The unconventional strategic option: Democracies supporting non-state armed groups

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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Manhattan, Kansas

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Abstract

This study examines the effects of regime type on support to foreign insurgent groups. Theoretically, it relies on structural and normative characteristics of democracies by arguing that leaders in these regimes tend to encounter multiple disincentive mechanisms generally not found in non-democracies. Thus, leaders of democratic regimes are less likely to actively support foreign insurgent groups as a component of strategy below the threshold of military intervention. When they do choose to lend their support, they tend to choose either low-level types of support (simple material support) or high-level support (full military intervention). Leaders of non-democratic regimes, however, can employ the full spectrum of support types to seize strategic opportunities and tailor strategies that are more costly and more risky.

The dissertation tests this theory by using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The statistical analysis of a dyadic, cross-sectional, time-series dataset of 179 countries from 1975 to 2009 provides some support for the proposed hypotheses. Structured, focused comparison of three conflicts with multiple within-case observations (cases) also reveals modest support for the hypothesis that democracies are unlikely to support insurgent groups in general and have multiple disincentives toward providing mid-level types of support that expose the democratic leaders to additional costs and risks. Unexpectedly, the qualitative case studies reveal that in addition to the structural disincentives initially identified, leaders of democratic regimes may have a harder time managing the principal-agent relationship between the supporting state (principal) and the insurgent groups (agents). The need to maintain a large winning coalition to survive as a leader in a democracy presents multiple principal-agent problems and allows rebel leaders and rebel factions to resist integration, prevent the loss of autonomy, and facilitate the establishment of alternative avenues of resource mobilization. While previous literature in
political science and international relations provides evidence that structural characteristics of democratic regimes make them good at winning interstate wars, this study provides initial evidence that those same structural characteristics make democracies’ success more elusive when applying unconventional strategies short of war.
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Major Professor
Emizet Kisangani
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>National Security Planning Group</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>SLFP</td>
<td>Sri Lankan Freedom Party</td>
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<td>Great Sinhalese Council (Sinhala Maha Sabha)</td>
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Ken Gleiman 2018
Dedication

To my father, Dr. Lubomir Gleiman, and his father Dr. Jan Gleiman, and his father Dr. Koloman Gleiman, and his father Dr. Eduard Gleiman, and his father Dr. Leupold Gleiman…
Chapter 1 - Introduction

For centuries, unconventional wars or proxy wars have been strategic options for state leaders. Rather than engaging in direct armed conflict with an adversary, state leaders can choose from several options that do not cross the commonly held norms defining the threshold of war. Such options allow them to pursue strategic objectives between full military intervention and non-intervention by supporting insurgent groups. This indirect approach, where a state provides support to a non-state armed group, which targets an adversary, has always been attractive because it avoids some of the costs and risks associated with direct, armed conflict. In recent years, this policy choice has received more attention in both mainstream policy circles and academic journals (Hoffman 2014; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014; San-Akca 2016). The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how and why different regime types consider and employ this unconventional strategic option.

The state of international norms and the legality of supporting violent non-state actors are clear, but frequently violated or bypassed by special exception. Many scholars would argue that international law prohibits states from supporting insurgent groups that target other states when the two states in question are not at war (Lobel 1983). This is largely based on the principles of non-intervention and neutrality in the legal tradition that lays the foundation for the law of armed conflict. Other scholars note, however, that the search for an explicit codification of this apparent international norm has been elusive (Bailes and Nord 2010; Greene 2006). For example, one of the most debated points in the United Nations (UN) quest for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has been whether there should be a blanket prohibition on arms transfers to non-state end users. Additionally, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 2131 in 1965 stating that, “no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist, or armed
activity directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state.” Yet, this type of activity (short of war) continues to serve as an alternative to militarized conflict between states. It is a policy choice that can provide an alternative to or supplement to armed intervention in an intra-state conflict. It allows state leaders to take some action toward seizing a perceived strategic opportunity or changing a perceived threat trajectory.

Despite the recent attention of this policy choice and the quest for establishing a ban on the practice, some states have made this a common practice in their foreign policy decision-making. Cuba, Iran, the Soviet Union, and post Cold War Russia have provided various types of support to insurgent groups in many countries over the years. Russia made little attempt to disguise its support for rebel forces in Ukraine, and Iran made no secret of its support to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthi rebels in Yemen (Hoffman 2014).

However, unconventional war or proxy war is not limited to those states that are well known to be autocratic regimes. Democratic regimes have also engaged in this kind of activity. For example, the United States (US) supported foreign insurgent groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Tibet, Nicaragua and many others during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the practice has not ceased. The US and other western democracies in a loose coalition provide support to non-state rebel factions in Syria that oppose President Bashar al Assad and fight the so-called Islamic State. It seems that the contemporary world is awash in non-state armed groups and situations where state leaders are making deliberate decisions to provide support to non-state armed groups.

Scholars have demonstrated that regime type remains among the most powerful predictors of war and impacts the decision making process of leaders in the use of direct military force against other states (Bennett and Stam 2003). When leaders are assessing the different
costs, risks, and potential benefits of policies in dealing with adversaries, they will consider and rule in or out various distinguishable policies. These might include everything from doing nothing to military intervention or some combination thereof. Supporting a foreign insurgent group is one option likely to be considered. If regime type is causal to decisions about the use of military force, then intuitively regime type should also have an impact on the decision to engage in support to foreign insurgent groups. Some research has been done in this area, but no single study has focused exclusively on how different regime types approach this strategic option particularly below the threshold of military intervention. Very little previous research has examined the inclinations of different regime types toward different types of support.

1.1 Purpose and Argument

The purpose of this dissertation is to answer the following research questions: How does regime type affect the decisions of state leaders to provide support to a non-state armed group? What factors affect this decision making process? Does regime type help determine the types of support a state is willing to provide and the overall strategy it is willing to pursue?

This study proposes that regime type is a key factor in determining if state leaders are likely to support an insurgent group and the types of support they may be willing to provide. Leaders of democratic regimes face both normative and structural conditions that affect their ability to consider and implement policies and strategies that involve the provision of support to foreign insurgent groups. Different types of support indicate varying levels of commitment and risk acceptance on the part of the supporting state. The nature of the support may also indicate different strategic purposes in terms of intentional signals sent by the supporting state. Thus, normative and structural conditions of democratic regimes compel leaders to avoid supporting insurgent groups; however, when they do, leaders of democratic regimes will do so in ways that
incur minimal domestic costs and risks. Consistent with other studies of regime type and conflict (Lake 1996; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999; Reiter and Stam 2002), democratic regimes may also support groups decisively but only as part of other major military operations. Based on the common assumptions of previous studies, leaders of democratic regimes need to show a clear threat trajectory that demonstrates existential potential (Maoz and Russet 1993).

Autocrats, on the other hand, are structurally less sensitive to risks associated with accountability to the electorate.¹ Leaders of such regimes may easily reject the norms prohibiting support to insurgent groups. Autocratic regimes, therefore, will be more flexible in the types of support they are willing to provide and may tailor their strategy to involve types of support that allow for greater effectiveness in unconventional warfare and greater influence over their insurgent proxies. Autocrats will use unconventional warfare to seize strategic opportunities.

1.2 Significance of the Study

Most studies that address support to insurgencies use state support as an independent variable. They usually focus on the effects of support on duration and violence of intrastate conflict (Heger and Salehyan 2007; Regan 2002), the effects on negotiation and bargaining (Bapat 2006; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Cunningham 2010), the impacts on the organization of insurgent groups (Weinstein 2007), and the effects on the outcomes of intrastate conflict (Connable and Libicki 2010; Paul 2010; Paul et al. 2013; Record 2007).

¹ The accountability of leaders in democratic regimes will be described in more detail in chapters two and three. This dissertation uses the framework of “selectorate” theory where leaders in a democracy must rely upon a large winning coalition from a broad group of people who collectively have the power to select the leadership. See (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003)
Limited recent research examining state support as a dependent variable shows that democratic regimes may be less likely to engage in the practice of supporting insurgencies both in general, and toward other democracies in particular (Maoz and San-Akca 2012; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; San-Akca 2009 2016). Yet, other scholars indicate that democracies use other methods short of war, including support to insurgent groups, to coerce democratic and autocratic adversaries alike (Forsythe 1992; James and Mitchell 1995). In most studies, regime type is not the focus of empirical analysis. For example, San-Akca (2009) and Salehyan et al. (2011) theorize that relative strength, alliances, and rebel group characteristics affect the decision of state leadership to provide support or the decision of rebel leaders to receive it. More recently, Maoz and San-Akca (2012) demonstrate that strategic rivalries have the most powerful effect on the probability of a state supporting an insurgent group. While their study also indicates a strong bivariate statistical significance when both the potential supporting state and the targeted rival state are democracies, their model shows no statistical significance for joint democracy when controlling for other factors. Most recently, San-Akca (2016) found that the democratic peace mechanism seems to work in the context of state support for rebel groups. She concludes that democracies maybe less likely to support rebels targeting other democracies and this support level may decline if a rebel group targets a democratic state.

On the other hand, Forsythe (1992) as well as James and Mitchell (1995) contend that democratic leaders might be more inclined to use covert action, including supporting an insurgent group, against other states regardless of regime type of the targeted state. A final group of scholars analyze the effect of regime type on the decisions about military intervention in civil wars in general (Koga 2011; Regan 1998).
This extant research has a theoretical gap that this research helps to fill. As San-Akca (2016) states, “The relationship between regime type and state support of rebels should be closely investigated, to reveal whether the assumptions of democratic peace holds when it comes to state support for rebels.” Theoretically, these previous studies do not focus on how regime type may affect state leaders in their decision to support insurgent groups and what the strategic manifestation of that policy will be in terms of how insurgent groups are supported. In other words, little knowledge exists to help understand how the type of support to insurgencies might also be determined in part by regime type. Examining how leaders decide to support insurgencies serves as a theoretical bridge between the gray area that constitutes the threshold between war and militarized policy options short of war. Thus, understanding how regime type affects the decision of leaders to pursue policies of supporting insurgencies is a significant contribution to existing knowledge on support to insurgent groups, and the types of support given to them.

At the theoretical level, this study thus goes beyond previous studies by arguing that regime type is a major factor in state leaders’ decision to provide support to insurgent groups and what the strategic manifestation of that policy will be in terms of how insurgent groups are supported. Most importantly, this dissertation explains why democracies are naturally impeded from using strategies relying on unconventional war. Because of normative and structural constraints, leaders of democratic regimes cannot use unconventional warfare to seize strategic opportunities. In order to use policies that involve supporting insurgent groups, leaders of democratic regimes must provide a convincing narrative of a threat trajectory that has existential potential.

Methodologically, most previous studies hardly differentiate between varying ways a state can support an insurgency. Extant literature mostly makes “support to insurgency” a
dichotomous variable, thus effectively equating the quality or type of support in all observations without examining the types of support in terms of the costs, risks, and benefits associated with supporting insurgencies (Salehyan et al. 2011; San-Akca 2014). While some other studies have acknowledged different types of and degrees of support (San-Akca 2016), most studies do not tie these types of support to the decision making mechanisms and the structural and normative pressures within regimes types.

Since the goal of this research is to connect the decision making of state leaders to support insurgent groups, one must look at what support actually means to the insurgent groups. Regan and Norton (2005) provide strong evidence that insurgent groups need more than just a grievance to fight an intrastate conflict. Critical to the effective execution of armed conflict is resource mobilization. Just like any other organization, insurgent groups must find avenues to mobilize the necessary types of resources required to pursue their strategies for achieving their goals. How an insurgent group obtains its resources (avenues of mobilization) can be just as important as the types or characteristics of the resources themselves. For example, an insurgent group can use a local avenue of resource mobilization by taxing a local population, or committing theft, or operating an otherwise legitimate business. A group can also develop external sources by smuggling, raising money from foreign diasporas, or find a sympathetic foreign state whose leaders are willing to sponsor the organization. While all resources have a value, insurgent groups must obtain specific kinds of resources that are both tangible and intangible. An insurgent group requires manpower (which may include people with special knowledge or skill), funding, material (of many kinds), sanctuary, and intelligence (Metz and Millen 2004; Paul 2010). This categorization speaks to the relevance of resources to the
This typology, however, only partially explains what insurgent groups need for victory or to achieve their goals.

This study uses the phrase, “avenues of resource mobilization,” to describe a particular method of acquiring resources from their source to their utilization. The term support refers to resources given to the insurgent group. Furthermore, this study uses a categorical variable (with ordinal attributes) to operationalize types of support and thus reduces aggregation bias. As a number of scholars contend, the use of dichotomous variables needlessly removes “potential important information” that may improve “our understanding of a given phenomenon” (Mitchell and Moore 2002; Pickering and Kisangani 2010). Very little research has been conducted on the characteristics or types of support states use when pursuing a policy of providing assistance to an insurgency. Other studies provide a limited typology of support. For example, Byman et al. (2001) classify support first by origin; for example, state support, non-state actor support, and diaspora support. Moreover, they examine support in general by degree as critical, significant, or minor in terms of its relevance to the outcome of the conflict. Although they also assess various types of support including money, safe haven, diplomatic backing, arms, training, intelligence, direct military support and inspiration, they do not analyze these types of support in terms of the decision-making and strategy of the supporting state. Generally, existing studies make no attempt to examine the strategic decision making of leaders in establishing policies and strategy to support insurgent groups.

Another methodological issue is that previous studies are limited to the type of data used in their analysis. Most studies use the post-Cold War period. Such limitations do not account for systemic pressures (post-Cold War only), or selected cases and observations based on criteria designed to conceptualize different phenomena. San-Akca and Maoz (2012) and San-Akca
(2016) are important exceptions. These recent studies use more comprehensive data from both the Cold War and post-Cold War period, but limit the analysis to dyads of politically relevant groups (PRGs), something that may not be ideal for this particular phenomenon. This study uses a dataset that accounts for all potential supporting states (not just PRGs) and includes both the Cold War era and post Cold War period.

Finally, most extant research uses either quantitative or qualitative analysis. This dissertation uses both approaches to analyze the impact of regime type on support and types of support to insurgent groups. Mahoney and Goertz (2006) explain that scope and causal generalizations are greater when using quantitative approaches than they are when attempting to apply qualitative approaches alone. A large-N multivariate statistical approach facilitates broader generalizations about many potentially causal variables and allows for replication of findings. However, in order to understand the intricacies and the influence of key factors in decision-making, case study approaches can be very effective. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) assert that in depth case studies in the development and examination of causal hypotheses are complimentary to quantitative approaches. The case studies used in this dissertation help to contextualize the quantitative material.

1.3 Conceptual Definitions

This area of research is currently awash with terms and definitions to describe the phenomenon of state support to insurgent groups. Most recently, terms such as “hybrid war”, proxy war, unconventional war, or even “Grey Zone” (Votel et al. 2016) have been used to describe, either in whole or in part, the phenomenon of a state providing support to non-state armed groups as a part of strategy. It is thus critical to provide conceptual definitions used in the literature that are associated with this phenomenon.
The explained variable: State Support to Insurgent Groups

For this study, state support refers to the deliberate action of state leadership to assist and influence an insurgent group in a foreign country against a targeted state government. An important conceptual aspect of this definition is the deliberate nature of the support. Some states may engage in or be involved in situations that can be called passive or unintentional support to insurgent groups. This passive support is often associated with weak states that may provide sanctuary for a non-state armed group (San-Akca 2011), or when citizens from a particular state lend private support to an insurgent group attacking another. Sometimes determining whether support is active or passive can be a challenge, as leaders may attempt to turn a blind eye to activities within their territory or among their officials. This study focuses on the decision making of state leaders and therefore focuses on the conceptual phenomenon of active or deliberate support, though the presence of passive or private support is relevant to the decision of leadership to engage in active support.

State support to insurgent groups is sometimes referred to in the literature as “proxy war” or “unconventional war.” This study prefers to use “state support to insurgent groups” or use the term “unconventional warfare.” Unconventional warfare refers to “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Proxy war is generally conceived more broadly as a state may provide support to either another state actor or a non-state actor involved in a conflict in which the sponsoring state

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is not directly involved. While the overall concept of proxy war is relevant, this study focuses primarily on decisions to support the non-state armed group.

**The explanatory variable: Regime Type**

Consistent with other studies in political science, this study defines regime type as the form of government and the sets of norms and rules that define the selection of the leadership of a state’s government. Synonymous with the term polity, regime types may have any number of nominal typologies. While characteristics of state regimes may be infinitely context dependent, this study uses the conceptual framework of a significant body of literature that focuses on a spectrum between the extremes of mature liberal democracy and mature rigid autocracy. In a democratic regime, leaders are selected through processes that distribute power and influence. Laws, institutions, and norms reinforce these processes that constrain power while allowing for public dissent. As Reiter and Stam (2002, 4) state, “…the core of democracy is the notion that those who govern are accountable in some way to the consent of the people. In democracies, leaders who act without the consent of voters do so at considerable political risk of removal from office.” Autocratic regimes, on the other hand, are characterized by leadership and authority held by an individual or small group where there are few constraints on power and instruments of government are used to suppress dissent and more easily influence laws, institutions, and norms.

**Insurgent Groups and Insurgency**

Rebel groups (Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014), insurgent groups (Byman et al. 2001), violent non-state actors (VNSAs) (Mulaj 2010), and non-state armed groups (NAGs) (San-Akca 2009, 2016; Maoz and San-Akca 2012; San-Akca 2016) are all terms used in recent literature to describe non-state organizations that are engaged in violent conflict within a state and against the official organizations/government of that state. This dissertation generally
prefers to use the more colloquial term “insurgent group” but may use any of the terms above, especially in the literature review.

Insurgency has also been defined as a more specific type of intra-state conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) provide a specific definition of insurgency as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. Their definition considers insurgency as a subset of the term civil war or intra-state conflict. For the purpose of this study, insurgency is a political and military activity carried out by a non-state domestic group (or groups) directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of violent force (Byman et al. 2001, p.). This is a condition when a non-state armed group is in conflict with a state government regardless of whether or not they use guerilla tactics or operate from a rural base. It is therefore, generally synonymous with the term civil-war and intra-state conflict but can also refer to the non-government or rebel side of a civil war or intra-state conflict.

1.4 Structure of the Dissertation

The rest of this dissertation is divided into nine chapters. Chapter two is a literature review that summarizes extant research related to the topic. Chapter three develops the general theoretical arguments, explaining why regime type affects how leaders employ strategies involving support to insurgent groups. It argues that normative and structural logics that explain democratic peace observations may also help explain why democratic regimes and autocratic regimes compel their leaders to make different strategic decisions between influence and open military intervention. Supporting foreign insurgent groups engaged in civil conflict has different implications for leaders depending upon their regime types. Chapter four develops the quantitative analysis by applying logistic regression (logit) to analyze a cross-sectional, time
series dyadic dataset of 179 states that had the potential to support insurgencies from 1975 to 2009. Chapter five explains the application of the qualitative methodology of structured, focused comparison and case selection for the next three chapters. The qualitative approach used in chapters six, seven, and eight is better suited for explaining how regime type influences leadership decisions and exposes the causal mechanisms and causal path of the phenomenon in question (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Chapters six through eight examine three case studies, each with multiple within-case observations (cases) where leaders of both democratic and non-democratic regimes faced decisions concerning support to insurgent groups. These case studies include the “Sandinista” (Anti-Somoza) rebellion in Nicaragua from 1961-1979, The “Contra” insurgency in Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990, and the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka (commonly known as Eelam War I) from 1979 to 1990. The two Nicaragua chapters allow for unit homogeneity and some control for potential confounding variables (King et al. 1994), while the Sri Lanka case study allows for a contrast of regional and geopolitical dynamics, as well as the examination of the decision making of a large democracy other than the US. Each chapter includes cases of non-democracies and democracies that chose to support insurgents in different ways or simply chose not to get involved. Chapter nine provides a brief discussion and conclusion.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review

The literature is divided into three categories. The first is the structural approach that attempts to understand support to insurgent groups as the result of various structural factors including strength of states involved, rivalry between states, and specific characteristics of insurgent groups, which may receive support. The second category includes the democratic peace literature. The review of democratic peace literature is important in connecting the decision-making constraints of different regime types in supporting insurgent groups. The third category involves research that examines third party intervention in civil wars. This category includes studies that examine regime type and its effect on the probability of military intervention in civil wars.

2.1 The Structural Approach

A number of studies examine structural indicators of support to insurgent groups. Some focus on the states involved, while others examine the rebel groups. San-Akca (2009) theorizes that supporting an insurgent group is a cheap and deniable alternative to overt warfare or military intervention against one’s enemy. She proposes that a state should be more likely to support an insurgent group if that state is relatively stronger than the state targeted by the insurgent group. San-Akca (2009) explains that fear of retaliation prevents weaker states from employing this policy option against stronger rivals. She uses the national capabilities dataset from the Correlates of War project to measure extractive capacity as a measure of strength, and relies on the ratio between the supporting state and the target state. Accordingly, when the supporting state faces domestic constraints to the extraction and mobilization of human and material resources, that state is more likely to support an insurgency (San-Akca 2009). In other words, if a state has constraints that inhibit the generation and employment of military forces, then that state might
turn to supporting a foreign insurgent group as an alternative strategy. San-Akca (2009) measures domestic vulnerabilities (constraints) through ethnic fragmentation and overall gross domestic product (GDP). She contends that state support is more likely when the supporting state has a high degree of ethnic fragmentation and less likely when the supporting state has a high GDP, which counters the vulnerability effects of ethnic fragmentation. Finally, San-Akca (2009) explains that a state will use an insurgent group as an expedient substitute for allies. However, she also introduces regime type as a control variable.

To test her theoretical argument, San-Akca (2009) uses a cross-sectional time series dataset with dyadic year observations between the potential supporting state and a potential target state. Since her dependent variable is dichotomous, she employs logistic regression to analyze her post-Cold War sample of 154 dyads from 1990 to 2001 when a potential supporting state provides support to an insurgent group. San-Akca’s statistical findings seem to support her theoretical arguments that relatively stronger states will use support to non-state armed groups as a substitute for allies. Using regime type as a control variable, she finds that a state is less likely to support an insurgent group if that state is a democracy. In other words, she presents but does not develop a theoretical argument related to regime type, but attributes this finding to either democracies’ high GDP or the possibility that democracies have “a hard time getting away with supporting” an insurgent group as a policy instrument (San-Akca 2009, 606).

In a later study, San-Akca (2014) proposes another important dichotomy in the typologies of support. Borrowing from Byman (2005), San-Akca stipulates that there are two types of state support to insurgent groups. Although specifically looking at “terrorist groups”, a subset of insurgent/rebel groups, San-Akca calls these types, “active support and passive support.” Active support refers to a situation where government leaders create channels to intentionally support
the members of an insurgent organization. Passive support means that a government does not
directly provide assistance, but knowingly allows other actors, such as wealthy civilians and
political parties, which do not have formal connection to the government, to aid a rebel group.
Examples of active support might include the US support to Tibetan rebels during the early Cold
War (Knaus 1999) or Greece’s support for the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) by providing
sanctuary for training camps (San-Akca 2014). Examples of passive support might include
Islamic fundamentalist groups raising funds in Saudi Arabia or the nineteenth century practice of
*filibustering* in the US where wealthy Americans often supported expeditions to incite and
support rebel movements in neighboring countries (Gleiman 2015). San-Akca (2014) emphasizes
that the definition implies that the government in question has the capacity to stop the assistance
but does not do so. Cases of active or passive support may be difficult to determine as active
support is sometimes intended to be secret. Likewise, passive support may be a question of
government capacity and capability to prevent such support coming from its citizens.

Nevertheless, San-Akca (2014) theorizes and provides evidence that democracies may be
more likely to engage in passive support to terrorist groups while autocratic regimes are more
likely to use active support. Though San-Akca (2014) focuses on terrorist groups, there is
theoretical justification that her findings may apply to all kinds of insurgent or rebel groups.
Furthermore, her study provides further evidence of the powerful effect that regime type seems
to have over policy preferences and strategic decision-making.

San-Akca’s (2009) study provides some evidence of the influence of some factors on
state support to insurgent groups including relative strength, alliances, and, to some extent,
regime type. However, there are five relevant criticisms, two are theoretical and three are
methodological (with theoretical implications). First, her study does not develop the causal
mechanism that links autocracies to any policy intent to insurgent groups. This is understandable, because her focus is on relative strength and alliances. While San-Akca (2009) claims that domestic constraints should limit the ability of state leaders to engage in warfare and thus make them more likely to support an insurgency, she does not examine structural or normative constraints of democracies. Second, a higher GDP is associated with greater strength and a greater ability to extract resources. If that is the case, then democracies should generally be more likely to support insurgencies because mature democracies tend to have higher overall GDP and higher relative strength. In other words, San-Akca’s theory maintains that high GDP decreases domestic vulnerability and leads to lower probability of support to insurgency. However, if high GDP is also associated with higher relative strength, and higher relative strength is associated with increased probability of support to insurgency, then San-Akca may be focusing on the wrong variable. Regime type seems to have stronger explanatory power and is worthy of closer examination.

From a methodological standpoint, San-Akca (2009) uses the concept of politically relevant dyads or politically relevant groups (PRGs). A state PRG includes geographically contiguous states, regional powers, and global powers whose influence goes far beyond their regions (Maoz and Russett 1993). Thus, PRGs are based on the military power projection capability of states and are constructed to cover the possibility of interstate militarized conflict. The problem with this standard methodology is that it may have effectively eliminated relevant or even critical cases when the topic under consideration is state support to insurgent groups. For example, Saudi Arabia was not considered part of the PRG for Afghanistan, yet Saudi Arabia provided active (and passive) support to various mujahedeen groups in their war against the Soviet occupation and communist government of Afghanistan from 1980 to 1990. This is clearly
a relevant factor. Also, Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, made it a common practice to support insurgent groups in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Nigeria (Salehyan et al. 2011). Most recently, there is evidence that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is providing support to Islamic rebels in Nigeria (Update, 2013) and Houthi movement in Yemen (Bayoumy & Ghobari 2014).

None of these cases fit as PRGs. Even though studies have shown that there is no significant difference between the PRGs and the entire dyadic dataset when used to explain international militarized conflict (Lemke and Reed 2001), support to an insurgent group is not the same thing as militarized conflict and may be used as a substitute when militarized conflict is not possible for reasons of a lack of military power projection capability. There is enough empirical and certainly theoretical reason to expand the PRG lists for countries when studying state support to foreign insurgent groups, which is below the threshold of war or military intervention. State leaders have reasons and motivations that might include prestige, ideology, economic competition, or religion for supporting a foreign insurgent group. One must conclude that every country is in fact relevant to every other country when it comes to the ability, the potential motivation, and the possibility of providing support to an insurgent group (Mahoney and Goertz 2004), given the ease of monetary transfer, increased connectivity and logistical capacity, and the general trends associated with globalization (Li and Schaub 2004; Strange 1998).

San-Akca (2009) argues that there is no theoretical or empirical justification for treating every state in the world as a potential supporter. The fact that states that are not within a PRG engage in the practice of supporting insurgencies that exist outside of their normal PRG provides enough empirical evidence that the rationale behind the use of this methodology reflects a
selection bias. Additionally, relatively weak states that are far outside the military power projection capability of a targeted state are less likely to fear retaliation if they are beyond the military power projection capability of the state that is targeted by the insurgent group. Fear of retaliation is a key factor in San-Akca’s (2009) theoretical argument and therefore the inclusion of non-PRG observations in her sample would benefit theory testing.

San-Akca’s (2009) sample examines state support to insurgent groups in only the first 11 years of the post-Cold War era (1990-2001). Conventional knowledge of the Cold War demonstrates that democracies and autocracies alike have supported numerous insurgent organizations targeting foreign states. A study that includes both Cold War and post-Cold War data would have allowed for comparison to determine the likely effect of international rivalry on the propensity of states to support insurgencies. The Cold War environment and its system of bipolar rivalry may have made countries more likely to engage in this practice; however, controlling for major powers and examining cases not directly involved in great power proxy wars might also explain a great deal and inform qualitative approaches.

Finally, the dichotomous measure of support used by San-Akca (2009) effectively equates different types of support, which can represent different strategic manifestations of policy and have very different costs and risks associated with them. Supporting an insurgent group in a far away country by sending money or small arms is low cost and low risk compared to committing ground troops or sending high-end military capability. The benefits of lower cost, lower risk options, however, are also smaller as the probability of a positive outcome and control or influence over the outcome will be lower with money and small arms as compared with committing ones own troops or providing high-end capability.
Maoz and San-Akca (2012) expand the examination of state support to non-state armed groups, using a dataset from 1946-2001. Their study demonstrates that rivalry between states is a powerful factor in predicting the probability of state support to insurgent groups targeting the rival state. It also shows that weak states are more likely to choose the policy of supporting an insurgent group than strong states. Thus relative strength measures including capabilities, military strength, and GDP are used as index variables. This last finding appears to contradict previous finding from San-Akca (2009) that support to non-state armed groups was more generally the tool of the strong over the weak.

Salehyan (2010) provides a different view of support to insurgent groups. He uses the ideas of delegation of war and principal-agent relationship between the supporting state and a rebel group to develop his theoretical argument. According to Salehyan (2010), supporting states forgo the costs and risks associated with direct conflict by delegating to rebels. In doing so, the supporting state loses some control over the implementation of their policy because the agent (rebel group) is responsible for implementation.

Similar to San-Akca (2009), yet contrary to Maoz and San-Akca (2012), Salehyan (2010) proposes that strong states are more likely to delegate their objectives to insurgent groups than weaker states because stronger states may possess a greater ability to control agency slack through screening (choosing rebels with similar goals), monitoring (using on-the-ground advisors) and sanctioning (restricting resources or activity to compel/influence actions) of their rebel proxies.

Salehyan (2010) further proposes that delegation is more likely when international and domestic political costs of military intervention are high. When this is the case, states will attempt to provide covert (secret) support. This logic could help explain why democracies in the
immediate post-Cold War period were less likely to engage in this practice (San-Akca 2009) since democratic leaders are more sensitive to audience costs (Schultz 1998; 2001). While audience costs are often precisely defined as the political cost of making a threat and then backing down (Tomz 2007), the broader concept of political accountability still applies. Leaders will pay a political cost for supporting an insurgent group that is defeated, fails to achieve expectations, acts outside of strongly held normative values, or when covert support is discovered and made public. Attempting to keep knowledge of support away from the electorate may prevent the accountability risk, but could have various kinds of political risks if the support is disclosed and becomes unpopular.

Finally, Salehyan (2010) explains that rebel groups must also decide whether or not to accept foreign resources. There may be risks for the insurgent group leaders in accepting foreign support. This avenue of resource mobilization could mean that leaders and members of the group may have to give up some degree of autonomy. Other studies have demonstrated that external support changes economic endowments of a rebel organization, which can fundamentally change the organization and strategy of a group (Weinstein 2007).

Salehyan (2010) provides no empirical analysis of his theoretical argument. However, he examines these arguments with coauthors in a subsequent study (Salehyan et al. 2011). Rather than focusing on the supporting state or regime type, Salehyan et al. (2011) examine how the characteristics of various rebel groups affect the probability of receiving support. They theorize that the weakest insurgent groups and the strongest groups are less likely to receive support because the weakest groups are not credible agents and the strongest groups will not wish to give-up autonomy (Salehyan et al. 2011). They further contend that a group is more likely to receive support if the government of the target state receives foreign support and a group that
controls territory will be less likely to accept support because it will extract resources from that territory and preserve its autonomy, rather than accept support from a state that will attach conditions (Salehyan et al. 2011).

Salehyan et al. (2011) use 403 groups and classify them based on measures of strength, territorial control, and leadership. Salehyan et al. (2011) find that support is less likely for the very strong and the very weak groups and that transnational linkage and cases where the target state government receives support help explain state support to the rebel group. Their study also shows a curvilinear relationship between a group’s organization and leadership and the likelihood of receiving state support (Salehyan et al. 2011). Accordingly, groups with a very strong centralized leadership and groups that are very decentralized with no clear central leadership are less likely to receive support, while groups in between are more likely. They also find that territorial control by an insurgent group actually makes it more, rather than less, likely to receive support, potentially indicating that supporting state leaders find such control to be an indicator of legitimacy and an effective agent worthy of support. Overall, Salehyan et al. (2011) find that country characteristics such as income and geopolitical power are unrelated to whether rebel groups receive support.

Although Salehyan’s (2010) research presents evidence of a causal link between insurgent group characteristic and the probability that such groups will receive support, Salehyan et al. (2011) admit that their study focuses on elements that affect only the demand side of state support to insurgent groups. They recommend further research on the supply side to identify what factors cause a state to support a rebel group, which is exactly the kind of research that this dissertation undertakes.
Like San-Akca (2009), Salehyan et al. (2011) employ a dichotomous dependent variable for support, thereby methodologically losing the information on different types of support. San-Akca (2009) and Salehyan et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence that states are more likely to support insurgencies that target their rivals. While that may not seem groundbreaking, this means that support to foreign insurgencies is part of the strategy and policy of states and must also be relevant to studies of bargaining theory, democratic peace, and their corollaries such as audience cost, signaling, information gaps, and commitment gaps (Fearon 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993; Schultz 1998; 1999; 2001).

In a subsequent study, Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood (2014) add an additional consideration to explain why democracies might not support insurgent groups. Building on the principal-agent concept, they theorize that principals (supporting states) use screening and sanctioning to manage agency slack and prevent agency loss with their rebel proxies. Leaders screen and monitor rebel groups and their leaders to find those that are most reliable, committed to similar ends, and open to influence and receiving support. State leaders will also sanction rebel groups (withdraw or threaten to withdraw support) and their leaders in order to manage agency slack, maintain influence over the rebels, and prevent agency loss. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood (2014) theorize that agency loss for democratic states might include human rights violations by rebels. They list three reasons that are germane to this study. First, democratic state may be “more committed to human rights norms and standards.” Second, leaders in democratic regimes are “more constrained by domestic legislatures, courts, and other institutions that scrutinize bad behavior.” Additionally, they state that democracies are “more likely to ‘name and shame’ governments for bad behavior. Finally, Salehyan et al (2014, 642) further propose that democratic leaders will pay a political cost if they openly support insurgent groups that commit
human rights violations. This logic will be extended later in this chapter in the section on theories of democratic peace.

In her most recent study, San-Akca (2016) leverages the work of Salehyan and others to construct a more comprehensive theory of how and why states support non-state armed groups. San-Akca theorizes that state support is a product of two models that jointly explain the phenomenon. She refers to these as the state selection model (SSM) and the rebel selection model (RSM). These two models happen simultaneously. In the SSM, a state must decide if a rebel group targets an adversary, whether that state has domestic problems that prevent it from dealing with that adversary directly, and whether the state shares ideational ties with prospective rebel allies that target the adversary. Rebel groups on the other hand, must weigh their need for certain resources with the potential loss of autonomy that accepting support might entail. As the title of her book indicates, rebel groups are essentially, “States in Disguise.” In this study, San-Akca uses a tremendous dataset, which is triadic and includes supporting states, target states, and rebel groups. Additionally, San-Akca proposes a typology of support that is categorical and ordinal. She lists these as Low (transport of equipment and offices), Moderate (Funds, safe havens for leaders and training), High (Safe haven for members or arms), and Very High (Troops or training camps). Her study also uses two measures of relative strength between the supporting state and the target state. These are the capabilities index of the Correlates of War and an extractive capacity measurement, which calculates the military expenditure as a proportion of GDP plus military personnel as a proportion of the total population (San-Akca 2016). Finally, San-Akca (2016) theorizes that major powers might be more likely to support insurgent groups and so includes an indicator for major power status.
San-Akca finds that weak states are not necessarily more inclined to provide support to non-state armed groups though domestically unstable states tend to provide higher level of defacto (passive) support. Furthermore, she finds that rebels seek resources from adversaries of their target states and choose supporters with ideational affinity. Finally, San-Akca finds that democracy in a potential supporting state is a motivating factor for rebels seeking safe haven for leaders, yet, when it comes to support levels, rebel groups can only acquire limited resources from democratic states.

Though San-Akca’s (2016) study is the most comprehensive to date on the subject, there are methodological improvements that could strengthen the research effort that this dissertation attempts to address. San-Akca’s study is limited to politically relevant groups (PRGs) of target and supporting states. As explained above, this may not be ideal as a screening criterion for observation when studying this particular phenomenon. Also, the typology of support is only one way to examine the problem. Another way is to examine types of support as a progressive risk calculation below the threshold of war. States choose to support insurgent groups to gain strategic advantage without risking war. Yet, certain types of support increase the risk of direct military confrontation between the supporting state and the target state more than others while some ways of supporting insurgents allow for greater ability to control agency slack through screening, monitoring, and sanctioning. Financial or material support is less risky but allows for little monitoring ability. On-the-ground advisors and providing training and technical military capability is more risky because it invests blood and treasure and it is harder to conceal.

On the other hand, it allows for more effective screening, sanctioning and general influence over proxies. Providing sanctuary and harboring rebel personnel may raise the stakes even further in terms of risk as the target state has greater justification for retaliation. On the
other hand, active sanctuary enables the supporting state leaders to have greater screening and sanctioning ability. San-Akca’s ordinal scale implicitly acknowledges the scale of risk to the supporting state, but does not necessarily acknowledge the relative agency-slack control in the scale and does not account for advisors on the ground. Using different data source and an alternate scale, one can test San-Akca’s findings from a different angle and apply them to the democratic peace.

Finally, there are two additional structural factors that relate to research on insurgency and low-intensity conflict indicate which may have some effect on the decisions of state leader to support insurgent groups. First, Record (2007) notes in his study of how insurgents prevail over counterinsurgents that insurgent groups are more likely to receive external assistance when the target state government is having some kind of external state assistance. Salehyan (2011) makes a similar observation and the motivation for doing so is implicit in the concept of proxy war. Second, research on the history of the Pakistan/India rivalry indicates that the possession of nuclear weapons by either the target state or the potential supporting state could affect the risk calculus of state leaders when considering the use of coercive or violent action (Sethi 2009; Khan 2009). However, the nuclear weapons status of a state has yet to be included as a variable in understanding why state leaders support insurgent groups. This could be simply because so few states possess nuclear weapons.

2.2 Theories of Democratic Peace

A second category of extant literature relates to democratic peace theories. Theories of democratic peace are part of a vast and progressive research program based on the core assumption that democratic regimes make different foreign policy choices than autocratic regimes especially when it comes to decisions of war and peace (Frieden and Lake 2005). Within
this “research program” (Lakatos 1979), there exist different theories about the nature of
democratic regimes and the causal mechanisms behind the decision making of democratically
elected leaders. Nevertheless, within the democratic peace research program, scholars have
tested key hypotheses mainly centered on explaining why democracies rarely (if ever) go to war
with each other (Maoz and Russett 1993; Lake 1992). Some scholars have expanded upon the
protective belt of this research program (Reiter and Stam 2002) and others continue to reject the
strength and logic behind this core assumption (Rosato 2003; Farber and Gowa 1995).
Nevertheless, the democratic peace research program maintains theoretical logics that are
supported by empirical evidence.

Maoz and Russett (1993) define the dueling theoretical logics of democratic peace in
terms of normative and structural. The normative logic maintains that democratic regimes share
domestic norms of political behavior that emphasize political competition through peaceful
means, adherence to law, and the value of negotiations and compromise to settle disputes over
competing interests. According to this normative logic of democratic peace, leaders of
democratic regimes externalize these norms in their foreign policy. An important exception
comes when leaders in democratic regimes must deal with external actors that do not appear to
share these norms. According to Maoz and Russett (1993), when democratic regimes come to
believe that the application of domestically developed democratic norms might put them at an
unacceptable disadvantage or threaten their very survival, these democratic leaders act in
accordance with norms established by their rivals. Thus, democracies will not fight other
democracies because they maintain these same norms of cooperation.

Part of the problem with normative explanations is that they should indicate a monadic
relationship between democracy and war. However, empirical studies provide evidence that
democracies tend to fight wars just as much as non-democracies and may even act more violently in war (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1988; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Downes 2007). The absence of a monadic pacifism among democratic states somewhat weakens the support for normative logic (Quackenbush and Rudy 2009). However, Maoz and Russet (1993, 636) provide evidence that the normative explanation “may be a better overall account of the democratic peace phenomenon than the structural model.” This conclusion is based upon their analysis of the passivity of more mature democratic regimes as opposed to newer democracies where democratic norms of civil society have had less time to solidify. Nevertheless, Maoz and Russet (1993) do not rule out the distinct possibility that both normative and structural logics could be at play as part of a more complex causal mechanism.

The theories of democratic peace, as articulated by Maoz and Russett, address the issue of war. These theories do not measure support to insurgent groups as the dependent variable. Yet, the initial and somewhat limited evidence provided by San-Akca (2009, 2016) indicates that democracies may be less likely to engage in support to insurgencies over all, regardless of the regime type of the target state. Why are democracies just as likely to go to war as other regimes, but appear less likely (overall) to use a military policy short of war, such as supporting insurgents? Is this an indicator of normative logic prevailing because situations where a democracy might support an insurgency are not seen as threats to its survival? Does this inhibit democracies from acting strategically except in cases of a perceived existential threat trajectory and thereby grant autocracies and anocracies more strategic flexibility to seize opportunities?

Supporting a foreign insurgent group does clearly violate international norms. The principles of neutrality and non-intervention are considered part of international norms professed by democracies (Lobel 1983). Taking the view of normative logic would show that democracies
facing a desire to target a foreign state will be tempted to engage in active support for insurgent groups, but will resist out of normative concern. Yet, there are also other norms that may justify an alternative decision, such as the duty to help the oppressed fight for their liberation, dignity, and survival. These counter norms cannot be dismissed and may inspire active support from democratic leaders.

Structural logics, on the other hand, assume that leaders of a winning coalition in democracies must mobilize and maintain domestic support for their policies from legitimate sources (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). War, according to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) is resource intensive and risky (high cost and high risk). The use of scarce resources for war means that there are fewer resources for public goods demanded by members of a large and complex winning coalition. The large “selectorate” and large winning coalition necessary to maintain political survival in a democracy ensure that there is little support for war unless the threat of an adversary is perceived as existential or the democracy faces a relatively small power that will be easy to defeat. Generally speaking, leaders in democracies must be prepared to win a war or they will face a higher likelihood of removal from office than autocrats due to the fracturing of a winning coalition. When confronting another democracy, the leaders of both democracies are faced with the same dilemma and know that they must be victorious if they go to war or they are likely to lose power.

Reinforcing this concept is the theory of costly signals in bargaining. According to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), democratic leaders will do what it takes to win potential war scenarios. These democratically elected leaders are therefore more willing to sink costs or tie their hands to demonstrate resolve. In short, democracies try harder because a leader’s survival depends on victory. Therefore, leaders of democratic regimes will tend to send costly signals in bargaining
that show resolve and solve the information and commitment problem in bargaining (Fearon 1997). Additionally, they will be much more selective about their targets, rarely choosing other democracies that will similarly dedicate great resources to ensure victory.3

The problem with attempting to apply structural logic to state support to insurgent groups is that supporting a foreign insurgent group is not necessarily war.4 Instead, supporting an insurgent group can often be a policy choice, in whole or in part, to avoid the financial and political costs and risks of direct conflict (Salehyan 2010). The specific structural logics of democratic peace theory may not apply in support to foreign insurgencies unless that support is done in conjunction with a military intervention. Furthermore, if leaders in democracies support a foreign insurgency and that insurgent group is defeated, there should be very little cost in terms of their political survival as long as they have only committed a few resources and not troops, advisors, significant capabilities, or worse, have rebels in sanctuary within their borders. Each of these put the state and the leaders at risk. The large selectorate of a democracy should be willing to tolerate diplomatic, material or financial support to insurgent groups in the same way that they tolerate foreign aid to dictators in order to purchase a public good to protect national security in international stability (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011). According to this logic, democracies

3 Bueno de Mesquito et al. (1999) also emphasize that large powerful democracies may have a tendency to use force or coercion against weaker powers as long as the application of that force does not significantly impact the provision of public goods and the maintenance of a winning coalition.

4 Scholars have stated that supporting a non-state armed group is generally a substitute for war. In extant political science literature, the standard conceptual definition of a war includes armed combat by organized military forces capable of effective resistance. The Correlates of War (COW) has further operational specifications. In order for a state to be considered a war participant, COW operationalizes the minimum requirement is that it has to either commit 1,000 troops to the war or suffer 100 battle related deaths (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Also see http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war/inter-state-wars-codebook (p.2) This commitment of blood and treasure is conceptually different than supporting a non-state armed group that may be a war or armed conflict participant.
should have very little structural disincentive toward low-level support to insurgent groups, such as supplying money or weapons. However, the normative logic implies that they may have some disincentive to do so.

Though democratic peace theory focuses on explaining why democracies do not fight each other, its logics and causal mechanisms may also inform state support to insurgent groups. Some studies have explained that democracies may not be exempt from violent policies below the threshold of war. For example, Forsythe (1992) claims that democracies will use violent methods short of war to coerce other democracies. He claims that covert action by democracies to target weaker democracies is actually common. Though Forsythe (1992, 386) does not specifically define covert action, he implies that covert action refers to forcible actions conducted in secret as a matter of deliberate policy outside normal military or intelligence collection for the purpose of influencing the course of political events. This broad concept could include support to foreign insurgent groups, but also covert support to coup d’état and assassination. Forsythe (1992) also provides six cases where the leadership of the US deliberately interfered with the transition of leadership of another elected government. However, out of Forsythe’s six cases, only two targeted states actually qualified as democracies by common operational measures.

James and Mitchell (1995) make a similar theoretical case, emphasizing that the structural reasoning of democracies demonstrates that leaders of democratic regimes will target weaker democracies with covert action. They argue that this allows democratic leaders to evade domestic constraints such as legislative or judicial oversight, veto player interference, and

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{5} Forsythe examines US action in Iran (1952), Guatemala (1952), Indonesia (1956), Brazil (1960), Chile (1972), and Nicaragua (1983). While the leadership of these countries may have been democratically elected, by Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2014) measures of regime, these countries were either autocracies or “anocracies”, with Brazil and Chile still democratizing but on the operational threshold (+6).} \]
exposure by a free press. James and Mitchell’s (1995) theoretical study makes the assertion that structural logic of democratic peace actually influences large democratic regimes to use covert action against very small democratic neighbors. Yet, support to a foreign insurgency is more difficult to conceal than other types of forcible covert action. Even when state support to a foreign insurgent group is secret, it often becomes public knowledge at some point in the future because many people are usually involved (as opposed to actions such as support to assassination and support to coup d’état). If democracies are still less inclined to engage in this practice, then normative and structural logics, or at least normative and structural characteristics may both be involved in similar logics associated with support to insurgent groups. Thus, it may be important to determine whether or not the supporting state’s leadership intended to conceal the support (covert), or whether the support was deliberately made public knowledge. Even if the support is overt, as long as it is limited, democratic leaders may, contrary to San-Akca’s (2014) assertion, be able to get away with it.

2.3 Military Intervention in Civil Wars

A final category of related literature includes studies that examine third-party intervention in civil wars. Much of the research in this area focuses on either the effects of third-party military intervention on the duration of civil wars (Regan 2002; Elbadawi and Smabanis 2000) or the factors that help determine the motivations and likelihood of an intervention (Koga 2011; Lemke and Regan 2004). One key area of disagreement throughout this literature concerns the assumptions made about the importance of the motivations of external actors who choose to intervene (Cunningham 2010).

As discussed in the previous section, the word “intervention” much like the word “support,” is used differently in the extant literature on civil wars and intrastate conflict. In some
studies, intervention is used to describe neutral diplomatic intervention employed to negotiate cease-fires or facilitate the use of non-violent means of conflict resolution as an alternative option to violence. Regan (1998, 757) makes clear that diplomatic interventions “…do not require the same level of political risk encountered by the more visible and costly military or economic interventions.” Diplomatic interventions have a low cost and therefore a different risk calculation. Such interventions are usually aimed at maintaining a status quo rather than changing it. Nevertheless, Regan (1998) and other scholars have made little attempt to examine whether those costs and risk calculation are different for different regime types.

Regan (1998) examines the phenomenon when state leaders choose to intervene in civil wars. Building on previous studies (see Rosenau 1968; 1969), Regan first separates the concepts of intervention and influence. Influence, according to Regan, would be any support (for the government of a targeted state or for the insurgent/rebel group) that falls below the threshold of intervention. Regan defines intervention as; “…convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces” (Regan 1998, 756). This definition effectively excludes diplomatic interventions, which might qualify as support for one side or the other, and it also may exclude the provision of arms, money, intelligence, and expertise. Thus, defining intervention specifically with “convention breaking” and “targeted at the authority structures of the government” limits examination to only the higher end of support to one side or another and does not examine the spectrum of support that state leaders may choose to offer short of actual armed intervention. This makes sense for Regan who is specifically examining the decision to become militarily involved in an intrastate conflict. He does not, however, examine the gray area of strategic
decision making within different types of regimes when state leaders wish to influence the outcome in favor of one group or another.

The extant literature on military intervention on the duration of civil wars provides solid evidence that third-party interventions generally tends to prolong civil wars (Regan 2002). Regan (2002) explains that the type of intervention matters. Balanced military intervention that provides military and economic support to both sides increases the duration of a civil war, while military and economic intervention that is strongly biased toward one-side may shorten the duration of the war. In a separate study, Regan and Ayudin (2006) classify interventions into two types, (1) those that attempt to influence the structure of the relationship among combatants and (2) those that attempt to manipulate the information that actors hold. Their theory, supported by evidence in the study, maintains that structural interventions (including military and economic support) tend to increase the duration of civil conflict, while manipulating the information of combatants (diplomatic interventions and mediation) will decrease the expected duration.

The relationship between regime type and military intervention in civil wars is less clear. While there are many studies that examine this phenomenon, Koga’s (2011) study builds on previous literature and specifically examines regime type. Koga (2011) theorizes that democracies and autocracies approach military intervention in civil wars differently. She (2011) argues that regime type of a state that is contemplating intervention on the side of rebels will affect the decision to intervene and will also be based on characteristics of the conflict. According to Koga (2011), if there is an ethnic tie between the rebel group and the intervening state, and that intervening state is a democracy, then that state is more likely to intervene militarily on behalf of the rebels. This is evidence of the “Kin country syndrome” in the context in which it was first expressed by Greenaway (1992) and later popularized by Huntington.
If, however, the intervening state is an autocracy, then the presence of “lootable natural resources,” rather than ethnic ties, will increase the probability of intervention (Koga 2011).

Koga (2011) uses a combined time series cross-sectional data set of military interventions in civil wars and uses a dichotomous dependent variable for military intervention. She defines military intervention as “convention breaking military activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between government and the opposition forces” (Koga 2011, 1145; see also Regan 1996). Such a definition makes Koga’s conception of intervention similar to that of Regan and Ayudin’s (2006) structural intervention. Koga (2011) finds evidence that ethnic ties may be the key motivator for military intervention by democracies, while the presence of lootable resources appears to provide motivation for intervention by autocracies.

Koga’s (2011) study is valuable to this research study because her work builds upon previous literature of military intervention on civil wars by showing that regime type matters in the decision making process and in the outcome of leadership decisions to support insurgent groups. However, like San-Akca (2009) and Salehyan (2010), Koga (2011) only examines a single dichotomous measure of support to the insurgency and her analysis is limited to military intervention, a type of support that may be an indicator of a higher level of commitment. Most importantly, military intervention as defined by Koga actually crosses the threshold of war as defined by much of the democratic peace literature described in the previous sub-section. Many lower levels or types of support that do not cross the threshold of military conflict, such as providing material support or sanctuary, might not be accounted for in Koga’s study.
Chapter 3 - Theoretical Development: Regime Type and Unconventional Strategy

The central theory of this dissertation is that regime type is a key factor in determining when and how state leaders decide to use different strategies to support insurgent groups. Leaders of democratic regimes face normative and structural barriers to implement policies that involve support to non-state armed groups. These leaders will tend to support insurgents cautiously with types of support that do not incur great risks to accountability for outcomes or methods. Consistent with other studies on democracies and war, leaders of democracies may use unconventional warfare as part of larger, decisive military campaigns. Leaders of autocratic regimes, on the other hand, will feel free to employ the full spectrum of unconventional warfare in order to seize strategic opportunities, limit agency slack, and maintain greater influence over proxies. Unlike previous studies, this dissertation uses an expanded typology of support to reflect the differences in strategic approaches and the differences in accepted risks.

Although the theory presented here builds on previous research on the democratic peace literature, this study uses a unique typology of state support to insurgent groups in order to understand the continuum between non- or less violent means and armed intervention in intra-state conflict that foreign states may use to influence outcomes.

Recent literature already indicates that democracies may be less likely to support foreign insurgent groups and less likely to be the targeted state when there is external support to an insurgent group (San-Akca 2009; Salehyan et al. 2011). These studies show that there may be something about the nature of democracies that causes them to be less inclined to choose this policy option or adopt unconventional warfare strategies. Using the democratic peace theory as a
foundation, this study relies on three assumptions to develop the theoretical argument on the relationship between regime type and the different kinds of support to insurgent groups.

The decision to support an insurgent group would follow the same or similar causal mechanisms and pathways highlighted in the literature on the democratic peace as the decision to go to war but would also be distinct from that process. State leaders who are confronted with a foreign intra-state conflict that affects their interests must make a decision if they will act to either influence or intervene. The decision, however, is never truly dichotomous or discreet, since leaders have at their disposal a range or menu of options, each with different costs and risks. On one extreme are the potentially high-cost, high-risk, and potentially high benefit options that involve direct military intervention. On the other extreme are the low-cost, lower-risk options of doing nothing or perhaps lending some level of moral, financial, or even diplomatic support to an insurgent group that holds similar goals and objectives. Likewise, these types of support offer little benefit in terms of the probability of victory or of influencing outcomes.

### 3.1 Assumptions

The theory proposed in this dissertation is based on four assumptions. Each of the four assumptions is grounded in foundational literature and theories of international relations. Three of the assumptions are borrowed from democratic peace literature.

The first assumption is thus about cost and risk. Supporting foreign insurgent groups provides state leaders with options that are less costly and less risky, in terms of casualties and treasure, than open armed conflict or military intervention. The costs and the risks of war are well understood. Becoming involved in a foreign internal conflict is messy and can be an uncertain endeavor. Providing some level of support to one side may have obvious costs and
minimal actual risk to ones’ own forces. The only risk may be in credibility of such a policy in the domestic political environment.

This leads to the second assumption, which concerns the structural characteristics of regimes and is borrowed from foundational literature on democratic peace theory (Maoz and Russett 1994). Political leaders facing international challenges must mobilize domestic support for policies. Democratic regimes have structural characteristics that are either weaker or wholly absent in non-democratic regimes. These include a free press, legislative and judicial constraints of executive action, and the necessity of maintaining a winning coalition within a large and diverse selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). If leaders of democratic regimes face international challenges, they must consider the implications of these characteristics.

The third assumption, which is also borrowed from the democratic peace literature, concerns norms of behavior. States externalize to the extent possible the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions (Maoz and Russett 1993). This assumption provides a foundation for the logical resistance leaders should feel when faced with a policy option of supporting an insurgent group. Supporting a violent non-state actor goes against the foundations of the international and domestic norms of sovereignty, neutrality, and non-intervention. While these norms are held by many regimes, they should be particularly strong in democratic regimes.

The final assumption deals with the threat and its effect on interpretation of norms and the ability to gain domestic support for policies. This assumption is also borrowed from democratic peace literature. The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a state will violate norms and leaders will gain support in situations that are perceived as emergencies, existential threats, plausible threat trajectories imply future existential threats.
Emergencies, existential threats, and especially political narratives that present an existential threat trajectory, however, are quite subjective and must be assessed according to each situation. The perception of a potential existential situation allows political leaders to take greater risks and sink greater costs to influence a situation. When it comes to supporting rebel groups in foreign intra-state conflict, democrats may not be able to explain logically how a foreign internal conflict is a threat that qualifies as existential. They must therefore, at least be able to articulate a threat trajectory that is convincing. In other words, the cost of doing nothing will plausibly lead to an existential threat or emergency.

3.2 Hypotheses

Given the assumption of cost and risks and the third assumption of norms, there should be greater resistance in democratic regimes to support insurgent groups. Because structural characteristics require broad support and greater scrutiny of policies and democratic norms favor negotiation over the idea of supporting insurgents and prolonging civil wars (Lobel 1983; Maoz and Russett 1990), a democracy will be disinclined from lending support, with the exception of diplomatic support, to a foreign insurgent group and will seek other means to address international concerns and perceptions of the threat trajectory. Democracies will also find it difficult to use support to insurgent groups to seize strategic opportunities. While there are certainly examples of leaders of democratic regimes supporting insurgent groups, there should be a general disinclination toward this policy choice. Thus, the first assumption of risks means that there should be a general, but neutral inclination across regime types to see potential benefits in supporting insurgent groups. However, given the second, third, and fourth assumptions of structure and norms, democracies should be less inclined overall. Thus the first hypothesis follows:
**H1:** Democracies are less likely to provide active support to foreign insurgent groups.

One might further theorize a second causal mechanism that acts as reinforcement to this outcome. This is perhaps what San-Akca (2016) called the rebel support model (RSM). For example, whenever a democratic regime decides to support an insurgent group (due to the regime leaders’ concerns over norms), that regime will tend to put more ancillary or collateral conditions on its support to insurgent groups. These ancillary conditions are part of the additional considerations placed by democracies when screening and sanctioning their rebel proxies (Salehyan et al. 2014). A recent example of this behavior can be observed as the US has, for several years, put Syrian rebel groups (and individuals), which it supported, through a vetting process (Alexander 2015).

Vetting processes and conditional demands placed upon insurgent groups by their foreign supporters essentially make the principal-agent relationship more difficult. As Salehyan et al. (2011) points out, supporting an insurgent group will only occur if the regime can find a group it is willing to support and if a group is willing to accept the conditions of that support. Thus, democratic supporting regimes may attempt to ensure that the insurgent group avoids human rights violations, refrains from activities or associations that could be labeled as terrorism, and adheres to tactics that are more in line with international norms. The blowback from actions taken by the insurgent group that violate international norms may have accountability costs within domestic political spheres of the supporting state.

Simply put, democracies will be more picky in choosing a group to support and will therefore reduce the likelihood of finding an acceptable agent. Additionally, as San-Akca (2016)
claims in her rebel selection model (RSM), insurgent groups may not appreciate the restrictions on their autonomy in exchange for resources and therefore are less likely to accept support from democracies. Moreover, democracies may be less likely to support insurgent groups due to the assumption of normative logic as well as the power of international norms specifically related to this phenomenon. Autocracies or non-democracies, on the other hand, may be less concerned about such things and more inclined to make their interests and the conditions of support more clear, without placing collateral conditions outside of the achievement of common goals.

As previously discussed, the type of support a state gives to an insurgent group is reflective of the commitment that the supporting state is willing to make. This is an indication of how state leaders assess and perceive the costs, risks, and benefits of policy. Some types of support may draw the supporting state deeper into a conflict. Although scholars have proposed different typologies of support, the most important typology, developed here, is one that reflects the level of commitment from state leaders based upon the potential political costs, risks, and benefits (control of agency-slack). Each category of support reflects a higher level of commitment, or resolve, on the part of the supporting state. Much like Fearon’s (1997) explanation of commitment involving “Cheap talk” versus “Tying hands and sinking costs,” the best typology of support to insurgent groups must separate the forms of support that signal a commitment to the insurgents. Certainly, public acknowledgement and expressed moral support for rebels is a sign of support, but the commitment of treasure, lives (of its citizens), and land would fall more into the areas of sinking costs and tying hands, albeit on a smaller scale between staying out of a conflict and direct or full military intervention.

Following this logic, leaders may have many types of support they can provide to insurgent groups. First, state leaders may choose to offer diplomatic support (See Regan 1998).
This refers to efforts undertaken in traditionally diplomatic channels that may give the insurgency an advantage or blunt the advantages of the target state government. *Diplomatic support* is probably the easiest type of support for state leadership to offer as it comes with very little cost and very little risk. It amounts to a step just beyond “cheap talk” and may even be hard to measure. There are also lower benefits in terms of the ability and probability of achieving the most desired strategic outcome or advantage. Diplomatic support would include efforts to establish the legitimacy of the insurgent group or condemn the government of the targeted state in international forums. It may also involve offers to support mediation of the conflict. Even though some mediation efforts may appear neutral, insurgent groups almost always receive some benefit from mediation as it provides them with status and legitimacy that can be valuable, even essential, toward the attainment of their goals.

Second, state leaders can provide financial or *material support* in the form of resources. This might include weapons, ammunitions, cash, transportation, end-user certificates, or other even non-lethal aid that might have an intrinsic economic value that can be sold or traded. *Material support* has a definable cost and is clearly a step above *diplomatic support* in terms of costs and risks. Providing *material support* exposes a government to the risk of being called out publically and of retaliation diplomatically, economically, or militarily from either the government of the targeted state or its friends and allies. If it is done in secret, its exposure can have domestic accountability cost (which are likely greater in a democracy) and international accountability costs.

Third, if states want to have a greater impact and influence over the insurgent groups they sponsor, then they can take a greater risk and increase the rebel strength by providing specialized capability, equipment, and expertise to train or advise insurgents. This is *advice/capability*
support. Capability may include intelligence, targeting, or anti-aircraft technology from a state’s military forces, but does not include the use of air strikes, air forces, or ground troops from a state’s military forces that are employed as cohesive, independent units of action. When a supporting state’s advisors or training personnel are actually on the ground or over (air space) the territory of the target state, the risk of exposure, escalation, and target state retaliation increases. The domestic political costs and risks of supplying this aggregated type of support should be much higher for leaders of a democracy than for autocrats. When it comes to this type of support, which is just short of war, autocracies can afford to be more strategic and flexible as they get more involved with a proxy force and attempt too mold, influence, and even control a foreign insurgent group.

Fourth, states may even provide sanctuary for rebel fighters and leaders (sanctuary support). Often associated with contiguous borders or short maritime distances, sanctuary support is defined as the deliberate decision of the executive leadership to allow and facilitate an insurgent group to operate, train, and reside within its territorial boundaries. This type of support shows an increased level of commitment that has greater costs and risks to the supporting state. Again, given the assumptions above, a democratic regime should be less inclined to provide this kind of support to an insurgent group. The costs of hosting a group may be high and the risks even higher as providing sanctuary to a belligerent in an intra-state conflict provides a convincing causus belli for the government of the targeted state. There are benefits however, as providing sanctuary means that the supporting state can reduce agency slack by screening and sanctioning the rebel group in order to exert greater influence over their operations and goals. However, it must be emphasized that this would only apply to what San-Akca (2014) refers to as active support. In the case of passive support or de-facto support, the results may be different.
Finally, there is direct military intervention. A supporting state can supply its own military forces to directly assist insurgent groups by taking up some share of the fighting. This is \textit{military intervention} and includes all cases that cross the \textit{advice/capability} threshold where the state’s military forces are used to directly destroy forces of the targeted state or blatantly violate the sovereignty of that state. There is further utility in subdividing military intervention into \textit{limited intervention} and \textit{full military intervention}.

While both categories technically cross the threshold of war or military intervention, there is still a difference in the risk calculation that must be considered. While employing \textit{limited intervention} in the form of joint operations, air support, or access to military infrastructure is a signal of strong commitment, these are still limited actions that are, by design, meant to reduce cost and risk when compared to the employment of a country’s own ground forces and full, decisive military power. The benefits of air support or joint operations to a rebel force are clear. For example, in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001-2002, the US and its coalition partners initially provided only \textit{diplomatic, material, advice/capability, and limited intervention support} (in the form of joint operations and air support) and helped the Northern Alliance defeat Taliban forces in a matter of months after the conflict had been locked in stalemate for years. Later in the conflict, the US and partners provided fully integrated ground forces employed as independent units of action. This allowed the US led coalition to reduce risk to its own forces by instead relying on the Northern Alliance to attack the Taliban on the ground. The same can be observed in the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 to 2015. The US led coalition entered the war but limited its involvement to all forms of support short of \textit{full intervention}.
When ground troops are employed as cohesive, independent units of action, the costs and risks are the highest, but so are the potential benefits. Not only do ground forces increase the chance of victory, they also give the supporting state significant influence in directing and controlling the political outcome of the conflict.

Democratic peace theory argues that democracies will only cross this threshold if they are certain of victory, if they perceive an existential threat, and if the target state is an autocracy (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Thus, democracies should be just as likely as autocracies to use the full military intervention option.6

Though categorical, each support type represents an increasing degree of commitment to the rebel cause, each has a generally higher level of political risk, and each has its own different normative perceptions. They can thus be conceived of as ordinal, discreet manifestations of support to insurgent groups. Therefore, the five types of support range from the lowest to the highest level of support, with the third (advice/capability), fourth (sanctuary), and fifth (limited intervention) types as middle range types of support. Where diplomatic support is a step beyond cheap talk, material support has some sunk costs and thus shows commitment. While material support has some sunk costs, it does very little to “tie the hands” of the supporting-state leaders in terms of its commitment to the rebels. When state leaders decide to train rebels, provide specialized capability, and/or embed advisors with rebels they are increasing costs and risks because now the blood of citizens is involved, albeit, specially trained military forces. When providing trainers or high-end capability, state leaders will have a harder time disassociating themselves from a failed strategy or passing responsibility off to the rebels. Providing sanctuary takes the costs and risks a step further. Not only are costs sunk and hands tied, but also the

6 Rarely will a country employ ground forces without air power if that country has air power.
leaders of the supporting regime will likely have to deal with the rebels on their soil. If the rebels fail, then state leaders will have both a refugee problem and the possibility of a justified attack on their own territory. Providing sanctuary therefore can be almost as severe as intervention.

_Limited intervention or full intervention_, where state leaders are committing their own military forces, undeniably crosses the line of entering into the conflict. It crosses the threshold of war and steps out of the grey area. With _limited intervention_, a leader may be able to avoid the appearance of starting an interstate war, but with _full intervention_ the leadership is committed to achieving military goals.

Theoretically, different types of support might affect the principal-agent relationship in different ways. Consider the difference in the amount of agency slack a supporting country will experience if it supplies funds to insurgent groups versus training forces or embedding advisors from a supporting state’s intelligence agencies or trained military personnel such as Special Operations Forces (SOF). The supporting state can leverage personal relationships and information gained from the access, placement, and proximity to help control agency slack. The benefit gained by the supporting state might, in terms of the reduction in agency slack, be counterbalanced by several risks associated with embedding advisors and providing experts or capabilities such as special equipment. If the operation is covert or secret, then the increased use of advisors or capability increases risk because it could lead to discovery of the support by domestic and international audiences. This could have negative consequences for the leaders of democracies and be perceived as a violation of norms, though still below the threshold of war.

Thus, democratic leaders have strong negative pressures when deciding if they will provide advice and capability. Based on the fourth assumption concerning threats however; democracies should be just as likely to engage in full intervention support since that would
indicate a commitment to actual war where something close to a perceived threat trajectory, existential threat, or emergency characterize the situation. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) explain that leaders of democratic regimes are more likely to dedicate all resources necessary to ensure victory and would not proceed with mid-levels of support to an insurgent group, unless they were also prepared to use the full measure of their military assets to support victory, or perhaps were of such superior military strength that they could afford a limited intervention with air power, thus crossing the threshold of intervention support.

**H2: When leaders of democracies support insurgent groups, they are more likely to choose support with either the lowest or highest levels of commitment (material support or full military intervention) over types of support with middle level commitment (advice/capability, sanctuary, or limited intervention support).**

Non-democratic regimes, including fully autocratic regimes, however, do not have the same normative constraints and are structurally less sensitive to costs for political decisions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 794) emphasize, autocrats may, “try less hard than democrats in war, and they sometimes fight wars in which their chances are poor because defeat does not so greatly affect their prospects of political survival at home.” However, this also means that they can be more flexible in their strategic approach and seize strategic opportunities by avoiding what Maoz and Russett (1993, 626) call the, “complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky policies… except in cases wherein war seems a necessity or when the war aims are seen as justifying the mobilization costs.” Non-democratic regimes may also espouse ideologies that
mitigate normative concerns and may even prefer the use of unconventional war in the form of support to insurgent groups (Ahram 2011).

Thus, leaders in non-democratic regimes should be more likely to use support to non-state armed groups as part of their strategies and, while potentially reckless, will have a great deal more flexibility in their strategic choices based on the context of the situation. They will be more likely to use unconventional warfare to seize strategic opportunities, as they only need to satisfy, “key constituents through the distribution of private goods to a small winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 794)”. The provision of advice/capability or even sanctuary can be tightly controlled by the regime and cancelled with little political risk to leadership.

Therefore, this study can examine a third hypothesis, which is similar to the second.

Decisions about whether or not to support an insurgent group and how to go about supporting them are strategic choices faced by autocrats and democrats. This study maintains that leaders in non-democracies in general and autocracies in particular will have more flexibility in making strategy. They are much more likely to use unconventional means and to attempt to bridge the principal-agent gap with their proxies while tailoring their strategic approach to seize strategic opportunities.

**H3**: When autocrats support insurgent groups, they will choose types of support tailored to the desired strategy to include middle range commitments. (Advice/Capability, Sanctuary, Limited Intervention)
Chapter 4 - Quantitative Research

This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section outlines the research design and operationalizes the variables of interest. The second section provides discussion of the methodology and empirical analysis. The last section includes a summary of findings and a brief discussion.

4.1 Research Design

This dissertation uses cross-sectional, time series data of state support to insurgent groups in 179 countries from 1975 to 2009. The unit of analysis consists of directed country dyadic years where one country is a supporting state (SS) and another country is a targeted state (TS). These are often described as “potential” supporting and potential targeted states.

The choice of countries and years for this dataset were highly dependent on the availability of existing data from multiple sources. The only available dataset that measures observations on the different types of support provided by external parties to an intra-state conflict is the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) External Support Project – Disaggregated/Supporter (UCDP ESP-DS) dataset (Croicu et al. 2011). This dataset catalogues the population of external supporters of warring parties in civil conflicts by year from 1975 to 2009. Thus, it presents the best span of available data for this dissertation’s dependent variable. There are other datasets on external support to insurgent groups that include more years, however, they would only be valuable toward testing H1 and would not be useful toward testing H2 and H3. Additionally, the UCDP ESP-DS dataset contains a reasonably complete coding of every country facing an internal conflict during that span of time. The dataset specifies conflict by using a threshold of 25-battle related deaths in a given year (Croicu et al. 2011).
The UCDP ESP-DS uses a unit of analysis of one-year incident of support catalogued by receiver. Receivers of support can be any insurgent group or government of a country involved in the conflict. Since the intent of this dissertation is to examine when state governments decide to support insurgencies, there is less concern about cases where a state supports the government of another state or when a non-state armed group supports the government of another state. Though this information is potentially valuable, it is not relevant to testing these hypotheses. Thus, the UCDP ESP-DS dataset is cleaned and merged into a dataset that has every possible directed dyad from relevant countries that could have been a supporting state (all countries, not just PRGs) and all countries that could have been a targeted state. This dyadic dataset is constructed using the NEWGENE program (Bennett et al. 2016), and filtered for countries where information on either the dependent variable or critical independent variable is not available. Finally, data from other sources were merged using directed dyad, dyadic year, target state (year), or supporting state (year) as appropriate.

Two separate datasets are built, one large and one small, in order to balance between potential concerns between selection bias (selecting on the dependent variable) and the possibility principle (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). The large dataset includes 891,228 observations, which includes every possible directed dyad year of the 179 countries in this study from 1975 to 2009 (see Appendix A for the list of country/years). The use of this large dataset is designed to address concerns of selection bias, thus even if a country did not have an internal conflict from 1975 to 2009, it is still treated as a potential case and included in the dataset.

Some scholars may argue that several negative observations in the large dataset could violate the possibility principle (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). In other words, if a state does not have an internal conflict, then there is no possibility of an external state supporting an insurgency
that does not (yet) exist. To address this concern, the second smaller dataset is used with only states that had an internal conflict, whether they had received support or not, during the time span of the available data (1975-2009). This dataset contains 440,512 observations. Tests for the hypotheses are conducted using the small dataset, while the same tests on the large dataset are available in Appendix C as a robustness check. There is no difference in the overall number of positive observations on the dependent variable (external support) between the large dataset and the small dataset.

There are some limitations to this dataset and to this research design. For example, this dataset is dyadic between the supporting state and the target state. Therefore, it cannot account for multiple insurgent groups active in a target country within the same year. The values of the dependent variable, therefore, correspond to the highest level of support from the supporting country to any rebel group targeting the target state at that time. Because of this the existence of support and the type of support cannot be measured as a factor of what San-Akca (2016) calls the rebel selection model (RSM). This design can only examine the state selection model (SSM) side. Thus, there may be unmeasured/unobserved cases where a state sought to support an insurgent group, but could not find one that would accept the conditions of screening and sanctioning and the willingness to lose some autonomy. However; the RSM is examined in the qualitative sections.

**Dependent variable and sub-samples.**

The UCDP ESP-DS uses an operational typology of active support that describes and categorizes the common needs of insurgent groups and the types of support state supporters are actually providing. UCDP ESP-DS dataset codes cases of support by the type of support given. In addition to two dummy variables for alleged support and existing support, the dataset has 10
different types of support, which include: troops as secondary warring party, access to military or intelligence infrastructure, access to territory, weapons, material/logistics support, training/expertise, funding/economic support, intelligence, other forms of support, and support of an unknown type. Though slightly more expansive and not a perfect fit for the proposed typology, the UCDP typology fits effectively with the theoretical typology developed in the previous chapter. Table 4.1 explains how the UCDP ESP-DS categories are merged into the five-typology types for this dissertation and their classification as low, medium (or mid-level), and high.
Table 4.1 UCDP ESP-DS and Theoretical Typology Merged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support Level</th>
<th>UCDP ESP-DS</th>
<th>Theoretical Typology</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Funding/Economic Support</td>
<td>Material Support</td>
<td>Each of these UCDP types provides exchangeable items of value. Weapons and materiel can be sold or traded and are harder to trace back to the supporting country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Materiel/Logistics Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Intelligence Material</td>
<td>Advice/Capability Support</td>
<td>Intelligence is a type of expertise and improves capability in such a way that is less transferable or tangible as a resource. The provision of intelligence and the transference of training, expertise, and advice require personnel from the supporting county.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training/Expertise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to Territory</td>
<td>Sanctuary Support</td>
<td>Access to territory is synonymous with the theoretical definition of sanctuary, though San Akca 2016 includes sanctuary for leaders as a separate category, UCDP draws no distinction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to Military or Intelligence Infrastructure/Joint Operations</td>
<td>Limited Intervention Support</td>
<td>The UCDP ESP-DS definition closely matches the theoretical definition of limited intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Troops as Secondary Warring Party</td>
<td>Full Military Intervention Support</td>
<td>The UCDP ESP-DS definition closely matches the theoretical definition of full military intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Forms of Support</td>
<td>Assess individual observation</td>
<td>These two categories will support testing Hypothesis 1 but for 2 &amp; 3 are assessed individually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support of Unknown Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One theoretical type of support that is not measured in this quantitative research design, and is missing from the UCDP dataset is diplomatic support. Regan, Frank, and Ayudin (2009) explain the value of diplomatic interventions in civil wars. Diplomatic interventions refer to attempts by outside parties to transform a conflict by enhancing communication between warring
parties and providing information about the conflict that can help generate movement toward negotiated outcomes (Regan, Frank, and Ayudin 2009). Regan, Frank, and Ayudin (2009) code four specific types of diplomatic interventions including mediation, international forums, the recall of ambassadors and explicit offers to mediate by third parties not accepted by both sides. One problem with this typology is that it is conceived as a typology for involvement to stop a conflict rather than as involvement to support or influence one side or another. This type of support will be discussed further in the qualitative section because no data is available for the time span of this study.

For this dissertation, two indicators operationalize state support to insurgents. The first is a dichotomous variable (external support) scored 1 for all types of support and zero otherwise. The UCDP ESP-DS provides two separate measures for this dichotomous variable, one where external support is alleged and one where it is probable. If an observation is coded as a 1 for either of these values, then the dataset used here applies the benefit of the doubt and codes external support as 1.

The second indicator is the level of support. Three indicators are dichotomized to capture the five theoretical types of support developed earlier. They include low-level – which includes material support, mid-level – which includes advice/capability, sanctuary, and limited intervention, and high-level – which includes full military intervention. (See table 4.1). Thus, low-level support or material support is coded 1 and other types as zero. Mid-level support or advice/capability, sanctuary, and limited intervention are grouped together and coded 1, and other types of support as zero. The final indicator is high-level or full military intervention, which is coded 1 and all other types of support are coded zero. This operationalization intends to ease the interpretation of the sub-sample of positive cases of support that bound H2 and H3.
There is no indication in UCDP ESP-DS as to whether the supporting state intended to keep the support secret or whether the policy was done openly to signal. Therefore, the secret versus overt nature of support is not examined in this quantitative section but is examined in the qualitative case studies.

**Independent variable.**

Independent variable is *democracy* coded from Polity2 (Marshall and Gurr 2014). The variable *democracy* receives a value of 1 if the Polity2 scores are from +7 to +10 and zero otherwise. This variable is created to test the first and second hypotheses, which states that democracies are less likely to provide support of any kind to insurgent groups. Similarly, the variable *autocracy* (or non-democracies) is the inverse, receiving a 1 for Polity2 values from -10 to +6 and zero otherwise. This measure is used to test the third hypothesis.

To test for robustness, two additional measures are used. A variable named *democracy2* measures democracies as +6 to +10 and *autocracy2* as -10 to +5. Lastly, a third regime typology is considered. Consistent with other studies on regime type, *regimetype3* includes democracy (+7 to +10), autocracy (-10 to -7), and anocracy (-6 to +6). Table.4.2 highlights the descriptive statistics.

**Control variables.**

The literature provides three sets of control variables associated with the structural approach, the democratic peace theory, and the literature on civil wars. The first approach highlights 10 control variables that affect the likelihood that a state would support insurgent groups (San Akca 2009; 2016; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). Nine variables are expected to increase the probability of state support to insurgent groups. These variables include the following: Relative capability (*capability ratio*), extractive capacity, Cold War, politically
relevant groups (PRG), rivalry, ethnic fragmentation (ethnic frag), number of allies (# allies),

external support to the targeted state government (TS gov supported), and major power. One

variable, TS nukes, indicated if the targeted state has nuclear weapons and should tend to lower

the probability of support to insurgent groups.

It logically follows that if these variables can explain the probability of state support to

insurgency, they may also help to explain the choice of support types as well. Thus the same

factors are used in testing H2 and H3.

Relative capability (capability ratio) is operationalized by the COW capabilities index of

both the target state and supporting state is used to calculate a directed dyad score for relative

military strength. This is calculated as a ratio for each observation as the supporting state score

divided by the target state score (Grieg and Enterline 2017; Singer 1987).

The second variable, extractive capacity, is also a ratio and is operationalized using San-

Akca’s (2016) formula. Thus the supporting state’s extractive capacity is the total of military

expenditures to total GDP ratio and military personnel to total population ratio. This formula

presents a measure of the domestic capacity and helps determine if a state has the power to resist

infiltration of a rebel groups or stand up to threats of retaliation (San-Akca 2016). Likewise, the

same measure for the target state can help determine its ability to retaliate. Therefore, this same

formula is used for the target state and a ratio variable is created as a measure of relative

extractive capacity. For both these measures, if the supporting state has greater capability or

capacity, i.e. a stronger state on a weaker state, the number will be higher. If the dyad represents

a weaker state considering supporting an insurgent groups that targets the stronger state, these

measures will be smaller.
A Cold War variable is necessary to test the findings of San-Akca (2009) against a more expansive data set that includes the Cold War period where democracies were known to support insurgent groups. If the Cold War provided a rationale for the perception of existential threat and systemic normative challenge to democratic leaders that caused them to “adopt the norms of their rivals,” (Maoz and Russett 1993) then democracies should have been more likely to support insurgent groups during the Cold War than in the post Cold War period.

Politically Relevant Groups (PRGs) is another variable: Because so much of the literature on state support to insurgencies is restricted by the use of PRGs, it is important to have a dummy variable indicating if a dyad is a PRG. The PRG of a state includes geographically contiguous states, regional powers, and global powers whose influence goes far beyond their regions (San Akca 2009). This study uses the PRGs as defined by San-Akca (2009) and Lemke and Reed (2001). Though states may be more likely to support insurgencies that target states within their politically relevant group, this study rejects the idea that PRGs are an appropriate observation criterion for studying foreign support to insurgency.

Rivalry is a dichotomous variable. San Akca (2009), Maoz and San Akca (2012) and Salehyan et al. (2011) provide strong indication that states provide support to non-state armed groups that target their rivals. Rivalry is indicated by a dummy variable and operationally defined using San-Akca’s (2009) strategic reference grouping where if two states experienced a militarized interstate dispute within the last 5 years or a war within the last 10 years, they are rivals.

The next variable is ethnic fragmentation (ethnic frag). San Akca (2009) found that internal vulnerability and constraints on extraction were correlated with an increased likelihood
of state support to non-state armed groups. Therefore, this study uses the same ethnic fragmentation index for both the supporting state and the target state (Fearon 2003).

Extant literature emphasizes that non-state armed groups can act as “states in disguise” and as substitutes for allies (San Akca 2009, 2016). This study uses a count variable for the number of allies (# allies) of the supporting state. The data comes from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds 2005). Although this data only goes through 2003, alliance data from 2003 is extrapolated through 2009 with the understanding that the alliance numbers did not change significantly in that time frame.

Salehyan et al. (2011) hypothesized that external support to the target state government (TS gov supported) would increase the likelihood of support to insurgent groups. Because states may be involved in more complex proxy wars, a dummy variable is provided indicating if the target state government also received outside assistance. This information is taken from the USDP-ESP-DS data by matching the target state year.

Because so much of the literature proposes that fear of retaliation is a disincentive to support an insurgency; a dichotomous control variable for nuclear weapons capability (TS Nukes) is applied to the targeted state. This helps to address potential questions concerning nuclear powers and the proclivity to use methods short of war, such as support for insurgency, in order to avoid escalation and gain strategic advantage (Sethi 2009).

A dummy variable for major power status is included. These variables come from the Correlates of War data and are merged directly from the NEWGENE software.

Democratic peace variables include most of the structural variables but also include an indicator for the differences in regime type between the elements of the dyad with dual-democracy being the most important. A discreet, categorical variable is generated for the
combination of regime types in the directed dyad (dd). The value for this variable is based upon
the Polity2 score of the target state and the supporting state. Values are assigned for both states
as autocracies, both democracies, or mixed. If dual democracy is important in explaining the
absence of war between states, it should have some effect on the likelihood of support to
insurgent groups.

Finally there is the literature on civil wars and military interventions. The control
variables associated with the military intervention in civil wars literature include the structural
and regime type variables but also include ethnic ties between the supporting state and rebel
movements and the presence of lootable resources (exploitable resources) in the target state. In
addition to these variables, two interaction terms will be used as part of robustness check to
assess Koga’s findings and as part of the tests of the second and third hypotheses. Her data is
used for these for variables and then extrapolated from the 1999 end date of her data to 2009. For
example, if a country had lootable resources in 1999, it is assumed that those resources still
existed for the next 10 years. Interaction terms are then adjusted for changes in the regime type
data.

4.2 A Few Methodological Issues

The use of panel data of this size and with so many binary explanatory variables raises
the possibility of concerns over autocorrelation and multicollinearity. First, there is some natural
reason to expect autocorrelation in this study. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that if a
supporting state is providing support to insurgent groups one year, then they are necessarily more
likely to continue that support in the following year. In order to account for this serial
correlation, a one-year lag variable of the dependent variable (lagged support) is included in each
of the models, again with standard errors clustered on the panel identification (dyad).
The second issue is multicollinearity, which is a condition where the explanatory variables in a model can be predicted by other explanatory variables in the same model with a reasonable degree of accuracy (Gujarati and Porter 2009). A VIF test was carried out and reveals that none of the explanatory variables showed a VIF above the acceptable threshold of 10.
### Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics Summary Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Support</td>
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<td>.0487297</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Support Level</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.0041677</td>
<td>.089532</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Low-Med-High)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (ss)</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.3643863</td>
<td>.4812582</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy (ts)</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.6356137</td>
<td>.4812582</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Ratio (ss/ts)</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>13.2422</td>
<td>116.9764</td>
<td>4.09e-06</td>
<td>13361.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extractive Capacity (ss/ts)</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>842.0127</td>
<td>26119.61</td>
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<td>9465515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically Relevant (PRG)</td>
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<td>Rivalry</td>
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<td>Major Power (ss)</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.0382542</td>
<td>.1918096</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fragmentation (ss)</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.475611</td>
<td>.2564236</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Allies (ss)</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>2.577096</td>
<td>4.180099</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS Gov Supported</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.2401911</td>
<td>.4271999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS Nukes</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.0703535</td>
<td>.2557421</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Democracy</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.0862816</td>
<td>.2807797</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Autocracy</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.4521464</td>
<td>.4977053</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.3921656</td>
<td>.4882338</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ties</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.0179858</td>
<td>.1328999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitable Resources (ts)</td>
<td>440,291</td>
<td>.3747681</td>
<td>.4840635</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ss – Supporting State

ts – Target State
4.3 Methodology and Empirical Analysis

This research uses logistic regression (logit) models with standard errors clustered on the dyad to analyze the cross-sectional time series dataset of 440,291 directed dyad years consisting of states that could have supported insurgencies from 1975 to 2009. These results are also tested using time-series logistic regression with random effects (as opposed to fixed effects) since the models contain mostly dummy variables. The use of a fixed effects approach with dummies and limited time variation on the panels will make interpretation problematic (Gujarati and Porter 2009).

Even though there are a few variables of interest that are fixed, several tests to determine the preferred method for estimation were conducted including the Breusch-Pagan multiplier test, the Hausman, and the Bera Sosa-Yoon test (Gujarati and Porter 2009; Wooldridge 2010). The results were inconclusive.

Table 4.3 displays the results of the models that test H1. Logistic regression with standard errors clustered on the dyad (panel-id) was used and all variables with variation over time were lagged one year. Model 1 examines state support with democracy as the sole independent variable. This base model is contrasted with the full model (model 2) that includes all the control variables. The models fit the data well as indicated by highly significant Chi².
Table 4.3 Logistic Regression of All Types of Support to Insurgencies. H1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables/Estimates</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy(t-1)</td>
<td>-1.292***</td>
<td>-0.688***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support(t-1)</td>
<td>6.036***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Ratio(t-1)</td>
<td>0.0000227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000140)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extractive Capacity(t-1)</td>
<td>-0.0000415</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000259)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War(t-1)</td>
<td>0.682***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRG</td>
<td>1.289***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>2.264***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethic Fragmentation</td>
<td>-0.169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Allies(t-1)</td>
<td>0.0178*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00939)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS Gov Supported(t-1)</td>
<td>1.369***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS Nukes(t-1)</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0.504**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Democracy</td>
<td>-0.621**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Autocracy</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ties</td>
<td>0.774***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitable Resources</td>
<td>0.509***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>425,588</td>
<td>425,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.0184</td>
<td>0.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi²</td>
<td>32.41***</td>
<td>4080.6***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 in one tailed test
Democracy is negatively correlated to support for insurgent groups and is statistically significant at one percent level. These findings support the first hypothesis, which states that leaders in democracies are less likely to support insurgent groups.

Looking at model 2, democracy remains negative and significant even after controlling for variables in previous literature. As anticipated, the lag for external support, Cold war, political relevance (PRG), rivalry, major power status, and the existence of support to the target state government (TS gov supported) all appear to increase the likelihood of external support and are significant. The coefficient for dual democracy is negative and significant at the five percent level indicating that democratic regimes are unlikely to target other democracies by supporting insurgent groups. Both ethnic ties and the existence of exploitable resources also increase the likelihood of support and are significant.

As a robustness check, the same models were run using a lower polity threshold for democracy and democracy retained its significance. As an additional robustness check, the interaction terms used by Koga (2011) to explain the relationship between regime type and military intervention were run and did not appear to have an impact on support to insurgent groups. Random effects models were also run using time series logit and reflected similar results.
Table 4.4 Logistic Regression of Levels of Support from Democracies (H2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables/Estimates</th>
<th>Low-Level</th>
<th>Middle-Level</th>
<th>High Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>0.742***</td>
<td>-0.828***</td>
<td>0.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem/Ethnic Ties (_{(int)})</td>
<td>-1.633***</td>
<td>1.224**</td>
<td>0.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.568)</td>
<td>(0.507)</td>
<td>(0.904)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support (_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>-0.241</td>
<td>0.547***</td>
<td>-1.137***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Ratio (_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>0.00109</td>
<td>-0.000156</td>
<td>-0.00674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00157)</td>
<td>(0.00157)</td>
<td>(0.00650)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extractive Capacity (_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>-0.000131*</td>
<td>0.000156**</td>
<td>-0.00283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0000727)</td>
<td>(0.0000716)</td>
<td>(0.00960)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>-0.0554</td>
<td>-0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRG</td>
<td>-1.525***</td>
<td>1.422***</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.652)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>-0.895***</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>1.972***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethic Frag</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>-0.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.379)</td>
<td>(0.350)</td>
<td>(0.708)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Allies (_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>-0.0337**</td>
<td>0.0180</td>
<td>0.0529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0167)</td>
<td>(0.0162)</td>
<td>(0.0321)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS Gov Supported (_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>-0.366*</td>
<td>0.0811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.234)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS Nukes (_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>0.640***</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>-2.984***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.218)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(1.068)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>1.338***</td>
<td>-1.272***</td>
<td>0.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
<td>(0.822)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitable Resources</td>
<td>0.00517</td>
<td>-0.297*</td>
<td>1.413***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>1012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R(^2)</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi(^2)</td>
<td>187.9***</td>
<td>162.4***</td>
<td>87.28***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.1   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01 in one tailed test

Table 4.4 displays the results of the regressions run to test the second hypothesis, which proposes that when democracies support insurgent groups, they tend to either provide low-level
support through material support, or provide high-level support through the conduct of full military intervention. These models include Koga’s (2011) regime-type based interaction term, where democracy and ethnic ties are included as an interaction term.

The results provide modest evidence to support this hypothesis. In the first model for low-level support, democracy is significant and positive indicating a preference of low-level support. In the second model measuring mid-level support, democracy is negative and significant at the one percent level as predicted. Oddly, democracy shows no significance for high-level support.

The changes in correlation and significance of certain variables between models may support the concept advocated in this dissertation that support typologies matter. For example, PRG is negatively correlated with low-level support and significant, indicating that the provision of material support does not require contiguity or major power status, but can be done with relative impunity and on a transactional basis. PRG and extractive capacity however, are positively correlated with mid-level support, possibly reinforcing the assertion from chapter three that mid-level support incurs greater costs and risks. Hence a state is more likely to provide mid-level support to insurgents if the target state is strategically relevant and if the supporting state is relatively stronger, thereby mitigating concerns about retaliation. Also, the possession of nuclear weapons capability by the targeted state is positive and significant for low-level support, but negative and significant for high-level support. Thus, the possession of nuclear weapons prevents full military intervention in support of insurgents, but may make potential supporting states more likely to support insurgents through simple material aid.
The interaction term proposed by Koga (2011) linking democracy and ethnic ties is significant for both low and mid-level support. This could indicate that democracies may be motivated to by ethnic ties to venture into the mid-level support gray zone.

Though the results show some support for the theory, the lack of significant variables in model 3 is of some concern. Perhaps, once state leaders make the decision to intervene by supporting insurgent groups, the same factors that brought the supporting state leadership to that decision, may not be the same factors that affect decisions on the types of support as assumed in this study. High-level support generally crosses the threshold of war and that is a well-studied and well-modeled decision in the field.
Table 4.5 Logistic Regression of Levels of Support from Autocracies (H3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables/Estimates</th>
<th>Low-Level</th>
<th>Middle-Level</th>
<th>High Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy(t-1)</td>
<td>-0.319</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.420)</td>
<td>(0.393)</td>
<td>(1.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autoc/Exploitable Resources</td>
<td>-0.0763</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>-0.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.473)</td>
<td>(0.449)</td>
<td>(1.222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support(t-1)</td>
<td>-0.272</td>
<td>0.571***</td>
<td>-1.110***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Ratio(t-1)</td>
<td>0.000989</td>
<td>-0.000162</td>
<td>-0.00639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00152)</td>
<td>(0.00154)</td>
<td>(0.00653)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extractive Capacity(t-1)</td>
<td>-0.000135*</td>
<td>0.000161**</td>
<td>-0.00288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000728)</td>
<td>(0.0000718)</td>
<td>(0.00997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War(t-1)</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>-0.0463</td>
<td>-0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRG</td>
<td>-1.400***</td>
<td>1.329***</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.658)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>-0.912***</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>1.990***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frag</td>
<td>-0.00352</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>-0.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.372)</td>
<td>(0.345)</td>
<td>(0.727)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Allies(t-1)</td>
<td>-0.0332**</td>
<td>0.0172</td>
<td>0.0549*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0166)</td>
<td>(0.0162)</td>
<td>(0.0328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS Gov Supported(t-1)</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>-0.419*</td>
<td>0.0840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS Nukes(t-1)</td>
<td>0.557**</td>
<td>-0.0413</td>
<td>-2.923***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
<td>(1.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS Major Power</td>
<td>1.307***</td>
<td>-1.249***</td>
<td>0.361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
<td>(0.841)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ties</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>-0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 1012
Pseudo R²: 0.141 0.118 0.202
Chi²: 176.4*** 156.6*** 87.41***

* p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 in one tailed test

Table 4.5 displays the results for the test of the third hypothesis, which proposes that the leaders of autocracies will choose types of support based on strategy and not be constrained to go low or go high like democrats. In this case, the autocracy variable is not significant in any of the models, indicating that the autocratic nature of these regimes allows leaders more flexibility in
choosing the level of support they wish to provide to insurgent groups. Thus, the results support the H3, which maintains that leaders of autocratic regimes can choose the type and level of support that allows them to seize strategic opportunities and tailor strategies.

Again, the Koga (2011) interaction term is included. Koga (2011) maintained that autocracies were more likely to intervene militarily if the target state had exploitable resources. Yet, even for high-level support, these results do not match Koga’s (2011) findings.

4.4 Summary and Discussion of Findings

There seems to be modest statistical evidence that regime type matters in the decision making process of state leaders considering the unconventional option of supporting an insurgency. Clearly these models do not account for all factors and certainly not for all the systems involved. The issues with endogeneity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation could not be completely satisfied with existing techniques largely due to the lack of variation in the independent variables of interest. Nevertheless, this section was able to confirm the results of previous research indicating that leaders in a democracy act differently when it comes to supporting insurgents (San-Akca 2009, 2016). Democratic leaders do appear to be less likely to support insurgent groups in general.

Once democratic leaders decide to support an insurgency, however, they seem to be less inclined to take the risks of mid-level types of support such as advice/capability, active sanctuary, and limited intervention. The results of this quantitative study, however, cannot really tell us why. There are a few possible explanations, which relate conveniently back to San-Akca’s (2016) two models; the state selection model (SSM) and the rebel selection model (RSM). Both of these models can help explain why democracies might be less inclined to provide mid-level support like advice and capability or sanctuary. The SSM could explain that democracies might
not wish to risk a deeper involvement without the guarantees against excessive agency slack and the assurances of victory. Meanwhile, the RSM could explain that if democracies are insisting on reducing agency slack, screening, and sanctioning of the rebels they seek to support, then rebel groups might be rejecting the support offered from, or negotiated with, democratic states because rebel leaders do not want to give up autonomy. It is likely that either or both of these processes are part of the explanation. Qualitative examinations of case studies can help shed light on this.
Chapter 5 - Qualitative Research

Chapter four used a quantitative analysis to show correlation of state support to insurgent groups and regime type. The analysis shows that democracy is just one factor that explains the odds of support to insurgency. The chapter presented modest statistical evidence that democracies are less likely to support insurgents in general, but when they do, they tend to avoid mid-level types of support. The chapter also presented evidence that autocracy is unrelated to the probability of any particular type of support. However; the chapter does not adequately explain what specifically it is about democracy that seems to provide a disincentive toward supporting insurgent groups in general and then avoiding mid-level types of support when they do. This is the nature of quantitative research. As Mahoney and Goertz (2006) assert, quantitative approaches can help explain the average effect of different variables (effects of causes), however, they are less suited to inference about the causal mechanisms involved.

Qualitative approaches are better suited for explaining how regime type influences leadership decisions because a qualitative approach allows scholars to expose the causal mechanism and causal path of the phenomenon in question (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Scholars can qualitatively examine the “causes of effects” systematically by using a number of methods. This dissertation uses structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney and Goertz 2006). As noted in chapter two, scholars identify two simultaneously operating causal mechanisms on which regime type is likely to have influence (state selection model (SSM) and the rebel selection model (RSM)) (San-Akca 2016; Salehyan et al. 2011). Both of these models could be affected by the independent variable and it is important to emphasize that both of these models must achieve a positive outcome in order to observe the phenomenon. In other words, they are both necessary, but not independently sufficient, to cause a positive
outcome. The supporting state and at least one rebel group must agree (select) to the support transaction or relationship in all cases, with the possible exception of cases where full intervention is involved. It is possible that a state intervenes militarily without rebel support or coordination. This contingent outcome can also be explored and understood through qualitative analysis.

The quantitative approach used in chapter four treats all observations equally without allowing the researcher to explore critical or non-conforming cases (lack of fit) and it assumes that the concept of the typology and the way this dissertation measures it (concepts and measurements) are valid (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). In order to understand why democratic regimes seem to be averse to supporting insurgents, it is important to examine and compare cases where democracies did choose to support insurgents and did so in ways that appear deviant to the predicted behavior. It is also important to examine such non-conforming cases to see if some characteristics of these cases ran counter to the logic behind the proposed typology, especially its ordinal relation to risk. This can help to refine the typology for future research.

In order to understand how regime type interacts with other complex factors on many levels of analysis, this study must describe the context of specific cases where democracies chose to support as anticipated (positive-predicted), chose not to support (negative-predicted), or chose to support in a way that is not anticipated by the theory (positive-deviant). A qualitative examination of specific cases allows for the consideration of other factors and causal mechanisms or “thick theory” (Coppedge 1999). As Coppedge explains, “Small-N comparisons tend to be more faithful to the rich concepts that inspire our theories and tend to be more

---

7 An example of full-intervention support might be the Philippines in the Spanish-American War in 1898. Though native Philippine rebel forces were fighting the Spanish colonists, the American forces conducted a full intervention and did not coordinate their efforts with Philippine insurgents. There was no acceptance from Philippine rebels.
sensitive to the complex and conditional causal relationships and intertwined levels of analysis that most closely approximate our intuitive understanding of how the political world really works. (Coppedge 2004, 475)”. If a qualitative examination of specific cases yields new factors or causal explanations, then concepts can be revised and new factors identified for future research (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 5.1 explains the rationale behind case selections and briefly explains the merits of the cases selected, the value of within-case study cases (within-case observations), and the terminology used to classify those cases. The second section explains the qualitative method of structured, focused comparison and how it is used in the subsequent case study chapters.

### 5.1 Case Selection and Classification

Selecting cases for in depth study is not an easy task. As King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) explain, merely selecting “crucial cases” that conform to a presented theory is inadequate and is a form of selection bias in both small N and large N studies. Yet, there is a limit to the practicality of simple random selection of cases and to increasing the number of case studies. It is important, therefore to examine cases that are both predicted by the theory (often called “positive” cases) and those that are deviant to the theory (often referred to as “negative” cases).

For the purpose of classification of cases within this dissertation, a case is considered “positive” if there was active support to an insurgent group from a potential supporting state and “negative” if state leaders decided not to provide support. A case is considered “predicted” if it
complies with a particular hypothesis about regime type of the supporting state and “deviant” if it does not.8

Even though qualitative methods tend to (and need to) orient toward positive cases on the dependent variable, negative cases must also be considered and studied (cases where leaders chose not to support insurgents). The dataset used in chapter four contained 1048 dyadic years of “positive” observations where a supporting state provided support to insurgents targeting a state. To do so, it is valuable to examine both the scope conditions and boundaries of the theory at hand and apply the possibility principle to the selection of cases (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). Though Mahoney and Goertz (2004) present scope conditions and the possibility principle as alternate methods of negative case selection, they can both be applied, or at least examined, here.

State support to foreign insurgent groups happens when there is an existing or incipient intra-state conflict. As Owen (2010) explains in his analysis of macro trends in forcible regime change, regime instability or crises are key triggers of external interference throughout history. Therefore, every internal conflict presents a strategic opportunity for multiple external actors, including states in particular, to gain strategic advantage through the support of rebel groups opposing a target state government. Thus, the first part of this theory involves the scope conditions of the phenomenon. That is the existence of intra-state conflict over time.

Observations for the large N study use dyadic years for target states that experienced an internal conflict during the span of the available data. In terms of scope conditions, it is important to select cases where democracies supported insurgents in some way. The second part of the theory

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8 This categorization is used because $H_1$ predicts democracies tend to avoid supporting foreign insurgents, while $H_2$ maintains that when they do they either use low-level or high-level support. Thus, referring to a case as negative or positive based on its orientation to the theory could get confusing as a single case may be negative to $H_1$, but positive to $H_2$. Each case is therefore either positive or negative based on whether active support exists, and predicted or deviant to a particular hypothesis.
asserts that democracies tend to prefer lowest or highest levels of commitment to rebel groups. Therefore, a crucial or most-likely case approach would suggest choosing cases where the expected phenomenon occurred. In other words, the outcome becomes a subset of the cause.

However, this is not enough and exposes the research to selection bias. In order to gain a more complete understanding of how democracy affects state support to insurgent groups, it is also critical to examine deviant or non-conforming cases where democratic regimes acted in a way that was not predicted by the theory. The theory at hand stipulates that democracies tend to avoid support for insurgent groups, but when they do, they prefer either high-level or low-level support. Therefore, a democracy providing support is important, but also, examining cases where a democracy went against the expected outcome and provided advice/capability, sanctuary, or limited intervention is also important as is a case where a democracy could have supported insurgents, but chose not to (negative-predicted H₁). Examining these deviant and negative cases helps to refine the theory and, as necessary, build typological theory with contingent generalizations (George and Bennett 2005). In other words, democracies might tend to favor or avoid certain policy options, but what critical factors cause democracies to go against that general tendency?

Mahoney and Goertz (2004) propose the possibility principle as an ideal method for selecting negative cases (or observations). The possibility principle, when applied to qualitative studies, demands that negative cases are chosen where the outcome of interest is possible. The possibility of a negative case can be determined by applying rules of inclusion and exclusion. According to Mahoney and Goertz (2004), cases should be included (are relevant) if their value on at least one independent variable is positively related to the outcome of interest and should be
excluded (are irrelevant) if their value on any eliminatory independent variable predicts the nonoccurrence of the outcome of interests.

Chapter four demonstrates that the absence of rivalry, contiguity, and/or political relevance do not effectively eliminate the possibility of occurrence. Though qualitative analysis will help clarify, it appears that these conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient in explaining active external support to insurgent groups. Only the non-existence of an intra-state conflict can really exclude the possibility of state support to an insurgent group, and even with this variable it must be noted that it is possible that a state could foment or secretly facilitate an insurgency/rebellion in a foreign state before conflict breaks out.

Therefore, case selection for this study focuses on the principle of inclusion in the application of the possibility principle for negative case selection and examines cases in context well before the conflict began or a rebel group emerged. Thus, these case studies also identify multiple within-case study observations (simply called “cases”) where arrangements for support may have begun prior to actual conflict, decisions to not-support were implied, a leader decided to change the type of support, or a leader decided to end support that had been going on. Thus the cases in the qualitative chapters will not strictly match the observations as specified in the quantitative study in chapter four. Tables are provided at the beginning of each structured, focused comparison section to highlight these differences.

Support to insurgent groups is part of the “gray zone” as defined by Mahoney and Goertz (2004) between negative and positive cases of other phenomenon such as military intervention. The typology / scale of support used in this dissertation is, in fact, a kind of measure of that gray zone. Thus, identifying negative cases is an endeavor that requires some precision. When selecting and examining negative, positive, predicted, or deviant cases, it is critical to include
potential supporting states that had some interest in an intra-state conflict that could have compelled a higher level of involvement or support, but did not. Additionally, the quantitative analysis argues that politically relevant groups are an imperfect application of the possibility principle for this phenomenon (See chapter 3). Non-PRG cases of positive support are important because other researchers might call these, “positive but irrelevant” cases (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). These cases make up 16% of the population of positive cases, which seems like too much to be positive and “irrelevant.” Including a case of non-PRG support could further expand the analysis on how and why states support insurgent groups and could demonstrate a degree of equifinality⁹ (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Examination of non-PRG cases could also expose contingent generalizations and build typological theory refinement (George and Bennett 2005).

With so many different types of cases to be studied, it would seem that the size of the N for qualitative case studies quickly becomes difficult to manage. However, the scope boundary of this study requires an intra-state conflict. Thus, a single case study of intra-state conflict offers many actors, many opportunities to support insurgents over the time-span of the conflict, which could last many years. This means that within one case study (intra-state or incipient intra-state war) there exist several sub-cases (within-case observations) that can be studied. As King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) explain, researchers in small-N studies should maximize their leverage over research problems by finding as many observable implications of the theory as possible and then make observations of those implications.

King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) recommend different ways of doing this including changing either the units of analysis/observation and/or changing the measures of the dependent

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⁹ Equifinality is the principle that there may be multiple causal paths, mechanisms, and factors that can lead to the same outcome. Equifinality is mostly associated with open systems.
variable. For this study, changing the measures of the dependent variable makes little sense, though, in depth, qualitative analysis naturally allows for some refinement and nuanced exploration of the measures of support and the typology as proposed. For example, state leaders may debate the types and quantities of material support or the specific rules and limitations of sanctuary. Massive increases in the quantities and specific types of material support (weapons, artillery, munitions etc.) could conceivably have the same risk implications of higher/riskier levels/types of support when it comes to assessing the possibility of target state retaliation.

Nevertheless, changing the units makes more sense. Although state leaders and their decisions remains the key observable unit, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) recommend using variations across time and space to allow for more within case observations. Among these within-case study observations, there are likely to be both positive and negative cases as well as other types of observations relevant to theory testing as described above, thus allowing for the full application of the possibility principle. For example, over the course of a ten-year intra-state conflict, several countries may consider supporting rebels. These same potential supporting states may change leadership and have reforms that alter their regime type. Furthermore, leaders may meet several times to consider support, change their minds, and are likely to adjust the type and degree of support over time.

Finally, an additional advantage to using within-case study cases over time and space is the natural degree of control for some factors by the homogeneity of the situation of the particular conflict. This natural and convenient unit homogeneity, allows for stronger evidence of the causal influence of certain factors that do change over time. The following case studies allow for multiple within case study observations and the applicability of the possibility principle and make up the next three chapters.
In classifying the multiple cases for the next three chapters, this dissertation refers to cases first by the existence (or non-existence) of state support from the potential supporting state and then by their conformity to the hypotheses presented in chapter three. Thus a single case to which structured, focused comparison is applied is labeled “positive” if state leaders chose to provide active support, and negative if state leaders chose not to provide active support. A case is labeled as “predicted H₁” or “deviant H₃” based on its conformity to the three hypotheses from chapter three. Thus, a case where a democracy decided to provide mid-level support is classified as “positive-deviant H₁&₂”, an observation where a democracy decided to provide material support is labeled as “positive-deviant H₁”, and an observation where a non-democracy chooses to provide mid-level support is “positive-predicted H₃.”

The qualitative case studies selected present observations that included various types of cases including where democratic and autocratic regimes acted as predicted, but also include numerous deviant cases to help examine what factors and mechanisms may have overridden the central tendency supported in chapter four. Chapters six and seven both focus on Nicaragua. Thus chapter six develops the first case study, which is the Sandinista Rebellion of Nicaragua 1961 to 1979. During this period, Nicaragua suffered from a persistent, incipient intra-state war that bridged the gray area between civil war and armed politics. After 1974, the trouble in Nicaragua easily met the criteria for an intra-state conflict of more than 25 battle related deaths per year. The conflict was characterized by foreign states providing active external support to rebel groups, especially the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN aka Sandinistas) (Spanish: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional). The Sandinistas targeted the Nicaraguan regime of Luis, and later Anastasio Somoza. During this period the Soviet Union and Cuba
provided active support to this particular rebel group (positive-predicted H₃). The Sandinistas also may have received some sporadic support from other Latin American countries.

Costa Rica, a democracy sharing a contiguous border with Nicaragua, chose not to provide active support (negative-predicted H₁), until 1978 when its government changed policy and provided active sanctuary support that proved decisive (positive-deviant H₁&₂), while Cuban and Soviet leaders significantly altered their strategy specifically with the quantities of their support (positive-predicted H₃).

Chapter seven again examines Nicaragua, this time describing the Contra rebellion of from 1979 to 1990. After the Sandinistas, with some help from other opposition groups, overthrew the Somoza regime and established a new, Sandinista led regime, several countries faced the decisions about supporting numerous anti-Sandinista groups collectively known as the “Contras.” Supported primarily by the democratic US (positive-deviant H₁&₂), the Contra groups received support from several countries. There is evidence that over a dozen countries may have provided support to Contra groups. Costa Rica at first resisted support (negative-predicted H₁) and then waivered between active and passive assistance to one particular breakaway element that resisted the Sandinistas. Examining the Contra rebellion of Nicaragua, in addition to the previous Sandinista rebellion has the great advantage of providing unit homogeneity.

Chapter eight sacrifices the unit homogeneity with respect to several factors including the region, target country, and grievance of the conflict in order to test some generalizability of the theory. It examines the early rebellion several Tamil groups against the government of Sri Lanka from 1979 to 1990. The period, generally known by historians as Eelam War I, was characterized by extremely brutal ethnic violence and competing visions of nationalism. Most relevant and critical to this dissertation, it also features observation where the leaders of the worlds largest
democracy, India, decided to go beyond mere material support, but also provided active sanctuary and advice/capability support to multiple insurgent groups (positive-deviant H1&2). When that policy began to fail, the Indian Prime Minister opted for a policy of limited intervention with the threat of full intervention. The threat led to the deployment of a peacekeeping force which turned into a disastrous full-intervention that eventually pitted India against some of the very insurgents it had supported.

5.2 Structured, Focused Comparison

The next three chapters use the qualitative method of structured, focused comparison in order to provide systematic comparisons that facilitate the development of findings (George and Bennett 2005). In order to structure a study, George and Bennett (2005) recommend a standardized set of questions to guide the research for a “controlled comparison…to assure comparable data from several cases” (p.68). This approach facilitates validity and reliability, ensuring that variables are explained and examined across all cases. In order to focus a study, George and Bennett (2005) emphasize that research should be undertaken with a specific objective in mind together with a theoretical focus appropriate for that objective. In this study, the focus is on determining the impact of regime type on the decision of state leadership to support and insurgent groups to accept support. The list of questions in table 5.1 provides the structure. These questions are designed to determine if the proposed causal mechanisms played a role in the process and the outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1 Structured-Focused Comparison Questions</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about supporting insurgent groups?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making?
4. How did agency-scanlc and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes?

Question one focuses on the structural characteristics of democracy as compared to other regime types. As discussed in chapter three, these include the preserved freedoms of the press, freedom of assembly and to form private organizations etc., legislative and judicial mechanisms of executive constraint, and the necessity of maintaining a winning coalition within a large selectorate. When examining non-democratic or autocratic regimes, care is taken to understand the structural constraints of that particular political system.

Question two examines the normative characteristics of the regime to see if there is an aversion to the violation of an international norm and what other norms might supersede that in the decision making of leaders and the discourse of the public. The focus is on any expression of norms against violating the principle of neutrality and interfering in the domestic affairs of a foreign state.

The third question attempts to assess motivation and determine if leaders justified (or rationalized) their decision based on threat trajectory perception or if they merely seized a strategic opportunity. The literature review and the theory development explained in chapters two and three indicate that threat perception is important if democratic leaders are going to risk war. Thus, if democratic leaders are going to enter the gray zone of supporting an insurgent group, threat perception must be important. By the same logic, leaders in non-democratic regimes should be more willing to use support to insurgent groups to create or seize strategic opportunities. It is recognized that these may not be mutually exclusive and that leaders may make policy decisions that do both.
Finally, question four addresses the rebel support model (RSM) described by San Akca (2016) and Salehyan (2014). Both scholars emphasize that the rebels get a vote and rebel acquiescence is a necessary condition for support to occur. Examining the relationship between the rebel groups and the supporting states, identifying agency slack, and examining how leaders of different regimes manage these issues could be important to understanding the role of regime type.

In order to thoroughly frame the case studies, each of the subsequent qualitative chapters begins with an in-depth historical narrative of the conflict that focuses on providing contextual understanding of the internal conflict and the interests of potential external supporting countries, target state government, and insurgent movement (groups). Because both chapter six and chapter seven are about Nicaragua, chapter six provides much of the historical background to chapter seven, with chapter seven covering the brief period of transition to the Sandinista led junta. The historical narrative section is followed by a section that examines the context of decisions surrounding external support (or non-support) to insurgents. The external support section is followed by a structured, focused comparison section that summarizes and compares the answers to the questions in table 5.1 for each of the potential supporters based on information available and inference about leader decisions. The final section of each chapter provides a summary of the most relevant findings including theory refinement and the identification of contingency generalizations as necessary.
Chapter 6 - The Sandinista Rebellion of Nicaragua 1961-1979

Nicaragua is the largest, in area, of the seven Central American countries. Today, it has a population of about six million people. Nicaragua shares land borders with Costa Rica in the south and Honduras to the north. Administratively, the country is sub-divided into 17 “Departments” with most delineated toward the Pacific coast; the largest concentration of the population (Staten 2010). Although it has long coastlines on the Pacific and Atlantic (Caribbean) oceans, the mountains and jungles of the interior have stood as a formidable barrier to logistics and cultural integration of the country. The country’s three main geographic regions; Pacific lowlands, North-central highlands, and the Caribbean lowlands, are characterized not only by different geographical and environmental features, but also by fairly distinct cultural and ethno-linguistic identities (Staten 2010; Brown 2001; Perez-Brignoli 1989). The Spanish-speaking mestizo majority live in the Pacific lowlands and urban centers, while a large population of mestizo peasantry live in the North-central highlands (Brown 2001). The Caribbean lowlands have been the home of large populations of Native Americans including the Miskito, Sumo, and Rama tribes as well as the descendants of creoles and other non-Spanish European settlers. Integration of the Caribbean lowland and North-central highland populations has long been a challenge of Nicaraguan leaders (Brown 2010).

The starting dates and the ending dates of the Nicaraguan civil wars in the late 20th century are difficult to identify or delineate for the purposes of this study. Nonetheless, active state support to rebellions and various insurgent groups have been a characteristic of Nicaragua’s history. The regimes of both Nicaragua and its Central American neighbors have were established as democracies, but the circumstances of history kept these countries from achieving anything close to mature democracy by the standards used in this dissertation (Marshall and Gurr
The seeds of the conflicts of the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s were sewn many years prior. From 1961 through 1979 there is evidence of many states providing various types and quantities of active support to rebel organizations involved in the conflict. Separating passive from active external support can be challenging. Numerous other external, non-state actors were also involved. These facts provide for the possibility of numerous, within-case study cases to examine how regime type of supporting states affected the decisions of leaders to get involved and provide active support in this internal struggle. Rebels also received support from private citizens and distant non-state armed groups, further blurring the lines and challenging the theoretical typologies proposed in this study.

Using the Sandinista rebellion as a case study is valuable for several reasons. First, this case study presents many theoretically deviant observations where democracies, specifically the United States and Costa Rica, went against the theoretical tendency described in chapter 3 and supported by statistical evidence in chapter four. During the Nicaraguan conflicts, democratic regimes chose to support insurgent groups using those middle range commitments (advice/capability, sanctuary, and even limited intervention), while the theory asserts that they should be disinclined to attempt such efforts. Careful analysis of this case study, however, provides a situation where the ‘exception helps to prove the rule’ and provides evidence to possible additional and reinforcing causal mechanisms. It demonstrates that the disinclination of democracies toward this type of action and these types of support may not be that strong and can be overcome by other factors in the causal path. Furthermore, the case study exposes a holistic understanding as to why democracies may not be very good at these kinds of gray zone strategic approaches and why that may be a reinforcing part of the causal mechanism.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section describes a summary narrative of the history of Nicaragua, as it is relevant to the geopolitical and national context of the conflicts described in this chapter and the subsequent chapter. The second section provides a more detailed history of the Sandinista rebellion against the regime of Presidents Luis (1956-1963) and Anastasio (1967-1979) Somoza Debalye (aka. Somoza). This historical analysis highlights the foreign support provided to the Sandinistas from both democratic and non-democratic regimes and supports subsequent structured, focused comparison by weaving these highlights with the chronology of key events. The third section presents the structured, focused comparison by summarizing the answers to the key questions. The final section provides a summary of findings and a brief discussion.

6.1 Historical and Geopolitical Context of Nicaraguan Conflict

Historians have often articulated thematic continuities about the history of Nicaragua. Among those themes are the recurring struggle between tyrant and rebel archetypes and the persistent influence of neighboring states and foreign powers into the internal struggles of armed and often violent politics (Perez-Brignoli 1989; Merrill 1993; Staten 2010; Kinzer 1991). The two interrelated themes can be traced as far back as the 16th century to the invasions of rival Spanish conquistadors and are seen to reoccur in struggles for power, influence, and ideals.

When Christopher Columbus, on his fourth voyage, first landed on the shores of Nicaragua’s Caribbean lowlands, he either did not encounter, or at least did not think much of the Miskito tribesmen that inhabited the areas (Merrill 1993). However, almost two decades later, in 1522, the Conquistador Gil Gonzalez Davila led an expedition from settlements in

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10 Historians generally consider Anastasio Somoza Debayle and his brother Luis to have been the defacto leaders of Nicaragua despite the fact that, like their father, they did not officially occupy the office of President at all times. During interim periods, political loyalists served as President or Acting President.
Panama up the Pacific lowlands through what is now Costa Rica into what is today Nicaragua.
There, he met local tribal kingdoms where he successfully converted and received tribute from local rulers including one named Nicaro, from whom the area evolved its name. But Gonzalez also encountered the hostile forces of a chief named Diirangen of the Chorotega tribe who forced Gonzalez to return to Panama and would continue to resist Spanish forces, becoming the first rebel in the historical consciousness of modern Nicaragua (Merrill 1993: Staten 2010).

In 1524, the Spanish governor of Panama, Pedro Arias Davilla (aka Pedrarias), sent Hernandez de Cordoba to establish permanent settlements that became the cities of Leon and Granada. After open conflicts between rival conquistadors and Diirangen, Pedarias was appointed Governor of the region, which was an administrative territory under the Captaincy of Guatemala along with most of modern day Central America. The Spanish colonization efforts however, were based largely on the extraction of resources and Spanish men, often without wives or children from Spain, commonly intermarried with native tribes. The dense jungles and mountains of the North-central highlands and Caribbean lowlands left Spanish presence and influence along the Miskito Coast at a bare minimum, limited to some missionary work (Brown 2001; Merrill 1993).

In 1655, the British laid claim to the Miskito Coast (Caribbean lowlands) and worked with the local leadership to form trade relations and agreements of protection. The British claim to the Miskito Coast and their arrangement with the local tribes would serve as a persistent barrier to Spanish efforts, and later efforts of the political power centers in Pacific lowland cities to unify the country (Staten 2010).

Spain dissolved the Captaincy of Guatemala in 1821 and Nicaragua, like most of Central America, briefly became part of the First Mexican Empire until 1823 when Nicaragua joined the
United Provinces of Central America. In 1828, Nicaragua became independent, but British and native leaders continued to claim a separate protectorate status for the Caribbean lowlands and various levels of political independence from the Pacific coast authorities of Nicaragua (Perez-Brignoli 1989; Merrill 1993).

Independence fostered and enflamed persistent and violent politics between liberal and conservative forces that would characterize Nicaraguan politics until the late 20th century. This ideological stratification in Nicaragua was similar to those throughout Latin America during the nineteenth century (Perez-Brignoli 1989). In Nicaragua, however, this period of strife was further complicated by mass migrations associated with the California gold rush after 1849. Nicaragua’s geographic position made it key terrain as a land bridge, which could shorten the sea voyage from the eastern and southern coasts of the US to the Pacific coast. Though the mountains of the North-central highlands had served as a logistical and cultural barrier, the San Juan River, Lake Nicaragua, and some investment made crossing possible for those with the means. With the assistance of the US government, American business tycoon, Cornelius Vanderbilt used his wealth and influence with the British and conservative Nicaraguan political leaders to secure the transit rights to such a route and to the building of a conceptual future canal. Vanderbilt’s company quickly established the infrastructure for a journey across Nicaragua, which began by small boat from Greytown (San Juan del Norte) on the Miskito coast (British controlled), traveled up the San Juan River to San Carlos, crossing Lake Nicaragua to La Virgen on the west shore, and finally continued by land to San Juan del Sur on the Pacific coast. In September 1849, the Nicaraguan Congress approved the United States-Nicaragua treaty, along with Vanderbilt’s contract (McCullough 2005: Merrill 1993).
However, Nicaragua was soon at war, as liberal forces conspired with the liberal government of Honduras to invade with a combined force of Hondurans and liberal Nicaraguans. Liberals, led by Maximo Jarez, fought bitterly against conservatives led by President/General Fruto Chamorro. This case of *full intervention* support from the Honduran government greatly strengthened the position of liberals, but their forces lost their source of active, external support when conservative Guatemalan forces invaded Honduras in early 1854 (Perez-Brignoli 1989; Merrill 1993).

It was largely this strategic situation, coupled with grand ambitions for territorial expansion and the perpetuation of the southern US institution of slavery that attracted American adventurer and filibuster William Walker (Brown 1980). In 1853, William Walker made an alliance with liberal Nicaraguan politicians to assist in removing the conservatives from power. Walker raised a small army of US mercenaries and landed in Nicaragua in 1855. Given the theoretically typology of this dissertation, Walker’s adventure is a rare case of non-state, *full intervention* support. Though clearly US officials must have known about Walker’s intent, there was no serious attempt made to stop him (Brown 1980). Walker and his forces achieved unprecedented success and defeated the conservatives at Granada and soon after, Walker was able to make himself President of Nicaragua and announce the re-establishment of slavery in 1856 (Brown 1980; Merrill 1993).

Though the US government initially recognized Walker’s new regime, political loyalties quickly changed as Walker managed to anger Cornelius Vanderbilt and the British when his actions jeopardized their investments and contracts in the region. At their urging, the Costa Rican

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11 William Walker was one of the most famous filibusters in US history. A doctor, lawyer, and journalist, Walker’s first filibuster mission occurred in Northern California in 1853. His efforts failed and he was tried and acquitted under the US Neutrality Act of 1794. Soon after his acquittal, Walker set his sights on Nicaragua.
President, Juan Rafael Mora, formed a coalition of conservatives and other Central American countries including Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador (Brown 1980). With a combined force, these armies conducted a full intervention from the north and the south in support of conservative forces in what Nicaraguan’s refer to as “The National War” (Merrill 1993). Conservative forces, aided by the mostly full-intervention support of the other Central American powers, defeated Walker and turned him over to the US Navy, but not before he ordered his men to completely destroy the old city of Granada. The Navy brought Walker back to the US for trial. To the great consternation of Nicaraguans and much of Central America, Walker received no punishment and instead, returned to Central America with similar intentions several times until the British captured him and turned him over to Honduras, where authorities executed him in 1860 (Brown 1980; Merrill 1993).

The National War and its aftermath secured two related themes into the historical consciousness of Nicaragua. First, was a distrust of the United States and “Yankee Imperialism” and the second was a perceived legitimacy, even necessity, of external support, especially from other Central American neighbors, for victory in internal wars. Yet, for Nicaragua, there was about 30 years of relative peace and growth under several, mostly conservative, administrations. Despite the initial closing of the Vanderbilt route, the government built a railroad connecting the Pacific and Caribbean coasts and maintained the interest of the US in building a future canal until 1903 (Merrill 1993; Staten 2010; McCullough 2005).

A turbulent end to the conservative reign occurred in 1893 when liberal General Jose Zelaya (Zelaya) became President under a new constitution. Zelaya ruled until 1909 and during

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12 Jose Santos Zelaya was the son of wealthy coffee planation owners. He was educated in Europe and rose to political power in 1893 just as conservative forces were undergoing a severe internal dispute. His ascension to the Presidency occurred as a result of a coup where the Army sided with liberal forces (Herring 1968).
his administration he negotiated a formal end to the dispute with Britain over the Caribbean lowlands, which officially became the Department of Zelaya. Though he could not establish complete internal sovereignty and local tribes continued to govern much of the region, Zelaya maintained ambitions of greater Central American unification throughout his 16-year rule (Merrill 1993).

While some historians emphasize Zelaya’s role as a reformer (Staten 2010), others focus on his powerful Presidency as a dictatorship (Merrill 1993; Perez-Brignoli 1989). Most agree, however, that it was after 1903 when Zelaya began to fall out of favor with the US and other Central American governments. In 1903, the US officially abandoned the prospects of a Nicaragua canal and began to focus on prospects in Panama despite the failure of the French (McCullough 2005). This led Zelaya to seek foreign investment from the Germans, Japanese, and others in the project. This, combined with his anti-US rhetoric, violent acts and rhetoric seeking Central American unity, led to US support for conservative opponents of Zelaya. A conservative rebellion, to which the US and British governments provided active diplomatic and material support, led to Zelaya’s resignation and the eventual takeover of the conservatives in 1911.

Unfortunately, liberals and conservatives continued their violent struggle and, at the request, of conservative leaders, the US provided full intervention support with US Marines to stabilize the country, thus perpetuating the historic continuity of intervention in Nicaragua (Herring 1968; Merrill 1993). The US Marines occupied Nicaragua on a near permanent, certainly persistent, basis from 1912 until 1933. During this period of “small wars”, the US Marines would face numerous minor rebellions and incipient insurgencies and would help to moderate and negotiate settlements between the rival liberal and conservative political factions.
The US would also help to establish a professional, non-partisan military force. The *Guardia Nacional* (National Guard aka *Guardia*) would soon become the dominant force in the perpetual armed politics of Nicaragua (Brown 2001; Merrill 1993).

In the waning years of that occupation, from 1927 to 1933, the US forces fought a breakaway liberal insurrection led by General Augusto Cesar Sandino (Sandino). Sandino was unlike previous Nicaraguan leaders. He was the illegitimate son of a wealthy landowner and a family servant. Although raised initially by his mother, his father arranged for his education and supported his status as a young man. In 1921, at age 26, Sandino was forced to flee Nicaragua after a fight with the son of a conservative politician. In exile, Sandino traveled throughout Central America and Mexico, even finding work in the oil fields operated by the American company Standard Oil. After getting involved with numerous revolutionary groups, Sandino returned to Nicaragua in 1926 and became active in the struggle of armed opposition to the rule of conservative President Adolfo Diaz and in support of exiled liberal Vice-President Juan Bautista Sacasa (Sacasa)\(^\text{13}\) (MacAulay 1998; Herring 1968).

A charismatic peasant leader, Sandino professed to fight not just for the cause of liberals, but also for an end to US dominance in Nicaragua and, like Zelaya before him, for Central American unity. Typical of rebel leaders before him, Sandino actively sought the support of external governments and private citizens. Unlike previous movements, however, he was mostly only able to get diplomatic and moral support. From Mexico, he was only able to receive sanctuary for himself and his immediate staff, but not for his forces (Merrill 1993). Sandino did

\(^{13}\) Juan Bautista Sacasa was born on December 21, 1874 to a wealthy family. He was educated in the US and received a medical degree from Colombia University in New York. As a young man he had been an avid supporter of President Zelaya. During the years of US marine occupation, Sacasa was active in liberal politics and joined a coalition led by a conservative moderate. Sacasa fled the country in 1925 after a coup placed Adolfo Diaz in power. He returned in 1926 after an uprising of Liberal soldiers in Puerto Cabezas (Herring 1968).
receive some financial support from external, non-governmental sources, particularly international communist organizations (Staten 2010). He also had personnel among his forces from other Central American countries, including a young Farabundo Martí of El Salvador who would go on to help establish the communist party of Central America and lead the deadly uprising in El Salvador in 1931 in which Martí died (Staten 2010). Most of Sandino’s support, however, came from the peasantry of the North-central highlands (MacAulay 1998). Though he could never claim a major tactical victory, Sandino harassed and frustrated US Marines and their Guardia partners in North-central highland departments of Nueva Segovia and Jinotega (Merrill 1993). 50 years later, the future Contra rebels would fight against a regime named after Sandino, while receiving assistance from the descendants of Sandino’s peasant supporters (Brown 2001).

The US Marine forces left Nicaragua in 1933 after liberals took power and made peace under the leadership of Juan Bautista Sacasa (Sacasa), the former Sandino ally. With the Marines gone, and Sacasa and the liberals in power, much of Sandino’s causus belli had been achieved. Yet, Sandino was also calling for the dissolution of the Guardia and his forces had already inflicted many casualties on the young force. Sacasa invited Sandino to the Presidential Palace in Managua for peace talks. Following a dinner at the Presidential Palace on February 21, 1934, Guardia troops surrounded Sandino’s vehicle, took him and his party prisoner, and then executed him. The Guardia then set about the systematic destruction of his rebel force (MacAulay 1998; Merrill 1993).

Historians agree that it was General Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza García (Somoza), the Chief Director of the Guardia, who gave the order for Sandino’s assassination (Merrill 1993; MacAulay 1998; Staten 2010). Like so many Nicaraguan leaders, Somoza was born into a wealthy family of coffee plantation owners, was educated in the US, and was connected to other
powerful political families through marriage. His wife was the niece of President Sacasa. General Somoza was a liberal, a close friend to the previous liberal President and General Moncada, and a close friend to US leaders. Somoza was trained and educated in the US and spoke perfect English. In the years following the Sandino execution, Somoza used his influence to consolidate power, win over liberal and conservative politicians, form his own party, and in early 1937, become President of Nicaragua through a blatantly fraudulent election (Staten 2010; Merrill 1993). According to Merrill (1993) and Diedreich (1981), Somoza won the election by the remarkable margin of 107,201 votes to 108.

According to most historians, Somoza was diligent in consolidating and protecting his power. He allowed and even encouraged a nominal opposition, but took steps to ensure the perpetuation of his political power. As President, he resumed his authority over the Guardia and then placed family members and loyal friends into positions of power. In 1938, he defied his conservative allies by appointing a Constituent Assembly that elected/appointed him as President for an eight-year term. As the US became increasingly concerned about the growing war in Europe, Somoza took a firm anti-fascist stance and began to receive ever increasing military aid from the US while integrating his countries industries into the global war effort on the side of the allies. As a result, the personal fortune of the Somoza family grew to proportions that dwarfed even the other wealthy families of Nicaragua and Central America (Merrill 1993).

As the end of World War II approached and Somoza’s official term as President came to a close, opposition against his rule began to grow. Recognizing that he could not continue as President, Somoza and his political party, the Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN), nominated a close friend, Leonardo Argüello for candidacy. Argüello won the Presidency in the 1947 election while Anastasio Somoza (Tacho) remained as the Chief of the Guardia. When Argüello, as
President, began to act in ways contrary to Somoza’s interest, Somoza staged a coup and placed Benjamin Lacayo Sacasa into the office. When the US, under President Harry Truman, refused to recognize the government of Sacasa, Somoza and his political associates established a constitutional convention, rewrote the constitution, and appointed Victor Roman Reyes as President (Herring 1968; Merrill 1993).

According to Merrill (1993), the new constitution was crafted with fierce anti-communist language that coincided with the advent of the Cold War, US concerns over communist infiltration in the western hemisphere, and with the revolution in neighboring Costa Rica led by Jose Figueres. This was eventually enough to convince the Truman administration to recognize the new government. Yet, Somoza also used the opportunity to make concessions to communist and socialist forces within his country by passing progressive labor laws. Somoza also carefully placated conservative politicians by agreeing to allow the conservative party to maintain one-third of the delegates in the national assembly (Staten 2010; Merrill 1993).

Anastasio Somoza was assassinated on September 21, 1956. Somoza’s eldest son Luis assumed the office of interim President, while his younger brother, Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza became the Director of the Guardia. The brothers used the assassination of their father as justification for the significant political repression that followed. Luis ordered the arrest and imprisonment of several political opponents and Anastasio (Tachito) used the Guardia to close down opposition media outlets. The repression led the conservative opposition groups to boycott the Presidential elections of 1957. Luis, therefore won the election and assumed the office of President with a term lasting from 1957 to 1963 (Merrill 1993).

Luis Somoza used his six years as President to build trust with other Central American partners and the US. Taking a firm anti-communist stance, he was one of the first Central
American leaders to denounce the revolution in Cuba in 1959 after the take over of Fidel Castro. Luis and Anastasio worked closely with US leaders and in early 1961 agreed to provide active sanctuary support to Cuban exiles and the US Central intelligence Agency (CIA). According to Prados (2006), the Somoza brothers allowed the use of facilities at Puerto Cabezas as a staging area for the failed Bay of Pigs invasion that occurred on April 17-19, 1961. Though they claimed that Cuban and Soviet leaders had been actively supporting communist/terrorist groups in Nicaragua, it was their support for the Bay of Pigs debacle that would act as a critical antecedent to Soviet and Cuban decisions to begin active support for insurgent groups (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005).

From 1963 to 1967, three leaders of the PLN held the Presidency of Nicaragua with the Somoza brothers acting as close advisers. As Luis had begun to experience health issues, Anastasio ran for the Presidency in 1967 and won, despite ever growing opposition groups, and an incipient insurgent movement. Conservatives and alienated liberals formed a coalition called the National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Opositora-UNO) and ran against Anastasio, but failed to achieve the support necessary amidst the Somozas’ powerful political network (Staten 2010; Merrill 1993).

Anastasio remained in power well past his initial 1971 term. He did so by using similar tactics used by his father and brother. He first amended the constitution in 1971, and then in early 1972, established a junta made up of political loyalists in an attempt to mollify ever-increasing opposition, which was by then coming from across the political spectrum and supported externally by both state and non-state actors.

From 1936 to 1979, the Somoza dynasty ran Nicaragua, either openly with the Somoza family serving as President, or behind the scenes with loyal friends assuming the office (Merrill
1993). Routinely, the Guardia was the primary tool of enforcement and coercion and it was during this period of unprecedented power that the Somoza family became very wealthy. The “Somoza dynasty” perpetuated and maintained its power through four reinforcing mechanisms; (1) Ownership and control over large sectors of the Nicaraguan economy; (2) Support for and influence over the Guardia; (3) Maintaining the favor of and support from the United States (4) Manipulating and making deals with political leaders across the spectrum of Nicaraguan politics (Merrill 1993; Herring 1968). Although the nature of the Somoza dynasty caused a great deal of friction with US leaders and those of other neighboring governments, Somoza and his sons were able to maintain US patronage first by taking solid anti-fascist positions during World War II, and then taking strong anti-communist positions in the early Cold War period (Merrill 1993).

The external support to opposition groups and insurgent groups that targeted the Somoza regime, played some role in the eventual downfall of the regime. But the insurgents, opposition leaders, and their state sponsors would have to breakdown these four pillars over-time. It was not until 1979 that they would be successful and it is clear that external support would be a critical factor.

6.2 The Sandinista Rebellion and External Support

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN aka “Sandinistas”) played the leading role in the demise of the Somoza dynasty and the dissolution of the Guardia in July of 1979. This group would quickly move to consolidate power, impose a communist and authoritarian government, rule Nicaragua for 10 years, and remain active in Nicaraguan politics to this day. The Sandinistas, like most previous Nicaraguan rebel movements, would owe their success to the active, external support of foreign governments and some non-state actors.

As discussed in chapter two, all rebel groups face resource mobilization challenges. Rebel leaders generally acquire those resources internally or from abroad, or both. Though the
Sandinistas would eventually mobilize the support of much of the local population, their seemingly swift victory in the first half of 1979 had everything to do with the decisions of both democratic and authoritarian regimes to provide robust active support that included diplomatic, material, advice/capability, and sanctuary support.

Jose Carlos Fonseca Amador (Fonseca), Silvio Mayorga, and Tomas Borge Martinez (Borge) formerly organized the FSLN on July 19, 1961. Prior to that time, the organization had been little more than a communist leaning student group (Merrill 1993). Of the three founding members, only Borge would live to see the organization depose Somoza and assume the leadership of the Nicaraguan government.\(^{14}\) Going from student group to a serious, albeit small, opposition/rebel movement requires resources, which, consistent with Nicaraguan history, these men found externally from Cuba and the Soviet Union (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005; Staten 2010).

The US sponsored “Bay of Pigs” invasion/debacle in April of 1961 was a turning point in Soviet foreign policy. Prior to this incident, The Soviet Politburo and the Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or KGB) did not have a plan or strategy to invest much effort in supporting rebel movements in Latin America. Even with Fidel Castro’s successful takeover of Cuba in 1958, the Soviets did not supply military aid until December 27, 1958, just three days prior to Castro’s victory (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). In the wake of Bay of Pigs, however, there seemed a clear opportunity to gain strategic advantage against the US. According to Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005), the KGB archives show the first disbursement

\(^{14}\) Borge was born to a poor family in the city of Matagalpa, which stands in the Pacific lowlands, at the base of the North-central highland region. His family had a strong revolutionary and anti-Somoza background as his father had fought alongside Augusto Sandino. As a young student leader, Borge was arrested during the crackdown in 1956 after the assassination of Tacho Somoza (Borge 1992).
of funds to the FSLN in the middle of 1961. Shortly after, on July 29, 1961, the KGB director sent Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, the concept for a new strategy that would help to “…create circumstances in different areas of the world which would assist in diverting attention and forces of the United States and its allies, and would tie them down during the resettlement of the question of a German peace treaty and West Berlin (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005, 40).” The director proposed to support national liberation movements and generate armed uprisings against pro-US leaders. He emphasized the need to focus on reactionary regimes in Central America and cited Nicaragua as a good place to start. The concept plan further recommended that the KGB work closely with Cuba. On August 1, 1961, the Central Committee officially approved this directive as Cuba’s new intelligence service, the Directorate of General Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia or DGI), began a very close relationship with the KGB (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005).

The Sandinistas, at their inception, began receiving active external support from Cuba and the Soviet Union. In addition to Soviet funding, in Cuba the leaders received immediate support in the form of material, advice/capability, and sanctuary for leadership. But that was not a complete recipe for success, nor was the material support of any great quantity. The base of Sandinista support was from the Pacific lowland urban areas and within that, mostly among urban intellectuals within university communities (Merrill 1993; Lafeber 1993). Thus, for the first 13 years of their existence, the Sandinistas led a miserable existence (Borge et al. 1982, Borge 1992). The Soviets and the Cubans had provided enough to get them started and sustain the leadership and even expand the development of a core cadre, but this resource mobilization from abroad was never enough and the movement failed to mobilize the population to a degree necessary to combat the Guardia and Somoza’s political network (Borge 1980; Merrill 1993:}
Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). Much of the leadership ended up dead or in prison as they tried to organize and launch what were, in hindsight, premature attacks (Nolan 1986).

For the Sandinistas, as for all political and military organizations, there was a problem of strategy. The revolutionary strategy problem was part of a grand debate among communists around the world who compared the theoretical writings of Lenin, Mao, and most recently, of Cuban leaders (Borge 1992). The Sandinista leadership, heavily influenced by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, initially believed in foco theory, where a small, secret group of guerillas could, without the initial support of the populations, move independently in the countryside and through military action generate popular discontent and the defeat of a regime (Nolan 1986). In 1963, the Sandinistas made a pitiful incursion from the jungles of Honduras into Jinotega Department of Nicaragua near the village of Riati and were quickly defeated by Guardia detachments. Authorities in Honduras promptly arrested Sandinista survivors. Honduran government officials would not provide active sanctuary support there until much later (Nolan 1986). The Sandinistas would repeat this pattern of defeat multiple times over the next 13 years.

Soviet leaders, according to Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005), were soon dismayed and less optimistic about their new strategy and its vanguard agent organization. Most of the Soviet aid came through Cuba, and Cuba itself was largely dependent on Soviet aid of all kinds. Some Soviet leaders believed that the Cubans were spending too much on training of rebels from all over Latin America, and the Sandinistas were showing little or no real progress (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005; Kinzer 1991). The events of the Cuban Missile Crisis in late 1962 did much to temper some Soviet enthusiasm for active measures in the Western hemisphere that might precipitate overly aggressive reactions from the US. Furthermore, Foco based strategies may have worked in Cuba, but they were clearly not a recipe that could be easily applied elsewhere.
Despite numerous defeats, however, these thirteen years were not wasted. Sandinista leadership continued to adjust its strategy after every defeat and after the consultations of other rebel groups’ leaders in forums such as the Tri-continental Conference in Cuba in 1966 (Nolan 1986; Borge et al. 1982). By 1967, the Sandinistas were attempting to implement a strategy that relied on silent peasant mobilization in the North-central highlands, by cadres of students largely from the Pacific lowlands and urban centers. After a crushing defeat in 1967, Sandinista General Secretary, Carlos Fonseca settled on a strategy called Prolonged Popular War (Guerra Popular Prolongada or GPP) (Nolan 1986). The Sandinista leaders assured their KGB and DGI sponsors that they had a strategy for success. Meanwhile, key leaders and cadre, including Fonseca and Borge travelled the world seeking additional support and even embedding members into other organizations, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005; Kinzer 1991).

Perhaps the most difficult resources for a rebel group to mobilize or generate are the practical elements of knowledge associated with rebellion and the networked organization of people. Though Sandinista leaders struggled to keep the movement alive within Nicaragua throughout the 1960s, their persistence in cadre development, outreach to foreign supporters, and network building, even in rural areas where they had failed before, would prove valuable as the political dynamics of Nicaragua began to change and expose opportunities (Borge et al. 1982).

On December 23, 1972, a major event punctured the political power equilibrium of the Somoza dynasty and started a chain of events that began to evolve the prospects of the Sandinistas. The massive earthquake struck Nicaragua’s most densely populated region in the Pacific lowlands, devastating the capital city of Managua. Though estimates of the death toll vary, thousands died and more than 50,000 people were left homeless, with massive damage to
infrastructure. For Anastasio Somoza, the 1972 earthquake could have been an opportunity. Somoza could have used the situation and the international goodwill it generated to build national cohesion in the wake of a tragedy. Historians and journalists at the time describe an aftermath of rampant corruption where Somoza, as head of the National Emergency Committee responsible for the distribution and coordination of foreign aid, enriched himself and his family (Merrill 1993; Staten 2010; Perez-Brignoli 1989; Kinzer 1991; Dickey 1987). Foreign and brave, domestic media sources exposed numerous incidences of graft, theft, and corruption and published stories abroad and some in Nicaragua, particularly in *La Prenza*, an increasingly anti-Somoza opposition newspaper run by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal (Chamorro), one of the leaders of the UNO opposition group that had campaigned against Somoza in the previous Presidential election (Perez-Brignoli 1989). According to Merrill (1993) Somoza’s personal wealth reached $400 million, more than double what it had been 10 years prior to the earthquake.

For Nicaragua and for the international community, the aftermath of the earthquake was a turning point. Opposition leaders became more vocal and Somoza responded with increased security arrests and restrictions, using Sandinista attacks and operations as justification (Staten 2010; Merrill 1993). In 1974, the Sandinistas took advantage of the situation and seized the residence of Somoza’s Minister of Agriculture in the town of Los Robles just outside of Managua. The small group took hostages including several of the closest associates of Somoza. The leaders demanded a ransom of $2 million, the release of several Sandinista and opposition prisoners, and the publication of a Sandinista manifesto in *La Prenza*. Somoza conceded to the demands of the hostage takers leaving the Sandinista’s stronger and more popular (Nolan 1986, Merrill 1993).
Somoza still had close relationships both inside and outside of Nicaragua. The US, Israel, and other Latin American governments began to change their tone and discuss openly the merits of their support for Somoza and potential support for opposition groups (Merrill 1993; Nolan 1986).

In the wake of the Los Robles success, Carlos Fonseca left his sanctuary in Cuba to try to build on the new momentum for the Sandinista cause. Within one year, however, Guardia forces captured and executed Fonseca and several of his cadre. Guardia forces killed several other Sandinista leaders and captured and imprisoned several more, including the last of the founding members, Tomas Borge. A testament to Somoza’s persistent power and the failure of the Sandinistas to mobilize the peasantry; it was largely peasants from the North-central highlands that alerted and assisted the Guardia in their mission to defeat the Sandinistas (Merrill 1993; Nolan 1986).

The remaining Sandinista leadership once again used their defeat to reassess their strategy. Within the discourse between Sandinista leaders and their external sponsors, historians and Sandinista leaders classify two primary schools of thought or tendencies. The first was the primary GPP strategy advocated by the now deceased Fonseca and the now imprisoned Borge. The second was known as the Proletarian Tendency (TP), which recommended an abandonment of the GPP strategy for a more urban-based strategy that played to the Sandinista strengths of organizing among students and workers in the urban centers of the Pacific-lowlands. While these two main factions debated, a third faction under the leadership of Daniel and Humberto Ortega, began to gain favor with the Sandinista’s two primary international sponsors (Nolan 1986; Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). This third way became known as the Tericista strategy and its adherents were referred to as “Tericistas”. The Tericistas sought to use elements of both the GPP
and the TP strategies, but also included controversial, tactical and temporary alliances with other opposition groups (Borge et al. 1982). The Sandinistas could first help depose Somoza and then gain supreme political power in a post-Somoza Nicaragua. Beginning in 1977, the Sandinistas would incrementally turn to this strategy as certain events unfolded which made the strategy more attractive and Cuban sponsors became convinced that the Tericista way was a worthy investment (Nolan 1986; Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). The inclusion of other opposition groups had the added advantage of winning over new external sponsors that were more cautious and were not favorable to the record of communist dictatorships, including Central America’s only true democracy, Costa Rica.

Costa Rica, however, was in a very difficult position. The government had routinely played host to Nicaraguan opposition leaders. But the border areas of Costa Rica and Nicaragua are remote and bands of Sandinistas were using Costa Rica as a sanctuary. The Costa Rican government officially opposed the use of their territory, however, Costa Rica had no military force capable of interdicting small guerilla bands hiding in the jungle or among their own population. When Somoza closed the border in late 1977, Costa Rican President Carazo reached out to treaty allies of the Organization of American States (OAS) and expressed concern about his ability to defend Costa Rican territory in the event of a Nicaraguan Guardia incursion (Nelson 1987).

The election of US President Jimmy Carter in 1976 signaled several changes in US policy that would affect relations with Nicaragua. In early 1977, the Carter administration made clear that future military assistance to the Somoza regime would be dependent on human rights. Simultaneously, the Tericistas established El Grupo Los Doce (aka Los Doce). Los Doce was a group of 12 prominent, non-communist citizens who declared their support for the Sandinistas to
be part of the political process in Nicaragua. This was significant as several of the members belonged to, or had close affiliations with, other more “legitimate” opposition groups and wealthy Nicaraguan families. La Prenza carried the news of the manifesto, which had been negotiated and signed in Costa Rica (Merrill 1993).

On January 10, 1978, Pedro Chamorro, the editor of La Prenza, was assassinated. Somoza denied involvement, but almost immediately, the country erupted in riots and several of the non-communist opposition groups called for a general strike. Tercista leaders seized the opportunity and launched guerilla attacks in several cities and some non-Sandinista opposition also launched attacks. Somoza’s response was predictable and effective in restoring order, but costly in that the allegations of human rights violations and the reintroduction of martial law led the Carter administration of the US to make good on the threat of cutting off military aid in April of 1978 (Nolan 1998; Staten 2010; Merrill 1993; Kinzer 1991).

Though the Sandinistas once again suffered defeat, the consolidation of anti-Somoza sentiment and the clear weakening of Somoza’s own resources in the loss of his most important sponsor, became one likely critical antecedent in the decisions of potential supporting states. Cuban and Soviet leaders knew the end of Somoza was approaching and also knew that the Sandinistas, who were not involved in any of the negotiation initiatives of the main opposition parties, might be left out of post-Somoza political decision making. The primary opposition parties formed an alliance called the Broad Opposition Front (FAO). This group, based mostly in Costa Rica and acting openly, included the main Somoza opposition group, Democratic Liberation Union (Unión Democrática de Liberación aka Udel), the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense--MDN), and Los Doce. Though not directly tied to the FAO, the Sandinistas were tied indirectly through Los Doce, but the movement had
gained diplomatic support from the US, the OAS, and neighboring governments in Central America, including, and especially Costa Rica. Cuban and Soviet authorities began immediately to work to increase the quantities of aid and began to negotiate with the government of Costa Rica (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005).

One of the first actions of the FAO was to establish plans for a new general strike in late August of 1978 to support their political leverage in negotiations with Somoza. The Tericistas feared that if the general strike led to a negotiated settlement for the ouster of Somoza, then the Sandinistas would be left out. Records show that their sponsors also believed this to be true. With the direct assistance of the DGI and the KGB, Tericista leaders decided to preempt the general strike with a daring operation much like the successful 1974, Los Robles mission (Nolan 1986). Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005) explain how KGB files reveal that Eden Pastora, an independent Sandinista leader who favored the Tericista strategy, and his guerillas had been trained and financed directly by the KGB in coordination with Cuba’s DGI. According to Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005), the KGB assigned to Pastora the codename “ISKRA” (spark); the same name they had given the entire Sandinista operation at its inception 17 years earlier. The day prior to the attack, the head of the KGB’s Latin American division received a briefing on the plan for the operation (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005).

Eden Pastora was born in the Pacific lowland city of Granada on January 22, 1937. Guardia forces killed Pastora’s father when Pastora was just seven years old and his family raised him with a strong sense of opposition to the Somoza dynasty. When he was twenty years old, Pastora began to organize his own resistance element from among poor farmers in southern Nicaragua. Calling themselves “Sandinistas”, Pastora’s rebel group allied itself with the FSLN in the mid 1960s. It is important to note that Pastora’s anti-Somoza rebel activity had preceded
that of the FSLN, and Fonseca, Borge, and other FSLN leaders adopted the name (Kinzer 1991). By 1978, Pastora was already well known by Somoza and the Guardia as a competent military commander. Eden Pastora was also the least communist among the most well known leaders, a fact that would become very apparent in the post-Somoza Nicaragua (Dickey 1991; Kinzer 1991). Historians seem to agree, and Sandinista leaders confirm (Borge et al. 1982), that the Sandinistas had a decentralized organizational structure (Nolan 1986; Merrill 1993). The Sandinista leadership had great difficulty in maintaining communication and remained out of contact with each other for significant periods of time. Therefore, the discourse of strategy also moved slowly (Borge et al. 1982).

In the Tericista operation, which occurred on August 23, 1978, Pastora led 19 Sandinistas in the seizure of the National Palace of Nicaragua. The Palace housed the country’s legislature at the time. There his men held the lawmakers hostage and made demands for $500,000 in ransom, the release of over 50 political prisoners (including Borge), passage out of the country, and the broadcast of Sandinista call for general strike and resistance to Somoza (Nolan 1986). Somoza had little choice but to agree to the demands (Merrill 1993).

Two days later, the hostage takers and prisoners were safely out of the country. The Sandinista leadership wasted no time and immediately launched a nationwide insurrection in conjunction with popular uprisings and demonstrations organized by FAO. Using cadres in major urban centers, the Sandinista’s attacked Guardia outposts and seized government buildings. This time, Somoza and the Guardia had a more difficult time restoring order and crushing the insurrection. However, the Guardia’s powerful mobile infantry forces, armed with motorized fighting vehicles, artillery, and aircraft, were able to neutralize the rebel forces systematically and sequentially. When a small group from Pastora’s southern front attacked
north from their sanctuaries in Costa Rica, Somoza sent Guardia forces across the border into Costa Rica to destroy them (Nolan 1986; Nelson 1983). President Rodrigo Carazo Odia (Carazo) called for Rio Pact allies to support and Venezuela sent four fighter aircraft to Costa Rica as a show of force. Somoza accused both countries of active support to the rebels and cut off diplomatic relations with Costa Rica (Nelson 1983). Within one month, order was restored and the Sandinista plan thwarted (Nolan 1986; Merrill 1993). Eden Pastora, who did not participate in the subsequent insurrection or incursions, was soon named the military commander of Sandinista forces and his celebrity grew both internationally and throughout Nicaragua (Nolan 1986).

The defeat of the 1978 insurrection may have precipitated the critical juncture in the decisions of Sandinista supporters. With Somoza still in charge but greatly weakened, the non-communist opposition gaining popularity both domestically and abroad, the President of Costa Rica calling upon allies for direct support, and Sandinista cadres throughout Nicaragua severely battered, Cuban and Soviet leaders recognized that the influence of their proxies in the future of Nicaragua was dependent on swift action. Castro, therefore, decided to eliminate agency slack between his government and the Sandinistas by incentivizing Sandinista unity under the Tericista strategy. In late 1978, Castro informed the Sandinista leadership, including the newly released, Borge, that further aid would be contingent upon their acceptance of the new strategy. If they accepted, then he would greatly increase the quantities and quality of the types of assistance he and the Soviets were already providing (Kinzer 1991).

It must not have been a difficult choice. Pastora had become a hero and had already developed close ties with non-communist politicians in Latin America. Most critically, he had developed a very close relationship with Costa Rica’s former President and father of Costa Rican
democracy, Jose Figueres Ferrer (Figueres) (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). Costa Rican leaders had slowly become more open to providing assistance to all Nicaraguan opposition, including the Sandinistas though most of the support up to this point can best be described as passive. The Tericista strategy of alliances with other democratic opposition groups made active support option more palatable to the Costa Rican government as they began to allow Cuban shipments of arms to Pastora’s Sandinista forces in late 1978 especially after the defeat of the September 1978 insurrection (Kinzer 1991; Brown 2001).

In the wake of the Sandinista decision to unite behind the Tericista strategy, the whole dynamic of the anti-Somoza fight changed. According to Brown (2001), the Cubans alone flooded the Sandinistas with arms, material, and other resources. Although other historians and journalists have stated that support also came from Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and others (Kinzer 1991; Merrill 1993; Staten 2010), Brown (2005) asserts that this was never true and presents as evidence, Costa Rican congressional documents, the personal testimony of the Costa Rican minister (Johnny Echevaria) tasked by President Carazo to facilitate the movement of arms, statements from a senior Sandinista field commander and, “numerous others who had seen or monitored various shipments from early 1978 through July 1979.” (Brown 2001, 80)

Furthermore, Brown (2001) provides the assessment of Figueres himself, who said that the final 1978-79 push against Somoza would not have succeeded had it not been for the massive active support of the Cuban government in the form of material, advice/capability, and of the Costa Rican government in the form sanctuary and facilitation of those external resources.

Events in the first six months of 1979 progressed quickly. The Sandinista’s made clear and public their intent to be a part of a “democratic” Nicaragua. The much-touted negotiations process sponsored by the OAS, backed by the US, and involving the FAO, broke down in
January. In February, the Sandinistas united left leaning parties under the National Patriotic Front (NPF), which included many of the parties from the broader opposition FAO (Merrill 1993; Nolan 1986). With over 400 cargo flights coming into Costa Rica from Cuba, including artillery, vehicles, and advisers, a large southern front invasion force formed (Nolan 1986). Simultaneously, Cuban planes dropped supplies to Sandinista guerrilla units in the north both inside Nicaragua and in rural Honduras (Brown 2001). According to Nolan (1986) and Brown (2001), these forces constantly harassed the Guardia and kept the government troops busy and dispersed. Even with this nationwide harassment, the mobile forces of the Guardia still managed to inflict heavy loses on the Sandinistas, even wiping out a 140 man unit that launched an assault in Southeast Nicaraguan town of Nueva Guinea in March (Nolan 1986).

The Sandinistas launched their “Final Offensive” on or about May 25, 1979 (DeYoung 1979). The Sandinistas used the NPF and its cross-party links to FAO opposition groups to launch another general strike. At the same time, Sandinista elements attacked Guardia garrisons in six cities while using rural partisan groups to block roads that supported the Guardia’s mobile forces (Merrill 1993: Nolan 1986). Most importantly, a large, conventional force led by Eden Pastora, invaded Southern Nicaragua from Costa Rica. This force was nothing like anything the Guardia had faced in the past. Whereas the Guardia, throughout its existence, had only faced asymmetric threats in the form of lightly armed guerillas, terrorists, and insurrectionists, the Guardia now faced a symmetric threat; a conventional force armed with modern weapons, communication, artillery, and vehicles to match the best of the Guardia’s mobile forces.

The size of Pastora’s force is unclear. Prior to this final offensive, forces under Sandinista command are generally described as being in the hundreds (Kinzer 1991, Nolan 1986). However, after it was clear that Costa Rica was actively providing and facilitating sanctuary, and Cubans
began their massive airlift of supplies and equipment, the size of the Pastora’s southern front forces grew exponentially. Nolan (1986, 80) claims that Pastora’s forces numbered 1500 while Nelson (1983, 66) estimates its size at 5000. Either number demonstrates a tremendous increase that must have required proportional increases in the quantities of military supplies, personnel, and advisers with the expertise to train fighters in less than six months.

Recognizing the threat and knowing full well that Eden Pastora was in personal command of the force, Somoza had little choice except to send his mobile forces to repel the attack, making it exceedingly difficult for the Guardia to do what it had done many times before. Fully engaged with Pastora’s Cuban supplied forces, the Guardia was unable to put down the multiple events occurring around the country as smaller northern front forces hiding in Honduras and in Nueva Segovia and Jinotega attacked south (Nolan 1986; Dickey 1987, Brown 2001).

By June 1979 it had become clear to most who were paying attention, that it was no longer a question of if Somoza would fall, but when. On June 18, while Pastora and his forces were engaged in sustained combat operations with the Guardia’s main effort, the Sandinistas and leaders from other opposition groups announced the formation of a government in exile with a five member directorate including, Daniel Ortega of the Sandinistas, Moisés Hassan Morales of the FPN, Sergio Ramirez Mercado of Los Doce, Alfonso Robelo Callejas of the MDN, and Violeta Chamorro, the widow of the assassinated editor of *La Prensa* (Merrill 1993). This was part of the Tericista strategy of tactical and temporary alliances and it helped the new Nicaraguan government gain the diplomatic support of many countries within two months. The junta published the Punta Arenas Pact in on July 9, 1979 publically promising universal suffrage, protection of private property, and an inclusive political system (Araujo 1982).
On July 17, 1979, Somoza finally resigned and Guardia resistance across the country disintegrated. On 19 July, the Sandinista forces entered the capital and the junta assumed power reiterating its pledge to work for not only democracy, but also a mixed economic system, and a nonaligned foreign policy (Merrill 1993). Of course, all of the military power was in the hands of the Sandinistas forces and they owed much to their foreign sponsors. The bases of supply quickly shifted to Nicaraguan controlled airfields and ports. Given the history of the armed politics of Nicaragua, many remained skeptical of the future.

6.3 Structured, Focused Comparison of External Support to the Sandinistas

Contrary to the assessment of some historians (Merrill 1993; Staten 2010), it was probably not so much the, “bold military and political moves that changed the FSLN (Sandinistas) from one of many opposition groups to a leadership role” in the anti-Somoza revolution (Merrill, 1993). Rather, the active, external-support to the Sandinista’s was most critical to their success. The Tericista strategy called for the bold political moves, but the military actions were clearly made possible by the active external support of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Costa Rica. Mexico, Honduras, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and others may have played an active role beyond diplomatic and moral support in 1978, but the historical record remains unclear and the overall effect is certainly less significant to the outcome than the support of these three states.15

15 Menges (1988, 101) claims that the Mexican government were, “providing active support to the Sandinistas and permitting communist guerilla movements to have propaganda and political headquarters inside Mexico.” Menges further credits the Mexican President, Jose Lopez Portillo, with providing diplomatic support for Cuba and the Sandinistas in their efforts to get Costa Rican assistance with the provision of sanctuary to and facilitation of material support to the Sandinistas. Menges gives no citation or footnote to this claim.
It seems that both Cuban leaders and Sandinista leaders had every intention of keeping the scope of the massive new support that began in 1978 as secret as possible. Certainly, there were claims of Cuban support, but Sandinista statements at the time and later, emphasized that Sandinista cadre in Nicaragua were conducting operations to support the “active accumulation of forces” which meant attacking the Guardia to steal weapons and ammunition and inspire new recruits. It is absurd to imagine that the Sandinistas could have acquired significant resources simply from raids on Guardia outposts and garrisons in the 1970s, most of which had ended in defeat. Several sources claim that the support that was going to the Sandinistas in 1978 came from several Latin American countries including Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela (Dickey 1987; Kinzer 1991; Merrill 1993), but these observations of alleged support are largely based on pronouncements from the Sandinistas at the time and seem to cite news reports. Brown (2001) and Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005) seem to disagree and Brown (2005) provides evidence that this was an intentionally fabricated story to divert worldwide, and especially US, attention away from the fact that all of the nearly 2000 tons of external material support coming to the Sandinistas through Costa Rica was from Cuba. In other words, Cuban and Sandinista leaders knew that concealing the fact that aid was coming to the Sandinistas, through a democratic sanctuary, would be impossible, however, concealing the sole (or at least primary) source and the quantity could be done with some deception. Dickey (1987) indicates that some of the advisers used were from third countries, mentioning Chile by name. With the Tericista strategy in play, it must have appeared that the increased support in 1978-79 was coming to aid the democratic opposition just as much as the Sandinistas. Kinzer (1991) and Dickey (1987) both stress that the massive amounts of aid going to Eden Pastora’s southern front forces helped to perpetuate this
notion as he had close relationships with the former Costa Rican President and leaders of the democratic opposition.

As the previous historical narrative makes clear, the Soviet Union and Cuba sponsored the Sandinistas from their inception and Cuba in particular took great care in managing the relationship overtime. In 1978, Castro used his influence to compel the factions of Sandinistas to unite behind the Tericista strategy by making aid contingent upon their acquiescence and greatly increasing aid if they did so. Once they united, the assistance flowed and their dominance in the armed politics was manifest.

Pastora’s southern front army was the key. Unlike all previous attempts, which had been crushed within a month, Pastora’s forces spent fifty-two days of heavy conventional combat directly engaged with Somoza’s best forces in May through June of 1979. Thus, in departments throughout Nicaragua and around the capital, the Guardia simply did not have enough troops to contain the onslaught. The small cells and guerilla forces that Somoza had easily defeated so many times before, including in just the past year were now able to control cities and isolate Guardia garrisons (Dickey 1987). Resource mobilization was not only key to explaining the rise of a rebellion, but certainly in this case study, it was also key to explaining the dominance of one group over so many others. Superior resource mobilization by the Sandinistas through their external supporters was a critical factor.

But the dependent variable of this dissertation is not about victory or defeat, nor is it a measure of the success of rebel groups. This dissertation is about the decision making of external supporters and the effects that regime type has upon those decisions. Prospects of achieving desired strategic outcomes, however, is part of the leadership calculus in making decisions about support. In this case, Cuba and the Soviet Union, during the years of the anti-Somoza rebellion
were both deeply authoritarian regimes, while Costa Rica was a mature democracy (Marshal and Gurr 2014). Examining and comparing the decision making of the leadership is therefore key to our understanding.

The quantitative analysis in chapter four relies on a typology of support based upon the theory described in chapter three. Operationalizing that typology required the use of data from the UCDP-ESP-DS. The qualitative analysis presented here reveals some limitations in the quantitative analysis. Given the strict operational definitions of active support used by UCDP and the time frame of the data (begins in 1975), the qualitative examination reveals more observations that are of value to the study of the phenomenon. Table 6.1 shows the positive observations pertinent to this case study as they are reflected in the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Supporting State</th>
<th>Regime Type (Converted Polity Score)</th>
<th>External Support</th>
<th>Type of Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>(4) Autocracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Advice &amp; Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>(4) Autocracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Advice &amp; Capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The information discussed in the historical narrative of the previous section does not use the explicit operational definitions required for quantitative analysis. Also, the UCDP study seems to have left the sanctuary support of Costa Rica unobserved. Therefore observations of external support that likely occurred or are relevant to this specific situation are not measured in the quantitative data. Table 6.2 provides a visual listing of these observations in *italics*. 
Table 6.2 Active External Support to Sandinista Rebellion 1961-1979 (Based on Qualitative examination)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Supporting State</th>
<th>Regime Type (Converted Polity Score)</th>
<th>External Support</th>
<th>Type of Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961-1979</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>(4) Autocracy</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Material (through Cuba)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1977</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>(4) Autocracy</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Material (Sanctuary and Training for Leadership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>(4) Autocracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Advice/Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>(4) Autocracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Advice/Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>(21) Democracy</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Sanctuary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>(21) Democracy</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Sanctuary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The FSLN formed in 1961 and it is clear that the Soviet Union and Cuba began providing active material support to the Sandinistas. Though the policy of support was likely reviewed several times over the years by leaders of each regime, the scope and type of support did not change significantly until late 1978. Each of these decision points provides a within-case observation that can be considered. Costa Rican leaders did not provide active support to the FSLN until late 1978, right about the same time as the second observation for Cuba and the Soviet Union. Prior to 1978, the Costa Rica’s support was a negative sub-case, though passive support and the transition from passive to active must be considered.

**Case 6a: Cuba and Soviet Union (Material) 1961-1977: Positive-Predicted H₁**

There are very few reliable sources available on Russian and Cuban leadership decisions. The Mitrokhin Archive (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005), for example, is valuable, yet the closed nature of autocratic regimes creates challenges in examining the decisions of leaders. Additionally, there are the writings of the Sandinistas themselves and research conducted by Timothy Brown (2001) including interviews and documentation from Costa Rica. The Sandinistas leaders however, often emphasize the role of the Nicaraguan people and the
Sandinista cadres and downplay the roles played by their sponsors, some even minimizing the role of Eden Pastora’s forces (Borge et al. 1982). From these sources, it is difficult to identify every observation and address the structured, focused comparison. However, it is possible to deduce these answers with the information available.

The four structured-focused comparison questions are best answered one by one.

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about supporting insurgent groups? It is clear that both Cuban and Soviet Leaders examined options and considered different types of support. Soviet leaders had engaged in such activities before and clearly the KGB had been involved in low-level support to groups (Prados 2006) but until 1961, it had not engaged in this practice outside of its own immediate geographic periphery (Mitrokhin and Andrews 2005). The fact that the strategy was conceived and approved at the highest level in the Soviet Union in a matter of days seems to indicate that there were few executive constraints.

There is little evidence that executive constraints within Cuba’s very young government affected the decision making of Fidel Castro. The Bay of Pigs invasion had altered or at least clarified threat perceptions for Cuban leadership. It was only after the invasion that Castro publicly declared himself to be a “communist” and when he made his most important foreign policy decision by forming an alliance with the Soviet Union. If there had been serious structural constraints within Castro’s government, they had either not established precedent and/or the acute threat perception considerations following Bay of Pigs made those constraints irrelevant.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? For both Cuba and the Soviet Union there seems to have been little consideration of domestic interpretation of international norms. Certainly Cuba was ruled by a new regime that
had built its narrative on the just revolution and anti-imperialism. As a revolutionary
government, Cuban leaders were rejecting the international status-quo and proclaiming foreign
political movements, which were their ideologically kin, to be worthy of such support.
Essentially there were domestic norms favoring the policy of support to insurgent groups rather
than against it.

Though the Soviet Union was long established, the leaders also had a revolutionary
narrative and the communist ideology. Again, the speed with which the KGB director drafted
and the central committee approved the strategy is a fair indication that there was likely no
consequential discussion among the leadership concerning the violation of international norms.
Moreover, the US had blatantly violated international norms in its support for the hapless Cuban
exile army that participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Nevertheless, the Soviet strategy was
secret as was the actual seed money to the Sandinistas and it remained unrevealed until the
exposure of the Mitrokhin archive. The secrecy of the initial money however, was likely for
operational reasons, not necessarily for strategic reasons.

3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making?

As Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005) assert, the failure of the US Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) sponsored “Bay of Pigs” invasion of Cuba, followed by the domestic political
backlash it caused in the US, presented a practical example of a strategic opportunity and laid
bare an existential threat to the new Cuban regime. As the KGB files indicate, the identification
of a strategic opportunity inspired the KGB director to draft a new strategic concept involving
the support to armed opposition groups involved in wars of national liberation, with an emphasis
on communist groups in general and the Sandinistas in particular. For the Soviet Union, approval
of the strategy at the highest level took a matter of days and approval of seed money to the
Sandinistas did not even require the approval of state leaders (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). It is safe to assume that Cuban leaders were already on board.

For the Soviet Union the new strategy was all about seizing a strategic opportunity. There was no existential threat in Nicaragua or really anywhere in the developing world. Soviet leaders, without significant executive constraints, were able to identify a strategic opportunity and respond with a strategy of supporting armed opposition groups. For Cuba the initial decision to support the Sandinistas was a product of both threat trajectory perception, but also one of seizing strategic opportunity. It is important to point out that supporting the Sandinistas in 1961 was one part of a much larger series of decisions about how to protect the new regime and prevent the US and other foreign leaders from enabling or sponsoring the overthrow of the Cuban regime by military force or support to opposition groups. Clearly the threat perception for Cuban leaders was serious enough, but Cuba in 1961 was not militarily capable enough to retaliate by direct military action against the US or Nicaragua. Key to this is that the CIA used the airfield and port facilities at Puerto Cabezas in Northwestern Nicaragua to stage and prepare the Cuban exile forces for the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Somoza brothers had agreed to provide the exile army and CIA sponsors with active sanctuary support for the endeavor (Prados 2006). Even if Castro had the military capability to retaliate against Somoza, he could not risk a full-scale invasion from the US. Supporting the nascent Sandinistas provided Cuban leaders with a strategic option to weaken Somoza and address part of a threat.

Cuban leaders recognized the US as an existential threat and therefore sought and established the Soviet alliance. Yet, the failure of the Bay of Pigs also presented a strategic opportunity in the form of a weak US President who had lost international reputation over the
event. Vulnerable US allies in Latin America, especially Somoza whose regime bore some resemblance to the Bautista regime of Cuba, could serve as a diversion of US power.

4. How did agency-sack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcome?

Chapter two and three provide an explanation of the term agency slack as it applies to state support to rebel groups. Salehyan (2010) defines agency slack as the condition that occurs when the agent (rebel group) takes actions that are not consistent with the principal (supporting state). Agency slack arises when principals and agents differ in goals for efforts or on the methods that can be used to achieve those goals.

For the FSLN in 1961, their goal was the overthrow of Somoza and the establishment of a Communist government much along the model that the world had witnessed just two years earlier in Cuba. For the Soviet Union, there appears to have been very little concern about agency slack with the nascent Sandinistas. Because they were only supplying small amounts of material support and much of that subsequently was just through Cuba and the DGI, there was little need to control the Sandinistas actions. The articulated KGB strategy, however, emphasized the focus on the developing world including Latin America and Nicaragua in particular. Yet, the Soviet strategy, as articulated and approved by the Central Committee in 1961, emphasized the goal of these efforts to divert, “the forces and attention of the US and its allies and tie them down during the resettlement of the question of a German peace treaty and West Berlin (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005, 40)” This was a decidedly short term goal and one must assume that the strategy underwent modification in the subsequent years. Sandinista leaders probably cared little about the potential of a peace treaty or settling the West Berlin question. For Soviet leaders, the Sandinistas were a small, but potentially useful diversion. They expected very little, risked a little, and invested a little.
An ideological affinity between the principal and agent can serve to reduce agency slack since ideology can help to align goals and methods to be used in achieving those goals. The ideological affinity between Soviets, Cuba, and the Sandinistas had been made clear by the student organization work of the FSLN leaders prior to 1961 (Borge et al. 1982).

It is unclear how much searching and screening the KGB did prior to identifying the Sandinistas as a group worthy of support (Cuban DGI did not exist yet). As discussed in chapters two and three, Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood (2014) explain that leaders of supporting states have the ability to close the principal-agent gap by screening groups prior to providing support and sanctioning groups that stray too far (withholding or incentivizing continued support). The Mitrokhin archive confirms that both the KGB (and eventually the DGI) had established a vast network of “illegals”, officials with false names, foreign passports, and deep cover, who were recruiting agents for various purposes throughout the region (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005).

Because the Sandinistas had mobilized very little resources of their own at the time, choosing the Sandinistas was a strategic decision that allowed Cuban and Russian sponsors to close the principal-agent gap and manage agency slack over time. Selecting a group with an ideological affinity that had few resources of its own was a good way to ensure the management of agency-slack as future sanctioning would be more effective if the groups was largely dependent on the resources of the principal.

For Cuba, unlike the Soviet Union, the goals and risks were much more existential, proximate, and similar to the goals of the Sandinistas. For Cuban leaders the goal of support to the Sandinistas was regime change, though Cuban and Soviet interests may also have been served with a US intervention into Nicaragua. Cuban leaders placed a good deal of confidence in
theory and strategy of *focoism* and had reason to expect that their investment would produce results of regime change and a better strategic position for the Cuban regime.

It is difficult to know for certain how many times Cuban and Soviet Leaders reviewed their decision to support the FSLN. Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005) indicate that after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963 and after the initial failures of *foco*-based strategy, Soviet leaders became, alarmed by “Cuban adventurism” and were disappointed in the Sandinistas (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005, 48). The scale of material support to the first 13 years however, was generally concealed, though Somoza and US intelligence services reported various estimates indicating that it was steady until 1977-78 (Prados 2006; Menges 1988). But Cuban leaders gained a great deal of confidence in the expeditionary capability of their own military forces and advisers during the 1970s. Efforts in Ethiopia and Angola had proved successful, but these were limited intervention support scenarios that went beyond supplying material and military advising (Prados 2006).

**Case 6b: Cuba and Soviet Union (Advice/Capability) 1978-79: Positive-Predicted H3**

By 1978, leaders in the Soviet Union and Cuba faced another critical decision, which involved a major change in the quantities and quality of aid including the types of *advice/capability*, including actually putting advisers on the ground and into the fight. Somoza’s legitimacy had been severely weakened after the earthquake, the scandals, and his own heart attack in 1977. All of these events likely precipitated Castro’s decision to increase support. Yet, Somoza’s de facto strength (especially in control of the Guardia) remained.

There was a cascading series of events from January 1978 (assassination of Chamorro) to July of 1979. Two events were particularly critical. The first is the Carter administration’s official cut off of military aid to Nicaragua in April of 1978. Both Cuban and Soviet leaders
likely saw this as a turning point. The second was the very real possibility of a negotiated 
resignation of Somoza. During 1978, the FAO was deep in OAS mediated and US supported 
negotiations with the Somoza government. Because the Sandinistas were not officially part of the 
democratic opposition, there was a distinct possibility that if FAO succeeded and came to an 
acceptable arrangement, the democratic opposition could have taken control of the government 
and the Guardia with restored US support. The Sandinista’s would then be on the outside and the 
Tericista strategy would not be able to use insurrection tactics of general strikes in support of 
their efforts to seize power. This possibility demanded a rapid acceleration of the Tericista 
strategy. The Sandinistas had to quickly become part of the post-Somoza authority and had to 
either destroy militarily or somehow politically neutralize the Guardia. Castro and Daniel Ortega 
recognized that three things needed to happen near simultaneously. First, the Sandinistas needed 
a firm voice in any post-Somoza authority. Second, the Guardia needed to be destroyed or 
neutralized. Finally, the Sandinistas needed the military strength to dominate the armed politics 
of post-Somoza Nicaragua.

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about 
the support to insurgent groups? By 1978, Fidel Castro had firmly consolidated power and faced 
no significant domestic structural constraints to the execution of his decision to back the 
Tericista plan. Neither does it appear that he faced any bureaucratic or organizational level 
structural constraints. As mentioned previously, by 1978, the Cuban military had already 
executed at least three successful expeditions involving military intervention support in Africa 
(Prados 2006: Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). The DGI and Cuban military forces were able to 
act on the decision quickly. Because the Soviet Union was acting through its Cuban relationships
and supporting primarily with resources, there seems to have been little evidence of structural constraints.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? For both the Soviet Union and Cuba there seems to have been little change with respect to views on international norms. Soviet leaders were experiencing a good deal of somewhat unexpected success in the establishment of communist regimes. For example, in April 1978, Afghan military personnel, led by Afghan KGB agents, staged a coup, executed President Muhammad Daoud, and installed Nur Muhammed Taraki, a communist leader and KGB contact for the past 30 years. Soviet leaders had been warned in advance of the coup, but doubted its chances for success (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). Additionally, Soviet leaders had encouraged and fully supported Cuban efforts in Angola and Ethiopia in the mid 1970s all of which were successful, though expensive. While Soviet leaders were frustrated with the shear amount of foreign aid provided to Cuba, they were generally impressed with the results of support to revolutionaries over the past 20 years. Castro, who according to KGB reports had consolidated his power and whose “Self-importance” and “Delusions of grandeur,” had only become more emboldened by the successes. Castro’s speeches emphasized a moral superiority in assisting wars of national liberation (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005, 115-116). Clearly, leaders in both countries believed that supporting rebels was not abhorrent to the norms, but was the norm. There was no visible opposition or effective mechanism for dissent.

3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? On this question, Soviet and Cuban leaders seem to have identified a strategic opportunity and acted upon it again, in a very short time. Cuban support had helped the Sandinistas weather numerous defeats and survive, but Somoza’s weakness was readily apparent. By late 1978, Somoza was no
longer a threat to Cuba but there was an opportunity to facilitate his replacement with a regime friendly to Cuban interests. As Nolan (1986, 76) explains, “The feared concessions that were being advocated by reformers in Managua and Washington consisted of free elections and social reform that would cut short the revolutionary process. If Somoza were to be pushed out and replaced by a Costa Rican-style social democracy, the Sandinistas would have become irrelevant. The opportunity for socialist revolution would have been lost.”

Castro, therefore, opted for a massive increase in the quantity of assistance. This included increases in the amounts of material and in the number of advisers he would need to place on the ground. The sheer size of the increase, would make it more difficult to conceal the support or for the Costa Rican government to ignore the support. It is unclear to what degree Cuba considered limited intervention, but the scope of the change in 1978 approached that of a limited intervention. The threat of a concerted US response, however, probably weighed heavily against using Cuban military units as independent units of action that could have been easily identified. Kinzer (1991) and Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005) emphasize the massive build up of Cuban support in Costa Rica and specifically mention Cuban advisers on the ground, who would become even more prominent after the fall of Somoza. The fact that Eden Pastora’s southern front would claim to have as many as 2000 soldiers and fought with artillery and some mounted assets (lightly armored vehicles), indicates that some advisers must have been on hand to train Pastora’s forces in the use of artillery (Kinzer 1991). These forces numbered around 250 in previous attacks noted months earlier (Nolan 1986). Either the training went very quickly (just a couple of months) or foreign advisers were doing much of the fire control.

4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes?
There does not seem to have been any major issue of agency slack for either the Soviet Union or Cuba. Castro had chosen the Tericista faction (led by Daniel and Umberto Ortega) to lead the Sandinistas and wanted to unite the damaged and factionalized organization. His insistence on uniting the factions around the strategy was tied to the aid that was forth coming and had already begun to flow. It was an example of sanctioning to close the reduce agency slack.

The Soviet leadership had already given Castro a loose hand in managing the support to revolutionary movements. As Mitrokhin and Andrews (2005) make clear, the KGB and DGI at this point were probably as closely tied as they had ever been. Therefore, Soviet leadership probably felt confident that they knew what Castro knew. But Castro and the DGI were clearly following the Nicaragua situation more closely. By the time Pastora and Borge flew to Cuba after the seizing of the National Palace and Borge’s release, Castro seems to have made up his mind.

Both Cuban and Soviet sponsors had changed their minds, if not about what they hoped to achieve then certainly about when they hoped to achieve it. For Cuba, it was clear that leaders sought to ensure that the Sandinistas were the dominant political force in a post-Somoza Nicaragua. This aligned perfectly with Tericista strategy so there was little agency slack with respect to the near term goals. One area of contention or concern was that Castro hoped to spread the revolutionary success quickly to El Salvador. Some sources indicate that there was concern and a firm desire to make as many gains as possible prior to the next US Presidential election where many indications existed that the current President, Jimmy Carter, was vulnerable and a republican challenger would be much more aggressive in terms of supporting Central American
regimes and resisting the insurgencies (Cannon 1991; Dickey 1987; Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005).

**Case 6c: Costa Rica (No Support) 1961-1977: Negative-Predicted H1**

For Costa Rican leaders, the decision to provide *sanctuary* support did not come easily and certainly did not come right away. For most of the history of the Sandinistas, Costa Rican leaders avoided active support and even jailed some Sandinista cadre in the 1960s and early 1970s. Additional background on the history of Costa Rica and its interactions with Nicaragua is necessary to understand this outcome.

In the mid to late 20th Century, Costa Rica was an anomaly among Central American and Latin American countries. It is safe to say that most historians would agree that President Jose Figueres Ferrer (Figueres) is the main reason for that anomaly (Nelson 1983; Perez-Brignoli 1989).

Figueres himself was a rebel and defined much of his early life as the leader of an armed rebellion benefitting from external support. In the 1940s, he was a wealthy landowner who was sent into exile by President Rafael Calderon after Figueres publically criticized Calderon’s decision to declare war. While in exile he helped establish a liberal armed resistance organization known as the Caribbean Legion, which received support from the governments of Cuba and Guatemala. When he returned from exile, he brought with him members of the Caribbean Legion and built a force that included members of his Social Democratic Party. In 1948, Figueres defeated the forces of the ruling Costa Rican regime in the Costa Rican Civil War of 194816 and led the establishment of a new regime with a new constitution. The constitutional reforms pushed by Figueres radically changed Costa Rican politics, especially the abolition of a standing army.

\[\text{________________________} \]

16 The Costa Rican Civil War lasted from March 12 to April 24, 1948.
Costa Rica instead would have a police force and a Civil Guard that could be mobilized in the event of an emergency (Nelson 1983).

Figueres would later serve three non-consecutive terms as President of Costa Rica and under his administration the government would eventually ban the communist party, rely heavily on collective security agreements of the Rio pact and OAS, and experience several periods of tension and clashes with the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. Without a standing army, Figueres frequently used his own land to provide sanctuary and training areas for anti-Somoza conspirators. The elder Somoza returned the favor in 1955 when a group of Costa Rican exiles, whom Somoza had trained, equipped, and harbored, invaded northern Costa Rica. In addition to material, advice/capability, and sanctuary support, Somoza provided air-support.\(^\text{17}\) Figueres invoked the Rio Treaty of collective self-defense and mobilized the Civil Guard. As a result, the US “sold” Costa Rica four P-51 Mustang fighter aircraft and supported the OAS mediation efforts (Nelson 1983)\(^\text{18}\). With the Civil Guard mobilized and having some air support and Somoza’s support to the rebels called out by OAS observers, Costa Rica was able to retake territory, capture many rebels and expel the rest back into Nicaragua. But, the OAS also reprimanded Figueres for maintaining his active support to the Caribbean Legion. After the elder Somoza was assassinated in 1956, both countries finally agreed to terms of peace that included Costa Rica expelling the Caribbean legion members and an OAS monitored and patrolled buffer zone on the border (Nelson 1983).

When Figueres became President again in 1970, the country experienced waves of student violence and active, domestic communist organizations. Figueres established diplomatic

\(^{17}\) The Nicaraguan government claimed that these were, “insurgent aircraft” flown by insurgent pilots.

\(^{18}\) The “sale” of the aircraft was reportedly done for the price of $1 a piece (Nelson 1983).
relations with the Soviet Union despite opposition (Nelson 1983). According to Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005) Figueres became a strong supporter of the Sandinistas in the 1960s prior to running for his third term in 1970. The KGB records indicate that the Figueres received a ‘loan’ of US $300,000 from the KGB through the Costa Rican Communist Party, which he used to help finance his campaign. According to Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005) this granted in return for a commitment to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union upon his election. When Figueres term expired in 1974, the next administration established diplomatic relations with Castro’s Cuba and, despite the election tribunal’s ban of the word “communist” and “Marxist” from the 1974 election, the Communist party was granted legal status once again (Nelson 1986).

Keeping this brief history in mind, it is easy to see that Costa Rica was an anomaly among democratic regimes. Without an army, it was difficult to prevent rebels from using sovereign territory as sanctuary. Figueres, in his second administration, had continued his support for a non-state armed group. The political leadership of the country resisted the temptation to provide active support for the Sandinistas and other groups, yet that did not prevent private citizens from lending their support. Technically, Costa Rica from 1961 to 1977 is a negative case (because there was no active support), and a predicted case because a democratic regime refused to provide active support to an insurgency). As San Akca (2016) makes clear however, democracies often provide passive support or “de facto” sanctuary for rebel organizations, especially for leadership and political organizations that represent non-state armed groups.

**Case 6d: Costa Rica (Sanctuary) 1978-79: Positive – Deviant H₁&₂**

By early 1978, it became clear that Figueres had established close relationships with left leaning parties of Nicaragua and much of the democratic opposition. He was also providing
sanctuary to Sandinista rebels associated with Eden Pastora. Though influential, he was a private citizen. His political party became split during the early 1978 campaign season and lost to a coalition party led by Rodrigo Carazo Odio (Carazo). Carazo was head of a conservative party that took a firm anti-communist position and even sought to end diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. But his coalition partner was a minority left leaning party that provided just enough seats for the coalition to receive a majority (Nelson 1983).

With only a police force and a weak coalition government, there was not much Carazo could do to expel the Sandinistas without mobilizing the Civil Guard. But the signals from Somoza were belligerent as he threatened Costa Rica for providing sanctuary and even closed the border in July 1977. After Pastora’s seizure of the National Palace in Nicaragua, the initiation of the September uprising, and the incursions into Costa Rica, President Carazo reached a critical juncture and decided to move to active support of the rebels at the same time that he mobilized the Civil Guard. Somoza had become a bigger threat than the Sandinistas. In other words, facilitating support for the Sandinistas was the surest way to defeat Somoza and get the Sandinistas out of his country.

It is important to note that the theoretically typology of this dissertation maintains that sanctuary is a kind of mid-level support that democracies generally avoid. In this case however, it would seem that the theoretical typology is imperfect or perhaps over-generalized. The case of Costa Rica, therefore, involves a contingent generalization. Costa Rica did not have an army with which to provide full or even limited intervention. The Civil Guard, even when fully mobilized, could only maintain order and perhaps defend the borders well enough to provide time for allied support. By invoking the Rio pact for collective self-defense, Carazo was, in effect, going to war. The Sandinistas, and their Cuban and Soviet sponsors, were the most
expedient source of military power. Costa Rica, by providing active sanctuary support was actually providing the highest level of support possible. Carazo could not hope to defeat Somoza by attacking on his own, especially in such a short time and with such a small force of Civil Guards. For this liberal democracy, active sanctuary support was the close equivalent of full-intervention support.

1. **What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about supporting insurgent groups?** The leadership of Costa Rica faced two general structural constraints in their decisions concerning support to the Sandinistas and other groups. These two constraints actually worked against each other. The first was the lack of a Costa Rican military other than the Civil Guard acted as a structural constraint on the enforcement of government policy. The second was the legislature and the free and fair electoral process. Throughout the history of the Sandinistas, there was debate in Costa Rican politics about communist groups taking refuge in the country. The issue became more prominent in the 1970s and Figueres faced difficult opposition in just opening up diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). However, the political openness fostered by democratic ideals meant that political groups associated with armed elements could take up residence in Costa Rica and perpetuate their narrative, while private citizens provided support to armed elements. The very structure of democracy prevented active support, but facilitated a kind of passive and moral support.

After the 1979 victory of the Sandinistas, the oversight mechanisms of the Costa Rican legislature would come into effect and reprimand Carazo and his Minister for Public Security, Juan Jose Echevarria Brealy (aka, Johnny Echevarria), for the way they handled and profited from
the facilitation of an estimated 2000 tons of weapons and ammunition from Cuba (Nelson 1983; Brown 2001).

2. *What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making?* International norms played a considerable role in the decision-making of the leadership of Costa Rica. Without an army, Costa Rican leaders were highly dependent on international opinion. The 1955 war with Nicaragua had proven that collective security could work and that international opinion mattered. Costa Rica was also forced to end its active support for an insurgent group, and this was much in the memory of Costa Rican leaders. Thus, it took an actual invasion from Nicaragua to compel the leadership to change their policy and actively support a non-state armed group. Yet, clearly there were several leaders, especially Figueres, who acted independently prior to the change in the government’s official position.

3. *How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making?* For Cuba and the Soviet Union, the decision to expand the scope and quantity of support for Sandinistas was an act of seizing a strategic opportunity. For Costa Rican leaders, it was much more about countering existential threats. Somoza was one clear threat as demonstrated by his incursion in September of 1978. But the Sandinistas were the other part of that threat. The Sandinistas were both part of the threat and part of the solution. By allowing them to rapidly arm and then invade, Carazo was able to eliminate the Sandinista and Communist nuisance, and get it out of his country. The Tericista strategy of temporary and tactical alliances with mainstream opposition parties of Nicaragua made this bargain even more palatable.

4. *How did agency-slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes?* For Costa Rica, agency slack with the Sandinistas presented a huge risk. The Sandinistas were dependent on Cuban support more than anything else. The fact that Eden Pastora was in charge of the forces
in Costa Rica alleviated some of that risk, but only the short-term goals of the Sandinistas and the Costa Rican government were compatible. Both Costa Rica and the Sandinistas wanted Somoza out of power and the Guardia defeated and unable to threaten Costa Rica. Costa Rican leaders wanted the rebel groups out of their sanctuary and the Sandinistas wanted to be out of Costa Rica and in Nicaragua.

6.4 Discussion and Findings

Critical external support to the Sandinistas came from three countries, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Costa Rica. While several countries provided diplomatic support or sanctuary for Sandinista leaders over the years, it was the long-term investment (beginning in 1961) of material and advice/capability support from Cuba and the Soviet Union, the substantial increases in that support in 1978, and finally, the active sanctuary support of democratic Costa Rica in 1978, that had the greatest impact. These observations provide some evidence that supports the theory proposed in this dissertation, but also offer some important caveats and contingent generalizations. It is important therefore, to review the theory, then explain how the cases in this case study support the theory, and explain possible contingent generalizations or refinement to the theory.

The theory proposed in this dissertation asserts that democracies are less likely to provide active support to insurgent groups but when they decide to provide support, they generally prefer either the lowest or the highest levels of support. The theoretical typology presented in chapter three classifies diplomatic and material support as lower level; advice/capability, sanctuary, and limited intervention support as mid-level; and full-intervention as highest level of support. Chapter three also proposes possible causal logics and causal mechanisms for this phenomenon. The proposed causal logic maintains that norms and structures within democratic regimes make
it difficult for leaders of democratic regimes to provide support for insurgent groups especially mid-level types of support. Democracies can provide *diplomatic* and *material* support if the costs and risks do not interfere too much with other public goods. In accordance with other theories of democracies in war, if a perceived threat trajectory can be explained in existential terms, then leaders of democracies will go all in with *full-intervention*. Additionally, norms and executive constraints lead democratic regimes to impose stricter screening and sanctioning on possible rebel groups, leading rebel groups to reject support because they do not wish to lose autonomy or be “over-controlled.” The lack of structural and normative constraints in authoritarian regimes allows them to act differently. Leaders of authoritarian regimes can seize strategic opportunities and tailor their strategies of support for their strategic purposes and are therefore more likely to support insurgent groups and more likely to risk mid-level types of support.

There is no evidence that leaders of either the Soviet Union’s or Cuba’s authoritarian government experienced any significant executive constraints on their decisions. Unhindered by a free press or oversight mechanisms of a legislative or judicial branch, Cuba and the Soviet Union were able to invest in the Sandinistas as a strategic opportunity which was part of a long term strategy and then watch them fail repeatedly between 1961 and 1978. When Somoza was weak in September of 1978, again the leaders of these two regimes were able to seize a strategic opportunity and dramatically increase their support in a very timely and decisive manner. Thus, this supports the causal logic and the third hypothesis.

The Costa Rican leadership did not actively support the Sandinistas until 1978. Between 1961 and 1978, the successive Costa Rican administration, particularly President Figueres, detested the Somoza regime and a clear rivalry existed, with the incursions of 1955 still fresh in the minds of Costa Rican leaders. All five of the Costa Rican Presidents serving between 1961
and 1978 had their difficulties with Somoza’s Nicaragua but never provided the active support that would occur in 1978 and 1979. But Costa Rica had maintained a very liberal refugee policy and had generally welcomed political dissidents from other countries who took advantage of the country’s free speech and assembly protections to organize and publish propaganda (Nelson 1983). These same laws and policies made it easy for political groups to plot against foreign governments and the remote, rural areas made it easy to conduct military training. Clearly, the Sandinistas, like other Nicaraguan opposition groups, used Costa Rica as a base and the Sandinistas used the remote areas near the border as sanctuary. But, by definition, this was defacto or possibly passive support.

In 1978, President Carazo decided to provide active sanctuary support to the Sandinistas. His government not only accepted the presence of Sandinista guerilla combatants, which he must have known about, but also began to work to facilitate their training, staging, and to provide logistical support for the vast amounts of Cuban aid (Brown 2001; Nelson 1983). This appears to go against the theory because active sanctuary support is a mid-level form of support according to the theoretical typology and Costa Rica was a democracy (Marshal and Gurr 2014). For this particular observation however, there is a contingent generalization. First, Somoza had attacked Costa Rica when Guardia forces violated the sovereignty of Costa Rica in pursuit of Sandinista rebels during the insurrection of September 1978. Thus, the crisis in Nicaragua had boiled over to what could be considered an existential threat trajectory. Somoza was blaming Costa Rica for harboring the Sandinistas, an accusation, which had some truth to it. Second, Costa Rica did not have a military force capable of fighting Somoza, much less launching a full-intervention support. Costa Rica’s Civil Guard found it difficult enough to enforce Costa Rican neutrality against Sandinista elements operating within its border. Providing active sanctuary and assisting
the Cubans in their support for the Sandinistas was a substitute policy for full-intervention. For Costa Rica active sanctuary support was the equivalent of full-intervention. Therefore, rather than being a deviant case, this exception actually supports the theory.

Further evidence of this can be seen in ex-post observations. In the aftermath of the Sandinista victory, President Carazo’s administration felt the full brunt of the executive constraints when the legislative assembly launched an investigation into the active support provided. The substantiated allegations of graft and misappropriation of materials damaged Carazo and helped to ruin the coalition that had brought him to the Presidency (Brown 2001; Nelson 1983).

This case study provides two additional points of theory refinement that are worth mentioning and considering. The first is the propensity for democratic regimes to provide types of passive sanctuary support. The second is the way in which Cuba and the Soviet Union managed agency slack.

The Sandinistas used both Costa Rica and Honduras for defacto sanctuary. In part this was a function of the remoteness of the borders, but also, to some degree, leaders in both countries had to make decisions about enforcement. It is difficult to determine what enforcement options were open to leaders. Honduran leaders had detained Sandinista guerillas in the past, while Costa Rican authorities, especially under President Figueres in the early 1970s, were quite content to ignore Sandinista elements as long as they were not involved in violent acts against Costa Rica. As the Somoza regime became more of a pariah in the late 1970s, it became easier for leaders in both Honduras and Costa Rica to just ignore Sandinista elements within their borders. Costa Rica, like many democracies, had laws that allow for political groups to organize, publish, recruit, and solicit support from external sources. Simultaneously, Costa Rica
maintained a policy and laws of neutrality. Identifying the difference between passive and active sanctuary support is difficult in any country, but it is especially difficult in democratic regimes. This observation provides evidence that supports San-Akca’s (2016) assertion that passive and defacto sanctuary support of non-state armed groups are associated with democratic regimes.

Part of the theory proposed in this dissertation is that democracies may be less likely to support insurgent groups because leaders of democracies will insist on too many restrictions and stipulations of behavior to either adhere to constraints imposed on the executive or to align norms of behavior. Democratic leaders will impose strict screening and sanctioning to reduce agency slack. This case study does not provide any evidence to support this assertion. In this case, leaders of authoritarian regimes used screening and sanctioning to ensure that leaders of an insurgent group acted in ways that supported the strategic goals of principal. By selecting the FSLN in 1961, the KGB appears to have screened for an ideological affinity that helped minimize agency slack. By making increased aid contingent on uniting around the Tericista strategy in 1978, Castro managed the agency slack as well. These were two strategic moves executed by authoritarian leaders to reduce agency slack and influence the agent. There is no evidence that the leaders of democratic Costa Rica made any such strategic efforts to deal with agency slack and control the Sandinistas within their borders.
Chapter 7 - The Contra Rebellion of Nicaragua 1979-1990

In mid July 1979, the Sandinista led junta seized the Presidential Palace as Somoza fled Nicaragua at the urging and with the assistance of the US. Simultaneously, the Guardia forces disintegrated and fled the country. In the immediate period of regime change, a rapid succession of events created a new reality for Nicaragua, Central America, and for Cold War strategies. The Sandinista’s external supporters again accelerated and intensified their support in order to facilitate a firm Sandinista/FSLN position in the armed politics of Nicaragua. The build-up of material and advice/capability support that had started in September of 1978 with the active sanctuary support from Costa Rica would merely shift to secure ports and airfields inside Nicaragua without the concerns of Costa Rican graft or the need hide the source (Kinzer 1991; Brown 2001; Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005).

Sandinista domestic policies, which were now well in line with the Tericista strategy, would surprise the leaders of neighboring states and compel them and domestic allied opposition groups to turn against the Sandinistas. Within a few months the Sandinistas, who were now the predominant force in a legitimate government of Nicaragua, would find themselves fighting a growing domestic insurgency. Within two years, that insurgency would expand and separate groups would receive external state support, much as the Sandinistas had on their march to victory. Over the next decade the governments of the US, Argentina, Honduras, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan would provide active support to a loose confederation of rebel groups who collectively became known as the “Contras” (short for contrarevolutionarias). Other countries would also be involved. There is evidence, which suggests that other Central American countries and non-PRG countries may have also provided active support. Ex-post executive constraint mechanisms within the US would expose secret schemes to provide active support from and
through many other countries as the executive leadership of the US sought to circumvent legislative restrictions. The Contras would receive support from other sources including the passive / defacto support of Costa Rica and other Central American governments who either took no serious steps to prevent support or secretly authorized it. The foundation of external support to the Contra groups was largely a US effort. Unlike the Cuban and Soviet sponsored effort to support the Sandinistas, however, US leadership and their support efforts would suffer the perils of agency slack on multiple levels and the obstacles of executive constraints would hinder the formulation and execution of strategy while preventing attempts to seize strategic opportunities.

7.1 The Contra Rebellion and External Support

Between July 1979 and December 1981, Sandinista leaders took four actions/initiatives that collectively helped to generate domestic and international grievances that would motivate the groups associated with the Contra rebellion. These actions included; (1) Providing active sanctuary support and the facilitation of significant flows of military aid to rebels in El Salvador, (2) Violating the Punta Arenas Pact by rapidly consolidating political power, restricting freedoms of speech/press, and building up a large, professional military force loyal to the FSLN as a party rather than to Nicaragua as a state, (3) alienating the North-central highland peasantry through ill-advised land reforms, and (4) Engaging in reactionary and violent policies to incorporate indigenous populations of the Caribbean lowlands (Brown 2001; Dickey 1987; Kinzer 1991). The actions in the Caribbean lowlands and North-central highlands provided the grievance and motivated the domestic resource mobilization that allowed the first Contra groups to form. The first two actions added an international dimension to those grievances and justified the resource flows from abroad that would make the Contras into a real threat to the Sandinista regime.
Though all four of these actions occurred incrementally and simultaneously over the course of the next two years, it is best to discuss the actions and their effects separately. First, the Sandinistas began allowing and facilitating significant outflows of military aid to communist rebels in El Salvador. According to Mitrokhin and Andrews (2005) and Dickey (1987), by March 1980, the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) voted to support a strategy for armed rebellion and resistance. In June 1980, Fidel Castro, Humberto Ortega, Schafik Handal, and leaders of four other Salvadoran leftist organizations united as the Dirección Revolutionaria Unida (DRU). Sandinista leaders agreed to provide active sanctuary support to the group just as Costa Rica had done for them two years earlier. According to Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005), DRU, Sandinista, and Cuban leaders all agreed that the current political situation in the US presented a fleeting window of strategic opportunity. The current President, Jimmy Carter, had recognized the new, Sandinista led, regime in Nicaragua and was supplying economic aid. However, Carter was unpopular and his likely challenger, Ronald Reagan, stood a good chance of winning the election in November 1980. To Cuban and Sandinista leaders it was important to change the reality on the ground prior to a new American President who might be more likely to provide greater military assistance to the Government of El Salvador under President Jose Napoleon Duarte. Ronald Reagan and his party had made clear their intent to resist communism in Central America (Cannon 1991; Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005).

The Soviet Union decided to help the El Salvadorans too by not only supplying aid through Cuba to the Sandinistas, but also by advocating and facilitating military aid from other Communist countries around the world. Vietnam, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Ethiopia all contributed some form of military type material aid meant for the
DRU and later for its umbrella group the Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005).

In late 1980, the Sandinistas improved an airstrip at El Papalonal in Leon department of Nicaragua. The Cubans shipped several hundred tons of weapons and ammunitions meant for Salvadoran guerilla forces in Nicaragua. US intelligence services knew about the airstrip and the operation and had aerial photographic evidence, which the new US Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzulo, used to confront Tomas Borge and other Sandinista leaders (Dickey 1987). President Carter, who had helped convince Somoza to resign, who had believed Sandinista assertions of democratic reforms and benign intent, who had advocated $75 million in economic aid for the new Nicaraguan regime, and who had invited and received a delegation to Washington led by Daniel Ortega, had been effectively and now publically, fooled by the Sandinistas just as he lost his re-election bid (Kinzer 1991). When the Salvadoran forces initiated attacks in El Salvador in December 1980, President Carter had little choice but to reverse policy immediately, freezing aid to Nicaragua and initiating additional military support to El Salvador (Kinzer 1991). Though Sandinista leaders quickly realized their error and tried to scale back their support, their actions had proved correct the assertions of candidate and later President-elect Reagan and his fiercely anti-communist supporters. President Reagan would enter office with a desire to build on the changes initiated by President Carter (Cannon 1991, Dickey 1987). 19

The export of revolution was just one technical violation of the Punta Arenas Pact of July 1979 that the Sandinistas violated in the first two years of the Junta. The incremental

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19 Brown (2000; 2001) provides evidence based on interviews with former Sandinistas and Contra rebels that under the Carter administration, the Sandinistas received material support from the US during their 1979 push into Managua from Costa Rica. Additionally, he asserts that Carter signed an intelligence finding (Classified document authorizing covert action), authorizing covert support to anti-Sandinista elements in January 1981 before leaving office.
consolidation of political power and the simultaneous establishment and growth of the Sandinista Peoples Army (EPS), not to mention the frequent reports of the presence of Cuban advisers, would cause serious domestic defections and change international opinion (Christian 1986).

When the Junta assumed power in July of 1979, Nicaragua was in massive debt, thousands of people were displaced or in exile, hundreds of thousands were homeless, and still thousands more had been killed. But goodwill and aid had flowed quickly from international donors, including the US, who took the Sandinistas at their word based, in part, on the Punta Arenas Pact and the fact that the Junta included non-Sandinista opposition representatives. Initial decrees from the Junta were promising. Somoza’s land and assets were seized and reports of human rights violations remained low especially when compared to Somoza’s regime. The Junta abolished the existing constitution, the powerful Presidency, the Congress and the courts all of which had been manipulated by the Somoza political dynasty. A nine member national directorate, dominated by Sandinistas, made policy and submitted it to the Junta for approval (Scott 1996). Later, Borge and Ortega replaced the Directorate with an appointed State Council, as planned in the Punta Arenas Pact. However, after some maneuvering, it too became dominated by Sandinistas. In mid-1980, the only non-Sandinista members of the ruling Junta, Violetta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo, resigned in protest over the make-up of the State Council and several other grievances including the forced resignation of non-Sandinista ministers, suppression of freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, and the domination of Sandinistas in military (Scott 2006; Kinzer 1991).

The establishment and growth of the EPS coincided with a steady influx of an estimated 3000 Cuban military advisers (Moreno 2016). These advisors and the material support for EPS began to raise great concern among neighboring states. By 1983, with the help of Cuban advisers
and Soviet material, the EPS would number 100,000 soldiers; the largest military in all of Central America (Merrill 1993; Menges 1987).

Early Sandinista policies also contributed to the almost immediate rise of an incipient insurgency in the North-central highlands. While several authors dismiss peasant uprisings in the early years of Sandinista rule (Merrill 1993; Dickey 1987), Brown (2001) and Horton (1998) provide a detailed accounting of the rise and significance of the armed peasant groups. Moreno (2006) also discusses the vast network of peasant families and militias that operated prior to 1982, and Brown (2000) publishes the first had accounts of early guerrilla leaders. According to Brown, Sandinista leaders beginning with Carlos Fonseca, had tried to operationalize the GPP strategy in the North-central highland departments by organizing peasant militias known as the Popular Anti-Somoza Militias (MILPA). As early as May 1979, some of these groups turned against the Sandinistas and began to resist their organizational methods and became resentful of the advice of the apparently ubiquitous Cuban advisers. Through interviews and documents, including diaries, Brown (2000; 2001) and Horton (1998) trace the roots of dissatisfaction and the early rise of the Popular Anti-Sandinista Militias (MILPAS) and demonstrate clear Sandinista records of their attacks in Nueva Segovia including the town of Quilali (the site of Augusto Sandino’s most famous base of operations).

The rebellion spread in the first two years of rule as land reforms failed to empower the peasantry as promised. Rather than dividing seized land belonging to Somoza and wealthy associates, the Sandinistas put ownership in the hands of the state and adopted collectivized solutions. To many peasants, the new policies merely substituted one master for another, and the traditional patron-laborer relationships proved stronger and less confrontational in many areas than Sandinista doctrine and rhetoric indicated (Brown 2001; Horton 1998). Though the growing
EPS forces probably could have eliminated these small and domestically mobilized insurgent groups, these groups and their local constituencies would feed the future US sponsored groups with recruits far beyond what the expectations of external sponsors, proxies, or the Nicaraguan government. As Horton (1993) states, the MILPAS were an "uncoordinated, poorly-supplied local rebel groups that the FSLN could have contained, if not completely eliminated." (p. 124)

With future external support from the US and Honduras, it became, "one of the largest military mobilizations of peasants in Latin America since the Mexican Revolution." (p. 266)

The fourth action taken by the Sandinistas that would lead to the rise of insurgent groups was the implementation of policies of forced incorporation of the generally autonomous populations of native tribes on the Caribbean coast. The Sandinista leadership and cadre were made up mostly of urban youth from the cities of the Pacific lowlands that knew very little about the populations on the other side of the isthmus (Kinzer 1991). As part of their initial efforts, the Sandinistas facilitated the organization of a reference group known as Misurata (a Spanish acronym for Miskito, Sumo, Rama and Sandinista “all together”). Steadman Fagoth, a Miskito Indian leader, assumed leadership of the group and Sandinistas appointed Fagoth to the newly formed State Council.

Unfortunately for the FSLN, Sandinista and Cuban efforts to organize the local populations of towns on the Miskito Coast quickly undid this positive first step. Resentful of Sandinista and Cuban organizers, the local population initiated a general strike in the eastern city of Puerto Cabezas (launching and training site of the US sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion in 1963). Newly formed EPS forces violently put down the strike and briefly imprisoned Fagoth and other leaders. After his release a few weeks later, Fagoth announced that he was joining the counterrevolutionary movement. Attempts to negotiate failed and by mid-1981, EPS forces
launched a counterinsurgency campaign designed to enforce strict population control measures including a forced resettlement of Miskito villages located near the Honduran border. The result was massive refugee migration of families into Honduras and a population of thousands of young men eager to fight back and earn a living (Prados 2006; Kinzer 1991).

The cumulative results of these four actions included the emergence of rebellion and the justification (or rationalization) of active external support from three primary countries: US, Honduras, and Argentina. Other countries would follow. Though the US would take the lead, it would be Argentinian and Honduran officials that would initiate meaningful and coordinated external support in late 1980. Honduran leaders would willingly provide active sanctuary support, Argentinian leaders would provide material and advice/capability, while leaders of democratic Costa Rica would fall back into an ambiguous form of passive and defacto support.

As President Reagan prepared to assume the Presidency in January of 1981, it had become clear that the Sandinistas had supported the rebellion in El Salvador and guerillas in Guatemala. In one of his last acts as President, Carter had suspended all aid to Nicaragua and initiated military support for the governments of El Salvador and Honduras (Merrill 1993; Prados 2006). When President Reagan’s administration took over, he officially cancelled food and economic aid in February and April respectively and issued a Presidential finding (classified document authorizing covert action) for the CIA to support democratic opposition groups and to obtain intelligence on Sandinista activities in support of other Central American Communist organizations (Scott 1996).

According to Scott (1996), Kinzer (1991) and Dickey (1987), the Sandinistas seem to have recognized the strategic error in providing material support to the DRU and, at the urging of the US Ambassador, took concrete measures to either end or at least curtail their active support
(Scott 1996; Kinzer 1991). Nevertheless, President Reagan’s National Security Council (NSC) and the staffs and working groups that supported decision-making proceeded with an internal discourse for establishing options, developing strategy, and executing policies (Menges 1988; Cannon 1991).

In order to formulate executive strategy and policies, President Reagan formed the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), which consisted of William Casey (CIA Director), Alexander Haig (Secretary of State), Richard Allen (National Security Adviser), Jeanne Kirkpatrick (UN Ambassador), and Casper Weinberger (Secretary of Defense). Supporting this small group of the NSC were working groups of deputies and staffs. In terms of the overall policy toward Nicaragua within the administration, the State Department generally favored negotiations to compel the Sandinistas to return to Punta Arenas commitments. The Department of Defense and administration hardliners generally favored reinforcing the militaries of Central American countries and preparation for full-scale intervention options if the threat trajectory of the Sandinistas continued to weaken other Central American regimes. The idea of support to emerging insurgent groups as a policy instrument came from William Casey and the CIA in the later months of 1981.

William Casey was a powerful, well-connected lawyer and venture capitalist who had served in multiple appointed positions in government throughout his career. In World War II, he served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) where he led covert operations throughout Europe, including support to resistance elements behind German lines. During Ronald Reagan’s campaign, Casey was a trusted advisor and served on the Reagan transition team.

Casey had used the initial finding to make contact with viable groups and explore the possibility of supporting insurgents. By May of 1981, the MILPAS were already active inside
Nicaragua, groups of former Guardia were loosely organized in Honduras, and other opposition elements were active politically within the United States. According to Prados (2006), Kornbluh (1987), and Dickey (1987), the CIA had established contacts with Argentinian intelligence officers who had already been working closely with some anti-Sandinista elements in Honduras. The special branch of Argentinian intelligence, known as Battalion 601, had been pro-active and had received instructions to assist in efforts to counter the Sandinistas. Representatives of the unit used the promise of material and advice/capability support to compel the merger of disparate groups; similar to what Castro had done almost two years earlier to the Sandinista factions. The initial groups included the Union Democratia Nicaragua (UDN) led by Jose Francisco Cardenal from Miami, 21 September Legion led by former Guardia Colonel Enrique Bermudez, and several other smaller groups. By August of 1981, these groups would form the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN). Initially, Argentinian representatives sent 50 FDN personnel to Argentina for training with the intent that these individuals later return to Honduras as cadre for a guerilla training enterprise (Prados 2006). Thus Argentina, a state with an autocratic regime (not in Nicaragua’s PRG), seized upon a strategic opportunity to build an insurgent group well prior to the official decisions of the democratic US and its bureaucratic executive branch.

The Argentinian regime had been led by military officers since the 1976 coup d’état. The military led regime had the distinction of having overthrown a leftist government and defeated Cuban sponsored communist groups in the country through a “National Reorganization Process” which included brutal tactics of rooting out insurgent groups and political groups thought to be nascent or incipient communist organization. Argentinian officials, especially those belonging to Battalion 601, often referred to their tactics as the “Argentinian method.” The method involved
tactics which most US leaders and much of the world deemed abhorrent to international norms, including assassination, covert capture and imprisonment (disappearances), and torture (Moreno 2006; Dickey 1987; Prados 2006). The mix of former Guardia soldiers, trained in the Argentinian method of countering communism, by Argentinian officers, inside Argentina would plague the FDN for some time. In terms of agency slack between US principals and the FDN agents, disagreement over acceptable methods of guerilla warfare would become a divisive issue (Prados 2006; Kinzer 1991).

The Honduran government was also in the mix but mostly as a result of military rule at the time under provisional President Policarpo Paz Garcia. Argentinian officers had been advising and supporting elements under the new Army Chief of Staff, Gustavo Alvarez Martinez (Alvarez). General Alvarez provided sanctuary to the disparate Contra groups and facilitated Argentinian assistance and eventual CIA support (Moreno 2016; Prados 2006). In 1981, promises of aid to the Contras accompanied commitments of US military assistance to Honduras at the same time that the rapid growth of the EPS in Nicaragua became apparent.

For Costa Rican President Carazo, the Sandinista victory was a bitter-sweet success. His government was one of the first to recognize the new Sandinista led regime. However, within months of the transition, opposition elements accused his administration of diverting attention away from economic problems, and the legislative assembly launched an investigation into his administration’s role in arms transfers. The investigation revealed that some of the Cuban military supplies, which had been stored in Costa Rican government areas and transported by government vehicles, had not reached Nicaraguan rebels but were instead sold for profit abroad, including to the leftists in El Salvador (Nelson 1983). The Carazo government also encountered problems with remaining Sandinista insurgents and their relationship to Costa Rica’s own
communist groups. This included attacks on mobilized elements of the Civil Guard and on US Marine embassy guards in San Jose on May 17, 1981. By late May of 1981, Carazo broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba and expelled a communist radio station that had supported the Sandinista invasion of Nicaragua in 1978-79. By the time of the 1982 elections, Carazo was unpopular and his Unity Coalition fell apart as opposition parties claimed that he had gone too far in his support for the Sandinistas (Nelson 1983). As the relationship with Nicaragua soured, the Sandinistas began to eliminate the “tactical and temporary alliances” that were central to the Tericista strategy (Nolan 1986). This further exacerbated the tensions and second-guessing of the strategy implemented by Carazo.

Robelo and Chamorro were not the only key figures to become quickly disenchanted with the Sandinistas. Eden Pastora also found himself marginalized despite his popularity and his prestigious title of Commander of the EPS. In late 1981, he left Nicaragua and traveled to Panama to confer with the President and then to Costa Rica where he met former President Figueres and other influential leaders. By April 1982, he had made a complete break with the Sandinistas and founded his own armed opposition group known as the Alliance for Democratic Revolution (ARDE) and established its headquarters in Costa Rica (Dickey 1987). Pastora also made contact with the CIA and indicated that he would accept material support from the CIA, but it had to be covert and without strings attached (Prados 2006). Pastora would later, with the help of US media outlets including the newly formed Cable News Network (CNN), set about raising awareness and money for his own anti-Sandinista cause. By 1984, after he had fallen out of favor with his CIA sponsors, Pastora would even travel to the US and openly campaign for political and financial support (DeCaro 1984).
Though ARDE would play a role in the armed rebellion in Nicaragua it would not achieve official support of the Costa Rican government. Costa Rican officials beginning with new President, Luis Monge Alvarez (Monge) (1982-86) would largely be aware of the support, but would publicly declare a strict policy of neutrality in the brewing Nicaraguan Contra War. Monge became President of Costa Rica on May 8, 1982, after a political campaign highlighted by Costa Rica’s economic crisis and a fierce debate over Sandinista and Cuban influence on the one hand and US influence on the other. Monge, a former ambassador to Israel, was firmly on the side of western democracies and concerned about the trajectory of the Sandinista regime and its relationship with Cuba (Murillo 2016).

There is evidence that Monge and other officials agreed to look the other way in exchange for US economic aid and security guarantees (Holden 2017; Murillo 2016). President Monge may have ignored the presence of armed Contra groups initially, but evidence suggests that at some point he acquiesced to CIA operations in exchange for aid. Documents from the Iran-Contra affair and future journalist interviews suggest that Monge knew a great deal about plans and his Minister of Public Security, Benjamin Piza, acted as a key contact for the CIA, especially in the mid 1980’s when the US administration would circumvent Congressionally imposed restrictions on aid to the Contras (Independent Counsel 1991). The Costa Rican balancing act between passive and active sanctuary support would come to an end after the next 4-year cycle of democratic elections and the assumption of a new presidential administration in 1986 (LeMoyne 1988).

Establishing clear goals for specific elements of President Reagan’s comprehensive strategy proved challenging for the NSPG for both structural and normative reasons. These challenges, specifically for the actions against Nicaragua, would later be compounded by agency
slack issues with insurgent forces, by a free press that consistently exposed the details of support that were supposed to be secret, and by ex-ante executive constraint mechanisms used by Congress over the next several years.

The major challenges, however, began internal to the Reagan administration and first manifested themselves in fundamental differences over the purpose and articulated goals of proposed support to insurgents. The NSPG considered no less than three definitive goals for aid to insurgents in the first two years of the Reagan administration. The first, and most obvious was the limited goal of stopping military aid from Nicaragua to the rebels targeting the El Salvadoran government. The second proposed goal of supporting insurgents was to provide a bargaining chip or pressure on Sandinista leaders that could support State Department efforts to negotiate with Sandinista leaders for political reforms and an end to active aid to rebels in other Central American countries. Finally, there was the ultimate goal of the complete overthrow of the Sandinista regime (Scott 1996; Menges 1987; Cannon 1991). This third goal was much desired among the most hawkish individuals within the Reagan administration, however it was largely unpopular outside the administration and generally considered to be a violation of international norms that much of the nation and opposition wished to prevent. It was contrary to the principle of neutrality and this theme occupied much of the Congressional debate on the issue.

The initial intelligence finding issued by President Reagan in March 1981, specified the use of $19.5 million to support opposition elements from Nicaragua gathering in Honduras (Scott 1991). The finding emerged from meetings where CIA Director Casey recommended initial support for insurgents targeting six separate countries including Nicaragua. The finding itself focused on funding for political opposition groups.
Over the course of the rest of 1981, the NSPG debated the strategy for Nicaragua among several other issues of national security. The State Department, meanwhile, reached out frequently to the Nicaraguan government with proposals of peace, all of which were blocked or thwarted by hard-liners within the administration. According to Scott (1996) and Menges (1988), negotiations for a non-aggression pact led by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Scott Enders, collapsed in October 1981 after Casey, Weinberger, Kirkpatrick and others put up stiff resistance. Casey, through his chief of the Central American Task Force, Duane “Dewey” Clarridge had already made arrangements and promises to the disparate groups that had started to unite under the influence of Argentinian and Honduran officials (Scott 1991; Prados 2006). The collapse of the diplomatic initiative prompted a policy review to present new options to the NSC and eventually the President. The NSC Director formed a smaller, lower level “restricted interagency policy group” (RIG) to develop options for presentation. The options developed by the group included attacking Cuba, an interdiction force in Nicaragua, limited aid to opposition groups, and paramilitary action (support to insurgent groups) to overthrow the Sandinistas.

Though eventually the NSC would come to agree to the paramilitary option and aid to opposition groups, it became clear to many that this was a “half-hearted” option that reflected a compromise between those that sought to roll back communism and those who wanted restraint (Cannon 1991; Menges 1988; Scott 1991; Gates 1984, 5075). Despite later findings articulating the more limited goals, there continued to be fierce disagreement on the purpose and the overall goal of such an option (Cannon 1991; Scott 1996; Kornbluh and Byrne 1997). The decision to move forward with this strategic option represented a compromise of bureaucratic politics as much as an application of strategy. To add to the difficulties of strategic decision-making, the
RIG options memorandum was leaked to the press and reported nationwide in the New York Times three months later (New York Times, 17 March 1982).

On December 1, 1981, President Reagan signed a new finding and authorized, “material support and guidance” as well as training for the rebels fighting the Sandinista regime (Kornbluh and Byrne 1993). It was a critical legal requirement to implement covert measures that were part of a regional strategy later articulated in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 17. That strategy included funding for military and economic assistance to neighboring states including Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. The finding document was submitted to the congressional intelligence oversight committees and CIA Director Casey briefed the committee as required by law. According to Scott (1991) and Menges (1988), Casey emphasized that the support operation would just be small and was meant to interdict the support going to El Salvadoran rebels and to put pressure on the Sandinistas that would support future negotiations.

The funding from the US made a big difference to the effort. During early 1982, Contra attacks increased especially those conducted by FDN elements operating out of southern Honduras. In March 1982 the attacks included the destruction of two bridges into Honduras leading to El Salvador that could be used in the transport of material to El Salvador. The attacks also had the second order effect of justifying Sandinista efforts to enact tougher measures of suppressing dissent and rooting out opposition within Nicaragua (Moreno 2006; Dickey 1987). These Sandinista actions further inflamed the peasant base in the North-central highlands, causing a significant increase in the number of MILPAS and FDN recruits.

By March of 1982, the FDN had grown well beyond 500 men. The Presidential finding, signed only three months earlier, had stipulated a force of 500 men. Thus, when FDN patrols returning from Nicaragua came back with more recruits than the number of guerillas with whom
they had departed, the ranks of FDN and MILPAS grew by the hundreds and later by thousands. According to Brown (2001), MILPAS and FDN began working together and the MILPAS leaders were able to build an underground network, which he refers to as the Peasant Internal Resistance or what Moreno (2006) refers to as the, “Sistema de Correos.” This resource mobilization network provided information, support, sustainment, and recruits. By spring of 1983, the FDN would have 7000 men in Honduras, Steadman Fagoth’s MISUARA would have approximately 2000 men in Eastern Honduras, and Eden Pastora’s ARDE would have an estimated 700 men in Costa Rica (Brown 2001; Prados 2006). All three elements would receive material assistance from the CIA.

However, the rapid growth of the supposed 500-man element was not the only difficulty that arose in the first few months. Just as Casey and Clarridge were getting the funding off the ground and dealing with growth issues, just as Pastora was announcing his official break with the Sandinistas and the establishment of ARDE, just as Fagoth’s MISUARA force was getting organized and trained, and just as the US and international press began exposing the CIA’s involvement in support for the Contras, President (General) Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina decided to seize the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands from Britain by force on April 2, 1982. This put the US administration in an awkward position between two allies as Britain’s leadership decided to go to war to take back its possession and Galtieri was covertly assisting the US with its proxy forces in Honduras. Galtieri’s attempt to seize what he thought was a strategic opportunity proved to be a reckless act, a disaster for Argentina, and a headache for the CIA. By May, Argentinian representatives informed the CIA that Galtieri would withdraw Battalion 601 elements from Central America. Clarridge and Casey now had to replace the Argentinian expertise and manpower, meaning a more hands-on effort from the US. In terms of the typology
of this dissertation, more “hands-on” means accepting more cost and risk in the form of 
*advice/capability* support. This meant that the CIA had to use its own advisors and/or contract 
private entities to provide the advice. But the Argentinian cadre could not be replaced overnight 
and many individuals remained for some time and their influence over mid-level FDN leaders 
also remained (Prados 2006; Kinzer 1991; Moreno 2006).

The discourse of US strategy toward Nicaragua in 1982-83 can best be described as a 
period of mission impossible for the CIA in terms of bridging the multiple principal-agent gaps 
and reigning in agency slack. Unfortunately for the CIA, there were huge gaps in the purpose, 
scope, and goals of US support on many levels. At the ground level, the FDN, MILPAS, 
MISUARA, and ARDE were not united but all sought an end to the Sandinista regime and none 
could entertain the notion of intentionally containing the potential size of their force. The FDN, 
led by many former Guardia soldiers and officers, had received reinforcing instruction in the 
“Argentinian Method” of fighting internal war. Their methods were not acceptable to many in 
the CIA and certainly not acceptable to Congressional committees and their constituents. The 
very existence of former Guardia in the FDN was unacceptable to Eden Pastora and his senior 
ARDE leaders. Even within ARDE, there was disagreement over how much aid to accept from 
the CIA. President Reagan’s NSC and Core Group of the NSPG had grudgingly come together 
on the two goals of using the rebel force to interdict the flow of Cuban and Sandinista support to 
rebels in El Salvador and throughout Central America and to put pressure on the Sandinistas in 
support of negotiations. The majority of the Congress, on the other hand, generally detested the 
idea of supporting the rebels for normative reasons and had grudgingly agreed to a covert 
program of very limited scope and simple objectives (500 men to interdict weapons). Casey’s 
meetings with Congressional oversight committees were tense and legislators demanded that the
CIA regain control of something that had already grown well beyond their capacity to control (Kinzer 1991, Prados 2006).

That is not to say that the CIA did not try to close the principal-agent gaps and regain some level of control or at least influence. They needed to unite the Contra groups and in order to do that, they needed to improve the image of the Contra’s, reign in the FDN’s former Guardia leadership, and place some level or semblance of civilian control over the Contras. To do this, the CIA made further funding and support contingent on having the FDN form a civilian directorate that they hoped would eventually include ARDE, and MISUARA. In December, the CIA strongly facilitated the formation of a civilian directorate and staged its announced formation in Miami in December 1982. According to Chamorro and Morley (1985), CIA officers coached the new organization through its first press conference and insisted that there could be no mention of overthrowing the Sandinistas as a goal in order to remain technically compliant with the US Neutrality laws.

Throughout 1982, the US State Department attempted to negotiate with the Sandinistas while the US administration carried out its information and public diplomacy plan as described in NSDD 17. Yet, the bureaucratic in-fighting within President Reagan’s own administration became evident as key advisers to the President argued strongly against negotiating and by some accounts deliberately undermined the efforts (Menges 1987; Scott 1991). Congress was also a concern, because as early as March 1982, opposition leaders began proposing a ban on covert support to Contra elements and several committee votes indicated support for a ban. Press reports about human rights violations committed by Contra forces added fuel to the fire. Finally, Edward Boland, a Democratic Party member of Congress and the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee added a restriction to the Defense Appropriations bill that became known
as “Boland I.” Boland I specifically banned using funding to support the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, something that was firm in the minds of all Contra leaders (Scott 1991). As one Contra leader (Moreno 2006, 14-15) would explain later, “… 17 million American dollars to train 500 men to force the Sandinistas to stop sending their weapons to the guerillas in El Salvador, a country aflame in civil war, with communist ideas and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua their friends. This was an insane idea conceived in the mind of a Washington bureaucrat. Who, for a salary, would fight and risk his life to make the dreams of a Washington bureaucrat come true? This is what I thought at the time, and time would prove me right.”

Nevertheless, Reagan and his team realized that Congress, especially the opposition controlled House, were leaning toward a complete ban on all support to the Contras. President Reagan therefore stepped up public diplomacy by initiating a bi-partisan commission to make recommendations on strategy for Central America, by creating the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean in the State Department to promote the President’s agenda and the image of the Contra cause, and finally by emphasizing the goal of negotiations and democratization in Nicaragua in several of his public speeches (Cannon 1991; Scott 1991). With ample support for his policies in the Senate and support for a complete ban in the opposition controlled House, Congress came to a compromise in September 1983 that put a cap on support for the Contras at $24 million and specified that the CIA could not use its contingency funds and defined a negotiated settlement as the goal (Kornbluh and Byrne 1997).

The September 1983 cap on support to the Contras displayed a concrete example of the power of ex-ante structural mechanisms to constrain the executive leadership in a democracy. As Scott (2006, 168) explains, “In this way, Congress placed the first real restrictions on the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua; the initiative was not reversed (because of disagreements between the
House and Senate), but limits were placed on funding and Congress placed itself ‘in the loop’ for future aid decisions.”

Ironically, the Congressional restriction on aid led the Reagan administration to seek to escalate the support unilaterally. From the perspective of administration officials, their strategy and policy were encountering a level of success for which they were unprepared. The rapid emergence of diverse rebel organizations and the inexplicable number of volunteers were clear signs that there was tactical momentum. Additionally, the administration had launched a tactically messy, but entirely successful full-military intervention on the Caribbean island country of Grenada. The November 1983 US invasion, ended Cuban support for the Communist regime on the island and sent a clear signal to the Nicaraguan regime and leaders of the entire region. To core members of the administration, this was yet another example of strategic momentum. Yet, Congress was constraining their success and demanding more control, oversight and restrictions on efforts short of armed conflict with Nicaragua.

While Congress was limiting the funding and trying to exert its power, the RIG and NSPG convinced the President to use the authority in the previous finding to engage in limited-intervention support. This escalation included several unilateral air and ground raids on Nicaraguan installations conducted by CIA personnel in December 1983 and the mining Nicaraguan harbors using improvised mines in January of 1984 (Prados 2006; Scott 1991). Though the CIA compelled the FDN’s civilian directorate to take credit for the mining operation, this limited intervention support was quickly exposed in the press (Dickey 1987).

The structural characteristics of democracy include a free press and that free press can facilitate the imposition of accountability costs. Though the raids on installations had technically been authorized as they could be tied directly to the interdiction of weapons, the mining of the
harbors was a different matter in the eyes of Congress and certainly the rest of the world. The indiscriminate mining operation had not been briefed to the intelligence committees and angered several Senate supporters as well as opposition members. Republican allies of President Reagan cited the incident as a “violation of international law” and world opinion agreed (Scott 1991). Nicaraguan leaders filed a case with the International Court of Justice and eventually won that case. President Reagan would later choose to ignore the court’s ruling (Prados 2006; Dickey 1987).

The incident and the Congressional reaction made it clear that any plans for continued limited-intervention support were permanently off the table. It was also clear to key members of the Reagan administration that the Contras needed to start getting their funding elsewhere. In May 1984, the House passed a resolution amendment calling for a ban on funds. The Senate later concurred with its own ban attached to a jobs bill and on October 12, 1984 both houses passed the ban in a continuing resolution signed into law by President Reagan. The law became known as Boland II, which stated, “During Fiscal Year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual” (Scott 1991, 170). This was a second attempt by Congress to exercise its powers of ex ante executive constraint and actually take a more active role in guiding policy. Congress had decided to effectively end material, advice/capability, and the limited-intervention support.

In reaction to the rigid application of executive constraints and mounting negative reports in the press concerning the Contra elements, especially the FDN, President Reagan’s staff
focused on three efforts to preserve this specific policy of external support to the Contras and pursued these vigorously throughout the rest of 1984 to 1986. First, the White House and the Department of State doubled down on their public diplomacy efforts and domestic messaging to frame the Contras as freedom fighters and improve their image as a democratic opposition. Second, President Reagan decided to continue to engage Congress on renewed support, focusing on non-lethal aid, tied to negotiation efforts. Through persistence, President Reagan hoped to compel Congress to change its mind and rally support from constituents (Cannon 1991). Concessions to Congress included putting support to the Contras and related opposition groups into the hands of the State Department rather than the CIA. Finally, and most controversially, President Reagan directed his staff to find other ways of keeping the Contra groups alive as a movement. Beginning in October of 1984, there would be no official active US assistance to the Contras without Congressional approval (Scott 1991, Kornbluh and Byrne 1997).

The administration’s public diplomacy efforts were made more difficult by press reports and changes in Central America within Central American countries, especially the key sanctuary countries of Honduras and Costa Rica. One of the most damaging press reports was an October 1984 New York Times article that exposed details about CIA advice/capability support provided to the Contras. The article discussed the contents of a training manual, produced by CIA contract for Contra soldiers. Conceived as a replacement for earlier material provided by and Argentinian officers, the manual still included tactics deemed ethically and morally repugnant (Chamorro and Morley 1985).

The internal politics of Honduras in 1984-86 presented difficulties for the Reagan administration and for Contra elements taking advantage of sanctuary support there. General Alvarez had been an aggressive supporter of Contras and an ardent anti-communist. He had risen
through the ranks and commanded the Honduran Army’s Battalion 3-16, a unit trained by and modeled after Argentina’s Battalion 601. He was elevated to the position of Chief of Staff of the Army in January 1982 soon after the election of a new President. President Roberto Suazo Cordova (Suazo) on the other hand, was a civilian liberal candidate who was intent on fulfilling the pledge to re-establish democratic rule. Though he was also an ardent anti-communist, Suazo and Alvarez began to clash over policy, including the active support Alvarez was providing to the rapidly growing Contra groups. Though well aware of Alvarez’s efforts to support the Contra groups, Suazo initiated peace efforts soon after his election. Alvarez’s own public rhetoric did not match the espoused policies of Suazo, but for a few years the two had an implicit accommodation where Suazo agreed to the active sanctuary efforts, the military supported Suazo’s domestic agenda, and both sides benefitted from the large sums of US military, economic, and development aid (Merrill 1993).

The balance between Suazo and Alvarez toppled in March 1984, at the same time when the Reagan administration was dealing with the blow back of its limited intervention efforts. General Alvarez had been encouraged by the US invasion of Grenada and wanted the US to support efforts to launch a similar invasion of Nicaragua from Honduras and with the help of other Central American countries. Yet, this escalation was not what President Suazo and several military officers wanted. Senior members of the military had become fearful of Alvarez’s increasing power, which had coincided with the increases in US aid. On March 31, 1984, a group of junior officers seized Alvarez and four other senior officers and sent him into exile in the US with the full approval of Suazo and other military leaders (Merrill 1993). The move came as a complete surprise to US officials including US Ambassador John Negroponte (Chavez 1984). From that point forward, all US support to the Contras that was funneled through Honduras
would be up for negotiation as the Suazo administration, and later the administration of his successor, Jose Azcona del Hoyo (Azcona), asserted their sovereignty and their vital geographic position.

Despite the increased international and domestic resistance, The Reagan administration continued to push the Congress for a restoration of active support to the contras. After multiple efforts and a back and forth negotiation with and between the Congress, in June of 1985 the administration and Congress agreed on a bill that provided $27 million of non-lethal *material* support to the Contras, administered by the State Department tied to a stated policy that the aid was part of a lever toward a negotiated settlement (Scott 1991).

Over the interim period, between the implementation of Boland II and the hopeful date of restored lethal aid, the task of keeping the Contras alive fell to NSC Director Robert McFarlane (and later, John Poindexter) and NSC staffer Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. Almost immediately after the exposure of the mining incident, when it had become clear that material support to the Contras was in jeopardy, North and other administration officials began to seek *material, advice/capability, and even limited intervention* support from other sources. These sources included foreign governments and private citizens (Independent Counsel 1999). The result would be an enterprise of shell companies and Swiss bank accounts that allowed North to facilitate funds and weapons transfers to Contra groups, particularly the FDN. Much about these efforts were illegal under the Boland II amendment and under the US neutrality laws. Their eventual exposure would lead to the most damaging scandal of Reagan’s Presidency, known as the Iran-Contra Affair, because one of the streams of funding exposed involved the sale of arms to Iran and the transfer of profits to the Contra groups (Kornbluh and Byrne 1997). Despite the imposition of executive constraints in a democratic regime, members of Reagan’s administration
would act illegally and would use the structural characteristics of democracy to engage in activities that were somewhere between passive and active support. The US support during 1985 and 1986 can be considered active because officials of the US government were executing these activities under orders from President, but passive in the sense that the specific actions were illegal.

Despite suffering the, “year of scarce resources” in 1985, the Contras did not disintegrate as some had predicted (Moreno 2016, 158). To some degree, the FDN organization went back to its MILPAS roots, something it would be forced to do to a greater extent much later (Brown 2001). The Contra movement, however, did suffer some serious setbacks. In 1984 and into 1985, Tomas Borge, serving as Minister of the Interior, launched a comprehensive campaign of amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration of Miskito and other tribes of the Caribbean lowlands. These efforts served to undermine Stedman Fagoth’s MISURA organization and also smaller groups and leaders not funded by the CIA (Kinzer 1991). MISURA separated from the FDN and largely disarmed while entering into agreements with the Sandinistas (Jeram 2012).

Additionally, the ARDE and its CIA support were effectively neutralized when Eden Pastora was nearly killed by a bomb during an assassination attempt in La Penca, Nicaragua on May 30, 1984. According to Dickey (1987), Pastora had recently stopped accepting CIA funds and called a press conference to announce that he would not unify with FDN and was splitting with members of his own organization who wanted to do so. Pastora had already begun his efforts to get financial and political support from private citizens in the US. The CIA efforts to make future US support contingent on Contra unification failed in the case of Pastora who was apparently not willing to give up autonomy and instead sought the freedom that comes with numerous and independent avenues of resource mobilizations. The CIA and the enterprise run by
Oliver North would continue to work on establishing a FDN run Southern Front in Costa Rica comprised of breakaway leaders of ARDE and other groups (Kornbluh and Byrne 1997).

Finally, in March 1986, Nicaragua’s EPS carried out cross border raids on FDN camps in Honduras, forcing reaction by the Honduran Army and direct logistical assistance by US forces in Honduras (Moreno 2006; Scott 1996; Prados 2006). The Sandinista leadership had hoped to deal the FDN a fatal blow, knowing that their external avenues of resource mobilization had been greatly depleted due to the restrictions imposed by the US Congress. Although a setback for the Contras, the event had the beneficial effect of helping the Reagan administrations efforts to restore some funding (Scott 1996).

The efforts of McFarlane, North, and others to secure the donations of third parties greatly assisted in the sustainment of resource flows to the Contras. Although the Iran-Contra Affair itself is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the ex-post investigations and the prosecution efforts revealed attempts to convince other countries to provide active support to the Contras. Without the Iran-Contra investigations, data on third party support to the Contras might never have been available to researchers. The efforts to find other state sponsors were successful in some instances and had the added incentives of easy US facilitation of the transfer of funds, and the implication or explicit offers of quid pro quo benefits with the US administration. In other words, leaders of several countries solicited were not necessarily agreeing to support the Contras in order to gain strategic advantage against the Nicaraguan regime, but instead they would be giving their support as a favor to the US administration in return for some other benefit (Kornbluh and Byrne 1997).

According to testimony and records associated with the Iran-Contra Affair, members of President Reagan’s administration, including unofficial associates who were private citizens at
the time, solicited the leaders of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Taiwan, Brunei, South Korea, Singapore, China (PRC), Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Chile, Israel, Britain, an unnamed “Asian country,” and an unnamed “South American country,” and an unnamed “European country.” (Independent Counsel 1989, 4-30; Walsh 1993; Kornbluh and Byrne 1997). Most other sources that offer a full accounting of the funding given to the Contras list only Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and sometimes Brunei because all three countries actually disbursed cash to bank accounts provided by North (Sobel 1995). There is ample evidence, however, indicating that several governments probably provided active support to the Contras in other ways. These cases can be classified as material support and even in some cases advice/capability support based upon the conceptual and operational definitions used in this dissertation. It is important to note however that most of the advice/capability support involved advisers or trainers operating within sanctuaries of Honduras and elsewhere, not necessarily in Nicaragua itself (as Cuban advisers had done during the fight against Somoza). Yet, each of these cases within this greater case study, are likely examples of what George and Bennett (2005) would call a contingent generalization. In other words, it is unlikely that several of these non-PRG countries would have supported the Contras had the leaders of a powerful friend (the US) not asked and offered something in return even implicitly. It is also unlikely that these countries would have provided external support had the US not facilitated the transactions, greatly reducing transaction costs and risks of exposure. Many of these countries that ended up providing support did so because they were seizing a strategic opportunity to improve their leverage with a major power, while facing significantly reduced risks that are often associated with supporting insurgent groups.
Saudi Arabia’s support for the Contras was the second highest in calculated dollar amounts and the most widely reported. Soon after the passage of the Boland II amendment, NSC Director McFarlane met with Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar, and made the case for support to the Contras. The Ambassador offered to contribute $1 million per month and made good on the payments beginning in July of 1984. In 1985 King Fahd of Saudi Arabia increased the support to $2 million per month during a meeting with President Reagan and these lasted until March 1986. In total Saudi Arabia would contribute $32 million to the effort (Sobel 1991; Cannon 1991). For the royal family of Saudi Arabia there was little concern in dedicating funds to support an insurgent group as a favor to a country its leaders deemed important to its own security. Saudi leaders also had the advantage of easily claiming that these donations were from personal, rather than government, funds, though that remains unclear based on available evidence (Scott 1996).

Taiwan on the other hand, received its initial solicitation from a member of the NSC staff and initially rejected the idea because Nicaragua was one of the few countries that recognized Taiwan as an independent state. Taiwan’s leaders changed their minds when Nicaraguan leaders decided to officially recognize the People’s Republic of China in December of 1985. In order to, "cherish good cooperation ties" with the United States, Taiwan leaders solicited $2 million from private businessmen and provided the money to Contra accounts (LA Times 1987; Walsh 1993).

The Sultan of Brunei also provided a direct payment of $10 million after Assistant Secretary of State, Elliott Abrams, solicited funds from a senior Brunei official. Unfortunately, the money never reached the Contra accounts because Oliver North’s secretary had incorrectly transcribed the bank account number (Walsh 1993; Kornbluh and Byrne 1997). Like Taiwan and
Saudi Arabia, this support was granted mostly as a favor to the US administration in the hope that the goodwill could be reciprocated in some future or unspecified but implied way.

Information in the Walsh (1993) report and specific documents pertaining to the case of United States vs. Oliver North outline numerous schemes for providing support (i.e. avenues of resource mobilization), and in many cases it is still unclear which countries ended up actually providing that support. The specifics and the schemes are quite convoluted and strain the operational definitions of active support types. These schemes involved the transfer of surplus military and humanitarian supplies through third parties, offers to sell supplies at reduced costs, or the use of real or forged “end-user certificates” that authorized arms transfers of the global market (Independent Counsel 1989). Of all the countries on the list of solicitation, only Britain, Israel, and Costa Rica could qualify as democratic regimes at the time, though Honduras was in the process of the restoration of its democracy (Marshal and Gurr 2014). There is little evidence of Britain actually contributing, however there is strong evidence that both Costa Rica and Israel may have lent their support (Independent Counsel 1989; Jamail and Gutierrez 2012). Costa Rica as a neighboring state, is certainly within the PRG of Nicaragua, however, Israel is not.

Costa Rica fell into the same category of solicitation as other Central American countries. Boland II cut off direct US funding for the Contra resistance. However; it did not end the military and economic assistance to the other Central American countries that were fighting domestic insurgencies of their own. These countries were concerned about the unprecedented growth of the Nicaraguan EPS, which was now by far the largest and most capable military force in Central America, thanks to over $1.1 billion in aid from the Soviet Union through Cuba (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). US officials began asking the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, and Costa Rica to aid the Contras in return for increased US
military and economic aid. To various degrees, there is evidence that leaders in all of the countries agreed to provide some support, though it is difficult to determine how much material or what degrees of advice/capability or limited intervention support were provided (Independent Counsel 1989).

For Costa Rica, however, this support would be similar in nature to support coming from the US during the “lean years” because it was active in the sense that the executive leadership of the country appears to have made secret agreements either to allow and support the efforts, or at least to, “look the other way” as a quid pro quo for increased economic and military assistance. Press reports and the report of the independent counsel investigating the Iran-Contra Affair assert that President Monge met with Oliver North, Elliot Abrams, and US Ambassador to Costa Rica, Lewis Tambs, and agreed to allow continued support and even the construction of the airstrip at Cape Santa Elena that would be used by Contra forces in Nicaragua for the movement of supplies and training (McManus 1987; Morgan and Goshko 1989; Murillo 2016). Even though Eden Pastora had been severely injured in the 1984 assassination attempt, other ARDE leaders had remained amenable to CIA support and Monge’s Minister of Public Security, Benjamin Piza, likely understood the plans of US officials, even if Monge had a less than full understanding.

Israel’s role as middlemen in the sale of arms to Iran was an important part of the Iran-Contra Affair, but documents from the investigation reveal that there may have been additional support. Some sources provide evidence that Israeli leaders turned down McFarlane’s initial solicitations for support to the Contras in 1984 (Cannon 1991; Walsh 1993) and this is likely true. Documents from the Iran-Contra investigations and evidence submitted in subsequent criminal trials indicate that Israel leaders were very concerned about public disclosures of any efforts. However, the same documents indicate that Israeli leaders discussed the use of a separate
advisory mission to Honduras as a cover for action to support the Contra resistance (Kornbluh and Byrne 1997; Independent Counsel 1989). 20

On 17 October 1986, the Reagan administration’s efforts to get the US Congress to restore lethal aid to the Contras finally paid off when an appropriations act containing $100 million in military and non-military aid became law (Scott 1996). Unfortunately, for the Reagan administration, the achievement would be short lived because the illegal actions and plans that had kept the Contras sustained would begin to unravel in the media. The chain of events that led to the exposure of the illicit support began two weeks prior to the restoration of aid when the Nicaraguan military shot down a cargo plane that had been supplying the Contras in southern Nicaragua and captured a surviving crew member, Eugene Hasenfuss, who turned out to be a US citizen, employed by the CIA (Scott 1996). Before the end of the year, the news of the scandal forced the President to appoint an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute violations of the law. By 1992, the independent counsel had charged 14 individuals with crimes and exposed illegal involvement of CIA and NSC personnel (Kornbluh and Byrne 1997).

The unraveling scandal also affected the future of US support to the Contras and had ripple effects in Costa Rica. In early 1987, committees of Congress began taking votes on proposals to once again end active support to the Contras. Simultaneously, the new President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, was effectively exposing and ending Costa Rican complicity in CIA

20 U.S. District Court document U.S. versus Oliver North criminal no. 88-0080-02-GAG, paragraphs 29, 40, and 41 explain some key elements of the plan as discussed which included the sale of Kfir jets. The delivery of such hardware would have included teams of Israeli personnel to train Hondurans on operations and maintenance. Paragraphs 1-3 discuss previous arrangement (codename TIPPED KETTLE I and II) where arms from Israel were transferred to the U.S. DoD, then transferred to the CIA for shipment to the Contras. There is no specific indication that Israeli officials knew these shipments were for the Contras so their initial arms shipments were through the US government. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/11-Stipulation%20(IC%2004305).pdf
support efforts through Costa Rican territory (McManus 1987; Independent Counsel 1993). This effort was done in conjunction with Arias’ diplomatic efforts with other Central American leaders to achieve a cease-fire and peace plan. Previous efforts, commonly referred to as the Contadora process, had stalled for many reasons including Sandinista resistance and firm opposition to such efforts within the Reagan administration (Menges 1988; Kinzer 1991). The renewed efforts of Arias would eventually end the fighting and earn Arias the Nobel Peace Prize in November 1987. Arias and other Central American Presidents had met in Esquipulas, Guatemala in May 1986 and began the process of peace negotiations. Arias’ proposed draft, submitted in February 1987, eventually became the Esquipulas II agreement, which all Central American Presidents signed on August 7, 1987. Thus, in order to make his peace plan a reality, Arias had to put pressure on armed Contra elements in Costa Rica in order to show good faith in the negotiations (LeMoyne 1988).

The momentum created by President Arias and Esquipulas I made it very difficult for the Reagan administration to negotiate for enhanced funding to support the Contras in 1987. President Arias and the peace process began to win favor in the US Congress, and President Arias developed relationships with members of the opposition party in the US Congress (Kinzer and Pear 1987). The ever-unfolding details of the Iran-Contra scandal made further attempts at facilitating third party aid impossible. When the new Soviet Leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, offered his support for the Arias peace plan, Congressional opponents had even more reason to scale back the administration’s requests for continued aid (Scott 1996).

In August 1987, President Reagan and the opposition speaker of the House of Representatives, Richard Wright, announced a bi-partisan plan that tied future aid to the Contras with a proposed cease-fire and an end to Soviet/Cuban military aid to the Sandinista regime. The
announcement of the Reagan-Wright initiative preceded the signing of the Esquipulas Accord by all five Central American presidents in Esquipulas, Guatemala. The accord required each country to create conditions for a cease-fire, negotiate with armed opposition groups, provide amnesty, halt further militarization, proceed with democratization and fair elections, and most importantly, end support to insurgent groups targeting neighbors (Scott 1996).

On 23 March 1988, Contra leaders from the FDN and Sandinistas signed a cease-fire at Sapoa, Nicaragua. That cease-fire further enabled opponents of continued assistance and eventually led to further peace negotiations and the free elections of 1990 in which the Sandinistas were defeated by a democratic coalition led by Violetta Chamorro, who became President of Nicaragua. Although Contra elements would continue to fight and rearm throughout the 1990s, active external state support effectively ended in 1990. For the final year of the Reagan administration and the beginning years of his successor, George H.W. Bush, the negotiations over authorizations and appropriations for Contra programs specified a typological difference between “lethal or military aid and non-lethal or humanitarian aid.” From 1987 to 1990, the US would provide $110 million in “Non-Lethal” aid to the remaining Contra groups as negotiations, reconciliation, and reintegration efforts continued (Sobel 1995). As Scott (1996, 186) explains, “Two weeks after George Bush won the 1988 election, he contacted Speaker Wright and the two met in Wright’s office. There Bush asked Wright to work with the newly designated Secretary of State, James Baker, to ‘search out the ingredients of a common policy.’ Wright agreed and on March 24, 1989, Baker and Wright announced a bi-partisan agreement that ended the conflict over the Contra issue and committed the Bush administration to a policy of support for the planned elections in Nicaragua.”
7.2 Structured Focused Comparison of External Support to the Contras

The Contra War case study provides dozens of positive and negative cases of support to insurgent groups. The theory proposed in chapter three maintains that democracies are less likely to support insurgent groups but when they do, they tend to either provide low-level support or high-level support, while avoiding mid-level support. Yet, among the countries that provided (in some cases allegedly) support, at least three (US, Costa Rica, and Israel) were democratic regimes. The main source of active external support was the US and in each observation, US leaders decided to provide material support, but also provided advice/capability, and briefly conducted limited intervention. Thus, in addition to providing numerous possible cases for examination, this case study provides deviant cases where democratic regimes engaged in (or seriously considered) active support using mid-level types of support.

It is important to point out that just as in chapter six, the qualitative narrative provides rich description and notable observations that are not necessarily accounted for in the quantitative research due to the strict operational definitions of active support and perhaps some measurement error. Table 7.1 provides a list of the positive observations of external support to the Contras based on the UCDP data that was used to construct the dataset in chapter four. Table 7.2 provides (in italics) the additional relevant cases exposed by the qualitative analysis. It must be emphasized that these observations in italics do not necessarily contradict the UCDP data as many of these fall outside of the strict operational definitions used by UCDP. Of note, are the additions of Argentina, Israel, and the other Central American countries that likely played a role in keeping the Contras sustained during the lean years. Also of note is the fact that the coding
system used by UCDP and the formula used to modify that code to align with the theoretical typology of this dissertation, codes US support in 1983 as “Full Intervention.”

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21 Qualitative analysis demonstrates that despite the use of CIA elements to build and emplace mines and the use of CIA personnel for limited raids, this action is better defined as a limited intervention. It also must be noted that this difference in the typology of this dissertation and the typology of UCDP could extend to some measurement error in the chapter four analysis of full intervention versus limited intervention.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Supporting State</th>
<th>Regime Type (Converted Polity Score)</th>
<th>External Support</th>
<th>Type of Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Advice &amp; Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>(21) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Full Intervention</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>(21) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Advice &amp; Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Advice &amp; Capability</td>
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<td>Advice &amp; Capability</td>
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<td>Advice &amp; Capability</td>
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<td>(1) Autocracy</td>
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<td>(4) Anocracy</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>(4) Anocracy</td>
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Table 7.2 External Support to Contra Rebellion 1979-1990 (Based on Qualitative Assessment)

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<th>External Support</th>
<th>Type of Support</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Yes (Paid but funds never reached rebels)</td>
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<td>Advice/Capability</td>
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<td>Alleged/Likely</td>
<td>Advice/Capability</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Just as in chapter six, this section will identify the cases of the major decision points for the supporting regimes and then examine the decision making of the leaders using the structured, focused comparison questions (see table 5.1). In order to manage the numerous supporting states and decision points that characterize each qualitative case, it is necessary to group those countries where the leadership faced similar antecedent conditions and where the answers to the structured, focused comparison questions are similar.

Leaders of Honduras and Argentina decided to provide initial active, external support to nascent Contra groups sometime in 1980 or early 1981. Honduras provided sanctuary and material and Argentina provided advice/capability. The initiation of external support therefore can be examined as case 7a. In late 1981, President Reagan decided to greatly enhance these efforts when he authorized US material support and advice/capability support (case 7b). The next observation occurred with President Reagan’s decision to elevate the type of support to limited intervention in late 1983 and early 1984 through the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and small-scale unilateral CIA raids (case 7c). When the US Congress cut off aid to the Contras in late 1984, the US administration decided to circumvent executive constraints and solicit support
from other countries and third parties. This decision constitutes case 7d, which also imposed a
decision point on the leaders of several countries. Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Brunei all provided
funding, but for the leaders of each of these non-PRG countries, support was based largely on
factors unrelated to the target state of Nicaragua. Therefore, the decision of these three countries
is examined as a contingent generalization (case 7e). The other non-democratic Central
American countries (Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala) faced similar solicitation in 1984
and 1985 but the antecedent conditions were quite different. The disproportionate military
strength and proximity of Nicaragua, the reliance on US economic and military assistance, and
efforts at democratization were important factors in the decisions of leaders (case 7f). Costa
Rican President Monge’s decision to provide low profile sanctuary support in 1984 must also be
considered and examined separately as case 7g. The decision of the Israeli leadership to support
the Contras through efforts in Honduras is examined as case 7h, with the understanding that
evidence of the actual implementation of the plans outlined in Iran-Contra documents is largely
circumstantial. Nevertheless, leaders within democratic Israel appear to have seriously
considered the plans enough to discuss details with President Reagan and other officials.
Therefore, treating this observation as if it did occur and analyzing it as part of structured,
focused comparison adds to the theory testing of this dissertation. President Arias of Costa Rica
made the decision to end Costa Rica’s sanctuary support and pursue peace in late 1986 (case 7i).
Finally, it is necessary to examine the last two years US assistance to the Contras and the
decisions of both President Reagan and his successor, President George H.W. Bush, to accept
reduced support and finally to end support for the Contras (case 7j).

Case 7a: Honduras and Argentina (Sanctuary and Advice/Capability) 1980-81: Positive –
Predicted H3.
The countries of Honduras and Argentina were the first to provide active support to the Contra groups. Neither government at the time, admitted to any kind of relationship that could be considered active support, but the evidence from historians is clear and corroborated (Prados 2006; Kinzer 1991; Brown 2001). The exact time that this began is unclear, however there is evidence that initial contact between Argentinian officers from Battalion 601 and the leadership of the September 15 Legion, a precursor group to the FDN, seems to have occurred in late 1980 or early 1981 (Prados 2006; Kinzer 1991). General Alvarez of Honduras seems to have been providing defacto support to the same group about the same time (Moreno 2006). There are numerous factors that may have been critical to the decisions of leaders from both countries. These include, (1) the personal and organizational relationship between General Alvarez and his special activities unit, Battalion 3-16, and the Argentinian leadership of Battalion 601, (2) the elevation of Alvarez, a fervent anti-communist, to Commander of the Honduran Armed Forces in January 1982, (3) The substantial influx of refugees from Nicaragua into Honduras beginning in 1978, and finally and perhaps most critically (4) the fact that both Honduras and Argentina were under the rule of powerful military juntas whose power base was wealthy land owners that had much to lose in the event of a spread of Sandinista style rebellions.

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? For both General/President Viola and later Galtieri of Argentina and for the three-member Honduran Junta led by General Policarpo Paz Garcia, there were almost no executive constraints preventing either leader from committing to active support. The refugee situation in Honduras meant that there was easily a viable population of potential resistance fighter recruits. In 1978, Argentina already had numerous advisors from Battalion 601 in Honduras working with, then Colonel Alvarez, in building up the capability of Battalion 3-16
and doing so much in the image of Battalion 601. Thus, Colonel Alvarez was responsible for rooting out dangerous personnel that might be working within that population. His officials from his unit quickly identified former Guardia and anti-Sandinista groups. The new Junta was quite prepared to provide sanctuary and training if for no other reason than just to keep close eye on the disposition of these nascent Contra groups arming themselves in Honduran territory.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? The fact that any official relationships or programs involving support to the Contras were ostensibly secret and the fact the Honduras maintained an official position of neutrality, suggests that there was some concern over international norms on the surface, however, these were not significant enough initially for the Junta leaders to be concerned about accountability costs. In Honduras, this would slowly begin to change after the January 1982 inauguration of President Suazo, which occurred at the same time that General Alvarez became head of the armed forces. While Alvarez was making public statements about Honduras being, “in a war to the death with Nicaragua,” President Suazo was maintaining an official position of neutrality. Suazo’s actions later in 1984 would demonstrate that he and much of his constituency were not entirely comfortable with the military’s policy of providing sanctuary (Merrill 1993, 45). As a new, democratically elected President assuming the office in the wake of Junta rule, Suazo could not immediately afford to challenge his most powerful military leader on issues of international norms, or even national security. While restoration of democratic institutions was of interest to him, executive constraint mechanisms did not carry enough power to force Alvarez (or Suazo) to change policy. Refugees and a new Nicaraguan regime could be justified as potential threats and US support would allow Suazo to distribute public goods.
3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? From the public statements of General Galtieri and General Alvarez it was clear that they both viewed communism and the Sandinista rebellion as serious threats. For Alvarez, the Sandinista rebellion was an existential threat. He had already demonstrated his resolve by arresting Sandinista leaders in Honduras, even as late as 1978, when the Junta in Honduras and every other Central American leader had decided to abandon Somoza and hoped for a swift and preferably negotiated end to his reign. For Honduran leaders then, threat perception was likely the greatest motivator. The Argentinian leaders, on the other hand, must have seen the population of anti-Sandinistas as a strategic opportunity to help fight back against an international and regional communist movement. For Alvarez this was a similar calculation. For President Suazo, there was little he could do as his power of office was tenuous in the wake of junta rule. The support to the Contras likely became more important as the Nicaraguan EPS began to grow well beyond the size and capability of the Honduran armed forces.

4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? For the initial decision to support, reigning in rebel autonomy and controlling agency slack appears to have been a major concern to General Alvarez. Several of the anti-Sandinista groups, especially those consisting of former Guardia, had actually taken to committing violent crimes (kidnapping and bank robbing) to raise funds to support group activity and living expenses (Moreno 2006; Prados 2006). By embracing the Contra groups, General Alvarez and his Argentinian partners could prevent this kind of activity and channel the refugee population, especially the young males, into organized elements. The decision of Battalion 601 leaders to compel unification of disparate groups into a united organization (the FDN) is further evidence that rebel autonomy and agency slack were important considerations.
Case 7b: United States (Material and Advice/Capability) 1981-83: Positive – Deviant H1&2

Many factors led President Reagan to the decision to support Contra groups. President Reagan had run for office on a platform that included an emphasis on a foreign policy that would be more aggressive and confrontational toward the spread of Communism and the influence of both the Soviet Union and Cuba especially in the Western Hemisphere (Cannon 1991). Yet, this alone was not enough to tip the balance of decision making otherwise it would not have taken a full year to apply funding to the rebel groups that made up the Contra movement. As the above historical narrative makes clear, those key leaders in the Reagan administration that favored active measures against the Sandinistas were buoyed in their arguments by the strong evidence that the Sandinista led Junta had provided material support to guerrilla forces in El Salvador.

Though State Department officials made reasonably successful attempts to compel the Sandinista leadership to cease or at least curtail these activities, CIA Director Casey and his officials in Central America used much of 1981 to establish contact and lay the ground work to enhance the Honduran and Argentinian efforts already underway in Honduras. These efforts clearly made the support to insurgent group options more viable than they otherwise would have been. Though the December 1981 findings allowed for advice and training, it was clear that most of this could be outsourced to the Argentinians, and little to none of it would involve US personnel operating on Nicaraguan territory.

Thus, two specific factors were likely most important, (1) the actions of the Sandinistas to spread rebellion in Central America gave credible evidence of a threat trajectory, and (2) the

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22 Though this case shows a democracy using mid-level support (advice/capability), initially the Reagan administration wanted to avoid mid-level support and tried to out-source advice and capability to the Argentinians and Hondurans.
viable insurgent group infrastructure that already existed would allow for just material support and an effective cover for advice/capability with minimized risk.

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? The structural constraints encountered by the Reagan administration in making the decision to support the Contras were numerous. The theory proposed in this dissertation highlights the executive constraints in a democracy imposed by ex ante mechanisms including legislative appropriation and oversight and ex-post mechanisms such as judicial oversight, free-press, and political accountability cost imposed. All of these executive constraints would eventually affect the decisions of President Reagan in the future, however, at this decision point (case 6b) it appears that bureaucratic executive constraints weighed more heavily on the decision making process. Scott (1997), Menges (1988), Cannon (1991), and numerous other scholars have highlighted how bureaucratic processes led to a decision that resulted in a, “half-hearted policy” where there was, “no agreement within the administration or with Congress on our real objectives (Gates 1984, 5075).”

Executive constraints generated by bureaucratic or organizational design are an unanticipated addition to the theory presented in this dissertation. Yet, this particular category of executive constraint is probably not necessarily unique to democracies. Autocracies and Anocracies are probably no less likely to have bureaucratic structures and processes that constrain the decisions of leaders. It is observed here, largely because of the openness associated with the decisions in democratic governments and is well publicized in this case in large part due to the investigations into the Iran-Contra Affair.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? Domestic interpretations of international norms played an important role in the
decision-making that led to this action. Members of Congress expressed concern that the neutrality of the US was compromised if the US supported insurgent groups that were trying to violently overthrow the legitimate and recognized government of Nicaragua. Concern over this international norm was manifested in objections raised by State Department officials and then in consideration of how the finding and the overall activity would be articulated and explained for Congress. These concerns were not enough to prevent the decision. However; these concerns contributed to the confusion and disparity over the purpose and goals of the program. In many ways, it is clear that the stated objectives in the initial finding were deliberately deceptive in that every member of the CIA and the administration that were close enough to the activity, must have understood full well that the groups receiving support had every intention of overthrowing the Sandinista regime if such a goal could be achieved.

3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? For the decision makers in the Reagan administration and for President Reagan himself, there is ample evidence to suggest that this decision was made based upon a firm belief in the threat trajectory that could have seriously jeopardized US interests. President Reagan’s speeches, his public statements and his statements made in closed meetings all indicate a firm belief that the Sandinistas were a proxy of Cuba and the Soviet Union that would be used to spread rebellion through Central America and Mexico. There may have been officials that later saw benefits of support as part of a strategic opportunity, but certainly for President Reagan and for this initial decision, the perception of the threat trajectory weighed heaviest on the decision. The 1983 invasion of Grenada also provides evidence of the administrations perception of the threat trajectory and their willingness to take military action to change it.
4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? For this initial decision, there seems to have been little thought and even fewer specific measures implemented to rein in agency slack and control rebel autonomy. Active measures to influence and even control the rebel groups would only come later as Congress applied pressure on the administration to control the size, activity, and methods used by the insurgent groups. At this particular decision point, the US administration appears to have been content to allow much of the hands-on support and advice to be done by the Argentinians. The insertion of the Argentinians as a secondary agent would only have made the control of agency slack more difficult.

Case 7c: United States (Limited Intervention) 1983-84: Positive – Deviant $H_{1&2}$

By the end of 1983, The Reagan administration had struggled with its whole support program. As demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter, the press had exposed secret deliberations and official memos that presented options; powerful elements of Congress with oversight authority were displeased with the way in which the program had been presented; and several factors prevented the CIA from gaining a sufficient sense of control over the entire enterprise. All of this led to the Congressional limitations on support. Congress had passed the Boland I amendment and set a cap on support to $24 million. This led some administration officials to advise the President to use some of the unilateral authority that already existed from a previous finding signed in 1982. Thus, the administration began to use CIA teams as independent units of actions to conduct raids inside Nicaragua and also to engage in the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors. These operations were covert in that the CIA sought to disguise the identity of the forces actually conducting the missions and attempted to compel the FDN leadership to claim credit. Scott (1997) explains that the idea originated in the RIG, won the approval of
President Reagan, and then was briefed to Congressional committees in such a way as to minimize or obscure the nature of the act.

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? In this particular case, influential administration officials pursued an expanded policy and by most accounts, deliberately avoided executive constraints in order to maintain the momentum of their strategy. The insurgent groups had grown in numbers and capabilities by 1983. In addition to an ever-growing FDN, the CIA had groups in Costa Rica, including Eden Pastora’s ARDE, and the tribal groups from the Caribbean lowlands including MISURA. With Congress putting severe limits on material support, these officials wanted to seize a strategic opportunity and sought to do so by circumventing executive constraints.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? Clearly, any concern over the violation of international norms was not enough to provide a constraint ex-ante to the decision. These were blatant “acts of war” and decision makers knew this and recognized that the acts had to be covert and attributable to the FDN. Thus, the CIA told FDN leadership to take credit for the acts and the FDN initially complied.

The domestic interpretation of international norms would, however, have a huge impact on the imposition of ex-post constraints. When the media began to report the actions, the Reagan administration suffered from the imposition of accountability costs and the loss of significant support for President Reagan’s Latin American strategy including from members of the President’s own winning coalition.

3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making?

For the small group of administration officials that recommended the specific operations that encompassed this limited intervention, this escalation was largely about strategic opportunity
and seizing momentum. The administration had already significantly reduced the perceived threat trajectory. The governments of neighboring Central American countries were receiving US military and economic aid and faring well in the suppression of violent, Sandinista and Cuban sponsored opposition. Just two months prior to the mining of the harbors, the US had successfully invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada and overthrown the government. This act had a very serious effect on the Sandinistas and on the leadership of neighboring Central American countries in that it sent a signal about US tolerance for exporting revolution.

4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes?

Over the previous two years, US material support had proven vital to the operation of the FDN and valuable to other groups such as ARDE. The FDN had never quite given up their autonomy and the actual military command of the FDN had not fully submitted to the civilian control system, which had been facilitated and guided by the CIA. Although, the FDN’s Director of Public Relations, Edgar Chamorro, complied with the CIA request to take credit for the actions, the exposure of the CIA involvement and the internal struggles between CIA, FDN civilian leadership, and FDN military personnel, and the non-FDN Contra groups meant that evidence of agency slack was ubiquitous on several levels and CIA attempts to rein it in would only be made more difficult by the Congressional constraints to the program and the independent actions of Contra leaders, most notably Eden Pastora in 1984 as he sought separate and distinct avenues of resource mobilization from private citizens and politicians in the US.

Case 7d: United States (Advice/Capability) 1984-86: Positive – Deviant H1&2

The realization that Congress was probably going to cut off all funding for the Contras in early 1984 was critical to decisions made by President Reagan and by those around him to circumvent executive constraints. What began in early 1984 as efforts to help the Contras find
alternative sources of material support grew into an executive enterprise where officials deliberately tried to avoid legal constraints. Thus structural mechanisms of a democratic regime were ineffective in stopping officials from acting according to the perceived intent of the leadership. While some of the efforts to circumvent executive constraints were clearly illegal, many were just actions taken in a gray area that could be defended using technical and political arguments.

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? The leadership in the US faced just about every structural constraint that could reasonably be imposed in a democratic regime. Legislative constraints were as specific and clear as possible and were imposed ex ante and publically. Congressional leaders wrote these constraints into law and therefore their violation would invoke ex-post judicial constraints through the imposition of punishments. Finally, these constraints were public so the free press, which had exposed many secret operations immediately prior, was fully ready to impose accountability costs on the administration. Yet, still officials in the administration made conscious decisions to, at worst, break the law and, at best, find clever ways to circumvent the spirit of the law.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? and 3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? The arguments used by administration officials in the wake of the Iran-Contra Affair show that there was a conflict of norms and the interpretation of actions. Administration officials involved in the efforts to “keep the Contras alive” all believed they were doing something that was normatively the right thing to do. They based this belief on their own conceptions of the threat
trajectory associated with the Sandinistas and their Cuban and Soviet allies. They fully expected that future events would vindicate any minor transgressions of the law.

4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? The same conditions of ubiquitous agency slack persisted during the “lean years” and in many ways got worse. Because the CIA was not supposed to be assisting the Contras, Contra leaders did not necessarily have to do things the CIA’s way, nor did the military leadership of the FDN have to follow the guidance and direction of the civilian leadership. The CIA had less ability to effectively screen and sanction Contra groups. Since the FDN was now raising money from multiple sources, it no longer had to serve a master. Although Oliver North and the NSC provide some relatively substantial avenues of resource mobilization, it was not enough to reign in growing agency slack. Additionally, the Honduran government, led by President Suazo, now wanted to assert itself in the situation and became far less accommodating especially after the junior military officers ousted General Alvarez in March of 1984. Not only was their increased agency slack between the US and the Contras, but by this time there was slack between the two critical sanctuary locations.

Case 7e: Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Brunei (Material Support) 1984-86: (Positive-Predicted H1)

For the leadership of each of these non-democratic, non-PRG countries, the decision to provide material support to the Contras had almost nothing to do with Nicaragua and everything to do with quid pro quo to the US leadership. The imposition of executive constraints in the US by Congress, put the executive leadership of the US at a strategic disadvantage relative to their relationship with other countries. Therefore, it was the imposition (or the anticipated imposition) of these constraints that was central to their decisions to provide of material support. The only exception could be Taiwan, as the Sandinista decision to recognize the Peoples Republic of
China, and therefore end official relations with Taiwan, helped to change the minds of some Taiwanese leaders. Thus, one could propose a contingent generalization to the theory in this dissertation that the imposition of executive constraints on leaders in a democracy may compel those leaders to find other ways of supporting rebel groups. When the imposition of these executive constraints are a matter of public record, that allows leaders in other countries and from other non-state entities to use external support to insurgents as one way of paying for other quid pro quo transactions.

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? There is no evidence that leaders of these countries faced any serious structural constraints in their decision to provide funds. The US administration had made the act of donating funds easy by providing bank account numbers. There were no other overhead costs for facilitating transfer of money or vetting the insurgent group. The US had handled all of this activity in advance and therefore eliminated a good deal of the risk associated with supporting insurgents. Only in Taiwan, did the leadership have to circumvent its own bureaucracy and ask for the money in private, directly from influential business leaders.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? There is no evidence that domestic interpretation of international norms played any part the decisions of leaders. Taiwanese leaders quickly admitted to their contributions when news of the Iran-Contra Affair included reports about Taiwan’s involvement.

3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? Threat perception appears to have had nothing to do with the decision. For each country, leaders acted on an either implicit or explicit quid pro quo basis. This was clearly about seizing a small strategic opportunity to gain something from a powerful friend/ally.
4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? There is no evidence that agency slack or rebel autonomy were of any concern to the leaders of these countries.


It is difficult to determine which Central American countries actually provided *material* support or *advice/capability* support to the Contras after the US Congress officially cancelled funding with the implementation of Boland II. The documents from the Iran-Contra Affair and specifically from the Oliver North trial revealed that Reagan administration officials actively discussed the possibility of diverting aid meant for these three countries to the Contras. It is highly likely that Honduran officials provided support despite clear indications of friction and a changing of heart in the Suazo administration. The accounts of Moreno (2006) and Contra commanders interviewed by Brown (2000) provide some evidence to this support as well as a souring of relationships with Honduran military and government. Guatemalan and El Salvadoran support is also probable but there is little evidence beyond the discussion highlighted in the Iran-Contra documents.

These three Central American countries each faced similar conditions in 1984 with respect to their active support (in some alleged) for the Contras. The Reagan administration had supported the leadership of each country by providing military and economic aid. For example, according to Merrill (1993), just in Honduras between 1975-80, the total US government aid had been $16.3 million. After President Reagan assumed leadership, the five-year total from 1981 to 1985 was $169 million. For the Honduran military, this was especially important as US military

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23 The support of Guatemala and El Salvador for the Contras is alleged. Primary sources with strong and specific evidence are few. Most evidence comes from secondary sources tied to Iran Contra Affair.
aid accounted for 76% of its entire budget in 1985 (Merrill 1993; USGAO 1989). For El Salvador the total aid package from 1980 to 1989 was even larger than that for Honduras totaling about $3 billion in military and economic assistance over 10 years. For Guatemala, the aid packages were similarly large, though the military government of Guatemala did not accept military aid in part because of the aid required human rights provisions (USGAO 1989).

After the removal of General Alvarez in 1984, President Suazo began to take a harder line toward the US concerning support for the Contras (Merrill 1993). The Contra forces in Honduras, particularly the FDN, had grown to levels on par with the Honduran military forces and made for a challenging internal and external security situation, especially with direct US Contra funding now cut off. The harder line manifested itself in actions and rhetoric against the Contras and the US including the forced closure of Contra facilities, threats to expel Contra elements, and limitations on US official visits to Contra camps (Merrill 1993).

Therefore, for all three countries, if they did in fact provide material or advice/capability support, the critical antecedent was the magnitude and importance of US aid. For President Suazo, the fact that the Contra force had grown so large probably provided additional motivation to continue supporting while finding ways to make peace and slowly demobilize Contra organizations.

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? Leaders in all three countries faced structural constraints that actually limited their decision-making power and pushed them toward providing support rather than ending support for the Contras. All three countries were anocracies with civilian leadership publically promoting democratic reforms while proceeding carefully due to powerful military establishments.
2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? Clearly domestic interpretation of international norms had begun to influence the decisions of the leadership. All Central American Presidents had begun to publically support peace negotiations, initially the Contadora process, and then later, Esquipulas I and the Arias plan that was the foundation of Esquipulas II. Yet, these concerns had to be weighed against the economic situation and the levels of US aid.

3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making?

For Honduras, the threat perception had begun to change. While the Sandinistas and the EPS were certainly a threat, the size of the Contra force amidst the refugee populations had also become a potential threat in and of itself. Thus, President Suazo had to strike the balance between reining in the Contras and appeasing the US administration enough to maintain valuable economic and military aid.

4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes?

For the leadership of all three countries agency slack was an issue and influencing the decisions of Contra groups was very important. This was especially true for Honduras who accepted the greatest risk due to the numbers of Contra fighters and refugees on its soil. Acting as middleman, Honduran officials were able to place restrictions on the Contras and extract payments from the Contras and their donors.

Case 7g: Costa Rica (Sanctuary) 1984-86: Positive – Deviant $H_{1,2}$

Media reports and documents from the Iran-Contra Affair reveal that President Monge likely entered into agreements with US government officials to allow Contra groups to have sanctuary in Costa Rica. ARDE and other smaller factions were already in country when President Monge assumed the office and most of the evidence indicates that the sanctuary of
Contra groups was passive at least initially. As had happened so many times in the past, political dissidents used the protections afforded under the Costa Rican democracy to live and work in exile. Many of these groups had armed contingents operating out of the purview of official government policy and as long as their activity did not threaten the general security of the country or become a domestic political issue, the government left them alone. In 1984-85, President Monge met several times with CIA officials, the US Ambassador, and other officials (Murillo 2016; Independent Counsel 1987). Despite an official declaration of neutrality in November of 1983, evidence suggests that Monge may have gone beyond passive support or at least operated in the gray area between passive and active support by making it clear to subordinates to disregard the Contras and the new FDN organization that was organizing with the help of the CIA from the former subordinates of Eden Pastora and ARDE (McManus 1987; Brown 2000). This makes it difficult to identify the specific point of the decision. Additionally, Monge’s administration did take some measures against armed Contra groups including arresting some leaders for arms trafficking in 1985 (Williams 1986).

The promises of economic aid from the US seem to have been a critical motivator in the decision. According to the US GAO (1991), Costa Rica would eventually receive $1.2 billion in US economic aid over the entire decade. In 1986, for example, the US aid for Costa Rica totaled $123 million (Hopfensperger 1986).

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? For President Monge, the structural constraints of Costa Rican democratic system were clear. At the beginning of his term, the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica had wrapped up a scathing investigation of his predecessor’s active support of the Sandinista regime. Now, the presence of Contra groups on his soil was well known. For years
after he left office, President Monge would deny that he had ever made a specific quid pro quo arrangements with US officials over the support for the Contras. When the Iran-Contra Affair broke and the evidence became public, it became very difficult and inconvenient for then former President Monge to deny the accusations that he had made a secret pact or agreement. The clear involvement of his Minister of Public Security, Benjamin Piza, added credibility to the assertions. His successor, President Oscar Arias, made the presence of the Contras and Central American peace a core part of his election platform and his future administration.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? President Monge’s November 1983 declaration of neutrality provides evidence that international norms mattered to his decision-making. Recognizing that Costa Rica (and President Monge as leader) needed US economic aid and that his Nicaraguan neighbor was growing powerful, Monge needed to support the Contras or at least facilitate US support for the proxy force. Costa Rica was safe from potential Nicaraguan retaliation for its provision of sanctuary because the Contra’s themselves could fight back and the US administration would have had a justification for armed intervention if Monge invoked the Rio Pact as his predecessor had done against Somoza. Despite the fact that supporting the Contra’s was in his interest, Monge recognized that normative pressures and structural constraints inhibited him from engaging in overt and active support the way that his predecessor, President Carazo, had for the Sandinistas in 1978 and 1979. He therefore toed the line and tried to have it both ways. Simply put, normative and structural constraints influenced his decision-making, but they were not strong enough to completely force his hand.

3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? Both threat perception and strategic opportunity likely influenced President Monge’s decision to toe
the line. US economic aid was a strategic opportunity, which he did not wish to pass up. In the parlance of selectorate theory that is foundational to this dissertation, US aid allowed him to supply public goods in an attempt to maintain a winning coalition. The threat posed by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was also a concern and US relations were an important piece of this. The Rio Pact allows member states to choose how aggressively they come to one another’s aid when a member is attacked or threatened. Thus, by helping the current US administration, he was dealing with a potential threat and seizing a strategic opportunity. The perception of the threat trajectory to Costa Rica, posed by the Contras themselves, however, would eventually be an important consideration of his successor.

4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? Press reports at the time indicate that agency slack and rebel autonomy were important issues for Costa Rican leaders. Evidence shows that the Costa Rican population was divided over the question of support for Contra elements. Observers at the time noted the presence of the rebels caused political tensions, crime, and included all the public service issues associated with approximately 250,000 refugees. Nevertheless, Monge remained, at least passively, supportive of the Contras as long as the armed elements remained in northern rural areas along the San Juan River and did not draw Nicaraguan forces across the border as the Sandinista rebel elements had years earlier.

Case 7h: Israel (Advice/Capability) 1986-87: Positive – Deviant H₁&₂

Evidence of active Israeli support for the Contras is mostly circumstantial. Most sources seem to indicate only alleged support. The Iran Contra Affair exposed the plans of the US administration to use weapons and other material that Israel had seized from the Palestine

24 Similar to case 7f concerning Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, this observation can only be described as alleged and is based on circumstantial evidence from the Iran-Contra Affair.
Liberation Organization (PLO) and send this these weapons to the Contras. In these cases, the Israeli government was simply donating or selling seized weapons to the US and the US was the country actually supplying the material. Thus, these transactions would not meet the operational threshold for the data used in chapter four. This is similar though to how much of the Soviet Union’s aid reached the Sandinistas through Cuba. Those arms transfers however, largely took place prior to the US Congress voting the Boland II amendment into law.

The possible transition of Israel’s status as a supporter changing from merely supplying weapons indirectly to providing active advice/capability support to Contra elements in Honduras took place just as it became clear that Boland II would soon become law. As documents from the Iran-Contra investigation make clear, US administration officials discussed using Israel’s sale of weapons and aircraft to Honduras as a cover for action for Israeli advisers and trainers to work with FDN elements. Iran Contra documents make clear that Israeli officials discussed these concept plans favorably and in some detail, but the same documents themselves provide no certainty as to whether or not they actually took place. Cannon (1991, 385) claims that the Israelis turned down requests from US officials to provide material and advice/capability support, while the Iran-Contra documents outline details of proposed operations and imply that they would, in fact, take place. Jamail and Gutierrez (1986), provide a list of journalist accounts of evidence that Israel did provide material and advice/capability support.

Nevertheless, if Israel did in fact go through with the plans outlined in Iran-Contra depositions, then it is important to make clear that the US Congress passage of Boland II was critical. The Iran Contra documents also make clear that Israel needed a highly plausible and effective cover for action.
1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? Though Israel was a democracy, there were few structural constraints imposed on Israeli leaders in this case. The sale of Kfir fighters to Honduras and the transfer of seized arms to the US were normal actions within the scope of legal foreign policy in Israel. The fact that senior Israeli officials discussed the use of the Kfir sale and training that went along with it as possible cover for action of advisers to the Contras indicates that they were somewhat concerned about the exposure of such activity. As Klieman (1985, 92) points out, the Israel government had become accustomed to arms sales as, “a sequence of low-level, ad-hoc, and specific decisions taken in response to opportunities as they arise.” The initial transfers of captured arms to the US had no real political consequences and the later sale of Kfir fighters to Honduras was part of normal business.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? It remains unclear as to any domestic concerns over normative issues with respect to the support for a distant insurgent group. Israel’s own existence was the result of a successful insurgency one generation earlier. The scions of the Somoza dynasty held a special relationship with Israel and had provided material and advice/capability support to the Haganah prior to the founding of the Israeli state, and the Nicaraguan regime later became an early customer of the nascent Israeli arms industry in the late 1950s (Jamail and Gutierrez 1986). This was contrasted with a close PLO-Sandinista relationship. Thus, though Israel was a democracy at the time, there seems to have been little structural or normative barriers to the possibility of providing direct material and advice/capability support to Contras.

3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? Without knowing for certain if Israeli leaders proceeded with material and advice/capability
support, it is difficult to answer this structured, focused comparison question. However, given the history of Israel’s foreign policy and the descriptions of meetings from the Iran-Contra evidence, it seems clear that the consideration of support was based on the strategic opportunity of assisting the US. The specific quid pro quos of the activity were either implied or simply did not arise in the primary source documentation. The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua posed no credible threat to Israel, other than potentially harboring PLO dissidents, terrorist leaders, or other assorted non-state enemies.

4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? There is no indication that either agency slack or rebel autonomy was a concern of the Israeli decision makers. The fact that the proposed advice/capability support would be taking place in Honduras, at a time when the President was expressing concern over the presence of the Contras may have been a concern. In fact, the increasing assertiveness of Suazo and his successor, President Acona, may have prevented many of the discussed plans from taking place.

Case 7i: Costa Rica (No Support) 1986-87: Negative – Predicted H1

Over the course of 1986 to 1988, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias made the critical decision to end the active sanctuary support to the Contras. His predecessor, President Monge continued to deny that he had authorized sanctuary to Contra elements and to deny that by doing so he was assisting or facilitating the CIA in their support for the Contras. Yet, his admission that he had met with American officials and authorized the construction and improvement of an airfield at Santa Elena, made most observers believe that he had given authorization with the understanding as to how the airfield would be used. The election of Oscar Arias and his assumption of the Presidency on May 8, 1986, however, prompted the reversal of the previous Presidential decision. Upon his inauguration, President Arias made clear his intent to pursue
diplomatic solutions to the conflicts in Central America. He also made clear his intent to close down Contra support bases. Although he did not immediately order the closure of the air base in Santa Elena, his administration sent several signals in meetings and in public that they would eventually take such action. In return, US officials sent signals of their own that his decision would jeopardize his standing with the US administration and the proposed future economic and development aid. The Arias administration, prompted by the expose of local journalists, confirmed the existence of the air-strip in September 1986 and then seized the air strip and ended operations there soon after. By the time Eugene Hassenfuss was shot down and captured one month later, the airfield had been closed and guarded by Costa Rican Civil Guard. Though Hassenfuss’ mission was to resupply rebels on the southern front near Costa Rica, his aircraft had flown from El Salvador, something he would not have had to do if the airfield had been operational. Although President Arias had made his peace proposal aspirations public, the unfolding of the Iran-Contra scandal in the US provided Arias with the political capital and the international recognition to gain support. In February of 1987, he proposed his peace plan, which included the stipulation that parties terminate their support to irregular military forces (Contras). Arias and other Central American Presidents signed Esquipulas II on August 31, 1987, and the Nobel committee in Norway announced Arias as the Nobel Peace Prize winner in October 1987. By January of 1988, President Arias was compelled to demonstrate that Costa Rica was acting on the plan and so he delivered an ultimatum to Contra leaders and thereafter worked to force armed Contra groups to either disarm or leave the country.

1. What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? President Arias did not face major structural constraints in terms of the democratic system within Costa Rica. The presence of Contra groups had become an
important political issue and Arias and his political allies made the arguments that much of the aid coming from the US was actually being used to help the country deal with problems to which the Contra groups were at least partially causal. The only structural issue faced by Arias was that of budget realities and the prospect of losing some unspecified amount of the aid coming from the US. It is notable that this concern could be largely dismissed because Arias himself, and his peace plan were gaining support in the US not only among the democratic opposition in the US Congress, but also among those who could be considered part of Reagan’s winning coalition.

2. What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? At this particular decision point, both domestic and international interpretation of norms influenced the outcome. Domestic and international media had exposed abhorrent actions attributed to Contra groups and had perpetuated a strong narrative in that direction. The previous President had declared a policy of neutrality and Arias reaffirmed it so the actions taken to end support were in line with those normative considerations. As the Iran-Contra scandal was breaking in the US, Arias’ ideas and proposals for peace quickly gained traction and it was these normative considerations that led to friends and associates of Arias successfully campaigning for the Nobel Prize, which further added to the momentum of peace efforts.

3. How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? In 1986, the perception of the Sandinista threat to Costa Rica no longer carried much weight in the minds of Costa Rican elites. The perception of the Contra groups and the refugee population as potential threats, however, appeared to grow. Additionally, once the Iran-Contra Affair became public in the US, the credibility of implied threats to end economic aid to Costa Rica simply became less credible as the Reagan administration suffered a crisis with Congress. The structural openness of the democratic US system provided the leader of Costa Rica and his winning
coalition the ability to assess the credibility of implied threats. In this way, President Arias seized on the momentum of peace negotiations as a strategic opportunity instead of supporting an insurgent group.

4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? The decision of President Arias to end active support and to slowly eliminate passive support of the Contras is a testament to how important sanctuary is to non-state armed groups. Although the Northern Front (Honduran) Contra forces were larger and more capable, the restrictions on and eventual denial of sanctuary to armed elements and leaders put great pressure on the Contra leaders to demonstrate their intent to adhere to future cease fire and the subsequent negotiations.

Case 7j: United States (Material and Ending Support) 1987-89: Negative – Predicted H₁

From 1987 to 1989, the US support to the Contras was a legacy issue undertaken primarily as a means to keep the remaining Contra groups (of which the FDN was the only significant force) alive as a fighting force as leverage on negotiations with the Sandinistas and insurance on their adherence to principles of Esquipulas II and the future process of peace including demobilization, reconciliation, and reintegration (a process that would endure for the next decade). Thus, it was the Iran-Contra affair itself that was the critical to the final negotiations of the Reagan administration and Congress, and then in the subsequent administration of George H.W. Bush. Even though the Iran-Contra Affair did not manifest itself as a major issue in the election of 1988, President Bush knew that compromise and open communication with Congress on the issue would be important in order to allow progress in other matters of governance. Thus, support to the Contras permanently became a matter of “non-lethal” material support and was largely run under the State Department’s Nicaraguan
Humanitarian Assistance Office, which had been established in 1985 after non-lethal aid had resumed.

1. *What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups?* After the exposure of Iran-Contra, the structural constraints of Congress over the executive could no longer be ignored or bypassed. The unraveling of the scandal forced the Reagan administration to negotiate with Congress in good faith over the amount of funding and the specific types of assistance that could be provided to the rebels. Scott (1996) goes so far as to assert that from 1987 onward, it was Congress, not the President that led policy-making efforts on support for the Contras. Congress now asserted its power and even Oscar Arias, used his visit in late 1987 after the signing of Esquipulas II to publically press Congress to give peace a chance and end *material* support for the Contras. The material support had to be “non-lethal” and higher levels of support could no longer be discussed or considered.

2. *What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making?* Just as in Costa Rica, domestic and international interpretations of international norms became critical part of the decision making process. The Reagan administration’s violation of international law in 1984 with the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the reports of Contra war crimes, and the Iran-Contra scandal all had normative consequences. The embarrassment weakened the standing of the administration and allowed opposition in Congress to rally support for the imposition of executive constraints that fundamentally altered the preferred policy of the executive leadership of the country.

3. *How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making?*

Normative issues and the power of the Iran-Contra scandal were not enough to compel the decision to reduce and eventually eliminate aid to the Contras. Although the scandal was the
critical, it was not the only antecedent condition and may not, in and of itself, have been necessary or sufficient to change the policy. Something else was happening simultaneously which was tangential to the narrative about Nicaragua, but was critical to the credibility of the Reagan administration’s narrative about the threat trajectory of the Sandinistas. The Reagan administration had begun to achieve a level of détente with the Soviet Union under its new leader Mikhail Gorbachev. When Gorbachev indicated his public support for Esquipulas peace plan, that action sent a signal to both Cuba and Nicaraguan leaders that their support was in jeopardy. The Soviet/Cuba/Sandinista supported rebellions in El Salvador and Guatemala had been largely contained. Thus, the threat trajectory had grown less convincing and despite President Reagan’s passion and persistence for perpetuating that narrative, he could not muster enough Congressional support.

4. How did agency slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? By 1987, rebel autonomy was no longer an issue. The Contras had survived through multiple avenues of resource mobilization including those generated from the administration’s illicit efforts. Yet, by this time, rebel leaders were actually more or at least equally beholden to the President of Honduras. Their sanctuary and their access to material came through Honduras and Honduran authorities made it a common practice to withhold support in exchange for behavior. The rebel organization and its leaders had to pursue negotiations and if they wished to continue to fight, had to go back to their MILPAS roots and rely on the minimal support of local population in the highlands of Jinotega and Nueva Segovia departments. Though many would do that and continue to fight and rearm after 1990, the election of 1990 saw the defeat of the Sandinistas and a permanent end to the single party dominance of Nicaragua.
7.3 Discussion and Findings

Critical external support to the Contras came from two countries; the United States and Honduras. Several other countries provided support and their contributions are also worthy of consideration. In the previous chapter, Cuba and the Soviet Union, both autocracies, were the main providers of support to the Sandinistas. Much like the previous chapter, these cases present some evidence that supports the theory proposed in this dissertation, especially in terms of the contrast between the support given to the Sandinista rebellion (FSLN) and the support given to the Contra groups, particularly the FDN.

Chapters six and seven have the advantage of a subjective level of unit homogeneity in that they occur in the same country, close in time, with a similar global systemic environment. It is important therefore, to explain how the cases in this case study support the theory while pointing out the strength of contrast. This case study also demonstrates how leaders in non-PRG countries may have a different strategic calculus than PRG countries. This difference offers a possible contingent generalization for understanding support to insurgent groups outside of mechanisms and motivations associated with regime type.

External support for the emergent Contra groups began with non-democratic countries of Honduras and Argentina. Though this fact probably has more to do with proximity than regime type, it is worth noting that President Reagan was in office for almost one year before making his executive decision to provide significant material support to these groups. Both President Carter and President Reagan signed Presidential findings in early 1981 directing the CIA to identify potential opposition groups for support. Yet, much of 1981 was a period of laying the groundwork and building a case for a policy that could be implemented as part of a larger strategy. Despite ex-post criticism of the consultative process within the administration, that process took several months before real support began to arrive. Soviet and Cuban initial support
for the nascent Sandinista organization in 1961 was different. Soviet leader, Nikita Khurshcev and his central committee adopted a comprehensive strategy of support to such movements within weeks of its initial proposal in the wake of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2006). The memoirs of Sandinista fighters provide evidence that the levels of that support ebbed and flowed over the years, but in 1978, the type and degree of support changed significantly right at a time when a strategic opportunity presented itself (Brown 2000).

The theory proposed in this dissertation is that leaders of democracies face normative and structural constraints that make it difficult for them to use support to insurgent groups as an element of their strategy. When they do, they tend to either go low (material support) or high (full-intervention), but tend to avoid mid-level types of support (advice/capability, sanctuary, and limited intervention). From a quantitative perspective, the observations within this case study would seem to go against that theory. The decisions of President Reagan at cases 7b and 7c are deviant to the theory. On the surface, case 7g and 7h also involve leaders of democratic regimes allegedly authorizing mid-level support.

The structured, focused comparison, however, provides insight into these deviant cases and in doing so illuminates evidence pertaining to the causal mechanism and the necessity and sufficiency of causal factors. For example, when President Reagan made his decision to authorize material and advice/capability support, it had been made clear that much of the actual advising would be done through Argentinian elements already working with Contra groups. Thus, much of the cost and risk associated with a significant presence of advisers in Honduras could be assumed away by the assistance of a third party. The Falklands War ended that caveat soon after the implementation of the policy and the administration could not turn back now that it
had started down the road. Still, most of the *advice/capability* support occurred outside of the target state territory and occurred largely in the safe sanctuary of Honduras.

The imposition of democratic structural constraints ironically led to the decision to escalate to a *limited intervention* (**case 7c**). When Congress limited the *material* support to the Contras in late 1983, administration officials advised the President to use the full authority of his Presidential finding and engage in covert operations that amounted to a *limited intervention*. This critical juncture is truly deviant in that the imposition of structural constraints characteristic of democratic regimes led to the provision of mid-level support. But this case exposes the very tension leaders in democracies face when they wish to engage in unconventional warfare to seize a strategic opportunity. The rapid growth of the Contra organization indicated that the program and this particular policy was having unanticipated success. Congressional action was a threat to that momentum and so the executive leadership attempted to take action and took a risk because it technically had authorization under the previous finding. The ex-post results, however, demonstrate the effectiveness of democratic structural constraints acting as a disincentive toward mid-level types of support. Within weeks the free press, an important structural characteristic of democratic regimes, exposed the *limited-intervention* actions. The fact that the actions were violations of international law highlighted the power of normative considerations. This in turn led to the imposition of stronger executive constraints imposed by Congress. This was an accountability cost.

In **case 7d**, the administration then tried to circumvent the imposition of executive constraints by reaching out to third parties and by breaking the law. Once again, this was done because the administration still believed its own narrative about the threat trajectory. It is also important to note that the Boland II amendment forced the administration to reduce the
advice/capability support to a bare minimum and just circumvent Congress on assisting the rebels in obtaining material support. Ironically, one of the few individuals providing the very limited advice/capability support was one of the causes of the exposure of the operation. The capture of Eugene Hassenfuss demonstrates the inherent risk of democracies providing advice/capability support. Hassenfuss was part of the system providing the capability of aerial resupply to forces in Nicaragua using privately owned, non-military aircraft.

The case of Costa Rica (case 7g) also demonstrates the limited, but important impacts of structural constraints within democratic regimes. Though Costa Rica had reason to fear the Sandinista regime, providing active sanctuary support to Contra groups was not exactly appealing to President Monge. His declared policy of neutrality was important, as was the normative tradition of allowing dissident leaders to live freely in Costa Rica. Yet the presence of the small southern front forces, first of ARDE and then of the FDN, could only partially be ignored. This was a perfect example of San-Akca’s (2016) observation that democracies may be more likely to provide passive or defacto sanctuary to rebels. US officials put President Monge in a difficult situation. They tied his acquiescence on the airstrip at Santa Elena to economic and development aid. The US aid gave him a greater ability to provide public goods to the country, while allowing CIA activity at the airfield presented a normative risk of accountability costs for going against his own policy. He chose to look the other way. When contrasted with President Arias’ rejection of active sanctuary and pursuit of peaceful solutions (case 7i), evidence of the strength of normative mechanisms of democratic regimes becomes apparent.

Israel’s decision (case 7h) demonstrates that normative considerations within different democracies are not always the same. History matters, but also the fact that Israeli leaders seem
to have believed that their arms sales to Honduras provided a highly plausible cover for action seems to have satisfied any concerns over international norms.

The cases of Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Brunei, and Israel all provide evidence that Non-PRG countries face a different risk calculus in providing support to insurgent groups than countries that share a border or regional proximity to target states. If the support can be easily concealed and facilitated with low transaction costs and it can buy them favor with another state, then there is little disincentive, even among democratic states to provide that support.

This case study demonstrates that structural and normative characteristics make it more difficult for leaders in a democracy to implement policies that use unconventional warfare. Many structural constraints impose accountability costs ex-post. Legislative oversight, control of spending, and the ability to use the free press to expose failure and violations of domestic interpretations of international norms, all provided a disincentive to leaders in democracies to accept the costs and the risks associated with mid-level types of support. It is therefore more difficult for democrats to use the spectrum of unconventional warfare and the various types of support to seize strategic opportunities. Though autocrats may act recklessly because they are less concerned about the distribution of public goods to broad winning coalitions, they can more easily use unconventional warfare to seize strategic opportunities and tailor comprehensive strategies.

Furthermore, this case study demonstrates why it may also be more difficult for democratic leaders to control agency slack. Advisers that are on the ground with insurgents are a key element of mid-level support. Without advisers on the ground, it is difficult to screen and sanction rebel behavior and to integrate critical capabilities into rebel plans and strategies. Additionally, rebel leaders seeking greater autonomy or alternative avenues of resource
mobilization can appeal directly to the private citizens within a democracy. That means they have access to members of the opposition and to members of the leader’s winning coalition. Thus, in addition to facing structural and normative constraints, democratic leaders are also less likely to effectively control agency slack, further exacerbating the aversion to mid-level types of support.

The one exception might be sanctuary support. For neighboring countries, whether democracies or autocracies, passive sanctuary can be an easier choice than active sanctuary and can be easily concealed. Yet when activity and acquiescence are exposed, there are ex-post accountability costs in democracies that do not exist in autocracies. Although the proposed typology of support in this dissertation considers sanctuary a mid-level type of support, “looking the other way” can mitigate some of the risks and possibly make the costs and risks lower than material support.
Chapter 8 - The Tamil Rebellion of Sri Lanka (1983-1990)

From 1983 to 1990, the government of India was actively involved in intrastate conflict in Sri Lanka (Eelam War I). During the period, Indian intelligence services provided material, advice/capability, and sanctuary support to Tamil insurgent groups. In 1987, India conducted a full intervention in the form of a peacekeeping force that rescued insurgent groups from a potential military defeat, but ended up pitting Indian forces against some of the same insurgent groups they had previously supported. Ironically, the Sri Lankan government itself provided active material support to the same insurgent group with which it was at war.

This case study demonstrates the complexity of strategic and political decisions faced by regime leaders in supporting insurgent groups and further illustrates why leaders of democratic regimes find unconventional warfare difficult including a powerful display of accountability costs. Most importantly, this case study indicates that the causal mechanism of the democratic aversion to unconventional warfare may have more to do with the difficulty experienced by democratic regimes in managing principal-agent relationships.

The analyses contained in the previous two chapters benefit from unit homogeneity. In other words, each chapter examines state support to insurgent groups in the context of Nicaragua during the late Cold War period. While unit homogeneity can act as a method for control for other possible causal factors when conducting qualitative analysis, it may also limit the generalizability of the theory (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). It is therefore important to examine a case study that has a different context and to articulate similarity and differences. The intrastate conflict in Sri Lanka during the 1980s is similar to the previous two case studies in that it occurred in the same time period. It is quite different however in several ways. Unlike Nicaragua, the Sri Lankan conflict is separatist and ethno-religious in character whereas the two
conflicts in Nicaragua can be characterized as political-ideological. Though Eelam War I occurred during the Cold War, the two great powers of the US and Soviet Union were not directly involved in the conflict. Also India, a different large democracy, played the central supporting role to the insurgents, as opposed to the two Nicaraguan case studies where the US played the leading role. Finally, unlike Nicaragua, Sri Lanka was a functioning democracy up until the years prior to the conflict (Marshall and Gurr 2014), whereas the regime in Nicaragua rated far below the threshold of a functioning and mature democracy earlier in its history.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section summarizes the historical and geopolitical context of the Sri Lankan conflict. The section provides a summary of the history leading up to the implementation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979. The second section is followed by a history of the events surrounding the external support to Tamil insurgents. It includes subsections with a description of the various Tamil insurgent groups and the private, passive, and defacto support they received in southern India, followed by an examination of the geopolitical context of India’s leadership decisions to provide active support to insurgents. It finishes with a subsection summarizing the history of that support up until the withdrawal of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in 1990. The third section illuminates the structured, focused comparison of each observation and the fourth section provides a discussion and findings.

8.1 Historical and Geopolitical Context of Sri Lankan Conflict (Eelam War I)

The island country that is today known as Sri Lanka is located just 40 miles off the southeastern tip of India across the Palk Strait. Throughout its thousands of years of history it has been known by several names. The Persians and Arabs called it Serendib, the Portuguese called it Cilao, the Dutch and British Ceylon (its official name until 1972), and many of the Indian
cultures referred to it as simply *Lanka* (De Silva 1981). In addition to its proximity to India, the island occupies a central, strategic position in the Indian Ocean that has made it an attractive location for trading and conquest throughout the centuries (Brewster 2014). Its land mass is just over 65,000 square kilometers, just slightly smaller than that of Ireland, measuring 440 km from north to south and 220 from east to west. The island can be divided into three zones by elevation including a mountainous central highland region in the southern half of the island, fertile plains that make up the majority of the area, and a coastal belt that has many natural harbors including Trincomalee in the northeast and Jaffna in the north. It also has both vast dry zones conducive to irrigated agriculture and smaller wet zones in the central highland areas (Blood 1990).

For most of its recorded history, Sri Lanka has been a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society (De Silva 1981; Blood 1990). According to the 1981 census, the island country had just fewer than 15 million people roughly about the time when the internal conflict commonly referred to as Eelam War I began. The ethno-linguistic-religious categories of the population of Sri Lanka consisted of 74% Sinhalese (mostly Buddhist), 25% Tamil (mostly Hindu with some Tamil speaking Muslims), and less than one percent others, including descendants of European colonists. Theravada Buddhism was by far the largest religious sect with 69% of the population, and the rest included Hindus 15%, Muslims 7.5%, and Christians 7.6% (mostly Catholic). The Tamil speaking population included both native Sri Lankan Tamils (12.6%) and about 5.6% non-native Indian Tamils (Bush 2003; Heitzman 1990).

Sri Lanka has a rich pre-colonial history characterized by immigration, conquest, robust trade, and internal conflict with ethnic, religious, and political motivations. According to De Silva (1981), Sri Lanka was settled and influenced first by the north Indian (Indo-Aryan) empires of the Mauryas and Guptas, from whom most of the Sinhalese Buddhist populations descend.
Through archeological research and the ancient Buddhist text, the *Mahavamsa*, scholars believe that the first north Indian settlers arrived in Sri Lanka around 500 BC, about the same time as the founding of the Buddhist faith. Buddhism came to Sri Lanka soon after, when an emissary of Mauryan Emperor Asoka, converted Sri Lankan royalty at Anuradhapura to the faith (approximately 250 BC). The *Mahavamsa* and other ancient texts emphasize the spread of Buddhism and its role as a common religion that united Indo-Aryan (pre-Sinhalese) settlements on the island (De Silva 1981; Blood 1990).

According to De Silva (1981) and other historians (Wickramasinghe 2014; Blood 1990), it is likely that the Dravidian culture (Tamils) of southern India had settlements in the north of Sri Lanka around what is today the city of Jaffna around the same time as the Buddhist conversion. The second century BC marked the first recorded Dravidian invasions of the island including periods of Dravidian direct rule over Anuradhapura. Yet, for most of the next 1500 years, the Sinhalese, Theravada Buddhist culture, centered on Anuradhapura (and later in Polonnaruwa) would be the predominant power on the island. This culture and its central kingdom at Anuradhapura thrived in the drier zones of the island by building impressive networks of irrigation. Sri Lanka, or *Serendib* to Persian and Arab traders, was part of a vast network of trade and by the 8th century AD, included very small Muslim populations largely involved in trading. Also during this 1500-year period, the Dravidian invasions from the north and the influence of Dravidian mercenaries would play important roles in internecine conflicts, intrigue, and dynastic transitions (Da Silva 1981; Wickramasinghe 2014).

The 13th century AD marked the beginning of a period of relative decline and break-up of the Sinhalese Buddhist kingdom into numerous smaller kingdoms. De Silva (1981) and Blood (1990) attribute this decline to several factors including the repeated invasion and eventual
conquest of the north by Dravidian kings and the appearance of malaria and other mosquito borne illnesses. The invasions pushed the Sinhalese populations out of the northern dry zones and away from the maintenance of the complex, ancient irrigation systems. The introduction of mosquito borne illnesses turned these vital systems into breeding grounds for disease. Blood (1990) points out that the abandonment of the dry zone cities on the island occurred almost simultaneously to the same phenomenon in other south Asian civilizations in Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma. Rulers from southern India and even Malaya took advantaged of the weakening Sinhalese kingdoms and invaded multiple times, pushing Sinhalese power centers into the central highland kingdom at Kandy.

From the thirteenth to the beginning of the sixteenth century, Buddhism also experienced a decline in India, and Tamil speaking Dravidian kings professing a Hindu faith gradually expanded their control over much of the north and east of the island. The Sinhalese kingdoms were weak and the coastal fiefdoms became more dependent on foreign trade with Arab and European traders. Additionally, the abandonment of the northern dry zones and jungles of the central highlands served as a natural obstacle between the two cultures. Blood (1990) and De Silva (1981) agree with the assessment of some historians, that had it not been for the Portuguese conquest of the island beginning in 1505, Tamil kings of Jaffna may have overrun the island with a Hindu Tamil population.

When the Portuguese arrived in Sri Lanka (called Cilao) in 1505, they gained a strategic foothold on the island with very few forces by exploiting the rivalry between competing Sinhalese kingdoms and within royal families. Over the next 100 years, the Portuguese foothold on the island met serious resistance from various kingdoms, while the Portuguese missionaries successfully converted pockets of the Sinhalese population to Catholicism and destroyed both
Hindu and Buddhist temples. By 1619, the Portuguese defeated most of the rival kingdoms including the annexation of the northern Tamil kingdom at Jaffna, leaving just the central highland Kingdom of Kandy as the only territory where leaders and the population stubbornly refused to submit to Portuguese rule despite coercive attempts by the Portuguese Captain General at Colombo. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Kandy became the center of a Sinhalese nationalism / group identity and would remain such for the rest of the colonial period and into the modern era (Bush 2003; De Silva 1981).

In 1638, the Dutch sought to gain a foothold over Sri Lanka as strategic base to support and connect their interests in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesian archipelago). In support of this effort, Dutch emissaries formed an alliance with the Kingdom of Kandy and seized the eastern port cities of Trincomalee and Batticaloa in 1639. By 1659, the Dutch defeated the Portuguese throughout the island and reneged on many promises made to the King of Kandy to hand over key territory. By 1664, the Dutch controlled the entire coastline of the island and had a near monopoly on trade in valuable spices including Cinnamon. The Dutch conquest left the Kingdom of Kandy completely landlocked but still politically independent (Blood 1990).

Aware that the British sought the use of the Sri Lankan port at Trincomalee, the Kandyan Kings made repeated attempts to negotiate for British support against the Dutch in the second half of the 18th century. However, in 1796, the British navy captured the port of Trincomalee from the Dutch with out any aid from Kandy. By 1801, the Dutch formally ceded their territorial possessions on the island to Britain. During their first years on the island, the British made two attempts to seize control of Kandy during periods of internal dispute. The first in 1804 ended in disaster for the British as the entire British force was decimated after it had seized control of the capital city. The second expedition in 1815, however, was a success and Kandy was conquered
with barely a shot fired due to the support of rival Kandyan factions including rebellious Buddhist monks (*bhikkus*) (Blood 1990; De Silva 1981; Mendis 1932).

The British treaty with Kandyan chiefs, The Kandyan Convention of 1815, initially permitted Sinhalese chieftains to retain much of their authority and allowed for the retention of customary Buddhist law. However, when Buddhist monks (*bhikkus*) led a swiftly defeated rebellion, the British administration eliminated much of the power of the chiefs and removed institutional privileges of Buddhism affording it the same respect given to all other faiths practiced on the island (Mendis 1932; Blood 1990).

The British administration of the island of Ceylon, though led by a single Governor, subdivided the island along primarily ethnic and cultural lines that allowed for some autonomy and political power to locals and a great degree of consideration for traditional systems of justice and dispute resolution. In 1833, the British Colonial Office adopted the recommendations of the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission. These recommendations amounted to reforms considered radical at the time. They included subdividing Ceylon into five provinces all administered under unified political, administrative, and judicial systems. The autocratic power of the Governor was reduced and an appointed Executive Council and Legislative Council were created with some representation from the local population including both Sinhalese and Tamils. Government monopolies on critical commodities, including cinnamon and coffee were abolished. Perhaps most importantly, the Colonial office opened the Ceylon Civil Service to the indigenous population creating a new incentive for western, English education (Mendis 1932; De Silva 1981).

The vast expansion and growth of the coffee industry from 1830 to 1850 had a significant effect on the demographics and infrastructure of the island. Beginning in the central highlands of
Kandy, coffee plantations grew. The demand had two primary consequences. First, the need for cheap labor caused plantation owners to hire migrant Tamil speaking workers from southern India. Second, the export of coffee incentivized the building of road and rail networks that effectively ended the isolation of the old Kanyan kingdom (Blood 1990).

In 1869, the massive coffee plantations of Ceylon suffered a devastating crop disease that wiped out the coffee industry within fifteen years. Coffee plantation owners replaced coffee with other crops, the most successful of which was tea. Unlike coffee however, tea required a year round labor force. Thus migrant Tamil workers from southern India soon became a permanent labor force on the island. By 1911, Indian Tamil laborers, who emigrated as large family units, made up about 12% of the total population (Blood 1990).

Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, two competing trends developed within Sinhalese society. The first was the gradual development of a professional, westernized elite class of citizenry. Comprising the indigenous members of the civil service, as well as lawyers, doctors and other educated professionals, this new class competed with more traditional upper castes of society for political power and influence. This included both Tamil and Sinhalese people, with a larger proportion of northern Tamils opting for higher education and professional careers at a time when American protestant missionaries were establishing a network of schools. The second trend was a Buddhist cultural revival. Led primarily by bhikkus, catalyzed by archeological discoveries of ancient Buddhists texts and cultures at Anuradhapura, and with the support of the Ceylon Theosophical Society, the movement resisted the influence of Christian missionaries and British education. Buddhist revivalists established schools and universities of its own to promote Buddhist identity and the Sinhala language and culture (Suryanarayan 1991; De Silva 1981). The first riots of modern times occurred in Colombo in
1883 and were instigated by bhikkus against Catholics and included the burning of churches and schools (Suryanarayan 1991; Mendis 1932). The Sinhala nationalist movement came to view the Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese as the dhammadvipa (Island of the Faith) with respect to its preservation of Buddhism in the midst of westernization from British rulers and the massive Hindu populations of India to the north. Sinhalese nationalism over the next century would take on the mentality and narratives of a desperate minority, even though the Sinhalese Buddhists were a majority on the island itself (Bush 1993).

The island of Ceylon was relatively unaffected by the geopolitical turmoil of the First World War, yet the global trends that coincided with and grew out of that time period were present and influential. Both communism and nationalism became ideological forces around which political groups began to coalesce. Small communist political associations and later political parties developed with international connections. A growing nationalism, much related to that displayed in India, was manifested in the early 1920s. At first, this movement helped to force a rewrite of the constitution in 1920 that involved only modest increases in the representation of indigenous individuals on the Executive and Legislative Councils. In 1927, however, the British Earl of Donoughmore led a royal commission to investigate and recommend changes to the governance of the island. The commission’s recommendations resulted in what historians refer to as the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931. The Donoughmore Constitution established a far more representative government including elected native officials that held the ranks of ministers alongside British appointed ministers that served on a council with the British Governor of the island (De Silva 1981).

Nationalism in Ceylon had many variations and political identity in the form of political parties emerged more as a function of ethnic and communal identity or around powerful
individual personalities. For example, the Great Sinhalese Council (*Sinhala Maha Sabha* - SMS), led by Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike (S.W.R.D Bandaranaike) promoted Sinhala and Buddhist identity, feeding off the powerful Buddhist revivalism in largely Sinhalese south and center of the island. Similarly, the Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC - representing Indian Tamil population) and the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC representing northeastern native Tamils) formed under the Donoughmore Constitution (Vanniasingham 1988; De Silva 1981).

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was born into a Christian family and his father held high office working for the British governor. He received his education in Britain and converted to Buddhism when he became active in Sri Lankan Politics in 1926. As a young man he served on the State Council and organized the SMS in 1936 (De Silva 1981).

In World War II, the island of Ceylon was a key strategic base for the British. After the fall of Singapore, the port of Trincomalee became the most critical naval base in the region. The Japanese attempted to attack both Trincomalee and Colombo, but were forced to withdraw. Though the British put the island under military jurisdiction for the duration of the war, the native population benefitted from the war both economically and politically. The war effort increased the demand for Sri Lankan agricultural products and compelled the British to make even greater investments in infrastructure. Influential Sri Lankan politicians, including head of the State Council, Don Stephen (D.S.) Senanayake, put pressure on the British to establish a postwar timeline for independence.

Unlike S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, D.S. Senanayake was born into an educated, but middle class Buddhist family. His father and brothers were all politically active in the temperance movement within Sri Lanka and D.S. was elected to the Legislative Council in 1931. During
World War II, D.S. Senanayake gained fame and political power when he served as the Minister of Agriculture on the State Council (De Silva 1981).

D.S. Senanayake established the United National Party (UNP) out of numerous smaller party organizations including S.W.R.D Bandaranaike’s SMS, the Ceylon National Congress (CNC), and the Muslim League. By 1944, the island had a new constitution (Soulbury Constitution) that prepared it for dominion status and paved the way for independence. The Ceylon Independence Act of 1947 formerly made the island an independent state within the British Commonwealth beginning on February 4, 1948 just six month after India gained its independence. D.S. Senanayake and the UNP easily won a large majority of the seats and he and his aggregated party took control of the new state. Though their membership consisted of SMS and other Sinhalese nationalist parties, the party platform in the 1947 elections recognized Ceylon as multi-racial society with religious freedom and equality for all citizens (Vanniasingham 1988).

Relative to its much larger northern neighbor, the newly independent country of Ceylon appeared to be a model for young democratic regimes throughout the world. While India was plagued with ethnic and religious violence as the country split into India and Pakistan, Ceylon under UNP rule appeared peaceful. Yet the ethnic and religious divisions on the island quickly showed themselves in debates over the first major issue facing the new UNP led government. This was the question over the citizenship of the Indian Tamil population: a small but powerful minority population located in areas where Sinhalese nationalists were often the decisive majority. Whereas most native Sri Lankan Tamils lived in the northern and eastern provinces that roughly made up the borders of the old kingdom of Jaffna, the Indian Tamil populations occupied pockets of central highland areas where tea and other crops were grown. Though the
Indian Tamil population had its own political party in the CIC that was officially part of the UNP, there were clear ideational divisions in the ruling party and throughout the island. These divisions were between the native Sinhalese and native Tamil populations and wider than expected divisions between native Tamils and Indian Tamils, some of who had been on the island for over two generations. The debates in Parliament led to several pieces of legislation, supported by many native Sri Lankan Tamils that effectively disenfranchised the majority of Indian Tamil residents (Blood 1991).

The nature of the debates and the appeals to Sinhalese nationalism from UNP officials, particularly the members of the SMS, left leading Tamil politicians alienated. D.S. Senanayake’s attempts to hold his party together and maintain a national unity of Tamils and Sinhalese proved very difficult. His anti-communist coalition slowly fractured. In 1951, S.W.R.D Bandaranaike led his SMS party of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists and other followers in a split from the UNP to form the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP). Senanayake made concessions in the form of policies that appealed to the vast and vocal Sinhalese base, such as the provision of land grants in northern Tamil areas to Sinhalese. This did much to fan a growing Tamil identity and ire.

In 1949, the ACTC split as Tamil nationalist leader, Samuel James Vellupilai Chelvanayakam (S.J.V. Chelvanayakam), formed the Tamil Federal Party (Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi - ITAK). The ITAK platform called for greater autonomy for the Tamil dominated northern and northeastern provinces around Jaffna and Trincomalee and a federated Ceylon.

S.J.V. Chelvanayakam was born in 1898 in Malaya to a Tamil Christian family. He was educated in Northern Sri Lanka and became a prominent lawyer. Chelvanayakam joined ACTC soon after its formation and he soon became one of its organizers and leaders. During negotiations for the Soulbury Constitution, Chelvanayakam and the ACTC unsuccessfully
argued for balanced ethnic representation to ensure that after independence the Tamil population of Ceylon was not forced to submit to the will of a large Sinhalese majority.

The UNP coalition suffered another serious setback when D.S. Senanayake was killed in a horseback riding accident in March 1952. This left his son, Dudley Senanayake, leading a fractured party in the election that followed. Though the UNP won the election and Dudley became Prime Minister, S.W.R.D Bandaranaike’s SLFP became the leading opposition. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam’s ITAK won most of the Parliamentary seats in the north, leaving the ACTC (the Tamil party that stood with the UNP for a united Ceylon) with no seats. In just over one year, a declining economy and some unpopular political decisions caused the UNP to replace Dudley Senanayake with his cousin John Kotewala (De Silva 1981).

Decisions of foreign policy and geopolitical rivalry of the Cold War became contentious during Kotewala’s term as Prime Minister. These decisions highlight a concern among the UNP leadership that the newly independent India, a country of vastly superior size and resources, might act as a regional hegemon. Brewster (2014) maintains that Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian’s first Prime Minister, envisioned a kind of Indian “Monroe Doctrine” which would keep the Indian Ocean free of any foreign (non-Indian) hegemony and would one day be guaranteed by Indian military and naval superiority. Though Nehru’s India did not have the military resources to realize such a vision and was primarily concerned with internal unity, the largely Buddhist and Sinhalese UNP of Ceylon remained concerned. The UNP’s fierce anti-communist position and westward leaning sympathies did not sit well with Nehru and were out of sync with Nehru’s sponsorship of the non-aligned movement. Kotewala and Nehru clashed in 1954 at the Colombo conference, the predecessor to the Bandung Conference of 1955. Kotewala had even openly considered the idea of joining the US sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
The defense agreement with the British, however, proved enough to allow the UNP to keep the military of Ceylon small and allay the worries of Nehru (Blood 1991; Brewster 2014).

A major shift in the political landscape of Ceylon occurred with the elections of 1956. Kotewala and the UNP attempted to maintain their fragile coalition of right leaning, anti-communist parties including the remainder of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), while at the same time, appeasing Sinhala nationalists. The fear of losing the large Sinhalese base voters in the populous south and central regions near Kandy led Kotewala and the UNP to back away from an earlier platform supporting dual use of Sinhalese and Tamil as official languages. The SLFP under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike formed a coalition of smaller parties called the People’s United Front (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna – MEP). This left leaning coalition did not include the small communist parties, but promoted a narrative of anti-western, anti-Tamil rhetoric with calls for socialist reforms, state ownership, and separation from the British Commonwealth. The most provocative and controversial, however, was Bandaranaike’s call for “Sinhala Only”: a promise to make Sinhala the official language of the state, forbidding the use of Tamil and English (the lingua franca of the island) in official government and legal business. The popularity of Bandaranaike’s efforts in the south and center of the island were contrasted by the growing popularity of the Tamil Federal Party (ITAK) under Chelvanayakam who continued his call for a separate semi-autonomous region in the north and east where Tamil would be the official language (Wickramasinghe 2014, Vanniasingham 1988).

The outcome of the 1956 election could not have been more foreboding for the future of peace on the island. S.W.R.D Bandaranaike and his SLFP coalition won the election with the UNP forming the primary opposition. In the north of the island, particularly in districts around Jaffna, Chelvanayakam and the ITAK won most of the seats leaving the ACTC with little
representation. Thus, a Sinhalese nationalist party ran the central government and a nascent Tamil nationalist party dominated the heavily Tamil populated north (De Silva 1981).

The SLFP used its majority in parliament to implement its promise of Sinhala only by passing the Official Language Act in October 1956. Thus, the politics of exclusion generated a grievance that would perpetuate. In response, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam led a satyagraha with other leaders of his party in the capital city of Colombo on Galle Face Green.25 As an admirer of India’s Independence leader, Mahatma Gandhi, Chelvanayakam intended to use this form of protest to demonstrate the strength of the Tamil minority and appeal to international opinion. Yet, Chelvanayakam and his associates were met with violent resistance from local Sinhalese and the mostly Sinhalese police force did not intervene.

The events motivated negotiations between Bandaranaike and Chelvanayakam that resulted in a public pact between the two leaders. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, or B-C Pact, stipulated that the Tamil north and northeast would be granted some level of autonomy and, in those regions, both Tamil and Sinhala could be used for official government and legal activities. The pact further specified that the question of citizenship for Indian Tamils would be revisited. Yet, the pact was unpopular with Bandaranaike’s base of support and caused outrage and peaceful protests from Buddhist monks and UNP leaders including a young Junius Richard (J.R.) Jayewardene who took the opportunity to gain favor with the Sinhalese nationalists. This resulted in Bandaranaike later tearing up (literally) the B-C Pact (Vanniasingham 1988).

J.R. Jayewardene was born into wealthy Christian family in 1906. His father served as a Supreme Court justice under the Donoughmore Constitution. Although raised as a Christian, J.R.

25 A satyagraha is a conception of non-violent protest/action popularized by Mahatma Gandhi during his campaign for Indian independence. Galle Face Green is a sea-side public park in Colombo.
Jayewardene converted to Buddhism while attending college in Colombo. He became politically active in 1938 when he joined the Ceylon National Congress and later became the party’s Joint Secretary. During World War II, Jayewardene did not support the British war effort, instead he was vocal in the calls for independence. He joined the UNP at its formation in 1946 and became the finance minister under D.S. Senanayake (De Silva and Wiggins 1988).

In May 1958, riots erupted throughout the island and demonstrated the level and character of ethnic violence of which the population of Sri Lanka was capable. The 1958 riots were apparently motivated by a simple (untrue) rumor of Tamil on Sinhalese violence. In the riots, Tamil owned businesses were attacked and in the end, around 25,000 Tamils living in southern areas moved north in search of better security. Twenty years later, recurring incidents of similar mass violence would compel more and more Tamils, including Indian Tamils, living in southern areas to move north (Blood 1991; De Silva 1981).

On September 26, 1959, the island fell into political turmoil when a disgruntled bhikku assassinated President S.W.R.D Bandaranaike. His death at the hands of a fervent Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist as reprisal for his initial concessions to the Tamil minority sent a clear message to the political class on the island. Sinhalese nationalism was a powerful force and concessions to the Tamil minority might come at a cost. Although initially replaced by the Minister of Education, policy differences within the SLFP coalition caused the dissolution of Parliament and an election in December 1959. For a very brief period, those elections saw the return to power of the UNP and Dudley Senanayake. Yet, the UNP had lost the trust of ITAK and the northern Tamils and remained vehemently anti-communist, so its slim majority coalition did not last. Only a few weeks after forming a government, Parliament again dissolved and the country held an election in July 1960 (De Silva 1981; Wickramasinghe 2014).
This time, the SFLP came under the leadership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s widow, Sirima Ratwatte Dias (S.R.D.) Bandaranaike (aka Sirimavo Bandaranaike). Sirimavo Bandaranaike was the daughter of a prominent Sinhalese politician and a member of the Radala caste, and a descendent of Kandyan royalty. Although she had not been personally politically active while married to her husband, she soon took on the leadership of his party as the brief interlude of UNP governance fell apart.

With the support of many smaller parties, Bandaranaike was able to win an absolute majority in Parliament, become the first female in history elected to the office of Prime Minister, and embark on an ambitious plan to re-energize the policies promoted by her late husband. These policies were a combination of the enforcement of Sinhalese nationalism and socialist policies. Her government began immediate enforcement of the Official Language Act, the state take over of private, non-Buddhist schools, and the nationalization or partial nationalization of large sectors of the economy. In foreign policy, S.R.D. Bandaranaike moved the country to a more left leaning neutralist stance while the SLFP brought the smaller communist parties into the government, building their support in anticipation of the 1965 elections (De Silva 1981).

S.R.D. Bandaranaike’s economic policies and her appeals to Sinhalese nationalism allowed Dudley Senanayake to rebuild the UNP and to pull in the support of ITAK and the Ceylon Workers Congress (Indian Tamils – formerly CIC) in the 1965 elections. The SLFP government had borrowed large amounts of money and had failed to improve the economy or increase the amount of government revenue. Thus, the UNP was able to win a plurality of the seats in parliament and form a government, in July 1965.

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26 The Radala caste was a small minority of Sinhalese families that had ruled the Kingdom of Kandy when the British began their conquest of the island.
D.S. Senanayake made a pact with Chelvanayakam that would ensure Tamil support for his economic initiatives in exchange for modifications to legislation that had been unpopular with the Tamil minority (Swamy 2003). Unfortunately for the UNP coalition, government attempts to reverse some of the socialist policies of the previous government failed to have the desired effect and the economy continued to stagnate. A drop in the global price of key export commodities and region-wide food shortages hurt the popularity of the UNP and Senanayake.

When the UNP enacted legislation to amend the Official Language Act, allowing Tamil to be an alternate official language in Tamil dominated areas, the reaction of Sinhalese nationalists sparked violence forcing the government to declare a state of emergency in 1966 that lasted over a year (De Silva 1981).

The unrest and economic difficulties of the late 1960s coincided with a rise in the popularity of the smaller communist parties and the rise of a radical left party with a strong sense of Sinhalese nationalism called the People’s Liberation Front (*Jenatha Vimukthi Peramuna* – JVP). Rohanna Wijiweera, a Sinhalese student who had studied in Moscow, led the JVP. During the late 1960s, he travelled throughout Sri Lanka preaching about Marxism and building a network of radical students while preparing and planning to violently overthrow the government (Gunaratna 1990). Wijiweera became a kind of Sinhalese cult hero as he preached his, “Five Lectures.” Using a mixture of Marxist theory and Sinhalese nationalism, his classes covered (1) the problems facing the peasant farmer and the rural worker; (2) Independence and colonialism; (3) the threat of Indian expansionism; (4) The failure of the left (e.g. Bandaranaike’s SLFP and the smaller communist parties with whom she was forming a coalition); and (5) the path the Revolution should take (i.e. mass insurrection led by JVP cadre). Neither the Senanayake
government nor the SLFP opposition took Wijiweera and his JVP very seriously (Gunaratna 1990).

The election of 1970 marked an important turning point in the history of the island. Sirimavo Bandaranaike and her coalition of leftists and Sinhalese nationalists regrouped and used the struggling economy, the civil unrest, and anti-Tamil rhetoric to surge to an unprecedented victory. Running this time as the United Front coalition, Bandaranaike promised to restore and build upon the socialist path of her previous term and, most significantly, announced that the United Front would pursue a path to leave the British Commonwealth. She proposed that the island should become the Republic of Sri Lanka under a new constitution that would codify the Sinhala language and the Buddhist faith as the official language and religion of the state (Wickramasinghe 2014).

The overwhelming victory of Bandaranaike and her United Front guaranteed her the legal and political power to carry out most of her promises. In 1970, The United Front won 118 of the 151 seats in Parliament, and the SLFP, the largest party in the coalition, won 90 seats. The UNP won only 17 seats and the Tamil Federal Party won 13 seats (Rajaratne 2009). Even without the smaller members of the United Front, the SLFP had the votes to enact its sweeping agenda.

Before Sirimavo Bandaranaike could implement her agenda, however, her government faced an existential crisis from the radical left in the form of a JVP insurrection. Her government and the country was unprepared and caught off guard by the scope, scale, and effectiveness of the violent students who had gone from an obscure political party to a violent terror group. In March of 1971, police arrested the Wijiweera and found evidence of planned terrorist activities including bomb-making materials. From a jail in Jaffna, Wijiweera ordered his followers to proceed early with plans for a nationwide uprising. On April 5, 1971, JVP members attacked 74
police stations within the span of 24 hours. Within just a few days, the JVP seized control of 35 local areas, 50 large towns, and attacked close to 92 police stations mostly in the central highlands. The JVP strategy was similar to the foco strategy initially employed by the Sandinista’s and other insurgent groups throughout the world (Gunaratna 1990).

The crisis demonstrated the profound weakness of the island’s security forces. With assistance from India, Pakistan and even the US in the form of material support, Bandaranaike was able to defeat the insurrection and detain thousands of young radical Sinhalese who had actively participated in the revolt (Gunaratna 1990). JVP leaders were given long prison sentences and lower level activists sent to hastily established “re-education camps.” Official estimates of the dead were 1,200 (Blood 1990; Bandaranaike 2005), while unofficial estimates are as high as 20,000 killed (Survanarayan 1991).

With the JVP insurrection soundly defeated, the United Front fulfilled their promise for a new constitution. In May 1972, the government adopted a new constitution that officially changed the name of the island from Ceylon to the Republic of Sri Lanka. The new constitution featured a National State Assembly that had legislative, executive, and judicial powers and did not include any specific protections for the rights of minorities (Blood 1990). Most importantly, the new constitution restored Sinhala as the country’s only official language and placed Buddhism in a pre-eminent position (Swamy 2002).

The outrage of the Tamil population was apparent as political differences among the Tamil parties became insignificant compared to the perceived threat from the new constitution. The three major Tamil parties joined together to become Tamil United Front (TUF) just one month after the adoption of the new constitution. The new party called for a secular state, recognition of the Tamil language, decentralization of administrative powers (to the provinces),
and constitutional protections for minorities. Chelvanayakam resigned his seat in parliament in protest and challenged the Bandaranaike government to hold an election for his seat. The government chose to defer an election for three years while it proceeded with its Sinhalese based agenda (Blood 1990; De Silva 1981).

The actions of the SLFP over the next five years would do a lot to motivate more direct and extreme action from the Tamil population. For example, in 1972, the government banned the import of Tamil language movies, books, and magazines from India. Not only did this anger northern Tamils, it sparked the interest of leaders in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, including Marudur Gopalan (M.G.) Ramachandran (aka MGR), the former Indian movie star / politician who had just publically broken away from the state’s ruling party. Then, in 1973, Bandaranaike implemented a plan for “standardization” in testing for university admissions. The standardization policy was designed to correct a perceived injustice against the Sinhalese population. Compared to the overall population of Sri Lanka, Tamil students in universities were proportionally over represented as were urban versus rural students. The disproportionate Tamil representation in higher education was largely a result of the work done by American protestant missionaries in the Tamil dominated regions (De Silva 1981). Sinhalese politicians and administrators attributed this to unfair practices by Tamil professors and university administrators. The new standardization rules therefore required Tamil students to score higher than their Sinhalese counterparts in order to gain admission to the best schools. The protests that erupted from young Tamils over the standardization policy concealed a much more deadly trend which was the emergence of violent Tamil nationalist groups led by young intellectuals who believed that the efforts of the non-violent Tamil leaders (e.g. Chelvanayakam) to defend the rights of Tamils had failed (Swamy 2002).
By 1975, the United Front suffered internal disputes between the Sinhalese nationalists of the SLFP and the smaller communist parties. The coalition also suffered in February 1975 when Chelvanayakam ran for his own vacated seat in Parliament. Upon winning the seat by an overwhelming majority, Chelvanayakam made an announcement that crossed a political line that had not been crossed by Tamil leadership. Chelvanayakam declared that the result of the election was a mandate that the Tamil nation should exercise sovereignty and become a free state (Tamil Eelam).

"I wish to announce to my people and to the country that I consider the verdict as a mandate that the Tamil Eelam nation should become free. On behalf of the Tamil United Front, I give you my solemn assurance that we will carry out this mandate." (Swamy 2003, 18)

The declaration coincided with rising violence of young Tamil gangs of “boys” committing act of terrorism, assassination, and bank robbery to fund operations against the government. There was also evidence of some nascent private support from Tamil Nadu in India (Survanarayan 1991, 41; Swamy 2002).

In July of 1975, the mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Durayappah, was assassinated. Durayappah was a close friend of Bandaranaike and the action caused much of the country to take notice that the situation in the north could not be handled with the same swiftness as the JVP insurrection (Blood 1990; Swamy 2003). The assassin was Vellupillai Prabakaran, a man who would soon become the most notorious insurgent leader in all of South Asia.

Prabakaran was the hands-on leader of a small group of Tamil militant group known as the Tamil New Tigers (TNT). He had come from the town of Valvettiturai (VVT) on the Northern coast of the Jaffna peninsula. The town had large fishing communities and thrived on illicit trade with Tamil Nadu province in India. It is no coincidence therefore that Prabakaran and
so many other leaders of Tamil insurgent groups came from VVT. According to Swamy (2003), one of Prabakaran’s first memories as a child was in 1958 when he heard the story of a Tamil Hindu priest who had been seized by a Sinhalese mob and burned alive during the riots that year. While growing up in VVT, most Tamil children were taught to admire the Indian independence hero, Mahatma Gandhi. Prabakaran, however, was obsessed with Bhagat Singh, the Sikh leader of a secret resistance organization, and Subhas Chandra Bose, the leader of the Indian National Army who defied Gandhi and the British by accepting support of the Japanese in World War II in his quest for Indian independence (Swamy 2003). A member of the Karawa caste of fishermen, Prabakaran would recruit many of the leaders of his group from the same caste and would take full advantage of the family ties to boat owners who could rapidly transport resources to and from Tamil Nadu across the 40 mile Palk Strait. Though other organizations used this network, Prabakaran’s connections made resource mobilization from Tamil Nadu easier and he was able to secure resources from non-government and non-official sources in Southern India beginning as early as 1975-76 (Swamy 2003).

The 1977 elections promised to be a kind of referendum on the new constitution just as much on the performance of the Bandaranaike United Front government. The resounding defeat of the UNP in 1971 and the subsequent death of Dudley Senanayake in 1973 allowed J.R. Jayewardene to become the party’s leader. Jayewardene used the period in the interim to rebrand and restructure the UNP. This time there would be no coalition with the Tamil parties because the TUF, in May 1976, made an independent Tamil Eelam part of its platform and renamed itself the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). While the ailing Chelvanayakam looked on, his deputy Appapillai (A.) Amirthalingham declared that the TULF was, “…resolved that the restoration and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam
based on the right of self-determination inherent in every nation has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil nation in this country (Swamy 2003, 37).” This statement took Chelvanayakam’s statement of one year earlier a step farther by making it clear that an independent Tamil state was critical to the very existence of the Tamil nation. The growing number of discontented Tamil youths who were joining militant organizations took this to heart.

Tamil militant organizations began to target Tamil police officers that were the responsible authorities and representatives of the Sri Lankan state. Prabakaran, who had renamed his TNT organization the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), ordered the assassination of the police officer investigating the murder of Mayor Duraiappah in February 1977. The LTTE and other militant organizations continued to attack Tamil officers and informants and succeeded in preventing police officials from being able to gather effective intelligence on the activities of the groups (Swamy 2003)

The results of the July 1977 election flipped the script on the results of the 1972 election. This time it was the UNP that came out on top and the SLFP that suffered the humiliating defeat even worse than the UNP had experienced in 1972. The UNP won 140 out of a total 168 seats in the National Assembly, leaving it with an overwhelming majority and a mandate to rewrite the constitution. The SLFP, on the other hand, won only eight total seats. To add insult to injury for the SLFP, the TULF won 18 seats making it, rather than the SLFP, the largest opposition party. The smaller communist parties failed to win even a single seat (Vanniasingham 1988; Bullion 1995).

Several factors in 1977 contributed to a steady decline into civil war. Though Jayewardene and the UNP had planned to work for peaceful solutions to Tamil issues, the death
of the elderly Chelvanayakam on April 26, 1977, just three months prior to the elections, hindered and diluted the effects of concessions. Tamil youth gangs had morphed into small, organized groups espousing violent resistance to the government in support of ambitions for a separate Tamil state in the northern and eastern province. Though the TULF maintained the same ambition as part of their platform, the party’s new leader, Amirthalingham, publically continued the Chelvanayakam tradition of non-violence and parliamentary actions to work toward the goal including compromise where necessary. Amirthalingham, however, was not the same pacifist as Chelvanayakam. According to Swamy (2003) and Gunaratna (2001), he viewed the TULF and the militant groups, as the part of the same struggle and both were necessary for the realization of *Tamil Eelam*. Amirthalingham began meeting with the leaders of the separate insurgent groups, including Prabakaran, as early as 1975 (Swamy 2003). Most of the emerging insurgent organizations no longer agreed with the path of non-violence, the utility of *satyagraha*, and in the case of Prabakaran and the LTTE, the willingness to compromise. Events in 1977-79 would cause many among the Tamil population to extend their sympathies and support overtime to the various insurgent groups (Swamy 2003).

The post election period produced an atmosphere of tension as well as shock and disbelief throughout the country. Sri Lankan Tamils seeking separation felt empowered and the most extreme supporters of Sinhalese nationalism felt threatened. The tension soon broke on August 15, 1977 when three policemen were killed in Jaffna. On the following day, police retaliated when crowds of students prevented the seizure of weapons from Tamil youths in Jaffna. Jayewardene ordered the Sri Lankan Army into Jaffna and upon their arrival the central market was burned down. Tamil leaders blamed the security forces. Communal riots, reminiscent of 1958, erupted across the country leading to approximately 300 deaths and thousands of
displaced Tamils who moved north. Just as in 1958, Tamil speaking families who lived in pockets throughout the country, moved north seeking security. This included 40,000 Indian Tamils who did not support the calls for a Tamil homeland in northern Sri Lanka, but were now starting to side with their northern, Sri Lankan Tamil protectors (Swamy 2003). Tamils in the north also attacked Sinhalese officials and private citizens.

The rioting was just the beginning of problems for Jayewardene government. Tamil insurgent groups, now collectively referred to as “Tigers,” increased the number of attacks and bank robberies in the north.27 Also notable was the reactions in the Indian southern state of Tamil Nadu. There the ruling party of Tamil Nadu, led by its newly elected Chief Minister, M.G. Ramachandran, organized a strike and a protest march that moved through the capital city of Madras to the office of the Deputy High Commissioner (Consul General) of Sri Lanka (Swamy 2003).

Initially, Jayewardene was undeterred and set about rewriting the constitution while finding ways to accommodate Tamil demands and rollback some of the most controversial policies and laws enacted under the SLFP. The new constitution of 1978 changed the power structure of Sri Lankan democracy. Modeled after France, rather than British parliamentary democracy, the new government had a powerful President (Jayewardene), a Prime Minister, and a cabinet appointed by the President based upon the parties and representatives in the legislature. In addition to the new constitution and power structure, Jayewardene repealed the standardization policy, made Tamil an alternate official language for the country, and appointed or promoted senior Tamils to cabinet positions or high level administrative positions.

27 The Tiger was the symbol of the Tamil Chola kingdom that had invaded and ruled all or part of Sri Lankan at different periods in its early history (Swamy 1994).
Additionally, members of his party brought corruption charges against S.R.D. Bandaranaike and, by 1980, had her banished from national politics for seven years. Even though the TULF did not participate directly in the writing of the new constitution, Jayewardene promised to host an “All Party Conference” to discuss the most sensitive issues of the Tamil opposition (Blood 1990).

The promise of the All Party Conference, however, could not be realized largely because of the growth of Tamil insurgent groups that had emerged and began to seriously challenge the state for control of the northern and parts of the eastern province. Jayewardene’s efforts were widely viewed among Tamils as too little too late and insurgent groups were already committed to the path of violence to achieve Tamil Eelam (Blood 1993; Swamy 2003).

Jayewardene also sowed the seeds of future problems with the establishment of the new constitution. The new constitution repealed the Criminal Justice Commission Act under which several JVP insurgents had been imprisoned. Thus, after being in jails and reeducation camps for seven years, many JVP cadres were released. According to De Silva and Wiggins (1994), this gave Jayewardene two political advantages. First, it appealed to the Sinhalese nationalists that had previously made up the base of the SLFP. Second, it further split the socialist and communist left as the JVP continued its series of lectures that accused the left wing parties in general and Sirimavo Bandaranaike in particular of failing the cause of socialism. Jayewardene, however, also decided to release the JVP leader, Rohan Wijiweera, believing that the insurgent leader was ill and would soon be dead of natural causes (De Silva and Wiggins 1994). Wijiweera and the JVP cadres, however, immediately continued their organizing activities and renewed their series of lectures with an emphasis on warnings about Indian imperialism (Gunaratna 1990).
In January 1978, the LTTE carried out an attempted assassination in the Sri Lankan capital city of Colombo. The target was a TULF Member of Parliament that had switched parties after winning his seat to join Jayewardene’s UNP as a show of support for the many concessions that Jayewardene was making. Though the assassination failed, the government responded with a manhunt that took police investigators all the way to the North. In April of 1978, the police leaders investigating the assassination were murdered by LTTE guerillas and within a few days the organization went public claiming responsibility for the murders as well as several others in the recent years. Later that summer, on September 7, 1978, the same day as the official adoption of Jayewardene’s new constitution, an airliner was destroyed at Colombo airport. Finally, in January 1979, Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) at the direction of President Jayewardene (Swamy 2002; Bullion 1995).

It is difficult to pinpoint the start of Eelam War I. The violence escalated slowly over a period of years, but the PTA was a clear milestone and is probably the best starting point if one must be identified in a manner other than death tolls. The PTA provided sweeping emergency powers to the police and Army to root out the Tamil militant groups. Soldiers and police used those sweeping powers to arrest and detain thousands of young Tamil men across the country, but especially in the north. Reports of disappearances, torture, and extra-judicial killings were frequent (Vanniasingham 1988). However, the actions taken under the PTA proved effective in countering the insurgent groups at least for the time being. As Swamy (2002) explains, the actions under the 1979 PTA were a serious disruption to the activities of the militant groups. Many of them could no longer move and operate safely in the north or east of Sri Lanka. Therefore, many of the young insurgents crossed the Palk Strait to Tamil Nadu in India: The only place where they knew they could find sanctuary and the place where their leaders had
already found private sponsors and sympathetic politicians willing to provide unofficial *material* and *sanctuary* support (Swamy 2003; Gunaratna 1993).

### 8.2 External Support to Tamil Insurgents in Sri Lanka

In the mid to late 1970s, the Tamil groups emerged that sought to use violence as a means to achieve the goal of Tamil Eelam or at least to defend the Tamil population against a clearly perceived and articulated oppression from the politics of exclusion that began with Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s Sinhalese Only movement. The grievance of the Tamil independence movement that inspired group formation was readily apparent and the ethno-religious narratives provided the stories that compelled sympathy for the cause. However; resource mobilization was almost entrepreneurial in its emergence. Prabakaran’s TNT and later the LTTE began with petty crime and bank robbery as its primary avenue of resource mobilization. Other groups used similar methods but soon began to reach out abroad to the network of insurgent groups, and to Tamil diaspora communities far abroad. Yet, there was nowhere more convenient than in Tamil Nadu just across the Palk Strait. The next sub-section explains how the emergent groups used passive and private support in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere as initial avenues for resource mobilization. The second subsection examines the Indian governments reasons for providing active support. The third subsection traces the history of that support and the conflict surrounding it while identifying the key cases for this case study.

*Tamil Insurgent Groups and the Roots of Indian Support*

Between 1979 and 1983 the political situation in northern Sri Lanka changed in three major ways that set the conditions for the Indian government’s decision to provide active support to Tamil insurgent groups. First, the TULF under Amirthalingham slowly lost the respect and allegiance of both the Tamil population and of the most powerful insurgent organizations.
Second, the insurgent groups established and consolidated private networks of support outside of Sri Lanka, especially in Tamil Nadu where group leaders built patron relationships with powerful, rival politicians active in state government. Finally, the Tamil insurgent groups began to fight amongst themselves for resources and over key elements of strategy. These conflicts would be only a tame preview to the conflicts that emerged after 1983 and the decision of Indian leadership to provide active support (Bullion 1995).

In 1980, acts of Tamil militancy dropped considerably and Jayewardene used the time to work with the TULF on possible compromises for increased Tamil autonomy. The Tamil insurgent groups used the period for reorganization and resource mobilization. Thus, it is helpful to examine the various Tamil groups that emerged over the course of the events of the 1970s and explain their connection to the Indian State of Tamil Nadu and its importance as a sanctuary that facilitated the resource mobilization of the groups and served as a battleground for intra and inter-group rivalries (Bush 2003).

The alphabet soup of insurgent group names that formed, separated, or merged in northern Sri Lanka from 1975 to 1990 can be difficult to follow. Generally speaking though, understanding the dynamics of the “Top 5” groups is important because these top five received the vast majority of external support and, due to their ability to mobilize resources and conduct violent attacks, they gained a voice in some political decisions (Swamy 2003; Gunaratna 1993). These five groups cooperated and clashed over the course of the conflict. The top five are: (1) Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), (2) the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), (3) Eelam Revolutionary Organizers (EROS), (4) the Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE or sometimes PLOT), and (5) the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). A sixth group, the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front
(ENDLF) would form from splinter groups of the Top 5 with Indian assistance after the Indian intervention in 1987. Each of the top-five groups mobilized resources through criminal activities, such as bank robbery, extortion, and smuggling. The groups also used contacts in Tamil diaspora communities around the world to solicit material support (Swamy 2003; Gunaratna 2003).

The LTTE, TELO, and EROS were among the first groups to achieve notoriety through their own propaganda efforts and their violent actions. From 1977 to 1979, most of the violent actions in Sri Lanka were carried out by TELO and the LTTE. As discussed in the previous section, the LTTE, at first called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), was the organization led primarily by Prabakaran. Although at first he was not the official leader, rather just a founding member and member of the central committee, most historians agree that he was the driving force behind the organization from its inception well before he assumed the undisputed leadership of the group on the early 1980s (Swamy 2002; Bullion 1995).

TELO on the other hand, went through changes in leadership after the loss of its founding members. Officially founded in September 1977 by Nadaraja Thangavelu (aka Thangadurai) and Selvaraja Togachandran (Kuttimani), the group had already been active politically since the early 1970s and began violent attacks as early as 1975. The militant wing of TELO was often referred to as the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA). The leaders envisioned a relationship along the lines of Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army. In March of 1981, TELO conducted a robbery that ended in the arrest of both founding leaders. Leadership of the organization then passed to a man known as Sri Sabarattinam who would lead TELO until its demise at the hands of the LTTE in 1986. Thangadurai and Kuttimani, who had achieved great fame prior to their arrest, were beaten to death in prison during the riots of July 1983.
EROS was formed in London in January 1975 by Tamil student organizers. One of its founders was Eliyathambi Ratnasabapathy (aka Ratna). According to Swamy (2002) and Gunaratna (2003), Ratna was responsible for building a bridge between EROS and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which led to the PLO providing training to Tamil insurgents in Lebanon on the late 1970s. Although largely viewed as a London based group, the leader in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu was Vellupillai Balakumar. Belakumar worked with LTTE leadership to help facilitate their training in Lebanon. One of the first indications of intergroup disputes actually occurred between Prabakaran and Belakumar when Prabakaran demanded a return of money spent on transit to PLO training in 1979 (Swamy 2003).

The PLOTE emerged out of a split between the leadership of the LTTE that would turn violent soon after the founding of the PLOTE in late 1979. PLOTE founder and leader for the duration of the group’s existence was Kadirgamapillai Nallainathan (aka Uma Maheshwaran or simply “Uma”). Uma began as a leading member of the TULF, however, like many Tamil activists, he became disenchanted with the party over its willingness to compromise with the Jayewardene government and with the TULF’s apparent lack of effectiveness in defending the Tamil population. While Uma was still officially in the TULF as the head of its office in Colombo, he was secretly made Chairman of the LTTE (a position technically superior to Prabakaran). In Colombo on January 27, 1978, he and Prabakaran masterminded the attempted assassination of a TULF politician that had switched his allegiance to the UNP. The assassination did much to injure the credibility of the TULF. But in 1979, a feud developed between Prabakaran and Uma. Swamy (2003) and Bush (1993) attribute the feud to a combination of personal, political, and ideological disputes. Prabakaran leveled a charge against Uma about personal behavior and the strict celibacy code of the Tiger organization. Additionally,
Uma had always been more left leaning and a devoted communist, while Prabakaran had always focused more on the nationalist aspects of the Tamil struggle. The dispute shattered the LTTE temporarily. Uma was forced out and after initially refusing to leave, formed the PLOTE with the help of loyal cadres. Prabakaran left the LTTE after he was charged with executing LTTE members that he suspected of being disloyal. For almost a full year Prabakaran joined TELO and moved to Tamil Nadu in 1980 where he was placed in charge of recruiting and establishing the training for TELO members. By the end of that year, however, he was back in charge of the LTTE (Swamy 2003).

The fifth major Tamil insurgent group was the EPRLF. The EPRLF had very little notoriety before 1983 and at that time was the poorest of the major groups operating in Jaffna. Its founder and leader was Kandasmy Pathmanabha who began as an early member of EROS when he was a student in London in the mid 1970s. Captivated by Marxism, Pathmanabha believed that the ideology was critical to the quest for Tamil Eelam. Formally founded in 1982, the EPRLF refused to gain resources through criminal activity in Tamil areas, believing that activities such as robbing banks in Jaffna, Trincomalee, and Batticoloa would only take wealth from the Tamil people. At its founding, the EPRLF focused on the political education and indoctrination of its members and on teaching poor Tamils about the struggle. Other groups were known for taunting the EPRLF members in 1982 and 1983 for their emphasis on non-violent struggle and political activism. The group’s leadership, however, also spent a good deal of time and effort in Tamil Nadu, especially in the city of Madras, building a network of political support. It was these activities, combined with the sudden surge of Indian material, advice/capability, and sanctuary support that altered the power structure between groups in favor of the EPRLF after 1983. The Indian government’s active support to the EPRLF would both
increase the organizations military capability, but also dilute the organizations emphasis on education and a commitment to Marxist principles (Swamy 2002).

Between 1979 and 1983, these groups all built relationships with key politicians of the Dravidian movement, particularly in Tamil Nadu. While the networks of Tamil support were vast and complex, three powerful state politicians played key roles in supporting the insurgent groups and their leaders. All three were popular leaders who prior to or in conjunction with their political careers were active in Tamil arts and literature. These three were: (1) Pazha Nedumaran, the founder and leader of the Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress (TNKC), (2) Muthuvel Karunanidhi, the leader of the Dravidian Progressive Federation (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam or DMK), and M.G. Ramachandran (MGR), the leader of All India Dravidian Progressive Federation (Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam or AIADMK) and the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu from 1977 to 1987 (Swamy 2003; Bullion 1995). The rivalry between all three would affect the relationships between the individual Tamil insurgent groups and between the groups and the Indian government.

Nedurmaran was one of the first Tamil politicians to privately and publically begin supporting the Tamil militant groups. As early as 1980, he had formed relationships with Tamil militants and assisted them in acquiring resources for their efforts. This included safe houses and training areas. He even boarded the leadership of the LTTE at his private residence and became close friends with Prabakaran (Swamy 2003). In May of 1982, when Uma and Prabakaran were arrested in Madras after a bizarre public shootout between the two of them, it was Nedurmaran who intervened both to stop the feud between the LTTE and the PLOTE and also to prevent the Tamil Nadu police and national authorities from extraditing the two insurgents to Sri Lanka.
Nedurmaran called an all-party conference in Madras and weighed in personally with the Chief Minister, M.G. Ramachandran (Gunaratna 1993; Swamy 2003).

It was through the influence of Ramachandran, and the pressure from Karunanidhi that both Prabakaran and Uma were spared extradition to Sri Lanka. The news of the arrest gained immediate attention around Tamil Nadu and in Sri Lanka. Nedurmaran called the all-party meeting of the Tamil Nadu legislature on June 1, 1982 to urge the government to keep the two leaders in India. According to Swamy (2003), Karunanidhi’s DMK party was the leading opposition party and immediately reached out to his political ally, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and asked for her intervention. On August 6, 1982, with the assistance of lawyers from DMK, AIADMK, and the Congress (I) parties, the two insurgent leaders were released under house arrest and assigned to separate cities. It was not long after the incident that these political leaders took the opportunity to meet with Prabakaran, Uma, and the leaders of the other insurgent groups. M.G. Ramachandran provided his own money to fund the LTTE (2 million rupees) and Karunanidhi funded TELO and the other groups. According to Gunaratna (1993), the TELO and LTTE served as virtual private armies for the two leaders. The political and personal rivalry between M.G. Ramachandran and Karunanidhi exacerbated the rivalry between the groups before the Indian government even began their active support in 1983, and then continued throughout the conflict.

Between 1980 and 1983, all of the top five insurgent groups had set up camps in Tamil Nadu and had begun recruiting and training. According to Gunaratna (1993), the numbers of recruits was in the low thousands. But the constant barrage of attacks on police and Army in the north and east and the numerous and increasing number of attacks around the country made government efforts seem weak. Sri Lankan police and Army forces reacted to insurgent attacks
with indiscriminate attacks on civilians that served to increase the refugee population in the north and in Tamil Nadu. The increased refugee populations made recruiting easier for the insurgent groups who continued the rate and severity of attacks. The Jayewardene government attempted to implement the concession of establishing District Development Councils (DDCs) around the country to partially devolve authority. This was part of the UNP’s two track policy to fight the militants but address Tamil grievances (Bush 2003).

The elections of July 1981, however, were marred by violence. This included the burning of the library in Jaffna by organized mobs of Sinhalese citizens, many transported in from southern areas. The library in Jaffna had been a major cultural landmark for both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil scholars and housed culturally important works of Tamil literature. The Sinhalese mob also burned down political offices of the TULF leadership, Tamil language newspapers, and Hindu temples (Wilson 2000).

Following those elections, the Sri Lankan parliament held a “no confidence vote” against the TULF leadership. The following year, in December 1982, the government held a special Presidential referendum to extend the mandate of the current Parliament for another six years. The TULF boycotted and all of the leading insurgent groups discouraged participation with threats and acts of violence. Turn out was high in Sinhalese areas, but exceptionally low in the Tamil dominated north and east. The JVP also made impressive showing in southern central districts (Gunaratna 1993).

During the period of increasing violence from 1978 to 1983, the Sri Lankan government was compelled to increase the capability and capacity of its security forces. After the JVP insurrection of 1971, the Bandaranaike government had begun several initiatives to build up forces, including reaching out to foreign countries for assistance (Ranatunga 2012). Jayewardene
and the UNP had demonstrated a willingness to accept support and sales from many different
countries including Pakistan and the US. Israel became more interested in support for the Sri
Lankan government with the knowledge that the PLO was training Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents
in Lebanon (Gunaratna 1993). The growing relationships of the Sri Lankan government with
Indian rivals began to raise the attention of Indian intelligence services.

In March of 1983, the UNP government again called for local elections. All insurgent
groups stepped up their attacks. However, one attack in particular provided the catalyst that
changed the course of events and greatly intensified the civil war. The LTTE, led by Prabakaran
himself, ambushed and killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers in Jaffna on July 26, 1983. The government
of Sri Lanka decided to bring the bodies of the 13 back to Colombo for burial, rather than send
the bodies directly home to the next of kin. The funeral turned into mob violence that quickly
spread throughout the country. The scope, scale, and systematic depravity of the countrywide
riots of July 1983 were the worst that the country had seen to date (Blood 1990). Observers were
stunned to see rioters using the voter rolls for the election that had been announced months
earlier as hit lists to target Tamils who still lived in Sinhalese areas (Ranatunga 2009). Estimates
of the dead range from 250 to 3000 and refugee estimates are about 150,000 (Survanarayan
1991). The founding leaders of the TELO, Thangdurai and Kittumani were tortured and beaten to
death in prison. The international attention gained was also unprecedented and gave new
recognition and justification the Tamil cause (Gunaratna 1993).

After the riots, the UNP led parliament passed the 6th Amendment to constitution, which
stated, “No person shall directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote,
finance, encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate state within the territory of Sri
Lanka.” This amendment effectively made all TULF parliamentarians enemies of the state and the organization had to give up its seats and go into exile in India (Bush 2003, 126).

**Indian Strategic and Political Considerations**

Understanding the decision-making of the Indian government requires a brief summary of the geopolitical perspective of Indian leadership in 1983. Prior to riots of July 1983, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was well aware of the training camps and other Sri Lankan Tamil insurgent activity going on in Tamil Nadu. According to Gunaratna (1993), Gandhi had approached Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran about shutting down the camps and reigning in the insurgents. Ramachandran, however complained that Gandhi’s political ally and Ramachandran’s primary opposition, Karunanidhi of the DMK was using the Tamil situation as a political issue and that he (Ramachandran) would be attacked politically over such action. The emotional outcry of the Tamil population in southern India immediately after the riots changed the political calculus of such an action from difficult to impossible for Ramachandran.

Indira Gandhi was the daughter of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. She had been close at his side during his time as Prime Minister, serving as his personal assistant. According to Brewster (2014), she had developed a strong conception of the notion of an Indian Monroe Doctrine as discussed in the previous section. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Indian policy experts began to refer to the idea as the Indira doctrine. Brewster (2014, 25) summarizes this doctrine using the description from Bhabani Sen Gupta:

- India has no intention of intervening in the internal conflicts of a South Asian country and it strongly opposes intervention by any other.
- India will not tolerate external intervention in a conflict situation in any South Asian country if the intervention has any implicit or explicit anti-Indian implication.
• No South Asian government should therefore ask for external assistance with an anti-Indian bias from any country.

• If a South Asian country genuinely needs external help to deal with a serious internal conflict situation or an intolerable threat to a government legitimately established, it should ask help from a number of neighboring countries including India.

• The exclusion of India from such a contingency will be considered to be an anti-Indian move on the part of the government concerned.

During Gandhi’s first term as Prime Minister from 1966 to 1977 she directed the Indian involvement in the Third India-Pakistan War of 1971 over East Pakistan that led to the establishment of an independent Bangladesh. Two facts about that war are critical to this case study. First, it provided a situational frame of reference for the Indian political leadership due to several similarities to the current situation with Sri Lanka. The Bengali people in Northeast India were the linguistic and ethnic kin of the Bengali populations of East Pakistan (though both Hindu and Muslim) and actions of the Pakistani government and the ensuing internal conflict had caused a massive refugee problem in India similar to the current problems in Southern India caused by Sri Lanka (Bass 2014). With the refugees from East Pakistan came the Bengali rebels of the Mukti Bahini.28 Private assistance to the Mukti Bahini became passive assistance as the Indian government was aware of private support, but did not enforce laws to curtail rebel activity on its territory due the political and economic costs of doing so. Eventually, Gandhi, with the guidance of her intelligence chief, Rameshwarnath (R.N.) Kao, implemented a strategy where the Indian government secretly trained and equipped the Mukti Bahini, while the Indian Army

28 The Mukti Bahini were Bangladeshi resistance fighters who in 1971 fought the Pakistani Army with the assistance of India (Bass 2014).
prepared and then executed a *full intervention* of East Pakistan that led to victory, the break-up of Pakistan, and the establishment of the independent state of Bangladesh (Bass 2014; Gunaratna 1993).

R.N. Kao was the founder of India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). While still a new Prime Minister in 1968, Indira Gandhi determined that India’s external intelligence and ability to conduct covert operations were unsatisfactory. She directed Kao to establish the organization and during the course of her first term, the organization grew and matured. In addition to its central role in the establishment of Bangladesh, the organization was instrumental in supporting internal resistance in the Kingdom of Sikkim and India’s subsequent *full-intervention* take over of the state in 1973 (Gunaratna 1993).

The second fact about the 1971 war was that it increased Gandhi’s distrust of the United States. According to (Bass 2014), US President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, had a mutual distrust of Gandhi and a very poor relationship. After the Indian *full intervention* into East Pakistan, Nixon ordered the US Seventh Fleet and its carrier strike group into the Bay of Bengal as a demonstration and warning to the Indians to halt the incursion and settle the conflict with Pakistan, with whom the US had formed a strategic military partnership. Throughout much of the Cold War, Pakistan was a regional anchor for the US, that improved US relationships with Muslim countries in South Asia, helped to contain the Soviet Union’s southern periphery, and kept India strategically preoccupied. The action may have saved West Pakistan from invasion and it certainly soured US-India relations for decades to come (Brewster 2014).

Gandhi’s other concerns with the situation in Sri Lanka were internal and related to Gandhi’s perception of the threat trajectory of the situation. After the riots of July 1983, Gandhi
faced a difficult political decision with few good options. She faced a strategic Catch-22 between the almost certain loss of power from an alienated Tamil electorate, or the future break-up of India itself. If she allowed a Sri Lankan victory over Tamil insurgents, the Tamil nationalist parties (DMK, AIADMK etc) would remove their support for her and that would be enough to lose future elections. If the Tamil insurgents were permitted to establish an independent Tamil state in the Northeast of Sri Lanka, she feared a future “spill-over effect.” An independent Tamil Eelam could serve as inspiration and precedent for the separation of Tamil Nadu and much of Southern India into an independent Tamil country, which had been the basis for the Tamil nationalist parties since their initial emergence as the Justice Party in 1939 (Vanniasingham 1988; Gunaratna 1993). To add credibility to this threat trajectory, within days of the riots, Nedurmaran and Karunanidhi had organized and participated in protests across Tamil Nadu expressing solidarity with the Tamils of Sri Lanka (Gunaratna 1993).

According to Gunaratna (1993) Gandhi’s inner circle of advisers, consisting of R.N. Kao (then serving as National Security Adviser), Girish Chandra Saxena (Director of RAW), and Shankar Nair (Former RAW Director who led the efforts with Mukti Bahini) designed a strategy that would prevent either outcome and help India to build its regional influence while maintaining the Indira Doctrine. The proposed strategy had three phases. First, the Indian government had to contain the leaders of Tamil Nadu and sever their patron relationships with the Tamil insurgent groups. Second, they had to strengthen the insurgent groups to withstand the Sri Lankan armed forces and thereby force the government of Sri Lanka to agree to the devolution power in the north that would be acceptable to the Tamil political and military groups. Finally, India could broker an agreement with Sri Lanka that would ensure that extra-regional powers (the US and China in particular) did not use Sri Lanka as a base of influence in
the region. If Sri Lankan leaders resisted, India could threaten a *full intervention* or increase the capability of the insurgents as it had done in 1971 with Pakistan. If the insurgents resisted the terms of a bespoke agreement, then India could use its active support as leverage.

In addition to the efforts to train and equip Tamil rebels, Indira Gandhi pursued a diplomatic track to try to reach a political settlement that might be acceptable to Sri Lanka and most of the Tamil leaders. She appointed Gopalaswam (G.) Parthasarathy as her special envoy to Sri Lanka in August 1983. With Jayewardene’s government, he began negotiating for a political settlement that centered on the devolution of power and the merging of the northern and eastern provinces into one political unit under the Sri Lankan government but with significant autonomy (aka. Annexure C). Together, these two provinces constituted most of what insurgent leaders referred to as Tamil Eelam (Bullion 1995; Balasingham 1983).

**Indian Active Support To Tamil Insurgent Groups (1983-90)**

Gandhi approved the plan soon after the July 1983 riots and immediately began the dialogue with President Jayewardene and the government of Sri Lanka through her special envoy G. Parthasarathy. According to Swamy (2002) and Gunaratna (1993), officials of the Indian central government used the senior leadership contacts from the TULF to contact militant group leaders. According to Kadian (2009), RAW officials initially determined that the bulk of their effort should focus on the TELO, because its two most respected leaders had just been killed and the organization had not espoused any concrete ideology other than the ultimate goal of fighting for an independent Tamil state. Sri Sabbaratam, the acting leader of TELO, began meeting with RAW officials and joined in the first iteration of training.

RAW however, did not limit itself to just TELO. Other groups quickly followed suit and established training and equipping relationships. The initial meetings between RAW officials and
insurgent leaders occurred at the same time as massive in-flows of refugees arrived in Tamil Nadu. Much like the Nicaraguan Sandinista government actions creating refugees to Honduras in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the actions of the Sri Lankan government was pushing Tamil refugees into Tamil Nadu and providing a significant recruiting base for the insurgent groups that had just found a new avenue of resource mobilization. Training began soon after initial meetings. A combined task force of Indian intelligence agencies (mostly RAW) and military personnel ran the massive training and equipping operation under an organization called the “Third Agency” and led by Saxena and R.N. Kao. In order to pull influence away from Tamil Nadu politicians, the Third Agency set up training camps throughout India including eight camps in three northern Indian states. TELO, PLOTE, EROS, EPRLF, and smaller groups including the Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) worked with agency representatives and became the immediate beneficiaries of Indian material and sanctuary support. According to Gunaratna (1993), there were over 30 camps around India.

The most active insurgent group, the LTTE, was one of the last to make contact with and to begin a relationship with the Third Agency. According to Swamy (2003), the LTTE’s leader Prabakaran was highly skeptical of Indian intentions and feared a loss of control over the future if the organization developed a dependency on the Indians. One of Prabakaran’s most respected and famous deputies, Anton Balasingham, however recognized that a delay in accepting Indian assistance would allow the other insurgent groups to overtake the LTTE. Balasingham, who had become the LTTE’s representative in Tamil Nadu, made the initial contacts and arranged for a meeting between Prabakaran and RAW personnel a few weeks after other groups had already done so. Unlike most other leaders, Prabakaran placed major restrictions and conditions on the training and the acceptance of support. Rather than depend on training and other forms of
support from the Indian government, the LTTE continued to use its other avenues of resource mobilization and maintained its own training camps in Tamil Nadu that were outside the control of RAW or the other elements of the Third Agency. LTTE leadership also forbade LTTE personnel, including recruits and trainees, from using their real names or disclosing any personal information to agents of the Indian government. Prabakaran also set about building and reinforcing his close relationship with Ramachandran to protect his network in Tamil Nadu. The only other group to significantly attempt to restrict RAW influence and to maintain separate control of its own resources and camps was the PLOTE. Uma maintained a similar relationship to Ramachandran’s rival, Karunanidhi (Gunaratna 1993).

The effects the Indian train and equip enterprise on the principal-agent relationships and on the dynamics of the armed politics between insurgent groups cannot be overstated. Prior to 1983, the emergent groups of Tamil insurgents competed for scarce resources and cooperated where possible for common goals. The sudden, unconditional and virtually unrestricted influx of massive amounts and types of material support caused a scramble for resources. Whereas the LTTE had been considered the strongest group in Sri Lanka, it now had to recognize that TELO, PLOTE, and the EPRLF might one day challenge its supremacy. PLOTE and EPRLF that once focused on political indoctrination, education, and governance, quickly became less concerned and selective in recruiting as they scrambled for resources including recruits (Swamy 2002).

The previous case studies demonstrate that the principal-agent relationship between India and the insurgents might have improved if the Indian government had used its leverage and the promise of resources and support to compel the unification of the groups and factions just as Fidel Castro had done five years earlier with the Sandinistas and the US CIA was attempting to do with the Contra groups in Nicaragua. Based on several accounts (Swamy 2002, 2003;
Gunaratna 1993), there is no evidence that the Third Agency ever attempted to use the full extent of its leverage to unite the groups or empower one group in such a way that it could eliminate or compel rival groups to act in India’s interest. In 1982, after the public conflict between the LTTE and PLOTE, EROS leadership established the Committee for Eelam Liberation (CEL) in an attempt to forge unity, however the ad hoc organization proved ineffective and superficial. There is also no evidence that the Third Agency attempted to centralize or restrict the official contacts of group leadership. Each insurgent group, big or small, was able to maintain its own offices and representatives and maintain contact with Tamil Nadu politicians, officials, and interest groups (Gunaratna 1993).

The RAW did attempt to unite the Tamil groups. The organization facilitated the establishment of the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) in August of 1984; however, RAW representatives were unable to convince all major groups to join. TELO, EROS, and the EPRLF agreed to join early, but the PLOTE and the LTTE preferred to remain separate. Despite the assistance RAW was providing, the two largest insurgent groups remained obstinate in their divisions (Bullion 1995).

Insurgent violence in Sri Lanka continued throughout 1983 and by early 1984 the government of Sri Lanka had no doubt that India was arming the insurgent groups on a grand scale. When the Sri Lankan Minister of National Security accused India of active material and sanctuary support to the insurgents, the Indian Government denied the charges. Yet, the security situation was the critical factor in Jayewardene’s decisions to pro-actively seek greater and more significant external support to his own security forces. Ranatunga (2009) and Gunaratna (1993) explain that Jayewardene directed and facilitated active efforts to obtain assistance of private military contractors (Keeny-Meeny Services), Israel, Pakistan, the US, and China. All of these
partners, except the US, provided military assistance. The US, negotiated the establishment of Voice of America activities in Sri Lanka, port visits for US warships, and economic and development aid. Though fears of US hegemony and interference expressed in the assessments of the RAW were over blown, the activities undertaken by India, were forcing Sri Lanka to invite extra-regional assistance. Gandhi, therefore, directed the planning and preparation for a full intervention of Sri Lanka. The Indian military began training and rehearsing for the operation (Gunaratna 1993).

It was not long before the presence of and support to insurgents in India began to have negative domestic consequences for both national and Tamil Nadu politicians. In August of 1984, Tamil insurgents from the TEA attempt to blow up a Sri Lankan airliner, however, the bomb exploded too early while the plane was parked at the airport in Madras, Tamil Nadu. To add to the domestic problems of India, Gandhi faced a Sikh insurrection in the northern province of Punjab and ordered a military solution that involved the Indian Army storming the Sikh Golden temple. The incident angered many among the Sikh population.

On October 31, 1984, Gandhi’s own Sikh bodyguards assassinated her. Gandhi’s son, Rajiv, became the leader of the Congress party and won the election that followed, officially assuming office on December 31, 1984. He eliminated the Third Agency and gave RAW control over the Sri Lankan operation. Soon after, he dismissed G. Parthasarathy as special envoy and appointed India’s less experienced Foreign Secretary, Romesh Bhandari to the position (Bullion 1995)

Rajiv Gandhi was not a professional politician and had chosen early in his life to not pursue politics as a career, choosing instead to become a pilot. Yet, the death of his mother and his politician brother left another unity crisis for the Congress party. Pressured by his mother’s
loyal political allies, Rajiv Gandhi was thrust into leadership of the world’s largest democracy with little experience.

When Rajiv Gandhi assumed the office of Prime Minister, he appointed several new cabinet ministers but maintained the general course of the strategy on which his mother had embarked. Though the new Prime Minister scrapped the plans for an invasion, he reinvigorated attempts at mediation and a negotiated solution the Sri Lankan conflict. He also allowed the RAW to open direct channels of communication with Jayewardene. In April of 1985, Prabakaran negotiated the LTTE’s membership in the ENLF and made it conditional on his group’s continued autonomy and on the promise that the PLOTE would not join. By this time, the PLOTE leader, Uma, had fallen out of favor with RAW officials. After joining the ENLF, the LTTE increased its attacks in Sri Lanka and the RAW and Bhandari were able to use this as leverage to compel Jayewardene to agree to a cease-fire and peace talks (Gunaratna 1993; Bullion 1995).

In July 1985, two years after the riots, Indian officials brokered a ceasefire between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil rebel groups. The RAW pressured all of the five major insurgent groups (members of the ENLF and the PLOTE) plus the leaders of the TULF to agree to come to India and then fly to Thimpu, Bhutan for direct talks with representatives of the government of Sri Lanka. While most of the groups viewed the talks as an opportunity to demonstrate that the government of Sri Lanka recognized them as representatives of the Tamil Nation, the LTTE leader claimed that the RAW had forced his attendance (Swamy 2003). According to Gunaratna (1993), however, the cease-fire and its extension due to the talks, allowed the LTTE to consolidate, reinforce, and resupply their entire force in northern Sri Lanka and their network infrastructure in Tamil Nadu. Ranatunga (2009) expresses a similar
assessment, indicating that the Thimpu talks provided the insurgents, especially the LTTE with valuable time.

The six Tamil parties at Thimpu immediately put forth four principles to which they insisted that the Sri Lankan delegation agree prior to any substantive negotiation of other issues. The principles articulated included: (1) Recognition of Tamil as a distinct nationality, (2) recognition of an independent Tamil homeland and guarantee of its territorial integrity, (3) recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation, and (4) Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other democratic rights of all Tamils on the island of Sri Lanka. These principles were well beyond any middle ground sought by the Sri Lankan representatives. The Thimpu talks were unsuccessful though they were followed by continued dialogue in New Delhi between the TULF and Sri Lankan government with Indian Ministry of External Affairs acting as a mediator.

Swamy (2002) presents evidence that Indian government agencies did not have a unity of effort with respect to their willingness to impose leverage on the insurgent groups. RAW officials who worked directly with the insurgent group delegations gave no indication about potential consequences of walking away from the talks. When the top five groups refused to send their delegations back to the negotiating table and the LTTE resumed attacks, police in Tamil Nadu began a swift crack down on insurgent group offices in Tamil Nadu. Balasingham, the LTTE’s spokesman in Tamil Nadu, was arrested and deported to Britain (he held a British passport) and other leaders suffered similar fates. Insurgent group property and facilities were confiscated, while DMK leader Karunanidhi initiated public denouncements of the Congress Party, Prime Minister Gandhi, and the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Ramachandran initiated a
general strike. Despite the cease-fire, violence in Sri Lanka resumed and Tamil on Tamil attacks increased, as did blatant attacks on Sinhalese civilians.

By late fall of 1985, Prime Minister Gandhi expressed obvious frustration and public condemnation of Tamil insurgent groups, yet, RAW support to these groups continued. The intransigence and disunity of the Tamil groups coupled with the public frustration of Indian leadership made clear to Jayewardene and the Sri Lankan government that the time was right for a renewed military effort. Foreign military assistance had enabled the growth of the Sri Lankan armed forces. The disunity and often violent disputes of the Tamil insurgent groups turned to out-right conflict on April 29, 1986 when the LTTE in Jaffna and throughout the northern and eastern provinces suddenly and viciously attacked TELO forces. Within two weeks, TELO forces in Sri Lanka were destroyed and Sri Sabbarattinam was assassinated. PLOTE, EPRLF, and EROS leaders received warnings not to intervene. Though the LTTE initially denied responsibility, privately its leadership said that TELO had become too close to the RAW and its leader had become too close to Karunanidhi, Ramachandran’s political rival and head of DMK in Tamil Nadu. Prabakaran would later justify the actions based on TELO’s close association with RAW and willingness to compromise (Swamy 2002).

The political dynamic of the insurgent groups changed immediately following the eradication of TELO. Prior to the attacks, TELO had rivaled the LTTE for control and influence over territories in the north and east. With TELO forces gone from Sri Lanka, the LTTE became the undisputed leader of the insurgent groups. TELO still had people, resources, and camps in Tamil Nadu and in RAW facilities throughout India, but these mattered very little. Both RAW and Karunanidhi had lost their most reliable armed proxy. EROS leader Bakumar had remained close to Prabakaran and an unspoken alliance had developed between the two groups. The
PLOTE leader Uma had already proven to be unreliable and his group suffered from internal dissent despite its strength and independence. This left only the EPRLF as a somewhat reliable proxy for India.

Yet, the RAW continued the training and equipping program and the Indian government did little to further contain or restrict the activities and sanctuary of the insurgent groups in Tamil Nadu. The LTTE no longer participated in the ENLF and in the fall of 1986 the Tamil Nadu public perception of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgent groups began to suffer due to incidents involving the behavior of group members and their apparent immunity to local laws. One such incident in November 1986 involved EPRLF guerillas that got into a shoot out in Madras. Even the Chief Minister Ramachandran had become impatient with the intransigence of the leaders and the behavior of group members (Swamy 2002). At the end of November 1986, police in Tamil Nadu executed a full-scale operation to arrest and disarm all militant groups and their leadership. Police arrested Prabakaran, Uma, Balakumar, and even Amirthaligham, the leader of the TULF. Only the EPRLF’s leader, Pathmanabha escaped while the others were processed and put under house arrest. Most of the camps and facilities were also seized or put under police control (Swamy 2002, 2003; Gunaratna 1993).

The operation backfired on the Indian government. The operation exposed the extent of Indian active support, which the government had denied for the last few years. The RAW arranged for Prabakaran and his deputy Balasingham to fly to Bangalore and meet with Indian officials who tried to convince him to change his demands and soften his position on negotiations with the Sri Lankan government. Essentially they insisted that he drop his demand for a separate state and agree to negotiate about autonomy. When Prabakaran threatened a
hunger strike, Ramachandran relented and offered to return some of the LTTE’s most vital equipment (Gunaratna 1993).

But the LTTE had already begun to consolidate its position and gain supremacy over the other groups. While its leader was dealing with the politics of India and Tamil Nadu, its cadres in Sri Lanka were actively targeting the other groups. In October of 1986, the LTTE made clear its intent to eradicate PLOTE forces operating in Jaffna. Though the LTTE allowed PLOTE members time to leave Jaffna and turn over their weapons, the LTTE commander in Jaffna arrested, imprisoned, and tortured to death his PLOTE counterpart. By November 1987, PLOTE ceased to be a real influence in Jaffna and the LTTE turned its attacks on the EPRLF. On 13 December, the LTTE launched another simultaneous and well-coordinated attack on the EPRLF in Sri Lanka. Though the LTTE quickly eliminated the EPRLF in the north, it took much longer in the east and the EPRLF continued to fight for many months. By January 1987, Prabakaran escaped house arrest in Tamil Nadu and had returned to Sri Lanka (Swamy 2003).

Contrast between the situation in 1983 and the situation in 1987 was stark. In 1983 the Tamil insurgent groups had the moral high ground due to the atrocities of the riots and the events leading up to the riots. Additionally, in 1983 the Sri Lankan military was relatively weak. By January of 1987, the Tamil insurgents, especially the LTTE, had lost the moral high ground with the vicious attacks on Sinhalese civilians and rival Tamil factions and the Sri Lankan Army was militarily far stronger than it had been in the past due to a steady stream of foreign assistance and increased defense spending (Ranatunga 2009; Gunaratna 1993). The Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa, had become publically critical of India and Indian leadership though President Jayewardene was still negotiating directly with the RAW. In January, the Sri Lankan military began to plan for operations designed to take advantage of the intra-Tamil violence
plaguing the northern and eastern provinces. Operation Liberation would be a coordinated land, sea, and air operation designed to strike exclusively at the LTTE and focus on the Jaffna peninsula at Vadamarachchi. Unlike previous operations launched by the Sri Lankan military, which were non-contiguous and low-intensity security actions, Operation Liberation was planned as a full-scale conventional attack designed to isolate and destroy the LTTE in Jaffna, and then seize and occupy the entire peninsula (Ranatunga 2009).

The preparations for Operation Liberation, including the increased pace of Sri Lankan military operations, helped to convince Prime Minister Gandhi that Jayewardene was no longer interested in finding a political solution. Though Gandhi continued to maintain a dialogue with the Sri Lankan government through the RAW and the Ministry of External Affairs by way of the Indian High Commissioner, Joythindra Nath (J.N.) Dixit, the talks made no real progress. Therefore, Gandhi authorized the planning and preparation for an Indian full-scale invasion of northern Sri Lanka. According to Gunaratna (1993) the operation was called Operation Pawan, which was the name that would later be given to Indian Peace Keeping Force’s (IPKF) operation to disarm the LTTE. In March of 1987, the Indian Army conducted combined arms rehearsals for the operation in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands with little concern for operational security; an apparent attempt to signal its resolve to the leadership of Sri Lanka (Gunaratna 1993; Bullion 1995).

Sri Lankan forces launched Operation Liberation on May 26, 1987 and achieved success at significant cost. Within five days, Sri Lankan units completely isolated the Jaffna Peninsula and had seized critical towns of Vadamarachchi and Prabakaran’s hometown of Valvettithurai and almost captured Prabakaran himself. The complete isolation of the peninsula by the Sri Lankan Army, Navy, and Air Force ensured that LTTE fighters could not be resupplied from
Tamil Nadu or from bases in the east and north of Sri Lanka. For a brief moment it looked as if the Sri Lankan military might achieve a decisive victory against the LTTE and the Tamil insurgency. Tamil Nadu politicians, however, raised concerns over an impending humanitarian disaster and the record of the Sri Lankan Army for attacks on civilians reinforced the credibility of their concern (Bullion 1995; Kadian 1993).

According to Gunaratna (1993), Prime Minister Gandhi began signaling his displeasure with the military operation within 48 hours of its launch and transmitted messages to President Jayewardene, through the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, J.N. Dixit. The messages included strongly implicit threats of an Indian escalation including a possible Indian invasion to save the Tamil population. Through private channels and through intelligence sources, Jayewardene learned that the RAW was proposing to greatly increase support to the LTTE including the provision of man-portable anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles (Gunaratna 1993; Bullion 1995).

On June 1, 1987, RAW officials set up a top-secret communication system that allowed the Indian Prime Minister and the Sri Lankan President to correspond directly and privately. Through this system, Gandhi requested that India be allowed to send a humanitarian relief mission to Jaffna. Jayewardene balked initially but indicated that he would be open to the Sri Lankan government receiving and distributing the humanitarian aid. Members of Jayewardene’s inner circle, including Sri Lankan Prime Minister Premadasa, were vocally and publically opposed to any Indian interference. Two days later, on June 3, 1987, India launched a flotilla of 19 fishing boats accompanied by Indian Navy vessels. The flotilla left Tamil Nadu and proceeded to cross the Palk Strait until the Sri Lanka Navy, as part of Operation Liberation...
efforts refused to permit their entry into Sri Lankan waters and all vessels were forced to return across the Palk Strait (Gunaratna 1993, Swamy 2003; Bullion 1995).

According to Gunaratna (1993), Prime Minister Gandhi was furious and indecisive. Gandhi called an emergency meeting of his most trusted advisors and cabinet members to discuss options concerning the fate of Jaffna and the LTTE. With his advisors divided, Gandhi called the ailing Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, who pleaded with him not to let the LTTE be defeated. The very next day, India launched Operation Poomalai: a military airdrop of supplies to Jaffna, using Indian Air Force transport aircraft and escorted by Indian Air Force fighter jets. The Indian government provided Sri Lanka with a formal warning shortly before the jets entered Sri Lankan air space. The forced incursion of India’s Air Force and overt violation of Sri Lankan air space marked a limited intervention support to the insurgents. Although the supplies were non-lethal supplies meant for the population, the area was controlled by the LTTE. According to Ranatunga (2009), President Jayewardene ordered that Operation Liberation not proceed any further to the second phase of clearing and occupying Jaffna. When the military commander protested, Jayewardene replied that he could not fight both India and the LTTE. The reaction in the south of Sri Lanka was one of great and public anger. China and most other South Asian countries condemned the Indian operation, yet the US did not take any official or public stance (Gunaratna 1993).

Throughout June and into July, J.N. Dixit, the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, met in secret negotiations with Jayewardene and his closest ministers and drafted the India-Sri Lanka Accord. The most relevant and controversial points in the accord included: (1) The deployment of an Indian Peace Keeping force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern provinces, (2) Amnesty for all Tamil militant groups for all acts of violence committed prior to
the signing of the accord, (3) The recognition of Tamil as an official language, (4) The immediate merger of the northern and eastern provinces into a single province with a devolution of authority to provincial government, the continuation of which was subject to a referendum in the former eastern province after many months, and (5) the disarmament of all Tamil militants in Sri Lanka within 48 hours of the implementation of the accord (Suryanarayan 1991; Dixit 1998).

In retrospect, many scholars have observed that the bilateral nature of the accord was its most significant weakness (Vanniasingham 1988; Swamy 2002; Suryanarayan 1991). Several important stakeholders were left out. During the negotiations, Prime Minister Premadasa was out of the country and could not weigh in. By July 23, 1987, Jayewardene obtained the concurrence of UNP members of Parliament, while Premadasa was still out of the country. When Premadasa returned, the accord was a fait accompli and Jayewardene justified his decision to proceed based upon India’s thinly veiled threats and the potential military and civilian cost of seizing Jaffna and defeating the LTTE. Unlike at Thimpu, Bhutan in 1985, this time there had been no Sri Lankan Tamil representation at the secret negotiations. Even the TULF, often scorned by other Tamil groups for its willingness to compromise, had been left out of the negotiations.

The most controversial compromise of the draft accord was the provision that the northern and eastern provinces would be merged into one province, but the future of that merger would be subject to a referendum in the eastern province several months after the merger. Hindu Tamils held a clear majority in the north, but in the east, the demographics and the support for Tamil Eelam was far more contested and it was unclear if the population would continue to support such a merger (Suryanarayan 1991; Swamy 2003; Gunaratna 1993; Dixit 1989; Vanniasingham 1988).
Just a few days prior to the official signing of the accord, the Indian government had to inform and gain the public concurrence, or at least acquiescence, of the major Sri Lankan Tamil groups. The leadership of the PLOTE, EPRLF, TELO, EROS, TULF, and now the ENDLF were all in India. Only Prabakaran, the LTTE leader, remained in northern Sri Lanka because only the LTTE had significant forces on the island still controlling territory. According to Swamy (2003) and Gunaratna (1993), Indian officials convinced Prabakaran to return to India. According to Swamy (2003) and Gunaratna (1993), Prabakaran and the LTTE would later claim that they had agreed to the trip because Indian official had presented the deceptive premise that Jayewardene had agreed to talks and offered to allow the merger of the northern and eastern provinces. The leaders of the LTTE maintain that nothing was said about an already drafted accord or about an Indian peace keeping force. J.N. Dixit (1998, 151-152) categorically denies this and insists that his envoy, Hardeep Puri, discussed the full details of the agreement with Prabakaran prior to his trip to India.

The Indian Army flew Prabakaran and his entourage to Madras, where they picked up Balasingham, and then on to Delhi where the group was staged to meet with representatives of the government and eventually Prime Minister Gandhi himself. The leaders of the other groups were staged in Delhi at a separate hotel and presented with the terms of the accord. Though the groups were permitted to submit their objections in writing, they were not permitted to make changes. J.N. Dixit met separately with Prabakaran’s LTTE delegation and explained the terms of the accord. The following day, on July 28, 1987, the Prime Minister himself met collectively with the leaders of the militant groups and the TULF and then separately with Prabakaran and the LTTE delegation. According to Gunaratna (1993), Prabakaran and Gandhi signed a secret agreement that the LTTE would agree to the accord as long as, “it did not go against the interests
of the Tamil people (Gunaratna 1993, 191).” According to Gunaratna (1993) and Swamy (2003), Gandhi also agreed to pay the LTTE as long as the LTTE stopped taxing the Tamil people in the areas controlled by the LTTE. In other words, Gandhi agreed to continue financial (material) support to the LTTE organization.

The signing ceremony for the accord took place in Colombo, Sri Lanka on July 29, 1987 and the day was filled with ominous indications of difficulty ahead. A member of the Sri Lankan honor guard attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Gandhi with a ceremonial bayonet and opposition leaders from the Sri Lankan Parliament boycotted the event including former Prime Minister and leader of the SLFP, Sirimavo Bandaranaike (Gunaratna 1993).

With the signing of the accord, Prime Minister Gandhi had committed India to a kind of limited or full intervention. To be fair, the accord and the introduction of the IPKF fits the conceptual definition of full intervention based upon the typology used in this dissertation. However, the nature of this full intervention magnifies the pitfalls and dangers of principal-agent gaps or agency slack. The IPKF, as it landed in Jaffna, was initially greeted as liberators and the Sri Lankan forces withdrew, though the IPKF was initially not allowed to occupy Sri Lankan Army posts. The initial force of the IPKF consisted of just fewer than 6,000 lightly armed troops and as time and events would demonstrate, these troops were woefully unprepared for the mission ahead (Gates and Roy 2014; Scudieri 1994). Though called a peace keeping force, there was no real peace to keep, instead the IPKF would quickly have to change from peacekeeping, demobilization, and reintegration of rebels, to occupation and counterinsurgency (Scudieri 1994).

In early August, Prabakaran began meeting with the Commanders of the IPKF. Prabakaran’s first meeting with General Depinder Singh, the Commander of the India’s Southern
Command, was ominous as Prabakaran stated clearly that he would, “…never again trust the Indian Ministry of External Affairs or the Research and Analysis Wing (Singh 1992, 54).”

During his first Public meeting at Jaffna University, Prabakaran gave a public speech about the handover of weapons and about the accord. In this rare public speech, he made clear that the LTTE was forced into the agreement, that he resented the fact that Sri Lankan Tamils were not consulted, and that the agreement was designed to help India’s strategic interests by putting Sri Lanka under India’s hegemony. Nevertheless, the LTTE would surrender arms to the IPKF and it was the responsibility of the IPKF to protect the Tamil people (Gunaratna 1993).

Unfortunately, in the following days and weeks, the LTTE handed over very few weapons and those that they did hand over were mostly older weapons. Instead, the LTTE stalled for time and apparently stored and buried several caches of weapons and ammunition while the LTTE continued violent attacks on remaining elements of rival groups and continued to mobilize resources through its other sources of funding and supply chains (Swamy 2003). LTTE elements also lured PLOTE leaders living in Tamil Nadu back to Sri Lanka and executed 34 of them in Batticoloa (Gunaratna 1993; Scudieri 1994). The IPKF forces did nothing at first to stop the internecine feuding, hoping that their personal relationships with the LTTE leadership could contain the emerging violence.

Opposition to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was growing in the south of the island as well. Not only had the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Premadasa, and the leader of the opposition, Sirimavo Bandaranaikke expressed their opposition, but also a resurgent JVP found a new issue to rally Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. On August 17, 1987, JVP members of Parliament attempted to assassinate President Jayewarden inside Parliament itself and almost succeeded.
Thus the leadership of Sri Lanka now faced violent rebellion on two sides of the cultural/political spectrum (Gunaratna 1993).

By September 1987, the LTTE began to protest the terms of the accord publically. One of Prabakaran’s deputies announced a hunger strike and died by the end of the month. When the LTTE was made part of an interim administration for the merged northern and eastern provinces, the organization protested the fact that the Sri Lankan President had appointed the council’s chairman (Swamy 2003).

The event that became the critical juncture that broke the peace, however, occurred in early October 1987 when the Sri Lankan Navy detained 17 LTTE personnel while the militants were crossing the Palk Straits in small craft the way they had done several times before. The LTTE personnel were armed and therefore in technical violation of the accord as arms should have been turned in months prior. Though all militants had been granted amnesty, these personnel had violated the terms of the accord and were therefore under arrest. The Government of Sri Lanka ordered the Navy to bring the militants to Colombo to face trial. Despite the protest of the IPKF leadership, the Sri Lankan Navy insisted (Singh 2007). The LTTE personnel however, had their signature symbol of commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam: a cyanide capsule worn around the neck of every insurgent. Before the Sri Lankan Navy could move the insurgent prisoners to Colombo, all 17 committed suicide (Swamy 2003; Bush 2003; Gunaratna 1993).

The LTTE response to the capture and suicide of its cadre was swift and brutal. The LTTE had eight Sri Lankan soldiers in custody whom they publically executed and then hung the bodies in public in Jaffna. Additionally, the LTTE attacked the IPKF and massacred Sinhalese civilians while fully mobilizing their public information network of newspapers and radio
stations to denounce the IPKF. The IPKF struck back immediately and the war between the IPKF and the LTTE began. What had been a wide principal-agent gap only a few months before quickly turned into open conflict between Indian sponsors and their defiant rebel proxies. This open conflict would last for the next two years and the IPKF would grow from a peace keeping force of 6,000 soldiers to a massive counterinsurgency operation consisting of 100,000 Indian military personnel (Vanniasingham 1988; Swamy 2002; Suryanarayan 1991). The Indian military would suffer the same criticisms of causing civilian casualties that the Indian government had levied against the Sri Lankan military for the past several years. The tragedy of this turn of events provides one of the most powerful examples of “blowback” in modern unconventional warfare.

The IPKF began reinforcing itself immediately and initiated a comprehensive plan for the seizure of Jaffna, termed Operation Pawan, which was remarkably similar in concept to the Sri Lankan military’s Operation Liberation from earlier in the same year (Scudieri 1994). In its first major operation targeting Prabakaran, however, an entire special operations task force of Indian soldiers was ambushed and 29 out of 30 commandos were killed. The defeat demonstrated how severely the IPKF and Indian military intelligence had underestimated the strength and resolve of the LTTE. It also gave LTTE cadres and the Tamil population under their control a tremendous boost in confidence about their ability to resist the IPKF (Swamy 2002).

The LTTE had been preparing for such a fight and had long ago begun the construction of infrastructure in what became known as the Multativu triangle. In the jungle area, Prabakaran had the LTTE build a network of camps, trenches, tunnels and caches all over-watched by sympathetic local population. From this base of operations, the LTTE remained connected logistically with revenue and resource-generating operations in Tamil Nadu. Even as open
conflict between the IPKF and the LTTE ensued, secret support for the Tamil insurgents continued to flow from Tamil Nadu. This support came from the local population, but also from sympathetic leaders of both the AIADMK and the DMK. On December 25, 1987, MGR died and the LTTE lost its most trusted political ally, who had continued his personal support to the LTTE even after they had attacked Indian forces (Dixit 1998). However, there was no shortage of political support for the LTTE who quickly formed a new relationship with MGR’s DMK rival, Karunanidhi. Though Prime Minister Gandhi imposed Presidential rule over Tamil Nadu in early 1988, it would be several months before Tamil Nadu police would begin to crack down on LTTE operations. Only in July of 1988, did the authorities finally begin to raid LTTE camps and businesses and arrest LTTE leaders. The arrests coincided with IPKF operations to neutralize the LTTE stronghold in the Mulativu triangle (Gunaratna 1993, Swamy 2002).

By the assessment of most scholars, the Indian government suffered from organizational incoherence. Essentially, the Indian government entities responsible for carrying out the strategy of the Prime Minister disagreed with each other over the correct courses of action (Scudieri 1994; Swamy 2002; Gunaratna 1993). This dis-unity of effort amounted to a situation where there were multiple principal-agent gaps within the Prime Minister Gandhi’s government, not just between India and Tamil Nadu state or between India and its proxy forces. For example, in March 1988 RAW agents initiated a dialogue with Prabakaran while LTTE was fighting the IPKF. This was part of a carrot and stick approach to convince the LTTE to change course. The RAW also received authorization from Gandhi to have an independent dialogue with President Jayewardene. Yet the RAW failed to coordinate with the IPKF on several levels, even resulting in the deaths of RAW officials at the hands of the IPKF because those officials were travelling with LTTE units to meet with LTTE leaders (Dixit 1998). J.N. Dixit, the Indian High
Commissioner to Sri Lanka, on the other hand, advocated publically and privately against any concessions to the LTTE and was unwitting of negotiations and possible continued payments to the LTTE to coerce a change of policy from the organization. Dixit, deliberately and publically exposed the RAW negotiations and payoffs. The IPKF, under instruction from the Prime Minister to destroy the LTTE, had launched a massive conventional and counterinsurgency operation that was overwhelming the LTTE and systematically destroying the jungle bases in the Multativu triangle. Yet IPKF leadership could not bring themselves to pursue the complete annihilation of the LTTE (Gunaratna 1993). Additionally, the Indian Navy received criticism from the Indian Army because of its inability to interdict the LTTE’s clandestine system of transportation and logistics that crossed the Palk Strait with relative impunity (Swamy 2002; Singh 2007).

Despite these difficulties, there is ample evidence that the organizations of the Indian government cooperated well on some initiatives. For example, RAW continued with its support and training of remaining and new members of EPRLF, TELO, and ENDLF and directed the use of these proxies, known as the “three Stars” to help IPKF root out LTTE. These forces provided language and cultural assistance to IPKF elements and assisted with the coordination and security for the planned provincial elections, which the LTTE was intent on disrupting (Gunaratna 1993).

By mid 1988, the LTTE had been severely weakened militarily and both the Indian and Sri Lankan governments completed several important actions and achieved critical milestones in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. For example, the Sri Lankan Parliament passed the 13th Amendment to the constitution in November 1987, which permitted the devolution of authorities to provincial governments. By July 1988, the IPKF had weakened the
LTTE in the north and the east enough to declare a date (November 18, 1988) for the provincial elections in the new northeastern province. Meanwhile, the RAW acted as a mediator between the Tamil groups and the President of Sri Lanka to ensure that Tamil prisoners were released and that the Tamil groups might be adequately represented as candidates. The IPKF provided security for the elections and in November, the elections were held with the vast majority of eligible Tamil and Sinhalese voters taking part. The results were overwhelmingly in favor of the EPRLF and ENDLF who had formed a coalition. Together, they would lead the North-Eastern Provincial Government (NEPG). Yet, there were accusations of IPKF meddling to ensure the EPRLF victory (Gunaratna 1993; Jayatilleka 1991).

The political changes occurring in Sri Lanka and in Tamil Nadu during 1988 would critically affect the outcome of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. The progress of implementation appeared good as the coordinated efforts achieved key milestones despite the LTTE’s violent opposition. In the rest of Sri Lanka, however, the accord had sparked the re-birth of the JVP and the power of Sinhalese nationalism. Thus, as Sri Lanka’s Presidential election approached and Jayewardene was no longer eligible, both of Sri Lanka’s major political parties shifted toward the forces of nationalism and began to denounce the accord and the IPKF. Simultaneously, the JVP launched violent attacks and instigated riots in major cities of the south. Prime Minister Premadasa became the UNP’s nominee and Sirimavo Bandaranaike led the SLFP with a coalition of smaller parties. The UNP promised to sign a treaty with India and remove the IPKF, while the SLFP promised to abrogate the accord and kick India out of Sri Lanka.

Premadasa and the UNP won the election, which was held on December 19, 1988, but the margin was far smaller than what his predecessor had experienced. In January 1988, Premadasa released numerous members of the JVP that were held in prison as a concession and with the
hope that the move would help his party in the parliamentary elections. The following month, in parliamentary elections, the UNP won only a slim majority: not enough to control the agenda the way Jayewardene had. Additionally, the JVP’s renewed insurrection throughout the country, made the government’s control outside of Colombo, tenuous at best. The JVP’s main grievance was the presence of the IPKF (Bullion 1995; Dixit 1998; Gunaratna 1993).

While Premadasa was making concessions to the forces of Sinhalese nationalism on Sri Lanka, Karunanidhi and his DMK party were stirring up Tamil nationalism in Tamil Nadu State in preparation for elections there. The party and candidate denounced the Indian Prime Minister and his Congress (I) party and called for the withdrawal of the IPKF. With the help of the LTTE’s underground propaganda apparatus, the DMK won the elections and in January 1989 Karunanidhi became the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu (Swamy 2003).

The post election situation in early 1988 meant that India’s efforts at implementation of the accord and the devolution of power in the northeast were not sustainable. Within the span of a few months, it became clear that the forces of Sinhalese nationalism (represented by the JVP), the new Sri Lankan government (represented by Premadasa and the UNP), the forces of Tamil nationalism (represented by the LTTE), and the political powers in Tamil Nadu (represented by Karunanidhi and the DMK), all shared one common political goal: the expulsion of the IPKF and an end to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Premadasa quickly began efforts to make that a reality (Swamy 2002; Bullion 1995).

In March of 1989, Premadasa’s government began a dialogue with the Indian government by presenting a draft of an India-Sri Lanka Friendship Treaty which attempted to address major geopolitical concerns of India, specifically Sri Lanka’s relationships and military assistance from foreign powers including the US, Israel, and Pakistan. The following month, April 1989
Premadasa opened a secret dialogue with Prabakaran and the LTTE. Using the LTTE’s spokesman in Tamil Nadu, Balasingham, as a go between, Premadasa emphasized the common goal of the expulsion of the IPKF from Sri Lanka and convinced the LTTE to cease operations against Sri Lankan forces. This enabled Premadasa to focus the efforts of his security forces on quelling the JVP insurrection in the south. By May 1989, the new President was secretly shuttling Balasingham and government representatives to LTTE camps in the north and even welcomed a delegation of LTTE representatives to Colombo. On June 16, 1989, Premadasa publicly called on the Government of India to begin withdrawing the IPKF at the end of the month. What he had been saying privately to Gandhi, he now demanded publicly (Swamy 2003).

Simultaneously, Premadasa secretly authorized the material support to the LTTE to assist in their fight against IPKF. According to Gunaratna (1993) and Swamy (2003, 2004), that support was more than just symbolic: the first shipment of arms included 400 Chinese rifles and ammunition that were meant for the Sri Lankan Police Special Task Force (STF). Subsequent shipments of material support essentially helped the LTTE replace the equipment that had been lost in while fighting the IPKF.

According to Singh (1991) and Gunaratna (1993), the RAW knew that Premadasa had begun covert material support to the LTTE as soon as it began. At the same time, Premadasa had begun a correspondence with Prime Minister Gandhi demanding IPKF withdrawal and progress on a friendship treaty. Prime Minister Gandhi ordered the IPKF to intensify its actions against the LTTE and ordered the RAW to intensify its efforts to train a unified Tamil proxy force secretly known as the Tamil National Army (TNA). The TNA would be trained by the RAW, but commanded by the Chief Minister of the NEPG. Thus, Gandhi knew that it was well past time to
begin setting the conditions for withdrawing the IPKF in such a way that that might preserve the perception of victory long enough to survive the Indian elections set for late November 1989. According to Gunaratna (1993) Prime Minister Gandhi made these decisions despite the fact that leading Indian military officers were providing assessments that defeating the LTTE and pacifying Northeastern Sri Lanka could take 10 to 20 years especially if the Sri Lankan government was now supporting the Tamil militants.

In July 1989, public opinion of the IPKF mission in India, which had suffered a slow decline, began to fall sharply as several incidents reinforced the challenges of the whole endeavor. The JVP insurrection in the south continued and forced many Sinhalese and Tamil refugees to flee to India. The NEPG with the assistance of Tamil groups including TELO, EPRLF, ENDLF, and PLOTE initiated a massive recruiting/conscription drive for recruits to join a Citizen Volunteer Force (CVF). The CVF was an auxiliary to the Sri Lankan Police, however, in the Northeast, its training was run by the IPKF and RAW and it came mostly under the authority of the NEPG. These recruits were actually meant for the TNA whose existence would not be formally announced for several months. Together the Tamil groups who had fought the LTTE formed the Tamil National Council (TNC) and declared a united front. Despite the newfound unity among non-LTTE groups, the LTTE once again succeeded in targeting the leadership of the other Tamil groups that had joined sides with the IPKF. LTTE militants assassinated Amirthalingham of the TULF in Colombo. The TULF in general and Amirthalingham in particular had been symbolic of non-violence and compromise on Tamil issues. In the same month, members of the PLOTE, suspiciously turned against their leader, Uma, and assassinated him in Madras, Tamil Nadu. Finally, in late July 1989 the IPKF had what several scholars refer to as “India’s Mai Lai incident (Gunaratna 1993, 306).” In Velvetithurai,
IPKF soldiers retaliated after an LTTE ambush by killing 52 civilians and destroying homes and property. The incident was quickly reported in Sri Lankan and Tamil media and picked up by news sources throughout India.

For Rajiv Gandhi and his Congress (I) party, the time had come to end the mission and focus on salvaging the upcoming Indian elections. On September 18, 1989 Sri Lanka and India published a joint communiqué announcing their intent to withdraw the IPKF and set a deadline for December 31, 1989.

In retrospect, the events following Prime Minister Gandhi’s decision to withdraw the IPKF seem a downward spiral of military disaster, defeat, and perhaps a textbook example of accountability costs paid by a democratic leader with the defeat of his winning coalition. Although the situation in Sri Lanka was just one of many important issues facing the Gandhi government, Gandhi and his Congress (I) party lost power in part because of the failure of the intervention. Despite the best efforts of the NEPG, the RAW, the IPKF and factions of the TNA, the objectives of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and India’s full intervention slipped away amid intense violence and increased support to the LTTE from the government of Sri Lanka.

According to Swamy (2002), the TNA launched attacks against the LTTE with the support of the withdrawing IPKF, while the LTTE counterattacked with the assistance of the Sri Lankan Army including at least one incident of the Sri Lankan Air Force transporting LTTE reinforcements (Swamy 2003; 309). While Gandhi campaigned in Tamil Nadu, the IPKF forces were returning, and the fighting in Sri Lanka reached its most intense since the introduction of the peacekeepers.

In the Indian election of November 1989, Gandhi faced a coalition called the United Front, which had come together under the leadership of Vishwanath Pratap (V.P.) Singh and his Janata Dal party. The United Front included the DMK and other regional parties. V.P. Singh had
served as Gandhi’s Finance Minister and then as the Minister of Defense; however, Gandhi dismissed him after Singh became aware of corruption in arms procurement unrelated to the IPKF in Sri Lanka. Singh’s dismissal precipitated what became known as the Bofors scandal, which exposed corruption in Gandhi’s government and added insult to injury for the prospects of reelection (Bullion 1995; Gopal 2016).

Gandhi and his Congress (I) party lost the election and Prime Minister Singh immediately cut the support to Tamil insurgents and increased the pace of withdrawal of the IPKF. Within months of the IPKF withdrawal, the LTTE would destroy the TNA, and the LTTE and Sri Lankan government would resume hostilities in what became known as Eelam War II, which lasted until 2009. In May 1991, Rajiv Gandhi paid the ultimate accountability cost after his assassination at the hands of the LTTE (Gopal 2016).

### 8.3 Structured Focused Comparison of External Support to Tamil Insurgents

This case study presents six cases where leaders of a regime made decisions concerning the active support to insurgent groups involved in Eelam War I. Similar to chapters six and seven, the qualitative narrative in this chapter provides rich description and notable observations that are not necessarily accounted for in the quantitative research due to the strict operational definitions of active support and perhaps some measurement error. Table 8.1 provides a list of the positive cases of external support to the Tamil insurgent groups based on the UCDP data.

**Table 8.1 External Support to Tamil Insurgent Groups: 1979-1990 (Based on UCDP data)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Supporting State</th>
<th>Regime Type (Converted Polity Score)</th>
<th>External Support</th>
<th>Type of Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sanctuary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sanctuary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Advice &amp; Capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.2 provides (in italics) the additional relevant cases exposed by the qualitative analysis. It must be emphasized that these cases in italics do not necessarily contradict the UCDP data. The UCDP data was gathered for a large dataset tracking active external support to parties in an intra-state conflict. In some observations, the evidence of support may not have been available to researchers, the combat death threshold may not have been met, or there was evidence that the supporting government was taking measures to either prevent or conceal support. Thus, the strict operational definitions used by UCDP may have excluded cases of support that can be observed and studied in this qualitative analysis. Specifically, UCDP does not account for the extremely deviant case where the Government of Sri Lanka provided material support to an insurgent group that was technically at war with the state. It is unclear why UCDP does not account for the persistent sanctuary support provided to Tamil insurgents from 1983 to 1987. It is likely because of the very public, post-Thimpu crackdown where Indian authorities appeared to arrest and cease any active support. To researchers at UCDP, these events demonstrated a shift from active sanctuary to passive or defacto sanctuary because it appeared that Indian authorities were making deliberate efforts to end the sanctuary. Yet, the research of Gunaratna (1993) and Swamy (2002) indicates that the Indian leadership continued to provide training and material at camps in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere. However, there is no evidence to indicate that India placed its advisers on the ground with Tamil insurgents inside of Sri Lanka. Most evidence suggests that Indian advisers and trainers remained in India and did not accompany insurgent elements into combat until the IPKF deployed to Sri Lanka. This provides additional evidence that the typology of support as proposed in this dissertation may not be ordinal in relation to costs and risks as described in chapter three. Providing the Tamil groups
with sanctuary in Tamil Nadu was actually less risky than if India had provided advisers on the ground in Sri Lanka.

**Table 8.2 External Support to Tamil Insurgent Groups: 1979-1990 (Based on Qualitative Assessment)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Supporting State</th>
<th>Regime Type (Converted Polity Score)</th>
<th>External Support</th>
<th>Type of Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sanctuary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sanctuary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sanctuary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sanctuary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sanctuary / Limited (Op Pomali) and Full Intervention (IPKF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Full Intervention (IPKF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(19) Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Full Intervention (IPKF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>(5) Anocracy</td>
<td>Deviant</td>
<td>Material</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Case 8a. India (No Support) Prior to 1983: Negative-Predicted $H_1$**

Before examining Indira Gandhi’s decision to provide active support to Tamil insurgent groups in 1983, it is important to consider why she did not provide active support sooner. By 1979, it was clear that the conflict in Sri Lanka had escalated to an intrastate conflict. Tamil insurgent groups were active in Tamil Nadu and had made their existence known internationally. Tamil Nadu politicians had adopted the cause of Tamil Eelam and expressed keen interest in moral and diplomatic support to these groups.

*What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about supporting insurgent groups?* Prior to the 1983 riots, support to Tamil militants was viewed as a state rather than a national issue. The decentralized nature of the Indian political structure granted significant authority to the state. In Tamil Nadu the parties of the Dravidian movement
were powerful but competition between the AIADMK and the DMK left both Dravidian parties vying with each other and the cause of Tamil nationalism. Prior to the 1983 riots and the significant flows of refugees, the Indian government had less compelling reasons to consider active support seriously. The passive support exhibited by allowing Tamil Nadu politicians and private citizens to provide support had no costs and, in the beginning, very little risk.

*What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making?* As with Costa Rica during the Sandinista rebellion and the Contra War, norms against interference in foreign conflict likely prevented any plans for active support to rebels from the national government, however, the brutal repression and discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka by the Sinhalese majority provided a justification for action and for the provision of *material* support. The normative arguments calling for the protection of Tamil rights began to outweigh the norms that maintained principled neutrality in foreign conflicts.

*How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making?* For Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the evidence suggests that interest in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka only became apparent when Sri Lanka, under Jayewardene and the UNP, began to actively seek greater assistance from foreign powers to build its military capability to fight the growing Tamil insurgency. Just as the US leadership became concerned when the Sandinistas sought military assistance from the Soviet Union and its allies, Indian leadership became concerned when the government of Sri Lanka reached out to extra regional competitors. The election of Jayewardene and his pro-western policies led to a change in the threat perception shared by India’s leaders and when Gandhi was returned to power in early 1980 she restored the RAW to prominence and relied heavily on the analysis provided by the organization and its former chief, R.N. Kao. Still,
prior to 1983 the strategic factors were not enough to merit any active intervention, but it was enough to raise concern.

How did agency-slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? In the years prior to 1983, the various Tamil groups had complete autonomy and were only dependent on the support of Tamil Nadu politicians and influential private citizens. The sheer number of independent groups that emerged in the pre-1983 environment would have made active support difficult.

It is also important to note that India and the Tamil groups did not have much of a principal-agent gap. Indian leaders wanted fair treatment for the Tamil population of Sri Lanka and wanted to avoid getting its own Tamil population stirred up about the nascent civil war in Sri Lanka. Yet, with each act of exclusion taken by the Sinhalese leadership, the principal agent gap would grow. India wanted fair treatment for Tamils in a united Sri Lanka, while Tamil groups increasingly believed that fair treatment could only be achieved in an independent Tamil state.

Case 8b. India (Sanctuary) 1983-84: Positive – Deviant $H_{1&2}$

Prior to the riots in 1983, India was in a state of passive support to the Tamil insurgent groups because the leaders of Tamil Nadu had made the decision to allow the groups to train and operate in their territory. After the riots, the Prime Minister made the decision to not only allow the Tamil insurgent groups to operate on Indian soil, but also tasked central government agencies with providing material support and training to all of the major groups. Supporting the insurgent groups was part of a strategy. The concept of the strategy was to strengthen the Tamil insurgents and force the government of Sri Lanka to negotiate a peace that would grant a level of Tamil autonomy in northern Sri Lanka that would placate Tamil nationalists and undermine the popular support of groups seeking to achieve a separate Tamil state through violence.
What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about supporting insurgent groups? Due to the pre-existence of Tamil Nadu support to the insurgent groups, Prime Minister Gandhi faced actually very few structural constraints in making the decision to provide active support. The intelligence agencies, especially the RAW, carried out the orders of the Prime Minister with speed and efficiency. Unlike in the US, at the same time when the Reagan administration faced opposition in Congress, Prime Minister Gandhi faced no serious opposition in Parliament. Though the active support to insurgent groups became widely suspected, the Indian government maintained official secrecy on its efforts until Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s post-Thimpu crack down in 1986. Thus, the structural constraints of the Parliamentary system did not affect the decision-making or block specific decisions to provide resources and training to Tamil groups located on Indian soil. Unlike President Reagan, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi did not have an opposition-controlled legislature and therefore had few ex-ante executive constraints.

What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? In this case, any normative concerns about supporting foreign non-state armed groups were clearly outweighed by the normative concerns over the treatment of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. The riots and the subsequent flow of refugees to Indian soil changed the calculus of norms. Those who supported the narrative of the Tamil groups could argue that if the government of a foreign state is violently oppressing an ethnic minority within its territory, then it must be right and just to help that minority fight back (especially if that minority happens to be Hindu and ethnic kin to a large population in the country). Many scholars agree that Indira Gandhi had the mental model of the successful support to the *Mukti Bahini* in Bangladesh during her first term as Prime Minister in 1971 (Gunaratna 1993, Bullion 1995). The forced secession of
East Pakistan was widely considered to be a necessary and just fight in defense of an oppressed population and India’s intervention helped to fix that. Support to insurgents was part of that success (Bass 2014).

*How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making?* It is difficult to assess whether threat perception of strategic opportunity had the greater effect on Prime Minister Gandhi’s decision making. In this case, the evidence suggests that the Prime Minister feared two separate threats stemming from the intrastate conflict in Sri Lanka. First, she was concerned that a victory by Tamil separatist in Sri Lanka might lead to Tamil separatism and secession of Tamil Nadu. Tamil Nadu politicians MGR and Karunanidhi might turn their relationship and patronage of these groups into leadership on Tamil militants targeting Indian authorities on Indian soil. At the same time, the RAW was providing Gandhi with assessments that exaggerated the interest of the US and other foreign powers in securing strategic bases to counter Indian influence in the Indian Ocean region. Brewster (2016), Gunaratna (1993), Bass (2014), all share this assessment and Dixit (1989) articulated as much publically in recalling later decisions to deploy the IPKF and force the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

*How did agency-slass and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes?* The initial concern of Indian leaders charged with providing support to the Tamil insurgent groups was less about rebel autonomy and more about severing the principal-agent relationship between the groups and Tamil Nadu politicians. In 1983 and 1984, the RAW seems to have provided support to all the groups with minimal conditions. Only the LTTE under Prabakaran and the PLOTE under Uma seem to have expressed initial concern over the preservation of their autonomy. According to Gunaratna (1993) and Swamy (2003), the LTTE took many precautions to limit RAW influence over and knowledge of LTTE personnel and operations. The LTTE ensured that
all cadre receiving training from the RAW used fake names and RAW officials were kept away from certain LTTE camps. Other than its encouragement of the top five’s participation in the ENLF, the RAW seems to have exerted little effort to force a real merger of the separate groups into one unified entity that could achieve unity of effort. Additionally, the RAW did very little to cut off other avenues of resource mobilization for the various groups.

**Case 8c. India (Rajiv Gandhi) (Sanctuary) 1984-1987: Positive – Deviant H1&2**

Rajiv Gandhi assumed the office of Prime Minister following the assassination of Indira Gandhi in on October 31, 1984. The new Prime Minister was considered a political neophyte and he chose to continue supporting the Tamil insurgent groups by providing sanctuary along with material and advice/capability support. Rajiv Gandhi, however, attempted to exert influence over the groups and quickly encountered principal-agent problems rather than any significant structural or normative constraints. The structural constraints of the Indian democratic regime only manifested themselves after the strategy failed.

*What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about supporting insurgent groups?* The only structural constraints experienced by Prime Minister Gandhi occurred after he had made the decision to continue supporting Tamil insurgents. In order to retain power, Gandhi needed the support of influential politicians of Tamil Nadu and MGR was able to provide that support as long as Gandhi continued to support the LTTE and other groups. Thus, Gandhi needed to take actions that would help him maintain his winning coalition, of which MGR was an important part.

Unlike in the previous case study, Rajiv Gandhi did not face ex ante constraints on budget and lines of funding within the RAW. The nature of India’s parliamentary system did not permit the situation that President Reagan experienced with a powerful opposition party holding
the power of the purse. While democracies are characterized by executive constraints, the mechanisms of those constraints can be quite different.

*What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making?* Much like when his mother made the initial decision to provide support, Rajiv Gandhi faced no palpable normative constraints. The Indian press paid far greater attention to the Bofors scandal, Sri Lankan mistreatment of Tamils, and terrorism in the Punjab than it did to concerns over active Indian government support to Tamil insurgent groups (Gopol 2016).

*How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making?* By most accounts, Rajiv Gandhi shared his mother’s concern about the influence of foreign powers in Sri Lanka and concerns about the trajectory of Indian domestic politics if Tamil separatists gained complete victory in Sri Lanka. Gandhi therefore made consistent efforts to negotiate with President Jayewardene and allowed the RAW to set up separate channels within the Sri Lankan government both for intelligence collection and for dialogue.

*How did agency-slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes?* Between 1984 and 1987, agency-slack and its many manifestations became the central problem for Rajiv Gandhi’s government. Rather than trying to unite the various groups into a single organization dependent on the Indian government, the RAW attempted first to strengthen all groups, then to entice the groups to participate in a forum that would present a veneer of unity (ENLF). When the Indian government facilitated the peace talks at Thimpu, Bhutan, the RAW made further support contingent on participation. Although all major groups participated, most groups, and especially the strongest group, the LTTE, were not willing to compromise on their goals and objectives. The failure of the India’s leaders to control agency slack was the most significant factor in the negative outcome at Thimpu.
After Thimpu, the Indian government attempted to use more coercive measures to compel a change of heart in the Tamil insurgent groups. Yet the Tamil groups still had their Tamil Nadu sponsors and political patrons and the LTTE still had many other avenues for resource mobilization. The RAW never created the necessary level of dependency among Tamil insurgent groups on its resource avenue. Had the RAW made itself indispensible to each of the Tamil groups, the organization may have been able to reduce agency slack and compel a different outcome.

**Case 8d. India (Limited & Full Intervention) 1987-1990: Positive-Predicted H₂**

In the late spring and early summer of 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made the decision to first conduct a limited intervention by using Indian military assets to prevent a victory by the Sri Lankan Military. The violation of Sri Lankan air space by Indian Air Force elements constituted a single act of limited intervention but was just part of an adjusted strategy and the threat of a full intervention was part of it. The original strategy had called for the strengthening of Tamil insurgent groups to force the Sri Lankan government to negotiate. The Sri Lankan government, however, had determined that the LTTE, which had achieved primacy on the ground, would never negotiate in good faith and would not accept anything less than the ultimate goal of Tamil Eelam. Therefore, only a military solution and the defeat of the LTTE would allow for an acceptable conclusion to the civil war. When the Sri Lankan military launched operation Liberation and began to achieve success, Gandhi had to demonstrate resolve through a limited intervention and signal his willingness to initiate a full intervention. Once President Jayewardene concluded that Gandhi was willing to use Indian Military force, he was willing to negotiate an agreement for India to deal with the LTTE.
What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about supporting insurgent groups? Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi faced no significant structural constraints in executing a limited and then a full intervention in Sri Lanka. If the Prime Minister had committed the country to a full intervention against the will of the Sri Lankan government, he may have faced greater opposition in Parliament, however, the sentiment and sympathy of the Indian electorate was still largely with the Tamil groups. By this time, however, that popular support had begun to wane or at least be frustrated by the burdens and the realities of providing sanctuary to armed groups. Just as with the provision of material and sanctuary support, the structural constraints of democracy were only based on the ex-post consequences failure.

What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? The fact that Operation Liberation was severely affecting the civilian population of Jaffna was enough to outweigh any concerns about the perception of violating international norms. Though the initial action strained relations and caused other countries to condemn India for its violation, there were no real consequences for the Prime Minister. The fact that the limited intervention was followed by an accord and a peacekeeping force, rather than a forced entry invasion, also satisfied any serious concern among the electorate and leaders about the violation of international norms.

How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? At this point in the conflict, the decisions of Prime Minister Gandhi were no longer about seizing strategic opportunity. The decisions to initiate the airdrop and to coerce President Jayewardene into signing the accord were done exclusively because the threat trajectory was imminent. A defeat of the Tamil insurgency would have caused the loss of political support in Tamil Nadu and emboldened the Sri Lankan military and government to continue and even enhance their
relationships with extra regional powers. Rather than seizing a strategic opportunity, Gandhi was attempting to salvage a failing strategy by increasing the immediate costs in the hope that such an action would lower the risk of failure and increase the probability of a favorable outcome.

*How did agency-slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes?* At this decision point, agency-slack was again a key factor. Recognizing that the Tamil rebel groups would not change their positions on Tamil Eelam, Rajiv Gandhi decided to cut them out of negotiations and present an outcome as a fait accompli. Gandhi’s gamble was that the Tamil groups would chose to adjust their goals and give up some autonomy rather than face the prospect starting an armed conflict with India. Unfortunately, one rebel group could not be swayed and chose to resist. Prabakaran and his LTTE cadres believed that they had the resources to resist both the Sri Lankan military and the Indian Army. Though the LTTE had grown strong with the help of the RAW, the organization ensured that it had other avenues of resource mobilization. Smuggling, illicit activity, donations and fund raising abroad, close ties with powerful forces in Tamil Nadu, and the control of territory in Sri Lanka all allowed the LTTE to accept the risk and fight back.

**Case 8e. Sri Lanka (Material) 1989: Positive – Anomaly**

In June of 1989, Sri Lankan President Rasinghe Premadasa made the decision to provide *material* support to the same group that had rebelled and killed thousands of Sri Lankan soldiers, police, and unarmed civilians. The seemingly bizarre decision occurred as a result of numerous twists and interactions of trends and events. It constitutes an anomalous observation, but cannot be ignored as it demonstrated the power of unconventional warfare in strategy and demonstrates why it is difficult to propose theories in political science without contingent generalizations.
What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about supporting insurgent groups? There were no inherent structural constraints in the Sri Lankan regime preventing Premadasa from making the decision to support the LTTE. Sri Lanka was not a democracy by the rigid standards of the Polity IV scale (Marshall and Gurr 2014). Yet, the country still had strong democratic characteristics including the imposition and aspiration of generally free and fair elections. Even though he had only a small majority in the Parliament, the powerful presidency established by his predecessor allowed President Premadasa to initiate the policy. If the policy had failed, much like in India, the democratic characteristics of the Sri Lankan constitution might have provided for a backlash and a disintegration of Premadasa’s already small winning coalition. But facing a Sinhalese insurrection on one side and a foreign occupation on the other, Premadasa had to do something. His choice was quite bold and dangerous but helps to demonstrate how support to insurgent groups can be used by the weak and the strong alike. The Sri Lankan government in 1989 was exceptionally weak compared to India and its military. Yet, through proxy warfare, Premadasa was able to eliminate one opponent while he focused on another (the JVP).

What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? Domestic interpretation of international norms probably played no role in President Premadasa’s decision to support the LTTE. Based on Polity IV assessments, Sri Lanka was not a full democracy, however, Premadasa’s political survival as President depended on the maintenance and strengthening of his UNP led winning coalition. Thus, domestic norms and beliefs among the Sinhalese population must have been a great concern. The general contempt for the IPKF, stirred up by the JVP, however must have outweighed concerns about supporting a terrorist group.
How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? At this juncture, Premadasa likely considered both the threat trajectory and identified a strategic opportunity. The presence of the IPKF had effectively removed 1/3 of the country from Sri Lankan government control. The continued presence of the IPKF and the JVP perpetuated narrative of the IPKF as an occupying force threatened to undermine the UNP, especially if the Sri Lankan security forces had to continue to assist that occupying force in a war against the LTTE, while simultaneously fighting a JVP insurrection. The identification of a shared interest and shared goal with an adversary presented Premadasa with a strategic opportunity to prevent the collapse of winning coalition and possibly the collapse of the Sri Lankan regime. By forming a limited and temporary alliance with the LTTE, Premadasa was able to compel the IPKF withdrawal and make Sri Lankan security forces that would have been engaged against the LTTE available to counter the JVP insurrection. Temporary and limited alliances between rival groups can be effective in gaining strategic advantage. As described in chapter six, the Tericista faction of the Sandinistas used temporary and limited alliances with other anti-Somoza groups in order to gain political advantage in 1978. In this case, the leader of a legitimate, non-democratic government made a temporary alliance with a rebel group in order to gain political and military advantage.

How did agency-slack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? In his negotiations with the LTTE, Premadasa seems to have been well aware of the problems with agency slack and had a keen understanding of the LTTE’s insistence on autonomy. Premadasa, as Prime Minister under President Jayewardene, had observed the LTTE defy its hapless patron the RAW. Thus Premadasa set about building a limited trust with the LTTE focused on clear goals. According to both Gunaratna (1993) and Swamy (2003), Premadasa promised not to
attack the LTTE and promised to publically call for the immediate withdrawal of the IPKF. He made good on both promises immediately after the first round of LTTE negotiations. He then offered support to the LTTE to intensify its efforts against the IPKF and its growing proxy force the TNA. The LTTE only had to pursue its main goals of defeating the IPKF and TNA, while suspending operations against the Sri Lankan government. Premadasa seems to have accepted the risk that weapons and ammunition supplied to the LTTE would eventually be turned against his own forces after the withdrawal of the IPKF and the defeat of the TNA. This was the exact outcome as Sri Lankan forces began fighting the LTTE within weeks of the departure of the IPKF and the disintegration of the TNA forces.

Case 8f. India (Termination of Support) 1990: Negative-Predicted H1

There are two parts to this observation. First, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made the decision to begin withdrawing the IPKF some time in late July or early August 1989 and subsequently announced his intent in the joint communiqué published in September 1989. The communiqué only declared the complete withdrawal by the end of the year as aspirational, and Gandhi fully intended to protect and resource the NEPG, TNC, and the TNA for as long as necessary to ensure the successful long term implementation of Indo-Sri Lanka accord. The second part of this observation occurred immediately following the Indian general election in November 1989 where Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress (I) led coalition was replaced by the new United Front winning coalition led by V.P. Singh and the Janata Dal party. V.P. Singh’s decided to immediately complete the withdrawal of the IPKF and to end all active support to the Tamil insurgent groups.

What structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about supporting insurgent groups? The decision to end all active support to Tamil insurgents came as
a direct result of the structural constraints of India’s democratic regime. Rajiv Gandhi’s initial decision to begin withdrawal of the IPKF was essentially a decision to end the *full intervention* and adjust course to a *limited intervention* and eventually a strategy involving merely *material* support. Gandhi made this decision because the intervention/occupation had become unpopular at home and jeopardized the future success of his winning coalition. The surge of the DMK party in Tamil Nadu and Karunanidhi’s decision to join the United Front, robbed Congress (I) of much needed support.

*What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making?* Although difficult to assess in its entirety, domestic interpretation of international norms appears to have been important, but not necessarily critical in the decision-making within this case. Rajiv Gandhi was aware of the concerns in India with the actions of IPKF soldiers against Tamil civilians, especially after the incident at Valvettithurai in late July 1989 (Gopal 2016; Dixit 1998). But first hand accounts indicate that this was not directly related to normative considerations regarding Gandhi’s decision to intervene or his decision to scale back the intervention (Dixit 1998).

Gandhi’s political rivals in the United Front had made legalistic arguments for the immediate withdrawal based upon the fact that the President of Sri Lanka was publically calling for the IPKF to withdraw. Upon entering office, V.P. Singh stated publically that India was interfering in the internal affairs of a foreign power and the legitimate leaders of that foreign power were demanding withdrawal. Regardless of outcome or consequences, Singh argued that immediate withdrawal was the right thing to do. The fact that Singh was merely cancelling the efforts of his predecessor meant that politically the United Front could lay blame for the consequences on the previous government.
How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? The election of November 1989 occurred amidst the dramatic geo-political shifts that characterized the end of the Cold War. Intervention decisions of Indira Gandhi and her son and successor Rajiv Gandhi were largely based on a threat perception that foreign powers would use Sri Lanka as a base of military and political influence in the Indian Ocean region. The conflict from 1983 to 1989 had actually increased the desire of the Sri Lankan government for external military and economic assistance, but the actual manifestation of this influence had been minimal. The US did not actively pursue the use of Trincomallee harbor as a naval base and most of the military aid to Sri Lanka was not a real threat to India in that it consisted of weapons systems best used for small scale military conflicts and did not include higher end prestige items that could interfere with Indian aspirations for regional influence (Gates and Roy 2014; Hashim 2013). These facts, plus the clear ending of the Cold War with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, political revolutions throughout Europe, and domestic upheaval in China, all provided evidence of a threat trajectory that did not merit the cost and risk of the current intervention.

Politically speaking, the withdrawal of the IPKF and the termination of active support to insurgent groups was a strategic opportunity of sorts for the United Front. There was no longer any compelling strategic or domestic political reason to continue the previous policy.

How did agency-slate and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes? As Rajiv Gandhi decided to begin the withdrawal of the IPKF the dependency of the NEPG, TNC groups and the TNA on Indian support became readily apparent. For the first time in the conflict, the Tamil insurgent groups, with the obvious exception of the LTTE, had lost a good deal of their autonomy because most of their avenues of resource mobilization were coming from Indian active support. To some degree, the NEPG could mobilize resources within the territory it now
controlled, but the control of that territory was still contested and dependent on the IPKF. The IPKF had disarmed the other insurgent groups and after the escalation in fighting against the LTTE, the IPKF and the RAW recognized the need to rearm and unify these groups slowly. The Sri Lankan government used its influence to hinder any rearming of these groups and its support of the LTTE was intended to help the LTTE crush the TNA before it could become an effective force to replace the IPKF. The new government of V.P. Singh decided to abandon the Tamil groups and therefore grant them full autonomy to fight and survive on their own.

8.4 Discussion and Findings

This chapter uses structured, focused comparison to examine cases within a case study that can be considered both critical and somewhat deviant to the theory proposed in this dissertation. India’s support to Tamil insurgent groups during Eelam War I is critical because the Indian regime is the world’s largest democracy. The case study can be characterized as deviant because Indian leaders decided to provide active support that can be characterized as mid-level (sanctuary support) based on the typology proposed in chapter three. The case study also provides an anomalous case in the decision of Sri Lankan leaders to provide active support to an insurgent group that actively targeted the regime itself.

This case study differs from the two previous case studies in some important ways, but maintains some unit homogeneity in other areas. This most important differences between this case study and those examined in chapter six and seven are; (1) a different region and culture of the targeted state, (2) a different large democracy in India, (3) no non-PRG countries engaged in active support to the insurgent groups, (4) the primary narrative of the conflict was based on ethnic and religious identity differences intermixed with politics of exclusion rather than political and ideological differences, and (5) the geo-political context of the case is only indirectly related
to the great power rivalry of the US and Soviet Union that categorized the Cold War. The case is similar to the previous two case studies in that it took place at the same time period in history and its final outcome was affected by geopolitical shifts that occurred at the end of the Cold War.

Evidence from the quantitative analysis in chapter four confirms that democratic regimes are less likely to support insurgent groups, but in the rare cases when they do, they should generally avoid mid-level types of support. Taken as a whole, this case study seems to demonstrate something different.

The cases in this case study do not necessarily provide evidence to support or falsify the theory proposed in this dissertation, but they do provide some evidence to support contingent generalizations and theory refinement. The structural and normative characteristics of democracies should compel democratic leaders to choose either low-level types of support (material support) or high-level support (full-intervention) and avoid mid-level support. This chapter presents deviant observations (8b and 8c) where Indian leaders decided to provide mid-level support to Tamil insurgents in the form of active sanctuary on Indian soil characterized by state sponsored training camps and material support.

Though the observations do not show that structural and normative characteristics of India’s democracy constrained executive decision-making with respect to supporting insurgents, they do provide insight into possible theory refinement in two key areas. The first area of theory refinement concerns the utility and validity of the proposed typology of support that frames the theory. The second is evidence of an additional or an alternative causal mechanism connected to structural characteristics.

In chapter three, this dissertation proposes that the typology of support is both categorical and ordinal. In other words, the different types of support incur increased costs and risks to the
supporting state because different types of support incur increased costs and risks to the supporting state in the following order; material, advice/capability, sanctuary, limited intervention, full intervention. The ordinal nature of these categories assumes that providing active sanctuary support incurs more costs and accepts more risk than providing advice/capability. Yet, the sui generis elements of this case study show that Indian leaders actually incurred less risk in providing active sanctuary than they would have had they provided the type of advice/capability that involved on the ground advisers (such as special forces) from 1983 to 1987. Available evidence suggests that the advice/capability support to Tamil insurgent groups was all provided on Indian soil, within training camps. There is no available evidence at this time to suggest that India embedded advisers with Tamil groups in Sri Lanka prior to the 1987 intervention of the IPKF (8d).

It is important to reiterate that the quantitative data used in chapter four derived from UCDP and the formula used to convert observations to the theoretical typology of this dissertation causes the provision of training taking place on Indian soil to be characterized as sanctuary (see table 8.2). If India had placed military advisers on the ground in Sri Lanka, Prime Minister Gandhi would have incurred increased political risk, as the capture of advisers by the Sri Lankan government would have exposed the active support that Gandhi’s government continued to deny. Thus, active sanctuary support from a democracy might be less risky than on-the-ground advice/capability. According to San Akca (2016), the nature of democratic regimes and the liberties preserved for private citizens make democratic regimes more likely to experience defacto and passive support. This is exactly what occurred in this case study when the Indian government quickly turned the passive/defacto support that existed in Tamil Nadu into active, secret support after the riots of July 1983. Therefore, the theoretical typology may require
an additional category or sub-category that specifies when advice/capability actually occurs within the territory of the targeted state. Furthermore, the low, medium, high classification may not be a perfect reflection of the reality of every situation when it comes to calculating costs and risks.

The second refinement to the theory is inspired by evidence of an additional (or alternative) causal mechanism that may explain why democracies are less likely to support insurgents and why they tend to avoid mid-level types of support. Leaders in democracies may have a much more difficult time managing the agency slack inherent in principal-agent relationships between supporting state and the insurgent groups.

The theory presented in chapter three maintains that structural and normative characteristics of democratic regimes provide disincentives to leaders when considering support to insurgent groups. The cases in this case study (8b and 8c) demonstrate that domestic concerns over the violation of international norms against supporting non-state armed groups were negligible to both Indian Prime Ministers. As discussed in chapter three, the structural characteristics of democratic regimes include a free press, legislative and judicial oversight mechanisms, and the need to maintain a winning coalition from a large selectorate. The structural characteristics of a free press and over-sight mechanisms played only a minimal role in this case whereas the role was greater in chapter seven’s examination of US support to the Contra groups. The necessity of maintaining a winning coalition from a large selectorate, however, was observed. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi suffered the ex-post consequences of the failed intervention and paid audience cost and the accountability cost with the electoral defeat followed by his assassination 18 months later.
The cases in this case study demonstrate that the failure of a strategy involving support to insurgent groups is related to the failure of the principal to manage agency slack and the structural characteristics of democratic regimes may hinder leaders in the management of agency slack. Managing agency slack requires that the principal (the state leader) influence the behavior of the agent (insurgent group) to such a degree that the actions of the agent align with the goals of the principal. Selecting groups to support and making support contingent on behavior (screening and sanctioning) are two ways of managing agency slack. In order for sanctioning to be influential, the provision of support or the threat to withdraw support must be important enough to insurgent group leaders to compel them to give up autonomy. Furthermore, the principal must have a reliable means of monitoring the behavior of the insurgent groups and, even better, the decision making of its leaders.

There is little evidence in this case study to suggest that Indian officials in the RAW made any serious attempt to screen groups or to ensure that support was contingent on behavior. Indian officials made no serious attempt to eliminate the alternative avenues of resource mobilization that existed prior to 1983 or to prevent the groups from developing new avenues of resource mobilization. The LTTE leadership was fiercely protective of its autonomy and although it accepted support from RAW, it continued to maintain and develop other avenues for resource mobilization and agreed to bend to the will of Indian leaders only temporarily and superficially.

It is important to emphasize that India’s democratic regime made it easier for the LTTE and other groups to maintain and develop avenues of resource mobilization. Personal relationships with powerful politicians in Tamil Nadu, the establishment of private organizations, and the publication of propaganda and through media outlets were possible because of the
structural characteristics of India’s democracy. The attempts made by RAW to compel unity or influence the behavior of the groups failed at Thimpu in 1985, met with temporary success immediately after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987, and eventually proved difficult with most major Tamil groups and both futile and counter productive with the LTTE.

Cases in the previous case studies add weight to this idea. In chapter seven, the Reagan administration, through the NSC and the CIA had a difficult time influencing the behavior of Contra groups even though the US was providing the main and overwhelming avenue of resource mobilization especially for the FDN, the largest group. Though the CIA, NSC, and later the State Department were able to exert some influence over the Contras, the structural characteristics of US democratic regime made it easy for Sandinista leaders and those opposed to the Reagan administration’s strategy to directly influence Congressional leaders who were willing to use their authority to influence policy. Even third party actors, such as Eden Pastora, who had broken from both the Contras and the Sandinistas was able to embark on a public visit to the US where he lobbied congressional leaders and public and private citizens to join his cause. Just as Tamil insurgent leaders made alliances with Tamil Nadu politicians to resist the influence of Prime Minister Gandhi, Contra leaders and those opposed to the Contras lobbied Congress and others in the administration to influence the execution of the strategy.

Chapter six provides a notable contrast in the management of principal-agent relationships. Fidel Castro, the autocratic leader of the Cuban regime, masterfully managed agency slack with his support to the Sandinistas. Castro compelled the Sandinistas to unite around the Tericista strategy and imposed unity and new leadership on the organization in exchange for overwhelming active support through resource mobilization channels that were
wholly controlled by Cuba and carefully monitored by Cuban advisers who were embedded with rebel elements within the territory of the targeted state.

This begs the question; do structural characteristics of democratic regimes make it more difficult for leaders to manage principal-agent relationships and control agency slack? If so, then the memory of the failures of strategies involving support to insurgent groups may cause leaders to avoid such policies and may constitute valuable practical advice for future leaders. More study on the management of principal-agent relationships in unconventional warfare is required.
Chapter 9 - Conclusion: Democracy and Support to Insurgency

This dissertation sought to better understand the relationship between regime types and the practice of supporting insurgencies in foreign states. Providing active support to an insurgent group that targets a foreign state has always been one of many policy options open to leaders and has gained some attention recently especially with the ongoing civil war in Syria. Previous literature had indicated that democracies might be less inclined to provide active support to non-state armed groups than other types of regimes, but understanding of the causal mechanisms has been elusive in part because typologies of support had not been applied and linked to theories about decision making until very recently.

9.1 Summary of Findings

This dissertation proposed that normative and structural constraints of democratic regimes cause leaders to be less likely to actively support foreign insurgent groups as a component of strategy below the threshold of armed conflict. When they do choose to lend their support, democratic regimes tend to choose low-level types of support such as simple material support or high-level support such as full military intervention. Leaders of non-democratic regimes, who face a different set of normative and structural characteristics, however, can employ the full spectrum of support types to seize strategic opportunities and tailor strategies that may be more costly and more risky. While both quantitative and qualitative methods provide evidence to support the proposed theory, they also indicate that the disincentives created are not always enough in relation to other factors.

Chapter two provides a review of literature on the topic and examines structural explanations, theories of democratic peace that might be related, and some additional research on regime type and military interventions. The structural literature attempts to explain all the factors
that correlate to the decision of state leaders to provide support to non-state armed groups. This literature emphasizes the role of structural factors including rivalry, measures of relative power, and ethnic and ideational ties. San-Akca (2016) and Salehyan (2011) recognize the inherent importance of principal-agent relationship between the supporting state (principal) and the insurgent group (agent). Support can only occur if state leaders decide to provide it and rebel leaders decide to accept it. If rebels decide to accept support, they risk giving up autonomy. If states decide to provide support, they may be risking retaliation from the targeted state or getting dragged into a conflict, which they seek to avoid.

Until San-Akca’s (2016) recent work, the structural approach literature has suffered from the lack of a typology of support that effectively classified the differences in how foreign states could create or enhance avenues of resource mobilization for insurgents. Yet, even with the typology, a growing dataset, and some groundbreaking conclusions, San-Akca (2016, 154) is still seeking to understand, “the relationship between regime type and state support of rebels…to reveal whether the assumptions of democratic peace hold when it comes to state support of rebels.” This dissertation brings us closer to an answer and a more nuanced understanding of this subject.

Chapter three develops the theory by borrowing assumptions from democratic peace literature. From these assumptions, this dissertation proposes that structural and normative characteristics of democracies create disincentives for leaders to choose policy options that involve supporting non-state armed groups. When democratic leaders do decide to support these groups, they tend to choose types of support that minimize risks and costs or they will go to the other extreme and support insurgent groups with a full-scale military intervention. Leaders in non-democratic or autocratic regimes, however, have greater leeway in choosing levels of
support that allow them to seize strategic opportunities, limit agency slack, and maintain greater influence over proxies. Thus, autocrats may find it easier and wiser to tailor strategies across the range of support typologies. Using an original typology of support based upon theoretical assumptions of cost and risk, this study tests the theory and the proposed causal mechanisms through both quantitative and qualitative research methods.

Chapter four analyzes the data using quantitative methods and finds evidence to support all three hypotheses. Through a dataset of directed dyad years from 1975 through 2009, this section uses multiple logistic regression models and robustness checks to test each hypothesis. The dependent variable is measured by *active external support* from a supporting state to insurgents targeting another state. Observations where external support exists are further classified as *low-level*, *mid-level*, or *high-level* support. Tests of the first hypothesis indicate that democratic regimes are less likely to provide external support to insurgent groups. Tests of the second hypothesis show that when democratic regimes do support insurgent groups, they are less inclined to provide *mid-level* support and more inclined to provide *low-level* support. Tests of the third hypothesis show that autocracies do not seem to prefer any particular level of support indicating that leaders of autocracies are less constrained and can choose levels of support that allow them to seize strategic opportunities and tailor strategies.

Chapter five explains the logic behind the qualitative methodology of structured, focused comparison and how it is applied to the case studies in the subsequent three chapters. Using the assumptions and explanations developed in chapter three, each case study examines the approximate span of an internal conflict and identifies within-case study cases where state leaders had to make a decision about providing active support to insurgent groups targeting a foreign state. For each of the cases, four questions are answered based upon evidence for
comparative purposes: (1) what structural constraints did the leadership face in making strategic decisions about the support to insurgent groups? (2) What role did domestic interpretation of international norms play in the decision-making? (3) How did threat perception or strategic opportunity affect the decision-making? (4) How did agency-sack and rebel autonomy affect decisions and outcomes?

The selection of cases was done to ensure that cases struck the balance between unit homogeneity, to better understand causal factors, and enough heterogeneity to provide greater plausibility of generalizations. Chapters six and seven maximize unit homogeneity by examining two separate conflicts that occurred within the same target state (Nicaragua) at different times, and with different regime types acting as the primary supporters of insurgent groups. Chapters seven and eight examine cases where the primary supporting state was a mature democracy (chapter seven - US; chapter eight – India) attempting to influence the outcome of an internal conflict within a neighboring target state.

Chapter six examines the external support to the Sandinista rebellion in Nicaragua. The case study provides cases that support the third hypothesis. The case study demonstrates how the leaders of two autocratic states tailored their support to a particular insurgent group over time to seize strategic opportunity. There is no evidence that leaders of either the Soviet Union’s or Cuba’s authoritarian governments experienced any significant executive constraints on their decisions. Without a free press to question decisions or oversight mechanisms imposed by a legislature or judicial branch, both countries were able to invest in the Sandinistas as part of a long-term strategy and watch their proxies fail repeatedly with little concern or consequence. When the Nicaraguan regime of Somoza was clearly weak politically in September of 1978, again the leaders of the two regimes were able to seize a strategic opportunity and dramatically
increase their support to the Sandinistas in a way that was decisive, but avoided full-military intervention.

The chapter also examines Costa Rica, a small but mature democratic regime. On the surface, the case appears to be deviant to the theory as Costa Rica’s leadership provided active sanctuary support to the Sandinistas in 1978. Yet a thorough qualitative examination of the case reveals that active sanctuary was perhaps the highest level of support available to the Costa Rican leaders, given the lack of an adequate military force and the state’s historical reliance on allies.

Chapter seven contrasts with chapter six. It examines the external support to the Contra groups that targeted the new Sandinista led regime in Nicaragua after 1979. Though the case study reveals cases that appear deviant to the theories proposed, qualitative examination reveals factors that led to exceptions, and evidence that the causal mechanisms proposed provided disincentives as predicted, but were overcome by other factors. Additionally, the contrast between chapter six and seven demonstrates that democratic leaders had difficulty closing the principal-agent gap and managing agency slack.

External support to the Contra groups began with two non-democratic states, Honduras and Argentina. Nevertheless, the leadership of the democratic US became the predominant external supporter of the groups and over the course of the conflict used mid-level types of support, which the theory says that democratic regimes should tend to avoid. The qualitative analysis however, demonstrates that the decision to support the Contras encountered both normative and structural constraints persistently throughout the life of the policy. The initial decision to support the groups occurred at a time when mid-level types of support of sanctuary and advice/capability were to be undertaken by third parties (Honduras and Argentina), while the
US would only provide *material* support. Argentina’s attack on the Falkland Islands and the subsequent withdrawal of their advisory force left the US CIA with little choice but to fill the gap.

The case study also reveals that the democratic nature of the US regime displayed structural disincentives that manifested in both ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms. The opposition party within the US legislature used its appropriation authority to attempt to restrict funding and activities of the executive (ex-ante). When the executive leadership ignored and tried to circumvent these restrictions, the free press exposed the activity, and the legislature and the courts became involved and imposed ex-post consequences on the executive leadership. Although the executive leadership maintained its winning coalition, it certainly suffered accountability costs.

Chapter seven is also valuable in that it demonstrates the difficulty that democratic leaders have in closing the principal-agent gap and managing agency slack with their rebel proxies. Thus, not only are structural and normative barriers at play, but rebel leaders can use the openness of democratic regimes to find alternative avenues of resource mobilization and interact directly with members of both the opposition and the leader’s winning coalition. This is one element of a possible causal mechanism not proposed in chapter three and amounts to a novel and unexpected finding reinforced by evidence in chapter eight.

Chapter seven also presents cases that give insight into interesting theoretical arguments. Several cases show that states that are outside of the politically relevant group (PRG) of the target state chose to provide *material* support in order to gain favor from the executive leadership of a powerful democracy. Additionally, the within-case study cases that examine Costa Rica and other Central American countries in the process of democratizing are valuable. These
observations expose the power of external incentives and how a powerful country can out-source support to insurgent groups by providing funds to a third party ostensibly for other purposes.

Chapter eight examines the external active support to Tamil insurgent groups during the Eelam War I (1979-1990). The case study is both crucial and partially deviant in that India, the lone state supporter in this case study, is the world’s largest democracy and provided mid-level support to a number of insurgent groups in the form of active sanctuary (with material and advice/capability) in order to influence the outcome of the intra-state conflict in Sri Lanka. The case differs most significantly from previous case studies in several ways. Not only did the conflict occur in a different region, but also the central grievance of the conflict was based on the politics of exclusion linked to ethnic and religious identity issues. Additionally, the conflict was only indirectly related to the Cold War and the strategic rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union.

The individual cases show that the normative and structural characteristics of India’s democracy failed to provide sufficient disincentive to compel leaders to avoid supporting insurgents. In fact, when the leadership of India decided to support the insurgent groups, they did choose to provide active sanctuary and advice/capability support: both mid-level types of support and contrary to the theory proposed. Though the central observations are deviant to the theory, the qualitative assessment of the conflict and the political relationships involved in decision-making offers some insight for theory refinement.

The case study demonstrates that Rajiv Gandhi, the leader of India, failed to close the principal-agent gap and manage agency slack with Tamil insurgents. Similar to the observations detailed in chapter seven, the open nature of Indian democratic institutions made this task excessively difficult. Tamil insurgent leaders, especially Prabakaran of the LTTE, were able to
use India to establish separate avenues of resource mobilization and maintain their independence and autonomy from their Indian sponsors. Although there were several issues that eventually caused Rajiv Gandhi and his Congress (I) winning coalition to lose the election of 1989, the grand scale of the failure of his policies in Sri Lanka certainly played a role as he and his party paid the accountability costs associated with intervention and the fact that a rebel proxy group had turned against the Indians. Thus, from this case study and from evidence in chapter seven it is reasonable to propose that the structural and normative characteristics of democratic regimes also make it harder for leaders to close the principal-agent gap and manage agency slack of the insurgent groups they support.

Chapter eight also provides an indication that the theoretical typology used in this dissertation requires some refinement. The typology developed in chapter three considers active sanctuary support a mid-level type of support, which is more risky than advice/capability support. Yet, as San-Akca (2016) asserts and as the case studies reinforce, democracies are more likely to be provided passive or defacto sanctuary to rebel groups. Thus, for democracies, turning defacto sanctuary into active sanctuary is actually a small increase in risk because of deniability. Similarly, if a state uses active sanctuary to also provide advice/capability support to insurgent groups, it may not be risking very much. When advice/capability support takes place inside the territory of the target state, however, it is an entirely different matter and the risk goes up. Thus, the typology developed for the dissertation still requires refinement both conceptually and operationally.

9.2 Prospects for Further Research

The findings in this dissertation provide inspiration for multiple areas of future research. This research involves questions that take a deeper, more nuanced look at the dependent variable
(support to insurgent groups) and the independent variable (regime type). Additionally, the data used in chapter four could be further expanded and exploited to examine the effects of global, great power competition. Also, greater understanding and measurements of agency slack and mechanisms for its management are needed. These particular areas could involve both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Finally, the dataset developed for this study has some interesting artifacts related to proxy war and great power rivalry.

This dissertation has tried to show that a typology of support that accounts for cost and risk is important. Conceptually this makes sense, but operationalizing the typology for quantitative examination has problems and falls short for a few reasons. Support comes in many forms with many characteristics and lumping support together as a singular factor of phenomenon has pitfalls. For example, the ordinal nature of the categories used here may not hold in all cases. Also, the UCDP-ESP-DS data used here was not operationalized or collected with the proposed typology in mind. The data simply existed in a separate typology that was merged into the typology of this dissertation based on the most logical formula (see table 4.1). There may be some misspecification as the qualitative examinations indicated. This is reinforced by the fact that the UCDP required that their be an internal conflict in order to qualify as an observation, which means that several instances of support might be omitted as support often begins before the conflict when groups are just establishing avenues of resource mobilization. Thus, a new dataset that is gathered with this typology in mind and accounts for the provision of on-the-ground advisory assistance in the target state might be useful. San-Akca’s (2016) dataset is close and still growing. Though her data specifies a slightly different typology it could be applied to test the hypotheses of this dissertation. Her data also has the advantage in that it is not just dyadic, but triadic as it includes the supporting state, the target state, and the different
insurgent groups. Thus it is used to test theoretical arguments related to both the state selection model (SSM) and the rebel selection model (RSM).

Further quantitative models that parse the independent variable of regime type and other missing variables might also help answer research questions. In other words, there is a lot more to regime type than democracy and autocracy. For example, the theory presented in this dissertation discusses executive constraints and the size of a winning coalition. Data on both of these factors exist and could add explanatory power to the models for better understanding of the specific elements of regime type that create incentives for leaders in their decision making. Also, recent literature has demonstrated that different types of democracies may approach diversionary war differently (Pickering and Kisangani 2005; 2011) as do different types of autocracies (Pickering and Kisangani 2010). The same may be true for support to insurgents groups.

Further qualitative examination may also be valuable and could help to answer the same research questions implied above. This dissertation provides an examination of case studies defined by a specific conflict and then identified observations that included numerous supporting states. While this approach allows for a deep understanding of the context of decisions made regarding that conflict, it does not allow for as much focus on the continuities of each regime. Another approach would be to examine a single regime overtime and identify within-case study cases where a leader decided to support an insurgent group. While the context of each conflict may not be as rich, the understanding of structural and normative characteristics within each regime would be richer than the approach used here.

Further research that develops theoretical arguments about agency slack and principal-agent gaps between insurgent groups and their sponsors is needed. The most unique and unexpected finding of this study is that the structural characteristics of democratic regimes may
cause democratic leaders to have difficulty managing agency slack with their rebel proxies. Though mid-level types of support may incur more costs and risks, they also facilitate screening, sanctioning, and monitoring; three actions that appear to help manage agency slack and influence rebel proxies. Research that measures agency slack, examines principal agent gaps, and compares methods for reducing these factors could be valuable.

The dataset used in chapter four shows some interesting characteristics that raise questions, which are outside of the stated hypotheses. The data exposes an interesting artifact about the Cold War and its relationship to democracies and support to insurgent groups. The theoretical assumption of norms and existential threats (Maoz and Russett 1993) which grounds the theory of this dissertation may be critical to explaining the significance of the Cold War for leaders of democratic countries weighing strategic options. The fact that Cold War is significant in testing H1 and the fact that descriptive statistics show an increase in democracies supporting insurgent groups that target other democracies in the post Cold War period is eye opening. All of the cases of democracies supporting insurgent groups that target other democracies occurred in either the post-Cold War period or toward the end of the Cold War. The existential nature of the conflict between super powers could explain, not only the increase in proxy war, but its absence could explain the rise in democracies being more willing to undermine each other in the post Cold War. As great power rivalry becomes more noticeable with the rise of Russia and China, ideational affinity between democracies might become more important than other strategic considerations. Democracies may become more likely to support insurgent groups that target non-democracies and less likely to support insurgents that target other democracies.
9.3 Implications for Policy Makers

Policy makers operating in democratic regimes should understand the pitfalls of operationalizing strategies that involve support to insurgent groups. Perceptions about threat trajectories may place policy makers in the difficult position of deciding between military interventions and doing nothing. In such circumstances using the unconventional strategic option of supporting insurgent groups that target an adversary may seem attractive. Yet, as this dissertation shows, the pitfalls are numerous, the structural and normative disincentives can be powerful, and the consequences of failure can be painful (even deadly). Having a robust understanding of key, interrelated theories found in this dissertation can help. These theoretical arguments include understanding (1) the centrality of principal-agent relationships, (2) the necessity of screening, monitoring, and sanctioning, (3) the importance of avenue of resource mobilization to insurgent groups, (4) the typology of support, and (5) the relationship of all of these to cost and risk. Perhaps equally important, policy makers in democratic regimes must understand that strategies pursued by autocrats may not be so easily copied. Though constraints inherent in the normative characteristics of democratic regimes may provide some disincentive, they are easily overcome by competing norms and a compelling threat trajectory narrative. The structural characteristics however, produce real disincentives to policy implementation, but also make success of such strategies more difficult once implemented. This is one strategic option that is just more difficult for democracies.

Principal-Agent Relationship

Principal-agent relationships are foundational to strategies of unconventional warfare. If leaders in a democratic regime do not want to risk full military intervention and opt instead for supporting an insurgent group, then they have become the principal and the leaders of the
insurgent group are now their agent. The conceptual difference between the vision of the future held by the principal and the vision of the future held by the agent is the principal-agent gap. Rebel leaders may not seek the same outcome from the relationship. The difference can be minute and specific, or it can be fundamental. When the principal-agent gap manifests itself in actions and methods of the agent that are counter to the desires of the principal, this is agency slack. When policy makers in democratic regimes consider supporting insurgent groups, they first need to identify and understand the principal-agent gap and then figure out ways to shrink that gap while managing the inevitable agency slack.

For policy makers in democracies, managing agency slack will be more challenging. Just as the LTTE did with India and Contra groups with the US, rebel leaders as well as their detractors can use the open institutions of democracies to appeal directly to political leaders and private citizens to resist efforts of the principal and chart their own path. These other actors may be critical members of the opposition or important members of a leader’s winning coalition. Thus, policymakers who fail to put emphasis on managing agency slack have already sewn the seeds of defeat.

Managing agency slack requires screening, monitoring, and sanctioning. Fidel Castro and the DGI did an effective job of doing all three during their long relationship with the Sandinistas. First, with the help of the KGB, they screened the group to ensure that its members were ideologically aligned and sought goals that were strategically favorable to Cuba. Then, over the years the DGI monitored their progress through training camps and conferences in Cuba, through agents in countries where the group had sanctuary, and after 1978, through military advisers that were on the ground and in the fight. When disunity among the Sandinistas threatened to waste a strategic opportunity, Castro used sanctioning by presenting the promise of future support and
the possibility of ending support to compel unity. Along with those resources came Cuban advisers that helped the principal to monitor the activities of the agent and therefore gave Castro significant influence over activities. In doing this, he seized a strategic opportunity by increasing the cost, but reducing the risks of failure.

Policy makers in democracies could, theoretically, do the same thing that Castro did. Yet in the case studies presented here, representatives of both India and the US failed to effectively screen, monitor, or sanction their rebel agents. The performance of Reagan and Gandhi in chapters seven and eight, make democratic leaders appear hapless when executing unconventional warfare. The norms of their domestic political processes did not prioritize the need for using screening, monitoring, and sanctioning to manage agency slack and compel group unity the way Castro did. The norms of autocratic regimes are simply more conducive to competing in the realm of armed politics that characterize intrastate war.

Rebel group leaders understand first hand that their grievance is not enough to build an effective organization, never mind actually prevail in a civil war. To build an effective political and military organization, they must mobilize resources. Building and maintaining avenues of resource mobilization is an existential task for rebel groups. Support from an external state power provides but one attractive avenue of resource mobilization. In the case studies involving both Nicaragua and India, rebel leaders first developed avenues of resource mobilization that involved crimes including kidnapping, bank robbery, and smuggling. They later turned to the solicitation of donations from diasporas and, if they controlled territory, through taxation. These avenues of resource mobilization are labor intensive, but provide a level of independence and autonomy. Accepting support from an external power might be less labor intensive, but may come with conditions of giving up some level of autonomy. Yet, if rebel leaders maintain
alternative avenues of resource mobilization, they can resist the loss of autonomy, prevent the principal’s efforts at managing agency slack, and reclaim their autonomy at a time and place of their choosing.

The typology of support is related to agency slack and to cost and risk. When it comes to support, there are plenty of ways to support an insurgent group. *Diplomatic* support and *material* support have the great advantage of being low cost and low risk. *Diplomatic* actions in support of rebels do not put much skin in the game and *material* support, whether it is money, non-lethal-goods, or weapons has little risk politically. It is easy to deny and as long as the sums are not disproportional to public expenditures, then there is little risk. But it also does very little to help with monitoring. Once *material* support is in the hands of rebels, it becomes sunk-expenditure. If the rebels use the *material* support contrary to the principal’s wishes, then the principal may have no idea. If the principal finds out, then he can threaten to sanction, but will still have no reliable means of monitoring. Providing advice, training, or enhancing the capability of insurgents to go beyond small isolated attacks can be more complicated, more costly, and more risky. It requires greater expense and may involve the lives of citizens. Advice can be out-sourced, but this increases risk as it creates additional principal-agent layers and problems. Yet, committing ones own advisers and trainers, especially if they are on the ground in hostile territory with insurgents, allows for effective monitoring, continued screening, and effective sanctioning that could help manage agency slack. In other words, the increased cost and risk of *advice/capability* support buys better agency slack management, a smaller principal-agent gap, and more influence and control over actions and strategy of the rebels. The same can be said about active *sanctuary*. Providing active *sanctuary* allows for better screening, sanctioning, and monitoring, but in a
democratic regime, it also may allow rebel leaders greater access to members of the opposition or winning coalition that could undermine or influence the strategies and policies of leadership.

Thus, policy makers in democratic regimes would do well to understand the structural disincentives and pitfalls inherent in the regime in which they operate. The shared power relationships that are structurally present in all democracies complicate the principal-agent relationship between the supporting government and the insurgent groups. The normative characteristics are easily overcome by competing norms. Unlike Democratic peace theory where the normative model, “may be a better overall account of…the phenomenon (Maoz and Russett 1993, 636)”, democratic resistance to engaging in active support to insurgent groups may be better explained by structural characteristic and the disincentives they generate.

The normative characteristics of democratic regimes add to and reinforce the structural disincentives and difficulties that democratic leaders have with multiple principal-agent problems. In the simplest terms, democratic leaders are not accustomed to the armed politics of intra-state conflict. The norms of democratic regimes, almost by definition, forbid the very idea of armed politics and exemplify unarmed politics. Armed politics is the very anti-thesis of democracy.
References


Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2006. “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research.” Political Analysis, 14(3), 227-249.


### Appendix A - List of Countries

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Appendix B - H₁ Random Effects

Table B.1 Time Series Logit RE all types of support. H₁

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N                      425,588        425,588
Pseudo R²               0.0184         0.635
Chi²                   47.91***      1987.6***

* p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 in one tailed test
## Appendix C - Large Dataset Descriptive Statistics

### Table C.1 Time Series Logit RE all types of support. H₁

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SS – Supporting State
TS – Target State
## Appendix D - H₁ Model Large Dataset

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| N                         | 859966              | 859966              |
| Pseudo R²                 | 0.0169***           | 0.657***            |
| Chi²                      | 32.68***            | 4963.8***           |

* p<0.1   ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 in one-tailed test
Appendix E - Supplemental Materials

The following supplemental files including replication data can be found on the KREX website. Go to https://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/ and search for this dissertation by author and title.

Gleiman Small Dataset (STATA 15.1 dta file)
Gleiman Large Dataset (STATA 15.1 dta file)
Gleiman Analysis.do (STATA 15.1 do file)