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THE INTELLIGENT MAN ON THE SPOT,
CAPTAIN JAMES H. HAUSMAN IN SOUTH KOREA, 1946-1948

by

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
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INTRODUCTION

Building indigenous armies in less developed countries with military advisory and aid programs has been an ongoing responsibility of the United States Army in this century. Often operating in primitive locales, many advisory programs were underfunded, short staffed and only succeeded because of dedicated American advisors. My thesis analyzes the impact that one man, Captain James H. Hausman, United States Army, had on the South Korean Army between July 1946 and August 1948.

Establishment of a South Korean Army was an early goal of American occupation policy in Korea. However, little support was given and few resources assigned. Between 1946 and 1948, a minute American advisory effort partially trained and equipped a South Korean Army cadre of 25,000 men.

The unceasing efforts of a talented American advisor, Captain James Hausman, made success possible. Assigned as a military advisor to Korea in July 1946, Captain Hausman had during the next 2 years overwhelming influence in altering Korean military affairs. He thoroughly analyzed the many problems

facing the South Korean Army and worked diligently to solve them. Overcoming cultural differences and shortages of everything, Captain Hausman provided continuity to the American advisory effort during the lean years of 1946 to mid 1948. He personified the positive attributes of the American military advising to South Korea. His efforts to improve the South Korean Army were capped by his successful reform of the civilian-military command structure of the South Korean Army in June 1948.

Although Captain Hausman served nearly five years in Korea, his first tour of duty, 1946-1948, was the most significant. He dominated the small advisory group and was given carte blanche to implement his ideas. He left indelible changes on the South Korean Army and defense structure.

Captain Hausman's overwhelming influence declined with South Korean independence in August 1948. No longer was he the "father-creator" of the South Korean Army, solely responsible for an overwhelming portion of the advisory effort. Instead he became a member of a better funded and much larger staffed American military advisory effort. As the advisory effort expanded, his role changed. Recognizing his abilities and experience, General William L. Roberts chose him for the delicate position of liaison officer between the American advisors and the Korean Army Chief of Staff. Although

certainly important, this position lacked the overwhelming power Captain Hausman had previously possessed. He served in this position with distinction until February 1951 when he returned to the United States.

Many historians see Captain Hausman's impact during the years 1946 to 1948 as enlightened and positive. Gregory Henderson later wrote in his work on Korea,

No American officer had, at that time (1946), any concept of the complex background of the men and groups (Koreans) with which he was dealing. Except for a devoted young officer named James Hausman, few stayed to find out 1/

1/ Gregory Henderson, Korea: Politics of a Vortex, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 340

CHAPTER I. - ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KOREAN CONSTABULARY
SEPTEMBER 1945 TO JULY 1946

KOREA AND U.S. ARMY OCCUPATION TO NOVEMBER 1945

Japanese hegemony was established in north Asia after the collapse of Tsarist Russian power during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Lacking diplomatic support from the Great Powers, Korea could not resist Japanese encroachments on its independence and by 1910, Korea was a satellite of Japan. Repression and control of all aspects of life were tenets of Japanese rule for the next 35 years. Any public demonstration of Korean nationalism was squelched. The Japanese ruthlessly exploited their Korean colony. Much of Korea's rice was exported to Japan, and Korean industry was restructured toward heavy goods production for the Japanese military economy. This created unbalanced Korean industrial production incapable of meeting domestic needs.

The institutions of Japanese political and economic control developed during 35 years of occupation collapsed suddenly with Japanese defeat in August 1945. As Japanese power dissolved, chaos filled the vacuum. A legacy of the Japanese was the lack of native trained administrators. No Koreans

had held significant managerial posts in industry, the occupation government, the police, or the military.

The rapid Japanese collapse left the United States (U.S.) with inadequate plans for the administration of Korea. The Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) entry into the Pacific War accelerated planning on the joint American-Russian occupation of the Korean peninsula. Since the U.S. wanted the capital city and a large port in its occupation zone, it proposed a temporary division of occupation responsibilities at the 38th Parallel, the U.S. occupying the southern zone, the U.S.S.R. the northern zone. American planning envisioned eventual reunification of the zones when the postwar situation was more settled. Democratic elections would be held and a Korea, favorable to the U.S., would emerge. But no timetable for Korean independence existed.

Unfortunately for Koreans, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were determined to foster a Korea favorable to their interests. The occupation powers represented two distinct political and economic systems in conflict. This confrontation inevitably led to the division of the peninsula at the 38th Parallel. The futile negotiations of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Korea during the first half of 1946 made it obvious that the occupation powers were unable to agree on a policy to reunify the zones.

The occupying powers administered their zones differently. Early on, the Russians restricted in their zone any Korean political or military activity contrary to their interests. Failing to wrestle control of the entire peninsula away from the Americans through negotiations, they embarked on creating a client state in their zone by mid-1946. For the Americans, occupation was an unwanted burden. Inheriting a situation where political and economic chaos reined, the U.S. wanted to establish a friendly democratic Korea but lacked a policy to achieve it. The occupying powers were unable to agree on how to reunify Korea and on what constituted a democratic government. The U.S. groped for a policy to deal with Korea.

To Americans, the occupation of Korea was considered a backwater assignment, a sideshow to the more important events in Japan. American prestige was tied to success in Japan, not Korea. A long-term American commitment was not originally intended for Korea. The American occupation command in the South was divided into two parts: the U.S. Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) concerned with civilian affairs; and the Army occupation force, called U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK). The army of occupation was composed of the XXIV Corps and commanded by Lt. General John R. Hodge, who was the senior American officer in Korea between September 1945 and August 1948. The occupation command was critically short of military

government teams, translators and civilian administrators. Heeding the domestic and troop cries for rapid demobilization, USAFIK and USAMGIK was debilitated by the pell mell departure of veteran troops. Reinforcement of USAFIK was not a high priority.

TOWARD A KOREAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE

An early action taken during the American occupation was the reconstitution of a Korean police agency. About 30 percent of this force were Korean police who had held minor posts under the Japanese. The police were to maintain internal order and relieve USAFIK forces from this duty. 1/

Nevertheless, violent internal disorders, common in postwar Korea, were more than the Korean police could handle and American troops were constantly used to help keep internal order. The USAFIK was a ready police reserve and provided for Korean national defense. The American command realized that as demobilization stripped away troops, establishment of a USAMGIK government bureau to manage Korean national defense and police reserve forces was necessary. 2/

1/ Interview of Colonel Reamer W. Argo by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 November 1951, Records of the Army Staff, Office of the Chief of Military History, Captain Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 728.

2/ Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Peace and War: KMAG in Peace and War, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government (footnote continued on page 9)

INITIAL PLANS FOR A KOREAN DEFENSE FORCE

On 10 November 1945, USAFIK Headquarters appointed an officer board to determine the needs of a Korean national defense program. 1/ On 13 November this officer board was merged into the newly established USAMGIK's Bureau of National Defense (BND). The bureau was responsible for the recruiting, training and equipping of Korean armed forces. The BND was headed by Brigadier General Lawrence Schick and staffed by American officers. 2/ Within days, a provisional program was ready and approved by General Hodge. It called for the formation of a 45,000-man Army and Air Force of three infantry divisions supported by a 5,000-man Navy under BND direction. BND's Korean defense program had to be approved by the Departments of Army and State in Washington before it could be implemented.


Printing Office, 1962), pp. 9-10.

Memorandum from Brig. General Schick, Provost Marshal General U.S. XXIV Corps to Major General Arnold, Commanding General USAMGIK, Subject: Plan for the National Defense of Korea, 31 October 1945, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

1/ Sawyer, KMAG, pp. 10-11.

2/ Korea Gazette, Ordinance Number 28, Headquarters United States Army Forces in Korea, Office of the Military Governor, 13 November 1945, Records of the Adjutant General Office, Administrative Services Division-Operations Branch, Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 2062.

Structure of the Bureau of National Defense 1/



While waiting for comments and approval of their Korean defense plan by Washington, BND officers started a Military Language School in Seoul. Opened on 4 December, the school's purpose was to ease the language difficulty by teaching potential Korean officers English military expressions. 2/ Applicants had to possess some knowledge of English and over 60 Koreans attended the first class. 3/

The establishment of an "elaborate" Korean defense force was moving too quickly for evolving American diplomatic policy on Korea. The Departments of Army and State believed the creation of a Korean defense force signaled an American decision to sponsor a client state in the South. But in late 1945, the U.S. still sought a diplomatic settlement

1/ Ibid.

2/ "History of Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 20, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

3/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 12.

to reunify both zones through the negotiations of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Korea. Only when the futility of negotiations was evident in mid-1947, would the U.S. support a larger Korean defense force. Until then, caution dominated American planning and resource allocation for a Korean defense force.

GENERAL CHAMPENY AND PLAN BAMBOO

Washington rejected the creation of an elaborate Army and ordered Brigadier General Arthur Champeny, who superseded General Schick as Director of National Defense, to submit a smaller, more practical plan. In late December, General Champeny's new plan, BAMBOO, was adopted. BAMBOO was a simple plan to develop a cadre of Korean soldiers through the framework of the BND. If a Korean Army formed later, this cadre could be the core. Initially, a 25,000-man reserve force would be raised to support the police in maintaining internal order and although trained along infantry lines, the reserve force would be organized as a constabulary police force, not an army. It would be called the Constabulary. 1/ As the Constabulary expanded in size and capability, it would assume some of the national defense responsibilities carried out by the USAFIK. BAMBOO kept the Constabulary small and unobtrusive.

1/ Letter from Brig. General Champeny to Captain Sawyer, 7 March 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

BAMBOO envisioned raising one infantry company 20 percent overstrength in each of southern Korea's eight mainland provinces. Companies were organized using U.S. infantry standards, 225 men and 6 officers. However, because of shortages of heavier infantry weapons (machine guns and mortars), there were no heavy weapons platoons. After training and equipping units with abandoned Japanese equipment, the excess men would serve as the core to recruit and build another company. Each succeeding company would be overstrength and expand in a similar manner. Three companies would form a battalion and three battalions a regiment. 1/ Each province would have a regiment of 2,200 men. Later, more regiments would be formed to bring Constabulary strength up to 25,000 men.

THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSTABULARY

Recruiting for the Constabulary started near Seoul on 14 January 1946 and the units attracted many enlisted and officer applicants with prior military experience. These men came from two distinct backgrounds: those with experience in the Japanese or Japanese-Manchurian Army; and those with Chinese Army or Korean Liberation Army experience. When assessed, the Japanese-trained men were considered more professional, able and disciplined.

1/ Ibid.

After being interviewed, tested and medically examined, selected Koreans were sent to the first Constabulary training and barracks area, northeast of Seoul on the Ch'unch'on Road. Security checks on applicants' political leanings were not completed. "Recruiting standards remained low and reasonably healthy applicants had little trouble enlisting." 1/ By month's end, three companies in Seoul were raised and training.

For the first year, American officers commanded Constabulary units. Colonel John T. Marshall was the first Chief of the Constabulary. To develop Korean managerial and administrative skills, a counterpart arrangement was instituted. Koreans served in American offices, learning the necessary skills to run the Bureau eventually.

In late January, a draft of American officers were assigned to Constabulary recruiting and organization duty. Pairs of officers, teamed with a translator and select Korean enlisted men from the Constabulary battalion at Seoul, were sent to provinces to organize companies. A daunting task faced them because,

...the Department of National Defense was the last department to be organized in Korea. Therefore, buildings, office space, supplies, civilian personnel, etc., which had already been allotted to other

1/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 26.

departments, had by this time become a scarcity. Now, at this late date, it was difficult for members of this organization to acquire the supplies they so urgently needed. 1/

Shortages were prevalent. Procurement of necessary supplies in the provinces, where American control was often tenuous, was time-consuming and difficult. The teams had to locate billets, training areas and food supplies and to procure abandoned Japanese weapons and equipment.

Early on, ill will developed between the Constabulary and the Police. Differences erupted over jurisdiction, enforcement powers and supplies. In the early months, the Constabulary lost many bureaucratic battles with the Police. American commanders tended to favor the Police because of their immediate impact, whereas the Constabulary was still an infant force, incapable of helping Americans keep order. For example, the Constabulary felt insulted because they were armed with Japanese pistols and Type 99 bolt action rifles, while the Police were equipped with American sidearms and light machine guns. The only light machine guns the Constabulary had were gifts of souvenir Japanese

1/ "History of Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 4, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

guns given by American units. 1/

Despite being poorly trained and equipped, overstrength Constabulary companies were raised in each province by April 1946. 2/ These companies were not scattered like the Police, but were concentrated on provincial posts in accordance to tactical and logistical considerations. 3/ Constabulary posts were established at Seoul, Pusan, Kwangju, Taegu, Iri, Taejon, Ch'ongju and Ch'unch'on. 4/ Total Constabulary strength was about 2,000 men.

CHANGES, SPRING 1946

Revisions were made to the BND in the spring of 1946. In March the Police were detached from BND and made an independent bureau to lessen bureaucratic infighting and improve the quality of the force. In April, the USAMGIK recognized national defense as an important government function and raised it from bureau to department status.

1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 August, 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.


2/ Ibid.

3/ "History of Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 19, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

4/ Sawyer, KMAG, pp. 16-17.

Development of the Constabulary slowed in June due to diplomatic considerations. The Russians insinuated that the newly titled Department of National Defense (DND) was evidence the Americans were not negotiating in good faith and were intent on creating a satellite state. The U.S., determined not to have their sponsorship of the DND become the Russian excuse to derail negotiations, redesignated National Defense as Internal Security. Not a Korean Army, the Americans contended, this force was merely a backup to the police in keeping civil order in the South. 1/

Reorganization of the Korean Defense Structure



These changes underscored the lukewarm support Washington and the Far East Command in Tokyo under MacArthur (FEC) gave to expanding the Constabulary. From mid-1946 to late 1947, the U.S. emphasized diplomacy at the expense of military considerations. As General Hodge (USAFIK commander) later wrote:


...I was very interested in establishing a Korean Army from the beginning of the Occupation...I met with much

1/ Sawyer, KMAG, pp. 20-21.

UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA 1/

30 SEPTEMBER 1946

1/ Foreign Occupied Area Reports
 Military Government Charts-Korea,
 Record Group 94, Adjutant General Office,
 Administrative Services Division-
 Operations Branch, National Archives,
 Washington, D.C., Box 2,070.



opposition at higher levels apparently in the belief that at that stage of our relations such a move might be misunderstood by the Russians and be a source of difficulty...." 1/

But as a later author noted:

Unfortunately, MacArthur and Washington, anxious not to arouse the Russians, demurred, and a modest, almost surreptitious, plan for a constabulary-type police reserve was substituted, what little was done being almost entirely on the initiative of Hodge and his staff. 2/

Changes to the Department of Internal Security (DIS) continued in September. To increase Korean responsibilities and lessen dependence on American supervision, Koreans were placed in charge of DIS and its subordinate offices. The Korean Director-DIS simply became the Director-DIS while the former American director became the Advisor-DIS. American officers connected with DIS became advisors, handing decision making to the Koreans. The official language was Korean, though important documents were accompanied by an English translation. 3/

1/ Letter from Lt. General Hodge to Major General Orlando Ward, 18 March 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

2/ Henderson, Korea: The Politics of a Vortex, p. 340.

3/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," pp. 14-15, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Despite this counterpart arrangement, Korean managerial skills were still inadequate. American advisors retained overwhelming influence and continued to make or approve all major decisions, ensuring that U.S. interests concerning the Constabulary were protected. 1/ The control of military aid afforded the Americans additional leverage over the materially poor Koreans.

1/ Ibid.

CHAPTER II. - CAPTAIN HAUSMAN AND THE KOREAN CONSTABULARY,
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS.

CAPTAIN HAUSMAN'S BACKGROUND

James H. Hausman was born on 28 February 1918 in New Jersey. Raised there, he dreamt about military service and living an adventuresome life. In 1934, facing the reality of jobless Depression-era America and wanting adventure, he "borrowed" his brother's birth certificate and at the age of 16 enlisted in the U.S. Army as John O. Hausman. Between 1934 and 1940, he served at Fort Devers, Massachusetts, in Panama and elsewhere. 1/

Even after reaching legal enlistment age, James H. Hausman continued the fiction of being John O. Hausman, fearing discharge from the Army for enlisting under false pretenses. He masqueraded successfully until the Selective Service Law of 1940, which required all men between the ages of 18 and 35 to register for the draft. James H. Hausman had to register, and brother John O. was unwilling to assume the identity of his younger brother James H. to conceal this problem.

1/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 March 1988.

It must have taken courage for Corporal John O. Hausman (actually James H.) to present this problem to his commanding officers. Requesting leniency, he feared retribution for his false enlistment. While not condoning his actions, his commanders saw that Corporal Hausman had a good record and was a motivated foot soldier. Reluctantly, the Army discharged him in late 1940. Until his Army records were corrected and he registered for the draft, he was not allowed to re-enlist. 1/

In 1941 the U.S. Army was desperate for experienced men and officers. James H. Hausman volunteered for service shortly after Pearl Harbor. In early 1942 the Army gave him a direct field commission of a First Lieutenant recognizing his prior service as John O. Hausman. He finished officers' training at Fort Benning, Georgia, in June. While there, his first son Jimmy was born. He was assigned for much of the war as a recruiting, organizing and training officer for the newly created U.S. Army Women's Army Corps (WAC). A member of the first group of 17 officers assigned to this duty, First Lieutenant Hausman was stationed at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, from July 1942 to July 1943 assembling the first WAC battalion in the U.S. Army. 2/

1/ Ibid.

2/ Ibid.

Daughter Judy was born in July 1943 when First Lieutenant Hausman was assigned to a WAC camp at Daytona Beach, Florida. In early 1944, he continued his organizing and training duties at a WAC camp in Spartansburg, South Carolina, where he was promoted to Captain. Though proud of his integral role in the far reaching social-military experiment of the WAC, he felt his military service during the war was perhaps less than heroic. He never heard a shot in anger nor even came remotely close to a combat area. 1/

Captain Hausman's excellent service record, prewar experience of 6 years as a Regular Army enlisted man, 4 years' duty as a WAC advisor and his desire to remain in the Army after the war allowed him to survive the drastic demobilizations personnel cuts of 1945 and 1946. At age 28 with 10 years of valuable Army experience in peace and war, he was assigned to Korea.

SERVICE WITH THE 8th REGIMENT, JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1946

Captain Hausman landed in Korea in July 1946 and was assigned to the USAMGIK as an advisor to the 8th Constabulary Regiment at Ch'unch'on in the Kangwon province about 45 miles northeast of Seoul. 2/ The 8th Regiment began forming on

1/ Ibid.

2/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.



DESCRIPTION: MAJOR GENERAL CHAE BYUNG DUK, CHIEF OF STAFF KOREAN ARMY, ADDRESSING KOREAN OFFICERS AT THE OPENING OF THE KOREAN ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL, 26 SEPTEMBER 1949. AMERICAN OFFICERS SEATED ON PLATFORM LEFT TO RIGHT: BRIG. GENERAL ROBERTS, MAJOR CLARKE, LT. COL. EDWARD, CAPTAIN HAUSMAN AND LT. COL. VIEMAN. (PHOTO SC#334611)

27 March 1946 and recruited 225 men by the end of March. 1/

Originally Captain Hausman thought he was assigned to the American occupation force in Japan. However, though he did not speak or write any Korean, G-1 (Personnel) Far East Command believed he would be more effective in Korea. 2/ His experience as an organizer and trainer for the WAC made him suitable as an advisor to the Korean Constabulary.

Captain Hausman traveled to Korea without his family because USAMGIK and USAFIK lacked facilities for dependent families, and Army regulations forbade dependent wives, beyond 7 months pregnant, to be sent overseas with their husbands. It was 9 months before he was reunited with his family. 3/

He joined an advisory effort in turmoil. Turnover of American personnel caused by rapid U.S. Army demobilization hindered efforts to advise the infant Constabulary. The loss of institutional memory and continuity when advisors left

1/ Republic of Korea, Military History of Korea, translated by the 500th Military Intelligence Service Group, Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, Records of the Army Staff, Office of the Chief of Military History, Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Record Group 319, Box 747.

2/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 March 1988.

3/ Ibid.

was devastating. Working relationships between the Americans and Koreans were fragmented, short-lived and often not effective. In the early months of 1946, quality long-term advising was nonexistent.

Between December 1945 and June 1946, there were four Directors of National Defense. Although General Champeny was the Director during the beginning of the Constabulary, much of his time from February to April 1946 was occupied with duties of Acting Deputy Military Governor. After General Champeny was promoted, two Directors followed quickly, Colonels Bernard and Thompson. Finally, Colonel Terrill E. Price was appointed as Director on 1 June. Within the Constabulary, the Chief of Constabulary, Colonel John T. Marshall, was replaced by Colonel Russell D. Barros in March.

Captain Hausman's duty with the 8th Regiment was a valuable learning experience. Previous advisors accomplished little beyond recruiting a company of Koreans and selecting a post site. Some recruits continued to wear civilian clothing, while the others wore a mixture of Japanese and U.S. Army uniform remnants. Weapons were in short supply. 1/

1/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 8, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Because of their innate knowledge of Korea and the language, Captain Hausman believed in delegating responsibilities to promising Korean officers. This gave him more time to develop training, and it gave Korean officers experience in managing staff functions. Captain Hausman was fortunate to have 2nd Lieutenant Whang as Finance Officer for the Regiment, a man whom Captain Hausman recognized as possessing excellent administrative skills. He established a working relationship with Lt. Whang to help solve local recruiting, training and supply problems. 1/

USAMGIK government teams backed by USAFIK occupation troops exercised American provincial control. Invaluable assistance was available from both. Previous advisors for the 8th Regiment had rotated so quickly that they had not maintained any on-going liaison with local American units. However, Captain Hausman's emphasis on good relations with the American forces immeasurably helped the 8th Regiment obtain facilities, supplies, transportation and temporary special advisors. 2/

1/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Lt. Whang later became a General in the South Korean Army and was a Military Attache to the United States.

2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," pp. 17-18, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Between July and September, Captain Hausman and Lt. Whang worked to improve the 8th Regiment. Uniforms and weapons were procured and issued to recruits. Billets were improved. Plans were finalized for expanding the 8th Regiment by recruiting another company using the excess of the first company as the core.

However, DIS provided little and inconsistent direction on training, leaving advisors to decide what was applicable. 1/ Captain Hausman devoted energy to training which stressed the basics, drill and marksmanship. Because many Korean officers were instilled with a "banzai" mentality, evaluation and training of them in American methods of drill, tactics and administration was time consuming, yet extremely important. 2/

CAPTAIN HAUSMAN IS REASSIGNED

In September, Colonel Barros, Chief of the Constabulary, visited Captain Hausman at Ch'unch'on. Reviewing his accomplishments, Colonel Barros noted the improvement and progress made toward welding the 8th Regiment into a cohesive unit.

1/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 4 October 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Although by this time, Colonel Barros had been Chief less than 4 months, he realized the Constabulary and advisory effort were struggling. Demobilization had gutted the advisory effort already handicapped by limited resources and support. Constabulary Headquarters in Seoul was a shell with few men, no resources and little direction. Policies were non-existent. Compounding these problems was the pending change to Korean control.

"The evening of his visit, Colonel Barros announced he was going to take me (Hausman) back to Seoul with him." 1/ Captain Hausman was reassigned to Constabulary Headquarters in Seoul. The 8th Regiment would suffer the loss of an excellent advisor, but Colonel Barros reasoned Captain Hausman would be more effective reorganizing and building up the Constabulary Headquarters.

This move was significant. 2/ In his new position, Captain Hausman wielded tremendous influence. Brigadier General William L. Roberts, first Chief of the U.S. Army's formal military advisory group to Korea (KMAG), noted Captain Hausman, "Had more to do with the start, the arming,

1/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 22.

equipping, moves and expansions (of the Korean Constabulary) than anyone else." 1/

Besides his new assignment in Seoul, Captain Hausman had another reason to think fondly of September 1946. His wife gave birth to their second daughter Ruth Ann. 2/ With the birth, arrangements could start to have the Hausman family sent to Korea in the spring of 1947.

CAPTAIN HAUSMAN AT CONSTABULARY HEADQUARTERS,
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1946

For 2 years, before establishment of a bonafide aid and advisory effort, American advising to the Constabulary was in a critical stage. Desperately short of personnel, funds, supplies and higher command support, a minute advisory mission driven by Captain Hausman, somehow created the Constabulary, the cadre upon which the South Korean Army was later built.

During the American occupation, the old walled city in central Seoul hummed with activities of the American occupation command. Despite the late scramble for office space, DIS procured some offices in the Security Building in

1/ Letter from Brigadier General William L. Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 March 1988.

the old city. 1/ Reporting to DIS Headquarters in late September, Captain Hausman noted that DIS was impressively staffed with Koreans and a complement of 20 American advisors. However, he was directed to the few small back offices of the Bureau of Constabulary. 2/ The Constabulary headquarters staff consisted of Colonel Barros, Major Lee Hyung Koon (Special Korean advisor to the Constabulary), 2nd Lieutenant Yim Sohn Hah (Barros' Adjutant) and a Korean Sergeant. Besides these men, there was nothing else to the Constabulary Headquarters. Policy development was non-existent as were military staff functions, personnel (G-1), intelligence (G-2), plans & operations (G-3) and logistics (G-4). 3/

1/ Telephone Directory, Greater Seoul Area for XXIV Corps (WASHINGTON), Military Government (WHITEHORSE), 7th Division (DENVER) and Branch Exchanges, 1 March 1948, Charles H. Donnelly Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Box: Japan and Korea, 1946-1949.

Irma Tenneant Materi, Irma and the Hermit, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1949), pp. 39-40.

2/ Interview of Major Russell Geist by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 3 July 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 25 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

3/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Captain Hausman was assigned significant responsibilities. Colonel Barros directed him to build up Constabulary Headquarters to improve and speed up the recruiting, training and advising programs. Trusted by Colonels Barros and Price, he was given carte blanche to carry out his duties. Scarce resources would limit implementation of improvements.

ASSESSMENT OF DIS/CONSTABULARY RELATIONSHIP

Captain Hausman first requested Lt. Whang of the 8th Regiment as his adjutant. 1/ Lt. Whang provided invaluable help. The first major project for Captain Hausman and Lt. Whang was to assess the bureaucratic relationship between DIS Headquarters and the subordinate Constabulary. In late 1946, DIS Headquarters dominated the Korean defense structure, garnering many scarce resources for its use. DIS was supposed to provide policy and military staff support to the bureaus. For the Constabulary, DIS Headquarters tried to manage all staff functions, G-1 to G-4. 2/


Despite providing some policy development, DIS proved incapable of administering hands-on direction for the Constabulary. DIS was unable and unwilling to provide the

1/ Ibid.

2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," pp. 10-11, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 1/

Department of Internal Security



*Denotes Special Staff Function

1/ Letter from Captain Schwartz to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 28 March 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Special Reports-Korea, Government Folder, Adjutant General Office, Record Group 94, Box 2063.

USAMGIK Manual of Military Government Organization and Function, U.S. Theatres of War, World War Two, XXIV Corps, G-2 Historical Section, Record Group 332, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 5.

necessary manpower resources to run the Constabulary correctly. With inadequate resources and attention the Constabulary was floundering. A headquarters was being developed, but the recruiting, equipping and training of the Constabulary and its officers was mismanaged. 1/

The command structure of DIS precluded the Constabulary from acting independently. Staff functions were duplicated at both the DIS and Constabulary Headquarters levels, but DIS dominated resulting in the Constabulary Headquarters staff serving as nothing more than messengers for policies developed by DIS. 2/ The overwhelming nature of DIS stifled development of Constabulary staff functions.

Rather than accept DIS dominance, Captain Hausman understood DIS control was not complete. Many DIS officers, both Korean and American, rarely spent time in the field working with Constabulary units. 3/ Often, DIS policies were not informative and effective. Captain Hausman believed Constabulary Headquarters could significantly influence its

1/ Letter from Brigadier General William L. Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 22.

3/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 25 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

affairs.

Constabulary Headquarters matured in November 1946. A Korean Chief of Constabulary was appointed, Lt. Colonel Song Ho Seung, with Lt. Colonel Barros assuming the role as senior American advisor. Major Lee Hyung Koon was not appointed Chief because his Japanese Army background might have proved embarrassing to American occupation authorities. Also, another regiment was activated on the island province of Cheju-do.

ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTABULARY & ADVISORY EFFORT,
DECEMBER 1946 TO JANUARY 1947


In December 1946 Captain Hausman began assessing the Constabulary and advisory program. Accompanied by Major Koon, he left Seoul on a trip by jeep that covered 7,000 miles and went to every Korean province. Each company post of all nine Constabulary regiments was inspected. 1/

Regiments and advisory programs were evaluated on: quantity and quality of recruits and advisory personnel; level of rudimentary military training program; area and units advisor responsible for; logistics support; armaments, uniforms and equipment; billets; recruiting; Korean officers' potential

1/ Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

1/ USAMGIK Manual for Military Government Organization and Function, Records of U.S. Theaters of War, World War Two, XXIVth Corps G-2 Historical Section 1945-1948, Record Group 332, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 5.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONSTABULARY - 1948



and past military experience; and relationship with the local Police and USAMGIK unit.

What Captain Hausman found was discouraging. Except for the 1st Regiment at Seoul, using the name regiment for the other Constabulary units was polite fiction which masked weakness. The other eight regiments were drastically understrength, consisting of one to three companies. 1/ Numbering 200-600 men actually in uniform and training, these regiments were not hampered by the lack of recruits but by the lack of supplies and equipment. 2/ In fact, ceilings were placed on two regiments to prevent overrecruiting. Recruiting did little good if funds, equipment and billets did not exist or could not be procured for new men. 3/

Recruits were of uneven quality, though many possessed prior military service in the Japanese or Chinese armies. The Korean officer corps was fractured between the Japanese and Chinese-trained officers. Better trained, disciplined and professional, the Japanese-trained officers dominated the

1/ Ibid.

2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 25 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

3/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Corps. Unfortunately, because security clearances were not performed during recruiting, disruptive politicized officers and men entered some units.

Units received spotty logistics support. Critically short of supplies and equipment, Constabulary men were armed with Japanese rifles and pistols. Japanese and American uniforms. Food was a severe problems. The rice ration, sufficient for civilian consumption, did not supply enough calories and vitamins to offset the rigorous physical demands placed on Constabulary men. 1/ Billets were in short supply and consisted of either property confiscated from negligent Korean renters or buildings rented at exorbitant prices. 2/

In many areas relations with the Police were poor. Favoritism shown the Police in supplies and equipment was resented by Constabulary men. Police often felt superior and thought of the Constabulary as their reserve. Frequent fighting, sometimes with guns, occurred between them.

The advisors were overwhelmed with work. In January 1947, six American advisors were assigned to Constabulary

1/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 5, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

2/ Ibid, pp. 8 & 12.

Regiments. Each advisor was given responsibility for two regiments, often separated by up to 100 miles. To advise all their regimental companies, some advisors drove a circuit of 350 miles. Although nominal control passed to Korean officers in December 1946, American advisors retained responsibility for major decisions. Advisors controlled training, ng, recruiting, finances, operations, construction and officer selection and promotion. 1/

Little contact was maintained between DIS and advisors, who were left on their own to train and promote unit cohesion and discipline. 2/ Since advisors were spread thin, Korean officers were relied upon to conduct much of the training and disciplining of the men.

The language barrier hampered advising and training. There was an acute shortage of Korean translators, and the few remaining were in Seoul with the occupation command. Initially, Nisei (Japanese-American) translators were attached to advisors since many Koreans, especially the officers, spoke Japanese. Later, as part of the de-Japanization of Korea, DIS forbade the use of Japanese as a

1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

2/ Ibid.

means of conversation, rendering the Nisei useless. The Nisei were not replaced with Korean interpreters, forcing advisors to continue operating under a language handicap. 1/ Even though many Constabulary men knew some English, carrying out simple instructions was a struggle. For convenience, many Korean Constabulary officers and advisors continued to use Japanese despite the ban. 2/ Training was impeded by the lack of training manuals translated into Korean. Advisors simply had little written material to distribute to Constabulary men.

1/ Ibid.

2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

CHAPTER III. - MOVING FORWARD, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
JANUARY 1947 TO JULY 1948

INTRODUCTION

Evaluations complete, Captain Hausman and Major Koon returned to Seoul in late January 1947. 1/ Determined not to have lethargy overtake the Constabulary and advisors, Captain Hausman believed success depended on correct use of available resources and promoting the Constabulary and its needs in DIS. 2/ He acknowledged severe problems including supply shortages, lack of advisors and support and the language barriers, but he did not accept these problems as ready excuses to let the Constabulary flounder. Many advisors were doing excellent work considering they were nearly overwhelmed with problems. He reasoned that an effective Constabulary Headquarters could provide immeasurable support.

Building up the Constabulary and its Headquarters would not

1/ Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

be easy. Conversations with Colonels Barros and Price (head of DIS) confirmed minimal support by higher headquarters for developing the Constabulary. The occupation command felt the Police more useful than the Constabulary, still considered a Police reserve force. The Police garnered 60 percent of the security budget. 1/ Constabulary supplies remained short and advisory personnel levels progressively fell from ten men in late 1946 to three men during the winter of 1947-1948. 2/

Captain Hausman recognized four problem areas within the Constabulary: recruiting; training; budget and logistics; and stature. Only if these problems were addressed, could the Constabulary develop into a legitimate national defense force.

RECRUITING

To project itself as the national defense force, Captain Hausman knew it was vital to reach the Constabulary authorized strength of 25,000 men in 1947. At 30,000 men, the Police were a larger force, with better funding and more equipment and respect. Without adequate manpower, the

1/ Memorandum from the Economic Advisor for the Commanding General USAFIK to the Secretary of State, Subject: "National Budget for Fiscal Year 1 April 1947/31 March 1948," 4 September 1947, Special Reports Korea, Adjutant General Office, Record Group 94, Box 2,048.

2/ Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Constabulary would continue as a Police reserve, underfunded and overlooked. 1/

An 18 month plan was devised by Captain Hausman to bring the Constabulary to full strength and provide it rudimentary training. To reach 25,000 men by years' end, drastic expansion was necessary since in November 1946, the Constabulary numbered only 4,200 and most regiments consisted of one or two companies. 2/

Captain Hausman sped up recruiting programs in early 1947. He encouraged advisors to hold recruiting drives in their units' province to form new companies. Advisor recruiting teams were sent throughout the provinces using radio and newspaper advertisements and word of mouth to attract recruits. New units were activated using overstrength companies to provide cadre for forming additional companies. Recruiting drives continued through the year. He envisioned every regiment increasing to at least three companies, by July 1947. This increase would form a battalion and a

1/ Memorandum to File by General Courtney Hodge, 5 December 1947, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division (G-3) 1946-1948, Decimal File 091.Korea Section I, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 20.

2/ Memorandum for General Wedemeyer from Lt. Colonel Seedlock, 9 March 1948, Plans and Operations Division, Record Group 319, Box 20.

battalion headquarters. Overstrength battalion cadre would form two more battalions and headquarters by years' end. Within a year each regiment would attain full strength and establish a regimental headquarters in the capital of the province where the regiment was based. 1/

Captain Hausman knew there were problems with rapid expansion. The rush to attain full strength produced battalions of uneven quality. Though recruiting expanded the Constabulary nearly six times over during the year, many new recruits possessed only basic military training. There was also a high risk of politically unreliable recruits infiltrating the ranks.

TRAINING

With the influx of thousands of recruits, training improvements were desperately needed. Captain Hausman worked extremely hard to implement his training ideas. Because the number of American advisors declined, much of his work was directed at the Korean officers who increasingly conducted more of the training. 2/

1/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," pp. 18 & 19, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

2/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Close Liaison With American Units

During his tour, Captain Hausman noted that the best organized and recruited regiments were those in which the advisor worked closely with local American forces. He emphasized to all advisors the need to cooperate to secure scarce facilities. The Constabulary was simply too resource poor not to seek help from all quarters. 1/

Examples of how American assistance could improve the Constabulary were evident. Because the Constabulary had few trucks, access to U.S. Army truck transportation was an immense help. Recruiting areas expanded from walking distances to outlying provincial towns. Though regiments continued to recruit on a provincial basis, with accessible transportation the entire province could now be canvassed for recruits. Borrowed transportation also gave the Constabulary mobility to conduct training exercises and operations. 2/

Letter from Captain Schwartz to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 28 March 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

1/ Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

"History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," pp. 17 & 18, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

2/ Ibid, p. 8.

(footnote continued on page 45)

Training help was also provided by American units. Advisors could not hope to cover adequately necessary military subjects with all of their regimental units. Instructors from U.S. units were lent temporarily to assist in the specialized training in American firearms, tactics and administrative functions. Sometimes American units hosted a military school for the Constabulary. The U.S. 20th Infantry Regiment, for example, conducted a brief school on American weapons training for Korean officers in March 1947. To cope with the new recruits, the training schedule was often upped to 16 hours a day, 7 days a week. Recreation was not permitted. Special classes for Korean officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO's) were often held nightly. English classes were held twice weekly. After only a few months of training, recruits would become the cadre upon which new units would form. 1/

Language Barriers

Perhaps the biggest obstacle advisors faced was the language barrier. Relaying basic instructions was often frustrating and time-consuming. Korean itself was an imprecise language lacking translations of many technical English terms. Many

Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

military terms had not found their way into Korean. Literal translations were often impossible or terribly confusing. Interpreting words into descriptive phrases created a machine gun described as gun-that-shoots-very-fast or headlight as candle-in-a-shiny-bowl. Interpretations were inconsistent. 1/

Captain Hausman sympathized with the plight of the advisors. He had landed in Korea not knowing Korean. However, with the help of Lt. Whang and Major Koon, he developed proficiency in understanding the language. But his Korean reading and writing skills remained basic. 2/

To reduce the language problem, Captain Hausman implemented many projects. He strongly urged advisors to develop a better understanding of Korean. 3/ As in his case, conversational Korean, supplemented with signs, was easier to learn than reading and writing Korean and it had an immediate use. Also, to alleviate confusion, all Constabulary Headquarters' documents were issued in both Korean and English, so both advisor and Constabulary men could understand.

1/ Sawyer, KMAG, pp. 62-64.

2/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 March 1988.

3/ Ibid.

After his return in January 1947, he requested that DIS write and translate military training manuals into Korean. Written training materials were critically lacking. Under his guidance handbooks on soldiering, squad and platoon tactics and for officers were completed. Printed locally, the manuals were distributed to Constabulary men by advisors beginning in March 1947. 1/

These manuals were very valuable to the advisors. Since training outlines from DIS did not exist, advisors used the manuals as guides. Not only was training more standardized, but Koreans could study military lessons without the presence of the advisor, which unfortunately was often necessary. Since advisors were thinly spread much of the training was conducted by Korean officers who readily used the manuals. 2/

Despite the changes, the language barrier proved nearly insurmountable. 3/ Advisors continued to struggle using a

1/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 5, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Ibid.

3/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 5, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

mixture of Korean, Japanese, English and signs.

Korean Officers

As the Constabulary expanded, Korean Constabulary officers were increasingly responsible for training. Shortages of advisors meant Americans were not able to supervise every unit.

To supply junior Constabulary officers, the Korean Training Center (KTC) was established on 1 May 1946. The old Military Language School, which provided the first draft of Korean officers back in early 1946 was disbanded. The KTC was a shell until 1947 when American and Korean advisors were assigned to gear up for the expansion. Activated progressively with the strengthening of the regiments, the KTC accepted Koreans as officer candidates for basic military and English training. Commissioned probationally, these officers were assigned to the newly raised units. 1/

Despite DIS's desire to de-Japanize Korea, Captain Hausman realized the need to continue recruiting Korean officers with prior military service in the Japanese or Chinese armies. Although their methods often clashed with American ideas of training, discipline and tactics, Captain Hausman understood their usefulness. With shortages of Korean and American

1/ Ibid, pp. 17-21.

officers, trained men could not be overlooked simply because they had served on the other side in the previous war. These officers provided a nucleus for a Korean officer corps. In the absence of advisors, they conducted much of the basic training (drill, marching, physical fitness and discipline). In fact some units were still using Japanese drill as late as July 1948! 1/

Although many Korean officers adhered to "banzai" charge tactics and had low regard for marksmanship, not all of their influence was detrimental. Many saw the fallacy of American efforts to create a road-bound force, tied to elaborate supply nets. Content with ox carts, horses and marching in mountainous Korea, their ability to adapt to local terrain and use their limited resources wisely allowed the Constabulary to develop excellent cross-country mobility. 2/

As the Police reserve, Constabulary units were often called

1/ Ha Woo Lee, "The Korean Polity Under Syngman Rhee: An Analysis of Its Culture, Structure and Elite" (Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1975), pp. 154-166.

Letter from Brigadier General William L. Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Letters from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 4 October 1952 and 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Ibid.

upon to quell civil disorders the Police could not handle. Though disruptive to training, the disorders provided realistic training and gave units an opportunity to conduct operations at company levels. Citing the example of advisor Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus, Captain Hausman encouraged other advisors to use the disorders to exercise troop movement and tactics. 1/

Increased recruiting fleshed out the Constabulary to 25,000 men by the end of 1947. The perseverance of the few American advisors and motivated Korean officers with the improvements in training methods and tools enabled the Constabulary to train most of the new recruits. Though training was excellent, it was limited in scope. In the fall of 1947 most units performed adequately in field training exercises and civil disorder operations. Though many Constabulary men continued to have only rudimentary training and units were uneven in quality, a cadre was slowly developing. 2/

BUDGET AND LOGISTICS

To support the build-up and additional training, better logistical support was needed. Shortages were evident.

1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 4 October 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Constabulary supplies and budget were controlled by DIS Headquarters. Captain Hausman knew the only way to obtain more funds, supplies and equipment was to push aggressively the needs of the Constabulary in DIS.

USAMGIK budgets of fiscal years 1946 and 1947 reflect the low priority of the Constabulary. Revenues generated by the weak Korean economy plus limited American aid were not enough to fund adequately all the USAMGIK departments. With lukewarm support from higher headquarters and limited usefulness, the Constabulary was allotted smaller appropriations than the Police. The expansion needed to promote the Constabulary proceeded on limited funds.

APPROPRIATIONS 1/
Comparision Between the Constabulary and Police

DEPARTMENT	FY 1946 2/	FY 1947 2/	% Increase FY46 to FY47
Police	Ȳ 624,743,264	Ȳ 1,584,562,600	153
Internal Security	Ȳ 445,460	Ȳ 1,750,000	293
Constabulary	Ȳ 669,901,800	Ȳ 716,250,000	6

Ȳ - Denotes Korean won currency

1/ Memorandum from the Office of the Economic Advisor to the Commanding General USAFIK to the Secretary of State, Subject: National Budget for Fiscal Year 1 April 1947/31 March 1948, 4 September 1947, Adjutant General Office, Record Group 94, Box 2048.

2/ FY represents the fiscal year from 1 April to 31 March.

Captain Hausman believed allowing DIS free reign on managing the Constabulary's budget was courting disaster. Most DIS officers rarely ventured into the field to monitor Constabulary activities and they remained somewhat uninformed on Constabulary needs. To prevent misuse of scarce funds, he believed it was important that the Constabulary have input in the budget process. Privy to budget discussions at DIS, Captain Hausman was the Constabulary's budget advocate. He knew the needs of the Constabulary and forcefully argued for them, often with success. He often used the ignorance of DIS officers about the Constabulary matters was used to his advantage. 1/

Only careful disbursement of the limited Constabulary funds would keep expansion and training progressing. For Captain

1/ Memorandum from the South Korean Interim Government, Office of the Military Governor to Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, Subject: 1947-1948 FY Budget, June 1947, Adjutant General Office, Record Group 94, Box 2048.

Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 March 1988.

"History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 6, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Hausman the administration of the budget was time-consuming. Food was the largest budget item. The larger caloric demands of the Constabulary men and the inability to procure all of its requirements through the USAMGIK's Provincial Food Service forced the Constabulary to purchase the rest of its food on the costly open market. Shortages and a thriving black market made food prices exorbitant. 1/

Paying the rent for leased buildings, barracks and warehouses was another significant money drain. Buildings suitable for the Constabulary were no longer available from USAMGIK. The Constabulary budget was hamstrung by the high prices charged by Korean landlords. Budget limitations made it extremely difficult to pay Constabulary men a decent salary. Although food, shelter and clothing for the men were provided by the Constabulary, little money was given for extra items. Constabulary men were unable to support their families on their small salaries. 2/

Fiscal conservatism and building emergency money reserves were

1/ Ibid.

Memorandum from the South Korean Interim Government, Office of the Military Governor to Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, Subject: 1947-1948 FY Budget, June 1947, Adjutant General Office, Record Group 94, Box 2048.

2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 12, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

tenets of Constabulary budget handling. Because much of the budget was taken by recurring items, rent, food and salaries, little was left for procuring equipment and supplies to improve Constabulary units. The resulting logistical support of equipment and supplies was based on recycling and salvaging. All supplies and equipment for the Constabulary had to be cleared through DIS Headquarters. To prevent excessive requisitioning of supplies by Koreans, only American advisors could request procurement of items by DIS. Two American advisors, Major Marsh and Captain Schwartz, worked with the Korean head of DIS's Logistics and Supply. Captain Hausman kept the DIS advisors informed of Constabulary needs and funds for purchases were handled by the DIS Finance section. 1/

The DIS Supply situation was described by Captain Schwartz as "...find what you can, where you can." Unable to buy new American supplies and equipment due to budgetary limitations, DIS Supply confiscated all the Japanese supplies they could find and inherited surplus and discarded supplies and equipment from demobilizing American units. Local

1/ Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Letter from Captain Schwartz to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 28 March 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

purchases were made with the limited funds available. 1/

Relying on salvage gave the Constabulary a Japanese look with an American accent. Arms were exclusively Japanese pistols and rifles, many inherited from the Police in poor condition. Japanese or rebuilt U.S. Army trucks made up the transportation inventory. Only when enough cloth became available in late 1947 were standard uniforms made locally and overcoats tailored from U.S. blankets. 2/

The two DIS procurement officers alone could not possibly find, purchase or confiscate all classes of needed supplies and equipment. As a result, procurements would not be made because there was not enough staff. Transportation and storage of supplies were other on-going problems. It was nearly impossible to transport supplies unloaded at Inchon to the DIS supply depot at Young Dong Po. The supplies that did reach Young Dong Po were often stored outside because adequate warehouse space was rarely available. As a result supplies were often lost to theft; a problem all Americans

1/ Ibid.

2/ Ibid.

Memorandum from Colonel William Biddle to Director of the Plans and Operations Division, TAB B, General Staff, U.S. Army, 20 November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

faced in postwar Korea. 1/

STATURE

INTRODUCTION

In order for the Constabulary to prosper, its governmental position had to improve. In principle, the Constabulary remained a reserve force for the Police through 1947, though its measured growth in strength and capabilities caused conflicts with the Police. 2/ It was humstrung by a restricted mission and DIS domination.

The failure of U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable agreement altered the Constabulary's role. Under American tutelage, the southern zone progressed toward independence by mid-1948 and the U.S. supported expansion of the Constabulary to protect the new republic.

POLICE/CONSTABULARY RELATIONS

From the start, the Constabulary had poor relations with the Police. Professional jealousy, jurisdictional disputes and politics created distrust and animosity. Despite Captain Hausman's and other advisors' best efforts to reduce

1/ Letter from Captain Schwartz to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 28 March 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Materi, Irma and the Hermit, pp. 188-191.

2/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 26.

friction, violence often flared.

Jurisdictional Disputes

Jurisdictional disputes soured relations. Separated from the Police during the June 1946 BND reorganization, the Constabulary's mission remained as a reserve force for the Police. As the Constabulary grew, this mission became too limited.

Despite increasing participation and effectiveness in quelling civil disturbances, the Constabulary lacked Police powers of arrest and search. When necessary however, the Constabulary ignored these limitations. The Police resented the Constabulary's usurping of their power and often retaliated by arresting Constabulary men for simply being off their so-called military bases. 1/

Politics

Political conflicts fractured relations. Political differences between members of the Police and Constabulary were apparent. Politically, the Police were a homogenous force of "Rightists", extremely conservative and suspicious of the left wing political leanings of many Constabulary men.

1/ Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Sawyer, KMAG, p. 26.

When the Americans organized the Constabulary, they wanted to draw recruits across the political spectrum to foster a national force for all Koreans. However, in the postwar political chaos, most major political parties had "private armies" to provide political muscle. Lower recruiting standards and few political background checks enabled recruits from politicized "private armies" to join the Constabulary easily. Thus many radical politicized recruits, often "Leftists", joined, and hid behind the Constabulary uniform to continue their political activities. Infiltration of units by Communist and other radical dissidents was commonplace. It was not until the Yosu mutiny of October 1948 that the Constabulary purged its ranks of dissidents and began screening recruits for political reliability. 1/

Professional Jealously

Many Constabulary men felt they were taking a backseat to the Police. 2/ For many Constabulary men, especially those with prior Japanese experience, kowtowing to the Police was humiliating. When under Japanese control, the Police had

1/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 26.

Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952 and 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Ibid.

been commanded by the Army. They had enjoyed no independence. However, under the Americans, the situation was reversed. 1/ The favoritism shown the Police by the American occupation command was manifest: the 1947 Police's budget was twice that of the Constabulary's; American pistols, carbines and light machine guns were issued to the Police in 1945 and 1946, whereas the Constabulary continued using Japanese arms; there were more American advisors assigned to the Police; and the mission of the Constabulary remained limited to a reserve force.

Violence between these forces erupted frequently during 1947. Most originated with the arbitrary Police arrest of Constabulary men off Constabulary bases. The worst such incident resulted from the arrest of an ex-Japanese Army non-commissioned officer in Yongam. In two hours of fighting, 23 Police and Constabulary men were killed. 2/

Although Captain Hausman believed the rifts were incurable, he and the other Constabulary advisors instituted measures to reduce tension: joint Police and Constabulary patrols; military police help manning police boxes; and regular

1/ Ibid.

2/ Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

conferences to promote cooperation. Though the Police and Constabulary cooperated somewhat to keep internal order, jealousy and distrust pervaded their relationship. 1/

AUGMENTATION OF THE CONSTABULARY

Captain Hausman and other DIS advisors realized the Constabulary needed a new mission separate from that of the Police to solve the Police Constabulary conflict. While the Constabulary remained weak, the role of Police reserve was adequate. However, by the Fall of 1947 the Constabulary's strength was nearly equal to that of the Police and Constabulary men chafed under their restrictions

Diplomatic events changed Constabulary fortunes. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. failed to achieve a mutually agreeable settlement to reunite the zones. This failure moved each zone toward separate independence under the tutelage of the occupying power. Subsequently, U.S. policy began shifting toward creation of a strong national army to protect the South and this provided Captain Hausman an opportunity to define a new role for the Constabulary.

1/ Ibid.

Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

American Diplomacy in Korea -- 1947 & 1948

The futility of American-Russian negotiations to reunite the zones was apparent by mid-1947. The Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission on Korea, suspended for a year in 1946 to 1947 met again from April to June 1947, but to no avail. Reluctantly, the U.S. concluded that an acceptable solution to the Korean problem was not possible through direct talks with the U.S.S.R.

One goal of U.S. policy in Korea was to withdraw American military forces without simply abandoning the South to Russian domination. Unfortunately, demobilization had left the U.S. with limited forces by 1947. The 45,000 troops of USAFIK were needed elsewhere in more important trouble spots. 1/ Korea was considered,

...a military liability...and the United States has little strategic interest in keeping bases and troops in Korea. 2/

In the Fall, the U.S. took the Korean problem to the United Nations (U.N.). Using its influence, the U.S. forced a resolution through the General Assembly in October, calling

1/ Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), pp. 17-18.

2/ Memorandum from the Joint Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "Military Importance of Korea," 23 September 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

for U.N. supervised elections in both zones. After the elections, a joint Korean government with members from both zones would form. When the new Korean government matured and its self-defense force was ready, the occupying armies would withdraw and a united Korea would emerge. Though many U.N. members were reluctant to support the American plan, they knew Russian obstinacy precluded other options short of abandoning the peninsula to communism. 1/

U.N. approval of the resolution, in the face of stern Russian opposition and counter proposals, was a diplomatic coup for the U.S. A temporary U.N. commission was formed and planning for the election started. The U.S.S.R. balked at cooperating and refused to hold elections in the their zone. Rebuffed, the U.S. pushed for a U.N. resolution that permitted elections to proceed in the South. In February, the U.N. approved the resolution and southern elections were set for May 1948. Independence for the South would follow in the summer. 2/

1/ John Merrill, "Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the Korean War," In Child of Conflict, ed. Bruce Cumings (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), p. 139.

Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations, (New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1972), pp. 46-65.

2/ James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 124-139.

Merrill, Internal Warfare, p. 140.

The U.N. acceptance of the U.S. plan hardened the division of Korea. Although the Americans knew from the beginning, that Russian participation in the U.N. approved American plan was unlikely, they proceeded. The essential diplomatic problem was that neither side was willing to abandon the peninsula to the other, making unification hopeless. 1/

By mid-1947, Korean politics in the South were extremely polarized between the Left and Right. Moderates were dwindling in influence. South Korean political parties failed to resolve their differences and establish a political consensus to form a government under American tutelage. Frustrated and with serious misgivings, the American occupation command backed the extreme Right led by Syngman Rhee. Despite Rhee's incessant opposition to many American occupation policies, the Americans considered him the only acceptable. All other major Korean political parties opposed the American plan of separate elections. Therefore, the American occupation command allowed him to pack the Police and the Korean Interim Government with his Rightist supporters. With American backing, Rhee swamped his opponents in the U.N. supervised election and he quickly formed a Rightist government to assume power in the South on

1/ Matray, Crusade, pp. 136-139.

15 August 1948, Korean independence day. 1/

U.S. Plans for Constabulary Expansion -- Fall 1947
In October 1947, as the Americans began moving the South toward independence, the Department of Army directed Generals MacArthur and Hodge to formulate plans for expanding the Korean Constabulary. General Hodge directed Major General Tyson, USAFIK's G-3 (Plans and Operations) to draw up plans for enlarging the Constabulary into a national defense force. General Tyson, who possessed only rudimentary knowledge of the Constabulary, ordered Colonel Price and Captain Hausman to do the detailed work on the USAFIK recommendation. 2/

Captain Hausman's knowledge of the Constabulary allowed him to shape the proposal. Theorizing that a South Korean government would face a hostile North Korea backed up by a Russian-trained Korean army of 150,000 to 200,000 men capable of rapid supply from the U.S.S.R., Captain Hausman argued 200,000 men were necessary to provide for an adequate

1/ Kaufman, The Korean War, pp. 12-20.

Carl Berger, The Korea Knot, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 47-76.

2/ Message WAR 88572 from the Department of the Army to Commander in Chief-Far East, General MacArthur, 16 October 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

defense of South Korea. To support this force, the embryonic Constabulary technical services branches (Quartermaster, Transport, Signal, Repair, etc.) would also expand. Also, the status of the Constabulary would need to change from Police reserve to national army. National defense would be the Constabulary's new mission: patrolling and protecting the South's borders; and quelling major internal disturbances, such as the growing Communist insurgency. 1/

Captain Hausman argued for dramatic expansion based on his belief that the Constabulary was well trained, motivated and capable of rapid expansion. To make the force more reliable, recruits' backgrounds would be screened to exclude subversive elements. Given sufficient advisory personnel and funds, Captain Hausman believed training and equipping this expanded force would take a year. 2/

1/ Ibid.

Memorandum from Plans & Operations Division to Lt. Colonel Conway, Subject: South Korean Armed Forces, 18 November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

2/ Ibid.

Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Memorandum by Colonel William Biddle to the Plans & Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 20 November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

In late October 1947, General Tyson gave General Hodge an expansion plan calling for the creation of a South Korean Army of 200,000 divided into six divisions with appropriate headquarters and technical service elements. A large U.S. Army advisory program would train and equip this force within a year. General Hodge wholeheartedly backed the proposal and sent it to General MacArthur for his endorsement. 1/

General MacArthur was reluctant to support the proposal for fear that it would wreck American diplomacy at the U.N. He believed U.N. members would interpret the proposal to create an army as confirmation that the U.S. had given up on unification and was determined to establish an independent South. Therefore, he recommended that the Department of Army delay the proposal until after the U.N. decided on Korea. The Department of Army concurred. 2/

1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Memorandum from Plans & Operations Division to Lt. Colonel Conway, Subject: South Korean Armed Forces, 18 November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

2/ Ibid.

Message CX 52266 from the Commander in Chief Far East Command to the Department of the Army, 22 October 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Waiting -- Winter 1947/1948

The Winter of 1947-1948 was the low point of the U.S. advisory operation. Expansion of the Constabulary and advisory effort was put on hold until the U.N. decided on what to do with Korea. In the interim, advisors could only wait and let diplomatic events take their course. In the face of Washington's desire to downplay the Constabulary, at least temporarily, General Hodge opted to do the minimum to sustain it and advisory effort. 1/

Few resources were spent and replacements for American advisors who rotated back to the U.S. failed to materialize. That Winter, the number of American advisors with the Constabulary fell to three while the advisors to DIS hovered between three and four. 2/ Initially, General Hodge wanted to proceed with some of the expansion plan, notably re-equipping the Constabulary with heavier American weapons:

1/ Memorandum from Plans & Operations Division to Lt. Colonel Conway, Subject: South Korean Armed Forces, 18 November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

Memorandum by Colonel William Biddle to the Plans & Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 20 November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Ibid.

heavy machine guns, 81mm mortars and 105mm howitzers.

However, as General MacArthur advised General Hodge,

....in order to maintain the appearance of the Constabulary as a police-type reserve force, no weapon heavier than a light machine gun should be issued. 1/

General Hodge delayed his decision.

As the Constabulary approached full strength in January 1948, the shortage of advisors diluted American influence. There were two American field advisors for nine regiments, one Lt. Colonel DeReus who was responsible for advising six regiments and an operational task force on Cheju-do, a total of 16,500 men. With the departure of Colonel Barros to be Military Governor of Cheju-do, only Captain Hausman remained at Constabulary Headquarters. Subsequently, nearly all the training and operations were conducted by Korean officers. 2/

Between December 1947 and February 1948, advisors continued training and developing staff functions, but until more

1/ Memorandum by Colonel William Biddle to the Plans & Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 20 November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

resources were allotted, there was little more this handful of advisors could do. Major Russell Geist aptly described the advisory situation,

....transferred to USAMGIK in Seoul in early March 1948. When I reported in to Constabulary Headquarters, I found a group of small offices overrun with Koreans. Finally located Captain Hausman in a back office. Colonel Price (Head of DIS) was out preparing to leave for ZI (Zone of the Interior, the U.S.) and he didn't care about anything. Nobody else showed up for several days...no equipment...no nothing. 1/

Revival -- Spring 1948

In February, U.N. acceptance of the American request to supervise elections in the South meant an independent southern regime would emerge within 6 months. The expansion plan was revived. On 6 February, General MacArthur cabled to the Department of Army, a plan to expand the Constabulary to 50,000 men only a fourth of the force proposed by Captain Hausman. The Constabulary would form five brigades each with three regiments. American equipment would be furnished as USAFIK units demobilized. General MacArthur felt USAFIK lacked capability to support a Constabulary expansion to 200,000 men, but he was confident an expansion to 50,000 men

1/ Interview of Major Russell Geist by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 3 July 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

could be effected before the May election. 1/ As he said in his cable to Washington,

This plan will accomplish the effect intended of enabling the U.S. government to withdraw from Korea without having "abandoning" it. 2/

On 10 March 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved the increase.

The mission of the expanded Constabulary was defined by General MacArthur as,

...maintaining internal order under conditions of political strife and inspired disorder.
...maintaining border patrols and of offering token resistance to invasion from the North.... 3/

1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Memorandum for the Record by Lt. Colonel Seedlock, Plans & Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 6 February 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20.

Memorandum from General MacArthur to General Wedemeyer, Commanding General G-3, General Staff, The Department of Army, Subject: Requirements for Establishment of a South Korea Army, 5 December 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20.

2/ Memorandum for the Record by Lt. Colonel Seedlock, Plans & Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 6 February 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20.

3/ Memorandum from General Wedemeyer, Commanding General G-3, General Staff The Department of the Army to General Omar Bradely, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Table of Organization and Equipment for Augmented Korean Constabulary, 7 June 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20.

In 1948 the U.S. did not intend to give the Constabulary offensive power. The group was seen as a defensive internal security force to be employed against guerrillas and small North Korean raiding parties. The choice of arms for the Constabulary was based on this assumption. Besides American infantry weapons, the Constabulary was given limited equipment: only 91 105 mm howitzers, a 6 month supply of ammunition, no tanks and no aircraft. 1/

Shortly after Captain Hausman heard about General MacArthur's proposal, he requested DIS to increase recruiting quietly. Colonel Price concurred. During February and March 1948, 25,000 men were recruited into the Constabulary in anticipation of JCS approval of the expansion. In May, the Constabulary reorganized into brigades. 2/

1/ Ibid.

Memorandum from General Hodge to General MacArthur,
Subject: Table of Organization and Equipment for Augmented
Korean Constabulary, 19 April 1948, Plans and Operations
Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20.

Memorandum for the Record by Lt. Colonel Gilchrist,
Subject: Cannon Companies for the South Korean Constabulary,
23 June 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record
Group 319, Box 20.

2/ Interviews of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K.
Sawyer, 24 January 1952 and 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief
of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Memorandum from Lt. Colonel Seedlock to General
Wedemeyer, Commanding General G-3, General Staff, The
(footnote continued on page 72)

U.S. policy secured the creation of a separate southern regime. However, the Department of Army, wanting to close its military commitment by the end of the year, ordered General Hodge on 8 April to prepare a Korean defense force to assume the military responsibilities of USAFIK. To support this effort, a formal U.S. Army military advisory mission was to be established upon Korean independence. 1/

Four months before independence, General Hodge realized the current advisory effort was almost nonexistent. To improve the Constabulary, he ordered USAFIK units to provide training. American officers were detailed to DIS as short-term advisors and U.S. units conducted schools on American equipment and tactics for Constabulary men. This influx of USAFIK advisors enabled the Constabulary to receive thorough intensive training which lasted through the summer of 1948, especially to accommodate the mass influx of new recruits. To increase firepower, General Hodge authorized demobilizing USAFIK units to turn their weapons over to the Constabulary. Korean units were reequipped with American M-1 carbines, .30

Department of Army, Subject: Notes for Directors Meeting, 9 March, 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20.

1/ Message WAR 99374 from the Department of Army to Commanding General USAFIK, General Hodge, 8 April 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22.

caliber machine guns and 60mm and 81mm mortars. 1/

REORGANIZATION OF DIS -- JUNE 1948

Brigadier General William L. Roberts replaced Colonel Price as the advisor to Director-DIS on 20 May 1948. The Department of Army believed General Roberts, slated to head the formal U.S. Army advisory group in August, would gain valuable experience serving in DIS. General Roberts knew very little about his new assignment. Wanting an indepth briefing on DIS, he consulted senior USAMGIK officers for a recommendation on who could provide such an orientation. Captain Hausman was the obvious choice. 2/

Conference for General Roberts -- May 1948

General Roberts called Captain Hausman in to request preparation of an orientation conference. Captain Hausman had only a few days to prepare. The conference which, lasted 9 hours, was primarily between General Roberts and Captain

1/ Memorandum from General Hodge to General MacArthur, Subject: Table of Organization and Equipment for Augmented Korean Constabulary, 19 April 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20.

Interview of Major Russell Geist by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 3 July 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Hausman and all aspects of DIS and the Constabulary were covered. 1/ The conference gave Captain Hausman an opportunity to express his dissatisfaction with the organizational structure of DIS, with which he had lived with since September 1946. This conference gave him a unique opportunity to convince General Roberts to alter it. 2/

Captain Hausman presented his arguments for changing the DIS command structure to General Roberts. As Captain Hausman later said,

All major decisions concerning the Constabulary were made by DIS, so that the Constabulary's staff was little more than a liaison group between DIS and the regiments. Obviously, such a condition severely restricted the Constabulary's breath of action, and I felt that progress in organization and training would be sped up if the foregoing functions were removed from the direct jurisdiction of DIS and placed under the Constabulary. 3/

Captain Hausman firmly believed that DIS was incapable of running the Constabulary and that DIS control over Constabulary units was nominal at best. He felt the command

1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

2/ Ibid.

Sawyer, KMAG, p. 32.

3/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

structure was top heavy and unable to coordinate policies: DIS would veto what the Constabulary Headquarters had approved and vice versa; duplicated staff functions at DIS and Constabulary Headquarters levels drained experienced officers, already in short supply, away from the troops who desperately needed them; and Constabulary men were constantly confused about where DIS authority left-off and Constabulary authority picked up. Often bad feelings developed when DIS continually meddled in Constabulary affairs, overruling decisions of Constabulary officers. Because DIS rarely sent its officers into the field to serve with Constabulary units, Captain Hausman felt DIS control of Constabulary supplies, finances and technical assistance was a disaster. Consequently, DIS could not respond to the rapidly changing situations the Constabulary faced in the provinces. 1/

General Roberts' initial experience at DIS confirmed what Captain Hausman had told him. As General Roberts later wrote

1/ Ibid.

Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Interview of Major Russell Geist by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 3 July 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

"History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," pp. 9-10, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

I found two large Constabulary Headquarters... viz DIS and KA. Physically they were in two buildings nearly adjacent and the offices of each were intermingled. There were many Korean officers being used in these headquarters who were unnecessary when the troops were woefully short of them. It was evident that only one headquarters was necessary and desirable for many reasons,...there were two Chiefs of Staff, neither good, one for DIS and one for KA. What had been done was to build up the top with little at the bottom. 1/

Captain Hausman's Reorganization Plan

General Roberts heeded Captain Hausman's arguments, ordering him to draw up plans for a more efficient Korean defense structure, de-emphasizing DIS and giving the Constabulary more control over its own affairs. 2/ In early June, Captain Hausman presented his reform plan to General Roberts. He urged General Roberts quickly to make any changes in the plan and approve it. Captain Hausman knew much of the advisors' power would evaporate when USAMGIK ended at Korean independence in August. To enforce such a far reaching change in the emerging nation's security force, the advisors had to act quickly to put it in place before independence. General Roberts approved the plan and implementation began on

1/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

KA in General Roberts letter refers to the Constabulary. The Korean Army was not formally established until 15 December 1948.

2/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

25 June 1948. 1/

The Hausman plan completely overhauled the command structure. DIS Headquarters was changed to the Office of the Director of DIS (ODDIS), and the large military staffs formerly attached to DIS were taken away. ODDIS was supported by seven, three-person staffs: Chief of Personnel; Chief of Intelligence; Chief of Supply and Procurement; Chief of Operations; a Budget and Finance Officer; Chief of Public Relations; and a Legislative Assistant. Each staff consisted of a Chief, usually a military officer, an assistant and clerk, and these staffs served as liaisons between ODDIS and the staffs of the Constabulary. 2/

Attached to ODDIS was the Chief of Staff for the Constabulary who now possessed decision making power formerly held by DIS. Supporting the Constabulary's Chief of Staff were the the Constabulary military staffs which now operated independently of ODDIS. The policies and procedures developed by the Constabulary staffs were sent through ODDIS for approval and

1/ Ibid.

Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," pp. 9, 10, 11 & 15, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

issuance as an ODDIS directive. ODDIS did not create policies without the approval of the Constabulary staff approval. 1/

The combining of the two former staffs produced a surplus of American advisors and Korean officers at Constabulary Headquarters. These extra officers were quickly sent to Constabulary units in the field. 2/

The relationship between DIS and the Constabulary changed. ODDIS became a civilian office which provided general policy direction and liaison between the Constabulary and the other Korean government bureaus. Now, the Constabulary was responsible for managing its own affairs. As the DIS History describes it,

....the main reins of control were placed in the hands of the Korean officers. The first major step had been made toward placing this army in such a position that it could function under its own power. 3/

Captain Hausman's plan had a tremendous positive impact on

1/ Ibid.

Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 1948," p. 11, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

3/ Ibid., p. 15.

developing the Constabulary. Incessant DIS meddling was reduced, morale was higher, Constabulary staff functioning developed and Constabulary Headquarters was better able to handle units in the provinces. When General Roberts held his last weekly staff meeting as head of the U.S. Army's Korean Military Advisory Group on 10 June 1950, he listed Captain Hausman's reorganization of DIS was one of the far-reaching accomplishments of his tenure. 1/

1/ Highlights of the Weekly Staff Meeting, U.S. Military Advisory to the Republic of Korea, 10 June 1950, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 727.

CHAPTER IV. - CAPTAIN HAUSMAN'S SECOND TOUR,
JULY 1948 TO JULY 1950

SUMMER 1948

After 2 1/2 years of struggling, the advisory effort finally began to receive adequate resources during the summer of 1948. Personnel, equipment and funds were made available. Additional resources were allocated in June when the Department of Army, recognizing the larger security needs of the South, authorized further expansion of the Constabulary to 65,000 men. Also, American advising would continue after Korean independence, for all advisory personnel would form into the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) under General Roberts. Planned as an independent U.S. Army aid mission PMAG was attached to the new U.S. embassy.

General Roberts spent May to August 1948 preparing for PMAG and learning the intricacies of advising the Koreans. He knew that although PMAG would begin with over 100 advisors, they would have little advisory experience. By June 1948, only two experienced advisors remained, Lt. Colonel DeReus and Captain Hausman, and both were nearing the end completing their 2 year tours. When these advisors left, General

Roberts feared the loss of knowledge to the advisory effort would be devastating. Continuity would be disrupted and inefficiencies created. New advisors often had little idea how to accomplish tasks.

General Roberts relied heavily on Captain Hausman for guidance. He viewed Captain Hausman as the institutional memory of the advisory effort and was tremendously impressed by, "His honesty, sincerity and selflessness...". 1/ To be an effective commander of PMAG, General Roberts knew he needed an experienced advisor. In June, General Roberts asked Captain Hausman to stay for another 2-year tour and to serve as his advisor. Captain Hausman accepted with no reservations. 2/

When Lt. Colonel DeReus left Korea in late June 1948, Captain Hausman was the last advisor left from the 1945-1946 period. Captain Hausman became the link between the early primitive advisory effort and the new well established one. His knowledge made him invaluable to General Roberts and PMAG. 3/

1/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 9 November 1951, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

2/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 March 1988.

3/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 9 November 1951, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

PMAG was formally established on 15 August 1948, South Korea independence day. General Roberts, at Captain Hausman's urging, retained the counterpart arrangement started in 1945. As Colonel Ralph Hansen later explained,

....the policy of General Roberts provided that the individual advisor would live intimately with his (Korean) counterpart. ...General Roberts insisted that an advisor could not know his counterpart nor understand his thinking, unless they had desks in the same office, attended social functions together, made troop inspections together, and otherwise reached a common understanding on mutual daily problems. 1/

With the creation of PMAG, Captain Hausman's role changed. No longer was he the Constabulary's "father-creator," solely responsible for countless projects and solving innumerable problems while given no resources to work with. Instead, General Roberts needed a single counterpart to the Chief of Staff, the top Korean officer of the Constabulary, and to the Korean Minister of Defense. This position demanded a tactful American officer with Korean military experience, who had the trust of senior Korean officers. Captain Hausman was immediately detailed. He would report to General Roberts

1/ Letter from Colonel Ralph W. Hansen to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 2 August 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

Interview of Lt. Colonel Martin O. Sorensen by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 17 December 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728.

through the PMAG Chief of Staff, Colonel W.H.S. Wright. 1/

Captain Hausman served in this position until February 1951, providing advice, direction and comfort on American military matters to five Korean Chiefs of Staff. Important for the advisory effort was his ability to keep General Roberts,

....informed of Korean projects soon enough to enable me (General Roberts) to modify or stop them if they were without merit. 2/

TO THE KOREAN WAR -- FALL 1948 TO JUNE 1950

Captain Hausman's ability to dominate and influence the Constabulary subsided after independence. PMAG strength started with 100 advisors and jumped to 241 by years' end.

The following summer, PMAG gave way to KMAG, U.S. Army Korean Military Advisory Group, a 500-man unit with a \$20 million budget. The days of only three American advisors for the Constabulary were finished. The sheer number of advisors the U.S. was devoting to improve the army of South Korea diluted

1/ Memorandum from Colonel J.W. Frazer to Director Plans and Operations Division, Subject: Table of Distribution for KMAG, 4 November 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20.

Letters from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 9 November 1951 and 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

2/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 9 November 1951, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.


1/ Semi-Annual Report of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, Annexes 1-4, Period Ending 31 December 1949, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Decimal File Korea Section I-A to 091.Netherlands, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 163.

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. MISSION - The mission of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea is to advise the Government of the Republic of Korea in the continued development of the Security Forces of that Government (Army, Coast Guard and Police) now in being, consistent with the limitations of the Korean Economy.


2. ASSIGNMENT - This is an advisory group as directed by TTX Da File WARK 90559 and letter D. File: AG.O-1 322 U. S. Military Advisory Group to Republic of Korea (24 Jun 49) CGCOT-M, as modified by TTX Da file WARK 91952 and D. Administrative Area Personnel Authorization No. 2, 19 Oct 49 (Wark 95373).

TOTAL STRENGTH: Officers 181
 Warrant Officers 7
 Nurses 1
 Enlisted Men 283
 Aggregate Total 472



1/ Advisor's Handbook, United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, 1949, The Daniel Doyle Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Box 5.

KOREAN ARMY 1/



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CHART NO. 1
INCLOSURE NO 1

Captain Hausman's dominating role.

Captain Hausman ceased being responsible for all Constabulary matters and instead became a specialist, a liaison officer between General Roberts and the Koreans. Although his responsibilities were less than what he had during 1946 to 1948, he had a unique position within PMAG. He served as a counterpart to the following Korean Chiefs of Staff:

NAME	APPOINTED
Song Ho Seung	23 December 1946
Lee Ung Jun	20 November 1948
Chae Byung Duk	May 1949
Shin Tai Yung	1 October 1949
Chae Byung Duk	14 April 1950
Chung Il Kwong	1 July 1950 1/

In his relationship with each Chief, he always dealt with similar thorny issues: too ambitious planning; unsound budgeting; poor policy coordination; poor use of military staffs by the Chief; unsound procurement and finance policies; misuse of basic equipment and supplies; and failure to consult advisors sometimes. 2/ But unlike his pre-PMAG situation, Captain Hausman was no longer solely

1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 April 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Box 728.

2/ Memorandum from General William L. Roberts to Silm Sung Mo, South Korean Minister of Defense, Subject: Deficiencies in Department of National Defense Operation, 31 January 1950, Office of the Chief of Military History, Box 728.

responsible for resolving these issues. He pointed out the problems and offered possible solutions and advice to General Roberts, who then attempted to implement corrections through the apparatus of the formal advisory group.

During his tour as a counterpart to the Chiefs, Captain Hausman participated in tragic, yet exciting events. The polarization of Korean politics in 1947, escalated political violence. The accession of Syngman Rhee, an extreme Rightist, to power in the Spring of 1948 caused the Left to resort to guerrilla warfare. The Left, composed primarily of the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) led by southerner Pak Hon-yong, was supported by increasingly hostile North Korea. The guerrilla war started on 3 April 1948 in Cheju-do and lasted until a few months before the North invaded the South.

North Korea, having exhausted all other means to topple the South, resorted to the military option on 25 June 1950. During the first 8 months of the war, Captain Hausman served with the Korean Chief of Staff. However, as the war widened and the necessity of conducting operations superseded the needs of training the South Korean Army, the close counterpart relation between Captain Hausman and the Korean Chief of Staff suffered. Especially devastating for Captain Hausman was the firing of the prewar Korean Chief of Staff, General Chae Byung Duk. Captain Hausman and General Duk had

become close friends and worked well together. General Duk's death in a July battle near the Pusan perimeter was especially tragic to Captain Hausman. 1/

Within a week of the invasion, the apparent collapse of the South's army in the face of a well equipped and experienced North Korean Army, triggered the introduction of American ground troops. The small American advisory effort to Korea was gone forever. The situation in Korea was now a crisis for the U.S. and advisors, funds, equipment and higher command support were given in great quantities to develop a South Korean Army.

After June 1950, Captain Hausman lost much of his influence over the affairs of the South Korean military. However, he had proven himself an extremely capable and valuable military advisor. When General Roberts left as commander of the military advisors in May 1950, he wrote to his successor about Captain Hausman.

Captain Hausman, an officer of long service in KMAG (U.S. Army's Korean Military Advisory Group) and Korea, is detailed as liaison with Chief of Staff KA (Korean Army)....Captain Hausman's

1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 April 1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Box 728.

Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 March 1988.

experience and background make him a very valuable staff officer in this respect. He has recent Korean history and personalities at his fingertip. His judgements and estimates can be relied upon. 1/

1/ Orientation Folder Compiled by General William Roberts, Chief KMAG for His Successor, May 1950, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 727.

CHAPTER V. - CONCLUSION

Captain James Hausman was instrumental in developing the Korean Constabulary between July 1946 and July 1948. Without his leadership, the Constabulary and accompanying American advisory effort would have floundered. His motivation, intelligence and resourcefulness guided the Constabulary through the lean years of 1946 to 1948.

The success Captain Hausman had building a better Constabulary enabled the successive American advisory effort to be more effective. When in 1948 the U.S. decided belatedly to support development of a stronger South Korean defense force, a 25,000 man cadre to build this force on was already established. Captain Hausman's efforts to develop the Constabulary saved PMAG years of work trying to create a Korean force from scratch.

Captain Hausman's greatest accomplishment was reforming the command structure between the civilian government and the military. The Hausman Plan of May 1948 established a civilian-military command structure, modeled much like the American defense structure. The new command structure

allowed the Constabulary to properly develop its military staff functions, which enabled a more effective force to emerge. Also impacted by this reform were Korean officers who responded to their growing responsibility with increased professionalism in military skills and administration.

For history, Captain Hausman has made an important contribution. General Roberts recognized early-on that Captain Hausman was the institutional memory of the early American advisory effort. Just as General Roberts relied on Captain Hausman's historical perspective, so have historians for he is mentioned in the text and/or footnotes of at least fifteen historical works.

Fellow officers and historians have praised Captain Hausman and the other advisors of the 1946 to 1948 period for their dedicated efforts to foster the Korean Constabulary.

As Lt. Colonel Eugene MacDonald summed up,

The few advisors there had done a very fine job against tremendous odds. 1/

1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene MacDonald to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 3 December 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726.

POSTSCRIPT

Captain Hausman's association with South Korea did not end in February 1951. Upon returning to the U.S., he served at the Pentagon in the Office of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence until 1954. During this time he accompanied many Korean general officers on their tours of U.S. Army facilities in the United States. In November 1957, he retired from the U.S. Army at the rank of Lt. Colonel.

He returned to South Korea in 1959 as a Special Advisor on Korean security matters to the Commander of United Nations Armed Forces in Korea. He held this influential post until his retirement in 1980. He continues to do consulting work with South Korean military forces on a regular basis.

Presently, Lt. Colonel Hausman (Retired) is residing in Austin, Texas with his wife of 47 years, Hazel Hausman.

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--RECORDS ACCESSIONS--

There were three significant problems I faced when conducting original records research on this topic:

(a) Captain Hausman, as far as can be determined, has not published anything about his activities, nor has he left any personal papers to an archives. His military personnel records were destroyed in the St. Louis Military Personnel Records Center fire of 1972.

(b) Few original records of the early American military advisory effort to Korea survive. Nearly all the official records were destroyed in the North Korean invasion of June 1950.

(c) The records held by the National Archives are more applicable to the study of policy development than for study on an individual. In general, few records groups contain documents related to the military advisory effort to Korea and almost no records apply directly to Captain Hausman. The few records which exist are scattered through the record groups of U.S. Army components and the personal papers of retired U.S. Army personnel.

However, the records of Captain Robert K. Sawyer, U.S. Army, are an important source. In 1951, Captain Sawyer was assigned to write the official U.S. Army history on the military advisory effort to Korea, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War. Unfortunately, he had almost no records to work from. Between 1951 and 1954, Captain Sawyer diligently collected the recollections of former U.S. Army advisory personnel through interviews and letters. Copies of some advisory documents supplement the interviews and letters.

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Major Daniel E. Doyle Papers, Boxes 1-6.

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--INTERVIEWS--

Telephone Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens
29 March 1988.

Because of previous commitments to work temporarily in South Korea, Mr. James Hausman was not available to interview during the researching and writing of this thesis.

THE INTELLIGENT MAN ON THE SPOT,
CAPTAIN JAMES H. HAUSMAN IN SOUTH KOREA, 1946-1948

by

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B.A., The University of Missouri-Rolla, 1983
B.A., The American University, 1986

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

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requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

HISTORY

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1988

In the Fall of 1945, the United States occupation command in Korea began forming a Korean army reserve force called the Constabulary. The U.S. had two purposes: to relieve American troops of the burdensome duty of internal security; and begin training a Korean army to eventually assume defense responsibilities when Korea became independent. This thesis analyzes the impact that Captain James H. Hausman, U.S. Army, had on the development of the Korean Constabulary between 1946 and 1948.

The thesis begins with a survey of U.S. Army policy toward establishing a Korean defense force. Due to diplomatic considerations, however, American support for Constabulary training and equipping was limited. Between 1945 and 1947, the U.S. negotiated with the other occupying power in Korea, the U.S.S.R., on how to reunite the peninsula under a democratic government. To avoid Russian accusations of promoting a separate regime in the American occupied South, the U.S. gave minimal support to the Constabulary between 1945 to mid 1948.

The assignment of Captain Hausman as an advisor in July 1946 prevented lethargy from overtaking the advisory effort and Constabulary. He was a motivated, intelligent advisor. After a stint in the field, Captain Hausman was assigned to Constabulary Headquarters. There, he became the driving force behind developing the Constabulary despite the severe lack of advisors, supplies, funds and support. He dominated

the activities of the advisory effort and Constabulary until July 1948.

Development of the Constabulary between 1946 and 1948 is assessed through Captain Hausman's actions. Four main areas concerning the Constabulary are discussed, recruiting, training, budget/logistics and stature. His greatest achievement, altering the command structure of the developing Korean military in June 1948, is discussed in detail.

Although Captain Hausman continued to serve in Korea after August 1948, the establishment of a well funded and staffed American military advisory mission that year eclipsed his role. No longer was he solely responsible for a tremendous portion of the advisory effort. The Constabulary, however, had benefited enormously from Captain Hausman's dominating influence and leadership during the lean years of 1946 to 1948.