SELECTED PATTERNS OF POPULATION
MOVEMENT AND SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST
BANK SINCE 1967

by

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This study explores patterns of Arab and Jewish movement and
settlement which have been observable on the West Bank of the Jordan
River since 1967. The first chapter is comprised of pertinent
background information, a statement of purpose, a discussion of
methodology, and justification of the research.

BACKGROUND

The West Bank of the Jordan River is a small parcel of land
consisting of only 5500 square kilometers; nonetheless the area
possesses a tremendous amount of historical and religious signifi-
cance for Israelis and Palestinian Arabs alike. This blend of
historical and religious appeal is potent and explosive. Recently
a third ingredient has been added to the blend; Israelis have argued
that possession of the West Bank is vital to their nation's defense
and security. In the final analysis, the region becomes "the ful-
crum of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the most significant of the
areas conquered by Israel in June 1967 . . . (it) constitutes the
main ground for the struggle between Israeli and Palestinian
nationalism."[1]

Historical Ties

The region is historically significant to both Israelis and
Palestinians. The West Bank highlands represent the heartland of
the Biblical kingdom of Israel and contain that kingdom's capital
at Jerusalem. Throughout the centuries of the Diaspora Jews drew
strength from their memories of and desire to return to the land of

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Israel. There were also a small number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank just prior to the creation of Israel in 1948. Therefore a number of Jews believe that historical precedent justifies the occupation, or "liberation," of the West Bank.

Palestinian Arabs also feel that history mandates their right to the West Bank. They have seen many conquerors come and go throughout the centuries, and as a result the blood of the Palestinian Arab is a somewhat confusing blend of Arab, Egyptian, Hyksos, Hittite, Amorite, Babylonian, Phillistine, and various European bloods. However, they are also descendants of the ancient Canaanites. The Palestinian may therefore claim that his/her ancestors dwelled in the Land of Canaan (including the West Bank of the Jordan) long before Moses and the Israelites wandered through the Sinai in search of the "promised land." By the same token they farmed West Bank soils for many centuries preceding the Six-Day War in 1967. A Palestinian farmer may reasonably argue that his father and his grandfather paid taxes on his land and have since been laid to rest beneath it; therefore, he would insist, the West Bank belongs also to his posterity.

A Palestinian Arab state has actually never existed. Between 1950 and 1967 the West Bank was annexed to Jordan and prior to that, the British held Palestine as a Mandate. In the centuries preceding British rule the Ottaman Turks governed Palestine's people. Yet the Palestinians insist the land is theirs because they have dwelled on it for so long. They believe self-determination should be accorded to them as it is to other peoples.

Religious Ties

Religious arguments are also presented to justify claims to the West Bank. According to the Old Testament all of this land was promised to Abraham and his descendants as Abraham stood in the ancient city of Shechem (Nablus). Jews and Arabs alike believe the promise applies to them. Both recognize Abraham as the father of their people, although the Arabs believe they descend from Ishmael, the son of Abraham's concubine, while the Jews descend from Isaac, the son of Abraham's wife.

The town of Shechem itself lies on the West Bank, as does the Biblical city of Jericho. Bethlehem, which is the "City of David" to Jews and the birthplace of Christ to Palestinian Christians, is also located in the West Bank. The city of Hebron is another important site; it is thought to contain Abraham's grave. It is Judaism's second holiest city and is also of importance to Palestinian Muslims and Christians. Finally, the ancient City of Jerusalem is in the West Bank and abuts Israel's eastern border. The Israelis had built a new Jerusalem on their side of the border prior to the 1967 War, but in 1967 Old and New Jerusalem were "unified." Old Jerusalem is the holiest city for Jews and the third holiest city for Palestinian Muslims.* It also has great significance for Arab Christians as the city in which Jesus was crucified.

Strategic Importance

The government of Israel claims that occupation of the West Bank makes Israel's borders more defensible. Because Israel is a small state, Israelis have long felt that its large concentrations

* The holiest city is Mecca, followed by Medina

of civilian population are frighteningly vulnerable to attack from nearby Arab states.   Before Israel occupied the West Bank, the width of its territory in the central heartland was only twelve kilometers. Many Israelis therefore view the West Bank as a necessary "buffer zone."

The West Bank boasts of several impressive topographical features which heighten the perception that it is an aid to security. The Jordan River consists of a number of entrenched meanders which could serve as the initial antitank ditch, should the Arabs attack from the east. The Jordan Rift Valley "would form a formidable topographical barrier."[2] To the west of the Valley lie rugged mountains; many Israeli officials believe that "relatively small forces, armed with sophisticated and appropriate weaponry, could hold the 'wall' even against an Arab army assisted by outside powers. Any passes through the mountains . . . are long and narrow and could be turned into death traps for advancing armor."[3] For these reasons, Israel emphasizes the strategic importance of the West Bank.

Physiography

An understanding of the strategic argument, and of others which will be presented throughout the course of the paper, is facilitated by a physiographic description of the West Bank. The area consists of two physiographic regions. A humid highland region runs along Israel's eastern border. It is made up of barren limestone hills and of fertile basins and valleys. The highlands which stretch to the north of Jerusalem lie in the area known to Israelis as

"Samaria," whereas the area to the south of Jerusalem is known as "Judea." Jerusalem itself perches between the Samarian and Judean mountain blocks. (Map I)

To the east of the highlands lies a transitional zone known to Israelis as the wilderness of Judea and Samaria. It is barren and uncultivated. It in turn adjoins the Jordan Valley, which forms the second major physiographic region in the West Bank. This is a rift valley; it is acutally a small segment of the lengthy Syrian-East African Rift. The entire valley lies in a rainshadow created by the highlands, and is arid to semiarid. In its northern reaches annual rainfall averages 300 millimeters, but this amount decreases to the south and tapers off to only 100 millimeters at the Dead Sea.[4] Parts of the Valley offer cultivable soils, while in other areas the soil is too thin or too saline to be easily utilized.

Population and Economy Prior to Israeli Occupation

It is estimated that nearly one million Arabs resided in the West Bank before the 1967 War. 758,000 of these resided in the highlands and an additional 175,000 lived in the Jordan Valley.[5] The highlands were densely populated and homed urban centers such as East Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron, Bethlehem, and Ramallah. The only major population center in the Valley was Jericho. Arab settlement in the Valley was dominated by three large refugee camps which surrounded that city.

Much of the population was employed in agriculture. According to a Jordanian census taken in 1961, approximately 37.6 percent of the West Bank labor force was engaged in agriculture.[6] However,

WEST BANK TOPOGRAPHY

Sources: Harris, 1980. Matar, 1981.

MAP I

"this probably underestimates the participation of unpaid family labor. In addition, much of the activity of the other economic sectors was centered around agriculture, including the processing of farm products in the industrial sector, and transport and commerce related to farm products. It is therefore no exagerration to say that agriculture was the dominant sector in the West Bank economy."[7] It has been estimated that agriculture provided jobs for about half of the labor force prior to 1967.[8] Also, Israel's Economic Planning Authority estimates that it accounted for 24 percent of the gross national product.[9]

The land obviously employed much of the population. However, between the years 1948 and 1967, little land was added to that which had been under cultivation in 1948. During this same period the West Bank received a large influx of refugees and experienced a high birth rate. West Bank industry was also unable to absorb the increase in population. It remained "small-scale and underdeveloped," with only five enterprises which employed 100 or more persons.[10] Most existing industry was located in Jerusalem.

As a result of this a high rate of unemployment existed, and many Palestinians responded by leaving the West Bank for the East Bank or for the oil fields. In early 1967 approximately 120,000 Jordanians were working abroad; most of these were from the West Bank.[11] According to Israel's Economic Planning Authority, the remittances these workers sent home accounted for 12 percent of the West Bank's gross national product.[12] Palestinians also worked in the East Bank, which was not classified as work "abroad." Therefore

a significant number of Arabs had left the West Bank to seek employment elsewhere.

Depopulation

In June of 1967 Israel occupied the West Bank. At this time many Palestinians fled to Jordan, although estimates concerning the number of refugees differ. These estimates vary between 182,000 and 355,000 refugees.[13] Due to postwar confusion and displacement, and to the resultant lack of reliable data, precise and indisputable estimates are unavailable. An Israeli census conducted after the war stated that 599,000 Arabs remained,[14] though some scholars argue that this number is low. William Harris claims that 175,000 Arabs left the highlands and that 75,000 left the Jordan Valley.[15] This would mean that 23 percent of those in the highlands and 88 percent of those in the Valley fled. Harris' estimates lie between the proposed extremes and while they cannot be verified, they do reveal two accepted facts: a small number of those in the highlands and many of those in the Valley left the West Bank.

First, a proportionately small number of highlanders fled. The mountains therefore remained densely populated. East Jerusalem had a postwar population of 65,000, Nablus of 44,000, and Hebron of 38,000.[16] In addition a majority of the highland farmers remained on their lands.

In the Valley large numbers of residents fled across the nearby Jordan River. Most of the Palestinians who had lived in the refugee camps near Jericho became refugees for a second time; the camps were virtually emptied. Much of the population of Jericho

also left, and so too did more than 50 percent of the native rural population.[17] The Jordan Valley was left sparcely populated. Harris observed in his text that there existed a "broad contrast between very heavy population reduction in the Jordan Rift and certain sections of the western border and substantial population retention in the heart of Judea-Samaria . . . ."[18] This contrast was evident to the Israeli occupiers as well, and would prove important in the development of settlement policy.

Finally, it should be noted briefly that the population of the West Bank continued to show some decline until 1969 due to emigration. In 1969 the population leveled out at 584,000,[19] and then again began to increase. This increase was due to a decrease in out-migration coupled with the continuation of high birth rates.*

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to examine selected patterns of population movement and settlement in the West Bank of the Jordan River since its occupation in 1967. Selected movements of the indigenous population, as well as the establishment of Jewish settlements in the region, will be dealt with. The Israeli government has been highly visible in directing and implementing the patterns to be discussed, and so the research consistently responds to this question: How have the policies of Israel's government impacted on patterns of movement and settlement in the West Bank? Also, how dominant is this impact, relative to other factors which have contributed to the patterns? What are these other factors? Finally, what patterns have resulted?

* A much more comprehensive discussion of Arab in-migration, out-migration, and natural increase will be included in Chapter 4.

JUSTIFICATION

Peter Perry, a geographer at the University of Canterbury, states that "the geographical dimension of current affairs has too often been neglected in public debate, at our peril and often by our default. The missing contribution in otherwise well informed analysis of the contemporary world . . . is almost invariably that of the political geographer."[20] This research is in part a response to this statement.

The West Bank receives a tremendous amount of international press. It is an area which seems to be undergoing "de facto" annexation by the Israelis and which is, at the same time, a centerpiece of Palestinian nationalism. This paper is rooted in the belief that an improved understanding of the area will be facilitated by a discussion of the population of the area, and more specifically of selected patterns of settlement exhibited by that population.

Selected patterns of movement and settlement and intensity of the same will be elucidated; the thesis will also seek insights into the evolution of the patterns. The patterns themselves represent a spatial phenomenon. The study of these fits into Pattison's "spatial tradition" of geographical study.

A discussion of the evolution of the patterns will necessarily deal with relevant political processes within Israel. Saul B. Cohen and Lewis D. Rosenthal suggested in the Geographical Review that "without more attention to the political, our geographical insights are likely to be limited and sterile."[21] This statement rings

particularly true in the case of the West Bank, where Israel's government has indeed played a dominant role. Other important factors which have impacted upon patterns of movement will also be discussed. The end result should be a much more thorough understanding of the selected spatial phenomena.

METHODOLOGY

Data for the thesis was gathered through an extensive review of relevant literature and also through use of available statistical documentation. Among those sources which were most productive was geographer William W. Harris' text Taking Root: Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, the Golan and Gaza-Sinai, 1967-1980. This book provided many maps illustrating Jewish settlement as well as valuable insight into Knesset decisions affecting settlement patterns.

Also of importance was Avshalom Rokach's Rural Settlement in Israel, which discussed the technicalities involved in establishing a settlement, such as how settlement groups form and what criteria they must meet, how settlers are selected and trained, and what factors influence specific settlement location. His text was virtually a handbook on how to establish a rural settlement in Israel or the occupied territories.

The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics' Quarterly Statistics of the Administered Territories and its annual Statistical Abstract of Israel were useful in that they provided quantitative data on the Arab population, and particularly on the movement of Arab laborers.

Ann Lesch's book entitled Israeli Occupation of the West Bank: The First Two Years dealt with Knesset decision making and with

settlement establishment in the early years. She later updated her study in an article entitled, "Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, 1967-1977" (Journal of Palestine Studies), which included a number of useful maps.

Among the most valuable journals utilized were Middle East International and the Journal of Palestine Studies. Middle East International provided a variety of information in its monthly section "News Out of Israel and the Occupied Territories." It also published Edward Mortimer's "Stealing the West Bank," which aided in an understanding of how Israel lays claim to West Bank law.

The Journal of Palestine Studies published applicable articles such as Ibrahim Matar's "Israeli Settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" which included a number of helpful maps, Selim Tamari's "Building Other People's Homes" which dealt with Arab labor in Israel, and Ann Lesch's."

A brief overview of the thesis is pertinent at this point. First, the settlement of Jews in the West Bank will be discussed. Chapter 2 will deal with the actual placement of the settlements and will focus on governmental decision-making. The government approves or disapproves all settlement plans and plays a dominant role in settlement distribution. The third chapter will deal with recruitment and selection of settlers, as well as with economic bases of the settlements and with settler numbers.

The fourth chapter will examine Arab patterns of movements. The most striking of these is the daily flow of laborers into Israel. Arab out-migration will also be discussed.

Chapter 5 will summarize findings after implications, discuss research constraints, and suggest questions which might be explored in future research.

The study area includes all of the conquered West Bank with the exception of East Jerusalem. On June 28, 1967, Israel formally annexed East Jerusalem, and its exclusion from this is necessitated because the government has dealt with it much differently than with the remainder of the West Bank. Jewish settler activity in and around East Jerusalem has been more intense, and also less controversial within Israel, than has been settler activity in the remainder of the territory. A discussion of East Jerusalem would be quite lengthy and involved; the city could quite easily serve as a second area for parallel research. Also, statistical information concerning East Jerusalem is not readily available. Israeli statistics for the West Bank exclude that city, and Israeli statistics on Israel do not divide it into "old" and "new" Jerusalem. Therefore, Jerusalem will be excluded from the study.

CHAPTER TWO:

FOUNDING AND DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH SETTLEMENTS

Introduction

The placement of Israeli settlements on the West Bank has, in almost all cases been determined by Israel's Knesset.* Decisions concerning placement have been controversial within Israel and within that country's government. The Labour Party (1967-1977) was in fact unable in ten years to officially adopt a settlement policy, due to a considerable degree of dissention within the Cabinet. Cabinet decisions have been the end result of a large number of competing pressures and inputs, which have in turn changed over time, and Cabinet members have responded accordingly. This chapter describes the decisions and also attempts to elucidate some of the important variables which have played into the decision-making process.** These decisions are important in an understanding of Jewish settler movement to the West Bank.

POSTWAR CONTROVERSY WITHIN ISRAEL CONCERNING SETTLEMENT

When Israel occupied the West Bank it was not immediately clear to anyone--including members of Israel's cabinet--how it should be dealt with. It was, however, clear to most Israelis that the status

* In several cases settlements which have not attained government approval have nevertheless been established. In most of these cases, government approval is eventually received. If it is not, the settlement is either disbanded or moved to another location on the West Bank, sometimes by force.

**Certainly some degree of subjectivity is involved in identifying the "important" variables; however I believe the variables to be discussed (albeit briefly) do, indeed, lend a fairly high percentage of explanation to the settlement distribution pattern.

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quo which had persisted prior to the war had been unacceptable, and that a total withdrawal to pre-war boundaries was not an option. Premier Levi Eshkol expressed these sentiments on June 12, 1967, when he addressed the Knesset. The address itself was not meant for Knesset ears only, but rather for "all the nations of the world."[1] He said:

> Be under no illusion that the State of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that reigned up to a week ago . . . . We are entitled to determine what are the true and vital interests of our country and how they shall be secured. The position that existed until now shall never again return . . . .[2]

While it was agreed that Israel should determine its "true and vital interests," attempts to determine what these interests were proved to be a much less harmonious affair. Agreement existed only in the case of East Jerusalem; on June 28, 1967, Israel formally unified the divided city. Cabinet members strongly disagreed, however, about the future of the remainder of the West Bank. Extreme annexationists, such as Menachem Begin, believed that Israel should retain and settle the entire territory. The very moderate, such as Foreign Minister Abba Eban, favored the annexation of East Jerusalem only and argued that the remainder of the West Bank should be returned to the Arabs. Most Cabinet members positioned themselves between these two extremes; they supported a policy of selective settlement. They believed that certain areas should be retained for purposes of defense and that others should be relinquished. This view "probably received the most widespread support in the political community and among the public at the time."[3]

Initially Israel's demand for defensible borders formed the single strongest rationale for the establishment of settlements. It was believed that strategically-located settlements would be capable of reducing guerilla infiltration and would also serve to impede an Arab invasion from the East. This argument appealed to many Israelis. It was not, however, the only argument presented.

A second potent argument involved the reestablishment of Israel's historical presence on the West Bank. Many Jews felt that Israel had an historic and a religious "right"--indeed, even an "obligation"--to settle the West Bank. Such feelings gave rise to the "Whole Land of Israel Movement" in August of 1967. The central precept of the movement was that "all of Palestine, indivisible, is part of Israel's historic birthright and must be immediately an-nexed."[4] Members believed that this "birthright" superceded the rights of West Bank Arabs to self-determination. The movement it-self had a considerable degree of popular appeal and quickly became adept at influencing policy-makers in the Knesset. According to a March, 1968, issue of the American Jewish journal _Commentary_, "(the movement) propagates a message of such apparent emotional force and popular attraction that even cabinet ministers, who are known to think differently, have been afraid to disagree in public. Only Foreign Minister Abba Eban has publicly criticized them . . . ."[5] This movement helped to propagate a reglious nationalism which con-tinued to intensify until 1977, at which time it came to dominate government policy under Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

There was also a much smaller and less influential group of Israelis who favored settlement on a temporary basis only. Some of

those who initially opposed all settlement gravitated towards this view in time, because the other did not seem feasible given the public mood. These Israelis hoped that the settlements would eventually be liquidated in exchange for Arab concessions. They would essentially serve as "bargaining chips." This group was not, however, organized in a formal manner.

Other factors made settlement look somewhat less attractive. Although some Israelis believed the settlements could be used as bargaining chips, others believed the establishment of a Jewish population in the West Bank would serve to strengthen Arab extremism and would thus preempt the option of negotiation. The Arabs had been deeply humiliated by the June War, and the annexation of Jerusalem had served to harden them. Settlement of the West Bank might further encourage Arab intransigence.[6]

There was also a fear of angering the international community. The Geneva Convention, to which Israel is party, states that no occupying power shall inhabit an occupied territory with its own populace. Israel claims that the Convention does not apply in the case of the West Bank because Jordan had no legitimate right to the territory. Therefore Israel had not taken land from its rightful owner. This argument has not found acceptance in the international community. International law and the principles of self-determination are, in the eyes of much of the world, antithetical to Jewish settlement. Israel particularly feared incurring the displeasure of its staunchest ally, the United States.

A final argument--and one which would profoundly effect policy under Labour--concerned demography. The West Bank retained many Arabs

following the war. The highlands--which are also the historic heartland of Judaism--were densely populated. The rate of natural increase among the Arabs was only 3.0 per 1000 in 1967, but in the following year it rose to a more characteristic 11.7.[7] Thus many Israelis quite reasonably warned that annexation of the West Bank would mean that, by the year 2000, Arabs would outnumber Jews in the Zionist state. Abba Eban warned:

> Let us face the hard truth. If the West Bank and Gaza Arabs were annexed, our principles would not allow us to withhold citizenship--and our vital interest would not allow us to grant it.[8]

Indeed, such an argument strikes at the very heart of Zionism.* One of the most fundamental tenets of Zionism is that the Jewish

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*   Zionism is a political idealogy revolving around the perceived necessity for a Jewish state. It is a response to 100's of years of persecution during the Jewish Diaspora. Although Jews through- out this long period spoke and sometimes wrote of an independent state. Zionism did not emerge as an important movement until the late 1800's. At this time the father of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl, published his book, Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State). This book and Herzl's subsequent work to promote the idea gave rise to a movement which culminated--following the horrors of World War II-- in the establishment of Israel.

In his youth Theodor Herzl firmly believed Jews were best served by assimilation in their many respective nations, but as he observed persecuion even in "liberalized" Europe, he instead con- cluded that antiSemitism was ineradicable. He believed that while it might at times be latent (as it was in Germany of his time) it would inevitably reemerge. He state it as follows:

> We have sincerely tried everywhere to merge with the na- tional communities in which we live seeking only to preserve the faith of our fathers. It is not permitted to us . . . . The world needs a Jewish state; therefore it will arise.[9]

The thesis of Zionism, then, is that all non-Jewish nations are persecuting or will persecute their Jewish residents; thus Jews must create and maintain a state in which they form a majority, and in which they may live as citizens enjoying full rights.

people are and always will be subject to persecution outside the refuge of a Jewish state. It does not matter that a non-Jewish state such as the United States--or such as Germany at the turn of the century--may appear to be a safe and an enlightened haven. Persecution remains inevitable; the question of "when" is the only random variable. Thus, a Jewish state containing a <u>Jewish majority</u> is necessary for the survival of Jews. Zionist ideology does not permit an Arab majority. Many Zionists therefore feared an annexation of the West Bank.

<u>THE ALLON PLAN</u>

Israel's cabinet ministers responded to all of these arguments and to others in a variety of ways, and a number of proposals were made concerning the West Bank. The most important of these was drafted by Yigal Allon, the Minister of Labour, in July of 1967. It was never officially adopted, but it did in fact become the policy "blueprint" under Labour.

The Allon Plan was basically a compromise. Allon claimed that it would achieve "an integral state geographically, and a Jewish state demographically,"[9] and Abba Eban called it "a model for the concept of maximum security with minimum addition of Arab population."[10]

The Plan originally called for the absorption into Israel of a strip of land 10-15 kilometers in depth along the Jordan Rift Valley. Very soon it was revised slightly so that the strip was 15-20 kilometers in depth. The strip was intended to "give the maximum possible height and terrain advantage."[11] It would stretch

from the river Jordan to the eastern margins of Arab cultivation
in the highlands. (Map II)

Two belts of Jewish settlement would be erected within this
security strip. The first of these would lie along the floor of
the Valley, extending from the Dead Sea in the south to the West
Bank's border with Israel in the north. The second would perch at
the edge of the highlands, 500 to 1000 meters above the Valley. It
would also run north-south, and would serve as the major line of
defense, guarding narrow mountain passages which might otherwise
allow an invading army to slip into the state of Israel.

Allon asserted that the strip would fortify Israel's defenses.
He also pointed out that the area to be developed was sparcely
populated by Arabs. The densely-populated highlands to the west
would not, according to the Plan, be settled by Jews. Eventually,
Israel would annex the security strip and at that time the highlands
would become either an autonomous state affiliated with Jordan or
fully independent. This would be acceptable to Israel. because the
new state would be separated from the Arab world to the east by the
bands of Israeli settlement. The Arabs would be "neutralized"
within a sea of Zionists. Nevertheless, the Allon Plan was soon
revised to allow for a thin corridor which would run through the
Valley and connect the highlands with the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan. The corridor would embrace the city of Jericho, removing
the only Arab city in the Valley from the security belt. As a re-
sult, only 6,000 Arabs would be absorbed into the strip.[12]

A corridor was also to connect Jerusalem with the annexed strip.
It would provide easy access and would, in addition, split the

ALLON PLAN

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Jericho

Jerusalem
Corridor

--- Lines of Settlement

Annexed East
Jerusalem

Areas for Eventual
Absorption into
Israel

Source: Harris, 1980.

MAP 2

0   20
├────────┤
        KM

highlands at its waist. It would be padded by Jewish settlements.

The Allon Plan received a great deal of attention over a considerable period of time. On June 17, 1968, it was finally reported that "the dominant figures in the Israeli cabinet have reached a consensus on a plan for the eventual disposition" of the West Bank.[13] The "dominant figures" referred to were Levi Eshkol, Moshe Daayan, and Allon. It was believed that the three of them had between them "more than enough prestige and influence to persuade a majority of the Cabinet to back any plan they jointly support."[14]

It was also believed that there would not be a campaign within the cabinet for formal adoption of the Plan. This was a result of the fact that it was not acceptable to all of the parties which composed the ruling coalition. If the Plan were formally adopted, dissenting cabinet members would be compelled to resign.

By the end of 1968 the Allon Plan had won the unofficial support of Israel's government. Many proponents of the Plan embraced it with a marked lack of enthusiasm; however, it seemed to provide the most workable compromise. The "doves" who supported the Plan hoped that it would bolster Israel's bargaining power with the Arabs and that it would also contribute to Israel's security. "Hawks" derived hope from the fact that it did not immediately eliminate the possibility of complete annexation at a future date. In the final analysis, the "operative part in the Allon Plan (the establishment of Jewish settlements) became the common denominator between the 'doves' and the 'hawks,'"[15] and the Allon Plan became

unofficial Israeli policy. It remained that until Labour fell from
power in 1977.

SETTLEMENT UNDER LABOUR (1967-1977)

Government-sponsored settlement actually began before the Allon
Plan gained the support of most cabinet ministers. On September 24,
1967, Levi Eshkol announced plans for the first settlement, which
was to be at Kfar Etzion.[16] Kfar Etzion had once been a kibbutz
which, along with three other kibbutzim in the Etzion bloc, had
been overrun by the Jordanian Arab Legion in 1948. The Etzion bloc
itself perched above the floor of the Jordan Valley between the
cities of Hebron and Bethlehem; it was strategically located for
the defense of Jerusalem. When it was overrun in 1948, many mem-
bers of the kibbutz perished. It had since become an Arab Legion
camp occupied by Jordanian forces.

On September 28, fifteen young men and three young women of
the Israeli Army's Nahal Corps* moved into the abandoned Arab
Legion camp and began rebuilding the kibbutz.[18] Most of these were
sons and daughters of Kfar Etzion's original settlers. Although
Israel claimed that they represented a garrison rather than set-
tlers, the New York Times commented that the young people "appeared
to consider themselves the vanguard of Israelis who will settle
the captured West Bank," and also that "the soldiers who went to
Kfar Etzion today clearly intend to remain there as civilians after

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* Nahal units are Israel's "Pioneer Fighting Youth."[17] Nahal is a
  paramilitary youth organization which combines military service
  with agricultural training. Often the units are employed in the
  establishment of new settlements in vulnerable areas. They
  strengthen the Israeli presence in these selected areas and pre-
  pare the land for an eventual civilian presence. Often members
  of the founding unit remain in the new settlement as civilians.

their demobilization."[19]   The settlement did, indeed, become a reli-
gious kibbutz.

The process of settlement continued. In February of 1968, the
first settlement was established in the Jordan Valley. Members of
Nahal Mehola developed the land and in 1969, Mehola became a moshav
shittufi Nahal Kalia and Nahal Argaman were also founded in 1968;
the first of these eventually became a kibbutz, while the second
became a moshav. All three of these Nahal settlements were located
near points of guerilla infiltration into the West Bank, and all
were on the floor of the Jordan Valley.

Another significant movement of Israelis onto the West Bank
also took place in 1968. These prospective settlers did not actu-
ally found a settlement until 1970, but their controversial story
began to unfold in 1968, when seventy-three fundamentalist Jews
traveled to Hebron, ostensibly to celebrate the Passover. They
checked into a motel and then refused to leave, demanding the
right to settle within Judaism's second holiest city. The govern-
ment was divided over how to handle the demand. While the issue
was being debated in the Knesset, the settlers were moved from
Hebron and into a nearby military administration compound. This
move was mandated because the government did not want to inflame
Hebron's Arabs. Eventually, Yigal Allon's proposal of a "dual
city" was the accepted solution within the cabinet. He recommended
that a Jewish quarter be built in the hills east of the Arab city.
The Jewish quarter, Kiryat 'Arba, would be incorporated into the
security belt at its western edge, while Hebron would remain Arab.

In 1970 the government approved the construction of Kiryat 'Arba.

A very difficult question had been answered in this case with the concept of a dual city. The question would, however, be raised again and again. The controversy over Hebron exposed a fundamental conflict for which the Allon Plan proposed no solution. This conflict is inherent in the belief that Jews have a right to the entire historic "homeland" and that the Jewish state must, at the same time, remain unequivocally Jewish. Areas which are densely populated with Arabs become quite troubling, as a result, and the question of settlement distribution is complicated by religious nationalism, historic "rights," and Zionist principles. Kiryat 'Arba represented a warning that this conflict remained unresolved.

This settlement also provides an early example of the ability of certain settlement groups to exert successful pressure upon policy makers. The settlers of Kiryat 'Arba set a precedent for later groups who would disapprove of government policy and who learned to force change through utilization of direct action. With the exception of Kiryat 'Arba, however, Labour was not troubled by such groups until the rise of Gush Emunin in 1974. The majority of the settlements established under Labour fit neatly into Yital Allon's Plan.

Prior to 1971 most of the settlements were located in the Jordan Valley. Allon's first and eastern-most line of settlement was being constructed. By the end of 1970 there was a moshav, a moshav shittufi, kibbutz, and five Nahals in the Jordan Valley. All five of the Nahals were being prepared for civilian occupation. There

was also a moshav located in the Latrun salient, which is in the highlands within Allon's corridor leading from Jerusalem to the security strip. There were, in addition, two religious kibbutzim and a regional center in the Etzion bloc. (Kfar Etzion was one of these kibbutzim.) Kiryat 'Arba had also been constructed; it was an urban settlement in the hills near Hebron. (Map III)

By October of 1973, when Israel was distracted from the settle-ment process by the eruption of war, both of Allon's proposed belts were clearly taking shape. A new moshav had been located in the Valley, and two Nahals, a moshav, and a regional center formed the initial outline of the second and higher belt of settlement to the west.

In October Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. The war lasted three weeks before a successful cease-fire was implemented. The Arabs fought well, and Israel emerged badly shaken. Prior to the war most Israelis had been content with an image of Israel's overwhelming military superiority. They did not believe the Arabs would be willing to fight again for a number of years. Israel had been complacent; thus a period of national "soul-searching" ensued after the war. The building of new settle-ments slowed considerably at this time. The nation as a whole was preoccupied; in addition, international pressure upon Israel had intensified. Even within the United State there was a degree of shift towards certain moderate Arab nations, particularly Egypt. As a result the United States pressured Israel to halt the building of the "illegal" settlements.

JEWISH SETTLEMENTS

DECEMBER 1970

24a

N

1 ✸ Moshav Shittufi
▲ Nahal
● Moshav
✳ Kibbutz
✪ Regional Center
☐ Urban Settlement

Sources: Harris, 1980. Lesch, 1977.

MAP 3

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KM

MAP III KEY

1. Mehola 2. Argaman 3. Massuah 4. Phatza'el
5. Gilgal 6. Yitav 7. Kalia 8. Mitzpe Shalem
9. Mevo Horon Gimmel 10. Rosh Tzurim
11. Alon Shvot 12. Kfar Etzion 13. Kiryat 'Arba

In 1974, mainly as a result of errors made in the October War, Golda Meir's cabinet resigned. Another member of the Labour Party, Yitzhak Rabin, stepped up. He too initiated very little action on the West Bank.

In mid-1975 the mood in Israel began to shift to the right. The PLO was strengthening and gaining considerable prestige in the Arab world. Israel's fears and sense of vulnerability--legacies in part of the October War--were heightened. Isolation in the international community also contributed to the new mood. In addition, the United States was preoccupied with a number of issues and it therefore exerted less pressure on Israel. A result of the shift to the right and a softening of U. S. pressure was the surge in West Bank development which took place during Rabin's final two years in office.

Although the government continued to honor Yigal Allon's concept of "maximum security with minimum addition of Arab population," the rise of Gush Emunin during this period sounded the first "death knell" for the Allon Plan. Gush Emunin is an organization which emerged out of the National Religious Party's Brei Akiva youth movement and from its religious seminaries. It is composed almost entirely of young ultra-orthodox Jews. Members of Gush Emunin are united in their belief that "the national justification for settlement is an ultimate, metaphysical, historico-religious command which obliges the Jewish people to seek total reunion with the integral Land of Israel. Settlement is an absolute moral obligation, which is precedent to any consideration of the needs of the state,

society, the individual, neighboring peoples, or the international community."[20] Gush Emunin therefore stresses the need to settle the highlands of Judea and Samaria.

Members of this group began moving to the highlands, in very small numbers, in 1974. At first they were forcibly removed by the military. They persisted in this action, however, and in 1975 began to realize some success. Considerable dissent within the government concerning the goals of Gush Emunin led to Knesset vacillation and inaction. By the time Labour relinquished power in 1977 three Gush Emunin settlements had been established in the highlands. All were officially "illegal" but were not forcibly disassembled.

Labour fell from power in June of 1977.* At this time there were thirty-six settlements on the West Bank; three of these were

---

* The defeat of Labour in 1977 was the end result of a number of interacting factors, with the major catalyst being the October War of 1973. Following this war (as is discussed above) Israelis experienced a heightened sense of vulnerability and international isolation. The public mood shift brought increased acceptance and respectability to political views (such as those espoused by the Likud Party) which many voters had considered excessively hard-lined prior to the war.[21]

This alone does not account for Labour's defeat, however, because the public mood shift was paralleled within that Party. The result was a "narrowing of policy differences between the . . . Labour Party and the opposition Likud on issues of peace and territory."[22] This eventually handicapped the incumbents. They were held responsible for perceived failures in the October War, which lead to the resignation of Golda Meir's cabinet in 1974. Following the resignation polical infighting and scandal worsened the Party's image. In addition, Labour had to contend with public dissatisfaction over inflationary pressures. Given an acceptable alternative in the Likud Party, many voters shifted loyalties.

It should also be mentioned that in 1977, Likud received strong electoral support from low-income voters and from Asian and African Jews, who had increased in number and who had felt alienated under Labour.[23] Likud also received considerable support from Israel's young voters, who were "particularly" hard-lined in their views.[24]

"illegal." The others lay within the bounds of Allon's security

belt. (Map IV)

SETTLEMENT UNDER LIKUD (1977-Present)

Menachem Begin's Likud formed a new and a more conservative

ruling coalition in 1977. As early as 1948, Begin had stated:

> The homeland is historically and geographically an entity.
> Whoever fails to recognize our right to the entire home-
> land, does not recognize our right to any of its terri-
> tories. We shall never yield our natural and eternal
> rights.[25]

Like the members of Gush Emunin, Begin proclaims Israel's right to

the Whole Land. Such a stance contrasts sharply with emphasis

under Labour on defense and demographic considerations. In 1977,

religious and historic obligation superceded these considerations;

the new government essentially began "using the Bible as a title

deed."[26] All Gush Emunin activies were legalized, and the densely-

populated Samarian highlands became top priority for Jewish settle-

ment.

A number of Gush Emunin settlements were immediately founded

and in March of 1978, members of the movement were permitted to

settle on the outskirts of the West Bank's largest city, Nablus.

When this decision was made "the last vestige of geographical con-

straint was overthrown and the transition from the Allon Plan to

unfettered maximalism was complete."[27]

In December of 1977 Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture and

Settlements, proposed a new and a bolder plan for the West Bank.

He recommended a third belt of settlements which would extend from

Jenin to Bethlehem, and would thus bisect the Samarian highlands.

JEWISH   SETTLEMENTS

JUNE 1977 [27a]

Sources: Harris, 1980. Lesch, 1977.

MAP 4

✳	Moshav Shittufi
▲	Nahal
○	Moshav
✳	Kibbutz
✪	Regional Center
□	Urban Settlement
☆	Area Center
✱	Illegal

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KM

MAP IV KEY

1. Mehola	13. Kiryat 'Arba	25. Mevo Shiloh
2. Argaman	14. Shlomit	26. Kokhav Hashahar
3. Massuah	15. Tomer	27. Romonin
4. Phatza'el	16. Netiv Hagdud	28. Mishor Adumin
5. Gilgal	17. Na'aren	29. Tekoah
6. Yitav	18. Almog	30. Malki Shua
7. Kalia	19. Ro'i	31. Reihona
8. Mitzpe Shalem	20. Bega'ot	32. Kaddum
8. Mevo Horon Gimmel	21. Hamra	33. Mas'ha
10. Rosh Tzurim	22. Mekhora	34. Ofra
11. Alon Shvot	23. Gitit	35. Elazar
12. Kfar Etzion	24. Ma'ale Ephraim	36. Yattir

The new government responded to the proposal by allowing Gush Emunin to begin construction of the settlements.[28]

In October of 1978--only a month after Camp David--the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency together deveoped the first five-year settlement plan for Judea and Samaria. The cabinet approved this plan. Its basic objective was to establish blocs among areas densely populated by Arabs. The settlements would "surround the major Palestinian towns and prevent their expansion" and would "cut off Arab towns from each other."[29] The plan also effected the area around Jericho in the Jordan Valley, which had been left untouched by Labour. Jericho was to be surrounded by six Israeli settlements. This would preempt the option of returning Jericho to the Arabs at a future date. In all, forty-six new settlements were to be established within a period of only five years. The plan states:

> The disposition of the settlements must be carried out not only around the settlements of the minorities, but also in between them, this in accordance with the settlement policy adopted in Galilee and in other parts of the coun- try.[30]

Only the region about Jenin was unaffected by the plan. However, it was revised in 1980 to include another bloc of settlements which would surround Jenin.

This plan, often called the Drobles Plan, proved somewhat dif- ficult to implement. Although nearly half of the November 1979 budget was dedicated to its realization, this was not money enough.[31] Also, Israel was beginning to experience a shortage of people needed

to establish and populate the settlements. Many Israelis had no desire to leave homes on the coastal plain for a life in the arid Valley or in the Arab-populated highlands. Although such moves were subsidized by the government, new settlers often experienced an initial drop in living standards. In addition, settlers often lived in tents or in temporary housing for some time before the government was able to fund more attractive quarters. Unattractive climatic conditions, unfriendly Arabs, occasionally primitive living conditions, and adverse monetary conditions inhibited many Israelis from joining settlements. Also, immigration into Israel had been declining since the October War in 1973; in the early 1980's, emigration actually began to exceed the rate of immigration. New immigrants were needed in substantial numbers to populate the settlements, but these numbers were simply unavailable. The Drobles Plan therefore faced several very real restraints. Nevertheless the plan was implemented in part; quite a number of settlements were established, and many existing settlements were expanded.

A particularly controversial development began to materialize in late 1979. At this time settlers in Kiryat 'Arba, who had been demanding the right to move out of the Jewish quarter and into Hebron itself, took over a building in Hebron. The government ordered the settlers to leave but when they refused, no action was taken. In January of 1980 one of the settlers was killed; this presented the others with an opportunity to demand "appropriate Zionist response,"[32] meaning the right to settle in Hebron. On February 10 this was granted by the cabinet.

Several months later the cabinet was split over another proposal concerning Hebron. This one suggested that two Jewish schools be established in the Arab city. Again, the proposal was accepted.

In 1981 Israel had an election year, and Likud suddenly undertook a flurry of West Bank activity. Cabinet members feared a Labour victory which might lead to concessions on the West Bank. In order to preempt Labour's options, settlements were constructed as swiftly as possible. Ten new settlements were planned. Several were to surround Jericho, which was already partially enclosed by three settlements, because the cabinet feared Labour would find the region around Jericho to be negotiable. There were also plans to build 3000 new homes in three existing settlements. These were Karnei Shomron, Elkana, and Shavei Shomron, each of which is in the Samarian highlands.[33] Not all of Likud's plans were brought to fruition, but the attempt to "prevent a change in the status of the West Bank in the case of an Alignment victory at the polls"[34] was a substantial one.

On June 30, 1981, Menachem Begin was again given the opportunity to form a governing coalition. He did so successfully. A part of his election day oath went as follows:

> I, Menachem Begin, the son of Ze'ev and Hasia Begin do solemnly swear that as long as I serve the nation as prime minister, we will not leave any part of Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights.[35]

Indeed, the Jerusalem Post's pre-election poll revealed that three-quarters of Israel's Jews favored continued settlement on the

West Bank.[36]   The election mandated Begin to proceed with plans.

At the end of 1980 there were seventy-four settlements on the West Bank. According to the Drobles Plan, which the government has embraced, fifty-nine additional settlements are projected. Some of these have since been established. (Map V)

OBTAINING LAND FOR SETTLEMENTS

A brief discussion of how Israel lays claim to West Bank land is in order at this point. Israel mounts a number of arguments to justify Jewish possession of the land.

One such argument concerns national security needs. Military Order 388 authorizes the military governor "to declare any area to be a closed area and to prohibit anyone from entering or leaving it without a permit."[37] Immediately following the 1967 War much of the land along the Jordan River and in the Latrun Valley was declared a "security zone." The area along the Jordan was nearly void of Arab population, but in the Latrun Valley three Arab villages were demolished and 4000 residents sent to the Jordan Rivers Last Bank.[38] 20,000 dunums of cultivated land were left behind by the refugees.[39] Since that time, kibbutzim and a large park have been established in the Latrun Valley.*

Additional security zones have also been founded. The process usually begins when a piece of land is fenced off by the military, and those Arabs who live upon or cultivate the tract are ordered to leave. The next step is often arrival of a Nahal unit and finally, once the land has been adequately prepared, civilian settlers appear.

* The Latrun Valley "thrusts across the main route between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and, according to the Israeli government, was a main saboteur base" prior to the war.[40]

JEWISH SETTLEMENTS

DECEMBER 1980 [31a]

Map showing Jewish settlements in the West Bank with numbered points. Arab cities marked: Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, Ramallah, Jericho, Bethlehem, Hebron.

Legend:
- ● Settlements Founded Under Labor
- * Settlements Founded Under Likud
- □ Arab City

N (compass pointing up)

Sources: Harris, 1980. Matar, 1981. Mroz, 1980.

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KM

MAP 5

KEY TO MAP V

1.	Mehola	26.	Almog	51.	Karnei Shomron B
2.	Mehola B	27.	Kalia	52.	Elkana
3.	Sheloh	28.	Horkamia	53.	Ariel
4.	Argaman	29.	Mitzpe Shalem	54	Tapuah
5.	New Massuah	30.	Ma'ale Adumin B	55.	Shiloh
6.	Massuah	31.	Mishor Adumin	56.	Halamish E
7.	Yafit	32.	Ma'ale Adumin	57.	Halamish
8.	Phatza'el	33.	Tekoah	58.	Ofra
9.	Tomer	34.	Kiryat 'Arba	59.	Beit El B
10.	Gilgal	35.	Nahal Zohar	60.	Beit El
11.	Netiv Hagdud	36.	Ma'on Carmel B	61.	Beit Horon
12.	Na'aren	37.	Yattir	62.	Mitzpe Givon
13.	Yitav	38.	Malki Shua	63.	Givon
14.	Ro'i	39.	Magen Shaul	64.	Matiyahu
15.	Bega'ot	40.	Mei Ami	65.	Shelat
16.	Hamra	41.	Reihan B	66.	Kfar Ruth
17.	Mekhora	42.	Reihan	67.	Mevo Horon
18.	Gitit	43.	Dotan	68.	Hargilo
19.	Ma'ale Ephraim	44.	Sanur	69.	Efrat
20.	Mevo Shiloh	45.	Ma'ale Nahal	70.	Elazar
21.	Kokhav Hashahar	46.	Shevei Shomron	71.	Migdal Oz
22.	Romonin	47.	Jebel Kbir	72.	Rosh Tzurim
23.	Neima	48.	Kaddum	73.	Alon Shvot
24.	Mitzpe Jericho B	49.	Salit	74.	Kfar Etzion
25.	Mitzpe Jericho	50.	Karnei Shomron		

31b

This "enables title of the land to be 'laundered' by the temporary administration of the Israeli Defense Forces."[41]

A second and more common technique involves utilization of the "state land" argument. State land is all land which cannot be shown to be privately owned. The difficulty, as might be expected, exists in determining whether or not land is privately owned. Land-holdings on the West Bank which may possibly be considered private fall into three broad categories. An enumeration of these is help-ful in an understanding of the difficulty in defining "state land."

"Mulk" land is privately held land to which owners have clear title. In most cases Israel has not challenged these titles.

"Miri" land is land to which no one holds title; it comprises 70 percent of the West Bank.[42] These lands have been cultivated by the same families for many generations and have more recently been registered with the Jordanian Ministry of Finance for tax purposes. Arabs argue that this land is private because they have long cultivated it and paid taxes on it. They have no titles simply because it is unsurveyed. Occasionally, an Arab challenges the Jew-ish authorities who lay claim to "miri" land and when this happens, government lawyers have not attempted to refute Arab arguments. Most often, they resort to an insistence that the land is necessary for Israel's security; the security argument preempts all other claims.

The final type of landholding is termed "jiftlik" land. This is land which was registered in the name of the Ottoman Sultan in the nineteenth century, and which then passed into the hands of the

British and the Jordanian governments. The registration was initially intended to serve as a temporary measure only, because the land in question had not been surveyed. Meanwhile it was cultivated and bought and sold by Arab farmers as if it were privately owned; and in fact, the governments which taxed these farmers prior to 1967 also regarded it as private.[43]

If each of these landholding categories is assumed to be private, some interesting figures are arrived at. In 1979 it was estimated that 126,000 dunums* of West Bank land had been claimed by Jewish civilians. Only 9.4 percent of this land did not fall within one of the categories. Thus it is sometimes argued that 90.6 percent of the land presently occupied by Jewish civilians had been privately owned by Arabs.[44]

A final means by which Israel lays claim to West Bank territory is through use of absentee property laws. Order Number 125 states that anyone who was absent from the West Bank on June 7, 1967, may not return. This Order has been particularly useful in the Jordan Valley, where about 40 percent of the land belongs to absentee landlords.[45] The land is viewed as deserted.

Arabs can seek recourse to the loss of lands through Israeli courts, but they are often discouraged by the prospects of a difficult and costly litigation. They are also disheartened by the fact that such cases usually result, at the most, in a temporary injunction against development of the land. The majority of the cases are lost on security grounds. Although Arabs who lose land usually receive compensation, most of them would much prefer return of the

* A dunum is approximately one-quarter of an acre.

land; and because Israeli courts have disappointed them, much anger
and bitterness has resulted.

In late 1980 Israel was in control of twenty-five to thirty-
five percent of the West Bank.* Not all of this area was in settle-
ment; some was used for military training and manuevers, and much
of it was being prepared for future settlement. And some of it
was simply idle, as Israel was not yet able to implement all of
its plans for the West Bank.

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*   When Israel's Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohen retired, he
spoke of Israel's land claims as follows: "We hold Judea and Samaria
as trustees only. It is elementary knowledge that a trustee who
takes for himself from the trust property is stealing in one of
the ugliest ways."[46]

In late 1980 Michael Hudson made this estimate in The Journal
of Palestine Studies[47] and Ibrahim Matar concurred in the following
year.[48] According to the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan, Isreal
controlled approximately twenty-seven percent of the West Bank in
1980, or 1.5 million dunums of land.[49] In early 1982 Donald Will
suggested that one third of the West Bank was under Israeli con-
trol.[50]

CHAPTER THREE: THE JEWISH SETTLERS

Introduction

The Jewish settlements on the West Bank are intensely contro-
versial and frequently debated. This chapter will address the
question of how settlers are recruited and selected, and will at-
tempt to shed light on some of the characteristics of the West
Bank's Jewish population. These characteristics include ideology,
religious beliefs, former residences, age and marital status. The
chapter will also deal with economic activities and with actual
numbers of settlers, as well as with distribution of the settlers.

RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION

Only recognized settlement groups are allowed to locate on
the West Bank. These groups must first organize themselves and
then obtain recognition from the government. An acceptable settle-
ment group is required to meet the following criteria.*

> 1. "The existence of a defined social topic, approved by the
>   authorized authorities,
>
> 2. "Implementation of self-labor and a cooperative settlement,
>
> 3. "Joint ownership of enterprises and services for employment,
>
> 4. "The authority of the settlement to accept new members in
>   accordance with the approved plan,
>
> 5. "The independence of the settlement in determining its own
>   way of life and in all which pertains to joining a
>   national settlement movement."[1]**

* This list of criteria is not comprehensive. I believe the most
  pertinent points have been included.

**National settlement movements include the moshavim, moshav
  shitufi'im, and kubbutzim, as well as "others," such as Nahals.

When one reads through this list, terms such as "defined social topic," "joint ownership," and self-labor" stand out clearly. These are worthy of further discussion.

Members of a particular group do, indeed, espouse many similar values; which makes it easier to arrive at a "defined social topic." Sometimes a settlement is associated with the political party which most nearly represents the beliefs of its members. A specific moshav, for instance, may be peopled exclusively by members of the Herut party and their families.*

The social ideals of a settlement group are important in determining which National Settlement Movement the group will choose to join. For instance, a kibbutz is defined as "an Israeli collective farm or settlement, cooperatively owned and operated by its members and organized on a communal basis."[2] There is no private property on a kibbutz, and all production and consumption are organized on a collective basis. Even the families live communally; there are no separate family dwellings. Thus, kibbutzim attract Jews who espouse many of the ideals of socialism. These same Jews also gravitate towards the Labour Party. The kibbutzim have traditionally provided a "pool of material and manpower resources"[3] upon which Labour could draw, and many of Labour's most outstanding members

---

* Settlement groups do not necessarily identify with a particular
  political party. Gush Emunin, for instance, is a religiously-
  inspired, ultra-nationalist group with well-defined goals; these
  goals are not necessarily shared by any one political party. Al-
  though the Likud coalition has supported the aspirations of the
  group in some cases, members of Gush Emunin are increasingly dis-
  illusioned with the present government. They feel that the West
  Bank is being settled too slowly and with too much caution.

have come from the ranks of the kibbutzim. As a result of this, a historical antipathy has been bred between the kibbutzim and the more right-winged Herut which dominates Israel's ruling coalition at present.*

The moshav movement attracts a somewhat different membership than do the kibbutzim. A moshav is defined as "a cooperative small-holders settlement of individual farms . . . . Individuals own their own farms and personal property. Work is organized collective-ly, equipment is used cooperatively, and produce is marketed joint-ly."[4] Moshavim are Israel's most popular form of cooperative agri-cultural settlement. The amount of collective activity varies from settlement to settlement, but in almost all cases individuals are allowed to farm their own plots. As a result the moshavim attract a much larger and more heterogeneous membership than do the kibbut-zim. The kibbutzim attract young socialist immigrants from Europe, but appeal very little to Jews who were raised in Israel or who have immigrated from non-European countries. In particular they attract very few Jews from Eastern cultures, because family ties receive more emphasis among these Jews.

The final form of collective agricultural settlement is the moshav shitufi'im. Because by 1977 these had almost disappeared in the West Bank, they will be only briefly discussed. A moshav shitufi is a "collective smallholders settlement that combines the

---

* Likud has reacted by funneling very little of the Ministry of Agri-culture's development budget into the kibbutzim. The budget has instead favored the moshavim and other settlement movements. How-ever, many of today's kibbutzim are involved in industry as well as in agriculture. This new emphasis on industrial development has helped the kibbutzim to "ride out" the monetary drought dealt them by Likud.

economic features of a kibbutz with the social features of a moshav.
Farming is done collectively, and profits are shared equally. Each
family lives in its own household, as in the moshav."[5] The few
moshav shitufi'im which were developed in the Jordan Valley soon
became moshavim instead, because winter crop production in the
Valley was so lucrative that it made profit-sharing unattractive.
The disappearance of the moshav shitufi'im illustrated the fact
that an established settlement may join another settlement group
if the members so choose.

It should again be noted that collective agricultural settle-
ments are not the only acceptable settlement movements; Nahal posts,
urban settlements such as Kiryat Arba, and regional and area cen-
ters which may house government offices, supply shops, and even
industry, are also located on the West Bank.

Prospective settlement groups are required to agree not only
on a defined social topic, but also on the principle of self-labor.
This particular criteria is elaborated upon because in practice
it is espoused more in "word" than in "deed." The principle was
adhered to during the earlier history of the collective movements,
but it underwent a marked deterioration following the 1967 War.
The moshavim have defected more than have the kibbutzim. Many of
the moshavim in the Valley are engaged in labor-intensive enter-
prises such as hot-house flower production, while the kibbutzim
favor highly-mechanized branches of activity. Thus the moshavim
have drawn increasingly upon the supply of cheap Arab labor. The
kibbutzim have also wandered somewhat from the principle of self-
labor. Collectivist values have weakened since Israel gained

independence, and the kibbutzim have "adapted to the surrounding society's new, more individualistic and materialist orientation."[6] Today Arab laborers may be found on many kibbutzim.

Once a settlement group is organized and has met the criteria for approval, it may then petition the government to allow it to settle in a particular area. The government claims that strategic and political significance is the most important variable in determining whether or not the proposal receives approval. Economic variables and the perceived necessity of population dispersal are of secondary importance, and the final factor is the wishes of the affected settlement group.[7] However, in reality these groups are sometimes capable of exerting a considerable amount of pressure upon the government; the ultra-Orthodox settlers of Kiryat Arba are a case in point, as are other members of Gush Emunin. The most controversial proposals usually involve the desire to settle near (or within) areas which are heavily populated by Arabs.

The settlement group's choice of location is influenced by varying factors. Early settlements in the Jordan Valley were often constructed at the limits of land farmed by the Arabs; usually they were placed no more than two or three kilometers from the existing Arab village.[8] "Absentee" land and idle wells also attracted settlers. On a broader level the Allon Plan was influential, but a choice of specific site was affected by the desire to engage in agriculture.

Other factors have also been important. Many West Bank settlements are placed on major roads; this is perhaps more a function of

security than of convenience. Ma'ale Adumin, for example, dominates the Jerusalem-Jericho highway. Its function is largely strategic, and it boasts an Israeli army base. It is also evident that many settlement blocs are placed so as to surround and separate Arab cities. In addition, settlers are drawn to areas which were populated by Jews prior to 1948. The Etzion bloc and Kiryat Arba are examples. Finally, a number of settlements have been built around former Jordanian army bases or police stations. Often the buildings are quickly converted for use by Israeli soldiers.*

Sometimes settlement groups are formed in Israel but they also may form in other countries. For instance, the town of Efran, between Bethlehem and Gush Etzion, is populated by 200 Jewish families from the United States. In Samaria the Heres settlement is occupied mostly by immigrants from the USSR. One of the Gush Etzion settlements is peopled by religious North American Jews.

When a group of immigrants (or prospective immigrants) gathers to form a settlement group, the members generally share the following characteristics:

(1) "Rejection of urban lifestyles in all their negative aspects and the desire to create a way of life which appears more just in their eyes.

(2) "The desire to overcome absorption, social and economic difficulties by joint settlement with an organized group," and

(3) "The desire to benefit from the assistance granted by settlement authorities to all those who reside in areas deemed important to the cause of settlement."[9]

* This listing is surely not comprehensive, but the above-mentioned factors stand out when maps and information concerning former and present land use are studied.

They also adhere to similar social values and religious beliefs.

A settlement group is not necessarily homogeneous in origin, however. Gush Emunin's Beit Al, for instance, consists mostly of Israeli families but also has a sprinkling of American and Soviet immigrants.

During and after the establishment of a settlement members are carefully selected. Selection of all new members is done by a committee comprised of representatives of the settlement itself, from the settlement movement with which the settlement is associated, and from the Jewish Agency or World Zionist Organization.[10] Members are selected according to how well they fit the criteria established by the settlement.

Before selection takes place, the settlement group usually advertises its need for new members. This Gush Emunin ad appeared in an Israeli newspaper on December 26, 1975:

> We have returned to:
>   Kiryat Arba--in the hills of Hebron
>   Gush Etzion--in the hills of Hebron
>   Maalei Adumim--in the Judean Desert
>   Ophira--in the hills of Beit Al
>   Gigit--in lower Samaria . . .
> Still before us are:
>   . . . Western Samaria, Shihah, Givon, Doton, Tirtza, Tekpa,
> Ashtemoa. If you want to join an existing settlement or a
> nucleus for a future settlement, please contact our office
> . . . .[11]

Prospective settlers must be of "suitable" age, which is defined for all settlements as "no older than thirty-five."[12] Sometimes a settlement also prefers only married couples, but usually young singles are also accepted.

If the prospective settlers are recent immigrants, the selection process is exceptionally stringent. The immigrants are interviewed and also undergo medical and psychological examinations. Their formal abilities are analyzed, and usually those selected are exposed to a degree of professional retraining, as well as to training in areas which are new to them.*[13] Thus most new settlers are prepared to begin productive activity immediately upon arrival at the settlement. This is in contrast to the mass settlement period of the 1950's when there was not time for extensive preparation, and when new settlers often had to be trained after rather than before they reached their destinations.

The government itself encourages Jews to join settlement groups by offering tax exemptions at the rate of 7% of a settler's income.[14] This cut has not been highly effective, however, because a move to the territories still means at least an initial drop in living standards for most Israelis. The Israelis who settle in the West Bank are not drawn primarily by promises of a tax exemption; other factors play more prominently in the decision-making process.**

It has been suggested that those who are drawn to West Bank settlements adhere to one of two ideological stances. They are either religious Jews who argue that "Jewish settlement and control of all of Biblical Israel is in accordance with divine 'promise'" or they are "secular nationalists, who argue that territorial

* The Jewish Agency is responsible for the training.

**The tax cuts and the promise of assistance from settlement authorities (mentioned above) may be more effective in the attraction of immigrants and of young Israelis who are in school or recent graduates than in the attraction of more "established" Israelis.

expansion to Israel's ancient borders is a necessity for maintaining both its military and historical integrity."[15] Those who wish to recruit new settlers often appeal primarily to these sentiments in order to increase the Jewish presence on the West Bank.

ECONOMIC BASE

Settlers on the West Bank are involved in a variety of economic activities. These include primary, secondary and tertiary activities. Most settlements have an economic base of their own, although a few Samarian settlements serve as "bedroom communities" for the city of Jerusalem.

Agriculture is of importance in the Jordan Valley. The Valley climate is well-suited to the cultivation of winter vegetables for export to markets in Europe. The majority of the Valley settlements are involved in the export of vegetables, but all moshavim and kibbutzim are also involved in other branches of agriculture. Monoculture is avoided by these Settlement Movements because it creates a peak season of labor demand, which makes a mockery of the self-labor principle. Thus the settlements are also involved in raising citrus fruit, flowers, poultry, and certain field crops. Fish ponds, dairies, and vineyards are also found in the Valley.

A few of the Valley settlements support some small industry. Hamra has a metal workshop, Mekhora houses a plan precision-locks workshop, and Mehola supports a metal factory.[16]

Settlements in the highlands are usually less agricultural in nature. In many cases cultivatable land is unavailable. The Gush Etzion bloc, for instance, is located on inhospitable soils.

Highland settlers have adjusted to the situation in a number of ways. Religious schools and military workshops have been established. Public services are provided. Elazar houses a chemical laboratory and a toy factory, and a steel plant is located in Kaddum. Some settlements lose at least part of their citizenry on a daily basis to Jerusalem. Alon Shvot, in the Etzion bloc, has no economic base; most citizens are Yeshiva students who commute daily to Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.[17]

Where agriculture exists, it generally consists of turkey runs and orchards. Economic diversity is common, but agriculture plays a much less important role in this mix than it does in the Valley.

A fairly recent development has been that of the industrial village. This is an arrangement whereby an industrial park is jointly owned by a cluster of settlements; the Etzion bloc is an example of such a cluster. An industrial village operates on the principle that most individual settlements are not large enough to support substantial industry, while a cluster of settlements can provide the necessary threshold. Industrial villages have attracted Israelis who prefer a rural lifestyle but are not accepted into a moshav or a kibbutz. For instance, many of those who have been raised on a moshav wish to return to the same, but unless they are trained in a "preferred profession" or own a piece of land in the moshav, they cannot settle there.[18] Because land by law cannot be divided among heirs, only one son is absorbed into a moshav. The others may find industrial villages to be an attractive alternative. The villages also attract young people who have learned skills which

a discussion of claims made. All claims should be viewed with a degree of caution, but general trends do emerge.

W. W. Harris reports that by 1975, the Jewish population in the Jordan Valley was 1800.* If the settlement at Kiryat Arba is not included, this number is reduced to only 620. At the same time Arab population in the Valley was at 22,000.[20] Thus even with the inclusion of Kiryat Arba, the Jews constituted only 8% of the population of the Valley. By June of 1977--according again to Harris-- the settler population had increased to 3300. This was an increase of 80% from 1975. The population of Kiryat Arba was 1400, meaning that approximately 1900 Jews lived at other locations.[21] The average population at each site was 130 persons.[22]

Harris states that by 1978 the Valley population had grown to 3990 Jews. 26,220 Arabs also lived in the Valley, meaning Jews constituted 13% of the total population. Meanwhile 3800 Jews had settled in the highlands. Approximately 1400 of these were in the Gush Etzion bloc. An additional 1870 were at Gush Emunin sites, and 530 lived elsewhere. Jews constituted only .5% of the total population of the highlands.[23]

When all of these figures are added together, they suggest that 7790 Jews lived on the West Bank in 1978. At this time an official Israeli source claimed that 3000 Israelis lived in the highlands, 1700 at Kiryat Arba, and 1550 in the Jordan Valley.[24] This total is only 6250.

The claims and counterclaims continue. The following table concerning the West Bank's Jewish population at the end of

* W. W. Harris' book is an elaboration upon a geographical dissertation.

April, 1979, appeared in the <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u>.[25]

AREA	# OF SETTLEMENTS	# OF SETTLERS
Ramallah and el-Bireh	13	1874
Hebron, Bethlehem and Jericho	13	7045
Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm	15	1100
Jordan Valley	21	4988

The researcher contends that 15,000 Jews resided in the West Bank in mid-1979. He further states that only 3200 Jews were in the West Bank in May of 1977--a figure very close to Harris' figure-- and that by mid-1981, the number had risen to 17,400. This represents an increase of 500% under Menachem Begin.[26] In March of 1981 <u>Macleans</u> magazine made a similar claim, stating that 18,000 settlers lived in the West Bank.[27]

The Macleans statement was, however, qualified. Although 18,000 settlers were present, there were only 3000 families.[28] This is an important point because it indicates that the ratio of children to adults is high. This is to be expected, because most settlers are in the peak of the child-bearing years. Although the actual number of Jewish settlers is much debated, it may at least be stated with certainty that it is a youthful population, composed of singles and of young couples and their children. For instance, approximately half of the adults living on moshavim are between the ages of 18 and

21.[29] The settlements are therefore capable of growth both through emigration and through the process of natural increase.

CHAPTER FOUR:

SELECTED PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT AMONG THE ARAB POPULATION

Introduction

The West Bank Arabs have also exhibited identifiable patterns
of movement. This chapter will focus primarily upon the daily move-
ment of laborers into Israel; this phenomena is of particular impor-
tance and has been termed "the most dramatic economic factor in the
entire picture since 1967 because of its great potential social
significance."[1]   The chapter will also deal with Arab emigration
and deportation.

CABINET DECISION ON ARAB LABORERS

In the summer of 1968 West Bank Arabs were granted permission
to apply for work as day-laborers in Israel. Permission was granted
for various reasons, and several important conditions were attached
to the decision.

Permission resulted in part from a desire to normalize the situ-
ation on the West Bank. Israeli leaders were natually aware that
poor economic conditions often serve to heighten unrest, and they
hoped that high rate of employment would have the opposite effect.

It has been argued that the decision was also intended to
"create such a dense network of functional ties that issues of
future sovereignty and precise political boundaries would become
secondary."[2]   According to this view, the resulting integration of
West Bank and Israeli economies would lead to de facto annexation
of the territory. It is doubtless that a number of Cabinet members
entertained such thoughts as the decision was being made, but it is

only fair to add that others did not favor this scenario. They were concerned that economic integration would lead to "de facto incorporation of an Arab population so large that it would undermine Israel's essential Jewish majority,"[3] and were therefore uncomfortable with the proposal.

Nonetheless the decision was made and Arab laborers, many of whom had been unemployed prior to the occupation, poured into Israel. Several conditions were imposed upon these laborers. They were to enter Israel each morning and leave each evening, for they were not allowed to reside within the state. In addition they were required to carry identification cards and were subjected to daily border checks. These final two conditions sometimes lead to unpleasant confrontations with Israeli soldiers, and are viewed as humiliations by many Arabs.

THE NUMBER OF LABORERS

Prior to Israeli occupation, a high rate of unemployment existed on the West Bank. It has already been noted that many young Arabs were leaving for opportunities abroad. In 1968 the unemployed were presented a new option; they were allowed to remain in the West Bank and to commute daily to Israel. During the last half of 1968 Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that the number of employed Arab males fourteen and over was 70,000. This increased sharply to 81,000 during the first half of 1969. The 16% increase was due almost entirely to the opening of job opportunities in Israel.[4]

By mid-1969 it was estimated that approximately 95,000 West Bank Arabs were employed. (This figure includes women). 12,800 of

these were employed in Israel. The latter figure, however, includes only those "legal" workers who were registered through labor exchange bureaus. This is significant because official Israeli statistics suggest that only 70% of the Arab workers in Israel are registered.[5] If one accepts this statistic it may be estimated that approximately 18,000 Arabs were employed in Israel in mid-1969.*

Table 1 deals with the employment of West Bank Arabs. The number of those employed in Israel represents only those who were legally employed.

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* The Israeli government makes little effort to control the influx of these "illegal" workers. Many Arabs, in turn, prefer to work "illegally." There are several reasons for this preference. First, large numbers of Arabs are employed in the construction sector, and work with subcontractors is often arranged informally through relatives. An Arab who is willing to work illegally is assured a quick assignment and almost no waiting period between jobs; this is due to the absence of "red tape." Also, the worker is able to retain approximately 30% of his/her income which would be channeled into payments for social benefits if he/she were registered. Although the worker pays no accident insurance, he/she is secure in the knowledge that almost all Israeli employers who hire "illegally" will cover their workers in the event of an accident on the job. The employers are not required to do so, but they are already violating Israeli law by not paying their share of the social tax, and many consider it cheaper and easier to provide coverage for their laborers.

Advantages in registration include health insurance and work compensation for accidents and lay-off periods. However, 30% of the salary is deducted and only about 15% is returned in the form of benefits; therefore the phenomena of the illegal worker is widespread.

Table 1

Population Employed (Age 14+) by Labor Force

Characteristics (1000's)

Year	Employed	Total Employed in Israel	Percent Employed Working in Israel	Percent Labor Force Employed
1971	176.6	33.8	19	97.2
1972	125.1	34.9	28	98.9
1973	126.4	38.6	31	99.0
1974	137.6	42.6	31	98.9
1975	132.4	40.4	31	98.9
1976	129.7	37.1	29	98.9
1977	127.4	35.5	28	98.9
1978	131.5	36.8	28	99.0
1979	132.8	39.8	30	99.0

Sources:

Columns 2, 3, 5; 1971: Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly, Volume IV, (Jerusalem: Israel Bureau of Statistics, April 1974), p. 35.

Columns 2, 3, 5; 1972-1977: Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly, Volume VII, (Jerusalem: Israel Bureau of Statistics, April 1978), p. 35.

Columns 2, 3, 5; 1978, 1979: Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly, Volume IX, (Jerusalem: Israel Bureau of Statistics, June 1980), p. 35.

This table leads to several noteworthy observations. First, the reported declines in the number of Arabs employed in Israel were

due partly to emigration from the West Bank. Although the total population of the West Bank declined in number only until the beginning of 1969, it is evident that the size of the labor force also declined between 1974 and 1977. During this period Israel experienced an economic slowdown while Jordan and the Gulf States enjoyed rapid growth. As a result a number of workers were drawn from the Israeli market. It is important to realize that in periods of economic difficulty the Arabs are more readily affected by job layoffs than are the Jews and are forced to look elsewhere. However, among those who remained on the West Bank during those years, the percent of unemployment never dipped beneath an impressively low 1.2%.

Statistics which break down male and female employment in Israel are unavailable, but it may be assumed that only a small minority of the employed are female. This assumption is derived from the following table, which has been constructed with the aid of available information on total numbers of Arabs employed and on total number of Arab men employed.

Table 2

Employed West Bank Population (Age 14+, In 1000's)

Year	Total Employed	Total Men Employed	Total Women Employed	Men Employed % of Total	Women Employed % of Total
1972	125.1	106.0	19.1	85	15
1973	126.4	107.2	19.2	85	15
1974	137.6	111.7	25.9	81	19
1975	132.4	108.5	23.9	82	18
1976	129.7	105.5	24.2	81	19
1977	127.4	104.1	23.3	82	18
1978	131.5	105.9	25.6	81	19
1979	132.8	108.8	24.0	82	18

Sources:

Column 2: from Column 2, Table 1.

Column 3; 1972-1977: Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly, Vol. VII,(Jerusalem: Israel Bureau of Statistics, April 1978), p. 35.

Column 3; 1978, 1979: Administered Territories Quarterly, Vol. IX, (Jerusalem: Israel Bureau of Statistics, June 1980), p. 35.

Columns 4, 5, 6: Derived from Columns 2 and 3.

A rapid increase in female employment is evident in the early 1970's, but since 1974 the number of employed females has remained fairly stable. Women have continued to comprise less than twenty percent

of the labor force.* The increase prior to 1974 probably reflects
the fact that women living in refugee camps, where there is no
access to farmland, were attracted by the prospect of wage labor.
Conversely, less than five percent of the rural women have joined
the labor force.

TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKER SETTLEMENT TYPES

The Bank of Israel reports that "unskilled jobs have come to
be considered the preserve of workers from the administered areas."[7]
The following table supports this statement.

Table 3

West Bank Arabs Employed in Israel

Year	Total (1000's)	Percent in Construction	Percent in Industry	Percent in Agriculture	Percent in Other Sectors
1970	14.7	57.2	12.9	17.7	12.2
1971	25.6	57.0	16.8	12.9	13.3
1972	34.9	56.8	18.6	12.3	12.3
1973	38.6	56.7	20.7	8.8	13.7
1974	42.4	56.1	19.3	10.6	14.0
1975	40.4	55.0	18.6	10.9	15.5
1976	37.1	49.6	20.9	12.2	17.3
1977	35.5	44.2	22.5	12.7	20.6

*This is in spite of the fact that there is a preponderance of women
ages 15 through 44, due to the tendency of many of their male counter-
parts to emigrate. Emigration will be discussed in more detail in
the latter part of this chapter.

Source for Table 3

   Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1978, (Jerusalem: Central
Bureau of Statustics), p. 788.

The preponderance of workers in Israel's construction sector is
evident. It is telling to note that in 1977, construction employed
only ten percent of those Arabs who worked on the West Bank, as
opposed to forty-four percent of those in Israel. One obvious
reason for the contrast is the healthy state of Israel's construc-
tion sector. The demand for buildings managed to withstand the
recession of 1974-1978, and has maintained its momentum since.
Another reason there are large number of Arab construction workers
is that many rural Arabs wish to work in Israel and at the same
time retain possession of their farmland. They prefer jobs from
which they can be released during periods of peak labor demand on
the farm. Israel's construction sector meets the needs of these
farmers. Eighty-two percent of the Arabs employed in Israeli con-
struction are from rural areas, while the remaining eighteen per-
cent are from West Bank cities or refugee camps. This testifies to
the importance of this sector in the lives of rural Arabs.

   Tables 4 and 5 deal in more detail with Arab employment in
Israel by the worker's place of residence.

Table 4

West Bank Arabs Employed in Israel by

(1) Economic Sector and (2) Type of Settlement, 1978

Sector	Total (1000's)	Percent From Cities	Percent From Rural Villages	Percent From Camps
Agriculture	4.1	(4.7)	83.8	(12.0)
Industry	8.7	(19.5)	70.2	(10.3)
Construction	16.7	(7.2)	82.0	(10.8)
Other	7.3	(18.8)	70.6	(10.6)

Source:

Tamari, Selim, "Building Other People's Homes," Journal of Palestine Studies (Autumn, 1981), p. 40.

Figures in brackets represent projections from small samples.

Table 5

West Bank Arabs Employed in Israel by

(1) Type of Settlement and (2) Economic Sector, 1978

Settlement Type	Total (1000's)	Percent in Construction	Percent in Industry	Percent in Agriculture	Percent in Other Sectors
Cities	4.4	(27.3)	(38.7)	(4.5)	(29.5)
Villages	28.5	48.2	21.5	12.3	18.0
Camps	3.9	(46.2)	(23.1)	(12.8)	(17.9)

Source for Table 5:

Tamari, Selim, "Building Other People's Homes," Journal of
Palestine Studies (Autumn, 1981), p. 40.

Figures in brackets represent projections from small samples.

The first table makes it evident that the great majority of
Israel's Arab laborers hail from rural areas. The second table
indicates that workers from refugee camps and from rural villages
have similar patterns of employment while those from urban areas
are more prevalent in the industrial sector.

It may be concluded that Arab laborers are concentrated in
those economic sectors which do not require highly-skilled labor.
Seventy percent of the Israeli-employed Arabs from cities, and
eighty-two percent of those from rural areas or refugee camps, are
employed in construction, industry, or agriculture. It is also
safe to conclude that an Arab's settlement type influences the sec-
tor in which he seeks employment. Generally speaking, those from
rural areas and camps are more prevalent on the construction site
whereas those from cities are most common in industry.

EMIGRATION

While many Palestinians have opted to take jobs in Israel,
others have decided to leave the West Bank and live abroad. From
1967 until 1969 emigration from the West Bank actually exceeded
the rate of natural increase. The issuance of Israeli work permits
helped to lower the emigration rate, but it has nonetheless remained
substantial.

Table 6

Arab Population of the West Bank (1000's)

Year	Natural Increase Per 1000 Inhabitants	Annual Rate of Increase	Population at End of Period
1967	3.0	-1.7	585.7
1968	11.7	-0.7	581.7
1969	12.3	+2.3	595.2
1970	13.7	+1.5	603.9
1971	15.9	+2.2	617.3
1972	16.8	+1.9	629.0
1973	16.9	+2.7	646.2
1974	18.1	+2.4	661.6
1975	18.6	+0.5	665.1
1976	20.3	+0.9	670.9
1977	20.5	+1.5	681.2

Source:

Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1978 (Jerusalem: Central
Bureau of Statistics), p. 765.

It is evident that the rate of population increase is much lower
than the rate of natural increase. The largest disparities between
the two figures existed in the years immediately following the war
and in the late 1970's, when Israel experienced a recession. This
lends credence to the suggestion that migration has been influenced

by economic conditions. Migration slumped when jobs opened in Israel, and then rose in 1975 when opportunity beckoned from the Gulf States and Jordan. As economic conditions again improved in Israel, migration slowed. If these figures were to be extended through the present, they would likely reflect the economic diffi- culties which have afflicted Israel since 1980.

Most of the emigrants are young males. The result is a high female-male ratio among many of the age groups on the West Bank. Although Table 7 is dated, it is indicative of a trend which con- tinues to the present.

Table 7

Males and Females by Age Group, December 1973

Age	Females	Males	Age	Females	Males
Total	327.4	330.0	40-44	15.0	11.2
0-4	55.6	63.0	45-49	12.6	10.1
5-9	47.2	53.1	50-54	8.8	7.9
10-14	48.0	52.9	55-59	6.8	6.3
15-19	36.2	40.3	60-64	6.1	6.1
20-24	24.2	24.2	65-69	6.0	6.1
25-29	18.9	15.1	70-74	3.4	4.7
30-34	16.9	12.0	75+	6.0	5.8
35-39	15.4	11.2			

Source for Table 7:

Van Arkadie, Brian, <u>Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies Since 1976</u> (N.Y.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977), p. 56.

It was pointed out earlier that the West Bank's labor force is predominantly male and so it is not surprising that men, rather than women, are attracted by job opportunities abroad. The table reveals that women are a clear majority within those age groups which are a part of the labor force.

Young men are also more likely than their female counterparts to travel abroad seeking higher education. Those who are beckoned by the ivory towers may or may not choose to return home upon completion of their education; however those that do return often discover they have educated themselves out of the West Bank job market. Opportunities in Israel have, for the most part, "moved semiemployed peasants and unemployed laborers from the territories into the Israeli economy at the lower end of the economic scale." Meanwhile "members of the middle economic strata of West Bank . . . society (have) found themselves with a narrower range of economic opportunities. . . . For the better educated Palestinians, the absence of full-scale governmental functions limits somewhat the employment opportunities that might otherwise be available . . . ."[8] As a result the newly-educated often take up residence in other parts of the world.

Large numbers of those who leave the West Bank go first to Jordan. Jordan functions as a "temporary refuge"[9] for many of these, who then find work in other countries. Between 1967 and 1972, the

Jordanian government estimates that approximately 133,000 people
left Jordan and did not return. The "vast majority" of these were
Palestinians and while they were not all from the West Bank, the
trend is evident.[10]

It is also evident that religious background effects an emi-
grant's choice of destination. Most Muslims tend to emigrate to
Arab states, with the majority settling in the Gulf States and
Jordan. Job opportunities draw these emigrants but so, evidently,
do religious ties. Young Arab Christians, on the contrary, often
travel to the Americas. They tend to favor the United States,
Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Peru. Often they join
entire communities of Christian Arabs which are already established
in these countries.[11]

Large numbers of Christians have left the West Bank in recent
years. Only about five percent of all West Bankers are Christians,[12]
but 5000 of the 17,000 Arabs who emigrated between 1975 and 1977
were Christians. Most of these hailed from Ramallah, which is pre-
dominantly Christian.[13] This high emigration rate is at least
partially due to the fact that Christians make up a better-educated
and wealthier segment of West Bank society.

DEPORTATION

Not all Arabs who have left the West Bank have done so volun-
tarily. More than 600 Palestinians were deported from the West
Bank between 1967 and 1978 and, in addition to this, two entire
tribes living in the Valley were transferred to the East Bank.[14]
Most of these deportations took place in the late 1960's and early
1970's.

Israeli officials place the number of deportees higher than this. They argue, however, that many of these were infiltrators from other Arab countries. Others, they say, chose migration as an alternative to long prison sentences which were the result of security offenses. They state that because choice was involved, the offenders cannot be said to have been forcibly expelled.

These claims are challenged by some of those who have compiled lists of deportees, including Jordanian border officials and various researchers. Ann Lesch states that no more than nine deportees give places outside of Palestine as their original homes.*[15] Lesch contends that, even when a degree of dishonesty among the deportees is accounted for, the Israeli claim that 140 of the exiles were foreign infiltrators is greatly exaggerated.**[16]

The assertion that some Arabs leave voluntarily in order to avoid prison sentences has also been challenged. Deportees have testified that they were "compelled to sign papers agreeing to their release"[17] into another Arab country. Others say they were told they could avoid prison only if they would "leave the country after signing a document to the effect that they are leaving voluntarily."[18] Although a degree of choice may be involved, the existence of accompanying Israeli pressures has also been attested to.

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* This very small number was arrived at after studying lists of <u>all</u>
  deportees from occupied territories, rather than only those from
  the West Bank, and so it may be assumed that the number for the
  West Bank is smaller.

**This Israeli figure also refers to exiles from all occupied
  territories.

According to the Jordanian Times, the deportations are an "Israeli effort to systematically wipe out the indigenous Palestian Arab leadership in the occupied territories."[19] Similarly, a United Nation's special committee to investigate Israeli practices in the territories discovered "evidence tending to show that the inhabitants of the occupied areas are being deprived of leadership by the deportation or detention of a considerable number of those persons looked upon by the inhabitants as their leaders."[21] Compiled lists of deportees include the names of lawyers, judges, doctors, teachers, mayors, and religious leaders.

This practice also "deters the growth of an alternative, natural and open political leadership that could express the political rights and aspirations" of West Bank Arabs.[22] It is a fairly effective deterrent because fear of deportation quiets resistance. Indeed, various West Bank leaders cite exile as one of their greatest fears.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis has been to examine patterns of
population movement and settlements in the West Bank since its
occupation in 1967, and to identify the factors causing the ob-
served patterns. Selected patterns have included the establishment
of Jewish settlements, the daily flow of Arab laborers into Israel,
and the voluntary and involuntary out-migration of Arabs. Patterns
of Jewish settlement were the primary focus; because of the contro-
versial nature of the settlements, this emphasis was deemed justi-
fiable. It is hoped that the research might shed light on this
volatile issue.

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Chapter Two

The second chapter of the thesis dealt with placement of
Isareli settlements and focused on governmental decision-making.
The Cabinet of the Knesset has played a major role in determining
location. It has born the responsibility of deciding which areas
are of high priority for settlement and although consensus has not
always been easy to attain, clear-cut patterns emerged under both
Labour (1967-1977) and Likud (1977-present).

Under Labour, emphasis was placed upon settlement in the Jordan
Valley. During this period the densely-populated highlands were
left virtually untouched. They were avoided for demographic
reasons in that Labour's leaders balked at settlement among a large
Arab population. They realized that annexation of the entire West

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Bank would mean Israel would eventually be characterized by an
Arab majority, which was not acceptable. According to the tenets
of Zionism, the Jewish state must maintain its Jewish majority.
Therefore Labour favored settlement (and eventual annexation) only
of the sparcely populated Jordan Valley. These settlements would
be of value defensively and would pose no threat to the ethnic
character of the state.

Under the leadership of Likud this policy was altered. Likud
was influenced by a body of thought which held that Jews _must_ set-
tle the highlands of Judea and Samaria. These had been the heart-
land of ancient Israel; therefore twentieth-century Israel was
justified--indeed, even obligated--in settling them again. The
territory had been given them by God and could not be rightfully
claimed by its Arab occupants. Likud adopted this view and has
consistently emphasized the need to establish settlements around
and between Arab centers of population in the highlands.

While the Cabinet has successfully determined the general
thrust of settlement, it has nonetheless faced stiff Jewish resis-
tence from time to time. Labour and Likud have both been forced
to deal with groups of settlers who chose to settle in unauthorized
areas and who proceeded to do so without approval. Labour initially
reacted to such threats by forcibly removing the settlers; it then
responded with compromise in the case of Kiryat 'Arba; and finally
it simply allowed three highland settlements to remain in place,
unchallenged and unapproved. After Likud took office, it was faced
with a group of settlers who had moved right into the Arab city of

Hebron. This action was eventually approved, albeit with considerable discomfort.

Today there are few barriers to Jewish settlement of the West Bank. Even Arab possession of land has not been an insurmountable barrier. The final section of chapter two dealt with how land has been obtained for settlement. It discusses in some detail the difficulty in defining "privately owned land." This difficulty arises because most of the West Bank was unsurveyed prior to occupation, and so many Arabs do not hold clear title. Such land is often claimed by Israel. By some estimates--and all estimates depend greatly upon how "private land" is defined by the researcher--over ninety percent of the land claimed by Israel had previously been privately owned by Arabs.

Chapter Three

Chapter three dealt with the settlers themselves. Available information was less abundant for this topic of research, but a number of findings and conclusions were possible.

First, certain criteria have been established and must be satisfied by any group of prospective settlers which wishes to gain governmental approval. These criteria particularly emphasize the need for a defined social topic, self-labor, and joint ownership.

Perhaps the easiest of these to satisfy is the demand for a defined social topic. Most settler groups recruit members based on homogeneous religious beliefs and social values. The demand for joint ownership is also rather easy to satisfy, although by

definition the different Settlement Movements satisfy it to vary-
ing degrees. For example, there are three collective agriculture
Settlement Movements. These are the kibbutzim, the moshavim, and
the moshav shitufi'im. The kibbutzim most nearly approach a state
of socialism; there is no private property and families live com-
munally. On the moshav shitufi'im farming is done collectively
and profits are shared, but families live in separate households.
And on the moshavim, individuals own both homes and farms, although
equipment is used cooperatively and produce is marketed jointly.
These differences in the degree of joint ownership play a role in
determining the sort of people these settlements attract. The
kibbutzim appeal mostly to young socialist immigrants from Europe,
while the moshavim have a much broader appeal and thus are found
in greater number in the West Bank.

The last of the emphasized criteria, the demand for self-
labor, is breaking down even on the kibbutzim. This is apparently
a situation which government officials are able to overlook in the
face of increased settlement production and the perceived need for
Arab laborers, but the requirement nevertheless remains "on the
books."

Chapter three also touched on settler choices of location.
The settlers usually make a decision within the broader context
of priorities established by the Cabinet, but on a smaller scale
they are influenced by factors such as quality of the land and its
intended utilization, strategic and historic significance, and
the location of Arab population.

A settlement group may form in Israel or abroad, and its members may or may not be of homogeneous origin. Common religious beliefs and social values seem to play the vital role in cementing a group together. Also, those who choose to settle the West Bank seem to be drawn, at a basic level, by either a religious conviction in Israel's "divine right" to the land or by a more secular concern for the maintenance of Israel's "military and historical integrity." These two views are very different and, again, Israelis will tend to settle with those who believe as they do.

Chapter three also discussed the economic bases of the settlements. In most cases the settlements do possess viable bases. In the Valley agriculture dominates, although there is a degree of small industry. In the highlands, where cultivatable land is not so readily available, the economic picture is more diverse. Settlements are supported by factories, schools, or the provision of services. Military posts have been founded and so too have several "bedroom communities" for the city of Jerusalem. Also, groups of settlements have banded together to own and jointly operate industrial parks.

Finally, the chapter dealt with settler numbers. Very few conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. It can be said only that most adults are at the peak of the child-bearing years, and that a majority of the West Bank's Jews are children. There is no consensus on the total number of settlers. Estimates made in 1980 and in early 1981 ranged from 5,000 to 18,000.

Chapter Four

Chapter four focused upon patterns of movement displayed by
the Arab population. Three identifiable patterns were discussed.

The first of these was the daily movement of Arab laborers
into Israel. In the summer of 1968 the Cabinet granted Arabs
permission to work in Israel (though not to live in Israel), and
the results of this decision have been termed "the most dramatic
economic factor in the entire picture since 1967.[1] A high rate of
unemployment had existed on the West Bank prior to occupation,
but by 1971 unemployment was very nearly nonexistent. The unemploy-
ment rate at that time was 2.8% and it continued to decline in
following years. During the 1970's, 44-57 percent of those Arabs
employed in Israel were construction workers, and the majority
hailed from rural areas. As might be expected, most were male.

Despite the very low rates of unemployment, emigration from
the West Bank rose markedly during periods of economic slowdown in
Israel. (Conversely emigration slowed when Israel's economy
improved.) Most emigrants have been young males, and most have
sought work in Jordan or in the Gulf States.

While some West Bankers emigrate in search of jobs others leave
in pursuit of higher education. Often they overqualify themselves
for work at home and do not return. Most of these are also young
men, which contributes to the high female/male ratio among many of
the West Bank's age groups.

The chapter also dealt briefly with deportation. Most depor-
tations took place in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and Arabs

and Israelis differ on the motives behind this practice. Israelis claim that most deportees were infiltrators from Arab countries and did not belong on the West Bank. Others were criminals who chose to leave Israel rather than serve out prison sentences. Arabs, on the other hand, argue that expulsion is an effort to "systematically wipe out the indigenous Palestinian Arab leadership."[2] This perception has resulted in a fear of eventual deportation among the West Bank's more vocal leadership, and it serves to subdue some of the voices of discontent.

RESEARCH CONSTRAINTS

I was confronted with a number of research constraints during construction of the thesis. The most disturbing of these was an inability to find information concerning the movement of Arabs who have lost land to the Israelis. It would be reasonable to assume that some of these lost land and retained homes, and thus opted for employment in Israel. Others have probably moved to West Bank urban centers or have migrated to the East Bank and abroad. However, I was unable to find any information on these patterns of movement or on the intensity of the same.

Another constraint concerned the lack of statistical data on the Jewish settlers. It would have been interesting to compare the characteristics of the settlers with those of Israel's Jewish population, but my sources did not differentiate between the two. Statistics on settler origin, age structure, male/female ratio, education level, and employment would have been valuable but were unavailable. There was also no consensus concerning the number of

settlers. This fact served as a reminder that much of my source
material displayed an evident bias. In most cases interpretations
rather than facts differed, but in this particular case the dis-
crepancies were glaring, and I was able to draw no conclusions.*

Finally, I was disappointed that I could not find more infor-
mation on the evolution of settlement types. For example, a set-
tlement may begin as a Nahal and become a kibbutz, and then even-
tually join the moshav Movement. The trends in settlement type
would have been interesting and revealing but again, information on
settlements was difficult to find, was often badly dated, and was
rarely comprehensive.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

As research for this thesis progressed, a number of topics
emerged which seem to be worthy of further study. Most of these
would be most easily developed through on-site research or through
the use of questionnaires; the methodology I employed would not
be sufficient.

I was particularly interested in those variables which moti-
vate Jews to settle on the West Bank. My sources dealt with this
question only in passing, and they then tended to lump the explana-
tion into terminology such as "religion" and "nationalism." There

* The problem of research bias has been mentioned and should be ela-
borated upon. It is of course almost impossible for a scholar
to eliminate bias from his/her writings. This is perhaps parti-
cularly true when the topic is intensely controversial as is
the West Bank. However, I do not feel that source bias was a
major constraint. Most of the researchers made a sincere attempt
to avoid propaganda, and often they presented opposing views for
the reader's consideration. When opposing views could not be
found within a single source, they could generally be found in
a comparison of sources.

was little or no mention of economic factors, occupational factors,
Jewish perceptions of life in the occupied territories, and a host
of additional factors which may or may not play roles in the
decision-making process. I believe this would be a worthwhile
study.

It would be interesting to explore Arab emigration from the
West Bank, again in terms of the decision-making process. Such a
study might focus on why the decision to leave is made, and on how
a destination is selected.

A study concerning Arab working conditions in Israel might
also be of benefit. Topics such as relations with Jewish manage-
ment, degree of integration into the surrounding environment,
wages, and extent of underemployment would be worth exploring.

A researcher might also concern himself with changes in Arab
settlement patterns. Because there has been an influx of Jewish
settlers, and because in many cases Arab lands have been taken to
accommodate these settlers, it seems reasonable to assume Arab
settlement patterns have undergone many changes which were not
discussed in this thesis. Unfortunately I was able to find no
information on this, and I feel this dearth should be corrected.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the trends which have
been elucidated in the thesis are ongoing trends, and will continue
to be worth researching in the future.

Today much of the world sees the tiny West Bank as a timebomb,
tightly wound and replete with the danger of havoc and destruction.
Entire novels have been written about the hypothetical international

repercussions of the settlements. The evening news occasionally brings us reels of riots and death in the territory. Peace plans continue to be drafted, and they continue to be rejected. Indeed, the menace to stability seems quite real.

Meanwhile Israeli settlement proceeds unabated. Most of the international community opposes it, and the U.N. never tires of demanding withdrawal, but little impact seems to be made by the barrage of words. If anything Israel is hardened by the estrangement.

In 1982 Israel relinquished the Sinai and annexed the Golan Heights. After annexation of the Golan Heights a number of onlookers suggested the West Bank would soon follow. The careful observer, however, should weigh predictions of annexation against a basic Israeli dilemma voiced by Abba Eban shortly after occupation. He said:

> If the West Bank and Gaza Arabs were annexed, our principles
> would not allow us to withhold citizenship--and our vital
> interests would not allow us to grant it.

It is common knowledge that annexation would enrage most the world, but often it is forgotten that it would frighten large numbers of Israelis as well. When the future of the West Bank is discussed, this variable should not be ignored. Under the present set of circumstances it seems that it is not to Israel's advantage to annex. And in reality, legal annexation hardly seems necessary. Israel's government has discovered the considerable advantages of de facto annexation; Arabs need not be granted the rights of citizenship,

and settlers can maintain their flow into "Judea" and "Samaria."
In the future, I believe that settlement will continue to focus
upon the highlands and that the Jewish population of the territory
will increase markedly. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that the
process of de facto annexation will be reversed by any of those
who wish to avoid spilling of blood in doing so.

FOOTNOTES

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[5]Ibid., p. 16.

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[8]Brian Van Arkadie, Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies Since 1967 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977), p. 24.

[9]Kanovsky, p. 140.

[10]Ibid., p. 142.

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[12]Ibid.

[13]Harris, p. 17.

[14]Abdul-Ilah Abu Ayyash, "Israeli Planning Policy in the Occupied Territories," Journal of Palestine Studies (Autumn, 1981), p. 112.

[15]Harris, p. 16.

[16]Van Arkadie, p. 32.

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[2]Ibid.

[3]Ann Lesch, Israel's Occupation of the West Bank: The First Two Years (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1970), p. 60.

[4]Amos Elon, "The Israeli Occupation," Commentary (March, 1968), p. 46.

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[6]Harris, p. 35.

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[11]Lesch, Israel's Occupation of the West Bank: The First Two Years, p. 61.

[12]Harris, p. 106.

[13]Lesch, Israel's Occupation of the West Bank: The First Two Years, p. 61.

[14]New York Times, June 18, 1968, p. 1.

[15]Ibid., p. 6.

[16]Lesch, Israel's Occupation of the West Bank: The First Two Years, p. 62.

[17]New York Times, September 25, 1967, p. 1.

[18] Richard F. Nyrop, ed., _Israel, A Country Study_ (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1979), p. 400.

[19] Lesch, _Israel's Occupation of the West Bank: The First Two Years_, p. 64.

[20] _New York Times_, Sept. 28, 1967, p. 24.

[21] Neal Sherman, "From Government to Opposition: The Rural Settlement Movement of the Israel Labor Party in the Wake of the Election of 1977," _International Journal of Middle East Studies_ (February, 1982), p. 62.

[22] Nyrop, p. 164.

[23] Ibid.

[24] "News Out of Israel and the Occupied Territories," _Middle East International_ (August, 1977), p. 18.

[25] Nyrop, p. 164.

[26] Ibid., p. 151.

[27] Edward Hughes, "Israel's Unsettling Settlements," _Readers Digest_ (May, 1980), p. 180.

[28] Harris, pp. 149, 151.

[29] Ibrahim Matar, "Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," _Journal of Palestine Studies_ (Autumn, 1981), p. 95.

[30] Ibid., p. 99.

[31] Donald S. Will, "Zionist Settlement Ideology and its Ramifications for the Palestinian People," _Journal of Palestine Studies_ (Spring, 1982), p. 44.

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[33] "From Our Correspondents," _Middle East International_ (February 15, 1980), p. 4.

[34] Will, p. 43.

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[1]Avshalam Rokach, <u>Rural Settlement in Israel</u> (Jerusalem: Department of Rural Settlement, 1978), pp. 65-66.

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[3]Sherman, p. 55.

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[6]Sherman, p. 57.

[7]Rokach, pp. 33-34.

[8]Harris, p. 106.

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[10]Rokach, p. 56.

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[23]Ibid., p. 45.

[24]"From the Israeli Press," Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer, 1978), p. 45.

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[28]Ibid.

[29]Rokach, p. 95.

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[3]Ibid.

[4]Kanovsky, p. 154.

[5]Selim Tamari, "Building Other People's Homes," Journal of Palestine Studies (Autumn, 1981), p. 45.

[6]Ibid., p. 38.

[7]Musa Budeira, "Occupation Leaves its Mark," Middle East International (May 8, 1981), p. 10.

[8]Van Arkadie, p. 47.

[9]"Palestinian Emigration and Israeli Land Expropriation in the Occupied Territories," Journal of Palestine Studies (Autumn, 1973), p. 108.

[10]Ibid.

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SELECTED PATTERNS OF POPULATION
MOVEMENT AND SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST
BANK SINCE 1967

by

CINDY DAUTEL

B. A., Kansas State University, 1981

———————————

A MASTER'S THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine selected patterns
of settlement, population movement in the West Bank since its
occupation in 1967. These patterns include the establishment of
Jewish settlements, the voluntary and involuntary out-migration
of Arabs, and the daily flow of Arab labor into Israel. The re-
search is a response to a preceived need for a better understand-
ing of this highly controversial part of the world. The patterns
represent vital human factors which must be accounted for by anyone
wishing to deal with the divisive issues of occupation.

Data for the thesis was gathered through a review of relevant
statistical information and of books, periodicals and newspapers.
The study area includes all the West Bank with the exception of
East Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel in June of 1967.

The sources made it clear that the Israeli Cabinet plays the
primary role in determining patterns of Jewish settlement. Chap-
ter 2 describes the decisions made by that body and attempts to
define the more important variables which have played into the
decision-making process. In general it may be stated that demo-
graphic and strategic factors were dominant in decision-making
within the Labour coalition (1967-1977), and that religious and
historical factors have dominated under Likud (1977-present). The
resultant patterns of settlement reflect these differences.

The third chapter discusses the Jewish settlers. Prospective
settlement groups are organized in Israel or abroad and must then

gain government approval. This involves satisfying established criteria, such as the development of a defined social topic and support of principles such as self-labor and joint ownership. Most settlement groups easily satisfy the first requirement, because members are knit together by common religious beliefs and social values. The principles of self-labor and joint ownership, however, are unequally embraced from settlement to settlement. Generally speaking, the kibbutzim more nearly approach a state of socialism than do the more plentiful moshavim.

Chapter 3 also deals with settler choices of location, which are made within the broader context of the government priorities discussed in Chapter 2. It discusses the economic bases of the settlements, and concludes that most are viable. In addition, it is concluded that most settlers who are drawn to the West Bank are attracted less by economic factors than by strongly-held beliefs, such as Israel's "divine right" to the land or a concern for Israeli security.

The fourth chapter deals with the movement of Arabs. The most notable pattern has been the daily flow of laborers into Israel. Most of these laborers are employed in construction, are from rural areas, and are males.

Although a very significant number of Arabs are employed in Israel, others choose to emigrate in search of work. They are particularly attracted to the lively economies of Jordan and the Gulf States. And finally, a small number of West Bankers have been forcibly expelled. Although their number is small, Arabs claim

the losses are disproportionately large. They say this practice
is systematically depriving them of effective leadership.

In conclusion, I feel the research has been worthwhile. Al-
though I had originally hoped to include a discussion on changes
in Arab settlement patterns and was unable to find the information,
the study as a whole has been an excellent learning experience.

Unfortunately the research convinced me that the period in
time when Israel might have compromised on the West Bank belongs
now to history, and that a complete "de facto" annexation is un-
avoidable.