COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS: GUIDELINES FOR WRITING COMPETITIVE CRITICISMS/

by

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B. S., Kansas State University, 1982

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Speech

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1985

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Dedicated
to
KSU Speech Unlimited

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Katherine, Virginia, Jim and my committee. I would also like to extend a special thank you to John Murphy for supplying most of the speech manuscripts.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Communication Analysis (CA) suffers from an image problem. Critics (Logue, 1981; McGee, 1983; Larson and O'Rourke, 1983; Murphy, 1983) argue that CA has low participation, shoddy analysis and generally poor execution. Murphy (1983) writes:

At each tournament it (CA) is invariably the smallest event. Many tournaments even dropped it from the schedule. The reason for this decline is clear. Students, coaches and judges do not agree on the goals, methods or criteria of rhetorical criticism (918).

In terms of most CAs, Murphy and the other critics are correct. CA does have its share of problems. However, not all CAs are problematic. If we turn our attention to the good CAs and try to determine what makes them good, we can improve CA's image and quality. By outlining just what a good CA is, competitors can know what to do when writing a CA. With the present negative literature, the only advice to competitors seems to be what not to do.

This study wishes to change that image. There are two goals to this analysis. First, I would like to develop some definition as to what a CA should be. Second, based on that definition, I would like to deduce some specific guidelines for writing a good CA. Hopefully, this will improve the general quality of CA.
There is a need for such research as there is a dearth of literature on CA. No articles have been published on CA at this writing in JAFCA, Speaker and Gavel, QJS, or the regional journals. Aside from the occasional convention paper, most CA literature has appeared at the Summer Conference on Argument (1981, 1983). This prompted Larson and O'Rourke (1983) to note, "CA has spawned little academic interest until recent years. What little literature exists on the topic focuses on what the authors view to be problems with the event as practiced today" (1).

It is precisely for this lack of academic interest in CA that this project is being conducted. To set up this project, this paper will first review the pertinent literature on CA. The review will entail an overview of the three categories of research and literature on CA. Then the literature will be summarized and critiqued. On the basis of this review, the study will be justified more fully.

Three types of literature have been written that are pertinent to CA. First, there have been attempts to determine the relevant attitudes of judges and contentants in CA. Second, one attempt has been made to analyze CA from an argumentative perspective. Finally, essays have been written that are basically opinion pieces on what is wrong with CA as it is practiced today.

In reviewing the attitude research, the first significant work pertaining to CA was conducted by Larson and O'Rourke (1981). Their study examined the predominant forms of arguments used in
individual events. Larson and O'Rourke conducted a content analysis of 550 ballots from the 1981-81 forensics season to see judges' preference toward argument forms. Overall, the results noted two common strategies and two subtle forms. The two strategies labeled "common" were the use of expert testimony and the use of statistics. The two subtle forms were first, the use of metaphor and analogy and second, the use of humor. For CA specifically, two points became apparent. "Humor was seen as a good way to 'enliven the presentation' or 'to keep the audience interested'" (329). Judges indicated that more humor in CAs would be appreciated. Second, judges indicated that they preferred topics that were "relevant" (329).

Larson and O'Rourke (1981) pointed out one potential weakness with their research: the study was conducted with their local judges. They argued that local judges may operate with different standards from judges across the nation. If this is so, then the results of the study can only be generalized to one local area.

Larson and O'Rourke (1983) were also responsible for the second study concerned with the attitudes of judges and contestants about CA. Acknowledging the lack of rhetoric background in forensics and the lack of sources indicating what constitutes a good CA, Larson and O'Rourke surveyed the judges and contestants in CA at the 1983 AFA NIET "to discover (1) what critics expect a communication analyst to do when presenting a speech,
and (2) how CA as a forensic event differs from rhetorical criticism in general" (1).

The first part of the study asked participants to weigh sixteen statements designed to answer the question, "What are the most important standards used to evaluate?" (2). The results were placed in three categories of importance. The first category contained the seven statements receiving a mean score of 6.0 or better on a 7.0 scale. These statements were then deemed very important. The second category was called important, and mean scores ranged from 5.9 to 5.0. The specific questions asked and their scores are:

1. A student should use outside sources for proof or documentation. 6.56
2. A student should analyze appropriately the topic in a communication analysis. 6.42
3. A student should explain properly the analytic method used in the analysis. 6.42
4. A clear organization is important in communication analysis. 6.29
5. Proper support (illustration) material is important in communication analysis. 6.23
6. A significant topic (subject matter) is important in communication analysis. 6.01
7. Effective delivery is important in communication analysis. 6.0
8. A speaker should justify the selection of the analytic method in communication analysis. 5.89
9. An in-depth analysis is important in communication analysis. 5.82
10. A speaker should justify the rhetorical (communication) importance of the event. 5.82
11. Choice of language is important in communication analysis. 5.67
12. Students should note the unique insight on the topics discovered from the analysis. 5.64
13. A speaker should justify the topic selection in communication analysis. 5.33
14. Students should not rely on a script in communication analysis. 5.06
15. A critique of the usefulness of the analytic method is important. 4.81
16. Students need to be objective (detached) when doing a communication analysis. 4.3 (4-5)

When comparing judges' and competitors' responses on the sixteen items, a significant difference was found on only two. Judges place more emphasis on noting the unique insight discovered with the analysis than the students do. On the other hand, the students were more adamant than the judges in their insistence on having the speech memorized.

Respondents were then asked to indicate the goals of CA. Then they were asked to indicate how well that goal was being met. There was not one clear answer for what CA's goal was. Thirteen possible goals were listed on the survey and none received a majority (over 50%). In response to the question of how well CA was meeting its goal, 3.1% gave students a superior grade, 10.9% excellent, 37.5% good and 25% were deemed poor; 22.5% did not respond. Larson and O'Rourke interpreted two justifications for the overall grades. Complaints centered around superficial analysis and lack of effective application of method to the facts under investigation.

On the basis of the study, Larson and O'Rourke made several suggestions for the improvement of CA. First, they recommended that more students be encouraged to compete and that they be educated better in rhetorical theory prior to competition. Second, increase the ten minute time limit for the speech and evaluate
the manuscript along with the speech. Third, judges should maintain an open and unbiased view toward methodologies. Fourth, the purpose and rules for CA should be made clearer.

The second literature category is comprised of Logue's (1981) examination of the finals of the 1981 AFA NIET. Logue looked at how argument was applied in individual events using the finals round as her data. Pertinent to her review was the examination of the CA finals. Logue found general trends concerning topics, methodologies, and analysis. First, Logue found that the significance of the topic needed to be justified. This mirrors Larson and O'Rourke's (1981) findings and lends some credence to the universality of their claim. Second, Logue (1981) noticed that the topics centered upon recent events. In turn, she suggested that topics for CA's should be no older than "five years" (391). Of the six speeches in finals, four were within those guidelines.

Logue expected that the CAs would employ "typical" methods dominated by Aristotle, Burke, Black and Bitzer. Instead, after listening to finals, the uniqueness of the method became apparent. Students were opting to use more obscure methods that would help the CA appear unique. For example, John Murphy used the Quest Story for his method.

Logue was critical of the analysis displayed in the speeches. Compared to other events, less evidence was cited. Moreover, Logue was disappointed that only one speech attempted to make an argument that the analysis would make a contribution for those
in the field of communication. On the basis of the CA finals, Logue claimed that the general rule for a speech is to claim that if the communication act being analyzed was successful, this was because the act followed the analytic method being used for the criticism. If the communication act was a failure, this was because the act failed to follow the method being used for the criticism. Successful communication was being defined as how well an act conformed to a theory, regardless of the act's effects. In other words, the competitors were taking only a classificatory approach. On the basis of this, Logue felt that the CA's did not function as rhetorical criticism. She argued that the speeches were mere classification or "cookie-cutting" in the forensic slang.

The final category of CA literature is the opinion essay, characterized as critical position papers on the current status of CA. Shawn McGee's (1983) essay is exactly this sort of paper. McGee was responding to the complaint about CA's poor analysis and the tendency for CAs to rely on classification.

McGee notes that the field of rhetorical criticism is in a state of "uncertainty" and this is reflected in the forensic event (1-2). For example, the field of rhetoric has no dominating paradigm. If the "experts" are at odds, how are coaches, judges, and students to be sure in what they are doing? As a result, McGee (1983) is not surprised that CA is one of the smallest events in forensics. "In light of the limited theoretical background which many coaches and students have in rhetorical criticism,
this (CA's small numbers) should not be perceived as a startling claim" (McGee 6). Because many coaches and students are not well versed in rhetoric, McGee argues that their uncertainty tends to make them avoid CA. This avoidance is reflected in the low number of people who compete in CA.

Up to this point in the literature concerning CA, one implied standard is that CA should mirror academic criticism in general nature (Logue, 1981; Larson and O'Rourke, 1983; McGee, 1983). Murphy (1983) would change our focus. Murphy argues, "Due to an inordinate emphasis on the methodology, the event has encouraged classification rather than argumentation" (918). Murphy's position is that the academic critic seeks to discover the processes and explain the theory that governs communication. The data, the communication acts, are used to further theory. As a result, coaches who are academicians have students trying to make a contribution to rhetorical theory. Considering the ten minute time limit alone, the very nature of competitive forensics mitigates against this. "By forcing students to use the standards or academic criticism, specifically the need to make a contribution to throtty, we damage competitive rhetorical criticism" (Murphy 918).

Murphy's argument about the present practice in the event centers around the degree of evaluation in CA. "Two different levels of claims are found in rhetorical criticism, an overall evaluation of effectiveness and individual claims made in the course of the speech to support this judgment. It seems as if
very few in forensics believe that evaluation need exist" (Murphy 919). Murphy not only notes an avoidance of evaluation on the part of the competitor but also on the part of the national organizations that run forensics. As he notes, neither the AFA nor the NFA organizations specifically ask for evaluation.

Murphy sees two reasons for evaluation. First, quoting Black (1978), he argues that "evaluation inevitable exists in any criticism" (919), so we should encourage that evaluation. Second, Murphy accepts an argument offered by Rosenfield (1968), "By requiring students to risk evaluation, we automatically ask them to argue in support of that evaluation" (919). Unfortunately, under current practices, students in CA are confined "to a statement indicating that this speech fulfilled the criteria set down by a renowned critic and thus won wide applause" (Murphy 919-920). Even worse, these claims flow from the methodology that is being used, not from the speech.

As a result of this lack of evaluation and the over-reliance on the method, the student is merely classifying. Murphy claims that the students are making no inferential leaps. "Students are not evaluating, they are doing 'cookie-cutter' analysis with no careful contextual analysis" (Murphy 920). By "cookie-cutter", Murphy is referring to an analysis that is more concerned with finding out if all the speech really fits the method being used.

Murphy's solution for CA is that it become "social criticism" (918). Adopting Campbell's (1974) view of criticism, Murphy
would have the critic analyze the communication act in such a way that a general audience would be served by the critique. In effect, Murphy would like to see rhetorical critics shift their emphasis away from theory. Instead, he would like rhetorical criticism to function in much the same way that an editorial does in the newspaper. The critic should select socially relevant and recent rhetorical acts with the aim of exposing fallacious rhetoric and praising good rhetoric.

Murphy argues that there are four problems with the present bent in CA. First, the time limit is only ten minutes. A student is hard pressed to do in 10 minutes what an article in QJS can do in 20 pages. Second CA is a competitive speech event. "Stylistically, it must be different from a scholarly article in the QJS" (922). Third, a contribution to rhetorical theory requires a skilled critic, while undergraduates are competing in CA. Fourth, Murphy notes that students who want to win in CA focus on their methodology at the expense of their new analysis.

By changing the focus from method to the actual communication act, Murphy claims four advantages. First, by reducing the import of the method, the time limit is less problematic. Second, by looking more at the "real world", the event is more educational. Third, social criticism would permit better teaching of argument. And finally, social criticism would broaden the focus of the event.

Looking at all of the research as a whole, some commonalities appear. First, Logue (1981) noted that topic significance
was important and criticized CA's shallow analysis. Larson and O'Rourke (1983), McGee (1983), and Murphy (1983) all argue that the topic should be significant. The same authors also agree on the presence of shallow analysis in most CAs. McGee's (1983) claim of "uncertainty" in CA due to coaches and student's inexperience with rhetoric is reflected by Larson and O'Rourke's (1983) findings that indicate that there is no clear purpose for CA. This is further substantiated by the poor grade CA received for achieving its purpose (Larson and O'Rourke, 1983).

But while there is some agreement among these authors, more research needs to be done before CA can shed its problematic image. The attitudinal research is troublesome primarily because Larson and O'Rourke (1981, 1983) do not demonstrate any link between the expressed attitudes about what is a good CA, and what actually is a good CA. Their work is based on the assumption that judges use the same criteria in judging CAs that they say they do. The very real possibility exists that judges vote on the basis of something that is not written on the ballot. For example, a judge could react to a competitor's reputation. If so, it is doubtful that a judge would indicate that on the ballot.

The argumentative research avoids the problem of analyzing attitudes. Logue's (1981) study actually looks at the behavior exhibited. But two problems exist. First, the study was of only one year's finals. Was the 1981 final a representative example
of all CA finals? We have no way of knowing this from Logue's work. Second, Logue was looking at the CAs from an argumentative perspective alone. That is not the sole criterion for judging CA. Logue's points about CA as argument are interesting, but they are irrelevant to a study of CA as a forensics event.

With the opinion work, problems are clearly delineated, but useful solutions are found wanting. McGee (1981) is correct in lamenting the general lack of expertise in rhetoric in coaches and competitors. But the likelihood that a coach will make the effort to become an expert in rhetoric purely for the sake of one forensics event is nil. With other responsibilities, a coach (who is normally an instructor as well) just does not have the time nor reasons to devote energy to the extra study of rhetoric. The undergraduate student is not likely to be an expert in rhetoric either. Like McGee, Murphy (1983) presents a compelling criticism of CA. However, despite Murphy's argument for changing the focus of CA, the event is presently operating under its old rules. Unless a coach or student is willing to forego the current trend in CA, Murphy's article is of no value to participants.

One point is consistent within all of the literature; CA has problems. As a result, suggestions for future CA practices encourage avoiding the problems of the past. But, if competitors are not to make mistakes, what are they to do? Nobody really offers firm advice in this area. We know what is wrong with CA, but what is right with it? I would have us focus on what we are
doing right in CA. Then we can not tell students not only what not to do, but also what to do. This study will analyze successful CAs and determine the characteristics and strategies that make them successful.

There are two justifications for this study. First, set down in an orderly fashion, the characteristics and strategies of a competent and competitive CA can increase the quality of present speeches. As documented (Gaske, 1981; Larson and O'Rourke, 1983; McGee, 1983), there is a dearth of literature on CA. By presenting exactly what is a good CA, coaches and students will have a model on which to base their efforts. They will know what a good CA should look like. While the guidelines will not automatically give coaches and students the requisite knowledge of rhetoric for CA, they will erase some of the "uncertainty" that McGee (1983) sees as characterizing the event.

Second, this research will also balance our vision of CA. Current literature easily tells us what is wrong with the event. This study can tell us what is right with CA. At present, it is too easy to look at the negative criticism of CA and concede that the event is in bad shape, but this is a case of selective perception. Nobody has made a real effort to look at the positive side of CA. When critics claim that CA is in trouble, we should ask compared to what? An ideal version of CA? If this is the case, problems can always be found.
So a guideline would be useful in putting our view of CA in perspective and in providing a text for the coach and competitor. Presently neither is in existence.

And until the forensics community knows what makes a competitive CA, it will continue to avoid the event. Avoiding the event is an educational sacrifice. To get the most out of CA, the qualities that make a good CA need to be delineated. The purpose of this study will be to delineate such qualities.
CHAPTER 2

Methodology

This study will first look at the rhetorical environment of forensic competition for CA. With this perspective in mind, successful CAs will then be examined to see whether they are rhetorical criticisms and why they are successful CAs. The speeches and their placings used for this study are:

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Competition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sam Marcosson</td>
<td>Bradley University</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>AFA 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie Goodlick</td>
<td>Illinois State University</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>AFA 4 NFA 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Marcosson</td>
<td>Bradley University</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>AFA 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Murphy</td>
<td>Bradley University</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>NFA 6 Iowa 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy Heaton</td>
<td>Bradley University</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>AFA 1 NFA 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Marcosson</td>
<td>Bradley University</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>AFA 1 NFA 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Sudhoff</td>
<td>Bradley University</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>AFA 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cham Ferguson</td>
<td>Kansas State University</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>AFA 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd Rasmusson</td>
<td>Iowa State University</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>OSR-TKA 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Sudhoff</td>
<td>Bradley University</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>NFA 1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The rationale for using these specific CAs as data is based on the expected quality attributed to a national finalist or to the winner of the Iowa tournament. Since these CAs are winners, they represent the best speeches at the time they were in competition. While the speeches are not perfect, they are the best CAs that forensics has to offer. For national finalist, the speeches had to qualify for nationals and survive the pre-lim and initial elimination rounds at nationals. The normal pressure and scrutiny of an invitational tournament is increased at nationals. Nationals has judges and critics from across the nation. Problems of local biases that potentially plague the Larson and O'Rourke (1983) study can be avoided.

CAs winning the Iowa tournament were selected because of the emphasis that Iowa places on the event. Iowa has a specific trophy for CA, the "Donald Bryant Memorial" trophy. Finals judges are selected from rhetoric scholars from the highly respected Iowa program. No other tournament to my knowledge places the importance on CA that the Iowa tournament does.

The actual speeches chosen were selected simply because they were available. Either I already had a copy of a speech, or I was able to contact the students who provided me with a copy of their CA. This sample represents the total number of people who were willing to provide speeches.

Before these speeches are specifically analyzed, the context in which they are delivered needs to be examined. Outside of the
actual rules for the event, no specific article or paper attempts to set down the environment of competitive forensics. To understand CA, a coach or student needs to understand its context. As Simons (1978) argues, "Rhetoric as a pragmatic, adaptive art, is highly constrained by purpose and situation" (41). To understand the effects of the purpose and situation on CA, Bitzer's (1968) "Rhetorical Situations" will be used. Bitzer was the first to discuss the rhetorical situation and greatly influenced Simons (Bormann, 1980, 211).

Bitzer's (1968) basic position is that rhetors do not create rhetoric as an action, but as a reaction to a specific situation, called a rhetorical situation, which he defines as:

"... a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence" (386).

There are three key terms to understand within any rhetorical situation: exigence, audience, and constraints. The exigence is the problem that initiates the situation. It is the exigence that the rhetor hopes to alleviate with a speech. Bitzer calls an exigence "an imperfection marked by urgency" (386). To be rhetorical exigence, the exigence must be solvable by discourse, otherwise it is not rhetorical.

By audience, Bitzer does not mean anyone who hears a speech, but specifically that portion of the audience that can solve the
exigence. For example, a politician is heard by many during a campaign, but only those who are registered voters can be the rhetorical audience. With every exigence and audience, a rhetorical situation also contains a set of constraints: the people, events, objects, and relations which may hinder a speaker in a given situation. For example, a president asking for a tax increase is going to be constrained by the public's general distaste for such measures. The constraints represent roadblocks for the rhetor.

In every rhetorical situation, a rhetor must confront the exigence. The constraints need to be removed or circumvented. Then the audience will hopefully modify the exigence in the appropriate manner. Each rhetorical situation has an appropriate fitting response. "One might say metaphorically that every situation prescribes its fitting response; the rhetor may or may not read the prescription accurately" (Bitzer, 390).

To analyze whether CAs are rhetorical criticisms, I will use the criteria developed by Brockriede (1974). Brockriede's position is that all rhetorical criticism should function as argument. By argument, he means the process a person engages in as he/she reasons his/her way from one idea to the choice of another idea. This concept implies five generic characteristics:

1. an inferential leap from existing beliefs to the adoption of a new belief or the reinforcement of an old one;
2. a perceived rationale to justify the leap;
3. a choice among two or more competing claims;
4. a regulation of uncertainty in relation to the selectec claim--since someone has made an
inferential leap, certainty can be neither zero nor total; and (5) a willingness to risk a confrontation of that claim with one's peers (166).

Rather than seeing a rhetorical criticism as being either argument or not an argument, Brockriede argues that "this definition implies an argument-nonargument continuum" (166). For example, making a statement that a speech was successful without presenting any reason is closer to the nonargument end of the continuum. While the criticism makes a claim and is presented in a forum, it does not provide a rationale; it does not justify the rationale nor regulate uncertainty. This is why Brockriede writes "any concrete rhetorical experience may embody these characteristics in varying degrees" (166). To make an argument, critics must say why they evaluated a rhetorical experience as they did.

Brockriede breaks down rhetorical criticism into three categories. They are description, classification, and explanation. The first two, description and classification, are seen as being closer to the nonargument end of the continuum. Since description does not make an inferential leap, nor does it provide any justification for a leap, the reader or audience has no question of choice about regulating uncertainty. Description can only serve as an argument if the critic draws conclusions from the data. Classification is rarely an argument because the critic is blindly applying bits of data to appropriate cubby holes. Brockriede makes it clear that he has no objections to categories. "No critic can manage without some categories in his head" (Brockriede, 170).
Brockriede's objection is to critics who use categories slavishly. The problem lies with critics who are "determined to force a concrete rhetorical experience into the confines of a closed system, a system that is closed because the critic will not allow himself to discover or create new categories while in the process of his analysis" (170).

There are at least five reasons why a category system tends to be nonargument. First, there is no inferential leap. Second a priori selection of a category system provides little if any rationale. Third, because of this, there is not much regulation of uncertainty. Fourth, the critic is taking only a small risk of confrontation. Finally, the critic is failing to answer the so-what question. A speech may use ethos, logos, and pathos, but why is that important? No answer is provided by a classification criticism.

The style of analysis favored by Brockriede is explanation. Explanation avoids the pitfalls of description and classification. The critic is comparing the rhetorical experience to a more general concept, so that the critic is not just describing. The critic also looks at the data and potential methodologies before analysis. Effort is given to selecting an appropriate method so that the critic is not making an a priori decision toward a particular category system. Then doing the actual analysis, the critic who attempts to explain is not using the category system as a passive receptable. The critic is making active use of both data and method.
One significant advantage to criticism by explanation is "a better understanding of rhetoric itself" (Brockriede, 171). When rhetorical criticism is practiced as argument, it fulfills one of two functions. It serves to "validate the present concepts or to discover new ones" (Brockriede, 171). A critic who validates is supporting a theoretical position or a generalization within a given theory. The criticism not only explains the rhetorical experience but substantiates theory as well. On the other hand, when the interpretation or explanation is not consistent with theory, the critic can rework and improve rhetorical theory. So a critic can corroborate or improve existing theory as well as analyze rhetoric.

As a result, Brockriede feels that "critics who argue are more useful than critics who do not" (173). First, significant arguments are more informative than nonarguments. And more importantly, "when a critic assumes the responsibility and risk of advancing a significant argument about his evaluation or explanation, he invites confrontation that may begin or continue a process enhancing an understanding of a rhetorical experience or of rhetoric" (Brockriede, 174).

Brockriede will be used because his essay has served as the common criteria for prior claims that CA is not rhetorical criticism (Logue, 1981; Murphy, 1983). Brockriede can be used to settle that claim based on the CAs to be examined. Other critics agree on Brockriede's standards for judging just what is rhetorical criticism (Benoit, 1981; McGee, 1983). Also, since CA has been rated as the
second most argumentative event in individual events (Benoit, 1981), it is appropriate to use an argumentative perspective in judging the event. Another reason for using Brockriede (1974) is that his essay can be applied to any CA, no matter what the topic or methodology.

Finally the CAs will be examined using the criteria set down by McGee (1983). McGee initiates her argument by first noting that many coaches and students have a weak background in rhetoric and CA. Her essay then is an attempt to provide a guide in the composition of a good CA. This guide is based on McGee's experience as a national finalist in CA and her experience as a successful forensic coach. McGee also bases the guide on input that judges consistently put on CA ballots.

I selected McGee's criteria for this study for two reasons. First, McGee is an experienced veteran of forensics both as a competitor and a coach. While the criteria are opinion, they are educated opinion. Second, McGee's essay is the only source on how to write a CA. McGee is confident that if the criteria are followed, coaches and students will realize CA's values.

For organizational purposes, McGee divides her criteria into three sections, the introduction, the body, and the conclusion. For the introductory section, there are three broad criteria. First, as with any speech, there should be a good introduction. There should be a good attention getter, thesis sentence, and preview. Second, as suggested by others (Logue, 1981; Larson and O'Rourke, 1981, 1983), the significance of the rhetorical artifact must be stated. "In doing this, the student also generates
a 'need' which will hopefully be fulfilled by the application of the critical perspective" (McGee, 7). Finally, the methodology or critical perspective should be introduced. McGee cautions that justification of the method should be placed in the body of the speech.

There are five criteria for the body of the speech. First, the justification of the appropriateness of the methodology should be made. Without the justification, the "rhetorical criticism becomes little more than an experience in cookie-cutting" (McGee, 7). This suggestion is echoed by Larson and O'Rourke (1983) in their research. Second, the method should be explained. The appropriate vocabulary and source of the method should be offered. This too is recommended by Larson and O'Rourke (1983). Next, the speaker should indicate the rhetorical purposes of the topic. In other words, what was the speaker under scrutiny trying to do with her or his speech? This should be substantiated. Fourth, the method should be applied to the topic. The organization will be dependent upon the particular method of the analysis. Fifth, the speaker should assess the effectiveness of the speech. McGee makes it clear that the claim of effectiveness should be "supported as thoroughly as the other essential elements of the criticism" (8) and argues that this development can better be served in the body of the speech than in the conclusion. In demanding support, McGee is once more in agreement with the findings of Larson and O'Rourke (1983).

There are three criteria for the conclusion section. As with any speech, the speaker should synthesize the information presented.
Second, the significance of the topic and the justification of the method should be reiterated. Finally, the speaker should finish (with a statement which retains their attention while offering finality to the presentation") (McGee, 9).

The next chapter will first apply Bitzer (1968) to the rhetorical situation. Then each CA will be analyzed using Brockriede's (1974) and McGee's (1983) criteria. From this, the guidelines of what constitutes a good CA will be derived.
CHAPTER 3

Analysis and Results

This chapter will first establish the rhetorical situation facing a competitor in CA. Then the individual CAs will be analyzed with McGee's (1983) and Brockriede's (1974) criteria. From this analysis, the guidelines of what constitutes a competent CA will be established.

The rhetorical situation facing a competitor in CA is centered on the exigence. The contestant is trying to convince the judge that his/her CA deserves the top rank in the round. The judge or judges serve as the rhetorical audience. Completing the situation are the four constraints. The constraints are the judges, the methodology used in the CA, CA rules and the qualities of a CA identified by Larson and O'Rourke (1983). As this analysis progresses, a synopsis of each data CA can be found in Appendix A and the full text in Appendix B.

First, some judges' inexperience with rhetorical theory serves as a constraint. As McGee (1983) pointed out, many coaches are not well versed in rhetorical theory. On the other hand, it is not uncommon for a tournament to ask the local professors of rhetoric to judge CA finals. So in the course of a tournament, a student may address an audience that runs the gamut from inexperienced to
expert. The student then needs to write the CA in a way that, on the one hand, does not appear shallow, yet on the other hand, does not appear so sophisticated that it talks over the head of a less experienced judge.

Second, the judge may present a bias in regard to what is an acceptable method or topic. Larson and O'Rourke (1983) have found that some judges prefer specific schools of thought in methods. This reflects the present state of uncertainty in rhetorical theory. As Black (1965), Campbell (1970) and Scott and Brock (1972) all argue, there is no one accepted theoretical paradigm for rhetoric. As coaches are taught rhetorical theory, they are being educated in a particular school of thought. This can be reflected as a methodology bias.

The situation of uncertainty in rhetoric also creates a bias as to what is rhetorical or not. As Berg (1972) observes, only discourse is universally accepted as being rhetorical. Depending on the theoretical school, art, movies and architecture may or may not be rhetorical. So, dependent on the judge's rhetorical philosophy, the topic of a CA may or may not be considered rhetorical. The only topics that can be assured of acceptance or speeches.

The methodology within the CA is the second major set of constraints. Logue (1981) found that the uniqueness of the method appears to be a factor in winning. Logue anticipated that CAs would use the methodologies of the major theorists such as Burke and Aristotle. Instead, lesser known methodologies were used. However, a difficulty arises in this research. Even though the
field of rhetoric is fragmented, most methods do belong to a particular school of thought. So even if a methodology is attributed to someone else, it may still be Burkeian or Aristotelian.

The question of uniqueness will have to be defined operationally. Rosenfield (1968) notes that a critical theory will encompass four "gross variables" (58). The variables are the source(s) or creator(s) of communication, the message of the communication, the context or environment of the communication and the critic him/herself. Rosenfield refers to these variables as SMEC for Source, Message, Environment, and Critic. When a theorist like Burke or Aristotle arrives at a theory of rhetoric, the theory has specific interpretations about the whole SMEC interaction. However, a unique method would only concern itself with one or two specific variables. Based on its foundation, the unique method assumes a prior understanding of the remaining variables. A unique method is a specific method in that it limits its scope of analysis to a particular SMEC variable.

The data CAs demonstrate this specificity. Marcosson's analysis of South Africa's racism is conducted using a power maintenance theory. The theory is Burkeian in nature and is Message centered. Goodlick's analysis of Phyllis Schlafly also relies on a Burkeian or dramaturgical theory, fantasy analysis. Again, the emphasis is on the Message. Marcosson's third CA uses a neo-Aristotelian method concerned with delivery. The analysis is centered on the Message. Murphy and Heaton both analyze different speeches by President Ronald Reagan. Both CAs focus on the Message with theories that are Burkeian. Murphy uses the Quest Story and Heaton uses the strategies identified
by Murray Edelman. Marcosson's third CA looks at how Lyndon Johnson tried to justify the Viet Nam war. The analysis used the theories of how a president tries to justify war. The analysis was Message centered and dramaturgical. Sudhoff's CA on Jimmy Carter used apologia, which is Message centered. The method is also dramaturgical in lineage. Ferguson's CA looked at beer commercials and used two methods. The first looked at American values in persuasion. This was a neo-Aristotelian theory. The second method looked at how images are manipulated. This theory is Burkeian in nature. But both methods are Message centered. Rasmuson's CA is the unique speech. Rasmuson analyzed the whole S-M-E relationship of Paul "Bear" Bryant with a fantasy theme and a minor concept of Burke's. This is the only CA that really focused on more than one variable. Finally, Sudhoff's last CA used a neo-Aristotelian theory about diplomatic rhetoric to analyze the Message in a John Kennedy speech.

This is not to say that a unique method cannot concern itself at all with any other variable. What this is saying is that a unique method focuses primarily on one variable in the SMEC interaction. To a certain degree, all of the variables need to be addressed. However, for forensics, it seems that a method should concern itself with one primary variable to be unique.

Another constraint applicable to the method is the question of time. Since a CA can last no longer than ten minutes, how long it takes to explain the method is an important consideration. All other things being equal, a CA would be better off with a concise
method. By concise method, the author means one that is quickly explained. The concise method would allow the competitor to spend more time on the actual analysis.

Along with the judges and the methods, the third major set of constraints is the rules for CA. While the National Forensics Association (NFA) and American Forensics Association (AFA) rules vary slightly, for the most part they are similar. The only significant difference is that the AFA rules allow for a broader range of topics. The NFA rules require a more traditional topic, primarily discourse. Otherwise, it is the rules for the event that prescribe the ten minute time limit and that the speech have some sort of method. As Murphy (1983) notes, the rules do not specifically ask for evaluation. In many ways, it is assumed that a CA will resemble an academic criticism in form (Murphy, 1983).

But, because the rules do not make a distinction between a CA and a rhetorical criticism, those differences should be made clear. First, a rhetorical criticism is written to be read. A CA is written to be spoken. Both Larson and O'Rourke (1983) and Murphy (1983) make this point. Campbell (1982) clearly makes the distinction between oral and written style:

> Oral style must be more redundant. Because you can re-read material and pause to think between paragraphs, a writer need not repeat and restate. But listeners do not have such options. As a result, successful speaking requires internal summaries, transitions connecting ideas, repetition of major steps in the argument and the like. Such redundancy increases both comprehension and impact for listeners (263).
A competitor cannot get as much information out in the same space as the writer of a rhetorical criticism. Combine this with CA's time limit and it is easy to see how the level of analysis between a CA and a rhetorical criticism can differ.

There is a difference in the quality of analysis in a CA and a rhetorical criticism. The CA is operating under the restriction of an oral style and a time limit. Analysis will be more superficial than in a rhetorical criticism. The time limit may be the underlying reason for the judges' complaints of shallow analysis in CAs (Logue, 1981; Larson and O'Rourke, 1983).

Finally, the audience analysis required for a CA differs from that in a rhetorical criticism. As discussed earlier, judges fall into various categories. "Competitors in communication analysis have to confront the problem of adapting to a changing audience where authors of criticism papers do not have to worry about this requirement as much" (Larson and O'Rourke, 1983, 7).

The last general set of constraints is the recommendations that Larson and O'Rourke (1983) made on the basis of their research. These serve as constraints because they are expected by judges. Judges want the recommendations fulfilled as one part of the desired response to the rhetorical situation. Judges expect the methods to be justified, explained, and used properly. The CA must exhibit clear, critical thinking and be fully documented. Since these points are covered well by McGee's (1983) criteria, they will be dealt with when McGee's essay is used.
Of Brockriede's five criteria for an argument, the fifth is clearly met by all the data CAs. Brockriede states that an argument must be presented for public scrutiny. Since an argument existing in a vacuum is useless, Brockriede would have the rhetorical critic share and defend his/her views with others. Since all of the CAs were presented in competition, they are consistently evaluated by peers. To avoid needless redundancy, this fifth criterion will not be acknowledged for all of the CAs.

The first CA to be analyzed is Sam Marcosson's criticism of South Africa's apartheid. Marcosson examines how the white government rhetorically maintains its power. The method for the CA is Andrew King's theory of power maintenance. King outlines the verbal strategies that groups in power use to rebuff challenges. This CA specifically examines how the strategies of definition, "cry anarchy" and "co-optation" are used.

With definition, the power group attempts to define the rules of the challenge in such a way that favors the status quo. In South Africa, Marcosson demonstrates that the problem is not represented as multi-racial, but as multi-national. Also, the right to power is defined as whoever was in South Africa first (the whites), instead of by majority.

When the status quo represents the challengers as potentially creating chaos, this is the strategy of crying anarchy. The white government depicts any black rule as leading to riots and civil war.
Finally, co-optation is when ground is given to the challenging group in a way that does not involve a real loss in power. South Africa did this by creating supposedly independent homelands for the blacks. However, the homelands are still under South African rules while depriving the blacks of South African citizenship.

Marcosson's specific claim is that the South African white dominated government is partially maintaining its power with their rhetorical strategies. The rationale for this claim is the insight provided by King's theory of power maintenance. Since power maintenance focuses on how the status quo stays in power and that is the whole point to the analysis, there is a perceivable rationale for the central claim.

The third criteria is that a choice be represented among two or more competing claims. This is to deter obvious statements being represented as arguments. Moreover, this criteria forbids a critic from assuming absolute certainty in his/her claim. For Marcosson's CA, the choice is at best implied. Marcosson states, "How the government is holding to power is a classic example of the rhetoric of power maintenance as outlined by Andrew King." While this claim does not dismiss the use of force to maintain white rule, it also does not acknowledge the possible use of force.

However, in application of King's theory, Marcosson does present a degree of choice. Instead of forcing all of the strategies of power maintenance into the analysis, Marcosson acknowledges that only three are used. To that extent, Marcosson provides a
choice in that while power maintenance strategies are used, not all strategies are present. An argument for the specific strategies becomes apparent.

The regulation of uncertainty is the execution of the argument. Does the critic back up the claim? To support the claim of definition, Marcosson demonstrates the definition of the problem as multi-national and the definition of the right to power on the basis of who was in South Africa first. The cry anarchy strategy was demonstrated by official references to violence in Tanzania and Mozambique and civil war in Angola. For co-optation, Marcosson identified the creation of black workers' unions and the black homelands. In both cases, substantive gains for blacks were not present. To this point, there is an attempt to prove the presence of the strategies.

The regulation of uncertainty is continued with the argument of effectiveness. First, the fact that power maintenance was successful is argued by pointing out that the white government is still in power. For each strategy, specific arguments of success are made. With definition, the lack of violence was seen as a sign of success. Specifically, Rhodesia dealt with their problems as multi-racial, and had violence. South Africa has had virtually no violence due to its "multi-national" problem. To an extent, cry anarchy has been successful since some tribal chieftans have accepted the homeland proposals. Co-optation's success was demonstrated by acceptance of rank-and-file South African whites and by evoking "excitement among South African blacks" for the changes.
As an argument, this CA has problems only with the third criteria with a choice among claims. On the basis of these criteria, the CA moves closer to the argument end of the continuum. This CA then serves as a rhetorical criticism.

With this established, an analysis of the CA as a competitive speech is in order. McGee's (1983) first requirement of a CA is the normal introduction requirements. Marcosson started the speech with an analogy to a Star Trek television show episode. Two men from a racially strife torn world are determined to kill each other. Marcosson used them to point to the problems that face South Africa. This introduction idea works first to establish an accepted comment on bigotry and then to transfer that comment to South Africa. The introduction analogy serves to create a justification for and need to analyze the topic. The power and clarity of the thesis statement are negated by the fact that the thesis is in two sentences, "The South African whites, now isolated from the rest of the world are clinging tenaciously to power. How the government is holding to power is a classic example of the rhetoric of power maintenance outlined by Andrew King." One definite weakness is the lack of a preview.

Marcosson established the significance of his topic by pointing out the power discrepancy in South Africa (4½ million whites control 18½ million blacks). Pointing out the strategic location and mineral wealth of the country also gives the CA significance. Plus, he noted the educational gains to be made from this analysis.
The method is introduced and explained in the introduction. The speech is clear and is easy to follow at all times.

The three things that McGee (1983) wishes the body to start with, justification of method, the explanation of the method and the explanation of the rhetor's objective, were all clearly in the introduction or in the ambiguous area between introduction and body. All of these considerations were clearly presented and easy to understand. The analysis and discussion of effectiveness were well supported with four outside sources and three examples.

In the conclusion, Marcosson chose to forsake a summary and instead pointed to the future. Since this is an ongoing rhetorical act, it appears that to look back on it as being over is inappropriate. But Marcosson's conclusion is excellent in that it makes a comment and ties back in with the introduction. Marcosson noticed how the two men from the Star Trek show returned to find their planet destroyed because of the racial wars. Marcosson then asked if this is the fate that faces South Africa unless they can solve their problems. The essentials of a CA were all present.

The next CA is Julie Goodlick's analysis of Phyllis Schlafly's speech delivered October 8, 1976 to Executive Council members of the Eagle Forum. Goodlick examines how Schlafly spread her anti-era message to fellow believers. The method for the analysis is Ernest Bormann's fantasy theme analysis. Bormann outlines the rhetorical function of fantasy for an audience. A given fantasy or vision is used to acculturate people into a rhetor's group or
movement. A rhetorical vision is an angle on events that makes sense out of them. It consists of one or more interpretations in which human beings, fictitious characters and/or supernatural forces enact behavior that explain why things happen.

A speaker will develop a fantasy theme that is central for the group. For Schlafly, this fantasy theme is the difference between the sexes. Women's "libbers" are seen negatively and traditional women are heroines. As this fantasy is chained out, the group should adopt a specific language. Again, the libbers are villains and the anti-ERA women are called positive women. Once the language has been adopted, group members are motivated to action. Schlafly urges her followers to devote a half-hour a day to saving the family, God, home, and country while stopping the ERA.

Goodlick's claim is that Phyllis Schlafly is the one responsible for motivating women to negate the ERA. Goodlick is then trying to explain how Schlafly gained their support. The rationale for this claim is Bormann's fantasy theme analysis. Since fantasy themes are presented to primarily believers, and since the Eagle Forum is a group developed by Schlafly, as Goodlick says, "This speech (was) well-suited for study via Ernest Bormann's Fantasy Theme Analysis."

The choice of competing claims is presented by not representing Schlafly as the single reason for the ERA's defeat. While citing Schlafly's effort as significant in stopping the ERA, Goodlick does not present Schlafly as the only reason the ERA failed.
The regulation of uncertainty begins with the selection of the speech to be analyzed. Goodlick picks the October 6th speech since it was typical of her speeches at the height of the ERA controversy and it served as the basis of the first chapter for her book, *The Power of the Positive Woman*.

Using examples from Schlafly's speech, Goodlick demonstrates the theme of libbers destroying traditionalism. Again, examples of the language to be used are indicated in the speech. However, if the followers are to adopt the language, in this case libbers as villain and positive women as hero, where is the proof? Nowhere does Goodlick demonstrate if this particular theme was picked up by the audience. It is not enough to demonstrate that a theme is used; it has to be chained out. So in this particular sense, the stopping of the ERA cannot be equated with the fantasy theme. Granted, women may have opposed the ERA, but why they did is not clear within this CA.

The argument in this CA serves as a description. While a rhetorical criticism can be descriptive, it serves its purpose better as an explanation. Since the explanatory function cannot be justified with this particular CA, the analysis is closer to the non-argument end of the continuum.

In terms of McGee's criteria, Goodlick's CA does not have a good introduction, but it is solid in the body. The introduction is not very interesting. Instead of trying to gain attention, the introduction appears to be a means of getting to the thesis. Simply put, the introduction says the ERA was introduced, met with
early success and has since faltered. Why? The answer is Phyllis Schlafly. While the introduction is sound with a clear thesis, it is not particularly interesting. Nor does Goodlick use a preview.

Goodlick made a very clear argument concerning McGee's call to justify the analysis. She used Schlafly's success as the justification for the analysis. Goodlick also gave a good argument as to why the particular speech of Schlafly's should be the one to look at. Essentially she argued that "Understanding the Difference" is a representative example of all of Schlafly's efforts. The speech used themes common to Schlafly and would later be the opening chapter to her book, *The Power of the Positive Woman*.

In the body, Goodlick did an excellent job of justifying the use of Bormann. The justification moved smoothly into the explanation of the analysis. As for the analysis, it was sound and clear, but could have easily been clearer. Goodlick's analysis took three steps: identify the fantasy theme, identify the specific language for the theme, and identify the eventual attitude change or rhetor's motivating plea. By simply saying that she was going to look at the themes, language and motivation of Schlafly, Goodlick could have solidified the organization of the analysis. Not that the organization was bad, but a simple use of labels would have been an improvement.

Since the CA used Schlafly's effectiveness as the rationale for the speech, there is not a discussion of the effectiveness in the body of the speech. There should have been some demonstrated link between the fantasy theme and the success. It would seem that if a competitor is using the effectiveness of a rhetor as the justification
for the CA, the student must prove that the success can be linked with the reasons for it from the analysis.

The conclusion manages to quickly summarize the CA. Goodlick noted that while the ERA was successful in its early stages, in recent years Schlafly and her followers have blunted that success. This ties in with the introduction. This not only summarizes well but it also reiterates the significance of the analysis. However, Goodlick ignored rejustifying the method. The concluding statement is solid as Goodlick notes that the silent majority "didn't stay silent for long." That conclusion says in effect that the anti-ERA movement won, and appreciating that victory is important. Except for the poor introduction and the omission of proof of the fantasy theme's involvement in stopping the ERA, Goodlick's CA fulfilled McGee's criteria.

The next CA to be analyzed is Sam Marcosson's critique of the 1976 Democratic Convention keynote speeches of John Glenn and Barbara Jordan. Marcosson examines how the message presentation of the speeches determined their success. The speeches were analyzed using Robert Oliver's rhetorical model, "Delivering the Persuasive Speech." Oliver discusses the conforming to audience expectations on three levels that leads to effective oratory.

Level one entails the speaker's and the audience's personalities. Marcosson asserts that Glenn came off as boring, and he misread the audience. On the other hand, Jordan was her expected, exciting self who recognized the convention audience for the pumped up crowd that it was.
Level two deals with the attitude that exists between the audience and the speaker. Ideally, the speaker solidifies a mutual attitude with the audience. Because he misread his audience, Glenn actually widened the attitude between himself and his audience. By fulfilling expectations, Jordan focused the attitude between the audience and herself.

Level three concerns the elements of the speech such as the voice, diction and the phrasing. Glenn was trite and uninspired while Jordan was described as being magic. Based on the analysis, it was argued that Glenn flopped and Jordan excelled due to their message presentation.

Marcosson's claim was that the crucial difference between Glenn's and Jordan's speeches was the way that the message was presented. Specifically Jordan delivered a wonderful speech and Glenn did not. This was reflected in their subsequent successes and failures.

The rationale for this is Oliver's model of delivering the persuasive speech. To the extent that the analysis is looking at message presentation, Oliver's model is germane. But, Marcosson offers no further reason for using Oliver's model. The CA does not supply the rationale for this specific method.

For the choice among competing claims, Marcosson acknowledged that there was more than one potential explanation for the reactions to the speeches. However, Marcosson did explain that the actual messages for both speeches were similar. So the crucial difference between the two speeches was the message presentation.
To regulate the uncertainty for the claim, Marcosson examined specific examples of each level of Oliver's model. First, Marcosson pointed out that Glenn knowingly gave a low key address. However, convention audiences are volatile crowds. Marcosson cited a Quarterly Journal of Speech article that pointed out that keynote address is expected to have grand phrases and excited tones. So Glenn failed to fulfill the criteria of the first level. Jordan, though, acknowledged the nature of her audience. Marcosson cited her use of partisan phrases and grand phrases.

For the second level, Marcosson noted that Jordan anticipated and took advantage of the audience's expectations. The audience realized that Jordan was a unique spokesperson, being black and female. Jordan played off of this by noting that the occasion was "special" and "different." Glenn failed to use the opportunity presented. Marcosson characterized Glenn's performance as a "wet firecracker" when "oratorical dynamite" was expected. Marcosson described Glenn's attitude as being like a lecturer, somberly teaching class.

For the third level, Marcosson noted that Jordan's vocal performance was equated to that of a Shakespearean actor by the New York Times. Time called the speech a "classic." Again, Glenn was seen as "monotone" and "amateurish." Marcosson cited an article in The Forensic calling the speech "trite, unimaginative, lacking in style and imagery, lackluster in delivery and deadly dull." Marcosson made convincing arguments for each part of the analysis.
To support the impact of the speeches, Marcosson noted the different fate of the two politicians. Jordan was being touted as a Supreme Court Justice, and Glenn was no longer mentioned as a potential running mate for Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter. Carter aide Hamilton Jordan was cited by Marcosson as squelching any Glenn-for-Vice-President talk.

Marcosson's CA successfully employs all but one of Brockriede's criteria. The analysis needed to justify the selection of the method more. With what the speech presents as a rationale for the claim, it is difficult to determine if Oliver's model is appropriate or was an a priori selection. To that extent, the CA should be placed on the non-argument end of the continuum.

Marcosson's CA was a well-written analysis. Of all McGee's criteria, the lack of method justification is the only one really omitted. And even then, by his phrasing, Marcosson gave the impression that he did indeed justify the method. In effect, Marcosson said, "... and so it is appropriate to use Oliver's model." He then explains Oliver's approach. This gives the impression that the explanation is also the justification. But a closer reading of the explanation does not bear this out.

Otherwise, the CA is a well-written speech. The introduction is interesting with the parallelism of Glenn's "high" as an astronaut and "low" as a speaker. The thesis is clear, and Marcosson offered a sound theoretical reason to hear the speech. He pointed out the opportunity to learn by comparing successful
and unsuccessful like speeches. He then added credence to this claim by noting that this is exactly what Campbell and Jamieson (1978) say to do with the Glenn and Jordan speeches in their book, *Form and Genre*. A need to do the analysis is generated, and the method is introduced.

In the body of the speech, the method is clearly explained. Marcosson also took the time to have labels for each part of the analysis. As mentioned before with the Goodlick CA, the method labels help make the organization more concrete and observable. The discussion of effectiveness is especially good. For example, Marcosson uses five separate sources to verify his claims. The entire CA was well documented. Except for why the method was appropriate, no single assertion was left unsupported.

As for the conclusion, the last comment regarding Glenn's failure makes for a nice transition to the ending. The conclusion is concise and ties back into the introduction. Marcosson observed that after the reaction to his speech, Glenn probably wished that he were back up in space listening to Jordan giving a speech. Marcosson made the whole point of his CA with that ending.

The next CA is John Murphy's analysis of Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential nomination acceptance address. Murphy examined how Reagan became a legitimate presidential candidate in 1980. The method was Herman Steltzner's Quest Story Theory. Steltzner explains how a rhetor can portray his/her cause as a quest. Five qualities of a quest must be met.
First, a prized object exists to be obtained. For Reagan, this prized object was making America great again. Second, there is a long journey to find the prized object. Reagan incorporates the American march over time since the Revolution as the long journey. Third, a hero exists. As would be expected, Reagan is the hero. Fourth, the guardians are overcome before the prized object can be realized. The guardians, or villains, were the Democratic leaders in the White House and in the Congress. Finally, the hero needs helpers to get the prized object. Reagan asked for the American people to be his helpers. Because of this approach, Reagan was nominated and won the 1980 election.

Murphy has two claims within the CA. First, Murphy argues that the nomination acceptance address can serve as a representative example for a particular candidate. Second, Murphy's argument is that Reagan's emergence as a president, after being considered washed up, is in part due to his quest rhetoric. The rationale for the first claim is that candidates tend to use their best appeals from the campaign within the nomination acceptance. Murphy cites evidence for this from the Central States Speech Journal. Moreover, Time made the same observation about Reagan's address. The rationale for the second claim is the Quest Story Theory. Murphy justifies this rationale by noting Reagan's strong personal identification with his message. This indicates the hero role. The quest and prized object were indicated by Reagan's call for "a great national crusade."
For the question of choice among competing claims, Murphy indicates that Reagan was not successful only because of his rhetoric. Murphy only wanted to examine the rhetoric of Reagan in his hour of victory. Murphy said, "... we must wonder what rhetorical strategies Reagan used." So Murphy granted the possibility that other factors could have been present that helped Reagan to victory.

To regulate the uncertainty, specific examples for each part of the quest story are drawn from the address. Murphy noted that Reagan set up the prized object by reviewing America's apparent downfall, "... grave threats to our very existence." Based on this, Reagan located and defined our "new beginning" as the prized object.

By reviewing our revolution, Abe Lincoln, and now Ronald eagan, Reagan associates the quest with the country's march through time. That, and the phrase, "the time is now," indicate the culmination of the long journey.

While Reagan is obviously the hero, it is not as simple as that. There are two types of heroes. One has a "superior aura." Reagan noted that such heroes were Barry Goldwater and Franklin Roosevelt. Both wished to simplify government and, according to Reagan, they failed. Reagan was the second hero type, of the "concealed aura." Murphy noted that Time wrote that Reagan sounded as if "the thoughts had just occurred to him, and darn it, he was going to share them with his friends all over the country."

Reagan created a limited set of guardians. Murphy pointed out that only the Democratic presidential administration and
Congress were at fault in Reagan's quest. By saying, "Can anyone look at the record of the Administration and say well-done?" Reagan created specific guardians while leaving all others to be potential helpers.

And that is what Murphy indicated that Reagan did. Murphy said, "Ronald Reagan opens his ranks to all Americans." Murphy also noted that a former John F. Kennedy speechwriter, Theodore Sorensen, made the same appraisal of the address.

That the quest story was used effectively is partially supported by the fact that Reagan won the election. However, more indicative of the quest story's effectiveness is Murphy's observation of how George Bush described the outcome. Said Bush, "Even people who weren't enthusiastic about us at first are hoping for an awful lot." So despite the limited power of the presidency, it would seem that people expect a hero's performance from Reagan.

Brockriede writes that an argument can also become a significant argument when it presents some use beyond the immediate analysis. Murphy's analysis approaches a significant argument when he points out the future problems Reagan's quest story strategies may present. Murphy argues that by creating such high expectations, Reagan may be setting himself up for future failures.

Murphy's CA fulfills all the criteria and operates as a significant argument. The CA not only describes, but also explains Reagan's rhetorical effectiveness. The speech can be placed on the argument end of the continuum.
Murphy's CA conformed for the most part to McGee's criteria. The introduction sets up Reagan as the underdog who ultimately triumphed. By being sarcastic about those who called Reagan washed up, Murphy gave the introduction some bite. The thesis is not so much a statement, but a question. Murphy asked how Reagan made his comeback. Answering this is the whole point to the speech. As seems to be common in all of the prior CAs, no preview is used.

Murphy established the significance of the topic in two ways. First, as noted, Reagan had made a comeback. Murphy is interested in finding out how he did that. Second, Murphy narrowed the focus of the comeback bid by looking specifically at the nomination acceptance speech. As Murphy noted, nomination speeches are claimed to be brief rhetorical summaries of a candidate's best appeals. So Murphy essentially argued that the campaign was important and the best way to look at it is to look at the nomination acceptance. Immediately following this, Murphy introduced and justified the method.

In the body of the speech, the method is explained by breaking down the quest story into its five elements. Murphy then took each element and delineated its counterpart in Reagan's speech. The analysis is complete in that it also explains why Reagan used each element as he did. For example, the guardians of the prized object are the "bad guys" and the helpers of the hero are the hero's supporters. Murphy noted that Reagan limited his guardian list to mainly the Carter administration. By having a short guardian
guardian list, Reagan could ask all Americans, Republicans and Democrats alike, to be his helpers. By taking that extra step to explain these things, Murphy made the analysis better.

Like Goodlick's CA, Murphy started off by granting that the CA's topic was successful. So the discussion of success is not really present. The end of the analysis is the end of the body of the speech. The conclusion serves to point to the future by its discussion of the implication of using the quest story. Doing the conclusion this way reiterated the significance of Murphy's topic. By implying that while Reagan's strategy caused a victory, Murphy also pointed out that this strategy could just as easily lead to his defeat in the long run. The conclusion ends well with Murphy making his final prediction that the potential political ramifications of the quest story could be devastating.

The next CA to be analyzed also deals with Ronald Reagan. Andy Heaton examined Reagan's July 27, 1981 television address for his tax plan. Heaton analyzed how Reagan created the message for the speech. The analytical tool that Heaton employed was the work of Murray Edelman. Edelman is concerned with the way our political process is influenced by the language strategies of our leaders. Heaton examined how Reagan's speech exhibited the strategies Edelman calls strategy, simplification, and ambiguity.

Strategy entails creating the impression that the leader has a plan. The leader knows what he/she is doing. Simplification is when a leader simplifies a complex situation to make it palatable to large numbers of people. Ambiguity is the use of
phrases that can have a variety of meanings. The idea is to use ambiguous phrases that everyone can interpret differently and accept or reject as the case may be. According to Heaton, Reagan used strategy by presenting his tax cut as a "carefully constructed plan." Plus he made it look as if the Democrats had no plan. Heaton argued that Reagan used simplification by making the tax cut a simple issue: you were either for or against it. A complex issue was set up in black and white. And finally, Reagan used ambiguity by using broad, patriotic appeals.

Heaton's claim was that Reagan's speech was effective due to the way the message was prepared. Heaton's point was that Reagan's impressive delivery style should not make us overlook the actual message construction. Edelman's theory served as the perceived rationale. The rationale is justified in two ways. First, Edelman is concerned with only political discourse's influence. Reagan's address is obviously political. Second, Edelman relied heavily on examples from presidents. As Heaton noted, this too suggests the suitability of Edelman to justify the claim.

Heaton did a very good job of fulfilling the criteria of choice among competing claims. First, Heaton does not deny Reagan's delivery skill. Heaton's point is that to "completely" appreciate Reagan's rhetoric, a critic should look at more than Reagan's delivery. Second, the analytical tool allows for a degree of choice. Heaton noted that "Edelman does not claim political rhetoric must contain these three elements (strategy, simplification
and ambiguity) to be successful." This means that the message does not have to be placed in cubbyholes that may not actually be present in the message.

To regulate the uncertainty, to execute the argument, Heaton relied mainly on examples from the speech and outside sources. To set up the initial claim, Heaton cited an article from the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* that substantiates the delivery claim. This set up Heaton's point that we must not overemphasize the delivery. To prove it was Reagan's skills at speech writing, Heaton cited an Associated Press article that explained Reagan relies little on speech writers.

For the strategy element, Heaton gave specific examples where Reagan portrayed his tax-cut as a plan, and the democratic option as lacking any strategy. Further proof came from a Chicago *Tribune* article that noted that Reagan came off as presenting a "comprehensive economic plan." However, not all of the arguments for simplification exist in fact. Heaton used three specific points to prove the existence of simplification. First, Reagan simplified his description of the all-savers plan. Second, Heaton noted how Reagan reduced the whole tax-cut question to a simple, "Well, are you fur 'em, or agin 'em?" Finally, Heaton quoted a *Newsweek* article describing Reagan as the best president at simplifying an issue since Harry Truman. While some sort of proof is offered for the last two arguments for simplification, only an unsupported assertion is the proof for the all-savers
example. There was no proof that the issue was more complicated than indicated in Reagan's speech.

With the last element, ambiguity, Heaton first demonstrated that Reagan extensively used terms like "renew the American spirit," "make America great again," and the "new beginning." Then Heaton explained how professors John Cragin and Donald Shields characterize such language as "safe political phrases." Heaton argued that these phrases fulfill the ambiguity criteria.

Finally, to demonstrate the impact of the message, Heaton first quoted former Jimmy Carter speechwriter, Hendrick Hertzberg. Hertzberg claimed that Reagan's speech would have been a success even read with a monotone. Second, to demonstrate the impact of the speech itself, Heaton noted that there was a tenfold increase in telegram traffic and Congress received twice its normal mail, most in favor of the tax-cut. Heaton also quoted two Congressional Representatives who attested to Reagan's effectiveness.

The only fault in Heaton's analysis was his failure to go beyond the assertion level with the all-savers argument. Otherwise, the rest of the criteria for an argument are made. Since the all-savers point is relatively insignificant, the CA should most definitely be placed near the argument end of the continuum and can be called a rhetorical criticism.

Heaton's CA was as good a speech as it was a rhetorical criticism. Heaton's introduction took advantage of a witty political jab by Tip O'Neill to garner audience attention. For the
thesis, it was clear that Heaton wished to prove that Reagan's speech was not only delivered well, but was also well written. Again, no preview is used. In justifying the significance of the topic, Heaton first points out that the speech was successful. But he also created a need to listen by saying that Reagan will continue to speak out on issues. To further understand future speeches, Heaton wants to look at what Reagan has been doing previously. Then, the method is introduced.

In the body of the speech, Heaton combined the justification of the method with its explanation. This works because in justifying it, Heaton had to explain it first. As discussed earlier, the analysis was organized and conducted properly. While the CA did not have a preview, Heaton did use the method strategy names for a means of forecasting and labeling throughout the speech. For example, the terms strategy, simplification and ambiguity are used as a means of signposting each section of the analysis. Finishing the body of the speech, Heaton demonstrated that Reagan's rhetoric was successful with four separate pieces of evidence.

The conclusion summarizes Heaton's point well. Heaton repeated that it was the key to Reagan's speech. By pointing to the future, the significance of the analysis is also re-established. The last line of the conclusion is an inside joke to forensic competitors. Since the joke applies to the CA and would be appreciated by forensic people, it ends the speech nicely.

The next CA to be analyzed is Sam Marcosson's examination of Lyndon Johnson's rhetoric concerning our entrance into the
Vietnam conflict. Marcosson examined how Johnson failed to justify the war to the American people. The method for the analysis was Robert Ivie's theory of how a president motivates a nation to war. Ivie maintains that a successful entry into war requires that the president fulfill four rhetorical criteria.

The four criteria must all be completed to successfully initiate a war. First, the President must identify an ideal. Second, a crisis, threatening the ideal, must be identified. Third, the President identifies a cause for the crisis. Finally, the President will have to propose war as the final option to solve the crisis. For Johnson, the ideal was freedom for South Vietnam. The crisis was aggression against South Vietnam caused by Communism and North Vietnam.

Marcosson's specific claim is that Johnson failed to successfully justify the Vietnam War because in setting up the first three criteria, Johnson prevented a successful fulfillment of the fourth criteria. The rationale is Ivie's theory. Ivie's approach is justified in that Ivie examines the Presidential justification of war, and as Marcosson stated, this is "precisely the rhetorical process in which Lyndon Johnson (is) engaged."

Marcosson acknowledged a certain degree of choice among claims. First, in the introduction, Marcosson states that Johnson's rhetoric "contributed greatly" to his problems with Vietnam. Note that Marcosson does not use Johnson's rhetoric, and rhetoric alone to explain Johnson's troubles. Second, Marcosson noted
that Johnson's failure was not only due to a poor justification of the war, but in his misrepresentation of the conflict as well. Marcosson's analysis acknowledged that Johnson's rhetoric was a prime factor, but not the only factor in the situation.

To justify the first part of the claim, Marcosson explained that over a two year period, Johnson used freedom as the ideal. In 1966, Johnson had 49 references to freedom in a February speech. Two years later, in reference to South Vietnam, Johnson said, "Its people maintain their determination to be free of domination by the North."

The crisis was aggression. Marcosson quoted F. M. Kail's book, *What Washington Said*, as making that point. A communist North Vietnam was the cause. Marcosson argued that Johnson set this up by presenting in a January 1966 address an idyllic South Vietnam attacked by a communist North Vietnam. In the same speech, Johnson had 12 references to this aggression.

Up to this point, Marcosson pointed out that Johnson was making a convincing plea. But, Johnson set the situation up where war was not an acceptable option. Marcosson noted two speeches where Johnson's position was that the main burden in Vietnam was on South Vietnam. But, Marcosson asks, if we were to have a limited role, "Why was the U.S. committing 500,000 young men, and billions of dollars a year, to the fight?" Marcosson noted that the early criticism and protest of the war was on such grounds. Marcosson cited such protests from Senator
William Fulbright, Arthur Schlesinger, and new left activist Carl Oglesby.

Marcosson's argument not only fulfilled Brockriede's criteria, but it moved in the direction of a significant argument as well. First, Marcosson made the argument that to a degree the analysis helps validate Ivie's theory. Second, it raised some questions as to the differences between a war and a "limited war" from a rhetorical sense. Since the argument presents some value beyond the immediate analysis, Marcosson's CA is definitely placed on the argument end of the continuum.

Using McGee's criteria the CA is well written. The introduction was a catchy bit from a Vietnam protest song which is not only interesting, but also reminds the audience of Johnson's failure, which sets up this analysis. While the thesis is clear, once more there is no preview. By linking Johnson's rhetoric with the public dissent over the Vietnam war and by projecting the possibility of learning more about presidential war rhetoric, Marcosson legitimized and justified the topic and the analysis. Right after this, the method is introduced.

The method is justified in the initial explanation of the theory. Immediately after this, Marcosson went into the details of the analytical tool. The analysis is backed up with specific examples and outside sources. For example, Marcosson argued that Johnson used freedom as a god term in his speeches on Vietnam. To back this up, he noted that in one speech alone, Johnson made
49 separate references to freedom. In another case, Marcosson uses F. M. Kail's book, What Washington Said, to back up a claim. The discussion of effectiveness was well reasoned. By showing how America reacted specifically to the final stage of Johnson's justification of the war, Marcosson could back up his ultimate claim. Moreover, by looking at two specific outside sources that support his point, Marcosson's claim is well supported.

The conclusions drawn by Marcosson not only summarized the speech, but they also lent some significance to the analysis. The concluding thought that we are a public that is becoming sophisticated enough to no longer senselessly condone a war is especially good. It praises the audience and condemns war. These last thoughts are likely to be seen positively by the critic.

The next CA to be analyzed is Steve Sudhoff's analysis of Jimmy Carter's defense of the "Billygate" scandal. Sudhoff centered on an August 4, 1980 press conference where Carter defended his administration's handling of Bill Carter's dealings with Libya. Sudhoff used B. L. Ware and Wil Linkugel's Theory of Apologia as his analytical tool. Apologia is a genre approach, analyzing how rhetors defend themselves.

Apologia centers on a defensive posture. Of the four possible postures, Sudhoff focused the analysis on the absolutive posture. An absolute posture is one seeking acquittal, a not guilty verdict. As for Carter, he was trying to explain that he was not guilty of any involvement with his brother's dealings with Libya. To do so, Carter would use two strategies, denial
and differentiation. Denial is simply that you deny that you did something. Differentiation is the separation of the charge from the actual behavior. A rhetor would say that he/she did actually do something, but that the act was not what it was represented to be. Carter denied any wrongdoing and differentiated his administration's behavior from the charge of incompetence.

Sudhoff's claim was that Carter was able to successfully maintain a hold on the Presidency due to his defense of the Billygate issue. Sudhoff's point was to explain how Carter made a successful defense. The rationale is the Apologia Theory. Since apologia is designed to study apologetic address, and Carter was making such an address, the use of apologia is warranted.

To a certain degree, on one level Sudhoff's CA presents no choice. It is obvious that Carter is trying to defend himself. The question of choice enters in when we ask how the defense was done. Ware and Linkugel offer a possibility of four explanations. To that extent, Sudhoff's CA offered a choice among four claims. Sudhoff argued for his one claim.

To regulate the uncertainty, to prove the claim, Sudhoff pulled pertinent examples from the press conference and outside sources. Sudhoff gave four separate examples of where Carter denied any wrongdoing. That this was successful, Sudhoff indicated by noting that newspaper headlines reflected Carter's innocence. Further proof of the denial success was offered by quoting from the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, opinion polls and the fact that a senate investigation was dropped.
For the issue of differentiation, Sudhoff first explained that Carter's administration was perceived as incompetent. So Carter had to separate the administration's actions from the issue of incompetence. Sudhoff noted that Carter first admitted to errors in handling Billygate, but errors from hurrying to get all the information public. Carter was claiming that a desire for honesty, not incompetence, was the issue. Plus Sudhoff quoted Carter arguing that history will find his administration competent. That differentiation was successful was indicated by Sudhoff noting that one expert claimed that Carter made the press look foolish. Indeed, one reporter even got complaints about his attitude toward the president. Further proof was given by opinion polls concerning Carter's 1980 candidacy.

To a degree, Sudhoff supposedly offers a significant argument by advancing the rhetorical theory. Sudhoff claimed that now apologia could be found in extemporaneous events like a press conference. However, nowhere do Ware and Likugel exclude extemporaneous address. So Sudhoff's extension of theory is actually non-existent.

However, despite that problem, the speech still acts as an argument. As such, it should be classified as a rhetorical criticism and placed on the argument end of the continuum.

In terms of McGee's criteria, Sudhoff's CA began in a very interesting and brilliant manner. It was interesting and attention getting in the use of humor. The example of the president's brother relieving himself on the White House lawn is funny. The
brilliance is displayed in how the speech creates a need. Sudhoff portrayed a Jimmy Carter who is down to his last straw. The crisis is at hand and Carter is going to have to save his career or face a massive defeat. Sudhoff pictured a man whose back is to the wall. It is only natural to wonder how he will react. And as Sudhoff put it, "Carter put on the show of his life." The need to know how this desperate underdog succeeded has been created. And in creating the need, the topic is then given significance. The thesis is clearly established when Sudhoff claimed that Carter won because of his excellent self defense. Prior to this, Sudhoff both introduced and justified the method. For once, a clear preview was used.

In the body of the speech, Sudhoff gave the needed specifics to understand apologia and applied the theory. Seven separate sources and examples were used to establish that Carter had indeed negated Billygate. Throughout the body, both the preview and the development of the analysis kept the CA organized.

The concluding section of the CA was an example of a bit of apparent brilliance and a bit of mediocrity. The brilliance came with the claim that this analysis extended Ware and Linkugel's theory. The assertion sounds brilliant on the surface and as far as it goes lends some extra stature to the CA. Unfortunately, the concluding paragraph is not as good. Essentially it says that in the long run Carter still lost since he was not re-elected. Not only is this irrelevant to the CA, it is a bland conclusion when compared to the triumphant upset created in the introduction.
The next CA to be analyzed is Cham Ferguson's examination of Miller Beer television advertisements. Ferguson looked at how Miller marketed its three main brands of beer, Miller Hi-Life, Lowenbrau, and Miller Lite. Ferguson used the work of Edward Steele and W. Charles Redding concerning the American Value System. In conjunction, Ferguson also used Walter R. Fisher's "A Motive View of Communication." Steele and Redding identified specific values that can serve as persuasive appeals to Americans. Fisher examined how an image may be manipulated in various persuasive ways.

For this analysis, Ferguson identified three different values. First, the Puritan morality value, which is an extension of the Puritan work ethic. Hard work is rewarded with economic success or impulse gratification. Second, the material comfort value, which is the idea that Americans like material comforts. Third, the macho male value, which is the idea that Americans like masculine, "macho" males.

Fisher's approach takes the stance that rhetors either affirm, reaffirm, subvert or purify an image. To affirm an image is to give birth to an image. To reaffirm is to revitalize an image. To attack an image is to subvert an image. Finally, purification is the correlation of an image. The ethos of the image is effected depending on the manipulation.

In the CA, Ferguson argued that the Miller Hi-Life ad used the Puritan morality value, and that the value was affirmed. For the Lowenbrau ad, the material value was reaffirmed. For the Lite
beer ad, light beer's "Diet Beer" image was purified by the use of the macho male value.

Ferguson's central claim is that Miller's ads helped make Miller the second biggest brewery in the U.S. The CA then attempted to explain how the ads worked. The rationale for the claim were Steele and Redding's and Fisher's theories. However, Ferguson offered no reason for the analytical tools. Why these particular methods were used was never stated. Obviously, this is a major problem with the CA.

The presentation of choice is evident in the CA. First, Ferguson acknowledged that the ads alone are not the only factor in Miller's success. Ferguson was intent on garnering "insight" into the issue, not a complete explanation of the success. Second, Steele and Redding's theory presents a wide range of choice. There are many values that underlie our culture, and so there are many choices for the criticism. The same holds true for Fisher's theory. A critic has four options within the theory. To this extent, a degree of choice is present within the CA.

To regulate the uncertainty, Ferguson demonstrated the presence of a particular value in each commercial. For the Miller Hi-Life commercial, Ferguson explained that by showing people rushing off from work to embrace a Miller Hi-Life, the Puritan morality value is evident. As Ferguson put it, "We are told that we have worked hard and it is time to have fun . . . . our reward has to be a Miller." Ferguson then argued that since the commercial was trying
to get the audience to adopt a new image for Miller Hi-Life, affirmation was present.

With the second commercial, Ferguson claimed that Lowenbrau was employing the material comfort value. Since the people in the commercial were obviously wealthy, Ferguson argued that Lowenbrau was being shown as a "money" beer. That Lowenbrau is offered to all is claimed to be an example of reaffirmation. Ferguson made the point that since we cannot all be rich, we can drink Lowenbrau. Therefore, the beer's image was reaffirmed. The image was tied to a wealth value.

The final analysis looked at a typical Lite Beer from Miller commercial. Ferguson first noted that light beers had never sold well as "diet" beers. Thus, the beer ads emphasized masculine, male athletes to overcome this effeminate image. Ferguson argued that the value present was a macho male value. While Steele and Redding never defined or indicated such a value, Ferguson pointed out that they never claimed that theirs was an exhaustive value list. Since the point of such macho commercials was to make a diet beer acceptable to males, Ferguson called the value manipulation an act of purification.

Ferguson then substantiated the point that the commercials were rhetorically powerful. First, Ferguson quotes Business Week, noting Miller's increase in market share. Second, Ferguson pointed out that this success was due to the commercials. Finally, Ferguson explained that the number one beer producer, Anheuser-Busch, "decided to fight fire with fire" and increase their ad budget in response.
While the impact of the commercials can be granted, the implied point to this CA cannot. There is no proof that the value manipulation contributed to the commercials' success. Since the CA is only descriptive, and has no perceived rationale due to the failure to justify the method, it does not operate as an argument. This CA should be placed on the non-argument end of the continuum.

An astute observer may question why such a poor argument could be fourth in the nation. Probably the best explanation is that Ferguson's CA is a very well written speech. Where substance faltered, style excelled.

McGee advises CAs to have an attention getting introduction. Ferguson's language choice in the introduction does this. For example, the image of sex leaps out when Ferguson says, "Everyone likes to be seduced." Now as it develops, he is not talking about sexual seduction, but that immediate shock value does grab attention. Humor and word play are the vehicles for the rest of the speech. For example, the transitions were funny as they drew on the speech's beer topic for their theme, "Our first order from our rhetorical barmaid will be a draw of Miller Hi-Life commercial."

The CA also followed the basics of McGee's criteria. It had a clear preview and organization. The speech clearly explained the method, conducted a superficially sound analysis and nicely argued discussion of effectiveness. All of this coupled with the creative language use kept the speech fun. Since the topic, beer commercials, is not quite as grave as war rhetoric or apartheid, Ferguson could get away with this light approach. Probably the best example
of this was in the conclusion. Summarizing the commercials and parading Miller Hi-Life's theme, Ferguson ended with, "So if you are into rowdy good times at the local bar, relaxing with friends, bowling with the buddies or just browsing through Aristotle, remember, if you've got the time, Miller's got the rhetoric." If nothing else, Ferguson's CA was a very well written speech.

The next CA to be analyzed is Todd Rasmuson's exploration of the mythic aspects of Paul "Bear" Bryant's life. Rasmuson claimed that Bryant, as a very successful football coach at the University of Alabama, served as a secular Christ figure for Alabama. Rasmuson's analytical tools were the works of Kenneth Burke and Ernest Bormann.

Burke is concerned with how our society adopts secular Christ figures. To serve as such a figure, Burke suggests that three criteria be fulfilled. First, there must be mutual beliefs between the rhetor and the audience. Second, the rhetor should exhibit strong leadership. Third, there must be an element of sacrifice from the rhetor.

Bormann, as explained with Goodlick’s CA, is concerned with how fantasy themes are spread among groups. For this analysis, Rasmuson was primarily concerned with the actual audiences of change.

Rasmuson claimed that Bryant evoked mutual beliefs with the people of Alabama by winning and being a Christian. Strong leadership was evinced by the fear and respect that coaches and players held for Bryant. Bryant's sacrifice was resigning as coach in 1982. The myth was spread by three audiences, the fans, the media, and Bryant's players.
Rasmuson's claim for the first half of the analysis is that Bryant served as a secular Christ figure for Alabama. The rationale for this claim is Burke's theory of what constitutes such a mythic figure. The method is justified by noting that it is Burke who "discusses the structure of a rhetorical myth." This is further reinforced when Rasmuson pointed out that it was Burke who introduced the rhetorical concept of a secular Christ.

Very little choice is offered within the CA. At no point did Rasmuson indicate any possibility that Bryant could have served any other role or myth for Alabama. Considering some of the problems within Rasmuson's argument, a choice of competing claims should have been offered.

In executing the argument, Rasmuson begins with the question of mutual beliefs. The mutual beliefs centered on Christianity. Rasmuson noted the constant allusions to Bryant as a Christ figure with jokes like "an Athiest in Alabama is someone who didn't believe in Bear Bryant." The Christianity link was reinforced when Rasmuson demonstrated how Bryant had a strong Christian background and how Bryant considered himself a preacher of sorts through football.

For strong leadership, Rasmuson relied heavily on anecdotes about Bryant's coaching style. First, Rasmuson noted two tales where it became clear that Bryant's players feared him and his coaches fanatically obeyed him. Further proof of Bryant's leadership was established by discussing how Bryant used his coaching tower. Several sources attested to how the tower let Bryant give
the impression of seeing everything going on at practices. The point is that Bryant appeared as an omnipresent God-like figure as a coach.

Rasmuson argued that retirement was Bryant's sacrifice. But, if that is so, how did Bryant operate as a secular Christ prior to 1982? This error within the argument seriously hurts the point of the CA. So while an attempt was made to regulate the uncertainty towards the claim, the flaw in the proof prevents the claim from being upheld.

At this point, the CA moved to the second half of the argument. The central claim was that Bryant's myth was chained out by Alabama fans, players, and the news media. Bormann's fantasy theme analysis was selected to serve as the rationale for the claim. Rasmuson's argument was that since Bormann discusses how myths are propagated, and the analysis was on such a phenomena, the method was appropriate for the CA.

Little choice was offered among competing claims. The CA made the assumption that Bryant's myth was spread, and that the fans, players, and media did all the spreading. To no degree were any of these points qualified. Considering the problems with the proof for the second half, such a tone of finality in the CA was not warranted.

First, Rasmuson claimed that Bryant propagated the myth through his players. The argument ran that since Alabama teams won, the myth was spread. However, to prove this point, Rasmuson recounts a story where Bryant remembered an old player and his girlfriend. This has nothing to do with winning. The story does not support
the claim. Second, the fans supposedly spread the myth. The argument was that Bryant's winning converted fans across the nation into believers. But that is it, no further substantiation was offered. Again, the claim is poorly supported. Third, Bryant's myth was spread by the media. This argument had support. Rasmuson noted that three-quarters of the audience at Bryant's retirement speech were reporters. It was also noted that there was coverage by TV, radio, magazines, and newspapers. To this extent, this particular claim was substantiated.

That Bryant was a Christ figure was claimed by Rasmuson based on how Bryant's successor, Dan Perkins, reacted. Since Perkins did not use Bryant's tower to coach, Rasmuson reasoned that Perkins did not want to try and replace "God." However, all that proved was that Perkins did not want to copy Bryant. That Bryant was a Christ figure cannot be established on the basis of this reasoning.

Because of the problems within this CA, it does not work well as an argument. The failure of the sacrifice argument and the weak arguments for how the myth was spread undermine the analysis. The lack of competing claims being acknowledged implies an a prior judgment. On the whole, the CA is on the non-argument end of the continuum.

By McGee's standards, Rasmuson's CA had a strong introduction. The humor of all the Bear Bryant jokes was an effective device. Since the humor revolved around Bryant's image, the point of the jokes was also an effective foreshadowing of the speech. The
thesis was clearly that Bryant's life had reached mythical levels. Once more, no preview was used. The rhetorical artifact, Bryant's life, was given significance by Bryant's powerful image. In turn, this created an unvoiced question as to how a football coach could have so much power. A need for the audience to care about the topic was therefore created. Following this, Rasmuson introduced the methods.

In the body, Rasmuson followed McGee's form twice. First, the use of Burke was justified, explained, applied and evaluated. Then the same thing was done using Bormann. Considering what Rasmuson was trying to do in the CA, this made sense. The Burke section had to be completed before the Bormann part of the analysis could take place.

Rasmuson saved the broader question of the overall impact of Bryant as a myth for the conclusion. Rasmuson indicated that the Bryant tradition still lives. Specifically, he pointed to the new Alabama coach, a Bryant disciple. Rasmuson noted that the new coach, Dan Perkins, was chaining out Bryant's myth, but was also deferring to it by avoiding a close personal identification with Bryant. In effect, Perkins is saying that Bryant is still with us. But no more would a mere mortal assume Jesus' mantle than Perkins would try to imitate Bryant.

By doing this in the conclusion, Rasmuson effectively repeated the point that he was trying to make that Bryant is indeed a Christ figure for Alabama. The humor that marked the introduction was also used in the conclusion. Referring to Alabama's faithful
carrying on in Bryant's wake, Rasmuson said "... they will no
doubt remember that believing and winning are the 'Bear' necessities.

The last CA to be examined is Steve Sudhoff's analysis of
President John F. Kennedy's June 10, 1963 speech, "A Strategy of
Peace." The analysis centered on how Kennedy's speech helped ini-
tiate a Strategic Arms Treaty later that year. Sudhoff used Robert
Oliver's theory of diplomatic rhetoric as his analytical tool.
Oliver's approach discussed the elements of effective diplomatic
address.

Oliver contends that a successful diplomatic speech usually dis-
plays four characteristics. First, the speech will appeal to a tri-
level audience. The speech will talk to the diplomat's domestic
audience, the "enemy," and neutral governments. Second, the speech
should be ambiguous enough to provide a loop-hole to retreat through
if needed. Third, the diplomat should be able to rationalize any
deviations from prior policy. Fourth, the speech should be depersonal-
ized. The diplomat needs to indicate that it is not he/she that is
speaking, but is his/her government.

Kennedy's speech was a graduation address at American University.
Kennedy addressed the first level audience, the U.S. Congress, by
insuring that the U.S. would not give up to the Soviets. To the Soviets,
Kennedy promised a change at peace. For the neutral audience, Kennedy
insured that the U.S. would stand by its commitments to its allies.
For the ambiguity, Kennedy stressed "Peace." And who is not for peace?
But Kennedy never specifically detailed what this peace would entail.
Kennedy's rationalization for the apparent break in policy was that
the situation had changed. Kennedy contended that since nuclear war has no survivors, peace and arms talks were needed. Finally, Kennedy did not use depersonalized speech. Instead, Kennedy relied on using personalized speech.

Sudhoff's central claim was that Kennedy's speech was instrumental in initiating the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August of 1963. The point of analysis is to explain Kennedy's success. The rationale for the claim was Oliver's theory of diplomat address. Sudhoff opted for Oliver's theory for two reasons. First, the method allowed for an analysis of the "specific attributes" of diplomatic speech "which give it its effectiveness." Second, the method is practical in that it helps us understand how nations talk to each other in an era of a "shrinking globe."

The question of choice came into the analysis when Sudhoff applied the method. First, Sudhoff pointed out that Kennedy's diplomatic speech "violates" the accepted theory. Sudhoff allowed that not all speeches will be true to a given formula. Second, Sudhoff also noted that Kennedy's address was successful despite the violation. We are not bound by the theory within the analysis.

In regulating the uncertainty, Sudhoff relied heavily on examples in the speech. First, Sudhoff argued that Kennedy's domestic audience was Congress. Sudhoff noted that the general public was not the audience because it was not an election year. Instead, due to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Congress was understandably cognizant of Kennedy's speech. Sudhoff backed this up with a quote from then Senate Minority Leader Dirksen. Kennedy supposedly placated this audience by promising not to "release our guard."
The neutral audience was our Western Allies. Sudhoff described how Kennedy specifically mentioned Western Europe and West Berlin. Kennedy assured those countries and our allies that, "The United States will make us deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations." Obviously, the enemy audience was the Soviet Union. Kennedy was described as being conciliatory in tone because he stressed that the U.S. and the Soviets have common interests and we all "inhabit this small planet."

For ambiguity, Sudhoff looked at how Kennedy discussed peace. Kennedy called for a "genuine peace." As Sudhoff noted, "No one, of course, would want to disagree with his hopes, but Kennedy's ambiguity about the specifics of his proposal enabled him to preempt potential criticism from ... Congress." Sudhoff's point was that Kennedy could not be faulted for his appeals for "genuine peace."

Sudhoff noted that Kennedy rationalized the change in policy by claiming that the situation called for a change. Kennedy was quoted first noting the threat of nuclear war, and second using that threat as a rationale for a treaty. And, as Sudhoff pointed out, Kennedy needed to rationalize since he campaigned for closing the "missile gap."

Up to this point, Sudhoff noted how Kennedy's speech followed Oliver's criteria for successful diplomatic address. But, Kennedy did not use depersonalized speech. Instead, Sudhoff counted seventeen times when Kennedy referred to himself, while only making references to the U.S. four times. Sudhoff maintained that Kennedy established a personal tie within the speech.

Sudhoff argued that the speech was successful based on the comments of several observers. A Kennedy speech writer called it "JFK's
greatest speech." The New Republic called it a success. Pravda printed the text in full, a rare occurrence during the Cold War. Soviet leader Nikita Kruschev reacted positively to the speech. And a Kennedy advisor credited the speech with the successful signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In all, Sudhoff cited five separate sources attesting to Kennedy's success.

Based on the success, and the apparent violation of Oliver's theory, Sudhoff suggested that possibly the "top national diplomat" can use a more personalized speech and be successful. This in turn suggested an "affirmation and an extension of Oliver's method." Based on this, and the fulfillment of Brockriede's criteria, I would classify Sudhoff's CA as a significant argument and call it a rhetorical criticism.

Sudhoff followed McGee's criteria for the most part. The introduction used humor and the implied end of the world as an attention getter. By noting the U.S. and USSR's failure to reach an arms control agreement, Sudhoff indicated the significance of understanding a successful attempt at arms control like Kennedy's speech. The introduction said we cannot achieve peace the way that the world powers are going about it presently, but Kennedy managed to do it in 1963. How did he do it, and can we do it today? The CA gained relevance this way. The thesis was clear, and the CA had a preview. As would be expected, the method was presented in the introduction. But Sudhoff also justified the method in the introduction. Since the justification of the method was also part of the justification for doing the CA, this worked.

Within the body of the CA, the method was explained and clearly applied. The discussion of the effectiveness of Kennedy's speech was
well documented. The conclusion then was divided into two parts. First, the implications were examined. Since this involved a quick discussion of the salient points of the analysis, this summarized the CA well. Second, the actual ending thought and the significance of the analysis were intertwined. In his final statement, Sudhoff looks to a hopeful future "where . . . the president can become an instrument of hope for all men everywhere." Since Sudhoff's intent in doing this CA is to point out what a wise president can do about the arms race, the conclusion is fitting. 

Based on the analysis of the speeches, specific points about the topic, analytic method, the CA as argument and McGee's (1983) standards can be demonstrated. First, concerning the topics, it becomes apparent that successful CAs have a traditional topic of a single act nature. By traditional, I mean a topic that is a speech, or an obviously persuasive act of discourse. Only Marcosson's CA on South Africa and Rasmuson's on Bear Bryant are non-traditional topics. All of the ten CAs focus on an obviously discoursive event.

The topics of the successful CAs also focus on a single act as a rule. Six of the CAs (Goodlick's, Murphy's, Heaton's, Rasmuson's and both of Sudhoff's) looked at one specific speech. Marcosson's CAs on South Africa and Lyndon Johnson narrowed the topics by looking at only one theme across the topics. Marcosson's analysis of Glenn and Jordan looked at only one particular aspect of two speeches. And Ferguson examined three commercials that in total lasted only three minutes. One way or another, all of the topics were selected so that the analysis focused on only one act or theme.
Second, the analytic methods used in successful CAs are appropriate and justified, concise and unique. Obviously a methodology should be appropriate and justified. All ten of the CAs used appropriate methods. The analysis and/or the conclusions drawn justify the selection of the methodologies. As for justifying the method selected, eight of the CAs offered believable arguments. One CA that did not, Marcosson's analysis of Glenn and Jordan, at least asserted the appropriateness of the method. Only Ferguson's CA offered no rationale for the methods used.

The methodologies used in successful CAs also appear to be concise. All ten CAs have methodologies that are concise. As explained earlier, by concise I mean a method that is easily and quickly explained. Each method requires a short general explanation and then a simple description of no more than four or five stages, strategies or concepts.

The methods were unique as well. This supports Logue's (1981) argument that unique methods seem to be a factor in winning. As I defined a unique method, only Rasmuson's CA fails to fulfill this criteria. His analysis centered on the S-M-E (Speaker, Message and Environment) variables. All the other CAs looked at only one of the SMEC variables.

Third, based on this analysis, a CA can operate as an argument and can be considered a rhetorical criticism. Six of the CAs were clearly arguments. Of the remaining four, Marcosson's Glenn-Jordan CA and Ferguson's CA only lacked a justification of the method to fit the criteria for an argument. I say "only" because it would have been relatively simple for either CA to add a method justification. One or
two sentences in either speech, and they would have moved to the argument end of the continuum. Only Goodlick's and Rasmuson's CAs fail to come close to the argument end of the continuum. Both CAs made claims that the available evidence could not support.

One interesting point about the CAs operating as an argument is the significant argument issue. Murphy (1983) considered it unwise for a CA to try and advance the rhetorical field of thought. Still, three of the data CAs tried to do just that. Sudhoff's Carter CA failed to do so. Sudhoff tried to claim that he had made a breakthrough by noting that apologetic address could occur in an extemporaneous setting. However, Ware and Linkugel never claimed that all apologetic address had to be planned discourse.

But with the other two CAs, it becomes evident that a CA can make a significant argument. Marcosson's Johnson analysis and Sudhoff's Kennedy analysis both deal with speeches that contain a deviance from what would be expected. Johnson should have been a success according to Ivie's theory, but was not. According to the theory of diplomatic address, Kennedy should have failed, but did not. Based on these inconsistencies, Marcosson and Sudhoff do not declare new theories, but only raise questions that could be dealt with at some later time by rhetoricians. Marcosson did not say that there was a new sub-genre of limited war rhetoric. Instead, he asks if such a sub-genre could exist. Sudhoff does not say that presidential diplomatic address differs from all other diplomatic address. Instead, he asks if a possible difference could exist. Murphy (1983) is right to say that it is absurd to attempt a legitimate contribution to rhetorical theory
in ten minutes. But it is not absurd to ask an insightful question that could spur a contribution. To a limited extent, a CA can make a significant argument.

Fourth, based on the analysis, McGee's (1983) standards seem to be evident in successful CAs. The only major deviance between the criteria and the speeches was a lack of previews. Only three of the CAs, Sudhoff's two and Ferguson's, had previews. However, before this casts aspersion on the other CAs, it should be noted that five of the other speeches used a labeling system which roughly serves the same purpose as a preview. A contestant would use the major parts of the analytic method as a labeling system to signpost throughout the speech. Heaton's CA is the best example of this. He emphasized the method's terms of STRATEGY, SIMPLIFICATION and AMBIGUITY in the speech such as to keep matters organized and recognizable. The other speeches doing this were both of Marcossen's and Murphy's.

Based on this labeling effort, it would seem that even this divergence from McGee's criteria was relatively minor. So on the whole, the data CAs demonstrate sound speech construction. Moreover, this also lends credence to McGee's criteria for writing and organizing a good CA. The only error, a lack of previews, should be an easy one to avoid.

At this stage, I would like to tie together what we know from the situational analysis and textual analysis, and argue for a set of specific guidelines to consider when writing a CA. To set this up, I would like to first quickly review what we know of CA's rhetorical situation. Judges, as a rule, are inexperienced in terms of
rhetorical theory, potentially easily bored with a CA, and likely biased in regards to analytical methods or speech topics. Because of the time limit and the judge, analytical methods should be unique and concise. While related to rhetorical criticism in form and purpose, a CA differs from rhetorical criticism because it is a speech, cannot be as complete in its analysis, and is delivered to an audience different than rhetorical criticism's. Finally, a CA is expected to adhere to certain criteria as outlined by McGee (1983).

From this information and the textual analysis, specific guidelines for a CA's topic, methodology, analysis and structure can be explained. With each of the areas, I will explain what a CA should try to accomplish and possible ways to do so. The data CAs not only offer general principles, but alternative ways to achieve these principles.

One of the first obvious steps in writing any speech is selecting a topic. The two points that become clear from the analysis is that the topic should be traditionally considered rhetorical and should be a concise or single act. First a competitor should opt for a topic that is obviously rhetorical. Since a judge may have a bias as to what is or is not rhetorical, it makes sense to pick a traditional topic. While a contestant could try to satisfy a non-traditional topic as being rhetorical, there are two reasons to avoid doing so. First, it is not very likely that one single undergraduate is going to change the philosophy of what is rhetorical for an instructor or professor in ten minutes. Second, any time spent justifying the rhetoricity of a topic is depriving the speaker of analysis time.
So, it is likely to be a waste of time and an unsuccessful effort if a CA focuses on a non-traditional topic.

Now actually defining just what is obviously rhetorical can be problematic. However, based on the data CAs, it seems clear that speeches are considered rhetorical. Seven of the CAs analyze speeches. Of the remaining three CAs, only one is clearly not a traditional CA in regards to the topic. This CA is Rasmuson's on Bear Bryant as a secular Christ figure. The last two CAs, Ferguson's on beer commercials and Marcosson's on South Africa are not as clearly traditional topics. However, Ferguson's CA is clearly dealing with oral persuasion since it deals with advertisements. And while Marcosson's topic is a bit different, he does focus on the communication used to maintain apartheid. In that sense, the topic is rhetorical.

After selecting a traditional topic, an effort should be made to limit the topic as well. A concise or single act topic should be selected. A concise topic can be more thoroughly analyzed in ten minutes than a complex topic. If shallow analysis is a constant complaint about CA, why make the problem worse by picking a topic that too little time exists to legitimately analyze. Plus, by narrowing the focus, the analysis is easier to do. Fewer factors need to be considered. Then the inexperienced judge can follow the analysis more easily. There will also be less room for error with a single act. The experienced judge will be less likely to find something significant to criticize in the analysis. The simpler the focus, the harder it is to make mistakes, and the easier it is to follow. Then the CA
will have a wider audience appeal. It will be easier for all judges to approve of the CA.

The CAs analyzed offer four ways to narrow the topic down. The first, and most obvious way, is to select a single act. Analyze only one speech.

Second, the topic can be limited by looking at a specific strategy or theme across speeches from one rhetor. To narrow a topic this way, the speaker would either look for the most prevalent categories of the analytic method that apply to the topic or look for a consistent theme of the speaker. Either way, the analysis is not concerned with any one communication act, but is concerned with a pattern of communication. For example, Marcosson's analysis of South Africa limited an entire government's policy within three categories of communication behaviors. If you explain to the judge what you are doing and justify why you are limiting your analysis to a specific set of categories, the topic can be legitimately held in check.

In terms of using a particular theme to limit the topic, Marcosson's analysis of Johnson's war rhetoric is a good example. While the CA looked at several speeches delivered by Johnson, it limited the analysis to specific themes. While Johnson gave several speeches while in office, Marcosson looked only at those that had to do with the conflict in Viet Nam. Even more specifically, the CA looked at the speeches where Johnson was trying to justify the war. By analyzing a specific theme, a competitor can look at significant acts over time and still realistically analyze the acts in ten minutes.
Third, a contestant can look at a larger rhetorical act and still keep it simple by looking at a representative example. Murphy's CA on Reagan's nomination acceptance is a fine example of this. Murphy manages to look at the whole Reagan presidential campaign of 1980 by arguing that Reagan's nomination acceptance address is a representative example of the campaign.

The representative example technique has a solid theoretical foundation. Smith and Windes (1978) argue that some rhetorical acts can operate as a text for a larger rhetorical act. Their point is that some acts are legitimate representative examples, called ideomemes (116). When a contestant wishes to analyze a rhetorical movement, instead of looking at the whole movement, the contestant can turn to the appropriate ideomeme. The important thing to remember is that the student will have to demonstrate that the topic is actually a representative example of the larger act. Murphy did so by citing evidence that supported his ideomeme.

Fourth, a contestant may pick multiple topics just as long as they can still be dealt with within the time limit. For example, Ferguson's analysis looked at three commercials, but since the commercials were only three minutes in length, the topic was still concise. The point to be learned from Ferguson's topic choice is that even though the topic must be limited, a certain degree of flexibility still exists. The overall concern is analyzing the topic well within the time limit. Just as a competitive persuasion would limit the scope of the topic within the confines of the time limit, so should a CA.
The data CAs demonstrate how any one or a combination of the ways to limit a topic can work. Aside from those already used as examples, Goodlick's analyzed a single act, Marcosson's analysis of Glenn and Jordan used their analytical method to limit the topic to delivery style, Heaton looked at a single act, Sudhoff's Carter analysis looked at a single act, Rasmuson used a single act (a speech Bear Bryant gave) as an ideomeme as well as only looking at a particular theme of a secular christ to limit the topic, and Sudhoff's analysis of Kennedy's speech focused on the single act.

Once the topic has been selected, the next consideration is the analytic method for the CA. Three factors should influence the method selection besides the fact that the method should be appropriate for the topic. The method should not be terribly involved, should be unique and should be traditionally based.

Again the time limit affects the selection of the method. The methodology should be relatively simple since it will have to be explained and applied within the time limit. Select a concise method. The data CAs provide three possible options for a competitor to take when selecting a method. First, use a method that is designed for a specific type of communication. Because the method narrows its focus, it is more likely to be concise. Four of the CAs used this approach. Marcosson's South Africa and Johnson CAs use methods designed to look specifically at the rhetoric of power maintenance and the rhetoric of justifying war. Sudhoff looked at the rhetoric of apologia and diplomatic rhetoric. Since the methods were designed for a specific kind of communication, they immediately focus on the unique qualities of
their subject matter. Because the methods are specific, they are inherently concise.

The second option is to pick a method that is not complex in its nature. Some theories are not as involved as others. If a method that is not complex is appropriate, then this simplicity is not a problem. For example, the father of rhetoric, Aristotle, gave us one of the less involved methods, ethos, logos and pathos. Three of the CAs used this option. Marcossen's CA on Glenn and Jordan uses a simple method that just asks the critic to look at the personality and attitude of both speaker and audience, as well as the elements of speech. Murphy's CA uses the quest theory which consists of looking for the five elements of a quest story. Ferguson's CA used a combination of looking at the value expressed in a particular beer commercial and then seeing how the advertisers modified the value. While Ferguson had a long list of values to choose from, there were only three commercials and so only three values. As for the modification of the values, there were only four possible options. All three CAs used methods that the average undergraduate could easily understand. But since the methods were appropriate for the analysis, the methods worked.

Third, select a broad theory, but edit the method in such a way to make it concise. Three of the CAs did this. Heaton's CA using Edelman's strategies of ambiguity, simplification and strategy is the best example of this. Edelman's works all focus on how political elites maintain the status quo through creating specific realities. As such, it is a detailed and complex theory. But for the purpose
of his specific analysis, Heaton draws upon three specific strategies. Goodlick's CA on how Phylis Schlafly beat back the ERA does the same with Bormann's fantasy theme analysis. Rasmuson's CA did this twice by simplifying both Burke and Bormann.

Since a concise method is likely to be easier to understand as well, this will make the CA more palatable for the inexperienced judge. If the judge can understand what is happening in the CA, he or she is more likely to rank the CA higher. Plus, a concise and simple method will combat the boring label that CA has. The point of a CA is to analyze. The method is a tool to help do this. By keeping the method concise and simple, the focus can be on the analysis, not on the methodology. Since most judges' area of interest is not rhetoric, a competitor is not going to keep an audience in a CA round interested by focusing on the method.

Besides being concise, the method should also be unique. The time limit dictates that only so much can be done with the analysis. Instead of analyzing everything about the topic, pick a particular SMEC variable and focus upon that.

As well as being concise and unique, the method should also be traditional in the sense that it is derived from one of the recognized schools of theory. This insure acceptance by the judge of the method as a legitimate analytical tool. Hopefully, this will negate any method bias on the judge's part.

Once the topic and the methodology have been selected, the next concern is conducting the actual analysis. The major finding in terms of whether a CA can operate as an argument and therefore as a rhetorical
criticism, is that a CA can. So, the overall guideline for the analysis is to have the criticism operate as an argument as defined by Brockriede (1974). The obvious point that is sometimes lost in even the best CAs is that the method selection should be justified. As a rule, I would advise competitors and coaches to heed the advice of McGee (1983) and read Brockriede's article on rhetorical criticism as argument. Since the implied standard for the event is that it operate much like rhetorical criticism, it would be wise for a competitor to know what makes a rhetorical criticism function as an argument.

The one other guideline to follow in terms of the analysis has to do with the furthering-the-field problem that Murphy (1983) sees as being problematic in CA. Murphy is correct in describing an attempt to create new rhetorical theory in a CA as absurd. However, the data CAs do demonstrate how a contribution can be made. Instead of creating a new theory, the contestant should limit the advance to just asking a pertinent question concerning the theory. As evinced in Marcosson's Johnson analysis and Sudhoff's Kennedy analysis, a strategically asked question can move the CA to the significant argument end of the continuum.

Once the actual analysis is completed, the concern of the competitor is to turn the criticism into a competitive speech. McGee's criteria demonstrate an acceptable way to do this. The biggest point to be made here is to stress the need for previewing and signposting throughout the speech. This seemed to be the one area where as speeches, the data CAs were collectively lax. Remember that the CA is a speech and has to face certain audience expectations.
If any two themes run throughout the guidelines, they should be that audience analysis and a recognition of the time limits are paramount. Remember and take into consideration that the judge in CA will likely be inexperienced when it comes to rhetorical criticism. This does not mean that CA should take on a condescending air. However, it does mean that your main audience is not interested in how rhetorical criticism is conducted in the *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. To deny that is to court disinterest and criticisms from the judge. And not surprisingly, that is the general atmosphere for CA today. Few are interested in it and the event is widely criticized. So when you select your topic and method, conduct your analysis and write your speech, remember that the same audience analysis that you would do in any other speech event or speaking situation applies just as much to CA.

Also remember and take into consideration that the time limit is only ten minutes long. The time factor is probably the biggest burden a competitor in CA has to carry. Given more time, the topics could be expanded, more intricate methods could be used and more detailed analysis could be conducted. Plus, if the competitor were faced with an inexperienced judge, explanations could be offered to make the whole analysis understandable. But the simple truth is that there are only ten minutes to conduct the analysis. This affects topic selection, method selection and even the degree of specificity in the analysis. The time limit and the judge's inexperience are perhaps the two most important rhetorical constraints that a competitor in CA will face.

While these guidelines will not insure success, they will deter the common criticisms that face CA. There are three basic criticisms
of CA today. First, there are complaints of shallow analysis (Logue, 1981; Larson and O'Rourke, 1983; McGee, 1983; Murphy, 1983). Second, McGee (1983) points out the inexperience of most coaches and students with CA. This is reflected in Larson and O'Rourke's (1983) work which demonstrates that there is no one clear goal for CA. And third, Murphy (1983) points out the overdependence on method in present CAs and the resultant absurd efforts to advance rhetorical theory with a CA. If a competitor or coach used the suggested guidelines correctly, these complaints could be avoided.

First, the complaint of shallow analysis can be met by selecting topics that can be realistically dealt with in the time limit. The same goes for the analytical method. And if the student keeps in mind that the analysis has to operate as an argument, the points of the analysis will have to be demonstrated.

Second, while these guidelines will not automatically grant rhetorical knowledge to those interested in CA, they will provide some direction for the inexperienced competitor. By selecting topics that are rhetorical and methods that are acceptable and understood by most judges, biases and inexperience can be avoided. And by conducting the analysis as an argument, the CA will have an obvious direction and goal that will be recognizable to the judge.

Finally, by limiting the topic and method to facilitate a better analysis, the emphasis will be taken off the method. Plus, when the audience analysis factor is taken into consideration, there will be less incentive to focus on the method. And not to over-state its value, but when the student views the analysis as an argument, the
tendency to just pigeonhole the analysis into neat little categorical cubbyholes will also deter the emphasis on method. Plus, the acknowledgment of the time limit and the impossibility of advancing the field will be restraining students to ask intelligent questions instead of making absurd claims about new rhetorical theories.

On the whole, I believe that these guidelines will make for better CAs. They will make the competitor recognize the important factors that influence the creation and subsequent degree of success for a CA. And since they are based on what is right with CA, the guidelines tell the student what to do when writing the speech, instead of the current trend that just emphasizes what not to do.

Invariably, when I have talked to the people who criticize CA, I find that they do it out of a fondness for the event. They criticize CA because they want to make it a better and more widely attended event. However, when we only criticize in the negative sense of the word, we are being unfair to CA. I too think the event is worthwhile and in trouble. Yet, I choose to look at the CAs that are healthy representatives of the event. If we can take a more optimistic perspective and emphasize what is right with CA, I think that we can make them even better and we can have more contestants. But to do so, we have to be able to tell those students what they will have to do to write a good CA. I hope these guidelines can do just that.
Bibliography


APPENDICES
Appendix A

Synopsis of the Communication Analyses

What follows is a breakdown of each CA so that the entire speech does not have to be read to understand my analysis. The actual introduction of each CA is quoted and then the analysis, method and effects of the CA are summarized. Following that, the conclusion is quoted. The entire text of each speech is also available in Appendix B.
INTRODUCTION

In one of the classic episodes of the old Star Trek series, the Enterprise becomes a battleground for one Commissioner Beal and the fugitive that he has been chasing, a revolutionary named Loki. Loki had been the leader of a racially motivated uprising on their home planet, Charron. The racial difference between Beal and Loki? Beal's people were black on the left side and white on the right, while Loki's were the reverse.

The program, which won a Hugo Award as the outstanding science fiction episode of 1967, was a statement about the racial crises facing the United States at that time. But it could just as easily apply today—to the Republic of South Africa. That nation has been plagued by racial strife for over a decade, strife emanating from the control exercised by 4½ million whites over 18½ million blacks. The South African whites, now isolated from the rest of the world, are clinging tenaciously to power. How the government is holding to power is a classic example of the rhetoric of power maintenance as outlined by Andrew King. The strategic importance, the mineral wealth, as well as what we can learn about how such non-Democratic regimes hold power, make the rhetoric of the South African whites clearly worthy of rhetorical analysis.
Andrew King, of the University of Arizona, outlined his theories in the April, 1976 issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech. He observed that when a group's power is challenged, it will consider a variety of choices of action. As such challenges occur, and are observed, the patterns of the rhetorical strategies become clear, and a rhetorical movement is established.

**METHOD**

Andrew King's Power Maintenance: This theory deals with the rhetorical strategies of groups in power when under attack. For this analysis, Marcosson used three of King's strategies:

1. **Definition:** "To set the terms of the conflict in such a way as to be advantageous to the group holding power."
2. **Crying Anarchy:** "To claim that chaos will be the result of any change in power."
3. **Co-optation:** "To give some ground to the challenging group, that does not involve actually losing power."

**ANALYSIS**

Marcosson looked at how each strategy was manifested by the South African government:

**Definition:** 1. The government defined the problem as multinational, not as multi-racial. 2. The government claimed their definition of what it takes to have leadership as the rule for leadership. Naturally, this rule favored the whites.

**Crying Anarchy:** The South African whites pointed to the violence in black-controlled states and claimed that black governments were doomed to failure.
Co-optation: 1. The South African government allowed blacks to join the labor unions. 2. The South African government created "independent" homelands for blacks. However, the homelands were still controlled by the white government.

EFFECT
Marcosson argued that the South African whites were successful at maintaining their power:

1. The whites are still in power.
2. South Africa has less racial violence than Rhodesia due to definition.
3. The blacks have accepted the homelands due to crying anarchy.
4. Violence is down due to co-optation.

CONCLUSION
Whether these rhetorical strategies of maintaining power—definition, crying anarchy, and co-optation—will succeed in the long term cannot now be known. So far, though, these strategies have succeeded. As King states, "The strategies discussed are examples of limited warfare. Their very constraints cut losses, minimize risks, and avoid the social instability that accompanies crushing defeat." Perhaps the example of Beal and Loki may provide us with an accurate gauge of South Africa's future, even though we don't know if Charron used King's strategies. Beal's 10,000 year chase of Loki ended when the Enterprise brought the two back to Charron—a planet where all the people had long since killed
each other in racial fighting. The chase, the hatred of the two men, were futile; the remnants of a culture devoured by the same racial divisions now present in South Africa.

Julie Goodlick 1980

INTRODUCTION

On March 22, 1972, the Equal Rights Amendment passed the United States Senate and was opened for state ratification. Within only three years, 34 states had ratified, and to date only three states are needed to pass the amendment. The original deadline for ratification came and went, and an extension was set at June, 1982. However, today we hear very little about the ERA in comparison to the mass of ardent pro- and anti-ERA rhetoric of the mid-70's. Is ERA dead? No, not at all, but on the surface one might believe so. What happened? A retrospective look at ERA shows that the anti-ERA forces were stronger and more effective, perhaps, than we realized.

As Hazel Greenburg of the Equal Rights Amendment Project said in 1976, "In the ratification process, it is female opposition epitomized by Phyllis Schlafly's Stop ERA group that is deterring passage." Indeed, Phyllis Schlafly herself became the primary agent or spokesperson for the entire ERA counter-movement. She has a tremendous following and has created two very wealthy and powerful anti-ERA groups--Stop ERA and Eagle Forum. Obviously Schlafly's leadership power is extremely significant in understanding the anti-ERA movement, and I believe her power derives
chiefly from her anti-women's movement, anti-ERA rhetoric. It is
my purpose then to analyze a speech by Schlafly in order to illum-
nate her incredible power for gaining the numbers needed in the
fight against ERA.

METHOD

Ernest Bormann's Fantasy Theme Analysis: Bormann looks at
how groups adopt a given fantasy and "chain it out" to others.
The idea is to include more people in the collective fantasy. A
critic should identify the fantasy theme present and how a rhetor
motivates others to accept the theme.

ANALYSIS

Goodlick claims that Schlafly successfully propagated her
anti-ERA theme by claiming the women libbers wanted to destroy
traditionalism in America. Further:

1. Schlafly's speech, "Understanding the Difference" is
analyzed because it is a representative example of
Schlafly's rhetoric.

2. Schlafly's key theme is that the sexes are fundamen-
tally different and the ERA is attempting to destroy
this. The villains, then, are the "libbers" and the
heroes are the "positive" women of America.

3. The motivation that Schlafly uses is that all positive
women should spend at least a half an hour a day fight-
ing the ERA and saving traditionalism.
EFFECT

Goodlick has already insisted that Schlafly was successful. The point to this analysis was to show how the success came about.

CONCLUSION

Today the rhetoric of the ERA controversy seems to have mellowed somewhat, though the amendment remains unratified. Looking at the controversy in retrospect, we might have to say that the anti-ERA movement has almost been successful in its efforts. In the early 70's, Ms. magazine called Phyllis Schlafly "the Sweetheart of the Silent Majority," but apparently, with Schlafly's help in spreading that powerful rhetorical vision, the majority didn't stay silent for long.

Sam Marcosson 1981

INTRODUCTION

Soaring 160 miles above the surface of the Earth as the first American to orbit the globe, gazing down upon the vast continents and oceans, must have been an incredible high for astronaut John Glenn.

Standing 30 feet above the delegates at the 1976 Democratic Convention, delivering one of the two Keynote Speeches, must have been an incredible low for Senator John Glenn.

For that Keynote Address by Senator John Glenn was one of the most poorly received in the history of the American two-party system, especially when compared to the reception given that evening's other Keynote Speech—that delivered by Texas Congresswoman Barbara Jordan.
Because of what we can learn about the Keynote Address as a speech genre by comparing a successful example to a failed one, the two speeches are clearly worthy of rhetorical analysis. Especially since Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Jamieson observed in the introduction to their book *Form and Genre* that such a study of these two speeches would aid in the understanding of generic rhetoric.

Ironically enough, the message of the two speeches was remarkably similar. Both Jordan and Glenn spoke of the need for government to earn the faith of the people, and of a commitment to traditional American ideas and values. The crucial difference between the two speeches was the manner in which the message was presented, and so it is appropriate to compare them through Robert Oliver's rhetorical model, "Delivering the Persuasive Speech," from his book *The Psychology of Persuasive Speech*.

**METHOD**

Robert Oliver's model "Delivering the Persuasive Speech":

Oliver feels that the key to successful persuasion is to conform to the audience expectations through:

1. **Personality**: The rhetor should conform his/her personality to the personality of the audience.

2. **Attitude**: The rhetor must align and focus his/her point of view with that of the audience.

3. **Elements of Speech**: The voice diction and phrasing must be appropriate for the occasion.
ANALYSIS

Marcosson demonstrated that Glenn failed to fulfill any of the expectations, while Jordan fulfilled them wonderfully. Marcosson went point by point and showed how the speakers handled their speeches.

EFFECT

Jordan received accolades and was proposed as a potential Supreme Court judge on the basis of the speech. Glenn's career, which had been on the upswing, was damaged. He was no longer considered as a vice-presidential running mate for Jimmy Carter.

CONCLUSION

As he delivered a speech virtually no one listened to, John Glenn may have wished that he were back, 160 miles above the surface of the Earth, gazing down upon vast continents and oceans, and listening, on his radio, to Barbara Jordan.

John Murphy 1981

INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 1981, Governor Ronald Reagan fulfilled a 12 year old dream and became President Ronald Reagan. In doing so, he dumbfounded many observers who had claimed that Reagan could not capture the high office. As Newsweek's November 17, 1980 issue states, "Once he was the most underestimated man in American politics--a washed up movie star, it was said, who was too old, too simple and too far right to be President." Somehow, though,
that washed up movie star managed to garner 483 electoral votes. Certainly, from our perspective, we must wonder what rhetorical strategies Reagan used.

**METHOD**

Herman Steltzner's Quest Story: Steltzner's theory looks at situations where a rhetor essentially characterizes him or herself as a hero on a quest. There are five elements of the quest that must exist:

1. A prized object and/or person to be found and possessed or married.
2. A long journey to find the object because its whereabouts is not originally known to the seekers.
3. A hero.
4. The guardians of the object who must be overcome before the quest can be finished.
5. The helpers, who with their knowledge and/or magical powers assist the hero and, without whom, he could never succeed.

**ANALYSIS**

1. Reagan portrays America's "New Beginning" as a return to our former greatness as destined as the prized object.
2. Time, in a historical sense, is the long journey. America is on the end of a long road back to greatness.
3. The hero is Ronald Reagan.
4. The guardians are the Democratic Party leadership, specifically the Carter administration.
5. The helpers are the American people, regardless of prior political affiliation.

**EFFECT**

Since the campaign was already called a success, Murphy was doing more of an explanatory analysis. But Murphy does point to some of the implications of Reagan using the quest story. To see these, go to the Conclusion.

**CONCLUSION**

But the very use of quest may damage his Presidency. As Steltzner explains, quest inherently magnifies the issues and the hero. Yet as various experts, including *Newsweek*’s January 26, 1981 issue, Gerald Ford, and Harry Truman have pointed out, the Presidency does not have as much power as people think it does. Put a larger than life hero into a life-sized presidency, and you get high expectations. George Bush put it this way: "Even people who aren't enthusiastic about us at first are hoping for an awful lot. It's unrealistic and they have to realize that." Quest does not help here, and the political ramifications could be devastating. Just imagine if Jason had come back with half the Golden Fleece.

Andy Heaton 1982

**INTRODUCTION**

As Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill put it, Wednesday, July 29, 1981 was a great day for the aristocracy. In the morning, there was the royal wedding. And in the afternoon, the "royal" tax cut. Despite strong objections from its Democratic leadership, the House
of Representatives approved the massive, three-year tax cut plan supported by Republican President Ronald Reagan.

The final vote wasn't even close: 238 to 195. Yet as late as two days before the crucial vote, it looked like a majority of House members would support the Democratic alternate plan. The New York Times concluded, "The principle reason behind the President's dramatic victory was Mr. Reagan's televised speech to the nation on Monday night. One Democratic congressman put it more bluntly, 'I hope he doesn't go on the tube again... and say no more sex.'"

We usually tend to attribute Reagan's success on television to the "media presence" that comes from his former profession. In the May, 1981 Quarterly Journal of Speech, Goodwin Berquist and James Goldin of Ohio State University support this contention. Yet if we give Reagan credit for excellence only in the non-verbal aspects of communication, we are probably selling the man short. Besides being well delivered, Reagan's tax speech was well written. And the writing, the Associated Press notes, was principally Reagan's own. Unlike many politicians, Reagan relies very little on speechwriters.

Without a doubt, President Reagan will continue to speak out on important issues. And if we are to completely understand Reagan's effectiveness as a communicator—and as President—we need to pay some attention to the too often ignored verbal aspect of Reagan's success in analyzing his tax speech. Murray Edelman, of the University of Wisconsin, provides us with the means of doing this in his book The Symbolic Uses of Politics.
Murray Edelman's *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*: Edelman looks at how politicians use language to create specific realities. In many ways this is a Burkeian view of political science. Heaton uses three of Edelman's concepts for the CA:

1. **Strategy**: "Edelman states that in the face of a serious problem, 'a leader whose acts suggest he (is following a strategy) finds it easy to attract a loyal and enthusiastic following.'"

2. **Simplification**: "Edelman notes that large numbers of people cannot recognize or tolerate complex situations... and that the best way to reach these people is through simplifying—even oversimplifying—the message."

3. **Ambiguity**: "Ambiguous terms can have a variety of meanings, but almost always evoke an emotional response."

**ANALYSIS**

Regarding Strategy, Reagan gave the impression that his tax program was well planned. Also, he made a point of making the Democratic plan look like it was hastily thrown together.

In the area of Simplification, Reagan simplified the tax cut when he described it. For example, he made the complex and controversial All-Savers plan sound like it was a simple matter.

In the third area, Ambiguity, Reagan used phrases like "renew the American spirit" and "make America great again" throughout the speech.
EFFECT

Heaton claims that Reagan was successful due to the speech's message. He cites that:

1. A former Carter speechwriter, who only read the speech, called it wonderful even if it were only read in a dull monotone.
2. Western Union and the House's mail room were swamped with telegrams and letters after the speech.
3. One Representative received 400 pro-tax cut telephone calls after Reagan's speech.
4. Another Representative claimed that Reagan successfully had gone over the heads of Congress to the American people.

CONCLUSION

There's no doubt Reagan is a good communicator. And, as we've seen through analysis of his July 19th tax speech, he's capable of delivering that simple and direct message as well. That's something to keep in mind as we observe Reagan's performance in the legislative battles that lie ahead in the next few years. He probably won't win them all, but Ronald Reagan is certainly one persuasive speaker who can make more than a trite solution out of "Write your congressman!"

Sam Marcosson 1983

INTRODUCTION

"Lyndon Johnson told the nation, 'Have no fear of escalation, I am trying everyone to please. And though it isn't really war, we're sending 50,000 more to help save Vietnam from Vietnamese.'" Tom Paxton's protest song of the 1960's was only one of many, as
America raised its voice against the American involvement in Southeast Asia. And one of the basic problems, Paxton suggests, was what Lyndon Johnson told the nation. Johnson's rhetoric contributed greatly to his problems, and to public dissent surrounding the Vietnam conflict. And a study of that rhetoric can tell us much about the Vietnam War, and about presidential discourse in general.

METHOD

Robert Ivie's Presidential Motives for War: Ivie studied how presidents have justified the entry into war and isolated four specific steps that the rhetor must go through for a successful justification:

1. The president will identify what ideal is being threatened and necessitates our entry into war.
2. The president will identify a crisis that threatens that ideal.
3. He will show the cause for that crisis.
4. Finally, war will be proposed as a final solution.

ANALYSIS

Marcosson claims that Johnson failed because he did not set up the fourth stage well:

1. The ideal in Vietnam was freedom.
2. The crisis and the cause of the crisis was Communism and aggression.
3. Unfortunately for Johnson, he stressed that the U.S. role was only to support the South Vietnamese and to supplement
their activity. On the basis of that, he had no grounds for the escalation of the war. War was not the final solution to the problem.

**EFFECT**

Marcosson notes that the first real protest to the war was that which pointed to the contradiction in Johnson's rhetoric and his policies. This then caused people to question his prior claims and led to the general undermining of Johnson's war policy.

Marcosson also argued that there may be a specific sub-genre of presidential rhetoric in terms of limited-war rhetoric.

**CONCLUSION**

The difficulty faced by Lyndon Johnson in justifying our involvement in Vietnam may also indicate a positive trend for our society. Our society may finally be becoming sophisticated enough, and our people wise enough, that we will never allow our leaders to justify easily war—the destruction, the death of thousands of young men, women, and children—to justify easily what almost never is "justifiable."

Steve Sudhoff 1983

**INTRODUCTION**

During the recent history of the American presidency, brothers have often played important roles. During the Kennedy years, John, Robert, and sometimes even Ted would be involved in major policy decisions. Richard Nixon sometimes had trouble controlling the questionable business dealings of his brother, Donald. And, of
course, there were Jimmy and Billy. At first it seemed as though the only problems associated with Billy Carter were that he guzzled beer and relieved himself in public. But, as it seems with all brothers, Billy was around when Jimmy needed him . . . the least. For it was during the summer of 1980, as the Iranian hostage crisis, the sad shape of the American economy, and the impending Democratic National Convention began to close around President Jimmy Carter, that Billy Carter's name was splashed across American newspaper headlines with reports of possible illegal business transactions between Billy and the government of Libya. Yet, when it seemed that Billy might be the final nail in Jimmy's political coffin, Jimmy was able to resurrect his hold on the Presidency through Ronald Reagan's favorite medium, television. On August 4, 1980, as a skeptical American electorate looked on, Jimmy Carter held a nationally televised press conference in the East Room of the White House. On the day before the press conference, New York Times columnist Terence Smith wrote that, unless Carter was extraordinarily successful at the conference, Billygate would remain a nagging political headache that would stay with him throughout the Presidential campaign. Yet, at the conference, Carter put on the show of his life, defending not only the actions of his brother, but also his own actions in permitting Billy to deal with the Libyans. Carter statements at the conference are an excellent example of the use of political apologia. It seems appropriate, then, that we examine Carter's statements with a rhetorical tool designed to be used in studying apologetic address.
METHOD

Ware and Linkugel's Generic Criticism of Apologia: This theory is based on the generic characteristics of self-defense speeches. Ware and Linkugel have isolated several potential defense postures and strategies that a person could assume when under attack, attempting to defend himself. Sudhoff looks at one specific posture and two strategies:

Absolute Posture: "Focusing audience attention upon the particulars of the charge" in an attempt to be cleared of the charge is the nature of this posture.

Denial Strategy: "Denial consists of the simple disavowal by the speaker of any participation in, relation to, or positive sentiment toward whatever it is that repels the audience."

Differentiation Strategy: This "... subsumes those strategies which serve the purpose of separating some fact, sentiment, object or relationship from some larger context within which the audience presently views the attribute."

ANALYSIS

Sudhoff claimed that Carter was effective in his use of denial and differentiation:

Denial: Carter simply denied any wrongdoing in the matter.
Differentiation: Carter argued that his administration was honest and quick to respond to the attacks, not incompetent in their handling of them. Plus, since Carter appeared to be under control and the press did not, it further demonstrated his competence.
EFFECT

Carter was successful in his attempt to clear his name:

1. Newspapers cleared Carter of any wrongdoing the day after the press conference.
2. Potential congressional investigations were called off.
3. Carter's popularity in the polls went up after the conference.
4. Sudhoff claimed that Ware and Linkugel's theory also applied to extemporaneous situations as well as prepared addresses.

CONCLUSION

Having examined Carter's press conference of August 1980, we see that Carter was able to use apologia to retain, although briefly, his hold on the Presidency. Of course, Carter's remarks did not help him win the November election, but perhaps historians will treat Carter a bit more kindly in light of his brilliant performance.

Cham Ferguson 1983

INTRODUCTION

Everyone likes to be seduced. Everyone enjoys being the center of attention. Who recognizes this the most? TV ads, TV rhetoric. Who are the champions of television commercials? The beer advertisers.

American breweries spent 550 million dollars in 1981 in hopes of getting us to become alcoholics preferring their beer. There are many beer companies and beer ads. At this time, though, the fiercest competition in TV seems to be taking place between Miller and
Anehuser-Busch as they fight for the number one spot. Since its purchase by Phillip Morris Company in 1971, Miller has been advancing steadily on Anehuser-Busch's coveted crown as the king of beers. As the fight enters the 80's, an analysis of Miller TV ads could provide valuable insight into their battle plan.

In this speech, I will analyze Miller's three main beers: Miller Hi-Life, Lowenbrau, and Miller Light. I will examine three TV commercials offered by Miller, each a representative example of how Miller is trying to sell its beer.

**METHOD**

Steele and Redding's American Value System and Fisher's Motive View of Communication: Steele and Redding believe that there is a body of American values that underlies most persuasion. They then proceed to list many of those values. Fisher's theory discusses how an image in persuasion can be modified to effect persuasion. Fisher sees one of four possible modifications happening:

1. Affirmation: Giving birth to an image.
2. Reaffirmation: Revitalizing an image.

**ANALYSIS**

Ferguson isolated the value in each commercial and then examined how that value was modified.

The Miller Hi-Life commercial used the Puritan Morality value and it was affirmed with the Miller beer. The commercial tied the reward for hard work with Miller.
The Lowenbrau commercial highlighted the Material Comfort value and reaffirmed it with the Lowenbrau image. Viewers were told that affluence was theirs when they drank Lowenbrau.

However, Ferguson observed that none of Steele and Redding's values fit the Lite Beer commercial. So Ferguson noted that the commercial was using what he called a Macho Male value. This value was purified in such a way that diet beer was now seen as manly.

**EFFECT**

Ferguson generally assumed that the commercials were successful:

1. Miller had moved to number two in the market and was now selling 21% of the beer in America.
2. The general consensus was that the commercials were the reason for the success.
3. Anheuser-Busch responded by raising their advertising budget.

**CONCLUSION**

So if you are into rowdy good times at the local bar, relaxing weekends with friends, bowling with buddies or just browsing through Aristotle, remember, If you've got the time, Miller's got the rhetoric.

Todd Rasmuson 1984

**INTRODUCTION**

A recent T-shirt proudly pictured a football coach strolling across a calm lake. The caption read, "If he can't walk on water, he sure knows where the stumps are." His wife had been quoted, as
he slipped into bed, as saying, "God, your feet are cold." The coach responded, "Around the house, dear, you can call me Paul."

Although few people may remember this coach on a first name basis, his nickname, along with his incredible accomplishments as coach at Alabama, will long be remembered. The legend is Paul "Bear" Bryant.

But Bryant is known for more than a collection of winning statistics printed in a trivia book. According to Alabama's House Speaker Pro Tem, Roy Johnson, "He was a legend and an inspiration to the young people of this state. His life and his accomplishments have enhanced the image of Alabama throughout the nation and the world."

Bryan'ts significant influence raised his status to a mythical level and he was even worshipped. Many stories developed about Bryant that strengthened this rhetorical image. One such story had him shopping for a burial plot, and a cemetery salesman showed him one for a thousand dollars. Bryant said, "That seems a little steep, boy. I'm only going to be here for three days."

By examining Bryant's rhetorical image, many interesting analogies can be drawn that support the idea of Bryant as Alabama's Secular Christ. Because of Bryant's significant influence, his rhetorical persona is worthy of our careful consideration.

METHOD

Kenneth Burke's Concept of a Secular Christ and Ernest Bormann's Fantasy Theme Analysis: Burke argues that in our present age, certain individuals can serve as a secular Christ figure. To do so, they must have mutual beliefs with their audience, they must display strong
leadership, and they must have made a sacrifice. Bormann looks at how groups of people develop and "chain out" fantasies. The idea is to incorporate other people into the group theme.

**ANALYSIS**

Rasmuson looked at how Bryant acted as the Christ figure and how the myth was chained out. Examples of the three qualities necessary for a Christ figure were examined in Bryant's life. Then Rasmuson looked at how this myth was propagated by Bryant's football players, the Alabama fans, and by the sports media.

**EFFECT**

Rasmuson was doing an explanatory type analysis, so there was no real discussion of effectiveness.

**CONCLUSION**

Whether they will be successful without Bryant, it is difficult to predict. But they will no doubt remember that believing and winning are the "Bear" necessities.

Steve Sudhoff 1984

**INTRODUCTION**

A French ambassador once observed, "It is fortunate that diplomats generally have long noses, since they usually cannot see beyond them." In the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union since WW II, it seems that at times both governments have refused to see beyond the ends of their noses in order to make basic compromises in their own positions which could have led to mutually-beneficial agreements. However, on the afternoon of June 10, 1963,
President John Kennedy took a major step toward a more peaceful world. In an address to the graduation class of American University in Washington, D.C., Kennedy announced his willingness to sign a limited nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. Labeled a "Strategy of Peace," the speech was widely acclaimed as the major diplomatic break responsible for the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty two months later. Given the current stagnation of arms control, it seems that we can learn something by examining Kennedy's speech and his diplomatic strategy.

**METHOD**

Robert Ivie's Rhetoric of Diplomacy: Ivie's work centers on the characteristics of diplomatic speech. From his observations, Ivie has found four characteristics that are common to diplomatic speech:

1. The speech must appeal to a tri-level audience. It must not alienate the diplomat's home government, the "enemy," or the neutral governments listening to the address.

2. The speech must be sufficiently ambiguous so that there is a loophole to retreat through in case something goes wrong. But it must not be so ambiguous that the speech is useless.

3. The speech must be able to rationalize any potential inconsistencies between the stance being forwarded and the prior stance of the diplomat.

4. The speech must be depersonalized. The speaker should make it clear that he or she is representing a government and the message is therefore legitimate.
ANALYSIS

Sudhoff's analysis was basically demonstrating that Kennedy followed the first three characteristics, and ignored the final characteristic of impersonality.

EFFECT

Sudhoff concludes that the speech was a success despite the break from the theory by noting the following points:

1. Kennedy's top speech writer called it Kennedy's greatest speech.
2. The New Republic magazine called it a diplomatic breakthrough.
3. The Soviets took an unprecedented step and printed the full text of the speech in Pravda.
4. Britain's Prime Minister reported that the Soviet Premier wanted to have talks once he heard the speech.
5. The Soviets signed the treaty within two months of the address.
6. Sudhoff proposes that the theory be looked at again to see if high ranking diplomats, like a president, can still be successful even when using personalized references.

CONCLUSION

By taking bold initiative, an American president was able to sign a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Perhaps such an initiative would not work today. But in this time of short-nosed diplomats, McGeorge Bundy's words come to mind:
"... where there is zeal in the search for agreement ... and a
firm use of the powers of the office, the President can become ...
an instrument of hope for all men everywhere."
Appendix B

Sam Marcosson, 1980

In one of the classic episodes of the old Star Trek series, the Enterprise becomes a battleground for one Commissioner Beal and the fugitive he had been chasing, a revolutionary named Loki. Loki had been the leader of a racially motivated uprising on their home planet, Charron. The racial difference between Beal and Loki? Beal's people were black on the left side and white on the right, while Loki's were the reverse.

The program, which won a Hugo Award as the outstanding science fiction episode of 1967, was a statement about the racial crisis facing the United States at that time. But it could just as easily apply today--to the Republic of South Africa. That nation has been plagued by racial strife for over a decade, strife emanating from the control exercised by 4½ million whites over 18½ million blacks. The South African whites, now isolated from the rest of the world, are clinging tenaciously to power. How the government is holding to power is a classic example of the rhetoric of power maintenance as outlined by Andrew King. The strategic importance, the mineral wealth, as well as what we can learn about how such non-Democratic regimes hold power, make the rhetoric of the South African whites clearly worthy of rhetorical analysis.

Andrew King of the University of Arizona outlined his theories in the April, 1976 issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech. He
observed that when a group's power is challenged, it will consider a variety of choices of action. As such challenges occur, and are observed, the patterns of the rhetorical strategies become clear and a rhetorical movement is established.

King describes several strategies that can be used by authorities struggling to hold power, three of which have been used by the South African whites. The first is Definition, to set the terms of the conflict in such a way as to be advantageous to the group holding power. Second is Crying Anarchy, to claim that chaos will be the result of any change in power. And third, Co-optation, to give some ground to the challenging group that does not involve actually losing power.

The first strategy is Definition, or standard setting. The goal is control of others through the manipulation of definitions. The whites in South Africa have in two ways used definition in their attempts to maintain authority.

First, they have tried to define away the problem of racial discrimination by claiming that the nation is multi-national rather than multi-racial. Former Prime Minister John Vorster gave a prime example of this rhetoric in a 1978 speech before the American Society of Johannesburg. Vorster said, "American politicians look upon South African tribes as tribes of the same nation. But they are different nations. The Zulu is as different to the Tswana as the Turk is to the German. We are not a multi-racial country, but a multi-national country." Thus, the government attempts to avoid the racial problem by defining it out of existence.
In addition, the whites' attempt to define the conflict in such a way that blacks cannot qualify for leadership. The whites claim that control of the country should rest not in the hands of the majority but with the group that was there first. No wonder, since South Africa was first settled by white Europeans with blacks moving in later. By the white definition of the conflict, their rule is perfectly legitimate and the blacks have no claim to power.

So by using Definition, the whites have established their rule as legitimate. But they have to take the process a step further. More than legitimate, they have to show that their rule is actually beneficial to the nation. And to do that, they have used a second of King's strategies, Crying Anarchy. The whites claim that the nation will collapse unless they are left in charge. As King states, "To the establishmentarianists themselves, or to the third parties faced by the uncertainties of rapid change, the cries of anarchy may often seem compelling."

The South African whites have used this strategy with great skill. Officials often point to the failure of democracy in such neighboring black African states as Tanzania and Mozambique, and to their contention that blacks in Sough Africa are economically better off than their counterparts in nations that have majority rule. King emphasizes, "Most people have a stake in the existing order, and when one's substance is threatened, there is an immediate loss of objectivity."

Officials also point to Angola, where the institution of majority rule resulted in a civil war of black against black.
By playing on the fear of anarchy and war, the government hopes to convince blacks to approve of, or at least tolerate, apartheid. The government reasons that if blacks fear that the institution of majority rule would result in a worsening of their situation, they might be less inclined to oppose the current system.

To garner further support on the part of blacks for apartheid, the whites have used a third of King's strategies, Co-optation. Co-optation, according to King, involves making limited concessions to the challenging groups without losing actual power. As King puts it, "When pressure becomes overwhelming, it may still be possible to assimilate one's rivals. Government programs, however inadequate, destroy the urgency of the rivals' rhetoric. In the mouth of a dominant group member, Co-optation is presented as the only realistic alternative."

As both internal and external pressure has mounted on South Africa, the government has begun to use Co-optation. No, the whites do not have any plans to dismantle the system of grand apartheid. But they are attempting to appease the blacks through limited concessions.

For example, Botha's ruling Nationalist Party last year announced plans to allow blacks to form unions, to encourage employers to pay white and black workers the same wages, and to abolish the law that bans blacks from certain occupations. The plan sounded impressive, but as the May 14, 1979 issue of Time pointed out, it didn't really amount to much. Of 7½ million black workers, fully two million will still be kept from unions because
they aren't officially South African citizens. No employers will be required to desegregate work places or pay an equal wage, only encouraged to do so. And the policy of reserving certain jobs for whites had been virtually abolished anyway due to a severe shortage of white labor. As King indicates, this is the cardinal rule of Co-optation: Give a little, but maintain authority.

In addition, whites have announced plans for the future that amount to Co-optation. In the short term, blacks will have their own Parliament and Prime Minister, which will have no decision-making power and play only an advisory role in the South African government. Under the final plan, all blacks will hold citizenship in semi-independent homelands. Three such homelands have already been set up, with more planned.

The fact that the homelands policy is intended to keep the whites in power is underscored by a statement by Cornelius Muldur, the former Cabinet Secretary in charge of black affairs. When the homelands policy has been fully implemented, Muldur states, "there will not be one black man with South African citizenship." Whites will then have gained permanent control of the nation.

Since the obvious goal of the rhetoric of South African whites is power maintenance, the fact that the white minority government there is still in power is the best indication that the various rhetorical strategies used have been successful. Specifically, each of the three strategies has been effective.

The success of the policy of Definition can best be measured in the relative rarity of violence in South Africa. There have
been disturbances, most notably the riots in Soweta township in 1976 in which 618 people were killed. But compared to Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, South Africa has been a peaceful nation. And the only major policy difference between South Africa and the now out-of-power regime in Rhodesia through 1976, according to Foreign Affairs, had been the South African characterization of the problem as multinational rather than multi-racial. In other words, Rhodesia did not use the strategy of Definition, while South Africa did—successfully.

The strategy of Crying Anarchy has caused at least limited support on the part of many black leaders for apartheid and has thus relieved pressure on the government. The best example of black support for apartheid, according to New African magazine, is the tribal chieftains who have become leaders of the three homelands created so far—Transkei, Bophutuswana, and Venda. So Crying Anarchy has been an effective strategy for Botha's government in enlisting the support of black leaders.

Similarly, the government has enlisted the support of rank-and-file South African whites through the policy of Co-optation. The policy was first used in 1976 after the Soweto riots and thus has not been employed long enough to fully evaluate it. On a short term basis, though, it has clearly been an effective strategy. The only change in South African policy since the Soweto riots has been the adoption of Co-optation, and although tension remains, violence has virtually stopped.

Perhaps even more significantly, the government policy of Co-optation has, as Newsweek put it on October 29, 1979, "evoked
excitement among South African blacks. 'There is a feeling in the air that something is happening,' says Percy Quoboza, editor of Johannesburg's only black newspaper."

So Co-optation has helped to keep the whites in power by increasing the black acceptance of that domination.

Whether these rhetorical strategies of maintaining power--Definition, Crying Anarchy, and Co-optation--will succeed in the long term cannot now be known. So far, though, these strategies have succeeded. As King states, "The strategies discussed are examples of limited warfare. Their very constraint cuts losses, minimizes risks, and avoids the social instability that accompanies crushing defeat." Perhaps the example of Beal and Loki may provide us with an accurate gauge of South Africa's future, even though we don't know if Charron used King's strategies. Beal's 10,000-year chase of Loki ended when the Enterprise brought the two back to Charron--a planet where all the people had long since killed each other off in racial fighting. The chase, and the hatred of the two men, were futile--the remnants of a culture devoured by the same racial divisions now present in South Africa.
Julie D. Goodlick, 1980

On March 22, 1972, the Equal Rights Amendment passed the United States Senate and was opened for state ratification. Within only three years, 34 states had ratified and to date only three states are needed to pass the amendment. The original deadline for ratification came and went, and an extension was set at June, 1982. However, today we hear very little about the ERA in comparison to the mass of ardent pro- and anti-ERA rhetoric of the mid-70's. Is ERA dead? No, not at all, but on the surface one might believe so. What happened? A retrospective look at ERA shows us that the anti-ERA forces were stronger and more effective, perhaps, than we realized.

As Hazel Greenburg of the Equal Rights Amendment Project said in 1976, "In the ratification process, it is female opposition epitomized by Phyllis Schlafly's Stop ERA group that is deterring passage" (Greenburg, 1976: xvii). Indeed, Phyllis Schlafly herself became the primary agent or spokesperson for the entire ERA counter-movement. She has a tremendous following and has created two very wealthy and powerful anti-ERA groups: Stop ERA and Eagle Forum. Obviously Schlafly's leadership power is extremely significant in understanding the anti-ERA movement and I believe her power derives chiefly from her anti-women's movement, anti-ERA rhetoric. It is my purpose, then, to analyze a speech by Schlafly in order to illuminate her incredible power for gaining the numbers needed in the fight against ERA.
The speech I will analyze was given in 1976 and is entitled "Understanding the Difference." Schlafly later used much of the content of this speech in the first chapter of her best-selling book, *The Power of the Positive Woman*. This particular speech serves as a very typical example of Schlafly's rhetoric and her purposes. It was given at the height of the ERA controversy when the countermovement was just reaching the peak of its development.

The basic purpose of the speech was to introduce a new anti-ERA program—"Half Hour a Day to Stop ERA"—yet Schlafly deals throughout the speech with aspects of the entire feminist movement, allowing the rhetorical critic a broad view of her overall rhetoric. Perhaps more significant, though, is the audience for whom the speech was given—the Executive Council members of Eagle Forum, those national leaders who would return to their respective chapters and spread Phyllis' word to women throughout the land.

The nature of Schlafly's rhetoric and the audience to whom it was directed make this speech especially well-suited for study via Ernest Bormann's Fantasy Theme Analysis. Bormann's methodology deals with the rhetorical function of fantasy, the rhetor's ability to create a set of symbols that leads to a symbolic reality or rhetorical vision. This symbolic reality may hold a special meaning for audience members, and the rhetorical vision, then, may help to acculturate more people into the speaker's group or movement. This process of group acculturation was Schlafly's long-run purpose, and in analyzing her speech using Bormann's method, we can see how
she effectively spread a rhetorical vision that helped her recruit more people for the anti-ERA cause.

Bormann developed his methodology from studies of the small group process of fantasizing. A fantasy might be called a group's perception of a given idea or subject, and a successful fantasy will "chain out," that is, catch on and spread out across a larger group. Bormann's application of this basic idea of fantasy chaining is to large groups hearing a public speech or message.

The first step in analyzing Schlafly's speech, then, is to look at what Bormann calls the "dramatic content," those fantasy themes which are eventually chained out among the anti-ERA followers. The primary fantasy theme in this speech is one of sexual differences. Schlafly seems to say that the inherent differences between the sexes make sexual equality impractical and even unjust, yet the women's libbers want to destroy all these differences and have total equality. According to Bormann, the language used by the group promotes the fantasy themes, and Schlafly's language here is indeed the key developmental factor in the fantasy. She works from a framework of "what they want," describing what she believes are the "fundamental dogmas" and the "Commandments" of the women's lib movement. Her language is one of superlatives. For example, she says:

... the drive of the women's lib movement is to refuse to allow any differences based on differences between men and women. They want men and women to be treated the same, all the time, everywhere, in
every part and aspect of our life. And it's not just."

A second fantasy developed throughout the speech is the threat to traditionalism which the women's movement and ERA creates, and Schlafly develops this fantasy through a framework of "what will happen if they have their way." She foresees a complete sexual role reversal and says "they really want to get the women into the jobs and turn the men into househusbands." She predicts the deterioration of morals and the destruction of the family unit by describing one of the "Commandments" of women's lib as "Thou shalt be neutral as between morality and immorality, as between the institution of the family and alternate lifestyles."

As the fantasy themes of sexual differences and traditionalism chained out, those involved in Schlafly's cause would begin to use the specific language and ideas in their own right; they would adhere to a unique set of symbols all their own, or as Bormann describes it, they would become caught up in their own symbolic reality, filled with "heroes, villains, emotions, and attitudes" (Bormann, 1972: 398). In this case, the emotions and attitudes provoked in the receivers of the messages are what are most likely to recruit new actives.

Obviously the two fantasy themes mentioned will provoke strong emotion in any traditionalist, any person disliking a drastic change in the status quo; that emotion will be fear, and this factor will then lead to the attitude that "they must be stopped." Yet even more clear in the fantasy drama are the strong characterizations
of the heroes and the villains which emerge and which appeal to
that beginning sense of fear, subsequently strengthening it.
Schlafly describes the heroes and villains in terms of positive
and negative. The libbers, of course, are the villains; Schlafly
says, "Negative is the word that best describes the women's lib
movement. It is a negative view of life." Schlafly also sees
the libbers as villains because they don't want to have babies.
She describes the heroes as "our kind of women, the Positive women"
who "think it is self-evident that the female body with its repro-
ducing organs was not designed by a conspiracy of male chauvinist
pigs, but by the architect of the human race." So the villains are
the bitter, unhappy, immoral women's libbers--the Negative women--
while the heroes are the God-fearing, traditionally dutiful wives
and doting mothers--the Positive women.

Schlafly develops another set of heroes also--Positive women
who've made it big in non-traditional areas. She uses examples
like Janet Lynn, the ice skater, who Schlafly describes as a "lovely,
lovely woman who has been a testament to her religious faith every
time she is interviewed on TV", or Rose Totino, a Pillsbury Corpora-
tion Vice President who became successful when she accepted Christ
and once said, "I am not a women's libber. Why should women go
from superiority to equality?" So in Schlafly's mind, it's okay
to be a corporation vice president, as long as you're not for
women's lib and ERA, and such women become heroes in the anti-ERA
movement.
Schlafly herself is probably the number one hero—that is, heroine—in the symbolic reality shared by her followers. These women can identify with her roles as wife and mother; to them, she represents the epitome of traditional American womanhood. She believes in motherhood as the primary part of the natural order of women. She says, "Women have a maternal instinct, else the human race would have died out long ago." She believes that women can't be separated from this biological sphere without drastic consequences. Moreover, she holds strong fundamental religious values, evidenced by her designation of God as "the architect of the human race." Schlafly's heroism becomes a part of the overall symbolic reality, and adds much to her power in gaining new group members.

According to Bormann, once a group member has accepted the symbolic reality, the degree of response may lead to attitude change, strong commitment, or motivation to action. Clearly Schlafly is seeking motivation to action as the purpose of her speech. In her conclusion she says, "Surely most women can find another half-hour in their day to do something that will help to save the values of family, God, home, and country that we are working for. I think you can enlist a lot of new people in our cause with a Half Hour a Day to Stop ERA." With this, the chaining process and the rhetorical vision become clear. The audience members in this situation are motivated to enlist others in the cause, and in doing so, they employ what has become the established rhetoric of the anti-ERA movement—the fantasies that create fear, the characterizations of libbers as villains and traditional women
as heroes, the whole symbolic reality that they have already accepted—and a rhetorical vision of "let's stop the ERA and save ourselves" is successfully spread and shared by women throughout the country.

Today, the rhetoric of the ERA controversy seems to have mellowed somewhat, though the amendment remains unratified. Looking at the controversy in retrospect, we might have to say that the anti-ERA movement has almost been successful in its efforts. In the early '70's, Ms. magazine called Phyllis Schlafly "the Sweetheart of the Silent Majority," but apparently, with Schlafly's help in spreading that powerful rhetorical vision, that majority didn't stay silent for long.
Sources


Soaring 160 miles above the surface of the Earth as the first American to orbit the globe, gazing down upon vast continents and oceans, must have been an incredible high for astronaut John Glenn.

Standing 30 feet above the delegates at the 1976 Democratic Convention, delivering one of the two Keynote Speeches, must have been an incredible low for Senator John Glenn.

For that Keynote Address by Senator Glenn was one of the most poorly received in the history of the American two party system, especially when compared to the reception given that evening's other Keynote speech— that delivered by Texas Congresswoman Barbara Jordan.

Because of what we can learn about the Keynote Address as a speech genre by comparing a successful example to a failed one, the two speeches are clearly worthy of rhetorical analysis. Especially since Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Jamieson observed in the introduction to their book Form and Genre that such a study of these two speeches would aid in the understanding of generic rhetoric.

Ironically enough, the message of the two speeches was remarkably similar. Both Jordan and Glenn spoke of the need for government to earn the faith of the people, and of a commitment to traditional American ideals and values. The crucial difference between the two speeches was the manner in which the message was
presented, and so it is appropriate to compare them through Robert Oliver's rhetorical model "Delivering the Persuasive Speech" from his book *The Psychology of Persuasive Speech*.

According to Oliver, the key element in successful oratory is to conform to the expectations of the audience on each of three levels. The first level is that of the personality of both speaker and audience. As Oliver states, "The speaker directs the group, but he directs it in accordance with the basic nature of the group itself." If the rhetor misreads the personality of his audience, or if he does not conform to their expectations of his personality, he loses much of his effect.

The second expectation level is that of attitude. The audience has a preset point of view towards the speaker, and he towards it. According to Oliver, "It is a key part of the speaker's task to bring the generalized attitude of the audience into sharper focus, to heighten the degree to which that attitude is felt, and to shore it up with facts and feelings that will last."

Finally, the actual elements of speech--the voice, diction, and phrasing of ideas--come into play. If, for example, Lawrence Olivier had delivered Hamlet's soliloquy with a Southern drawl, he would have lost much of his impact, not to mention an Academy Award. Diction is equally important--imagine Olivier doing Hamlet with a list or a stutter. Again, the audience's expectations would not have been fulfilled and impact would have been lost. And as for phrasing, would *Hamlet* itself be a classic if "To be, or not to be?" was instead, "Well, should I kill myself?"
Taken together, the personality and attitude of both speaker and audience, as well as the elements of speech, form the crucial components of successful oratory.

In Senator Glenn's speech, he first encountered failure in his misinterpretation of the personality of his audience and in its misconception of his personality. Glenn was speaking to a hall full of fiery Democratic party activists—the usual Convention delegates, active at the local party level—activists who were ready and waiting for fiery oratory. Instead Glenn gave them, intentionally and admittedly, a low key address. Glenn himself said he "deliberately avoided using crowd-stirring oratory." Glenn's choice of tone was unfortunate, for his speech thus lacked the grand phrases and excited tones that normally mark the Keynote and are crucial to the Keynote genre, according to Edwin Miles in his 1960 Quarterly Journal of Speech article "The Rhetoric of the Keynote." And these rhetorical highs were especially expected from Glenn, the former astronaut, the great, exciting American hero—a living symbol of a bright and promising future. Just as Glenn had misread his audience, they too had misread him.

Representative Jordan, on the other hand, anticipated well the nature of the people she was addressing. Her speech was full of the partisan phrases she knew would excite her Democratic listeners. She declared, "The Democratic Party can lead the way. We can find new ways to implement the system and realize our destiny."
And the delegates were ready for Barbara Jordan. They expected the Jordan they remembered from the Nixon impeachment hearings, the one who became a House Judiciary Committee star for her eloquent and impassioned defense of the Constitution.

And it was just that Barbara Jordan the Convention got. She observed, "The past notwithstanding, a Barbara Jordan is before you tonight. This is one additional bit of evidence that the American dream need not forever be deferred." It was stunning in its impact, largely because it was exactly what the delegates had expected from a personality like Barbara Jordan.

Jordan was equally successful in anticipating the mood of the delegates. They knew there was something special about the first black, and the first woman, to deliver the Keynote Address at a major American political party convention. Their attitude was one of anticipation and excitement.

Jordan captured that sense, and her audience, with her opening lines: "There is something different about this opening night. What is different, and what is special, is that I, Barbara Jordan, am a Keynote speaker." Needless to say, the attitude of the delegates reflected that of Jordan, and she had their attention for the rest of the speech.

Similar excitement awaited Senator Glenn. His speech was the first major address of the Convention. As such, it would set the tone for the rest of the week. The delegates expected oratorical dynamite--but got a wet firecracker. Glenn seemed to be going his best to put a damper on the mood of his audience. He seemed
almost to be reproaching them when he said, "Now is the time for all citizens to accept their obligation to participate." Glenn's mood was one of calm, steady, sincere determination; almost the bearing of a college lecturer before a class. Unfortunately for Glenn, his "class" had been expecting bombastic oratory.

On one last level, though, Glenn still had the opportunity to capture his audience. But his voice was a monotone, doing nothing to excite the delegates. Glenn's diction was faulty as he attempted to make himself heard over an arena that was paying little attention. And his phrasing was amateurish and convoluted, as in this passage: "We face great challenges, but we also face great and wondrous opportunities to correct those faults where we have fallen so far short of where we should be."

To complete the picture of contrast, Rep. Jordan excelled in all three areas of speech elements. Her voice is perhaps the most magnificent in politics. It led one observer to remark upon hearing it for the first time that "it was as if the gates of Heaven had opened." And as for diction, no one speaks more clearly or distinctly than Barbara Jordan. David Rosenbaum of the New York Times compared Jordan's vocal crispness to that of a Shakespearian actor. And Jordan's phrasing that night was magic, as in this example: If we promise, we must deliver. If we propose, we must produce. If we ask for sacrifices, we must be the first to give."

In short, Barbara Jordan's speech was a classic example of everything the Keynote is supposed to be—exciting, inspiring, and
beautifully delivered, all qualities sadly lacking in this Keynote Address of Senator John Glenn.

As might be expected, the results of the two speeches were as different as the addresses themselves. For Barbara Jordan, all was right with the world. Time magazine wrote, "Jordan's speech will take its place among Democratic Convention oratorical classics." And the New York Times editorialized, "If the delegates had been willing to match their cheers with their votes, Barbara Jordan might have won the Democratic Presidential nomination."

Even today, the impact of that speech remains alive. Jordan is now voluntarily retired from the U. S. House of Representatives, and is considered a likely choice to fill the next vacancy on the U. S. Supreme Court--as soon as a Democrat is back in the White House to make the appointment. Such speculation about Jordan's future began after that stirring Keynote Address.

Senator Glenn's speech, on the other hand, put an end to some speculation about his future. Before the speech, Glenn was considered one of Jimmy Carter's top choices to fill the second spot on the Democratic ticket. The Miami Herald, in fact, wrote in an editorial published the day the speech was delivered that Glenn would be Carter's choice. Such speculation died quickly after the speech. Carter aide Hamilton Jordan remarked immediately afterward, with a broad grin on his face, "Well, we know now who we don't want for vice-president, don't we?" And James Grissinger of Pi Kappa Delta wrote in The Forensic, "We watched and listened
to John Glenn. What we saw and heard was trite, unimaginative, lacking in style and imagery, lackluster in delivery—and deadly dull."

As he delivered a speech virtually no one listened to, John Glenn may have wished he were back, 160 miles above the surface of the Earth, gazing down upon vast continents and oceans, and listening, on his radio, to Barbara Jordan.
On January 20, 1981, Governor Ronald Reagan fulfilled a twelve year dream and became President Ronald Reagan. In doing so, he dumbfounded many observers who had claimed that Reagan could not capture that high office. As Newsweek stated November 17, 1980, "Once he was the most underestimated man in American politics—a washed-up movie star, it was said, who was too old, too simple and too far right to be President." Somehow though, that washed-up movie star managed to garner 463 electoral votes. Certainly, from our perspective, we must wonder what rhetorical strategies Reagan used.

In analyzing the campaign rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, I will concentrate on his nomination-acceptance speech. Professor Kurt W. Ritter demonstrates in the Fall 1980 Central States Speech Journal that nomination-acceptance speeches tend to be repetitious of previous material, noting that "the unoriginal quality of the acceptance speeches is significant, for it suggests that they are a kind of brief rhetorical summary of what the candidate believes are his best appeals." Time magazine's article of July 28, 1980 confirms that Reagan adhered to that philosophy, noting that "he repackaged phrases and lines from speeches he has been making for months." Thus, Reagan's nomination-acceptance speech should be representative of his rhetoric. To illuminate that rhetoric, I will utilize
the Quest Story. I chose this methodology for a couple of reasons. Reagan's strong personal identification with the campaign, saying for instance, "I will not stand by and watch this great country destroy itself," and his call for a "great national crusade" indicate that Quest could provide us with a useful way into Reagan's rhetoric. Further, the President provides us with an opportunity to begin to examine the effects of Quest on practical politics.

W. H. Auden originated this form of the Quest Story with his article "The Quest Hero" (Texas Quarterly, Winter, 1961). Herman Steltzner modified Auden's analysis slightly and put this literary criticism in a rhetorical setting with his article "The Quest Story and Nixon's November 3, 1969 Address" (QJS, April 1971). Professor Steltzner details the five essential elements in a Quest: 1) A Prized Object and/or person to be found and possessed or married, 2) a Long Journey to find the Object because its whereabouts is not originally known to the seekers, 3) a Hero, 4) the Guardians of the Object who must be overcome before it can be obtained, and 5) the Helpers, who with their knowledge and/or magical powers assist the Hero and but for whom he would never succeed.

Steltzner succinctly explains the importance of the Prized Object. "To look for a paperclip," he says, "is not a true quest." He tells us the Prized Object should have "magnitude" and involve "potentially great risks and great moments." Ronald Reagan provides such an Object, but before he reveals it, he reviews the situation with an eye toward setting up his Prized Object. He states, "Never before in our history have Americans been called upon to face three
grave threats to our very existence—a disintegrating economy, a weakened defense, and an energy policy based on the sharing of scarcity." The candidate then denigrates the opposition, saying they think that "America has passed its zenith," or that "it's had its day in the sun." He directly confronts the enemy: "I utterly reject that view." Only then does he reveal his Object: "Together, let us make this a New Beginning." Reagan has made clear that the America his opponents see, "a future of sacrifice and few opportunities," cannot be prized. His "new beginning" is a "renewal" of our "compact of freedom." It requires "a commitment to care for the needy," and "courage and sacrifice to defend our values," but it could allow us to "recapture our destiny" and "make America great again." The Prized Object has been located and defined.

Time plays a central role in Reagan's analysis and thus the Long Journey phase assumes importance. Steltzner explains that long journeys dignify the Object but he also points out that to satisfy listeners, one must make the timeless future somehow concrete and reasonably immediate. Reagan dignifies his Object by incorporating the American Revolution renewed: Abe Lincoln renewed and now Ronald Reagan renews. He associates himself with timeless American values and a timeless American journey. The nominee fulfills the second condition in two ways. His very presence as the nominated candidate of a major political party convinces his audience that the Quest can succeed. He also repeatedly assures them that "the time is now." Not only does this sentence charge
the air with urgency, but also it allows his audience to feel that, in Steltzner's words, "The battle with time can be won."

To lead the Quest, a Hero must appear. Professor Steltzner explains that not just anybody can win the Prized Object, but only one person with the right qualifications. He does, however, specify two types of Hero. The first has a "superior aura manifest to all", while the second has a "concealed aura." He turns out to be the Hero when his manifest betters have failed. Heroes of the first type had failed in this Quest. Reagan's conservative predecessor, the messianic Barry Goldwater, had fallen in 1964, and certainly the ghost of his campaign lurked in the corners. Reagan explicitly cites another superior aura in FDR. Roosevelt had promised to "abolish useless offices" and make government "give up luxuries." This humble candidate swears to redeem those unkept promises. He identifies himself as a second-aura hero through his style and his content. *Time*, for instance, says the speech sounded as if "the thoughts had just occurred to him, and darn it, he was going to share them with his friends all over the country." Reagan talks of "practical down to earth things, not ideological commitments." Humble Grandpa Ron had fallen in 1968 and 1976. But now his warm style has matured and helps lead this Quest to victory.

First though, he must overcome the Guardians. Early on Reagan identifies the major issue of the campaign--the direct moral and political responsibility of the Democratic Party leadership in the White House and Congress. Reagan runs down a list of specifics,
then asks, "Can anyone look at the record of the Administration and say, 'Well done'?" Significantly though, Reagan creates no other Guardians than the Administration. Not the labor unions, not the moderate Republicans, no one. He thus assures himself of Guardians, but he's isolated and weakened them.

The designation of the negative side of the coin, the Guardians, naturally has an effect on the positive side, the Helpers. Ronald Reagan opens his ranks to all Americans. "Everywhere," Reagan says, he and his wife Nancy, "have met thousands of Democrats, Independents and Republicans . . . bound together in that community of shared values." Theodore Sorensen, JFK's speech writer, sums it up by saying, "Ronald Reagan tried to make the tent he was constructing large enough to hold a significant portion of the population, and I think he did."

Election day proved that. Steltzner points out that even when a speech fits all of the criteria, as this one demonstrably does, the critic must look at the political effects since, in this case and Nixon's, an effect was the goal. Reagan won an overwhelming victory.

But the very use of Quest may damage his Presidency. As Steltzner explains, Quest inherently magnifies the issues and the Hero. Yet as various experts including Gerald Ford, Harry Truman, and Newsweek magazine have pointed out, the presidency does not have as much power as people think it does. Put a larger than life Hero into a life-sized presidency, and you get high expectations. George Bush put it this way: "Even people who weren't enthusiastic about
us at first are hoping for an awful lot. It's unrealistic and they have to realize that." Quest does not help here, and the political ramifications could be devastating. Just imagine if Jason had returned with only half of the Golden Fleece.
Andy Heaton, 1982

As Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill put it, Wednesday, July 29, 1981 was a great day for the aristocracy. In the morning there was the royal wedding. And in the afternoon, the "royal" tax cut. Despite strong objections from its Democratic leadership, the House of Representatives approved the massive, three-year tax cut plan supported by Republican President Ronald Reagan.

The final vote wasn't even close: 238 to 195. Yet as late as two days before the crucial vote, it looked like a majority of House members would support the Democratic alternative plan. The New York Times of July 30, 1981 concluded: "The principle reason behind the President's dramatic victory was Mr. Reagan's televised speech to the nation" on Monday night. One Democratic congressman put it more bluntly: "I sure hope he doesn't go on the tube again ... and say no more sex."

Usually, we tend to attribute Reagan's success on television to the "media presence" that comes from his former profession. In the May, 1981 edition of the Quarterly Journal of Speech, Goodwin Berquist and James Goldin of Ohio State University support this conclusion. Yet if we give Reagan credit for excellence only in the non-verbal aspects of communication, we are probably selling the man short. Besides being well-delivered, Reagan's tax speech was well written. And the writing, the Associated Press noted,
was principally Reagan's own. Unlike many politicians, Reagan relies very little on speechwriters.

Without a doubt, President Reagan will continue to speak out on important issues. And if we are to completely understand Reagan's effectiveness as a communicator—and as President—we need to pay some attention to the too-often-ignored Verbal aspect of Reagan's success in analyzing his tax speech. Murray Edelman of the University of Wisconsin provides us with the means of doing this in his book *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*.

Drawing from a number of sources including works of Leon Festinger, pollster George Gallup, and Kenneth Burke, Edelman presents an explanation of how and why the political process is influenced by the symbolic reality created by the rhetoric of our leaders. The fact that Edelman relies heavily on examples from former Presidents suggests the suitability of his work for an analysis of Reagan's rhetoric. An investigation of the work reveals three concepts which help to explain the success of Reagan's tax speech: Strategy, Simplification, and Ambiguity. While Edelman does not claim political rhetoric *must* contain these three elements to be successful, he suggests that each of them can make an important contribution toward success.

The first of the three concepts is Strategy. Edelman states that in the face of a serious problem, "a leader whose acts suggest he [is following a strategy] finds it easy to attract a loyal and enthusiastic following." Whether the strategy itself is any good is less important. Edelman includes the observation that when
people are convinced a leader has a plan, they do not hold him or her immediately responsible for 100 percent success.

Reagan capitalized on this concept of strategy by characterizing his tax cut proposal as an essential part of his economic program. He noted that steps toward economic recovery had already been taken with passage of the administration's budget cuts. But, he added, "Our economic package is a . . . carefully constructed plan . . . . Only if Congress passes all of its major components does it have any real chance of success." Reagan further emphasized strategy by claiming his Democratic opposition didn't have one. "They've put a tax program together for one reason only," Reagan said, "to provide themselves with a political victory. Never mind that it won't solve the economic problems confronting our country . . . ." Now Reagan never promised that his plan would solve the nation's problems, saying only that it offered a chance. But he did emphasize that he had a strategy, while his opposition did not. And that distinction played a crucial role in the public's acceptance of Reagan's plan. As the Chicago Tribune of August 2 reported, "True, the Democrats wanted to cut taxes, too . . . . But Reagan's cuts were part of his comprehensive economic plan . . . . [Thus] the public was quite willing to be mobilized in the cause."

But strategy was not the only reason Reagan won support for his proposal. He was also able to capitalize on Edelman's second concept, Simplification. Edelman notes that large numbers of people cannot recognize or tolerate complex situations and that the best way to reach these people is through simplifying--even
over-simplifying—the message. Particularly in the face of poor economic conditions, Edelman says, people are willing to accept distortions of reality if they serve to counter feelings of insecurity.

One of the remarkable things about Reagan's tax speech was that it covered an extremely technical subject without getting bogged down in statistics. Reagan accomplished that by engaging in a good deal of simplification. One example occurred when Reagan told his audience about the all-savers plan—a proposal that allows financial institutions to offer tax-free interest on certain accounts. Reagan said only that the plan included "short-term but substantial assistance for the hard-pressed thrift industry." That explanation was accurate, but far from complete. Actually, the all-savers plan is quite complicated and rather controversial, for some analysts feared it might actually hurt the thrift industry in the long run. In his speech, however, Reagan omitted the complexities of the plan, keeping his message easy to understand.

Reagan applied the same principle of Simplification to the other provisions of his tax bill and, in one of the speech's most memorable lines, to the entire bill as a whole. Reagan quoted the Southern farmer who reduced the entire tax-cut issue to its most basic form in asking his congressman, "Well, are you fur 'em, or agin 'em?" Reagan was thus able to transform a complex question into a referendum on his personal popularity. Though perhaps a bit of a distortion, at a time when his standing in the polls was high, Reagan made effective use of Simplification. Newsweek
magazine concluded that Ronald Reagan is better at simplifying issues than any president since Harry Truman.

Just as this concept of Simplification appeals to the public's dislike of complexity, so does the third concept—Ambiguity. Ambiguous terms can have a variety of meanings, but almost always evoke an emotional response. Edelman gives the example of a politician who might claim a proposed law would "curb unfair tactics" and "safeguard the public interest." It would be difficult to argue with goals such as those, until you realize that terms such as "unfair" and "public interest" mean different things to different people. By using ambiguous language, a politician can conceal possible differences with the public.

Reagan used this strategy of ambiguity extensively throughout his speech. The Republican plan, Reagan said, would "renew the American spirit." It would "make America great again." And of course it offered the ever-present "new beginning." Those terms and others like them are examples of the type of language referred to by John Cragin of Illinois State University and Donald Shields of the University of Missouri at Saint Louis in their 1976 study of presidential campaign rhetoric. Cragin and Shields found that the most successful political language is composed of "safe political phrases that most Americans would have difficulty rejecting", ambiguous phrases very much like the ones found scattered throughout Reagan's tax speech.

Reagan thus included elements of all three of Edelman's concepts: Strategy, Simplification, and Ambiguity. Obviously we cannot discount entirely the effects of Reagan's delivery on the
success of the speech. But Hendrik Hertzberg, a former speechwriter for Jimmy Carter, supports the general contention that it was textual elements that were the crucial factor. In The New Republic, Hertzberg called REagan's speech "an impressive piece of work" though he never saw nor heard it, only reading a copy of the text. As Hertzberg remarked, even if it had been delivered in a dull monotone it still would have been effective. Delivered instead in Reagan's usual style, the speech generated an amazing response from the public. Western Union reported a ten-fold increase in traffic; moreover, the House and Senate received more than twice as many letters as usual over the next three days. And the response was overwhelmingly in favor of the President. One representative, Bo Ginn of Georgia, reported only four pro-Democrat phone calls out of more than 400, and one of those was from Jimmy Carter. The avalanche of public support had an undeniable effect on Congress. As Representative Bill Nelson of Florida put it, "Previous Presidents tried and failed to go over the heads of Congress. But in this age of electronic media, a good communicator can go straight to the public with a simple and direct message."

There's no doubt Reagan is a good communicator. And, as we've seen through analysis of his July 19th tax speech, he's capable of delivering that simple and direct message as well. That's something we need to keep in mind as we observe Reagan's performances in the legislative battles that lie ahead in the next few years. He probably won't win them all, but Ronald Reagan is certainly one persuasive speaker who can make more than a trite solution out of "Write your congressman"!
Lyndon Johnson told the nation, "Have no fear of escalation, I am trying everyone to please. And though it isn't really war, we're sending 50,000 more to help save Vietnam from Vietnamese." Tom Paxton's protest song of the 1960's was only one of many, as America raised its voice against the conduct of American involvement in Southeast Asia. And one of the basic problems, as Paxton suggests, was what Lyndon Johnson told the nation. Johnson's rhetoric contributed greatly to his problems, and to public dissent surrounding the Vietnam conflict. And a study of that rhetoric can tell us much about the Vietnam War, and about Presidential war discourse in general.

Robert Ivie's October, 1974 Quarterly Journal of Speech article, "Presidential Motives for War" provides us with a lens for viewing Johnson's rhetoric. Ivie analyzes, "The vocabulary of American Presidents to locate the images they project in justification of War,"--precisely the rhetorical process in which Lyndon Johnson engaged.

Ivie identifies four stages in Presidential war discourse, which he then establishes as a criteria for successful war rhetoric. In the first stage, the President will identify an ideal, a moral principle, which is being threatened and necessitates our entry into war. Within this stage there operate god-terms, defined by
Richard Weaver as representing that ideal to which all others are secondary. Next the President will identify a crisis which threatens that ideal. Third, he will show the cause of that crisis, and in so doing, "will persistently hold the enemy accountable for the crisis confronting America." Within each of these two areas operate devil-terms, the antithesis of the god-term. In Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam War rhetoric, the second and third areas of Ivie's method were closely intertwined. Finally, the President will propose the solution—war. It is crucial that war be proposed only as a last resort, pursued only when other, peaceful approaches have failed to restore the ideal or prevent the disharmony. Johnson's rhetoric fits this classification system remarkably well, and it allows us to understand the failure of his rhetoric, through his failure to fulfill that fourth stage of Ivie's method.

Johnson was remarkably effective, however, in that first stage—identifying the ideal. To Johnson, freedom was the ideal, and it operated as a god-term worth defending in Vietnam. A February, 1966 Johnson address, for example, contained 49 separate references to freedom, such as, "Tonight, in South Vietnam, more than 200,000 of our young Americans stand there fighting for your freedom." "The American forces of freedom," he declared, "were defending freedom's frontier."

Even two years later, with dissent over the war reaching its peak, Johnson stuck to his rhetorical guns. In his famous March 30, 1968 address in which Johnson announced a temporary halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and that he would not seek re-election to
the White House, Johnson continued to identify freedom as the operative ideal. In reference to South Vietnam he said, "Its people maintain their determination to be free of domination by the North."

Thus did Johnson's rhetoric identify freedom as the ideal, the god-term. But his rhetoric also had to show the corresponding devil-terms, which Ivie writes operate within the framework of "the crisis" and "the cause of the crisis."

In Johnson's rhetorical scheme of things, the crisis was aggression--hostility against South Vietnam. F. M. Kail writes in his book *What Washington Said* that in 1965, "Aggression became the principal symbol for hostile activity in South Vietnam." And the accompanying devil-term which served to identify the cause of that crisis was, of course, Communism. A January, 1966 Johnson address served to make the link between Communism and aggression quite clear through the President's effective use of a "before-after" scenario. The before portion was pre-war, idyllic Vietnam:

> Not too many years ago, Vietnam was a peaceful land. In the North was an independent, Communist government. In the South the people struggled to build a nation, with the friendly help of the United States.

This section was followed by the after phase.

> Then, a little more than six years ago, North Vietnam decided on conquest. And from that day to this, soldiers and supplies have flowed from North to South in a swelling stream, swallowing the remnants of revolution in aggression.

And from that point on in the speech, for the next nine paragraphs, Johnson made 12 separate references to "conquest," "assault," and "aggression." The symbolism was unmistakable: the threat to
freedom—the ideal, the god-term—came from Communist aggression, the crisis and its cause, the devil terms. And as F. M. Kail makes clear, for the next three years until Johnson left the White House he was remarkably consistent in linking "Communism" with "aggression."

For the first three stages of Ivie's method, then, Johnson's rhetoric would seem to be perfectly appropriate Presidential War discourse, and it would seem to offer us little insight into Johnson's rhetorical failure. It is in that fourth stage, identifying the solution, that Johnson's rhetoric fell far short of "appropriate"—perhaps "disastrous" would be a better term.

Like Eisenhower and Kennedy before him, Johnson stressed that the U.S. role in the solution was to support South Vietnam—to supplement their activity. In April of 1965, for example, Lyndon Johnson told the nation, "We have made a national pledge to HELP South Vietnam to defend its independence." Once again, Johnson's approach had not changed three years later. By the time of his denouement, the March 30, 1968 address, Johnson told the public, "Our presence there has always rested on this basic belief: that the main burden for preserving their freedom must be carried out by the South Vietnamese themselves."

For Eisenhower and Kennedy, it was legitimate to speak of a limited U.S. responsibility, since our commitment there was relatively limited. The number of troops being sent and dollars being spent seemed appropriate, or at least rational, for a nation that was supporting another.
Johnson's escalation was an entirely different rhetorical situation. If the primary burden was still South Vietnam's, many Americans wondered why was the U.S. committing 500,000 young men, and billions of dollars a year, to the fight? It seemed to most of us that the U.S. was shouldering the burden which Johnson kept telling us was Vietnam's.

Ivie also points out that war becomes an acceptable course only when the public believes it is the only means available to protect the ideal. By presenting Vietnamese action as an alternative means, Johnson served to undermine the justification for the massive American involvement. If the South Vietnamese could still act on their own behalf, the U.S. action was premature--and, to the American public, unjustifiable.

That the failure of Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam War rhetoric occurred in the solution phase was demonstrated in the character of the public protest surrounding the Vietnam War. Much of that protest centered on the actual conduct of the war--the solution. Senator William Fulbright and Arthur Schlesinger both argued that by bombing North and South Vietnam, the U.S. was destroying the very people we were trying to "save." New Left political activist Carl Oglesby went so far as to say that the U.S. was destroying itself by our conduct of the War. Later on in the 1960's questions did begin to arise about whether there really was "freedom" in South Vietnam, and about the "aggressive" nature of the Communists in North Vietnam--but these questions arose later, after Johnson's difficulties with the solution phase, and the conduct of the war,
had undermined his credibility and paved the way for the downfall of his administration.

A study of Johnson's rhetoric yields several conclusions. The first concerns Robert Ivie's methodology itself. Johnson's failure to fulfill that fourth stage of Ivie's prescription, and the public response he met with, indicate that at least that portion of the criteria is valid, and that a president who fails to meet it is likely to be met with a massive credibility gap.

Even more important, many of the questions about the differences between a "full-scale war" and a so-called "limited war" seem to gain at least a partial answer. At least on the rhetorical level, a president who enters a limited war situation may be taking upon himself an impossible burden. As Ivie describes it, war is a final, ultimate, no-holds-barred solution. But the very term "limited war" implies limited means and objectives. This contradiction in the nature of a limited war may make it impossible for a leader to justify such a course. Certainly, further study is needed into the possibility that a new sub-genre of limited war rhetoric may be forming within the overall category of presidential war rhetoric—research which should center on our involvement in Korea, our intervention in Lebanon in 1956, in the Dominican Republic in 1964, and the current situations in El Salvador and Lebanon.

The difficulty faced by Lyndon Johnson justifying our involvement in Vietnam may also indicate a positive trend for our society. Our society may finally be becoming sophisticated enough, and our people wise enough, that we will never again allow our leaders to
justify easily war—the destruction, the death of thousands of young men, women, and children—to justify easily what is almost never "justifiable."
A recent T-shirt proudly pictured a football coach strolling across a calm lake. The caption read: "If he can't walk on water, he sure knows where the stumps are." His wife had been quoted as he slipped into bed, "God, you're feet are cold!" The coach responded, "Around the house, dear, you can call me Paul."

Although few people may remember this coach on a first name basis, his nickname along with his incredible accomplishments as coach at Alabama will long be remembered. The legend is Paul "Bear" Bryant.

But Bryant is known for much more than a collection of winning statistics printed in a trivia book. According to Alabama's House Speaker Pro Tem, Roy Johnson, "He was a legend and an inspiration to the young people of this state. His life and his accomplishments have enhanced the image of Alabama throughout the nation and the world.

Bryant's significant influence raised his status to a mythical level and he was even worshipped. Many stories developed about Bryant that strengthened this rhetorical image. One such story had him shopping for a burial plot, and a cemetery salesmen showed him one for a thousand dollars. Bryant said, "That seems a little steep, boy. I'm only going to be here for three days."
By examining Bryant's rhetorical image, many interesting analogies can be drawn that support the idea of Bryant as Alabama's Secular Christ. Because of Bryant's significant influence, his rhetorical persona is worthy of our careful consideration.

In this criticism, I will concentrate on the later part of Bryant's career which developed his rhetorical image because it is most likely how Bryant will be remembered. To illuminate the impact of the myth, I will use his retirement speech delivered on December 15, 1982 as a prime example of his rhetoric. The application of ideas from two rhetorical critics effectively illustrate the concept of Bryant as a Secular Christ. First, Kenneth Burke discusses the structure of a rhetorical myth and secondly, Ernest Bromann points out how a myth propagates as disciples spread the word.

Kenneth Burke, always on the lookout for analogies, in his book *The Rhetoric of Motives*, asks the questions. Our culture formed about the redemption of the sacrifice of a crucified Christ. What happens in an era of post Christian Science when the ways of socialization have been secularized? Must some person or persons take over the redemptive role?

To answer these questions using Bryant as a role model, one must determine if Bryant possesses the necessary characteristics in the structure of a rhetorical myth. Three credentials are imperative to qualify Bryant as a Christ figure: mutual beliefs, strong leadership, and what Burke labels as the essence of religion, sacrifice.
In order for an audience member to worship Bryant, Burke would claim their interests must be joined. The more common ground between speaker and audience, the stronger the identification, understanding, and appreciation of ideas. Bryant's rhetorical myth spread his beliefs like an Alabama star: bright and hot at its origin, but some heat and light radiated across the nation. To an unquestioning Alabama fan, Bryant could do no wrong, but respect and admiration could even come from a dedicated Cornhusker.

Besides identifying with believers in football, Bryant was also noted as a strong Christian. It was said an athiest in Alabama is someone who didn't believe in Bear Bryant. Bookstores carried postcards picturing Bryant walking on water saying, "I Believe."

Bryant began believing as a young child in Moro Bottom, Arkansas. His parents had only one book in the house, the Bible: and the family's social life existed at one regular place: the Smith Chapel, about a quarter mile from his home. His mother wanted him to become a preacher, and Bryant felt he had.

Although Bryant never led a congregation in church, he demonstrated strong leadership on the football field and produced the best college coaching record of all time. Bryant said, "God did give me the gift of leading men. I can do that. So I don't try to save the world. I just go at it one football player at a time."

As a leader, Bryant instilled a God-like fear and respect into his players and assistant coaches. John David Crow, a Heisman trophy winner, was afraid to knock on his door to interrupt him. And after being ordered to be at Bryant's office first thing
in the morning, assistant coach Dude Henessey, not knowing what first thing meant, slept on the office floor that night.

One coaching technique used by Bryant that put fear into his players and positioned the Bear as an omniscient God was his use of the coaching tower. According to an interview I had with one of his players, "When Bryant climbed to the top of the tower platform, you didn't want him coming down until practice was over or it meant trouble." Sports Illustrated, November 23, 1981 writes, "The gridiron King will zero in on this one or that one for two or three plays. But of course, no one down there knows whom he might be watching at any given moment. But everyone feels the Bear is coming right down on him which is the way he wants it."

This God-like judgment gave even more power to the rhetorical myth, but the more power, the more Bryant remained humble. His Christ-like humility has a significant argumentative function in his rhetoric. In his retirement speech, Bryant uses an enthymeme with the premise, "We lost two big football games we should have won," and draws the conclusion, "I've done a poor job of coaching." Bryant jumps past a few small mistakes and his audience must concentrate on his overall coaching ability, which really cannot be denied. However, Bryant's fans do not fall for this type of argument. Senior majorette for Alabama, Kim Norris, says: "Nobody's supposed to beat Bear Bryant. But we know it's not his fault, whatever he says. It's the quarterback who fumbled or it's just a bad day, but it's never Coach Bryant."
The third characteristic of a mythic figure, and very important according to Burke, is sacrificing. In his retirement speech, Bryant makes the supreme sacrifice of giving up his important coaching position for the football program. He says: "They deserve better coaching than they've been getting from me this year, and my stepping down is an effort to see that they get that better coaching from someone else."

Throughout his career, his work and his vision of winning are propagated by groups of disciples. Ernest Bormann, in his 1972 QJS article, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," constructs a vision of fantasy themes that chain out in speaker-audience transactions, in viewers of television broadcasts, in listeners to radio programs, and in diverse settings for public and intimate communication in a given society.

Bryant's rhetorical vision is propagated by three groups of disciples: the football players, the fans, and finally the reporters.

Bryant's football players spread his beliefs by winning football games and Bryant didn't forget this fact. One may wonder how well Bryant remembered the thousands of players he coached over the years. Well, one player returned after three years of pro ball, and Bryant not only remembered him but also the name of the girl he used to date. Each football Saturday Bryant's players practiced their religion in a church called Bryant-Denny stadium, and seated in the rows of pews along the sidelines, fans wildly shouted the secular equivalents to "Alleluiahs and Amens."
Like his brief resignation speech, Bryant didn't have to say much to please the sellout crowds that attended his games. Bryant converted fans around the nation to Alabama's popular religion through his actions. The Bear was a winner, and a record 323 wins had gained him quite a following.

Bryant's rhetorical myth had significantly chained out due to one disciple group: the media. In fact, Bryant delivered his resignation speech in a small press room to an audience of three-fourths reporters. Of course, his speech was heard by more than this immediate audience. TV, radio, magazines, and newspapers covered the event, and a copy of his speech was even printed in the program of his final football game. College football fans knew a mythical hero was hanging up his houndstooth hat.

Obviously, Bear Bryant is not a true savior, and football is not an authentic religion. However many Christ analogies can illuminate Bryant's rhetorical myth. Because of mutual beliefs, strong leadership, and sacrifice, Bryant possessed the appropriate mythical structure. And through the football players, fans, and reporters, Bryant's rhetorical myth propogated to the end of his career.

However, Kenneth Burke, in his book, _The Rhetoric of Religion_, speaks of Christ as having retired from the world though at the same time without having retired. The beliefs communicated by Bryant's rhetorical myth are still very evident today. The University of Alabama was highly ranked in the nation this year, and other coaches are preaching ideas that they learned from Bryant. In fact, Ray
Perkins, who had once been at Alabama under Bryant, returned from the pros to coach the Crimson Tide. However he removed the coaching tower since he realized he could only continue God's work. Whether they will be as successful without Bryant, it is difficult to predice. But they will no doubt remember that believing and winning are the "Bear" necessities.
During the recent history of the American presidency, brothers have often played important roles. During the Kennedy years, John, Robert, and sometimes even Ted would be involved in major policy decisions. Richard Nixon sometimes had trouble controlling the questionable business dealings of his brother, Donald. And, of course, there were Jimmy, and Billy. At first it seemed as though the only major problems associated with Billy Carter were that he guzzled beer and relieved himself in public. But, as it seems with all brothers, Billy was around when Jimmy needed him . . . the least. For it was during the summer of 1980, as the Iranian hostage crisis, the sad shape of the American economy, and the impending Democratic National Convention began to close around President Jimmy Carter, that Billy Carter's name was splashed across American newspaper headlines with reports of possible illegal business transactions between Billy and the government of Libya. Yet, when it seemed that Billy might be the final nail in Jimmy's political coffin, Jimmy was able to resurrect his hold on the presidency through Ronald Reagan's favorite medium, television. On August fourth, 1980, as a skeptical American electorate looked on, Jimmy Carter held a nationally-televised press conference in the East Room of the White House. On the day before the press conference, New York Times columnist Terrence Smith wrote that, unless Carter was
extraordinarily successful at the conference, Billygate would remain a nagging political headache that would stay with him throughout the presidential election campaign. Yet, at the conference, Carter put on the show of his life, defending not only the actions of his brother, but his own actions in permitting Billy to deal with the Libyans. Carter statements at the conference are an excellent example of the use of political apologia. It seems appropriate, then, that we examine Carter's statements with a rhetorical tool designed to be used in studying apologetic addresses. "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves; On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," by B. L. Ware and Will Linkugel, provides us with just such an appropriate tool to examine Carter's statements. For, as they note, "The questioning of a man's moral nature, motives, or reputation, is qualitatively different from the challenging of his policies. Witnesses to such a personal charge are most easily and most completely satisfied only by the most direct of responses by the accused." And, in fact, Carter's press conference was just such a direct response, because Billygate was just such a case where Jimmy Carter's reputation was called into question. For, as one analyst noted, this scandal, to the American public, was another example of Carter's ineptitude and mismanagement, "another piece of plaster loose behind the wallpaper." Our analysis here can be threefold. First, we need to look, in greater depth, at the method put forth by Ware and Linkugel and to describe those parts of the method relevant to our analysis. Then, we can examine Carter's remarks in light of the method, and finally, we can look at Carter's success, and the effects of that success.
In their article, Ware and Linkugel argue that a speaker giving an apologetic address will usually adopt a major rhetorical posture which helps to place in the minds of the audience what the speaker is attempting to accomplish. As we look at Carter's press conference remarks of August fourth, 1980, we can clearly see the attempts by Carter to clear his name; Carter is obviously seeking acquittal from public opinion and the press. Ware and Linkugel would classify such a posture as being "absolutive," as Carter sought acquittal by "focusing audience attention upon the particulars or specifics of the charge." In adopting this posture, Ware and Linkugel argue that a speaker would use strategies indicating the presence of two factors of verbal self-defense. These factors are "denial," and "differentiation." Denial consists of "the simple disavowal by the speaker of any participation in, relation to, or positive sentiment toward whatever it is that repels the audience." Differentiation, on the other hand, "subsumes those strategies which serve the purpose of separating some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship from some larger context within which the audience presently views that attribute." The movement on the part of the audience is to view the attribute as being less abstract, more specific.

Having briefly examined Ware and Linkugel's work on apologia, we can turn our attention to Carter's press conference remarks of August fourth, 1980. While at the conference Carter used strategies indicating the presence of two other factors of verbal self-defense—bolstering and transcendence. His use of such strategies was qualitatively and quantitatively insignificant in comparison to his use
of strategies indicating the presence of denial and differentiation. As we look at strategies termed as denial, we see that Carter used such strategies from the beginning to the end of the press conference. In answering the first question, "Do you know where the Libyan payments did go and how Billy used the money?," Carter responded, "No, I don't know where the money went, or where it might go." When asked about whether he knew that Billy had received money from Libya, Carter stated, "No, I never had any indication that Billy was receiving any money until I read about it in the newspapers on July 15." In subsequent responses to questions Carter denied knowing of Billy's financial stake in the dealings, denied a personal financial interest in the dealings, and denied having discussed the case with Billy. Carter also relied upon what Ware and Linkugel refer to as "denial of intent" in order to persuade his audience, the American public. Carter states, "Billy did go to Libya," but "without my knowledge or approval." He noted that after one Libyan delegation had visited Georgia, "Billy was severely castigated by [me] ... Following that, I tried to persuade him not to go to Libya," but Billy disobeyed, to which the President stated, "I don't believe there's anything further I could have done that would have been effective."

Besides these strategies of denial, Carter also used strategies classified as differentiation in an important way. A major problem faced by Carter was the "aura of incompetence" that surrounded his administration. Before the press conference, columnist Joseph Kraft noted that, "The President ... [has shown] no capacity to deal with the Billy problem ... [W]hy did it happen? Because Jimmy
Carter is an essentially weak President who does not deal with problems until they hit him in the face." In order to overcome such criticism, Carter had to differentiate--separate--the Billygate issue from the issue of incompetence, to make the audience view Billygate as something less abstract, not simply another example of the incompetence of the administration. In using this strategy, Carter makes the following statement: "I don't believe this has been a comedy of errors, or that we have made many errors. A few, yes, we've made some mistakes--but that was because we were in a hurry to get all the information out. It was much better to have all the information come out ... than if we would have stone-walled the question for two or three weeks." In addition, Carter argues that time would be the ultimate judge of the administration's accomplishments. He noted, "I believe the historic record of this administration will show that it was a competent administration ... and had many notable achievements." What Carter requested is a strategy of differentiation noted by Ware and Linkugel, "... a suppression of judgment until his actions can be viewed from a different temporal perspective."

Given Carter's use of strategies indicating the presence of denial and differentiation, we can conclude that Carter's posture was absolution--that he sought acquittal. Perhaps the best way to verify this conclusion is to examine the public reaction to Carter's statements, thus also gaining some overall measure of Carter's success. First, we see that the audience--the press and the public--was highly impressed by Carter's use of strategies indicating the
presence of denial. Typical newspaper headlines the next day read, "Carter Denies Impropriety in Dealings With his Brother." One New York Times columnist, on the day after the press conference, stated that Carter, by providing a blitzkrieg of information denying the charges, brought the issue to a political climax. Carter's use of strategies showing differentiation reinforced this posture. By separating the Billygate issue from the issue of incompetence, Carter showed the reporters as making a mountain out of a molehill. Herbert Klein, the communication director at the Nixon White House (and therefore an expert on both mountains and molehills), said that Carter kept his cool and made the newsmen look unprofessional. One reporter, Sam Donaldson, even received calls from viewers denouncing him as viscious toward the President. Carter's posture was clearly absolutive.

Yet, what were the direct effects of this posture? For one thing, congressional investigations into the matter all but ended. Senator Robert Dole, who had been pushing for an investigation, the next day backed away, claiming no basis for the charges. According to Washington Post Editor Barry Sussman, Billygate had "gone poof." The reaction among the general public was similar. A New York Times poll conducted the two days before the press conference showed that only forty-seven percent of those polled believed that Carter was telling the truth about Libya. After the press conference, that percentage was fifty-nine percent. In addition, Carter solidified his support among Democratic voters. Before the conference, the preference among Democrats for who should receive the party's
nomination was forty-three percent for Carter and forty-three percent for Kennedy. After the press conference, the margin was fifty-seven percent for Carter, and thirty-two percent for Kennedy. At least in its immediate impact, Carter's press conference was highly successful. In addition, Carter's remarks give us greater insight into the nature of apologia, for we see that apologia can be found not only in those communication events entirely prepared in advance, but also in the more extemporaneous atmosphere of a press conference. We see an affirmation and an extension of Ware and Linkugel's work in that we find that factors of verbal self-defense, and a posture of verbal self-defense, can be found in those communication events not entirely prepared in advance.

Having examined Carter's press conference of August, 1980, we see that Carter was able to use apologia to retain, although briefly, his hold on the presidency. Of course, Carter's remarks did not help him win the November election, but perhaps historians will treat Carter a bit more kindly in light of his brilliant performance.
Everyone likes to be seduced. Everyone enjoys being the center of attention. Who recognizes this more than anyone? TV ads, TV rhetoric. Who are the champions of television commercials? The beer advertisers.

American breweries spent $550 million in 1981 in hopes of getting us to become alcoholics preferring their beer. There are many beer companies and beer ads, at this time though, the fiercest competition on TV seems to be taking place between Miller and Anheuser-Busch as they fight for the number one spot. Since its purchase by Phillip Morris Co. in 1971, Miller has steadily advanced on Anheuser-Busch's coveted crown as the king of beers. As the fight enters the 80's, a rhetorical analysis of Miller's TV ads could provide valuable insight into their battle plan.

In this speech, I will analyze Miller's three main beers: Miller Hi-Life, Lowenbrau and Miller Lite. I will examine three TV commercials offered by Miller, each a representative example of how Miller is trying to sell its beer.

In an attempt to illustrate and understand the rhetoric used by these commercials, I will apply Edward Steele and W. Charles Redding's "The American Values System: A Premise for Persuasion," in conjunction with Walter R. Fisher's "A Motive View of Communication."
First, Steele and Redding arrive at the conclusion that 1) it is possible to locate a body of relatively unchanging values shared by most Americans, and 2) it is possible to observe the explicit and implicit functioning of such values as the underpinning for persuasive, appealing argument. Within their article, Steele and Redding imply that certain images are established through cultural values. Once we see these specific images established in the three commercials, I will move to Fisher's "motive view" of communication.

Fisher says images are subjected to or are attacked by four motives, or kinds of rhetorical situations. They are: Affirmation, concerned with giving birth to an image; Reaffirmation, concerned with revitalizing an image; Purification, the correcting of an image; and Subversion, the undermining of an image. Fisher argues that this manipulation of the image causes a corresponding change in the image's ethos. Persuasion, and hence rhetoric, is then effected.

Our first order from our rhetorical barmaid will be a draw of Miller Hi-Life commercial. The representative Miller ad shows several macho males as they get off work and head to town for a good time at the local bar. Framed behind a cowboy and rural backdrop, general frivolity and good times follow.

The most prominent value displayed is Steele and Redding's Puritan Morality value. Based on an extension of the Puritan work ethic, we now view hard work as being rewarded not with salvation necessarily, but with economic success or impulse gratification. This is established in the Miller as with the production techniques, the song lyrics and the actual story.
With the production techniques, we are subjected to many rapid sequences of pictures. This, coupled with the up-tempo music, helps create the positive tension in the commercial. We know that these guys are not only going to have fun, they're going to have some good clean rowdy fun!

The lyrics of the song and the narrator then clearly establish just what is taking place. We are welcomed to "Miller Time", the end of the day when we are getting our just reward. As the song says, "We've got the beer for what you have in mind." To reinforce this, the narrator tells the potential alcoholic that Miller is the "best beer for the best times."

Finally, the story of the commercial hits us with fast action to reinforce the positive tension. Horses racing cars, swing dancing, heads dunked in a water trough being whipped out spraying water, a six pack of Miller pulled out of a trough, quick entrances and highly energetic people in the bar, back slapping, hat waving and heels up kicking.

The commercial is clearly establishing an identification with the Puritan morality value. We are told that we have worked hard and it is time to have fun. Even more importantly, our reward has to be a Miller. After all, it is the "best beer."

Tieing the image created by the value in with Fisher, it is now apparent that affirmation is being employed.

Affirmation is used in situations when a communicator addresses potential believers in an effort to get them to adopt a "new" concept.
The Miller ad is trying to get the audience to adopt the new concept that Miller is the best and only way to have fun. The new image is a combination of the Puritan Morality and Miller beer.

This new image is driven home at the very end of the commercial. As the song lyrics tell us that "its all yours" the happy bartender thrusts four Millers practically right into your face.

The second round ordered from the rhetorical tavern is the Lowenbrau commercial. Lowenbrau is Miller's high-class beer, designed to appeal to the more affluent drinker. So it is not too surprising that the Lowenbrau ads are built on the foundation of what Steele and Redding call the Material Comfort value. They note that the opportunity to secure material comfort has elicited an unlimited desire for them, which is broadly equated with happiness.

The typical Lowenbrau ad takes place at a weekend cabin retreat. We are greeted with two men chopping wood as their wives return with the groceries. As they go inside, the men decide to reward themselves with a Lowenbrau. The people, their clothes, the cabin and all the surrounding images suggest upper-middle-class status.

As the mood is more relaxed in this commercial, the camera takes long, slow shots. The music is very mellow, suggesting a relaxing weekend at your cabin retreat.

The song lyrics in the background establish the material comfort idea, "Tonight is something special, the beer will pour, but it must be something more somehow--Let it be Lowenbrau." With the narrator telling us that it is a "Great American Beer", one of the
men notes that even though he's so tired, he would have a Lowenbrau even if he had to hold it with two hands.

The commercial is clearly appealing to our material values. The images are all upper-middle class. The cabin owners are clearly affluent by their clothes and even by the fact that to them, chopping wood is recreational, not everyday work.

This material value is subjected to Fisher's concept of Reaffirmation. Reaffirmation describes a situation in which a communicator attempts to revitalize an image or faith already held by the audience.

In the Lowenbrau commercial, that image is clearly one of material gratification. We would all like to be able to have a weekend retreat. While we may not have the cabin, the material comfort, we can have the material comfort of Lowenbrau. We too can end our day like the couples, with a clink of beer mugs raised in toast. It may not be in a grand cabin, but it is Lowenbrau beer.

Lastly, Miller's latest line of beer has been Miller Lite. At first this beer was marketed as a diet brew, but this idea did not catch on. So the approach was dropped. Not surprisingly, the Lite Beer ads now appeal to a Macho Male value. While Steele and Redding do not directly address a Macho value, they do note in their article that they do not make a complete inventory of all American values. It could be argued that the recent attacks on the "men-have-to-be-macho" image is proof in itself that such a value exists.

The representative Miller Lite commercial plays directly to this value. We are confronted with the Miller Lite All Stars at a bowling tournament. The All Stars are made up of retired macho
athletes. We see Bubba Smith, a former football player, poke new holes in a bowling ball with his bare hands, Deacon Jones, a former terror of the gridiron, knocks down three lanes of pins, with just one ball.

The identification of the Macho value is blatant. This is not surprising, as Advertising Age magazine points out, "Brewers know their best customer is the 18 to 49 year-old male, one who quite likely thinks of himself as the macho type."

The problem for Miller is that while women prefer light beer over regular, men still consume 70% of it. To keep the macho image, the diet image has to be negated.

Hence, the commercial is best explained by Fisher's Purification. Purification is found in situations in which a communicator attempts to refine an image. The Lite commercial refines the image by appealing to macho jocks. For every time that we are told that it is less filling, we are immediately reminded that it tastes great.

What's more, the big burly types are ready to force their view right down your throat if you care to disagree. Hardly the kind of image a diet beer would try to identify with. So, if we wish to save a few calories, but still want to be a man, we can maintain our image with Lite beer from Miller.

The success of such image manipulation is best established by the impressive increase in Miller's sales. As Business Week notes, in the last decade, Miller's market share has gone from 4.2% up to 21%. They go on to state that Miller has blossomed from a seventh-place also-ran into a strong number two. The general
feeling seems to be that the praise should be laid at the feet of a massive and innovative advertising strategy. Perhaps the most convincing sign of success comes from Anheuser-Busch. Instead of trying to up-grade their product to stave off the challenge, Anheuser-Busch has decided to fight fire with fire. They increased their advertising budget 245% since 1976, to the tune of 175 million dollars.

So, if you are into rowdy good times at the local bar, relaxing weekends with friends, bowling with the buddies or just browsing through Aristotle, remember,

If you've got the time, Miller's got the rhetoric.
Steve Sudhoff, 1984

A French ambassador once observed, "It is fortunate that diplomats generally have long noses, since usually they cannot see beyond them." In the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union since World War II, it seems that at times both governments have refused to see beyond the ends of their noses in order to make the basic compromises in their own positions which could have led to mutually-beneficial agreements. However, on the afternoon of June 10, 1963, President John Kennedy took a major step toward a more peaceful world. In an address to the graduating class of American University in Washington, D.C., Kennedy announced his willingness to sign a limited nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. Labelled "A Strategy of Peace," the speech was widely acclaimed as the major diplomatic break responsible for the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty two months later. Given the current stagnation of arms control, it seems that we can learn something by examining Kennedy's speech and his diplomatic strategy. In order to do so, we can use a rhetorical tool designed to be used in studying diplomatic speech. In his article entitled, "The Speech of Diplomacy as a Field for Research," published in the March 1950 Central States Speech Journal, Robert T. Oliver provides us with just such an appropriate tool for at least two reasons. First, Oliver lets us analyze the interrelationships between the different parts of
diplomatic speech, forcing us to analyze the specific attributes which give it its effectiveness. Second, Oliver lends some practicality to our analysis. As he notes, "... the effort must be made to determine how speech operates in international relations ... On this shrinking globe ... diplomatic speech [will not] falter ... in its increasingly vital significance to human survival." His words have even more impact, thirty-four years and 19,000 nuclear bombs later. Our analysis here can be in three parts. First, we need to look in greater depth at the method put forth by Oliver and describe those parts of the method relevant to our analysis. Then, we can look at Kennedy's speech in light of the method. And finally, we can look at Kennedy's success, and some of the conclusions that we can draw from that success.

In his article, Oliver essentially notes four functions, or characteristics, of diplomatic speech. These functions differ from speech to speech, and are found in different combinations within each speech. The first characteristic noted by Oliver is that diplomatic speech must attempt to appeal to a tri-level audience. The speaker must attempt not to alienate the domestic constituency of the government he is representing, must avoid making the wrong impact upon the "enemy" audience, and must also seek to influence neutral governments or audiences. The second characteristic of diplomatic speech is that it must be sufficiently ambiguous so that it gives the speaker a loophole to retreat through if he or she so desires. A call to war may be uncontrollable or unsupportable; yet, "reckless talk of the possibilities of peace" may leave the diplomat open for
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attack. Ambiguity must not be so great, however, that the speech fails to move the audience that it is intended to influence.

Rationalization is the third characteristic of diplomatic speech. Responses to world events should appear singular and consistent, directly flowing from past policies; but, since perfect consistency is impossible in a changing world, diplomats must learn to rationalize. A good diplomat, like any good politician, must learn to dance around the distortions and contradictions of his government's policies. Finally, diplomatic speech must be depersonalized. Since policy is determined not just by the speaker, but by the entire government he represents, views expressed by the speaker are never just his own but a synthesis of the views of the policymakers of his government.

Having briefly examined Oliver's work, we can now turn our attention to Kennedy's speech of June 10, 1963. We see that these four characteristics existed in Kennedy's speech, but they are used in different ways and, most importantly, in different proportions.

Initially, we can look at Kennedy's appeals to a tri-level audience. Kennedy's major domestic audience was Congress, since the general public, nearly sixteen months before the next election, would have very little impact on any arms control agreement. Nearly eight months after the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy had to allay Congressional fears of an ill-conceived, hasty agreement, perhaps best summed up by Senate Minority Leader Dirksen from Illinois, who asked if this would be a case of "concession and more concession to Kruschev". Kennedy, after stating that the United States and the
Soviet Union should build upon a mutual abhorrence of war, states, ". . . we can seek a relaxation of tension, without releasing our 
guard." He then goes on to refer to how international organizations 
like the United Nations should be strengthened to solve future world 
conflicts. Kennedy also appeals to a more neutral audience--the 
Western allies. After the construction of the Berlin wall and the 
blockade of West Berlin, Kennedy reaffirms U.S. security promises. 
"Our commitment," he states, "to defend Western Europe and West 
Berlin . . . stands undiminished because of the identity of our 
vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet 
Union at the expense of other nations." Finally, Kennedy appeals to 
the "hostile" audience--the Soviet government--by stressing mutuality 
of interest. Typical of Kennedy's conciliatory tone are the follow-
ing words: " . . . let us . . . direct attention to our common inter-
est and the means by which differences can be resolved . . . . [We] 
all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air . . . . 
And we are all mortal."

A second diplomatic characteristic of Kennedy's speech was its 
ambiguity. Initially, Kennedy defines the problem--world peace-- 
and its solution in rather general terms, thereby justifying almost 
any course of action. For example, he states, "I am talking of 
genuine peace--the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth 
living." He then states: "Genuine peace must be the product of 
many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic . . . chang-
ing to meet the challenge of each new generation." In true politician-
form, he continues: "Our problems are man-made. Therefore, they
can be solved by man." No one, of course, would want to disagree with his hopes, but Kennedy's ambiguity about the specifics of his proposal enabled him to preempt potential criticism from his primary domestic audience--Congress. He states, "The United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere as long as other states do not do so . . . . Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal, binding treaty . . . . [n]or would such a treaty be a substitute for disarmament--but I hope it will help us to achieve it."

Third, Kennedy uses rationalization to justify his stance. The major attribute of Kennedy's speech was that it represented a break from previous U.S. positions--inconsistency, which Robert Oliver says a good diplomat should avoid. Yet Kennedy is able to defend this inconsistency. First, Kennedy argues that the political game has changed, so that the rules must also. For example, Kennedy states, "I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war . . . makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the Allied air forces in the Second World War." The changing world situation can therefore justify any arms control attempt. He goes on: "No treaty . . . can provide absolute minimum security against . . . deception and invasion. But it can . . . offer far more security, and far fewer risks, than an unabated, uncontrolled . . . arms race." This, of course, is from the man who campaigned for the Presidency on the basis of closing the "missile gap."

The final characteristic of diplomatic speech noted by Oliver--depersonalization--is generally lacking in Kennedy's speech. Rather,
his address is distinctive in how it directly ties the speaker into the problem and the solution. "I speak of peace," JFK says, "... as the necessary rational end of rational men." He adds, "I ... declare that the United States [will stop atmospheric testing]."

Overall, Kennedy makes seventeen separate references to himself, while making only four references to the government he is representing.

Despite the absence of a crucial characteristic of diplomatic speech, Kennedy's speech was incredibly successful. Kennedy's top speechwriter, Ted Sorensen, called it JFK's greatest speech. The New Republic magazine of June 22, 1963, stated, "The entire speech breathed a fresh and hopeful spirit that is altogether different from the stale air of the Dulles era." The Soviet Union seemed impressed as well. The entire speech was reprinted in Pravda, something unheard of for an American speech during the Cold War. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson found that, immediately after the speech, Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev felt reassured by Kennedy and was clearly more open-minded about a test ban treaty. Kennedy Advisor McGeorge Bundy called the speech as likely the cause as any for the Soviet decision to sign the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of August, 1963.

From this analysis several conclusions can be drawn. First, the abandonment by Kennedy of an important function of diplomatic speech does not mean that we have to abandon Oliver's model but, rather, refine it. It appears that there can be a trade-off between rationalization and depersonalization in diplomatic speech. In this
case, making the speech more personalized by the use of the top national diplomat made it easier for the speaker to rationalize inconsistency with previous policy positions. We therefore find an affirmation and an extension of Oliver's method. But perhaps more important are the implications of this speech for world peace. By taking bold initiative, an American president was able to sign a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Perhaps such an initiative would not work today. But in this time of short-nosed diplomats, McGeorge Bundy's words come to mind: "... where there is zeal in the search for agreement . . . and a firm use of the powers of the office, the president can become . . . an instrument of hope for all men everywhere."
COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS: GUIDELINES FOR WRITING COMPETITIVE CRITICISMS

by

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B. S., Kansas State University, 1982

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Speech

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1985
ABSTRACT

Because of the complaints within the literature concerning poor argument and shallow analysis in Communication Analysis (CA), this study attempts to determine what characteristics constitute a successful CA. A successful CA was defined as a speech that was in the finals of the American Forensic Association, National Forensic Association or Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha national tournaments, or that won the University of Iowa tournament. Ten such CAs were analyzed. (The analysis consisted of an identification of the rhetorical situation facing a CA, and how CAs operate as arguments and as speeches.) From this analysis, certain characteristics were identified as belonging to a successful CA. Important characteristics to CAs were topic, method, organization and the rhetorical situation. Additionally, it was concluded that CAs can be considered legitimate rhetorical criticisms. From the analysis, specific guidelines for writing a competent competitive criticism were offered.