

SURVEY OF MENNONITE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MATERIAL AID PROGRAMS
IN THREE COUNTRIES FROM 1962-1976 WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS
ON THEIR DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|---|------|
| PREFACE | iv |
| LIST OF TABLES | v |
| Chapter | |
| 1. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| PURPOSE OF STUDY | 4 |
| NEED FOR THE STUDY | 5 |
| METHOD OF STUDY | 7 |
| DEFINITION OF TERMS | 8 |
| 2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE | 10 |
| TYPES OF LITERATURE | 10 |
| NEED FOR FOOD AID | 11 |
| TYPES OF ASSISTANCE | 13 |
| PUBLIC LAW 480 | 15 |
| DISASTER AND FAMINE LITERATURE | 22 |
| 3. THREE-COUNTRY ANALYSIS | 27 |
| HAITI | 27 |
| USE OF MATERIAL AID | 30 |
| JORDAN | 34 |
| P.L. 480 PROGRAM IN JORDAN | 38 |
| FOOD-FOR-WORK DISCUSSION | 40 |
| INDIA | 41 |
| REGULAR DISTRIBUTION PATTERN IN INDIA | 43 |

| | |
|--|----|
| RESPONSE TO BIHAR FAMINE OF 1966-68 | 47 |
| RESPONSE TO THE 1974-75 FOOD SHORTAGE | 51 |
| 4. DATA ANALYSIS | 56 |
| IMPORTANCE OF MATERIAL AID. | 56 |
| QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES | 58 |
| 5. OBSERVATIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. | 70 |
| SUMMARY | 80 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY. | 82 |
| APPENDIXES | |
| A. SAMPLE WEEKLY REPORT OF WORK PROJECT. | 89 |
| B. MATERIAL AID PORTION OF MCC'S PROGRAM | 90 |
| C. QUESTIONNAIRE | 91 |
| D. THE ROLE OF MATERIAL AID. | 95 |

PREFACE

Through the past twelve years in Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) service, my work touched the issues of material aid and development from three perspectives. In Vietnam from 1964-67, and to a lesser extent in Indonesia from 1971-72, I actually planned and carried out material aid distributions. Working at the central offices for four years as Asia Director, I grappled again, but from an administrative viewpoint, with how to help others make best use of material aid. In four succeeding years in the Executive Office, the perspective shifted once more as I dealt with MCC's constituency expectations of how and with what inputs human need might be met. All three categories of experience influenced this study.

My vision for the future of material aid in MCC programs does not necessarily include increasing or decreasing its use. Rather our goal should be to read both past experience and the current scene for the direction they give to future planning. Hopefully this study contributes to that process.

The following persons deserve special acknowledgement and thanks: Dr. Warren Prawl, Extension Specialist, Staff Development, Kansas State University, for guiding me through the project; Dr. Wayne Nafziger and Dr. Thomas Sloan for additional insights and encouragement; the staffs of Farrell Library, Kansas State University, Mennonite Central Committee, Akron, Pennsylvania and Mennonite Archives, Goshen, Indiana; and my wife, Doris, for editing skills.

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | Page |
|--|------|
| 1. Mennonite Central Committee Material Aid Supplies 1943-1976. | 3 |
| 2. Ratio of Material Aid to Cash Contributions | 4 |
| 3. Annual Value of Public Law 480 Shipments. | 16 |
| 4. Material Aid Shipped to Haiti | 29 |
| 5. Material Aid Shipped to Jordan. | 36 |
| 6. Material Aid Shipped to India | 44 |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For thousands of years individuals and communities have banded together to provide assistance to indigent people. Increasingly governments and intergovernmental agencies have taken responsibility for providing such assistance. In spite of the increasing role of government, the North American sociological, religious and economic climate has spawned thousands of volunteer organizations to serve the needy at home and overseas. Many of these organizations are religiously oriented. One such is the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC).

The help provided by MCC and similar voluntary organizations to needy people takes many forms. The most common form of assistance is food and clothing to meet immediate needs. But voluntary agencies also seek to solve more basic problems of the needy through economic development programs, self-help projects and efforts to combat injustice. This study will attempt to ascertain what contribution distribution of food and other material aid supplies makes to long-range development in the MCC program.

Founded in 1920, MCC represents the Mennonite and Brethren in Christ churches in Canada and the United States. Total membership in these churches numbers approximately 320,000.¹ Currently MCC has programs in about 40 countries and has a budget of 11 million dollars. Major emphasis has been

¹James Horsch, ed., Mennonite Yearbook, Vol. LXIX (Scottsdale, Pa.: Mennonite Publishing House, 1978), p. 140.

on a Peace Corps-type volunteer service with approximately 500 persons serving two and three-year periods of overseas service.

During MCC's 58-year history, some evolution in methods of assistance are apparent. One can identify three periods: relief, rehabilitation and development. The evolution through these three periods was largely precipitated by historical needs. The first period, relief, lasted from 1920 until about 1945. Much assistance was provided to famine-suffering Mennonites in Russia. The period ended with a massive relief program in war-torn Europe. In the second period, rehabilitation, MCC gave major attention to rehabilitating refugees within Europe and from Europe to North and South America. This was also the period in which post-war rehabilitation programs were begun in Indonesia, Taiwan, India/Pakistan, Korea and Congo. The third period, beginning in the mid 1960s, saw major emphasis in newly-independent countries of Africa and expanded activity to endemic poverty areas of Latin America and Asia. Evolution in terms of reference used in the Workbooks (Annual Reports) of MCC during these periods is noticeable. Words such as relief and war-sufferers relief evolved to rehabilitation, service, development and justice.

Material aid consisting of food, clothing, bedding, soap, medical supplies, etc. has been a significant part of MCC's assistance. Table 1 gives the total amount and type of material aid supplies shipped from 1943 to 1976.

In the past ten years material aid provided approximately one third of MCC's total resources. Earlier, in the relief and rehabilitation stages, the percentage was larger. Table 2 provides data on the ratio of material aid to total resources for the years 1962-1976. These were supplies

contributed by churches and individuals. A question explored later in the study is whether or not these same individuals and churches would donate an equivalent amount of cash should the option of donating material aid not be open to them. In addition to these contributed supplies, MCC distributed 75,808,044 pounds of US P.L. 480 foods and 2,194,924 pounds of food from the Canadian government between 1954 and 1968.

Table 1

Mennonite Central Committee Material Aid Supplies
1943-1976 (in pounds)

| Clothing, Bedding and Shoes | Food | Soap, Medical and Other | Total |
|--------------------------------|------------|----------------------------|------------|
| 20,882,755 | 62,686,632 | 10,105,770 | 93,675,157 |

^aSource: Mennonite Central Committee Workbooks, 1943-1976.

The material resources of MCC were supplemented in several ways by host governments and the United States Government. The latter provided reimbursement for ocean freight to authorized voluntary agencies for material aid shipments. In the last ten years this has amounted to approximately \$300,000 per year for MCC.² The value of host government contributions were usually not recorded in the reports sent to the MCC headquarters offices but have included the following: in-country transportation of goods, warehousing and engineering skills for work projects.

²Reported by John Hostetler, MCC Material Aid Director, in conversation with the author, April 18, 1978.

Table 2

Ratio of Material Aid to Cash Contributions

| Year | Total Con- tributions | Cash Con- tributions | \$ Value of Material Aid | Percent Material Aid |
|------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1962 | 4,240,584 | 2,531,550 | 1,709,034 | 40.3 |
| 1963 | 4,667,285 | 3,047,428 | 1,619,857 | 34.7 |
| 1964 | 5,937,184 | 3,864,218 | 2,072,966 | 34.9 |
| 1965 | 5,935,446 | 3,760,927 | 2,174,519 | 33.6 |
| 1966 | 4,213,149 | 1,961,272 | 2,251,877 | 53.4 |
| 1967 | 5,001,992 | 2,236,166 | 2,765,826 | 55.3 |
| 1968 | 4,919,648 | 2,433,201 | 2,485,947 | 50.5 |
| 1969 | 4,773,761 | 2,645,092 | 2,128,669 | 44.6 |
| 1970 | 6,271,915 | 2,732,243 | 3,539,672 | 56.4 |
| 1971 | 6,301,583 | 3,505,363 | 2,796,220 | 44.4 |
| 1972 | 6,828,879 | 3,986,540 | 2,842,339 | 41.6 |
| 1973 | 6,458,365 | 4,323,261 | 2,135,104 | 33.1 |
| 1974 | 9,295,911 | 5,573,961 | 3,721,950 | 40.0 |
| 1975 | 10,431,437 | 6,963,589 | 3,467,848 | 33.2 |
| 1976 | 10,946,950 | 7,737,748 | 3,209,202 | 29.3 |

^aSource: Mennonite Central Committee Workbooks, 1962-1976.

Philosophically and practically, MCC like other voluntary organizations, faces the dilemma of determining programs on the basis of what supporting churches and individuals wish to give, or on the basis of what is of utmost benefit in needy countries. This dilemma is similar to that which the US government faces in its decision to utilize surplus commodities in food aid and development programs.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study was to determine the degree to which MCC was successful in fostering economic development through its material aid program. What have been the major contributing factors to success or

failure in given countries? On the basis of findings, suggestions were made on how MCC could improve the development potential of the material aid program.

The study examined these contributing factors: (1) Were certain types of material aid more appropriate for development purposes than others? (2) What type of local organization was best able to utilize material aid? (3) What factor did the interests, abilities and experience of personnel play? (4) Has MCC or the local agency using the material aid identified clear project goals? (5) Can material aid be more successfully utilized following a disaster than in responding to long-term poverty? (6) What structures and resources are necessary to conduct work projects using food?

Need for the Study

In its 58-year history, MCC contributed 93,675,157 pounds of material aid to needy individuals. In addition approximately 75 million pounds of US government foods were used in the program. During this time no overall study was done to determine the effects of the aid. No study was made on whether the material was only temporarily improving the well-being of the recipients or whether it was contributing to their long-range development. During the 58-year history, a number of studies were made on individual country programs but no specific study was made of the contribution material aid makes to development.

A second reason for the study is that MCC's Executive Committee asked for greater clarification on the role of material aid. They identify a growing disquiet in the supporting constituency concerning MCC's inability to use larger amounts of material aid in its programs.

A third reason for the study relates to discussion MCC had with representatives of Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief in 1976 and 1977. The three agencies discussed engaging in a major study on the use of material aid in development and negotiated with a consulting firm to do field research in Brazil, India and Sudan. The study was dropped because of high cost. It was not the purpose of this study to pick up where the proposed study terminated, but to narrow the scope of inquiry to MCC only and three countries in which MCC has used material aid.

A fourth reason for the study, which holds some urgency, relates to plans for MCC to increase food aid in its program. This is due to the creation of MCC (Canada) Food Bank. At the Bank's formation, it was anticipated that 4.5 million bushels of wheat might be stockpiled for use in times of acute shortage. Major funding for this project will come from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Since its formation, the amount of wheat entering the Bank is not meeting projected levels. Still the amount available to MCC, the planned channel of distribution, will be significant.

A fifth and most important reason for the study relates to a possible worldwide food shortage. Numerous studies indicate that a number of third world countries will experience modest to severe food shortages between now and the year 2000. If these forecasts are accurate, voluntary agencies such as MCC will be involved in large-scale food distribution programs. Maximizing development efforts through these food distribution programs can only benefit recipients in the long run. Learnings from past material aid programs should be appropriated to future efforts.

This study can contribute to efforts currently underway at MCC to prepare contingency plans for food relief needs in areas prone to food shortages. One person in South Asia and another in the Sahel region of Africa have been assigned this task.

Method of Study

The study concentrated on two primary sources of information: (1) Literature on the subject of relief, disaster response and food aid in development programs and (2) data from the files of the Menmonite Central Committee. The above two sources were supplemented with a brief questionnaire sent to 15 persons who were administratively responsible for MCC's material aid programs in the three countries of the study. The literature review focused first on materials related to the P.L. 480 program and second, on disaster response studies.

Since it was impossible to analyze all of MCC's material aid programs through 58 years, three representative countries were chosen for analysis: Haiti, India and Jordan. These countries were chosen for the following reasons: (1) each country received a significant amount of material aid; (2) aid continued for a decade or more; (3) in each country MCC was involved with a development program in addition to the material aid activity; (4) MCC was primarily responsible for utilization of the aid in these countries rather than merely allocating it to another agency for distribution; (5) each country received a variety of material aid items; (6) material aid in each country was used in response to both disasters and endemic poverty needs; (7) the three countries represent different economic levels, geographic locations and political structures.

The period of study was from 1962 to 1976. This 15-year period spanned times of shortages in each country and periods of worldwide surplus and shortages. It included at least three different MCC directors in each country. This 15-year span covered times of substantial material aid shipments to each country as well as times of limited shipments.

Definition of Terms

Material aid: Non-cash resources such as wheat, canned beef, bedding or hand tools used in relief or development programs.

The literature frequently uses the term "material resources."

Development: ". . . the process by which both persons and societies come to realize the full potential of human life in a context of social justice, with an emphasis on self-reliance; economic growth being seen as one of the means for carrying forward this process."³

Relief: Aid in the form of money or material necessities to assist the poor, usually for a temporary period.

Voluntary Agency: Private, nongovernmental agency organized to provide assistance for needy people, particularly those overseas in the context of this study.

Food-for-work: Form of assistance in which a laborer receives a specified amount of food for a specified amount of work done.

Cash-for-work: Similar to the above except that the payment is made with cash instead of food.

³Edgar Stoesz, Thoughts on Development, Development Monograph Series, No. 1 (Akron, Pa.: Mennonite Central Committee, 1976), p. 2.

Work project: Either of the two preceding items.

Successful project: One that has evoked observable community participation and ownership and continues to serve its projected purpose a year or more after its inception.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Types of Literature

During the past three decades there has been a steady stream of literature on development theory, planning and execution, much of it devoted to the macro-planning level.

Literature on the subject of food aid and disaster relief assistance appeared primarily in two time blocks. The first came in the late 1950s and early 1960s, largely as a result of the P.L. 480 program in 1954. This new food resource precipitated a series of studies on programmatic subjects by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations and numerous studies on the impact of food aid on development by agricultural economists.

A second wave of studies on disaster relief and food aid occurred in the mid-1970s. This followed a period of depleted world grain stocks, the oil embargo of the OPEC countries and the World Food Conference in November, 1974. The mid-1970s also produced a few studies on disaster response as a consequence of the Sahel famine and the Bangladesh disaster and civil war.

The voluntary agencies have been particularly deficient in publishing analyses of their programs. This is understandable in that they are action-oriented agencies. Further, any reports that have been published tend to enhance an agency's image in order to elicit support rather than present a critical analysis. Materials published by voluntary agencies tend to

originate from home offices rather than field programs. Consequently much specificity is lost.⁴ It may be that numerous internal program studies are taking place, but that voluntary agencies lack the interest or mechanism to give them wider circulation. If this is so, it is most unfortunate because the findings could be beneficial to other development agencies, both private and governmental.

Few studies were made on the use of nonfood items in either relief or development programs. Yet, in the case of several voluntary agencies, distribution of blankets, clothing, medical supplies and hand tools are a significant part of their programs.

Need for Food Aid

Brown⁵ and Borgstrom,⁶ along with many other writers, describe the impact of growing population on world food supply. Agile, using UN data published in 1975, points out accelerated population growth of the past two decades and its downward trend only at the turn of the next century. He says:

The world population, increasing at an average annual rate of only 0.5 percent throughout the 19th century, and 0.8 percent in the first half of the 20th century, considerably accelerated its growth during the decade of the 1950's, attaining a rate of 1.7 percent per annum. The rate of growth of the world's population rose still higher during the 1960's and is currently estimated at about 2.0

⁴Morris Davis, Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 76.

⁵Lester R. Brown with Erik P. Eckholm, By Bread Alone (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 35-44.

⁶Georg Borgstrom, The Food and Population Dilemma (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1973), pp. 15-28.

percent per annum. According to the "medium" variant of the latest United Nations projections, the total world population may continue to grow at an annual rate of 2.0 percent until 1980. A downward trend would then start, ending with a value of 1.6 percent per annum at the end of the century.⁷

The "medium" variant has the world population at 6.4 billion by the year 2000.

Brown⁸ emphasizes not only the impact of growing population on food supply, but also the impact increased affluence of the wealthy nations and the elites of some of the poor countries has on the food supply. The wealthy demand more of their nutrients from animal products, fruits and highly processed and packaged foods.

George⁹ and Lappe and Collins¹⁰ document how the institutional and political structures reinforce the well-being of the wealthy countries and poor-country elites to deprive the majority of people in the third world from utilizing limited resources to the best advantage for their own dietary needs.

Predictions are that, at best, overall world food supplies will be tight in the next several decades resulting in malnutrition and starvation

⁷Roger Agile, "Seminar on Population, Food and Agricultural Development," Food Enough or Starvation for Millions, ed. Douglas Ensminger (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 217.

⁸Brown, loc. cit.

⁹Susan George, How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for World Hunger (Montclair: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1977), pp. 46-64.

¹⁰Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 181-205.

for many in poorer countries. A 1974 Central Intelligence Agency report says:

Trying to provide adequate world food supplies will become a problem of over-riding priority in the years and decades immediately ahead . . . and a key role in any successful effort must fall to the US. Even in the most favorable circumstances predictable, with increased devotion of scarce resources and technical expertise, the outcome will be doubtful; in the event of adverse change in climate, the outcome will be grave.¹¹

The need for accelerated food production and more equitable distribution is voiced in all the literature reviewed. The need for greater concentration of this production in needy countries is also undisputed. Uncertainty arises, however, as to whether food aid from the developed countries contributes or detracts from that development.

Types of Assistance

Food aid to needy countries is viewed as a temporary but necessary form of aid. The persistent need for food and its ready availability during the past three decades gave it a certain degree of permanence. An important FAO study in 1962 projected that food aid would be needed for a transitional period of five to ten years.¹² Given the past history, it is difficult to see a US foreign aid package without a percentage comprised of food aid.

Ideally, the form of aid most beneficial to a needy country is cash grants.¹³ The country is then free to spend aid in a way which most supports

¹¹CIA, Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production and Climate (Washington, The Office, 1974), p. 1.

¹²FAO, Development Through Food (Rome: FAO, 1962), p. 36.

¹³Class lecture, Dr. Patrick Gormley, International Economics, I Semester, 1976-77, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas.

its own development plans. If food is needed, it can purchase desired food for the lowest price. Remaining cash aid can be allocated for other development needs. Unfortunately most needy countries do not receive aid in such a liquid form. If cash is granted it is usually in the form of short or long-term loans. Often it is tied to purchases of equipment or technology from the donor country.

Much of the United States Foreign Aid of the past three decades was in the form of food aid under the P.L. 480 program. Since the early 1960s food aid accounted for almost one third of all the US's official development assistance.¹⁴

The next section will discuss the P.L. 480 program in more detail, but first it is important to look at the overall benefits and disadvantages of various types of aid. Little needs to be mentioned of the need for food in times of emergency. That need is universally recognized. More disagreement persists on whether food aid can be used for development purposes. The following are generally recognized contributions of food aid:

1. Increases the total amount of development aid available
2. Assists in emergencies
3. Raises consumption levels
4. Improves nutritional levels
5. Resolves temporary difficulties such as, balance of payments, budget deficits, inflationary pressures
6. Makes possible new development projects via direct capital improvement projects or via expenditure of counterpart funds in the case of P.L. 480.

Food aid also benefits the donor country in the following ways:

¹⁴Emma Rothschild, "It's Time to End Food for Peace," New York Times Magazine, March 13, 1977, p. 45.

1. Improves position of surplus country--eliminates storage costs
2. May create export markets
3. Increases total amount of development aid available.

At the same time one needs to balance benefits with potential harmful effects:

1. May create new needs and tastes which can only be satisfied with imports; e.g., milk, wheat in Subshara Africa
2. Disrupts production cycles
3. Cuts into potential exports of other nations
4. Substitutes for more beneficial cash aid
5. Deters a country's own investment in the agricultural sector
6. Reduces incentives for local farmers.¹⁵

Public Law 480 Program

A study of food aid must include a review of the P.L. 480 program since it played such a significant role in many countries during the past 25 years. Table 3 gives the dollar value of the P.L. 480 program from 1954 to 1974.

A brief look at the P.L. 480 program is relevant in this study for two reasons. First, numerous analytical studies have been done on the impact of P.L. 480 food distribution programs on development in the third world. Second, the P.L. 480 program has had a provision under Title II which allows food distributions through qualified voluntary agencies. Sommer¹⁶ reports that more than one quarter of voluntary agency income in 1975-1976 was in the form of P.L. 480 food aid and its related

¹⁵Jan Dessau, The Role of Multilateral Food Aid Programs, World Food Program Studies, No. 4 (Rome: FAO, 1965), pp. 5-10.

¹⁶John G. Sommer, Beyond Charity: U.S. Voluntary Aid for a Changing Third World (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1977), p. 45.

transportation value. MUC took advantage of this provision during the late 1950s and 1960s.

Table 3

Annual Value of Public Law 480 Shipments
(Dollar amounts in millions)

| Calendar year | Total P.L. 480 |
|-------------------------|----------------|
| 1954 (July to December) | \$48 |
| 1955 | 505 |
| 1956 | 890 |
| 1957 | 974 |
| 1958 | 954 |
| 1959 | 875 |
| 1960 | 1,187 |
| 1961 | 1,123 |
| 1962 | 1,307 |
| 1963 | 1,472 |
| 1964 | 1,578 |
| 1965 | 1,304 |
| 1966 | 1,265 |
| 1967 | 1,217 |
| 1968 | 1,175 |
| 1969 | 1,021 |
| 1970 | 1,021 |
| 1971 | 932 |
| 1972 | 1,107 |
| 1973 | 750 |
| 1974 (preliminary) | 760 |

^aSource: Ross B. Talbot, The World Food Problem and US Food Policies: 1972-1976, A Readings Book (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1977), p. 255.

Rothschild describes the tremendous importance of the P.L. 480 program to the United States and the world, "Twenty years ago, the United States Congress wrote a law which has changed the diet and political life

of half the world."¹⁷

Historically, four purposes can be listed for the P.L. 480 program:

1. A means to get rid of surplus food
2. A way of feeding hungry people
3. An instrument of political and economic policy
4. A tool to expand foreign markets

During the 24-year evolution of the program, different purposes were emphasized at different times. Provisions of the 1954 law and subsequent revisions are briefly summarized as follows:

Title I: Authorizes agreements with friendly nations, or organizations in such nations, for the sale of agricultural commodities for foreign currencies.

Title II: Provides food assistance for emergency situations, grants of food for economic and community development projects for needy countries and for voluntary agencies' use in needy countries.

Title III: Allows for the use of food commodities in state, federal or private programs in the United States.¹⁸

The primary intent of the original act was surplus disposal. By 1960 the program was increasingly shifting to foreign economic development. By the early 1960s substantial amounts of local currencies generated from the sale of P.L. 480 commodities were being designated for development projects.¹⁹ The shift away from surplus disposal toward economic and political considerations became more pronounced with the 1966 revision. The 1966 Act officially changed the title of the law to Food for Peace.

¹⁷Rothschild, loc. cit.

¹⁸Robert G. Stanley, Food for Peace: Hope and Reality of US Food Aid (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1973), pp. 84-98.

¹⁹Uma K. Srivastava and others, Food Aid and International Economic Growth (2d ed.; Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1975), p. 57.

Controversy about its ultimate effects, both political and economic, plagued the P.L. 480 program since its origin. For purposes of this study only questions about its economic impact will be noted. Mettrick²⁰ indicates that there has been little conflict over the emergency aid portion of the program. In such aid, long-term development and cost effectiveness are of little concern. Speed, efficiency of delivery and good administration are of primary importance in this form of life-saving aid. The portion of P.L. 480 food spent for emergency purposes has been minimal, however.

A second form of P.L. 480 aid that received minimal criticism is aid provided for projects. Such aid is allocated to voluntary agencies, governments or authorized private agencies in needy countries. Food-for-work projects often result from this type of assistance. Mettrick²¹ notes the only major danger to project aid is the possibility of replacing diets of locally-produced foods with diets of imported foods which are not as well balanced. Like emergency aid, the portion of P.L. 480 food used in project aid was small.

The bulk of P.L. 480 aid was distributed through commercial channels and was the object of major criticism. Size of the program rather than method of distribution was the primary object of the criticism. In this form of aid P.L. 480 food is given or sold to another country on generous terms. Provisions frequently allow 30 years to repay. US political interest rather than a recipient country's needs were usually factors in establishing repayment rates and schedules. Until 1970, repayment could

²⁰Hal Mettrick, Food Aid and Britain (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1969), p. 53.

²¹Ibid., p. 54.

be made in local currencies. This provision created sizeable US-controlled local currencies in a number of countries. These currencies became a valuable tool for economic development. They were also a factor in encouraging inflationary spending as noted later in this section.

Schultz²² set out the basic argument on the development impact of food aid in the 1960s. His contention, based on studies of the P.L. 480 program in India, indicated that these food supplies depressed Indian grain prices, resulting in reduced local production and investment in agriculture by local producers and the Indian government itself.

Though his study has remained as one of the main bulwarks against the food aid program, several studies soon appeared to challenge his conclusions. Witt, in a study of the P.L. 480 program in Israel noted, "The impact of P.L. 480 imports on international agricultural production, surprisingly was to stimulate rather than discourage agricultural production."²³ Witt's evaluations of programs in Colombia, Pakistan and India were not as positive as that of Israel, but in none of these countries did he report that the program had a drastic negative effect. He says, "Either a sweeping attack on the program or a comprehensive defense will miss the mark. There are too many individual exceptions."²⁴

²²Theodore W. Schultz, "Value of US Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries," Journal of Farm Economics, XLII (December, 1960).

²³Lawrence W. Witt, "Development through Food Grants and Concessional Sales," Agriculture in Economic Development, eds. Carl Eicher and Lawrence Witt (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 346.

²⁴Ibid., p. 354.

Khatkhate²⁵ tried to refute Schultz's conclusions by putting food aid in a much broader context. He attempted to study its overall impact upon the stability of agricultural prices, identifying stability of agricultural prices as a key factor in promoting development. Food imports actually helped to stabilize prices rather than having the opposite effect.

Amin's²⁶ study of Egyptian agriculture concluded that US aid of wheat and wheat flour did not have an adverse effect upon Egypt's wheat production.

The controversy has not abated in the decade and a half since the early 1960s. If anything, it has intensified. Bhatia,²⁷ in a study of US food shipments to India, concludes that low grain prices served as a disincentive to investment in the agricultural sector and an urban bias in India's development planning and that the spending of counterpart funds was inflationary.

Isenman and Singer (1977) in a major study of the issue state:

There is sufficient concern about the possible harmful effects of food aid on domestic food production that many economists recommend less or no food aid (other than, perhaps, for emergencies) even in cases where nutritional and other human needs are strongest.²⁸

²⁵D. R. Khatkhate, "Some Notes on the Real Effects of Foreign Surplus Disposal in Underdeveloped Economies," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXVI (May, 1962), pp. 186-196.

²⁶Galal A. Amin, Food Supply and Economic Development with Special Emphasis on Egypt (New York: A.M. Kelly, 1966), p. 90.

²⁷B. M. Bhatia, Famines in India (London: Asia Publishing House, 1967), pp. 142-147.

²⁸Paul J. Isenman and H. W. Singer, "Food Aid: Disincentive Effects and Their Policy Implications," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XXV (June, 1972), pp. 205-237.

A 1977 report from Bangladesh, indicates that large US food shipments served as disincentives to government investments in the agricultural sector in recent years.²⁹

Conversely, Mellor argues in a 1975 article:

Food aid can play a major role in encouraging low income nations to choose a strategy of economic development which will provide accelerated growth in employment (and, consequently, broadened participation of the poor in economic growth), effectively, focus attention on increasing agricultural production and, eventually, reduce rates of population growth.³⁰

Like Mellor, a 1976 study by Sinha concluded:

There is no doubt that the massive US food aid programme not only played a major role in alleviating misery during emergencies but also assisted economic development in some countries by relieving inflationary pressures and the foreign exchange constraint; but because of its close association with US foreign policy its full potentialities were never realized.³¹

A Witt and Eicher 1964 study puts the controversy in proper perspective. They show that food aid's positive or negative impact is not inherent in the food aid itself, but is rather a result of the recipient country's plans and policies in reference to that aid. A country with effective public administration and a well-conceived development program can use food aid effectively. A country which does not have strong support for the central government and gives high priority to current consumption

²⁹Kai Bird and Susan Goldmark, "The Food Aid Conspiracy," New Internationalist, March 1977, pp. 20-21.

³⁰John W. Mellor, "Food Aid and Long Run Food-Population Balances," Columbia Journal of World Business, X (Fall, 1975), p. 29.

³¹Radha Sinha, Food and Poverty: The Political Economy of Confrontation (London: Croom Helm, 1976), p. 122.

will not have positive development results from food aid.³²

Clearly, the positive or negative development impact results more from a given country's willingness and ability to use the food aid effectively than from the food aid itself.

Disaster and Famine Literature

FAO's World Food Studies, Commodity Series and Nutritional Studies, all published in the early 1960s, sought to give guidance to developing countries and the various United Nations' sponsored programs in using food aid for development purposes. These studies are helpful but lack sufficient field experience to make them enduring guides.

G. B. Masfield stands out in the 1960s and in United Nations circles as the authority on famines and disaster response programs. His two studies, Famine: Its Prevention and Relief³³ and Food and Nutrition Procedures in Times of Disaster³⁴ established procedures that were followed by United Nations agencies throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. These studies emphasized a number of principles that are applicable to smaller private agencies. Among them are the following:

1. Historically, food requirements in disasters have usually been overestimated.

³²L. W. Witt and C. Eicher, The Effect of United States Agricultural Surplus Disposal Programs on Recipient Countries, Michigan State University Research Bulletin, No. 2 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1964), p. 65.

³³G. B. Masfield, Famine: Its Prevention and Relief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

³⁴G. B. Masfield, Food and Nutritional Procedures in Times of Disaster, Nutritional Studies, No. 21 (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization, 1967).

2. Food supplies introduced into famine areas need not be the exact type normally eaten by the population, but they must be acceptable.
3. Food supplies should be able to be cooked with local equipment.
4. Any processing required must be able to be done locally.
5. "There is also psychological value in making a specially large issue of relief foods, or supplying special foods, at times of festivals which the people are accustomed to celebrate by heavy eating or by eating special foods. Attention to these matters can make a significant contribution to maintaining morale during a famine."³⁵
6. Two methods can be followed in ending relief. Both are difficult. This stage often creates the most vexing problems in relief administration. The first method is to sort out the most needy and supply them only. The second is simply to reduce the ration of all. Sometimes a combination of both methods is possible.
7. Efforts should be made to prevent farmers from eating their seed. This can best be done by providing relief foodstuffs before the famine becomes too critical.
8. Helping farmers preserve livestock can be extremely important in the relief effort as well as the rehabilitation stage.
9. Lists of suitable work projects should be maintained in famine-prone areas.

As G. B. Masefield set the direction for famine relief programs in the 1960s, so Jean Mayer and Alan Berg set it in the 1970s. Their writings and those of others, particularly relating to nutritional concerns in famine relief, are found in a publication by the Swedish Nutritional Foundation.³⁶

³⁵ Ibid., p. 45.

³⁶ G. Blix, Y. Hofvander and B. Vahlquist, eds., Famine: A Symposium Dealing with Nutrition and Relief Operations in Times of Disaster (Uppsala: Wiksells, 1971).

Berg³⁷ highlights these lessons from the Bihar famine experience that have applicability to small private agencies:

1. The Bihar famine proved that there is no substitute for strong leadership in relief operations.
2. A manual of relief operations can save much time in the early stages of organization of a program.
3. Too much debate can be given to what type of foods to give in times of disaster. The important thing is to simply provide something to eat. Food should be simple and easy to cook with minimum of utensils.
4. In times of crisis it is better to utilize existing institutions for organizing distribution points rather than creating new ones.
5. Schools tend to be the best outlet for feeding operations.
6. The Bihar famine proved that it is possible to design a relief operation with development orientation.
7. Information and communications are very important in a famine situation.

Mayer^{38,39} makes many of the same points as do Berg and Masefield, particularly emphasizing the importance of good communications, early assessment of need, good planning and the economics of disaster relief.

Davis'⁴⁰ study on the peculiar relief needs emerging out of civil war situations adds some helpful insights to the previous studies. His

³⁷ Alan Berg, "Famine Contained: Notes and Lessons from the Bihar Experience," Famine: A Symposium Dealing with Nutrition and Relief Operations in Times of Disaster, eds. G. Blix, Y. Hofvander and B. Vahlquist (Uppsala: Wiksells, 1971), pp. 113-129.

³⁸ Jean Mayer, "Coping with Famine," Foreign Affairs, LIII (October, 1974), pp. 98-120.

³⁹ Jean Mayer, "Management of Famine Relief," Science, May 9, 1975, pp. 571-577.

⁴⁰ Morris Davis, Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief (New York: Praeger, 1975).

study documents the political character of all relief. Voluntary agencies and intergovernmental agencies espouse their nonpolitical motives, but they are seen by local government and by recipients of relief as highly political.

Sheets and Morris⁴¹ document how the governmental, intergovernmental and private agencies were slow and somewhat inept in responding to the disaster in the Sahel in the 1970s. The authors appeal for a better international information network to provide early warnings of disasters.

Burley⁴² calls not only for a better information system but also for better coordination and administration of disaster relief. He suggests:

A small secretariat, attached to the UN, could serve as a clearing house for several major donors, and maintain a handful of skilled and internationally acceptable administrators.⁴³

Hagen⁴⁴ documents unnecessary and inappropriate aid given to disaster victims in Peru and East Pakistan. He appeals for less emergency type relief aid (baby food, blankets, milkpowder, medicines) and more emphasis upon local purchases and development assistance. He notes the reason for such aid--high visibility--but urges donors and administrative personnel to downgrade the emergency phase of relief.

⁴¹Herman Sheets and R. Morris, Disaster in the Desert: The Failure of International Relief in the West African Drought (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974).

⁴²Lawrence Anderson Burley, "Disaster Relief Administration in the Third World," International Development Review, XV (October, 1973), pp. 8-12.

⁴³Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁴Toni Hagen, "Problems of International Emergency Aid," Swiss Review of World Affairs, October, 1973, pp. 23-26.

Green⁴⁵ analyzes the present haphazard system of international relief and proposes that all countries and agencies agree to a Geneva-type convention and says:

The fundamental element of the convention would be a statement of principle asserting the common responsibility of all people and governments to provide protection and relief to the victims of natural disasters.⁴⁶

Methods would be agreed upon to provide relief under varying political situations.

⁴⁵Stephen Green, International Disaster Relief: Toward a Responsive System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 66.

CHAPTER 3

THREE-COUNTRY ANALYSIS

The study now turns from the macro to the micro level; from the impact of large government food aid programs to the modest program effort of MCC. Further, the field of study is narrowed to only three of 40 countries in which MCC is engaged. Though some reference will be made to all material aid inputs used by MCC in these countries, the major focus is on food aid, particularly wheat. Before looking in depth at the material aid programs and experiences in Haiti, Jordan and India, a brief profile and program overview of each country is provided.

HAITI

MCC became involved in this small Caribbean country in 1957. The focus of the program is the operation of a district health center at Grande Riviere Du Nord, 30 kilometers south of Cape Haitian, on the northern coast of the country. A formal agreement with the Ministry of Health, signed in 1959, committed MCC to operate the hospital/clinic for five years. Renewal took place at regular intervals. The most recent renewal of the contract provided for much larger Haitian input and a substantially reduced role for MCC.

From the beginning, MCC viewed its role as considerably broader than that of operating the hospital/clinic. In an initial letter of instruction to the Haiti country director, MCC administrator for Caribbean programs said:

Additionally, we would like you to survey the total needs of that area and write up a C.D. program perspective which describes the urgent needs of the G.R. larger community together with a description of proposed program to meet these needs and the supplies, budget and personnel needed thereto.⁴⁷

The resulting community development program took on more importance and absorbed more expatriate personnel than the clinic/hospital. A 1967 Annual Report listed these projects in addition to the clinic/hospital and public health work: water projects, school construction, rat eradication, gardening, rabbits, poultry, hogs, library, educational assistance, craft productions, veterinary services and cannery. The Haitian program attempted to operate in a classical community development style with the MCC staff serving as a catalyst to the community in their process of economic development. In 1970, the MCC director stated the program emphasis as follows:

The purpose of the MCC program is to establish in Grande Riviere Du Nord and surrounding areas the Community Development process of problem-solving.⁴⁸

MCC material aid, along with cash and foreign personnel, was seen as a resource to the community development effort. Though material aid input was not large in comparison to cash and personnel inputs, it was still significant. Table 4 gives the total number of pounds and type of material aid shipped to Haiti from 1962 to 1976. Approximately one fourth of this amount was shipped to Haiti for other relief and service organizations operating in Haiti. About one half of the amount reaching Grande Riviere Du Nord was for the hospital/clinic program. MCC had a very close

⁴⁷Letter from Edgar Stoesz, Director Voluntary Service, to Arlin Hunsberger, MCC Haiti Director, August 15, 1962.

⁴⁸Paul Derstine, Three Year Community Development Plan, July 9, 1970.

Table 4

Material Aid Shipped to Haiti (in pounds)

| Year | Bedding/ clothing | Food | Soap/ medical | Educational/ vocational | Self-help | Purchased goods | Totals |
|------|----------------------|---------|------------------|----------------------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|
| 1962 | 4,836 | 12,577 | 6,041 | | 1,575 | | 24,829 |
| 1963 | 55,990* | 12,744 | 16,091 | 2,285 | 297,266 | 2,756 | 567,197 |
| 1964 | 777 | 6,250 | 18,455 | 902 | | 2,447 | 28,831 |
| 1965 | 1,685 | 10,110 | 12,381 | 1,526 | 150 | 1,725 | 27,577 |
| 1966 | 4,718 | 16,524 | 9,829 | | 4,285 | 4,657 | 59,995 |
| 1967 | 5,306 | 20,928 | 13,777 | 687 | 808 | 5,580 | 45,086 |
| 1968 | 5,172 | 25,147 | 27,959 | 4,358 | 8,674 | 7,170 | 76,460 |
| 1969 | 88,907 | 62,887 | 19,816 | 2,808 | | 16,946 | 111,564 |
| 1970 | 6,182 | 75,615 | 53,878 | 3,935 | 714 | 1,676 | 120,000 |
| 1971 | 5,102 | 5,760 | 26,128 | 7,496 | 6,363 | 2,594 | 55,445 |
| 1972 | 12,298 | 20,595 | 22,716 | 5,816 | 14,402 | 15,754 | 91,581 |
| 1973 | 13,546 | 23,694 | 10,245 | 927 | 15,872 | 11,554 | 75,816 |
| 1974 | 18,913 | 46,011 | 17,934 | 1,758 | 18,987 | 5,505 | 106,908 |
| 1975 | 5,921 | 267,670 | 18,889 | 2,527 | 13,082 | 19,316 | 327,205 |
| 1976 | 6,677 | 61,591 | 11,011 | 1,881 | 3,442 | 5,286 | 89,888 |
| | | | | | | | 1,585,978 |

*Includes 35,000 lbs. P.L. 480 food

working relationship with CARE and Church World Service in Haiti and drew on their P.L. 480 sources rather than importing its own grain.

MCC originally planned to move on to other needs within the country after the government was able to operate the health facility, and the community development process had built up momentum in the surrounding area. But, the government was slow to provide personnel and management resources necessary to operate the clinic/hospital, and poverty persisted among the people. In 1962, the MCC Chairman on a visit to Haiti said:

It appears now that MCC assistance will need to continue to some degree for another 3-5 years, beyond the July 5, 1964 agreement termination date.⁴⁹

MCC did stay, in fact continues working in community development at present. Material aid has all but ceased to be shipped to Haiti. But in spite of the large volume of aid provided by United States government, private and international agencies, Haiti is still listed on the United Nation's list of most severely affected nations.

Use of Material Aid

Of the three countries studied, nowhere was the question of material aid use more vigorously discussed than in reference to Haiti. From some correspondence it appears that debate on the subject with reference to Haiti was more vigorous than for any of the 40 or more countries in which MCC had programs.

Discussion was not only evident in letters and reports from Haiti, but radical changes in approach to the use of material aid by MCC directors

⁴⁹C. N. Hostetter Jr. and Edgar Stoesz, Haiti Report, November 6-16, 1962.

in Haiti reflect this debate. Following are some reasons for the debate and varying responses during the 15-year period.

On the positive side:

- (1) Haiti had obvious needs. People were hungry, ill clothed and illiterate. Material aid could be used to ameliorate these needs.
- (2) Other agencies, CARE and Church World Service, were using substantial quantities of material aid, particularly P.L. 480 commodities. Could not MCC do the same?
- (3) There was substantial need for development activities-- roads to be built, schools to be constructed, reforestation and terracing needed. Could not food-for-work be used to effect these objectives?
- (4) Financial resources were limited. Could not food-for-work projects serve as a resource for development in lieu of funds?

On the negative side:

- (1) Though Haiti experienced frequent minor disasters during the 15-year period, there was no overwhelming disaster that invited a large-scale MCC relief effort. Further, larger agencies such as CARE and Church World Service were better able and more willing to respond to these needs.
- (2) Because much of the population lived at marginal levels, if material aid was given one could not envision a termination point. Aid would help temporarily but would contribute little to long-term solutions.
- (3) Material aid would exacerbate patronage, a practice already rampant in Haiti.
- (4) MCC's geographic base was rather narrow. All abuses of material aid activity were highly visible and an obvious caution to expanded activity.

This debate was reflected by Dr. Merrill Ewert, MCC Agricultural Director in Zaire, when he visited the Haitian program in 1976. He said:

I have not settled in my mind the role of material aid in our third world involvement, but I was forced to ask myself some hard questions as I looked at the Grande Riviere program.⁵⁰

The debate on legitimate use of material aid was accentuated by the fact that the Haiti program was conceived primarily as one of development. This was in sharp contrast to the program in Jordan and even in India where there was a much greater recognition of the need for material aid. In Haiti, the "hand out" philosophy seemed to clash sharply with the "development of peoples and communities" philosophy. Workers were sent to Haiti with skills and assignments in community development, public health and agriculture in contrast to Jordan where persons were sent with the sole responsibility of administering the material aid program. Few people wanted to take out time from their agricultural development or nursing duties to oversee material aid distributions.

Material aid was listed with resources available to communities wishing to engage in development projects as was technical services, cash, and specialized personnel. The fact that so few communities requested material aid, or requested it on terms which MCC could provide, may be the most legitimate indicator of the value of material aid in the Haitian context.

The negative effects of the material aid program were mentioned in various reports. In 1975 the MCC director reported:

Material aid has not been the best part of the program here. Many observations indicate that material aid has had negative effects on communities developing their own resources.⁵¹

⁵⁰Dr. Merrill Ewert, "Visit to Grande Riviere Du Nord, Haiti," November 2, 1976.

⁵¹Vernon King, "1975 Quarterly Report."

In 1970, the director wrote:

. . . I am advancing an economic principle of community development, which states in effect, that money properly injected into a sluggish economy does more for development of that locality or country, as the case may be, than free imported goods. It would seem that free imported goods could do nothing more than depress the economy by creating less demand.⁵²

But in spite of numerous negative comments, there were some positive reports about the contribution material aid was making to the program. In a 1973 quarterly report the director said:

Food-for-work in this rural development effort has been an important factor. It is not used here as an inducement to community participation. Rather, food is used to encourage the process and comes only after the community has taken the initiative The staff here does not want to think that the development program is totally dependent on the Food-for-Peace program. However we recognize the difficulty for community members to give a day or a week at a time to community projects without having some kind of assistance. A day not spent in the garden means little food in the house that evening.⁵³

One type of material aid project which received broad acclaim in Haiti and by the MCC staff was the importing of plastic pipe. Numerous springs were capped and potable water brought to villages with plastic pipe. As part of the community development process, villagers were required to put up a certain amount of money for the cement and pipe before MCC made its contribution. Likewise villagers were expected to contribute the major amount of unskilled labor for the project. This type of material aid project was seen by the MCC staff as clearly contributing to the

⁵²Letter from Harlan Hochstetler, MCC Haiti Director to Art Driedger, Acting Director for Latin America, February 5, 1970.

⁵³Paul Derstine, "1973 Second and Third Quarterly Report," March-August 31, 1973.

development process. It must be noted that plastic pipe was not the type of material donated through the material aid program, but had to be purchased. It is listed under the "purchased goods" category in Table 4.

In some part, change in the attitude toward and use of material aid in Haiti during 15 years resulted not only from differing viewpoints of MCC directors and staff plus changing needs, but rather reflected MCC's overall evolving views on the use of material aid and development. Merrill Ewert notes:

It seems to me that the history of the Grande Riviere program reflects the evolution of MCC's development thinking. Beginning with institutions, structures and material aid, there has been a movement towards doing less for people and more things with them. From hiring Haitian staff and building with bricks and mortar MCC involvement in the community has become a catalytic one. This shift has been a gradual process resulting from our growing awareness of the effects of our programs, and our new understandings of what development is all about.⁵⁴

A similar change in attitude toward material aid and development will be noted in Jordan and to some extent in India.

JORDAN

MCC activity in Jordan, begun in 1950, was largely in response to the needs of Palestine refugees. From 1950 to 1967 attention focused on refugees on the West Bank with Hebron and East Jerusalem as bases of program activity. Following the 1967 war, refugees on the East Bank were the focus of attention, with Amman the primary base of operation. MCC programs among the Arab population continued on the Israeli-occupied West Bank but very little material aid was used in this program so it is not

⁵⁴Ewert, op. cit.

included in this study. Since the early 1970s, the MCC East Bank program has steadily shifted away from the Palestine refugees to rural economic development services to the Jordanian population. Table 5 gives the statistics of material aid used in Jordan for the 15 years.

The MCC program in Jordan cooperated more closely with government, United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and other voluntary agencies than was true in India or Haiti. This was probably due to the relatively small size of the country, the political nature of needs and the sudden and massive requirements of aid. The MCC program in Jordan had fewer connections with local Christian churches than in Haiti or India. This also could explain the necessity for more coordination with government and nongovernment agencies.

The Jordan program was punctuated with several crises--the initial 1948 war, the 1967 war, the 1970 civil disturbance between Jordanians and Palestinians and the October war of 1973. Between these crisis points MCC programs gradually wound down and the need to stay was questioned. In 1964 the MCC director wrote to headquarters as follows:

We remain convinced that the situation here can no longer be categorized as an emergency, but must be considered as one of chronic need. One difficulty if this evaluation is valid is to define what stance MCC ought to take vis-a-vis chronic need. The limited ability of the government to assume full responsibility for all social services because of limited finances and lack of trained personnel suggests that there is a place for a partner role.⁵⁵

Because UNRWA assumed overall responsibility for Palestinian refugees and provided for their minimal food, clothing and housing needs,

⁵⁵ Letter from Herbert Swartz, MCC Jordan Director, to Wilbert Shenk, MCC Administrator for the Middle East, June 5, 1964.

Table 5

Material Aid Shipped to Jordan (in pounds)

| Year | Bedding/ clothing | Food | Soap/ medical | Educational/ vocational | Self-help *Xmas bundles | Purchased goods | P. L. 480 | Totals | |
|------|----------------------|--------|------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| 1962 | 209,911 | 27,085 | 6,039 | | 285 | | 874,234 | 1,117,544 | |
| 1963 | 174,925 | 31,732 | 2,700 | 2,822 | 11,817 | 3,160 | 3,145,500 | 3,372,659 | |
| 1964 | 58,152 | 34,435 | 1,417 | 1,840 | 10,303 | 3,185 | 2,520,000 | 2,629,332 | |
| 1965 | 91,492 | 29,583 | 2,550 | 193 | 8,940 | | 2,688,000 | 2,820,713 | |
| 1966 | 13,426 | 880 | | 155 | | | 2,820,713 | 2,404,961 | |
| 1967 | 69,457 | 46,380 | 12,000 | | | | 2,058,000 | 2,185,837 | |
| 1968 | 415,456 | | 11,682 | 110 | | | | 427,248 | |
| 1969 | 411,019 | 62,750 | 3,374 | 4,770 | | | | 483,913 | |
| 1970 | 373,200 | | 16,267 | 5,897 | | | | 395,364 | |
| 1971 | 177,354 | | 75 | 1,625 | | 450 | | 179,504 | |
| 1972 | 160,519 | 8,400 | 27,791 | 4,484 | 5,089 | 250 | | 208,533 | |
| 1973 | 45,641 | 12,600 | 19,038 | 5,204 | 1,240 | | | 83,723 | |
| 1974 | 34,393 | 16,800 | 14,278 | 2,809 | 2,148 | | | 70,429 | |
| 1975 | 7,616 | | 6,830 | 3,329 | 488 | 2,300 | | 20,563 | |
| 1976 | 6,261 | | 2,948 | 1,768 | 738 | | | 11,715 | |
| | | | | | | | | 14,106,447 | 16,412,058 |

*Christmas Bundles from 1962-1965.

the voluntary agencies saw their role as supplementary. The Jordanian Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor (MSAL), in cooperation with UNRWA, regularly appealed to the voluntary agencies for supplemental resources. These were often in the form of blankets, tents, funds for temporary housing construction, soap and specialized educational needs. Because of these specific requests, blankets, clothing and soap were some of the most important items sent to Jordan from MCC's material aid supplies. Limited quantities of food were also shipped. The P.L. 480 flour distribution program was an important part of the Jordan program from 1962 to 1967 and will be reported on later in the study.

Like other voluntary agencies MCC responded to UNRWA's requests as it was able. For example, in 1963, UNRWA requested 187,391 pounds of used clothing, which MCC agreed to provide. This amounted to 1.7 kgs. per person for 85,000 refugees out of a total of 880,000 needy refugees. The difference was made up by other voluntary agencies.

The 1971 Workbook reported:

A total of 116 tons of new and used clothing arrived in Jordan during the year, valued at \$233,000. Additional supplies valued at \$259,534 included blankets, quilts and Christmas Bundles, layette bundles, new yard materials, school supplies, sewing kits, soap and misc. supplies. Nearly all clothing and blankets are distributed through UNRWA and Ministry of Social Affairs channels.⁵⁶

1972 marked the end of general material aid distributions to refugees. A November, 1972 letter from the director said:

As you already know this is the last year for our material aid program. That is, we will discontinue shipments of clothing, blankets, shoes and Christmas bundles for children. Specific items will be requested

⁵⁶Mennonite Central Committee, "1971 Workbook."

only if they are used in connection with another existing project. So we plan to continue importing kindergarten supplies, sewing kits, fabric and layettes.⁵⁷

Distribution in Jordan for clothing and bedding followed several patterns: (1) Most often bedding and sometimes soap were packed into five kilo bundles. MCC received instructions from UNRWA or the MSAL regarding distribution. (2) Sometimes materials were turned over in bulk to UNRWA or MSAL for distribution to designated refugees living in camps or scattered among relatives in urban areas. (3) After 1973, as the amount of material aid diminished, allocation was made to clinics, day care centers and kindergartens operated by MCC, other agencies or by the government.

A project report by the MCC director in 1968 describes the unique way of involving women, training them and distributing cloth:

In November, 1967 we opened a one-room layette center at the NECC clinic in Jabel Nadeef giving expectant mothers an opportunity to sew clothes for their babies. Between 20 and 40 women come to sew each week. Each mother is given precut items consisting of 2 diapers, 1 blanket, 2 dresses, 2 sacques, a bib and a band. All sewing is done by hand, taking 2 days to complete. When the baby arrives and birth certificate is shown the mother is presented with a layette she made and one made up in the United States.⁵⁸

P.L. 480 Program in Jordan

From 1962 until 1967 MCC Jordan administered a P.L. 480 program consisting of flour distributions to indigent people on the East Bank of

⁵⁷ Letter from Urbane Peachy, MCC Director in Jordan to Inter-Mennonite Organization, November 14, 1972.

⁵⁸ Virgil Claassen, "Project Report," 1968.

Jordan. Approximately 14 million pounds of flour were distributed in this six-year period.

The purposes of the P.L. 480 flour distribution program as stated in the July 5, 1962 agreement between MCC and the Government of Jordan were:

. . . to operate a food distribution program for needy individuals, i.e. social welfare cases and frontier villages, in the districts of Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Irbid and Amman.⁵⁹

Distribution took place from 12 centers in monthly or quarterly rations with recipients selected by the MSAL. Reports of those years indicate some dissatisfaction with MSAL's selection method or eligibility levels. The 1963 Workbook notes:

We insist, with both UNRWA and the GOJ . . . that in direct aid programs involving MCC clothing and US surplus flour, we aim to serve only those social cases who have been found to be in real need as a result of proper investigation.⁶⁰

A letter from the MCC person responsible for flour distribution programs quoted an MSAL official reporting off the record that the list of eligible recipients was only 60% accurate. The MCC person estimated only 45% accuracy.⁶¹

The 1963, 1964 and 1965 Workbooks mentioned 14,000 recipients of surplus. The 1963 report indicates 20 pounds per month as the ration for each recipient. A terminal audit dated July 30, 1968 gives MCC good marks

⁵⁹ Audit MCC PL 480 Title II Program, Jordan and Israeli-Occupied West Bank Territory, Period July 1, 1965-July 18, 1967, AID Office of Area Controller General, Athens Greece, July 30, 1968.

⁶⁰ Mennonite Central Committee, "1963 Workbook."

⁶¹ Letter from David Ott to Vern Preheim, MCC Administrator for Africa and the Middle East, December 19, 1966.

for its part in the program: "It appears that the MCC, P.L. 480, Title II food distribution program in Jordan was operated during FY 1966 and 1967 in accordance with AID regulations."⁶² A similar audit for the period July 1, 1962-June 30, 1965, indicated MCC had met its responsibilities as far as the P.L. 480 program was concerned.⁶³

Food-for-Work Discussion

During the years of the flour distribution program there was discussion about the possibility of MCC initiating a food-for-work program using P.L. 480 commodities. Most of this initiative came from MCC, both in Jordan and the Akron headquarters, though there was some encouragement from USAID. A 1966 letter noted that USAID was planning changes in the Title III program which would encourage voluntary agencies to redirect their feeding programs to food-for-work. Yet MCC was uncertain about USAID's intentions, since they planned to reduce the portion of food available to Jordan.⁶⁴

Three more significant factors in MCC's decision on whether or not to engage in food for work were (1) additional resources in personnel and money required, (2) lack of promising projects to be undertaken and (3) overall shortage of laborers for such projects.⁶⁵

⁶²Audit Report on P.L. 480 Title II, Food Commodities, Mennonite Central Committee, for Period July 1, 1962-June 30, 1965, USAID Mission to Jordan, January 31, 1965.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ott Letter, op. cit.

⁶⁵Ibid.

The need for more finances to administer a workable food-for-work program was noted by both field and home offices. A negative decision on the question was partially indicated by instructions to reduce the budget for the following year (FY 1967).

Lack of good projects, a constraint in developing a food-for-work program resulted when the Jordanian government took over the building of roads and schools, projects which had been done with food-for-work by other voluntary agencies. The third reason noted for not initiating food-for-work programs, the difficulty in securing adequate numbers of laborers, called into question the need for such employment.

In retrospect, it was difficult to utilize material aid in any meaningful development program in Jordan. The Jordanian population, though poor, was not particularly in need of food. There was no specific "pre-harvest hunger" as found in many countries. The Palestine refugees had their basic food needs met by UNRWA. Nonfood material aid items did not lend themselves well to work-type projects. Yard goods and several MCC-supplied kits were useable in vocational training activities but these projects required only small amounts. What was needed before meaningful development could take place among Palestinian refugees was a political settlement.

INDIA

MCC relief activities in India began in 1942 in connection with the work of Menmonite missionaries. Relief assistance was given to meet needs resulting from the Bengal Famine of 1943 and the Partition of

India/Pakistan.⁶⁶ A sustained presence began in the early 1960s. Calcutta and the surrounding area became the base of operation.

Though the program has a Calcutta base, assistance is provided through numerous church and government-related hospitals, clinics, schools and day care centers throughout the area. Aid was provided in response to disasters in various parts of India. Because of the size and population of the country and the marginal level of existence of many people, disaster assistance has almost been an annual occurrence. Droughts and floods occur with predictable frequency.

Of the many disasters, two merited special response and will receive special focus in this study: drought in 1966-68 in Bihar State and the general food shortage in 1974-75. The latter resulted from drought and floods throughout South Asia and from the worldwide food shortage and higher prices of the period. Shortages were particularly acute in Madhya Pradesh and Bihar State, two areas where Mennonite missions and churches are located.

Proportionally, material aid has been a more significant input in the India program than in most other MCC programs. Disasters necessitated immediate response with food and clothing. There were many mission-operated institutions such as hospitals and schools through which material aid could be funneled; and material aid could be shipped to and within India with relative ease. Docking facilities, warehousing, customs, rail and truck transport all provided impediments in the handling process, but

⁶⁶ John D. Unruh, In the Name of Christ: A History of the Mennonite Central Committee and Its Service 1920-1951 (Scottsdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1952), pp. 73-80.

in contrast to Vietnam, Tchad or Indonesia, handling material aid was much easier in India than in many other countries in which MCC worked.

Possibly a more important factor in MCC's focus on material aid in contrast to community development or a more narrowly focused agricultural development program was the difficulty of getting foreign personnel into the country. A material aid program could be carried out by one foreign staff person, given the existing institutions, while a rural development program in the MCC style would have required a much larger foreign staff.

Table 6 gives data on the amount of material aid shipped to India for the period 1962-76. Except for 1974-75, MCC drew on resources of Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief (CWS/LWR) for P.L. 480 commodities. This was particularly significant in the disaster response program in Bihar in 1966-68. Since this resource was not available in 1974-75, MCC shipped in substantial quantities of its own grain.

MCC's experience with material aid in India will be analyzed as follows: (1) the regular distribution pattern followed during the 15-year period, (2) response to the Bihar famine of 1966-68 and (3) MCC's response to the 1974-75 food shortage.

Regular Distribution Pattern in India

Excluding the two famine periods, 1966-68 and 1974-75, 50 to 75 percent of the material aid was allocated to various institutions in India. Little or no attempt was made by MCC to encourage or compel these institutions to use the material aid in development-type activities. Material aid was seen as complementing indigenous resources of these institutions.

Because of the variety and number of institutions served various material aid items could be used effectively. Correspondence between MCC

Table 6

Material Aid Shipped to India (in pounds)

| Year | Bedding/ clothing | Food | Soap/ medical | Educational/ vocational | Self-help | Purchased goods | Total |
|------|----------------------|-----------|------------------|----------------------------|-----------|--------------------|------------------|
| 1962 | 1,440 | | 700 | | | | 2,140 |
| 1963 | 1,587 | | 317 | | 1,850 | | 3,754 |
| 1964 | 1,997 | | 5,314 | | 4,202 | | 11,515 |
| 1965 | | | 5,937 | | | | 5,937 |
| 1966 | 11,142 | 291,920 | 10,096 | | | 7,033 | 320,191 |
| 1967 | 11,841 | 403,757 | 71,580 | | | 350 | 487,528 |
| 1968 | 14,551 | 77,975 | 80,796 | | | 5,100 | 178,422 |
| 1969 | 24,911 | 422,010 | 139,921 | | 8,008 | 874 | 645,324 |
| 1970 | 12,024 | 176,612 | 273,700 | | | 853 | 463,189 |
| 1971 | 136,437 | 246,112 | 299,753 | 3,848 | | 2,257 | 688,407 |
| 1972 | 94,362 | 208,312 | 250,071 | | 1,361 | 2,415 | 556,521 |
| 1973 | 27,188 | 118,045 | 85,476 | 719 | 4,103 | 2,365 | 237,896 |
| 1974 | 63,696 | 2,810,059 | 307,172 | 6,589 | 2,475 | 2,200 | 3,192,191 |
| 1975 | 32,362 | 1,694,435 | 98,353 | 835 | | 500 | 1,826,485 |
| 1976 | 16,285 | 527,500 | 52,455 | | | | 596,240 |
| | | | | | | | <u>9,215,758</u> |

Akron and MCC Calcutta indicates that if MCC had an unusual or specialized commodity available, India was a likely candidate to receive it. Raisins, tomato paste, dried apples and honey were a few food items readily accepted by the various institutions.

Medicines and soap were a significant portion of aid sent to India in nonfamine periods, representing almost one-half the assistance sent between 1969 and 1973. Some medicines were purchased by MCC, but most were received as donations from American drug companies.

MCC did limit the scope of its institutional support program. Opportunities and requests were almost limitless. Seven Mennonite missions, related hospitals and selected institutions in the immediate Calcutta area were the regular recipients of MCC aid. An attempt to limit the number of receiving institutions was outlined in a visit of the MCC material aid director to India in 1973. His report to the MCC Executive Committee said:

There is obviously a need for all kinds of material aid supplies in the Calcutta area The question is when and how much MCC should contribute? . . . We agreed that for the next two years MCC Calcutta would relate closely to five to seven institutions worthy of help. We will give them supplies on a regular basis with a termination date in mind. We believe this is better than giving small amounts to 40 to 50 institutions and have a limited relationship. We want material aid help to have a long-term constructive effect on the institution.⁶⁷

Reports seldom referred to the number of institutions receiving help or the number of beneficiaries. The 1973 Workbook was an exception, saying that material aid of all types was distributed to 53 different

⁶⁷ John Hostetler, "Material Aid Report to the MCC Executive Committee, December 11-12, 1973."

institutions with a combined total of 14,500 beneficiaries.⁶⁸

MCC had a close fraternal relationship with CASA (Christian Agency for Social Action), the relief and service section of the National Council of Churches of India. CASA provided clearances for all MCC shipments into the country. Periodically shipments of food, bedding or soap were turned over to CASA for distribution in Eastern India. Responses to small disasters were always coordinated or cooperative ventures between the two agencies.

A major program activity during the 1960s and early 1970s was a nutrition-health program among the East Bengal refugees living on the outskirts of Calcutta. Milk from P.L. 480 via CWS/LWR was the main ingredient in this feeding effort. Only young children, pregnant and nursing mothers numbering approximately 1,200, were eligible recipients at the milk kitchens. Commensurate with the feeding program was a poultry development project. MCC assisted refugee families in establishing small laying flocks and marketing eggs. Through this project an attempt was made to integrate a child-feeding and development program.

MCC Calcutta office and staff were heavily involved in procurement and shipping of supplies to East Pakistan following the devastating November, 1970 hurricane and tidal wave and the 1971 civil war. The bulge of material aid activity in 1971 reflects that action. Only limited MCC help was possible to the 10 million Bengalis who moved into India during the civil war. The Indian government restricted the type and nature of assistance which could be given. Most MCC effort during this period was to purchase

⁶⁸Mennonite Central Committee, 1973 Workbook.

and transship materials from Calcutta to East Pakistan, later Bangladesh.

Although some unusual aid items were sent to India as described earlier, overall MCC made a determined effort during the 15 years to send only what was appropriate. MCC canned beef was not sent due to dietary restrictions. Instead canned chicken was purchased as the primary protein supply. Few clothes were sent. Instead saris and dhoties were purchased within India for distribution following disasters. Not only were local garments more appropriate, but usually they were cheaper. Fortunately Eastern and Central Indians use some wheat in their diets. Rice is preferred, but wheat is acceptable. Consequently MCC could and did respond with the commodity it had in greatest abundance--wheat. Some rice was purchased in 1967 and 1974, but the quantities were small in comparison to the amount of wheat used.

Response to Bihar Famine of 1966-68

The Bihar 1966-68 famine was considerably more severe than was the 1974-75 famine. Palamau District, the primary area of MCC concentration, is a food deficit area in normal years. The years of serious or total crop failure caused tremendous hardships on the local population. MCC's response with food was larger in 1966-68 than it was in 1974-75, though cash expenditures were less. Statistics on total grain used are not available but the 1969 Workbook reports that 3,000,000 pounds of wheat, 1,300,000 pounds of milo, 200,000 pounds of cooking oil, 7,000 pounds of rice and 8,200 pounds of milk were used.⁶⁹ While some of this food was used in direct feeding programs, the majority was used in food-for-work projects.

⁶⁹ Mennonite Central Committee, 1969 Workbook.

Like the amount of material and cash used, there is no comprehensive report of accomplishments. The following data on activities is available:

In 1967:

- 150,000 children involved in daily school feeding programs
- 75 miles of road constructed
- 74 large diameter wells dug
- 8 water storage tanks built
- 1 road bridge built⁷⁰

In the period March 1968 - July 1969:

- 257 larger diameter wells
- 23 dams
- 14 miles of road
- 3 schools⁷¹

In contrast to 1974-75 famine relief, it was easier for MCC to get clearance for expatriate personnel to help supervise relief programs. Usually three MCC-supported persons were in Bihar in addition to as many longer-term missionaries who were able to give part-time help. Handling grain took more personnel, both expatriate and local, than cash payments. The project director in Bihar wrote:

During the month of June, (1968) we had an average of 14,500 labourers working on the above projects each day. To cope with the supervision and maintenance of proper records we have hired a staff of 30 national men.⁷²

The staff reported numerous difficulties in project selection and implementation. The location of wells was a particularly vexing problem. Who would benefit from the well? Larger landowners only? Could wells be

⁷⁰ A. C. Lobe, "Palamau District: Lethargic, Hungry," (Undated).

⁷¹ Mennonite Central Committee, 1969 Workbook.

⁷² A. C. Lobe, "Report of Bihar Agricultural Development Projects," July 7, 1968.

located so irrigation potential could be shared?⁷³ Construction of dams and holding tanks were also undertaken without sufficient planning and engineering skill. There was some pressure from government to initiate bigger projects than would otherwise have been undertaken.⁷⁴

Substantially better records are available from the Bihar 1966-68 famine than from the one seven years later. Appendix A is a sample weekly report to the government of food-for-work projects. The data seems to indicate that the government took a much stronger role in coordinating the work of voluntary agencies in 1966-68 than it did in 1974-75. This could have been due to the greater severity of the famine. Better records on MCC's part may reflect the use of P.L. 480 commodities and thus a greater need to keep records.

The Bihar famine of 1966-68 received some post-mortem analysis by Alan Berg, internationally known nutritionist and US Drought Relief Operations Coordinator in India (1966-67). His analysis, published in Famine: A Symposium Dealing with Nutrition and Relief Operations in Times of Disaster, provides insights on the role and performance of the voluntary agencies in responding to such a massive disaster.⁷⁵

Berg notes the success of the famine response by saying, ". . . the recent India crisis constitutes the first time in modern history that a government declared war on large-scale famine--and won."⁷⁶

⁷³A. C. Lobe, "Mennonite Relief Committee: What? Who? Why? Where?" (Undated).

⁷⁴A. C. Lobe, "Palamau District: Lethargic, Hungry," op. cit.

⁷⁵Blix, op. cit.

⁷⁶Berg, op. cit., p. 115.

The presence of many voluntary agencies with broad experience in India and famine relief were major assets according to Berg. Their large work programs served several useful purposes: They provided food or purchasing power for thousands of destitute persons as well as accomplishing worthwhile development projects; The work programs of the voluntary agencies and of the government served to stem migrations from the famine area, a serious problem in previous famines in India.⁷⁷

Berg notes that famine demands food. The need in some famines for water is equally great. This was true in Bihar. Government and private agency response to this need was effective with numerous schemes for construction of wells and transport of water.⁷⁸

Berg details the massive size of the relief effort. He says:

In 1966-67, more than 20 million tons of food grain were moved into drought effected areas of India, much of this from abroad, but also much from elsewhere in India. During the crisis, the Indian Government loaded and moved an average of seven trains a day--50 cars per train--an average of 550 miles. By the end of 1967, 153,000 fair price shops were operating in the country (20,000 of them in Bihar, the ration system benefiting 47 million Biharis) and six million people were involved in relief projects (700,000 in Bihar). Programs for youngsters and destitutes reached nearly 20 million (seven million in Bihar) during the two years. The cost of all this: somewhere in the vicinity of \$700 million (perhaps \$200 million of it spent in Bihar). Help came from many foreign quarters, but the major flow came from the United States which provided one-fifth of its wheat crop. This constituted an unprecedented movement of food from one country to another and required an armada of some 600 ships. These docked at a rate of three ships a day, depositing an average of 2 billion pounds a month. Lester Brown estimates an equivalent of 60 million Indians were sustained for two years solely by these shipments.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 117

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 118.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 121.

Response to the 1974-75 Food Shortage

Indian crops in 1972 and 1973 were below average, particularly in Bihar. MCC responded with additional cash appropriations. Most of these funds were used in cash-for-work projects (workers paid in cash rather than food). \$10,000 of the appropriation was used to purchase rice in Thailand. But as the food crisis gathered international attention, the number of letters, reports and visits to the area accelerated. Budgets were projected upwards every several months. The critical nature of the food shortage was strongly perceived in India. The MCC director wrote in August 1973: "With reports coming from various parts of the world of similar food 'shortages' one almost begins to get a feeling of panic."⁸⁰

In contrast to the 1966-68 famine MCC received no P.L. 480 grains via CWS/LWR. P.L. 480 commodities were extremely tight. Consequently, CWS/LWR were hardly able to supply CASA requirements. As a result MCC had to supply its own grains. In late 1973 and early 1974 three shipments of wheat were sent to India totaling approximately 1,000 tons. Of this amount, 40% was donated by farmers in the midwest and 60% purchased by MCC. Wheat was allocated to two areas in Madhya Pradesh where Mennonite mission and church relief committees supervised food-for-work projects; to Bihar where the Mennonite Service Agency (MSA) directed similar projects; to CASA for relief programs in Orissa; and to Calcutta where MCC allocated the wheat to feeding programs operated by other organizations. In none of these areas was MCC solely responsible for the food-for-work projects.

⁸⁰Letter from Neil Janzen, MCC India Director to Robert W. Miller, MCC Administrator for Asia, August 21, 1973.

Throughout this crisis period, MCC sought to initiate long-range development programs rather than concentrate entirely on emergency relief, a philosophy with growing emphasis in the 70s. This was done not only with the work projects but also with budget allocations for India which included monies for agricultural development. TELARC (The Economic Life and Relief Committee) and MADRA (Mennonite Agricultural Development and Relief Committee), similar to MSA, were started in Madhya Pradesh and received grants from MCC for development activity. After much effort, MCC was able to get a visa for a trained agriculturalist to assist these three associations in agricultural development projects.

One major exception to this integration of emergency relief and development was a large child feeding program planned for Calcutta in 1974. MCC initiated discussions with a consortium of agencies to supply food (largely wheat) for a feeding program which was to reach a maximum of 40,000 recipients. Plans were to incorporate a strong nutritional/health component into the program. MCC made the program contingent upon securing a visa for a person to provide leadership. The program was dropped when the visa was not forthcoming and when the group of agencies in Calcutta lost interest. Improved crop prospects within India as the discussions dragged on also seemed to indicate that the program was ill-conceived or ill-timed.

During 1974-75 and to a lesser extent in 1966-68, sharp debate took place concerning the desirability of using "cash" or "food" in the work programs. In 1966-68 this debate was not as acute since food was readily available from P.L. 480 stocks at no cost. MCC cash was also more restricted in 1966-68 than it was in 1974-75.

Letters and reports from India indicate several ingredients in the debate:

1. Cost was a factor. If wheat had to be purchased in North America and shipped to India, the overall cost would be greater than if cash was paid to the workers.⁸¹
2. Food imports add to the total supply. Cash given forces up the price of food in a short-supply situation.⁸²
3. Food was less likely to be diverted by the recipients to nonessentials than was cash. The MCC director reported, "Government officials contacted estimate that anywhere from 50 to 70 percent of the workers' wages will be misused in this way (consumed on alcohol)."⁸³
4. There was mixed feeling and opinion on whether diversion is greater in food-for-work or cash-for-work projects. "Actually working with cash is much easier, faster and more efficient . . . than working with wheat," the director wrote in 1975.⁸⁴

But the head of the CWS office in New Delhi wrote to the CASA director in Calcutta as follows: "As you know, it is extremely difficult to control food and materials. It is far more difficult to control money. The chances for leakage and misuse are vastly increased."⁸⁵

The above factors were taken into account in deciding which method of payment to use in a given situation. But sometimes the lack of available food shipments predisposed a decision toward cash. Sometimes both methods of payment were used at the same time.

⁸¹Neil Janzen, letter to John Hostetler, MCC Material Aid Director, October 21, 1975.

⁸²Neil Janzen, letter to Robert W. Miller, May 3, 1974.

⁸³Neil Janzen, "Report, Drought: Palamau District, Bihar," November, 1972.

⁸⁴Neil Janzen, letter to Gayle Gerber Koontz, MCC Information Secretary, April 30, 1975.

⁸⁵Thomas Hemphill, CWS New Delhi, letter to P. C. Joseph, CASA Director, Calcutta, April 24, 1973.

It is impossible to totally measure the development benefit of any given work project. Dams built, roads constructed or wells dug are of no development consequence unless they are used and maintained. MCC records do give some positive indicators on work projects. The 1974, 1975 and 1976 Workbooks report completed projects being utilized for greater food production. The 1975 Workbook reports of one project area alone: "Up to 400 acres of land will come under cropping due to the presence of dams. Perhaps three times that acreage will receive supplemental irrigation from the dams during the rainy season."⁸⁶

Dr. Leonard Siemens, MCC (Canada) Member and Dean of the College of Agriculture of the University of Manitoba, and Edgar Stoesz, MCC staff member, visited India in September 1975 and made the following observation on the benefits of work projects in Central India and Bihar:

A rough cost-benefit calculation indicates that the dam work paid for with one bag of wheat made possible new food production in the first year of from 3-6 bags depending on the level of natural rainfall.⁸⁷

A further factor contributing to development potential of MCC-initiated work projects was the fact that often MCC development programs paralleled the cash-for-work or food-for-work projects in a given community. This continued through MSA in Bihar and TELARC and MADRA in Madhya Pradesh. Seeds, fertilizer, credit, technical help and specialized equipment were available from these development-oriented agencies.

The key to good projects was good planning. Records do not show any manual or standard-operating-procedures on how to set up projects.

⁸⁶ Mennonite Central Committee, 1975 Workbook.

⁸⁷ Leonard Siemens, Edgar Stoesz, "India Trip Report," September 11-19, 1975.

There is evidence that instructions were given by the MCC director to project leaders at the time of his on-site visits, and several letters list the following brief criteria for selection of projects:

1. Community Involvement. The basic idea of these relief projects is to provide interim employment. Therefore a project should attempt to employ as many people as possible.
2. Execution of the Project. The project must be one that can be properly carried out and where ever necessary the advice of qualified persons such as engineers should be sought after.
3. Usefulness to the community. The project should not be one that merely gives people work in doing something that has no lasting benefit. Thus the end product whether it be a well or irrigation canal should benefit a community or small group of people but not merely one or two individuals or a family.⁸⁸

⁸⁸Neil Janzen, Memo to Ben Sawatzky, January 30, 1975.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS

Importance of Material Aid

In order to try to ascertain the importance of material aid contributions to MCC's supporting constituency, a question was submitted to seventeen persons who are involved in some way in MCC's fund raising efforts. Most of these persons also have some responsibility for interpreting material aid needs. About one-half of the respondents serve as directors of MCC regional offices.

The question asked (Appendix B) was this: In the event of a radical reduction of material aid used, would MCC receive the equivalent monies as cash donations? Would MCC get its current cash donation of 6 million dollars and an additional 3 million dollars or a part of it now represented by the material aid contribution?

The response was as follows:

1. _____ Would MCC get its current \$6 million and an extra \$3 million that now comes in the form of material aid?
2. 8 Would MCC get the \$6 million and about one-half the material aid value, \$1.5 million?
3. 7 Would MCC get only the \$6 million?
4. 2 Would MCC get less than the \$6 million?

Clearly, material aid plays a very important role in the minds and actions of MCC's supporting constituency. One respondent commented:

To radically eliminate or reduce the program I think would cause our constituency to lose confidence in MCC and would create confusion and uncertainty since the media

would continue to remind us that there still are hungry people around the world. Eliminate relief (material aid) and I feel in the minds of many constituents you have closed the door on MCC. As long as we continue to do relief, they will support us in our other endeavors, e.g. development.⁸⁹

Another respondent indicated that if MCC requests for material aid were radically reduced, cash contributions would fall. He said:

. . . other organizations are actively pursuing relief programs that emphasize material aid; these siphon off material aid from our regular constituency, and cash donations tend to follow.⁹⁰

The importance of linking some cash contributions to material aid-type purchases was emphasized by several persons. One said:

It (material aid) could be purchased in North America by MCC or even purchased in the receiving country as long as the constituents would know that a certain portion of their contributed dollars would be used for purchasing of material aid to be distributed to the needy.⁹¹

Several respondents emphasized the importance of adequate interpretation of any reduction in requests for material aid. They felt that with proper management the fall-off in contributions need not occur. The director of the Lancaster, Pennsylvania Area Relief Committee noted how cash contributions had actually been increased when it was no longer possible for volunteers to can meat for relief. He said:

We told our story and asked for cash instead of donated animals. The cash received enabled purchase of similar volume Cash for food for relief continues to enjoy an increasing response over the past ten years.⁹²

⁸⁹Reg Toews, Memo to author, February 23, 1978.

⁹⁰Vern Ratzlaff, Letter to author, February 7, 1978.

⁹¹Arthur Driedger, Note to author, March 10, 1978.

⁹²Norman Shenk, Note to author, February 2, 1978.

Another person pointed to actual giving statistics in his area. He noted that from 1968-1975 material aid contributions went down while cash contributions went up even after allowance was made for inflation. This, he noted, would indicate that contributions need not drop off if material aid requests are reduced.⁹³

All respondents from Western Canada, except one, checked numbers three or four among the options. They believe the constituency in this region wants to continue contributing material aid items. This may be due to the fact that most of these persons were helped themselves by MCC's food and clothing contributions to Russia in the 1920s and Western Europe in the 1940s.

Clearly, MCC will need to give vigorous attention to interpreting the reasons for reductions in material aid requests if cash contributions are not to be lost. With proper interpretation, substantial loss in overall income is not automatic, except possibly in Western Canada. But the link between total cash contributions and material aid contributions must be recognized for the present. Material aid contributions will continue to be an important resource for MCC, not only for value per se, but for its relationship with contributions of cash.

Questionnaire Responses

Fifteen questionnaires were sent to persons who had been responsible for MCC's material aid programs and other development activity in Haiti, Jordan and India. (See complete questionnaire in Appendix C). Most of these persons served as country directors. Twelve questionnaires were

⁹³Doug Snyder, Letter to author, (undated).

returned. Of five questionnaires sent to persons involved in programs of each of the three countries, one person from each country failed to respond.

The questionnaire was not designed to measure attitudes and program achievements in a scientific way. It was rather an attempt to survey attitudes and perceptions of those MCC persons who were intimately involved in the use of material aid during their period of service. It served as a source of supplemental data to that found in the MCC records. Most of the respondents had served three-year assignments in the respective countries. Responses reflect not only the individual's own perspective on development and material aid's contribution to it, but also conditions pertaining to respective countries and time of service.

The following is a tabulation of responses. Most questions indicate responses from the three countries separately. Some questions required sentence responses. Some of these are reported. An analysis of responses is made after each question.

1. What percentage of material aid was distributed in a given year directly under MCC's responsibility, and what percentage through second parties, e.g., government, churches?

Haiti: The first three directors to serve in Haiti listed 90-100% under MCC responsibility; the last, or most recent, listed 25%.

Jordan: The respondents, listed in chronological order as they served in Jordan, indicated 100, 90, 25, and 20% distributed under MCC responsibility.

India: Here second parties were responsible for the majority of materials; 60, 95, 85 and 100%. (Chronological order does not apply for the last two respondents because of personnel overlapping in periods of service and locations).

Overall there seems to be a shift from MCC taking primary responsibility for distribution, to that of working through other agencies.

2. Indicate the percentage of material aid distributed through the following channels:

| | <u>Haiti</u> | | | | <u>Jordan</u> | | | | <u>India</u> | | | |
|-------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | <u>1st</u> | <u>2nd</u> | <u>3rd</u> | <u>4th</u> | <u>1st</u> | <u>2nd</u> | <u>3rd</u> | <u>4th</u> | <u>1st</u> | <u>2nd</u> | <u>3rd</u> | <u>4th</u> |
| % institutions | 50 | 45 | 90 | 100 | 15 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 50 | 40 | 85 | 10 |
| % food-for-work | 25 | 45 | 5 | | 5 | 2 | | | 35 | 45 | 15 | 87 |
| % direct hand out | 25 | 10 | | | 80 | 90 | 90 | 10 | 15 | 15 | | 2 |
| % other | | | 5 | | | | | 80 | | | | 1 |

3. Indicate the percentage of material aid distributed to meet the following needs:

| | <u>Haiti</u> | | | | <u>Jordan</u> | | | | <u>India</u> | | | |
|--------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | <u>1st</u> | <u>2nd</u> | <u>3rd</u> | <u>4th</u> | <u>1st</u> | <u>2nd</u> | <u>3rd</u> | <u>4th</u> | <u>1st</u> | <u>2nd</u> | <u>3rd</u> | <u>4th</u> |
| % emergency relief | 5 | | | | 100 | 20 | 80 | | 25 | 10 | 25 | 8 |
| % development | 10 | 45 | 60 | | 5 | | | | 25 | 45 | | 80 |
| % endemic needs | 10 | 10 | | | 80 | | 70 | 10 | | 10 | 10 | 2 |
| % institutional | 75 | 45 | 40 | 100 | 15 | | 10 | | 50 | 30 | 65 | 10 |
| % other | | | | | | | | 10 | | | 5 | |

Questions 2 and 3 were quite similar and responses reflected that similarity. There was no unanimity of opinion as to what constitutes use of material aid for emergency relief or endemic needs, particularly in Jordan. The bulk of relief supplies were distributed in camps or to refugees scattered among relatives in urban areas. Either designation would seem appropriate to describe the needs of these refugees.

4. What staff person in your program had primary responsibility for the material aid program?

No one uniform pattern was evident in all three countries. In Haiti, the MCC director or expatriate staff person had responsibility. In Jordan and India a national staff person had primary responsibility.

5. Of the material aid distributed in your program, approximately what percentage was purchased locally: _____ 0%, _____ 25%, _____ 50% or _____ 75%? The number of MCC directors from each country responded as follows:

| | <u>Haiti</u> | <u>Jordan</u> | <u>India</u> |
|-----|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| 0% | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| 25% | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| 50% | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 75% | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Only a very small percentage of the material aid was purchased locally in any of the countries. Several persons who checked "25%" noted that it was actually less than this.

6. Who made the primary decision as to where your material aid was distributed?

All respondents indicated that the MCC director made the primary decision on material aid allocations. Several noted that this was done in consultation with local government or churches. In Jordan this consultation was with UNRWA.

7. Regarding the economic level of the population the material aid program was directed to the:

| | <u>Haiti</u> | <u>Jordan</u> | <u>India</u> |
|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| lowest 10% | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| lowest 25% | | 2 | 3 |
| lowest 50% | 3 | | |

Responses to this question were somewhat surprising, particularly from Haiti. One would have expected a greater portion to be directed to the

neediest portion of the population. Since much of the material aid was allocated to the hospital/clinic, this could explain the response from Haiti.

8. Material aid was _____ easier, _____ about the same, _____ more difficult to administer following a disaster than in response to a situation of endemic poverty?

| | <u>Haiti</u> | <u>Jordan</u> | <u>India</u> |
|----------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| easier | | 1 | 2 |
| about the same | 1 | | 1 |
| more difficult | 1 | 3 | 1 |

Responses reflect experiences the different directors had in supervising material aid programs. Two responses from Haiti indicate that they did not participate in disaster programs. One respondent said: "The endemic situation was easier because channels were there for distribution. Within myself the struggle was more difficult because of the dehumanizing effect long-term distributions had on people."

9. Did you have _____ adequate, _____ less than adequate instructions from MCC (Akron office) in setting goals for the material aid program?

| | <u>Haiti</u> | <u>Jordan</u> | <u>India</u> |
|--------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| adequate | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| less than adequate | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Interestingly, the directors who indicated that they had "less than adequate" instructions all served from about 1973 to 1976. This probably resulted from the tremendous emphasis MCC placed on development programs during this period. At the MCC Annual Meeting in 1974, a resolution on world hunger was passed calling for priority to development during the next five to ten years. No mention was made in the resolution to food aid.

10. List several economic and programmatic/administrative factors used to determine whether or not a material aid program should be initiated:

Economic

- need; food shortages, floods, famines, refugees, etc.
- would material aid items neutralize local production
- if receiving institution could extend its services with this additional support
- expressed community need and participation
- long-term economic effect on recipients

Programmatic/administrative

- available resources; budget, materials, staff time
- had organizational know-how
- national emphasis on development
- following feasibility study
- degree of control over distribution
- suitability of available material aid to meeting objectives
- cost of shipping, freight and time involved
- factors of developing dependency on goods

11. Among these items which have most often been available in the MCC material aid program, which were most useful in meeting emergency, development and endemic poverty needs?

Responses to this question were interesting though very difficult to quantify. The majority of respondents simply checked several items that were most useful. Little attempt was made to rank the different items. In India, wheat and milk received a uniformly high rating for use in all three situations. Blankets and soap were indicated as suitable items for emergency and endemic poverty situations. The suitability of blankets for response to emergencies and endemic poverty needs was the only point of agreement in the Jordan responses. There was surprising disagreement in other categories. Clearly, there is no unanimity of opinion among personnel who served in one country, let alone among those from several countries on what material aid items are most useful for given situations. This might

help to explain why it has been necessary to provide so many different types of items in the MCC material aid program.

12. List several factors which were most significant in making the material aid program successful in your country:

- government cooperation
- high quality of MCC materials
- clear, identifiable needs
- good coordination with other voluntary agencies
- good organization for distribution
- careful advance planning
- clear policy on allocations
- good infrastructure that allowed material aid to be part of resource input
- ability to use it in food-for-work programs
- the fact that it was not the primary program input added to the success
- (two respondents commented that mass distributions of material aid could not be considered successful under any terms of reference)

13. Did you feel the Akron administrator responsible for your country gave _____ more, _____ less, or _____ about the same amount of care and attention to the material aid program as he gave to other aspects of the program?

| | <u>Haiti</u> | <u>Jordan</u> | <u>India</u> |
|----------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| more | | | |
| less | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| about the same | 1 | 2 | 2 |

The responses to this question may help to explain why some directors experienced difficulty in utilizing the material aid resource that was available to them.

14. If applicable, list ways in which nonfood items were used in development programs:

- health kits, sewing kits and yard goods to home economics programs in rural schools
- blankets and sheets used as "prizes" to encourage rural women to construct latrines and sanitary outdoor kitchens
- plastic pipe used in capping springs
- soap was used in conjunction with food-for-work
- blankets for work projects following cyclones
- yard goods provided for village sewing centers

One person said, "Material aid was used more in earlier years in food-for-work projects, but it was my view that after 20 years of basically relief mentality, material aid had to be removed entirely from development program."

15. Did you feel that you had on your staff the necessary skills to administer a material aid program effectively?

All but one respondent indicated that they had the necessary skills.

16. Did you feel that you or those on your staff responsible for the material aid program had the necessary time to adequately administer the material aid program?

All but one person answered "yes" to this question. The negative respondent said that much more case work was required.

17. Did your material aid program _____ contribute, _____ detract from, or _____ have a neutral effect upon your other development activity?

(Tabulation of responses after question 18).

18. If "contribute toward" or "detract from" was checked in the above question, please indicate how or why this was true.

| | <u>Haiti</u> | <u>Jordan</u> | <u>India</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| contribute toward | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| detract from | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| neutral effect upon | 1 | 1 | |

Some positive responses: "It served as a reward and encouragement factor in the total process;" and "Food was available for well digging, dam building, irrigation work where funds would not have been. Hence projects were much larger."

Some negative responses were:

I say detract, because the handling of material aid, at times because of obligation to 'keep it coming,' tended to divert our attention from the problem being addressed. Thus we could easily become preoccupied with the means and forget the end.

Why work when others were receiving it free?

The importation of goods is a major distraction from the self help process. It for one tells the nationals they are failures that their own materials are of less quality Seldom do those who really need assistance get it.

19. In what ways, if any, was food used for development purposes other than in food-for-work projects?

None were mentioned.

20. In your opinion who determined the size of MCC's material aid program?

Although several persons checked two or three different options, all but one indicated that "need for material aid as perceived by the country director or other responsible field staff" determined the size.

21. If the dollar value of all the material aid that was available to you would have been sent to you as cash in addition to the regular budget

in a given year, what percent would you have spent for material aid?

Responses to this question were so varied that one can only conclude that the question was misunderstood or poorly phrased.

22. The following question pertains specifically to the portion of material aid used in development activity: If the value of that material aid had been available in cash, would the accomplishments have been
greater, about the same, or less than what was accomplished with the material aid?

| | <u>Haiti</u> | <u>Jordan</u> | <u>India</u> |
|----------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| greater | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| about the same | | 1 | |
| less | 3 | 1 | |

The directors in India would have preferred cash and in Haiti there was preference for material aid. The responses might reflect the fact that some of the items imported into Haiti could not be purchased there. One person from Jordan wrote, "We could have done much more effective work before and during my time had we had cash resources for a flexible approach to material aid. Response was too much predicated on the available givens from our constituency and warehouse stocks."

23. Were you encouraged by the Akron office to use material aid in development activities?

All responded positively except one person.

24. Did you receive a great deal of, some, little, or no satisfaction from administering the material aid aspect of your program?

| | <u>Haiti</u> | <u>Jordan</u> | <u>India</u> |
|-----------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| a great deal of | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| some | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| little | | 1 | 2 |
| no | 1 | | |

The persons who were responsible for programs in the 1960s checked "great deal of" or "some" whereas the persons who carried program responsibility in the 1970s tended to check "little" or "no" satisfaction.

25. What factors, if any, prevented you from using a greater percentage of material aid for development?

- lack of staff, time, budget
- fear of developing dependency
- tendency of recipients to view aid as "hand outs" only
- lack of local organization
- long-term development objectives difficult to achieve vis a vis aid-in-kind
- food was locally available
- resale of material aid was common

26. As you reflect on MCC's total world-wide material aid program, describe its objective in a sentence or two.

A surprising number of respondents defined the objective in terms of North America's need to give of their surplus. The other definitions emphasized response to emergencies and resources for development.

27. Among the following, check the statements which most clearly reflect your attitude toward MCC's material aid program: (See list of options in Appendix).

There was no unanimity of response to this question. Several respondents checked more than one option. All items were checked at least once though number 2, "The material aid program should be discontinued except for emergency disaster-type situations," received the most responses.

28 and 29. Responses to these two questions on food-for-work project administration were too few to indicate any preferences.

30. List your major difficulties related to food-for-work programs:

- funding needed for skilled labor
- spoilage of food, storage
- sale of food by workers
- getting food on time
- selection of good projects
- relating "need" to work

31. What type of food-for-work activity provided the best development results?

All the projects listed were checked at least once.

CHAPTER 5

OBSERVATIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This part of the study attempts to refine the MCC experience in Haiti, India and Jordan for specific applicability to future programs. Some suggestions and guidelines emerge from the literature review chapter as well. Findings will have specific applicability for MCC but hopefully will also have some relevance for other development agencies, large or small. Some findings appear self-evident and hardly seem to bear mentioning, but reference to some which seem obvious should be evidence that they are too often overlooked. Findings focus particularly on the development aspect of material aid use.

It should be noted that beginning in late 1976, MCC has been giving attention to deficiencies in its material aid and disaster response program. Material aid/disaster coordinators have been assigned to India/Bangladesh, the Sahel region of Africa and the MCC headquarters offices. A policy statement on the role of material aid was approved at the most recent MCC Annual Meeting (Exhibit D). In India and Bangladesh, the material aid/disaster coordinator along with MCC country directors are giving concerted attention to formulating program goals and procedures for material aid programs.

The following is a summary of learnings:

1. Results from the brief questionnaire submitted to 17 fund raising-related persons offer some insights on MCC's available resources. One can conclude that MCC's ability and willingness to respond to emergency

relief needs may be more important to the supporting constituency than whether or not material aid is used. The supporting constituency wants to see a certain portion of contributions used to meet immediate and basic needs of people. There is not as much concern as to how needs are met, whether with material aid or cash. It would be easier to discontinue material aid assistance than to stop responding to disasters with emergency relief, whatever form that relief takes.

2. MCC records and questionnaire responses are almost uniformly agreed that material aid has a legitimate place in emergency relief programs. There is no agreement on its legitimacy for assisting the development process.

3. Disasters, particularly famine periods, can be an opportunity for development. Contributing factors may be: (a) Receptivity of people to new methods of cultivation, (b) New seeds can be introduced since old ones are consumed, (c) Increased attention to and urgency of agricultural development on the part of farmers and government, (d) Added resources available both from within the country and from outside, e.g. credit, technical advice, (e) Reduced bureaucratic constraints and (f) Increased prices of farm products.

The difficulty of getting viable development programs going in Haiti may be related to the above. Haiti has experienced chronic poverty and repeated small disasters but has never had to declare "war on famine" as India had to in 1966-68 and 1974-75.

4. Before 1976, MCC seldom had specific and clearly-stated goals for material aid programs. This probably resulted from a lack of clearly-

stated goals for the total program which has also recently been corrected. The lack of clear goals and specific directions for material aid programs also gives one the impression that the Akron area administrators generally gave less interest and time to material aid programs than to other parts of the program. Without clear, specific goals it was difficult for local staff to measure accomplishments from year to year.

5. Reporting and records of material aid use lacks consistency and regularity. Records on development accomplishments through the use of material aid are also poor and inconsistent. Records from India's Bihar famine of 1966-68 are the best from any country and any period studied, but their regularity and content could have been improved with minimal extra effort. Clearer directions on record keeping and reporting on material aid use should be issued by the Akron office, allowing for balance between uniformity and individual country variation. Reports should include the type and quantity of material aid used, destination and accomplishments resulting from it. Categories such as long-range development, institutional support and emergency relief should be developed.

6. Much of the material aid shipped to the three countries studied (more than 50 percent most years in both India and Haiti) is allocated to institutions. This study did not adequately probe the overall contribution made by this contribution to institutions.

There was no coherent philosophy or guidelines on why, when, and what type of material aid to provide to institutions. Guidelines were being developed in India in 1976 but the records did not indicate such for Haiti or Jordan for the period under study. Development of such a

statement should be done for the agency as a whole with each country able to adapt it to meet local peculiarities. This might allow for expansion of material aid activity in some countries.

7. No definitive statement on what type of organization to work through can be made for material aid distributions on the basis of the three-country study. Cooperation with some churches, local governments and village organizations was effective, with others it was ineffective. Criteria other than the type of local cooperating body determines program success.

8. MCC country directors expressed differences on how they view the role of material aid in the MCC program. But those differences were not as varied as anticipated. Most of the differences reflected were related to the time period of service (1960 vs. 1970s) rather than to differing views of the directors themselves or the countries in which they served. Generally directors in the 1960s felt better about material aid use and distributed more than did their counterparts in the 1970s. This observation reflects an evolution in general thinking on development and MCC's evolving program priorities more than the views of personnel involved. More guidance to country directors on the role material aid can have in the overall program, and specifically in development, would be helpful.

9. In an attempt to determine which material aid items contributed most to development, no clear pattern emerged.

10. Nonfood items can make a positive contribution to development programs but only in relatively small quantities. They are more useful

and can be used in larger quantities in emergency relief or institutional support programs. Frequently nonfood items can and should be bought within the country where they are distributed.

11. MCC has a good record of sending quality and culturally-appropriate items. Few complaints and many positive comments were noted. In addition to good quality control within the constituency, MCC is willing to purchase needed items in local countries when that is most appropriate.

12. MCC personnel administering material aid set a very high standard for distribution. Consequently, when abuses occurred, as they did, there was often a desire to discontinue the program. A greater realism must be recognized when handling materials. One needs to strive for the most efficient program possible, but recognize that some abuses are inevitable.

13. At least in emergencies, relief for relief's sake is legitimate. Relief may, but does not always have to lead to development. But clearly defined objectives, target audiences and time schedule plus adequate administration are as important in a strictly relief program as they are in a development program.

14. MCC use of material aid for development purposes emerged from the need to provide cash or food for immediate relief rather than from a desire to accomplish some development objective. Drought, flood, preharvest hunger or political unrest created the need. The development component of these efforts has been secondary rather than a primary purpose. Work projects were seen as a means to avoid hand outs.

Given MCC's past history, size and program philosophy this emphasis will likely continue. Food-for-work projects will be initiated in response to food needs rather than as an attempt to accomplish a development objective.

15. Work projects are only successful in meeting a temporary employment or food need such as preharvest hunger. They are not viable as a solution to long-term unemployment or food shortage. Therefore, goals and termination schedule are crucial and must be set from the beginning.

16. No one comprehensive set of ingredients can be identified for establishing a successful food-for-work project, but the following are usually required:

- identifiable purpose for the project
- cooperative local government
- careful advance planning and clear administrative procedures
- available supplemental resources such as skilled labor, cash, transport, storage
- adequate, competent staff

17. No clear preference for cash-for-work or food-for-work projects can be given without analyzing various factors. The following factors would favor a food-for-work approach:

- overall shortage of food in the area or country
- goal of getting maximum amount of food to people
- availability of food from outside the country or from another part of the country
- good transport and storage facilities for the food
- a culturally acceptable food available for payment
- adequate and competent personnel for transport and distribution of the food
- preference stated by the government or the people themselves
- able to provide a more nutritious food than traditionally eaten, e.g. corn-soya-milk rather than corn meal
- limited cash available
- lengthy lead time (procurement and transport of grain to project site may take six months or more)
- goal to reduce inflationary spiral on local food prices

The following factors would favor a cash-for-work approach:

- adequate food locally available
- primary goal is to ease unemployment problem
- only food available is culturally unacceptable
- limited personnel resources
- funds not a limiting factor
- limited storage and transport facilities
- inadequate lead time
- little opportunity for spending funds on nonproductive, non-essential consumption
- preference of government or workers themselves
- goal to avoid depressing local grain prices

Frequently it is possible and advantageous to use a combination of both cash-for-work and food-for-work. This requires more administration and record keeping but offers advantages from both approaches. Particularly it can prevent the selling of food commodities for cash, a problem that accompanies many food-for-work projects. The ratio of food to cash payments can be varied according to local conditions.

18. Smaller food-for-work projects were usually more successful than larger ones. More administration was required per grain input and work output, but the success rate was higher. Before starting large work projects, one should have successfully completed similar smaller ones.

19. Work projects should be community-based. They must serve a defined group of persons, such as an entire or specific part of a community. Difficulties resulted in India when wells served only one farmer.

20. Clear government coordination and cooperation is important in any work program. The MCC work program in India experienced excellent support and cooperation. Part of the success can be attributed to that. Programs in Haiti suffered from lack of government cooperation. Undoubtedly this was a contributing factor to MCC's unwillingness to initiate more work

projects. Maintaining effective communications with government, both local and national, can be most helpful when discussions related to disaster response program must be initiated. One can anticipate greater government interest and cooperation in disaster response programs than in other day-to-day operations.

21. Work projects should be a type which local communities or governments cannot do on their own. They also should not be competitive with local community or government projects. Real efforts should be made to make such projects experimental or innovative. If successful, local governments or communities can multiply the projects in size and scope. One reason MCC Jordan did not engage in more food-for-work projects was that other agencies and the government were already building roads and schools. MCC staff was at a loss to project more innovative projects.

22. When financial resources are a constraint, and if free or low-cost food is available, food-for-work projects can contribute to added development activity. But administrative costs are a factor and need to be provided for. Food may be free, but converting it to food-for-work and development will take cash which may range from 25% to 100% of the value of the food.

23. No clear consensus emerges on whether work projects are best located in conjunction with or apart from other development efforts. The majority of evidence appears to come down on the side of linking the two efforts. The ability to maximize production efforts seems to outweigh the "make work" factor.

When development rather than employment is the primary consideration work projects are most effective when initiated in conjunction with other development activity. Other development programs, particularly extension-type programs, can help to insure that benefits accrued from the work projects are maximized.

24. Work projects designed to meet temporary unemployment or a food deficit situation may naturally lead to a development program. This was particularly true in MCC's Bihar program in 1966-68.

25. Before initiating a work project it is essential to have assured other inputs besides food and cash such as technical-engineering expertise, government clearances, and all material supplies (cement, steel, stone, wood, etc.) before proceeding. Frequently these other resources should be solicited from the local community or government.

26. Related to the above and probably even more important, it is essential to determine before the project is begun how benefits from it are to be distributed or utilized. Untold problems can result from not determining in advance how the water from the dam or well will be distributed, for example.

27. In planning for a work project, particular attention needs to be given to legal and practical considerations governing land reclamation and usage. What provisions are there for providing compensation for the landowners and tenants of land covered by a dam? What provision for compensation is needed for land used to widen a road?

28. Work projects should be planned with the seasonal work schedule clearly in mind. Work activities on the project should not pull laborers from planting, cultivating or harvesting their own crops. Such planning usually identifies periods of maximum need for food or cash to purchase food.

29. In planning work projects, attempt should be made to avoid large migrations of workers. Where possible, projects should be located near homes of potential laborers. Smaller projects help avoid importing laborers from a distance. Scatter numerous projects rather than concentrating them in one area. This will reduce housing, transportation and sanitation needs.

30. Payment for work projects, whether in food or cash, should be high enough to attract workers but not too high that it draws them away from regular employment. Frequently governments or other agencies will have a prescribed formula which can be followed. Where several agencies are working in a given area, care should be taken to pay equivalent wages.

31. Work projects begun in response to famine conditions need to take into account the weakened condition of the population. Expectations, rest periods, etc., need to consider the health of workers.

32. Work projects can be an effective way of reaching the lower 10% (poorest of the poor) of the population. These persons are frequently landless and have only seasonal employment if any employment at all.

33. Work projects lend themselves much better to rural than to urban areas. MCC has had only limited success in initiating successful work projects in urban areas.

34. Before initiating a work project, be sure the objectives to be achieved are clearly stated. Is relief, development or employment the primary objective? If several objectives are desired, which has priority? The type of project and manner in which it is carried out should reflect the objective(s).

35. Provision should be made for the maintenance of the end product before the work project is begun. Just as it is an essential development principle to have assured the operating expenses of an institution before it is launched, so maintenance and servicing cost of any dam, well, road or school should be assured before it is constructed.

Summary

The food shortages of 1974-75 generated a new look at the role of voluntary agencies in disaster response programs. In the last decade a growing urgency to move from emergency food aid to long-range development programs has emerged. This study of MCC's experiences in three countries hopefully contributes to that discussion.

In MCC's experience, material aid was an important resource, but played only a supporting role to other inputs in the countries studied. Its contribution was made more effective by the other inputs. It is not clear, however, to what degree material aid inputs contributed to other longer-term development efforts.

The study showed how MCC's use of food for development resulted primarily from the need for food rather than from the desire to implement a development objective. More attention should be given by MCC on how the resource of food could be used to accomplish a development objective in other than emergency situations. The experiences of other voluntary agencies such as CARE, Church World Service and Catholic Relief Service should be solicited in this regard.

Two areas of MCC's material aid program which merit further study are: (1) factors which contribute to or prevent the development of dependency on the part of material aid recipients and (2) criteria for determining when MCC should purchase local food or other material aid supplies, rather than relying on imports.

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MENNONITE RELIEF COMMITTEE

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Satbarwa P. O. Palmau Dist.

Bihar

District Commissioner
Daltongunj P. O.
District. Palamau
Binar State.

18th April, 1968

Ref: Reports on Community Development Projects
undertaken by the Mennonite Relief Committee
during the month of March 1968.

Dear Sir:

Following are the details of all projects undertaken by the Mennonite Relief Committee: -

| Sl No. | Center | Daily Workers | Daily Benefits | P R O J E C T S Wells | Bandhs | R o a d |
|--------|---------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------|----------|
| 1. | Latehar Block | 1084 | 6155 | 41 | None | One |
| 2. | Manika Block | 2589 | 13009 | 51 | 8 | |
| 3. | Chandwa Block | 1162 | 6810 | 35 | 1 | |
| 4. | Balamuth Block | 360 | 1800 | 15 | 1 | |
| 5. | Kuru Block, Rnanchi District | 4067 | 20335 | 104 | 4 | |
| | Total | <u>9262</u> | <u>47109</u> | <u>246</u> | <u>14</u> | <u>1</u> |

From the above you will note that 9262 people worked on the above projects daily and that 47109 people benefited daily.

The number of days worked at each center was as follows:

| | | |
|----|---------------------------------|---------|
| 1. | Latehar Block | 22 days |
| 2. | Manika Block | 22 days |
| 3. | Chandwa Block | 19 days |
| 4. | Balemuth Block | 12 days |
| 5. | Kuru Block, Rnanchi District | 18 days |

In the month of March projects were open and under construction for 19 days. The figure is arrived at by averaging a number of days each center had its projects open. In the month of April projects will likely be under construction for 26 days. We anticipate completing the above projects by July 16th, 1968.

In addition of the above projects we anticipate opening the following additional projects by April 20th, 1968:

| | | |
|----|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. | Latehar Block | Nawghar Road - Bandhpur Bandh |
| 2. | Manika Block | School Building (1) |
| 3. | Chandwa Block | 1 bandh |
| 4. | Balumath Block | 1 Road |
| 5. | Kuru Block, Rnanchi District | 5 wells and 2 bandhs |

APPENDIX B

January 30, 1973
 734 Fulton St.
 Allentown, PA 17501

MATERIAL AID PORTION OF MCC'S PROGRAM

I am currently writing on the use of material aid in development as my Master's Thesis topic. In addition to considerable study on the U.S. Government's P.L. 480 program, I am attempting to analyze MCC's use of material aid in three countries: India, Haiti and Jordan. As part of this research I would appreciate your response to the question listed below on the importance of material aid as viewed by contributors to MCC.

During the past six years, 1972-1977, MCC's annual income averaged approximately 9 million dollars. Of this amount, 3 million or 33 percent represented the value of the material aid portion. MCC has no intention at present to eliminate or radically reduce the material aid program. But in the event that there would be a radical reduction or even elimination of the material aid program what effect would this have on the overall contributions to MCC? Any change would assume an adequate and reasonable explanation for the change.

Please check one of the following:

1. Would MCC get its current \$6 million and an extra \$3 million that now comes in the form of material aid?
2. Would MCC get the \$6 million and about one half the material aid value, \$1.5 million?
3. Would MCC get only the \$6 million?
4. Would MCC get less than the \$6 million?

Please return this letter with your response to the above four options and any additional note you wish to add to me in the enclosed envelope. I am sending this letter to approximately 15 persons who work closely with MCC's material aid and fund raising activity. Thank you for your response.

Paul Longacre

January 30, 1978
724 Fulton St.
Akron, PA 17501

QUESTIONNAIRE

I am currently working on my Master's Thesis at Kansas State University. My research topic relates to the use of material aid, particularly its development potential. In addition to doing considerable study of the impact of the U.S. Government's P.L. 480 Program on developing countries, I am analyzing MCC's use of material aid in three different countries. These countries are, Haiti, India and Jordan with analysis for the years between 1962 and 1976.

It would be advantageous to interview you on your experience with material aid in one of the above countries. Since that is not possible I would appreciate it if you would fill out the enclosed brief questionnaire. I am only sending the questionnaire to five persons related to each of these countries, so it is important that every questionnaire be returned. Also, since the number of questions is small, I will welcome your elaboration on any of them. Statistical analysis of responses is not my goal in this case. Rather, I am interested in your experiences with material aid and overall perception.

A number of questions relate to the use of material aid in development. It is not possible for me to precisely define what constitutes development projects in each of the three countries. As a guide to you in answering the questions related to development, I quote the definition of development Edgar Stoesz uses in the Development Monograph, Series # 1, Thoughts on Development: "...the process by which both persons and societies come to realize the full potential of human life in a context of social justice, with an emphasis on self-reliance; economic growth being seen as one of the means for carrying forward this process."

I will be sharing my findings with MCC. I have consulted with John Hostetler and others in my research. I am not sure if the findings will be printed in any form other than the final thesis. Please check back with MCC or me in June if you wish to receive a report of my findings in whatever shape they are available at that time.

Thank you for completing this questionnaire and returning it to me promptly at my home address, given above.

Paul Longacre

QUESTIONNAIRE

In completing this questionnaire attempt to answer the questions in terms of an average year.

1. What percentage of material aid was distributed in a given year directly under MCC's responsibility, and what percentage through second parties, e.g., government, churches?
 ___% solely MCC responsibility
 ___% second parties

2. Indicate the percentage of material aid distributed through the following channels:
 ___% institutions (hospitals, day care centers, schools, etc.)
 ___% food-for-work
 ___% direct hand out
 ___% other

3. Indicate the percentage of material aid distributed to meet the following needs:
 ___% emergency relief
 ___% development
 ___% endemic needs (long term poverty)
 ___% institutional support
 ___% other

4. Which staff person in your program had primary responsibility for the material aid program?
 ___ MCC director
 ___ MCC expatriate specifically designed for this task
 ___ national staff person
 ___ anybody who was available
 ___ other

5. Of the material aid distributed in your program approximately what percentage was purchased locally?

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 0% | <input type="checkbox"/> 50% |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 25% | <input type="checkbox"/> 75% |

6. Who made the primary decision as to where your material aid was distributed?

- MCC director
- local government
- local church or other society
- other

7. Regarding the economic level of the population the material aid program was directed to the:

- lowest 10% of the population
- lowest 25% of the population
- lowest 50% of the population

8. Material aid was easier, about the same, more difficult to administer following a disaster than in response to a situation of endemic poverty?

9. Did you have adequate, less than adequate instructions from MCC (Akron office) in setting goals for the material aid program?

10. List several economic and programmatic/administrative factors used to determine whether or not a material aid program should be initiated:

| Economic | Programmatic/administrative |
|----------|-----------------------------|
| 1. | 1. |
| 2. | 2. |

11. Among these items which have most often been available in the MCC material aid program which were most useful in meeting emergency, development and endemic poverty needs? (Rank in order of importance, indicating zero for those of no value.)

| <u>Emergency</u> | <u>Development</u> | <u>Endemic</u> | |
|------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------------|
| _____ | _____ | _____ | canned beef |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | wheat |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | milk |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | blankets |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | used clothing |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | yard goods |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | health kits |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | sewing kits |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | Christmas bundles |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | soap |

12. List several factors which were most significant in making the material aid program successful in your country.
- 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
13. Did you feel the Akron administrator responsible for your country gave ___ more, ___ less, or ___ about the same amount of care and attention to the material aid program they gave to other aspects of the program.
14. If applicable, list ways in which nonfood items were used in development programs.
- 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.

15. Did you feel that you had on your staff the necessary skills to administer a material aid program effectively? ___ yes, ___ no. If "no," why not?
16. Did you feel that you or those on your staff responsible for the material aid program had the necessary time to adequately administer the material aid program? ___ yes, ___ no. If "no," why not?
17. Did your material aid program ___ contribute toward, ___ detract from, or ___ have a neutral effect upon your other development activity?
18. If "contribute toward" or "detracted from" was checked in the above question, please indicate how or why this was true.
19. In what ways, if any, was food used for development purposes other than in food-for-work projects?
20. In your opinion who determined the size of MCC's material aid program?
 ___ MCC Executive Committee and annual meeting
 ___ John Hostetler (MCC Material Aid Director)
 ___ need for material aid as perceived by the country director or other responsible field staff
 ___ persons in constituency who make material aid available
 ___ Akron area administrator
 ___ other
21. If the dollar value of all the material aid that was available to you would have been sent to you as cash in addition to the regular budget in a given year, what percent would you have spent for material aid purchases? ___ 0%, ___ 25%, ___ 50%, ___ 75%, ___ 100%.
22. The following question pertains specifically to the portion of material aid used in development activity: If the value of that material aid had been available in cash, would the accomplishments have been ___ greater, ___ about the same, or ___ less than what was accomplished with the material aid?

23. Were you encouraged by the Akron office to use material aid in development activities? yes, no. Why?
24. Did you receive a great deal of, some, little, or no satisfaction from administering the material aid aspect of your program?
25. What factors, if any, prevented you from using a greater percentage of material aid for development?
- 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
26. As you reflect on MCC's total world-wide material aid program, describe its objective in a sentence or two.
27. Among the following, check the statements which most clearly reflect your attitude toward MCC's total material aid program:
1. The material aid program should be discontinued entirely.
 2. The material aid program should be discontinued except for emergency disaster-type situations.
 3. The current range of supply of MCC material aid items should be reduced to about one-half the present number.
(If this item is checked, please list the four items in question 11 you wish to see continued.)
 4. MCC should use locally purchased items only (nearby country purchase acceptable).
 5. Material aid program should be continued at about the present level.
 6. The material aid program should be expanded.

(Answer 28-30 only if involved in food-for-work projects.)

28. In administration of food-for-work projects what was your usual practice?

- a. ___ food for 5 days
 ___ food for 4 days, cash for 1
 ___ food for 3 days, cash for 2
 ___ other

b. Food given was sufficient for:

- ___ worker only
___ 3 family members
___ 5 family members
___ 7 family members
___ other

29. List your major difficulties related to food-for-work programs.

1.

2.

3.

30. What type of food-for-work activity provided the best development results?

- ___ construction of dams
___ construction of roads
___ construction of wells
___ construction of schools
___ terraces
___ other

APPENDIX D

THE ROLE OF MATERIAL AID

January 1978

A paper prepared by Edgar Stoesz, et.al. at the request of the Executive Committee for presentation to the MCC membership at the annual meeting for further discussion and clarification.

MCC was organized to distribute food to Mennonite families in Russia. MCC was from the beginning also involved in food production and what is now known as development. In its second year twenty-five tractors and plows were sent to the Ukraine to increase food production.

Relief and development have been for MCC from the beginning, and remain, two void dimensions of a comprehensive ministry to human suffering. The quantity of material aid has varied according to world need but in recent years its value has been in the range of 25% of the resources available to MCC.

The term material aid is meant to apply not only to food, primarily wheat and meat, but also to such commodities as clothing, bandages, bedding, yard goods, soaps, bundles, seeds, sewing and health kits and medicines. It should not go unnoticed that these resources are used for both development and relief programs.

The question which is with us constantly is one of priority and useful guidelines on how best to respond to a wide range of needs. One very general and broadly accepted definition is that relief is needed to respond to emergencies resulting from war, drought, or whatever, while development, including food production, is the more appropriate response to endemic poverty. The distinction between an emergency and poverty is, however, seldom that clear in practice. The sobering fact is that millions live in perpetual poverty compounded by periodic crises.

While affirming the rightful role of relief, it would perhaps be useful to discuss a few of the major problems MCC encounters in administering relief programs, especially along side of development programs, and suggest a few guidelines. These problems are not unique to MCC and they are not new, though it does appear that they arise with increased frequency and force. This may be because the needs MCC responds to today are different from the needs of post World War II or starvation in Russia.

1. MCC remains deeply committed to both, but there are fundamental differences between relief and development - some would even say contradictions. Relief makes few demands on the recipient while development is based primarily on self-initiative. Relief is predicated on imports while development builds on indigenous resources. Relief ministers to the neediest while development works with those who respond and who are often not the neediest.

A relief program may be effective in ministering to human suffering but there is always the danger of creating dependencies if the situation does not improve and it is necessary to continue the program for more than several months. This is particularly true where the cause of need is poverty as contrasted with an emergency. An illustration is Bihar, India where MCC in the mid-sixties, in cooperation with missions and other agencies, responded to starvation with a sizeable relief program. Many lives were saved and the value of dams, roads and wells resulting from the work people did for the food continues. Nevertheless, now more than ten years later, MCC workers and missionaries observe that the people continue to have a tendency to look for help to come from the outside.

2. A second question is when supplies needed in a relief activity should be imported from North America and when they should be purchased locally? The answer would appear to be simply in a cost comparison, but in practice the issue becomes very complex. MCC has donated wheat in storage in Kansas and Canada but the preference is frequently for rice, which often must be purchased from yet another country. Do the cost calculations include freight, often reimbursable by the U.S. Government, or do we consider only net MCC costs? Can the needed commodity be purchased from the producer or does local purchase mostly benefit a middleman? Will imports prove to be a disincentive for domestic production by depressing prices? Can the North American shipment be accommodated by the dock and freight facilities without undue delay, waste or cost?

In practice MCC is finding it advantageous to purchase more material aid supplies within the country or region of need but each determination must be made on its own merits.

3. Still another valid issue revolves around the need to coordinate what is needed with supplies available. Rice is universally preferred but wheat and corn are more readily available in North America. MCC has red meat but people in food deficit countries more commonly get their protein from beans and fish. North American Mennonite women's groups like to prepare layette bundles, and Christmas bundles made good Sunday School projects, and bundles can be used to good advantage in some settings, but the distribution must be selective. To what extent shall MCC help be predicated on supplies available here but at best second choice for the recipients?

During 1978 the MCC overseas department is committed to continuing the process already begun in 1977 to articulate and implement a more adequate philosophy and strategy for the use of material aid. We believe the following points deserve to be developed further among others.

1. MCC, in behalf of its supporting constituency and in obedience to the Biblical injunction to feed the hungry, feels a responsibility to minister to people in need regardless of their creed, political affiliation, or the cause of their need.
2. Relief deserves to exist along with education, evangelism, medicine and development in a comprehensive ministry to human suffering.

The Role of Material Aid, January 1978, Page 3

3. The nature of the need and the well-being of the intended recipient must influence the response before such considerations as what supplies and services are available to the sending agency.
4. Recognizing that there are persons who prefer to give material as well as money and, on the other side, that purchases within the country benefit people through job and market creation, when there is an option to ship or purchase locally, (i.e. the needed commodity is available in both places) the decision shall be made on the basis of:
 - a) Price/cost to MCC based on current market value of the commodity (if salable) plus MCC net shipping costs.
 - b) Ability to deliver at the point of need without serious delay.
 - c) Sensitivity to such considerations as:
 - i) The effect imports have on ongoing development activities -
 - ii) The effect failure to use a donated commodity would have on the supporting constituency -
5. While granting the fundamental differences between relief and development, continuing efforts shall be made to bring the two into a mutually complementary relationship. This can be accomplished through providing for maximum recipient participation and the incorporation of development principles to the extent feasible.
6. Precaution must be taken in planning programs, specifically relief programs, to minimize the accompanying negative side effects including creating dependencies, retarding self-initiative, introducing foods into the diet which are not grown locally, and distracting from domestic production.
7. Programs to increase food production and to provide nutrition education should be introduced along with relief programs to minister to both the immediate and the longer term needs.
8. When, for whatever reason, it is not possible to incorporate a needed relief activity into an ongoing program, the relief program shall be facilitated through a second track, thus permitting a ministry to the most destitute without distracting from the ongoing program commitment.

Approved as a working paper by the MCC Annual Meeting on January 27, 1978

SURVEY OF MENNONITE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MATERIAL AID PROGRAMS
IN THREE COUNTRIES FROM 1962-1976 WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS
ON THEIR DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF SCIENCE

College of Education

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1978

This study covers the Mennonite Central Committee's (MCC) use of material aid, primarily wheat, in Haiti, India and Jordan between 1962 and 1976. Particular focus is given to the use of material aid for development purposes. The reports and records of field personnel on file with MCC were primary source materials. These were supplemented by brief questionnaire responses from 12 persons who were administratively responsible for utilizing material aid in the three countries. Literature on the P.L. 480 program and disaster relief assistance is extensively reviewed. A list of findings from the study includes recommendations for the material aid program of MCC, or similar voluntary agencies.

Wider use of material aid was made in India, both for development and other purposes, than in the other two countries. The larger population, greater number of institutions served, more frequent disasters and more acute poverty accounted for this greater material aid use.

Several factors influencing the use of material aid were studied. It was found that the type of local cooperating agency, e.g. church or school, was not a factor in success or failure; the interest and abilities of MCC field personnel were a factor, but differences reported between persons serving in the 1960s vs the 1970s were greater than differences reported between the three countries; and government cooperation is crucial to the success of a given project.

MCC use of material aid for development purposes resulted from the need to provide food or cash for immediate relief rather than from a desire to accomplish some development purpose. Food-for-work projects were an

effective way of accomplishing the primary purpose of providing emergency food relief and achieving some development activity as a secondary objective.

Work projects can be made more effective if greater attention is given to setting goals, assuring that other physical and technical inputs are present and making the projects more community based. Food-for-work projects are mainly successful in meeting temporary unemployment needs in rural areas. They do not provide a solution to large urban unemployment.