NGO INSECURITY IN HIGH-RISK CONFLICT ZONES: 
THE POLITICIZATION OF AID AND ITS IMPACT ON “HUMANITARIAN SPACE”

by

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B.A., George Mason University, 2008
M.S., George Mason University, 2010

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

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Abstract

Attacks against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in high-risk conflict zones have increased exponentially over the last two decades. However, the few existing empirical studies on NGO insecurity have tended to focus on external factors influencing attacks, with little attention paid to the actions of aid workers themselves. To fill this gap, this dissertation theorizes that aid workers may have contributed to their own insecurity by engaging in greater political action. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used to assess the impact of political activity by NGOs on the insecurity of aid workers.

The quantitative analyses test the theory at two levels. The first is a large-N country-level analysis of 117 nations from 1999 to 2015 using panel corrected standard errors. The second is a subnational-level statistical analysis of four case studies: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia from 2000 to 2014. Both the country- and provincial-level analyses show that the magnitude of aid tends to be a significant determinant of aid worker security.

The qualitative methods of “structured-focused comparison” and “process tracing” are used to analyze the four cases. Results show that aid workers are most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit. Consistent with the quantitative findings, it is speculated that if workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that political statements made by NGOs—regardless of their sectors of activity—have increased insecurity for the broader aid community.

These results dispel the myth that humanitarian activity has historically been independent, impartial, and neutral. Several NGOs have relied on this false assumption for
security, believing that adherence to core principles has contributed to “humanitarian space.” The results also dispel the popular NGO assumption that targeted attacks are not official tactics of organized militants, but rather the result of criminality or mistaken identity. In fact, the overwhelming majority of aid workers attacked in high-risk conflict zones have been targeted by political actors.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Attacks against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in high-risk conflict zones have increased exponentially over the last two decades. This dissertation defines a “high-risk conflict zone” as an intrastate conflict with 1,000 or more combat-related deaths in a given year, with at least 5 percent on each side (see Small and Singer 1982, 214-215). According to the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD) (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016), there were 2,416 international and national NGO workers either killed, wounded, or abducted worldwide between 2000 and 2014.\(^1\) Separated into five-year increments, this figure was 409 between 2000 and 2004, 876 from 2005 to 2009, and 1,131 between 2010 and 2014 (see figure 1.1). What accounts for the increasing number of attacks on NGOs in recent years?

The purpose of this dissertation is to answer this question. Despite the increasing number of attacks against NGOs in high-risk conflict zones, only a few empirical studies have been conducted to explain the insecurity of aid workers. The paucity of data and research on NGO activity and attacks also motivates this dissertation. In 2006, the leading blog covering the security and safety of NGOs called upon the academic community to focus its efforts in this area:

Using statistical methods to discover trends and validate observations helps contribute to enhanced safety measures and training for field staff…Academic study of NGO security practices is crucial to us “getting it right.” It’s all too easy to make decisions based on anecdotal data or what are historically believed to be truths. Having researchers objectively validate or invalidate our perceptions and cast light in areas we might not have a full understanding of, will help us enhance the safety of the people we serve (NGO Security 2006a; NGO Security 2006b).

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\(^1\) The figures cited here include international and local humanitarian NGOs. They do not include UN, Red Cross, or national Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations.
Unfortunately this call went unanswered, as highlighted by Schreter and Harmer’s (2013) comprehensive review of studies conducted on aid delivery in insecure environments. They note the following:

Much of the literature on delivering aid in highly insecure environments is self-published, including policy studies, good practice guides and evaluations. It has a practitioner focus, and relatively little has been published in academic journals. While this practitioner focus makes the literature accessible and relevant to operational actors, there are implications as regards methodology and academic rigor—including limited academic engagement in the design and methodology of the studies, as well as in peer review…Overall, there is only a relatively small pool of authors, researchers and evaluators working in this subject area (Schreter and Harmer 2013, 5).

Mazurana et al. (2011, 1) also share this view, revealing that “[h]umanitarian aid remains largely anecdote rather than evidence driven. Currently, the humanitarian system shows significant weaknesses in data collection, analysis and response in all stages of a crisis or emergency.” Perhaps the most significant obstacle to the study of aid work security is a lack of existing data, a problem that has been repeatedly highlighted over the last fifteen years (Barnett...
and Weiss 2008; Bollettino 2008; Fearon 2008; Hammond 2008; Hoffman and Weiss 2008; Peytre\textbackslash{}mann et al. 2001; Rowley, Crape, and Burnham 2008; Schreter and Harmer 2013; Sheik et al. 2000; Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico 2009). At the top of Schreter and Harmer’s (2013, 8) list of “research gaps” in the current literature is “quantitative analyses and mapping of access trends, including country-level data on aid presence (coverage).” The researchers note that “[t]here is a significant gap in our knowledge as to the actual level of organizational aid presence in insecure environments…For example, there is currently no field-level organizational mapping that covers the entirety of aid organizations’ operations/programs. In most insecure settings, such information is unavailable or partial” (Schreter and Harmer 2013, 54). Similarly, Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015, 26) note that “still lacking is systematic, fine-grained information about who, where, and what aid workers are doing.” This is especially true for non-Western NGOs in insecure environments (Schreter and Harmer 2013, 55).

As a result, only a handful of empirical studies have been conducted to-date (Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård 2015; Mitchell 2015; Murdie and Stapley 2014; Watts 2004). This lack of independent research has forced NGOs to continue to rely on their own observations and explanations for insecurity in the field. The most dominant explanation is the argument that military forces engaged in humanitarian and relief activity are decreasing safety in conflict zones, as insurgent actors are no longer able to distinguish who is and is not a combatant. This explanation, informally referred to as “blurred lines theory,” has been empirically tested by Watts (2004) and Mitchell (2015), who did not find any support for the argument. However, these two studies fail to take into account the type of projects NGOs are engaged in when they come under attack. This is a major shortcoming in the literature.
To fill this gap, this dissertation theorizes that aid workers may play a role in “blurring lines” by moving away from traditional apolitical activity toward political action. Apolitical aid is conceptualized as independent, impartial, and neutral humanitarian action that is not motivated by, or designed to, alter existing power structures. The principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence are often cited by the NGO community as imperative for creating “humanitarian space.” “Humanitarian space” has been defined as “an operating environment in which the right of populations to receive protection and assistance is upheld, and aid agencies can carry out effective humanitarian action by responding to their needs in an impartial and independent way” (Oxfam 2008, 2). Many NGOs believe that humanitarian space “allows humanitarian agencies to work independently and impartially to assist populations in need, without fear of attack or obstruction by political or physical barriers to their work” [emphasis added] (Oxfam 2008, 2).

As defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (IFRC 2015), impartiality implies that the aid distribution makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress. Neutrality means that the NGO may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature. Independence infers that organizations must always maintain their autonomy.

Political aid is conceptualized as action that is designed to bring about change by altering existing power structures within a society. Its goal is to address the root causes of suffering that result in the need for humanitarian intervention. Whereas apolitical aid does not take sides in hostilities, the latter aligns itself with one of the competing factions or ideologies. It is important
to note that the focus here is on the motivation and action of the provider, not necessarily how
the aid is perceived by local populations.

The significance of this dissertation is both theoretical and methodological. Theoretically,
this dissertation contends that the increased insecurity of NGOs in the field is due to type of
activity organizations are engaged in. By including the type of aid distributed in the field, this
study holds the potential for altering existing empirical findings in the scant academic literature,
while furthering the understanding of why aid workers are attacked in high-risk conflict zones.

As a result, this dissertation is useful for both the NGO community and policymakers.
For NGOs, the project helps identify whether the type of activity organizations are engaged in
results in decreased security in high-risk environments. For policymakers, it may assist with the
grant decision-making process for specific projects and organizations.

This dissertation is also methodologically significant. Unlike previous studies on NGO
security that have only relied on anecdotal evidence and a few quantitative analyses, this
dissertation uses both quantitative and qualitative methods, referred to in the literature as a
mixed-methods approach. A country-level statistical analysis is conducted on 117 countries that
received humanitarian aid between 1999 and 2015, in addition to provincial-level statistical and
qualitative analyses of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia between 2000 and 2014. ²

The dual approach is employed with the expectation that the strengths of one will balance
out the weaknesses of the other (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Levy
2007). As Carvalho and White (1997, v) note, “there are limits to a purely quantitative approach
as well as a purely qualitative approach to…measurement and analysis…[I]n most cases both
approaches will generally be required to address different aspects of a problem and to answer

² The high-risk conflict zone nations are listed in Appendix A.
questions which the other approach cannot answer \textit{as well or cannot answer at all.”} Schreter and Harmer (2013, 5) reveal that there is a lack of mixed-method approaches, which “reflects a broader general weakness in the humanitarian literature as regards empirical evidence.” With this in mind, this study couples the statistical analysis with the qualitative methods of “structured-focused comparison” and “process tracing.”

There is no agreed upon definition of an aid worker or NGO in the literature. While some researchers have broadly included all nonprofit civil society organizations (Davies 2013), others have combined International Organizations (IOs) and non-profit humanitarian groups (Sheik et al. 2000). As Werker and Ahmed (2008, 74) note, taken literally, an NGO “could describe just about anything from social groups like Mensa to educational institutions like Harvard University to for-profit firms like Wal-Mart.” Similarly, any individual engaged in relief activity could be considered an aid worker. This dissertation defines NGOs as independent, nonprofit organizations engaged in humanitarian, development, human rights, or advocacy work, and aid workers as the employees of these organizations. The NGOs referred to in this dissertation are the subset of the broader nonprofit sector that engage specifically in international development (Werker and Ahmed 2008, 74). This definition excludes professional associations, commercial entities, for-profit development companies, nonprofit research institutions (e.g. universities and think tanks), UN personnel (both peacekeepers and non-peacekeepers), governmental aid organizations (e.g. United States Agency for International Development and German Technical Cooperation Agency), inter-governmental aid organizations (e.g. International Organization for Migration), or hybrid organizations (e.g. the International Committee of the Red Cross). This dissertation assesses attacks on both foreign and local NGOs.
Studies have also differed on how they define the “insecurity” of aid workers. Sheik et al. (2000) assess all fatalities—including traffic accidents. Watts (2004) and Mitchell (2015) use the Afghan NGO Safety Office’s (ANSO) combination of killings, abductions, injuries, threats, theft, and attacks against facilities. Consistent with the AWSD, Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico (2009) and Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015) combine killings, abductions, and attacks resulting in injury. This dissertation also defines an insecurity incident as a killing, wounding, or abduction. However, it differs with the AWSD on the definition of abduction. Whereas the AWSD excludes abductions in which individuals were held for less than 24 hours, this dissertation includes such attacks.³

The following dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter two reviews the literature related to the insecurity of NGOs and develops the theory that the type of aid being distributed affects aid worker insecurity in the field. Chapter three tests this theory with country- and subnational-level quantitative analyses. Chapter four outlines the qualitative research design. Chapters five, six, seven, and eight are qualitative analyses of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia respectively. The final chapter offers concluding remarks.

³ The AWSD refers to these attacks as “kidnappings,” while others have used the term “hostage-takings.” This dissertation uses the phrase “abduction,” as it is a broader, more-inclusive term for individuals taken against their will.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review and Theoretical Development

The following chapter provides an overview of the literature related to the insecurity of NGOs and introduces the theory that the type and magnitude of aid being delivered influences attacks. The literature is divided into three major themes. The first theme is an assessment of security trends, the second is why attacks occur, and the third is organizational activity and approaches in the field. Each of these themes are addressed in sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. The literature on the insecurity of aid workers is limited. Therefore, this section reviews work that addresses attacks on both UN and NGO personnel. Section 2.4 highlights limitations in the current literature and section 2.5 introduces the theory.

2.1 Theme One: Security Trends

A handful of studies related to the first theme in the literature assess trends over time to determine if NGOs have experienced heightened insecurity in the modern era (Rowley, Crape, and Burnham 2008; Sheik et al. 2000; Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico; Wille and Fast 2013). Although attacks have risen substantially in recent years, so have NGO activities. For example, the number of NGOs that receive money from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has increased from 301 in 1991 to 663 in 2014 (USAID 1992, 4; USAID 2014, 5). It has been estimated that the total global population of aid workers has increased from 136,000 in 1997 to 450,000 in 2013 (Humanitarian Outcomes 2015; Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006, 1). There are four major reasons for this expansion in humanitarian activity. The first is the increase in intrastate conflicts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. According to Perito (2007, 103), “Since the 1990s, the need for humanitarian assistance has grown sharply because of a significant rise in the numbers of
refugees and displaced persons, most of whom have been caught up in warfare within their nation’s borders…As ethnic and religious conflicts have proliferated, so has the need for organizations specializing in human rights, refugee protection, humanitarian relief, and conflict resolution.”

The second explanation is technological advancement and an increasingly-interconnected world (Gordenker and Weiss 1996, 25). Widespread media coverage has boosted public awareness of the plight of those in need, resulting in a demand that measures be taken to alleviate human suffering. Perhaps related to this development, a third explanation is the philanthropic involvement of the private sector, which has enlarged its financial donations to organizations both out of altruism and the recognition that “being seen as doing good can be good for business” (Barnett and Weiss 2008, 14).

The final explanation is the increased involvement of nation-states. As Barnett and Weiss (2008) reveal, states directed 45 percent of humanitarian assistance through the UN in 1988, but this dropped to 25 percent after 1994. This shift from multilateral to bilateral distribution is attributed to governments looking to advance their individual foreign policy initiatives. States have also begun to move away from direct distribution and instead provide NGOs with funds to carry out activity. Thus, many governmental and intergovernmental entities often refer to NGOs as their “implementing partners” (Bartsiotas and Prom-Jackson 2013; USAID 2012).

Although efforts to estimate the total number of aid workers operating worldwide (ALNAP 2010, 18; Humanitarian Outcomes 2015; Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006, 1) have shown that the overall rate of violence has been increasing (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016), these have failed to account for country and subnational presence. It is thus difficult to determine whether a causal link between NGO presence and attack rates exists in specific contexts.
Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico (2009) assess whether attacks on aid workers from 1998 to 2008 across 69 countries has risen per 10,000 individuals in the field. The study includes NGOs, non-peacekeeping UN personnel, and Red Cross organizations. They found that, although the level of NGO activity expanded over the years with a greater number of organizations and workers in the field, attacks increased from 4 per 10,000 workers in 1997 to 9 per 10,000 workers in 2008 (Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico 2009, 3). Ferreiro (2012) assesses attacks against aid workers in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan between 1998 and 2010. He discovers a strong correlation between Official Development Assistance (ODA) and aid workers’ security incidents. This suggests that the expanding size of the humanitarian enterprise is likely responsible, at least in part, for the increased number of attacks in recent years.

Wille and Fast (2013) examine international NGOs (INGOs), UN, and Red Cross security incidents over three different five-year time periods: 1996-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010. They found that the proportion of national staff fatalities have increased over time. Whereas national staff members of INGOs, UN, and Red Cross organizations made up 20 percent of aid worker fatalities between 1996 and 2000, they accounted for 70 percent between 2006 and 2010. Many humanitarian organizations have begun to work with local partners and other national assistance actors through “remote management programing” (also referred to as “limited access programing”), which could account for this increase. Growing insecurity in conflict zones has prompted the use of this approach, which includes withdrawing international staff while shifting responsibility of project implementation to national staff and/or local partners (Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard 2011, 25-27; Schreter and Harmer 2013, 12; Stoddard, Harmer, and Renouf, 2010).

However, as Schreter and Harmer (2013, 31) point out, “Despite this growing reliance, there has been little research into the nature and scope of the role of local organizations and
national societies in highly insecure environments. This includes basic information such as the size of the local aid presence in a given country.” One of the few studies that has been conducted in this area is Miklian, Lidén, and Kolás (2011). Among other criticisms of remote management, they highlight that many local NGOs in developing nations such as Nepal are run by relatives of politicians. As a result, money, projects, and jobs are often provided to political supporters, undermining peacebuilding efforts.

Research has also been conducted in the security trend literature assessing deliberate targeting. An analysis by Sheik et al. (2000) of both UN and NGO worker fatalities that occurred between 1985 and 1998 found that 68 percent of all deaths were due to intentional violence. They also discovered that UN staff fatalities have decreased over time, while NGO staff fatalities have increased. Meanwhile, Rowley, Crape, and Burnham (2008) found that intentional violence accounted for 55 percent of aid worker fatalities reported by 13 humanitarian organizations between September 2002 and December 2005. They estimated that the overall rate of intentional violence events was 6 per 10,000 aid worker person-years, while unintentional violence was 4 per 10,000 aid worker person-years.

2.2 Theme Two: Explanations for Attacks

The second theme in the literature attempts to explain the causes of NGO insecurity (Sheik et al. 2000; Peytreman et al. 2001; Watts 2004; Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico 2009; Murdie and Stapley 2014; Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård 2015; Mitchell 2015). Ten

4 Intentional violence is defined by the authors as actions intended to inflict harm, such as guns, bombs, ordnance, landmines, or other weapons. Unintentional violence are accidents such as drowning and aircraft crashes (Sheik et al. 2000, 166).
explanations for insecurity in the field have been identified: seven political, two economic, and one cultural. The first political explanation concerns the nature of the state in which NGOs operate within (Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård 2015; Humanitarian Outcomes 2012). Using the AWSD, Humanitarian Outcomes (2012) found that violence against aid workers was related to low levels of political stability, and that weak governmental institutions—be they democratic or autocratic—were more predictive of attacks than either entrenched dictatorships or strong democracies. Contrary to this study, Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015) did not find support for the notion that weak governmental institutions result in heightened insecurity. They found no support for the assumption that autocracies and democracies experience fewer attacks, while inconsistent states (e.g. semi-democracies or hybrid regimes) encounter a greater number.

The second political explanation for attacks is the UN’s increasing combination of humanitarian and political affairs. Following the end of the Cold War, the UN—which had historically focused its efforts on resolving interstate disputes—began to insert itself into the internal workings of sovereign nations. This transformation began with the 1992 report An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992), and was later solidified by the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), first introduced in 2001 and later unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005 (UNRIC 2016a). As defined by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), R2P is “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (ICISS 2001, viii). In essence, the UN redefined its mandate from traditional international security to intrastate humanitarian and political intervention. Prior to the 1990s, UN peacekeeping mandates did not include
humanitarian activities. However, the arrival of multi-component peace support operations during this period tasked the UN with political, civil, humanitarian, and military responsibilities (Thornberry 1996, 226-227). These are often referred to as “integrated missions.”

This shift to integrated missions was not embraced by many within the humanitarian community (Glad 2012, 3). The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR 2000, 3) claimed that “[t]he raison d’être of humanitarian action is not the achievement of peace, and most certainly not the achievement of the enforced peace of the Security Council. As unattractive as this may seem, it is the fact that separates any peace operation from true humanitarian action.” Referencing UN integrated mission efforts in Afghanistan, the head of MSF Holland warned that “[t]he perception that humanitarian assistance can be used explicitly as a tool of peacebuilding or conflict management ignores the principle of impartial action—arguably the most fundamental principle we have” (Harrison 2001, 4). It has also been argued that a close relationship between peacekeeping missions and humanitarian activity “implicates humanitarians in political action to which elements of the local population are opposed, thereby putting them at risk of retaliation” (HPN 2001, 39).

Disagreements between humanitarians and UN political representatives of integrated missions have marred relations between the communities, especially in Afghanistan, Burundi, DRC, Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Harmer 2008, 528). However, through the current

5 According to the UN, “Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and shared understanding of the priorities and types of program interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner” (DPKO 2006).
humanitarian coordination system, many UN and non-UN NGOs engage in joint planning and access common funding mechanisms (Glad 2012, 3). Given their “implementing partner” status, one observer has claimed that “NGOs have become paradoxical ‘outsiders within’ international organizations, in particular within many UN agencies and bodies that have actually become hybrid bureaucracies in constant need of their nonbureaucratic supporters” (Heins 2008, 63).

An example of how local populations have confused NGOs with UN personnel in the past has been provided by Doctors without Borders (MSF). In the Ituri Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUG) launched a military operation to disarm the militias. However, the UN forces were using the same white all-terrain vehicles as MSF. According to MSF, “[i]t became difficult for the organization to explain its neutrality to the local people. MSF-Switzerland decided to repaint its vehicles fuchsia, as that color was not associated with any political or military force present in the region” (Abu-Sada 2012, 10-11).

However, empirical evidence regarding the impact of integrated missions on humanitarian operations has been scarce (Combaz 2013). Harmer (2008, 528) contends that “[w]hile concerns regarding the politicization of humanitarian action by states and other political actors are well founded, the actual evidence regarding the impacts of integrated missions on humanitarian operations, including threats to access and the security of aid workers themselves, has been weak.” That said, a few studies have attempted to assess this possible impact in recent years.

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6 For more information on NGO-UN relations, see Martens (2005).
Although Metcalfe, Giffen, and Elhawary (2011, 2) found no direct link between UN integration and attacks on humanitarian workers, they warn that this association could be problematic in high-risk environments:

The research team found no clear evidence of a direct link between UN integration arrangements and attacks on humanitarian workers in the contexts reviewed. Nonetheless, most security analysts interviewed for this study agreed that, in particular environments, the association of humanitarian actors with political actors, including the UN, can be an additional risk factor. This association is particularly problematic in high-risk environments, where the UN mission is implementing a political mandate that is opposed or contested by one or more of the conflict parties, and where those parties are willing and able to distinguish between international actors. In these contexts, highly visible integration arrangements may blur this distinction and therefore pose an additional risk to the security of humanitarian personnel.

This view has been echoed by Glad (2012, 4-6) who notes that, armed opposition groups—especially in high-risk areas such as Afghanistan, DRC, and Somalia—tend to consider the UN a party to the conflict. Consequently, many NGOs increasingly fear that association with UN peacekeeping or political missions will damage their image as neutral actors, resulting in decreased security. These organizations argue that it is impossible to protect humanitarian space while also promoting a political agenda. To test this explanation, Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015) analyzed if UN peacekeeping presence in nations impacted the security situation for aid workers. Their results show that countries with UN peacekeepers present were less safe for aid workers. However, the study combined UN workers and NGOs for their dependent variable. As a result, there is a chance that the relationship may be the result of a larger number of UN personnel in the field.

The third political explanation is that NGOs—regardless of their individual issue-focus—may be more likely to come under attack when the presence of international human rights organizations increase (Murdie and Stapley 2014). Central to this argument is that NGOs that advocate for changes in human rights practices ultimately influence the behaviors of potential
terrorist group supporters, disrupting the patterns of support terrorist organizations want to receive (Murdie and Stapley 2014, 81). Human rights NGOs are viewed by terrorist organizations as competitors for the same audience of supporters. As a result, an increase in the number of human rights organizations active in an area should make attacks against the whole NGO sector more likely. To test this Murdie and Stapley (2014) conducted a country-level statistical analysis using a sample of states between 1981 and 2008. They find that a greater number of international human rights NGOs within a country equates to a greater number of NGO attacks. In fact, an increase in general international NGO organizations does not increase the likelihood of attack. They find that growth in international non-human rights NGOs actually leads to a reduction in the likelihood of NGO-targeted attacks. However, the researchers used a broad definition of NGOs which included general nongovernmental civil society organizations (e.g. professional associations and trade unions), not those specifically engaged in relief or development.

The fourth political explanation is that the presence of armed conflict is likely to result in decreased security for aid workers. Humanitarian Outcomes (2012) discovered that the presence of armed conflict was the most important determinant of aid worker insecurity. Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015) also discovered that aid workers were much more likely to come under attack in countries experiencing conflict. Furthermore, they found that an increase in conflict battle deaths from 400 per year to 2,000 per year roughly doubled the number of aid worker attacks.

A fifth political explanation is that aid workers may be more likely to come under attack in areas with high levels of violence against other civilians. In other words, NGOs may not be
singled out for attacks because of their organizational status or activity, but rather have fallen victim to attacks by perpetrators that target all civilians. As Fast (2014) has written:

Violent attacks against aid workers occur, yet so do attacks on the civilians they are there to help; the latter often do not receive comparable outcry for their equally despicable atrocities committed against them...The occurrence of violence against aid workers, though tragic, is no different or less complicated than violence against civilians more generally (Fast 2014, 205).

Both Humanitarian Outcomes (2012) and Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015) used a country’s general homicide rate to test if aid workers were more likely to come under attack in regions volatile for other civilian actors, but both did not discover a relationship. In fact, Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015, 21-22) found that countries with high homicide rates witness the same amount of attacks on aid workers as those with low rates. However, the researchers note that the data for homicides at the country-level is quite poor, and consequently few observations were available to test this hypothesis. Meanwhile Ferreiro (2012) discovered a positive relationship between aid worker security incidents and civilian casualties caused by anti-government forces in Afghanistan. Mitchell (2015) also found that aid workers were less safe in Afghan provinces that experienced high levels of attacks on journalists.

Related to the fourth and fifth political explanations, the sixth suggests that aid workers may be more likely to experience attacks in regions with high levels of terrorist activity. Wille and Fast (2010) found that humanitarian agencies were rarely affected by “general terrorist events,” such as attacks on hotels and markets where NGOs were not the direct target. However, aid workers were likely to be the victims of targeted attacks in specific countries.

Perhaps the most popular anecdotal explanation advanced by the NGO community for insecurity is that of “blurred lines.” This seventh and final political explanation suggests that military engagement in humanitarian and relief work in conflict ridden areas has made it so that insurgent actors can no longer distinguish between combatants and civilians. Since the early
1990s, Western militaries have begun to take a more active role in humanitarian assistance, relief, and reconstruction (Barry and Jefferys 2002; Shiras 1996, 108; USDOD 1994). For example, as NATO attacked Yugoslavia in 1999, it simultaneously established refugee camps for fleeing Kosovars (Lischer 2007). The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) took note of this engagement in 2001: “In NATO and elsewhere there has been an evolution of the doctrine of military-civilian operations, with an increasing tendency for military forces being used to support the delivery of humanitarian aid, and sometimes even to provide this aid directly” (OCHA 2001, 3).

During the early phases of the War in Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (USDOD), US Department of State (USDOS), USAID, and NATO further advanced their role in humanitarian activity through the development of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) (CHC 2003). PRTs were small military units with a civilian component that served three broad functions: reinforcement of the authority and legitimacy the Afghan government at the provincial and district levels; development of national, provincial, district, and local governance and infrastructure; and establishment of economic and social stability and security for the people (SIGAR 2010, 75). PRTs combined diplomatic, military, and development components in an effort to “improve stability by building up the capacity of the host nation to govern; enhance economic viability; and deliver essential public services such as security, law and order, justice, health care, and education” (CALL 2011, 2). Although first established in Afghanistan in 2003, the PRT model expanded to Iraq in 2005.

Scholars and practitioners have noted that humanitarian aid and military goals have become increasingly conflated in recent years (Abiew 2012; Barry and Jefferys 2002; Brassard-Boudreau and Hubert 2010; Carmichael and Karamouzian 2014; Ferreiro 2012; Hoelscher,
Miklian, and Nygård 2015; Mitchell 2015). A 2009 report by 11 NGOs operating in Afghanistan claimed that the global increase in violence against aid workers can be attributed, in part, to military engagement in similar activity, which has “blurred the line between military and humanitarian actors” and thus “adversely affected NGO security [and] endangered the lives of NGO workers” (Waldman 2009, 16). Similarly, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has warned that “[w]hen humanitarian action becomes part of strategies aimed at defeating an enemy, the risks for aid agencies in the field grow exponentially” (Krahenbuhl 2011). For example, an NGO that had operated in a refugee camp alongside NATO was told by Angolan rebels that they could no longer be trusted because of the perceived relationship (Abiew 2003, 33).

To test this, Watts (2004) analyzed US military presence and NGO security at the provincial-level in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2003 using statistical analysis. However, he failed to discover a relationship between military presence within a province and NGO insecurity. Mitchell (2015) expanded upon Watts’ work by testing for the presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) specifically and aid worker insecurity in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2011 across all 34 provinces. Whereas Watts analyzed US military presence generally, Mitchell included PRTs because of their specific humanitarian and reconstruction mandates, which were most likely to mirror NGO activity. Mitchell’s study showed that aid workers were less likely to experience security incidents within provinces with US-led teams, but more likely to experience incidents in provinces with teams led by other coalition forces. Aid workers were also shown to be safer in provinces with a US troop presence. In a separate analysis, Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015) tested the “blurred lines” hypothesis by assessing NATO troop
deployments at the country-level. Consistent with the findings of Mitchell (2015), they discovered that aid workers were actually safer in countries where NATO troops were present.

In addition to the seven political explanations for attacks, two economic explanations for attacks have also been advanced. The first is that aid workers may be more likely to come under attack in areas with high levels of drug trafficking. To test this, both Watts (2004) and Mitchell (2015) controlled for poppy cultivation in their studies of Afghanistan. However, both discovered that NGOs tended to be safer in provinces with high levels of poppy cultivation. One speculation is that cultivation only occurs in regions with existing stability, as farmers may not want to risk growing crops in conflict-ridden zones. Another possibility is that many of the projects NGOs engage in are beneficial to cultivators. These organizations not only provide the necessary materials and equipment to farmers, but also engage in infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges which facilitate crop transportation in rural areas.

The second economic explanation is that the overall modernization of a society can influence security. Modernization theory dates back to the Cold War period, when scholars such as Rostow (1960) advanced the notion that economic and societal advancement results in greater peace. This influenced several US foreign policies in the 1960s, to include the Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps, Food for Peace, and Agency for International Development. Although the original modernization theory dealt with relations between states, recent works have begun to look at how modernization influences non-state actor behavior, such as terrorism (Meierrieks 2008; Ibarra 2011). Mitchell (2015) found that NGOs were less likely to experience insecurity in Afghan provinces with high levels of mobile phone ownership and Internet access, while Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015, 20) discovered that more developed countries measured in terms of GDP per capita experienced fewer attacks against aid workers. This supports the
notion that the overall development and modernization of a region may influence the security situation.

In addition to the nine political and economic explanations for attacks, there is one cultural explanation which concerns the religious ambitions of NGOs. Evangelical Christianity laid the foundation for modern humanitarianism, and religious identity has long influenced the field dating back to the missionary activity that dominated the 19th century. Barnett (2011) traces the origins of humanitarianism to the Latitudinarian preachers of the late 17th and early 18th centuries, who stressed a new spirit of benevolence to counter what they perceived as puritan pessimism regarding human nature. Subsequently, the early 19th century witnessed the growth of such organizations and societies throughout Europe (Barnett 2011, 49-51).

Humanitarianism was heavily influenced by religious experimentation through evangelicalism. Whereas as predestination—the belief that humans can do little to save themselves—dominated religious interpretation prior to the evangelical movement, evangelicalism was premised on the notion that individuals could choose to be saved. As salvation was shifted from God to the individual, a boom in charitable activity ensued. This activity was conducted not only for personal salvation, but to save others previously not exposed to, or enlightened by, the Christian faith (Barnett 2011, 52-53).

Missionaries deployed throughout the world in an effort to evangelize populations. During the early 19th century, American Protestants deployed to the Ottoman Empire and Middle East, where they established schools, hospitals, and orphanages in an attempt to convert Muslim populations (Keshgegian 2009, 141-142). Christian missionaries maintained a dominant global presence through the early 20th century. In fact, one of the themes of the 1910 World
Missionary Conference in Edinburgh was how to successfully stem the tide of Islam through humanitarian activity (Barnett 2011, 69-70).

However, Christian aid facilitation on a global scale began to shift during this period. Historically, Christian missions were permanent enterprises based on the immersion of foreigners into local cultures to spread religious ideals, while simultaneously providing humanitarian relief. In the modern era, these missions have changed from “permanent enterprises” to reactive “emergency-oriented” responses (Heins 2008, 124). During the 1950s and 1960s, the Christian NGO World Vision International (WVI) welcomed the opportunity to spread religious values and ideals in response to a communist movement that was atheist-centric. Likewise, during the Vietnam War, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) worked in support of Catholic officials in Saigon. In one instance, CRS worked with the CIA to assist the movement of 700,000 Catholic refugees to South Vietnam in 1954 (Barnett 2011, 147).

Although Barnett (2011) does not link the religious ambitions of NGOs to insecurity in the field, this history may contribute to why attacks occur. This area has yet to be explored in detail, but perhaps humanitarianism’s relationship with Islam has been strained for more than a century. This may explain why the majority of modern-day attacks on aid workers occur in areas with large Muslim populations, and why NGOs are safer operating in predominantly-Christian regions like Latin America.

For example, following the death of a local NGO worker in Afghanistan, a Taliban spokesman stated: “We take responsibility for all the attacks on NGOs…who are spoiling the Islamic faith of the Afghan people. They are preaching Christianity and distributing books on Christianity among the people” (UNHCR 2003, 11). A representative of an Islamic student movement in Pakistan claimed in 2008 that “NGOs come here to help us on different fronts, but
their actual motives are different. They come here to protect and promote the interests of the West. They give our children toffees but actually they strive to distance them from our religion. This is not acceptable to us. So we are not going to let these people turn our children into infidels” (IRIN 2008). Three faith-based organizations were expelled from Somalia in 2010 (Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Diakonia, and World Vision) on charges of proselytism. Al-Shabaab stated that the NGOs were “[a]cting as missionaries under the guise of humanitarian work, the organizations have been spreading their corrupted ideologies in order to taint the pure creed of the Muslims in Somalia” (quoted in Fast 2014, 168). In 1997, Ahmed Sonoussi—the head of the Afghan office of Lajnat al-Dawa—circulated a memo referring to Western NGOs as “malicious…crusaders” who were attempting to “poison the minds of Afghans and gradually convert them to Christianity” (cited in Ghandour 2003, 15).

Researchers have noted that a lack of data on religious organizations has not permitted a thorough evaluation of whether there is a relationship between religious activity and NGO insecurity (Hammond 2008, 189). However, an analysis by Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico (2009) found that faith-based NGOs did not experience a higher rate of attacks compared to their secular counterparts.

2.3 Theme Three: Organizational Activity and Approaches

The third theme in the literature addresses the growing political activity of NGOs. Whereas humanitarian actors may have once attempted to insulate themselves from politics, many now work closely with states to help eliminate the root causes of conflict and suffering (Barnett 2005). Politicization is not primarily about politicians directing aid operations, “but a more subtle process whereby many humanitarian organizations assume a set of values associated
with the political culture of the West and volunteer to contribute to a wider process of peace building” (Macrae and Leader 2001, 305). This trend has resulted in tension between “traditional” apolitical organizations and their more politically active counterparts (Calhoun 2008, 74).

The move to greater political action has its roots in two developments that occurred during the 1990s. The first was the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which marked a critical turning point for many humanitarians who now felt the need to incorporate human rights advocacy and conflict resolution into their platforms. The genocide led many NGOs to advocate for outside military intervention. These NGOs wanted to avoid resembling the ICRC during World War II, which had remained neutral during the Holocaust. Much of the aid that was being delivered to Rwanda ended up in the hands of those perpetrating the genocide. The conflict confronted the humanitarian community with the adverse effects of strict adherence to apolitical core principles. In response, many NGOs subsequently felt the need to incorporate human rights advocacy and conflict resolution into their platforms (Barnett 2011, 181-185; Barnett and Snyder 2008, 157).

As NGOs sought to address the root causes of humanitarian emergencies, they were forced to look at the political dimensions of conflict (Shiras 1996, 106; Whitman and Pocock 1996). Much of the community was heavily influenced by Mary Anderson’s book Do No Harm during this period. Anderson (1999, 146) argues that “aid workers should try to identify local capacities for peace and connectors and design their aid programs to support and reinforce them.” In response, several organizations began to expand their work to include conflict resolution, election monitoring, independent media promotion, democracy-building, and governance. Although several of these groups still claimed to adhere to their core principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality, political activity was on the upswing.
Many within the community did not welcome this shift. Barry and Jefferys (2002, 12) argue that “[a]ny integration of humanitarian aid into wider political and military strategy compromises humanitarian principles, making it harder for humanitarian actors on the ground to assert their independence and impartiality, and to negotiate access to people in need.” As Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard (2011, 4) note, “[w]hile simultaneously calling for respect for humanitarian principles, in the recent past many humanitarian organizations have also willingly compromised a principled approach in their own conduct through close alignment with political and military activities and actors.” Indeed, civilian identity can become ambiguous when actors begin to play an ideologically supportive role for one of the parties to a conflict (Schütte 2015, 23; Slim 2008, 181-211).

The second development was greater government involvement in third world development projects. Nation-states determined that they could use NGO as “implementing partners” to advance foreign policy objectives. Both governments and NGOs began to employ the “liberal peace” argument to shape responses to conflict and post-conflict scenarios in the development world. The “liberal peace” is grounded in three fundamental assumptions: (1) democracies will engage peacefully with each other, (2) economic and trade liberalization encourages democratic norms, and (3) it is the duty of developed states to assist vulnerable countries to achieve these aims. Miklian (2014, 495) contends that the third assumption “was a driving force behind great power intervention throughout the 1990s by actors ranging from the UN and great coalitions to single states and the International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) community.”

According to Weiss (1999), this shift to greater political action resulted in a collective identity crisis among aid workers operating in conflict zones (Weiss 1999, 1). Several scholars
and practitioners have attempted to label and define the different apolitical and political approaches aid workers employ in the field. Barnett (2011) refers to the two as *emergency humanitarianism* and *alchemical humanitarianism*, with the first largely focusing on symptoms while the latter seeks to remove the root causes of human suffering. Fast (2014) classifies them as *purist* and *Wilsonian*. While purists believe it is not the role or responsibility of humanitarians to decide who is right or wrong, Wilsonians reject the notion that humanitarian action can exist separate from politics (Fast 2014, 97).

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) refers to the approaches as *humanitarian relief* and *development aid*. The distinction is that humanitarian relief applies to responses to emergencies while development aid attempts to improve the state of affairs (Fearon 2008, 51-52). Atmar and Goodhand (2002, 11) identify organizations *working in conflict* and *working on conflict*. While the former refers to NGOs engaged in a principled approach to delivering aid, the later refers to those with a conflict reduction or peacebuilding agenda. Similar to Fast (2014), Barnett (2011), the OECD, and Atmar and Goodhand (2002), Calhoun (2008) divides organizations into *minimalists*—those seeking to alleviate suffering—and *consequentialists*—those wanting to improve the human condition through social transformation (Calhoun 2008, 73-74).

Other scholars have further parsed these approaches. Leader (2000, 2) identifies three broad humanitarian responses, separated by their relationship to political action. *Neutrality elevated* is humanitarian action for the relief of suffering only, emphasizes universal legal principles, and views humanitarian politics as tightly bound by rules of impartiality and neutrality. *Neutrality abandoned* is humanitarian action subordinated to political goals, as adherents believe this will reduce suffering in the long run. This also may mean taking sides.
Third-way humanitarianism is aid for development relief, peacebuilding, and dealing with root causes.

Weiss (1999) divides humanitarian approaches into a scale of classicists to solidarists, according to their degree of political involvement. Whereas classicists believe that action should be completely insulated from politics, solidarists believe that political and humanitarian action should not be disassociated. However, humanitarian action is not always black and white. He therefore uses the concepts of minimalism and maximalism to scale action from purely apolitical to political.

Barnett and Snyder (2008, 145-146) differentiate humanitarian action into two dimensions. The first dimension is whether the action is apolitical or political. The authors define apolitical as actions that are not intended to alter governance arrangements that are assumed to be the cause of suffering, and political as actions that are intended to do so. The second dimension is the goal of aid: humanitarian actions may be either modest or ambitious. They consider aid to be ambitious if it attempts to change the incentives for and constraints on local actors in significant ways, and modest if it works largely within the parameters of the existing circumstances. The four “grand strategies” are classified as: Bed for the Night (apolitical modest), Do no Harm (apolitical ambitious), Back a Decent Winner (political modest), and Comprehensive Peace Building (political ambitious).

Goodhand (2006, 187-191) also divides NGO activity into four separate approaches: Dunantist, Wilsonian, political humanitarian, and political maximalist. In addition to dividing activity into apolitical (Duntantist and Wilsonian) and political (political humanitarian and political maximalist), he further separates these by broad and narrow mandates. The Dunantist approach is the classical apolitical humanitarian response of strict neutrality and impartiality,
with a narrow focus. It is premised on the principles of Genevan Henry Dunant—often credited as the founder of modern humanitarianism—who published the influential *A Memory of Solferino* in 1862. Dunant (1986) argued that battlefield medical corps were inadequate and called for organizations to intervene and help wounded civilians and combatants, subsequently resulting in the Geneva Conventions and formation of the Red Cross (see Barnett 2011, 76-80). The Wilsonian approach as also apolitical in nature, but more broadly focused on service delivery and disaster response. The third and fourth approaches are political. Political humanitarians have a narrow focus, but engage in the political sphere through advocacy work. Meanwhile, political maximalists have a broad, multi-mandate focus, and engage in peacebuilding.

Although classicists, Dunantists, purists, emergency humanitarians, or minimalists may not outwardly express the desire for change in the same manner as solidarists, Wilsonians, alchemists, consequentialists, or maximalists, some have argued that all aid may be perceived by local populations as being political to some degree (Barnett 2008, 237; Hammond 2008, 182-283; Stein 2008, 128). For example, given the emphasis on reconstruction and development operations as part of the US military’s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, NGO activity can benefit government objectives. The importance of humanitarian aid was highlighted by Secretary of State Colin Powell when he made the following remarks at the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations: “I want you to know that I have made it clear to my staff here and to all of our ambassadors around the world that I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team” (Powell 2001).

7 It should be noted that Goodhand’s (2006) definition of “Wilsonian” action differs from Fast’s (2014).
It can be surmised from the current literature that, although it is possible that all action may influence ongoing conflicts to some degree, a distinction can be made between those engaged in apolitical and political activity (Atmar and Goodhand 2002; Barnett 2011; Calhoun 2008; Fast 2014; Stoddard 2006; Weiss 1999). For example, although Barnett (2008, 237, 250) is a supporter of the notion that humanitarianism cannot be entirely devoid of politics, Barnett and Snyder (2008, 157) nevertheless differentiate action into separate apolitical and political dimensions. The OECD (2002, 32) has recognized that aid has political impacts—whether intended or not—but this admission “is not the same as accepting that (humanitarian) aid should be used as a major tool to pursue political objectives.” Furthermore, while Barry and Jefferys (2002, 11) recognize the value and importance of political action, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding, they believe “these tasks are different, maybe parallel, initiatives or activities, and [a] distinction [from apolitical humanitarian action] must be respected.” Schloms (2003, 44-45) reveals that the controversy between these approaches within the NGO community “has reached heights of vehemence hardly comprehensible to outsiders.”

As Barnett (2005, 723-724) contends, it is the aspirations behind the aid that separates the approaches: one attempts to provide relief, the other seeks to alter an existing order.

Any actions that aspire to restructure underlying social relations are inherently political. Humanitarianism provides relief; it offers to save individuals, but not to eliminate the underlying causes that placed them at risk. Viewed in this way, humanitarianism plays a distinctive role in the international sacrificial order. All international orders have winners and losers and thus require their quota of victims. Humanitarianism interrupts this selection process by saving lives, thus reducing the number of sacrifices. However, it does not aspire to alter that order; that is the job of politics.
2.4 Limitations

This literature review has aimed to synthesize available information and publications according to three themes: (1) security trends, (2) explanations for attacks, and (3) organizational activity and approaches. However, there are a number of limitations. Primarily, the literature reveals a significant lack of information on NGO presence and activity at the country- and subnational-levels. This is especially the case when it comes to local organizations (Schreter and Harmer 2013, 5).

There are also some limitations related to the second theme on insecurity. Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico (2009) found that faith-based NGOs were not more likely to experience insecurity in the field. However, their study analyzed attacks across 69 different countries, failing to take into account regional- or country-specific contexts. Although faith-based NGOs may not be more likely to experience insecurity worldwide, this may not hold true for conflicts in Islamic regions. Watts (2004) and Mitchell (2015) both restricted their studies to Afghanistan during specific periods of time, limiting the generalizability of their findings. These analyses have largely been restricted by the dearth of accessible data needed for thorough assessment. Meanwhile, Murdie and Stapley (2014) only assessed the impact of international human rights organizations on NGO insecurity, without taking into account organizations engaged in other political activity such as peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and state-building. The researchers also did not account for local NGOs. Furthermore, the aforementioned studies have only employed quantitative methods, failing to utilize qualitative approaches that are beneficial for increased understanding of NGO insecurity in high-risk conflict zones. They also included all attacks against NGOs for their dependent variable, without taking into account if these were politically- or criminally-motivated.
As for the final theme on organizational approaches, Schreter and Harmer (2013, 37) identify two major weaknesses with the current state of evidence regarding humanitarian principles.

First, most analysis has been in the form of secondary, qualitative, general analysis and think-pieces rather than detailed, empirical, field-level research over a long time-horizon within which an evidence base might produce concrete findings and guidance for future/other operations. Second, the research lacks quantitative evidentiary support. As a result, there are many studies on the politicization of aid and the implications this has for humanitarian principles, without strong evidence measuring the impact this has on humanitarian access.

Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of aid workers believe that apolitical humanitarian principles are vital to obtaining security. Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard (2011, 46-47) distributed an Internet-based survey to local aid workers operating throughout the world, but with special emphasis on high-risk countries. One of the questions asked respondents to offer their opinions on the causes of insecurity in the field. “Lack of respect for the apolitical humanitarian principles of impartiality, independence, and neutrality” was discovered to be a major influencer of attacks in the view of those working in the field. In fact, the survey revealed that 91 percent of all respondents believed that adherence to humanitarian principles enhances security.

However, although scholars and policymakers have attempted to categorize aid activity based on various political dimensions, it has yet to be explicitly theorized and empirically tested if these approaches are in fact influencing the security situation for NGOs. Organizations that are engaged in political aid distribution may have a negative impact on overall humanitarian security. The following section develops this theory.
2.5 Theoretical Argument

This dissertation starts with the assumption that a heavy reliance on aid funding from public sources makes aid workers more accountable to Western governments than to the people they are supposed to help. Gordenker and Weiss (1996, 31) have estimated that as much as 90 percent of NGO financing emanates from governments, which increasingly rely on organizations to deliver services. Thus, the relationship between NGOs and Western governments is a “principal-agent” relationship, with governments as the principals and humanitarian organizations as the agents. As Stein (2008, 127) notes, “Agents always seek to maximize their autonomy and the principal tends to seek to constrain the agents as much as possible so that the principal’s preferences are maximized…[Principals] specify outcomes, establish benchmarks, and hope to constrain their agents.”

When the state was present in the field to manage aid, the degree of separation between states and humanitarian organizations was quite visible. As the state retreats physically but reemerges as a principal funder, the demand for professionalization and accountability of organizations delivering assistance has increased (Stein 2008, 128).

“Traditional” independent humanitarian organizations have often been viewed by conflicting parties as adhering to the principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality. However, as the state has emerged as a principal funder, many organizations have shifted away from these principles in an effort to advance the political objectives of donors. Between 1990 and 2000, official humanitarian aid increased in real terms from $2.1 billion to $5.9 billion. It also increased from 5.8 percent to 10.5 percent as a proportion of total ODA (Macrae et al. 2002, 3).

It is difficult to separate analytically the changing dimensions of humanitarian space in war zones from the absence of states. Put another way, humanitarian organizations are now filling the space in ways they did not three decades ago. As states have retreated, however, and contracted out the delivery of emergency
assistance, they have increased their monitoring and regulation of nationally headquartered humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. Even as they became physically absent, they became increasingly present as regulators, interested in “outcomes” and “accountability.” (Stein 2008, 127)

Given this assumption, this dissertation differentiates humanitarian action into two dimensions. The first dimension relates to the purpose of aid from the donors’ perspective. Here the action may be apolitical or political. As defined in the introduction, apolitical aid is independent, impartial, and neutral humanitarian action that is not motivated by, or designed to, alter existing power structures, whereas political aid includes actions that are intended to do so. However, it is important to note that this dissertation uses the giver’s intent of the aid being delivered, not necessarily how this aid is perceived by local populations (see Barnett 2008; Powell 2001; and Stein 2008).

The second dimension is the magnitude of aid being delivered. As noted in the literature review, Barnett and Snyder (2008, 145-146) consider aid to be “ambitious” if it attempts to change the incentives for and constraints on local actors in significant ways, and “modest” if it works largely within the parameters of the existing circumstances. However, these approaches merely represent different degrees of political action, rather than separate dimensions. Therefore, this dissertation conceptualizes modest and ambitious aid as the magnitude of the assistance. Ambitious aid is dynamic and involves large, long-term projects, while modest aid is limited in its approach to projects that seek to alleviate short-term suffering. By using these four concepts, a set of hypotheses are developed to explain NGO insecurity in high-risk conflict zones.

Apolitical and modest aid is intended to be neutral, independent, and impartial. It attempts to provide relief to those in need without taking sides or inserting itself into the conflict. It is modest because it is engaged in small-scale work, quick impact projects, and emergency
response. It is expected that this type of aid is less visible, and may therefore have no negative impact on aid worker security. Hypothesis one follows, as illustrated in cell 1 of figure 2.1.

**H1:** Aid workers engaged in apolitical and modest activities are less likely to negatively influence the security situation for NGOs (cell 1, figure 2.1).

*Apolitical and ambitious aid* is also neutral, independent, and impartial. However, it is ambitious because it is engaged in large-scale and perhaps long-term projects. Although this form of aid may adhere to humanitarian principles, its magnitude may be perceived negatively by some parties, especially if such large projects are not equally distributed across regions or groups. Because such projects are visible by their size, they may be viewed as being biased toward specific regions or groups at the expense of others. Therefore, the line of causality between foreign aid and aid workers’ security is not straightforward and thus remains ambiguous.

**H2:** Aid workers engaged in apolitical and ambitious activities are no more or less likely to influence the security situation for NGOs (cell 2, figure 2.1).

*Political and modest aid* is intended to alter or enhance existing structures. Its goal is to resolve conflicts, build institutions, and/or enhance governance and rule of law. Its political nature is thus likely to jeopardize aid worker safety. However, it remains modest in magnitude and may therefore not endanger security in the short-run. Similar to apolitical and ambitious aid, the line of causality between aid and the security of aid workers is ambiguous.

**H3:** Aid workers engaged in political and modest activities are no more or less likely to influence the security situation for NGOs (cell 3, figure 2.1).

*Political and ambitious aid* is the most dangerous action for aid worker security. In addition to its objective to resolve conflicts, change institutional arrangements, and/or enhance governance,
it also engages in large-scale and long-term projects. By combining the two extreme attributes of foreign aid, this type of assistance is likely to have a significant negative impact on aid worker safety and security.

**H4**: Aid workers engaged in political and ambitious activities are likely to negatively influence the security situation for NGOs (cell 4, **figure 2.1**).

**Figure 2.1** Theoretical Summary of Aid Worker Insecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of Aid</th>
<th>Magnitude of Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical</td>
<td>Modest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Minimal Attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Ambitious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Ambiguous Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Ambiguous Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Attacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3 - Quantitative Analysis

To test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, this chapter uses a quantitative approach. According to Bueno de Mesquita (1985, 133) “quantitative research facilitates judgments about the general accuracy of explanations and the precision with which methods of evaluation are applied while nonquantitative research sacrifices such precision in order to enhance the accuracy of description with respect to particular events.” As a result, quantitative analyses “permit us the opportunity to evaluate the quality of inferences that are drawn from the available evidence in a broader, more readily replicated or refuted, analytical framework than do nonquantitative analyses” (Bueno de Mesquita 1985, 134).

This dissertation conducts analyses at two separate levels. The first is a large-N country-level analysis between 1999 and 2015. To test the robustness of these findings, a separate analysis is conducted at the subnational-level across four case studies between 2000 and 2014: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia. This chapter is structured as follows: the first section presents the research design, section 3.2 operational definitions of the variables, section 3.3 empirical analysis at the country-level, and section 3.4 empirical analysis at the provincial-level. The final section provides a summary of findings.

3.1 Research Design

This dissertation conducts quantitative analyses at two levels. The first is a statistical analysis of a balanced pooled time series cross section of 117 countries from 1999 to 2015. The temporal domain was chosen because of existing data limitations on attacks against aid workers and global humanitarian aid flows delivered by NGOs (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016; OCHA 2016). The Aid Worker Security Database (Humanitarian Outcomes) has data available from
1997 on, while OCHA’s FTS data begins in 1999. Therefore, the study is restricted to assessing events that occurred between 1999 and 2015. The unit of analysis is state-year.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), NGOs were present and delivering aid in each of these countries during the time period under analysis. The regional breakdown of the countries included in the study is as follows: Africa (48), Asia (31), Central America (11), Europe (12), Oceania (5), and South America (10). A complete list of these nations is available in Appendix A.

There are currently no data available on the total number of NGOs operating in each nation or their individual sectors of activity. The country-level analysis is therefore constrained to using proxy variables to operationalize these variables. Therefore, to assess the robustness of findings, a subnational, provincial-level analysis of an unbalanced pooled times series cross section of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia is conducted between 2000 and 2014.

Seawright and Gerring (2008, 296) define case studies as “the intensive (qualitative or quantitative) analysis of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases), where the researcher’s goal is to understand a larger class of similar units (a population of cases).” Case selection has the same objectives as random sampling: (1) a representative sample and (2) useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest. The choice of cases is therefore driven by the way a case is situated along these dimensions within the population of interest (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296).

The cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia were chosen for purposes of geographic diversity and unit homogeneity, because each country was considered “high-risk” for
a minimum of five years between 2000 and 2014. Additionally, there is variation in the dependent variable. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia are all “positive” cases, in that they each accounted for high levels of attacks against aid workers, while Colombia serves as a “negative” case because of the relatively few attacks that occurred in that country over the same period (Humanitarian Outcomes 2015). There are 502 observations for Afghanistan, 270 for Iraq, 270 for Somalia, and 480 for Colombia. In total, there are 1,522 observations across the four cases, thus contributing to a more complete quantitative assessment.

Data on NGO activities, subnational locations, and years of operation were collected through extensive online research and correspondence with organizations in the field. After collecting information on organizations from official government registries and NGO directories, an online search was conducted on Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and LexisNexis for additional groups. Each NGO’s website was consulted to determine the type of work they are engaged in. As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation defines an NGO as an independent, nonprofit organization engaged in humanitarian, development, human rights, or advocacy work, and aid workers as the employees of these organizations. Organizations not fitting this definition were removed from the list. It should be reiterated that information on both international and national organizations was collected.

Information was gathered on the sectors of activity and provincial locations for each NGO operating in the four countries between 2000 and 2014. To enhance the validity of the data, e-mails were sent and phone calls were made to each organization for confirmation. Of the

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8 A list of all high-risk conflict zones is available in Appendix A. The PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015; UCDP 2015) was used to identify high-risk conflict zones as defined by this dissertation.
approximately 1,500 organizations contacted, 54 percent did not respond, 20 percent either did not have contact information listed or were no longer active, 17 percent confirmed the data collected, 8 percent of messages bounced, and one percent refused provide a response for security reasons. Data collection began in 2014 and took ten months to complete. Hence, the most recent year in the provincial-level analysis is 2014, unlike the country-level analysis which runs through 2015.

3.2 Operational Definitions of Variables

*Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable is insecurity experienced by NGOs during a given year. This dissertation operationalizes *NGO insecurity* as the total number of those killed, wounded, and abducted. These indicators are also analyzed separately. Data for the country-level analysis are from the Aid Worker Security Database (Humanitarian Outcomes 2015). However, the AWSD does not provide provincial information for all of the attacks listed in the database. Therefore, for the subnational analysis of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia, additional research was conducted through the consultation of additional databases and open-source local/international news stories (IntelCenter 2015; Patronus Analytical 2015; START 2015).

*Independent Variables*

The theoretical argument provides four independent variables at two levels related to humanitarian action. The first is the purpose of aid received: *apolitical* or *political*. The operational definition of *political aid* includes education, multi-sector, institution-building,
protection of human rights, safety, and rule of law. “Multi-sector” aid is included in this definition because it is a combination of sectors that often include a political component. This variable is the total dollar amount of aid allocated to all of these sectors. Conversely, *apolitical aid* is the sum of money spent on agriculture, coordination and support services, economic recovery and infrastructure, food, health, mine action, shelter and non-food items, and water and sanitation.\(^9\) For the country-level analysis, data are from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) to determine the amount of humanitarian aid distributed to each of the 117 countries in millions of US dollars (OCHA 2016). This study assesses the total contributions made to each country, not pledges or commitments. Aid that was classified as “sector not yet specified” in the database was not included in this assessment because its political classification could not be determined.

The two variables, *apolitical aid* and *political aid* were logged to remove significant variance between cross-sectional units and time points (see Hsiao 2003). Logarithmic transformations are useful for transforming a highly skewed variable into one that is more approximately normal in distribution (Benoit 2011, 2). When a change in an independent variable is related with a percentage change in the dependent variable, the relationship is better modeled by taking the natural log of either variable (Princeton University 2007). All countries

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\(^9\) There has been debate regarding whether aid allocated for educational purposes should be classified as political or apolitical. Both country- and provincial-level models were run with the sector included in both classifications; however, results remained unchanged. Table 19 and table 20 in Appendix A present models with the sum of educational aid under the apolitical category.
that did not receive foreign aid in any given year were given the value of $1.00 so that their natural logs were equal to zero.\textsuperscript{10}

The second level of aid is its magnitude, \textit{modest} or \textit{ambitious}. Three steps were followed to operationalize \textit{modest aid} and \textit{ambitious aid}. First, the amount of humanitarian aid delivered was computed. This total amount, in millions of US dollars, also includes the cluster “sector not yet specified,” but excludes money allocated to safety and security of NGO staff because this was not spent on local projects. Second, the sample average of humanitarian aid was calculated. This average was $51.1 million. Third, two dummy variables were created. If the amount of aid delivered to a country in a given year was higher than the sample average, it was classified as \textit{ambitious} and given a value of one, otherwise zero. If the amount was below the average, it was classified as \textit{modest} and assigned one, otherwise zero. Aid distributed per capita for each country was also calculated, but results revealed no additional information to warrant any further statistical investigation (see \textit{table 21} and \textit{table 22}, \textit{Appendix A}). Because the results were the same, the decision to use total aid delivered rather than per capita aid was influenced by the former’s better model fit.

Four interaction terms were generated from the two dimensions to test the hypotheses. The first two hypotheses highlight the impact of \textit{apolitical} aid that is \textit{modest} on aid worker insecurity, and the effect of \textit{apolitical} aid that is \textit{ambitious} on these incidents. Two interaction terms were thus created, which consist of \textit{apolitical aid} x \textit{modest aid} and \textit{apolitical aid} x \textit{ambitious aid}. Hypotheses three and four highlight the impact of \textit{political} aid that is \textit{modest} and

\textsuperscript{10} The UN OCHA FTS database also includes negative values. These have been changed to zero here. Separate models were run with negative values included, but results remained unchanged.
political aid that is ambitious on aid worker insecurity. The interaction terms created to test these are political aid x modest aid and political aid x ambitious aid.

The operational definitions differ slightly in the provincial analysis of the four cases. Given the lack of information on individual NGO activities at the country-level, the total dollar amount of humanitarian aid was used as a proxy. However, the data collected for the provincial analysis includes the sectors of activity for each NGO operative in the field. The operational definition of political aid for the provincial-analysis includes organizations engaged in conflict resolution, education, governance, human rights promotion, peacebuilding, and state-building. Furthermore, organizations engaged in multi-sector activity with a political component are classified as political. Conversely, apolitical aid includes animal health, childcare, emergency response, food, demining, infrastructure, internally displaced people (IDPs), medical care, microfinance, refugees, vocational training, and water/sanitation/hygiene (WASH).

To estimate the amount of money spent by NGOs in each province, the sum of humanitarian aid provided at the country-level was obtained from the OCHA FTS database. This dollar amount was then divided by the number of NGOs operating in the country during each year, providing an average for each organization. The number of apolitical and political NGOs operating in each province was then multiplied by this amount to estimate the money being spent on projects in each province/year. Consistent with the country-level analysis, the two variables, apolitical aid and political aid were logged to remove significant variance between cross-sectional units and time points.

The magnitude of aid, modest or ambitious, was determined after calculating the average amount of total aid distributed to a province in a given year. Two dummy variables were created. If the amount of aid in a country a given year was higher than the provincial average, it was
classified as *ambitious* and given the value of one, otherwise zero. If the amount was below the average, it was classified as *modest* and assigned one, otherwise zero. Following the same method as the country-level analysis, four interaction terms were created using both dimensions of aid to test the four hypotheses: *apolitical x modest*, *apolitical x ambitious*, *political x modest*, and *political x ambitious*.

*Control Variables*

The literature review provides a number of variables that have been either anecdotally or empirically related to aid worker insecurity. These include *total NGO presence*, *governmental instability*, *conflict presence*, *general civilian targeting*, *terrorist activity*, *religious motivations*, *Western military presence*, *modernization*, *drug trafficking*, and *UN presence*. Each of these variables are included in both the country- and provincial-level analyses, except for *governmental instability* and *conflict presence*, which are only assessed at the country-level. This is because information on *governmental instability* is only available and relevant at the national-level, but not at the provincial-level. Furthermore, all four case studies are conflict zones.

**Total NGO Presence.** This variable accounts for the total number of NGOs. Given the lack of information on humanitarian NGO activity—especially local organizations (Schreter and Harmer 2013, 5)—previous empirical studies have relied on the total country population as a proxy variable to control for NGO presence, as countries with larger populations may attract more aid workers (Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård 2015). For this study, data on international NGO presence is used as a proxy variable for the country-level analysis. This information is from OCHA’s FTS database. However, the FTS only includes information provided to OCHA by affiliate organizations, generally constraining the data to the largest international NGOs. For
the provincial-level study, the total number of both local and international NGOs in each province is accounted for based on the data collected for this dissertation.

**Governmental Instability.** This variable concerns the nature of the state. Humanitarian Outcomes (2012) discovered a relationship between weak governmental institutions and heightened insecurity, but Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015) did not. Consistent with these studies, a nation’s Polity score is used to control for governmental stability (Center for Systemic Peace 2014). The Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Cole 2014) classifies nations with a score between -6 and -10 as autocratic and those between 6 and 10 as democratic. Countries that fall between -5 and 5 are classified as anocracies. Given that anocracies are societies in transition, they are likely to be power vacuums for competing factions. These unstable polities are scored 1, while democracies (6 to 10) and autocracies (-6 to -10) are assigned zero.

**Conflict Presence.** The presence of armed conflict has previously been discovered to significantly impact NGO security (Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård 2015; Humanitarian Outcomes 2012). If NGOs are operating in regions with warring factions and high levels of violence, they are likely to experience attacks, be they indirect or direct. Information from UCDP is used to determine if an intrastate conflict is present (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). This is a dummy variable, scored “1” if 1,000 or more conflict-related deaths occur in a given year, and zero otherwise.

**General Civilian Targeting.** Although aid workers are experiencing heightened insecurity in the field, this may be part of a larger trend in general civilian targeting. Humanitarian Outcomes (2012) and Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015, 21-22) found no relationship between a country’s homicide rate and the number of attacks on aid workers. However, the researchers note that the data for homicides is quite poor, and consequently had few observations
available to test this hypothesis. Given the scarcity of data on civilian attacks, Mitchell (2015) controlled for the total number of attacks against journalists in Afghanistan as a proxy variable, discovering a positive relationship between attacks against journalists and NGOs. This study uses the total number of journalist fatalities as a proxy variable. Data are from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ 2015).

**Terrorist Activity.** Aid workers may be more likely to come under attack in regions with high levels of terrorist activity. Wille and Fast (2010) discovered that aid workers were rarely affected by indirect terrorist attacks, but were likely to be the victims of targeted attacks in high-risk countries. The total number of terrorist attacks is used to control of the level of terrorist activity in a region. Data on these attacks are from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2015). However, as of this writing, the Global Terrorism Database has not been updated with figures beyond 2014. Therefore, data are not included for 2015 in the country-level analysis.

**Religious Motivations.** Populations in the Islamic world may view humanitarians as being primarily motivated by a desire to supplant their religion. Thus, the presence of Christian NGOs may be associated with an increase in NGO insecurity. However, Christian organizations are present in all conflict zones throughout the world. Therefore, a dummy variable scores 1 if at least 50 percent of a nation’s population are Islamic, and zero otherwise. Data on the religious makeup of each country are from the Pew Research Center (2011a).

**Western Military Presence.** Many NGOs believe that military engagement in similar relief and development operations has increased their insecurity, referred to as “blurred lines” in the extant literature (Mitchell 2015). This variable is operationalized differently in the country- and provincial-analyses. For the country-level analysis, this variable takes into account two factors: the number of US military troops present in a country and NATO missions. If a country
has 1,000 or more US troops present and/or NATO is conducting a mission during a given year, this dummy variable is scored 1, and zero otherwise. Information is from quarterly US Department of Defense (DoD) reports on military personnel deployments (DMDC 2015) and NATO (2015c). For the case studies, research has identified where military personnel are specifically engaged in humanitarian and relief activity within each country. For example, US military personnel often engaged in similar activity as NGOs in Afghanistan and Iraq through the PRT initiative. This information was obtained from news stories, government press releases, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests submitted to the US government. For the provincial analysis, this variable is a dummy and scored 1 for the presence of military personnel engaged in humanitarian and relief activity in a province, and zero otherwise.

**Modernization.** Previous studies have discovered that attacks against NGOs are less likely to occur in regions with modernization (Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård. 2015; Mitchell 2015). Two indicators are used to account for modernization. The first is the number of individuals with access to the Internet and mobile phone ownership per 100 people in a population. These two scores are averaged to produce the variable *mobile/Internet*. The second indicator of modernization is the literacy rate of a population. This study takes into account adult literacy, defined as the percentage of a population—aged 15 and older, both sexes—who can read and write, and have the ability to make basic arithmetic calculations. Data on Internet access, mobile phone ownership, and literacy rates are from the World Bank (World Bank 2016). However, information on Internet access and mobile phone ownership is scarce at the subnational level. Therefore, *mobile/Internet* is restricted to the country-level analysis.

**Drug Trafficking.** Previous studies have theorized that NGOs are more likely to encounter insecurity in areas with high levels of drug trafficking (Watts 2004). This variable is a
dummy, scores 1 if a region is a major drug producer or trafficking location, and zero otherwise. Information on whether a country is a major drug producer or trafficker is from annual “Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries” reports (Kelly 2009; USDOS 2002-2005, 2006a, 2007-2008, 2010, 2012; 2011, USWH 2013-2014). At the subnational level, reports from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNIDCP 2001; UNODC 2005; UNODOC 2007; UNODC 2014; UNODOC 2015) were consulted to determine the level of drug production. If a province produced 1,000 or more hectares of illicit poppy or coca, it is scored “1,” and zero otherwise.

**UN Presence.** Previous studies have combined NGOs and UN personnel under the umbrella term “aid workers.” However, UN personnel may be responsible for “blurred lines” in the same way Western militaries engaged in civil affairs. In many countries, the UN has taken side in a conflict and is engaged in ambitious peacebuilding efforts. Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård (2015) found that UN peacekeepers may be putting aid workers at risk. This variable takes into account the presence of peacekeeping or political missions in a country or province. It does not include humanitarian UN agency presence (e.g. United Nations Children’s Fund). Data on peacekeeping and political missions at the country-level is from the Global Peace Operations Review’s “Timeline of Key Peace Operations Events” (Global Peace Operations Review 2015). Information at the subnational-level is from quarterly reports published by each respective mission. This variable is a dummy and scored 1 for the presence of UN workers associated with peacekeeping or political missions in a country or province and zero otherwise.
3.3 Country-Level Empirical Analysis

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the country-level analysis. Of the 1,977 observations, attacks against aid workers occurred in 275 of the country-years, while 1,702 did not have any. Of those observations with security incidents, the number of aid workers attacked in a country-year ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 141 in 2013 for Afghanistan. The highest number of aid workers killed in a country-year was 38 in 2015 for Afghanistan, while the most wounded was 47 in 2005 for Sudan. The highest number of aid workers abducted, 77, occurred in Afghanistan during 2013. The average amount of apolitical aid received was $30.64 million a year, with a high of $1.77 billion in 2003 for Iraq. The average amount of political aid received was $9.23 million a year a year, with a high of $1.14 billion in 2015 for Lebanon.

A panel-corrected standard error regression model is used to analyze the sample of 117 countries between 1999 and 2015. The panel-corrected standard error estimator is recommended by Beck and Katz (1995) because it is well suited for estimating the presence of panel-level heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of observations among panels. It is also recommended if the number of cross-national units is greater than the number of time units. Furthermore, although the number of attacks tends to be a rare event, the number of casualties is not. Nonetheless, a negative binomial regression was also used, but the panel corrected standard error models provided a better fit. The research design confronts two methodological issues. The first is endogeneity, which happens when an explanatory variable is correlated with the disturbance term. It occurs when there is a loop of causality between the dependent and independent variables in model, resulting in estimation bias (Wooldridge 2013, 82-83). In this study, it is suspected that aid worker insecurity and foreign aid may be reciprocally related. A

11 The results are consistent across the panel corrected standard error and negative binomial models.
Hausman specification test suggests that they are not (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991, 303-304). A two-tailed $t$-test of the null hypothesis of no simultaneity could not be rejected at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively.

### Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of all Countries Receiving Humanitarian Aid, 1999-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers Attacked</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>1.323</td>
<td>7.308</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers Killed</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.468</td>
<td>2.662</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers Wounded</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.453</td>
<td>2.588</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers Abducted</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.402</td>
<td>3.081</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical Aid (millions$)</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>30.643</td>
<td>113.873</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Aid (millions$)</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>9.233</td>
<td>50.870</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aid (millions$)</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>51.100</td>
<td>188.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.360</td>
<td>.480</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>2.881</td>
<td>8.447</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anocracies</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.415</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intragrade War</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist Fatalities</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.434</td>
<td>2.098</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Attacks</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>37.776</td>
<td>188.343</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Population</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.459</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Troops</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mobile/Internet</td>
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<td>.367</td>
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The second methodological concern is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more variables (or combinations of variables) are highly, but not perfectly, correlated with each other (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991, 84). A consequence of multicollinearity is that the estimate of a variable’s impact on the dependent variable, while controlling for others, may be less precise than if the predictors were uncorrelated. It is problematic because it can increase the variance of the regression coefficients, making them unstable and difficult to interpret. To assess this potential problem, bivariate correlations between variables suspected to be highly collinear were examined (e.g. NGO presence and foreign aid). The highest correlation was .69 between
apolitical aid and NGO presence. All models were thus assessed with variance inflation factor (VIF) tests. The VIF measures how much the variance of the estimated regression coefficients are inflated as compared to when the predictor variables are not linearly related (Minitab 2016). VIF has a clear interpretation in terms of the effect of collinearity on the estimated variance of the \( i \)th regression coefficient: a VIF of 10 indicates that (all other things being equal) the variance of the \( i \)th regression coefficient is 10 times greater than it would have been if the \( i \)th independent variable had been linearly independent of the other variables in the analysis (O’Brien 2007, 684). The mean VIF outcomes for the models was 3.32. This outcome indicates that multicollinearity does not have a pernicious effect on the estimates.

Table 2 provides four baseline models of the number of NGO insecurity incidents, which include the sum of aid workers killed, wounded, and abducted. The four models fit the data well, as indicated by the highly statistically significant chi-square statistics. The Wald chi-square are reported in each table. Models 1 and 2 highlight the impact of apolitical aid on the dependent variable, while models 3 and 4 reflect that of political aid.

The main effect terms in the first two models capture the impact of apolitical aid when modest aid and ambitious aid are set to zero, respectively. For example, model 1 suggests that apolitical aid tends to increase the likelihood of aid worker attacks when modest aid is set to zero. Thus, 1 percent increase in apolitical aid is likely to result in almost two aid workers being attacked, given zero modest aid. Model 2 lowers the attacks to almost one when ambitious aid is set to zero.

The main effects in models 3 and 4 also indicate that political aid is likely to lead to insecurity of aid workers when both modest aid and ambitious aid are set to zero. Model 3 shows that an increase in foreign aid by 1 percent is likely to increase attacks on aid workers by
at least two, holding other variables constant. Model 4 lowers the attacks to almost one with ambitious aid is set to zero. The findings from the four models seem to reject the argument that politicization of aid tends to decrease security for aid workers.

Table 2 Baseline Models of NGO Security Incidents, Country-Level Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>.012</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.103</td>
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<td>(.108)</td>
<td>(.162)</td>
<td>(.133)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.165)</td>
<td>(.157)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>.716**</td>
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<td>(.328)</td>
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<td>-.106</td>
<td>.014</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.299)</td>
<td>(.268)</td>
<td>(.299)</td>
<td>(.268)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.972)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.852)</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.306)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political x Modest</td>
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<td>-1.543***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political x Ambitious</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.147*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.729)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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<td>.20</td>
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<td>.14</td>
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<td>Chi-Square</td>
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<td>150.20***</td>
<td>72.34***</td>
<td>96.27***</td>
</tr>
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<td>1,977</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>1,977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test

The first interaction term, apolitical x modest, is negative and statistically significant at 1 percent level in model 1. The coefficient of the interaction term indicates the different units that the slope of the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable, apolitical aid, changes given the presence of modest aid. This coefficient implies that for a given modest aid, the slope of aid workers’ insecurity decreases by 1.187 units. Following Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990, 25-26), this information can be used to calculate the marginal effect of
apolitical aid on aid worker insecurity given the presence of modest aid. The equation is as follows:

\[
\text{Aid Worker Insecurity} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ Apolitical} + b_2 \text{ Modest} + b_3 (\text{Apolitical} \times \text{Modest}) + e
\]  

where \(e\) is the error term. Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990, 26) provide the following interaction formula or the marginal effect from this equation:

\[
\text{Apolitical aid given the presence of modest aid} = b_1 + b_3 (\text{Modest} = 1)
\]  

According to table 2, \(b_1 = 1.794\) and \(b_3 = -1.187\) and replacing these values in the formula 2 yields the following: \text{apolitical aid given modest aid} = [1.794 + (-1.187 \times 1)] or 0.607. In other words, a 1 percent increase in apolitical aid is associated with almost one aid worker being attacked when a recipient country receives any level of modest aid, holding other variables constant. **Hypothesis 1**, which states that when aid workers are engaged in apolitical and modest projects they are less likely to be attacked is not supported by the data.

The interaction term in model 2, \text{apolitical x ambitious}, is positive and also statistically significant at 1 percent level. Using formula 2, the marginal effect is \([.487 + (4.245 \times 1)]\) or 4.732. The result indicates that for a 1 percent increase in apolitical aid, some five aid workers are likely to be attacked given any level of ambitious aid. This finding partially supports **hypothesis 2**, which states that aid workers engaged in apolitical and ambitious activities are more or less likely to experience insecurity in the recipient country.

Using the same formula, the marginal effect of model 3 is \([2.231 + (-1.543 \times 1)]\) or .688, while the marginal effect of model 4 is \([.716 + (1.147 \times 1)]\) or 1.863, compared to one and five attacks in the two apolitical models 1 and 2. Model 3 partly support **hypothesis 3**. However, model 4 shows that when aid workers carry out political and ambitious activities, they are likely to be the target of attacks. This result fully supports **hypothesis 4**.
The marginal effects in table 2 seem to suggest that the magnitude of foreign aid is more critical and important than its purpose in explaining attacks against aid workers. Without the marginal effects, the results can be misleading. In fact, the purpose of aid matters less than its magnitude because both apolitical and political aid tend to increase security incidents. However, the higher the level of magnitude of aid, the higher the number of attacks.

Table 3 presents models 5, 6, 7, and 8, which add control variables to assess the robustness of findings in table 2. The most noticeable change in these models is the lack of statistical significance of apolitical and political aid in models 6 and 8 once control variables are included in the baseline models. However, the four interaction terms are all statistically significant at 10 percent level or better. Using formula 2, the marginal effect of model 5 is \[.716 + (-.459 \times 1)\] or .257, while model 6 is 3.772 because the coefficient of apolitical aid is not statistically significant. For a 1 percent increase in apolitical aid, almost four aid workers are likely to be attacked at any level of ambitious aid, holding other variables constant. This supports the notion that the magnitude of foreign aid is the most statistically significant factor in explaining attacks compared with the purpose of aid.

Model 7 reinforces this contention. The marginal effect is \[.734 + (-.729 \times 1)\] or .005, while model 8 is 1.109. In sum, as long as foreign aid remains modest, aid workers are less likely to come under attack than when aid is ambitious. The results from table 3 lend only partial support for the first three hypotheses, but full support to hypothesis 4, even when controlling for alternative explanations.

Most control variables are in the expected direction, except journalist fatalities and mobile/Internet. Mobile/Internet is not statistically significant, while journalist fatalities holds a negative relationship. The argument that aid workers may be collaterals of general civilian
attacks by combatants or antagonistic groups does not hold. Also noteworthy, the presence of Western troops in aid recipient countries seems to be a major indicator of NGO insecurity. This contradicts two previous empirical findings by Watts (2004) and Mitchell (2015) in their analyses of Afghanistan, but supports anecdotal explanations put forth by NGOs.

Two tests were run to assess the robustness of findings. The first solely analyzes “high-risk” conflict zones. In 99 cases of civil wars, the first and fourth hypotheses hold, as highlighted in Table 4. The interaction terms are not statistically significant in apolitical models 9 and 10, but are statistically significant in political models 11 and 12. The marginal effect of model 11 is 

\[ 4.724 + (-6.973 \times 1) \] or -2.249, while model 12 is 7.282 because the coefficient of political aid is not statistically significant. For a 1 percent increase in political aid, seven aid workers are likely to be attacked at any level of ambitious aid, holding other variables constant. The magnitude of foreign aid appears again to be the most statistically significant factor compared with the purpose of aid in high risk conflict zones. In other words, when aid workers carry out projects that are apolitical and modest in conflict zones, they are less likely to be targeted by combatants, supporting hypothesis 1. Any project that is both political and ambitious tends to result in attacks, supporting hypothesis 4.

The control variables in Table 4 behave differently from Table 3. Journalist fatalities, Western troops, and literacy rate, and drug trafficking are each statistically significant in all four models, while terrorism is only significant in model 10. Each of these variables are in the same direction as Table 3.

The second test is an assessment of the three separate indicators of security incidents, which include killed, wounded, and abducted. Table 5 presents statistical results of apolitical aid and its magnitude. Models 13-15 highlight apolitical and modest aid, while models 16-18
represent *apolitical* and *ambitious* aid. The main effects show that *apolitical* aid tends to increase all three indicators of insecurity when *modest* aid is set to zero. The coefficients are .224 for *killed*, .327 for *wounded*, and .165 for *abducted*. Apolitical aid for *killed* and *wounded* are statistically significant at 1 percent level, *abducted* at 5 percent level. The marginal effects show that an increase in *apolitical* aid is likely to result in insecurity given any level of modest aid. Although the marginal effects are not statistically significant for *killed*, and are significant but zero for *abducted* [.165 + (-.165 x 1)], they are statistically significant for *wounded* at 5 percent level. The marginal effect for wounded is [.327 + (-.232 x 1)], or .095. The findings do not support **hypothesis 1**. The control variables behave similarly to those in **table 4**, and are in the same direction. All are statistically significant in each model except for *journalist fatalities* and *mobile/Internet*, which are only statistically significant in the *abducted* model. Interestingly, *mobile/Internet* holds a positive relationship with aid workers abducted.
Table 3 Full Models of NGO Security Incidents, Country-Level Analysis

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
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<td>.779</td>
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<td>(.530)</td>
<td>(.658)</td>
<td>(.627)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.080</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.167)</td>
<td>(.151)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>-.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(.256)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(3.399)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.548)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Apolitical x Modest</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.261)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical x Ambitious</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political x Modest</td>
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<td>-.729**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(.408)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political x Ambitious</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.109**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.631)</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>.112***</td>
<td>.111***</td>
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<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
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<td>.575***</td>
<td>.578***</td>
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<td>(.193)</td>
<td>(.193)</td>
<td>(.195)</td>
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<td>-.279*</td>
<td>-.266*</td>
<td>-.267*</td>
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<td>(.188)</td>
<td>(.184)</td>
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<td>(.191)</td>
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<td>.006***</td>
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<td>(1.069)</td>
<td>(1.062)</td>
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<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
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<td>-.029***</td>
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<td>(.644)</td>
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Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test
Table 4 NGO Security Incidents in High-Risk Conflict Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
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<td>12.330*</td>
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<td>(8.138)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1.842)</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.364)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political x Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.282**</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(.152)</td>
<td>(.140)</td>
<td>(.145)</td>
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<td>-0.817</td>
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<td>(3.886)</td>
<td>(3.588)</td>
<td>(3.926)</td>
<td>(4.284)</td>
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<td>-.397*</td>
<td>-.426**</td>
<td>-.424*</td>
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<td>(.256)</td>
<td>(.257)</td>
<td>(.257)</td>
<td>(.262)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Population</td>
<td>-6.132</td>
<td>-5.769</td>
<td>-4.936</td>
<td>-4.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.464)</td>
<td>(5.451)</td>
<td>(5.647)</td>
<td>(5.486)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Troops</td>
<td>23.100***</td>
<td>22.390***</td>
<td>22.826***</td>
<td>23.067***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.156)</td>
<td>(3.977)</td>
<td>(3.974)</td>
<td>(3.984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile/Internet</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.073)</td>
<td>(.066)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>-.185*</td>
<td>-.165*</td>
<td>-.189*</td>
<td>-.219**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.114)</td>
<td>(.106)</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td>(.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking</td>
<td>16.777***</td>
<td>16.775***</td>
<td>18.430***</td>
<td>17.752***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>2.230</td>
<td>2.096</td>
<td>2.661</td>
<td>3.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.800)</td>
<td>(3.500)</td>
<td>(3.575)</td>
<td>(3.738)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
<td>200.34***</td>
<td>264.88***</td>
<td>895.34***</td>
<td>3,390.73***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test
Models 16-18 represent *apolitical* and *ambitious* aid. None of the main effects are statistically significant, but all three marginal effects are at 1 percent level. The marginal effect for *killed*, *wounded*, and *abducted* are .985, 1.628, and 1.159, respectively. This means that aid workers are likely to be killed, wounded, or abducted if they are engaged in apolitical projects at any level of ambitious aid. At least one aid worker is likely to be attacked if apolitical aid increases by 1 percent, given any level of ambitious aid, holding other factors constant. The findings partially support hypothesis 2. Table 5 supports the notion that the magnitude of aid has a greater impact on NGO insecurity than its purpose. The control variables behave the same as in models 13-15, except *NGOs* is no longer statistically significant.

**Table 6** presents statistical results of *political* aid and its magnitude. Models 19-21 highlight *political* and *modest* aid, while models 19-21 represent *political* and *ambitious* aid. The main effects show that *political* aid tends to increase killings and those wounded, but not abductions when *modest* aid is set to zero. The coefficients are .221 for *killed* and .416 for *wounded*, statistically significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. The marginal effects are also statistically significant for *killed* and *wounded*, but not for *abductions*. The marginal effect for killed is [.221 + (-.204 x 1)], or .017, statistically significant at 10 percent level. The marginal effect for wounded is [.416 + (-.433 x 1)], or -.017, statistically significant at 1 percent level. These findings fully support hypothesis 3.

Models 22-24 represent *political* and *ambitious* aid. None of the main effects are statistically significant, but all the marginal effects are for *wounded*, -1.066 at 5 percent level. At least one aid worker is likely to be wounded if political aid increases by 1 percent, given any level of ambitious aid, holding other factors constant. The findings do not support hypothesis 4. **Table 6** does not support the notion that either the purpose or the magnitude of aid are drivers of
NGO insecurity. Most of the control variables in models 19-24 behave in the same way as those in table 4, except for NGOs, which holds a positive relationship in all models, and mobile/Internet, which is only statistically significant in the abduction models. Given that mobile/Internet is statistically significant in all of the abduction models in table 5 and table 6, but not in the killed and wounded models, it can be speculated that these modernizing tools may help abductors coordinate their activities to obtain ransom in return for hostages.
Table 5: Apolitical Aid and NGO Security Incidents, Country-Level Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 13 (Killed)</th>
<th>Model 14 (Wounded)</th>
<th>Model 15 (Abducted)</th>
<th>Model 16 (Killed)</th>
<th>Model 17 (Wounded)</th>
<th>Model 18 (Abducted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.323* (.226)</td>
<td>-.084 (.233)</td>
<td>.243 (.272)</td>
<td>.298* (.214)</td>
<td>-.033 (.200)</td>
<td>.246 (.261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apol (Apol)</td>
<td>.224*** (.062)</td>
<td>.327*** (.087)</td>
<td>.165** (.072)</td>
<td>.075 (.061)</td>
<td>.065 (.056)</td>
<td>-.060 (.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mod (Mod)</td>
<td>-.288** (.126)</td>
<td>-.054 (.105)</td>
<td>-.148 (.131)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious (Amb)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.940*** (1.181)</td>
<td>-6.517*** (1.427)</td>
<td>-4.432*** (1.492)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apol x Mod</td>
<td>-.062 (.096)</td>
<td>-.232** (.103)</td>
<td>-.165* (.121)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apol x Amb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.985*** (.279)</td>
<td>1.628*** (.336)</td>
<td>1.159*** (.342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>.022* (.015)</td>
<td>.037* (.024)</td>
<td>.031** (.015)</td>
<td>.006 (.014)</td>
<td>.012 (.023)</td>
<td>.013 (.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anocracies</td>
<td>.147** (.077)</td>
<td>.206** (.093)</td>
<td>.169** (.079)</td>
<td>.136** (.077)</td>
<td>.187** (.093)</td>
<td>.156** (.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrastate War</td>
<td>3.412*** (.703)</td>
<td>1.401** (.814)</td>
<td>2.738*** (.880)</td>
<td>3.257*** (.692)</td>
<td>1.142*** (.771)</td>
<td>2.563*** (.862)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist Fatal.</td>
<td>-.068 (.063)</td>
<td>-.076 (.061)</td>
<td>-.131* (.088)</td>
<td>-.069 (.061)</td>
<td>-.078* (.059)</td>
<td>-.132* (.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Attacks</td>
<td>.001* (.001)</td>
<td>.001* (.001)</td>
<td>.003*** (.001)</td>
<td>.002* (.001)</td>
<td>.002* (.001)</td>
<td>.004*** (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Pop.</td>
<td>.298*** (.110)</td>
<td>.370*** (.125)</td>
<td>.414*** (.090)</td>
<td>.307*** (.109)</td>
<td>.373*** (.128)</td>
<td>.420*** (.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Troops</td>
<td>2.248*** (.352)</td>
<td>2.081*** (.423)</td>
<td>2.023*** (.573)</td>
<td>2.181*** (.350)</td>
<td>1.977*** (.434)</td>
<td>1.950*** (.588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile/Internet</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>-.001 (.001)</td>
<td>.002* (.001)</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>-.001 (.001)</td>
<td>.002* (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>-.010*** (.003)</td>
<td>-.005** (.003)</td>
<td>-.010*** (.004)</td>
<td>-.010*** (.003)</td>
<td>-.005** (.003)</td>
<td>-.010*** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking</td>
<td>.845*** (.209)</td>
<td>.697*** (.190)</td>
<td>.860*** (.305)</td>
<td>.843*** (.206)</td>
<td>.693*** (.194)</td>
<td>.857*** (.309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>.430*** (.138)</td>
<td>.321** (.178)</td>
<td>.429*** (.176)</td>
<td>.508*** (.132)</td>
<td>.440*** (.180)</td>
<td>.514*** (.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test
### Table 6: Political Aid and NGO Security Incidents, Country-Level Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Political and Modest Aid</th>
<th></th>
<th>Political and Ambitious Aid</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 19 (Killed)</td>
<td>Model 20 (Wounded)</td>
<td>Model 21 (Abducted)</td>
<td>Model 22 (Killed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.468** (.240)</td>
<td>.029 (.248)</td>
<td>.383* (.292)</td>
<td>.426** (.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political (Pol)</td>
<td>.221** (.099)</td>
<td>.416*** (.118)</td>
<td>.097 (.126)</td>
<td>-.014 (.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>-.079 (.106)</td>
<td>.045 (.097)</td>
<td>-.243** (.110)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.045 (.523)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol x Mod</td>
<td>-.204* (.138)</td>
<td>-.433*** (.148)</td>
<td>-.092 (.197)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol x Amb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.255 (.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>.030** (.015)</td>
<td>.041** (.024)</td>
<td>.041*** (.016)</td>
<td>.029** (.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anocracies</td>
<td>.168** (.078)</td>
<td>.223*** (.092)</td>
<td>.184*** (.078)</td>
<td>.168** (.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrastate War</td>
<td>3.514*** (.703)</td>
<td>1.539** (.825)</td>
<td>2.827*** (.881)</td>
<td>3.526*** (.704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist Fatal.</td>
<td>-.064 (.064)</td>
<td>-.075 (.062)</td>
<td>-.127* (.088)</td>
<td>-.065 (.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Attacks</td>
<td>.001* (.001)</td>
<td>.001* (.001)</td>
<td>.003*** (.001)</td>
<td>.001* (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Population</td>
<td>.295*** (.110)</td>
<td>.350*** (.122)</td>
<td>.406*** (.090)</td>
<td>.296*** (.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Troops</td>
<td>2.219*** (.355)</td>
<td>2.055*** (.425)</td>
<td>2.012*** (.574)</td>
<td>2.218*** (.350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile/Internet</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>-.001 (.001)</td>
<td>.002* (.001)</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>-.012*** (.003)</td>
<td>-.006** (.003)</td>
<td>-.017*** (.004)</td>
<td>-.011*** (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking</td>
<td>.826*** (.213)</td>
<td>.694*** (.195)</td>
<td>.841*** (.309)</td>
<td>.830*** (.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>.478*** (.146)</td>
<td>.345** (.180)</td>
<td>.475*** (.176)</td>
<td>.482*** (.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.37 (.37)</td>
<td>.28 (.27)</td>
<td>.27 (.37)</td>
<td>.28 (.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
<td>139.23*** 132.10***</td>
<td>296.61*** 147.78***</td>
<td>140.59*** 310.61***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,860 1,860 1,860 1,860 1,860 1,860</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test
3.4 Provincial-Level Empirical Analysis

Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of the provincial-level analysis of four “high risk” countries from 2000 to 2014. The countries are Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia. Of the 1,522 observations, attacks against aid workers occurred in 354 of the province-years, while 1,168 did not have any. Of those observations with security incidents, the number of aid workers attacked in a province per year ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 90 in 2014 for Herat, Afghanistan. The highest number of aid workers killed in a province-year was 18 in 2014 for Helmand, Afghanistan, while the most wounded was 17 in 2003 for Kandahar, Afghanistan. The highest number of aid workers abducted, 78, occurred in Herat, Afghanistan during 2014. The average amount of apolitical aid received was $4.16 million a year, with a high of $193.2 million distributed in 2003 for Baghdad, Iraq. The average amount of political aid received was $5.07 million a year, with a high of $154.77 million in 2002 for Kabul, Afghanistan.

A panel-corrected standard error regression model was used to analyze the 102 provinces between 2000 and 2014. Similar to the country-level analysis, the provincial-level research design also confronts the same methodological issues of endogeneity and multicollinearity. As for endogeneity, a Hausman specification test suggests that aid worker insecurity and aid distributed are not reciprocally related. A two-tailed $t$-test of the null hypothesis of no simultaneity could not be rejected at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively. Regarding multicollinearity, the highest correlation between variables was .79 between modest and ambitious, with all others falling below .33. The mean VIF outcomes for the models was 8.26.
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics, Four Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers Attacked</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>1.223</td>
<td>4.127</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers Killed</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>1.267</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers Wounded</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>1.175</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers Abducted</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.561</td>
<td>3.140</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical Aid (millions$)</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>4.162</td>
<td>11.857</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Aid (millions$)</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>5.071</td>
<td>10.792</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aid (millions$)</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>9.233</td>
<td>21.823</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.644</td>
<td>.479</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>.437</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>29.153</td>
<td>45.451</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist Fatalities</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>1.679</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Attacks</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>17.789</td>
<td>64.061</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Population</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.684</td>
<td>.465</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Civil Affairs</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.556</td>
<td>.497</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>54.681</td>
<td>30.832</td>
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<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>.419</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 provides four baseline models of the number of NGO security incidents, which includes the sum of aid workers killed, wounded, and abducted. Models 25 and 26 highlight the impact of apolitical aid on the dependent variable, while models 3 and 4 reflect that of political aid. Models 25 and 26 suggest that apolitical aid tends to increase the likelihood of aid worker attacks when modest aid is set to zero, with coefficients of .324 and .253 respectively at 1 percent level of significance. The main effects in models 27 and 28 also indicate that political aid is likely to lead to insecurity of aid workers when both modest aid and ambitious aid are set to zero, with coefficients of .375 and .304 respectively at 1 percent level of significance. Consistent with the country-level baseline models in table 2, the findings reject the argument that politicization of aid tends to increase the insecurity of aid workers.

However, the results of the interaction terms are quite different from the country-level baseline models in table 2. While the interaction terms in all four models presented in table 2 are statistically significant, only model 26, apolitical x ambitious, in table 8 is statistically significant, at 1 percent level. The marginal effect is [.253 + (-1.032 x 1)], or -.779. Interestingly,
these results show that neither the type of aid nor its magnitude are significantly influencing attacks at the subnational level. In fact, the only statistically significant marginal effect shows that a 1 percent increase in apolitical aid when a recipient province receives any level of ambitious aid is likely to result in one fewer aid worker being attacked, holding other variables constant. Unlike the country-level analysis, hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 are not supported at the provincial-level. Only hypothesis 3 is partially supported by the results.

**Table 8** Baseline Models of NGO Security Incidents, Provincial-Level Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 25</th>
<th>Model 26</th>
<th>Model 27</th>
<th>Model 28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.313</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>-.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.438)</td>
<td>(.185)</td>
<td>(.416)</td>
<td>(.268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical</td>
<td>.324***</td>
<td>.253***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.064)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.375***</td>
<td>.304***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.083)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>-.325</td>
<td>-.629</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.566)</td>
<td>(.693)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>7.953***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.701)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.598)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical x Modest</td>
<td>-.070</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.120)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical x Ambitious</td>
<td>-1.032***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.399)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political x Modest</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.150)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political x Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.248</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.378)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R^2: 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06
Chi-Square: 35.23*** 46.32*** 40.61*** 37.73***
N: 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test

**Table 9** adds control variables to the models. Models 29 and 30 highlight the impact of apolitical aid on the dependent variable, while models 31 and 32 reflect that of political aid. The main effects for apolitical and political aid in model 29 and model 31 are not statistically significant. Model 30 suggests that apolitical aid tends to decrease the likelihood of aid worker
attacks when ambitious aid is set to zero. The main effect in model 32 indicates that political aid is likely to decrease insecurity of aid workers when ambitious aid is set to zero. Consistent with the country-level models in table 3, the findings reject the argument that politicization of aid tends to decrease security of aid workers.

The marginal effects in table 9 are different from the baseline models presented in table 8. Apolitical x ambitious is no longer statistically significant, while apolitical x modest and political x modest are now statistically significant. The marginal effect of political x ambitious is the only interaction term that remained the same (not statistically significant) in both baseline and full models. Using formula 2, the marginal effect of model 29 is -.125, while model 31 is -.161, both statistically significant at 5 percent level. This suggests that aid workers engaged in modest aid are less likely to experience attacks in the field. However, unlike the country-level findings in table 3, the interaction terms for ambitious aid are not statistically significant.

Regardless, both the country- and provincial-level analyses reveal that the magnitude of foreign aid appears to be the most statistically significant factor in explaining attacks compared with the purpose of aid. The results from table 9 fully support hypothesis 1, partially support hypotheses 2 and 3, and do not support hypothesis 4.
Table 9 Full Models of NGO Security Incidents, Provincial-Level Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 29</th>
<th>Model 30</th>
<th>Model 31</th>
<th>Model 32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.023* (.742)</td>
<td>.969 (.721)</td>
<td>.935* (.722)</td>
<td>1.032* (.738)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical</td>
<td>-.013 (.060)</td>
<td>-.119** (.063)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.016 (.056)</td>
<td>-.121** (.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>-.035 (.302)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.182 (.422)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>2.623 (2.236)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.200 (2.230)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical x Modest</td>
<td>-.125** (0.072)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apolitical x Ambitious</td>
<td>-.253 (0.336)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political x Modest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.161** (.097)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political x Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.155 (.325)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>.020*** (.006)</td>
<td>.020*** (.006)</td>
<td>.020*** (.006)</td>
<td>.020*** (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist Fatalities</td>
<td>.160** (.088)</td>
<td>.168** (.088)</td>
<td>.157** (.088)</td>
<td>.157** (.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Attacks</td>
<td>.005*** (.002)</td>
<td>.005*** (.002)</td>
<td>.005*** (.002)</td>
<td>.005*** (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Population</td>
<td>.407 (.420)</td>
<td>.382 (.443)</td>
<td>.332 (.406)</td>
<td>.309 (.408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Civil Affairs</td>
<td>1.058*** (.292)</td>
<td>.985*** (.298)</td>
<td>1.086*** (.294)</td>
<td>1.088*** (.297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>-.023*** (.007)</td>
<td>-.027*** (.008)</td>
<td>-.023*** (.008)</td>
<td>-.023*** (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking</td>
<td>.330 (.274)</td>
<td>.353* (.268)</td>
<td>.359* (.274)</td>
<td>.358* (.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>1.046*** (.375)</td>
<td>1.014*** (.371)</td>
<td>1.062*** (.375)</td>
<td>1.059*** (.375)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
<td>337.65*** 328.56***</td>
<td>319.47*** 328.82***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>1,522</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test
Most control variables are consistent with the country-level analysis, except for journalist fatalities and Islamic population. Contrary to the country-level study, the argument that aid workers may be collaterals of general civilian attacks by combatants or antagonistic groups is supported in all of the four models. Although not captured at the country-level, it is probable that NGOs operating in regions that are volatile for other civilian actors are more likely to experience insecurity at the subnational-level. The Islamic population variable is not statistically significant although three of the four case studies are Islamic nations. Compared with the country-level analysis, there is less variation at the provincial-level.

Consistent in both country- and provincial-level full models, military forces engaged in humanitarian and relief operations, UN peacekeeping and political missions, drug trafficking, and terrorism all seem to have major effects on NGO insecurity. Also consistent in both analyses, literacy rate appears to have a mitigating impact on attacks. Perhaps populations with higher levels of education are less likely to adhere to extremist ideologies or engage in hostilities toward civilians.

3.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings

Both the country- and provincial-level analyses have not revealed a statistically significant relationship between the type of aid being delivered and insecurity experienced in the field. These findings partially reject earlier findings by Murdie and Stapley (2014), who discovered that NGOs experience a greater number of attacks in countries with high numbers of international human rights organizations. Unlike Murdie and Stapley (2014), this dissertation’s quantitative analysis took into account all political aid being distributed, not just the presence of international human rights organizations. However, both the country- and provincial-level
analyses have shown that the magnitude of aid tends to be a significant determinant of aid worker security. Only when ambitious projects are carried out by NGOs is their security likely to be compromised. The analysis suggests that combatants may not necessarily distinguish apolitical from political aid, but could be concerned with the visibility and magnitude of projects.

NGOs that withdraw from regions following emergency relief projects are not likely to be viewed in a negative manner by combatants or disaffected groups. However, those that remain for a sustained period of time and engage in large-scale relief or development operations—regardless of political motivation—may be viewed as occupying entities aligned with specific factions. In fact, many NGOs involved in long-term projects are often viewed as quasi- or shadow-governmental entities by recipient populations (Clark 2003, 18). To assess this in greater detail, the four cases quantitatively analyzed in the preceding provincial-level analysis—Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia—are examined qualitatively in the following chapters.
Chapter 4 - Qualitative Research Design

The statistical results presented in chapter three do not support the idea that politicization of aid affects the likelihood of attacks against NGOs. Although there was a strong statistical relationship between the magnitude of aid and insecurity encountered in the field, the level of politicization was found to be statistically insignificant in both the country- and provincial-level models. However, the use of quantitative methods alone does not allow researchers to “untangle competing causal stories or determine causal ordering, and it thus requires a deeper analysis to validate a proposed mechanism” (Clayton 2014, 18-19). As King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 44) note, quantitative design may “produce precision, [but] it does not necessarily encourage accuracy.” This is where qualitative methods can be useful to enhance confidence in statistical findings.

In recent years, scholars have recognized the benefit of mixing methods. Combining both quantitative and qualitative methods “can help quantitative researchers address measurement issues, assess outliers, discuss variables omitted from the large-N analysis, and examine cases incorrectly predicted” (Clayton 2014, 19). Green, Caracelli, and Graham (1989, 259) identify five purposes for mixing quantitative and qualitative methods: (1) triangulation, (2) complementarity, (3) development, (4) initiation, and (5) expansion. *Triangulation* seeks convergence, corroboration, and correspondence of results from the different methods. It increases the validity of constructs and inquiry results by counteracting or maximizing the heterogeneity of irrelevant sources. *Complementarity* seeks elaboration, enhancement, illustration, and clarification of the results from one method with the results from the other method. This is used to increase the interpretability, meaningfulness, and validity of constructs and inquiry results.
Development aims to use the results from one method to help develop or inform the other method in order to increase the validity of constructs and inquiry results by capitalizing on inherent method strengths. Initiation seeks the discovery of paradox and contradiction, new perspectives of frameworks, and the recasting of questions or results from one method with questions or results from the other method. This is utilized to increase the breadth and depth of inquiry results and interpretations by analyzing them from different perspectives, methods, and paradigms. Finally, expansion extends the breadth and range of inquiry by using different methods.

It is important to develop a framework using theoretical propositions to guide the collection, organization, and assessment of case study information (Yin 2003). This dissertation uses the qualitative methods of “structured-focused comparison” and “process tracing” to help explain the causes of aid worker insecurity. These methods were chosen, in part, because they emphasize comparability, a critical factor missing from the current literature. By utilizing these established frameworks, cross-case analysis is possible.

The following chapter details the process for examining factors that explain why actors choose to attack NGOs. Section 4.1 outlines the utility of a mixed-methods approach, section 4.2 provides the “structured-focused comparison” framework, and section 4.3 presents the “process-tracing” methodology. These methods will be employed in the chapters that follow.

4.1 Qualitative Approach

To build upon the quantitative findings, this dissertation uses “structured-focused comparison” and “process tracing” methods to analyze the four cases that include Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia. As previously noted, these cases were chosen for purposes of
geographic diversity and unit homogeneity, as each conflict zone was considered “high-risk” for a minimum of five years between 2000 and 2014.\textsuperscript{12} Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia are all “positive” cases, while Colombia serves as a “negative” case (Humanitarian Outcomes 2015).\textsuperscript{13}

The literature on NGO activity in insecure environments is primarily qualitative, relying on interviews and case studies. The general tendency in humanitarian research toward qualitative approaches is due to the difficulties involved in collecting data in unstable settings (Schreter and Harmer 2013, 5). However, most case studies are practitioner-based and do not follow qualitative methodological guidelines. In fact, the majority of studies are largely descriptive accounts of attacks against aid workers and safety measures in place to avoid these events (Stoddard 2006; Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico 2009; Fast 2014). Furthermore, existing analyses have largely not attempted to uncover causal relationships that explain attacks against aid workers.

Although quantitative methods can often be used to test for causal relationships at the macro- and meso-levels of analysis, qualitative methods are best suited for micro-level analyses because they cover a wide range of approaches, and tend to focus on a small number of cases using depth analysis of historical materials. Historical research can be used to evaluate explanations through a process of valid causal inference (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 3-5). As King, Keohane, and Verba explain (1994, 5), “If we are to understand the rapidly changing social word, we will need to include information that cannot be easily quantified as well as that which can…neither quantitative nor qualitative research is superior to the other, regardless of the research problem being addressed.”

\textsuperscript{12} See page 332 in Appendix A for a list of all “high-risk” conflict zones by year.

\textsuperscript{13} See figure A.1 on page 333 in Appendix A for more detail.
4.2 Structured-Focused Comparison

The method of structured-focused comparison was developed to study historical experience in ways that would yield useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems (George and Bennett 2005). According to George and Bennett (2005, 67), “the particular challenge was to analyze phenomena such as deterrence in ways that would draw the explanations of each case of a particular phenomenon into a broader, more complex theory. The aim was to discourage decision-makers from relying on a single historical analogy in dealing with a new case.”

The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective. These questions are then asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison of the findings of the cases possible. It is “focused” because it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. In other words, “the requirements for structure and focus apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 67). The method follows a four-step procedure: first, the research design is constructed and a problem is specified; second, the case materials are examined; third, theoretical implications are developed; and fourth, results are compared across cases and conclusions are drawn based on theoretical and empirical evidence (George and McKeown 1985, 43-54).

Structured-focused comparison is valuable for security studies because it provides a scientific method for analyzing qualitative case studies. Prior to its development, many within the political science community conducted individual case studies in an attempt to develop knowledge and theory. However, although these were instructive, “they did not lend themselves readily to strict comparison or to orderly cumulation” (George and Bennett 2005, 68). These
studies were thus descriptive and monographic instead of theory-oriented. As a result, enthusiasm for case study research and analysis faded.

In response, the method of structured-focused comparison was developed in the 1970s. It provided general guidelines for qualitative case studies to follow as to yield more “scientific” results. Three requirements are highlighted (George and Bennett 2005, 69). First, the investigator should clearly identify the universe of which a single case or group of cases to be studied are instances. Second, a well-defined research objective and appropriate research strategy to achieve that objective should guide the selection and analysis of a single case or several cases within the class or subclass of the phenomenon under investigation. Cases should not be chosen simply because they are “interesting” or because ample data exist for studying them. Third, case studies should employ variables of theoretical interest for purposes of explanation. These should include variables that provide some leverage for policymakers to enable them to influence outcomes (George and Bennett 2005, 69).

By using a set of general questions, the phenomenon under analysis can be examined across multiple cases in a comparable manner. This is beneficial for future research, as the model can be emulated in other studies. As George and Bennett (2005, 70) note, “[i]t is important for researchers to build self-consciously upon previous studies and variable definitions as much as possible—including studies using formal, statistical, and qualitative methods. ‘Situating’ one’s research in the context of the literature is key to identifying the contribution the new research makes.” The structured-focused comparison method has not yet been utilized by studies on NGO insecurity.

14 As mentioned in the previous section, this continues to be the case in the contemporary humanitarian security literature.
The questions formulated for structured comparison in this dissertation emphasize the motivations for, and locations of, attacks. Studies in the existing literature have merely assessed the total number of attacks that occur in respective contexts, without taking into account whether these are politically- or criminally- motivated. This is a major shortcoming in the literature, and one which partially constrained the quantitative analyses in chapter three. Aid workers have experienced an increase in attacks in recent decades, and most analyses simply assume these are influenced by political factors. However, unstable and conflict-ridden societies may also breed elements of criminality. Be they professional criminals, or individuals forced to resort to such actions out of necessity, the criminal element has yet to be assessed. This is largely due to the lack of information on motivations of attacks. To fill this gap, a content analyses is conducted across all four cases to answer the set of questions presented in table 10.

**Table 10 Structured-Focused Comparison Questions**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong></td>
<td>Were attacks against aid workers the result of a group excluded from, or dominated by, the political process (i.e. politically-motivated)? Were attacks against aid workers the result of criminal activity conducted by individuals not affiliated with a competing political faction (i.e. criminally-motivated)? Or were aid workers collaterals in indirect attacks (i.e. not targeted)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong></td>
<td>Where did attacks against aid workers occur (NGO compound, in-transit, project site, or public area)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 Process Tracing

Identifying the potential causes of an outcome is necessary for understanding the complexity of the phenomenon under study. To complement the structured-focused comparison, this dissertation also uses the method of “process tracing.” Process tracing is “the examination of ‘diagnostic’ pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses” (Bennett 2010, 2). The essence of process tracing is that researchers want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables and outcomes (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 1). The method is well-suited for testing theories when it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or three variables (George and Bennett 2005, 206).

For the method to be most effective, it is critical to not only look for events preceding an outcome that connect the two, but also explain how the two are connected (George and McKeown 1985). Process tracing moves backward from observed outcomes to potential causes, and forward from hypothesized causes to subsequent outcomes. This procedure allows researchers to uncover variables they have not previously considered. The method can provide inferential leverage on two problems that are difficult to address through statistical analysis alone. First is to establish causal direction. If X and Y are correlated, did X cause Y, or did Y cause X? The second is potential spuriousness. If X and Y are correlated, is this because X caused Y, or is it because some third variable Z caused both X and Y?

Process tracing is also useful for resolving the problem of equifinality, or similar outcomes occurring through different causal processes. According to Bennett and George (1997), the method “forces the investigator to take equifinality into account, and it offers the possibility of mapping out one or more potential causal paths that are consistent with the outcome and the
process tracing evidence in a single case. With more cases, the investigator can begin to chart out
the repertoire of causal paths that lead to a given outcome and the conditions under which they
obtain.”

Although the process tracing method can take several different forms (Beach and
Pedersen 2013; Collier 2011; Gerring 2001; George and Bennett 2005; King, Keohane, and
Verba 1994), this dissertation utilizes the critical antecedent approach introduced by Slater and
Simmons (2010).15 Acknowledging the “historic turn” that political science has been undergoing
in recent years, Slater and Simmons (2010, 886-887) note that political scientists “increasingly
recognize that [the] biggest ‘why’ questions cannot be adequately answered without careful
attention to the question of ‘when.’” They argue that many researchers focus on a specific event,
or “critical juncture,” when cases began to diverge in path dependent ways, but fail to examine
the process leading up to this point. By assigning all causation to a critical juncture, causative
possibilities are severely limited.

Slater and Simmons (2010, 887) contend that, in many instances, “factors or conditions
preceding a critical juncture combine in a causal sequence with factors during a critical juncture
to produce divergent long-term outcomes. These critical antecedents shape the choices and
changes that emerge during critical junctures in causally significant ways.” To assess the impact
of critical antecedents preceding critical junctures, they specify a systematic process for
historical regress (see figure 4.1). The framework does not necessarily require the researcher to
specify each particular event as important, but rather indicate the significance through the level
of explanation given to an event in order to explain the outcome of interest. Although several
events that have occurred may be indirectly related to a critical juncture, it is stressed that

15 For examples of case studies that have utilized this method, see Danzell (2011) and Pfannenstiel (2015).
emphasis on these events should be limited. The method thus provides a concentrated structure to traditional historical process tracing.

**Figure 4.1 Critical Antecedents and Critical Junctures**

The following chapters apply the two approaches to three positive cases and one negative case. These cases were considered “high-risk” for a minimum of five years between 2000 and 2014. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia are positive cases because there were high levels of violence against aid workers during the period under study, while Colombia is a negative case because relatively minimal aid workers came under attack in that country. Chapter five discusses Afghanistan. The next three chapters cover Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia, respectively.
Chapter 5 - Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a land-locked country located in southern Asia made up of 34 provinces. Its total area is 637,397 square kilometers, approximately six times the size of Virginia and slightly smaller than Texas (Nyrop and Seekins 1986, 78). The country shares its borders with Pakistan, Tajikistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China. Although there are plains in the north and southwest, Afghanistan’s terrain is predominately rugged mountains that traverse the center of the country in a northeast-southwest direction. Of the country’s total land area, over 49 percent lies above 2,000 meters (Nyrop and Seekins 1986, 78). The primary ethnic groups within the country are Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek. As of 2014, the population was 31.6 million (World Bank 2016), 99.8 percent of which are Muslim (Pew 2011a).

The current political structure is a democratic Islamic republic, which arose after the removal of the Taliban in mid-November 2001. The government is comprised of three branches: executive, legislative and judiciary (Pajhwok 2014). The National Assembly is a bicameral legislative body comprising of two chambers: the upper house Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) and the lower house Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) (Pajhwok 2014).

This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 5.1 provides a brief history of the country and section 5.2 is an overview of the most recent conflicts. Section 5.3 is an overview of attacks against aid workers that occurred between 2000 and 2014. This section also answers the structured-focused comparison questions presented in chapter four. Section 5.4 uses the process tracing method to determine the critical antecedents and critical juncture that influenced these attacks. Section 5.5 is a summary and discussion of findings.
5.1 A Brief History of Afghanistan (1747-1978)

Dating the instrumentalities of the Afghan state is the subject of debate (Maley 2002, 11-12). Some scholars point to 1747 (Adamec 1974; Rasanayagam 2003), when Ahmad Khan Abdali assembled a tribal confederation independent of the Safavid dynasty in Persia and the Mughals in India. However, the Abdali-led confederation was less of a state and more of a loose alliance of tribes that shared a strong Pashtun cultural identity (Rasanayagam 2003, xv). Domestic institutions were weak, boundaries remained in flux, and the confederation was in continuous dispute with powerful tribal khans (Ghani 1983).

Others observe that 1826 laid the foundation for the modern nation-state (Noelle 1998), when Dost Mohammad Khan of the Muhammadzai clan became the Emir of Afghanistan. During this period, British General Sir Henry Rawlinson observed the following about the Afghan state: “The nation consists of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal power and divergent habits, which are held together, more or less loosely, according to the personal character of the chief who rules them. The feeling of patriotism, as known in Europe, cannot exist among Afghans, for there is no common country” (quoted in Arney 1990, 7). Khan began to change this by strengthening domestic institutions and establishing a system of tax collection (Noelle 1998).

However, Dost Mohammad Khan was removed from power during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842). With Russian military support, the Persians attempted to retake Herat in 1838. Fearing Russian ambitions in the region—which they believed could threaten their interests in India—the British militarily occupied Kabul from 1839 to 1842, and replaced Dost Mohammad Khan with Shah Shuja. The reason for the change in power was that the British believed Shah Shuja could more easily be influenced and controlled than Dost Mohammed
Khan, who was exiled to Mussoorie, India. The military expedition was futile and disastrous, and the British were ultimately forced to retreat to Jalalabad (Rasanayagam 2003, xvii).

Following the murder of Shah Shuja in 1842, Dost Mohammad Khan was restored to his former position. He expanded Afghan territory in 1850 after conquering Balkh, and again in 1854 when he captured Kandahar. His son Sher Ali Khan seized power following his death in 1863, but was ousted by his older brother, Mohammad Afzal Khan, shortly thereafter. As the elder brother, Mohammad Afzal Khan believed that he was entitled to the throne, which eventually resulted in warfare between the siblings until Sher Ali Khan regained control in 1868. Although he was able to strengthen and expand state institutions during his reign from 1868 to 1879, these were not strong enough to survive the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) (Maley 2002, 11-12).

In 1878, Russia sent an uninvited diplomatic mission to Kabul, prompting London to demand Afghanistan also accept a British mission. Sher Ali Khan had unsuccessfully attempted to keep the Russians out, and outright refused the British offer. Although London nonetheless dispatched a mission to Kabul, it was stopped and turned back as it approached the Khyber Pass. This ultimately triggered the Second Anglo-Afghan War (Barthorp 2002, 66-67). British troops invaded Afghanistan in November 1878, and by early 1879 Sher Ali Khan had fled the country, installing his son, Yaqub Khan, as regent. Once the British took control of Kabul, they compelled Yaqub Khan to sign the Treaty of Gandamak, which committed future emirs to “conduct all relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government” (Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 90). The triumph only lasted a few months before an Afghan uprising resulted in the murder of the British envoy and his escort, prompting British
troops to reoccupy Kabul. Yaqub Khan abdicated the throne in late 1879, which remained vacant until Amir Abdul Rahman Kahn became emir the following year.

Many believe that the foundation of the modern Afghan state was established during the reign of Amir Abdul Rahman Kahn (1880-1901). He was the first to establish a bureaucratic government within Afghanistan, subordinate several internal power holders to a dominant central authority, and forcefully resettle large numbers of Pashtuns amidst non-Pashtun populations (Maley 2002, 12). However, this process was an extremely bloody one. It was continuous warfare during his reign, and rebellions were put down by mass executions and deportations. Amir Abdul Rahman Kahn himself described his task as putting “in order all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers and cut-throats. This necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule” (quoted in Rasanayagam 2003, 11).

Amir Abdul Rahman Kahn agreed to only have diplomatic relations with the government of British India, and he adhered to militant independence and defensive isolationism (Adamec 1974, 3). This continued under the rule of his son, Habibullah Khan (1901-1919), who assumed power after his father’s death in 1901. Following the outbreak of World War I (1914-1918), there was widespread support within Afghanistan for Ottoman Turkey against the British. Habibullah Khan was able to maintain neutrality and noninvolvement during the war, but this ultimately resulted in his assassination by an anti-British faction in 1919. His son, Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), assumed the throne shortly thereafter. The new emir publicly espoused democratic ideals and called for significant governmental reforms. Furthermore, in his coronation address, he declared that Afghanistan would no longer abide by the Treaty of Gandamak. However, Amanullah Khan faced resistance from conservatives within the country.
who were opposed to his calls for reform. By April 1919 he had reached the conclusion that there was no way to placate conservatives, which were threatening his hold on power. Internal political difficulties, coupled with the rising civil unrest in India following the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre,\textsuperscript{16} prompted the emir to engage in diversionary war by invading British India in May 1919. This began the Third Anglo-Afghan War (Barthrop 2002, 150-151).

The war only lasted for three months, and the outcome is disputed. It has been argued that the result of the war was a tactical victory for the British and a strategic victory for the Afghans (Barthrop 2002, 157). The British were able to drive the Afghans from Indian territory while conducting a successful bombing campaign within Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Afghans were able to gain control of their own foreign affairs and emerged as a fully independent state in the aftermath of the conflict. This period of independence coincided with the beginning of global decolonization in the aftermath of World War I (Magnus and Naby 2002, 40-41).

Amanullah Khan implemented several judicial and political reforms shortly thereafter, including the First Constitution of Afghanistan in 1923. However, his movement unraveled when a Tajik rebellion overtook Kabul (Runion 2007, 92). Although Tajik rule only lasted for 10 months between January and October 1929, Amanullah Khan was forced into exile in Italy, where he remained until his death in 1960. Tajik rule came to an end after Pashtuns rebelled, and Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933) subsequently took the throne. The new king abolished many of the reforms implemented by his predecessor, and severely limited the rights to free

\textsuperscript{16} The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre occurred on 13 April 1919. Several civilians were participating in the annual Baisakhi celebrations—a Punjabi religious festival—when they were fired upon by the British Indian Army for approximately ten minutes. Many of the civilians were unaware that martial law had been imposed. The British government estimates placed the dead at 379 and 1,200 wounded. This stunned the nation and resulted in a significant loss of faith in British rule among the population (Metcalf and Metcalf 2006, 169).
speech. This resulted in the imprisonment and execution of thousands of Afghan intellectuals. In response, he was shot and killed in 1933 by an Afghan student, Abdul Kahaliq Hazara, who was displeased with the state of Afghanistan (Runion 2007, 91-93).

Mohammad Nadir Shah’s son, Mohammed Zahir Shah (1933-1973), took control upon his father’s death in 1933. Referred to as the “Father of the Nation,” Mohammed Zahir Shah assumed the throne at the age of 19 and was the final king of Afghanistan (Runion 2007, 93-94). Although he largely ceded power to his paternal uncles during the first decades of his rule, Afghanistan’s relations with the international community grew considerably during this period. For example, Afghanistan joined the League of Nations in 1934, propelling the country to international status (Adamec 1974, 216-217). Shortly thereafter, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt formally recognized Afghanistan’s independence.

Although the Afghan government had formed an economic partnership with Germany in the 1930s, the country remained neutral during World War II (Runion 2007, 94). After the war was over, Afghanistan attempted to liberalize many aspects of society, including less controlled elections for the National Assembly. Yet these failed when numerous diverse parties emerged in rapid succession and overwhelmed the government, prompting a termination of all political groups in 1951. Mohammed Zahir Shah attempted to experiment with democracy again in 1964 by establishing a liberal constitution with a bicameral legislature and independent judiciary. The legislature was composed of representatives appointed in a ratio of one-third by the king, the provincial assemblies, and the Afghan people. However, the new reforms resulted in the creation of extremist political parties, including the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had strong ties to the Soviet Union (Runion 2007, 93-101).
The Afghan economy began to suffer in the early 1970s after neighboring Pakistan began to close border-crossings. This move, coupled with a severe drought, meant that Afghanistan was on the brink of crisis and ripe for popular upheaval. While the king was in London receiving medical care for a hemorrhage in one eye, Mohammed Daoud Khan (1973-1978) seized control of the government on 17 July 1973 following a nearly bloodless coup aided by the Soviet Union (Jones 2009, 11). He immediately abolished monarchical rule and eradicated the 1864 Constitution. He then claimed Afghanistan to be a republican government, and appointed himself as president. A new constitution was ratified the following year implementing a presidential system of government. However, Mohammed Daoud Khan’s relationship with the Soviet Union steadily declined during his five years in power. Although he had conducted a successful coup with the assistance of the Soviets, once president he shifted this politics away from communism (Runion 2007, 101-102). This eventually resulted in his downfall.

5.2 Modern Conflict (1978-Present)

The Marxist coup of 1978 propelled Afghanistan into a seemingly perpetual state of violent struggle. The country has since experienced three major conflicts. The first from 1978 to 1989, the second from 1989 to 2001, and the third from 2001 to present day (Maley 2002, 1-2). This chapter assesses NGO insecurity during the third conflict that occurred following the US-led intervention and overthrow of the Taliban. However, it is important to understand the first and second conflicts, as the seeds of the most recent conflict were planted during these periods.

On 17 April 1978, a leading Communist activist and PDPA member, Mir Akbar Khyber, was assassinated outside his home. Many PDPA members believed that the hit was orchestrated and carried out by the government. In response, approximately 15,000 demonstrators joined his
funeral procession demanding justice. President Mohammed Daoud Khan responded to the
demonstrations by arresting Marxist leaders, but this resulted in a violent response (Jones 2009, 12). Ten days later, revolutionaries trained and financed by the Soviet Union overthrew the
government. In what became known as the Saur Revolution, the PDPA implemented communist rule and reasserted Soviet influence over Afghanistan. Within 24 hours, President Mohammed Daoud Khan and his family were executed and the PDPA assumed control (Runion 2007, 103).

Strong military and economic ties were formed with the Soviet Union in an effort to modernize Afghanistan under the new regime, and sweeping reforms were implemented throughout the country. Ruling by decrees, the new government began to take land from owners and redistribute it among the country’s poor. Women were also given rights. Not only were forced marriages banned, but women were also allowed to attend school and obtain jobs. As Marxist rule began to supplant traditional religious laws, much of the population began to perceive the reforms as an attack against Islam (Runion 2007, 107). Violent Islamic resistance fighters—identifying themselves as mujahedeen (those who wage jihad)—formed in protest of the changes, particularly in the countryside. On 3 July 1979, US President Jimmy Carter authorized a covert program to finance the mujahedeen’s operations (Meher 2004, 68-69).

In response, the new regime embarked upon a reign of terror, arresting and executing those who opposed the government. This prompted a backlash. A month-long rebellion ensued in Herat Province, in which Afghans slaughtered over 100 Soviet advisers (Runion 2007, 107-109). This was followed by several months of revolts by various tribes throughout Afghanistan. The popular upheaval caused concern for Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, who believed that Afghan President Hafizullah Amin had erroneously over-extended his power. Following a botched assassination attempt on Amin that was orchestrated by the Soviets, the Afghan
President scrambled for support both within and outside of his country (Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 150-152).

In an effort to make amends with the population, Amin endeavored to implement a new constitution while offering amnesty for refugees returning to the country. However, during these efforts he hastily drafted a list of 12,000 prisoners who had been killed by the government since the Saur Revolution (Runion 2007, 109-110). Although he was attempting to console the families of those prisoners who had been executed, the move only further angered Afghan citizens because it was an official recognition of the government’s atrocities. Another backlash ensued, and by December 1979 the country was in turmoil. Fearing a possible Amin-Western alliance and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism across the border, the Soviet Union ultimately decided to deploy troops to Afghanistan (Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 152-155). Soviet planes continuously landed at Kabul airport on 24 December and troops overtook the capital three days later. Amin was captured and executed on 27 December. By 1 January 1980, over 50,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 military vehicles had been deployed to Afghanistan (Runion 2007, 110). Over the next month, troop levels increased to 85,000 (Runion 2007, 110).

In response to the Soviet invasion, the mujahideen immediately took up arms in an effort to expel the Soviets, who they viewed as a threat to their religious culture and way of life. Although Soviet troops were able to quickly gain control of Kabul, the mujahideen held about 85 percent of the countryside and other large cities (Amstutz 1986, 127). Soviet units could penetrate to any part of the country, but when they withdrew the insurgents resumed control. Militarily, the situation was a standoff in the early 1980s—a remarkable achievement for the mujahideen who lacked formal military training and were facing an enemy with total aid control and overwhelmingly superior firepower (Amstutz 1986, 127-128).
The United States continued to provide covert assistance to the mujahedeen in support of their fight against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. US President Jimmy Carter claimed on 8 January 1980 that “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War” (Carter 1980). The US moved quickly to form alliances with various countries in the region in January 1980, including Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia matched US financial assistance to the resistance fighters, Egypt became the primary military supplier, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency provided weapons and training (Nojumi 2008, 90-91).

Although the US provided funding for weapons, they largely did so through the Pakistani ISI, which dictated how these were distributed. This was at the request of Pakistani President Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq, who informed the US in January 1980 that all arms supplies, finance, and training of the mujahedeen was to be provided through Pakistan and not directly from the CIA (Cooley 2000, 55). The mujahedeen were not a homogenous group, and many factions within the movement fought each other between engagements with the Soviets (Dick 2002, 2). The Pakistanis therefore diverted US funding to the groups perceived to be most aligned with their interests. The ISI supported extremist mujahedeen factions at the expense of moderate and pro-democracy Afghan national groups. These militant Islamist factions were given free rein over the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan from 1980 on, which were used to spread their ideological beliefs and recruit fighters (Nojumi 2008, 91-95). The Afghan refugee population was massive across the country’s eastern border. In 1979 Pakistan was home to 80,000 Afghan refugees, yet this figure increased exponentially to 750,000 the following year, and to nearly 4 million by 1984 (Runion 2007, 111).
A similar recruitment and training process was carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran, a country that housed approximately two million Afghan refugees in 1981 (Runion 2007, 111). In fact, the only way Afghans were able to maintain their refugee status within Iran was by pledging allegiance to one of the Afghan Islamist groups authorized by Tehran\(^\text{17}\) (Nojumi 2008, 93-96). It was not uncommon for part-time mujahedeen soldiers to return to the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran during lulls in the fighting (Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 171), a tactic that would be replicated following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Wealthy individuals also offered their assistance to the fight. Saudi businessman Osama bin Laden became a significant supporter of the mujahedeen movement beginning in early 1980, providing money, weapons, training, and additional Islamic fighters from outside the country (Runion 2007, 112). The fighting continued for five years before the major mujahedeen factions united to form the Seven Party Mujahedeen Alliance in May 1985, also known as the Peshawar Seven. This unification morphed into the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedeen, a party comprised of two sects: traditionalists (three groups) and Islamists (four groups) (Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 173).\(^\text{18}\) Traditionalists sought to overthrow the communist regime, but had no political program of their own. Islamists supported the establishment of a theocratic government. Soon after its formation, the alliance coordinated its efforts through numerous attacks on the Soviets, leveling mass casualties. It has been estimated that as many as 800 rockets were launched on Soviet targets per day (Runion 2007, 114).

\(^{17}\) Authorized Afghan Islamist groups included Hizb-e Islami and Jamiat-e Islami.

\(^{18}\) Traditionalists included the National Islamic Front for Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Liberation Front, and Revolutionary Islamic Movement. Islamists included Hezb-e Islami Khalis, Hezbi Islami, Jamiat-e Islami, and Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan.
After assuming leadership in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev sought a way to disengage militarily from the country. In July 1986 he gave a speech signaling his intentions to withdraw six regiments by the end of the year, but it was largely met with skepticism (Maley 2002, 126; Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 169-170). However, as the war dragged on and casualties mounted, support within the Soviet Union faded. It was not until 15 May 1988 when the Soviet government began a withdrawal of troops, with the final units leaving on 15 February 1989. Sensing an opportunity when the Soviets began their withdrawal, Osama bin Laden formed al-Qaeda in Peshawar in August 1988 to spearhead the efforts in Afghanistan into a global Islamic advancement (Jones 2009, 73).

Although the total number of Soviet troops within Afghanistan at a given time peaked at approximately 100,000, more than 620,000 served in the country between December 1979 and February 1989 (Runion 2007, 115). Of those, 14,453 troops were killed and 469,000 were either wounded or fell ill. Meanwhile, the mujahedeen suffering fatalities ranging from one million to 1.5 million, with tens of thousands more seriously wounded (Runion 2007, 115).

The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 marked the beginning of the second phase of recent conflict in Afghanistan. This period witnessed a continuous civil war that occurred in three sub-phases: 1989 to 1992, 1992 to 1996, and 1996 to 2001. The first of these began immediately after Soviet forces left in February 1989, leaving the communist government to militarily defend itself against the mujahedeen. However, although troops had withdrawn, the Soviets continued to support the Afghan government with billions of dollars in aid. This enabled the government to fend off the mujahedeen for a few years before finally succumbing to the insurgents in April 1992, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Runion 2007, 115-116).
The Republic of Afghanistan was renamed the Islamic State of Afghanistan on 18 April 1992. However, the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedeen could not remain unified after taking control. Internal political disagreements resulted in the outbreak of another civil war, this time between traditionalist and Islamist factions. This was further exacerbated by the return of millions of refugees from Pakistan and Iran, most of whom were living in abject poverty. The fracturing of the mujahedeen resulted in the advent of “warlordism” in Afghanistan. In the absence of a strong central government, Mujahedeen military leaders with personal militias accumulated immense power in different parts of the country (Giustozzi 2009; Kaphle 2015). However, Western financial support had ceased following the Soviet withdrawal. Financial constraints led many warlords to embrace poppy cultivation as a primary means of funding their militaries (UNODC 2003, 12-13, 69). The opium trade became an integral part of Afghanistan’s war economy, with production increasing from 200 metric tons in 1980 to 2,000 metric tons in 1992 (UNODC 2003, 6). By 1994, opium production in the country had reached approximately 3,500 metric tons (UNODC 2003, 6).

It is estimated that 50,000 civilians were killed in Kabul alone between 1992 and 1996 (Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 229). Widespread disorder gave rise to the Taliban (meaning “students” in Pashto) movement in the spring of 1994. The Islamist movement was led by

19 “Warlordism” is characterized by a power struggle between the center and the periphery. In the case of Afghanistan, the center was unable to strengthen its power in the periphery, while the periphery gained the ability to impose its interests on the center. Schetter and Glassner (2012) refer to this as development as the “peripherization of the center” in Afghanistan.

20 Some of the most prominent warlords included Mullah Dadullah, Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammed Qaseem Fahim, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Ahmed Shah Massoud, Atta Mohammad Noor, Mohammed Omar, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, and Gul Agha Sherzai. For more information about these individuals, see Kaphle 2015.
veteran mujahedeen commander and ethnic Pashtun Mullah Muhammad Omar, and had as its goal the implementation of strict Islamic rule in Afghanistan. Although Omar was only a relatively small-time commander in the mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation, a localized uprising he led against warlords in Kandahar in 1994 earned him widespread respect among Islamist leaders in the country. This is often regarded as the catalyst for the Taliban movement that followed (Reuters 2011; BBC 2015b).

In an effort to form alliance between the Taliban and his al-Qaeda organization, Osama bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan on 18 May 1996. Welcoming bin Laden, the Taliban allowed him to establish terrorist training camps for al-Qaeda in southern Afghanistan in exchange for millions of dollars. It is believed that Omar took bin Laden’s eldest daughter as a wife, and that bin Laden may have taken one of Omar’s daughters as a fourth wife (BBC 2015b)

Recruit and support for the Taliban was helped by the fact that millions of refugees returning from neighboring Iran and Pakistan had undergone years of indoctrination in Islamist ideology (Nojumi 2008, 97-100). The vast majority of the Taliban were Pashtuns from the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. With chaos erupting across its border, the Pakistani government and ISI aligned itself with the Taliban, providing training, weapons, and supplies to the movement. On 27 September 1996, the Taliban had seized Kabul and taken control of the government (Runion 2007, 120-121).  

As Maley (2002, 232) has noted, the Taliban were above all an anti-modernist movement. Reversing the reforms brought about by the Saur Revolution, women were now required to have a male blood relative accompany them outside the home, wear burqas in public,

\footnote{For an overview of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan during this period, see Davis (1998) and Maley (2002, 218-250).}
and banned from attending schools or obtaining employment. The rule was so extreme that in one instance a woman briefly exposed her hand while walking, revealing nail polish on her fingertips. As a result, several Taliban men cut off her fingers (Runion 2007, 121-124). The regime also instituted media bans on music, photography, televisions, VCRs, and satellite dishes, while unleashing thousands of religious police to enforce these rules. Public beatings, executions, amputations, and stonings became commonplace (Nojumi 2008, 109; Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 218).

The al-Qaeda training camps established by bin Laden provided terrorists with knowledge in how to carry out attacks on Western targets, efforts which culminated in the 7 August 1998 American Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. Although bin Laden was indicted for these attacks by a US criminal court, the Taliban protected him from extradition (Runion 2007, 126-127). In response, President Bill Clinton ordered US forces to carry out airstrikes on the training camps on 20 August 1998, followed by economic sanctions against the Taliban government five days later.

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the US once again demanded that the Taliban extradite bin Laden. When the Taliban claimed that there was not enough proof of bin Laden’s involvement, the US commenced a sustained bombing campaign on the country beginning on 7 October 2001 (Murphy 2002, 243-247). This began the third phase of recent conflict in Afghanistan. Airstrikes and Special Forces operations by the US military under Operation Enduring Freedom culminated in the removal of the Taliban regime from power on 12 November 2001 (CFR 2014). Attempts to reconstruct a political order began the following month on 5 December, when a meeting was held between major (non-Taliban) Afghan factions in Bonn, Germany to develop a governing structure under the auspices
of the UN. An agreement for an interim government was reached at the meeting, followed by the UN Security Council authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist with the transition. ISAF was to help Afghanistan during this period until a new constitution could be ratified and popular elections held (CFR 2014; UNSC 2001a; UNSC 2001b).

However, the Taliban movement had gained a resurgence and was leading an insurgency throughout the country. During 2002 and 2003, Islamists fighters managed to regroup and rearm across the border in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Provinces and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Jones 2009, 101-108). In response, NATO formally took command of ISAF in August 2003. ISAF was initially authorized for a six-month period and tasked with only securing Kabul, but expanded throughout the country during 2005 and 2006 as a result of the Taliban resurgence (Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 242-243; CFR 2014; NATO 2015a).

The year 2008 was the deadliest for US and coalition troops in Afghanistan since the invasion, with more than 200 killed. This prompted US President Barrack Obama to announce on 17 February 2009 the deployment of 17,000 additional American troops during the spring and summer (New York Times 2011). On 1 December 2009 President Obama announced an additional 30,000 troop increase to the surge. However, he vowed to start bringing American forces home by the summer of 2011, claiming that the US could not afford to shoulder an open-ended commitment in the country (New York Times 2011).

22 The names of those who participated in the meeting are available in Appendix B.

23 The Constitutional Loya Jirga and Hamid Karzai approved a new constitution on 26 January 2004. The first democratically held presidential election occurred on 9 October 2004, followed by parliamentary and provincial council elections the following year on 18 September 2005.
By 2011 the US had suffered 1,800 troop casualties and spent $444 billion (CFR 2014). On 22 June 2011, President Obama ordered a troop reduction of 10,000 by the end of the year. A second Bonn Conference was held on 5 December 2011 to devise a plan for international troop withdrawal. However, an agreement was not reached, and the insurgency continued to rage across the country. On 2 February 2012, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced a plan to conclude combat missions by mid-2013, while shifting resources to a security assistance role (Alexander and Brunnstrom 2012). Afghan forces took over security responsibility from NATO in June 2013, while the coalition altered its mission to focus more on training and smaller-scale counterterrorism operations. The ISAF mission officially came to an end on 31 December 2014, yet the fighting in Afghanistan continues as of mid-2016. NATO is currently leading an advisory mission by the name of Operation Resolute Support, which began on 1 January, 2015 immediately following the end of ISAF. Approximately 12,000 personnel remain in the country as a part of this effort (NATO 2015b). Of that figure, 9,800 are US troops, most of whom will remain in Afghanistan until the end of 2016 (Obama 2014).

5.3 Insecurity of NGOs in Afghanistan, 2000-2014

Afghanistan has been the most volatile nation for NGOs to operate in over the past 15 years (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016). In total, 543 attacks occurred between 2000 and 2014, affecting 1,458 aid workers. According to figure 5.1, 717 aid workers were abducted, 377 killed, and 364 wounded. Of the aid workers abducted, 89 percent were later released, 8 percent were

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24 It is unclear exactly how many Taliban casualties there have been in Afghanistan. It was recently estimated that Taliban fatalities were between 20,000 and 35,000 during the period 2001 to 2014 (Dawi 2014).
killed, 2 percent were rescued, and 1 percent were able to escape. Those individuals who were abducted and later murdered by their captors remain under total “abducted.”

The security situation for NGOs steadily declined throughout the War in Afghanistan. As figure 5.2 shows, aid workers experienced relatively few attacks between 2000 and 2001, but beginning in 2002 incidents increased at a considerable rate. The number of aid workers attacked ranged from a low of 8 in 2000 to a high of 212 in 2014. Although attacks decreased during the 2009 to 2011 period, they increased significantly from 2011 to 2014. This coincides with the withdrawal of US troops from the country, which began in June 2011. The figure reveals that the number of aid workers killed and wounded remained consistent during the period under study. However, the abduction rate soared over time, accounting for a large portion of the total increase. The number of aid workers abducted ranged from a low of zero in 2000 to a high of 134 in 2014.

Figure 5.1 Aid Workers Attacked in Afghanistan by Attack Type, 2000-2014

Data source: AWSD (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016), Global Terrorism Database (START 2015), Intelcenter Database (Intelcenter 2015), Patronus Analytical (2009), NGO security reports, UN security reports, and content analysis of news stories.

This is due to a critical juncture that occurred in June 2002, which will be explained in greater detail in the following section.
Figure 5.2 Aid Workers Attacked in Afghanistan, 2000-2014

Data source: AWSD (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016), Global Terrorism Database (START 2015), Intelcenter Database (Intelcenter 2015), Patronus Analytical (2009), NGO security reports, UN security reports, and content analysis of news stories.

There was significant variation in attacks at the subnational level. Figure 5.3 highlights the most volatile provinces for aid workers to operate in. Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul were the most dangerous, with 165, 113, and 109 aid workers attacked respectively. Conversely, Panjshir was the only province where NGOs experienced no insecurity. Laghman, Paktika, and Bamyan were also relatively safe, with only 2, 4, and 4 aid workers attacked respectively. Figure 5.4 shows the overall NGO presence. Kabul province by far had the most organizations with 492, followed by Nangarhar with 194 and Balkh with 182. The provinces with the fewest NGOs were Nuristan with 33 and Paktika and Zabul, both with 37. Overall, NGO presence was determined to be significantly related to provincial population. Kabul, Nangarhar, and Balkh are three of the
four most populated provinces in the country, while Nuristan, Paktika, and Zabul have relatively low populations.

**Figure 5.3** Map of Aid Workers Killed, Wounded, and Abducted in Afghanistan, 2000-2014
Figure 5.4 Map of NGO Presence in Afghanistan, 2000-2014
5.3.1 Structured-Focused Comparison: Motivations and Locations

The previous section provided an overview of NGO security incidents and NGO presence in Afghanistan between 2000 and 2014. It revealed that aid workers experienced the most insecurity in Herat after the 2001 US-led invasion. This section builds upon these findings by examining the two structured-focused comparison questions. By using a set of general questions, NGO insecurity can be examined across multiple cases in a comparable manner. The questions formulated for structured comparison in this dissertation emphasize the motivations for, and locations of, attacks. The first is: were attacks against NGOs politically- or criminally-motivated? The second is: where did attacks occur at the micro-level?

To assess the first question in greater detail, a review was conducted of all news stories pertaining to NGO attacks in Afghanistan. A content analysis of these reports was used to determine whether specific attacks were politically-motivated, criminally-motivated, or collateral (not targeted). News outlets often speculated whether the motivation behind attacks were political or criminal based on subsequent statements by militant spokesmen and interviews conducted with residents living in the areas in which the events occurred. “Not targeted” attacks were instances in which aid workers were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. An example is when a US warplane bombed a remote village in Kunar believed to be housing militants. An NGO was working in the area at the time, and one of its workers was wounded in the attack (Associated Press 2004).

There has been limited discussion in the literature regarding the motivations behind attacks. According to one outlet, there is a general view held by aid workers that targeted attacks are not official tactics of organized militants, but rather the result of criminality or mistaken identity (Featherstone 2012, 5-6). This view is also echoed by the Afghanistan NGO Safety
Office (ANSO). ANSO director Nic Lee told Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) in 2010 that “We don’t believe the Taliban have a strategic intent to target NGOs” (IRIN 2010). Rather, he pointed to criminal gangs and “collateral damage” as the primary risks posed to workers in the field. Some have questioned this assertion, claiming that it could simply be a “wishful thinking” from the humanitarian community (Ferreiro 2012). However, data restrictions have impeded analysis of attack motivations to this point.

The information collected through content analysis reveals that it is in fact “wishful thinking” for NGOs to believe they are primarily victims of criminal attacks or collateral violence. Figure 5.5 shows that the majority of attacks were carried out by perpetrators with a political motive. However, this is not to downplay the significant number of aid workers targeted by criminals. In total, 932 aid workers were the victims of political attacks (64 percent), 447 of criminal attacks (31 percent), and 79 were not specifically targeted (5 percent). Figure 5.6 reveals the evolution in attack motivation over time. While the “not targeted” figures remained consistently low, political and criminal attacks varied during the period. Victims of criminally-motivated attacks spiked significantly in 2010, actually surpassing those of a political motivation for that year. However, there was a substantial drop-off in criminal attacks in 2014, and a simultaneous massive increase in political attacks. This could be due to the withdrawal of US troops from the region. Victims of politically-motivated attacks varied from a low of zero in 2000 to a high of 187 in 2014, while victims of criminally-motivated attacks varied from a low of zero in 2001 to a high of 77 in 2010. Aid workers injured or killed as the result of collateral damage (not targeted) ranged from a low of zero in 2000 and 2003, to a high of 17 in 2013.
The second structured-focused comparison question concerns the location in which attacks occurred. Although information collected for this dissertation has already revealed the provinces in which aid workers have experienced insecurity, it is also important to identify where these attacks occur at the micro-level. Following the same method used to answer the first
question, a review of local and international news events was conducted to determine where each attack occurred. This information is highlighted in **figure 5.7** and **figure 5.8**. In total, 822 aid workers were attacked in-transit (61 percent), 261 at project sites (19 percent), 216 at NGO compounds (16 percent), and 54 in public areas (4 percent). Aid workers attacked in-transit ranged from a low of zero in 2001 to a high of 146 in 2014. Aid workers attacked at a project site ranged from a low of zero in 2000, 2001, and 2004, to a high of 46 in 2011. Workers attacked at an NGO compound ranged from a low of zero in 2000 to a high of 29 in 2004. Meanwhile, those attacked in public areas ranged from a low of zero in 2000, 2003, and 2005, to a high of 13 in 2013.

The two structured-focused comparison questions reveal that aid workers operating in Afghanistan are most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit to or from project sites. These findings can help to better interpret the quantitative results presented in chapter three, which showed that NGOs were more likely to encounter attacks when engaged in large-scale projects. Given that NGOs projects are often in rural locations of Afghanistan, attackers likely prefer to target workers in-transit because of the lack of military and police presence in these areas. It is speculated that if workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, thus making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush.
5.4 Process Tracing

The following section covers specific historical events that have influenced contemporary insecurity in Afghanistan. As outlined in chapter four, Slater and Simmons’ (2010) methodology is used to identify *critical antecedents* that preceded the attacks and influenced *critical junctures*
in which the targeting of aid workers became a tactic of both militants and criminals. Given the significant number of NGOs that were victims of criminal activity in Afghanistan (31 percent of all incidents), this section covers two separate critical junctures to explain the motivation behind both political and criminal attacks.

5.4.1 Critical Antecedents

As noted previously, 543 attacks against NGOs occurred between 2000 and 2014 in Afghanistan, affecting 1,458 aid workers. However, tension between the Taliban and the NGO community existed for several years prior to the US-led intervention in 2001. Taliban militants did not begin to physically assault or murder aid workers as a tactic until the summer of 2002. Prior to this period, several incidents occurred that influenced this critical juncture. These critical antecedents are highlighted in figure 5.9 and include: (1) Taliban restrictions on NGO activities after coming to power in September 1996, (2) the expulsion of international NGOs from Afghanistan in July 1998, and (3) a shift to more politically-oriented action by the NGO community in the aftermath of the US-led intervention.

By the early 1980s, organizations started to implement cross-border programs in Afghanistan to address the basic needs of the population, yet these were limited to areas which were not under Soviet control (ACBAR 2014, 31). Although a small number of national NGOs were allowed to operate in Kabul on a restricted basis, international organizations were banned from the country (West 2001, 62). During the war, NGOs strictly focused on providing emergency assistance including food distribution, medical care, and shelter (ACBAR 2014, 31). However, many organizations expanded their activities after Soviet withdrawal in 1988 to include the sectors of education, infrastructure, vocational training, and mine clearance. NGOs
also began working in Afghan regions previously off-limits due to Soviet control. Eastern Afghanistan was the primary recipient of assistance at this time because of security concerns and the close proximity to Peshawar (Goodhand 2002, 842).

Figure 5.9 Tracing the Causal Path: Afghanistan

The Afghan government ratified a law in January 1990 formally allowing NGOs to operate within the country (Rubin 1995, 167-168). In response, organizations received substantial funding from international organizations and governments such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), UNHCR, and World Food Program (WFP) (Oliker et al. 2004, 34). The growing number of organizations and activities resulted in the formation of multiple NGO coordination bodies to increase professionalism and accountability within the community (ACBAR 2014, 31; Atmar and Goodhand 2002, 24). Perhaps the most significant of these is the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development (ACBAR), founded in 1988 and still active as of mid-2016.
Although NGOs enjoyed relative freedom of action in the early 1990s, this changed after the Taliban solidified their control over the country in September 1996. Numerous NGOs were forced to flee back to Pakistan during the Taliban period (1996-2001), while those that remained had their activities significantly restricted. Consistent with their broader constraints on women’s rights, the Taliban government significantly limited female access to NGOs after taking control in late 1996\(^\text{26}\) (McDonald 2000). Under Taliban rule, women were not allowed to be in contact with men who were not their husbands or blood relatives. Since women were no longer allowed to work for NGOs, this limited female access to humanitarian relief considerably. Organizations were also restricted from providing assistance to females, including a total ban on education for girls.

The Taliban also prohibited NGOs from engaging in politically-oriented activity, believing this posed a threat to their strict Islamic vision for society. Although a few organizations attempted to engage in human rights advocacy and peacebuilding during this period, the vast majority focused their efforts on emergency relief programs. However, tensions and inconsistencies began to arise within the aid community at this time. An OECD report on development assistance to Afghanistan during the Taliban period noted the following:

[T]he aid community wants its aid to be only humanitarian, yet conditional in respecting human rights, whilst also upholding the right to humanitarian assistance. As a matter of policy, the aid community is stuck in the dilemma of a development crisis and human rights crisis: the human rights crisis suggests that aid be reduced to what is “life-saving” only, the development crisis suggests that aid be mobilized for community development and local peace-building (OECD 2002, 5).

Johnson and Leslie (2004, 64-65) reveal that “[n]ot only were there many different sets of principles…but there was no agreement as to what took precedence when principles came into

\(^{26}\) They would later issue an official edict banning all females from working for NGOs in July 2000.
contradiction. Was the imperative, for example, to provide humanitarian assistance or to support women’s rights?”

Although several NGOs claimed to be committed to the promotion of human rights and peacebuilding, this was rarely put into action under Taliban rule. Rieff (2002, 249-250) claims that these statements were “pure rhetoric, designed, it seemed, to make aid workers, their donors, and the general public feel better.” He believes that “a serious commitment to humanitarian relief and a serious commitment to human rights, as long as the Taliban remained in power, were irreconcilable, and every relief worker knew it.” Writing shortly before the fall of the Taliban, Atmar and Goodhand (2002, 62-63) observed that “there is the perception that aid has shifted from being needs driven to increasingly politically driven…In reality, the vast majority of funding in Afghanistan still goes to life saving, relief programs.”

The Taliban government was wary of NGOs engaged in political activity, but they were especially suspicious of international organizations because of their Western origin. In 1998, 38 international NGOs were expelled and banned from operating in the country, while many others withdrew because of the harsh restrictions imposed on their activities (Josselin and Wallace 2001, 10; Monshipouri 2003, 140; West 2001, 131). For example, in April 1997 Oxfam suspended a water-supply project in Logar Province to protest the Taliban’s policies toward women (Oxfam 1997). In addition to Taliban expulsions and voluntary withdrawals from the country, NGO donors were also calling for disengagement during this period. Following the US airstrikes in August 1998, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO) ceased assistance to organizations, while the United Kingdom ruled that any international NGO sending expatriate staff to the country would automatically be disqualified from government funding (Atmar 2001, 2; Marsden 2009, 93).
The Taliban were especially harsh on NGOs adhering to the Christian faith, although crackdowns did not become commonplace until 2001 (prior to the US-led invasion). For example, in August 2001, 16 local and 8 international employees of Shelter Now International—a Christian NGO—were arrested by the Taliban for distributing “religious propaganda” (CNN 2001; Guardian 2001). In a separate instance a month later, the Taliban raided the offices of two Christian organizations, International Assistance Mission (IAM) and Serve International, and arrested several of their employees. The NGOs were then ordered to close their offices and leave the country (Salahuddin 2001).

Although a limited number of international workers remained operative in Afghanistan during 2001, virtually all relocated to Pakistan following the 9/11 attacks in anticipation of retaliatory military action (Oliker et al. 2004, 37). In a strategy referred to as “remote management,” most international NGOs transferred their projects to local Afghan employees at this time. The flight of these organizations in September 2001, coupled with the mass exodus of NGOs from Afghanistan over the previous six years, meant that the primary distribution network for humanitarian assistance was essentially nonfunctional once Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) commenced on 7 October 2001 (Oliker et al. 2004, 26). In response, the US military began to build its own systems for aid delivery. Simultaneously engaging in relief and development operations during major combat operations was a unique endeavor for military forces, as civil affairs units typically did not enter the theater until the post-conflict phase (Oliker et al. 2004, 48). However, a shortage of NGOs in Afghanistan in late 2001 meant that the US military was one of the few entities capable of providing humanitarian relief to conflict-ridden areas of the country.
The civil affairs mission began in December 2001 with the creation of the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) in Kabul (Neumann, Mundey, and Mikolashek 2005, 32). Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) and Joint Regional Teams (JRTs) were formed to provide relief to communities in need (Neumann, Mundey, and Mikolashek 2005; Steward 2004; Wright et al. 2010). These were the precursors to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) initiative, which took the lead in military development operations in 2003.

NGOs began a piecemeal return to Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002 as the security situation allowed (Wright et al. 2010, 194). However, their activities during this period closely paralleled those of the UN. This was not voluntary, but rather a condition: UN-funded NGOs are often required to take guidance on security and movements from UNSECOORD if they are to acquire insurance for their organizations (Oliker et al. 2004, 54-55). As a result, several international NGOs reentered Afghanistan on a rolling basis, and were initially restricted to operating in less hostile regions of the country. Military personnel have argued that many of their civil affairs efforts in the aftermath of the war were focused on areas where NGOs were unable or unwilling to go because of these restrictions (Oliker et al. 2004, 74).

Due in part to NGO restrictions, the military continued to provide humanitarian relief. Although their physical presence was largely restricted in 2001 and 2002, many NGOs expanded the scope of their activities at this time. Several organizations began to couple their traditional emergency response activity with broader development initiatives (ACBAR 2014, 32). These included human rights promotion, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution—action that many NGOs wanted to engage in under the Taliban, but were restricted from doing so. Rieff (2002, 250-251) has suggested that the only way to move into these areas of activity “was for an outside...
event to change the conditions under which the agencies worked. That deus ex machina was the American attack on Afghanistan…The dream of a new humanitarian order was particularly powerful in the context of Afghanistan, where humanitarian action alone would never do enough to ease the sufferings of the people.” This view was echoed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who stated that he would “like to concentrate more on removing the causes of humanitarian difficulties rather than treating the symptoms” (IRIN 2003a).

The shift to greater political action by NGOs in Afghanistan was also donor-driven. In an effort to help rebuild the country, governments and international organizations increased funds for projects related to nation-building. In the early stages of the conflict, the Asian Development Bank, UNDP, and World Bank conducted a joint needs assessment in Afghanistan. In part, this report called for a “moderate scaling up of NGO programs, while achieving a *phased change in the role of NGOs* from implementing agencies to facilitators of participatory community development, clearly accountable to government and/or communities” [emphasis added] (ADB, UNDP, and World Bank 2002, 19). Similarly, USAID claimed that the agency “will work with Afghan NGOs to help build a dynamic Afghan civil society that can hold policy makers accountable, promote democratic principles, and engage as full partners with the government and the private sector in the economic and *political development of Afghanistan*” [emphasis added] (USAID 2005, 10).

In sum, three *critical antecedents* preceded the Taliban’s decision to deliberately attack NGOs: (1) Taliban restrictions on NGO activities after coming to power in September 1996, (2) the expulsion of international NGOs from Afghanistan in July 1998, and (3) a shift to more politically-oriented action by the NGO community in the aftermath of the US-led intervention.
However, as the following section will reveal, NGO security did not significantly decrease until two critical junctures occurred in mid-2002.

5.4.2 Critical Junctures

Each of the preceding critical antecedents created an environment in which aid workers were likely to experience insecurity. However, two critical junctures occurred in 2002: one that influenced political attacks and another that influenced criminal attacks. These events are outlined in the following subsections.

5.4.2.1 Political Critical Juncture

The Taliban were wary of NGOs when they were in power, but this distrust was exacerbated following the US-led intervention. The political critical juncture that influenced politically-motivated attacks against aid workers occurred in mid-2002 when the NGO community called for an expansion of ISAF’s mandate beyond Kabul in order to strengthen the central government. Many of these organizations claimed to be independent, impartial, and neutral actors, yet their outspoken support for a competing combatant faction signaled to the Taliban that they were aligned against them.

These calls began in June 2002 following a string of attacks over a weeklong period in Balkh Province. An international health clinic was attacked by gunmen in Sholgara on 6 June, a female aid worker was gang-raped two days later en route to work, and a food supply truck heading to a refugee camp outside of Mazar-e-Sharif was fired upon on 14 June. There were also numerous robberies and lootings of NGO offices in the region over the same period. In response, international aid groups pleaded for ISAF to expand its reach, noting that, if left unchecked, “the
violence will threaten the work of aid groups, *undermine the stability of the new government of President Hamid Karzai* and jeopardize billions of dollars in foreign aid needed to rebuild Afghanistan after two decades of war” [emphasis added] (Associated Press 2002).

Meanwhile, ISAF was restricted by its UN mandate to only securing the capital of Kabul. “This country needs a foreign army right now because it does not have a national army…We have been advocating for an extension of ISAF to volatile parts of Afghanistan,” stated the head of ACBAR (IRIN 2002). The regional director of CARE claimed that “We’re at a critical juncture now. Without security we won’t get development aid, and that’s necessary for stability” (Associated Press 2002). “Without international forces—both [ISAF] and the American special forces—there will be no peace for sure,” pleaded a People in Need Foundation Director (Sobieraj 2002). InterAction, an umbrella group of some 160 NGOs, also called for an expansion of ISAF activity (Lobe 2002). In June 2002, the Afghanistan program director for Save the Children US stated that “We do feel it’s important for the international community to *support the government*” [emphasis added] (Associated Press 2002).

These statements from the aid community were hardly neutral or impartial, and were likely perceived by the Taliban as supportive of ISAF and American efforts. They also coincided with calls by President Karzai for US forces to provide security outside Kabul in major population centers like Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, and Kandahar (Dao 2002). However, the Bush Administration resisted ISAF expansion throughout 2002, fearful that its operations might interfere with US efforts to track down Taliban units (Lobe 2002). The US military was coordinating their activities outside of Kabul with regional warlords at the time, many of whom served as provincial governors (Zucchino 2002). Therefore, in response to the recommendations by NGOs and Karzai, the US decided to send additional civil affairs soldiers to Afghanistan in
November 2002 to assist with relief and development projects (Dao 2002). The ISAF peacekeeping mission did not expand its reach, as no coalition nations offered to provide additional troops (Lederer 2002).

Many NGOs were opposed to the decision to expand US civil affairs engagements, believing that military forces should be limited to providing security for civilian actors delivering humanitarian relief. Organizations were afraid that they would be identified with the US military if soldiers continued to be involved in providing similar assistance, which would ultimately compromise their neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Goldenberg 2002). Ironically, these were the same organizations that had publicly called for an expansion of central government authority and greater foreign troops, all the while urging the US military to increase attacks on Taliban militants.

Although aid workers had previously experienced insecurity, these attacks were largely criminal in nature. The Taliban rarely, if ever, took responsibility for such attacks, yet this began to change after the vocal support by NGOs for ISAF. For example, in January 2003 a series of security incidents occurred in Zabul province, including several armed robberies and a grenade attack on an NGO office. Zabul’s governor was stopped on a road by Taliban militants, who claimed responsibility for the attacks. They informed the governor that Mullah Omar had observed that “the NGOs were spying for the Americans” and the Taliban should “force them to leave” (Reuters 2003a). However, aid organizations tended to downplay statements like these, choosing instead to place the blame for decreased security in US civil affairs activity. Shortly after the Taliban statement in Zabul, the executive director for ACBAR claimed that “insecurity is increasing, but targeted at the military” (Kaufman 2003a).
By February 2003, attacks against NGOs had spread throughout southeastern Afghanistan, including several grenades lobbed at compounds, vehicle ambushes, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In Kandahar, members of the Taliban distributed leaflets to locals urging them to attack all foreign aid workers and the Afghans who assist them (Kaufman 2003b). Not only had international NGOs publicly called for an expansion of ISAF and central government control, but many of these organizations were now located in close proximity of government offices to enhance collaboration. In one instance that occurred on 28 February, two rockets were fired upon government buildings and NGO compounds located directly next to each other in the city of Kandahar (Reuters 2003b).

On 27 March 2003 the Taliban stopped a convoy of aid workers traveling between Uruzgan and Kandahar, executing a water engineer from El Salvador. Although NGOs had previously encountered insecurity, this was the first instance in which a foreign aid worker was murdered in Afghanistan since 1998 (Mercy Corps 2003). The militants released the other workers, but not before issuing a stern warning: “You are working with kafirs (unbelievers). You are slaves of Karzai and Karzai is a slave to America. This time we will let you go because you are Afghan, but if we find you again and you are still working for the government we will kill you” (Gannon 2003a). As one American aid worker observed, “One year ago I didn’t have any problem driving around Kandahar by myself. Now I feel it is a lot more dangerous” (Witt 2003). Many organizations were forced to flee in response to these events, and those that remained often stayed close to the city rather than risk traveling to outlying districts. The head of the Kandahar office of UNAMA observed that reconstruction and humanitarian aid had slowed or stopped as a result (Witt 2003). These withdrawals resulted in US military civil affairs units taking the lead in
humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, as it was the only way to reach populations living in volatile regions of the country (Kaufman 2003b).

Not only were NGOs compromising their neutrality by calling on western governments to curb Taliban activity, but many were also advocating for specific legislative initiatives designed to strengthen the central government. For example, Refugees International issued a press release calling upon the US government to help improve international capacity for post-conflict security. Specifically, they called upon the US government to support the International Rule of Law and Antiterrorism Act of 2003, expand civilian policing, and strengthen judicial capacities in order to preserve “the political changes that the US spent lives and billions of dollars to effect” (Refugees International 2003).

Perhaps the most vocal political statement made during this period was a joint letter written and signed by 79 international NGOs (ICVA 2003). The letter called on the international community to strengthen and expand ISAF to locations outside of Kabul to provide “active support for a comprehensive program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all militia forces outside the control of the central government.” The letter went on to claim that “[m]uch has been accomplished in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban…but] the international community must continue to build the capacity of the central government to maintain the peace and provide for the rule of law. Sustainable security can only be achieved by a unified Afghan Government with control over internal and external security matters” [emphasis added]. The letter went on to refer to the Taliban as a “terrorist group” impeding free and fair elections: “Continuing challenges to the authority of the central government by regional warlords and terrorist groups, and the persistent security vacuum in many parts of the country.

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27 The names of these NGOs are available in Appendix B.
make it difficult to prepare for elections, including voter registration.” Therefore, “[u]rgent action is required by the international community to support the Afghan government’s efforts…We call on the international community to expand the ISAF mandate and provide the resources need to secure Afghanistan so that democracy can flourish” [emphasis added].

Interestingly, many of the NGO signatories were “apolitical” organizations in the sense that they strictly engaged in humanitarian relief projects. However, given these declarations, perhaps it is not the type of aid being delivered that influences attacks, but the statements that are made by organizations. This would partially explain the quantitative findings in chapter three. Although many NGOs are classified as “apolitical” because of the nature of the work, if these organizations are making politically-charged statements, they may be contributing to their own insecurity—a factor not captured in quantitative analyses.

Nonetheless, many NGOs continued to claim that they were “neutral” actors while placing blame for growing insecurity on US military civil affairs activity. As the country director for CARE International stated, “For many years we felt that our identities as neutral, impartial aid workers gave us protection in Afghanistan and I think that’s been eroded this last year by the international military presence and especially their interest in doing reconstruction work” (Pitman 2003). Another NGO advocate wrote, US civil affairs soldiers “no doubt feel good [about their work]. But they are blurring a crucial line of principle which damages the image of impartiality of NGOs working in the same field. The bigger NGOs worked under the mujahedin and Taliban regimes and have earned long-term respect from Afghans. They do not want to be seen as part of the political plans of governments” [emphasis added] (Steele 2003).

It is difficult to square these claims with the aforementioned letter—of which CARE was a signatory party—that called for strengthening the Afghan central government, expanding
security forces, democratic elections, and eradication of the “terrorist” Taliban. The Taliban made it abundantly clear that their attacks were not the result of confusion, but rather deliberate actions. Pamphlets were distributed throughout the country warning Afghans not to work with aid workers because of their explicit support of the central government (Shah 2003). As one US soldier observed, “The NGOs have made their choice already in terms of what they want to do in this country. They have chosen to help the reconstruction of not just the economy, but the government itself…The NGOs and international organizations and military, coalition, ISAF, seem to me all [having] the same objective” (IRIN 2004).

NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003, but it remained unwilling to expand operations beyond Kabul. The refusal to extend the central government’s reach outside the capital prompted more calls from the NGO community. On the day that NATO assumed command, ACBAR released a statement that “the need for an expanded ISAF was universally recognized and there was no time for delay” (Reuters 2003c). Two days later, Mullah Omar issued a written statement calling for Afghans to attack aid agencies, referring to them as the “greatest enemies of Islam” (Gannon 2003b). This was followed by a statement from another senior Taliban official accusing NGOs of supporting the central government and acting as spies for the United States (Reuters 2003d). The Taliban were also furious at their inability to participate in the political process. Given the outpouring of NGO support for a central government that not only denied the Taliban representation, but were actively trying to eliminate them, it is no surprise that the aid community was no longer viewed as impartial.

On 8 September 2003, members of the Taliban held up five local workers from the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghanistan Refugees (DACAAR) who were returning from a project site where they had supplied water to villagers. The militants tied their hands, lectured
them on the evils of Afghans collaborating with international NGOs, and accused them of ignoring a previous fatwa banning them from doing so. They then executed four of the five workers, leaving the fifth badly injured. The wounded aid worker survived to tell the story (Reeves 2003). These workers were not attacked because of any confusion—they were deliberately targeted. By September 2003, attacks against NGOs had soared to an average of one every two days, and nearly half of Afghanistan’s provinces were deemed too high-risk for international workers to operate in (Agence France-Presse 2003a). The Taliban continued to issue edicts calling for aid workers to be targeted. One pamphlet distributed in Laghman warned that “Those women who are working with foreign NGOs will definitely suffer punishment of death” (Reuters 2003e). According to a news outlet, Taliban militants argued that “any relief group that receives American funding or works in support of the US-backed government of President Hamid Karzai are deserving of attack” (Baldauf 2003a).

Given this insecure environment, the US military opened more PRTs to deliver humanitarian assistance. Because the PRTs operated under the auspices of the US-led coalition, rather than the UN (like ISAF), the program could be expanded in provinces across the country without specific authorization from a new UN Security Council resolution (Synovitz 2003). The US also began to change its tone regarding the expansion of ISAF at this time, as its forces were stretched due to the conflict in Iraq. It thus encouraged other nations to set up PRTs to help restore authority and economic infrastructure in areas outside of Kabul (Associated Press 2003a). In October, the Security Council unanimously authorized ISAF to deploy troops anywhere in the country, a change long sought by President Karzai, UN officials, and the broader NGO community (Arieff 2003).
Many NGOs were critical of the move, believing it did not do enough. For example, InterAction sent President George Bush a letter asking him to press US allies to provide more military troops for ISAF. The President and CEO of InterAction stated, “Upon close examination, we have concluded that ISAF expansion, as presently contemplated, will not have the needed beneficial effect on security” (Agence France-Presse 2003b). This was echoed by CARE, which urged the international community to go further in supporting the Central government: “The international community needs to provide vigorous backing for the accelerated training of professional Afghan police and military forces under the control of the central government in order to combat the violence…The Coalition should cut back its support of non-state militias and expand the ongoing campaign to disarm and demobilize the thousands of militiamen in the country” [emphasis added] (CARE International 2004).

ISAF would expand its reach, but not in any significant fashion until the Taliban resurgence of 2005 and 2006. During this period, ISAF troop levels increased from 5,000 to 65,000 (CFR 2014; NATO 2015a). However, NGO security continued to decline during this period and beyond. Although several hypotheses have been advanced to explain aid workers insecurity in Afghanistan, most of these tend to focus on external factors. As the quantitative analysis in chapter three revealed, the type of work NGOs engage in does not appear to be a significant influencer of insecurity. However, as the qualitative analysis has revealed, it is the political statements made by NGOs—regardless of their work—that have decreased security by compromising the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality. In sum, the political critical juncture occurred in June 2002 when the NGO community decided to collectively abandon their principles and publicly support a competing combatant faction. The effect of this causal path is visualized in figure 5.9.
5.4.3.2 Criminal Critical Juncture

Although the preceding subsection explains critical historical events that contributed to political attacks against aid workers, it is also important to assess the motivations for criminal activity. The criminal critical juncture for criminally-motivated attacks also occurred in 2002, when NGOs were perceived by some of the population as using a majority of humanitarian funds to support their lavish lifestyles. Aid worker expenditures on non-humanitarian activities had an indirect effect of substantially increasing rent and prices for locals. This was especially the case in Kabul, where the vast majority of international organizations resided.

By May 2002, most NGOs had returned to Afghanistan from neighboring Pakistan. This was coupled with the arrival of hundreds of new organizations, eager to contribute to the “post-conflict” reconstruction effort. Approximately $1.8 billion dollars in aid had been pledged to rebuild the country by foreign nations in 2002 (Agence France-Presse 2002), most of which was to be distributed by NGOs and the UN. But many Afghans claimed that the majority of money never made it to the local population. Instead, it was widely believed that aid workers used the funds to cover large salaries, gleaming new offices, and fancy cars. Rents of houses and offices in Kabul skyrocketed, causing many locals to lose their homes and businesses. According to local real-estate brokers, rents increased up to fiftyfold in certain parts of the city. In one instance, an Arab NGO signed a $4,800 per-month lease for a six-bedroom villa that went for $300 a month during the Taliban era (Daragahi 2002). In another, a highly-regarded school for street children lost its building to an international NGO that wanted to convert it into a staff guesthouse (Lamb 2002). The landlord was offered far more in rent money from the NGO.

Responding to these events, one Afghan official bluntly told a group of foreign NGOs: “Get out of Kabul. You’re driving up the rents” (Daragahi 2002).
As one reporter observed in May 2002, “The perception among Afghans is that the UN and aid groups have spent donations on high rents and salaries, Toyota Landcruisers, and computers, while little money has filtered down to the people” (Lakshmanan 2003). Afghanistan’s ambassador to India went so far as to claim, “By giving money to these NGOs, the world has made it so that the money has vaporized without any result. All the money goes to big houses, big cars, big salaries, and where is our money?” (Baldauf 2003b). “Lots of money comes to Afghanistan through…NGOs” said one local, “but they don’t spend it on reconstruction; they put it in their pockets” (Associated Press 2003b). The president of the Central Council of the National Union of Afghanistan Workers (CCNUAW) stressed in a speech critical of NGOs that “Over 50,000 foreign specialists work here with high salary but Afghan workers looks [sic] for job on the streets” (Xinhua 2004). Meanwhile, an Afghan businessman alleged that NGOs were “corrupt” and “uninterested” in locals: “They are doing more harm than good. They drive fancy vehicles, they take high salaries, they travel with beautiful girls. They just drink and eat kabobs and sleep” (Thorne 2004).

These perceptions ultimately led to an increase in banditry from common criminals, many of whom viewed foreign aid workers as attractive targets because of their perceived wealth (Kaufman 2003b). In a country where the average income is less than $75 a month, it is easy to see why NGOs were regularly victims of criminal activity. Furthermore, a poorly paid police force—with wages averaging about $50 a month—lacked the motivation to crack down on crime (Garcia 2004). Prior to 2002, NGOs that operated within Afghanistan were relatively modest in their approach. However, the boom in available funds following the US-led invasion resulted in an influx of international organizations, several of which adversely impacted the Afghan economy. Many impoverished locals viewed aid workers as having “stole” the money allocated

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to rebuild their nation, choosing to spend these funds on their personal wellbeing. This critical juncture is likely responsible for an increase in criminal attacks throughout the country.

Of those aid workers that fell victim to criminal attacks, 38 were killed (9 percent), 89 wounded (20 percent) and 318 abducted (71 percent). Of those targeted for political purposes, 298 were killed (32 percent), 237 were wounded (25 percent), and 399 were abducted (43 percent). As these figures indicate, criminals were much less likely to kill aid workers and more likely to wound and abduct individuals. A common occurrence was for criminals to target NGO compounds and those en route to project sites. They would often assault aid workers, constrain them, and then steal valuables such as money, computers, and vehicles. Abductions were also a popular criminal action. These attacks were motivated by lucrative ransom payments that NGOs or family members would regularly pay to secure the release of their employees. A review of news stories covering abductions in Afghanistan reveals that ransom demands for aid workers tended to average between $100,000 and $150,000.

5.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings

This dissertation theorizes that the type and magnitude of aid that NGOs deliver in conflict zones influences the security situation for aid workers. It is hypothesized that as aid increases in both political scope and magnitude, the security situation for NGOs will decrease. The qualitative findings presented in this chapter have provided support for all four hypotheses. Contrary to the quantitative analysis, which showed no relationship between the political activity of NGOs and insecurity, the qualitative analysis has revealed that a relationship does exist.

The structured-focused comparison questions highlight the importance of separately analyzing attacks based on the motivations behind them. The results show that aid workers operating in Afghanistan are most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-
transit to or from project sites. These findings corroborate the quantitative results in chapter three, which showed that NGOs were more likely to encounter attacks when engaged in large-scale activity. If workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. These results support the notion that the magnitude of aid also influences insecurity.

Process tracing has shown that it is not necessarily the type of aid being delivered that results in insecurity, but rather the political statements made by NGOs. The quantitative analyses revealed that the type of work NGOs engage in does not appear to be a significant cause of aid worker insecurity. However, process tracing discloses that both the political statements made by NGOs and their affiliations—regardless of their sectors of activity—have increased insecurity by compromising the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality. Although NGOs may be engaged in apolitical projects in the field, many of these organizations nonetheless make politically-charged statements or have aligned with one of the competing factions in a conflict. In Afghanistan, the critical juncture for politically-motivated attacks occurred in mid-2002 when the NGO community abandoned their principles by publicly supporting a competing combatant faction. Furthermore, although the quantitative analyses revealed a statistically significant relationship between the presence of military civil affairs units and attacks against aid workers, process tracing has shown that the deployment of these units was actually in response to existing NGO insecurity.

Finally, process tracing has revealed that criminally-motivated attacks were largely driven by the perception of NGOs as being more concerned with their personal wealth and wellbeing than the needs of local populations. Of the billions of dollars spent on humanitarian
and development projects in the years following the US-led intervention, it has been estimated that 70 percent of the money that went to NGOs was used for their own purposes (Radio Netherlands 2004). This, coupled with many Afghans losing their homes and businesses due to rent increases, resulted in NGOs becoming a primary target for criminal actors.
Chapter 6 - Iraq

Iraq is a Middle Eastern country made up of 18 provinces.\(^{28}\) Its total area is 438,317 square kilometers (BBC 2016c) which is slightly more than three times the size of New York State. The country shares its borders with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Kuwait, and Jordan. Iraq’s terrain is primarily broad plains and plateaus, with a mountainous region that stretches over 92,000 square kilometers in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country (Omer 2011). The primary ethnic groups within the country are Arabs (75-80 percent), Kurdish (15-20 percent), Turkomans (less than 5 percent), and Assyrians (less than 5 percent). As of 2014, the population was 34.8 million (World Bank 2016), 98.9 percent of which are Muslim (Pew 2011a). Of the Muslim population, 60-65 percent are Shiite and 32-37 percent are Sunni (USDOS 2006c).

The current political structure is a parliamentary system. The executive branch is composed of the president, the prime minister and the council of ministers (IRFAD 2014). The parliamentary body is a unicameral Council of Representatives with 328 seats. Members directly elect 320 of these representatives by proportional representation vote, while 8 seats are reserved for minorities.

This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 6.1 provides a brief history of Iraq and section 6.2 is a summary of the most recent conflicts. Section 6.3 is an overview of attacks against aid workers that occurred between 2000 and 2014. This section also answers the structured-focused comparison questions presented in chapter four. Section 6.4 uses process

\(^{28}\) These are technically referred to as “governorates” in Iraq.
tracing to identify the critical antecedents and critical juncture that influenced politically-motivated attacks. Section 6.5 is a summary and discussion of findings.

6.1 A Brief History of Iraq (1638-1979)

Prior to Ottoman rule, the region that is today known as Iraq fell under the control of various pastoral tribes and tribal confederations (Çetinsaya 2006, 4). Iraq was conquered by the Ottomans in three stages during the first half of the 16th century. The province of Mosul was taken in 1516-1517, Baghdad in 1534, and Basra between 1538 and 1546.

Early modern Iraq began under Ottoman rule in the 17th century. Between 1638 and 1914, Iraqi provinces developed from a loosely knit collection of towns and villages to a more centralized state. While never completely forming a united region during this period, the provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul nonetheless exhibited important elements of an “Ottomanized” culture and administration that tied it to Istanbul (Fattah and Caso 2009, 125-126). Within the provinces, localism, autonomy, and family rule ran counter to the development of a growing centralized bureaucracy.

The Ottomans were concerned about two major issues in regard to Iraq: economics and geopolitics (Stansfield 2007, 24-25). Economically, they wanted to continue the flow of taxes and subsidies from Baghdad and Basra—which served as major centers of trade and commerce—to Istanbul. Geopolitically, they wanted to block penetration into the southeastern regions of their empire. Baghdad was regarded as vital for the defense of the frontier from Iran in the central part of Iraq, Basra in the south, and Mosul to the north (Çetinsaya 2006, 4). Basra served as an important naval base until the Portuguese and Dutch threats diminished in the late 17th century. In Mosul, Kurdish families in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah were appointed to
positions of power under the supervision of an Ottoman governor in return for protecting the Iranian frontier.

The massive territorial size of the Ottoman Empire necessitated a strong, centralized state apparatus that could maintain influence over the provinces. In order to prevent the emergence of power centers within the empire that could potentially threaten the sultan’s authority, the Ottomans operated a shifting system of appointments to restrict the influence of regional governors within Iraq (Stansfield 2007, 24-25). They also stimulated rivalries between various tribes and ethnicities to deter a potential unified uprising.

During the first period of Ottoman control, the political system was dominated by military interests (Nieuwenhuis 1982, 171). Military officials were given districts and villages in which they were required to maintain law and order, collect taxes, and supervise production and trade. However, military control often did not reach the periphery. As Nieuwenhuis (1982, 171) notes, “State power was hardly effective outside the main administrative centers, and any control that government had over tribal regions was largely based on threats of pacification.” Relatively little developmental progress was made outside of major urban centers. This was due, in part, to a lack of state control and expertise at the local level. Hardened roads did not exist before the end of the 19th century, and river transportation was not improved until the 1830s (Nieuwenhuis 1982, 172-173). This lack of “interconnectedness” contributed to a weak central state and absence of national identity.

Over the course of Ottoman rule, central authority in Iraq grew progressively weaker. From 1747 to 1831, Baghdad and Basra were ruled by successive Mamluks (Çetinsaya 2006, 5)—freed Ottoman slaves who had converted to Islam. The al-Jalili family controlled Mosul between 1726 and 1834, while the Kurdish Baban family maintained power in Sulaymaniyyah.
Local emirs ruled over various other Kurdish districts. It was not until the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) that the central government attempted to restore its authority over the provinces. Yet this was a gradual process. Control of Baghdad was regained in 1831, followed by Mosul in 1834. However, it took much longer to subordinate the Kurdish Emirates, with Sulaymaniyah submitting as late as 1850 (Çetinsaya 2006, 5).

Following the restoration of Ottoman rule in neighboring Syria in 1839, a new reform program called *Tanzimat* was introduced in Iraq by Sultan Abdülmecid (1839-1861). The *Tanzimat* reforms were intended to transform the Ottoman Empire into a modern centralized state, and to reestablish control over its semi-autonomous provinces (Ceylan 2011, 69). In the pre-*Tanzimat* era, the Ottomans practiced a form of indirect rule over their Iraqi provinces. Provincial governors had considerable authority over their territories, which many considered to their personal assets. The reforms restructured provincial administrations in order to strengthen the center’s control over the periphery. One aspect of this was reducing the power of provincial governors. As Ceylan (2011, 69) notes, this was accomplished by “subdividing the provinces into subordinate units of authority, which were made autonomous of the governors and dependent directly on the central government and its agents…The lower officials in the provincial hierarchy also had a direct responsibility to the central government, independent of his immediate superiors.”

In addition to restructuring provincial administrations, the *Tanzimat* reforms also implemented a more orderly process of tax collection and a regular system of military conscription (Çetinsaya 2006, 5). The reforms were initiated in Baghdad in 1844 and in Mosul in 1848. However, by 1851 central authorities reached the conclusion that Iraq would be better dealt with under a single administration. As a result, Mosul was reduced to an administrative unit
of Baghdad. By the end of 1852, all officials within provincial administrations were placed under the control of Baghdad (Çetinsaya 2006, 6-7). This trend continued in 1858, when Baghdad took authority over provincial officials, turning them into local representatives of the central government.

The Ottomans became suspicious of British designs on Iraq during this period. This was further exacerbated following the Ottomans’ defeat in the 1877 war with Russia. The Ottomans believed that Great Britain had failed to assist them during the war, which they took as proof that the British Empire had designs on the provinces of Iraq (Stansfield 2007, 32). The presence of British forces in the Gulf that resulted in confrontations in Kuwait (1896-1902) only further confirmed Ottoman suspicions. Constantinople believed that Great Britain wanted to annex Iraq and turn it into a source of wealth for the empire, much like Egypt (Stansfield 2007, 32-33). The Ottomans’ suspicions of Great Britain, coupled with their increasingly close ties with Berlin, meant that it was impossible for them to remain neutral when World War I broke out in July 1914. The Ottoman Empire entered the war in November 1914 as one of the Central Powers.

Following the outbreak of war, Great Britain moved to defend its position in the Gulf. It quickly occupied the Fao peninsula and Basra in November 1914, but it was a prolonged effort to take the remaining provinces (Stansfield 2007, 33-34). Baghdad did not fall to the British until March 1917, while Kirkuk followed the next year in May 1918. After the capitulation of the Ottoman government and signing of the Armistices of Mudros, Great Britain occupied Mosul in November 1918 (Stansfield 2007, 34). Although the seeds of an Iraqi state had been planted during the three Ottoman centuries, this would not be fully realized until the post-World War I period.
Following World War I, Great Britain was awarded a mandate for Iraq in April 1920 to transition the region to civil rule. However, the ruling Council of State that was established was composed largely of British officials, while Iraqis were in strictly subordinate positions (Tripp 2007, 40-44). At this point a coalition began to form among Iraqis who were concerned about being incorporated into the British Empire. Beginning in May 1920, a series of meetings took place in Baghdad to denounce the mandate. At one of these meetings, fifteen representatives were chosen to make the case for Iraqi independence to Great Britain. Although the British agreed to meet with the representatives, they continued to pursue a policy of limited self-rule for Iraq. Armed revolt broke out at the end of June 1920 and lasted for four months, resulting in the death of an estimated 6,000 Iraqis and 500 British and Indian soldiers (Tripp 2007, 43).

Direct rule by Great Britain was seen as having contributed to the rebellion by many in London, which led to the search for a more acceptable form of government for Iraq (Tripp 2007, 44). This resulted in the establishment of a semi-independent kingdom during a transition to independence (Hunt 2005, 63-64), which was achieved on 3 October 1932. Iraq was subsequently ruled by a hereditary monarchy from 23 August 1921 to 14 July 1958 under three kings: Faisal I (23 August 1921 – 8 September 1933), Ghazi I (8 September 1933 – 4 April 1939), and Faisal II (4 April 1939 – 14 July 1958). Ghazi I was the son of Faisal I, and Faisal II the son of Ghazi I (Anderson 2011, 12-14). Faisal I attempted to harmonize relations between various factions within the country. A popular phrase within the Shiite communities was “the

29 During this period, Great Britain respected Iraqi sovereignty but acted as an adviser on issues related to both foreign and domestic policy. In the 1920s, three political parties came into being: one represented the Sunnis in power, and the other two were opposition parties formed by Shiites (Fattah and Caso 2009, 154, 162-163). All three were nationalistic in nature and devoted to independence. Following independence, these three parties disbanded and members formed other political blocs centered on various social and economic issues.
taxes are on the Shiite, death is on the Shiite, and the posts are for the Sunni.” The king went out of his way to bring members of the Shiite community into the new state, providing many with government jobs. Faisal I “put promising young members of this sect through an accelerated program of training, and afforded them the chance to rise rapidly to positions of responsibility. He also saw to it that the Kurds received an appropriate quota of public appointments” (Batatu 1978, 26). However, Faisal I’s successors did not continue this effort following his death from a heart attack on 8 September 1933. Rather, they rejected a policy of accommodation, choosing not to include Shiite and other minorities in many governmental consultations (Fattah and Caso 2009, 173-174).

Iraq’s army grew considerably under Ghazi I. A force that was only 12,000 troops in 1932 increased to 43,000 by 1941 (Tripp 2000, 78). However, the growth of the military during the 1930s ultimately created an unstable political atmosphere. Iraqi generals often had conflicts with the civilian leadership, which resulted in three coups that occurred on 29 October 1936, 1 April 1941, and 14 July 1958 (Fattah and Caso 2009, 174-186). Sporadic conflict also arose in the northern part of the country when Kurdish nationalists periodically rebelled against the government in the 1940s. The Kurds supported an independent Kurdistan after Iraq formally achieved its independence in October 1932. However, this was not granted, prompting the initial rebellion between July and October 1943 (Mullenbach 2016a). Iraqi government troops managed to suppress the rebellion with the assistance of British aircraft, but another one transpired in August 1945. The Kurdish Liberation Party (KLP) (later renamed the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)) was established in January 1946, which led another month-long rebellion in May 1947.

The coup that occurred on 14 July 1958 was a bloody affair that resulted in the complete overthrow of the monarchy and the installment of the first republican regime (Stansfield 2007,
NGOs colluded with political activists and parties to create an environment ripe for revolution in 1958 (NCCI 2011, 9-10). Forces loyal to Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif conducted the 1958 upheaval, which resulted in the massacre of Faisal II and the royal family (Stansfield 2007, 92). Qasim and Arif were members of a clandestine military organization known as the “Free Officers Movement” which sought to emulate the success of Nasser in Egypt. On 3 September 1958, shortly after the formation of the new government, an amnesty was granted to Kurdish rebels who had fought against the previous regimes (Mullenbach 2016a).

A few months after the coup, a split occurred between Qasim and Arif, who did not share the same vision for Iraq. Arif led an “Arab nationalist” faction that advocated a union with Egypt and Syria as part of the United Arab Republic (UAR), while Qasim led “Iraqi nationalists” opposed to such action (Stansfield 2007, 92-93). Although the latter won out in the weeks following the coup, a rift opened within Iraqi politics between the Arab nationalists (most notably the Ba’ath Party) and Iraqi nationalists (such as the Iraqi Communist Party or ICP). Members of the Ba’ath Party conducted a botched assassination attempt on Qasim on 7 October 1959 which further drove a wedge between the factions (Stansfield 2007, 93). The assassination attempt was led by 22-year-old Saddam Hussein.

30 The government later legalized the KDP in January 1960 (Mullenbach 2016a).
31 The Ba’ath Party, which was formed in April 1947, is a political movement based on an Arab nationalist ideology. The founders of the Ba’ath were three Syrian intellectuals: Michel Aflaq (a Greek Orthodox Christian), Salah al-Din Bitar (a Sunni Muslim) and Zaki Arsuzi. Ba’athists believe in the creation of a unified Arab state. The ideology and movement came into being in the aftermath of World War II, which created a climate favoring major political change in the Arab East (Devlin 1976, 1, 5, 7, 15).
32 In the 1950s, revolutionary sentiment was prevalent throughout Iraq as new political movements began to assail traditional political elites. Saddam dropped out of law school in 1957 at the age of 20 to join the Ba’ath Party, of which his uncle was a supporter (Humphreys 1999, 68).
Another Kurdish uprising began on 11 September 1961, led by the military wing of the KDP (Peshmerga). Iraqi government troops conducted an offensive against the rebels from 16 September to 10 October 1961, before formally dissolving the KDP on 23 September (Mullenbach 2016a). In response, Iran provided military assistance to the KDP. The fighting continued and the KDP bombed the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline on 30 August 1962.

Ba‘athists ultimately overthrew Qasim’s government during a violent coup on 8 February 1963. Qasim was murdered and his body paraded on television for the public to see. The first Ba‘ath government was formed under Abd al-Salam Arif, who immediately embarked upon a ruthless campaign (Stansfield 2007, 93-94). Qasim supporters and members of the ICP were rooted out and persecuted. However, while the Ba‘athist were adept at removing political opponents, they failed to do the same within the governmental apparatus. Less than a year after assuming power, the military overthrew the Ba‘athists and took control of the country between 13 and 18 November 1963. The military ruled for the next five years. During this period, government troops launched a military offensive against Kurdish rebels on 5 April 1965. Fighting continued until a ceasefire was agreed upon on 29 June 1966. Approximately 10,000 individuals were killed and 80,000 displaced as a result of the Kurdish-Iraq conflict that lasted from September 1961 to June 1966 (Mullenbach 2016a).

The Ba‘athists once again regained control on 17 July 1968, appointing Ahmad Hassan al-Baker as president. Saddam Hussein became his vice president. On 3 January 1969, government troops launched another military offensive against the Kurds. The Kurds responded with a counter-offensive on 1 March 1969. Fighting continued until the Iraqi government and KDP signed a 15-point peace agreement on 11 March 1970, which granted autonomy to the
Kurds. Approximately 60,000 people were killed and 300,000 displaced during the conflict between October 1968 and March 1970 (Mullenbach 2016a).

To help consolidate power, the new Ba’ath government nationalized the oil industry in 1972. Iraq’s oil export revenue increased substantially from $488 million in 1968 to $21.4 billion by 1979 (Mufti 1996, 200-201). This enabled the central government to expand its power and reach. The regime used the oil money to develop a highly-centralized public welfare system. Because the government wanted to be the primary provider of assistance to the population, restrictions were placed on NGOs so that their activities were in line with the government’s agenda (NCCI 2011, 11) (see section 6.4.1 for more detail). The oil revenue also enabled the Ba’ath Party to build an expansive internal security apparatus. The number of armed forces personnel increased from 100,000 in 1970 to 250,000 in 1980. This was in addition to the 175,000 serving in the Ba’athist militia and 260,000 working in the police force (Stork 1982, 32; Stansfield 2007, 93-96).

Iraq was moving quickly toward totalitarianism in the late 1970s. This was exacerbated after Saddam Hussein succeeded al-Baker as president on 16 July 1979 following the latter’s retirement. Ba’athism had become a massive political movement in the 1970s, and a meaningful political opposition did not exist aside from the Kurds in the north and the Shiite in the south. The state moved to limit all political movements under Saddam, who was committed to violent control to maintain power. He established a sophisticated network of armed intelligence organizations, party security agencies, police forces, and paramilitaries to protect the regime from any form of opposition. As Stansfield (2007, 97) notes, “These organizations formed an Orwellian web of mistrust, fear and coercion which comprehensively permeated every aspect of Iraqi life, and few formations of civil or political life could exist in such an environment.”
Political affiliation to any party other than the Ba‘ath was outlawed and often punishable by death. Thus, domestically the Kurds and Shiites—which made up the majority of the population—were not provided with a legal political outlet to express their views or grievances.

6.2 Modern Conflict (1979-Present)

Iraq has experienced four major conflicts in the modern era. The first was the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the second was the Gulf War (1990-1991), the third was the Iraq War (2003-2011), and the fourth is the ongoing Iraqi Civil War (2014-Present). This chapter assesses NGO insecurity during the third and fourth conflicts which began after the US-led intervention in 2003. However, it is important to know the history of the first and second conflicts for a more complete understanding of events that transpired thereafter. The history and causes of these wars have been developed in great detail elsewhere. Thus, this section provides a brief overview of each.

The Iran-Iraq War was the result of a power vacuum that developed in the Persian Gulf following Great Britain’s withdrawal from the region (January 1968 – December 1971) (Pelletiere 1992, 1-8). Since the turn of the century, Great Britain had consistently taken the lead in overseeing Gulf affairs. However, US influence had begun to surpass the British by the early 1950s. Therefore, by the time Great Britain announced it was pulling out of the region in January 1968, many anticipated that the US would become the guarantor of stability in the Gulf. However, the US did not assume Great Britain’s responsibilities in the area because of its involvement in Vietnam. The withdrawal thus inspired the shah of Iran to assume Great Britain’s
role of “policeman” in the Gulf with the encouragement of the US.\textsuperscript{33} The US bolstered this support with over $20 billion of weapons and military equipment to Iran (Johnson 2011, 180-181). These moves further disturbed relations between Iran and Iraq.

The Shah was overthrown during the Iranian Revolution (January 1978 – February 1979). Although the Ba’athists initially supported the Ayatollah Khomeini, it did not take long for tensions to form between the two (Pelletiere 1992, 31-32). Khomeini appointed a new ambassador to Iraq in 1979, but the Ba’athists considered him an agitator and ultimately expelled him from the country within six months for meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs. In response, Khomeini downgraded the Baghdad embassy to the level of a mission. In another instance, the leader of Iraq’s Shiite community—Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Sadr—wrote to Khomeini in 1979 complaining about the politically unacceptable conditions for Shiite in Iraq and asking for asylum in Iran. Khomeini counseled al-Sadr to stay put, but noted that he hoped the “source of his distress would soon be removed” (Pelletiere 1992, 31-32). Saddam reacted to this not-so-subtle attack on his power by placing al-Sadr under house arrest. This sparked riots by al-Sadr’s followers in southern Iraq.

The situation had progressively worsened by spring 1980. In two separate instances that occurred in April 1980, grenades were tossed at Iraqi officials. In response, Saddam rounded up hundreds of Shiite militants. One allegedly confessed to the attacks, claiming that he had been ordered to do so by Khomeini. Saddam subsequently ordered the torture and execution of al-Sadr

\textsuperscript{33} This encouragement and support ceased following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. During the 1980s, US policymakers sought to contain Iran, which was perceived as the main threat in the region. During the Iran-Iraq War, the US went so far as to provide Iraq with satellite pictures of Iran’s military positions. In a public show of support, they took Iraq off the US list of “states supporting terrorism” in 1982, and restored diplomatic relations in 1984 (Graham-Brown 1999, 2).
while expelling thousands of expatriate Iranians back to their home country. Khomeini answered with a public call to Iraq’s Shiite community to revolt and destroy the “infidel” Ba’athists (Pelletiere 1992, 31). With Shiites accounting for approximately 60 percent of Iraq’s total population, Tehran hoped that this community would emulate the Iranian revolutionary example and rise up against Saddam. These hopes were further fueled by the secular nature of the Ba’ath, which was adamantly opposed to the notion of an Islamic political order (Chubin 1987, 29).

Fears of a 1979 Iranian-style revolution at home, coupled with Iraq’s desire to supplant its neighbor as regional hegemon, led to the outbreak of war between the two countries in September 1980. As Chubin (1987, 13) has noted, the war was less of a dispute over territory and more of a contest over power and ideas. Iraq began its assault on 22 September by bombing and invading western Iran. Saddam not only hoped to overthrow Khomeini, but also sought to annex Khuzestan—Iran’s Arabic-speaking province with substantial oil reserves. Although it first appeared that Iraq would win easily, the offensive stalled at the end of 1980. Iran subsequently counter-attacked in the spring and summer of 1981, driving the Iraqi forces back (Brogan 1998, 289).

In a series of offensive assaults over the next few years, Iran pushed across the border into the Kurdish portion of Iraq and across the desert toward the Tigris. In February 1984, Iranian troops seized Majnoon Island in southern Iraq, an area in which over 6 billion barrels of oil reserves were located. Two years later in February 1986, they occupied the Faw peninsula, followed by a massive onslaught on Basra in January 1987. Although the Iraqis were able to hold Basra, in doing so they left the northern front undermanned (Brogan 1998, 290-292).

Iran’s last offensive was in northern Iraq in March 1988. Steadily moving toward Kirkuk, Iraq used poison gas to stop the Iranian advancement on 16 March 1988. According to Iranian
sources, this resulted in the death of more than 2,000 people, including hundreds of civilians. In the south, Iraqi troops were able to reclaim Faw in April 1988 after two years of Iranian occupation, and also recovered the Majnoon oilfield in June. These victories have been attributed by some to Iran’s war-weariness and loss of revolutionary enthusiasm (Brogan 1998, 293). In July 1988, Tehran announced that it would support a UN-proposed ceasefire, which took effect the following month. A UN peacekeeping mission (United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group or UNIIMOG) was subsequently assembled and deployed to the Gulf in August 1988. Following the ceasefire, Saddam turned his attention to the north and quickly restored central authority throughout Iraqi Kurdistan (Brogan 1998, 292-293). The eight-year-long war resulted in the deaths of 200,000 Iraqis, in addition to the 400,000 wounded and 70,000 taken prisoner. The Iranian losses are estimated at half a million (Johnson 2011, 192-193).

Iraq was in dire straits financially following the war. The conflict is estimated to have cost approximately $350 billion, which plunged the country into debt (Johnson 2011, 193-194). This spurred Saddam to further military action in the Gulf. Facing the prospect of economic and political collapse, Saddam attempted to intimidate his oil-rich neighbor to the south, Kuwait. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 can therefore be directly traced to the Iran-Iraq War.

In desperate need of an immediate injection of funds, Iraq demanded that Kuwait forgive the loans it had made in support of Iraq during the war. The Iraqi government also charged Kuwait with stealing from the Rumailia oilfield, which spanned the border of the two countries (Brogan 1998, 295-296). Iraq demanded that Kuwait repay the money it had “stolen” and

34 UNIIMOG was tasked with supervising the ceasefire and withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognized boundaries. The mission was terminated in February 1991 after Iran and Iraq had fully withdrawn their forces (UN 2003a).
claimed that a “Marshall Plan” was needed to help Iraq out of its post-war difficulties. Kuwait rejected these demands out of hand, prompting Iraq to invade Kuwait on 2 August 1990.

However, the speed and extent of the international response to the invasion came as a surprise to the regime, as many of these nations had supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. By 6 August a UN Security Council Resolution (661) was agreed upon, implementing a comprehensive economic embargo on Iraq. Additionally, Iraq’s key oil pipelines were shut down. But as Graham-Brown (1999, 7-8) notes, the response was not necessarily to protect the sovereignty of Kuwait. Rather, it was believed by many in the West that Iraq intended to subsequently threaten—if not outright invade—Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer in the region.

The Gulf War was carried out in two stages: Operation Desert Shield (2 August 1990 - 16 January 1991), which was the buildup of troops and defenses in the region, and Operation Desert Storm (16 January 1991 - 28 February 1991), which was the combat phase. Desert Shield was a defensive arrangement immediately following the invasion to protect Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations. Although economic sanctions had been put in place, a separate Security Council Resolution (678) was adopted on 29 November calling for “all necessary means” to be used to “restore international peace and security in the area” (UNSC 1990, 27-28). The US deployed approximately half a million troops to the region at this time, a move that was intended to induce Iraq to withdraw (Khadduri and Ghareeb 1997, 169-170).

Desert Storm military operations began on 16 January 1991, which was the deadline set by the UN Security Council under resolution 678 that authorized Coalition troops to use force to liberate Kuwait if Iraq had failed to unconditionally withdraw. America, British, French, Italian, Kuwaiti, and Saudi aircraft immediately began air attacks on southern Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
Saddam responded by firing Scud missiles into Israel. By attacking Israel, he was attempting to provoke the country into striking back. The reasoning behind the move was to draw other Arab nations out of the UN coalition by pitting the war as one between Islamic Arabs and Jews (Kent 1994, 59-64).

Ground fighting began on 29 January 1991 when 45 Iraqi tanks drove across the Saudi border and took Khafji. However, it took only 36 hours before they were forced to flee following a counterattack by Saudi and Qatari troops. On 22 February President Bush set a deadline of 12:00PM the next day for Iraq to begin its withdraw from Kuwait, or risk a ground war. Saddam did not comply, prompting a ground offensive by US and coalition troops in the morning of 24 February. Within three days, the Iraqis were in full retreat. By 28 February, coalition forces had full control of Kuwait and occupied one fifth of Iraq. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz subsequently dispatched a letter to the UN Security Council promising that Iraq would comply with all UN resolutions (Kent 1994, 72-75, 103-107).

The Gulf War left Iraq in a state of turmoil. Fully aware that Saddam’s regime was militarily and politically damaged, the Shiites in southern Iraq hoped to wrestle political control from the Ba’athists. They began to militarily engage Republican Guard units in March 1991 and captured dozens of Iraqi towns. To repress the uprising, Saddam conducted a brutal massacre of thousands of Shiite civilians. It has been estimated that 100,000 to 180,000 people died during the government crackdown on the Shiite (Moore 2006).

Meanwhile in the north, Iraqi Kurds also revolted against the regime in March. Among the factors leading up to the March 1991 Kurdish uprising was a call by US President George H.W. Bush for minority groups in Iraq to revolt against Saddam. However, the uprising ultimately failed within two weeks, causing a massive displacement of Kurds in the region.
Beginning on 28 March, there was a massive exodus of Kurdish refugees to the Turkish and Iranian borders. It has been estimated that between 400,000 and 500,000 refugees fled to the Turkish border, while 1 million to 1.5 million fled to the Iranian border. Approximately 2 million of the 3.5 to 4.8 million Kurds were displaced (Weiss 2005, 40-44).

Although the Iranian government permitted the refugees to enter its country, they already housed 600,000 Kurdish refugees and 2.2 million Afghan refugees who had fled after the Soviet invasion (Weiss 2005, 45). Iran was therefore unable to provide the necessary resources to take care of the newly-displaced people. Meanwhile, Turkey outright prevented all Kurdish refugees from crossing the border. The harsh winter conditions in the mountains along the Turkish-Iraqi border resulted in the death of between 400 and 1,000 Kurdish refugees per day due to exposure, hypothermia, exhaustion, and bacteria-ridden drinking water (Weiss 2005, 44). In response, the UN Security Council passed resolution 688 on 5 April 1991, which demanded that Iraq “allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations” (Weiss 2005, 45-46).

President Bush responded in April 1991 with a major humanitarian relief effort for Iraqi Kurds. More than 10,000 US, British, Dutch, and French troops provided humanitarian assistance for the refugees (Kent 1994, 110-112). NGOs first began to arrive in the Kurdish region of Iraq in 1991 in response to the humanitarian crisis.35

35 Although welcomed by the Kurdish population in 1991, the political climate in which these organizations had to operate within later deteriorated significantly due to the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War (May 1994 to November 1997). In May 1992, elections were held in areas under Kurdish control, in which the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) won 50.8 percent of the vote and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) won 49.2 percent. Although the two political parties had evenly split power between themselves in a coalition formed after the elections, they continued to clash with each other until outright civil war began in May 1994 (Gunter 1996; BBC 2015c). The impact of this civil war on NGO security is detailed in section 6.4.1.
Upon the conclusion of the Gulf War, Iraq was required to formally recognize Kuwait, commit to war reparations, and open up all sites for inspection by UN teams searching for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons development. The first UN Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM) teams began their work in Iraq in May 1991. The investigations revealed the scale and sophistication of Iraq’s various weapons programs. Not only was it discovered that Iraq had an arsenal of chemical weapons and had succeeded in adapting biological organisms for use as weapons (e.g. anthrax), but it was also on the verge of developing its own nuclear device (Tripp 2007, 250-251). Yet eight years after these initial inspections, UNSCOM still worried that the country had retained a substantial capacity for manufacturing chemical and biological weapons. This perception was propagated by Saddam himself, who needed to deter regional states from exploiting the weapons inspections. A suspicion of Iraq’s continued possession of the weapons, coupled with the regime’s past use of such weapons, would be deterrent enough during the 1990s. Ironically, this would also contribute to Saddam’s downfall in 2003 (Tripp 2007, 250-251).

Although Iraq allowed UNSCOM inspectors into the country, they continued to secretly import missile components and weapons-making materials. Iraq built clandestine underground laboratories to thwart inspectors and refused to cooperate, often ordering troops to fire warning shots to intimidate UNSCOM, confiscating collected documents by inspectors, spying on UN personnel, sabotaging UNSCOM monitoring equipment, and preventing the inspectors from using their own surveillance aircraft (CFR 2003). Iraq eventually accused UNSCOM of spying for the United States and banned them from the country in October 1998, prompting Operation Desert Fox—several days of US and British air strikes that occurred in December. UNSCOM withdrew its inspectors before the air strikes began, and would never return to the country. A
year later, UNMOVIC was created in December 1999 as a weapons monitoring body, but it was significantly weaker than its predecessor. For example, the new inspectors could not share classified information with intelligence agencies or enter areas Iraq deemed off-limits by Saddam (CFR 2003).

In addition to the UNSCOM fiasco, the UN was also largely unsuccessful with its “oil-for-food” program in the 1990s. Given the dire situation Iraq faced in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the UN attempted to alleviate some of the hardship of the population in September 1991 by offering the government the opportunity to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil to pay for imported food and medicine (Tripp 2007, 252). This was ultimately rejected by Saddam because the UN insisted on controlling the funds collected and would retain approximately 30 percent for war reparations. But he relinquished in May 1996, agreeing to a UN offer that allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil every six months for the purposes of purchasing necessities for his population. This was increased to $5.5 billion every six months in 1998 and $8.3 billion in 1999 (Tripp 2007, 252).

However, the oil-for-food program developed into a massive scandal. Although the UN prohibited Saddam from purchasing military equipment with its oil proceeds, he was given wide latitude in determining to whom he sold his oil. He was also permitted to select the vendors from which the UN would purchase goods with the oil profits. Saddam exploited the program while earning some $1.7 billion through kickbacks and surcharges, and $10.9 billion through illegal oil smuggling (CFR 2005). A UN committee report released on 27 October 2005 accused approximately half of the 4,500 participating “oil-for-food” companies of paying kickbacks to Saddam in order to win lucrative contracts. It has been estimated that companies in France and Russia—two security council nations that would later oppose the US-led intervention—received
$11 billion worth of business from the program between May 1996 and February 2003 (Washington Times 2004). Iraqi records later revealed that the executive director of the Oil for Food office, Benon Sevan, accepted bribes from Saddam in the form of oil vouchers worth between $575,000 and $3.5 million (BBC 2005; CFR 2005).

In the aftermath 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, Saddam was the only Arab leader who did not issue a condemnation. Rather, he suggested that the US had brought the attacks upon itself through its policies in the Middle East. However, an absence of a link between Iraq and the attacks, coupled with US intervention in Afghanistan, meant that Iraq was not immediately at the forefront of US foreign policy. Nonetheless, there were many within the administration of President George W. Bush who believed that the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) had much broader, long-term implications. According to this view, the US needed to focus not only on those who were directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks, but also those who had the will and means to launch similar action (Tripp 2007, 271). Iraq fell under this umbrella.

A succession of Iraqi defectors suggested to US intelligence agencies that Saddam had resumed his weapons development programs after kicking UNSCOM out of the country in 1998. Any truth behind these allegations could not be verified unless UNMOVIC was allowed to inspect off-limits sites within the Iraq. However, Saddam repeated his refusal to allow UNMOVIC access in November 2001. Plans for a US invasion of Iraq were submitted to President Bush as early as December 2001, and by mid-2002 it had become apparent that the US was gearing up for a possible invasion (Tripp 2007, 271-272).

In November 2002, Iraq finally allowed UNMOVIC to begin its work, providing the inspectors with what it claimed to be full documentation of its terminated weapons program. However, the documentation was treated with skepticism by the US. This skepticism was
influenced by public actions and statements by Saddam. Iraq neither possessed weapons of mass
destruction, nor had developed programs designed to restart production of such weapons. But it
was part of Saddam’s broader strategy to maintain a degree of ambiguity about Iraq’s
capabilities. This was primarily done to deter Iran, who Iraq believed harbored resentment for the
outcome of the Iran-Iraq War. A public exposure of Iraq’s lack of weapons capabilities could
open the nation up to possible attack by its neighbor to the east (Tripp 2007, 272-273). In fact,
many top officials within Saddam’s government believed that Iraq did in fact possess such
capabilities.

Although Iraq opened itself up to inspection by UNMOVIC in November 2002, the US
had already finalized its plans for invasion that summer. Furthermore, the failures of
UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and the oil-for-food program fiasco did not provide the US with
confidence in the UN to conduct an adequate assessment. On 5 February, Secretary of State
Colin Powell briefed the UN Security Council on the inspections and presented evidence that the
US said proved Iraq had further misled inspectors and hidden weapons and equipment. On 14
February, the head of UNMOVIC Hans Blix briefed the Security Council that inspectors had not
yet found any weapons of mass destruction, but that Iraq was in violation of UN resolutions
concerning its al Samoud 2 missile program (CNN 2016a). Iraq agreed to destroy the al Samoud
missile stock on 27 February, but failed to specify a date that the destruction would begin. On 10
March is was revealed that Iraq possessed drone aircraft that could have been used to launch a
chemical or biological attack against other countries, as it was deemed capable of flying further
than the 93-mile limit imposed by UN resolutions.

However, despite these findings, US efforts to obtain explicit UN authorization for
military intervention had failed by mid-March. Nonetheless, the US and its allies prepared for
war in Iraq. UN inspectors subsequently withdrew on 18 March prior to US military action which began two days later. The Bush Administration believed that the invasion would replace Saddam’s despotic regime with a democracy that could serve as a model for the rest of the region. This would improve regional security and stability for the US and its allies, it was believed, because a democratic Iraq would result in a virtuous and reinforcing cycle (Duffield and Dombrowski 2009, 1-2). It was also assumed that a relatively small amount of US combat forces would be needed for a limited period of time. Following a swift victory, the costs of rebuilding the country would be paid for largely out of Iraq’s oil revenues. This initially appeared to be the case, as US and coalition forces quickly defeated the Iraqi army, captured Baghdad, and drove Saddam into hiding within a matter of weeks (Duffield and Dombrowski 2009, 1-2). In fact, President Bush declared the end of major combat operations less than two months after the invasion on 1 May (CNN 2016b).36 This was followed by the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 1483 on 22 May reaffirming the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq” and acknowledging the US and Great Britain’s right to occupy the country (CNN 2016b). The resolution also set up a UN support system to help facilitate the governmental transition. However, the initial victory developed into a prolonged occupation in the face of an insurgency.

Following the initial occupation, US forces failed to find weapons of mass destruction. US weapons inspector David Kay would later acknowledge to the US Congress that “we were almost all wrong” about Iraq’s weapons capabilities (Telegraph 2011). Saddam was captured

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36 At this time NGOs began to arrive in Iraq en masse. Due to constraints put in place by Saddam, NGOs did not operate in the central and southern regions of the country prior to 2003. This is discussed in greater detail in section 6.4.1.
near Tikrit on 13 December 2003 and later handed over to Iraqi authorities. Although a relatively small-scale insurgency began in the summer of 2003, fighting intensified during spring and summer of 2004 (Telegraph 2011). An unintended consequence of the war was that Iraq turned into breeding ground for foreign terrorist organizations seeking to wage jihad against the West. For example, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) appeared for the first time in 2004.

Jordanian-born Iraqi militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed an alliance with the terrorist group, which began to recruit and train fighters throughout the country. Zarqawi, who had previously worked with mujahedeen jihadi groups in Jordan and Afghanistan, was thrust into the international spotlight in 2003 when Colin Powel told the UN Security Council that he was the link between Iraq’s Ba’athist regime and al-Qaeda (Teslik 2006). Although this assertion was later disproved, Zarqawi was put at the forefront of the US War on Terror. As Teslik (2006) has observed, “Though false, Powell’s words were darkly self-fulfilling. Enabled by global attention, a man previously considered little more than a malcontent thug emerged as Iraq’s leading coordinator of terror.”

The predominantly-Sunni Anbar province became a hotbed for insurgent activity in 2004 and 2005. Upset by their removal from power in the new Shiite-dominated government, many Sunni neighborhoods in Anbar provided a safe haven for insurgents (Telegraph 2011). Fighting was also prevalent in major southern Shiite cities under the direction of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr—the son of Muhammad Bakr al-Sadr. Sadr’s army, known as the Mahdi Militia, was created in the summer of 2003 in defiance of the US-led coalition’s arms controls. Its membership grew from just a few thousand in mid-2003 to approximately 60,000 by the end of 2006 (Jackson 2007).

37 He was hanged three years later on 30 December 2006.
There were multiple violent factions in Iraq, which included AQI and Iraqi nationalist groups. Although over time Iraqis increasingly filled the AQI ranks, the organization’s leadership and early fighters were predominantly non-Iraqi Arabs (e.g. al-Zarqawi). Meanwhile, the Iraqi nationalist groups consisted of Ba’ath Party loyalists, soldiers who had lost their jobs following the occupation, Sunnis upset with the US-installed Shiite government, and Shiite militia (Patel 2015, 2). Although Islamist and “secular” nationalist insurgents often engaged in alliances of convenience, “red-on-red” violence between groups ostensibly on the same side was commonplace. This was especially the case between Sunni and Shiite factions. Furthermore, although al-Zarqawi allowed a few to join AQI, he reputedly distrusted Ba’athists (Washington Post 2015).

The city of Fallujah in Anbar was a haven for AQI insurgent activity, many of whom were foreign fighters led by al-Zarqawi. US Marines launched a successful offensive on the city in November 2004, but 95 American troops were killed in the process. Fallujah was the largest battle of the war and was the bloodiest for US forces since Vietnam. The insurgency continued throughout 2005, but fighting intensified between Sunni and Shiite militants following the 26 February 2006 Samarra Shrine bombing. One of Shiite Islam’s holiest landmarks, the Askariya Shrine in Samarra was completely destroyed in the attack. In response, Shiite militia destroyed 27 Sunni mosques and killed 15 people. The bombing ignited sectarian violence between Sunni and Shiite for years to come in Iraq (Sastry and Wiersema 2013). As one former CIA officer noted, “I think this is probably the most dangerous event that has occurred since the fall of Saddam Hussein. It risks our entire enterprise in Iraq” (Lobe 2006).

Although no group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, Shiite militia placed the blame on Sunnis. However, the US and others believed that AQI was actually behind
the Samarra bombing. During a news conference in August 2006, President Bush claimed that “[I]t’s pretty clear—at least the evidence indicates—that the bombing of the shrine was an Al Qaida plot, all intending to create sectarian violence” (Washington Post 2006). If so, the tactic would be consistent with al-Zarqawi’s previous statements. For example, in February 2004 the US military obtained a letter that al-Zarqawi had written calling for suicide attacks and car bombings against Shiite targets to promote a civil war between Sunni and Shiite in Iraq. AQI believed that continued chaos would derail Iraqi self-rule and the newly-formed democratic government (CNN 2004).

Increasing levels of violence plagued Iraq throughout 2006, prompting President Bush to announce a “surge” of 20,000 additional US troops on 10 January 2007. These soldiers and Marines deployed over the following six months to provide greater security in Baghdad and surrounding areas (Sastry and Wiersema 2013). On 15 June 2007, the US military completed its troop build-up in Iraq to 170,000 soldiers. The massive troop presence coincided with the “Sunni Awakening,” the combination of which had an immediate pacifying effect on insurgency. The Awakening occurred following disputes over Sunni Arabs and AQI, the former of which took issue with the latter’s strict religious edicts. AQI responded to these disagreements by terrorizing Sunni neighborhoods, prompting Sunnis to partner with US forces. With the help of Sunni leaders, the US military was able to neutralize AQI in their stronghold of Anbar Province.

On 29 August 2007, al-Sadr ordered his militia to cease fire, and conditions improved considerably over the following year. As a result, Iraq and the US signed an accord on 17 November 2008 requiring the US to withdraw its forces by the end of 2011. By 30 June 2009, all US combat units had withdrawn from Iraq’s urban centers and relocated to bases outside major cities (Telegraph 2011). On 19 August 2010, the last US combat brigade left Iraq. However,
52,000 troops would remain in the country until the US military mission officially ended on 15 December 2011 (CNN 2016b).

Iraq remained relatively peaceful until June 2012 when violence erupted in Anbar Province. Iraqi security forces, Sunni tribesman, and an al-Qaeda splinter group by the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) were battling for control of the cities of Falluja and Ramadi. The Islamic State had its roots in the Iraq War following the death of AQI leader al-Zarqawi on 7 June 2006. His successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, decided to create a new organization in the aftermath of Zarqawi’s death. Al-Masri announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006 and proclaimed Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its leader (CNN 2016c). However, the group suffered significantly following the Awakening and US troops surge, which resulted the capture or death of many of AQI and ISI leaders (Phillips 2009, 65).

In April 2010, both Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi were killed in a joint US-Iraqi operation, after which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took control of ISI. The second al-Baghdadi replenished ISI leadership with former Ba‘athist military and intelligence officers that had previously served under Saddam (Sly 2015a). The de-Ba‘athification law, which was promulgated by L. Paul Bremer—the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq—in 2003, barred 400,000 members of the defeated Iraqi army and Ba‘ath Party from government employment (Sly 2015b). Thereafter, former Ba‘athist officers joined various insurgents groups and provided tactical support to AQI. However, following the death of Saddam Hussein, many former regime loyalists established the group Men of the Army of the

38 Al-Masri was an Egyptian who first met al-Zarqawi in 2001 at a training camp in Afghanistan. He was an explosives expert who first came to Baghdad in 2003 to help establish AQI (CNN 2006). Very little is known about al Baghdadi, except that he served as a Major General in the Iraqi Army under Saddam (Washington Post 2015).
Naqshbandia Order (often referred to as JRTN, the initials of its Arabic name). Under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, former officers and members of the JRTN became more than relevant. These men were instrumental in the group’s rebirth from the defeats they encountered in years prior. While they may currently be allies in the interest in fighting a common enemy—the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq—Arango (2014) speculates that “the two sides are unlikely to coexist if they should attain power in some areas. The Baathists, being more secular and more nationalist, have no interest in living under the harsh Islamic law that ISIS has already started to put in place in Mosul.”

In July 2012, the new ISI leader released a statement announcing that the group was planning to regain control of its former strongholds in Iraq. The new offensive was called “Breaking the Walls,” and was centered on freeing ISI members held in Iraqi prisons. Violence increased incrementally over the next year before spiking significantly in June 2012. By July 2013, total monthly fatalities in Iraq exceeded 1,000 for the first time since April 2008 (Lewis 2013, 7). As one analyst has observed, without the ISI/JRTN alliance and coordination with various Sunni groups “[ISI] couldn’t have seized a fraction of what they did” (Arango 2014).

In April 2013, ISI declared its absorption of al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda-backed militant group in Syria. Subsequently, al-Baghdadi claimed that the organization would be known as ISIS. However, the leader of al-Nusra, Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, rejected ISIS’s attempt to merge with his group (CNN 2016c). In defiance of al-Baghdadi’s edict, al Nusra immediately announced its allegiance to al-Qaeda. Relations between ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al Nusra began to deteriorate in the spring of 2013. Beginning in the summer of 2013, these tensions evolved into violence, and by early 2014 a war between ISIS and al-Nusra commenced in northern Syria. After continued infighting between al-Nusra and ISIS, al-Qaeda formally disavowed ISIS and
ultimately renounced its ties to the organization in February 2014 (CNN 2016c). ISIS responded with violence against al-Qaeda affiliates, assassinating Abu Khaled al Suri—a longtime member of the organization—on 23 February 2014 (Stern and Berger 2015, 41-44). Ties between ISIS and al-Qaeda were officially severed.

An ISIS surge began in January 2014 when fighters infiltrated Fallujah and Ramadi following months of mounting violence in Anbar Province. The group then surged to Mosul in June and seized Iraq’s second largest city. In response, Kurdish and Iraqi forces attempted to repel the attacks with the assistance of the US and Iran. The US announced a new forward strategy against ISIS in September, in which it carried out air raids in support of the Iraqi army. This was followed by a signed agreement between the Iraqi government and Kurdish leadership in which they agreed to share Iraq’s oil wealth and military resources to help reunite the country in the face of what they perceived to be a common threat (BBC 2015a).

Although government forces were able to regain control of Tikrit in April 2015, ISIS captured Ramadi the following month. As of mid-2016, ISIS maintains a strong hold on parts of Iraq. These include Fallujah, Hit, Rutba, Al Qalm, Khazir, Tel Afar, and Alqosh (Financial Times 2016). While the government has regained parts of Ramadi, the fight for Iraq continues.

6.3 Insecurity of NGOs in Iraq, 2000-2014

The previous section provided an overview of the most recent conflicts to occur in Iraq. These included the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Gulf War (1990-1991), the Iraq War (2003-2011), and the the ongoing Iraqi Civil War (2014-Present). The following two sections analyze NGO activity and insecurity that occurred during the two most recent conflicts.
Iraq ranks fifth in overall NGO security incidents over the past 15 years, behind Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan respectively (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016). In total, 90 attacks occurred between 2000 and 2014, affecting 164 aid workers. According to figure 6.1, 74 aid workers were killed, 45 wounded, and 45 abducted. Of the aid workers abducted, 62 percent were later released, 30 percent were killed, and 8 percent were rescued. Those individuals who were abducted and later murdered by their captors remain under total “abducted.”

**Figure 6.1** Aid Workers Attacked in Iraq by Attack Type, 2000-2014

Data source: AWSD (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016), Global Terrorism Database (START 2015), Intelcenter Database (Intelcenter 2015), Iraq Body Count Database (2015), Patronus Analytical (2009), and NGO security reports.

NGOs primarily experienced insecurity between 2003 and 2005 during the height of the Iraq War (2003-2011). As figure 6.2 shows, aid workers experienced no attacks before this period. This is due to the absence of conflict between 2000 and 2002 and the relatively small NGO presence in central and southern Iraq prior to the US-led invasion. In fact, with the exception of autonomous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan, national NGOs were non-existent prior to 2003 (FMO 2011). After the emergence of a humanitarian emergency in the aftermath of the invasion, NGOs began to arrive to Iraq en masse. The number of aid workers attacked ranged from a low of zero in 2000-2002, 2012, and 2014 to a high of 60 in 2004. Attacks decreased
significantly in 2005 and 2008. This coincides with the mass NGO exodus from southern and central Iraq due to insecurity in 2004 and the withdrawal of US troops from the country, which began in December 2007. These developments are analyzed in detail in section 6.4. The number of attacks decreased further after the Iraq War officially ended in 2011. This is consistent with the statistical findings in chapter three, which revealed that NGOs were likely to come under attack during years in which a country experienced intrastate conflict. The number of aid workers killed ranged from a low of zero in 2000-2002 and 2012-2014, to a high of 23 in 2004. The number of those wounded varied from a low of zero in 2000-2002, 2009, 2011-2012, and 2014, to a high of 21 in 2003. Abductions ranged from a low of zero in 2000-2002, 2008-2009, and 2011-2014, to a high of 25 in 2004.

Figure 6.2 Aid Workers Attacked in Iraq, 2000-2014

Data source: AWSD (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016), Global Terrorism Database (START 2015), Intelcenter Database (Intelcenter 2015), Iraq Body Count Database (2015), Patronus Analytical (2009), and NGO security reports.
There was significant variation in attacks at the subnational level. **Figure 6.3** highlights the most volatile provinces for aid workers to operate in. Baghdad—where fighting between factions was prevalent during the Iraq War—was by far the most dangerous with 55 aid workers attacked, followed by Dhi Qar with 16 and Nineveh with 14. Conversely, NGOs experienced no insecurity in Dohuk, Maysan, Muthana, and Wasit, while only one aid worker was attacked in Qadisiyah, Saladin, and Sulaimaniyah. **Figure 6.4** shows the overall NGO presence. Dohuk province had the most organizations with 53, followed by Erbil with 50 and Baghdad with 48. The provinces with the fewest NGOs were Muthanna and Qadisiyah with five each, and Maysan and Wasit with six each. Unlike Afghanistan, NGO presence in Iraq was not identified to be significantly related to provincial population.
Figure 6.3 Map of Aid Workers Killed, Wounded, and Abducted in Iraq, 2000-2014
Figure 6.4 Map of NGO Presence in Iraq, 2000-2014
Similar to Afghanistan, one of most NGO-populated areas in the country was the capital city of Baghdad. Figure 6.4 also shows that many NGOs tended to operate in the relatively-stable Kurdish region of northern Iraq. When aid workers left central and southern Iraq in 2005 due to the security situation, many relocated to the less-volatile northern Kurdish part of the country. Interestingly, Dhi Qar had a relatively small NGO population, but accounted for the second-most security incidents behind Baghdad. However, a closer look at the data reveals that a single attack in November 2003 was responsible for 13 of the 16 aid worker victims in the province. Furthermore, they were not not directly targeted in the attack. Thirteen of the UK-based NGO Caritas were wounded in Nasiriyah after a suicide bomb attack on an Italian police base. A total of 16 Italian military and police personnel, two Italian civilians, and eight Iraqis were killed, while 70 were wounded (IRIN 2003c).

6.3.1 Structured-Focused Comparison: Motivations and Locations

The previous section provided an overview of NGO security incidents and NGO presence in Iraq between 2000 and 2014. It revealed that aid workers experienced the most insecurity in Baghdad between 2003 and 2005. This sub-section builds upon these findings by examining the two structured-focused comparison questions. By using a set of general questions, NGO insecurity can be examined across multiple cases in a comparable manner. The questions formulated for structured comparison in this dissertation emphasize the motivations for, and locations of, attacks. The first is: were attacks against NGOs politically- or criminally-motivated? The second is: where did attacks occur at the micro-level?

Following the same collection method used in the Afghanistan case study, a review was conducted of all news stories pertaining to NGO attacks in Iraq. A content analysis of these reports was used to determine whether specific attacks were politically-motivated, criminally-
motivated, or collateral (not targeted). News outlets often speculated whether the motivation behind attacks were political or criminal based on subsequent statements by militant spokesmen and interviews conducted with residents living in the areas in which the events occurred. The information collected through content analysis reveals that the vast majority of attacks were carried out by perpetrators with a political motive. Figure 6.5 shows that 135 aid workers were the victims of political attacks (82 percent), 21 were not specifically targeted (13 percent), and 8 were victims of criminal attacks (5 percent). Figure 6.6 highlights the evolution in attack motivations over time.

**Figure 6.5** Victim Comparison of Political, Criminal, and Not Targeted Attacks in Iraq, 2000-2014

While criminally-motivated attacks remained consistently low, political and “not targeted” attacks varied during the period. Victims of politically-motivated attacks spiked significantly in 2003 and 2004 before steadily dropping off in 2005. This coincides with the US-led invasion and influx of NGOs to Iraq in 2003, and subsequent NGO exodus in summer and fall 2004. As previously noted, NGOs were largely nonexistent in the country prior to 2003 because of Iraqi government restrictions. The only significant year for “not targeted” attacks was
2003, which coincides with the beginning of major combat operations. An example is the Caritas incident mentioned previously, in which 13 aid workers were wounded in a suicide bombing on a nearby Italian police base in November 2003.

**Figure 6.6** Aid Worker Victims by Attack Motivation in Iraq, 2000-2014

The second structured-focused comparison question concerns the location in which attacks occurred. Following the same method used to answer the first question, a review of local and international news events was conducted to determine where each attack occurred. This information is highlighted in **figure 6.7** and **figure 6.8**. In total, 135 aid workers were attacked in-transit (51 percent), 74 at NGO compounds (36 percent), 21 at project sites (9 percent), and 8 in public areas (4 percent). The spike in attacks that occurred in-transit between 2003 and 2005 coincides with the increase in NGO activity during this period in Iraq’s volatile central region.
The two structured-focused comparison questions reveal that aid workers operating in Iraq are most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit to or from project sites. These findings further bolster the quantitative results in chapter three, which showed that NGOs were more likely to encounter attacks when engaged in large-scale projects. It is reiterated here that if workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of
time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, thus making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. Attackers also likely prefer to target NGOs in-transit because of the lack of military and police presence in these areas.

### 6.4 Process Tracing

The following section covers specific historical events that have influenced contemporary insecurity in Iraq. As outlined in chapter four, Slater and Simmons’ (2010) methodology is used to identify critical antecedents that preceded the attacks and influenced critical junctures in which the targeting of aid workers became a tactic of militants. Unlike Afghanistan, the number of NGOs that were victims of criminal activity in Iraq was minimal, accounting for only 5 percent of all incidents. Therefore, this section only covers the critical juncture explaining the motivation behind political attacks.

#### 6.4.1 Critical Antecedents

As noted previously, 90 attacks against NGOs occurred between 2000 and 2014 in Iraq, affecting 164 aid workers. Yet all of these occurred following the US-led intervention in March 2003. Prior to this period, multiple incidents occurred that influenced these attacks. These critical antecedents are highlighted in figure 6.9 and include: (1) Iraqi political party use of civil society organizations to mobilize against the monarchy in the late 1950s; (2) Ba‘ath Party restrictions on NGO activity beginning in 1968; (3) state control of public welfare following the nationalization of Iraq’s oil industry in 1972; (4) NGO support of the Kurds in northern Iraq between June 1991 and November 1996; (5) manipulation of NGOs by Kurdish political parties
during the May 1994 to November 1997 civil war; and (6) the US-led invasion which resulted in a massive influx of NGOs to Iraq in the spring and summer of 2003.

**Figure 6.9 Tracing the Causal Path: Iraq**

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<tr>
<th>Critical Antecedents</th>
<th>Critical Juncture</th>
<th>Divergent Outcome</th>
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<td>• 1950s NGOs help mobilize against monarchy</td>
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<td>• 1968 Ba‘ath Party restrictions on NGOs</td>
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<td>• 1972 State control of public welfare</td>
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<td>• 1991-1996 NGO support of Kurds</td>
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<td>• 1994-1997 KDP/PUK political manipulation of NGOs</td>
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<td>• 2003 US-led invasion</td>
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<td>• 2003 NGO political alignments with warring factions</td>
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<td>• Politically-motivated attacks against NGOs</td>
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The roots of Iraqi civil society and NGO activity in Iraq can be traced to the monarchic period (1921-1958). At this time, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Ba‘ath Party, and a number of Sunni and Shiite political movements began to engage in civil activism. These parties were also active in community organizations (e.g. trade unions), which they would later use to mobilize the population against the monarchy in the late 1950s. The period also witnessed the creation of organizations that did not directly contest the monarchy. Examples of these included the Women’s Revival Club (1923), Iraqi Red Crescent Society (1932), Al Al-Bayt Schooling Association (1950), and the Women’s Rights League (1952). These groups engaged in both apolitical humanitarianism (e.g. healthcare) and political action (e.g. women’s rights) (NCCI 2011, 8).
Although the monarchy was supportive of apolitical organizations that provided humanitarian relief to the public, they were wary of NGOs with an ideological agenda. If an organization was engaging in political activity, the monarchy would place the group under close surveillance by authorities. If surveillance revealed that the NGO had the potential to weaken the state, it was consequently banned by the government. However, as the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI) has noted, NGOs under the monarchy “generally enjoyed more freedom in terms of operations and much less governmental pressure than during any subsequent period in Iraqi history” (NCCI 2011, 8-9).

The monarchy’s suspicion of NGOs was well-founded, as several of these groups colluded with political activists and parties to create an environment ripe for upheaval 1958. Although many political parties, civil society organizations, and local NGOs had collaborated in an effort to overthrow the monarchy in the pre-1958 period, factional infighting and political polarization ensued thereafter. Many local NGOs split along ideological lines, typically between the Ba‘ath and Communist parties (NCCI 2011, 9-10). As previously highlighted in section 6.1, Iraq witnessed several coups and regime changes during this period. Leaders of political parties and civil society organizations were often purged along ideological lines depending on which faction was in power (NCCI 2011, 9-10).

Following the 17 July 1968 coup that put the Ba‘athists back in power, the new regime implemented three specific measures to bring civil society under its control (NCCI 2011, 10). The first of these was “containment and control” of existing organizations. This was obtained through means of rewards and financial incentives, which were offered in exchange for loyalty and submission. The second measure was the creation of new “NGOs,” which were referred to as “popular organizations” by the regime (NCCI 2011, 10). These organizations fell under the
Ba’ath party umbrella, and were overseen and supervised by a governmental political bureau known as the Office of Popular Organization. The third measure was the imprisonment, banishment, exile, and death of individuals associated with organizations that threatened the status quo by not abiding by the aforementioned measures. As a result, the development of an independent NGO community was thwarted and replaced by organizations closely linked to, and monitored by, the regime.

The nationalization of its oil industry in 1972 provided the Iraqi government with billions of dollars in state revenue. The regime used this money to develop a highly-centralized public welfare system by supplying education, healthcare, and social security programs to those living in populated urban areas.39 “While the emergence of a social welfare system was a significant achievement for Iraq, it further suppressed the role of civil society at the community-level, as the Iraqi people began to view the central government as a reliable service provider” (NCCI 2011, 11). Legal restrictions were introduced so that NGO programs and activities were in line with the government’s agenda. For example, educational programs had to adopt the national curriculum.

Although the Ba’athists were largely successful in developing and maintaining a centralized welfare system in the 1970s, its capacity to deliver these services diminished substantially following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. This was because the country’s oil revenue was mainly diverted to the war effort. Iraq’s welfare system was further weakened by international sanctions imposed by the UN in August 1990 as a result of the invasion of Kuwait. The state was no longer able to provide basic services to its population, and was thus forced to implement drastic measures such as food rations (NCCI 2011, 12). As a result, Saddam allowed a few international NGOs to begin operating in the country under strict governmental oversight

39 Rural areas were generally underserved by the government’s public welfare system (NCCI 2011, 11).
and control. Examples of these organizations included CARE and Première Urgence. However, there was widespread mistrust and suspicion of agencies at this time, as many Iraqis tended to associate these entities with the UN sanctions.

This was not the case among the Kurdish population in the northern region of Iraq. As outlined in section 6.2, a Kurdish uprising began on 4 March 1991 after the Gulf War. After the failure of this uprising, approximately 2 million of the 3.5 to 4.8 million Kurds were displaced. It has been estimated that between 400,000 and 500,000 refugees fled to the Turkish border, while 1 million to 1.5 million fled to the Iranian border (Weiss 2005, 40-44).

The absence of NGOs in Kurdistan in April 1991 meant that military units were the only entities capable of providing relief in the early weeks of the humanitarian intervention. Only a week after the refugee flight began, the US authorized Operation Express Care. The military was able to undertake a rapid and large-scale relief effort because its transport equipment and supplies were already in the region. A coalition of US, British, German, French, and Italian aircraft airdropped 32,000 pounds of humanitarian relief to refugees on the first day of operations (Weiss 2005, 46). By the end of the first week, the military had delivered 1,727,200 pounds of food, water, clothing, tents, and blankets (Weiss 2005, 46). In addition to the airdrops, US Special Forces organized field relief efforts to provide aid on the ground to refugee camps along the Turkish border.

President Bush authorized the creation of a Kurdish “safe haven” on 16 April, which was accompanied by a warning to Saddam not to intervene. At the peak of Operation Express Care in mid-May, the US had committed 12,000 troops alongside an additional 10,000 from Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK (Weiss 2005, 47). After two months of aid distribution from military forces, UNHCR...
assumed responsibility for relief efforts on 7 June. A gradual reduction of forces in the region followed, while the number of NGOs simultaneously increased (Weiss 2005, 47). Funding for NGOs primarily came from USAID and ECHO. The main activities of these organizations were demining, health, rehabilitation of schools, and WASH (Gautier and Fancia 2005, 1).

However, although these organizations were primarily involved in “apolitical” activities, Saddam considered it illegal for NGOs to operate in the Kurdish region of the country. Baghdad consistently put pressure on UN staff to isolate the presence of NGOs, making it difficult for UN agencies to sub-contract their work to NGOs (Gautier and Fancia 2005, 4). Saddam further launched a series of attacks against NGOs in northern Iraq in the early 1990s (USDOS 2001). As Graham-Brown (1999, 309) has noted, “the Iraqi Government viewed aid workers as hostile agents who had ‘sided’ with the Kurdish administration. It reportedly offered financial rewards to those who carried out attacks on foreigners.” A few examples of attacks at this time included the murder of two aid workers—Stuart Cameron of Care International in January 1993 and Vincent Tollet of Handicap International in March 1993—who were both shot dead in roadside ambushes. In May 1993, two Kurdish aid workers working in a school were killed in a bomb explosion (Graham-Brown 1999, 309).

The number of Iraqi Government-inspired attacks on NGOs declined in 1994, but the political climate in which these organizations had to operate within deteriorated significantly due

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40 Although a simultaneous Shiite uprising occurred in southern Iraq in March 1991, aid was not provided by US, coalition, or NGOs. This was influenced by two factors. First, the refugee crisis was less severe (an estimated 70,000 refugees fled into southern Iran). However, the US did create a camp in Saudi Arabia for 30,000 to 50,000 additional refugees (Weiss 2005, 45). Second, Iraqi Kurdistan was considered a de facto independent region by the US. Southern Iraq, on the other hand, was recognized as a legitimate part of Iraq. International forces were therefore showed greater reluctance to intervene in what was considered sovereign territory. Saddam also banned UN agencies and NGOs from providing relief in the south (IBP 2008, 202).
to the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War (May 1994 to November 1997). Although at a formal level the
Kurdish leadership in both parties continued to welcome NGOs and urged them to stay in the
region, Kurdish aid workers associated with international organizations experienced intensified
pressure from the KDP and PUK to support their movements. Aid workers who were identified
with one party found it difficult to operate in areas controlled by the other. NGOs found it
increasingly difficult to maintain their independence, neutrality, and independence in this highly-
politicized conflict, and many groups simply “left that concept behind” between 1994 and 1996.
Graham-Brown (1999, 311-312) observes that “Most local NGOs had some party allegiance or
were under the patronage of a powerful individual with party ties. International NGOs which
already had clear political allegiances accepted this situation.”

In September 1996, KDP forces seized the city of Erbil from the PUK with the help of
Iraqi government troops and announced a new government. However, the PUK was able to
retake the area the following month. The PUK subsequently announced a new government in
January 1997, but both factions continued to claim jurisdiction over the whole of the Kurdish-
controlled north (BBC 2015c). The fighting that occurred in 1996 and 1997 resulted in the mass
exodus of NGOs from Iraqi Kurdistan. For example, all US-based NGOs withdrew from the
region during this period, which drained an estimated $25-30 million from the already-stressed
Kurdish economy (Kweskin 2015).

This withdrawal was heavily influenced by the US government, which decided to pull out
all US nationals and local staff who had any connection with US NGOs. In November 1996,
some 5,000 local Kurds who had worked for American NGOs were evacuated from Iraq with
their families (Chicago Tribune 1996). They were flown to the Pacific Ocean island of Guam to
be resettled in the US. A few US NGOs criticized their government’s action, arguing that the act
made NGOs appear to have a close association with the US government and its policies. Turkey also closed its border to aid personnel in the fall of 1996, forcing those who wanted to continue their work in the region to travel through Syria. However, the KDP controlled the border entry with Syria and would not allow NGOs to enter Iraqi Kurdistan unless their activities met with the approval of KDP political leaders. By 1997, the “age of the NGO” in northern Iraq was over (Graham-Brown 1999, 312-313).

Although a few organizations managed to continue work in the northern part of the country, there was essentially no independent NGO community operating in Iraq before the US-led invasion in March 2003. Under Saddam, nearly every civic institution was affiliated in some way with the ruling Ba‘ath party and thus could not be considered a truly “non-governmental” organizations (ICNL 2016a). The March 2003 invasion was a critical turning point for NGOs, which were now allowed to freely operate within the country. Hundreds of international organizations flooded into Iraq at this time. As one NGO observed, “there was the military in Kuwait and 300 NGOs behind them” (Hedlund 2010, 1). Another NGO has claimed, “The US started the culture of the NGOs in Iraq and they pressed the Iraqi government to accept the NGOs’ role” (Bradley 2013).

In response to the booming NGO sector, the NCCI was established in April 2003 in Baghdad. The Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) also formed a Committee for Civil Society Organizations to institutionalize state support for these NGOs (Hedlund 2010, 1-2; NCCI 2011, 16). Both international and national NGOs benefited from widely available funds from Western

41 One source estimates that approximately 15 NGOs (all international) were present in Iraq in 1997. By the following year, only half of these remained and would do so until the 2003 invasion. However, these organizations were under strict scrutiny and surveillance by Saddam’s regime (Carle and Chkam 2006, 3).
governments in post-invasion Iraq (Carle and Chkam 2006, 4). For example, by 2 May 2003, USAID had begun to deliver $1.5 billion in assistance to Iraq (USAID 2004). Most of this aid—which predominately focused on energy, education, health, local governance, and WASH—was delivered through NGOs. A year after the invasion in March 2004, total USAID assistance through these organizations in Iraq had reached $3.2 billion (USAID 2004).

In sum, six critical antecedents preceded the deliberate targeting of NGOs in post-invasion Iraq. These are highlighted in figure 6.9. NGOs have long been politically manipulated in the Iraqi society. Many of these groups were used to organize and mobilize against the monarchy in the pre-1958 period. Having themselves utilized NGOs for this purpose, the Ba‘ath Party understood how these groups could pose a threat to power. They therefore placed significant restrictions on NGO activity as early as 1968. NGOs were further marginalized from society when Iraq’s oil industry was nationalized in 1972 because the state wanted complete control over public welfare. NGO support for Kurdish refugees between June 1991 and November 1996 was highly-politicized in the eyes of Baghdad. Not only did the Kurds rebel against the central government with support from Washington, but the US military also conducted a humanitarian intervention in its aftermath. NGO support of these efforts led Saddam to deem their activities in the region “illegal.” NGOs were further politicized by PUK and KDP factions during the Kurdish Civil War. Finally, the US-led invasion made it possible for NGOs to operate outside of the Kurdish region in Iraq. Not only were NGOs now legally able to conduct work in the country, but the humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of the invasion coupled with substantial funding from Western governments and international bodies meant that there were ample opportunities to expand the community’s presence and activities.
6.4.2 Critical Juncture

As highlighted in the previous section, NGOs in Iraq have long been affiliated with political factions. Although some NGOs made conscientious decisions to align themselves with competing groups, many were pressured or forced to support political movements (this was especially the case during the Kurdish Civil War between 1994 and 1997). Given this history, it is unsurprising that AQI and various Sunni/Shiite militia would view NGOs that were not directly aligned with their efforts with suspicion. In fact, it was impossible for organizations to appear independent, impartial, and neutral, because an aid worker’s ethnicity or religious affiliation was often considered valid justification for attack. However, the critical juncture that significantly influenced politically-motivated attacks against aid workers occurred in mid-2003. In a move that was consistent with prior 20th century conflicts in Iraq, several national NGOs began to align themselves with political parties, warring factions, and religious groups of influence.

The first non-Kurdish national NGOs were created after the invasion on 20 March 2003. However, most of these organizations were formed as branches of various political parties that participated in Iraq’s first power-sharing agreement (NCCI 2011, 16). National NGOs were largely composed of men who wanted to exploit new opportunities to influence Iraq’s public affairs (Carle and Chkam 2006, 4). Many national NGOs assumed governmental functions at the local, provincial, and national levels. As the NCCI has observed, Iraqis are generally aware of the connections between NGOs and political actors. Furthermore, “politically affiliated NGOs benefit from the protection of those militias affiliated with each political party, thereby ensuring security for NGO operations in those areas under the militia’s control. Many political
organizations perceive affiliation with NGOs as a highly effective way to seek representation and popularity with the people” (NCCI 2011, 16-17).

Since the spring of 2003, political actors have created NGOs to use as implementing partners for social welfare projects. However, these NGOs have allegiances to those political actors. The Iraqi population was generally loyal to any organization or party that was able or willing to assist them and provide protection in the aftermath of the US-led intervention. A large number of NGOs filled the void left by a lack of efficient public institutions in 2003 and 2004. Although several NGOs did not have an affiliation with politicians or political parties represented in the government, many of these were nonetheless strongly linked to sectarian ethnic and/or religious groups (NCCI 2011, 18). For example, in Shiite-dominated neighborhoods such as Sadr City, many NGOs were affiliated with specific mosques, religious figures, and/or militia throughout Iraq. In Sunni communities, NGOs tended to align themselves with tribal or regional constituencies rather than with specific religious figures. While some NGOs chose to be less visibly affiliated with these actors, many aid workers remained their proxies by delivering relief in exchange for political support. Several of these NGOs utilized public funds provided by Western governments and international bodies to serve the agenda of these actors—not all of whom were friendly to Western interests. As a result, very few national NGOs could be described as being truly independent (Carle and Chkam 2006, 4; NCCI 2011, 18-19).

Given the strong ties between political actors and NGOs in Iraq, politically-motivated attacks against aid workers were often carried out by competing factions. Based on interviews conducted by Carle and Chkam (2006, 7), most Iraqis who worked with international NGOs did not make the distinction between these NGOs and political organizations. It is noted that Iraqis
“tend to differentiate more on the basis of the country where the agency has its HQ [headquarters]...In the eyes of Iraqis who were dealing directly or indirectly with all those new actors who appeared after the 2003 invasion, there was almost no possibility of distinction.”

In one example, an Iraqi aid worker was stopped in the Shiite-stronghold of Sadr City while attempting to deliver aid to the community (IRIN 2007a). Shiite militants approached the individual and asked for his documents. When his surname revealed that he was Sunni, the Shiite militants murdered him and subsequently dumped his body near the capital. Although the Sunni aid worker was providing “apolitical” humanitarian relief to Shiite communities, he was targeted because of his perceived affiliation with Sunni militants. In a separate but similar attack, the vice president of the Iraqi Aid Association (IAA) was killed while delivering aid in a Sunni neighborhood outside of Baghdad (IRIN 2007b). Sunni militants murdered the aid worker after discovering that he was Shiite.

Instances like these reveal that it is not necessarily the activity (apolitical or political) that NGOs are engaged in that is influencing insecurity, but rather the perceived political or religious affiliation of the group or individual. Interviews conducted by the Feinstein International Center in 2006 and 2007 confirm that the real or perceived affiliation of a person or organization is most important and will be scrutinized by Iraqis, be it “affiliation with the ‘occupiers,’ the Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), the government, or, increasingly, with a particular religious leaning, party, or militia” (Hansen 2007, 6-7). The interviewers found that aid delivery in Iraq had been “tainted” by association with activities motivated by military or political objectives. Similarly, an NCCI workshop with Iraqis and international and national NGOs revealed that local communities do not make a distinction between humanitarian and political or military actors (NCCI and Oxfam 2007, 16-17).
Given this environment, Sunni militants and AQI insurgents perceived international NGOs as being aligned with US government efforts. Although many international workers attempted to create “humanitarian space” by adhering to the core principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality, this was ultimately an impossible task. In June 2003, USAID administrator Andrew Natsios instructed an audience of international NGO officials that if they wanted to continue to be funded by the US government they needed to emphasize their links to the government. Their work in Iraq was to be inextricably linked to the US’s strategic goals (Rieff 2010). Some international NGOs outspokenly tossed their principles to the wind. For example, a program manager for Oxfam claimed that the organization’s stance at the beginning of the Iraq war “was not neutral” (Brubacher 2004, 12). Likewise, the Secretary General of Norwegian People’s Aid wrote an article in 2003 claiming that the organization’s work in Iraq “is independent, but it is not neutral and impartial; instead, its work is grounded in the idea of solidarity with the people it helps…It is important to see organizations as political and social actors” (Bjøreng 2003).

Iraq’s history with NGOs, coupled with local NGO allegiances to warring factions, meant that no aid worker could be perceived as truly “outside” the conflict in 2003. In June 2003, Sunni militants developed an insurgent strategy to drive US and Coalition forces out of Iraq. One of the pillars of this strategy was to broaden their attacks against non-military targets. Viewing Western NGOs as supportive of US efforts, the insurgency laid out a plan to specifically target aid workers. Insurgents believed that this would disrupt the flow of aid to communities in need and force international NGOs to withdraw (Cordesman 2008, 61-65). In response, AQI and Sunni militia-approved NGOs would fill the void, thus enabling the insurgents to manipulate aid
distribution for political purposes. Attacks against aid workers as a military tactic commenced in July 2003 with ambushes of NGOs in Baghdad, Babil, and Mosul.

In addition to attacks against NGOs, militants also began to target UN and ICRC personnel. On 19 August 2003, a truck loaded with approximately 1,000 kilograms of explosives targeted the Canal Hotel in Baghdad. The hotel, which served as the UN headquarters in Iraq, was completely leveled, killing the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative (SRSG) Sergio Vieira de Mello, 14 international and Iraqi UN personnel, and seven others. An additional 160 people were wounded (Fast 2014, 16-17). AQI took credit for the bombing. Following the bombing, the UN began to evacuate its foreign staff from Iraq and relocated to Jordan. A similar attack on the ICRC occurred approximately two months later on 27 October 2003 when car bombers attacked the organization’s headquarters in Baghdad, killing 12 people (Guardian 2003a). Although the organization did not entirely pull out of Iraq, it significantly reduced the number of its foreign staff following the bombing (BBC 2003).

The UN and ICRC attacks resulted in virtually all NGOs scaling back programming in the central and southern provinces. While some NGOs ended their operations completely, others remained active on a limited basis through remote management (Ferris and Hall 2007, 5; Hansen 2007, 10; Hedlund 2010, 2). “Remote management” occurs when NGOs withdraw their international staff and transfer projects to local Iraqis. Although the organization is still technically active in the region, it is administered by international workers located outside the country. By the end of 2003, NCCI had relocated from Baghdad to Amman and significantly reduced its staff (Hedlund 2010, 3). Although their overall presence had been reduced, many NGOs remained active in the country. However, attacks against aid workers continued to increase throughout 2004, culminating in what local NGOs usually refer to as the “two Simonas”
incident on 7 September 2004. This attack resulted in the abduction of two 29-year-old Italian aid workers and two of their Iraqi co-workers. The incident was followed by a wave of other abductions, such as the seizure of two Americans and a British worker nine days later. As some have observed, these events changed the perception of the NGOs that remained in the country (Zwitter 2011, 82-83). In response, all international NGOs closed their offices in Iraq by the end of 2004 and adopted a remote management approach (Carle and Chkam 2006, vi; NCCI 2007, 16).

**Figure 6.2** (presented earlier in this chapter) reveals a significant increase in NGO attacks in 2003 and 2004, before a precipitous drop occurred in 2005. This decrease was not the result of a tactical shift by militants, but rather a consequence of a massive NGO withdrawal from central and southern Iraq in 2005. The mass exodus of international NGOs and UN agencies, coupled with the downsizing of ICRC staff, created a large gap in aid service provisions. In response, both Coalition forces and insurgents began to fill the humanitarian vacuum.

As noted in the previous chapter, US forces introduced the PRT concept in Afghanistan during 2003. PRTs were military units tasked with humanitarian and development work. This initiative was replicated in Iraq in response to a deteriorating humanitarian situation. Given the lack of NGOs operative in the country following the 2004 exodus, PRTs were established in Iraq to promote social and economic development. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice inaugurated the first PRT during a visit to Mosul on 11 November 2005 (USIP 2013). Similar to their counterparts in Afghanistan, US and Coalition military personnel in Iraq took the lead in humanitarian and development assistance only in response to existing NGO insecurity.
In similar fashion to the PRT initiative, insurgents also attempted to fill the humanitarian gap that formed following the NGO exodus. A spokesman for Muqtada al-Sader’s Madhi Army stated in February 2007 that “Some people need medical assistance, others food and since they are our followers, we have to support them” (IRIN 2007c). The keyword here is “followers,” as factions would only provide assistance for those who supported their efforts. A civilian living in Sadr City told IRIN in February 2007 the following:

One of my sons was hit by US troops and on the same day my other son had serious convulsions. I went to one of [Muqtadar] al-Sadr’s offices in our district seeking help. The first question they asked me was if my boys were fighting under the name of the Mahdi Army. When I said they were, they gave me everything I wanted…But a month ago the same happened to the son of my neighbor who was shot by the Iraqi military. When she asked for their help and they knew he was not supporting the militia, they let him die of bleeding in the middle of the street (IRIN 2007c).

Similarly, Sunni insurgent groups also began to develop their own means of humanitarian assistance. However, their reach and funds were less than that of the Shiite militias. A spokesman for the Islamic Army—a Sunni insurgent group—noted in 2007 that they were “developing very good projects, especially in [the Sunni-dominated] Anbar province, offering supplies like food items and water with funds coming from different donors” (IRIN 2007c). According to another Sunni Iraqi, “Sunnis still suffer by being targeted with violence and someone should help them. If the government is unable to and NGOs cannot cope, we have to do it ourselves” (IRIN 2007c).

6.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings

This dissertation theorizes that the type and magnitude of aid that NGOs deliver in conflict zones influences the security situation for aid workers. It has been hypothesized that as aid increases in both political scope and magnitude, the security situation for NGOs will
decrease. The qualitative findings presented in this chapter have provided support for all four hypotheses. The structured-focused comparison results corroborate the quantitative results in chapter three, which showed that NGOs were more likely to encounter attacks when engaged in large-scale activity. If workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush while in-transit. These results support the notion that the magnitude of aid also influences insecurity. However, contrary to the quantitative analysis, which showed no relationship between the political activity of NGOs and insecurity, process tracing has revealed that a relationship does exist. Although the quantitative analysis showed that the type of aid being delivered does not influence insecurity, process tracing discovered that the political alignments of NGOs did have an impact.

There were significantly fewer aid workers attacked in Iraq (164) than Afghanistan (1,458). Table 11 compares the motives behind these events in the two countries. Similar to Afghanistan, attacks were predominantly politically-motivated in Iraq. While politically-motivated attacks accounted for 64 percent of all NGO security incidents in Afghanistan, they accounted for 82 percent in Iraq. However, NGOs were much more likely to experience criminal attacks in Afghanistan. Criminally-motivated attacks in Afghanistan accounted for 31 percent of all NGO security incidents, but only 5 percent in Iraq. Aid workers were also proportionally more likely to be the victims of collateral violence in Iraq, which accounted for 13 percent of all incidents in that country compared with only 5 percent in Afghanistan.
Table 11 Structured-Focused Comparison: Afghanistan and Iraq NGO Attack Motives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>NGO Security Incidents</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Criminal</th>
<th>Not Targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 compares attack locations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both countries, aid workers were most likely to come under attack while in-transit (61 percent in Afghanistan and 51 percent in Iraq). NGOs were also relatively unlikely to experience insecurity in public areas, which accounted for only 4 percent of incidents in both countries. Aid workers were more likely to come under attack at project sites in Afghanistan (19 percent) than in Iraq (9 percent). However, the opposite was true for attacks on NGO compounds, which accounted for 36 percent of incidents in Iraq but only 16 percent in Afghanistan.

Table 12 Structured-Focused Comparison: Afghanistan and Iraq NGO Attack Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In-Transit</th>
<th>Project Site</th>
<th>NGO Compound</th>
<th>Public Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, most attacks against NGOs occurred when they were most active in the country between 2003 and 2004. Also consistent with the Afghanistan findings, process tracing has shown that it is not necessarily the type of aid being delivered that results in insecurity, but rather the perception of an NGO’s political affiliation. The quantitative analyses revealed that the type of work NGOs engage in does not appear to be a significant cause of aid worker insecurity. However, process tracing discloses that NGO political affiliations—regardless of their actions—have increased insecurity by compromising the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality.
Although NGOs may be engaged in apolitical projects in the field, many of these organizations are nonetheless associated with various factions in the eyes of most Iraqis. These perceptions have been significantly influenced by Iraq’s history with NGOs. As the *critical antecedent* section has revealed, many NGOs were used to help mobilize against the monarchy in the pre-1958 period. Recognizing the political power of these organizations, the Ba’ath Party placed significant restrictions on NGO activity beginning in 1968. NGOs were further marginalized when the state assumed total control over public welfare following the nationalization of the oil industry in 1972. Meanwhile, between June 1991 and November 1996, NGO support for Kurdish refugees was deemed illegal by Saddam, who viewed them as appendages of the US government. However, NGOs were further politicized by PUK and KDP factions during the Kurdish Civil War. Finally, the US-led invasion made it possible for NGOs to operate in the central and southern regions of Iraq, paving the way for a massive influx of organizations in March 2003.

These six *critical antecedents* helped create an environment for a *critical juncture* that occurred in March-June 2003. In a move that was consistent with Iraqi history, both national and international NGOs began to align themselves with political parties, warring factions, and religious groups of influence. This compromised any perception of independence, neutrality, or impartiality within the humanitarian community, ultimately resulting in politically-motivated attacks against aid workers. Furthermore, although the quantitative analyses revealed a statistically significant relationship between the presence of military engagement in humanitarian assistance and attacks against NGOs, process tracing has shown that—similar to Afghanistan—the PRT initiative in Iraq was actually in response to existing NGO insecurity.
Chapter 7 - Somalia

Somalia is a country in Eastern Africa divided into 18 provinces. Its total area is 637,540 square kilometers, which is slightly smaller than the state of Texas (Metz 1992, 59). The country has a 3,025 kilometer-long coastline, with the Gulf of Aden along its northern border and the Indian Ocean to the east. Somalia shares its borders with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.

The primary ethnic groups within the country are Somali (85 percent), Bantu and other-non Somali (15 percent), and Arab (less than one percent). As of 2014, the population was 10.5 million (World Bank 2016), 99 percent of which are Muslim (Pew 2011a) and less than one percent are Christian (Pew 2011b). The current government consists of a unicameral National Parliament known as the House of the People (NDI 2016). The inaugural House of the People was appointed by clan elders in September 2012. The country’s legal system is a mix of civil law, Islamic law, and customary law.

This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 7.1 provides a brief history of Somalia and section 7.2 is a summary of the most recent conflicts. Section 7.3 is an overview of attacks against aid workers that occurred between 2000 and 2014. This section also answers the structured-focused comparison questions presented in the previous chapters. Section 7.4 uses process tracing to identify the critical antecedents and critical juncture that influenced politically-motivated attacks. Section 7.5 is a summary and discussion of findings.

42 These are technically referred to as “administrative regions” in Somalia.
7.1 A Brief History of Somalia before 1977

When the early Egyptians and Greeks arrived in Somalia (about 2500 BC to 500 BC), the inhabitants of the land would utter the word “Somalidda.” This word meant “milk the domestic animal,” as it was common for the locals to present fresh milk to visitors—an ancient tradition that is still practiced (Aidid and Ruhela 1994, 3). The often repeated word “Somalidda” was taken by the foreign visitors to be the name of the territory. Gradually, the land came to be known by outsiders as “Somaliya” or “Somalia” (Aidid and Ruhela 1994, 3).

Beginning in the tenth century, the coastal zone of Somalia became a passageway for regional commerce centers in southeastern Africa, coastal parts of Arabia, Egypt, Persia, and even China (Lyons and Samatar 1995, 10-11). Muslim Arabs and Persians were the most successful in connecting Somalis to the global trading system, resulting in the spread of Islamic culture throughout the region. As commercial coastal towns acquired importance, town governors were created to provide bureaucratic structure and order. This was the beginning of gradual incorporation of the region into evolving regional and global systems (Lyons and Samatar 1995, 10-11).

Although Islam penetrated the Somali coast as early as the 8th century, the mass conversion of the population did not occur until the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries when Muslim patriarchs arrived and initiated a period of aggressive proselytization in the region (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 8; Samatar 1991, 10). As Muslims, Somalis played an important role in the protracted Jihads that occurred in the late middle ages between Christian Ethiopia and the surrounding Islamic sultanates (Lewis 1981, 2). At the peak of these conflicts in the 16th century, the Somali Islamic leader Ahmad Guray (“Ahmad the left-handed”) briefly conquered much of the central Abyssinian highlands (1529-1543). His army was composed of Somalis,
Arabs, Afars, and Ottoman Turks. Somali participation in these wars has remained a vivid part of folk consciousness in the country (Lewis 1981, 2).

Prior to the colonial period, the Somali people were never organized under a monolithic form of government (Njoku 2013, 48-49). Rather, various systems of indigenous governments existed that differed from clan to clan. Although there was a strong cultural identity among the Somalis, the region’s various systems of government were highly decentralized. This began to change during the colonial period (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 49). France first acquired Obok (in what is now Djibouti) along the northwestern coast in 1862. France’s interest in the region in the 1870s was influenced by its seizure of Madagascar and much of Indochina (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 49).

Somalia’s strategic location on the Horn of Africa was magnified following the opening of the Suez Canal in November 1869 (Njoku 2013, 53-56). European and regional powers, which wanted more control of the coast to support their trade, began to set their sights on the region at this time. Egypt launched a military expedition to Somalia in 1875 (Njoku 2013, 53-56). In 1877, Great Britain signed an agreement with Egypt recognizing its jurisdiction as far south as Ras Hafun, a small territory in the Bari region. One of the parts of the agreement was that Egypt would not cede any part of the Somali coast to a foreign power. At the Berlin Conference on African colonization (1884-1885), Belgium, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal met to divide power and control in Africa. Great Britain, France, and Italy had a particular interest in Somalia. However, Egypt and Ethiopia were determined not to be outplayed by their European counterparts in the region. In a letter addressed to European powers, the emperor of Ethiopia, Menelik II, wrote, “I have no intentions at all of being an indifferent spectator, if the distant Powers hold onto the idea of dividing up Africa. For the past Fourteen centuries, Ethiopia
has been an island of Christians in a sea of pagans...[I]n the past, the boundary of Ethiopia was the sea” (quoted in Njoku 2013, 54).

However, Egypt’s colonial interests in Somalia faced a considerable setback in 1880s following the anti-Egyptian Muslim Mahdist revolt in Sudan. The Egyptians had imposed a Westernized state in Sudan and implemented anti-slavery measures that threatened local economic interests. On 29 June 1881, a Sudanese religious leader named Mohammed Ahmed proclaimed himself the Mahdi and organized an army to wage a holy war against the Egyptians (Stapleton 2012). The Egyptians failed to put down the rebellion, which resulted major victories for the Mahdist forces in the early 1880s. The military and financial cost of the conflict ultimately forced Egypt to evacuate from the Somali region in 1884 (Njoku 2013, 54-56). This left Great Britain, Ethiopia, France, and Italy to compete for power and influence over the region. Following Egypt’s withdrawal, Great Britain moved to fill the power vacuum by dealing directly with coastal Somali clans in 1884. A number of treaties of protection were signed between the British and local rulers of northern Somalia during the 1884-1888 period, marking the beginning of formal British colonization. For the next 14 years, Great Britain indirectly ruled northern Somalia from its Indian colonial territory. The British also began to acquire the southwestern edge of the Somali peninsula as part of its East African sphere of influence (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 49).43 The primary British concern in this region was to safeguard the headwaters of the Nile, which is Egypt’s lifeline.

While Great Britain was establishing treaties of protection in the 1880s, the French were busy doing the same with Somali and Danakil clans in the northwestern part of the region known as Djibouti. The treaties, which were signed between 1884 and 1886, placed these territories

43 This area would later become known as Jubbaland.
under French control so that “they may protect them against all foreigners” (Aidid and Ruhela 1994, 50, 71). Italy followed suit in 1889, signing treaties with Somali rulers from Bender Ziada in the Gulf of Aden in the north to Kismayo to the south. However, unlike the British and the French, Italy did not confine itself to coastal areas. Although Italy was met with firm opposition from Somalis, it was able to conclude treaties of protection with Somalis in Ogaden in 1891 (Aidid and Ruhela 1994, 50). This was followed by the acquisition of Merca in 1893, marking the formal establishment of a colony of Italian Somaliland on the Somali Peninsula (Njoku 2013, 61).

However, Ethiopia’s Emperor Menelik II did not sit aside while the British, French, and Italians consolidated power in the region. As a landlocked territory, Ethiopia needed to safeguard its access to Somalia’s coastal ports, especially the Ogaden passage to the city of Zeila. Menelik II calculated that the only way to fulfill this need within the context of colonization was to carve out his own part of Somalia. As a result, the Ethiopian army raided the Ogaden region of Western Somalia between 1887 and 1897 (Njoku 2013, 62-63). By 1897, Harar and Ogaden were under Ethiopian rule. By maintaining a strong military presence in its occupied Somali lands, Menelik II was able to successfully negotiate treaties with England, France, and Italy between 1894 and 1908. These treaties recognized Ethiopia’s position and guaranteed that the European powers would not challenge Menelik II’s rights over his occupied territories.

Somalia was divided into five parts at the turn of the 20th century (Lewis 2008, 29). The first was in Djibouti, which was under French rule. The second was the British Somaliland Protectorate, which had Hargeisa as its main town. The third was Italian Somalia, with

\[\text{______________}\]

\[44\] This was not an uncommon move, as the two regions had a history of conflict over economic, political, and religious matters dating back to the 13th century.
Mogadishu as its capital, and the fourth was British control over Somalis in northern Kenya. The fifth division was the Ethiopian portion in Harar and Ogaden. These five divisions are represented in the five-pointed white “Star of Unity,” the national emblem later adopted by the Somali Republic at the time of independence in 1960 (Lewis 2008, 29).

The Europeans attempted various styles of administration during colonial rule (Njoku 2013, 65-66). In the first two decades of colonization in Somalia, the primary challenge for each of the powers was to gain and maintain control. In British Somaliland, the colonial order acknowledged “subjects” and “citizens.” Whether one was classified as a subject or citizen was largely dependent on geography. For example, those who lived in cities and coastal towns such as Zeila and Berbera fell under direct British rule and were considered subjects. Meanwhile, those who live in the hinterlands—where the Europeans had little to no contact—were considered citizens. These people continued to live their nomadic lifestyle, and maintained loyalties to their local clan rather than the colonizers (Njoku 2013, 65-66).

Ethiopian rule differed from the Europeans in two major respects (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 54-55). First, given that the majority of Somali people lived inland as nomadic pastoralists, those living in European divisions of the country largely did not fall under direct rule and were therefore not significantly affected by colonization. However, this was not the case with the Ethiopians, who expanded their reach into the heart of Somali pastureland. This decision was influenced by a famine in the Ethiopian highlands that occurred during the 1890s. The Ethiopians thus descended upon the Somali lowlands to recoup their losses from the herds of the Oromos and Somalis. Similarly, Menelik II allowed his warlords to indiscriminately raid livestock for their armies in the Ogaden between 1890 and 1900. The second difference between the Ethiopians and the Europeans was that the former lacked an industrial home base and access
to capital to finance their colonies. This meant that the Ethiopian army was forced to live off the conquered land. It has been estimated that Menelik II seized 600,000 sheep and goats, 200,000 head of camels, and 100,000 head of cattle from Ogaden between 1890 and 1897 (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 55). These frequent and devastating raids despoiled a large portion of Somalis living under Ethiopian rule.

A guerrilla campaign to drive colonists out of Somali territory began to form in 1897 (Njoku 2013, 73-74). Given the aforementioned actions, it is not surprising that the guerilla’s first targets in 1899 and 1900 were the Ethiopians. The leader of the insurgency was Mohammed Abdullah “Mad Mullah” Hassan. Hassan, who is today widely acknowledge as the father of contemporary Somali nationalism, was from a small village in the Ogaden desert region of Western Somalia (Njoku 2013, 73-74). His father was an Islamic scholar who was known for his strict interpretation of the Quran, which Hassan sought to apply in a violent manner among his people. Hassan spent his formative years in Egypt and Saudi Arabia studying under radical Islamic religious leaders. Following one of his many trips to Saudi Arabia in 1895, Hassan returned to Somalia to establish an Islamic state in his homeland free of Christian colonizers (Njoku 2013, 73-74).

Hassan first began preaching sedition in the northwestern coastal port city of Berbera in 1895. However, he was unsuccessful in his efforts, which prompted him to relocate to the interior village of Kob Faradod in the Nugaal Valley two years later (Njoku 2013, 75). He then began to familiarize himself with the politics of Ethiopian rule in the Ogaden territory. Given the widespread unpopularity of Ethiopian rule in the interior of the country, Hassan discovered a much more receptive audience for his teachings than he had in Berbera (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 55-56). Thus, in 1897 he began to lay the groundwork to flush out the Ethiopian
occupations from his native Ogaden land and create an autonomous Dervish State. The eventual uprising (1900-1920) became known as the “Dervish Resistance Movement” (Mohamoud 2006, 61).

Although Hassan initially focused his efforts on the Ethiopian colonists, his struggle expanded to include Europeans following an incident in 1899 (Njoku 2013, 75-76). The incident occurred when a Somali constable, who was employed by the British colonial administration, illegally sold a gun to Hassan. However, he later lied to British authorities that Hassan had stolen the gun from him. This prompted the British vice-consul to dispatch a memo insulting Hassan and demanding that he immediately return the gun. On 1 September 1899, Hassan wrote a reply challenging British rule in Somalia. In this letter, he accused the British of oppressing Islam without cause and demanded that they choose between war and the payment of jizya, the tax due to an Islamic ruler from tolerated infidels. He was immediately proclaimed a rebel (Sanderson 1985, 672).

Hassan’s early calls to jihad appeared to be essentially anti-Ethiopian prior to this letter. However, his first act of war was neither against the Ethiopians nor the British, but rather against fellow Muslims in the Dandariwiiyya section of the Ahmadiyya (Sanderson 1985, 671-674). Hassan looted and destroyed the settlement at Shaykh in September 1899. It has been surmised that this move was intended to impress his followers, while collecting much-need riches and supplies needed to purchase firearms. Shaykh appears to have been chosen simply because it was a soft target. By the summer of 1900, Hassan had developed a fighting forces of 6,000 “regulars” and thousands of more part-time “irregulars” (Sanderson 1985, 674). These men were religious followers who pledged to embrace martyrdom of Islam as defined by Hassan.
The Dervish insurgents were mobile and had the ability to survive on camel’s milk, while government troops were constrained by available water supply. Hassan was therefore able to continue his guerilla attacks, while the British and Ethiopians had difficulty penetrating inland. However, a series of joint British and Ethiopian expeditions between 1901 and 1904 managed to largely quell the Dervish uprising (Sanderson 1985, 674-678). Hassan’s undoing was also the result of the brutal manner by which he attempted to build a centralized Islamic state in Somalia. The raids, looting, and murder of villages and clans resulted in most Somalis being opposed to the Dervish movement (Njoku 2013, 78-79).

Although Hassan and his remaining followers had been inflicted with heavy losses, they nonetheless managed to remain elusive. The British launched various unsuccessful assaults aimed at capturing or killing Hassan between 1913 and 1920 (Njoku 2013, 80-81). In the late 1910s, Somalia presented the British with the opportunity to test its new doctrine of war, which emphasized the use of aircraft as the primary arm. The Royal Air Force (RAF) landed in Berbera in December 1919 in attempt to take out Hassan. A 23-day-long aerial bombardment in Taleh commenced, eliminating thousands of Dervish forces. Hassan and his remaining followers fled to Gorrahei, but the British Camel Corps were able to track him down. In a violent battle, the Corps killed the majority of his remaining followers, including six of his sons, four of his daughters, and two of his sisters. Hassan was able to escape, but he ultimately died from pneumonia in December 1920 following an influenza epidemic that in the region that year (Njoku 2013, 81). As Sanderson (1985, 679) notes, “[Hassan’s] twenty years of defiant and successful resistance were undoubtedly an example and an inspiration for modern Somali nationalists.”
A number of critical events occurred from 1920 to 1940 (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 59). First, the Italians introduced a series of large-scale development projects at this time. These included the introduction of a system of plantation farming, construction of roads, digging of wells, basic health services, and education. These actions diversified southern Somali society, and developed a nascent working class. By 1940, although Benito Mussolini’s plan to turn Somalia into a prosperous new Italy had not been fully realized, “the Italians could point, with justifiable pride, to the fact that they had laid the ground work in their colony for an infrastructure far superior to any in the other Somali colonies” (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 59).

Although the French attempted to develop their Somali territory, their efforts were diminished by the lack of developable substance in their small colony of Djibouti (which is largely a lava-strewn wasteland devoid of agriculture and natural resources). Their development projects were therefore constrained to the construction of a modern port in the town of Djibouti and the extension of a railroad line from the port to the Ethiopian interior (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 60). However, the rail line—which reached the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa in 1917—increased Ethiopian trade and Djibouti soon obtained a commercial preeminence in the region that it still retains as of mid-2016.

In contrast to the Italians and the French, the British and the Ethiopians largely neglected their Somali territories in the years that followed Hassan’s death (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 59-61). For the British, this was partially influenced by the massive amount of funds spent by the empire to suppress the Dervish revolt. The territory was treated as an expendable asset that the British hoped to trade in the future for higher imperial stakes in Ethiopia. As a result of this neglect, the northern part of Somalia significantly lagged behind the south in economic and educational development. The Ethiopians also did not engage in economic or social development
in the Ogaden. Rather, they were content with the periodic seizures of livestock to replenish the dwindling reserves of their military garrisons.

The restoration of Somali unity began during fascist Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 59-62). Between 1935 and 1940, the Italians reunified Ethiopia’s division of Somalia with the Italian southern colony. This brought together Somali clans that had been arbitrarily separated by the Italo-Ethiopian boundaries for 40 years. Furthermore, the Italians expanded their economic and development initiatives to the newly-acquired Oagaden. These included large agriculture projects, the development of roads, basic healthcare, education, and a centralized system of taxation. Thousands of Italians moved to the region and became actively involved in the Somali economy. It is worth noting that no major insurrection against Italian authority occurred during this five-year period.

Following the outbreak of World War II, Italian East Africa invaded and ousted the British from northern Somalia in August 1940. This only added fuel to the fire of Somali reunification. However, the Italian victory was short-lived, as the British returned to northern Somalia in March 1941. The British proceeded to reconquer Ethiopia from Italy and obtain southern Somalia. Following the Italian defeat, all of Somalia—with the exception of French Somaliland—fell under British military control. British rule resulted in the growth of anti-colonial sentiment, which was influenced by two primary factors (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 62-63). The first was the lack of economic growth and development, which soured a large portion of the population. The second was a lifting of the ban on political debate by new colonial administration. This enabled Somalis to politically organize in public meetings, which ultimately contributed to the rise of a new nationalist climate. Out of this nationalist climate a modernist political party known as the Somali Youth Club (SYC) was formed on 13 May 1943. The party,
which later changed its name in 1947 to the Somali Youth League (SYL), had as its goal the reunification and independence of Somalia (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 62-63).

In February 1948, the SYL organized a conference in Mogadishu which was attended by delegates from all of the Somali regions. The result of the conference was a push for Somalia to be united under one administration (Aidid and Ruhela 1994, 68-69). The members submitted a memorandum to the visiting Four Power Commission of Investigation of Ex-Italian Somaliland and the UN Secretary General. However, this was not approved or accepted by Great Britain, Italy, or Ethiopia. Instead, Great Britain unilaterally handed over a portion of western Somali territory, including Ogaden, to Ethiopia on 24 September 1948. In response, riots and spontaneous demonstrations occurred throughout all of Somalia. The colonial administrators took violent action to suppress the popular upheaval, which resulted in the death of several Somalis. In 1950, the UN General Assembly made the decision to allow Italy to administer ex-Italian Somaliland for a period of 10 years under UN trusteeship prior to its independence. This was followed four years later by an agreement in 1954 between Great Britain and Ethiopia to hand over the remaining part of western Somalia to Ethiopia, which was carried out the following year. Once again riots and demonstrations were carried out by Somalis who felt betrayed by their colonial administrators. These moves ultimately resulted in a popular and vigorous push for independence among the Somali people wishing to rid themselves of foreign rule (Aidid and Ruhela 1994, 68-69).

The movement for unification was recognized at the African level in 1958 when the All African Peoples’ Conference “denounced artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist powers to divide the people of Africa” and called for “the adjustment of such frontiers at an early date…founded upon the true wishes of the people” (Aidid and Ruhela 1994, 69). Following the
desires expressed by political leaders in both countries, British Somaliland in the north was prepared for independence so that it could join with Italian Somaliland in the south when it became independent in 1960. The British Protectorate became self-governing on 26 June 1960 and joined Italian Somalia on 1 July to form the Somali Republic (Lewis 2008, 33). The two legislatures met in Mogadishu and formally joined to form the new republic’s national assembly.

However, the problem of blending the British and Italian traditions was a major issue during the first years of independence (Lewis 1981, 6-7). In addition to the language barrier, there were divergences between British and Italian administrative practices, bureaucratic procedure, and law. These differences and issues were not easily resolved, and there was often tension between personnel. A symptom of this friction was an attempted military coup in northern Somalia in December 1961, which was ultimately suppressed by government troops. By the mid-1960s, a considerable degree of integration had been achieved both in politics and administration. As Lewis (1981, 6-7) notes, “The political parties had come to accept the Somali Republic as an established fact and readjusted their alignments correspondingly.”

Somalia’s constitution was approved in a referendum held on 20 June 1961 and legislative elections were held on 30 March 1964. In these elections, the SYL won 69 of 123 seats in the National Assembly, while the Socialist National Congress (SNC) won 22. In June 1967, Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmarke was elected president by the National Assembly (Mullenbach 2016b). However, the development of a Western-style centralized parliamentary system dominated by two parties ultimately produced disorder in a diverse Somali society of various social classes and rival clans (Njoku 2013, 109-111). In a reflection of long-established clan divisions, approximately 1,000 candidates representing 68 political parties emerged by 1969. The majority of these parties were one-man associations representing their family clans and sub-clans
Regardless, the SYL won 73 seats in the National Assembly and the SNC won 11 in the 24 March 1969 legislative elections. This resulted in election-related violence that killed more than 25 people (Mullenbach 2016b).

Only a few months after the new parliament formed in May 1969, President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated on 15 October 1969 by one of his bodyguards. Although the reason behind the assassination is still unclear, the popular assumption is that the murder was connected to how the government apparently mistreated the assassin’s clan during the 1969 elections (Njoku 2013, 110). The political chaos that ensued in the aftermath of the assassination resulted in a Soviet-backed military coup on 21 October 1969 led by General Mohammed Siad Barre. General Barre immediately abolished all political parties, suspended the constitution, and proclaimed himself president of a new country now branded the Somali Democratic Republic (Njoku 2013, 111). He further banned all NGOs and civil society organizations that were not linked to his new government (El Bushra and Gardner 2004, 191).

Members of the coup formed the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) with Barre as its chairman. In the aftermath of the coup, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided 1,500 military advisors to the new Somali government (Mullenbach 2016b). These advisors later helped suppress a popular rebellion on 21 April 1970. The SRC nationalized Somalia’s banks and oil companies on 7 May 1970, which was followed by US-imposed economic sanctions against the government on 1 June 1970 (Mullenbach 2016b).45

Meanwhile, chaos spread throughout Ethiopia following a military coup that removed Emperor Haile Selassie from power on 12 September 1974. In response, pro-Somalia separatist

45 The SRC was dissolved in 1976 and replaced by the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), headed by Barre, on 1 July 1976 (Mullenbach 2016b).
groups sought to take advantage of the chaos in the Ogaden. One of these groups was the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a separatist organization that began to attack government outposts in an attempt to create an independent state free of Ethiopian control. Somalia increased its support to the WSLF and other pro-Somali liberation groups located in the Ogaden (Metz 1992, 184). By backing the separatists, Barre intended to reclaim Somalia’s “lost” Ogaden area. These groups continued to attack Ethiopian outposts over the next two and a half years before Somalia began to send some of its own military units to assist in the fighting. After Somalia committed troops to the Ogaden, the conflict transitioned from a guerrilla campaign to a more traditional war in which mechanized infantry, armor, and airpower played decisive roles (Metz 1992, 184-185).

The war officially began on 13 July 1977 when a Somali military offensive was launched against Ethiopia over the disputed Ogaden region. In what became known as the Ogaden War, 70,000 troops from the Somali Democratic Republic invaded eastern Ethiopia in an attempt to “reunify” Somalia. However, the Soviet Union did not approve of the invasion and thus attempted to broker a ceasefire. When that failed, the Soviets ultimately withdrew their military advisors from Somalia and began to support Ethiopia in the conflict. This was a decisive moment in the war, and eventually turned the tide of battle in favor of Ethiopia (Metz 1992, 185). In response, the United States ceased its support for Ethiopia and began to support Somalia’s efforts.

The Ogaden War resulted in a massive refugee crisis, which prompted Barre to lift his ban on NGOs operating in Somalia (El Bushra and Gardner 2004, 191). It has been estimated that up to two million people were displaced during the conflict (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 146-147). The war lasted less than a year, coming to an end on 15 March 1978 when Somali troops
retreated across the border, thanks in large part to Soviet military support. The Ethiopians suffered 6,133 troops killed, 10,563 wounded, and 3,867 captured or missing (Tareke 2000, 665). The Somalis suffered 6,453 killed, 2,409 wounded, and 275 captured or missing (Tareke 2000, 665).

Until the Ogaden War, Somalia has one of East Africa’s best equipped armed forces. However, much of its fighting capability was destroyed during the 1977-1978 (Metz 1992, 181). The major consequence of Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden War was that the revolutionary regime began to founder. The defeat resulted in deteriorating internal conditions which lost the government much of its domestic support (Metz 1992, 181). Sensing weakness in the government in the aftermath of Somalia’s defeat, Colonel Abdulaahi Yusuf attempted a military coup on 9 April 1978. However, the coup ultimately failed and resulted in the death of 20 government soldiers (Mullenbach 2016b). Although most of the individuals involved in the coup were summarily executed on 26 October 1978, Yusuf and other colonels were able to escape to Ethiopia. It was from there that he formed the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) (later renamed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)) in Addis Ababa in February 1979. The formation of this resistance movement and others ushered in a new era of protracted conflict in the region (Mullenbach 2016b).

7.2 Modern Conflict (1979-Present)

Approximately a year after the Ogaden War, the SRSP won 171 out of 171 seats in the People’s Assembly on 30 December 1979. General Barre was subsequently elected president by the assembly on 26 January 1980. This infuriated much of the population, including Yusuf’s SSF. SSF rebels clashed with government troops on 8 February 1980, which resulted in the death
of 52 Somali soldiers (Mullenbach 2016b). Fighting continued throughout the summer before Barre declared a state of emergency on 21 October 1980. By early 1981, other resistance groups had formulated throughout the region with the assistance of the Ethiopian government. One of the groups was the Somali National Movement (SNM), formed in April 1981 by citizens belonging to the Isaaq clan of northwestern Somalia (Njoku 2013, 131-132). Not only were the Isaaqs politically and economically alienated by the central government, but they produced the majority of livestock that provided the country with the bulk of its foreign earnings.

In the early 1980s, Somalia became part of the US policy of communist containment. Both the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 concerned the US government, which was scrambling for supporters to help combat the spread of communism. It was within this context that the US formed an alliance with Barre’s government in Somalia, which offered access to strategic Somali seaports in exchange for economic and military aid. Assisted by this military aid, Barre launched a program to annihilate the SSF and SNM rebels. These attacks often included the deliberate targeting of civilians (Njoku 2013, 131-132). For example, in 1982 government forces used airpower in an attempt to repel the insurgents who had captured two small towns in the central border areas of Somalia. When this proved difficult, the entire Majerteen clan—rather than the militia—were deemed fair targets by the government. The Isaaq have cited these attacks as justification for their push for independent northern statehood (Njoku 2013, 132).

Relatively small-scale guerrilla attacks occurred throughout Somalia until 1988. From 1988 on, the insurgency escalated into a full-scale civil war following the SNM offensive on government garrisons in Burco and Hargeisa. The government responded in a bloody counteroffensive on the Isaaq clan that killed approximately 50,000 people and forced an
additional 650,000 to flee to Djibouti and Ethiopia (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 10). Between 1988 and 1989, Barre continued his ruthless suppression of the rebels with aid supplied by the US government. However, with the conclusion of the Cold War, the US policy of containment came to an end. Thus, Somali’s strategic importance to the West diminished. As a result, the economic and military aid that had sustained the state was withdrawn. Without this aid, Barre lost control of the government and the military, resulting in his removal from power by the United Somali Congress (USC)—a coalition of intellectuals and disgruntled army officers of the Hawiye clans in south central Somalia—on 17 January 1991 (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 10).46

Somalia descended into chaos after the fall of the government in January 1991. There was widespread civil war among rival political groups and various clans and subclans throughout the region (Njoku 2013, 134-138). For example, a rift developed between groups that collaborated with the USC against Barre. The most influential of these were the USC-Mahdi (also known as the USC-SSA) headed by Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the Abgal subclan, and the USC-Aidid (also known as the USC-SNA) led by Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed of the Habr-Gedir subclan. Both of these subclans were members of the Hawiye clan and the rift was due to an interclan rivalry over political control. The country was further thrusted into disorder when the northern region formally announced its secession from Somalia with the proclamation of the Somaliland Republic on 18 May 1991.47

46 Barre was exiled to Nigeria, where he later died on 2 January 1995.
47 This declaration created a deep rift in Somali politics that remains to this day. However, in 1991 the move insulated Somaliland from the war and famine in the south. This enabled the northern region to begin a process of state-building. That has not been an easy process, as Somaliland experienced two civil wars between 1992 and 1996. Yet today the region has all the attributes of a sovereign state, including its own elected government. However, Somaliland has no international legal status and no country has formal diplomatic relations with it (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 11).
Somalis often use the word “bubur” (catastrophe) to describe the 1991 to 1992 period, when the country was torn apart by clan-based warfare. During a four-month period between December 1991 and March 1992, some 25,000 people were killed in Mogadishu alone, while 1.5 million fled the country and another 2 million were internally displaced (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 10). With the breakdown of law and order, indiscriminate violence, looting, and criminal activity were commonplace. Furthermore, the environmental destruction brought about by continuous fighting, coupled with a severe drought in 1991 and 1992, resulted in widespread famine. The situation was exacerbated by combatants who hoarded food supplies and used starvation as a weapon of war against rival groups (Njoku 2013, 137-138). It has been estimated that 250,000 people died because of the famine between 1991 and 1992 (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 10). In response to these conditions, several new local NGOs formed to help alleviate the suffering (El Bushra and Gardner 2004, 192).

Outside support from the US was belated because of its involvement in the Gulf War. However, the UN imposed an arms embargo against Somalia in January 1992 (UN 2003b). The Secretary-General then negotiated a ceasefire between the USC-Mahdi and the USC-Aidid. In April 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was established to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort those delivering humanitarian relief to distribution centers in the city. But the ceasefire did not last and fighting quickly resumed. In response to the growing insecurity, the Security Council decided to deploy 3,000 additional troops in August 1992 to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid (UN 2003b).

In November 1992, the US offered to lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia. The UN accepted this offer and authorized the use of “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for the relief effort. A coalition of 24 countries led by
the US was formed in December 1992 and called the United Task Force (UNITAF) (UN 2003b). UNITAF quickly secured all major relief centers in Somalia so that humanitarian aid could continue to flow to the region. As will be developed in greater detail in section 7.4.1, NGOs operating in Somalia began to coordinate their activities with the UN at this time. In early 1993, a meeting was convened by the Secretary General between the 14 Somali political movements. A ceasefire was agreed upon and all factions pledged to hand over their weapons to UNOSOM I and UNITAF. In March 1993, the UN decided to transition from UNOSOM I and UNITAF to a new peacekeeping mission, UNOSOM II (UN 2003b). Unlike its predecessor, UNOSOM II was authorized to use force to ensure its mandate of securing a stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. It was also mandated to assist in the reconstruction of economic, social, and political life.

However, UNOSOM II ultimately failed to end hostilities, as fighting between various militia—including those loyal to Aidid—resumed shortly after the 1993 ceasefire. Some of these groups viewed the new UN mission as a threat to their power. Consequently, they took up arms against the peacekeepers in and around Mogadishu. After Aidid’s troops attacked Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 2003, US Special Forces units were tasked with tracking down and capturing Aidid (Gordon and Friedman 1993). But by the time the administration of US President Bill Clinton decided to deploy these units in late August, Aidid had been driven underground. On 3 October, US Army Rangers received intelligence that Aidid’s deputies were meeting in at a location in downtown Mogadishu. They subsequently dispatch several Black Hawk helicopters to capture the men (Gordon and Friedman 1993).

The first part of the operation was a success, as the Rangers caught Aidid’s men by surprise. Twenty-four of his men were captured in the raid (Gordon and Friedman 1993). But
soon thereafter, the lead Black Hawk helicopter was shot down by a rocket-propelled grenade three blocks north of the site. The Rangers consolidated their forces and moved toward the crash site, but as they advanced they came under a barrage of fire from rooftops and alleyways. Suffering mounting casualties, the situation was worsened when a second Black Hawk helicopter was downed two miles south of the first crash. More soldiers were dispatched to the area, but it took until the next morning before they could reach both crash sites. It has been estimated that at least 300 Somalis, including civilians, were killed and over 700 wounded in the firefights (Gordon and Friedman 1993). The US suffered 18 killed and 73 wounded (Bowden 1997).

US military presence in Somalia increased in the immediate aftermath of the two-day battle, but only temporarily. The Clinton Administration was focused on using these forces to help facilitate the withdrawal of US troops from the country, rather than to combat Aidid (Stewart 2002, 24-26). On 6 October 1993, President Clinton directed US forces to stop all actions against Aidid except for those required in self-defense. He also announced that all US forces would withdraw from Somalia no later than 31 March 1994. All UNOSOM II personnel were withdrawn a year later in March 1995. International attempts to reconcile the competing Somali factions had proven futile.\footnote{Aidid later died on 1 August 1996 from injuries he sustained on 24 July 1996 following a clash with a rival militia.}

However, the withdrawal of international troops and decline in foreign aid did not result in a revival of civil war in Somalia. Instead, many clans and factions consolidated their power and ended violent confrontations. These consolidations were predominantly done on a regional basis, the most successful of which occurred in the secessionist Somaliland state in the north (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 12). A byproduct of these developments was the declaration of an
autonomous Puntland Federal State of Somalia in the northeastern region in August 1998.\(^{49}\) In June 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA)—an autonomous militant group with Ethiopian support—won control of Bakool and Bay in the southwestern region of the country and subsequently established their own administration. Meanwhile, in southern Somalia, two separate governments emerged in Mogadishu made up of clan elders in what has been referred to as “governance without government.” Although fragile and uncoordinated, these structures produced improvement in security, so that by turn of the century the situation in Somalia was described as “neither war nor peace” (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 12).

In April and May 2000 a Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) was held in Djibouti, resulting in the formation of an interim central government known as the Transnational National Government (TNG). The SNPC and TNG were opposed by the SRRC. In August 2000, clan leaders and senior figures met again in Djibouti to elect Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president of Somalia. Two months later in October, Hassan and his newly-appointed prime minister Ali Khalif Gelaydh arrived in Mogadishu to announce the formation of a new central government. However, the new government was not universally accepted, and in April 2001 Somali warlords backed by Ethiopia declined to support the TNG (Interpeace 2009, 40-43; BBC 2016a).

Due to continued violence among Somali clans, militia, and warlords, the TNG ultimately failed to establish adequate security or governing institutions. In response, the

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\(^{49}\) Political leaders in northeastern region of Somalia, who were frustrated with the absence of a national government, decided to create the autonomous Puntland state. Colonel Yusuf of the SSDF was selected as Puntland’s first president. However, unlike Somaliland, Puntland is a non-secessionist state, and is therefore supported by the international community. There are territorial disputes between Somaliland and Puntland that have occasionally escalated into violence. Although Puntland has remained a relatively stable polity, it has recently become the home base of Somali pirates (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 12).
government of Kenya led a subsequent peace process in October 2004. This second interim government—known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)—elected Colonel Abdulaahi Yusuf of the SSDF as president. The TFG also included a 275-member parliament known as the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). However, the TFP did not meet for the first time until February 2006 (BBC 2016a). A month later fighting erupted between rival militia in Mogadishu, killing and wounding hundreds of Somali. From May through July 2006, militias loyal to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) overtook Mogadishu in a clash referred to as the Second Battle of Mogadishu. The ICU proceeded to take over additional territory in the south after defeating various clan warlords (BBC 2016a).

Concerned with the Islamist advancement occurring across its border, the Ethiopian government dispatched military forces to Somalia in support of the TFG in July 2006. The war officially began in December when Ethiopian, TFG, and Puntland forces coalesced to fight the ICU and other affiliated militias. Ethiopia sent fighter jets into Somalia and bombed several towns under ICU control. On 24 December Ethiopian Prime Minister Melese Zenawi public stated that his country had been “forced to enter a war” against the ICU that wanted to rule neighboring Somalia by the Koran (Associated Press 2006). Although troops had been in the country since July, this was the first time Ethiopia had acknowledged it was fighting in support of the TFG. Meanwhile, Eritrea, a rival of Ethiopia, tossed its support behind the ICU. Hundreds of Muslims from foreign countries—including al-Qaeda splinter cells—entered Somalia in 2006 after the ICU called upon the Islamic world to help fight a “holy war” (Associated Press 2006; Duhul 2007).

By the end of December, the Ethiopians and TFG retook Mogadishu from the ICU. This was followed by US military airstrikes on ICU and al-Qaida targets in the southern part of the
country in January 2007—the first direct US military engagement in Somalia since 1993 (Duhul 2007). The Islamists were forced to abandon their southern stronghold of Kismayo and President Yusuf arrived in Mogadishu for the first time since taking office in 2004 (BBC 2016a). This was followed by UN approval of a regional peacekeeping force known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to support the TFG. Despite the ICU’s defeat, violence persisted for the next two years as former ICU loyalists, Islamist militants such as al-Shabaab (meaning “the youth” in Arabic), and the newly-formed Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) conducted an insurgent campaign against the Ethiopians and TFG.

As a consequence, Ethiopia announced that its troops would withdrawal from Somalia in November 2008, a process that was completed at the end of January 2009. Over the war’s two-year period, an estimated 15,000 civilians were killed and a further 1.1 million displaced (Civins 2010, 136). Although Ethiopia claimed to have nullified the threat of Islamist rule across its border, much of the country remained in the hands of violent factions. The Ethiopians and TFG were initially successful at defeating the ICU, but the new Islamist-led insurgencies that developed in the aftermath of this defeat proved elusive. The most prominent of these new groups was al-Shabaab, which controlled significant parts of the country at the time of Ethiopian military withdrawal. In a move intended to pacify the Islamist threat, members of the TFP agreed to double its size in January 2009 to 550 seats in order to allow 200 members of the ARS to join

50 Although active in 2005, al-Shabaab became public in early 2006 when the war against clan factions began in Mogadishu. It was part of the military wing of the ICU. The group built itself faster than other factions within the Islamic Courts because it was better organized and had financial support. Al-Shabaab also follows a military doctrine that differs from other militia and warring factions in Somalia. This includes the use of IEDs and suicide bombers (Marchal 2011, 5-7).
the parliament (Rice 2009). In contrast to al-Shabaab, the ARS was considered by the
government to be a moderate Islamic party. A TFG-ARS unity government was thus formed.

The newly-expanded parliament elected the former ICU and ARS chairman, Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed, president of Somalia in January 2009. However, the incorporation of the ARS
into the government and the election of Ahmed did not temper the insurgency. Throughout 2008,
al-Shabaab captured territory at a rapid pace, and by early 2009 it held the majority of territory
south of Puntland. The group established eight administrative districts in these areas and
appointed governors in each. Referred to as “Islamic districts,” each included a Shariah court,
office of financial and social affairs, and an al-Shabaab-approved police force (Anzalone 2014,
389). These governing structures continued to expand between 2009 and 2010. Leaders also
began to direct medium-scale development projects in local communities which included
infrastructure projects, humanitarian relief, and education. Al-Shabaab also built up a media
apparatus, to include terrestrial radio stations, video production, websites, and a media office
(Anzalone 2014, 389-390). As will be discussed in section 7.4.2, all NGOs operating in al-
Shabaab-held territory were required to have their projects approved by the insurgents prior to
implementation. This was to make sure clans and regions not deemed loyal to al-Shabaab would
not receive assistance. Furthermore, NGOs had to pay a substantial tax to al-Shabaab in order to
operate. Those aid workers who did not abide by these rules were subject to attack.

Some have referred to the 2009-2010 period as the “golden age of al-Shabaab” in
Somalia (Hansen 2013, 73). But after enjoying two years of territorial expansion and military
success against the Somali government, the group began to experience setbacks during the
summer of 2010. In an effort to completely overtake the Somali government and AMISOM
forces in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab launched a majority military campaign on 23 August 2010
known as the “Ramadan Offensive.” The campaign lasted for a year and included both mass infantry attacks and targeted suicide bombings. Although hundreds of people died on both sides, al-Shabaab suffered significant losses. The group was forced to withdraw from the capital city on 6 August 2011, although fighting continued in the suburbs through the fall (Anzalone 2014, 390).

Dissent and discontent grew within al-Shabaab’s leadership ranks in the aftermath of the Ramadan Offensive failure (Anzalone 2014, 390-391). This was exacerbated following a military offensive on the group by the Somali government and African Union forces in February 2011, followed by the invasion of southern Somalia by Kenyan and Ethiopian militaries in October 2011. The 2011 famine also significantly damaged al-Shabaab’s public image among the populace, as the group actively prevented humanitarian organizations from operating in its territory. The famine was caused by a severe drought, but worsened by al-Shabaab. The organization denied to the international community that a famine existed, and refused to let aid agencies in to assess the situation (BBC 2013).

In an effort to bolster its image among the local populace, al-Shabaab attempted to provide aid on its own to people living in areas under its control. These efforts ultimately failed, forcing tens of thousands of Somalis to flee al-Shabaab-held territories in search of basic food and water. It has been estimated that nearly 260,000 people died as a result of the famine (BBC 2013). By January 2012, Ethiopian forces had taken control of Beledweyne and Baidoa. These setbacks forced the group to strengthen its ties to jihadist networks outside of Somalia. Although long affiliated with al Qaeda, al-Shabaab officially pledged allegiance to the militant Islamist organization in February 2012 (CNN 2012). In October 2012, the group faced further setbacks when Kenyan forces seized Kismayo.
These setbacks significantly damaged al-Shabaab’s stranglehold on central and southern Somalia. However, despite the losses, the group maintained a hold on large parts of the region. Shifting back to clandestine guerrilla tactics as a result of its 2010-2012 defeats, al-Shabaab continued to keep the Somali government and AMISOM from solidifying control over the country (Anzalone 2014, 393). This prompted the Somali military, AMISOM, and the US military to launch Operation Indian Ocean on 16 August 2014. The joint operation, which is still active as of mid-2016, is aimed at eliminating the remaining al-Shabaab-held territories in Somalia (Al Jazeera 2014). The offensive is called Operation Indian Ocean because a major component of the initiative is to deny the insurgent group any access to the sea in order to stop the flow of illegal arms shipments to Somalia.

Al-Shabaab has suffered significant setbacks since Operation Indian Ocean commenced. On 1 September 2014, a US airstrike killed the leader of the group, Moktar Ali Zubeyr (Associated Press 2014). Soon thereafter, the government of Somalia announced a 45-day amnesty to members of al-Shabaab. Within a month, over 700 members surrendered to the federal government (Goobjoog News 2014). This was followed by the defection and surrender of multiple senior commanders in early 2015 (Goobjoog News 2015). By 2016, the group had withdrawn from all major cities and only maintained control over a few rural areas. Major ground offenses by the Somali military and AMISOM, coupled with US drone airstrikes targeting senior militants, have brought the country closer to full federal control (VOA 2015).

7.3 Insecurity of NGOs in Somalia, 2000-2014

Somalia ranks third in overall NGO security incidents over the past 15 years, behind only Sudan and Afghanistan. In total, 167 attacks occurred between 2000 and 2014, affecting 288 aid
workers. According to figure 7.1, 124 aid workers were killed, 97 abducted, and 67 wounded. Of the aid workers abducted, 64 percent were later released, 18 percent were killed, 16 percent were rescued, and 2 percent escaped. Those individuals who were abducted and later murdered by their captors remain under total “abducted.”

Figure 7.1 Aid Workers Attacked in Somalia by Attack Type, 2000-2014

As figure 7.2 shows, NGOs primarily experienced insecurity in Somalia between 2007 and 2011. This coincides with the rise, dominance, and decline of al-Shabaab in the country’s central and southern regions. Although violent conflict was present prior to the rise of al-Shabaab, the organization was different from previous warring factions because it directly targeted civilians as a tactic of war. The number of aid workers attacked jumped from zero in 2006 to a high of 73 in 2008. The number of aid workers killed ranged from zero in 2001 and 2006 to a high of 40 in 2008. The number of those wounded increased from zero in 2001 and 2006 to a high of 15 in 2012. Abductions ranged from zero in 2002, 2005, and 2006 to a high of 26 in 2008.
There was variation in attacks at the subnational level, with most incidents occurring in the southern al-Shabaab strongholds. Figure 7.3 highlights the most volatile provinces for aid workers to operate. Unsurprisingly, the 73 incidents that occurred in Banaadir where the capital city of Mogadishu is located was the majority of cases. This was followed by Lower Shabelle with 32 incidents and Lower Juba with 31 incidents. All three of these areas are located in the southern region where al-Shabaab maintained its control. Conversely, only one aid worker was attacked in Awdal, Sanaag, and Togdheer, and two were attacked in Sool. All of these provinces are located in the relatively-stable northern part of the country that is free of al-Shabaab influence and activity. As Figure 7.3 reveals, the security situation for aid workers progressively deteriorated in the country from north to south. Figure 7.4 shows the overall NGO presence. Similar to Afghanistan and Iraq, one of most NGO-populated areas in the country was the capital...
city of Mogadishu in Banaadir province. Banaadir had the most organizations with 45, followed by Woqooyi Galbeed with 44 and Sanaag with 39. The provinces with the fewest NGOs were Bakool with 21, followed by Galguduud with 22 and Middle Juba with 23. Similar to Iraq but unlike Afghanistan, NGO presence in Somalia was not identified to be significantly related to provincial population.

Figure 7.3 Map of Aid Workers Killed, Wounded, and Abducted in Somalia, 2000-2014
Figure 7.4 Map of NGO Presence in Somalia, 2000-2014
7.3.1 Structured-Focused Comparison: Motivations and Locations

The previous section provided an overview of NGO security incidents and NGO presence in Somalia between 2000 and 2014. It revealed that aid workers experienced the most insecurity in Banaadir between 2007 and 2011. This section builds upon these findings by examining the two structured-focused comparison questions. By using a set of general questions, NGO insecurity can be examined across multiple cases in a comparable manner. The questions formulated for structured comparison in this dissertation emphasize the motivations for, and locations of, attacks. The first is: were attacks against NGOs politically- or criminally-motivated? The second is: where did attacks occur at the micro-level?

Following the same collection method used in the previous two case studies, a review was conducted of all news stories pertaining to NGO attacks in Somalia. A content analysis of these reports was used to determine whether specific attacks were politically-motivated, criminally-motivated, or collateral (not targeted). News outlets often speculated whether the motivation behind attacks were political or criminal based on subsequent statements by militant spokesmen and interviews conducted with residents living in the areas in which the events occurred.

The information collected through content analysis reveals that the vast majority of attacks were carried out by perpetrators with a political motive. Figure 7.5 shows that 191 aid workers were the victims of political attacks (67 percent), 61 were victims of criminal attacks (22 percent), and 31 were not specifically targeted (11 percent). Figure 7.6 highlights the evolution in attack motivations over time. While criminally-motivated and “not targeted” attacks remained consistently low, politically-motivated attacks varied during the period. The number of politically-motivated attacks spiked significantly in 2008 before steadily declining in 2012. This
coincides with the rise and decline of al-Shabaab’s influence in Somalia. As will be discussed in section 7.4.2, al-Shabaab targeted several NGOs during this period because they wanted to limit assistance to segments of the population not under their control.

**Figure 7.5** Victim Comparison of Political, Criminal, and Not Targeted Attacks in Somalia, 2000-2014

![Graph showing victim comparison of political, criminal, and not targeted attacks in Somalia, 2000-2014.]

*Note: Information on motives could not be determined for 5 aid workers attacked.*

**Figure 7.6** Aid Worker Victims by Attack Motivation in Somalia, 2000-2014

![Graph showing aid worker victims by attack motivation in Somalia, 2000-2014.]

![Legend for graph showing total, political, criminal, and not targeted attacks.]

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The second structured-focused comparison question concerns the location in which attacks occurred. Following the same method used to answer the first question, a review of local and international news events was conducted to determine where each attack occurred. This information is highlighted in figure 7.7 and figure 7.8. In total, 115 aid workers were attacked in-transit (47 percent), 48 at project sites (20 percent), 45 at NGO compounds (18 percent), and 37 in public areas (15 percent).

Figure 7.7 Aid Worker Attack Locations in Somalia, 2000-2014*

*Note: Location information could not be determined for 43 aid workers attacked.
The two structured-focused comparison questions reveal that aid workers operating in Somalia were most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit to or from project sites. It is reiterated here that if workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, thus making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. Thus, the findings that aid workers are most likely to come under attack in-transit bolster the quantitative results in chapter three, which showed that NGOs were more likely to encounter attacks when engaged in large-scale projects. Moreover, attackers are likely to target NGOs in-transit because of the lack of military and police presence in these areas. Also similar to the previous cases, attacks on NGO compounds were relatively low. This may be the result of armed security personnel typically located at these sites, which can serve as a deterrent to potential attackers.
7.4 Process Tracing

The following section covers specific historical events that have influenced contemporary insecurity in Somalia. As outlined in chapter four, Slater and Simmons’ (2010) methodology is used to identify critical antecedents that preceded the attacks and influenced critical junctures in which the targeting of aid workers became a tactic of militants. Similar to Afghanistan—and unlike Iraq—the number of NGOs that were victims of criminal activity in Somalia was significant, accounting for approximately a quarter of all incidents. Therefore, this section covers two divergent outcomes that that were a result of the critical juncture.

7.4.1 Critical Antecedents

The previous section revealed that 167 attacks against NGOs occurred between 2000 and 2014 in Somalia, affecting 288 aid workers. Most of these happened following the advent of al-Shabaab in 2006. However, prior to this period, multiple incidents occurred that influenced these attacks. These eight critical antecedents are highlighted in figure 7.9 and include the following events: (1) President Barre’s ban on NGOs in 1969; (2) the lifting of the NGO ban in 1979 in response to the Ogaden War refugee crisis; (3) NGO complicity with Barre’s regime in the 1980s; (4) NGO human rights abuse revelations in 1989; (5) NGO engagement in political activity beginning in 1991; (6) the emergence of clan-specific NGOs during the 1991-1992 famine; (7) NGO calls for military intervention in 1992; and (8) NGO coordination with UN missions between 1992 and 1995.

Following the Soviet-backed military coup on 21 October 1969, General Barre proclaimed himself president of a new country now branded the Somali Democratic Republic. In addition to abolishing all political parties and suspending the constitution, Barre also banned all
civil society organizations that were not linked to his government. However, this ban was lifted after the outbreak of the Ogaden War (1977-1978) and subsequent refugee crisis (El Bushra and Gardner 2004, 191). It has been estimated that up to 2 million people were displaced during the conflict. Although the Somali government established multiple refugee camps in response to the crisis, it soon became apparent that additional resources were needed to deal with the problem. In September 1979, the government appealed to the UN and international NGOs for humanitarian assistance (Laitin and Samatar 1987, 146-147).

**Figure 7.9 Tracing the Causal Path: Somalia**

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<th>Critical Antecedents</th>
<th>Critical Juncture</th>
<th>Divergent Outcome</th>
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<td>• 1969 Barre bans NGOs</td>
<td>• 2006 Rise of al-Shabaab and NGO restrictions</td>
<td>• Politically-motivated attacks against NGOs</td>
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<td>• 1979 NGO ban lifted because Ogaden War</td>
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<td>• Criminally-motivated attacks against NGOs</td>
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<td>• 1980s NGO complicity with Barre regime</td>
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<td>• 1989 NGO human rights revelations</td>
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<td>• 1991 NGOs engage in political activity</td>
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<td>• 1992 NGO calls for military intervention</td>
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<td>• 1992-1995 NGO coordination with UN</td>
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International NGOs first arrived in Somalia in 1980 to assist with the refugee crisis. In the wake of the international NGO influx, the first indigenous Somali NGOs also began to form in the early 1980s. However, unlike their international counterparts—which predominantly worked in refugee camps—national NGOs focused their efforts on healthcare and income-
generating projects in and around Mogadishu (Abdillahi 1997, 1). In 1988, the sector expanded when the World Bank established a $3 million fund as seed money to encourage local NGOs to implement basic social service projects. This was followed by the establishment of the Management Unit for Supervision and Training (MUST) by USAID to work with local NGOs implementing agency-funded projects (Abdillahi 1997, 1). Officially, there were only 18 NGOs operating in Somalia in 1988 (Pérouse de Montclos 2005, 291-292).

Although no longer banned from working within Somalia, NGOs operated under constant surveillance and scrutiny by Barre’s government throughout the 1980s (El Bushra and Gardner 2004, 191). As some have observed, strict governmental control damaged the perception of NGOs as independent, impartial, or neutral actors. Beinart (1995) has noted that the need for government approval in Somalia during the 1980s led many aid agencies to condone, or even participate in, the corrupt networks and repressive strategies of Barre’s regime. For example, UN envoys observed that the government was distributing guns through refugee camps to help fight its civil war. The Somali government also banned all foreign journalists from the country in May 1988 after serious fighting began with the SNM (Battiata 1989). Beinart (1995) suggests that NGO complicity with government repression decimated civil society and sowed clan hatred, which ultimately led to the civil war that followed Barre’s removal from power in 1991. Only a single NGO—a small Australian group called Community Aid Abroad that was working in the sectors of agriculture and healthcare—publicly spoke out against Barre’s human rights record and left the country in protest in January 1989 (Bone 1989; Beinart 1995).

Community Aid Abroad had a major impact on foreign aid flows to the country. In response to the organization’s accusations that Barre was conducting a “scorched earth” strategy against northern civilians, the US Congress moved to block more than $55 million in economic
aid to Somalia. Great Britain also suspend $9 million in foreign aid, citing concerns about human rights violations (Battiata 1989). Throughout the 1980s, Barre was able to conduct a ruthless suppression of rebels with military and economic aid supplied by the US government. Over a 10-year period, the US supported Barre with $200 million in military aid and several hundred million more in economic assistance. To put this in perspective, the entire annual Somali GNP was only $950 million in 1988 (Ederer 1993, 6-7). However, the human rights violations brought to light by Community Aid Abroad, coupled with the end of the Cold War, resulted in the withdrawal of this assistance. In the absence of aid, Barre lost control of the government and the military, resulting in his removal from power by the USC on 17 January 1991 (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 10).

The fifth critical antecedent was the involvement of NGOs in political activities in the early 1990s. As one report notes, NGOs that were established at this time “played crucial roles in conflict resolution and in the process of pacification…NGOs [were] digging wells or building schools in rural areas as well as shar[ing] their counseling with the traditional elders in the area” (Social Watch 2010). However, the most widespread characteristic among these new groups was the tendency for many of them to be clan or sub-clan specific (El Bushra and Gardner 2004, 192).

Since many local NGOs were clan-specific, they were not viewed as independent, neutral, or impartial entities when the country was torn apart by clan-based warfare in 1991 and 1992. As pointed out earlier, 25,000 people were killed in Mogadishu alone between December 1991 and March 1992, while 1.5 million fled the country and another 2 million were internally displaced (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 10). The environmental destruction brought about by continuous fighting, coupled with a severe drought, resulted in a widespread famine that killed
an estimated 250,000 people between 1991 and 1992 alone (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 10). Since many Somali NGOs held allegiances to specific clans and sub-clans, the aid they distributed was inextricably linked to the conflict. Combatants would hoard food supplies from international donors and dictate which clans would receive assistance. Starvation was used as a weapon of war in the early 1990s to punish rival groups (Njoku 2013, 137-138).

Even NGOs without allegiances to any clan found it impossible to maintain a perception of independence, neutrality, and impartiality. Analyzing the Somali civil war between 1991 and 1992, Møller (2009, 27) observed that “not everybody can be helped all the time, necessitating choices of whom to help and whom not—and the recipient of assistance will usually be able to transform humanitarian assistance somehow into politically or even militarily relevant assets, thereby strengthening themselves relative to their adversaries.” Regardless of the apolitical intentions behind foreign aid being delivered to Somalia, assistance was used as a tool of war and thus viewed through a political lens. As some have noted, “the international community and the US discovered in the early 1990s [that] getting humanitarian aid to needy Somalis is not an apolitical undertaking. It may not even be possible without being drawn into conflict” (Zimmerman 2011).

Within this context, international NGOs were largely unable to operate in Somalia without coming under attack. As a result, all but a few international aid agencies withdrew from Somalia in early 1992. The few NGOs that remained included Kinderdorf, CARE, Save the Children UK, World Vision, and MSF (Weiss 2005, 61; Njoku 2013, 138). It was during this period of intense conflict that UNOSOM I was established to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort those delivering humanitarian relief to distribution centers in the city. The UN Security Council decided to deploy 3,000 additional troops to the country in August 1992 to
protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance (UN 2003b). In October, the international NGO Oxfam America released a statement calling for greater armed intervention to enable the secure supply of humanitarian aid to the Somali people. At the end of November, Oxfam America’s executive director led a delegation of NGOs in a White House briefing advocating once more for armed intervention. That same month, President George H.W. Bush—buoyed by initial success after northern Iraq—proposed a US military mission to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia (Ederer 1993, 18). The UN accepted this offer and authorized the use of “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for the relief effort. As detailed previously in this chapter, UNITAF was formed and deployed on 9 December 1992. Brubacher (2004, 12) highlights that NGOs took an “overtly political and non-neutral stance” when they advocated for military intervention and the use of force to protect civilians in Somalia in 1992.

But not all NGOs agreed with Oxfam’s call for a humanitarian military intervention. In general, European NGOs opposed the action, while more than two dozen large American NGOs endorsed the move (Rutherford 2008, 96). NGOs even disagreed internally. For example, following the announcement that US troops would deploy to Somalia, Save the Children UK criticized the US effort. Conversely, Save the Children US endorsed the effort. To compound the confusion, both made their views public to the media at the same time (Rutherford 2008, 96).

Although some NGOs criticized the intervention, the US military enabled many international NGOs that had withdrawn from Somalia to return. The military also undertook an unprecedented outreach effort to these organizations (Rutherford 2008, 96). NGO leaders were often invited to extensive briefings by senior US military commanders on operations in Somalia. The US military also conducted after-action briefings for NGOs on lessons learned. However, the US military was not the primary deliverer and facilitator of the aid being delivered (Weiss
Rather, they supported the humanitarian effort logistically by transporting food to local airstrips where NGOs would then distributed it. Within a month UNITAF had secured all major relief centers in Somalia so that humanitarian aid could continue to flow to the region, and hunger was eradicated by early spring 1993 (Ederer 1993, 18).

The last critical antecedent was coordination of humanitarian activities between NGOs and the UN from late 1992 to 1995. First, the UN decided to transition UNOSOM I and UNITAF to UNOSOM II in March 1993. Unlike its predecessor, UNOSOM II was authorized to use force to ensure its mandate of securing a stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. It was also tasked with assisting in the reconstruction of economic, social, and political life in Somalia (UN 2003b). The UN deployed up to 30,000 military and logistic personnel after the withdrawal of UNITAF in May 1993. UNOSOM II forces provided security escorts for humanitarian convoys, implemented community development projects, and provided food and medical aid to Somali civilians. Thus, to carry out the humanitarian portion of its mandate, UNOSOM II combined its efforts with international and national NGOs that were used as implementing partners. A UN Coordination Team (UNCT) was established to harmonize the activities of UN and NGO activities in Somalia. Over the next two years, the UN and its NGO partners distributed food and clean water, resuscitated agricultural production, provided healthcare, established primary educational programs, and helped to reintegrate refugees and IDPs (UNSC 1995, 7-11).

However, the UN mission in Somalia in the mid-1990s was not an independent, neutral, or impartial operation. Tension between the UN and Aidid began with UNISOM I. In 1992, Aidid’s forces were more powerful and numerous than Mahdi Mohamed’s. Aidid thus believed that without international intervention, he would win the conflict (Weiss 2005, 63). Furthermore,
Aidid associated the UN efforts with Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had been the deputy foreign minister in Egypt. He therefore also believed that there were UN political ambitions in Somalia. Contrarily, Mahdi Mohamed was enthusiastic about UN involvement. Relations between the UN and Aidid further soured in October 1992 when it was alleged that the UN was suppling Mahdi Mohamed with weapons and currency through its military airlifts. In late October, Aidid expelled the UN humanitarian coordinator. This was followed by a steadily-increasing number of attacks against the UN force (Weiss 2005, 63).

In October 1992, the Swedish Life and Peace Institute (LPI) sponsored a peace conference with the heads of local NGOs and UN representatives to discuss reconciliation in Somalia. Aidid condemned the conference and threatened to direct violence toward all clan members who wished to attend (Menkhaus 1997, 48). Disagreements between the UN and Somali militiamen led to several clashes in Mogadishu. In one instance, 24 UNOSOM II soldiers from Pakistan were killed in June 1993 (UN 2003c). A UN resolution (837) was quickly passed calling for the arrest of those responsible for the attack. Between June and October, UNOSOM II and US military forces engaged in a war against Aidid (Weiss 2005, 67-68). Given the strong ties between the UN and aid agencies, many NGOs were viewed as an appendage of the UN by Aidid and his militia. Following an increase in attacks, NGOs eventually attempted to dissociate themselves from the UN efforts in Somalia. Glad (2012, 8) notes that “Association with the UN in the context of Somalia is considered to potentially compromise access and security of staff, hence public association to the UN is avoided.”

In sum, eight critical antecedents preceded the significant increase in NGO attacks that occurred in Somalia after 2006. Although aid workers experienced insecurity throughout the
1990s and early 2000s, attacks increased substantially following al-Shabaab’s rise to power in 2006. This critical juncture is assessed in the following subsection.

7.4.2 Critical Juncture

Each of the eight critical antecedents preceded the significant increase in NGO attacks that occurred in Somalia after 2006. Although aid workers experienced insecurity throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, attacks increased substantially following al-Shabaab’s rise to power in late 2006. The rise of al-Shabaab influenced both politically- and criminally-motivated attacks against aid workers. The two divergent outcomes that resulted from this critical juncture are assessed in the following subsections.

7.4.2.1 Political Divergent Outcome

In the early 2000s, Islamist militia began to form throughout central and southern Somalia. This led to multiple attacks against aid workers by militants who wanted to expel them from the country. For example, two serious incidents occurred in October 2003 (Lewis 2008, 98). In the first, a female Italian medical volunteer— with several years of experience working in Somalia—was shot at the hospital she had founded for tuberculosis and AIDS treatment. In the second incident, two British teachers were shot at a secondary school. The Islamists who were found responsible for the attacks were opposed to females working for NGOs and “infidel” non-Muslims teaching Somalis.

However, although the rise of Islamist movements in the early 2000s resulted in decreased security for NGOs, the majority of attacks were sporadic and uncoordinated efforts often carried out by fundamentalist individuals. It was not until the rise of al-Shabaab in late
2006 when aid workers became a primary target of combatants. As noted previously, al-Shabaab began as a small faction within Somalia’s ICU before splintering off in the wake of the alliance’s demise in December 2006 (Robins-Early 2015). The end of the ICU’s rule “drastically stoked extremist flames and catapulted al-Shabaab—previously a mere fringe movement—into a full-blown insurgency” (Cohn 2010). The group differed from other militia and warring factions in Somalia in that it included the use of IEDs and suicide bombers to specifically target civilians and spread terror (Marchal 2011, 6-7).

As al-Shabaab solidified control of territory in the central and southern parts of Somalia in 2007, the group began to place restrictions on NGO activity. For example, the group only allowed Islamic NGOs to operate in the areas it controlled (UKEUC 2012, 23). Similar to the Taliban, al-Shabaab issued an edict banning all females from working for aid agencies. According to interviews with members of al-Shabaab conducted by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) (Jackson 2014, 2-3), the organization believed that NGOs were not only allied with military efforts against them, but also profited from funds meant to benefit local populations. In fact, the HPG—which also conducted interviews with Taliban leaders in Afghanistan—discovered that al-Shabaab’s attitude towards NGOs was actually less tolerant than that of the Taliban. The interviews revealed that while healthcare services provided by aid workers were the most likely to be welcomed, the sectors of education (especially for women) and road construction were contentious. Opposition to the latter stemmed from the difficulties it posed in planting IEDs.

Although al-Shabaab were responsible for the significant increase in NGO attacks beginning in 2007, they did not target all aid workers. Rather, they provided safe passage and protection for select organizations that met the following criteria: (1) must be Islamic, (2) must
not employ women, (3) all projects must have been approved by al-Shabaab, (4) all NGOs must employ individuals approved by al-Shabaab, and (5) the NGO must pay a monetary fee to help support al-Shabaab insurgency. The fifth criterion was the most controversial within the aid community. However, many complied with the demand in order to gain access. As one manager of an NGO in Mogadishu told Hansen (2013, 91) on condition of anonymity:

In the regions where the Shabaab has absolute control, they demand a percentage of the total project cost. It may range between 5 and 15 per cent depending on the administration and the influence of the local partners implementing the project. A demand is also made on landlords [and] vehicle owners working under a contract with the UN or international [NGOs]. Around 15 per cent of the rent must be paid to the Shabaab if you lease your property to an international [NGO] or the UN. Employees are also instructed to reimburse roughly 5 per cent of their salary on a monthly basis.

Although many international NGOs opposed these demands, it was often the case that local staff working for these organizations complied with the taxation in a roundabout way. For example, a respondent informed Hansen (2013, 91) “I know a case with MSF in Middle Juba: Al-Shabaab told them to pay US$10,000 in contribution for being allowed to stay there. They refused, but they agreed about paying tax in the form of qat. They are still there, doing their work.”51 Fees for NGOs to operate in al-Shabaab’s territory ranged from $500 to $10,000 depending on the size, scope, and location of the project (Jackson and Aynte 2013, 18). The organization frequently required NGOs to complete registration forms and sign a pledge stating that they would refrain from certain social and religious activities, including proselytization. They were also instructed not to engage in any activities that would violate sharia law or contradict al-Shabaab policy. As one aid worker described being told by members of al-Shabaab,

51 Qat (also spelled “khat”) is a leafy plant that acts as a stimulant when chewed. Al-Shabaab has profited from the export and sale of the plant (Grimley 2014).
“We are the government of this area and responsible for your security; unfortunately we do not have enough to pay our soldiers so you should pay us for providing protection” (Jackson and Aynte 2013, 18).

NGOs were also forbidden from engaging in activities that empowered traditional or local leaders outside of al-Shabaab. NGOs were not allowed to hold meetings with the community or clan elders without permission. This restriction was influenced by fear that NGOs would mobilize local communities against the insurgency. Al-Shabaab would also demand to distribute food directly to Somalis. In some instances, there were efforts to prevent all direct contact between NGOs and intended beneficiaries (Jackson and Aynte 2013, 18-19). This was done for two reasons: (1) al-Shabaab wanted to appear as the provider of the assistance in order to garner public support and (2) the organization wanted to dictate who received aid. While many NGOs wanted to deliver aid in an impartial manner based on the needs of various communities, al-Shabaab restricted assistance to individuals and groups loyal to the insurgency. As one local Somali observed, al-Shabaab would also often keep 50 to 75 percent of food aid to give to their fighters. Another local claimed that aid meant for one community was routinely diverted to another, with al-Shabaab members justifying this on the basis that “they knew who was in real need and who was not” (Jackson and Aynte 2013, 18-19).

In areas of the country that the insurgents could not directly control aid distribution, they sought to strongly monitor the activities of NGOs. As noted previously, all NGOs operating in the south-central areas of Somalia were required to employ individuals approved by al-Shabaab. These men were “spies” tasked with monitoring each agency’s work and issuing regular reports to the insurgency (Jackson and Aynte 2013, 19). These spies were often plucked from local communities in which the NGOs operated. One man from Baidoa told HPG interviewers that he
was approached by al-Shabaab to monitor aid activities in the camp he resided in. As compensation, he was given an extra food ration, but was required to maintain constant dialogue with an al-Shabaab representative. He was instructed to inform the group of any “new faces” and report all activities being conducted in the camp. He told interviewers that he believed he would have been killed if he had refused to do so (Jackson and Aynte 2013, 19).

In order to operate within the central and southern parts of Somalia, aid agencies were required to follow the five criteria and engage in routine negotiation with al-Shabaab—often on a weekly, and sometimes daily, basis. NGOs that did not follow these demands opened themselves up to attacks, as Al-Shabaab claimed that they were justified in targeting NGOs that did not adhere to their rules. Attacks began in 2007 with 19 aid worker incidents reported, and spike the following year to 73 (see figure 7.2 presented earlier in this chapter).

There was a substantial drop-off in attacks against aid workers from 73 in 2008 to 24 in 2009. This was influenced by two developments. First, in response to the increase in attacks between 2007 and 2008, many NGOs moved out of al-Shabaab controlled territory in the southern and central parts of the country. Aid agencies instead disproportionately concentrated their efforts on the more peaceful northern part of Somalia where they were less likely to encounter insecurity (Jackson 2014, 2). Second, al-Shabaab expelled several NGOs from the south in 2008 for allegedly gathering intelligence for the CIA. Among the organizations banned were the International Medical Corps (IMC) and CARE (Ferreiro 2012). Another drop in attacks occurred in 2011 when al-Shabaab banned 16 additional aid organizations from central and southern Somalia. The accusations levied against the NGOs included the misappropriation of funds, collection of data, and work with “international bodies” to promote secularism, immorality and the “degrading values of democracy in an Islamic country” (Al Jazeera 2011).
7.4.2.2 Criminal Divergent Outcome

As figure 7.6 and the content analysis reveal, criminal attacks against NGOs in Somalia have remained relatively consistent over time. Although there was a slight increase in criminal activity following the rise of al-Shabaab in 2006, the attacks have paled in comparison to those of a political motivation. Still, 61 aid workers were the victims of criminal attacks between 2000 and 2014, accounting for 22 percentage of all incidents. The critical antecedent that preceded the targeting of NGOs by criminals was lavish NGO expenditures in the 1990s.

When international NGOs returned to Somalia in 1993, many had expansive budgets supported by Western governments. As a result, they were able to pay local staff large fees for their services. Numerous NGOs paid their Somali security guards more than $100,000 per month (Rutherford 2008, 94). Organizations also paid approximately $2,500 per month per vehicle they rented (Rutherford 2008, 94). Given that a large amount of money was associated with international NGOs, many became the targets of common criminals.

However, the critical juncture for criminal attacks occurred following the rise of al-Shabaab in 2006. As Kambere (2012) has noted, looting NGOs that operate in areas controlled by al-Shabaab is a way that the group survives financially. The organization will also hire criminals to abduct aid workers for ransom in order to boost al-Shabaab’s finances. While no aid workers fell victim to criminal attacks in 2005 and 2006, 8 criminal incidents occurred in 2007 and 11 in 2008. Although NGOs who paid taxes and fees to al-Shabaab are largely protected from these attacks, independent organizations became victims of looting and abductions by criminal elements after 2006.
7.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings

This dissertation theorizes that the type and magnitude of aid that NGOs deliver in conflict zones influences the security situation for aid workers. It has been hypothesized that as aid increases in both political scope and magnitude, the security situation for NGOs will decrease. The qualitative findings presented in this chapter have provided partial support for all four hypotheses. The perceptions of aid workers have been influenced by Somalia’s history with NGOs. As the critical antecedent section has revealed, Barre banned NGOs after coming to power in 1969. However, this ban was lifted in 1979 following the refugee crisis caused by the Ogaden War (1977-1978). Most of the NGOs that operated in Somalia throughout the 1980s were complicit with Barre’s regime, which damaged their perception as independent, neutral, and impartial actors. However, in 1989 Community Aid Abroad publicly spoke out against Barre’s human rights abuses, which resulted in a decrease in foreign aid to Somalia. After the fall of the Barre regime, many NGOs began to engage in political activities such conflict resolution and peacebuilding in 1991. This was followed by the emergence of clan-based NGOs in 1991 and 1992 that strictly provided relief and assistance to their respective communities. In 1992, international NGOs abandoned core principles and called for Western military intervention in Somalia. Subsequently, many NGOs coordinated their activities with the UN between 1992 and 1995.

These eight critical antecedents helped create an environment for a critical juncture that occurred in 2006. Given the history of political involvement by NGOs in Somalia, al-Shabaab was wary of aid agencies not under its control. Attacks in Somalia were primarily the result of al-Shabaab’s desire to control the distribution of all aid after their 2006 rise to prominence in the central and southern regions of the country. If NGOs provided aid to communities in an
independent, neutral, and impartial manner, they opened themselves up to attacks from insurgents and clan-specific militia that desired to use aid as a weapon of war. Al-Shabaab used starvation as a means to punish communities that did not submit to their authority. Therefore, in the case of Somalia, strict adherence to core principles actually resulted in an increase in politically-motivated attacks.

Table 13 compares the motives behind attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. Similar to Afghanistan and Iraq, attacks were predominantly politically-motivated in Somalia. Politically-motivated attacks accounted for 82 percent of all NGO security incidents in Iraq, 67 percent in Somalia, and 64 percent in Afghanistan. NGOs were proportionally more likely to experience criminal attacks in Somalia than in Iraq, but less likely to encounter these instances when compared with Afghanistan. Criminally-motivated attacks accounted for 31 percent of all NGO security incidents in Afghanistan and 22 percent in Somalia, but only 5 percent in Iraq. Aid workers were also proportionally more likely to be the victims of collateral violence in Somalia than in Afghanistan, but less likely when compared with Iraq. “Not targeted” attacks accounted for 13 percent of all NGO security incidents in Iraq, 11 percent in Somalia, and 5 percent in Afghanistan.

Table 13 Structured-Focused Comparison: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia NGO Attack Motives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>NGO Security Incidents</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Criminal</th>
<th>Not Targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 compares attack locations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. In all countries, aid workers were most likely to come under attack while in-transit (61 percent in Afghanistan, 51
percent in Iraq, and 47 percent in Somalia). Aid workers were more likely to come under attack at project sites in Afghanistan (19 percent) and Somalia (20 percent) than in Iraq (9 percent).

However, the opposite was true for attacks on NGO compounds, which accounted for 36 percent of incidents in Iraq but only 16 percent in Afghanistan and 18 percent in Somalia.

**Table 14** Structured-Focused Comparison: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia NGO Attack Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In-Transit</th>
<th>Project Site</th>
<th>NGO Compound</th>
<th>Public Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 8 - Colombia

Colombia is a South American country divided into 32 provinces. Its total area is 1,138,910 square kilometers, which is slightly less than twice the size of Texas. The country has a 3,208 kilometer-long coastline, with the Caribbean Sea along its northern border and the Pacific Ocean to the west (Hanratty and Meditz 1988, 60). Colombia shares its borders with Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama. The primary ethnic groups within the country are mestizo and white (84 percent), Afro-Colombian (10 percent), and Amerindian (3 percent). As of 2014, the population was 47.8 million (World Bank 2016), 92.5 percent of which are Christian (Pew 2011b). Colombia is a presidential republic with a chief executive who is directly elected by absolute majority vote for a four-year term. The legislature is a bicameral congress consisting of a Senate with 102 seats elected nationally (not by district or state) to four-year terms and a Chamber of Representatives with 166 seats elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to four-year terms (Ramirez 2007).

As noted previously, this dissertation defines a “high-risk conflict zone” as an intrastate conflict with 1,000 or more deaths in a given year. Colombia serves as the “negative” case study in this dissertation. Of the countries considered “high-risk” for a minimum of five years between 2000 and 2014, Colombia had the least amount of NGO security incidents. In total, 25 aid workers were either killed, wounded, or abducted in Colombia between 2000 and 2014. This is significantly lower than the 1,458 aid workers killed, wounded, or abducted in Afghanistan, 288 in Somalia, and 164 in Iraq. Since no country that experienced sustained conflict during the

52 These are technically referred to as “departments” in Colombia.
period under analysis had zero attacks against NGOs, Colombia serves as the “negative” case because it was the safest “high-risk” country for aid workers to operate in.

This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 8.1 provides a brief history of Colombia and section 8.2 is a summary of the most recent conflicts. Section 8.3 is an overview of attacks against aid workers that occurred between 2000 and 2014. This section also answers the structured-focused comparison questions presented in the previous chapters. Section 8.4 uses process tracing to identify the critical antecedents and critical juncture that led the decision by militants not to engage in politically-motivated attacks against aid workers. Section 8.5 is a summary and discussion of findings.

8.1 A Brief History of Colombia (1499-1963)

Although Colombia derives its name from Christopher Columbus, he was not the first to visit its shores (Eder 1913, 13). Rather, it was Alonso de Ojeda and Juan de la Cosa—both of whom had accompanied Columbus on his second voyage—who first reached what is today Colombia in 1499. Their expedition initially arrived at the coast of Guiana and continued to sail northwest to parts not yet explored by Columbus. Ojeda soon entered the Gulf of Maracaibo and named the region Venezuela (little Venice). Proceeding further along the coast, he rounded Cape de la Vela and became the first to touch what is now Colombian soil. However, the condition of his ships prevented further advancement. Juan de la Cosa and Rodrigo de Bastidas completed the discovery of the Colombian coast the following year (Eder 1913, 13).

53 The Spaniards sought the riches of the New World, but were also motivated by the opportunity to “save” Indian souls through the Church and civil authorities (USDA 1961, 10).
King Ferdinand later decided to found colonies in the region and awarded Ojeda’s a grant of the country from the Gulf of Urabá to the Cape de la Vela, under the name Nueva Andalucia. Ojeda arrived in Cartagena in 1509 intending to found a colony. However, he was met with resistance from the natives who, as Eder (1913, 14) notes, “were neither abashed by the reading of the stately and formal proclamation, wherein [Ojeda] called upon them, in the name of the Pope and the Catholic King of Castile, to embrace Christianity and serve and obey the King, nor intimidated by the dire threats with which the proclamation wound up.” Fighting erupted between the natives and Ojeda’s men. Among those who were killed was Juan de la Cosa, who was struck by a poison arrow. Realizing the difficulties of establishing a colony in Cartagena, Ojeda moved to the Gulf of Urabá where he founded the town of San Sebastian in 1510. However, the hostility of the natives kept the Spaniards fortified, which resulted in widespread hunger and disease (Eder 1913, 14). Ojeda left San Sebastian in search of supplies, leaving in charge Francisco Pizarro who decided to abandon the settlement (USDA 1961, 11).

Neither San Sebastian nor other settlements in the Gulf of Urabá were permanent, but lasting footholds did develop later along the coast (Bushnell 1993, 7-8). The oldest Spanish city in Colombia, Santa Marta, was founded by Rodrigo de Bastidas in 1525. By 1527 the settlement was secure, and thereafter the Spaniards used Santa Marta as a base from which they could move further inland. They eventually conquered the northern Andes region, including the high valleys of the Eastern Cordillera (USDA 1961, 12).

In 1529, Emperor Charles V sent Governor García de Lerma to the region to help facilitate the transition from military to civil rule. Cartagena was founded shortly thereafter in 1533 by Pedro de Heredia. Although Heredia established friendly relations with some native leaders, he nonetheless conducted raiding expeditions into the interior. Cartagena soon became
prosperous as the result of gold obtained in the raids, in addition to its status as the most frequently visited port in the region (USDA 1961, 12-13).

The conquest of the northern Andean interior region of Colombia began in the early 1530s from the bases of Santa Marta and Cartagena. The Spanish crown also contracted Germans conquistadors to help penetrate the region’s interior (USDA 1961, 13). However, the most famous exploration movement of the interior was led by Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada. Leaving Santa Marta in April 1536, he reached the town of Chía a year later in April 1537. By August 1538, he had founded a new Spanish settlement known as the City of Granada and a civil government was established (USDA 1961, 13-14). The name of the settlement was later changed to Santa Fé de Bogotá and then to Bogotá, the present-day capital of Colombia. The major achievements of the Spanish interior conquest were accomplished by 1539, although it would take another decade before the area would be consolidated.

After the founding of Bogotá, Calí, and Popayán, a consolidation of the region began, an endeavor that was accomplished by the beginning of the 1550s (USDA 1961, 14-15). The Antioquian region was absorbed, settlements were established in the Upper Magdalena River Valley, the land northeast of Bogotá came within the purview of an embryonic government, and the Cauca River Valley and its adjacent valleys were settled. Even the region around Buenaventura near the Pacific coast fell under rudimentary administration. The consolidated group of Spanish colonial provinces became known as the New Kingdom of Granada in 1550. Although the territory of the New Kingdom predominantly consisted of what is today Colombia, it also included parts of modern-day Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama.

During most of its history, the New Kingdom of Granada was technically subordinate to Peru, but largely functioned autonomously—although it was subordinate to the royal authority
(USDA 1961, 16). The Audiencia Real, established in Bogotá in 1550, provided the Granadine territories as a collective body with political, administrative, and judicial powers. Executive power was centralized in 1564 with the appointment of the first president of the New Kingdom of Granada, Venero de Leiva (1564-1574).

During the late 16th century, Spanish America came into conflict with the rising British Empire. With the consent of the British government, Sir Francis Drake attacked Cartagena in February 1586 (Kraus 1970). Drake held Cartagena for ransom until the Spanish made a payment to recover the town. He later destroyed both Ríohacha and Santa Marta in 1596. The New Kingdom of Granada suffered from numerous attacks and raids from private adventurers throughout the 17th century. Many of these were led by the English buccaneer Henry Morgan, who amassed a fortune through raids on the coast from Venezuela to Panama (USDA 1961, 21).

Although there was a considerable amount of gold in Colombia, the Spaniards never found riches comparable to those in Bolivia and Peru. Therefore, Colombia was relatively neglected during the first two centuries of the colonial period (Holt 1964, 21). However, in 1700 this began to change as the Spanish sought to strengthen their overseas empire. Steps were taken to increase royal authority, enhance trade, and promote intellectual activity stimulated by European influences (USDA 1961, 21). In 1718, the Spanish created the Viceroyalty of New Granada—a jurisdiction consisting of modern Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela—with Bogotá as its capital city. This was the third viceroyalty of Spanish America, after New Spain (Mexico) in 1535 and Peru in 1544 (Freile 1961, 9).

The establishment of the viceroyalty concentrated authority into the hands of a single person, who served as vice patron, governor, general superintendent of the royal revenues, and captain-general of the armies (Henao and Arrubla 1938, 123). By concentrating these powers, an
authority superior to the governors and presidents was created to end the frequent conflicts between regional factions and officials. Furthermore, the creation of the viceroyalty made the territory independent of the viceroyalty of Peru, upon which the New Kingdom of Granada had been dependent. However, the initial viceroyalty only lasted for approximately five years. It was determined that the previous form of government was cheaper, so a return to presidency occurred in 1723 (Henao and Arrubla 1938, 124).

In 1740 a viceroyalty was again established by the Spanish throne, and the colony remained under this form of government until independence. By the mid-1700s, New Grenada had gained a degree of material prosperity. Agriculture had become a major source of revenue for the colony, and cacao and tobacco were exported in large quantities (Eder 1913, 27). Additionally, New Granada was the chief gold-producing country in the Spanish domain during the 1700s, if not the world.

New Granada was relatively peaceful during the 18th century until a revolt occurred in 1781. The Spanish authorities implemented new policies in order to establish stricter control over the colonial government, which included increased tobacco and polling taxes. In response, a rebellion flared in Socorro on 16 March 1781. Refusing to pay the new taxes, approximately 6,000 people attacked government warehouses in the town, drove out Spanish authorities, and elected their own leaders (Loy 1981, 237). The revolt soon spread to Antioquia, Casanare, Neiva, Pamplona, and Tunja. Furthermore, a number of Indians, who were encouraged by Túpac Amaru in Peru, provided their support to the rebellion.

The 20,000-person insurgency marched on Bogotá on 2 June 1781 with a list of demands calling for administrative reforms (Loy 1981, 237). Not wanting the conflict to escalate, officials in Bogotá met the demands on 4 June. In response, the rebel force began to disperse and return.
home. However, when news of the treaty reached Cartagena, the Spanish viceroy disavowed it. On 6 June, the viceroy sent troops from the coast to quash the anti-government sentiment. Many of the rebel leaders were summarily executed. Although the revolt provided food for thought a few years later to intellectuals who aspired for liberty and independence as expounded by the American and French Revolutions, the rebellion of 1781 merely sought reforms and “was in no way a movement for independence” (Eder 1913, 32).

A new viceroy, José de Expeleta y Galdeano, was appointed in 1789. A patron of art and literature, he opened the first primary schools in Bogotá, published the first periodicals, built a theater, and formed clubs for increased literary activity (USDA 1961, 27; see also Blossom 1967). It was within this environment that Antonio Nariño received his education. Born in Bogotá in 1765, Nariño studied philosophy and jurisprudence at San Bartolomé College. It was here that he was exposed to the new doctrines of political liberty that were being espoused in North America and Europe. Nariño became one of the first to foment revolution against Spain in South America, and secretly translated and distributed copies of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. He was arrested and exiled to Africa in 1795 for preaching liberty and independence (USDA 1961, 27). Nariño managed to escape to France and then to England, ultimately returning to New Granada in 1797 to continue his revolutionary activity. He was subsequently arrested and imprisoned again, but this time in Cartagena.

Although the formation of a new state would not be realized until years later, Nariño is recognized as one of the most influential early advocates of independence. As Eder (1913, 32) notes, Nariño’s actions have “given him immortal fame in Colombia under the title of the Precursor.” However, the desire for independence around 1800 was only among a liberal few. There was no popular demand for self-government (Eder 1913, 33). It took an outside
development to trigger the outbreak of the independence movement, which occurred in 1808. At that time, Napoleon deposed the king of Spain, Ferdinand VII, took captive the royal family, and attempted to place one of his own brothers on the Spanish throne as Joseph I (Bushnell 1993, 34). Although Napoleon had successfully established puppet monarchs in other European nations, he faced resistance from the populations of Spain both domestically and abroad. In response to the invasion, various political entities within Spain’s American colonies began to advocate for independence (USDA 1961, 28).

Caracas led the way by setting up its own junta on 19 April 1810, followed by Cartagena on 10 May. Subsequent juntas were created in multiple provinces until Bogotá followed suit on 20 July (Bushnell 1993, 36). The Bogotá junta swore allegiance to Ferdinand VII, but claimed full authority to rule in his name during his captivity. However, each outlying province also claimed a right to take control of affairs in the name of Ferdinand. Furthermore, outlying towns began to declare independence from their provincial capitals. As a result, provinces, cities, and towns refused to accept subordination to the junta in Bogotá (Bushnell 1993, 36-37).

The organization of the first junta in Bogotá in 1810 raised a question that has plagued Colombia ever since: should the federal government embrace centralism or federalism? (Holt 1964, 24-25). This issue was settled in an unsatisfactory compromise by which the Bogotá junta acknowledged the autonomy of the provinces, but obtained the right to regulate provincial elections. While some of the provinces organized independent juntas, others elected to remain loyal to Spain. Rivalries soon developed between several of these juntas, most notably between those in Bogotá and Cartagena. A small war broke out between Santa Marta and Cartagena, while a separate “state” was proclaimed in Cundinamarca. Meanwhile, several other provinces

54 This date is recognized as Colombia’s Independence Day.
organized themselves into the United Provinces of New Granada, a federation modeled on the United States (Holt 1964, 24-25).

However, conflicts between the provinces facilitated a temporary return of Spanish authority in 1814 after Ferdinand VII regained the throne in December 1813. Spanish rule ended in 1819 following an uprising led by General Simón Bolívar (USDA 1961, 28). Bolívar, also known as “the Liberator,” was a Venezuelan military leader who was instrumental in the revolutions against the Spanish empire in South America. He had previously joined the resistance movement in Venezuela and led a campaign to wrest control of that country from Spain in 1813. In 1819, Bolívar decided to fight for the independence of New Granada to obtain resources and help consolidate Venezuela’s independence. His army decisively defeated the loyalist forces at Boyacá on 7 August 1819 and subsequently established the Republic of Gran Colombia (USDA 1961, 28). The newly-established republic covered parts of modern Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela.

Although the republic was established in 1819, it was more formally organized in July 1821 when the government was divided into three branches (executive, legislative, and judicial) (USDA 1961, 28). It was designed to govern the old captain-generalcy of Venezuela and the viceroyalty of New Granada, and divided the territory into six departments administratively dependent on the central government. Bogotá was established as the capital. Bolívar was elected president and inaugurated on 3 October 1821.

The new system of government was highly centralized, which created disputes between regional political actors who favored a more federalist system. Eventually, regional political rivalries began to weaken the new government, culminating in an 1826 revolt in Venezuela by a faction seeking separation from Gran Colombia (USDA 1961, 29). Although the rebellion was
put down, similar outbreaks of violence also took place throughout the country. These uprisings led Bolívar to assume dictatorial powers in 1830. He issued a decree to produce a constitutional convention to help save Gran Colombia, but ultimately resigned from the presidency in April 1830. That same year the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan portions of Gran Colombia seceded from the republic (USDA 1961, 29). Gran Colombia dissolved, leaving present-day Colombia and Panama a separate state known as the Republic of New Granada (BBC 2016b).

It was during this period in the 1830s that Colombia, which had historically been a loose cabal of provinces and villages, began to take form as a nation (Holt 1964, 28-29). This was not an easy process, however, as the issue of centralism and federalism still existed. Furthermore, although the lines were not distinct, Liberals generally upheld the power of the state while Conservatives supported the power of the church. The Liberals obtained control in the 1830s and began to suppress the power of monasteries. In May 1839, the government voted to close monasteries in Pasto and divert their income to public education. This resulted in a civil war, from which the Conservatives regained power in 1842. The church regained most of its traditional prerogatives at this time (Holt 1964, 28-29).

As some have observed, the civil war “had a catalytic effect in producing parties and forces which in their struggles and collisions kept the country in turmoil beyond the turn of the next century” (USDA 1961, 30-31). This period of distress was exacerbated following the series of European revolutions that occurred in 1848. Several young educated men of the upper class became bitterly opposed to the government and, with the help of organized college students, worked to get Liberals back in power in April 1849. Inspired by the European revolutionary developments, the new Liberal government moved to abandon the official titles of magistrates, abolish slavery, maintain freedom of the press, and establish secular control over the church.
In May 1853, a new constitution was adopted further separating church and state, providing autonomy to the provinces, and establishing universal suffrage for all males. The Liberal measures were vigorously opposed by Conservative factions, ushering in a period of “extraordinarily complex factionalism” (USDA 1961, 32).

The initial outcome of these differences was a military coup that was conducted on 17 April 1854 (USDA 1961, 32). However, although a military dictatorship was attempted, it was opposed by leaders of both Liberal and Conservative factions. The military dictatorship was overturned after seven months, and a new moderate Conservative regime came to power in 1855. But the new Conservative central administration refused to include men of both parties in the government, which ultimately led to another civil war in 1860 in which the Liberals sought to obtain control of the central government. The war ended in 1861 with a Liberal victory that endured for two decades (Holt 1964, 29).

Similar to the Conservative administration that preceded it, the new Liberal government was representative only of Liberals. It enacted a new Constitution in 1863 that further suppressed religious orders and granted greater autonomy to the provinces (USDA 1961, 32-33; Holt 1964, 29-30). In a move that mirrored the US system of federalism, all powers not granted to the central government in the Constitution were reserved to the states. Peace did not develop between the two sides under the new Liberal rule. Several conflicts and the local-level continued between Conservatives and Liberals before the former took to arms in 1876, initiating another civil war. However, the Liberal national government managed put down the rebellion in 1877 (USDA 1961, 33).

During the early 1880s, the economic conditions of Colombia deteriorated significantly. As a result, the government was authorized to take steps to improve the economic situation in
February 1884. A movement was formed among political leaders to reform the Constitution with the agreement of both Conservatives and Liberals (USDA 1961, 33-34). But the radical faction of the Liberals feared that the constitutional reforms would benefit the Conservatives, and thus began a revolt. By November 1884 the entire country was in rebellion. However, the Independent-Conservative alliance was able to crush the radical Liberal uprising within nine months (Palacios 2006, 26-27).

In 1886, moderate Liberals and Conservatives came together to implement the Regeneration Constitution.55 The new Constitution strengthened the power of the presidency at the expense of the legislature, but not necessarily the national government at the expense of the regions. However, the provinces and states were turned into “departments” with governors named by the president of the republic. The governors, in turn, appointed the local mayors (Palacios 2006, 27-29). From 1886 on, the country became officially known as the Republic of Colombia. The new alliance ushered in an era of economic liberalism. Colombia opened to foreign investment, developed mines and railroads, and assigned state lands to export agriculture. Furthermore, the army was modernized and a central bank was created with the exclusive power to issue paper money (Palacios 2006, 27).

However, these developments and the Conservative-Liberal alliance did not succeed in establishing peace or depoliticizing Colombia (Palacios 2006, 36-37). Rather, the centralism of the 1886 Constitution caused resentment in the provinces. As a result, Liberals called for insurrection on 18 October 1899, launching the longest and bloodiest civil war since independence. The “War of a Thousand Days” lasted until June 1902 and resulted in the death of

55 Although the Constitution would go through more than 50 revisions, it endured until 1991 (Palacios 2006, 27).
approximately 120,000 people (BBC 2012). In less than eight months after the start of the war, the fighting moved from conventional warfare to a guerilla campaign (Palacios 2006, 38).

The major consequence of the War of a Thousand Days was that it discredited the Conservative and Liberal parties in the eyes of many within Panamanian society. As a result, Panama declared the region’s independence on 3 November 1903 (Palacios 2006, 42–43). This move was quickly backed by the US, which moved warships to the area to block possible Colombian troops from entering Panama to retake the territory. On 6 November 1903, Panama granted rights to the US to build and administer the Panama Canal Zone.

Although the Liberals had lost the War of a Thousand Days, they had successfully demonstrated that Colombia could not be governed peacefully when one of the two parties were completely excluded from participating in the political process (Bushnell 1993, 155). Furthermore, the loss of Panama inspired many Conservatives to seek national reconciliation in 1904. Liberal leaders also rejected violence as a means of seeking political power following the civil war. Instead, they sought electoral reforms such as proportional representation of the parties. Thus, “[v]iolent conflict was followed by consociation practices in an attempt to prevent renewed violence” (Hartlyn 1988, 26).

The period after the civil war was an era of political stability, especially after 1910. Some historians date the beginning of modern democracy in the country to this period (Holt 1964, 36). Between 1910 and 1949, Colombia functioned as an oligarchical democracy, which was surprisingly open, competitive and stable (Hartlyn 1988, 27). As Holt (1964, 36) has observed, the period from 1910 to 1949 “were years of relative good feeling, of a growing tolerance and sophistication in the political process, and, especially in the 1920s and 1940s, of considerable economic growth.” A sustained coffee boom set the stage for industrialization in Colombia, and
brought both Conservative and Liberal groups into the export trade. Coffee was the predominant export item, and helped increase Colombia’s foreign trade from 57 million pesos in 1914 to 268 million pesos in 1929 (Hartlyn 1988, 28). Meanwhile, US private investment grew from US$21.5 million in 1914 to US$214 million in 1929 (Hartlyn 1988, 28). The country focused heavily on development initiatives during this period, doubling railroad mileage between 1913 and 1926 and increasing the volume of passengers and freight carried eightfold (USDA 1961, 38). The population increased from 5 million in 1912 to 8 million in 1929 (USDA 1961, 38).

By 1934 a Liberal republic had emerged in Colombia. Responding to the challenging economic circumstances brought upon by the depression, the Liberals implemented a series of reforms in 1936 that mirrored those of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal (Holt 1964, 37). These expanded the right of the state to expropriate private property and intervene in the affairs of businesses and industries “for the purpose of rationalizing production, distribution and consumption of goods, or to give labor the just protection to which it has a right” (Hartlyn 1988, 31). A system of direct taxation was implemented with progressive rates and differential treatment of industries based on their size. These measures intensified opposition by Conservatives and industrialists.

In the early 1940s, violence was again on the rise in Colombia. Although the Liberals retained control of the government, Conservatives began to target Liberal supporters in rural parts of the country. In July 1944 there was an attempted coup by disgruntled Conservative military officers who took the president hostage. However, it failed after the military leadership in Bogotá refused to support the rebels. As Bushnell (1993, 197) has observed, “The movement was easily suppressed, but it was a disturbing sign: Colombia had not seen anything of the sort for a very long time.” Given the state of the country in the mid-1940s, the 1946 election proved
to be a reversal of the 1930 election. The Liberals were removed from power and a new era of Conservative rule began (Bushnell 1993, 200).

Similar to the 1930 election, localized partisan violence flared in the aftermath of the 1946 election. However, unlike in 1930, the violence did not soon peter out. Rather, it eventually engulfed most of Colombia (Bushnell 1993, 201). Violence intensified following the 9 April 1948 assassination of Bogotá’s Liberal mayor, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. The assassination sparked massive riots and extreme violence in Bogotá, which reduced the heart of the city to ruin (USDA 1961, 39). The uprising—which became known as the Bogotazo—was exploited by local and international Communist leaders, who attempted to take charge of the movement. In response, the central government launched what has been referred to as a “reign of terror” against the opposition (USDA 1961, 40). Military forces engaged in acts of violence against Liberal communities, which only encouraged a guerilla campaign in the countryside.

As a consequence, the Conservatives initiated a period of ruthless dictatorship in 1950, which banned all legal contest of ideas and interests (USDA 1961, 40). However, the government fell to a coup on 13 June 1953, at which point the military—unaffiliated with either Conservatives or Liberals—took control of the country in an effort to reestablish peace and political order. But corruption and ineptitude led to the dissolution of the government, which was replaced by a military junta in May 1957. The junta paved the way for a National Front government between Conservatives and Liberals that was established in August 1958 in a bid to end the civil war. It has been estimated that 250,000-300,000 people were killed in the conflict between 1948 and 1957 (BBC 2012). The civil war is often referred to as La Violencia (The Violence).
The newly-establish bipartisan National Front would remain in control of Colombia until the 1970s. It differed from previous coalitions because, unlike the others, it followed a set of rules written into the Constitution itself—rules that were specified so that they could not be casually changed from day-to-day. As Bushnell (1993, 224) highlights, these rules specified two things primarily: (1) the compulsory sharing of all elective and appointive positions on an equal basis between Conservative and Liberal parties, and (2) the alternation of the two parties in possession of the Colombian presidency. They further banned any and all third parties from shares of political power.

The new era ushered in by the National Front resulted in political reconciliation and domestic peace, which helped to advance social and economic development (Bushnell 1993, 223). This resulted in significant economic growth and improvements in public education. Additionally, advancements in transportation, communications technology, and mass media helped to lessen the differences between regions while creating a national culture and identity. However, Conservative and Liberal leaders were less successful in quelling the new phenomenon of leftist guerilla insurgency that emerged in the mid-1960s.

8.2 Modern Conflict (1964-Present)

Several leftist guerilla organizations were founded in the aftermath of the civil war: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) (Vargas 1999). Each adhered to communist ideology and were created after their members were excluded from the National Front’s power sharing agreement between the Conservatives and Liberals (Renwick 2016). The ELN was formed in 1965 by students, Catholic radicals, and leftist intellectuals hoping to
replicate Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba. The FARC was formed in 1966 and composed of militant communists and peasant groups that grew out of the Liberal guerrilla bands of *La Violencia* (Renwick 2016; UNRIC 2016b). Both the ELN and FARC claim to represent the rural poor against the country’s wealthy classes and oppose US influence, the privatization of natural resources, and multinational corporations. When the insurgencies began in the mid-1960s, one of their banners was radical agrarian reform. Specifically, they sought to seize large landholdings and redistribute it to those who worked it (Economist 2012).

FARC and ELN have an ambiguous relationship, as they have historically cooperated in some parts of the country while clashing directly in others (UNRIC 2016b). The EPL was formed in 1967 and, unlike the FARC and ELN, was the official armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). The PCC and EPL worked together in an attempt to end government influence over local corporations and labor unions (Stanford 2015c). As of mid-2016, the FARC and ELN are still active in Colombia.

On 7 January 1965, the ELN conducted its first attack, seizing a small town in Santander called Simacota. It then spent the next few years organizing and obtaining recruits, which were primarily priests from the Catholic Church (Stanford 2015a). In May 1966, the FARC moved to defend the rural population from government attacks. However, it also began to simultaneously engage in humanitarian and development work, providing education and healthcare to local communities, while at the same time training militants and carrying out attacks. In its early years, the FARC engaged in abductions for ransom—primarily targeting elites and politicians—in order to pay for its social service provisions (Stanford 2015b). Meanwhile, the EPL operated
exclusively in the rural areas of Antioquia in the late 1960s, but was nearly eliminated following a series of attacks from paramilitaries and the Colombian government (Stanford 2015c).  

56 Given the EPL’s weakened capacity, the ELN and FARC were the two predominant guerilla organizations in the early 1970s. However, the ELN’s growth was halted in 1973 when a military offensive practically eliminated the group, killing 135 of the 200 members (Stanford 2015a). Although the ELN had previously shied away from the FARC’s tactics of abducting for ransom, it began abducting politicians and wealthy landowners for revenue to rebuild. In the mid-1970s, the ELN’s primary activities were abductions, robbing banks, and assassinating military members (Stanford 2015a). Meanwhile, the FARC began to traffic cocaine to fund its activities in the late 1970s. This practice facilitated rapid growth in the group, as the wealth obtained from the drug trade and abductions helped in the provision of social services that attracted a large number of new members seeking to escape poverty (Stanford 2015b). Unlike the FARC, the ELN avoided the drug trade and instead focused its efforts on furthering political goals (Stanford 2015a).

A new leftist guerilla group emerged in the 1970s known as the April 19 Movement, or M-19. The name came from the 19 April 1970 elections, in which Conservative candidate Misael Pastrana Borrero defeated Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 40.7 percent to 39.1 percent. Many supporters of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla believed that the election had been rigged, and subsequently formed M-19 in January 1974 to “fight for a popular democracy and a more open political system that would be representative of the majority and inclusive of marginalized Colombians” (Stanford 2015d). In the late 1970s, the group abducted drug traffickers and members of their families for payment.

56 It was not until the 1980s when the group rebuilt and strengthened (Stanford 2015c).
ransom money in order to fund its activities, which grew rapidly. It is estimated that M-19 abducted at least 400 people between 1976 and 1978 alone (Stanford 2015d).

In 1980, the Colombian government arrested the leader of M-19, Jaime Batemen. In response, M-19 seized the Dominican Republic’s Embassy in Bogotá in February 1980, holding 80 people hostage (USDOD 1988, 91). The hostages included ambassadors from the US and 13 Latin American, European, and Middle Eastern countries. After 61 days in captivity, the M-19 hostage-takers flew to Cuba with 11 hostages. Their demands for the release of 28 political prisoners and $10 million in ransom were not met (USDOD 1988, 91). Meanwhile, the ELN had become experts in abductions by the 1980s, and thus began to expand its activities to stealing boats, vehicles, and airplanes (Stanford 2015a). In response, the group grew significantly in size.

The 1980s also witnessed the rebirth of the EPL, which began to focus its efforts on agro-industrial development while simultaneously expanding into the drug trade in order to finance its operations. As a result, it began to expand its attacks and movements from rural to urban areas (Stanford 2015c). During the 1980s, narcotics accounted for at least six percent of Colombia’s economy (Zill and Bergman 2000). Virtually all coca comes from the Andes Mountains—which run through Colombia—because the slopes provide perfect conditions for the plant to grow (Economist 2013). The drug trade dominated Colombia’s economy and politics because of the huge profit margins associated with processed Cocaine. According to a report published in 2000, processed cocaine is available in Colombia for approximately $1,500 dollars per kilo and sold in the United States for as much as $66,000 per kilo (Zill and Bergman 2000).

In response to the increasing number of attacks perpetrated by these growing leftist guerrilla organizations, right-wing paramilitary groups and apolitical drug traffickers emerged in the 1980s to protect themselves from the violence. On 3 December 1981, a helicopter flying over
the city of Cali dropped leaflets announcing the formation of a new group called Death to Kidnappers (MAS). MAS was established by 223 drug traffickers in retaliation for the abduction of one of its members by M-19 (HRW 1996). In part, the leaflets read: “Kidnappers will be executed in public: they will be hanged from trees in public places or executed by firing squad” (Brogan 1998, 538).

Many Colombians outside of the drug trade viewed the MAS model as a violent, but effective means of fighting back against the guerillas. As a result, a separate group consisting of Conservatives, Liberals, businessmen, and ranchers came together in 1982. They chose the same name as the drug traffickers—MAS—for their new organization, which sought to cleanse the region of leftist insurgents (HRW 1996). Money for MAS came from businessmen and ranchers, while the military provided tactical support. As a HRW (1996) report noted, the Colombian army essentially “authorized and actively encouraged civilians to pursue and kill suspected guerrillas.” By 1983, the army was taking part in joint operations with MAS.

Multiple attempts at brokering a peace agreement between the government and leftist guerrillas occurred during the 1980s. In 1982, the FARC and the Colombia government began peace talks for the first time, and in May 1984 they reached a bilateral agreement known as the Uribe Accords that lasted for three years (Stanford 2015b). The EPL also participated in peace talks with the government in 1984, but they ultimately failed due to breaches in the ceasefire committed by both sides (Stanford 2015c). Likewise, although some members of M-19 reached a truce with the government in 1984, they returned to combat the following year (Stanford 2015d). The FARC was the only guerrilla group to influence the political process to some degree in the 1980s. As part of their agreement with the government, they co-founded a political party in 1985.
with the PCC known as the Patriotic Union. The party achieved success in the 1986 elections, managing to secure 350 local council seats, 9 House seats, and 6 Senate seats (Stanford 2015b).

However, the peace agreement soon deteriorated as the Colombian army, paramilitary groups, and drug gangs began a campaign of systematic assassinations of Patriotic Union leaders (Freeman 2014), who they viewed as a threat to their power and the traditional political establishment. It has been estimated that 200 to 500 Patriotic Union leaders were assassinated between 1986 and 1988, while 4,000 to 6,000 Patriotic Union members were murdered between 1988 and 1992 (Stanford 2015b). In response, the FARC’s campaign of violence and abductions continued.

The assassinations and murders by paramilitary groups in the late 1980s were so widespread that Colombian government statistics showed that paramilitaries were actually responsible for more civilian deaths than the guerrillas (Avilés 2006, 392-393). Therefore, in 1989 the Colombian government established a series of anti-paramilitary measures. These “consisted of a series of presidential decrees establishing criminal penalties for the formation or operation of such groups, and requiring the approval of the president before any type of self-defense group was established” (Avilés 2006, 392). However, in defiance of these measures, paramilitary groups managed to increase their numbers and attacks against the guerrillas.

In 1989, M-19 began peace negotiations with the Colombian government, which resulted in the transformation of the organization into a legal political party in November 1989 (Stanford 2015d). M-19 disbanded in 1990 with the majority of members demobilizing and transitioning to the political sphere. Shortly thereafter, the EPL signed a truce with the government and also disbanded in 1991 (Stanford 2015c). M-19 and the EPL united to form the April 19 Movement Democratic Alliance (AD M-19). The AD M-19 grew in popularity and became a formidable
political opponent to the traditional Colombian two-party dynamic in the early 1990s (Stanford 2015d). Although both the EPL and M-19 disbanded in 1990 and 1991 respectively, some dissident members of the EPL continued to operate under the group’s name. However, the Colombian government considers the group to be official disbanded as of 1991 (Stanford 2015c).

A new Colombia Constitution was also ratified in 1991, which acknowledged NGOs for the first time and obligated the state to recognize civil society organizations and aid agencies as legitimate actors (ICNL 2016b). The 1991 Constitution also established freedom of association in general. In response, several local and international NGOs began to operate in the country. As will be discussed in greater detail in section 8.4.1, many of these organizations would go on to support the efforts of the FARC and the ELN, which resulted in considerable tension between the NGO community and the central government.

With the disbanding of the EPL and M-19, the FARC and the ELN were the only two active major guerilla organizations in the 1990s. Both expanded in size and scope at this time. As a result, violence increased considerably. In 1994, 4,000 people were abducted for ransom in Colombia (Brogan 1998, 536). In 1996, there were approximately 26,000 homicides—six times the rate in the US—and 3,000 political killings (Brogan 1998, 534). By the mid-1990s, the ELN commanded an army of approximately 5,000 soldiers, and at least 15,000 student, union, and political supporters (Insight Crime 2016). The group began to target oil companies, regularly bombing Colombia’s largest pipelines. Additionally, it extorted the employees of oil companies operating in country, earning $84 million from ransoms and $225 million from extortion of oil company employees in 1998 alone (Stanford 2015a). The ELN also entered the drug trade for the first time, and began taxing coca and marijuana farmers in the Bolivar Provinces where its headquarters was located. The group further expanded its abducting activities in the late 1990s.
For example, it hijacked a flight with 43 passengers and crew in April 1999, forcing it to land in a remote area and taking all of those on board captive. The following month ELN abducted 186 people in May 1999 from a church in Cali in the largest single abduction in Colombia’s history (Insight Crime 2016).

The FARC also expanded its activities in the 1990s. Beginning in 1995, the group began to demonstrate increasing military prowess while expanding its territorial control. As Vargas (1999) points out, one of the most significant changes in the group during the 1990s was their increased control over local economic resources to fuel their war efforts. They became involved in the oversight of municipal budget administrations and were active in gathering intelligence on resource administration at the provincial-level. By 1999, its membership had inflated to 18,000 people. That same year the group abducted approximately 3,000 people, many of whom were politicians and executives of the banana, cattle, commercial agriculture, and petroleum industries (Vargas 1999; Stanford 2015b).

Right-wing paramilitaries also increased in size and scope during the 1990s in response to the leftist guerrillas. Although paramilitary organizations initially began as private armies, these groups banded together in April 1997 as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The AUC became even more involved in drug trafficking, and began to expand their control throughout regions occupied by the FARC and ELN (Castro 2014). Between 1997 and 1999, the ACU killed approximately 19,000 people in areas with suspected leftist guerrilla sympathizers (Stanford 2015e).

The FARC and ELN experienced multiple setbacks in the late 1990s. The ELN suffered significant blows at the hands of paramilitaries in its stronghold of Bolivar, which led to internal fighting. Its lack of a coherent national strategy left the group vulnerable to repeated attacks by
the AUC and Colombian military (Insight Crime 2016). In a desperate move, the group formed an alliance with the FARC to counter the attacks, but it ultimately lost control of its primary area. This was the beginning of a decline for the ELN. Meanwhile, the FARC’s extreme record of abductions and involvement in the drug trade elicited domestic and international responses (Stanford 2015b). In 1999, approximately a quarter of the Colombian population began “No Más” protests against the FARC in cities throughout the country. The following year, the US and Colombia initiated a $9 billion US military aid program known as “Plan Colombia” to help combat the drug trade and strengthen the central government’s authority and control (Stanford 2015b). The US strengthened its relationship with Colombia following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of these attacks, Colombia became the US’s leading regional ally in the War on Terror (LaRosa and Mejía 2012, 213-214).

In 2001, the ELN began peace talks with the Colombian government, but these ultimately failed. It has been argued that the talks were unsuccessful because the government was more interested in negotiating with the FARC instead of the ELN (Stanford 2015a). During the 2002 election, the FARC abducted presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt in February. Álvaro Uribe won the presidency, but used the abduction as political motivation to combat the FARC’s activity (Stanford 2015b). He moved to professionalized Colombia’s army, embrace paramilitary assistance, and continue to work with the US on Plan Colombia. Uribe’s crackdown on the FARC was well received by the public and resulted in a decrease in violence throughout the country. As his administration cracked down on leftist guerrillas, the homicide rate fell by 40 percent and abductions decreased by 80 percent during Uribe’s first term (Renwick 2016). The

57 She was rescued by Colombian security forces on 2 July 2008, nearly six and a half years later.
FARC became weaker in 2002, while the Patriotic UNION lost its legal status and was no longer able to participate politically (Stanford 2015b).

In 2003, the AUC publicized that they were ready to engage in peace talks with the government and promised to demobilize by 2005. However, the government refused to meet the AUC’s demands, which included immunity from extradition and pardoning for previous crimes (Stanford 2015e). In response, the AUC abandoned the ceasefire and continued its activities. By 2004, the AUC had killed more than 2,000 people since the peace talks began (Stanford 2015e). The US government thus began to pressure the Colombian government to take the same aggressive stance against the AUC as it had recently done with the FARC. But in 2005 the AUC and Colombian government reached an agreement that resulted in the official disbandment of the group in 2006 (Stanford 2015e).

As the government continued its crackdown on the FARC and the ELN, guerrillas were forced to seek refuge in rural areas bordering Ecuador and Venezuela. Colombian military offensives across these borders resulted in tensions with its neighbors (Renwick 2016). These tensions were exacerbated in 2008 when the Colombian military claimed to have discovered evidence that Ecuador and Venezuela had been providing material support to the FARC—a charge both governments denied. By 2009, the ELN showed signs of internal fragmentation, and units began disobeying orders from leaders. Reports published in early 2009 referred to the ELN as “a weakened and forgotten force” (Stanford 2015a). As a result, the FARC and ELN announced in December 2009 that they had formed an alliance and intended to concentrate their collective efforts on attacking government forces (BBC 2016b).

However, the leftist guerrillas continued to decline in strength due to Uribe’s offensive. Following Uribe’s tenure as president, Juan Manuel Santos took office in August 2010. Santos
subsequently restarted peace talks with the FARC. Although the FARC responded in February 2011 by releasing several hostages in what it described as a “unilateral gesture of peace” to the government, they simultaneous increased hit and run raids (BBC 2016b). An increase in violence by the FARC in 2011 resulted in another set of widespread public protests against the group in December 2011. Peace talks between the government and the FARC resumed in 2012 (BBC 2016b). But by the time the guerrillas agreed to negotiations, their ranks had fallen considerably. By 2012, the FARC only had approximately 7,000 members, down from 16,000 in 2001 (Renwick 2016). Meanwhile, the ELN was estimated to have approximately 1,400 members, down from 5,000 in the late 1990s (Renwick 2016).

As part of the peace talks, the FARC publicly renounced abductions and agreed to a ceasefire. But the guerrillas continued to abduct people for ransom, resulting in the Colombian government suspending the ceasefire agreement in November 2014 (Stanford 2015b). The ELN was so weak that the Colombian government refused to invite them to the 2012 peace talks with the FARC, as they no longer viewed them as a viable threat (Stanford 2015a). However, this angered the ELN, which responded by carrying out attacks on police officers and blowing up oil pipelines in 2012 and 2013. In response, the Colombian government restarted exploratory talks with the ELN in June 2014 (Stanford 2015a).

In July 2015, the Colombian government and the FARC agreed to another round of peace talks (Associated Press 2015). However, they have since failed to sign a final ceasefire agreement. In March 2016, the FARC and the government, citing remaining differences, claimed that they would seek a new deal by the end of the year (BBC 2016b). As of mid-2016, violence in Colombia continues. Figure 8.1 highlights the number of general attacks conducted by the
FARC and the ELN between 1980 and 2014, according to the Global Terrorism Database (START 2015). This graph does not include attacks against aid workers.

**Figure 8.1** Total Attacks Conducted by the FARC and the ELN, 1980-2014

![Graph showing total attacks conducted by FARC and ELN from 1980 to 2014](image)

*Data source: Global Terrorism Database (START 2015)*

### 8.3 Insecurity of NGOs in Colombia, 2000-2014

Colombia serves as the “negative” case study in this dissertation. Of the countries considered “high-risk” for a minimum of five years between 2000 and 2014, Colombia had the least amount of NGO security incidents. In total, 12 attacks occurred between 2000 and 2014, affecting 25 aid workers. This is significantly lower than the 1,458 aid workers killed, wounded, or abducted in Afghanistan, 288 in Somalia, and 164 in Iraq. Fifteen aid workers in Colombia were abducted, 8 were killed, and 2 wounded. Of the 15 aid workers abducted, 14 were later released and 1 was killed.

**Table 15** Aid Workers Attacked in Colombia, 2000-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Abducted</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data source:* AWSD (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016), Global Terrorism Database (START 2015), Intelcenter Database (Intelcenter 2015), Patronus Analytical (2009), and NGO security reports.
There was variation in attacks at the subnational level, with most incidents occurring in the northwestern and southeastern parts of the country. Figure 8.2 highlights the most volatile provinces for aid workers to operate in. The majority of incidents occurred in Norte de Santander with 5 aid workers attacked, followed by Cauca with 4 and Antioquia with 2. The provinces of Cundinamarca, Meta, and Risaralda each had one aid worker attacked. There were no attacks against aid workers in all 26 other provinces. Figure 8.3 shows the overall NGO presence.

Similar to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, one of the most NGO-populated areas in country was the capital city of Bogotá, which is located in Cundinamarca province. Antioquia had the most organizations between 2000 and 2014 with a high of 107, followed by Cundinamarca with 78, and Valle del Cauca with 21. Similar to Afghanistan—but unlike Iraq and Somalia—there was a very strong relationship between NGO presence and provincial population. Cundinamarca, Antioquia, and Valle del Cauca are the three most populated provinces in Colombia (DANE 2016).
Figure 8.2 Map of Aid Workers Killed, Wounded, and Abducted in Colombia, 2000-2014
Figure 8.3 Map of NGO Presence in Colombia, 2000-2014
8.3.1 Structured-Focused Comparison: Motivations and Locations

The previous section provided an overview of NGO security incidents and NGO presence in Colombia between 2000 and 2014. It revealed that aid workers encountered minimal attacks compared with other nations experiencing sustained intrastate conflict. The most insecurity incidents occurred in Norte de Santander and Cauca, and no aid workers were attacked after 2011. This section builds upon these findings by examining the two structured-focused comparison questions. By using a set of general questions, NGO insecurity can be examined across multiple cases in a comparable manner. The questions formulated for structured comparison in this dissertation emphasize the motivations for, and locations of, attacks. The first is: were attacks against NGOs politically- or criminally- motivated? The second is: where did attacks occur at the micro-level?

Following the same collection method used in the previous three case studies, a review was conducted of news stories pertaining to the few NGO attacks that occurred in Colombia. A content analysis of these reports was used to determine whether specific attacks were politically-motivated, criminally-motivated, or collateral (not targeted). News outlets often speculate whether the motivation behind attacks are political or criminal based on subsequent statements by militant spokesmen and interviews conducted with residents living in the areas in which the events occurred.

The information collected through content analysis reveals that all of the 12 individual attacks that occurred were carried out by political actors. There were no criminal attacks against NGOs and no aid workers were victims of “collateral” violence. Furthermore, all attacks were conducted by the leftist guerrilla organizations the FARC and the ELN. The FARC were responsible for seven of the attacks, while the ELN were responsible for five. Right-wing
paramilitary organizations were not responsible for any NGO insecurity incidents that occurred between 2000 and 2014.

The second structured-focused comparison question concerns the location in which attacks occurred. Following the same method used to answer the first question, a review of local and international news events was conducted to determine where each attack occurred. This information is highlighted in table 16, which reveals that the majority of aid workers were attacked while in-transit.

Table 16 Aid Worker Attack Locations in Colombia over Time, 2000-2014*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>NGO Compound</th>
<th>Public Area</th>
<th>Project Site</th>
<th>In-Transit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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</table>

*Note: Location information could not be determined for 9 aid workers attacked. These are not included in this table’s total. For a precise number of aid workers attacked per year, see table 15.
The two structured-focused comparison questions reveal that of the relatively few aid workers operating in Colombia that experienced insecurity, most were the victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit to or from project sites. These findings further bolster the quantitative results in chapter three, which showed that NGOs were more likely to encounter attacks when engaged in large-scale projects. It is reiterated here that if workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, thus making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. Attackers also likely prefer to target NGOs in-transit because of the lack of military and police presence in these areas.

8.4 Process Tracing

The following section covers specific historical events that have influenced contemporary NGO relations with warring factions in Colombia. As outlined in chapter four, Slater and Simmons’ (2010) methodology is used to identify critical antecedents that preceded and influenced a critical juncture in which militants chose not to target aid workers as a tactic.

8.4.1 Critical Antecedents

As noted previously, only 12 attacks occurred between 2000 and 2014 in Colombia, affecting 25 aid workers. Although the FARC and ELN were responsible for these attacks, these were isolated incidents, as the groups did not target the broader NGO community. Multiple incidents have occurred in Colombia that have influenced the decision of leftist guerrilla organizations not to attack aid workers. These tend to center around the NGO community’s historic support of these groups and repeated criticisms of the Colombian government. The
**critical juncture** was the 2003 publication by 80 NGOs condemning the Colombian government, which was subsequently followed by a speech by Uribe classifying the NGO community as “politickers of terrorism.” However, prior to this period three **critical antecedents** occurred in the 1990s that influenced Uribe’s statement. These include (1) the 1991 Constitution that allowed NGOs to operate in Colombia, (2) NGOs engaging in judicial warfare against Colombian military personnel beginning in 1994, and (3) NGOs establishing “peace communities” to support the FARC’s efforts beginning in 1997. These are highlighted in figure 8.4.

**Figure 8.4** Tracing the Causal Path: Colombia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Antecedents</th>
<th>Critical Juncture</th>
<th>Divergent Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991 Constitution allowing NGOs to operate</td>
<td>September 2003 NGO publication of &quot;The Authoritarian Spell&quot; condemning Uribe</td>
<td>Few politically-motivated attacks against NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 NGOs begin judicial warfare against Colombian military</td>
<td></td>
<td>No criminally-motivated attacks against NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 NGOs begin to administer peace communities used as FARC safe-havens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first civil society organizations in Colombia were founded and supported by the church and missionaries during the mid-16th century. Later, in the 1960s, the Colombian government created and sponsored community-based organizations such as the National Peasant Association (ANUC). Independent NGOs were largely inactive in Colombia until the early 1990s. The 1991 Colombian Constitution acknowledged the role of NGOs and obligated the state to recognize them as legitimate actors. Specifically, the Constitution provides that the State “will contribute to the organization, promotion, and guidance of professional, civic, trade union,
community, youth and charitable or nongovernmental public-purpose associations, without prejudicing their authority so that they may constitute democratic means of representation in the various functions of participation, agreement, control, and supervision of the public activities that they undertake” (ICNL 2016b). The 1991 Constitution also established freedom of association in general.

As a result of the new Constitution, several local and international NGOs began to operate in Colombia. However, many of these organizations were leftist in nature and supported the FARC and the ELN (O’Grady 2008). In the 1990s, several NGOs began to collude with the guerrillas in an effort to undermine the credibility of Colombia’s government. They did this primarily through the publication of alleged human rights violations conducted by military officers. As one Colombian military officer has observed, while NGOs publicly condemned the government, they would simultaneously attempt to downplay the actions of the guerrillas.

To minimize attention to [the FARC’s] atrocities, some NGOs prefer to call the people kidnapped by the FARC “retained” rather than “hostages”; they use the sophism of “sociopolitical conflict” to refer to the terrorist threat posed by the FARC, and they use the term “political prisoners” to refer to FARC operatives convicted of terrorist attacks. It is also remarkable that all of these organizations remain silent towards the FARC's terrorist attacks, giving the impression that they do not support human rights for victims of the FARC's attacks, even if they are unarmed civilians. In the same way, the narrative seeks to delegitimize the government by presenting it as a quasi-dictatorship, and Colombia as an oppressive state where there is no democracy, and where state security forces commit systematic violations of human rights. This disinformation is used to justify the bloody resistance to a “dirty war as a strategy of the terrorism of the state.” (Cardenas 2013)

In response to these publications released in the mid- and late 1990s, the US Congress began to view the Colombian military with suspicion. This resulted in the removal of top Colombian generals the NGOs accused of abuses and cuts in military aid at the behest of NGOs (O’Grady 2004). As O’Grady (2008) notes, this form of “judicial warfare” turned out to be
especially effective because “the NGOs knew that they only had to point fingers to get rid of an effective leader and demoralize the ranks.”

The US Embassy in Bogotá tended to rely heavily on statistics provided by NGOs to guide US policy toward Colombia. However, the Colombian government repeatedly charged that these figures were biased and misleading. This resulted in an investigation by the US Embassy, which produced the 2003 internal report entitled “A Closer Look at Human Rights Statistics.” The investigation revealed how some of Colombia’s most influential NGOs collect and interpret human-rights data (O’Grady 2004). The major finding was that the methodology used by NGOs created a significant bias against the Colombian government while granting a wide berth to the FARC and the ELN. Unlike the previous case studies of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, NGOs in Colombia were largely viewed favorably the insurgents due, in part, to these reports. This partially explains why attacks against aid workers were minimal.

The embassy found that the reason for the discrepancy between statistics published by NGOs and the Colombian government was a difference in definitions. For example, one NGO claimed that 2,000 “arbitrary” detentions by the government during the first 9 months of Uribe’s presidency were an increase of over 400 percent from the previous year (O’Grady 2004). However, the definition of “arbitrary” included “legally authorized arrests of protestors occupying state property, detentions of suspicious persons during urban combat operations and warrant-based arrests of civic activists and union leaders suspected of supporting guerrillas” (O’Grady 2004).

One of the most significant findings in the report was how “human-rights violations” were defined. According to the US embassy, the Center for Popular Research and Education (CINEP) manages Colombia’s largest and most influential database of human-rights violations.
But CINEP “follows legal conventions that define ‘human-rights violations’ as crimes that can only be committed by the state or state-sponsored actors” [emphasis added] (O’Grady 2004). According to this definition, both the FARC and the ELN are incapable of committing human rights violations, as they are not a part of the Colombian government. Moreover, CINEP “defines deaths of combatants in hostilities as human-rights violations” (O’Grady 2004). By including the deaths of guerrillas engaged in combat with the government in their figures, the number of human rights violations recorded by CINEP is more than double what it would be without the inclusion of combatants. As O’Grady (2004) has charged, the report suggests “that NGOs have been manipulating the statistics [and] lying to serve certain unacknowledged political goals.”

Also in the 1990s, NGOs established “peace communities” which were exploited by the FARC in the effort to discredit the government. The peace communities were created in the mid-1990s under a plan proposed by the local Catholic diocese. The initiative sought to create a place where civilians could live without fear of guerrillas or paramilitaries, and were predominantly run and administered by NGOs. However, according to ex-FARC Commander Daniel Sierra Martinez, the NGOs running these communities were “not the least bit neutral” (O’Grady 2009). Rather, the FARC had a close relationship with the leaders, who were sympathetic to the cause of the guerrillas.

According to Commander Martinez, the peace community of San José de Apartadó58 was a FARC safe haven for wounded and sick rebels and for storing medical supplies (O’Grady 2009). Furthermore, the peace community helped the FARC in its effort to brand the Colombian military as an abuser of human rights. When the community was getting ready to accuse an

58 The community was formed in 1997 and consists of more than 500 peasant farmers in the Urabá region of northwest Colombia (PBI 2016).
individual of a human-rights violation, Martinez would organize the “witness” by ordering FARC members, posing as civilians, to give testimony. Additionally, when fighting between the FARC and paramilitaries occurred, the peace communities played a key role in shaping the story in order to lay blame on the government (O’Grady 2009). For example, in one instance a FARC rebel was killed by a paramilitary organization. However, the peace community worked with the FARC to provide misleading information to the media. NGO leaders within the community insisted that the guerrilla killed was a civilian from the community rather than a combatant in an attempt to damage the legitimacy and perception of the government.

8.4.2 Critical Juncture

As highlighted in the previous section, NGOs in Colombia maintained a positive relationship with leftist guerrillas in the 1990s. However, this was often done in a tacit or concealed manner through statistical manipulation or community safe havens. This changed in 2003 when 80 NGOs issued a collective report that publicly condemned the Colombian government. The report, entitled “El Embrujo Autoritario: Primer Año de Gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez” (The Authoritarian Spell: The First Year of Government of Alvaro Uribe Velez) (PCDHDD 2003), was the critical juncture that solidified the alliance between the rebels and the broader NGO community. This move mirrored the collective letter published in 2002 by 79 NGOs in Afghanistan (see chapter five, section 5.4.2.1), but instead of condemning the insurgents—as was the case in Afghanistan—the NGO community in Colombia set its sights on the government.

On 29 June 2003, President Uribe unveiled a new security initiative called the “democratic defense and security policy” (DSP). Under the DSP, the Colombian government
sought to reestablish control of the country by increasing the number and capacity of military troops and police to challenge the guerrillas (ICG 2003, 3-4). Additionally, the government began to incorporate civilians into the anti-guerrilla effort by establishing a network of “collaborators” and “informants.” Those individuals who participated in the program were paid for information which led to the capture of guerrillas. The DSP also proposed making military service universal for all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 28. Within 16 months of the program’s implementation, more than 1.5 million citizens had enrolled in the government’s network of collaborators and informants, while 15,228 peasant soldiers had been incorporated into the army (ICG 2003, 4-5).

Approximately three months after the DSP was implemented, 80 NGOs (including CINEP) released “The Authoritarian Spell” in September 2003. The 176-page report was highly critical of Uribe and the DSP (PCDHDD 2003; USIP 2004). The NGOs wrote that the government’s “strategies of war and repression have been directed against the civilian population” (Guardian 2003b). The report went on to accuse the government of ignoring thousands of people displaced by the fighting, and claimed that the DSP was simply a disguise for repression and the militarization of society. The NGOs also stated that the government had failed to provide adequate education, food, healthcare, and shelter for Colombia’s population. One senior NGO representative who contributed to the report claimed that Uribe was “dangerous” and warned the present to “be careful of what he says” (Guardian 2003b).

In response to the report, Uribe made a public speech claiming that NGOs operating in Colombia were nothing more than “spokesmen for” and “politickers of” terrorism. He called on NGOs to “take off [their] masks…and drop this cowardice of hiding their ideas behind human rights” (quoted in Brittain 2007, 122). This claim was echoed by Colombia’s vice president
Francisco Santos, who accused several NGOs of assisting the FARC (Brittain 2007, 122-123). Although the relationship between NGOs and the government had been tense dating back to the mid-1990s, the “Authoritarian Spell” report drove a seemingly irrevocable wedge between the two. The broader NGO community had publicly taken sides in the conflict, choosing to align with the FARC and ELN over the Colombian government.

As a result, Uribe began to investigate and scrutinize the activities of NGOs operating in the country. This led to the March 2004 capture and arrest of aid workers accused of aiding and abetting guerrillas (DeRouen and Bellamy 2008, 17). The perception of NGO partiality was exacerbated in 2006 when two Danish NGOs began raising money for the FARC on the international scene (Minear 2006, 32). The spokesman of one of these NGOs, Oprør (“Rebellion” or “Revolt”), informed local media that the group had raised and transferred funds to the FARC. This resulted in the Danish government pressing charges against the NGO for assisting a terrorist organization (USDOS 2006b).

However, the most glaring example of the ties between the guerrillas and the NGO community came from a Colombian military hostage rescue in July 2008. “Operation Check-Mate” was a military operation that resulted in the rescue of former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt—who was captured by the FARC in February 2001— and 14 other hostages. The FARC wanted to transfer the hostages, but did not have helicopters of their own to use. This was brought to the attention of the Colombian government, which had infiltrated the group (Luhnow and Córdoba 2008). As a result, the Colombian military posed as a sympathetic NGO and offered to transfer the hostages in one of its helicopters under the guise of a mission to distribute humanitarian aid; the name of the fictitious NGO was “International Humanitarian Mission” (Penhaul 2008).
When the “International Humanitarian Mission” arrived to pick up the hostages, they warmly greeted the FARC rebels while dressed in Che Guevara t-shirts and looking like leftist sympathizers (Luhnow and Córdoba 2008). The undercover army officers then handcuffed the hostages and loaded them aboard the helicopter along with two FARC commanders who were to accompany them to their destination. Once aboard, the soldiers subdued the FARC commanders and directed the helicopter to safety (Luhnow and Córdoba 2008).

The mission was a resounding success, but it also highlighted the strong ties between the FARC and NGOs. As O’Grady (2008) observed in the aftermath of the event, “It may have taken years for army intelligence to infiltrate the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and it may have been tough to convincingly impersonate rebels. But what seems to have been a walk in the park was getting the FARC to believe that an NGO was providing resources to help it in the dirty work of ferrying captives to a new location.” She went on to note that the mission “warrants attention because it adds to the already robust evidence that left-wing NGOs and other so-called human rights defenders…are nothing more than propagandists for terrorists…How else to explain the fact that the FARC swallowed the line without batting an eye?” Just how trusting the FARC commanders were of an NGO’s offer to transport hostages suggests that aid workers may have actually done so in the past.

8.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings

This dissertation theorizes that the type and magnitude of aid that NGOs deliver in conflict zones influences the security situation for aid workers. It has been hypothesized that as aid increases in both political scope and magnitude, the security situation for NGOs will decrease. The qualitative findings presented in the chapter provided partial support for all four
hypotheses. Contrary to the quantitative analysis, which showed no relationship between the political activity of NGOs and insecurity, process tracing has revealed that a relationship does exist. However, in the case of Colombia, NGOs tended to be safer the more they engaged in political activity—as long as it was supportive of the FARC and the ELN. In the previous three case studies, it was shown that aid workers were more likely to come under attack if aligned with the central government or factions competing with the predominant insurgencies. In Colombia, a large portion of the NGO community actually aligned with the insurgents. Thus the FARC and the ELN did not view them as a threat, unlike the central government. However, the US-backed central government chose not to target aid workers with violence.

Although NGOs operating in Colombia did not experience the same level of insecurity as the previous case studies, there were a few instances in which attacks occurred. The data reveal that these attacks tended to occur against NGOs perceived to be aligned with the central government. For example, on 10 November 2001 guerrillas abducted and killed an aid worker for a US-sponsored program because they believed the worker was working with the military (START 2015). However, these instances were rare because the FARC and the ELN viewed the broader aid community as sympathetic to their cause.

Table 17 compares the motives behind attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia. Unlike the other case study nations, there were no criminal or “not targeted” attacks against aid workers in Colombia, and political security incidents were minimal. Table 18 compares attack locations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia. In all countries, aid workers were most likely to come under attack while in-transit.
Table 17 Structured-Focused Comparison: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia NGO Attack Motives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>NGO Security Incidents</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Criminal</th>
<th>Not Targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18 Structured-Focused Comparison: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia NGO Attack Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In-Transit</th>
<th>Project Site</th>
<th>NGO Compound</th>
<th>Public Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quantitative analyses revealed that the type of work NGOs engage in does not appear to be a significant cause of aid worker insecurity. Process tracing supports these findings. The perceptions of aid workers have been influenced by Colombia’s recent history with NGOs. As the critical antecedent section has revealed, the 1991 Colombian Constitution allowed NGOs to legally operate in the country. Beginning in the 1990s, several NGOs engaged in “judicial warfare” against the Colombian military by publishing reports on human rights abuses, many of which used inflated statistics. NGOs also administered “peace communities” beginning in the 1990s, which were occasionally used as FARC safe-havens.

These three critical antecedents helped create an environment for a critical juncture that occurred in 2003. Given the tense history between the Colombian government and the NGO community, the 2003 publication of “The Authoritarian Spell” by 80 aid agencies prompted Uribe to label NGOs as “spokesmen for” and “politickers of” terrorism. This development
brought to light how many NGOs were more supportive of the guerrillas than the central government. As a result, the FARC and the ELN chose not to target aid workers in attacks, as many were viewed as allies in their fight. In the case of Colombia, political action by NGOs actually resulted in greater security, but only because the action came at the expense of the government.
Chapter 9 - Conclusion

This dissertation sought to explain the increasing number of attacks against NGOs working in high-risk conflict zones. According to the Aid Worker Security Database (Humanitarian Outcomes 2016), there were 2,416 international and national aid workers either killed, wounded, or abducted worldwide between 2000 and 2014.\textsuperscript{59} Separated into five-year increments, this figure was 409 between 2000 and 2004, 876 from 2005 to 2009, and 1,131 between 2010 and 2014. Theoretically, this dissertation contends that the increased insecurity of NGOs in the field is due to type of activity organizations are engaged in. By including the type of aid distributed in the field, this study further the understanding of why aid workers are attacked in high-risk conflict zones.

Chapter two provides a review of the literature on NGO insecurity, which is divided into three themes: (1) security trends, (2) explanations for attacks, and (3) organizational activity and approaches. The review reveals that the literature on NGO insecurity is limited. Despite the increasing number of attacks in high-risk conflict zones, only a few empirical studies have been conducted along with numerous anecdotal evidence to explain the causes of aid workers’ insecurity. Furthermore, previous studies have largely assessed the impact of external factors influencing attacks against NGOs, without addressing the actions of aid workers themselves. For example, one group of studies analyzes the impact of military presence and attacks against aid workers, but only in Afghanistan (Mitchell 2015; Watts 2004).

Another takes into consideration the type of work NGOs are conducting in the field, but they only assess the impact of international human rights organizations on NGO insecurity, \textsuperscript{59} The figures cited here include international and local humanitarian NGOs. It does not include UN, Red Cross, or national Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations.
without taking into account organizations engaged in other political activity such as peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and state-building (Murdie and Stapley 2014). Moreover, the researchers did not account for local NGOs in their study, and used a broad definition of NGOs which included general nongovernmental civil society organizations (e.g. professional associations and trade unions), not those specifically engaged in relief or development. The aforementioned empirical studies have also only employed quantitative methods, failing to utilize qualitative approaches that are beneficial for increased understanding of NGO insecurity in high-risk conflict zones.

To build upon the limited extant research, this dissertation contends that the insecurity of NGOs in the field is due to the type and magnitude of activity that organizations are engaged in. It assesses both sectors of activity and statements made by NGOs operating in high-risk conflict zones. The theoretical argument contends that aid workers engaged in political and ambitious activities are likely to negatively influence the security situation for NGOs. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used to assess this theory.

Chapter three thus presents a quantitative analysis at two levels. The first is a large-N analysis. A panel-corrected standard error regression model is used to analyze the sample of 117 countries between 1999 and 2015. The results do not reveal a statistically significant relationship between the type of aid being delivered and insecurity experienced in the field. However, the analysis shows that the magnitude of aid tends to be a significant determinant of aid worker’s insecurity. Only when ambitious projects are carried out by NGOs is their security likely to be compromised. To test the robustness of these findings, a separate analysis is conducted at the subnational-level across four case studies: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia. The four cases were chosen for purposes of geographic diversity and unit homogeneity, as each country
was considered “high-risk” for a minimum of five years between 2000 and 2014. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia are all “positive” cases, in that they each accounted for high levels of attacks against aid workers. Colombia serves as a “negative” case because there were relatively minimal victims over the same time period (Humanitarian Outcomes 2015). Consistent with the findings at the country-level, the subnational-level analysis does not show a statistically significant relationship between the type of aid and attacks against NGOs. However, the results show that aid workers are likely to come under attack when engaged in ambitious projects. These findings support the country-level analysis, which also found that the magnitude of aid tends to be a significant factor.

The quantitative findings both support and challenge the previous results of statistical analyses. While one study discovered a relationship between weak governmental institutions and heightened insecurity for aid workers (Humanitarian Outcomes 2012), another did not (Hoelscher, Miklian, and Nygård 2015). This dissertation found that weak government institutions were in fact a statistically significant indicator of attacks against NGOs. Furthermore, the quantitative results reveal that countries with higher literacy rates tended to be safer for NGOs. This supports the results of two previous studies (Mitchell 2015; Watts 2004), that found that aid workers tended to be safer in modernized areas.

However, as Clayton (2014, 18-19) has noted, the use of quantitative methods alone does not allow researchers to “untangle competing causal stories or determine causal ordering, and it thus requires a deeper analysis to validate a proposed mechanism.” Thus, a qualitative analysis of the four case studies is conducted to assess the theory in greater detail. Chapter four outlines the qualitative research design, which includes “structured-focused comparison” and “process tracing” methods to analyze the four cases that include Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and
Colombia. The first three are positive cases and the last is a negative case. This dissertation also uses the *critical antecedent* approach.

Chapter five is a qualitative assessment of NGO insecurity in Afghanistan. The structured-focused comparison results show that aid workers operating in Afghanistan between 2000 and 2014 were most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit to or from project sites. It is speculated that if workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. The results thus corroborate the quantitative findings, which show a relationship between the magnitude of aid and insecurity for aid workers.

Furthermore, the process tracing results reveal that political statements made by NGOs—regardless of their sectors of activity—contributed to decreased security. Although many NGOs were engaged in apolitical projects in the field, several of these organizations nonetheless made politically-charged statements. The three *critical antecedents* that proceeded the *critical juncture* were: (1) Taliban restrictions on NGO activities after coming to power in September 1996, (2) the expulsion of international NGOs from Afghanistan in July 1998, and (3) a shift to more politically-oriented action by the NGO community in the aftermath of the US-led intervention. The *critical juncture* for politically-motivated attacks occurred in mid-2002 when many within the NGO community abandoned their principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality by publicly supporting ISAF and calling for an increased military presence in order to defeat the Taliban.

Chapter six analyzes Iraq. Similar to Afghanistan, the structured-focused comparison results show that aid workers operating in Iraq are most likely to be victims of politically-
motivated attacks while in-transit. Also consistent with the Afghan findings, process tracing shows that it is not necessarily the type of aid being delivered that results in insecurity, but rather the perception of an NGO’s political or religious affiliation. These perceptions were significantly influenced by Iraq’s history with NGOs, described by six critical antecedents: (1) Iraqi political party use of civil society organizations to mobilize against the monarchy in the late 1950s; (2) Ba’ath Party restrictions on NGO activity beginning in 1968; (3) state control of public welfare following the nationalization of Iraq’s oil industry in 1972; (4) NGO support of the Kurds in northern Iraq between June 1991 and November 1996; (5) manipulation of NGOs by Kurdish political parties during the May 1994 to November 1997 civil war; and (6) the US-led invasion which resulted in a massive influx of NGOs to Iraq in the spring and summer of 2003.

These critical antecedents help explain a critical juncture that occurred in March-June 2003. In a move that was consistent with Iraqi history, both national and international NGOs began to align themselves with political parties, warring factions, and religious groups of influence. This compromised any perception of independence, neutrality, or impartiality within the humanitarian community, ultimately resulting in politically-motivated attacks against aid workers.

Chapter seven deals with Somalia. Consistent with the previous two case studies, structured-focused comparison shows that aid workers operating in Somalia were most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit. Also consistent with the previous cases, process tracing reveals that the contemporary security situation for aid workers has been significantly influenced by Somalia’s history with NGOs. This history is summarized by eight critical antecedents: (1) President Barre’s ban on NGOs in 1969; (2) the lifting of the NGO ban in 1979 in response to the Ogaden War refugee crisis; (3) NGO complicity with Barre’s regime

These critical antecedents provided an environment that set the stage for a critical juncture in 2006. Given the history of political involvement by NGOs in Somalia, al-Shabaab was wary of aid agencies not under its control. Attacks in Somalia were primarily the result of al-Shabaab’s desire to control the distribution of aid after their 2006 rise to prominence in the central and southern regions of the country. If NGOs provided aid to communities in an independent, neutral, and impartial manner, they opened themselves up to attacks from insurgents and clan-specific militia that desired to use aid as a weapon of war. For example, al-Shabaab used starvation as a means to punish communities that did not submit to their authority. Therefore, in the case of Somalia, strict adherence to core principles actually resulted in an increase in politically-motivated attacks.

Finally is Colombia, which is a negative case. Chapter eight shows that the perceptions of aid workers have been influenced by Colombia’s recent history with NGOs. The critical antecedents are highlighted in the chapter: (1) the 1991 Colombian Constitution which allowed NGOs to legally operate in the country; (2) NGOs engagement in “judicial warfare” against the Colombian military in the 1990s through the publication of reports on human rights abuses, many of which used inflated statistics; and (3) NGO administration of “peace communities” in the 1990s, which were occasionally used as FARC safe-havens.

Given the tense history between the Colombian government and the NGO community, the 2003 publication of “The Authoritarian Spell” by 80 NGOs condemning President Uribe and
the Colombian government prompted Uribe to label NGOs as “spokesmen for” and “politickers of” terrorism. This critical juncture brought to light how many NGOs were more supportive of the guerrillas than the central government. As a result, the FARC and the ELN chose not to target aid workers in attacks, as several were viewed as allies in their fight. In the case of Colombia, political action by NGOs actually resulted in greater security, but only because the action came at the expense of the government.

**9.1 Prospects for Future Research**

As noted in the previous section, NGOs were most likely to be targeted by political actors while in-transit. This finding was consistent across all four case studies. As a result, future research should assess the impact of NGO approaches to deter these attacks. According to Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard (2011, 40-44), approximately 60 percent of international NGOs and 20 percent of local NGOs operating complex security environments\(^\text{60}\) receive security training. Are NGOs that provide security training less likely to experience attacks in the field? Questions like these should be analyzed in greater detail to help mitigate the threats that aid workers currently face.

**9.2 Implications for Policymakers**

The findings of this dissertation have some policy implications for those concerned with NGO insecurity in countries experiencing intrastate war. First, it dispels the myth that humanitarian activity has historically been independent, impartial, and neutral. Several NGOs

\(^{60}\) The countries included in their survey include Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Palestinian territories, Pakistan, Somalia, and Sudan.
have relied on this false assumption for security, believing that adherence to core principles has contributed to “humanitarian space.” However, this dissertation has revealed that NGOs have played influential political roles throughout history in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia. These roles have significantly impacted modern-day perceptions. As a result, the broader aid community is not viewed as independent, impartial, or neutral, regardless of whether their individual sectors of activity are apolitical or political in nature. It is therefore not enough for NGOs to solely rely on strict adherence to core humanitarian principles as a means of deterring attacks.

Both the quantitative and qualitative findings of this dissertation reveal that the magnitude of aid provided in conflict zones significantly impacts the security situation for aid workers. When NGOs are engaged in large-scale and long-term projects, they can be viewed by militant factions as occupying entities or appendages of the central government. Additionally, if aid workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. As a result, NGOs may be best suited to work on relatively small-scale relief projects in conflict zones. Consequently, governmental or military personnel may be better options for large-scale development initiatives.

Furthermore, this dissertation also finds no support for the argument that military engagement in humanitarian relief and development work in conflict ridden areas has made it so that insurgent actors can no longer distinguish between combatants and civilians. This is perhaps the most popular and common explanation for decreased security advanced by the NGO community, notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the quantitative analyses presented in this dissertation show a statistically significant relationship between military engagement in
humanitarian assistance and increased attacks against aid workers, process tracing reveals that these military initiatives were actually in response to an existing insecure setting for NGOs. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, PRTs were established because NGOs were no longer able to operate in certain areas due to an already-hostile environment for aid workers. PRTs engaged in both small-scale humanitarian relief activities and large-scale development projects. However, given this dissertation’s findings, PRTs may be a viable option moving forward for large-scale development initiatives in conflict zones. However, from a security perspective, NGOs may be best situated to take the lead when it comes to relatively smaller-scale humanitarian relief projects.
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Appendix A - Quantitative Analysis

Countries included in Quantitative Analysis

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Camodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Democratic Rep of
Congo, Rep of
Costa Rica
Cote D'Ivoire
Cuba
Czech Republic
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gambia
Georgia
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haïti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel/Palestinian Territories
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, North
Kosovo/Serbia
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Mozambique
Myanmar/Burma
Namibia
Nepal
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Russia/Chechnya
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Western Sahara/Morocco
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Countries included in Quantitative Analysis by Region

Africa

Algeria
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Democratic Rep of
Congo, Rep of
Cote D'Ivoire
Djibouti
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Western Sahara/Morocco
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Asia

Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel/Palestinian Territories
Japan
Jordan
Korea, North
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Lebanon
Malaysia
Mongolia
Myanmar/Burma
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Russia/Chechnya
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tajikistan
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Turkey
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Yemen

Central America

Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama

Europe

Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Georgia
Kosovo/Serbia
Macedonia
Moldova
Romania
Ukraine

Oceania

Fiji
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands

South America

Argentina
Bolivia
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Guyana
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Venezuela
High-Risk Conflict Zone Countries

Algeria (1999)
Angola (1999-2001)
Burundi (2000-2002)
Chad (2006)
India (2000, 2002-2005)
Israel/Palestinian Territories (2014)
Liberia (2003)
Libya (2011)
Nepal (2002-2005)
Nigeria (2013-2014)
Pakistan (2008-2014)
Philippines (2000)
Rwanda (2001, 2009)
Serbia (1999)
Sierra Leone (1999)
South Sudan (2014)
Syria (2012-2014)
Turkey (1999)
Figure A.1 Average # of Aid Workers Attacked per Year of Intrastate Conflict Experienced, 2000-2014*

*Each of these countries experienced at least five years of intrastate conflict between 2000 and 2014.
Table 19 NGO Security Incidents, Education as Apolitical Aid, Country-Level Analysis

<table>
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Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test
Table 20 NGO Security Incidents, Education as Apolitical Aid, Provincial-Level Analysis

<table>
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Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test
Table 21 NGO Security Incidents, Aid per Capita, Country-Level Analysis

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<td>-.245*</td>
<td>-.250*</td>
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<td>(.187)</td>
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<td>(.191)</td>
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Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test
Table 22 NGO Security Incidents, Aid per Capita, Provincial-Level Analysis

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<th>Variables</th>
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Pseudo R²: .18 .18 .18 .18
Chi-Square: 302.32*** 278.36*** 335.95*** 285.00***
N: 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed test
Appendix B - Afghanistan

Bonn Agreement Participants (UN 2001)

Ms. Amena Afzali
Mr. S. Hussain Anwari
Mr. Hedayat Amin Arsala
Mr. Sayed Hamed Gailani
Mr. Rahmatullah Mousa Ghazi
Eng. Abdul Hakim
Mr. Houmayoun Jareer
Mr. Abbas Karimi
Mr. Mustafa Kazimi
Dr. Azizullah Ludin
Mr. Ahmad Wali Massoud
Mr. Hafizullah Asif Mohseni
Prof. Mohammad Ishaq Nadiri
Mr. Mohammad Natiqi
Mr. Aref Noorzay
Mr. Yunus Qanooni
Dr. Zalmai Rassoul
Mr. H. Mirwais Sadeq
Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams
Prof. Abdul Sattar Sirat
Mr. Humayun Tandar
Mrs. Sima Wali
General Abdul Rahim Wardak
Mr. Azizullah Wasefi
Mr. Pacha Khan Zadran
“A Call for Security” NGO Signatories (ICVA 2003)

ActionAid
AfghanAid
Afghan Community Islamic Center of San Diego
Afghani Community of Greater Salt Lake City
Afghans4tomorrow
Aide Medicale Internationale
Air Serve International
American Near East Refugee Aid
Asian Institute For Rural Development
AUSTCARE
Australian Council for Overseas Aid
British American Security Information Council
Campaign for UN Reform
CARE International
Caritas Internationalis
Catholic Relief Services
Center for Victims of Torture
Center for Humanitarian Cooperation
Children in Crisis
Christian Children's Fund/ Child Fund Afghanistan
Church World Service
Church Women United
Coalition for International Justice
Coalition of Afghan Associations of Northern California
Committee for an Effective International Criminal Law
Congressional Hunger Center
Concern International
Concern Worldwide
Cordaid
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
Danish Refugee Council
Episcopal Migration Ministries
Equality Now
Ethiopian Community Development Council
Feminist Majority
Fund for Peace
Global Action to Prevent War
Hope Worldwide
Human Rights Watch
Institute on Religion and Public Policy
International Catholic Migration Commission
International Crisis Group
International Human Rights Law Group
International Medical Corps
International Rescue Committee
International Women's Health Coalition
Jesuit Refugee Service/USA
Marie Stopes International
Media Action International
Mercy Corps
National Council of Women's Organizations
National NGO Council of Sri Lanka
National Peace Corps Association
Norwegian Refugee Council
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
Ockenden International
Operation USA
Orphans and Widows Association of San Diego
Oxfam International
Pax Christi International
Peace Through Law Education
Fund Physicians for Human Rights
Project on the Future of Peace Operations at the Henry L. Stimson Center
Refugee Consortium of Kenya
Refugee Educational Trust
Refugees International
Save the Children UK
Save the Children USA
Solidarités
Triangle Generation Humanitaire
US Committee for Refugees/Immigrant Refugee Services of America
Vital Voices Global Partnership
Washington Kurdish Institute
Widows for Peace and Reconstruction
Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
Women's EDGE
World Order Models Project
World Vision Afghanistan
World Vision US