THE FALL OF JOSEPH MCCARTHY, 1953-1954
A DESCRIPTIVE AND THEORETICAL ACCOUNT

by

PETER GREENFIELD COCKS
B. A., Dublin University, 1963

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Approved by:

Louis H. Douglas
Major Professor
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. FORESIGHT IN POLITICS AND THE CASE OF JOSEPH MCCARTHY</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problems of Foresight and Values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the Emergence of Another McCarthy Probable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. MCCARTHY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Historical Pattern of American Demagoguery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergence from the Historical Pattern—McCarthy's Uniqueness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. MCCARTHY'S SOURCES OF SUPPORT</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Era of Increased Conservatism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological and Sociological Foundations of Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A The Problems of Alienation and Status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B The Problems of Authoritarianism and Paranois With Reference to Conservatism</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Anti-Intellectualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) McCarthy and the &quot;Authoritarian Personality&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) The Question of Paranoia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. EISENHOWER AND MCCARTHY</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower--Political Background and Concept of the Presidency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Explanation of Eisenhower's Inaction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. MCCARTHY AND CONGRESS</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCarthy in the 83rd. Congress, First Session</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army-McCarthy Hearings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Censure Debate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VI. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS</strong></td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conceptual Framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A The Problem Stated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B The Significant Event and the Decision-Maker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCarthy and his Political Environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Events of Secondary Significance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Events of Tertiary Significance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VII. CONCLUSION</strong></td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY</strong></td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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My two years at Kansas State University mark my initiation in the study of American politics. There are many persons who contributed, knowingly and not quite so knowingly, to my studies. Of all the debts which I owe, I would like to single out Professor Louis H. Douglas for such repayment as I can offer. He ungrudgingly gave me his time and stimulated my thought on American politics, which led to the writing of this thesis.
Foresight in Politics and the Case of Joseph McCarthy

Senator Joseph McCarthy was amongst the most colorful and, perhaps, potentially dangerous political figures ever to have emerged in the United States. Surprisingly little purely scholastic work has been done concerning this controversial figure. It is our aim to deal with a limited aspect of l'affaire McCarthy for a relatively limited end. Namely, it is our intention to deal with the final demise of McCarthy and to discern the reasons for this demise. If, as we hope, it is possible to establish that a major threat to the American political system, in the person of McCarthy, was dealt with too late and too softly, there arises the question of how the situation could have been better handled. We are thus brought to the question of providing some possible guidelines for the future handling of a nouveau demagogue in the McCarthy style. There are, of course, a number of questions implicitly involved here which must be answered. Two are of particular relevance to us at this stage. First, is attempting to foresee and deal with future occurrences a legitimate function of political scientists? Second, can we be at all certain that another McCarthy type figure will arise in the United States? If the second occurrence is improbable, then obviously the relevance of the first question, in this instance, is, at the most, extremely limited. Thus, at this stage, these two problems must be clarified and a solution postulated.
I. The Problems of Foresight and Values

Unless one takes a totally deterministic view of political life, it would seem that the future is not ineluctably predestined. Further, if this is the case, and we take a voluntaristic approach to the process of change in our environment, then we must assume at least a limited ability to foresee, and consequently deal with, future events. In democratic societies the belief that we can change our systems for better or for worse is widely accepted. The very fact that in the main we reject Marxist economic determinism is indicative of our own attitudes to change in the world. Once this facet of democratic thought is established, we have by no means reached a conclusion, since arising from this proposition there is a question of whether we can effectually foresee future events and thus adapt our society in the light of them. The political scientist, in using historical knowledge, hopes to establish some framework for future action.

Historical knowledge is a technique of the first order to preserve and continue a civilization already advanced. Not that it affords positive solutions to the new aspect of vital conditions -- life is always different from what it was -- but that it prevents us committing the ingenuous mistakes of other times. But if, in addition to being old and, therefore, beginning to find life difficult, you have lost the memory of the past, and do not profit by experience, then everything turns to disadvantage.¹

The fact that McCarthy is dead does not mean that the possibility for the emergence of another such demagogue is a mere chimera; as we shall see later in the chapter, the objective conditions for the rise of a new "McCarthy" are by no means lacking.

Because the future is never stable, because there are inevitably unforeseen events which obstruct our vision of it, the suggestion that we can in a real sense predict it has been frequently brushed aside as wishful thinking.

To some extent, of course, man has always predicted the future, but there are, at bottom, two types of prediction. First, there is what we may call utopian-universal prediction. This is the type of foresight which enables its author to see the future in some sort of millenial view through a mechanism of "absolute rationality". This is a point of view which has been widely associated with the work of such political theorists as Rousseau, Babeuf, Hegel, Marx and others, who, while themselves not necessarily committed to the idea of totalitarianism, did much to help establish it. Second, there is what we may characterize as limited pragmatic prediction. This type of prediction is concerned with limiting its scope to an area where sufficient relevant data may be gathered to enable the investigator to predict the future with some degree of confidence. This does not mean that the political scientist is attempting to be omniscient. Bertrand de Jouvenal has written,

Foresight is an expertise required in the political scientist. . . . Need I stress that expertise does not mean infallibility? A political scientist will often misread the course of events or miscalculate the consequences of a decision, but the frequency of his successful forecasts should be higher than that of the average politician or lay citizen; this is not a great deal to ask, and whoever denies that it can be achieved, thereby denies any practical value to political research.

De Jouvenal sees the political scientist as necessarily an expert in the field of foresight; he should be able to foresee trouble to come; to obtain foresight, political behavior must be studied; the political forecaster must

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3Ibid. p. 32.

4Ibid. p. 33.
gueaa how people will come to feel; lastly, "the political scientist should foretell the adjustments suitable to improve the adequacy of the institutional system to cope with changing circumstances." As far as this author is concerned, the final point made above is the most important, since it is, in the final analysis, the objective of this thesis to study the fall of Joseph McCarthy with the objective in mind of how better to deal with McCarthy types in the future. There are, of course, many difficulties involved here which should not be brushed over too lightly.

Prediction . . . involves the selection of past experiences which seem relevant to the developing sequence of events . . . . Successful prediction would thus be contingent on the reliability of significances assigned to the world and on the ability to select from these significances those relevant to what has not yet occurred.

Further,

. . . a prediction is, in a sense, always a guess . . . . Successful prediction also depends on an ability to anticipate novelty and to not assume permanence or undistorted sequences. Being bound by the past will stand in the way of realistic anticipation of the future.

There are, perhaps, more important difficulties involved, difficulties of which we are aware, and which we are hoping to avoid. The most important of these possible pitfalls is that "predictions often have a wish-fulfilling character which has been repeatedly established from public opinion data." Academics tend to think that laymen are much more prone to this type of wishfulfillment than they themselves are. For this reason, this author takes special note of

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1Ibid. p. 37.
2Ibid. p. 38.
4Ibid. p. 62.
the comment of Douglas McGregor on this point.

It is commonly believed that the predictions of the laymen are largely determined by wishful thinking, and that scientists and sophisticated academicians are somehow immune to this influence. The data of the present study indicate that both of these suppositions may be in error.¹

Certain values have to be accepted in assessing dangers to democratic forms of government. We trust that we may be value free in our analysis apart from condoning certain basic values largely acceptable to the majority of democratic people. The type of basic value judgement which will be subsumed in this study will be, for example, that individuals should effectively control those by whom they are ruled. We are aware that this is by no means an easy task, but we believe with Christian Bay that "politics" should refer to power, but the term should also refer to some conception of human welfare or the public good."²

Henry Steele Commager has said,

the case for freedom—especially the case for freedom of dissent and for heterodoxy—rests not only on the familiar and fundamental arguments of constitutional and natural rights, but on one other that is equally persuasive, and that seems to me conclusive. That is the argument of the pragmatic necessity for freedom.³

We intend to show that the methods which were used to bring about the downfall of Joseph McCarthy were, in their lateness and inadequacy, in danger, by inference, of destroying freedom in any meaningful sense of the word, particularly in the sense put forward by Commager above. Since freedom as defined by


Commager is a pillar of the democratic form of government in the United States, then McCarthy can be viewed as a grave threat to this system. The fact that we esteem freedom on its pragmatic grounds is, in a sense, a value judgement. If McCarthy put in operation a tendency to destroy this concept of freedom, and, further, if the Congress faltered in its duty to effectively deal with this threat, then it may be in order to suggest a more efficient framework for dealing with such a political phenomenon as McCarthy. Again, we are very much aware of the difficulties endemic in model building. As Hans Toch has said, "Caution seems to be positively correlated with accuracy in the prediction of future events."¹ In addition, Toch has pointed out that where there is caution, people tend to make more than one prediction, or set of causes which might produce a number of effects.² Thus there is no one answer, and certainly no simple answer to political problems. The political scientist who prescribes machinery to cope with future events must bear in mind that his prescription is of little value if it is not accepted by the politicians themselves, or at least seriously studied by them. Value judgements are, then, inherent in any political schemata, whether made implicit or explicit. It is not our concern to proceed on an extensive discussion of the normative content of political science. It is, rather, our intention to take a stand with those political scientists who believe that,

Even the most democratic governments are likely to come to a bad end--to say nothing of the individuals living under them--unless they learn to become at least as responsive to the basic needs of all their citizens as they are to the most insistent wants of the various articulate and influential interest groups and parties.³

¹Hans H. Toch, loc. cit., p. 65.
²Ibid, p. 65.
³Christian Bay, loc. cit., p. 50.
Political ideas, however, are not by any means eternal truths. As Alfred Cobban has written, "The view that our cherished political ideas may be capable of dying will naturally meet with opposition, yet there is nothing impossible in such a development."

It is the nature of prescription to make at least some basic value commitments. It must be borne in mind, however, that what ought to be must not be allowed to exclude what is. But, again, there is even a danger in stressing what is, lest we return to Hegelian concepts of what is ought to be. We have every intention of rejecting this latter hypothesis, while attempting not to fall into the error of stressing the normative nature inherent in prevision and prescription in political life. We should make explicit the fact that we believe that if we can, to some extent, predict events, then we should act upon such predictions.

II. Is the Emergence of Another "McCarthy" Probable?

Assuming that we can to some extent predict the future, then we must apply this theory to our particular problem. We are frequently, and often incorrectly, told that history repeats itself. This naive belief cannot be sufficient justification for carrying out a study of McCarthy's fall. What has to be established is that there are certain significances in the McCarthy affair which would lead us to conclude that a similar event might happen in the future. In a broader sense, we may look at some currents of post-World War II United States history and try to establish that some of the characteristics of this period may be indicative of a probable repeat of the McCarthy phenomenon in national political life.

Few would question the proposition that we are now in not only a quantitatively different age than any previous epoch in history. Further we believe that it has become an age which differs qualitatively from any previous period. The reason for this is fundamentally simple; warfare as it may happen between the two super powers of the world, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., would be of such a nature as to perhaps destroy a major part of the civilized world. Moreover, the speed with which such a war could start bears absolutely no resemblance to those of the more limited types of the past. Nuclear capacities have speeded up the processes by which we may destroy or be destroyed—men and materiel no longer have to be moved before battle ensues. This situation has led these two countries into a position of mutual readiness and suspicion, into a period which we call the Cold War. What we are concerned to show is that the nature of this hostility is liable to have important repercussions on the domestic front, particularly in an open society like the United States. "... the threats to individual freedom in an emerging state of chronic mobilization are recognized as impelling some of the deepest traditions of the American body politic."¹ When a country becomes security-conscious in peacetime, as the United States has, there is an inherent possibility of a clash between what are regarded as democratic ideals and what is necessary for national security, frequently postulated in terms of loyalty. Robert E. Cushman has stated, "On the debit side of the national civil liberty ledger one must list a number of familiar and persistent denials of civil liberty, together with a number of new threats and dangers which have arisen out of the Cold War and our almost pathological fear of Communism." Of these threats "the most serious ... stem

from our nationwide and rapidly accelerating drive against Communism and other forms of disloyalty and subversion."\(^1\) In addition Cushman has said, "American public opinion has become diseased with regard to the whole problem presented by communism and disloyalty."\(^2\) Admittedly this was written in 1951, but there are many indications that the position has not changed substantially since this time. It was in this atmosphere that McCarthy thrived. Now, if it is true that the persistence of a "garrison state"\(^3\) is well established, whether as a result of the hostility of Russia or China, or of both, to the United States, then the likelihood of another McCarthy phenomenon arising is, to say the least a strong likelihood.

There are, it would seem, good grounds for supposing that the environment which gave rise to McCarthy's antics is not lacking at the present time, nor, as long as the Cold War persists, will it cease to exist.

In a future fraught with complex social, economic, and diplomatic dilemmas, future demagogues will probably find more untapped areas of ignorance, prejudice, bigotry, and emotionalism to exploit. With television and other new means of mass communication, their voices and their faces may invade any home in the United States and many abroad. Such professional 'men of the people' accordingly present a persistent problem which this and future generations of Americans and peoples of other lands will be forced to face.\(^4\)

Thus, there would seem to be good reason to try to interpret the Wisconsin Senator's fall in the hope that we may learn something for the future. It is

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\(^1\)Robert E. Cushman, "American Civil Liberties in Mid-Twentieth Century", \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 2-3.

\(^2\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 7.

\(^3\)For an exposition of this concept see Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State", \textit{American Journal of Sociology}, Vol. XLVI, (Jan., 1941), pp. 455-468.

\(^4\)Reinhard E. Luthin, \textit{American Demagogues Twentieth Century}, (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959.), pp. ix-x.
our intention, therefore, to investigate the end of his political career, and, more particularly his relations with the executive and the legislature, with a view to providing a framework for dealing with future McCarthy types. Some space will be devoted to fitting McCarthy into the context of demagoguery in America in the twentieth century, but the bulk of the study will concern his actions vis-a-vis the two branches of government mentioned above. This will, inevitably involve some investigation of the nature and composition of Congress in the early 1950's and a discussion of the moves that were made by Congress to curb McCarthy. The role that President Eisenhower played must also be studied; as the leader of the nation in the period of McCarthy's heyday and fall, his attitudes toward McCarthy were of importance in molding public and administration opinions. These historical studies, it must be remembered, are only our concern in that we hope to be able to assign various significances to some of their aspects in order to prescribe some future possible course, or alternative course, of action in dealing with future McCarthy types.
CHAPTER II

McCarthy in Historical Perspective

We must now attempt to place Joseph McCarthy in some meaningful historical context. It will be our purpose in this chapter to try to establish some reasons for bearing out an argument which sees McCarthy within a historical continuum, but which at the same time sees him as a departure from pre-existent patterns. As far as this study is concerned there is no intention of going beyond the experience of the twentieth century. It is in this century, we believe, that the important events have taken place which are relevant to the case of Senator McCarthy. More particularly must we look at the precedent of one person, namely Huey Long, the "Kingfish" of Louisiana. He is deserving of study in connection with the McCarthy phenomenon mainly because he was the only previous American demagogue who built up any sort of substantial national following. Long, of course, was assassinated before he could make an effective national political challenge, so that much that might have been instructive for us never occurred. Some may object that we should include William Jennings Bryan among the nationally based demagogues. There is without doubt, some validity in this claim. We would wish however to take a somewhat narrower meaning of the word demagogue so that we may imply a body of men of whom McCarthy is but one example. This may seem somewhat arbitrary, but, as T. D. Weldon has said,

the search for the true or correct meaning or use of words and sentences is a wild goose chase . . . . There are indeed no fixed immutable or essential meanings or concepts, but for all that verbal usage at any given time and for any given society is fairly stable and is not subject to the arbitrary whims of individuals.¹

In using a rather narrow meaning of the word demagogue, we do not feel that we are stepping outside the bounds of Mr. Weldon's framework. We believe, therefore, that we may, without too much equivocation, use the following definition: A demagogue

is a politician skilled in oratory, flattery, and invective; evasive in discussing vital issues; promising everything to everybody; appealing to the passions rather than the reasons of the public; and arousing racial, religious, and class prejudices—a man whose lust for power without recourse to principle leads him to seek to become a master of the masses.¹

This is only, it must be borne in mind, an operational definition for the limited purposes of this study. "A definition," as Robert Dahl writes, "is, so to speak, a proposed treaty governing the use of terms."²

I. The Historical Pattern of American Denagoguery

Fundamentally, our argument is that twentieth century American demagogues have had much in common, and, with the notable exceptions of Long and McCarthy, have had more or less predictable careers. At whom, therefore, must we look, and what are the common characteristics of these particular political actors?

We know that the relationship between bad economic conditions and political unrest is very close. We need only look at the examples, extreme as they may be, of the German Weimar Republic and 1917 Russia to see that the claim bears looking at. Although it is not true that all American demagogues have consistently ridden to power and influence on the back of economic difficulty, a significant number have. Others have simulated economic unrest

¹Luthin op. cit. p. 3.

by appealing to the poorer elements in society through jeering at the wealthy sectors, and blaming the ills of the nation upon these classes. Theodore G. Bilbo, as Governor of Mississippi, wrote in an April 1910 manifesto, "The fight between the classes and the masses, between the corporate influences and the people is on!"1 Another demagogue who voiced similar opinions to those of Bilbo, was Frank Hague, the Mayor of Jersey City. In the early 1920's he was uttering such battle-cries as "I stand with the people against corporations like the Public Service. My record of office in Jersey City is one of labor for the people against the corporations."2 Not dissimilar was James M. Curley, the Mayor of Boston a number of times before and after the Second World War, who made political ammunition out of attacking the established Boston families, using his invective to hold them up to ridicule.3 Both Huey and Earl Long used the same economic appeal, sometimes voiced as an explicit class appeal, sometimes more subtly in innuendo. Huey Long, in his successful 1928 gubernatorial primary campaign, put forward "criticisms and promises merged in an emotional appeal to the masses to overthrow the 'old gang' and the corporations, and in an invitation to lowerclass whites to displace the ruling alliance and grasp political power for themselves."4 To a somewhat less extreme extent, Earl Long made similar appeals in his campaigns,5 and was still making them in his final attempt to be elected governor in 1959. In

1Quoted in Luthin op. cit. p. 50.
2Quoted in Ibid., p. 134.
3Ibid. pp. 20-21
5For his 1948 campaign promises, see Ibid. p. 200.
We got the finest roads, finest schools, finest hospitals in the country -- yet there are rich men who complain. They are so tight you can hear 'em squeak when they walk. They wouldn't give a nickel to see a earthquake. They sit there swallowin' hundred-dollar bills like a bullfrog swallows minnows -- if you chunked them as many as they want they'd bust.

Liebling reports that an old man in the audience interjected, "Amen, Earl, God have mercy on the poor people."¹

The foregoing gives some impression of the emphasis put on some basically crude questions of economics by these demagogues. We have mentioned this problem at length because we contend that there is a marked comparison to that of the appeal which McCarthy made to the people. We will deal with the reasons for this and other differences between the majority of American demagogues and Senator McCarthy at a later juncture.

With the exception of Huey Long, demagogues in the twentieth century United States have had almost exclusively regional appeal, confined to a state or urban area. This is largely a function of the fact that local leaders have a patronage machine which can be used to consolidate their positions. Huey Long had such too, but he also had a national organization which served as the most important base for his national power ambitions. These were the Share-Our-Wealth clubs which, while concentrated in the South and North-Central states,² were the nucleus for national influence.³ In 1935 "Long claimed a total of 27,431 clubs ... while his staff claimed to possess the

²Sindler, op. cit. p. 85.
³Luthin op. cit. p. 315.
names and addresses of over 7,500,000 persons on file."¹ It was pure patronage, however, that was the fundamental factor in his control of the state of Louisiana. In 1928 "it was only through cajolery and patronage that Long was able to persuade a majority of the Legislature to go along with him".² Similarly, Mayor William Hale Thompson of Chicago controlled his position of power largely through patronage, not always, it must be added, to the benefit of the city.³ The case was much the same for other regional demagogues. "They (demagogues) hold on by building themselves a political machine and running it."⁴

Whether the demagogue controlled a city, as Curley, Hague and Thompson did, or whether he controlled a state, as the Longs, Bilbo and Eugene Talmadge did, the prospects for moving to political dominance on a wider scale were slim, since the political sub-structure for doing so was absent. This is not to say that these species of political life are incapable of gaining national support, but rather that their appeal is too narrow to do so, since they must rely on emotional factors which cannot be advantageously scaled up to the national level. Rabid appeals to race and religion,⁵ which have characterized the operations of all of the demagogues of whom we have talked, are more of a handicap than a help on the national political scene. The same can be said of modes of dress and behavior which tend to be local in flavor and thus political aids,⁶ but which on the national level often appear merely bizarre.

¹Sindler op. cit. p. 85.
²Ibid. pp. 57-58.
³Luthin op. cit. pp. 85-86.
⁵Luthin, op. cit. p. 302.
⁶Ibid. p. 303.
Of the demagogues of whom we have spoken, Huey Long is the single one who had both pretensions to national power and some, albeit rather crude, means to implement his ambitions. As we have observed, we will never know how effective the Share-Our-Wealth clubs might have been in Long's drive for national power, since he was assassinated in 1935, just at the point at which his national movement was getting under way.\(^1\) Given that Long's appeal was, as was the case with the other demagogues we have mentioned, mainly economic in nature, it would seem that Franklin Roosevelt's program would have taken much of the impetus out of Long's simplistic plans.\(^2\) It is notable, too, that Long did not effectively use his position in the Senate to create a wider basis for popular appeal. His antics in this house\(^3\) were more likely to produce scorn than serious consideration, particularly on the part of his Senatorial colleagues. Despite this, James A. Farley is stated to have been very worried by Long's strength as it might have been used at the 1936 election. Huey Long could have had considerable national support and financing if he had run in the 1936 election.\(^4\) But his national political potential was never to be tested since his death intervened.

Long was an exception to the main trends in demagoguery in the United States in that he was, at least to some extent, a nationally based leader. There is therefore, some parallel with the case of Joseph McCarthy who has been

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\(^2\)A brief exposition of this viewpoint is in Ibid. p. 57. For a precis of Long's plans, see Sindler op. cit. p. 81.

\(^3\)See Luthin op. cit. pp. 252-253.

called "our first and only national demagogue."\(^1\) But, we think, the ways in which McCarthy differed from not only Long, but also from his other precursors, are more important than the similarities which existed among them. We must, therefore, attempt to explain this dichotomy.

II. **Divergence from the Historical Pattern—McCarthy's Uniqueness**

We have already put forward the argument that the emergence of a new McCarthy type in American political life is likely.\(^2\) What we must now establish is that McCarthy is different in some important ways from most of his predecessors in American demagoguery. This may, in some instances, overlap with what we have said previously, but we believe that it is necessary to locate McCarthy in his historical setting thoroughly, even if it has to be done at the expense of a limited amount of repetition.

We live in a markedly different age from that of preceding epochs. We are aware that there is a danger of erosion of civil liberties from Cold War situations—either in a "Garrison State" or an "Amphibial State", that is one which is neither totally free nor totally garrison.\(^3\) D.F. Fleming has suggested that civil liberties may become limited in either of two ways; first, if another serious economic depression should take place; second, through a slow process of erosion.\(^4\) The whole problem, he maintains, is one tied up with the possi-

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\(^2\) *Supra*, pp. 7-9.


bility that we are moving, in the United States, toward Fascism, characterized as "an effort to erect a secure fortress for a capitalist social structure by using Communist methods".\(^1\) Thus, it is evident that such was not the situation for most other American demagogues of the twentieth century. They lived in an epoch when appeal to more collective elements in economic life was made.

McCarthy, however, lived in a prosperous society in which it was well-nigh impossible to make populist-type economic appeals, but where there was another factor which could provide grist for his mill. This factor was the Communist threat, a problem of national proportions which awaited an unscrupulous exploiter at the national level. McCarthy thus had, readymade, an issue which, by and large, was not sectarian in nature.\(^2\) In a campaign speech made in 1952, McCarthy made it quite clear to whom he was appealing and on what subject. "There is," he said, "only one real issue for the farmer, the laborer, and the businessman—the issue of Communism in government."\(^3\) It was an issue firmly implanted in the heads of American individuals throughout the land, people who were genuinely frightened of the threat of Communism, and who might well be susceptible to play on that theme. Senator McCarthy was in a position, therefore, to exploit a national issue for his own ends in a way that would appeal, potentially, to a greater audience than any previous issue could have done for his precursors.

As we have observed, most of the demagogues we have mentioned built their power on the basis of an urban or state political machine of which they

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\(^1\) Fleming loc. cit. p. 41.

\(^2\) An attempt to show how and why McCarthy appealed to many classes and ethnic groups will be made in the next chapter. The chapter will deal, overall, with the sources of McCarthy's support.

\(^3\) Quoted in Rovere, op. cit. p. 41.
were the boss.\(^1\) This can hardly be said of McCarthy. "McCarthyism," Rovere has remarked, "had no real grit and substance as a doctrine and no organization."\(^2\) In one sense, this may have been a distinct advantage for McCarthy in his drive for national recognition. Unlike other demagogues, he was not sullied with the work of a corrupt political organization, often built upon unscrupulous use of patronage which had its manifestation in inefficient or corrupt government, or both. This was, of course, as far as the general population was concerned, an attraction in dealing with what eventually became to some people a moral question.\(^3\)

When we look into the background of twentieth century American demagoguery, it becomes evident that the methods available to demagogues to transmit their messages have changed in the last forty years, out of all recognition. What has caused this? The answer lies in the emergence of sophisticated new mass media techniques apart from the printed word, namely, radio, film and, more recently, television. The demagogue of yesteryear could talk on the stump to specialised ethnic or religious audiences making sectarian appeals to each. This was possible, of course, because, even accounting for newspaper coverage, news was not suddenly available in easily digestible form to everyone. If it had been, promising everything to everyone would have become a danger that could not be risked. But, "With the development of television the American demagogue has a new medium. Yet the demagogue also takes the risk that he may be seen and heard by too many people who may come

\(^1\)Supra, pp. 14-15.

\(^2\)Rovere op. cit. p. 20. (emphasis added.)

\(^3\)The propensity of the American people for transforming political questions into moral questions will be dealt with in the next chapter.
to know and see through him."¹ Richard Hofstadter has written, "the growth of mass media of communication and their use in politics have brought politics closer to the people than ever before and have made politics a form of entertainment in which spectators feel themselves involved."² McCarthy, then, had available a means of communicating with the people which was quite unlike any previous type of news media. Television offered the simplest way in which to get into American homes; the maximum use of it, as far as McCarthy was concerned, was during the Army-McCarthy hearings in 1954. Television was, however, as much of a disadvantage as an advantage for the Senator—although it gave him more exposure on a national level, it was this very exposure which contributed to his eventual fall.³

Accounting for the fact that television was a new medium through which a demagogue could communicate, it remains that McCarthy used the oldest established form of mass media to reach his audience—the newspaper. The fact that he knew the potential power of newspapers does not set him aside from other demagogues, many of whom started their own,⁴ but his handling of them does make him a deviant from the established pattern.

The fuel for (McCarthy's) engine was printer's ink. McCarthy captured the headlines and held them in a vise of continuing and startling accusations for nearly five years. There was a McCarthy story almost every day, certainly several every week. Almost everything he said and did was news in every paper across the country.⁵

His habit of constantly appearing in the headlines was achieved by such devices

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¹Luthin, op. cit. p. 311.
³A full treatment of the Army-McCarthy hearings will be given in a later chapter.
⁴Luthin, op. cit. pp. 310-311.
as calling a morning press conference to announce an afternoon press conference. The results, as Richard Rovere has pointed out, would be a headline in both the afternoon and the following morning's editions of the newspapers. The afternoon headline might read, "NEW MCCARTHY REVELATIONS AWAITED IN CAPITAL", and if McCarthy had some news he would reveal it, but if he did not, then he would claim that he was still working on it. The following morning's headline might then read, "DELAY SEEN IN NEW MCCARTHY CASE--MYSTERY WITNESS BEING SOUGHT".¹

The press was manipulated extremely successfully by McCarthy—he did not need his own newspaper to receive sufficient coverage. This sets him aside from his precursors in the art of demagoguery, and adds to his uniqueness. McCarthy was aware of to what extent he could afford to be different, and to what extent it was incumbent upon him to conform. This is well illustrated in the trademark which like all other demagogues he adopted. McCarthy's was the "bulging briefcase". "The bulging briefcase", writes Rovere, "—the scholar's toolbox—became to him what snapping red galluses and a stream of tobacco juice were to the older Southern demagogues."² This was not a bizarre trade-mark; on the contrary it was eminently respectable and impressive. McCarthy had chosen well to adapt to his circumstances and to the threat with which he was concerned.

In concluding, we must not forget one further technique which was used by McCarthy that sets him apart from the traditional American demagogue. This was his use of the "multiple untruth".

The 'multiple untruth' need not be a particularly large untruth but can instead be a long series of loosely related untruths, or a single untruth with many facets. In either case, the whole is composed of so many parts that anyone wishing to set the record straight will discover that it is utterly impossible to keep all the elements of the falsehood in mind at

¹Rovere op. cit., p. 164.
²Ibid., p. 168.
the same time. Anyone making the attempt may seize upon a few selected statements and show them to be false, but doing this may leave the impression that only the statements selected are false and that the rest are true. An even greater advantage of the 'multiple untruth' is that statements shown to be false can be repeated over and over again with impunity because no one will remember which statements have been disproved and which haven't.¹

Earlier demagogues had certainly told lies, but not in the same manner nor with the same results that McCarthy did.² His technique was essentially a departure from previous demagogic practices—it was a refinement of Hitler's "Big Lie," and was, of course, used to great effect by McCarthy.

Joseph McCarthy was, we believe, an exception in the general pattern of American demagoguery. The different techniques which he used to amass a following were a function of the age in which he lived, reflected in new used of mass media and, more especially, in the issue upon which he landed—that of the internal threat of Communism. In the final analysis, McCarthy was indicative of an emerging epoch, an epoch that is seeing the rise of new and/or latent forces in politics which provided the basis for his support. If we are to deal with future McCarthy types effectively, we must know from what sources their support may come. It is to this question that we must now turn.

¹Ibid., p. 110.
²For a description of how Rovere himself was subjected to the "multiple untruth" treatment, see Ibid, pp. 112-118.
McCarthy's Sources of Support

I. An Era of Increased Conservatism

Few would deny that the last fifteen years has seen a resurgence of conservatism in American politics. We must be somewhat careful, however, in identifying the reasons for this renaissance, for the sense in which we have referred to conservatism here is very broad in scope. Clinton Rossiter has identified three major categories into which one may divide the contemporary Right: the ultra-conservatives, who are represented by such figures as Strom Thurmond, Bruce Alger and "their defunct Galahad", Joseph McCarthy; the middling-conservatives, represented by persons such as Eisenhower and Taft in the centre and Dewey and Nixon at the periphery; finally, the liberal conservatives, made up, for example, of such men as Earl Warren, Nelson Rockefeller and Arthur Larson.¹ Rossiter succintly summarises how McCarthy stood vis-a-vis each of these groups in the following manner: "of Senator McCarthy the ultra-conservative said proudly, 'That's my boy!', the middling conservative uneasily, 'Joe is a little rough, but he gets results', the liberal conservative queasily, 'He's a disgrace to American democracy and a disaster to American Prestige.'"² (At a later stage in the chapter we will explain why it was that


²Ibid, p. 175.

For another indication that McCarthy attracted the support of the ultra-conservatives, see Rovere op. cit. pp. 20-21.
McCarthy attracted the support of the ultra-conservative, and, further, what people comprise this particular conservative grouping.)

Dwight Eisenhower had been elected President in 1952. This was interpreted as a turn to the moderate right in American politics, as symptomatic of the emergence of a new political atmosphere. As Samuel Lubell has written, "In essence the drama of [Eisenhower's] Presidency can be described as the ordeal of a nation turned conservative and struggling...to give effective voice and force to the conservatism."\(^1\) As for the reasons for this veering to the right, Rossiter, writing five years later than Lubell, had this to say,

A nation that considers itself a success and finds itself under attack has little use for progressive reform and none at all for radical ferment. Small wonder, then, that America's present mood displays an obstinate streak of conservatism. Our triumphs are soured with frustration, our prosperity with apprehension, our taste for peace with preparations for war. We are all more conservative than we were a generation ago. Even the reformer, the man with his heart in the future, is heard to speak the language of tradition, loyalty, order, and preservation.\(^2\)

Whereas we may not fully agree with this statement, we do believe that it is indicative of an overall trend in America at the present time. To repeat, Conservatism is a greater political force today than it was a few years ago. Norman Phillips, writing in 1956, expressed the position of a number of the intelligentsia in this way: "To many thoughtful writers and men of affairs, this has been pre-eminently an era of great uncertainty and growing cynicism. In skepticism many of them observe the intellectual expression of this mood—the distilled essence of the spirit of the age."\(^3\) From here Phillips goes on


\(^2\)Rossiter, op. cit. p. 163.

to develop a thesis which sees skepticism as desirable,\(^1\) and which proposes that, "the skeptic, if he is to be logically consistent, should be a conservative."\(^2\)

We have felt it necessary to establish our's as an epoch of increasing conservatism because we believe that McCarthy drew much of his support from men and women of this political inclination, most of whom were extremists, some of whom were not. To some large extent McCarthy's success rested upon these sources of support. These wells of encouragement and maintenance for McCarthy did not simply dry up when he died. They are, indeed, as we propose to show, still with us, sometimes covert, sometimes overt. The reasons for demagoguery in general are not, unfortunately, as simple as Frank Kent would have us believe, that is, merely a result of appeal to an uncivilizable, illiterate "moronic underworld," the emotions of which can easily be preyed upon.\(^3\) The particular case of Joe McCarthy is even more complex than the run of the mill demagogue. Besides being the manifestation of a political problem, he was, too, a reflection of deep-seated sociological and psychological factors.

To explain McCarthy in terms of what conservatism has meant historically in the United States is not enough, for, if we may return to Rossiter for a moment,

Whatever else it was, McCarthyism was not conservatism, and ultra-conservatives, by their own proud admission, were the most loyal soldiers in McCarthy's ranks. The demagoguery of the Right is no more akin to upright conservatism than the demagoguery of the Left is to decent liberalism, and too many ultra-conservatives have shown themselves much too willing to forgive, to encourage, and often even to practice the disruptive arts of pseudo-conservative extremism.\(^4\)

\(^{1}\)Ibid., pp. 33-38.

\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 32.


\(^{4}\)Rossiter, op. cit., pp. 177-178.
McCarthy was part of a conservative movement without being wedded to an American philosophy of conservatism. For the most part, his appeal generated support from the extremities of such intellectual movements, and sometimes from nearer their centers, but much less frequently. It was precisely the periphery of the movement which had little, or no interest in the American conservative tradition. What follows is a partial explanation of why this was, and still is, etc.

II. Psychological and Sociological Foundations of Support

A. The Problems of Alienation and Status

Since the latter half of the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century, social scientists have had an abiding interest in the problem of alienation. There is, of course, a wide gulf between the concepts of alienation which exist in Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, and those which appear in the writings of Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset and other contemporaries. Although this difference exists, there is certainly a perception common to these social scientists which papers over some of the divisive factors. The central point which joins them together is that of man isolated from society, however we may conceive this latter word.

Marx and Hegel see

a long process of social, intellectual and moral change leading man steadily but inevitably to the condition where he understands himself and the world,

and,

In this condition man is at long last no longer 'alienated' but is at peace with himself, is 'whole' and morally secure in his 'wholeness', because he is 'at home' in the social world which is both the product and the sphere of his activities.¹

Marx ascribes man's alienation from society to the bourgeois system under which he lives. Bourgeois society sets men apart from each other by conceiving of them as atoms, which stresses the individual at the expense of the community. Man could, therefore, only overcome this alienation by breaking down bourgeois society and thus finding himself re-integrated in a community, as essentially part of society.¹

The problems that man faces in being isolated from his community need not lead to wholesale condemnation of that community and the demand for it to be overthrown. Rather, alienation is seen as a problem which faces all societies, and which, if the society is not to collapse, must, in some measure, be solved. America, as we will show, is not an exception to other societies in this matter. Political alienation certainly exists and is a powerful source of support for the ultra-rightists in the United States.²

Alienation is experienced in varying forms and degrees of intensity when certain forces block the individual's quest for so-called authentic, or true, existence, when he feels unable to shake off a sense of cleavage, of an abyss, within himself, and between himself and other men. At bottom, the alienated man is convinced that he is unable to assume what he believes to be his rightful role in society.³

Abcarian and Stanage identify four major variables in "the general concept of alienation", meaninglessness, normlessness, powerlessness and social isolation, which permeate many of the ultra-rightists' views and feelings. McCarthyism,


¹Ibid., pp. 785-788.
Lipset has written, makes an appeal to much the same kind of people as Pouladiem, Italian Fascism and German and Austrian Nazism did, people "who feel cut off from the main trends of modern society." But what kind of people are those who are alienated in society?

There are several sources of this alienation which gives vent to ultra-conservatism in America, arising largely from stresses and strains which produce many sorts of status anxiety. Economic upheaval has played a large role here. The smaller business enterprises, private corporations and the newly wealthy tend to feel oppressed because they find it difficult to deal with the managed economy, whereas large corporations tend to welcome it as producing increased stability and predictability.

Another source of ultra-conservatism has been religious in nature, and again ties in with the manifestation of alienation in American society. It is primarily the evangelical Protestant minority among religious denominations which renders support to ultra-conservative forces. These are groups which have seen their influence diminishing and which have become increasingly hostile to trends in society which, they contend, are undermining their faith. "...many of them [evangelical Protestants] do identify with a politics of retrogression, an effort to return to 19th-century values."

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2Hofstadter, loc. cit., pp. 41-42.


4Lipset, loc. cit., (Encounter) p. 16.
It has also been postulated that some old-established families and emerging ethnic groups feel the pressures of alienation. The latter, wishing to feel totally Americanized and accepted in society, and finding that this objective may be forbidden them, become alienated. The divergence between the myth of the "American way" and the harsher realities of life encourages disillusionment, but it can also encourage extreme demonstrations of patriotism in order to prove loyalty to America and, thus, genuine assimilation. (It will not be lost on the reader that McCarthy was rabid in his appeal to patriotism.) Similarly, the old-established families feel themselves isolated in a newly emerging social situation, and tend, by way of defense, to hark back to the past.

McCarthy's attacks were directed against the "establishment" in American society, against those who were assimilated in the "American way of life". Whether McCarthy knew it or not, he drew support from, and appealed to, the alienated in society, to those with status anxieties. As sociologists have suggested, a major structural change in society will set up anxieties and tensions, and there will be desire for retrogression to a situation prior to the arrival of the disturbances. "McCarthyism", writes Parsons,

Can be understood as a relatively acute symptom of the strains which accompany a major change in the situation and structure of American society, a change which in this instance consists in the development

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1Lipset, loc. cit., (Bell (Ed.) op. cit.) p. 193.
2Lubell, op. cit., pp. 80-84.
3Lipset, loc. cit., (Bell(Ed.) op. cit.) p. 195.
5Talcott Parsons, "Social Strains in America", in Daniel Bell (Ed.) op. cit. p. 127.
of the attitudes and institutional machinery required to implement a greatly enhanced level of national political responsibility.\(^1\)

Apart from the sociological aspects of McCarthyism we have dealt with above, there are other, perhaps more important, factors which determine the kinds of support which might be available to a future McCarthy. One facet of McCarthy's support can be interpreted psychologically, and, while we are aware of the close connexion between the psychological and sociological factors, we believe that the former deserve some treatment of their own.

B. The Problems of Authoritarianism and Paranoia with Reference to Conservatism

(a) Anti-Intellectualism

When we cast our minds back to twentieth century demagogues prior to McCarthy, we find that they had, amongst other things, a peculiar and somewhat disturbing common characteristic. All shared an anti-intellectual outlook. Governor Bilbo of Mississippi could work his followers into such a frenetic state that, at his instigation, they would shout, "We are the low-brows, we are the red-necks."\(^2\) One more example, that of William Hale Thompson, will suffice to bear out this common attribute. In 1927 Thompson had been attacked by all the newspapers except the Hearst group in his campaign for the Chicago mayoralty. In the same year, in a campaign speech, Thompson raged against the University of Chicago, social workers and others, proclaiming to his audience, "They call you low-brows and hoodlums. We low-brows have got to stick together. Look who is against us!"\(^3\)

McCarthy, as we shall see, certainly did play on similar emotions to

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 117-118.
\(^2\)Quoted in Luthin op. cit., p. 49.
\(^3\)Quoted in Ibid., pp. 77-78.
those which provided fuel for other demagogues’ fire, but it was in a somewhat different way. Levels of education had risen appreciably since the death of Huey Long and the rise of McCarthy, and, we contend they had produced something of a novel situation in American life. We have talked of McCarthy’s use of the “multiple untruth”, and it is this technique which is closely attached to the educational level of the early 1950’s. McCarthy claimed to have reams of evidence (in the “bulging briefcase”) which many people considered to be tantamount to proof of whatever it was that he was attempting to prove. Rovere has pointed out that American education, with its emphasis on facts, inclines people to “take the symbol of the fact as proof of the fact.”

This is germane to our discussion of psychological factors in that it once more offers us a picture of McCarthy’s adaptability to traditional demagogic modes of appeal in the light of modern social and political developments. McCarthy retained the semblance of anti-intellectualism while also providing the relatively well-educated people with enough “information” to provide credibility for his allegations. As David Riesman and Nathan Glaser have pointed out, “many of those who have swamped the colleges have acquired there, and helped their families learn, a half-educated resentment for the traditional intellectual values some of their teachers and schoolmates represented.”

This attitude of anti-intellectualism, however manifested, has relevance to the conservative cause in the United States. Rossiter has written that,

the American Right has displayed an attitude of anti-intellectualism that goes far beyond the quixical suspicion that most conservatives seem to have for men whose business is thinking rather than doing. The American conservative has not merely distrusted the poet, professor, philosopher,

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1 Rove, op. cit. p. 169.

2 David Riesman and Nathan Glaser, “The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes”, in Daniel Bell (Ed.) op. cit. p. 68.
and political theorist; he has scorned them, bullied them and not seldom despised them.1

Why should the existence of anti-intellectualism concern us in connection with psychological roots of support for McCarthy? The answer lies in the attributes of authoritarianism and its relationship to conservatism. What we now intend to show, is that authoritarian personality types, frequently of anti-intellectual and anti-National tendency, offered support for McCarthy and will continue to offer support for McCarthy types in the future.

(b) McCarthy and the "Authoritarian Personality"

In common sense language, the authoritarian is the individual who is concerned with power and toughness and who is prone to resolve conflict in an arbitrary manner. He is seen as having strong and persistent desires that others submit to his outlook. Social psychology in recent years has added the observation that the authoritarian person has another powerful desire of which he is not fully aware. He himself desires to submit to other individuals whom he sees as more powerful.2

We believe, as we hope subsequent evidence will indicate, that the authoritarian person tends to exist in greater numbers amongst the types of people who supported Senator McCarthy, or who might support a future McCarthy type. We are, we admit, of democratic persuasion, and we thus see in the authoritarian a very real, but for the most part latent, threat to democratic government.

Janowitz and Marvick, using a nation-wide survey technique, demonstrated some important aspects of the authoritarian individual. Older people tend to be more authoritarian than younger people, and the less well-educated more authoritarian than the better-educated.3

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1Rossiter, op. cit. p. 213


3Ibid., p. 191. For the method of measuring authoritarian tendencies, see Ibid., pp. 188-190.
In class terms, the lower classes tend to be more authoritarian than the upper classes, with the lower lower classes the most authoritarian and the lower middle classes the next in degree of authoritarian tendencies.¹

This finding is echoed by Lipset.

The lower class individual is likely to have been exposed to punishment, lack of love, and a general atmosphere of tension and aggression since early childhood—all experiences which tend to produce deep-rooted hostilities expressed by ethnic prejudices, political authoritarianism, and chiliastic transvaluational religion.²

Perhaps the most interesting findings in this connection are those which are closely related to the sociological factors we have discussed above. "A consistent pattern of authoritarian responses is . . . seen as a mode for the release of tensions created in persons who have accepted the goals of our society but who find it difficult to adapt to the democratic processes by which they are achieved."³ Abcarian and Stanage found that the Radical Right was strongly disposed toward feelings of powerlessness and normlessness in its ideology.⁴ There is, therefore, reason to believe that those who are alienated from society respond to the problem in an authoritarian manner. Even those who are apolitical, or who have low incidences of political activity in terms of voting patterns, tend to be more authoritarian in outlook than those who are politically active.⁵

¹Ibid., pp. 191-193.
²Lipset, Political Man, p. 114.
⁴Abcarian and Stanage, loc. cit., pp. 791-792.
The best summary of the problem with which we deal here can be found stated by Farris who sees his "authoritarian respondent"¹ as

a working class person, in middle age or over. The economy is threatening. He expects prices to rise, and unemployment to increase. He dislikes Negroes. Although he professes great self-interest in elections, he is a politically ignorant, politically inactive person, who has little belief in his ability to influence the course of politics. When he responds positively to political figures, the objects of his choice are not moderates but a man of the far right, like Senator McCarthy, or of the populist 'left' like Governor Folsom.²

The authoritarian is, then, attracted to extremist solutions in politics, and, as far as we are concerned, the most important of these extremes is the ultra-right. McClosky has indicated the closeness of feelings of isolation with those of conservatism. "Conservatism," he writes,

in our society at least, appears to be far more characteristic of social isolates, of people who think poorly of themselves, who suffer personal disharmony and frustration, who are submissive, timid, and wanting in confidence, who lack a clear sense of direction and purpose, who are uncertain about their values, and who are generally bewildered by the alarming task of having to thread their way through a society which seems to them too complex to fathom.³

(c) The Question of Paranoia

In addition to those psychological propensities of some Americans that we have observed up to this point, we should devote some space to discussing the question of paranoia, or quasi-paranoia, which appears to exist amongst the ultra-Rightists in America. The manifestation of some form of paranoia, however, is not something which is found in the American political system alone. If we conceive of paranoia, as Hofstadter does, we would view it not in its

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¹See Farris loc. cit., p. 66. His measurement of authoritarianism is somewhat different from that of Janowitz and Marvick, loc. cit., p. 188.

²Farris, loc. cit., p. 71.

clinical psychological sense, but would see it, rather, as a word suitably operational to describe a "sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy."¹ The "paranoid style" is of particular importance to us not only because it has been associated with American politics, and with McCarthy, amongst other politicians, but also because it has had relevance to anti-democratic movements elsewhere in the world.

In June of 1951, Joseph McCarthy was saying,

How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this government are concerting to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men... ²

McCarthy referred, then, to a conspiracy which existed within the government, but a conspiracy which was attached at the same time to world-wide communism. The plot on the home front was little more than a facet of a plot of global dimensions, but for McCarthy the former was more important than the latter. "He even insisted", writes Rovere, "that the struggle against world Communism was a diversion from the struggle against the domestic conspiracy."³ Hofstadter indicates that this type of manipulation of paranoid fears by McCarthy was part of a historical characteristic in the United States, of which the modern ultra-Right is an extension.⁴

The extreme right in the United States, we believe, finding itself isolated from society, will attach blame somewhere for the condition in which

²Quoted in Ibid., p. 77.
³Rovere, op. cit., p. 41.
⁴Hofstadter, loc. cit., (Harpers) pp. 78-81.
it finds itself.

Externally the world Communist movement is the most obvious of the serious difficulties we have to face. On the other hand, although Communism has constituted to some degree a realistic internal danger, it has above all come to symbolise those factors that have disturbed the beneficent natural state of an American society which allegedly and in phantasy existed before the urgent problems of control of the economy and greatly enhanced responsibility in international affairs had to be tackled.1

Thus, blame is attached, but it is based, we must notice, on certain plausible first premises. "Paranoid writing", states Hofstadter, "begins with certain broad defensible judgements."2 It is not merely coincidence that the ultra-Rightist shares this propensity to start from some real danger, and to extrapolate from this basis to wild conclusions, with the totalitarian actor.

Hannah Arendt writes,

The fiction of the Protocols (of the Elders of Zion) was as adequate as the fiction a Trotskyite conspiracy, for both contained an element of plausibility—the nonpublic influence of the Jews in the past; the struggle for power between Trotsky and Stalin—which not even the fictitious world of totalitarianism can safely do without.3

This initial position of relative truth does not mean that the emergence of a conspiratorial theory is based in fact, the contrary is the case. Both McCarthyism and totalitarian regimes have a tendency to provide a political framework which is complete with a conspiratorial facet which is only based on something less than a half-truth. Each, in its own way, represents a journey into an ethereal world of innuendo and explicit accusation based on largely fictitious evidence. "McCarthyism", writes Rovner, "was, among other things, but perhaps foremost among them, a

1Parsons, loc. cit., p. 135.
head-long flight from reality."\textsuperscript{1} Arendt discerns a similar characteristic in the totalitarian world. The masses, she says,

are predisposed to all ideologies because they explain facts as mere examples of laws and eliminate coincidences by inventing an all-embracing omnipotence which is supposed to be at the root of every accident. Totalitarian propaganda thrives on this escape from reality into fiction, from coincidence into consistency.\textsuperscript{2}

The "flight from reality", the evocation of a conspiracy, the tendency toward paranoia, are combined in a syndrome which is observable not only in America. The historical and international ties of such a political style are particularly reminiscent of the symptoms of a malaise which gives rise to totalitarianism, or of the actual existence of a totalitarian regime. Arendt offers an insight which is of some relevance at this point.

The revolt of the masses against 'realism', common sense, and all 'the plausibilities of the world' (Burke) was the result of their atomization, of their loss of social status along with which they lost the whole sector of communal relationships in whose framework common sense makes sense.\textsuperscript{3}

The manifestation of paranoia is, then, effect rather than cause, but there are indications that the personality attracted to ultra-Rightist movements may have elements within him which contribute heavily to his inclination toward accepting conspiratorial theories of government. The parallels which exist between ultra-Rightist thought and that of the totalitarian governor give some indication of the nature of the appeals of which we of democratic persuasion must beware. History would disclaim any attempt to idly push aside the theory of conspiracy in government---it has been used to too good an effect in the past to be ignored.

\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{Rovere, op. cit., p. 40.}
\textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{Arendt, op. cit., p. 452.}
\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{Ibid., p. 352.}
III. Political Foundations of Support

Political explanations of events are often tied very closely to other social science disciplines, particularly those of sociology, economics and psychology. At times it is somewhat difficult to disentangle the central point or points in an explanation of political life. Frequently the foundation of a "solution" to political problems does not lie in politics per se. The McCarthyist phenomenon is no exception, as we hope we have already shown. That we are only at this stage dealing with McCarthy's political bases of support does not mean that we judge this aspect of the foundations of his support as less important than the other factors with which we have dealt. There are identifiable political factors with which we must deal. The concluding remarks at the end of this chapter will attempt to draw the ingredients of McCarthy's support into a coherent whole.

There has been some criticism of the hypothesis which explains McCarthy's support in sociological terms.¹ Polsby points to what is for him a deficiency in the study of McCarthyism. "It is a surprising fact," he writes, "that analyses have discounted so heavily the purely political aspect of his success."²

What factors in the political environment, therefore, allowed McCarthy to arise as a national figure? Polsby identifies five particular points of departure. First, the Republicans were searching for a means of embarrassing a long-standing Democratic administration, and McCarthy happened to be a suitable


²Ibid., p. 815.
method through which to achieve this end. Second, since McCarthy had congressional immunity he could not be sued for libel or slander, and thus his accusations could take on the wildest tones without being challenged in a court of law. Third, McCarthy's exploitation of mass media, which we have dealt with in Chapter II above. Fourth, the vulnerability of the Truman administration on the question of the threat of internal communism, and, fifth, "the emasculation of administrative resistance to McCarthy's activities, by order of President Eisenhower." (As far as this latter point is concerned, the following chapter will deal with it exclusively.) We would add to Polsby's list at least one more important basis for McCarthyism, namely, the vacillation which existed within Congress itself. We feel this to be of great significance for us, for we believe that it is in this area particularly that the government failed in its obligations to the American people. For this reason we will devote a separate chapter to a study of Congressional action concerning McCarthy.

Danger may come from a distraught Republican party searching for an issue with which to dislodge an entrenched Democratic administration. The party may, possibly, turn to the right to do so, although this seems unlikely after the Goldwater debacle of 1964. What we are concerned with fundamentally, is

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1 Ibid., p. 817.
2 Ibid., p. 818.
3 Ibid., p. 818.
4 Ibid., p. 818.
5 Ibid., p. 818.
finding ways in which we can stop the disruptive nature of another Joe McCarthy. Democratic processes will allow such demagogues to arise, thus, we believe, the onus of dealing with them must fall on the legislature and the executive.

IV. Summary

We must repeat that there is no one source of McCarthyism, no single piece of evidence to which we can point, exclaiming, "there is the reason". On the contrary, McCarthy's sources of support were numerous and interlocking. Sociological, psychological and political factors are bound together into a conglomerate whole, seemingly with little coherence.

In a democratic society everyone is by no means imbued with tolerance and ideas of fair-play. Social isolation and psychological authoritarianism, bound together, form a powerful anti-democratic force. The parallel with the masses who are appealed to by totalitarian movements, the declassed of society, is not without significance. Because people are politically inactive, we should not simply ignore them. The apolitical person offers fertile ground for extremist appeals in political life.¹ These apolitical persons are more likely to react to the conservative right than the liberal left,² partly because the extreme left in America has been emasculated by means of popular rejection and governmental action.

The financial means of support for the ultra-Right will continue to exist as they do now,³ and such support, amongst other, will come from people

¹Arendt, op. cit., p. 311.
²Rossiter, op. cit., p. 182.
who are chronically addicted to transmuting political questions into moral questions.¹ Those who gave support to McCarthy are still active in American political life; the ultra-Right is a seedbed for a McCarthy type political actor.²

Since the executive branch of government was involved in attempting to deal with McCarthy in the early 1950's, it is to it that we must now turn; from its handling of the McCarthy affair, we may well be able to have a fuller understanding of its mistakes and correct judgements.

¹See Daniel Bell, "Interpretations of American Politics", in Bell (Ed.) op. cit., pp. 3-30.
²Forster & Epstein, op. cit., p. 5.
Eisenhower and McCarthy

We have indicated that the political factors involved in this study should be dealt with at some length. As far as we are concerned, this implies that we must cast a searching look at the executive and legislative machinery as it pertained to McCarthy and his position in American political life.

Every president of the United States has established, to greater or lesser degree, a particular style by which one can identify his office. Eisenhower was no exception to this rule. His concept of the presidency, and the manner in which the office was operated by him, had a distinct relevance to the machinations of Senator McCarthy. Combined with the Congressional aspect of the McCarthy era, which will be dealt with in the two succeeding chapters, the strategies of the executive branch of government were crucial in setting the possible bounds within which McCarthy could work. If, by 1952, McCarthy was, as we believe, a serious disruptive threat to the United States, it would seem evident that some sector of the government machinery would have to take him in hand. Eisenhower, as we shall attempt to show, was hampered by his view of what were the permissible limits of presidential power, and also by a belief that McCarthy had widescale support within the country.

We believe that Eisenhower, to some extent, negated the raison d'être of executive power. Executive power is "the power of government that is the most spontaneously responsive to emergency conditions; conditions, that is, which have not obtained enough of stability or recurrency to admit of their being dealt with according to rule." 1 The reasons for this partial negation are what

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we are here concerned with, and it is to them that we shall now turn.

I. Eisenhower - Political Background and Concept of the Presidency

1952 was, without doubt, a year of triumph for the Republican Party. Not only had it succeeded in placing its candidate in the White House for the first time in twenty years, but it also found itself with a majority in Congress. 1

1952 was an important year for McCarthy too, for he was re-elected to the Senate, largely on a campaign based upon virulent and demagogic appeals to the threat of internal communism in America. McCarthy had used the issue of communism before 1952, in his 1946 campaign, 2 but the preparations for his re-election in 1952 saw the burgeoning issue burst into flower. 3

More importantly, McCarthy, as a result of the Republican majority in the Senate, became Chairman of both the Committee on Government Operations, and its Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations. If there had been hopes that a Republican victory would result in the toning down of McCarthy's frenetic attacks on Communism, they were to be rudely disappointed. "Circumstances were," as Eric F. Goldman has written, "hardly such as to curb the arrogance of

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<tr>
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Source: Congressional Digest, Vol. 32, (February, 1953), p. 34.

Jack Anderson and Ronald W. May, McCarthy, the Man, the Senator, the "Ism", (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 108-110.

Rovere, op. cit., pp. 120-140.
Joseph McCarthy. 1 Clayton Knowles, as early as November of 1952, foresaw that the accession to power of the Republicans would very likely produce an increase in the number and intensity of investigations concerning security, rather than a decrease, since the Republicans now had a chance to uncover Democratic "mismanagement" in this area. 2 According to Rovere, Senator Taft, who was the majority leader in the Senate, had hoped to isolate McCarthy by assigning him the committee posts mentioned above, but, as it transpired, he had made a grave error; McCarthy soon discovered that the Sub-Committee on Investigations could deal with virtually anything it had a mind to. 3 Congressional authorization for the Committee on Government Operations was broad in scope. In part it read, "Such committee shall have the duty of investigating and studying the operation of Government activities at all levels with a view to determining its economy and efficiency." 4 In 1953, McCarthy wasted little time in creating political mayhem from the vantage points of his two chairmanships, with investigations into the Voice of America, State Department Files and the Army Signal Corps Radar Center at Fort Monmouth in New Jersey among others. 5

In all this political thrust and parry, it was not the size of McCarthy's following that was crucial, in fact Polsby has argued that McCarthy did not have wide-scale grass-roots support, 6 but, rather, the disruption of the normal

5 For a summary of these, and other investigations, see Congressional Quarterly, Almanac, Vol. IX, pp. 334-350.
functioning of government. Perhaps even more important was the dilemma with which Eisenhower was faced as leader of the Republican party. As far as the party was concerned, McCarthy was certainly a dangerously divisive factor, since he was a rallying point for many of the right wing Republicans within it. In addition, as we shall observe in the next chapter, Eisenhower, in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, did little to help the army when it came under the heavy hand of the Wisconsin Senator. What were the principles which invoked this inaction in President Eisenhower?

As Samuel Lubell has indicated, "How to handle McCarthy remained Eisenhower's most nettlesome political problem during his first two years as President." In the light of this, it is remarkable that Eisenhower tackled the problem almost as if McCarthy did not even exist. The important clue to the whole relationship lies in Eisenhower's concept of the office which he held. On a spectrum between Teddy Roosevelt's view of the president as a "steward of the people", and William Howard Taft's view of him as only being allowed to do that which was strictly stated in the Constitution, Eisenhower veered toward the Taftian, or "passive" concept of the office. Lubell summarizes the central attitude thus: "the essential quality of his [Eisenhower's] leadership has lain in the skill with which he has followed the public mood...he led the people by moving in the direction toward which they were already inclined." Eisenhower, then, tended to follow the line of Carlyle's aphorism, "I am their leader,

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2Lubell, op. cit., p. 29.
4Lubell, op. cit., p. 37.
therefore I must follow them". He clearly felt that what happened in Congress was Congress' business, and not directly his.\(^1\) But, further than this, Eisenhower appears to have been remarkably uninformed about McCarthy's actions. In his autobiography, he states that up to the time of his nomination, he knew little of McCarthy and his operations because he had been abroad during 1951 and the first half of 1952.\(^2\) This would seem to indicate a curious lack of information on Eisenhower's part, since by this time McCarthy had been on the warpath for at least two years.

Eisenhower was convinced that McCarthy himself would be his own undoing, and that the best thing he himself could do was to ignore him.\(^3\) It is clear that, while the president had a deep dislike of McCarthy himself, he did "not intend to get into a public brawl with this man... my position as President of this country, demands more dignity. I cannot brawl with every irresponsible person who becomes a problem."\(^4\) Some of Eisenhower's advisers were less convinced of the President's sagacity in dealing with McCarthy. On November 21th, 1953, McCarthy had appeared on television, stating that the internal threat of communism would be an issue in the 1954 Congressional campaign.\(^5\) Eisenhower's staff were anxious to somehow nullify this contention, but were divided down the middle on whether Eisenhower should issue an outright...

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\(^1\)Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower, the Inside Story, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1956), pp. 243-244.


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 320.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 245.

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 320.


\(^7\)Donovan, op. cit., p. 246.
demunciation or not.\footnote{1}{Tbid., p. 218.}  C. D. Jackson, the President's Chief Adviser on Psychological Strategy, formulated a reply to McCarthy's television statement mentioning McCarthy by name, but Eisenhower rejected the draft of the note saying, "I will not get into the gutter with that guy."\footnote{2}{Quoted in Tbid., p. 249.}

The President was clearly repulsed by McCarthy. The Wisconsin Senator's antics during 1953 apparently aggravated an intense feeling of disgust which Eisenhower already had earlier in the year. In a letter to Harry Bullis of General Mills written in May, and referring to the McCarthyist offensive, the President wrote, "It is a sorry mess, at times one feels almost like hanging his head in shame when he reads some of the unreasoned, vicious outbursts of demagoguery that appear in out public prints." Eisenhower gave some indication of the quandry in which he felt himself to be when he continued, "But whether a Presidential 'crack down' would better, or would actually worsen, the situation, is a moot question."\footnote{3}{Donovan, op. cit., p. 257.}

Donovan makes an interesting observation on Eisenhower's relations with McCarthy in suggesting that the President was guided by an attitude rather than a strategy in dealing with the problem—an attitude of disdain.\footnote{4}{Donovan, op. cit., p. 257.} It was, we believe, largely for this reason that Eisenhower was at least once beaten to the punch by the obstreperous Wisconsin Senator. The most notable occasion upon which Eisenhower was, to all appearances, outwitted, concerned the Camp Kilmer
investigation carried out in February of 1954.1 The camp commander, General Ralph Zwicker, was accused of harboring communists at his installation, especially one Irving Peress who had been promoted from Captain to Major while on duty there. McCarthy ordered John Adams, the Army's Council, to produce the names of those who had been involved in this promotion within twenty-four hours. In reply, Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens, ordered Zwicker and others not to appear before the subcommittee. In order for the bad relations between Stevens and McCarthy to be patched up, a meeting was arranged between the Republican members of the subcommittee and Stevens. At the meeting, held on Wednesday, February 24th, 1954, Stevens agreed to rescind his order that Army personnel should not appear before McCarthy's subcommittee if, for his part, McCarthy would agree to treat them with the correct degree of courtesy. Stevens, thinking he had achieved his objective, found, at the end of the meeting, that McCarthy had invited the press to collect a memorandum after this ostensibly secret encounter was over. The memorandum contained Stevens' concessions to McCarthy, but none of the reciprocal concessions to which McCarthy had agreed during the meeting.

While it is true that Eisenhower did not know of the McCarthy-Stevens meeting prior to its occurrence, we believe that some degree of blame should be attached to him. If, as Richard Neustadt has said, it is true that "Eisenhower could not quite absorb the notion that effective power had to be extracted out of other men's self-interest; neither did he quite absorb the notion that nobody else's interest could be wholly like his own,"2 then the Stevens affair was not only Stevens' fault. Eisenhower had only very vaguely

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talked of the treatment of officers of the executive branch by Congress, pointing out that fair play was in the American tradition and should be observed. In fact, it was not until May 17th of 1954 that Eisenhower made explicit, in a letter to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, that the executive branch of government, headed by the President could not be encroached upon by Congress; this involved the making public of confidential material which was the business of the executive branch alone.¹ Unlike President Truman, Eisenhower procrastinated in his opposition to the investigatory methods used by some Congressional committees. Truman made it very clear at the outset of the loyalty-security program set up in 1946 and 1947 that he would not tolerate executive information concerned therewith being freely made available to Congressional committees.²

There are other indications which bear out the argument that Eisenhower was not entirely master of his own house. As the Eisenhower Administration was constructed in 1953, there came to Washington one Donald B. Lowrie to be Under Secretary of State for Administration.³ Lowrie was not a man with great political experience, having previously been president of Quaker Oats. As part of his duties, Lowrie made an appointment which frightened many knowledgeable anti-McCarthyitee. As Security Officer for the State Department he chose Scott McLeod. McLeod was an extremely conservative ex-F.B.I. man, and, to boot, a stout defender of McCarthy. There was, then, grave danger that he might release information to McCarthy, and, perhaps encourage the Wisconsin Senator to become even more vituperative in his attacks on the executive branch. There were sub-

¹Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 597.
³For a description of this incident I have largely relied upon Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 84-86.
sequently, indications that Scott McLeod was ready to make information available to McCarthy, but the actual quantity which may have been disclosed appears to be a mystery. Rovere has even gone so far as to suggest that McLeod was "appointed by McCarthy" and, more or less, ran the State Department. Hughes' information would seem to discredit this suggestion. Nevertheless, what is important is that Eisenhower certainly put his control of the State Department in jeopardy, something which he could ill afford to do in the early months of his Administration. A President's power, as Neustadt points out, rests partially in his ability to choose. "...Adequate or not, a President's own choices are the only means in his own hands of guarding his own prospects for effective influence." Eisenhower, again, could scarcely have been fully aware of this in appointing a man of Lowrie's political experience as Under-Secretary of State for Administration.

There is another case, we believe, which offers a clear-cut example of the way in which Eisenhower put his administration in jeopardy from a McCarthyist attack. This concerned McCarthy's efforts in making deals with shipping companies not to trade with communist nations. In the latter part of March, 1953, McCarthy announced that he had made agreements with some Greek shippers to the effect that they had consented to refrain from trade with Communist countries. On April 1st, Harold Stassen, Director of Mutual Security, in giving evidence before McCarthy's Subcommittee on Investigations, claimed that McCarthy was

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2Rovere, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

3Neustadt, op. cit., p. 62. (emphasis in original.)

undermining efforts to curb this type of trade in an enforceable manner, and, thus, American foreign policy. The same day, Secretary of State Dulles met with McCarthy and pointed out to him that he (McCarthy) was in danger of encroaching on the executives' sphere of power as laid down in the Constitution. The following day, April 2nd, there were some interesting developments. At a press conference, President Eisenhower modified Stassen's insistence that United States foreign policy had been "undermined", replacing this latter word with "infringed" upon. It seemed as if Stassen had had his knuckles rapped by his boss. Furthermore, that same day, McCarthy denied that he had been warned about encroaching upon the executive branch's business by Dulles on April 1st.

Both Arthur Krock and William S. White pointed out some of the dangers which were implicit in the line the Administration had taken over this fracas. Krock felt that while the Truman Administration had been wrong in openly battling with McCarthy, the Eisenhower Administration was in danger of having to face even worse consequences if it simply turned the other cheek. White, writing a few days later, was more specific. Dulles had lost face in the eyes of some Democrats. This endangered the bases of support for Eisenhower's foreign policy in the face of a split Republican party. But the President had not only offended the Democrats, said White, he had also caused some ill-feeling on the Republican side amongst those who wished him to make a clear stand.

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2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
against McCarthy.\textsuperscript{1} We do not, of course, have to accept these speculations in toto, but they are important for at least two reasons. First, they give an indication that Eisenhower was failing to use his influence to the maximum degree, and further, that loss of prestige in one area (the Executive) may lead to loss of influence in another area (Congress). Second, they show that two moderately conservative correspondents were by this stage asking, albeit implicitly, for a stronger stance by the President \textit{vis-a-vis} McCarthy.

It was perhaps possible that Eisenhower might have changed the whole tenor of his relationship with McCarthy if he had not agreed, somewhat against his own will, to refrain from criticising the Senator while he himself was campaigning in Wisconsin in 1952.\textsuperscript{2} But, given that he did not, the President had, it seems to us, set the pattern for his future attitude to McCarthy. It is interesting to notice, however, that he was more concerned to criticise McCarthy then, when he was not yet burdened with the Presidency, than he was once he entered office.

Eisenhower, at least at the beginning of his Presidential career when he had to face McCarthy, was by no stretch of the imagination an inveterate politician. His approach to political problems in general was cautious, his approach to the problem of McCarthy in particular was verging on one of non-recognition, at least as far as the public knew. Not without some justification, James A. Wechsler summed up the situation thus: McCarthy was not a superman; he was nourished more by the weakness of those who should have resolutely challenged him—most notably Dwight D. Eisenhower—than by any mysterious resources. There must have been many moments when he shook with laughter over the conduct of those he was harassing; surely he must have enjoyed Mr. Eisenhower’s austere refusal to indulge in

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{New York Times}, April 5th, 1953.

\textsuperscript{2}This incident is related by Eisenhower, op. cit., pp. 317-319.
personalities: the craven formula devised early at the White House for the preservation of internal Republican peace and quiet.¹

II. An Explanation of Eisenhower's Inaction

The President of the United States is burdened with many political roles which he must fulfill. Inevitably, of course, these roles are by no means smoothly interlocking;² role conflict was a feature of Eisenhower's Presidency as much as it was of all twentieth century Presidents. Lester Seligman has stated that "President Eisenhower's reluctance to 'take on' Senator McCarthy was an attempt to minimize a conflict between his role as Chief Executive and his role as party leader."³ Eisenhower was anxious, as we have pointed out, not to have a direct confrontation with McCarthy for fear that party unity might be destroyed. He preferred, rather as he himself makes clear, to operate in a more stealthy fashion behind the scenes. In early March of 1954, for example, Eisenhower invited Senator Dirksen to breakfast.⁴ The President evidently hoped that he could encourage Dirksen, who was a Republican member of the Subcommittee on Investigations chaired by McCarthy, to persuade the Wisconsin senator to observe rules of fair play in his committee's hearings. The apparent failure of this approach was borne out in the Army-McCarthy hearings which started in the following month.⁵

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⁴This incident is related in Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 325.
⁵See below, Chap. 5.
This dilemma of how to deal with a maverick in one's own party goes somewhat deeper than simply the personality of Eisenhower himself. The problem is one which is rooted fundamentally in the structure of American government itself and, indeed, in the sheer size of the United States. Political parties in America, for instance, are highly decentralized in nature, lack cohesion and are relatively undisciplined.1 By drawing a parallel with the British party system we may indicate the kind of problem that Eisenhower faced in his role as party leader. "The member of Parliament," writes Sir Ivor Jennings, is . . . returned to support a party. He recognizes his party obligations by receipt of the 'whip'; if he disagrees with the party policy on a particular matter, he may abstain from voting. Occasionally, perhaps, he votes against his party. If he does so too frequently, he loses the 'whip'; and this means, probably, the loss of party support at the next election. Without that support, he will probably not be elected.2

Now, it is true that any President needs the help of Congress to put his program into operation. For this reason he hopes that he can acquire the backing of his own party in Congress, but simply being party leader does not guarantee this; he must use the weapons of veto, patronage and so on, to eke out a working relationship with Congress, and with his party in Congress.3 Thus, the threat of discipline is considerably less potent in the American party system than in the British party system. It was certainly with some of this knowledge in mind that Eisenhower took a stand of inaction toward McCarthy—lack of party discipline made even him, as party leader, wary of taking action which might upset the Republicans in Congress.4

3See, Corwin, op. cit., pp. 263-291.
4Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 326.
Intimately connected with the problem of party leadership *vis-a-vis* McCarthy, is the question of the separation of powers in the national government. We have pointed out that Eisenhower tended to regard this separation as much more rigid than did a president of the type of Franklin Delano Roosevelt; he thus left the condemnation of McCarthy to Congress. Of the implications of this stance we shall have more to say in our concluding chapter.

If Eisenhower was deferential to Congress, he was more forceful in his handling of the Executive branch, although here too there were inadequacies. It is certainly true that the Executive is now so large that any real sense of centralized control is lost. As Peter Woll has remarked, "Under the Constitution the President is the executive, but this does not necessarily give him the power to control the bureaucracy."¹ Eisenhower institutionalized the office of the Presidency considerably, attempting to decentralize an overburdened chief executive.² However, he was not the best of administrators in that he "was not especially interested in either the purposes or mechanics of most parts of the federal administration, and the first requisite of a successful administrator at the top of the pyramid is...an unforced interest in what goes on below."³ This would, perhaps, account for the appointment of a man like Scott McLeod. But, in connection with McCarthy, there was another apparent failure in administration. Until McCarthy's attack on General Zwicker, according to Robert Donovan, "by and large the White House had been taking a hands-off attitude toward the dispute. . . .on the grounds that it was the Army's affair, and there was

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²Corwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 300-305.
little coordination between the White House and Stevens on it.\(^1\) This would seem to indicate that Eisenhower's operation of the executive branch left something to be desired in terms of location and coordination in dealing with possible trouble spots. Inaction in this case arose on account of a rather "compartmentalized" view of the executive branch.

Eisenhower's attitudes toward McCarthy were of some relevance too, for they added a further reason for his inaction. The President felt that if he were to attack McCarthy openly, he would merely give the Senator additional publicity, thereby giving him exposure "without achieving any constructive purpose."\(^2\) This, then, was a deliberate stand taken by Eisenhower; it was not something which he merely fell into.

III. **Summary**

There is no doubt that President Eisenhower played a large role in the McCarthy affair—this was inevitable since he was chief executive. Whether he played a crucial role is not what we must assess here, but, rather, whether he could have hastened the final collapse of Senator McCarthy.

Eisenhower's view of his office was somewhat passive in relation to Congress. Further than this, he seems to have taken a limited view of his role as leader of the Republican party. These two facets of his political behavior combined with at least two other factors to provide a somewhat amorphous machine to deal with mavericks such as McCarthy. First, his lack of political acumen in terms of the importance for him of maintaining the sources of his power. Second, his own attitude of aloofness to the whole question that Joseph McCarthy

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\(^1\)Donovan, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

\(^2\)Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 320.
posed. The factor of the maintenance of power, power that has to be earned by, rather than simply bestowed upon, the President, is, we believe, of immense importance. In his first year, at least, Eisenhower did not take full cognizance of the situation that, "The probabilities of power do not derive from the literary theory of the Constitution."¹

Even accounting for the fact of his personal dislike of McCarthy, Eisenhower did not take enough precautions to protect his own staff, the treatment of which reflected, good or bad, upon him. These were things which he could have controlled. There were, and still are, other more deep-rooted politico-structural elements which could not be changed over night, and which are unlikely to be changed in anything but the longest run. These would include such ingredients of the American system of government as the separation of powers, and, less formally, an undisciplined party system, with its centrifugal overcoming its centripetal tendencies.

There were, therefore, two identifiable types of problems which caused delays and difficulties in dealing with McCarthy. The first type, which we shall call immediate, was involved with Eisenhower's own decisions which could have been changed at relatively short notice. The second type, which we shall call extended, are problems which were not amenable to any real solution in the immediate future, such as the American party structure and the separation of powers. It is, partially, the intention of this study to attempt to see which of these types and their subtypes are most suitable for change in the American political context.

¹Neustadt, op. cit., p. 51.
CHAPTER V

McCarthy and Congress

McCarthy's committee assignments in 1953 provided an important base of power for him. If 1953 saw the emergence of a McCarthy with a real foundation from which to launch himself, 1954 saw his sudden collapse. The very body which had given him a base from which to work finally acted, condemning his actions as a senator. In a sense, it is probably true that the very fact that the Wisconsin Senator became chairman of both the Senate Committee on Government Operations and of its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was a very mixed blessing. Initially, it seemed that such assignments might be used to add impetus to Senator McCarthy's anti-Communist drive, and so they were. It was ironical, therefore, that the Senator's antics on these committees finally contributed to his downfall.

In this chapter our aim will be to cover four main areas in McCarthy-Congressional relations, all of which occurred in 1954: the Army-McCarthy Hearings, from April 22nd to June 17th; the censure motion introduced by Senator Ralph Flanders on July 30th, and its subsequent debate; the hearings and report of Senator Arthur Watkins' Select Committee which reported on November 8th; and the Senate debate on the Watkins Committee's recommendations, culminating in the vote of condemnation on December 2nd. It is pertinent to our discussion, therefore, to put these events into the context of the 83rd Congress, to answer, first of all, some questions of personnel and personalities, alliances and structure. The political environment in which McCarthy operated is of importance if we are to understand his power and the inherent inadequacies in his position which led to his demise.
I. McCarthy in the 83rd Congress, First Session

In the presidential election of 1952 Eisenhower had overcome Adlai Stevenson not only by a large plurality of the popular vote, but also by an overwhelming majority of the Electoral College votes cast. The Republican majorities in Congress were much less startling, but there was, nevertheless, Republican control of the national government apparatus. Eisenhower's victory seems to have been more in the nature of a personal rather than of a partisan political triumph. As far as we are concerned, what is important is that the Republicans came to control the Congressional committees through their majority. The committees in Congress are, of course, of immense strategic importance, and so too, a fortiori, are the committee chairmen. "It is difficult to exaggerate," writes Daniel Berman, "the power of a committee chairman. Even on committees with comparatively democratic procedures, chairmen are generally able to exercise firm control, and what the committee does is seldom different from what the chairman wants it to do."

1

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<td>Adlai E. Stevenson</td>
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2See above, p. 43.


Senator McCarthy was assigned to two Senate Committees, Appropriations and Government Operations, the latter of which he was chairman, and which was to become the Congressional basis of his influence. He was not alone, however, in his "crusade" against Communists in government. Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana was appointed to three committees, Judiciary, Post Office and Civil Service, and Rules and Administration, the last of which he became chairman. Jenner was of the same inclination as McCarthy vis-à-vis the threat of Communist subversion in America. He carried out similar investigations to those of McCarthy as Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Membership of the Permanent Investigations
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 33rd Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions

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<td>(chairman)</td>
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Table I

*Seniority in party based on "years served, precedent, and opinions of key officials". (Congressional Quarterly, Almanac, Vol. IX, 1953).


2 Ibid., p. 239

Senator McCarthy was not, the, alone in his tirades against Communism; he could, in the Senate, rely on the support of Senator Jenner and, as we shall see at a later stage in this chapter, of a number of other Senators.

The central pivot of McCarthy's base of attack was the Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. It would seem that McCarthy deliberately chose the Subcommittee as the most useful instrument for his particular purposes. First, the Subcommittee had the advantage over its parent committee of being relatively small, numbering only seven members in all. Second, McCarthy made sure of his control over it by appointing himself its chairman. By doing so he avoided being saddled with a subcommittee which might become an independent center of power, a not uncommon occurrence with Congressional subcommittees. Third the Subcommittee was very flexible in its terms of reference, thus allowing McCarthy to use it, more or less, for ends which he, as Chairman, could determine. Thus even a cursory glance at the publications of the Permanent Subcommittee in the 82nd Congress yields a marked contrast to those of the 83rd Congress, after McCarthy had taken over control as Chairman. In the 82nd Congress the Subcommittee was not concerned with the threat of internal Communism - its major publications were concerned with much more mundane affairs. In the 83rd Congress, the position had so much changed that the Subcommittee was dealing almost exclusively with matters concerning Communism. In addition, the Committee on Government Operations was not

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1Berman, op. cit., pp. 124-125.


concerned with Communism either in the 82nd or 83rd Congress, thus indicating that McCarthy did not aim to use the larger organization as a vehicle for his personal objectives. The 83rd Congress gave the Subcommittee augmented financial muscle at McCarthy's request - $200,000 was appropriated for it in 1953, more than twice the appropriation for 1952. In the second session of the 83rd Congress, $214,000 was appropriated for the Subcommittee. After some probing by Senator Eastland, the money was voted on a roll-call which yielded only one dissenting vote, that of Senator Fulbright of Arkansas. The type and extent of the Subcommittee's investigations bear ample witness to the reasons for asking such increases in funds. McCarthy used his political intuition skillfully to provide the foundation for a rampage which lasted for a very full eighteen months.

The Wisconsin Senator had first been elected to Congress in 1946, assuring himself of victory by beating Robert LaFollette, Jr. in the Republican primary. According to Anderson and May in their description of McCarthy's campaign, it seems evident that he was by no means totally scrupulous. Apart from his campaign methods, he also chose to run for office while still a judge, which was banned under the Wisconsin State Constitution. The Wisconsin State Supreme Court decided, however, not to take disciplinary action. There was little evidence in this campaign of the rabid anti-Communism that was to appear four years later. How, then, did McCarthy come to be embroiled in such an issue in

1Ibid., pp. 100-103 and 104-107.
4For a description of this campaign see, Anderson and May, op. cit., pp. 78-105.
5For a description of this facet of the campaign, see The McCarthy Record, (Madison: The Wisconsin Citizens' Committee on McCarthy's Record, 1951),
1950? According to Rovere, the answer was pragmatic. "McCarthy took up the Communist menace in 1950 not with any expectation that it would make him sovereign of the assemblies, but with the simple hope that it would help him hold his job in 1952."¹ We have been able to find no evidence which would prove this contention one way or the other. Rovere does provide some factual material, however, which appears to back up his hypothesis,² and it would seem that the generally practical, hand to mouth, style of McCarthy's political action would reinforce Rovere's hypothesis. This, after all, is the style of the demagogue.

The Subcommittee wasted no time in getting under way in 1953, and very soon it was obvious what kind of investigations were going to be carried out. On February 4th there began an investigation into mismanagement of State Department files.³ Very soon the hearings began to take on the face of uncovering subversives in government. This investigation, as it transpired, set the tone for the rest of the Subcommittee's investigations in that year. There followed a number of perusals of various governmental agencies,⁴ including the Voice of America, State Department Information Center Libraries overseas and the Government Printing Office.

¹Rovere, op. cit., p. 120
²Ibid., pp. 122-123
⁴For a summary of these, see Congressional Quarterly, Almanac, Vol. IX, pp. 334-351.


There were, besides the investigations, a number of occurrences in 1953 which were to influence McCarthy's relations with the Senate in 1954. Perhaps the most important of these events was the hiring of Roy Cohn and David Schine to the staff of the Subcommittee. McCarthy himself hired Cohn, and Cohn, in turn, then hired Schine. As we shall see at a later juncture, it was Schine's induction into the Army, and Cohn's reaction to it, that was in large part to blame for McCarthy's political collapse. Cohn and Schine were involved, too, in an incident that caused some degree of hilarity in Europe, namely an investigative tour of U.S. Information Service European libraries which started on April 4th and finished on April 21st.

On July 9th, J. B. Matthews, Executive Director of the Subcommittee resigned following an article in the American Mercury in which he alleged that the largest group supporting Communism in the United States was composed of Protestant clergymen. Eisenhower was angry about the article, and had brought pressure to bear on the Subcommittee to fire Matthews. Not all the members of the Subcommittee had been in favor of Matthew's resignation, indeed only one of the Republican members supported his ouster, Charles Potter of Michigan. Potter was joined by the three Democratic members, Senators McClellan, Symington and Jackson, in forcing the decision upon McCarthy. This was not, however, the end of the affair. The next day, July 10th, the three Democrats on the Subcommittee resigned. The reason for the resignations was simple:

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1Rovere, op. cit., p. 191.


3Adams, op. cit., pp. 141-142. See, also, Potter, op. cit., pp. 117 and 173. Potter, it seems to us, exaggerates the role he played in forcing Matthews' resignation.

McCarthy, they claimed, had complete and unwarranted jurisdiction over hiring and firing procedures concerning Subcommittee staff. In other words, the members of the Subcommittee were being allowed little or no influence in a matter which could possibly be of great relevance to them personally.

On July 13th, the first genuinely overt signs of discontent with McCarthy showed in the Senate. Senator Mike Monroney of Oklahoma charged that the Wisconsin Senator had produced chaos in the State Department and was endangering the work of the Central Intelligence Agency. "More and more," Monroney said, "the Senate and the Congress have infringed upon the necessary administrative prerogative granted to the President by the Constitution." The Oklahoman, however, was not content to leave his criticism there. He put his arguments into an important overall context when he stated that,

Sooner or later - and I believe sooner - the Senate must be willing to take full responsibility for acts of its committees and subcommittees, and must be prepared to defend them as its own. Since the committees act as an arm of the Senate, our people have the right to hold us personally responsible for whatever is done in the name of the Senate and under its authority. We cannot wash our hands of this ultimate responsibility.

Monroney followed up his assault against McCarthy's Subcommittee a week later on July 20th, when he introduced into the Senate Resolution 146. This resolution would have put power in the Presiding Officer of the Senate to stop a committee investigation if he felt that the scope of the probe was outside the jurisdiction of the committee. But there the criticism ceased, for the time being at least - Monroney at this stage remained the exception to the rule.

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1Ibid., p. 34.
3Ibid., p. 8620.
4Ibid., p. 9185.
On July 16th Senator McCarthy had written to the three Democrats who had resigned from the Subcommittee, inviting them to return. Replying individually, each turned down the offer. ¹ Politically, of course, this placed the onus on the Republican members of the Subcommittee - if there was blame to be attached in the future, more of it was sure to rub off on these unfortunate G.O.P. members than on the Democrats. By staying in the Subcommittee, the Republican members maintained party unity, which, at the time, was perhaps the lesser of two evils - refusing to serve under McCarthy or hoping that by remaining on the Subcommittee, they might be able to control his most outrageous abuses of Congressional power. As we shall see in the events of 1954, Senators Mundt and Dirksen were far from being reticent in their support of their colleague from Wisconsin; for them at least, the dilemma of whether to stay on the Subcommittee or not, may not have appeared very real. What is certain is that those members who resigned were to be in a better position than those who remained on the Subcommittee when the all out attack on McCarthy came in 1954 - it would be difficult for him at that stage to defend himself by using an entirely _tu quoque_ method of defense. The three Democrats did rejoin the Subcommittee on January 25th, 1954, but not until Senator McCarthy had agreed to certain changes in the rules of that body. First, hiring and firing of Subcommittee staff members would henceforth only be done with approval of a majority of the Subcommittee. Second the minority members would be able to have their own counsel in the future. Third, a committee clerk would be made available to them to keep them advised. Lastly, if the Democrat members of the Subcommittee opposed public hearing on any question, that opposition would have to be

¹ _Congressional Quarterly, Almanac_, Vol. IX, p. 341
resolved by a vote of the parent Committee on Government Operations.\(^1\) Thus, the Democrats had taken good care not to leave their flank open to possible subsequent attack.

August 31st saw McCarthy's first contact with the Army; on that day he started to conduct one-man closed-door hearings into Communist infiltration of the military services.\(^2\) As 1953 drew to a close, so did McCarthy increase his pressure upon the military. On October 12th the Subcommittee began hearings into alleged espionage at the Army Signal Corps Radar Center at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.\(^3\) The hearings lasted until March of the following year. These were fateful steps for McCarthy to take, for it was the fight with the Army in 1951 which brought on the collapse of the mechanisms of his influence.

Before turning to the Army-McCarthy hearings, it is worthwhile to look back on the year 1953 through the eyes of the Annual Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations.\(^4\) The report clearly bears the imprint of Senator McCarthy. In a preface signed by him, McCarthy claims that the Subcommittee and its parent Committee on Government Operations were established in part, to deal with subversion in government.\(^5\) That this was clearly not the intention of the act which established the committee, as Monroney had pointed out, was made clear on the following pages of the report in which the official terms of reference for the parent Committee were laid out.\(^6\) This portion of the Legislative Reorganisation Act of 1946 does not even approximate mention

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\(^1\)See *New York Times*, January 26th and 27th, 1954.


\(^4\)See Ibid.

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 1

\(^6\)Ibid., p. 3.
of the word subversion in referring to the committee.

A later section of the Report brings up the problem of dealing with witnesses, what their rights should be and so on. On page 8 of the Report there is a reasonable interpretation of the powers of Congressional committees. "A Congressional Committee can subpena witnesses, hear their testimony, and make recommendations for legislation or take other appropriate action predicated on the record of its hearings, but it has no direct punitive powers." The last phrase is interesting in view of the contents of other parts of the Report. By means of innuendo the Report would have us believe that those people who plead the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution are, ipso facto, Communists. Pages ten through fourteen list all seventy-one witnesses who pleaded the Fifth Amendment in public hearings before the Subcommittee. Inferentially, we believe it is difficult to give oredence to the general principles of Congressional committees laid out at the beginning of the Report in view of the way in which the seventy-one Fifth Amendment witnesses are later displayed in the same Report. As we will see at a later juncture, the Army-McCarthy hearings will further tend to bear out this scepticisim as to McCarthy's motives.

One last fact should be mentioned in dealing with this Report. Some interesting figures are put forward concerning the number of witnesses questioned and the number of investigations initiated by the Subcommittee. Of one thousand seven hundred and forty-six witnesses, only two hundred and fifteen were examined in public sessions, that is, before the whole Subcommittee. Three hundred and thirty-one were examined in executive session, that is by McCarthy and his staff. The remaining one thousand two hundred were interviewed by the subcommittee staff. What is clear from the information is that the majority of the

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1Ibid., pp. 8-9. See, also, p. 8. footnote, in which the procedures of the Subcommittee are enumerated.

2See, Ibid., p. 5.

3For these figures, see Ibid., p. 10.
Subcommittee did not hear a majority of the witnesses involved in its investigations during 1953. Much of this procedure came in for criticism during the Army-McCarthy hearings. Since these latter hearings are important in explaining Senator McCarthy's political fall, we must now devote a separate section to them.

II. The Army-McCarthy Hearings

In 1954 Congressional elections witnessed the end, temporarily, of Republican domination in Congress. McCarthy himself lost a major center of his power when, with his fellow Republicans, he lost his Committee chairmanship, and with it, his mastery of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation. But his power had already been eroded to a significant extent before the elections to the 84th Congress, by a fight which was not undertaken entirely at the Senator's own volition. The fight was, of course, with the U. S. Army, which culminated in Congressional hearings lasting from April 22nd to June 17th, 1954, to consider charges and counter charges from the Army and McCarthy respectively.

At the heart of the problem which faced the Wisconsin Senator in the Spring of that year was a twenty-five year old man who had been attached to his staff for the preceding twelve-months—G. David Schine. Schine had been brought onto the Permanent Subcommittees staff on the recommendation of Roy Cohn, the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee.¹ Schine acted as unpaid chief consultant to the Subcommittee from February of 1953 until the time of his induction into the Army on November 3rd, 1953. What were to become known as the Army-McCarthy hearings centered around the circumstances of Schine's being drafted into the

armed forces. Rumors had been circulating in the early part of 1954 concerning Roy Cohn's allegedly dubious actions on behalf of his fellow staff member in connection with Schine's induction. In order to clarify the situation, a Chronological Series of Events was published on March 10, 1954 by the Departments of Defense and the Army. It was circulated to a number of Senators and Representatives with repercussions that were to set off a stream of events that have been called "the greatest political show on earth."  

On April 13th the Army made charges against McCarthy and some of his staff in relation to the person of David Schine. "The Department of the Army", the document began, "alleges that Senator Joseph R. McCarthy as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, United States Senate, and its Chief Counsel Roy M. Cohn, as well as other members of its staff, sought by improper means to obtain preferential treatment for one Private G. David Schine, U. S. Army, formerly Chief Consultant of their Subcommittee..." This general charge was then followed by particulars as to when, where and how such "improper means" had been applied. One week later, on April 20th, McCarthy struck back, rejecting the charges that had been preferred against him as "unfounded." In addition, the Senator preferred counter-charges against Robert T. Stevens, Secretary of the Department of the Army, and John G. Adams, Counselor of the Department of the Army, while also making charges concerning malfeasance of

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1Ibid., p. 1.
2See Appendix I in ibid., pp. 103-110.
3Ibid., p. 1.
4David T. Bazelon, in the Introduction to de Antonio and Talbot, op. cit., p. 11.
5Subcommittee, Report, p. 3.
6See ibid., pp. 3-5.
office against H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Stevens
and Adams were accused, in essence, of using the Schine case in order to force
the Permanent Subcommittee to cease its investigations into subversion in the
armed services.\(^1\) Charges and countercharges having been made, the Senate,
according to then Republican majority leader William F. Knowland, should have
moved to investigate them with all speed.\(^2\) The task of conducting hearings on
the charges fell to McCarthy's Subcommittee, from which he himself temporarily
abdicated his position; Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota consequently took
the chair and Senator Henry Dworshak of Idaho was co-opted onto the Subcommittee
to bring it up to full strength again.

We shall not be concerned, by and large, merely with the procession of
events in the hearings. As we have stressed in Chapter One, what we are
interested in doing is assigning historical significances to situations in
order that we may use them to learn for the future. Thus, we must ask our-
selves, what was in the Army-McCarthy hearings that is relevant to this problem
of foresight in politics? Clearly, some of the information which was turned up
in the hearings themselves is important, but perhaps just as significant for
us were the attitudes of the members of the Subcommittee in the Reports that
they submitted upon termination of the hearings. We shall, therefore, be
selective in our approach to the televised political extravaganza known as the
Army-McCarthy hearings.

The aura of the hearings was something to which the public had not
hitherto been submitted. Television was used to cover the hearings which was
at once a boon and, eventually, a source of discomfort to McCarthy. He himself

\(^{1}\)For the complete list of McCarthy's charges against Stevens, Adams, and
Hensel, see ibid., pp. 5-11.

\(^{2}\)Potter, op. cit., p. 133.
was in a somewhat peculiar situation. David Schine had never seemed an important part of his life, not, at least, in the same way as Roy Cohn evidently was. As it transpired, we believe, McCarthy became a drowning man politically because of his defense of a person in whom he really had no interest. In other words, McCarthy was put in an unenviable position as a result of an appointment for which he had not been directly responsible. Several events will, we think, bear out the Wisconsin Senator's predicament. In a phone call which he made to Secretary of the Department of the Army Stevens on November 7th, 1953, McCarthy said in part,

I would like to ask you one personal favor. For God's sake, don't put Dave (Schine) in Service and assign him back to my committee. From three standpoints: One, I couldn't get away with any more than a week. The newspapers would be back on us, and you would have to send him back into uniform anyway. Two: this thing has been running along so cleanly so far, they have not been able to beat your brains out. . . . And the third thing, they would say I asked for him. He is a good boy, but there is nothing indispensable about him.  

McCarthy went on to point out that Roy Cohn was very unreasonable in asserting that Schine should not be treated like any other draftee, in that he wanted Schine assigned back to work on the Subcommittee instead of carrying out his basic training. The Senator added that Cohn had been on the verge of leaving his job as Subcommittee counsel when he thought that McCarthy might be willing to let Schine carry out his Army commitment like any other draftee. The phone call was followed up by a letter to Secretary Stevens dated December 22nd, 1953.  

The communication read in part, "I have an unbreakable rule that neither I nor anyone in my behalf shall ever attempt to interfere with or influence the Army in its assignments, promotion, et-cetera." Somewhat later in the letter,

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1See Subcommittee, Report, pp. 116-117 for text of whole phone call.

2For the text of the whole letter, see ibid., p. 118.
McCarthy wrote, "while I am inclined to agree that Mr. Schine would never have been drafted except because of the fact that he worked for my committee, I want to make it clear at this time that no one has any authority to request any consideration for Mr. Schine other than what other draftees get."

It is clear from the hearings that Cohn was the person who was pressuring the Army, and that McCarthy, wishing, for reasons of his own, to retain Cohn on his Subcommittee staff, became embroiled in attempting to defend his Chief Counsel's position. The majority findings at the end of the hearings were more critical of Roy Cohn than they were of Joe McCarthy. The latter was criticized mostly for his inability to control his own staff, while the former was found to have exercised undue exertion on behalf of his comrade, Private G. David Schine. The minority findings, similarly, made it patently obvious that they found an equally important distinction between what was done on behalf of Schine by Cohn, and what was done on his behalf by Senator McCarthy. Cohn, according to the minority, took the actions concerning Schine, but McCarthy was culpable because he had condoned these actions. Senator Charles E. Potter, adding a personal opinion in addition to the majority findings and recommendations which he had signed, supported the minority's opinion strongly in stating that, "The fact that Senator McCarthy at no time expressed disapproval of Mr. Cohn's actions in his efforts to obtain favors for Mr. Schine, gave the strength of sanction to them."

1See, for instance, Ibid., pp. 32 and 35-36.
2Ibid., pp. 79-80.
3Ibid., pp. 87-88.
4Ibid., p. 100.
Roy Cohn could not have contrived to get away with as much as he did, were it not for an environment which was favorable to this particular type of arcana. More than any other person with whom either Cohn or McCarthy had dealings, Secretary Stevens appeared to be the least forceful, the least-decisive and the least politically intelligent.¹ The findings of the Subcommittee relating to Stevens are as critical of him as they were of either Cohn or McCarthy. The majority report says in reference to the Secretary of the Department of the Army,

We find that the motives of Secretary Stevens, as head of the Army, were beyond reproach, but that he followed a course of placation, appeasement, and vacillation throughout the period leading up to this controversy when he should have asserted himself by protesting such action promptly to the committee or by terminating such contacts through administrative action.²

The minority report went even further in stating that privileges were accorded to Schine where they should not have been. Responsibility for this happening, the minority report alleged, lay at the feet of Stevens and Adams. Senator Potter, in addition, in his separate statement, concluded that Stevens "showed a lack of competency in this matter i.e. handling the Schine affair which at times suggested bewilderment. He did not grasp the far-reaching and deleterious effects of such indecision on Army personnel."³ Stevens, then, according to these sources, acted with a lack of decision, finally finding himself in a very unenviable position vis-à-vis McCarthy and his staff members. Moreover, as we have mentioned above,⁴ Eisenhower was not always forthcoming with the kind of support for Stevens which The Secretary of The Army needed to repulse Cohn's advances on behalf of Schine.⁵

¹See Michael Straight, Trial by Television, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), Chapter 4.
²Subcommittee, Report, pp. 80-81.
³Ibid., p. 101.
⁴See, Supra Chapter 4.
⁵See, Senator Potter's comments in Potter, op. cit., pp. 182-183.
There would seem to be some good reason for maintaining that, "It was Cohn who brought Schine to his castle on Capitol Hill. It was Schine who brought the castle down by adding one too many blocks on top of the dizzy structure Cohn had built."¹ It is, therefore, important to point out that McCarthy suffered from his attachment to Cohn and his consequent laxness in allowing Cohn his head with the Executive Branch. The personality reasons of McCarthy himself here are not under investigation; as far as we are concerned, we merely wish to point out that Cohn, somehow, was necessary to McCarthy. If this is so, the Army-McCarthy hearings, which certainly demonstrated McCarthyist techniques to the nation and from which McCarthy suffered accordingly, resulted from a political failure on the part of the Senator. Like President Eisenhower, McCarthy had failed to ensure his power position by indirectly making an appointment which contributed to the undermining of his popular appeal.

The Army-McCarthy hearings mark the real turning point in the Wisconsin Senator's career. It is one of the paradoxes of this political show that one of the crucial points in it was one in which McCarthy finally ended up by tying a noose around his own neck, while Roy Cohn, the real progenitor of the hearings, looked on in dismay, attempting to stop what he evidently regarded as a very dangerous move. The incident to which we refer is one in which McCarthy, quite out of context, proceeded to assail Joseph H. Welch, Counsel for the Army, for harboring a Communist sympathizer amongst the members of the law firm of which he was a partner. Welch, replying to McCarthy, said in part, "until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gauged your cruelty or recklessness."

Welch then went on to point out that Fred Fisher, the young man in question, had been a member of a Communist front organization for a short space of time, and was now a Young Republican and a man with integrity well aware of the mistake of the past. In closing his defense of Fisher, Welch said, "I fear he [Fisher].

¹Straight, op. cit., p. 189
shall always bear a scar needlessly inflicted by you. If it were in my power to forgive you for your reckless cruelty, I would do so. I like to think I'm a gentleman, but your forgiveness will have to come from someone other than me.\textsuperscript{1} McCarthy would not let the matter lie at this point -- almost impulsively he continued to belabor Fisher and his past associations. Finally, Welch would hear no more. "Mr. McCarthy," he said,

I will not discuss this further with you. You have sat within six feet of me and could ask, could have asked me to bring it out and if there is a God in heaven, it will do neither you nor your cause any good. I will not discuss it further. I will not ask Mr. Cohn any more witnesses. You, Mr. Chairman, may, it you will, call the next witness.\textsuperscript{2}

McCarthy admitted at one point that he knew that Roy Cohn did not want him to pursue the matter further, but, irrespective, he carried on. "Roy Cohn vainly signaled the Senator to stop the attack. But it was too late -- the country had seen McCarthyism at work, and it would not forget."\textsuperscript{3} One survey, however, does not bear out some observations that the Army-McCarthy hearings changed the minds of many people. A study carried out in two "middle-sized cities" in Maine and Kansas, in 1954, contained, amongst others, the following conclusion: "The hearings had relatively little effect in changing respondents' minds about Senator McCarthy."\textsuperscript{4} Whether or not attitudes to McCarthy were changed by the hearings, the fact remains that his political decline dates from this time, although we should add that the 1954 Congressional elections deprived him of his valuable chairmanships in Congress. It may be that the events of the

\textsuperscript{1}For this incident, see deAntonio and Talbot, op. cit., pp. 90-97.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., pp. 96-97.


Army-McCarthy hearings, the censure debate, with which we shall deal next, and the Congressional elections are too intertwined to ascribe the Senator's fall to any one of these incidents. A combination of events, triggered his political collapse; what we are more concerned with is why his demise did not come sooner.

Dorsen and Simon have argued that there were at least two reasons why the Army did not fight back against McCarthy earlier than it did -- it had certainly been provoked sufficiently to do so. First, Republican officials did not want to appear "soft on Communism" and perhaps risk splitting the Republican Party. Second, the Administration officials could not empathise with the kind of people who were being harrassed -- privates in the Army and members of minority groups at work as civilians in Fort Monmouth. The real battle, Dorsen and Simon claim, should not have been joined over the treatment of David Schine, but should have been fought, rather, over the more fundamental question of Congressional rights in regard to investigation of the Executive. This contention will be pursued further in our concluding chapter.

The Army-McCarthy hearings were at the same time demonstrations of McCarthy at his zenith and at his nadir. Publicity undoubtedly contributed to many people's growing antipathy toward him -- television was both blessing and bane to the Senator. The question which we may well ask is whether the hearings need have taken place at all? This is not a sterile issue. On balance, demagogues have a desire for publicity. It is our contention, which we hope to substantiate in the following chapter, that both Congress and the Executive could have found other, better, methods for dealing with McCarthy that would have severely reduced his political drawing power. If they

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1See Dorsen and Simon, loc. cit., p. 24.

2Ibid., pp. 24-25 and p. 28.
achieved nothing else, the Army-McCarthy hearings finally precipitated a full-scale debate on whether the Senator from Wisconsin was deserving of censure by his colleagues.

III. The Censure Debate.

It was a Republican, Senator Flanders of Vermont, who initiated the action which was to lead to McCarthy's condemnation by the Senate. On July 30th, 1954 he introduced to the Senate Resolution 301, which read, "Resolved: That the conduct of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. McCarthy) is unbecoming a Member of the United States Senate, is contrary to Senatorial tradition, and tends to bring the Senate into disrepute, and such conduct is hereby condemned." Following the introduction of the resolution, two Senators on the Republican side of the aisle made clear their intention to vote against any such resolution of censure, Everett Dirksen of Illinois and the Senate majority leader, William Knowland of California. Dirksen made it plain that he felt that the Senate would merely be helping the Communists by voting for the Flanders resolution. "Take your choice, Senators," said Dirksen.

"Do your want to march with that multitude to do evil and liquidate a member of this body by the name of McCarthy, or are we going to stand up and be counted for a man--whom I do not defend on every score, by any means, a man whom I have scolded roundly many times, but a man who has had the courage to go forward and do a good job, as he saw it, for his country, notwithstanding the mistakes he made." Objections to the resolution were not based only on this type of grounds. Senator Wayne Morse voiced misgivings in connection with the resolution, although he evidently did not oppose the spirit of it. The Oregon Senator was more concerned with the fact that the resolution was too broadly worded.

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2See Ibid., pp. 12736-12742.

3Ibid., p. 12742.
Morse preferred that specific charges be made rather than more general assertions.¹

Debate on the resolution was initially perfunctory and it was finally decided on August 2nd that the question should be referred to a select committee of three Republicans and three Democrats chosen by the Vice-President.² This decision had been suggested by Senator Corden of Oregon on July 30th.³ The Select Committee as established was composed of Senators Watkins of Utah, Johnson of Colorado, Stennis of Mississippi, Carlson of Kansas, Case of South Dakota and Ervin of North Carolina, with Senator Watkins acting as Chairman and Senator Johnson acting as Vice Chairman.⁴ The committee was not bound to studying alleged misconduct since 1952 only; the investigation was more widespread, covering McCarthy's career in the Senate since his election in 1946. The Committee did in fact look back to one particular incident prior to 1953, that of the fracas that had emerged between Senators Benton and McCarthy.⁵

More recent allegations of misconduct were also investigated by the Committee involving encouragement of executive officers to violate laws and oaths of office, abuse of fellow Senators, receipt of classified material and the incident relating to General Ralph Zwicker.⁶ We are not here concerned with

¹Ibid., pp. 12735-12736.
³Select Committee, Report, p. 2.
⁴Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Pt. 10, p. 12732.
⁵For a full exposition of these occurrences, see ibid., pp. 5-31 and U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, Investigations of Senators Joseph R. McCarthy and William Benton, Report No. 459, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1952.
⁶See, Select Committee, Report, pp. 31-61.
the intricacies of the Committee Report, but rather with the end results of its deliberations. In connection with alleged abuse of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, in reference to the Wisconsin's altercation with Senator Benton, the Select Committee found grounds for censure. Similarly, the Select-Committee found that McCarthy, in its opinion, should be censured for his behavior in the case of his treatment of General Zwicker. In all the remaining cases dealt with by the Committee it was felt that a resolution of censure could not be justified.

The Select Committee reported its findings on November 8th, 1954. The Senate lost little time in initiating discussion on the basis of these findings and Senator Flander's resolution of censure. Debate began on November 10th, and continued, with one significant break, until December 2nd, 1954. There are several factors in the debate which are of relevance as far as we are concerned. With one or two notable exceptions, certain Republican Senators provided their party conferees with his most effective defense and with some of his most trying moments. It will be remembered that Senator Flanders, a Republican, had introduced the censure motion. Although the Senator from Vermont did not participate to any large degree in the debate, his presence was constantly there in spirit, if not in the flesh. Senator Watkins, of Utah, it will be recalled, had been appointed chairman of the Select Committee. He too was a Republican, and one of the few men not to be intimidated by McCarthy's attacks. In defending his Committee's actions in the Senate, he did not flinch in his adherence to the Committee's procedures or findings.

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1 For the Committee's recommendations, see ibid., pp. 67-68.
2 See, Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 10, pp. 15922-16395.
3 See, for instance, McCarthy's verbal assault upon Watkins in ibid., pp. 15922-15934.
Republican defense of McCarthy was more prolific. Senator Welker of Idaho was the most consistent defender of the Wisconsin Senator's interests, but he was backed in his efforts by a number of party comrades. Everett Dirksen continued to defend McCarthy, finally offering an amendment to Senate Resolution 301, on December 1st. The amendment would have effectually repudiated the charges against Senator McCarthy but it was voted down 66-21. Help, too, came from Senator Jenner of Indiana, a long time stalwart of McCarthy's battles involving Communist subversion, and Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. Senator Barry Goldwater also gave his support to the beleaguered Senator, and was joined by Senator Mundt of South Dakota. But of all these, it was Senator Welker who bore the brunt of the defense.

The Democrats, for the most part appeared to be content to leave the Republicans to argue amongst themselves. An exception existed in Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, who had been an opponent of McCarthy's for a long period of time prior to the censure debate. By inference, Fulbright gave indications of some of the riff-raff which he considered McCarthy had wittingly, or unwittingly, attracted to his support, when on November 30th, he read into the Congressional Record various letters which he had recently received. A propos this correspondence he remarked that criticism had changed from "legitimate differences of opinion" to "unadulterated hate, vituperation, and abuse." He went on, "It is highly emotional, irrational, and designed to intimidate and overawe Members of the Senate." The Senator from Arkansas was joined in his attack upon McCarthy by Senator Lehman of New York, but,

1Ibid., p. 16322.
2Ibid., p. 16329.
3See, for instance, ibid., p. 16001 and p. 16330 respectively.
4Ibid., pp. 16196-16200.
5Ibid., p. 16196.
as we have pointed out, the Democrats tended to avoid what seemed to be in essence an intra party affair.

Numbers of amendments to the original Flanders resolution were proposed\(^1\) until at long last, on December 2nd, 1951, a vote was taken on Senate Resolution 301 as amended.\(^2\) The resolution now consisted of two sections. The first of these condemned McCarthy for his behavior in connection with the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections which grow out of his dispute with Senator Benton in 1951 and 1952. The second section condemned him for charges he had made against the Select Committee set up to investigate grounds for censure in relation to the original Flanders resolution. The words of the resolution did not mention censure specifically. There was some short discussion as to this point subsequent to the vote on Senate resolution 301. Some senators were dubious as to whether the Resolution was one of censure or not, but the final decision was probably best manifested in the following exchange:

Mr. Bridges: Mr. President, another parliamentary inquiry.

The Vice-President: The Senator will state it.

Mr. Bridges: Then the resolution which has been agreed to is not a censure resolution?

The Vice-President: The Senator has not stated a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. Bridges: The Senator from New Hampshire will ask the Chair if, after the elimination of the word "censure" in the amendment of the title, the resolution as adopted concerns the censure of a United States Senator.

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\(^1\)These amendments, and individual Senators' votes upon them, are usefully summarized in *Congressional Quarterly, Almanac*, Vol. X, pp. 472-473.

\(^2\)For the full text, see *Congressional Record*, Vol. 100, Part 10, p. 16392.
The Vice-President: The Senator has stated the same inquiry in different words. The resolution does concern the conduct of a Senator, and the Senator from New Hampshire or other Senators may place upon the resolution such interpretation as they desire.  

Senator McCarthy was equally reticent when, immediately after the vote, he was asked whether he felt he had been censured. "Well," he replied, "it wasn't exactly a vote of confidence." What was clear was that the precedents for the Flanders resolution had not mentioned censure either, but the Senators involved had been considered, nevertheless, censured.  

During the debate on Senate Resolution 301, demonstrations for McCarthy were displayed, the chief one being on November 30th at Madison Square Garden in New York City. The organizers had hoped for at least 20,000 participants in the rally, but, as it transpired, only approximately 13,000 persons did turn out. The reporter covering the story for the New York Times recorded that the chief villains of the meeting were, Senator Flanders, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, George C. Marshall, Dean Acheson and the New York Times. The personalities who evoked the most rousing reaction from the crowd were, he added, General McArthur, Senator McCarran, Roy Cohn, Senator Bricker, Westbrook Pegler and Senator Knowland. The debate on the Flanders resolution was not merely a matter which concerned the Senate alone. Senator Watkins, whatever his personal feelings concerning the Senator from Wisconsin, aptly summed up the wider implications of McCarthy's actions. At the conclusion of a long  

1 Ibid., pp. 16392-16393.  
3 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.
speech delivered in the Senate on November 16th Senator Watkins had this to say:

...when a Senator takes the oath of office to defend and to support the Constitution of the United States, that pledge is not merely reference to a document containing certain words. It goes to the living Constitution. That living Constitution consists not only of words, but the Office of the President, the Supreme Court, the Senate, and the House of Representatives which those words create. When a Senator does or says things which injure those institutions, he is violating the living Constitution of the United States.¹

Senator Lehman of New York, too, made some pertinent comments on the broader scope of McCarthy's behavior. On November 30th he said in the Senate,

It is not Senator McCarthy the individual who is at issue. There is no individual Member of the Senate who would merit, or who could justify, the expenditure of the time and energy we have devoted to this question. No, the junior Senator from Wisconsin is only the symbol of the real issue. The real issue is the nature of the Senate, and its ability to insure that the powers conferred upon each Senator under the rules and under the Constitution - powers provided for the protection of the people - shall not be used to abuse people, to distort the legislative process, and to besmirch the name and dignity, not only of the Senate, but of our country.

The remarks of Senators Watkins and Lehman were lent some credence, if in a way which they had not quite intended, by the action of the Senate in connection with Senator McCarthy. As one would expect from an inspection of the debate on Resolution 301, the final vote clearly showed that McCarthy divided the Republican party much more than he did the Democratic party. The Democrats, apart from Senators Gore, Kennedy and Smathers, who did not vote, registered their approval of the resolution as amended.² The Republicans, on the contrary, could not show such a united front; they were, in point of fact, split down the middle, twenty-three of them voting for the motion, and twenty-two against it. Republican Senators Bricker, Capehart, and Wiley did not vote, while Senator McCarthy answered "present" when his name was called on the roll.

¹Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 10, p. 16061.
²Ibid., p. 16220.
³For this, and the following voting data on Senate Resolution 301, see Ibid., p. 16392 and Congressional Quarterly, Almanac, Vol. X, p. 473.
Perhaps the most important single vote on the Resolution was that cast against it by Senate majority leader William F. Knowland. Although Knowland would no longer be in the position of majority leader in the 86th Congress, he was still in a position of considerable power. William S. White remarked that Knowland's vote against the Resolution would widen the split in the Republican party and would deprive Eisenhower of any effective leadership in the Senate, since it was well known that Eisenhower supported the Resolution, having personally congratulated Senator Watkins on December 4th for the job which he had done. White's comment may appear somewhat too strong, but it is certain that relations between those Senators who voted "nay" on the Resolution and President Eisenhower were liable to be a trifle cool. It may be that the Democratic victory in the 1954 Congressional elections, leading to a Democratic majority in the Senate, was by way of an advantage to President Eisenhower in the long run.

In concluding this discussion of the censure debate, we might pose the question: Why did McCarthy not apologise for his actions, thereby obviating any need for the Senate proceedings that led to his condemnation? Senator Fulbright was of the opinion, in a clear allusion to the Wisconsin Senator, that, as in the 1929 censure case of Senator Bingham, an apology would have led to the dropping of charges, but McCarthy, following Bingham's example, refused to recant. Richard Rovere has indicated some of the reasons for this stand. First, McCarthy would have felt that he was letting down his two main supporters in the Senate, Herman Welker and William Jenner. Second, McCarthy was a fighter with little intention of retreat in the face of adversity. What could have ended in an apology ended in condemnation.

3Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 10, p. 12906.
4Rovere, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
IV. Summary

Although the events of 1954 marked some dark hours in McCarthy's career, he was not completely finished by the end of the year, but he had begun a precipitous decline in influence. The public had seen his methods at work in the Army-McCarthy hearings and had, at least to some extent, reacted unfavorably, although, we admit, this finding is based more in subjective observations than in empirical data.

The Republicans had started out 1954 in control of the Senate, but by the end of the year had lost that control through the Congressional elections. With this loss, McCarthy lost his powerful chairmanships of the Committee on Government Operations and of its Subcommittee on Permanent investigations. His Congressional base of operations had all but disappeared. But it is well to remember here that half of the Republican members of Congress had voted against Resolution 301, and, as Hovere remarks, it was "by and large the more influential half."

President Eisenhower had evidently endorsed the action which the Senate had taken. As far as he was concerned this was a satisfactory conclusion to an affair which he regarded as the business of Congress. The Republicans in the Senate with little active participation on the part of their party leader had dealt with their own problem child. Whether such procedure was the most efficacious is a problem with which we shall deal in our concluding chapter.

The 83rd Congress had provided Senator McCarthy with a large portion of the foundation of his influence. The year 1954 through a combination of political action on behalf of the Senate and luck, in the emergence of a

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1Ibid., p. 234.
Democratic majority in the Senate through Congressional elections, had largely diminished the Wisconsin Senator's power. But, had the Senate acted soon enough or sufficiently strongly? Had President Eisenhower used his influence to a great enough extent? Could it have been, more broadly, that the political system contingent upon the McCarthyist problem was derelict in its duty? These questions, amongst others, we will attempt to answer in the succeeding chapter.
Conceptual Analysis

In this chapter we return to some of the ideas which were tentatively outlined in Chapter I. We are concerned here to carry out two tasks: first, to postulate a conceptual framework of some predictive value, and, second, to apply this framework to the case of the political demise of Senator Joseph McCarthy. It is our contention, as we hope to show, that it is possible to evolve a theory on the basis of the McCarthy affair which may be of relevance to political decision makers.

I. The Conceptual Framework

A. The Problem Stated.

In building our framework for analysis we hope that it need not exist on a purely theoretical level. The objective has been to erect a practically applicable model, to establish, as Louis Halle would say, conceptual order from the chaotic existential world. We are aware, therefore, that the political scientist is more concerned with models of limited use rather than with those of the universal type. We are, in Professor Shackle's words more of a "fox," that is concerned with building ones amongst a variety of particular theories as stepping stones to more all-inclusive theories of social action. Our objective is, then, modest but, nevertheless, fraught with many dangers, the most important of which, we re-emphasize, is falling prey to building static idealistic models which do not take sufficient account of the dynamic existential world.

Of somewhat less importance is the question which asks, can there truly be such an act as making a decision? In a determinist view of history, as Professor Shackle has observed, there can be no real decision making, since decision involves choice, and this latter does not exist for the determinist since there can be only one decision he can make in any one circumstance. A similar position occurs if we view the decision maker as able to list all the possible courses open to him, and subsequently coming to a decision when he chooses the most attractive of the available alternatives. Such an idealistic method of reaching a decision has been characterized as "synoptic." It bears some resemblance to the determinist position in that certain alternatives present themselves to the decision-maker in relatively simple form. As far as we are concerned, both the "synoptic" and determinist views of decision-making must be rejected. The former approach suffers the limitation, amongst others, of failing to take cognizance of the existential world in which it is impossible to rank all the available alternatives relevant to a decision merely because of the astronomical amount of factual data with which a decision maker would have to deal. The latter approach, as Shackle has pointed out, must be rejected since decision in a determinist sense is no decision at all; it is, in fact, empty. We are, therefore, left implanted firmly in a real world where every problem involves uncertainty to greater or lesser degree, and, moreover, a world in which political problems are more often alleviated than solved.

3See, ibid., pp. 47-57.
The conceptual and existential worlds are constantly interacting with each other, each one modifying the other. Perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of the twentieth century has been the attempt by Marxists to make the existential world conform to their concept of the world as it should be. There is no clearer example of the folly of stressing the conceptual at the expense of the existential. We wish, in our analysis, to avoid pressing the facts as they exist into a preconceived pattern. Rather, the facts themselves have largely shaped a concept which has been developed from this point to further explain the facts, and which may be of more general predictive value.

In our search for some basis from which to start a theoretical interpretation of the decline in McCarthy's political power, it occurred to us that the field of economic analysis might offer us fertile ground. Some of the reasons for this being so should be stated here. First, Keynesian economic analysis has been increasingly concerned with the study of dynamic, rather than of static, economic equilibria, and dynamics is "a scheme of calculation of the future from the past." It is our intention to stress the dynamic aspects of the political system. Second, the distinction made in economic analysis between events of short run and long run importance is also valuable for political science, since it may enable us to distinguish between those facets of the political system which are worthy of immediate attention and those which may be subject to treatment in the more distant future, or over a long period of time. In both cases, it will be noticed, we are concerned with movement. This is our main task - to provide some theory which will be pertinent to explaining an other than a static world. We too infrequently remember in any

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1Halle, op. cit., p. 126 and Chapter 7, passim.
2See, ibid, Chapters 4-7.
3Shackle, The Nature of Economic Thought, p. 82.
but an uninterested fashion that, "The present is saturated with the past
and pregnant with the future."\(^1\)

Our problem, very basically, is to provide a conceptual order for the
events surrounding McCarthy's political decline which will help us understand
the chaotic real world as it existed then and as it may exist in the future.
As with any theory, it must, to a large extent, be tentative in nature and
inevitably needful of future revision. Dynamic society does not tarry for
the theories which explain and interpret it.

B. **The Significant Event and the Decision-Maker.**

McCarthy's behavior and the reactions to it in 1953 and 1954 provide
political data which is of relevance to the idea of a political system. We
would wish to interpret the scope of political science as being coincidental
with the political system, however large or small. A political system has
been defined as "any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves,
to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority."\(^2\) David Easton has
provided, in addition, the observation that the boundaries of a political
system are molded by the extent to which a system is able to make binding
decisions upon its members.\(^3\) A political system, therefore, may be interpreted
in a broad sense. For our purposes, such an interpretation is not disingenuous.
We hope to be able to provide an analysis of the McCarthy demise which will be
of some general relevance to all types of political systems.

We are concerned initially with dealing with the problem of time which
faces any decision-maker, particularly with those individuals who must make
decisions at a high level in the governmental machinery. It is clear that a

\(^1\)Leibnitz quoted in Halle, *op. cit.*, p. 152.


member of an executive branch in any government is inevitably involved with attaching priorities to the business which he must transact. Some problems will require immediate attention, others, while still requiring some sort of decision, may be left to a later date. The dilemma of the decision-maker is to attach significances to the information before him so that he may, if only vaguely, rank them in order of importance.

Some decisions can be implemented at once, or in the immediate future; they are thus what we may characterize as short run decision phenomena, even though the outcome of the decision made may have consequences over a long period of time. Other decisions are of a long run nature, often involving sequences of many decisions and supplemental decision which can only be implemented more slowly; these we may call long run decision phenomena. To complete the picture, we may say that decision phenomena which are of neither long or short run nature may be characterised as intermediate run decision phenomena. Merely to ascribe this nomenclature to political information does not by itself help the decision maker in a political system to choose which decisions he should make first. Somehow significances must be attached to the facts which have been gleaned by the individual who must make a decision. It should be borne in mind, too, that a decision need not be a positive act. Deciding to take no action is as much a decision as deciding to act.

Much of what transpires in any political system will be deemed unworthy of the making of a decision by those in authority, either because of lack of time or because what has taken place is deemed insignificant. But how do any of those persons in the decision making process decide what is significant and what is insignificant? The choices of the decision-maker are vital to the equilibrium of the political system, since demands (inputs) on the political system must be balanced, to some degree, by the decisions (outputs) made by it.¹ The question of equilibrium is, as in economics, of prime importance.

Our first task then, must be to locate the framework in which disequilibrium may occur. We may call an event in the purview of the decision-maker which threatens the equilibrium of the political system a **politically significant event.** Further, we give the definition of such an event thus: *an occurrence or stance which directly, or indirectly, may have a disequilibrating effect upon a political system, the continued existence of which is generally regarded as desirable by its members.* If, at first glance, this appears to be a definition which is conservatively biased, we believe that on inspection this would no longer appear so. Whatever the political system in question, we are suggesting, its essentials, however much the superstructure of the system is altered, can only be maintained if decisions are made which will restore an equilibrium to the system. The equilibrium need not be identical to that which existed before the disturbance occurred, in most cases it cannot be the same. Generally speaking, returns to pre-existing equilibria are associated with reactionary politics, and even they cannot, of course, avoid all political movement. We must add that many contributing equilibria go to make up the balance for the whole political system - a disturbance of one of these lesser equilibria is, obviously, capable of disturbing the overall balance, and frequently does so. The parallel with economic analysis will be noticed once again.

The concept of the significant event can be broken down into composite parts so that we may be able to distinguish events of differing levels of significance. (This breakdown will enable us to combine the concepts of long and short run decision phenomena with that of the significant event). The decision-maker, as we have pointed out, must have some method of ranking politically significant events if he is to know which ones he should tackle first. Common sense tells us that decisions are made approximately according to some such ranking. What we propose to show is that in breaking down the
significant event we are both explaining, to some extent, the actions of the man in authority and, at the same time, offering a tentative framework which could offer some guidance to the decision-making machinery.

We may divide the significant event into three categories, primary, secondary and tertiary. Broadly, the ranking denotes the degree of importance which the decision-maker attaches to the decision making problem at hand. Although there are some coincidences, the degree of speed with which a policy can be implemented is not necessarily coincidental with the degree of importance of the event. Thus, for example, the most important events are not necessarily short run decision phenomena. Events of primary significance are those happenings which obviously, and immediately, threaten the dynamic equilibrium of a political system, and which may well be destructive of the essence, as well as the trappings, of the system. In a nation-state, examples which might be given are invasion or civil war. In an interest group an example might exist in legislation which was aimed at effectively crippling the organization; anti-trade union legislation, as in nineteenth century Great Britain, readily comes to mind. Events of primary significance are usually amongst short run decision phenomena since they are needful, and capable, of an immediate decision. This fact tends to place them in the domain of economics and politics, rather than in the sphere of the other social sciences.

Events of secondary significance are more complicated. Whereas events of primary significance are overt, those of secondary significance tend to be more latent, and thus more difficult to detect. Occurrences which are not obviously destructive of the political system, or which do not seem, at first glance, to threaten the equilibrium of the system, we term events of secondary significance. Events of secondary significance are generally occurrences which take place over a period of time and which may be subject to a sequence of decisions concerning them. For reasons which will become apparent, such
events are not classified as long run decision phenomena, but rather as intermediate run decision phenomena. An example of this type of event would be the struggle of the American Negro for civil rights since the end of the Second World War.

Events of tertiary significance are concerned entirely with long run decision phenomena, that is, with situations that are not amenable to change except over the long run, and which political decisions cannot change except in the long run. The main areas of concern here are social and psychological factors. It is clear, we think, that social mores and psychological attributes are only changeable by decisions of which it may be extremely difficult to see the long run effects. This is an area where the decision-maker must grope forward as best he can, and where, more so than in the other two classifications of events, his objective may be thwarted by happenings over which he has little or no control.

Before departing from this aspect of the conceptual analysis, there are some problems concerned with it which are deserving of some attention. First, it is possible, of course, that overlap can occur between the three levels of significance, but we do not believe that this detracts from the framework as a whole as an instrument of political analysis, and, perhaps, of political action. It would be foolhardy to suppose that we can divide significant events into watertight compartments. Second, we are, as we have mentioned, involved, to some extent, in the area of values. In the sense that a political leader may believe that the ends of, say, his social club are desirable, we are suggesting a method by which the desired ends may have some chance of achievement. Such a background of values, we believe, does not jeopardize our analysis by making it normative. Third, there are bound to be conflicts between short, intermediate, and long run decision phenomena. The balancing of these conflicts is necessary if the equilibrium of the political system, which, as we have
observed, is a dynamic equilibrium, is to be maintained. A clear example of such conflict today can be seen in the attempts by the U. S. government to provide for a burgeoning economy at home while fighting a war in Vietnam.

Fourth, it may seem that we are no more than borrowing Lindblom and Braybrooke's analysis of decision-making. Their division of the decision-making process broadly into incremental and non-incremental changes, that is, into policies which are merely added to incrementally, and those that can be classed as major social changes, is of relevance to us.¹ Events of secondary and tertiary significance inevitably lead to incremental policy making. We are more concerned, however, with making decisions in order of importance vis-a-vis the equilibrium of the political system; in this task Lindblom and Braybrooke's analysis is of prime importance, for, amongst other things, they have produced a cogent empirically based explanation of how political decisions are made.

We hope that our explanation is of wider proportions, with emphasis on the relative importance to the decision-maker of what we have termed significant events.

II. McCarthy and his Political Environment.

The years 1953 and 1954, which mark the zenith of Senator McCarthy's influence, are particularly interesting in terms of our conceptual analysis. Events of primary significance do not directly interest us in this period - we are more concerned, as we will show, with events of secondary and tertiary significance. Further, we hope to be able to situate the reactions to these significant events in such a way that some conceptual order may be established from the "chaotic existential world" as it existed during these years.

¹See, Lindblom and Braybrooke, op. cit., Chapters 4 and 5.
A. **Events of Secondary Significance.**

In this section we intend to deal with McCarthy's relations with President Eisenhower and with the 83rd Congress.

President Eisenhower was preoccupied immediately before and after his election to office with at least one event of primary significance - the Korean War. It appears that the specter of Joseph McCarthy did not loom large upon his horizon. When the President finally became aware of the gravity of the situation, we shall argue, McCarthy was certainly of secondary significance, and, yet, Eisenhower did not treat him as such in the decisions which he made concerning him. Eisenhower's perception of the existential world, to use Halle's nomenclature, was, to some extent, distorted by his conceptual vision of what it should have been - a situation which could have possibly led to tragic consequences.¹ From all indications, as we have pointed out in Chapter IV above, Eisenhower's concept of the Presidency was more inclined to the Taftian view than the Rooseveltian. This concept of the office, however, loosely formed in Eisenhower's own mind, had important repercussions on the existential world. An event of secondary significance, simply the importance of McCarthy in America, was recognized by the administration, but the Eisenhower view of the office of President was such as to cause difficulty in dealing with it. McCarthy, as we have mentioned, was capable of jeopardizing the Republican equilibrium by splitting it over the issue of Communism in government.² Although this is a contributing equilibrium, it is evident that moves away from that equilibrium could have repercussions in terms of disturbing the equilibrium of the political system of the United States as a whole. Eisenhower's reaction clearly portrays the division between his conceptual world and the world as

¹See above, Chapter IV, pp. 11-12.

²See above, Chapter IV, pp. 11-12.
it then existed. The President was concerned that he should not, as he put it, "get into the gutter," with McCarthy, or indeed, encroach upon the power of the legislature. The decision not to do anything directly was, of course, a policy decision of possibly large scale dimensions. The unwillingness, or inability, to recognize this problem as being an event of secondary significance inclined the President to throw the difficulty into the lap of the Congress. Moreover, from the outset of his campaign for the Presidency, it would appear that Eisenhower did not recognize that his attitude toward McCarthy was jeopardizing his position of power, and, thus, once again, was threatening the basic equilibrium of the political system. It was not a matter of morality to condemn McCarthy for some of the actions he took, but it was a matter of political exigency. Possibly the clearest example which will substantiate this line of thought is Eisenhower in his role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Matters which concern the armed forces are both of primary and secondary significance, since in war time decisions concerning them pertain directly to the existence of the American political system, while in peace time, generally speaking, decisions concerning them may be decided over the intermediate run. That Eisenhower had put his position as commander-in-chief in jeopardy is attested to by Hanson Baldwin who observed that McCarthy's investigations of the Army in late 1953 and early 1954 had lowered the morale of officers, and had led to a situation where Eisenhower was sharing command of the Army with Senator McCarthy.1 McCarthy, in investigating the Army and using the methods that he did, it may be argued, was encroaching upon the executive domain, thus threatening any meaningful interpretation of the separation of powers. Eisenhower, it seems, was remiss in not observing the level of significance which McCarthy's action had achieved. Whereas Eisenhower could have spoken out

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immediately, he chose to leave the final burden of scuttling McCarthy's ship to a more cumbersome vessel, that of Congress. The dangers in doing so, in putting the problem into the hands of the legislature which is by nature more adept at dealing with more long run problems, were immense, since many of McCarthy's actions needed swift replies which carried considerable weight - only the Presidency carried sufficient weight to provide meaningful replies.

President Eisenhower, it appears, was not enough of a politician to know when his bases of power, which are essential to maintaining the dynamic equilibrium of the political system, were being seriously threatened. Events of secondary significance, such as McCarthy's usurpation of executive power and its attendant implications, do not appear to have been fully perceived by Eisenhower. His lack of awareness of that precious Presidential commodity, political power, was limited. As Erwin C. Hargrove has remarked, "Eisenhower enjoyed being President, but he did not seek the office as a vehicle of personal power."

Eisenhower, on hindsight, appears to have been unable to see the levels of significance connected with his dealings with McCarthy, or further, that levels of significance are inter-connected and may escalate so that one level spills over into a higher level of significance. (This process, of course, may be reversed.) But after all is said and done, Eisenhower was limited in his actions concerning McCarthy because of his reluctance to modify his concept of his office to suit the world as it existed. If McCarthy's performance had become an event of primary significance Eisenhower would certainly have had grounds to act on the basis of his own concepts. It was Congressional action which finally obviated this necessity.

Congress, as has been shown,1 was ambivalent in its attitude toward McCarthy. Once again, it is clear that some members of the Senate were not aware of the dis-equilibrating possibilities in McCarthy's actions. The Senate, in addition, being a deliberative assembly, can seldom act with great rapidity. The few occasions on which it can do so are usually when an event of primary significance is imminent or has happened. The length of time which the Senate took in dealing with McCarthy, especially after Monroney's denunciation of him in July of 1953, is indicative of their perception of the threat which McCarthy presented to the political systems of the Senate itself and to the United States in general. What we are suggesting here is not that the Senate acted in the wrong way, but that it failed to take action, to make a positive decision, where some sort of positive decision was necessary. It was not, after all, until eighteen months after Monroney's attack on McCarthy's methods that the Senate decided whether McCarthy was deserving of censure or not. Whether a person was for or against McCarthy does not necessarily distort the picture of the man in the total political system. One had only to follow the newspaper headlines to know that McCarthy was an important figure in the political system. But the Senate, being what it was, was only capable, except in exceptional circumstances, of treating McCarthy as a long run decision phenomenon, when, in fact, he was in that category we have called a short run decision phenomenon. McCarthy's activities could have been dealt with rapidly had the Senate a mind to do so. Senator Joseph Clark has succinctly pointed up this lack of perception by Congress in suggesting that this great legislative body conceives that doing nothing is not making a decision when, in effect, it is quite the reverse.2

1See above, Chapter V.

It may be speculated that Congress' conception of itself has come to be truly out of step with what it must be if it is to adapt to the existential world. Senator Everett Dirksen, in a speech on November 21st, 1963, had this to say concerning the Senate. It "is much like an old cow. It does not move fast; it does not move very far at one time; but it does not sink."\(^1\) We might remark that an old cow cannot fight Polaris submarines, for such is our age.

It may be, too, that the Congress does not wish to perceive the levels of significance of various events, since these events might call for action which would be so precipitate as to destroy the conceptions of Congress held by some of the members of that august body. In other words, we are saying that the perception of the significant event by some members of Congress might seriously jeopardize their own conception of the way in which Congress should operate. Our analysis, using the phraseology of the significant event, is, we suggest, closely connected with the problem of the gap which exists between the conceptual and the existential worlds. Further, this division between what we perceive and what exists in reality is mirrored in the probability that prediction frequently has wish-fulfilling characteristics.\(^2\) What we often interpret, on hindsight, is what we would wish to have happened. In other words, we squeeze the existential world into the preconceived pattern of the conceptual world.

The whole problem of ascribing levels of significance to events is not merely one of attaching measures of importance to each level. For various reasons it is quite possible, and often, we would venture, probable, that the decision-maker in whatever type of political system, is unwilling to see an event as of a certain level of significance if this level cannot somehow be incorporated into his own conceptual world.\(^3\) The implications of such an argument, it will

\(^1\)Quoted in Ibid., p. 130.
\(^2\)See, Toch, loc. cit., p. 62.
\(^3\)See, Halle, op. cit., Chapter 3.
be agreed, are enormous. Inflexibility, whether amongst statesmen, political scientists or others, is, in many situations, a characteristic which we abhor.

To conclude, Congress, in its view of what American government should be, in its view, more specifically, of the separation of powers, has produced some dangerous tendencies in terms of the maintenance of a dynamic political equilibrium. Senator Clark in referring to McCarthy's actions in 1953 and 1954 writes,

Such aggressive threats i.e., McCarthy's activities to constitutional government and the national welfare were, no doubt, extreme. But in our time Congress has recourse more and more to the use of the investigating committee as it becomes more and more frustrated in its battle for power with the executive branch. 1

In a period when, as a result of the Cold War, demagogues of a nationally disruptive nature are liable to arise, Congress may offer them a potential home inside the machinery of government so that they can, possibly, as McCarthy did, attack the executive branch of government.

B. Events of Tertiary Significance.

Sociological and psychological problems of the nature which we have put forward in Chapter III are only amenable to long term treatment - they are, in our terms, long run decision phenomena. Frequently the decision-maker, as we have observed, will be groping forward in an area in which there are so many variables that making policy, because of the nature of the problems involved, must be incremental.

Events of tertiary significance can be understood best if we say that alleviating them involves changing or modifying environmental factors which bear upon the political system. This is, inevitably, an area of immensely wide scope, but it is, nevertheless, an area in which decision-makers must act. Decision is necessary here because, however incomplete the information and final objectives may be, events of tertiary significance can spill over into higher

1Clark, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
levels of significance, thus increasing the chances of jeopardizing the equilibriu
m of the political system involved. This being the case, how can the
decision-maker deal with the sociological and psychological foundations of
McCarthy’s support?

It is all too easy and, we think, almost inevitable, to platitudinize
where events of tertiary significance are concerned. The authoritarian per-
sonality, as outlined by McClosky, Lipset and Farris,¹ is amenable only to very
extended treatment by the decision-maker. His status anxieties, his socio-
econic background and so on, can only be dealt with when large structural
changes are made in our social, economic and political systems. These changes
are liable to be made through a series of incremental policies. Any solution
to this particular problem, as such, will only be proximate. If past history
is anything by which to judge, alleviation of social problems in particular
lags behind the need for such treatment. The reasons for this need not detain
us - suffice it to say that tertiary problems are of an extended long run nature.

In the area of decision-making in connection with events of tertiary
significance, problems may seem insurmountable if the decision-maker believes
he must solve them. If, on the other hand, meaningful alleviation is stressed
rather than solution, then the decision-maker may make decisions. Faced with
the problem of those people who feel themselves to be alienated from society,
people who are often attracted to extremist politics, the decision-maker may
implement meaningful alleviatory decisions. The recent example of civil
rights legislation pertaining to Negroes would bear out this point. Many
Negroes have been amongst the declasses of American society; legislation by
itself does not immediately bring them "back into society," but it does con-
tribute toward that final objective. Thus, too, decisions in the area of the

¹See above, pp. 32-34.
economic system may lead to the raising of the standards of living of America's poorer population. This, in turn, is inclined to lead these people away from extremist politics of the nature which McCarthy's influence encouraged.

Events of tertiary significance are, then, capable of alleviation rather than solution. The equilibrium of the political system is threatened if the decision-maker is overwhelmed by what seem to be gargantuan problems incapable of solution. The value of seeing the importance of events of tertiary significance, with which the political system must somehow deal, cannot be stressed too highly. In addition, incremental policies are the modus operandi for the decision-maker once this factor has been absorbed by the decision-maker himself.

III. Summary

Political events, which may be interpreted as one occurrence or a series of occurrences, may be divided into three levels of significance, primary, secondary, and tertiary. Associated with each level of significance is the speed with which the decision-maker may deal with these occurrences and the machinery available to him to enable him to do so. If the decision can be implemented at once, then we call this possibility a short run decision phenomenon. If the decision can be implemented in the near future, we call this possibility an intermediate run decision phenomenon. Similarly, if a decision can only be implemented sequentially over the extended long run, we call this type of decision a long run decision phenomenon. The main distinction between each of these levels is the means that the decision-maker has available to enable him to implement a decision. These divisions, while to some extent paralleling the events of varying degrees of significance show the problems with which the decision-maker can, not should, deal sooner, rather than later. The long, intermediate and short run decision phenomena describe the rapidity with which a decision can be made with the means available.
Eisenhower and the Congress did not approach the McCarthy problem which each knew to exist, in a sufficiently swift way. There are, briefly, four reasons for this state of affairs. First, neither party's conceptual view of the political system approximated, to a large enough degree, the exigencies of the existential political system. Second, neither Eisenhower nor Congress seemed aware of the level of significance into which McCarthy's activities fell. Third, Eisenhower felt that McCarthy did not fall into that category of decisions concerning which he could act at once. That is, Eisenhower felt that the McCarthy event was not a short run decision phenomenon. Fourth, Congress, by its nature, seldom treats any event as other than an intermediate or long run decision phenomenon. It acts, therefore, deliberately and somewhat slowly.
The maintenance of balance within a political system is necessary if that political system is to prevail over a long period of time. All political systems, of whatever size, are subjected to forces which may seriously impair or, in fact, destroy their dynamic equilibrium. The United States had not seen without its fair share of such disequilibrating factors. We have argued that McCarthy was a person about whom, and, partially, at the instigation of whom, the extreme right of the American political system flourished.

Stable political systems have been capable of withstanding severe disruptive factors providing that they existed within a favorable environment. (In the United States, the Civil War comes to mind). At some periods in history, however, there are events which significantly alter the environment in which a political system may exist. The spectacular rise of two large-scale Communist powers, Russia and China, especially since the end of the Second World War, has materially altered the political situations of the democratic countries of the western hemisphere. This is particularly so in relation to Russia, since she now has a capacity in nuclear weaponry which approaches parity with that of the United States. Real or imagined, the Soviet Union and Communist China are seen by most Americans as posing some kind of threat to America and her allies. For many Americans this is not merely an external threat; Communist subversion is also perceived as jeopardizing the persistence of the American political system from within. And the very nature of the postulated "threat" makes it clear for many Americans who the "enemy" is. In starting from a
position based in fact, Senator McCarthy took the fears arising from these conceptions and harped on them until, for his supporters, Communist countries, and more particularly Communist organizations and Communist sympathizers in America, could be blamed for most of America's ills. The history of Soviet Russia and, more recently, of Communist China, incline us to the belief that the leadership in these two countries, that is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, tend to harbor similar types of belief about the "bourgeois capitalists" of the West. The mutual threat, as it is perceived, is, therefore, an instrument which can be used in both cases to whip up enthusiasm against "subversives" at home or "aggressors" overseas. McCarthy recognized, as much as Mao Tse Tung recognizes, the efficacy of such slogans in forwarding personal power. The state of Cold War is liable to persist in the foreseeable future, and is thus fruitful ground for the politician who wishes to find a subject in which everything is "clear" and easily presentable to the public on whose support he must ride to power. In the Chinese political system, for instance, such threats can be used to whip up support for the system. In America too, this may happen. There is more chance of such activities jeopardizing the American political system, however, than there is of their throwing the Chinese system into disarray. In the final analysis, we may argue that such appeals to unique sources of subversion at home and abroad are more dysfunctional to the American political system than they would be for example, to the Soviet Union. The reason for this is that in Communist countries it is generally easier to control such movements since they are usually initiated by the ruling authorities. Such may not be the case in America, but this does not mean that the governmental authorities are in no position to act.

Senator McCarthy attracted to his support many of the extreme right wing in American politics. Many of these people so attracted are, as we have shown,
least likely to adhere to democratic principles in settling their differences with their fellow men. The ideology that pertains to Communism gives many of them something to rail against. The radical right wing, with the exception of McCarthy, has not been able to produce a national leader around whom to rally. That McCarthy has been their only true national leader, adept at attracting all degrees of right wing conservatives to his banner, does not mean that his type of leadership, such as it was, will not arise again. If it does arise, and the democratic system should be aware of such contingencies, the equilibrium of the political system must be better defended.

Planning for the future is frequently carried out on the basis of existing conditions, or existing policies. In other words, existing contingencies may appear to have passed out of the decision-makers purview when a policy concerning the contingencies has been implemented. It is possible that policies may not really deal with the core of a problem, but may, rather, produce a symbol which indicated that the problem has been disposed of, when in reality it still exists. Thus, having "successfully concluded" the McCarthy event, the problem may be put aside. Such a conclusion is not only erroneous, but dangerous too. McCarthy, as we have remarked, was brought down by a combination of luck and decisions made by Congress, President Eisenhower and, above all, by McCarthy himself. The former, the fact that the Republican party lost control of the Senate in the 1954 Congressional elections, was as important, we believe, in bringing down McCarthy as were the deliberate decisions. It is difficult to predict what might have been the situation had the Republicans held control of the Senate in the 1954 elections.

Had McCarthy been a more complete politician he might have concentrated on two areas where he was particularly weak. First, in building up some kind of political organization which could have provided a permanent base from which he could have worked. Second, in tempering his own natural inclination
to be loyal to his staff where it could in no sense be to his advantage to be so. A more adroit politician might be able to increase his leverage considerably were he to take such considerations into account. If McCarthy had himself taken such precautions it might have been very much more difficult for either Congress or the President to take steps against him.

A McCarthy type demagogue is a contingency worthy of some planning in the democratic political system. Planning could be inestimably helped if the policy-makers who might be connected with such a figure were aware of the relationships between their conceptual world and the existential world. To provide a framework for such clarification is, indeed, taking into account the stubbornness of human nature, somewhat presumptuous. However, by giving a broad initial conceptual structure, which we have attempted to do, it may be possible to build a more intricate model which would considerably refine the original crude concept. By interpreting the events which occur in the political system in terms of levels of significance, we may move away from the area of interpretation into the realm of a possible model for the decision-maker.

It seems to us that, throughout the years 1953 and 1954, both the executive and legislative branches of the government failed to perceive the priorities which McCarthy was beginning to impose at a number of differing levels of the governmental structure. Whether either branch of the government wished to make policy concerning him or not, the time approached at which positive policy, as opposed to the policy of doing nothing, or as little as possible, would have to be carried out. Both branches of government were reluctant to make policy of a positive nature even when that time had arrived. Fundamentally, the reasons for such vacillation were, we have indicated, based in the dichotomy, which each nurtured, between their conceptions of political life and how political life actually exists. However slow the process, political exigency finally overcame what those persons in the political act considered
ought to happen.

Eisenhower, by the nature of the office which he occupied, probably had more possibilities open to him concerning McCarthy's activities than any other part of the American government. The President, however, failed to see that not only was the McCarthy event one which was in the category of short run decision phenomenon, but also that by not speaking out openly against McCarthy he was both undermining his own authority in the executive branch of government, and also setting some harmful precedents for legislative interference in activities that properly belonged to the executive. His decision to do nothing, or next to nothing, in connection with McCarthy was not simply harmful to himself, it also jeopardized the office that he occupied, other members of the executive and the proper relationship between Congress and the President. Such implications which grew from the lack of action on the part of the President were, we suggest, capable of destroying equilibrium within the political system.

In terms of the more extended long run problems of American society, environmental changes are going to be, and, in fact, are of prime importance. We do not doubt that environment is, to a large degree, responsible for forming the political characteristics of a population. If the United States government cannot, or does not wish to, change the kind of environment which, we have good reason to believe, helps to produce extremist politics, then the American political system may be faced with serious disruptive factors. The alteration of the environment of the political system is, as David Easton would conceive it, necessary in some degree to the persistence of the system. A lack of some correspondence between each may be seriously dysfunctional to the system itself. Hence, societal factors, psychological, sociological and economic, bear an important relationship to the political system. What the political system does in relation to these environmental factors thus reflects back upon the system and partially determines its ability to survive. However much we grope forward,
making decisions concerning events of tertiary significance, we may advance towards the alleviation, if not the solution, of problems connected with environmental factors.

We have made some very limited and, what we might call, peripheral predictions in our study of McCarthy at his zenith. We have stated that another demagogic type similar to McCarthy could arise. If such a political actor should arise, then, for the sake of continuing dynamic equilibrium in the political system, the system should be prepared to deal with such a personage. Responsibilities within the American governmental system are intentionally divided, and, yet, in times of crisis unity is achieved. But times of crisis are, sometimes, not recognized as such even by the governmental machinery. Recognition of latent crisis is more difficult. We have attempted to show why it must be located and dealt with and why, if not dealt with, crisis may escalate to more significant levels. The McCarthy event, for all the publicity which it received, was not attacked as it should have been if the interests of the political system were to be forwarded. Hindsight, we are aware, creates order from the "chaotic existential world." Nevertheless, lessons of history are frequently forgotten. Because McCarthy is dead, personalities of his ilk have not vanished, nor have the conditions which give rise to them.
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by

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B. A., Dublin University, 1963

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ABSTRACT

Political action rests, to some extent, on the ability to foresee future contingencies. If political systems are to achieve their primary aim, persistence, then foresight, and decisions based on foresight, must be taken into serious consideration.

Senator Joseph McCarthy was a political personage who may be viewed as part of a tradition of American demagoguery. He was significantly different from preceding demagogues in at least one important respect. The nature of his appeal, the threat arising from Communist subversion within the United States, was one which cut across class lines and was formulated in easily digestible shape. The conditions which gave rise to McCarthy's peculiar brand of political action are not missing at the present time. It is quite possible that another person of McCarthy's ilk may arise in the future. To understand this possibility and to deal with it, it is necessary to know, first, where McCarthy's support came from.

Certain persons in society, it is well known, feel alienated. Those who are in this state are particularly ripe for appeals from extremist politicians. In America, where the extreme left has atrophied, this appeal is likely to come from the extreme right. Psychological factors reinforce this picture. Authoritarian personalities, are most often those individuals who are alienated from society. Frequently these groups suffer from quasi-paranoia, constantly fearing conspiracies and the like. These types of persons are susceptible to appeals from the radical right in the style of Joseph McCarthy.

Political support from McCarthy came from the Republicans' tacit acceptance of him and his role—he was seen as a useful thorn in the flesh of the Democrat. In addition, his position of Senator gave him immunities and privileges which offered a relatively safe base for his political activities.
President Eisenhower's attitude toward McCarthy was no less important in giving this latter politician support. Although the President found McCarthy and his activities repulsive, he nevertheless pursued a policy of non-recognition of the McCarthyist phenomenon and the problems it posed. He felt that Congress was the body which was responsible for dealing with the Senator. Eisenhower's concept of the Presidential office seriously blocked his awareness of the threat which McCarthy posed to Presidential power. Moreover, the President's appointments in his administration were not carefully sifted to ensure protection from possible McCarthyist subterfuges in the executive branch of government.

Congress realized comparatively slowly the danger which McCarthy posed, not only to Congress, but also to the whole national government. In hoping to neutralize the Senator, a seemingly innocuous chairmanship was given to him, but this proved a tactical mistake. The Republicans, faced with McCarthy's investigations and the criticisms arising from them, were divided. A showdown concerning McCarthy's activities was finally forced in connection with one David Schine's induction into the army. McCarthy was little interested in Schine, but seemed to rely upon, and thus supported, his Subcommittee counsel Roy Cohn who had brought Schine onto the Subcommittee staff and whose pressure on the army was instrumental in bringing about the hearings. McCarthy was, in effect, pulled into a fight in which he had no real personal stake. After the Army-McCarthy hearings McCarthy received a vote of condemnation from the Senate. His political life deteriorated after this point.

In conceptual terms, the decision-maker, whoever it is, must consider what is immediately necessary of action and what is not. In some way significances must be attached to events of political relevance. We may identify events of primary, secondary and tertiary significance which signify
the priorities which decision-makers can or should adhere to in deciding what to deal with first. We may, further, classify the speeds with which the decision-maker is able to implement a decision as short run decision phenomena, intermediate run decision phenomena and long run decision phenomena. In combining these two concepts it may be possible to more effectively identify and deal with dysfunctional political events. The fall of Joseph McCarthy offers some opportunity for illustrating the concepts postulated and has, in turn, been used to shape these concepts.