Loss aversion and US European security policy, 1989 to 1999

by

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B.A., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH GEORGIA, 2000
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Abstract

From 1989 to 1999, the US had an opportunity to end its rivalry with Russia. However, a “loss aversion heuristic” dominated the decision-making processes of George Bush and Bill Clinton resulting in policies that provoked Russian fears of encirclement. This “loss aversion heuristic” manifested in four key security decisions: the reunification of Germany within NATO, NATO expansion to newly independent states, the Balkans interventions, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Although initially suspicious of Gorbachev, Bush eventually pursued a policy of supporting his reforms. However, as the administration came to terms with the inevitability of German reunification and increased European integration as outlined in the Single European Act of 1987, worries about the US leadership role in Europe emerged. By the fall of 1989, Bush backed German reunification to bolster pro-NATO political parties in Germany.

As he assumed the presidency in 1993, Clinton wanted to increase financial assistance to Russia. However, when it came to security issues, Clinton’s fear of losing democratic gains in Eastern Europe to an emerging Russian nationalist movement made him less conciliatory to Russia. Despite Yeltsin’s dismay, Clinton pushed for NATO’s enlargement to protect the newly independent states.

The same “loss aversion heuristic” was in play with the NATO interventions in the Balkans in 1995 and 1998. Criticisms of NATO’s ineffectiveness at preventing genocide on the continent called into question the necessity of a European security organization that could not provide security. Even though the interventions cemented a continued rivalry with Russia, the US backed them as a means of protecting the relevance of NATO.
These decisions had implications to the US policy of protecting the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Instead of securing a nuclear security partner, US policy contributed to Russians selling technology to rogue regimes, and they resisted US attempts to create an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) system in Eastern Europe. In this way, US policy success in securing NATO resulted in decreased nuclear security.

In the first three security decisions, the US overestimated the probability of loss making them unable to consider a more cooperative posture vis-à-vis Russian security concerns. The result of this loss aversion was the protection of NATO and the loss of cooperation on the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
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Dedication

To Lucas Eldridge: May you always be bold in the face of adversity, steadfast in your commitment to virtue, and indefatigable in pursuit of your life’s dream.

*It was the same old tantalizing challenge to puzzles that had faced him ever since he was a boy. It was the certain knowledge that something had happened in the past—happened in an ordered, logical, very specific way. And the challenge had been, and still was, to gather the disparate elements of the puzzle together and to try to reconstruct that “very specific way.”*

--Colin Dexter, “The Remorseful Day”
Preface

In March 2014, I was in the last months of a military assignment in the newly established NATO Land Command located in Izmir, Turkey. It was during this time that the Russian Federation deployed Spetsnaz special forces soldiers to seize Crimea from Ukraine. Only two months later, Russia again deployed poorly disguised Spetsnaz units to invade Donbass and install a puppet secessionist government. This move could not be overlooked by the Ukrainian government, and open warfare erupted between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military. After the US imposed sanctions for these aggressions, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated in an interview with Bloomberg that “slowly but surely we are approaching a second Cold War that nobody needs.” Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was the culmination of a fourteen-year regression in which Vladimir Putin systematically rejected cooperation with the US. If there were any doubts about Putin’s anti-democratic inclinations, the Russian intervention in Ukraine put them to rest.

The deterioration of relations between the West and Russia in the first two decades of the twenty-first century caused me to wonder about how things had reached such a poor state. In my late teenage years, I witnessed how Mikhail Gorbachev embraced historic change with the reforms associated with his perestroika and glasnosts initiatives. At any moment, he could have intervened militarily in Central and Eastern Europe to thwart the democratic movements that emerged in 1989, but he chose to let freedom spread. His successor, Boris Yeltsin, overcame a 1993 coup attempt and implemented Russia’s first democratic constitution. To be sure, the constitution vested a large amount of power in the presidency, but the document placed Russia on the path to democratic governance. As part of their reform efforts, Gorbachev and Yeltsin both wanted better relations with the US and other Western nations.
Due to the democratic changes occurring within Russia, the years 1989 to 1999 were an excellent opportunity to bring Russia into Western security organizations. In fact, many of the political science theories I studied suggested that bringing transitioning democracies into security organizations helps bind them to cooperative norms and enables democratic transitions within member states. Bush used this logic in defending his insistence on bringing a reunified Germany into NATO, and Clinton used similar logic for enlarging NATO in the 1990s. Thus, at a theoretical level, including Russia in Western security organizations would have had the same outcomes. Including Russia would bind it to Western norms, facilitate its transition to democracy, and assuage its ancient fear of encirclement. In this way, managing the transitioning Russian democracy through membership in a pan-European security organization would be cheaper than continuing the costly power confrontation.

To be sure, Bush and Clinton both appreciated the value of international organizations. For example, the former president tried to incorporate Russia into NATO through the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The latter pursued a similar policy with 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which created the Permanent Joint Council to facilitate NATO-Russia cooperation. Both presidents advocated for an increased role for the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). However, although Clinton entertained the idea of Russian membership in NATO, neither of the presidents made a significant effort to bring Russia into NATO or to create an entirely different pan-European security organization. The most that was ever offered to Russia was membership in the Partnership for Peace (PiP) initiative, which was merely a gesture to appease Russian apprehension about NATO enlargement. Given the predicted advantages of including Russia in a pan-European security organization, I found it puzzling that the option of including Russia in such an organization was
discarded by both administrations. Assuming that theorists are correct about the predicted advantages of security organizations, one could imagine Russian cooperation on issues related to terrorism and weapons proliferation could be exceedingly helpful. However, for all intents and purposes, Russia was excluded, and they became a contributor to these problems.

Around the time that I was wrestling with this puzzle, I came across Daniel Kahneman’s book *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. In this book, Kahneman summarizes more than thirty years of psychological research into how heuristics affect human decision-making. His research culminates in an analytical perspective known as prospect theory, which refutes the rationalist decision-making models. According to rationalists, humans make decisions based on a perception of the probability of outcomes and their level of expected utility. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I cover in detail the assumptions behind expected utility. For now, it is enough to say that Kahneman refutes these assumptions. He argues that human decision-making is affected by a loss aversion heuristic when confronted with uncertain choices. Even if there is more utility and a favorable probability in a given choice, Kahneman’s research suggests that humans tend to make “loss averse decisions” that maintain a satisficing status quo. Thus, Kahneman argues that “losses loom larger than gains” in human decision-making. Utility and probability are less important considerations than the prospect of loss.

After reading Kahneman’s book, I realized that it offered a possible explanation for why the US chose decisions that rejected pan-European security cooperation and alienated the Russians. For more than forty years, NATO functioned well enough to ensure security in Europe. If the Russians were included, they might manipulate the internal politics of NATO to a degree that would make it a dysfunctional organization or, even worse, cause an internal split that would destroy the alliance.
At this point, I should note that I am fully aware that rationalists would argue that policymakers within the Bush and Clinton administrations chose to exclude Russia from NATO (or an alternative security organization) because they perceived a high expected utility of maintaining a cohesive security organization that maintained US political leverage in European affairs. While I concur with some aspects of this argument, my observations reveal that the decision was more complex and nuanced. My assumption throughout this work is that decision-makers in the Bush and Clinton administrations would have accepted a pan-European security organization if it were certain that it remained functional and included the US. Given Bush and Clinton’s deep appreciation for international organizations, they understood the potential value of including Russia; however, the uncertainty of the future outcome triggered a “loss aversion” decision-making heuristic that dominated.

Finally, this dissertation is not an attempt to prove cognitive theories superior to rationalist theories. At its core, this dissertation is a work of history influenced by psychological and political science theory. Furthermore, my utilization of Kahneman’s prospect theory does not mean that I reject utility maximization theory. On the contrary, experience and education convince me that human decision-making naturally aspires to the assumptions behind rational decision-making models, but there are factors that seem to disrupt rationality. This disruption creates anomalous outcomes. Indeed, rationalists do not refute this claim, and their research models do an admirable job of accounting for these disruptions. Thus, this dissertation is merely a contribution that utilizes one cognitive theory to explain US European security policy from 1989 to 1999. The US decision not to seriously consider a pan-European security organization is an anomaly worthy of consideration. I believe that Kahneman’s prospect theory is an original approach to explaining this anomaly.
Chapter 1 - Decision-making Theories and Historical Application

On December 25, 1989, Leonard Bernstein conducted a symphony orchestra comprised of musicians from both sides of the recently opened Berlin Wall. His selection was Ludwig van Beethoven’s “Ninth Symphony in D Minor.” The choice was appropriate. The choral arrangement in the fourth movement uses Friedrich Schiller’s poem “Ode to Joy” to celebrate the “brotherhood of humanity.” Written in the early nineteenth century when Europe was in the middle of its first attempt at rejecting hereditary monarchy, the symphony is full of Beethoven’s liberal sentiment and soars with suggestions of struggle, hope, and triumph. Bernstein did, however, change one aspect of Beethoven’s masterpiece. Instead of using the word “Joy” (*Freude*) in the choral arrangement, he used the word “Freedom” (*Freiheit*).

The opening of the Berlin Wall kindled similar feelings among audience members and international observers alike. Indeed, there was optimism that freedom would lead to a new era in European security relations. In attendance at the concert, Rita Süßmuth, a prominent West German politician, expressed optimism when she told a reporter, “We’re celebrating in Berlin, and we’re celebrating with good cause, but the issue is bigger than the German question. It’s about freedom, peace and justice in the entire world.”

Although the concert was a moment of hope, the world witnessed over the next ten years Russia’s regression from an emerging democracy to an emerging oligarchy. Just as Beethoven was disillusioned with the reactionary response of Europe’s post-Napoleonic epoch, the Western world of the twenty-first century became disillusioned with the prospect of achieving “freedom, peace and justice in the entire world.”

By the second decade of the twenty-first century, relations between the United States (US) and Russia deteriorated to a post-Cold War low, as evidenced by the confrontation over the status of Ukraine and Crimea. This divergence is especially acute in security cooperation on issues such as nuclear arms control, ballistic missile defense, and nuclear proliferation. From the Russian side, their security policies are necessary to counter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) encirclement. Historians such as Walter Laqueur dismiss these concerns. From his perspective, the Russians have an unnecessary fear of encirclement and overreact with aggression in their “near abroad” as a compensatory measure. Laqueur questions whether US security policy in Europe at the end of the Cold War had anything to do with the decisions of the Russian regime to engage in hostilities in the Ukraine and Crimea. “Perhaps NATO should not have admitted any further members,” Laqueur asserts, “but it is by no means certain whether such a concession would have calmed Russian nerves or whether, on the contrary, it would have been interpreted as a sign of weakness and an invitation to Russia to expand.”

In this dissertation, I disagree that US policy played no role in Russia’s security concerns—whether they are real or imagined. I argue that US security policy in Europe from 1989 to 1999 provoked Russian security fears and reinforced their distrust of the West. While Laqueur is correct that there is no way of knowing the alternative outcome of a more cooperative policy, he is wrong to dismiss the role of US European security policy in the current confrontational relationship. National security officials in the George H. W. Bush and William J. “Bill” Clinton administrations made maintaining the status quo of the NATO endowment the central focus of their European security policies. This commitment to maintaining the status quo influenced four critical security decisions that were provocative to the Russians:

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1) Bush’s decision to secure German reunification and include it in NATO;

2) Clinton’s decision to lead NATO in forcefully ending ethnic cleansing in the Balkans;

3) Clinton’s decision to extend NATO membership to Central and Eastern European nations while excluding the Russians;

4) Clinton’s decision to lead NATO in forcefully ending ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Each of these decisions confirmed perceptions of insecurity among Russian ultraconservatives, and they ultimately contributed to continued East-West power rivalry.

The central aim of this work is to contribute an empirically validated explanation for why US policymakers made these decisions. I argue that a series of “loss aversion” heuristic-based decisions related to protecting NATO were factors in all four decisions. However, before beginning this journey of explanation about decision behavior in US foreign policy, I will briefly discuss the conditions surrounding the unmade decisions. In other words, was a more cooperative East-West security policy a viable alternative, or was it merely an illusionary option that was unavailable to decision-makers in either administration? The evidence suggests that alternative courses of action were both theoretically formulated and historically possible.

**Exploring the Validity of Alternative Options**

Political scientists have long theorized that states form organizations such as the United Nations (UN), NATO, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) because they are an efficient means for pursuing their respective interests.³ Within these organizations, states maintain regimes, which are defined as sets of principles, rules, and norms

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prescribing and proscribing international behaviors. Through repeated interaction inside these organizations, theorists argue that path dependencies are created that make it easier for states to cooperate and more difficult for them to renege on established agreements.

G. John Ikenberry posits in *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* that victorious states of system altering wars voluntarily submit to security regimes that limit their power. Submitting to security regimes that bound the power of victorious states decreases perceptions of threat to other states. If other states in the international system feel less threatened, they are less likely to counterbalance against the victor and compete in costly arms races. Because victorious states voluntarily limit their power, defeated states allow them to create the rules for managing the post-war international system. Thus, the theory predicts that victorious states are likely to manage the international system through institutions, which is less costly than using material power.

In making his argument, Ikenberry asserts that NATO served such a role at the end of the Cold War and helped to convince the Soviets to accept a reunified Germany:

> The alliance tied the rising German power down within a dense set of Atlantic institutional links, and insured that American power would remain connected to Europe. If NATO was partly attractive to alliance members because it lessened European fears of American domination or abandonment, it also reassured outside states to some extent by restraining abrupt and offensive shifts in Western military power.

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4 It is important not to confuse organizations and regimes in this discussion. Organizations are politically constituted bodies such as the UN, NATO, and the CSCE. On the other hand, regimes are the established rules, norms, and procedures surrounding a general issue. Thus, security, economic, and environmental are all examples of operative regimes within the international system. Regimes often manifest with organizations, but they are not restricted to this venue.


6 Ibid., 272.
There is no disputing the fact that the Soviets and other European leaders wanted to constrain German military power. During the diplomatic negotiations over the reunification of Germany, Gorbachev stated unequivocally that US troops in Germany were necessary—even if it meant that NATO remained. However, if Ikenberry’s theory is correct and the US and other European leaders sought German reunification as NATO member state because of the institutional constraints it offered, why then did the West not follow the logic to its conclusion and incorporate Russia into a pan-European security structure to constrain its power? It appears they missed the grand prize of constraining Russian power by failing to include it into a pan-European security institution.

In fairness to Ikenberry’s theory, he points out that “Democracies are better able to create binding intuitions and establish credible restraints and commitments than non-democracies.”

By this logic, one might argue that the non-democratic nature of the Soviet Union made consideration of incorporating it into a security organization impracticable. However, as Stephen Kotkin notes, Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms led to the March 1989 elections in which “local soviets were to be revived by means of contested elections . . . which would in turn choose representatives to a thoroughly revamped USSR Supreme Soviet or working parliament” that moved “beyond the party’s hereditary power and acquiring a popular mandate.” To be sure,

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7 From 1989–1992 the Soviet Union dissolved, and its former republics established the Commonwealth of Independent States. Given that this dissertation covers this transitional period, referencing the country can be confusing. Unless it is necessary to do otherwise, I will use the term “Russia” consistently. However, there will be cases when I will need to mention the “Soviet Union.” Hopefully, this rare transition in technique will be readily apparent to the reader.

8 Ikenberry, After Victory, 75.

9 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, Amazon Kindle location 1029 of 3168.
these elections were still limited to one party, but they were multi-candidate and an historic change in policy. In his memoir, Gorbachev unsurprisingly cites the changes as significant:

> Profound democratic changes were begun. Free general elections were held for the first time, allowing real choice. Freedom of the press and a multi-party system were guaranteed. Representative bodies of government were established, and the first steps toward a separation of powers were taken.\(^{10}\)

In this quote, Gorbachev glosses over his power consolidating intentions for allowing these elections, but there is no question that democracy was taking root in the Soviet Union. After the December 1991 dissolution, Yeltsin moved Russia even closer towards democracy with the drafting of a new constitution that was approved through public referendum in December 1993. While trying not to overstate the level of democratization occurring in the Soviet Union and Russia, the point being made here is that there was evidence of an emerging democracy within the Soviet Union and Russia. Thus, discussions about their inclusion in NATO or some other pan-European security organization should not have been categorically excluded.

To be sure, both the Bush and Clinton administrations pursued some institutionalizing policies. For instance, the Bush administration backed the July 1990 NATO London Declaration, which suggested that the CSCE “should become more prominent in Europe’s future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America,” and the Clinton administration worked to establish the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which created the Permanent Joint Council to enhance collaboration and cooperation between NATO and Russia.\(^{11}\) Also, the Clinton administration implemented the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which made Russia a “partner” to

\(^{10}\) Mikhail Gorbachev, *On My Country and World*, Amazon Kindle location 1109 of 6027.

NATO. However, ultraconservative hardliners in Russia considered these efforts half measures and insulting to a great power. Despite these Russian objections, US security officials in both administrations did not envision a more inclusive alternative. As historian Hal Brands notes in *Making the Unipolar Moment*, “US officials doubted that alternative institutions, such as CSCE, could fulfill [a balancing] role [in Europe] because those institutions were not anchored by a stabilizing and pacifying American presence.” Because decision-makers in US foreign policy were anchored to the status quo, there was no effort to convene a summit to consider a different possibility; and even if only at a theoretical level, there were indeed other possibilities.

In a 1991 *International Security* article, Charles and Clifford Kupchan proposed a theoretical course of action to reorganize the CSCE into a pan-European security structure that would utilize great power management principles to pursue an all against one deterrence objective. Established as a consequence of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the CSCE was comprised of the US, Canada, and all the European powers to include the Soviet Union and Turkey. The Kupchans envisioned a reorganization that divided the CSCE into a two-tiered system similar to the UN: security and general membership. The security group would consist of the US, the Soviets, the UK, France, Germany, and a rotational membership from smaller countries. If a CSCE country were attacked, the security group of the CSCE would organize a collective defense through institutional processes.

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Under this proposed system, unanimous endorsement of a security action, a demonstrated obstacle to UN efficacy, would not be a requirement; a simple majority vote would prevail. To prevent automatic escalation as in World War One, a codified response would not be written into a treaty. Thus, the security group of the CSCE would have flexibility to deal with crisis situations. To minimize Western apprehension about such a foundational change in European security policy, NATO would continue as it had long operated. However, as the Security Group became firmly established and Russia continued to demonstrate cooperation and democratization, NATO would be phased out and replaced. The obstacle to such reforms, however, was that US decision-makers were deeply committed to the status quo and unable to consider a course of action that would replace NATO. In fact, this commitment made US decision-makers were unable to seriously consider including (e.g., through a summit or conference) Russia in NATO even though the Russians requested membership and Clinton ostensibly considered it a possibility.

Historians reveal that including Russia into NATO was possible. For instance, Mary Sarotte notes in *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* that Mikhail Gorbachev, after vigorously resisting and eventually accepting German reunification as a member of NATO, requested Soviet membership. According to Sarotte’s accounting, Gorbachev explicitly stated to US Secretary of State James Baker that Soviet membership was not some hypothetical point. If keeping Germany in NATO was right for European security, Gorbachev argued, then the Soviets should be included in the organization as well. Suspicious that Gorbachev only wanted to join NATO to divide the organization, Baker firmly responded that such pan-European security arrangements were impossible. Thus, the US decision not to allow the Soviets into

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NATO marks a departure from Ikenberry’s predictive model about institutionalizing after system-altering victories.

In his biography of Yeltsin, Andrew Felkay recounts that Yeltsin was eager to “establish friendly relations with NATO as a significant step of Russia’s integration into prosperous and democratic Western Europe.” To this end, Yeltsin, as the Russian leader of the post-Soviet state, sent a letter to NATO in December 1991 formally requesting membership.\(^\text{16}\) Yeltsin never received a response to the letter. “Even after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the Soviet Union,” Felkay writes, “NATO could not bring itself to seriously entertain Yeltsin’s offer. By not encouraging Russia to become a member, the West missed an excellent opportunity to strengthen Russia’s nascent democracy.”\(^\text{17}\) Instead, the West, led by the US, embraced the status quo.

During the Clinton administration, the idea of Russian membership in NATO was not categorically excluded. According to Strobe Talbott, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative included “an explicit affirmation that someday in the future—well after most or all of the Central European states had joined—Russia itself might apply for membership in NATO.”\(^\text{18}\) Clinton, however, never seriously pursued Russian membership in NATO. Despite his public endorsement of better US-Russian relations, Clinton was unable to follow through on a course of action that deviated from the status quo.

The commitment to protecting NATO had deep roots emanating from the earliest days of the Cold War. In 1952, Stalin sent a note calling for peace negotiations that included the


reunification of Germany as a neutral state. In this way, a neutral Germany would divide a US-dominated Western Europe and a Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. Stalin’s so called “peace note” was controversial because it divided NATO leadership. For example, Winston Churchill viewed the note as opportunity for negotiations to end East-West rivalry. The US, however, viewed Stalin’s note as an attempt to stall the establishment NATO, prevent the rearmament of West Germany, and create time for the Soviets to catch up with the US nuclear weapons program. In the end, nothing ever came of Stalin’s peace note because US leaders never took the offer seriously. Similarly, the US struggled to take Gorbachev and Yeltsin seriously when they proposed negotiations for security cooperation in Europe. Even though Bush and Clinton wanted transcend their Cold War experiences, it seems they were held captive to history.

The evidence suggests that an alternative course of action was both theoretically predicted and historically possible. Some theorists predict that states prefer the benefits of an international system that has been highly institutionalized. More interestingly, there were plausible hypotheses about how existing international organizations such as the CSCE could be modified to integrate the Soviets into the European security structure. However, the principal decision-makers of the time chose the alternative of maintaining the status quo. As stated previously, the aim of this work is to present an empirically validated explanation for why this decision was made; therefore, it is important to delve into the rich literature on how political leaders make decisions.

Rationalist and Cognitive Explanations for Decision-making

Within the respective fields of social science, the rationalist understanding of decision-making is the dominant analytical tool. Rationalist theories are founded on Daniel Bernoulli’s expected utility theorem, which explains how human subjectivity influences decision-making in uncertainty. According to Bernoulli’s well-known claim, the “diminishing marginal value” of wealth means that the utility of wealth is proportional to the current state of wealth. Thus, on a theoretical level, people who possess the same amount of wealth should have equal utility.

In 1941, John von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern expanded on Bernoulli’s expected utility theory by identifying five axioms that must be satisfied before a rational actor can determine the expected utility of an outcome. First, political decisions are made either by an individual or a group of individuals performing as unitary actors, and these unitary actors have defined preferences that are ranked. Second, all given choices adhere to the transitivity principle (if \( A > B \) and \( B > C \), then \( A > C \)). Third, within a continuous set of options, there must be an option in which a decision-maker assumes risk on a small probability of the worst-case scenario. Fourth, when given a choice in a range of preferences, individuals will consider the rank of their various options, the probability of future outcomes, and choose the highest rank ordered option. Fifth, if the decision-maker is indifferent to two decisions, then they will be indifferent if both outcomes offers the same probability.

If these axioms are met, then there is an equilibrium (or

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21 Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 270.
solution) at which decision makers will choose “a strategy from which a rational actor would have no incentive to deviate unilaterally.” For Neumann and Morgenstern, these axioms are both normative and descriptive in that they apply to how rational decisions should be made as well as how rational actors actually make decisions.

Both cognitivists and rationalists agree that there is uncertainty in decision-making, but it is in the realm of how decision-makers deal with uncertainty that cognitivist and rationalist begin to significantly diverge. As rationalist James Morrow correctly observes, uncertainty complicates how decisions are made:

If each and every action produced one outcome with certainty, chosen actions would follow directly from preferences of outcomes. An actor would just choose the action that produced the outcome ranked highest among the set of outcomes that could result. But we usually believe that actors are not certain about the consequences of their actions.

International politics is full of uncertainty about future outcomes. For rationalists, determining how a decision-maker deals with this uncertainty is based on a consistent application of Bayes’ theorem on conditional probability. In its simplest form, one merely needs to multiply “each possible outcome by the probability of that outcome’s occurring in the gamble.” To account for new information, Bayes’ theorem applies anterior probabilities of a given outcome prior to any information. Once new information is received, the posterior probability functions within


25 Ibid., 13.
the formula are updated and repeated for all the possible outcomes. In the end, the decision made (or equilibrium) is that which has the lowest cost and the highest probable outcome.26

Cognitivists disagree with this methodical approach to human decision-making in uncertainty. From the cognitivist perspective, decision-makers are humans who do not evaluate their choices per Bayesian mathematical models. Humans struggle with a wide range of policy decisions that involve the complex interplay of personal belief systems, domestic, and international politics.27 Furthermore, time constraints limit the ability of decision-makers to consider available information.28 Cognitivists argue that the complexity of this environment creates psychological anxieties which cause decision-makers to sacrifice increased long-term utility for the ease of what is most expedient at present. This satisficing behavior accepts the adage that “the better is the enemy of the good.” Decision-making, therefore, is much more chaotic and less predictable than rationalists claim. Cognitivists agree that rationalists’ approaches for explaining decision-making are useful for creating general theories, but they hold less value for understanding how decisions are actually made.

There are, however, attempts to bridge the divide separating the cognitivist and rationalist approaches to decision-making. For example, Alex Mintz’s poliheuristic theory posits that

28 It should be noted that rationalists utilize many tools to deal with what they term “bounded rationality.” For example, a decision-maker who does not have time to search for better information faces “search costs,” and these costs are accounted for in the mathematical modeling. The point here is that rationalists are not as rigid as some cognitivists claim. There are other “bounded rationality” tools available for rationalist research, but “search costs” helps to make the point about flexibility within the rationalist approach.
decision-makers use a two-stage decision process. In the first stage, decision-makers reduce complexity by systematically rejecting alternatives based on a few critical dimensions or attributes of the different choices. An important aspect of poliheuristic theory is that it is “non-compensatory,” which is the idea that an exceedingly high score in one dimension cannot counteract perceived lacking in a critical dimension. Therefore, there is very little consideration of maximizing utility or rank-ordering probabilities and/or preferences during this first stage. However, in many situations, more than one choice meets the critical attribute. When this happens, decision-makers enter a second stage in which a rationalist approach, as described above, is used to choose among the remaining alternatives.

Poliheuristic theory borrows from psychologist Daniel Kahneman’s prospect theory, which rejects assumptions about a drive to maximize utility. According to the theory, one must consider the notion of “reference point” to understand how humans engage in decision-making. At the cognitive level, the prospect of loss is much more daunting than considerations of utility. To illustrate, Kahneman offered in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow the following scenario:

Today Jack and Jill each have a wealth of $5 million.

Yesterday, Jack had $1 million and Jill had $9 million.


30 Poliheuristic theory suggests that acceptance of a course of action involves a “lexicographic heuristic” in which a choice is adopted because of the perceived importance of a single attribute. On the other hand, rejection of alternative choices is based on the “elimination by aspect” heuristic in which the elimination is based on the perceived importance of a single attribute.

Are they equally happy? (Do they have the same utility?)\textsuperscript{32}

Although they both have an equal amount of money (utility), the obvious answer to the question is that Jill is not happy because her “reference point” is different. Jack got a lot richer, and Jill, while still possessing the same amount of money as Jack, lost a lot of money. As a result, Jill is less happy than Jack even though both have the same amount of wealth. In this rhetorical example, Kahneman exposes a faulty assumption in Bernoulli’s expected utility theory about how utility is assessed. Prospect theorists have consistently demonstrated this “loss aversion” heuristic in repeated psychological experiments over the past forty-three years.\textsuperscript{33} According to Kahneman, to fully understand how humans evaluate decisions, one must consider how a “reference point” affects understanding about “possible outcomes and by the probabilities of these outcomes.” If it is a gamble (uncertain outcome), the options “can be framed either as gains and losses relative to the status quo.”\textsuperscript{34}

Further complicating claims about human rationality is Kahneman’s findings that human decision-makers have difficulty assessing probabilities. In his book, he relates a story in which Maurice Allais presented a group of Nobel Prize-winning economists and statisticians a question:

In problems A and B, which would you choose?

A. 61 percent chance to win $520,000 or 63 percent chance to win $500,000

B. 98 percent chance to win $520,000 or 100 percent chance to win $500,000\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} Daniel Kahneman, \textit{Thinking, Fast and Slow}, 436.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 312–315.
According to Kahneman, the group, which included well-known names such as Paul Samuelson, Kenneth Arrow, and Milton Friedman, chose the left-hand option in A and the right-hand option in B. This was, however, a violation of rationality. In problem A, the participants were perfectly willing to sacrifice two percentage points for the chance to win $520,000 versus $500,000. On the other hand, the participants declined a 98 percent chance of winning $520,000 for a 100 percent chance of winning $500,000. Given that 98 percent is a near certainty for winning, the sophisticated participants Allais polled should have chosen the left-hand option of $520,000 in problem B, but they chose the absolute certainty of $500,000 instead. In mathematical terms, this is completely illogical. According to Kahneman, this inconsistency has a psychological explanation: “The certainty effect is at work. The 2 percent difference between a 100 percent and a 98 percent chance to win in problem B is vastly more impressive than the same difference between 63 percent and 61 percent in problem A.”\(^{36}\) In this way, they underweighted the near certainty of achieving a $20,000 gain.

The “certainty effect” also has a corresponding “possibility effect,” which causes humans to overweight improbable outcomes. Table 1 below presents Kahneman’s research findings on how humans weight probabilities:

**Table 1. "Loss Aversion" and Weighted Probabilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>95</th>
<th>98</th>
<th>99</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Weight</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Kahneman, these results demonstrate how rationalists’ assumptions do not hold because humans are challenged in assessing probabilities: “For example, the decision weight that corresponds to a 2 percent chance is 8.1. If people conformed to the axioms of rational choice,

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\(^{36}\) Ibid., *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 314.
the decision weight would be 2—so the rare event is over-weighted by a factor of 4.”

However, humans have a tendency to overweight improbable outcomes. The “certainty effect” and “probability effect” will be revisited in Chapter 6. For now, it is only necessary to understand Kahneman’s argument that the “loss aversion” heuristic changes perceptions of expected utility and diminishes human ability to assess the probabilities of future outcomes.

Figure 1 below is Kahneman’s famous chart for demonstrating the “loss aversion” asymmetry in decision-making. According to Kahneman, “If prospect theory had a flag, this image would be on it.” On the x-axis, one sees the possibility of loss relative to a given reference point or current state of wealth. The y-axis represents the psychological value individuals place on the possibility of gain or loss. One of the revealing findings of Kahneman’s research is the significant drop off in psychological value (y-axis) to the prospect of losing very little and the slower increase in psychological value to the prospect of gain. The result is an asymmetrical s-shaped curve. “The slope of the function changes,” Kahneman asserts, “abruptly at the reference point: the response to losses is stronger than the response to corresponding gains. This is loss aversion.”
Kahneman’s research focuses on prospect theory’s application to economic questions, but he argues that the results are applicable to political decisions as well: “Many of the options we face in life are ‘mixed’: there is a risk of loss and an opportunity for gain, and we must decide whether to accept the gamble or reject it. Investors who evaluate a start-up, lawyers who wonder whether to file a lawsuit, wartime generals who consider an offensive, and politicians who must decide whether to run for office all face the possibilities of victory or defeat.”39 Although he disagrees with prospect theory, prominent rationalist Jack Levy agrees that the conclusions within prospect theory are significant:

This asymmetry in the way people renormalize to gains and to losses has serious implications for conflict, cooperation, and bargaining in international relations and elsewhere. If A seizes territory from B, for example, prospect theory suggests that B will take excessive risks to recover its losses while A will take excessive risks to maintain its gains.40

Political leaders are indeed charged with making decisions among a range of choices with uncertain outcomes, and the Bush and Clinton administrations were confronted with many.

Unlike monetary values, which are explicit and fixed at a given point in time, the value of political decisions varies based on the assumptions of an individual decision-maker. In this way, the challenge for applying prospect theory to a historical analysis of decision motivations is defining the real value for a range of possible outcome. In terms of US European security options from 1989 to 1999, I assume that both the Bush and Clinton administration placed a high value (or utility) on institutions in general. If they knew for a certainty that including the Soviets and, later, the Russians in a pan-European security organization would work, then this is the policy option that would have been chosen. As institutionalists suggest, this is a more optimal solution because it decreases resistance to cooperation on security issues. Figure 2 below uses institutionalist logic and replaces monetary value with the institutionalized outcomes. Thus, the options available to US policymakers ranged from limited bi-lateral cooperation on the left side of the x-axis to a completely integrated pan-European security organization on the right side of the x-axis:
The results of my historical research suggest that the US had a contradictory perspective on the prospect of gain and loss from 1989 to 1999. On one hand, the US adhered to an institutionalizing approach to US European security policy. Insisting on German membership in NATO in 1989, and enlarging NATO with the inclusion of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in 1997 are examples of the high value US policy officials placed on institutions. On the other hand, US policy officials depart from institutionalists’ assumptions vis-à-vis Russia. In this case, the US refused to consider including Russia because they believed that it would destroy NATO—even if this outcome was highly improbable. Thus, the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1992, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, and the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997 are all sub-optimal decisions that were influenced by a “loss aversion” cognitive heuristic. These sub-optimal cooperative measures were ultimately a means to protect the NATO status quo. Thus, the desire to protect NATO consistently trumped the desire to cooperate with Russia on German reunification, the Bosnia intervention, NATO enlargement, and the Kosovo intervention.
In examining US European security policy, one can see how the protection of NATO was a “reference point.” Even though including Russia in European security institutions might have drastically improved future relations, maintaining the viability of NATO was the “reference point” for critical decisions, and US decision-makers were not keen to pursue any option that might threaten the status quo. In his 1992 book Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger captured this sentiment when he wrote about the impossibility of US-Soviet cooperation over the status of Germany in 1953: “There are some experiments in diplomacy which cannot be tried because failure invites irreversible risks. And the risk of a collapse of all that had been built in the Atlantic Alliance was significant.”

Throughout this work, I utilize the assumptions of prospect theory to examine the key European security decisions that occurred. The intent of my work is not to prove the validity of rationalist or cognitive theories. On the contrary, both offer valuable lenses for understanding human decision-making. However, given that rationalist assumptions are overwhelmingly represented in the study of the end of the Cold War, I believe the cognitive lens offers an original way of interpreting the critical events that occurred during this epoch of history. I will apply prospect theory to the security assumptions of each administration as they assumed office, the security environment in which they applied their assumptions, and how those assumptions evolved and were realized in actual policy decisions. Each administration made important foreign policy decisions that resonated well beyond their tenures. When making these decisions, both administrations were concerned about how the Russians would react, but they were not so concerned as to seriously consider Russian security concerns.

Historiography

For some historians, the end of the Cold War provides examples of ineffectiveness in both the Bush and Clinton administrations. In this narrative, US foreign policy suffered from a lack of vision and leadership compared to the containment policy. Often, the US found itself pursuing the sometimes contradictory notions of democracy, free-market capitalism, sovereignty, stability, and international order.42 According to Strobe Talbott and Michael Beschloss in *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*, the Bush administration’s lack of vision resulted in a reactionary response of supporting the stability of the Gorbachev regime at the expense of rising democratic movements in the Soviet republics.43 On the other hand, the Clinton administration developed a contradictory policy of supporting democracy in Russia while simultaneously trying to prevent genocide in Bosnia and protecting emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. For some scholars, Clinton’s self-defeating policy was a result of his lack of focus on foreign policy issues.44 William I. Cohen, Clinton’s last Secretary of Defense, argues as much in *America’s Failing Empire: US Foreign Relations since the Cold War*:

The critical problem with the Clinton administration’s foreign policy was the lack of presidential leadership. His appointment of [Warren] Christopher as secretary of state and [Anthony] Lake as national security adviser compounded the problem. Both were highly intelligent, experienced and able, but neither had the charismatic personality that might have allowed them to compensate for a


disengaged president. Their successors, Albright and Berger, proved to be only a marginal improvement. In fairness to Christopher, Lake, Albright, and Berger, it probably would have taken someone as forceful as Dean Acheson or Henry Kissinger to fill the gap.\(^{45}\)

This lack of leadership was especially manifest in Clinton’s incoherent Bosnia policy that shifted based on the demands of any given moment.

Other historians argue that the worldviews of the various decision-makers are a critical component to understanding US foreign policy decisions from 1989 to 1999. Borrowing from international relations theory, James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul posit in *Power and Purpose: US Policy toward Russia after the Cold War* that the realist and liberal international relations perspectives of the Bush and Clinton administrations played a significant role in their decision-making.\(^{46}\) However, the regular departures in each administration from the assumptions behind these worldviews make this analysis problematic. For example, realists have little use for international organizations, but Bush, whom Goldgeier and McFaul label a realist, was very much committed to the importance of international organizations to the proper functioning of the international system. As diplomatic historian Jeffrey Engel noted, Bush felt that “sovereignty and respect for recognized borders must be maintained for the international system to function . . . especially as he explained why it was important for the United Nations, which he considered as a result of his own service as UN ambassador, to embody the consensus of world opinion.”\(^{47}\)

Even Goldgeier and McFaul acknowledge that the worldview explanation “covers up many


nuances, paradoxes, and contradictions, while at the same time ignores many factors beyond ideas that intervened to influence the making of American policy toward Russia.”

Another historical explanation presented for explaining US policy at the end of the Cold War focuses on pure power politics. From this angle, US foreign policy at the end of the Cold War fixated on, as Odd Westad noted in *In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11*, “creating a world that is more amenable to US interests, ideologically, politically, and economically.” According to Andrew Bacevich in his book *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy*, US foreign policy decisions can be traced to a single purpose:

That purpose is to preserve and, where both feasible and conducive to US interests, to expand an American imperium. Central to this strategy is a commitment to global openness—removing barriers that inhibit the movement of goods, capital, ideas, and people. Its ultimate objective is the creation of an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms.

A European security construct managed through NATO served as a “bulwark against Soviet aggression” and “an instrument to promote Europe's political and economic transformation while cementing the advantageous position that America had secured in Europe as a result of victory in


World War II.” To this end, Hal Brands posits in *Making the Unipolar Moment: US Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War* that the decision to back German reunification in NATO was made “to keep US power and influence at the center of post-Cold War Europe.”

Maintaining NATO was the proven way to accomplish this objective.

To be sure, the US aggrandizing narrative has been explored in depth. However, the historical record suggests that there was more in play at the end of the Cold War than American triumphalism and the consolidation of strategic gains. Both Bush and Clinton were personally connected to Gorbachev and Yeltsin. They sincerely wanted the Russians to be part of the democratic community of nations. Bush refused to travel to Berlin in November 1989 to celebrate the fall of the Berlin Wall. In explaining his decision, Bush recollected, “What would I do, dance on the wall?” Furthermore, US support to Russia went beyond mere sentiment. From 1992 to 1998, the US paid out $5.4 billion in direct economic assistance to Russia. Thus, while the US did indeed capitalize on its superior position at the end of the Cold War with the expansion of NATO, the idea that neo-imperialism was the sole US objective vis-à-vis Russia at the end of the Cold War seems incomplete. At the very least, there was a conflicted nature to US policy.

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52 Ibid., Amazon Kindle, location 96-97 of 3939.
In this dissertation, I offer a different interpretation to the commonly accepted historical narratives. Due to cognitive heuristics associated with managing risks, US policy was conflicted between bringing Russia into Western institutions and protecting a long-established US-led NATO security construct. The perceived success of NATO as a critical component of European security was a “reference point” or “endowment” from which decisions were made. When there was a perception that the “endowment” was threatened, US decision-makers chose to protect the endowment even if it meant antagonizing the Russians. They had cognitive heuristics that made them “loss averse.” As historian Mary Sarotte noted in *In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11*, the end of the Cold War was a “punctuational” moment when great change was possible, but the “US policy response was an energetic effort to ensure the perpetuation of Cold War institutions, specifically NATO, in the post-Cold War world.”  

One significant advantage to using prospect theory to interpret this epoch in US-Russian foreign relations is that it is neutral. There is a temptation to think of “loss aversion” as a negative attribute, and there is no doubt that a missed opportunity for a more cooperative international situation is a sub-optimal outcome. However, Kahneman points out that there are beneficial attributes associated with this cognitive heuristic:

> Loss aversion is a powerful conservative force that favors minimal changes from the status quo in the lives of both institutions and individuals. This conservatism helps keep us stable in our neighborhood, our marriage, and our job; it is the gravitational force that holds our life together near the reference point.  


58 Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 305.
The decision to protect NATO might be the best decision ever made in the history of US European security policy, or it may be the worst? This is a subjective question that is beyond the scope of this inquiry. We do, however, know that US decisions made during this period were antagonistic to the Russians, and Western leaders are dealing with the consequences of those decisions today.

**Methodology**

Identifying the decision-making criteria of an individual is a monumental task. In fact, one might successfully argue that accurately knowing the decision motivations of a human being is near impossible. This difficulty is exponentially compounded when considering the motives of several humans within multiple administrations. Determining how experiences, media criticism, political pressure, and public sentiment affects leaders is indeed a challenge. However, in the course of archival research, it is possible to observe actual statements, connect them with the events of the time, and deduce from them plausible decision motivations. For example, Fredrik Logevall’s excellent work in *Choosing War: The Last Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* examines how the opinion of other world leaders, media elites, and the American public supported the de-escalation of US involvement in Vietnam. Thus, the war was not inevitable. Despite this fact, Johnson, because of his belief that losing the war would be a personal embarrassment, chose to increase US troop levels in 1965.

In this dissertation, I take a similar approach. Methodologically, I attempt to identify the policy inclinations of both the Bush and Clinton administrations before taking office and how those inclinations were affected by political pressures emanating from the public, media, other

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politicians, and their Russian counterparts. I utilize the “loss aversion” aspect of Kahneman’s prospect theory to establish an alternative explanation for how these factors interacted and manifested in critical decisions. As with Johnson’s decision to escalate in 1965, nothing about how the Cold War ended was inevitable. There were alternatives.

In terms of European security policy from 1989 to 1999, I have identified ten different “loss aversion” heuristics. Table 2 lists each of the “loss aversion” heuristics and their related decisions:

**Table 2. Loss Aversion Decisions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bush Administration: 1989 to 1992</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss Aversion Heuristic 1: Protecting Flexible Response</td>
<td>Compromise on Short Range Nuclear Force Modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Aversion Heuristic 2: Protecting the US-German Strategic Relationship</td>
<td>Support Helmut Kohl’s Decision for German Reunification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Aversion Heuristic 3: Protecting German Membership in NATO</td>
<td>Critical Security Decision: Secure German Membership through “2 Plus 4” Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Aversion Heuristic 4: Protecting European Stability</td>
<td>Staying out of the Yugoslav Civil War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clinton Administration: 1993 to 1999</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss Aversion Heuristic 5: Protecting Political Prospects of Russian Reformers</td>
<td>Focus on Negotiations over Balkans Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Aversion Heuristic 7: Protecting Democracy and Liberal Economic System</td>
<td>Institutional Integration of East-West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Aversion Heuristic 8: Protecting Central and Eastern Europe from Russian Revanchism</td>
<td>Critical Security Decision: Enlargement of NATO to Include Central and Eastern European States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Aversion Heuristic 9: Protecting from Proliferation of “Loose Nukes”</td>
<td>Eliminate Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Pursue Denuclearization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although each “loss aversion” heuristic is interrelated and has an associated decision, only four of the choices fall into the category of what I have determined to be *critical security decisions*. They are critical because they directly contributed to an East-West rivalry that endures to the
In this way, the “loss aversion” lens is utilized to summarize the critical European security decisions previously identified. As Kahneman has noted, the “loss aversion” heuristic is identifiable in all negotiations:

If you are set to look for it, the asymmetric intensity of the motives to avoid losses and to achieve gains shows up almost everywhere. It is an ever-present feature of negotiations, especially of renegotiations of an existing contract, the typical situation in labor negotiations and in international discussions of trade or arms limitations. The existing terms define reference points, and a proposed change in any aspect of the agreement is inevitably viewed as a concession that one side makes to the other.  

This dissertation is indeed “set to look” for the loss aversion heuristic.


Comprised of men who learned their statecraft during the contentious days of détente, the Bush administration came to office determined to place a traditional Cold War mentality on a fast-changing international system. However, the public response to Gorbachev’s continued peace overtures and his demonstrated restraint to European liberation movements in Europe forced the Bush team to develop a security policy that moved “beyond containment.” To be sure, they developed this policy begrudgingly and with a fair amount of suspicion of their old rivals. However, by the end of the Bush’s term in office, he and his team felt comfortable enough with Gorbachev that he publicly cautioned Soviet republics in 1992 to pursue independence cautiously lest it lead to ethnic conflict similar to what was occurring in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Bush’s confidence in Gorbachev’s and, later, Yeltsin’s sincere desire for reform allowed them to achieve historic arms control reductions that have yet to be equaled. In many ways, this was the apex of East-West security cooperation.

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60 Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 304.
Choosing Compromise on Short-Range Nuclear Force Modernization

The Bush national security team came to office with a traditional Cold War mindset and determined to protect the Cold War strategic doctrine of “flexible response.” They were worried that Reagan’s 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty, which eliminated all ground-based cruise and ballistic missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometers, was unwise because it was founded on an “unwarranted assumption that the changes in Soviet attitudes and rhetoric or perhaps the accession of Gorbachev to power, signaled the end of the forty-year confrontation between East and West.” Reducing the number of nuclear weapons was acceptable as long as the Soviets were willing to cut a substantial amount of conventional forces. Deterring the Soviet conventional capability was the reason why nuclear weapons were necessary. Thus, Bush used the first few months of his administration to slow down US-Soviet peace initiatives. Known as the “Bush Pause,” his national security team wanted to develop a European security policy that included a reduction in Russian conventional forces in Eastern Europe and a modernization to the Short-range Nuclear Force (SNF), which was considered crucial to defending US troops in West Germany, especially since the INF treaty eliminated key elements of the flexible “response capabilities.” However, Bush found it politically difficult to slow the process due to Gorbachev’s “peace offensive” urging further cooperation.

Eager to bolster his perestroika policy through continued rapprochement with the US, Gorbachev used high rhetoric in speeches at the UN and the Council of Europe to advocate for a “common European home” that included both the US and Russia. In these speeches, he

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committed to unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe. Such language was well received by left-wing political parties in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) who advocated for a change in European security policy. The Green Party rejected nuclear deterrence, promoted FRG withdrawal from NATO, the restructuring of NATO to include a European pillar that was more independent from the US, and increased negotiations with the Soviets.63

Considered a fringe party in West German politics, the US concern about the Greens was not that they would win executive level positions; rather, the worry was about the influence the Greens might have on the policies of the mainstream parties: Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Freedom Democratic Party (FDP).64 Since the Green Party splintered from the SPD in 1982, the more conservative and NATO-friendly CDU held the chancellorship. To rebuild a winning coalition against the CDU, politicians from the SPD and CDU embraced some of the anti-nuclear rhetoric of the Greens. The possibility that an anti-nuclear coalition of FDP and SPD could win the December 1990 elections was concerning to the Bush administration.

This concern was amplified by the fact that the European Community (EC) had just agreed to the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987, which sought to achieve the full economic, legal, and security integration of the European Community by December 31, 1992. The SEA


created uncertainties about the future of Europe and whether it would remain contained in the existing NATO system. Furthermore, US policymakers assessed that the economically powerful FRG would be the leader of a fully integrated Europe, and the anti-NATO Green Party was increasingly exerting its influence on various political parties. As a result, US leaders were keen to ensure they formulated policies that bolstered the political prospects of Helmut Kohl who was pro-NATO.

Thus, when Helmut Kohl came under intense pressure in 1989 not only to resist Bush’s efforts at SNF modernization but to eliminate the weapons system entirely, the Bush team decided to compromise to take political pressure off Kohl. The US agreed to postpone modernization until after 1992 when the Soviets followed through on a proposed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, which established an acceptable level of parity in conventional capabilities between NATO and the Soviets. Furthermore, after CFE was complete, the US would enter into negotiations about the partial reduction of SNF.

In this way, the Bush administration identified its policy dilemma as maintaining flexible deterrence without alienating the West German population to the point that they would elect an anti-NATO political coalition. Furthermore, given its economic preeminence on the European continent, the FRG was sure to be the most influential political player in a unified Europe after full European integration in 1992. In a worst-case scenario, a united Europe led by an SPD coalition in the FRG might lead the continent to adopt a European identity that was conciliatory to the Soviets and did not include the US as chief guarantor of European security. In and of themselves, these were tricky diplomatic considerations, and the Bush team felt the CFE proposal and SNF compromise would be enough to counter Gorbachev’s peace initiatives.
However, events in the summer and fall of 1989 would compound the complexity and force the Bush team to make quick decisions with long-term implications.

**Choosing “Two Plus Four” to Control the Process**

Although Kohl’s ten-point plan outlined a gradual process towards reunification, political events within the GDR were deteriorating to a point where reunification was going to occur sooner than anticipated. Even the Soviets conceded that Reunification was inevitable whether they liked it or not. Thus, a diplomatic confrontation emerged in how the reunification process would happen, but they wanted it to happen on terms that were equitable regarding security. Thus, they advocated various German reunification schemes ranging from German neutrality to simultaneous membership in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

None of these options were acceptable to Bush administration officials. From their perspective, NATO could not exist without full German membership. Therefore, the only acceptable option was Germany reunified as a full member of NATO. In order to achieve this objective in a way that did not completely undercut Gorbachev was to involve the Soviets in reunification in such a way that they were unable to prevent a reunified Germany’s NATO membership. To this end, the US State Department devised the so called “Two Plus Four” diplomatic process in which the two German states would negotiate internal political issues (e.g., monetary union, future elections, alliance membership, etc.), and the “Four Powers” would negotiate external issues (e.g., CFE, termination of the legacy “Four Power Rights,” settlement of the border question, etc.). In this way, the “Two Plus Four” ostensibly acknowledged the Soviets, but they were prevented from interfering in Germany’s internal security decisions.65

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Gorbachev eventually accepted the “Two Plus Four” mechanism, and he agreed in a May 1990 Washington summit to allow Germany to choose its alliance. These events were politically damaging for Gorbachev, and his leadership of the Soviet Union came into question in the July 1990 28th Party Congress in Moscow. Gorbachev’s political troubles caused the Bush national security team to begin a transition in its strategic thinking. If Gorbachev was forcibly removed from power, it might cause a reactionary response that would lead to an instability that threatened German reunification and the existence of NATO.

Only a few weeks prior to Gorbachev’s visit for the Washington Summit, Bush revealed in a commencement address at Oklahoma State University how his thinking was transitioning from securing German reunification in NATO to stability. To strengthen Gorbachev’s political position, the US needed to offer something in return for Soviet acceptance of German reunification in NATO. He acknowledged the momentous changes occurring in the Soviet Union, called for a NATO summit to review its strategy, and announced his intention to accelerate negotiations on SNF reductions agreed to in May 1989. Two months later the NATO summit occurred, and the result was the London Declaration in which NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with Russian representation, declared the Soviets no longer an enemy and made many of the changes Bush announced in the Oklahoma State University speech. These changes in NATO gave Gorbachev the political space he needed, and German reunification occurred in October 1990 without Soviet intervention.

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Choosing Stability

As independence movements spread throughout Eastern Europe, Soviet republics started demanding their independence. Bush administration officials feared the loss of stability in Eastern Europe, and the emerging break-up of Yugoslavia compounded this fear. If a country like Ukraine suffered a similar fate as Yugoslavia, the presence of nuclear weapons would make the security situation dire. Therefore, in a 1992 speech to the Ukrainian parliament, Bush chided its members not to break from the Soviet Union. In this way, Bush and his national security team were leery of choosing any security policy that undercut what they viewed as a stabilizing Soviet regime, and this policy had a detrimental effect on preventing conflict associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia.67

When Slovenia and Croatia broke away from Yugoslavia in July 1991, Serbia used force to try to keep the country together. The fighting intensified in 1992 when Bosnia attempted to achieve independence. A key strategy to the Serbian military campaign was rape and indiscriminate killing to seize territory, drive out the Muslim population, and create a greater Serbia. Despite this carnage, the Bush administration refused to intervene. On the surface, the decision not to intervene was related to the ethnic difficulties of the situation, but Bush also wanted to avoid any action that might destabilize the Gorbachev regime. David Halberstam presents this as the main reason for Bush’s non-intervention decision on Bosnia:

Thus, a fascinating critical issue, which overshadowed the violence in Yugoslavia, came from a third country—not what was good for the people of Yugoslavia, but what was good for Mikhail Gorbachev and American-Soviet relations. Gorbachev was attempting to navigate his way through the difficult—indeed treacherous—period that came with the collapse of a once great empire. The stakes in his success as far as American policymakers were concerned were

immense . . . If Gorbachev were successful, it would mean nothing less than the end of a rival superpower and an entire forty-year era of terrifying nuclear tensions.\textsuperscript{68}

The Bush administration did not want to do anything that might endanger the political changes occurring in the Soviet Union. To be sure, achieving the reunification of Germany in NATO was destabilizing enough without following it with an intervention in a region the Soviets viewed as firmly within their sphere of influence.

Ironically, Bush’s decision not to intervene in Bosnia did little to help the political fortunes of his counterpart in the Soviet Union, and it did even less for his own political prospects. When Russian president Boris Yeltsin led the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991, the Soviet Union effectively ceased to exist. A few weeks later Gorbachev resigned his post as president of the Soviet Union. Eleven months later, Bush lost his reelection bid to a candidate who went out of his way to place blame for the Yugoslavian situation on a failed US foreign policy. In the end, history moved beyond Bush, Gorbachev, and the Soviet Union, but a US-led NATO remained intact.


In his presidential campaign, Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration for not doing more to help the Bosnian Muslims, and he indicated that his administration would do more to help emerging democracies and prevent ethnic violence in Eastern Europe. Russia was one of the democracies he was intent on supporting. However, he soon discovered that ending the violence in Bosnia was more complicated than he anticipated. If he intervened to stop the violence, he created a political vulnerability for Boris Yeltsin and a group of pro-Western

\textsuperscript{68} David Halberstam, \textit{War in a Time of Peace}, 32.
reformers who were facing constant political challenges from communist and nationalist political parties in Russia. If these parties came to power, they might renege on agreements to withdraw Russian troops from the Baltics, and the Clinton team might be accused of “losing Russia.”69

Thus, despite his publicly stated commitment to do more than Bush to assist Bosnian Muslims, his administration chose for the first two years of his administration to embrace negotiations over action in Bosnia.

However, as public scrutiny of the US Balkans policy increased, the futility of NATO as an institution came into question. Commentators in the media and US Congress wondered why NATO, an organization committed to maintaining peace and security in Europe, existed if it could not stop the Balkans conflict. Even worse, the French elected Jacques Chirac as its new president in 1995, and he was keen to grandstand about the lack of action in Bosnia and looked to be a stronger leader than the US president. Furthermore, Russia finally followed through in August 1994 with the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic states. Under these conditions, Clinton chose to lead NATO into a sustained air campaign that ended the Bosnian conflict in a month. Clinton’s concern over the loss of NATO’s credibility finally trumped his concern over possibly “losing Russia.”70

**Choosing Negotiations**

In the 1992 US presidential campaign, Bill Clinton criticized George Bush for his lack of support for Russia, and he was sincere in his desire to assist the Russians. Clinton viewed the problem from an economic perspective. If the Russian state had a healthy economy, it would not cause any problems as the West worked to secure democracy in Eastern Europe. Critical to

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69 Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 56.
70 Strove Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 56.
Clinton’s strategic vision was assisting Boris Yeltsin and a small group of reformers who were advocates of liberal economic theory.\textsuperscript{71}

When he assumed office as president, Clinton sincerely wanted to follow through on his campaign pledges to do more to help the Russians and to stop the killing in Bosnia. However, several factors were working against action. First, he chose to keep Colin Powell from the Bush administration as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Profoundly influenced by his experiences in Vietnam, Powell, a holdover from the Bush administration, recommended against intervention in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{72} Second, Clinton confronted the consequences of a 1993 failed intervention with a Somalia fiasco in which eighteen US service members were killed as a part of a UN peace enforcement mission. Third, the Clinton administration was deeply committed to multilateralism, and Western European leaders refused to agree to use NATO in any significant military campaign. They already had small units on the ground in support of a UN mission, and the Serbs threatened to retaliate against the peacekeepers if NATO intervened.\textsuperscript{73} While these three reasons were undoubtedly influential in his decision not to intervene, there was a fourth reason that seems to hold the most explanatory power for Clinton’s inaction in Bosnia. Intervening in Bosnia jeopardized the political prospects for Russian reformers.

Instead of intervening in Bosnia, Clinton spent 1992 to 1995 endorsing several failed peace initiatives ranging from the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, to the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, to the


Contact Group Plan. Many supporters of intervention in the press and in the opposing party considered Clinton’s reluctance to intervene a lack of leadership. From their perspective, the purpose of a post-Cold War NATO was to maintain the peace and security of Europe, and the ongoing slaughter in places like Srebrenica, Goražde, and Sarajevo was an embarrassment. The inability of NATO to deal with the Balkans crises made prominent opinion leaders in the press question the need for a dysfunctional security organization. These criticisms were reinforced by the increasingly anti-democratic events occurring within Russia.

Despite Clinton’s support of Yeltsin, a constitutional crisis threatened the survival of the nascent Russian democracy. Ultra-conservative forces claimed that Yeltsin did not have the authority to follow through on his economic reforms, which were very painful to the Russian people. In an audacious political gambit, Yeltsin called for an April 1993 public referendum on his presidency and won. Capitalizing on his victory, Yeltsin pushed for an election in December in which the public would simultaneously vote on a new constitution and elect a new Russian parliament under the laws of the constitution being considered. However, his political enemies continued to challenge his leadership and attempted a coup in October 1993. After Yeltsin forcibly reestablished control in Moscow, he insisted that the December elections proceed as planned. Yeltsin maintained his hold on power, but a large percentage of communists and ultra-conservatives took seats in the Russian Duma.

74 Raymond Tanter and John Psarouthakis, Balancing in the Balkans (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) 19–45; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 319–324.
75 Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, 210–215.
77 Andrew Felkay, Yeltsin’s Russia and the West, 80–82.
Choosing the Bosnian Intervention

Throughout 1994, the pressure on Clinton to do something to stop the carnage in Bosnia increased. As might be expected, there was the usual pressure coming from Republican leader Bob Dole who was considering challenging Clinton for the presidency in 1996. However, in November 1994, a new brand of Republican politician led by Newt Gingrich took control of the House of Representatives, and they were more virulent in their attacks on the Clinton administration. The criticism was even coming from individuals who were more supportive of the administration. For example, Christiane Amanpour, a CNN reporter who commented in a recent interview that she believed Clinton was talented and “unbelievably smart,” questioned why Clinton was unable to develop a policy on Bosnia. In short, Clinton was getting pressure from every corner of the political spectrum to fix Bosnia.78

To remedy this problem, Clinton directed National Security Adviser Tony Lake to develop a policy to resolve the Bosnia crisis. In completing this task, Lake was aided by two developments. First, the US convinced Croatian President Franjo Tuđman to agree to a peace settlement with Bosnia in March 1994.79 This peace agreement solved a good portion of the Bosnian conflict. Second, in August, the Russians finally withdrew their last remaining troops from the Baltics, which freed up Clinton’s decisions vis-à-vis Bosnian action. Thus, when the Bosnian parliament rejected the Contact Group’s peace plan in August 1994. Lake was freed to implement his so called “End Game” strategy, which called for the US to convince allies to support a lift of the arms embargo and conduct a sustained air operation against Bosnian Serbs.80


79 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 360–363.

80 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 313–318.
As the Clinton team was about to implement its strategy in the fall of 1994, Jimmy Carter flew to Sarajevo and negotiated a ceasefire between the warring parties. The Carter ceasefire lasted until May 1995 when the Bosnian Serbs deployed heavy artillery in an exclusion zone surrounding Sarajevo and bombed civilian targets. Under US pressure, NATO responded immediately with airstrikes against Bosnian Serb artillery positions. In response, the Bosnian Serbs took European peacekeepers hostage causing NATO to end its air campaign. When Jacques Chirac was elected to the French presidency in the summer of 1995, he claimed that Serb actions against French UN peacekeepers were an insult to French national honor. He made public claims that the Atlantic Alliance was without leadership; and with this criticism, the Clinton presidency finally decided to act in a sustained way against Serb forces.\(^{81}\) Even if it was a detriment to Yeltsin, the US would stop the killing in Bosnia. In August 1995, NATO commenced Operation Deliberate Force—a sustained air campaign that lasted less than four weeks, ended the slaughter, and opened the door to the Dayton Peace Accords.

**Loss Aversion and US European Security: 1994 to 1997**

Very early on in his presidency, Clinton was confronted about whether or not to admit Central and Eastern European (CEE) states into NATO. Leaders of CEE states, US domestic organizations, and foreign policy elites all advocated for NATO enlargement. Clinton agreed that CEE states should be included in NATO as a way to secure new democracies and expand free markets.\(^{82}\) However, he did not want to move forward with enlargement if it threatened Yeltsin’s political prospects.

\(^{81}\) Ibid., 303–307.

Thus, his national security team developed Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 36, which expanded the NATO endowment by identifying the security of CEE states as a “key test of this Administration’s concept of enlarging the world’s free community of market democracies as a major organizing principle of American foreign policy.” While the document advised against Russia having a veto on enlargement, PRD 36 established three bridging mechanisms to address Kremlin security concerns: participation in the Bush era North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), expanding the role for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the creation of the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). Through these bridging mechanisms, Clinton’s national security team hoped to enlarge NATO without alienating Russia. In the long term, Clinton was ostensibly open to the possibility of Russia joining NATO. In execution, however, this strategy proved problematic because the Clinton team underestimated the intensity of the Russian objections against enlargement.

**Choosing an Integrative Security Arrangement**

In his first months in office, Clinton confronted questions about his security vision for Central Europe. In April 1993, he was visited by leaders of the Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary all of whom requested membership in NATO because, from their perspective, it was only a matter of time until Russian imperialism reemerged. The Baltics states also wanted membership, and they were well represented in the US by organizations such as the American Latvian Association, Estonian American National Council, Joint Baltic American National Council, the Lithuanian American Community and the Lithuanian American Council.

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consistently lobbied on behalf of their homelands. Additionally, foreign policy elites on both sides of the political divide were advocating for the inclusion of CEE states into NATO.

To be sure, Clinton wanted NATO enlarged to include these states, but he had different motivations. He thought that enlargement would take advantage of a democratic peace in which inclusion in institutions helped to secure emerging democracies and facilitated the spread of free markets. In early 1993, Clinton did not share their concerns about Russian imperialism. He was convinced that Yeltsin was a true reformer. In fact, Clinton asserted that enlarging NATO on the rationale of preventing Russian neo-imperialism would result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, and he charged his national security team to develop a policy that facilitated NATO enlargement while simultaneously considering Russian security interests.

As a result, his national security team developed PRD 36 in 1993 which served as the foundation of Clinton’s European security policy throughout his two terms as president. According to PRD 36, the US had indeed won the Cold War, and it was imperative that the gains from that victory be secured. In this way, PRD 36 expanded the NATO endowment to include the CEE states. Moreover, the document hinted that in some future reality the newly independent states (former Soviet republics) might also be part of the NATO endowment — including Russia. In the short term, the US, as outlined in PRD 36, would address Russian concerns about including CEE states in NATO by creating the Partnership for Peace (PfP), enhancing the role of the CSCE, and highlighting the role of the NACC.

Clinton formally announced the enlargement policy in Prague in January 1994, and Yeltsin did not receive the news well. From his perspective, the enlargement policy was against

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the Russians and an effort to dismember the CIS. Clinton assured Yeltsin that enlargement was not imminent. Clinton believed that with enough consultation he could talk Yeltsin into accepting enlargement. However, before Clinton could convince Yeltsin to accept the policy, NATO issued an official communique in November 1994 stating its intention of starting a study on enlargement to be released in December 1995. Yeltsin was furious with the announcement. At a joint press conference with Clinton in Budapest, Yeltsin warned that enlargement might result in the Cold War being replaced with a Cold Peace. Despite Clinton’s efforts to the contrary, the impression that NATO enlargement was being directed against Russia was becoming a reality.

**Choosing Enlargement**

The change in tone in US-Russian relations was amplified by increasing questions about whether Russia was indeed on a reform path. Although he was lauded for supporting Gorbachev in the August 1992 coup attempt, Yeltsin demonstrated instances of autocratic tendencies such as when he enacted Presidential Decree 1400, attempted to dissolve the Congress of People’s Deputies in September 1993, responded with lethal force to the coup attempt the following month, and defended the indiscriminate bombing in Chechnya in 1995. Clinton always looked past these incidents as the problematic necessities of a fellow politician working hard to reform the Russian system. However, the election of communists and nationalist hardliners in December 1993 was hard to dismiss.

The reactionary turn in Russian politics caused Yeltsin to hesitate in his cooperation with Clinton on NATO enlargement. Although it was a critical component to Clinton’s bridging strategy in East-West cooperation, political expediency forced Yeltsin to resist joining PfP.

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From the Russian perspective, joining the PfP like the other countries of Eastern Europe was insulting. Russia was a great power, and it was being treated like a small power. In this way, the US, from the Russian point of view, was using a moment of weakness to humiliate Russia. Clinton decided to fly to Moscow in May 1995 to discuss the matter with Yeltsin. After much cajoling and a promise not to enlarge NATO until after the 1996 Russian presidential elections, Yeltsin finally relented. Russia reluctantly joined PfP in May 1995.  

Yeltsin won the 1996 election, but it took a toll on him both politically and physically. During the campaign, he bolstered his political credentials by hiring Yevgeny Primakov to replace Kozyrev as Russia’s foreign minister. Primakov was less pro-Western than Yeltsin or Kozyrev. However, the nationalists and communists were portraying Yeltsin and Kozyrev’s inability to stop NATO intervention in the Balkans, NATO enlargement, and the negative press surrounding the Chechnyan War as major failings of Yeltsin’s foreign policy. Hiring Primakov helped to strengthen Yeltsin’s weak foreign policy credentials. Only a few months after winning the election, however, Yeltsin had to have open heart surgery, which essentially sidelined him for the second half of 1996. During that time, Primakov established a more aggressive tone in US-Russian diplomatic negotiations.

Primakov’s appointment as foreign minister marked a significant change in the tenor of US-Russian relations. As a pragmatist, Primakov accepted the inevitability of NATO enlargement, but he demanded that four conditions be met before Russia could agree to NATO enlargement:

1) Russia wanted a prohibition against stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states;

87 Ibid., 193–195.
2) Russia wanted a prohibition on the permanent stationing of US forces on the soil of new member states;

3) Russia wanted co-decision-making between Russia and NATO on any issue of European security;

4) Russia wanted a commitment that no states of the former Soviet Union, especially the Baltics, would be admitted;

5) Russia wanted codification of these and other restrictions on NATO and rights for Russia in a legally binding treaty.\textsuperscript{88}

Although the US would never agree to all of these terms, they did find some room for negotiations. Despite telling domestic audiences that he fully supported Baltic membership in NATO, Clinton agreed with Yeltsin that the Baltic states would not be admitted in the first round of enlargement and their accession would not occur for some time in the distant future. The other four issues were worked out in the 1997 NATO Russia Founding Act, which created the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) that included a Russian emissary.\textsuperscript{89} Although Russia could not veto a NATO action in the PJC, it was a more prestigious and formal body than the NACC and more reflective of Russia’s great power standing. Finally, the Founding Act stated that NATO had no intention of stationing nuclear weapons or additional forces in the territory of new member states.

The Founding Act was enough of an appeasement for Russia to agree to the enlargement of NATO, but the tough negotiating stance of Primakov was a portent of the future. Russia would no longer allow the West to have its way without resistance. This position had negative

\textsuperscript{88} Strobe Talbott, \textit{The Russia Hand}, 318.

consequences on US efforts to continue arms control, maintain the non-proliferation regime, and establish a limited missile defense system.

**Loss Aversion Consequences**

As the US and the Soviets continued their spiraling nuclear arms race, the international community called for negotiations on how to slow the competition. Thus, the UN sponsored in 1961 the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC). Although the ENDC was unable to achieve reductions in arms control, it did create the 1969 Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which aimed to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states and called on the US and Soviets to negotiate on nuclear arms reduction. To this end, the US and Russia began arms control negotiations in 1968. The result of these negotiations was the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) of 1972, and its associated Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. These treaties were successful in controlling an otherwise out of control nuclear arms race by placing caps on the current nuclear inventory. The Carter administration was successful in creating in SALT II a framework that reinforced gains achieved in SALT I. However, because of the Soviet invasion in 1979, the US Senate never ratified SALT II. When Reagan came to office in 1980, his more aggressive stance against the Soviets further disrupted nuclear arms negotiations for another five years. However, when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, his glasnost and perestroika reform initiatives resulted in increased trust between nuclear powers. The result was the historic 1987 INF Treaty, which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapon. Unlike SALT I and II, the 1987 INF Treaty was a true reduction in the nuclear arsenal. The

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decision-making of the Bush and Clinton administrations had serious effects in three crucial areas of security cooperation: missile defense, strategic arms control, and non-proliferation.

**The Bush Administration, Missile Defense, and Arms Control**

Ever since the 1972 ABM treaty, the US and Russia agreed not to employ missile defense systems in their respective areas of control. The idea behind this treaty was that the prevention of nuclear war was best secured if both sides understood that the utilization of nuclear weapons would result in mutually assured destruction. While this was an acceptable diplomatic arrangement when the US and Russia had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, the prospect of proliferation of nuclear technologies to rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea prompted the US to seek a missile defense partnership with Russia.

To this end, the Bush administration proposed to Gorbachev the development of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) initiative in early 1991. Bush did not envision GPALS as a comprehensive missile defense system. On the contrary, it would be limited in scope and focused on preventing the limited deployment of nuclear weapons that a rogue state might employ. Although Gorbachev showed initial interest in the program, closing out the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union prevented a real commitment. If there were to be ABM, it would need to be negotiated during the Clinton administration.

If cooperation on arms control is an indicator, Bush’s “loss aversion” decision to insist that a reunified Germany remain in NATO was acceptable to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. From 1991 to 1992, the US, the Soviets, and later Russia achieved historic arms control agreements.

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Bush and Gorbachev signed START I, which significantly reduced the total number of nuclear warheads available to each country.\(^9\) In the fall of 1991, Bush unilaterally agreed to eliminate all tactical and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe; Gorbachev reciprocated a month later with his own initiative to eliminate the same class of weapon. If Gorbachev disagreed with German reunification in NATO, it did not affect his willingness to cooperate on arms negotiations. However, the hardline coup against Gorbachev indicated the unease about East-West cooperation. When Yeltsin assumed control of an independent Russia, Bush worried that arms control negotiations might stall, but he found Yeltsin to be an even more willing negotiating partner. Bush and Yeltsin signed START II in 1992, which further reduced the number of nuclear warheads in each country and even had a provision eliminating Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads. When Bush left office, he passed a good deal of arms control momentum to the Clinton administration.

**The Clinton Administration and the End of Cooperation**

The Clinton team, however, disagreed with the GPALS initiative. From their perspective, it resembled too much Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a space-based program to implement a comprehensive strategic missile defense system, which was highly criticized by the Democrats for threatening the 1972 ABM Treaty.\(^9\) Clinton wanted to focus on continued reductions to strategic nuclear weapons as Bush had done with START II, which was signed just before he left office.

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To compromise on the missile defense issue, Clinton discarded Bush’s GPALS initiative in favor of negotiations on a demarcation to the 1972 ABM treaty to allow the employment of a theater missile defense (TMD) systems. In September 1997, the Clinton administration signed the demarcation which forbid any space-based interceptors and limited ground-based interceptors to less than “3 kilometers a second, if the target missile’s speed did not exceed 5 kilometers a second, and the target’s range did not exceed 3,500 kilometers. In other words, any interceptor effective against a strategic missile would still violate the ABM treaty.” With limited missile defense and strategic deterrence thus resolved, Clinton was set to begin negotiations on START III during the second term of his presidency, but he found achieving a new strategic arms reduction treaty a challenge.

Although Bush and Yeltsin signed the START II treaty in 1992, the Russian Duma still had not ratified the document in 1997. On the other hand, the US Senate ratified the START II in January 1996, but passed a corollary law that implementation could not proceed until the Russian Duma ratified the START II treaty. Unfortunately for the Clinton administration, the Russian Duma refused ratification citing NATO enlargement and the 1995 use of force in the Balkans as the reason for the hesitation. Despite intense negotiations between Clinton and Yeltsin over the next several years, the Russian Duma remained intransigent. Furthermore, the deteriorating US-Russian relations severely restricted the bargaining range between the US and Russia on nuclear non-proliferation.

As previously mentioned, the ENDC established the 1969 NPT, which attempted to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, gaps in the NPT were enabling nuclear seeking countries the ability to develop nuclear programs. To fill these gaps, the G7 countries

95 Ibid., 293.
established the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987. The MTCR was a voluntary, non-binding organization established to facilitate cooperation among states with nuclear capabilities to limit access to technologies related weapons of mass destruction (Category I) or sub-components (Category II). The Clinton administration identified two critical objectives to securing the MTCR: ensuring nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were removed back to Russia and stopping the sale of nuclear technology to India and Iran.

To accomplish these objectives, Clinton directed Vice President Al Gore to work with Victory Chernomyrdin to negotiate issues related to nuclear weapons. Unofficially known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the group was established in the spring of 1993, and it had early success on nuclear issues when US-Russian relations were at their apex. The commission played an integral role in convincing the Russians to suspend sales of Category II technology (cryogenic rocket technology) to India in exchange for the US using exclusively Mir rockets for transport to and from the International Space Station—a deal worth $400 million. The US was essentially replacing the earnings Russia would have made if the Indian deal had been fully implemented. In January 1994, the US, Russia, and Ukraine signed the Trilateral Accords, which committed the US to pay for the shipment of nuclear materials out of Ukraine, and, more importantly, secured an agreement from Russia to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine. In this way, the US used carrots to achieve a lot of success on important MTCR issues in the early days of the Clinton administration. However, things stalled from that point forward.

In January 1995, news leaked that the Russian government was covertly providing nuclear technology to the Iranian government to assist them in the building of the Bushehr nuclear reactor. Part of that deal included technology to enrich uranium, which is a necessary technology required to eventually build nuclear weapons. When Clinton met with Yeltsin in
Moscow in May 1995, he asked the Russian president to stop the nuclear deal with the Iranians. Although Yeltsin agreed to suspend the transfer of centrifuges for enrichment, he refused, under pressure from hardliners in the Russian Duma, to stop the deal in total. Russia might not be able to stop NATO intervention in the Balkans and expansion into Central Europe, but it would do what it liked in other parts of the world.96

1998 Economic Collapse and Choosing the Kosovo Intervention

From 1998 to 1999, two events occurred that severely diminished US-Soviet cooperation on missile defense, arms control, and non-proliferation. First, the Russian economy suffered a significant setback when a suspect bond program that promised high interest returns on a short-term investment collapsed. The result was devastating for Yeltsin’s political situation. The second event was Milošević’s effort to stop Kosovo, a province within Serbia, from gaining increased autonomy from Belgrade. Just as bloody as the Bosnian Serb actions against Bosnian Muslims from 1993 to 1995, Serbian actions against Albanian Muslims once again called into question the legitimacy of NATO. In this case, however, Clinton did not hesitate to act. In the case of Kosovo, he would not again allow the loss of NATO credibility. Without a UN Security Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force, Clinton intervened immediately in the conflict. When NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999, any hope of cooperation on strategic security issues during the Clinton administration ended.

96 Ibid., 157–182.
Chapter 2 - Managing a Complex Environment

George Herbert Walker Bush began the first day of his term as the forty-first president of the United States eager to get to work when Brent Scowcroft, his pick for national security adviser, walked into the Oval Office with some strange and suspicious news. A large box with a Soviet return address had arrived at the White House. Nobody was expecting the package; therefore, a Secret Service bomb disposal unit carefully removed it from the premise. When the package was finally opened at a safe location, they found a “colorfully decorated, five-hundred-pound cake” that “had been baked for the President by a collective in a Soviet town in honor of his inauguration.” Unfortunately for all involved, the cake was already destroyed by the time the innocence of the gesture was discerned. This story provides an example of how the Bush administration viewed the Soviet Union as they began their term in office. Despite the progress towards East-West rapprochement Reagan began with Gorbachev since 1985, the Bush administration clung to a Cold War worldview in which anything emanating from the Soviet Union was suspect, and the dire economic situation of the Soviet Union guaranteed that more gestures of goodwill would come from the Soviet Union.

When he became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was determined to save the Soviet socialist system through an aggressive reform program. Known around the world as *perestroika*, one of the key components was to fundamentally change the confrontational relationship between the Soviets and the West. Thus, he wanted to end the long military confrontation and integrate the Soviet economy with the West. To this end, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the 1987 Intermediate

Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, which eliminated nuclear weapons with a range from 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers from the Soviet and American arsenals. Gorbachev wanted to continue de-escalating the conflict with Reagan’s successor, and he made an historic speech to the United Nations in December 1988, a month prior to Bush’s inauguration, announcing unilateral reductions in Soviet forces in Central and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev was signaling a willingness to substantively transform the international political system, but there was also change occurring in Western Europe.

The development of a “United States of Europe” was the dream of European politicians who viewed it as a mechanism to achieve peace and prosperity. To achieve this outcome, French and German diplomats created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) after World War Two. Acknowledging the success of the ECSC, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and West Germany signed the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created the European Community (EC) and established a customs union across Western Europe. Although these were early successes, the 1960s were a time when European nationalists manipulated the EC to achieve national goals related to agricultural subsidies, and this behavior was exacerbated during the economic malaise of the 1970s. However, as new leadership was elected in France and Germany, the nationalist perspective subsided and the European project regained momentum. Thus, the 1987 Single European Act was enacted, and Europe was set for full political, economic, and legal integration of Europe by 1992.

This movement towards full European integration was a positive development for members of the West German Green Party. Suspicious of US influence in Europe, the Green Party was anti-NATO and supportive of policies that increased the independence of the Federal

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Republic of Germany (FRG). Although a relatively small party, they had enough popular support to influence the policy positions of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Given the economic strength of the FRG, the US knew that it would be the leader of a fully integrated Europe. Thus, they were concerned that an SPD victory in the 1990 elections might result in a government that would lead Europe away from a NATO security structure. Such was the European political milieu when the Bush national security team came to office, and these concerns were compounded by the Bush administration concerns related to the Reagan era nuclear arms agreement.

Tempered by what they considered the failures of détente, the Bush administration was suspicious of the 1987 INF Treaty because it conceded too much to the Soviets. From their perspective, the Soviets needed to withdraw their robust conventional capabilities before the US entertained further negotiations on nuclear weapons. Bush perceived Gorbachev’s overtures for cooperation as propaganda meant to divide Europe from the US. Taking such a hardline stance had blowback for the Bush administration because European publics were demanding more cooperation and less confrontation. As Gorbachev consistently demonstrated restraint with Central and Eastern European countries moving towards independence in the summer of 1989, Bush’s suspicion lessened, and he wrote Gorbachev a letter requesting a face-to-face meeting at Malta. However, before the two leaders could get together, dramatic events in the FRG forced them to adapt their security perspectives.

When the Berlin Wall collapsed in November 1989, events accelerated at a rapid pace. As West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl embraced reunification on a rapid timeline, the US was keen to keep Germany in NATO by supporting German reunification. The Soviets were firmly against such an outcome. After failing to achieve a “Four Powers” negotiation on German
reunification, they called for a “Helsinki II” diplomatic approach in which all the nations of Europe would work together to establish a pan-European security organization to replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Fearing the unpredictable nature of a “Helsinki II” process, Bush worked with Kohl to establish the “Two Plus Four” process in which the Soviets would gain a marginal say in some external aspects of German reunification, but Kohl was free to deal with internal questions related to rapid reunification. In this way, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was signed in October 1990 in which the “Four Powers” renounced any legal claim to manage German affairs, and a fully sovereign and united Germany chose NATO as its preferred security organization.

**Change in the East**

Mikhail Gorbachev was devoted to the economic ideals of socialism. His memoir goes out of its way to extol the accomplishments of Soviet socialism. In Gorbachev’s recounting, there was guaranteed employment “for the entire able-bodied working population.” Income and housing increased for the working class in the cities, and the illiteracy rate fell from 75 percent to only 12 percent. Every citizen in the country had access to health care. Gorbachev could not help but contrast the success of these programs with Yeltsin’s economic “shock therapy,” which was austere capitalist reform that increased unemployment, decreased wages, and generally lowered Russia’s standard of living. Thus, from Gorbachev’s perspective, the problems confronting the Soviet Union when he took control in the 1980s were not a failure of socialism *per se*; rather, the problems were a result of a dictatorial betrayal of the socialist ideal.

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Gorbachev believed that Stalin’s turn towards tyranny in the 1920s and 1930s betrayed the Lenin’s communist idea. When Stalin wrestled control of the Communist Party from Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and Leon Trotsky after Lenin’s death in 1925, he rejected the New Economic Policy (NEP), which allowed limited capitalism. Although it was based on the fundamentals of communism, NEP was successful in that it improved economic conditions after the Russian Civil War.\textsuperscript{100} Instead of continuing with NEP, Stalin embarked on an aggressive economic plan to build “socialism in one country,” which was meant to create autarky for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would not depend on the capitalist West for its survival. To this end, he committed to building an urbanized industrial society, one of Karl Marx’s prerequisites to the establishment of socialism, that included “more factories, railways, machinery, and technology.”\textsuperscript{101} In completing this task, Stalin outlawed opposition within the Communist Party and society in general. Dissenters were deported, killed, or thrown into a Siberian \textit{gulag}. With the opposition quelled, he implemented his version of socialism.

The major obstacle to Stalin’s plan was that starvation, caused by the Russian Civil War, drove a large portion of the urban population to rural areas where they could grow subsistence crops. Because of this migration away from the cities, the Soviet Union was more urbanized prior to the Russian Revolution than after. To achieve the industrialization of society and keep pace with the West, Stalin needed to devise a plan to get peasants back to the cities and into the factories. Known as the Five-Year Plan, Stalin nationalized the property of private farmers and replaced them with collective workers.\textsuperscript{102} Those who lost property were relocated to urban areas

\textsuperscript{100} Melvin P. Leffler, \textit{The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War}, Amazon Kindle location 311 of 2295.


and forced to work factory jobs. In this way, Stalin created a centralized state economy that incorporated rural and urban production to make the Soviet Union self-sustaining. Stalin’s centralized state economy became the foundation of the Soviet economy for the next sixty years.

By the time Gorbachev became General Secretary, the inefficiencies of the centralized economy were overwhelming. Instead of agriculture and industry producing at a market-dictated rate, they produced to fill quotas established by the state apparatus. This centrally managed system resulted in either the production of too much or too little capital and consumer goods. When Stalin was alive, he made this system work through pure fear. However, after his death in 1953, the Soviet production system broke down into a system of “hierarchical deals” in which, as Yegor Gaidar noted in his memoir, “the benchmarks for production and the system of resource allocation were not dictated from above but were a product of internal negotiation among the organization hierarchy.”103 Although Khrushchev attempted to reform the system in the 1960s, the inefficient centralized economic system, artificially sustained by volatile oil revenues during the 1970s, crept along into the 1980s.104 However, the election of Ronald Reagan brought the system to a culminating crisis.

Reagan was tough on arms control negotiations. He insisted on a “zero-zero” option on intermediate range nuclear weapons.105 Either the Soviets would withdraw their intermediate range SS-20s from Eastern Europe, or the US would deploy its intermediate range Pershing IIs to five Western countries on the European continent. Perhaps the most challenging military initiative for the Soviets was his commitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which

103 Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire, 78.
was a design to create a space-based Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense system. According to Robert Gates, “SDI was a Soviet nightmare come to life. America’s industrial base, coupled with American technology, wealth, and managerial skill, all mobilized to build a wholly new and different military capability that might negate the Soviet offensive buildup of a quarter century.”

The Reagan military build-up worried many US allies who were concerned that it might escalate tensions, but it terrified Gorbachev who knew the Soviet centralized economic system could not keep up with the economic dynamism of the West.

During Reagan’s first years in office, the Soviet Union increasingly fell behind in its basic standards of living. While the rest of the world used emerging computer technologies to integrate economies, the Soviets lagged in the production of basic consumer goods. Radios and TVs were unavailable to regular citizens. On the rare occasion they got access to such amenities, they were reminded about the prosperity of the West and the relative destitution in the East.

Gorbachev realized the calamity of the Soviet economic condition, and he blamed the entire situation on Stalin’s dictatorship. He supposed that “collectivization and the Gulag together destroyed the human potential of our nation; both drained the blood from the most important and vital base of our economy—agriculture—and they strengthened the dictatorial regime.”

If the Soviet people were freed from state constraints, the Soviet socialist state could prosper.

Gorbachev knew that the centralized economy of the Soviet Union must be reformed. In his memoirs, he described how he believed the situation required significant changes: “My understanding of the depths to which totalitarianism had brought our country impelled me to

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make a decisive and irreversible choice in favor of democracy and reform.”

Thus, Gorbachev embarked on perestroika, which was a program to privatize certain aspects of the Soviet economy. Perestroika was intended as an adjustment of degree not of kind. Historian Tony Judt noted that “Gorbachev displayed a distinctly Leninist quality: he was willing to compromise his ideals in order to secure his goals.”

The Soviet Union would continue to be a socialist state, but it would be a socialist state integrated with the broader international economic system—not separated as Stalin wanted. Faced with the choices of the continued economic deprivation of his people or openness to the West, Gorbachev chose openness.

In terms of European security, Gorbachev signaled to the West his desire to end the costly military confrontation. Thus, he made several conciliatory gestures to Western leaders in the spring of 1985 that he believed would demonstrate his sincere desire for improved relations. First, he met with Vice President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State George P. Schultz and expressed his desire to end the nuclear arms race. Second, at a Warsaw Pact meeting in March and April, he denounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, which was the long-established policy that the Soviets would use force to ensure that countries in its sphere remained socialist. Instead, Warsaw Pact countries would be dealt with, as Gorbachev expressed, “on principles of independence, equality, and non-interference in one another’s internal affairs.”

In July 1985, Gorbachev announced a moratorium on all nuclear testing. After failing to tie a Soviet agreement to remove intermediate-range missiles from Eastern Europe to a US agreement to end

109 Ibid., 34.
110 Tony Judt, Postwar, 595.
112 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, On My Country and the World, 183.
the SDI program, Gorbachev finally relented and signed the INF treaty on December 7, 1987.\textsuperscript{113} From his perspective, these were “realistic measures aimed at stopping the expansion of the nuclear arms race” and increasing the level of East-West trust. Clearly, Gorbachev was willing to go to great extremes to end the costly competition and enable his economic reform program.\textsuperscript{114}

Bush did not know what to make of these concessions. After meeting Gorbachev for the first time at General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko’s funeral in 1985, he sent a letter to Reagan explaining his ambivalence about future US-Soviet relations. Bush suggested that Gorbachev would certainly “show the West a much more reasonable face,” but it was unclear whether “this ‘new look man’ merely [was] a more effective spokesman for tired, failed policies or will he have enough self-assurance and foresight to ‘start anew.’” Bush could not completely overcome his deep suspicion of Soviet peace overtures:

After 8 hours of contemplation, there is also the possibility that his attractive personality will be used to divide us from our allies and to attract more support for old views and themes. I can just see some of our [members of Congress] eating out of his hand in wishful anticipation of achieving détente but giving away too much in the process as we try to figure out who this man really is. It will be an interesting trip but as the monkey said when he was shot into outer space “It beats the hell out of the cancer research lab.”\textsuperscript{115}

Gorbachev sensed this ambivalence from Bush, and he developed an aggressive approach for establishing a partnership with the new president.

Gorbachev and his advisers believed that continuing the US-Soviet rapprochement after the 1988 presidential elections was essential to successful reform. In a June 1988 advisory letter to Gorbachev, influential policy advisor Georgy Arbatov wrote that it was important not to

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 195; Robert Gates, \textit{From the Shadows}, 423; Tony Judt, \textit{Postwar}, 600.

\textsuperscript{114} Tony Judt, \textit{Postwar}, 601.

“allow any breaks in the process of dialogue,” even though Reagan was on his way out of the presidency. This sentiment was reinforced in a September 1988 letter to Gorbachev from Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, who urged that it was “extremely important to seek mutual understanding with the new President early, before his approach to the Soviet Union is fully formulated.” If they were not able to continue East-West rapprochement, continuing with perestroika would be difficult, if not impossible.

Gorbachev agreed with his advisers that the momentum had to be maintained. He suggested to them that the Soviets must show the world “how we are changing, how we comprehend the changing world, and how we develop along with it.” Gorbachev wanted to demonstrate the sincerity of his vision with a unilateral announcement concerning the reduction of Soviet conventional forces in Europe because “they will believe us only when they see that we are making clearly evident, real steps.” Gorbachev chose a December 1989 speech to the UN General Assembly to declare his intentions. Harkening back to Churchill’s Fulton, Missouri speech announcing the beginning of the Cold War by describing the descending of an “Iron Curtain” across Europe, Gorbachev told his aides that the speech would be a “Fulton in reverse.” He intended to announce nothing less than an end to the Cold War.

When he delivered the speech, Gorbachev advocated for a new era of relations between East and West. Cooperation should replace conflict to create a “consensus for all mankind.”

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went on to suggest, “force and the threat of force can no longer be, and should not be instruments of foreign policy.” In this new world order, ideological confrontation should be set aside, and the people should choose their internal political arrangements in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Toward the end of his speech, Gorbachev presented a proposal for unilateral Soviet conventional force reductions to demonstrate his commitment:

1) Soviet forces in general would be reduced by 500,000 men;

2) Six Soviet tank divisions would be removed from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary;

3) Assault landing troops (offensive capability) would be entirely removed from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary;

4) Soviet forces in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would be reduced by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks and restructured according to a defensive posture;

5) Soviet forces in European Soviet republics would be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft.119 Gorbachev hoped this speech signal the beginning of the end to the East-West rivalry and open economic opportunities to the Soviet Union.

**Uniting Europe**

The horror and devastation inflicted on Europe during World War One made the idea of creating a “United States of Europe” a serious consideration during the interwar years. European politicians such as Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, Louis Loucheur, and Aristide Briand argued that Europe could find enduring peace only when it united and worked towards a

common good that trumped traditional rivalries. Conduenhove-Kalergi and Loucheur advocated for a movement toward unity along the lines of a “functionalist” approach, which was an incremental approach that focused on functional economic integration prior to political integration. On the other hand, Briand, the most influential leader of the group, used the interwar years to pursue a more direct approach towards a united Europe. On September 9, 1929, he presented a conceptual document called the Memorandum on the Organization of a System of European Union in which he called for a “representative and responsible body” to act as “the primary directing body of the European Union.” Briand labelled this body the “European Conference,” and it would be governed by an executive organ he called the “European Committee.” The European Committee would conduct research on “political, economic, social and other questions of special interest to the European commonwealth and not covered by the League of Nations” and “accelerate the execution by the European Governments of the general decisions of the League of Nations.”

Briand envisioned an active European government that covered both political and functional concerns.

After World War Two, European leaders reinvigorated their efforts for a unified Europe. The architects of the post-war unification movement committed to the “functionalist” approach to achieve their objectives. Thus, when French diplomats Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman established in 1950 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), they envisioned this as a


modest first step towards the full political, military, and legal integration of Europe.\textsuperscript{122}

According to Schuman, “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany.”\textsuperscript{123}

Europe leaders built on the successful implementation of the ECSC with the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community (EEC) and eliminated tariffs on the continent.\textsuperscript{124} Furthermore, the Treaty of Rome laid the groundwork for three governmental institutions responsible for legislating economic integration: the European Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. The European Council of Ministers was comprised of ministers from the governments of each member state. Depending on the issue to be discussed, member states sent an appropriate delegate to regularly scheduled meetings. In most circumstances, representation for the meetings came from each nation’s foreign affairs office. The European Commission was the executive organ charged with implementing the dictates of the European Council, though it should be noted that the European Commission was also able to draft EEC legislation. Each national government appointed a commissioner who took an oath of allegiance to approach issues from a European perspective—not a national perspective. Finally, the European Parliament served as a popularly elected body charged with representing European citizens. As will be discussed below, nationalist inclinations prevented

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\textsuperscript{122} Pender and Usherwood,\textit{ The European Union: A Very Short Introduction}, 9-33 of 3240.


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implementation of this provision for twenty-two years. Although the roles of these governmental organs would change over the years, the Treaty of Rome laid the foundation for the future. In the early days, however, progress tended to be slow as nationalist politicians manipulated the EEC to achieve national objectives.

When Charles de Gaulle came to power in June 1958, a mere six months after the Treaty of Rome was adopted, the idea of European unification encountered its first obstacle. The Gaullist government in France was amenable to the idea of intergovernmental European cooperation so long as it protected French agriculture subsidies through the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), which would be funded out of the common European budget. Most members of the EEC agreed that CAP should be funded out of the European budget, but there was an insistence that the allocation process occur within the European Parliament—not the Council of Ministers. De Gaulle could not abide the idea of such budgetary power being allocated to a supranational political body, and he insisted on a veto right for member states. When he got his veto concession in 1966, CAP was passed, but the implementation of the veto set a precedent that stymied Europe’s ability to adapt to economic challenges.\(^\text{125}\)

Although limited in scope by French concerns, the EEC survived as an intergovernmental body and the elimination of tariffs stimulated economic growth with GDP increases averaging 5 percent a year during the 1960s.\(^\text{126}\) Desiring to participate in the economic boon that resulted from open markets, the UK, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EEC in 1973. Monnet and Schuman’s vision of a federated Europe was slowly becoming a reality, but the international economy of the 1970s presented a second obstacle that made progress difficult.

\(^\text{125}\) Tony Judt, *Postwar*, 308.

The economic malaise of the 1970s led to mixed results for the development of the EEC. As new members joined, budget pressures increased, and economic protectionism seemed to be the rationale behind all negotiations. High oil prices, unemployment, and unpredictable currency fluctuations acted as a counterbalance to desires for a more integrated Europe. Instead of viewing the EEC as a body to make Europe stronger, each country competed for access to the common European budget. In this way, the EEC stagnated into what Tony Judt called an “institutionalized cattle market, in which countries trade political alliances for material reward.” Thus, the disharmony within the EEC nullified any thought of it being a serious challenge to US influence in Europe, but the EEC also achieved several reforms during the 1970s that would pay dividends later.

In the early 1970s, a change in European leadership paved the way for EEC reform. Valery Giscard d’Estaing became the president of France. In contrast to his Gaullist predecessors, he was committed to European integration. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt, also committed to European integration, became chancellor. In 1974, these leaders helped establish the European Council (not to be confused with the Council of Ministers), an informal gathering of the executives from each member state, which met regularly to set agendas and work out issues that were beyond the Council of Ministers. Also, Giscard d’Estaing and Schmidt worked together to establish the European Monetary System (EMS) to mitigate the currency instability caused by Nixon’s decision to discard the gold standard and allow the US currency to float. By 1979, all EEC member states save the United Kingdom were a party to the EMS. In the same year, the European Parliament, twenty-two years after the Treaty of Rome came into effect, was directly elected by the citizens of Europe.

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127 Tony Judt, *Postwar*, 528.
With these reforms, the EEC attempted to move forward as an institution, and it expanded once again in 1983 with the accession of Spain, Portugal, and Greece. These countries were relatively poor and weighed heavily on the EEC as it tried to recover from the 1970s. While there was some recovery, the most economically significant EEC countries lagged the US and Japan in GDP growth. For example, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom averaged 2.0 percent GDP growth from 1975-1985, but the US averaged 3.19 percent during the same period. Even more concerning, Japan outpaced all three European countries and the US with an average GDP growth of 4.22 percent.\footnote{World Bank Economic Indicators, National Annual GDP Database, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (date accessed April 22, 2017).} Although the customs union and the EMS did much to improve trade on the continent, the reality was that each country acting independently in the global economy was a sub-optimal solution.

European leaders determined that a more comprehensive integration was necessary for Europe to be a competitor in the global economy. If there was full political, economic, and legal unification, regulating economic policies would be easier, and Europe could act uniformly and compete better. To achieve the necessary unity, European leaders passed the 1987 Single European Act (SEA), which set December 31, 1992 as the target date for full integration. While the EEC created a customs union, the SEA was designed take the concept further by enabling the free flow of capital, labor, and goods across the continent.

In terms of foreign and security policy, the SEA mandated that EEC countries “consider that closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. . . .They shall work to that end both at the national level and, where appropriate, within the framework of the competent
institutions and bodies.”¹²⁹ The idea of creating a “European identity” in security matters was the antithesis of the long-established Atlantic identity. To assuage any US concern on this matter, the SEA stipulated that this “European identity” did not “impede closer co-operation in the field of security” between EC member states “within the framework of the Western European Union of the Atlantic Alliance.”¹³⁰ Although this caveat suggested continued cooperation with NATO, the “European identity” language simultaneously left open a suggestion for an identity separate from these institutions.

While it is tempting to look back at this period and dismiss the notion of an “European military power” independent from NATO, contemporaries of the time were less convinced of the folly of such an idea. Writing in 1987, influential historian Paul Kennedy noted in The Rise and Fall of Great Powers that Europe had the potential of a great power:

> In military terms also, the European member states are far from negligible. Taking only the four largest countries (West Germany, France, Britain, Italy) into account, one finds their combined regular army size to be over a million men, with a further 1.7 million in reserves—a total which is of course smaller than the Russian and Chinese armies, but considerably larger than the US Army. In addition, these four states possess hundreds of major surface warships and submarines and thousands of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Finally, both France and Britain possess nuclear weapons . . . the point being made here is simply that, once combined, the totals are very substantial.”¹³¹

Of course, Kennedy was aware of the challenges confronting Europe in terms of military integration. In his writing, he noted that language barriers, equipment interoperability, and

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funding would present challenges to European defense integration. However, in its potential as a great power, he had confidence.

In his memoir, James Baker was certainly sensitive to thoughts about Europe going its own way in terms of security:

[The US State Department] had been engaged in a political battle in Brussels over the relationship of the Western European Union—the EC’s defense arm—and NATO. At its heart, this rather theological battle revolved around different conceptions of America’s role in Europe. Some Europeans—certain that political and monetary union was coming and would create a European superpower—were headstrong about asserting a European defense identity in which America’s role on the continent was minimized. We had been fighting this for some time, and trying to get them to recognize that, even with a diminished Soviet threat, they still needed an engaged America. But our protestations were overlooked in an emotional rush for a united Europe.132

Baker’s quote demonstrates US ambivalence on the development of the EEC.133 On one hand, the EEC was complementary to NATO because, according to a March 1989 National Security Council policy memorandum written for Brent Scowcroft, it “should provide an expanded market, for US goods, additional resources for Western defense, and greater global economic well-being.” The process of integration “helped preserve political stability on the Continent and has contributed to a more peaceful and prosperous world order.” To this end, the US “welcomes 1992 and its role in moving Western Europe toward greater economic and political integration.”134 On the other hand, integration was “a complex process,” and the US was opposed to “any effect of 1992 that would close EC markets to US goods and services.”

According to Hutchings, the NSC deputies “believe[d] that NATO will continue to be the best institutional vehicle for forging a general Alliance consensus, but US-EC negotiations will become increasingly important as the community takes on a higher foreign policy profile.” This was especially important considering the rise of the anti-NATO Green party in the FRG.

The Rise of the Green Party

After World War Two, three political parties emerged in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The differences between the parties were nuanced but worth mentioning. Influenced by Catholic social doctrine, the CDU was economically and socially conservative and placed an emphasis on society and family. However, for the CDU, economic conservatism did not mean laissez-faire capitalism. Free enterprise was acceptable if it worked for the common good, but CDU politicians would intervene when it did not. The SPD, on the other hand, was economically and socially liberal. Thus, the SPD platform stressed economic and social issues associated with perceived class disparities. By its very nature, the SPD was not inclined towards capitalist policies. Finally, the FDP was socially conservative and economically liberal. Within the political contest between the CDU and the SPD, the FDP often served as the “kingmaker” as the CDU and SPD formed governing coalitions with FDP politicians. Since World War Two, the FDP aligned more often with the CDU than SPD.

When the Western allies announced in 1948 that the FRG would be an independent country, the sentiment in the US was that a CDU victory was important. The first election of a chancellor was a contest between CDU candidate Konrad Adenauer and SPD candidate Kurt

135 Tony Judt, Postwar, 45–67.
Schumacher. For Schumacher, the election was about keeping Germany unified and installing socialism. However, given the prevalence of Catholics in the territories of the FRG and the lack of any other conservative alternative (all other right-wing parties were banned in de-Nazification), Adenauer won the chancellorship and a pro-Western regime was established.\textsuperscript{136} The CDU governed the FRG for more than two decades until the 1970s.

In 1969, SPD candidate Willy Brandt won the chancellorship of the FRG. Unlike his CDU predecessors, Brandt did not automatically embrace Western leanings, and he wanted to cooperate with Soviets. Being a pragmatic politician, he knew that complete reunification was politically impossible. Thus, he embraced the so called \textit{ostpolitik} policy of seeking rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the GDR. From 1970 to 1974, Brandt orchestrated a series of treaties that recognized the current political borders in Poland and between the two Germanies. He also renounced any claim that the FRG was the sole representative of the German people. In the future, Germany would be “two states, one nation.”\textsuperscript{137} Such diplomatic initiatives worried many Western leaders, and it is one of the reasons why French president Georges Pompidou acquiesced to the UK joining the EEC in 1973. If the FRG was turning towards the Soviets, then the UK could counterbalance. When pressed on security issues, however, Brandt decided to keep the FRG within Western security institutions. In this way, the SPD followed the security inclinations of the CDU—even if less enthusiastically. When Reagan became the US president, the SPD split over the future of FRG security.

The split within the SPD started in the late 1970s when various local groups across the FRG formed in opposition to industrial growth in the country. Comprised largely of the extreme

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 80–83.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 496–498.
left wing of the SDP, these groups were concerned about environmental issues, especially the government’s embrace of nuclear technologies for energy production. As a natural outgrowth of the protest culture of the late 1960s, these groups were anti-establishment, and they criticized the policies of the traditional political groups. After a string of local electoral victories in Niedersachsen, Bremen, and Hamburg, these groups agreed in January 1980 to form a national political party; it would be known as the Green Party.

The Green Party rejected the traditional security arrangements established in Europe since 1945. Writing in 1989, William Griffith noted that the Green Party security policy was against US involvement in Europe:

The Greens reject nuclear weapons and nuclear power. They give top priority to peace and ecology. They oppose United States security policy, as well as the military presence and political influence of the US in the Federal Republic. They favor unilateral nuclear and conventional disarmament of the Federal Republic, withdrawal of all foreign military forces from German soil, withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO, and a neutralist West German foreign policy.  

While most Germans considered the Greens a radical party, they did agree that nuclear weapons, which would affect Germany more than other NATO countries in a war, were a problem. Thus, while the German electorate never endorsed the entirety of the Green Party’s radical platform, they were respected on specific issues. Despite their organization as a national party, the Greens failed to achieve the 5 percent threshold necessary for Bundestag representation in the 1980 elections. However, Reagan’s decision to install Pershing IIs in Europe gave the group a catalyst for national prominence.

As previously mentioned, Reagan came to power with a confrontational policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and he publicly committed in 1981 to the installation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons.
nuclear weapons in Europe. In keeping with previous SPD policy, the SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt supported Reagan’s decision, but this support cost him politically. Given the unpopularity of intermediate nuclear weapons within the FRG, the initiative energized the Green Party’s efforts to be a nationally relevant party.\textsuperscript{139} Although he had been out of the chancellorship since 1974, SPD Chairman Willy Brandt sensed the political winds in the FRG and gave a speech in 1983 to 300,000 citizens assembled in Bonn to protest Reagan’s Pershing II decision. The speech resulted in a petition with 2.7 million signatures rejecting the nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{140} Oskar Lafontaine, a rising SPD politician from the Saarland, joined with Brandt in opposing Schmidt’s decision to support the Pershing II deployment because it “grossly contradict[s] the interests of the Federal Republic.”\textsuperscript{141} Due to this widespread dissatisfaction, Schmidt, only the second SPD politician (Brandt being first) to hold that position, was forced out of office after the FDP broke its alliance with the SPD and formed a coalition with the CDU. This resulted in Helmut Kohl, a pro-NATO politician, securing the chancellorship. In large part, Schmidt’s loss was due to the split that occurred in the SPD when he supported, as Brandt had previously done, the US led nuclear policy. During the 1983 election that removed Schmidt, the Green Party captured 5.6 percent of the electorate, which secured 27 seats in the Bundestag.

In the same city where Brandt’s speech was so popular, Vice-President George Bush witnessed first-hand in 1983 the vigor behind the Green Party movement when he travelled to the FRG to advocate on behalf of the Pershing II deployment. While his motorcade was travelling through Krefeld, thousands of protestors lined the streets jeering and throwing rocks at

\textsuperscript{139} Erick Surotchak, \textit{Security Perspectives of the West German Left}, 66–71.
\textsuperscript{140} Tony Judt, \textit{Postwar}, 590–595.
what they considered a hardline American politician. Bush described the event in a subsequent letter to Ronald Reagan:

All in all, the visits to Krefeld and Bottrop were useful. The Germans were deeply embarrassed by the fact that our motorcade has suffered a few dents and broken windows. I downplayed the issue. . . The violent demonstrators were ugly—their hand gestures, though not new, had real vigor—and their appearance made them likely candidates in case central casting ever had a call for “Radical Left Demonstrators.” The sad part is they ruined the day not for us but for our Krefeld hosts . . . Kohl is a true friend, who faces real domestic problems as deployment approaches. While keeping absolutely firm on our schedule, we must be sympathetic to Kohl’s problems and do all we can to ease his way through them. With solid support from Kohl and the Germans can, I believe, be counted on. But difficult days lie ahead—Krefeld might prove to be the Iceberg’s tip.”

In this quote, one can see the initial thoughts of a policy that would fully manifest itself in six years when Bush was president. The “radical left” in the FRG was a real problem for Kohl, and it was in the interest of the US to support Kohl because he could be “counted on.”

In the 1987 elections, the SPD candidate Johannes Rau lost to CDU candidate Kohl. However, the Green Party achieved another gain by increasing their share of the electorate. According to Cerny, “If analysts wondered after the 1983 election whether their 5.6 percent of the vote did not foreshadow failure to clear the 5 percent hurdle at the next election, the 1987 outcome of 8.3 percent represented the best percentage point gain of any party, and suggested that the Greens had consolidated their position as a fourth party in the party system of the FRG.” With numbers below 10 percent, there was no way that a Green Party candidate would win the chancellorship, but this was never the concern for US policymakers. The real concern was that the Green Party would get enough support to pull the SPD to the left on its foreign

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policy platform. It would be up to Oskar Lafontaine, one of Brandt’s political disciples and chosen successor, to lead the new party.

After the 1987 defeat, Brandt retired, and Lafontaine was placed in position as the SDP deputy chairman, and he led a committee that drafted a new platform to incorporate more Green Party positions. From Lafontaine’s perspective, the SPD would never secure the chancellorship unless it reconciled with the Green Party members. Thus, he developed the so-called “eco-socialist” plank of the SPD platform. Like the Green Party, the future SPD would take up the environmental cause to include positions against both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. Furthermore, Lafontaine departed from Willy Brandt on the NATO question. Whereas Brandt accepted FRG membership in NATO as a necessary evil, Lafontaine advocated for FRG exit from NATO as a neutral state. Lafontaine was Kohl’s political opponent in the 1990 election, and the Bush national security team was eager to craft US security policy in a way that bolstered Kohl’s electoral chances.

The Bush National Security Team

The George H. W. Bush national security team was arguably one of the most experienced and cohesive groups in the history of the United States. Prior to becoming president, Bush served as ambassador to China from 1971 to 1973, and he had a brief stint as the CIA director in 1976. As ambassador, he worked closely with Henry Kissinger on the complicated grand strategy of establishing relations with China. During his service as the CIA director, Bush was exposed to intelligence reports such as those associated with the US, Soviet, and Cuban

interventions into Angola. In this way, Bush had first-hand experience with the formulation of geopolitical grand strategy and the bloody implications of the Cold War conflict.

His national security advisor, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, was identified early in his career as a military man with unlimited potential. During his time in the military, he served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and advised the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He was so skilled at his duties that the Pentagon assigned him to be a military assistant to the Nixon administration in 1970. While in that position, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger noticed Scowcroft’s talents, and he was reassigned as Kissinger’s deputy. After Scowcroft resigned from military service in 1975, he replaced Kissinger as Gerald Ford’s national security adviser placing him in a collegial relationship with Bush as the Director of the CIA.

Of all the members of Bush’s national security team, Secretary of State James Baker had the least national security experience, but he made up for this deficiency with an abundance of political skill. Prior to joining the Bush administration, he served as a campaign manager for Ford and Reagan. He went on to serve as Reagan’s chief of staff and eventually took over as the Secretary of the Treasury. These experiences taught him how to get things done in Washington. His reputation was that of a tough Texan who was result oriented and had limited patience for ineptitude. Although it was not a position dealing directly with security issues, Baker’s position as Secretary of the Treasury gave him experience at negotiating with foreign leaders.\(^{145}\)

Bush and Baker had a long history with each other. Their friendship went back to the 1960s when Bush first ran for Congress in Texas, and Baker’s wife worked on the campaign staff. As a result, they were close friends. However, both men being exceedingly ambitious, they were also competitors. According to Baker, they had a “big brother-little brother

relationship” which included a “healthy measure of friendly competition.” Halberstam notes that Baker’s inability to run successfully for the presidency in his own right was “one of the true disappointments” of his life. Some observers suggest that Baker had a latent resentment to serving in Bush’s shadow. According to Gates, Baker often “demanded more loyalty of the president than he gave in return.” It was, as Gates noted, “a complex friendship.” Despite the vagaries of their friendship, the familiarity between the two men was an important component in their formulation of security policy.

Central to the Bush national security team’s thinking was the existence of NATO as the key component for decreasing continental rivalries, deterring Soviet aggression, and ensuring European security. However, the mere existence of NATO was not enough. For it to function properly, American leadership, as Bush outlines in his memoir, was required:

I always have believed that the United States bears a disproportionate responsibility for peace in Europe and an obligation to lead NATO. In the 1930s, we learned the hard way that it was a mistake to withdraw into isolation after World War I. We watched as Europe struggled with fascism but were drawn inevitably into battle to restore its freedom. When the Cold War began, Western Europe became the front line against a Soviet threat, and our allies depended on the United States to point the direction for NATO; the American president was to lead the way.

This thinking was the essence of the so called “Atlanticist consensus,” which accepted the idea that European security was tied to an alliance that included the US. From the perspective of the Bush team, the most pressing existential threat to NATO came from the Soviets who were constantly seeking ways to manipulate fissures among Alliance members. This was a perspective reinforced from their past experiences.

147 David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 64.
The principle members of the Bush team formulated their foreign policy credentials during the 1970s when détente was the official policy of the US. Created by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the détente policy treated the Soviets “as both adversary and collaborator: adversary in fundamental ideology and in the need to prevent communism from upsetting the global equilibrium; collaborator in keeping the ideological conflict from exploding into a nuclear war.” Détente was a policy that recognized the complexities of a post-Vietnam world “that could be neither dominated nor rejected.”

To this end, Nixon and Kissinger successfully seized several opportunities for rapprochement with communist nations. In early 1972, Nixon reestablished a relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Later in the year, the Nixon administration successfully negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), which limited the number of available ICBMs (US-1,054/USS.R.-1,618) and SLBMs (US-710/USS.R.-950). Furthermore, SALT I severely restricted the establishment of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) sites in either country. There was an agreement to enter a second round of negotiations to pursue further reductions in nuclear weapons.

During their presidencies, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter continued the détente policy. Ford’s major achievement was agreeing to participate in the Soviet-initiated European Security Conference, which resulted in thirty-five nations signing the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Final Act settled many lingering issues concerning borders after World War Two, and it essentially recognized Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. However, the Final Act also

149 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 742.
recognized the importance of basic human rights, especially the right of self-determination. During his time in office, Carter continued with strategic arms negotiations resulting in the signing of SALT II in 1979. Proponents of these diplomatic successes considered them a positive development in East-West relations. Conservatives in the US considered them naive. Being closely connected to Kissinger, Bush and Scowcroft were active participants to implementing the initial aspects of the détente policy. However, as time progressed, they became discontented with what the US got in return for its cooperation.

Although they were the originators of the policy, Republican conservatives eventually viewed détente as a retreat in the face of Soviet aggression—especially as the policy played out during the Democratic administration of Jimmy Carter.\footnote{Bartholomew Sparrow, \textit{The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security}, (New York: Public Affairs, 2015), 294–295.} These conservatives cited Soviet construction of support bases in Cuba, support of communist rebels in Angola, and, most importantly, support to communist movements in Latin America as evidence of malign manipulation of the policy.\footnote{Robert M. Gates, \textit{From the Shadows}, 39–50.} All this occurred while the Carter administration was cutting defense and intelligence budgets, scrapping the B-1 program, and reducing troop levels in strategic areas such as South Korea. However, it was the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan that destroyed any lingering thoughts among conservative Republicans about the viability of détente as a functional policy. In the same month of the invasion, Bush, running for the Republican nomination against Ronald Reagan, wrote a letter to a potential California voter explaining his view on Carter’s SALT II treaty and Russian intentions in general:

\begin{quote}
I must respectfully disagree with your support of SALT II. I, too, have studied the Treaty and don’t believe that it is verifiable or equitable. I firmly believe that the Russians do not seek parity with the United States but superiority. We must
have a treaty that insures parity; and then, we can move toward a real strategic arms limitation agreement in SALT III. That would be my objective as President.\textsuperscript{153}

The lesson that Bush and his team learned was that the Soviets could not be trusted.\textsuperscript{154} They would maintain the public appearance of cooperation while simultaneously pursuing aggressive actions in peripheral areas.

**The Bush Pause**

Due to their previous experiences, Bush and his national security team were uncertain about the changes occurring in Eastern and Western Europe. To address this uncertainty, he directed his national security team on February 15, 1989 to conduct strategic reviews of US European security policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (NSR-3), Eastern Europe (NSR-4), and Western Europe (NSR-5). Each review was to be completed no later than March 15, 1989. The language in each of these memoranda reveals the concerns of Bush, Baker, and Scowcroft, and the documents demonstrate how Kahneman’s “loss aversion” heuristic manifested itself in their thinking.

For example, Bush declared in NSR-3 that “containment is being vindicated,” but “it would be unwise thoughtlessly to abandon policies that have brought us this far.” He acknowledged that changes in the Soviet Union might lead to a new security posture in Europe. However, he followed this language with a reminder that “the USSR remains an adversary with awesome military power whose interests conflict in important ways with our own. My own sense is that the Soviet challenge may be even greater than before.” However, Bush could not


ignore that Gorbachev’s reforms offered the opportunity to “make progress toward resolution of other international problems, to enhance international and strategic stability, and to promote the cause of democracy.”¹⁵⁵ Bush ends the memorandum with a directive to review Soviet internal and external policies, assess the Soviet internal situation and its foreign military policy, and assess how the US could develop and leverage its policies to encourage reform.

NSR-4 challenged his team to find ways to encourage Eastern Europeans to break free from their Soviet-backed regimes “without bringing a strong counterproductive reaction either from the USSR or the governments involved.”¹⁵⁶ In his memoirs, Bush acknowledged that the “traumatic uprisings in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were constantly on my mind.”¹⁵⁷ Thus, Bush directed his staff in NSR-4 to assess the current situation in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. How had Gorbachev’s reform initiatives emboldened democratic reforms? He also wanted his team to review policy objectives in Eastern Europe. In the past, the US followed a path of “differentiation” in which US policy was friendly to Eastern European regimes that showed independence from the Soviets. Tito’s Yugoslavia was a good example of “differentiation.” Could Gorbachev’s restraint in Eastern Europe lead to a restructuring of US priorities? Finally, Bush directed his team to identify how the US could use economic, political, cultural, regional, and arms control initiatives to leverage change in Eastern Europe.


¹⁵⁷ George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 39.
NSR-5 is the most revealing of all of Bush’s February policy review memoranda because it serves as the nexus for all other European security concerns. No policy was viable without maintaining a strong NATO. Baker illustrates this point in his memoirs when he says that the US “would never get East-West relations right unless we first had West-West unity.” In explaining the rationale behind the NSR-5 review, Bush acknowledged that all the old Atlanticist assumptions were “now being challenged for relevance”:

Questions are posed about the continued commonality of American and European world views, potential shifts in the priorities and goals of the Soviet leadership, the growing integration of Europe moving toward the 1992 goals of the Single European Act, the related competitive pressures being applied to the free trading system, and whether any voluntary alliance can endure the absence of a popular consensus that there is a common and dangerous adversary. The coherence of the Alliance is challenged as never before by two developments: internally by European integration plans centered on 1992; and externally by the political success of Gorbachev and the USSR in weakening the perception of European publics.

Thus, in the early stages of his presidency, Bush considered Gorbachev’s December 1988 statements at the UN as nothing more than a “propaganda offensive” delivered by a man who “loved the gamesmanship that went with an appearance” at the UN and who wanted to divide the West. To counter this propaganda effort, Bush directed his staff in NSR-5 to develop a policy that adapted the old assumptions in a way that secured the “central importance of American leadership” in Europe. Specifically, Bush wanted an assessment of the prospects for defense policy in Europe and the long-term effect of European integration scheduled for 1992.

These memoranda reveal an incoming administration that certainly appreciated the momentous changes occurring in Europe. Although they acknowledged the possibility of authentic change in the Soviet Union, the acknowledgment is tinged with incredulity about Gorbachev’s intentions. Two camps emerged within the administration pitting Scowcroft against Baker. From Scowcroft’s perspective, Gorbachev’s reforms were only intended to provide space for the Soviet Union to rejuvenate its economy to regain lost initiative against the West:

I was suspicious of Gorbachev’s motives and skeptical of his prospects. There was no doubt he was a new phenomenon. Following a period in the 1970s when the United States seemed to be faltering and the Soviets were confidently talking about a permanent change in the “correlation of forces” (the measurement by which, under their ideology, they judged whether the time was ripe to move offensively), things began to turn sour for them... In choosing Gorbachev, the old men of the Politburo clearly did not think they were selecting someone who would overturn the system, but one who could get it back on track. Gorbachev’s hard-nosed reputation, and the character of the chief sponsors of his rise through the ranks seemed to confirm their choice. The fundamental question was, were they all wrong? In 1989, I didn’t think that was likely.161

Such a perspective is unsurprising coming from a man who was directly involved in the frustrating policies of the détente era. From this perspective, the Soviets would feign cooperation in one area only to achieve gains in another. Because his previous government roles were not directly linked to national security, Baker was more open to the possibility that Gorbachev was sincere in his reform initiatives:

My senior advisers and I felt more inclined toward what could be called an “activist” view. The experts had told me that perestroika could be translated either as “restructuring” or “revolution.” My sense was that Gorbachev might actually be prepared to usher in far-reaching, fundamental change—but we would be able to find out how far he was willing to go only by moving forward ourselves.

To be sure, Baker was not ready to accept Gorbachev at face value, but he was more open to the idea of cooperation. Clearly there was uncertainty about how to protect the status quo in a changing Europe, but there was no uncertainty about the ultimate objective. American leadership of NATO must endure the changes. While the strategic review was in progress, the Bush administration moved forward to secure flexible response as its core security strategy.

**Loss Aversion 1: Protecting Flexible Response**

While avoiding any public statements that might undercut Reagan’s foreign policy, Bush and his closest advisers believed Reagan’s foreign policy was too erratic. For example, Scowcroft, a significant influencer on Bush’s security thinking, believed that labeling the Soviet Union an “evil empire” only served to “frighten our allies and make support of American leadership of the West more difficult.” He asserted that it was the kind of rhetoric that the Soviets used to manipulate the Green Party and the Social Democrats. On the other hand, Scowcroft thought Reagan’s willingness to cooperate with Gorbachev on reductions in strategic arms was based on an “unwarranted assumption that the changes in Soviet attitudes . . . signaled the end of the forty-year confrontation between East and West.”162 While reducing nuclear weapons was not bad, they were an important capability enabling NATO’s doctrine of “flexible response.” Scowcroft felt these reductions should not occur without reductions in Soviet conventional forces, which were numerically superior to the West. Although the development of “flexible response” is covered in detail in Chapter 5, the brief introduction that follows is necessary to understand Bush’s thinking at the beginning of his presidency.

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In the 1950s, the US’s nuclear strategy was founded on the principle of “massive retaliation,” which was the idea that the US would use nuclear weapons to defend its interests around the world. There was, however, never a publicly declared list of what interests the US considered worthy of a nuclear defense, and this “calculated ambiguity” always seemed to undermine the credibility of the strategy. Additionally, as the Soviets gained nuclear parity with the US, the idea that the US would engage in a full-scale nuclear war to protect its interests became dubious. Thus, to increase credibility, US leaders in the 1960s decided that they needed to have options “other than Armageddon and capitulation.” For originators of the flexible response strategy, options came in the form of a logical escalation. As long as the Soviets had a massive army in the East, the US would have soldiers in the West as a deterrent. If a conventional war were initiated and the Alliance failed to stop Soviet advances in the West, then tactical and intermediate nuclear weapons could be used to save Europe. Finally, if necessary, strategic ICBMs could be used in a full-scale nuclear war. One can see in this logic a graduated response in which leaders had options prior to full-scale nuclear war.

It should be stressed that not all Alliance leaders agreed with the “flexible response” strategy. Predictably, de Gaulle criticized the strategy because it depended too much on America staying in the conflict. From his perspective, the US had the option of backing out in the middle of an escalation, prior to transitioning to strategic ICBMs, leaving Europe a wasteland while protecting American cities. The US response to such allegations was that US troops would be stationed in Europe; therefore, the cost associated with losing American lives made them

163 Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, 90–94.
164 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 612.
committed. Although de Gaulle was never convinced, enough of the Alliance leaders were convinced that “flexible response” became part of the NATO’s “forward defense” strategy.

This strategy was firmly in place until Reagan signed the INF treaty in 1987. As previously mentioned, Bush and Scowcroft felt that nuclear weapons were “an indispensable element in the US strategy of keeping the Soviets at bay, a compensation for their enormous superiority in conventional forces.”\textsuperscript{165} To compensate for the loss of INF weapons, the Bush administration wanted to modernize the Short-range Nuclear Force (SNF) weapon known as the Lance missile as quickly as possible. However, the Lance missile only had a range of 500 kilometers, which meant that any nuclear exchange of SNF weapons would inevitably result in a greater amount of devastation in the FRG. Thus, there was much West German resistance to the Bush administration’s commitment to the modernization program. According to Scowcroft’s assessment, “Part of the current problem appeared to be willingness among some groups in West Germany, especially the Social Democrats and the Green Party, to accept at face value much of Gorbachev’s rhetoric about arms reductions.”\textsuperscript{166} Despite this resistance, Bush sent Baker on a whirlwind trip to convince NATO members of the need for unity on the SNF modernization issue.

During this trip, Baker visited the leader of every Alliance member, and he found little support for modernization of the Lance missile. In fact, only two leaders, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, supported the idea. When he arrived in Bonn, Baker found Kohl, usually an ally, against the modernization program and insisting that the US begin negotiations with the Soviets on the elimination of SNF weapons.

\textsuperscript{165} George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, \textit{A World Transformed}, 12.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 59.
Influenced by the political rhetoric of the Green Party, his constituents wanted a treaty that eliminated SNF weapons the way Reagan and Gorbachev eliminated INF weapons. The issue was urgent for Kohl because he was facing reelection in December 1990; the issue was urgent for US policymakers because the SDP was becoming increasingly anti-NATO. 167

As word spread about Bush’s SNF modernization program, the US press gave voice to concerns about how the Bush administration was developing its policy. In a February 1989 New York Times opinion editorial, George Kennan conceded that “uncertainties are unquestionably reasons for great alertness, caution and prudence in American policy towards [the Soviet Union],” but these concerns were not sufficient reasons “for neglecting the opportunities offered by Gorbachev’s policies for easing of military tensions and for improving the atmosphere of East-West relations.” Kennan lamented the US response to Gorbachev’s UN speech as “reluctant, embarrassed, and occasionally even surly. These responses have caused a great many people elsewhere in the world to wonder whether we really have any serious interest in arms control at all.” He closed the article with a scathing criticism of the assumption that “American tactical and short-range nuclear weapons in West Germany are an essential element of ‘deterrence,’ without which there would be serious danger of a Soviet attack in that region.” For Kennan, the Bush administration would do well to consider raw capabilities less important than intentions and interests. From his perspective, the Soviets had no intention of invading West Germany because it did not serve any of their interests. 168

While the SNF debate continued to heat up, the strategic review continued, and Bush’s national security team delivered their final reports. Baker and Scowcroft were generally dissatisfied with the official review. Frustrated by the lack of imagination in the reports, Scowcroft tasked two of his best subordinates, Condoleezza Rice and Robert Blackwill, to write an alternative report. This report suggested that the US should move “beyond containment” as long as the Soviets passed some basic thresholds. Another interesting development within the NSC staff during this review process was the emergence of German reunification as an agenda item. Although German reunification was the official policy of the US, the issue was considered a low priority. However, Blackwill tried to raise its relevance by inserting it into the official review process but was rebuffed by his counterparts at the State Department who felt it was not a vital interest for the US. In March 1989, Scowcroft received an NSC memo written by deputies Robert Blackwill and Phillip Zelikow suggesting that the “top priority for American foreign policy in Europe should be the fate of the Federal Republic of Germany.” The US should “help keep Kohl in power” because his “government is now lagging in the polls behind an opposition that as currently constituted, has too little regard either for nuclear deterrence or for conventional defense.” The US could bolster Kohl with a visible push for “movement” on German reunification because “there is no German of any age who does not dream of it in his soul.”

Ironically, Baker seemed to agree more with the NSC staffers than his own people at the State Department. Early in the presidency he was concerned about the future of the European Community after it completed integration in 1992. In his first NSC meeting in January 1989, Baker jotted a hand-written note stating that “EC ‘92 [was] also a major challenge; we need to make sure the result is outward looking, not inward. Will require a well-coordinated, consistent,

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169 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 28–30.
active effort by the USG [United States Government].” In his memoirs, Baker suggests that this concern over the EC ’92 was eventually linked to the fate of Germany:

Many Americans (as well as other North Americans and Asians) were quite concerned at the time that “EC92” would lead to an inward-looking European political and economic bloc, walled off from the rest of the West. To avoid this, we looked to establish early links with the EC. I also became convinced that, while nothing could replace our “special relationship” with London, power within Europe was shifting to Bonn, not only economically but also because of the openings being created with the East Europeans. Strong US-German ties, therefore, would also become critical to managing transatlantic relations.

In this way, the Bush administration policy began coalescing around the idea of supporting Kohl as a critical component of US European security policy, and this thinking eventually manifested itself fully in the SNF modernization compromise.

**Decision: Compromise on SNF**

When Baker returned from Europe in March, he communicated to the Bush that the SNF modernization program was a “psychological dilemma” for the German people. Gorbachev was not trying to split NATO leaders; however, he was successfully splitting the public from NATO leaders. Scowcroft and Bush agreed that the US had to do something bold to “regain the initiative” from Gorbachev’s December speech. Scowcroft floated a proposal to remove all US and Soviet troops from Central Europe. If the overwhelming Soviet conventional forces were removed, the US did not need to push for SNF modernization, and Kohl’s political troubles would be eased. The other member of the NSC, especially Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, considered this too much. However, the discussion did open the group to the idea of


172 Ibid., 90.
linking the reduction (not elimination) of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) to the SNF discussion. If Soviet forces were reduced to acceptable levels, then the SNF modernization aspect of “flexible response” became less important.

The impasse over SNF modernization was an unusual but serious rift between Bush and Kohl. The problem was exacerbated when NATO leaders approved in late April Kohl’s formal request to postpone SNF until after 1990. This was unacceptable to the Bush administration, but the problem was exacerbated when the press published a leaked story that the FRG reached out directly to the Soviets requesting talks over SNF reductions. Bush was upset that Kohl had reached out directly to Gorbachev, but he was also frustrated with his staff for failing to provide him with an agreed upon CFE package. Gorbachev aggravated tensions when he announced in May, only a couple of weeks before a major NATO summit in Brussels, his intention to unilaterally eliminate 500 Soviet SNF weapons system from Eastern Europe. Bush was once again upstaged with a Gorbachev peace gesture. He hoped that a Texas A&M speech in May would help counter Gorbachev’s peace offensive.

On May 12, 1989, Bush gave a speech at Texas A&M that outlined the “beyond containment” concept developed by Rice and Zelikow back in March. In the speech, Bush stated that the West must “encourage the evolution of the Soviet Union toward an open society.” However, Bush reminded the audience that the Soviet Union was required “to take [five] positive steps” to demonstrate their commitment to a new era of relations. First, Bush pressed his CFE initiative challenging the Soviets to “cut their forces to less threatening levels, in proportion to their legitimate security needs.” Second, he expected the Soviets to live up to their past promises and allow “self-determination for all the nations of Eastern Europe and Central Europe.” Third, he acknowledged the Soviet’s recent withdrawal from Afghanistan, but he expected concrete
“steps toward diplomatic solutions to these regional disputes around the world.” Fourth, Bush praised the Soviet’s increased respect for human rights inside the Soviet Union with the exclamation, “Mr. Gorbachev, don’t stop now!” Finally, he reached out to Gorbachev to work with the US to prevent international problems such as drug trafficking and environmental degradation. If the two superpowers worked together, “We can build a better world for our children.” If these steps were followed, Bush was prepared to move US policy “beyond containment” but, given the several caveats, only just beyond.173

The speech was not well received in the press, and it seemed to solidify perceptions of Bush as a reluctant leader. In a May 28, 1989 Los Angeles Times opinion piece, William Schneider lambasted Bush’s foreign policy approach. “George Bush is a status-quo politician,” Schneider wrote. The article goes on to portray Bush as a reactive politician, especially when compared with Gorbachev:

Today Gorbachev has become the symbol of change in the world. Wherever he goes, he seems to spread democracy in his wake . . . When Gorbachev said he would stop sending weapons to Nicaragua, the White House responded with annoyance. Press spokesman Marlin Fitzwater dismissed the gesture as a “public relations gambit” perpetuated by a “drugstore cowboy.” The White House just doesn’t get it. To say the Soviets are engaging in “public relations” implies they are being superficial while we are being substantive. But they are reforming their system and making unilateral arms cuts while we are saying, “Let’s wait and see.”174

Gorbachev’s rhetoric was clearly having a public relations impact on the administration’s efforts. From the administration’s perspective, Gorbachev’s peace overtures might result in a situation in which the “Europeans would cease to follow and the Soviets would seize the international agenda.” The Bush team wanted to use the May 1989 NATO Brussels summit to pitch his CFE proposal to NATO leaders.

Bush’s speech at the May 1989 NATO Brussels summit was a second attempt to regain the initiative from Gorbachev. In his remarks to the press, Bush acknowledged that he made four proposals to achieve CFE reductions:

1) NATO should lock in the Warsaw Pact’s proposals on the number of NATO tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters in inventory;

2) NATO should reduce attack helicopters and combat aircraft to 15 percent below current levels;

3) The US and Soviets should create a 275,000-man cap on combat personnel serving in the Atlantic-Urals zone;

4) The timetable for reaching an agreement should be accelerated to six to twelve months, and CFE reductions should be complete by 1992 or 1993.

When a reporter asked him if he ever envisioned a nuclear-free Europe, Bush responded, “No. We need the concept of ‘flexible response,’ and I can’t in the foreseeable future see us getting away from that.” At this point, Bush was still cynical about Gorbachev’s rhetoric, and he expressed this cynicism when a reporter asked him about his motivations for the CFE initiative:

This is to put [Gorbachev’s peace initiative] to the test. This is to say: Here we go, we’re out there now with a proposal that the United States puts forward and that has widespread alliance support. Now test it. How serious are you?

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175 Goerge H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 43.
177 Ibid.
you] really want to reduce the imbalances that exist in all these categories, or do we want rhetoric? And so, what we’re saying – we’re not changing; I’m not changing my mind. I’ve said I want to see perestroika succeed. I said I want to see us move forward in arms reductions. Indeed, we’ve set a date for the resumption of START talks – but eyes wide open. And here we go now, on the offense with a proposal that is bold and tests whether the Soviet Union will move towards balance, or whether they insist on retaining an unacceptable conventional force imbalance.178

Although he was loath to admit to being in a public relations war with Gorbachev, this candid comment proposing that his administration was “on the offense with a proposal” suggests that a public relations battle was very much on his mind.

While Bush was engaging at the NATO summit, Baker’s team was working SNF negotiations in the background. The US would not budge on their refusal to enter negotiations on the elimination of SNF. However, the US did agree, once CFE reductions were completed in 1992 or 1993, to enter negotiations on the partial reductions of SNF in Europe. Bush’s summit proposal for dramatic reductions in conventional troops and the promise of future negotiations on partial reductions after CFE was complete gave Kohl the political space he needed. Even Gorbachev was happy with the outcome. Scowcroft pointed out that the summit was a “resounding success” and he noted that the press “never returned to their theme of the spring—that we had no vision, and no strategy but drift.”179

Only a day after the NATO summit, Bush capitalized on his political gains with a speech in Mainz. The speech was everything the German public wanted; it was a public proclamation for East-West peace. Bush stated as much previously, but this speech used aspirational language. He described NATO’s forty years of success as “a second Renaissance of Europe.”

178 Ibid.
179 George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 83.
He then asked a poignant question: “If ancient rivals like Britain and France, or France and Germany, can reconcile, then why not the nations of East and West?” He reminded Gorbachev that “there cannot be a common European home until all within it are free to move from room to room.” He challenged Gorbachev to open the borders, especially the border between East and West Berlin. If this could occur, Europe would be “whole and free,” which should be the ultimate prize. The atmosphere in Europe was ebullient about the future of East-West relations, and leaders began wondering what the future might look like with reconciliation.

In a late May meeting, Bush and Kohl discussed the future of the EC and the importance of Germany’s relationship with the US. Kohl reminded Bush “that, without any overestimation, the FRG was the real engine of the EC.” If there was concern about the EC turning inward after the 1992 integration, the US should know that “Bonn’s policy was to avoid a ‘fortress Europe’ at all costs.” As far as NATO was concerned, Kohl “wanted the President to be sure that the Germans understood that there could be no secure future for the FRG without NATO and without German friendship with the United States.” Bush responded that he “felt that German-American relations probably had never been better. There was a feeling of goodwill toward Germany in the US.” Harkening back to the tough SNF negotiations, Bush conceded “there would be differences, but the relationship would endure and only get better and better.” In this

way, one can see Bush’s European security policy maturing, and it is clear that Germany’s leadership in a fully integrated Europe was an influential factor in US policy deliberations.  

During the policy review, the Bush team was skeptical about Gorbachev’s reform initiatives. Based on their previous experiences during détente, they tried to apply traditional Cold War thinking in a changing environment. In this way, they pursued a policy of SNF modernization to counter what they thought were careless Reagan-era strategic reductions. However, the rest of the world took Gorbachev more seriously—especially the citizens of the FRG. As pressure to cooperate with the Soviets mounted, the Bush team realized that they needed to adapt to keep Kohl in power. If he lost to the SPD candidate, Oskar Lafontaine, the FRG would be led by an anti-NATO politician. Given the economic power of the FRG, they would be a principal leader in a fully integrated Europe, and this would have potentially negative consequences for US security policy. As events in the summer of 1989 developed, the logic of protecting Kohl would have increased significance and lead to US support of a reunified Germany.

**Loss Aversion 2: Protecting the US-German Relationship**

The revolutions in Eastern Europe during the summer of 1989 were a popular rejection of the communist system. The first two countries to make a move towards a non-Communist government were Poland and Hungary. Inside each country, poor economic conditions led to a low of standard of living. Disillusioned with the communist system, the people took to the streets to protest one-party rule and demanded their right of self-determination as outlined in the

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1975 Helsinki Accords. Due to political pressures from protests, the Polish Communist Party allowed free elections in June. The results were an overwhelming victory for Lech Walesa’s Solidarity Party. Although not as organized as the Polish Solidarity party, the Hungarian opposition followed suit and held democratic elections in October.

At any point during the summer, Gorbachev could have used Soviet troops to crush protestors in the streets. This was the Soviet decision in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 when the Soviet leadership ordered a brutal crackdown on demonstrators who wanted a more independent course for their country. However, Gorbachev stayed true to the promises of his 1988 UN speech in which he declared that “force and the threat of force can no longer be and should not be instruments of foreign policy.” In each instance of protest, he backed up his rhetoric with restraint. Furthermore, he made a second highly publicized speech that further clarified the depth of his reform vision.

In July 1989, only a month after Polish Solidarity won a majority in the Sejm, Gorbachev gave a speech to the Council of Europe with his vision for the future. He made clear that the “social and political order” of European countries “is exclusively a matter for the peoples themselves and of their choice.” In clearer language than the December 1988 speech, he stated that the Soviets would not use force to suppress popular movements against Communist governments in Europe. He condemned “outmoded stereotypes that the Soviet Union” wanted to decouple the United States from Europe. Instead, Gorbachev professed that “the Soviet Union and the United States are a natural part of the European international and political structure.” Gorbachev called for a “common European home” in which capitalist and socialist politico-economic systems coexisted peacefully. Gorbachev admitted he did not have a blueprint for his

182 Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 249
proposed “common European home,” but he suggested that the foundations already existed in the shared values expressed in the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Finally, Gorbachev made another unilateral commitment to immediately cut the Soviet SNF, and he professed a desire for “eliminating all nuclear weapons by the turn of the century” and a reduction in conventional forces “to a level of reasonable defense sufficiency.”

Although highly rhetorical, Gorbachev’s peace initiatives were popular with Western European publics. On a visit to Paris in July 1989, he was greeted by “thousands of onlookers pressed against barricades” shouting “Gorby! Gorby!” Polling of French citizens showed that 66 percent of the public approved of Gorbachev. One French citizen was quoted in a Chicago Tribune article as saying, “No matter what happens, he will be remembered by history as an exceptional man, a man who has transformed hate to trust.” Two weeks prior to his visit to Paris, Gorbachev received an equally warm welcome in Stuttgart where 5,000 West German citizens greeted him with supportive signs: “I like Gorby,” “Greetings Gorby,” and “New Thinking, No New Weapons.” Although there was doubt among the public about Gorbachev’s ability to follow through on his lofty rhetoric, the aspirational tone of his speech about ending the Cold War was a refreshing change for many people, and this was a frustrating state of affairs for US policymakers.

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183 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev speech to the Council of Europe, July 6, 1989, Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media, George Mason University, http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/gorbachev-speech-7-6-89_e3cc87237.pdf (date accessed April 20, 2016).


Gorbachev was again upstaging the Bush administration, and some members of Bush national security team refused to consider peace initiatives as sincere. The December 1989 speech was viewed as propaganda to corner an incoming president, and the July speech was an attempt to split the Alliance over the SNF weapons issue that Bush had recently reconciled at the NATO summit. In his recounting of the July speech, Scowcroft thought it “was clearly designed to create mischief within NATO.” Although Western European publics felt that Gorbachev was sincere, Scowcroft was committed to the understanding that the speech was the same Soviet Cold War obfuscation he had witnessed during the 1970s. From Scowcroft’s perspective, Gorbachev’s speech was the behavior of a leader who was not “behaving as a wholly post-Cold War Soviet leader.” However, Gorbachev’s non-intervention with the protestors was hard to ignore, and, more importantly, his popularity with European publics was disturbing. The Bush administration had to confront Gorbachev on his own populist terms.

In late July, Bush made a trip to Poland and Hungary to “encourage reformers” but also to “offset the appeal of [Gorbachev’s] message.” In his memoir, Bush recounts that he wanted to avoid “hot rhetoric” that might embolden hard-liners who might move against Gorbachev and force a crackdown on the reformers in Eastern Europe. To be sure, these concerns were central to Bush’s thinking at the time, but Gorbachev’s peace offensive placed Bush in a delicate situation. To secure the future of the Alliance, he needed to reconsider his past assumptions about Soviet intentions. Under pressure from West European leaders, Bush finally decided to reach out to Gorbachev for a meeting. On a July 21, 1989 plane ride returning from Eastern Europe, Bush wrote Gorbachev a personal note requesting a face-to-face meeting. “Perhaps it

186 George H. W Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 114.
187 Ibid., 115.
was my visit to Poland and Hungary,” Bush wrote, “or perhaps it is what I heard about your recent visits to France and Germany—whatever the cause—I just want to reduce the chances there could be misunderstandings between us. I want to get our relationship on a more personal basis.” After several diplomatic exchanges negotiating the location of the meeting, the Soviets and Americans agreed to meet in December on ships anchored near Malta. Intended to be a meeting to continue US-Soviet dialogue, events in East Germany would increase the significance of the meeting.

Because of its relatively robust economy, the Soviets often presented the GDR as the model for socialism. However, under the leadership of Erich Honecker, the economic decay in the country became acute. To fund its robust social programs, the GDR was $26 billion dollars in debt to the West. Its current account deficit was $12.1 billion. This macro-economic reality devalued the East-German mark, and it resulted in micro-economic distress that fueled street protests. In the East German system, each citizen had a job and cheap access to common consumer goods. In this way, the cost of locally produced products was affordable. A reporter from the Los Angeles Times noted that “potatoes cost less than 25 cents” and “frozen chicken was the equivalent of about $2 dollars.” Thus, East Germany was presented as the model socialist country. However, if an East German desired to purchase items outside of East Germany, the cost became prohibitive. Items such as fruit and coffee, imported from capitalist countries, cost as much as dinner for two in the West. To purchase a sub-standard Soviet

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188 George H. W. Bush letter to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings, 433.
189 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 87.
automobile, applicants had to wait up to sixteen years. The wait for a telephone could be as long as ten years. Like their counterparts in Poland and Hungary, the East Germans took to the street demanding a higher standard of living comparable to those of their western neighbors.

In April 1989, the new non-communist president of Hungary, Miklos Nemeth, ordered that the border fence separating his country from Austria be taken down. His intent was to allow Hungarian citizens to move freely between Austria and Hungary. In doing so, however, he also inadvertently opened the gates to East Germans who fled through Hungary to Austria and finally to West Germany in search of a better way of life. As part of a prior agreement with their East German allies, the Hungarian government initially attempted to restrict the transit of East Germans to Austria without a valid exit visa. Hundreds were turned back, but hundreds more slipped through the porous border. Those who did not make it through to Austria sought refuge in the West German embassy in Budapest rather than return to East Germany. Thousands of refugees sought asylum in this manner. Nemeth eventually realized that restricting travel for East Germans while allowing it for Hungarians was a contradiction that could not stand. In August, the Hungarian government overturned its return policy and opened the border.

The East German government, led by Erich Honecker, was furious that their ally had betrayed them. When Honecker appealed to Gorbachev for support, he was told that the problem was a GDR concern, and it needed to be worked out at that level. From the Soviet perspective, the problem in East Germany was that Honecker was a hardliner who refused to cooperate with Gorbachev’s reform. Honecker’s reactionary response to the refugee crisis was to close the East German border with Hungary. However, this only diverted the refugee flow to Czechoslovakia where thousands of East Germans converged on the West German embassy in Prague seeking
asylum. By October, the Soviets endorsed a regime change in East Germany where Honecker was replaced with the reform minded Egon Krenz.

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were in favor of more relaxed border controls, and they understood the political implications of the refugee problem. In notes from a November 3, 1989 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo Session, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, and Gorbachev were discussing the unrest in the GDR. After conceding that Krenz would have difficulty holding on to power without FRG economic assistance, Shevardnadze made a bold proposal to “take down the wall ourselves.” Gorbachev’s response to the comment reveals that he understood that Bush and the West were keen to prevent the Soviets taking the lead on the German issue:

The West does not want the unification of Germany, but it wants to prevent it with our hands, to push us against the FRG, in order to then exclude [a possibility] of conspiracy between the USSR and Germany. We will deal with the FRG in the “triangle,” i.e. with the participation of the GDR, and openly, by the way.¹⁹¹

The challenge, as Kryuchkov noted in the meeting, was that taking down the wall “would be hard for the East Germans.” It was up to Krenz to institute enough reforms to save the GDR

To this end, Krenz convened a communist plenum in East Germany to discuss how to move forward with reforms. At the conclusion of each day, Günter Schabowski, a leading East German party member, held a press conference to discuss the events of the day. On November 9, 1989, he held a press conference to discuss reforms associated with relaxing exit visa requirements on the western borders. During the press conference, Schabowski stated that a

decision was made that “allows every citizen of the German Democratic Republic to leave the GDR through any of the border crossings.” When asked what the effective date of the decision was, he responded that “according to my information, immediately, without delay.” In making the change, the East German government hoped that the refuge crisis would “regulate itself.”

As it turned out, the decision Schabowski referenced only applied to the extreme western borders and did not apply to transit from East to West Berlin. However, the ambiguous nature of the pronouncement was enough of an opening for the East German people. By the following morning, Berliners were dancing in the streets celebrating the end of the division and actively moving across the Berlin Wall. The East German guards did not resist, and the Berlin Wall became a relic from the past.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November was a tipping point that accelerated change in Europe. In dealing with the accelerated pace of change, historian Mary Sarotte notes in her book, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe, that European leaders considered four options. The first option was to return to the post-World War Two “Four Powers” management of the German question. The second option was to eliminate NATO and the Warsaw Pact and replace it with a pan-European security structure tethered to the CSCE. Gorbachev favored either of these first two options. The third option, originally invoked by Kohl, involved the creation of a German confederation, but this idea was “overtaken by events


more quickly than anyone ever imagined.” The final option was to simply apply already existing Cold War institutions on a fully reunified Germany in Europe.

Kohl was in Poland when the Berlin Wall fell, and he immediately flew back to Bonn to deal with how each international player pursued their favored option. Gorbachev was his first concern. Immediately after the wall fell, he sent letters to all the Western leaders warning them of the grave consequences of taking advantage of the situation in East Germany and formally requested “Four Power” consultations. For the Soviets, opening the borders was acceptable, but reunification was out of the question because the FRG and GDR were now historical realities. Kohl called Gorbachev on November 11 to reassure him that West Germany did not want a “destabilization of the situation.” Gorbachev was glad that Kohl was committed to a stable process moving forward because pushing “developments toward an unpredictable course” would be a move “toward chaos.” Such an outcome “would be undesirable in all respects.” He urged Kohl to use his authority to “keep others within [the] limits that are adequate for the time being and for the requirements of our time.” Kohl’s phone call seemed to calm Gorbachev.

Kohl also had to deal with Western leaders who were not interested in reunification. Basing much of their thinking on history, the United Kingdom and France were firmly against the prospect. According to notes from Anatoly Chernyaev, a close adviser to Gorbachev, Thatcher echoed Gorbachev’s concerns in a September 1989 meeting in which she stated that “Britain and Western Europe were not interested in the unification of Germany . . . It would lead

194 Ibid., 7.
to changes in the post-war borders, and we cannot allow that because such a development would undermine the stability of the entire international situation and could lead to threats to our security.”197 Although more ambivalent in language, the French were also against reunification. Mitterrand communicated to Gorbachev on November 14, 1989 that France did not think “the issue of changing borders can realistically be raised now—at least until a certain time.”198 Thus, it seemed that only Bush and Kohl supported the idea of reunification.

**Decision: Supporting German Reunification**

On the day after the wall came down, the strategy of bolstering Kohl’s political prospects by aligning US policy with German reunification started moving beyond policy papers and coalescing on an official level. In a November 10 phone call, Kohl intimated to Bush that the people of Germany were very happy about the opening. To signal to Bush the popular sentiment on reunification, Kohl noted that in a recent address to a crowd of 150,000 to 200,000, “there was much applause.”199 With Kohl expressing the popularity of the opening, Blackwill and Zelikow’s March memo stating that the dream of reunification was “in the soul of every German” was surely on Bush’s mind. The opening of borders was an opportunity to improve Kohl’s lagging political fortunes. As late as September, he was still trailing in the polls.

According to Zelikow and Rice, US policymakers were worried that the 1990 election “was an

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election many observers expected the CDU to lose.” Thus, it was important for Bush and Kohl to get the reunification policy right.

In the phone call, Bush told Kohl that the opening of the border made the upcoming Malta summit “even more important,” and the two of them needed to “spend enough time on the telephone so I have the full benefit of your thinking before I meet with him.” Seven days later, Bush and Kohl talked once again via telephone. Bush reiterated that he was “determined to get advice and suggestions” from Kohl. “Input from the FRG, from Chancellor Kohl,” Bush stressed, “is more important than at any other time or for any other meeting.” At Malta, Bush wanted to be sure that he was properly communicating Kohl’s message to Gorbachev. In this critical moment, Bush wanted to be sure the US supported Kohl in a way that was beneficial for the 1990 elections.

Bush was trying to tease out from Kohl how far he wanted to go on the future relationship between the FRG and GDR. In an October 25, 1989 interview with New York Times reporter R. W. Apple, Jr., Bush was asked how he felt about reunification when so many Western leaders were against the idea. “There’s a lot written,” Bush responded, “on the fear of reunification that I personally don’t share.” With this interview, he signaled to the world that

200 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 79.
the US was willing to chart a different course from what was expected. Kohl took note of the comment. In late November, he surprised the world with a plan that would eventually result in a confederated Germany.

The speech was developed in complete secrecy. Even Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FRG foreign minister and Kohl’s political rival from the FDP, was not involved in the drafting. Bush received a letter about the speech only an hour prior to its delivery. The points were straightforward:

1) Institute measures to facilitate travel between East and West Germany;

2) Expand technological cooperation with the GDR, as in environmental protection, telecommunications and railroads;

3) Expand economic aid to the GDR provided they liberalized their political and economic system;

4) Establish a “treaty community” to cooperate on specific issues;

5) Proceed, after free elections in the GDR, to develop “confederative structures” between the two states;

6) Embed the development of intra-German relations in the “All European” process;

7) Encourage the EC to open itself to the GDR and other Central and Eastern European countries;

8) Speed up the development of the CSCE;

9) Support rapid progress for arms control;

10) Strive for a “peace order” to allow for German reunification as one state.\textsuperscript{204}

In this speech, Kohl laid out a plan for gradual reunification with no timetable; however, he knew that support from the US was essential for the plan’s success.

\textsuperscript{204} Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, \textit{Germany Unified and Europe Transformed}, 120.
In his last-minute letter to Bush informing him about the speech, Kohl asked for US support of the plan when he met with Gorbachev at Malta in December. Specifically, Kohl asked Bush to reject any notion that the division was a historical reality:

General Secretary Gorbachev may speak of this question in the sense that we must continue to respect the post-War reality, and that the reforms in the GDR may not go so far to change the borders between East and West and to reestablish the unity of Germany in whatever form. I ask you explicitly—also in the sense of which I explained at the outset—not to agree with any commitments that could be displayed as restricting the policy of working towards peace in Europe, in which the German people recover their free self-determination of their unity.  

Finally, Kohl asked Bush, in a very personal tone, to support his ten points when he met with Gorbachev at Malta:

Dear George—I would be especially indebted to you if, when you meet with Gorbachev, you could support the policies in these ten points and make clear to him that the best interests of his country do not lie in holding onto taboos that can be overcome, but rather in this forward-looking course. For this I thank you in advance.

If there were any doubts with Bush about what Kohl wanted for the future, this letter eliminated them. The deteriorating situation in East Germany was at such a level that the public demand for unification was insurmountable. In many ways, it was the German people who were making the decisions about reunification; Kohl was merely a populist instrument. With his intentions articulated in the phone call, Bush knew what he had to do in his meeting with Gorbachev.

When the issue of German reunification came up at Malta on December 2, 1989, Gorbachev made clear that he thought Kohl was not acting “seriously and responsibly,” and his initiative towards reunification was being “exploited for electoral gain” in the 1990 elections.

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Gorbachev then hinted that such calculations might be overestimated because “opinions in the FRG vary on this issue, both inside the governing coalition and between the coalition and the Social Democrats.” Gorbachev was correct on this point. Reunification was emerging as contentious political issue for the 1990 elections. The likely SDP candidate, Oskar Lafontaine, publicly criticized Kohl for moving too fast with reunification, which might result in negative consequences for both East and West. At this point, Gorbachev asked Bush a rhetorical question about whether a unified Germany would be neutral or a member of NATO. As Kohl had anticipated in his telephone call with Bush, Gorbachev then stated that the division of Germany was a matter of history: “None of us is responsible for the division of Germany. History occurred this way. Let history continue to decide on this issue in the future. It seems to me we have developed and understanding in this regard.”

Bush responded that while electoral consideration might be partly responsible for Kohl’s speech, it was also “greatly influenced by an emotional reaction to events.” However, Bush assured Gorbachev that the West would not “take any rash steps; we will not try to accelerate the outcome of the debate on reunification.” In this first session, the two leaders decided to let the German issue drop; however, in the plenary session on the second day of the summit, Bush was more explicit with his position on German reunification: “Although we did not go into details, during yesterday’s conversation we discussed eye-to-eye the problem of the reunification of Germany. I hope you understand that you cannot expect us not to approve of German

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reunification.” In one of the more perplexing occurrences Malta summit, Gorbachev never responded directly to Bush’s proclamation. Bush had declared a policy that was extremely provocative to the Soviets, and Gorbachev said nothing. Bush followed through on Kohl’s request to support his reunification policy. At this point, Bush needed to announce it publicly; and as he had done the previous May, he used a NATO summit to reveal his European policy.

**Loss Aversion 3: Protecting German Membership in NATO**

Only a day after the Malta summit, Bush presented his plan for Europe in a speech to NATO in which he brought all the elements together for a “new Atlanticism.” In the future, the EC, the CSCE, and NATO would be the principle institutions in Europe. Germany would be allowed to reunify according to the principle of self-determination, and it would remain within NATO. Border issues related to Poland, a legacy issue left over from World War Two, would fall under the Helsinki Final Act. Finally, US troops would remain in Europe.

Bush’s speech to NATO was the consolidation of a strategy that was developed since Bush came to office. US policymakers would endorse German membership in NATO and its integration into the EC as necessary components of reunification. However, guaranteeing German membership in NATO required that Kohl win in the 1990 elections. According to a policy memorandum from Scowcroft to Bush, “Chancellor Kohl’s preoccupation between now and December 1990 will be to get reelected. . . Your [post-Malta] meeting will be an opportunity to reaffirm your firm support for Kohl, particularly for his strongly Atlanticist approach to the

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German Question.” In making such a strong demonstration of support, they could “help Kohl avoid a bidding war with Genscher on the subject.”\(^\text{210}\) If Lafontaine’s party won the election, there were no guarantees. Therefore, the US would do whatever it could to facilitate Kohl’s efforts to pursue reunification to improve his political viability. Given that Kohl was pro-NATO, his hold on power would ensure that NATO endured. In this way, the NATO endowment would be protected even though Europe was undergoing a rapid and extraordinary transformation. However, having a strategy was one thing, but Soviet intransigence on German membership in NATO made implementing the strategy a monumental diplomatic challenge.

Although he did not express it at the Malta meeting, Gorbachev was furious with Kohl’s plan for reunification.\(^\text{211}\) On December 5, he met with Genscher to complain about Gorbachev’s audacity on the issue of reunification. He told Genscher that he felt betrayed by Kohl’s announcement because in the November 11 phone call he had promised not to destabilize the situation in the GDR, but “his practical steps deviate from his assurances.” Then Gorbachev asked Genscher the same questions he had asked Bush at the Malta meeting. In a confederated Germany, “Where will the FRG find itself then, in NATO or in the Warsaw Treaty? Or maybe it will become neutral? And what would NATO mean without the FRG?” Ignoring the difficulties of the situation demonstrated that Kohl was an irresponsible and unpredictable politician: “Politics without brains is not politics. This way you may spoil everything we have created together.” At the end of the conversation, Gorbachev shrewdly attempted to exploit the dynamics of the West German domestic political situation when he reminded the foreign


\(^{211}\) Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, \textit{Germany Unified and Europe Transformed}, 134–137.
minister of the embarrassing fact that he “only learned about his 10 points from the speech in the Bundestag.” Genscher conceded this point but noted that he and Kohl would “deal with it ourselves.” Gorbachev reminded Genscher that he should “not take everything I said personally . . . You know that we feel differently about you than we do about others.”

Like the Bush national security team, Gorbachev clearly recognized the importance of West German domestic politics. A September 1990 entry in the personal diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, a close confidant and adviser to Gorbachev, demonstrates that the Soviets were hoping that Genscher would work with Lafontaine for an SPD victory in the 1990 elections:

All day today I was preparing materials for [Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev] meeting with Lafontaine tomorrow. For several months I have been trying to resist this meeting, especially lately. We do not need this double game. Even if he becomes chancellor (with Genscher’s support) he will be doing the same thing as Kohl—German reunification (no matter how upset he is with us). However, the lobbying efforts by Falin & Co., and M.S.’ social-democratic friend (even Kvitsinskii joined them) won him over: M.S. will see Lafontaine.

As Bush and Kohl were allies during the transformation, Gorbachev was desperately trying to find a similar relationship in West Germany via Lafontaine so that the Soviets could have a weighted say in how the transformation occurred.

In the absence of such a personal ally, the Soviets attempted to control the reunification through process. In late November, the Soviets called for a “Helsinki II” to deal with the German question. This would create a situation in which all the countries of Europe were consulted on future outcomes. The Americans, however, viewed such consultations as merely


opportunities for Soviet manipulation of European leaders, and they rejected the prospect as too unpredictable.214 Several weeks later, the Soviets reversed course again—this time calling again for “Four Power” negotiations. Remembering the humiliation of the Yalta Conference, the Germans hated the idea of being excluded from the negotiations. From their perspective, they had paid the price for their past aggression and learned to be cooperative members of the international community. To placate an increasingly erratic Gorbachev, not to mention the French and British, the Americans agreed to a low-level, minimally publicized “Four Power” meeting on December 8 in Strasbourg, France. This was the one and only time a concession was made on the Four Power proposal.215

Kohl’s reunification announcement was clearly a disturbing event in Europe, and Bush’s speech at the NATO did not assuage the stress. Baker immediately returned to Europe to more clearly articulate the US vision for a “New Atlanticism.” In a December 12 speech to the Berlin Press Club, Baker described in more detail what Bush envisioned for the future of Europe. It would be a future that maintained “a place for old foundations and structures that remain valuable—like NATO—while recognizing that they can also serve new collective purpose.”216 Baker then stated that the new architecture “should reflect” two principles: a reunified Germany and the acknowledgement that US security was inextricably linked to Europe.

215 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 154-160.
At this point in the speech, Baker outlined a new mission for NATO. While NATO would always maintain its preparedness for deterrence and collective defense, the US believed it should take on four additional tasks:

1) Serve as the central institution for CFE arms control verification once the final settlement was agreed to in 1990;

5) Provide an institutional framework through which consultations to occur on dealing with regional conflicts;

6) Develop initiatives through which the West might promote economic and political ties with Eastern Europe and to help increase human rights;

7) Demonstrate to Eastern Europe how NATO members had overcome ancient rivalries and “offers the nations of Eastern Europe an appealing model of international relations.”

This concept was an attempt to move NATO away from a military to a political body that presented no threat to the Soviet Union.

The speech anchored US European security policy to two institutions: the EC and the CSCE. The US supported an EC that integrated all elements of European society as outlined in the Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act. However, the US wanted an EC that was “open to cooperation with others.” For the CSCE, the US sought to strengthen the three baskets of the organization: security, economic, and human rights. As might be expected, the security basket should enable “negotiations on confidence-building measures” surrounding the CFE negotiations. The economic basket of the CSCE would focus on helping centrally planned economies transition to capitalism. Finally, the CSCE should use the third basket, human rights,

217 Although this speech does not mention enlargement specifically, there is a clear hint here that NATO might be open to enlargement. The subject of enlargement is dealt with in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
to help establish a Europe in which every citizen had the democratic right to choose their leaders and form of government.

Baker closed out the speech with an ominous warning that provides a good example of how the Bush administration’s “loss aversion” heuristic was manifesting in US policy:

My friends, the changes we see underway today in the East are a source of great hope. But a new era brings different concerns for all of us. Some are as old as Europe itself. Others are themselves the new product of change. Were the West to abandon that we have built up over four decades, these concerns could grow into problems. But the institutions we have created—NATO, the European Community, and the CSCE process—are alive. Rooted in democratic values, they fit well with the people power that is shaping history’s new course.218

This was a speech that attempted to satisfy the concerns of all parties involved. The commitment to a reunified Germany within NATO was good for Kohl’s political future and US security goals. For the British, the commitment to the continuance of NATO was reassuring, even if expected. The strong statements in support of an integrated Europe were meant for the French who were willing to accept German reunification if they continued to cooperate in accordance with the SEA. Finally, the CSCE remarks were meant to let the Soviets know they would have a venue through which to advocate their perspective. However, as will be discussed later, the Soviets never viewed the US vision for the CSCE as adequate. In the meantime, the situation in East Germany continued to decline.

While the diplomatic game surrounding Baker’s speech played out, events deteriorated in East Germany to such a degree that the reunification process would take on an unforeseen rapid tempo. In early December, several top officials from the East German government were

arrested on corruption charges. Three days later, Egon Krenz resigned as head of the communist party. Krenz was replaced by Hans Modrow who established a “roundtable” of left-wing dissidents who, like Gorbachev, wanted to reform the East German state to save the GDR and its socialist system.\textsuperscript{219} In this way, the members of the “roundtable” agreed to open elections in May 1990. They would purge the East German political structure through the democratic process. However, the members of the “roundtable” began taking actions that transcended their original reform charter. According to Zelikow and Rice, “The members of the roundtable began to act as a surrogate parliament, taking on the still powerful and recalcitrant secret police by publicizing new revelations about the murderous activities of the Stasi.”\textsuperscript{220} By January 15, 1990, thousands of protestors were in the streets, and they attacked a secret police headquarters in East Germany. In some cases, local governments were so marginalized they ceased functioning. In view of these circumstances, the “roundtable” agreed to reschedule the elections to an earlier date in March 1990. By February, the Modrow government was so discredited that, according to Zelikow and Rice, “Kohl was no longer interested” in considering their ideas for confederation.\textsuperscript{221} In short, the citizens of East Germany wanted nothing less than full reunification, and Kohl wanted to accommodate what would be a new constituent block in a reunified Germany.

By embracing an accelerated reunification timeline, a debate arose in FRG politics as to what reunification method to use, and this debate had implications for the future of NATO. The FRG’s constitution, known as the Basic Law, provided for two mechanisms for the eventual

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{219} Mary Elise Sarotte, \textit{1989}, 92–95.
\item \textsuperscript{220} Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, \textit{Germany Unified and Europe Transformed}, 153.
\item \textsuperscript{221} Ibid., 158.
\end{itemize}
reunification of the two German states. Article 146 mandated all-German elections to choose delegates for a convention to draft a new constitution. On the other hand, Article 23 provided an approach in which the GDR would simply merge into the FRG’s established political and economic system. The SPD wanted to use the Article 146 method because, as Scowcroft noted in a March memorandum to Bush, it would lead “to negotiations between the two German states toward unification on a new basis, with a new constitution and with a new debate over Germany’s membership in NATO.” Kohl and the US preferred Article 23 because it was faster and adopted the de facto security arrangements.

Kohl’s adoption of such an aggressive reunification policy amplified his political troubles. He was playing a precarious political game in which he was utilizing right-wing enthusiasm to shore up his conservative base without pushing moderate FRG voters towards Lafontaine and the SPD. Thus, when he was asked if he would honor the existing Polish border, he refused to comment because the issue was “important to the political right in Germany, and thus to Kohl’s reelection prospects” in December 1990. West German citizens were sensitive to international perceptions related to German nationalism, and they wondered if Kohl was handling things appropriately. In a February 1990 poll, 67 percent of West Germans agreed with

Lafontaine’s perspective that reunification was proceeding too fast and 55 percent believed that the unification would bring more disadvantages than advantages.²²⁵

Much of the political problem for Kohl was that his own foreign minister, Genscher, was using reunification to bolster his personal political position. In a January speech, he declared that a reunified Germany would be negotiated strictly between the two German states. While the territory of West Germany would remain in NATO, the territory of East Germany would remain in the Warsaw Pact.²²⁶ This speech was worrisome to US policymakers who could not understand how a reunified Germany could simultaneously be a part of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Scowcroft noted that Genscher had “not formally endorsed [Kohl’s Article 23 plan], presumably to preserve his option of switching sides – or even of ultimately jumping over to join a future SPD-led all-German government.”²²⁷

The uncertainty and instability confronting Kohl and his approach to reunification worried US policymakers. As Zelikow and Rice relate in their memoir, the concern was that an unnecessarily long process would give the Soviets “too many opportunities to trade their acceptance of unity for concessions from Bonn on Germany’s NATO membership.”²²⁸ The ambiguity in Genscher’s speech was an example of how the Soviets might find exploitable political issues. Additionally, SDP politician Oskar Lafontaine was increasingly adopting Green

²²⁶ Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 174.
²²⁸ Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Reunified and Europe Transformed, 160.
Party positions. In a March memorandum to Bush, Scowcroft expressed his concerns about Lafontaine’s adoption of an anti-NATO political statement known as *Progress 90*:

> You asked whether the Social Democrats oppose a unified Germany in NATO. The most recent official SPD statement, issued March 20, is “Progress 90,” a proposed disarmament program for a future SPD wing under the direction of Oskar Lafontaine, the Party’s prospective Chancellor-candidate in the next elections. The 12-point plan calls for removal of all nuclear and chemical weapons from German soil, abolition of the NATO strategies of nuclear deterrence and forward defense, and dissolution of the “military blocs” and their replacement by a new and undefined “European Security System.”

From the US perspective, these were precarious times in which the SPD and Soviets could manipulate the process for the elimination of NATO. They needed to gain control of the process.

**Critical Security Decision: Secure NATO through “Two Plus Four” Process**

Because it offered the possibility of too much Soviet influence, everybody on the US side agreed that “Four Power” negotiations were out of the question. Additionally, the Germans resisted “Four Powers” as an antiquated approach and insisted that negotiations include both the FRG and the GDR. To satisfy all the parties involved, two of Baker’s advisers, Robert Zoellick and Dennis Ross, recommended a “Two Plus Four” approach in which the two German states would negotiate internal political issues (e.g., monetary union, future elections, etc.) related to reunification, and the “Four Powers” would negotiate external issues (e.g., CFE, termination of the legacy “Four Power Rights,” settlement of the border question, etc.). The “Two Plus Four” mechanism was a brilliant diplomatic tool that helped the US and Kohl control the process. The “Two Plus Four” negotiations “would start work very slowly while German

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230 Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989, 126.

unification was happening very quickly,” and the topics under discussion would be very limited.\textsuperscript{232} Thus, the Soviets were included, but their ability to influence the process was limited.

Including the Soviets in the process was important because the Bush team knew how difficult the problem of German reunification in NATO was for Gorbachev. According to a State Department policy memorandum, “Unification is an emotional issue for the Soviets domestically. It’s highly charged politically, and Gorbachev needs to take certain public postures to deal with that.” To this end, the “Two Plus Four” mechanism gave Gorbachev a way to show his domestic audience that he was “managing the issue in a way that handles Soviet concerns and needs.”\textsuperscript{233} In reality, however, the “Two Plus Four” process took away Soviet control: “Right now, Gorbachev needs to show he has some control over the process. ‘Two Plus Four’ gives him that cover with little real control.” Most importantly “Two Plus Four” gave the US “additional support (the UK and France) on keeping a united Germany in NATO.” In this way, the mechanism enabled the US to manage the reunification process in way that satisfied the political needs of all the relevant stakeholders.

From the US perspective, the key to the “Two Plus Four” process was to have the correct starting point, which was understood as having all the major players in agreement that Germany would reunify within NATO. The Soviets conceded the reality of a reunified Germany, but they were holding firm that it should remain a neutral country. US policymakers worried that insistence on a reunified Germany in NATO “might then be seen as the obstacle to unity, and it

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., 208–210.

would be the Americans, not the Soviets, standing in front of the train.”

Thus, Baker had to convince both the Soviets and the West Germans that a reunified German state must remain within NATO. To this end, he met in early February with both Genscher and Gorbachev to make his case. In the first engagement with the German foreign minister, Baker and Genscher agreed that settling the German question via a CSCE summit was out of the question, and they further agreed that “Two Plus Four” was the optimal diplomatic solution. However, Genscher insisted that the West needed to address Soviet concerns by agreeing not to extend NATO territory to the east. Baker agreed with Genscher’s position that NATO should not expand eastward, and he flew to the Kremlin for talks with Gorbachev.

In his meeting with Gorbachev, Baker pitched the idea of the “Two Plus Four” process, but he made sure that Gorbachev understood that the US insisted on German membership in NATO. “Two Plus Four” was necessary because involving too many countries in the internal aspects of reunification “would be too cumbersome.”

As far as the future of German security arrangements, the US military presence in Germany benefitted the Soviets because it countered a return of German militarism in which it “decide[s] to create its own nuclear potential instead of relying on American nuclear deterrent forces.” However, the US would not keep troops in Germany “if NATO is liquidated.” Furthermore, Baker told Gorbachev that the US was sensitive that the Soviets “have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction


234 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 172–173.
will spread in an eastern direction.” Gorbachev conceded “it goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone was unacceptable.” This language about NATO not extending further eastward is a source of continuing controversy. In any case, Gorbachev expressed to Baker that a pan-European security structure could provide assurances similar to NATO. In the end, Gorbachev agreed to the possibility of German membership in NATO, but he asked Baker not to ask for a final decision at that meeting.

When Kohl and Genscher visited Moscow later in February to follow-up on Baker’s visit and convince Gorbachev to make a public commitment to reunification. In the meeting, Gorbachev acknowledged that it was up to the Germans about when they wanted to reunify, the pace of reunification, and their form of government. He also formally agreed to the “Two Plus Four” process for negotiations. When Kohl suggested continued membership in NATO, Gorbachev was inconclusive and requested more time to consider continued membership as a possibility. After the meeting, Kohl held a press conference declaring that the meetings were a breakthrough for German reunification: “Ladies and gentleman, this is a very good day for Germany. I want to thank Mikhail Gorbachev for making it possible to achieve this historic event.” The momentum from this announcement was instrumental in the East German elections a month later.

The election results in East Germany in March were a surprise to the international community and a boon to Bush and Kohl’s efforts to keep a reunified Germany in NATO. Almost everybody conceded that the Social Democrats, led by Ibrahim Bohme, would win the

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237 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 186–187.

However, in a political upset, the Alliance for Germany, a conservative coalition more in line with Kohl’s unification policy, won 48 percent of the votes, which was twice as many as the Social Democrats. Although the Alliance for Germany was led by GDR Lothar de Maiziere, the election results were a political victor for Kohl. When Bush called Kohl on March 20 to congratulate him on the victory, Kohl responded that the “results are very important for the NATO question as well. I will now find totally different support than if the Left had won.” With the rejection of the SDP, the East German citizens rejected the gradual approach through confederation and demanded full reunification as quickly as possible.

The first few months of 1990 were devastating for Gorbachev’s foreign policy. In addition to the East Germans voting for full reunification, Lithuania and Estonia became the first Soviet republics to declare independence. Thus, the Soviets lost their strongest satellite state in East Germany, and now the Soviet Union was disintegrating as republics broke away from a weakened state in which the Communist Party no longer controlled events. Only two months later, Latvia followed the lead of their Baltic cousins and declared independence. In this turmoil, Bush was becoming sensitive to Gorbachev’s weakened political position.

In April, members of the Estonian-American National Committee, American Latvian Committee, and the Lithuanian-American Committee met with Bush and Baker in the oval office to request “immediate recognition of the Lithuanian Government” by the US. Bush responded that while he supported Baltic independence he did not want to move in a way that led to a

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239 Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989, 141–144.
240 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany United and Europe Transformed, 230.
241 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between George H. W. Bush and Helmut Kohl, March 20, 1989, National Security Council, Hutchings Chronological Files, Box 2, Stack G, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.
“reversal inside the USSR.” Bush asserted that Baltic independence “would not fail in the long run,” and the US wanted “to insure that there is not a disaster in the short run.” He reminded them of the crackdown on the Hungarian revolution in 1956. According to Bush, “I am not sure you have thought through the other considerations. A lot is at stake here—in arms control, Eastern Europe, and other areas . . . you are underestimating the pressures in the Soviet Union. We have seen a certain pulling back—in the vote, on arms control—and don’t want to return to square one.”

Gorbachev was indeed coming under increasingly severe political pressure. In May, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, wrote a classified memorandum to James Baker describing Gorbachev’s dire political situation. In the memorandum, Matlock described Gorbachev as “less a man in control and more an embattled leader.” His political reform had undercut the Communist Party by legalizing a multi-party system, encouraging openness that revealed Communist Party crimes and corruption, and liberalizing the economy in such a way that the Communist Party no longer controlled the economic system. Matlock noted that while Gorbachev was adept at destroying the old system, he was inept at installing a replacement. With the Communist Party discredited and freedom encouraged, Gorbachev unleashed “powerful social forces” that encouraged the republics to demand independence so they could chart their own courses. To repair some of the damage, the Soviets identified a May 1990 summit in Washington to make a stand against German membership in NATO.

242 Memorandum of Conversation between President George H. W. Bush, James A. Baker III, and members of various Baltic-American organizations, National Security Council, Robert Hutchings Chronological Files Box 2, Stack G, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.

In preparation for the Washington summit, the Soviet Communist Plenum met to discuss
the agenda. Present at the meeting were all the key members of the Communist Party:
Gorbachev, Kryuchkov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yazov, and Koblov. All participants agreed
that Gorbachev would seek three objectives:

1) Adopt a single, coherent document that would cover all external aspects of
reunification—a German peace treaty;

2) Link reunification to the successful resolution of external issues related to
borders;

3) Cessation of “four-way” rights and responsibilities only ended after peace
settlement was concluded.

As far as a reunified Germany remaining in NATO, the group was unequivocal that the issue was
“politically and psychologically unacceptable.” The Soviets could not “agree to the destruction
of the balance of power and stability in Europe that would result from this step. This would
create a dangerous military-strategic situation for us.” The US emphasis on the CSCE as a pan-
European consultative body was not enough. The Soviets wanted “new pan-European security
structures” that eliminated both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.”^244

At the May 1990 summit, Bush explained the US position to Gorbachev. He highlighted
how the Soviets, despite their memory of World War Two, should not fear German reunification
because of their “50-year old democratic experience.”^245 Furthermore, Germany’s continued
membership in NATO was a guarantee that they would not revert to their militaristic past. On

^244 Excerpt from Minutes No. 187 of the CC CPSU Politburo Session, May 16, 1990, George Washington
University, Digital National Security Archive, translated by Anna Melyakova,

^245 Memorandum of Conversation between George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, May 31, 1990, George
Washington University Digital National Security Archives, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4325698-
the other hand, Bush believed that imposing “some special status and humiliating conditions” on Germany is precisely the kind of approach that might lead “to a revival of German militarism and revanchism—which is exactly the concern you have.”

Gorbachev responded by agreeing that the US presence in Europe was necessary, but he believed Bush was making a “methodological miscalculation” about linking Germany’s membership in NATO to a continued US troop presence. However, if NATO was a “genuinely open organization,” then the Soviets “could also think about becoming a member of NATO. However, today, honestly speaking, there are very few facts for such a radical conclusion.” Furthermore, Bush’s fixation, according to Gorbachev, on keeping a reunified Germany in NATO made him “forget about the health and interests of the Soviet Union. And this, in its turn, does not help either stability or predictability at all.” At this point, Gorbachev responded that perhaps Germany could simultaneously remain in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and he asked Bush a significant question: “If NATO does not plan to fight with [the Soviets], then with whom? Not with Germany?” Bush responded, “I already said—with instability.”

At this point, Gorbachev said to Bush, “But one has to have a clear understanding that if the Soviet people get an impression that we are disregarded in the German question, then all the positive processes in Europe, including the [CFE] negotiations in Vienna, would be in serious danger. This is not just bluffing. It is simply that the people will force us to stop and look around. And I would really prefer not to do it.” Bush reiterated that there should be no hesitation in the Soviet Union about German membership in NATO because it “is the anchor of stability.” Gorbachev retorted, “But two anchors are better. As a seaman, you should be able to understand it.” The Soviets were clearly against German reunification in NATO. They wanted to transition to a genuinely pan-European security structure.
Gorbachev then made a fatal error that backed him into a corner. He accused the US of being hypocritical in its policies by saying the Soviets can now trust the Germans but then insisting that they stay in NATO as a means of keeping them in order. If the US really trusted Germany, Gorbachev argued, then “let her decide on her own what alliance she wants to belong to.” Bush called his bluff. “I fully agree with that . . . If Germany does not want to stay in NATO, it has a right to choose a different path. This is what the Helsinki Final Act says too.” Gorbachev responded that this was “how we will formulate it then: the United States and the Soviet Union agree that united Germany, upon reaching final settlement, taking into account the results of World War Two, would decide on its own which alliance she would be a member of.” Given Kohl’s commitment to NATO, this guaranteed Germany’s membership in NATO.

Bush was very excited about Gorbachev’s concession on allowing Germany to make its own choice of alliance, but he realized that the political pressure on Gorbachev was increasing. Since as early as May, he was worried about the possibility of instability inside the Soviet Union. At a commencement address at Oklahoma State University, Bush commented that “our enemy today—if you think about it, what’s the enemy today—our enemy today is uncertainty and instability.” In that speech, he attempted to address Gorbachev’s security concerns by calling for a NATO summit to change its function to a more political role and to strengthen the role of the CSCE. After Gorbachev’s concession in Washington, Bush called Kohl to tell him they had

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246 George Bush speech to Oklahoma State University commencement, May 4, 1990, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, College Station, Texas, National Security Council, David Gompert Subject Files.
“a lot of work to do” and “a lot will depend on having a successful NATO summit” in July to reprioritize NATO’s role as a political organization.\(^{247}\)

At the July 1990 summit, NATO issued the London Declaration, which was intended to reset NATO’s posture vis-à-vis the Soviets. The document reset the NATO-Russia relationship in six critical ways: 1) declared that Warsaw Pact countries were no longer an adversary, 2) requested Soviet liaisons at NATO (precursor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council) 3) requested accelerated talks on SNF reductions, 4) called for a CFE II to further limit conventional forces, 5) announced an intention to renounce the “forward defense” strategy, and 6) committed to strengthening the CSCSE.\(^{248}\) In many ways, the London Declaration was Gorbachev’s reward for cooperating on German reunification, and the Bush team hoped it would strengthen his political position in the Soviet Union. Given that the Soviets did not interfere with reunification in October 1990, the US-NATO gambit seemed to be effective. There were, of course, further negotiations related to compensating the Soviets for lost property and the cost of relocating Soviet troops. In the end, Kohl agreed to pay the Soviets “DM 12 billion and with an interest-free credit of DM 3 billion.”\(^{249}\) The Soviets were essentially easing their strategic losses with financial remuneration. With this payoff, the Soviets agreed to sign the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany in October 1990. Article 6 of the treaty maintained the “right of the United Germany to belong to alliances, with all the rights and responsibilities

\(^{247}\) Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between George H. W. Bush and Helmut Kohl, June 3, 1990, National Security Council, Robert Hutchings Chronological Files, Box 3 Stack G, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.

\(^{248}\) London Declaration, July 6, 1990, National Security Council, David Gompert Subject Files, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.

\(^{249}\) Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany United and Europe Transformed*, 352.
arising therefrom.” Article 7 stated that the “Four Powers” herby terminate their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole.” With this treaty, a united Germany regained its full sovereignty within the international community, and Helmut Kohl won reelection as chancellor of a united Germany.

**Conclusion**

During the Bush administration, there was an opportunity to create a pan-European security organization that incorporated the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in the summer of 1989, Gorbachev plainly stated that the US had a role in such an organization. In such an arrangement, there was an opportunity for the two most powerful states in the international system to more efficiently manage international security. However, the Bush administration never took Gorbachev seriously. From their perspective, Soviet membership in NATO was a high-risk venture that might lead to a dysfunctional institution and decreased US European influence. This perspective led to a US policy that supported German reunification to increase the probability of Kohl’s reelection in 1990. In successfully pursuing this policy, the US helped a pro-NATO leader win reelection and secured US leadership of NATO and influence in the future of Europe.
Chapter 3 - Good and Conflicting Intentions

When Yugoslavia began to break apart in 1991, Bush’s “loss aversion heuristic” was tied to protecting stability in Europe. Having achieved German reunification in NATO, he committed to a US policy that would not make more demands on the Soviets. He worried that US actions perceived as aggression might undercut Gorbachev and lead to the break-up of the Soviet Union. To this end, Bush was sensitive to Yugoslavia being a politically charged subject in Russia and refused to intervene to stop the ethnic conflict. However, this prudence did little to keep Gorbachev in power and the Soviet Union completely dissolved in December 1991. Moreover, Bill Clinton used the turmoil occurring in Yugoslavia to discredit Bush’s otherwise strong foreign policy credentials. In the 1992 US presidential election, Clinton defeated Bush.

Bill Clinton made US refusal to intervene against Serb atrocities in Bosnia a key component of his criticism of Bush’s foreign policy record. When Clinton assumed the presidency in January 1993, his “loss aversion” heuristic for protecting democratic gains in Russia made it difficult for him to follow through on his campaign rhetoric with a level of intensity that made any real difference in the ongoing slaughter. Thus, in the early days of his administration, he chose negotiations over action in Bosnia as a means to protect Russian reformers. This hesitancy to intervene resulted in public criticism that threatened the relevancy of NATO. Opinion leaders from the US Congress, media, and foreign policy circles were aghast at the lack of Western commitment to stopping the atrocities in the Balkans. This “chattering class,” a term Clinton used to refer to his critics in the media, condemned the inaction as nothing less than a moral failure. As the Balkans conflict raged, editorials highlighted the futility of

250 Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, 117.
251 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 191.
NATO and the US’s lack of leadership. Why should NATO exist in the post-Cold War world if it could not even secure peace in Europe? As a result of this criticism, Clinton’s “loss aversion” heuristic transitioned away from protecting Russian reformers to protecting the relevance of NATO. Thus, in August 1995, the US led NATO in Operation Deliberate Force, a sustained air campaign against Serbian ground targets that effectively ended the Bosnian War in less than a month. The operation undercut Boris Yeltsin and his reformers, but Clinton’s concern for NATO trumped his concern for US-Russian cooperation.

**Loss Aversion 4: Protecting Stability**

As the communist ideal disintegrated throughout Eastern Europe, an ideological vacuum emerged within formerly communist states as political leaders and their constituencies searched for a new rationale to guide politics. Of all the former communist states, Yugoslavia was the most ethnically diverse. The state was comprised of six semi-autonomous republics: Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The ethnic composition of Yugoslavia was comprised of Serbs (8.1 million), Croats (4.4 million), Muslims (2 million), Albanians (1.7 million), and Macedonians (1.3 million). The most diverse republic was Bosnia with a population consisting of 44 percent Serbian-Muslim, 32 percent Serbian-Orthodox Christian, and 17 percent Croatian-Catholic Christian (Croats). Clearly, there was plenty of kindling for a fire, and political leaders such as Franjo Tudman of Croatia and Slobodan Milošević of Serbia were keen to stoke ancient nationalistic rivalries among these groups to secure the leadership of their respective republics. Milošević was formerly a member of the


communist party, and he invoked nationalism to overcome his connection with what was perceived as a failed political ideology. Milošević’s manipulation of nationalistic sentiment is discussed in Chapter 5. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is enough to understand that the increase in Serb nationalist rhetoric was troubling to the other republics.

Different in culture and more economically prosperous than the southern republics of Yugoslavia, the Slovenes alleged they were unequally burdened with providing revenues to Belgrade. When Milošević began consolidating his power by appealing to Serbian nationalist sentiments and reallocating a larger portion of the national budget to the federal payroll, which was comprised largely of his Serbian compatriots, Slovenian leaders decided to pursue independence through a December 1990 referendum. The vote was overwhelmingly in favor of independence, though they would not formally secede from Yugoslavia for another six months.

Fear of Serbian nationalism was also prevalent in Croatia, which held a large Serbian minority population. In the spring of 1991, Franjo Tuđman, another politician keen to manipulate ethnic tensions for personal gain, began removing all Serbian police officers from duty. Violence escalated in Croatia as the minority Serbs began attacking the Croat-dominated police officers. While the violence was significant, it fell short of full-scale war. During the spring of 1991, there was a small window of opportunity for Western Europe to intervene to stop Serbian aggression. However, the US did not want to get involved in the emerging civil war.

The Bush national security team advocated for Yugoslavia to remain intact as a state.²⁵⁴ Bush made his position clear in a May 1991 telephone conversation with Yugoslavian Prime Minister Ante Marković: “You know that the United States supports the unity of Yugoslavia and

the establishment of genuine democracy throughout Yugoslavia.“ He reinforced this message through American Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman who issued on June 13, 1992 a diplomatic démarche to the effect that the US would not tolerate Croatian moves towards independence. Baker made a trip to Yugoslavia a week later to discuss the matter with Franjo Tuđman, and he came away discouraged: “The concerns that we came to Yugoslavia with have not been allayed by the meetings. We think that the situation is very serious. We worry frankly about history repeating itself.” To be sure, Bush wanted Yugoslavia to remain a sovereign state, but he was not willing to advocate for the use of NATO to stabilize the situation.

The decision to not intervene through NATO was confirmed in a June 23 meeting between Baker, Bush, Scowcroft, and NATO Secretary General Manfred Wöerner at the White House. In that meeting, Bush asked, “Is there any role for NATO in the Yugoslavia crisis?” Wöerner responded that it was “highly unlikely.” He also conceded that Serbia might use force to keep the country together, but he did not think the conflict would spread to neighboring countries. At this point, Baker interjected, “Once the shooting starts, and I think it will, it’ll be a mess. The Serbs have armed the Serbian minority in Croatia, and the Croats have armed their own party.” All the participants agreed about the “danger of various gangs starting to shoot each other.” Baker then made the declarative statement: “The Yugoslavs will use their army. NATO will not get involved. The emergency mechanism of CSCE will likely be used.” When


256 Raymond Tanter and John Psarouthakis, Balancing in the Balkans, 17.

Scowcroft asked what the CSCE mechanism might accomplish, Baker shot back a terse, “Nothing.” In closing the conversation, Bush declared that “emotions are too high” for intervention. The policy was set. The war was ostensibly too messy for NATO to get involved, and Yugoslavia was left to determine its own fate.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation between George H.W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, and Manfred Wöerner, June 25, 1991, Bush Presidential Library Digital Archive, Memcons and Telcons, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-06-25--Woerner.pdf (date accessed June 1, 2016).}

Milošević interpreted the US non-intervention policy as implicit permission to use force to keep Yugoslavia together under Serbian leadership, and he was emboldened in his efforts to consolidate power away from Ante Marković. His Serb-nationalists and aggressive actions amplified the desire within other Yugoslavian republics for independence. In July 1991, the Slovenian republic followed through on its December 1990 referendum vote and officially seceded from Yugoslavia. Since the Serb population in Slovenia was small, Milošević was not overly concerned about its secession. After a ten-day military offensive, Yugoslavia and Slovenia signed the Brioni Accords, which gave Slovenia its independence. Slovenia’s independence ended Ante Marković’s control of the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA), which Milošević had thoroughly converted to a Serbian national army by placing Serbian soldiers in all of the key officer positions.\footnote{Raymond Tantar and John Psarouthakis, \textit{Balancing in the Balkans}, 30.}

While these events played out, Croatia held its own independence referendum in May 1991. The idea of remaining in Yugoslavia with the Serbs as the dominate population group was too much. Subsequently, a newly united Germany made one of its first significant diplomatic decisions in late July 1991 to recognize the independence of Croatia. Thus, Germany’s acknowledgement of Croatian independence highlighted a policy split within NATO.
early stages of the Yugoslavia break-up, Germany was pro-Zagreb and the US was pro-Belgrade.\textsuperscript{260} This policy split was an obstacle to the formulation of an effective NATO Bosnian policy for the next three years and provided the Milošević with a fissure to manipulate.

While Slovenian independence was gaining international recognition, the Milošević regime turned its attention to Croatia. Inside the borders of Croatia, most Serbs lived in the Krajina region. Milošević was determined to use the JNA to secure the Krajina region and keep Serb-dominated Yugoslavia together. The JNA was well equipped to deal with the lightly armed Croatian defense force that hastily formed after the referendum. This overmatch was reinforced with the publication of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) passed in September 1991, which placed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia to prevent an escalation of hostilities. This well-intentioned measure only further disadvantaged the Croats who could not arm themselves for defense. By January 1992, JNA forces controlled most of the Krajina territory in Croatia and held the cities of Dubrovnik and Vukovar under siege. In the process, many atrocities occurred against non-Serbian Croatian population groups to include the Vukovar massacre in which more than 200 Croatian prisoners were summarily executed.\textsuperscript{261}

Since NATO was unable to unite on a policy to end violence in the Balkans, the Security Council passed in February 1992 UNSCR 743 establishing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The UNPROFOR’s mandate was to assist in the implementation of a ceasefire in Croatia and to establish United Nations Protected Areas in Bosnia where the war was spreading. Unfortunately for the inhabitants of both Croatia and Bosnia, the UNPROFOR was


\textsuperscript{261} Carol Rogel, \textit{The Break-up of Yugoslavia and Its Aftermath}, 141.
poorly equipped and restricted by mandate to maintain a neutral stance in all their operations. The lack of material means and a clear understanding of the UNPROFOR mission eventually caused more problems than it solved.\textsuperscript{262} Primarily because of Bill Clinton’s criticism during the 1992 presidential campaign, Bush finally offered in December 1992 to deploy US ground troops to Bosnia provided the UN authorized a “no fly zone” over the area.\textsuperscript{263} However, he reversed course after Lord David Owen and former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance indicated they thought they could achieve a diplomatic resolution without the use of force.

**Decision: Staying out of Yugoslavia**

Yugoslavia was perceived as an exception to the narrative of the Bush administration’s skillful management of the end of the Cold War. Historian David Halberstam posits three reasons for why Bush decided not to get involved in Yugoslavia. First, the Bush administration was hampered by the “ghosts of Vietnam.” From this angle, Yugoslavia was a messy civil war that would only involve US forces in another Vietnam like quagmire. Second, the national security team was overwhelmed with “the complicated job of putting together the Gulf War alliance and overseeing the end of the communist empire in Eastern Europe.” Third, the “importance of dealing with Russia was constantly on their minds,” and intervention in the Balkans would complicate matters with Russia.\textsuperscript{264}

The Bush team was certainly concerned about the messy nature of getting involved with an internal civil war, but it is not clear that it was related to the Vietnam experience. In fact,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{262} Raymond Tanter and John Psarthokakis, *Balancing in the Balkans*, 40.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid, 41.
\textsuperscript{264} David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, 32.
\end{flushright}
Bush related in his memoirs that he felt like the success of the Gulf War ended the “Vietnam syndrome” of fearing to utilize the US military:

I was (and am) proud of the way our military performed, very proud. Many of those who had served in the previous thirty years had been “beaten up” largely because of the way the Vietnam War had been fought. A generation of Americans had been acclaimed for refusing to serve. Those who did serve often returned home, not to gratitude and praise, but to ridicule – even while the draft-dodger and the protestor were considered by many to be courageous, even heroic. Now this had been put to rest and American credibility restored.265

Given this perspective, the idea that a fear of a Vietnam redux was a key part of Bush’s decision not to intervene in Yugoslavia lacks some credibility. This is especially true when one considers his willingness to get involved in the Somalian civil war.

In 1992, the Bush administration sent the US military to Somalia to help populations who were suffering in a civil war where the various factions used access to food supplies as a weapon. Powell lamented in his memoir how the “television hovered over Somalia and wrenched our hearts, night after night, with images of people starving to death before our own eyes.” He was “not eager to get us involved in a Somalian civil war, but we were apparently the only nation that could help end the suffering.”266 This contradiction in policy suggests that the “Vietnam ghosts” narrative is insufficient. One must consider the next alternative: Was the administration exhausted from organizing the coalition for the liberation of Kuwait?

There is no doubt that the Bush team was preoccupied with the Gulf War in the first few months of 1991. Bush conceded as much in a March conversation with German Foreign Minister Genscher that was focused primarily on Iraq and the broader Middle East. Towards the end of the conversation, Genscher asked him about the need for more US support in Eastern

265 George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 486
266 Colin Powell, My American Journey, 664–665.
Europe, and Bush admitted that the Gulf War had forced his administration “to divert our attention somewhat from Eastern Europe but I agree with you on the need to get on with our support.” However, the chronology of events seems to leave this explanation lacking as well.

For all intents and purposes, the Gulf War was completed by March 3, 1991 when the Iraqi military accepted all US demands for the cessation of hostilities. Although there were still concerns related to the Shia uprising in southern Iraq and a deployment of US troops to northern Iraq to protect Kurdish civilians from Iraqi reprisals, major combat operations were complete.267 The most challenging aspects of the Iraq situation were dealt with. It was not until June 1991 that events in Yugoslavia prompted James Baker to make his visit to appeal for peace among all the parties. Thus, the Bush administration had three months to regroup and deal with the situation in Yugoslavia.

Pursuing this logic to its conclusion, one might surmise that it was a “loss aversion” heuristic for preventing instability in the Soviet Union that was the most relevant factor in his decision not to intervene in Yugoslavia in 1991.268 A May CIA intelligence report drafted for Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates outlines how the Bush administration viewed the Soviet problem:

The Gorbachev era is effectively over. Even if Gorbachev remains in office a year from now, real power is likely to be in the hands of either the hardliners or reformers. If Gorbachev is forced out in the near term, it most likely would be by hardliners who would rule through a weak front man or some sort of National Salvation Committee. Without any action by the traditionalists, however, the influence of the reformers will continue to grow. They would move quickly to suppress Yeltsin, and to roll back newly won freedoms. They would adopt a more truculent public posture toward the United States and seek opportunities to assert their influence abroad. Even if they were willing to rely on a massive use of force and repression, traditionalists would have difficulty maintaining power because

they lack a credible program to address the country’s mounting problems and would have difficulty overcoming internal divisions. Under such a regime the economy would continue to deteriorate and social alienation would increase sharply, ensuring that eventually democratic and nationalist movements would emerge.  

Bush was not so much concerned about keeping Gorbachev in power, but he was concerned about providing space for other democratic reformers to replace him. In fact, the Bush administration, as evidenced by the CIA report, was already thinking about Gorbachev’s replacement. However, it was unclear whether a hardline or reform regime would come to power. To increase the probability that it was a reform regime, US policy was focused on keeping Gorbachev around long enough to give reformers the necessary political space to assume power in a peaceful and stable manner:

Time is working against the traditionalists, however. The longer force is not used the weaker their position will become. The security forces will continue to fracture, while democratic nationalist forces continue to gain strength and organize. . . Even if Gorbachev manages to remain in office a year from now, the Gorbachev era is over. The sharp decline in his power will be almost impossible to reverse and a de facto transfer of power will likely have taken place to either the reformers or traditionalists, with very much the same policy consequences if they had come to power without him.  

If Bush pressed too hard on Yugoslavia, this would give hardliners a political advantage. A hardline replacement might use force to restore the republics, and this might in turn cause a civil war in Russia similar to what was going on in Yugoslavia. Intervening in Yugoslavia would increase the probability of hardliners regaining power.

270 Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 7821 of 12070.  
As a result of seven high level summits, Bush and Gorbachev resolved their “loss aversion” heuristics related to protecting the flexible response doctrine and German membership in NATO. Gorbachev assuaged US concerns by matching his words with deeds in not responding to the independence movements spreading across Europe and negotiating in good faith on nuclear arms reduction. On the German question, Bush essentially forced Gorbachev to accept reunification and its membership in NATO. Although he did not like the idea, Gorbachev eventually accepted a united Germany as a new reality because he knew that, in the absence of a better alternative, Soviet security concerns were better addressed with Germany inside NATO than out. In short, Bush and Gorbachev achieved a high level of personal trust through intense negotiations, and they secured a large measure of stability despite the tumult of the times.

Unlike Gorbachev’s attempt to save Russia by reforming socialism, Yeltsin wanted to abandon socialism entirely and replace it with Western style capitalism. To this end, he viewed Russia, not the Soviet Union, as his first priority. In March 1989, Yeltsin took advantage of Gorbachev’s democratic reforms and won election to the Congress of People’s Deputies to the Soviet Union. In this position, he created the Democratic Russia political party, which was the first opposition party in the Soviet Union. Understanding that the centralized state was crumbling, Yeltsin ran for and won a seat in the Congress of People’s Deputies to Russia in March 1990. In the past, a move from the Soviet level political position to a republic level position was viewed as a step down; but with power devolving to the republics, Yeltsin was well placed to advance his political career. Less than two months later, he was appointed Chairman of the Congress of People’s Deputies to Russia where he led a successful vote for Russian sovereignty from the Soviet Union in June.272

272 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 18.
From Bush’s perspective, Yeltsin was a drunken populist who was less concerned about high diplomacy than he was about obtaining political power through opportunism.\textsuperscript{273} Bush did not want to support Yeltsin for two reasons. First, supporting Yeltsin would undermine Gorbachev and erode all the hard-won trust. As a man who held loyalty as a high virtue, Bush found this option unappealing. In reminiscing on Yeltsin’s establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Bush claims in his memoirs that he “was worried about the contempt with which Yeltsin seemed to be treating Gorbachev, who had done so much for the Soviet Union—and peace.”\textsuperscript{274} However, it was the potentially negative consequences to stability in Europe that worried him most. Germany’s recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 led to a bitter civil war in the Balkans. Bush’s national security team worried that supporting Yeltsin’s declaration of Russian independence might result in, as Baker pointed out on Face the Nation, a “Yugoslavia with Nukes.”\textsuperscript{275}

Expressing his concern about European stability, Bush gave an August 1991 speech to the Ukrainian parliament in which he warned its members about the dangers of independence. Derisively identified by \textit{New York Times} editorialist William Safire as the “Chicken Kiev” speech, Bush cautioned parliament members that “America will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.”\textsuperscript{276} In the article, Safire

\textsuperscript{273} Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, \textit{At the Highest Levels}, 8690 of 12070.
\textsuperscript{274} George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, \textit{A World Transformed}, 557.
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid., 562.
suggested that Bush’s comments appeared to be “anti-liberty” and “jeopardized our relations with an emerging European power.”277 However, in his memoir, Scowcroft argues that Bush was not referring to tyranny from Ukrainian democratic reformers but from instability:

The reference to local despotism was not directed specifically at Ukraine. It was aimed at a number of areas where an upsurge of intolerant nationalism threatened the outbreak of major violence. We were especially concerned about developments in Yugoslavia and in Moldavia and other Soviet Republics. The speech was given in Kiev because it would obviously have been inappropriate in Moscow, and Ukraine was the only stop outside Russia where the issue was relevant. The ethnic makeup of Ukraine did, of course, contain potential for national strife. The subsequent history of Yugoslavia and several of the former Soviet republics certainly validated the warning the President expressed.278

Once again, the “loss aversion” heuristic dominated the Bush administration’s policy decisions. In a complete reversal of his perspective when he took office, Bush’s fear of the loss of stability in Europe led him to support the Soviet Union. Even if the speech was not intended as full-throated endorsement of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, it was perceived as such by many.

On August 19, 1991, only eighteen days after Bush’s speech in the Ukraine, eight Soviet officials used Gorbachev’s absence on vacation to seize power in the Kremlin.279 Falsely claiming that Gorbachev was ill, the conspirators organized the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GkChP), which was a group of reactionaries who wanted to restore the moribund communist regime to assume governing responsibilities. Yeltsin immediately denounced the coup attempt and pleaded with the military not to follow GkChP orders. Bush and his team did

278 George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 541.
279 Coup conspirators: Vice President Gennady Yanayev, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council Oleg Baklanov, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, Internal Affairs Minister Boris Pugo, Chairman of the Union of Peasants Vasily Sturodubtsov, President of the Association of USSR State Industries Aleksandr Tizyakov, and Defense Minister Dmitri Ysov.
not know whom to support between the competing factions. In a press conference on the matter, he reiterated US support for START I and hinted at his willingness to cooperate with a regime change as long as it occurred within constitutional limits. When tens of thousands of Russians took to the streets in support of Yeltsin against the coup plotters, the prospects of success for the GkChP evaporated. By the third day, Gorbachev, thanks in no small measure to the support of Yeltsin, was restored to power, even if significantly weakened.

After the coup attempt, Yeltsin knew that Gorbachev and the Communist Party were finished. Thus, Yeltsin maneuvered to ensure his emergence as the leader of an independent Russia. In early December 1991, Yeltsin met with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Belarussian President Stanislav Shushkevich in Brest, Belarus where they declared the Soviet Union formally dissolved. In its place, they established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In a televised speech three weeks later, Gorbachev resigned from office, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Despite Bush’s efforts, Gorbachev was removed from power.

Taking Credit for the Dawn

Few political pundits in 1991 predicted Bush’s defeat in the upcoming presidential election. His administration peacefully managed the reunification of Germany, the independence movements within the former Soviet satellite states, the Gulf War, and signed historic arms control agreements. When asked to rate Bush’s performance during this period, a January 1990 public opinion poll related that 73 percent of Americans approved of his handling of foreign policy. Most Americans seemed to feel that Bush managed the waning Cold War well. Freed

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from the cumbersome US-Soviet confrontation preventing collective security through UN resolutions, Bush cobbled together a multi-national coalition to successfully confront Iraq’s aggression against its Kuwaiti neighbor. At the conclusion of the Gulf War in March 1991, a Gallup poll showed Bush’s overall approval rating at 89 percent. In the shadow of this success, an assumption emerged that Bush was all but certain to win the 1992 election, but the same polling revealed that 40 percent of Americans disapproved of Bush’s handling of the economy. This emerging dissatisfaction with domestic economic policy revealed to Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton a pathway to the presidency.

Seeking to capitalize on the economic unease, Clinton developed a three-pronged strategy that simultaneously attacked Bush’s foreign policy strengths and exploited his weakness. On the first prong, Clinton attacked the perception that the Bush team “won the Cold War.” Clinton articulated a narrative that Bush was the lucky president who happened to be in office when America’s collective effort facilitated the collapse of a corrupt Soviet regime. The second prong attacked Bush’s commitment to stability, which Clinton claimed was rooted in old assumptions about the way the world worked. He argued that this commitment made Bush blind and indifferent to the democratic revolutions occurring around the world, and his lack of concern for these causes was leading to the unnecessary death and destruction of people fighting for freedom. The final prong was the lynchpin to Clinton’s attack on Bush’s foreign policy, and it focused on linking the domestic economy with national security. The US would never, Clinton claimed, be secure in the world if it continued to lag in economic performance.

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Clinton operationalized this strategy in a December 1991 speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council and an August 1992 speech to faculty and students at Georgetown University. In these speeches, he acknowledged that the US “won” the Cold War, but he made sure to stress that it was not due to any individual person or political party. The victory was largely the result of the “outstanding courage and sacrifice of the American people.” Furthermore, success in the Cold War was the result of the Soviet Union’s “economic and political” and “ultimately. . .spiritual failure” more than any policy from the Bush or Reagan era. In this way, the demise of the Soviet Union was inevitable regardless of which political party was in power. Clinton argued that any notion that the Republicans won the Cold War was akin to “the rooster who took credit for the dawn. The truth is that from Truman to Kennedy to Carter, Democrats as well as Republicans have held firm against the expansion of communism.”

Clinton then suggested that the Bush administration’s commitment to stability above supporting the emergence of a new, democratic era was founded on “old assumptions and policies, trying to prop up yesterday’s status quo, failing to confront new challenges.” In fact, this commitment to stability “let [Bush] side with China’s Communist rulers after a democratic uprising of students.” Clinton even found fault with Bush’s victory against Iraq in the Gulf War. Despite his “clear effectiveness in organizing the allies against Iraq’s aggression,” Bush’s “concern for stability made him willing to lead the Kurds to an awful fate.” In this way, Clinton cleverly associated Bush’s foreign policy with a recognized human rights catastrophe thereby casting doubt that his policies were making the world a safer place.

When it came to European security, Clinton used the stability argument to negate perceptions that Bush managed the end of the Cold War well. He denounced the Bush presidency for not doing enough to help Russia:
Let us look at the record. It reflects an unmistakable pattern in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy. Fearing attacks by isolationists in his own party, President Bush was reluctant to offer Boris Yeltsin, Russia's freely elected president, a helping hand. It took a chorus of complaints, culminating with the prodding of another Republican, Richard Nixon, to move him into action on the Russian aid package. Just weeks before the attempted coup in Moscow, President Bush traveled to Ukraine. There he lectured a people subjected to genocidal starvation in the Stalin era, warning that their aspirations for independence constituted, and I quote, "a suicidal nationalism."282

Clinton then placed the blame for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia on the Bush administration’s reluctance to support independence movements. He claimed that the Bush administration “gave short shrift to the yearnings of those seeking freedom in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, and ignored warning signs that Slobodan Milošević was emerging as one of Europe’s bloodiest tyrants.” After casting doubts on the perceived successes of the Bush foreign policy, Clinton delivered what he hoped was the decisive blow by linking national security to the lagging economy.

When Bush assumed office in January 1989, the US unemployment rate was 5.4 percent. Two years later, this rate had risen to 7.3 percent.283 Clinton questioned why domestic economic success did not follow the Cold War victory. While it was good to win the Cold War, where was the lucrative peace dividend of victory? In his announcement speech, Clinton attacked a Bush administration that did not “take care of our own, that turns its back on the middle class, and is afraid to change in a world that is changing so fast.” The world was “still a dangerous and uncertain place.” If America was not economically strong, the future security of the country was threatened. “It is our very ability to take care of our own that gives us the strength to stand up


for what we believe in around the world,” Clinton argued.284 If the US did not improve its economic performance, then it, too, would run the risk of internal collapse. Thus, Clinton’s foreign policy criticism of Bush was linked to domestic economic policy. However, Clinton was not calling for isolationism, for the US has a responsibility to “lead the world we’ve done so much to make.” The leadership, however, must not adhere to the old foreign policy principles of the previous generation. As will be demonstrated below, Clinton proved hesitant to exercise US leadership in convincing NATO to intervene in Bosnia.

Clinton’s “new covenant” on American security was an attempt to define a new national security policy that replaced the containment policy of the Cold War.285 His policy recognized that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not mean that the world was a safe place. The international political system still presented new threats such as deprivation in the former Soviet Union, the spread of WMD, transnational terrorism, and ethnic rivalries in places such as Yugoslavia. To face these threats, the US must work within a multinational context to expand democracy and free market capitalism. “Democracies don’t go to war with each other. The French and the British have nuclear weapons. We don’t fear annihilation at their hands. Democracies don’t sponsor terrorist acts against each other. They’re more likely to be reliable trading partners, protect the global environment, and abide by international law.” Clinton

believed that achieving these goals was a moral imperative, and “foreign policy cannot be
divorced from moral principle.”

To finance this moralistic foreign policy ideal, Clinton proposed a new approach to
American leadership. The US could no longer afford to finance security for the entire world
with a Cold War military. Clinton promised to negotiate “an agreement with our allies for
sharing the cost and the risks of maintaining peace.” His administration would capitalize on the
post-Cold War peace dividend to create a smaller, more deployable military that relied on timely
intelligence and focused on cultural and political information as much as the destructive
capability of its equipment. Instead of the “futile pursuit of a fool-proof defense against nuclear
attack,” the Clinton administration would work within the constraints of the 1972 Anti-ballistic
Missile (ABM) treaty to create a defense from WMD emanating from rogue regimes.

Feeling political pressure from these attacks on his foreign policy, Bush announced in
April 1992 his intention to create a $24 billion aid package for Russia, but the announcement
was too late for a campaign that was reeling from domestic dissatisfaction resulting from an
economic recession. Even if he had done more for Russia at an earlier date, Clinton campaign
adviser James Carville’s mantra “It’s the economy, stupid!” was an insurmountable reality. In
November 1992, Bush lost the presidency to Clinton. Now, it was Clinton’s time to form a
national security team to implement his foreign policy vision.

286 Bill Clinton Speech at Georgetown University, C-Span, December 12, 1991, https://www.c-
span.org/video/?33576-1/clinton-foreign-policy-speech (date accessed August 2016); Bill Clinton speech at the Los
speech (date accessed September 2016).
The Clinton National Security Team

As is the case with any new president, Clinton’s selection of his national security team reflected his personality and priorities. Most historians agree that Clinton placed domestic politics over foreign policy matters.\textsuperscript{287} He wanted foreign policy, as Halberstam suggested, “minimized and, if at all possible, kept on the back burner.”\textsuperscript{288} In his memoirs, Clinton refutes this charge suggesting that the confusion was caused by his personal philosophy, which suggested that “global interdependence was erasing the divide between foreign and domestic policy.”\textsuperscript{289} In any case, he wanted a national security team that avoided any policies that might trump his domestic economic agenda.

In accomplishing this objective, Clinton’s main challenge was finding experienced people. The Republicans had just finished a twelve-year run in the executive office. To find anybody with experience, Clinton had to look to Jimmy Carter’s national security team.\textsuperscript{290} However, because he deemed the Carter wing of the Democratic Party too conservative, he did not feel comfortable moving in that direction. Nevertheless, his pick for Secretary of State was Warren Christopher had served as a deputy to Cyrus Vance—Carter’s secretary of state. Halberstam describes Christopher as an “old-fashioned” man who worked hard and did not seek accolades.\textsuperscript{291} He was loyal and could be counted on to protect his boss when things went badly. Because of this humble perspective, Christopher was well respected by Democratic and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item David Halberstam, \textit{War in a Time of Peace}, 168.
\item David Halberstam, \textit{War in a Time of Peace}, 168–170.
\item David Halberstam, \textit{War in a Time of Peace}, 172.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Republican politicians alike. He was twenty-seven years senior to Clinton; therefore, he was old enough to be Clinton’s father. Although they had never worked together directly, Clinton seemed to trust Christopher despite his association with the Carter administration. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia was also a strong candidate, but Clinton’s political advisers believed that Nunn’s personality was too strong. They preferred Christopher’s quiet professionalism. After all other options were exhausted, Christopher was chosen as the safest alternative.\(^{292}\)

In terms of European security matters, Strobe Talbott was arguably one of the most influential members of the Clinton national security team. A highly talented intellectual, Talbott learned Russian at an early age. Clinton met Talbott while studying as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University in the 1960s when he was translating deposed Soviet reformer Nikita Khrushchev’s tape-recorded comments into book form. When he became president, Clinton asked Talbott to come on the team as a special adviser to the secretary of state for the newly independent states. Eventually, he was promoted to deputy secretary of state, and his connections in Russia proved to be a liability at times. Republicans in congress were keen to accuse Clinton of being soft on the Russians, and Talbott’s desire to work with the Russian government was a weak spot in the realm of US politics.

Tony Lake, another deputy in the Carter administration, was Clinton’s pick as national security adviser. Lake was a product of the eastern establishment. He was educated at Harvard; and after graduation in the 1960s, his parents used their connections to help him get started in the Foreign Service. His first diplomatic posting was in Vietnam. As was the case with many young diplomats during that time, he eventually soured on the war effort. However, when Kissinger convinced Lake that he wanted to end the Vietnam War, Lake took a job as a deputy to the

\(^{292}\) Ibid., 175–176.
national security adviser. Kissinger and Nixon’s decision to invade Cambodia was appalling to Lake, and he subsequently resigned. Brzezinski rehired Lake during the Carter years. From that point forward, Lake was tagged as a national security professional with strong ties to the Democratic Party. He was talented and willing to take a hard line against the Russians. As will be discussed below, Lake was the driving force developing an “endgame strategy” for ending the Bosnian War, and he was a fierce advocate for NATO enlargement.

For his Secretary of Defense, Clinton picked Congressman Les Aspin. Although well respected because of his intelligence and affable nature, Aspin was not the best choice to run the Department of Defense. Halberstam describes Aspin as a “hedgehog of a man, overweight, always late to meetings. His shirts were wrinkled and hung out at his waist, and his tie, if not untied, was loosened at the collar, with his collar button open, if it existed at all.” Given that the generals at the Pentagon valued image above all, it is no surprise that Aspin was not well received. Not long after the military debacle in Mogadishu in the fall of 1993, Aspin resigned and William Perry took control of the Pentagon.

In one of Clinton’s more peculiar decisions during the transition, Colin Powell was asked to stay on as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell was an acolyte of the Reagan and Bush administrations, and he ascribed much of his personal success to the opportunities he received while in these administrations. As the media spokesman for the Gulf War, he was well received in the American public. Halberstam suggests that Clinton wanted to keep Powell on to prevent him from running for president in the 1996 election cycle. Powell was reluctant to deploy military forces without having set a clear end state. Thus, he was firmly against intervention into the Bosnian civil war. Powell retired in August 1993 and was replaced by

293 Ibid., 245.
General John Shalikashvili. A first-generation immigrant from Georgia, Shalikashvili was more internationalist in his perspective and more willing than Powell to deploy US forces for humanitarian purposes. In the end, Shalikashvili proved a better fit for the Clinton administration.

**Loss Aversion 5: Protecting Russian Reformers**

Clinton based much of his foreign and domestic agenda on the fate of Russia, and he linked the success of Russia to the political fortunes of Boris Yeltsin and his team of democratic reformers. Finance Minister Yegor Gaidar, Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov were Yeltsin’s choices for leading Russia towards a closer relationship with the US. Although Beschloss and Talbott’s 1993 book criticized the Bush team for being too close to Gorbachev, it is a great irony that Talbott would find himself serving an administration that was arguably more aligned to Russian personalities than Bush’s. If Yeltsin’s rivals were successful in removing him from office, Clinton worried that the reformers would be replaced with Russian hardliners and a new Cold War would ignite that would divert revenue to defense at the expense of domestic spending. He held that it was necessary to provide Russia with economic assistance to bolster Yeltsin’s fight against his opponents in the Russian Congress: “I don’t care what it costs. It’ll be a bargain. If Russia goes bad—if those guys trying to impeach Yeltsin win—we’ll be back here talking about reversing our defense cuts and spending really big money to wage a new Cold War.”

Clinton’s concerns were valid. When he came to office, there were still Russian troops stationed in the Baltics, and a miscalculation might reignite tensions.

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In addition to the political benefits of supporting Yeltsin, Clinton seemed to have a personal liking for his counterpart. Only a few months into his presidency, Clinton met Yeltsin in Vancouver, Canada. He appreciated Yeltsin for the way he handled Russia’s domestic politics. According to Clinton’s memoirs, he departed from his first summit with Yeltsin in Vancouver with “more confidence in Yeltsin and a better understanding of his challenges and his visceral determination to overcome them. And I liked him.”296 From Clinton’s perspective, Yeltsin was a complex personality. Thus, Clinton found a kindred spirit—a larger than life politician who knew how to rise to an occasion.297

One begins to see the emergence of a three-way dilemma in Clinton’s foreign policy. When he entered office in 1993, Clinton had every intention of fulfilling his campaign pledge of expanding democracy, fostering free market capitalism, and protecting the human rights of the victimized. Dealing with the ongoing crisis in the Balkans was obviously the most urgent test of this policy. However, a decision to intervene on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims would threaten the political fortunes of Boris Yeltsin. His radical political opponents would use the intervention as an example of how Yeltsin’s pro-Western policies were causing a decline in Russian international influence. In this way, an aggressive interventionist policy to stop the killing in the Balkans might cost democratic reforms in Russia.298 Given the turmoil within Russia in the early 1990s, Clinton’s concern about Yeltsin’s political position was understandable.

When Russian President Boris Yeltsin joined Ukraine and Belarus in establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991, he was immediately confronted

296 Bill Clinton, My Life, 508.
297 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 125.
298 Ibid., 170–175.
with the monumental task of creating a democratic state based on democracy and free market
principles. To accomplish this task, Yeltsin’s instinct was to embrace the West. Thus, he
appointed a pro-Western reformer, Finance Minister Yegor Gaidar, as the acting Russian prime
minister and charged him to implement privatization of state property and the elimination of
price controls. Known as “shock therapy,” this system aimed “to impose monetary stabilization
through fiscal discipline, while also crushing the remnants of the planning system and clearing a
path for market behavior.” For an administration committed to advancing the cause of free
markets in Eastern Europe, Yeltsin and Gaidar’s commitment to reform was encouraging to the
Clinton team. To implement his reform programs, Yeltsin convinced the Congress of People’s
Deputies to grant him special powers of decree throughout 1991. However, Russian “shock
therapy” became an end unto itself and ignored its ultimate purpose, which was to make life
better for Russian citizens.

Reforming the Russian economy at all costs turned out to have negative effects for the
Russian people who were expecting reforms to bring American style affluence. The main
problem was inflation, which rose approximately 25 percent a month from 1992 to 1993. Strobe Talbott related in his memoir that the crisis was so severe that the “average monthly wage
was not enough to purchase a grocery basket full of necessities.” Retirement savings
accumulated over a lifetime were suddenly worthless. To make matters worse, Russian
government officials took advantage of the challenges associated with economic liberalization
to

300 Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted*, Amazon Kindle location 1500 of 3168; James Goldgeier and Michael
301 Ibid., Amazon Kindle location 1529 of 3168.
make themselves rich. To obtain official government documents to start a private enterprise, Russian citizens had to pay bureaucrats a special fee, and criminal elements took control of the streets demanding extortionary payments for “protection” from other criminal elements. Such conditions were unpalatable to the Russian population, and Boris Yeltsin’s political opponents in the Russian Congress were keen to capitalize on the vulnerability.

Communist leader Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, used the economic difficulties to remind Russian citizens that they had it better under the old regime, and nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, reminded them that the new policies diminished the historical greatness of Russia. Even Yeltsin’s Vice President Aleksander Rutskoy came out against the liberalizing reforms. When Gaidar came to the Congress of People’s Deputies for confirmation (until then he was only acting prime minister) in December 1992, the Congress refused to accept Gaidar as prime minister. Yeltsin was furious. He made a speech the day after Congress’ rebuff of Gaidar calling for an April 1993 referendum on his presidency and liberalizing policies. In a compromise, Khasbulatov agreed to the referendum, and Yeltsin agreed to replace the unpopular reformer, Gaidar, with the more moderate Victor Chernomyrdin, a politician more acceptable to the Congress, as the prime minister.

The compromise did not last as disagreements emerged over petty issues related to the language of the April referendum and the legal relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government. The problem was rooted in fact that the Russian government was formed around a Soviet-era political structure. When the Congress attempted to strip Yeltsin of

303 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, Amazon Kindle location 1537–1555 of 3168.
304 Andrew Felkay, Yeltsin’s Russia and the West, 68-72; Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life, 270–275.
his special powers of decree and cancel the referendum, Yeltsin responded with a March 20 speech in which he declared a “special regime” that superseded parliamentary oversight until after the April referendum. The instability in Russia had an immediate impact on Clinton’s foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis Bosnia.

The events occurring inside Russia informed an intelligence assessment that landed on Clinton’s desk when he was barely a month in office. Established in June 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Balkans Task Force (DCI-IBTF) was comprised of members of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). One of its core functions was “to coordinate general military intelligence support to US policy and contingency planning and tactical intelligence support.”305 In February 1993, Clinton’s national security team received one of its first intelligence assessment from the DCI-IBTF that informed Clinton’s Balkans policy. Entitled “Yugoslavia Policy Options: Likely Responses,” the document systematically considered three packages for dealing with the Balkans problem: “Package 1: Minimal Activism,” “Package 2: Moderate Activism,” and “Package 3: Militant Activism.” In each package, the DCI-IBTF provided an assessment of the Russian response to increasing levels of NATO military force.

The “Minimal Activism” option considered Russian reactions to continuing existing sanctions, increasing delivery of humanitarian aid, lifting the UN arms embargo, and enforcing a “No Fly” zone over Bosnia. “Moderate Activism” considered Russian reactions related to “clear threats to use force against Serbia if it does not curb the Bosnian Serbs.” Finally, “Militant

Activism” was a consideration of a sustained use of force against “Belgrade to restrain the Bosnian Serbs.” The assessment suggested that the Russians “probably would go along with most initiatives” in the first package. However, Russia would utilize its Security Council veto to stop the lifting of the arms embargo, and enforcement of the “no fly” zone would need to “be limited to attacking individual aircraft in the act of violating the ban in the air of Bosnia; the Russians want no attacks on ground targets or into Serbia.”

According to the assessment, the “Moderate Activism” and “Militant Activism” packages were completely unacceptable to the Russians. The assessment predicted that a deliberate military campaign, save for a limited implementation of a “no fly” zone, against the Serbians would have negative effects on Yeltsin’s political situation in Russia and threaten US interests in other European security discussions:

Russia would criticize a US intention to use force against Serbia if Belgrade ignores Washington’s demands, arguing that such an intent would be totally counter to Russia’s interests in the Balkans. Western attacks on Belgrade would fuel domestic criticism of Yeltsin’s Yugoslav policy, and he probably would have no option but to back away from cooperation with the West on Yugoslavia . . . Cooperation on a broad range of issues—including European security discussions would suffer significantly. Ukraine would also be concerned about the precedent of intervention, but probably would try to avoid confrontation with the US.306

The essential message from this assessment was that a deliberate and substantive military campaign against Serbia might lead to a loss of Russia.

This assessment encouraged Clinton to support Yeltsin even if his policies leaned toward the oppressive. During the lead-up to the April referendum, the Clinton administration did not flinch at Yeltsin’s anti-democratic move with the establishment of a “special regime” to deal

306 Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Balkans Task Force Intelligence Assessment to the White House, “Yugoslavia” Policy Options: Likely Responses,” February 1, 1993, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Collection 0797 F Box 1, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AR.
with the constitutional crisis. Strobe Talbott and Anthony Lake drafted a press statement concerning Yeltsin’s speech “that endorsed democracy rather than Yeltsin’s move per se.”

When he received this draft of the speech, Clinton thought it too equivocal and made edits explicitly supporting the Russian president. In the final version, Clinton reaffirmed his support for “the historic movement toward democratic and free markets in Russia.” This statement effectively communicated to Khasbulatov that the US supported Yeltsin’s “shock therapy” in Russia. Thus, future US and IMF economic assistance might be linked to continued economic austerity measures. In case there was any confusion on the matter, the statement closed by saying, “What matters most is that Russia is, and must remain, a democratic country moving toward a market economy. That is the basis for a continued US-Russian partnership, and for a better and more prosperous future for the Russian people.”

Clinton’s chief of staff, George Stephanopoulos, worried that Clinton was being too gracious with Yeltsin. Clinton explained his position to the press the day after issuing the official statement:

> I think he’s the duly elected president of Russia and he’s a genuine democrat—small ‘d’—and he is leading a country that is trying to do two things: one escape from communism into market economics. . .and second, to preserve real democracy. . .I intend to do what I can to be supportive of that process, and to be supportive of him while he serves as president of Russia.

In the first days of his presidency, Clinton clearly linked his administration to Yeltsin’s success.

**Decision: Focus on Negotiations over Action**

Given that the Russian Congress was adamantly opposed to US military intervention in Bosnia, the constitutional crisis in Russia made it difficult for Clinton to follow through on his

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campaign commitment to do more to protect Bosnian Muslims. Luckily for the Clinton administration, a tentative peace plan was being negotiated that gave his team some space to resolve how they would follow through on their pledge to help the Bosnian Muslims without alienating the Russians. Only a couple weeks prior to Clinton’s inauguration in 1993, Lord David Owen, representing the European Community, and former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, representing the United Nations, presented a peace plan that would keep Yugoslavia united in a loose confederation of ten separate cantons distributed according to ethnic majority: three were Bosnian Serb-dominated, three were Bosnian Muslim dominated, two were Croat majority, one was Croat-Bosnian Muslim majority, and Sarajevo was a separate Canton.\footnote{Laura Silber and Allan Little, \textit{Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation} 276; David Halberstam, \textit{War in a Time of Peace}, 198; Carol Rogel, \textit{The Break-up of Yugoslavia and Its Aftermath}, 61.} Owen and Vance just needed to get all the parties to sign the document.

While the UN/EU team was negotiating signatures on the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, Secretary of State Warren Christopher revealed Clinton’s Bosnia policy in a press conference on February 10, 1993. Although Christopher opened the conference stating he was “announcing a series of new steps . . . for the United States to become actively and directly engaged” in Bosnia, the press conference essentially confirmed the implementation of the “Minimal Activist” course of action in Bosnia, as outlined by the DCI-IBCTF. In the press conference, Christopher announced six Clinton initiatives for Bosnia: 1) support the Vance-Owen Peace Plan by assigning Reginald Bartholomew as a US delegate, 2) insistence on a negotiated settlement between the parties, 3) work with Russia and other allies to tighten economic sanctions on Serbia, 4) enforce a “no-fly” zone over Bosnia under UN mandate, 5) committed to providing US ground to a multinational force to implement a settlement, and 6) continue communication
with Russia and other allies on further actions. In many ways, this announcement was rather hollow. Other than the addition of a US delegate to Vance-Owen negotiations and the “no-fly” zone, the rest was just promises for more discussions with the UN and other allies.

Christopher ended the press conference with a contradictory set of ideals. He clearly articulated Clinton’s commitment to multilateralism, but he caveated the commitment with a reminder of the power and responsibility of the US:

The United States is not the world’s policeman. We cannot interpose our forces to stop every armed conflict in the world. Yet we are the United States of America. We have singular powers and influence. We are committed to Europe’s stability. Yet no great power can dismiss the likely consequences of letting a Balkan conflict rage. Acting now, in close cooperation with our friends and allies, offers the best chance to contain these flames of conflict before they become an underground fire that could later erupt and become all-consuming. By acting now, we can demonstrate that not every crisis need become a choice between inaction and unilateral American intervention.311

This statement leaves one wondering where the US policy stood vis-à-vis the Bosnian situation. If the US was truly “committed to Europe’s stability,” why did it not use its “singular power and influence” to move NATO forward to an active military role to protect the Bosnian Muslims? If it chose, could not America use its “power and influence” to create the multilateral coalition Clinton desired?

The opposition party in the US was certainly asking these kinds of questions. In a response to Christopher’s press conference announcing the “Minimal Activist” approach in Bosnia, Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole issued a statement criticizing Clinton’s policy. He asserted that the “Clinton plan is more old than new. It’s a disappointment because it is far less than the tough action he promised during the campaign.” Implementing the “no fly” zone was a

positive first step, but the action was insufficient to make a real difference. “In the absence of military pressure on Serb forces—such as the threat of NATO air strikes and lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government—there is little hope that the killing of civilians will stop.” Dole wanted a “new approach, not just words, but real action, tough measures against the perpetrators of this aggression. I hope the Clinton plan works, but I’m not optimistic.”

He suggested that the president should do more. Dole would support the announced measures, but he “would also support him if he lifts the arms embargo.” Dole’s main concern was that the conflict would spread throughout the region:

We’ve got to take a look at what happens next. You look at Kosovo, where you have two million Albanians, and maybe 150-200 thousand Serbs – if this spreads to that area, then we’re looking at problems not only in Kosovo, but in Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Turkey, Greece, then I think our national interest is certainly—we have a real interest in what happens there. If we can keep negotiating, but in the meantime let the Serbs know that they can’t continue this ravaging of women and slaughter of innocent people without at least us noticing it and responding as we should.”

From the earliest stages of his presidency, the opposition party signaled to Clinton they would support an assertive Bosnian policy. However, outside of an increased enforcement of the “no fly” zone, the Clinton team chose a strategy of maintaining the status quo to secure the political prospects of Yeltsin. This policy was explicitly stated in a March 15, 1993 NSC deputy meeting summary memorandum:

The US will not propose a new Security Council resolution on sanctions during the meeting of the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies. The Sanctions Working Group will, however, continue refining our substantive position in order to be prepared when/if the time is right. The Deputies will revisit the issue at the end of this week in light, inter alia, of developments at the Russian Congress and

of whether our willingness to introduce such a resolution might help get Bosnian President Izetbegović to return to the talks.\textsuperscript{314}

At this point in time, Russian political considerations were clearly more important to the Clinton administration than forcing the Bosnian issue—at least until after the results of the Russian referendum.

This hesitation turned out to be catastrophic for Muslims trapped in Srebrenica. The town was located deep in the heart of Bosnian Serb territory. Cut off by the Bosnian Serbs from all UN humanitarian assistance, the Muslim population starved as they suffered heavy artillery attack from well emplaced Serbian guns in the mountains overlooking the town. Despite futile attempts from the UNPROFOR commander, General Phillipe Morillon, to deliver assistance, the population continued to endure death and deprivation.\textsuperscript{315} It became a source of deep embarrassment for the UN. When Bosnian Serb commander, General Ratko Mladić, learned in April 1993 that the small defensive force in Srebrenica was running low on ammunition, he authorized an offensive to finally eliminate the Muslim enclave. As a preparation for the offensive, Mladić’s forces executed a deadly artillery attack that killed fifty-six civilians many of whom were children. Serb forces eventually seized critical tactical objectives surrounding Srebrenica and prepared for the final assault. On April 12, two days after the deadly attack, civilian authorities within Srebrenica sent a secret communique to UN headquarters in Sarajevo.


They could not hold out any longer. Srebrenica would surrender to the Bosnian Serb forces without assistance.316

The events in Srebrenica were becoming a political problem for Clinton. In an April 14 press release, Dole used the Srebrenica crisis to pounce on Clinton for his hesitation: “While I was encouraged by President Clinton’s early statements on Bosnia, I am troubled by the apparent reversal of his position.” Rejecting any notion of neutrality in the conflict, Dole contended that the culprits in the Bosnian War were “Slobodan Milošević and his allies in Bosnia.” He went on to make the point that “pointing fingers and talking tough have done nothing to halt the spread of ‘ethnic cleansing’ . . . No matter how you spin it, this policy has been a failure. President Milošević is so certain of the international community’s inability to act that he feels free to mock the Clinton administration for its strategy.”317

In an April 17 open letter to Clinton, Dole again gave his blessing for a strong response to the attack on Srebrenica. He wanted Clinton to “issue an ultimatum to Serbia and its proxies in Bosnia to pull back Serbian forces within twenty-four hours or face NATO air strikes against Serbian military positions in eastern Bosnia-Hercegovina.” However, Dole was “not advocating US or NATO involvement on the ground in Bosnia-Hercegovina – it is not in the US interest to fight for the Bosnians.” Instead of deploying ground forces, Dole wanted Clinton to implement a unilateral US policy in which the arms embargo was “immediately lifted.”318

316 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 265-276; David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 122–123.
From the UN perspective, Srebrenica was embarrassing because the Vance-Owen Peace Plan identified the city as part of Bosnian Muslim territory—not the Bosnian Serbs. In a feeble attempt to maintain control of Srebrenica, the UN declared the city a UN Safe Area with the implementation of UNSCR 819 even though they had no means to enforce the declaration outside of NATO intervention, which was unlikely to be provided. Nevertheless, the international attention from the resolution caused Mladić, encouraged by Milošević, to halt operations around Srebrenica. In contrast to the aggressive tenor of his campaign rhetoric, the whole world was watching Clinton turn away from his campaign pledge.

The media noted Clinton’s change of position vis-à-vis the Bosnian situation. Writing in an April 8, 1993 edition of *The New York Times*, Thomas Friedman explained Clinton’s reassessment of the Bosnian policy:

After coming into office proclaiming the need to action against moral outrages in Bosnia, the Clinton Administration has shifted gears, and is now telling the American people that Bosnia is a quagmire about which little can be done. Administration policymakers deny that they have given up trying to press the Serbs into making concessions to the Bosnian Muslims, and insist that they are now working on lifting the arms embargo to give the Muslims more of a fighting chance. But they also concede that they have begun to talk about Bosnia differently, to cast the problem there less as a moral tragedy—which would make American inaction immoral—and more as a tribal feud that not outsider could hope to settle. The reason for this political redefinition goes back to the Presidential campaign, when Mr. Clinton used the Bosnia issue to differentiate himself from President Bush in foreign policy, and to put Mr. Bush on the defensive. Mr. Clinton lambasted Mr. Bush for passivity toward Bosnia’s fate and for dumping the problem in the lap of the Europeans.

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319 Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, 271–273

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Ironically, Clinton was also willing to dump the Bosnian problem into the lap of the Europeans by blaming them for their resistance to the “lift and strike” policy. Friedman, however, would not let Clinton off the hook with the multilateral excuse stating “it was precisely the Bush administration’s willingness to draw a line in the sand, and commit its own manpower first, that brought the Europeans along behind it in the Gulf War. In Bosnia, Mr. Clinton is suggesting that if the Europeans will not follow, America cannot lead.” In this way, Clinton’s Bosnia policy was receiving pressure from both political opponents and media opinion leaders.

To eliminate the Bosnian distraction, the Clinton administration wanted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan to work, but they were hesitant to use military force against Serbia to back-up the negotiations. On one hand, the Clinton team feared that increased economic sanctions on the Serbs would embolden Yeltsin’s political opponents and threaten Russia’s democratic transformation. On the other hand, the fall of Srebrenica would undercut the Vance Owen Peace Plan. In the end, Clinton’s ambassador to Serbia informed Milošević that the fall of Srebrenica would result in the US pursuing increased sanctions on Serbia regardless of the consequences in Russia. Fearing the possibility of increased sanctions, Milošević called Mladić on the phone and told him to stop the attack. Srebrenica remained in Muslim hands for the time being, but it had a tragic future ahead.

**Yeltsin’s Affirmation and the Rejection of Vance Owen**

While the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was being pushed and Srebrenica was being attacked, the April referendum in Russia was approaching. Clinton was feeling the political pressure to do more in Bosnia, but he worried about the outcome of the referendum in Russia. In an April 20 conversation at the White House, Clinton discussed his dilemma with Czechoslovakian President Václav Havel:
I am particularly concerned about the situation in Bosnia. There are now voices in this country and in Europe saying that we should do more. We are tightening the sanctions, but it is unclear that they will have their intended effect. It seems clear that the Serbs will not participate in peace negotiations as long as they keep winning. They continue to have an enormous advantage because of the embargo. What should the international community do? Should we end the embargo and give Muslims the ability to defend themselves? Should we seek UN authorization to use air power against artillery? What can we do to promote peace, stop ethnic cleansing, and prevent sending the wrong message to potential aggressors elsewhere?

Although Havel’s response is currently redacted, he seems to indicate a concern about the pending Russian referendum because Clinton mentioned the referendum in his next statement:

We will have to await the outcome of Sunday’s referendum. I think Yeltsin would like to be more supportive; he did not block the tightening of sanctions. If he enjoys a big victory on Sunday, he may go along with further steps. Yeltsin has less influence over the Serbs than I thought. He has tried to stop the Serbs. Part of the problem is that the supporters of Serbs in Russia are his opponents. They limit his room for maneuver.  

The referendum consisted of a four-question survey of how the Russian public felt about Yeltsin’s leadership:

**Question 1:** Do you have confidence in the President of the Russian Federation, B. N. Yeltsin?

**Question 2:** Do you support the economic and social policy that has been conducted since 1992 by the president and Government of the Russian Federation?

**Question 3:** Should there be early elections for the President of the Russian Federation?

**Question 4:** Should there be early elections for the People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation?

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The results affirmed Yeltsin’s hold on power: 58 percent expressed confidence in Yeltsin, 53 percent favored his economic and social reforms, less than 50 percent wanted early presidential elections, but more than 67 percent of the population wanted early elections for the entire Russian parliament: “Da, Da, Nyet, DA!” Yeltsin’s success was a boon to Clinton’s European security policy. After the referendum, Clinton phoned Yeltsin saying that the results were good “not only for the people of Russia, but for the people of the United States and all the people of the world.” All Clinton needed to do now was close the deal on the Vance Owen Peace Plan, and he could focus his efforts on supporting the Russian democratic transformation and negotiating the removal of Russian soldiers from the Baltic states. Unfortunately for the Clinton administration and, more importantly, the civilians living in Bosnia, closing the deal was elusive.

Vance and Owen had a difficult time trying to convince all parties to agree to sign the peace plan. Tuđman was excited about the plan because it created a Croat state within Bosnia that had a contiguous border with Croatia proper. Karadžić disliked the plan because it ceded large amounts of Bosnian Serb-held territory to the Muslim population, and Izetbegović disliked it because it created a weak central government with the unenviable task of governing such an unwieldy state. However, in a clever gambit, Izetbegović signed the document because he knew the Bosnian Serbs would eventually reject the proposal. Given that two of the three belligerents signed the plan, Karadžić was under intense diplomatic pressure to cooperate. He signed the agreement in May, but he played his own gambit by insisting that the treaty would not go into effect until the Bosnian Serb parliament approved the plan.


324 Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, 276–291.
With the referendum securing Yeltsin’s political situation, Milošević knew there was nothing holding back the US from pushing for economic sanctions in the UNSC. All he had to do to avoid these sanctions was to convince the Bosnian Serb parliament to sign the peace plan, and Milošević was determined to do his part. However, when the issue was presented to the Bosnian Serb parliament in May, he found that he had little sway with his Serbian cousins. Far more persuasive was the Bosnian Serb military hero, General Ratko Mladić. In a speech to the assembly, he demonstrated with a map and overlays how the Vance-Owen Peace Plan would force the Bosnian Serbs to give up territory.\footnote{Laura Silber and Allan Little, \textit{Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation}, 285.} Despite the determined haranguing of Milošević, the Bosnian Serb parliament voted to send the decision to the people in a referendum, which resulted in a rejection of the peace plan on May 16.

As the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was dying in Bosnia, Secretary of State Warren Christopher was in Europe ostensibly to convince allied partners of the wisdom of the “lift and strike policy.” This trip gave hope to media elites who were lambasting Clinton for his lack of leadership in Bosnia. In a May 9, 1993 opinion piece, the \textit{Newsweek} editorial staff lauded Christopher’s trip as evidence that Clinton was finally ready “to do something to stop the bloodshed.”\footnote{Editorial staff, “Getting Tough at Last,” \textit{Newsweek}, May 9, 1993, http://www.newsweek.com/getting-tough-last-193372?rx=us (date accessed, November 15, 2016).} European leaders, however, refused to agree to “lift and strike” unless the US was willing to put US troops on the ground. Under those conditions, Clinton decided not to assert US leadership to force the Europeans to cooperate. In fact, his national security team was not interested in substantive military action in Bosnia. In a May 17, 1993 NSC deputies meeting, a decision was made that the US would “continue raising our preferred course of lifting the arms
embargo on Bosnia and interim air strikes, making clear our reasons for believing it is the best course, but will not press it to the point of shattering relations with allies or the Russians.”

Frustrated by the failure of the peace plan and what he considered a lack of leadership on Bosnia, Dole introduced the Bosnia-Hercegovina Self Defense Act of 1993 to unilaterally end the US arms embargo against Bosnia. Since the Republicans were in the minority in the Senate, Dole knew the bill would not pass. However, he wanted to make a political point about the inaction in Bosnia. In a press release announcing the bill, Dole noted the fact that the UN arms embargo was implemented on Yugoslavia and, therefore, was not binding on Bosnia—a newly independent state. Moreover, Article 51 of the UN charter granted the right of self-defense to every sovereign nation. Dole went on to use the press release to admonish Clinton to “lead the way in doing what is right. The international community may choose not to follow through on collective defense, but it should not and must not stand in the way of Bosnia’s right to self-defense.” Instead of “leading the way,” Clinton chose to pursue more diplomacy in Bosnia.

The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and NATO Legitimacy

After the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was rejected in May, Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Cyrus Vance who retired from service at the UN. To regain momentum on peace negotiations, Owen and Stoltenberg met with the belligerents on the HMS Invincible in July 1993. They worked out another peace plan that “gave fifty three percent of Bosnian (contiguous) territory to the Serbs, seventeen percent to the Croats, divided into two parts, and left the Muslims with the

remaining 30 percent.” Since the plan essentially affirmed Serbian territorial gains, many observers viewed the plan as too lenient.

At this point, Dole lost all confidence in any UN/EU peace process. His basic position was that previous UN resolutions already provided NATO with what it needed to act; therefore, “Boutros-Ghali should step out of the way and let NATO do the job.” For Dole, action was critical because the “credibility of NATO is on the line. And, US credibility is on the line – not just NATO.” Owen and Stoltenberg were merely “pressuring the Bosnians to sign away most of their country.” Instead of forsaking a principled approach to the Bosnian peace process, Dole urged Clinton to “stay on course with our NATO allies – to press for their cooperation to move swiftly and decisively, and not to be deterred by bureaucratic obstacles raised by the United States.”

Dole’s concerns were echoed in the media. A July 25, 1993 Washington Post article written by George Zarychky condemned the West and NATO for its claim “that intervention was untenable given the terrain, logistics, and complexity of the situation even as the United Nations sends helicopter gunships into the heart of downtown Mogadishu. . . Bosnia’s tragedy reflects the lack of will, courage, resolve, the fragility of the democratic idea espoused but not defended.” There was also pressure coming from intellectuals in US national security.

329 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 305.
Substantive military intervention had the backing of some of the most esteemed foreign policy intellectuals in the West. In a September 2, 1993 open letter in the *Wall Street Journal*, Albert Wohlstetter and Margaret Thatcher urged Clinton to “lead a coalition of Western governments that exercises the right of each to individual and collective self-defense. The UN Charter does not confer that right; it acknowledges it to be ‘inherent.’ Nor is that right conditioned on the secretary-general’s approval.” Thus, if he chose to exercise the right, Clinton had sufficient legal and moral justification to form a military coalition against the Serbians. Failure to act, would be a “disaster not only for the Bosnians, but for the relevance of the UN, Europe, NATO—and the US.” Although written by Thatcher and Wohlstetter, the letter was signed by more than one hundred other esteemed intellectual opinion leaders from around the world. The signatures included many noted figures such as Paul Nitze, Elie Wiesel, Karl Popper, George Soros, Alfred Dregger, and Paul Wolfowitz—just to highlight a few.332 As has been demonstrated, intervention had the backing of the leader of the opposition party, media elites, and leading foreign policy intellectuals. Everything was in place for Clinton to follow through on his campaign pledge to protect Bosnian Muslims. However, he chose not to act, and he had to explain this decision to Izetbegović just six days after the open letter was published.

In a September 8 meeting with Clinton, Izetbegović met with Clinton to explain that the Bosnian Serbs had to reject the Owen-Stoltenberg plan because “the Serbs are trying to keep territory taken from Muslims, around the Drina River, which were 65-70% Muslim before they were ethnically cleansed and the people killed or driven out. This is unacceptable morally and

politically.” When Izetbegović asked Clinton to put pressure on Serbia and Croatia to be more cooperative, Clinton explained that he was only willing to provide ground forces provided a peace plan was in place and conducted by NATO:

As I told you earlier this year, I believe the US would participate in helping keep the peace if you reach an agreement that is fair, do it willingly, and if you want us to do it. For me there are two conditions. It must be done by NATO rather than the UN because I never want to be in a position like before, when we wanted to lift the arms embargo and the Russians, British, and French objected. The British and French also are in NATO but the US can lead NATO.

Given that Izetbegović had already rejected the only plan on the table, his comment about reaching an agreement was a moot point. The subtle point Clinton was really making was that the US would not do more than what it was already doing. What is, however, more revealing in this exchange is Clinton’s acknowledgment that the “US can lead NATO,” but he was choosing an alternative course. He confirmed as much in a subsequent statement to Izetbegović:

As to territory, we believe you should have some access to the Adriatic and the largest possible territory. We have done what we could to push the Serbs and Croats. But I do not believe there will be any military intervention to secure more. So the most leverage we have is now, when they worry whether I will be able to persuade others if they resume fighting. They know we have a slightly better position with NATO rather than with the UN in this.

Clinton was essentially offering a bluff hand to Izetbegović. He acknowledged that Serbia and Croatia knew the US had “a slightly better position with NATO” because, like Clinton, they knew the US could “lead NATO”—if the US elected to do so. However, Clinton was clearly communicating to Izetbegović that he would not lead NATO towards a full intervention. Clinton then delivers the coup d’*grace* to Izetbegović’s hopes for substantive US military intervention: “So my strong recommendation is to get the best agreement you can, knowing that the US will
do what it can to push the Serbs and Croats.” The US would do everything it could save for substantive military intervention.333

Frustrated by the complexity of the problem and the intransigence of the belligerents, Clinton gave up on his policy of determined intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims. He would instead commit to the newly developed Joint Action Plan (JAP), which was Signed by the US, Russia, France, the UK, and Spain in May. The sole objective of JAP was to contain the conflict within Bosnia. As part of the JAP commitment, Clinton deployed a small US force to Macedonia, reiterated to Milošević that Kosovo was protected, and sealed the Bosnian border to reinforcement of military equipment. The decision to back JAP had little to do with NATO resistance to military intervention. By his own admission, Clinton could lead that institution. The reality was that he could not follow through on an aggressive Bosnian policy because there was still too much in play within Russia.

**Russian Troubles Continue**

Although he won the referendum in April, Yeltsin’s political troubles were not solved. He still needed to move forward with establishing a post-Soviet constitution, but Khasbulatov resisted every move Yeltsin made towards this end. Less than two weeks after Clinton’s meeting with Izetbegović, Yeltsin rehired Gaidar as a deputy to Chernomyrdin and issued Presidential Decree 1400 dissolving the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet and called for new elections in December. The decree mandated that all members of the current parliament leave government facilities no later than October 4. Outraged by what he considered an

extraconstitutional action, Khasbulatov led a successful movement within the Congress of People’s Deputies to impeach Yeltsin and replace him with Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy. Expecting a populist uprising on their behalf, which did not occur, Khasbulatov, Rutskoy, and many of their supporters, seized the Russian parliamentary building and demanded that Presidential Decree 1400 be rescinded. To regain order, Yeltsin called in the military to retake the parliament. In the process, 187 people were killed and more than 400 wounded.\textsuperscript{334}

Despite the coup attempt, Yeltsin moved forward with his plan for a Dumas election and a public referendum on a new constitution in December. The document created a bicameral legislative body consisting of the Federation Council (178 seats) and the State Duma (450 seats). On December 12, Russian citizens went to the polls to simultaneously approve the constitution and elect a legislative body. Any party that could accumulate at least 100,000 signatures on petition could put forward a candidate. The constitution was approved with more than 58 percent of the vote. Of the 450 seats in the Duma, the new constitution assigned 225 based on proportionality of votes cast for the respective party, and the results were discouraging for Yeltsin. His reform party, Russia’s Choice (RC), received only 15.38 percent. Russia’s Choice was outperformed by Zhirinovsky’s ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which received 22.79 percent of the vote. Despite having just led a coup against the government, the Communist Party (CP) came in third with 12.35 percent of the vote. Thus, if the results are aggregated, Yeltsin’s nationalist and communist rivals, who were opposed to reform, outperformed the RC party 35.14 percent to 15.38 percent.

The only positive outcome of the election for Yeltsin was based on a technicality in the constitution. While 225 of the Duma seats were allocated according to a party based on party

\textsuperscript{334} Andrew Felkay, \textit{Yeltsin’s Russia and the West}, 80–82.
votes, the other 225 were elections based on the platform of individual candidates. The RC party performed better in this election, which helped Yeltsin in the Duma. When the results were finally allocated, the RC party still had the most seats in the Duma: RC (96), LDP (70), and CP (65). On a technicality, Yeltsin maintained a majority, but even that was vulnerable if the LDP and CP chose to work together against the reform agenda.

In an ironic twist, Clinton had sacrificed his intended Balkans policy, as stated in his campaign, to protect Yeltsin’s political fortunes, but Yeltsin still lost power within the Russian legislature. He still held the power of decree for the implementation of reform, but the idea of moving forward with an aggressive reform agenda was diminished with Yeltsin’s weakened political position vis-à-vis his rivals in the legislature. Clinton continued to support Yeltsin, but it was tempered by the increasing reality that reform would come slow.

Loss Aversion 6: Protecting NATO Credibility

On February 5, 1994, Serb artillery landed in a crowded Sarajevo market square killing 69 people and wounding more than 200. Although miniscule in number to the thousands killed since 1992, the shock of so many deaths in a single instant changed the entire political situation. On the domestic front, Dole was keen to highlight the continued failure of Clinton’s Bosnian policy. In a press release responding to the Sarajevo bombing, Dole stated that the attack was “not surprising in light of the international community’s lack of will and principle in responding to nearly two years of aggression against Bosnia,” and he excoriated NATO for

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conducting “an air show, not a military operation.”

Within NATO, the British were still against lifting the arms embargo, but the rest of NATO was slowly coming around to the idea that it was time to consider the use of force in response to the Bosnian Serb aggression. As early as January, the Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes communicated to Clinton that NATO needed “to send the signal that enough is enough . . . Can we envisage air strikes? Yes, it is necessary.”

On February 9, 1994, NATO ambassadors drafted a communiqué demanding that Bosnian Serbs withdraw their heavy weapons at least 20 kilometers from Sarajevo within ten days or NATO would launch airstrikes against them.

For Clinton, the NATO communiqué was necessary to maintain the credibility of the alliance. In a press conference after the communique was published, he stated that the US has “an interest in showing that NATO, history’s greatest military alliance, remains a credible force for peace in post-Cold War Europe.” While the interests of NATO were important, they did not justify unilateral intervention, but they did “justify the involvement of America and the exercise of our leadership.”

Dole argued the opposite. In a bipartisan open letter signed by fifty-one senators, Dole and his colleagues urged Clinton to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

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They claimed that “if the United States takes the first decisive step, our allies will follow.”\textsuperscript{340} While opinion leaders and politicians debated Bosnia, events in Sarajevo came to climax.

The Bosnian Serbs ignored the NATO ultimatum to withdraw heavy weapons from Sarajevo. As the deadline approached, Yeltsin, under pressure from the newly elected nationalists in the Duma, made his dissatisfaction with NATO clear.\textsuperscript{341} He argued that the organization had no right to intervene militarily in Bosnia without full consultation with Russia. Agreeing for NATO to enforce a “no fly” zone under the auspices of the UN was one thing, but allowing NATO to act independently to bomb Bosnian Serb ground forces was unacceptable. To stop the NATO attack, Yeltsin sent a letter to Karadžić promising to insert Russian troops into Sarajevo firing positions vacated by the Bosnian Serb forces. With this promise, Karadžić ordered Mladić to comply with the ultimatum and four hundred Russian troops were deployed to Sarajevo. The Russian intervention was a great diplomatic success for Yeltsin. He prevented NATO military action and showed the world that Russia was still an important part of European security.

Such victories were not insignificant for Boris Yeltsin because the new constitution dictated that the president was limited to a four-year term in office. Since he was elected in 1992, Yeltsin needed to ensure his foreign policy credentials were strong for the reelection campaign in 1996, and this was a challenge given the fact that the ultranationalists, led by Zhirinovsky, were so strongly represented in the Russian Duma. For the Clinton administration,


\textsuperscript{341} Laura Silber and Allan Little, \textit{Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation}, 317.
maintaining the support of Yeltsin was important because they were still working to get Russian soldiers out of the Baltics.

The Baltics issue was a political challenge to Yeltsin because there were Russian minorities living in Estonia (30 percent), Latvia (32 percent), and Lithuania (8 percent). Because of these minorities, ultranationalists within the Duma were constantly citing a need to protect Russians as a reason to keep troops in the region. The Russians wanted the Baltic states to grant unqualified citizenship to all Russian minorities including former Russian army officers and KGB agents. This was an unacceptable demand to the leaders of Estonia and Latvia who did not want to grant citizenship to any person not living in the country prior to the 1940 Soviet occupation. Since it had a very small ethnic minority and was of the least strategic value, the Lithuanian issue was cleared up easily when all Russian troops pulled out in August 1993, but they remained in the other two Baltic states. Although Clinton stood firm on the Sarajevo exclusion zone, he had no desire to continue to push the Bosnia issue until he got the Russian troops out of the Baltics.

At this point, the Clinton administration’s affinity for Yeltsin started coming under scrutiny. Dole believed that Clinton was too friendly towards the Russians. In a press release explaining his nay vote against Strobe Talbott’s nomination to Deputy Secretary of State, he asserted that Talbott was pro-Russian. Dole pointed out that Talbott was against Reagan’s “get tough” policy with the Soviets. Now, that he was in the Clinton administration, the friendliness toward Russia was manifesting itself in the Bosnia policy:

This Russia tilt is evident in US policy toward Bosnia. The United States has bent over backward to accommodate Russia—which staunchly opposes tough action

against its close ally, Serbia—despite the fact that Serbia is the aggressor. While I support NATO’s latest decision, it is more than just even-handed, it favors the Serbian position. And Russia’s involvement is destined to make the situation even more favorable to the Bosnian Serbs. The United States must not only expect reform in Russia’s domestic policy, but in its foreign policy, as well. . . I am opposed to developing US foreign policy options according to the expected response from hardliners in Russia. US interests should guide US foreign policy, not the potential reaction of Yeltsin critics.343

In an extraordinarily bad bit of timing, on February 22, 1993, the Department of Justice charged CIA agent Aldridge Ames with espionage for working as a Russian mole. Dole used the media coverage of the event to increase his attacks on Clinton for being too friendly towards Russia. When it came to the Bosnia policy, Russia’s objective to “blunt the actions of NATO and protect the gains of Serbian aggression” were countering the Russian reform narrative. According to Dole, “. . .some have said that reform in Russia—especially in the security policy area—is moving too slowly. The latest developments make me wonder if it was ever moving at all.”

Despite such criticism, Clinton maintained his policy of simultaneously supporting Yeltsin and working for a negotiated peace in the Balkans. In March, his team scored a major diplomatic success that rivaled that of the Russian intervention in Sarajevo. Clinton’s Special Envoy to Croatia Charles Redman and Ambassador to Croatia Paul Galbraith were working to complete a bilateral peace deal between Bosnia and Croatia.344 In August 1993, Tudman informed Redman that he was worried about his legacy, and he wanted Croatia to enjoy Western economic benefits. Over the next few months, Redman and Galbraith made clear to the Croatian leadership that there would be no integration with the West if Croatia had 30,000 troops fighting

344 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 319-324; David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 332–334.
Bosnian Muslims for control of territory. On February 6, 1994, Redman and Galbraith told Tuđman that the US would help Croatia economically if it ceased military operations in Bosnia and withdrew its troops. Galbraith was subsequently summoned to Tuđman’s office and informed that the Croatians would comply. Although the formal details were not worked out until the following month in Washington, Croatia agreed to a peace. When the Washington Agreement was signed on March 18, 1994, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, merging the Bosnian Muslims and Croats into one nation, was born. This was a significant diplomatic success for the Clinton administration. Part of the Bosnian problem was solved, but the toughest part of the problem was still active.

The afterglow of US and Russian diplomatic successes in Bosnia was a short-lived affair. In April 1994, Bosnian Serbs commenced a deadly attack on the Muslim town of Goražde, which, like Srebrenica, was situated right in the middle of Bosnian Serb held territory. To protect his forces on the ground, the new UNPROFOR commander, General Michael Rose, requested airstrikes from NATO aircraft. The UN approved the request; and on April 10, two US aircraft attacked a Bosnian Serb artillery bunker. When the Bosnian Serbs continued their attacks, Rose ordered a second round of aerial bombardments against several armored personnel carriers. In response to these attacks, Mladić took 150 UNPROFOR soldiers hostage. These were the first live military actions from NATO in its entire history.

Although the attacks were a marked departure from NATO’s previous passivity in Bosnia, they were very limited in their actual effect. Based on prior agreements, targets had to be approved by both the UN and NATO. This dual track approval limited what Rose could achieve with the close air support. Thus, by April 16, 1994, the Bosnian Serbs had surrounded Goražde, and they were preparing for their final assault. It was almost exactly a year since the
same scene played out in Srebrenica. In a last-ditch effort to save the town, Rose called for another round of air attacks on ground targets. This time a British aircraft was shot down. Although the pilot ejected safely, the situation was escalating.

Fearing a massive retaliation against Bosnian Serb forces in response to the shoot-down, Russian special envoy to the Balkans, Vataly Churkin, engaged in a frantic round of negotiations between Bosnian Speaker of the House Momcilo Krajisnik and UN Special Envoy Yusushi Akashi. Churkin brokered a deal in which Akashi agreed to call off the NATO attacks if Krajisnik agreed to stop the shelling of Goražde, pull back Serb forces, and release the 150 UNPROFOR hostages. The situation was dire because Churkin knew that the ultraconservatives in Moscow were fuming about NATO’s military response. The Russians seemed to be on the precipice of another diplomatic success, but the Bosnian Serbs destroyed such aspirations when they reneged on all three promises and began their final assault on Goražde.

In response to the failure of a deal, the North Atlantic Council conducted consultations on how to proceed. Learning from Sarajevo that the threat of military force helped in diplomatic negotiations, the Clinton administration pushed for another ultimatum to be delivered to the Bosnian Serbs. They would follow through on the conditions of the Churkin deal, or they would face a robust air response from NATO. As might be expected, the British were dead set against such an approach. In their history of the event, Silber and Little suggest that the Goražde affair threatened the unity of the alliance:

US diplomats were contemptuous of the British position – which one US diplomat privately described as “really wet.” The British chided the Americans for lacking the courage to put troops on the ground. The North Atlantic alliance – not to mention the so called “special relationship” between Britain and the US – was under strain as never before.345

345 Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, 352
To preserve the alliance, the British agreed to an ultimatum that demanded the Bosnian Serbs withdraw from Goražde no later than April 23 and heavy artillery was to be withdrawn no later than April 26. The Clinton administration was finally leading NATO to action. However, before any NATO air attack occurred, Rose negotiated a settlement with the Bosnian Serbs. They would withdraw their forces from Goražde, and UN troops from Britain and Ukraine would patrol a demilitarized zone between the belligerents.

During the Goražde crisis, Dole went on the offensive. In an April 1994 speech to a group of Republican voters in Elmira, New York, Dole claimed that the “United States, together with NATO, is on the verge of losing its credibility in world affairs.”346 He reiterated the point in a press release a few days later: “Among the casualties of continued Serbian defiance and aggression in Bosnia, are the credibility of the United Nations, NATO, and finally, the United States.”347 From Dole’s perspective, the US did not need permission from the UN or NATO to establish a policy on Bosnia. He noted that Clinton wanted to lift the arms embargo, but did nothing to lead NATO towards the policy. Dole’s basic argument was that US flip-flopping on the issue was a basic abdication of global leadership.348 Elite members of the press seemed to agree with Dole on his point about the lack of US leadership on Bosnia.

In a CNN televised “Global Forum,” reporter Christiane Amanpour presented Clinton a very tough question concerning his Bosnia policy:

Mr. President, it’s a privilege to address you from Sarajevo. You tonight just said that Bosnia was just a humanitarian catastrophe. Surely, sir, you would agree it is so much more than that. Why in the absence of a policy have you allowed the US and the West to be held hostage to those who do have a clear policy—the Bosnian Serbs—and do you not think the constant flip-flops of your administration on the issue of Bosnia sets a dangerous precedent and leads people to take you less seriously than you would like to be taken?

Clearly agitated by the temerity of the question in such a public forum, Clinton provided a defensive response to the question:

No, but speeches like that make them take me less seriously than I like to be taken. There have been no constant flip-flops, madam. I ran for president saying that I would do my best to limit ethnic cleansing and to see the United States play a more active role in resolving the problem in Bosnia. And we have been much more active than my predecessor was in every way from the beginning. I also said very clearly that I did not believe we should inject American ground forces on the ground in Bosnia to try to affect the strategic outcome, to take part in the civil war.349

Clinton’s frustrated response in this exchange seems to reveal that he was indeed feeling the pressure of so much negative press coverage of his Bosnia policy. He went on in his response to highlight the NATO rejection of his proposal to end the arms embargo, his initiative to enforce the “no-fly” zone, and the deployment of US troops to Macedonia to prevent the spread of the conflict. Clinton closed his answer by saying he was doing the best he could and that “air power cannot change the course of the civil war either.” As it turned out, air power turned out to be the very thing that stopped the civil war. In any case, Clinton was also receiving pressure from domestic organizations to ensure that his policies did not interfere with Russian withdrawal from the Baltics.

Although Clinton did not mention it specifically in his response to Amanpour, the Baltics issue was creating a lot of domestic political pressure for his administration. Much of this pressure emanated from the political activities of special interest groups in the US. Organizations such as the American Latvian Association in the United States, the Joint Baltic American National Committee, and the Estonian American National Council were sending letters to the White House arguing their case for Clinton to ensure troop withdrawals. The Latvian group requested the president to “firmly and unequivocally state the commitment of the US government to the sovereignty and independence of Latvia and her Baltic brethren, Estonia and Lithuania.” Similarly, the joint committee asked Clinton to “demand that Russia live up to its commitment to an early, orderly and complete withdrawal by August 31, 1994.” While it is no surprise that such groups sent letters, it is interesting to note that Clinton felt the need to respond to these letters reiterating his “strong support for Baltic freedom, security and prosperity.” As is covered in Chapter Four, this commitment had limitations, but Clinton was keen to not do anything that might interrupt the redeployment of Russian troops from the Baltics.

Clinton wanted the Russian troops out of Estonia and Latvia by August 31, 1994. To achieve this objective, he was willing to cut a deal to achieve the objective. Clinton invited Yeltsin to an April G-7 conference in Naples to get him to agree to the August date in exchange for admission to the G-7. Yeltsin agreed to a bilateral deal with Latvia to withdraw before August 31 just prior to coming to Naples; therefore, the only unresolved issue was in Estonia. In private meetings, Clinton thought he had secured an agreement; but in a press conference

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350 Correspondence between Bill Clinton and Baltic Special Interest Groups, June-July 1994, William Jefferson Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, Arkansas, Series 1036F, Box 5, Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, Arkansas.
announcing Russia’s ascension into the G-7, Yeltsin was asked if Russia would indeed withdraw from the Estonia by August 31. He responded that he would not in fact order the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltics. Goldgeier and McFaul point out that Yeltsin’s Baltics position was weakened by the election to the Duma of Russian nationalists:

A major problem for Estonia and Latvia was the deterioration in the Russian political scene during 1993. As Yeltsin was battling his nationalist and pro-Soviet foes in the Russian Supreme Soviet and at the same time trying to keep his military loyal, it was difficult for him politically to do what the West and the Balts wanted on troop withdrawal.

Because of these political pressures, Yeltsin found it difficult to make a public announcement about withdrawal from Estonia. After the press conference, Clinton and Talbott informed Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev that Russian incorporation into important economic forums was off the table if there was no withdrawal from Estonia. Under such political pressure, Yeltsin met Estonian President Lennart Meri in July and agreed to the August date. The Baltics issue was solved, which freed up Clinton’s freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis the Balkans. The Russian concession was just in time because the pressure to do more in Bosnia was increasing.

On May 10, 1994, Dole responded to Clinton’s assertion that British and French agreement was a basis for lifting the arms embargo:

The participation of British and French troops in UNPROFOR is the main reason the British and French object to lifting the embargo. Well, the answer is simple: remove UNPROFOR troops. And, until all UNPROFOR troops have been evacuated, threaten the Bosnian Serbs with NATO air strikes if any UNPROFOR troops are taken hostage or harmed, and be prepared to follow-through.

Dole’s logic in this statement was straightforward. The allies did not want to cooperate in a substantive military campaign to end the violence in Bosnia because they had troops on the ground as part of UNPROFOR. However, UNPROFOR was completely unable to fulfill its mandate to protect United Nations Safe Areas; therefore, there would be no real loss should NATO nations remove their forces from UNPROFOR in protest to US unilateral action. Dole felt there was no legitimate excuse for Clinton’s inaction in Bosnia.

At this point, the Clinton administration knew that there would never be a peace agreement unless the US was directly leading negotiations. Thus, the administration established the Contact Group to settle the questions. Very much akin to traditional great power management, the Contact Group was comprised of the United Kingdom, Russia, France, Germany, and the United States. If the UN and EU could not push the peace initiative forward to a successful conclusion, then the most powerful countries in Europe would need to get involved. Acknowledging his success on brokering the Bosnian-Croat peace deal, Clinton assigned Redman as the lead negotiator within the Contact Group, but he and the representatives from the other countries soon discovered what Vance, Owen, and Stoltenberg had learned for the past two years. Peace in the Balkans was elusive without the threat of military action.

The Contact Group developed a peace plan that gave fifty-one percent of contested territory to the Muslim-Croat federation and the rest to the Bosnian Serbs. The most challenging aspect of the plan was that the Bosnian Serbs had to be convinced to give up seventy percent of the territory they had seized up to that point. Under threats from international economic sanctions, Milošević was completely onboard with the Contact Group plan. When the

355 Ibid., 337.
Vance-Owen Peace Plan was being debated a year earlier, he had pushed the Bosnian Serbs to accept the plan. This time Milošević went so far as to threaten a complete embargo against Bosnian Serbs if they did not cooperate. Serbia, at least publicly, would cut off all its support to the Bosnian Serb military. Despite this pressure from their ally, the Bosnian Serb intransigence on the peace process remained a constant.

Dole disagreed with the Contact Group’s peace proposal because it rewarded the Bosnian Serbs by allowing them to unjustly hold seized territory. Even if there were no moral snags, Dole argued that there was no enforcer who was willing “to make the Bosnian Serbs withdraw from 70 percent of Bosnia to 49 percent as proposed by the so-called contact group.” Unless there was a credible threat for the use of force, there would never be a successful implementation of any peace plan, and NATO’s unwillingness to use force was marginalized.

In a June 9, 1994 testimony before Congress, Talbott, Shalikashvili, and Perry defended the Clinton administration’s Bosnia policy. The representatives communicated four objectives they were trying to achieve: 1) limit the intensity of the violence, 2) limit the spread of the violence, 3) mitigate the effects of the violence through humanitarian assistance, and 4) reach a negotiated settlement. Then the administration officials recalled what they viewed as successes to date, which included a successful enforcement of the “no fly” zone, the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and the protection of NATO through close air support.

The testimony then addressed Dole’s policy arguing for a unilateral lift of the arms embargo. If the US pursued a unilateral lift policy, the situation on the ground would not improve, and the Russians would not cooperate to constrain Bosnian Serb aggression. US

leadership in NATO would be compromised as policies conflicted. UNPROFOR might withdraw early requiring US military to provide support, and the Bosnian war would be suddenly Americanized. Finally, they acknowledged that Russian domestic politics was a part of their concern: “Our relations with Russia would also be seriously damaged. The Russian parliament has strong pro-Serb sentiments and has already voted to lift the sanctions regime against Serbia unilaterally if the US unilaterally lifts the arms embargo.” The best course of action was to continue to set the conditions for the Contact Group’s peace plan to succeed. When the peace plan was presented to the Bosnian Serb parliament, the concerns of Dole turned out to be justified.

The Contact Group peace plan met the same demise as previous plans. There were allegations that Milošević had stabbed the Bosnian Serbs in the back and that accepting the plan would be disastrous. On August 3, 1994, the Bosnian Serb parliament once again deferred the decision to a public referendum knowing it would be rejected. Milošević was furious, and he ostensibly initiated the embargo against the Bosnian Serbs. When the referendum occurred on August 28, 1994, the peace plan was rejected.358

Critical Security Decision: Intervene in Bosnia

In the 1994 mid-term presidential elections, the Democrats suffered a historic loss when both houses of the US Congress passed to the Republicans. In foreign policy terms, it was a devastating setback for Clinton. According to Halberstam, these Republicans were led by a young Georgia representative named Newt Gingrich, and “they represented a complete break

357 Strobe Talbott, William Perry, and Shalikashvili testimony to the House of Representatives, June 9, 1994, Series 0994 F Box 20, Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, Arkansas.

358 Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, 335–344.
with the Republican Party of the past, particularly those Republicans who had been part of a bipartisan coalition in foreign policy." This new breed of Republican was more than willing to use foreign policy as a political weapon. Dole was certainly a nuisance, but his party did not control Congress. Republican control of the Congress meant that they could enact legislation that inhibited Clinton’s European security objectives. Now, both Clinton and Yeltsin had vocal oppositions in control of their respective legislatures. This would have adverse effects on the US-Russian security cooperation. In terms of the Balkans, the loss increased pressure on Clinton to get his European security policy sorted.

After the failure of Contact Group’s peace plan, Clinton demanded a new policy from his national security team, and his National Security Adviser, Tony Lake, developed a much more aggressive policy called the Endgame Strategy. In many ways, the Endgame Strategy adopted many of the Dole’s proposals. First, the US would advocate for the removal of the completely ineffective UNPROFOR. Second, the US would insist on a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo; and, if resisted, communicate to NATO allies a willingness to do so unilaterally. Third, the US would approach the allies with a demand to use air power to bring peace to the Balkans. Unlike Christopher’s trip the previous year, this time the US exerted its leadership. Finally, the Serbians were given an ultimatum to agree to the Contact Group plan or face the full brunt of NATO air power. No more pinpricks like the Goražde engagement. This time NATO would launch a substantive air campaign and achieve its strategic objectives in the Balkans.  

Halberstam relates that Lake pitched the “endgame strategy” directly to Clinton in June 1994, and he immediately agreed to the strategy.

359 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 298.
360 Ibid., 309–314.
NSC meeting notes reflect the change in tone inside the Clinton administration. In a July 27, 1994 NSC principles meeting, Lake charged Christopher to approach the Contact Group to let them know that “we will move sooner rather than later to seek multilaterally lifting the arms embargo, and failing that, there will be irresistible pressures to lift unilaterally.”361 Also, the State Department would “develop a strategy to increase high-level US pressure on the British to accede to our view concerning tightening of economic sanctions.”362 In the same meeting, a few weeks later in the same meeting the language was even tougher:

Planning should focus on the development of robust air options, including the use of air power for tactical, punitive, deterrent, or other purposes. Planning should include options for responses to Bosnian Serb action against the eastern enclaves, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and elsewhere. Scenarios should include: 1) air options following complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and 2) air strike options within the context of a remaining, reconfigured UNPROFOR presence following lift. Planning should assume action in the NATO context, or within a coalition of willing allies.363

On October 18, 1994, the NSC principles agreed to circulate a resolution through the Security Council calling for a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, and they agreed to support the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment, passed the previous August, to cease US military enforcement of the arms embargo if the Bosnian Serbs did not agree to the Contact Group peace plan by November 15.364

362 Ibid.
364 Notes from NSC Principles Meeting, October 18, 1993, Clinton Presidential Digital Library, Declassified Documents,
The Endgame Strategy was indeed a departure from the previous policy, and it was being systematically implemented over the fall. With Yeltsin’s political situation somewhat secure, if not weakened, in Russia and troops removed from the Baltics, Clinton’s team was setting the conditions for NATO to engage in a substantive military intervention. However, before they could fully implement their strategy, former President Jimmy Carter became involved.

Sensing that the US was increasing its pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić invited Jimmy Carter to Bosnia in December to discuss getting the peace negotiation restarted within the context of the Contact Group. Most people thought the trip was a terrible idea. Dole released a press statement calling on Carter to reject the trip because “Karadžić is not interested in peace, but in public relations and buying time to consolidate his gains in Bosnia through more ethnic cleansing.”365 Despite concerns from Washington DC, Carter went on the trip, and he negotiated a four-month ceasefire ostensibly to provide space to restart negotiations.

The Carter negotiated ceasefire ended in May 1995 when Bosnian Serbs violated the exclusion zone around Sarajevo; however, there was no reluctance from NATO this time around. They immediately bombed targets in Pale in response. However, General Mladić took several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage, and he used them as human shields to stop the bombing. In July 1995, Mladić then began an offensive on Srebrenica with the intention of finishing what was started two years prior.366 In response, NATO aircraft engaged the Bosnian Serb forces, but they

stopped when Mladić threatened to kill 50 hostages. After a small contingent of Dutch UN peacekeepers assigned to protect a UN safe area in Srebrenica was overrun, General Mladić’s forces rounded up more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims and had them executed. It was the worst humanitarian disaster in Europe since the Holocaust. After two years of barely holding out, Srebrenica was now in control of the Bosnian Serbs. \textsuperscript{367} Outrage over Srebrenica was intense, especially with the newly elected French president.

A veteran of the French army in Algeria, Chirac was furious about the humiliation of the French soldiers serving with UNPROFOR. He was especially upset with the lack of leadership coming from within NATO. \textsuperscript{368} In a June 1995 speech, he publicly proclaimed that “the Atlantic Alliance has no leader,” and he demanded an increase in the US and UK military commitment to stopping atrocities in Bosnia or he would push to withdraw the entire 39,000 strong UNPROFOR. \textsuperscript{369} In the absence of leadership, Chirac took charge, and he worked with the British to create a Rapid Reaction Force should it be needed to evacuate the UNPROFOR from Bosnia. At a G-7 conference in Halifax, he forcefully brought up the issue of Bosnia even though it was not on the agenda. Chirac’s aggressive posture on Bosnia was the tipping point for provoking the Clinton administration to insist on NATO military action. The idea of France usurping the US leadership role, even if only as public relations gesture, was too much. Thus, when a Bosnian Serb shell landed for a second time in a Sarajevo market killing 37 people in

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August 1995, the US insisted that NATO immediately launch Operation Deliberate Force.

Instead of the pinprick strikes of the previous years, this was a substantive air campaign with waves of NATO aircraft bombing selected targets in Bosnia. In their excellent history of the war, Silber and Little recount the scale of the attack:

In a two week campaign, NATO flew 3,400 sorties, including 750 attack missions against 56 ground targets. Ammunition stores, anti-aircraft batteries, radar installations, communications facilities, warehouses, artillery units, command bunkers and bridges were destroyed. The result was to cripple Bosnian Serb communications and temporarily incapacitate their ability to respond to reinforce. Even the civilian telephone system was knocked out.

Remembering how his council was ignored in the Bosnian Serb parliament during the debate over the previously rejected peace agreements. Milošević refused to assist the Bosnian Serbs. From Milošević’s perspective, they had brought the bombings on themselves. When General Mladić finally removed all the heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, the air campaign stopped, and the pathway was opened to the Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War.

Yeltsin was furious over the bombing of Bosnian Serbs, and, more importantly, the flexing of NATO’s muscle in Russia’s backyard. According to Strobe Talbott, Yeltsin fired off a letter calling the air campaign murder and threatening an expansion of the war. Russia, however, was diminishing in Clinton’s weighting of priorities in foreign policy. Despite Clinton’s backing of Yeltsin in every possible way, he was still losing politically to the communist and nationalists. Clinton had not yet given up on Yeltsin, but the reality of the political situation in Russia was hard to ignore. Also, Clinton had secured the removal of all

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370 Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, 366.
Russian troops from the Baltic states, which was a major objective of the administration. In short, the need to support Yeltsin was less in the fall of 1995 than it was in the winter of 1993.

**Conclusion**

As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, prospect theory argues that there is an asymmetry between the perception of losses and gains. The asymmetry is rooted in the fact that people will work hard to avoid loss and less to achieve gains when presented with some reference point. In some cases, the reference point is merely the status quo that people will work hard to maintain. In others, the reference point is a gain for which people will put some amount of effort into achieving, but they are more willing to sacrifice gains when the cost increases. Prospect theory’s loss aversion logic provides a helpful lens for examining Clinton’s Bosnia policy from 1993 to 1995.

When he came to office in January 1993, Clinton had two competing aspirations. On one hand, he sincerely desired to achieve gains relative the status quo in Bosnia by stopping the Serbs, whether through peace or through negotiated settlement, from committing atrocities against the Muslim population. On the other hand, he wanted to maintain the status quo in Russia, which was a transitioning democratic regime, friendly to the West, and moving toward free-market capitalism. However, Clinton soon realized that Yeltsin and his reform-minded aides were not securely entrenched in Russia and achieving gains in Bosnia threatened the status quo in Russia.

When faced with losing the status quo in Russia in 1993, Clinton effectively abandoned a policy that would achieve gains in Bosnia. He was more concerned about maintaining Yeltsin’s

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372 Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 300-309.
political survival. The prospect of losing the status quo in Russia loomed larger than the prospect of achieving gains in Bosnia. However, as events became ever more tragic in Bosnia, the political pressure generated from the media, political opponents, and interest groups began to threaten US leadership of NATO. Given the importance of NATO in US security policy, preserving the status quo of NATO trumped the preservation of the status quo in Russia. Regardless of the consequences with Yeltsin, Clinton decided to exert US leadership with Lake’s Endgame Strategy, which eventually resulted in Operation Deliberate force and the end of the Bosnian War. In the following years, Clinton would surely continue his support of Yeltsin, but this support was tempered by a protection of NATO’s prestige.
Chapter 4 - Enlargement

As was mentioned in Chapter One, Kahneman’s prospect theory relies heavily on the notion of an “endowment effect,” which posits that humans have a self-preservation heuristic that increases the probability that a person will choose a satisficing endowment over the possibility of an improved situation. Bush and Clinton protected the forty-year NATO endowment by advocating for German reunification in NATO and intervening in Bosnia even though both actions were opposed to the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation. Although both presidents were sensitive to how these decisions affected the political prospects of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the “loss aversion” heuristic dominated their decision-making. In the end, they chose to protect the NATO endowment over the possibility of ending the East-West rivalry.

Over the course of his presidency, Clinton and his national security team expanded the NATO endowment to include the recently democratized Central and Eastern European (former Soviet satellites) states and the Newly Independent States (former Soviet republics). The Clinton administration wanted to use the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as bridging mechanisms to satisfy Russian security concerns and create an integrated European security structure. However, they soon realized that Russian security fears and their domestic instability made this integration difficult.

From a security perspective, Russia never really trusted the PfP program. Despite Clinton’s assurances that the PfP and eventual NATO membership was as open to the Newly Independent States (NIS), including Russia, as it was to the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, hardliners within the government saw it as a mechanism to dismember the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and isolate Russia. The disagreement came down to two different points of emphasis: method vs. pace. The Russians complained about the method of enlargement in that it occurred piecemeal. They could not understand why the US would not support the simultaneous membership of all the CEE states and the NIS. From the US perspective, the unanimous assent requirement of NATO members necessitated a gradual or piecemeal approach to enlargement—linking membership to democratic and economic reforms with membership. Based on the fact that some countries were further along in the transformation process than others, enlargement would only occur in a piecemeal fashion. Clinton was sensitive to Yeltsin’s political situation, and he elected to delay enlargement until after Yeltsin’s 1996 reelection campaign. Thus, Clinton tried to use the pace of enlargement to mitigate Russian concerns over method. However, anti-democratic events occurring in Russia decreased Clinton’s trust in the democratic prospects of Russia and diminished his vision of an integrated European security structure.

The democratic transformation of Russia began to decline after the December 1993 parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum. Although Yeltsin’s constitution was approved, ultra-nationalists and communists gained a strong foothold in the government and pushed Yeltsin towards hardline policies. The first victims of the reactionaries in the Russian government were the reformers. Because of the electoral success of the hardliners, Yeltsin was forced to remove pro-Western politicians such as Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. In their place, more hardline officials such as Victor Chernomyrdin, Yevgeny Primakov, and Pavel Grachev increased their influence. Although the Russians still worked with NATO as a matter of self-interest, these politicians influenced Yeltsin to enter into a politically disastrous war in Chechnya, in which indiscriminate bombing of civilians was an
accepted tactic and to resist NATO enlargement. These actions caused the US and the broader international community to worry about how committed the Russians were to democracy. Due to these events in Russia, Clinton’s “loss aversion” priority shifted from maintaining democratic reforms in both the CEE states and the NIS to solely protecting CEE states from Russian revanchism. To this end, enlargement ceased to be a bridging mechanism to an integrated European security structure and became a necessity to protect the CEE states, which were now a part of the expanded NATO endowment.

Loss Aversion 7: Protecting New Democracies

After NATO’s successful intervention in Bosnia, exogenous pressures caused the Clinton administration to incorporate the future of the CEE states into the legacy NATO security endowment. As might be expected, the initial pressure came from the leaders of CEE states themselves. On the eve of Yeltsin’s April 1993 referendum, Lech Wałęsa of Poland, Václav Havel of the Czech Republic, and Árpád Göncz of Hungary were visiting Washington DC to celebrate the grand opening of the Holocaust Museum. During the several days they were in town, each leader visited Clinton in the Oval Office to make his pitch for the inclusion of their respective countries into NATO. The message from each leader was the same. Basing their opinions on their respective historical experiences, they had little faith that Russia was permanently reformed, and they were concerned that Clinton was focusing too much on assisting Russia. They urged Clinton to focus more on the CEE states because, as Estonian President Lennart Meri related in a conversation with Talbott, “Russia was a malignancy in remission; the Yeltsin era was at best a fleeting opportunity to be seized before Russia relapsed into
authoritarianism at home and expansion abroad.” In his meeting with Clinton, Havel pointed out that the Czech Republic was transforming itself from its communist past and embracing privatization and democracy. “We now want,” he insisted, “to focus on entering NATO and the EC because we see ourselves as Europeans who embrace European values. The Czech Republic wants to help implant these values in the center of Europe.” From each leader’s perspective, security in Europe could only be guaranteed with his country’s accession to the NATO alliance.

Although Clinton sympathized with their requests, he knew that pursuing NATO expansion would put Boris Yeltsin in a vulnerable position and endanger democratic reform in Russia. Clinton was interested in incorporating CEE states into NATO, but he also valued the democratic gains occurring in Russia. Thus, any efforts for enlargement should occur, if possible, in a way that did not offend Russian sensibilities. In contrast to Clinton’s aspirations to move beyond Cold War assumptions, the leaders of these states had a dichotomous view of the region: Russia versus the CEE states. Clinton agreed with Wałęsa, Havel, and Göncz that supporting democracy in Central Europe was important as it continued its transformation. However, he was not as pessimistic about the future of Russia. Clinton told Wałęsa that US policy was focused on supporting “all countries [including Russia] that are standing up for freedom,” and he “did not believe Russia at present is too strong.” Clinton informed Wałęsa that his administration wanted to facilitate democratic transformation in Russia and the CEE states. He did, however, acknowledge Wałęsa’s concern: “I hear your central message: Do not put all our eggs in one basket.”

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373 Lennart Meri quoted by Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 162.
Another pressure point came from domestic groups within the US who represented Eastern European diasporas and were well connected in Washington DC foreign policy circles. Groups such as the American Latvian Association, Estonian American National Council, Joint Baltic American National Council, the Lithuanian American Community and the Lithuanian American Council were active in their direct lobbying of the White House. As recounted in the previous two chapters, these groups were influential in lobbying Bush and Clinton to pressure Gorbachev and Yeltsin for the permanent withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states. When Clinton successfully negotiated the removal of Russian troops in August 1994, the US-Baltic activists redoubled their lobbying efforts for the inclusion of the Baltic states into the NATO security structure. Although these groups would eventually see their objectives realized, success was slow. In fact, the Baltic states would not join NATO until 2004, and this slow process, as will be demonstrated below, had much to do with Russian domestic politics.

A final source of pressure for enlargement came from influential politicians and foreign policy professionals who used opinion editorials to criticize Clinton’s approach. As might be expected, much of this criticism came from Republican commentators such as Robert Dole and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. However, Democratic Party pundits such as Zbigniew Brzezinski were also advocating for accelerated enlargement. Under these pressures, Clinton directed his team to develop an official CEE policy.

In July 1993, Clinton’s National Security Adviser Anthony Lake initiated an interagency working group to execute Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 36, which was a US policy review of European security. This review established the Clinton policy of enlargement. According to the security section of PRD 36, the US had made “great strides in” normalizing relations with the new states in Europe. However, “the collapse and fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the USSR have forced us to react to emergencies at the expense of long-range plans.” Since economically successful democracies tend to be more stable, the “principal post-Cold War foreign policy goal is the ‘enlargement’ of the community of free market democracies.” To prevent the instability associated with “ultra-nationalism, ethnic conflict, chaos, war or massive flows of refugees,” the US must make the “former Soviet Republics and Western Europe/NATO” a top priority. 376 With this guidance from the president, the group began its work to develop official policy, but the idea of enlargement was not universally accepted within the administration.

The enlargement of NATO was a contentious subject within the Clinton administration. Tony Lake and his staff were strongly in favor of enlargement, and they wanted to announce a “fast track” process at the January 1994 NATO summit for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 377 Les Aspin and the Pentagon were against the entire concept of enlargement because they worried about the military readiness of the new members, and they also worried that enlargement would antagonize the Russians. In his memoir, Talbott claims he was somewhere in the middle about enlargement, but he certainly leaned toward Aspin’s position

377 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 97.
because he understood the consequences of expansion for the Russian reformers. Talbott’s opinions were influenced through his interactions with Mamedov, who made it clear that any movement towards enlargement in 1994 would be catastrophic for US-Russian relations and reform efforts within Russia.

To reconcile this disagreement, the Pentagon proposed in the summer of 1993 a new program known as Partnership for Peace (PfP), which “would bring officers and units from NATO, the former Warsaw Pact and the ranks of the neutrals together for joint planning, exercises and peacekeeping missions.”378 The reception given to the PfP proposal was mixed. The CEE states viewed it as an inadequate half measure. On the other hand, the Russians viewed PfP as a great compromise that avoided NATO expansion. In October 1993, Warren Christopher and Strobe Talbott flew to Moscow to explain to Yeltsin the decision to pursue the PfP initiative, and Talbott relates that Yeltsin responded with a euphoric “Brilliant! Terrific! Tell Bill this is a wonderful decision!”379 He believed that PfP was a replacement for the policy of enlargement. Christopher and Talbott tried to explain that PfP was only a temporary measure before actual enlargement. It was a transitional measure, but the goal was still enlargement. However, given the upcoming Dumas election and constitutional referendum, Yeltsin was only concerned that enlargement was not be happening in 1994.

When the final version of PRD 36 was delivered to Clinton in December 1993, the US policy of incorporating CEE states into the already established NATO security endowment became official. The document acknowledged in the first paragraphs that the CEE states were an expansion of the already established endowment when it suggested that “four decades of US

378 Ibid., 98.
policy in Central and Eastern Europe bore fruit in the revolutions of 1989, which attained the ultimate aim set forth in NSC 58, the policy directive of 1949.\textsuperscript{380} NSC 58 was the US policy for resisting Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe. Now that the Soviets were out of the CEE states, the US must embark on a new policy that protected the gains because “failure would be a blow to Western—including American—values.” Enlarging the “community of free market democracies” was the best means for ensuring European stability. From this point forward, NATO was no longer constrained within Western European security interests. Now, NATO was concerned about the security of all Europe. At this point, the document attempted to describe how, as Talbott articulates in his memoir, “to find ways of breaking down the suspicions and stereotypes of the Cold War and building cooperation between NATO and all the former Warsaw Pact countries, including Russia.”\textsuperscript{381} Thus, PRD 36 outlined an intricate strategic agenda to reconcile the differences.

**Decision: Institutional Integration of East-West**

The document divided Europe into three different categories: 1) Western Europe, 2) Central and Eastern Europe (non-combatants in the ex-Yugoslav Bosnia conflict, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania), and 3) the New Independent States (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova). The US’s desired outcome was a “strategy of integration” of all three categories that would replace Cold War security assumptions. To do this, Clinton’s national security team envisioned a gradual process because the “integration of the CEE states will not be attainable


\textsuperscript{381} Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 92–93.
overnight (and, as we have already decided with respect to NATO, can only be the end of an evolutionary process that potentially embraces Russia, Ukraine, and other NIS).” By including Russia and the NIS as potential members, the Clinton policymakers believed they avoided drawing old lines. From their perspective, European security was not “a choice between our strategic interests with Russia and our interests in Central and Eastern Europe.” On the contrary, the Clinton administration viewed these interests as reconcilable—despite the misgivings of the stakeholders in the CEE and/or NIS countries. However, the US would not “give Russia a veto power over our CEE policy.” In this paradoxical perspective, the US was unconcerned about how the Russians viewed the strategy of integration, but the ostensible long-term goal was nothing less than “a common Euro-Atlantic security system in which relationships among Eastern states are as stable and peaceful as among most NATO members.” Therefore, to avoid Russian resistance, the policymakers identified three bridging mechanisms that would help Russia accept the integration of CEE states until, in some unspecified future, the NIS states, to include Russia, were ready for admission.

First, the PfP initiative would augment the already established North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to ameliorate Russian concerns about NATO encirclement. Through the PfP, Russia and NATO would cooperate in “a more dynamic role . . . in peacekeeping and crisis-management” operations. Unfortunately for the Clinton administration, the Russians were only interested in PfP unless it was a replacement for the enlargement of NATO. The Russian concern was expressed to Les Aspin in a January 1994 telephone conversation with Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev. In that conversation, Grachev expressed Russian support for the PfP initiative, but he was firmly opposed to the enlargement of NATO. From the Russian perspective, NATO enlargement was a faulty premise “based on a
bloc mentality and unbased fears of the ‘imperial ambitions’ of Russia.” Instead, the Russians wanted, according to Grachev, “an all-European process for security.” The Russian position had not changed since Gorbachev lobbied Bush in 1990 for an “all-European” process. To address Russian desires for an “all-European” process, the Clinton national security team, like the Bush administration, articulated in PRD 36 an enhanced role for the CSCE.

An enhanced role for the CSCE was the second bridging mechanism for consolidating the interests of the NIS, the CEE, and Western Europe. After acknowledging the “limitations of the CSCE,” the PRD 36 noted that the US could still give the organization the “political backing it needs and improve its tools for oversight of compliance and for moral suasion.” Thus, with no enforcement mechanism other than US “political backing,” the CSCE would use its “moral suasion” to serve “as the pan-European instrument of choice for conflict-prevention and crisis management in situations not requiring military action.” The problem with this approach was that the CSCE was already filling that role. From the Russian perspective, the fact that the CSCE had no jurisdiction on military action relegated it to a meaningless discussion forum. Despite Russian concerns about how NATO’s continued existence undercut what the CSCE might become, the Clinton team envisioned the CSCE as the organization for managing European crisis situations. However, in situations requiring military action, member states were to “turn to NATO, members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), or the Western European Union,” which excluded the Russians.

In this way, the PRD 36 identified the NACC as the third bridging mechanism in the new European security structure. Established by the Bush administration on the precipice of Gorbachev’s resignation in December 1991, the NACC was another deliberative body in which Russia could voice its concerns about NATO action. However, Russia had no voting power. Russian participation was voluntary, and it had no real voice in decisions it did not agree with. Thus, when the Clinton national security team identified the NACC as the source for military cooperation on European security problems, they were choosing an approach that was unacceptable to the Russians. Therefore, the Clinton administration’s three bridge approach for enlarging NATO was a flawed policy based on imaginary assumptions about Russia’s willingness to be relegated to a secondary role. The policy was further hampered by the Clinton administration’s disregard for its inherently irreconcilable contradiction of enlarging NATO while supporting democratic reformers in Russia.

Despite these difficulties, Clinton announced his enlargement policy in a January 1994 speech at the NATO Brussels summit. In the speech, he called on Europe to “join in building the new security for the 21st Century.” Clinton acknowledged, as outlined in PRD 36, that “many institutions will play a role” in the new security, but he made clear that “NATO, history’s greatest military alliance, must be central to that process.” In this way, he articulated a new policy that was founded on the principle of maintaining the NATO security endowment. Clinton then explained the PfP as a bridging mechanism that “will advance a process of evolution for NATO’s formal enlargement . . . This partnership will build new bonds of cooperation among militaries of East and the West.”

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Prague: “It is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how.”\textsuperscript{384} From Clinton’s perspective, the “when” of the equation was in some distant future after each country spent time in the PfP.

Clinton was eager to explain to Yeltsin that enlargement would be an evolutionary process in which Russia might also eventually participate. However, when he tried to discuss the details of his enlargement strategy with Yeltsin in Moscow a few days after the Brussels speech, Clinton received a cold response. Yeltsin waited until the press conference to make his position known. He did not want the process to occur in a piecemeal fashion in a way that would “dismember us.” Instead, he wanted an integration process that occurred “in just one package” because it would “make everyone more secure.” When the press turned to Clinton, he simply stated that PfP was “the real thing now” and enlargement was a future project. Clinton knew he had much to do to convince Yeltsin to accept PfP as a first step towards enlargement.\textsuperscript{385} At this point, however, NATO still had several questions to resolve. What were the entrance requirements? What states would be first to be admitted? What was the timetable for everything? Clinton and his team knew these questions needed to be answered, but they were not in a hurry to answer them. This was a calculated ambiguity that they hoped would let the issue ride while issues related to Russian domestic politics, the Bosnian War, and Ukrainian nuclear weapons were worked out.\textsuperscript{386}

Critics of the president were quick to portray Clinton’s evolutionary approach to the enlargement of NATO as weakness. As he had done over the hesitation to intervene in Bosnia,  

\textsuperscript{384} Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, Amazon Kindle location 314 of 1249; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 187.
\textsuperscript{385} Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, Amazon Kindle location 324 of 1249.
\textsuperscript{386} James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 188.
Dole criticized Clinton’s lack of leadership. On January 24, 1994, Dole articulated his position when he gave the Republican response to Clinton’s State of the Union address:

In the Cold War, for millions behind the Iron Curtain, and in the many nations that depended on us to protect them, it was, again, only because of strong American leadership that freedom prevailed. And now, as countries that were tyrannies learn democracy, as people learn about free markets where a short time ago buying and selling without the state’s permission was illegal, the world again wants and needs strong American leadership, so that freedom will endure. Many times over the past few years, right here in this office, I’ve met with representative the new emerging democracies. Some were leaders. Some were ordinary citizens. Some had been in jail for many years. Some were ordinary citizens. And they all told me about the same thing. They all said that “We want to be like America.”

Just like it had done on the Bosnia policy, the opposition party wanted Clinton to do the very thing he wanted to do -- enlarge NATO. In both circumstances, it was the ultimate irony that Clinton was criticized for not executing his own policy. But Clinton hesitated because he had not given up on Yeltsin and his reformers. He did not want to “lose Russia.”

In September 1994, Yeltsin visited Washington DC for a summit, and Clinton used this opportunity to ease Yeltsin’s concerns over enlargement. As Talbott recalled it, Clinton reassured Yeltsin that Russia would be considered for membership in NATO or have a special status. “So, when we talk about NATO expanding,” Clinton explained, “we’re emphasizing inclusion, not exclusion.” There was no timetable for enlargement, but “it would still take several years until they qualified” and other NATO countries agreed. This was a tacit acknowledgement that Clinton was considering Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential race. Clinton insisted that he did not “wake up every morning thinking only about how to make Warsaw Pact countries

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a part of Russia.” On the contrary, he wanted “to use expansion to advance the broader, higher goal of European security, unity and integration.” Clinton closed the conversation by telling Yeltsin that there would be “no surprises, no rush, and no exclusion.” With these assurances, Yeltsin seemed appeased, and he asked Clinton to attend the CSCE conference in December in Budapest, Hungary. Clinton agreed.

Clearly readying himself for his own presidential bid, Dole gave a September 1994 speech to the members of the National Guard Association of the US in Boston. He chided the Clinton administration for its lack of a national security strategy. Given his criticism of Talbott being too close to the Russians, Dole was probably referring to him when he suggested that the Clinton national security team was full of “individuals [who] pursue their personal agendas, and domestic concerns drive foreign policy. Without leadership at the top, policy drifts along subject to change on a daily or even hourly basis.” Talbott suggests that the administration believed that the attacks in these speeches were effective in helping the Republicans win the majority in the Congress in 1994: “Bob Dole—soon to be the majority leader of the Senate as well as GOP presidential candidate-presumptive in 1996—had been attacking the administration for not moving faster to open the doors of the alliance.” Kozyrev considered Dole, and other members of the Republican Party, anti-Russian hardliners, and he was especially eager to have

388 Bill Clinton quoted by Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 136; James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 189.
390 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 139.
Clinton in Budapest to demonstrate that the US-Russian relationship was strong. However, the event turned out to be a disaster.

**Loss Aversion 8: Protecting CEE from Russian Revanchism**

Only a week prior to the beginning of the CSCE summit, the NATO foreign ministers released a communiqué stating that they would begin a study to determine the particulars of NATO enlargement to be delivered in December 1995.\(^{391}\) Yeltsin interpreted this as an intention to expand NATO in 1995, and he felt Clinton had betrayed his “three no’s” promise form the September summit in Washington DC.\(^{392}\) He used the CSCE summit in Budapest, a summit meant to boost the significance of the CSCE, to vent his frustration on what he considered US overreach. In a speech responding to Clinton’s NATO enlargement agenda, Yeltsin warned that Russia did not want to be excluded from Europe’s post-Cold War security structure, and he worried that the US was dominating the discussion:

> No major country would live in isolation and any country would reject such a game with itself. Why sow the seeds of mistrust? We hear explanations to the effect that [NATO enlargement] is allegedly the expansion of stability, just in case there are undesirable developments in Russia. If the objective is to bring NATO to Russia’s borders, let me say one thing: It is too early to bury a democratic Russia. Europe has not yet freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War and is in danger of plunging into a Cold Peace. History demonstrates that it is a dangerous delusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital.\(^{393}\)

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\(^{391}\) James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 185-188.

\(^{392}\) Ibid., 190–192.

Yeltsin’s so called “Cold Peace” speech was a setback for Clinton. His policy of protecting
democratic gains by including CEE states into NATO was causing him to lose Russia. Thus, the
Clinton national security team decided in late summer 1994 to delay enlargement until after the
1996 presidential elections in Russia. This decision frustrated pundits who were opposed to
waiting for NATO enlargement.

On December 19, 1994, Kissinger wrote an opinion editorial in the Washington Post in
which he linked the failed Bosnia policy to the NATO enlargement debate. According to his
reasoning, NATO’s lack of cohesion on Bosnia was due to “conceptual failures within each of
the allied governments.” The problem, from Kissinger’s perspective, was that NATO failed to
identify a common purpose for action vis-à-vis Bosnia, and this doubt threatened its future
relevancy. He argued that NATO still had a common purpose in maintaining a balance of power
in Europe by enlarging NATO and filling the power vacuum that was created in central Europe
after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Kissinger had disdain for any thought of including
Russia in the alliance:

Russian membership in NATO would dissolve the Atlantic Alliance into just such
a vague system [general collective security system similar to the United Nations] without meeting the security concerns of Europe, especially of Eastern Europe, or of America. It would remove NATO as a shield of Western Europe because the NATO obligation does not run to protecting its members against each other. Instead, it would place NATO’s frontiers at the borders of China. This is why Russian membership in NATO and in the European Union was standard fare in Communist times. NATO expansion represents a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and Russia. 395

394 Talbott, 131.
Kissinger apparently did not consider Russia’s perspective that enlarging NATO would create an imbalance against Russia; nevertheless, he predicted that failure to enlarge NATO would lead to major calamity on the continent as Germany and Russia competed for dominance within the security vacuum.

Although not categorically against Russia’s eventual membership in NATO, Brzezinski followed a similar line of logic in his own opinion editorial in the New York Times a week after Kissinger. In the article, Brzezinski argues that the timidity of the Clinton administration on moving forward with enlargement only weakened the “Westernists” within the Russian government who were “certainly not gaining ground” in the debate. “The most articulate and politically appealing leaders,” Brzezinski suggested, “seem to be those who argue that Russia is destined to exercise geopolitical sway over Eurasia, that it is the embodiment of a distinctive Eurasian identity and that its political status must be asserted—directly in Eurasia and indirectly in Central Europe.” Thus, NATO should enlarge immediately to secure Central Europe, and the question of NATO membership could be addressed after. Hesitation might threaten the very future of NATO, especially if the “Eurasianists” in Russia won the day. Kissinger and Brzezinski were influential voices who were making their opinions known in a very public way. However, the more significant impetus for enlargement came from anti-democratic developments within Russia.

When Boris Yeltsin emerged on the international scene with his June 1991 victory in the Russian presidential election, many observers viewed him as a reform minded democrat. To be sure, this is the narrative that Bill Clinton accepted. Yeltsin’s willingness to recognize the
independence of the Baltic States and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States were essential artifacts in this narrative. His courageous stand against the August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev was arguably the pinnacle of his reputation as a liberal reformer. After the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, his sincere outreach to the West seemed to indicate that Russia was finally on a path to true democratic reform. However, several incidents in Russian politics slowly eroded confidence in Yeltsin’s ability to follow through on his transformation.

The first concern emerged with how Yeltsin dealt with the constitutional crisis in 1993. As described in Chapter Three, Yeltsin was frustrated by resistance to liberal reforms coming from communist and ultraconservative hardliners in the Supreme Soviet. In response, he enacted Presidential Decree 1400 at the end of September 1993, which disbanded the Congress of People’s Deputies—the Russian parliament.396 This wholly undemocratic act prompted New York Times reporter Celestine Bohlen to write a September 1993 article with an ironic title: “Russians See Democracy by Decree.” In the article, she described how Yeltsin was systematically using his decree power to remove democratically elected communist governors because they disagreed with his decision to dissolve congress.397

When Russian communists took control of the parliament building in October 1993 in protest to the decree, Yeltsin used what many observers considered excessive force to retake control of the building. Although there is uncertainty on the exact number of casualties, the consensus is that hundreds were killed. Yeltsin also banned the communist party, which

396 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 123–130.
prompted *The Guardian* newspaper to note that this would “severely limit the options for Russians who oppose Mr. Yeltsin. They will also remove the risk that those unhappy with the government’s tough economic reforms will vote for communists on the model of Poland.”

Yeltsin’s decisions seemed to indicate that he was consolidating power. According to Talbott, Clinton knew that Yeltsin’s response to the coup “was a political setback of considerable proportions and potentially lasting consequences for a leader who claimed, with good reason, to have introduced ‘civilized’ politics to Russia,” but he continued to support Yeltsin because he was preferable to the communist and ultra-nationalist rebels behind the coup attempt.

The second concern centered on the results of the December 1993 elections. As described in detail in Chapter Three, Yeltsin’s Russia’s Choice (RC) party maintained a plurality in the Duma. However, the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the Communist Party, led by Gennady Zyuganov, gained enough seats to overrule the Russia Choice politicians should they unite in opposition. The significance of this election on East-West relations cannot be overstated. Between Yeltsin’s anti-democratic decrees and the success of his radicalized opposition in the elections, people began to wonder if Russia was regressing. Even regular Americans were concerned about this turn of events. One West Virginia constituent of Democrat Senator William Byrd wrote him a letter in June 1994 stating her fear that Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s rise to power would result in “another Holocaust of greater


399 Talbott, Amazon Kindle location 157 of 759.
horror than the last one under Hitler!” By 1994, Yeltsin’s was under extreme pressure from anti-democratic political opponents, and this had negative consequences for his reform team.

Related to the outcome of the elections, the third concern about Russian democracy was the demise of Yeltsin’s pro-Western reformers. As a matter of political expediency, the elections forced Yeltsin to distance himself from politicians who advocated liberal economic reforms and security cooperation with the West. As the politician most closely associated with liberal economic reforms, Yeltsin removed Gaidar as the acting prime minister in December 1992 and replaced him with Chernomyrdin—a politician who was less accommodating to liberal economic reform. Yeltsin hoped to reinstate Gaidar as a deputy with a RC victory in December, but the election results forced Gaidar out for good. However, it was the removal of Andrei Kozyrev as Russia’s foreign minister that proved to be the most significant blow to East-West relations.

The Clinton administration considered Kozyrev a reasonable partner in moving forward with its European security strategy. A member of the RC party, Kozyrev was certainly pro-Western in his outlook. According to Talbott, “Even when toeing the party line, he would find ways of signaling—with a knowing smile, a roll of his eyes, a gentle wisecrack—a hint of irony about the absurdities in which he was required to traffic.” Kozyrev was constantly warning that a tough US foreign policy line would lead to the communist and nationalists taking control of the Russian government. In his memoirs, Talbott suggests that Kozyrev used the threat of Yeltsin losing power to achieve his objectives vis-à-vis US policy. If that was the case, he was unsuccessful given the Bosnian intervention and NATO enlargement policy.

401 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 22.
Because of these perceived setbacks, Russian hardliners in the Duma considered Kozyrev weak and criticized him for his inability to stop NATO’s intervention into Bosnia and the establishment of the enlargement policy. The perception was that Kozyrev was Yeltsin’s front man for his pro-Western policies. According to journalist Alexei Pushkov of the *Moscow Times*, “As long as the Kremlin viewed the United States as a senior friend and was ready to agree with it on nearly everything, Kozyrev could easily promise the Americans to settle certain problems in Moscow and he nearly always succeeded in this.” However, with Yeltsin’s political power undercut by the 1993 elections, Kozyrev “was unable to persuade the president to shift to his position.”

Given Talbott’s assessment of Kozyrev, the perception of Kozyrev as a weak foreign minister may have been correct. However, it was his handling of the Chechen War that eventually cost him his job as foreign minister.

Ever since Peter the Great first conquered Chechnya, the Chechen people resisted rule from Moscow. Throughout the 1920s, the Chechen people fought bitter campaigns to establish their independence only to be met with harsh reprisals from the Communist regime. In the 1940s, Stalin accused the Chechens of collaborating with the Nazis and had more than 500,000 deported to Central Asia. As part of his reform efforts in the 1960s, Khrushchev allowed them to return to their homeland, but the feelings of animosity towards their Soviet masters always remained. To shore up internal support in his struggle against Gorbachev, Yeltsin took a magnanimous tone in 1991, and encouraged all the republics within Russia to increase their

sovereignty. Seeing an opportunity to move closer to independence, the Chechens issued a declaration of state sovereignty in November 1990.

When Yeltsin encouraged Chechens to pursue increased sovereignty, he only meant them to do so within the context of the Russian Federation. However, the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow against Gorbachev tempted Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudayev, a former Soviet air force officer, to make a move towards a complete break from Russia. He and his supporters declared the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush defunct and held a presidential election in October 1991 in which Dudayev was elected president. A few days later, the Chechen legislature passed the Law on State Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic, which was for all intents and purposes a declaration of secession.

The Chechen move towards full independence was indeed more than Moscow intended. In March 1992, the Russian government completed a Federation Treaty that clearly defined the limits of sovereignty within the autonomous republics. From the Russian perspective, signing the treaty was optional, but there would be no bilateral discussions with states that refused to sign. In an interview with the Christian Science Monitor, Russian parliamentarian Ramazan Abdulatipov stated that the new Russia would not be “twisting anyone’s arm. If you don’t want to sign then don’t sign. We don’t see any tragedy to that.” Those autonomous republics who did not sign, however, would remain in Russia under the existing constitution. Thus, the Federation Treaty was essentially a “take it or leave it” ultimatum to the Chechens, and they chose to reject the ultimatum.

404 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 138–144.
405 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 147–150.
From 1992 to 1994, the Chechnya problem devolved into what political scientist Gail Lapidus called “benign but profitable neglect.” During this time, Russian leadership refused to recognize the legitimacy of Dudayev and failed to develop a coherent policy. Meanwhile, Russian politicians profited in various criminal undertakings within the region. However, the December 1993 elections wrought “major changes in the configuration of Yeltsin’s government involving the dismissal or resignation of reformist advisers and the growing influence of a hawkish coalition prompted a shift in policy toward Chechnya.” For economic reasons related to Caspian Sea oil, the hardliners wanted Yeltsin to get the Chechnya situation under control.

To this end, the Russians began a covert campaign, led by the Federal Counterintelligence Service (the successor to the Soviet KGB), to destroy the Chechen opposition. The campaign involved assassination schemes against Dudayev and the establishment of the pro-Russian Chechen Provisional Council (CPC), led by Umar Avturkhanov, which Russia identified as the legitimate transition government. The CPC was secretly provided military equipment to include heavy armor, aircraft, and tanks. Russian officers resigned their commissions and “volunteered” to fight for the CPC. The thinking was that this group would achieve an easy victory in Chechnya, and Russian control would be established. However, when a hastily assembled group of Chechen defenders destroyed the column of “volunteers” in late November, the hopes of an easy victory were dashed. To make matters worse, several of the “Russian volunteers” were captured and humiliated on television. The whole operation was a fiasco.

408 Ibid., 17.
Although they denied knowledge of the operation, the Russian National Security Council, primarily led by Defense Minister Grachev, decided to make the operation overt and sent in regular Russian troops. In his recounting of the decision, Kozyrev claims that he was told the whole operation was a minor affair and would be complete in a week. However, the invasion only coalesced the Chechen population around Dudayev, as he became the defender of the homeland. Men, women, and children armed to block the invasion. In response, the Russians executed indiscriminate bombing over the next two years that “resulted in some 100,000 casualties and 400,000 refugees, one third of the republic’s population.”\textsuperscript{409} Clearly, the expectation of quick victory was proven wrong, and the media coverage of Russian tactics was highly negative.

As the war in Chechnya continued, reports of Russian atrocities began surfacing in international press. The \textit{Christian Science Monitor} reported in February 1995 that Russian soldiers went “on a shooting spree as they searched for weapons, looting enemy houses and burning some of them, according to eyewitnesses.” The report also suggested that the indiscriminate violence and criminality were so bad that Russians living in Chechnya “were ashamed of the Army.”\textsuperscript{410} A British nurse working in Chechnya conveyed to \textit{The Herald}, a Scottish newspaper, that Chechnya was worse than Bosnia and Chechens were “having to eat dog meat” to survive.\textsuperscript{411} The \textit{Philadelphia Inquirer} editorial board picked up on the story and

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\textsuperscript{409} Ibid., 321. \\
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wrote and open letter to Yeltsin that encapsulated international dissatisfaction with the Chechen War:

Dear Boris Nikolayevich—We Americans who lived through the Vietnam War would like to send you a message: Don’t make the mistake of getting bogged down in another guerilla conflict. . . Today, you have the bare beginnings of a democracy. You say it is necessary to keep pieces of the Russian federation, like Chechnya, from seceding, or the ultranationalists will take over. You even say you are winding down the Chechen war. But those who have been on the ground in Chechnya see that, in fact, the war is still raging. You are continuing to bomb civilians in the capital, Grozny, even as spokesman in Moscow say you’ve stopped. Your helicopter gunships are raining rockets down on Chechen villages, even as you say the process of rebuilding Chechnya has started. . . Listen to your generals who have served in Afghanistan and are opposed to your tactics. Boris Nikolayevich, stop the Chechen war. Now.412

These indignant articles fed a narrative that Yeltsin was no democrat and the Russian democratic project was waning. The Washington Post noted that Yeltsin’s decision to intervene in Chechnya had “squandered much of his international prestige and lost considerable moral standing at home.”413 Clearly, opinion leaders in the West did not approve of the war, and Kozyrev received much of the blame among Russian politicians for the negative perceptions. Zyuganov called Kozyrev the “minister of national disgrace,” and Zhirinovsky suggested that Kozyrev be “prosecuted for his crimes.”414 He was replaced in January 1996 by Yevgeny Primakov, and he was Kozyrev’s complete opposite.

In many respects, Primakov was not strictly anti-American in his worldview. He could be more accurately described as a nationalist who believed that “relations between states was competitive, and the bigger the states the more competitive.”\textsuperscript{415} He considered Russia a Eurasian power, and the US was in competition for influence in this area—the so called “near abroad.” Thus, he was not against the US because of its ideals. On the contrary, he was against the US because it happened to be the most powerful competitor. According to Jean Mackenzie of the \textit{Moscow Times}, this outlook made Primakov a popular pick “all across the ideological spectrum.” Indeed, Communist Party’s Gennady Zyuganov, Yeltsin’s most powerful political opponent, praised the choice: “Primakov’s new capacity implies open political efforts to protect Russia’s national interests which were sacrificed to experiments and enemies of our state.” As early as 1993, when he was head of Russia’s foreign intelligence Primakov spoke out against the threat of NATO expansion.\textsuperscript{416} When Primakov assumed his role as Russian foreign minister in 1996, he rejected the idea of US-Russian security cooperation. Instead, he formulated a policy of Russian resistance to the US superpower. Although he would still work with NATO, he would only do so as a suspicious participant.\textsuperscript{417}

Despite Primakov’s appointment as foreign minister, the Chechen War dragged on and became increasingly unpopular. Opinion polls in 1995 suggested that 60 percent of Russians opposed the use of force in Chechnya, and as many as 25 percent were willing to let Chechnya have its independence.\textsuperscript{418} Yeltsin’s popularity was dropping precipitously during this period,

\textsuperscript{415} Strobe Talbott, \textit{The Russia Hand}, 194.
\textsuperscript{416} Herbert J. Ellison, \textit{Boris Yeltsin and Russia’s Democratic Transformation}, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 204.
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid., 197.
\textsuperscript{418} Gail Lapidus, \textit{International Organizations} 23 (1), 21.
“mainly because of widespread revulsion at the violence” in Chechnya. In the spring of 1996, Yeltsin, under much pressure from Clinton, began pushing for an end to the conflict. Eyeing an opportunity for political gain, General Alexander Lebed, a highly respected Soviet era military leader who was critical of the handling of the war, offered to serve as a special envoy to Chechnya for peace negotiations. In July 1996, Lebed successfully negotiated a peace settlement to the conflict, and increased his standing in the minds of the Russian electorate. In this way, the Chechen War was a political disaster for Yeltsin. Although somewhat forced by the hardliners in the Russian government, Yeltsin’s support for the conflict diminished his standing internationally and domestically.

Critical Security Decision: Expand NATO at the Expense of US-Russian Relations

Despite international criticism, Clinton refused to publicly condemn Yeltsin’s decision to prosecute the Chechen War. Clinton seemed to connect with Yeltsin as a kind of kindred political spirit. Talbott records a conversation in which Clinton expressed a deep sense of empathy for Yeltsin’s political situation:

You know, we’ve got to remember that Yeltsin’s got his problems, but he’s a good man. He’s trying to do his best in the face of a lot of problems back home. I think we are going to get this Bosnia deal done, and it’s harder for him than it is for me. I’ve got problems, but nothing like his. We can’t ever forget that Yeltsin drunk is better than most alternatives sober.

In this way, Clinton viewed the situation in relativistic terms. Although Yeltsin’s government was sometimes dictatorial and responsible for atrocities in Chechnya, the situation would be

420 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 141.
421 Bill Clinton quoted by Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 185.
worse if one of his political rivals were in power. Zyuganov would “undermine most market reforms that had been put in place.” Lebed seemed willing to “institute martial law,” and Zhirinovsky’s nationalist rhetoric seemed to indicate a return to fascism for the largest country in Europe. Viewed within this context, one might consider Yeltsin a good man. However, Yeltsin’s “Cold Peace” rhetoric in Budapest was the first instance in which Clinton began to doubt the prospects for reconciling his competing “loss aversion” priorities. However, the “loss aversion” inclination, according to Kahneman’s theory, has a powerful sway on human decision-making, and Clinton was not yet ready to concede the loss of Russia.

To mend the post-Budapest relationship, Clinton sent his Vice-President to Russia as part of the routinely scheduled Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC), which was a meeting between Al Gore and Viktor Chernomyrdin to work out the details of executive-level commitments. Primarily focused on issues related to nuclear arms negotiations and strengthening economic ties, the late December 1994 meeting was also an opportunity for Gore to clear the air with Yeltsin vis-à-vis NATO enlargement. When Gore met with Yeltsin, he found a president more conciliatory than the one who warned of a “Cold Peace” in Budapest.

According to Talbott, Yeltsin was eager to reaffirm the personal relationship between the two presidents. Yeltsin suggested that the negative news coverage about his statements was overblown, and it would “take more than we’ve been through to ruin that.” However, the NATO communiqué worried Yeltsin. From his point of view, it seemed like the West was moving forward with NATO enlargement in 1995, and the attitude of the Western states was “triumphalist, even gloating.” These concerns were compounded by US domestic politics that

witnessed an overwhelming Republican victory in Congress the previous fall. The rhetoric of Republican leaders such as Bob Dole seemed to indicate a “toughening of the American position.” Gore reassured Yeltsin that Clinton remained true to his September promise that NATO enlargement would occur gradually and simultaneously with a NATO-Russia dialogue. Gore stressed that no enlargement would happen in 1995. With this promise, Yeltsin, once again satisfied, agreed to “let the matter drop.”

At this point in the meeting, Gore reminded Yeltsin that NATO membership was theoretically open to Russia provided it continued its democratic transformation. According to Talbott, Yeltsin responded, “Nyet, nyet! That doesn’t make sense. Russia is very, very big and NATO is quite small.” This was a curious response given Yeltsin’s 1991 letter requesting Russian membership in NATO, and it reflected the changing relationship between the US and Russia. When he originally came to power, Yeltsin was eager to cement ties between the US and Russia. Now, in 1995, getting Russia to join the PfP was a monumental diplomatic challenge, let alone joining NATO as a full member. As Talbott noted in his memoir, the objective was to convince the Russians that their security concerns over NATO enlargement were invalid:

Working with the Russians meant finding a way to coax them into being part of an outcome that they would regard as something other than a strategic defeat. Clinton felt that that was still possible, but not until Yeltsin had gained confidence in his ability to prevail over his domestic enemies.

Nevertheless, the Gore meeting in Russia was successful in putting salve on the Budapest wound. Clinton and Yeltsin were ostensibly still partners. However, within Russian security circles, the opinion that the US was working against Russia dominated.

424 Ibid., 142–145.
425 Ibid., 146.
In April 1995, the Duma’s Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing to discuss the state of US-Russian relations. Although only a deputy-level meeting, the notes from that meeting reveal that many Russians were suspicious of US motives. At the beginning of the meeting, all the participants expressed a desire for a constructive relationship with the US because there was “common cause” on strategic issues related to international stability, arms control, non-proliferation, and resolution of regional conflicts. However, the Russians believed that the US was attempting “to take advantage of the sharp change in the balance of power between Russia and the United States to weaken Russia . . . to make sure that in the future Russia would not be a major factor in world politics, would not be a force for the US to reckon with.”

As far as the enlargement of NATO was concerned, the participants were unequivocal in their opposition to the possibility:

> In the sphere of European security, US actions to expand NATO, in the opinion of the hearing participants, directly contradict Russia’s national interests and are not in the interest of strengthening security and stability in Europe. This issue is of fundamental strategic importance to Russia and ignoring Russia’s opinion cannot be seen as anything but the desire to isolate Russia and prevent its integration into the European space.427

The hardliners in the Russian government viewed NATO enlargement as a “zero-sum” scenario in which PfP membership was an insignificant mitigation. Despite the highest hopes of Clinton and Talbott, “finding a way to coax them into being part of an outcome that they would regard as something other than a strategic defeat” was a more difficult task than had been anticipated.

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To fully move past Budapest, Talbott convinced Clinton to fly to Moscow in May 1995 to convince Yeltsin to join the PfP, which was one month before the G-7 summit in Halifax. Russian membership in PfP was a critical component to Clinton’s NATO enlargement policy because it would alleviate the concerns of NATO members, who worried that enlargement would antagonize Russian security concerns. If the Russians were members of PfP prior to enlargement, the US could make the case that NATO enlargement was not targeted against the Russians who were associated to NATO through the PfP process. However, concern over Russian reaction to enlargement was not confined only to NATO members.

Within the Clinton administration, the NATO enlargement policy continued to be a contentious subject. Pro-enlargement advocates such as National Security Adviser Tony Lake and Chief of Staff George Stephanopoulos argued that any delay would signal that Russia had a veto on the enlargement policy and affirm the criticisms of political opponents such as Robert Dole and Henry Kissinger. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense William Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili argued that enlargement would antagonize the Russians and cause problems for US defense policy objectives. Talbott continued to adhere to a center position between the two objectives, but he was slowly realizing that domestic politics in Russia might pose future threat to the recently democratized states, which were not part of the NATO endowment. According to Goldgeier and McFaul, the administration reconciled the competing perspectives with a dual track policy: “enlarge NATO and at the same time create a new relationship between NATO and Russia.”

Essential to creating this new relationship was convincing the Russians to join the PfP, and Clinton intended to use his May 1995 meeting in Moscow to convince Yeltsin to join.

During the meeting, Clinton found Yeltsin intransigent on the enlargement policy. He asked Clinton to delay enlargement until 2000. Clinton responded that he could not agree to that, but he could assure Yeltsin that enlargement would not occur until after the 1996 elections. Clinton then stressed the importance of Russia joining the PfP before the NATO foreign ministers meeting at the end of the month. Yeltsin resisted agreeing to this deadline, but Clinton insisted that PfP was the critical component for the US and Russia. According to Talbott Clinton argued that there was an opportunity to renew World War Two era cooperation and “to make common cause again—but only if Russia participated fully in post-Cold War security structures. That meant joining PfP.”

Despite pushback from hardliners on his security council, Yeltsin agreed to allow Kozyrev to sign the PfP documents at the Noordwijk NATO foreign ministers meeting at the end of May. On May 31, 1995, Russia officially joined as PfP nation.

Although Clinton achieved a policy objective in getting Russia to join PfP, his close association with Yeltsin was becoming a political liability due to the Chechen War and NATO’s inability to stop the fighting in Bosnia earlier in his presidency. This became clear at the June G-7 conference in Halifax where Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien publicly chastised Yeltsin for the Chechen War. In the beginning of the conflict, Clinton was unequivocal in his support of Yeltsin. At one point, he compared Russia’s conflict to the American Civil War, which caused significant blowback in the press. The image of Boris Yeltsin as a modern-day Abraham Lincoln did not resonate well. To make matters worse, Jacques Chirac used the summit to

430 Ibid., 166
grandstand for a NATO military response in Bosnia. The impression coming out of the summit was that Clinton was, according to one Canadian reporter’s opinion, a “diminished leader.” 431

Although one of the most ardent supporters of a cooperative US-Russia partnership, Talbott sensed deterioration in the relationship. A month before the G-7 conference and just after Clinton’s visit to Moscow, he wrote a memorandum to Warren Christopher expressing his concerns about the future of US-Russian relations. The memorandum acknowledged the changed domestic situation in the US and Russia, which would make achieving Clinton’s policy of integrating Russia with the West difficult. In this memorandum, Talbott’s tone departs from the more optimistic perspective in PRD 36, as he acknowledged the growing indicators of Russian revanchism:

We must be vigilant and vocal on the issue of Russian strategic intentions and political behavior in the other former republics, resisting both in our rhetoric and in our diplomacy Moscow’s increasingly overt aspirations to establish Russian influence over the NIS at the expense of their independence. We should continue to assure the other eleven NIS that we will support only truly voluntary integration with Russia and that we will help them form countervailing ties to bind them to the outside world. The emergence of a neo or crypto-imperialistic strain in Russian policy could be an especially dangerous longer-term problem for us. It could represent the one policy difference between us and the Russians that we could not absorb under the rubric of our contention that we should not hold the relationship hostage to a single issue.

In contrast to PRD 36’s articulation of NATO enlargement as protecting and fostering democratic reforms in the NIS, Talbott’s language reveals a change in perspective in which enlargement was becoming focused on protection from Russian aggression. Furthermore, in protecting these states through NATO membership, Talbott began to acknowledge the mutually exclusive nature of the Clinton administration’s objectives in European security policy:

There is a dilemma for us in this dynamic: If we try too hard—and succeed too well—in mollifying our domestic critics [advocates of enlargement], we will rile and strengthen powerful forces on the Russian side who oppose whatever solutions might be possible. That would be contrary to our interest in strengthening reformers, who face an uphill battle in back-to-back election years. At a minimum, we do not want to be complicit in any massive retreat from reform. We had enough of the perverse symbiosis between hardliners in the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The irony of Talbott’s criticism of “hardliners in the US” is striking. In many conversations with Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev, and Yuri Mamedov, Talbott was told that Russian leaders considered the very concept of NATO enlargement, a policy that Talbott fully supported, a hardline position. Thus, whether he acknowledged the fact or not, Talbott, from the Russian perspective, was a de facto hardliner in American domestic politics. In any case, Talbott was correct to be concerned about the Russian internal politics.

The Chechen War had a negative political impact on Yeltsin as the Russian people lost faith in his leadership. While they suffered under the stress of economic reforms, the government was spending $23 million a day on a war that most people considered a mistake. Because of the war, the ruble dropped 11.2 percent, and this loss was coupled with 11 percent inflation. One Russian citizen lamented to a reporter in January 1995, “[Yeltsin] robbed the people, made us poor, and now he robs us of our sons. We elected Yeltsin because we thought he came from the heart of the Russian people, and now he’s cheated us.”

was clearly a political liability for Yeltsin. When the NATO enlargement study was released, Yeltsin was faced with another foreign policy setback.

In September 1995, NATO finally released the anticipated study of enlargement. According to the document, the purpose of enlargement was to increase security, democracy, cooperation, friendly relations, and NATO’s “ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions.” The expressed desire of operating outside Europe was concerning to the Russians, but the study noted that Russia’s PfP membership was the method for “addressing these concerns in developing its wider relationship with Russia and the Alliance has made it clear that the enlargement process . . . will threaten no-one and contribute to a developing broad European security architecture based on true cooperation.” Also, the Alliance desired continued dialogue with Russia “in rough parallel with NATO’s own enlargement. . . The substance and form of this enhanced relationship will be developed through a NATO-Russia dialogue.” Thus, the study attempted to articulate an enlargement policy “without recreating dividing lines.” The study did not identify which states would be admitted first. Instead, it laid out the requirements that states must meet prior to admission. New members needed to resolve internal ethnic and external territorial disputes, show a commitment to democracy and human rights, establish civilian control of the military, and allocate the necessary resources to fulfill military obligations prior to being admitted.435

At the end of 1995, US-Russian relations were in a complicated state. Russia was concerned about the enlargement of NATO, and the US was concerned about the rise of anti-democratic forces within Russian politics. Some of the Russian problems were self-generated with the prosecution of the Chechen War, but these problems were exacerbated by Western efforts to pursue enlargement. Despite increasing challenges and doubts, the Clinton administration still hoped that their policy could succeed. To be sure, they had convinced Yeltsin, against his better judgment, to join the PfP, and the enlargement study offered the possibility of continued dialogue. Perhaps differences could indeed be reconciled.

For the Russians, they had no option but to accept the inevitability of NATO enlargement. Already involved in a disastrous internal conflict in Chechnya and beset with monumental economic challenges, there were no viable options to stop the US from achieving its objectives. Instead, they determined to make the most of a bad situation. They would still engage with the West where practicable. However, unlike in the first years of the Yeltsin administration, the engagement would be based on assumptions of competition, and the hardliners in Russian politics in 1996 facilitated this new approach.

In December 1995, Russia held its second parliamentary elections, and the results, as they had in 1993, weakened Yeltsin’s political position.436 Zyuganov’s Communist Party secured 22 percent of the popular vote, and Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party won 11 percent. The Our Home Party, a party established by Chernomyrdin to replace Russia’s Choice and most closely associated with Yeltsin, came in third with a paltry 10 percent of the vote.437 Both the

436 Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 188.
communists and nationalists were firmly entrenched in the Duma. These results reflected “the social pain and confusion caused by the fitful transition to a market economy,” and they worried “western politicians who hope the country will pursue a peaceful democratic capitalist path.” Worried about these results, Clinton confided to Talbott, “How many more of these things is it going to take before they stop electing fascists and communists?” To make matters worse for Yeltsin, Lebed was capitalizing on the popularity he generated from negotiating an end to the Chechen War to win a seat in the Duma, and he would eventually run against Yeltsin in the June presidential elections.

Primakov’s hiring was an acknowledgement of a new political reality in which Yeltsin would not concede so easily to Western objectives. Although he continued to express resistance to enlargement, Primakov pragmatically accepted its inevitability, and he began a negotiating process in which he attempted to shape who was admitted, established Russian influence on decisions, and limited what military capabilities would be deployed in new NATO territory. To this end, the Russians expressed five conditions for their acceptance of enlargement:

1) Russia wanted a prohibition against stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states;

2) Russia wanted a prohibition on the permanent stationing of US forces on the soil of new member states;

3) Russia wanted co-decision-making between Russia and NATO on any issue of European security;

4) Russia wanted a commitment that no states of the former Soviet Union, especially the Baltics, would be admitted;

5) Russia wanted codification of these and other restrictions on NATO and rights for Russia in a legally binding treaty.

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438 Bill Clinton quoted by Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 188.
Primakov knew that the US and NATO would never agree to such terms, but he was signaling Russia’s tougher position vis-à-vis East-West negotiations. By asking for more than he could realistically achieve, Primakov was anchoring the negotiations to an extreme position so that future concessions would be more amenable to Russian interests. The tactic seemed to work. According to Talbott, “if Russia was willing to scale back its demands, there were variants of all three items on Primakov’s list that would be acceptable to NATO.” The days of half-hearted resistance to US European security policy were over.

NATO and the US informed Primakov that the US could never agree to such terms because it undercut the authority and flexibility of NATO as Western Europe’s main security body. However, the US and NATO did agree to make a public statement that there was no intention to station nuclear weapons and soldiers in new member states “as long as Russia refrained from threatening its neighbors.” As far as a treaty was concerned, the most that the US and NATO could offer the Russians was a political committee in the form of charter and an enhanced consultative body like the NACC. However, when it came to the Russian proposal of excluding the Baltic states, the US drew a hard line. Making such an announcement would essentially recreate a dividing line in Europe, which was anathema to the goals and objectives of PRD 36. There was, however, another reason for Clinton to resist Russia’s proposal to not admit the Baltic states.

As mentioned previously, there was a very active lobbying effort in the US to admit these states. In February 1996, Clinton met with the Central and East European Coalition, which included all the Baltic-American lobbying organizations, and “reconfirmed US support for the security, sovereignty and independence of the region’s countries, as well as their effort to

439 Ibid., 218–219.
integrate with European and transatlantic structures.”

Despite these reassurances, the Baltic-American lobbying groups were frustrated by the slow progress and lack of clarity on enlargement. In March, the president of the Lithuanian-American Community wrote a letter to Clinton expressing gratitude for his “candid remarks” the previous month; however, the group was concerned that there was no “answer to how your Administration will protect the security of the Baltic States as well as the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe.”

In October 1996, members of the Baltic-American lobbying organizations met again with Anthony Lake to discuss their concerns about getting the Baltic states admitted to NATO. At that meeting, Lake revealed the administration’s Baltic Action Plan, which was an initiative for the US to help the Baltic states meet the membership requirements. The plan was reinforced with the passage of the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, which gave legal impetus to the policy. With these reassurances, the American-Lithuanian community seemed satisfied. They wrote Clinton a letter stating that the meeting “put to rest some of our concerns that your Administration’s support for NATO admission for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was wavering in the face of Russian objections.” One month later, Clinton responded back to the organization that he believed “NATO should remain open to all of Europe’s democracies” including the Baltic states.

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441 Letter from the Lithuanian-American Community, Inc. to Bill Clinton, March 15, 1996, Clinton Papers, 1038 F Box 4, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AR.
442 Correspondence between Bill Clinton and the leadership of the American-Baltic Communities, November 15, 1996, Clinton Papers Series, 1036 F Box 7, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock AR.
Since they were both up for reelection in 1996, Clinton and Yeltsin were appealing to domestic audiences with their agreement on the Baltics. With Dole criticizing every compromise with Russia and the Baltic diaspora actively lobbying for Baltic for the immediate inclusion of the Baltics into NATO, Clinton had to stand firm on the eventual admission of the Baltic states. On the other hand, Yeltsin was fending off no less than six rivals and a 6 percent approval rating in his June 1996 reelection bid.\footnote{Inga Saffron, “Yeltsin Looking Shaky, But Don’t Count Him Out,” \textit{The Philadelphia Inquirer}, February 18, 1996, http://www.lexisnexis.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/? (date accessed, October 7, 2017).} Both candidates won reelection, but they were both under increasing pressure to enact confrontational US-Russian policies.

Clinton won his campaign with a comfortable margin of victory—increasing his overall vote count from 1992. However, his political mandate was weaker. Yeltsin, however, was involved in a grueling campaign in which it took a runoff election in July to defeat the communist Zyuganov. When Yeltsin finally secured the victory, Clinton was exultant. His man had indeed won the election; however, it was somewhat of a pyrrhic victory in the sense that Yeltsin emerged both physically and mentally weakened. His health had been deteriorating for some time prior to the election. In July and October 1995, he was admitted to the hospital for chest pains.\footnote{Alessandra Stanley, “Yeltsin Reveals He’ll Undergo Heart Surgery,” \textit{The New York Times}, September 6, 1996, http://www.lexisnexis.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/? (date accessed, October 6, 2017).} Yeltsin’s health was a point of debate in the election, as his opponents questioned his physical ability to lead the country. Immediately after the 1996 elections, he was once again admitted to the hospital for heart problems. After a medical review, the Russian doctors advised immediate open-heart surgery; but in a phone call with Clinton, Yeltsin asked if he knew of an American doctor he could consult. Clinton recommended Dr. Michael DeBakey of Baylor
After examining Yeltsin, DeBakey recommended waiting until November for the surgery. In effect, Yeltsin was out for the entire second half of 1996. If he could not continue the term, Chernomyrdin would serve as president until new elections could be held. Given that there was no acceptable alternative to Yeltsin, the Clinton administration faced the limits of their European security policy and the possibility of rapprochement with Russia.

These limits were publicly exposed when George Kennan wrote a *New York Times* article condemning the Clinton administration’s intent to expand NATO as “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. Kennan astutely observed that the decision would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion . . . and to impel Russian foreign policy in a direction decidedly not to our liking.” As far as US proclamations that NATO expansion was not hostile, Kennan noted that the Russians would be “little impressed” with such logic. Instead, the Russians “would see their prestige (always uppermost in the Russian mind) and their security interests as adversely affected.”

From the perspective of Clinton and Talbott, this was no ordinary criticism. Unlike Kissinger and Brzezinski, both of whom editorialized against Clinton’s policy, the Clinton team respected Kennan as a voice of reason who, from their perspective, had stood against the errors of the Cold War—especially the ill-considered Vietnam War debacle. Kennan’s article sowed doubt about enlargement. Talbott relates in his book that Clinton asked, “Why isn’t Kennan right? Isn’t he a kind of guru of yours going back to when we were at Oxford?” Talbott responded that he did indeed respect Kennan but “not as the source of all wisdom.” In the end, Talbott suggested that

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445 Talbott, 213.

the article prompted a “hint of doubt about the policy itself—not the desirability of enlarging NATO, but the feasibility of reconciling it with the integration of Russia.”

This exchange is revealing in terms of the Clinton team accepting the irreconcilability of their European security policy. With Russian domestic politics taking a hostile turn and Yeltsin’s failing health, the reality that NATO enlargement would alienate the Russians was becoming accepted. Even if the Russians negotiated on the finer points of how enlargement would occur, Clinton and his national security team realized that the Russians considered their inability to stop NATO’s enlargement a strategic failure. In fairness, the Clinton administration always knew that enlargement would be difficult for Russia, and they established early on in PRD 36 that Russia would not have a veto on the decision. However, they simultaneously held on to an idea that they could talk the Russians into accepting the unacceptable. In early 1997, however, they accepted that they might have to alienate an increasingly anti-Western Russia to accomplish their objectives. Regardless of the difficulties involved, Yeltsin won reelection, and there was still a glimmer of hope for reaching an amicable solution.

As he began his second term in office, Clinton reshuffled his national security team. Madeleine Albright moved from the UN to take over as the secretary of state. Sandy Berger took over the national security adviser position from Anthony Lake. At the Pentagon, William Cohen took over as secretary of defense from William Perry. The influential Strobe Talbott stayed on as deputy secretary of state. With the new team in place, the Clinton administration moved forward to salvage as much of its European security policy as possible.

For Clinton, the key to salvaging his European security policy was to offer Russia membership in the G-7 as a compensatory measure for NATO enlargement. According to

Goldgeier and McFaul, Clinton wanted to include Russia as early as 1995, but Anthony Lake and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin opposed the move because of Russia’s massive economic troubles. It would be more of a burden than an asset. However, in early 1997, Clinton admonished his advisers to get their “heads out of the weeds” and realize that including Russia was a way of “keeping Russia sullen but not mutinous while we take in new members.”

Clinton, Albright, Berger, and Talbott flew to Helsinki in March 1997 to offer Yeltsin membership in the G-7 in exchange for acquiescence on NATO enlargement.

According to Talbott, Yeltsin opened the summit by reiterating Russia’s position that it was “a mistake for NATO to move eastward.” As he had told Albright prior to the opening of the summit, Russia showed restraint in the past by not admitting Cuba and Vietnam into the Warsaw Pact, even though they requested membership. However, Yeltsin acknowledged that the US would not turn back on its effort to enlarge NATO, and he would enter into an agreement because it was a step he was “compelled to take.” In keeping with Primakov’s hardline negotiating tactics, Yeltsin laid down his one condition. NATO enlargement would not include the Baltics. Clinton refused to make the concession.

From Clinton’s perspective, this was the kind of “secret deal” that was so prevalent in the past. He wanted to avoid those mistakes because it would reinforce the perception that NATO was “organized against Russia” and divide Europe. Clinton then argued that excluding the possibility of membership would result in smaller countries, those not currently seeking membership, feeling threatened and actively seeking membership. Also, excluding Baltic membership would be a tacit exclusion of the “possibility of [Russian membership] in NATO.” Although he could not make a specific commitment to exclude Baltic membership, he did

remind Yeltsin that he was not “talking about a massive, all-out, accelerated expansion.” Clinton reminded Yeltsin that the US had already “demonstrated our ability to move deliberately,” referring to his decision to postpone enlargement until the Russian presidential elections.449 Thus, although he could not commit to excluding Baltic membership, he could commit to delaying the proposition.

During the meeting, Yeltsin never really accepted the idea of Baltic membership in NATO, but Clinton’s assurance that the inclusion of the Baltics would not happen soon was enough to assuage his resistance. Additionally, Clinton and Yeltsin both agreed that a formal treaty would be unwise since it would be vulnerable to hardline opponents in the US Congress and Russian Duma. Instead of a treaty, NATO and Russia would negotiate a political commitment on how relations would move forward in the future. Ironically, although Clinton was sensitive to making secret deals with Russia, he was essentially doing that very thing. To be sure, he would not explicitly reject Baltic membership; however, he did signal to Yeltsin that it would not occur anytime soon despite the Baltic states desire to join immediately. However, due to Clinton’s willingness to make a deal with Yeltsin, the Baltic states would have to wait for membership. Whether Clinton acknowledged it or not, that was the “secret deal” that he made with Yeltsin.

Based on Clinton and Yeltsin’s agreement at Helsinki, NATO and Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act on May 27, 1997, which established the parameters of the relationship. Acknowledging that NATO and Russia had revised their respective military doctrines to be less threatening, the Founding Act declared a common security interest in the “Euro-Atlantic” area; and as had been expressed in previous declarations since 1991, it

committed NATO and Russia to strengthening the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Founding Act also had its obligatory commitment to regional transparency, democratization, respect for territorial integrity, settlement of conflicts through UN and OSCE principles, and cooperation on peacekeeping operations. The mechanism for achieving these goals was the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, a more formal version of NACC, which would meet monthly at the ambassadorial level and twice annually at the ministerial level to discuss various security issues and “where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member states or Russia.” In this way, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council brought Russia into the NATO security structure but restricted it to deliberative consultation. Russia would have no voice in NATO policies. The Founding Act also went out of its way to state its commitment to the UN and OSCE: “Any actions undertaken by NATO or Russia, together or separately, must be consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE’s governing principles.” Although this must have seemed an innocuous statement at the time, it would become a challenge when NATO and Russia were discussing how to deal with Serbian atrocities in Kosovo.

450 Although Yeltsin’s “Cold Peace” comment at the 1995 Budapest Conference was a setback for Clinton’s policy, there was some success at that conference for increasing the stature of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was established in 1975 at the completion of the Helsinki Final Act as a permanent organization. As a result, the CSCE was renamed to the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although beyond the scope of this work, the development of the CSCE into the OSCE has an interesting history of its own. In many ways, it is a history of unmet aspirations.

The Founding Act closes with a commitment for NATO and Russia to continue work on security matters related to arms control, nuclear safety, non-proliferation, conventional forces, and combatting terrorism. To this end, NATO reiterated that it had “no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy.” As far as conventional forces were concerned, the language becomes more ambiguous. NATO would continue to negotiate the CFE treaty with Russia. While the CFE was being negotiated, NATO would “exercise restraint . . . with respect to their levels of deployments – in the Treaty’s area of application, in order to avoid developments in the security situation in Europe diminishing the security of any State Party.” In this way, NATO would “carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” The founding act left open to the signatories the definition of terms such as “restraint” and “substantial.” Furthermore, as it was not a treaty, there was nothing binding on any party. The hope was that the Joint Council would establish habitual relationships in which difficult security issues could be resolved. Thus, with the Founding Act in place, NATO was ready to announce new members.

In July 1997, NATO formally decided at the Madrid summit who would be the first new members. As Kissinger had advised in his opinion editorial, the first new members would be the Visegrad states of Central Europe: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The Baltic states and other Eastern European states were disappointed by the announcement. Instead of immediate NATO membership, they would settle for membership in the European Atlantic

452 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 247.
Partnership Council (EAPC), which was a replacement for the NACC, and hope for NATO membership in the future.

Clinton’s European security policy was ostensibly realized. He and his national security team helped Yeltsin’s reelection prospects by delaying enlargement until after the Russian presidential elections. In the meantime, the US moved forward on enlargement through establishment of the PfP, and they even convinced the Russians to join the PfP. After their 1996 presidential elections, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on the process for enlargement, which included delayed membership for any former state of the USSR and signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. However, these successes were established on an eroding foundation of trust. Each of these successes came at a price with nationalistic politicians successfully using Russian cooperation with the West to gain political points in Russian domestic politics. As these extremists secured more power in Russia, the US’s trust in the future of Russia decreased.

In her 1997 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Albright expressed clearly the administration’s concerns about Russia. According to the recorded testimony, she acknowledged that the Clinton administration had “questions about the future of Russia”:

We want Russian democracy to endure. We are optimistic that it will, but one should not dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of the past. By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.453

Contrary to the aspirational language outlined in PRD 36, this statement reflected the changing perceptions within the Clinton administration. Clinton’s national security had come to realize

453 Testimony of Madeleine Albright in Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate One Hundred Fifth Congress, October 7 1997, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC.
that NATO enlargement might lead to a Russian government that was hostile to the West, but Clinton continued to pursue the enlargement policy because he wanted to protect the NATO endowment, which now included Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. When the enlargement issue came to the Senate floor for debate, Democrat Senator William Byrd expressed well the real state of relations between the West and Russia:

The success of NATO cannot be judged merely by time, but also by the scope of its mission. For NATO was not intended merely to prevent another conventional war but also to deter nuclear war. At stake was—and still is—nothing less than the preservation of global civilization . . . The question of Russian nationalists, and their future role in their own country, speaks to the core of the issues surrounding the future of NATO. The question is not only how Russian nationalists react today, but also whether the most militaristic and virulent nationalists might gain power in the future, and whether that could pose a renewed threat to peace in Europe . . . Although we all sincerely hope that this wounded bear will regain her health and settle into a peaceful way of life that protects the interests of all her citizens and which deals fairly and openly in the community of nations, it is not at all clear that democratic traditions will survive within that nation for the next ten years . . . If authoritarian nationalists are to gain power in Russia in the future, that sad scenario will be caused by the fundamental instability of Russian democratic institutions and the general collapse of the economy, not by NATO expansion. If nationalists seize power, and impose a new militaristic dictatorship upon Russia, it will pose a new threat to the peace of Europe, and the continuation of NATO will be essential to again preserve that peace.\textsuperscript{454}

In this statement, one can see again see how the “loss aversion” heuristic took hold throughout the US political narrative. NATO was the endowment that preserved global civilization and must endure to protect Europe from Russian revanchism.

\textbf{Conclusion}

After meetings with several CEE leaders, Clinton adopted a policy to enlarge NATO. His purpose in adopting the policy was related to a sincere desire to protect the emerging

\textsuperscript{454} Robert C. Byrd speech to the US Senate, April 18, 1998, Robert C. Byrd Congressional Papers, Box 76, Robert C. Byrd Center for Legislative Studies, Shepherdstown, WV.
democracies of Europe, which included Russia. Although enlarging NATO and supporting democracy in Russia were at cross purposes, Clinton and his team believed they could talk the Russians into accepting NATO’s enlargement. In this way, they believed that merely decreeing that NATO was no threat to Russia was enough to erase more than forty years of rivalry and distrust. However, the Clinton administration underestimated Russian resistance as extreme nationalists continued to gain a foothold in Russian domestic politics. To deal with this problem, Clinton delayed the enlargement process, established the PfP, created the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and included Russia into the G-7. However, Russian hardliners, such as Primakov, only acquiesced to these overtures as a necessary evil in which they would concede what was necessary now and confront the US as a rival in other areas. This had negative implications on arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, anti-ballistic missile defense, and the US effort to end Milošević’s atrocities in Kosovo.
Chapter 5 - Arms Control

Despite the suspicions underlying the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were able to achieve significant arms control agreements. Richard Nixon was able to achieve success in slowing down the arms race with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I, and Jimmy Carter reinforced this agreement with the controversial SALT II. While these treaties were instrumental in slowing down the out-of-control nuclear arms race, Reagan and Gorbachev achieved the first significant strategic reductions with the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons as outlined in the 1987 INF Treaty. Although initially suspicious of arms control treaties, Bush was able to simultaneously guide German reunification within NATO and agreement on historic arms control in Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and START II with the Russians. Although Gorbachev hated the reunification of Germany within NATO, he was apparently able to move past the perceived strategic defeat towards security cooperation. Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, campaigned intensively for the US to do more to help Russia, and it seemed that more could be achieved in the realm of arms control. However, in an ironic twist, the Bush years turned out to be the apex of cooperation in arms control.

When Bill Clinton came to office, he was keen to continue the arms control progress of his predecessors. However, his strategic objectives were inhibited by his previous loss-averse decisions. Clinton’s decision to intervene in the Balkans, and his insistence on protecting the expansion of the NATO endowment by including the CEE states empowered hardliners within the Russian government. When the Russian economy collapsed in 1998 because economic assistance from the IMF was too slow and the US intervened in Kosovo in 1999, the hardliner narrative that NATO was a tool for Western expansion and uninterested in reciprocal security cooperation was reinforced. As a result, Yeltsin’s political position was weakened to the point
that he was unable to follow through on a missile-defense compromise or START III negotiations. He elected to resign in December 1999 paving the way for Vladimir Putin’s presidency—a former KGB agent who would only agree to cooperation if there was a clear advantage to Russia.

**US-Russian Arms Control History: A Brief Review**

In the mid-1950s, the United States had an overwhelming advantage in nuclear weapons technology.\(^{455}\) Thus, the Eisenhower administration developed the so called “massive retaliation” strategy as part of his “New Look” national defense policy in which costly investments in conventional forces were replaced with a relatively cheap investment in nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Allen Dulles signaled the “massive retaliation” doctrine in a 1952 speech in which he stated the US would respond “instantly” and “massively” against communist aggression.\(^{456}\) However, the Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957 inaugurated the age of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and increased the stakes in the nuclear arms race. In American policy circles, a consensus developed that the Soviets had an advantage over the US in missile technology. Scholars now know that the “missile gap” was actually exaggerated by the Soviets in order to create the perception of a nuclear umbrella for their aggressive policies in Eastern Europe. However, at that time, the “missile gap” was accepted as a fact.\(^{457}\) Due to the exaggeration of the missile gap in the 1960s, the US began reassessing the idea of “massive retaliation” as a viable strategy.\(^{458}\)


\(^{456}\) Ibid, 73.


In 1958, John Kennedy, preparing for the 1959 presidential elections, delivered a speech in the US Senate revealing elements of the “flexible response” strategy. Like most of his contemporaries, he acknowledged in the speech the prevailing assumption that a missile gap existed, and he criticized Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy for placing too much emphasis on nuclear capabilities as a “Maginot-line mentality . . . which may collapse or may never be used, but which meanwhile prevents the consideration of any alternative.” Kennedy wanted to reinvest in conventional capabilities. To this end, he advocated for reinvesting in US airlift and manpower capabilities, which were cut during the Eisenhower administration, to increase the US capability to “intervene in a limited war [something short of a nuclear exchange] with the speed, discrimination, and versatility which may well be needed to keep it limited—and without weakening our ultimate retaliatory power.”459 Conventional forces would be deployed to strategic locations in Europe and Asia to deter Soviet aggression.460 Tactical nuclear weapons would be used as an intermediary tool to prevent full scale nuclear war, and, of course, a healthy arsenal of strategic nuclear capabilities was reserved as a last resort.

The key component of “flexible response” was to make the last resort of nuclear exchange so unacceptable that neither side would choose an escalatory policy. In this way, the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) took root in policy discussions. According to McNamara’s articulation in a 1967 speech in San Francisco, the US must maintain “a highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any single aggressor or combination of aggressors at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a


460 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, Amazon Kindle location 4251–4279 of 12402.
surprise first strike. This can be defined as our assured-destruction capability.” Maintaining this “second strike advantage” required the US to assume “a worst plausible case” in its estimation of the adversary’s nuclear capability. The US “must be able to absorb the total weight of nuclear attack on our country—on our retaliatory forces, on our command and control apparatus, on our industrial capacity, on our cities, and on our population—and still be capable of damaging the aggressor to the point that his society would be simply no longer viable in twentieth-century terms.”

Albert Wohlstetter called it a “delicate balance of terror,” and the fulcrum of this balance was the notion that one state not have a preponderance of nuclear capabilities over the other, which resulted in a spiraling arms race. In this way, the US launched a massive military build-up that rested on a triad of nuclear capabilities: Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), and the newly developed Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). The Soviets responded with the development of their own nuclear triad capability. According to Richard Smoke, “By the end of the decade, the USSR was rapidly achieving strategic parity.” Because of this arms race, controlling the pace of development of nuclear weapons became an international concern.

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462 Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, 98
463 Ibid., 109.
464 Ibid., 130.
Realizing that the arms race was spiraling out of control, the United Nations sponsored the establishment of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) in 1961. Comprised of both nuclear and non-nuclear states, the ENDC was charged to achieve general reductions in the number of nuclear weapons, but the committee bogged down over negotiations on limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. Thus, from 1965 to 1969, the sole purpose of the ENDC devolved to the drafting of a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to E. L. M. Burns, the lead Canadian negotiator within the ENDC, “Russia’s goal throughout [the negotiations] was designed primarily to prevent West Germany from becoming a nuclear power.” The Allies, on the other hand, were keen to protect the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM), which was an organization that facilitated the exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

After four years of intense negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, the competing interests were resolved on July 1, 1969. According to the terms of the NPT, nuclear states agreed “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.” Thus, the US was forbidden to provide nuclear weapons directly to West Germany. The terms of the NPT prevented nuclear states from transferring “to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control

ENCD: Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, United States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and United Arab Republic.

over such weapons or explosive devices.” As far as EURATOM was concerned, the Soviets relaxed their concerns when language was included that placed peaceful development of nuclear energy under the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard systems, which allowed for the “verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view of to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive.”467 Lest the nuclear states get a free pass to continue their arms race while non-nuclear states watched, the NPT also obliged nuclear states “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

As the international community dealt with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, competition between the US and Russia continued. Fear of a nuclear catastrophe prompted both the US and the Soviets to consider developing an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense capability.468 The problem with ABM defense was that it undermined the deterrent features of MAD. If one side had an effective means of defense against nuclear attack, then the “mutual” aspect was eliminated. Because a successful ABM would undermine the assumption of mutual destruction, the news that the Soviets were developing an ABM capability sparked a vigorous debate in the Johnson administration.469 On one hand, proponents of MAD advised the president


469 Robert McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 55.
to counter the Soviet ABM defense system with more offensive weapons. On the other hand, proponents of a more protectionist policy advocated that the US develop its own ABM defense system, which would naturally contribute to the nuclear arms race as both sides developed enough weapons to defeat the respective ABM systems.

McNamara advised Kennedy and Johnson that a “thick” solution of protecting the entirety of the US was not feasible. He reasoned that the endeavor was expensive in relation to expected return on investment. The Soviets would always be able to launch more weapons than the US could defend against. However, MacNamara did see a requirement for a limited ABM defense capability that would protect US nuclear assets. This “thin” solution focused on protecting US nuclear silos thereby securing an ability to achieve an overwhelming “second strike” against the Soviets. Johnson and McNamara both agreed that an ABM system was undermining MAD. Instead of continuing down the same policy path, the better solution was to engage the Russians about the possibility of nuclear arms control—a diplomatic approach.

In 1967, Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara met Soviet Prime Minister Alexsei Kosygin in New York to discuss US concerns over the Soviet deployment of an ABM system. At this meeting, McNamara told Kosygin “that the proper US response to your Soviet ABM system is an expansion of our offensive force.” The better course of action for the Soviets, from the US perspective, was to enter into discussions about arms reduction. Kosygin rejected the offer, but he left the meeting impressed. He reported back to the Kremlin that there might be room for negotiations. In the meantime, Johnson and McNamara pursued their assured

470 Ibid, 55.
471 Reuben Steff, Strategic Thinking, Deterrence, and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Project, 18.
472 Ibid, 59.
destruction doctrine through the development of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology. This technology allowed for one missile to carry multiple warheads thereby increasing the nuclear capabilities of the US without increasing its total number of missiles.

When Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in 1969, he and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger developed the détente policy. According to détente, the Soviets were “both adversary and collaborator: adversary in fundamental ideology and in the need to prevent communism from upsetting the global equilibrium; collaborator in keeping the ideological conflict from exploding into a nuclear war.”473 In this way, Nixon continued Johnson’s efforts at arms control. Although delayed by Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations began in 1969.474 The possible development of ABM capabilities system became a key point in the SALT negotiations. A central assumption on both sides of the bargaining table was that each nation possessed more than enough weapons to achieve mutually assured destruction; therefore, continued development of ABM defense capabilities would only lead to unnecessary expenditures and increased risks for miscalculation. Based on this understanding, the US and the Soviet Union signed the SALT I agreements in May 1972. SALT I had two components: a separate treaty prohibiting the deployment of national level (theater level systems were allowed but not defined) ABM systems and an interim agreement to cap the number of available ICBMs (US-1,054/USSR-1,618) at existing levels and regulate overall SLBM capabilities (US-710/USS.R.-950).475 Thus, SALT I gave the Soviets a numerical advantage of 564 ICBM and 240 SLBM. Looking only at the raw numbers, opponents of the

473 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 742.
475 Ibid, 160; Reuben Steff, Strategic Thinking, Deterrence, and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Project, 18.
SALT I agreement argued that the US should not allow the Soviets to have such a strategic advantage.

The perception of a “SALT I missile gap” was unfounded due to the emerging Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology being developed by the US and Soviets, even as the SALT I negotiations were occurring.\textsuperscript{476} With the MIRV capability, one ballistic missile could deliver multiple nuclear warheads. Although both countries were developing MIRV capabilities, the US testing was further along. In this way, the US critics of SALT I failed to appreciate the fact that US ICBMs were more technologically advanced in accuracy and destructiveness than their Soviet counterparts.\textsuperscript{477} These debates hindered the subsequent SALT II negotiations between the US and the Soviets, which began immediately at the conclusion of the SALT I negotiations.

Whereas SALT I focused mainly on ABM agreements and holding ICBM/SLBM numbers at current levels, the SALT II negotiations were focused on capping the total number of nuclear forces across the entire nuclear triad.\textsuperscript{478} To this end, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to limit the total number of offensive nuclear weapons (ICBM and SLBM) to an aggregated total of 2,250. Moreover, offensive nuclear weapons equipped with MIRV technology were limited to 1,200 warheads within the total aggregated number. Hardliners such as Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Caspar Weinberger, Henry Jackson, and Richard Perle asserted that America’s

\textsuperscript{476} Robert McNamara, \textit{Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age} (New York: Pantheon Books, 2007), 61.

\textsuperscript{477} Henry Kissinger, \textit{Diplomacy}, 752.

security was being negotiated away.\textsuperscript{479} Despite the political costs of negotiating with the Soviets on reductions in the nuclear arsenal, Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreements in May 1979, but the Soviet Union’s subsequent invasion of Afghanistan stymied any hope of the US Senate ratifying the deal.

Capitalizing on a weak US domestic economy and perceived setbacks against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Indochina, Angola, and Central America, Ronald Reagan campaigned on a hardline Soviet policy and won the 1980 presidential election.\textsuperscript{480} His foreign policy position focused on ending détente and “getting tough” with the Soviets in order to force them to the bargaining table. In the long term, Reagan wanted the two superpowers to find common ground on arms control. However, these negotiations could not occur with the US in a weak position. Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger summarized Reagan’s national security strategy in a 1986 \textit{Foreign Affairs} article. For the Reagan administration, the first priority was to “reestablish the balance of military power necessary for stable deterrence.” However, the Reagan national security team also reassessed “those strategic concepts inherited from past policy makers.”\textsuperscript{481} Considering MAD a “suicide pact,” Reagan’s national security advisers proposed replacing it with a missile defense strategy. They questioned the assumption that a suicidal response was a credible deterrent. If, for example, the Soviets viewed a US president to be weak, the credibility of MAD might be diminished. In this circumstance, they might actually launch an attack thinking a response to be unlikely.

\textsuperscript{481} Ibid, 676.
Weinberger closed the article with his assessment about Soviet intentions suggesting that they were not seriously committed to the 1972 ABM Treaty. He asserted that the Soviets were already violating because they “spent as much on strategic defense as on its extraordinary nuclear offensive buildup.” In short, the Soviets were actively exploiting the treaty to “test and gain experience in the operation of an effective full-scale defense against ballistic missiles.”

The Soviet advancement of ABM technology would create, Weinberger argued, a scenario in which they would break out of the 1972 ABM Treaty before the US, and this was a scenario that was untenable for the Reagan administration. If the Soviets were not committed to the spirit of the 1972 ABM Treaty, then the US should not hesitate to pursue research in these technologies.

On March 23, 1983, Reagan declared his intent to develop a missile defense system that would protect the entirety of the United States. Known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the program reportedly examined the idea that alternative defense mechanisms such as lasers and electromagnetic energy bursts mounted on satellite systems could prevent Soviet ICBMs from reentering the earth’s atmosphere. Reagan wanted “to render obsolete the balance of terror—or mutual assured destruction, as it’s called—and replace it with a system incapable of initiating armed conflict or causing mass destruction, yet effective in preventing war.” As a result of SDI, the US successfully developed hit-to-kill missiles such as the Patriot Advanced Capability 3, Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Interceptors, and Ground Based Interceptor (GBI). However, the success of SDI was not in the systems it created but in the psychological effect it had on the Soviets.

482 Caspar Weinberger, *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Spring 1986): 682.
484 Robert McNamara, *Blundering into Disaster*, 90.
As part of his policy to confront the Soviets, Reagan promised in 1981 to deploy the Pershing II missile platform by 1983 in response to the 1979 deployment of the Soviet SS-20 ICBM platform.\textsuperscript{486} Both the Pershing II and SS-20 were MIRV-enabled intermediate-range missiles (500-5,500 KM). In subsequent talks over these intermediate range nuclear forces (INF), the Reagan administration offered the Soviets a “zero-zero” ultimatum: 0 Pershing II and 0 SS-20s or no deal. The Soviets, however, pursued a more nuanced agreement that allowed a limited number of intermediate missiles on both sides. The US negotiators refused to budge on their “zero-zero” position, and the Soviets walked out of the negotiations. In response, the US followed through on its Pershing II deployment in 1983.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Gorbachev knew that the Soviet centralized economy could not keep pace with the dynamism of the US economy. When he took office in 1985, Gorbachev was eager reestablish US-Soviet cooperation in nuclear arms reductions. At first, he attempted to link an INF treaty to a US agreement to abandon SDI development. However, Reagan refused this concession. In October 1986, Reagan met Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland to negotiate on the INF issue. At that meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan agreed to eliminate all US and Soviet intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, and both sides agreed to independent verification of the implementation. After further discussions to hammer out details, the US and Soviets signed the INF Treaty on December 8, 1987. Given that it eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, the INF Treaty was an historic event in nuclear arms reduction.

In the same year, the Reagan administration achieved another success in arms control with the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Concerned by the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{486} US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm (date accessed, November 10, 2017).}
rapid missile technology advances in countries such as Argentina, Iran, Iraq, India, Libya, and South Africa, the Reagan administration negotiated an agreement among seven countries (Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Japan) to “limit the spread of missiles and missile technology” to non-nuclear states.\textsuperscript{487} Thus, the MTCR was an active measure to ensure that the objectives of the NPT were met. Specifically, members of the MTCR agreed “to restrict their exports of missiles and related technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers.”\textsuperscript{488} To this end, the MTCR focused on controlling the export of two categories of items: “Category I includes complete missiles and rockets, major sub-systems, and production facilities. Specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles and rockets comprise Category II.”

Despite their adversarial relationship, the two superpowers were able to achieve success in arms control. Although US political actors were suspicious of efforts at cooperation, the NPT, SALT I, and SALT II negotiations showed the potential for cooperation in arms control. Given Gorbachev’s commitment to reform efforts, the INF Treaty signaled the possibility of even more arms reduction in the future. Furthermore, a reformed Russia might be an important participant in the newly established MTCR.

\textbf{Loss Aversion 9: Protecting from Nuclear Proliferation}

The Bush administration’s initial suspicion of Gorbachev made his team reluctant to cooperate with the Soviets on arms control. However, Gorbachev’s commitment to non-


intervention against democratic movements in Central Europe, openness to tangible democratic reform within the Soviet Union, and his acquiescence, even if reluctant, on a reunified Germany remaining within NATO convinced Bush that he had an authentic partner in change.\textsuperscript{489} In this way, Gorbachev’s peaceful acceptance of most democratic movements from January 1989 to January 1991 cleared much of Bush’s doubt about the authenticity of Gorbachev’s motives.\textsuperscript{490} If he was slow to come to this conclusion, Bush’s actions from January 1991 to July 1992 demonstrated a complete change of perspective. In only an eighteen-month period, Bush and Gorbachev achieved a reduction in nuclear weapons on a level that was unimaginable at any time prior to 1991.

The first result of Bush’s willingness to cooperate with Gorbachev was the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in July 1991. Whereas SALT I and SALT II had been designed to cap strategic weapons at current levels, the objective of START was a comprehensive reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{491} Negotiations on this scale were groundbreaking. While the INF treaty was historic for eliminating an entire class of weapons, START was an initiative to make substantial reductions in overall nuclear weapons capability. The landmark treaty achieved a 36 percent reduction in delivery capabilities by capping ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bombers at 1600, a 43 percent reduction of total nuclear warheads by capping


\textsuperscript{490} On January 12-13, 1991, Soviet troops responded violently to protesters in Vilnius, Lithuania. The final butcher’s bill on the action was fourteen Lithuanians dead. Gorbachev stopped the action before it got out of hand, and he later claimed that he did not personally give the crackdown order, though this is a matter of some debate. In his memoirs, Bush says he believed Gorbachev.

them at 6,000, and a complete elimination of all heavy and mobile launched nuclear weapons. Perhaps most importantly to the US was the agreement to cap the total throw weight of both sides to 3,600 metric tons essentially eliminating either side’s capability of achieving a “first strike” advantage. When the treaty was ratified by the US Senate in October 1991, a significant and real reduction in strategic nuclear weapons capabilities became a reality. This was a foreign policy triumph for the Bush national security team, but he wanted to achieve more. However, just as the Bush-Gorbachev relationship was producing results, the Soviet Union began a slow process of dissolution.

**Decision: Eliminate Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Pursue NIS Denuclearization**

Since April 1990, the Bush administration received reports that Gorbachev’s days as leader of the Soviet Union were numbered, but a peculiar event in June 1991 increased the anxiety. John Matlock received a classified report, clandestinely delivered to him by Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov, that a coup to replace Gorbachev was imminent. Popov was trying to get the message to Yeltsin who was on a visit to the United States. The US shared the information with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Although nothing occurred in that month, the incident caused the administration to consider what would happen with nuclear weapons if Gorbachev were suddenly removed from power. According to Goldgeier and McFaul, Cheney and other defense officials began to make the argument that improvements in the accuracy of strategic weapons made tactical nuclear weapons irrelevant, and they “worried about the new Russian state’s ability to maintain control over its nuclear inheritance.”

492 Ibid., 415.
In light of this consideration, Bush made a bold proposal to eliminate all US tactical weapons from its nuclear inventory. As part of this initiative, Cohen notes that the Bush administration ordered in September 1991 the elimination or reduction of a multitude of tactically focused nuclear weapons:

1) Eliminated 2,150 land-based tactical weapons;

2) Withdrew half of 1,400 air-based tactical weapons, withdrew 2,175 sea-based tactical and 360 Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SCLM) weapons;

3) Stood down all strategic heavy bombers, 450 Minuteman II missiles, and 1,600 Poseidon C3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile warheads;

4) Cancelled the rail mobile MX missile, road mobile Midgetman (while retaining the silo version), and SRAM-II programs;

5) Cancelled replacements for the nuclear short-range attack missile (for strategic bombers) and streamlined US command and control procedures.

Gorbachev reciprocated one week later with his own unilateral reduction:

1) Eliminated up to 10,000 land-based tactical weapons in nuclear artillery, tactical missiles, and mines;

2) Withdrew all 2,000 sea-based tactical weapons;

3) Initiated immediate stand down of 503 ICBMs and all heavy bombers;

4) Reduced START limit of 6,000 warheads to a ceiling of 5,000;

5) Froze the number of deployed rail-mobile SS-24 and SS-25 missiles, Short Range Attack Missile Systems (SRAM), and heavy bombers;

6) Discontinued out-of-garrison movements of SS-24;

7) Canceled new versions of rail-mobile SS-24 and SS-25 missiles, SRAMs, and heavy bombers;

8) Halted production of weapons usable isotopes on a bilateral basis;

9) Decreased Soviet army troop strength from 3.7 to 3.0 million;

10) Halted unilaterally all nuclear tests for a one-year period;
11) Agreed to discuss the SDI issue.\footnote{David B. Cohen, 416.}

The concern over controlling tactical nuclear weapons demonstrates how the Bush national security team’s “loss aversion” heuristic shifted from maintaining stability to maintaining the non-proliferation regime that was established with the NPT and MTCR and threatened with the imminent break-up of the Soviet Union.\footnote{James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, \textit{Power and Purpose}, 33–35.} However, tactical nuclear weapons were only part of the concern. There were still strategic nuclear weapons in the NIS.

James Baker was the first member of Bush’s national security team to realize the significance of the threat of the break-up of the Soviet Union to the non-proliferation regime. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all had nuclear weapons on their territory. Under the Soviet Union, they were centrally controlled. If they maintained control of the nuclear weapons within their borders after independence, there would be three new nuclear states. Baker considered this an unacceptable situation; however, other members of the Bush team were not convinced. Scowcroft did not see a problem with these countries maintaining control of the weapons because that meant there were fewer pointed at the US—presumably they would be pointed at Russia. After some debate, Bush came down on the side of Baker. The US policy was focused on securing non-proliferation from the break-up of the Soviet Union. In early September, Baker flew to Moscow to discuss matters with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. One of his first questions was whether they agreed that the nuclear weapons had to be controlled by “the center,” and they both agreed that they should.
To achieve his goal, Baker had congressional support. Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, also fearing the loss of the non-proliferation regime, sponsored the passage of a bill that established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP). Passed in late November 1991, the CTRP allocated $400 million dollars of the Pentagon’s budget towards helping the Soviet Union dismantle its nuclear weapons in the NIS. As might be expected, the CTRP was not popular with Secretary of Defense Cheney who argued that using defense funds to assist the Soviet Union was an ill-conceived proposition. Despite this resistance, Baker found the CTRP invaluable as he worked to remove nuclear weapons from the independent republics back to Russia.

On December 16, 1991, only a week after the establishment of the CIS, Baker flew to Europe to present his idea of removing nuclear weapons from the NIS to Russia to maintain centralized control. His first stop was in Moscow where Yeltsin assured Baker “that there would be a single, highly unified command and control structure in the new Commonwealth.” He told Baker that it was in Russia’s best interest to have a close relationship with NATO, and Yeltsin agreed with Baker that the nuclear weapons should be removed to Russia. More importantly, the nuclear weapons that were removed should be destroyed not just redeployed. Baker met with Gorbachev as well, but it was clear to Baker that Gorbachev’s days in power were numbered. In many ways, the stop was a mere courtesy toward a man who proved to be true to his words on ending the Cold War. On his way back to Washington, Baker stopped in Ukraine and Kazakhstan to gauge each president’s support for nuclear weapons removal. He again found leadership that was eager to please the US and willing to cooperate on nuclear


weapons removal. On December 24, 1991, Gorbachev resigned his position as General Secretary of the Soviet Union in a televised speech. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Bush national security team would need to work with Yeltsin to achieve further reductions, and he demonstrated a remarkable willingness for continued cooperation.

On January 29, 1992, Yeltsin made a televised speech to his Russian constituents where he signaled to the US his desire to take arms control to a new level. In the speech, he pledged to end the production of heavy bombers, and he expressed a desire to bring the allowable number of warheads down from START’s 6,000 cap to an even lower 2,500 cap. Also, he committed publicly to his support of Baker’s plan to remove all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Finally, he stated that nuclear weapons “should not be aimed at American and Russian targets respectively.”

When Bush met Yeltsin at Camp David in February, the Russian president completely removed any doubt about his willingness and ability to cooperate with the US. In this summit, Yeltsin reaffirmed his commitment to Ukrainian independence and Baltic independence. He reiterated his desire to cut strategic nuclear warheads to a 2,500 ceiling and requested CTRP funding for the dismantling of nuclear warheads.

Yeltsin’s willingness to cooperate proved important in moving START I forward. Although the US ratified the treaty the previous year, the break-up of the Soviet Union delayed Russian ratification thereby preventing the treaty going into force. From the Russian perspective, a key stipulation for ratification of START I was that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan follow through on removing nuclear weapons. Russia did not appreciate the idea of

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their immediate neighbors maintaining control of a nuclear arsenal. As was previously
mentioned, these countries were initially cooperative on the idea. However, the Ukrainians
backtracked after they realized that losing nuclear weapons would remove an important
defensive measure against future Russian aggression. During this period, Baker worked
feverishly with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko to convince him to follow through
on his agreement to remove nuclear weapons from Ukraine. The issue was finally resolved in
May 1992 in Lisbon when Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all signed an addendum to START
I, which stated in writing their agreement to remove the weapons.

At the Lisbon conference, Kozyrev proposed to Baker to begin negotiations for reducing
nuclear weapons even further. He suggested dropping the number of total nuclear war heads to
2,500 and eliminating all MIRV capabilities on ICBM platforms (SLBM would still have MIRV
technology). Baker was amenable to the idea, but he knew that the Pentagon would be against
such a deep cut. Secretary of Defense Cheney wanted to link the MIRV proposal to Russian
agreement to cooperate on a Joint Missile Defense system. Because of these internal
disagreements, the prospect of achieving a START II reduction might have never gotten started.
However, Yeltsin’s June 1992 speech to a joint session of congress created an environment that
couraged further cooperation.

In the speech, Yeltsin declared that the two sides had “left behind the period when
America and Russia looked at each other through gunsights, ready to pull the trigger at any time.
Despite what we saw in the well-known [post nuclear Armageddon] film “The Day After,” it can
be said today, tomorrow will be a day of peace, less of fear and more of hope for the happiness
of our children.”

Perhaps more importantly, Yeltsin promised that Russia would “carry through unprecedented reforms in the economy, that over the seven decades, has been stripped of all market infrastructure,” and he boasted that it was “practically impossible to topple Yeltsin in Russia.”

Given that Bush was in the middle of an election campaign in which his challenger was publicly criticizing US policy for not supporting Russia more, Bush eventually sided with Baker and pursued START II negotiations. By January 1993, he and Yeltsin signed the historic START II treaty, which limited the total number of nuclear warheads to 3,500 and eliminated all MIRV technology on ICBM missiles.

From 1992 to 1993, the US and Russia achieved historic cooperation on arms reduction. In doing so, the two countries significantly reduced the probability of a nuclear conflagration. In many ways, however, this was the apex of US-Russian post-Cold War security cooperation. Despite his diplomatic successes, it was not enough to help Bush win reelection. However, he left his successor with a solid foundation of achieved cooperation and a decent amount of goodwill vis-à-vis security cooperation. Table 3 below demonstrates how the arms negotiations evolved from merely stopping the arms race to achieving real reductions during the Bush administration.

Table 3. Twenty Years of Arms Control Negotiations

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<td>No new production of ICBM and SLBM launchers: freeze at current levels</td>
<td>Renewed commitment to moratorium on production of new ICBM. New commitment not to relocate or convert</td>
<td>Elimination of all nuclear weapons and their launchers with a range of 500-5,500 kilometers</td>
<td>Aggregate ICBM/SLBM/Heavy Bombers: 1,600 (US/USSR)</td>
<td>Total number of allowed warheads: 3,500 (US/USSR)</td>
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<td>Total number of warheads for SLBM: 1,750 (US/USSR)</td>
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Despite these successes, there was still work to be done. START II needed to be ratified by both governments; and although Ukraine agreed to remove nuclear weapons from their territory, implementation was still not completed. Furthermore, Clinton wanted to achieve his own arms reduction treaty. However, Clinton would find it challenging to have the same level of success on arms control.

**Clinton’s Troubled Cooperation**

Similar to the Bush administration, the Clinton team was also concerned about losing the non-proliferation regime and wanted to strengthen the 1987 MTCR. In fact, prior to becoming Bill Clinton’s vice-president, Al Gore worked with John McCain in 1989 to pass the Missile and Proliferation Control Act (MPCA), which augmented the MTCR by implementing US sanctions.
on states providing long range missile technologies to states seeking a nuclear capability. In the spring of 1992, the act became relevant when Glavkosmos, Russia’s space agency, agreed to a lucrative contract to share cryogenic rocket engine technology with the India Space Rocket Organization (ISRO). The deal brought in millions of dollars of much needed cash into the Russian economy. The Bush team originally imposed sanctions on both Russia and India. By the fall, however, the Bush team backed off the sanctions in order to follow through on their promise to provide $24 billion in economic aid to Russia and to eliminate potential obstacles to a START II agreement. In this way, the Indian nuclear problem was essentially transferred to the Clinton administration.

Unlike the Balkans decision, which could be delayed, sanctioning states that enabled proliferation was mandated in the MPCA, and Clinton was forced to deal with Russia’s proliferation policy. In June 1993, the Clinton administration announced sanctions on Russia because of the Indian rocket deal. However, they agreed to waive implementation of the sanctions until July 15, 1993, which was just after the G-7 Tokyo summit. This would give the US and Russia an opportunity to discuss the issue face-to-face in Tokyo and make a deal. In exchange for Russian agreement to back off the Indian deal, the US agreed to a $400 million investment in a US-Russian cooperative effort on the international space station and to potential Russian membership in the G-7. After long negotiations in Tokyo, the two sides came to a deal only hours before the sanctions were to go into effect. However, the deal was controversial in Russia. Russia was in the middle of a constitutional crisis, and right-wing nationalists criticized

501 Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 81–85; Although not formally a part of the G-7 in 1993, Yeltsin flew to Tokyo to meet with the G-7 members and to discuss Russia’s economic challenges. The meeting over the Iranian nuclear deal was a bi-lateral discussion between Clinton and Yeltsin.
Yeltsin for allowing the US to interfere in the deal, which contributed to an effort to depose Yeltsin from power in October. Although Yeltsin survived the attempt, the threat to non-proliferation continued as Ukraine threatened to renege on its agreement to allow the removal of nuclear weapons to Russia.

Although Ukrainian President Kravchuck signed the START I addendum in Lisbon in 1992 to remove its nuclear weapons to Russia, he was pressured by hardliners in the Ukrainian parliament to get more concessions for the exchange. Thus, when he met with Talbott in May 1993, he jockeyed to get billions of dollars in economic aid and some kind of security guarantee from the West similar to what other NATO countries received as part of their membership. Since it hinted at the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians were displeased with such talk. According to Goldgeier and McFaul’s recounting of an interview with Talbott, the situation worsened when Les Aspin said, “A non-nuclear Ukraine is a better ally for us. Ukraine is a small country with a big enemy, and we should show that it also has a big friend. Any arrangement that keeps the Russians farther to the East is a good thing.”\(^{502}\) This type of language was irritating to Russian hardliners because they viewed the Ukrainian nuclear negotiations as a bi-lateral issue between Russia and Ukraine. US interference was only complicating matters. During these negotiations, Yuri Mamedov told Talbott that “many on our side will resent your meddling in something they believe is none of your business.”\(^{503}\) Between interference in the Iranian deal and the Ukrainian nuclear removal, the first cracks in US-Russian security cooperation were revealed. However, at this point, Clinton and Yeltsin were committed to working a deal that would satisfy the needs of Ukraine, Russia, and the US.


\(^{503}\) Yuri Mamedove quoted by Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 80.
With promises to conclude a future agreement from Russia in respect to Ukrainian territory in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Ukrainian government signed the Trilateral Accords between the US, Ukraine, and Russia in January 1994. In this agreement, Ukraine agreed to remove all of its strategic nuclear weapons to Russia within ten months. The US agreed to use $60 million of CTRP funds to reimburse Russia for the shipment of 100 tons of nuclear fuel to Ukraine to be used for peaceful nuclear energy. Finally, Clinton committed to a $750 million aid package to Ukraine.\textsuperscript{504} In return for these concessions, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the START I addendum in the spring of 1994. In December of the same year, the US, the UK, Ukraine, and Russia all signed the Budapest memorandum confirming that Ukrainian territory would be protected from “the threat or use of force” against its territory.\textsuperscript{505} These were precarious negotiations occurring while Russian hardliners were achieving electoral success in the Duma. Although the negotiations were successful, the change in Russian domestic politics made future agreements more difficult, and this was evident in the negotiations surrounding the Iranian nuclear deal.

\textbf{Russian Proliferation}

By January 1995, Russian hardliners in the Duma had plenty of material to demonstrate what they claimed was the US taking advantage of Russia’s misfortune. First, the US had completely humiliated Russia in 1991 by insisting that a reunified Germany be admitted as a member of NATO. In the end, they conceded to this development because they had no good alternative outside of bloody conflict. Furthermore, regardless of their protestations to the

\textsuperscript{504} James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, \textit{Power and Purpose}, 166–170.

contrary, the Russians knew that Germany had to be constrained in an institution to help prevent any possible repeat of past aggression. Second, the US infringed on Russian sovereignty concerning the 1992 sale of nuclear technology to India. To be sure, Russia received financial benefits for its cooperation, but the audacity of the US in presuming it had a say in what Russia could do was overwhelming to hardline nationalists. Third, NATO used bombers in April 1994 to defend besieged ground forces in Goražde and was threatening further armed intervention in the Balkans. This was the first time in NATO’s history that it had engaged in live military action, which confirmed an “aggressive NATO” narrative among Russian hardliners. Fourth, with the backing of the US, NATO released in 1994 its famous communiqué publicly announcing the study of NATO expansion. In every case, the US achieved its desired outcome while Russia merely protested because there was little that they could do. However, as the hardliners secured their footing within the Yeltsin administration, they looked for opportunities to confront the US—even if only in spite. Viktor Mikhailov found such an issue in the sale of nuclear technology to Iran.

Much like Primakov, Viktor Mikhailov was a nationalist who believed that Russia should concede as little as possible to the US. During the Soviet era, Mikhailov worked for the deceptively named Ministry of Medium Scale Machine Building, which was in reality the Soviet agency responsible for nuclear weapons production. Within that organization Mikhailov headed its most secretive research laboratory known as Arzamas-16. With the establishment of Russian independence in 1991, Yeltsin created the Ministry of Atomic Energy for the Russian Federation (MINATOM), and he tagged Mikhailov to head the organization. In assuming

leadership of MINATOM, Mikhailov obtained responsibility for one of the most important bureaucracies in Russia. MINATOM was responsible for the safety of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, dismantling weapons in accordance with treaty provisions, nuclear research, and conversion of nuclear weapons technology to civilian purposes. Mikhailov was an advocate for the benefits of nuclear technologies, and he was convinced that it was the single greatest source of Russia’s strength. As a result, Mikhailov linked the prosperity of MINATOM to the prosperity of Russia. Talbott recalls how Mikhailov railed against Undersecretary of Defense Lynn Davis in April 1993 for suggesting that Russia cooperate with the non-proliferation regime:

For three hours, the chain-smoking Mikhailov harangued Lynn on how outrageous it was that the US, under the self-righteous guise of concern for non-proliferation, was trying to keep Russia out of a legitimate market for its nuclear technology. It was the testiest high-level exchange between the two governments since the Clinton administration came into office, and it augured years of trouble ahead.507

Thus, MINATOM conducted its own foreign policy outside of the auspices of the Russian foreign ministry, and this became problematic as the US attempted to convince Yeltsin to halt nuclear cooperation with Iran on the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor.

Since the mid-1970s, Iran was interested in building a nuclear reactor for peaceful energy production, which was indeed authorized under the NPT.508 In fact, the US and West Germany were instrumental in helping Iran towards this end.509 After the Iranian revolution in 1979, however, both countries halted all cooperation with the new regime. For the next several years, Iran’s nuclear program atrophied as the top nuclear scientists fled the country and an existential

507 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 66.
war erupted between Iraq and Iran, which halted progress on the Bushehr facility. By the mid-1980s, the Iranians reignited their pursuit of nuclear capabilities by signing training deals with China and Pakistan in 1987, which provided training and a commitment to build two small reactors. However, the US pressured both countries to abandon the deals, and the training and technology were never provided.

Given the lucrative nature of these deals, the cash-strapped Russians were eager to step in and assist the Iranians with the development Bushehr. In 1992, the Russians signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran. According to Talbott, Yeltsin initially denied any potential nuclear deal with the Russians stating that the only military exchanges were conventional capabilities related to a 1988 treaty. However, in January 1995, reports surfaced that Russia had signed an agreement with Iran to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant—a deal reportedly worth between $800 million and $3 billion. More troubling to the US was evidence that Russia would also supply a research reactor and a gas centrifuge plant as part of the deal. Although Russia and Iran claimed that the reactor and centrifuges were to be used for peaceful purposes, American intelligence suspected that the centrifuges would be used to enrich uranium (U-235) to the 90 percent level needed for weapons grade (power reactors only require 3-5 percent enrichment). In August 1995, Russian and Iran deepened their nuclear

510 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Handi, 255.
512 Ibid., 136.
cooperation even further with a ten year deal in which Russia agreed to “supply nuclear fuel, fabricated at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant” in Russia.514

The Iranian deal was a serious problem for Clinton’s Russia policy. As was the case on the Indian deal, the Missile Proliferation Control Act obligated the US Congress to impose sanctions on Russia for sharing nuclear technology with Iran. In addition, Congress was threatening to withhold financial assistance to Russia if they proceeded with the nuclear deal. Republicans in Congress were especially keen to pounce on the issue as a problem. Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, the chairman of the appropriations committee for foreign aid, was vocal in his opposition: “I would like the message to be very clear: this deal threatens Russian aid, period. This is not the kind of behavior we expect of a country that purports to be an ally and aid recipient. This thing could really be a deal-breaker.” Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole stated in the spring of 1995 that “Congress is a little leery of aid right now in any event, with Chechnya and other problems.” Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich reinforced these concerns saying, “We cannot tolerate Iran getting weapons of mass destruction.” However, concern was not just a partisan Republican issue. Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy admitted that “aid may well be cut off because of inexplicably stupid moves on the part of Russia. The Russians could try the patience of a saint.”515

For the Russians, US concern over providing nuclear technology to Iran was hypocritical. They cited the 1993 US agreement to provide light-water nuclear technology to North Korea as a

justification for their assistance to Iran.\textsuperscript{516} As a sovereign state, the US had a right to assist states with nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and Russia had the same right to do so with Iran. In addition, Clinton’s effort to expand NATO required a response. According to Talbott, there were “elements in the Russian government” using “enlargement as a pretext for stepping up lethal Russian assistance to Iran . . . there was no question that the hard-liners were exploiting resentment over NATO expansion in their advocacy of a strategic marriage of convenience with Iran.”\textsuperscript{517} The consequences of Clinton’s “loss aversion” decisions were causing his European security policy a lot of problems.

In May 1995, the Clinton team planned a trip to Moscow to celebrate V-E Day with Yeltsin. They saw this as an opportunity to discuss the nuclear problem with Yeltsin. According to Talbott, Clinton wanted to deal with the Iranian issue because it was threatening his entire Russian policy:

I know we’ve got to keep our eyes on the prize, which is everything we’re trying to do with Russia, but I’ve got to get Yeltsin to acknowledge that Iran is a serious problem, otherwise we’re not going to get anywhere on the other stuff. He keeps telling me about his political problems, and they’re a lot bigger than mine. But I’ve got a few of my own. I’m going to Russia because of the dogs we have in this hunt, but we’ve got to do something on Iran. Joe Lunchbucket out there in Ames, Iowa, doesn’t care about NATO enlargement. He cares about whether this ol’boy is going over there to Russia and let those people give the new ayatollah an A-bomb.\textsuperscript{518}

Yeltsin knew Clinton would want to discuss the nuclear deal at the Moscow summit; and at the beginning of the meeting, Yeltsin announced that he had implemented special controls on nuclear cooperation with Iran to include a ban on providing centrifuge technology. Clinton was


\textsuperscript{517} Strobe Talbott, \textit{The Russia Hand}, 255.

\textsuperscript{518} Bill Clinton quoted in Strobe Talbott, \textit{The Russia Hand}, 160.
pleased with this opening salvo, but he wanted to make sure that Yeltsin understood that his administration was against cooperation on any nuclear technology. Yeltsin said he agreed and the details would be worked out through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. They shook hands, and the issue seemed to be resolved.

The problem with such agreements between Clinton and Yeltsin was that there was concern that Yeltsin’s control of nuclear exports was limited. According to Talbott, Mikhailov “was bypassing his own government’s export controls, blocking adoption of new and better ones and cutting deals with Iran that would accelerate its development of a nuclear weapon.” Of course this problem was exacerbated in January 1996 when Primakov replaced Kozyrev as the Russian foreign minister. Between Mikhailov and Primakov, cooperation on nuclear issues would be difficult at best. In any case, the provision of centrifuges may have been cancelled because of Clinton and Yeltsin’s agreement, but MINATOM continued assisting Iran by training its physicists and continued construction on the Bushehr facility.

Meanwhile, the Russians compounded problem in 1997 when reports emerged that they were also selling missile technology to Iran. In this way, they were not only providing technology to the Iranians that would accelerate their nuclear weapons capability, but they were also accelerating Iran’s ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. According to Talbott, Primakov became aggressive when Madeleine Albright expressed her concern over the sharing of Russian missile technology with Iran at dinner during a Denver summit between the two nations:

Primakov whose back was already up, dispensed with his usual drollery and went on the attack. Coming on top of NATO’s enlargement, American “pressure tactics” over Iran were simply unacceptable. Russia’s laws, its enforcement of

519 Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 258.
those laws and its relations with Iran were all its own business. He was sick and
tired of being told by the US what Russia could and could not do.  

Despite Primakov’s irritation over US meddling, Clinton and Yeltsin were still willing to cooperate with each other. In a meeting a day after Albright and Primakov’s contentious dinner, Yeltsin admitted to Clinton that agencies within the Russian government sometimes “have direct contacts with Iran, and they make agreements on their own.” Yeltsin promised to establish an investigative committee to crackdown on illegal sales to Iran.

Clinging to Yeltsin’s commitment to crackdown on the problem of illicit interactions with Iran, the Clinton administration hoped that their Russia policy might remain intact. However, after the Denver summit, the US continued to uncover instances of Russian-Iranian cooperation on nuclear and missile technologies. In each case, Primakov would deny the allegations, and the problem was left unresolved. By the spring of 1998, the US Congress reached its limits, and there were renewed calls for sanctions. The Clinton administration, however, was encouraged by Russian efforts to implement a “catchall law” that would close all loopholes that MINATOM used to continue its exchanges with Iran. From their perspective, sanctioning Russia would be catastrophic for US-Russian relations. It would officially acknowledge the emerging reality. Russia and the US were emerging from the Cold War as rivals -- not as partners. Still, if the “catchall law” was successfully implemented, perhaps it was not too late to shape a more favorable reality; but before the relationship could get back on track, domestic politics in Russia shifted in a way that worked against cooperation.

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521 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 256.
522 Ibid., 256.
According to Talbott, Chernomyrdin was achieving political notoriety for his relationship with Al Gore, and he had political aspirations for the Russian presidency in 2000. Yeltsin, however, had not ruled out running for president again. Furthermore, he blamed Chernomyrdin, a politician the Duma forced on him in 1994, for Russia’s continued economic problems. Thus, Yeltsin made the decision to fire Chernomyrdin in March 1998 in favor of Sergei Kiriyenko, Russia’s minister of fuel and energy. Whereas Chernomyrdin had links to the old regime, Kiriyenko was a thirty-five-year-old reformer in the mold of Yegor Gaidar. Yeltsin hoped the appointment would please the US and restart his vision of aggressive liberal economic reform. However, in terms of resolution of the Iranian problem, the change in leadership backfired at a time when the US Congress was eager to implement sanctions.

Although the announcement of Russian efforts to pass a “catchall law” appeased the US Congress in the short term, they were quickly disillusioned when Yevgney Adamov replaced Mikhailov as the leader of MINATOM and demonstrated a continuing desire for nuclear cooperation with Iran. In addition, the Azerbaijan navy intercepted a tanker operated by a Russian front company containing missile-grade steel headed to Iran, which confirmed Yeltsin’s inability to follow through on his non-proliferation commitments. After the Azerbaijan story broke in the newspapers, the US Congress decided to act. In June 1998, the US Congress voted overwhelmingly for sanctions against Russia. The reality of losing Russia, a reality that Clinton fought so hard to avoid, came to pass. Yet, he still refused to accept that the US-Russian relationship was entering a new period of rivalry. Clinton immediately vetoed the resolution. He was still trying to avoid losing Russia.

Clinton hoped that his veto would allow the Russians time to fully implement several new laws to stop Russian transfers of technology to Iran. As had been the case in the previous
six years, the hopes were misplaced. According to Talbott, the laws did nothing to stop Russian entities from cooperating with Iran:

But for the [Russian authorities] the problem persisted. Several Russian companies and institutes, in defiance of the new Kremlin-ordered measures, maintained their contacts with Iran. Therefore, we had little choice: either we imposed sanctions of our own or the Senate would override the president’s veto and the more draconian sanctions bills would become law.\textsuperscript{523}

Thus, the Clinton administration implemented US “trade restrictions” against the Russians. Even in implementing sanctions against the Russians, Clinton’s “loss aversion” heuristic was dominant. If he had to implement sanctions, perhaps he could do it in a way that was minimally impactful and left the door open for cooperation in the future. Perhaps he could implement sanctions in a way that would not “lose Russia.”

Clinton’s reluctance to aggressively deal with Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation had significant consequences for the non-proliferation regime. According to Fred Wehling, Russian assistance from 1997 to 1999 helped to significantly advance Iran’s nuclear program. In December 1998, Mikhaliov and Adamov approved a deal for the Russian and Design Institute of Power Technology (NIKIET) to facilitate the construction of a 40 MWt heavy-water research reactor to Iran and the sale of a facility that enabled the enrichment of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The enrichment capability was especially concerning because, as Wehling points out, it “would significantly upgrade Iran’s capability to enrich uranium for possible use in nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{524}

In terms of missile technology, the proliferation damage was even more profound. Russia provided Iran with components for a RD-214 liquid fuel rocket engine, guidance

\textsuperscript{523} Strobe Talbott, \textit{The Russia Hand}, 273.

\textsuperscript{524} Fred Wehling, \textit{The Nonproliferation Review} (Winter 1999), 137.
components, and 620 kg of special alloys. Due to this assistance, the Iranians successfully developed and tested the Shahab-3 missile in July 1998. Russia might not have been able to stop NATO enlargement or intervention in the Balkans, but they were determined to do what they wanted with their nuclear and missile technologies.

**Missile Defense**

The Bush administration’s “loss aversion” heuristic concerning nuclear deterrence made them suspicious of Reagan’s arms reduction treaty with Gorbachev. The same “loss aversion” heuristic also affected their views on missile defense. Being adherents to the tenets of MAD, the Bush administration rejected the SDI because it undermined deterrence. However, one of the outcomes of the Gulf War was a realization of how close the regime in Iraq was to achieving a nuclear capability, and Saddam Hussein’s willingness to launch missiles at Israel made the Bush administration reconsider the benefits of establishing a limited missile-defense system. Thus, in 1992, the Bush administration developed an initiative known as the Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS). Taking advantage of the improved relationship with Russia, the Bush administration even established the Russian American Observation and Satellite (RAMOS) program, which was a joint scientific research program dealing with missile defense. Given that missile defense was such a divisive issue, Bush and Gorbachev determined to set the issue aside while START II was finalized. However, a US-Russian working group consisting of low level officials continued meeting. The idea was that this group would work out the details of a joint missile defense program for implementation after START was signed. When Bush lost the election to Clinton, however, the missile defense issue would need to be handled under different leadership.

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When the Clinton administration took control, they viewed the issue from a completely
different perspective. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin believed that missile defense should be
theater-focused to protect troops in the field. To this end, the Clinton administration shut down
discussions with the Russians on development of GPALS, and they invested instead in the
cheaper Theater Missile Defense (TMD) program. According to Goldgeier and McFaul, the
Clinton administration wanted to pursue a “demarcation” agreement in which TMD was pursued
in such a way that it did not threaten the 1972 ABM Treaty and kept the Russians comfortable in
ratifying the START II treaty. Also, the Clinton administration wanted to conduct negotiations
to develop a START III treaty with even further strategic arms reductions.526

As he entered his second term office, Clinton made achieving these goals a priority for
his national security team. In March 1997, Clinton and Yeltsin met in Helsinki to discuss arms
control. After intense negotiations, the two sides reached an agreement on two fundamental
issues that seemed to portent eventual agreement. First, both sides agreed to a “demarcation”
definition that delineated the difference between a TMD and an ABM capability. If the ground-
based interceptor did not exceed 3 kilometers per second and the target missile had a range of
less than 3,500 kilometers, then the system was considered TMD not in violation of the 1972
ABM Treaty. Second, both sides agreed to begin START III negotiations as soon as the Russian
Duma ratified the START II treaty. The goal for START III was to reduce the total number of
nuclear warheads another 1,000 from the START II levels, which would leave both sides at
around 2,500 total warheads. Thus, despite US and Russian domestic political pressure, security
cooperation continued to move forward, but it moved forward on nothing but the personal
relationship between Clinton and Yeltsin.

Outside of that personal relationship, the US-Russia relationship was faltering. The Duma refused to ratify START II, and the US Congress’s increased its demand for sanctions on Russia for cooperating with Iran. Also, the US Congress, acting on information from the *Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States* drafted under the auspices of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, passed in March the National Missile Defense Act of 1999.\(^{527}\) The law mandated US policy “to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.”\(^{528}\) Although driven by Republican hardliners in the US Congress, the act passed in bipartisan fashion with a 97-3 vote. The domestic situation in both countries was surpassing Clinton and Yeltsin’s personal relationship. However, the economic collapse of 1998 and the subsequent Kosovo crisis ended comprehensive cooperation and paved the way for the rise of Vladimir Putin.

**Economic Collapse**

The 1998 collapse of the Russian economy was a political setback from which even the personal relationship between Clinton and Yeltsin could not recover. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy had suffered inflation as the Russian Central Bank merely printed money to pay its debts. After the new Russian Constitution was passed in December 1993, Yeltsin gained control of the Central Bank and forbade them from printing money to pay debt obligations. However, while this controlled inflation, Russia still confronted


the problem of paying its debts—a problem compounded by the government’s refusal to collect taxes from corporations run by oligarchs. According to Goldgeier and McFaul, Russian “companies paid less than 10 percent of money owed to the government in 1997.”

To meet the debt obligations, Russia employed several stop-gap measures to survive. First, the Russian government borrowed exceedingly large amounts of money from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: $4.25 billion by the summer of 1998. When those funds proved insufficient, the Russian government saved money by not paying money owed to state employees. Third, the Russian government created a debt instrument known as gosudarstvenkiye kratkosrochiniye obligatzii (GKO), which was a short-term bond instrument in which investors bought bonds that matured in 60 to 90 days with very high interest rates. Although unsound as a macro-economic monetary practice (very similar to the infamous Ponzi scheme), the GKO was effective in short-term stabilization of the ruble and bringing in much needed revenues. Yeltsin knew the GKO was unsustainable, but he was only trying to stabilize the economic situation until the Russian Duma could reform its tax code in a way that would replace the fictitious GKO revenue with real revenue.

In this way, Kiriyenko came to office confronting a major economic crisis, and he immediately reached out to the IMF for more funding. The IMF, however, was becoming disillusioned with Russian economic reforms. Other countries receiving IMF loans were required to meet rigid fiscal policy requirements. In the case of Russia, the IMF wanted Russia to finally correct its tax policy, which was not popular with politicians in the Russian Duma.

529 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 216.
530 Ibid., 217.
531 Ibid., 217.
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration, believing Russia was too big to fail, pressured the IMF to provide the funds without demonstrated internal reforms. A compromise was reached when “the Russian government agreed to implement a 5 percent sales tax, increase the land tax, restructure the corporate tax, force companies to pay utility bills and taxes or face bankruptcy, and cut the budget deficit from 5.6 percent to 2.8 percent of GDP.” Given this commitment to change its tax code, the IMF, in conjunction with the World Bank and Japan, agreed to a massive bailout of $22.6 billion. The package was to be distributed in three tranches with the first tranche consisting of $5.6 billion in the summer of 1998. However, when the Duma did not follow through on Yeltsin and Kiriyenko’s pledge to reform the tax code and failed to pass legislation, the IMF responded by severely limiting its initial tranche to $4.8 billion.

While Kiriyenko and the IMF were haggling over the details of the bailout, investors lost confidence in the GKO, and they ceased buying the bond. In other words, the Ponzi scheme began to collapse. Investors began cashing in their GKO’s in an effort to get as much return as possible before the Russian ruble completely collapsed. In mid-August, the Russian stock market lost 25 percent of its value. To deal with the collapse, the Russians resorted to their old methodology of printing more money, which drove up inflation. Moreover, they placed a three-month moratorium on foreign investors calling in GKO bonds. This resulted in a further loss of confidence in the Russian economy. However, the most significant challenge caused by the collapse of the GKO was that Russia’s banks were invested as well: “Most of these large Russian banks also held billions in GKOs. The combination of holding worthless government debt, dollar-denominated debt to outside lenders, and forward contracts that they could not repay

532 Ibid., 228.
meant that most of these banks wen out of business.”  

By the end of 1998, the Russian ruble lost 71 percent of its value, and inflation was once again a problem. The Russian economic collapse was a significant event that had consequences on Russian foreign and security policy. It confirmed the anti-reform rhetoric of Russian hardliners such as Zyugnaov and Zhirinovsky, and increased the political prospects of hardliners already within the government such as Primakov, Mikhailiov, and Adamov. Thus, when Yeltsin removed Kiriyenko as prime minister in August 1998, after only six months in office, the Russian Duma refused to allow the re-appointment of Victor Chernomyrdin. Instead, Yeltsin was forced to promote Yevgeny Primakov from foreign minister to prime minister. Given his confrontational perspective vis-à-vis the West, the Russian Duma was eager to approve the appointment. Yeltsin’s pro-Western reform government was once again stymied, and this had significant effects as Europe struggled to deal with the crisis in Kosovo that was emerging just as the Russian economy was collapsing. From their perspective, it demonstrated the fact that the US was willing to step outside the bounds of international law and use NATO to further its imperial ambitions. If the 1998 economic collapse was evidence of a failure of Yeltsin’s economic policy, Kosovo would serve well to provide Russian hardliners evidence of his failed security policy.

**Loss Aversion 10: Protecting NATO Credibility**

From the seventh to the fourteenth century, Kosovo was a cultural center of Orthodox Christianity—under the Byzantine Empire in the earlier centuries and the Serbian Empire in the latter. However, at the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, the Ottoman Empire invaded Kosovo and gained

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533 Ibid., 231.
a costly victory against the Serbian army.\textsuperscript{534} This victory marked the beginning of five hundred years of Ottoman rule in Serbia. During that time, Muslim Turks and Albanians replaced Christian Serbs as the majority ethnic group.\textsuperscript{535} However, after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War One, Kosovo was returned to Serbia as an autonomous state within a greater Serbia. This arrangement was reaffirmed after World War Two when Serbia, with its Kosovo province, was incorporated into Yugoslavia under the Tito regime. However, at the end of the Cold War, old antagonisms were manipulated for political gain.

Slobodan Milošević used nationalism to secure power in Serbia; and as Yugoslavia began its slow process of murderous disintegration, Milošević used historical imagery to inflame nationalist passions and gain support for his political aims. In a June 1989 speech, he invoked the Battle of Kosovo to mark a time when “the tragic disunity in the leadership of the Serbian state” resulted in a defeat for the Serbian people.\textsuperscript{536} As far as the Muslims living in Kosovo, Milošević ostensibly accepted the reality that Serbia was a multicultural state, and he was “truly convinced that [multiculturalism] was its advantage.” However, multiculturalism should not trump Serb unity. From Milošević’s perspective, Serb unity was “a necessary condition for its


\textsuperscript{535} As Tim Judah notes in his book on the Kosovo conflict, the demographic history of Kosovo is a hotly contested subject. Albanians claim that Illyrians, an ethnic group associated with their anthropological origins, were a majority long before Serbs occupied the land. Even historians who specialize in Balkans history struggle indeed on this topic, though the majority seem to accept that Serbians were the majority prior to 1389. However, the consensus seems to be that there was a larger minority of Albanians than Serb nationalists want to acknowledge.

economic and social prosperity.” Unfortunately for the Muslim majority in Kosovo, Milošević’s vision for Serbian unity, influenced largely by a Serbian nationalist intelligentsia, entailed the elimination of Kosovo’s historical autonomy and complete submission to his regime in Belgrade.537

Using these historical artifacts as pretext, Milošević’s government amended the Serbian constitution to remove much of Kosovo’s autonomy in September 1990.538 In addition, the Serbs passed a plethora of anti-Albanian laws: prohibition on Albanians buying land from Serbs, monetary incentives for Serbs to return to Kosovo, and removal of Albanians from public sector jobs.539 Consequently, the following year Albanian leaders in Kosovo conducted a referendum and declared independence. They elected Ibrahim Rugova from the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) as leader. Over the next year, tensions between Belgrade and Pristina increased, and Milošević threatened a full-scale military response. However, Rugova’s commitment to non-violence as Kosovo’s path helped prevent an immediate conflict. Furthermore, in December 1992, Bush sent a demarche to Milošević informing him that the “United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper” to prevent a military response.540 The Bush team worried that Serbian aggression against their rebellious province would cause the conflict to spread with Albania entering the war on the side of Kosovar Muslims. Given that Serbia tempered its response to Kosovo in 1992, Bush’s “Christmas

537 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 47–50.
539 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 62.
Démarche” seemed to prevent Milošević from sending in his military forces. In any case, Milošević was so preoccupied with the conflict against Bosnia and Croatia that he had little time to deal with the Kosovo issue.

NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 brought all the competing parties to the negotiating table in Dayton, Ohio and ended the Bosnian War. The Clinton team convinced Milošević, Tuđman, and Izetbegović to agree on a peace accord that created a new state known as Federation of Bosnian-Herzegovina. Because the Kosovo issue was too contentious and threatened to derail the negotiations, the Dayton Accords failed to deal with the ongoing issue in Kosovo. Unlike Bosnia and Croatia, Kosovo was not an autonomous republic within the old Yugoslavia. Instead, it was a province within the Serbian republic. In this way, many US diplomats thought that the Kosovo issue was an internal Serbian problem. Therefore, from 1995 to 1998, the Kosovo problem festered as the regime in Belgrade suppressed Muslim Kosovar protests with violence and arrests.

Within the context of increasingly nationalist Serbian policies, Rugova’s inability to find a political solution to the impasse decreased his legitimacy among his fellow compatriots. Thus, the more hardline elements within the LDK, as represented by men such as Bujar Bukoshi and Xhafer Shatri, began working with other extremists to form a militant group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA was more offensive-minded, and they engaged in terrorist tactics in pursuit of their objectives. In February 1998, the KLA secured much needed weaponry when they attacked a national armory in Drenica, which enabled an immediate offensive operation against Serbian forces stationed in the area. During the subsequent clash,

541 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 91–93.
542 Ibid., 110–113.
which lasted for several months, the Serbian military responded brutally. Approximately 800 Kosovars were killed and more than 200,000 were internally displaced during the initial fighting.\(^\text{543}\) As a result, international concern over Kosovo increased, and the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1160 which placed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia; also known as “Rump Yugoslavia”) and called on all parties to negotiate a peace agreement.

For the Clinton administration, the situation in Kosovo seemed to be a Bosnia redux; and as Bosnia had done six years earlier, it created policy dilemmas vis-à-vis European security.\(^\text{544}\) Clinton’s first concern was to maintain the legitimacy of NATO. From 1993 to 1995, Clinton reacted slowly to the Balkans conflict, which raised questions among international observers about the relevance of NATO after the Cold War. After all other alternatives were exhausted, Clinton eventually led NATO in its Bosnian intervention and maintained its relevancy. He then protected NATO’s expanded endowment by admitting the Visegrad states as permanent members of NATO even though it had negative implications for his Russia policy. In 1998, NATO was about to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary and had just signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Thus, Clinton had good reason for feeling optimistic about the future. Accomplishing these objectives was a monumental task that represented the essence of his desired foreign policy legacy—enlarging NATO and thus averting the potential loss of democracy in Central Europe, while simultaneously supporting Russian reformers from recidivists who were unhappy about US security policy in Europe. It was a delicate balancing

\(^{543}\) Michael MccGuire, *International Affairs (76)* 1, 4.
act, and the situation in Kosovo threatened to tip the balance by discrediting NATO, whose future he secured the previous year with enlargement and the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

According to Talbott, Clinton still wanted to maintain “some form of partnership with Russia” by finding a diplomatic solution to settle the conflict, but these efforts proved to be just as fruitless as the efforts for a diplomatic solution in Bosnia. In May 1998, the Clinton administration directed Christopher Hill, US Ambassador to Macedonia, to facilitate talks between Rugova and Milošević, but the two sides could not come to an agreement. With the failure of these talks, the US was still committed to working with Russia through the UN to develop a political solution. According to declassified notes from a May NSC principals meeting, all participants agreed that “working with Russia and other Security Council members, the US should seek a UNSC resolution endorsing international observers in Kosovo, if possible under Chapter VII.” Specifically, the Clinton team wanted Article 42 of Chapter VII, which authorized the use of force to secure international peace and security. The Russians were firmly against a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force.

By July, the Clinton national security team was beginning to come to terms with the necessity to intervene without explicit UN approval. According to NSC notes, all the principals agreed “to make a major effort to elicit British, French, and German assurance that they would, if necessary, participate in NATO action without United Nations authorization. To this end, NSA [National Security Adviser] Berger and Secretary [of State] Albright will contact counterparts, stressing the unacceptability of permitting Russia to veto effectively critical NATO actions in

545 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 299.
Europe.” Clinton administration officials did not want a replay of the Bosnian debacle because it brought into question the existence of NATO. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the administration’s most vocal advocate for the Kosovo intervention, said that action was necessary for “reaffirming NATO’s core purpose as a defender of democracy, stability and human decency on European soil,” and she warned her European colleagues that their predecessors “delayed as Bosnia burned, and history will not be kind to us if we do the same.”

In an interview with Goldgeier and McFaul, Leon Feurth, national security adviser to Al Gore, said, “There was a conscious decision made that the issue toward NATO was existential and we would have to proceed whether the Russians liked it or not.”

Tim Judah, a reporter on the ground during Kosovo, argues “that NATO could not afford to lose. If it did, its credibility would be devastated.” In his memoir, the US military commander leading the Kosovo operation, General Wesley Clarke, also understood how Kosovo affected NATO’s credibility: “This conflict about Kosovo became a test of NATO’s role in post-Cold War Europe. NATO itself was at risk of irrelevance or simply falling apart following a defeat. Even those governments that could have survived operational failure could not afford to lose NATO.”

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549 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose, 251.

550 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 236.

While the US developed its response options, the Serbian military continued its brutal counterinsurgency campaign in Kosovo, and the Clinton administration came under increasing pressure from the press to prevent another Bosnia. According to a June 1998 article from the Washington Post editorial board, the Serbian approach to counterinsurgency was “destroying villages, killing civilians and turning thousands of men, women and children into refugees,” and they made comparisons between Kosovo and the US’s dithering response in Bosnia:

US policy in the past three months has been a confusing mixture of sanctions threatened, imposed, and withdrawn. Such sanctions are in any case mostly beside the point; only the credible threat of force, and the use of force if necessary, can deter Milošević. The United States can intervene now, as it has said it would. Or, as in Bosnia, it can be forced to intervene later, after much damage has been done and any solution is far more difficult.  

In a *New York Times* article, journalist Jane Perlez wrote, “NATO indecision about whether to act against a three-month-old offensive in Kosovo by President Slobodan Milošević of Yugoslavia has severely threatened the credibility of the alliance and almost insured a winter-long human catastrophe.” A Canadian journalist was more candid in his assessment when he wrote, “The wily and conscienceless Milošević has made monkeys out of us again and the tragedy of Bosnia is about to be repeated. In spades.”

Under this negative spotlight, US Secretary of Defense Cohen conceded that, “NATO’s credibility is on the line.”

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In September 1998, the UN Security Council finally used Chapter VII authorities and issued resolution 1199. The resolution demanded five conditions from Serbia:

1) Cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression;

2) Enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo . . . including access and complete freedom of movement of such monitors . . . and expeditious issuance of appropriate travel documents to international personnel contributing to the monitoring;

3) Facilitate . . . the safe return of refugees and displaced persons . . . and allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo;

4) Make rapid progress to a clear timetable . . . with the Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolution 1160, with the aim of . . . finding a political solution to the problems of Kosovo.  

In a memorandum to Clinton, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger noted that the resolution “helps to create the political basis for the use of force for many of our Allies, but it does not explicitly authorize the use of force.” Instead, the resolution promised “to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region.” Given the looming Russian veto, this was the best the US could expect. Furthermore, Yeltsin made clear that Russia would never support a military intervention in Kosovo; therefore, trying to get something more explicit from the Security Council was a useless endeavor because of the Russian veto. Talbott relates in his memoir a conversation in which Yeltsin was “nearly unhinged on the subject of Kosovo,” and he declared “emphatically, the use of force would be

inadmissible and forbidden.” But from the US perspective, it was enough of an opening to provide a level of legitimacy to a NATO military intervention.

Prodded by the US, NATO finally issued an action order to intervene in October, but Milošević made a last-minute concession to avert the strikes. As part of the Contact Group, the same group that had negotiated over the Bosnian War, Clinton dispatched Richard Holbrooke to negotiate with Milošević. As they were a part of the Contact Group, Russia supported Holbrooke’s October 1998 meeting in which he expressed that the US’s patience had run out. Russia did not mind tough talk as long as it did not lead to action. In any case, Holbrooke’s visit led to Milošević agreeing to NATO access to airspace over Kosovo for surveillance, the introduction of 2,000 civilian monitors, the return of Kosovars forcibly removed from their homes, and the beginning of a political process to grant Kosovo more autonomy. Milošević had no intention of complying with the concession, but it bought him more time. As long as there was a semblance of diplomatic progress, Milošević figured NATO would not bomb. However, in January, the media reported that the Serbian military had killed 45 unarmed Kosovars in Račak. This event prompted NATO towards action, but the West would use negotiations at Rambouillet, France to give the Serbs one last chance to comply with international demands.

The political process for granting Kosovo more autonomy in February at Rambouillet and lasted until the middle of March. The talks turned out to be a failure. According to Talbott, the US wanted Kosovo to remain a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and a “restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy for an interim period until its final status could be determined by a

referendum.” Any final settlement would “be enforced by a peacekeeping operation backed by the full force of NATO.” For the Kosovars, US and NATO insistence that Kosovo remain a part of Serbia was difficult to accept. On the other hand, the Serbians had difficulties with a deployment of NATO troops for enforcement purposes, which they and Russia believed was a violation of their sovereign rights. After much diplomatic pressure, the Kosovars agreed to remain part of FRY as long as their autonomy was returned. However, on March 23, Serbia rejected the Rambouillet agreement. Although the NATO force was certainly a non-starter for Milošević, the reality was that Serbian negotiators were never serious about negotiations. It was a tactic out of the playbook from Bosnia. Pretend to negotiate while the atrocities continued. This time, however, the Serbs miscalculated Western resolve.

**Critical Security Decision: Intervene in Kosovo**

On the precipice of the fiftieth anniversary of NATO, Clinton would not let NATO’s relevance be questioned because of the Kosovo crisis. He determined to lead NATO into a conflict with only marginal legality. Unlike in the early 1990s, he was not hindered about doubts concerning allied support. In fairness, the circumstances were different in that the UK and France did not have troops in Kosovo as they had had in Bosnia in 1994. However, Clinton was clearly of a different mindset in the spring of 1999. Only hours before Operation Allied Force commenced, Clinton called Yeltsin to try to explain why the action was necessary. Yeltsin would not listen. He felt betrayed considering how he had worked so hard to cooperate with the West. Now, according to Talbott’s recollection, it was “going to be practically impossible to keep [Russian policy] headed in that direction.”

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560 Ibid., 305.
topics, Clinton offered no concession to ease the Russian angst. In a fit of anger, Yeltsin hung up on Clinton who lamented to Talbott that “something pretty basic is broken and it’ll take a lot of fixing.” Given the choice between the loss of Russia or the loss of NATO, he chose the loss of Russia.

On March 24, 1999, Operation Allied Force began with the objective of forcing Serbia to adhere to UN Resolution 1199 and the demands communicated at the failed Rambouillet negotiations. The air operation was much larger than Operation Deliberate Force four years earlier. For the next 78 days, NATO used 1,031 aircraft to launch 10,484 strike sorties in which 28,236 air munitions were delivered. Furthermore, NATO serviced 218 targets with US and UK Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles. With NATO engaging in military operations, its credibility was even more on the line than prior to the commencement of operations. It was one thing not to intervene due to political considerations. It was a totally different scenario to decide to overcome those political obstacles, intervene, and fail. Russia asserted the illegality of the decision to intervene. According to Mark Weber, “Victor Chernomyrdin, Russia’s Balkan envoy, argued that the bombing clashed with international law, the Helsinki agreements, and the entire world order that took shape after World War Two.” Yegor Gaidar, one of the most pro-Western figures in Russian domestic politics, called Talbott in March expressing his dismay with the decision: “Oh, Strobe, if only you knew what a disaster this war is for those of us in Russia

562 Mark Webber, *International Affairs* (85) 3, 450.
563 Ibid., 450.
564 Ibid., 451.
who want for our country what you want.” However, it was after the bombing ended that US-Russian tensions climaxed.

In an effort to finally end the bombing, Yeltsin brought Chernomyrdin out of forced retirement to act as Russia’s special envoy for peace negotiations. Yeltsin believed Chernomyrdin’s close relationship with the Clinton administration, established through interactions on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, would increase the probability of success. After meeting with Talbott, the US lead negotiator, Chernomyrdin suggested bringing on a third-party negotiator who was not aligned with the US, Russia, or Serbia. They chose President Ahtisarri of Finland. He could serve as the public face for any Milošević concession, thereby saving him from embarrassment. Around this time, Yeltsin made another political move. He fired Primakov as prime minister and hired Sergei Stepashin, a more reform minded politician and the third prime minister in less than a year. Yeltsin realized that his time in office was coming to a close; and given the loud voices in the Russian Duma who wanted to prosecute Yeltsin for allowing NATO enlargement, he wanted to prevent future difficulties by putting his own people in power. Of course, ending the Kosovo conflict in a way that was amenable to Russian interests was an important step to prevent such an outcome.

From May to early June 1999, Talbott and Ahtisarri used Chernomyrdin as a conduit to negotiate with Milošević. In the early stages of the discussions, the sticking point was whether NATO troops would be allowed in Kosovo as part of a deal. After strong resistance, however, Talbott and Ahtisarri’s message finally got through to Chernomyrdin and Milošević. As a non-negotiable condition for cessation of bombing, all Serbian troops would withdraw from Kosovo and a NATO implementation force would deploy. However, once this point was accepted, the

trickiest disagreement emerged. Russia would be part of the implementation force, but they refused to be under NATO command. On the other hand, NATO was happy to have Russia’s participation, but only under NATO command. As a compromise, Russia offered to divide Kosovo into a NATO sector and Russia sector. Considering this a recipe for further ethnic division, Talbott, backed by Western governments, refused the compromise. Chernomyrdin pleaded with Talbott to reconsider his position saying, “You’ve got to find a way out of this for us, Strobe. If President Yeltsin agrees to subordinate Russian troops to the alliance which has been waging this war, the impeachment process against him will start all over again.”\textsuperscript{566} In the end, all three decided not to address the command structure in the final document outlining the terms for NATO suspending its operations. The details of the command structure could be worked out at lower levels after the bombing stopped. When Milošević received the terms, endorsed by his perceived Russian ally, he accepted the deal. On June 10, 1999, NATO stopped its bombing campaign and began preparations for sending in its implementation force.

The Russian Ministry of Defense, however, never fully accepted the Kosovo deal. Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev sent General Leonid Ivashov with Chernomyrdin as the military representative for the peace negotiations. Throughout the entire negotiating process, he undermined Chernomyrdin’s efforts. Talbott reports that the two men were often heard arguing loudly in an adjacent room during breaks. When Chernomyrdin was about to sign the final document outlining the terms to be delivered to Milosević, Ivashov stated publicly that he did not support Chernomyrdin’s concessions even though Yeltsin chose him as his lead negotiator.

As a result of this internal disagreement, the infamous race to Pristina started, and it was a fitting representation of the state of relations between the US and Russia. In subsequent

\textsuperscript{566} Victor Chernomyrdin quoted by Strobe Talbott, \textit{The Russia Hand}, 320.
negotiations with US state department representative Victoria Nuland, Ivashov explicitly stated that if NATO moved its troops stationed in Macedonia across the border into Kosovo without a deal on command relationships, Russia would send its troops in from Bosnia in the north. When the Russians found out that NATO planned to cross the border on June 12, Russian Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, in conjunction with Ivashov, ordered the Russian troops in Bosnia to begin their movement to Pristina the day prior. According to Talbott, who happened to be flying back to Washington, the entire Russian movement was being broadcast on CNN. He immediately turned the plan around to find out what happened.

When Talbott got back to Russia, he found a Russian government in complete disarray. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov was completely against the action, and he actively worked with Talbott on how to diffuse the situation. Sergeyev seemed to know that the movement was occurring, but he was confused as to the circumstances of the movement. He seemed to think that the movement was a response to NATO already moving forward without a deal. Furthermore, it seemed that neither Sergeyev, Ivashov, or Kvashnin had full command and control of the Russian convoy. According to Talbott’s recollection of his conversation with Sergeyev, he looked “acutely uncomfortable” when he learned from CNN that Russian troops had reached Belgrade. He promised that Russia would not cross the border into Kosovo; but by 4 a.m. on the morning of June 12, CNN was reporting that the Russian troops were at the airport. Given that NATO was scheduled to depart Macedonia for Pristina at 5:30 a.m., the situation was very tense. When NATO forces arrived at the airport later that day, a stand-off occurred centering on who controlled the airport.

Talbott argues that the entire situation was due to Kvashnin and Ivashov’s attempts to undermine the government. “Their repeated and fallacious claims,” Talbott relates, “that NATO
had already deployed were a smokescreen for Russia to preempt. In pulling this stunt, Kvashnin and Ivashov disregarded the objections of the minister of foreign affairs and very likely, judging from the sound of a ruckus coming from Sergeyv’s office, the minister of defense as well.”

The issue was finally resolved on June 13 when Clinton telephoned Yeltsin. During their conversation, Yeltsin conceded to NATO commanding the implementation force. The problem was solved, but it was clear that Yeltsin was not in full control of Russia’s government, and this had consequences for arms control negotiations.

The Rise of Putin and Fall of Security Cooperation

The Kosovo War marked the end to Yeltsin’s time in office for two reasons. First, his inability to prevent NATO intervention completely discredited his leadership. As evidenced by the debacle at the Pristina Airport and the inability to prevent Russian ministries from providing nuclear technology to Iran, the hardliners were increasingly in control of security decisions in the Kremlin. Second, Yeltsin’s health was deteriorating to the point of dysfunction. Talbott reports that Yeltsin showed up to a June 1999 meeting in Cologne looking very ill and interrupting the meeting with coughing fits. In essence, he was broken both politically and physically. Yeltsin, however, wanted to move the US-Russian relationship beyond Kosovo and committed to Clinton at Cologne to reinvigorate START III negotiations and consider modifications to the ABM Treaty. Given the pressure for a national missile defense system in the US, the Clinton national security team was happy after the Cologne summit, but Yeltsin was making commitments he could not deliver.

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567 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 345.
569 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 352.
In the past, Yeltsin was able to appeal to populist sentiments for his survival. By 1999, the Russian public had lost confidence in Yeltsin. During his administration, they suffered many economic woes and a general loss of international prestige. They were nostalgic and longing for the days when Russia was feared and respected around the world. In these circumstances, ultra-conservative politicians scored easy political points by promising to prosecute Yeltsin for crimes. If these individuals came to power after he left office, there was a fear “that [Yeltsin] would spend his final days in jail.”

Yeltsin’s inner circle led by his daughter Tatyana Yeltsin, chief of staff Valentin Yumashev, and oligarch Boris Berezovsky were advising him to establish a strong successor who could resist political opponents. Although he supported Yeltsin’s pro-Western reform policies, Sergei Stepashin was considered too weak to stop political opponents from prosecuting Yeltsin.

Berezovsky, a Russian oligarch who had made his fortune in Russia’s burgeoning automobile, oil, and television industries, recommended Vladimir Putin as a replacement to Stepashin. Putin was a former Soviet KGB agent; and as the Soviet Union collapsed, he chose politics as his new profession. In 1990, Putin secured a political appointment as a Leningrad deputy city councilman where he impressed Berezovsky by refusing a bribe, which was a common practice at the time. The two men maintained a close relationship throughout the 1990s. Berezovsky deemed Putin loyal, tough, efficient, and, most importantly, not allied to Yeltsin’s opponents. In August 1999, Yeltsin made the decision to replace Stepashin with Putin. In this way, Yeltsin chose a man whose ideology was the need to preserve Russia’s greatness through a strong central government. This not to say that he wanted to revert to the failed

centralized state economy. On the contrary, Putin embraced capitalism, but it must be a
capitalism guided by a strong sovereign. In terms of security policy, he took an approach like
Primakov. He was willing to cooperate with the US where it was advantageous to Russia, but he
would not allow the country to be pushed around as it had been throughout the 1990s. When
Yeltsin resigned in December 1999, Putin became the acting Russian president until national
elections occurred in the spring of 2000.

This had implications for Clinton as he tried to follow through on both the National
Missile Defense system and a continuation of START III negotiations. Clinton reached out to
Vladimir Putin to set conditions for achievement of a milestone arms control treaty similar to
what every president since 1972 had achieved. He wanted to convince him to agree to a
modification of the 1972 ABM Treaty to allow the establishment of a US National Missile
Defense system with interceptor sites located in Alaska and North Dakota. Clinton was not
enthusiastic about such a move, but the politics surrounding the National Missile Defense Act of
1999 was forcing him in this direction. In return for Putin’s cooperation on missile defense,
Clinton promised to a START III commitment to drop the strategic nuclear arsenal to 1,500
warheads, which was significantly lower than the limits agreed to in the still unratified START II
treaties. Putin rejected the deal. In January 2000, Putin sent Ivanov to Washington with a
compromise. Russia agreed to allow the US one missile defense system in Alaska to defend
against the emerging threat from North Korea; however, Ivanov made it clear that Russia did not
agree to the North Dakota site or any move towards a US comprehensive missile defense system.
After he won the Russian election in March 2000, the Russian Duma finally approved START II.
However, Putin made clear that any US move towards a comprehensive missile defense system

572 Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 381.
would result in Russia leaving START II. Thus, Russia’s agreement to START II was in reality a way to force the US to abandon its national missile defense efforts. Putin never engaged in START III negotiations with Clinton.

**Conclusion**

The inability to follow through on a major arms control treaty was major disappointment to Bill Clinton. According to Goldgeier and McFaul, “he was the first president since the era of arms control deals began not to get one. On this score, even his Republican predecessors had done better.” In many ways, it was a classical tragedy. From the beginning of his candidacy, Clinton wanted to support Russia’s incorporation into the community of democratic nations. However, he had a “loss aversion” heuristic that prompted him to focus on securing the future of NATO over fostering Russia’s democratic transition. When NATO’s credibility was threatened in 1995, he chose to intervene in the Balkans. Considering the newly independent states an expansion of the NATO endowment, he chose to pursue the enlargement of NATO in 1997 despite the fact that it weakened Yeltsin politically. In 1999, Clinton wanted to end his presidency with a landmark arms control treaty; however, Yeltsin was weakened so much physically and politically that such a treaty was impossible. The consequences of Clinton’s policies were realized. To be sure, the collapse of Yeltsin’s reform government had other causes—economic calamities being the most prominent. However, Clinton’s security decisions vis-à-vis European security were certainly a contributing factor.

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Chapter 6 - Conclusion

From Putin’s rise to now, US-Russian security cooperation has had mixed results. Over the objections of the Russians, the George W. Bush administration withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty in December 2001 but succeeded in negotiating the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2003, which reduced the total number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads from START II’s 3,500 mark to 1,700-2,200.574 In 2010, the Barack Obama administration resurrected the never ratified START II and achieved New START, which reduced the respective nuclear arsenals “to 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 700 long-range delivery systems—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers.”575 However, these successes in security cooperation were mixed with disturbing examples of confrontation as evidenced by Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, 2012 invasion of Ukraine and the Crimea, US-Russian competition over the ongoing Syrian Civil War, and the recently reported ongoing undermining of the 1987 INF Treaty.576 To understand why the East-West rivalry survived the end of the Cold War, one must understand the impact of US foreign policy on the Russian mindset.

In a 2007 article in Survival, historian John Lewis Gaddis compares US foreign policy decisions from 1989 to 1999 to the way the Allies handled a defeated Germany after 1918, which established conditions for the outbreak of World War Two. In the article, Gaddis suggests that

the decision to enlarge NATO was “arrogant” and “short-sighted, for it assumes that defeated adversaries no longer have choice . . . Russia has no choice but to accept what NATO has decided to do—having swallowed the loss of their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany and the eventual break-up of the former Soviet Union itself, their only alternative with respect to enlarging the alliance is to gulp and swallow again.”

To be sure, these were indeed the only options available to the Russians, and they subsequently exercised choices that were detrimental to US security objectives.

In repeated conversations, Yeltsin’s national security team tried unsuccessfully to communicate to the US that enlarging NATO would have negative consequences for the future. However, the Clinton team dismissed these concerns as unreasonable. According to Talbott, “Russia had habitually defined its own security at the expense of others”; many Russians seemed incapable of feeling secure unless others felt insecure.” In this comment, Talbott is guilty of “begging the question” because he assumes that the Russians should not fear NATO based on a US proclamation of its goodwill. Because Clinton decreed that NATO was no longer a threat, Russia was supposed to dismiss all of its security concerns. However, this was an unrealistic expectation because one can turn Talbott’s logic around and proclaim that the US and NATO should not feel secure unless the Russians felt insecure. Prospect theory offers a way to understand how decision-makers become blind to the logical inconsistencies of their policy positions.

578 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, 260.
The Fourfold Pattern and US European Security Policy

In Chapter 1, Kahneman’s prospect theory was presented as a possible lens for viewing US European security policy decisions from 1989 to 1999. The central idea of prospect theory is that the prospect of loss trumps utility in decision-making. Thus, decision-makers make choices relative to the domains of gain and loss. The human inclination to avoid losses causes them to inaccurately consider the probabilities of outcomes. In this way, Kahneman’s research suggests that humans are vulnerable to “certainty effect” and “possibility effect.” According to this logic, the “certainty effect” is represented by the human tendency to underestimate the certainty of high-probability events in decision-making. Conversely, the “possibility effect” is represented by the human tendency to overestimate improbable events. Kahneman combined all the aspects of his research to develop the “four-fold pattern” on decision-making. He utilized four illustrative scenarios to demonstrate how the “certainty effect” and “possibility effect” are related in the domains of gain and loss:

Table 4. The Fourfold Pattern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GAINS</th>
<th>LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH PROBABILITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>Certainty Effect</strong></td>
<td><strong>Certainty Effect</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95% chance to win $10,000</td>
<td>95% chance to lose $10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fear of disappointment</td>
<td>Hope to avoid loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RISK AVERSE</td>
<td>RISK SEEKING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accept unfavorable settlement</td>
<td>Reject favorable settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOW PROBABILITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>Possibility Effect</strong></td>
<td><strong>Possibility Effect</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5% chance to win $10,000</td>
<td>5% chance to lose $10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hope of large gain</td>
<td>Fear of large loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RISK SEEKING</td>
<td>RISK AVERSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reject favorable settlement</td>
<td>Accept unfavorable settlement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The “four-fold pattern” is helpful in analyzing the four critical security decisions discussed in this dissertation. Key terms are italicized to help demonstrate the connection to Kahneman’s illustrative scenarios ideas in Table 4 above.
Critical Security Decision 1: Secure NATO through “Two Plus Four”

If one were to apply the “four-fold pattern” to the US decision about a reunified Germany’s membership in NATO, it seems that the decision-making analysis operated in the upper-right quadrant. From the US perspective, the future of NATO was at risk due to the rise of the “Green Party” in Germany and the passage of the Single European Act of 1987. With the extraordinary pace and depth of change occurring from 1989 to 1990, the US discerned a high probability for the Soviets to exploit the dynamic political milieu to convince a reunified Germany to reject NATO (loss) if reunification negotiations gave the Soviets a voice. To prevent this outcome, the US decided to take control of the process of reunification through the “Two Plus Four” negotiations because it gave Helmut Kohl the political space he needed to ensure that Germany remained in NATO after reunification. This was risk-seeking behavior because it jeopardized Gorbachev’s reform project. In the end, the US rejected a favorable settlement of increased East-West cooperation for the satisficing status quo of the NATO endowment. Although the Bush administration was able to achieve historic arms control negotiations after German reunification, the loss of the Warsaw Pact was a severe political setback for Gorbachev as evidenced by the 1992 coup attempt. The US success in insuring that a reunified Germany remained in NATO undercut Gorbachev’s ability to reform the Soviet Union and eventually contributed to its dissolution.

Critical Security Decision 2: Intervene in Bosnia

When Bill Clinton came to office, his decision-making analysis seems to have operated in the upper-left quadrant of the “four-fold pattern.” Highly critical of Bush’s handling of Russia’s democratic transformation, Clinton determined that increased US support of Russia would result in a high probability of ending the East-West rivalry. To this end, his European security policy
was closely associated with Yeltsin and his fellow reformers, and the fear of “losing Russia” made Clinton *risk averse* to any policy that might destabilize Yeltsin. However, Clinton’s commitment to supporting Russian reformers clashed with his other stated priority of ending ethnic conflict in Bosnia. To resolve this conflict, Clinton engaged in *risk averse* decision behavior from 1993 to 1995 by choosing negotiations over military intervention in Bosnia. Thus, he was willing to *accept an unfavorable settlement* of continued conflict in Bosnia to support democratic transformation in Russia.

As the Bosnian violence increased, political and media criticism about the lack of a successful policy in Bosnia generated questions about the need of a post-Cold War NATO if it could not secure peace on the European continent. This development caused Clinton’s decision analysis to shift to the upper right quadrant of the “four-fold pattern.” If ethnic cleansing continued, Clinton appeared to calculate a *high probability* that NATO’s legitimacy would be lost. Therefore, he decided to engage in *risk seeking* behavior and intervene in Bosnia despite Russian objections. In this way, he *rejected a favorable outcome* of ending East-West rivalry by pursuing a policy that undercut Russian reformers but secured the NATO endowment.

**Critical Security Decision 3: Expand NATO at the Expense of Russian Relations**

After only a few months in office, key leaders from the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) states visited Clinton in Washington DC where they requested NATO membership to protect against future Russian aggression. Clinton was open to the possibility of NATO enlargement, but he was not as pessimistic about Russia’s future. Clinton suggested that it was possible to enlarge NATO in a way that it did not focus on Russian and perpetuate old stereotypes. Thus, Clinton was operating in the upper-left quadrant of the “four-fold pattern.” With the right European security policy (PRD 36), he calculated a *high probability* of enlarging...
NATO to include the CEE states and eventually the newly independent states (NIS)—including Russia—would lead to an integrated European security structure. To ensure that NATO enlargement occurred in a way that did not threaten Yeltsin, Clinton developed a *risk averse* enlargement policy that used the PfP as a first step in a gradual process for CEE accession into NATO and later the NIS. In doing so, he made a conscious decision to delay implementation of enlargement until after Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential election. Thus, he *accepted the unfavorable settlement of* delaying enlargement to ensure it did not subvert Yeltsin’s political prospects.

Despite this concession, the decision to delay enlargement did not satisfy Russian political leaders. Yeltsin complained about a piecemeal accession process that postponed NIS accession until after the CEE states, and hardliners in the Dumas viewed PfP membership as acceptable for small CEE states but insulting to a great power. They used Yeltsin’s foreign policy concessions to the US as political tools to achieve electoral gains in the Duma and to insist that reformers in Yeltsin’s government be replaced with more hardline politicians. Additionally, Yeltsin’s brutal military intervention in Chechnya caused international observers to question his commitment to democratic reform. Under these developments, Clinton’s decision analysis shifted to the upper-right quadrant of the “four-fold pattern.” Clinton assessed a *high probability* that Yeltsin’s replacement would be less reform minded. To *avoid the loss* of the CEE states to possible future Russian revanchism, Clinton engaged in *risk seeking* behavior by following through on NATO enlargement despite its consequences in Russia. In this way, he *rejected the favorable settlement* of ending the East-West rivalry. To be sure, Clinton tried to ameliorate the negative effects of enlargement through the NATO-Russia Founding Act and agreeing to delay Baltic accession into NATO, but he was committed to protecting the NATO endowment regardless of the consequences in Russia.
Critical Security Decision 4: Intervene in Kosovo

By the end of his second term in office, Clinton’s European security policy was in trouble. Although there were ostensible successes with NATO enlargement and the NATO Founding Act, these were pyrrhic victories because of the more substantive setbacks. Yeltsin won reelection in 1996, but he was severely weakened both politically and physically. His control of the Russian government was diminished as evidenced by his inability to prevent MINATOM from providing nuclear technology to Iran, and Yeltsin’s reformers were replaced with hardliners who were less willing to concede Russia’s security interests. In view of these developments, Clinton, under pressure from an increasingly hostile US Congress, reluctantly conceded that his European security policy could not be reconciled with the Russians. This concession had an impact on how he dealt with the eruption of ethnic conflict in Kosovo.

When ethnic conflict erupted in Kosovo in 1998, Clinton’s decision analysis was firmly situated in the upper-right quadrant of the “four-fold pattern.” Occurring around the time of NATO’s fiftieth anniversary, he deduced that failing to stop the conflict early would result in a high probability that NATO’s credibility would be lost. As a consequence, he wasted no time in leading NATO into an intervention that had only marginal UN approval. From the Russian perspective, the Kosovo intervention confirmed their worst fears; NATO was a tool through which the US exercised its unconstrained power to take advantage of Russia. Thus, despite Clinton’s sincere desire to include Russia in his European security policy, he was forced to engage in a risk seeking policy that rejected the favorable settlement of ending East-West rivalry.

Final Thoughts

Understanding the role that “loss aversion” plays in political decision-making is important because it helps leaders understand the cognitive motivations behind their choices. As
was mentioned in Chapter One, the “loss aversion” heuristic is not inherently good or bad. All of the worst-case scenarios envisioned by both the Bush and Clinton administrations may have been accurate. Including Russia in NATO may have destroyed the efficacy of a proven alliance structure. Not intervening in Bosnia and Kosovo may have destroyed the credibility of NATO, and a policy that left CEE states out of NATO might have made the vulnerable to future Russian revanchist policies in Eastern Europe. If so, engaging in “loss averse” decision-making was appropriate for protecting the security of Europe.

In the case of US European security policy from 1989 to 1999, it is not clear that decision-makers fully explored alternative courses of action. In each of the identified critical decisions, the worst-case assumptions were never fully examined. For example, when Gorbachev tried to discuss in the May 1990 Washington summit alternative security structures, Bush dismissed them as “screwy ideas” without even fully considering the prospect. He never proposed a summit devoted to discussing even the possibility of alternatives. On the contrary, he just assumed the worst-case scenario that including the Soviet Union in a pan-European structure would result in the loss of NATO. If an examination had occurred, the idea might have indeed been “screwy,” but there was no examination. If Bush had understood the power of the “loss aversion” heuristic on decision-making, perhaps he would have at least explored the possibility to confirm or deny his pre-existing assumption. Thus, Bush might have been influenced by Kahneman’s “possibility effect” by overestimating the possibility that discussions would result in the Soviets dividing NATO.

In contrast to Bush, Clinton was seemed open to more security cooperation with Russia, but his “loss aversion” heuristic caused him to proceed slowly. He was willing to eventually include Russia in NATO after they had participated in the PfP, but there were no serious discussions about whether the piecemeal approach was appropriate. This alienated the Russians, who believed their status as a historically great power made immediate accession into NATO a realistic proposition. Furthermore, the hesitation let external events in the Balkans force Clinton’s hand to choose the relevance of NATO over continued cooperation with Russia. If Clinton had understood the power of the “loss aversion” heuristic on decision-making, perhaps he would have explored the possibility of including Russia in NATO at an earlier stage.

In highlighting these alternative courses of action, I am not suggesting that either leader should have done something different. Instead, I am presenting the observation that the “loss aversion” heuristic diminished any desire to seriously explore increased security cooperation with Russia. The most that was ever considered was token security cooperation through the NACC, PfP, the PJC, and CSCE. These measures were presented to the Russians as “take it or leave it propositions.” Thus, for US leaders, the “loss aversion” heuristic dominated and the worst-case scenario was assumed. On one hand, these *critical decisions* may have been the best approach for European security in the 21st century. On the other hand, they may have been the catalyst for a self-fulfilling prophecy of continued East-West rivalry.
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