Manuals.

like planning model can be easily understood and applied to FM 3-07, and done so without imposing complications of interpreting planning and development meanings.

The Nature of 'Whole of Government' and 'Comprehensive Planning'

The whole of government approach, as described in FM 3-07, can potentially be a boundless contribution of USG resources concerning reconstruction efforts. Defined as "…an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal" (p.1-4), FM 3-07 attempts to coordinate multi-organizational tasks and methods, through a process called 'line of efforts'[28], in order to achieve mission objectives. Essentially, this doctrine endorses the involvement of specialized civilian teams, incorporated with military tasking and resources, to operate in a synchronized manner in order to reconstitute some post-conflict society. Despite the objectives of FM 3-07, HASC continues to criticize reconstruction efforts, specifically those of the PRT, as being decentralized; meaning these units are not established, coordinated, synchronized, nor controlled to meet a desired end state. Oddly, the whole of government approach was conceived to limit these circumstances.

A major component of whole of government approaches is to "…avoid duplication of efforts, interfering with the plans of other departments, and the consequent waste of energy and resources"(Baker, 2007). This is, therefore, a fundamental discrepancy which challenges the effect of reconstruction teams; if there is no principal overseer, which is an observation verified by HASC reports, then control of reconstruction objectives becomes fragmented and difficult to

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[28] Lines of efforts are the commander's ability to coordinate and control the objectives of tasks from multiple organizations in order to create conditions of a desirable end state.

manage and assess. If US Army reconstruction teams cannot be managed effectively, then their primary tasks will be difficult to achieve.

The comprehensive planning process strongly correlates to the whole of government approach in that, in a locality, it utilizes multi-faceted civilian and government efforts to create a democratic process that aims for a desired end state. In fact, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928 set out the purpose of comprehensive plans as (Department of Commerce, 1928):

> The plan shall be made with the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the municipality and its environs which will, in accordance with present and future needs, best promote health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare as well as efficiency and economy in the process of development…

The nature of the whole of government approach and the comprehensive planning process embodies all-inclusive contributions of civilian and governmental organizations, in a collaborative and agreed upon effort to develop some society. Where the nature of organized comprehensive planning processes date to the City Beautiful Movement of Washington, D.C. in 1902 (Peterson, 2003), a collaborative approach to creating doctrine for the US Army came across the authoring of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency in 2006 (The Brookings Institution, 2009); and even so, this manual focuses on the ability of Soldiers and Marines to blend combative responsibilities with those that are generally conducted by civilian agencies. Therefore, in essence, the true nature of whole of government approaches for US Army reconstruction teams begin present day with the implementation of FM 3-07 in 2008.

FM 3-07

Planning Framework for Reconstruction Efforts

The US Army's planning framework for reconstruction efforts is tied into doctrine of a

stability operations assessment process in Appendix D – *Interagency Conflict Assessment*

Overview of FM 3-07. The framework is designed to entice stability in a region by focusing

efforts of five integrated sectors for conducting operations. *Figure 4-1: An integrated approach*

to stability operations shows the stability tasks which evolve into the five stability sectors. These

are the guiding vision behind stability operations.

Figure 4-1: An integrated approach to stability operations.

Source: FM 3-07(2008).

As described below, this framework consists of the basic elements of any planning

process (p. D-10):

- Collection of Data
- Analysis
- Design
- Evaluation

While this framework encompasses a plethora of actions, it may be unsuitable as the

primary source which directs reconstruction processes. It does not account for specified

measures or approaches which are inherent to achieve a purpose. Also, it is not bounded by

ethical obligations focused on the health, safety, and welfare of society. Instead, it generalizes that experiences of commanders are fluent in reconstruction efforts, which may be unfitting for a doctrine designed to provide one-the-ground 'how-to' directions during conflict and post-conflict operations.

This Field Manual relies on an invalidated assumption that "For every operation, commanders develop personal, detailed understanding of the situation and operational environment. They then visualize a desired end state and craft a broad concept for shaping the current conditions toward that end state."(p. 4-1). Realistically, the planning framework as illustrated in Appendix D of FM 3-07, provides the explicit foundation of all general procedures needed to solve a problem. If the commander does develop an intimate and comprehensive understanding of the operational environment, it is still a difficult task conceptualizing broad concepts of progressive measures which are inherently limited by the actions of the host-nation. This reason stands, because the factors impacting reconstruction have a human dimension, which cannot always be accounted for or predicted. And, as HASC reports, the coordination of whole of government approaches are not grounded through any process. Therefore, the operational environment is moderated by dynamic conditions; as planning evolves so may the commander's concepts as he/she obtains new information. *Figure 4-2: Commander's Cyclical Planning* **Process** visualizes how planning is a cyclical process in which commanders of reconstruction teams must analytically react to negative impacts.

Figure 4-2: Commander's Cyclical Planning Process.

Tasking from higher command.

Social and physical data collection and analysis.

Develops intent and end state desires.

Monitors detrimental social and physical effect.

Conceptualize a broad concept to implement and proclaims intent.

Implements, oversees, and reinforces plan.

Task and synchronize subordinate commands.

Evaluates subordinate planning design/process.

Source: Author (2010).

What is shown in *Figure 4-1: An integrated approach to stability* operations is a systematic process for implanting a plan, recognizing its impacts, and re-implementing the planning process to a desired state that has less negative effects. However rational the process looks, it is anything of the sort. The contribution of the whole of government approach complicates many aspects of this process when control is not enforced or a hierarchy of decision-making is ambiguous. Data collected for the social and physical environment may be uniquely interpreted depending on the experience of the handler. A US Army commander may not understand the data with the same results as a USAID member. In the efforts of a PRT, where the US Army provides the majority of resources but a DOS official is the leader, there may exists friction in deciding what needs to be done and who needs to do it. Possibly, the initial process of planning fosters criticism from the HASC because FM 3-07 does not outline objectives and responsibilities in a clear manner. Instead, what is provided are fragmented methods and undefined processes.

In the House of Representatives Report, HASC found that PRTs are decentralized, lack leadership, and are not given guidance by CENTCOM (US House of Representatives, 2008). If this is the case, the first, and prudent, course of action would be to expound and investigate the organizational development of PRTs. According to FM 3-07, these reconstruction teams are led by civilian DOS representatives who do not command PRT military personnel (p. F-4). In response to HASC criticism, the assumption becomes: if DOS is the upper echelon of team leadership, how does guidance from CENTCOM come to play in the roles of PRTs? And more specifically, how does the interpretation of social and physical data of a post-conflict society, the segue to operational planning, juxtapose between civilian and military leadership?

What the commander contends with is unilateral direction and a balance between primary tasks and secondary tasks per the information he/she receives. This becomes apparent by the guidelines of FM 3-07 and the criticism of HASC. The information and guidance that a commander uses to begin his/her development of intent may be subjective in stability operations; depending upon who is providing information, how it is interpreted, and who dictates the end results. Indeed, what appears to be lacking from FM 3-07 isn't whole of government approaches to reconstruction, that statement is made clear in the manual, but unilateral direction as to how these governments implement tasks alongside their military counterparts and how information pertaining to internal and external resources are collected and managed in a post-conflict society.

FM 3-07 addresses the issue of coordinating efforts across a whole of government approach by endorsing the 'essential stability task list[29]'; where National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) – 44 imposes that *all* USG departments' tasks adhere to DOS guidance concerning stability operations (National Security Presidential Directive - 44, 2005). However, investigation into the *Framework of Stability Operations* by the USACE Afghanistan District North, only mentions higher echelon policy coordination with the DOS (USACE, 2010), and no mention of coordinating with the essential stability task matrix. If this is a pillar of how the US Army applies reconstruction in a whole of government environment (Szayna, Eaton, & Richardson, 2007) it is not clearly defined as so in FM 3-07. Therefore, the link between who delivers and interprets information *and* who coordinates specific tasks regarding that information is arbitrarily decided within the on-the-ground reconstruction leadership, and this may only

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[29] FM 3-07 explains that the DOS controls stability operations. The primary measure for control and coordinating whole of government tasks is through the essential stability task matrix. There are five components of tasking: 1) Security. 2) Justice and reconciliation. 3) Humanitarian and social well-being. 4) Governance and participation. 5) Economic stabilization and infrastructure (p.2-5).

happen when the commander has a comprehensive understanding of all USG agencies operating in his/her area of operation.

Where processes are "… orchestrated series of occurrences that are systematically linked to one another…" to serve a function (Rescher, 2000), they must begin with inquiries, information, and analysis. If FM 3-07 claims to show the on-the-ground- soldier how stability operations occur in a whole of government approach to reconstruction efforts, seemingly a process would be the binding entity that coordinates these efforts; and hopefully it would be explained *as so* through some controlling mechanism. Who controls tasks is fundamental to effective leadership, and how efforts are assessed is fundamental to understanding progress.

Figure 4-3: Whole of Government Illustration, illustrates a glimpse of the internal environment of which agencies contend in stability operations, such as reconstruction. It attempts to illustrate a comment Ms. Ginger Cruz[30] made during an HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing in SEP2007; where Ms. Cruz said "Iraqi officials commonly suffer from something we call interlocutor fatigue, where a whole parade of U.S. officials – a major, a colonel, a PRT team leader, a USAID guide, a contractor who works for USAID – will come in at various points and will meet with Iraqi leaders. And so, it is very easy to see how Iraqis get extremely confused[,] and how PRTs spend an inordinate amount of time trying to coordinate and still fall short because there is too much coordination the needs to go on." The meaning behind this figure illustrates her point of a decentralized approach to stability, which also is proclaimed by HASC. There is no catchment (authority) of agency efforts in this illustration, but rather a storm of efforts.

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[30] Ginger Cruz is a former Deputy Inspector General for Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Her responsibilities included formulating organizational responsibilities during OIF reconstruction phases.

Figure 4-3: Whole of Government Illustration.

This graphic portrays some USG agencies who contribute to reconstruction and stability operations. It is provided to visualize the nature of the decentralized criticism by HASC. Notice there are no controlling factors or catchments for agency efforts. *Source: Author, (2010).*

If reconstruction tasking is not being controlled by DOS, as directed in NSPD-44, then relying on FM 3-07 to conduct on-the-field coordinated reconstruction efforts seems unsound. Where FM 3-07 states, "Within the USG, the [DOS] *leads* and *coordinates* reconstruction and stabilization operations, including activities to establish and support the rule of law." (p.1-9, emphasis added), the coordinating efforts are not clearly defined. For instance, the CERP Handbook implies that during project planning "…members of the unit staff coordinate with

other governmental organizations to synchronize efforts and verify they are not already pursuing similar initiatives." (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008). Creating a working link between FM 3-07 and the CERP handbook is challenging although essential in order to achieve Presidential Directives. The CERP Handbook does not reference NSPD-44, which FM 3-07 references as the lead agency for *all* stability operations and reconstruction as the controlling agency. Herein lies the disconnect, in 2005 NSPD-44 was instituted, yet who and how it is enforced is not clear. Reconstruction efforts were well underway before FM 3-07 was implemented in OCT2008. However, as the co-authors of the Field Manual explain, it is "confusing" and "…the military will find it inherently frustrating…" but it is a manual which "… shows how to conduct [stability and reconstruction] operations…" "…geared for the people on the ground" (The Brookings Institution, 2009).

Leadership and organization are monumental tasks. In the US Army leadership is defined as the ability of a person to influence others to accomplish specified objectives. Purpose, direction, and motivation are essential components of leadership which leads to how efforts are organized. As doctrine which provides the process for stabilizing areas through reconstruction to create security in post-conflict societies, co-author Janine Davidson from The Brookings Institute[31], exclaims that FM 3-07 describes "…how to do things, not why we do it, not where we do it, not when we do it. That's up to the politicians. That's important to understand." (The Brookings Institution, 2009). This declaration fosters uncertain directives set forth to reconstruction efforts. It backs the efforts of reconstruction on political agenda and questions if

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[31] The Brookings Institution is a public policy organization whose goals focus on: 1) Strengthening American Democracy 2) Foster the economic and social welfare, security and opportunity for all Americans 3) Secure a more open, safe, prosperous, and cooperative international system.

the politician or the soldier has a better understanding of what's occurring on the ground. If the co-author claims that *doing* reconstruction is the only instigating factor towards reconstituting a post-conflict nation, then those efforts will most likely embrace challenges and longevity. Understanding why we use reconstruction as a stability measure increases our perspective on the actions that create positive impacts. It is the "why we do it" concern that commanders need to understand in order to make effective decisions. General Marshall figured this out rebuilding Germany. His focus on 'hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos' were the center of his reconstituting Germany efforts and increasing the quality of life of a decimated population.

FM 3-07 challenges on-the-ground soldiers by its generality. As the co-author points out, politicians drive 'why, where, and when' reconstruction efforts occur. The main objective in post-conflict situations is security, which shouldn't be any surprise considering security is inherent to our well-being[32]. After essential services are restored in a post-conflict event (food, water, shelter, and medical) the process of reconstituting government through basic services should be clearly defined in order to promote the lasting effects of security of which the manual sets out to accomplish. This cannot be accomplished when leaders rotate through deployments and the context of the operational environment is lost because a process was not followed. These actions will further be challenged when policy clouds the professional and ethical judgment of progressive efforts needed to increase the quality of life through fostering health, safety, and welfare of the suffering population.

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[32] See Abraham Maslow's *Hierarchy of Needs*. http://www.deepermind.com/20maslow.htm.

Comprehensive Planning Process

Urban planning principles and techniques in the US revolve largely around a community's comprehensive plan. The comprehensive plan is the mechanism which orchestrates community development. It is referred as the "…most basic plan prepared to guide the development of the community" (Levy, 2009). There are eight goals of the comprehensive plan which are developed to sustain a society's health, safety, and welfare (Levy, 2009). These are not all-inclusive, but through overlap may progressively maintain society. *Figure 4-4: 8 Comprehensive Planning Goals as they Correlate to FM 3-07 5 Stability* **Sectors** attempts to illustrate the correlation of these goals and the five sectors of stability task set out by FM 3-07. They are inherently similar, with the strongest overlap supporting Economic and Infrastructure Development. This is hardly a surprise as infrastructure helps revive and sustain the economy, making it easier to predict the effects of certain development (USAID, 2006).

Figure 4-4: 8 Comprehensive Planning Goals as they Correlate to FM 3-07 5 Stability Sectors.

8 Comprehensive Planning Goals	FM 3-07 5 Stability Sectors
1. Health	1. Security
2. Public safety	2. Justice and Reconciliation
3. Circulation	3. Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being
4. Provision of services and facilities	4. Governance and Participation
5. Fiscal health	5. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure
6. Economic goals	
7. Environmental protection	
8. Redistributive goals	

Source: Author (2010). From information obtained from John M. Levy's Contemporary Urban Planning *and FM 3-07.*

A Model for Development

Planning, just as post-conflict reconstruction, occurs in complex changing systems (Hopkins, 2001). The nature of the comprehensive plan process and its goals are, indeed, familiar to the objectives of stability operations. While there is overlap between these goals, the essence of both is to coordinate efforts so a desired future may be achieved and sustained. In fact, planning in the urban discipline has five major implications which are, inherently, addressed in FM 3-07. In this case, the five elements of planning methods construct a society by the following actions (Hopkins, 2001): 1) Planners guide and steer development: While unable to

control complex social and environmental systems, planners affect outcomes of complex systems by becoming a part of them; 2) Planning entails monitoring, continuous planning, and acting: Planning principles, and even those of reconstruction efforts, cannot be based on reaction and irrational decision-making. The urban planner is versed in his/her environment, responsibilities of maintaining an agreed upon course, and inclusive and progressive decision-making; 3) Planners must be able to forecast complex systems in order to be prepared and effective: The planner who assumes the social and physical environment remains constant will find himself/herself incapable of making the best decision for their constituents; 4) Planners use the environment and resources around them to capitalize on opportunities and impede problems: In this way, planners are progressive. They are not isolated from the environment of which they impact, but rather embrace it and exploiting resources to attain goals; 5) Planning actions are interdependent: A planner focuses on actions that are aligned with goals. One decision or action affects how future actions are taken. Planning maintains its course by focusing on goals and thoroughly understanding the implications of their actions.

Both the comprehensive plan and stability operations focus on long-range planning and enduring effects. Using these five elements of planning as a model for reconstruction efforts may drive US Army leadership to develop plans which are driven by interaction and conscientious development. Still, where the comprehensive plan is mostly applicable as a reconstruction model lies within its ability to carry out these elements by coordinating society and local governments towards a common goal. The local government - city, town, village, county, or parish - is the organization that creates and maintains essential and basic services for a community (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000). While stability operations implement reconstruction efforts, these efforts are not designed for indefinite presence. The US Army *does not* maintain

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provincial responsibilities indefinitely. There are limits to its assistance and amount of resources it offers. It is for this reason an analysis of the comprehensive plan is an endeavor worth investigating. The goal of a hybrid comprehensive and reconstruction planning process allows leadership to comprehend approaches to sustainable governments while exhibiting the health, safety, and general welfare of the host-nation.

This fact, above all others, drives General Petraeus's infamous question of 2003 "Tell me how this ends?"[33] There are at least two responses to this question. The first being, this ends when the post-conflict society can sustain self-governance in a manner that maintains the minimum standard of life – food, water, shelter, sanitation, healthcare, rule of law, governance, and infrastructure. The second response is more detailed, and pertains to a different perspective of the question. In this case, the question evolves to, "Tell me *how* this ends." In this form the question derails from an explicit answer and requires an analytical reply. *How* this ends, doesn't require a informal response as much as it requests an explanation of a method. This form is altered from a question to a directive. It is in this manner that the comprehensive plan can assist as a model for development to increase the likelihood of a self-sustaining post-conflict society. This notion is offered for support of USG leadership who continue to strive for appropriate measures in order to be increasingly effective and efficient in their strategy.

Efforts of stability operations in Afghanistan are challenged with efficacy (as well as reconstruction planning efforts in Haiti, similar efforts in Somalia in the 1990s, and efforts in

[33] Rick Atkinson, embedded reporter for The Washington Post, spent considerable time with General Petraeus in Iraq of 2003. He later chronicled his experiences in the book *In the Company of Soldiers*, of which the question General Petraeus asked routinely "Tell me how this ends?" fueled political debate to the militaries strategy of ending war in Iraq. As of recent, the question has been transposed to a statement and redeemed to President Obama for a response to closure of war in Afghanistan.

post-war Germany before the Marshall Plan). National Security Advisor, Secretary of State, and Noble Peace Prize winner, Henry Kissinger, proclaims that current USG strategy of stabilizing post-conflict societies by *primarily* reconstituting national governance and "…creat[ing] a central government, help it extend its authority over the entire country and, in the process, bring about a modern bureaucratic and democratic society" is a strategy that cannot succeed (Kissinger, 2009). In this remark, Kissinger's allures that in Afghanistan an incompatibility for the USG to orchestrate such a difficult goal is given in part due to the social dynamics, the effect of years of civil war, and Afghanistan's "forbidding territory". Reconstituting a national government and putting forth the efforts to make it self-sustained extend across a broad time horizon and are better suited if it occurs in a bottom-up method. Evidence of this is not only transparent through Afghanistan, but may be relevant to the current Haiti situation where over 1 million Haitians live in dilapidated housing with sub-standard quality of life while the US Army coordinates with Haitian national governance to build schools.

While PRTs are intended to share reconstruction efforts through provincial governors, there remains a need for more emphasis on local and regional efforts (Kissinger, 2009). Population commitments at tribal groups, and the local community, are where the strongest sense of loyalty lays. These local levels of governance have the most access to people and security[34]; also, looking no further than our own local police, local security is more prudent than what national government tends to offer (Etzioni, 2009) . The comprehensive plan fits into this mold because the process it entails is centered on local community leadership, where government most often and directly interacts with the society (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000).

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[34] In this sense, the word security is not traditionally thought of as the uniformed police, but rather tribal and community social leadership.

As previously stated, the basic elements of a planning process are not unique between FM 3-07 and the comprehensive plan. The process entails the collection of data, analysis, design of a plan, and implementation and continual evaluation. These steps create the framework for planning, but do not suffice for a specific methodology. Whereas, the comprehensive planning process, while never operating as an all-inclusive guide, considers specific factors in a collaborative approach by searching for methods to enforce the public's health, safety, and welfare, FM 3-07 offers fragmented information, organized loosely on the commander's ability to control the operational environment. *Figure 4-5: The Comprehensive Planning* Process attempts to illustrate the method. In every approach is underlined 'ongoing public and agency participation'. It is this approach that is the basis for strong, community oriented development.

Figure 4-5: The Comprehensive Planning Process.

The Comprehensive Planning Process

STEP 1

Identify Goals & Objectives

- Issues & Problems
- Opportunities
- Current & Projected needs
- Priorities

Analyze & Document Planning Factors

- Demographic
- Environmental
- Land Use
- Economic/Market
- Infrastructure
- Public Service, Facilities
- Social/Cultural
- Esthetic
- Historical Context

STEP 2

Formulate Alternatives

- Preservation Areas
- Key Areas or Sub-areas
- Type & Intensity of Uses
- Infrastructure
- System Linkages

Evaluate Criteria

- Goals & Objectives
- Land Use Compatibility
- Location Criteria
- Land Use Balance
- Preservation Priorities
- Planning & Design Guidelines
- Planning & Design Prototypes
- Infrastructure Requirements
- Economic Impact
- Public Facilities, Services
- Multi-modal Transportation Opportunities

STEP 3

Evaluate & Refine Alternatives

- Evolve Hybrid
- Build Consensus

Implementation Program

- Capital Improvements Program
- Codes and Ordinances
- Plan Review Process & Procedures
- Funding Mechanisms
- Intergovernmental Agreements
- Sub-area Plans and Projects
- Special Service Districts
- Control Rate and/or Sequence of Development
- Administrative Action

STEP 4

Plan Adoption & Documentation

- Draft Final Plan
- Public Review
- Plan Refinement
- Plan Adoption
- Final Graphics & Text
- Implementation Actions

ONGOING PUBLIC AND AGENCY PARTICIPATION PROGRAM

Source: (Pointer, 2008).

Leadership

The comprehensive planning process begins with leadership. In order to enforce and tailor planning processes on behalf of the community, there must exist a point of unilateral direction. Without this critical element, the comprehensive plan would be discombobulated and nothing more than a collection of documents; where policy and guidelines are only as effective as the entity that enforces them. Leadership provides the control and synchronization of planning efforts in a community. Typically, this leadership is organized in some form of committee, such as the Planning Commission or Planning Board. Luckily for the US Army, leadership for reconstruction and stability operations has been ultimately allocated to DOS per NSPD-44. While DOS is the ultimate agency for responsibility, they should not be the sole proprietors of definitive decisions on high impact reconstruction projects. Rather, DOS should enhance the whole of government approach through mitigation and organization by establishing a headquarters which houses the planning process. In this manner, DOS becomes the organization of accountability and has access to the resources of other USG agencies involved in reconstruction efforts.

Leadership, coordination, and collaborative methods are fundamental theories of urban planning principles; where planners "…come to understand that problems will not be solved by one expert, but by pooling expertise and non-professional contributions as well; not by formal procedures alone, but by informal consultation and involvement; not predominantly by strict reliance on data bases, but by careful use of trusted 'resources,' 'contact,' 'friends,'; not through formally rational management procedures, but by internal politics and the development of a working consensus; not by solving an engineering equation, but by complementing technical

performance with political sophistication, support-building, liaison work, and , finally, intuition and luck" (Forester, 1980). This leadership theory and guiding planning principle fosters community development contiguously with FM 3-07 and NSPD-44 whole of government approach. As the DOS embraces leadership roles to build and direct strategies, US Army reconstruction teams may better coordinate and synchronize efforts when they have a conventional understanding of the nature of planning about which Forester remarks. *Figure 4-6: Transition to Unilateral* Direction attempts to illustrate new whole of government coordinated efforts to reconstitute a broken society. It exemplifies a whole of government approach where USG agencies do not operate as separate entities, but as a collection of different resources sharing a common goal (putting the pieces back together).

Figure 4-6: Transition to Unilateral Direction.

Source: Author (2010).

Ethics

Where leadership coordinates the physical efforts of reconstruction teams, ethics coordinates the rule of conduct of those involved in reconstruction development. Ethics in the

US Army bind moral behavior and good conduct. While good conduct is sometimes subjective, it is a soldier's responsibility to be prepared to understand the unconstructive or egotistical effects of his/her decision-making. It is even more imperative to be prepared in times of war, when policy decisions which have shown "…blurred moral, ethical, and legal lines that Soldiers have long been trained to observe and uphold" (Moten, 2010). Ethics provides an understanding and gives decision-making boundaries to the US Army's operational environment. Where the US Army adheres to general ethical guidelines known as *The Soldier's Creed*, it must also consider ethical basis for the sub-discipline of reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies in order to maintain a progressive course that is common as soldiers' transition through deployments.

Ethical principles for urban planning officials who implement the comprehensive plan are developed by the American Institute of Certified Planners and the American Planning Association. They are centered on three categories: 1) Serve the public interest; 2) Achieve high standards of integrity and proficiency; and 3) Continuously pursue improvements in competence. For the interest of comprehensive planning as a post-conflict development model, 'Serving the public interest' details are provided to illustrate approaches to foster an enduring self-governing community, as follows[35]:

1. Recognize the rights of citizens to participate in planning decisions;

2. Strive to give citizens (including those who lack formal organization or influence) full, clear and accurate information on

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[35] For a complete understanding of all three categories of planning ethics, visit: http://www.planning.org/ethics/ethicalprinciples.htm.

planning issues and the opportunity to have a meaningful role in the development of plans and programs;

3. Strive to expand choice and opportunity for all persons, recognizing a special responsibility to plan for the needs of disadvantaged groups and persons;

4. Assist in the clarification of community goals, objectives and policies in plan-making;

5. Ensure that reports, records and any other non-confidential information which is, or will be, available to decision makers is made available to the public in a convenient format and sufficiently in advance of any decision;

6. Strive to protect the integrity of the natural environment and the heritage of the built environment;

7. Pay special attention to the interrelatedness of decisions and the long range consequences of present actions.

According to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, FM 3-07 is "…first and foremost a document that provides guidance to the Army on how to better prepare for difficult challenges, it also helps to inform policymakers and the American public about why it is so important that we provide improved interagency capacity and planning and guidance to compliment the military's capabilities as they support and defend American interests in stability operations" (The Brookings Institution, 2009). Given the significant role of impacting on-the-ground efforts and reconstruction policy, leadership must be oriented to foster progressive policy. Progressive policy must be centralized on the best interests of the host-nation. It must consolidate whole of government efforts to instill self-governance of the host-nation. By creating grounded ethical causes of reconstruction, USG agencies may have a more enduring impact on creating self-governance and security in a region. Where urban planners typically

adhere to the public's health, safety, and general welfare, US Army reconstruction teams can enforce a similar ethical code. By doing so, it keeps a 'checks and balance' process in place of which USG agencies assist each other in maintaining progressive and familiar measures.

It is the efforts of strong leadership, backed by sound ethics, which will create the better procedures to accomplish any group tasks. Even though goal-finding is an obstinate task (Rittel & Webber, 1973), it is most likely better developed when those who are creating a goal have a comprehensive understanding of who, why, how, and what impact they may have. It is therefore thought, that during the goal setting stage of US Army reconstruction efforts, a foundation of professional ethics can create more long-term effects.

Data Collection and Analysis

Data collection of the existing conditions of social, environmental, infrastructure, and economic data gives urban planners the operational environment for the comprehensive plan in much of the same way that the intelligence discipline gives civil-military personnel an overview of the operational environment during combat, training, and peace keeping missions.   As with all steps of the general planning process, procedures may be enhanced, but conducting a step half-heartedly sets up a more un-predictive environment. Data collection is a prime example of this. The methods to data collection[36] are meant to keep meaning and context to information for decision-making. Generally, an urban planner understands this principle by making himself/herself aware of the concerns of the public through personal involvement (Forester,

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[36] The five step process to data collection is: 1) Clarify data collection goals – why are you collecting data? 2) Develop procedures to answer what you are trying to evaluate 3) Plan for consistency – ensure data is collected comprehensively, pragmatically, and similarly 4) Synchronize collection efforts and get off to a good start 5) Remain on track with goals and objective (Joiner Associates Incorporated, 1995).

1980). The goal of a whole of government approach to data collection invests in personal

involvement and is outlined in FM 3-07 Appendix D Section 49 as:

- Has the population of the village changed in the last twelve months?
- What are the greatest problems facing the village?
- Who is trusted to resolve problems?
- What should be done first to help the village?

These goals strongly correlate to data collection principles for creating elements of the

comprehensive plan. The goals provided in FM 3-07 are fixated to developing a story. Urban

planning theorist John Forester supports the development of a story to address planning issues

because stories provide a view of the social ways of a community which cannot be expressed on

paper or digits. He emphasizes the importance of listening to stories for context of situations,

and how to listen for before jumping into theory to address an urban development circumstances

(Forester, 1999). Data collected in a whole of government approach benefits from the questions

addressed in Appendix D of FM 3-07 by adding an element of context to US Army decision-

makers.

Once data is collected, the analysis begins for planners and is commonly expressed and

managed in maps through Geographic Information Systems (GIS)[37]. The US Army has the

capability of a similar approach by coordinating open-source GIS data from the National

Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the Human Terrain System[38], and civil-military personnel - CIA,

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[37] To understand how this data is arranged and stored in a US community visit Albany, OR website at: http://www.cityofalbany.net/it/gis/datausers/index.php?view=ShapeFiles.

[38] The Human Terrain System is a hardware/software package developed for experienced civil-military operators in order to provide a commander with details of the operational environment. For more information visit:

USAID, DOS, USDA, USACE, and the international community - operating on-the-ground to begin development of a spatial database of existing conditions. There are two primary characteristics which should be embraced when using GIS to manage spatial characteristics across some geographical area. The first, GIS databases created for analysis must primarily be managed by one entity. It is conclusive to match this responsibility to the leading organization. Urban planners most often have a working knowledge of GIS because much of their decisions are based on spatial references. With GIS, planners transpose digital layers of corresponding information to understand a comprehensive impact; thus, if a road network was proposed for a specific geographic area, it could be transposed on land plats to understand what and who will be affected by its construction. In a similar approach, during reconstruction in post-conflict societies, if a road is proposed in a new community, there must be an understanding of how that road affects adjacent communities. Will it detract from a community, or cause it to grow? If growth is the result, does the community have the infrastructure in place to sustain it? If it detracts, is US Army leadership engaging foresight which protects or maintain that community's quality of life?

This simple example shows how data can be analyzed and portrayed to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT). SWOT, in the urban/regional planning discipline, is a analysis tool that helps understand the characteristics of a community and develop processes to make improvements. In order for decision-makers to understand the context of how SWOT affects the community, there must include some type of public participation and interpretation of the environment. Data from this process can create basemaps which delineate

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https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2010/information_papers/Human_Terrain_Systems_(HTS).asp.

areas of responsibilities amongst coordinating and synchronizing efforts. Similarly, the US Army uses a method known as SWEAT-MSO assessment, to analyze existing conditions of sewer, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other.

What should be emphasized is that the organizational development of data collection and analysis may be inherent to leadership, but should follow guidelines of leadership and organization. When data and information are inherent to one entity, it allows a point of reference for reconstruction teams to turn to for information. This is imperative in civil-military reconstruction operations where personnel are routinely rotated through deployments. By fostering a single point of information, personnel can begin to depend on sound and confident information that is continued through a familiar process in order to better impact societies.

Identify Goals

Goals provide direction to planning efforts and are the general aims of the community (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000). While the approach is simple to understand, implementing goals on a whole of government approach, along with community leadership in a post-conflict community, can be immensely difficult to manage. The human dimension of goals competes with many different political agendas. On one hand, USG agencies contend with their departmental agendas. A US Army reconstruction team leader may have opposing goals to a USDA reconstruction team leader; where one might focus on increasing security thorough the presence of police, the other might desire to instigate measures of crop development for the same purpose. Conversely, there lies contention between the host-nation community leaders, as opposed to provincial leaders, and possibly to national leadership and international influences. For instance, the goal of prioritizing and improving specific dilapidated road networks may be argued between

community needs and national needs. Furthermore, USG reconstruction teams may have different ideas of goals for road networks to have the ability to expand logistical services across different regions within the host-nation.

A goal, in the sense of the comprehensive plan however, is a measure of development derived from a collaborative process between the public and the planning council. Equally contentious, goal setting in communities, where similar culture and societal values are shared, can be the most complicated process for planners to manage (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000). In these cases, this process typically entails a visioning workshop sponsored by the planning department of the local community. The workshop sets out to solicit direction from community members in order to set objectives for comprehensive development. It is this process which encourages a democratic approach and community invested efforts. There are different processes to visioning workshops. Some may focus on opportunity-driven approaches, where the community assesses its future on opportunity or constraints and identifies ways to exploit or repress those measures; some approaches may be issue-driven, where the community identifies critical issues and develops efforts to address those issues; some focus on goal-drive approaches, while the most complicated to manage, orient future development based on community consensus; other approaches focus on vision-driven, where community leadership express egocentric goals and the community has the opportunity to support or ratify what is being expressed; and finally, there is the blended approach, which is a hybrid of the any combination of the above mentioned (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000).

No matter what approach urban planners adhere to, it is their professional responsibility to utilize a combination of empirical data, education, and experience to progressively drive community participation in order to develop common goals. Planners must be able to respond to

community inquiries in a technical manner that informs them of the underlying reasons of certain proposals (Healey, 1996). FM 3-07 upholds these principles, but does so in a generalist way. Described as 'unity of effort', this goal making process is defined across the DOD as "… the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization – the product of successful unified action" (p.1-3). In other words, FM 3-07 acknowledges that cooperation, participation, and unified actions are elements of organizational goal development, but lacks description of how this "plays out" in post-conflict communities. Reconstruction leadership may be counterproductive when a comprehensive goal development is not outlined in a field manual. If US Army reconstruction teams do not include managed participatory goal development, than post-conflict societies may revolt in some manner to restructure USG reconstruction agendas to reshape the direction of efforts and policy in much the same way that contemporary 1960s American society did during human rights movements (Rittel & Webber, 1973).

Goals setting in a post-conflict society must be done with experienced and well trained professionals. However, this does not necessarily need to rely on the DOS to implement. When US Army forces take on this responsibility they must be prepared for principles in planning *and* communication. The must be able to reformulate what post-conflict community leadership discerns as necessary goals, as opposed to an indigenous culture of telling a more resourceful entity what they think you want to hear (Wilson & Conway, 2009). This, possibly, is the reason why over 1 million Haitians live in squabbles as the USACE works with the Haitian national government to build schools following the massive earthquake of JAN2010.

Formulate Alternatives

The process of formulating alternatives in FM 3-07 is inherently unclear. In the Field

Manual's planning process this step is not addressed in a manner that allows a on-the-ground

soldier to make decisions regarding this procedure. In the comprehensive planning process,

however, formulating alternatives provides frameworks for achieving comprehensive goals

through different resources or different approaches. Just as the path to meet economic goals are

not analytically and innately created, the path to reaching goals that stabilize a society after some

post-conflict will not always be replicable. This occurs because of the dynamics of the physical

environment and the human dimension of planning. These cause uncertainty of how specific

impacts of planning will be repeated. For community development in America, a participatory

approach to create alternatives to planning goals ensures that the community provides insight to

the methods of attaining goals. This is important because formulating alternatives involves the

community. It provides another forum for planners to understand the local culture, to develop

and refine objectives, and to solve potential problems as the planning design begins to form.

To account for the development of alternatives in the comprehensive plan, urban planners

evaluate criteria with public input. *Figure 4-5: The Comprehensive Planning* Process listed

some of the criteria which build up the process of formulating alternatives. The top criteria,

goals and objectives, are discussed in a public forum and not by defining them from an isolated

approach. In this sense, planners may get a sense of priority in how to implement designs. If the

goal of the community is to create a public outside theater, planners may evaluate certain criteria,

such as availability of public and private funding, infrastructure requirements, need, and land use compatibility, and begin to discuss the probable course of action(s) needed to meet this goal.

Potentially, this could be a powerful tool of which US Army reconstruction teams utilize to understand the extent of local resources and/or efficient methodologies to accomplish goals. For example, given the detrimental effects of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the ultimate goal, presumably, is to reconstitute infrastructure. By conducting a 'formulating alternative' forum, reconstruction team leadership may determine approaches to accomplish this goal by coordinated efforts of Haitians and the USG. Where the USG could improve road conditions, it may be found out that the Haitians have the skill set and resources to repair sidewalks, or vice versa. This closely resembles the US Army's and USAID's approach to capacity building, but more so embraces a working solution to collaborative decision-making and reconstruction efforts. Specifically, it enhances capacity building by implementing participation procedures that exploit host-nation decision-making. Also, formulating alternatives fosters the US Army's professional experience of reconstruction in post-conflict by orienting goals on essential and basic needs, rather than potential needs. It gives a platform to implement professional and educated assumptions to local host-nation civilians.

Evaluate and Refine

Implementing the comprehensive plan requires control and synchronizing interdependent parts. It also sets the conditions of the third step in the comprehensive planning process, 'evaluate and refine'. The approach to implementing a plan which adheres to comprehensive planning measures is considerably different than implementing plans through stability operations in post-conflict societies. Implementing a planning process has the luxury of being more

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centrally controlled in the urban planning discipline. Generally, plans and developments are controlled by planning and local leadership committees who maintain and enforce standards through land-use and subdivision regulations and ordinances. This central control represents the importance of designated leadership mentioned previously.

While the NSPD-44 directs the DOS to coordinate, plan, and implement reconstruction and stability operations it does not provide a method to do so. In this, there is little understanding of how on-the-ground agency players utilize FM 3-07 to manage specific and synchronized efforts concerning how plans are implemented. Instead, FM 3-07 reinforces that the whole of government approach will be composed of the Interagency Management System (IMS) established by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization of the DOS (p.1-14). IMS is a "…Washington-based decisionmaking body with an executive secretariat that serves as the central coordinating body for the USG effort" (p.1-14). Its goal is to prepare whole of government implementation plans for USG reconstruction efforts, in post-conflict societies. Understanding how ground efforts utilize this information to implement plans is unclear in FM 3-07.

A comprehensive approach to mitigating the implementation of reconstruction efforts from across international borders would entail having USG agencies, such as US Army reconstruction teams, to implement planning processes in community areas and report the information collected to a locally controlled DOS authority. This method keeps decision making closer to the source of its impact and retains policy guidance as demonstrated in NSPD-44. Instead of sustaining a disenfranchised method of impacting post-conflict societies, USG agencies can create inclusionary argumentation, which is a valued system of knowing what

decision to enforce based on its meaning to a community (Healey, 1996). In this sense, the decision maker has context of the operational environment and the impact of his/her efforts.

Once the planning process has been implemented, leadership from USG agencies and the host-nation can expect unforeseen repercussions to the policies, plans, and ideas they propose. Their efforts must not stop at the physical completion of a specific reconstruction effort, but must be monitored to understand if their impact met the intention and facilitated a post-conflict society or decremented it. This can be done through participatory measures that involve holding the host-nation responsible to reporting how the reconstruction project affected society and what were the repercussions.   Repercussions must be valued by their impact. Participatory leadership must decide how the cons measure to the pros of the project and its plan. If the repercussion is progressive in nature and benefits the general community without exploiting particular groups, than reconstruction teams can "bag" the experience, reference it, and hope to apply it in similar situations in order to predict further progressive efforts. If, however, the repercussion creates an impact that is negative and detrimental to the community, then reconstruction teams must be part of the solution to remedy the situation. These procedures are the basis for how evaluation and refinement take place.

Additionally, when a planning process is implemented and needs to be refined, leadership can expect to readdress the planning process at the collection and analysis stage. New information acquired might require a different decision to be made, or a conclusive examination of the pros and cons for maintaining existing planning measures; this is illustrated in *Figure 4-2: Commander's Cyclical Planning* **Process**. When a problem must be implemented, but may have a negative effect on some part of society, it would seem imperative to reach a goal through communicative efforts and comprehensive planning methodologies mentioned so far. The role

of the reconstruction team mitigates detrimental efforts by evaluating and applying a value system to consequences it imposes.

A prime example of this is illustrated in *Figure 4-7: Evaluate and Refine Problem Solving* Example, where an existing road adequately services Village A and Village B, but is dilapidated from lack of maintenance to a point that it needs to be replaced. As reconstruction teams plan and implement reconstructing a new road design, they realize that the existing environment and conditions are not cost-efficient to rebuild the dilapidated road and a proposed road is implemented. However, this circumstance now ostracizes the inhabitants of Village B who require access to the road to sustain their livelihood. In order to be successful in the ultimate agenda of creating sustainable governing communities and implementing efforts to generate security, the reconstruction team should utilize local leadership and comprehensive planning process to formulate a conclusive decision.

Figure 4-7: Evaluate and Refine Problem Solving Example.

Source: Author (2010).

Policy Formulation and Adoption

Formulating and adopting policy completes the comprehensive plan. So far, the methods mentioned up to this point have centered on leadership, bounded by common principles, which

utilize information in an organized and collaborative matter to create measurements of development which lead to a self-governed and enduring community. The comprehensive planning process is designed to meet a desired end, and must be documented in such a way that is understandable to the general public. The plan, after all, is the public's rightful owner since they are the ones who fund it and contribute to it through democratic processes.

As exclaimed in a panel discussion during the release of FM 3-07, the manual acts as a mechanism to influence policymaking towards informed decisions which exploit the capability of the military in stability operations (The Brookings Institution, 2009). Part of this process is to include local decision making capability of the post-conflict society. Their involvement has been the theme of the comprehensive planning approach to international reconstruction efforts. The insight post-conflict societies can offer will help US Army reconstruction teams to understand the human-dimension of the operational environment and create more enduring effects.

Once plans are comprehensively adopted, they must be available in formats that are understandable and accessible to the host-nation community and occupying agencies. Doing so will enhance its prospects for adoption and will provided a point of reference that can be used by the local community and reconstruction teams as they strive to make progressive decisions to stabilize the region (E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000).

CHAPTER 5 - Conclusion and Recommendations

"It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; because there is not effort without error and shortcomings; but who does actually strive to do the deed; who knows the great enthusiasm, the great devotion, who spends himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement and who at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly. So that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat."

> - President Theodore Roosevelt

Conclusion

The Need of a Post-conflict Development Model to supplement FM 3-07

As mentioned earlier, this thesis sets out to accomplish the recognition of a decision making model which US Army leadership may utilize to take into account the impact of reconstruction measures on the health, safety, and well-being of people who are transitioning through conflict. According to recent Congressional Reports, news media, and non-profit and NGO studies, reconstruction teams are plagued with a lack of organization and the ability to implement goals. Allegedly, this process has been undermined since post-WWII and continues in response to the Haiti earthquake disaster, OIF, and OEF. This criticism is continually echoed in the discussions of today's military responsibilities through the media, USG leadership, and US Army leadership. Methods are questioned in a manner that sequesters US Army reconstruction efforts and their ability to have an enduring positive effect on foreign nations. Therefore, a study

of reconstruction team methodology as it pertains to the guiding doctrine of FM 3-07 is prudent to investigate in order to root out the causes of criticisms. As has been shown in this thesis, US Army reconstruction efforts form policy and give guidance based from this Field Manual, which does not appear to grasp a clear post-conflict reconstruction methodology. As a result, the population of which the US Army services post-conflict societies is susceptible to well-intended efforts, but unfavorable responses; and the on-the-ground reconstruction leader is left to make decisions based on incremental outcomes and not a strong source of reference.

In this matter, FM 3-07 appears to need a model which encapsulates post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Building a model within FM 3-07 reinforces the organization of reconstruction authority and provides a purposeful process which can be evaluated, implemented, controlled, maintained, revised, and, most importantly, transposed. While methods and procedures are not new concepts to the US Army, they are routinely investigated for effectiveness. The US Army looks for ways to encapture processes which are utilized through rotating leadership with the intention of maintaining context, command, and control. The most familiar of these is the decision making model known as the MDMP. As illustrated in *Figure 5-1: Military Decision Making* Process, this process reinforces procedures of the basic problem solving process mentioned in Chapter 4. The MDMP is nothing more than the scientific approach to solving military problems (Misigoy, 2010), but has had an enduring effect on military leadership. It is familiar to soldiers, as well as other DOD agencies, and is a vital method to develop courses of actions on an objective. It is implemented to compensate for austere conditions, such as when a leader is replaced - the incoming leader understands the direction of the predecessor's mission by studying his/her MDMP information.

Figure 5-1: Military Decision Making Process.

Source: FM 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion.

While an post-conflict development model can be considered a tool for guiding US Army leadership, it does not solve every issue or create the absolute desired commander's end state. It does, however, provide the leader a *process*, much like the MDMP, in which he/she may implement and reinforce leadership decisions, much as the way the comprehensive plan does. Where FM 3-07 lacks a reconstruction methodology, the comprehensive plan can provide a possible solution to measurable procedures necessary to reconstitute a post-conflict society. The comprehensive and rational plan are "touchstone" (Hoch, 1993) guides that help form decision making which seeks to instill the health, safety, and welfare of its people through community influenced policy. In much the same way, US Army leadership uses Field Manuals to guide their actions during mission planning and implementation. In this, a model used as a touchstone can progressively direct US Army activities in a manner to achieve specific task. Furthermore, when applied, a model can be used as a tool to measure response and activity.

Models are tools for military leaders to help develop goals and manage progress. The process for leadership decision-making must be conclusive in military disciplines in order for missions to be carried out in an organized and controlled environment. Bringing a clear, understandable, decision-making process and expressed methodology for post-conflict reconstruction efforts to FM 3-07 is conventional to the nature of DOD operations. If criticisms suggest reconstruction teams are disorganized, the only way to debunk those claims will be to investigate methods of organizational development and track measureable progress. One way to accomplish these goals are to develop a post-conflict development model of with which US Army leadership is familiar, and use it as a tool that aims to create environments in post-conflict societies that are centered on health, safety, and well-fare. It will be through these measures that a stable society will begin to emerge and foster events which lead to sustainability.

A Personal Experience

In SEP2007, you would have found me at Fort Riley, Kansas preparing to deploy to Afghanistan as an Embedded Training Team (ETT) member to the Afghan National Army (ANA). My pre-deployment training as an ETT member prepared me to mentor ANA soldiers, handle combative medical emergencies, combat/infantry tactics, reaction to improvised explosive devices, cultural awareness/familiarity, and command and control during uncertain events in the operational environment. I spent three months with the 1st Infantry Division learning the strategies and tactics needed to become "proficient" as an ETT leader. The training was oriented to infantry tactics more so than mentoring methods, but provided me with a foundation of how to carry myself amongst foreign coalition forces.

Upon arriving in Afghanistan, however, I was assigned to the Afghan Regional Integrated Security Command – South - Engineers. I found myself emplacing buildings and structures on ANA bases and performed reconnaissance of emergency response requirements for the host-nation population, all without having an understanding how these efforts interrelate with people and land usage. My unit's decision making process implemented little consideration of the people we were going to impact, and more consideration for the guidance of our Afghan interpreter. We emplaced a trust in him that was too great to be balanced with the needs of the people. We deliberated and trusted in him, water-well locations, hygienic facilities, orphanage improvements, construction and operation of needed medical facilities, and any other construction issue of which we didn't have the resources to dictate ourselves.

Then, during a foot patrol in Kandahar Province, it occurred to me that we (the greatest military in the world) were mismanaging our resources and capabilities in reconstituting this

worn torn and oppressed country. The occurrence happened while I was teamed with one US

Air Force Enlisted Generator Technician and embedded within an ANA company which was

accompanied by a Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team. During this patrol, we set

out to monitor the day's activities of the community, provide low level medical services, enhance

the ANA's navigational techniques, and if possible engage the enemy. The area was far

removed from the protection of the coalition forces which protected the city Kandahar. It was

farther west and on the border of Helmand Province. Helmand is inauspiciously known for the

large number of Taliban forces, combat, improvised explosive devises, and Taliban supporters.

During this patrol, we navigated through small communities and agriculture land. We

interacted mostly with children, and monitored our surroundings carefully. The foot patrol lasted

about six hours, and in between that time we came across a newly built school. The structure

was more new and brighter than surrounding structures, excluding a distant mosque. It was

encompassed by a mud wall which stood about six feet tall and coated with a pleasant earth tone

white. I noticed the ANA starting to take formation on one side of the school, and I remember

pondering "What are they doing?!?" I had no authority to intervene in their mission, nor was I

apart of their planning. I was simply asked if I wanted to accompany the ANA and Canadians on

a foot patrol, of which I and my counterpart willingly volunteered. We maintained position

around the school for approximately 45 minutes. As the ANA regrouped and continued the foot

patrol, my element passed the school. I then gathered more information about the site - it had a

simple playground and looked like a well-suited building to school children. A closer look

revealed that most of the windows were broken and the school, while new, was empty.

During the rest of our journey I tried to piece together the events and inquired why the

ANA would take an offense approach on a school, and why the windows were broken and the

school empty. A logical assumption occurred that the Taliban had gained control of the school and were using it as one of their assets.

As we finished our patrol and regrouped at the ANA base, I inquired about the situation we had just experienced. The answer given to me was – the US and Canada built the school for the local children. Once the children started using the facilities, they were ostracized and tormented by Taliban and Taliban sympathizers. The children's parents were harassed and eventually the Taliban forced the children to no longer use the school. Instead of being utilized for its intent, as I suspected, the Taliban began using it for their needs.

Later I learned, and would experience, that events such as these were not unique. Continually, I would be involved with construction of ANA facilities that did not involve ANA leadership collaboration. I would be asked to be responsible for situations of which my technical expertise was far too limited for the profound impact my duties would have on human life. Oddly enough, the person I replaced on my deployment was a Lieutenant Naval Pilot, who admitted to having no desire or inklings into construction planning and methods, nor seemed to care about his impact on the population. My commanding officer was a Submarine Engineer, and one of my teammates hadn't been in the military for six years. In total, we were eight Air Force, Naval, and Army personnel with only one junior grade officer who was an experienced engineer and we were impacting the lives of ANA soldiers and Afghan civilians the best way we could; but, allegedly, our impact didn't account for who and how we were making a difference.

Today's military personnel are often tasked to accomplish missions for which they have not been sufficiently trained for. This is expected during times of war, and lack of experience and training is intended to be supplemented by procedures and methods found in Field Manuals.

When a Field Manual fails to provide clear methods to achieve intent, then how does one measure its value? What quality does it have if it cannot be used as an unambiguous instrument to direct actions and reference procedures?

My personal experience tells me reconstruction efforts are important to reconstituting post-conflict societies and initiating a self-governing nation can provide security within its borders. It tells me that where experience lacks, a dependency for precise and clear direction is needed. It tells me that how we meddle in the affairs of our international neighbors in a time of need reflects our true character and purpose. If we complicate the process and cloud reconstruction efforts with un-constituted policy, then we are not doing justice to those we serve, nor are we improving the security of a situation in the manner we set out to do.

Today's reconstruction teams *are* making a positive difference, but I have experienced that their efforts are defragmented amongst the agencies and amongst different teams. While some literature and studies indicate that reconstruction teams are now organizing and monitoring their efforts, there are still improvements the US Army should make in FM 3-07 to solidify how methods of planning reconstruction are carried out. This thesis was written in order to provide a solution to consolidating, organizing, and planning those efforts. It sets out to call upon those who can, to instill organized techniques that can be transposed amongst rotating leadership. It challenges the effectiveness of FM 3-07 as a true on-the-ground resource that binds efforts amongst the whole of government approach. It is written, so that the commander of the next "Haiti event" can recognize that as he/she drives through shantytowns that house 1.5 million people and of whom are amid cholera pandemics, just to build schools for children, that priorities and synchronization of efforts are being overlooked, which insure that the public has first and foremost their health, safety, and welfare interests represented. Not through distant policy

making does this realization occur, but through the ethical guidelines and incorporated procedures that bind today's US Army leaders to ensure that the "right" thing is being done in reconstruction of post-conflict societies.

Summary

The evaluation of US Army reconstruction teams lends itself to more than merely critiquing organizational development issues. There lies in reconstruction teams an opportunity and hope that a dire situation can be made better. In that, the critique of reconstruction is only as good as the leader who is willing to investigate those claims and develop methods of how to improve his/her responsibility to reconstituting post-conflict societies. What should be the center of reconstruction efforts are agendas that lead to peaceful and sovereign nations through progressive policy, clear objectives, and a formulated plan. The goal to sovereignty happens through empowering the host-nation population through sustainment of basic quality of life principles, and is part of the overall goal of creating stable and secure regions following conflict. In order to instigate a self-governing region, local leadership must be validated through provisions it offers its population – health, safety, and welfare. A government must develop the means to implement its judicial power and provide ways for the population to earn income, all the while maintaining internal integrity. US Army reconstruction teams can be, and are, an integral component to development during post-conflict reconstruction. They can become the catalyst which binds a process of cohesiveness, comprehensive reconstruction methodologies, and clear objectives to meet security goals through reconstruction.

As the US continues to be involved in foreign affairs of reconstruction, there will constantly be a need to understand how our actions affect other parts of the world. We cannot

operate in increments whose methods are nontransferable nor measureable, nor can we isolate agency participation in whole of government approaches to reconstruction agendas. Reconstruction efforts for the US Army must converge to a central arrangement that encourages command and control, that instills a presence of authority and responsibility, which has the understanding of efforts and impact, one which measures objectives and accounts for changes, and, finally, one that coordinates host-nation development through collaboration, knowledge, empowerment, and human-rights entitlements. These ideas help orient today's US Army reconstruction leader to professional conduct that assists in decision making to insure the security of a defragmented and suffering population.

The continual efforts to explore and develop methods of US Army reconstruction efforts matter because, literally, livelihoods are at stake. People – children, women, disabled, the elderly, the oppressed, the tortured, the crippled, and families - are not always granted and blessed with the resources that exist in American society. The US Army has a means to ensure the welfare and security of those who cannot provide for themselves in periods of post-conflict. It has the ability to change environments, to improve lives, to give a chance for independence where no chance existed before. US Army reconstruction teams have the opportunity to improve quality of life, to construct shelter, to implement social and judicial justice, to plan out communities, to integrate and foster community involvement, and to fundamentally change the course of civilizations. Our army is more capable and disciplined than any other army in the world. The US Army is well versed to fight and equally accomplished in peacekeeping missions, all in the name of volunteered and selfless service membership. Where situations require the best efforts, the US Army must continually strive to meet the world's expectations.

People in decimated areas depend on our army to save their lives, to change their environment for the better, and to expunge the wickedness which breaks down the sanctuary of communities.

As with most changes in the way something is done, the process of improving the US Army's effect on post-conflict reconstruction will be entangled with pros and cons. And even though criticism dictates that modifications in organizational reconstruction team efforts are necessary, US Army culture will embattle this change mainly through the logistical challenges of acquiring the "right" personnel and re-training the force. *Table 5-1: Pros and Cons of a Change to Current US Army Post-Conflict Reconstruction* Methods illustrates and prepares the leader for the positive effects of improving US Army post-conflict reconstruction methods, and the challenges that each idea incurs.

Table 5-1: Pros and Cons of a Change to Current US Army Post-Conflict Reconstruction Methods

Change to Current US Army Post-Conflict Reconstruction Methods	
Proposal	*Ethical and Rational Based Reconstruction Methods and Policy*
Pros	Sets comprehensive occupational standards; unifies inter-agency efforts; may reinforce host-nation quality of life and human-rights issues; provides context of operational objectives; gives meaning for desired end state effects
Cons	Requires occupational "buy-in" and continual motivation for sustainment; allows for less flexibility in the decision-making process
Proposal	*Centralize Leadership Authority in Reconstruction Efforts*
Pros	Emplaces DOS as the accountable agency per National Security Presidential Directive 44; balances inter-agency resources; provides one-stop-shop for information; inherently organizes control and progress; defines the operational environment
Cons	Must determine how NSPD-44 is enforced; could create cultural differences between inter-agency objectives; could create resource management issues between inter-agency leadership
Proposal	*Use of Local Reconstruction as a Means to Support National Governance*

Pros	Theoretically creates a progress and long-term impact to redevelopment; if managed correctly, can easily measure progress; develops host-nation understanding to give context to other operation within areas of responsibilities
Cons	The process requires extensive training of USG personnel in order to be implemented correctly; could be resource intensive; may require detailed and comprehensive planning; requires intimate knowledge of host-nation
Proposal	*Adopting a post-conflict reconstruction model to supplement FM 3-07 for US Army Reconstruction Teams.*
Pros	Provides the on-the-ground soldier context to operational procedures; lays out comprehensive courses of actions; can be used as a true reference to tasking where lack of experience exist
Cons	Will require subject matter experts to re-train the force; to be successfully implemented may require leadership to possess multidiscipline understanding (physical and cultural environment, politics, communication)

Source: Author, (2010).

If the US Army doesn't look at ways to improve its capability to reconstitute incapacitated societies, the consequence doesn't just fall to the host-nation populace, it is globally impacted. Security becomes the ever-present issue in these circumstances; and those nations which do not operate with some type of developed governance, do not participate in progressive global issues. They, instead, become isolated and volatile countries and are "eyed" because of their inability to coordinate control. The oppressive and precariousness reign they may foster, creates ill-communication and an aurora of uncertainty. The US Army does not seek to embrace these types of conditions. Instead, it seeks to recover governance and human rights, but it cannot do so on unmediated procedures. The organization is too big and complex, and the operational environment is often filled with too many uncertain factors. Soldiers and leadership are, and have always been, expected to complete missions based on procedures, methods, and authority which limit uncertainty. To ensure that life is preserved and livelihoods enhanced, the US Army is obligated to increasing the effectiveness of its force through better organizations of reconstruction efforts.

Recommendation

Throughout this thesis, a course has been laid that illustrates the recent history of reconstruction efforts in post-conflict societies, their impact, and a review of their criticisms. It is important to understand the role of US Army reconstruction teams in order to understand how the USG pieces together fragmented nations. This study has challenged readers to weigh historical reconstruction events, with policy based reconstruction methods. Inherently, what's involved with reconstruction efforts are the effects of livelihoods and global security. The US Army must realize that methods of reconstruction efforts are worthy of in-depth study because they are the means to enhance and give opportunity to a society that has been stripped from its governance and are intended to promote the stability that the USG seeks to instill. Also, US Army leadership is charged with the moral and ethical obligations to encourage acts that are proactive to USG directives. When USG studies deplore the effect and efficiency of US Army reconstruction efforts, then internal investigations into organizational development and methodologies are valued for their aim to recourse efforts in a manner that support Presidential directives.

What is provided in the remaining portion of this thesis are four concepts of which FM 3-07 can enhance in order to attend criticism and improve the development and methods of US Army reconstruction teams. The first concept exploits the ethics to method based reconstruction policy and methods. It illustrates that an ethical foundation is an appropriate foundation to bind collaborative efforts, while at the same time providing a valued framework of promotable efforts. The second concept illustrates the importance of a unity of effort that is controlled and not fragmented in its approach to solve issues. This concept maintains that command and control are instrumental in military tasks, as they are the epitome of conduct. Third, a bottom up approach

to stabilization is mentioned in order to emphasize the power of local community. This is not to say that in post-conflict societies US Army reconstruction efforts seek to pit the community to national governance; rather, the local community is the mechanism of the national community. Before a nation is created, it is done so through the union of communities. Finally, a proposed post-conflict development model is offered as a supplement to FM 3-07. This model is offered as groundwork to further investigate the impact of current US Army reconstruction methods. It represents a solution, and not *the* solution. It is developed through the correlation analysis of local US communities comprehensive plans, because the plans are familiar, effective, and instill the same type of stable characteristics desired in post-conflict communities.

These concepts, while conceived empirically through a deployment as an Engineer Officer, and enforced through various experts, are mentioned to provide a solution to a known problem. They may, or may not, be conclusive to solving the issue, but the intent here is to declare that an issue exist, it needs attention, and there are solutions.

Ethical and Rational Based Reconstruction Methods and Policy

FM 3-07 is a manual that influences post-conflict reconstruction policy and on-the-ground US Army leadership efforts. It is devised to create stability in regions which contend with a defragmented government as a result of some type of threat. In reconstruction efforts are the deliberate actions to create the sovereignty needed to implement a quality of life that sustains the host-nation population, while providing a means to regain independence. Reconstruction efforts primary effect is to create security, the residual effects are to foster an environment of independence.

Given these boundaries, decisions which directly impact the well-being of a population should not compete with unclear motives that are removed from the health, safety, and welfare of a suffering society. An approach to anchor these efforts must be founded on *ethics*. In US Army reconstruction efforts, ethics bind directives and exploit the health and prosperity of the host-nation first and foremost. Indeed, a nation prospers when it is secure, and it is secure as a result of its prosperity. Where the natural cycle of community development in a nation contends within itself, the cycle of US Army post-conflict development efforts must contend with a desired end state. How the US Army organizes ideals of prosperity are best suited if they are known throughout the reconstruction team discipline by some predetermined ethical standard.

In this, ethics provides a context to efforts. It reasons the importance of efforts and provides an inherent checks and balance within the reconstruction team community concerning cohesive decision making. It gives value to the profession and sets it apart from other functions of military services. A solution to binding reconstruction teams, to give them meaning and solidarity, is to provide them with an ethical statement. Just as the DOD has authorized each military agency its own ethic standard (Department of Defense, 2010), the US Army has the means to provide ethical guidelines to sub-agencies/units which promote Army Values during the course of fulfilling missions and abiding by leadership.

Forming the ethics which bind a discipline can be illustrated in many forms. Ethics can become a list of values or principles, such as the USAIDs Nine Principles of Reconstruction; illustrated in

Appendix A - USAID Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development. Or, ethics can come

in a statement which aims to guide actions. Finally, ethics can be distributed as a set of codes

which orient the implementation of actions. An ethical statement which binds reconstruction

efforts for US Army teams may look similar to:

> In post-conflict society involvement, the US Army seeks first and foremost to prioritize the actions which value security, shelter, hygiene, and community betterment. We recognize our responsibility to provide the basic needs of life, and will implement our resources in a manner that support human-rights, and foster community independence. Through interdisciplinary and cross-cultural collaboration, the US Army will enforce NSPD-44 as the means to stabilize decentralized foreign governments and improve the quality of life of those who are unable to do so for themselves.

Centralize Leadership Authority in Reconstruction Efforts

A whole of government approach, as set out in FM 3-07, insists that in order to achieve

"…the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress…" interagency

coordination is essential. This coordination, as determined in NSPD-44, falls on the shoulders of

the DOS. However, this study finds that organizations and projects, such as USACE and CERP

funds, operate regardless of DOS intentions. There is little evidence to support that the DOS is

implementing the command and control of reconstruction efforts as the Presidential Directive set

out to mitigate. Reasons why the function and capability of DOS in reconstruction efforts are

not the center criticism is unknown. The leadership authority in these situations has been

mandated and enforced by the highest political power, but their progress to organize and plan

reconstruction efforts are undermined by the complexity of the situation, human-dimensions, and

independent agency goals.

In order to reclaim a command and control presence, DOS must coordinate internally and

formulate progressive methods to unite different USG agencies, and do so through exploiting

NSPD-44. Authority is only effective when it is enforced. If DOS does not enforce its authority, a disorganized approach to reconstruction will continue, resulting in sustained criticism and immeasurable progress. Secondly, DOS must instill operation centers where information is housed and collectable. When US Army units implement reconstruction efforts, there needs to be a familiar source of decision making and leadership. The US Army maintains control through rank in the "chain of command". As a mechanism to organize US Army efforts, the DOS must realize that it is the cornerstone of the development process, and falls within the chain of command.

Centralized leadership creates points of contact which can assess progress and impacts in development. Just as the Planning Board channels information and decisions through the comprehensive plan, the DOS can be the source to information US Army leaders can turn to in time of need.

Use Local Reconstruction Efforts as a Means to Support National Government

Most sustainable nations are formed when communities interlock and agree, or forced to agree, upon a set of standards. Presuming that national governance is more capable than the sum of all its communities is a dangerous assumption which presupposes that political power is explicit. Political power is not explicit, but equitable. It's enforced through people who are bound to a code; or bribed, or coerced, or blackmailed, etc. Political power is not a magical force which controls our actions. It is the product of a group of people who share ideas and have collected the necessary resources to enforce those ideas.

The *power* of community cannot be intrinsically replicated through the coercion of some outside entity; it must be encouraged and nourished through internal motivation. In this, the

enduring effects of nationalism result from the collaboration and motivation of many communities. The sum of communities builds a nation. The community, after all, maintains the integrity of a nation. If communities fail, how does the power of the nation make-out?

These ideas support, what Henry Kissinger professes, as a bottom-up approach to reconstituting national governance. In other words, US Army and DOS efforts may be better suited if they simultaneously develop local community ideals with recognition to national development. The idea is that communities reinforce the nation. They are not so much a product of the nation, but rather the means to put in place governance which looks to the best interest of its people across a broader scale.

The process of fostering community development to sustain national governance is circumstantial to the context of the post-conflict society. Where a society is economically limited before a conflict, the post-conflict situation cannot readily provide means to escape economic despair; however, a post-conflict event may provide an environment where the community is willing to re-identify itself as a stronger, more resilient entity. Therefore, and maybe even suspect, a community approach to national governance would be enduring. It becomes a mean to preserve nationalism, and not a manufactured organization instilled to support nationalism.

A Proposed Post-Conflict Development Model

The benefit of FM 3-07 to an on-the-ground soldier is, allegedly, impeded by its lack of clear methodologies. As a reference to supporting NSPD-44, it may not provide today's soldier with a familiar, transposable, process which sets out to accomplish necessary tasks in support of a commander's intent. Soldiers manage an inconceivable amount of internal and external

logistics and procedures during the implementation of any mission or tasking, any method to

clarify any procedure is valued for its efficiency results. For this reason, a systematic approach

to conclude appropriate decisions during reconstruction efforts can be part of the soldier's

"toolkit". This approach becomes an intangible, but very necessary, tool which directs efforts

and has a deliberate affect upon the host-nation populace. The systematic approach is

consciously implemented through procedures, and known to urban planners as a method which

"…selects a course of action (a set of means) for the attainment of his ends" (Banfield, 1991).

Even though the ends in urban planning and those of reconstruction development are carried

through by intrinsically different organizations, both aim to achieve the well-being of the

population for the purpose of creating security.   What is offered in the following pages is a

simple understanding of the elements of a systematic approach in post-conflict reconstruction

and a proposed post-conflict development model. These tools are offered as a method to obtain a

"…clear and consistent set of ends" (Banfield, 1991) of which all participating USG agencies

can orient towards.

Elements of a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Decision Making Process

FM 3-07, most likely, excels at defining objectives, but it lacks defining a model to reach

those objectives. It is good at defining policy, but lacks the ethics behind policy and how it is

implemented in US Army leadership. It defines leadership, but does not define *how* information

is secured, distributed, and accessed through the hierarchy of reconstruction team members. It

describes the operational environment, but misses laying out a rational process to impact that

environment. It could be mentioned that FM 3-07 is good at providing overtly broad efforts to

reestablish peace, but does so through objectives that are not well laid out or comprehensively

understood under reconstruction team communities. It provides elements to reconstruction that are too vague, decentralized, and un-methodological.

US Army leadership typically is aware that the on-the-ground soldier makes decisions best when he/she understands their operational environment and those who operate in it, know their areas of responsibilities, and follows distinct leadership that can manage and assess their efforts. When these three components are within the soldier's understanding, he/she will be able to better implement their tasks, and provide the flexibility needed to meet the overall objectives. It is this reason that this thesis promotes a model of systematic approach to decision making in reconstruction efforts – in order for the soldier to understand their environment and operate in an efficient and effective manner, which instills leadership direction while positively considering the best interest of the host-nation. These accomplishments are not done so by elements which are arbitrary, but rather an interconnected set of actions by various organizational responsibilities that all orient towards an assumed end.

In order to maintain integrity of NSPD-44, US Army leadership takes into account resources from various other USG agencies. This process supports NSPD-44 directives by reinforcing a whole of government approach. As provided in

Figure 5-2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Decision Making Process, a layout of the systematic approach to post-conflict reconstruction illustrates the elements needed to develop a course of action provided from a layout of the internal operational environment of reconstruction teams. This layout, in and of itself, provides a conceptual, if not fundamental, map to the actions needed to develop an approach to planning reconstruction. As a planning tool, it represents the assembly of the resources necessary needed to achieve objectives established within the reconstruction team (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, & DeGrasse, 2007). It sets out to illustrate the basic components to developing reconstruction efforts and portrays them in ways that suggest how they interconnect. It also emphasizes the organic[39] nature of reconstruction teams, but its strengths lie within interpreting the elements to understand key players and their responsibilities. While some elements can be expanded upon, depending on the context of the operational environment, this model can be a tool to understand the different social, physical, and policy factors needed to reach a goal.

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[39] The term *'organic'* in military terms suggest the degree at which a unit is self efficient. If a unit is organic, it depends less on other units to accomplish its mission; whereas, if a unit in non-organic, it requires support from other entities to maintain operational effectiveness. Organic reconstruction teams rely on their internal resources to accomplish missions. The organic environment provides centralized efforts that are not confused with non-organic leadership and directions. Non-organic reconstruction teams are reliant upon logistical measures which can prohibit them from accomplishing tasks; for example: a reconstruction team reliant on some other unit for security and transportation, its prioritized to that unit's leadership and mission requirements. A team may not get to where they need to be and when.

Figure 5-2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Decision Making Process.

It lays out a simplified approach to how decisions come to be made; an approach that is distinct and recognizable. If distributed amongst USG agencies operating in host-nation, this map distinguishes responsibilities and defines participation. It ties in the efforts of multi-agency participation. It shows that Descriptive Reports are needed to draw a Course of Action, and provides a setting in which the leader can implement direction to obtain those reports. Anywhere in this layout you can point to some element and define the impacting variables which influence its implementation. If Uncertainty is a mitigating issue, than the model can be used as a tool to understanding the factors which have an impact on Uncertainty – which are the Human Dimension and natural environment; Descriptive Reports; Social Input, Survey, and Professional Experience; and Objectives. The leader then identifies the weak links he/she are contending with, and reaches an appropriate course of action to compensate. For example, are Descriptive Reports too vague to assess the social situation of the host-nation; is the Human Dimension too complex and removed from western cultural ideologies that it creates doubt in the impact of efforts, etc. Understanding the weak links creates motives to better understand the situation, therefore, providing the means to make a better decision on behalf of USG or host-nation leadership.

If, however, one of the elements are overlooked, not implemented, or half-heartedly implemented, the course of action is at a greater chance of not meeting its full intent. This is because each element of the layout is dependent on other element(s). To increase the probability that reconstruction efforts meet a desired end state, each element must be defined and understood by the presiding leadership and distributed to the reconstruction teams. This creates a point of reference when teams run into issues, and defines the operational environment in such a way that those issues have a direction to be remedied.

Potentially in this model, we can observe Table of Contents for a FM solely dedicated to reconstruction efforts. One which lays out the topics for an on-the-ground soldier who needs to fulfill their mission in the best possible manner they can, but may have limited experience in post-conflict reconstruction. One which defines organizational responsibility and seeks to improve the mechanisms of reconstruction efforts in a whole of government approach. One which maps whole of government participation and illustrates the operational environment and cultural response. One which offers procedural techniques which are understood across various organizations and implemented in a similar fashion through transposing leadership.

It is when a soldier can conceive an appropriate course of action through deduced means, such as this systematic process model, that he/she will have an impending effect from which they were sent out to accomplish. With good information, comes good decision making. The systematic approach modeled here, sets out to provide the soldier with the good information they need to make the right decision.

A Comprehensive Planning Model for Reconstruction Efforts

This thesis concludes with a proposed model to conduct reconstruction in post-conflict societies of which the US Army may abide by. It looks to mitigate the *ad hoc* manner of organizational development of which current criticism is aimed, and offer a resolution that binds these types of efforts in a uniformed and controlled manner. In this study is advocated a model that exploits the importance of leadership and policy which relates to host-nation interests, through a series of synchronizing and partnering efforts. It plainly illustrates that methods to post-conflict reconstruction are headed by the DOS through NSPD-44 and founded on local host-nation participation. The US Army can best achieve the security it looks to create when it can

implement the elements which create a functional hierarchy of leadership, comprehend known internal/external motives, understand the operational environment and whole of government approach, and familiarize themselves with a transposable reconstruction methodology.

The urban planning discipline's comprehensive plan, plays into this model as a process that organizes and supports FM 3-07 by illustrating leadership, emplacing host-nation interest, and developing reconstruction strategies. Illustrated in *Figure 5-2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Decision Making* Process, this proposed model is not *the* solution to HASC criticism; but a viable alternative to reconstruction methodologies which lead to more organized and responsible efforts. What is underlined in this model is the rational planning process. The rational planning process must be the keystone which holds all other agency efforts together. It is the plan, after all, which creates decisions with regard to courses of actions (Banfield, 1991). Without well understood goals and an enforced unity of effort, courses of actions are distorted.

In all, if a plan is not implemented, organizations will exercise efforts which are not harmonious to their counterparts. Instead, they will develop internal plans whose objectives predominantly lie with their own understanding of the host-nation situation. To keep organizations grounded to this plan, it must be at least understood by four categories: 1) Leadership of DOS, implemented by synchronizing efforts and directed by the NSPD-44; 2) A planning model, based on the comprehensive plan, which illustrates the process of the accumulation of information to implementing a plan; 3) Partnering with host-nation leadership, to develop local goals and identity; and 4) The rational planning process.

Figure 5-3: Comprehensive Planning Model for US Army Reconstruction Efforts.

Department of State Leadership

Figure 5-4: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 1.

As mentioned before, NSPD-44 is the Presidential authority which assigns reconstruction leadership authority to the DOS for all USG agencies. *Figure 5-4: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part* **1** (above) shows how this fits into the comprehensive planning model for US Army reconstruction efforts by establishing a source of leadership much as the way a local US community does with a Planning Commission. Where, in urban planning fields, the Planning Commission is the "…body charged with both the power and the legal duty to prepare the comprehensive plan…"(E. D. Kelly & Becker, 2000), the DOS holds comparable authority by developing and enforcing policy to which reconstruction teams abide.

This proposed model also demonstrates the need for DOS to continually communicate, monitor, and assess reconstruction team efforts (which as we will see, are followed through to include host-nation participation). This is done through the management of information, and is carried out the same way as a local community plan. Where a city manages development information in a comprehensive plan, the DOS could manage information at a headquarters which is accessible to reconstruction teams. The information concerned with reconstruction efforts may be Presidential/key leadership goals, host-nation goals, social/cultural characteristics, infrastructure requirements, key concepts which are unique to the host-nation, community

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identities, physical environment, housing requirements and existing conditions, economic background, natural resources, agri-business, existing land-uses, and human-rights.

This information can be managed through various different media – reports, web links, booklets, operation orders; but, as with the comprehensive plan, is best managed through a combination of documents and maps. In the comprehensive plan, documents give the local community access to law abiding procedures, while the maps act as visionary tools that describe the community setting. A similar approach can be carried out through DOS efforts by using GIS and the Human Terrain System. The use of maps, in this case, becomes a tool that signifies cultural, physical, and infrastructure boundaries. It acts as a guide to help delineate where USG agencies need to be involved. As a resource for US Army reconstruction teams, a map enhances the operational environment by illustrating who and what will be impacted in each unit's area of responsibility. It easily describes events in spatial locations, and is part of the analysis procedures which identify areas in need. When controlled and managed properly, the method of controlling and managing information ensures that DOS will incessantly be involved in planning reoccurring development events *and* assess reconstruction impacts on the local host-nation community. Furthermore, it implicates DOS as the entity which limits the friction between other USG agencies in goals and objectives. And, most importantly, it provides a single point of contact concerning the operational environment and is vital to transposing leadership which rotates through deployments.

A Comprehensive Model to Reconstruction of Post-Conflict Societies

Figure 5-5: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 2.

Source: Adapted from RM Plan Group (1998) by Author (2010).

Isolated from the rest of the model, *Figure 5-5: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part* 2 (above) demonstrates the rational planning process in a post-conflict operational environment. This section demonstrates through the vertical headings a need to obtain information, prioritize it, develop goals, develop alternatives, implement a plan, and evaluate and re-implement procedures where necessary. Through the horizontal headings are elements necessary to complete each task. Each element must be seen for its context to the situation. There must be flexibility implemented in the process, but done so to grounded and familiar components. The elements take into account those actions which look to create stability in a post-conflict society.

The model takes on a whole of government approach and combines it with participation of the host-nation to instill a true unity of effort, all the while being maintained through DOS. Through this model basic human needs are addressed (food, water, shelter, sanitation, and healthcare) and FM 3-07s Five Primary Stability Tasks (security, justice, humanitarian,

governance, and infrastructure) are approached. This section empowers the host-nation by linking them through the reconstruction teams to the DOS. It adds a balance to the decision making power that embraces opinions and directions from those who are most impacted by reconstruction efforts, the local host-nation community.

Reconstruction teams, which are in constant contact with the host-nation and DOS, apply post-conflict reconstruction efforts through communication, community involvement, professional experience/education, and DOS guidance. These teams comprise the whole of government approach set out by NSPD-44 and are the mechanisms by which the DOS plan is enforced to work towards goals. They are, simply, all USG agencies, to which the US Army has currently made the largest contribution to.

The process illustrated here closely resembles the MDMP, and is not only familiar to the US Army, but other DOD agencies as well (as a matter of fact, this process is the basic approach to the scientific model used to solve issues). It is in this section that local community goals are derived through host-nation participation, a capacity-building assessment is completed, and a preliminary plan is developed. The information collected here is then retained by DOS, to be used to produce a comprehensive report on the entire host-nation which can assess reconstruction impacts and help determine gaps in community development. This model is important because it organizes efforts, it includes host-nation participation, and it provides a means to assess current efforts, allowing adjustments to be made where necessary. It provides the link that legitimizes host-nation authority by having them represented through trained reconstruction team leaders.

Partnering with Local Host-Nation

Figure 5-6: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 3.

Local Host-Nation Meetings and Participation

Source: Adapted from RM Plan Group (1998) by Author (2010).

Appendix A - USAID Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development describes partnership as the ability to collaborate with all organizations within the operational environment. As part of the proposed Comprehensive Planning Model for US Army Reconstruction Teams, partnership must be both recognized and respected, and especially so amongst the host-nation participation. *Figure 5-6: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part* 3 emphasizes partnership as collaboration, and most definitely not the fulfillment of a host-nation 'wish-list'. This, above all other efforts of communication, must be realized by the reconstruction team leadership. He/she must understand that they are fulfilling specific mission requirements that are unique to the nation-building discipline and instill certain ethics and values. The US Army reconstruction team leader must be assertive and partner with the local host-nation to develop a balance of ideas that are important or essential to the community, and to the well-being of all of society.

In this, the host-nation must be involved in the redevelopment of their community, but they cannot be the decision makers of how US resources are allocated. They should have an influence on direction, but must be reinforced that reconstruction teams are allocated to support human-rights to instill security. The team leader must investigate community information and develop a priority list of achievable objectives, and then bring this list for discussion to the community or community leadership. As illustrated, this list can be mitigated by the reconstruction teams, and should so since it's inconceivable to expect the DOS to accomplish all elements of reconstruction progress.

Rational Urban Planning Model

Figure 5-7: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 4.

Identify Problem and Needs	Collect and Analyze Data	Develop Goals and Objectives	Clarify and Diagnose Issues	Identify Possible Alternatives	Analyze and Asses Alternatives	Evaluate and Recommend Alternatives	Develop and Implement Plan	Manage and Evaluate

Source: Adapted from RM Plan Group (1998) by Author (2010).

The rational urban planning model, illustrated in *Figure 5-7: Comprehensive Planning Model - Part 4* (above), is the means US urban planners use to create a process that limits uncontrollable effects, and balances the methods to solving issues fairly among citizens. The components of the comprehensive planning model for US Army reconstruction teams are blended by the rational planning process. As the comprehensive planning model is implemented, it can be correlated to the rational planning process for familiarity of the MDMP.

The rational model is offered in the comprehensive planning model as a support tool that demonstrates the flow of decision making. It shows that the comprehensive planning model is encompassed by familiar methods to derive a course of action. As a supplement, it is a reminder that planning reconstruction efforts occurs in a logical and rational method that is adhered to by large functioning organizations such as the US Army and other USG agencies. Furthermore, it

illustrates that the reconstruction team is, quite literally, the passage from post-conflict to stability. It requires that reconstruction teams adhere to and implement specific procedures that are both measurable and transposable.

Appendix A - USAID Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development

1. Ownership

Build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people.

2. Capacity-Building

Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies.

3. Sustainability

Design programs to ensure their impact endures.

4. Selectivity

Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests.

5. Assessment

Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions.

6. Results

Focus resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable and strategically-focused objectives.

7. Partnership

Collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors, NGOs, the private sector, international organizations, and universities.

8. Flexibility

Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency.

9. Accountability

Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.

Appendix B - PRT Occupational Functions

- A *PRT Team Leader* is a member of the DOS and serves as the primary advisor to Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees on reconstruction issues. The PRT Team Leader will initiate and assists host-nation local governance to prioritize necessary actions to ensure stability. He or she also prepares reconstruction situation reports for their assigned area and oversees the management of the team's inter-agency resources.

- The *Deputy Team Leader* is generally a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel and is the Chief of Staff to the PRT Team Leader. He or she approves security measures for PRT operations, is the liaison to the military force in the area of which they reside, and coordinates the day-to-day activities of the inter-agencies.

- A *Multinational Force Liaison Officer* is a senior ranking DOD officer who is responsible for initiating security measures for PRT convoys and operations. He or she collects the intelligence of the area to brief the Deputy Team Leader and coordinates emergency responses in case of attacks.

- The Department of Justice provides a *Rule of Law Coordinator* to advise the US Embassy on how PRTs are responding to host-nation government issues. He or she also provides guidance to host-nation government officials concerning judicial issues and reports to the Embassy on the progress of the local judicial system.

- A *Provincial Action Officer* is a DOS official who is the reporting officer that meets with host-nation authorities and reports to Embassy officials' weekly progress. He or she is the subject matter expert on host-nation politics and economic development. They meet with local officials and private citizens to support the PRT Team Leader decision-making.

- The *Public Diplomacy Officer*, who is also employed by the DOS, is a public affairs administrator who exploits the PRTs successes. He or she shares the responsibility of coordinating meetings between PRT leadership and host-nation officials.

- The USDA provides an *Agriculture Advisor* who develops agriculture assistance programs for the host-nation.

- The Army Corps of Engineers provides *Engineers* to train and advise the host-nation engineers on PRT projects. The engineer also provides assessments of infrastructure, contractual scope-of-work objectives for host-nation contractors, and project management. This person supports the information provided to PRT Team and Deputy Leader of 'on the ground' projects.

- The *Development Officer* is employed by the USAID. This representative works with host-nation leaders to increase economic and infrastructure viability. He or she coordinates their activities with the PRT to develop and coordinate a PRT work plan. He or she is also the subject matter expert on USAID Principles of Reconstruction and Development and counsels the PRT Team and Deputy Leader.

- A *Governance Team* is a three person team contracted through the USAID. These teams provide PRTs "hands-on training in the provision of public services, finance, accounting and personnel management" (FM 3-07, F-27).

- The US Army provides *Civil Affairs* teams, who make up the largest component of the PRTs. These teams are generally US Army Reserve soldiers with special skill sets, unique to their civilian jobs. If a Civil Affairs team member is a Police Officer in his civilian occupation, he or she will most likely be utilized to a Rule of Law team to support the Department of Justice official.

- The *Bilingual Biculture Advisor* is a DOD contractor, who is usually an expatriate. This person is the main contact between PRT personnel and host-nation leadership. They are advisors of cultural and society issues, and maintain a college degree.

Appendix C - United Nations Declaration of Human Rights

Article 1.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3.

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4.

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14.

(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15.

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16.

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17.

(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22.

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.

(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24.

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25.

(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26.

(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27.

(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28.

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29.

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

# Appendix D - Haiti Reconstruction Mapping Efforts

Source: *European Commission Joint Research Center 2010.*

Residential Houses Damage

Source: Quickbird 2003, copyright Digitalglobe.

Significant number of collapsed dwelling units.

Source: Geoeye 2010, copyright GeoEye.

Appendix E – Map of Afghanistan's "Ring Road"

Map Appendix - E: Map of Afghanistan's "Ring Road"

Source: The Atlantic, McClatchy Washington Bureau 2009.

Appendix F – Physical Infrastructure Discrepancies in Iraq

Kinks in the railroad system network are common. Iraq struggles to keep railroad materials from being looted and the network itself maintained. *Source: Bechtel Corporation, 2003.*


Reconstruction teams are often charged with organizing the repair of equipment, such as this train axel which is missing the brake block, oil feed, and axel cover. *Source: Bechtel Corporation, 2003.*

Iraq power infrastructure has been the target of destruction and looting, such as this Substation Control System. *Source: Bechtel Corporation, 2003.*

Water/wastewater infrastructure are often illegally tapped, exposed, or have leaks which introduce disease into the community. *Source: Bechtel Corporation, 2003.*

Most bridges along major transportation routes need special repairs which Iraqis are unable to accommodate. *Source: Bechtel Corporation, 2003.*

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