THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE CUBAN CHALLENGE, 1961-1964: CASE STUDIES IN DECISION MAKING

by

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Major Professor
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INTRODUCTION

This study will encompass an examination in depth of decisions made by members of the Organization of American States to take collective action against the Cuban Government in the following instances: (1) The Punta del Este Foreign Ministers' Meeting, January, 1962; (2) The Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962; and (3) the Cuban intervention in Venezuela, 1963-1964.

In each instance the necessary two thirds of the O.A.S. membership acted to isolate the Cuban Government because of its threats and acts of aggression against other nations of the Western hemisphere. In the first and third cases dealt with at the Eighth and Ninth Foreign Ministers' conferences in 1962 and 1964, the O.A.S. voted to impose sanctions directly against the Cuban Government. But in the case of the Cuban missile crisis the O.A.S. nations voted to apply sanctions against the Soviet Union directly and against Cuba only indirectly.

At the Punta del Este Foreign Ministers' Meeting six Latin American states, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico refused to support a United States-sponsored resolution to exclude the Government of Cuba from the inter-American system on the grounds that the Cuban Government's subscription to Communist ideology and practice was incompatible with the principles of the O.A.S. Charter.

But in response to the Soviet missile threat based from Cuba in October, 1962, the Latin American states rallied unanimously to support
the U. S. by authorizing a resolution to establish a quarantine against further shipment of offensive weapons from the Soviet Union to Cuba.

Yet the expedient removal of the missiles did not remove the imminence of the Cuban threat of intervention particularly in the Caribbean area. This fact was poignantly demonstrated when a cache of Cuban arms planned for use in the overthrow of the Betancourt Government was uncovered on Venezuelan territory in the winter of 1963.

When the Ninth Meeting of Consultation was finally held in Washington in June, 1964 to consider the Venezuelan complaint of Cuban aggression, the O.A.S. nations voted (15-4) in favor of a resolution to require all O.A.S. nations to sever diplomatic relations with the Castro Government. Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay voted against taking such action. But only Mexico has to date refused to comply with O.A.S. sanctions.

The particular concern of this study will be to identify the conditions motivating the various foreign policy orientations of Latin American governments in each of these situations in order to explain:

1. Why there was unanimous agreement to authorize forceful measures in the missile crisis and less than unanimity in the imposition of political sanctions in the other two instances.

2. Why the positions of certain governments varied from the Punta del Este Meeting in 1962 to the Washington meeting in 1964.

Analysis of the dynamics of Latin American foreign policies expressed within the O.A.S. during the period 1962-1964, concerning sanctions against Cuba, will form the basis for a composite evaluation of the present condition of harmony within O.A.S. ranks.
Finally it is the writer's objective to speculate concerning the potential for developing greater mutuality of interests within the O.A.S. in the future.

In approaching this investigation the writer, in a separate chapter devoted to each O.A.S. decision, intends to characterize the general political process within countries that actively or tacitly supported sanctions. Then by way of contrast the writer will analyze the political forces that prompted the decision of a minority of states to oppose sanctions at the Eighth Meeting in Punta del Este, 1962 and at the Ninth Meeting in Washington, 1964.

Analysis of the decisions of the individual Latin American governments taken at these three O.A.S. Meetings will be constructed by investigating the following indices as possible determinants of their foreign policies: use of U. S. power and influence; military influence; degree of advancement of social and economic reform; potential appeal of fidelismo; principles of nonintervention and self-determination; historical traditions of Pan-American cooperation.

In this study the investigation of the process of foreign policy formulation of separate western hemisphere nations in these three situations has been keyed to an ultimate objective—adjudging the impact of national foreign policy decisions on the O.A.S. as an international organization. Because this study has been approached from a broad perspective, no attempt has been made to give background analysis of domestic factors involved in these particular decisions by extensively consulting original Latin American sources. For this part of the inquiry a great deal of reliance has been upon dependable secondary sources,
from which it has been possible to select certain key factors relevant to Latin American decision-making processes during the period under investigation.

The information which will be cited in this study will include the standard works of leading historians and political scientists in the field of Latin American and O.A.S. affairs. The writer has relied on the public documents of the United States, the O.A.S. and the United Nations; articles in professional journals and other periodicals; unpublished Ph.D. dissertations; and coverage of the Punta del Este Meeting, the Cuban missile crisis and the Cuban intervention in Venezuela through the New York Times. Also important in developing overall perspective and understanding of the O.A.S. including the gathering of documents and research materials, was her opportunity to interview several officials of the U. S. Department of State and the O.A.S. during a trip to Washington, D. C. in late July, 1965.
CHAPTER I

THE PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE

Introductory Background

Following the abortive Cuban exile invasion in April 1961, the Kennedy administration began to sound out the Latin American governments on their willingness to take strong collective action against Cuba.

Certain members of the Latin American diplomatic corps felt that it would be possible to obtain support from two thirds of the Latin American governments provided that extremely careful diplomatic preparation was undertaken in advance.¹

Initially, U. N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson was dispatched to Latin American capitals in June, 1961, as a personal emissary of President Kennedy to determine the effect of the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion on inter-American relations.² Ambassador Stevenson reported that the invasion had raised the spectre of U. S. intervention, and had increased pressure from radical leftist elements on moderate constitutional governments. Because of such internal difficulties, leaders of these nations—to insure success for a program of social and economic reform within a democratic framework—could not take a strong anti-Cuban

stand. To do so would have been tantamount to taking sides with the United States against Cuba in what was widely regarded merely as a Yanqui-Cuban dispute.\(^3\) The Ambassador also recognized that while increased Communist subversion threatened the democratic governments, right wing groups jealous of the loss of ancient privileges and opposed to social reform, loomed as an equal menace to the existence of constitutional government. These two extremes of left and right were joined, according to Mr. Stevenson, in an unholy community of interest. Stressing the positive policy of the Alliance for Progress, Ambassador Stevenson concluded from his observations and interviews that the best long-range policy of hemispheric defense against Communism and Castroism should rest upon elimination of the desperate conditions which enlivened the Fidelista slogans— the urban slum conditions and rural insecurity.\(^4\)

It would seem that Ambassador Stevenson's perceptive analysis forecast the widening rift in the inter-American community concerning appropriate measures to deal with subversion emanating from Cuba, whose government was fast becoming affixed to the Soviet orbit through aid and trade agreements.

Most South American governments officially treated the Cuban revolution as an indigenous revolution, insisting that it had not been proven conclusively that Castro was taking orders from the Soviet Union.\(^5\)

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But other governments which had been directly subjected to Cuban-directed subversion, pressed for strong sanctions against Cuba.

The Peruvian Request. The threat of Cuban-based subversion prompted the Government of Peru to request a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers under the Rio Treaty without prior diplomatic consultation with the other O.A.S. nations. The Peruvian request invoked Article 6 of the Rio Treaty in reference to the subversive actions by the Government of Cuba which allegedly constituted acts of aggression within the meaning of the Treaty. 6

After considering the Peruvian request on October 16 and 25, 1961, the O.A.S. Council submitted the draft to the General Committee for study. The General Committee delivered its Report to the Council at the meeting on November 22, 1961, recommending that the Inter-American Peace Committee study and investigate the Peruvian charges. 7

Premature, ill-timed and too-strongly worded, the Peruvian request disregarded the strong disagreements within the inter-American system concerning the Cuban problem. The Peruvian request conflicted with a more careful diplomatic probe conducted by the Government of Colombia for a more generally acceptable formula to deal with the Castro regime. 8

The Colombian Request. On November 9, 1961, the Government of Colombia couched a request for a Meeting of Consultation in more general

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7 Ibid., 62.

terms also under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, not specifically mentioning the government of Cuba. The Colombian note proposed that the Ministers be asked to consider the threats to the peace and the political independence of the American states that might arise from the intervention of extracontinental powers directed toward breaking American solidarity, and particularly to:

a. Point out the various types of threats to the peace or certain acts that if they do occur, justify the application of measures for the maintenance of peace and security, pursuant to Chapter V of the Charter of the Organization of American States and the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance;

b. Determine the measures that it is advisable to take for the maintenance of the peace and the security of the hemisphere.9

Although the United States Government had not officially initiated the request for a Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers, it gave active support to the more temperate Colombian request. For over six months, the Kennedy Administration had devoted considerable time and energy to bilateral diplomatic exercises to avoid an open split and to cultivate mutual understanding among hemisphere nations prior to the holding of any formal conference to deal with the Cuban threat. Therefore, U. S. statesmen felt that the moderate Colombian resolution could achieve the dual purpose of holding the system together while accomplishing effective collective action against Cuban subversion.

A significant minority of states, particularly Mexico, objected to this resolution strenuously. Vicente Sanchez Gavito, the Mexican O.A.S. Council representative, stated that his government would vote against convocation of such a parley under the Rio Treaty on legal

grounds. The Mexican Government did not believe that any American state was being subjected to an armed attack or "any other act or situation that might place in danger the peace of America," to justify application of the Rio Treaty. The Mexican Government made it quite clear that any broad definition of subversion could never be fit into the meaning of aggression as armed attack according to the Rio Treaty.

This uncompromising position on the relatively non-specific Colombian proposal perhaps reflected the continued sensitivity of the Mexican Government concerning what that government had defined as U. S. intervention in the April 1961, Cuban exile invasion. This meeting to be convened under the Rio Treaty was held suspect among Mexican diplomats as a U. S. maneuver to secure collective legitimacy for another assault on Cuban independence. Mexico had been the only Latin American government to draft a resolution in the U. N. General Assembly implicitly endorsing Cuba's charges of U. S. responsibility for the invasion. The Mexican draft directly invoked the principle of nonintervention against the U. S. and appealed directly to the U. N. for a solution. Seven other Latin American nations introduced a draft which acknowledged the seriousness of the situation and exhorted the O.A.S. nations to lend assistance in the peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Mexican draft was rejected by the Political Committee, while the original Latin American draft, though accepted by a committee majority was rejected by a narrow margin in the Assembly. However a revised Latin American draft


was adopted omitting all reference to the O.A.S., but exhorting all U. N. members "to take peaceful action as it is open to them to remove existing tension." 12

Convocation of the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Although the U. S. regarded the open confession of Fidel Castro on December 2, 1961, that he had always been a Marxist-Leninist as proof of the aggressive danger of Cuban subversion, the Cuban Premier's statement did not alter the positions of Latin American governments. Only a (14-2) two-thirds majority with five important nations abstaining, weakly supported the call for the Foreign Ministers' Conference to be held January 22, 1962, at Punta del Este, Uruguay. Mexico joined Cuba to vote no. Five nations abstained—Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador. Uruguay's last-minute yea vote had been the one to complete a bare two-thirds majority which authorized the holding of the Punta del Este Conference. 13

To the governments opposed to the holding of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, the link between the Marxist-Leninist confession of Fidel Castro and his status as a tool of Soviet Communism was not self-evident. A loose interpretation of the Rio Treaty to justify collective action on an unproven supposition, to them meant giving cover to intervention—feared more in Latin American than Communism.

Pre-Conference Diplomacy. The Castro statement of December 2, 1961, added to the urgency of the U. S. commitment to fairly strong


sanctions at the Foreign Ministers' Conference. U. S. policymakers decided that the risk of splitting the inter-American system was better than delaying further.\textsuperscript{14}

Led by the United States, twelve nations definitely favoring sanctions began a probe to discover an effective plan to cope with Cuban subversion that would win the support of the maximum number of Latin American governments. President Kennedy felt that any U. S. demand for strong sanctions supported only by a bare two-thirds majority of smaller nations, exclusive of the support of Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, would project a bad picture to the world. But at the same time he indicated that if the support of Argentina could be won, perhaps it would be wise to press for mandatory sanctions.\textsuperscript{15} As the U. S. delegation departed for Punta del Este, the President had approved a policy that would aim for the hardest result consistent with the best possible consensus, but would not strive for symbolic hardness at the expense of substantial consensus.\textsuperscript{16}

Circulated by U. S. officials in early January, 1962, the State Department White Paper, originally published in August, 1962, was "clearly intended to prove the existence of a situation calling for the application of measures by the O.A.S."\textsuperscript{17} By presenting a factual summary, the paper called attention to the fact that

\textsuperscript{15}Morrison, p. 172.
The Castro regime has established such extensive and intimate political-military, economic, and cultural ties with the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the countries associated with them as to render Cuba an appendage of the communist system.  

The State Department referred to concrete activities to support its charges that Fidel Castro was attempting to spread his revolution by "example":  

It is bringing hundreds of students, labor leaders, intellectuals and dissident political leaders to Cuba for indoctrination and training to be sent back to their countries for the double purpose of agitating in favor of the Castro regime and undermining the stability of their own governments. It is fostering the establishment in other Latin American countries of so-called 'Committees of Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution' for the same dual purpose. Cuban diplomatic personnel encourage and finance agitation and subversion by dissident elements seeking to overthrow established governments by force.  

Professor C. Neale Ronning, a scholarly observer of the Punta del Este Conference for the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, has assessed the weakness of the appeal of the White Paper to the nations opposed to sanctions for which the matter of proof was so crucial to their decisions:  

What detracts from this part of the case is that these are precisely the kinds of activities that while they may threaten the peace, least require collective action. Those governments threatened by the exchange of students, labor leaders and intellectuals, presumably have it within their power to take unilateral action. The use of diplomatic personnel for subversive purposes could be prevented by the simple expedient of declaring individuals personae non gratae or, if necessary, of breaking diplomatic relations. As a matter of fact, the governments most concerned  

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19 Ibid., 11.
about Castro's activities had already severed diplomatic ties by the time of the Punta del Este Conference.20

Likewise most of the evidence against Cuba presented in the Inter-American Peace Committee Report dealt with proving the identification of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet bloc—"rather than to proving that this identification was antagonistic to the principles established in the O.A.S. Charter."21

Apparently the Investigating Committee could not muster enough facts to prove the allegation that Cuba had aggravated international tensions by committing political aggression.22 Therefore the committee's final recommendation for Rio Treaty action was based upon Cuba's "incompatibility" with the inter-American system.

To important segments of Latin American public opinion, such evidence was regarded as superficial and unsubstantial, and very difficult to interpret within the legal scope of the Rio Treaty.23

Opening of the Conference. As the Conference opened January 22, 1962, the O.A.S. nations had become divided into two opposing blocs. The bloc favoring sanctions against Cuba included the United States, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Peru, Paraguay and the Central American Republics. The bloc opposed to immediate sanctions included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico. Haiti and Uruguay sent split delegations to the conference. Confronted by the

20Ibid., 11.
21Ibid., 11.
22Ibid., 11.
23Ibid., 13-14.
impending split within the system on the eve of the Conference, many Ministers doubted the wisdom of forcing this Conference to be held. 

According to Ronning,

The major task of the Meeting, then became one of finding a formula that would emphasize points of agreement while minimizing the degree of discord. But it was not at all certain that it would be possible to get even the bare two-thirds vote necessary for sanctions. Seven states--Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Haiti, and Mexico--had openly stated their opposition. With Uruguay's vote uncertain, this left only twelve--two short of the required fourteen--firmly in favor of sanctions. If there were going to be sanctions it became clear that they would be something less than what the twelve had originally wanted: a break in diplomatic and economic relations and the expulsion of Cuba from the O.A.S.

From his vantage point, Ronning stated that despite the fact that it was reported publicly that the U. S. stance had stiffened, in reality "the State Department had for the most part given up the idea of seeking a resolution calling for a break in diplomatic relations with Cuba." The New York Times reported on January 16 that the United States, primarily to increase its negotiating position, had proposed that the Foreign Ministers order automatic sanctions against Cuba if she didn't break with the Soviet Union in sixty days. The Times account stressed that the State Department termed this plan a confidential working paper rather than a proposal, calling special attention to the Department's own qualification that the paper did not necessarily represent a firm position.

Resolutions Adopted. Of the nine resolutions finally approved by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, substantial disagreement existed in

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24 Ibid., 16.
25 Ibid., 16.
26 Ibid., 16.
the case of two—Resolution VI entitled Exclusion of the Present Govern-
ment of Cuba From Participation in the Inter-American System, and Resolu-
tion VIII entitled Economic Relations. Both resolutions, though modified,
represented an attempt to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions on
the Government of Cuba.

Every nation except Cuba (which opposed all resolutions) agreed to the
following paragraph of Resolution VI:

That adherence by any member of the Organization of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the principles of the Inter-American system.28

A wider margin than a two-thirds majority was willing to agree that "the present Government of Cuba had voluntarily placed itself outside the inter-American system."29 No official record has identified the three abstentions, although it is possible to surmise that these nations probably included Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador.

But six of the larger more populous states, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador, abstained on the paragraph of
Resolution 6 that resolved:

'that their incompatibility excludes the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system; and 'that the Council of the Organization of American States and the other organs and organizations of the inter-American system adopt without delay the measures necessary to comply with this resolution.30

On Resolution VIII, seventeen states approved paragraph I which
resolved:

29 Ronning, p. 20.
30 Ibid., p. 21.
to suspend immediately trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war of every kind. 31

Again, no official record of this vote has been released, but it can be inferred that the nations abstaining were Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador, those apparently strongest in their anti-sanctions positions.

But only sixteen nations approved paragraph II which called upon the O.A.S. Council to study the "feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade to other items, with special attention to items of strategic importance." 32 Here the record shows that Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador and Chile abstained.

Although Resolution II entitled Special Consultative Committee on Security Against the Subversive Action of International Communism, was supported by a near-unanimous majority, 33 the single Bolivian abstention is of special note and will be given separate examination and evaluation later in this chapter.

Other significant resolutions which were each approved 20-1 included:

Resolution I, which pointed to the threat of the communist offensive in America; Resolution III, which offered a reiteration of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination; Resolution IV, which affirmed the need for the holding of free elections; Resolution V, which called for the intensification of efforts under the Alliance for Progress; Resolution VIII, which excluded the government of Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board; Resolution IX, which called for a revision of the statute of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 34

31 Ibid., 22.
32 Ibid., 22.
33 Ibid., 23.
34 Ibid., 23.
All of the aforementioned resolutions affirmed principles and proposed positive measures to deal with the threat of Communism to the hemisphere. Agreement on principles is important, but implementation of principles in the form of measures becomes the real test of a viable international security organization. And the voting on the key resolutions revealed a substantial lack of agreement between the United States and the Latin American states on the meaning and desirability of collective security measures.

That abstentions were recorded instead of negative votes, however, can largely be attributed to Mr. Rusk's intensive personal diplomacy and a reluctance of the six soft-line countries to vote openly against the United States... 35

The split within the inter-American system exhibited at Punta del Este reflected a division with important implications for the future ability of the O.A.S. to function as a viable international security organization. To determine the constants and variants affecting the determination of Latin American foreign policy, so that a realistic appraisal of future O.A.S. capability can be advanced, it is necessary to analyze in depth the general factors motivating both the countries that supported sanctions and those that opposed sanctions.

**Pro-Sanctions Group**

The United States. At this Conference, the U. S. delegation played a central role in forging a compromise acceptable to at least two thirds of the member governments which would apply the strongest possible sanctions against the Castro Government yet preserve maximum

consensus within the system. The Kennedy Administration was responsive to domestic pressure which demanded positive action against Cuba, largely because experts predicted that Cuba might become the central issue in the upcoming November 1962, Congressional elections. Of equal concern to President Kennedy was Congressional financing for the Alliance for Progress. The New York Times observed:

That Congress and United States public opinion may take a dim view of the role played here [at Punta del Este] by Brazil and a few other countries is fully realized by their delegates. The U. S. negotiators have told them so, not in terms of threats, but in simple declaratory sentences, urging the Latin Americans to think of the consequences of their attitudes.36

Despite these very real domestic pressures, the Kennedy Administration hesitated to hasten the impending split by making impossible demands on the fragile bonds of inter-American unity. But O.A.S. Ambassador, deLesseps Morrison, convinced that collective imposition of sanctions on the Dominican Republic had successfully achieved a political objective, persistently demanded throughout the negotiations that a like penalty be meted out to Castro.37


37Morrison, p. 170. Trujillo, reactionary totalitarian dictator of the Dominican Republic, had been implicated in a plot to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela. The Sixth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the O.A.S. in August, 1960 overwhelmingly voted to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, and suspend trade in arms. The vote was unanimous among the nineteen nations eligible to vote. Neither the Dominican Republic nor Venezuela was eligible, since both were involved directly in the dispute. This action proved that at least a significant majority of nations were willing to act collectively to further goals of social, political and economic reform. Therefore it should be noted that the political context of the Punta del Este Meeting was not as favorable to the invocation of similar sanctions against Cuba. While a majority of states might have given
Within the U. S. delegation during the difficult negotiations, there was hope that at least a two-thirds majority might be possible because some nations had not advanced firm positions. There was great probability that a shift by an important member of either group would bring others along. For this shift, the U. S. focused on the possibility of altering the Argentine position, perhaps to influence the votes of Chile, Ecuador or Bolivia. 38

Resisting many suggestions from members of the U. S. delegation to compromise with watered-down Brazilian resolutions, Ambassador deLesseps Morrison continued to argue for meaningful sanctions, approaching Latin American delegations on the level of intensive personal diplomacy. 39

The U. S. mission to gain meaningful support for sanctions was complicated by pro-Castro demonstrations in Venezuela, Brazil, Peru and Mexico triggered by the opening of the Conference. These riots threatened internal order and put great pressures from the leftist sectors on the statesmen of these nations. 40

There was general agreement among the members of delegations opposed to sanctions that the attitude of the U. S. was far more enthusiastic approval of sanctions aimed at a reactionary dictator, it was quite another matter to expect similar automatic response from a like majority to punish Castro, a charismatic leader, the image of a successful social revolution recently triumphant against the brutal Batista dictatorship.

38Ronning, p. 18.
39Morrison, Chapter 12, pp. 177-197.
40Morrison, pp. 178-179.
conciliatory than that of Colombia and the Central American govern-
ments.

A sympathetic reporter for La Nación (Buenos Aires), described
the U. S. dilemma in this manner:

Rusk’s mission will probably decide the fate of the Alliance
for Progress. The success of the program centers on whether
Congress will approve the funds to finance it. . . . With the
ghost of North American public opinion, Rusk has struggled day
and night in order to get the most energetic action against
Castro while preserving the unity of the inter-American system. 42

The Central American States. The strongest proponents of sanctions
were the Central American nations. At the outset of the Meeting these
nations, situated in the zone of geographical proximity to Cuba, warned
that they would walk out of the Meeting if the other Latin American
nations blocked collective action against the Castro regime. Also
they threatened to turn to the U. S. for a Caribbean regional system
if effective resolutions could not be approved by the larger O.A.S.
body. 43

Ronning has emphasized that the governments of Central American
nations (excepting Costa Rica) had in common "domestic political situ-
ations that would make the example of Castro and his supporters highly
dangerous to the governments in power." 44 All were either dictatorships

41Ronning, p. 18.

42Ibid., 19. Quoted from "El fantasma de San Rafael," La Nación


44Ronning, p. 15.
(such as Nicaragua), or "democracies" run or effectively controlled by the military and the oligarchy. Because of the tradition of "rigging" free elections, governments of this area, "... were probably less concerned about domestic repercussions of any O.A.S. action against Cuba than the dangers Cuba itself represented for them."  

Costa Rica. The Government of Costa Rica, unlike the neighboring Central American republics has operated as a comparably viable political democracy, largely because of the astute political leadership of former President José Figueres. That nation has supported policies within the O.A.S. which have been consistent with the ideals of democracy. Prior to the Punta del Este Conference, the Costa Rican Government had severed diplomatic relations with the Castro Government because of that government's anti-democratic development.  

It is possible to conclude that three major factors influenced the Costa Rican stand in favor of sanctions at Punta del Este: (1) a relatively non-dogmatic stand on intervention, especially in favor of promoting democracy; (2) the fact that the Costa Rican Government had already broken diplomatic ties with the Cuban regime; (3) geographical proximity to the danger of Cuban infiltration and subversion.

Dominican Republic. In January 1962, the first interim government since the assassination of dictator Trujillo had been installed to prepare the Dominican people for free elections.  

Having emerged from a


47A. Terry Rombo, "The Dominican Republic," in Needler, Political Systems of Latin America, p. 177.
repressive totalitarian dictatorship and having been rescued from a Trujillo family counter-revolution by U. S. naval presence, the democratic leaders in the Dominican Republic were primarily interested in stabilizing the uncertain internal political situation. Geographical proximity to the Cuban-based subversion worried Dominicans by complicating this task.

In a declaration which equated the purposes of right and left-wing dictatorships, somewhat understandably the Dominican Minister called on the Punta del Este conferees to apply against Cuba the kind of sanctions that helped destroy Trujillo. Quite firmly, the Dominican Republic aligned itself with nations seeking sanctions, approving intervention to promote democratic ideals.

Colombia. The Government of Colombia, assumed a leadership role among the Latin American nations in requesting the Meeting of Foreign Ministers to work out an O.A.S. formula for combatting subversion. The Colombian initiative complemented earlier U. S. attempts to sound out Latin American governments concerning their views on O.A.S. sanctions of Cuba. Under the guidance of President Alberto Lleras Camargo, the first Secretary-General of the O.A.S., the Colombian Government has become a mediating force within the O.A.S. Colombian leadership in inter-American affairs has also developed in response to the cold war and the growing awareness of the need for economic interdependence. Lleras, a Liberal, was elected in 1958 as a result of a bipartisan Liberal-Conservative agreement to alternate Liberals and Conservatives in the office of Presidency for a twelve-year period. Joint bipartisan

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cooperation was undertaken to re-establish freedom and constitutional guarantees after a lengthy period of civilian and military dictatorship.

President Lleras had preserved bipartisan support for the outlines of his program of economic progress begun in 1960. But because of party anarchy, Lleras had enacted his program largely through executive decree or administrative initiative. Through the efforts of its President, Colombia became the first nation to deliver a detailed development plan to United States officials of the Alliance for Progress.

A "qualified" democracy, in 1962 Colombia had yet to substantially reorient both attitudes and procedures to cope with the need for social change. The challenge of fidelismo mushroomed during Lleras' term. Thus the difficult decisions of Colombian foreign policy during this period bore his personal stamp.

Dependent upon the Alliance for Progress funds to support a reform program imperiled by both domestic uncertainty and Cuban subversion, Lleras appealed to the inter-American collective security machinery, in alignment with the U.S., to support sanctions against the Cuban regime. Apparently two major factors influenced the Colombian decision: (1) danger of disequilibrium to a relatively uncertain domestic situation caused by Cuban subversion—a result of Colombia's geographical proximity to Cuba and reputation for being a successful "Alliance for Progress country;" (2) direct dependence on U.S. Alliance for Progress aid

50Ibid., 216.
51Ibid., 216, 230.
dollars to advance social reform.

*Venezuela.* The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution which antedated the Cuban Revolution became permanent when Rómulo Betancourt won 49 percent of the total vote in a 1958 election and his party Acción Democrática won a clear majority in both houses of Congress and in most state legislatures. Seeking a revolution by consent, Rómulo Betancourt shunned the firing squad techniques employed by Fidel Castro. The Venezuelan regime instituted agrarian reform by law with just compensation, not by arbitrary seizure. After its democratic revolution Venezuela was able to maintain friendly established economic relations with the U. S. and with other Western hemisphere countries. By contrast, Castro through his own choice essentially had alienated himself from the U. S. and had become entirely dependent upon Soviet trade. The Venezuelan regime under Betancourt made no attempt, as did Castro, to regiment the entire economy under state control, although Venezuelan leaders made provision for extensive governmental planning. Governmental ownership of basic industries was mixed with private manufacturing, commerce and agriculture.

Because the Venezuelan Democratic Revolution has represented the antithesis of the Cuban Revolution, Castro has attempted to vindicate his cause by labeling the Betancourt Government as a primary target for overthrow by subversion. Robert Alexander, a noted authority on Latin American affairs has compared the rivalry between Cuba and Venezuela

53Ibid., 316.
to the contest between Communist China and India in Asia. 54

The Betancourt Government broke diplomatic relations with the Castro regime on November 11, 1961, when the hostility between the two nations precluded any correct diplomatic interchange. 55 Thus because its political symbolism as a model democratic revolutionary government marked it for overthrow by Fidel Castro, Venezuela has supported proposals to sanction the Castro regime. Geographic proximity also intensified the urgency of Venezuelan support for collective O.A.S. sanctions. Consistently in its foreign policy the Venezuelan Government has been a foe of all dictatorships whether of the right or left, and has supported collective intervention on behalf of constitutional democracy within the inter-American system. And in 1962 the Venezuelan Government announced that it would no longer extend diplomatic recognition to any regime which came to power through illegal means regardless of the circumstances. 56

Peru. The recurring patterns of Peruvian politics from 1931-1962 have been governed by a feud between the Aprista party and the Peruvian military. The Aprista party was organized by Víctor Raul Haya de la Torre to bring reform not only to Peru but to "Indo-America" as a whole. 57 With its cooperative efforts to unite laborers and intellectuals and to blend Marxist economics with democratic philosophy it became more of a social movement or a popular crusade than a political party. Apra's

54Ibid., 315.
55Ibid., 146.
56Leo B. Lott, "Venezuela," in Needler, Political Systems of Latin America, p. 264.
program centered around five major points:

(1) Action against "Yankee" imperialism . . ; (2) political unity of Latin America; (3) the nationalization of lands and industry; (4) the internationalization of the Panama Canal; and (5) solidarity with all oppressed people and classes of the world.\(^{58}\)

Frequently the Apristas on the side of social change and the military on the side of status-quo forces, have clashed in the streets.\(^{59}\) The modern Peruvian military, though more amenable to social change now than in the past, has clung to its guardianship role, upholding a self-conceived constitutional mission. It has been especially watchful of any attempt by the Apristas to assume complete control of high offices, not only because of ideological cleavages but because of fear of reprisal for the past.\(^{60}\)

In the period 1931-1962 Manuel Prado served two terms totalling twelve years as President (1939-1945 and 1956-1962). Prado served his first terms as a conservative, numb to the problems of social change and progress. Prado's second term, however, resulted from a compromise between Conservatives and Apristas forced by the rising influence of the latter. Prado, in exchange for power, agreed to act as a moderate buffer between the Apristas and the military in order to bring the Apristas forward in the 1962 election with their own candidate.\(^{61}\)

Given the relatively conservative orientation of the Prado Administration under the considerable surveillance of military guardians, Peru


\(^{59}\)Ibid., 304.

\(^{60}\)Ibid., 302.

\(^{61}\)Ibid., 298.
favored a strong stand against Cuba. At Punta del Este, the Peruvian delegation, which had actually been the first to demand collective action against Cuba, contended that Cuban agents had intervened actively in Peruvian politics.

Recently the radical left in Peru has been concentrating on forming violent peasant movements among the Indians. Some Aprista politicians have been drawn by more vigorous radical slogans. Many Apristas, primarily students, have broken with their party because of its temporary pragmatic alliance and compromise with the conservative Prado. Continued defection of younger Apristas to more radical and extreme political groups could well deplete the reserve of capable moderate centrist democratic leaders, and sharpen the edge of left and right wing conflict, perhaps to nullify the hard-won progress in social reform made possible by political order.

Paraguay. Under the iron hand of dictator General-President Alfredo Stroessner, Paraguay has consistently voted with the United States in inter-American councils. Somewhat of an embarrassment to the United States, Paraguay has made little progress toward fulfilling the economic and social goals of the Alliance for Progress. Opposing all forces considered detrimental to its continued control, the dictatorship outlawed the Communist party, and in 1961 broke relations with the Castro government in Cuba. The Paraguayan stand in favor of strong sanctions

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against Cuba at Punta del Este reflected the reactionary vested interest of the President-dictator in maintaining rigid control.\(^{64}\)

**Uruguay.** A rather atypical Latin American state, Uruguay has an almost entirely literate population of chiefly European descent, and has been noted for its democracy, remarkable political stability and advanced social welfare.\(^{65}\)

However, Uruguayan political programs have reached a stalemate because of political division in the nine-member collegiate executive. The original purpose of the collective executive had been to prevent any seizure of power by an aspiring dictator.\(^{66}\) Six seats on the collective Executive Council are distributed to the highest vote-getters in the majority coalition (lema), while three are allotted to the highest vote-getters in the minority coalition. Under this lema system, several political parties (sub-lemas) with similar programs are grouped together for the purposes of winning the elections.\(^{67}\) Often those groups which cooperate to win elections cannot cooperate within the National Council or parliament to govern coherently. With no clear working majority, nominations for important posts have often been left unfilled and coherent policy has been difficult to formulate.\(^{68}\)

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\(^{64}\)Leo B. Lott, "Paraguay," in Needler, Political Systems of Latin America, p. 447.


\(^{66}\)Ibid., 456.

\(^{67}\)Ibid., 457.

\(^{68}\)Ibid., 454.
The Cuban question has raised sharp controversy in Uruguay though the Communist party has had only mediocre success. Among Democratic Socialists and even fervent anti-Communists there has been admiration for Castro. In January 1962, Uruguay had not yet severed diplomatic ties with Cuba. The traditional two-party coalition system has effectively controlled internal extremism. But the current fragmentation of political unity, stemming from petty disagreements between party leaders, could well be exploited by leftist-extremist groups for their own advantage. 69

Uruguay's indecisiveness at Punta del Este was clearly a reflection of the political division of the National Council. Although the Uruguayan Government voted to convene the conference, the National Executive Council was split between two diametrically opposed groups. 70 As a result the Uruguayan delegation was sent to the Conference without prior instructions. A position was to be charted according to new information presented or new resolutions advanced. 71 Clearly a compromise position was needed to win the support of the Uruguayan Government. No hard-line resolution calling for mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions could have healed the breach within Uruguay's National Council. With regard to Uruguay's indecision, Ronning has recorded, "Throughout the Meeting Uruguay remained a microcosm of the split that was affecting all of Latin America." 72

69 Ibid., 461.
72 Ronning, p. 19.
Very significant in contributing to this indecision was Uruguay's difficult position between two large anti-sanctions nations, Brazil and Argentina. One group headed by the Chairman of the Executive Council, President Haedo, veered toward the position of these powerful neighbors. 73

Resolution VI which excluded Cuba from the inter-American system in lieu of requiring a mandatory break in diplomatic relations, struck the fine balance necessary to unite the factions in the Uruguayan Council.

The first paragraph of Resolution VIII which required the interruption of arms traffic was a specific sanction directly related to the problem of subversion, rather than a vague punitive sanction that could have been arbitrarily applied. A middle-ground position, this resolution was calculated to unify opposing points of view—a necessary prerequisite for obtaining a positive Uruguayan vote. The second paragraph of Resolution VIII which referred to the O.A.S. Council the study of feasibility and desirability of extending trade suspensions to other items, particularly those with strategic importance, may also be construed as a compromise measure. The relatively noncommittal language of the resolution enabled divided governments such as Uruguay's to postpone a final decision until more information could be collected or until a more propitious political moment.

Haiti. Governed by a dictatorial regime, Haiti is the only predominantly Negro nation and the only nation whose European culture is French in Latin America. The gross national product in 1962 was $304,000,000, one of the lowest in Latin America. The population density, 424.7 persons per square mile, is the greatest of all Latin American

73Morrison, p. 171.
countries. Complicating its low economic output and overpopulation is a lack of natural resources, a rudimentary state of agricultural technology, and the highest illiteracy rate (90 per cent) in Latin America. These conditions are expected to hinder the development of a responsible constitutional democracy. 75

The President-Dictator "Papa Doc" Duvalier has indicated little desire to improve the overall social welfare of his nation. The greatest share of his national budget has been allocated to defense spending, representation abroad, and upkeep of the presidency and administration. 76

Originally one of seven nations that declared its opposition to sanctions against Cuba, Haiti shifted its position to support sanctions on the final vote. At the time Haiti's position was mysterious and unclear. However, it has become increasingly obvious that Haiti adopted an independent position only to gain economic commitments from the United States. U. S. aid formerly totalling $13.5 million annually was cut off when President Duvalier insisted, against United States objections, on dismissing qualified engineering personnel and replacing them with unqualified political appointees. A U. S. announcement of a commitment to build a jet airport outside Port-au-Prince coincided with the Haitian decision to vote with the two-thirds majority at Punta del Este. 77


75 Rayford W. Logan and M. C. Needler, "Haiti," in Needler, Political Systems of Latin America, p. 149.

76 Ibid., 152.

77 Ibid., 161.
Anti-Sanctions Group

Mexico. The Government of Mexico has been a most consistent advocate of non-intervention and self-determination of peoples. Dr. Howard F. Cline, an eminent authority on the history and politics of Mexico, has characterized Mexican policy as follows:

In the hemisphere, Mexico has high prestige as an independent spokesman for the Latin American point of view, based primarily on the fact that it has shaken off most of the ills that have beset its colleagues from time-to-time--dictatorships, foreign control of the economy, even national politics; and has clearly, through its own Revolution, set the nation on the road to social and economic betterment. 78

Dr. Cline has made it quite clear that Mexico's adherence to the doctrine of nonintervention has not always resulted in a passive foreign policy:

Mexico has been among the leaders in organizing collective defense against external intrusions in the internal affairs of peoples, especially those of Latin America. This modern tradition which has prevented the rise of a Mexican neutralist or third force concept was clearly demonstrated by Mexico's entry early and vigorous, under President Alemán, into World War II against a clearly visible Nazi threat. 79

The posture of Mexican foreign policy toward Cuba has been officially correct through diplomatic channels, though not unnecessarily cordial. Policy decisions are made within the all-inclusive moderate Party of Revolutionary Institutions, a symbol of the Mexican experience of revolution to evolution. The vocal pro-Castro Leftist groups were


dealt with effectively by the Lopez Mateos Government, and precluded from capturing control of official Mexican policies during this period.

Thus the Mexican unwillingness to break diplomatic relations with Castro or support mandatory inter-American sanctions against his regime stems not from political sympathy with Castro's goals, but from a deep-seated tenacity to the dogma of nonintervention. 80

The juridical principles of nonintervention and self-determination of peoples are mutually-related and derived from the experience of the Mexican revolution. In his First Annual Message, Lopez Mateos reiterated the stand of every Mexican President since Lazaro Cardenas: "The principles of our foreign policy emanate from our historical experience. We were forced to defend our territory, our sovereignty and our integrity." 81

The absolute principle of nonintervention has been based on Mexico's special sensitivity to the interventionary actions of all nations which might block the legitimate aspirations of people to modify their political, social and economic conditions by revolution if necessary. 82 Consistently Mexico has defended the right of the Cuban revolutionaries to commit errors—as long as those errors don't result in definitely proven overt acts of aggression against other states. Mexico, having peaceful and friendly relations with the United States, has attempted to interpose itself as an "honest broker" between the United States and Latin America. 83

80 Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 300.
81 Ibid., 300.
82 Ibid., 300.
83 Cline, Orbis V, 161.
The support of sanctions against the Castro regime, in the absence of conclusively proven overt acts of aggression, then was considered by the Mexican Government as a violation of the doctrine of nonintervention embodied in Article 15 of the O.A.S. Charter.

Responding to the Colombian request for a Meeting under the Rio Treaty to discuss and define attacks and aggression, the Mexican representative on the O.A.S. Council announced that Mexico would vote against a convocation of a Meeting under the Rio Treaty, because contrary to the terms of Articles 3 and 6, no American state was being subjected to either an armed attack or "any other act or situation that may place in danger the peace of America."\(^{34}\) He further added during the debate that the O.A.S. was not strong enough to sustain the burden of decisions of this nature, and should avoid such issues.\(^{35}\)

Throughout the Punta del Este Conference the Mexican stand against intervention was absolute and uncompromising. This stand was particularly evident in Mexico's opposition to the resolution concerning economic sanctions. Because no conclusive proof had been offered that Cuba's Marxist-Leninist system had committed overt acts of aggression against other states, the Mexican position was based on the argument that any application of sanctions solely against a country's internal political system would constitute an illegal intervention into that country's domestic policy.

Although the Mexican delegation assented to the vague resolution declaring Cuba incompatible with the principles of the inter-American

\(^{34}\) *New York Times*, November 15, 1961, p. 18.

\(^{35}\) Berle, p. 100.
system, Mexico opposed the key resolution excluding Cuba from participation in the inter-American system on juridical grounds. Adopting a strict-constructionist attitude, the Mexicans argued that the O.A.S. Charter did not make provision for the exclusion of a member, and if this were to be done the Charter would need to be amended by calling a special Inter-American Conference for this purpose. But Mexico was willing to approve the resolution excluding Cuba from attendance of sessions of the Inter-American Defense Board because that agency, created by the Foreign Ministers, was within the competence of that Organ to regulate without Charter provisions. Thus the Mexican Government's decision to support this resolution appeared to be based upon political discretion rather than juridical arguments.

Although the argument against the exclusion resolution was made without reference to the doctrine of nonintervention, it appeared that the Mexican bias against intervention was a factor in making this decision. Though not technically listed as a sanction under Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, the exclusion resolution carried the effect of a punitive action (or intervention) against a state, strictly because of its "incompatibility" with the principles of the inter-American system—something to which the Mexican Government had been opposed on the ground of non-intervention. As has been recognized earlier, the Bay of Pigs invasion had alerted the Mexican Government to the possibility that any collective action might easily become an act of intervention.

Postponement of such a decision until the convening of an Inter-American Conference conceivably would have allowed more time for the Mexican Government to observe closely Cuban international actions as a
consequence of that government's conversion to Marxism-Leninism. A premature decision taken before Cuban aggression could be successfully demonstrated, could have revived leftist agitation, perhaps violence, and jeopardized Mexico's proud record of internal stability and security.

Brazil. The largest nation in South America, Brazil in recent years has rapidly awakened to a new awareness of national identity and destiny in world affairs. Inspired by the spiraling rate of Brazilian national growth, in 1960 President Janio Quadros steered the ship-of-state to an independent course. He premised the new foreign policy on democratic economic development and social reform—an aim common to Brazil and other less-developed countries united in their rejection of colonialism.

By outlining this independent policy Brazil assumed the role of self-appointed spokesman for the needs and grievances of the less-developed nations, especially in the Western hemisphere. Quadros condemned the "shortsighted" "ideological prejudices of capitalist democracies, ever ready to decry the idea of state intervention . . ." and answered that "We of the less-developed nations are not in a position to allow the free play of economic forces in our territory, simply because those forces, controlled from outside, play their own game, and not that of our country." 86


87 Ibid., 104.
He warned that "The Western world must show and prove that it is not only Communist planning that promotes the prosperity of national economies."

The Brazilian president challenged the United States to rectify the economic imbalance which he considered to be the most critical of all the adverse factors besetting the inter-American regional system. Recognizing that the U. S. through its recent aid programs had taken steps to revise a rather inoperative continental policy, President Quadros expressed hope that President Kennedy would "sweep away the remaining obstacles on the road to a truly democratic continental community." For translation into reality Brazilian foreign policy was ultimately dependent on the juridical principles of respect for the self-determination of peoples and nonintervention as the best safeguards for each nation's unhindered basic economic and social development.

A preface to the explicit Quadros third force policy had been phrased by Horatio Lafer, Head of the Brazilian delegation to the United Nations in 1960, who addressed himself to the problem of East-West conflict:

The only feasible path leading to solution of our age's problems is that of permanent negotiation, the persistent determination to continue to negotiate . . . . Nonetheless to attain this state of peaceful coexistence . . . a basic premise, a point of departure must be fixed. This premise is the acceptance by each one of the reality, just or unjust, of nations with regimes, ideologies and organizations not as we would

\[88\] Ibid., 104.

\[89\] Ibid., 105.
wish them to be, but as they are today. This acceptance must be accompanied by the pledge of non-intervention, direct or indirect, by one ideology in the sphere of another. 90

According to Señor Lafer, acceptance of the status quo is the primary prerequisite for the resolution of the cold-war conflict. He felt that a "... relevant role can be played, vis-a-vis the major protagonists in the current political scene, by the lesser anti-war powers [Brazil] who can become the impartial interpreters of the world's desire for peace." 91

When a partial cold war detente has been achieved through negotiations, the Brazilian argued, the nations of the world will be able to consolidate world peace permanently by channeling resources saved from arms reduction into economic development. 92

Jânio Quadros, the man responsible for articulating this major shift in Brazilian foreign policy, assumed office as President with elaborate campaign promises to raise the living standards of the masses.

Since 1950 Brazilian presidents have had to become more sensitive to the clamor of the masses for social reform in order to win the electorate. But these democratic leftist reform-minded presidents, including Quadros, have faced both conservative Congresses, which have ignored the executive's progressive programs, and conservative jealous military guardians. 93 As had previous presidents, Quadros faced an uncompromising

91 Ibid., 111.
92 Ibid., 111.
Congress, and as a result he resigned on August 25, 1961, less than seven months after assuming office.\textsuperscript{94}

His resignation elevated João Goulart to the office of the presidency. Because of Goulart's radical leftist background as Labor Minister under Getúlio Vargas, in 1954, the military intervened to prevent his assumption to full presidential power.\textsuperscript{95} However, a compromise solution was worked out by the military to allow Goulart to assume office. A parliamentary system was established, conferring more power on the Congress, to insure that Goulart's independence as president would be even more severely constricted by conservative forces.\textsuperscript{96}

Thus Goulart, from the day he assumed the Brazilian presidency in August, 1961, was forced to tread a narrow path between right-wing military coup-d'etat and left-wing violent social upheaval.

The Eighth Meeting of Consultation offered the new Goulart Administration its first major opportunity to shape the direction of its foreign policy.

On September 10, 1961, the new Brazilian Foreign Minister reaffirmed Quadros' independent foreign policy by announcing that his country would "spare no effort to maintain Cuba within the inter-American system in accordance with the characteristics that are the basis for coexistence between the countries of this hemisphere."\textsuperscript{97} Despite President Goulart's

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid., 73.

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., 73.

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid., 74.

difficulties with the conservative right-wing Congressional opposition and the military, his initial foreign policy appeared as positive and independent of the United States as had his predecessor's. This reaction was the Brazilian answer to the careful U. S. probe of the dynamics of Latin American foreign policy in the fall of 1961 prior to the call for the Ministers' Conference.

On December 3, 1961, Brazil joined with Mexico and four other nations to oppose the Colombian proposal for a Foreign Ministers' parley to consider the (Cuban) problem of subversion as a form of aggression prohibited by the Rio Treaty. Consistent with its conviction that respect for national self-determination and coexistence offered the best permanent solution to the current international conflict, the Brazilian Government on January 22, 1962, set forth a general plan for neutralizing the Castro regime. Dr. San Tiago Dantas, Brazilian Foreign Minister defended his government's proposal because it recognized the need for the defense of American diplomacy against international Communism by aiming to create conditions for the neutralization of Cuba on valid legal grounds.

A more specific proposal was advanced by the Brazilian delegation for consideration by the Foreign Ministers. The plan called for (1) Cuban acceptance of a "status of limitations" to include reduction of armaments, termination of subversion, cessation of purchase of Soviet weapons; (2) a specially-appointed O.A.S. committee that would determine by negotiation

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Cuba's "status of incompatibility" after a sixty-day period. If after this sixty-day period Cuba had shown no willingness to adhere to the principles of the inter-American system, then the plan would have implemented the strictest collective sanctions, including military force.100

Certainly the major emphasis of this plan was on negotiation with Cuba, rather than punishment for Cuba. And for this reason the United States rejected it although the plan had the merit of attempting to bridge the gulf between the pro-sanctions group and the anti-sanctions group. It would seem doubtful that strong military sanctions would have been applied under this plan had it been adopted. If there was but slight agreement within the inter-American system concerning the status of Cuba's incompatibility it would have been improbable to suppose that within sixty days all the differences could have been reconciled. Undoubtedly the Brazilian Government understood this reality, and could propose sanctions, knowing that they would probably never be applied under the circumstances.

A second Brazilian attempt to mediate also failed. Concerning the matter of applying limited economic sanctions, a Brazilian draft "recommended to the governments of member states immediate suspension of all arms traffic or any other implements of war."101 Couched in terms of a recommendation, the proposal would have avoided a controversial formal collective decision in the compulsory terms of the Rio Treaty on whether the Cuban regime "constitutes a situation that might endanger the peace of America."102 Perhaps the proposal would have been acceptable to the

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102 Ibid., p. 4.
anti-sanctions group, but it was clearly too weak to win approval from the nations of pro-sanctions group who wanted some manifestation of action.

On the final tally, Brazil abstained on the exclusion paragraph of Resolution VIII concerning limited mandatory economic sanctions. For the most part the Brazilian Government was objecting to the immediacy of the application and the mandatory nature of these propositions because all resolutions sponsored by the Brazilian delegation had sought to avoid either immediate or required action.

Like Mexico, Brazil used juridical arguments for its decisions. But Brazilian policy, the more flexible of the two governments, lent itself to modulation according to the national self-interest. At Punta del Este, Brazil advanced policies that were circumscribed by the state of internal affairs. Roberto de Oliveira Campos, a former Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, has outlined practical considerations of Brazilian politics which influenced his government's abstentions on key measures sponsored and backed by the United States. If strong action against Cuba had been supported by the Goulart government, leftist minorities in certain key positions could have started a chain reaction of strikes, street incidents and general disturbances at a time when Brazil and other countries were in a delicate state of political convalescence and needed normalization of economic life. 103

It would seem that any position the Goulart government might have taken would have placed its political safety in jeopardy. A pro-sanctions

103 Roberto de Oliveira Campos, "The United States and Brazil: A Diplomatic View," in Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil, p. 360.
position likely would have incited leftist rebellion with the possibility of a military coup. The soft-line pursued by the Goulart Government put the government under closer scrutiny by the military guardians.

Ambassador Campos also pointed out the unworkability of sanctions proposed and adopted at Punta del Este. Because of the insignificance of trade between Cuba and the rest of Latin America, commercial sanctions would have been meaningless. Diplomatic sanctions, the Brazilian Ambassador argued, would not have protected Latin America from infiltration.

Argentina. Because of upcoming elections, internal pressures on the Frondizi Government were especially acute. Increasingly the government's austerity program had encountered opposition from the labor-left, particularly the peronistas, followers of ex-dictator Juan Peron.

For the Frondizi Government to have taken a firm pro-sanctions stand at Punta del Este would have added to this already growing left-wing opposition, and been an act of political suicide. On the other hand President Frondizi was under pressure from the armed forces to take strong measures against Cuba, although prior to Punta del Este, Argentina still maintained diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. Argentine armed forces leaders had been quoted as saying that "Communism was a cancer, and with cancer half-measures would not do." A compromise which would have reconciled these opposing pressures, in all probability, would have won the approval of the Frondizi Government.

104 Ibid., 360.
105 Ronning, p. 17.
106 Ibid., p. 17.
Throughout the preparation for the Punta del Este Ministers' Meeting, the U. S. had regarded Argentina hopefully as a pivot swing state capable of influencing other votes. Hopes of State Department strategists that Argentina would support sanctions were heightened by the knowledge that President Frondizi himself was personally anti-Castro and pro-West, and that his Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Carcano shared his views. The following illustrates the effect of uncertain domestic politics on Argentine foreign policy decision making. Just before the Council voted to convoke a Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Argentine Government presented a compromise formula to call the Meeting under Article 39 of the Charter, a broader less-specific provision, to avoid the controversial question of applying compulsory sanctions altogether. When this proposal did not win acceptance, Argentina abstained on the Colombian request to convoke the Meeting under the Rio Treaty.

During negotiations before the official opening of the Conference a compromise formula was compiled from Argentine and Colombian draft resolutions. The Argentine draft had strongly condemned Cuban-Soviet ties and Cuba's violation of human rights. Added to this condemnation was the Colombian proposal to issue Cuba an ultimatum to sever military ties with the Soviet bloc and otherwise return to the inter-American system, or submit to collective sanctions. This plan received little

107Morrison, p. 104, 105, 192.
consideration because of the difficulty in determining the meaning of "return to the inter-American system." 111

Ambassador Morrison reported that two high-ranking Argentine officials were dispatched to Washington a little over a week before the Conference opened. The team made it clear that Argentina would not favor sanctions against Cuba, but would support a resolution bearing a lesser penalty, excluding Cuba from the inter-American system.

Members of the U. S. delegation carefully probed the positions of the pro-sanctions nations during the Conference negotiations. Toward the end of the Conference when the resolutions were to be formally presented, a decision had been reached to push for ouster instead of sanctions on the virtual promise of Argentinian and possibly Brazilian support. But when the U. S. confronted the Argentine delegation ready to accept the Argentine plan to oust Cuba from the system, the Argentines were unreceptive and evasive. 112 Later they abstained on the exclusion resolution ostensibly because of juridical scruples. It was believed that Rogelio Frigerio, a powerful pro-Castro Peronista adviser, influenced President Frondizi's ultimate decision to abstain on the exclusion resolution. 113

However, as a pivotal state, the Argentine Government deviated from the strict anti-sanctions group, when it approved limited economic sanctions barring arms traffic. The resolution directed the Council to study the desirability of extending sanctions to strategic materials, which also

111 Ronning, p. 18.
112 Morrison, p. 193.
113 Ibid., p. 105.
won Argentine approval seemed to be a modification of an earlier Argentine plan asking the O.A.S. to study what should be done about Cuban incompatibility.

President Frondizi's refusal to endorse the exclusion of the Cuban Government from participation in inter-American Councils was soundly condemned by the Argentine military. Armed forces leaders demanded that Frondizi break diplomatic ties with Cuba, and force his Foreign Minister to resign. 114

During the first week in February, President Frondizi, in an attempt to appease the military and retain maximal civilian control over Argentine foreign policy, agreed to break diplomatic relations with Cuba gradually and to support resolutions adopted at Punta del Este. 115 When armed forces leaders demanded a full and immediate break, Frondizi agreed but angrily stated that he would not preside over a puppet government. 116 But succumbing to heavy military pressures, President Frondizi retracted by breaking relations with Cuba on February 8, 1962. 117

Military guardianship ultimately proved to be the most significant short-term factor conditioning Argentine foreign policy toward Cuba following the Punta del Este Conference. But the reluctance of President Frondizi to take an unrelenting hard line during the negotiations at Punta del Este, was based on factors likely to persist in future Argentine

policy making: (1) the unknown quantities of leftist unrest in the slums; and (2) the possibility of a thoroughgoing social revolution in Brazil, Argentina's powerful and somewhat paradoxical neighbor to the north. 118

Chile. Chile's position at Punta del Este also must be evaluated most significantly in terms of the domestic political equation. A balance of power between rightists, leftists and moderates has contributed to the maintenance of orderly political democracy in Chile.

Through evolution, rather than revolution, Chilean parties and statesmen have accomplished moderate political, economic and social reforms in urban areas. 119 But the most serious maladjustment that has retarded Chile's progress has been the system of rural land ownership and distribution. Because more than 30 per cent of the total active population depends on agriculture, "monopolization of land, the core of the plantation system, has been and still is an important source of political power as well as a source of semi-feudal social relationships. 120

The combined power monopoly of elite groups of rural landholders, urban industrialists and businessmen, was first broken in 1920 when the middle-class-oriented and labor-supported Radical Party successfully endorsed Arturo Alessandri for the Presidency. 121

121Schmitt and Burks, p. 195.
Progress in implementing social-welfare legislation was halting and uncertain in the 1920's and 1930's. But a Radical-led popular front middle-class-proletarian coalition government of 1938 yielded the most advanced legislation for urban welfare and economic development. The flood-tide of reform legislation ebbed in the immediate post-war years, even though the Radicals controlled the Presidency. 122

The Socialist-Radical alliance fell apart in 1941 largely because of intragovernmental rivalry between the two parties for control of patronage and policy, a conflict that was exploited by the right-wing majority in the legislature. 123

Socialist and Communist competition for control of the labor movement further weakened the role of the Socialists as the left balance wheel of the Popular Front.

Also within the middle-class Radical party, two distinct wings emerged to complicate the political scene—one Marxist and leftist, the other moderate, liberal and non-extremist. Although this "split personality" muted the sharp edges of conflict and contributed to moderation, policy-making effectiveness stagnated, and with it progress toward social and economic reform. 124

The paternalistic personalismo of ex-dictator Carlos Ibáñez waxed strong in the 1952 presidential campaign. Contributing to this temporary reaction was widespread disillusionment among all groups of the electorate

122 Ibid., 195.
124 Ibid., 364.
concerning party fragmentation and inertia, which was complicated by the spiraling post-war inflation. 125

Failure of middle-class leadership consolidated the influence of the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties. An observer of Chilean politics has noted that:

A key to the power of the Liberal and Conservative rightist parties was the fact that their hold on the rural parts of Chile remained practically untouched. At no time during the years of leftist predominance did the leadership of the temporarily allied government parties attempt any program involving the partition, the expropriation or even the increased taxation of the landed estates.126

By the presidential election of 1958, past political coalitions in Chile had been regrouped along more definable ideological lines. The right-wing Liberal and Conservative parties backed Jorge Alessandri, son of former President Arturo Alessandri, who ran on an independent platform.

Eduardo Frei, candidate of the Christian Democratic party appealed most strongly to the middle-class intellectuals, technicians and non-Marxist leftists as well as to Catholics. The Radical Party, formerly a center stabilizing force in Chilean politics, ran for the first time as a single isolated party rather than as part of any middle-class leftist coalition group.

In the 1958 election, non-Marxist leftists, Socialists and Communists joined ranks to form the Popular Action Front (FRAP). Led by the dynamic Salvador Allende, this left-wing coalition emerged with

125Ibid., 364.
126Ibid., 364.
consolidated strength and influence, and came within a hair's breadth of capturing the Presidency by popular vote. 127

Alessandri, the victor by a narrow margin, represented the Chilean upper class and did little to alter the status quo. 128 Both moderate center parties (Radicals and Christian Democrats) following Alessandri's election, expressed uneasiness about the consequences of Alessandri's conservatism and his narrow election.

During the period 1945-1961, United States policy had aided rightist sectors in maintaining the established order by only mildly becoming associated with the pressing needs for social reform in Chile through rather ineffectual aid programs. 129 This position reflected the interest of protecting considerable U. S. economic investment in that nation. Nationalist noncommunist reform advocates, chiefly from the center left, became attracted to a policy that would liberate Chile and other Latin American nations from economic subservience to the United States, and establish a Third Position in international affairs independent of both Washington and Moscow. Such a Third Position was founded on the tenets of nonintervention and self-determination of peoples. 130

Focus on Chile's adoption of an independent foreign policy became more intense when its implications were considered in terms of U. S.-Cuban

127 Ibid., 365.
128 Ibid., 365.
129 Schmitt and Burks, p. 196.
conflicts which occupied the American states at Punta del Este. Dubious of past U. S. motivations, leftist noncommunist Chileans have feared that U. S. concern for the spread of Communism in Latin America by Fidel Castro would be used as an excuse to suppress all meaningful social reform by bolstering right-wing regimes that protected U. S. financial interests. 131

The danger of a Communist take-over has not always been successfully demonstrated by the U. S. to Chileans. On the contrary, many Chileans have credited the Communist influence in the leftist coalition with accelerating the progress toward needed social reforms. It is generally felt among Chileans that the non-Communist groups will be able to control the Party's activities as an agent of Moscow. 132

The conservative elements in Chile have succeeded in maintaining control through the democratic constitutional structure. Therefore, the armed forces have not been called upon to intervene on behalf of the status-quo interests. 133 In 1958 the unified left seriously threatened the conservative base of power. If the leftist coalition ever were to gain power, then perhaps the military would, as it has done in other Latin American countries, intervene and become politically conscious. But when the Alessandri Administration assumed power, the military remained apolitical. Subsequently, Alessandri, without strong military support, was vulnerable to pressures of nationalist center and left voices in the Congress, especially concerning foreign policy decisions.

131Ibid., 266.
132Ibid., 266.
133Lieuwen, p. 131.
Therefore the Chilean delegation decided to oppose the convocation of a Foreign Ministers' Meeting under the Rio Treaty to sanction Cuba, ostensibly on the legal grounds advanced by Mexico, that the O.A.S. had no jurisdiction because no direct act of aggression had been committed. But cross-pressures of the Chilean domestic scene were evident when the delegation was sent to Punta del Este virtually without specific instructions on the initial proposals.

Perhaps either a limited weak resolution or a soft-line resolution would have been a likely alternative to enlist Chilean support, particularly through Argentine leadership. But because the resolution to exclude Cuba from the inter-American system was too strong, final and lacking in sound legal foundations, the Chilean delegation decided to abstain, most likely for reasons of political safety and fear of increasing the advantage of the Communists.

But the Chilean position on the barring of arms traffic is not quite clear. Official sources list a single vote on Resolution VIII with votes of Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Ecuador listed as abstentions. But C. Neale Ronning, a conference observer, has recorded that the vote on Resolution VIII was done on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, though the results were never published officially in this manner. Actually there were three abstentions for paragraph I and four abstentions for paragraph II. Because the U. S. had hoped to win Chilean support

136 Ronning, p. 22.
through Argentine mediation, it would seem likely that Chile, following Argentina's lead, did not abstain on paragraph I, which barred arms traffic. By the process of elimination, no other nation would seem as likely a candidate as Chile for this position. Mexico's stand, as well as Brazil's, had been based on its bids for leadership among the soft-line nations at Punta del Este, and consequently was more rigid in opposition to all sanctions. Ecuador's president had a record of leftist leanings and was thus not likely to approve any sanctions. Also Chile's secondary role as follower in hemisphere relations, as well as the precarious balance-of-power in her domestic affairs, lend credence to the supposition that the government could very well support a strictly-defined resolution sanctioning the probable source of aggression—the arms traffic. It would be equally consistent with Chilean foreign policy for the Alessandri Government to switch to the soft-line position on a more vague resolution which in reality gave to the O.A.S. Council undefined authority on the question of extending sanctions to undefined categories of "strategic materials," because of the constant internal leftist pressure.

**Bolivia.** Bolivia, together with Mexico and Cuba, has enjoyed the distinction of having successfully accomplished a thoroughgoing social revolution in the twentieth century. The revolution destroyed the power and privilege of vested conservative groups, the landed aristocrats, foreign capitalists, the church and the military. Although there are many parallels which prompted these three revolutions, the results have been unique in all three circumstances.
Prior to 1952 when the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) seized power, political control was maintained by a wealthy landed upper-class elite that derived power from a monopoly on the mining enterprises, reinforced by army support. The Indian majority had not been integrated into the mainstream of national political or economic life.

The challenge to this traditional order mushroomed following the Bolivian-Paraguayan conflict in the Chaco (1932-1935). Regarding the significance of the Chaco War it has been reported that

The severe losses in men and territory had eroded the prestige of the army and the oligarchy. Widespread discontent was openly voiced by the lower classes, who during the war had for the first time experienced broad social contacts, new values and aspirations, and a consciousness of nationality.

Led by Víctor Paz Estenssoro, a middle-class radical intellectual, the MNR protest took shape as "an anti-foreign nationalism focused primarily against U. S. investments in Bolivian tin-mining operations." Tentatively the MNR shared power with the military in 1943-1946, and carried out a restrained reform program. Although Paz Estenssoro and the MNR won the free elections of 1951, the army intervened to prevent this orderly evolutionary transition. Early in April, 1952, the MNR forces revolted and destroyed the military and last vestiges of upper-class privileges in Bolivian society.

137 Schmitt and Burks, p. 224.
138 Ibid., 224.
139 Ibid., 224.
140 Ibid., 224.
141 Ibid., 225.
Merging the party machinery with the government at all levels, the MNR embarked on an anti-privilege reform campaign of incorporating the lower class into national life by redistributing the wealth. Dramatically the new regime nationalized the tin mines in October 1951—the major focal point of discontent and distress. However Paz proceeded more slowly with expansion of education, wage and other security benefits to the lower classes, and agrarian reform.  

Although the Paz regime had originally exhibited a strong anti-U. S. bias, gradually it modified that harsh position when the U. S. recognized the government and expressed sympathy for the goals of the revolution. The U. S. continued support of the revolution by purchasing tin from the nationalized mines and extending large-scale Point-Four aid and technical assistance.  

After four years of rule by executive decree without a legislature, Paz in 1956 allowed elections to be held for President and a Congress.  

The MNR won impressive victories in the Congress and maintained control of the Presidency. Hernán Siles Zuazo, a protege of Paz Estenssoro, took office as president. Following a steady moderate program, President Siles met determined opposition from left-wing radicals led by Juan Lechín.  

In the general elections of 1960, Paz was returned to the Presidency as the MNR, though split internally into right-center-left wings, won another solid numerical majority.  

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142 Ibid., 225.
143 Ibid., 225.
144 Ibid., 227.
145 Ibid., 226.
The basically moderate orientation of the Bolivian government was most seriously compromised by leftist pressure from Vice-President Juan Lechin, a leftist, extremist—and a disruptive force within the party.\footnote{Ibid., 227.} The left wing has conspicuously consolidated control over the mining unions by exploiting the worker discontent with deteriorating economic conditions.\footnote{Ibid., 227.} In the face of serious internal dissension within his government and party, Paz could not be expected to take a definitive stand against Cuba.

The Bolivian Government aligned itself rather consistently with the anti-sanctions group led by Brazil and Mexico, despite the heavy U. S. financial assistance annually channeled into Bolivia.

Officially Bolivian Foreign Minister José Fellman Velarde, in his press conference of January 23, alluded to the dilemma his government faced because of economic dependence on the United States. He pointed out that while the U. S. had underwritten 30 per cent of the Bolivian national budget, for reasons of principle Bolivia would support the Mexican position.\footnote{Ronning, p. 19, quoted from \textit{El Día} (Montevideo), January 24, 1962.}

The Bolivian Government even went further to demonstrate its opposition to strong sanctions by being the only nation except Cuba to oppose the creation of the Special Committee on Security Against the Subversive Action of International Communism. Explaining his government's abstention, the Bolivian delegate compared the new Commission to this Consultative Committee on Security which operated during World War II:
Eighteen years ago the men who now form part of the government of Bolivia began on a small scale the first attempts to advance, along the same road that we are now traveling, toward the realization of our ideal of liberty and social justice. Unfortunately, not only for us, our truth was hidden behind a tin curtain and a great deal of misunderstanding and inaccurate information; the result was that some governments, which are now our friends and should have been then, were inclined to empower a commission to observe the conduct of the Bolivian government and to punish it with the suspension of diplomatic and commercial relations. This contributed to the tragic failure of our declared objectives.149

Ecuador. The outstanding feature of Ecuador's political history has been the lack of national integration. There are three basic dimensions which explain this lack of integration: (1) rigid class system; (2) political regionalism; (3) rural-urban cleavage.

The upper-class whites of Spanish descent have consistently been the nation's landholders, political leaders and army officers. In recent years the role of the mestizo, a fusion of white and Indian stock, has been expanding in the country's national life. The rigidity of the class system can be most sharply noted by the fact that half the population are Indians relegated to the bottom of the social scale.

Politics in Ecuador has been reflected also by a competitive power struggle between the coastal region, center of social and political liberalism, and the Sierra highland, traditionally the stronghold of social and political conservatism and Indian indigenous culture.

The rural-urban cleavage, symbolic of political fragmentation, is closely related to the large rural Indian subculture in the high Sierras, which has been separated culturally and socially from the upper and middle ruling classes. Rural life, traditional and indigenous, has changed

149Ronning, p. 25.
slowly. Tied to the soil, either through work on a large landed estate, individual ownership of a small plot of land, or collective ownership of a small farm, the Indian has been as dependent and subservient as a serf on a feudal manor in medieval Europe.  

Lack of political integration has produced a pattern of instability in Ecuadoran politics. So-called revolutions, merely changes of governments, have been common and fairly frequent in the country. Typically change has been restricted to an ouster of the President and close aides, without accompanying alteration of the political system. Revolutions have usually occurred because of constitutional violations. Because Ecuadorian constitutions (fifteen since 1830) have been norms for an ideal political system rather than real documentary indicators of the status quo, "constitutional interpretation" has been reduced to subjective argumentation among rival political leaders of the ruling classes.

The class system, political regionalism and rural-urban divisions have been reflected in the operation of the political process. Both major parties, the Conservatives and Radical-Liberals, have appealed to the upper classes by endorsing the principle of private land ownership. The major doctrinal difference separating the traditional parties has been the role of church in the state. Conservatives have upheld church-state union, while Radical-liberals have supported and been able to implement complete church-state separation.

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151 Ibid., 279.
152 Ibid., 276.
As the two major parties have declined in strength in recent years, third as well as ad hoc parties have become increasingly important in Ecuadorian politics.

There are two chief minor parties—the Socialists and the Communists. The Socialist party has been the only party concerned with integrating the indigenous Indian culture into the national life, despite the fact that the Indian himself has not been active in planning party policy. The Communist party, small and relatively weak, has been very active since the Cuban revolution. Though cooperating with Socialists domestically, the Communist party has independently adopted a sympathetic line on policy toward Cuba. Ad hoc parties, extremely fluid organizations created for the purpose of achieving short-range political objectives, have assumed an even more significant role than third parties in recent Ecuadorian politics.

After over ten years of orderly constitutional transfer of power the administration of Velasco Ibarra, a liberal, dependent upon ad hoc support, was overthrown by military coup d'etat in November 1961. The Vice-President, Carlos Julio Arosemena, assumed the presidency in the midst of hemisphere deliberation on Cuba. Arosemena also drew political support from ad hoc organizations. Though predominantly moderate, Arosemena's backing drew initially from leftist and rightist groups. Having a reputation for leftist leanings, President Arosemena had been

\[153\textit{Ibid.}, 277.\]
\[154\textit{Ibid.}, 277.\]
\[155\textit{Ibid.}, 285.\]
known to admire Fidel Castro prior to his ascent to power. One of his first executive acts was to renew diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba. 156

Consistently, Arosemena's foreign policy favored a soft line toward Cuba in the Punta del Este Foreign Ministers' deliberations. But, in taking this position, the President was relying only upon the will of a minority in his government. Given the precariousness of the President's position and the fluidity of Ecuador's political process, with the constant regrouping of ad hoc parties, this position could not be expected to be permanent.

Concluding Remarks

The bare two-thirds majority vote approving sanctions at Punta del Este fell far short of the goal of inter-American solidarity on a critical security problem. Moreover the weight of this two-thirds majority was unrepresentative of the will of the largest most populous states in Latin America.

A consensus of the delegates believed honestly that the Conference had been convened prematurely, since no overt aggression had been committed by Cuba against any American state—formerly a necessary precondition for applying the Rio Treaty. A significant minority of states failed to accept any hasty collective action against Cuba only on the strength of that government's "incompatibility" with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system. Such a collective action taken without convincing proof of any international aggression resulting from

that government's conversion to Marxism-Leninism, it was argued, would constitute intervention into the internal political affairs of a nation—something strictly forbidden by Article 15 of the O.A.S. Charter.

These essentially juridical arguments of the anti-sanctions group at Punta del Este, as it has been shown, more realistically corresponded to the national self-interests of each state. Although it is difficult to generalize, it would seem that the common denominator of pro-Castro or leftist pressure on the respective governments opposed to sanctions was a factor in shaping the foreign policy decisions at Punta del Este.

In Mexico and Bolivia, the social revolution had become institutionalized in the form of civilian moderate-center-leftist governments. Even though the objections of Mexico and Bolivia were registered strictly on legal grounds, their anti-sanction positions cannot be completely separated from the policy of their leaders to contain radical activity by maintaining broad based support.

Anti-U. S. leftist pressures, however, were more acute and obvious in the civilian governments of Brazil, Chile and Argentina. In these nations the edges of social conflict were much sharper because the privileged classes—the military, landed aristocracy, and the industrialists—though their power had been diminished, were still struggling with progressive forces for control. In order to prevent violent upheavals generated by the pro-Castro left, almost a certainty if sanctions would be approved, these governments opposed mandatory sanctions, upheld the principles of nonintervention and self-determination, and sought compromise and a softer more "recommendatory" line toward Cuba. The position of Ecuador, though represented a separate case of a foreign policy decision
which seemingly did not correlate with a dominant leftist political combination. President Arosemena in making this decision seemed to stand precariously alone.

Those governments that supported sanctions were also motivated by factors affecting their respective national interests. Some governments that supported sanctions—particularly most Central American nations, Peru and Paraguay—were those least touched by social revolution, those in which privileged groups, fearful of social change, had used their power to maintain stability and upper-class predominance in varying degrees.

Equally significant was the factor of relative geographic proximity to the center of the Cuban subversion. Constitutional democracies that had made remarkable progress toward the goals of development, Costa Rica and Venezuela particularly, were influenced by considerations of immediate national security—as were other less democratic Central American and bordering Caribbean states, who all sought protection from collective security.

Of perhaps lesser importance in motivating some governments to favor sanctions was a heavy dependence on U. S. Alliance for Progress aid. Colombia could possibly be included as a major example of this type. Haiti used its critical "swing" position to win favorable economic aid agreements from the United States, whereas other governments disregarded U. S. economic power to join the soft-line group. Bolivia and Argentina are cases in point.

Of all the votes favorable to sanctions, Uruguay's was the most unstable and indecisive. That the sanctions were ultimately less stringent
and more limited probably resulted from the need to compromise in order to procure the bare minimum for a two-thirds majority of votes, including Uruguay's.

Community of interest on fundamentals concerning aggression and methods of combatting threats to security is basic to the successful operation of any mutual defense reciprocal assistance system; it was clear that at the Punta del Este Conference such community of interest was less than adequate to insure effective functioning of the O.A.S. Wide disparities in level of social and economic development among the Latin American nations and the United States contributed to the complex gradation of factors that compromised the effectiveness of the O.A.S. as a security system.

Correction of the internal disparities which divided the inter-American community at Punta del Este would be the best long-range approach to insure stabilization of Latin American politics, fulfillment of economic goals and hopefully increased mutuality of national interests. In the meantime, any astute observer of the extremely fluid inter-American system would inevitably expect serious tensions to continue to divide the O.A.S. members on the issue of applying mandatory sanctions against states in questionable situations where evidence of aggression presented is vague and unconvincing, and where collective intervention is proposed as a solution.

Whereas Punta del Este revealed the potentiality for disintegration within O.A.S. ranks in a difficult and challenging situation, the Cuban missile crisis, to be examined in the next chapter, demonstrated latent
possibilities for reintegration within the O.A.S. in response to a difficult but equally challenging situation.
CHAPTER II

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Purpose

When the Soviet Union attempted to build a missile base with offensive capability in Cuba, in an expression of unprecedented unanimity, the Latin American states resolutely supported a collective measure authorizing the use of force to prevent further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the political rationale of the positions of the United States and Latin American nations in this crisis to determine what particular factors were most significant in influencing this dramatic convergence of United States and Latin American national interests within the Organization of American States. Because the U. S. was responsible for detecting the evidence of offensive missiles and precipitating the crisis, it is necessary to examine the chronological background of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba, and the step-by-step formulation of United States policy which culminated in the quarantine action.

United States Confirmation of Increased Soviet Military Aid to Cuba

U. S. confirmation of a substantial increase in Soviet military aid and technical assistance to Cuba in August 1962, did not suddenly
alter the consensus among the O.A.S. members following the Punta del Este meeting, that the major threat posed by the Castro regime was still political and not military. At this time, there was no conclusive evidence to indicate that the Soviet military build-up in Cuba constituted an offensive military threat against any Latin American state.

Theodore Sorensen, a key member of President Kennedy's White House staff, has recorded that aerial reconnaissance flights covered the entire island of Cuba twice monthly beginning on August 27. The flight on August 31 yielded photographs which provided the first "hard intelligence" evidence of anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles, missile-equipped torpedo boats for coastal defense and substantially more military personnel.¹

This new intelligence information which did not prove the construction of offensive ballistic missile sites, confirmed the earlier Administration suppositions that the Soviet preparations were of a defensive nature. Consequently the Administration officially reported to the public that the defensive Soviet military installations had not significantly increased Cuban striking power.²

Reaction to the Administration Policy

When the Soviet Union finally announced its program of military aid to Cuba on September 1, President Kennedy's deliberative approach to the Cuban developments was increasingly subjected to skeptical criticism from the Congress. The more extreme critics called upon the President to

²Ibid., 44.
intervene unilaterally without delay, emphasizing the need to protect United States security and defend the Monroe Doctrine. Senator Keating (R., N. Y.), a more restrained critic of Administration policy, suggested the possibility that the Soviets might be covering real intentions to install offensive missile sites in Cuba. Keating's remarks stemmed mainly from his acceptance of exile reports which had reported Soviet troop landings in Cuba as early as August 21, 1962, contrary to official denials.

Central Intelligence Agency Chief John McCone also held this view, speculating that the surface-to-air missiles might be intended to protect offensive missile sites being constructed under cover.  

3 Senator Keating, acknowledging that the military build-up in Cuba involved the security of both the United States and the Latin American states, advocated that an inter-American mission be sent to Cuba to determine whether missile bases were actually in preparation.  

4 Professor Hans J. Morgenthau also was opposed to the cautious policies of the Administration. He acknowledged that decisions concerning how, when and where to use U. S. military power against Cuba depended on circumstances and a knowledge of details which was "a monopoly of government officials." Morgenthau stressed that the permanent Soviet military power in Cuba was detrimental "to the political position of the U. S. in the western hemisphere," "the political and military position

3Ibid., 44.

4Ibid., 44.

of the U. S. in the world," and "to the intellectual and emotional health of our body politic." He continued,

Not only does the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet political and military base challenge American influence in an area which has traditionally been regarded as such for a century and a half, it might lead to Kremlin speculation that it would be less likely to protect interests elsewhere which are of more recent origin and much more dubious validity [Berlin]. 6

Morgenthau's thesis stressed the priority of executing an immediate action over the President's priority of resting any American response on a sound collective foundation.

President Kennedy's Defense of the Administration Approach, September 4, 1962

After conferring with a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders, President Kennedy decided to clarify his policy objectives in a public statement issued on September 4, 1962, concerning the military developments in Cuba. According to Sorensen's account, the President relied heavily on the intelligence data from the August 31 overflight which had not detected construction of any offensive ballistic missile sites. 7 Congressional and Administration leaders agreed that O.A.S. machinery should be activated to deal with the Cuban arms build-up. But the President did not yield to pressure as he continued to oppose any immediate action, either unilateral or collective, because of the difficult unresolved questions concerning what O.A.S. organ to utilize and what concrete measures to propose. 8 The President's caution possibly can be

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6Ibid., 428.

7Sorensen, 44.

attributed to the fact that his intelligence information was admittedly incomplete, and that there could be no certainty that full Latin American support would be forthcoming. There was no indication from recent O.A.S. actions that the members would support strong and effective collective action, much less intervention in the internal affairs of a Western hemisphere republic. The recent two-thirds narrow support given to the United States-supported resolution to exclude Cuba from the inter-American system taken at Punta del Este in January 1962, had acquainted Administration leaders with the reality of dissidence and the tenuous unity within the inter-American system.

In his September 4 public statement, President Kennedy announced that he would pursue a flexible policy, advocating immediate action only when hard intelligence evidence had proved the existence of a significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet guidance and direction. He stressed that any unilateral or collective action would be premature and unwarranted because there was as yet:

... no evidence of any organized Soviet-bloc combat force in Cuba; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles ... .

By implication President Kennedy had rejected anticipatory response to a threat only then suspected. However, he had urged continuance of a combined U. S. and O.A.S. policy to contain overt armed or subversive aggression in situations when they became apparent.

9 Ibid., 1.
11 Ibid., 450.
Secretary Rusk's Preparation for an Informal Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Soon after the President's September 4 pronouncement, Secretary Rusk met with nineteen Latin American envoys to discuss the implications of U. S. policy for the O.A.S. "Full unanimity" on the President's policy was reported among the envoys present. Although no meeting of the O.A.S. had been scheduled at that time, Secretary Rusk reportedly was moving to prepare for an informal meeting of American foreign ministers.\(^{12}\)

Proposal for a Joint Resolution of Congress on Cuba

Congressional pressure on the President to adopt a firmer policy continued to mount as Senate and House Republican leaders Dirksen and Halleck proposed that the Congress by joint resolution authorize the President to employ armed forces wherever necessary to meet the urgency of the Cuban threat.\(^ {13}\)

Announcement of the proposed Joint Resolution provoked a new Soviet warning on September 11, that any United States attack on Cuba would mean war. The Soviet statement declared that "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes," denying that the Soviet Government had need to station offensive missiles outside its boundaries.\(^ {14}\)


The State Department termed the latest Soviet warning "obvious propaganda," designed to cloak aggressive goals by a defensive posture. Although Administration sources doubted that the Soviet Union intended to risk nuclear war to defend Cuba, they continued to fear that Soviet military aid would significantly increase Cuban capability to launch subversive activities in other Latin American nations. 15

The President's Second Explanatory Statement, September 13, 1962

In a second public statement on September 13 on the Cuban situation, President Kennedy explicitly singled out for special criticism the war hawks in the United States who were demanding unilateral military action against Cuba when no credible verifiable proof existed that the Soviet military build-up constituted an offensive threat to the U. S. or to other hemisphere nations. He stated that "it is regrettable that loose talk about such action might serve to give a thin color of legitimacy to the Communist pretense that such a threat exists." 16 A second time he underscored the distinction between offensive and defensive capabilities:

If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, or if Cuba should ever become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. 17

15Ibid., 1.
17Ibid., 481.
When the President made this speech, the U. S. did not yet possess sufficient intelligence information that the President thought would be necessary in order to proceed with the support of Latin American nations and the Western European allies. Neither group of nations had showed any signs of supporting—or even respecting—a blockade or other sanctions.

Adoption of the Joint Resolution of Congress

The Joint Resolution of Congress was passed overwhelmingly on September 20 and 26, respectively, by the Senate and the House. It underscored Administration policy and quieted the dissident voices demanding immediate, stronger and more forceful action.

The Resolution advocated continued emphasis on the multilateral approach, pledging the U. S. to take instant action only when direct acts or threats of force threatened its own security or the security of any hemisphere nation. Clearly the Resolution was founded upon the President's thesis that the Soviet arms build-up did not signify enough increase of Cuban offensive capability to justify preventive armed action on the part of either the United States or the O. A. S. at that time.19

In Hearings on the Joint Resolution, Senator Keating, a leading proponent of a stronger approach, had qualified his respect for and

18Sorensen, 44.

support of the Executive Branch by again warning that the Administration's public distinction between an offensive and defensive military build-up was dangerous and unrealistic. The Senator emphasized that missile launching facilities for the defensive short-range missiles already based in Cuba could be transformed in a short period of time into a facility for offensive intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles.  

As previously emphasized, the Senator's own opinion was based on exile reports which he did not offer to document.  

Although Senator Keating had announced his preference for multilateral action, he testified that in his opinion the Resolution should broadly express U. S. intentions to act unilaterally in accordance with the national interest if the O.A.S. refused to meet the situation honestly, fearlessly, and without undue delay.  

Secretary of State Rusk, who also testified before the Committee, stated that the Executive Branch would value a Resolution which would reaffirm and honor the commitments of the United States to other hemisphere nations, according to the security arrangements of the inter-American system. Throughout his testimony the Secretary presented an effective defense of the multilateral approach currently being followed by the Administration in dealing with the Cuban military build-up. Defending this point of view, Secretary Rusk stated:

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20U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Situation in Cuba, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, pp. 7-8.  
21Sorensen, 44.  
22Hearings, Situation in Cuba, pp. 7-8.  
23Ibid., 31.
I think it is of the greatest maximum importance, . . . that we try to act jointly with our allies in a matter of this sort, not only because we have commitments to try to act on it with them, but also because the United States cannot really act alone in these matters without heavily involving those who are closely allied with us. 24

As the questioning proceeded to a discussion of the effectiveness of a hypothetical naval blockade, Secretary Rusk remarked that the United States Government would take such a step only if there were a much stronger showing of a clear and present danger which would increase the likelihood that the United States would have the political support of the Latin American nations. 25

The Secretary then informed Congress that the Department of State had been examining the possibility of seeking greater accord within the O.A.S. concerning collective sanctions against Cuba. Although Secretary Rusk reported that some governments were scrutinizing the possibility of supporting collective sanctions more seriously, he declined comment on the nature of these developments. To continue the effort to obtain greater accord within the inter-American system, Secretary Rusk announced that the American Foreign Ministers would meet informally on October 2 and 3 in Washington to consider what further steps against Cuba the O.A.S. could take beyond the Punta del Este sanctions that would meet with a solid majority of the hemisphere.

Secretary Rusk announced to Committee members that the U. S. had invited the O.A.S. Secretary General to the informal Foreign Ministers'
talks to represent the overall interests of the regional international organization.26

Preparations for the Informal Foreign Ministers' Meeting

The nations most favorable to an immediate concerted action against Cuba included the ten nations in the Central American and Caribbean area. United in this resolve because of relative geographical proximity, and vulnerability, to the Castro threat, these nations sponsored a movement to seek greater politico-military cooperation among the nations of the region supported by the U. S.

The U. S. looked with favor upon these renewed Caribbean initiatives. To the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, Secretary Rusk had previously explained that some action had clearly been envisaged by the U. S. and the Caribbean states during the Punta del Este Conference. The Caribbean states had given the strongest unqualified support for Resolution 6 which called for the exclusion of the Castro Government from participation in the inter-American system. Secretary Rusk had evaluated this support pragmatically:

... at Punta del Este where six of the so-called important countries wanted to abstain on throwing Cuba out of the O.A.S. We took the view that the important countries were those who felt themselves threatened.27

This statement does not take into consideration the fact that the U. S. had attempted to procure support from countries such as Mexico and

26Ibid., 40.
27Ibid., 63-64.
Brazil, that had abstained on the resolutions at Punta del Este. Rather, the Secretary's attitude probably reflects more accurately a rationalization and practical acceptance of the reality of division within the O.A.S.

On September 26, Secretary Rusk met with several Central American and Caribbean ambassadors to sound out their viewpoints on creating a special ten-nation security organization to guard against Cuban-based subversion or aggression. The organization would have:

1. provided for curbs on travel of Cuban agents.
2. prevented the transfer of funds for subversive purposes.
3. coordinated surveillance activities among the nations. 28

These nations proceeded to join with the United States in an "educational campaign" directed primarily at those nations still maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba including Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia. 29

The United States had continued to proceed as if the expected threat from Cuba was more political and subversive than military and overt, and had continued in attempts to convince the hemisphere nations that cooperation on anti-subversive measures either on a hemisphere or regional basis was vital.

The Informal Foreign Ministers' Meeting, October 2 and 3, 1962

When the ministerial talks opened in Washington behind closed doors at the State Department, Secretary Rusk declared that the U. S.

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29 Ibid., 1.
was prepared to provide political leadership to defeat Communist inroads in the hemisphere. He announced that the United States desired free expression and comment from the Latin American nations concerning this common problem. Intentionally the Secretary refrained from making specific recommendations to Latin American republics to take measures against Cuba. This omission was significant in that it discreetly allowed the Latin Americans to take the lead in discussing alternatives without direct U.S. pressure. Secretary Rusk's approach followed the Administration's announced objectives of carefully seeking effective multilateral support in dealing with the critical Cuban situation.

President Kennedy also addressed the Foreign Ministers in the same broad overtones. He stressed the common interest of the American nations in consulting together to consider actions that could be most usefully taken to contain the expansion of Communism from the island of Cuba. The President did not explain what such steps might include, but previously he had ruled out any military action under the prevailing circumstances. 30

A separate working group represented all the Ministers, except Mexican Foreign Minister, Manuel Tello, who was unable to attend. This group was assigned the task of discussing possible collective measures to isolate Castro further primarily in the field of limiting trade and countering subversion. The debates reflected considerable accord on the view that the Soviet military build-up had more political than military implications for the security of American nations.

In parallel diplomatic consultations among Central American and Caribbean Foreign Ministers concerning regional collective security action, little progress was reported. The governments were divided on the issue of applying forceful measures. Guatemala, in particular, had persisted in demanding strong collective action.  

The American Foreign Ministers concluded the meeting by issuing a communique declaring generally that the Soviet intervention in Cuba threatened the Americas and required collective measures. Although the Ministers were unprepared and unwilling to authorize forceful measures to eliminate the Cuban-Soviet arms threat, the Communique stated that the O.A.S. "should stand in readiness to consider the matter promptly if the situation requires measures beyond those already authorized."  

But the Communique recommended increased economic pressure, including the prohibition of the use of the ships of American nations in the Cuban trade, and an appeal to world shippers to cease providing their ships to Soviet-bloc countries for use in the Cuban trade. The Ministers further agreed that it was the responsibility of each republic to intensify efforts to halt internal subversive operations to conduct individual and collective surveillance of arms shipments to Cuba, and to further study the need to transfer funds to the Latin American nations to help them combat propaganda emanating from Cuba.  

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32 Ibid., 1.
33 Ibid., 1.
Although the Joint Communique did not comprise authorization for the preventive use of armed force to reduce the danger of the Cuban arms threat, it did recommend that each nation prohibit the use of its ships in the Cuban trade. The United States used this provision to justify a four-point program, to be activated within two weeks, to penalize world shipping engaged in the Cuban trade. The plan, which directed sanctions not only at Cuba, but against allied and neutral shipping, outlined the following steps:

1. Withholding from any shipowner cargoes owned or financed by the U. S. government if his ships engaged in carrying goods from Communist nations to Cuba.
2. Closing of all U. S. ports to all ships of any country, if any ship flying that country's flag was engaged in transporting war materiel to Cuba.
3. Barring from U. S. ports any ship which on the same voyage delivered nonmilitary cargoes to Cuba.
4. Prohibition to all U. S. ships from carrying goods to or from Cuba.34

The plan would have penalized Chile and Mexico in particular, because at this time they were the only nations in the Western hemisphere that carried on significant commerce with Cuba.35

New York Times Latin American affairs analyst, Tad Szulc, has commented upon the effect of the Informal Ministers' Meeting of October 2 and 3 on the political unity of the inter-American security system:

34 Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. The Organization of American States. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963) p. 330. This sanction was never carried out because the effective date was preceded by U. S. action taken in response to the new developments of the missile crisis.

For Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a man of immense patience and tactful but dogged determination, this two-day ministerial exercise in careful semantics and partial commitment had the great value of increasing among the Latin Americans the awareness of the cold facts of the Cuban situation.  

Szulc observed that the results of the Conference had mended the pending break in the tenuous hemispheric unity which had been strained by the Cuban issue. Seen as significant by this journalist was the fact that the October 3 Communiqué represented the first unanimous recognition that "the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba is an attempt to convert the island into an armed base for Communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of the democratic institutions of the hemisphere." This statement reflects an oversight on the part of Szulc that the Mexican Foreign Minister was absent and had not consented to the Communiqué's terms. But it is important that other nations, particularly Brazil, endorsed this statement.

Detection of the Offensive Missile Sites in Cuba

According to the account of Theodore Sorensen, the first evidence of the rude beginnings of a Soviet medium-range missile base was spotted by photo interpreters from pictures taken from a camera aboard the October 14 U-2 flight. After detailed analysis of the pictures, the intelligence chiefs informed President Kennedy of the evidence on the morning of October 16.

37 Ibid., 4.
38 Sorensen, 45.
Three steps were taken. First, the President ordered more photography in order to record the speed of the missile site construction and to detect the possible installation of intermediate-range missile launching facilities. Second, the President directed his advisers to make a "prompt and intensive survey of the dangers and all possible courses of action." Third, President Kennedy admonished this closely-knit group of advisers to guard their meetings with the tightest secrecy until both the facts and the U. S. response could be announced. He stressed that "Any premature disclosure ... could precipitate a Soviet move or panic the American public before we were ready to act. Because of the security requirements surrounding the situation, even "advance consultations with the allies were impossible."

According to the President's orders these photographic disclosures were withheld from the public as the President and his fifteen advisers, later called the Executive Committee (EXCOM) worked under conditions of maximum secrecy to examine the meaning of the forthcoming threat, and to prepare carefully an American response which would remove an obstacle to security with finality without closing the avenues to negotiation. Theodore Sorensen, a participant in these deliberations has written of these men who were his colleagues, "[they] had little in common except the President's desire for their [independent] judgment."

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39Ibid., 45.
40Ibid., 45.
41Ibid., 45.
Anatomy of the Decision-Making Process

Theories Considered by the Presidential Advisers. In the course of the informal meetings of the Kennedy advisers, several theories were advanced, "some inconsistent and some overlapping," to explain the Soviet and Cuban motives in positioning offensive missiles in Cuba:

1. Cold War Politics: This theory, given considerable weight by President Kennedy, speculated that the Soviet missiles constituted a test of America's will to resist. Perhaps Khrushchev thought that the American people were

   too timid to risk nuclear war and too concerned with legalisms to justify any distinction between our overseas missile bases and his, that once we were actually confronted with his missiles, that we would do nothing but protest, thereby appearing weak and irresolute to the world, encouraging our allies to doubt our word and to seek accommodation with the Soviets, and permitting increased Communist sway in Latin America in particular. If this strategy produced these hoped-for results, then Khrushchev could be expected to move in West Berlin or with new pressures on United States overseas bases.

2. Diverting Trap: The second theory advanced, conjectured that Khrushchev might be inviting a U. S. invasion of Cuba, hoping to divide the allies and to agitate the anti-American sentiment in Latin America to divert all U. S. attention away from Soviet maneuvering so that the Soviet Union could move on Berlin.

   43 Sorensen, 45.
   44 Ibid., 45.
   45 Ibid., 45.
3. **Cuban Defense**: The theory presumed that Cuba, a Soviet satellite in the western hemisphere, was a valuable asset to the Soviet Union, both in its drive for expansion and in the contest with Red China. Thus, Khrushchev could not allow the Castro government to fall and risk invasion from the United States and some hostile Latin American states. The presence of Soviet missiles in this case would seem to be a tighter guarantee for Cuban security.\(^{46}\)

4. **Bargaining Power**: This theory asserted that Khrushchev, aware of Cuba's sensitive role in domestic American politics, "intended to use these bases in a summit or U. N. confrontation with Kennedy as effective bargaining power--to trade them off for his kind of Berlin settlement or for a withdrawal of American overseas bases."\(^{47}\)

5. **Missile Power**: The theory was based on the reason that perhaps the Soviets could no longer benefit from the fiction that the missile gap was in their favor. To close it with ICBM's and submarine-based missiles was too expensive. Providing Cuban bases for their MCBM's and ICBM's gave them a swift, relatively inexpensive means of adding sharply to the number of missiles targeted on the United States, positioned to bypass most of our missile-warning systems and permitting virtually no tactical-warning time between their launch and arrival on target.\(^{48}\)

Thus, such a fait accompli might have enhanced the appearance of Soviet superiority in matters of national will and world leadership.\(^{49}\)

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\(^{46}\) Ibid., 45.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 45.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 45-46.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 46.
Preparation of the United States Position. The President's advisors considered these theories, canvassed all possible courses, prepared back-up materials, suggested time schedules, draft messages, military estimates and predictions of Soviet and Cuban responses.  

Pressure on the team of top decision-makers grew when aerial reconnaissance photographs detected that six MRBM bases were rapidly reaching the operational stage much faster than had been predicted earlier, and that excavations for two additional IRBM sites had begun.

Various courses of action were suggested, but those given most final attention were an air strike and a blockade.

Theodore Sorensen has related that initially the idea of a "surgical" air strike appealed to almost all the advisers, including the President. At first it was thought that "It [an air strike] would be over quickly and cleanly, remove the missiles effectively and serve as a warning to the Communists."  

But the obvious drawbacks soon became apparent. It became clear for various reasons that an air strike would need to be backed up by an invasion—a course consistently rejected by President Kennedy.

The problem of advance warning complicated the military and logistical difficulties. Sudden attack without warning would have created a "Pearl Harbor in reverse," and blackened the image of the U. S. particularly among Latin Americans. Added to these problems was the likelihood that Russians might be killed which would provoke a

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50 Ibid., 51.
51 Ibid., 46.
52 Ibid., 51.
Soviet military response. A warning, on the other hand, would have enabled the Soviets to conceal the missiles and make their elimination less certain, perhaps would have invited Khrushchev to commit himself to bombing the U. S. if the attack was carried through, and would have given the Soviet leader time enough to seize the propaganda and diplomatic initiative to stir up objections in the United Nations, Latin American and the Western allied nations.

A blockade had few supporters at the outset, largely because of the disadvantage of the time factor. Of the initial reaction to a blockade approach, Theodore Sorensen has written:

Instead of presenting Khrushchev with a fait accompli, it offered a prolonged and agonizing approach, uncertain in its effect, and indefinite in its duration, enabling the missiles to become operational, subjecting us to counterthreats from Khrushchev, giving him a propaganda advantage, stirring fears and protests and pickets all over the world, ... causing Latin American governments to fall, encouraging the U. N. or O. A. S. to bring pressure for talks, before the removal of the missiles had been secured and in all these ways making more difficult a subsequent air strike if the missiles remained.

In spite of these disadvantages, the Administration preferred the blockade response. The pro-blockade argument shaped up in this manner:

Precisely because it was a limited low-level action ... the blockade against offensive weapons only had the advantage of permitting a more controlled escalation on our part, gradual or rapid as the situation required extension of the blockade to cover other items or an air strike. It could serve as an unmistakable, but not sudden or humiliating warning to Khrushchev of what we expected from him. Its prudence, its avoidance of

53Ibid., 52.
54Ibid., 52.
55Ibid., 53.
casualties, and its avoidance of attacking Cuban soil would make it more appealing to other nations than an air strike, permitting O.A.S. and allied support for our initial position, and making that support more likely for whatever air strike or other action was later necessary.\textsuperscript{56}

While these crucial decisions were being made, extra efforts were made in official Washington circles to normalize the President's schedule. The most important event of the week was the President's two-hour interview with the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko. Both the President and Mr. Gromyko conferred in routine way covering generally topics from Berlin, to Laos and finally to Cuba. On the historic occasion, while the American preparations to confront the Soviet Union were being finalized, the Soviet Minister confidently denied that the military build-up in Cuba served any offensive intentions. But it should be noted that Gromyko did not really say in so many words that Fidel Castro had not obtained offensive weapons. Because the President chose to avoid clearing up the ambiguity, no doubt Mr. Gromyko concluded that the U.S. government did not yet have in its possession evidence confirming construction of the missile sites.\textsuperscript{57}

**Presidential Address to the Nation**

A climax was reached on October 22, when the President denounced Khrushchev in a nationwide television speech and explained the American purpose and response. President Kennedy declared that "a strict quarantine of all offensive equipment under shipment to Cuba\textsuperscript{56} was\textsuperscript{57} being

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., 53.

\textsuperscript{57}Pachter, 27.
initiated. The President warned that the quarantine could be extended to other types of cargo, if necessary. Secondly, the President directed the continued and increased surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup to judge whether further forceful action was justified. For authority the President referred to the Communique issued by the O.A.S. Foreign Ministers October 3, which had rejected secrecy on such matters and affirmed that the O.A.S. "should stand in readiness to consider the matter promptly if the situation required measures beyond those already authorized." 59

Here it is well to note that during this anxious week, the presidential advisers had adequate time to prepare the scenario without the pressure of public exposure. This time allotment enabled the State Department to time consultations with O.A.S. nations at the most auspicious moment—a factor which seemed to be significant in cultivating hemispheric unity in this crisis.

Singling out the Soviet Union, not Cuba, as the major aggressor, the President avowed:

It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. 60

Consistent with the pre-planned regional multilateral approach, the President announced the request of the U. S. Government for an

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59Ibid., 718.

60Ibid., 718.
immediate Emergency Meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the O.A.S. to consider the Soviet provocation as a threat to hemispheric security and to invoke Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. Simultaneously the President called for an emergency meeting of the U. N. Security Council to consider a U. S. resolution calling for prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U. N. observers.61

On October 23, the Council of the O.A.S. met in Extraordinary Session to hear the request of the U. S. Government for O.A.S. approval under the Rio Treaty of the naval quarantine announced by President Kennedy.

Securing voluntary O.A.S. approval had always been a high priority of President Kennedy's, but Theodore Sorensen has explicitly confirmed that the President would have instituted the blockade without O.A.S. approval, because the vital national security of the U. S. was at stake. His profound desire to preserve hemispheric solidarity had led President Kennedy to include a reference to the Latin American and Canadian areas within the target range of the Soviet missiles.62

O.A.S. Deliberation of U. S. Quarantine Resolution

When the Emergency Meeting convened October 23, 1962 the feverish canvassing of the various Latin American Foreign Offices by U. S. officials

61Ibid., 175.

had revealed support of sixteen nations. Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Bolivia remained in the doubtful column. All still recognized the Castro regime. 63

Secretary of State Dean Rusk personally addressed the Council as the U. S. Representative. The Secretary reminded them of the inter-American resolve expressed in the Communique of October 4, to take collective action against the build-up in Cuba if it should become offensive. Then the Secretary outlined for the Council members the threats the missile sites posed to the independent nations of the Western hemisphere:

Their significance is immediate, direct, and perhaps fateful to the maintenance of that independence. The principal implications are, first that the Communist regime in Cuba, with the complicity of its Soviet mentors, has deceived the Hemisphere, under the cloak of secrecy and with loud protestations of arming for self-defense, in allowing an extracontinental power bent on the destruction of national independence and democratic aspirations of all peoples, to establish an offensive military foothold in the heart of our hemisphere. 64

Secretary Rusk emphasized the President's statement that for the first time Latin American capitals had become strategic targets within range of the medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The effect of this rapid build-up, the Secretary continued, would be that "No country of this hemisphere can feel secure, either from direct attack or from persistent blackmail /from subversion/. 65


65Ibid., 5.
Finally Rusk stressed that the aggressor was the Soviet Union:

The Soviet intervention in the Western hemisphere with major offensive weapons challenges as never before the determination of the American governments to carry out hemispheric commitments for the defense of the peace and security of the nations of this Hemisphere against extraregional aggression or intervention.66

Secretary Rusk concluded his remarks by introducing the texts of two draft resolutions prepared by the U. S. Government. The first, a procedural resolution, provided for the Convocation of the Council as Provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty. The second, a more substantive resolution to be considered immediately following the adoption of the first, called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capacity and would

... recommend, though not seek to compel the member states of the O.A.S. to take the measures necessary to ensure that this build-up does not continue, that Cuba does not continue to receive offensive weapons, and if necessary, to prevent the offensive capacity already acquired by the Castro regime from being used to destroy the peace and security of the hemisphere.67

The Council, according to the first U. S. draft resolution constituted itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation. U. S. Ambassador deLesseps Morrison proposed that the session of the Council be recessed until later that afternoon to allow the delegations sufficient time to receive clear, definite and final instructions from their respective governments.68

66Ibid., 6.
67Ibid., 8.
68Ibid., 31.
The American governments gave unanimous approval to the first section of the U. S. draft resolution which called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability.

The Uruguayan Ambassador did not receive his instructions in time to make the decision unanimous before the quarantine went into effect. But a favorable position was soon recorded to make support for the resolution unanimous. Reasons given for the delay were, that with elections only two weeks away, most of the members of the nine-man Executive Council of State were campaigning in scattered parts of the country and could not assemble themselves quickly enough to make the decision. 69

Two governments, Brazil and Mexico, requested a separate vote on the last phrase of the second paragraph of the resolution beginning with "and . . . continent," so that each could approve the first part and abstain on the second part. The section resolved:

To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to insure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and the security of the Continent. 70

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69Morrison, 31.

The Government of Bolivia joined the Governments of Mexico and Brazil in abstaining on the second part of the paragraph. The Council also expressed the resolve to:

inform the Security Council of the U. N. of this resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the U. N. and to express the hope that the Security Council will in accordance with the draft resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch U. N. observers to Cuba at the earliest moment.

[and continue to serve provisionally as the Organ of Consultation and to request the member states to keep the Organ of Consultation duly informed of measures taken by them in accordance with paragraph two of this resolution.]

Firmly backed by the unanimous O.A.S. vote, the quarantine went into effect at 2:00 p.m. Greenwich time, October 24, 1962. Several Latin American nations offered military aid to the U. S. in support of the quarantine. On October 24, the Government of Argentina took the lead in offering ships of its Navy to cooperate in the defense of the hemisphere. Naval and port facilities were also offered by the Governments of Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Colombia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and El Salvador.

Formation of a Combined Quarantine Force

On November 1, the Argentine delegation prepared a draft resolution to coordinate the formal offers of cooperation made pursuant to the October 23 resolution. That resolution, approved with modifications, resolved:

71 Ibid., 112.
72 Ibid., 113.
73 Ibid., 116-119, 138, 142, 144.
1. to take due note of the military and other contributions that the member states have made and are making in order to give effect to the resolution adopted on October 23, 1962 by the Council acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation.

2. to recommend that the member states participating with military forces or with other facilities in the defense of the hemisphere work out directly among themselves the technical measures that may be necessary to the coordinated and effective action of the combined forces, and that they keep the Organ of Consultation informed of this action, in compliance with paragraph four of the above-mentioned resolution.74

The Council also approved the following explanatory statement delivered by the Chairman of the Council:

The Chairman states that a faithful record of the resolution adopted must make it clear that the Council, established provisionally as Organ of Consultation, is of the opinion that the measures for coordination referred to in paragraph two in no way constitute authorization for the formation of regional military groups within the inter-American system.75

The nations cooperating to carry out the naval quarantine were representative of three geographic regions, symbolizing the total unity of all the Americas with regard to the quarantine. The partnership of Argentina in this endeavor was valued highly, as an expression of inter-American solidarity--Argentina's distant territory being least threatened by the Cuban based missiles. Although the actual military value of these Latin American contributions to the United States forces was limited, the Kennedy Administration welcomed them highly as manifestations of inter-American solidarity.76

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Western Hemisphere Solidarity Vis-a-vis the United Nations

This unanimous manifestation of western hemisphere solidarity strengthened the United States position in the United Nations forum, when U. S. Ambassador Stevenson exposed Soviet duplicity to the Security Council members by displaying photographic evidence of the missile bases under construction in Cuba. Such verbal and concrete unity by Latin American nations in the hour of crisis gave immeasurable political support to the United States in its demand that the missiles be removed from Cuba. It was believed that the Soviet Union did not presume the solidarity of the inter-American system. 77

The U. S. resolution presented to the U. N. Security Council October 23, 1962 called for the following measures:

1. As an interim measure under Article 40 of the Charter, for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons.
2. It further authorized and requested the Acting Secretary General to dispatch to Cuba a United Nations observer corps to assure and report on compliance with this resolution.
3. Upon U. N. certification of compliance it called for the termination of the measures of quarantine against military shipments to Cuba.
4. In conclusion, it urgently recommended that the United States and the Soviet Union to confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the peace of the world and to report thereon to the Security Council. 78

Successful Resolution of the Crisis

Acting Secretary General U Thant played a leading role as Chief Negotiator in the resolution of the crisis. Through Thant's good offices,


Chairman Khrushchev was persuaded to call back freighters loaded with contraband cargo from the quarantine zone to avoid escalation of the conflict through a confrontation of the two powers at sea.  

However, the Soviets were reluctant to halt work on the missile sites as a result of the U. S. quarantine or U Thant's diplomatic entreaties. A White House statement released October 26, 1962, revealed that "The activity at these sites apparently was directed at achieving full operational capability as soon as possible."  

It became imperative that the American offensive had to gain speed before the sites were ready and the missiles operational. Two major alternatives were seriously discussed which would have increased offensive pressure to insure the removal of the missiles. A "surgical operation" consisting of pin-point bombing of the missile sites was again discarded by the Kennedy advisers because of the possibility of Russian casualties and the danger of disturbing the inter-American solidarity by arousing dissidence from states opposed to intervention. A less dangerous but more serious alternative that had frequently been discussed was the tightening of the blockade to exclude oil shipments. The major drawback of this plan was that it would have been directed at Castro, and hence less effective, because the major contender and decision-maker had been identified as Chairman Khrushchev.  

[79 Pachter, 43-44.  
81 Pachter, 50.]
But on October 26, it was reported that the U. S. was interpreting the October 23, O.A.S. resolution as clear authority to use force as an alternative in dismantling the missile bases. The U. S. interpretation was endorsed by José A. Mora, Secretary-General of the O.A.S. At a news conference, Dr. Mora stated that any measures taken by the U. S. to dismantle the bases forcefully would be considered multilateral measures, which would receive authority from paragraph two of the October 23, O.A.S. resolution.  

It was felt that the three member nations (Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia) that had objected to this enabling clause, would undoubtedly have opposed any such action as unlawful collective intervention and would have likely been joined by powerful sectors of leftist public opinion in other Latin American states.

Although sufficient numerical strength within the O.A.S. approved such a course of action, U. S. decision-makers consistently had reserved pin-point bombing as the last alternative only in case other measures should fail, in a bid to retain the substance of power gained by full unanimity of the inter-American system. U. S. officials proceeded with regard in this critical matter for the interest of all Latin American states as part of the overall security interest of the U. S.

Though the O.A.S. authorized such further forceful measures that would be necessary to accomplish the removal of missiles, there is legitimate doubt that the O.A.S. nations would have been in complete

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agreement as to the need for such action. So the degree of unity behind the second paragraph of the quarantine resolution remained untested.

After extending two somewhat conflicting peace offers, Premier Khrushchev on October 28, agreed to dismantle the offensive arms under mutually satisfactory arrangements for U. N. verification, and ship them back to the Soviet Union. 83

Although in subsequent negotiations, aided by the services of U Thant, the U. S. and the Soviet Union reached satisfactory agreement on the modalities of U. N. inspection. Fidel Castro refused to permit any on-site inspection of Cuban soil. 84 Castro also turned a deaf ear to Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan's solicitations concerning inspection during an unsuccessful three-week mission to Havana. 85

In the absence of on-site international inspection by a U. N. team, the U. S. proceeded unilaterally to survey the dismantling process through aerial reconnaissance photographs and alongside inspection of out-going Soviet freighters loaded with offensive weapons. After the President was certain that the limited objective of dismantling had been achieved, he instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift the naval quarantine on November 21, 1962. 86

83Pachter, 58.
84Thomas, p. 332.
85Pachter, pp. 79-30.
Survey of Factors Producing Inter-American Solidarity

Latin American nations have been fearful of any foreign aggression or threat of aggression aimed at their territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence. This quest for Latin American solidarity against outside aggression has been supported by the historical tradition of seeking cooperation for purposes of mutual defense begun as early as the Panama Congress of 1826 by Simon Bolívar, the Great Liberator. The unanimous response of the Latin American nations to the Soviet missile threat in Cuba corresponded to this general historical pattern. Somewhat paradoxically, the rough idea for inter-American mutual defense against external aggression was fostered when U. S. President James Monroe proclaimed his famous doctrine in 1823. Although in the Monroe Doctrine the United States had declared its opposition to further extracontinental settlement and foreign encroachment on the independent states of Latin America, the U. S. stifled all Latin American proposals for any type of inter-American mutual defense union.

The potential idea of inter-American defense cooperation lay dormant for a half-century. Intervening was the occurrence of an immediate and nearly complete alienation of the U. S. from Latin American nations. The U. S., strengthened by rapidly expanding power and an awakening national consciousness, fulfilled its territorial "manifest destiny" at

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the expense of Mexico during the Mexican war in 1848. Latin Americans afterward feared U. S. power as a threat to their own territorial sovereignties.

Although the U. S. extended the offer of inter-American cooperation to Latin American nations in non-political fields near the turn of the century, the Latin Americans continued to distrust U. S. motives. The "taking" of the Panama Canal, the U. S. supervision of Cuban political affairs following the Spanish American war, and the U. S. assumption of international police power in the Caribbean enforced by military interventions, rekindled the Latin American fear that the superior power of the U. S. was being used for selfish reasons.

Thus efforts to merge U. S. national interest, expressed in terms of the Monroe Doctrine, with the Latin American desire to utilize U. S. power to shield their vulnerable positions against overseas threats, were not renewed until unrestricted German submarine warfare threatened American shores in 1917. The war threat temporarily unified the diverse nations of Latin America in rudimentary mutual defense cooperation despite their anti-United States feelings.

President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy and his nonintervention pledge in 1933 renewed respect for the motives and leadership of the U. S. on a more solid basis of unity and mutual understanding.

Thus, when extracontinental aggression threatened the Americas in 1935, the Latin American republics, encouraged by the change in

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90 Ibid., 112.
U. S. policy, were prepared to establish the first permanent security machinery to reinforce American preparedness.

In the Declaration of Lima, 1938, the American states in effect "continentalized" the Monroe Doctrine by establishing the Foreign Ministers of the respective republics as a permanent consultative organ to agree upon and implement unspecified measures for defense cooperation. 91

During World War II, the Foreign Ministers held three such formal consultative meetings. This hemispheric policy-making body proclaimed American neutrality and issued a Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance before direct U. S. participation in the war. When the Japanese did attack U. S. territory at Pearl Harbor, the Foreign Ministers "recommended" that all American states display their solidarity by breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis; in addition they established the Inter-American defense board and the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense to coordinate inter-American military and political defense. 92

Because of confidence in the value of the inter-American security system, as a shield against external aggression, Latin Americans insisted upon the retention of regional organizations within the post-war international order.

At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, Latin Americans, alarmed by the proposal that any regional enforcement action have prior Security

91Ibid., 143.
92Ibid., 212.
Council approval, forced a compromise by insisting upon the insertion of Article 51 into the United Nations Charter. This Article authorized collective and individual self-defense against armed attack until action could be taken by the Security Council. 93

The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, negotiated following the establishment of the U. N., institutionalized the informal development of the inter-American system as a regional defense organization compatible with Article 51 of the U. N. Charter.

Article 3 of the Treaty is concerned with action in the event of an armed attack within the territory of an American state or within the region. By its terms each of the contracting parties is obligated to assist in meeting the attack by exercising the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the U. N. Charter. 94 The function of the Foreign Ministers of the American States is to examine the legality of immediate self-help measures and agree upon collective O.A.S. action, which except for use of armed force would be considered binding upon all members by a two-thirds vote. 95 The O.A.S. is authorized to continue these self-help measures until the U. N. Security Council has acted to maintain or re-establish the peace. 96

Article 6 deals with an act of aggression which is not in fact an armed attack, including such threats to security as extracontinental

93 Thomas, 31.
94 Ibid., 249.
95 Ibid., 249.
96 Ibid., 250.
or intracontinental conflicts, or other facts or situations which might endanger the peace of America, provided that such aggression, conflict, fact or situation affects the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American state. When such a situation arises, the Organ of Consultation is authorized to meet immediately to agree upon the measures which must be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent. In such cases Article 52 of the U. N. Charter provides for the supervision of the Security Council in utilizing regional agencies for pacific settlement of disputes and enforcement action.  

It would seem that the framers of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty predicated this section upon a broad interpretation of Article 51 of the U. N. Charter. Proponents of the broad interpretation of self-defense have argued that in view of the political and military necessities of modern international life, states should not be expected to await an actual attack which in the face of an imminent threat, would paralyze their ability to resist.

The situation created by the covert construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba posed such a threat to the Western Hemisphere. In this case then the Organ of Consultation was authorized to act to preserve hemispheric security when essential legal rights had been violated by the Soviet Union before actual armed attack was launched.  

\[97\] Ibid., 252.  
\[98\] Ibid., 252.
Under this interpretation the actions of the O.A.S. under Article 6 could then have continued until the U. N. Security Council had been able to restore the peace.\textsuperscript{99}

The clandestine construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba marked the first time that Soviet nuclear weapons, located within the hemisphere, constituted an offensive military threat to the security of all American nations. That the Latin American nations, despite their varying political orientations, unanimously supported the U. S. quarantine to halt Soviet arms shipments, reflected the historical determination of the Western hemisphere nations to unite in self-defense against extra-continental acts or threats of aggression.

The Crisis and the Foreign Policy Shifts of the Six Dissenting Nations at Punta del Este

The six nations abstaining on the resolution of the Punta del Este Foreign Ministers' Conference to exclude Cuba from the inter-American system seemed to reverse their foreign policy positions by approving the quarantine action under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty in this crisis. It is necessary to examine the conditions which prompted these nations to shift their positions and support collective sanctions in order to give a more meaningful appraisal of the implications of the "unanimity" for the future of the O.A.S.

\textit{Mexico}. Mexico had been a leading spokesman for the six nations abstaining on sanctions against Cuba at Punta del Este. An inquiry into the \textit{raison d'etre} of the Mexican position will be significant in

\textsuperscript{99}\textit{Ibid.}, 264.
ascertaining general factors motivating the decision-making process of the other five dissenting governments.

In September, 1962, when only unsubstantiated exile reports spread rumors about secret preparations for Soviet missile installations, Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello stated unequivocally that Mexico would oppose any kind of blockade of Cuba. 100

After the informal Foreign Ministers' parley in Washington October 2-3, 1962, which the Mexican Minister had been unable to attend, President Lopez Mateos declared at a news conference that the Rio Treaty had "supplanted the Monroe Doctrine," and could only be invoked if an American nation was the victim of aggression. 101

Implicitly, the Mexican President reminded the U. S. and other Latin American nations favoring strong action against Cuba, that Mexico would not support any collective action under the Rio Treaty unless evidence could be produced to prove that Soviet military aid to Cuba had transformed the island into an offensive military base.

But when the U. S. was able to produce convincing facts of the existence of an intermediate range missile base rapidly being assembled in Cuba on October 22, President Lopez Mateos responded that the Mexican Government would stand by its obligations under the Rio Treaty in meeting the Cuban situation. 102 U. S. Ambassador deLesseps Morrison reported that President Kennedy, in order to secure a positive Mexican vote, had

100 Hispanic American Report, XV, September 1962, p. 792.
twice telephoned President Mateos who was then traveling in the Far East. 103

The Mexican Foreign Office was divided. Vicente Sanchez Gavito, O.A.S. Mexican Ambassador, was skeptical that the U. S. resolution would in effect give Latin American endorsement to a possible U. S. invasion of another Latin American state. But Antonio Carello Flores, Mexican Ambassador to the U. S., had consistently favored stronger collective action on Cuba within the O.A.S. Ambassador Carillo Flores' persuasion was known in State Department circles to be a significant factor in securing a favorable reaction from the Mexican home office. Although Sanchez Gavito would cast the final vote, his action was conditioned on the nature of the instructions he received from his Government, where the opinion and information of all Ambassadors would be heard. 104

Subsequently at the C.A.S. Meeting on October 23, Mexico joined all Latin American representatives in supporting recommendations for drastic action to halt the military build-up under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. However, Mexico abstained on the second paragraph which united the American nations in their determination to prevent the missiles in Cuba from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the continent. 105 The delegate from Mexico explained his government's abstention by declaring that the Mexican constitution had affixed precise

103Morrison, p. 244.
104Ibid., 243.
105Organization of American States, Applications, p. 112.
limitations to the Executive power in accordance with the requirements of the resolution.

This position can be traced to Mexico's rigid adherence to the principle of nonintervention, considered inherently binding as a restraint upon the power of the Mexican President. It was thought that the loose ambiguous wording of the second paragraph of the resolution could easily be construed by the U. S. to give inter-American backing to an invasion of Cuba to remove the missiles if they could not be removed by negotiation. This inference has been substantiated by Theodore Sorensen's commentary on President Kennedy's decision-making process.

Editorial comment in Mexican newspapers of the political center was dominantly favorable to the position of the Mexican Government. One editorial in El Universal, a moderate paper, severely criticized Castro and supported President Kennedy, particularly lamenting that Cuba had not had a chance for self-determination. The editorial expressed the wish that Khrushchev would leave Cuba and Castro alone. However, the less politically powerful Mexican right continued to criticize the Mexican position and urged stronger action.

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108 Engel, p. 284.
The left-wing groups, usually quite influential in Mexican politics, were divided, and their united influence diminished in this crisis. One element was reportedly disillusioned with Castro and the unilateral removal of missiles by the Soviet Union. According to the assessment of one scholar:

It seemed that the general emotion was one of shock that Mexico was under the nuclear blanket, that Castro had actually allowed this to happen, and that Castro was openly revealed to be just what the United States had been claiming for so long—a satellite of the Soviet Union, no longer an independent revolutionary force to which discontented Latin Americans would look upon as an indigenous symbol.

It appeared that the Mexican Government's support of the quarantine measure in response to the Cuban missile crisis was fully consistent with that government's strict adherence to the legal principles of non-intervention and self-determination.

As the Soviet military build-up had progressed during September, 1962, the Mexican president indicated that his government would not support collective action under the Rio Treaty until significant proof could be obtained that the Cuban build-up constituted an offensive military threat against the nations of the western hemisphere. Even then he did not specifically promise that Mexico would join other nations in taking collective action against the Cuban Government. Because the Mexican Foreign Minister had stated in early September that Mexico would oppose any kind of blockade of Cuba, President Kennedy's advisory team

109 Ibid., 286.
110 Ibid., 279-280.
could not be certain that the Mexican Government would react favorably to the U. S. request for quarantine action under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. Mexico had always opposed collective actions under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. The loose terms of Article 6, classifying Treaty violations broadly as acts of aggression other than armed attacks which might affect territorial sovereignty and political independence of an American state, were incompatible with the legalistic bias of Mexican foreign policy.

Such terms which do not require extensive overt proof of actual international aggression perhaps could have the effect of authorizing collective intervention in the affairs of an American state on the basis of a two-thirds majority political decision.

Because Mexican participation in international politics has been conditioned by strict adherence to the legal norm of nonintervention, each exercise in inter-American security cooperation has had to be weighed against the potential that collective action would become collective intervention. Thus Mexican decision-makers have been extremely cautious in their assessments of the imminence, gravity and scope of the aggression and type of collective measures under consideration, before determining the Mexican position on any O.A.S. action called for under Articles 6 and 8.

The factor of obtaining unanimous Latin American support, especially that of Mexico, undoubtedly weighed heavily in President Kennedy's first choice of a course of action that would apply sanctions not against Cuba directly, but against the Soviet Union. This careful prior choice
with its carefully defined objective of removing the missiles (not overthrowing Castro) which appealed to the traditional Latin American fear of extracontinental military aggression, while avoiding an unnecessary collective intervention in Cuba, proved to be an acceptable plan consistent with the requirements of the Mexican policy of non-intervention.

Because U. S. decision-makers had weighed several reserve plans which could have been activated had the quarantine failed to achieve the removal of the missiles, the U. S. delegation advanced a loosely-worded companion proposal which had been designed to procure O.A.S. support for removal of the missiles by a possible bombing or invasion of Cuba, if exigences demanded.

In predictable manner, the Mexican Government abstained on the second paragraph of the resolution, refusing to give support to any form of collectively-executed intervention on the territory of any American state.

Although the Mexican Government had given its support to the quarantine maneuver, it did not offer to participate directly in the military effort--for under treaty terms no government was under an obligation to apply armed force.

Mexico also expressed reservations on an Argentine proposal November 5, 1962, which called for the coordination of military preparations of nine countries in the blockade of Cuba. Abstaining on several paragraphs, the Mexican Government objected to what it called a precedent for establishing a semi-permanent military structure within the
inter-American security system—which in its interpretation was prohibited by the principle of nonintervention in the Mexican Constitution. 111

The Cuban missile crisis did not bring about a shift in the official Mexican policy toward Cuba either bilaterally or within the O.A.S. The Mexican delegate restated the independent policy of his government before the missile crisis had been finally resolved, by objecting strenuously to a U. S. request for studies investigating the possibility of stronger O.A.S. action to counter subversion. Mexico, joined by other Latin American nations, argued that neither the newly-created Special Consultative Security Committee nor any special committee of the O.A.S. Council had the power to initiate such studies unless they were authorized by the full membership. He was referring to the fact that only the U. S. and three Central American republics had requested the investigation. 112 The Mexican Government continued to maintain that the problem of security against subversion was fundamentally an internal matter—insisting that its own security measures were fully adequate. 113

Brazil. Like the Government of Mexico, the Brazilian Government also supported the U. S. quarantine resolution. Also like Mexico, Brazil was divided. Ambassador to the U. S., Roberto de Oliveira Campos, supported the resolution. But Ilmar Penna Marinho, the O.A.S. Ambassador, a career officer who was always remote and noncommital, appeared to await instructions. Thus the extent of his influence over this matter of

113Ibid., 1.
Brazilian foreign policy could not easily be assessed. But the activities of Campos, a brilliant world renowned economist, proved to be a key factor in persuading President Goulart to accept the U. S. quarantine resolution. But Brazilian approval also was limited only to measures necessary to interfere with further shipment of offensive Soviet weapons to Cuba. Brazil abstained on the portion of the resolution which would have authorized collective intervention to remove the missiles already in Cuba, if necessary. In the general debate the Brazilian delegate expressed his Government's position by pointing out in the final part of paragraph two, that the implied measures were ambiguous and of a wide scope. He stated that because the uncertainty of the situation permitted little time to specify such measures, the Brazilian Government would abstain.

Brazil's stand on nonintervention at Punta del Este, had been based on practical as well as juridical arguments. Unlike the rigid dogmatic determination of Mexican policy according to the legal norm of nonintervention, recent Brazilian policy has been more frankly based upon juridical safeguards as a justification for underlying political realities.

Thus recent Brazilian foreign policy, characterized by an independence from U. S. leadership and domination and premised upon the doctrine of nonintervention, has largely resulted from resurgent

114 Morrison, p. 243.

nationalism common to all Brazilian political factions, and the impact of the cold war upon domestic politics of social and economic reform.

In April 1962, President João Goulart had reaffirmed the independence of Brazilian foreign policy by clearly enunciating Brazil's intention to free itself from the obligations of membership in a politico-military bloc. This policy is of course basic to the re-evaluation of the Brazilian role in mediating a détente in the cold war in order that peaceful self-determination of peoples and economic development be facilitated as the major stabilizing forces for world peace.

Roberto de Oliviera Campos, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States during this period, has explained that

the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro antedates the cold war and was not established as a politico-military instrument in connection with the present ideological conflict. It was designed to protect the Latin American countries themselves from aggression of their neighbors as well as an aggressive resurrection of European Nazism.

Part of the implementation of the Brazilian independent position in inter-American councils has been that government's emphasis on the O.A.S. as an instrument of social and economic cooperation rather than as a political and military alliance. To this end, President Goulart offered qualified support to the new U. S. policy embodied in the Alliance for Progress. Prognosticating on the practicability of the

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117 Roberto de Oliviera Campos, "The United States and Brazil: A Diplomatic View," in Horowitz, p. 356.
Alliance blueprint, President Goulart warned the U. S. that this policy which placed the burden of responsibility for socio-economic and political reform squarely upon Latin Americans, could "introduce hindrances capable of impairing the urgency of solution which in many countries cannot be put off." 118

President Goulart could realistically appraise this aspect of the Latin American political scene principally because the immovable status quo forces in Brazil had stultified his own program for social and economic advancement in the face of growing pressure from the left.

Throughout the balance of 1962, President Goulart had to struggle to maximize his presidential power by trying to consolidate control over the military, curbing the impatient radical opposition elements within his own Brazilian Labor Party and persuading the Congress to call a national plebiscite in January 1963 to decide the fate of the weak presidential-parliamentary system. 119

The factionalism of Brazilian politics, which hampered Goulart's power, combined with inexperience in operating under a parliamentary system, had produced "a regime that could not develop, enact or implement a coherent policy." 120 Confronted with deep divisions among Brazilian leaders over method and means of tackling a worsening economic and social crisis, and of the approaching elections in October, the


119 "Charisma, Constitutions, and Brazil's Men of Power," in Horowitz, p. 95.

government was reduced to virtual inactivity during most of 1962.\textsuperscript{121}

Although the October 7, elections were primarily victories for the moderates and centrists, left-wing parties formed a coalition front which included Communist splinter groups, and made important gains.\textsuperscript{122}

While tensions heightened concerning the possible Soviet offensive military build-up in Cuba, Brazilian attention was preoccupied with the domestic campaign and approaching parliamentary elections.

The Brazilian response to the Cuban missile crisis conformed to the general pattern of foreign policy shaped by the Goulart Government.

Previously, President Goulart had announced that because of its independent foreign policy, Brazil did not consider itself bound by ties to any politico-military bloc. Although the Brazilian Government had implicitly renounced the anti-Communist politico-military character of the O.A.S., it in no way intended to abandon the collective security obligation of the Rio Treaty to defend the hemisphere and its own national security against outside military aggression.

In this case the Soviet Union had extended its nuclear threat for the first time into the Western hemisphere by basing intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. The U. S. position, based on conclusive evidence which narrowly isolated the Soviet Union as the aggressor, made it possible for the Brazilian Government, profoundly opposed to nuclear weapons, within the requirements of its foreign policy to assent to the quarantine of Cuba directed against the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{121}\textit{Ibid.}, 193.

\textsuperscript{122}\textit{Ibid.}, 194.
President Kennedy's choice of a quarantine instead of an invasion reflected the judgment that an irreversible military action might well have had some serious repercussions both within the Americas and in other areas of the world.\(^{123}\)

An invasion might have acted as a catalyst which would have reinforced the strength of the Communist cause, already growing in Brazilian leftist circles, because of widespread discontent with a status-quo majority in Congress.

When the U. S. requested O.A.S. approval for a quarantine action, however, it also asked for collective authorization of further measures to remove the missiles already in Cuba if the quarantine failed to achieve this objective.

The Brazilian Government objected to this paragraph, taking the lead to split the voting on the resolution into two sections. Mexico and Bolivia also abstained on this paragraph.

As at Punta del Este, Brazil refused to support any intervention directed at Cuba because of the basic conviction that intervention, especially military, could not permanently resolve the fundamental East-West ideological conflict. In the missile crisis, Brazil also feared that any forceful military move was likely to escalate the critical situation into a full-scale nuclear war.

Therefore, Brazil as self-appointed leader of the anti-war nations capitalized on the opportunity to support avenues of negotiation for the

peaceful removal of the missiles as an alternative to the forceful measures largely to be executed by U. S. military power, ambiguously alluded to in the second paragraph of the resolution.

After Premier Khrushchev had agreed to withdraw the missiles under international inspection procedures, Premier Castro's refusal to allow the U. N. inspection team on Cuban territory, inspired a Brazilian attempt to persuade him to reconsider. Joined by Bolivia and Chile, Brazil by-passed the O.A.S. and set before the U. N. a resolution which would have all Latin American countries pledge not to have any nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles placed on their respective territories. This clause would have enabled Premier Castro to accept international inspection of Cuban missile sites as part of a general Latin American agreement. The Cuban leader refused to accept this alternative plan, though U. S. sources had indicated respect and support for the Brazilian initiative. 124

In the aftermath of the crisis subsequent events showed that efforts to persuade President Goulart to support even the U. S. quarantine paragraph had been quite difficult. When violent reactions from the extreme left immediately threatened to militate against President Goulart, the President changed course and summoned the O.A.S. Ambassador back to Brazil, intimating that the latter had disobeyed instructions.

Even before the crisis had been resolved, Goulart ordered an Air Force General to investigate Kennedy's charges--an empty maneuver which was soon undercut by Khrushchev's own admission of Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba.

Only when public opinion in Brazil shifted to favor the U. S. did Goulart consider it safe to acknowledge Brazil's role in approving the quarantine resolution.125

Chile. The Chilean decision to vote affirmatively for the quarantine appeared to be consistent with the previous decisions taken by the Chilean Government at Punta del Este.

The U. S. Ambassador in Santiago cabled Washington that although Salvador Allende, leader of the powerful Socialist-Communist coalition publicly had charged that Kennedy lied, Chile's Foreign Office would support the quarantine resolution.126

During the debate the Chilean delegate endorsed the Mexican delegate's proposal that the voting be done separately on paragraphs 1 and 2.127 Announcing that his government would support the quarantine (paragraph 1) because it was consistent with the requirements of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, he indicated that the Chilean Government would not, because of general constitutional limitations on executive power and because of leftist pressure on his government be able to participate in a collective action to remove the missiles already in Cuba.128 (Paragraph 2.)

Despite the above reason given for Chile's incapacity to execute the provisions of paragraph 2, the Chilean Government did not abstain or vote against that provision. Speaking on his government's position, the Chilean delegate felt that each government should react according to

125Morrison, p. 250.
126Morrison, p. 250.
128Ibid., 19.
its respective constitutional limitations as the circumstances demanded. This showed that Chile intended to take full advantage of the fact that the use of force was not mandatory. While respecting the security requirements of other Western hemisphere nations strategically much closer to the striking zone.

This position enabled the government, besieged by the leftist coalition, to take a middle-ground position, and to maintain internal stability. The government, by taking this position, could win partial support from all political groups by claiming unfledging support for the principles of collective security against extracontinental aggression and respect for the rights and needs of other nations, while maintaining its own constitutional principle of nonintervention.

Its own remote geographic location, barely included in U. S. estimates of Soviet striking power, would tend to insulate that nation against pressure to take immediate action, felt by other nations located more completely within the range of the missiles.

Such a relatively independent position would be consistent with Chile's historical reluctance to align with other hemisphere nations against overt threat of aggression in both World wars.

In connection with this particular crisis, Chile followed the Brazilian lead in the U. N. to co-sponsor a compromise plan for international verification satisfactory to all, including Cuba, making Latin America a nuclear-free zone.

129 Ibid., 19.
Because of a traditional Latin American confidence in the peaceful settlement of disputes as opposed to intervention and military settlements, Chile joined with Brazil to lead in a long-range arbitration for world peace and order.

Argentina. The Argentine decision to support the quarantine resolution and contribute military aid can largely be attributed to the change of governments resulting from a coup d'etat which deposed President Arturo Frondizi on March 29, 1962.

The coup removed President Frondizi from office following the March 18, 1962, elections in which the peronistas had scored a decisive victory in the legislature and provinces. 131

Prior to the election, President Frondizi had assured the military that moderate middle class political parties would capture the old peronista vote and consolidate his government. 132

When the election did not produce the desired political results, the armed forces deposed Frondizi and set up a three-man governing junta.

The splits within and among the armed forces which developed during the Peron era were noticeable in this coup. The Navy, unified by its upper-middle class composition, traditionally anti-peronista and opposed to any socio-political advance of the labor-left, prevailed to bring about the ouster of Frondizi. 133 Although the services coordinated moves to depose Frondizi, the leaders found it difficult to form a smoothly-working government. In late March, 1962, governmental power in Argentina

132 Ibid., 11.
133 Ibid., 16.
resided in an anti-peronista three-man junta representing the Army, Navy and Air Force. Senate President José Maria Guido, a constitutional successor, had himself sworn in as President to challenge the ruling authority of the junta.

Guido exploited the split between the rival army factions to work out a compromise between the alternatives of peronista election victory and military rule. The President was allowed to retain his position as head of the government, in return for his agreement to declare the March 13, elections void and schedule new elections. After May 1962, Guido could muster little organized civilian support, and found himself a puppet of the military, buffeted about by the Navy, the competing cliques in the Army and the Air Force.

Throughout the remainder of 1962 the armed forces retained the substance of power; but the various factions continued to struggle for dominance.

The issue of what type of formula should be used to establish representation and whether or not elections should be held, divided the conservative and liberal elements and touched off a major armed conflict in August, 1962. By late September the moderates had subdued the conservative anti-peronistas.

The October missile crisis constituted a major test of the direction of Argentine foreign policy under military rule.

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134 Ibid., 18.
135 Ibid., 19.
136 Ibid., 21.
Though somewhat moderate in its approach to domestic economic and social reform, the armed forces majority in the junta government, by offering military assistance to the U. S. quarantine, pursued a more conservative foreign policy than had Brazil and Mexico. That the Argentine Government furnished naval aid, perhaps corresponded to the prestige and influence of the Navy--the most consistently conservative arm of the military--in Argentine politics.

Latin American military governments have assumed power through intervention (coup d'etat) to safeguard political stability and a status quo threatened by leftist reform groups. In foreign policy decisions, military governments have tended to support firm unilateral or collective action against Cuba, for the broader objective of maintaining hemispheric stability. Then, both domestically and internationally, military governments have favored the expedient of swift interventionary action to achieve their objectives.

Most Latin American elected civilian governments have seemed to use democratic representation and procedures when formulating foreign policy as well as domestic policy. When sanctions against Cuba have been opposed by significant segments of the population, civilian governments have tended to weigh this in taking anti-sanction stands.

The Argentine military's enthusiastic endorsement of a blank check on intervention, paragraph 2 of the quarantine resolution, deviated significantly from President Frondizi's decision not to give Argentine support to sanctions of Cuba earlier in 1962 at Punta del Este. The governments of Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Bolivia, still controlled by civilian
governments had refused to give the U. S. this blank check, to remain consistent with their decisions to abstain at Punta del Este.

Ecuador. The reversal of Ecuadorian foreign policy in the period February 1962-October 1962, also was the result of a change in the composition of the government brought about by the pressure of the military.

On March 30, the Ecuadorian Cabinet resigned under growing army pressure for a break in relations with Cuba. A group of officers demanded that the President either rupture diplomatic relations or resign. 137

In response, President Arosemena had ordered a national plebiscite to let the people decide Ecuador's foreign policy toward Cuba. But because of pressure from a newly-formed democratic front composed of liberals, moderate Socialists and independents, Arosemena agreed to cancel the projected plebiscite. 138

The following day President Arosemena succumbed to the influence of the moderate political coalition and the military, and severed diplomatic ties with Fidel Castro's government. 139

Again, military ultimatum was sufficient to alter the foreign policy course of a left-leaning government. That there was no direct military intervention in Ecuador as had been exhibited in Argentina as a consequence of the Frondizi Government's vote at Punta del Este, resulted from a pragmatic political accommodation with conservative forces.

Undoubtedly it seemed to moderate Ecuadorian politicians that the breaking off of diplomatic relations was not too high a price to pay for greater internal stability with moderate social and economic reforms.

Arosemena's friendly attitude toward Castro, as has been pointed out in the preceding chapter, had little domestic support. From the beginning the character of Arosemena's program had been shaky because his ad hoc support had ranged all the way from right to the extreme left. 140

The realignment of Arosemena's new cabinet enabled centrist forces to edge out the extreme leftists in the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Education whose position in Ecuadorian politics then was reduced to influence in peripheral worker and student movements. 141

The pro-Castro left attempted a guerilla counterattack, but was quickly suppressed by government forces. Any latent appeal of fidelismo to the Indian masses had been at least temporarily checked by democratic forces.

A potential advantage to leftist forces was the failure of the Ecuadorian political system (hobbled by continual shifting of ad hoc groups) to develop any single democratic party with strong mass appeal or any strongly-held platform for social reform or economic development. 142

By July, 1962, Arosemena's basic political support was much stronger, but his foreign policy position had been reconstructed. On

142 Ibid., 13.
July 24, the Ecuadorian President reaffirmed his Government's faith in
the Alliance for Progress, whereas in February, 1962 he had opposed any
strong or mild sanctions against Cuba, and in July of the same year, he
gave his government's approval to the formation of an inter-American
armed force as a defense against aggression. This position on Cuba was
much stronger and more daring than any proposals set forth by any nations
of the pro-sanctions group at Punta del Este.

Though undoubtedly Ecuador's decision to support the U. S. quaran-
tine was influenced by a variety of factors commonly shared by O.A.S.
members with serious intentions to abide by Rio Treaty obligations, it
can be shown that Ecuador's new position prior to the intense Soviet
military build-up had shifted to a clear-cut anti-Cuban bias. This
shift was evidenced by the absence of any Ecuadorian reservations on
the second paragraph resolution authorizing whatever means necessary
(including armed force) to remove the missiles already on Cuban territory.

**Bolivia.** Political pressures remained constant in Bolivia from

Bolivia's vote proved to be one of the most difficult to obtain,
although both the Bolivian Ambassador to the U. S. and the Bolivian
Ambassador to the O.A.S. favored the quarantine. Poor communications
with the Bolivian capital further complicated the situation.143 Also
the Paz Government faced a small but highly organized vocal Communist
minority which threatened the overthrow of the government if Bolivia
went along with the U. S. resolution.144 Until U. S. delegate, Ambassador

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143Morrison, p. 245.
144Ibid., 247.
Morrison, began to concentrate upon winning the Bolivian approval, it seemed that Emilio Sarmiento, the Bolivian delegate, would not receive instructions from his government and would have been forced to abstain. However, deLesseps Morrison noted that Chile's definite approval could have a significant effect on the Bolivian decision. Bolivia and Chile had been involved in a territorial dispute. Chile, desperately needing irrigation, maintained that one half of the waters of the Rio Lauca belonged to her, and had built a tunnel diverting that amount of water to her arid land. As a result, the two countries had severed diplomatic relations: Bolivia was trying to get O.A.S. action against Chile.

Morrison pointed out to Sarmiento that U. S. public opinion might tend to demand support for Chile in the Rio Lauca dispute, and reject Bolivian claims because Bolivia had failed to support the U. S. quarantine resolution. Sarmiento was persuaded by this reasoning to telephone this information to Foreign Minister José Fellman Velarde and warn him of the possibility of a setback to Bolivia, perhaps even an overthrow of the government. Subsequently, the Foreign Minister promised a decision as soon as possible.

This move was timed perfectly and assisted by better than normal telephone communications to La Paz. Sarmiento, however, decided to risk his political future by promising to vote for the U. S. quarantine resolution even though he firmly thought that he would not receive instructions

145 Ibid., 245.
146 Ibid., 245-246.
147 Ibid., 246.
Although he had been very skeptical, the Bolivian Ambassador received the important assent from his government before the voting was over.\(^{149}\)

Bolivia had strenuously objected to sanctions of Cuba at Punta del Este because of the relevance of nonintervention to the Bolivian national revolutionary experience. In the missile crisis, the Paz Administration modified an absolute position on nonintervention, as did Mexico, by viewing the quarantine as a defense against Soviet (extracontinental) aggression which did not constitute intervention in Cuban affairs.

Furthermore the factual background had changed since Punta del Este. An ominous Soviet missile threat based in Cuba was obviously more conclusive evidence upon which to base a Rio Treaty sanction than the doubtful legal and factual grounds on which sanctions and condemnation had been applied at Punta del Este.

But, as did Mexico and Brazil, Bolivia abstained on the second paragraph for the same basic reasons. The vague language, on which was designed to provide collective authorization to the U. S. possibly to remove the missiles by a surgical air strike or an invasion, was opposed as intervention by the Bolivian Government. Because of deep reservations concerning intervention, unilateral or multilateral, and internal leftist opposition, Bolivia proved unwilling to fulfill the full requirements of collective security and reciprocal assistance in

\(^{148}\) Ibid., 247.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., 249.
this instance. At the root of this decision of course lay the latent fear of setting precedent for granting any state, particularly the U. S. or combination of states the right to intervene in the future, perhaps to stop the progress of social reform, only because of an exaggerated fear of Communism.

The position taken by the Paz Government in response to the shock of the Cuban missile crisis, enabled the moderates to regain some of their lost prestige and influence temporarily in the aftermath of the crisis. 150

When Bolivian approval of the quarantine resolution had been registered, the extreme left began to riot in the streets. But in unprecedented numbers, anti-Communists poured into the streets and silenced the leftist sectors. 151

The individual foreign policy of Bolivia toward Cuba did not change as a result of the crisis, for that Government continued to maintain diplomatic ties with the Castro Government.

Significance of the Crisis

The unanimity displayed within the O.A.S. in response to the Cuban missile crisis resulted from a uniquely favorable combination of circumstances.

Of central importance was President Kennedy's choice of a multilateral approach which consciously identified the national self-interests

150 Schmitt and Burks, p. 228.
151 Morrison, p. 251.
of the Latin American states with that of the U. S. in an effort to
gain Western Hemisphere solidarity. This largely was accomplished by
isolating the Soviet Union as the outside aggressor. Quarantine measures
called for under the Rio Treaty were actually to be directed against the
Soviet Union, and would not interfere with Cuba's territorial integrity,
sovereignty or independence.

Such an approach successfully evoked the strong historical tradition
of multilateral cooperation and solidarity against emergencies created
by threats or acts of extracontinental aggression from the Spanish
threats of reconquest to twentieth-century threats of intervention
during World Wars I and II.

Although little objection was raised that the quarantine resolution
constituted a violation of the nonintervention doctrine, several nations
(Mexico, Bolivia and Brazil) abstained on the second paragraph of the
resolution which authorized collective measures to remove the missiles
from Cuba, if this expedient became necessary.

That the necessary numerical majority of O.A.S. nations implicitly
authorized the U. S. to prevent the missiles in Cuba from becoming an
active threat to the security of the continent seemed remarkable for
the progress of inter-American unity. Implementation of this provision
if the need had arisen as a last alternative, would have constituted
collective intervention in the territory of an American state. Such
action was, however, unnecessary, and the usefulness of the precedent
remained untested.

In retrospect, it would seem that the circumstances of the missile
crisis severely damaged, at least temporarily, Fidel Castro's image as
the hero of the indigenous Latin American social revolution. The realization that Castro was being used as a mere pawn in a cold war chess play by the Soviet Union rudely shocked Latin American governments and important segments of Latin American public opinion, especially students. 152

Pro-sanctions countries attempted to turn this anti-Castro sentiment into a collective willingness to further isolate the Castro regime with more meaningful majorities than had been possible at Punta del Este, earlier in 1962.

It soon became apparent that the mere removal of the Soviet nuclear threat had not eliminated the danger of continuing Cuban subversion as Castro launched new assaults to recoup his lost prestige. As early as November 9, 1962, the Government of Venezuela furnished documentary evidence linking the Cuban regime with recent acts of sabotage and subversion by Venezuelan Communists. However, the source of this information was kept secret for security reasons. 153

U. S. Ambassador delesseps Morrison urged the O.A.S. to:

As a community of free nations we need to be as alert to the danger and as decisive in our response to this threat as we were to the challenge of the missile bases. The nature of the measures we should take will be different and will vary from country to country. But the effectiveness of an individual effort will be strengthened or weakened by the extent to which there is cooperation between the countries in combatting subversive techniques. 154

Therefore, the long-range significance of the Cuban missile crisis for the viability of the O.A.S. as a security organization will be

152 Personal interview with Mr. Myles Frechette, Cuban desk officer, U. S. Department of State, July 27, 1965.


measured by its effect in alerting all Western Hemisphere nations to the continued dangers of subversion—a more common but opaque form of Communist aggression.

The circumstances which provoked the missile crisis were singular and rare. So it is only from the impact and aftermath that the effect on the inter-American security system can be judged. The crisis facing the security system will be sustained and difficult as cases of aggression will not be nearly as clear-cut as was true in the Cuban missile crisis.

Therefore a better cooperative system for detecting the source and methods of subversion is needed. Then any concrete evidence furnished by a multilateral consultation and investigation, in this way should gradually lead to a clearer more precise identification of subversion as a form of aggression outlawed by the Rio Treaty and the O.A.S. Charter.

If this rigorous multilateral procedure can be followed fairly, then in future situations perhaps it will be more likely that a meaningful majority of nations will find it legally, if not politically easier to vote for mandatory sanctions against Cuba.
CHAPTER III

CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN VENEZUELA

This chapter will examine the conditions motivating decisions to impose mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba taken by the O.A.S. Foreign Ministers at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation, July 21-26, 1964. This analysis will be undertaken from the perspective of the previous Rio Treaty applications concerning Cuba, particularly the Punta del Este sanctions, and also the quarantine approved in response to the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962.

On the surface, it seemed that the O.A.S. had overcome the barrier that the principle of nonintervention had formerly raised to the imposition of mandatory sanctions on the Cuban Government. It seemed also that the Western hemisphere nations had acquired a greater mutuality of interest to enable the O.A.S. to function as a viable security organization. Whereas six nations, some of the largest and most populous in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador) had opposed rigid sanctions at Punta del Este, only four nations (Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay) opposed the sanctions voted by the Ninth Ministers' Meeting.

Only three nations of the original six objectors remained steadfastly attached to the principle of nonintervention, while policies of Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador had shifted to a pro-sanctions bias. But Uruguay, once favorable to sanctions at Punta del Este in 1962, wavered into the anti-sanctions column on the final tally at Washington in 1964.
This chapter will examine the motivations responsible for these significant alterations of national foreign policies within the O.A.S. between 1962 and 1964, and evaluate the new political alignment within the O.A.S. described by the United States Government as a "meaningful majority."

Introductory Background

On November 29, 1963, the Government of Venezuela requested that the Foreign Ministers as the Organ of Consultation be convoked immediately and on an urgent basis in accordance with Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to consider the measures that should be taken to deal with the acts of intervention and aggression on the part of the Government of Cuba that affect the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Venezuela, as well as the operation of its democratic institutions.¹

The request was studied and, at first, the O.A.S. Council acted "with a dispatch and decisiveness that left nothing to be desired."²

The O.A.S. Council began consideration of the Venezuelan complaint on December 3, 1963. At that meeting the Venezuelan representative, supporting his government's charge, referred to the discovery by Venezuelan authorities on November 2, 1963 of "abundant war equipment hidden in a place called Macama on the seacoast of Falcon State,"


regarding which the Government of Venezuela had ample proof of Cuban origin and provenance.\textsuperscript{3}

A resolution was passed by the Council to convolve the Foreign Ministers as Organ of Consultation in accordance with the provisions at a date to be fixed later, and in the meantime to constitute itself as the Provisional Organ of Consultation. Immediately steps were taken to appoint an investigatory committee to travel to Venezuela and report on the acts denounced by that government that were attributed to the complicity of the Cuban Government.\textsuperscript{4}

The Chairman of the Council designated the following countries to compose the committee: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States and Uruguay. Two military experts from the General Staff of the Inter-American Defense Board accompanied the committee to inspect the evidence.\textsuperscript{5}

Following an eight-day mission to Venezuela in December 1963, the Investigating Committee prepared an extensive report, released to O.A.S. governments February 18, 1964, fully substantiating the Venezuelan charges. An important portion of the Committee Report was devoted to remarks made by President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela to the O.A.S. team upon its arrival in Caracas. The statement was a full explanation detailing the reasons for the accusation brought against Cuba before the O.A.S. Council. The Committee reported that

\textsuperscript{3O.A.S. General Secretariat, Applications, p. 190.}
\textsuperscript{4Ibid., 190.}
\textsuperscript{5Ibid., 191.}
President Betancourt particularly emphasized the fact that Cuba's intervention in the internal affairs of Venezuela as confirmed by the discovery of a shipment of arms in the Province of Paraguana, was not an isolated incident, but rather part of a process that had been evolving for some time and whose implications were not only hemispheric but world-wide.  

The President's analysis dated the deterioration in Cuban-Venezuelan relations from the refusal of the Venezuelan leadership in 1960 to cooperate in Castro's scheme for "liberating" the hemisphere.

Thus the committee examined the evidence of "acts of intervention and aggression" denounced by Venezuela—an aggregate of acts that violated Venezuelan sovereignty and political independence—and that at the same time "transgressed the most fundamental principles of the inter-American system." It was determined by the Committee that the international prohibition of intervention in the external or internal affairs of an American state had been violated by systematic use by Cuba of radio and written propaganda, political indoctrination of Venezuelans in Cuba, training of Venezuelans in Cuba in the techniques of sabotage and guerrilla warfare, and continuous supply of funds and armaments to Venezuelan rebels.

It was conceded by the Committee that though technically the aggressor in this case had not crossed geographical boundaries, he had transgressed juridical limits by violating the sovereignty of another state by "taking coercive measures to abolish the free exercise of its sovereign will."

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6Ibid., 194.  
7Ibid., 195.  
8Ibid., 196.  
9Ibid., 196.
The immediate stimulus for the O.A.S. probe was the shipment of arms found on the Paraguana peninsula, November 2, 1963 by a Venezuelan fisherman. The Committee verified the Cuban origin of the weapons by means of:

a. ocular inspection of the place where the arms were found.
b. detailed examination of the arms, carried out with the advice from the military experts who accompanied the Committee.
c. interrogation of witnesses.
d. examination of the information and evidence supplied by the Government of Venezuela.
e. obtaining of evidence by the Committee itself.
f. chemical tests made for the purpose of determining the characteristics indicative of the origin of the arms.10

The Committee also reported that the arms shipment was related to a plot discovered on November 4, 1963, by Venezuelan authorities to capture the city of Caracas, prevent the holding of elections on December 1, 1964, and seize control of the country. Documentary proof of this plot had been seized by the Caracas police from a Venezuelan citizen, who was later confirmed as a frequent traveler to Cuba, and a member of the Venezuelan Communist Party living in Caracas under an assumed name.

The manuscripts consisted in detailed plans for the conduct of subversive operations and sabotage in the city of Caracas; sketches and reproduction of maps of the main sectors of the city; studies of certain instructions for the use of various weapons and explosives.11

On January 24, 1964, the Investigating Committee in a note transmitted to the Government of Cuba, extended that Government an opportunity

10 Ibid., 203.
11 Ibid., 206-207.
to present its defense out of deference to the Government of Brazil.  

In weighing the political orientations of the four Latin American nations represented on the Investigating Committee, it would be difficult to conclude that the Committee was extremely biased against Cuba. Although Colombia and Costa Rica had advocated strong sanctions against Cuba, Uruguay had opposed it, while Argentina had a mixed record.

After the Report of the Investigating Committee had been publicized in February 1964, the O.A.S. machinery lapsed into a political stalemate. The uncertainty of winning a "meaningful majority" of states postponed collective consideration of the Venezuelan complaint until late in June when the O.A.S. Council voted to set the date for the Ninth Meeting of Consultation for July 21. Only Mexico abstained.

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation in Washington, July 1964

When the Conference opened, thirteen nations could be counted on to support mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions, while four remained unalterably opposed to sanctions (Mexico, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay). Argentina and Brazil were uncommitted to either group in the early stages of the conference.

A working group within the O.A.S. Council composed of the United States, Peru, Costa Rica and Colombia, prior to the Conference had

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13Whitaker, Orbis, VIII, p. 513.
15Whitaker, Orbis, VIII, p. 528.
drafted a compromise proposal to obtain greater agreement. The proposal declared that the Cuban type of action in Venezuela constituted aggression under the terms of the Rio Treaty and made the severance of commerce and shipping with Cuba mandatory, but only recommended the severance of diplomatic ties. Suspension of air communications was also recommended. 16

Venezuela and other Caribbean states demanded both mandatory political and economic sanctions, and refused to compromise merely to reach a shallow political accommodation that would exhibit a facade of unity within the system. President Raul Leoni (the constitutional successor and party cohort of Romulo Betancourt) said, on the contrary, that the juridical basis of the O.A.S. would disappear if its members were not prepared to act to uphold it. The unrelenting position forced other nations favorable to sanctions into a more uncompromising position. 17

Because of the emphasis that the U. S. had placed on the goals of obtaining a "meaningful majority,"—more than a bare two thirds, and one that included significant countries and populations--Argentina and Brazil held the balance of power. Both had stressed the need for unanimity when the conference opened. This position meant their willingness to concede to the soft-line nations still maintaining diplomatic ties with Cuba, led by Mexico. 18

16Ibid., 525-526.
17Ibid., 526.
18Ibid., 529.
Essentially the final resolutions adopted by the Ninth Meeting of Consultation were hard-line, though they were softened by minor changes principally to secure the approval of Brazil and Argentina.

After declaring that the acts verified by the Investigating Committee constituted aggression within the meaning of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, the American Ministers condemned the Government of Cuba and applied in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Treaty the following mandatory measures:

a. That the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba.

b. That the governments of the American states suspend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons.

c. That the governments of the American states suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature.\(^{19}\)

As a concession to the four nations opposing sanctions in paragraph (a) the words "not maintain" had been substituted for "rupture" in the original draft, although the effect was still mandatory. Also, a clause prohibiting air transport to and from Cuba had been deleted from the original draft to appease Mexico, the only nation still maintaining such a connection. But the original draft had been strengthened by the addition in paragraph (b) of the qualifications that trade in foodstuffs, medicines and medical equipment must be of a strictly humanitarian, rather than of a profit-making character. The qualification was significant

\(^{19}\)O.A.S. General Secretariat, Applications, p. 186.
particularly regarding foodstuffs, because Uruguay at that time had conducted negotiations to sell surplus beef to Cuba. 20

By a two-thirds vote, any of the foregoing sanctions could be lifted when the nations determined that the Government of Cuba no longer constituted a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

Perhaps the strongest long-term part of the resolution warned the Government of Cuba that

if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as to resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and the security of the hemisphere. 21

Both the definition of subversion as an act of aggression under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and the resolution to counter future Cuban subversive aggression with forceful individual or collective self-defense measures represented alternatives for interpreting the Rio Treaty so that in the future quicker action might be taken. 22

This rule established a significant precedent for the hard-line governments, no matter how few, to circumvent even a majority of soft-line governments to meet renewed Cuban aggression with instant retaliatory measures. But the implementation of such action would face obvious risks,

20 Whitaker, Orbis, VIII, p. 530.
22 Whitaker, Orbis, VIII, p. 530.
ranging from the disruption of the inter-American system to the initia-
tion of armed conflict that could escalate into a major war. 23

Within six weeks three of the no sanctions nations had complied
with the mandatory diplomatic sanctions, first Bolivia, then Chile,
and finally Uruguay. Only Mexico refused. 24

Pro-Sanctions Positions

Nature of the Situation. When the Ministers met for discussions
at Washington there was ample evidence corroborated by the Report of the
Inter-American Investigating Committee that the Cuban Government was re-
sponsible for committing an act of aggression against an American state.
None of the countries present disputed these facts. 25

Because the evidence had linked the Cuban intervention in
Venezuela as an international aggression, the soft-line nations could not
argue as convincingly as they had at Punta del Este that the principle
of nonintervention precluded collective action. Advocates of non-
intervention continued to maintain that because Cuba had not sponsored
a direct attack across an international boundary, collective action could
not be taken against Cuba under the Rio Treaty. But it seemed that under-
lying reasons responsible for dissenting positions more openly reflected
the internal political pressures affecting the governments especially in
Mexico.

23Ibid., 531.
24Ibid., 534.
Section IV, p. 5.
Raymond Gonzales of the U. S. delegation to the O.A.S. Council has commented that the clear-cut circumstances of this case were more conducive to the application of sanctions of the Rio Treaty because they were not confused with issues of intervention.26

**Venezuelan Diplomacy.** Venezuela's persistence was a major factor in prodding the O.A.S. Council finally to convoke the Meeting nearly six months after the original request had been registered.27

Even before the O.A.S. Investigating Committee had issued its report in February, Venezuela had sent a military mission to several South American countries to present directly to their governments full proof of its charges against the Castro regime.28

Venezuela encouraged the American states to accept the responsibilities of membership in the inter-American security system, and protested against the absurdity of using the nonintervention rule to prevent sanctions of Cuba for its intervention. President Betancourt had pointed out that the O.A.S. Charter did not classify legitimate collective action as intervention. Furthermore Venezuela warned that if this folly prevailed, the hands of the O.A.S. would be tied and, so far as it was concerned, Castro could go on repeating his interventions and aggressions elsewhere in Latin America with impunity.29

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26Personal interview with Raymond Gonzales, Member of U. S. delegation to O.A.S. Council, July 28, 1965.

27**Whitaker, Orbis,** VIII, p. 525.

28**Ibid.,** 515.

29**Ibid.,** 521.
That the leadership initiative came from a Latin American state—one that had demonstrated its ability to accomplish peaceful democratic social and economic reform—rather than the United States, undoubtedly had a beneficial effect on influencing a "meaningful majority" of states to take action against Cuba.

**Change of Governments.** As far as can be determined, the Venezuelan request for a Meeting might have been pigeonholed indefinitely were it not for the military coup that toppled the pro-Castro Government of João Goulart of Brazil in early April, 1964.

As one nation with the most advanced independent policy at Punta del Este, Brazil under Goulart had consistently resisted pressure to interrupt diplomatic relations with the Cuban government. Although Brazil voted in favor of considering the Venezuelan charges in the December 3, 1963, O.A.S. Council Meeting, and constituting a fact-finding Committee, the Brazilian Ambassador demanded that Cuba, while excluded from participation in the inter-American system be granted an opportunity to answer the charges. 30

But by early January, Brazil's position had definitely hardened to oppose sanctions of Cuba even before the results of the fact-finding investigation were made public. 31

This hardening of foreign policy against sanctions of Cuba corresponded to a concomitant rise in extreme leftist prestige and power in the formulation of Brazilian domestic policy. These developments, taken

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together, proved to be responsible for the events which culminated in a military take-over in Brazil, April 1, 1964. After the coup, observers explained that Goulart, for two years a moderate centrist, had become desperate when inflation wrecked Brazil's economic life. Early in the year Goulart had shown a tendency to alter the basis of his political power. In a bid for poor peasant and leftist support, he favored legalization of the Communist party, embarked on a radical land seizure policy, asked for the lifting of all literacy requirements for voting, and appealed for the military support of the lower-class noncommissioned officers. He also moved to abolish the Congress in order to set up a Socialist-syndicalist dictatorship. 32

The upset of the leftist-veering government in Brazil was first regarded by U. S. observers as a definite blow to Cuba, for Brazil had been the mainstay opposition to the diplomatic and economic sanctions proposed by Venezuela. 33 Washington proceeded as if confident that Brazil, under the new regime would take a leading part in advocating sanctions of the Castro regime; but many Latin American diplomats speculated that change in the Brazilian Government would not automatically weaken that government's independent foreign policy instituted even before Goulart's ascension to the presidency. 34

Nevertheless the Government of Venezuela seized the opportunity to stress the need for a hemisphere foreign ministers' parley on Cuba, in

the belief that the sudden changes in the hemisphere's political picture had improved the possibility.  

Although Brazil, three weeks after the coup, finally severed diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba, the new military leader, President Castelo Branco, refused to give Brazilian endorsement to mandatory sanctions imposed by the O.A.S. Council under the Rio Treaty. Throughout the pre-conference deliberations Brazil's position seemed quite uncertain.

When the Conference opened, Brazil continued to pursue a policy that would reconcile the opposing groups, an acceptable compromise formula that would avoid a split. Largely at Brazilian insistence, the wording of the section of the resolution dealing with diplomatic sanctions had been softened from a decisive "rupture" to a more bland "not maintain."

The fact that a military coup had interrupted the orderly process of constitutional transition in Brazil, did not, as had been true with other countries, bring with it an uncompromising hard-line against the Castro regime. Before breaking with Castro, the new president, General

Branco, was careful to establish the social-reform objectives of the new government.  

Secretary Rusk said of the Brazilian military:

It has been demonstrated that over the last several years that the armed forces of Brazil basically are committed to constitutional government in that country and that the coup against President Goulart did not occur until there were many signs that President Goulart seemed to be moving to change the Constitutional arrangements and to move toward some sort of an 'authoritarian regime.'

Between the Eighth Meeting at Punta del Este in 1962 and the Ninth Meeting at Washington in 1964, military pressure on the governments of Argentina and Ecuador had also changed their anti-sanction position to a pro-sanction position on Cuba.

In Argentina, the armed services had first exerted pressure on President Frondizi to break diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1962 immediately following the Punta del Este decision to exclude the government of Cuba from the inter-American system.

And in March 1962, following a Congressional election in which the labor-left had made important gains, Argentine military leaders seized power and deposed civilian President Arturo Frondizi. The constitutional successor to Frondizi, José María Guido, was sworn in as President, but he governed under the strict control of the military chiefs. From March 1962 to April 1963, the Army, Navy and Air Force leaders debated a decision and a formula to hold elections that would suppress labor-leftist political power. When this intra-service

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political struggle was resolved, the elections were held in July 1963. The armed forces had forced President Guido to take the necessary precautions to minimize peronista influence by cutting ties with moderate parties. As a result, a centrist Congress and government won the elections. And on October 12, 1963, power was transferred to Dr. Arturo Illía and his party. The Illía Government, in power when Venezuela pressed charges against Cuba in November 1963, took a moderate position on collective sanctions, despite the high residue of military influence still exerted upon that government. The strong influence of Argentina's big Peronist-controlled General Confederation of Labor which admonished the government to oppose sanctions of any kind, undoubtedly contributed to Illía's desire for a compromise position in order to preserve hard-won domestic harmony.

A report was given to the O.A.S. Council early in July, 1964, by the Argentine representative describing Cuban-inspired guerrilla activities in Argentina's northern provinces. The report, while demonstrating the danger of Cuban subversion to remoter portions of South America, was designed to strengthen arguments made by the soft-line nations (Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay) that the O.A.S. members should cope with subversion on an individual basis than rely on collective sanctions.

Seeking unity within the O.A.S., Argentina pragmatically had stressed the ineffectiveness and unworkability of sanctions that would

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44 Ibid., 22.


46 Ibid., p. 16.
only have alienated important members of the O.A.S. This attitude certainly clashed with that of Venezuela and the United States who together had been working toward symbolic unity of a "meaningful majority" of states to impose sanctions, not because sanctions would materially weaken the Castro regime, but because they would isolate Cuba and strengthen the principles of the inter-American system.

On the eve of the Conference the Argentine delegation announced its opposition to mandatory sanctions despite domestic military opposition. 47

During the Conference, Argentina's role as conference mediator caused numerous vacillations in that nation's position as it searched for a formula acceptable to all nations. However, when it became apparent that the positions of the anti-sanctions nations were completely uncompromising, Argentina bridged the divide to join the pro-sanctions group.

In another instance, a nation in which the military had intervened had shifted from an anti-sanctions position to a pro-sanctions position.

Soon after President Arosemena had instructed the Ecuadorian delegate to abstain at Punta del Este on resolutions excluding Cuba from the inter-American system and curbing arms trade with Cuba, the military forced Arosemena to alter his policy by breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba. To accomplish this end, the military threatened to seize power from the civilian government, and forced a political realignment within the president's cabinet, purging it of leftist influence.

The accommodation did not prove to be permanently satisfactory, because the armed services joined to depose President Arosemena on

July 12, 1963. The military chiefs charged the President with perennial ineptness, radicalism and inability to work with the Congress. Although these were the ostensible reasons for the military coup, perhaps as responsible as any other factor, was the threatened re-election in 1963 of ex-President Velasco Ibarra, who had been deposed by the military in 1961. The military feared reprisals should Ibarra again assume power.

The armed forces immediately began to assume responsibility for developing meaningful programs for social reform. The junta first assumed the task of checking the internal Castro Communist threat, however exaggerated.

As far as Ecuador's position on Cuba within the O.A.S. was concerned it was not altered by the July 1963, military coup. Indeed Arosemena had complied with the military ultimatum to sever diplomatic relations and had become quite outspoken in appeals for an inter-American police force, as well as supporting the U. S.-instituted quarantine in the Cuban missile crisis without reservations. Therefore, the effect of the coup should perhaps be viewed as a more permanent consolidation of military influence on the Ecuadorian decision-making process.

Although the Government of Peru was a supporter of sanctions at Punta del Este, in 1962 and again at Washington in 1964, it is significant

48Lieuwen, 50.
49Ibid., 48.
50Ibid., 50.
to note a degree of alteration in that nation's foreign policy as a result of intervening domestic developments. At Punta del Este, moderate conservative President Prado had been one of the strongest advocates of hard-line sanctions. But perhaps because of the relative security enjoyed from geographical remoteness from the Cuban aggression, the moderate reform-minded Belaunde government, in 1964 held back its whole-hearted approval of sanctions even up till the time of the Conference.  

Even during the Conference the Peruvian delegation was unenthusiastic about mandatory sanctions.  

In June, 1962, the Peruvian armed forces provoked a military coup to nullify the election of Aprista leader Haya de la Torre to the Presidency. The election of Haya, who had been implacably opposed to all forms of military guardianship, reactivated the dormant Apra-military feud that had at times resulted in street fighting.

After a year, the ruling junta called elections for a second time. Backed solidly by the military, Fernando Belaunde Terry won election in June 1963.  

No longer did the Peruvian military act solely as the upholder of traditional status-quo forces. The election of Belaunde's moderate progressive Government produced a distinct shift of that government's O.A.S. position compared to the Prado Government's position at Punta del Este. In an O.A.S. Council Meeting concerning Haiti, the new

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53 Lieuwen, 32.
54 Ibid., 32.
Peruvian representative was quoted as having "specific instructions" from his government against any step that could in any way depart from the principle of nonintervention. 55

**Anti-Sanctions Positions**

Although favorable factors temporarily converged to secure a meaningful inter-American consensus to sanction Cuba at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation, there still persisted four dissenting opinions, important to analyze as barometers of underlying division within the Western hemisphere community of nations.

**The Mexican Position.** Of foremost concern was the Mexican position that seemed to be even more uncompromising than at Punta del Este, despite the more conclusive and even damning evidence mounted against Cuba for the Ninth Meeting of Consultation. Opposed to any inter-American measures against Cuba as a result of her intrusion into Venezuela, at the December 3, 1963 Council Meeting, Mexico explained that such measures would set off a new East-West confrontation and imperil world peace. 56

Initially, Mexico had voted against the Venezuelan request for a Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Following bilateral consultations between Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Lopez Mateos at Palm Springs after which a communique had been issued February 22 indicating that the meeting of the two Chiefs of State had been completely harmonious, the Mexican President declared at a press conference without qualification that

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Venezuela's charges should be handled not by the O.A.S. but by the U. N. on the ground that Cuba was no longer a member of the O.A.S. This surprise move was followed by a stronger pronouncement by Foreign Minister Manuel Tello that if the O.A.S. insisted upon handling the case, Mexico would not necessarily feel bound to support any sanction it might impose upon Castro's government. 57

The Mexican bombshell obviously had been strategically timed to neutralize in advance the stimulus that the O.A.S. Investigating Committee's Report would give to enforcement action against Cuba. Although perhaps not a threat to secede from the O.A.S., the Mexican warnings did give notice that Mexico was prepared to violate the Rio Treaty (a two-thirds vote on sanctions makes action, except armed force, collectively binding on all member states). 58

Mexico's uncompromising position threatened to drive a wedge among members favorable to sanctions. Already there was disagreement within this group concerning the practicality of mandatory economic sanctions since there was but token trade between Cuba and the rest of Latin America. And Mexico's statement heightened concern that such measures might increase the danger of a permanent schism in the O.A.S.—for Mexico was the only nation continuing to have significant diplomatic ties, trading relations, and air communications with Cuba. 59

Mexico's devotion to nonintervention, self-determination and absolute national sovereignty partially explained that government's

58 Ibid., 516-517.
59 Ibid., 519.
intense antagonism to sanctions in this case.\textsuperscript{60} As has been noted earlier, however, the argument based on nonintervention was weakened considerably. President Betancourt of Venezuela had pointed out that legitimate O.A.S. collective enforcement actions against a state for international aggression according to the O.A.S. Charter were not to be regarded as intervention. Whereas the legitimacy of sanctions in the absence of convincing evidence might have been seriously questioned at Punta del Este, the legitimacy of sanctions in this case appeared more clear-cut.

Mexico's opposition to diplomatic sanctions can be further explained by the Estrada Doctrine of recognition, which has shaped Mexican foreign policy since 1930. According to this doctrine, Mexico has continued to recognize and maintain diplomatic relations with foreign governments regardless of the manner in which they assumed power. Thus Mexico has rejected the withdrawing of diplomatic recognition as a tool to gain political objectives under any circumstances, whether on a unilateral or multilateral basis.\textsuperscript{61} Diplomatic sanctions would be viewed by Mexico according to this doctrine as an act of intervention in violation of the principle of self-determination. To make the carrying out of diplomatic sanctions mandatory and binding on all nations would violate Mexican sovereignty as well. This policy can be traced to Mexican experiences during the revolution, when the nation suffered from the consequences of recognition policies whereby foreign governments (particularly

\textsuperscript{60}\textit{Ibid.}, 520.

the U. S.) assumed the prerogative of passing on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of governments, thus subordinating national authority to foreign opinion. 62

Reinforcing Mexico's traditional opposition to sanctions on legal grounds were an upcoming election in July, 1964, and certain vested interests built up in Mexico which opposed any change in Mexico's favorable position as a main channel for what remained of western hemisphere trade and communications with Cuba. Though the moderate Party of Revolutionary Institutions was certain to win the election, in an election year the Administration could take no chances of stirring up powerful pro-Castro antagonism within the Party. 63

When it appeared that the Ministers had agreed to apply sanctions, Mexican O.A.S. Ambassador Sanchez Gavito delivered a vehement speech denouncing the proposed sanctions as not merely inappropriate under the terms of the Rio Treaty but as a "flagrant violation" of it. He supported this charge by asserting that Cuba's actions had never disturbed the peace of Venezuela nor violated its territory, sovereignty or independence and had at no time threatened the peace of the "continent." This statement was uncharacteristic of Mexico's usual pattern of restraint based upon legal arguments. Sanchez Gavito's irrational display of anger and flat denial of the findings of the Committee upon closer examination perhaps indicated that some domestic stresses and strains had surfaced.

62Ibid., 720.
63Whitaker, Orbis, p. 522.
Mexico refused to comply with any part of the resolution. The announcement was made official on August 3, 1964, when Foreign Minister José Gorostiza stated that President López Mateos had decided to "maintain the contacts with the Cuban government" without change.64

Particularly, Mexico directed criticism at the portion of the resolution authorizing collective or unilateral self-defense measures automatically in response to renewed Cuban aggression. Foreign Minister Gorostiza objected to paragraph 5 of the resolution as an improper extension of the right of self-defense. He reasoned that because there were conflicting interpretations of the Rio Treaty among O.A.S. nations involved, the case should be submitted to the International Court of Justice, for a final binding settlement on all parties.65 To date Mexico has refused to break diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Chilean Position. In response to the Venezuelan-Cuban situation, Chile remained in alignment with the no-sanctions group which was loosely formed and identified at Punta del Este in 1962.

Again the freedom permitted by Chile’s geographical remoteness enabled the government to tailor its foreign policy to meet the requirements of a potentially volatile domestic situation. Although openly the Chilean Government justified its stand on the basis of a strict adherence to the doctrine of nonintervention, it was clear that the decision not to support sanctions closely mirrored internal political cleavage.

64Ibid., 534.
65Ibid., 534-535.
The conservatively inclined Alessandri Administration, though constantly under pressure from a well-organized labor and intellectual Socialist-Communist left, faced an election crisis in the fall of 1964. Salvador Allende, the Socialist-coalition candidate had come close to edging out Alessandri in the elections of 1958, and had retained a powerful opposition influence through control of the labor movement. All signs pointed to a close race between Eduardo Frei, Christian Democrat, and Socialist Allende. An Allende victory threatened to transform Chilean foreign policy in O.A.S. Councils, because Allende had unreservedly expressed sympathy for the Castro regime.  

The supercharged electoral atmosphere in Chile made it virtually impossible for Chile to take a decisive stand on sanctions. To take such a position would have contributed to Allende's already increasing political capital.  

Though Chile did not approve of sanctions, President Jorge Alessandri, just before going out of office, agreed to comply with the binding two-thirds majority decisions ruled by the Ninth Meeting of Consultation to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba. Alessandri, still sensitive to domestic repercussions, carefully explained that this decision would not necessarily bind his successor, especially should Salvador Allende win the election. The moderate Eduardo Frei Montalva, victor by a slim margin, had originally opposed sanctions of Cuba, but

66 Ibid., 522.
was not expected to reverse outgoing President Alessandri's decision. 68

**Bolivian Position.** Also one of the original hard-core anti-sanctions group at Punta del Este, Bolivia consistently maintained its official objections to sanctions despite the existence of more precise evidence proving Cuba as an aggressor than was offered at Punta del Este.

Bolivia's position, though predicated upon the legal norm of nonintervention, perhaps can best be explained by internal dissension within the MNR. Aggravated by rising leftist influence of Juan Lechin, although moderate, President Paz Estenssoro had been elected for another term. 69

Despite a seemingly unrelenting position, the Government of Bolivia became the first dissenter to comply with the binding decision of the Foreign Ministers by severing diplomatic relations with Cuba after President Paz had been safely inaugurated for another term. 70

**Uruguayan Position.** Uruguay's government shifted its foreign policy in the two-year interval between the Eighth and Ninth Meetings of Consultation. While on record as a supporter of sanctions at Punta del Este, Uruguay had not cast a final decisive vote. The nine member Executive Council had been able to reach a decision only after great deliberation and several compromises. Strict mandatory Rio Treaty

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68 Whitaker, Orbis, VIII, p. 534.


70 Whitaker, Orbis, VIII, p. 534.
sanctions had not been called for in the final resolution which resulted from the Punta del Este negotiations. While in this instance, Uruguay, one of four nations unilaterally maintaining diplomatic ties with Cuba, was being asked to comply with a decision contrary to its own individual foreign policy. As did Mexico, Chile and Bolivia, Uruguay rested its decision on the legal norms of nonintervention and absolute sovereignty. Although a member of the Investigating team that found Cuba guilty as charged, Uruguay had maintained that such problems of subversion should be handled by each country individually without relying on collective sanctions. Perhaps Uruguay's geographical remoteness from Cuba made it easier for the Government to take such a position.

Political division in Uruguay had worsened since the Punta del Este Conference. The Executive Council members had been in a constant state of disagreement, making the possibility of a military coup seem more likely—the first time in many years.

Under these circumstances it would seem safe to conclude that undoubtedly the collective Executive Council may have found it impossible to reach any decision.

Uruguay was the last of three governments to vote to comply with the mandatory diplomatic sanctions. According to one source, its decision was influenced by the course of events in Chile, but even so, the vote carried by only a slim margin; only five of the nine Council members favored the break.

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Significance of the Decision

The unity of purpose apparent in the O.A.S. decision to apply mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba in 1964 was reached only after a gradual process of persuasion and compromise, assisted by favorable changes in key Latin American governments.

Multilateral investigation to verify the legitimacy of the Venezuelan charge of Cuban intervention was of crucial importance in securing enough votes for a "meaningful majority" of nations.

Although every nation except Mexico readily complied with the mandatory requirement to sever diplomatic relations and suspend trade and sea transportation with Cuba, questions could be raised concerning the substance of unity behind this decision. Governments of Brazil, Argentina and Peru voted in favor of sanctions, but with reservations concerning the impact of such mandatory sanctions on the unity of the inter-American system. All of these governments had explored compromise alternatives.

Mexico's uncompromising attitude should be a continuing source of concern to students of the O.A.S., principally because of its symbolic representation of dormant anti-sanctions sentiment in other Latin American countries.

A "meaningful majority" of O.A.S. nations were convinced that adequate proof had demonstrated subversion as a form of aggression covered by the Rio Treaty, but they did not seem to be as resolutely convinced that subversion should or could be curbed by mandatory
sanctions. In view of these political reservations, there would seem to be a question as to whether a "meaningful majority" of nations would support the unilateral or collective self-defense action authorized by the final resolution of Ninth Foreign Ministers' Meeting, prior to a multilateral consultation which would establish proof of Cuban aggression.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The three situations selected to study the decision-making process of the Organization of American States illustrate critical challenges for the capability of the international organization to function as a viable security system.

Although collective action was supported by the necessary two-thirds majority, substantial dissent from leading Latin American governments weakened that solidarity. Because of disparate national interests, there was need for extensive negotiation and compromise to compose the differences in national foreign policies.

As a security system the O.A.S. functioned with uncertainty, as its decision-making process demonstrated marked sensitivity even to slight variations in the domestic politics and international balance of power. A more complete evaluation of O.A.S. solidarity can be made by summarizing these complex kaleidoscopic forces shaping both pro- and anti-sanction positions.

Factors Motivating Pro-Sanction Positions

**Multilateral Verification of International Aggression.** Multilateral verification of an actual threat or act of aggression against O.A.S. members was of signal importance in influencing the degree of consensus within the O.A.S.
The Eighth and Ninth Meetings of Foreign Ministers in 1962 and 1964, were convened to consider application of Rio Treaty sanctions against the Cuban Government for subversive assaults upon other O.A.S. governments. In each of these cases there was serious dissent from several important Latin American governments concerning the legitimacy of collective sanctions.

But in response to the Cuban missile crisis, the O.A.S. Council, convened as emergency Organ of Consultation, responded with an overwhelming approval for the U. S. quarantine which prevented Soviet vessels from entering Cuban ports. Only three nations refused to endorse the second paragraph of the resolution which approved intervention in Cuba to remove the missiles.

The Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay, examined a broad Colombian proposal that collective action be taken to curb subversion. The initial request had not specifically mentioned Cuba; but in pre-conference diplomatic negotiation, pro-sanction governments drafted measures calling for action against Cuba. Indictments were not sufficiently backed by conclusive evidence proving a specific Cuban attempt to overthrow a government. Nor were charges verified by multilateral investigation. Absence of convincing proof of international aggression caused anti-sanctions nations to decide that mandatory collective sanctions would violate the Rio Treaty. Any action taken on such a shallow legal basis, they argued, would in effect impose a majority political censorship on the internal governmental structure of a member nation. This would constitute a form of collective intervention prohibited by the O.A.S. Charter. The Foreign
Ministers avoided an open clash between pro- and anti-sanction nations through the major compromise proposal to exclude the Cuban Government from participation in the Organs of the inter-American system. This alternative, not a Rio Treaty sanction, was approved by a minimum two-thirds majority. Still, six anti-sanction nations abstained on the grounds that the O.A.S. Charter did not make provision for the exclusion of a member.

The facts contributing to the decision of the Ninth Foreign Ministers' Meeting to vote mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba for intervening in Venezuela, were significantly different from those producing stalemate at Punta del Este. In this case the Ministers dealt with a Cuban plot to overthrow the Betancourt Government verified by an O.A.S. investigating team. For the first time a meaningful consensus established that subversion could logically be interpreted as a form of aggression prohibited by the Rio Treaty. Also it was quite significant that a meaningful majority of O.A.S. members adopted a resolution authorizing emergency unilateral or collective self-defense measures against Cuban subversion without prior multilateral consultation.

Anti-sanctions protests were raised because mandatory diplomatic sanctions interfered with a nation's sovereign right to determine its own policies of diplomatic recognition. Mexico's O.A.S. Ambassador stubbornly refused to recognize that Cuba had even committed an aggression against Venezuela. Furthermore he denounced the collective sanctions as a "flagrant violation" of the Rio Treaty. Apparently the rigid bias against intervention prevented that government from
interpreting subversion as an overt form of international aggression specifically defined by the Rio Treaty. The authorization of collective and unilateral self-defense measures contradicted Mexico’s interpretation of nonintervention.

The Cuban missile crisis represented a grave threat of extrahemispheric aggression. The O.A.S. nations voted promptly and unanimously to support the U. S. quarantine directly aimed at the Soviet Union, indirectly at Cuba. However, three nations abstained on the second paragraph of the resolution which authorized any necessary measures to remove missiles already located in Cuba—the unconditional objective of U. S. strategy. These objections were registered because the O.A.S. could not legally intervene to violate the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of another American state. It would seem significant for inter-American unity that some formerly anti-sanction nations modified their interpretation of absolute non-intervention to agree to a blank check on intervention. There is some question, though, that had intervention become necessary from the U. S. point of view, some Latin American states might have challenged its timing or implementation. Photographic evidence of a common threat to hemispheric security presented to the U. S. delegation in multilateral consultation was crucial in convincing O.A.S. members that sufficient grounds existed for applying the enforcement measures of the Rio Treaty.

This case study has suggested that different criteria formed the basis of collective action in response to aggressions of an intra-hemispheric and those of extrahemispheric character. In response to the missile crisis, the O.A.S. governments acted to prevent a
predominantly extrahemispheric threat from becoming an overt aggression. But when Cuba was accused as the aggressor, the requisite two-thirds majority to apply mandatory Rio Treaty sanctions was not obtained until sufficient proof demonstrated that an act of international aggression had been committed.

Perhaps the inconsistency can be explained by noting the fundamental differences in the two types of threats. Inherently the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba represented a grave and relatively self-evident peril to inter-American security. The intrahemispheric Cuban subversion was, on the other hand, more evasive, of less immediate common danger, disguised by domestic politics of self-determination and difficult to prove.

**Geographic Proximity.** In all three cases, the nations of Central America and the Caribbean, nearest the Castro threat, were the most vulnerable to subversive assaults on their governments. The threatened nations were leaders in enlisting collective support to isolate Cuba through diplomatic and economic sanctions. The U. S., Colombia, and the Central American and Caribbean states were the major pro-sanction nations that insisted upon the holding of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation in January 1962.

Nations of Central America and the Caribbean located within closest striking range of the missiles in October 1962, also were the most active in offering facilities for the U. S. quarantine operation.

The Cuban intervention in Venezuela led the Betancourt Government to press relentlessly for diplomatic sanctions at the Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in July 1964.
Internal Weakness. The factor of internal weakness, added to geographic proximity, made some nations in the Central American and Caribbean region more vulnerable to the Cuban threat. Larger, stronger Latin American nations, and some more remotely located from Cuba (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile) insisted that internal security against subversion was a unilateral responsibility. But weaker Central American and Caribbean nations lacked resources to combat threats intensified by geographic proximity. In each case these nations sought protection either from the U. S. or the inter-American security system.

Military Influence in Latin American Governments. In this study, it has been demonstrated that governments under heavy military influence voted for sanctions.

Except for the U. S., Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, who had other reasons for supporting sanctions, the most consistent pro-sanctions nations were those led by corrupt dictator-presidents perpetuated in power by the military.

In Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru, the military did not maintain absolute perpetual control over the governments, but exerted a great deal of influence through the use of coups d'etat. In some cases the mere threat of a coup was sufficient to modify policies of civilian governments.

In both Argentina and Ecuador, the threat of a military coup immediately following the Punta del Este Meeting, forced Presidents Frondizi and Arosemena to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and reverse positions recorded at Punta del Este. Shortly thereafter the Frondizi Government fell, and was replaced by a military junta. During
the Cuban missile crisis the Argentine junta backed up support for
the quarantine by contributing naval units to the U. S. maneuver.
Ecuador's President Arosemena, though not immediately overthrown, was
forced to reshuffle the Cabinet by forcing leftist ministers to resign.

The Brazilian military did not immediately depose the left-leaning
government of President João Goulart after his anti-sanctions stand at
the Punta del Este Meeting in January 1962. But when it was clear
that the Goulart Government had obviously identified with domestic
leftist groups, in April 1964, the military intervened to restore
equilibrium to Brazil's internal politics. After this coup efforts to
schedule a Foreign Ministers' Meeting to discuss sanctions of Cuba for
intervention in Venezuela picked up momentum. Military leaders in
Brazil did not immediately alter foreign policy concerning Cuba,
although eventually the military supported mandatory sanctions at the
Ninth Meeting in Washington, July 1964.

The conservative Prado regime that governed Peru with military
approval, backed hard-line sanctions against Cuba in January 1962.
When elections elevated moderately-liberal Aprista, Haya de la Torre,
to the Presidency, the military provoked a coup to nullify the election.
In October 1962, the junta gave strong support to the U. S. naval
quarantine. By 1963, however, the military agreed to a new election
under close junta supervision. The winner, Fernando Belaunde Terry,
had solid military support, yet he did not readily instruct the Peruvian
delegation to vote for sanctions at the Ninth Meeting in Washington in
1964.
The Peruvian and Brazilian cases demonstrated that while Latin American military governments in general voted with the pro-sanctions bloc in the O.A.S., there was considerable variance in the hardness of such positions.

United States Approach. U. S. prestige suffered a serious set-back as a result of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs episode which had implicated the U. S. in a direct intervention of Cuban territory, April 1961. But confidence in U. S. motives slowly was restored as the U. S. prudently exercised more restraint in its diplomatic relations with Latin America throughout the remainder of 1961.

At Punta del Este, U. S. willingness to compromise to avoid an impending split in the inter-American system, earned Latin American respect, and in the case of Uruguay a favorable vote. That the six dissenting nations abstained rather than voted negatively seemed to underscore the wisdom of a moderate U. S. approach.

Certainly it would seem that the display of photographic evidence of the Soviet missile sites in Cuba in multilateral consultation, greatly influenced the overwhelming approval of the U. S. position by the O.A.S. Council.

The Alliance for Progress aid program as a part of U. S. concern for Latin American welfare, as well as U. S. interests, undoubtedly had some positive effect upon foreign policy decisions of Latin American governments. For President Lleras of Colombia, the promise of economic aid supplemented other factors influencing his decision not only to support sanctions, but to assume concurrent responsibility with the U. S. at Punta del Este.
Of somewhat minor importance in this respect, was Haiti's opportunistic maneuver to gain U. S. aid despite Washington's disapproval of dictator Duvalier, by holding off a pro-sanctions vote at a crucial interval.

**History.** An historic fear of foreign intervention evoked the overwhelming Latin American support for U. S. measures to halt further Soviet missile build-up in Cuba and bring about dismantling and removal of the missiles already in Cuba. This fear had traditionally produced an alignment with the U. S. for protection in times of peril.

**Factors Motivating Anti-Sanction Positions**

**Nonintervention.** Anti-sanctions positions were prefaced by a reminder that the O.A.S. Charter prohibits unilateral or collective intervention in the domestic affairs of member states.

Mexico was the most consistent and representative advocate of the doctrine of absolute nonintervention. As the first Latin American nation to complete a thoroughgoing social revolution, Mexico showed sympathy for the ideals of the Cuban Revolution, and was relatively patient with the "errors" of its leaders.

Because Mexico experienced intervention from the U. S. during its own revolution, that nation has regarded the principle of non-intervention as the best safeguard for the right of self-determination. Mexican spokesmen argued that any collective action taken against Cuba without convincing proof that Cuba had committed overt acts of international aggression against neighboring states would be illegal collective intervention.
The Mexican Government refused to comply with the binding decision of the Ninth Foreign Ministers' Meeting to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, because such a requirement interfered with its sovereign right to determine policies according to its Constitution and doctrines of recognition.

But Mexico showed greater flexibility when its security was threatened by extracontinental aggression. While the government did not accept vague Soviet connections with Castro's subversion as justification for collective sanctions, it did not find it inconsistent to give full backing to the naval quarantine in the Cuban missile crisis. But in accordance with its standard of absolute nonintervention, Mexico refused to authorize invasion of Cuba to remove the missiles.

Domestic Balance of Power. All six governments opposed to sanctions at Punta del Este were under strong pressure from leftist groups who sympathized with the Cuban Revolution. Leaders of these nations adopted anti-sanction positions to avoid strikes, other internal disturbances and loss of broad-based political support. Of the heads of state, only President Goulart of Brazil seemed personally inclined to favor a pro-Cuban position.

All of these nations continued to maintain uninterrupted diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. All stressed compromise solutions which would have included negotiation and recommendatory measures as preferable alternatives to sanctions. The Brazilian Government, in particular, stressed the impracticality and the unworkability of sanctions.
The unanimous response of the Latin American nations in support of the U. S. quarantine of Cuba would seem remarkable in view of latent leftist disruptive capability. In the missile crisis, however, leftist opposition was uncoordinated and divided because Khrushchev admitted to President Kennedy's charges by backing down— which at least temporarily tended to diminish Castro's prestige.

But in the Cuban intervention in Venezuela in 1963, regrouped leftist strength returned as a major factor influencing Latin American foreign policies.

The increasing pro-Castro sentiment which developed in Brazil during President Goulart's tenure, was a major cause of delay in holding a Foreign Ministers' Meeting to deal with Cuba's intervention in Venezuela. When the left-leaning Goulart regime was overthrown, preparations for the Foreign Ministers' Meeting proceeded immediately. Leftist strength in Brazil prompted the Branco military regime to adopt a cautious approach toward proposed mandatory sanctions. Until the time for voting, the Brazilian delegation explored possible areas of agreement to heal the O.A.S. breach on the Cuban issue.

By 1964, a new civilian government had been elected in Argentina. President Arturo Illia enjoyed military backing, but was vulnerable to pro-Castro pressure from the left-wing faction of peronistas. Initially Argentina, as well as Brazil, favored compromise positions rather than mandatory sanctions to avoid domestic turmoil.

Chile's decision in 1964 not to vote for sanctions was also directly related to a precarious internal balance of power. The moderate Alessandri Administration was opposed by a dynamic presidential
candidate from a united leftist coalition in forthcoming elections. The President was vulnerable to this opposition that had nearly defeated him in a bid for electoral power in 1958.

Bolivia's negative vote was also explained by the rising influence of leftist-extremist, Juan Lechin, who had challenged moderate President Paz' control of the Government Party (MNR).

Uruguay's negative vote at the 1964 Meeting reflected that nation's faction-ridden internal political structure. It was by only a narrow margin that the Nine-Man Collective Executive Council supported watered-down sanctions at Punta del Este. Political strife had grown more intense during the two-year interval. The negative vote based on the juridical norm of nonintervention avoided a controversial stand that might have split the government still more.

In 1964, domestic politics also added a new overture to Mexico's objection to and noncompliance with mandatory sanctions. In an election year the government could not afford to comply with an O.A.S. decision that would have had the effect of cutting off its vested interests as the only Western hemisphere nation maintaining meaningful diplomatic and trading relations and communications with Cuba.

General Observations

In spite of obstacles to unity, the O.A.S. functioned remarkably well as a security system in response to these challenges. Though certain differences remained unresolved, progress toward mutual understanding was facilitated by patient diplomatic negotiation and multilateral consultation.
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THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE CUBAN CHALLENGE, 1961-1964: CASE STUDIES IN DECISION MAKING

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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MASTER OF ARTS

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The purpose of this study was to examine the collective decision-making process of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) in dealing with three challenges to inter-American security, 1961-1964.

A case study method was used to investigate three O.A.S. decisions to take collective action under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty): (1) Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 1962, which acted to bar the Cuban Government from participation in the inter-American system; (2) the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, during which the O.A.S. voted to support the U.S.; (3) Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington, July 1964, which voted mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Cuban Government.

At Punta del Este, six nations abstained on the final resolution: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile and Mexico. In the case of the missile crisis, Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico abstained on a paragraph of the resolution that would have authorized intervention in Cuba to remove the missiles. At Washington, only four nations abstained on the binding decision: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay.

For each case, foreign policy positions of pro- and anti-sanction nations were analyzed on a country-by-country basis.

The decision-making process of the international organization reflected several important common legal, political, military and geographic aspects of the national interests of its member states.
Multilateral verification of Cuban aggression was found to be important in securing favorable votes for collective Rio Treaty security measures. At Punta del Este, when request for sanctions had not been adequately supported by convincing proof that the Cuban Government had actually intervened in another American state, the necessary two-thirds majority to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions had been lacking, and a compromise measure adopted instead. But when Venezuela had been able to produce proof of Cuban intervention which was verified by an inter-American investigation, the O.A.S. nations voted to approve sanctions. Likewise, the O.A.S. nations voted to support the U. S. quarantine when presented with detailed photographs which confirmed the existence of Soviet missile sites in Cuba and the target range of the missiles.

Central American and Caribbean nations geographically nearest Cuba in all cases favored a strong pro-sanctions position, particularly weak governments that sought protection from the U. S. or the inter-American system.

Governments under strong military influence, in every case, voted for collective action.

A flexible multilateral U. S. approach which allowed for compromise, was instrumental in persuading nations to adopt collective measures, particularly in the Cuban missile crisis.

An historical fear of extracontinental aggression led the O.A.S. nations to approve the U. S. quarantine during the Cuban missile crisis.

Objections to sanctions were largely based upon an O.A.S. Charter provision which prohibits both unilateral or collective intervention.
Although Rio Treaty sanctions do not constitute collective intervention prohibited by the C.A.S. Charter, anti-sanctions nations have narrowed through interpretation the circumstances under which collective action may be taken legitimately. Essentially, collective Rio Treaty action was equated with collective intervention by these nations. Nonintervention was advocated to bar sanctions in a variety of ways.

This principle prevented some governments from supporting collective action in the absence of proof that an international aggression had been committed. Absolute anti-sanctions nations refused to endorse collective entry into Cuba as an expedient to remove missiles acknowledged as a grave threat to inter-American security. Still another objection to sanctions was based on the position that binding sanctions constituted an intervention in the internal affairs of dissenting minority nations.

In all three cases investigated, governments under pressure from strong leftist groups took anti-sanctions positions to maintain political stability.