

A STUDY OF A NATIONALITY UNIT IN THE UNITED STATES:
LITHUANIAN AND ITALY GROUPS

BY

WILLIAM STANTON

B. A., Stanford University, 1954

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology

LYRASIS Members and Sloan Foundation

MASTERS OF ARTS

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Stanford, California

1958

Approved by:

Eugene A. Friedlander
Faculty Advisor

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I especially wish to acknowledge my major professor at Kansas State University, Eugene A. Friedmann, for his encouragement and advice which made the final report of this study possible. I also wish to acknowledge Professors Robin Higham and Wayne C. Rohrer for their correcting many mistakes I made in my analysis of data and in my writing. Moreover, I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Ai-li Chin who encouraged me to initiate this study after I graduated from National Taiwan University in 1964. None of my professors are responsible for any mistake I made in this study.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: ONE PROBLEM, A REVIEW OF LITERATURE, A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME, AND METHODOLOGY

The Problem

This is an exploratory study of a Nationalist Chinese Air Police company which in 1955 consisted of five to seven officers, thirty to thirty-eight sergeants, and thirty-two to forty-five privates. They were stationed at a city in Taiwan, and were under the command of both the Air Force Headquarters and the Military Police Headquarters. Their duties were to provide security guards for some Air Force bases and, occasionally, for the president of the country. They were also assigned to criminal investigation in the military.

Sociological interest in military organizations began with World War II, and the existing literature is largely in the form of "applied sociology." That is, it has tended to focus primarily on certain military matters with the aim of presenting knowledge important to the solution of practical

problems.¹ This study is not concerned with the presentation of solutions for military problems; rather, it is concerned with an analysis of the sociological topic of complex organization. One of the particular foci is to inquire into the effects of leadership and primary groups on the performance of a complex organization.

Organizational studies to date have had limited success in studying leadership and primary groups. Most studies of leadership have gravitated toward two presumably crucial clusters of leadership attitudes and behaviors, i. e., the democratic and the authoritarian style of leadership.² Some students found that one style of leadership (e. g. democratic leadership) tends to increase organizational effectiveness,³ but others found in different organizations that a similar

¹Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institution and Military Life, (University Park, Maryland: The Social Science Press, 1965). Preface. The famous work of Stouffer's group, The American Soldier, (Princeton University Press, 1949), is a good example.

²Fred E. Fiedler, "The Contingency Model: A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness," in Harold Proshansky & Bernard Seidenberg, ed., Basic Studies in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 538. See also Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964), p. 274.

³For example, Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1946), p. 117. Robert Kahn and Daniel Katz, "Leadership Practices in Relation to Productivity and Morale," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, ed., Group Dynamic: Research and Theory (Harper & Row, 1953), pp. 612-28.

style is dysfunctional.⁴ In studying primary groups, students found in many organizations that cohesive primary groups increase productivity,⁵ but they also found negative results in other organizations.⁶ As Fiedler observed in his own studies on leadership; "while one can always rationalize that contradictory findings by other investigators are due to poor research design, or different tests and criteria, such problems present difficulties if they appear in one's own research. We have, during the past thirteen years, conducted a large number of studies on leadership and group performance, using the same operational definitions and essentially similar leader attitude measures. The inconsistencies which we obtained in our own research program demanded an integrative theoretical formulation which would adequately account for the seemingly confusing results."⁷ As a matter of fact, a new

⁴Alan Harrington, Life in the Crystal Palace (New York: Knopf, 1959), p. 25. See also Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization (New York: Knopf, 1961), pp. 122-26.

⁵D. H. Goodacre, "The Use of a Sociometric Test as a Predictor of Combat Unit Effectiveness," Sociometry (1951, 14), pp. 148-52.

⁶A. B. Horsfall & G. H. Avenberg, "Teamwork and Productivity in a Shoe Factory," Human Organization (1949, 8(1)), pp. 13-25. Stanley E. Seashore, "Administrative Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness," in Rensis Likert and Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., ed., Some Applications of Behavioral Research (UNESCO, 1957), p. 66. See also Morris Janowitz and Roger Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965), pp. 9-10.

⁷Fiedler, op. cit., p. 536. See also J. E. McGrath, A Summary of Small Group Research Studies (Arlington, Va.: Human Science Research, Inc., 1962).

conceptual scheme is needed not only by Pialler but also by most other students of leadership and primary groups. This study is intended to clarify a few problems concerning the construction of a proper conceptual scheme.

Furthermore, this study may be the first sociological study of a Chinese military unit. Though the author cannot estimate the extent that this Air Police company could represent other tactical units of the Chinese army, this study seemed to have revealed some problems which occur in other units as well. Findings might be interesting despite their theoretical implications.

Review of Literature

Complex organizations are defined as goal-oriented social systems. Parsons claimed, "although an organization must solve several basic problems if it is to continue to operate, priority is given to those processes most directly involved with the success or failure of goal-attainment endeavors."⁸ Therefore, the problem of organizational effectiveness or of the function of goal-attainment is a central one in most organizational studies and in the present study. Many elements of an organization may be relevant to its achievement of goals. But this review of literature includes only studies concerned with the effects of leadership and primary groups on the organizational performance.

⁸Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. 18.

Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness

Studies of organizational effectiveness typically report that good leadership is a primary criterion for efficiency.⁹ In a review of industrial research, Kahn and Katz reported four factors concerning good leadership: the supervisor's ability to play a differentiated role, the degree of delegation of authority or closeness of supervision, the quality of supportiveness by employees, and the amount of group cohesiveness.¹⁰ In this section, only the delegation of authority and the supportiveness by employees (or subordinates) will be discussed. The last factor, the group cohesiveness, will be discussed in the next section on primary groups. The first factor, the leader's ability to perform differentiated roles, will not be examined in this study.¹¹

⁹A. Paul Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962), p. 390. For example, questionnaires were given to 98 workers at a shipyard to isolate factors related to organizational effectiveness. H. Gekoski, "Predicting Group Productivity," Personnel Psychology (1952), 5; pp. 281-292.

¹⁰Robert Kahn & Daniel Katz, "Leadership Practices in Relation to Productivity and Morale," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, ed., Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (Evanston, Ill.: Harper & Row, 1953), pp. 612-628. Cited by Hare, Ibid., p. 390.

¹¹Many studies have confirmed a positive relationship between leader's ability to perform differentiated role and organizational effectiveness. For example, H. B. Ghiselli & T. H. Podahl, "Patterns of Managerial Traits and Group Effectiveness," Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology (1958, 57), pp. 61-66. L. A. Longenecker, R. S. Couch, & A. W. Fales, "Some Findings Relevant to the Great Man Theory of Leadership," American Sociological Review (1954, 19), pp. 755-758.

Democratic leadership and supportive behavior of subordinates.--Many studies suggested that a democratic style of leadership tends to increase the supportive behavior of subordinates, therefore, it tends to increase organizational effectiveness. Based on his study of American industry, Mayo stated that the modern administrator must above all aim at achieving the spontaneous--i. e., voluntary cooperation of his followers; to do this, he must think of communication with his followers in much broader terms than those of logical self-interest and rational understanding . . . through leader-follower communication an equilibrium highly resistant to outside pressures and expressive of high morale will result in the work group.¹² Mayo's theory of democratic leadership has been supported and furthered by many other studies. Homans added that, through the establishment of such an equilibrium, a sustained increase in productivity may be expected to follow all other factors (e. g., technical skills of the leader) being equal.¹³ Some findings also suggested that the opposite style of leadership, the authoritarian leadership, which emphasizes the delegation of authority, was dysfunctional. Here, for

¹² Mayo, op. cit., p. 72. Mayo might be the first student who has systematically formulated a theory of democratic leadership.

¹³ George C. Homans, "Group Factors in Worker Productivity," in T. H. Newcomb, Readings in Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1947), p. 460. See also Serelson and Gary A. Steiner, op. cit., pp. 374-375; Vance Packard, The Pyramid Climbers (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962) and Samuel A. Stouffer et. al., op. cit.

example, are some data on closeness of supervision from a study of different sections within an insurance company.

TABLE I
RELATION OF SECTION PRODUCTIVITY TO CLOSURESS
OF SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES¹⁴

	Close supervision	General supervision	Not ascertained
Heads of high-producing section	6	5	1
Heads of low-producing section	11	1	0

(The findings are based upon an over-all code that defines closeness of supervision as the degree to which the supervisor checks up on his employees, gives them detailed and frequent instructions and, in general, limits the employees' freedom to do the work in their own way. This over-all code is derived from the supervisors' discussion of their jobs.)

Authoritarian leadership and the delegation of authority.---Findings of many studies seem to disagree with the theory of the effectiveness of democratic leadership. The first type of disagreement is that in some organizations authoritarian style of leadership, which emphasizes the delegation of authority, may increase the supportive behavior by lower participants, while democratic leadership tends to decrease the informal supportiveness. In a study of seventy-two conferences in industry and government, Berkowitz found a negative relation between democratic leadership and the

¹⁴ Robert Kahn & Katz, op. cit., p. 617.

attractiveness of the group and satisfaction with the conference.¹⁵ Shils also pointed out that "the authoritarian leadership can indeed be a crucial component in primary groups composed of persons with personality needs which can best be satisfied by authoritative protection or in primary groups operating in situations which bring these needs for paternal protection to the fore."¹⁶

The second type of disagreement is that to gain the support by followers may be impossible or difficult in some organizations. As Leighton found in Japanese relocation centers, attempts at gaining informal support have proved to be a failure. The delegation of authority seemed to be the only effective means of organizational control in organizations where leaders confronted highly alienated lower participants.¹⁷ This also has been true in forced labor camps.¹⁸

The third type of disagreement is that democratic leaders tend to avoid hard decisions. Through the "participant

¹⁵L. Berkowitz, "Sharing Leadership in Small, Decision-making Groups," Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology (1953, 48), pp. 251-258.

¹⁶Edward A. Shils, "The Study of the Primary Groups," in Daniel Lerner & Harold D. Lasswell, ed., The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method (Stanford U. Press, 1951), p. 64.

¹⁷A. H. Leighton, The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton U. Press, 1945), Chapter 6-10.

¹⁸Mid-European Law Project, Forced Labor and Confinement without Trial (Washington, D. C.: National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., 1952).

observ. also" in a corporation governed by manipulated consent; Harrington observed some fundamentally dissatisfying qualities in the cooperative routine. He condemned consultation without meaningful context and the avoidance of hard decisions.¹⁹ Thompson also pointed out that a democratic style of leadership diverts attention away from the need for institutional change by emphasizing the possibility of adapting the individual to the existing structure.²⁰

These disagreements have become a controversy between two schools of thought in recent years. As McGrath stated in his summary of small group research:

the major controversy in this area has been between the more orthodox viewpoint--reflected in traditional supervisory training and military doctrine that the leader should be decisive and forceful, that he should do the planning and thinking for the group, and that he should coordinate, direct, and evaluate his men's actions--and the other viewpoint--reflected in the newer human-relation-oriented training and in the philosophy behind non-directive and brain-storming techniques--which stresses the need for democratic, permissive, group-oriented leadership techniques.²¹

Both schools of thought have strong adherents and there is evidence supporting both points of view.²²

¹⁹Alan Harrington, op. cit.

²⁰Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 123.

²¹J. E. McGrath, A Summary of Small Group Research Studies, (Arlington, Va.: Human Sciences Research Inc., 1962), cited by Fiedler, op. cit., p. 538.

²²Fiedler, op. cit., p. 538.

A leader should stress both the delegation of authority and the obtainment of support from followers (an attempt to the settlement of the controversy).---To settle the controversy, Berelson and Steiner suggested that the best organizational leader is the one who firmly keeps the goal before his subordinates and urges them to attain the goal, but also treats them like human beings.²³ Some empirical findings support this idea. As Kahn found, the best foremen in manufacturing situations were both production and employee-oriented.²⁴ In testing opinions of aircraft commanders, Halpin found the effective leaders were ranked high on both types of roles.²⁵ This is also true in a study of college department heads.²⁶ Homans agreed; he stated that a formal leader may be more successful in his own job if he has something of the informal leader about him too. But, he also stated, this only adds to the evidence that the two are not the same.²⁷ As studies of relocation centers and forced labor

²³Berelson and Steiner, op. cit., p. 538.

²⁴Robert L. Kahn, "The Prediction of Productivity," Journal of Social Issues, XII (2, 1956), pp. 41-49.

²⁵Andrew W. Halpin, "The Leader Behavior and Effectiveness of Aircraft Commanders," Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement, ed., Ralph H. Stogdill and A. E. Coons (Columbus, Ohio: The Bureau of Business Research, College of Commerce and Administration, The Ohio State University, 1957), p. 64.

²⁶John K. Hemphill, "Leader Behavior Associated with the Administrative Reputations of College Departments," in Stogdill and Coons, Ibid., p. 81.

²⁷George C. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1951), p. 260.

campus show the informal leadership with support from lower participants is difficult or impossible to obtain in these situations. Thus, efforts to obtain such support may lead to a decrease in the total amount of the followers' compliance with official orders.²⁸ Therefore, Herzlson and Steiner's suggestion is not always true.

A tentative settlement of the controversy.--It is clear that there is no need to argue that either democratic or authoritarian leadership has to be functional in every organization. A particular style of leadership might be functional only in certain types of organizations. For example, democratic leadership might be necessary in organizations in which people desire democratic practices and in which leaders have no effective means to force their subordinates to conform. On the other hand, authoritarian leadership is desirable if the organization confronts a considerable number of alienated lower participants and the organization provides effective sanctions to force personnel to conform.

Many studies of leadership imply that democratic leadership is more likely to gain voluntary support from lower participants, while authoritarian leadership is more likely to extend the functions of sanction provided by the organization. But authoritarian leadership can also evoke

²⁸ See Leighton and Mid-European Law Project, op. cit.

support from lower participants in some organizations and democratic practices might be useless in relocation camps. In the Chinese Air Police company, professional sergeants explained a reserve officer's democratic actions as "lack of experience in commanding soldiers." Moreover, some characteristics of leadership behavior, other than democratic-authoritarian dichotomy, might also increase support from subordinates. The political officer in the Air Police company, for example, acquired respect from subordinates by his show of courage in stopping a bloody fight between two soldiers. Soldiers seemed to esteem masculinity. It is more precise to state that any style of leadership which can gratify the subordinates' needs or agrees with the subordinates' values tends to evoke voluntary support from the followers.

If leaders find no way to gratify subordinates' needs without sacrificing the purposes of the organization, they have to stress the use of available sanctions to force subordinates to conform. If no effective sanctions are available or if the application of sanction is difficult because the defiance is difficult to detect, the use of sanctions might evoke little compliance. Leaders might be forced to try to acquire voluntary support from subordinates. In most organizations, leaders may be able to gratify some needs of subordinates on the one hand, and to force subordinates with sanctions on the other.

It seems to be more fruitful to clarify the effects

of sanctions and of gratifying the needs of subordinates, and to explain how leaders could combine both factors, than to study the unstable and erratic relation between leadership styles and compliance. This study, therefore, will address the analysis of the two factors which lead to increase the compliance rather than the leadership style.

Primary Groups and Organizational Effectiveness

The inconsistency about findings.--Many studies of military organizations reported that cohesive primary groups were particularly relevant to organizational effectiveness. The eminent psychiatrists, Roy Grinker and John P. Spiegel, summarized their work in the Air Force with this statement: "The men seem to be fighting more for someone than against somebody."²⁹ Authors of The American Soldier found in tactical units that the direct identification with the total symbols of the military organization as a whole, of the state, or of the political cause in the name of which a war was fought, was relatively unimportant as contrasted with the feelings of strength and security in the military primary group and loyalty to one's immediate comrades. The effective transmission and execution of commands along the formal lines of authority can be successful only when it coincides with this system of informal groups.³⁰ The function

²⁹Cited from Janowitz and Little, op. cit., p. 77.

³⁰Samuel A. Stouffer, et. al., The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, op. cit.

of the primary group under the stress of combat was more specifically defined by Shils and Janowitz in an analysis of the effects of Allied psychological warfare on the Wehrmacht. They concluded that the continued effectiveness of the individual combat soldier was a function of his immediate primary group, to the extent that it met his basic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power, and adequately regulated his relation to authority. There was also recognition of the significance to the primary group of the continued functioning of top command and supply echelons.³¹

In an experimental study, Goodacre even concluded that the cohesion of primary groups was a reliable predictor of the combat effectiveness of tactic units.³² A positive relation between cohesive primary groups and effectiveness has also been found in industrial situations.³³

However, highly cohesive primary groups may also decrease productivity. Mouton, Blake, and Fruchter reported a positive relation between group attractiveness and effectiveness in military crews, but also reported results on basketball teams and survey teams in which there was a negative

³¹Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12 (Summer, 1948), pp. 280-315.

³²Goodacre, op. cit.

³³H. H. Strupp & H. J. Housman, "Some Correlates of Group Productivity," American Psychologist (1953, 8), pp. 443-444. See also Mare, op. cit., pp. 254-255, 263, 375, 380.

relationship.³⁴ Stouffer's group have also observed that cohesive primary groups with norms which were contradictory to official orders led to widespread deviation from orders.³⁵ In an experimental study, Schachter and others found that high-cohesion groups were more successful than low-cohesion groups in increasing or reducing productivity.³⁶ Seashore also found in a large factory that work group cohesion could result in productivity which was either higher or lower than the plant norm.³⁷

Reviewed literature shows that inconsistency among findings exists. Studies have provided, however, sufficient information for a clarification of the functions of primary groups.

A clarification of the function of primary groups.---

Primary groups may contribute to organizational effectiveness in two different ways.

1. They may provide a minimum amount of socio-emotional activity which is necessary for improving communication, maintaining group unity, or resisting hardship in

³⁴Jane Srygley Mouton, Robert P. Blake, and Benjamin Fruchter, "The Validity of Socio-metric Responses," The Sociometry Reader, ed., J. L. Moreno, et. al (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1950), p. 384.

³⁵Stouffer, et al., op. cit., p. 411.

³⁶Stanley Schachter, Norris Ellertsch, Dorothy McBride, and Doris Gregory, "An Experimental Study of Cohesiveness and Productivity," Human Relations, (4, 1951), pp. 229-236.

³⁷Stanley G. Seashore, "Administrative Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness," in Nedra Likert and Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., ed., op. cit., p. 66.

certain situations thereby contributing to organizational effectiveness.³⁸ Homans said that primary groups tend to produce a positive surplus, a margin of safety in the qualities the group needs for survival (morale, leadership, control, extensions of the range of social contacts) and that this surplus may be used, not simply to maintain the existing adaptation of the group to its environment but to achieve a new and better adaptation.³⁹ Too much friendship however, may reduce the total amount of energy available for carrying out the group's major purpose.⁴⁰ The disfunction of high-cohesion primary groups in basketball teams seems to support this assumption.⁴¹

One question which has remained is what is the proper amount of cohesion necessary for effective performance in an organization? A precise answer has not been found; but we can say that the more hostile the environment in which an organization operates the higher cohesion needed. An army unit in combat situation obviously needs more primary relationships than a unit in reserve for maintaining effective performance.

³⁸Stuart Adams, "Status Congruency as a Variable in Small Group Performance," Social Forces, XXXII, (Oct. 1953), pp. 16-22.

³⁹George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1950), pp. 271-272.

⁴⁰E. Paul Torrance, "Sociometric Techniques for Diagnosing Group Ills," Sociometry, XVIII (Dec. 1955), p. 347.

⁴¹Houton, et. al., op. cit.

2. The members of primary groups share one or more motives or goals which determine the direction in which the group moves.⁴² If primary groups' goals are consistent with the goals (or orders from formal leaders), then, high cohesive primary groups tend to increase organizational effectiveness.⁴³ In other words, cohesive primary groups reduce the effectiveness of the organization if their norms are conflicting with the formal structure.

If the task structure or the environment permits the exercise of strong formal authority, the need for such informal support may be little in maintaining the organizational effectiveness. The American Navy is an example.⁴⁴ On the other hand, army units on the front-line are in a different situation. The hazardous conditions in the environment increase the cohesion of primary groups and make the application of formal sanctions difficult. Leaders have to rely on the informal support of primary groups.⁴⁵ Stouffer and his associates, interviewing several hundred American infantry and artillery officers who led men in combat against Japan, reported that only 5 per cent said they had ever observed a

⁴²Hare, op. cit., p. 10.

⁴³Schachter, et. al., op. cit.

⁴⁴Theodore Caplow, Principles of Organization (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964), pp. 152-153.

⁴⁵Roger W. Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance," in Morris Janowitz, ed., The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), pp. 195-223.

company-grade officer who showed little concern for his men before combat later turn out to be a successful combat leader.⁴⁶ Similar phenomena have also been found among miners.⁴⁷

Concepts

One of the universal phenomena existing in different organizations is called "compliance." Since the compliance of personnel is closely related to the problem of organizational effectiveness, it has been an important topic in many studies. If personnel refuse to comply with an order, the task might not be properly completed. Many organizational variables may affect the compliance of personnel, but, in this study, emphasis will be on the effects of leadership and primary groups. The key concepts will be compliance, leadership, and primary groups.

A student who has his operational definitions of concepts at the beginning of his study may tend to perceive the phenomena according to his definitions and to explain them in ways to fit his definitions. Therefore, he may confront a danger of losing his objectivity. In this study, concepts have been defined only after the data have been collected. It was a conscious purpose to define the concepts to fit the phenomena under study rather than vice versa. Moreover, the

⁴⁶Kurt Lang, op. cit., p. 850.

⁴⁷Alvin M. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (New York: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 105-136.

author had no intention of contributing to sociological definitions; he tried to define the concepts as close to some others as possible. He also tried to employ as few concepts as possible. Data presented in the paper may help to explain the phenomena being studied.

Since in an observational study it is difficult to provide objective measurements of organizational effectiveness, this study may not be able to clarify the precise relationship between compliance and organizational effectiveness. Different types of compliance, however, might be distinguished, and the clarification of the nature of each type of compliance might indicate its implications for organizational effectiveness.

A Definition of Compliance

Compliance is a major element of the relationship between those who have leadership and those over whom they exercise it. It refers to a relation in which an actor behaves in accordance with a directive supported by the sanctions applied by another actor, and to the orientation of the subordinated actor to the sanctions applied and to the other actor who issues directives. "Sanction" denotes an actor's manipulating means which he commands in such a manner that certain other actors find the following of the directive rewarding, while not following it incurs deprivations.

According to this definition, compliance could be viewed as the subordinates' carrying out the leaders' orders. Compliance is also measurable; a subordinate who violates an

order once a week may have shown a higher degree of compliance than the one who violates ten times a week; one who conforms to ten detailed directives has complied to a higher degree than the one who conforms to only five.

Some subordinates comply with orders chiefly because the orders are supported by sanctions. And some comply chiefly because the content of orders, or the leader who gives the orders, is satisfactory to them. Based on this observation, two types of compliance could be singled out:

1. Mechanical compliance: Subordinates comply with orders because of the threat of sanction. If the threat of sanctions vanishes, compliance will discontinue. Thus, soldiers may disconform to an order after officers stop punishing the violators.
2. Voluntary compliance means that subordinates comply because the content of orders or the leader who gives the orders is desirable (or the organization is legitimized). Therefore, though without the threat of sanctions, compliance may continue. Thus, soldiers may conform to certain orders even when they know that officers will not punish the violators.

A Definition of Primary Group

Primary group is second key concept in this analysis. It is defined as small social groupings in which social behavior is governed by intimate face-to-face relations.⁴⁸

⁴⁸Janowitz and Little, op. cit., p. 77.

Some chief characteristics of the primary group are given by Charles H. Cooley. In his Social Organization:

. . . They (primary groups) are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of individuals. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individuals in a common whole, so that one's self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group.⁴⁹

According to Cooley, members of a primary group tend to commit to their common ideals, especially in confronting their common problems. Members also tend to have strong emotional attachments to one another, so that they help and are concerned for one another without consciously expecting rewards. As draftees in the Air Police company stated: "Kou-mers (buddies) should share their hardship as well as happiness," but "they should never expect rewards from the others for help--this is what Kou-mers mean." They may help other members at the cost of their own convenience; they may lend money to others and refuse its return; or they may help others to clean in their own leisure time. Due to the strong emotional attachments, members tend to stick together; they would be together whenever the situation permits. Thus, Kou-mers like to be assigned to the same squad; they like to spend their leisure time together; and they like to sit together even in official meetings.

The concept of primary group could be translated into

⁴⁹Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Inc., 1909), pp. 22-24.

a measurable variable. We may measure the quality of members' commitments to their common ideals, their willingness to help one another at the cost of their own convenience, and, more often measured by students, their stick-togetherness. Such commitments and attachments may be named as the cohesion of primary group. Then, a primary group may be of relatively high or low cohesion.

Primary group seems usually to be small since the strong emotional attachments among members could hardly be developed among a large group of persons. However, there should be no definite limits for the size of a primary group. In a military organization, an all-male commune, a large number of soldiers might be intimate friends to one another. They could be, more or less, a primary group, though they may be a group of lower cohesion.

Hypotheses (primary group and compliance)

Due to the nature of the Air Police company, this study is intended to examine the effects of primary groups in only one organizational situation. By considering the problem of compliance, this situation may be defined as follows: the situation in which (1) lower participants are highly dissatisfied with the organization (or/ and the content of official orders are contradictory to lower participants' needs), and (2) official orders are supported by the threat of severe punishments.

One might suppose that cohesive primary groups among

lower participants tend to reduce the compliance of lower participants with the official orders because primary groups may be more capable of resisting the disliked orders and the threat of severe punishment.⁵⁰ But this study suggests a reverse relation.

Hypothesis I

In an organizational situation in which lower participants are highly dissatisfied and official orders are supported by the threat of severe punishment, compliance of lower participants tends to vary accordingly with the cohesion of primary groups among lower participants.

This relation is because: (1) members of a cohesive primary group who have strong attachments to one another hesitate to see one another being severely punished and tend to persuade one another to comply, and (2) primary group relations tend to increase members' emotional stability, thus they may be better able to control their emotions and may be less likely to risk not conforming. The size of a primary group should be "small", e. g., two to five persons in the case of the Air Police company.

Since (1) severe punishments are a less threat to a large group because it is not so easy to punish a large number of personnel severely at the same time (and also because a large group of persons might feel psychologically stronger), and since (2) members of a large group (ten to thirty in the

⁵⁰Schachter, et al., op. cit.

case of the Air Police company) could hardly develop emotional attachments which are strong enough to make them hesitate to see one another severely punished, the unity of a large group of personnel tends to reduce the compliance.

A large group may bear some characteristics of a primary group, although it can hardly be as cohesive as smaller groups. The large group may be named as informal grouping or large primary group of low cohesion if it more or less bears the characteristics of a primary group.

Hypothesis II

In an organizational situation in which (1) lower participants are highly dissatisfied with the organization, and (2) the official orders are supported by severe punishments, there is an inverse relation between the compliance of lower participants and the cohesion of the group of a large number or all lower participants, (about 30 in the case of the Air Police company.)

The relations assumed in the first two hypotheses could be seen in comparisons between the attitudes and activities of members of primary groups and of marginal men who were relatively isolated from their fellow enlisted men, or by comparing the activities of personnel in different periods of time in which the average cohesions of primary groups were obviously different. The official records provide information for comparisons of deviant rates in different periods of time and of different categories of personnel.

* Definition of Leadership

In the broadest sense, a leader is the one who leads by initiating social behavior.⁵¹ Leadership, then, denotes the ability of an individual to give directives which are carried out. The elements of leadership can be singled out.

The threat of sanction (formal leadership).--The organization may assign to an individual the right to issue certain kinds of orders, and provide sanctions (punishment and/or reward)⁵² to support the orders. If lower participants of an organization obey the officer's orders because of the threat of the official sanctions supporting these orders, then, such a threat is the officer's formal leadership.

Two officers of the same rank or who play the same leadership role do not have to possess the same amount of formal leadership. In other words, one of them may be more successful in creating a threat which makes subordinates obey. When a "green" reserve officer took charge of the operative office to lead all enlisted men in the Air Police company, he could not make enlisted men obey any "new, hard, order" he issued because enlisted men thought "all reserve officers were easy-going." After he shocked enlisted men by punishing three professional sergeants severely at one time, all

⁵¹Henry P. Fairchild, et al., Dictionary of Sociology and Related Sciences (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1966), p. 177.

⁵²Sanctions could be physical, material, or symbolic, as suggested by Steiner. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Human Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 5.

enlisted men began to obey. This means that formal leadership, though based on sanctions provided by the organization, is chiefly acquired by the leader; he has to be able to create a threat over subordinates by effectively applying sanctions. Kahn's term, the delegation of authority, means the leader's efforts to maximize the threat of formal sanctions which make subordinates conform.

Formal leadership is different from formal sanctions in another sense. An officer may not need actually to apply sanctions every time when he gives orders. Subordinates may obey simply because they believe they may be punished. Thus, the threat of the formal leadership may possibly exist even if the application of formal sanctions is not really possible.

In the Air Police company, leaders relied chiefly on punishment rather than reward to force subordinates to conform. Therefore, the term, "the threat of punishment," as one type of formal leadership, has been used in this study to avoid a confusion with the positive sanctions, rewards. Both types of leadership are not assumed to have the same functions.

The hypothesis about the formal leadership which will be tested is:

Hypothesis III

In an organizational situation in which official orders are frequently contradictory to lower participants' values and needs, compliance tends to vary according to the threat of punishment. No inverse relationship is possible.

This hypothesis can be tested by rising together the leadership patterns, the patterns of subordinates' responses and the deviant rates of subordinates.

Voluntary support from subordinates (informal leadership).—Leadership may also stem from personal relations with subordinates. Subordinates may voluntarily obey a leader's orders because they like or respect the leader. Then, such a voluntary support from subordinates is the leader's informal leadership since it is not based upon the sources provided by the organization. In reviewed literature, this is the quality which democratic leaders intend to acquire. According to the definition of compliance, it is essentially a problem of the orientation of subordinates toward the leader.

According to the study of relocation camps and forced labor camps, the support from subordinates could not be acquired when an organization confronts a group of highly alienated lower participants. It seems that this assumption could be more precisely formulated as follows: If the lower participants are highly dissatisfied with the organization, and the official orders are frequently contradictory to the needs of lower participants, it is difficult to acquire voluntary support from the lower participants.

But if the lower participants' dissatisfactions mainly stem from some reasons other than the content of orders given, leaders could acquire voluntary support without sacrificing

the purposes of the organization. A leader's actions frequently intensify subordinates' dissatisfactions (if his orders are particularly disliked by subordinates).

The discussions above do not contradict the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis IV

The voluntary compliance of subordinates tends to vary according to the leader's ability to gratify subordinates' needs.

If orders given by a leader are the main sources of the subordinates' dissatisfactions, the leader would be unable to gratify the subordinates' needs.

The professional sergeants and the draftees represented two groups of highly dissatisfied lower participants in the Air Police company. Draftees were essentially dissatisfied with the content of most orders they received, but the sergeants were dissatisfied chiefly with their low pay, low status in both military and civilian society, and their difficulty in getting married. To draftees, leaders found no way to gratify their needs since they were interested in only doing less work. But to professionals, leaders could gratify their needs without avoiding hard orders.

It is important that no assumption has been made that leadership includes all factors which tend to evoke compliance of subordinates. Rather, it denotes only the few factors which a leader acquires more or less by his own efforts.

Subordinates may obey orders from a well legitimized office no matter who occupies the office. Then, the problem of legitimacy is excluded from the concept of leadership. This exclusion would single out the problem of what kind of efforts of a leader tend to evoke more compliance.

Methodology

Methods of Data Collecting.

The author was a 2nd Lt. Vice-platoon-leader in the Air Police company for more than eight months. Most data were collected through his participant observation. He has also collected some socio-metric questionnaires, simple questionnaires about leadership, and documents.

One of the central purposes of the Air Police company was "to protect military secrets," and "secrecy" was defined to include almost everything that happened in the company. Therefore, no student had ever been allowed to conduct any kind of research in the company. Even an officer from the higher command would find no way to know many things about soldiers, e. g., he could never know how privates help one another to shrink work. Privates would not tell for their own security, and officers would not tell in order to protect the reputation of the company and of themselves. Therefore, the only possible and effective way to study the company was to become a member of it.

Participant observation.--A participant observer

usually, questions people being studied about their attitudes and activities, and, on the other hand, he depends heavily upon patient and painstaking observation.⁵³ Thus, he could record a wide range of data in detail, watch closely the changing sequence of events, and observe the actual situation which might be distorted by an outsider. A participant observer could also uncover many latent patterns of behavior--patterns the participants themselves are not completely aware of and so cannot report--by piecing together a wide variety of relevant details and insights. Consciously or unconsciously a professional sergeant would not admit that their inhumanity toward draftees was a defensive mechanism which stemmed from their own permanent low status in the military and their rejection by the civilian society.

Despite the advantages, a participant observer would confront many problems in his questioning and observing, in using observational data to test hypotheses, and in presenting his data in the final report. The success of his study would very much depend upon his efforts in confronting these problems. Some of the problems confronted by the author and his efforts to solve them were:

⁵³ Some examples of this kind of study are: Gouldner, op. cit., Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1926), William Foote Whyte, Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1943). Roger W. Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance," in K. Janowitz, ed., op. cit., pp. 195-224.

1. The use of theoretical framework.--A theoretical framework is necessary for any study for selecting data, organizing data, and developing significant hypotheses. Even the use of such a framework could well destroy its purpose for an exploratory study. The observer's attention may be channeled to some selective aspects of the phenomenon under study and to overlook some others.

This study employed no framework in the early months of data collecting; the observer simply recorded everything he saw or heard. Only after a period of exploration, did he begin to concentrate more on some roughly defined areas which seemed to be significant for the more effective use of his energy and time. The observer gradually developed his conceptual scheme according to his observations only after the sixth month of this study. An explicit scheme was formulated after he left the company at the beginning of the ninth month. The observer, therefore, believes that he has eliminated many possible biases in his data; he, at least, has not tried to collect only the data which might support his previous thinking.

2. The observer's position in the organization.--The author as an officer in the company found it to be difficult to observe closely some informal activities of enlisted men. He could not well integrate into primary groups among them because he had to give orders which were frequently conflicting with their desires. Enlisted men also hesitated to

inform about some of their activities which had violated official rules.

A hard, but effective, way to solve this problem was to spend more time trying to observe them. By spending several nights with a group of privates, to chat with them, to play games with them, and to buy ice-cream for them, they even told the author how they shirked from their work and how three of them shared one girl friend. They also told the author that they would call a fellow private who refused to help others to shirk the "Commander's big son." They told about their deviant behavior also partially because of their common image that all reserve officers were "easy-going."

However, the author could not always be too close to enlisted men; he had been frequently warned by the commander who believed that officers should maintain a distance from enlisted men. So he sometimes also relied on official records to make estimates of the frequency of some kinds of deviant behavior. Since official information was provided by an institutional and standardized check system by professional sergeants and all officers in any hour day and night, the information should be relatively reliable. Furthermore, the author had tried to cross check any information he found.

There were also advantages for the observer in holding an office. He could easily observe the operation of the formal command system, and he could have access to most of the official documents.

3. Self-involvement of the observer.--The self-involvement which is inevitable to a long term participant observer presented another problem. The emotional involvement of an observer might impede his objectivity. The observer had once become sympathetic with the unhappy life of draftees. He became too critical of the inhumanity of the commander and some professional sergeants. This difficulty however was largely obviated if the observer always tried to examine his own bias and if he often discussed his data with outsiders. A different point of view could sensitise the observer to his own prejudice. The author had frequently discussed his data with at least eight outsiders who knew either sociology or the Chinese military.

In concluding this section, the author would state that he followed Homans' advice that ". . . no one who studies a group will go far wrong if he gets close to it and, by whatever methods are available, observes all that he can."⁵⁴

Socio-metric test.--In the inquiry into primary groups among enlisted men, two socio-metric tests have been used. The two tests, combined with interviews and observations, were intended to provide more accurate data for identifying the membership of primary groups as well as the degree of emotional attachment of each member to the others.

It was required that all military policemen take a course on Confucius' "Four Books." The author taught this

⁵⁴Homans, op. cit., p. 22.

course in the company. For improving reading efficiency of students (all enlisted men), he tried to apply group pressure. He let students choose their own reading partners, and organized them into groups according to their own choices. If any one of a reading group failed to pass the weekly examination, the whole group would have no off-days in the next two weeks. In such a situation, every one liked to have good readers as his reading partners. Students would not choose a bad reader unless he was involved very much in a primary relationship with the bad reader. Based on this assumption, a dual question questionnaire had been made:

1. With whom would you like to be in the same squad?
2. Whom would you like to have as your reading partners?

The first question was a rather reliable indicator of the membership of primary group according to observations, but it did not tell the degree of emotional involvement of members of groups. Both the ones who had strong attachments to others and the ones who had little attachments to others made their first and second choices. The reciprocal choices could not accurately tell the emotional involvement either. Three out of twelve marginal men who obviously showed their low emotional attachments to their companions had exchanged their choices with others. As one said:

. . . I have closer friends in the company. . . . But I think that it would make little difference if being transferred to other units. I can make new friends there. We become friends simply because we need help from each other and we need companionship from one another. But there is no reason that our companions could not be changed. . . . It would be too sentimental for one who

would not be transferred just because he would not leave his friends in his company.

As another said:

No, I don't want to be transferred to other units. . . . If Lu (his buddy) would like to be transferred, we would like to be transferred together. I don't think that I can find a better friend than Lu anywhere.

Comparing the two statements, it seems to be obvious that the first soldier had little sentiments attached to his friends than the second soldier, but both of them had exchanged choices with their closer friends.

The combination of the first and the second question might show the soldiers' emotional attachments to others. If a soldier chose good readers as his reading partners but chose others as his squad fellows, this student tends to be a marginal man or a member of low participation of his primary group since his choices of partners were based on rational judgments rather than his attachments to others. On the other hand, the person who chose the same persons for his reading partners and squad fellows tends to be a highly involved member of his primary group. Observations and interviews seemed to support such an assumption if the following three problems can be solved.

Three problems about the questionnaires could be asked:

1. A good reader might be also an easy-going personality, therefore, a person who chose him did not have to be because of the person's sentiments attached to him. Regarding

this, the author had corrected any notable mistake according to his interviews and observations.

2. If the reduction in off-days was not a threat to respondents, then, they would not consider whether the persons they chose were good readers or not. This problem, was not significant since all enlisted men were afraid of the reduction of their off-days. Enlisted men thought that it was an unbearable punishment to them.

3. The third problem was that the respondents might not be able to identify good readers. Concerning this the author had identified about one third of the students as good readers who never failed in previous examinations. He reported to students the results of examinations before giving the tests and reported only good readers. Moreover, he had purposely assigned more marginal men and low involved members of primary groups as good readers for the better control of the first problem he just mentioned.

Using Observational Data to Support Hypotheses

The interpretation of observational data.--Each event observed has been treated as unique. Its meaning has to be judged by the reference of the unique situation in which the event happens. To take the face-value of any event is dangerous. When the author was an operative officer who actually operates the whole company, enlisted men very often overstate the hardship in their daily life; sometimes the presence of

other persons beside the author may influence a respondent's statement. A conversation shared with in-group members might be different from what shared with out-group persons; a volunteered statement may show the respondent's pre-occupation and a directed statement may be different in meaning; an informant's observation might be biased because of his own position, knowledge, values, and limitations of memory and recall; and an unbiased one attacks an officer's order in the "honor and solidarity meeting" simply for increasing his own informal status in his primary group. These are just some factors which may require that the observational data be judged one by one as unique units.

The judgment of an event may also have to depend upon other relevant data. A friendly sergeant once advised the author not to disobey the orders from the company commander. He said, ". . . The happiest person in the army is the one who takes every order from the top for granted." This sergeant who had been in the army for seventeen years probably had been well socialized under the arbitrary type of military power. He might have adopted absolute obedience as a way to adjust himself to the military life. But after two months, the author found that this sergeant had disobeyed orders more frequently than others and he has frequently attacked some official rules at the "honor and solidarity meetings." One of his good friends told the author that "he would have been promoted to master-sergeant many years ago if he had had a better temper."

These facts indicated the assumption the author had made earlier that the sergeant was a well socialized person in the army. This example explains why the interpretation of any datum should be consistent with all other relevant data.

The Problem of Testing Hypotheses

M. W. Riley classified observational studies in general as exploratory in objective rather than hypothesis-testing.⁵⁵ In other words, observational studies are more capable of creating hypotheses than testing hypotheses. The researcher can find no way to make objective statements about the frequency and distribution of phenomena, or to suggest a correlation coefficient to a relation between variables. The author however, should support his hypotheses as solidly as possible.

In a few cases, students may deal with what have been called "quasi-statistics," in checking the frequency and distribution of phenomena. "His conclusions, while implicitly numerical, do not require precise quantification. . . . In assessing the evidence for such a conclusion, the observer decides, if possible, how likely it is that his conclusion about the frequency or distribution of some phenomenon is an accurate quasi-statistic, just as the statistician decides,

⁵⁵Riley, *op. cit.*, p. 68. Howard S. Becker & Blanche Geer, "Participant Observation: The Analysis of Qualitative Field Data," in R. H. Adams and J. J. Rees ed., Human Organization Research (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1960), p. 288.

on the basis of the varying values of a correlation coefficient or a significance figure, that his conclusion is more or less likely to be accurate. The observer's confidence in the conclusion will vary with the characteristics of the evidence."⁵⁶ In other cases, he may reason from the results trying to establish whether his hypothesis is plausible in the light of conceivable alternatives. Thus, if he should find that there are a great number of incidents in his field notes in which a hypothesis is true, and no negative cases could be found or could not be explained, then, this hypothesis is more plausible than the opposite alternate hypothesis.⁵⁷

The presentation of data is also a difficulty in qualitative study. Statistical data can be summarized in tables, but the data of observations cannot. The latter often consist of many different kinds of observations which cannot be simply categorized and counted without losing some of their value as evidence. Yet it is clearly out of the question to publish all the evidence. The author would follow Howard S. Becker's suggestion to describe the natural history of the conclusions, presenting the evidence as it came to the attention of the observer during the successive stages of his conceptualization of the problem. The term, natural history, implies not the presentation of every datum, but only the characteristic forms data took at each stage of research. . . .

⁵⁶Becker & Geer, op. cit., p. 275.

⁵⁷Becker & Geer, op. cit., pp. 232-239.

In this way, the reader would be able to follow the details of the analysis and to see how and on what basis any conclusion was reached. This would give the reader, as to present modes of statistical presentation, an opportunity to make his own judgment as to the adequacy of the proof and the degree of confidence to be assigned to the conclusion.⁵⁸

The author of this study tried his best to offer support for his hypotheses. He was not able to test or prove his hypotheses in precise ways as other observers.⁵⁹ He therefore offers his results as suggestive of results which might be obtained, rather than as a definitive test of hypotheses.

⁵⁸Howard S. Becker, "Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation," American Sociological Review (Dec. 1958), pp. 652-660.

⁵⁹One of few students who have been able to collect data in relatively standardized forms capable of being transformed to meet the assumptions of statistical tests is Peter H. Blau's, "Co-operation and Competition in a Bureaucracy," American Journal of Sociology, (1954, 59), pp. 530-535.

CHAPTER II

PRIMARY GROUPS AND COHESION

The company could be seen as consisting of three larger informal groupings: the officers, the professional sergeants, and the draftees. Among each grouping, there were smaller primary groups of two to five persons and a number of marginal men. The structure and functions of informal groupings varied considerably.

The Informal Grouping of Draftees and Primary Groups among Draftees

The separation of draftees from professional sergeants and officers was observed in their leisure activities. Seldom did any draftee play checkers, or billiards, or chat with a sergeant or an officer in the barracks. Most draftees had never spent a day off together with a professional sergeant or an officer, but they went out frequently with other draftees. Moreover, in every monthly "honor and solidarity meeting," they sat separately from other groups though they were not required to do so.

Most draftees had one to three close friends. Thirty-three out of thirty-four draftees had been questioned and

observed in the first and the second month of this study.¹ Among them, ten designated only one person as the close friend, nine designated two, four designated three, three designated four, one designated six, and six were marginal men who had no strong attachments to anyone else in the company. Only about 29 per cent of all choices made by them were reciprocated. Thus the group of draftees was a network of interpersonal linkages. Smaller primary groups could be roughly identified, but most of them were linked with one another. As observed, draftees often chatted together in their bed rooms in groups of six or more. These groups were much larger than the number of best friends any one of them had.

The Cohesion of Primary Groups

Dissatisfied soldiers.---Draftees were typically dissatisfied with their military lives; they felt that their routine of standing on posts for six to eight hours a day plus training and other irregular work was tiresome. They felt that the authoritarian military command was unbearable, and the two years of service disrupted their plans. Among twenty-eight draftees questioned, none had shown high satisfaction; fourteen said that the military life was not desirable but they could well adjust to it; eight said that it was highly undesirable but they were able to adjust to it because they had to; six reported that it was simply unbearable and they

¹One draftee who was hospitalized three weeks after the beginning of this study.

were suffering very much. As a highly dissatisfied draftee, who had been close to the author, said:

Maybe you (the author) can imagine what we feel about the service. You sure know how much we could like our work. Sometime, I really preferred to be jailed than to stand on post; it was just too boring. . . . Some squad leaders and officers, I mean professional officers, had little humanity. They never care whether we will be dead or alive. After we come back from posts, we couldn't really take a rest. They always had some stupid things for us to do. . . . If we did a little bit wrong, we would get trouble immediately. They like to see us draftees suffering. (tape)²

As another said:

I don't think that any of us would like to stay in the military. But we have to stay here, so we have to cheat ourselves and to convince ourselves that this is just a punishment for we having not studied hard in high school (so we failed to get into college and had to join the army). . . . We are not happy, but we are not sad either. We already lost so much, and we would lose even more if we feel sad. (tape)

As a better adjusted draftee stated:

Sure nobody likes to waste two years of time in the army. I need not to lie to you. But if we find no way to avoid it, we should not just pray for avoiding it. We should find a way to make our life in military meaningful to us. As a matter of fact, we could learn a lot here. We can at least learn to be patient and tough here. (tape)

These statements were likely representative answers.

There were often exaggerations, e.g., "Prefer to be jailed than to stand on post" and "officers never care whether we will be dead or alive" in the first statement. Such exaggerations might reflect draftees' hostility toward their leaders and dissatisfaction with the official orders. Based on the

²Many interviews conducted in the author's bad room had been recorded with a tape recorder.

answers of the thirty-four draftees in the company (a random sample out of sixty-four draftees who had been in the company for more than four months during the eight months of this study), it seems accurate to state that draftees in general were dissatisfied with their work, their leaders, and the organization as a whole.

Dissatisfaction as a basis of primary groups.--It seems obvious that the share of common problems and hardship by draftees was the most important basis for the cohesive primary groups among them and for the cohesion of the large group of all draftees. Almost all draftees were consciously aware of the importance of friendship to them in confronting their hardships though some of them failed to find intimate friends in the company. Eleven out of twenty-nine draftees reported that friends would help them in performing tasks and other work which made their lives easier, such as:

When you feel really tired, your Kou-ner (buddy) would stand two hours of post for you. When you have to go home for an afternoon, squad fellows will report to the operative officer that they would share your works and let you have a better chance to get the leave-permit from the officer. . . . Even when you make your bed (a hard job for any draftee) you need others to help you. . . . We need friends in military more than anywhere else. . . .
(tape)

Friendship seems most important in fulfilling their emotional needs. It provides them with a feeling of security and of being loved which they particularly need. Sixteen out of nineteen draftees agreed that friendship had made them happier and they needed friendship more than ever.

As a draftee said in a conversation with the author:

When there is one who would like to help you, to be concerned for you, and to be a companion to you, and when you would like to do the same for him, both of you feel that you are still worth something. . . . Everything goes better when you are with your friend, even when you are doing hard labour together. This is what I meant that everybody needs friends here.

The nineteen draftees being questioned all agreed that friends could give them psychological support and help them in doing work. They meant that their sharing of hardship had tied them together into primary groups. Six others who had not been questioned also showed their need for primary relations. As reported by a draftee whose buddy was transferred to another military police company: "I hope you (the author) would like to help us find a way to make Wou (his buddy) stay. I really want to beg you. We can't stand it. . . . Wou is the only real friend I have ever had. (tape)

One draftee praised one operative officer who encouraged soldiers to be helpful and loyal to his friends:

Our operative officer knew well what we really needed. Most of us just left our homes and schools for the first time. What we need in such a completely different place is friends who would be helpful and loyal to one another. (diary)²

Though the results presented were the opinions of only twenty-five draftees out of sixty-four who had been in the company for more than four months, the author concludes that the share of common problems and hardship was an essential

²It was required in the military police units that officers read enlisted men's diaries.

basis for most primary relations. All the twenty-five draftees tended to take their need for friendship for granted in confronting their hardship; many felt that the author should know their answers without asking them. It seemed that these draftees seldom found others who didn't need friends in the military.

Time for informal interactions among soldiers as a condition for the development of primary groups.--However, draftees' need for friendship did not guarantee the development of primary groups among them. They had to have chances for contacts with one another before they might become friends. Fifteen out of twenty-six had chosen their squad fellows who could frequently make contact with them and help them as their best friend. Increase of time for leisure activities increased the average degree of cohesion of each primary group and, also of the group of all draftees (since the group of all draftees was a group of linked primary groups).

Two socio-metric tests had been given, one at the beginning of the second month of this study and one at the beginning of the sixth month. Before the first test, all draftees had been in the company for more than five months to one year. Two-thirds of all draftees being questioned in the second test had been in the company for just about four months.⁴ One might suppose that the first group (thirty-three) being

⁴Just one month after the first group of draftees being tested, about two-thirds of all draftees in the company had been changed.

tested who had been together for a longer time would show higher sentiments attached to their friends. But the results of the two tests showed that the second group (thirty-eight) who had been in the company for a shorter period of time had higher attachments to one another. By using the same measurement, 51.5 per cent of the first group had high attachments to their buddies and 36.4 per cent had low attachments. But the second group had a 75.7 per cent of high and 18.4 per cent of low attachments.

We might assume that the difference was because the first group who had been in the company for a longer period of time had become better adjusted in the company and, therefore, had less need for friendship. But this did not test out since five out of six, who felt suffering very much, belonged to the first group. But eight out of fourteen who said that they could well adjust in the company belonged to the second group.

We might also assume that the two groups had different social background and thus had different viewpoints about friendship. This seemed to be not plausible either because the two groups had received a similar amount of education and military training, most of them were from middle class families, and they all were similar in age and other factors. The only difference was that the first group were initially assigned to the regular military police units while the second group were assigned to the air police units. But both of the two groups were trained in the same training school, and both of the two

groups had little sentiments attached to either the Air Force or the Military Police as a group.

TABLE II
TIME IN THE COMPANY AND PRIMARY GROUP PARTICIPATION*

Time in the company	Primary group participation			
	High	Low	No answer	N.
More than five months	51.5	36.4	12.1	33
Four months	73.7	18.4	7.9	38

*The measurement of primary group participation see "Socio-metric Test" on pages 33 to 36.

The most plausible explanation seems to be that the first group in which soldiers had higher sentiments attached to their close friends was because they had more spare time to make friends due to the reduction of official work. The second group of thirty-eight shared a little less work than the first group of thirty-three; the second group usually stood on posts for about six to eight hours while the first had to stand for about eight to ten hours. The second group seemed also to draw less irregular tasks such as to guard the president one or two times a week, a few hours every time. The results of the tests are shown in Table III.

It should be noticed that free interaction among draftees was difficult while on duty.

Judging by the results of the "Socio-metric Test" and by rejecting other seemingly possible explanations of the

results, the author felt that the correlation between time for free interaction and the cohesion of primary groups is rather high. Two hours more spare time made notable differences in the average cohesion of primary groups.

TABLE III

WORKING HOURS AND PRIMARY GROUP PARTICIPATION

Hours of regular work	Primary group participation			
	High	Low	No answer	N.
8 to 10 (1st test)	51.1	36.4	12.1	33
6 to 8 (2nd test)	73.7	18.4	7.9	38

Norms of Primary Groups

Many actions of primary groups seemed to be guided by the norms members held. The set of norms was named by draftees as "Kou-yi-ssu," being loyal and helpful to friends. They used this term very frequently in their conversations. One might say that "Lee was very Kou-yi-ssu" which might be a praise to Lee; or one might blame Lee that he was "Fu-kou-yi-ssu" which meant that Lee was not loyal to his friends. "Kou-yi-ssu" could be viewed as a generalized central norm or value under which a set of more specific norms oriented a wide range of specific activities of primary groups.

To persuade one another to play everything safely.--

Members of primary groups had strong emotional attachments to one another. They would hesitate to see anyone of them being

punished, as described by them. In the Air Police company where leaders could theoretically always apply unbearable punishment to enforce their orders, and they could increase the punishment until their orders were obeyed, draftees tended to persuade their buddies to obey orders unless it was safe to violate them. Since draftees were closely observed by professional sergeants and officers, members of cohesive primary groups were indeed more likely to conform to official orders. As a draftee stated in a conversation with the author:

. . . Lu (his best friend in the company) always got into trouble because he liked to argue with our squad leader. I always told him that we won't be here forever; why couldn't we just be patient and get through the two years (of service) happily? . . . He agreed with me but sometimes he still couldn't control his temper. (tape)

As his friend, Lu, answered the author the next day: "Chai was right. I am pretty sure that I have been changed by him. If I have no Chai with me, I might have been jailed many times." Chai's influences on Lu could be seen in the official records. Lu had been punished by his squad leader and the operative officer fourteen times in the first month of this study, but only five times in the third month and four times in the fifth month.

Similar type of data about two other cohesive primary groups had provided similar evidence. Draftees tended to avoid boasting how they persuaded one another to obey orders which would be conflicting with their negative sentiments to the military. Hence, the author failed to question other groups in the same fashion. Evidence showed that other primary

groups might also reduce deviance. In asking twelve draftees what were some reasons most of them disobeyed orders, five out of six marginal men had mentioned: "One of the reasons was that their dignity had been hurt by squad leaders." or "They (squad leaders) sometimes were not giving orders but insulting and threatening us." On the other hand, only one out of six members of six different groups had ever mentioned that squad leaders or officers insulted them. One statement these primary group participants agreed was: "I think that some of us did not obey because of our own carelessness or ill temper." The marginal men seemed to be more hostile toward the leaders than members of primary groups.

The data presented above roughly represents the opinions of nine cohesive primary groups (about twenty-four draftees) and five marginal men. Their opinions suggest that leaders who applied severe punishment could more easily overrule the members of cohesive groups than isolated individuals.

The top three deviants among all draftees had been singled out according to official records every one or two months. In the first seven months of this study, nine draftees had been identified--one of them had been identified three times and one two times. Surprisingly, six out of nine top deviants were marginal men and the rest were low-participating

members of primary groups.⁵ None of the highly involved members of primary groups had ever been on the black list. Moreover, the three low-participating members of primary groups were among the five "fast-improved" ones according to the reports from squad leaders and officers. It is important to notice that marginal men consisted of only about 18.4 to 36.4 per cent of all draftees in the company according to the socio-metric tests.

The study of the top deviants had further confirmed the statement that leaders could easier overrule participants of cohesive primary groups. No negative data could not be explained. It was highly plausible that, in an organization in which lower participants are dissatisfied and official orders and rules are supported by severe punishments, compliance of lower participants tends to vary accordingly with the cohesion of primary groups to which they belong.

This hypothesis makes necessary a modification of our conclusion of reviewed literature. It is insufficient to conclude that primary groups tend to increase compliance if their goals are consistent with official orders. Primary groups also tend to increase the compliance with inconsistent official order if they find that disobedience definitely induces

⁵Marginal men were identified according to socio-metric tests and observations. Low-participating members were identified according to observations and interviews. As one draftee described a low-participating member of his group: "Mu is a good guy. Mu, Mu, and I were closer friends in the company, but Mu often had different interests from ours. Sometimes, we had difficulty in getting along with him."

more deprivation. It seems to be sound to conclude that primary groups are more capable of adjusting to the situation in which they find themselves.

To help and to be comforted for one another.--Draftees tended to help and to be concerned for their buddies in almost anything. Buddies might lend money to one another and refuse its return. One informant reported that this was not uncommon. Draftees also would like to give their day off,⁶ which was important to each of them, to their best friends if the friends needed a day off. In eight months of this study, nine reports from draftees for giving away their days off had been received by the operative officers. Most definitely a draftee would try to comfort a frustrated friend. Five draftees being questioned, they all assumed that it was true of everybody. As one said: "Sure we will try our best to comfort a frustrated friend. This is what friendship means."

As another said: "I believe that even a kid would comfort his frustrated friend."

By viewing this norm of *Hou-yi-asu*, it seemed to be understandable that primary group relations could provide a feeling of strength and security in an insecure environment, and made draftees better adjusted in the environment. As one wrote in his diary: "It is true that everyone has to live with friends. I feel ten times stronger and happier when with my *Hou-nor*'s (similar to the word, buddies)." Sixteen out of

⁶Only one of each squad could take his eight-hour day off each day.

nineteen draftees agreed that friendship had made them happier. Many of them had also related their happiness to their mutual help and consideration with friends. As one reported:

When there is one who would like to help you, to be concerned for you, and to be a companion for you, and when you would like to do the same for him, both of you feel that you are still worth something.

From this data, there seems little doubt that primary relations provide a better adjustment of soldiers. Many tips suggest that their better adjustments had made them feel that the hardship and the inhumanity in the military were more bearable. Therefore, the primary groups may increase compliance. In asking twelve draftees why they disobeyed orders, seven of the twelve voluntarily stated that: "if they were happier, they could better control their temper and they sure would obey better." The remaining five, though they didn't state it voluntarily, agreed with this statement when the author asked them. They also agreed that they had that kind of experience before.

The twelve draftees were selected from a population of thirty-seven draftees. They consistently reported that a better adjustment could increase compliance. Their opinions are probably those of the majority. They may have further confirmed the hypothesis that cohesive primary groups tend to increase the compliance with undesirable orders if the orders are supported by strong sanctions.

To help friends to avoid punishment and to share one another's punishment.—Once two draftees forgot to go back to

their bedrooms to clean their guns and were punished by being forced to stand in the office for a half hour. A few minutes later, the operative officer went to the draftees' bedrooms to check the absentees and asked where were the two who were not there. One of the two absentees' squad fellow answered: "I just saw them here a couple of minutes ago." Another said: "You see, their guns have been disassembled. They may be in the restroom right now." The operative officer, then, asked the other six draftees in the room. Two reported that they didn't notice these two guys, but they seemed to have seen them walking round a couple of minutes ago. The other four reported that they didn't pay attention at all, but they supposed that the two guys were in the restroom.

As a matter of fact, all the nine draftees had lied to the officer since they had disassembled the guns for the absentees and the two absentees had not been in the bedroom for more than an hour.

Similar incidents were observed occasionally. Draftees seemed willing to risk themselves to cover their fellows. But it was important to notice that they covered for others only if they had a good chance of not being uncovered in their covering. They never risked too much for covering others.

Draftees (usually of small primary groups or squads) often also shared one another's hardship and punishment if it was possible. Once a draftee was punished by being required to clean 20 reserve pistols in his spare time because his own

carbine was dirty. The author soon found that at least four others were cleaning the pistols, and the one being punished was cleaning his own carbine.

Once after an anti-spy exercise, when officers were trying to identify one draftee who had failed to stop an offender with a bomb, one of the squad reported: ". . . It was a mistake of all of us. We all should receive punishment." It seemed that they knew that officers could not punish the whole squad too strongly, and they preferred to share the punishment rather than have one of them severely punished.

This norm of helping friends avoid punishment and sharing punishment seemed not related directly to the problem of compliance. Rather, it seemed to be a reflection of the cohesion of smaller groups as well as a factor in strengthening the solidarity of groups.

One might suppose that their share of hardship and punishment might have reduced the threat of punishment an officer could apply and, therefore, might have reduced the compliance of draftees with orders. This didn't seem true since draftees felt guilty if they let their buddies share the hardship or the punishment they received. As one reported to the operative officer, the author, after a few of his squad fellows had been punished because they shared the punishments he received: "These guys simply make me feel worse. I would like to receive ten times the punishment if you would not punish them."

To help one another to shirk from work.—The first three norms were essentially shared within small primary groups, but this norm was essentially shared in the large group of all draftees.

As draftees disliked most of the work they had, they tended to be willing to shirk their work. But they were closely observed by leaders who threatened them with severe punishments, so they seldom had a chance to shirk. Besides, primary groups also played an important role in reducing deviance. Therefore, in the first five months of this study, only a few draftees had ever been punished because they shirked their work, though one or more of them had been punished every day for some minor mistakes and carelessness. If one did shirk, he shirked individually. No primary group of two had been found to shirk together. As shown in the higher deviant rate for marginal men, we would also assume that marginal men were more likely to shirk their work.

Since the sixth month of this study, a norm, "to help one another to shirk work" (or what they called "catching fishes together"), emerged. This norm was reflected in a long established warning system developed by draftees: they were required to stand on posts in good military manner and with high alertness for two hours at a time and three to four times every twenty-four hours. Gradually all draftees seemed to reach a mutual agreement that if any guard saw an officer or a sergeant coming to check on them, he must warn guards on

other posts by making a phone call. The operator working in the operative office would give an early warning if he saw an officer or a sergeant approaching the posts. Protected by such a system, they could relax on posts, or write letters, or listen to transistor radios. The officers found many had been forced to conform to this norm by others; anyone who refused to conform would be called "the commander's big son," or "the operative officer's dog," an unbearable insult to any of them. The officers also found that almost all draftees, guards or operators, had been committed to such a norm.

There were three reasons why it could not be a norm of a primary group of small size.

1. Cohesive primary groups hesitated to risk it since they felt it unbearable if one of them was punished severely. It was the larger group which had attracted a certain amount of loyalty from members but yet became a highly cohesive unity tending to initiate a massive violation of official rules. Actually, this warning system was discovered only after the unity of all draftees had been recognized. Thirteen draftees had been questioned in the fifth and the sixth month before and after the warning system was found, nine of them clearly stated that all draftees were their Ko-mer's. At the beginning of this study, only less than one-third of all draftees had such a statement.

As a draftee stated in the later period of this study:
". . . Chang is my best friend in the company, but all of us

(draftees) are Lou-er's to each other."

As a draftee stated in the first month of this study: "We squad fellows are closer friends, but we seldom have enough time to make friends with all brothers⁷ in the company. . . I knew very little about some other fellows in other squads." A sample of thirteen draftees out of thirty-nine being questioned in the later period might be too small to represent the whole population. Never did the author find in the later period that any draftee said that he "knew little about fellows in another squad."

The cohesion of the large group of all draftees could never be as high as the smaller primary group. Most soldiers had only one or a few close friends in the company. They thought of one another in a deeply personal sense only within their small primary group. Interestingly enough, many draftees persuaded their close friends to play everything safely, or "not to risk too much," or "to be chicken but smart." But, on the other hand, they blamed the ones other than their close friends as "lu-kou-yi-ssu" if the ones failed to warn them on posts. The author found eight draftees who called others "the commander's big son" or the "operative officer's dog" in two months. He interviewed them and the closest friend of each of them (except two marginal men who had no close friends), found that four out of the six who had close friend(s) did persuade their friends to play everything safely. As one of the six

⁷Semi-officially soldiers called others in the same unit as "brothers."

said:

I really didn't intend to insult him because he didn't help others. I called him 'the commander's son' because every body called him so. When the author asked him what would happen if his Kou-mer did not warn him on the posts? He answered: 'I sure will not get mad of him. . . Wang and I often wanted one another not to risk. . . . We will never get mad of each other.'

2. The warning system had to be performed by the larger group because a larger group was less likely to feel the threat of punishment. Five out of thirteen draftees being questioned said they warned each other because they saw that everybody did so. Two informants also said that many guys simply dared not try if they did not see that many others did so, and if they did not believe that everybody would not betray him after being caught by the leaders. Every draftee knew that the officers could not punish eight guards too severely at one time if they deviated collectively. Even if they would all be punished severely, they would feel much better than being punished alone. Four draftees answered that they all took it for granted.

3. Posted guards were occupants of offices and not necessarily members of a friendship group. It would be unusual if all guards posted at a given hour were members of a primary group. Each squad provided only one or two guards at any given time, but more than half of the primary groups were within each squad. A larger group should have more chances to help one another to deviate.

Data seems to support that in an organization in which

lower participants are dissatisfied, and official orders are supported by strong sanction, there is an inverse relation between the compliance of lower participants and the cohesion of the large group among them, (for example, a group of about thirty in the case of the Air Police company). But a minor modification is necessary in order to agree with the second reason we have discussed.

The punishment would be less a threat to a large group. Leaders cannot apply punishments effectively, and their orders are not supported by strong sanctions as described in the hypothesis. Therefore, we should change the sentence, "official orders are supported by strong sanction," to "leaders frequently apply punishments to support their orders." The new sentence permits the possibility that in a large group of subordinates compliance decreases because leaders' application of punishment creates less a threat over them.

The Informal Grouping of Professional Sergeants and Primary Groups among Them

Old sergeants⁸ distinguished themselves from draftees and, to a lesser extent, from officers. Through the eight months, never did the author see an old sergeant go out with a draftee or officer on their day off. They seldom played a

⁸All personnel including professional sergeants themselves called professional sergeants "old sergeants" to distinguish from non-professional sergeants and draftees.

billiard game with drafted or officers. All old sergeants were clearly an informal interacting group rather than a social category in the Air Police company. One could often observe two to ten old sergeants gathered together in conversation, or to watch T.V., or to gamble (officially prohibited).

Smaller primary groups among old sergeants could only be roughly identified; most of them belonged to the larger group of all rather than to a primary group of a few. In answering the author's questions, only a few stated in the following way: "Squad leader Chai, Chang, and I are best friends. We are old timers who have been in the same units for more than ten years." But most others stated:

Comparatively I have been closer to Laing and Chi, but most old brothers are my old timers. . . . I can get along well with most of them; or they might state: Most of us are good friends to each other, but we can hardly say that any of us has a real friend.

Socio-metric questionnaires had been given to thirty of the thirty-four old sergeants, but only two had made their choices for partners. Six wrote on their questionnaires that they would like to obey orders rather than to make choices themselves. The rest did not answer at all.

Twelve sergeants who did not answer were questioned further. Three did not give clear answers, and four others said they were not accustomed to making "free choices" of working partners. Seven of them said they were close to most of the fellow old sergeants so they would not choose a few and denounce all others. As one reported: "We are all old

timers. It would be embarrassing to let us make choices among them. He also added: "We never had such kind of 'Iron choices' before. We simply don't think that it works."

It seemed clear that the boundaries of small primary groups among old sergeants were vague. This was not only because they would not boast of their close relationship with a few, but because they were indeed less likely to be involved in highly intimate, mutually dependent, primary relationships than draftees. More sociologically speaking, old sergeants seldom treat their relationships with others as ends rather than means. They often gathered in groups of more than five. Though some interacted with certain others more often, anyone might join with any others. Unlike the draftees, they seldom paid for billiard games or for a drink for friends. They were unlikely to lend money to others, and loans were repaid. As one complained: "We would not borrow money from or lend money to friends, since it might destroy the friendship. As a matter of fact, you simply cannot find a loyal friend in this world."

They might also help others, but they would count how much they had helped and expect others to do something of equal value for them later. Once two old sergeants, old timers, quarrelled because one of them had checked the posts for the other before, but the other refused to check posts for him because the other had a sore neck.

Throughout the eight months of this study, only four

primary groups of two to three old sergeants were observed. These groups had a comparable degree of cohesion to that of draftees. The remainder of the old sergeants had little emotional attachments to one another.

Cohesion of Primary Groups

Old sergeants had plenty of spare time for contact with one another,⁹ and most of them had been in this company for more than three years, but they did not maintain cohesive primary groups among them. This seemed to be because they did not have as much need for primary relationship as draftees did.

Through the long processes of socialization, they seemed to be able to adjust well in the military; they tended to take the authoritarian military command for granted as reflected in their objections in answering socio-metric tests; they complained about many things, but they seldom complained that their work was boring and unbearable as draftees did. The author joined their conversations almost every day. He never heard any of them complain that work was boring.

Their better adjustment in the military might be an important reason for their lack of emotional attachments to one another. They seemed to be loyal friends to others about ten to seventeen years ago when they first joined the army, but their loyalty was disappearing as time passed by.

⁹They usually carried about six to nine hours of work while draftees carried nine to eleven hours.

This could be seen in old sergeants' complaints about the loss of the "good old days" when brothers were loyal. At least three sergeants voluntarily stated their dissatisfaction with friends (in the company). As one stated:

Everybody has changed in these days. We were pretty loyal to one another when we first joined the Army. But now everybody has become selfish. Especially these God-damn married guys; they think that only they are important in this world.

As another said: "Since the government moved to Taiwan, everybody has become more and more selfish." Six others blamed the change on the surrounding society for their lack of primary relationship in everyday life (in military). As one stated: "Society is changing worse and worse. The modern man just looks like an animal; he wants to satisfy only himself and never thinks of others." The decrease of loyal friendship ought to be highly apparent when many people voluntarily reported it.

Old sergeants also typically agreed that "their life was much more difficult" in the old army than what draftees were leading in this company in the present. As one described:

. . . We never could get a chance to go home to see our families after we joined the army. We simply never got a day off in the first two years. The squad leader could beat you if you said 'no' to him. If anyone dared to sleep on posts, our company commander would beat him with his big stick . . .

By piecing together this data, it seems logical to suppose that old sergeants had less need for primary relationships until about "five to ten years" ago (as recalled by an old sergeant) because they had become better adjusted in the

army and because the life was easier in peacetime. Therefore, they were less likely to be involved in highly intimate primary relationship. This generalization should be rather reliable; since it is based upon many persons' close observations.

The study of the primary groups among old sergeants might indicate that personnel might not be able to maintain cohesive primary groups if they did not need one another to a certain degree even if they lived, worked, and played together, and had chances to contact one another. On the other hand, the study of draftees suggested that no matter how much personnel needed one another, they might not be able to find intimate friends if they did not have chances to come in contact with others.

Their better adjustment in the military, however, did not mean that they were satisfied with the organization. They were, in general, dissatisfied because of many chronic problems, i. e., the low pay, their permanent low status in military and in the civilian society, and their difficulties in marriage. Why did not these common problems create cohesive primary groups among old sergeants?

The problems of low pay and low status seemed to operate to unite old sergeants together. It could be seen in many incidents that old sergeants punished draftees to maintain their own slightly higher status and attacked officers in many meetings to increase their status, at least in their

image. When they tried to increase or to maintain their status, they often showed high unity among them. Once in an "honor and solidarity meeting," one sergeant reported that some draftees simply did not respect old sergeants. When, followed by the statements of six others, old sergeants seemed to be overly eager to support one another's opinion. In the following days, they were very hostile to the draftees. Five squad leaders had doubled the frequency of punishing their subordinates, draftees. Their dissatisfactions with their low status and low pay had been repressed to a certain extent since they found no way to improve their situation. They did not talk much about these problems. When they chatted together, worked together, played games together, they seldom thought about these problems. A massive collective outburst of attacking officers in the meetings or finding fault with draftees could happen through a process of agitation and of communicating dissatisfactions, and if some events occurred which would remind them of their problems. It seemed that their needs for the unity with others could not exist long enough to create cohesive primary groups among them; only three widely spread outbursts had been observed in eight months, each outburst lasted about three days to a few weeks.

The youngest old sergeant in the company was thirty-two years of age, but only about 30 to 38 per cent of them were married because they could hardly find girls who would marry them. This was a problem constantly bothering the

unmarried, the majority. The sharing of the common problem among singles was a factor which could well impede the unity of smaller groups as well as the large group of all old sergeants. Usually competition of four or five for one girl caused conflicts among them.¹⁰ As an informant said: ". . . these crazy guys are still hostile to each other even after all of them were rejected by the girl." Sometimes single men attacked married ones because married men had two more days off than they each month. As one stated in an official meeting: "It is too unfair that we single men carry extra work for these married ones and let them go home to hold their wives." On the other hand, married old sergeants paid much of their attentions to their own families rather than friends in the company.

In general, there were less bases for the development of primary groups among old sergeants than for draftees. It seemed to be understandable that ten out of eighteen old sergeants questioned said that it would make little difference if they were transferred to other units. On the other hand, only one out of twelve draftees said that he would like to be in any other unit. All the rest of them would not be transferred. The study of old sergeants shows that the sharing of common problems and hardships may not tie personnel together unless friendship can reduce hardship or solve problems. The common

¹⁰All unmarried ones usually had only enough time and money to court a few lower class girls near the base where the company stationed.

marriage problem, for example, operated to disorganize the group.

All old sergeants, however, could be viewed as a large interacting group, and a set of norms was shared by members to a certain extent.

Norms of Primary Groups

Old sergeants confronted different problems from draftees. Therefore, they tended to shape a different set of norms.

Status seeker.--Old sergeants were low class men in both the military and civilian society. Very few of them could promote their status by receiving officer training or by taking better jobs after their retirement. But more importantly, they tended to be rejected by the civilian society as shown in their difficulties in finding girls to marry. This could also be seen in the background of old sergeants' wives; most wives were from farmer's families and a few from families of aboriginal people,¹¹ the very low class families. An old sergeant could hardly get a lower class girl with a city origin. Their problems of low pay, low status, and marriage, were interacting. Low pay and low status also induced problems in marriages.

Their dissatisfactions with low status and other problems seemed to have made them very sensitive to their status.

¹¹Aboriginal people were not so-called Taiwanese; they were immigrants from Malaysia while Taiwanese were immigrants from mainland China.

They successfully maintained their distinction from draftees. Seldom did an old sergeant fool around with a draftee though some draftees were sergeants (third class) also. If one did, he would be belittled by his fellow old sergeants as "an old innocent kid" (an insult to old sergeants). They also insisted that all draftees salute them. Thus they wanted a sergeant third class draftee to salute an old sergeant second class, but an old sergeant second class never saluted an old sergeant first class. Their ritualism is obviously not because of their conformity to official rules. Draftees also could not call old sergeants' first names; they had to call "squad leader Lee" even though Lee might be just a sergeant first class military policeman, not really a squad leader. The first names could only be called among the group of old sergeants or by a higher rank.

There were many more indications that their efforts to maintain a higher status were likely a kind of defensive reaction. Squad leaders, for example, often branded their subordinates, draftees, "dead civilians." Other sergeants often used this term in their conversation. This term might be a projection of their frustration received from the civilian society. Some squad leaders also did not like to see draftees read text books which might remind old sergeants that draftees had better formal education and might have better future. As a draftee complained: "Whenever I studied in my spare time, the squad leader would always find some stupid

thing for me to do. But he would not bother me if I just fooled around . . ." (tape)

The motivation for maintaining or increasing status was not only defensive responses of individuals, but also a kind of collective response of the group of all old sergeants. If one old sergeant "lost face," this might threaten the status of other old sergeants at least psychologically, they tended to respond collectively. They also might feel that they were in the same boat. Once an old sergeant second class fought with a sergeant third class draftee, and both of them were punished by a reserve officer. The old sergeant felt he was losing face very much because he had been punished together with a draftee. He came up to the officer many times in one day to try to alter the charge. This was very unusual in the company. At least five other old sergeants had also told the officer that "it might be Lu's (the draftee) fault." The interesting thing was that the old sergeant being punished was not a popular personality in his own group at all, but others still helped him. As a matter of fact, others seemed to be trying to help themselves in maintaining their own status rather than being concerned for the one being punished. As an old sergeant informed:

Many old brothers blamed Wang (the old sergeant being punished) for several days. They said that it was Wang who found the insult for himself. It was Wang's fault to be too close to the draftees, and made them not respect him a bit.

Furthermore, the author simply could not find that there was

any other old sergeant who had ever tried to comfort Wang who suffered many times.

More importantly, their striving for higher status included belittling and attacking officers. It was heroic behavior to disobey openly a disliked officer's orders. An old sergeant who would disobey an officer would boast of it for several days among his group. The author himself had heard old sergeants criticize or belittle almost every officer in the company. As one said in a group: ". . . What can the political officer do? You see his dead appearance."

Another one blamed a company commander: "He is simply stupid. God damn, he knows only to give orders like an old woman (give a lot of orders but cannot get things done). It is us bad lucky guys who suffer." Other old sergeants who were listening frequently showed their approval. Old sergeants also had more reasons to belittle or to attack reserve officers. Reserve officers usually did not like to punish old sergeants. They usually were less capable of applying sanctions to support their orders since some commanders sometimes would rather support old sergeants than reserve officers. Reserve officers also did not have enough knowledge about military policemen's tasks, therefore, gave more chances for old sergeants to criticize them. More importantly, reserve officers in the military police units were typically sons or close relatives of high ranking officers or officials; they were unquestionably reminders of old sergeants' low status.

It was clear that reserve officers were more likely to be belittled and attacked than any other officer. As one squad leader wrote in his diary when the two reserve officers just reported to the company: "There came two guys who knew only how to wait for the day to go back to their homes." Two old sergeants who were close to the author also agree that old sergeants seldom respect a reserve officer. But a reserve officer could easily gain popularity if he did everything professionals might do and if he showed his willingness to make friends with old sergeants, and if he would share the hardship all enlisted men had. For example, a reserve officer slept outside the buildings with his subordinates on a rainy night instead of sharing a room in the building with all other officers in a two-day special operation. The reserve officer's effort to integrate himself into the group of enlisted men seemed to have gratified enlisted men's latent needs for higher status. As seen in an election for the chairman of a "honor and solidarity meeting,"¹² this reserve officer beat all other professional officers as well as old sergeants. In other words, this reserve officer became the most popular figure in that moment. This example shows that sergeants' hostility toward the reserve officer stemmed from their striving for higher status; they might also favor a reserve officer if the officer gratified their need for status even just

¹²The meeting was the only democratic situation in the company. Soldiers usually elect the most popular person as the chairman.

psychologically. Their belittling professional officers might also be due to similar reasons. As they criticized an officer, they seldom forgot to mention that "the officer cared only for his own promotion" and "he wanted just to impress the higher command."

Old sergeants' attack on officers was to reduce their compliance with official orders. Most of the time it seemed to be proper to say that old sergeants were well socialized in the military community. They would obey unquestionably orders from a disliked officer though their obedience might be partially because of the threat of punishment. But when some events happened that evoked hostility, then, one or two might initiate an attack on a certain officer. If the officer failed to stop the attack on him, many others would begin to disobey. A reserve officer once was criticized for his carelessness in handling the "welfare fund," a small amount of money belonging to all personnel of the company. He did not effectively stop the critics at the beginning, and finally the hostility of old sergeants toward him materialized and spread widely among all sergeants. During that period of time, the officer simply could hardly issue a new order and make everybody obey.

It was important to notice that their action of attacking officers and disobeying orders was an action of the larger group of many or of all old sergeants. They usually create an atmosphere in which they might feel the consensus of opinions

and the unity of the group, then, a few days to risk initiating the attack. They usually talked about the relevant events for maybe several days, and encouraged one another in the large group, at the beginning. It seemed that individuals would not risk until they felt that others would support them to confront the possible threat of punishment and their action would be highly praised by others. Never had any individual action to attack officers been observed throughout the eight months of this study; their attacks were more or less to represent the group opinion and to be supported or praised by the group. Even the small primary groups had never been able to launch an attack. All the observed happenings of the massive disobedience followed the processes described.

It seemed to be true that the unity of a large number of old sergeants was always a potential threat to the formal authority. The carelessness of leaders or the chance of some special events might lead to widely spread disobedience. Without the unity of all sergeants, they might not be able to communicate their opinions, their dissatisfaction, and finally their support of hostile actions. Then, no one would dare to attack officers and disobey orders. Some old sergeants who disobeyed on their own had been overruled easily, and others would either not support them or follow them.

The seeking of status was essentially a latent norm of old sergeants. It was difficult to detect by questioning them. But, by piecing together a wide variety of clues, the

norm becomes apparent. These clues suggested repeatedly that the norm was accepted by the majority of old sergeants.

Data has further confirmed the hypothesis that the unity of a large number of lower participants tends to reduce the compliance. The specific needs of lower participants seem to be the decisive factors in the functions of a group. An officer, for example, may prevent the massive disobedience from happening if he avoids reference to old sergeants' chronic problems. However, since the old sergeants were highly dissatisfied with the organization as a whole, we would not expect the large group of them to have positive functions in the organization.

Old sergeants and draftees were all dissatisfied with the organization, but old sergeants were rather unfriendly toward draftees. This was not only because of the differences in rank; only six old sergeants, squad leaders, had rights to give orders to draftees, but also more likely, old sergeants wanted to prove that they had a higher status. Old sergeants knew that draftees were leading an unhappy life, but they would not lower their own status to sympathize with draftees. Old sergeants never accepted draftees as friends because of their need for status. The specific needs of personnel not only can decide the cohesion and the norms of informal groupings of them, but can also decide the membership of informal groupings.

Mutual help.--Mutual help was also a norm observable

among old sergeants. But their mutual help was restricted to a more limited extent than that of draftees; they usually only helped one another to perform such simple work, such as to spend twenty minutes to check posts. Furthermore, their mutual help was usually on the basis of mutual exchange. If one had helped another to check posts one night, the other would be obligated to do an equal amount of work for him. They seldom lent money to one another, but if they did they wanted it repaid. Even in the most cohesive primary groups among old sergeants, the sharing of money was uncommon.

As a member of a cohesive primary group stated:

We lent money to one another only on very rare occasions . . . I did lend two hundred dollars (US \$5.) to Chai (his buddy) last month to pay for his bicycle. He paid me back about a week ago on our pay day.

As another, a marginal man stated: "We usually planned our expenses according to our pay. We seldom borrowed money except when we needed it badly. To borrow money is the worst habit. It could destroy friendship." A draftee showed his very different point of view:

We are all poor guys; we often need to borrow money from Kou-mers. The ones who have girl friends are the poorest among us, some of them often spend all his own money and his Kou-mers' money . . . (Pat) we usually do not want Kou-mers to return the money we lend them unless we need it badly. . . . Friendship is more important than money. (tape)

When an old sergeant took leave, he had to find another to take over his job. At least five times the author found that two old sergeants quarrelled because one did not finish the work for the other when the first left. Officially,

they should finish the others' work.

Most frequently, old sergeants only helped one another to do some easy job, such as to check the posts. Even if one had spent only ten minutes checking the posts for another, he expected the other to do the same for him within a few days. Twelve times the author observed such occasions. Two informants, old sergeants, said that this was common among them.

Old sergeants' lack of willingness to help simply reflected the low cohesion of their group.

Companionship.--Old sergeants are best described as leisure companions of one another. The author seldom found that there was one who did not join others in his leisure. They usually chatted, played, and, occasionally, gambled, with others when they were not on duty. About fifteen old sergeants who worked in one office chatted even when they were working.

A few old sergeants might be together more frequently, but anyone might join with any other. Evenings when most old sergeants were off duty, they usually gathered into a few large groups of four to ten. A few might shift from one group to another. Companionship seemed to be a function of the large group of all old sergeants.

It was noticed that playmates had little sentiments attached to one another. The author was surprised to see that one playmate beat another in their bedroom while four others lay in their beds with ease. As an informant said:

These guys would not bother to take part in any conflict between brothers. They wouldn't stop the fight unless

one is going to be killed. These old guys are just too selfish. You (the author) need not spend more time to find out why these guys did not stop the fight.

This informant also believed that other old sergeants were rather selfish too.

Old sergeants' leisure activities seemed to agree with our conclusion that most old sergeants belonged to the large group of all of them rather than to smaller primary groups of a few. They also had little emotional attachments to one another among the large group.

The functions of the leisure group could be seen in the content of their conversations. They often talked about their experience in the old army (more than ten years ago); they talked about things that happened in other MP units; they also often praised or criticized officers' orders. More important, if some events had evoked their hostility toward an officer or draftee, they communicated the hostility in the group. Before any outburst of a massive attack on officers or on draftees, they talked only about the disliked officers or draftees maybe for several days. They seemed to have developed a consensus, strengthened one another's hostility, and encouraged one another to attack the disliked officers or draftees.

The companionship could also maintain emotional stability. Five old sergeants had shown their awareness of the importance of companionship. One talked about an old sergeants' emotional stability. One talked about an ill-tempered old sergeant with a group of three:

. . . He said he didn't feel well. God damn, he didn't even like to talk with others, how could he feel happy. We would be unhappy too; we have no money, no women, and no future, just exactly like him. Why this tortoise's son could not come to chat with others. He did not even have a chance to forget (unhappy things) for awhile.

As one criticized the political officer who complained that old sergeants talked too much in the office: "He just doesn't know that we have to chat. Chatting with others could make us happier."

The existence of the unity of the large group of all old sergeants is a potential threat to the formal authority. The function of maintaining old sergeants' emotional stability could be better fulfilled by small primary groups. It seems that the development of small primary groups is a better functional alternative for companionship among the group of all old sergeants.

The three norms seemed to be generalizations of most activities of the group of all old sergeants. The activities of small primary groups of old sergeants has been omitted since only nine of thirty-nine old sergeants had shown their commitments to their small groups. Even these nine old sergeants had never had high loyalty for their friends comparable to that of highly involved draftees. No significant differences in the actions of these nine old sergeants had been observed.

CHAPTER III

LEADERSHIP AND COMPLIANCE

Two sets of leader-follower relationships will be examined, i. e., the relations between draftees and their leaders, and the relations between professional sergeants and officers. In this study, emphasis has been laid upon some factors particularly relevant to the problem of the compliance of subordinates to leaders.

Leadership and the Compliance of Draftees

In general, the company commander or/and the operative officers gave most orders in regulating draftees' activities. They also set the levels of effort or achievement in giving their orders. A political officer in the company usually gave suggestions to the commander and guidance to the operative officers concerning the human relations. Usually the company had one commander, one political officer and two to three platoon leaders who took turns acting as the operative officer.

Squad leaders were responsible for supervising draftees in performing tasks, maintaining equipment, and helping the officers to restrict draftees' leisure activities. They were chiefly assigned to reinforce officers' orders and, sometimes to translate certain orders of officers into detailed

specifications for draftees.

The attitudes of leaders toward draftees were very authoritarian. They demanded blind, unquestioning, obedience. They relied heavily on the use of punishment to support their orders. They tended to set very high levels for draftees to achieve in performing tasks or in conforming to any order, since draftees would not do more than required. In other words, draftees' compliance with leaders was typically mechanical.

The Threat of Punishment

Officers and squad leaders believed that the use of punishment was the most effective means in controlling draftees, who simply did not like their jobs. Four officers and all squad leaders were questioned, all of them reported that they could not imagine any method other than the threat of punishment to make draftees work harder. As one platoon leader, who had been in the company for five years, stated in a conversation with the author:

. . . We can easily make them like us, but it is different to make them work harder. They will not do good jobs just because they like us or respect us. We often had better-liked officers in our company, but these well-liked officers were usually unsuccessful officers (in the sense of maintaining the high efficiency of the company). Draftees liked them only because they did not care whether draftees had done a good job. I believe that draftees work hard only if they are afraid of being punished. I don't think any other way would do any good. (tape)

As a squad leader stated:

We simply could not make these draftees work if we didn't

punish them once in awhile. We did try to be friendly to them, but it was wisely useless. They never cared whether our work was done. They might like us if we are friendly, but they never like their work.

Another platoon leader gave many examples of well-liked but yet unsuccessful officers and squad leaders in the company in the last few years. He believed that well-liked officers might be able to increase the compliance of old sergeants but not of the draftees who were interested in shirking their work more than anything else. He also said that punishing them was the only easy way to lead these draftees.

As observed, leaders did punish draftees very often. According to the official records, there was an average of one or two draftees punished every day, ranging from carrying a few hours of extra work to being jailed for one month. This number did not include the unreported punishments applied by squad leaders.

Officially, squad leaders had little right to punish their subordinates, but they used their rights excessively. They were permitted to punish draftees, for example, only to do less than an hour of extra work or to have an hour of policeman technical training.¹ If a draftee had seriously violated official orders, the squad leader had to report to the operative officer instead of punishing the draftee himself. Only officers could cancel a draftee's day off, or jail a draftee, or report a draftee to the higher command. But,

¹It is a combination of Chinese boxing, karate, and judo. It was a tiresome exercise to every enlisted man.

the official rules concerning the application of punishments were rather vague. Squad leaders could punish one draftee frequently, e. g., to order him to carry one hour of extra work once or twice every day. Many squad leaders had apparently violated the rules; at least two squad leaders had beaten their subordinates although it was an officially prohibited action in any Chinese military unit. As a matter of fact, the excessive use of punishment was un-officially approved by the commander and a few other professional officers. Once a reserve officer submitted an official report to advise that one squad leader must be changed because he punished all his subordinates by making them kneel on the ground, an unbearable insult to any Chinese, and he also beat with a stick the ones who refused to kneel. But the commander made no reply. The commander himself over-stepped his rights; he punished one draftee by making him clean toilets with his bare hands.

The frequent use of punishment seemed to have forced draftees to maintain a high level of compliance with orders. Take the guards for instance, the officers set very high standards for them to achieve. They were required to keep their uniforms in perfect condition; the uniforms had to be clean and well ironed; the bronze ornaments and shoes had to be shining. They had to be perfect in manner. Thus, they had to be perfectly clean. If any person was approaching a post, the guard must check the person's identification and package; he

might have to check more than a hundred persons every day. Besides, guards were required to be alert enough to be aware of any person within twenty to one hundred yards according to the environment of each post. As seen in this description, we can imagine that guards had to pay full attention in performing such a task. Their compliance with orders had to be high if all the detailed directives were met. To be posted eight to ten hours a day and about nine in every ten days, draftees were easily bored. But they did well; at least no major deviation had ever been found though there were one or more leaders checking the posts every hour. One or more might be punished, but it was for some minor mistake or carelessness, e. g., one's gun was not clean enough or one's bronze buttons were not shining enough.

Two squads which had been frequently ranked as the best in performing tasks, in every day training, and in leisure activities, were led by tyrannical squad leaders. The two squad leaders punished their draftees more often than the other four squad leaders. Although draftees frequently described the two leaders as something similar to the word, "martinet," draftees under them did a better job.

The two reserve officers had tried to minimize the use of punishment and to increase the use of warnings and to counsel with the careless draftees. The two officers' popularity was soon increased; draftees voluntarily went to the two officers' bedroom more frequently; they invited the officers

to join their basketball games. But after one and one-half months, the deviance had been increased by more than 45 per cent in the weeks when the reserve officers took charge of the operative office. In the remaining weeks, deviant rate increased by about 10 per cent. The author supposed that the increase was because other officers and old sergeants had tried harder to look for the deviance. These leaders might increase their pressure on draftees when the reserve officers spoiled them. But, this supposition seemed to be insignificant since the reserve officers themselves found a notable increase in deviance. Two guards even napped on a remote post. A notable increase of draftees left the barracks to buy ice-cream or for a drink.

Leaders often warned draftees before they needed to punish. When an officer announced an order, he might specify what punishment would be received if anyone failed to reach the satisfactory level of conformity. As an operative officer announced before an anti-spy exercise: ". . . Anyone who fails to stop an offender will have no days off in the next month. He will also carry one hour of extra work every day in the next week." Officers also consciously tried to make every draftee constantly feel the threat of punishment; they announced everyday the names of enlisted men who had been punished. Thus, they threatened all enlisted men when they punished one. As observed, about twelve ran back to their bedroom to check their carbines after the operative officer

announced that a draftee had been punished by having to clean top reserved pistols because his carbine was not clean. It was obvious that the operative officer did not need to punish every draftee everyday in order to force them to conform; he punished only one or a few, and others were threatened and conformed.

Data presented includes the opinions of all officers and squad leaders, and the facts about the compliance of draftees (with different leaders). These data consistently and repeatedly support the hypothesis that in an organizational situation in which official orders are frequently contrary to the values and needs of lower participants, compliance tends to vary according to the threat of punishment. No data suggesting a negative relation was found.

It was important to notice that draftees' compliance is essentially mechanical. Officers announced many new orders from the higher command every week or two, but they tended to forget to punish the violators. Consequently draftees, too, forgot these orders. They seemed never to conform to any disliked order if leaders did not support the order with the threat of punishment. This is shown in the fact that the deviance soon increased as the two reserve officers reduced the use of punishment. Mechanical compliance bears the following characteristics.

1. Draftees did not do more than was clearly stated in orders. They were ordered to stay in the barracks when

they were off duty. But they often went too far away until the operative officer announced that "west from the bridge, north from the end of the path . . . is defined as "within the barracks.'" When the company added a new post, guards seldom bothered to keep civilians away from the post even though every military policeman knew that it was a big mistake. When the operative officer blamed them, they reported: "We didn't know we had to keep the civilians away. We didn't see it in the directives." Surely, these draftees knew that the post would be endangered if everybody could come close to it. But these draftees would not think of it for a minute. All leaders had been questioned, they all agreed that draftees would do no more than they required, and they felt that they had to give detailed directives if they expected draftees to do a good job. Hence, leaders pushed draftees to memorize pages of directives about their regular work, to guard posts, and even irregular assignments, e. g., to guard the president. Once in awhile, they announced a new directive if they found the old directives were not sufficient.

Moreover, the detailed directives included the levels of conformity to the orders, e. g., how clean a gun should be and how shining the bronze ornaments on the uniform should be. If a leader orders a draftee to clean a gun, the draftee will do it but will never do it perfectly. It seems that if a leader gives an order with five detailed directives, draftees will conform to the five directives! If ten directives, they will conform to ten.

Leaders always set the levels as high as possible. Thus, no matter how hard the draftees tried to achieve the required levels, they would be punished for some inevitable minor mistakes once in awhile. Therefore, draftees were constantly pushed to maintain a high level of efficiency and obedience. Without detailed directives, leaders were not able to force draftees to compliance to a high level.

2. The conformity of the results of the conformity have to be observable, in order that leaders can apply sanctions to support their orders. It was interesting that draftees called to guard a remote post, where it was hard for leaders to check as frequently as other posts, they "took a vacation." Officers also would never risk sending a draftee to perform any task alone outside the base--a draftee was always led by a squad leader or an officer. The company had well designed systems to detect deviance of a draftee's performance of tasks. Leaders often modified these detecting systems since draftees typically would violate certain rules which detecting systems could not cover. The warning system of guards was a counteraction to the detecting systems. This shows that draftees deviated if their deviance could not be observed.

3. To facilitate the application of punishment, leaders tended to maintain a distance from draftees. Usually squad leaders lived and worked together with draftees. A statement which all squad leaders agreed to was: "If you want

draftees to obey you, you have to maintain a distance from them. If you are too friendly to them, they will not be afraid of you and will not obey you." Officers, except reserve officers, also maintained their distinctions. It seems that leaders have difficulty in punishing their friends.

The ritualism was also a part of the leaders' efforts to maintain status. They wanted draftees to salute them and to say "report to the squad leader (or the operative officer)" before they could report anything. If a draftee forgot the salute or to say "report", he might be punished by being forced to practice the military ritual. Thus, draftees could not be friends with leaders.

Ritualism seems also to have a function in legitimizing leaders' roles. It constantly reminds draftees that leaders are assigned to be higher than they. A commander has said that the military rituals were designed to train subordinates to have the habits of obedience.

From these facts it appears that the hypothesis', compliance tends to vary according to the threat of punishment when official orders are frequently contrary to the values and needs of lower participants, is true only if the organization possesses the following conditions:

- (a) orders are clearly defined; they are clarified to the minute detail,
- (b) orders are of a nature that the conformity or the results of the conformity is observable, and
- (c) leaders must maintain a distance from their subordinates to avoid the difficulty of punishing friends.

These requirements are based upon the consistent opinions of all leaders, the author's observation on special events, and the summary of his long-time observations on task systems. Leaders' opinions could be biased to a certain extent, but their years of experience would not allow them to be far from reality--they have to be able to make draftees comply. The author's observations could be biased too, but the chances are small that he would overlook all the negative evidence throughout the eight months. Moreover, these requirements are logically consistent with the chief condition of the compliance of draftees, i. e., they would not conform if they do not feel the threat of punishment.

Voluntary Support from Draftees

As described in the last section, popular leaders did not increase the compliance of draftees. This seemed to be because content of leaders' orders was one of the main sources of their dissatisfactions. Also a leader who supported strict orders which were essential for the performance of the organization would lose his popularity.

Sixteen draftees were questioned in one single week concerning their ideal leaders: eleven of them liked to have leaders who understood their feelings and considered their needs; nine said that the leaders should speak briefly and to the point ("if a leader could explain an order in one minute, he should not spend two minutes"); seven of them said that they liked a leader to be democratic; four liked intelligent

leaders; four liked leaders willing to share the hardship with them; and four of them said a leader ought to be honest and fair to subordinates. Their ideal leaders seemed to correspond to their needs, to reduce their hardship in their everyday life.

To meet draftees' opinions, leaders in the Air Police company could hardly match the expectations without sacrificing the official purposes. Most leaders knew well that draftees' dissatisfactions were largely because their main task, to guard the posts, was boring, and the pages of detailed directives concerning different orders were just nuisances (about 70 per cent of draftees punished were for the mistakes they made in guarding the posts). Instead of considering draftees' needs, leaders had to force them to memorize and to conform to every detailed directive. If a guard failed to shine the bronze ornaments on his uniform, the Air Force Headquarters might complain.

Leaders also knew well that they should be brief. Every leader in the company had heard the jokes about talkative commanders. It seemed that leaders did not have enough time and energy to press bulks of necessary directives into short sentences before they had to announce them. More importantly, draftees' complaints about the talkative leaders might be simply that they were not interested in the content of orders announced.

They seemed to like the more democratic leaders, for

example, they once liked the two reserve officers. Was they did not like to support the democratic leaders' orders as shown in the higher deviance rate. Draftees seemed to like the democratic leaders because the leaders would not punish if they deviated from orders, or they believed that the democratic leaders allowed them to deviate. If the leaders who gave strict orders and strongly supported the orders, the leaders were not regarded as democratic since they interfered with draftees' interests. After the two reserve officers were forced to require draftees to do a good job and to punish the ones who deviated from orders, their popularity among the draftees dropped noticeably. As an informant said: "They (some draftees) said that officers were always officers (who considered only their own purposes, not ours)."

In short, what draftees were really interested in were leaders who would minimize their hardships. Intelligent leaders who would share subordinates' hardships might also tend to reduce draftees' hardships.

A leader can easily become popular if he can reduce the hardship of draftees. Six among the sixteen draftees questioned chose a certain squad leader as best fitting their expectations. But this squad leader was described by at least two officers as "being willing to fool around with other old sergeants rather than to lead his subordinates." He would not bother to watch what his subordinates were doing and was unlikely to restrict the activities of his subordinates. The

important fact was that his squad was often ranked at the bottom in performing tasks, in cleaning guns, and in everyday training. This squad leader was the only one being chosen by the sixteen draftees.

We have mentioned that no popular leader had been a successful leader in the company. It seems that the only way leaders could satisfy draftees was to avoid strict orders or to avoid forcing them to conform to strict orders. The two reserve officers who had tried to reduce the use of punishments are examples. The two best squads of the company were headed by two tyrannical squad leaders.

In short, the author did not find any evidence that draftees supported any strict order from any leader. The leaders who gave hard strict orders could not gratify draftees' needs of reducing hardships, so could not become popular. Leaders have to be able to gratify subordinates' needs if they expect voluntary support. But, if subordinates' needs are avoiding hard orders, the leader may have to sacrifice the purposes of the organization. This was the reason that most leaders in the company, who had the purpose of the organization in mind, were very much disliked by draftees. A successful democratic leader may be impossible in the company in which subordinates' dissatisfactions largely stem from the content of official orders.

This conclusion is drawn from data about all leaders of draftees. No negative evidence has been found in the company.

Officer--Old Sergeants Relationship

There was a tendency for officers to avoid punishing old sergeants and to tolerate old sergeants' deviance; old sergeants often gambled in their spare time; one or a few might shirk the weekly "Four Books" class; a group of three or four often left the barracks for a couple of hours in the evening if they thought the operative officer would not have jobs for them to do. All these actions violated official rules but they were seldom punished. They were punished only for more serious deviance, e. g., if one fought with another.

Officers' unwillingness to punish did not mean that they did not rely on the use of punishment to support their orders. Rather, they threatened old sergeants with punishment instead of actually applying the punishment. When an officer felt that old sergeants deviated so often that it would hurt the performance or the reputation of the company, he might announce in front of all enlisted men that he would punish the ones who deviated again. Usually, he did not mention the names of the old sergeants he was warning; he might not even specify that they were old sergeants who violated the rules. Or, an officer might call an old sergeant to his office and persuade him to behave himself. As a platoon leader once told a sergeant who forgot to check the posts one night: "You guys are just impossible. We all would have had trouble if something had happened on the posts. Maybe we all would be jailed. . . . Never forget (to check the posts) again! Don't be

lazy."

After being threatened or blamed by officers, old sergeants tended to act more properly for awhile. They would stay in the barracks in the evening, would be less likely to argue with the operative officer about their share of work, and, if they gambled, they would gamble quietly in a hidden place in the barracks.

In performing some important tasks, e. g., to guard the president or other VIP's, officers usually did not need to threaten old sergeants since they knew well that the disobedience would lead to severe punishment--a deviant might be jailed for years, or, if his deviance endangered the security of the president, he might be shot. Besides, old sergeants seemed to be willing to perform "important tasks," since it would make them feel that they were important too. Two old sergeants once felt very much disappointed because the operative officer assigned them to stay home while most others were sent to a remote military base to guard the president and other VIP's in a military operation.

In general, officers, (except one tyrannical commander who had commanded the company in the first three months of this study), were more humane, friendly, and democratic to old sergeants. Besides avoiding the use of punishment, they often showed their personal consideration for the old sergeants. They presented gifts on some special occasions, e. g., when one married sergeant had a new baby. They also seemed to be

willing to join old sergeants' billiard game or conversation (only the reserve officers often chatted with drafted).

The Threat of Punishment

The use of punishment was also an effective means of control in leading old sergeants. As described above, old sergeants would behave themselves after being warned or threatened by their officers. When a reserve officer first began to take charge of the operative office, old sergeants frequently disobeyed his orders if the orders were different from the traditions in the company, e. g., they disobeyed the order that no one was allowed to play billiards after 10 p.m. Many old sergeants did not even salute the officer. Finally, the reserve officer had to announce that three old sergeants who left the barracks without permission would be given (official) warnings (which would influence their promotion and increase of salary). He also announced that these three or any other who disobeyed any order again, would be sent to the military court immediately. As a result, all old sergeants began to salute and they would report to the officer before they left the barracks. This incident seemed to show that the use of punishment could also force old sergeants to compliance.

Most officers relied upon both the threat of punishment and voluntary support from old sergeants. Hence, it was hard to distinguish to what extent old sergeants' compliance was due to the threat of punishment. To study the leadership

of a disliked officer makes it easier to clarify the effects of punishment. There was a commander who frequently blamed old sergeants in the front of the row, and who was the only commander who ever gave (official warnings) and more serious punishment to old sergeants. The commander was disliked by old sergeants. At least nine old sergeants were observed to complain and to insult the commander in their conversations with other old sergeants and, with the author. As one complained in the author's bedroom:

He (the commander) is almost old enough to retire, but he is still a captain. So he would like to do everything he can to get himself promoted. He does not care so much what is our feeling. . . . He cares only for what he wishes . . . I believe no old sergeant would like him . . . He looks like a dog when he meets a high ranking officer (he toadies to the high rank).

Despite the negative attitudes toward him, the commander had controlled old sergeants in the first two months of this study. Never had any old sergeant dared to disobey openly. The commander watched old sergeants closely, so sergeants had few chances to shirk work. For example, the commander hung a notebook at each post. The sergeant who checked posts had to sign his name at each post. The commander walked around the base all day to check the notebooks to make sure that everybody was doing what he had ordered. Obviously, the commander made everybody work hard.

Other officers also threatened old sergeants once in awhile. If the threat of punishment was not an effective means, it would be impossible for an officer to use it.

But the use of punishment tended to make old sergeants lose face and evoked strong hostility. At least five old sergeants who had been punished continued to attack officers in different meetings and to disobey orders once in awhile. They seemed to be trying to regain their status in the informal group of sergeants; they boasted their "bravery" in attacking or disobeying officers among their fellow old sergeants. As a sergeant once boasted in a group including the author:

The commander wanted me to lead two draftees to guard the theater (in the base) last night. God damn! I just told him that it was not my turn to perform the irregular work. He shouted to me and I just shouted back. I told him that it was his order that we (old sergeants) took turns to perform the irregular work.

As discussed above, old sergeants were very sensitive to their status. If one was punished and yet did not show his resistance to the officer it might mean one's acceptance of his lower status. Sometimes his fellow old sergeants might belittle him. For example, two old sergeants broke their friendship because, according to an informant, one of them sneered at the other who had been scolded by the commander as "daring to be brave only when the commander was not present."

If an officer applied punishment extensively and caused the hostility of a large number of old sergeants, there might be a massive outburst of hostility. The tyrannical commander who had overruled old sergeants in the first two months of this study failed in the third month.

During a large scale operation of the company, his

"lack of considerations for subordinates" had intensified sergeants' hostility to an uncontrollable degree. In the briefing after the operation, at least eighteen old sergeants did directly attack the commander's mishandling of them and they seemed to have become very excited. As one attacked in the briefing: "There was no reason for us to stand on posts for nine hours; four hours should have been enough. Our commander never knew that we were human beings. He just treated us like stone pillars; put us on the posts and forgot us." More important, old sergeants began to violate rules and disobey orders more often though they were punished more frequently. Whenever there was a chance, they would try to attack or to insult the commander (and even other officers). As in an "honor and solidarity meeting," old sergeants (and a few draftees) elected the commander to help in the kitchen in preparing for the New Year's banquet.

Why could officers always control draftees by using punishment but they could not control the old sergeants? The most important reason might be that the officers lacked means of creating an ultimate threat which old sergeants dared not face. To threaten a draftee to prolong his service for one year, would be an ultimate threat which the draftee, by all means, wanted to avoid. Thus, officers could always increase the punishment until a draftee must obey absolutely. Many draftees thought that to disobey a leader was stupid because they would be punished and, finally, they had to conform in

any case. This was also the reason that best friends persuaded one another to conform. To old sergeants, even five years in jail might be less a deprivation since they could not possibly have a good future. Old sergeants felt that they had little to lose. As one old sergeant complained about the tyrannical commander in a group of four:

He (the commander) is just a syncephant (translated according to the meaning). He knows only to toady to the high ranks. He just wants to get ahead by stepping on our heads. He threatened to jail us, but he forgot that we weren't really afraid of being jailed. God damn, to live in jail would be little worse than to live here. After five years in jail, maybe we will lead a life exactly the same as what other brothers will lead (because no other could improve his life so much in the five years).

Married old sergeants obviously had more social ties. Therefore, they were more afraid of being severely punished as this would mean a deprivation to their families also, e. g., the possible reduction of their already insufficient income or the loss of the chance to visit their families once or twice every month. On the other hand, a single man said: "We do not have to be afraid of him. . . . To live in jail is not too much worse than to live here." This old sergeant did not really believe that to live in jail was much worse than to live in the company, but his statement, at least, indicated that he would be less afraid of being jailed than married ones. At least three other single men had the similar expressions when they were angry, but none of the married ones did. The single men were obviously more hostile than married ones though the official diary recorded only a few old sergeants

being punished. This is not sufficient for a comparison between the deviant rate of single men and of married ones since officers threatened old sergeants more than they punished them. In the last months of this study, only four old sergeants were punished, and they were all single men.

Data seems to support the hypothesis that compliance varies according to the threat of punishment. But the threat of punishment was not sufficient if leaders could not create an ultimate threat that subordinates want to avoid in any situation. Old sergeants, especially the single men, were people who had little to lose. Leaders might also have to be able to minimize the hostility of subordinates toward them and/or to minimize the dissatisfactions of subordinates with the organization as a whole. Thus, the success of a leader seemed to depend on his ability to maximize the threat on the one hand, and to minimize the hostility on the other.

Data also suggested that the same punishment may not mean the same amount of threat to everybody. An example was that some single men who seldom bothered to leave the barracks on their day off might not be very much afraid of the loss of days off. Therefore, "the threat of punishment" may be a more suitable term than "punishment" in the study of "compliance."

Old sergeants' norm of seeking for status seemed to have been one of the causes for their disobeying orders. Their feelings of loss of face may intensify their dissatisfactions with leaders as seen in the fact that old sergeants

who were punished tended to attack officers, and those, however, in their informal group. It was also discussed in the study of the informal group of all old sergeants.

Voluntary Support from Subordinates

In studying the compliance of draftees, it was found that a leader might not be able to evoke lower participants' voluntary compliance with orders if orders were frequently contrary to their needs. A leader's popularity seemed to increase old sergeants' voluntary compliance with his orders since the sources of their dissatisfactions were mainly the low pay, the low status, and the marriage problem, not their everyday work or the content of the orders. Moreover, a leader might maintain his popularity for a long time if he did not have to give too many orders which were highly contrary to old sergeants' needs.

A reserve officer was often embarrassed by some sergeants who frequently disobeyed his orders (even the orders which were not disagreeable to them at all). After he gained popularity among enlisted men (being elected by old sergeants and draftees as the chairman of a monthly "honor and solidarity meeting"), he felt no difficulty in gaining support for new orders or even the strict orders he issued; he still threatened old sergeants to conform, but he did not seem to have aroused observable hostility toward himself. As an old sergeant wrote in his diary: "Our reserve officer is young, capable, but hot tempered. However, his hot temper does not

make us sick. He is pleasant most of the time."

One of the three commanders who had command of the company (in succession) in the eight months of this study was a well-liked and well-respected leader of old sergeants. Sergeants compared him with other commanders in the past few years and praised him very much. As one said when chatting with a few others: "Commander Mo (the well-liked one) never liked him (another commander). Commander Mo was always reasonable to us. . . . Sure, commander Mo was better than any other commander we had in recent years." As observed, never had any old sergeant openly disobeyed his orders. He did give strict orders and he did threaten to punish many old sergeants who violated rules, but it seemed that no one had ever become hostile toward him.

On the other hand, the disliked commander had met the strong resistance by old sergeants as we have discussed. However, relying only on the voluntary support seemed to be insufficient since there were still many orders which old sergeants tended to violate. Therefore, even the well-liked commander had to threaten old sergeants with punishment frequently. They were highly dissatisfied soldiers. It is doubtful that any officer could gratify their needs and make them support the officer 100 per cent. At least, no officer in the company had gained such support that he did not need to threaten the old sergeants with punishment.

Comparing old sergeants with draftees, we may say that

it would be hard, or impossible, for leaders to acquire sufficient voluntary support from dissatisfied soldiers. Moreover, as seen in the study of draftees, leaders would find it more difficult to get support from their subordinates if they had to give disagreeable orders frequently.

As described in the study of draftees, leaders could not gain voluntary support because leaders could not give easy orders to gratify draftees' needs. In the case of old sergeants, officers' success in gaining voluntary support (informal leadership) also depended very much on their ability to gratify old sergeants' needs. The need of old sergeants which an officer could gratify was the need for status. The well-liked commander seemed to be well integrated into the group of old sergeants. He played games and chatted with old sergeants very frequently and even gambled with old sergeants. By closely associating with old sergeants, the commander seemed to have made old sergeants feel a gain of higher status. As one praised the commander: "Commander Ho treated us like brothers. God Damn! the old woman (another commander) acted like a general." They seemed particularly to like to be brothers of the officer rather than to be subordinates, while draftees didn't care so much whether a leader treated them like brothers--they needed easy orders. A draftee once said that draftees felt:

Officers usually were not very honest. They always said that they would be considerate of subordinates, but they did not really do so. They just pushed us to work as hard as possible no matter whether we could stand it or

not. Even their smiling faces were pretended. The informant added: I agreed that we draftees were interested only in less work and in getting more leisure time. (tape)

The well-liked commander also tended to avoid making sergeants feel a loss of face; he had never really punished any old sergeant. Though he did threaten old sergeants frequently, he seldom threatened them in front of all personnel. He might call a sergeant to his office and tell him: "What were you doing? I will punish you next time. You guys just don't look like soldiers. O. K., don't bother me again." Then, he might let the sergeant go.

Moreover, the commander seldom showed his intention to impress the higher command. His lack of motives to go ahead was regarded by old sergeants as a virtue since an officer's promotion might also remain their problem of permanent low status. Old sergeants frequently belittled the ones who tried to impress the higher command and praised the ones who did not. When they criticized an officer, they often mentioned that the officer tried to impress the higher command. On the other hand, three draftees reported that draftees simply did not pay attention to an officers' promotion at all.

In short, the commander's actions seemed to be well congruent with old sergeants' needs. Other officers, except the disliked commander, also followed this pattern to a less extent. All officers in the company had been closely observed since the author and other officers more or less belonged to the same informal group. The author feels that we can treat

the well-liked commander and the disliked commander as two extreme cases, and all other officers fall in between if we are talking about their patterns of leadership activities. The two platoon leaders and the other reserve officer also agreed with the author's description. As a platoon leader said: "We all old soldiers. What we have learned are similar things. Some may have strange personality, but, in leading soldiers, we act in similar ways." As another platoon leader described when discussed with the author and another reserve officer:

. . . Well, we all have tried to make friends with old sergeants; we all presented gifts to the ones who had new babies; we all played billiards with these guys; we all chatted with them. We all know that these old guys are afraid of losing face, so we don't want to punish them. . . . But I don't like to fool around with old sergeants as much as you do.

Moreover, other officers tended to gain less support from old sergeants than the well-liked commander; they had to threaten old sergeants more often to support their orders.

Data seemed to support the hypothesis that the voluntary compliance of subordinates tends to vary according to the leader's ability to gratify subordinates' needs. Subordinates' needs may vary from group to group, but the different needs could be stated as "the needs for solving their common problems and difficulties," status for old sergeants and easy orders for draftees.

Comparing old sergeants and draftees, we can distinguish two types of dissatisfied soldiers: soldiers

dissatisfied largely with the content of official orders and soldiers dissatisfied mainly because of some reasons other than the content of orders. In leading the first type of dissatisfied lower participants, leaders may not be able to gain the voluntary support without sacrificing the purposes of the organization. Draftees did not show their unwillingness to support the purposes of the organization, but they were unwilling to conform to the orders which were essential to achieving the purposes of the organization. Organizational goals seemed to be remote from the problems of voluntary compliance. In leading the second type of dissatisfied soldiers, leaders may gain the voluntary support without sacrificing the organizational goals; leaders may gratify soldiers' needs and evoke voluntary compliance with their orders.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Findings

We studied a military structure which was characterized by a rigid and severe system of rule enforcement and by a high degree of dissatisfaction on the part of the lower echelon of its membership. On the groups we are dealing with the dissatisfaction was high for both the inductees, who had a short-term commitment to the military, and the old sergeants who had a long-term career commitment.

In this exploratory study in which we were seeking to derive both hypotheses for relating the phenomena we observed and a conceptual framework for its interpretation. Several findings seemed challenging to the existing body of organizational theory. We found:

1. In large organizational groupings (thirty or more) compliance varied inversely with the strength of group cohesion.
2. In small primary or "buddy" groups compliance varied directly with the strength of group cohesion.
3. The incidence of strong primary group formation was far greater among the inductees (2/3 belonged to primary

groups within the organization) than among the old sergeants (only 1/4 belonged to primary groups within the organization). Our interpretation will deal with the conditions under which strong primary group relations are formed in an organization of this character, and the relationship between compliance and strength of group cohesion as it is modified by the size and type of group in which it is observed.

Formation of Primary Groups

Draftees were young boys (twenty to twenty-two years of age) who joined the army for the first time. They felt constantly under the stress of rigid military discipline, and they needed the help and personal consideration from others in adjusting to the hostile environment, the military organization. Therefore, most of them participated in primary groups in which they offered one another help and consideration.

All old sergeants had been in the military for more than ten years. They were well adjusted in the organization, and they needed leisure companionship rather than personal consideration. Therefore, a few of them participated in highly cohesive primary groups though most of them (old timers) were friends.

Compliance and Group Cohesion

Two reasons explained the relation that compliance varied directly with the cohesion of the small primary group:

1. Buddies had strong emotional attachments to one another. They hesitated to see one another being

severely punished, tended to persuade one another to conform, and even willingly shared the punishment with buddies who were being punished, and

2. Primary groups tended to increase deviants' emotional stability. Members of the groups were better able to control their emotions and less likely to risk disconfirming.

Three reasons explained the relation that compliance varied inversely with the cohesion of large organizational groupings:

1. The unity of a large group tended to facilitate the communication of grievances which might lead to massive deviance. Yet members of a large group could not develop strong emotional attachments which might make them hesitate to see one another being severely punished;
2. Punishment was less a threat to a large group, for example, officers could not severely punish eight guards at the same time if guards deviated collectively. They also felt better if being punished together than alone; and
3. The large group had more chances to help one another to shirk work.

In the study of leadership, we found that the threat of punishments and the gratification of inductees' needs were the factors which tended to evoke compliance:

1. Mechanical compliance varied accordingly with the threat of punishment. This relation was true only if leaders had:
 - a. Clarified his orders to the minute detail since subordinates would not do more than the leader had specified;
 - b. Designed his orders so that conformity or the results of the conformity was observable. This was necessary for the application of punishments; and
 - c. Maintained social distance from their subordinates to avoid the difficulty of punishing friends.
2. The gratification of subordinates' needs directly related to voluntary compliance. Officers could not evoke the voluntary compliance of draftees because officers had to give hard orders which were contrary to draftees' needs, reducing hardships. On the other hand, officers could gratify old sergeants' needs for status without avoiding hard orders. Officers could evoke the voluntary compliance of old sergeants, not draftees.

Discussion

The Study of Informal Groupings in an Organization

We found in the Air Police company that a large informal group and smaller groups within the large group have contrary consequences on the compliance; the unity of the large

group reduced the compliance while the smaller groups within it increased the compliance. None of the reviewed literature has paid due attention to the phenomenon of the unity of large informal grouping. We would assume that the unity of large informal grouping may be a spurious factor in the relation between small primary groups and compliance.

The Study of Leadership

This study may have provided sufficient knowledge to settle the controversy between students of authoritarian leadership and democratic leadership. By applying the generalizations made in this study, seemingly inconsistent findings in reviewed literature might be explained. Here are some examples.

1. In a relocation camp,¹ democratic practices could not evoke voluntary compliance of lower participants because such practices failed to gratify the needs of highly alienated lower participants. Leaders, for example, could not agree with lower participants' preferred objective and send them back to their homes. On the other hand, leaders are required to force lower participants to do simple work. Hence leaders have no difficulty to clarify their orders. The conformity and the results of conformity of lower participants are also highly observable, so leaders can apply sanctions to support their orders. The leaders also had no difficulty applying severe punishment repeatedly and creating an ultimate threat

¹List study.

over lower participants. Therefore, the use of punishment is the only effective means for leaders in the relocation camps.

2. In an insurance company, a supervisor who could create only a limited threat over the agents under him. The conformity of agents was not highly observable. Hence the supervisor cannot be authoritarian in leading his agents. On the other hand, agents have a desire to do the work in their own way. The supervisor can gratify their needs by allowing them to do the work according to their wishes. Therefore, the democratic supervisor tends to increase the productivities because he has gratified the agents' needs (providing the agents' desire to do a good job).

3. In the American Navy, a captain has highly routinized task structures, so the conformity of his crew is highly observable. The captain has no difficulty to detect deviance and he has the ability to apply strong sanctions. Therefore, he can be authoritarian in commanding his battleship. His ritualism also facilitates the application of sanctions and the legitimation of application of sanctions. On the other hand, the captain can hardly gratify the needs of his isolated crew.

These examples may have demonstrated that the effects of leadership on compliance can be understood by analyzing the two factors, the threat of punishment and the gratification of subordinates' needs.

To What Extent High The Air Police
Company Represent Other Tactic Units
of the Chinese Army?

Since this is the only sociological study which has ever been conducted in the Nationalist Chinese Army, it is worthwhile to estimate the extent that this Air Police Company may represent other tactic units of the Chinese army. The author has discussed some problems found in the Air Police Company with at least eighteen officers² who have recently served in different company-level units, ranging from a battal-ship to an infantry company. They generally agreed that the description of the compliance of draftees and old sergeants in this study was rather close to the situation in their own units.

They agreed that draftees were typically dissatisfied with their work and their service in general, but officers had no difficulty in overruling draftees by applying punishments. All officers being questioned agreed that draftees would not risk disobeying officers because these officers could threaten them by delaying their discharge from the army which draftees would, by all means, avoid. The function of primary groups among draftees had also been perceived by a few officers. Three officers had reported that draftees who had some intimate friends seemed to be "more docile." Most of the others had not paid attention to the friendships among draftees.

²Four reserve officers had been interviewed at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas.

All officers agreed that old sergeants were highly dissatisfied. The major sources of their dissatisfactions were their low pay, low status, and marriage problem.³ Officers also reported a strong tendency of old sergeants to disobey officers.

Officers typically complained of the existence of the unity among a large number of old sergeants. In one infantry company, the group of more than twenty sergeants struck to force the commander to grant more privileges to them. Officers of this unit gave the informal leader of the group of old sergeants a nickname, "the Vice-Company-Commander."

Obviously, the alienation of old sergeants is a serious problem in the Chinese army. Fourteen out of eighteen officers voluntarily stated their difficulties in leading old sergeants. The top Military Police officers also had stated in the front of hundreds of lower rank officers (and reserve officers) at the Military Police Training School: "If you can be successful in commanding old sergeants, you are a successful officer." The dissatisfied draftees were not a problem to officers, since officers could always overrule draftees.

However, we should not exaggerate the problems in the Chinese army. Officers also reported that their units could

³In one infantry company, none of the old sergeants were married. Their needs for wives could be seen in the stories that many of them fall in love with prostitutes--an unusual phenomenon in Chinese society.

maintain the required level of efficiency.⁴ More important, the descriptions in this study seems to be close to only the peacetime army. Six officers who were stationed at Kinmen Island, the front line of the Chinese army, typically reported the high morale of old sergeants. It seems that the low pay, marriage, and low status, were less a problem when they were confronting enemy and when they were stationed at a place remote from the prosperous civilian society. Old sergeants were unlikely to disobey on the front line because they were not highly dissatisfied.

In general, we may have a feeling that the army may need to increase the salary of the soldiers to ease their dissatisfactions since many of the soldiers are stationed in the prosperous island of Taiwan. The army is believed to be efficient which was proven in the defensive war of the Kinmen island a few years ago; but it would be much better if officers did not spend so much of their energy in dealing with their dissatisfied subordinates when a unit is preparing for the battle in the rare.

Compliance and Organizational Effectiveness

In the Air Police Company, organizational effectiveness seemed to be highly correlated with the compliance of the lower participants, all other factors being equal. However,

⁴They could always fulfill the requirements from their higher command.

we had not collected sufficient data to suggest a precise relation between organizational effectiveness and compliance. Further study of this relation may be recommended.

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A STUDY OF A NATIONALIST CHINESE AIR POLICE COMPANY:
LEADERSHIP AND PRIMARY GROUPS

by

WEN-LUNG CHANG

B. A., National Taiwan University, 1964

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ART

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1968

This is an exploratory study of a Chinese Air Police Company. The company was characterized by a rigid and severe system of rule enforcement and by a high degree of dissatisfaction on the part of the lower echelons of its membership. One of the foci of this study was to inquire into the effects of leadership and primary or "buddy" groups on the performance of the company. We were seeking to derive both hypotheses for relating the phenomena we observed and a conceptual framework for its interpretation. We found in our study of buddy groups in the company:

1. The incidence of strong buddy group formation was far greater among the inductees ($2/3$ belonged to primary groups within the organization) than among the professional sergeants (only $1/4$ belonged to primary groups within the organization).

Draftees were young boys (twenty to twenty-two years of age) who joined the army for the first time. They felt constantly under the stress of rigid military discipline, and they needed help and personal consideration from others in adjusting to the hostile environment, the military organization. Therefore, most of them participated in buddy groups in which they offered one another help and consideration.

All old sergeants had been in the military for more than ten years. They were well adjusted in the organization, and they needed only the leisure companionship rather than personal consideration. Therefore, only a few of them participated in highly cohesive buddy groups though most of them

were friends and old-timers to see another.

2. In small buddy groups compliance varied directly with the strength of group cohesion. Two reasons explained this relation:

- a. Buddies had strong emotional attachments to one another, so they hesitated to see one another being severely punished and tended to persuade one another to conform, and
- b. Buddy groups tended to increase drafted's' emotional stability. Members of the groups might be better able to control their emotions and less likely to risk disconforming.

3. In large organizational groupings (thirty or more) compliance varied inversely with the strength of group cohesion. Three reasons explained this relation:

- a. Members of a large group could not develop strong emotional attachments which might make them hesitate to see one another being severely punished. Yet the unity of the large group tended to facilitate the communication of grievance which may lead to massive deviance;
- b. Punishment was less a threat to a large group. For example, officers could not punish severely all guards at the same time if guards deviated collectively. Guards also felt better if being punished together than alone, and

- c. The large group has more chances to help one another to shirk work.

In our study of leadership, we found that the threat of punishment and the gratification of inductees' needs were two factors which tended to evoke compliance:

1. Mechanical compliance varied according with the threat of punishment. But this relation was true only if leaders had:

- a. His orders clarified to the minute detail since inductees would not do more than what leaders had specified;
- b. His orders designed in the ways that the conformity or the results of the conformity was observable. This was necessary for the application of punishments, and
- c. To maintain a social distance from their subordinates to avoid the difficulty of punishing friends.

2. The gratification of subordinates' needs directly related to voluntary compliance. In most occasions, officers in the Air Police Company could evoke little voluntary compliance either because they had little sources to gratify inductees' needs or because they could not gratify inductees' needs without avoiding hard orders.