

**Diplomats and diplomacy: Assessing the influence of experience
in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy**

by

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B.S., Louisiana State University, 1988
M.S., Florida Institute of Technology, 1998
M.M.A., Marine Corps University, 2003

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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Abstract

In 2008, Ambassador's Neumann and Pickering wrote letters to Senator's Obama and McCain, with recommendations on qualifications for US Ambassador's. Both Senator's had recently received their party's nomination for President, and Neumann and Pickering took the opportunity to suggest qualifications they believed were necessary for US ambassadors to perform their diplomatic tasks better. Their letters suggested that career ambassadors perform better, and they recommended that political appointees be limited to ten percent. The historical average has been roughly thirty percent. They also recommended that ambassadors have previous regional experience, and be knowledgeable about the countries in which they would be assigned, as well as speak the local language.

What their letters were missing was evidence these traits actually make a difference in how well ambassadors perform their roles. In fact, this evidence is missing from the extant literature describing ambassadorial roles and responsibilities. This dissertation seeks to quantitatively and qualitatively analyze Neumann's and Pickering's qualifications, marking the first time this important subject has been examined using social science methodology.

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Approved by:

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to the two most important women in my life. The first is my mother, who instilled in me a love of literature and education. The second is my wife, who has been extraordinarily supportive and encouraging throughout this process. I love you both.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Statement of the Problem

1.1 Introduction

Ambassadors in foreign countries have implemented the foreign policy of the United States since the days of the first foreign minister, Benjamin Franklin, in 1776. As the personal envoy and representative of the President to a foreign government, the ambassador enjoys a high level of responsibility and trust. Not only are ambassadors the personal representative of the President, they also act as the eyes and ears on the ground capable of influencing policy due to their intimate knowledge of their assigned country. Robert R. Bowie believes ambassadors play the primary role as the main source of intimate understanding of the local issues, politics, economics, and social issues of their assigned country (Keeley 2000). He goes on to say the ambassador is the most likely person to have not only the latest information, but also the context. He should be able to provide an assessment of what is going on, and recommend a course of action to meet the objectives of US strategy (Keeley 2000).

The statutory duties of an ambassador are described in 22 US Code 3927, as well in the letter each president gives to Ambassadors before they depart for their assigned country. Ambassadors have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that country except for personnel under the command of a United States military commander. Second, they shall be kept fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the executive branch agencies within that country and shall insure that all government employees in that country comply fully with all the applicable directives of the chief of

mission (Hertz 1983, 180). Ambassadors also receive a letter of instruction from the President detailing their additional special duties or tasks. A letter of instruction is also sent to the heads of all executive branch agencies informing them of their requirement to support the new ambassador (McCamy and Corradini 1954; Hertz 1983; Keeley 2000; Gurman 2012).

The tradition of providing a presidential letter of instruction to new ambassadors dates to President Eisenhower (Gurman 2012). Historians have noted these letters have changed little over time, as they are general in nature and reinforce the roles and responsibilities of ambassadors. It also details the authorities ambassadors have for the successful execution of the foreign policy mission as the president's personal representative. An example letter (2008) from President Obama is indicative of the nature of the responsibilities.¹ The letter states "you have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Executive Branch employees in (assigned country), regardless of their employment categories or location." The letter goes on to state, "you have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Department of Defense personnel on official duty in (assigned country) except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander."

For ambassadors today, the challenges range from weapons of mass destruction, trade and commerce expansion, piracy of intellectual property rights, terrorism, trafficking in drugs and persons, environmental pollution, regional ethnic and religious conflicts, refugee displacements, human rights violations, and an increasingly

¹ During initial research, an example copy of the basic letter used by President Obama to new Ambassadors was given to the researcher.

global economy that cannot be managed unilaterally by even a global power (Keeley 2000; Grossman 2011; Gurman 2012).

Thus, one would expect a high level of Foreign Service expertise and experience in those persons selected to be Ambassadors (Grove 2005; Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala 2011; Grossman 2012). However, that is not always the case (McCamy and Corradini 1954; Heclo 1988; Foschi 2000; Gurman 2012). Historically, fully thirty-five percent of selected ambassadors are political appointees with little or no diplomatic or regional experience (McCamy and Corradini 1954; Bunker 1983; Heclo 1988; Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006; Kopp and Gillespie 2011). Although this patronage system has been the norm since the earliest of presidential administrations, it has come under increasing scrutiny and discussion by foreign policy and diplomacy experts.

In June 2008, Ambassador's Ronald Neumann and Thomas Pickering from the American Academy of Diplomacy sent Presidential Candidates Senator's Obama and McCain a letter requesting their support for reform of the selection processes for ambassadors. While acknowledging that historically a third of all ambassadors are political appointees, the ambassadors recommended these numbers be limited to no more than ten percent (Neumann and Pickering 2008). Others have argued the role of an ambassador has increased in complexity and coordination because the ambassador has the responsibility to coordinate activities in his country with all the assigned agencies at the embassy. For an average medium size embassy, that can easily be over thirty different agencies, each owing their allegiance to a headquarters back in Washington (Cohen 1986; Heclo 1988; Neumann & Pickering 2008; Gurman 2012; Nader 2013).

Neumann and Pickering (2008) also recommended a list of qualities an ambassador should possess whether they are a career foreign service officer or political appointee. Among these qualities were integrity, experience in their assigned country, ability to speak the language, an understanding of American history and the democratic process, and demonstrated skills as a leader and team builder (McCamy and Corradini 1954; Mathias 1983; Sartori 2005; Neumann and Pickering 2008; Gurman 2012).

Although technology and the increased use of Presidential Special Envoys has made the interaction between Washington and regional areas of conflict easier, former Ambassador Harrop argues that both the State Department and the Foreign Service face greater burdens than ever before. Advances in communications have not made their jobs easier, and in some cases have made it too easy for Washington to micromanage (Keeley 2000). Ambassador Harrop also voices what others in the diplomatic service believe, the international arena and agenda is more complex now than during the Cold War (Cohen 1986; Heclo 1988; Nader 2003; Keeley 2000; Grossman 2011; Gurman 2012).

Compounding the complexities of the international arena are the challenges of the Washington DC bureaucratic arena. Good to great ambassadors must understand the bureaucratic policy making apparatus within the US government in order to explain the decision making peculiarities to foreign officials. Ambassador Seitz and others (Mathias 1983; Keeley 2000; Sartori 2005) believes this education is not easy to get due to the fragmented way Washington is structured for decision-making. This would seem to support the choice of a career foreign service officer who has dealt with this

fragmented decision making apparatus, or an appointee who has dealt on the national or strategic level with Washington decision making.

Ambassadors are not alone when working in a foreign country. They are supported by an embassy staff of various skills and experiences. For both first time ambassadors and political appointees, as long as inexperienced ambassadors are assigned to a country with a fully manned and experienced embassy staff, there should be no problems (Heclio 1988; Grove 2005; Kopp & Gillespie 2011). This proposal postulates that problems arise when the country the inexperienced ambassador is assigned is not fully manned with experienced personnel. Then the experience level of the ambassador becomes critical (Keeley 2000; Sartori 2005).

1.1.1 Statement of the Problem

A gap has been noted in the literature of diplomatic history and research regarding the selection patterns and performance of ambassadors (Scott 1969; Harr 1970; Heclio 1988; Sartori 2005; Gurman 2012). The literature addresses the facts and details of events surrounding a foreign policy or diplomatic crisis, but genuinely lacks any systematic analysis of US diplomatic persons acting on behalf of the President of the United States. Because the ambassador is the president's personal representative to a foreign government, his or her qualifications and actions are essential to truly understanding a political or diplomatic crisis involving a foreign government.

There has been both a quantitative and qualitative gap in the research on ambassadors. Quantitatively there has been no central dataset of information available

to researchers of the selection patterns and qualifications of ambassadors.² Although there are individual records of every ambassador or minister since Benjamin Franklin, the lack of a central database has drastically limited researcher's ability to analyze selection patterns of ambassadors across time and political administrations. A comprehensive study that has analyzed the characteristics of ambassadors as a whole, including politically appointed ambassadors, has not been possible to make (McCamy & Corradini 1954; Heclo 1988; Foschi 2000; Sartori 2005; Lewis 2007).

Qualitatively a systematic study of the patterns of performance of career diplomats and political appointees confronted with crises has yet to be achieved. As a result, it has been difficult to accurately pinpoint measurable and identifiable characteristics and experiences that might help ambassadors be more effective or successful. In their letter to Senator's Obama and McCain, Neumann and Pickering (2008) listed several skills they believed were important to the success of an ambassador. However, there were no empirical studies which either supported or contradicted their recommended characteristics. This study examines these issues in an attempt to fill in these gaps in the study of diplomatic history and foreign policy making.

1.1.2 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is two-fold. Because the office and role of the ambassador in the conduct of US foreign policy is so central to its successful

² Having searched numerous diplomatic databases, spoken with the State Department historian, the Dean of the Foreign Service Institute, and numerous Ambassadors, the researcher is convinced this database did not exist.

implementation, examining the qualifications and experiences of ambassadors is itself intrinsically important.

The first goal is to establish a researchable database of US Ambassadors. This database will code select variables and attributes useful to measure the characteristics and skills noted in the Neumann & Pickering (2008) letter, and the instructions contained in the Presidents letter to Ambassadors. Using this data, the study investigates identifiable skills and characteristics of ambassadors that were able to sustain a higher level of cooperation among nations involved in a diplomatic dispute or crisis with the US.

The second goal of this study is to try and determine if there are identifiable differences in the abilities of both career and politically appointed ambassadors to enable and sustain cooperation between the US and designated countries during periods of diplomatic tension or crisis. The gap in both current scholarly literature and current Department of State practices limit our ability to identify what skills and characteristics are important for effective ambassadors (Scott 1969; Harr 1970; Heclo 1988; Grove 2005; Sartori 2005). Consequently, when looking for the ideal ambassadorial candidate, the Department of State has to date had limited information on which to make this determination.

1.1.3 Research Design

A well-trained Ambassador is an important part of the foreign policy development and implementation team. In order for foreign policy to work, the ambassador plays a key role not only in implementing it at the country level, but also in providing informed

feedback and counsel to the President, the State Department, and the National Security Council. In this study, the attributes listed in the Neumann and Pickering (2008) letter were used to distinguish skilled ambassadors from those less qualified. Several questions based on the literature review were addressed in this study:

Primary Research Question: Are there measurable differences in the abilities of skilled ambassador's to enable or enhance cooperation during times of crisis?

Secondary Research Question: Are there consistent identifiable attributes and characteristics that exist among ambassadors who are able to maintain cooperation during times of crisis?

Secondary Research Question: Are there measurable differences in the success of career and political appointees during times of diplomatic crisis?

From these questions, two key hypotheses help focus the research.

H1: The presence of a skilled ambassador should lead to higher levels of cooperation during times of diplomatic crisis.

H2: Career ambassadors should enable better cooperation during crisis periods due to their extensive diplomatic experiences and training.

In any study of human performance assessed against history, there are many intervening factors that impact what is being measured. In this study of characteristics and attributes assessed against cooperation, this will continue to be an issue raised by readers. However, because no combined study of Ambassadorial attributes and performance exists, it is hoped that this first attempt to correlate increased cooperation

among countries during a crisis to ambassadorial attributes will lead others to investigate this phenomena. Alternative explanations of performance have been discussed through control variables, as well as alternative explanations in chapter six.

In order to accomplish this study, the first task was to build a database of all US Ambassadors from 1948 to 1974 using information contained in the US Department of State Biographic Register. By doing so the researcher was able to conduct a quantitative examination of discrete independent variables using the Conflict and Peace Data set 1948-1978 (COPDAB). As with all public governmental records, there are some challenges when conducting this type of research. In the case of using the Biographic Register, publication was discontinued after 1974 due to security concerns. This is unfortunate because some of the relevant information such as language skills became unavailable.

1.1.4 The Study

This study examined two groups of US Ambassadors during two time periods. The first time period was 1948 – 1974. Differing levels of cooperation with host countries was assessed using the Conflict and Peace Dataset. The second group of US Ambassadors were assigned to countries in the Middle East, from 1970 to 1974, which comprised four of the original five members of the Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC). These countries were Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait.

These countries were involved to varying degrees in the oil embargo of the United States from October 1973 to March 1974. This embargo was the result of dissatisfaction with US military and political support for Israel during their October 1973

Yom Kippur War with Egypt and Syria. The US Ambassadors assigned to these four countries during this period were a mix of career and political ambassadors. Although an embargo is generally viewed as an overtly hostile act, the application and enforcement of the embargo among these countries were not the same.

1.1.5 Significance of the Study

The day to day conduct of American foreign policy around the world is performed by Ambassadors who act as the personal representative of the President. Although there have been books written about individual ambassadors or events in history that highlighted the talents of an ambassador, there has been no comprehensive study on ambassadors as a group. Although an argument that the role of the ambassador is less important today than in the past due to advances in modern telecommunications and air travel, the fact remains the ambassador is the eyes and ears on the ground able to provide a shared understanding back to the Department of State and the President.

There also has been continuing discussion on the practice of Presidents appointing non-career diplomats as part of a spoils system that dated back to the 1950s. Although historically the numbers of political ambassadors remain in the thirty percent range that number had been creeping steadily upwards. Organizations such as the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) have long advocated for strict limits on non-career diplomats, and much like Ambassadors Neumann and Pickering, have developed a list of recommended skills and qualifications that seek to curtail the practice of selecting unqualified candidates. According to Paul Bedard (2010) of US News and World Report, the American Foreign Service Association calls attention to the

appointments of non-career ambassadors to positions of important diplomatic posts abroad. He noted that although they believe non-career ambassadors are accomplished in their professional non-diplomatic fields, their appointments should be the exception and not the exception as they have become. The evidence they present to show the overuse of non-career ambassadors is to show that over a three decade period, over 85 percent of ambassadorial appointments to major European countries and Japan, and nearly 60 percent of appointments to a wider group of emerging global powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, have been political appointees (Bedard 2010).

This research is important because it directly examines whom the US selects to act as the personal representative of the President to a foreign government. It provides a database previously unavailable of all US Ambassadors from 1948-1974, and codes numerous variables of tertiary interest on ambassador performance. The ability to examine ambassadors using this dataset will enable researchers to focus on any number of characteristics of US ambassadors. Questions that could not be easily accessed have now become accessible. Not only are pattern analysis of particular selection variables available, but this dataset allows for an examination of ambassador characteristics by region, country, year, or political affiliation.

Secondly this research examines the ability of US ambassadors to retain the cooperation of their host country during times of political crisis. Assessing the cooperation or hostility of a host nation towards the United States stands as a proxy measure to assess good performance by the ambassador. This also allows for an examination of career versus political appointee characteristics and traits.

By completing this project, an important gap in the diplomatic history of the US has been filled, and more importantly, an analysis of the types of persons who have been selected to be ambassadors has been examined.

1.1.6 Organization of the Study

This study examined the question of whether a skilled ambassador was able to sustain a higher level of cooperation between nations during a crisis than their contemporaries who were less experienced. In particular, it examined a group of career and political appointee ambassadors during a period of diplomatic crisis to see if there were any measurable differences.

This dissertation is organized into six chapters. This first chapter contains the introduction, the statement of the problem, and the overall purpose and goals of the study. Chapter two discusses the relevant literature related to the problems facing modern ambassadors, as well as a discussion on the difficulties in assessing the performance of a very human enterprise. Chapter three describes the quantitative methodologies used, and the quantitative results. Chapters four and five are comprised of the case studies used. Chapter four discusses the major events leading to the 1973 war, and the case studies of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, while chapter five is comprised of Iran and Iraq. Chapter six discusses the key findings, alternative explanations, policy implications, and suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Section I

2.1 Introduction

The role of the modern Ambassador has been shaped by changes in the diplomatic landscape, as well as increased modernization in communication and travel. However, what has not changed is the expectation that the Ambassador is the eyes and ears on the ground while performing duties as the representative of the President of the United States. This chapter will discuss the current literature on the challenges facing a modern ambassador, both from an institutional, as well as an individual perspective.

Often the diplomatic or political history of a crisis in American foreign policy tells the story from the perspective of experts generally geographically involved, usually from the point of view of a senior government or military official, not the participants. Although the Ambassador and his or her embassy staff are the first line of foreign policy contact and implementation in a foreign country, little has been written or researched about the actual qualifications and experience levels of the principle US diplomat in the country, and the positive or negative effects an inexperienced Ambassador can have. There are many anecdotal stories concerning underperforming Ambassadors (Halperin et. al. 2006; Gurman 2011), but these stories rarely discuss any of the personal characteristics or training of the Ambassador, only that the opinion of him or her was not positive.

It is rarely ever discussed how long he had been an Ambassador, if he was a career or political appointee, whether he knew much about the region he was assigned to, or if he spoke any regional or local language (McCamy & Corradini 1954; Harr 1970;

Heclo 1988; Kopp & Gillespie 2011; Gurman, 2011). The importance of culture, and the ability to speak the language of their assigned country, has been discussed in numerous articles and research, and is specifically mentioned in the Foreign Service Act of 1980.³ And yet these qualities have not received much attention in the Department of State as criteria for ambassadorial selection (Herz 1983; Keeley 2000; Grove 2005; Sartori 2005).

While the actual qualifications of an Ambassador has not received much attention, the importance of the embassy and the ambassador has been the subject of extensive research (Von Staden 1983; Mathias 1983; Keeley 2000; Sartori 2005; Gurman 2011). Ambassador Bunker (1983) discusses the importance of the role played by the ambassador and the embassy in the conduct of American foreign policy. A Senate Foreign Relations report written in 1981 entitled *The Ambassador in U.S. Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns of Roles, Selection, and Designation* (Herz 1983, 5) stating “there is one area of unanimity – if not within the whole government, at least in Congress, the White House, and the Foreign Service – that within a foreign country the ambassador must be the paramount authority for coordination and administration of American foreign policy.”

In his article, Ambassador Bunker discusses the subject of political appointments of ambassadors by presidents, although he also does not take a particular side in the discussion. He describes what he believes are the qualities needed in a successful ambassador. For him, the qualities of good character, a historical and political

³ Senior department of state officials interviewed concurred in the value of speaking the host language, but all agreed this was a difficult goal to attain and sustain.

knowledge of the assigned country, and experience in diplomatic skills would help the new ambassador be more successful (Bunker 1983, 2). This same sentiment is echoed by Keeley (2000), in *First Line of Defense*, where the author also notes the challenges faced by ambassadors being even greater today than during the Cold War.

As an outside observer, Berndt Von Staden who was the German Ambassador to the United States, observes that good ambassadors are educated through years of experience and schooling. They are not born, they are trained to be good at what they are expected to accomplish (Von Staden 1983, 22). The implication is that the ambassador and his staff are a major part of the implementation, recommendation, and execution of policy; thus, the level of experience required does not come easily or quickly. Von Staden does not take a point of view on the merits of political appointment or career diplomat, although the level of experience he discusses implies a career status. Ambassador Seitz explains that the education of an ambassador is made more difficult because of the fragmented decision making inherent in Washington DC policymaking (Keeley 2000, 51). Historian Paul Kennedy agrees with both Von Staden and Seitz, noting that good ambassadors have to be nurtured and taken care of, they are rare enough to require special consideration. He also commented on the unfavorable differences he has noted between the selections patterns of US Ambassadors versus many European Ambassadors, who have generally spent their lives learning the business of diplomacy.

Writing in 1983, Senator Charles Mathias, Jr. bemoans the patronage system used by presidents to reward supporters with ambassadorial appointments. As a Senator, he introduced Senate Bill 1886, which would have required eighty-five percent

of ambassadors be career diplomats. Mathias reasoned that the complexities of the world, coupled with the need to communicate and negotiate with potential adversaries required experienced and competent diplomats (Mathias 1983). Ambassador Seitz (Keeley 2000, 53) offers a similar perspective when he recounts the importance placed on the communications of an ambassador back to the State Department in shaping emerging policy in the absence of an official policy espoused by the White House.

One constraint that nearly all ambassadors encounter are size limitations imposed on embassy staffs and facilities due to resources. Miller (1992) argues that good diplomacy requires not only a commitment to staff with good personnel, but also build the type of facilities necessary for the conduct of modern consular affairs. As a GAO report on embassy staffing underscores, there seems to be a larger issue of embassy staffing shortages. This could directly affect the ability of the senior staff to accomplish the operational and tactical missions necessary for the successful implementation of American foreign policy. However, this argument only reinforces the criticality in the selection of the most experienced Ambassador's to represent the US.

There are detractors that do not believe that even with adequate resources the State Department can adequately perform their role in diplomacy. Kori Schake's belief is that it takes more than an embassy and a staff to conduct US foreign policy. She is not alone in her opinion, noting that even outside think tanks like the Stimson Center do not believe the State Department is capable of equipping their diplomats with the skills necessary to conduct twenty-first century diplomacy (Schake 2011, 2).

Part of the problem may be the limited education offered to both Foreign Service Officers (FSO) and Political Appointees. Schake (2011) notes the State Department

does not invest in the education necessary to help diplomats be more successful. This may be partly due to the lack of empirical research to allow for greater understanding of what helps their Ambassador's to succeed. Part of this is an absence of measurable standards to assess against. The second problem is the almost total lack of diplomatic training offered and available for political appointees.

One consequence, as noted scholars of civil-military relations Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala (2007, 96) observe, the State Department does not do well with planning, both for their diplomats, but also long range planning able to link domestic political concerns to foreign policy outcomes. They observe that although the regional departments are staffed with seasoned professionals, they do not think in terms of policy planning objectives in which to develop measurable programs. Military planners view this type of strategic planning using the Ends, Ways, Means construct (Joint Publication 5-0). This may be one of several reasons why many formerly inherently diplomatic roles and responsibilities in embassies have more recently been executed by the military (Skinner 2008; Schake 2011; Nader 2013).

However, this lack of planning does not relieve the Department of State, or the ambassadors, from providing foreign policy recommendations to the President. Most presidents do not come into office with much foreign policy experience (Adler and George 1996). If anything, it makes it even more important for ambassadors to provide relevant and timely information. Halperin et. al. (2006) notes that the president faces so many issues each day that he tends to practice a form of “uncommitted thinking.” In the face of contradicting or intractable problems, the president may yield to emotion or a gut feeling when making decision. This was clearly the case at the start of the 1967 War,

when President Johnson seemed to change his mind overnight on the question of Israel's right to defend themselves (Oren 2003).

There were too many contradictory opinions in his cabinet to arrive at an unassailable decision, thus a logical emotional decision based on the last conversation may be the result. Halperin et. al. (2006), observe that presidents are pressured from all sides by special interest actors, and at times respond to those that are the strongest. These pressures often come from inside the administration. Knowledgeable, qualified, expert opinion is thus critical to a President trying to make foreign policy decisions. Yet he may be served by a Department of State that does not value education or change.

As even internal studies admit, the Department of State has not responded well to the various challenges it faces in providing timely and informed advice to the President and senior decision makers. In fact, the Department of State has proven highly resistant to change (Schake 2011). Sarkesian, et. al. (2007) observe that the State Department can be stifled in their ability to change, tethered to the status quo, and more interested in self-protection than introspection. According to some, this has produced bureaucratic inertia and burdensome procedures that allow little room for initiative and innovation. The danger of such stasis should be apparent given the important role that ambassadors play for US foreign policy.

2.2 Section II Importance of an ambassador

2.2.1 The complexities of the foreign policy environment

The foreign policy establishment is comprised of a host of federal agencies and bureaucracies, including the Department of State. As part of the National Security Council, the Secretary of State is advised by bureau chiefs from the Department of State as well as Ambassadors and their staffs. The goal of foreign policy, as stated by Sarkesian et. al. (2007, 4), is to develop and administer the policies and relations of the United States with all other countries. This requires policies that are multi-dimensional in their construct and implementation, able to prevent the growth of conditions that are sub-optimal for the US. The instruments of foreign policy are primarily diplomatic and political, and are complex in their execution. This complexity in the foreign policy environment is matched by the increasing complexities of the diplomatic operating environment.

Ambassador Grossman (2011) notes, "...in today's world, the major challenges cannot be solved by talking points. Fighting extremism, defeating narco-terrorism, preventing genocide, promoting sustainable development, stopping the trafficking in human beings, for example requires front-line action from the State Department and other US government agencies." Because of the complexities of this international environment, US national security has become complicated and often ambiguous. The international environment is often unpredictable and confusing, characterized by turmoil (Sarkesian et. al. 2007, 3).

2.2.2 Maintaining contact with Washington

This ability to provide strategic insight back to policy planners in the department has not been made easier with the advent of modern aircraft and communications, as proponents of non-career appointees would opine. Halperin et. al. (2006, 14) note that even with the modern conveniences of instantaneous communications and media, gradual changes take place over a length of time that require individual observation. And while these changes may bring about a change in US policy and understanding, the effects of change are rarely direct and immediate. He notes the diplomatic establishment took years before it began to realize the extent of change taking place in Russia under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. The change in policy that seemingly dissolved the Soviet Union overnight, actually took place over several years. It takes the person on the ground with the right training and instincts to understand the change taking place.

This ability to provide strategic insight while being on the spot is emphasized in the role Ambassador Loy Henderson played in the summer of 1946 when the Soviets demanded access to the eastern provinces of Turkey, and participation and control in the Turkish Straits. Henderson understood that if the Russians gained a foothold in the Straits, the US would have a difficult time keeping them from gaining control over larger swaths of Turkey and Greece. Together with the Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, Henderson was able to persuade President Truman to send a message of encouragement to Ankara, and to order a naval task force into the eastern Mediterranean. In the face of this assertive action, the Soviets backed down (Dale 1983, 151).

2.2.3 There is more to the role of Ambassador than diplomacy

There is usually an economic component to the duties of an ambassador, and the extent of this is defined in detail in the President's letter to new ambassadors. This area sounds ripe for a non-career Ambassador with a previous role as a business executive. While this may be true, the scope of the global economy and the role it plays in foreign affairs may be more than anticipated for non-career appointees. As Keeley notes, the size and importance of the international business environment has led to the increased dependence on the economic growth of US businesses. The growth of multinational corporations have made the protection of US economic and commercial activities abroad command more attention. Responsibility for these matters rightly falls directly on our ambassadors (Keeley, 2000). Part of the requirements of maintaining, and increasing both the trade and protection of this system leads to a requirement for a skilled negotiator. As Nicolson (1988, 55) notes, "...the art of negotiation requires a combination of certain special qualities which are not always to be found in the ordinary politician, nor even in the ordinary man."

While the size of an embassy varies with the scope of the engagement in a country, there are usually several federal agencies that work inside the embassy or out in the country-side, and thus fall under the authority of the Ambassador. One standing organization common to every embassy is the Country Team. The importance of this team to the unified accomplishment of the US mission cannot be overstated. It is the country team that forms the central foreign policy team for the ambassador. The team is chaired by the ambassador, and includes senior representatives of each of the non-state agencies in the embassy (Keeley 2000, 11). These non-State agencies may

include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), among others. Because the Ambassador is responsible for all personnel and the direction of the overall foreign policy mission inside their assigned country, he will require a certain amount of experience and education.

Much like how the US military grows their officers and non-commissioned officers through education and experiences, the Department of State does as well. However, there are significant differences in the type and length of training that prepares an ambassador for their responsibilities. The course that all new ambassadors attend at the State Departments' Foreign Service Institute is two weeks long. In this short period, new ambassadors are taught a handful of the essential skills they need to be successful at their new post. For non-career Ambassador's, this training cannot take place with the Department until their confirmation hearing with the US Senate has been completed (Hardy, 2013). This minimal period to prepare an Ambassador would make performance assessment and measurable standards seemingly more important.

2.3 Section III Potential limitations of career ambassadors

2.3.1 Organizational Culture at the Department of State

Large formal organizations promote cultures that help define and guide their organizations, and the Department of State has a well-defined cultural sense of itself. In many organizations, this cultural identification helps guide their inward and outward thinking and behavior. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1996) defines culture as "the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes a company or corporation." In his article on the organizational culture of the department of

state, Scott (1969) suggests that many of the problems in the department stem from both the formal and informal culture that has taken hold. In particular, he notes that many of the past and current failures of the department can be explained by understanding the functioning of the dominant subculture that exists in the Department (Scott, 1969, 1).

It is the identification of this informal dominant subculture that lends understanding to several of the problems with the Department of State noted by others (Krogh 1968; Scott 1969; Bergman 1999; Gurman 2011; Kopp & Gillespie 2011). An understanding of these subculture traits may help to explain the department's resistance to change (Scott 1969; Agocs 1997; Bergman 1999; Sarkesian, et. al. 2007); why they have a hard time defining what traits successful Ambassadors should possess (Sartori 2005; Neumann & Pickering 2008); and why the department has a hard time planning for strategic change in the world environment (Bergman 1999; Scott 1969; Sartori 2005; Kopp & Gillespie 2011). Scott (1969, 2) believes there are eighteen identifiable subculture traits inside the State Department.

One of the key subculture themes is the idea that each foreign policy problem is unique, with complex and intractable problems that defy solutions. This leads to the unspoken admonition that because these problems are unique, they cannot be planned for, and thus long range planning is a waste of time (Krogh 1968; Scott 1969; Bergman 1999; Sartori 2005; Kopp & Gillespie 2011). This also leads to the internal belief that because these problems are unique, outsiders cannot possibly understand how or why diplomacy cannot be assessed as anything other than successful. Because one of the

other dominant themes is there are no problems in the department of state, and if there were, outsiders would not be able to help fix them (Scott, 1969, 8).

This belief that diplomacy is an art best left to the experts is noted by Krogh (1968, 12). There has always been an undercurrent of tension between American diplomats and the public they serve. The fault for this is shared by both the state department and the public. Some Foreign Service Officers harbor an attitude that foreign policy is their area of expertise, and is best kept from the public. Halperin et. al. (2006) notes this is the essence of an organization, and how senior officials in that organization will work to protect what they see is the core essential thing that makes that organization special. This belief can extend to others inside the organization as well. Known as “in-and-outers,” political appointees are not seen as part of the establishment. Halperin et. al. (2006, 85) observes the career patterns of participants plays a role in who they look to for professional guidance, and for what is important in US national security. The guides of career officials are likely to differ from those of in-and-outers with ties to banking, legal, or think tank communities.

2.3.2 A preference for the status quo

For years criticism has been directed toward the Department of State for not growing and changing with the times. This is not to say there have not been changes over the years. When former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, became the Secretary of State, he instituted several changes designed to invigorate and educate senior leaders (Grossman 2011). Called the Senior Seminar, he involved senior executives from not only the Department of State, but also other key federal

agencies involved in the national security process. This type of initiative is what Vicere (1992) writes about in *The Strategic Leadership Imperative*. In order to develop high performing organizations, leaders have to be willing to adopt the organization to the marketplace. Leaders should consistently seek ways to meet the needs of their customers. Vicere notes that, all organizations go through periods of change, and for institutional resistance to change; this fact must be recognized. What slows and shapes this change is the strength of the dominant subculture. Harr (1970) concludes Scott (1969) is correct in his assessment about Foreign Service Officers being the dominant subculture that is highly resistant to change. Harr calls the Department of State “the Ottoman Empire of Federal Government” (1970, 101).

A recurring theme from Scott’s (1969, 8) subculture analysis was the almost total lack of desire to coordinate or work with other agencies to share information. Halperin et. al. (2006, 51) ascribes this lack of interagency activity to an organizational desire to seek control over the forces assigned or required, and rarely wish to undertake shared operations with forces they don’t control. To avoid this encroachment, they seek to report directly to the President. This leads to another common theme noted by Scott (1969, 8), as well as others (Krogh 1968; Bergman 1999; Sartori 2005; Kopp & Gillespie 2011) regarding planning and education.

Scott (1969, 8) notes that not only does the department lack the desire to work with other agencies outside the department, they also lack the desire to conduct basic research with organizations outside or inside the department. Although seemingly a small matter, this underlies the Department’s minimal training effort in anything other than language training, to include regional, cultural, or diplomatic skills. Scott explains

why the Department believes this is an acceptable occurrence by noting that State does not and has not sought to encourage a research relationship with outside partners. This may be partly due to the ideological belief that each problem is new and unique, and must be approached de novo (1969, 12). Because there are no generalized problems as opposed to unique problems, there is no need to approach it with any prior research. This approach however has also had several undesirable outcomes.

In a 1968 report entitled, “The Behavioral Sciences and the Federal Government”, the authors noted the almost total lack of research conducted by the Department of State in International affairs. This report went on to say that because of this, most research and leadership in this area was being conducted by the Department of Defense (Scott, 1969, 9). Similarly, a RAND report identified three obstacles to cooperation between the military and civilian agencies; money, planning capability, and capacity (Kopp & Gillespie, 2011, 152). Sarkesian et. al. (2007, 96) writes that various studies show the Department of State has difficulty in conducting long range planning of the sort conducted routinely by the Department of Defense. Christopher Shoemakes notes this lack of long range planning capability in the Department also exists beyond Washington, DC. He says that although the geographical bureaus are staffed with seasoned professionals, they are virtually unable to develop long range plans and policies.

2.3.3 Limited training and education

The low priority given to research extends to education and training for Foreign Service students as well. Career diplomat Brandon Grove has observed that in his early career, training took place in a poorly configured makeshift classroom in a reconfigured garage beneath the Arlington Towers Apartments in Rosslyn. Although this training was part of the Foreign Service Institutes curriculum, many of the classrooms were low-ceilinged, cramped, and windowless. He argues this poor educational environment was accepted in the department, who did not value any training not connected to language training. He believes it was standard practice to only provide the minimal resources to training, and this was twelve years into the Cold War (Grove, 2005, 51). Although Ambassador Grove indicated language training was the priority for resources in 1959, by 2008 Kopp & Gillespie (2011, 170) note that greater than thirty-three percent of embassy positions identified as language designated positions were unfilled.

Grove contrasted the training he received in his first Department of State training course, A100, to the training he had received in the US Navy, and found the differences striking. The State Department provided very little discussion on leadership, management, or tradecraft, although an assignment to an embassy might require some basic education in those areas. He believed that tradecraft in diplomacy should have been second nature to the Department of State, much like seamanship in the navy. It should have been taught in order to increase the level of experience and allow the exercise of skills in the art of diplomacy, the ability to observe, analyze, represent, advocate, negotiate, and get on with the day's business successfully (Grove, 2005, 52). He went on to note that information about other agencies they were expected to be

engaged was discussed, however, the realities of how this would actually work was left out. When he arrived at his first embassy post in Abidjan, Grove (2005, 58) discusses how unprepared he felt for his surroundings and job. He talked about the impenetrable cultural barriers that surrounded the population, and felt that he would achieve little understanding of this in the two years he would be posted there.

In this type of environment, several attributes of personnel would seem to become expected. Kopp & Gillespie (2011, 167) note that most Foreign Service Officers are hired for a five year probationary period. But in this system, it is not hard to stay and make a career of the Foreign Service if desired. He recognizes that fully ninety five percent of entry level members make tenure, and that greater than ninety percent of those will achieve the highest grade rank of FSO-01. Kopp also reveals that by the mid-1970s, the policy of up or out adopted from the US Navy had grown so lax that officers in the higher grades almost never lost their jobs for substandard performance.

This lack of emphasis on training and education has had an undesirable effect noticed by other researchers on the experience level of assigned Foreign Service Officers. Some have observed the lack of experience in Foreign Service Officers has created a cadre of diplomats that are new to the business of diplomacy, who are required to learn on the job, with a lack of senior mentors to guide them (McCamy & Corradini, 1954, 1082). Part of this is due to the overall lack of formal diplomatic training. However, they also note that there is a serious lack of true expertness in the department, that their experiences in various posts around the world are too short for them to become area specialists in any true definition of the word.

Career officers may know the practices of diplomatic and consular work, but with few exceptions they can hardly claim to be experts in either the regions they support, and in the larger politics of international relations (McCamy & Corradini, 1954, 1082). They found that in order to become an area specialists, a term of five years in one region is assumed to be reasonable. They found that only fifteen percent of Foreign Service Officers had spent more than five years in any region. This leads them to state that most Foreign Service Officers have acquired the basic skills of routine embassy administrative skills such as report writing, but not the knowledge that comes with prolonged study of an area or topic.

2.3.4 The danger of clientitis

This lack of expertness is not coincidental to Gurman (2011, 199) who believes the success or failure of a country's foreign policy is based on the dependability and reliability of its diplomatic reports. Although some State supporters say the structure of each region is supported by a strong regional bureau with experienced personnel, Ambassador Grossman notes that "While regional bureaus can most quickly bring the art of what is possible to the table and galvanize embassy action, they also suffer the most 'clientitis,' the tendency to be overly concerned with another country's sensitivities" (Grossman, 2011). This tendency to overlook a country's liabilities is exacerbated when combined with inexperienced Foreign Service Officers.

The lack of true expertness can allow the phenomenon of clientitis to affect the regional bureau's supporting multiple embassies in a region. The Near East bureau is an example of an elitist culture that sought to ensure the state of Israel would not be

allowed to form. The climate of the bureau was one of comparable social attitudes regarding the Arab countries in their region (Bergman, 1999, 166). This over-reliance on the experience of the Near East bureau allowed this group to plot extensively against the formation of the State of Israel, while seeming to support the executive branch's desires. Bergman noted that the culture of the bureau was something of a brotherhood, and combined with their Arabism outlook, sought to protect their clients. In the prevailing corporate culture of the Near East Asia bureau, this uniformity of outlook was not surprising (Bergman, 1999, 146).

Clientitis has led to other more detrimental outcomes. In Nicaragua in 1978, events were spinning out of control for the government of Anastasio Somoza. Although the United States had supported Somoza for many years with both economic and military aid, diplomatic personnel failed to understand the strength of the opposition to Somoza's rule. After a popular anti-government activist was assassinated by government forces, at a critical point in the relationship, the US seemed hesitant, unable to choose between her commitment to human rights, her desire for political continuity in Central America, and the fear of creating another Cuba (Strategic Survey, 1979, 109).

This indecision can be traced to a sense of clientitis and lack of expertness on the ground, and led to a decision to cut off military aid to the Somoza regime, while at the same time congratulating him on his improved human rights record. The Somoza government would fall to rebel forces within a year. Strategic Survey (1979, 108) notes that "During Somoza's final years, US policy had been hesitant and dilatory: first assuming that Somoza could weather the storm...and finally realizing too late, that he

would in fact be toppled." The same problem would blind the ambassador and the State Department to the fragile state the government of Iran was in.

This misunderstanding of how serious conditions had grown on the ground extended to Iran as well. President Carter had spent the New Year holiday with the Shah of Iran in 1979, and during a toast proclaimed the Peacock Throne would last another hundred years. The government of Iran would be swept away by opposition forces within one year. "Oblivious to the mounting evidence of mismanagement and corruption, successive US governments had failed to impress upon the Shah the need for reform and the decentralization of authority" (Strategic Survey, 1979, 54). The State Department and the President were taken utterly by surprise, both at the fall of the Iranian government, and the speed at which it happened. Gurman's (2011, 199) comment on the success or failure of a country's foreign policy depending on the accuracy of the diplomats reporting brings a new level of importance when governments friendly to the United States begin to fall.

2.3.5 Resistance to change

The role that organizational culture plays in the day to day operation of the Department of State cannot be underestimated. As Sarkesian et. al. (2007, 290) notes, the national security establishment of the US is made up of a very divergent group of people with different backgrounds. They cannot be viewed in theoretical terms, they are the foundation of the national security system. Understanding the differing backgrounds must include how these human factors shape and influence national security policy. Understanding the hold that culture, and ideology, has on the members of a group or

organization is necessary to understanding why organizations are resistant to change (Hunt 1990). Individuals are unlikely to change the culture of a group, and in trying to do so may find their colleagues will punish them. Approval by one's peers is important to most men, and the threat of general disapproval is a powerful sanction (Almond and Verba 1965; Scott 1969).

Change in any organization is difficult. Numerous books have been written about the mechanics of change, the building process necessary, and how to implement change. However, most don't discuss the challenges of change and the chances of failure. Northouse (2013, 10) notes that in all organizations, there are two major types of power, position and personal. Positional power stems from the organizational chart, showing the chain of responsibility beginning at the top and working its way through each designated department. Personal power is harder to delineate but is often as strong if not more so than positional power. It is the influence a person has because the followers who give him that power find him likeable and knowledgeable. This begins to describe the challenges with change in an organization with a strong dominant subculture like the Department of State.

When the question of the establishment of the State of Israel was being debated, the State Department received numerous visitors interested in obtaining diplomatic agreement and support. Ambassador Henderson, who was the bureau chief of the NEA received all of them with respect and penetrating questions. Many of the visitors believed they had made a good case for and against the formation of Israel in the Middle East. What they did not understand was that Henderson's and the NEA's mind were made up; no amount of reasoning or pleading could change them (Bergman,

1999, 147). This decision to resist the formation of the State of Israel conflicted with the desire of the Executive branch, but became the hardened position of the Near East bureau and subsequently the Department.

For Scott (1969) this represents his findings about the strength of the dominant subculture of the Department, and their resistance to change. He believes that to discuss change inside the Department of State without considering the role of the dominant subculture would be to misunderstand the ability to make change. The resistance to change of new ideas, new educational or re-organizational issues, as well as the need for long range planning all fall under the idea that "If a problem is encountered, it will be deemed to be unique and will be approached *de novo*" (Scott, 1969, 12). He notes that the elements of subculture ideology are designed to produce an agreed upon organizational outlook, a set of organizational goals, it justifies organizational or subcultural beliefs and actions, and provides a basis for morale and status judgments (Scott, 1969, 5).

One method the Department of State uses to stave off criticisms of lackluster performance is to point to the lack of resources as being proof that diplomacy is not supported by either the Executive Branch or the public at large. Krogh (1968) believes the Department needs to change with the foreign policy times. He believes that the public and Congress are noting the similarities between foreign and domestic problems, and the distance between the two are getting closer. He says the Department of State needs to recognize the changing political landscape and change accordingly. However, this would require that State stop hiding behind a perceived lack of a constituency. This belief has allowed themselves to blame their failures on this lack of support.

Trader-Leigh (2002) conducted research to understand resistance to change among Department of State leadership to changes mandated by Congress. Because embassies have large numbers of non-diplomatic agencies aligned with and working from the embassy, Congress mandated several initiatives designed to gain efficiencies through cost sharing and management. However, these changes led to significant resistance efforts among key senior personnel. Trader-Leigh (2002, 148) notes that employees believed the culture of the department was too difficult to change, and there was no real incentive. She concluded by noting that change is hard for organizations to accept, that many change initiatives fail because cultures do not readily accept change. She also noted that many times change agents do not adequately account or anticipate the impact on human systems (Trader-Leigh, 2002, 151).

Sarkesian et. al. (2007, 95) previously observed that the State Department has been criticized as a bureaucracy committed to stability, the status quo, and self-protection. This has bred a sense of bureaucratic inertia and procedures that allow little room for initiative or innovation. However, the department has shown its ability to implement change for the benefit of their workforce that have become institutionalized. One of these was the establishment of the Dissent Channel (Gurman, 2011). The Dissent channel was first implemented in 1971 as a means to allow dissenting opinions about the Vietnam War to be heard. It also allowed these dissenting voices to be controlled as the dissent channel is restricted from public access. This change had been implemented because new faces at the Department of State were culturally different from previous generations, and this was seen as a means to allow dissent while

maintaining organizational silence. The dissent channel is still in use at embassies today, although true dissent is relatively rare (Gurman, 2011).

Both Patti (1974) and Scott (1969) agree that bureaucracies occupy positions of disfavor, and are often seen as a necessary evil. While Patti (1974, 367) sees them as being concerned with maintenance and self-perpetuation, Scott (1969, 7) notes that as long as the dominant subculture does not try and take over the administration, and they feel rewarded by a grateful department, that it is probably vain to expect bold and innovative policy from the Department of State. Scott concludes by noting the real problems at the Department of State are cultural rather than organizational, and that trying to induce organizational change without changing the subculture will not likely produce the change desired (1969, 7).

A strong case could be made for the establishment of groups of independent outsiders to help the Department explore its problems by engaging in such debate. The subculture is not receptive to this kind of thing, however, and outsiders tend to be viewed as both unneeded and incompetent. If change is going to be made inside the Department of State, it would have to come from outsiders—with an insider's seat at the table. In order to accomplish this, former Ambassador Silberman (1979), outlines his strong support for political appointments to the Foreign Service Officer ranks.

He states that Presidential control of foreign policy is maintained through political appointments. He also notes that there are many reasons career Foreign Service Officers don't like political appointments, but that past Presidents have been unimpressed both with their complaints, and with the Department of State when they didn't have "their" people in position. There is a case to be made for the expert Foreign

Service knowledge of career officers, just as there are for the domestic knowledge of appointees. As for the complaints and dire warnings from career Foreign Service Officers as to the dangers of too many career appointees, Silberman views this as a rejection of political control of foreign policy and the Department of State.

2.4 Section IV Career vs. Political Appointees

2.4.1 Presidents are not immune from a lack of expertise

While Hammond (1971, 1) agrees that the President towers over the foreign policy establishment, and is the first among equals, what is also apparent is the unequal foreign policy experience of Presidents. The Carter administration came under criticism for their handling of foreign policy when the Somoza and Pahlavi governments fell. Some of the criticism centered on the Presidents lack of foreign policy skills. While there are many reasons for successes and failures in foreign policy, it is worth remembering that Presidents are interested in being re-elected. Halperin et. al. (2006, 71) notes that many Presidents tie their foreign policy decisions to strong voting blocks, and even stronger special interests. He notes that the decision to expand NATO by President Clinton was tied to the interests of Eastern European immigrants. Many of the public positions of the President are for the appearances of consensus building, maintaining policy consistency, public consumption, or political advocacy.

The problem with having the foreign policy of the United States managed by a President who may have either little knowledge or interest in that direction, can be the problem of waiting to be persuaded to accept a course of action. During the course of a day many issues come at him at once, and from different directions. Because many

outside special interests may be involved, a president's behavior may be swayed by the emotion of the moment, or by the last convincing argument he hears. He often responds at any one time to whichever pressures are momentarily strongest, whether they come from particular elements in the bureaucracy, from foreign governments, or from his own domestic concerns (Halperin et. al. 2006, 83). This behavior is clearly seen in the change in attitudes of the Johnson and Nixon administration's prior to the initiation of hostilities in both the 1967 and 1973 wars. This manifests itself in a couple definable ways of thinking that may be defined as ideological, grooved, or uncommitted. These three types of thinking are prevalent in all branches and agencies of the government, and pose a challenge for decision makers.

In any discussion of political appointees, there is a high probability that some of the selectees will bring a very ideological perspective to their new role. Halperin notes that ideological thinkers can often be seen in the role of in-and-outers, and have an emphasis on a single value (like fighting communism) that tends to be pursued independent of instructions. He notes that grooved thinking is very typical of career officials, and like its name implies, there is a routine response to change that might be ignoring the larger issues making that response inappropriate. When thinking of some of the challenges in the Department of State, the dominant subculture might be accused of groove thinking. Common for Presidents is the last of the three types; uncommitted thinking. Halperin sees this in Presidents who must deal with problems in which they may have little to no experience or knowledge. Because of this, they tend to seek compromise and consensus, and can be seen as vacillating (Halperin et. al. 2006, 23). This trait is clearly seen in the President Johnson waiting until the last possible moment

before he gave his unofficial blessing to Israel to take action to protect themselves prior to the 1967 war. His decision to support their attack was credited to a visit from an old friend of his the weekend prior to the war.

2.4.2 The case for career Foreign Service Ambassadors

Discussions of the qualities career Foreign Service Officers bring to an Ambassadorship often center on the years of on the job training in diplomacy, culture, negotiation, and languages (Hammond 1971; Briggs 1983; Dale 1983; Hodge 1983; Nicolson 1988; Keeley 2000; Halperin et. al. 2006; Sarkesian et. al. 2007). The United States is unique in being one of a few countries in the world that uses political appointees as Ambassadors, and thus other countries do not have some of the tension between career and non-career Ambassadors the United States has. Sarkesian et. al. (2007, 40) notes that during the entrance phase to any conflict, it may be the best people on the ground first that provide the edge to success. From this, the question of who or what constitutes the best people is answered by Nicolson (1988, 39) who declares that it should always be the professionals a country turns to when they desire a reliable presence on the ground. He believes that amateur diplomats are unreliable. Briggs (1983, 153) frames the discussion in terms of a patriotic sense of duty to the country. He believes that political appointments are made for the good of the individual, whereas, appointments made of career ambassadors are for the good of the country.

Nicolson (1988, 70) sees the differences in career and non-career in terms of the reputation of the United States by noting political appointments damage the reputation of not only the US, but also the diplomatic corps. The capitals of Europe and Latin

America have suffered the indiscretions of the amateur diplomatists and this has done damage to the prestige of US diplomacy. Ambassador Merchant (Grove, 2005, 256) takes a slightly different approach by observing the ambassador may be at the end of the diplomatic lifeline, and as such needed to be self-reliant, not only in personal needs, but diplomatic as well. Because he is there, the diplomat will be seen as representing the US, and as such is responsible for maintaining relations with his assigned country and the US. Ambassadors are the senior representative of the President to a foreign government, and as such are responsible for the totality of the relations with that country. They are responsible for providing strategic insight back to the Department of State, as well as tactical insight for the managing of relations locally (Grove, 2005, 256).

Part of the explanation about the value of having career Foreign Service Officers may lie in their exposure to the subtle language of diplomacy, and the signals this language sends. Skilled Ambassadors are not only crucial for providing advice to the president and foreign policy decision-makers, they are also necessary for the successful implementation of many foreign policy decisions. Sartori (2005) provides keen insight into such implementation in her examination of diplomatic language. She states that, “diplomacy is the use of language and other signals by one state in an attempt to convey information to another. It is a kind of communication—the use of language by representatives of one state aimed at influencing the actions of one or more others” (Sartori 2005, 3). Her work deals with an alternative extension of both signaling and deterrence research that discusses the role diplomatic language plays in the believability of one state to another’s actions.

Labeled “Reputational Theory”, Sartori (2005) examines the effectiveness of negotiators with a reputation for trust, knowledge, and honesty. Her use of game theory to understand the role honesty and trustworthiness plays in the believability, and thus the deterrence value, is an important link to the knowledge, skills, and credibility an experienced ambassador can bring to the foreign policy discussion. Although it would seem that ambassadors that do not possess the attributes highlighted by Neumann and Pickering (2008) may have difficulty with such signaling, this possibility has yet to be analyzed systematically in the literature.

The need for, and value of experienced diplomats was seen throughout the Cold War years. The skills necessary for dealing with foreign governments can be seemingly benign. When Ambassador Bullitt resigned as Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1935, he was replaced by Joseph Davies, a friend of President Roosevelt. Ambassador Davies had no diplomatic experience, and when dealing with the Soviet government, allowed himself to be convinced by the Soviets as to the reasons for political purges. His deputy, Loy Henderson was forced to report contrary interpretations by personal letter (Dale, 1983, 150).

However, it was not only the Soviets during the Cold War years who were challenging to work with, as Hodge (1983, 59-61) notes in his comments on the assignment of the first US Ambassador to Germany in 1955. Ambassador Conant was a previous president of Harvard, and had worked as a member of the European Development Committee. When he was assigned as the first post-World War II US Ambassador to Germany, German President Adenauer thought Conant was a political sophomore, and would not take him too seriously. Despite the importance of the NATO

Alliance immediately following the war in Europe, Germany did not want to live up to their troop requirements, partly because Ambassador Conant was not able to explain the security planning and policy decisions that had been agreed to (Hodge, 1983, 61).

There are times that inexperienced Ambassadors like to surround themselves with likewise inexperienced personnel. Grove (2005, 79) writes that when he reported to his first embassy post in Abidjan, Ambassador Bowles, was happy to have an inexperienced consular officer. The fact that he felt Grove to be untainted by the State Department may have colored his trust in his advice. Even Grove believed he would have been wiser to have a more senior Foreign Service Officer working for him. A more senior Foreign Service Officer would have involved the ambassador in the department's work and spoke more authoritatively on his behalf to other agencies.

2.4.3 The case for non-career political appointed Ambassadors

The United States is one of the very few countries in the world that uses non-career, and some would say, non-professional, diplomats as Ambassadors (Kopp & Gillespie 2011; Grove 2005; Nicolson 1988; Nolan 1998; Sartori 2005). Their use could be seen as a hold out of one of the last vestiges of the political patronage spoils system. However, this practice has been a norm since the Eisenhower presidency, and has been routinely limited to roughly thirty percent of US Ambassadors at any given period. There are a few countries that have always been provided a non-career political appointee, the United Kingdom is one example. There are some countries that specifically request a political appointee, believing these are friends of the US President, and able to reach out and speak with the President when desired.

Although this practice of appointing non-career Ambassadors has a lengthy lineage, it is not so well accepted among both Department of State diplomats, and other countries. Some wonder why the US would support assigning diplomats that have neither the experience nor understanding of their assigned country or its customs and culture. In this event McCamy and Corradini (1954, 1082) might be used as a guide to expert knowledge when they observed, “If we turn to the career Foreign Service Officers to discover expertness, we find that their terms of service in particular world areas are usually too short to allow them to become area specialists in any true definition of the term.” In their book *Career Diplomacy*, Kopp and Gillespie (2011, 6) observed that the diplomatic skills necessary to be effective are not so difficult to master they cannot be learned over time. Specialized training is available, but not required.

The idea that non-career diplomats could be as effective as career diplomats has many supporters. Although supportive of the use of non-career appointees, Kopp and Gillespie (2011, 6) have observed that in the field of professional diplomacy, the US is the only country that employs amateurs in large numbers. The acknowledgment that the US is almost alone in using non-career diplomats is an interesting comment, but labeling them as amateurs is revealing.

If non-career Ambassadors can be seen as amateurs, the endorsement of career Ambassadors and Foreign Service Officers is hardly effusive. McCamy and Corradini (1954, 1082) had previously noted that most career officers know consular administrative tasks, but are hardly seen as experts in the field of diplomacy. They believe that a mere knowledge of techniques is not enough to justify calling most

Foreign Service Officers skilled professional diplomats. If they are correct, there should be no reason why career and non-career ambassadors do not perform the same.

Some countries around the world both desire political appointees, and have been served by non-career Ambassadors for many years. For them, the perception that is ambassador is a political or personal friend of the President is appealing, and somewhat of a status symbol. However, it may be more perception than reality that the US Ambassador can pick up the phone at any time and talk with the President. State Department officials working in the office of Legislative Affairs observed that many times once a political act of patronage had been repaid, the ability to get the President on the phone may not be possible.

However, this does not stop either the appointee or receiving countries from believing there is a close personal connection to the President. During a conversation with a European Ambassador, the same expression of belief in the ability of a non-career politically appointed US Ambassador to simply pick up the phone was expressed. There are instances when this tie back to the White House is questioned, as Grove (2005, 83) notes, "Foreign leaders tend to doubt that Presidential ties to an erstwhile political fundraiser from a key state will do them much good when it comes to the specifics."

An unintended consequence of providing a non-career political appointee to a country, especially one that may have expected a career diplomat, is the level of actual diplomatic work the Ambassador may be allowed to accomplish. As Grove (2005, 83) notes, an unintended consequence of having a political appointee is the American people may be poorly served, and the government in their assigned country may not be

well served either. Sometime these governments shift their negotiations to their embassy in Washington to conduct what should have been routine country discussions. Beyond that, the understanding and accuracy in which an inexperienced Ambassador may have of a diplomatic event may not be as precise as expected. Nicolson (1988, 49) notes that most professional diplomats will be very careful in their estimations of relations with their assigned country. They will be very wary of generalizing hastily observed actions, content to wait and see how situations mature. He believes the appointed officials show no such caution, and may report success when none exists. Gurman's admonition from *The Dissent Papers*, about the success of a country's foreign policy being dependent on the accuracy of the diplomats report should come to mind (Gurman, 2012, 199).

It would be easy to believe the machinery of foreign affairs runs smoothly. However, as Grove also notes, political leaders have a challenging job trying to piece together a coherent foreign policy program among shifting alliances and interests. To meet these challenges requires a counsel of informed ambassadors able to think in broad strategic terms (Grove 2005, 256). So while career and non-career ambassadors may be equally capable of discharging the instructions they have been given by the President, there is a very vocal advocacy for professionalism as expressed by Nicolson that, it should always be professionals who are charged with carrying out the foreign policy of the United States (Nicholson, 39).

2.5 Attributes needed for success of either career or political appointees

2.5.1 Executive performance and the managerial crisis

One of the goals of this study is to determine if there are measurable skills an Ambassador may have that help them be more effective in their job. Discussions with several key Department of State executives and Ambassadors has led to an understanding that the Department of State does not look for Ambassadors with skills to match requirements. For career Foreign Service Officers, the selection criteria is normally based on seniority and relationships. For non-career Ambassadors, the standard is even more ambiguous, although being a skillful political fundraiser seems to be a common theme. This is unlike how large corporations hire their senior executives.

In their letter to Senator's Obama and McCain, Ambassador's Neumann and Pickering (2008) listed several criteria they believed would help an Ambassador be more effective in their role. These criteria do not seem to be overly onerous or challenging. In fact, being able to speak the language, have some experience in the region and have exposure to the culture seem rather easy to attain, and these skills seem directly related to the job. What is interesting is that in 2008, the Department had not already listed similar objectives for their search criteria of Ambassadors. In *An Ambassador Quota System*, Ambassador John Krizay notes there were no measurable criteria in which to assess ambassadorial candidates. If there were any objective criteria, these had never been defined (Krizay 1983; Laboulaye and Laloy 1983). He asserts that ambassador candidates are known to their community and host country, with the assertion that Ambassadors are subjectively judged by their experience with foreign cultures and languages.

There may be a false sense that there is a commonality of leadership skills and traits among senior executives. Although the US Military spends a considerable amount of time and educational expense teaching their officers and non-commissioned officers about leadership, this is not the case in the Department of State (Scott 1969; Harr, 1970; Grove 2005; Sartori, 2005). When it comes to leadership, several authors and researchers have challenged the universality of common knowledge. As Northouse notes, “In the mid-20th century, the trait approach was challenged by research that questioned the universality of leadership traits. An individual who was a leader in one situation might not be a leader in another” (2013, 19). Northouse continues by noting that organizational change expert John Kotter contends that both management and leadership skills are essential to an organization (2013, 13).

The US military spends a considerable amount of time and effort not only teaching leadership, but writing about it as well. They have determined the fifteen leadership competencies they want their senior leaders to exhibit in order to be more successful (FM 6-22). Successful corporations have also learned to identify and develop the leadership traits and characteristics necessary at the executive level. Hughes notes in *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience* (Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy 2012, 450), “Selecting the right kind of people and continuously developing those skills needed to achieve team goals are two key leadership activities.”

For the Department of State, the problem with finding the right executive has to begin with determining measurable expected performance standards. These should guide the search committee to assess potential executives based on specific criteria and competencies that match the future needs of the department. Reliance on seniority

and relationships, in-lieu of measurable standards, may be in keeping with their culture, however, as O’Neil notes in *The Criterion Problem*, without measurable standards, completely subjective criterion is suspect and subject to bias. Standards that are expressed as satisfactory are not sufficient to build a successful organization (O’Neil, 1965, 99).

2.5.2 Standardization through objective performance criteria

O’Neil (1965) discusses the need for a relevant set of objective criterion that while difficult to develop, will yield the most consistent set of criterion. This is because being subjectively satisfied with performance changes from manager to manager, and situation to situation. Often, managers are more satisfied with average, non-troublesome operators, than with brilliant but eccentric operators. When discussing hallway reputation, a well-known Department of State phenomenon, Foreign Service Officers who might have served as great Ambassadors may not be given the opportunity because they have been subjectively assessed against an unknown performance standard. Thompson (1965) notes that successful prediction of managerial success rests on improvement in the criterion used to measure success. This criterion should be dynamic, measuring the progress made through time, not just one assessment (Brolly 1965; O’Neil 1965). This would address the differences in the occupational and career models, where the first assesses objective requirements, against the subjective assessment of the second. In assessing performance based on subjective standards, Burchman and Schneier (1989, 26) note, “...directors face the dilemma of what to judge. It is hard to develop a database for qualitative performance.

Subjective measures are tough to define, behavior is difficult to capture.” As discussed above, career ambassadors may not have the training or regional and linguistic expertise to succeed in their posts, but the on the job training they receive as an FSO may prove valuable.

Promotion of career Foreign Service personnel to the rank of Ambassador, and the selection of non-career Ambassadors is a somewhat lucky happenstance. In his book, *The National Security Enterprise*, Ambassador Marc Grossman comments, “...there is a lack of clarity, even though lengthy promotion precepts are published each year, about what actually constitute criteria for advancement” (2011, 81). While there can be several reasons why personnel don’t understand what it takes to be promoted, Harr (1970) has determined the problem lies in the Department of State’s traditions and culture, and their unwillingness to change. In *The Managerial Crisis*, Harr (1968, 32), writes that President John F. Kennedy challenged the Department of State to a more active role in leading foreign affairs. However, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. noted, “...the Department remained a frustration for the President until the end.” This unwillingness to change and embrace a larger role in foreign affairs has changed little in the years since 1960 (Hook 2003). In a congressional statement, US Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (2012) called on the State Department to reform how information is disseminated and stop protecting managers who are not doing their job.

The goal of this study is to determine if there are measurable traits and characteristics of higher performing ambassadors. Ambassadors Neumann and Pickering listed several traits they believe, based on their extensive experience in diplomatic affairs, would help an ambassador perform better. They listed the

measurable traits of regional experience, ability to speak the language of their assigned country, and career versus non-career ambassadors. They also listed several subjective criteria including integrity, an understanding of American history, and demonstrated skills as a leader.

In order to gain a better understanding of how these characteristics may benefit an ambassador, a quantitative approach will assess these traits using a longitudinal study of ambassadors measured against a conflict and peace dataset. For the subjective criterion of integrity and demonstrated leadership, the traits of military service and number of times selected as an ambassador will serve as a proxy to assess that trait. The goal is to understand if these traits are more identifiable in career versus non-career ambassadors, and if the presence of these characteristics leads to superior outcomes.

The qualitative component of this study will seek to fill the gaps that are unavoidable when using strictly quantitative methods. It will use two significant events in Middle East history to examine the performance of ambassadors as they manage a crisis in US diplomacy. The two periods are the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1973-1974 oil embargoes against the US. Both periods happened one after the other, and include a mix of career and non-career ambassadors with varying characteristics listed by Neumann and Pickering.

2.6 Research Design

2.6.1 Introduction

Ambassadors act as the personal representative of the President, and conduct the day-to-day business of American foreign policy around the world. Although there have been numerous books written about individual ambassadors or events in history that highlighted the talents of an ambassador, there has been no comprehensive study on ambassadors as a group. Although an argument can be made that the role of the ambassador is less critical today than in the past due to advances in modern telecommunications and air travel, the fact remains the ambassador is the eyes and ears on the ground able to provide a shared understanding back to the Department of State and the President.

There is also continuing discussion on the practice of Presidents appointing non-career diplomats as part of a spoils system that dated back to the 1950s. Although historically the numbers of political ambassadors had remained in the thirty percent range that number had been creeping steadily upwards. Organizations such as the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) have long advocated for strict limits on non-career diplomats, and much like Ambassadors Neumann and Pickering (2008), have developed a list of recommended skills and qualifications that seek to curtail the practice of selecting unqualified candidates.

2.6.2 The study

There is a gap in the research and study of diplomatic history regarding the selection patterns and performance of Ambassadors (Scott 1969; Harr, 1970; Heclo, 1988; Sartori, 2005; Gurman, 2011). The extant literature addresses the facts and details of events surrounding a foreign policy or diplomatic crisis, but is generally lacking with regard to any systematic analysis of US diplomatic persons. Because the Ambassador is the president's personal representative to a foreign government, his or her qualifications and actions are essential to truly understanding political or diplomatic crisis involving a foreign government.

This gap is both quantitative and qualitative (McCamy & Corradini 1954; Heclo 1988; Foschi 2000; Sartori 2005; Lewis 2007). Quantitatively there is no central dataset of information available to researchers of the selection patterns and qualifications of Ambassadors.⁴ Although there are individual records of almost every ambassador or minister since Benjamin Franklin, the lack of a central database has limited researcher's ability to analyze selection patterns of ambassadors across time and political administrations. What is missing is a comprehensive study that analyzes the characteristics of Ambassadors as a whole, including non-career political appointee Ambassadors.

Qualitatively there is no systematic study of the patterns of performance of career diplomats and political appointees when they confront crises. Are there characteristics and experiences that would contribute to Ambassadors being more effective or

⁴ Having searched numerous diplomatic databases, spoken with the State Department historian, the Dean of the Foreign Service Institute, and numerous Ambassadors, I am confident this database does not exist.

successful? In their letter to Senator's Obama and McCain, Neumann and Pickering (2008) listed several skills they believe are important to the success of an Ambassador. However, there are no empirical studies, which either support or contradict their recommended characteristics.

Although there is a sizeable quantitative assessment to this study, this inquiry will be conducted using a mixed methods approach. This will allow an assessment of multiple quantitative attributes while also allowing for a richer qualitative assessment of the other factors that influence foreign policy.

Adding a qualitative approach will enhance the explanatory power of the discussion. This mixed approach has become a more accepted methodology as the technique has become more stable (George & Bennett 2005, 4; George 1979). As George and Bennett observe, it is more common to find scholars with training in more than one methodology (2005, 5). The case study approach allows for the detailed examination of a particular event or period that may be generalizable to other events.

The logic of the case study approach is strengthened by the structured and focused nature of the inquiry. According to George and Bennett (2005; George and Smoke 1974; George 1979), the method is structured by the systemic nature of the general questions asked of each case. It is focused by asking about specific aspects of the cases. They argue this method was developed in order to study historical phenomena in enough detail to yield generic knowledge of foreign policy events (2005, 67).

2.6.3 The Research Design

There are generally three accepted methods of conducting research collectively known as Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods (George and Smoke 1974; George 1979; Adcock & Collier 2001; Biddle 2004; George & Bennett 2005; Barkin 2007; Prakash & Klotz, 2007; Creswell 2009; Tashakkori & Teddlie 2010; Ahram 2011). Inside these three major approaches are numerous subsets of design methods. Of these, the mixed methods approach would be considered the newest, originating in 1959 by Benjamin and Fisk, researchers studying psychological traits (Creswell 2009; Tashakkori & Teddlie 2010). Each of these methodologies of research have their proponents and opponents, each guarding their epistemology jealously. Because of the blended nature of Mixed Methods, there are detractors who believe the mixed methods approach should not be used due to the uncertainty of measurement validity (Ahram 2011; Adcock & Collier 2001), as well as advocates who believe mixed methods allows for a stronger explanatory methodology (George and Smoke 1974; George 1979; George & Bennett 2005; Creswell 2009; Tashakkori & Teddlie 2010).

In his seminal work on research design, Creswell notes that, qualitative research assists the researcher to better understand the meaning individuals or groups give to the phenomena under study. Quantitative research allows for an objective test of theory by assessing the relationship among variables (Creswell, 2009, 4). Nevertheless, there are times selecting one method over the other does not adequately allow for inquiry able to help answer complex, multilayered phenomena. For these types of problems, Creswell notes, a mixed methods approach that combines the best features of both approaches will yield a study that is stronger than using one or the other method

(Creswell, 2009, 4). In *Military Power*, Biddle supports Creswell's assertion of the strengthening of research by combining methods, saying science has not yet determined a perfect methodology (Biddle, 2004, 9).

Both Biddle (2004) and Creswell (2009) use the term "triangulation" to describe the effects brought by mixing methods in research. Biddle states that small—N case study permits a depth of study not achievable by quantitative methods, while statistical findings can speak to larger trends over time (Biddle 2004). He further surmises the synergistic effects of mixed methods offer an opportunity to cover the weaknesses of each individual effort. Another strength noted by Creswell was the neutralizing effect mixing methods has on bias. All methods have certain limitations, mixing methods allows for the neutralizing of biases in other methods (Creswell 2009).

For Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010), the value of mixed methods is based on the characteristics of what they term as Mixed Methods Research (MMR). They believe there is a methodological eclecticism to MMR allowing for the ability to integrate the most appropriate techniques. They further note that researchers that reject the mixed methods approach do so from a belief in the incompatibility of methods. Tashakkori and Teddlie reject these incommensurability reasons for not mixing research methods, noting George and Bennett's observation of new developments in the philosophy of science having provided a firmer foundation for case study methods (George & Bennett, 2005).

Case study methodology has come in for its share of criticisms as well. Comments on bias and degrees of freedom are common (Biddle 2004; George & Bennett 2005). Biddle (2004) comments that case methodology does pose a danger for

selection bias. Small sample research can lead to selecting cases that are unrepresentative of larger samples. George & Bennett (2005) address the issues of bias, degrees of freedom, and the lack of independence of cases. They note that case studies have sometimes been criticized for a degrees of freedom problem, which they describe as a statistical term for under determination, or the inability to differentiate among competing explanations on the basis of evidence. For the OPEC countries selected for this study, there are some similarities because they are all oil producing countries located in the Middle East. However, this is not a case of Galton's Problem. Each of these countries had a different relationship with the United States prior to the embargo; the idea of Pan Arabism was not a binding factor. George and Bennett note that case studies are often strong where statistical methods and models are weak. According to George and Bennett, the case study methodology enhances conceptual validity, helps researchers to derive new hypothesis, explore causal mechanisms, and model complex causal mechanisms.

As George and Bennett have noted, the case study approach allows for a detailed examination of an aspect of history in order to develop generalizable explanations (George & Bennett, 2005, 5). The ability of the mixed method approach to "triangulate" sources and data, integrate and connect results, and refine large N sample data with small N detail makes this approach more suitable for this study. Because selection bias is a concern in any reputable study, the mixing of methods is expected to reduce or neutralize the effects better than if addressed in a single method of study alone (Creswell, 2009, 4). Because the data will allow for the triangulating of data sources, it can be expected to merge qualitative and quantitative methods.

2.6.4 Case study using a structured, focused comparison approach

George and Bennett (2005) advocate an objective approach to using case studies that allow them to code variables across cases. Called the structured focused comparison of cases, the researcher asks general questions that reflect the research objective of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection. This allows for a systematic comparison of the findings of the cases possible. By doing so, the issues raised by Ahram (2011) and Adcock and Collier (2001) on measurement validity are addressed. This process is focused by ensuring the questions only examine certain aspects of the case.

This study examines the question of whether a skilled ambassador is more able to sustain higher levels of cooperation between nations than their contemporaries who may be less experienced. In particular, it will examine a group of career and political appointee Ambassadors during a period of diplomatic crisis to see if there are any measurable differences. In order to accomplish this, the first task is to build a database of all US Ambassadors from 1948 to 1974 using information contained in the US Department of State Biographic Register. The biographic register was the official publication used by the Department of State to present the biographies of all US Ambassadors, Ministers, Foreign Service Reserve Officers, and Foreign Service Staff Officers in the grade of Class 12 and higher. It was routinely produced until 1974 when publication was discontinued due to security concerns. This will allow a quantitative examination of discrete independent variables of performance using the Conflict and Peace Data set 1948-1978 (COPDAB).

The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (Azar 1980) 1948-1978 will be used to measure cooperation. This dataset is widely used to assist in researching questions on foreign policy using quantified data. The COPDAB database is a digital, longitudinal collection of daily international and domestic events that can be manipulated to show cooperation between nations. The events are discrete items that are distinct enough to be newsworthy, and have been captured by selected publications. The COPDAB codebook will specify rules for collection. The current COPDAB collection includes 135 nations and spans the period of 1 January 1948 through 31 December 1978.

This period will be used because this represents the modern era of the president in the post war industrial age, and an era of global diplomacy conducted by the United States with other countries in all continents of the world. This database will encompass all US Ambassadors and have the ability to be manipulated using standard statistical techniques. It will code selected variables described in the Neumann and Pickering (2008) letter to record selection patterns and characteristics of US Ambassadors with the ability to correlate this selection to specific countries, presidential administrations and episodic conflict.

2.6.5 Examining cooperation during a crisis – Yom Kippur and the oil embargo

Secondly, I plan to examine the events and circumstances surrounding US diplomatic actions during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the oil embargo of the United States from October 1973 to March 1974. This embargo was the result of dissatisfaction with US military and political support for Israel during their October 1973 Yom Kippur War with Egypt and Syria. There were five original members of OPEC, with

four of these members -- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq -- located in the Middle East. The US Ambassadors assigned to these four countries during this period were a mix of career and political Ambassadors. Although an embargo is generally viewed as an overtly hostile act, the application of the embargo among these different countries was not the same.

2.6.6 Case Selection

During the 1973 oil embargo, each of these countries played a role in either supporting the embargo or in the case of Iran, not supporting the embargo. Each of these countries is located in the modern Middle East, although they are not all Arab countries. Three of the four countries were considered friendly by the US, and had received many years of economic, military, and diplomatic support from the US. Using these four countries will follow the notion of unit homogeneity, and the assumption of constant causal effects (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 93). This assumption holds that the differences observed in the values of the dependent variables can be explained by the changes in the explanatory variables for homogenous units across time and space.

The qualitative assessment will be comprised of structured and focused comparison of ambassadorial skills and attributes supported by case study methodology of four of the original five OPEC nations that played a role or took part in the 1973 oil embargo of the United States. The case study will allow a richer understanding of the dependent variables associated with the level of cooperation maintained between the US and OPEC countries during this tense period. Information that was private at the

time or not fully revealed may indicate that relations with the US were more stable or belligerent than COPDAB data reveals. This study will also use a cross-sectional time series approach to assess the ability to measure the skills and attributes deemed essential to the conduct of foreign policy in an attempt to answer the research questions.

The Yom Kippur War began on 6 October 1973, and ended on 25 October 1973. The OPEC oil embargo of the United States and other supporting countries began on 17 October 1973, and ended on 18 March 1974. Beginning the investigation of US Ambassadors from 1970 will enable the establishment of a baseline of cooperation prior to the beginning of the Yom Kippur War, which is widely recognized as the precursor crisis to the oil embargo.

Chapter 3: Statistical Analysis

Section I

3.1 Introduction

In their letter to Senator's Obama and McCain, Ambassador's Neumann and Pickering (2008) listed several traits and skills they believe would help ambassadors to be more effective. The goal of this study is to try to assess the influence these skills may have on an ambassador's ability to sustain a higher level of cooperation between their assigned country and the United States. In order to conduct this research, a longitudinal study of ambassadors using Time Series Cross Sectional (TSCS) statistical analysis of US Ambassadors from 1948-1975 has been designed. Time Series statistical analysis will allow for a stronger claim of validity and correlation due to the length of time and the quantity of observations. Most studies of ambassadors involve a qualitative approach, and because of this the data necessary to enable a quantitative assessment has been lacking. The ability to assess cooperation across a longer period of occurrences in order to see change across time is a particularly useful way to see the effects varying skills in ambassadors may play.

This chapter is organized into three sections, and will comprise the quantitative examination of cooperation among the wider world of US Ambassadors from 1948 to 1974. Section I is comprised of the introduction, a discussion of the research variables, and the datasets used. Section II is comprised of the descriptive statistical summaries, data analysis and graphs. Section III contains the statistical discussion and analysis of the findings. This period of examination was chosen to align with both the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) dataset which covers 1948 to 1978 (Azar 1993), and the

Department of State Biographic Register, which began publication in the early 1800s, but discontinued public release at the end of 1974 due to security concerns.

3.1.1 Research Variables, Datasets, and Methods

There is one dependent variable, two independent variables with four attributes, and two control variables used for this study. These variables are described below.

3.1.2 The dependent variable

The proxy dependent variable used for the quantitative component will be cooperation as measured by the Conflict and Peace Data Bank, 1948-1978 (ICPSR 7767). This dataset is a widely used scaled compilation of diplomatic events sourced from major news sources, and has been used in studies as a measure of cooperation between target countries and the United States. This dataset was designed to assist in researching questions on foreign policy using quantified data (Azar 1980). The COPDAB database is a digital, longitudinal collection of daily international and domestic events that can be manipulated to show a scaled range of cooperation and conflict between nations (Azar 1980, 146). The events are discrete items that are distinct enough to be newsworthy, and follow the rules identified in the COPDAB codebook (Azar 1980). The current COPDAB collection includes 135 nations and spans the period of 1 January 1948 through 31 December 1978. The COPDAB dataset ranks cooperation using an ordinal scale from 2 – 15, with 15 being the highest level of conflict. In order to control for serial correlation, the variable has been lagged one event (Beck and Katz 1995). The data uses Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) analysis.

The COPDAB events have been aggregated by year, while the other variables are annual. This variable has been labeled COPDAB Scale in the dataset.

3.1.3 The independent variables and attributes

There are two independent variables used for this study, with four attributes. The first codes whether the ambassador is a career Foreign Service Officer, or a political appointee. A career ambassador would generally begin his or her career as a junior Foreign Service Officer (FSO) in the Department of State or the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Career Foreign Service Officers typically grow up in the Department of State, and work their way through the ranks until being selected as an ambassador. Not all Foreign Service Officers are selected to be ambassadors as there are many more Foreign Service Officers than positions for ambassadors. Politically appointed ambassadors are selected by the President, and will generally have little to no diplomatic or foreign policy experience. Of course this does not mean they are not capable and competent; some will have many of the attributes listed in the Neumann / Pickering letter. If the ambassador joined and served in the Department of State in a variety of roles prior to selection, and is labeled a Foreign Service Officer in the Biographic Register, he will be determined to be a career FSO. This is a dichotomous variable with 0=no, and 1=yes. This variable has been labeled *Career Status*.

The second independent variable will be the experience and skill level of an ambassador as discussed in the Neumann / Pickering letter, and the letter given by the President to new Ambassadors measured using the following attributes:

1) Did the Ambassador have a period of military service? An ambassador is responsible for all US personnel, to include military personnel not under the command of a geographic commander. Ambassadors are frequently consulted by military commanders and their staffs for authorization to conduct military exercises and operations with host countries as part of the theater engagement plan. Service with or in the military will have exposed the recipient to a culture of planning and education, and will be evidence of a better understanding of military planning and education. This is a dichotomous variable with 0=no, and 1=yes. This variable has been labeled *Military Service*.

2) Did he have a previous assignment to the region prior to assignment as an ambassador? A previous assignment to the region where the ambassador is assigned will be considered if that assignment was greater than one year, and has taken place within the previous ten years. This will be determined by the biographic register, which lists assignments by country and year. Previous experience in a region will be assumed to have acquainted an ambassador with an understanding of the diplomatic and cultural issues prevalent in the region. This is a dichotomous variable with 0=no, and 1=yes. This variable has been labeled *Regional Experience*.

3) Does he speak any language beyond English? Although this skill may not be directly useful in their assigned country, it will be assumed to help sensitize the ambassador to the role that culture and language play in the identity of people. Learning one language will also be assumed to make learning the basics of another language easier. This is a dichotomous variable with 0=no, and 1=yes. This variable has been labeled *Speaks Language*.

4) Has the assigned ambassador had a previous assignment to any country as an ambassador? This will speak to the experience of the ambassador. Ambassadorial assignments can range from one to four years for career Foreign Service Officers, while the average for a political appointee is one to two years. The Ambassador would have at least one previous assignment as an ambassador of at least one year to qualify. This is a dichotomous coded variable with 0=no, and 1=yes. This variable has been labeled *Previous Ambassador Experience*.

3.1.4 The control variables

There are two control variables used to assist in clarifying the relationships of the dependent and independent variables. The first control variable will be economic trade using Katherine Barbieri's directional economic trade dataset. The second control variable will use Leeds' Alliance dataset to assess alliance relationships that were in effect during the assessed period.

As part of her dissertation research, Katherine Barbieri (1996) compiled the first of several international trade datasets (Barbieri 2002). This dataset has been used extensively by researchers, including Robst, Polacheck, and Chang (2007), in their discussion of the relationship between trade proximity and conflict. This control variable will act as a proxy for consistent or inconsistent preferences between the US and target countries, and will assess the increase or decrease in export trade. The dichotomous variable *Differential Trade* will assess the growth in exports from the US to the target country. The assumption will be an increase in export trade should correlate with positive cooperation, and will be assessed with no=0 and yes=1.

There is a significant body of literature on the effects that alliances between countries has on militarized disputes. As Leeds (2003) notes, “Alliance commitments affect decisions to initiate disputes, but because different alliances involve different promises to different actors, alliances can have different effects.” The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, 2002) will be used to record the presence of a defense agreement between the US and the target country. The assumption is that having an alliance agreement in place will correlate with positive cooperation. The variable *Defense* will be recorded as no=0 and yes=1.⁵

3.1.5 The datasets

The first task necessary for my analysis was to build a database of all US Ambassadors from 1948 to 1974 using information contained in the US Department of State Biographic Register. The biographic register was the official publication used by the Department of State to present the biographies of all US Ambassadors, Ministers, Foreign Service Reserve Officers, and Foreign Service Staff Officers in the grade of Class 12 and lower. It was publicly available until 1974 when publication was discontinued due to security concerns.

Building this database was necessary because there is no existing database listing US Ambassadors in a format that would allow for quantitative analysis. Although there is biographic information available on US Ambassadors in both print and digital, this data has not been combined in a way that would allow a researcher to access and

⁵ There are other confounding variables discussed in the literature review that will not be analyzed in the empirical analysis at this time. These include embassy staffing, embassy size, and sub-culture.

compare relevant aggregate information with other data. Information on all US Ambassadors was compiled using official Department of State data contained in the Biographic Register.

The base period constructed using the biographic register is January 1, 1948 until December 31, 1974. This period was chosen because this represents the modern era of the president in the post war industrial age, and an era of global diplomacy conducted by the United States with other countries in all continents of the world. This database will encompass all US Ambassadors and have the ability to be manipulated using standard statistical techniques. It will code selected variables described in the Neumann / Pickering letter to record selection patterns and characteristics of US Ambassadors with the ability to correlate this selection to specific countries, time periods, and episodic conflict.

The modified dataset used to assess the dependent and independent variables is a merged combination of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank constructed by Azar (1993), and the ambassador dataset developed for this research. The two sets were merged using the Correlates of War (COW) country codes and year of incident in order to align discrete instances of noteworthy diplomatic activity. The merging of the two datasets allows the conflict dataset to be particularly paired with the ambassador that was present at the time.

Making the assumption there are regional differences in the way diplomacy is conducted, the main dataset was further subdivided into seven regional groups following the Conflict and Peace Data Bank format. The countries assigned to each group, and the overall countries included in this study can be seen in appendix A at the

end of this dissertation. The regions are based on their geographic location, and are numbered using the correlates of war (COW) country numbering system. One last method of assessing cooperation and conflict was to divide the main dataset into a top half of conflict scaled using the COPDAB scale values of 9-15, and the bottom half of the dataset representing cooperation using the scale values from 2-8. Dividing the dataset in this manner allowed for the closer examination of variables present in both highly conflicted periods as well as highly cooperative periods.

3.2 Section II

3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 3.1 provides the variable names, the number of observations, the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum scores. There are 22, 303 observations for the dependent variable used to measure cooperation, *COPDAB Scale*, with a mean value of 6.988 and a standard deviation of 2.6048. The scored values range from 2 to 15. This is a proxy variable that relies on the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). The additional year of 1975 is not included in the Department of State Biographic Register, so this period will only be included so long as the same ambassador from 1974 was still assigned. It is assumed the skills assessed in 1974, did not change over this additional one year period.

The independent variable for *Career Status* has 22, 303 observations, with a mean of .6151 and a standard deviation of .4866. The independent variable for *Military Service* has 22, 303 observations, with a mean value of .3937 and the standard deviation of .4866. The independent variable for previous *Regional Experience* has a

mean value of .4491 and a standard deviation of .4974. The independent variable for language ability beyond the primary language of English, *Speaks Language*, has a mean value of .2221 with a standard deviation of .4160. The independent variable for a previous assignment as an ambassador, *Ambassador Experience*, has a mean of .4630 with a standard deviation of .4990. The control variable for an increase in exports to the target country, *Differential Trade*, has a mean value of .6257 with a standard deviation of .4839. The control variable for a defense agreement in effect, *Defense*, has a mean value of .5085 with a standard deviation of .4999.

Statistical Summary of the full COPBAD Scale dataset

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
COPDAB Scale	22,303	6.9388	2.6048	2	15
Career Status	22,303	0.6151	0.4866	0	1
Military Service	22,303	0.3937	0.4886	0	1
Regional Experience	22,303	0.4491	0.4974	0	1
Speaks Language	22,303	0.2221	0.4160	0	1
Ambassador Experience	22,303	0.4630	0.4990	0	1
Differential Trade	22,303	0.6257	0.4839	0	1
Defense	22,303	0.5085	0.4999	0	1

Table 3.1 Summary of variables

Three methodological considerations for regression analysis deserve mention. These are the influences that collinearity, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation can have on the variables. While it is desirable to see a relationship between the dependent and independent variables, it is not desirable for there to be a relationship between the independent variables. The test for this in Stata is the variance inflation factor (VIF). Collinearity can be a concern if the VIF score exceeds 4, and is a problem that must be

corrected when the VIF score exceeds 10. For all models used in this study the mean VIF score does not exceed 1.94. The closest correlation is between the variables related to career status and ambassador experience. The relationship between these two makes sense because many ambassadors come from the ranks of career Foreign Service Officers.

Correlation of standard errors is difficult to assess, and should be assumed to exist. Correlated standard errors can artificially increase the statistical significance of coefficients. Because the panel data is comprised of time series cross sectional (TSCS) data where the number of cross sectional observations are larger than the year's observed, the panel data may be unbalanced (Beck and Katz 1995). The issue of heteroscedasticity has been addressed using robust White standard errors, while serial correlation has been addressed through the use of a lagged dependent variable for all regression models.

Due to the size of the dataset, and because it covers all countries in which the United States had an ambassador assigned from 1948 through 1974, and owing to the differences in languages and culture, seven regional models are also examined. Tables 3.2 through 3.8 show the number of observations, the mean, and the standard deviations of these models.

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
COPDAB Scale	2054	6.9114	2.4154	2	14
Career Status	2055	.7007	.4580	0	1
Military Service	2055	.4360	.4960	0	1
Regional Experience	2055	.5066	.5001	0	1
Speaks Language	2055	.4058	.4912	0	1
Ambassador Experience	2055	.4584	.4983	0	1
Differential Trade	2055	.5381	.4987	0	1
Defense	2055	.9980	.0441	0	1

Table 3.2 North America

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
COPDAB Scale	1343	6.5160	2.1779	2	15
Career Status	1343	.6813	.4661	0	1
Military Service	1343	.4676	.4991	0	1
Regional Experience	1343	.4520	.4979	0	1
Speaks Language	1343	.5391	.4987	0	1
Ambassador Experience	1343	.2472	.4315	0	1
Differential Trade	1343	.7528	.4315	0	1
Defense	1343	1	0	1	1

Table 3.3 Central America

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
COPDAB Scale	1828	6.5252	2.2795	2	14
Career Status	1828	.7773	.4161	0	1
Military Service	1828	.2784	.4484	0	1
Regional Experience	1828	.4612	.4986	0	1
Speaks Language	1828	.3665	.4820	0	1
Ambassador Experience	1828	.5591	.4966	0	1
Differential Trade	1828	.4381	.4962	0	1
Defense	1828	.9967	.0572	0	1

Table 3.4 South America

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
COPDAB Scale	6570	7.0269	2.3022	2	14
Career Status	6570	.5545	.4971	0	1
Military Service	6570	.3805	.4856	0	1
Regional Experience	6570	.5880	.4922	0	1
Speaks Language	6570	.1139	.3177	0	1
Ambassador Experience	6570	.4656	.4989	0	1
Differential Trade	6570	.5522	.4973	0	1
Defense	6570	.4601	.4984	0	1

Table 3.5 Europe

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
COPDAB Scale	1167	6.1268	2.1570	3	14
Career Status	1167	.7738	.4186	0	1
Military Service	1167	.4841	.4999	0	1
Regional Experience	1167	.2649	.4414	0	1
Speaks Language	1167	.2896	.4538	0	1
Ambassador Experience	1167	.3076	.4617	0	1
Differential Trade	1167	.6274	.4837	0	1
Defense	1167	0	0	0	0

Table 3.6 Africa

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
COPDAB Scale	3327	6.4074	2.1645	2	13
Career Status	3327	.8079	.3940	0	1
Military Service	3327	.4226	.4940	0	1
Regional Experience	3327	.4658	.4989	0	1
Speaks Language	3327	.1515	.3586	0	1
Ambassador Experience	3327	.4626	.4987	0	1
Differential Trade	3327	.7965	.4027	0	1
Defense	3327	.3940	.4887	0	1

Table 3.7 Middle East

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
COPDAB Scale	6013	7.5242	3.2445	2	15
Career Status	6013	.4504	.4976	0	1
Military Service	6013	.3785	.4851	0	1
Regional Experience	6013	.3000	.4583	0	1
Speaks Language	6013	.1888	.3913	0	1
Ambassador Experience	6013	.5111	.4999	0	1
Differential Trade	6013	.6697	.4703	0	1
Defense	6013	.2976	.4527	0	1

Table 3.8 Asia (ASIA)

3.2.2 Statistical Analysis

The statistical analysis for the ambassador experience models are displayed in table 3.9. The table lists the linear regression for the full data model, and then by region, following the pattern of models previously shown. The basic regression equation for the full model is:

$$Y(\text{Cooperation}) = \beta_0(L) + \beta_1(\text{career status}) + \beta_2(\text{military service}) + \beta_3(\text{regional experience}) + \beta_4(\text{speaks language}) + \beta_5(\text{embassy experience}) + \beta_6(\text{ambassador experience}) + C_1(\text{differential trade}) + C_2(\text{defense}) + E$$


Statistical results for the full dataset 2-15

Variable	Full Data	N.AMER	C.AMER	S.AMER	EU	AFRICA	M.EAST	ASIA
Career Status	-.794*** (-19.11)	.001 (0.01)	-.255* (-1.92)	-.149 (-1.08)	-.441*** (-5.38)	.010 (0.06)	-.363*** (-3.32)	-.926*** (-11.26)
Military Service	-.227*** (-6.42)	.073 (-0.55)	.171 (1.30)	-.515*** (-4.03)	-.074 (1.15)	.124 (0.92)	.001 (0.01)	.146* (1.69)
Regional Exp	.227*** (6.48)	.950*** (6.71)	.040 (0.34)	.067 (0.59)	.511*** (7.32)	.454*** (3.14)	.027 (0.31)	-.471*** (-5.38)
Speaks Language	.292*** (6.69)	-.021 (-0.14)	.094 (0.74)	.891*** (7.28)	-.780*** (-8.75)	-.242* (-1.16)	-.377*** (-3.46)	.974*** (9.24)
Ambassador Exp	.566*** (16.15)	.271* (2.14)	.687*** (4.45)	-.106 (-0.94)	.084 (1.41)	.083 (0.55)	-.366*** (-4.49)	1.214*** (14.13)
Differential Trade	-.297*** (-8.54)	-1.41*** (-12.73)	.277** (2.14)	-.236** (-2.18)	-591*** (-8.51)	-.027 (-0.20)	.931*** (9.29)	.181** (2.43)
Defense	-1.18*** (-32.68)	.321 (0.37)	omitted	1.19* (1.86)	-1.34*** (-16.62)	omitted	-.492*** (-5.80)	-2.13*** (-29.91)
observations	22,302	2054	1343	1828	6568	1167	3327	6012
R Squared	0.08	0.1	0.03	0.05	0.18	0.01	0.04	0.18
Wald χ2	4933.3***	316.62***	158.78***	282.68***	1690.67***	110.12***	455.57***	1309.02***
Pseudo R Square	0.23	0.77	0.12	0.22	0.55	0.12	0.22	0.28

Table 3.9 Statistical Results for all models

The variable representing *Career Status* is statistically significant at the p<.01 level. The coefficient for the career variable is -.794, which suggests that for every increase in career foreign service officers, there is a corresponding decrease in the overall conflict continuum. Graph 3.1 gives a visual depiction of what this would reflect. For the 663 incidents of conflict at the highest levels of 14 and 15 in the graphs, political appointees were present in 90% of these events. What is more striking is the fact that political appointees only comprise 38% of this population, while being present for 90% of the higher conflict incidents.

This same pattern of an increase in career service ambassadors leading to a decrease in the overall conflict continuum is also statistically significant in Central America (-.255*), Europe (-.441***), the Middle East (-.363***), and Asia (-.926***). This data would suggest support for H2, which hypothesized that the presence of a skilled ambassador would enable higher levels of cooperation during periods of conflict.




Graph 3.1 Career Status of Ambassador

Graph 3.1 shows that problems on the higher end of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank scale reflecting the highest levels of conflict, also suggests the absence of career Foreign Service ambassadors. The data suggests that skilled career ambassadors seem to be able to maintain cooperation around the transition levels of ten and eleven, while political appointees are having problems at the highest end of conflict.

The *Military Service* variable is significant to the $p < .01$ level, with a coefficient of -.227, suggesting that an increase in military service would see a decrease in the overall conflict values for the COPDAB numbers. As seen in graph 3.2, the conflict numbers for prior military service ambassadors seem to be almost two-thirds lower at the upper levels of conflict than their counterparts with no prior military service. Ambassadors with previous military experience comprised 39% of the population, and

this attribute was present during 34% of the events at the levels of 10-15. However, at the levels of 14 and 15, the highest levels of conflict, this attribute was present in 24% of these events. Ambassadors without previous military experience accounted for 76% of these events, a number 309% higher.

South America and Asia also show statistically significant indicators that an increase in military experience has an impact on levels of conflict. While the other regions do not show the same level of significance, what is notable is the lack of significance these numbers show. This data might suggest that experiences can be tailored for various regions.




Graph 3.2 Military Service

The data suggests there is support for the secondary research question about measurable attributes among ambassadors that may influence cooperation. The data would also support the contention by Ambassador's Neumann and Pickering that ambassadors with identifiable skills may be better able to conduct diplomacy.

The *Regional Experience* variable is significant at the p<.01 level, with a coefficient of .227. This would suggest an increase of regional experience would result

in an increase of the overall conflict range. However, as noted in graph 3.3, ambassadors that lack regional experience share comparable conflict numbers up to level ten. Conflict at the highest levels of fourteen and fifteen is roughly fifteen times higher than ambassadors that have regional experience.




Graph 3.3 Regional Experience

This data suggests support for H1 that states the presence of a skilled ambassador should lead to higher levels of cooperation. This is more notable because of the almost even split of 45% to 55% between regional experience among ambassadors in this data set. For ambassadors with no regional experience, the incidents of higher conflict are over thirteen hundred times higher.

The *Speaks Language* variable is significant at the $p < .01$ level, with a coefficient of .292. This would suggest that an increase in language ability would yield an increase in the overall conflict scale result. As seen in graph 3.4, the overall rates for Ambassadors that speak a second language are 22%, significantly lower than for those Ambassadors that do not. The rates of incidents at levels higher than ten are almost four times higher for Ambassadors that only speak English.


Because of the disparity in ambassadors that speak a second language, the two charts are roughly even. The notable exception would be the transition level at the ten and eleven level where incidents of conflict are roughly 20% higher for the English only language speakers. Europe, Africa, and the Middle East do show statistically significant differences in ambassadors that speak a second language. This would support the secondary research question related to measurable attributes, and again suggests there are tailorable differences in ambassador experiences assigned to different regions.



Graph 3.4 Speaks Language


The variable for *Ambassador Experience* is significant at the $p<.01$ level, with a coefficient of .566. The data suggest that new ambassadors are better able to maintain conflict at levels below 10, and these numbers are comparable to more experienced ambassadors. However, as noted in graph 3.1, career service ambassadors are better able to maintain conflict at lower levels. This would suggest that for the numbers in graph 3.5, career service ambassadors are better able to sustain conflict at lower levels. Alternatively, a selection effect may be at work that impacts the results for regional

experience, language skills, and ambassadorial experience. Ambassadors with these skills may be assigned to challenging posts where conflict is more likely.




Graph 3.5 Ambassador Experience

The control variable *Differential Trade* is significant at the p<.01 level, with a coefficient of -.297. This would suggest that an increase in trade exports would yield a decrease in the overall conflict scale result. As seen in graph 3.6, the overall cooperation with countries where exports are greater than imports are higher at the lower levels of conflict, although show similar cluster patterns around the five to seven levels in the conflict-cooperation continuum. Trade also seems to have a statistically significant impact on lowering conflict in South America (-.236**), Europe (-.591***); whereas in Central America, the Middle East, and Asia it seems to have the opposite effect. This data might suggest that while trade is important, there are areas where an emphasis on increasing trade could have a more positive affect.



Graph 3.6 Differential Trade

The alliance agreement control variable *Defense* is significant at the $p < .01$ level, with a coefficient of -1.188. This would suggest that an increase in defense agreements would yield a decrease in the overall conflict scale result. As seen in graph 3.7, the overall cooperation with countries where there is a defense agreement in place are greater than during periods when an agreement is not in place. This is seen regionally as well in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia where an increase in defense agreements has a statistically significant effect on lowering the overall level of conflict.



Graph 3.7 Defense

To parse the data further, two additional models were developed that examine the independent variables against the upper and lower half of the conflict and peace data scale. The upper half model examines the relationships between these variables and the higher conflict range of 9-15. The lower half model examines the same variables with the higher cooperation range of 2-8. These two models allow the upper scale range of conflict and the lower scale range of cooperation to be assessed. Table 3.10 shows the statistical results for the 9-15 range, while table 3.11 shows the lower half range of 2-8.

3.2.3 Statistical analysis of the upper conflict range of COPDAB data (SV9-15)


Statistical results for the upper half of the COPDAB data 9-15

Variable	SV 9-15	N.AMER	C.AMER	S.AMER	EU	AFRICA	M.EAST	ASIA
Career Status	-1.16*** (-13.93)	1.230* (2.23)	-.156 (-0.40)	-.214 (-0.60)	-.421*** (-2.56)	-.972** (-2.25)	.091 (0.39)	-1.36*** (-6.46)
Military Service	-.366*** (-4.70)	.578* (1.90)	-.086 (-0.24)	-.496 (-1.35)	.402*** (2.69)	.032 (0.09)	.112 (0.50)	-.295 (-1.53)
Regional Exp	.006 (0.09)	.499 (1.56)	-.358 (-1.08)	.139 (0.52)	.271** (2.18)	1.38*** (3.73)	.117 (0.50)	-.659*** (-2.90)
Speak Language	.476*** (5.06)	-.756* (-1.78)	-.134 (-0.38)	1.207*** (4.93)	-1.105*** (-4.66)	-.453 (-1.16)	-.677** (-2.43)	1.064*** (5.37)
Ambassador Exp	.801*** (11.69)	.324 (0.77)	1.004** (2.58)	-.172 (-0.66)	.230** (2.47)	.447 (1.19)	-.467*** (-2.65)	1.317*** (7.26)
Differential Trade	-.482*** (-6.98)	-1.94*** (-7.93)	-.027 (-0.07)	-.085 (-0.27)	-.318** (-2.38)	-.253 (-0.68)	.761*** (2.70)	-.233 (-1.46)
Defense	-1.32*** (-17.97)	omitted	omitted	omitted	-1.88*** (-10.16)	omitted	-.633*** (-3.31)	-2.47*** (-13.27)
observations	6,263	595	266	373	2086	186	686	2071
R Squared	0.11	0.24	0.04	0.06	0.18	0.12	0.04	0.15
Wald χ^2	1372.82***	omitted	59.34***	66.04***	442.80***	27.07***	73.89***	604.03***
Pseudo R Square	0.3		0.34	0.28	0.58	0.14	0.21	0.58

Table 3.10 Statistical results for all models 9-15


The *Career Status* variable is significant to the $p < .01$ level, with a coefficient of -1.163. This would suggest increase in this attribute would lead to a decrease in the overall conflict range. Career ambassadors comprise 60.5% of this population. Graph 3.8 shows that political appointee ambassadors are associated with higher levels of measured COPDAB incidents at rates ten times higher than career ambassadors. This is a significant difference in conflict measured between career and non-career, and would support the hypothesis that an experienced ambassador would be able to sustain lower levels of conflict, resulting in higher levels of cooperation.

This same pattern of an increase in career service ambassadors leading to a decrease in the overall conflict continuum is also statistically significant in Europe (-.421***), Africa (-.972**), and Asia (-1.355***). This data would suggest support for H2, which hypothesized that the presence of a skilled ambassador would enable higher levels of cooperation during periods of conflict.



Graph 3.8 Career Status


The variable *Military Service* is significant at the $p < .01$ level, with a coefficient of $-.366$. Graph 3.9 shows that when assessing conflict incidents greater than ten, ambassadors with no prior military experience are associated at twice the rate of ambassadors with military experience, 1124 versus 527. The statistical mean for this population of ambassadors with military experience is 34.6%, almost one third of all ambassadors. However, the rate of association with higher end conflict at the 14 and 15 level is almost four times the rate for non-military experience, 600 versus 163 events. This data would suggest support for the hypothesis there are measurable attributes that are present with higher levels of cooperation.



Graph 3.9 Military Service


The variable *Regional Experience* is not statistically significant with a coefficient of $.006$. Graph 3.9 supports the estimation that ambassadors with no regional experience or previous assignment are associated with incidents greater than 10 on the COPDAB scale at twice the rate of ambassadors with previous regional assignment. However, the rates of events at the conflict levels of 14 and 15 are 1300% higher, 621 versus 42. This data suggests support for the hypothesis that skilled ambassadors with

regional experience will be able to sustain lower levels of conflict, and higher levels of cooperation.




Graph 3.10 Regional Experience

The variable *Speaks Language* is significant at the $p < .01$ level, with a coefficient of .476. The data would suggest that an increase in language skills would result in an increase in the overall conflict rank. Graph 3.10 showing the association of language to conflict would seem to support this, although the statistical mean for speaking a second language is a very small 19%. The association of ambassadors with higher levels of conflict that do not speak a second language is greater than five times the average of ambassadors that do speak a second language, roughly 430%. This provides some qualified evidence that a skilled ambassador is able to sustain conflict at lower levels, and cooperation at higher levels. There is also a regional component to the data as well. Speaking the language of EU countries is statistically significant at $p < .01$ with a coefficient of (-1.105), while in Asia the same significance has a coefficient of (1.064).




Graph 3.11 Speaks Language

The variable *Ambassador Experience* is statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level, with a coefficient of .801. The data would suggest that an increase in ambassadors with previous assignments as ambassadors would lead to an increase in the overall conflict values, and the graph below supports that. Graph 3.11 shows that conflict incident numbers on both sides of the variable are roughly even until the conflict value of 14. At this level there is an increase in events for ambassadors with previous assignment as an ambassador. Again, this outcome may be the product of selection effect that will need to be analyzed further in future studies.




Graph 3.12 Ambassador Experience

The control variable *Differential Trade* is significant at the p<.01 level, with a coefficient of -.482. This would suggest that an increase in trade exports would yield a decrease in the overall conflict scale result. As seen in graph 3.13, the overall cooperation with countries where exports are greater than imports are show similar patterns where imports are greater than exports, particularly at the transition levels of 9 and 10 in the conflict-cooperation continuum.



Graph 3.13 *Differential Trade*

The alliance agreement control variable *Defense* is significant at the p<.01 level, with a coefficient of -1.323. This would suggest that a increase in defense agreements would yield an decrease in the overall conflict scale result. As seen in graph 3.14, while the overall cooperation with countries where there is a defense agreement in place are greater than during periods when an agreement is not in place, the two show similar cluster patterns at the conflict levels of 9 and 10.



Graph 3.14 Defense


3.2.4 Statistical analysis of the lower cooperation range of COPDAB data (SV2-8)

Variable	SV 2-8	N.AMER	C.AMER	S.AMER	EU	AFRICA	M.EAST	ASIA
Career Status	-.440*** (-9.64)	-.365* (-1.78)	-329** (-2.31)	-.113 (-0.77)	-.201** (-1.99)	.238 (1.44)	-.464*** (-3.75)	-.563*** (-6.38)
Military Service	-.132*** (-3.46)	-.303 (-0.21)	.259* (1.86)	-.443*** (-3.24)	-.237*** (-3.36)	.259* (1.83)	-.035 (-0.37)	.294 (3.18)
Regional Exp	.212*** (5.51)	.691*** (4.46)	.196 (1.51)	.051 (0.40)	.522*** (6.20)	.186 (1.23)	.012 (0.13)	-.309*** (-3.45)
Speak Language	.191*** (4.05)	.381* (2.42)	.159 (1.18)	.708*** (5.02)	-.631*** (-6.59)	-.259* (-1.68)	-.209* (-1.77)	.760*** (6.16)
Ambassador Exp	.273*** (6.95)	.043 (0.26)	.448*** (2.69)	-.106 (-0.83)	-.090*** (-1.17)	-.117 (-0.72)	-.252*** (-2.76)	.779*** (8.19)
Differential Trade	-.139*** (-3.61)	-.553*** (-3.95)	.383*** (2.79)	-.233** (-2.00)	-.535*** (-6.64)	.120 (0.80)	.796*** (7.28)	.209** (2.54)
Defense	-.774*** (-18.82)	.196 (.030)	omitted	1.097* (1.72)	-.867*** (-9.39)	omitted	-.366*** (-3.85)	-1.59*** (-19.63)
observations	16,036	1459	1077	1454	4484	981	2641	3941
R Square	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.13
Wald χ^2	3534.54***	230.38***	110.90***	223.08***	1138.01***	115.87***	382.51***	619.12***
Pseudo R Square	0.23	0.73	0.09	0.21	0.56	0.12	0.24	0.18

Table 3.11 Statistical results for all models 2-8

The *Career Status* variable is statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level, with a coefficient of $-.440$. Graph 3.15 shows the relationship between career and political appointee ambassadors to be very similar. However, even at lower levels of conflict, and higher levels of cooperation, the data suggests an increase in career ambassadors would lead to even higher levels of cooperation.


This same pattern of an increase in career service ambassadors leading to a decrease in the overall conflict continuum is also statistically significant in Central America ($-.329^{**}$), Europe ($-.201^{**}$), the Middle East ($-.464^{***}$), and Asia ($-.563^{***}$). This data would suggest support for H2, which hypothesized that the presence of a skilled ambassador would enable higher levels of cooperation during periods of conflict.



Graph 3.15 Career Status


The variable *Military Service* is significant at the $p < .01$ level, with the coefficient of $-.132$ and a mean of $.41$. Graph 3.16 shows that the variable for military service is evenly represented among those with no prior military service, and those with military service. The mean of ambassadors with no military service is roughly 60%, and the

numbers on both sides support this ratio. Regionally, military service is statistical significant in South America (-.443***), Europe (-.237***), Africa (.259*).




Graph 3.16 Military Service

The variable *Regional Experience* is significant at the p<.01 level, with a coefficient of .212 and a mean of .43. This would suggest that greater levels of regional experience in ambassadors would lead to an overall increase in the conflict range. The mean for ambassadors with no regional experience is roughly 57%, and the graph suggests that regional experience plays less of a role at lower levels of conflict overall.




Graph 3.17 Regional Experience

The variable *Speaks Language* is significant at the p<.01 level with a coefficient of .191 and a mean of .23. The data suggests that language ability at the lower conflict levels does not seem to have a significant role.



Graph 3.18 Speaks Language


The variable *Ambassador Experience* is statistically significant at the p<.01 level with a coefficient of .273 and a mean of .43. At the lower levels of conflict, the data suggests that previous ambassador experience may not play a significant role.



Graph 3.19 Ambassador Experience


The control variable *Differential Trade* is significant at the p<.01 level with a coefficient of -.139. This might suggest that an increase in trade exports would yield an decrease in the overall conflict scale result. As seen in graph 3.13, the overall

cooperation with countries where exports are greater than imports are proportional at the lower levels of conflict, particularly at the transition levels of 4-7 in the conflict-cooperation continuum.



Graph 3.20 Differential trade

The alliance agreement control variable Defense is significant at the $p < .01$ level, with a coefficient of -.774. This would suggest that an increase in defense agreements would yield a decrease in the overall conflict scale result. As seen in graph 3.21, the overall cooperation with countries where there is a defense agreement in place are greater than during periods when an agreement is in place, although for the highest levels of cooperation, the data clusters suggests high levels of cooperation at the 2-4 level for both models.



Graph 3.21 Alliance agreement (defense)

3.3 Summary of findings

The following chart summarizes the findings that support the research questions (R1, R2, and R3) and the hypothesis (H1, H2). This summary will use the analysis from the full data set in table 3.0, the upper half of the full data set in table 3.10 which measure conflict from 9-15, and the lower half cooperation data set in table 3.11 which measures cooperation from 2-8. The regional models are shown for comparison but are not discussed individually.

Summary of findings

Research questions and hypothesis	Full data set SV 2-15	Upper level data set SV 9-15	Lower level data set SV 2-8
Are there measurable differences in the abilities of skilled ambassador's to enable or enhance cooperation during times of crisis?	The data supports the indication of measurable differences in the abilities of ambassadors that do enhance cooperation during periods of crisis.	The data suggests there are measurable differences in all key attributes, with several having the most impact.	At the lower levels of conflict, there are few differences in the abilities of career and non-career ambassadors.
Are there consistent identifiable attributes and characteristics that exist among ambassadors who are able to maintain cooperation during times of crisis?	The full data set shows there are identifiable differences in the attributes among ambassadors that indicate a variance in the dependent variable.	The two most identifiable characteristics are career status and regional experience. The three other attributes show a difference, but are not as significant.	At the lower levels of conflict, the data suggests that non-career ambassadors are very successful in sustaining cooperation.
Are there measurable differences in the success of career and political appointees during times of diplomatic crisis?	The data suggests there is support for the higher levels of cooperation career ambassadors are able to sustain during periods of conflict.	The data suggests there is considerable support for this at the higher levels of conflict.	At the lower levels of conflict, the data suggests that non-career ambassadors are at times better able to sustain cooperation than career ambassadors.
The presence of a skilled ambassador should lead to higher levels of cooperation during times of diplomatic crisis.	The data suggests the presence of a skilled ambassador does lead to higher levels of cooperation. There are a couple of attributes that do seem more important than others.	The data suggests the attributes with the most impact are career status and regional experience.	At the lower levels of conflict, the data suggests there are no measurable differences between career and non-career ambassadors.
Career ambassadors should enable better cooperation during crisis periods due to their extensive diplomatic experiences and training.	When assessing strictly career versus non-career ambassadors, the data does suggest there is a measurable difference in the ability of career ambassadors to maintain lower levels of conflict.	The data suggests that career ambassadors offer a significantly better chance of sustaining cooperation over non-career ambassadors.	At the lower levels of conflict, the data suggests there are no measurable differences between career and non-career ambassadors.

Table 3.12 Summary of findings

3.3.1 Discussion and Analysis

The data suggests support for the objectives of this research, which attempts to answer whether there are measurable skills that would help an ambassador sustain higher levels of cooperation during periods of diplomatic crisis. In their letter to Senator's Obama and McCain, Ambassador's Neumann and Pickering (2008) were specific in the attributes they believe all ambassadors should have. What was missing was some type of indication as to whether these attributes actually do make any difference. The data from this research suggests there are some consistently clear indicators and attributes, and their presence or absence during times of diplomatic crisis and conflict are measurable. What is also clear is the differences these attributes seem to have when assessed against the various regions.

The data for the various regions suggests there are differences in the affect the assessed variables have on cooperation. Career status seems to have more affect in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, than in the other regions. Military service is more significant in South America than the other regions. Regional experience seems to be statistically significant in Europe, Africa, and Asia. The ability to speak a second language seems more important in South America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, and Asia. Ambassador experience was significant in Central America, the Middle East, and Asia; although it did not seem to play a role in increasing cooperation except in the Middle East. What the data suggests is there may be an ability to tailor the training and assignments of ambassadors to those regions.

When assessing the full COPDAB scale model which includes all countries and observations, the attributes that seem the most consistent are career status, regional

experience, language, and in some regions, previous experience as an ambassador. Graph 3.1 seems to clearly indicate the value and impact that career ambassadors have when looking at the highest levels of conflict. Although non-career ambassadors comprise 38% of the total ambassadors in the full data set, their presence at the highest levels of conflict are ten times higher than career ambassadors. However, at the lowest levels of conflict, their performance is as good as career ambassadors at maintaining high levels of cooperation. However, the negative coefficient indicates that an increase in career ambassadors could lead to an increase in higher levels of cooperation. This would seem to suggest that as long as relations between the United States and the target country are going well, the presence of either career or non-career ambassadors can be equally good. However, when relations between the two countries begin to deteriorate, a career ambassador consistently does a better job maintaining lower levels of conflict. This is clearly indicated in both the full data set, and the upper half data set that measures conflict from the midpoint transition level of nine through the upper levels of fifteen.

Understanding the role that prior military service plays is not quite as clear in the full data model as it is when assessing the upper half model in table 3.10. While both models do seem to support the contention that military service is present in ambassadors that have been maintaining lower levels of conflict, this is seen much clearer when assessing the upper conflict model. This is understandable as the lower half model would also show that when cooperation is at its highest, and conflict at its lowest, military service is not measurably significant. However, when tensions between countries begin to escalate, the difference between ambassadors with prior military

service and no prior service becomes more pronounced, especially at the higher levels of conflict. Graphs 3.2, 3.8, and 3.16 show this transition very clearly.

The importance of regional experience is not as clearly indicated in the data. In both the full data model, and the full upper half conflict model, regional experience seems to play less of a role in sustaining lower levels of conflict. However, when looking at specific regions, particularly Asia and Central America, higher levels of regional experience seem to play a more important role. Graphs 3.3 and 3.9 suggest that lower levels of conflict are associated with ambassadors that have higher levels of regional experience. The importance of this indication is best observed in graph 3.17 where conflict is at the lowest levels. When compared to the effect that regional experience has at the lower level of conflict, it does not seem to have much impact. The data seems to indicate that as tensions begin to escalate, ambassadors with regional experience seem able to sustain conflict at lower levels. Although the overall regional experience levels in the assessed population are almost evenly split, the presence of ambassadors with no regional experience at the highest levels of conflict are almost fifteen times higher than ambassadors with regional experience. What is important to note is that both career and non-career ambassadors were coded as having regional experience, this attribute is not limited to career ambassadors.

In their letter outlining the traits ambassadors should possess, Neumann and Pickering note the importance of language skills. The ability to speak a second language may result in greater understanding in the assigned country, or a better appreciation for cultural differences. Whatever the reason, the data is not very clear on the linkage between the absence of language skills and higher levels of conflict in the

full data sets. However, in the regions of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, the data suggest a more clear relationship between language and conflict. Graphs 3.4 and 3.10 reveal that ambassadors with a second language skill are associated with lower levels of conflict. The full data set indicates that at the transition level of ten, the absence of language skills is markedly higher in the higher levels of conflict. This is seen more clearly in the upper conflict data set in graph 3.10 where the lack of language skills is seen at a rate almost ten times higher than without. Even acknowledging the small percentage of ambassadors that speak a second language, the data suggests the rate of conflict is still significant. At the lower levels of conflict shown in graph 3.15, the ability to speak a second language does not seem to be significant.

An anomaly is noted with the variable that measures previous assignment as an ambassador. Logic would suggest that an ambassador that had a previous assignment as an ambassador would be better able to sustain cooperation. However, the data and graphs 3.5 and 3.12 are not as supporting of that. Although there is a slight rise in conflict at the transition level of ten for first time ambassadors, the numbers are fairly even in terms of conflict and cooperation levels for first time ambassadors compared to second and third time ambassadors. A regional difference between the full model and the Asia model suggests previous experience as an ambassador is significant.

For the two control variables of differential trade and a defense agreement in place, the data does show support for lower levels of conflict when exports are greater than imports, and a defense alliance agreement is in place. Differential trade seems to have more relationship with conflict when assessed against the higher levels of conflict as shown in the 9-15 data. In all regions except the Middle East, an increase in trade

seems to have a moderating effect on conflict. Where there is a defense agreement in place, the same moderating effect is noted. In both models, cooperation is clustered around the mean of the scale for both alliance and trade showing there is an impact on the cooperation – conflict continuum.

The results of the different variables, as well as the differences between regions suggests there are measurable attributes and characteristics among ambassadors that seem to support higher levels of cooperation, with lower sustainable levels of conflict. The data in tables 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 suggest there is a relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Although the R value for several of the models may be low, the intent is to understand if there is a variance between the variables, and not use the models to predict outcomes. Because the art and science of diplomacy is based in human behaviors, low R values are acceptable as long as they achieve a level of statistical significance. To better understand the goodness of fit of the variables, the Wald chi-square test was conducted. The estimates fit very well as indicated by a statistically significant Wald χ^2 test. Each of the models were significant to the p<01 level.

There are other factors that may also explain higher levels of cooperation, and these will be explored in the next two chapters. Chapter's four and five are comprised of structured and focused case study analysis, and will include three control variables that will allow for additional explanatory variables that will particularly focus on four of the five countries that comprised the OPEC countries during a time of particular stress for the Middle East and the United States. This particular methodology will be discussed in detail in those chapters.

Chapter 4: Background to the Crisis

4.1 Section I

4.1.1 Introduction and overview

Chapter Four is comprised of three sections. Section I is the introduction and description of the chapter. Section II will discuss events leading to the 1967 Six Day War, critical aspects of the war itself, the War of Attrition that followed, and the Jordanian Civil War. Section III will discuss events leading to the 1973 October War, the ensuing oil embargo, and peace negotiation efforts necessary to end the embargo. The purpose of chapter four is to describe a brief account of the history and complexities of the region in a way that will allow for a better understanding of the environment that ambassadors assigned to the Middle East found themselves operating in. This will provide better context for chapter five.

4.2 Section II. Events in the Middle East leading to the Six Day War

4.2.1 Background to the Middle East conflict

The history of the modern Middle East has been shaped by a combination of war, diplomatic initiatives, and missed opportunities. By the start of the Six Day War in June 1967, there had already been two other major confrontations. The first was in 1948, the day after Israel declared their independence, and the second was the 1956 Suez Canal confrontation between Egypt, Israel, France and Great Britain. The end of the Suez

crisis began a period of diplomatic stalemate. The war in 1967 occurred in part because the underlying issues between Israel and the Arab countries had not been resolved. The tensions in the region that led to the 1967 war also showed the US, UK, and France had abandoned their promises under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, in which these three countries had pledged to oppose the use of force in the region (Brown & Parker 1996, 2).

The UK and France provided tacit support to Nasser, while the US supported Israel. Each side played a role in encouraging aggressive behavior in the region to change the status quo (Parker 2001). The border area between Syria and Israel during 1967 was one of the most fortified borders in the world. Referred to as the Maginot Line of the Middle East, it consisted of "...half a million mines, two-level underground bases of operations, miles of trenches and communications tunnels, and thick concrete walls on which machine guns and batteries of antiaircraft guns had been mounted and concealed under camouflage nets" (Bar-Zohar 1970, 35).

4.2.2 Events Leading to the Six-Day War

After the 1956 Suez Canal confrontation, Egypt and Syria formed a short lived United Arab Republic (U.A.R) political alliance on 1 February, 1958. Egyptian President Gamal abdel Nasser had dreamed of a wider Arab unity, but was disheartened when Syria revoked the union in 1961. Although the U.A.R was dissolved, Egypt had previously signed a mutual defense pact with Syria that remained in place. Nasser searched for Arab unity, and wanted to protect the rights of the Palestinians who had been forced out of their homes (Heikal 1971). Syrian President Assad had an extreme

hatred of Israel, and had repeatedly attempted to get Egypt involved in another war with Israel. For his part, Egyptian President Nasser did not believe his forces were ready for another war with Israel, and in any event Egypt was heavily involved supporting royalist forces inside Yemen against Saudi Arabia (Bar-Zohar 1970).

This caused increased diplomatic tension between Syria and Egypt, who openly quarreled after an incident in the Jordanian village of Samu in November 1966. Israeli military forces had raided the town in retaliation for commando raids into Israel conducted by al-Fatah (Bar-Zohar 1970, 9). Although Assad called for action by Nasser against Israel for the raids, Egypt did not budge. In April 1967, this led to a border incident in which large numbers of Israeli Mirage fighters crossed the border into Syria and during a vicious dogfight shot down six Syrian MIG fighters (Bar-Zohar 1970, 10; Dawn 1996, 155). A few days later, Mohammed Sidki Mahmoud, commander of the Egyptian air force visited Syria with a message from Nasser. He relayed to the Syrians that "...if you stubbornly persist in provoking incidents, you will get no aid whatever from us. We are not going to let ourselves be dragged into a war" (Bar-Zohar 1970, 10).

This all changed on 14 May 1967, with the unexpected visit of General Mohammed Fawzi, Commander in Chief of Egyptian military forces. Egypt had received what they considered to be reliable intelligence reports that Israel was planning to attack Syria on 17 May 1967 (Amit 1996, 51; Bar-Zohar 1970, 11; Bassiouny 1996, 42). Damascus had received the same information, but unknown to them it was from the same source. Nasser had sent Fawzi to discuss the planned attack by Israel, and to coordinate military options with Syria for their defense. The source of the intelligence was the Soviet embassy in Cairo, and the information claimed that Israel had moved

eleven to fifteen infantry and artillery brigades into position on the Syrian border (Bar-Zohar 1970, 11; Brown & Parker 1996, 6; Shamir 1996, 28; Naumkin 1996, 38). It further stated that Israel planned to attack Syria on 17 May between 0400 and 0500.

For Nasser, this information confirmed what he already expected. He had heard similar warnings from Arab diplomats returning from Moscow, as well as other intelligence services in the region (Dawn 1996, 154; Heikal 1971, 242). Supporting his suspicions, Israeli newspapers carried stories of threats against Syria for their support of commando raids on Israeli settlements. Nasser was convinced that Israel planned a major offensive, and he had already notified his military commanders to begin mobilizing Egyptian forces. He directed that infantry, artillery, and aircraft be massed in the Sinai in preparation for an attack through the Sinai into Israel's southern flank. What Nasser did not know was Egypt, Syria, and the Lebanese had been fed the same information, by the same source (Bar-Zohar 1970, 13).

Although Nasser did not try and hide the movement of his military forces, when Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs, Ambassador Lucius Battle, notified Avraham Harman, the Israeli ambassador to the US of the troop movement, he noted it was probably just a show of strength. Battle had previously been the US ambassador to Cairo, and was well acquainted with the Middle East and Egypt. He believed that this Egyptian show of force was in response to the Independence Day celebrations in Israel. What Battle did not know was that although Israeli intelligence had picked up on the heightened alert of the Egyptian military, this new troop movement information had them moving into the Sinai, and that Israeli intelligence did not know

(Bar-Zohar 1970, 20). This new information would cause no small amount of panic in the office of the Israeli Foreign Minister.

4.2.3 Russian involvement

Soviet sponsorship of certain Arab countries in the Middle East dated to 1955, when Russia was providing military and non-military support to Egypt and Syria (Brown & Parker 1996, 2; Heikal 1971, 191). Although Russia maintained low level relations with Israel, high level government and military officials were often visiting Egypt and Syria. The interest of Egypt and Syria in building relations with the Soviet Union contrasted with that of Saudi Arabia, who saw an incompatibility between their conservative Islamic faith and communism. Soviet Marshal Andrei Gretchko led a military mission to Cairo and Damascus in 1965, with the intention of increasing Russian military and political support to both countries. His proposal would lead to a dramatic increase in the deployment of Soviet advisors into both countries. In 1966, a pro-Soviet government took control in Damascus, leading to additional international support to Syria from Russia. This aid coming at a time when Syria was having frequent cross border clashes with Israel, including protecting al-Fatah commandos from retribution by Israel. Russian interference in Middle Eastern affairs became so pronounced that during a dinner party in Tel Aviv in the spring of 1966, an Israeli diplomat bluntly asked his American guest "Haven't you noticed that the Soviets are trying right now to infiltrate this whole area?" (Bar-Zohar 1970, 24).

The Russians considered the Israeli retaliatory attack on the Jordanian town of Samu as an indicator of further military action to come. When the Israeli's shot down the six MIGs on April 1967, they were further convinced that Israel planned to attack Syria

in the near future. The Russians have never satisfactorily explained their intelligence report that fifteen Israeli brigades had closed on the Syrian border, although that is what they reported to Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) peacekeepers, Egyptian, and Syrian military troops in the immediate vicinity of the border reported no troop buildups from either side. This leads to the question as to Soviet motives in reporting the buildup. Were they trying to convince the Egyptians to support the Syrians in a military action against Israel? Or were there other motives?

Although professing their desire there be no war (Heikal 1971, 244), the Russians had been the source of the misleading force movement intelligence (Bassiouny 1996, 42; Brown & Parker 1996, 6; Naumkin 1996, 38). They had also pledged their support during a meeting in Moscow for future supplies of basic armaments to their Middle East friends. Soviet Defense Minister General Gretchko spoke during the signing, and affirmed their partnership by stating, "Our army, our people, and our government are on the side of the Arabs" (Bar-Zohar 1970, 122).

4.2.4 UN Secretary General Withdraws UNEF forces

At the conclusion of the Sinai campaign in 1956 in which British, French, and Israeli forces attempted to take control of the recently nationalized Suez Canal, the United Nations (UN) organized and deployed what became the first peace keeping force on the Sinai frontier between Egypt and Israel. This United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was a small military force numbering approximately 3400 troops, and was not designed to conduct military operations. It was an observer force meant to report on violations of the border zones by either Egyptian or Israeli military forces.

As part of the preparations for combat, Nasser directed General Amer to request the UNEF Commander, Major General Indar Jit Rikhye, to withdraw his forces to the Gaza Strip for their safety (Atherton 1996, 60; Heikal 1971, 241). General Rikhye sent an emergency cable to the UN Secretary General asking for instructions. Although the language of the charter establishing this peace force between Egypt and Israel required the approval of the UN Security Council before removal, at the request of Egypt, this force was removed. Secretary General U Thant received significant criticism for allowing this force to be removed as it was determined this eliminated the final obstacle holding preventing Egypt from attacking Israel.

In later years, Egypt would claim they had only requested the UNEF force relocate to a safe area away from the border, although the paper trail from Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad seems to contradict this. At the end of meetings in Cairo concerning the status of the UNEF forces, Minister Riad sent the Secretary General the following letter (Bar-Zohar 1970, 38);

Dear U Thant:

The government of the United Arab Republic has the honor to inform you that it has decided to end the presence of the U.N. Emergency Force in the U.A.R. territory and in the Gaza Strip. Please take the necessary measures to evacuate these troops as soon as possible.

I take this opportunity to express to you my profound gratitude and respect.

*Mahmoud Riad
Minister of Foreign Affairs*

4.2.5 Syria and Egypt prepare for an attack by Israel

For several days, Syrian troops and equipment had reinforced their border area in anticipation of an impending attack. In the Sinai, long lines of Egyptian troops were still on the move, several divisions having already crossed the canal. Egyptian tanks would soon close in on Israeli frontier positions, and at that point pulling back from confrontation would be difficult if not impossible. Bar-Zohar (1970, 39) believes that when the Foreign Minister sent his letter to the Secretary General directing the removal of the UNEF force, that Egypt had crossed the point of no return.

Israeli leaders had downplayed the buildup of forces along the Syrian border, as well as the movement of Egyptian forces into the Sinai, as just a show of force. They now had to take into consideration that Nasser and Assad meant to go to war. As a precaution, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Army Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, had started a partial mobilization of Israeli forces, but had not yet called for a general mobilization (Brown 1996, 33). On the evening of 17 May 1967, US Ambassador Barbour received a cable from the White House to be delivered to Prime Minister Eshkol. It expressed the anxiety of President Johnson at the buildup of forces in the Sinai and along the Golan Heights, and described the actions the White House was taking. The president requested that Israel avoid any action that might add to the tension, and if they wanted the US by their side, they needed to consult before taking any military action.

In response to President Johnson's cable, Prime Minister Eshkol prepared a letter in which he outlined five points he wanted the president to know about Israel's intentions. He noted that Israel had not responded militarily to over fourteen attacks on

its citizens by Syria in the past months. He observed that Egypt had introduced over 500 tanks into the Sinai Peninsula in recent weeks, and noted they should be warned to return to their bases. As for the withdrawal of UNEF forces, Eshkol reinforced the understanding the force should have only been removed with the concurrence of the Security Council. He stated that Syria and Egypt both believed the Soviet Union would stand with them, and asked the United States to publicly reaffirm their support for Israel. And lastly, he remembered the pledge the US had made during his visit in 1964 to preserve Israel's independence (Bar-Zohar 1970, 45, 62). On 18 May, Eshkol sent the same letter to the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and the United States.

The last act by Nasser the Israeli's were concerned about in this escalation of tension was the closing of the Strait of Tiran. Keeping the straits open allowed the Israeli's access to the Gulf of Aqaba, and resupply through their only southern port on the Red Sea. This port was important for the planned sustainment of Israeli forces in the Sinai because it allowed for greatly reduced distances supplies would have to travel. Part of the UNEF force had been stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh, but had recently departed at the insistence of the Egyptian military. The Israeli's did not know the Egyptians were already at Sharm el-Sheikh, and were planning to close the straits.

By 19 May the situation for Israel was becoming serious. The Egyptians had over 70,000 soldiers, and 600 tanks arrayed against Israeli positions on the Eastern side of the Suez Canal, in the Sinai. The UNEF forces had withdrawn, and Palestinian para-military forces from the Gaza Strip were moving to take over their former positions. Egyptian brigades supporting the fight in Yemen were moving back into Egypt, and Sharm el-Sheikh was occupied by Egyptian soldiers. But as yet, the Israeli's had not

begun to mobilize their forces. The caution by President Johnson, and the uncertainty of Egyptian intentions caused the Defense Minister to delay. Unbeknownst to the Israeli's, President Johnson was very worried about events in the Middle East, and had sent a secret telegram to Russia's General Secretary outlining his concerns for the impending conflict. He reiterated what Eshkol had told him about Egypt and Syrian belief that Russia would support them in any conflict. He reiterated to the General Secretary the intention of the US to support Israel if it came to violence, and proposed a joint program between the US and Russia to try and prevent the escalation of tensions and conflict in the region (Bar-Zohar 1970, 48). On 20 May, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran.

4.2.6 Nasser closes the Straits of Tiran

When Nasser announced the closing of the Straits of Tiran, it proved to be a watershed moment for several reasons (Brown 1996, 60; Korn 1992, 11). Nasser had increased his personal power and prestige in the weeks leading to the closure. For Arab populations, he was seen as the leader among the Arab poor, fighting for their dignity. But for the great powers, this act was seen as a challenge to their responsibilities to their clients and their agreements under the tripartite agreement of 1950 (Bergus 1996, 192; Korn 1992, 16). Nasser's statement left no doubt as to his reasons for closing the straits. "Our troops have been in Sharm el-Sheikh since yesterday. The strait of Tiran is part of our territorial waters. No Israeli ship will ever negotiate it again. We also forbid the shipment of strategic materials to Israel on non-Israeli vessels" (Bar-Zohar 1970, 71). He then said that if Israel wanted war, that Egypt was ready. The Israelis had long

since proclaimed the closing of the straits would be a casus belli. For the United States and the State Department, they finally understood this meant war.

For the Soviets, the closing of the straits put them into a panic (Kornienko 1996, 72). Bar-Zohar (1970) notes that although they had wanted to increase the tensions in the Middle East by spreading false rumors of Israeli troop movement in the Golan, closing the straits would have two very undesirable consequences. The first was their continuing negotiations with the Turks over freedom of navigation through the Dardanelles straits, and the second was the possibility of war between the two superpowers. The Russians understood the closing of the straits of Tiran would lead to war between Egypt and Israel, and they did not want this either. But the Russians had been caught by surprise, even their ambassador in Cairo had no forewarning. While Soviet radio and television were supporting the Arabs in their cause, the Soviet Foreign Minister was searching for a replacement for their ambassador.

4.2.7 The Johnson administration and the 1967 War

When the British announced their decision to withdraw their forces from Aden due to financial hardships in the UK, the question was how this would affect the security of the region, and importantly the flow of oil. The US determined that for the security of the region, and importantly the security of the oil fields, they had to increase their presence to fill the security void left by the departure of the British. They also determined to increase the capability of regional partners like Saudi Arabia and Iran (Quandt 2005, 13). The US had always viewed the stability of oil prices and availability as vital to the national security of the Western world. One other important factor was the

special relationship the US had with Israel. Not only for Israel's survival in the Middle East, but also because of the political strength of the Jewish lobby in the US. Part of the US problem in the Middle East was a lack of long range diplomatic planning, making each new crisis that emerged a new policy problem that inevitably landed in the lap of the President or Secretary of State. As many observers of these crisis in the Middle East have noted, when there is a crisis, it always moves to the chief executives desk (Bar-Zohar 1970; Boyne 2002; Quandt 2005; Kissinger 1982; Oren 2003).

Competing for attention during the Johnson presidency was Vietnam. This had become more of an issue, and required more of the president's time and energy (Quandt 2005, 204). As such, Middle Eastern planning and diplomacy was mainly relegated to the State Department for policy development and coordination. In the lead up to the 1967 Six Day War, tensions along the Israeli – Syrian border increased. The new US Ambassador to Egypt was not much help. Arriving at Cairo International Airport during the increase in tensions, when asked by local news reporters what he thought about the crisis Ambassador Nolte responded "what crisis?" (Bar-Zohar 1970, 60).

Ambassador Richard Nolte was an academic who had taught at American University before becoming the director at the Institute of Current World Affairs in New York. His deputy chief of mission, David Ney, had requested an experienced ambassador be assigned to Egypt to replace the outgoing Lucius Battle who had departed on 5 March 1967. Ney believed that war was coming to the Middle East sooner rather than later, and wanted an experienced hand to work with Egypt to try and head off any conflict. Ney had been an outspoken critic of US diplomatic policy in Egypt, which he felt was dangerous and shortsighted. His request fell on deaf ears.

Unfortunately for Ney, Ambassador Nolte was very much out of his depth in this crisis, and it would take Washington about four days to lose faith in his advice (Bar-Zohar 1970, 167).

President Nasser sent Egyptian troops deep into the Sinai in an unmistakable challenge to Israel. At this point, had the President or Secretary of State taken a strong stand against these moves by Nasser, many believe this would have prevented or at least delayed, the escalation of tensions (Quandt 1996, 206; 2005, 24). However, President Johnson and his advisors hesitated to take a strong stand, and consequently, Nasser felt he had the go ahead to continue. Part of the reason for the hesitation may have been the characterization of Nasser's intentions. Nasser's initial moves were interpreted in primarily political terms. The State Department thought they recognized a familiar pattern involving sending troops into the Sinai, much like Nasser had done in 1960. The troops would stay in the area for a while, and then leave claiming they had withstood Israeli aggression. It was all propaganda, but for the regional papers, it played well. When Nasser began moving forces into the Sinai in May 1967, Iraqi brigades began moving toward their frontier borders as well. With a single act, Nasser had united the Arab countries against Israel (Bar-Zohar 1970, 44). Because Nasser had used this provocative act before, even the Israeli's did not seem particularly worried. This same pattern would be seen again just before the 1973 war, with largely the same results (Bar-Zohar 1970, 20; Quandt, 2005, 25).

However, on 16 MAY, in what was a clear signal that hostilities were about to escalate, the Egyptians requested that the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), that had been in place since the end of the Suez crisis in November 1956, be removed. When the US

still did not make any direct approaches to Nasser or the Egyptian government to try and lower the rising tensions. On 22 MAY, Nasser requested the removal of the UNEF forces from the port city of Sharm al-Sheikh, and on 23 May, he closed the straits of Tiran to all shipping. Although there has been some disagreement whether the request was to simply relocate the UNEF force, or to remove it from the area, the end result was the removal of the force by the UN (Atherton 1996, 60; Heikal 1971, 241; Quandt 2005, 31). Tensions were further heightened by Nasser's early moves to close of the shipping in the Straits of Tiran, located near the port city of Sharm al-Shaykh (Brown 1996, 60; Korn 1992, 11; Quandt 2005, 26). UNEF forces had been positioned at Sharm al-Shaykh to ensure the safety of shipping, and Israel saw the closure of the straits to be a casus belli (Quandt 2005, 27).

At this point, recognizing the danger to Israel, President Johnson kicked American diplomacy into action. On 23 May, Secretary of State Rusk sent a cable to Ambassador Nolte directing him to transmit a message to Nasser for the President. Nolte met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, and provided the following request; that the UNEF forces remain in Egypt until a Security Council decision, that the forces in the Sinai return to their bases in order to reduce tensions in the region, that the Straits of Tiran remain open to freedom of navigation, and that senior government personnel meet to try and resolve the differences between Egypt and Israel. The President issued a public statement outlining the US position after considerable pressure had been brought by the House and Senate. The congress had already released a statement of support for Israel, indicating they were prepared to take whatever action was necessary for Israel to resist aggression and support peace (Bar-

Zohar 1970, 85). The President went on national television and delivered the following message:

The United States considers the Gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockage of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the entire international community (Bar-Zohar 1970, 86).

The President also had the US Ambassador to Israel request they not take any action for forty-eight hours. State and Defense Department personnel were working on options for the president in case these requests were not acceptable to Egypt or Israel. A statement by National Security Advisor Rostow was often repeated by others in the lead up to the war, and it was, “If you want us to be with you at the crash landing, then you had better consult us at the takeoff” (Bar-Zohar 1970, 56).

Although several courses of action had been debated inside the administration, none were particularly appealing. The two most common were to let Israel take independent action to keep the straits open, this would keep the US from seeming to support any of the belligerents. The other option was unilateral or coalition action supported by the US. On balance, the US military was not enthusiastic about a maritime display of force involving the US and other coalition partners. Navy officials were more direct in their answer when they gave an unequivocal, “no” (Bar Zohar 1970, 105). Senior officials in the Department of State were very much in favor of this approach, and set out to find donors for the ships among other countries. While this was an area in which State specialized, they did not coordinate these efforts with the Department of Defense (Quandt 2005, 31). President Johnson was loath to involve the US in another

engagement while the Vietnam conflict was raging. He was also mindful of the Tonkin Gulf incident which was seen by some members of Congress as an expansion of Presidential powers based on a minor incident. Johnson was determined to have full congressional and public support before any US involvement in the Middle East, and this would take time (Bar-Zohar 1970, 99; Quandt 2005, 29).

When Israeli Foreign Minister Eban arrived for diplomatic talks on 25 MAY, he arrived with the news that Israel was anticipating an attack from Egypt. US intelligence began examining their data for confirmation an attack was imminent, but concluded the next day that no attack seemed pending within hours or even days. This caused a loss of Israeli credibility at a crucial time (Bar-Zohar 1970, 112; Bergus 1996, 192; Quandt 2005, 34), particularly because Israel was asking for a strong commitment from the US to support them in case of attack. While the Egyptians had over four divisions of infantry and armor in the peninsula, the intelligence officials noted they had not moved into an attack formation. Concluding they were not prepared for an attack, analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State Department, and the National Security Agency (NSA) concluded they were not ready to attack. However, this did not mean they were not going to attack, and surprisingly, this seems to be missing from their analysis. Also missing from this group of analysts were any military experts from the defense department. During this meeting, Eban brought up the subject of US guarantees concerning freedom of navigation through the strait of Tiran. He noted that no less than Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had given him such a guarantee in writing in 1957. Embarrassingly, the State Department did not have a copy of the memorandum, and had to borrow Eban's to show the president. They were later able to

locate a copy of the memorandum in the archives of President Eisenhower's library (Bar-Zohar 1970, 118).

On 31 MAY, the head of Israel's intelligence service, Meir Amit, traveled to Washington for talks. Just before his arrival, On 30 May, King Hussein of Jordan had went to Cairo to sign a mutual defense pact with Egypt. After the signing, Nasser telephoned Baghdad to obtain President Abdul Rahman Muhammad Aref's agreement to send Iraqi troops to the Jordanian frontier. The head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Ahmed Shukairy, had also been present at the signing of the defense pact. The PLO had been expelled from Jordan, and Shukairy, who was a vocal critic of King Hussein, regularly called for his overthrow. Hussein was worried about losing his throne, and was equally worried about having Iraqi and PLO soldiers in his country. This worry would prove prescient in the near future (Bar-Zohar 1970, 154; Quandt 2005, 76).

When King Hussein returned to Jordan, he was accompanied by an Egyptian general. Several in the Johnson administration saw this as a warning, and began to believe Egypt was preparing for war with Israel. The US was beginning to discuss the idea that Israel may need to take action to reopen the straits and protect themselves. This idea was further solidified when Prime Minister Eban received word through Minister Evron about a meeting he had attended, and the comments made by a trusted friend and advisor to the President, Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas (Quandt 1996, 212). Fortas said that because of the dialogue with Israel, in particular Ministers Eban and Eshkol, that the US had the time necessary to explore other options with Israel before the use of force. Fortas noted that had they not done so, they may not have won

the president's sympathy. Because few presidents enter office as foreign policy experts, their opinions are shaped by close advisors, and their personal lens on events (Bundy 1996, 213). The president is not usually seen as a purely strategic rational decision maker, and will be influenced by other events, as well as core beliefs and values. Eban determined this was the closest to a green light for military action Israel was likely to get or need (Bar-Zohar 1970, 84; Brown 1996, 44; Korn 1992, 18; Quandt 2005, 39).

In a news article summarizing the position Israel found herself in, Hassanein Heikal, Nasser's confident and owner of the influential Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram wrote:

An armed engagement with Israel is inevitable. The psychological factor involved compels Israel to take up the challenge of war, for there is a question of Israel's security and even its survival. It is not only a matter of the Gulf al Aqaba but also of a more important question of its security, which is the entire basis for its defense (Bar-Zohar 1970, 118).

Israel had survived several major wars due to the strength of her military. Israeli's sense of survival depended on that strength, and the security buffer it had built against their Arab enemies. This buffer and security were now threatened with the movement into the Sinai Peninsula of over a hundred thousand troops and eight hundred tanks, and the massing along the Golan Heights of Syrian infantry and armor brigades. The closing of the straits of Tiran, the movement of troops, and the removal of the UNEF force solidified in Israeli minds that war was inevitable, and so they prepared; both mentally and physically.

On 4 Jun, after being rebuffed by longtime allies France and the United States for public statements in support of Israel, the Israeli cabinet met and determined that war

was inevitable (Korn 1992, 16; Stein 1996, 231). The Knesset gave their support to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to take what actions were needed to safeguard Israel. For those present, they understood this meant Israel would soon be at war (Bar-Zohar 190).

4.3 The 1967 Six Day War

The beginning of the war caught everyone by surprise. The Israeli's had remained deceptively quiet about their decision to open the war on the morning of 5 Jun. Nasser believed he had won the game of poker he was playing. France had sent him secret cables proclaiming their support of the Arab cause, and Russia had publicly proclaimed their support. The other countries in the Arab region, to include Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Libya, Sudan, Algeria, Aden, and Yemen were supporting him as well. On 4 Jun, Iraq had sent their prime minister to Egypt to sign a defense pact, and to pledge support for Nasser's policies. Even longtime rival Saudi Arabia supported Egypt's plans, with King Feisal proclaiming, "Every Arab who does not participate in this conflict will seal his fate. He will not be worthy of being called an Arab." Nasser never felt so powerful (Bar-Zohar 1970, 191).

The first notification received at the White House communication room came at 0238, and a little after 0300 Secretary Rusk was headed to the seventh floor of the State Department. President Johnson was awoken at 0430, and his first question concerned who had fired first. Messages were sent to the US ambassadors asking for information, and importantly, who started the war. When General de Gaulle learned that war had started in the Middle East, he was said to be very angry. He had felt his advice

to both Egypt and Israel had been disregarded, and he took this as an insult. His concern was that Israel would not be able to withstand the Arab counterattack, and that the US would be forced to intervene in order to save Israel.

The fear was what might happen if the violence spread through the region, eventually involving the two nuclear superpowers. Ambassador Ghaleb from the U.A.R. requested to see Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. He gave a very unsettling assessment of the military situation facing Egypt. He told him the truth about the destruction of the Egyptian air force and the penetration of Egyptian armored positions in the Sinai by the Israeli's, and requested immediate help. Kosygin reiterated Russia's pledge to support the Arabs, and to replace any military equipment lost during the conflict, but that they could not become personally involved. Ghaleb cabled the Egyptian Foreign Ministers office and bitterly said, "These people can think of nothing but saving their own skins" (Bar-Zohar 1970, 218). Kosygin sent a message to President Johnson that restated their desire to remain out of the conflict, but would intervene militarily if the US became involved. In a show of force, President Johnson ordered the 6th Fleet to begin moving toward the conflict zone. This movement was picked up by Soviet warships in the area, and they reported as such to Moscow. This sent an unmistakable signal to Moscow that the US would take any Russian military support to Egypt seriously.

On the evening of 6 Jun, a serious diplomatic problem for the US and UK was developing. Cairo radio had begun broadcasting that US and British aircraft were helping provide air cover for attacking Israeli forces. They were soon joined by broadcasters in Syria and Jordan. At midnight, Ambassador Nolte cabled Washington with the story, recommending they come out forcefully against this latest propaganda

before it spread. However, it was too late. Collusion between Nasser and Hussein ensured the misinformation was spread throughout the Arab countries. Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Yemen, Iraq, and Sudan severed diplomatic relations with the US, and the oil producing countries announced the end of oil sales to the West in response. It would take a number of years before diplomatic relations were restored between these countries. The severing of relations with Egypt would provide the catalyst for the 1973 Yom Kippur War as it again led to a diplomatic stalemate in the region.

Once hostilities started, Prime Minister Eshkol had sent a note to King Hussein in Jordan, asking them to refrain from entering the conflict. In return, Israel would not attack them. However, when it seemed Egypt was making progress in their fight, Jordanian artillery forces began shelling Israeli positions along the border with Jordan. This caused Defense Minister Dayan to order the capture off all Jordanian territory between the eastern Israeli border and the river. Jordanian artillery was also shelling the western portions of Jerusalem, and this led to the entire old city being surrounded by Israeli forces. Although they may not have known at the time, the capture of East Jerusalem would remain a sticking point in peace negotiations until today.

The war ended on 10 October, and the President stayed away from much of the details of the peace process through the end of 1967, and during most of 1968. The president was busy with Vietnam, particularly after the TET offensive in February. He did meet with Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol to discuss a request to purchase weapons made by the Israeli's. Prior to the 1967 Six Day War, the US had not been a major source of weapons for Israel. They purchased most of their equipment and aircraft from the French. However, French President de' Gaulle was somewhat pro-Arab in his

comments and viewpoint, and the Israeli's were determined to move their purchases away from them. They had seen the new F-4 Phantom jet in service, and they wanted it. In order to keep Israel strong enough to deter their Arab neighbors, Johnson was determined they would get it (Bar-Zohar 1970, 82; Quandt 2005, 48). Israel had captured a tremendous amount of Arab territory during the war, and would need additional armaments to provide oversight. Before the 1967 war, Israel controlled an area roughly 8000 square miles in size. After the war this grew to 38000 square miles, and added roughly one million additional Palestinians (Stein 1996, 51).

The Johnson administration would end soon, the President had already announced his decision to not accept the nomination for a second term as president. His actions during the crisis showed that decision-making during the height of the crisis had coalesced in Washington, at the White House. Decisions about the US role and involvement in that crisis were clearly made by the president and his closest advisors. The role of the ambassador was to follow instructions and relay communications (Quandt 2005, 49). There were some US ambassadors in the region that could clearly see what was happening between Israel and Egypt, and hoped that Israel would take military action quickly to resolve the situation, but on a limited scale. Their view was not the normal State Department position, and this was also seen in the actions and recommendations of senior policy officials like Secretary Rusk and National Security Advisor Rostow. While there were other friends and policy considerations, the question of protecting the US ability to access oil was a secondary policy consideration. The Arabs would try an initial oil embargo against oil consuming Western countries, but this

embargo would be a failure. But, what they learned about how to influence Western actions by using oil as a weapon would be used again during the 1973 war.

President Johnson had held certain preconceived ideas about the Middle East, and had worked to lower the tensions in the region before war broke out, once the conflict was initiated, he whole heartedly supported Israel, understanding they could not be allowed to lose in the conflict. This showed that although a crisis period may be defined in an enduring manner, overwhelming evidence from an outside or trusted source can change how a situation is handled. During this crisis, the president seemed to have changed his outlook after a stay at his ranch in Texas one weekend in May (Korn 1992, 16). After his return to Washington, he sensed that war was inevitable, and began to signal Israel his acceptance of the need for them to initiate military action. This also shows the preeminence of the president in matters involving foreign policy, and that presidents can be persuaded by trusted advisors; the mind of the president (Quandt 2005, 52).

4.3.1 UN Resolution 242

The fighting ended in a cease-fire on 10 JUN. While the US allowed the Israeli's and Egyptian's time to work out the details of the cease-fire, the President made a major foreign policy speech at Glassboro, New Jersey, that became the basis for United Nation Security Council Resolution (UNSC RES) 242. Although dating to November 1967, this is one of the key documents that defines the US position on the Middle East to this day (Bergus 1996, 199). In his speech, the president outlined five principles he felt were essential to peace (Korn 1992, 27). Known as the five points, he said all

countries in the region must recognize the right to a national life, there must be justice for the refugees, there must be freedom of navigation, limits on the arms race that had been going on in the region, and political independence and territorial integrity for all countries. While UNSC Resolution 242 did signal an end to the fighting, it was very imprecise in its meaning of several other terms. One of the biggest problems was the understanding between the UN, Israel, and the Arab world on the terms of the Israeli withdrawal from territory captured during the conflict, and the termination of claims or acts of belligerency (Parker 1996, 2; Rostow 1996, 295).

UN Resolution 242 had been agreed to by the general assembly 22 November 1967, and was intended to create a just and lasting peace inside secure and recognized borders. However, the borders were purposely never clearly defined, and this created a stalemate that has lasted until today. The resolution was written in a manner that allowed a certain amount of ambiguity so that all parties to the conflict would sign it, with the understanding more negotiations would take place later (Parker 1996, 25). Kissinger believed the stalemate in Middle East peace was better in the long run for the United States. His goal was to push the Soviets to the fringes of power, while not giving in to the Arabs demands for the US to rein in Israel (Kissinger 1982, 201). For their part, the Arab countries called on Israel to fully withdraw from all territories occupied during the most recent fighting. Although the US had originally supported this, President Johnson did not want to repeat the mistakes of the Eisenhower administration when they forced Israel to give up all territories in the Suez after the 1956 conflict (Quandt 2005, 46). Even though the fighting ended on 10 Jun, it took until 22 November 1967 for the

agreement that became known as UNSC Resolution 242 to be signed by the belligerents.

4.3.2 The Jarring Mission

On 22 November, 1967, UN Security Council Resolution 242 was passed. The resolution included all of Johnson's five points, and a balanced call for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" (Quandt 46). This resolution fell short of calling on Israel to withdraw from all captured territories, and also did not call on the Arab countries to make peace with Israel. This vague construct was purposeful, in order to allow all sides to agree to the resolution, while at the same time understanding more negotiation between the warring parties would be required (Korn 1992, 143). The resolution also called for a UN appointed negotiator to work with Israel and other Arab countries to find a solution to their disagreements. For this task, Gunnar Jarring, a former Swedish ambassador to Moscow was appointed. Unfortunately, Ambassador Jarring had no Middle Eastern experience, and this lack of cultural understanding would cause him problems as he worked his way through the negotiating process.

This vagueness and ambiguity of UNSC 242 may have led to all sides being able to sign it, but it has been the source of continuing tension and recriminations in the region. Although all sides had signed the cease-fire agreement, getting them to agree to a common understanding of UNSC 242 would prove impossible. Jarring quickly found out he would be unable to overcome resistance in the region by Israel and Egypt (Parker 1996, 2). The Jarring mission had some success, but Jarring was left to his own

abilities when what he needed was support from other Western governments to bring the belligerents to compromise. Because UNSC 242 was written in such an ambiguous manner, Jarring's mission was to try and negotiate the legal definitions of terms to the satisfaction of all parties. In the end, he was unsuccessful (Korn 1992; Parker 1996). Part of the problem was the diametric differences between the parties; part of it was the lack of high level support he received.

Ambassador MacArthur, the US ambassador to Iran, relayed notes from a meeting held with Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi (AmEmbassy Tehran 0967, 1 MAR 1971) in which the Iranian Foreign Minister reiterated that Israel seemed to be the stumbling block to moving the peace negotiations forward. Zahedi said he believed Egyptian Vice President Anwar el Sadat had gone as far as possible in trying to be responsive to Ambassador Jarring's requests on both Egypt and Israel regarding peace initiatives. Zahedi noted the concern of his office, and the Shah, that if the Jarring mission failed, the probability of the resumption of hostilities would be pretty high. MacArthur noted that it is useful to have other countries in the region also relaying to Israel their fear that if negotiations do not show some progress, the danger of hostilities continuing are high. For Sadat, the era of no war, no peace, and no negotiation will finally help him to decide to go to war with Israel to change the diplomatic status quo.

4.3.3 The Khartoum Conference

Arab leaders attended what would become an important milestone conference in Middle Eastern affairs. Hosted in Khartoum, eight Arab leaders attended the conference from 29 August until 1 September, 1967. Importantly, and unfortunately for the region, Arab demands hardened after attendance at the Khartoum conference. Asking for support from the oil producing countries to help pay for the cost of the war, President Nasser of Egypt, and King Hussein of Jordan, accepted money from the oil producing countries in the region meant to underwrite their economies. However, with this money came the pledge there would be no political settlement with Israel. This became known as the three no's: no recognition, no negotiation, no peace (Quandt 2005, 47; Khartoum Resolution; Sisco 2001, 26). Korn (1992, 86) notes this severely limited Nasser's, and later Sadat's, diplomatic freedom.

The text of the resolution read as follows:

"The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action and the need for coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives of the other Arab Heads of State at the conference have affirmed their countries' stand by and implementation of the Arab Solidarity Charter which was signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca.

The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects of the aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these lands falls on all the Arab States.

The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.

The conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil recommended that suspension of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab States directly affected by the aggression, so that these States will be able to stand firm in the battle. The conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing States have, in fact, participated in the efforts to enable the States affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure.

The participants in the conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab Economic and Social Development Fund on the basis of the

recommendation of the Baghdad conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil.

The participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary measures to strengthen military preparation to face all eventualities.

The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab States."

These three "no's" would set the stage for the next phase of conflict in the Middle East.

4.4 The Nixon administration and the War of Attrition

When Nixon entered office, he brought some experience in Middle East affairs, and some preconceived ideas about how to approach some of the issues surrounding it. While in Morocco during the 1967 war, Nixon sent Secretary Rusk a cable outlining some of these thoughts. In the memo, he stated that other Middle East countries should be expected to be working toward peace, and that he felt the key to peace in the region ran through Moscow. Nixon did not believe that all Arab countries supported Nasser, and that the US had to be seen as impartial for all countries in the region to have trust in the US desire for peace (Quandt 2005, 56).

It became clear early on that President Nixon expected to be very involved in foreign policy decisions, and that he would reinvigorate the National Security Council as a means to help him. He also brought in to government an outspoken former Harvard University professor as his National Security Advisor, Henry A. Kissinger. Although

different in their approach, both held similar views on the fundamental questions of national security, diplomacy, and the dangers of nuclear war.

New to the role of Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia was Joseph Sisco. Joe had never served overseas, although he was a career Department of State Foreign Service officer. However, he was the consummate Washington bureaucrat and insider. Nixon called on Sisco for several high-level negotiation tasks, one working with the Russians on matters relating to peace and stability in the Middle East. The second was an attempt to negotiate directly with Nasser on the outlines of a peace deal rather than trying to work through the Russians (Sisco 2001, 25). His deputy was Alfred Atherton, who did have extensive Middle East experience, and represented continuity and expertise.

As the new administration settled in to their new roles, President Nixon moved to establish the principles of US foreign policy. Some of these would be different from the previous administration of President Johnson, but one foreign policy problem would be the same; Vietnam. During his presidency, Vietnam would occupy his foreign policy attention to the detriment of other decisions and crisis that needed attention. While Nixon desired to be the key participant in the foreign policy circle, events would soon show him this was not possible.

Because of the pull Vietnam had on his time and attention, the State Department was given responsibility for Middle East planning and policy. The Department was anxious to play the main role in the Middle, and felt they had plenty of experts to call on for support. For the time being, this arrangement was satisfactory. Nixon felt the Middle East was somewhat stable and quiet, and his National Security Advisor did not have

any Middle East experience. Although they both viewed the Soviet Union with distrust, the Middle East was not a part of the world Kissinger knew very well.

Nixon was interested in working on Middle East peace as he saw it was a potentially explosive region. However, Vietnam was still a major foreign policy issue, and this continued to use his time. Nixon was also conscious of the animosity of the congress over Vietnam, and did not believe working the Middle East peace would bring about any lasting good will. There, he continued to allow the State Department to have lead control of efforts to bring about peace. The State Department continued to have the lead on diplomacy in the ME, as they saw the erosion of American influence and values a bad indicator of the direction the Arab countries were going. They were very interested in trying to bring about consensus on UNSC Resolution 242, and they were trying to be very evenhanded. However, being evenhanded in the eyes of Israel was being pro-Arab (Quandt 2005).

Kissinger, however, did not believe that being evenhanded was the way to approach peace in the Middle East. He believed that Israel needed to be supported, even overtly. Because of this, the Israeli's began bypassing the State Department and going direct to Kissinger (Korn 1992, 154). Unlike Rogers and Under Secretary Sisco, Kissinger believed a strong Israel would convince the Arabs to make peace; sooner or later. This would shortly setup serious disagreement between the national security advisor and the secretary of state. Kissinger's duplicity would have serious consequences.

Kissinger also saw as a major power player the role of the Soviet Union, and he wanted to reduce their influence among Arab countries. Nixon was also concerned

about the influence of the Russians in the Middle East, and equally concerned it could easily lead to superpower confrontation. After one of President Nixon's speeches in January 1969, the National Security Council began reviewing alternatives. Of the many options, two were given serious discussion. The first was an imposed peace and security plan proposed by the US. This option was rejected for various and obvious reasons. The second option was to begin a step by step diplomatic effort that would try to make small improvements in the region toward peace. The second option would grow and develop into the Rogers Plan, named after Secretary of State Rogers (Quandt 2005, 64).

4.4.1 The Rogers Plan

The Rogers Plan was proposed by Secretary Rogers in a December 9, 1969, speech in which he called for an almost complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. His plan would include the framework of a binding peace treaty ending Israel's state of war with Jordan and Egypt. The plan also called for establishment of secure borders and demilitarized zones, maritime passage through the Suez Canal, and a just settlement of the refugee problem (*The New York Times*, December 10, 1969). ***find the DOS work on this for the official messages.

The Rogers Plan was a desire to establish some ground rules and goals, and were much like Johnson's five points. They followed the provisions of UNSC 242, and tried to provide some measurable steps. These key points were:

- 1) The final borders in the region would be agreed upon by the affected parties.
- 2) There would be no imposed settlement.

- 3) The four powers (Egypt, Israel, US, and USSR) would work closely with Ambassador Jarring.
- 4) The final agreement would be a contract signed by all parties.
- 5) Peace would be achieved as part of a package settlement (Quandt 2005, 64, Stein 1999, 57).

In layman's terms, the proposal called for the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the Sinai to the international border. This was conditioned on three caveats: removal of Egyptian forces from Sharm el-Sheikh and the opening of the strait of Tiran to free navigation, the demilitarization of the Suez Canal, and arrangements made for the security of Gaza (Sisco 2001, 28). The Israeli's also wanted direct negotiations between them and the Arab countries, they did not want to try to negotiate through the UN, the US, or USSR.

By tying regional peace agreements to a package settlement, Israel would not be expected to begin withdrawal from any occupied territories from the 1967 war until the other elements had been resolved. However, this understanding would increase the chances that a package settlement could not be achieved because the other elements cannot be agreed upon (Quandt 2005, 65). The Arabs and the Russians wanted to see an Israeli withdrawal first, and then begin discussion on the other elements.

Undersecretary Sisco believed the Roger's Plan was doomed to fail for several reasons. Because of the US – Soviet rivalry, there was a lack of mutual trust, and this limited the ability for the two countries to work together. He believed the goal of the plan was too ambitious, there was too much substance in the plan, and it became too hard to negotiate. This understanding would lead Kissinger into his now famous step-by-step

negotiation method. Lastly, there was a gap in the cohesion of policy development and implementation between the White House and the State Department. Part of this gap was due to the personal conflict then ongoing between Secretary Rogers and National Security Advisor Kissinger (Sisco 2001, 29). The failure of the Rogers Plan did not displease Kissinger or Nixon. Nixon had little trust in the State Department or its policies (Stein 1999, 31).

Sisco took two lessons about the failed effort that helped shape future discussions. The first was the desire to negotiate directly with the parties involved, to cut out the USSR and other major powers that had been involved. This would allow a better ability to remain neutral, which has been the hallmark of US negotiations in the Middle East since that time. The second was the need for full Presidential support and involvement during key periods of the negotiations. During a conference discussing the Middle East and in particular the October War, Sisco said the indispensability of the president during negotiations was the most important lesson he learned in over five decades of negotiations in the Middle East (Bar-Zohar 1970, 234; Korn 1992, 5; Quandt 2005, 49; Parker 2001, 30).

4.4.2 The War of Attrition

However, the situation began to deteriorate in March and April. Fighting between Egyptian Fedayeen and Israeli forces along the Suez Canal had increased. Attacks from both sides intensified dramatically, causing President Nasser to proclaim the cease-fire had been breached (Korn 1992, 109). This began what would be called The War of Attrition (Quandt 2005, 65). The War of Attrition began along the Suez Canal in

March 1969. It would last until August 1970, ending only after deep strikes into Egypt by Israeli aircraft. It had the unintended benefit of teaching the Egyptians new tactics, allowing them to better train their army (parker 2001, 2). Simcha Dinitz noted the War of Attrition showed the dangers of diplomatic and political stagnation. It brought Egypt, Syria, and the USSR closer together. It also allowed for the introduction of large numbers of Soviet advisors into the Middle East (Dinitz 2001, 244).

A new round of discussion with the Arab countries brought a new round of disagreements between the State Department and Kissinger. Rogers believed the Russians would cooperate with the US in trying to bring peace to the region. Kissinger believed they would not because they had worked hard to build up influence and presence, and they would not force their satellite Egypt into making peace. However, reports of a visit to Egypt by the Soviet Foreign Minister during June 10-13, 1969 indicated he tried to pressure Egypt into beginning talks with Israel (Quandt 2005, 66).

The war continued through the summer and fall of 1969. In September, Golda Meir visited the White House to meet with President Nixon. She made a good impression on the president, and when she requested additional aircraft and arms to compliment Israel's recent request, the president was inclined to help. Meir and Nixon also agreed to establish a direct communications channel between the White House and the Prime Minister's residence, again bypassing the State Department (Korn 1992, 154). In later years, Prime Minister Rabin would suggest that although the Department of State was recommending caution, his "sources" were recommending action (Kissinger 1982, 221; Quandt 2005, 66).

While Secretary Rogers was trying to gain acceptance for his diplomacy plan, Nixon was assuring his supporters in the Jewish community that he had doubts about the State Department diplomatic efforts. The plan being pushed so diligently by Secretary Rogers included the following points:

- 1) The state of war between Egypt and Israel would end.
- 2) Establishment of demilitarized zones and the opening of the Straits of Tiran.
- 3) The previous international boundary between Egypt and the Palestinian mandate would be restored.
- 4) A guarantee by Egypt of freedom of navigation for all nations in the Suez and Straits of Tiran.
- 5) An agreement by Egypt and Israel to mutually respect each country's sovereignty and territory, and their right to live in peace (Quandt 2005, 67).

Secretary Roger's plan was submitted to Egypt for review and comment on 10 November 69. After a month had gone by, Secretary Rogers publicly commented on the plan during a speech. The next day, 9 December, Israel rejected the plan. This was quickly followed by a Russian rejection of the plan. After a lot of work on the part of Secretary Rogers, the plan was finished (Quandt 2005, 69). Although deemed a very good description of US goals for peace in the region, it was also undermined by the actions of Kissinger, who was not an advocate of the plan. Not only did he oppose the settlement attempt, he was signaling Rabin that Washington would welcome a more aggressive Israeli stance. The running feud between Rogers and Kissinger ensured the Roger's Plan would never be accepted (Quandt 2005, 69). "There relationship revealed

all the shabby traits of Henry's character: his secretiveness, suspiciousness, and vindictiveness" (Stein 1999, 31).

Events took a more serious turn in the spring of 1970 (Korn 1992, 170). Fighting along the Suez greatly intensified, and the Russians moved 10,000-15,000 military advisors and technicians in to Egypt. The advisors were a mix of missile technicians to work on the new SAM-3 surface – to – air missiles being introduced into Egypt, and pilots to help train the Egyptian air force (Korn 1992, 191). These two developments changed the situation markedly. They redesigned and managed the air defense systems for the Egyptians. They also encouraged Nasser to move his air defense systems closer to the Suez Canal. This would have significant consequences for the Israeli's during the 1973 war (Parker 2001, 2).The introduction of the SAM-3 missiles meant a significant improvement in the air defense capability of Egypt. The training of the Egyptian air force by Soviet pilots would greatly increase their skill and equipment capability, and lead to the introduction of Soviet pilots flying combat missions over Egypt (Quandt 2005, 70).

When Nasser died on 28 September 1970, one of the first initiatives by Sadat was to send word to the US that he wanted to turn to the page on Egyptian relations with the US. Kissinger does not believe Sadat is mature or respected enough as president, and does not pursue his offer (Kissinger 1982, 201; Parker 2001, 2).

This period of escalating tensions also saw an increase in pressure on the Nixon administration to approve the sale of over 100 A-4 attack aircraft, and 50 F-4 fighter aircraft. The Israeli's had made several requests to the administration, who in general was supportive of their needs. With the increase in fighting and escalating tensions,

even Congress began to question why the administration had not agreed with the request to arm Israel (Kissinger 1982, 222; Quandt 2005, 73).

The second year of the Nixon administration saw the lead for policy planning in the Middle East shift from the State Department to Henry Kissinger and the National Security Council. After the failure of the Roger's Plan, the escalation of fighting along the cease fire lines between Egypt and Israel, the increase in cross border attacks between Jordan and Israel, and the introduction of thousands of Soviet advisors into Egypt, Kissinger had enough. Within days of the new August 7 cease-fire initiative brokered by the State Department, fighting broke out again. This also led to the termination of cooperation between Kissinger and Rogers, who supported the cease-fire, and the balanced approach to dealing with the Arabs and Israelis in the region. Kissinger believed it would be a strong US – Israeli partnership, and a militarily strong Israel, that would be needed to counter the Soviet influences in the region and help bring about a stable peace (Quandt 2005, 76).

4.4.3 Jordanian Civil War

A new crisis began to develop involving the Palestinian Fedayeen in Jordan. When it appeared a new cease-fire would be agreed to between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the US and Russia, the Palestinians in Jordan became concerned the new peace would be at their expense. Since February 1970, the Palestinians had been working to undermine the authority of Jordan's King Hussein. The main group, al-Fatah led by Yasser Arafat, sought to keep tensions under control. The splinter group, called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash, had been

carrying out hijackings of Western commercial airlines and flying the airplanes and captives to the Jordanian desert (Quandt 2005, 76).

Of more concern was the attempts by the PFLP to provoke a confrontation between King Hussein and the Palestinians, with the assumption Syria and Iraq would throw their support behind the Fedayeen. Iraq had almost twenty thousand soldiers on an extended training exercise inside Jordan, and Syrian troops were just across the border to the north. In August 1970, King Hussein approached the American ambassador and asked about the full range of options and support he might expect from the US if the Iraqi Army was to move against him in a coup (Quandt 2005).

As the fighting inside Jordan between the army and the Fedayeen intensified, the Nixon administration became more alarmed. Israel had been accused by local newspapers like the Ayandegan (April 13, 1970) of striking both military and civilian targets in the U.A.R. in retaliation for raids by Fedayeen forces into Israel (AIRGRAM Tehran dated 12 May 1970). Ambassador MacArthur noted that both the Iranian government and the local citizens were beginning to change their opinion of Israeli intentions. They began to wonder if they should continue to openly support Israel, especially as they were trying to increase their ties with other Arab countries.

In a Top Secret Telegram from the US Embassy to the Secretary of State, MacArthur recounted a conversation with Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi, who had recently had a meeting with the Vice Foreign Minister of Israel (AmEmbassy Tehran 3110, 19 July 1970). The Foreign Minister relayed details of his meeting that confirmed MacArthur's earlier estimation of Iranian tension with Israeli actions regarding the U.A.R. and Jordan in which the IDF were accused of excessive use of force against

non-military targets in retaliation for Fedayeen raids. The Foreign Minister also stated he had chastised the Israeli Vice Foreign Minister for continuing to publicly link US military support and aid as a way of bolstering Israel's standing in the region. The Foreign Minister asked the Vice Foreign Minister if he did not see this was damaging US standing in the region with other Arab countries. He asked why they did not just keep this information to themselves and try to protect their relationship with the US. This was a signal to MacArthur there was a change in the governmental mood between Iran and Israel, and that the US would need to help with the peace process.

Nixon saw this as an opportunity to crush the Fedayeen, and pushed for military action. Secretary Rogers and the State Department did not feel much could be done since this was a Jordanian internal security issue. Nevertheless, Nixon was determined to take a stronger stance, and ordered the 82nd Airborne Division put on alert and had transport aircraft moved into position to provide support to Jordan if needed. On September 15, King Hussein reorganized his civilian government into a military government, with the intention of taking decisive action against the Fedayeen (Quandt 2005, 78).

The Nixon administration clearly needed Hussein to be successful. Overthrowing a friend of the US, with Soviet help and equipment would be seen as a disaster. However, the risk of an expanded war, with other Arab countries drawn in, was a very real possibility. Nixon gave a series of speeches aimed at warning against outside interference, and was joined by similar Soviet protestations. However, on September 19, there were reports of a Syrian armored brigade moving across the border into Jordan. Although the Soviets reassured the administration they were urging restraint on

their client state Syria, there was considerable skepticism the Syrians would have taken this action without the support of their benefactor.

On 20 September, King Hussein made an urgent request to the US Ambassador for immediate help in maintaining Jordanian sovereignty. This request quickly turned in to an urgent appeal for US air strikes against Syrian forces in northern Jordan. However, with the conflict in Vietnam still the priority, there were few US forces available for immediate use in Jordan. King Hussein expanded his request for US assistance with a request for assistance from any country in the area that could provide immediate support, including Israel.

Kissinger was able to reach Israeli Ambassador Rabin, who was in New York attending a social gala with Prime Minister Meir. Asked if Israel could assist the US with air reconnaissance, Rabin asked if the US wanted Israel to provide air strikes into northern Jordan. After recommending to Nixon that the US support Jordan by allowing Israel to strike Syrian forces inside Jordan, Nixon requested they verify with air surveillance before making a final recommendation. Prime Minister Meir agreed that Israel would conduct air surveillance first thing the next morning and provide the details to the White House.

Initial air reconnaissance indicated there were approximately 300 Syrian tanks in and around the Jordanian town of Irbid. Further coordination with Israel resulted in a planned attack by Israeli armored and air forces if required and approved by King Hussein. With this assurance of support, King Hussein attacked the Syrian forces with his smaller Army, and was able to drive them back across the border into Syria. This

action precluded the need for Israeli ground support, although the King was still interested in an air strike against remaining Syrian forces inside Jordan.

President Nasser had disagreed with the Fedayeen push to undermine King Hussein, and asked Arafat, Hussein, and other leaders to attend a meeting in Cairo to try to broker a cease-fire himself. On 27 September 1970, after seeing his guests off at the airport, Nasser became ill. He died several hours later of a heart attack (Quandt 2005, 83). His vice president, Anwar el-Sadat became president. Although Sadat had recently suffered a mild heart attack himself, he was determined to meet with the US representatives who attended the funeral. At that meeting, Sadat told Elliot Richardson that he wanted to open a new page with the United States (Korn 1992, 272; Ghorbal 2001, 36). However, there was no initiative from the State Department or the White House to try and take him up on this proposal. In his memoirs, Kissinger (1982) has mentioned several times he did not take Sadat seriously as a diplomat, and consequently did not believe him when he made similar statements along this line. Kissinger, who did not feel he was up to the role of President, initially saw Sadat as a transition figure and peacemaker. This would not be the last time the US would miss an important opening for negotiations and diplomacy with Sadat due to Kissinger's influence.

As the tension from the recent Jordanian crisis began to fade, both Nixon and Kissinger considered their policy of handling the most recent Middle East crisis a success. King Hussein remained in power, the Fedayeen were reduced as an immediate threat, the Syrians had been pushed out of Jordan without Israeli or US assistance, and relations with Israel were stable. However, the Department of State was

concerned with US policy regarding the closeness to Israel, seeing this as a stumbling block to better relations in the region overall. They still advocated the evenhanded approach (Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforth FRUS), XXIII, 232).

With the War of Attrition ending, Ambassador MacArthur relayed to Undersecretary Sisco a conversation he had recently with Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi (AmEmbassy Tehran 5502, 23 December 1970). Zahedi had recently met with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, where they discussed Arab demands previously made on Israel. Both acknowledged the fear that continued hostilities would allow the Russians a foothold in the Middle East. They also discounted the idea that Egypt wanted peace, and stated that Sadat was not Nasser. Zahedi tried to dissuade Eban that direct talks could realistically begin with individual Arab states, and noted that although Eban thought Jordan might be ready to begin direct negotiations over the status of the West Bank and Jerusalem, if King Hussein tried to hold talks, he would be destroyed.

During a meeting with the Shah, Ambassador MacArthur, the Shah expressed his concerns about Iraqi troops inside Kuwait (AmEmbassy Tehran Airgram A-711, 21 April 1971). The Shah believed that by not publicly asking the Iraqi's to leave, the Kuwaiti Emir was putting his country in danger because of the long standing territorial claims by Iraq that Kuwait was part of their country. Iraq had a history of making claims to Kuwaiti territory, and this issue will surface again in the future. It will play a significant role in bringing US forces to aid Kuwait during the occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in 1998. Iraq's continuing aggression was also copied to the other relevant US embassies in the region, including Kuwait.

The sense of success also allowed for a sense of complacency to take hold in both Israel and the US. Kissinger believed this was in large part because of the military balance of power that favored Israel. His long held belief that instability in the region was caused by Soviet interference, Kissinger determined to try and persuade the new Egyptian President, Anwar el-Sadat to make the Russian advisors leave (Quandt 2005, 85). Although Kissinger did not have the expertise or time to work issues in the Middle East, he did have a strategy that would limit Soviet influence in the Arab countries. He was also interested in maintaining the momentum of détente with the Soviets.

4.5 Section III Events leading to the 1973 October War

4.5.1 Middle East diplomatic stalemate

The success of the US diplomatic effort during the Jordanian crisis was followed by a period of diplomatic stalemate. The lack of progress in trying to better manage or solve the outstanding issues in the region was masked by a lack of conflict, and this led to the sense that the Middle East situation was improving. It is during the period from late 1970 to mid-1973, the period of diplomatic stalemate, that several opportunities for a real peace achievement in the Middle East may have been missed (FRUS, XXIII, 294; Quandt 2005, 85). Between the death of Nasser in September 1970, and the October War, Sadat tried three initiatives to break the diplomatic impasse and work towards peace. The first initiative was introduced in a speech to the Egyptian parliament on 4 February 1971. During his speech, Sadat said he would extend the expiring cease-fire agreement with Israel for thirty days. However, he requested that as a sign of good faith, Israel begin a partial withdrawal from the east banks of the Canal back towards

the Mitla and Giddi passes. In return, Sadat would clear the debris from the Canal, and reopen it to international traffic (FRUS, XXIII, 232; parker 2001 2).

Sadat's second initiative was to establish communications with Kissinger. When it became clear Sadat was not getting the recognition or help from the US State Department he was looking for, he set up a backchannel communication network that would allow him to communicate direct with the National Security Advisor. This was tacit recognition by Sadat that Kissinger, not Secretary of State Rogers, held the key to US Middle East policy in the Nixon administration (Kissinger 1982, 202; Parker 2001, 3).

Sadat's third initiative was to expel the Soviet advisors from Egypt. Several advisors stated this was a sticking point in Egyptian US relations (Kissinger 1982, 202; Parker 2001, 4). On 8 July 1972, Sadat notified Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov of his decision to remove all Russian advisors from Egypt (Kirpitchenko 2001, 48). Sadat had his own reasons from requesting the Soviets leave Egypt. After his conference in Moscow, Sadat felt the Soviets were ignoring his requests for advanced military equipment in favor of detente with the US. Golan (2001, 74) asserts that Sadat was unhappy with the Russians, and planned to remove them from Egypt regardless of the US response.

Sadat had attended a summit in Moscow in May 1972, and had complained about the slowness of Soviet arms deliveries. He also wanted the Soviets to provide him with more advanced weaponry than they were willing to provide. The final insult to Sadat was the non-committal statement in the final communiqué of the summit, which seemed to put the Middle East on ice. The Soviets wanted détente with the US, and they needed US grain deliveries (Kissinger 1982, 204). The Russians were also

extremely upset with one of Sadat's close advisors, who was also the editor of a well-respected Cairo newspaper. Mohamed Heikal had been writing for some time that the Russians needed to provide Egypt with advanced weaponry in order to prove their usefulness. The Russians wanted Sadat to get rid of Heikal as an advisor. Sadat got rid of the Russians instead (Heikal, 1971).

On 18 July 1972, Sadat ordered the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Egypt (FRUS, XXIII, 298; Kissinger 1982, 205). This accomplished two things; it removed Soviet resistance to an attack on Israel, and opened the door to diplomatic overtures to the US. In furtherance of that goal, Sadat opened backchannel communications with the US in late July. However, several of his close advisors, to include General el-Gamasy, noted Sadat had expected the US would respond in a more positive manner than they did. Galia Golan agreed with Rodman (2001) on the importance of Sadat's removal of the Soviet advisors from Egypt. She believes this was the turning point in Middle East history, and was a significant loss for the Russians (Golan 2001, 203). However, the US did not seem to appreciate that Sadat had accomplished one of the goals the US had set out to persuade Sadat to do. Sadat felt like his efforts were being ignored, and because of this begins to understand the diplomatic stalemate he is in regarding advancing negotiations in the Middle East. He begins to formulate the idea that in order to break the stalemate, some other event of significance will have to occur.

The State Department had been excluded from much of the policymaking in the Middle East by Nixon and Kissinger during this period of 1970-1973. Indeed, Kissinger had worked to undermine the ability of the state department to get the ear of Nixon for

programs they were trying to implement (FRUS, XXIII, 232). This resulted in several failed initiatives that led to a lack of diplomatic advances. That did not mean that Kissinger was not busy with diplomacy during this period. It just was not in the Middle East. The Vietnam War was still competing for White House attention, and in 1971, Kissinger would begin protracted high-level talks with North Vietnamese negotiators to try to end the war. Nixon was preparing for his opening to China, and the WH was interested in nuclear disarmament talks with the Russians. The White House and the National Security Advisor had a full plate, and so it was easy to overlook a somewhat calm Middle East that was not in conflict (Quandt 2005, 86).

What the State Department was trying diplomatically was to bring to talks back to the status of the Suez Canal. Israel was asked to submit their proposal on a partial Suez agreement, including the reduction of military forces in the area. The Israeli proposal included the opening of the canal and the unrestricted use of the canal by Israeli shipping, continued Israeli control of the Bar Lev line along the east side of the canal, and a cease-fire of unlimited duration while these issues were being negotiated (FRUS, XXIII, 23; Quandt 2005, 90;). Sadat met with Ambassador's Bergus and Sternen in order to reply to the Israeli proposals. His counter-proposal declared the Egyptians must be able to remain to the East of the canal, and control the Mitla and Giddi passes. In return, the Israelis could maintain control of the port at Sharm el-Sheikh for six months. Sadat emphasized that if the Israeli's did not give up the two passes, the deal would be compromised.

Trying to keep negotiations on track, Secretary Rogers visited the Middle East, stopping first in Egypt to meet with President Sadat. Rogers noted that Sadat seemed

willing to compromise, but he did not find this same willingness when he visited Israel. There the situation was somber and untrusting, as they thought Rogers was pro-Arab. Undersecretary Joe Sisco returned to the region to continue talks with Egypt and Israel, but began to lose credibility to trying to oversell the level of compromise being offered by either side. Both sides lost credibility in Rogers and Sisco, and shortly after, the White House did as well. There would be no interim canal agreement.

Kissinger now took over all Middle East policy planning, which suited him, as he had not been a fan of the way the State Department had acted in the Middle East. During the years 1971-1972, the State Department was directed by the White House not to plan any new initiatives until after the US elections (Quandt 2005, 94). Kissinger particularly disagreed on Rogers' assessment that Israel would be more accommodating if military equipment and supplies were withheld. He felt the key to Middle East peace was a strong Israel with firm backing by the US. He believed the Arab countries would see the hopelessness of their situation and begin to negotiate with Israel. Kissinger admitted early on that he was not an expert in Middle Eastern affairs, and that when Egyptian ambassador Hafiz Ismail arrived for diplomatic meetings in Washington, they knew very little about the real thinking of Sadat and Egypt. Although Nixon had talked with Kissinger about a broader settlement of Egyptian-Israeli issues, Nixon also noted that Israel could be quite intransigent in their position (Kissinger 1982, 212).

In May 1972, Nixon and Kissinger visited Moscow for strategic discussions on missile reductions, and détente. In a joint communiqué, the Soviet Union and the US reaffirmed their support for UN Resolution 242, and of the continuing Jarring mission

(FRUS, XXIII, 294; Quandt 2005, 95). Sadat saw this joint communiqué as further evidence the Russians did not have Egypt's interests at heart. They would not press the US to pressure Israel into a settlement as they had said. On July 8, President Sadat notified the Russian Ambassador to Egypt that he wanted most of the advisors, technicians, and families removed from Egypt. Sadat's visit to Russia had convinced him that no new initiatives would be forthcoming, and so he decided on a different approach. On July 18, he made a public announcement of this decision (Kirpitchenko 2001, 48). This action met with minimal recognition from the US, although many today see this as the turning point in the modern Middle East.

Although this is something both Nixon and Kissinger wanted, disappointingly, they did not seem to capitalize on this new development (FRUS, XXIII, 299; Quandt 2005, 96; Kirpitchenko 2001, 48). While being pleased at this new development, they did little to reach out with what Sadat thought would be a meaningful gesture. What Sadat received was a message of congratulations, and a promise that after the elections in November, and after the fighting in Vietnam ended, that the Middle East would be the new US priority (FRUS, XXIII, 300; Quandt 2005, 97). Until then, Egypt was caught in the same diplomatic stalemate that had existed before expelling the Russians. Seeing there was not going to be any new initiatives regarding pressuring Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai, Sadat and Assad began preparing for war.

4.5.2 Kissinger is ready to focus on the Middle East

The years 1972-1973 were deceptively calm in the Middle East, at least as far as the US was concerned. The White House and Kissinger were busy with the end of the

Vietnam War, the détente talks with Russia, the opening of diplomatic relations with China, and the Watergate investigation. Sadat had been planning; some of his advisors believe he had decided a year earlier to go to war. Sadat had three goals in mind, the first was to restore Arab honor, the second was to get the two superpowers reengaged in peace discussions in the Middle East, and the third was to break the myth of Israeli invincibility (Saunders 2001, 50). Although Sadat and Assad had been planning their attacks for a while, they were very good at keeping it a secret. Arnaud de Borchgrave interviewed Sadat on 9 April 1973 while a foreign correspondent with Newsweek. Sadat stated,

The time has come for a shock. Diplomacy will continue before, during, and after the battle. All West Europeans are telling us that everybody has fallen asleep over the Middle East crisis. But they will soon wake up to the fact that America has left us no other way out. The resumption of the hostilities is the only way out. Everything is now being mobilized in concert for the resumption of the battle which is inevitable” (Stein 1999, 68).

Sadat had decided the diplomatic stalemate he was in would not change, and Kissinger later believed he had decided on war during the summer of 1972 (FRUS, XXIII, 290; Kissinger 1982, 226). Sadat went through the motions of diplomacy, but knew only a bold move would keep Arab unity with him. Although Sadat proclaimed himself a man of peace, he wanted his territory from the 1967 war back, and could not make peace with Israel without a good reason. He wanted to cut the Gordian knot – and believed war was the answer. Sadat was concerned that to give in to peace with Israel would be seen as weakness instead of statesmanship.

It was well known in the Middle East that Sadat had been talking about going to war with Israel to break the stalemate. During an interview with Newsweek, Sadat had told Arnaud de Borchgrave he was planning to go to war soon because he could not change the diplomatic situation. Sadat's boasts were dismissed by US policy makers as an exaggeration (Parker 2001, 4). KGB Station Chief General Kirpitchenko noted that Sadat had always talked about the inevitability of war with Israel, but after so many false starts, Israeli senses were dulled (Kirpitchenko 2001, 49). In May 1972, after an unsuccessful attempt of acquiring advanced weapons from the Soviets, Sadat wrote to Brezhnev complaining, "Why are we relying on you? You obviously can't do anything for us. It's obvious the Americans hold most of the cards here" (Rodman 2001, 168). In July 1972, after Sadat had expelled the 15,000 Soviet advisors and technicians, many thought this was the turning point in the history of the Middle East. Sadat's change of alliance from the USSR to the US changed the trajectory of the modern Middle East, and Egypt.

With a peace agreement concluded with Vietnam in January 1973, Kissinger turned his attention to gaining a better understanding of the issues in the Middle East. There were three key initiatives that Kissinger wanted to have a better understanding of. The first was UNSC Resolution 242, with all its vague language. The next was the Rogers plan of interim agreements, and the last was the Jarring memorandum that summed the work of Ambassador Jarring over the past three years. Kissinger had already invited Egypt's national security advisor, Hafiz Ismail, for talks. Nixon and Kissinger met with Ismail on 23 February 1973, and then Kissinger continued to meet in private with Ismail for the next two days (FRUS, XXIII, 296; Kissinger 1982, 210; Quandt

2005, 99). Kissinger wanted his first meeting with Ismail to be a secret so he could begin to understand the issues surrounding the lack of peace in the Middle East. When he met Ismail on 25 and 26 February 1973, he would quickly learn that the complexities of the Arab-Israeli dispute would center on the understanding of UNSC 242.

The Arabs viewed UNSC Resolution 242 as requiring the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab lands, pulling back to the borders 5 June 1967. The Arabs also believed it was a requirement that this move be accomplished prior to any substantive peace negotiations between Israel and all affected Arab countries. What the Arabs would not agree to at the end of the day was peace with Israel. They would discuss Israel's security, but would not agree to peace. For Kissinger, he did not believe this was a workable set of terms (FRUS, XXV, 28; Kissinger 1982, 216). Ismail wanted Kissinger to guarantee that a comprehensive settlement would be pursued, but Kissinger does not want to commit to something he may not be able to deliver. But, Sadat is already headed for a showdown with Israel, and Kissinger and Washington are not taking his threat seriously.

Kissinger had a new negotiating strategy that revolved around security and sovereignty. He purposefully excluded the Department of State from these meetings, preferring instead to begin the groundwork of his step – by – step negotiating strategy. This meeting with Ismail produced a negotiating framework, and the two agreed that a second meeting would take place after the Israeli elections in October 1973 (Quandt 2005; Kissinger 1982). However, after leaks in the Arab press about the first secret meeting between Ismail and Kissinger, the officer in charge of the Cairo US interest section began some indiscrete inquiries with the State Department, and began making

waves about being excluded from the meetings and resultant information. After this, the State Department was invited to take part in future meetings.

The second meeting was held in Paris, and much like the first, did not produce much in the way of diplomatic energy or breakthrough. Kissinger notes he was just getting his feet wet, and did not know the Middle East. He wanted to meet Ismail and get to know him. However, he also wanted Ismail to understand he should not "...expect to achieve on the negotiating table what you lost on the battlefield" (El-Sayed 2001, 77). El-Sayed (2001) believes Sadat understood this to mean an inevitable war. In Egypt, this meant no political solution was possible. Kissinger told Ismail during their second meeting in March 1973, that he cannot help Egypt because they are the defeated power between them and Israel (Kissinger 1982; Parker 2001). During this discussion, Kissinger told Ismail;

We live in a world of realities and facts. The fact is that you, the Arabs, have been defeated and that Israel has been victorious. You talk as though you were the victors and Israel was the loser. The situation will not change unless you change it militarily. Despite this, I wish you to convey some advice to Sadat and tell him: Beware of attempting to change the situation militarily because you will be defeated again as you were defeated in 1967. There would then be no hope of finding a settlement on the basis of a just peace or anything else. Nobody would be able to speak to Israel (Stein 1999, 67).

The secret, although largely unproductive talks between Kissinger and Hafiz Ismail in early 1973 also led to frustration in Egypt as it seemed no progress was being made (Rodman 2001). Ismail had been invited to Russia in February, and was tacitly told that Egypt could engage in a limited war with Israel as long as it did not involve the USSR and the US. They also agreed to the largest arms package ever negotiated for

the Middle East. The Russians told Ismail they did not want a separate deal for peace between Egypt and Israel, they were pushing for a package deal, especially for their other client, Syria. Kissinger believes this put into motion the 1973 October War (Kissinger 1982).

There was the beginning of another crisis on the horizon, and that was the rising cost of oil from the Middle East. Although US oil import from the Middle East was less than ten percent of total imports, US exploration inside the continental boundaries had been stagnant, and refining capacity was lower than needed. It was at this time that visitors to Saudi Arabia began reporting that King Feisal was hinting that oil could be used as a weapon to pressure the US into making Israel withdraw from the captured territories (Quandt 2005).

Through the summer of 1973, diplomatic energy had been suspended in the Middle East. Sadat was clearly frustrated, and King Feisal was publicly linking the use of oil to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this early period of diplomatic stalemate, part of the inertia on the part of the US was caused by the upcoming election cycle. While Sadat was taking some very bold initiatives to try and get peace negotiations back on track, the White House was involved with the upcoming election cycle. In response to an Egyptian suggestion for a peace initiative, the Israeli's suggested a mutual pullback from the canal, and that it be reopened to shipping traffic. Sadat did not want to do that, but in the interest of peace, he sent a note to Ambassador Jarring on 15 February 1971, stating Egypt would be willing to accept a comprehensive peace in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory in the Sinai (Parker 2001).

On 22 August 1973, President Nixon made a surprising announcement by nominating Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State, replacing the outgoing William Rogers (Kissinger 1982; Quandt 2005). Kissinger would retain the title of National Security Advisor, gathering in one place most of the foreign policy making of the US. Kissinger would no longer worry about the State Department meddling in his Middle Eastern initiatives. There were some significant differences inside the State Department, particularly within the regional bureau's overseeing the Middle East. There were those that saw problems within their own parochial boundaries, and those who viewed all diplomacy through a cold war window. The personal feud between Kissinger and Rogers seriously limited the desire for any new initiatives, and impacted the ability to make progress (Kissinger 1982; Quandt 2005; Parker 2001). Sadat had been pushing for a comprehensive peace settlement prior to 1973, and would not budge from this position, even as Israel was willing to negotiate, Sadat's insistence on a comprehensive deal was not acceptable to the Israeli's (Gazit 2001).

On 5 October 1973, President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed el-Zayyat, and other Arab foreign ministers in Washington DC. Among other topics, they agreed they would meet in November to begin work on Middle East peace. Unbeknownst to President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger, in April 1973, Sadat had met with Syrian President Hafez el-Assad in Egypt. Sadat told Assad he was going to war against Israel soon, and asked if he would join him. Assad readily agreed, and was shown the operational plans that had been prepared by the Egyptian War Ministry. General el-Gamasy recommended three months he felt would best support military operations. These were May, September, and October 1973. After

October, the weather would not support fighting in the Golan Heights. Sadat and Assad agreed that May was too soon. Syria was still receiving weapons from the Soviets, and the deliveries would not be complete until after May. However, Sadat began repositioning his forces along the west bank of the Suez Canal, which was dismissed by Israeli intelligence as simple posturing (Kissinger 1982; Stein 1999). The next day, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in a coordinated attack on Yom Kippur, one of the most holy of Jewish holidays.

Kissinger had totally misread Arab frustrations and intentions, and Israeli belief in the stability of the situation (Kissinger 1982; Quandt 2005; Parker 2001). Kissinger's belief that stability in the region meant a militarily strong Israel, supported by the US, lay in tatters. Although the US had invested millions in military aid, this strategy did not seem to offset the frustrations and hopelessness felt by the Arab countries over the diplomatic stalemate they could not break. Both Nixon and Kissinger also failed to see the growing impatience of the key oil producers in the region to US inaction, and were not paying attention to the growing calls to use oil as a weapon (Bronson 2006; FRUS, XXIII, 289; Quandt 2005).

4.6 The 1973 October War

The White House situation room received a flash cable from the US Embassy in Tel Aviv just after 6am on 6 October 1973. The cable had been passed through the US Ambassador by Prime Minister Golda Meir, saying Israel had incontrovertible proof the Egyptians and the Syrians were going to attack not later than 6pm that day. Kissinger was awakened in his room at the Waldorf Astoria on 6 October 1973, at 0615, by Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Kissinger 1982). Sisco had received a message from Ambassador Kenneth Keating; US Ambassador to Israel, that war between Israel and Egypt and Syria was imminent. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had told Keating "We may be in trouble" (Kissinger 1982, 450). The Ambassador said he thought each side was misreading each other's intentions – and Kissinger could help if he would quickly make contact with Egypt and Syria and let them know Israel did not intend to attack them. However, as events would show, getting the attack stopped was not possible.

Kissinger immediately began telephoning leaders in Russia, Israel, Egypt, and the UN to try and forestall the attack. Kissinger was able to quickly contact Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, at the Soviet Embassy, at 0640. He asked him to contact Egypt and Syria, and tell them they were making a mistake, that Israel had no intention of attacking them. He then spent several more hours making phone calls to inquire as to what was going on, and to continue to assure Soviet and Egyptian ministers that Israel was not, and would not, make a preemptive strike. Interestingly, Kissinger had lunched with the Egyptian UN Ambassador the previous day, and had been given no sign that an attack by Egypt on Israel was imminent. However, it was too

late. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal on barges mounted with water canon to blow open spaces for tanks into the soft sides of the far banks. The Syrians crossed the Golan Heights with over 1400 tanks. Although it seemed to come as a surprise to the US and the Israeli's, plenty of advance warning had been readily available for at least a year prior. In later years, Kissinger would conclude that Sadat had determined to go to war the year prior, in the summer of 1972 (Kissinger 1982; Quandt 2005).

Three incorrect assumptions seemed to have clouded Israeli diplomats, intelligence analysts, and US officials:

- 1) Sadat had repeatedly been threatening war since 1971, but had not taken any type of action that would indicate he was serious.
- 2) Egypt had learned the lesson of air power during the 1967 war, and it was believed they would not attack without air superiority. If they were to attack, Israel would have at least 24-48 hours warning.
- 3) The Arabs would always give diplomacy one more chance.

These all proved to be false assumptions (Kissinger 1982, 460). There had been plenty of warning since the spring. The Soviets had warned Kissinger in May during his trip to Moscow. Also in May, King Hussein had warned that military preparations were too realistic to be simple military maneuvers. Lastly, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Newsweek's senior Middle East diplomatic correspondent had warned of increased tension across the Middle East. In fact he had interviewed Sadat, and been told that war was the only way to break the diplomatic stalemate Egypt found itself in (Kissinger 1982, 461). Since early 1970, Sadat had made comments about going to war if the diplomatic stalemate

continued. These comments increases after the US did not react positively and favorably to Sadat's removal of the Russians from Egypt (Parker 2001). During the annual summer review of security and economic assistance, representatives from the Defense department asked representatives from State what assistance they planned to extent to Sadat as a reward for moving the Soviets out. Embarrassingly, they had no plan to offer him anything (Suddarth 2001, 72). Undersecretary Sisco and Ambassador's Saunders and Goodman agree the no plan was in place to reward or recognize this action by Sadat. Goodman sees this is a major missed opportunity to avoid war (parker 70). President Nixon had even sent a note to Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia that he wanted forwarded to Sadat telling him he would have US assistance in getting Israel to the negotiating table if he removed the Soviets from Egypt (Quandt 2005; Merrick 2001).

By January of 1973, the Egyptian ministry of war had the outlines of the basic plan to attack across the Suez (Lippman 2016; Parker 2001). Sadat had been working on his plans for war since November 1972, and by the spring of 1973 had committed himself to the inevitability of war if nothing changed (Stein 1999). At a Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG)⁶ meeting held in May to discuss the continual stream of warning coming from the Middle East, the group reaffirmed their belief that war was not likely. This affirmation coming even after a State Department report from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research sent a report to Secretary of State Rogers noting that war

⁶ The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) was an interdepartmental group responsible for policy coordination during a crisis. It first met in 1969. It was chaired by Henry Kissinger, and included the deputies of State and Defense, the Director of the CIA, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other participants were invited as necessary (Kissinger 1982, 316).

would be an even bet in the Autumn if the diplomatic stalemate continued. They abandoned this view as war became more probable (Kissinger 1982).

The US had other intelligence indicators an attack was likely, but did not know the month or day. Roger Merrick, a researcher in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) had written a report in May 1973 warning of the increasing danger of hostilities. The findings stated there was a greater than 50 percent probability of an attack on Israel if there were no change in the diplomatic stalemate Egypt found herself in (INR Report on the Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities with Israel, dated 31 May 1973, NARA). Merrick believed Sadat's credibility was reinforced when he removed the Soviet advisors. After that, he took Sadat seriously when he talked about the "year of decision," in which the reoccupation of captured Egyptian territory in the Sinai was the goal. Merrick assessed Sadat as a "strong player, serious, neglected, and in an intolerable situation with his political alternative exhausted" (Merrick 2001, 115).

Joe Sisco, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs (NEA) disputed the INR report. The dispute continued until war broke out. Sisco's attitude was common among many in the State department, and helped shape his views of the situation. Interestingly, this will be the same failure suffered by the intelligence agencies offering their assurances of the low probability of war. Sisco supported his views as falling on the side of Israeli intelligence over his own department's intelligence reporting (Merrick 2001). Ambassador Lewis recalled a story he heard about General Zeria, who was the head of Israeli Intelligence during the war, saying there would not be war on the Golan Heights for ten years. He made this comment on 5 October. The point of his story was if

General Zeria, head of Israeli intelligence thought this, the Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan undoubtedly thought this as well, and it would have colored his judgment about Egyptian and Syrian preparations and intent (Lewis 2001).

Ambassador Eilts noted that after the 1967 war, US policymakers were convinced of Israeli superiority against Arab threats, and it colored their thinking and actions. Eilts also subscribed the failure to see war coming as a military analysis failure, not an intelligence or diplomacy failure. He believes the military assessed the leadership capabilities at the company and battalion level as being poor, in reality, they were very good (Eilts 2001). While his view is an interesting approach, the military will normally assess the capabilities of an army by looking at the capability to maneuver large combined arms elements across terrain, to include other enables such as aviation and artillery. Although the military may have assessed the training and education at the lower level, it will normally see this as one of many data points. What is more important is the technology level of the weapons and equipment, and the demonstrated ability to command and control large formations. During the lead up to the war, Syrian forces had undergone significant improvements in training and modernization. Well-trained officers led well-trained and well equipped soldiers. Israeli forces felt the modernization and training of Egyptian soldiers immediately. In the opening salvos of artillery along the Bar Lev line, four commanders along the strongpoints were killed immediately (Boyne 2002).

On 4 October, the Russians began evacuating their civilians and dependents from both Egypt and Syria. After there had been no inquiries from either Israeli or US intelligence, Vasilli Kuznetsov, the first deputy minister of Soviet foreign affairs, noted,

"There is so much evidence of Arab military preparations that only a stone-blind person could miss it" (Stein 1999, 70). Although Meir's government understood the Arabs could attack, they were being reassured by Israeli intelligence that the probability of an attack was low. Stein notes the failure of intelligence agencies to grasp the importance of the coordinated evacuation of Soviet citizens from both Egypt and Syria days before the outbreak of hostilities. Mordechai Gazit, in the office of Prime Minister Meir noted that Moshe Dayan, Israeli Defense Minister was troubled by the evacuations, but continued to believe the probability of war was still very low.

Other intelligence agencies knew of or suspected that Egypt had developed an attack plan by the spring of 1973, but they too dismissed Sadat's comments as being improbable. The Israeli's did not believe they would attack because they lacked air superiority. They also believed they would not attack without Syrian help (Parker 2001). The Saudi's had warned the US in late summer 1973 that they were certain Sadat was going to attack Israel soon. No date was mentioned, and because the Saudi's had been wrong on other issues, their warning was not taken seriously by US intelligence (Stein 1999). Mosallum (2001) noted that by 1973, it was clear war was inevitable. The state of no war, no peace, coupled with Kissinger's admonitions that Egypt had to change the dynamics, confirmed this. The War of Attrition had allowed Egypt to learn and practice new tactics, and they had gained an impressive air defense system from the Soviets. Jouejati (2001) linked the faltering economies in both Egypt and Syria as pushing them toward war. The rejection of Sadat's overtures also denied him the access of economic markets and monies he needed to help stabilize the economy.

Israel had also received very strong indications an attack was imminent. Sources inside Egypt relayed to Israeli intelligence the attack was scheduled for the evening of 6 October. With this specific date, Prime Minister Golda Meir contacted US Ambassador Kenneth Keating to have him relay to Kissinger and the White House their assurances they would not conduct a pre-emptive strike. Unlike the 1967 war, Israel did not want to be seen as the aggressor. When the war started at 2 p.m. on 6 October, the Israeli's had mobilized less than 100,000 of their military forces. It was Yom Kippur, and the citizens and military were enjoying the holiday. Radio and television stations were off the air, and it would take 48 – 72 hours to fully mobilize Israeli military forces to counter the attacks in the Golan Heights and across the Sinai (Stein 1999). The source inside Egypt was off by four hours, but Israel did not try and preemptively counter the initial attack (Kissinger 1982; Parker 2001).

On 6 October, the Egyptians and Syrians attacked Israel in a coordinated assault. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal by boats and ferries, and used water cannons, supplied by the Russians, to blow paths through the sand embankments of the Bar Lev line. They systematically reduced the strong points along the defensive line, creating sixty openings in the high sand barriers of the defensive line along the east bank of the canal. Their air defense wreaked havoc among the low flying Israeli aircraft, while new tactics and hand held anti-armor missiles destroyed Israeli armor formations (Parker 2001).

Sadat had been very successful at keeping his plans for a surprise attack secret, even from his former allies. The Soviets found out about the attack five or six days prior, and began evacuating their civilians and dependents. General Kirpitchenko notes he did

not understand why this action was not picked up by Western intelligence. The Israeli intelligence admits they knew of the evacuations, but dismissed them as important (Kirpitchenko 2001). An intelligence review of Egypt and Syrian military maneuvers by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the week before war broke out confirmed the moves as routine military maneuvers. Israeli intelligence had much the same assessment. This proved to be a total intelligence failure, particularly since the Soviets had begun evacuating their civilians from Egypt and Syria a couple of days prior to the start of the war, and this action was missed or misinterpreted by intelligence agencies (Kissinger 1982).

In an after dinner speech, former Defense Secretary Schlesinger noted that “most so called failures, if the events are knowable at all, reflect political mind-sets or political axioms which make political leaders almost impervious to intelligence” (Schlesinger 2001, 153). Kissinger had lunch with a group of Arab ministers on 5 October in New York, where they were attending the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. During the lunch, Kissinger stated he would be working on a new Middle East peace initiative after the end of October, and the pending Israeli elections. He referred to UN Security Council Resolution 242, but the Egyptian representative and others present did not believe he understood the contents of the resolution, calling his comments, “grandiose simplicity” (Stein 1999, 71).

The US had all the information necessary to understand the situation in the Middle East. It had information on the coming war, and information on the coming oil embargo. King Feisal had sent several letters of concern about US support for Israel, along with hints about using oil as a weapon. The US had also received warnings about Sadat’s

intentions from other known sources. These were also disregarded. The common myth among the Israeli's was the Arabs needed air superiority before they would attack, and by tracking aircraft purchases from Russia, they believed that requirement had not been met (Schlesinger 2001).

Kissinger (1982) viewed the outbreak of the war as a way to begin implementing his strategy of moving peace forward. As part of this strategy, he outlined three key points that he believed were necessary:

- 1) Israel could not be allowed to lose – or to win too big a victory.
- 2) The Soviets must not be allowed to play a decisive role in the post conflict negotiations.
- 3) The US had to be seen as not taking sides, and not participating in the conflict.

The timing of the start of the 1973 conflict could not have been worse for the Nixon administration. Facing corruption charges, Vice-President Spiro Agnew had resigned on 10 October. The Watergate burglary investigation was continuing, and Nixon was in court arguing executive privilege to protect the secret tapes made of conversations in the White House. This situation led to Kissinger being in almost total control of the Middle East situation, to include chairing an emergency NSC meeting that would lead to an increase in American war readiness due to threats by Soviet leaders.

On 7 October, Nixon sent Soviet Premier Brezhnev a letter urging mutual restraint and asking for assistance in arranging a cease fire. Brezhnev liked the idea of a joint request; especially since Assad had told the Soviet ambassador he would be

contacting him soon after the initiation of hostilities to begin working a cease fire. Assad understood the limitations of his army, and had limited goals of recapturing lost territory in mind. Although the Syrians were interested in an immediate cease-fire, the Egyptians were not. Later Sadat would profess to having limited goals as well, but at the time of the first cease-fire attempt they were enjoying considerable battlefield success (Kissinger 1982; Quandt 2005; Parker 2001). However, this battlefield success was going to be short-lived.

By 18 October, the Egyptians and Soviets were calling for a cease-fire. Israel rejected this request because they were enjoying considerable success, and were continuing to advance across the Sinai into Egypt. Kissinger had sent a message to the Israeli ambassador urging them to speed up their military actions because he has determined the UN will soon take action to bring about a cease-fire. Kissinger also wanted to delay discussion about a cease-fire at the UN to allow Israel time to complete their planned military actions, although he later admits he was not sure what they hoped to accomplish. After their initial military setbacks, Kissinger wanted Israel to be in a better bargaining position for the post conflict talks. He wanted to Arabs to be defeated, but not humiliated, and he wanted the Soviets to be pushed out of the Middle East. However, events were moving quickly. Later that evening, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin called Kissinger with a recommendation for the wording of a cease-fire. His three part proposal recommended an immediate cease fire in place, followed by an Israeli withdrawal to the UNSC Resolution 242 borders, to be followed by appropriate consultations by Egypt, Syria, Israel, the US, and the USSR to help find a just peace

(Kissinger 1982). The formal cease-fire was not agreed to by both Syria and Egypt until 22 October, fully seventeen days after the start of hostilities.

Against the backdrop of war in the Middle East, and Kissinger's strategy for peace was the ever-present Watergate investigations. The Nixon office tapes were moving through the courts, and a campaign aid had just plead guilty to organizing dirty tricks during the 1972 presidential campaign. John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, had been indicted for obstruction of justice, and the Vice President, Spiro Agnew, had resigned on 10 October 1973 (Kissinger 1982). Although this created a lot of stress for the White House working to reduce the tensions in the Middle East, this allowed Kissinger an almost free hand in working his strategy for peace. Kissinger's strategy for the US in the Middle East was to ensure the survival of Israel, and to split the Arabs from the USSR. However, the situation was going to get much worse before it got better.

4.6.1 The US airlift

Since 1967, the US had been Israel's main military trading partner, and the Pentagon believed they understood how much equipment and supplies Israel had. The belief inside the Pentagon was that Israel had enough supplies and equipment to sustain a three to four week fight. They also believed it would not take that long for Israel to be victorious over her Arab enemies. The US did not want to be seen actively supporting Israel in their fight, and was counting on Israel's ability to defeat the Arabs without resupply from the US. However, it did not take long for the Israeli's to realize they would need to increase the pace of resupply for military stocks already ordered

from the US. On 6 October, they made their first request to increase the speed of delivery on items that had already been ordered, or agreed to. They also requested an increase for air – to – air sidewinder missiles for use against Egyptian and Syrian aircraft. This immediate resupply was agreed to, and began on 7 October using El-Al aircraft in keeping with Kissinger's strategy of not being seen as supporting either side. However, this arrangement would soon change.

Over the course of 7 and 8 October, events on the ground in the Sinai and the Golan Heights seemed to be going the way they were expected to go, and Kissinger and Nixon were discussing how to move the peace process forward. They expected the Israelis to be victorious, and were discussing ways to overcome Israeli intransigence that would follow their most recent victory. However, early in the morning on 9 October, Kissinger received an emergency call from Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz. Israel was requesting an immediate emergency resupply of aircraft, armor, and ammunition to replace unexpectedly large losses. This request would throw the measured thinking in Washington about the situation on the ground in the Middle East into turmoil (Kissinger 1987).

On 9 October, Israel had notified the US ambassador that ammunition and other supplies were running low. They had underestimated the rates of fire for artillery and other systems, in addition to the battlefield losses of tanks, aircraft, and other equipment. In order to stop the simultaneous attacks by Egyptian and Syrian forces, the Israeli's had to expend far greater quantities of all types of ammunition than planned. Coupled with extreme losses in personnel, tanks, artillery, and aircraft; Israel was facing an existential threat to their survival (Boyne 2002). They estimated to be in dire straits

within days. However, there was considerable disagreement among senior US officials about the seriousness of the Israeli request. CIA Director Colby did not believe the emergency was as bad as the Israeli's were saying. He saw it as a negotiating position for post conflict support. After Kissinger met with President Nixon, all resupply requests were approved. Nixon agreed that Israel could not be allowed to lose. Ambassador Dinitz was notified of the US decisions, and it was agreed that resupply had to be either by El-Al aircraft, or commercial contracted aircraft so that the US would not been seen as taking part in the fight. However, the small quantities of available El-Al aircraft made that option unrealistic. It was determined that commercial aircraft had to be chartered. This would quickly lead to a controversial decision by President Nixon (Kissinger 1987).

Later in the evening on 9 October, Kissinger called Dinitz and told him he had talked with Schlesinger and that Dinitz could go ahead with resupply. He added that a situation was developing in which it would be very hard for the United States to resist a cease-fire in place proposal being presented at the United Nations. Therefore, they needed to be aware in Jerusalem of how the tactical situation was developing. The United States could drag it out, but there was a limit to what could be done. (Kissinger 2003, 154–155). The Syrian advance had been halted first, as Israel's strategy was to use the breadth and depth of the Sinai to delay the Egyptian attack. The immediate threat came from the north, especially if Syria was successful in capturing the Golan Heights. The Israeli's counterattacked into the Golan, stopping Syria's advance. The Golan was the priority because of the proximity to Israeli population centers. Beginning 11 October, Israel began withdrawing forces from the north and moving them to the Sinai to counter Egyptian advances. During this period, the US, the Soviets, and the UN

had been working on the language of a cease-fire, and the thought was the war was near to conclusion (Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005). On October 12 – 13, Israeli commandos destroyed a bridge one hundred miles north of Damascus, cutting off 16,000 Iraqi infantry, and 250 tanks enroute to the Golan to join the fight against Israel (Stein 1999, 77). Along the Jordanian border, there had been virtually no fighting.

In a message to Israeli Prime Minister Meir on 11 October, King Hussein stated that Jordan was in an impossible position. He refused to commit his armed forces to a senseless war against Israel, but, on the other hand, if Jordan did not participate in some form, it would be isolated in the Arab world. Thus, “with a heavy heart,” he had found a third alternative, which was to send a relatively small force into Syria to an area adjacent to Jordan’s frontiers with Syria. This would not affect the outcome of the fighting there and would give Jordan the political cover it needed for remaining outside of the present conflict. Hussein emphasized that, most importantly, it would prevent Jordan and Israel from going to war against each other. In an 8:10 p.m. telephone conversation with Dinitz on October 11, Kissinger told the Ambassador that Hussein, who was under enormous pressure, wanted to move a brigade into Syria “out of harm’s way.” He said the Jordanians did not care what the Israelis did against Egyptian or Syrian forces, but wanted to make sure that Israeli forces did not attack them. Dinitz asked if this was an infantry brigade, to which Kissinger replied that it was an armored brigade. Dinitz asked if they would fight or just stand there, and the Secretary responded that they would just stand there. The Ambassador said he would have to pass this on to his government (Kissinger 2003, 190). In a follow up telegram, Ambassador Brown reported that the Jordanians had replied to Assad and Sadat that

they could not afford to send a division. They were planning to send a brigade, which they wanted to station on the left flank of the Golan. This would be the easiest place from which they could get back to Jordan, and it would keep them out of direct contact with Israeli forces (AmEmbassy Amman 5436, 11 OCT 67). Israel sent an unofficial note to King Hussein saying in essence, if you will let us know the location of your brigade in Syria, and assure us they have no intention of firing on Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the IDF would not fire on them (Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 618, NARA).

Although the Pentagon did not believe the need for resupply was an emergency, Kissinger directed they begin the necessary initial planning to replace losses of equipment and supplies. Kissinger and the White House were still concerned about using American assets to move equipment or supplies into Israel as they did not want to be seen openly supporting Israel. This changed with the discovery the Soviets had begun resupplying Egypt with large quantities of supplies and equipment (Quandt 2005). Beginning 10 October, the Russians initiated a large scale airlift of military equipment and supplies into Egypt and Syria to help make-up some of the losses they had suffered on the battlefield. By 13 October, the Soviets were beginning a major resupply effort to both Egypt and Syria to replace battles losses of military equipment. Monitoring the effort, the US noted there were sixty-seven flights by Soviet resupply aircraft into Egypt and Syria on that one day (Kissinger 1987, 512). This coincided with the arrival of the first of the El-Al aircraft bringing replacement supplies from the US for Israel. It was quickly apparent the few El-Al aircraft in the Israeli fleet would not be enough to deliver the supplies needed. The need for more airlift support, and the desire from the US for the Israeli's to accept a cease fire, opened the door for a

misunderstanding of US intentions. Critics of the initial stages of the airlift accuse the US, and Kissinger in particular, for slowing the delivery of military supplies and equipment in an effort to force the Israeli's into accepting the cease fire (Boyne 2002; Quandt 2005). However, both Kissinger and Defense Secretary Schlesinger disagreed with that assessment.

The problem was finding sufficient commercial aircraft that could be contracted to support the airlift. All of the commercial carriers contacted refused to voluntarily contract to support one side or the other in the conflict as they believed they would be shut out of future business in the Middle East. The Department of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, Claude Brinegar had so far been unable to pressure the major airlines into providing charter aircraft. The airlines response was for the Secretary to call up the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and this would require the support of the major airlines. However, to do so entailed invoking a national emergency, and this would have tipped the hand the US was trying to conceal. Secretary Schlesinger contacted Kissinger and the White House to relay the lack of charter aircraft, and told them if resupply to Israel was to take place, that US Air Force aircraft were going to be required to conduct the delivery. Upon hearing of the problems getting commercial charter aircraft, President Nixon noted in his memoirs that he turned to Kissinger as said, "Goddamn it, use every one we have. Tell them to send everything that can fly" (Reich 2001, 164). Although both men agree that no delay was purposely imposed, it took Prime Minister Golda Meir to contact the president to break through the impasse.

On 13 October, Meir contacted President Nixon, and personally requested his assistance in getting the emergency resupply to Israel underway. Not only did Israel

have significant losses that needed to be replaced, they also hinted that defeat was possible. Although Nixon was aware of the dangers of being seen to directly support Israel in their war with the Arabs, he directed Kissinger to provide all requested and required support to Israel immediately. He also directed the use of US military assets due to the seriousness of the emergency. Part of the hesitancy of using US assets to openly support Israel had been the veiled threats by the Middle East oil producing countries of the threat of using oil as a weapon if the US openly sided with Israel (Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005). Although the US received less than twelve percent of her oil imports from the Middle East, Europe and Japan would be significantly impacted if there were an interruption in Middle East oil. After it was determined that US Air Force C-5 aircraft would be used for the resupply effort, Secretary Schlesinger directed they be scheduled to arrive at night so they would not be so apparent. While there was general concern about our relations with Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia; US relations with European and NATO allies were tenuous as not all of who supported our Israeli policies. Afraid of what an oil boycott might do to their economies, France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Spain would not support the US effort in the Middle East (Boyne 2002, Kissinger 1987).

Codenamed Operation Nickel Grass, the US airlift in to Israel began on 14 October, and continued for thirty-two days. It was able to deliver 22,300 tons of military supplies and equipment, including nineteen M60 main battle tanks. Significant quantities of ammunition of other materials were also supplied by sea from supply stocks in Europe (Boyne 2002; Parker 2001). The Department of Defense had found it impossible to contract for commercial aircraft to carry supplies in to Israel, and in order to meet the

growing crisis, USAF aircraft were required to be used. Delays due to the unavailability of aircraft would fuel speculation the resupply operations was delayed to try and get Israel to agree to cease fire proposals. The USAF effort to resupply Israel during darkness would mean picking up supplies from inside the US, or at prearranged locations in Europe to allow for an arrival during darkness. One of the pickup points was a Portuguese airfield in the Azores, and unfortunately, the weather did not cooperate. Delays landing and taking off from the airfield required the first USAF C-5 to land during daylight. Approval to use the USAF aircraft was received, but several delays were encountered at the Lajes Air Force Base in Portugal. That was not the only problem with using Lajes Air Force Base. There had been a diplomatic oversight in requesting landing permission from the Portuguese government. Although Secretary Schlesinger had requested the State Department work the landing permits, they had not acted on the request quickly enough, and it took President Nixon to contact the Portuguese Prime Minister directly to request permission (SecState 203571, 13 October 1973). The President transmitted a personal letter to Portuguese Prime Minister Caetano stating that the United States needed Portugal's cooperation to support ending hostilities and bring a durable peace to the Middle East. He noted that if Portugal were threatened by terrorism or an oil boycott as a result of its help, the United States would be willing to consult on what steps they could jointly take. Nixon warned Caetano "in all frankness" that if the U.S. Government were forced to look to alternative routes due to Portugal's failure to help at this critical time, the United States would be forced to adopt measures that could not but hurt their relationship. In a return message, Prime Minister Caetano agreed to provide transit support for USAF aircraft, relying on the word of the US

President that his country would not remain defenseless should his assistance bring his country problems (SecState 203651, 13 October 1973). Ambassador Themido emphasized that allowing the United States use of Lajes as a transit point in the resupply operation for Israel was the largest risk in their history and had only been agreed upon in response to President Nixon's direct appeal to Prime Minister Caetano. Themido also stressed that the Portuguese were going to expect "greater understanding and more friendly attitude on part of the United States," including shipments of surface-to-air missiles (AmEmbassy Lisbon 3782, 13 October 1973).

The original plan had been to time the arrival of the USAF C-5 aircraft to arrive and be offloaded during the night in Tel Aviv, and to take off before daylight. This would have continued the ruse the US was not directly involved. With the delay in landing in Lajes, the first C-5 aircraft landed in Tel Aviv on 14 October during daylight hours, and was soon being broadcast around the Middle East on television news channels (Kissinger 1987; Parker 2001). Kissinger telephoned Dinitz and informed him that the United States was going to fly three C-5's that day through the US base in Portugal and fly at least three of the C-141's that were already in the Azores to Israel. He also told Dinitz the number of Phantoms that would be supplied had been increased to fourteen, and these would be in Israel by the night of October 15. The Secretary then asked Dinitz to tell his Congressional critics like Senator Henry Jackson, who was threatening an investigation of Kissinger's crisis management, what was going on. He emphasized that the administration's whole foreign policy position depended on its not being represented as having "screwed up" in a crisis. Dinitz said he would call Jackson and

explain what the situation was, adding that he had told the Senator three days earlier that Israel had never had a better friend than Kissinger (Kissinger 2003, 227-228).

In Israel, Ambassador Keating reported that the Defense Attaché' had received an extensive IDF briefing that day regarding Israel's urgent need for a quick, large-scale resupply of aircraft and armor. The Ambassador said he knew the United States had already begun to resupply some categories of weapons, ammo, and planes, but he did not have any feel for current U.S. Government views on such a large-scale resupply of aircraft or tanks. He noted that most Arabs were already thinking the worst of the United States in this respect, so they were already damned to some extent even if they did not do anything. He added that based on all the available information, if the U.S. Government believed that Israel was likely to be in serious military trouble, he recommended without qualification that the United States be responsive on an urgent basis to the latest Israeli Government request. (AmEmbassy Tel Aviv 8040, 13 October 1973).

By 15 October, the US was admitting to the world they were resupplying Israel with military equipment and supplies, although by 14 October, the war was essentially over. The last large attack made by Egypt to retake the Mitla and Giddi passes had failed, and the Egyptians had lost a considerable amount of tanks and men. Egypt was at last ready to accept a cease-fire, but the Israelis were not (Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005). However, as the US was about to find out, this was only one of the problems facing them. Ominously, the ministers of the oil producing countries met in Kuwait the next day, and Kissinger suspected oil production cuts may have been discussed.

At the 16 October Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) meeting, Kissinger pressed for a large aid bill for Israel. The intent was to show the Soviets that the US continued to support Israel, and was part of Kissinger's belief that a militarily strong Israel would bring the Arab countries to the negotiating table. Although the oil producing countries had threatened some type of oil production cut-back, Kissinger felt the danger of that now was minimal (Quandt 2005), although the letter he received from Saudi King Feisal did give him some worry. When the US had determined to provide military airlift support to Israel, Kissinger had taken the step of notifying King Feisal in Saudi Arabia so he might have an opportunity to explain this decision and to mitigate the damaging fallout. It was to this event the King was responding (Kissinger 1987). As part of trying to maintain communications in the Arab world, Kissinger had sent a letter to King Feisal notifying him of the US effort in the airlift, and offering an explanation of why this was seen as necessary by the US. He asked the King for his understanding of the need to keep Israel from being overrun by Egypt and Syria. He also sent a letter to the Shah of Iran outlining the airlift and the need to help Israel. The Shah responded to Kissinger letter with a show of support, and saying he had long advocated for a reduction in the Soviet presence in the Middle East. When King Feisal responded, he was not as supportive (Kissinger 1987).

By the afternoon of 16 October, the tide of battle had turned in the Sinai, and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had advanced deep into the Sinai, and crossed the Suez Canal in several locations. They had destroyed numerous surface to air (SAM) missile sites, and this allowed Israeli aircraft to fly into the Sinai in support of the ground forces. The Egyptian Third Army was in imminent danger, and was trapped on the East side of

the canal, just south of the Great Bitters Lake. Although IDF forces were continuing to advance across the Suez, surrounding the Third Army would have lasting consequences for both sides at the end of hostilities.

During the concluding stages of the battle in the Sinai, the Israeli army had managed to cross the Suez canal near a town called Deversoir, and get in between the Egyptian Third Army and safety. The Egyptians were trapped on the east side of the canal, and could not cross back to the west and safety. They were essentially surrounded by the IDF, and the negotiated cease-fire meant all forces were to remain in place, ensuring they would remain trapped until there was a negotiated settlement. By 17 October, it was clear the conflict between Egypt and Israel was almost complete. To the North, the Syrians had been pushed back across their borders and were being held in place by Israeli forces. In the Sinai, Egyptian forces were mostly back across the Suez, or in the case of the Third Army, were surrounded. After a seemingly successful meeting in Washington with Arab ministers from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, and Kuwait, Kissinger had thought the threat of an oil embargo seemed unlikely. However, wrapping up a meeting in Kuwait, the oil ministers of OPEC announced a seventy percent price increase in the cost per barrel of oil, and a five percent cutback in production, compounding each month that the Israeli's did not withdraw to the pre-1967 border lines. This action took Kissinger by complete surprise (1987, 537).

In his letter to Kissinger, the King noted that he was pained by the US decision to openly support Israel. King Feisal had already determined to support Egypt and Syria in their fight with Israel, although not with soldiers, but with money and diplomacy. He had given his word to Sadat that he would support him, and had promised to use oil as a

weapon of diplomacy. His opening comments to Kissinger were meant to relay his concerns about US support for Israel. The King again noted that Israel should withdraw from all occupied Arab lands, and that the US should stop supporting them; otherwise, the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia would become lukewarm (Quandt 2005). The question of Arab reaction to the airlift had been a major factor in Kissinger's desire to keep the US from being seen as actively participating in the conflict. Using Israeli El-Al aircraft with their identification markings covered had allowed the US to support some of the Israeli resupply requests without much press coverage. At the Special Actions Group meeting that day, it was determined that an emergency delivery of equipment and ammunition would be made by US Air Force C-5 aircraft direct to Israel. It was further agreed that fourteen F-4 aircraft requested by Israel would be delivered at the same time. Kissinger was planning to request the UN Security Council take up the issue of a cease-fire, but warned his deputy national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft to be prepared to increase the size and speed of resupply if no cease-fire recommendation was approved.

Trying to stave off adverse Arab reaction, Kissinger hosted a meeting of four Arab ministers. He explained that the US was working hard toward a cease-fire, and would shortly undertake significant diplomatic efforts to bring about peace in the Middle East. He also told the ministers the US was working on the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 242. Kissinger felt fairly confident after the meeting that the ministers would return to their countries and work to avert an oil embargo. What he did not know is that while he was meeting with the ministers in Washington, the oil ministers in Kuwait had agreed to an oil production cut of five percent per month until Israel withdrew to the pre-

1967 territories, thus giving up all occupied Arab lands. On 19 October, after the president submitted a request for 2.2 billion dollars for military aid, King Feisal announced an embargo of oil products to the United States and the Netherlands, as well as an additional five percent cutback in oil production for global markets (Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005).

While Kissinger was occupied with the impending oil embargo, Egypt had committed another armored division across the Suez Canal in the Sinai region. This made the resupply effort all the more critical. Although Kissinger had tried to keep the US effort low key and out of the eye of the press so as not to incur Arab criticism, he determined the need to ensure the survival of Israel was paramount. The only relief was that Moscow had not yet introduced a UN resolution condemning Israel and demanding they return to the pre-1967 borders as they had in the past. Kissinger feared this would reveal the hand of the US in supporting Israel during the present conflict.

When King Feisal responded on 16 October, he said he was deeply sorrowful at the actions of the US in supporting Israel. He wanted an end to the airlift, and said that US and Saudi relations would become “lukewarm” if the US did not accede to his requests (Kissinger 1987, 528). The Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Ibrahim Masuud called a meeting of the European Community Ambassadors and advised them to pressure the US into changing their policy of support for Israel. At this meeting he threatened to use the oil weapon of production cutbacks and embargoes if they did not support Saudi Arabia’s request. After receiving the King’s letter, Kissinger sent a note to Egypt asking if they would agree to a cease fire.

Both State and Defense would later criticize each other over the slow start to the airlift. State complained Defense was dragging their feet, while Defense claimed State was incompetent for not requesting permission to use Lajes Air Force Base in Portugal. Ambassador Reich notes that what was clear is that it took Presidential action to get the airlift underway. Although this effort would ramp up very quickly, Nicholas Veliotes, who was stationed at the US Embassy in Tel Aviv as the Deputy Chief of Mission is not sure of the real significance of the airlift effort. Although the airlift was conducted over a period of thirty-two days, he believed the quantities of supplies were minimal compared to the effort (Reich 2001, 164). Numerous Israeli military and diplomatic personnel as well as many USAF military planners have disputed Veliotes comments. The crisis Israel found herself in regarding ammunition required that pallets of ammunition off-loaded from USAF aircraft were moved straight to the battlefield. In some cases the shells were still cool from the flight when they were loaded into hot artillery breaches (Boyne 2002, 4). During conversations with the WASG, it seems that DOD had initially dragged their feet on getting the resupply operation going. Kissinger asked Schlesinger why he had not put pressure on the airlines to provide charters, and Schlesinger did not have any reasons, except to say he did not know it was a crisis. Even General Muhammad el-Gamasy, Egyptian Director of Operations noted, “The United States positive response was a life-giving artery to Israel...without the direct and flagrant assistance from the United States, Israel would not have been able to mark the success of the last phase of the war (Reich 2001, 164).

Both sides during this period had explored the idea of a cease-fire, with limited results. When Kissinger had first discussed a cease-fire, Egypt was making progress in

their fight with the Israelis, and were not interested. After the battle at the Mitla and Giddi passes, Egypt was interested in a cease-fire, but the Israelis were not. In order to speed the peace process, Kissinger was requested to come to Moscow for emergency meetings on getting a cease-fire in place. Moscow's client, Egypt, is in a crisis. The Israelis have crossed the Suez, and surrounded their Third Army on the eastern side of the Canal. Israel was continuing to gain territory and solidify their gains. Kissinger sees the talks with Moscow as useful as it will allow several more days for the Israeli's to continue their military campaign. On 21 October, an initial agreement was reached between the Soviets and the US, and it was very close to the original Soviet proposal, with the exception of any expectation of Israeli withdrawal from territories captured from the Arabs prior to direct peace talks between Israel, Egypt, and Syria. Kissinger knows direct talks are a goal of Israel, as it will underscore their victory in battle as well as a political acknowledgment by the Arabs of the country of Israel. Kissinger also knows the Arabs have been unwilling to agree to direct talks. Due to problems with his aircraft communications system, the text message of the cease-fire being sent to Israel for their agreement was delayed. Kissinger inadvertently started a new crisis when he allowed the Israeli's to continue moving into better positions following the expected time of cease-fire implementation to make up for the time lost in transmission (Kissinger 1987, 569).

After agreeing to the language of the cease-fire in Russia, Kissinger visited Prime Minister Golda Meir to discuss the agreement, and importantly assure her there were no secret codicils that would negatively impact Israel. During his discussions, Kissinger apologized for the delay in transmitting the cease-fire language for review by the Prime

Minister and cabinet. This delay cost the cabinet valuable review time prior to the agreed implementation time by the UN. Kissinger mentioned that he would understand if there were a few hours slippage in the Israeli's implementation of the cease-fire in order to make up for the delay in transmitting the details of the cease-fire agreement (Kissinger 1987). Kissinger admitted he may have inadvertently green-lighted the continued IDF moves to completely surround the Egyptian Third Army. Others have opined he did this on purpose, or certainly more purposefully than he is willing to admit. It is at this delicate time in Middle East negotiations that the Watergate crisis was set to explode. The Friday night massacre involving the firing of the Special Prosecutor investigating the President, and the resignations in protest of the Attorney General and his Assistant Attorney General takes place. The continued investigations in Washington of the President have placed enormous pressure on the White House, consequently leaving a free hand for Kissinger in his Middle East strategy.

Although Israel had been attacked first, there was significant diplomatic pressure on them to release the surrounded Egyptian Third Army. The crisis of the Third Army intensified as the IDF cut all roads leading from Egypt to the force, completely surrounding them, leaving them cut off from all resupply and medical operations from outside their containment area. The Egyptians and the Russians sent notes to the White House and Kissinger requesting their help in keeping the IDF from destroying the Third Army. Kissinger did not want the Egyptian Army destroyed either, as he believed if Sadat and the Arabs were humiliated, there would never be peace in the Middle East. Because of his vocal stance, some in the Israeli parliament accused him of siding with

the Egyptians. Through Ambassador Dinitz, Golda also intimates they will spare the surrounded Third Army (Kissinger 187).

By 27 October, both Israel and Egyptian diplomats had agreed to military talks aimed at disengagement and relief for the cutoff Egyptian army. Efforts to improve their situation were proving difficult, with constant accusations of cease-fire violations by both sides. Kissinger kept up a string of messages to both Sadat and Meir trying to calm tensions so there would not be a re-emergence of fighting. His goal was to keep Israel from destroying the Third Army and humiliating the Arabs. For his part, Sadat had not been able to provide any resupply to the trapped army, and wanted the US to pressure Israel to allow food, water, and medical aid into the beleaguered soldiers. Kissinger was forced to have a showdown with the Israeli ambassador, and tell him that Israel would not be allowed to destroy the trapped Army. He also told them the IDF must allow non-military aid to be provided to the surrounded forces. He told Dinitz that failure to agree to the US request would require further UN efforts to force the resupply. Israel tentatively agreed to provide non-military aid, and Sadat requested that negotiations on how best to resupply the force begin at the two star general officer level, between soldiers (Kissinger 1987, 609). These talks would become known as the Kilometer 101 talks, located on the Cairo – Suez highway, and had the effect of cooling diplomatic tensions almost immediately. On 29 October, the first of many convoys carrying non-military aid was allowed into the perimeter of the surrounded Third Army.

Although these talks were initially thought to be limited in scope and duration, they began to make enough progress that the cease-fire became more stabilized, and by 30 October, non-military supplies were able to reach the trapped Egyptian army

(Quandt 2005). Kissinger met with Egyptian President Sadat, for the first time, on 7 November. When Kissinger had met with Israeli Prime Minister Meir in Washington before his trip, she had been adamant there would be no pull back for Israeli forces until certain conditions had been met. When Kissinger met with Sadat, he was afraid Sadat would demand conditions the Israeli's would not grant. He was surprised when Sadat turned out more flexible, particularly with regards to earlier demands the Israeli's withdraw far enough to allow for the escape of the Egyptian Third Army (Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005). This early cooperation by Sadat allowed for an initial six-point agreement to be signed by military representatives at Kilometer 101. This agreement began the long process of disengagement, and allowed for a more permanent resupply arrangement for the Third Army until negotiations could allow for their release.

Israeli General Yariv and Egyptian General el-Gamasy agreed to a six-point plan for disengagement on 11 November 1973. It contained the following points (Stein 1999, 108);

- 1) Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the Security Council.
- 2) Both sides agree that discussion between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22 position in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations.
- 3) The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water, and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.

- 4) There will be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East bank.
- 5) The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo – Suez road will be replaced by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers can participate with the UN to supervise the nonmilitary nature of the cargo at the bank of the canal.
- 6) As soon as the UN checkpoints are established on the Cairo – Suez road, there will be an exchange of all prisoners-of-war, including wounded.

On 28 November, General Yariv informed General el-Gamasy he would no longer be able to hold talks. Kissinger had asked his government to cease further peace talks pending their renewal in Geneva. Kissinger did not want either side to give away everything in the early negotiations that could be better managed in Geneva.

Sadat was anxious that his army not be destroyed, and concerned about their stockage of medical supplies, food and water. In order to protect them, Sadat was requesting the US and Russia send observers to ensure the Israelis did not violate the cease fire and attack them. Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss Sadat's request, and initial planning for a peace conference. They agreed that no forces would be sent to observe the cease fire, and agreed on Geneva as the location for peace talks. Although there was a significant crisis brewing, neither side sensed it (Quandt 121).

Although there had already been several tense moments for the US during the 1973 War, the crisis that quickly formed on 24 October had begun innocently enough with a charge the Israelis were violating the cease fire. The dynamics turned very

quickly when Sadat made a request for US and Russian forces to help observe the cease fire, which they had repeatedly accused the Israelis of violating. The Russians had initially been acquiescent to US requests that no forces be sent, either Russian or US, into the conflict area, as this could inflame an already tense situation. This changed in the early evening when Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin notified Secretary Kissinger that the Russians would support Sadat's request for observers, and added ominously that if the US did not want to support the effort, the Soviets were prepared to respond unilaterally. Kissinger knew the Russians had been much more active during the conflict than they had let on. The Soviets had been trying to get the Jordanians and the Algerians to join in the fight against Israel. Appeals to the King had been made by the Soviet embassy, and a direct appeal to President Houari Boumedienne had been made by the Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (Kissinger 1987, 494). King Hussein had successfully resisted Arab pressures to join the fight, even resisting Saudi King Feisal's request that a Saudi brigade stationed in Jordan be allowed to cross their border to join the fight.

To Kissinger, this was an open challenge to the role of the US in the Middle East, and he believed would dramatically increase the danger of superpower conflict. Nixon and Kissinger were both in agreement on the danger of two nuclear powers engaged in conflict in the Middle Ease. There is still some questions on what happened next, but Kissinger was about to dramatically increase the nuclear readiness of the US in response.

4.6.2 The DEFCON III Alert

Although there was an agreed cease fire in place since 22 October, both sides had been accused by the other of cease fire violations. Kissinger believed he might have been the cause for the slowness of the Israeli implementation of the cease-fire due to poor communications relay from his aircraft in Moscow. The agreement in Moscow that was agreed to by Sadat and Meir became UNSC Resolution 338. It reaffirmed the conditions of UNSC 242, and required a cease-fire in place. On 23 October, UNSC Resolution 339 was put into effect due to the continuing cease-fire violations. To try to break the cycle of cease-fire violations, Sadat made a request to the UN for a joint US-USSR contingent of military troops to help enforce the agreement. This sets of alarm bells in the White House as both Nixon and Kissinger were concerned this could lead to the very superpower confrontation they had worked to avoid. For their part, the Soviets are concerned about a confrontation as well, and explore the idea of a veto with the US of this request. This allowed a face saving measure for the UN Security Council president to issue a call that the cease-fire be honored. Kissinger believed this to be the end of the matter, and directed the Near Eastern Asia bureau to draft a working paper on cease-fire procedures. However, this new crisis was just beginning, and later on the evening of 24 October, Kissinger received a message the Soviets had decided to support Sadat's call for Russian troops to help monitor the cease-fire. The crisis heated up very quickly with a letter from Soviet Premier Brezhnev to Nixon that was read to Kissinger by Ambassador Dobrynin. The USSR was asking the US to send troops for a joint military force to enforce the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel. The Premier went on to say that, he hoped the US would participate, but the USSR was prepared to act

unilaterally if the US would not. To Kissinger, this was seen as a precursor to a superpower confrontation that could not go unchallenged. The US could not allow a Russian military force into the Middle East (Kissinger 1987, 584).

On 24 October, Sadat had requested both the US and USSR provide military observers to help enforce the cease-fire. At first, both agreed they would not provide military observers. However, later that evening Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin notified Kissinger they would provide support to Sadat. A letter being sent from Premier Brezhnev (Kissinger 1987, 583; Reich 2001, 165) to the White House was read to Kissinger that said;

Let us together, the USSR and the United States, urgently dispatch to Egypt the Soviet and American military contingents to ensure the implementation of the decision of the Security Council of October 22 and 23 concerning the cessation of fire and of all military activities and also of our understanding with you on the guarantee of the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council.

It is necessary to adhere without delay. I will say is straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this manner, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel.

Kissinger called a meeting of the National Security Council. Sending a contingent of military observers was not what Kissinger had in mind, especially Soviet military. His plan was to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East, and their plan would only invite them back in. Nixon had already gone to bed, and did not attend the meeting. When Kissinger asked the president's chief of staff Alexander Haig to wake Nixon, he refused. Ominously, it had been reported the Soviet airlift of supplies into Egypt had stopped, and Kissinger saw this as a sign the Soviets were reconfiguring their transport aircraft to

be capable of ferrying troops into Egypt and Syria. There was also a contingent of Soviet ships, numbering almost eighty-five, in the Mediterranean, with an amphibious flotilla enroute to the port of Alexandria. Kissinger called for a late night meeting of the WSAG to meet at the White House situation room, where he hosted the meeting as the National Security Advisor. At 2330, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alerted all US forces to increase their readiness posture from Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) IV to DEFCON III. This action was intended to signal the Russians the seriousness of their intended actions. At midnight, the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina was alerted for possible movement. The naval aircraft carriers Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy were ordered to join the carrier Independence in the Mediterranean (Kissinger 1987, 589).

Kissinger (Kissinger 1987, 591; Reich 2001, 166) sent a note in response to Premier Brezhnev's letter which rejected all Soviet demands, and noted the US would not accept unilateral action by the USSR in the Middle East. Ominously, Kissinger wrote;

This would be a violation of our understanding of the agreed principles we signed in Moscow in 1972 and of Article II of the agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War. As I stated above, such action would produce incalculable consequences which would be in the interest of neither of our countries and would end all we have striven so hard to achieve.

A similar message was sent to Sadat.

The Soviets were surprised by the aggressiveness of the tone of the letter. Brezhnev had added the line about unilateral action, but had only meant it as a reinforcement of the joint request (Reich 2001), not to create a new crisis. General

Kirpitchenko, the Cairo KGB Station Chief noted that no preparations had been made to move Soviet troops in to the regions. Responding to the US reply, Brezhnev clarified his comments to stress the joint partnership he was asking for, and the crisis quickly abated. However, the US was criticized by what many saw as an overreaction by Kissinger.

The crisis was averted when the UNSC agreed to an international observer group that did not include any permanent members of the Security Council. This would automatically exclude participation by the US or USSR. By announcing this decision, the President of the Security Council was able to quickly put the negotiations back in the UN, and reduced the tensions between the US and USSR. There were many who supported the alert, and believed the US would have been justified in going to war to protect their vital interests in Israel (Reich 2001). Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir noted in her speech to the Knesset on 13 November 1973, that quick action by the US had averted a crisis for Israel that may have led to a serious deterioration of the situation in the Sinai (Parker 2001).

Secretary Schlesinger notes there were indications the Soviets were preparing their forces to move into the region, and this influenced the NSC group to raise the DEFCON level of US military forces worldwide. The very strong US response was in part influenced by the Saturday night massacre resulting from the firing of the Special Watergate Prosecutor by President Nixon, and the subsequent resignation of the Attorney General. The fear was the Soviets believed the US was tied down by domestic problems and would be unable to react, allowing them to push their way back into the Middle East. Kissinger had wanted the alert to be kept quiet from everyone except

Russia, but as Schlesinger noted, you cannot put 2.5 million soldiers on alert around the world and not have anyone notice (Schlesinger 2001, 175).

Golan (2001, 184) disputes Schlesinger's comments about the perceived Soviet indicators. She notes the Soviet airborne divisions had an increased alert status since the beginning of the war, and had not changed. The Soviet cargo aircraft had not been recalled for a new mission, they were still providing resupply to Egyptian and Syrian forces. Goodman agrees and notes the intelligence necessary for the alert on 24 October was too ambiguous to make a determination about Soviet intentions (2001, 194). He also notes the requirements of the National Security Act of 1947 as requiring the president or vice-president to run the National Security Council meeting. The vice-president, Spiro Agnew, had recently resigned, and Gerald Ford had not been confirmed as the new vice-president. He believes the meeting may have been conducted with questionable authority. This would be disputed later by Rodman who noted the National Security Act of 1947 is advisory in law, and the President and senior government officials are authorized to conduct meetings as they deem required (Rodman 2001). Secretary Schlesinger commented on the curious nature of the session. The meeting started as a WSAG, then changed to a National Security Council meeting, and was finally listed officially as an NSC rump meeting with the absence of the president.

White House Chief of Staff Haig acted as an intermediary between Kissinger and the President, and left the situation room to confer with the President for 20-30 minutes. When he returned he said the president endorsed the recommendations. Earlier in the evening Haig had refused Kissinger's request to awaken the president so that he could

take part in the meeting. Goodman points out that by changing the readiness posture from DEFCON IV to DEFCON III, diplomatic relations with NATO were damaged. The UK was mad they had not been consulted, and Germany cut back support to US military bases in Germany. Italy and Spain were also unhappy, but were less vocal about what they saw as US mismanagement of the response to the Soviets (Goodman 2001).

While the war was officially ended, disengagement talks between Egypt and Israel would take many more months, and disengagement talks between Syria and Israel would take longer still. The war meant something different to each of the participants. For the US, it solidified the lead role US diplomacy would have in the years to come. The Soviets never tried to play a role in the Middle East on such a grand scale again. Egypt was moving toward the US sphere, and away from the USSR as Kissinger had worked toward.

For the Egyptians, their honor and pride in Egypt and in being Arab had been restored among the people, the Army, and their Arab neighbors. The failures on the battlefield from the 1967 war had been replaced by the successes of the 1973 war. Sadat had shown the invincibility of the Israeli army and air forces were a myth. Sadat had the attention and assistance of the US, with pledges of both military and non-military support. In addition, Egypt had agreed to direct negotiations with Israel.

For the Israeli's, the 1973 war reaffirmed their military strength and resilience. Although the aura of invincibility was gone, they had proven that even when defeat seemed certain, they remained a victorious army and country. Moreover, they were able to attain something they had tried for years to get, and that was the chance for direct

negotiations with Egypt that might allow a separate peace. This was something the Israelis had wanted since the 1947 War of Independence.

4.6.3 Diplomatic Lessons Learned from the October War

The passage of UNSC 340 signaled the end of the 1973 War. The disengagement talks and working to end the oil embargo would take several more months, but the lethal portion of the conflict had concluded. Kissinger had learned some difficult lessons from the war. Namely, a militarily stronger Israel did not lead to stability in the regions, and did not encourage the Arabs to negotiate with Israel. Moreover, although the US and the Russians were exploring the mutual benefits of détente, this did not keep them from supporting their clients against the wishes of the other, almost leading to disastrous consequences. The last big lesson was the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli Defense Force was washed away. Since the 1967 War, the Israelis had been seen as supermen by many nations in the region, and by policy makers in the US. Sadat and Assad had shown the military capability of Arab armies, and this would change their relationship with Israel and the US.

There are two key points noted by Quandt, the first was that crisis periods tend to bring about change in policy very quickly (Quandt 2005, 127). Long held position can and did change very quickly, both during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The second was the primacy of presidential authority in decision making surrounding US foreign policy, particularly during a crisis. This requirement for presidential engagement was seen in both the Johnson administration during the 1967 War, and the Nixon administration during the 1973 War. At the beginning of the conflict, President Nixon

had issued his three tenets concerning the goals of the administration as it related to Israel and the war. He wanted to ensure Israel was not driven to desperation through isolation or a lack of confidence in her survival. He also did not want Sadat to be humiliated. The third was that the US would be the sole superpower in the Middle East, and that Russia's influence would be continually diminished (Quandt 2001, 127).

After this war, unlike after the 1967 War, the US would devote considerable diplomatic attention to trying to resolve the complex issues surrounding the Arab countries in the Middle East. The protracted negotiations over how to separate the military combatants were upcoming, as was the discussion of how to end the oil embargo that was still in place (Bronson 2006; Freedland, Seabury & Wildavsky, 1975; Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005; Sampson 1976). The success of the US diplomatic efforts that followed the October war can be attributed to the strong performance of the US military during the airlift. Rodman notes it was a clear demonstration of the value of being aligned with the US (Rodman 2001). As Kissinger would later comment, "Having failed to bring the war to a conclusion by diplomatic methods, we concluded that the only way to end the war would be to demonstrate to the Soviets and to the Arabs that the war could not be won by military methods" (Kissinger 2001, 344).

Although the war had ended, there were still several seemingly intractable problems remaining. The Egyptian Third Army was still surrounded and cut off from Egypt, the Arab oil embargo was still in place, and the cease fire could collapse at any time. Kissinger believed that administrations in the past had failed with regards to achieving progress in the Arab – Israeli conflict because of the desire for a grand bargain. He determined the best way forward was by using a step by step diplomatic

approach. Although slower, the ability to create areas of limited agreement were deemed greater, and thus could some progress be shown. Kissinger was also determined to reduce and if possible eliminate the Soviet presence and influence in the Middle East. He still believed that many of the problems in the Middle East were traceable to the Russians, and he was determined to keep them out of any meaningful negotiations. For his part, President Sadat was comfortable with this goal, and he believed Egypt path to peace and prosperity lay in their relations with the US. Kissinger determined to get the negotiations started with peace talks in Geneva (Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005).

Kissinger exerted direct personal control over the diplomatic negotiations during and after the war. While the war was underway, Kissinger was already laying the groundwork for the post-conflict negotiations. L Carl Brown notes that Kissinger's modus operandi was to, "ration information carefully even to his own staff" (Brown 2001, 234). Kissinger did not use the embassies or ambassadors in the region to help develop policy choices. Instead, he relied on a few key individual – but kept the negotiations to himself. US Ambassadors rarely had a full picture or understanding of what was going on, even if it directly affected their post (Stein 1999, 31). When Kissinger was conducting his shuttle diplomacy, he kept the discussions to himself, and was the only person with a full understanding of what each side was telling him. This allowed him to relate to each side directly what the other side wanted, and cut out the traditional backchannel communication. As a close aide noted, he was, "about as conspiratorial as the people he was dealing with" (Stein 1999, 32).

The exception was Ambassador Hermann Eilts, who was highly regarded by Kissinger, Sadat, his Egyptian counterparts, and his peers, as an exceptional diplomat. Eilts was a career FSO and had served as the ambassador to Saudi Arabia from January 1966, to July 1970. During the October War, he was on the staff of the US Army War College. Immediately following the cease-fire he was nominated as the new Ambassador to Egypt, and reopened the US embassy in November 1973. He played an instrumental role in maintaining contact between Sadat and Kissinger. Eilts displayed a cultural sensitivity for the politics involved in the negotiations (Stein 1999, 31), and clearly understood Kissinger's three goals, preserve the security of Israel, avoid a unilateral Arab defeat, and avoid a superpower confrontation.

The war destroyed the perception in both Israel and the US that a no war – no peace strategy was a viable policy. Although Israel had enjoyed the relative calm this offered, it belied the tensions that existed in Arab countries (Parker 2001). Stein notes that part of the surprise of the 1973 war was the Egyptian army was much better trained. They had received a very sophisticated air defense system from the Russians, and this countered the lack of air superiority. They had also acquired and trained with new hand – held anti-armor missile systems that would provide very effective against Israeli tanks. Israel lost 200 tanks in the first 24 hours of the war (Stein 1999).

Dinitz noted the Yom Kippur War had the effect of shifting US diplomatic policy. After the 1967 war, diplomatic engagement was minimal. However, during the war Kissinger was laying the strategy for the peace to follow. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy was appreciated for the personal touch it gave to the parties involved. Kissinger was a master of dramatic personal diplomacy. According to Stein, Kissinger inserted himself

into events to ensure American influence in the 1973 war. The re-supply operations, the DEFCON III decision, and the decision to have Golda Meir end the Kilometer 101 talks by withdrawing Major General Yariv from the meetings. Sadat appreciated these efforts because his goal was to involve the US fully in the diplomatic initiatives that were emerging (Stein 1999).

Telhami (2001) notes that Kissinger's diplomatic success during and after the war and embargo have garnered their share of criticism. Kissinger's belief that a militarily strong Israel would be sufficient to maintain peace in the Middle East because Israel would not feel threatened and the Arabs would see the futility of trying to defeat them on the battlefield was too simplistic. When both sides refused to compromise in order to move peace forward, Kissinger had no advantage to use. His step – by – step negotiating methodology, which clearly allowed for smaller but measurable bits of progress to be achieved, did not try to take advantage of the bigger issues that may have brought about a diplomatic breakthrough. He was also accused of not having an overall vision for peace in the region, his methods only buying time instead of a comprehensive peace.

Most Foreign Service Officers do not know much about diplomatic history. It is not taught at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). Part of the learning process is to look back at mistakes or misinterpretations that arise in many situations. Richard Parker had served in the Middle East, and discounted that the Egyptians had crossed the canal in 1973 when he first heard it. His experience serving as the United Arab Republic (UAR) desk officer from 1967-1970, had convinced him the Egyptians were not militarily or politically capable of crossing the canal. He said most of his colleagues in the State

Department believed the same thing. It took a war for them to change their opinions of the Egyptian military, and of Sadat (Parker 2001, 312). Harold Saunders recalls when he was hired to work on the National Security Council staff in 1969. Kissinger had told him he had no experience in the Middle East, and Saunders believes there were several missed opportunities beginning in 1971, due to Kissinger's uncertainty (Saunders 2001). Golan (2001) had worked in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Johnson presidency, and observed that much of what Johnson believed or acted on was sometimes who spoke the loudest or last. She saw it as the lack of rationality in policies that come out of the White House or the State Department.

Ambassador Samuel Lewis comments that domestic politics play a significant role in diplomacy. He called it a straightjacket, and further noted that neither diplomat's nor intelligence operatives want to admit it or talk about the domestic political setting in which decisions are made (Lewis 2001). He further notes that academics who have never served in government service tend to see events from a different angle. Unless they have served in very senior positions, they do not understand that in a moment of crisis, with imperfect information, with a domestic political context, that you cannot explain this with a rational – actor analysis. Scholars have no understanding of how policy can change by events. Looking at the events of the Six Day War and US policy towards Israel, Lewis noted that people made new assumptions, and policy changed. During a staff meeting on 23 October 1973, Kissinger commented on what he saw as European interference. He said the, "Europeans behaved like jackals. Their behavior was a total disgrace. They did everything to egg on the Arabs. They have us no support

"when we needed it" (Record of Secretary Kissinger's Staff Meeting of October 23, 1973).

One of the last lessons may be the level of control Washington may exert during a multi-boundary conflict involving the national interests of the US. In the case of the 1973 war, and indeed the 1967 war, the National Security Advisor and the President played a significant role. The level of personal attention devoted to the crisis by these two positions may push aside even the most experienced ambassador. But what is critical at this point is for the ambassador to continue with the day to day requirements of the embassy, and like Ambassador Eilts, work to be as helpful as possible.

4.7 Disengagement talks and the beginning of shuttle diplomacy

With President Nixon's full support, Kissinger became the chief negotiator for disengagement talks in the Middle East, and superpower talks with the Russians on matters concerning the Middle East. Although he had little to no experience in the Middle East, and did not understand yet the impact oil had on the international economy, he determined to learn much more about both in the coming months (Kissinger 1987). Kissinger would find that he had extraordinary latitude in these matters because of the problems Nixon was continuing to have with the Watergate investigation. Although the president was interested in some foreign policy success, it was more to help sustain support among his crumbling base (Quandt 2005). Kissinger determined that the US would play a more active diplomatic role in working to find peace in the Middle East than had the Johnson administration after the 1967 war, and then they had after the 1970 War of Attrition (Korn 1992; Quandt 2005).

Shuttle diplomacy took Kissinger to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, where talks with King Hussein failed to convince the King to participate in the Geneva peace talks. Hussein was concerned about the growing role and importance of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) remaining on the West Bank. However, the talks between Egypt and Israel were consuming so much effort that Kissinger wanted to put off negotiations between Jordan and the PLO until later (Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005). Hussein was more concerned by the radical PLO than the negotiations between the Egyptians and Israeli's since his rein on the throne had nearly ended due to PLO intrigue and fighting. In Saudi Arabia, Kissinger met with King Feisal in a bid to link the peace process to ending the oil embargo against the US and other Western countries. Kissinger claimed the step-by-step diplomacy he envisioned would take time, and said the embargo hindered the US position. King Feisal did acknowledge the US efforts at ending the conflict, but wanted to link easing the embargo with movement on the Israeli side towards the previous 5 June borders.

Israel and Egypt began exchanging prisoners of war on 15 November 1973, while Israeli General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian General Abd al-Ghany Gamasy continued with disengagement talks at Kilometer 101. Kissinger wanted the bulk of disengagement talks to be held in Geneva, where the pace of the negotiations could be overseen and controlled by the US. He was concerned about the direction of talks at Kilometer 101 between military officers as being short sighted in their goals. He was concerned it would begin to derail the important goals he saw for the Geneva discussions. He was concerned enough that he reminded the Egyptian Foreign Minister that disengagement talks would be the subject of the Geneva peace talks. With the

Israeli's, Kissinger warned them not to give in too quickly to disengagement talks lest they give up the opportunity for longer term gains, and to not look too weak in the eyes of the Arabs. Kissinger believed it was important for the Arabs to believe it had been difficult to bring the Israeli's to the negotiating table, and too much give on their part early on would allow their expectations to increase. The peace conference in Geneva was set for 18 December 1973 (Kissinger 1987).

The Geneva peace conference formally convened on 21 December 1973. The countries that attended were Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, with the US and Russia as co-chairs. Because Nixon and Kissinger still believed it was in the best interest of the US to limit the role of Russia both in the Middle East, and in Geneva, they had devised the strategy to limit the co-chairs role to a role of mediation when needed, but to otherwise allow the involved countries to meet directly. Syria did not attend this first round due to disagreements on the pace of disengagement talks relating to their borders, and the status of their prisoners of war. Kissinger opened the conference by laying out the goals of the conference, and noting the importance of a disengagement of forces and the implementation of US Resolution 242. With that, the formal portion of the conference was recessed for an indefinite period of time to allow the belligerents to convene (Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005). While this strategy of allowing the belligerents to meet for direct talks between themselves would make it harder for Kissinger to control the pace of discussion, it did allow him to work other important matters related to the conflict, in particular the oil embargo.

4.7.1 The oil weapon is unsheathed

Although King Feisal had agreed with Kissinger that progress in the disengagement talks would lead him to lift the production cutbacks and end the oil embargo, no timetable had been established. Even though the Geneva conference had begun, no movement had taken place on the production cutbacks or the embargo. Instead, on 23 December, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had doubled the price of a barrel of oil (Bronson 2006; Kissinger 1987). Although the oil embargo hung over the conference, progress was made in the disengagement talks between Egypt and Israel. Sadat's desire to improve his diplomatic position with the US led him to be more accommodating than expected, this in turn led the Israeli's to work toward an equally acceptable withdrawal plan. By 16 January, a plan that would allow the Israeli's a boundary west of the Mitla and Giddi passes had been approved by Sadat, and a small force of Egyptian infantry and armor units east of the Suez Canal had been approved by Meir. The following day, this initial plan for the disengagement of forces was signed by the military representatives at Kilometer 101. And true to his word, President Sadat flew to Saudi Arabia to try and convince King Feisal the time had come to end the embargo, and to ask him to take the lead in talks with the other OPEC producers. Although there were still ongoing negotiations, a lot of progress had been made between Egypt and Israel. In light of this, and the growing relationship between the leaders of Egypt and the US, on 28 February 1974, full diplomatic relations were restored between Egypt and the United States.

Reich (2001) believes the use of the oil weapon had little impact on the US. It did not achieve its goals of causing the US to pressure Israel in to withdrawing from Arab

territories, or returning Jerusalem and the West Bank to the Jordanians. It did cause some of our allies to change their policies towards Israel and the Arab cause. Secretary Schlesinger noted, “I indicated at the time we were prepared, if necessary, to move military forces to the Gulf to take over whatever country it was necessary to supply our oil” (Schlesinger 2001, 169). Suffice to say, his comments were not well received in the Middle East. Schlesinger believes it is hard to pinpoint what caused Saudi King Feisal to use the oil weapon against the United States. He believes because the start of the airlift, and the \$2.2 billion dollar request for aid to Israel occurred so closely together, it is not clear which event may have triggered the embargo.

The triggering of the embargo was the end of a longer process of production cutbacks and price increases, but when it was finally initiated, it happened very quickly. Kissinger notes it was really three days over which the economies of the US and other countries in the world were changed (Kissinger 1987). After a seemingly successful meeting in Washington with Arab minister from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, and Kuwait, Kissinger thought the threat of an oil embargo seemed unlikely. Wrapping up a meeting in Kuwait, the oil ministers of OPEC announced a seventy percent price increase in the cost per barrel of oil, and a five percent cutback in production, compounding each month that the Israeli's did not withdraw to the pre-1967 border lines. This action took Kissinger by complete surprise.

In a letter to President Nixon, King Feisal reiterated what he had told Kissinger. He was disappointed in US actions regarding support for Israel, and that the US should end the resupply airlift and other support immediately. Later that day, Saudi Arabia announced an additional production cutback of five percent, taking the total OPEC

production cutback to ten percent. They also hinted at a total embargo of oil to the US. The total embargo would become a reality in a few days when the request for \$2.2Billion dollars was sent to the congress. Although the aid money was intended to replace military and non-military losses, and had been agreed to earlier, the timing of the request to congress infuriated the King.

On October 19, Nixon had submitted his \$2.2 billion dollar aid request for Israel. On 20 October, King Feisal announced a total embargo of Saudi oil to the United States, as well as an additional 5 percent production cut for the global markets. Hermann (2001) notes that Kissinger stated no one warned him the Arabs would object, however, Ambassador Akins stated that "...no one consulted any of the posts in the regions over what the anticipated reaction might be" (Hermann 2001, 192). OPEC oil ministers meeting in Kuwait agreed to support the embargo against the US, and added a further 25 percent production cut.

Two Arab members of the OPEC cartel are not participating in the embargo, Libya and Iraq. Both want the sanctions to go further than OPEC ministers want, and decide not to participate. Iran also did not participate in the embargo, but was a non-Arab country. The oil embargo and importantly the production cutbacks, had such a profound impact on the global market of consumers. The prosperity of countries was suddenly reduced, and poorer countries were plunged into irreversible debt. Before the oil crisis was brought on by the 1973 war, Kissinger did not believe OPEC was a serious cartel. Although they had been around since 1960, Kissinger did not believe they wielded any real power. An earlier embargo during the 1967 war had collapsed easily, and in Kissinger mind this confirmed their weakness (Kissinger 1987).

Interestingly, the US had several opportunities to secure contracts for cheap oil from both Saudi Arabia and Iran in the years leading to the oil crisis. The Shah of Iran had offered to sell the US one million barrels of oil per day for ten years for the unheard of price of one US dollar per barrel. King Feisal had offered a similar deal in 1972. Both had been turned down for reasons that seem short sighted today. In order to protect domestic sources of oil, import quotas were placed on all oil from outside the US. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the US imported less than twenty percent of its oil from places outside the US. Of this, only a portion was imported from Middle East countries. The competition was among the suppliers who were jockeying for a greater share of the US market.

There were several offers from Iran and Saudi Arabia for long term, low cost deals that would guarantee oil supplies at a set price. However, domestic suppliers were against the deals as they would have suppressed the price of oil, and several federal agencies were concerned about the increased risk of foreign influence and coercion. The US government saw the purchase of oil as a commercial activity; as such did not believe the government had any business buying oil outright, with the exception of oil contracts for military forces. Consequently, oil imports were purchased and managed by the seven major oil companies, known as the Seven Sisters (Sampson 1976). These seven companies had emerged over time into conglomerates controlling US oil production, exploration, and importation around the world. In the Middle East, the Seven Sisters managed not only the exploration and production, but in many cases negotiations with governments for the lease of oil tracts. In some cases when the US was not interested in developing better foreign relations with emerging Middle Eastern

countries, it was the Seven Sisters who were developing and implementing this policy. While the US government set the import ceilings, the actual quotas from each country was being set by the consortium composed of the major oil companies.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the ability of the major oil companies to punish or reward oil-producing countries was almost absolute. Moreover, for many countries, they had limited recourse to complain to the US government. The major oil companies operated in the various countries under a lease or concession arrangement. They owned most of the means of production, to include the well drilling equipment, the pipelines, and the refineries. The concession companies were paid a negotiated price per barrel, and the barrel price was generally set by the oil companies. The major oil companies controlled the output from the wells, and this had an immeasurable impact on a concession country's budget. Because the availability of cheap oil seemed limitless, the US had allowed wide latitude to the oil majors to make these decisions. The oil companies had pursued their goals of profit and control for over fifty years, since oil was first discovered in the Middle East in 1930 (Kissinger 1987; Sampson 1976; Yergin 2009). Their singular devotion to their own interests would have disastrous consequences for US national security.

The seeds of escalating prices began in Libya with the overthrow of King Idris by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in September 1969. Price stability had been maintained through negotiations, and a desire for stability and security on the part of King Idris. Qaddafi was an avowed anti-Western radical who did not care about those norms. The State Department viewed the coup as an internal Libyan matter, although King Idris had been pro-Western, and Qaddafi was decidedly not. Much like their interpretation of the

Arab Spring in later years, this may have been a false assumption that unfortunately heavily influenced diplomatic thinking. The US pursued a policy of acceptance of the Qaddafi government with the hope there would be no oil interruptions, particularly for Europe (Kissinger 1987).

When there was no US pushback on the coup, other Middle Eastern oil producing countries began to understand that as long as the oil flowed, Western governments would not interfere in the internal processes of their governments. However, the de-linking of political considerations would allow for an escalation in prices and control, and finally an ability to influence and coerce Western governments. In the spring of 1970, Libya demanded an increase of thirty percent in the price per barrel of oil. Percentage wise this was the largest increase ever to be demanded in the history of price negotiations, although the overall cost increase was not that large. When no real pressure was put on Libya by the oil consortium, whose main suppliers were outside of Libya, this encouraged the other producers to renew negotiations with the consortium.

By the end of the year, OPEC convened in Caracas and pressed their demand for new price negotiations with all the major oil companies. To reduce the individual price negotiations with each oil producing country, the oil companies requested OPEC to negotiate as one unit for all oil producing countries. In hindsight, this promoted the ability of OPEC to dictate price increases and production quotas for all cartel members. This inadvertently set the conditions for OPEC to control the majority of the world's oil market. The State Department and other US government agencies still recommended a policy of non-intervention in what was seen as purely economic negotiations. Although they were slow to understand what was taking place, and the danger to US national

security, events were to change quickly enough they would begin to better understand the danger OPEC presented to the world economy. The next stage of negotiations between OPEC and the major oil companies involved equity participation. The oil producing countries wanted a share of the production end of the business, and began their offer of an ownership stake at 20 percent (Bronson 2006; Sampson 1976). Their stated intent was a majority ownership within several years. This was seen as a form of creeping nationalization by the companies, and this raised concern in Washington as well.

Beginning to understand the danger to Western countries by having most of the earth's oil located in the Middle East, President Nixon ordered a review of US energy policy. Kissinger notified the Secretaries of State, Defense Treasury and the Director of Central Intelligence that the President had ordered a security review of US energy policy (FRUS, XXXIV, 171). The President had previously received indications that conflict in the Middle East could pose a problem for oil production to Western countries. This prescient move by the President would foreshadow the oil crisis that was on the horizon.

Although the State Department saw the business of oil exploration and production in purely commercial terms, they did have a responsibility to protect smaller US oil firms. They normally performed this role by ensuring fair competition among the US oil firms. However, when it came to the major oil companies, they were given some latitude to conduct their business. During a 16 March 1973 meeting between representatives from Continental and Marathon Oil and Department State officials, the Libyan Oil Sharing Agreement was discussed. The implications of this meeting was the

permission by the Department of State to jointly negotiate price structure among the major oil companies that comprised the oil consortium. When the Libyan government nationalized US oil companies in 1971, the consortium was allowed anti-trust protection to organize and create bargaining units by the US Department of Justice. The Department of State sanctioned the special anti-trust permission given the oil companies, although were concerned that a special subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that had started meeting to discuss the activities of oil companies in US foreign policy would not find the anti-trust activities of the consortium acceptable (FRUS, XXXIV, 173). The concern was that by sanctioning the actions of the oil companies, the State Department was also turning over portions of US foreign policy and diplomacy to the oil companies. The resulting oil embargo was in some cases exacerbated by this arrangement.

In a report prepared by the CIA's Office of Economic Research dated 30 March 1973, it was estimated the demand for oil by Western countries could only be met by a massive increase in oil output by producing countries (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research, 80-T01315A, Box 33; FRUS, XXXIV, 175). The increase in required oil production was expected to double from 20 million barrels per day (m/bpd), to 40. The increase in revenue was expected to almost triple, from 20 Billion in 1975, to 50 Billion in 1980. The danger was seen in the inability of many Middle Eastern countries to absorb that amount of wealth. The twofold danger was seen in the increasing amount of foreign capital held by these countries, and the enormous discretionary potential for the disruption of financial markets this could cause. Countries holding these vast reserves could slow the growth of production in order to slow the

growth of these capital assets. This was one of the key differences between the situation the oil producers were in during the 1967 War when an oil production cutback and embargo was tried, and the situation they were in during the 1973 oil production cutback and embargo.

In the spring and early summer of 1973, both President Nixon and NSA Kissinger were giving public speeches on the necessity of energy security (FRUS, XXXIV, 177). At the time, the US had an oil import policy that limited the amount of foreign oil and energy products that could be imported into the US. This program had been in place since oil was discovered in the US, in order to ensure a stable market price for US oil companies. As part of his energy program, Nixon removed these barriers and determined this would lead to better security for the US. He also began to reorganize government agencies to add energy innovation and conservation offices. This early action taken by the President demonstrates the concern the US government had over energy security issues.

By the spring of 1973, Kissinger was becoming more concerned with the oil price and participation negotiations, and began soliciting advice and recommended that consumer countries bond together to British Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend. Kissinger believed the only protection against the constant price increases by OPEC was for the consuming nations to band together to resist paying ever increasing prices. On 19 April 1973, he sent the following note to Sir Burke Trend:

If all the oil consuming nations are going to wait for the debacle of one of the others, so they can jump in and increase their reserves, than sooner or later we have a prescription for breaking whatever exists in the industrial nations. We need some ideas on how to cooperate to avoid the dangers. We are prepared to do it (Kissinger 1987, 870).

When the war began, although there were a few senior officials who discussed the potential of an embargo, the general belief in the government was the oil producers would not allow so drastic of a disruption to their own economies. Events would soon prove them wrong.

At a 16 October meeting, OPEC members agreed to a 70 percent increase in the price per barrel of oil. The cost per barrel of oil went from \$3.01 to \$5.12 overnight. Led by Saudi Arabia, OPEC next linked Middle East politics to oil production cutbacks by instituting a 5 percent cutback in production that would increase by 5 percent per month unless Israel agreed to withdraw from all occupied Arab lands. Kissinger had previously recommended a \$2.2 billion dollar aid package of loans and military equipment for Israel designed to encourage their acceptance of the cease fire proposals. When President Nixon forwarded this request to Congress on 19 October, King Feisal announced a total embargo of oil to the US. In his memoirs, Kissinger (1987) defended his request by claiming he believed the crisis period in the Middle East had passed, and no one had warned him the Saudi's would object to the aid request. Other participants disagree with this, and stated there were plenty of signals that the Saudi's would react strongly to this aid request.

Over the course of three days in October, 16, 17, and 20, the world economy had changed dramatically. Compounding this was the fact the oil producing countries had tried to tell the US they felt trapped by the request of the oil companies to have OPEC as their negotiating cartel. While the oil companies believed it better to negotiate with one entity about production and price, the individual countries believed this tied their hands to whatever demands were put forward by OPEC. They felt they would not be able

to withstand block increased in price. Responding to these protestations, Kissinger did not believe they were serious, and were simply a bargaining position used by the oil producers to cover their desire for price increases.

Although the production cutbacks and embargo had a negative effect on the US, it had a much worse effect on Europe and Asia. By the time of the 1973 War, the US was importing less than twenty percent of its oil requirements from the Middle East. Europe on the other hand, was almost totally dependent on Middle East oil, as was Japan. Their response to the cutbacks was to try and gain favor with the Saudi's by pressuring the US to change their policy toward Israel, and pressuring the Israeli's to withdraw back to the pre-1967 borders (Kissinger 1987; Quandt 2005). Mainly France, England, and Germany led European opposition to US policy, while Denmark and Italy tried to be supportive of both sides. For their part, the Saudi's were trying to tie politics to the oil production cutbacks, and were rewarding countries that openly supported their position with increased production. Kissinger determined the oil embargo was a matter of principle, and that the US would not be blackmailed into changing policy based on threats. He resisted ideas that had been presented that would have potentially shortened the embargo, but would have put the US in the position of changing policy based on what he saw were economic issues.

The US determined to pursue disengagement talks between Egypt and Israel at the Geneva Peace Conference that began in December 1973. Kissinger believed this would allow the Arabs to negotiate directly with Israel, and would keep the US and Soviets out of day to day discussions. Sadat was supportive of US efforts to get the peace negotiations underway, and promised to help get the embargo lifted once

progress on disengagement was shown. The idea behind the Geneva Conference was that once the conference had begun, participant countries would be left alone to conduct their own negotiations. Once all were satisfied with their discussion, the formal participants would be reconvened. For his part, Kissinger would begin what would come to be called “shuttle diplomacy,” as he moved between the capitals of Egypt, Syria, and Israel working to keep the negotiations moving (Kissinger 1987). Kissinger also credits the work of his Undersecretary of State Joe Sisco for helping bring about the negotiations, and for keeping the diplomatic staff in each country informed and up to date. Although for his part, Kissinger was very secretive of the negotiations, and worked to limit the amount of information flowing to the ambassadors in each country. He still had a mistrust in their abilities and wanted to make sure he controlled the information.

By the end of 1973, oil prices were up almost 400 percent, and the production cutbacks, price increases, and the embargo were causing the US and the world economy problems. Over 500,000 jobs had been lost, and \$20 billion dollars in gross national product (GNP) had been lost. Between 1973-1975 US GNP declined by 6 percent, and unemployment increased to 9 percent from roughly 4.5 percent (Parker 2001, 193). During an interview on 2 January 1974, Kissinger hinted at the possibility of countermeasures. On 7 January, Secretary Schlesinger commented that he was able to move military forces into the region to assure the oil supply for the US if needed. The New York Times reported that President Nixon had reminded the OPEC oil producing countries of the fate of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, who had been involved in nationalizing the Iranian oil company during the 1950s and had been overthrown in a coup. The production cutbacks did not change US policy toward Israel,

but it did have an effect on the European Countries. On 6 November 1973, the European Economic Community (EEC) urged Israel and Egypt to disengage and return to the 1967 borders, and for Israel to free the cutoff Egyptian Third Army. It also urged Israel to end their occupation of Arab territories. Other allied actions included Japan's support of Arab claims, and Canada's abstention from a key UN vote on a Palestinian resolution.

There are several diplomats who believed the use of the oil weapon was totally predictable, and is not sure why the US was surprised. There had been plenty of warnings by Saudi officials, and the King as well. Beginning in April 1973, Sheikh Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Minister of Petroleum, warned Secretary of State Rogers that Saudi Arabia was producing too much oil, and cannot absorb the revenues easily enough. That they are producing as much as they are only to help benefit the consuming countries, but they expect friendship in return. In July 1973, King Feisal gave an interview to the Christian Science Monitor and the Washington Post in order to reiterate what his oil minister had said to Secretary Rogers. The King followed this interview by going on US television, telling Americans their support for the policies of Israel makes it hard for Arabs to supply them with oil. What US policymakers had in the back of their minds were a couple of what they thought were sound facts and assumptions.

The first was the limited amount of oil the US imported from the Middle East, less than 12 percent. Other countries were much more dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The second was the failed attempt at an oil embargo tried following the 1967 Six Day War. It had failed very quickly, mainly due to the lack of discipline among oil producers. However, with the rise of OPEC as the controlling cartel, this would not happen again so

easily (Hermann 2001). The US viewed the oil threat through the 1967 lens, and did not take into account how the Arab economic situation had changed, how the oil markets had changed, and how the relationship between Feisal and Sadat had changed. Unlike 1967, the Arab producers had a lot more money, and could withstand production cuts for much longer than thought. The ownership of production had also changed with nationalization and participation agreements, with the producer countries now able to control the price of oil and the production quantities.

King Feisal and Anwar Sadat had become closer after the death of Nasser. Sadat was moving Egypt back to a Shari 'a country, away from the secular society Nasser had tried to encourage. And with the removal of the Russians, he had removed the threat of communism, which King Feisal had been concerned with. Feisal also believed the very presence of Israel caused a certain radicalization of Arabs. The more successful the Israeli's, the more radicalized the Arabs became. Feisal and Sadat met twice during the summer leading up to the war. By the time the decision for war was made in April 1973, Sadat had enlisted King Feisal to use the oil weapon. Feisal agreed but only if Sadat could sustain the war for several days. Feisal also did not want to use the oil weapon until after Sadat had initiated hostilities (Stein 1999).

4.7.2 The oil weapon is sheathed

Although the embargo and production cuts began easing in February 1974, and were lifted in March 1974, they were done so because the Arabs wanted and needed Kissinger's help negotiating the disengagement and peace processes. Kissinger held out the promise of full support of the US until the embargo was ended (Kissinger 1987;

Parker 2001). Led by the Saudi's, OPEC tried to link progress in the disengagement talks, and Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, to increasing production and ending the embargo against the US and other select countries. However, Kissinger resisted efforts to link economic coercion to US policy in the Middle East. Although Kissinger stated that he was sympathetic to Arab goals, he believed that US policy and commitments had to remain free of blackmail and coercion. OPEC and Saudi Arabia did have success in moderating some Western European countries support for Israel and in obtaining their help in pressuring the US to moderate support for Israel. These actions did not sit well with Kissinger, and in a cable to Prince Fahd, he noted:

Those countries who are engaging in economic pressures against the United States should consider whether it is appropriate to engage in such steps while peace negotiations are being prepared, and, even more, while negotiations are begin conducted. I would like to state for the United States Government that policy, that we have expressed our commitments and that we will adhere to those and will not be pushed beyond this point by any pressures. It is clear that if pressures continue unreasonably and indefinitely, then the United States will have to consider what countermeasures it may have to take. We would do this with enormous reluctance, and we are hopeful that matters mill not reach this point (Kissinger 1987, 880).

Negotiations on lifting the embargo were conducted at the ministerial level because of the national security implications. As disengagement negotiations began to show progress, it seemed the embargo was going to be lifted in mid-December. However, as in all negotiations, the requirements for lifting the embargo changed several times until it became a time line triggered by Israeli withdrawal. Previous production increases would be cut back on any nations that did not "provide concrete evidence of friendliness such as by showing that they are putting pressure on the United States or Israel" (Kissinger 1987, 883). As a reward to countries openly supporting the

Arab cause, Sheikh Yamani was negotiating increased production levels. While there were encouraging comments from Sadat and Feisal about ending the embargo, OPEC continued to dramatically increase the price per barrel of oil.

At the OPEC minister meeting in Tehran on 22-23 December 1973, the price was increased by 128 percent from \$5.12 to \$11.65 per barrel. Coupled with the 70 percent price increase in October, this amounted to a 387 percent increase in less than three months (Kissinger 1987, 885). Following the OPEC oil ministers meeting in Tehran, Arab oil ministers met in Kuwait on 24-25 December. They reaffirmed the continuation of the embargo against the US and other select countries, and the normal 5 percent production cut back was increased to 10 percent in January. For those countries supporting the Arab cause, there were no production cutbacks. In the long run, this allowed more oil into the global supply, and made the other production and embargo actions bearable for the global markets and the US.

The embargo was lifted on 24 March 1974, after Kissinger was invited to tour several Middle East countries to prepare for Syrian disengagement talks. This action reassured Syria's Assad that his country was next for disengagement assistance, and this allowed the Arab producers to agree to lift the embargo. This face-saving gesture allowed the Arab oil producers to agree the embargo had achieved its desired effects.

Kissinger was firmly in control of negotiations in the Middle East, especially relating to the oil embargo. When the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Akins, tried to suggest that the US would welcome resumed oil refueling to the US Sixth Fleet, and a deferment of the upcoming 5 percent production cutback, Kissinger was quick to remind Akins that the strategy of the US was not partial relief. This was a warning to the

new ambassador to toe the directed negotiating program (Kissinger 1987, 880). After King Feisal ordered the embargo of US markets, Secretary Schlesinger commented that he had received a message from the EXXON Corporation directing them to cutoff oil deliveries to the US Navy's Sixth Fleet, and US military forces in Europe. This while the US was still involved in Vietnam.

By 4 March, the disengagement of military forces plan had been fully implemented between Egypt and Israel. Partly in recognition of the new relationship, new aid packages had been proposed that would provide \$250 million dollars in military and non-military support for Egypt, and \$207.5 million dollars for Jordan. This marked a turning point in the relationship between the US, Egypt, and Jordan, and clearly established a financial link with those countries. Two hurdles remained for Kissinger. The first was the disengagement negotiations between the Syrians and the Israeli's, and the second was the continuing oil embargo. On 18 March, OPEC announced the lifting of the oil embargo and an end to production cutbacks (Quandt 2005).

Although there are many supporters and detractors of the Kissinger approach to the Middle East disengagement negotiations, he was able to successfully bring an end to the shooting part of the Middle East conflict. Kissinger would defend his actions by saying he was able to bring about an end to the shooting, he was able to get the Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli military forces to disengage, and he was able to keep the Russians out of the negotiations, and to limit their influence. The detractors may say he was able to use the step-by-step approach during these negotiations, but to what end? Did it achieve a breakthrough in Middle East peace, or did it prevent a bold initiative that may have been possible with Sadat and Meir? The key issues of a lasting peace, with a

discussion of the Palestinians were not addressed. What came out of the negotiations and the strategy was a limited plan with limited goals. Even these goals were hard to sustain, and Nixon found himself using large amounts of military and non-military aid to keep the belligerents from restarting the conflict. Kissinger believed that progress had to be shown, consequently believed the step-by-step process was necessary to sustain movement. Detractors believe the step-by-step may only have bought time. Kissinger did show that sustained high-level negotiations, fully supported by the President could make progress. He also knew that mastery of the complex details of the Middle East were essential, and that military aid was an essential part of negotiating in the Middle East, and part of the diplomatic process (Kissinger 1987).

For ambassadors assigned to the region, the complexities of Middle Eastern history and security could be difficult to master while on the job. Coupled with increased violence during the lead up to the 1973 War, a lack of good understanding could greatly increase the consequences to the security of the region and US interests. It is this environment the ambassadors discussed in chapter five found themselves.

Chapter 5: Case Studies

5.1 Section I

5.1.1 Introduction

Chapter five is comprised of four case studies in order to gain a better understanding of the diplomatic environment in the Middle East during the 1973 October War and ensuing oil embargo. These case studies will use a qualitative structured and focused comparison methodology (George and Bennett 2005). This mixed method approach of using case study with structured and focused analysis will allow for a better understanding of the richer elements that may not be captured by large - N statistical analysis.

Chapter five is comprised of three sections. Section I is the introduction, and will discuss case study methodology, complimenting the discussion of this qualitative methodology from chapter two. This section will also present the three control variables, and the four questions that will comprise the structured and focused portion regarding the diplomatic, alliance, and economic cooperation between the countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, and the United States from 1970-1974. Section II is comprised of the four case study's and includes a country overview of events leading to the conflict and the oil embargo, a discussion of the assigned ambassadors, and an examination of the COBDAB and UN voting patterns, trade data, and alliance agreements. The last section will consist of an analysis of the information discussed, and a conclusion.

There were two crises that take place in the Middle East in 1973 – 1974 that had broad impacts on the international community. The first was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, involving the countries of Israel, Syria, and Egypt in a militarized conflict. The second was the ensuing oil production cut back and embargo directed against Western countries by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, in retaliation for US support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

5.1.2 Case study approach

Although there is a sizeable quantitative assessment in chapter three to this study, adding a qualitative case study approach enhances the explanatory power of the discussion. This mixed approach has become a more accepted methodology as the technique has become more stable (George & Bennett 2005, 4). As George and Bennett (2005, 5) observe, “A new generation of scholars has emerged with training in or at least exposure to more than one methodology.” The case study approach allows for the detailed examination of a particular event or period that may be generalizable to other events.

In his seminal work on research design, Creswell notes that, “Qualitative research is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem”, whereas, “Quantitative research is a measure for testing objective theories by examining the relationship among variables” (Creswell, 2009, 4). However, there are times when selecting one method over the other does not adequately allow for inquiry able to help answer complex, multilayered phenomena. For

these types of problems, Creswell notes, "Mixed methods research is an approach to inquiry that combines or associates both qualitative and quantitative forms...it also involves the use of both approaches in tandem so that the overall strength of a study is greater than either qualitative or quantitative research" (Creswell, 2009, 4). In *Military Power*, Biddle (2004) supports Creswell's assertion of the strengthening of research by combining methods, saying, "Social science has yet to provide a single perfect methodology; each of the major research traditions has important shortcomings taken alone" (Biddle, 2004, 9).

Both Biddle (2004) and Creswell (2009) use the term "triangulation" to describe the effects brought by mixing methods in research. Biddle notes, "Small—n case method permits the depth of analysis needed to characterize variables" (Biddle, 2004, 10). He further surmises the synergistic effects of mixed methods by observing that, "Taken together, a combination of contrasting approaches offers an opportunity to cover the weaknesses of each with the strength of others" (Biddle, 2004, 9). Another strength noted by Creswell was the neutralizing effect mixing methods has on bias. "Recognizing that all methods have limitations, researchers felt that biases inherent in any single method could neutralize or cancel the biases of other methods" (Creswell, 2009, 14).

The logic of the case study approach is strengthened by the structured and focused nature of the inquiry. According to George and Bennett (2005, 67), the method is structured by the systemic nature of the general questions asked of each case. It is focused by asking about specific aspects of the cases. They further argue this method was developed in order to study "Historical experience in ways that would yield generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems' (2005, 67). As George and Bennett

(2005, 5) have noted, this approach is useful in that it allows “...the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George & Bennett, 2005, 5). The ability of the mixed method approach to “triangulate” sources and data, integrate and connect results, and refine large N sample data with small n detail makes this approach more suitable for this study. Because selection bias is a concern in any reputable study, the mixing of methods is expected to reduce or neutralize the effects better than if addressed in a single method of study alone (Creswell, 2009, 4).

5.1.3 Case selection

The countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq, represent the four Middle East countries that formed the original organization of petroleum export countries (OPEC) cartel. The US Ambassadors assigned to these countries from 1970 – 1974 represent a mix of both career and non-career ambassadors, along with varying skills as determined in the Neumann – Pickering letter. During the 1973 oil embargo, each of these countries played a role in either supporting the embargo, partially supporting the embargo, or in the case of Iran; not supporting the embargo. Each of these countries is located in the modern Middle East, although they are not all Arab countries. Three of the four countries had received many years of economic, military, and diplomatic support from the United States. Using these four countries will follow the notion of unit homogeneity, and the assumption of constant causal effects (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 93). This assumption holds that the differences observed in the values of the

dependent variables can be explained by the changes in the explanatory variables for homogenous units across time and space.

The qualitative assessment will be comprised of four structured and focused questions that should help provide a better understanding of cooperation, UN voting patterns, trade, and alliance types, by assessing four of the original five OPEC nations that played a role or took part in the 1973 oil embargo of the United States. The case study's will enable the analysis to delve more deeply in the level of cooperation and other explanatory variables that helped guide relations between the United States, and OPEC countries during this tense period. Information that was private at the time or not fully revealed may indicate that relations with the United States were more stable or belligerent than COPDAB data reveals. This study will use a cross-sectional time series (CSTS) approach to improve the ability to measure the skills and attributes deemed essential to the conduct of foreign policy in an attempt to answer the research questions.

The Yom Kippur War began on 6 October 1973, and ended on 25 October 1973. The OPEC oil embargo of the United States and other select countries began on 17 October 1973, and ended on 18 March 1974. Beginning this portion of the investigation from January 1, 1970 will enable the establishment of a baseline of cooperation prior to the beginning of the Yom Kippur War, which is widely recognized as the precursor crisis to the oil embargo.

5.1.4 Control variables

There are three control variables used in this portion of the study to offer an explanation for cooperation other than ambassador attributes. The first is the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) voting patterns compiled by Michael Bailey, Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten (2013), for the selected countries from 1970-1974. This is a widely used dataset of roll-call votes in the UN General Assembly from 1946-2012. This dataset also contains affinity of nation's scores and ideal point estimates derived from these votes. This control variable will be used as a proxy for consistent or inconsistent preferences between the US and the other states in the region.

The second control variable used will be international trade as measured by total import and export trade data compiled by Katherine Barbieri (2013). As part of her dissertation research, Katherine Barbieri (1996), compiled the first of several international trade datasets (Barbieri 2002) to discuss the use of her data to assess trade. This dataset has been used extensively by researchers, including Robst, Polacheck, and Chang (2007), in their discussion of the relationship between trade proximity and conflict. This control variable will act as a proxy for consistent or inconsistent preferences between the US and case study countries, and will assess whether the increase or decrease in trade during the period 1970-1974 help explain levels of cooperation instead of ambassador skills for the case study countries.

The third control variable will be the identification of alliance formation and type based on the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions data compiled by Ashley Leeds (2002). There is a significant body of literature on the effects that alliances between countries have on militarized disputes. As Leeds (2003) notes, "Alliance commitments

affect decisions to initiate disputes, but because different alliances involve different promises to different actors, alliances can have different effects.” The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions dataset (Leeds, 2002) will be used to understand the types of alliance that were in effect between the countries involved in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the case study OPEC countries. This alliance control variable will act as a proxy for consistent or inconsistent preferences among the case study countries and the US, and will assess whether alliance patterns during the period 1970-1974 help explain levels of cooperation instead of ambassador skills for the case study countries.

5.1.5 The four structured - focused comparison questions

Four countries will be assessed further using a structured and focused case study methodology. The countries that will be studied using this approach are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq. Four structured questions will be asked in order to better explore and understand the effectiveness of the ambassador.

- 1) What was the level of cooperation between the US and the host country as measured by the Conflict and Peace Database (COPDAB) and the UN Voting dataset? Was there a change in the level of cooperation during or after the crisis period?
- 2) What was the experience level of the ambassador as assessed using the independent variables based on the Neumann – Pickering letter?
- 3) What was the dollar value of trade before, during, and after the crisis as measured by total import and export trade? Was there a change in the level

- of trade volume between the United States and the target country during and after the crisis?
- 4) Was there an alliance relationship among the four countries, or those four countries and the United States? An alliance between any of these countries and Egypt will also be considered due to the direct involvement of Egypt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the presupposed relationship to the oil embargo.

Section II Case study countries

5.2 Saudi Arabia

5.2.1 Background to the conflict and the embargo

Egypt's loss to Israel during the 1967 Six Day War created a leadership vacuum in the Pan-Arab movement in the Middle East. President Nasser of Egypt had been the vocal leader of the movement, and Egypt's loss of prestige after the war compelled Saudi Arabia to step into this leadership role to try to maintain unity among Arab countries. However, Saudi Arabia needed Egypt's support to defend them from the ideological attacks from activists inside Egypt (Korany 1984).

As Al-Sowayel (1990) notes, historically, Saudi foreign policy and decision-making had been guided by five tenets; "the primacy of religion, Arab loyalties, tribal considerations, the search for secure boundaries, and consensus within the Saudi

leadership." Saudi foreign policy was based on a desire for Arab unity. Before the 1973 war, Saudi senior leaders had engineered a rapprochement with Egypt in order to undermine Egyptian military support for the Yemen insurgency, and to encourage them to end Russian presence in the Middle East.

The death of Egyptian President Nasser brought Anwar Sadat to power, and it was his desire to change the relationship in the Middle East with the United States that brought him into contact with both US and Saudi Arabian foreign policy (Lippman 1989). Sadat wanted to change the relationship between the United States and Egypt, but believed the US unfairly favored their relationship with Israel to the disadvantage of other Middle East Arab countries. Sadat sent his emissaries to Washington in February 1973 to try to improve the diplomatic landscape, but was rebuffed. Korany (1984, 53) notes, "The pity is that the United States failed to engage in intensive diplomatic activity during the decisive years of 1972-1973." By late August 1973, the decision for war had been decided between Egypt and Syria, and the approximate day and time had been discussed. At the end of August 1973, Sadat visited King Feisal to discuss this decision, and asked him to support their war effort with oil as a weapon. The King agreed that he would (Korany 1984).

The decision to support an oil embargo coincided with a change in Saudi attitudes about oil. This change saw oil not as an economic commodity, but as a political-economic weapon (Korany 1984). Rustow (1982, 149-153) contends the peace initiative of President Sadat in 1971 set the stage for the October 1973 war. He also notes that Saudi Arabia offered the United States an oil production guarantee based on

the growing importation of oil, and in return wanted a slight tempering of US support for Israel. This tempering would have ensured a privileged status for the delivery of oil.

The change in King Feisal's thinking about using oil as a weapon was influenced by several factors. The first was a desire to change the US relationship with Israel, he was also trying to maintain his new sense of regional leadership, and in that, he needed internal and external security with his neighbors. There was also a glut of oil on the world markets that were constraining oil pricing. King Feisal met with senior oil company representatives on several occasions in May 1973. He warned them about an impending crisis that may involve oil pricing and production. He asked them to carry the message to Washington that all that was needed was a softening or US support for Israel. He warned this support for Israel was creating anti-American attitudes, and endangering the Saudi position in the Arab world (Al-Sowayel 1990, Rustow, 1982). Even Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, did not understand the dilemma the Saudi leadership was in (Al-Sowayel 1990, 75). One month before the embargo, the Economist summed up the perils of Saudi leadership in the Arab world. "Now they are finding that any Arab leader who gives a decisive lead must keep moving forward briskly if he is not to be trampled down by his energetic following" (Korany 1984, 54).

Although some scholars have argued that the Saudis made an emotional decision to use oil as a weapon during the embargo, they overlook the great pains the Saudi's, to include King Feisal, went to try and change US foreign policy in the Middle East (Al-Sowayel 1990, Rustow, 1982, Korany, 1984). On 10 October 1973, four days after the war had started; an Egyptian delegation visited King Feisal in Saudi Arabia to brief him on the progress of the war. The King was very accommodating as they

discussed several options and scenarios involving the war and the use of oil as a weapon. Although the King had sent several warnings to the Department of State and the White House, he believed that no action had been taken in response. After the meeting with the Egyptians, the King sent for the US Charges de Affairs, because the Ambassador was out of the region. It is unfortunate that at this particular moment, the US Ambassador was being replaced, and his successor had not been confirmed yet. The October war triggered three key decisions. On 17 October, OPEC determined to cut production to the US and other countries by five percent. This was followed on 18 October by a Saudi decision to further reduce production and delivery to the US by ten percent. The embargo was further strengthened on 20 October by a decision to stop all oil exports to the US following President Nixon's request to congress for immediate arms assistance to Israel (Korany 1984, 48).

5.22 Saudi Arabia four questions

Q1: What was the level of cooperation between the US and the host country as measured by the Conflict and Peace Database (COPDAB) and the UN Voting dataset? Was there a change in the level of cooperation during or after the crisis period?

While the mean level of conflict in the Conflict and Peace Data Base is 8.5, the level of conflict for these four countries during this period, and particularly Saudi Arabia, remains at 7 and below, and for this indicator, lower is better. This would indicate a higher than average level of cooperation. In the year leading up to the October War, the level of conflict was 6.7. During 1973, the COPDAB level of conflict is a mean of 5.8.

The chart at 5.1 shows that while there were three incidents greater than a coded score of 7, the majority of reportable incidents are coded a 7 and below.




Chart 5.1 Saudi Arabia COPDAB scale value

In 1974, the majority of incidents are coded below 7, indicating low levels of conflict, and high levels of cooperation. Because Saudi Arabia was one of the main initiators of the embargo, the potential for conflict would be expected to be higher. However, this was not the case for this variable. Because there are two major crisis periods that take place during and immediately following the 1973 October War, maintaining this high level of cooperation is significant.

Although the levels of cooperation suggested by the COPDAB data seem high for this period, the US had reason to be very unhappy with the King. In the lead up to the 1973 war, King Feisal and Saudi Arabia were economic and sanctuary supporters of Fatah and members of the Black September Organization (BSO). Fatah had been infiltrated by radical terrorist members who carried out cross border attacks on Israeli citizen, aided by Black September. Ambassador Thacher relayed a conversation with King Feisal about the close connection between Fatah and Black September in a telegram to the Department of State in which he diplomatically confronted the King

about Saudi Arabia's efforts to support two terrorist organizations. A recent terrorist attack in Khartoum involving a Saudi embassy vehicle had brought to light the increasing connection of Fatah with Black September, and Ambassador Thatcher tried to get King Feisal to limit Saudi support for Fatah. However, as the leader of the Arab world, the King would not publicly limit support, and instead pressed Thatcher on the need for the US to pressure Israel to withdraw to the 5 June 1967 borders in order for the peace in the Middle East to be restored (AmEmbassy Jidda, 1047, 14 March 1973, Masserachi collection). Saudi Arabia's financial support for Fatah and Black September would continue to be a point of contention between the ambassador and the King.

Shortly after the aid request for support to Israel was sent to the Congress, Saudi Arabia announced a complete embargo of oil for the US. In a telegram from embassy Jidda to the Department of State, Ambassador Akins discussed details he had learned surrounding the King's recent embargo of oil to the US (AmEmbassy Jidda, 4663, 23 October 1973). Akins was told by senior Saudi officials that the decision to cut off oil supplies to the US was made by the King himself. Officials told Akins the King was extremely mad after learning of the US aid request of \$2.2 billion dollars for Israel. Akins notes that having met with the same official in the previous twenty-four hours; they had not had any notice the King was going to make this decision. The officials believe the King had to make such an announcement after the details of the aid request were made public, particularly to ensure he was not ostracized by other Arab countries for not participating in an embargo. In Saudi Arabia, the King is the only authoritative decision maker, although he does seek unity in his decisions. For there to be an embargo, the King was the only person who could have imposed it.

Akins went on to report he was also told the King wanted to try and minimize the damage to US-Saudi relations, the Director of Public Security going so far as to assure the ambassador that safety and security of the American citizens living and working in Saudi Arabia was of primary importance. During a meeting on 21 October Prince Turki, the King's brother, told General Hill, Commander of the US Military Training Mission (CUSMTM) that certain political decisions have to be made in war, just as in the US. Nevertheless, the prince wanted to ensure these political decisions were kept separate from the training mission between the US and Saudi Arabia. Although the King was very upset with the US over the proposed aid to Israel, he still wanted to have good relations with the US, and to continue receiving training and support for his military. This helps explain why although Saudi Arabia had initiated a very unfriendly act against the US, they still wanted to maintain some type of relationship.

This high level of cooperation is supported by the UN voting patterns of Saudi Arabia. In chart 5.2, the aggregate voting patterns of select countries in the Middle East, to include Egypt, Israel, and the United States, shows that Saudi Arabia voted consistently, although not always with the US. This pattern was set prior to the two crisis

periods of the October War and the oil embargo that followed.




Chart 5.2 Saudi Arabia UN voting patterns

Ideal Point Estimate	-0.307	-1.153	-0.770	-0.686	0.230	2.043	1.308
Percent Agree US	0.300	0.242	0.312	0.269	0.376	1.0	0.612

Chart 5.2 shows the aggregate voting for the period 1970-1974, but what is not clearly shown Saudi Arabia also voted in line with OPEC partners Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, and Iran. As seen in the UN voting pattern country charts, Saudi Arabia has routinely voted in line with Middle Eastern countries, as opposed to clearly voting with or against the United States. In fact the percent of UN votes that agreed with the US position was 0.300 for the five year period. Although this is as high as or higher than the other countries, it is consistent with their historical agreement with the US. From this, the data suggests that the level of support for the US in the UN was not significantly affected by the October conflict, and the ensuing oil embargo.

Although the UN voting data suggests minimal change to Saudi Arabia's voting patterns regarding the US, it was clear the King was not happy with the US. In a memorandum to Brent Scowcroft dated 10 October 1973, William B. Quandt updated a call he had received from Jim Critchfield, President of Mobile Oil. He noted that Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister, said the King was very upset with the US over their continued support of Israel (FRUS, XXXVI, 210; Nixon Presidential Files, Box 664, Country Files, Middle Ease, Middle East-General, National Archives). Yamani had stated that King Feisal had talked about a plan to cut production back to 7.2 m/bpd, and then five percent each month after that until the Israeli's withdrew from Arab territory. Critchfield sourly noted that if the Israeli's began scoring more battlefield victories, and the US was supplying them, then the US oil interests in the Middle East have had it.

Saudi Arabia strongly disagreed with the US decision to resupply Israel with essential military and non-military supplies. In a message to King Feisal, Kissinger explained the US had to begin an airlift of supplies to Israel in response to the Soviet resupply of Egypt and Syria (SecState Washing, 203672, 14 October 1973). Kissinger asked for the King's understanding that the US airlift to Israel was not intended as anti-Arab, noting that it "became inevitable when the Soviets moved to take advantage of the situation instead of using their influence to work for a ceasefire which would end the fighting and it became necessary if we are to remain in a position to use our influence to work for a just and lasting peace." Kissinger concluded "I want to assure you that as soon as an effective ceasefire has been achieved, we are prepared to stop our airlift promptly provided the Soviets do the same." The initial reply to the Secretary's letter came in telegram 4517 from Jidda, October 15. In a telegram to the Department of

State, Ambassador Akins relays the feelings of the King's court when they learned of the US supply efforts to Israel. Akins notes the comments from the court were more sorrow at the divergence of interests between the two governments. No anger, only sorrow was how he described it (AmEmbassy Jidda, 4549, 16 October 1973).

On 17 October 1973, Kissinger met with Middle East foreign ministers to discuss the conflict ongoing in the Middle East. Attending the meeting were Omar Saqqaf, Saudi Arabia; Ahmed Taibi Benhima, Morocco; Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, Kuwait; Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria. Kissinger pressed the idea of negotiations resuming, with an agreed agenda on what the negotiations were expected to accomplish. Speaking for the four, Minister Saqqaf reiterated the long standing Arab view the Israelis must withdraw to the 5 June 1967 borders, and resolve the question of Palestinian rights of return. Kissinger said those conditions would not be acceptable to Israel as pre-conditions, and reiterated his now infamous remark that the Arabs should not expect to win at the negotiating table what had not been gained on the battlefield (FRUS, XXV, 195). This unfortunate comment led the Arab's to believe the US was not in a position to help them unless the status quo was changed. Saudi Arabia was in a position to help with this change. At the end of this meeting, Kissinger believed the danger of an oil production cutback or embargo had passed. This was to be an overly optimistic assessment. On this same day, OPEC ministers meeting in Kuwait would impose a significant price increase, and a production cutback, and two days after that, the King would impose an oil embargo on the US and other select countries.

Although the war would end in two days, at this point the outcome was all but certain. In a message from Saudi Prince Fahd, to Kissinger dated 23 October 1973, the

Prince established what he saw as four clear-cut objectives. These objectives represented the goals Prince Fahd believed were shared by the US. These were to 1) stop the fighting, 2) achieve a lasting peace, 3) achieve this peace while denying the Soviets a foothold in the Middle East, 4) Re-establish confidence in the US's desire to implement UN Resolution 242, allowing the oil production cuts to be lifted (FRUS, XXXVI, 224). The Prince noted that the Arabs and Israeli's each had a different interpretation of UNSC 242, and asked exactly how the US understood the resolution. This was the confidence that Saudi Arabia was looking for. He also noted that Saudi Arabia intended to continue the embargo on oil to the US for as long as Israel occupied Arab territory, because of US support for Israel. During his 8 November meeting with the King, Kissinger tried to discuss US foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. The US wanted peace and stability. The King reiterated the desire of the Arab countries in the Middle East for Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 war borders, a condition he will continue to press as a condition of lifting the embargo. The King told Kissinger that if the US would stop coddling Israel, they would withdraw. Kissinger told the King this was not politically possible.

In a telegram from the US Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the DOS dated 26 November 1973, Ambassador Akins relayed a conversation he had recently with Prince Fahd, the brother of King Feisal (AmEmbassy Jidda, 5225, 26 November 1973; FRUS, XXXVI, 246). The Prince told Akins the King had determined the embargo had achieved the desired effect, and he was prepared to ease the boycott and increase production back to September levels. However, the King needed to see concrete steps being taken by the US to pressure Israel to begin withdrawing from Arab lands. Akins knew this would

be impossible to agree to, and asked if there were any interim steps that could demonstrate the US was working towards a peace agreement. The Prince believed such action would be difficult for the King to get others to agree to. Akins recommended the President send a letter to the King thanking him for his continued support, and describing in detail the harm the embargo, production cutbacks, and price increases were having on the world economy. Akins believed the King needed the personal touch of the President to enable him to broach the subject of lifting the oil embargo with the other OPEC countries. While this shows that Akins understood what the King needed to help bolster his case, he was also a bit optimistic the other OPEC countries would go along with the King.

At the conclusion of the war, the burden of the struggle for Middle Eastern peace had moved to the oil producing countries, and Saudi Arabia was happy to claim the mantle as chief spokesman for the Arab oil producers (FRUS, XXXVI, 228). The CIA believed the shift in emphasis from military to political had been Egypt's ultimate goal, to pull the Middle East and the US into a political discussion about peace in the region.

Q2: What was the experience level of the ambassadors as assessed using the qualifications listed in the Neumann – Pickering letter?

Herman F. Eilts was a career Foreign Service Officer, and served as the ambassador to Saudi Arabia from January 1966 until July 1970. Born in Germany in March 1922, Ambassador Eilts attended Ursinus College, earning a Bachelor of Arts degree. He attended the School of Advanced Individual Studies, and earned a Master of

Arts degree. He served in the US Army during World War II for three years, from 1942-1945. He had extensive Middle East experience, but his records did not show any language ability. From the perspective of the variables in the Neumann – Pickering letter, his extensive regional experiences in the Middle East would have been of benefit to his understanding of the cultures and languages, although he did not speak any of the regional languages. He was also a career Foreign Service Officer, which is another of the qualifications that Ambassadors Neumann and Pickering talked about. According to these criteria, Ambassador Eilts, would have been considered an experienced ambassador, and the higher levels of cooperation as assessed by the COPDAB data set, and as measured in 1970 would seem to suggest that. He was a respected diplomat by his Arab and US counterparts, and Kissinger would select him as the first Ambassador to Egypt when the Cairo embassy reopened in 1974.

Nicholas G. Thacker was a career Foreign Service Officer and served as the ambassador to Saudi Arabia from August 1970 until August 1973. Born in Missouri in August 1915, he attended Princeton University, earning an Artium Baccalaureatus (AB). He then attended Fordham Law, earning a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) degree. He served in the US Navy during World War II, from 1942-1946. Later in his career, he served as the Department of State faculty representative at the National War College. He had previous regional experience, but did not speak any additional languages beyond English. Being a career Foreign Service Officer, and having some regional experience would certainly be seen as adding to the level of experience for Ambassador Thacker, as the qualifications as described in the Neumann – Pickering letter would suggest. The fact that he had previous military experience, and volunteered to serve as the State

Department representative on the faculty of the National War College would also meet one of the independent variables as additional experience.

James E. Akins was a career Foreign Service Officer, and served as the ambassador to Saudi Arabia from November 1973 until February 1975. Born in Ohio, in October 1926, he attended Akron University, where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree. He also attended the University of Strasbourg, where he was awarded a certificate in history. Ambassador Akins served in the US Navy during World War II, from 1945-1946. He had previous regional experience, and spoke three languages beyond English: Arabic, French, and German. Clearly, Ambassador Akins was a very experienced career Foreign Service Officer, and very qualified to be the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the time he was selected. Ambassador Akins had previously experience working in the petroleum section of the Department of State, and had warned that oil could become a political issue for the United States. He was one of the few petroleum experts in the Department of State during the oil embargo, and often provided expert advice to the Secretary.

During a critical period in US – Saudi relations in the lead up to the 1973 War, Ambassador Thacker departed Saudi Arabia in August 1973 as part of the normal diplomatic rotation, and Ambassador Akins arrived in mid-October after the start of the war. For a critical period of time, the Charge de affairs was the senior person in Saudi, and did not have ambassador status. As the King was discussing using oil as a weapon with several audiences, the timing of the replacement of the ambassador could not have come at a worse time.

A transcript of the meeting between President Nixon, Secretary Kissinger and the four Arab ministers reveals he charged Kissinger with the lead role in negotiations between the Arab countries and Israel. Although at the time his trust in Kissinger's negotiating skills allowed him to consolidate requirements in one person, he also removed the ability for ambassadors in the affected countries from having much say, and put the responsibility for hosting negotiations on the Secretary of State (FRUS XXV, 195). Although this met with Kissinger's approval, it would also deprive the ambassadors of any meaningful role in the disengagement talks ending the war. Kissinger would use the ambassadors as a means to relay messages between him and the host governments, but would keep key information about the negotiations to himself. Kissinger tended to distrust the abilities of the ambassadors, and at times it would seem this distrust was warranted.

In an embassy cable to the Department of State dated 11 February 1974, Ambassador Akins relayed the details of a call he had from Saudi Petroleum Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani (AmEmbassy Jidda, 691, 11 February 1974). Yamani wanted to know if Akins had read his statement given in Tokyo about the need to reduce the price of oil. Yamani told Akins the King had written to each of the heads of the oil producing countries and said he believed the 22 December price increase had been too high. The King was concerned about the high cost of oil and the damage the price increases were doing to the world economy. Akins told Yamani the efforts were not paying dividends, and that Iran and Kuwait wanted to raise the price of oil even higher. Yamani wanted to bet Akins the price would come down soon, but Akins did not bet him.

In his cable, Akins said it would probably be beyond the capability or ingenuity of the new Kissinger State Department to authorize him to take the bet. Kissinger had recently had Undersecretary Sisco send Akins a cable of concern about his conduct during some of the oil negotiations. Akins had not been following his instructions closely enough, and Kissinger had him reprimanded. This was not the first time Akins had not followed his instructions, Kissinger had to reprimand him before for trying to negotiate with Saudi Arabia outside of the official instructions Kissinger had sent him. During a telephone conversation with Sisco, Kissinger called his attention to Akins not following his instructions (TELCON, DNSA KA11963, 2 February 1974). Sisco said he would speak with Akins about this. However, during a 25 April 1974 telephone call, Kissinger again asked Sisco if he had seen the most recent cable from Akins saying he has asked the Saudi's to extend an invitation to President Nixon for a visit. Kissinger was furious, and told Sisco he needed to get a handle on the indiscipline from Akins (TELCON, DNSA KA12352, 25 April 1974). Kissinger would ask for Akins resignation before his tenure was up because he believed he was trying to run his own diplomatic program.

Q3: What was the dollar value of trade before, during, and after the crisis as measured by the Barbieri international directional trade dataset? Was there a change in the level of trade volume between the United States and the target country during and after the crisis?

The dollar value of the control variable trade with Saudi Arabia in 1970 with imports and exports combined, equaled \$147 million dollars. At the end of 1974, that dollar value with imports and exports combined was \$2.376 billion dollars. Even as Saudi

Arabia supported Egypt and Syria during the conflict, it still continued to trade with the United States. As seen in chart 5.3, the increase in trade each year, both in imports and exports, shows that although there was a regional crisis with the war and embargo, it did not significantly affect other trade.




Chart 5.3 Saudi Arabia import / export trade data

The desire to use oil as a weapon was not a new concept. An oil embargo had been tried on four other occasions by OPEC producers, to little effect. The problems with implementing an oil embargo in the past stemmed largely from a lack of political will on the part of OPEC producers to cut off their supply of funds for national budgets. During the 1967 Six Day War, a limited embargo was tried, but petroleum supertankers were already carrying Persian oil around the world (Issawi 1978). The 1973 Arab – Israeli war was different. King Feisal had given his pledge of support for an oil embargo to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Korany (1984), argues that the King wanted to use the threat of an embargo to change the diplomatic landscape, while others saw this as a means to

strengthen Saudi Arabia's economic and political power in the Middle East, and with her trading partners.

There is some confusion as to the actual amount of Middle East oil taken off the market as a result of the embargo. Part of the reason for this was the amount of "leakage" from OPEC and non-OPEC oil producers interested in increasing revenue at the expense of the other producers. Also, the manner in which oil was sold on the world market made tracking quantities difficult. Oil bound for Europe could be re-routed and sold in the United States. Iran, although an OPEC member, did not take part in the embargo, and continued to sell oil to the United States. At the most severe part of the embargo, there was roughly 9% less Arab oil available on the world market (Yergin 2009), although the psychological panic that ensued made the embargo seem more effective. During the October war, the Saudi decision to use oil as a weapon took the west, particularly the US, by surprise. Although King Feisal had threatened to use oil as weapon if the US did not work harder to pressure the Israeli's to return to the pre-1967 borders, few if any thought he would actually do it.

Arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the mid-1960s were considered controversial. The Israeli lobby was particularly strong, and able to influence large blocks of voters to condemn sales to the Arabs. In order to push the sale of F-5 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Defense Secretary McNamara had to get personally involved. Strategically, the US linked the sale of aircraft to Saudi Arabia, with a larger planned sale of newer aircraft to Israel in the same order. The US sought to maintain a balance of sales in the Middle East so as not to be seen as favoring one country over another. The US had not been a

major seller of weapons in the Middle East, and was concerned they be seen as neutral (Ottaway 2008).

In the two years leading up to the October war, the King had tried to sign a defense pact with the US, but had been rebuffed. He had even tried to "...guarantee to the United States a supply of oil necessary for its needs at a price it could pay for an absolute security guarantee" (Ottaway 2008, 21). As part of the agreement, the US would allow the Saudi's to invest in US oil companies, something the administration would not allow, and turned down. In April 1973, Saudi oil minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani was back with a new message, Saudi Arabia was willing to use oil as a weapon if the US policy toward Israel did not change.

James Akins, who would later become the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, had warned Congress that the US was becoming too dependent on Middle Eastern oil, and that each year would see an increase of one million barrels a day. Akins was an expert on the oil trade, and was the top energy expert at the State Department. Akins would remark that, "When we're talking about our oil needs, we're talking about one country-Saudi Arabia." Representative James Culver, chairman of the House Foreign Economic Policy Sub-committee remarked, "The implications of this stark fact are only now beginning to be taken into account by top U.S. officials" (Ottaway 2008, 22).

In what was clearly a misunderstanding of the amounts of oil the US was actually importing through various sources, the White House issued a report in February 1970 that predicted continued energy self-sufficiency over the next ten years (Bronson 2006). The official import numbers showed only five percent of oil was from Middle East markets. In reality, the US was importing almost fifteen percent. National Security

Council staffer William Quandt noted this was a time in Washington when almost no one really understood how the oil markets worked.

Other Middle Eastern countries had already partially or fully nationalized their oil companies following the 1967 war, and the continuing tensions during the war of attrition. King Feisal's oil minister, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani had successfully negotiated an OPEC plan to transition ownership of oil company concessions to Arab ownership. This plan was euphemistically called participation (Bronson 2006). King Feisal had already negotiated a twenty-five percent share of ARAMCO, and would follow this with a move to increase their holdings to sixty percent. During the oil embargo, he would complete the takeover of ARAMCO.

In a memorandum prepared by the Chairman of Exxon, J.K. Jamieson, dated 12 October 1973, he notes the oil industry is operating wide open, with no spare capacity (FRUS XXXVI, 212). He was concerned that market forces and market fear had driven the price of crude oil up substantially, and a new push for a 100% increase in the price was on the horizon. He stated a recent request from the US that Arab forces return to the 6 October cease-fire lines had infuriated the King, and that they should expect a cutback in production as a result. Jamieson did not rule out further action by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and that at this critical juncture if the US was seen openly supplying Israel materially, it would have an adverse effect on US relations. Jamieson's concern was that it would only take a reaction by one of the oil producing countries to raise prices and the rest would quickly follow suit.

King Feisal may have felt betrayed by Nixon during the 1973 war, and that may have played a role in the oil embargo. Although other OPEC countries were prepared to

cut production, few thought Feisal would also participate. However, when Nixon asked the congress for \$2.2 billion in military and non-military aid to support Israel during the war, Feisal saw this as the last straw. Nixon had previously sent him a personal note on 14 October pledging neutrality in the war. Feisal felt he had no choice, and enacted the oil embargo against the US (Ottaway 2008).

Kissinger may have had some indications there would be an embargo, because during a 14 October 1973 Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) meeting, Kissinger asked the group what would happen if there was an oil embargo against the US (FRUS, XXXVI, 214). Governor Love, the special assistant to the President for energy, noted the assumptions they were making about an oil cutoff would include all countries of the oil producing Persian Gulf States, Libya and Algeria. He noted that Iran would not cooperate in the embargo, and so they were counting on their oil.

Love noted that such a cutoff would require drastic action that would require immediate and affirmative action. Kissinger believed if it were going to happen, it would happen the next week. This comment belies Kissinger's later claim that no one told him there might be a danger of an oil embargo if the US continued to support Israel (Kissinger 1987). He followed his comments with an explanation that an oil cutoff has not been mentioned by the Saudi's in any conversations in the past three weeks. The only people talking about a cutoff are the oil companies, and he has already labeled them as hysterical. However, Deputy Secretary of State Rush notes that when they start resupplying Israel, they are going to have a problem.

After Kissinger sent his letter to King Feisal in an attempt to explain US reasons for resupplying Israel, he began to have second thoughts. In a Washington Special

Action Group meeting dated 16 October 1973, Kissinger wonders if he made a mistake informing the King the US was resupplying Israel after he was told by William Colby, the Director of the CIA, that the King was very upset by these actions (FRUS, XXXVI, 217). Although the Saudi's key demand was US assistance in pressuring the Israelis to withdraw to the June 1967 pre-war borders, Kissinger noted that because of their monopolist position relative to oil, they would still squeeze the US if Israel disappeared the next day given the chance. Kissinger noted, "You put a man in a monopoly position and he will squeeze you."

During a meeting with Sheikh Adham of Saudi Arabia, and Secretary Kissinger dated 17 October 1973, Adham relayed to Kissinger the position the Saudi government planned to take in the upcoming Arab Organization of Petroleum Export Companies (AOPEC) meeting in Kuwait (FRUS, XXXVI, 218). The King and President Sadat had agreed to a joint position that would include a five percent cutback in production every month until there was a satisfactory resolution of the Middle East crisis. They further agreed that a total embargo would be used against any country that employed their own military forces to assist Israel in any manner. Any country that helped the Arab's, on the other hand, would be assured of all the oil it wanted. The Kuwaitis also pledged to join in the agreement with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. After this conversation, Kissinger should have no doubt there would be an embargo. The airlift, with USAF aircraft was well underway, and he had prepared and sent his recommendation for a massive aid program for Israel to help offset the cost of the resupply operation.

True to their word, during the 17 October Kuwait meeting, OPEC agreed to a production cutback of five percent a month, compounding each month until the Israelis withdrew from Arab territory to the pre-1967 borders. OPEC also agreed to supply any country helping the Arabs with all the oil they needed, and further, to totally embargo any country that officially assisted the Israelis in the current conflict (FRUS, XXXVI, 223). An estimate conducted by the CIA's office of economic research determined a cutback between 5-10% per month would equate to roughly 1-2 m/bpd of oil off the world market. The estimate further noted the US only received roughly 1.6 m/bpd of oil from Arab countries, however, Europe and Japan would be greatly affected. Europe was estimated to receive 70% of their oil from Arab producers, while Japan received approximately 40%. The report further noted the future vulnerability of the US to an Arab oil embargo, as the percentage of oil from Arab producers was expected to rise substantially by 1980. Just as Ambassador Akins had reported, the share of oil the US imported from the Middle East would continue to rise, becoming much more vulnerable to political blackmail in the future.

In an embassy telegram to the Department of State dated 29 October 1973, Saudi Foreign Minister Saqqaf is quoted as saying the oil embargo would stay in place until the US pressured Israel for a just solution to the Middle East conflict. This would also include a restoration of UN Resolution 242 and a withdrawal of Israeli forces to the 5 June 1967 borders (AmEmbassy Jidda, 4745, 29 October 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 41; FRUS, XXXVI, 224). In a previous telegram (Jidda 4708) Ambassador Akins stated he believed the embargo would stay in place until an acceptable solution to the Middle East, to include the disposition of Jerusalem, had been achieved.

During the embargo and production cutbacks, Kissinger had a stormy relationship with the oil companies. He saw them as an interference in his negotiations, as well as apologists for the Arab embargo (FRUS, XXXVI, 227). Although in the early stages of the crisis Kissinger had been happy to allow the oil companies to take the lead in negotiations, he now blamed them for being a major part of the problem. The oil companies did want Kissinger to help them in their negotiations with the oil producers, but wanted Kissinger to be more agreeable to the Arab position. Kissinger however stuck to his belief that when a country has you in a monopoly position, they will use it, and he is determined not to allow the US to remain in that precarious position.

Kissinger continued to have poor relations with the oil companies. During a meeting with the Chairmen of ARCO, EXXON, MOBIL, SOCAL, TEXACO, and Sun Oil, Kissinger excoriated them all for remarks from an anonymous oil executive that had made the newspapers. The executive was quoted as saying he agreed with the Arab position on the embargo and production cutbacks, and was surprised it had taken them so long to implement against the US and the West (FRUS, XXXVI, 230). However, at this point he determined to help the Chairmen at least understand the position the US had taken in the negotiations with the Arabs. He noted the good relations that had been built with Egypt while trying to broker a cease-fire, and their understanding of the time this would take.

He noted that Kuwait was a belligerent country that was hard to negotiate with, but luckily would follow Saudi Arabia's lead, did not have a large say in the negotiations. Kissinger then discussed the US relations with Saudi Arabia, and how they had been good until the US had requested supplemental aid for Israel. At that point, Kissinger

described it as an “emotional wave” that overcame sensibilities in Saudi Arabia, and led to the embargo. Kissinger went on to tell the oil executives that it did not help the process of trying to negotiate both a disengagement and an oil embargo if the oil companies kept wringing their hands and siding with the Arabs. He did say he sympathized with the oil companies, and in their shoes might feel the same way they did, but he implored them to help carry his message of peace to their Arab contacts.

Mr. Jamieson of Exxon agreed the strategy being described by the Secretary was sound, but cautioned the embargo was reaching a critical phase. He stated the loss of 2.5 to 3 m/bpd of oil was going to have a critical impact on the US. Jamieson went on to say the key to resolving the problem lay with King Feisal. Kissinger assured him the US was doing everything possible to end the embargo, but again told the assembled audience they had to stop commiserating with the Arabs. Chairman Warner of Mobile agreed, but stated the message the Arabs were influenced most by were the messages from Washington.

The oil embargo had greatly affected the ability of the Department of Defense to sustain operations, especially in the Navy’s Sixth and Seventh fleet, conducting operations off the coast of Israel and Egypt. After Ambassador Akins had worked an agreement for Saudi Arabia to resume oil shipments for fleet operations, Sheikh Yamani notified the president of ARAMCO, Frank Jungers. The King did not want the oil transfers to take place from any Saudi ports, and directed the orders for fuel be filled outside of Saudi borders (FRUS, XXXVI, 328). For unknown reasons, Jungers disregarded the requirements and notified the Minister of Petroleum’s staff in Dhahran, telling them Yamani had given orders to fill the fuel requirements. The Minister’s staff

denied there were any orders for the fuel, and refused to follow Jungers directions. When Yamani was contacted, he of course had to deny any such orders existed, and cancelled the fuel agreement with Akins. Jungers tried to keep his mistake quiet, but Yamani notified Ambassador Akins of the problem. Akins assumed Jungers was trying to hide his mistake, hoping the embargo would be lifted before the mistake was discovered. Kissinger's displeasure with the oil companies was at times not misplaced.

The embargo and production cutbacks were so damaging to the national security of the US that talk began of putting troops into the Middle East to guarantee the flow of oil to the West. During a press conference on 27 October 1973, the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted the US had gone on an increased alert (Kissinger 1987, 589) and had mentioned "putting troops in crucial states to get oil." Schlesinger had previously discussed putting troops into the Middle East to secure the supply of oil with members of the NATO nuclear planning group. These discussions setup a further testy exchange between Secretary Schlesinger and the British Ambassador Lord Cromer. Schlesinger's concern was the ease in which the UK had acquiesced to the demands of the Arab countries, and how much easier it would be in the future for them to control the UK. This exchange did not help the already struggling relations the US was having with both NATO and the European allies. Kissinger had also broached the use of military force in the Arab countries to resolve the energy crisis (FRUS, XXXVI, 244; Kissinger, 1987, 880). During a 21 November press conference, Kissinger had aired the idea of the possible use of military force if the pressure of the embargo continued unreasonably and indefinitely.

The Department of Defense traditionally relies on foreign refineries in order to obtain their energy needs. In a paper prepared by the Office of the Director, Installations and Logistics in the Department of Defense, the dire nature of the embargo and production cutbacks were becoming critical (FRUS, XXXVI, 249). The DOD projected a requirement of 650,000 barrels per day, and were currently projecting the availability of 275,000 barrels per day for 1974. The paper noted the total cutoff of supplies from the refineries in Singapore, and the heavy reductions of oil provided by Exxon that had already been contracted for. The department had already began using fuel stored in prepositioned war reserve locations, and noted this only served to degrade military readiness further. It seemed that Exxon was being much harsher on providing contracted fuels than other suppliers, and although the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics had approached Exxon officials, they were not willing to increase their support to US military forces and risk the wrath of their Arab contracts.

Rumors of military action to secure oil production facilities reached into Saudi Arabia. Aides to King Feisal contacted Peter Rousel of the Republican National Committee, who forwarded their messages on 27 November 1973, to George H.W. Bush, the Chairman of the National Committee (FRUS, XXXVI, 250). The aide stated that King Feisal had information the US was considering using military force to secure oil production in the Middle East. The aide stated it was important no action be taken to increase tensions in the Middle East, and that King Feisal had taken the precautionary step of ordering the mining of oil production facilities. Crown Prince Khalid contacted Bill Wittmer, the former head of the Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company with a request that

President Nixon make it clear the US had no intention of invading any Middle Eastern countries to secure oil production.

Kissinger again brought up the suggestion of using military force to open the oil facilities in the Middle East during a 29 November 1973 meeting with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Major General Scowcroft, the Deputy National Security Advisor (FRUS, XXXVI, 251). Kissinger noted "It is ridiculous that the civilized world is held up by 8 million savages." Secretary of Defense Schlesinger remarked they had been talking about using the US Marines, but Kissinger stated he believed the Saudi's were about the blink. He thought the King was looking for a way out of the embargo problem, but noted the US could not yield to blackmail. He felt if the US did not stand firm and demonstrate resolve, the Soviets would soon seek some advantage in the Middle East against the US as well.

In the months of negotiations that followed, one figure emerged as the face of negotiations with OPEC over the lifting of the oil embargo, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister. Because King Feisal proclaimed he could not lift the embargo without the consensus of the other oil producers, Yamani became a very familiar face on television and in interviews. The ultimate goal of King Feisal during the negotiations seemed to be multifaceted. He wanted progress on disengagement talks between Egypt and Israel, and also between Syria and Israel. The King wanted Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, and for them to give up East Jerusalem and the West Bank (Kissinger 1987, 876). In return, he promised to work with the other oil producers to lift the embargo.

King Feisal expressed his desire to get the embargo lifted, but needed or wanted consensus from the oil producing countries. He also wanted Egypt, Syria, and Algeria to agree to the lifting. Egyptian President Sadat agreed the embargo should be lifted, however, Syria's President Assad wanted the embargo kept in place until he completed disengagement talks with Israel. He believed that without the oil leverage, Syrian talks would drag on and not be completed to their satisfaction. Assad noted that all disengagement talks to date had taken place between Egypt and Israel.

One of the key areas an ambassador plays an essential role is ensuring an understanding between countries. In a cable to Secretary Shultz dated 21 JAN 74, Ambassador Akins relays a conversation he had with Saudi Petroleum Minister, Ahmad Zaki Yamani, about trying to reduce the cost of oil (AmEmbassy Jidda 0330, 21 January 1974). Yamani was upset about recent news stories that placed the blame for the high prices on the Arab's. Yamani stated it was the Shah of Iran who was pushing members for higher prices. The Shah had also bragged in a recent news article about pushing for higher prices. Yamani recommended the US send demarches to the oil producing countries protesting the higher prices, and that he, Yamani, would support the push for lower prices among the members. Akins doubted the sincerity of Yamani's claim, but noted the US should work immediately to begin corresponding with the OPEC countries to try and get the prices lower. The Saudi's, much like Iran, had an unquenchable thirst for modern aircraft and weapons. And much like Iran, had the increasing profits of oil money to pay for them (Ottaway 2008). Ambassadors play a vital role when they understand what is important for Washington to know.

The continuing damage wrought by the embargo and price increases were again discussed in a memorandum from William Casey, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs dated 3 November 1973 (FRUS, XXXVI, 235). Casey notes the previous assessments of the impact of shortages and prices increases have proven inaccurate, and the damage was expected to be much worse, with shortages approaching eighteen percent. In a previous memo it was discussed that the impact of World War Two on fuel rationing only approximated a six percent shortage (FRUS, XXXVI, 232). Clearly the impact of the current situation was going to have a much greater effect on the economic stability of not only the US, but the world economy. Casey reiterated the economic costs of the price increases would be much greater than the embargo. His reasoning was the embargo would end, but the price increases would remain. And the main problem was the increased revenue would provide little incentive to the Arabs to increase production.

Kissinger worked to link his personal attention, and the US participation in the disengagement talks, to lifting the oil embargo. In a 23 October 1973 meeting with his staff, he stated there would be no US participation in joint auspices, the language of the ceasefire, until the oil boycott was ended (FRUS, XXXVI, 223). On 9 November 1973, Kissinger also told King Feisal directly the oil boycott was making his role as a negotiator harder to explain to Congress, and that an oil crisis in America would make the King's position more uncomfortable (FRUS, XXXVI, 238). To his staff, Kissinger explained he was telling the president they should tell the Arabs they will make progress when they lift the embargo, and not accept the embargo would be lifted if and when progress was made (FRUS, XXXVI, 251).

At the OAPEC meeting on 8 December in Kuwait, the oil producers were not swayed by King Feisal. Prince Fahd sent a message to Kissinger noting the results were not what they wanted or expected (FRUS, XXXVI, 265). The Arab members stuck to their demands that Israel withdraw from captured Arab territories, and return Jerusalem to Arab control, then a lifting of the embargo and return to the production levels of September could be discussed. Kissinger noted in his memoirs that was clearly not going to work (Kissinger, 1987, 883).

Q4: Was there a security alliance relationship among the four countries, or those four countries and the United States? An alliance between any of these countries and Egypt will also be considered due to the direct involvement of Egypt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the presupposed relationship to the oil embargo.

Saudi Arabia had a military alliance relationship during the years 1970-1974 with Iraq, Kuwait, and Egypt, that involved a defensive agreement, a non-aggression agreement, and a consultation agreement. According to Leeds (2005, 9), a defense agreement would require signatories to come to the aid of an ally militarily if their sovereignty or territorial integrity was attacked. The other two agreements, non-aggression and consultation, would obligate members to provide support short of active military engagement. The non-aggression agreement requires members to refrain from military conflict with their ally, while the consultation agreement would require coordination between members during periods of conflict. Chart 5.4 shows the relationship between alliance members and non-members.

Military alliance relations for select M.E. countries 1970-1974

	Saudi Arabia	Iraq	Kuwait	Egypt	Iran	United States	Israel
Saudi Arabia	—	DE/NA/CO	DE/NA/CO	DE/NA/CO	—	—	—
Iraq	DE/NA/CO	—	DE/NA/CO	DE/NA/CO	—	—	—
Kuwait	DE/NA/CO	DE/NA/CO	—	DE/NA/CO	—	—	—
Egypt	DE/NA/CO	DE/NA/CO	DE/NA/CO	—	—	—	—
Iran	—	—	—	—	—	CO	—
United States	—	—	—	—	DE / CO	—	—
Israel	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	DE = defense	NA = non-aggression	CO = consult				

Chart 5.4 Middle East military alliance

Saudi Arabia did not have an alliance relationship with Iran, the United States, or Israel. The economic relationship with Iran was through their membership in OPEC, while militarily, they were on the opposite ends of the security spectrum regarding support to each other. Saudi Arabia did have extensive economic trade relations with the United States, as well as extensive military training and foreign military sales agreements for military weapons and technology.

Feisal was the King of the House of Saud from 1964 to 1975, and is often thought of as the father of the modern state of Saudi Arabia (Ottaway 17). In the Saudi monarchy, the King was the final word on alliances and other political matters. When Nasser planned to mobilize troops in the Sinai in a bid to provoke Israel, Saudi Arabia declared its open support of Nasser's plans for the movement of troops and the closing of the Straits of Tiran. They also reopened the question of a united Arab command (Bar-Zohar 1975, 101). Although during the war with Yemen, the tension between Nasser and the

Saudi King increased. Nasser supported the rebels, while the Saudi's supported the Royalists (Ottaway 2008).

By the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union was providing Nasser with weapons, parts, and training. The US had not been in the business of selling arms to Saudi Arabia, but with the increase of Soviet influence, became more interested. Especially as it was looking more likely that Nasser was gearing up for another war with Israel, and had taken on the role of pan-Arab leadership.

Saudi Arabia pledged their support for the efforts of Egypt and Syria, and the King called for other Arab countries to provide material and forces. Ambassador Brown, the US Ambassador to Jordan, reported that King Hussein contacted him with the news that he had just received a message from Feisal asking for release of the Saudi forces stationed in Jordan so they could be sent immediately to the Syrian front to take part in the battle. The King said that Feisal's message was "semi-hysterical and very critical of Jordanian inaction at moment Syria and Egypt fighting the 'sacred battle'." Hussein had already replied, saying that the Saudi troops were needed in their present positions in Jordan, but told Brown that this was the sort of pressure he was increasingly subject to from virtually every Arab state and he begged for a prompt cease-fire. (AmEmbassy Amman 5367, 8 October 1973; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 618). Ambassador Brown's note to Washington will energize Kissinger to try and keep Jordan out of the war. Although Jordan did eventually send one brigade, by the time they arrived in their battle locations in Syrian, the fight was almost over.

Saudi Arabia's call to arms for Arab countries in the region put tremendous pressure on the region. Ambassador Brown reported that King Hussein had told him

that he was about to authorize dispatch of a Jordanian armored brigade to Syria, saying that this was the least he could do under the circumstances. The Ambassador commented that he had not repeated this "devastating" news elsewhere because he hoped that the United States might be able to deter, or at least defer the decision. (AmEmbassy Amman 5398, 10 October 1973; Harold H. Saunders Files, Box 1174, Middle East Negotiations Files; Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 618). The CIA White House Support Staff's report on this cable to the Director of the White House Situation Room noted that Hussein was desperately looking for some way out of his present dilemma short of becoming directly involved in the fighting. The King apparently still hoped that the Israelis would not attack Jordan in reprisal, but he had ordered a general mobilization of the Jordanian army just in case. Ambassador Keating reported that Minister Allon had emphasized in a conversation earlier in the day that Israel would crush Jordan if Hussein was foolish enough to intervene in the war.

Allon noted that Hussein had lost a good deal of his Kingdom the last time he had assisted the Syrians and that there would be little to reign over if he made the same mistake again. Keating reported that he had pointed out to Allon that it was in their mutual interests that Hussein not only not intervene, but that he survive the current hostilities (AmEmbassy Tel Aviv 7938, 10 October 1973). In a return message, Kissinger asked the Ambassador to convey immediately to the King a personal message from him which reads, "I have just learned from Ambassador Brown's latest message that you have been asked by President Sadat to intervene militarily. I urge you to delay such a decision as long as possible, and at least for another 36-48 hours. I am making a major effort through quiet diplomatic channels to bring about an end to the

fighting. I do not say this lightly—I need time and your help. It is imperative you keep this in strict confidence" (SecState 201118, 10 October 1973).

During the 1973 war, Kissinger complained several time the US was not being supported by the European countries, with the exception of a few, or by many NATO allies. In a Washington Special Action Group memo dated 15 October 1973, Kissinger was again complaining about the lack of support from the Europeans (FRUS, XXXVI, 210). When discussing the estimated impact of an oil cutoff of Europe, Secretary Rush noted it would negatively affect their support for the war. Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Staff, noted they were already content to let the US carry the burden of the war. Kissinger, in a rare moment of undiplomatic outburst, noted they had been "...goddamned unhelpful in the diplomacy." Again Kissinger noted the Saudi's had not indicated they would cut off the flow of oil to the US or other countries, that officially they had taken the opposite track. He noted sending the King a letter detailing the reasons why the US was beginning to resupply war material to the Israeli's, and indicated their initial reply was to keep the resupply efforts low key. He did, however, note the reply had not come from the King. Kissinger stated he believed the US efforts in ending the war in Vietnam was seen as weakness around the world, and that if the US were to get into another confrontation, they needed to be seen as a giant in the international arena.

Kissinger's view was believed the European countries were not doing anything to help the US in either getting the embargo lifted, or negotiating the disengagement of military forces in the Sinai. This was reinforced in a memorandum from the National Security Staff to Secretary Kissinger, dated 4 December, in which the actions of certain European countries to appease the Arabs was reflected in their oil imports from Arab

sources (FRUS, XXXVI, 261). While several of the European countries were facing a 20% decrease in available Arab oil, the UK and France were anticipating only a 6% decrease. The US was in the envious position of not obtaining more than a small percentage of oil from Arab sources. The report noted that the negative effects of the embargo were now affecting the US about as bad as it was expected to get, and from this point forward, the US still controlled sufficient oil stocks to sustain US markets. The US was prepared to assist European partners to help make up shortages, but noted the Europeans had not asked for much of anything from the US. It was assumed they were counting on the US to pressure Israel to accept withdrawal from Arab territories, and their own efforts at appeasing Arab producers to try and make their situation better.

In a message from King Feisal's political advisor, Kamal Adham, dated 2 December 1973, the break Kissinger was looking for was offered (FRUS, XXXVI, 257). The King's senior advisors believed the pressure on Kissinger was too great, and that easing the restrictions of the embargo might help move the negotiations forward. This had been Kissinger's position all along, and it now seemed to be within his grasp. The King believed if the six point agreement previously agreed to by the Egyptian and Israeli military forces were began to be implemented, this would allow the King to say this was evidence of movement in the peace process. Because King Feisal had become the primary spokesman for the Arabs, his position was powerful enough to sway the argument, but fragile enough to be brought down quickly if it turned out the embargo was lifted too swiftly.

Prince Fahd followed Adham' s note on 3 December 1973, with additional clarification of what the Saudis hoped to accomplish regarding the lifting of the

embargo, and the immediate increase in oil production (FRUS, XXXVI, 259). Fahd and Adham planned to travel to Cairo and meet with President Sadat. After getting his support for ending the embargo, Prince Fahd would travel to Washington and meet with Secretary Kissinger on 6 December. If Kissinger were able to get the six point cease fire agreement implemented on both sides of the Sinai, the King would move for an immediate lifting of the embargo and cessation of the production cuts. The only other condition the King demanded was these negotiations remain top secret. No one outside a very small audience could know the King was negotiating with the US for the ending of the embargo. Notably for the first time, the King did not tie the future of Jerusalem to the negotiations. However, the Prince would not make the trip to Washington as planned.

King Feisal determined the best place to gain concessions from the other Arab countries was at the upcoming OPEC meeting scheduled for 8 December in Kuwait. His plan was to get their pledge to lift the sanctions and production cuts pending the start of the Geneva negotiations, and with the implementation of the six point agreement. Although Kissinger had initially rejected the meetings at Kilometer 101 that had produced the six point agreement, it now seemed to be the methodology that would allow the King to push for lifting the embargo.

The efforts of Kissinger's negotiation, and Ambassador Akins discussions on the impact the oil embargo and production cuts were having on the world economy led to King Feisal to work toward ending the oil sanctions. He pledged that at the 8 December OPEC meeting he would push for the lifting of production cuts. Although he was fairly confident he would be able to persuade the other oil producing countries, the other

OPEC members were not persuaded, and the King failed. However, King Feisal was not deterred, and recommended another oil ministers meeting on 25 December in Kuwait. This would be 24 December in the US, and unfortunately this meeting would be called the Christmas Eve Massacre when it was over. In a telegram from the embassy in Saudi Arabia (AmEmbassy Jidda, 5606, 19 December 1973), Ambassador Akins reported a conversation with Saudi Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf, in which King Feisal was planning to restate the case for lifting the embargo and production cuts due to the harm being done to other smaller Arab countries, and friends of Arab countries. The King also planned to tell the assembled ministers he believed the efforts of Secretary Kissinger to bring about a just peace were sincere, and that he, the King, trusted him (FRUS, XXXVI, 268).

The disengagement negotiations began to bear fruit, and this added pressure from Kissinger and Akins to get the oil sanctions lifted. Through January and February, King Feisal and his advisors worked with the US to craft the right message, and the other OPEC ministers to persuade them to end the embargo and restore the production cuts. In a 6 March 1974 meeting between Kissinger, Sisco, and Akins; and Umar al-Saqqaf, Saudi Minister of State, and Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Saudi Ambassador to the US at the guest palace in Riyadh, the discussion centered around the oil embargo, which the King had indicated he would push to lift shortly (Memorandum of Conversation, DNSA KT 01048, 6 March 1974). During the meeting, Kissinger and Saqqaf discussed the progress being made in the disengagement talks between the Egyptians, Syrians and Israeli's. Kissinger noted the Syrians were not happy with the talks, but he thought they would come around if there were some limited withdrawal on the part of the Israelis

to the 6 October 1973 lines. Saqqaf reminded him they actually wanted the 5 June 1967 lines, but he was happy there was at least some movement. Saqqaf indicated the King would press to lift the embargo soon, and without any conditions. Akins interrupted and said that was not his understanding after speaking with the King recently. Saqqaf indicated he had spoken with the King and they agreed there would be no conditions, and that the embargo would be lifted at the next OPEC ministers meeting.

In an interesting note about the desire of Saudi Arabia to maintain friendly ties with the US, Ambassador Jordan relayed a story that took place during the US airlift of supplies to Israel. During the airlift, Prince Fahd had a meeting with his security officials, and showed them news-footage of arriving USAF aircraft into Israel. The Prince is reported to have said, "This is why we need to maintain close relations with the U.S. They are the only ones capable of saving us in this manner should we ever be at risk" (Bronson 2006, 118).

5.3 Kuwait

5.31 Background to the conflict and the embargo

Although Kuwait was an oil rich country, their membership in OPEC and their alliance agreements with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt, meant their trade and voting policies were very much influenced by those countries; particularly Saudi Arabia. Kuwait did advocate strongly for a total embargo against the United States, but followed Saudi Arabia's lead when that country did not initially support such an embargo.

Kuwait was very interested in US technology, especially military equipment. The price increases for oil meant they had the ability to spend a significant amount of money on this. They also had a continuing problem with their neighbor Iraq over border boundaries. Iraq wanted to acquire as much Kuwaiti territory as possible, and this found Kuwait constantly fending off challenges from the north.

During the lead up to the 1973 conflict, Kuwait provided little actual oil to the United States, and consequently when they did enact the production cuts agreed to by OPEC, the actual effect on the United States was minimal. Although the economic impact was minimal, the psychological effect of US economic power being influenced by as small a country as Kuwait may have been significant.

5.3.2 Kuwait's four questions

Q1: What was the level of cooperation between the Ambassador and the host country as measured by the Conflict and Peace Database (COPDAB) and the UN Voting dataset? Was there a change in the level of cooperation during or after the crisis period?

Kuwait maintained a COPDAB scale value mean point average below 7 for most of the period under investigation. The highest mean point reading was in 1971, when the average was recorded as a 7. After that, the scale value decreased, particularly in

KUWAIT COPDAB SCALE VALUE 1970-1974

■ SV 3 ■ SV 4 ■ SV 5 ■ SV 6 ■ SV 7 ■ SV 8 ■ SV 9 ■ SV 10 ■ SV 11




Chart 5.5 Kuwait COPDAB scale value

1974 when the average was at 4. For most of this period, this represented a higher than average level of cooperation. This is significant especially in light of the support Kuwait gave to the oil production cut-back, and their support for a total oil embargo against the United States.

This higher level of cooperation is reflected in the ideal point average and the percent of UN votes that agreed with the US position. As seen in Chart 5.6, although the percentages are not as high as Iran, they are roughly the same average as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt.

UN VOTING PATTERNS 1970-1974




Chart 5.6 Kuwait UN voting patterns

As the leader of the Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic movement, Saudi Arabia was a stabilizing force in the Middle East. When Saudi Arabia determined to use oil as a weapon, the other OPEC and Arab nations followed suit. But when assessing cooperation, Kuwait sustains a high level of cooperation with the US, and their votes at the UN reflect this. Kuwait votes no in-line with Saudi Arabia, but abstains almost 20 percent more, although this is perceived as a no vote by UN researchers (Voeten 2013). Kuwait also votes yes almost 12 percent more often than Saudi Arabia during this period.

Q2: What was the experience level of the ambassador as determined by the qualifications listed in the Neumann – Pickering letter?

John P. Walsh was a career Foreign Service Officer, and served as the ambassador to Kuwait from November 1969 until December 1971. Born in Illinois in December 1918, he attended the University of Illinois, where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree. He then attended Catholic University and the University of Chicago, where he earned a Masters of Arts and a PhD respectively. He served in the US Navy during World War II from 1941-1945. He had previous regional experience, but the biographic register does not show he spoke any additional languages. Ambassador Walsh does meet several of the key Neumann-Pickering qualifications, and would be considered an experienced ambassador due to his career status and regional experience.

William A. Stoltzfus, Jr., was a career Foreign Service Officer, and served as the ambassador to Kuwait from February 1972 until January 1976. Concurrent with the Kuwait assignment, Ambassador Stoltzfus was also accredited to Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Republic during a portion of this period as well. Born in Lebanon to American parents, he attended Princeton University where he was awarded an Artium Baccalaureatus (AB) degree. He did not serve in the military, but did have previous regional experience. He spoke two additional languages, Arabic and French. Ambassador Stoltzfus was a Department of State faculty representative at the National War College for one year. Ambassador Stoltzfus met many of the criteria from the Neumann-Pickering letter, and would be considered highly qualified as an ambassador for a Middle Eastern country.

The embargo of oil was not the whole issue during the period following the end of hostilities from the October war. The posted price of oil had undergone significant increases, and Kuwait was no different. Although the US was not receiving oil exports from Kuwait, Europe and Japan were heavily dependent on Kuwaiti oil, and the increased prices were causing their economies to contract. Stoltzfus noted the Kuwaitis would not likely reduce prices anytime soon, and felt justified by the higher prices for oil based on supply and demand. They also believed that historically, the Arabs had not been treated as equals by the West, and were in no mood to be generous with their resources. In his meetings with Kuwaiti officials, Stoltzfus noted their intransigence in reducing prices, while at the same time recognizing the damage high oil prices were causing the world economy (AmEmbassy Kuwait 0305, 24January 1974).

Ambassador Stoltzfus worked hard to understand the oil markets, and had developed a lot of knowledge about the oil business, Kuwaiti negotiation strategies, and business planning. When British Petroleum and Gulf oil were negotiating a participation agreement with Kuwait, they sought Ambassador Stoltzfus opinion on the fairness of the planned arrangements. The Kuwaitis were demanding a minimum of 60% ownership of the oil concessions, and when asked for his opinion, the ambassador offered his assessment of the deal. The disagreement between the government and the oil majors was in how the oil company assets were being valued. Kuwait planned to purchase their shares of the companies, and the two oil companies were concerned the valuations were not as good as they should be getting. After discussing the various means of production, Stoltzfus agreed the offered prices may not be the best possible, but the alternative could be Kuwait nationalizing their companies, at which point they may

receive nowhere near their values. The oil companies agreed with his reasoning, and made the deal with Kuwait (AmEmbassy Kuwait 0263, 21 January 1974).

Ambassador Stoltzfus kept close track of the oil export statistics for Kuwait, and routinely reported their export numbers for the various oil consumers, particularly in Europe and Japan. During the first six months of 1973, Kuwait exported 894.4 million barrels of oil. Of this, the US imported 7.6 million barrels from Kuwait. Although the US was not a major consumer of Kuwaiti oil, they exported a substantial amount to Japan and Europe (AmEmbassy Kuwait 0307, 26 January 1973). When Kuwait joined the oil embargo in October 1973, the exports to the US stopped. While this had minimal impact on the US, the production cutbacks would have a major effect on Japan and Europe.

Ambassador Stoltzfus continued to keep track of Kuwait's oil production, and reported that in March, the ending of the embargo allowed Kuwait to export oil to the US. Production numbers for Kuwait in March 1973 showed a production of 79.6 million barrels of oil. This averaged 2.57 m/bpd of production. They shipped 863,854 thousand barrels of oil to the US. This was a small amount compared to the quantities shipped to the UK (14.8 million barrels), Japan (14.4 million), and France (10.3 million). The quantities shipped to the European countries along with Japan was reflected in their efforts to maintain good relations with the Arab oil producers, at the expense of supporting US efforts to rein in higher fuel prices and to establish peace in the Middle East (AmEmbassy Kuwait 1454, 16 April 1974).

Comments attributed to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger about using military force to oppose the oil embargo were treated harshly in the Arab press, and the Kuwait press was no exception. The Kuwait government also reacted strongly to what they

interpreted as threats to the security and sovereignty of Kuwait. The ambassador noted the government had directed the mining of oil fields with explosives, and threatened to blow up oil installations and pipelines if the US sent military forces to Kuwait (AmEmbassy Kuwait 0129, 13 January 1974). Secretary Schlesinger had made these comments in several press interviews, and it was known Secretary Kissinger had voiced similar comments as well. This increased the tension in the Middle East at a time Kissinger was negotiating both the lifting of the embargo as well as the negotiated settlement between Egypt and Israel.

In a lengthy cable to the State Department, Ambassador Stoltzfus demonstrated his understanding of the situation inside Kuwait as he carefully explained the logic of the oil embargo and higher prices to the Kuwaiti government. He noted that although they may wish to lift the embargo against the US, there were significant political and economic reasons why they could not do that alone. The ambassador noted the oil embargo was a complex problem for the Kuwaitis, comprised of medium and long range economic factors, as well as the short term political desire to support Arab efforts to use oil as a weapon against the West (AmEmbassy Kuwait 0488, 6 February 1974).

Stoltzfus relayed that talks with government officials had revealed their fear that Kuwait did not have as much oil reserves as other major Arab producers, and saw higher prices, and the embargo, as a way to rapidly increase their financial revenues, while simultaneously supporting the Arab cause.

The ambassador stated his goal was to ensure Kuwaiti officials understood not only the financial harm excessively high oil prices were causing the world economy, but also the political damage being done to US and Kuwaiti relations because of the

embargo. He continued to advise the Kuwaiti government that peace efforts being promoted by Secretary Kissinger would run the risk of being curtailed due to political pressures from the American people, who may not appreciate the hardships the embargo were requiring. Stoltzfus closed by noting that oil minister Atiqi continued to link the cost of oil with the high cost of basic food and other commodities, with Atiqi also noting the problem was not the high cost of oil, but the purchasing power it brought. Stoltzfus advised that because of the political cost to Kuwait if they acted alone, the key was to get Saudi Arabia to move on oil prices and the embargo, and this might embolden the Kuwaitis to act in concert with them.

Q3: What was the dollar value of trade before, during, and after the crisis as measured by total import and export trade? Was there a change in the level of trade volume between the United States and the target country during and after the crisis?

Kuwait is another Middle Eastern country in which the trade value was either missing or unreliable in the Barbieri data set. Because the gap covers the years 1961-1972, no attempt was made to use trade value linked to previous years. However, what is seen in chart 5.7 is that during the crisis periods of 1973 and 1974, Kuwait was increasing trade with the US.

TRADE BETWEEN THE US AND KUWAIT 1970-1974




Chart 5.7 Kuwait import / export trade data

Although modest by other trade value increases with Saudi Arabia and Iran, trade did increase with Kuwait by 7 percent from 1973 to 1974.

Although Kuwait was not a major arms trading country for the US, they were still interested in US weapons and technology. In the summer of 1973, they were interested in purchasing US aircraft, and Ambassador Stoltzfus sent a note to the US State Department telling them the Kuwaitis were interested in flying each of the various types of aircraft they were interested in purchasing. The ambassador, although he did not care to be a part of the weapons selling business (ADST Oral History Ambassador Stoltzfus, 1994), was nonetheless very involved in helping the Kuwaitis with their purchases (AmEmbassy Kuwait 2521, 16 July 1974).

Saudi Arabia had a robust US military training mission, and the Kuwaiti Chief of Staff, MAJ General Mubarak had visited the Saudi air defense training school located in Jidda. The Chief of Staff was very impressed with the quality of the training, and asked the ambassador if the US would help him develop a proposal to put forward to the Saudis to ask them to help train Kuwaiti military at their school. He also wanted a proposal for a US training mission to teach advanced air defense in Kuwait. The ambassador arranged for Raytheon, a US defense contractor, to help provide assistance for a two part proposal for Kuwait (AmEmbassy Kuwait 2607, 23 July 1974). The ability to link key business partners with their assigned country is one of the important roles ambassadors play in a foreign country.

Ambassador Stoltzfus had sent a note earlier in July stating the Kuwaiti government had asked him if the US would be interested in selling arms to the United Arab Emirates. They said the Abu Dhabi Defense Forces, and the Union Defense Force (UAE) were interested in US technology due to the recent weapon sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait (SecState 129189, 2 July 1974). For ambassadors that develop a positive working relationship with their host government, being able to extend their support to other countries shows the true worth of having an ambassador with exceptional experience working to enhance US business interests.

The massive increase in oil revenues led to instability not only in the economy of Kuwait, but in the government as well. Ambassador Stoltzfus noted there was a significant power struggle developing between the established government, and the new business technocrats. He predicted there would be a shakeup in the government that would see the politicians be pushed aside for the businessmen. He believed the

shakeup would be successful because of the billions of dollars of new money available to the government and businesses. He observed that although the economy of Kuwait was expanding rapidly, it would be unable to absorb the significant amounts of capital flowing into the country (AmEmbassy Kuwait 0265, 22 January 1974; AmEmbassy Kuwait 1037, 18 March 1974). The amounts of money being transferred from Western economies was staggering. Not only would Kuwait suffer from too much money, Saudi Arabia and Iran would have problems as well. In fact, the introduction of significant sums of money allowed rulers to improve the lives of their countrymen, although at some risk.

A key area of contention was the pace of price increases on oil for Western countries. For the Arabs, they linked the high price of oil with the increased costs of basic commodities imported by most Arab countries from Western producers. The increased cost of these commodities continued to be a point of contention among Arab countries, although US and other Western governments linked the higher cost of commodities to the higher cost of energy to produce them. However, the Minister of Finance and Oil Atiqi also noted that Kuwait did not intend to keep its new oil wealth "in boxes under their chairs." Atiqi noted that Kuwait wanted to invest in US technology and partnership deals, and this would return much of the petro-dollars back to the US (AmEmbassy Kuwait 3283, 6 August 1974). Ambassador Stoltzfus stated he had his staff working on ideas for opportunities to help create US and Kuwaiti partnerships, and would have some ideas to present to the State Department soon.

The high price of oil had the net effect of reducing demand among the oil consuming nations. Ambassador Stoltzfus reported a recent oil auction that Kuwait was

planning to host was postponed after most bids for a barrel of oil came in much lower than anticipated (AmEmbassy Kuwait 0658, 20 February 1974). Although the press had reported some bids had been tendered at \$16 per barrel, most bids were between \$8-\$10 dollars per barrel. The Kuwaiti press wondered if the major oil companies were colluding to keep the bid price of oil lower than anticipated.

One of Kuwait's stated goals when their oil wealth began to growth substantially was to invest their money in projects outside of Kuwait. This would ensure they did not saturate their markets with new money. In an embassy cable from the ambassador to the State Department was a notice that South Carolina officials were close to completing arrangements for an investment group from Kuwait that were partnering in a British Petroleum Company (BPC) refinery in South Carolina (AmEmbassy Kuwait 993, 14 March 1974). This would mark the first Arab investments in the oil business inside the US, but showed the expanding interests of the oil producers in being more involved with the downstream portions of the oil business. The refinery would be built near Charlestown, South Carolina, and would be supported by extensive Kuwaiti financing.

Business development by mid-May 1974 had grown so much the ambassador requested that a Regional Economic Officer position be converted to work economic affairs specifically in Kuwait. The ambassador noted that events in the past year had increased the attention of economic agencies of the US government, as well as commercial interests in the US (AmEmbassy Kuwait 2144, 29 May 1974). He also observed that with Kuwait's increasing wealth and activity in Arab affairs that its significance to the US had increased significantly. Stoltzfus argued that along with increased commercial business activity, the growth of US arms sales in Kuwait through

the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program had also steadily increased, and the US needed to be positioned to take full advantage of this. Clearly the view from inside Kuwait is of an expanding appetite for US technology, and Stoltzfus is prepared to help US businesses take part in their expansion.

Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat had promised Secretary Kissinger that when a disengagement settlement had been negotiated with Israel he would recommend to King Feisal, of Saudi Arabia, that the embargo be ended against the US. On 2 March 1974, the Bahraini Foreign Minister reported that Sadat's Assistant for Foreign Contacts, Ashraf Marwan, asked the government of Bahrain for their support in having the embargo lifted. Egypt had asked for a meeting of oil ministers in Cairo on 11 March 1973 in order to discuss lifting the embargo. Marwan reportedly told the minister that Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait had pledged to follow Egypt's lead. Kuwait stated they would agree to whatever King Feisal wanted to do (AmEmbassy Manama Bahrain, 0110, 3 March 1974).

When the embargo ended on 18 March 1974, oil exports to the US were restarted. Due to Dr. Kissinger's efforts at trying to bring about a just peace in the Middle East, the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance and Oil Atiqi said Kuwait would not seek to re-impose an embargo on the US. He was quoted as saying, "We do not want to be enemies of the American people nor do we seek the hostility of the US. Kuwait considers that the US is the only country that is sincerely working for peace in the Middle East." However, Atiqi also stated that Kuwait was not likely to renew its previous production levels, or lower the posted price of oil in return for better relations (AmEmbassy Kuwait 2020, 21 May 1974).

Q4: Was there an alliance relationship among the four countries, or those four countries and the United States? An alliance between any of these countries and Egypt will also be considered due to the direct involvement of Egypt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the presupposed relationship to the oil embargo.

During the period 1970 – 1974, Kuwait had a defensive agreement, along with a non-aggression and consultation agreement with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt. As seen in chart 5.8, just as with those three countries, there is no alliance relationship with Iran, Israel, or the United States.

	Saudi Arabia	Iraq	Kuwait	Egypt	Iran	United States	Israel
Kuwait	DE/NA/CO	DE/NA/CO	—	DE/NA/CO	—	—	—

Chart 5.8 Kuwait alliance agreements

The alliance relationship with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt seemed to strongly influence Kuwait's actions regarding their relationships with the United States. In particular, they followed Saudi Arabia's lead in supporting Egypt, and the production cut-backs in oil.

Kuwait took their alliance responsibilities seriously. Although Kuwait is a small country compared to Egypt or Saudi Arabia, with the signing of the defense pact between Jordan and Egypt on 30 May 1967, the forces against Israel had increased to include Kuwaiti forces sent by Emir Sabah as-Salim as-Sabab, the Emir of Kuwait. As soon as the signing had taken place, the US woke up to the real danger facing Israel

and the region. In support of Nasser's policies Algeria, Iraq, and Kuwait had put troops at Egypt's disposal (Bar Zohar 1975).

5.4 Iran

5.4.1 Background to the conflict and the embargo

The United States had long enjoyed an economic and military relationship with several countries in the Middle East, particularly with Iran and Saudi Arabia. American foreign policy in the Middle East has been driven and sustained by several factors, stability, security, and economically; particularly oil and particularly with Iran and Saudi Arabia. These growing military and economic relationships were greatly strengthened by the end of World War II. In the case of Iran, this was even truer after the royal coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953. Miglieta (2002) notes, military relations were strengthened through several operational initiatives that resulted in a massive increase in arms sales and grants. Economic programs increased through international as well as domestic loans and grants. Further, the Eisenhower administration had positioned the major US oil companies to become major players in Iranian oil exploration and sales.

Strategically, the diplomatic relationship with Iran would pay dividends in the lead up to the October War. While Arab countries were lining up against Israel, the Shah approved plans for the US use of Iranian ports, airfields, and fuel depots. Iran maintained good relations with Israel, to include military and economic trade, due to the alliance relationship between Israel and the United States. Like Iran, Israel had been provided extensive military training and support, as well as economic development

opportunities. The alliance with Iran was based on geostrategic reasons, and was supported with a desire by the Shah to modernize both his military and economy. The modernization effort was supported by high oil prices to pay for infrastructure and military improvements. This created a very co-dependent relationship that helped sustain the flow of Iranian oil during the 1973 embargo (Miglieta 2002).

So insatiable was the Shah's desire for weapons that during the first two years of the Nixon Presidency, he had purchased \$750 million worth of new systems. That was roughly the total amount purchased from 1955-1969. During a 1969 State visit, the Shah pressed Nixon for help with the oil companies. He needed them to pump more oil from their concessions in Iran to help finance his economic and military reforms. Nixon's aides had advised the President to be careful with his requests due to the fragility in Iran's economy, but the Shah was insistent (Miglieta 2002, 37).

Once Nixon was in the White House, the Shah began asking for more military weapons. Secretary of State William Rogers, was concerned that Iran's economy was beginning to show signs of strain due to the cost of these modern weapon systems. Iran was already hard pressed to pay for the systems they had, and relied heavily on the continued sale of oil. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had estimated that the Shah's proposed FY 1971-1972 budget would consume current oil revenues, and require deficit financing of \$1.3B dollars. They were concerned this would use all available private investment capital (Cooper 2011, 54). In a private meeting, President Nixon assured Iran's Ambassador to the United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, that he would support price increases so Iran could pay for modernization and military weapons (Cooper 2011, 42).

Iran did not support the Arab countries during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Iran saw the US and Israel as allies, and determined to continue to support them during the conflict. When Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries began to impose oil production cut backs as an economic means to get the US to change their support for Israel, Iran did not support that either. As Chester (1983, 412) notes, "In the crisis that followed the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war in October, the United States was deprived of petroleum by such tiny oil-producing nations as Kuwait, as well as by its longtime friend Saudi Arabia, although Iran did continue to supply oil." The dividends of a carefully nurtured economic and military friendship seemed to be paying off, as it's during this time Secretary of State Kissinger, in a less perceptive moment, states that the United States enjoys excellent relations in the Middle East. He can foresee no time that there would be an oil embargo against the United States (Chester 1983, 213). The real unseen benefit may have been that Iran's economy and modernization required so much revenue that it could not afford an interruption (Cooper 2011).

The Shah used the embargo to drastically raise the price of oil. Kissinger and Nixon had quietly assured him they would support these increases, although, there is evidence they were surprised by how much the Shah intended to raise prices. The Shah wanted to raise the price of oil in order to continue modernizing his country and military. Henry Kissinger was notified just prior to the OPEC meeting in Tehran in December 1973, there would be a large increase. Although the US Ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms, had been notified of how large the increase would be, he did not understand its significance. Iranian Oil Minister, Asadollah Alam, noted in his diary that the ambassador misunderstood the true implications. "This was likely a failure by the

Ambassador and State Department to understand the basic economics of oil pricing" (Cooper 2011, 572).

In 1974, the embassy in Tehran was one of the largest in Asia. Embassy Tehran was also the regional base of operations for the CIA. This alone convinced Ambassador Helms and Secretary Kissinger to overlook many of the concerns about the Shah's spending on military equipment, oil price increases, and human rights abuses. The Shah had a special connection to CIA Director Richard Helms, who had become the ambassador to Iran. The Shah had attended school in Switzerland with his brother. Because of this, the Shah had been very accommodating when asked by the CIA to establish listening posts and sub-stations in Iran. It was Richard Helms, who routinely intervened on the Shah's behalf for more weapon systems (Cooper 2011). Ambassador Helms stepped down as the ambassador to Iran at the end of 1977. His resignation was timed before the release of a CIA report that was highly critical of his tenure as ambassador.

5.4.2 Iran's four questions

Q1: What was the level of cooperation between the US and the host country as measured by the Conflict and Peace Database (COPDAB) and the UN Voting dataset? Was there a change in the level of cooperation during or after the crisis period?

While Iran did not join the oil embargo against the United States and her allies, the relationship was strained by the increasing cost of oil, driven mainly by Iran.

Disagreements with Iraq centered mainly on their insistence on increasing the price of oil. The Shah maintained his desire for sophisticated military technology, and this drove him to continue to increase the price of oil. While these increases had been previously sanctioned by both Nixon and Kissinger, they found themselves unable to control the Shah. Coupled with policy disagreements with the Secretary of Commerce, Mike Sullivan, cooperation began to suffer. As seen in Chart 5.9, there is a slight uptick beyond the scale value of 7 beginning in 1973, and a significant uptick at the scale value of 7.




Chart 5.9 Iran COPDAB scale value

However, as previously noted (Cooper 2011), what was more important to Ambassador Helms in 1973, and 1974, was the access to outposts for the CIA, and modernization for the Iranian military. The fact that Iran continued to supply increasing quantities of oil while other OPEC producers cut back on production was enough to offset the degradation of cooperation in other areas. As for the increases in price for oil, the US would soon lose control of its Iranian ally.

During the embargo and production cuts, OPEC would routinely meet to discuss the markets, reset quotas, and adjust prices. In a December 1973 meeting of the OPEC ministers, the Shah pushed for a dramatic increase in prices. In what would be dubbed “the Christmas Eve Massacre,” the price of oil more than doubled; from \$5.12 per barrel, to \$11.66 (Bronson 2006, 122). Although the Shah had been a partner and ally of the US since 1942, his desire for modernization of Iranian society and his military was unquenchable. Three days after the price increase, King Feisal led OPEC to dramatically increase production. The King feared the price increases would lead to the collapse of Western economies and the world markets.

The importance of Iran and the Shah to the Nixon administration and their desire for stability of the region should not be underestimated. Nixon and Kissinger placed a lot of faith and trust in the Shah, and this was evidenced in the contingency planning the White House conducted with the Shah over the remote chance there might be a Gadhafi type coup in either Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. Kissinger directed Ambassador Helms to work with the Shah to develop contingency plans that would result in the US and Iran providing military forces to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait in the event their governments were about to fall. This was to ensure the vast oil fields did not fall into unfriendly hands. The Shah noted if there were an illegal coup in Saudi Arabia, he could have an airborne brigade inside Saudi Arabia very quickly, followed by a full division of troops. These plans were designed with the idea that members of the Royal House would request assistance in defeating the coup. In this planning, Helms is a key partner with the Shah and the Nixon White House. Both Nixon and Kissinger wanted the Shah to think about

such an event, and to begin preliminary planning; but to only speak with Ambassador Helms about such a plan (MEMCON 24 July 1973, 5:00 – 6:40 p.m., DNSA KC00218).

However, Ambassador Helms was concerned the Shah may not be the most reliable partner when it came to contingency planning for military operations inside Saudi Arabia. The Shah had a contentious relationship with the Saudi's because of their claim as the leaders of the Arab countries. The Saudi's also had significant proven reserves of oil that the Shah was interested in. In a backchannel telegram from Ambassador Helms to Kissinger, Helms was becoming very concerned about the demeanor of the Shah relating to the contingency planning for a takeover of either Saudi Arabia or Kuwait that Kissinger had spoken to the Shah about. Helms believed the Shah was overthinking the planning, and was perhaps overestimating the need for a plan. He was concerned about any leaks or ill-advised inquiries that might find their way to the Saudis or Kuwaitis. He was concerned the Shah might even leak some information for Saudi consumption for his own political purposes (AmEmbassy Tehran, backchannel 86, 20 August 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 33). Although King Feisal may have understood the US desire to help the Saud government protect their country and oil reserves, had word of this military contingency planning reached the King, it may have been extremely damaging to both the US and Iran.

Ambassador Helms worked to ensure the Shah trusted him as the US Ambassador. In a 23 July 1973 memorandum of conversation involving Kissinger and Helms, the topic of being forthright with the Shah had come up (FRUS, XXVII, 24). As a regional power, the Shah believed part of his role was to ensure peace and stability in the region. During a conversation with Ambassador Helms, the Shah had discussed the

instability in Pakistan, and wondered what the US could or would do to help increase their internal security. Relaying this conversation to Kissinger, Helms stated that Kissinger should be honest and tell the Shah what the US could or could not do to help. Kissinger had told the ambassador it was almost impossible for the US to get involved at the current time.

The use of the oil card by Saudi Arabia and OPEC had been an openly discussed topic. In a White House meeting between the Shah, Kissinger, and Ambassador Helms, the Shah discussed options for US diplomacy that might forestall the use of the oil weapon (White House memorandum dated 24 July 1973, 5:00 – 6:40 p.m.). As early as July before the October War and ensuing oil embargo, it was an open threat from OPEC that the oil weapon would be used if needed. The Saudi's felt the need to use this weapon would be tied to the resumption of diplomatic talks between Egypt and Israel, and felt the US should play a constructive role in bringing that about. Kissinger noted the Egyptian position had not changed over time, they were demanding Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, but without the promise of peace even if they were to accept. The Shah was a strategic partner of the US in the region; and he often provided valuable insight into the Middle East.

As a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Ambassador Helms had a keen appreciation for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of Iran. He often provided Kissinger and the State Department a thorough picture of the Shah and of Iran through his assessment of the governmental, economic, and military situation inside Iran. In an embassy cable to the State Department (AmEmbassy Tehran 05268, 26 June 1974), Ambassador Helms stated that increased oil revenues have made Iran

more capable in the region, and that the Shah was a very capable administrator of his country. However, this was a double-edged sword as well. As the Shah became more powerful through his oil wealth and modernization, he also became more dismissive of the need for good relations among his Arab neighbors. He also discussed the continuing hostility between Iraq and Iran, which he saw stemmed from the continued Soviet influence on Iraq. He realistically assessed that Iran is still very much an underdeveloped country that will take years to grow economically and militarily. In addition, he identified the danger of the entire effort depending on one man; the Shah. Helms recommended the US work to encourage Saudi Arabia to take a more active role in regional security and economics to ensure Iran does not become the dominant powerhouse, as this would make Arab countries in the region nervous. This proved to be prescient advice as the future would show the government of the Shah was not as stable as it seemed.

The degradation in diplomatic and foreign policy cooperation became more apparent in UN voting patterns. As seen in chart 5.10, the lack of agreement in the UN with voting patterns between the US and Iran began to change as well.




Chart 5.10 Iran UN voting patterns

The average percent of agreement between the US and Iran in UN voting for the period 1970-1974 was roughly 38 percent. But, during the critical years from 1972-1974, the agreement percentage moved down from 41 percent in 1972, to 28 percent in 1973, to 31 percent in 1974. Conversely, the other US ally in the region, Israel, had an almost 61 percent average agreement rate with the US for the period 1970-1974.

During a meeting with Kissinger, Sisco, and Helms in Tehran, 9 June 1973, The Shah asked Kissinger what the US could do to keep Sadat from “committing suicide” by going to war with Israel (SecState 118336, 18 June 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 19). The Shah asked if the Roger’s Plan could be revisited, as he believed Egypt would reenter negotiations if the plan was brought forward and this would give Sadat more time to show his people he was still negotiating the return of captured Egyptian territory (MEMCON 24 July 1973, 5:00 – 6:40 p.m., DNSA KC00218). Kissinger demurred,

stating he did not believe the Egyptians understood what was in the Roger's Plan, and they needed to trust that the US was trying to be evenhanded in their desire for peace. Kissinger invited the Shah to enlist his UN ambassador to meet with the Egyptian ambassador to see what might be done. Although the Shah believed he knew how to proceed with negotiations in the Middle East, Kissinger did not want to pursue his advice.

In a backchannel message from Ambassador Helms to Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft dated 30 October 1973, Helms succinctly described the oil situation facing the US (AmEmbassy Tehran, backchannel 110, 30 October 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 41). Helms noted the seriousness of the Saudi position that the US pressure Israel to accept the Arab understanding of UN Resolution 242, and for Israel to withdraw to their 5 June 1967 borders. He reiterated the dangerousness of the situation, and the fact the Saudi's monetarily underwrote the actions by Egypt and Syria against Israel. Because the Arabs had lost, the importance of the economic action against the West had only added to the power and prestige of Saudi King Feisal. Helms also believed the Saudi's were in a power position, and could make the economic situation much worse for the West and the US if they wanted to. He advocated for a review of US policy towards Israel and the Arabs, with a view the approach be as even handed as possible. Helms also noted the Shah had made a similar observation about US policy in the past, and indicated the US policy was unbalanced and unfair.

Q2: What was the experience level of the ambassador as determined by the qualifications listed in the Neumann – Pickering letter?

Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, was assigned to Iran from October 1969 until February 1972. He was a career Foreign Service Officer, born July 1909, in Pennsylvania. He attended Yale University, earning a Bachelor of Arts degree, and attended the University of Maryland, earning a law degree. Ambassador MacArthur had limited military experience, having served in the US Army from 1933-1935. Prior to his assignment as Ambassador to Iran, he had been assigned to the Far East, serving as ambassador to Japan. He did not have any regional experience in the Middle East prior to assignment in Iran, nor did he speak any languages beyond English. From the perspective of the Neumann – Pickering qualifications, although Ambassador MacArthur was a career Foreign Service Officer, he has no regional experience, and did not speak any additional languages beyond English. He did have extensive Far East diplomatic experience, however, the Far East is not the Middle East.

Joseph S. Farland replaced Ambassador MacArthur in May 1972, and served until March 1973. He was a non-career ambassador, although he had extensive diplomatic experience. Ambassador Farland had previously served as an ambassador in the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Pakistan. Born in West Virginia in August 1914, Ambassador Farland attended West Virginia University, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts degree and a degree in law. He served in the US Navy during the Second World War from 1944-1945. He did have some experience in regional matters due to his time in Pakistan, although did not speak any additional languages beyond English. It could be argued that although he had some relevant experience in the region

from his time in Pakistan, the Shah at this time is mainly concerned with events surrounding the Persian Gulf, and had been for some time. Consequently, with no experience in the economics of oil, limited relevant regional experience, a non-career Foreign Service Officer, with no language ability, the ambassador does not fit the criteria as listed in the Neumann-Pickering letter. What will make matters worse, he will be followed by an equally unskilled non-career ambassador.

Richard Helms served as ambassador to Iran from April 1973 until December 1977. He was a non-career ambassador, and had served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1966-1973. His full career in the CIA spanned the years 1947-1973. Born in Pennsylvania in March 1913, Ambassador Helms attended Williams College, earning a Bachelor of Arts degree. He served in the US Navy during World War II, from 1942-1946. His diplomatic records do not show a previous assignment to the Middle East previously, nor do they show he spoke any of the regional languages. As the Director of the CIA, he would have been knowledgeable of regional issues, and of the US interests in Iran. Much like the previous two US ambassadors to Iran, Ambassador Helms does not meet the qualifications listed by Ambassadors Neumann and Pickering. As previously noted, he had no experience in the economics of oil, and missed the importance of the coming price increases on American and European economic well-being. His encouragement of the Shah's modernization efforts was tied to his desire to maintain access to intelligence gathering facilities for the CIA, and modernization efforts for the Iranian military. Ambassador Helm's tenure would end just before the release of a government report extremely critical of his time as ambassador to Iran.

In a conversation with Kissinger, President Nixon notes that former director of the CIA, Richard Helms, will do a good job in Iran as their new ambassador (FRUS, XXVII, 2). Kissinger agreed, and commented that the new Director of Central Intelligence, James Schlesinger, was in the process of firing over one thousand personnel from the CIA. Nixon agreed the CIA was bloated with personnel, and that Helms could not bring himself to reduce their numbers. In a New York Times article, Seymour Hersh had reported the reduction in personnel, and the sudden retirement of several senior CIA officials, noting they were retiring because of White House dissatisfaction with Helms previous management and oversight of the CIA (FRUS, XXVII, 2). When Ambassador Helms left his post in Iran in 1977, he would resign just before an interagency report was going to be released critical of his management skills as an ambassador in Iran.

In perhaps a sign of issues that would surface later, Director Marshall, of the office of NET Assessment, National Security Council, wrote Kissinger that he was having problems getting the DCI, Richard Helms, to prepare some assessment reports on programs required by the NSCIC staff. In a memorandum dated 13 April 1972 (FRUS, XXVII, 268), the director wrote he had tried to get Helms to respond, but was having no luck. As the senior NSC member, Kissinger would be able to direct the completion of the reports. Marshall noted that Helms had been directed to reorganize his analysts, and that he was essentially dragging his feet. Marshall recommended that Kissinger put pressure on Helms to complete the reorganization and the reports.

When the former DCI was announced as the new ambassador for Iran, the embassy noted that local papers had been instructed to downplay Helm's former role in the CIA (AmEmbassy Tehran 7769, 27 December 1972; FRUS, XXVII, 241). The local

papers stressed the closeness of Helms to President Nixon, and how that means Iran has a heightened importance for the president. There was one radio station, located outside Iran, that noted the ambassador's former role in the CIA, and that this was the reason he was selected for Iran, to continue spying on Russian and other Gulf activities.

Helms appeared to have gained the trust of the Shah. In an embassy telegram dated 21 November 1973, Helms relays a discussion he had with the Shah regarding the Shah's new anti-corruption policies (AmEmbassy Tehran, 8233, 21 November 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 45). After a discussion of a Soviet news report that the Shah's new policy was creating unrest among the population, Helms told the Shah he believed it was just Soviet propaganda. The Shah asked if Helms thought the policies were too tough, and Helms replied the Shah needed to get corruption under control, that if left unchecked it could damage his government. Helms reported in his telegram he believed the Shah was serious about stemming corruption, believing it would create problems for his government if not curbed. Asking the US Ambassador his opinion on internal issues shows the trust the Shah has in Helms, and that he valued his opinion.

Ambassador Helms was sensitive to the expanding presence of US personnel in Iran, both civilian and military. When the embassy was notified in a 24 September 1973 message the US Air Force wanted to increase the number of personnel in order to develop a satellite tracking station, Helms pushed back (FRUS, XXVII, 37). In a message to Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Helms noted, "...there are many reasons why we would prefer not rpt not to have yet another American installation here." After reconsidering the requirement, the USAF determined a smaller contingent would meet their requirements.

Q3: What was the dollar value of trade before, during, and after the crisis as measured by military and non-military trade? Was there a change in the level of trade volume between the United States and the target country during and after the crisis?

As noted previously, in the first two years of the Nixon presidency, 1969 and 1970, the Shah had ordered \$750 million dollars' worth of equipment and commodities for his economy and military from the US. As noted in chart 5.11, the amount of imports from Iran, and exports to Iran, increased exponentially during 1970-1974.




Chart 5.11 Iran import / export trade data

As noted in the chart, while imports from Iran increased in dollar value both with the increased amount of oil being imported, as well as the increase in cost, exports to Iran increased substantially as well. The chart uses import and export dollar values from 1967 and 1968, in place of values for 1970 and 1971, due to missing data from Barbieri's data set. What is interesting to note, although the cost of oil more than doubled during

1972 to 1974, the dollar value of exports to Iran seemed to keep pace with this increase. This is likely due to the substantial amount of military technology and weapons the Shah was continuing to purchase. It is readily apparent why many analysts in both the intelligence community and the Department of State were becoming more worried by the strain this buying was putting on the Iranian economy (Cooper 2011). The increased cost of oil allowed Iran to pay for its modernization, and the US benefited from the recycled petro dollars (Miglieta 2002).

In a memorandum signed by Director of the CIA Richard Helms regarding meeting the security requests of the Shah of Iran, Helms notes the important role Iran plays in supporting US intelligence efforts in the region (FRUS, XXVII, 63). Helms noted that most intelligence documents mention the intelligence facilities located in Iran were of such importance, their capabilities could not be replaced if they were forced to move outside of Iran. Helms memo was forwarded to both House and Senate committees to advise them of the importance of supporting the Shah, as these facilities remained in Iran due to the goodwill of the Shah. In the coming years, Helms would at times unequivocally support any weapon system request by the Shah due to the importance he placed on the intelligence facilities inside Iran.

During a 24 July 1973 meeting with the Shah, the President, and Kissinger, the Shah asked Nixon for assistance in building a better Iranian navy. He wanted the ability to co-produce navy boats in conjunction with several of the defense contractors, including Hughes and Westinghouse. The Shah also asked about nuclear breeder reactors to allow Iran to move into energy generation as the price of oil rose and became scarcer. Nixon agreed to his suggestions, and directed Kissinger to follow

through with some concrete recommendations (White House memorandum dated 24 July 1973, RG59, NARA). During this meeting, the Shah told Nixon they supported Israel over the Arabs as their natural ally, a term he had used before to describe his closeness to Israel over the Arabs (AmEmbassy Tehran 2763, 8 JUL 1969).

In a memorandum from NSC staffer Harold Saunders to Kissinger dated 11 MAY 1973 (FRUS, XXVII, 15), Saunders recounted information from his recent discussions with Ambassador Helms about current issues in the region. Helms said the Shah had expressed his concerns about the rumors that Sadat may initiate hostilities with Israel to break what he saw was a diplomatic stalemate. The Shah was also concerned about the rising price of oil, and his belief they were rising too quickly. The Shah's solution was to reach an agreement with the oil companies quickly for new price contracts in order to preclude further increases. Kissinger's response back through Saunders to Helms stated he did not believe further conflict between Egypt and Israel would lead to a restart of the diplomatic process, and believed Egypt should begin to negotiate more responsibly. As for the discussion on oil pricing, Saunders noted as a comment he did not believe any US government action was required as the oil companies were actively negotiating and he believed these negotiations would be successful. Both Kissinger and Saunders would be proven wrong. The end of the 1973 war did yield significant diplomatic activity and progress, and the oil companies were not able to negotiate price and production contracts with OPEC to preclude either price increases or production cutbacks.

The Shah could be somewhat paranoid about the security of Iran and the region. Helms stated the Shah was agitated over the recent news Iraq had received Russian

TU-22 supersonic bomber aircraft. The Shah was also concerned about the recent provision of Russian advanced MIG-23 fighter aircraft to Arab countries surrounding Iran. The Shah wanted the US to provide in writing a guarantee they would supply Iran with the new F14 and F15 fighter aircraft. He wanted a firm commitment on price and delivery dates, and used the increased threat of Russian aircraft supply to the region as his reason. He also hinted that Iran might be forced to buy Russian aircraft if the US would not supply them (AmEmbassy Tehran 6816, 25 September 1973).

Ambassador Helms reported he had been asked by the Shah for pricing and availability of the new F14 and F15 aircraft in order to begin planning for the future air defense of Iran. He relayed the Shah was concerned about the recent deployment to the region of advanced Soviet MIG 23 aircraft, and did not want to be left behind in the race for modernization. Helms acrimoniously pointed to Assistant Secretary of Defense Clements recent statement that Iraq had been fielded the new aircraft as heightening the Shah's interest in receiving the newer aircraft, and asked Kissinger if he could ask the Department of Defense to stop adding to the Shah's fears (AmEmbassy Tehran, 6982, 2 October 1973).

In a further communication with Kissinger, Ambassador Helms wrote that Clements comments on advanced Russian aircraft deliveries to Middle East countries were not helpful in negotiations with the Shah, and requested White House assistance in moderating Department of Defense comments (AmEmbassy Tehran, Backchannel Files 98, 3 October 1973). Helms was sensitive to the requests of the Shah for security, but was also aware that others were negatively influencing the Shah's overreaction. In a telegram from the State Department (SecState 197528, 4 October 1973), Helms was

given authorization to commit to selling the Shah the F14 and F15 at US government prices.

Ambassador Helms worked to ensure that Iranians requests for military equipment were taken care of. In a 4 September 1974 backchannel message to Scowcroft (AmEmbassy Tehran, backchannel 974, 4 September 1974; FRUS, XXVII, 76), Helms warned Scowcroft that delays in answering Iranian requests for advanced aircraft and a co-production license were hurting their relationship with the Shah. Helms noted they at least owed the Iranians an answer on how long the review of the requests would be expected to take. He also noted that commercial industries in the US were not very responsive to Iranian business opportunities, and included a discussion of a commercial bid for additional housing for US military personnel that had gone unanswered. Helms noted the Iranians had already purchased \$3.6 billion dollars' worth of defense equipment in 1974, and over \$8 billion since 1965.

The economic importance of Iran to the US were noted in a State Department Inspector General report in a section that began with the words "US economic interests are major." The report noted that US economic contracts with Iran exceeded \$7 billion dollars, and were expected to continue to rise. The strategic importance of the country was strengthened because they were a principle source of oil and natural gas for the European economic markets, as well as providing stable oil access for the US. The strategic importance for the US was the access to airspace corridors for commercial and military aircraft, seaports for shipping and naval stationing, and the use of Iranian territory for intelligence and military facilities (FRUS, XXVII, 83).

In 1969, the Shah had offered to sell the US one million barrels of oil per day for ten years at the set price of one dollar per barrel. This would have alleviated any production shortages between domestic and imported oil for the increasing requirements of the US, and would have allowed for the start of a petroleum strategic reserve. However, because of the oil consortium's control of the quota system, any increase in Iran's imports would have meant a cut in another country's quota. Because of this arcane quota system, the government rejected the Shah's offer. Although the Shah was upset that his offer was not accepted, in later years as the price of oil increased exponentially, he was probably relieved the offer had been rejected (Kissinger 1987, 857).

Before the government had rejected his offer, the Shah asked President Nixon for help in increasing his quota so that he could fund his modernization programs. After nine months of trying to negotiate an increase with the oil consortium, the President had to inform the Shah he was not able to help. This had a negative impact on the President's relations with the Shah, and showed the strength of the oil consortium to resistance from government pressure. When OPEC negotiated for the transfer of oil concession property to producer control, the Shah again offered a special deal to the US. He had not taken part in the participation talks, but did want to increase his quota, and in return would extend oil company concessions for fifteen years. Short-sightedly, the US government again refused his offer (Kissinger 1987).

The Shah had not forgotten the actions by the US in refusing his special oil offers. When Ambassador Helms presented his diplomatic credentials at the palace, the Shah brought up his offer to the US some ten years previous, in which he had offered to

sell the US oil at a much reduced rate. The Shah said the US would have been able to begin a strategic reserve of oil in the US against shortages brought on by conflict in the Middle East. He noted the Shah commented with a smile, "I will never make you that offer again." Helms reported the first meeting ended with the Shah reassuring Helms that he saw no problems between Iran and the US (AmEmbassy Tehran, 2166, 7 April 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 12).

Although the Shah did not take part in the oil embargo or production cutbacks, he did take part in, and encourage, the rapid increase in the cost of a barrel of oil. At the 23 December, OPEC ministers meeting in Tehran, the Shah had recommended a significantly large price increase. The Shah said he was producing additional oil to try and stabilize the markets, however, the Shah had experimented earlier in December with an oil spot auction, and the dollar amounts bid for a barrel of oil convinced him that oil was priced too low. The Shah would become relentless after this in seeking prices increased in oil when and where possible (Kissinger 1987; 889).

During a meeting with Secretary Kissinger and French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert on 11 October 1973, Jobert told Kissinger the Arabs were planning to double the price of oil at their next OPEC meeting in Kuwait (FRUS, XXXVI, 210). He asked Kissinger if the US was willing to accept the increases, and Kissinger replied the US did not have an oil strategy, although the US had reports from the Department of State for over two years warning of the coming oil crisis. Jobert told Kissinger he did not understand the US governments position regarding the Shah, that he believed the Shah was taking advantage of the oil embargo, and was the one pushing OPEC for price increases. He said he did not understand why the US thought the Shah was a friend

(FRUS, XXVII, 48). Kissinger proposed that the oil consuming countries join together to oppose the price increases, and be prepared to share oil amongst themselves to make up any shortages. However, Kissinger also noted the matter had not yet gained in sufficient importance for him to become involved in essentially economic business matters between the oil companies and the oil producers. This shortsightedness is uncharacteristic of Kissinger, and perhaps blinds him to the dangers to the US and world economy that will become apparent shortly.

The State Department stayed engaged with Iran over their push for higher oil prices. Just prior to the 23 December 1973 OPEC meeting in Tehran, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Davies called the Iranian Ambassador Ardesir Zahedi, to express US concern over rumors the Shah was going to press OPEC for a larger than expected increase in oil prices (SecState 249539, 22 December 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 48). The rumor was a recommended threefold increase in the price of oil, and Davies was anxious to relay to Zahedi the economic impact among oil consumers this would cause. The main concern, from an economic standpoint, was the damage to the world economic system that oil price increases were having (FRUS, XXXVI, 223). The increase in the cost of oil was anticipated to impact the US and Japan with an increased cost of imports of \$3 billion dollars, while the cost to Europe was expected to increase by \$8 billion dollars. For most industrialized countries, their trade surpluses were expected to quickly turn into trade deficits. The revenue to the oil producers was expected to increase by \$15 billion, and the problem was the economies of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Kuwait, had limited absorptive capacities.

Even though the Shah had his own interests in mind, he was still an important ally of the US, and did try to do his part in getting the embargo ended against the US, and oil production increased among the OPEC producers. Ambassador Helms reported he was called to the Iranian Foreign Ministers office to be read a telegram from the Iranian Ambassador to Cairo (AmEmbassy Tehran 8095, 18 November 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 44). The ambassador had met with President Sadat regarding a previous message from the Shah to Sadat. In his message, the Shah had laid the groundwork for Sadat to ask the oil embargo be lifted. The Shah noted the economic harm to consumer nations and the US, and the harm to the oil companies. The Shah believed the embargo had achieved its stated goals, and its continued use would only harm those who needed oil for heat in the coming winter. In an interview on 25 November, the Shah would publicly advocate for the lifting of the embargo, and was quoted as saying, "Oil is like bread – it cannot be held back in times of peace" (AmEmbassy Tehran 8305, 26 November 1973).

The Shah was very supportive of the oil price increases OPEC was negotiating with the consumer countries, as well as ensuring Iran maintained control of their resources. In a memo from Acting Secretary of State Rush to President Nixon (FRUS, XXVII, 10), Rush noted the Shah has gained significant revenue as a result of the price increases. The Shah needed the additional revenue to support his modernization programs. Iran had recently signed an agreement with the oil consortium that would allow Iranian additional control over the means of production and sales. The Shah's goal had been to own the production capability, and to sell oil to the consortium, which was different than the agreement the Arab producers had. The Arab arrangements were

more an ownership sharing arrangement in which the oil companies sold oil and split the profits with the producing countries. This was a de-facto sharing of sovereignty in the Shah's opinion, and he would not allow it.

Ambassador Helms was keenly aware of the importance to US security that Saudi Arabia and Iran played. Helms believed that Saudi Arabia was in some ways more important to the US than Iran, mainly due to their proven reserves of oil. Iran did not have nearly as much oil as their ideological enemy Saudi Arabia, and the Shah was concerned there was a definable lifespan on Iran's supply they could count on. In a memorandum sent to President Nixon (FRUS, XXVII, 166), Helms listed Saudi Arabia first, and then Iran as strategic exporters of oil to the US and other Western countries. Helms notes in his memo that he tried not to think of the complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as this tends to cloud his thinking on the importance of these countries in terms of energy production. He discussed the sensitivity of the Israeli's anytime the importance of energy was discussed, as they see this as a weakening of resolve for their defense by the US.

The Shah was concerned about the correlation of increased oil prices with an increase in the commodity price of wheat and other agricultural goods (AmEmbassy Tehran, 6506, 13 September 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 35). The Shah relayed he was trying to keep the price of wheat down through subsidies so the Iranian population could afford bread, and thought the price of commodities was spiraling too quickly, and was going to cause harm to the US economy. Helms noted the increasing inflationary pressures on Iran, and the potential for unrest among the population if the Shah could not keep subsidizing food prices. The Department of State noted that while oil prices had

increased an average of 350%, agricultural goods had increase roughly 75% (SecState 16493, 25 January 1974; FRUS, XXVII, 52). Ambassador Helms sent several messages to the State Department asking about the availability of agriculture commodities, and their spiraling cost. The ambassador was concerned the shortages might be severe enough it would cause the Shah significant problems with the population, and wants the Agriculture Department to prepare a report showing the world wide shortages of these grains. Helms is sensitive enough to the needs of Iran and the Shah in maintaining good relations between them and the US, and to keep a restive population secure (AmEmbassy Tehran 5888, 20 August 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 34). The State Department also noted they did not wish to intervene with OPEC concerning the cost of goods, preferring instead to allow commercial producers to negotiate with each other.

The challenge of having Iran as a strategic partner were captured in an interdepartmental working group paper prepared 25 April 1974. It noted that Iran was the most economically developed country in the Persian Gulf region, and as a responsible regional power, could help stabilize the region both politically and militarily. The report also discussed the key role played by Iran during the oil embargo, but noted the differences between the US and Iran over the topic of oil pricing policy. The Shah saw these increases as a way the market was trying to accurately price the value of oil, while the US was concerned about the impact these increases were having on world economic health. The Shah was also very interested in co-producing advanced military equipment under license from the US, and had discussed several times with Kissinger his desire to build a nuclear facility to reduce Iran's own energy demands from oil (FRUS, XXVII, 59). While Iran did offer some obvious advantages being an ally in the

region, they also offered a lot of challenges for US foreign policy. Not the least of which is to maintain reliable relationships while at the same time being unable to provide everything an important ally may want.

Although the US had been providing Iran with significant military aid, an investigation by the State Department Inspector General reported there was “no approved document that provides a definitive statement of U.S. policy toward Iran” (Office of the Inspector General, Foreign Service Inspection Report, October 1974). There were two older National Security Council memorandum that essentially said the President had authorized Iran to purchase military arms and equipment. These documents were dated 15 June 1972, and 25 July 1972. The 1972 Presidential directive on arms sales to Iran essentially left to Iran the decisions on what it needed for their security. Although the Defense Department often wondered why certain complex weapon systems were being provided, Iran was able to request and receive essentially what they wanted because of the close relationship between the Shah and President Nixon. There were several agencies that were beginning to question the societal impact modernization was having on Iran, and the foreign military sales programs involved billions of dollars’ worth of equipment and other assistance.

The IG’s report noted three problems in the US-Iran relationship. The first was the serious military imbalance being created by providing over \$7 billion dollars’ worth of military equipment to Iran in just the past two years. The President had authorized Iran to request and receive all the modern weapon systems they wanted, and the report stated this was negatively affecting other countries in the region. The second problem found was the increasing amount of US contractors and dependents moving to Iran to

support their military modernization. The IG report cautioned this would increase cultural tensions among Iranians and US citizens. The report estimated the numbers of American citizens in Iran could number as many as 42,000 by 1978. The last issue noted there were no reliable mechanisms to determine the impact on Iran, their neighbors, and their citizens caused by these changes. Because all important decisions were made by the Shah, input from various members of the Iranian community were non-existent, and the report highlighted the risk of this (Office of the Inspector General, Foreign Service Inspection Report, October 1974).

Q4: Was there an alliance relationship among the four countries, or those four countries and the United States? An alliance between any of these countries and Egypt will also be considered due to the direct involvement of Egypt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the presupposed relationship to the oil embargo.

There was no military alliance agreements between Iran and the other countries in the Middle East that are part of this study. Iran did enjoy the membership privileges of OPEC, but did not participate in the oil embargo. In fact, Iran increased their oil production to both try and fill the gap in requirements created by the oil production reductions, and to take advantage of the increase in price created by the production cut-backs. As seen in Chart 5.12, Iran had an alliance relationship with the US that required the US to come to the defense of Iran in case they were attacked, and both Iran and the US had a consultation agreement in order to coordinate their actions short of military activity.

	Saudi Arabia	Iraq	Kuwait	Egypt	Iran	United States	Israel
Iran	—	—	—	—	—	CO	—
United States	—	—	—	—	DE / CO	—	—

Chart 5.12 Iran alliance agreements

The fact that Iran did not have an alliance with the Arab countries of the Middle East is not surprising. The Shah had watched the several wars carried out between neighboring Arab countries and Israel, and had largely stayed out of them. Alliance formation can be a stabilizing factor in some cases. In others it can become destabilizing if the alliance generates counter alliances. Some alliances are formed simply to enhance national prestige (Levy 1981). In the case of counter alliances, Iran had witnessed the obligations of Arab countries to the wars initiated against Israel.

Iran did have reliable trading partners in both the United States and Israel. Because of the economic and military relations between the US and Israel, Iran cultivated similar relations. Iran continued to buy and sell military, agricultural, and industrial goods to Israel, even during crisis periods. As an ally with the US, the Shah could be counted on to provide his insight into what was going on in the region, and to help explain the logic of some of the Arab leaders. The US offered the Shah the opportunity to express his views, while at the same time maybe not take any action on them.

The Shah was a regionally strategic thinker, and in a meeting with Kissinger at Blair House on 24 July 1973, provided Kissinger with several options for the Gulf region. During this meeting, the Shah proposed the formation of an Arabic NATO type alliance that would come to the aid of each other in the event of attack by outside forces. In particular, the Shah shared the view of the White House that Russia had an unhealthy

interest in the Middle East, and to keep them out was the goal. However, the other countries were hesitant to sign an agreement because Saudi Arabia did not want to join an alliance with Iran. The Shah noted the other countries were afraid of Saudi Arabia. The Shah provided several additional views, that the Jarring mission had been a failure from the start, and that the diplomatic stalemate between Egypt and Israel was running out of time (White House memorandum, 24 July 1973). Shortly after assuming the role of Ambassador to Iran, Helms submitted a report to Kissinger on his assessment of Iran's goals in the Middle East. He noted that Iran wanted to be seen as the regional superpower, and as such, the Shah could be overbearing and heavy handed in his dealings with other Arab leaders.

Ambassador Helms observed that "Arabs feels that Iranians in general and the Shah in particular are so contemptuous of them and are so arrogant in their dealings with them that true cooperation probably is not possible. The Arabs generally fear Iranian colonialism in the Gulf." In an NSC memorandum to Kissinger from Harold Saunders and William B. Quandt, they note that "The US has no interest in being faced with a choice between Persians and Arabs...and that cooperation should not be taken for granted because the Shah does not see Saudi Arabia as an effective partner." They concluded the US has an interest in assisting Saudi Arabia, without affecting the US relationship with Iran (FRUS, XXVII, 22).

Kissinger, Helms, and the Shah discussed the hardline attitudes of Sadat and the Egyptians in their demands that in order to discuss peace terms in the region, that Israel must first agree to withdraw to the pre-1967 War borders, and respond to Palestinian demands for negotiations. Kissinger relayed to the Shah this would not be possible, and

it was not something he wanted to even discuss with the Israelis. Kissinger floated his concept of separating sovereignty from security, and in this developing strategy, the Egyptians could claim the sovereignty of the disputed territory, while agreeing to Israeli presence in the name of security (MEMCON 24 July 1973, DNSA KC00218).

There were times when the US listened to the Shah, and did not take action because his recommendation was not sound. There were other times the Shah was correct, but the US did not believe he was right. Leading up to the 1973 War, Sadat was worried about the future viability of his government, especially because he had told the people that he could restore Egyptian territories lost during the 1967 War with Israel. After a series of meetings with the Shah, as well as Iranian Foreign Minister Zehedi (AmEmbassy Tehran 2649, 20 May 1971; AmEmbassy Tehran 2673, 20 May 1971; AmEmbassy Tehran 2813, 27 May 1971), Ambassador MacArthur alerted the Secretary of State of the tensions inside Egypt and the other Arab states over the stalemate caused by Israeli intransigence. The Shah told MacArthur that if Sadat was not able to show progress soon, he would likely be replaced by elements that may be less friendly to the US and the West in general. Zehedi noted that it was essential that progress was made soon, otherwise the present Egyptian government would not remain in power. The Shah requested the US government make an assessment of the current situation in Egypt. After acknowledging the recent friendship treaty signed with Russia, Secretary Rogers concluded by saying the State Department did not believe there would be any major changes in U.A.R. policies, and that Sadat would continue to rely on support from Russia for his policies. Rogers believed the threat of continuing hostilities was low, but that the Soviets would probably not oppose Sadat if he decided to resort to conflict.

But to the Iranians, the danger of the Russians in the Middle East was growing. In just one year, the countries the Soviets were operating in had increased, and were surrounding them. Ambassador Farland, noted that during a recent meeting, Iranian Foreign Minister Khalatbari expressed the concern of the government of Iran that Soviet forces were now in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria (AmEmbassy Tehran 3267, 31 May 1972). He also stated he understood the US was mindful of the Soviet presence, but did not believe they were as concerned as Iran was of the growing presence and influence of the Russians. He discussed secret intelligence Iran had received from Israel that linked Russian influence in the region. These included the existence of guerilla training camps in Turkey, and new speedboats to be used as gunboats being provided to Iraq. Khalatbari said he appreciated the US view, but believed the situation was much more serious than the US did. For his part, Ambassador Farland had been recently assigned, and simply reported the details of the meeting without providing any personal analysis.

Following a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, the Shah stated he did not consider the Soviets as pushing Sadat to initiate hostilities in the region. If anything, he believed they did not want any military confrontations that might lead to a larger crisis involving them and the US (MEMCON 24 July 1973, DNSA KC00218). The Shah did warn Kissinger the Arabs were discussing the possibility of using oil as a weapon to force the US to put pressure on the Israeli's to begin negotiations for the return of Arab lands. Kissinger mentioned it might be helpful for the Shah to add his voice to the Arab discussion on the use of oil, and try and keep the linking of oil economics out of the diplomatic arena. In this request, the Shah readily agree.

Just as the 1973 War had started, Ambassador Helms remarked he was called to the Prime Minister's office to meet with the Shah about a message he had received from President Sadat of Egypt. He said Egypt wanted peace, and if Israel would withdraw to the 5 June 1967 borders, Egypt would withdraw their forces from the Sinai, and allow international peace keepers to resume their positions in the Sinai separating the belligerent forces (AmEmbassy Tehran, Backchannel 99, 7 October 1973; FRUS, XXVII, 38). Sadat would also allow peace keepers to return to Sharm el Sheik and monitor freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. Sadat wanted the Shah to relay this message to President Nixon, who he believed could pressure Israel into accepting those terms. In a separate memo from the embassy to the Department of State (AmEmbassy Tehran 7126, 8 October 1973), the embassy noted that Iran was trying to remain neutral and support both sides. The government supported the efforts of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan for the return of territory seized during the 1967 War, while also maintaining friendly relations with Israel. Iran's desire to walk a tightrope between the Arabs and Israeli's also allowed them to disregard the oil embargo and continue to support the oil needs of the US when the time came.

Part of the intransigence in the disengagement talks was seen in the Egyptian demand, repeated often, that Israel had to withdraw from occupied territories before peace negotiations could begin. In a discussion with Iranian Ambassador Zehedi, Kissinger commented again on the senselessness of the Egyptian demand that Israel withdraw from all occupied territories as a precondition to peace talks (MEMCON, White House memorandum, 13 August 1973). Kissinger was discussing the stalemate on initiatives between Egypt and Israel, and why the US was having a hard time getting

either side to move forward on negotiations. Kissinger was very critical of the negotiating positions of both Egypt and Israel, seeing them as intractable. But Kissinger is a mercurial negotiator, and saved a bit of scorn for his Undersecretary as well. Sisco had been interviewed Israeli television, and made what Kissinger saw was an unrealistic request to Israel that they be reasonable.

Although Secretary Kissinger preferred to keep the ambassadors out of the negotiating and decision making loop, he did send updates on the situation during the war, so they could keep their assigned country leaders informed of US intentions in the region. In a message from the White House to Ambassador Helms, Kissinger directed him to meet with and brief the Shah on US efforts to that point. In particular, he wanted the Shah to know the US had to begin resupply operations to Israel because of the massive Soviet resupply effort to both Egypt and Syria (Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 425).

The relationship between the US and the Shah was mutually supporting in many respects. During the Soviet resupply of Arab forces during the October war, the Shah fired Deputy Foreign Minister Mirfendereski (Amembassy Tehran 7511, dated 25 October 1973) because he allowed more Soviet aircraft to overfly Iran than the Shah had authorized. The Shah had to walk a tightrope between the US and Russia due to the long border shared with the USSR, and the relationship with the US. Kissinger requested the ambassador pass to the Shah a personal thank you from the White House for the Shah's understanding and assistance in the current conflict between Egypt and Israel. Kissinger wanted the Shah to know the US had acted with restraint regarding the conflict, and was trying all it could to bring about a cease fire. He noted

the US airlift was in response to Soviet efforts to resupply Egypt and Syria. He also thanked the Shah for denying the Soviets permission to overfly Iranian airspace in their efforts to resupply the Egyptians and Syrians (FRUS, XXVII, 40; White House 32501, 14 October 1973).

Because Iran had few friends in the region, and even fewer alliances, an approach by Iraq was viewed with some interest by the Shah. At the beginning of the 1973 October War, Iraq had requested closer ties with Iran, and wanted to discuss the normalization of their diplomatic status. By early December, it was apparent to US diplomats in the region this had either been a ploy of Iraq, or relations had cooled. Ambassador Helms explained the tension in the press between the two countries over the use of the ancient Arabic language to refer to the Persian city of Khorramshahr. Ambassador Helms asserted the unhappy relations seemed to confirm the view of embassy staff that any real improvement in the Iraq – Iran relationship was unlikely (AmEmbassy Tehran 8549, 5 December 1973).

As the US prepared to end another year in the Middle East, the Inspector General of the Department of State released an extensive report on the conduct of US-Iran relations (Office of the Inspector General, Foreign Service Inspection Report, October 1974) in which several key issues were noted. The first was the preeminence of the US in the growth and future of Iran that was mutually beneficial to both countries. However, much like Ambassador Helms had noted, the future of Iran seemed frailly built on the success of the vision and drive of the Shah. The inspectors were concerned the military buildup of Iran had caused instability in the region due to the imbalance between other

countries forces in the region. This imbalance was affecting the relationship between Saudi Arabia, the US, and Iran. It was also pushing the Iraqi's closer to the Soviets.

The IG report also noted that most policy for Iran was made at the White House or National Security Council level, and that the regional directorate and embassy had little input into those decisions. It expressed a sense of unease among participants at the State Department due to the increased level of economic and military ties between the US and Iran. They observed the embassy needed to do a better job of analysis of the various economic and security reports they were sending, as well as the overall political reporting they were doing (Office of the Inspector General, Foreign Service Inspection Report, October 1974). The report concluded with a caution about the lack of supervision of local and US embassy personnel in the day to day management of consular affairs.

5.5 Iraq

5.5.1 Background to the conflict and the embargo

Iraq had both an alliance and economic relationship with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Iraq had been a founding member of OPEC, and had been historically the more aggressive of the OPEC members (Chester 1983; Yergin 2006). After the September 1960, meeting which first established OPEC, Iraq seized 99.5 percent of the oil company's concessions inside Iraq (Chester, 1983, 213). After the 1967 Six Day War, Iraq would seize the remaining half percent. Because the US and Iraq had severed diplomatic relations in the wake of the 1967 war, the United States had no official representation in that country until the embassy and diplomatic relations were

reestablished in 2003. By and large, the oil companies had been left to manage their economic relations with Iraq to themselves.

After the 17 October 1973 OPEC price increase of 70 percent, the Arab members of OPEC met in Kuwait City by themselves to discuss an oil embargo. The Iraq delegation wanted to target the US in particular with a total embargo. However, the other delegates, the Saudi's in particular, would not go along. The Iraqi's withdrew from the meeting and the embargo plan (Yergin, 2006, 589). The Iraqi's continued to supply oil to world markets during the embargo.

5.5.2 Iraq's four questions

Q1: What was the level of cooperation between the Ambassador and the host country as measured by the Conflict and Peace Database (COPDAB) and the UN Voting dataset? Was there a change in the level of cooperation during or after the crisis period?

Iraq is the one country in this study that did not have a diplomatic relationship with the United States during this period. Since June 1967, the US had not had an ambassador assigned to the embassy in Baghdad. There were a series of Charges de Affairs that worked the Iraq interest section from the Belgian embassy. This would help explain the higher level of conflict resident in the COPDAB scale value. In this study, the only other country to have conflict ratings this high was Egypt, which also did not have an ambassador assigned. For the period under discussion, Iraq had a mean scale value of 9 for 1971, 7.8 for 1972, and 8.2 for 1973. As seen in chart 5.13, the higher levels of conflict are seen in the data for 1973.

IRAQ COPDAB SCALE VALUE 1970-1974

■ SV 3 ■ SV 4 ■ SV 5 ■ SV 6 ■ SV 7 ■ SV 8 ■ SV 9 ■ SV 10 ■ SV 11




Chart 5.13 Iraq COPDAB scale value

This higher level of conflict with the United States is borne out by looking at the UN voting patterns for Iraq. Chart 5.14 shows that while Iraq was consistent with the voting patterns of the other Middle East countries in this study, what is a better indicator of agreement with the US outlook is the ideal point estimate. As noted by Strezhnev and Voeten, (2013, 1) “These ideal points can be interpreted as states' positions towards the U.S.-led liberal order. Compared to other measures of state preferences, these ideal points are less noisy, better match the historical record, more clearly identify shifts in countries' foreign policy, and facilitate improved inter-temporal comparisons by controlling for changes in the UNGA agenda over time.” In the case of Iraq, their average ideal point for the period 1970-1974 was significantly opposite the United States. Iraq's average for this period is -1.153, while the US is 2.043. In fact, Iraq exceeds all the other countries in this study, to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

FSO Lowrie reported on diplomatic life in Iraq during the period before the war. He noted that during a farewell party for a Dutch ambassador, a joking comment was made by the Belgian ambassador. One of the party's attendees was the Iraqi Director General of Consular Affairs, who upon hearing the joke, departed the party. When

asked by the Belgian ambassador if he had offended the minister, the Dutch Ambassador explained he probably departed knowing the negative comment would soon make its way to the secret police, and this could be a problem for him (USINT Bagdad 0358, 24 June 1973).




Chart 5.14 Iraq UN voting patterns

When Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the US over the 1967 Six Day War, the ousted embassy section sent an Air Gram signed by Ambassador Thacher (AmEmbassy Tehran 4998, 15 June 1967) from the embassy in Tehran, to the Secretary of State discussing their observations. From the Arab perspective, they noted the US's quick support for Israeli interests once the Straits of Tiran were closed, as well as Israeli concerns about Egyptian troop movements. The embassy section did not see

the short term loss of diplomatic relations with Iraq as critical, although the long term effect on access to oil might be adversely affected. What they saw as the main problem was the psychological loss of the image of the US as an unbiased moderator for the region. As part of this, they advocated that Israel withdraw from territories captured in the war, and to obey other UN resolutions designed to move the peace process forward in the region.

In early January, 1974, in an effort to bring about an end to the oil production cuts and embargo, President Nixon invited members of the major oil consuming nations and members of OPEC to attend an energy summit in Washington DC. In response to this invitation, Iraq's President Bakr sent a lengthy reply. Iraq had not joined the embargo against the US for various political reasons, and the letter sent by Bakr was written in an informational tone vice an accusatorial tone that had become expected for many members of OPEC (FRUS, XXVII, 241). Bakr did not wish to attend the summit, not because he would not attend a summit hosted by the US, but more from a standpoint of trying to expand the discussion from a strictly energy focus, to more of a regional focus linking security, economic, and diplomatic issues into a conference hosted by the UN.

Q2: What was the experience level of the ambassador as determined by the qualifications listed in the Neumann – Pickering letter?

The United States and Iraq severed diplomatic relations in June 1967. There were several Charges de Affairs working out of the Belgium embassy, but there was no ambassador assigned. The US embassy will not be reestablished until 2003.

In a letter from Arthur Lowrie, the Chief of the Interest Section in Bagdad, to David Korn, dated 30 April 1973, Lowrie discusses a recent Chief of Mission conference he had attended hosted in Tehran. Attending the meeting were Ambassador's Helms, Thacher, Stoltzfus, and Crawford, who Lowrie met with privately after the meeting. Lowrie said the group of ambassadors agreed the collusion between Iraq and the Soviet Union were a principle cause of instability in the region. Lowrie tried to show there were other variables at play, including that Iraq felt threatened by Iran. He noted the conference was valuable to learn Washington's thinking on regional issues, including their thoughts on the use of oil as a weapon by the Arab states (FRUS, XXVII, 214).

Although the US did not have an ambassador in Iraq, Arthur Lowrie plays a critical role in keeping the State Department informed of Iraqi internal issues. In a telegram to the Department of State, Lowrie relays the relationship between the Iraqi leadership and the Soviet Union has cooled. The new naval base at Umm Qasr is apparently not being built with Soviet ships in mind, although Foreign Minister Abdul Baqi stated they would probably visit them in the future. Lowrie speculates the Soviets are concerned about the recent oil settlement reached between Exxon, Mobile, and the Iraq Petroleum Corporation, the recent signing of the Boeing aircraft deal, and the construction deal with Brown and Root for a deep sea terminal (FRUS, XXVII, 212).

Iraq had recently undergone a coup attempt, and in a memorandum prepared by the CIA's office of current intelligence dated 4 October 1973, they discussed the 30 June 1973 coup attempt inside Iraq. The report detailed the split inside the Baath party, and the call for the regime to return to power two previous senior officials who were serving as ambassadors to the USSR and the UN. The report also notes the increasing power of the Iraq Communist Party, working closely with Baath party officials (FRUS, XXVII, 235). The increasing influence of the communist party was explained by the closeness of the ruling government to the USSR.

After the 1973 War ended, Iraq was very outspoken in its criticism of Egypt for their settlement with Israel. However, the Egyptian counselor Baraka believed their position on the cease-fire and settlement was actually more moderate. He noted they agreed to support and join Egypt in the most recent Algerian financial summit, and had commented on their desire to reestablish relations with the UK and France. The minister noted they privately approved the actions of Egypt, and were afraid to publicly support them lest they be criticized by other more conservative Arab countries (USINT Bagdad 682, 23 December 1973).

Q3: What was the dollar value of trade before, during, and after the crisis as measured by total import and export trade? Was there a change in the level of trade volume between the United States and the target country during and after the crisis?

While the US and Iraq did not have formal diplomatic relations during the period 1970-1974, the two countries still engaged in trade. As chart 5.15 shows, the import and export of goods between the two countries never stopped. Importantly, during the crisis period of 1973 and 1974, trade increased. The trade value in 1972 was \$40 million dollars, while during 1973 and 1974, the trade value increased from \$69M to \$189M dollars. This is important, especially in light of the hostility Iraq displayed toward the United States.




Chart 5.15 Iraq import / export trade data

As previously noted, following the OPEC meeting in Vienna in October 1973, the Arab members of OPEC convened a separate meeting in Kuwait City to discuss how to better use the oil weapon as part of the political dialogue in the Middle East. The other delegation members were against a total embargo because of the harm it would cause

all economies involved, not just the United States. The Iraqi's determined after that meeting to not take part in the planned production cut-backs.

Lowrie provided much needed analysis of events inside Iraq during the period that diplomatic relations were suspended. He wrote that in March 1973, Iraq was a country with ten million citizens. It was led by a combination military and civilian revolutionary command council, and Saddam Hussein was the Vice President. He was already a ruthless and ambitious politician of the controlling Baath Party, which counted an estimated 100,000 members. The Baath Party had mobilized mass public support through their control of labor unions, farming federations, and party front organizations. Oil at this point comprised almost thirty-five percent of their gross national product (GNP). There were only two remaining US oil companies, Exxon and Mobile, operating in Iraq, and they were part of the British Petroleum Company's concession, which controlled a 23.75 percent interest (USINT Bagdad 0167, 31 March 1973).

In 1971, oil revenue for Iraq was valued at approximately \$900 million dollars. By 1975 it was expected to rise to \$2 billion dollars. With the steep rise in prices beginning in September 1973, the actual revenues in 1975 would be much higher (USINT Bagdad 36, 20 January 1974). The Baath Party leadership viewed the actions of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan as working in concert to undermine Iraqi leadership in the region. In April 1972, Iraq entered a strategic alliance with the Soviets by signing a Friendship Treaty signifying Russia was a major economic supporter of Iraq through loans and grants of money and weapons. France had also nurtured a close relationship with Iraq through its pro-Arab foreign policy and public statements. The US had opened an interest section in the Indian Embassy in October 1972, which was staffed by two

consular Foreign Service officers. The dollar value of exports to Iraq was stable for several years at \$30 million dollars, but Iraq had recently negotiated with Boeing to purchase six aircraft worth roughly \$60 million dollars.

Although the US and Iraq did not have formal diplomatic relations, that did not stop Iraq from purchasing modern US technology (USINT Bagdad 480, 9 September 1973). In a message from the interest section, Lowrie requested the State Department to verify the status of negotiations for Iraq to purchase new Boeing aircraft (USINT Bagdad 280, 18 May 1973). Business with Iraq had not stopped due to the lack of official relations. Lowrie would routinely send cables to State noting the business opportunities for American firms in Iraq. Although Iraq supported efforts by Arab countries, they were very pragmatic when it came to internal business requirements, and would continue to work with US oil and business firms, even during the war and oil embargo (USINT Bagdad 0111, 13 March 1973).

By March 1973, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) had resolved long standing disagreements with the government over revenue sharing, and Lowrie was seeing the expansion of business opportunities as a result. He noted that infrastructure development in Iraq was booming, and recommended US firms come to Iraq and seek business contracts. Several projects Lowrie listed would in fact be awarded to US firms, including a deep water oil terminal awarded to Brown and Root, and a pipeline project also awarded to Brown and Root (USINT Bagdad 0572, 23 October 1973). These contracts were for millions of dollars, and were an indication of Iraq's businesslike approach to development. Exxon and Mobile were partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company, and although they benefited from the conclusion of the agreement, the real

benefactors were the French, who were given preferential treatment by the Iraqi's (FRUS, XXVII, 205). Both Iran and Saudi Arabia watched with interest as they saw this as the first test of a new round of negotiations with the consortium on profit and participation sharing.

After the start of the 1973 War, Iraq moved to nationalize the remaining oil interests of Exxon and Mobile. The US interest section recommended waiting before an official US protest was issued because they believed with the recent lessening of the rhetoric against the US that Iraq was posturing for their Arab audience (FRUS, XXVII, 236). Lowrie had previously reported the Iraq was interested in gaining access to American technology and other commercial business, and did not want to take any immediate actions to disrupt their plan. The terms of the appropriation stated Iraq was to pay fair compensation for the lost resources. By 20 December 1973, no payment had been received, and no negotiations began to resolve the issue. Dr. Saadun Hammadi, the Iraqi Minister of Oil and Minerals, had said in an interview with the New York Times on 19 December 1973 that all US oil assets in the Middle East should be nationalized. One reason for Hammadi's comments were attributed to the perceived weakness of the US in not protesting the seizing of Exxon's and Mobile's assets by Iraq (FRUS, XXVII, 240). Contrary to Hammadi's comments was telegram 546 from the interest section in Bagdad which stated the Iraqi government believed that substantial commercial interests with the US would continue to expand, regardless of the embargo.

Although other Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia, supported the embargo on the US and select European countries, Iraq continued to provide oil for Western markets. After Iraq nationalized the remaining Exxon and Mobile oil concessions, it left

British Petroleum Corporation's (BPC) assets alone. During negotiations on bidding for the nationalized oil production quota, the Minister of Petroleum told BPC that Exxon and Mobile would have right of first refusal to purchase the nationalized oil through 1974. In effect, this allowed Exxon and Mobile to purchase oil for US markets as there was no restriction on destination consumer markets (USINT Bagdad 0546, 9 October 1973). On the same day that Iraq nationalized the Exxon and Mobile production assets, they signed a multi-million dollar deal with US Steel for the purchase of four drilling rigs. Due to the continuing and expanding business relationship with Iraq, Lowrie recommended no public protest of Iraq's nationalization of Exxon and Mobile's assets. He recommended time for the process to resolve any lingering business conflict.

In a further indication of Iraq's desire for pure competition in development projects, Iraqi Minister of Petroleum Hammadi representatives from BPC that the government of Iraq wanted a package settlement to resolve any remaining nationalization or price sharing issues from the nationalization of Exxon and Mobile assets. Hammadi also stated that the companies would still enjoy the right of first refusal for nationalized oil production through 1974 as well as 1975. The price would be market price at the time of production, and there was no restriction on final delivery consumers. In essence, they were able to continue to purchase oil for US markets with no restrictions. Hammadi also stated the companies could bid on upcoming oil services contracts without restrictions (USINT Bagdad 260, 18 November 1973). Iraq desired a better relationship with the US, although did not desire official diplomatic relations with the US. They were very interested in establishing a business relationship, and in buying

US technology to aid in their overall development (USINT Bagdad 36, 20 January 1974).

While Iraq was only too happy to support OPEC price increases, they did not support the call for an embargo of select Western countries, including the US. Their rational for this was multifaceted, and based on the unequal effects the embargo would have on the US and other countries. Iraq advocated for the nationalization of US assets, but otherwise continued to sell oil to US firms, knowing the oil would end up in US markets (USINT Bagdad 0572, 23 October 1973). Their unstated goals were to maximize their revenues while continuing to expand their economy (USINT Bagdad 649, 8 December 1973).

Shortly after the end of the war, Brown and Root were awarded the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) Deep Sea Terminal project. The value of the project was \$120 million dollars, and would allow additional oil terminal berths for INOC to load oil into larger oil tanker ships. Brown and Root was also awarded a port expansion contract at the same time (USINT Bagdad 0629, 25 November 1973). This again showed that Iraq was more interested in providing a pure competition environment for development, and did not discriminate against US firms, although they had still not reestablished diplomatic relations with the US.

By early January 1974, business had increased in Iraq to such an extent the US interest section was requesting the assignment of an economic and commercial affairs officer. They noted in their request to the State Department that although there was still no official recognition between the US and Iraq, these fundamental differences had not caused the Iraqis to cancel any pre-war contracts with the US. In fact, with their

newfound oil wealth, business was booming. Exports to Iraq in the first nine months of 1973 were \$30.2 million dollars, up 58% from the previous year (USINT Bagdad 0023, 12 January 1974). With their new oil wealth, Iraq was more than able to finance their new development plans, and the interest section wanted to ensure US firms had an opportunity to compete. The new economic and commercial affairs officer would be able to help manage the current business affairs, as well as provide economic assessments of Iraq's oil production.

In a post war assessment of Iraq, and to provide some policy recommendations, the US interest section forwarded a report to the Department of State that described the political and economic situation in Iraq. Lowrie noted the war allowed the Baath party to rebuild some damaged relations with their Arab partners by providing military forces. Lowrie also asserted the party moved against the Iraq Communist Party as a way of pushing them out of power and influence. He observed that although Iraq had nationalized the remaining Exxon and Mobile oil interests, they had restarted compensation negotiations with the two companies. Lowrie suggested that by ending the last colonial era oil holdings in Iraq, this may actually make it easier for US businesses to do work inside Iraq (FRUS, XXVII, 238). He again strongly recommended no US protest against the nationalization of Exxon and Mobile assets for the time being, instead requesting the compensation negotiations be allowed to continue.

Q4: Was there an alliance relationship among the four countries, or those four countries and the United States? An alliance between any of these countries and

Egypt will also be considered due to the direct involvement of Egypt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the presupposed relationship to the oil embargo.

Iraq did have a defensive alliance agreement with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Like Saudi Arabia, they also had non-aggression and consultation agreements with these countries as well. As seen in chart 5.16, Iraq did not have any alliance agreements with Iran, Israel, or the United States.

	Saudi Arabia	Iraq	Kuwait	Egypt	Iran	United States	Israel
Iraq	DE/NA/CO	—	DE/NA/CO	DE/NA/CO	—	—	—

Chart 5.16 Iraq alliance agreements

Although there is considerable evidence that alliances promote economic trade (Leeds 2003; Leeds and Long, 2006; Levy, 1981), in the case of Iraq and the oil production cut-backs and embargo, their disagreement with the other OPEC members did not contribute to their economic agreements. When assessing the UN voting patterns, there is a similar disagreement, especially regarding Saudi Arabia. Iraq voted no 37 percent more than Saudi Arabia, although their yes votes agreed with Saudi Arabia 98 percent of the time. The remaining difference is when both Iraq and Saudi Arabia abstained from voting, and this was a 20 percent difference. When a country abstains from a vote, UN observers note these are generally perceived as a no vote (Voeten 2013).

One of Iraq's continuous concerns was the border area between Kuwait and Iraq. For years, Iraq had been trying to seize portions of Kuwait sovereign territory along their two borders, and this had led to conflict numerous times. In a 1 May 1973 cable from the US interest section, Lowrie describes the routine border maneuvers conducted by

Iraq. The tension between the two countries stemmed from the Iraqi desire to absorb Kuwait into Iraq control, not only for their access to the Gulf, but also their oil reserves (USINT Bagdad 238, 1 May 1973).

Not only was Iraq trying to seize territory along the ground border, in an intelligence note prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) dated 17 April 1973, David E. Long, notes that Iraq is preparing a new naval base and oil terminal near Umm Qasr, Iraq. To approach the terminal, ships have to pass near two Kuwaiti islands that Iraq publicly stated were a threat to their security. Kuwait did not want to approach either Saudi Arabia or Iran for assistance, but was asking the US to assist with weapons purchases and security assistance (FRUS, XXVII, 213). Iraq has a history of trying to occupy portions of Kuwaiti territory, this is a continuing ploy to gain control of territory for Iraq.

Another continuing problem for the Iraqi government was the large Kurdish population that resided in the northern mountains area comprised of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. It was estimated there were 5-6 million Kurds living in this region. Their collective goal was the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, however, the Iraqi Kurds would accept an autonomous Kurdish region (FRUS, XXVII, 232; Central Intelligence Agency, Box 3, Folder 33). The Kurds received extensive economic support from the US that was funneled through Iran, and from the Shah as well. In a memo from the acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated 26 July 1973, the Kurds believed the Iraqi government was not going to live up to its March 1970 agreement. Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani believed there would be a marked increase in fighting, and they were requesting additional support from the Shah (FRUS, XXVII, 225).

Kissinger believed the US should provide support to the Kurds, and in a March memo to President Nixon, he requested continued US economic and military support to the Kurds that would equal the previous year. He noted that support was channeled through Iran, who had also contributed \$4.8 million dollars the past year (FRUS, XXVII, 207). This continued support maintained pressure on the Iraqi central government, forcing it to maintain military ground forces in the northern regions to contain the Kurds. This force also provided a buffer against Iraqi infiltrations into Iran.

Although the US did not have official relations with Iraq, Lowrie was on the lookout for opportunities to improve relations nonetheless. In a telegram to the State Department, Lowrie requested US air support for the Iraqi basketball team to visit the US, and proposed the government provide several scholarships for Iraqi students as a means to further US relations with Iraq. Lowrie stated there were two sides to Iraq. The first was the anti-American Baathist party that incited armed clashes on the Kuwait and Iranian borders, and was very anti-American. He described this party as being comprised on twenty to thirty year old militants who dominated security and party organizations. The other side were the technocrats, who while equally nationalistic, are trying to improve Iraq through development plans, tourism, and trade. Lowrie believed the majority of the population resided in this group. He believed this group could be influenced by engagement plan that may pay dividends at a later time (FRUS, XXVII, 206).

Iraq did have a relationship with Russia, and in a telegram from the State Department on 4 October 1973, they confirmed Iraq had recently received delivery of fourteen TU-22 medium bombers from the Soviet Union. The department speculated an

arms deal had been concluded between Iraq and the Soviet's after the 1972 expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt (FRUS, XXVII, 234). However, they also noted the change in Iraqi attitudes toward the West, and included the signing of the Boeing and Brown and Root contracts.

When Egypt determined to go to war with Israel, they notified Iraq, and asked that twelve Iraqi aircraft stationed in Egypt be allowed to participate in the attack. Iraq agreed, and relayed they would provide forces to assist Sadat if needed. Egypt did not request Iraqi support, but Syria quickly agreed to their offer of assistance. The Egyptian Foreign Minister said in a press interview that Egypt's goals were limited, and they would seek a cease-fire when the Israelis had withdrawn from Arab land. Egyptian Charge Baraka also noted the Soviets did not know the timing to the start of the conflict, but had given Sadat assurances they would support his limited objectives (USINT Bagdad 0592, 9 November 1973). The speed at which Sadat asked for and accepted a cease fire took Iraq by surprise (USINT Bagdad 0641, 1 December 1973).

The media were reporting that Sadat's actions were not popular, even inside Egypt. The people thought Sadat had accepted a ceasefire too soon. Baraka was concerned that Sadat may have gambled by taking the ceasefire offer, and that he had a good chance of being disappeared by the military. Iraqi leaders were not only caught by surprise, they were also mad at Sadat for not consulting with them both on the beginning of the war, and on its end (USINT Bagdad 0577, 25 October 1973). Sadat for his part did not trust the Iraqi leadership, and thus did not consult nor ask for Iraqi military support.

On 12 October 1973, the Bagdad interest section reported that life in the streets of Bagdad remained largely unaffected by the war. Citizens were seen carrying on life as normal, although the press reported that most people supported the actions of Egypt and Syria, and had a renewed sense of Arab pride (USINT Bagdad 0551, 12 October 1973). Lowrie reported a conversation with the Indian Military Attaché that one division of infantry, and one division of Iraqi armor had gone west to fight. Two squadrons of SU-7 fighters had also been sent to join the fight. The attaché noted the newer T-62 tanks and TU-22 bombers had been kept back in Iraq, while older T-54 and SU-7 aircraft had been sent.

Lowrie noted that prior to the October war, Iraq was isolated from most of the Arab countries and Iran. But when war broke out, they quickly sent two divisions and five Air Force squadrons, although they kept their best weapons in Iraq. However, casualties were high among the Iraqi's, losing an average of 50% combat power in each of their units that made it to the fight. The Soviets had gained the most from the fighting after the war inside Iraq, making long term low interest loans to the government, while also discussing replacing lost military hardware (FRUS, XXVII, 238).

Tensions between Iraq and other Arab countries continued through the disengagement negotiations between Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. When Egypt and Saudi Arabia called for a lifting of the oil embargo, they said the US policy in the Middle East had changed, and had moderated against the Arabs. Iraq publicly denied the US policy had changed, and said the reactionary governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia were undermining the Arab desire for justice and peace (USINT Bagdad 0177, 23 May 1974). Iraq maintained the best course for Arab countries was to nationalize all US

assets in the Middle East, although they still advocated for free trade of oil, albeit at the higher posted OPEC prices.

In a show of support for Iraq, on 8 January 1974, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Novikov led a trade and commerce delegation for a visit to Iraq. Relations between the Soviets and Iraq had cooled since the end of the war, and their new found oil wealth allowed Iraq a sense of independence from Russia's loans and grants. Russia was very interested in maintaining their relationship with Iraq, and at least a foothold in the Middle East (USINT Bagdad 0024, 16 January 1974). Iran still needed the partnership offered by the Soviets as a counter to the growing strength of the Shah, who the Iraqis saw as a regional threat to their security. The Indian military attaché noted that Iraq continued to receive advanced weapons and aircraft from the Soviets. The January Soviet delegation was followed by additional high level visits from Soviet officials, In March 1974, Minister of Defense Marshall Gretchko, and Minister of the Interior Shilikov visited Iraq to demonstrate Soviet support.

5.6 Analysis

5.6.1 The Ambassadors, cooperation, and UN voting patterns

The 1973 War and follow on negotiations offer a glimpse into how the US approached foreign policy in the 1970's. As the National Security Advisor, Kissinger was in a position to push US policy in a direction that did not seem to be supported by the State Department. His views on Russian interference in the Middle East matched that of President Nixon, and this ran counter to the recommendations of the Secretary of State. When the fighting concluded, Kissinger was designated by President Nixon as the sole

negotiator for the US, impairing the country ambassadors' role in the ensuing negotiations. Perhaps he did this inadvertently, or perhaps this played into his already perceived notion the State Department would not be able to conduct negotiations either quickly or meaningfully.

The White House was involved in many of the critical decisions made during the lead up to, during, and after the war. Did their involvement in the most basic of decisions allow them to miss some opportunities that may have avoided the need for the war? Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat seemed to desire the reestablishment of relations with the US, but for some reason his offer was not acted upon. It may be that the wounds of the 1967 War were deemed too deep for the US to move on his request. However, when he acceded to one of their key demands, that he push the Soviet advisors out of Egypt, Washington took no action. Several of the authors cited in this paper believe Sadat's decision to remove the advisors from Egypt was the turning point in Middle East history. But the Nixon administration is not the only example of approaching the Middle East with a hands on style. During the Johnson Administration, when decisions were made, they were generally made at the White House.

Of the four case study countries, only Iraq did not have an ambassador during the period under investigation. Of the remaining three countries, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had career foreign service officers, while Iran had a series of political appointees. Of the eight ambassadors that were assigned to these countries during this period, six were career ambassadors, and two were political appointees. Of the eight ambassadors, only two meet the key qualification skills referenced in the Neumann – Pickering letter. Ambassador Akins assigned to Saudi Arabia was a career foreign

service officer, had regional experience, spoke several regional languages, and met the independent variable of having served in the military.

The other ambassador was Ambassador Stoltzfus, Jr., assigned to Kuwait. He was also a career ambassador, had extensive regional experience, and spoke several languages, although he did not have any military experience. For the argument that Ambassador's Neumann and Pickering make about the importance of career status, regional experience, and language ability, only 25 percent of the ambassadors assigned during this five-year period met those qualifications.

Saudi Arabia was well served during this period by three experienced ambassadors. All three were career Foreign Service officers with regional experience, and in the case of Ambassador Elts, extensive Middle East experience. Although only one, Ambassador Akins, spoke several regional languages, all three had military experience. Assessing conflict and cooperation between the ambassadors and Saudi Arabia, the COPDAB scale value mean scores for the years leading up to, and the period during the 1973 war and oil embargo, are relatively high for cooperation, and low for conflict. And during the period of the war, the scale value of conflict is lower even than the period leading to war. This level of cooperation is reflected in the mean percent agreement in UN voting patterns with the United States. During this five-year period with two significant crisis, Saudi Arabia voted with the United States an average of 30 percent of the time. While not as high as Israel or Iran, it is in line with the voting patterns of the other Arab countries in this study.

Iran had three ambassadors assigned consecutively that did not have many of the criteria listed by Neumann and Pickering, including career status, regional

experience, and language ability. What is interesting about the assignments of the ambassadors to Iran, is most were not career ambassadors, and this occurs during a time of great events in that country, and the Middle East. In the early post World War II stages, the military and economic relationships between the US and Iran allowed them to become a regional source of stability and security for US national interests. The relationship with Iran was special, and economic and military assistance flowed into the country. However, in three of four years, the scale value of cooperation between the US and Iran was lower than the Arab countries. In voting, although the ideal point average with the US is 38 percent, 62 percent of the time Iran does not vote with the US. And this is by all accounts a special relationship. In 1973, both Iran and Iraq voted with the US 28 percent of the time, and Iraq was not even our ally. What is apparent in both the COPDAB and UN voting patterns is although the US has a special diplomatic and economic trade relationship with Iran; their outward behavior does not seem to acknowledge this.

Kuwait was also well served with experienced ambassadors during this period. Both Ambassadors Walsh and Stoltzfus are career service officers, and both have regional experience. Ambassador Stoltzfus, Jr. is the only one of the two to speak a regional language, but he does not have any military experience. However, for the purposes of the Neumann – Pickering list of desired qualifications, they are both considered experienced ambassadors. Kuwait maintains a level of cooperation at the relatively high level of 7 and below on the COPDAB mean scale value of cooperation and conflict, and agrees with the US in UN voting averages 28 percent of the time. They remain very closely aligned with Saudi Arabia in both COPDAB and UN voting patterns

during this period. Saudi Arabia clearly has a lot of influence in both these areas during this period.

5.6.2 Trading patterns

Trade with each of the countries in the study steadily increased during the period 1970 to 1974. As a control variable, trade does not seem to have much significance. While it would be expected that trade with Iran would increase, surprisingly trade with each of the countries, to include Iraq, increased during this period. Saudi Arabia increased overall trade during this period from \$188M dollars to \$2.367B dollars. While much of this increase is seen in the price of oil, exports of US trade goods to Saudi Arabia increased by 60 percent year over year from 1970-1974. This included a significant amount of military equipment.

Trade also increased with Iraq and Egypt, two countries the United States did not have diplomatic relations with during this period. Trade with Iraq increased from \$21M dollars in 1970, to \$188M dollars in 1974. Significantly, the majority of trade with Iraq in 1974 was in US exports. While trade with Egypt increased from \$70M dollars in 1970, to \$464M dollars in 1974. Exports to Egypt increased over 290 percent from 1973 to 1974.

In fact, for all the Middle Eastern countries that joined the embargo decision against the United States because they were trying to change the diplomatic landscape for Egypt, all dramatically increased their import and export relationship with the United States by 1974. For the alliance of countries supporting Egypt, and this alliance was clearly led by Saudi Arabia, trade was still an important factor in their relationship with

the United States. Even for Saudi Arabia, the leader of the alliance supporting Egypt, trade with the United States never stopped. And once the hostility in the region subsided, economic activity increased tenfold. While trade did of course continue with Iran, the level of cooperation as measured by the COPDAB data base, and the UN voting patterns as measured by Strezhnev and Voeten, were roughly the same as the Arab countries. One of the key differences among those countries was the experience levels of the ambassadors as espoused by Ambassador's Neumann and Pickering.

5.6.3 Alliances and agreements

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Arab unity was at a low point. Egypt's Nasser had been the spokesman for the Pan - Arab movement, and with the loss of prestige and power, he was no longer able to keep the movement together. When Saudi Arabia stepped in to offer their leadership, they became a target for Islamic activists, and this created an internal security problem. Saudi Arabia needed Egyptian support to defend them from the ideological attacks from activists inside Egypt. Saudi Arabia also wanted to curb Egyptian support for insurgents fighting another of the Saudi allies in the Yemen government. In exchange for their support, Saudi Arabia moved closer to Egypt with economic and military support (Korany 1984, 54).

Alliance formations can be a stabilizing factor in some cases (Levy 1981). Leeds (2003) references the alliance security dilemma, and notes that while it presents a security pact between two or more countries that may lead to better security cooperation, it can also tie an ally's hands and bind them to a conflict they may not wish to be a part of. This may help explain the limited influence of the control variable

alliance in this region. Saudi Arabia has an alliance with other Arab members, but not the US or Iran. Egypt's decision to increase her external alliances, particularly with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are explained by the internal security threat to the political survival of their government (Barnett and Levy 1991, 393). The decision to form an alliance or arm against a threat is rarely made in isolation. These two alternatives to security offer advantages and disadvantages. There are internal costs and external benefits that must be weighed to understand the cost, with domestic politics determining the cost for each (Gibler 2006; Morrow 1993; Schultz 2001).

Saudi foreign policy was based on a desire for Arab unity. Al-Sowayel (1990), notes that before the 1973 war, Saudi senior leaders engineered a rapprochement with Egypt in order to undermine their support for the Yemen insurgency and to end the Russian presence in the Middle East. Historically, Saudi foreign policy and decision making has been guided by five tenets, "the primacy of religion, Arab loyalties, tribal considerations, the search for secure boundaries, and consensus within the Saudi leadership" (Al-Sowayel, 1990, 54). For the United States, part of the problem for their understanding of what is going on in Egypt's government was the lack of diplomatic representation in the country (Lippman 1989). Even Kissinger (1982) admitted that what no one in the US understood was the mind of the man, when speaking of President Sadat. That what he wanted was more economic and diplomatic; than military (Yergin 2009, 575).

Egypt and Saudi Arabia were crucial to the initiation and success of two decisions that jolted the world economy and the Middle East in October 1973. The Egyptian – Syrian attack on Israel, and the oil embargo (Korany 1984, 47). Once Egypt

had made the decision to attack Israel, King Feisal of Saudi Arabia was under pressure from Egypt and other Arab countries to use oil as a weapon. Egypt believed a war with Israel would change their diplomatic future with the United States. King Feisal's warnings in Geneva to US oil executives was shared with Washington, to no avail. Washington did not believe it was that bad, or that Saudi Arabia would follow through with their threat (Yergin 578). However, Saudi Arabia is tied to an embargo by both OPEC, their defensive alliance with Egypt, and their leadership role in the Pan-Arab movement. Even Secretary of State Kissinger did not understand the dilemma the Saudi leadership was in (Al-Sowayel, 1990, 75).

While the Yom Kippur war may have been a surprise, Knorr and Rosenau (1969) note that the use of oil as a weapon should not have been. Sufficient warnings had been sent, but were ignored, believing Arab unity was insufficient to enforce an embargo. Long (2000) and Long and Leeds (2006) discuss the role security externalities have on trade among allies and non-allies. Although there was reason to believe Saudi Arabia would not support an embargo, Leeds (2003) notes that alliances affect behavior based on the content of the treaty. She finds that seventy-five percent of the time, allies honor their commitment. So after repeated warnings to Washington and the major oil executives, Saudi Arabian oil minister Sheikh Yamani exclaimed "Anyone who knows our regime and how it works realizes that the decision to limit production is made by only one man, i.e., the King, and that he makes that decision without asking for anybody's concurrence" (Yergin 2009, 579-580).

5.6.4 Summary of analysis

Although Europe quickly felt the effects of the oil embargo, they were still more willing to embrace the United States than rely on security partners inside Europe. Their need for security overcame economic fear, except for immediately after the embargo was announced. Then they looked inside their own countries for support, reaffirming the sovereignty instinct for survival (Knorr and Rosenau 1969). Korany (1984) concludes that the King's decision to use oil as a weapon was more as a deterrent – and not literally. He notes the King's repeated attempts to warn the United States through various channels, including using the oil companies. Korany also notes that although the embargo did cause an economic panic, the true effects were more psychological than real, and that the Saudi's moved to end the embargo before achieving their stated objectives (Korany 1984, 69).

Part of the reason the embargo ended was the desire by the Saudi's to restore their relationship with the United States. Knorr (1975, 232) notes, "The monopoly power of a state that attempts to exploit a relationship of asymmetrical economic interdependence is usually insufficient to achieve coercion." The United States was discommoded by the oil embargo, but not threatened as Europe, and Japan, were. The United States still produced oil, and although was required to adjust some policies, did not give in to their demands so much that OPEC achieved their goals. Knorr (1975) argues that economic strength only works when country A needs country B, more than B needs A. In that case, B's power is absolute; and this is the law of reciprocal demand (Knorr 1975, 231).

Although the embargo effort was largely supported and encouraged by Saudi Arabia, diplomatic cooperation as assessed using the COPDAB data was maintained at a relatively stable rate, even during the crisis periods in 1973, and 1974. This localized assessment of cooperation is reinforced by their UN voting patterns, which show a consistency from 1970 through 1974. This same level of cooperation and consistency voting patterns is also seen in the actions of Kuwait, and to some extent, Iraq. Although there is an OPEC sponsored oil production cut-back, trade and cooperation with the United States are relatively unchanged.

The level of cooperation and UN voting are not the same for Iran, which was seen as an ally of the United States. During the period 1970-1974, increasing levels of conflict as measured by the COPDAB data are seen. This is complimented by less agreement in the United Nations with the United States position. While the United States had an alliance with Iran, and had supported Iran's economic and military modernization for many years, Iran's outward support of the United States was actually fairly close to the positions of the Arab OPEC countries. Contrast their support with the high level of cooperation and UN agreement shown by Israel, and it becomes apparent that Iran was not as supportive an ally of the United States as might have been expected.

For different reasons, all the case study countries continued to trade with the United States, even though three of the four had an alliance with each other for military support. United Nations voting patterns and the percent of votes that agreed with the United States are largely unchanged with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the period 1970-1974. While the level of conflict with Iraq was higher than the COPDAB average

for the Middle East countries, the severed diplomatic relations could help explain this. There was one country that did not have the same stability with the United States during this period, and it was Iran, and there is a difference in the diplomatic representation that may help explain why.

A review of the ambassadors assigned to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait show a high level of experience as described by the Neumann – Pickering letter. Of the five ambassadors assigned to these two countries during this period, each were career Foreign Service Officers. And of these five, all had regional experience with Middle East countries. Of these five ambassadors, two spoke regional languages.

Contrast the experience level of the ambassadors assigned to Saudi Arabia with the experience of the ambassadors assigned to Iran. Of the three ambassadors assigned during this period, one was a career Foreign Service Officer, who had extensive experience in Japan. He had never been assigned to the Middle East. The other two were political appointees, with no Middle East experience. Ambassador Farland did have some experience in Pakistan, but no experience in Middle Eastern affairs. None of the ambassadors assigned to Iran during this period spoke any regional languages, or any other languages except for English. As far as the qualifications listed in the Neumann – Pickering letter, they may not have been described as having the skills Ambassador's Neumann and Pickering believed were important.

While it is hard to say the proximate cause of the differing relations between the four countries was due to the qualifications of the ambassadors, what is not hard to show is there was a difference in their experiences, and the outcomes of the relations.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Summary

This research project was driven by a desire to understand if there are any particular sets of skills or qualifications that may help an ambassador be more successful in the accomplishment of their roles as the chief diplomat and personal representative of the President of the United States assigned in a foreign country. This effort was given direction by a letter written by Ambassador's Neumann and Pickering to then Senator's McCain and Obama as they were running for the job of President of the United States. In their letter, these two ambassadors, with many years of experience in the art of diplomacy, listed several qualifications they believed would help an ambassador be more effective.

Anecdotally, the agreement as to whether a career ambassador has more experience and qualifications to be more effective than a political appointee has supporters on both sides. However, what was lacking was any empirical assessment based on quantitative or qualitative research on ambassadors as a whole. Researchers and historians have written about ambassadors and events, but mainly from a singular perspective focused on a particular event. What hampered any longitudinal research of US Ambassadors was the lack of a single database of ambassadors with searchable qualifications. This limited the ability of researchers to interact with a large – N dataset of ambassadors. This led to an unbridgeable gap in the literature and allowed anecdotal arguments to continue without end.

Institutionally this gap was encouraged and in many cases, defended. In both the extant literature and in interviews with senior Department of State executives, the motive was to protect the cultural ideology that diplomacy is a human endeavor that required the application of diplomatic art. At the most senior levels, to include current and former ambassadors, I was reminded that each diplomatic problem is unique, both in origin and in solution, and the skills necessary to resolve them cannot be measured; or planned for. While I do not disagree that diplomacy is a unique human endeavor, I do not believe that patterns of success operationalized using specific variables cannot be assessed over time, with a large – N population; given the right methodology and criterion.

This research attempts to add some measure of quantitative and qualitative assessment to these arguments. While I am under no illusion that this will end these debates, I am hopeful that by creating a database of ambassadors, with measurable qualifications as listed in the Neumann – Pickering letter, that more research will enable some application of science to the art of diplomacy.

This quantitative portion of this study was based on assessing levels of cooperation using Azir's (2003) Conflict and Peace Database, and an ambassador dataset of over six hundred US ambassadors assigned around the world from 1946-1974. This allowed a longitudinal assessment of the qualifications listed in the Neumann – Pickering letter. The key qualifications that were assessed in this portion were the career status of the ambassador, either a career Foreign Service Officer or a political appointee, regional experience, regional language ability, and prior military service.

The quantitative portion of this research is based on a structured and focused comparison of four case study countries that comprise the OPEC countries of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, assessed against the background of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the ensuing oil production cut-back and embargo against the United States.

This chapter highlights the key findings of this research dissertation, it discusses some policy implications, and suggests areas of additional research.

6.1.2 Findings

This study sought to understand whether performance as an ambassador could be assessed using several datasets as proxies for success. To understand the broader context of success and performance, this dissertation sought to answer the following research questions:

R1: Are the measurable differences in the abilities of skilled ambassadors to enable or enhance cooperation during times of crisis?

R2: Are there consistent identifiable attributes and characteristics that exist among ambassadors who are able to maintain cooperation during times of crisis?

R3: Are there measurable differences in the success of career and political appointees during times of diplomatic crisis?

For this dissertation, two key hypotheses were tested to help focus the research:

H1: The presence of a skilled ambassador should lead to higher levels of cooperation during times of diplomatic crisis.

H2: Career ambassadors should enable better cooperation during crisis periods due to their extensive diplomatic experience and training.

The qualitative research was guided by the following focused and structured questions when assessing the four case study countries during the period 1970-1974:

Q1: What was the level of cooperation between the Ambassador and the host country as measured by the Conflict and Peace Database and the UN Voting dataset? Was there a change in the level of cooperation during or after the crisis period?

Q2: What was the experience level of the ambassador as assessed using the qualifications listed in the Neumann – Pickering letter?

Q3: What was the dollar value of trade before, during, and after the crisis as measured by total import and export trade? Was there a change in the level of trade volume between the United States and the target country during and after the crisis?

Q4: Was there an alliance relationship among the four countries, or those four countries and the United States? An alliance between any of these countries and Egypt will also be considered due to the direct involvement of Egypt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the presupposed relationship to the oil embargo.

A mixed methods approach was designed that allowed for the testing of the hypotheses using both quantitative and qualitative methodology. The quantitative

approach utilized a large – N database of US Ambassadors from 1946 – 1974 that allowed for a Time Series Cross Sectional assessment of the dependent variable of cooperation based on several independent variables. The large number of ambassadors assessed during this twenty-eight year period should increase the generalizability of the findings. The assessment of these findings across different geographic regions should also provide some insight into the relative importance of varying skills across cultures as well.

The qualitative approach was based on four case study countries utilizing a structured and focused methodology to allow for a controlled comparison of historical events during a period of crisis. This controlled comparison allowed for a more precise understanding of the dependent variable when assessed against the independent and control variables.

The findings demonstrate there are measurable differences in the abilities of skilled ambassadors that enable and enhance cooperation during periods of crisis. While the predictable level of cooperation is not assessable, what is demonstrated in the data is there is a higher level of cooperation when a career Foreign Service Officer is assigned as the ambassador, particularly when that ambassador has been previously assigned to the region. What is also shown in the data is the varying effect these variables have based on geographic regions. The data suggests there is a difference in the effect career status, regional experience, language ability, and military experience seems to have in influencing higher levels of cooperation. While the presence or absence of these characteristics cannot predict the level of cooperation, what seems to be shown is there is a difference when these variables are present. This is reinforced in

the qualitative case studies that examined ambassadors assigned to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, during the period 1970-1974. During this period, the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the OPEC oil production cutback and embargo take place.

In the four case study countries the more experienced ambassadors were able to sustain cooperation at pre-conflict levels with the countries that support Egypt during the war, and the embargo, while the inexperienced ambassadors assigned to our ally country, Iran, experience-decreasing levels of cooperation. This higher level of cooperation is supported by the data, which also shows a significant increase in trade in all four countries during the period under examination. Voting patterns as seen in United Nations General Assembly voting remained at roughly pre-conflict levels. These empirical findings seems to suggest that even with a military alliance among three of the countries and the main conflict initiator, Egypt, cooperation remained relatively stable among the three countries with the more experienced ambassadors assigned.

6.1.3 Policy implications

There are several policy related implications that could be drawn from this study. While career status is an important consideration, regional experience seems to have the most relevant impact. Although several geographic graphs suggest that career status is important, what is consistent across each of the regions is the importance of regional experience. A non-career status ambassador that had previously studied or conducted business in the region could have as much success as a career ambassador that has been previously posted to the region. The data is not sufficiently complete to allow it to be parsed so precisely that this occurrence could be seen.

The geographic data suggests there are differences in how the different variables seem to interact with the dependent variable. This shows that care should be made when selecting ambassadors with experience in a particular region. The US State Department Biographic Register shows numerous instances of ambassadors that had gained extensive regional experience prior to selection as an ambassador are routinely assigned to a region in which they had no prior experience. The data suggests this may not be the best use of experience. When William Sullivan was approached to be the ambassador to Iran after the resignation of Richard Helms, he was told the President wanted an experienced professional. Ambassador Sullivan replied he knew nothing about Iran, or the Islamic world. He was told that an understanding of history, Iranian politics, culture, and language was a secondary qualification (Cooper 2008, 377). This led a former diplomat to remark that the embassy's lack of experience made it very easy for the Iranians to play them off against each other. After the successful coup against the Shah in 1978, investigators uncovered that, "...US intelligence had not understood the magnitude of the Iranian opposition to the Shah – over-reliance on Iranian security sources for intelligence having deprived them of precisely the kind of objective analysis that was crucial in a time of change" (Strategic Survey 1978).

6.1.4 Future research

There are several areas for future research that could contribute to a better understanding of diplomacy. The extension of the ambassadorial dataset beyond 1974 will enable researchers to connect current diplomatic events to ambassador qualification. This will be challenging because of the discontinuation of the US Department of State Biographic Register due to security concerns, but the fidelity it would provide could make this effort worthwhile. Secondarily, these datasets could then be refined to identify more precisely the effects that time may have on regional experience, and the level of assignment in each region. There may be a point in a Foreign Service Officer's career in which a regional assignment might make more of an impact on their future performance.

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United States Department of State telegram to US Embassy Tel Aviv, Reference number 201118, dated 10 October 1973, Record Group 59, National Archives.

United States Department of State telegram to US Embassy Jidda, Reference number 203672, dated 14 October 1973, Record Group 59, National Archives. (In this telegram, Secretary Kissinger had the ambassador relay to King Faisal the beginning of the US airlift to supply Israel).

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Israel

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United States Department of State, US Embassy Tel Aviv, Reference number 8040, dated 13 October 1973, Record Group 59, National Security Archives.

Jordan

United States Department of State, US Embassy Amman, Reference number 5367, dated 8 October 1973, Record Group 59, National Archives.

United States Department of State, US Embassy Amman, Reference number 5398, dated 10 October 1973, Record Group 59, National Archives

Portugal

United States Department of State telegram to US Embassy Lisbon, Reference number 203571, dated 13 October 1973, Record Group 59, National Archives. (In this telegram, President Nixon had the ambassador relay to Prime Minister Caetano they United States requested Portuguese airspace and airfield support for the US airlift to supply Israel).

United States Department of State telegram from US Embassy Lisbon, Reference number 203651, dated 13 October 1973, Record Group 59, National Archives. (In this telegram, Prime Minister Caetano promised support to US airlift requirements). See also AmEmbassy telegram 3782 from Ambassador Themido.

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Appendix A: Countries with assigned US Ambassadors using COW coding

Country Code	State Name	Region	R. Name
2	USA	1	N. America
20	Canada	1	N. America
40	Cuba	1	N. America
41	Haiti	1	N. America
41	Haiti	1	N. America
42	Dom Rep	1	N. America
51	Jamaica	1	N. America
52	Trinidad and Tobago	1	N. America
53	Barbados	1	N. America
70	Mexico	1	N. America
90	Guatemala	2	C. America
91	Honduras	2	C. America
92	El Salvador	2	C. America
93	Nicaragua	2	C. America
94	Costa Rica	2	C. America
95	Panama	2	C. America
100	Colombia	3	S. America
101	Venezuela	3	S. America
110	Guyana	3	S. America
130	Ecuador	3	S. America
135	Peru	3	S. America
140	Brazil	3	S. America
145	Bolivia	3	S. America
150	Paraguay	3	S. America
155	Chile	3	S. America
160	Argentina	3	S. America
165	Uruguay	3	S. America

Country Code	State Name	Region	R. Name
200	United Kingdom	4	Europe
205	Ireland	4	Europe
210	Netherlands	4	Europe
211	Belgium	4	Europe
212	Luxembourg	4	Europe
220	France	4	Europe
225	Switzerland	4	Europe
230	Spain	4	Europe
235	Portugal	4	Europe
255	Germany	4	Europe
290	Poland	4	Europe
305	Austria	4	Europe
310	Hungary	4	Europe
315	Czechoslovakia	4	Europe
325	Italy	4	Europe
338	Malta	4	Europe
339	Albania	4	Europe
345	Yugoslavia	4	Europe
350	Greece	4	Europe
352	Cyprus	4	Europe
355	Bulgaria	4	Europe
360	Romania	4	Europe
365	Russia	4	Europe
375	Finland	4	Europe
380	Sweden	4	Europe
385	Norway	4	Europe
390	Denmark	4	Europe
395	Iceland	4	Europe

Country Code	State Name	Region	R. Name
420	Gambia	5	Africa
432	Mali	5	Africa
433	Senegal	5	Africa
434	Benin	5	Africa
435	Mauritania	5	Africa
436	Niger	5	Africa
437	Ivory Coast	5	Africa
438	Guinea	5	Africa
439	Burkina Faso	5	Africa
450	Liberia	5	Africa
452	Ghana	5	Africa
461	Togo	5	Africa
471	Cameroon	5	Africa
475	Nigeria	5	Africa
481	Gabon	5	Africa
482	Central African Republic	5	Africa
483	Chad	5	Africa
484	Congo	5	Africa
490	Dem Rep of the Congo	5	Africa
500	Uganda	5	Africa
501	Kenya	5	Africa
510	Tanzania	5	Africa
516	Burundi	5	Africa
517	Rwanda	5	Africa
520	Somalia	5	Africa
530	Ethiopia	5	Africa
551	Zambia	5	Africa
553	Malawi	5	Africa

Country Code	State Name	Region	R. Name
630	Iran	6	M. East
640	Turkey	6	M. East
645	Iraq	6	M. East
651	Egypt	6	M. East
652	Syria	6	M. East
660	Lebanon	6	M. East
663	Jordan	6	M. East
666	Israel	6	M. East
670	Saudi Arabia	6	M. East
690	Kuwait	6	M. East
694	Qatar	6	M. East
696	United Arab Emirates	6	M. East
698	Oman	6	M. East
700	Afghanistan	6	M. East
710	China	7	Asia
732	South Korea	7	Asia
740	Japan	7	Asia
750	India	7	Asia
760	Bhutan	7	Asia
770	Pakistan	7	Asia
771	Bangladesh	7	Asia
775	Myanmar	7	Asia
780	Sri Lanka	7	Asia
790	Nepal	7	Asia
800	Thailand	7	Asia
811	Cambodia	7	Asia
812	Laos	7	Asia
816	Vietnam	7	Asia
820	Malaysia	7	Asia
830	Singapore	7	Asia
840	Philippines	7	Asia
850	Indonesia	7	Asia
900	Australia	7	Asia
920	New Zealand	7	Asia

Appendix B: Letter to Senator McCain



Chairman
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Vice Chairman
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RONALD E. NEUMANN

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Secretary
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Assistant Secretary
GLENN S. GERSTELL

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R. MARCUS PALMER
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J. STAPLETON ROY
DANIEL SIMPSON
EDWARD S. WALKER, JR.
JOHNNY YOUNG
ANTHONY ZINNI

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MAX M. KAMPELMAN
LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
FRANK C. CARLUCCI
SOL M. LINOWITZ
ELLIOT RICHARDSON

Former Presidents
BRANDON H. GROVE
L. BRUCE LAINGEN
DAVID H. POPPER
DAVID D. NEWSOM

Ex-Officio
BRUCE S. GELE, Council of
American Ambassadors
KENNETH BROWN, Association for
Diplomatic Studies & Training
CLYDE TAYLOR, Una Chapman Cox
Foundation

Counsel
GLENN GERSTELL
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy, LLP

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ARTHUR ROSS FOUNDATION

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY

June 24, 2008

The Honorable John McCain
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator McCain,

Congratulations on your nomination as the Republican nominee for President of the United States of America.

The American Academy of Diplomacy, founded in 1983 and today representing an elected membership of 200 of the most experienced retired professional diplomats and diplomatic practitioners from other civilian services in the United States, seeks to strengthen American diplomacy by fostering high standards of qualification for, and performance in, the conduct of diplomacy. Together, the membership accounts for well over 4,000 years of combined diplomatic experience. The Academy is committed to increasing public understanding and appreciation of the contributions of diplomacy to the national interests of our great country.

As leaders of the Academy, we believe that the President who takes office on January 20, 2009 will have a unique opportunity to highlight to the American people, and our friends, allies and adversaries around the world, the importance of diplomacy as a national security tool of the United States. Among the new President's first responsibilities will be the appointment of Ambassadors to carry out America's foreign policy. Given the opportunity that we believe will exist to commit our nation to active diplomatic engagement with the world in pursuit of America's interests, the new President will need to pay close attention to these appointments. The same care will obviously need to be taken with senior appointments in the State Department and other national security agencies.

We look forward to the debate about the future of our diplomacy and our foreign policy in the coming campaign. We write to both candidates today to propose at least one policy on which we ask both of you to agree: having Ambassadors with the qualities of leadership, judgment and management required of their demanding positions.

Ambassadors must coordinate a staff including representatives of as many as thirty Washington agencies, each communicating directly with his or her headquarters and each devoted to particular objectives. Only the Ambassador is appointed by the president and approved by the Senate to represent America as a whole and to set priorities and reconcile objectives in

Strengthening American Diplomacy

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the field. To successfully carry out this mission, we believe that the following criteria are essential and must be considered in the nomination and confirmation of American Ambassadors:

- Unquestioned integrity, personal discretion and self-discipline;
- Demonstrated interest and experience in foreign affairs, at least in dealing with foreign cultures; preferably, personal knowledge of the country involved, its region, people and language;
- Understanding power relationships, influence and negotiation;
- Thorough knowledge of American history and values, and of American economic, commercial and political purposes – with a clear commitment to them;
- Appreciation of the dynamics of American politics, of the role of the Congress and the Executive, and the constraints upon each, of the bureaucratic politics of Washington;
- The intellect, perception and interpersonal skills required to report accurately in both directions between the host country and Washington, and to recommend appropriate policies;
- Proficiency in communication: the ability to explain American positions persuasively to foreign governments and publics, and to address the American public as well;
- Finally, demonstrated efficiency as a leader, manager and executive, reinforced by sound judgment and strength of character to lead our missions abroad and command attention and respect in Washington.

There have been many outstanding non-career Ambassadors appointed by recent Presidents, and we support the continuation of the appointment of some non-career Ambassadors as a way to tap the unique capacities of America in our representation abroad. But too often Ambassadorships have served as political rewards for unqualified candidates.

Accordingly, we recommend that the number of non-professional appointments be more limited than in the past and that far stricter attention be given to appointing only those fully qualified by both personal and professional background for the demanding task of leading today's American diplomatic missions.

The traditional percentage of non-career appointees as Ambassadors has generally been about one-third of total appointments since the Administration of President Kennedy. To assure meeting the qualification noted above, we believe a new target in the area of 10% should be adopted.

We ask that when you speak about the future of our foreign policy and diplomacy in your campaigns, that you commit to appointing qualified Ambassadors, generally from the career Foreign Service. Adopting this policy, both during the campaign and, if elected, for your Administration, would show your commitment to diplomatic engagement with the world and your recognition of the unique value added the career

Foreign Service brings to the pursuit of our nation's interests. It goes without saying that you should demand that the State Department produce the very best Foreign Service officers for these appointments.

We recognize that appointments at the policy level in Washington reflect somewhat different factors from those of Ambassadors in the field. But expertise in the conduct of diplomacy is no less necessary at home than abroad. We hope you will consider similar standards for domestic foreign policy appointments.

The Academy also supports adequate funding for foreign affairs. We are conducting a zero-based review of the foreign affairs budget and will make recommendations in September on the minimum resources we believe necessary to promote and protect America's interests abroad. This study is entitled the Foreign Affairs Budget of the Future (FAB) Project, and we hope that when it is finished, you might make a member of your campaign staff available to hear a briefing on its findings.

Undoubtedly, the United States faces opportunities and challenges around the world. We will not meet these challenges, or grasp the opportunities available to us, without successful American diplomacy. How our next President decides who should represent the United States abroad will say much about his or her commitment to America's global leadership.

We thank you for your consideration of this proposal.

Sincerely,



Ronald E. Neumann
President



Thomas R. Pickering
Chairman

Appendix C: Letter to Senator Obama

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THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY

June 24, 2008

The Honorable Barack Obama
713 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Obama,

Congratulations on your nomination as the Democratic nominee for President of the United States of America.

The American Academy of Diplomacy, founded in 1983 and today representing an elected membership of 200 of the most experienced retired professional diplomats and diplomatic practitioners from other civilian services in the United States, seeks to strengthen American diplomacy by fostering high standards of qualification for, and performance in, the conduct of diplomacy. Together, the membership accounts for well over 4,000 years of combined diplomatic experience. The Academy is committed to increasing public understanding and appreciation of the contributions of diplomacy to the national interests of our great country.

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Ronald E. Neumann
President



Thomas R. Pickering
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