

INDIA'S POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Scope and Methodology:

This study examines India's policy of non-alignment only in the context of the "Cold War" between the Western and Soviet-led power blocs that has dominated bi-polar world politics since India's independence in 1947. No attempt is made to analyze the totality of India's foreign policy including India's relations with her principal antagonists -- Pakistan since 1947 and China since 1962. Accordingly, the focus on non-alignment vis-a-vis the "Cold War" struggle between super powers excludes consideration of the Sino-Soviet estrangement and the corollary role of China in Asia -- developments portending emergence of a multi-polar world and possible realignments of major proportions. However significant also are developments antecedent to 1947 to India's policy of non-alignment, this study arbitrarily is concerned with the period only since India's independence.

Another major limitation is the paucity of sources. Though an effort is made to draw on contemporary sources -- primarily secondary -- including politicians, statesmen and academicians, the writer acknowledges that time and distance prevented access to adequate sources concerning the views of different political groups in India, discussed in Chapter III, while those of interest groups are missing completely.

Nevertheless, the writer knows of no similar single published work wholly concerned with India's policy of non-alignment. Discussion of this policy comprises only parts of various books, articles, pamphlets, and documents that provide the sources for this study.

What is non-alignment?

There is a basic difference between neutrality and non-alignment, a difference that tends to be neglected in many popular and journalistic discussions on the subject. According to B. K. Nehru, India's Ambassador to the United States:

A neutral nation is a nation which has declared - and there are several such in the world - that in case of war, it will not fight no matter who the belligerents may be nor what the causes and the stakes at issue.¹

A non-aligned country, on the other hand, does not say that it will not fight in case of war. On the contrary, a non-aligned country merely says that in arriving at a decision in world affairs, during a cold war or a hot war, it will make up its mind on the merits of the issues involved, and independently of what other countries may think.² In short a non-aligned nation may go to war or may not. If it does, it will not go to war because a number of other nations have decided that it should, but only if it believes that under the circumstances "there is no alternative in its national and international interests but to take

¹ B. K. Nehru, Speaking of India (Washington: Information Service of India, Undated), p. 64.

² Ibid.

this extremely serious step."³ It is also important at this stage to clarify the difference between neutrality and neutralism. Most observers seem to agree that neutralism is not synonymous with neutrality:

It is pointed out that whereas neutrality can only be predicated upon the existence of a state of belligerency. Neutralism is said to mean non-involvement in time of peace.....⁴

To put it more bluntly.

With... illusory forms of neutrality, the policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment has nothing in common, for it has continually concerned itself with political realities.⁵

Thus we can say with some degree of certainty, that the non-aligned countries of the world do not follow the policy of neutrality. It is even wrong to say that they follow the policy of 'positive neutrality'. India's permanent representative to the United Nations, Krishna Menon, raised this objection to the use of 'positive neutrality' in his address to the General Assembly on October 17, 1960:

Even that expression 'positive neutrality' is a contradiction in terms. There can no more be

³ Ibid.

⁴ Samir M. Anatabi, "Neutrality and Neutralism," The Journal of Politics, XXVII No.2 (May, 1965), p.391.

⁵ Alex Quaison-Sackey, "Positive Neutralism and Non-alignment," Neutralism and Disengagement, ed. Paul F. Power (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p.39.

positive neutrality than there can be a vegetarian tiger.⁶

Positive neutralism, however, strikes many people as a contradiction in terms, too, especially since neutrality is usually associated with passivity. But we have already established the difference in the terms -- neutrality and neutralism. We have also found that neutralism means non-involvement in times of peace. What, then, is positive neutralism? Is it a principle, an ideology, or a specific policy expressing a principle on the part of leaders like Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah? Their policy of neutralism is neither negative nor passive, as we shall see, although its development from its earlier concept may at first make it seem so. It was necessary for them to steer away from the negative attitude toward a positive one at the international level. Here the concept of positive neutralism emerged very clearly and powerfully as the formula for policy in international affairs. It is also important to point out that positive neutralism does not mean neutralism as in war time. This concept is no longer consistent with the kind of arms that could be used in future wars. The policy of positive neutralism has to be followed in times of peace as well, because if war breaks out it will affect all, belligerents as well as non-aligned. The effect of nuclear weapons can be felt beyond the national frontiers, a fact which makes the old fashioned neutrality

⁶ Krishna V. K. Menon, "An Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations," Neutralism and Disengagement, ed. Paul F. Power (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 23.

irrelevant. Positive neutralism is active, particularly in times of peace, to ensure continuation of peace, or avoidance of war. In short the policy of positive neutralism is followed by a nation which does not want to shy away from the problems of present day Cold War.⁷

People may also wonder how a non-aligned nation can participate actively at the international level, and yet not take sides. In the first place, the leaders of non-aligned nations regard the Cold War as dangerous and destructive. This perception among leaders is well illustrated in the words of Jomo Kenyatta, the Prime Minister of Kenya, who said:

When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers; and when East and West are struggling in Africa, it is Africa that suffers.⁸

In the second place, a non-aligned nation likes to participate without taking sides, perhaps because of the different ways in which leaders of the non-aligned nations see themselves and the role of their nations in the Cold War. Each of them has elected a policy of positive neutralism and/or non-alignment with either the Russian or Chinese oriented Communist bloc or the Western Coalition. All statesmen of the developing nations have different conceptions of non-alignment. Foremost among them are Nasser and Nkrumah. These differences largely spring from their desire to

⁷Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism," Neutralism and Non-alignment, ed. Laurence W. Martin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 93 - 95.

⁸Ibid., p. 93.

maintain political independence and freedom of action in a world torn by Cold War rivalries:

Each maintains that non-alignment does not mean moral neutrality. "The only camp we like to be in is the camp of peace and goodwill," said Nehru, 1959.

Nasser has said: "I will not become the stooge or satellite or hireling of anybody."

According to Nkrumah, "nonalignment can be understood only in the context of the present atomic arms race and the atmosphere of the Cold War... attitude of nonalignment does not imply indifference to the great issues of the day... It is in no way anti-Western; nor is it anti-Eastern."⁹

President Nkrumah went even one step further and advocated the creation of a non-nuclear third force of non-aligned nations, which would refuse to allow their territories to be used as a military base and would reject any allegiance based on nuclear weapons. Such a bloc would exert moral pressure on the two big power blocs and prevent them from plunging all of humanity into the holocaust of a disastrous war. Presumably, Nkrumah thought that this third force would contribute to world peace and stability by acting as a buffer and balancer in the bi-polar struggle.

Nehru and Nasser both refused such a third force for reasons of their own. Nehru, who considered himself the chief spokesman for a fluid, non-aligned group, wanted to keep such a group vague. He argued: "If a neutral nation joins a neutral bloc it ceases to be a neutral."¹⁰ President Nasser, on the other hand, had been

⁹ Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 99.

preoccupied with problems of Arab unity, has opposed the formation of a neutralist bloc because he feels: "We then would have to apply our policy of non-alignment to all three blocs."¹¹ Thus it seems there is no possibility of forming any fixed bloc of non-aligned nations because the moment such a bloc is formed, "it will mean bilateral alignment and that very surrender of judgment which is the essence of a non-aligned policy."¹²

In spite of all the differences between the leaders of the non-aligned nations, there is something common among them, such as the present day necessity of world politics and regard for the national interest, both of which point to non-alignment as the best policy. Since positive neutralism and/or non-alignment is only a policy as opposed to a dogma, it is a passing phase which would last as long as do the facts of the international situation upon which it rests.¹³ In short, we can say that the leaders of non-aligned nations are responding to the same historical forces -- internal economic weakness, a recent colonial past, and global bipolarity, etc. Yet each of them wants to maintain political independence and freedom of action in the Cold War rivalry for his nation. The reason for such an attitude can be well expressed in the following words of Lefever:

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² B. K. Nehru, Speaking of India (Washington: Information Service of India, Undated), p. 64.

¹³ Clovis Maqsood, "The Story of Arab Positive Neutralism", Neutralism and Disengagement, ed. Paul F. Power (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 14.

The differences among the neutralists are differences of emphasis and style, for each molds his public philosophy to his personality and to his political and cultural setting and each adapts his policy to changing circumstances inside and outside his country.¹⁴

The best way to examine India's policy of non-alignment is to examine her foreign policy and the principles upon which it is based in the light of the personality of her leaders, and her religious, political, and cultural setting.

India's foreign policy is based on three main principles: first, non-alignment with power blocs; second, support of the principle of freedom for colonial people; and third, opposition to racial discrimination.¹⁵

This discussion concerns the first one, mainly with non-alignment with power blocs. At the root of India's policy of non-alignment, lies the Hindu philosophy of non-violence, the aversion of war, and considering nothing in its absolute terms as good or evil. Everything has two sides, a good side and a bad side. India's policy of non-alignment rests, on the basis of this philosophy, and the general belief of arriving at a peaceful solution to all problems. An Indian Philosopher said:

The foreign policy of the leaders of this ancient civilization, but of this young republic, reflects

¹⁴Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Naasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism," Neutralism and Non-alignment, ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 94.

¹⁵Karunakar Gupta, Indian Foreign Policy: in Defence of National Interest (Calcutta: The World Press Private Ltd., 1956), p. 1.

deeprooted historical traditions and memories which are embodied in a philosophical and spiritual non-materialism.¹⁶

Though India's outlook on life is based on religious philosophy and literature, her heritage of non-violence springs from Gautama Buddha, Emperor Ashoka, and Mahatma Gandhi.¹⁷

¹⁶ Balendra Palayan, "Is India's Role in World Affairs Misunderstood," Pacific Spectator, X No.1 (Winter, 1956), pp. 28-29.

¹⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru, India Today and Tomorrow (New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1960). Nehru defined the following terms:

BUDDHA: Died C.486 B.C. Born in a princely family, left home, wife and young son, in quest of knowledge that would put an end to sorrow and suffering in the world. Successful in his quest after six years of discipline and meditation, spent the latter part (about 42 years) of his life as a mendicant journeying from place to place to preach his message. The essence of his teachings was that all human sorrow and suffering could ultimately be ended by living a perfectly moral life and cultivating the virtues of mercy, non-violence and love for others." Ibid., p. 47-48.

ASHOKA: "Died C. 232 B.C. Great emperor of the Maurya dynasty whose dominions extended beyond the frontiers of modern India. After a fierce battle in which he was victorious he felt great remorse for the slaughter and devastation caused and resolved never again to engage in warfare. Influenced by Buddhist teachings, he exhorted his subjects to practise mercy, respect for parents, elders and seniors, charity, truthfulness, non-killing of animals, purity of disposition and respect for others' religious beliefs. Sent envoys to neighbouring rulers laying emphasis in the evils of war and engraved a large number of edicts on stone throughout his dominions to preach and plead for the general acceptance of his message. Sent Indian medical men and medicines to foreign countries, and built hospitals for men and animals, roads, wells, etc. throughout his dominion." Ibid., p. 47

MAHATMA: A Sanskrit word meaning 'great-souled'. Ibid.

India's relations with her neighbors can be very easily expressed in the terms of Panchsheel.¹⁸ "To India the concept of Panchsheel constitutes the ethical alternative to war; the choice between Panchsheel and Hydrogen bomb."¹⁹

This concept not only gives Nehru the courage to stand alone, and the feeling of security when he stands alone, but they virtually give him no other choice than to chart an independent course in world affairs. He recognizes that consistency forbids India's joining alliances that imply armed rival camps, and forbids India's favouring one nation above another - at least the major rival powers - in her friendships.²⁰

India's policy of independent action has been interpreted by many people as a policy of 'neutrality'. But India's policy of non-alignment is one of neutralism and not of neutrality. "I do not think we are neutral,"²¹ said Nehru:

In Nehru's sense of the term 'Neutralism', India has adopted a policy of non-alignment, non-commitment, and

¹⁸ PANCHSHEEL: "The 'Five Rules of Conduct', originally used by the Buddhist. Now popularly applied to the five principles of international relations, viz. (1) Mutual respect of each other, (2) territorial integrity and sovereignty, (3) non-aggression, (4) non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and (5) equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence." Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Delhi 6; The Publication Division, 1961), p. 99.

²⁰ Malcolm E. Hause, "India: Noncommitted and Non-aligned," Western Political Quarterly, XIII No.1 (March, 1960), p. 2.

²¹ Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Text of Prime Minister's Speech in Lok Sabha (House of People) March 29, 1956 (New Delhi: External Publicity Division, 1956), p. 2.

independent action in her diplomatic relations vis-a-vis her bipolar world. Non-alignment, as India lives it, does not mean submission to evil, passivity of mind, lack of conviction, a listless desire for non-involvement; it means a 'positive and dynamic approach' to world independence, in her exemplary participation in the spectrum of international organs of peace, and in the service of her representative as chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea and chairman of the Supervisory Commission for Indochina.²²

Lastly it is important to point out that India does not categorically deny that there would be any major war or that there is no such possibility. However, India feels if such a possibility does arise, it can be averted. In the final analysis, we can lay down in the following words of Nehru what India's policy will be if such a disaster comes:

If and when disaster comes it will affect the world as a whole... our first effort should be to prevent that from happening. If that proves to be beyond us, we must, at any rate, try to avoid disaster or retain a position in which we shall be able to minimize, as much as possible the consequences of that disaster even if it comes.²³

In this introductory chapter, the attempt is made to acquaint the reader with what non-alignment and/or neutralism is, what the differences between the leading exponents of this policy are, and what motivated India to pursue such a policy. In the next chapter we shall examine at length India's claim that her policy of non-alignment is in her self-interest. At that time we will examine India's cultural and

²²Malcolm E. Haase, "India: Noncommitted and Non-aligned," Western Political Quarterly, XIII No. 1 (March, 1960), p. 72.

²³Jagdish Chandra Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54 (Groningen, Djakarta: J. B. Walters, 1955), p. 63.

historical background and the economic, political and social policies pursued by the government of India, upon which India's policy of non-alignment has great bearing.

CHAPTER II

INDIA'S NON-ALIGNMENT IN SELF INTEREST - 1947-62.

When India emerged on the map of the world as an independent sovereign state in 1947, she was fortunate in having no traditional enemies and no vested interest in world affairs. She could afford to express her desire for friendship with other nations and her readiness to co-operate with them in the interest of world peace.

In the light of the conditions existing at the time of India's independence, August 15, 1947, her foreign policy was not formulated in any manner. She was not even anxious to declare her policy. This can be witnessed from Nehru's statement on March 22, 1949, in New Delhi: "Foreign policy is normally something which develops gradually... we cannot precisely lay down our general outlook or general approach, but gradually it develops."¹

If India had not declared her foreign policy at the time of her independence, then when had she declared it or was it evolved over a period of time, through what stages of evolution did it pass? What were the contributing factors? What were the guide-lines of this policy?

¹Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Delhi 6: The Publication Division, 1961), pp. 44-45.

At the time of India's independence, the polarisation of the world into the so-called Soviet and Western blocs had begun and India, like many other nations, was presented with the alternative of being on one side or the other or to remain independent between the two rapidly forming rival coalitions.

India was thus presented with a challenge from the beginning of her independence -- to choose a foreign policy in accordance with her national interest, in the context of a world divided between East and West. India had to take a stand on this issue because the attitudes of the principal powers (U.S.A., U.S.S.R., U.K., France) and of the world towards India were inevitably to be determined by that stand.

An acquaintance with historical and factual background in foreign policy will facilitate our understanding of the Indian people, their past history, culture, civilization, their internal political and economic problems. A more complete understanding of the present philosophy of India's leaders will be aided by an examination of India's external relations under the British and the views of the Indian leaders before independence.

The present population of India is a strange mixture of several racial strains. To mention only the most outstanding -- Dravidian, Aryan, and Mongolian.² Thus there is no definite answer to the question

²In fact Jawaharlal Nehru mentions many more races in his book the Discovery of India, (New York: The John Day Company, 1946). Such as Medians, Iranians, Greeks, Bactrians, Parthians, Shakas or Scythians, Kushans or the Yuen-Chih, Turkis, Turco-Mongols, and others.

'to what race do the Indians belong?' As for the religion of India, the bulk of her population professes Hinduism as their religion. However, we can easily find large segments of Indians who are Muslims, Buddhists, Jains, etc. To maintain the unity of India and to check disintegration, the national independence movement led by the Congress Party turned mainly to secularism. It stood for keeping racial and religious influences away from politics although it did not prevent the creation of Pakistan. It is also true that Indian thinking remains colored by the predominant influence of Hinduism, which in turn has absorbed many other influences. Pacifist outlook and moderation in attitude, from philosophy and teachings of Buddhism and Jainism, are two such influences. "Nevertheless, the religion and culture of India have maintained a separate and independent existence for centuries."³ Frank Moraes, a leading Indian Journalist, expresses his feeling as follows:

The Indian Constitution of 1950 ordains that the state shall be secular; but however enlightened and well intentioned this proviso is, it cannot in itself erase the imprint of history. For better or worse, Hinduism has set its stamp on India and pervaded every step of life from social and economic to the cultural and political.⁴

Though religion and culture may have remained separate, their influence on the minds of Indian leaders cannot be underestimated.

³A. S. Toynbee, The World and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 34.

⁴Frank Moraes, India Today (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 2.

In ancient days Buddha and his influence personified India's tradition of peace. In modern times and especially during the first half of the present century Gandhi symbolized it in India's history. Both influences Nehru calls "ideals inherited from our past" including "years of conditioning by Gandhi."⁵ Gandhi sincerely felt that India's freedom was not worth having if it was to be won with violence and racial strife. His conception of non-violence involved a rejection of the gospel of force as the basis of international life. To appreciate fully India's attitude in world affairs, it is important to remember that India's national leaders deliberately choose the method of non-violence in her struggle for independence.

In their zeal for the cause of India's independence, the Indian leaders did not overlook the importance of foreign policy. They were aware of the contribution the world-at-large could make toward the solution of Indian problems. The policy of the Indian National Congress in the pre-independence era could be summed up in the resolution passed at its Calcutta Session in 1928:

The struggle of the Indian people for freedom is a part of the general world struggle against imperialism and its manifestations... India should develop contacts with other countries and peoples who also suffer under imperialism and desire to combat it.⁶

It was also resolved that a Pan-Asiatic Federation should be called

⁵Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," Neutralism and Non-alignment, ed Laurence W. Martin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 95.

⁶Jagdish Chandra Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54 Groningen, Djakarta: J. B. Walters, 1955), p. 36.

in 1930 for the purpose.

The major objective of Indian foreign policy under Nehru's leadership has been to dissolve the psychosis of fear that for thousands of years has pervaded the atmosphere of international relations. As early as 1921, in the first resolution passed by the Indian National Congress on foreign policy, Nehru asserted that when given her independence, "India as a self governing country can have nothing to fear from any neighboring state or any state as her people have no designs upon them."⁷ Since independence was gained on August 15, 1947, Nehru reiterated the same thought time and again, declaring not only that India was not afraid of any neighbor, but also that India was not afraid of any great power, despite its huge armies, fleets, and atomic bombs; for India had proved it was possible to stand before a great power and not submit. India has very little power of aggression; however, if aggression would occur, India's power to resist it will prove equal to the occasion.⁸

This does not mean that Nehru was asking other nations to give up all their arms and become pacifists. On the contrary, he felt that no statesman can afford to risk the security of his own state; therefore, every state must remain militarily prepared to resist aggression. But he did insist that preparations for war that go to the point of producing fear in others simply bring war nearer:

⁷ Ibid., p. 37. (Nehru was in charge of Congress foreign policy from the inception of Congress interest in the matter - since 1918 - and this resolution, therefore, is considered a product of his creation.)

⁸ Range Willard, Jawaharlal Nehru's World View: A Theory of International Relations (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1961), p. 28.

The very concept of military aid from abroad is evidence that a state is afraid, and if India ever accepts such aid it will be a sign that she too has succumbed to fear.⁹

To Nehru the greater danger to world peace, was not communism, but the fear generated from the preparation of war. It is fear, Nehru claimed, that is the most basic threat to the survival of the modern world. To Nehru's mind fear was everywhere permeating and saturating the behavior of individuals and nations. The rich fear the poor, nations fear nations, East fears West, and West fears East. The entire world atmosphere is filled with fear, in spite of the presence of the United Nations, a means available to settle the world dispute. According to Nehru, the Soviet Union and the United States both suffer from a fear complex and have adopted wrong attitudes in arming their nations and in encircling each other in the name of self protection. This attitude of fear has produced and is maintaining the Cold War.¹⁰

Thus, Nehru looked upon the attitudes of fear as the most basic obstacle to the solution of Cold War problems. The primary difficulty of human nature is that of psychological attitude.¹¹ Perhaps most of the conflicts of society and the world are due to

⁹ Nehru's Speeches, 1949-53 (New Delhi: Information Service of India, 1954), p. 415.

¹⁰ Range Willard, Jawaharlal Nehru's World View: A Theory of International Relations (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1961), pp. 24-25.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 27.

this attitude. Therefore the first step for relaxing the conflict is to change the attitude. Once the attitude is changed people will see the problems in their true colors, instead of blurred by prejudices.

It does not suffice to change the existing attitude in order to solve the problem of present day world. Nations should also discard the traditional means of settling conflicts or disputes -- war. There is a need to adopt new methods and approaches, an adoption which will not create fear, but dissolve it. Quoting as an example the non-violence movement for the cause of India's independence, Nehru said:

When the psychosis of fear was dissolved, it was possible, so the story goes, for the people to apply new methods, a completely new approach -- the technique of Satyagraha -- to the solution of problems involving conflict. And Nehru implies that all the world would do well to follow the Indian example.¹²

Thus Nehru suggested that by following India's example of the non-cooperation movement, the world would benefit. However, he refrained from preaching pacifism.

If Nehru is against aggression and pacifism, then how does he propose to solve the world problem? According to Nehru, "Tolerance is essential to world peace."¹³ If the people of the world really wish to avoid war they have to tolerate much that they

¹²Ibid., (Satyagrah - Non-cooperation).

¹³Ibid., p. 35.

do not like. People should refrain from interfering in each other's affairs. The message, 'Diversity is the spice of life,' that Nehru gave to the people of India, in his book Discovery of India, very aptly applies here, too. People should learn to tolerate different cultures, religions, social, economic and political institutions among different nations of the world. Unless they stop thinking in terms of their institution as the right kind of institution, it will be very difficult for every one to walk the path of peace.

In short it is better to stop thinking in terms of absolutism. Everything in this world is relative. India's Ambassador to the United States appropriately describes the world situation when he says: "... the truth however, is that in international affairs, there is no black and no white: there is an infinite variety of grey."¹⁴

The major cause of intolerance in Nehru's view was that people too often confuse the superficial with the basic difference.¹⁵ People feel that the differences in ways of eating, drinking, dressing, cultural characteristics, etc., are fundamental divergences. To the contrary, they are all superficial differences. We know that most people are similar in their basic characteristics,

¹⁴ B. K. Nehru, Speaking of Nehru (Washington: Information Service of India, Undated), p. 66.

¹⁵ Range Willard, Jawaharlal Nehru's World View: A Theory of International Relations (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1961), p. 32.

that they have more or less the same urge, the same desire. Every human being wants peace in the world. Who likes all the killing in the world? People want to live and let live. They want to get along without any trouble. They want their country to have peace so that they can progress. As Nehru stated it:

There is a great deal of unity underlying all the diversity among human beings; and those who see only the superficial differences, who think other people are entirely different, who feel other behaving people have no common bonds with them, who feel alien to one another -- such people tend to forget that the basic urge and thoughts of all are more or less alike.¹⁶

By looking through their own glasses, often people feel that there is basically something wrong in the way of other people. Others may also feel the same way about us, and our way of living. Instead of each criticizing the other, it is better for each to tolerate the other and try to learn from him. Nehru insists tolerance is essential to peace:

If the peoples of the world really wish to avoid war they are going to have to tolerate much that they do not like and refrain from interfering in each other's affairs. Otherwise peace is impossible.¹⁷

Did Nehru follow the advice he gave, or was he, too, swept away by the art of double-faced diplomacy in international affairs? Was this the result of the British training in him, or of the unique position India enjoyed in the world due to her strategic geographical position coupled largely with a densely populated huge nation, or a combination of all? One thing is certain. Nehru began to play the

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 35.

same game of acting as a balancer of power in the international sphere that he played during the independence movement within the Congress Party.

Thus far we have explored the mind of Nehru and that of India. We have examined the reasons why Nehru thought there was no peace in the world. We have also examined his feelings, with regard to some of the basic attitudes in international relations. Nehru felt there was a need for changing these attitudes built on fear. There should be tolerance instead.

Is India's policy of non-alignment based only on moral principles, or is there something more than there seems to be on the surface? There are other contributing factors, historical, geographical, economic, and military, which should not be overlooked in our assessment of India's policy of non-alignment. A leading Indian diplomat, Panikkar, points out that,:

the policy of a state is determined by its geographical position, the object of all policy is territorial security, and this is governed predominantly by geographical factors.¹⁸

Even Guy Wint, writing in 1947, could foresee a continuity of policy in foreign affairs in India (in spite of the transfer of power) because of the fixed fact of geography. He wrote:

...The interests are determined chiefly by geography and technical science and will be much the same in the next decade or two as in the past few years. Briefly the principal ones are as follows:

¹⁸ K. M. Panikkar, The Basis of Indo-British Treaty (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 35

The integrity, neutrality and, if possible, alliance of all the border states from which India might be attacked -- Persia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indo-China, Siam, Netherlands East Indies.

Safety of Sea and air routes in the Indian Ocean on which the security and commerce of India depends.

The desire to play a part in the external world and in the affairs of the family of sovereign powers which is fitting to its own stature, culture and past history.¹⁹

Geographically India occupies a peninsular, as well as a continental position. According to Panikkar's analysis in his book, The Basis of Indo-British Treaty, India has no future as a major Asian land power, for on land she can be no more than an appendage of only minor interest to the Soviet Union which controls the heartland. On this analysis, India must necessarily align herself with the maritime system. Even continuance of her commonwealth membership has been looked upon as influenced by the fact that Britain possesses a chain of developed bases in the Indian Ocean, without which continental defence of India would scarcely be possible. India's military weakness, in spite of her large manpower, can be chiefly attributed to her industrial weakness. From a defence point of view, India is still dependent on the British, fully or partially, since the bulk of her military equipment comes from Britain, and the bulk of her foreign trade is still with Western Europe and North America.²⁰

¹⁹ Guy Wint, The British in Asia (2d ed. rev.; New York: Faber and Faber, 1954), p. 20.

²⁰ L. M. Panikkar, The Basis of Indo-British Treaty (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 40.

India still remains mainly an agricultural country, and, in spite of legislation, the condition of the farmer has not improved. From an economic point of view, it is chiefly the western powers that can supply the capital equipment and technical personnel, without which the industrialization of the country and the raising of its standard of living will remain a dream. Thus India, geographically, militarily and economically is at the mercy of the western world.

India's close contact with the West has not been merely economic or strategic. A positive influence pulling India towards the West is expressed by a New York Times correspondent, Trumbull: "India's strongest bond with the West is a common political tradition of parliamentary government."²¹ Indian high officials are British-trained and oriented towards the Western political traditions. Last but not least, India is acquainted with the rest of the world through British and American avenues of information and learning. In a speech to the Indian Parliament on June 12, 1952, Nehru rebuffed the Communist members who had criticized the use of Hindi in Parliament:

I have not heard any protest about the use of the English language which ultimately ties us mentally or otherwise to the Anglo-American bloc. There is nothing that ties us more closely to that bloc than the English language, which inevitably brings the people of India nearer to its thoughts, activities, books and cultural standards than those of the rest of the world from which Indians are linguistically cut off.²²

²¹ R. Trumbull, "Nehru's Policies Based on his Fear for India," New York Times, January 10, 1951, p. 35.

²² Karunakar Gupta, Indian Foreign Policy in Defense of National Interest. (Calcutta: The World Press Private Ltd., 1956), p. iv.

In spite of all these ties with the West, India refuses to align formally with the West, and also refuses to accept its military help. Some of the underlying reasons for India's attitude toward the western bloc are: (1) There is an inherent distrust of colonialism from which she has recently emerged. (2) India does not look on communism as a menace to freedom everywhere, as does the United States, but as a local nuisance to be dealt with locally when it causes a disturbance. Lastly, India like all the other Asian countries, feels that there is a need for an Asian view in the settlement of Asian problems.²³

This and other factors result in India's middle-of-the-road policy in the present phase of ideological alignment with either the Communist or the Western bloc. To find India's national interest within the limits of our interpretation, we must look into these factors: India's geographical position bordering the Soviet Union and Mainland China, and far away from Britain and the United States; her economic weakness and military vulnerability -- both aggravated by partition; the desperate need for peace so that the government may stabilize itself by tackling the country's economic problems. We should also take into account India's fear of a new kind of imperialism -- economic -- in Asia, caused by her experience as a colony: For example a powerful economic link with the United Kingdom and the United States, close ties of Indian big businesses in partnership with western monopolists, India's exclusive dependence on the United Kingdom for military supplies and training, and not

²³ Ibid., p. v.

least her hope of assuming leadership among the newly emerging nations of Asia.²⁴

These factors have pulled India in one direction, or another. Taken together, they have produced a middle course, prompting India to avoid definite commitments or alignments with either bloc.

Thus we can safely assume that the foreign policy of India is not only based on moral principles but also on the concept of the national interest. In fact, in some of his foreign policy speeches, Nehru was quite frank about this point. As early as December 4, 1947, in the Constituent Assembly, he said:

Whatever policy you may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say, but in the ultimate analysis, a government dares to do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.

Therefore whether a country is imperialist or socialist or communist, its Foreign Minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country.²⁵

India became independent on August 15, 1947. From that day until the declaration of a cease-fire in Kashmir on January 1, 1949, India was too much preoccupied with her internal problems. The Government of India was being seriously harassed by the communalist elements which fed on communal passion, creating riots and violence

²⁴ Ibid., p. 36.

²⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Delhi 6: The Publication Division, 1961), p. 28.

within the country, and resulting problem of transporting and rehabilitating millions of refugees. As if this was not enough, a limited war was being fought with Pakistan in Kashmir over the future of Kashmir. There was also the problem of integrating nearly 500 Indian princely states, the solution of which included police action against Hyderabad, which wanted to be independent, and Junagadh which acceded to Pakistan. During this period the Indian Government was mainly preoccupied at home with internal communal problems and the problem of the consolidation of power rather than problems of the Cold War. In the opinion of her leaders, the problems with Pakistan did not constitute a problem of the Cold War. Under these circumstances, the Indian Government gave a distant attention to the problems of the Cold War facing Europe.

Indian leaders also felt that the foreign policy of a government is the reflection of its internal economic policy. At that time the Government of India was too preoccupied with immediate problems of establishing law and order within the country to think of long term plans of economic development. India's first five year plan was yet a distant dream. The uncertainty in economic policy was resulting in uncertainty in foreign policy. This attitude is clearly shown by a foreign policy speech by Nehru on December 4, 1947. He stated that:

Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, and until India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping.²⁶

²⁶ Ibid., p. 24.

We must also bear in mind that India had not yet severed her relation with Britain. She had no such intentions in mind. She did want to continue to lean on Britain as she has during the days immediately after independence. In fact, India's relations with the British Commonwealth and particularly the United Kingdom were very close. Lord Louis Mountbatten continued to be the Governor-General of India till June 21, 1948, and a considerable number of British military personnel continued to serve in India's defence service. The Commanders-in-Chief of the three wings of India's armed forces were British.

The Government of India was not only consolidating power and suppressing the communal riots, but was also engaged in the suppression of instigations within the country. Under these circumstances, the Government of India, obviously could not conceive of any military alignment with the Western bloc while still having close economic and other ties with England. But the Communist world felt otherwise. They thought India was aligned with the Western bloc by some secret treaty.²⁷ The conclusion is not at all unwarranted. However, the truth of the matter is India had hardly committed herself to any of the blocs. The following statement by Nehru on December 4, 1947, covers not only the situation at home, at the time, but in the last sentence also hints at India's non-alignment with either blocs.

²⁷ Charles H. Heimsath, "Non-alignment Reassessed: The Experience of India," Foreign Policy in the Sixties, ed. Roger Hillsman and Robert C. Good (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 49.

We have not had a free hand in our external relations... I would beg the House to judge this period in the context of what has been happening in this country, not only during the past unhappy three or four months, but in the course of the past year when we lived in the midst of internal conflict and confusion which drained away our energy and did not leave us to attend to other matters. That has been the dominant feature of our politics during the past year and undoubtedly that has affected our foreign policy in the sense of our not giving enough time or energy to it... The main subject in foreign policy today is vaguely talked in terms of 'Do you belong to this group or that group?'... We have proclaimed during the past year that we will not attach ourselves to this group or that group.²⁸

During this period -- from August 15, 1947, (India's independence day) to January 1, 1949 -- India was pre-occupied with affairs at home, and her foreign policy was yet vague. However we cannot deny that the undercurrents of India's policy of non-alignment were clearly visible. India was following an independent policy in her foreign affairs. To cite an example, India proposed a solution (which she thought to be best under the circumstances) for the Palestine problem. According to India's proposal, in the United Nations naturally, a federal state was to be established, with an Arab majority in charge but with autonomy for the Jewish region, as opposed to the two alternate solutions -- partition of Palestine or unitary government for Palestine. Undoubtedly the Indian solution did not find favor in the United Nations. However, it was a point of view -- a view which looked at the Palestine problem from a different and an independent angle instead of blindly following one of the big powers and adopting their alternative proposal.

²⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches 1946-49 (New York: The John Day, 1950), pp. 199-200.

In the ultimate analysis the adopted solution was in the interest of those powerful nations without regard for the interests of the people concerned.²⁹

In spite of the fact that the undercurrents were pointing to India's policy of non-alignment, Nehru regarded it as indefinite. In his speech on December 4, 1947, in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), Nehru said, "I wish it were a more definite policy. I think it is growing more definite..."³⁰ From January 1, 1949 on, India's policy became more definite. Though some of the internal problems continued to exert pressure on the Government of India, the war in Kashmir had stopped, the princely states had been integrated with the Indian Union, and the Law and order had been consolidated. India could now afford to look around the world, with less pre-occupation at home.

In 1949, India seemed to be inclining toward the Western bloc, compelled mainly by economic reasons and her belief in democracy. She did not offer, however, to commit herself militarily, and she still maintained in official statements the position that she was with neither bloc. During this period, India was prepared to lend moral support to the West, but nothing more than that. Nehru felt at this time that full alignment with either bloc was neither in the interest of India nor would public opinion in India approve of it.

²⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy Government of India Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Delhi 6: The Publication Division, 1961), p. 26.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

During this period the Government of India continued to suppress the communist movement within the country. Moscow, watching all this closely, felt that India had moved closer to the Western alliance. A Western commentator, Rosinger, confirmed Moscow's doubts, in the following words:

The Indian Government had gradually moved in the direction of Britain and the United States, although not abandoning the verbal formula of an independent foreign policy.³¹

India had not yet committed herself wholeheartedly to non-alignment. This was perhaps for many reasons, but mainly because she did not feel the pressure of the Cold War on her door-step. She could still afford to be an onlooker with regard to the situation in Europe. However, such a comforting situation did not last long.

Events began to move rapidly during the next few years, on her border and in Asia. The coming to power of the Communist Chinese, India's recognition of the Peking Government, subsequent Chinese occupation of Tibet, the signing of the U.S. - Pakistan defense aid agreement, war in Korea and later on in Indo-China, the involvement of the United States, Soviet Union and Communist China in both these Asian wars, all these made India conscious of a serious danger to peace in Asia. All these events led to a consolidation of India's attitude in her non-alignment policy.

At about the same time Nehru seemed to have discarded his old concept that foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy.

³¹L. K. Rosinger, India and the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 35.

Although India's economic policy was tied to Britain and the United States, military and political policy were another matter. Concerning this duality of foreign and economic policy pursued by India, Karunakaran, an Indian Scholar on International Relations, commented:

In the political field, the Indian Foreign Minister was trying to follow an independent foreign policy. But the internal economic development programmes were based on the assumption that it would be possible to obtain assistance from abroad -- especially from America -- in the form of loans, capital equipment and technical assistance. There is a contradiction between these policies, unless it is assumed that America had two unco-ordinated policies in regard to political and strategic matters.³²

The years immediately after India became a Republic -- January 26, 1950 -- until the signing of the Panchsheel agreement in 1953 between India and China, to restore peace in Korea, Indo-China and Laos were the most difficult years in the history of non-alignment. In addition to this, since the theory was in its formative years, it had to defend itself on two fronts -- against both Soviet and American foreign policy. Neither Stalin nor Dulles were friends of neutralism. The big change came only after the collapse of Stalinism -- in the Soviet Union -- when the new dynamic foreign policy of peaceful co-existence was evolved by Khrushchev after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist party in 1956. In the United States the shadow of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles lingered longer than the shadow of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. However, the policy makers in Washington gradually realized the

³² K. P. Karunakaran, India in World Affairs 1947-50 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 48.

importance of non-aligned nations in solving the pressing problems of our time.

The basic aim of India's foreign policy is not to commit herself in the Cold War and also not to get involved in a possible third world war. It will be helpful to point out at this stage that the 'non-alignment' or 'independent' policy of India was not, as is often wrongly believed, the aim of Indian foreign policy but the instrument through which India hoped to remain independent in a possible third world war. India also tried to keep the Cold War away from her border. In these efforts she did not meet with much success. This is made apparent by the Chinese take over of Tibet and Pakistan's entrance into the Western alliance in February 1954. India had also opposed the military pacts such as SEATO, CENTO, the Manila Pact, etc., but without much success. On the credit side, her two immediate neighbors, Burma and Ceylon, followed the lead given by India in that part of Asia. Apart from taking this step of not committing herself on either side and trying to insulate India's borders from the Cold War -- without much success -- India made a positive approach to prevent war altogether. Kundra felt:

In such a policy she found the triple coincidence of serving India's own interests, the interests of world peace and finding a moral justification in a 'policy of peace', which is not easy to find in mere 'neutralism'.³³

Kundra also felt that neutralism was not the principle aim of Indian foreign policy, but that it was only an instrument. Then what were

³³Jagdish Chandra Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54 (Groningen, Djakarta: J. B. Walters, 1955), p. 61.

the aims Indian foreign policy according to him? He classified them as:

- 1) non-involvement in a Third World War.
- 2) Development of Indian economy and for that purpose keeping open all channels of international trade and aid.
- 3) Maintenance of India's independence in the sphere of external affairs.
- 4) Winning of international support on the Kashmir Question.
- 5) Integration of the French and Portugal settlements with the Indian Union.
- 6) Securing a fair treatment and the dignity of Indians settled abroad.
- 7) Championship of the cause of colonial people.
- 8) Abolition of racial discrimination everywhere, particularly in South Africa.
- 9) Creation of the cause of a consultative machinery in co-operation with neighbouring and other Asian countries. ³⁴

With the above aims and non-alignment as an instrument, how can India's interest be served in a world torn between two power blocs poles apart and ready to grab at each other? India seemed to be attempting the impossible. Her enthusiasm will wane as her efforts are wasted. It might not have lasted, had it not been for Nehru's courage, determination and firm belief in India's destiny to be a nucleus nation. If India too, becomes a camp follower of some world power, India will never be in a position to come out of a subordinate situation? If she does come out it will be at a great cost to India.

India is a big country. She has the natural resources and manpower. What she lacks is a solid industrial base and a strong military force to match China's in the immediate future and perhaps more in the years to follow. She is destined to be a world power. She cannot continue to follow others. She has to lead. If she cannot

³⁴ Ibid., p. 59. (Since the publication of Mr. Kundra's book, French and Portuguese settlements have been integrated with the Indian Union).

lead herself, how is she going to lead others? She has to begin taking responsibility. By having an independent policy she leads herself. At one time she was alone in the wilderness of the Cold War jungle. She was treading a lonely path. Gradually, nations began to see a different way to look at the world's problems and began to give their support. In 1960 at the first conference of the non-aligned nations, neutralism found favor among 25 nations. In 1964, at the Cairo conference of non-aligned nations, about 55 nations were invited to attend.

During the latter part of the fifties and the early sixties, the United States and the Soviet Union began to look upon these non-aligned nations with benevolence and to give them support and even economic aid:

Both power coalitions came to regard that posture as a beneficial state of affairs, and henceforth their respective policies towards India were directed toward the preservation of its special relationship to both sides.

By the mid-1950's India's non-alignment had passed through the period of rebellious, sometimes, irresponsible, youth into the confidence of middle age, and its posture was regarded as a stable and relatively permanent feature of international politics.³⁵

It is impossible to measure the price India has paid or is paying in terms of material benefit for the undeclared leadership of non-aligned nations. What is important is to find out whether or not non-alignment has served India's interest or has blocked her way to progress?

³⁵ Charles H. Heimsath, "Non-alignment Reassessed: The Experience of India," Foreign Policy in the Sixties, ed. Roger Hillsman and Robert C. Good (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 57.

It is popularly believed in the world that the non-aligned nations have the better of both worlds. Such a belief springs from the fact that non-aligned countries often receive economic aid, both from the Soviet Union and the United States, and from their allies. Therefore it is assumed that because aid is received from two sources it must in the aggregate amount to more than would be received from one source alone. On the contrary, B.K. Nehru, India's Ambassador to the United States, feels:

that on a per capita basis the aligned, whether aligned with the East or with the West, received by and large more aid from one source than the non-aligned countries do from both.³⁶

Thus the policy of neutralism has not resulted in any kind of large-scale economic benefit to India. But we should not overlook the psychology of India and her 'middle-of-the-road' policy in the present phase of ideological alignment of states in the Soviet and Anglo-American bloc. The attitude of Indians towards communism and war was clearly expressed by Mrs. Pandit, one of the Indian National leaders and the only woman President of the United Nations, who said: "We feel that war is a greater threat to us than communism in Asia."³⁷ To understand India's 'National Interest' and her desire for contentment of communism within the limits of her foreign policy aims and ambitions, we must also look at other factors; India's geographical position -- bordering the Soviet Union and China, and

³⁶ B. K. Nehru, Speaking of India (Washington: Information Service of India, Undated), p. 66.

³⁷ Karunakar Gupta, Indian Foreign Policy: in Defence of National Interest (Calcutta: The World Press Private Ltd., 1956), p. iv.

far from Britain and the United States and her economic weakness and military vulnerability -- both aggravated by partition. All these arguments propose to lead India to one thing -- quick economic development to meet the rising expectation of her rapidly increasing population. We should also take into account India's fear of a new kind of Imperialism in Asia, a fear based on her own experience as a colony, the powerful economic links with the United Kingdom and the United States, her desire to pursue her economic policy, -- a kind of mixed economy -- that does not resemble either the Soviet or the Anglo-American patterns, her strong desire to follow neither of the two patterns, India's exclusive dependence on the United Kingdom and the United States for military supplies and training, her hope of assuming a leading position among the newly emergent non-committed nations of Asia, and even of Africa, the state of public opinion within the country, and the attitude of big powers in the disputes in which India has been directly involved (Kashmir, Hyderabad and the Apartheid problems in South Africa).

In calling the Asian conference on March, 1949, the subsequent Afro-Asian conference, and the two conferences of non-aligned nations in the first half of the sixties, India might have been planning to take the leadership of the newly independent non-committed nations. Whatever might have been the original plans of India, her initiative had the effect of "taking the wind out of Russian anti-imperialist sails, by giving leadership to Asian opinion on the subject."³⁸ At the same time, India was achieving a compromise

³⁸L. K. Rosinger, India and the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), pp. 99-100.

settlement which satisfied the big colonial powers as well as the moderate elements in control of national leadership.

Today in retrospect, India's attitude toward the evolution of world problems does appear inconsistent. On the one hand, she has condemned the Malayan liberation movement in the strongest terms as sheer terrorism, on the other hand she has permitted the Gurkhas belonging to British troops to pass through India. In his speech in Singapore in June 1950, Nehru called communism the enemy of Nationalism in Asia. He also spoke against the immediate withdrawal of the British from Malaya, since their presence might lead to chaos and disorder. On the other hand Nehru regards Ho-Chi Minh's movement in Indo-China as a national liberation movement, though it is definitely communist-dominated. In Iran, Nehru gave support to the National Government's right to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but at the same time counselled moderation for an amicable settlement. While he accepted Egypt's absolute control over the Suez, he opposed a sudden withdrawal by the British, that might keep it defenceless. Again, in the matter of Tunisia, and Morocco, he has raised a very loud voice as the leader of the Arab-Asian bloc. In addition to this he made a bitter critic of British colonial policy in Kenya. He also opposed the creation of the Central African Federation against the will of the African people. Such diversity of policy clearly indicates that India had to moderate her principles to suit the situation like any other state in defence of 'National Interest'.

CHAPTER III

VIEWED BY DIFFERENT POLITICAL GROUPS IN INDIA - 1957-62.

Indian National Congress

The Indian National Congress is the oldest political party in India. It was established in 1884. It has also been the ruling party in the country since India gained her independence on August 15, 1947. In the Indian parliamentary system, unless an idea -- in domestic policy or foreign affairs -- has the support of the ruling (Indian National Congress) party, it has very little chance of becoming a policy of the country. In case a particular policy -- domestic or foreign -- was followed in the past, the ruling party can either change it or introduce reforms, depending upon the support the change will receive.

We know two facts for certain. One, the Indian National Congress has been successful in maintaining its majority in the Lok Sabha¹ since independence was attained. Secondly, India's policy of non-alignment has not been changed during the period, 1947-62. Thus, the policy of non-alignment has had the continuing support of the Indian National Congress.

The Indian National Congress in 1948, at its Jaipur² session,

¹Lok Sabha: House of People.

²Jaipur: Name of a city in the State of Rajasthan.

passed its first foreign policy resolution after independence.

The foreign policy of India must necessarily be based on the principles that have guided the Congress in the past years. These principles are: promotion of world peace, the freedom of all nations, racial equality and the ending of imperialism and colonialism... It should be the constant aim of the foreign policy of India to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with all nations and to avoid entanglement in military or similar alliances which tend to divide up the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace.³

The Indian National Congress position in foreign policy has not changed much over the period 1947-62 since the passing of the above resolution, after India's independence.

Praja Socialist Party

The Praja Socialist Party, the Socialist Party of India, and the Revolutionary Socialist Party are the three political groups who lead the Socialist movement in India. Of the three Socialist groups, the Praja Socialist Party has the largest membership and organizational network throughout India.

According to The Times Directory, the Revolutionary Socialist Party of India:

is a Marxist-Leninist Party and relies on mass and class action. It is organized on the principle of democratic centralism.

But it is opposed to subservience to the foreign policy of Russia or China.⁴

³Jagdish Chandra Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54 (Groningen, Djakarta: J. B. Walters, 1955), pp. 53-54.

⁴Times of India Directory and Year Book 1960-61 (London: Bennett, Coleman & Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 1110.

Looking at the Revolutionary Socialist Party's leaning to radical socialism, it seems that it (the Revolutionary Socialist Party) would not want India to be identified with the Western Alliance led by a capitalist country. From the above mentioned statement from The Times Directory it (the Revolutionary Socialist Party) does not believe that India should be aligned with the communist bloc. In other words the party would probably like India to follow an independent foreign policy.

The Socialist Party also professed an independent foreign policy for India. According to the Socialist Party the United States arms aid to Pakistan has caused a deterioration of the relations between India and Pakistan.

Lastly, the Praja Socialist Party supported India's policy of non-alignment and declares that: "Panchshila is the norm of international relations and co-existence of different systems."⁵ The party advocates more freedom for smaller nations. It also advocates: "active and positive neutrality; condemns all military pacts, favours the formation of a 'third force'."⁶

In short we can say that the Praja Socialist Party supported the policy of non-alignment. The party was concerned about Tibet and wanted freedom for the Tibetan people; however, it also advocated stronger ties with China. According to the Praja Socialist Party, Tibet should not stand in the way of strong friendly relations between India and China.

⁵Ibid., p. 1109.

⁶Ibid.

From the above survey of the Indian Socialist movement in India, one thing is clear; all three Socialist parties favored India's policy of non-alignment, with only minor differences here and there.

Communist Party of India

The Communist movement in India dates back as far as the twenties; however, it was not organized as an all-India party until late 1928. Since that time it has grown until today it is the second largest political party in India.⁷ There is a wide gap between the strength of the Indian National Congress and that of the Communist Party of India. As for its control, Retslaff correctly points out that:

During early phases of the development of Indian communism in the 1920's, the movement as elsewhere was largely under the direction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), but a pattern developed whereby this control was exercised indirectly through the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).⁸

The above pattern was continued even after India became independent and until 1962. After 1962, the party was split into two factions; one of the moderates led by Dange, which follows -- as before -- Moscow's direction and the other faction of revolutionaries led by Randiv and P.C. Joshi, which follows China's leadership.

⁷Ralph Retslaff, "Revisionism and Dogmatism in the Communist Party of India," The Communist Revolution in Asia; ed. Robert A. Scalapino (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 308.

⁸Ibid., p. 310.

In the early days of India's independence, the CPI under Moscow's direction -- severely criticized Nehru's foreign policy of non-alignment. But during the first half of the fifties the Indian Communists began to change their thinking, keeping it in line with the Communist party of the Soviet Union. They felt, after all, that Nehru's foreign policy was not bad. Undoubtedly, the left wing of the party was not pleased with the line adopted by the party. However, at that time they were unprepared to break openly with the right wing.

Thus, whether the Communist Party of India was or was not in favor of India's foreign policy, depended a great deal on Moscow's attitude. If Moscow criticized India's foreign policy, so did the Indian Communists. In short, the Communist Party of India approved or disapproved of India's foreign policy, not because it thought the policy was in the interest of India, but because it furthered the cause of international communism, then the Communists in India supported the policy; if not, then they did not favor the policy.

Referring to the exclusive dependence in the past of India's Communist Party on Moscow for its policy judgments, Stern says that this dependence is gradually diminishing. To put it more positively, the Communist Party of India is becoming more and more independent of Moscow. For each gradual independence, according to Stern there are four outstanding reasons. In his words they are:

It may be, however, that the relationship of dependence between the CPI and the Soviet Union is in the process of gradually being eroded by a number of political forces that have been at work in the world since the end of World War II. Among these forces four stand out as being particularly erosive. First, the establishment of India

as an independent republic and the development among its major political spokesmen of highly self-conscious nationalism have placed an implicit and, in times of stress, an explicit restriction on any group's being too obviously guided or inspired from abroad and at the same time retaining its status as "patriotic," the sine qua non of political respectability. Second, growing Soviet friendship and support for the Nehru government has made it virtually impossible for Indian Communist to be revolutionaries and has left them with no alternative other than to be "nationalists." Third, the rise to world power prominence of China under Communism and its controversy with the Soviet Union has, on the one hand, introduced a division into the C.P.I.'s overseas loyalties, and on the other hand, it has threatened the party with debility if this division develops into schism. Finally, the sino-Indian conflict has had the direct effect of seriously disturbing the C.P.I.'s international affiliations and has served to catalyze other executive forces. The early stages of that conflict in 1959-60 provided the background for this study.⁹

Swatantra (Freedom) Party

The Swatantra Party was founded in Mid-1959. Thus, it is a new comer to India's political arena. However, it has achieved considerable strength within a few years. This party in the third general election of 1962 captured 8% of the total votes. The Swatantra Party has its greatest supporters among the rich peasants, rich industrialists, zamindars, maharajas and nawabs. This element and other similar ones have led political pundits to believe that the Swatantra Party is a conservative one. The party leaders prefer to call it:

'progressive liberal party' which will 'slow down the congress steam roller' by providing a non-communist,

⁹Robert W. Stern, "The Sino-Indian Border Controversy and the Communist Party of India," The Journal of Politics, XXVII No. 1 (February, 1965), p. 66

non-socialist, aecular, and constitutionalist alternative to the ruling party.¹⁰

However Life magazine says:

the Swatantra Party could really get that huge country moving in a direction favorable to free institutions. The free world can wish this little party a big future.¹¹

The Swatantra Party, long before the 1962 Chinese aggression on India's northern border, felt that "non-alignment, Panchsheel, and other pillars of India's foreign policy would have to be replaced."¹² Thus, it seems that since its inception the Swatantra Party was not in favor of India's policy of non-alignment.

Bharatiya Jan Sangh (Indian People's Association):

The Bharatiya Jan Sangh is relatively smaller in its strength in the Parliament, compared to other political parties in spite of the party's larger membership. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh believes that India should follow a system best suited to the country, instead of following the Soviet Union or the United States. They say India should follow a policy of her own.

In foreign policy the Bharatiya Jan Sangh seemed to support India's policy of non-alignment.

The Jan Sangh believes that the enlightened self-interest of India demands a policy of non-alignment in her foreign relations. It should however be considered a policy and

¹⁰ Howard L. Erdman, "India's Swatantra Party," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI No. 4 (Winter, 1963-64), p. 394.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 404.

¹² Ibid., p. 394.

not a dogma. The Chinese aggression in Ladakh and NEFA does not demand any change in this policy. Non-alignment, however, should not prevent us from increasing our military strength by securing the latest weapons from any possible source.¹³

¹³The Times of India Directory and Year Book 1960-61 (London: Bennett, Coleman & Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 1102.

CHAPTER IV

VIEWS BY OTHER COUNTRIES -- 1947-1962.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two leading powers of the opposing blocs in the Cold War. India's relations with them occupy a very important position in the study undertaken here. However, we should not ignore India's relations with the other large powers, such as Britain, France, and China. As we shall see, India's relations with both alliances mainly turn on the issues of the Cold War during the period from 1947-62.

The years 1947-62 have been classified by Peter Lyon in his book 'Neutrality' into four phases:

The main vicissitude of the Cold War can be conveniently outlined in terms of four fairly distinct phases. Each of these phases is characterized by changes: in the most intense areas of Cold War alliance systems, in the emergence of new states, and in the policies of the superpowers toward neutrality... Following Hobbes' example of meteorological metaphor these four main Cold War phases may be described as (1) the great freeze-up (1945-9), (2) constant cold (1949-53), (3) partial thaw (1953-7), (4) variable weather (1957-December 1962). Though these four headings mark major Cold War phases, they also, and perhaps more accurately, mark changes in Soviet politics towards neutralist states.¹

Western Countries

India and the United States are the two largest democracies in the world. One is a very ancient civilisation, but a young

¹Peter Lyon, Neutrality (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963) pp. 28-29.

republic. The other is a very young and energetic country, but one of the oldest democratic republics. One professed neutralism, whereas the other is the leader of the Western Alliance. Geographically they are situated on opposite sides of the globe. Consequently, the interests of the two countries did not collide at the time of India's independence or since then. If their interests did not collide on any important issue, and both uphold similar democratic ideals, then how do they differ and why?

Their differences are mainly derived from Cold War problems and their solutions. The United States, a strong military power with tremendous economic resources, felt that the solution of Cold War problems lies in the military strength of the Western Alliance. She felt that any sign of weakness in the Western Alliance will encourage the Soviet Union to pursue her expansionist ambitions further into the western sphere of influence and to destroy the western world and her principles of freedom and democracy. On the other hand, India, militarily a weak nation, faced with grave economic problems at home, believed in friendship as the best weapon of defense for the independence of the country. India felt that she should not be afraid of other countries and their views. Nehru considered that the building up of armaments generated fear in the minds of people and nations:

This is a terrible thing, this fear complex that we see all over the world today... And he has noted more of it in Europe and America than in Asia; for it is in Europe and America that the so-called "have" nations are located and it is the "have" nations that are in dreadful fear of losing their possessions.²

²Range Willard, Jawaharlal Nehru's World View (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1961), pp. 24-25.

There is a singular difference between the ways in which the two countries view the problems of the Cold War. There is even a difference in the solution of Cold War problems, for example: the desire of the Indian people for immediate freedom for the rest of the Asian and the African colonial countries may be cited. Whereas the United States was prepared to use all her might to stop the advances of communism in Europe, she was also paying "lip-service" to the idea of freeing the people from colonialism. In fact, in the struggle between the countries of Asia and Western Europe over the freedom of the colonies, the United States seemed, in effect, to be on the side of the colonial powers during the period 1946-48. No doubt some sympathy existed for the freedom of the dependent peoples among non-official organisations and individuals in the United States, but the official attitude of the United States remained strictly non-interventionist. It was reported during World War II that the United States Government had drawn up a blueprint for a 'new deal' for the independence of colonies, a deal that would have helped them considerably in achieving their independence. But after the conclusion of World War II the United States seemed to accept in practice the legal argument that the colonial territories should be restored to their pre-war owners, namely the Colonial Powers, at least as a starting point for negotiations. The Colonial Powers showed no eagerness to negotiate with the nationalist leaders in their colonies, nor did they make any attempt to transfer power to the real leaders of the people.³

³K. P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs 1947-50* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 49.

The Great Freeze-up, 1945-49: During this period India's attitude concerning the problems of the Cold War facing Europe was in its formative years. Following independence, India was too much pre-occupied with problems at home -- communal riots, the influx of refugees from Pakistan, and the integration of the princely states -- to pay much attention to Cold War problems in Europe. For India the problems in Europe were far from home; thus, India remained a distant onlooker.

The United States was also occupied with stopping the Russian advances in Europe. But during this time the United States was not so much concerned with the problems of Asia as those of Europe. The days of communist advances in Asia -- the Korean war -- were far in the future. The birth of NATO (April, 1949) in Europe was some years away and that of SEATO and CENTO was much further off.

During this period, India's relations with the United Kingdom were close, in-as-much as Lord Mountbatten continued to be the Governor-General of India and many British military personnel were employed in the Indian Armed Forces. India's economic relations also remained close to Britain.

During the first two years of independence, India talked about non-alignment, but her foreign policy objectives mostly remained undeclared and hazy:

It was in France in the years 1947-49 that the word Neutralism first emerged and became widely used publicly. The French Neutralists straddled a wide segment of opinion and were far from agreed among themselves. At this time the word Neutralism became primarily associated with expressions of war-weariness, of pessimism, or nihilism, of distrust and dislike of alliance and indeed of all foreign policy, of passivity or je-m'en-fichisme (I could not care less-ism). In Europe generally professions of neutralism, however articulate,

were the concern of opposition to the formation of N.A.T.O. and apparently had no significant effect on policies. States either fell under Russian sway, became formal allies of America, or stayed isolated. In this latter class were Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland -- all neutrals of the Second World War -- and they were joined by Yugoslavia after its break with the Cominform in 1948.⁴

Thus, while neutralism was popular among certain sections of the French population and to a lesser extent among the British public, the official policy of both countries was in favor of the United States military build-up in Europe. Later on, when N.A.T.O. and S. E. A. T. O. were established, both -- Britain and France -- became members and continued their membership in spite of the internal changes in their governments. Differences with non-aligned nations did not prevent the British Government from continuing to work in close co-operation with India.

The prevailing concept of 'neutralism' in its infant years in Europe may have had some bearing on the American image of neutralism in later days, in India and other non-aligned countries. President Eisenhower's thinking might have been colored by his experience with European neutralism at the time he was in office. But in our analysis of India's neutralism, we must remember that it was a positive neutralism as opposed to the prevailing negative neutralism in Europe, particularly in France.

Constant Cold, 1949-53: By the end of 1949, the consolidation of the princely states in India had been completed, with the exception

⁴Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 33.

of Kashmir where a cease-fire was established through the efforts of the United Nations. The communal riots in the country and the influx of refugees from Pakistan had largely stopped. In 1949, India began to look around the world and found the focus of world attention shifted from Europe to Asia. With the Communists in power in China, the latter's subsequent occupation of Tibet, and the outbreak of war in Korea in June, 1950, India could no longer afford to be a distant onlooker. India's foreign policy at the time clearly indicated that she was in favor of non-alignment.

During this period India and the United States achieved a great deal of co-operation especially in the field of economics. However, serious differences arose between them over the solution of Far-Eastern and South-East Asian problems. In short, Indo-U.S. policies came into conflict over the following issues:

Korea: Over the best method of achieving a peaceful settlement in Korea, the crossing of the 38th parallel by U.N. forces and India's participation in the Korean Political Conference.

China: Over the recognition and admission of communist China to the United Nations, and the Formosa question.

Japan: Over the terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Pakistan: Over the inclusion of Pakistan in the Western Defense plans.

South-East Asia: Over the partly successful U.S. attempts to break up the 'no-war area' designated by India.⁵

In spite of differences in the approach of each to the problems facing the Far-East and South-East Asia, and in spite of disagreement on military and political problems, the relationship between the

⁵Jagdiah Chandra Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54 (Groningen, Djakarta: J. E. Walters, 1955), pp.121-22.

United States and India remained cordial. But worse was yet to come. Western European countries continued to work in close co-operation with the United States. This period marked a greater co-operation between Britain and India in dealing with the communist countries.

These years saw the heyday of the neutralism of European public opinion. Ironically, it was probably American enthusiasms for consolidating N.A.T.O. as a means of raising European morale and countering "creeping neutralism" -- the growth of neutralist feeling, sentiment, and ideas in a state whose foreign policy is not ostensibly or avowedly neutralist -- that gave European neutralism most succour. In retrospect, ideological neutralism still seems to have been an insignificant force in Europe and American fears of "creeping neutralism" exaggerated.⁶

Partial Thaw, 1953-57: It was during this period that the transfer of power in the United States from the hands of the Democratic to the Republicans occurred. This seems to have brought about many changes in American foreign policy of the time. At the helm of the American executive power was a conservative President. His greatest aid in foreign policy matters, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, considered neutralism immoral. In the opinion of Dulles there were only two kinds of nations -- friendly nations or enemy nations. His attitude was that the enemy of his enemy was a friend.

The Eisenhower-Dulles policies in foreign matters differed considerably from those of the Truman-Acheson Administration. Greater reliance was placed on military alliances. During this period America, aided at times by her chief allies Britain and France, seemed determined to extend the range and membership of her military alliances

⁶ Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 38.

and to give foreign aid only to allies, but then mostly for military purposes.⁷ The non-aligned nations were more interested in only economic aid. This period also marks the conclusion of the South-East Asian Defence Treaty in September 1954, the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956, the Suez Crisis in October 1956, the conclusion of the United States bilateral defence agreements with Formosa in December 1954. India played a prominent role in the aftermath of the Indo-China war in 1954; however, she refused to enter into any bilateral or collective defense agreements with the United States.

Thus, differences between India and the United States were not only over the forms of aid given or received. Even on most of the major issues of the time India refused to 'toe' the American line and followed an independent path instead. She treated the United States and the Soviet Union alike. Such an attitude of non-aligned India and other countries tempted Dulles to make his most notorious statement against neutralism in which he described it as: "an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances ... an immoral and a short-sighted conception."⁸

⁷ Ibid., p. 41. "Talking of the Russian policy, he says: "At the same time the Soviets, pursuing a 'new look' policy, began to try openly to encourage the spread of neutralism outside the Soviet bloc and to woo several leading neutralist nations with offers of aid, and, in certain respects, with diplomatic support. It seemed that just as the Americans were offering 'sworthe' and then only on condition that a state was, or became, a formal ally, the Soviets were offering 'ploughshares' to neutralist nations and were asking for no formal undertaking in return." Ibid.

⁸ John Foster Dulles, "The Cost of Peace," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV No. 886 (June 18, 1956), pp. 999-1000.

Even Nixon, the then Vice-President of the United States, on two occasions in Manila and in Karachi during his tour of Asia made critical remarks about the position taken by India in declining to join the United States-sponsored South-East Asia Treaty Organization.⁹

In December 1955, AFL-CIO President George Meany told the National Religion and Labor Foundations in a speech:

Nehru and Tito are not neutrals. They are aides and allies of communist imperialism -- in fact and in effect, if not in diplomatic verbiage.¹⁰

Soon afterwards the New York Times said editorially:

The joint communique (issued by Nehru and Bulganin, in Delhi) and Mr. Nehru's toleration of Soviet anti-Western attacks on Indian soil have aligned him closely [enough] with Soviet policies as to put a large question mark behind his professional neutrality.¹¹

We can see very easily that not only at the highest governmental level India's policy of non-alignment was being criticized but even by leading labor union leaders and newspapers. It is quite apparent from all this that public opinion in the United States during these years was very much against India's policy of non-alignment. In talking about prevailing public opinion, it is well not to ignore the rise of McCarthyism in the United States. Thus, public opinion may be an extension of the belief in guilt by association, from

⁹Vera Michalee Dean, "The 'Neutralist' against U.S.?" Foreign Policy Bulletin XXXVI No. 11 (February 17, 1957), p. 87.

¹⁰Marshall Windmiller, "America's Relations with India: A Re-appraisal," The Eastern Survey, XXV No. 3 (March, 1956), p.33.

¹¹Ibid.

domestic policy to the international field.

In a discussion of public opinion, it is also important to point out the analysis of Vera Micheles Dean. According to Dean, what American critics deplore when they speak of the attitudes of Tito or Nehru or Nasser is not neutrality as Grotius thought of it -- this is indeed obsolete -- but "neutrality." Neutrality, however, is not a legal concept. It can more accurately be described as a state of mind. The question, then, is -- a state of mind about what?

The state of mind of the United States can be regarded as contrasting communism with democracy.¹² Vice-President Nixon referred to this in his July 4, 1956, address on the 10th anniversary of the independence of the Republic of the Philippines at Manila.

But there is still another brand of neutrality that makes no moral distinction between the communist world and the free world. With this viewpoint, we have no sympathy.¹³

Dean did not agree with Vice-President Nixon's views. He said that Nixon's was not a clear test of neutrality. He (Dean) contended that Marshall Tito, a communist, has been a staunch opponent of Stalinism; Nehru, a Socialist, had fought against communists in India and was a supporter of democratic Britain in the Commonwealth. Nasser in Egypt, did not get along with communists in his own country.¹⁴

¹²Vera Micheles Dean, "What is U.S. Policy on Neutrality?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXXV No. 23 (June 18, 1956), pp. 183-84.

¹³Richard M. Nixon, "Our Partnership in Creating a World Peace," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV No. 890 (July 16, 1956), p. 94.

¹⁴Vera Micheles Dean, "What is U.S. Policy on Neutrality?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXXV No. 23 (June 18, 1956), p. 183.

To make matters worse, in the rest of Asia the American attempt to build up defense armaments against possible communist attacks further alienated other non-aligned nations, and official American spokesmen openly regarded most forms of neutrality with suspicion and dislike.¹⁵

But such misconceptions in the minds of the American people did not last long. The shadow of McCarthyism that swept through the United States receded as fast as it advanced. As for Dulles it is very difficult to say how much he believed what he said, or was it an emotional outburst? Indeed, one thing is certain, in the same speech he recognized the importance of continuance and enlargement of economic aid to the non-aligned nations. On June 9, 1956, at Iowa State University Dulles said: "It would be ironical if we should drop out of the field just at the time when the Soviet Union is moving into it."¹⁶ As we all know, during this particular period the Soviet Union increasingly began to give more economic aid to non-aligned countries and within a period of four years the Soviet Union increased it to One Billion Dollars. Vice-President Nixon did not go as far as Secretary of State Dulles in his support of economic aid, but he, too, recognized the lesser importance of military aid to match the new tactics employed by Soviet leaders in the post-Stalin era. On June 7, 1956, at Lafayette College, Easton, Pa., he

¹⁵Peter Lyon, Neutrality (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 45.

¹⁶John Foster Dulles, "The Cost of Peace," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV No. 889 (June 18, 1956), p. 1001.

said:

If it is made to appear that our primary concern is military hardware, we may find ourselves isolated in a world that has been convinced by the travelling salesmen of the Soviet Union selling other products.

What we face today is a new line which could be far more dangerous in the long run than the Stalin line of bluster and brute force. It is basically a war for men's minds, a struggle for their allegiance, and effort to win them peacefully to the Soviet camp.

In this struggle, ideas -- not guns or aircraft -- are the weapons. In this war, our armies wear the university cap and gown -- not the uniform of the soldier. Books and pamphlets, rather than tanks and battleships, will be decisive in this contest.¹⁷

The attitude of President Eisenhower at his Press conference on June 6, 1956, was more rational than his subordinates in-as-much as he expressed understanding, and even sympathy, for the problems of the non-aligned nations, reminding his listeners of the similar problems faced by the United States in her early history.¹⁸ However, this should not lead us to believe that he agreed with the non-aligned nations, but under the circumstances he was prepared to recognize their problems and difficulties.

The period brings out two important attitudes depicted by American leaders and their difficulties. The leadership had to combat public opinion under the pressure of McCarthyism and had to challenge the Soviet Union's attitude and tactics toward the non-aligned nations. The U.S. Administration recognized the need for

¹⁷Richard M. Nixon, "Peaceful Crusade for Freedom," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV No. 887 (June 25, 1956), p. 1043.

¹⁸"President Eisenhower's views on Neutrality," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV No. 887 (June 18, 1956), p. 1004 (White House Press release on June 7, 1956).

greater economic aid to non-aligned nations, but its greatest problem was to convince the people. A British professor, Lyon, analysed the situation in the following way: "By the middle of 1957 there was evidence of a far more balanced estimate than hitherto in influential American thought about Neutralism."¹⁹ This is as far as economic co-operation went, at the time, between the United States and the non-aligned nations.

In terms of military alliances, the non-aligned nations were prepared to co-operate with the United Nations but with no commitments to collective security systems outside the United Nations Security System such as SEATO, NATO or the Baghdad Pact. In the final analysis, the attitude of the U.S. administration was changing. The administration was beginning to regard non-aligned nations as helpful for the stabilization of the world community instead of being regarded as against the United States.

The relations with Britain can be summed up in the observations of the British Professor Lyon. During this period India worked in co-operation with Britain. Probably the Commonwealth ties helped where no conflicting interest arose, such as in the case of the Suez Canal Crisis.²⁰

Variable Weather 1957-December 1962: The first half of this period did not mark any radical departure from the previous period. However, the rivalry between the two big powers was

¹⁹ Peter Lyon, Neutrality (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 47.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 125.

increasingly complicated by a growing number of new states which were emerging and pursuing a policy of non-alignment. The days of the expansion of American influence abroad through military alliance were over, or at least receding. No new military alliances were formed during this period.

This period marks another radical change from the previous one in the world. A new and looser international system, more flexible and multilateral, had emerged and formal ties now seemed far less significant than hitherto:

Within both Cold War camps it became increasingly clear that military alliance now prescribed far less exclusive and comprehensive bonds than ever before. And as so many states were not members of Cold War alliance, less importance was attached to the mere fact of being outside certain military alliance and more to matters of general diplomatic relations and standing -- securing invitations to neutralist conferences and being recognized as "one of us" by neutralists.²¹

The U.S. administration was well aware of this changing attitude in the world. It was changing and molding itself to meet challenges of the time. But the attitude of the United States Congress hadly needed change because, it has persistently argued:

... countries should be entitled to receive assistance from the United States only if they clearly demonstrate, by their words and their deeds, that they support the free-world position.²²

The administration could not continue to ignore the increasing influence of neutralism among the newly-emerging countries. It was not only neutralism that was gaining ground. The shift in the Soviet

²¹ ibid., p. 51.

²² Francis O. Wilcox, "The Nonaligned States and the United Nations," Neutralism and Nonalignment, ed. Laurence W. Martin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 147.

policy toward the non-aligned nations was increasing the Soviet influence among them. From September 1 to 6, 1961, when the conference of the non-aligned nations was called at Belgrade, 28 nations from different parts of the world attended or sent observers.²³

The influence of non-alignment in the Latin American countries was yet very insignificant, inasmuch as only one Latin American country (Cuba) was a full fledged member at the Belgrade conference and only three Latin American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador) sent observers. But this was enough to alert the United States to make a radical departure from her attitude toward the non-aligned nations and the Latin American countries. Now the influence of neutralism was on her doorstep. Changes in Africa were too significant to be brushed aside without any heed. In 1960 sixteen African states became independent.²⁴ Thus, with almost all the Asian countries independent, the African nations progressively gaining their independence, and Latin American countries gradually coming under the spell of neutralism, it was increasingly difficult for Washington to continue to preach about the dangers of communism, especially when the Soviet Union was giving economic aid to the non-aligned nations.

²³ D.N. Malik, "Belgrade: New Phase," Outside the Contest, ed. K. P. Karunakaran (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1963), p. 216. (Nonaligned nations at the Belgrade conference as full members: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Countries represented by observers: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador.)

²⁴ Parmeshwaran N. Mair, "Neutralism - History, Ideology, Prospects," Outside the Contest, ed. K. P. Karunakaran (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1963), p. 42.

Not only was the influence of neutralism increasing, but India's stand on international issues was also considerably changed:

Since 1957 India had tended to be content with a rather quieter role internationally than hitherto; by contrast with either Egypt or Yugoslavia to be more moderate, less stridently radical and revisionist, even on anti-colonial issues. Thus contrasts were particularly evident throughout 1960-62 in the policies of these three states towards the problems arising from the civil war in the former Belgian Congo.²⁵

This period -- variable weather 1957-December 1962 -- marks some important changes; the increasing popularity of neutralism among the newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa and even some of the States of Latin America; the adoption of a relatively quieter role by India in international sphere, and lastly:

the tendency of conciliating the 'neutrals' went on in the United States and found a better expression during the closing years of the Eisenhower administration. Together they resulted in a cordial relationship between India and the United States.²⁶

The real credit for providing a dynamic leadership to the United States in the non-aligned nations went to President Kennedy. Under a dynamic leadership, the administration made more conscious efforts to conciliate the non-aligned nations' opinion than any previous administration or even the subsequent Johnson administration had made. Under President Kennedy's leadership the United States made a major departure in her relationship with India. The most notable and immediate changes were in the field of economic aid to India. For the first two years (1961-62) of the Kennedy administration India

²⁵ Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 127.

²⁶ Parameashwaran N. Nair, "Neutralism: History, Ideology, Prospect," Outside the Contest, ed. K. P. Karunakaran (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1963), p. 57

India received 980 million dollars in economic aid.²⁷ Unfortunately, Kennedy did not live long enough to bring about similar changes in the Congress, a fact which no doubt made the position of President Kennedy tough in retrospect, but he persisted in his efforts until his death. The following statement by Dean Rusk, on November 1961, throws some light on the change in the administration's position toward non-aligned nations:

They will say things from time to time which will annoy us. They will take points of view in particular questions which differ from ours. They will criticize us especially on certain points, sometimes in the most rigorous terms. But the test is whether they are trying to live out their own lives in the way in which their own people would like to have them shape it.²⁸

The above statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk marked a major departure in the outlook of the administration towards the foreign policies of the non-aligned nations. The Kennedy administration exhibiting a true democratic spirit, let the people of the non-aligned nations be the judge of their countries' foreign policy, as opposed to the Eisenhower administration which attempted to be the judge of the foreign policy pursued by the non-aligned nations.

Indo-American relations during the period 1947-62 are very well summed up by Heesler in the following words:

We can conclude Indo-U.S. relations during the period by saying that India and the United States have been suspicious and

²⁷ Government of India, External Assistance 1962 (Faridabad, India: Government of India Press, 1963), p. 2.

(Assistance provided during the First Five Year Plan was \$427.31 million. During the Second Five Year Plan, U.S. allocation of aid amounted to \$780.77 million.)

²⁸ New York Times, November 17, 1961, p. 2.

distrustful friends ever since India gained her independence in 1947. During the period India has maintained non-alignment. Seen through typical American eyes, it is a self-righteous neutralism that has often leaned unneutrally towards the Soviet bloc. In the days of John Foster Dulles, every able Secretary of State but also an unflexible moralist, [the] Americans usually proceeded on the principles that nations who are not for us are against us. Neutralism, in his lexicon, was immoral. And only with difficulty has the U.S. government come to take a more tolerant view of Free World countries embracing non-alignment of neutralism.²⁹

Communist Countries:

Among the Communist Countries there are two major nations, the Soviet Union and Communist China. Curiously, they both are neighbors of India. China shares a long and common border with India. At the time of India's independence the Communists had not yet gained control of mainland China, and the Soviet Union was the strongest and largest Communist country in the world. However, militarily, she was no match for the United States, and she had not yet exploded her first atom bomb. The United States had a monopoly of the atom bomb at the time of India's independence in 1947.

The Great Freeze-up, 1945-9: India attained her independence on August 15, 1947. At the time of India's independence, the Soviet Union began to look at India's moves with mistrust and suspicion. Soviet leaders suspected some kind of a secret deal between the Indian leaders and the British leaders. The New Times (Moscow), at the time analyzed the situation as follows:

Congressional leaders have made a deal with Anglo-American imperialism and Indian reactionaries to fight their own people.

²⁹William R. Hessler, "India as a Prospective Partner," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXX No. 2 (February, 1964), p. 73.

Now the struggle for the real independence of India for the interest of the labouring masses is continuing outside the Congress against it.³⁰

Thus the Russians went one step further than the Americans. America disliked the Indian attitude and at times referred to the Indian leaders as communist. But the Russians, besides calling the Indian leaders reactionaries, suspected them of making some kind of secret deal with the western powers. Thus, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, Indian leadership was acting as an enemy of her own people. Moscow sincerely believed that Nehru was directing his country's affairs with the support of the warmongers and trying to cut off the Indian people from the natural allies and liberty loving people.³¹

Constant Cold, 1949-53: During the second period the Soviet Union also continued to remain suspicious and hostile to India. A basic change in the Soviet attitude was visible in the last year of this period, only after the death of Stalin in 1952.

The nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party, held in 1952 during the last days of Stalin, did not even recognize India's independence. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned the movement for national liberation continued to be fought by the Indian people.³² Up to 1952, the relationship between the two countries -- India and

³⁰ Parameeswaran N. Nair, "Neutralism: History, Ideology, Prospects," Outside the Contest, ed. K. P. Karunakaran (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1963), p. 53.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Russia -- remained cold. The most radical changes were yet to come.

One important gain for the Soviet Union during this period was the territorial expansion in Asia, through the successful communist revolution in China. Communists were still reaping the fruits of revolution. It had no need for peaceful co-existence or peaceful changes.

Partial Thaw, 1953-7: A basic change in the Soviet attitude was, however, visible in 1953. This can be attributed partly to the clearer emergence of an 'independent' and 'non-aligned' policy and partly to the increasing divergence between the western-bloc countries and the non-aligned nations. It was also due to changes set in motion within the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin in 1952.

This period marks radical changes in Russian attitudes toward the non-aligned nations. In their new policy outlook they openly began to woo the non-aligned nations. This change can be illustrated by the importance the Soviet Union attached to the economic aid to the non-aligned nations. The Soviet Union began to increase this aid rapidly.

The relations between India and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and India and China on the other were improved considerably. India and China signed the Panchsheel agreement in 1955 at the Bandung conference, and the relationship between India and the Soviet Union was highlighted by the Krushchev-Bulganin state visit to India in 1955 to be followed by massive economic and technical aid to India. Commenting on the change in Soviet tactics, an Indian scholar, Devdutt, said:

There was a change in the character of Soviet policy, economic aid replaced military and diplomatic pressure. And in 1955 or a little earlier 'Soviet Russia decided to provide direct technical assistance to an under-developed country not within the orbit of Soviet political influence.' The non-aligned position of India facilitated the implementation of this policy and made it easier for Russia to give aid.³³

Ever since the beginning of economic and technical aid to India from the Soviet Union, diplomatic relations between the two countries have continually improved and have remained cordial to the present time, whereas the friendly relations between India and China that began in 1955, did not last long. This has to do with a shift in Chinese policy toward non-aligned nations, in general, and India in particular.

Variable Weather, 1957-December 1962: This period marks the successful launching of the Soviet Sputnik in October 1957. The Soviet scientific achievement seemed to have given the Russian leaders some self-confidence in the field of politics, and have prompted Khrushchev "to claim that this event had altered the power balance in the world."³⁴ In a sense this was true. The balance of power had not altered in favor of the Soviet Union, but the achievement raised Russia to a power level equal to that of the United States. Not only was the balance of power altered, but also the numbers of non-aligned nations were rapidly increasing,

³³ Devdutt, "India: National Interest," Outside the Contest, ed. K.P. Karunakaran (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1963), pp. 82-83.

³⁴ Peter Lyon, Neutrality (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 49.

and both super powers were facing increasing difficulties with their own allies. The allies wanted to be increasingly free. In short, the allies both of the East and the West were increasingly becoming (or trying to become) independent from the super powers. In the words of British professor Lyon:

A new and looser international system, more flexible and multilateral, was in being, and formal ties now seemed far less significant than hitherto.³⁵

The Soviet policy of giving economic aid to non-aligned nations made its modest beginning in 1954, and continued to find increasing support among Soviet leaders even during this period.

As for China, for the first two years of this period the Chinese attitude toward the non-aligned nations was friendly. However, with the passing of time, an Indian scholar said some changes began to appear, culminating in 1962 with China's attack on India's northern borders.

With assiduous care China had built up the foundation of a firm friendship with most of the Asian nations. But, by 1959-60, there was an apparent change in policy. As though by deliberate decision, China's relations with Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Yugoslavia and India -- the most important member of the non-aligned world -- showed evidences of sudden strain and deterioration. It is not impossible that there has been a reassessment in Peking that the period of giving tactical support to the non-aligned countries was over and that the time has come to expose 'the true class character' of the governments in these countries.³⁶

³⁵ Ibid., p. 51

³⁶ Parameshwaran N. Nair, "Neutrality: History, Ideology, Prospect," Outside the Context, ed. K.P. Karunakaran (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1963), pp. 55-56.

Such changes in Chinese thinking did not cause the Russians to change their basic attitude toward the non-aligned nations. On the contrary the attitudes of both these communist countries towards the non-aligned nations increasingly brought out ideological differences between them to an extent that a western scholar observed: "As a 'neutral' in the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Soviet Union has volunteered military supplies to India."³⁷

Non-aligned Nations

India fought almost a lone battle, in the formative years of the concept of non-alignment. Thus, the question of the attitude of other non-aligned countries did not arise. During these initial years Yugoslavia, too, followed a similar policy; however, the concept of non-alignment was yet too vague to deserve any compliment or criticism from another non-aligned country which was also groping in the darkness. By 1951 India had had enough opportunities to show the practicability of non-alignment in the international field. She had also by now decided to adhere to it and face the consequences.

In the fifties other marked changes were taking place. Many Asian countries were gaining independence from their colonial rulers. These newly-emerging countries of Asia had a dislike for communism and suspicion of the western powers. Naturally they began to find inspiration from India's policy of non-alignment, a policy which was independent of either of the power blocs. In short, in their minds India was also one of their kind.

³⁷George Liska, "Tripartite: Dilemmas and Strategies," Neutrality and Nonalignment, ed. Laurence W. Martin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 220.

During the fifties; India had gained enough self-confidence to get closer to the other Asian countries. The British scholar Lyon says:

From 1951 onward India had assiduously striven to build up close relations with a number of fellow neutralist states, and soon came to be widely regarded as the leader of the so-called Arch-Asian bloc in the United Nations.³⁸

During the late fifties and the early sixties most of the African countries had gained their independence and many of them were also drawn closer to non-alignment. But by now some changes were taking place in India's attitude along with the attainment of success:

Since 1957 India had tended to be content with a rather quieter role internationally than hitherto; by contrast with either Egypt or Yugoslavia, even on anti-colonial issues.³⁹

However, Nehru remained the undisputed leader of the non-aligned nations. Even at the first conference of the non-aligned nations, Tito and Nasser -- the initial sponsors of the conference -- sought close co-operation with Nehru.

But during this period, from 1957 onwards until the Chinese attack on India's northern border in 1962, India seemed less concerned with problems of colonialism and neo-colonialism. At the Belgrade conference India was primarily concerned with problems of international relations to war and peace.⁴⁰

³⁸ Peter Lyon, Neutrality (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 126.

³⁹ D. N. Malik, "Belgrade: New Phase," Outside the Contest, ed. K. P. Karunakaran (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1963), p. 191

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 197.

India had also been opposed to the idea advocated by President Nkrumah of Ghana of a third force. On this point President Nasser and Tito seemed to agree with Nehru for reasons of their own.

The opinion of different powers on India's policy of non-alignment till October, 1962, can be very easily summed up in the following words of an Indian scholar:

Until about 1955, the Communist bloc did not accept our non-alignment as genuine -- it considered it a mere facade for our de facto alignment with the West. Indeed, it went further in not categorically acknowledging our independence. Likewise, until very recently, the Western bloc did not acknowledge the integrity of our non-alignment policy; it thought that our policy was inclined in favour of the Communist bloc and was even "immoral." Both the blocs are now pretty vociferous about their respect for our non-alignment policy, but nobody can say with any certainty that either of them is sincere in its stand. All that one can say with certainty is that their present attitude to non-alignment is simply in furtherance of their permanent national interests as now conceived.⁴¹

⁴¹M. S. Rajan, "Chinese Aggression and the Future of India's Non-alignment Policy," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July - October, 1963), p. 124.

CHAPTER V

INDIA'S POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT - SINCE OCTOBER 1962.

As India was following the policy of non-alignment in world affairs with some degree of certainty for more than a decade-- 1947- 62, her popularity and weight as a non-aligned nation were increasing not only among the non-aligned nations, but also between the two power blocs and their respective allies. The first successful conference of the non-aligned nations was held in September 1961. Twenty five nations from different parts of the world participated in that conference, and some degree of homogeneity of ideas and convictions was achieved among them.

Just when things were going well for India and for the concept of non-alignment, China decided to attack India's northern border for the apparent reason of settling the Himalayan border, which, according to the Chinese, was drawn by the British Imperialists and needed to be resettled.

Since the Chinese thought that the border between India and China was the creation of Britishers and unjust to China, China could have forwarded her claim to India. Considering the fact that a cordial and friendly relationship existed between India and China, some kind of negotiations could have been carried out and at least an attempt made to attain understanding through negotiations. On the contrary, by such an unilateral act, the Chinese "converted a friendly country like India into one basically hostile to them and

united and determined against them..."¹

In fact, in October 1954, when Nehru visited Peking, he raised the question of the Chinese maps with Premier Chou En-Lai; he was told that they were old maps coming from Kuomintang days, and that the present Chinese authorities had no time to revise them. In 1956-57, the Chinese Premier, on a visit to India, himself told Nehru that though China did not like the McMahon Line and considered it illegal, that in view of the subsequent developments, the People's Republic of China was prepared to recognize it, and would be consulting the Tibetan authorities on the subject. According to the Indian Government, from June 28, 1955 to July 12, 1962, China made as many as thirty intrusions into Indian territory, and each time the Government of India protested against the Chinese action.²

On all these and many more occasions China had ample opportunity to protect India's contention or even to enter into negotiations. The question is why the Chinese chose to attack India and make an enemy out of a friend who not only recognized the People's Republic of China as the legal government of China, but later extended a hand of friendship and signed a pact of non-interference under the principles of Panchsheel and the Bandung spirit, in 1954.³

¹Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, XII No. 3 (April, 1963), p. 464.

²R. K. Patil, "The India-China Border Dispute," India Quarterly, XX No. 2 (April-June, 1964), pp. 157-58.

³Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, XII No. 3 (April, 1963), p. 457.

India also championed China's cause of membership and her rightful place in the United Nations. What happened to all this friendship? Was it forgotten, when the Chinese decided to attack India? If one were to look on the surface, one would very easily conclude that the Chinese attack on India was a result of their expansionist design to spread communism in Asia and the world through war and revolutions. American news media seemed to voice this opinion at the time of the Chinese attack on India, in 1962, and hoped for the sweeping modifications in India's foreign policy in general and India's policy of non-alignment in particular. This is as far as India's relations with China went before October 1962.

As early as October 1949, in his speech in the U.S. Congress, Nehru solemnly declared: "Whenever freedom and democracy are in jeopardy, the world will not find India neutral."⁴ Dulles said in his press conference in Delhi in June 1953 that he was convinced that "this country (India) was not a neutral in the conflict between democracy and totalitarianism."⁵ Such statements by Nehru, Dulles and other leaders, lead us to believe that, ideologically, India was sympathetic towards the West. It was only a case of military and diplomatic alignment with the West, an alignment which India has withheld ever since her independence. Such ideological alignment with the West, did not deter India, in the past, from criticising

⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Delhi 6: The Publication Division, 1961), p. 99.

⁵ Karunakar Gupta, Indian Foreign Policy: in Defence of National Interest (Calcutta: The World Press Private Ltd., 1956), p. 22.

the Western position on a number of issues. At the same time, not just any good causes induced India to support diplomatic moves by the West. This ideological alignment with the West cannot presuppose India's military or diplomatic support.

After the Chinese attack on India's northern border in October, 1962 the Indian commentator Sen said: "he (Nehru) declared that as regards China, India is not non-aligned."⁶ Does this statement by Nehru indicate any change in India's policy of non-alignment? According to Hessler's assessment, India's position in 1964 was:

As spelled out by a diversity of Indians, informed and outspoken in the main, the effect of the Chinese onslaught may be summarised under five headings: the effect on Nehru's leadership and image, the effect on India's sagging national unity, the effect on the Communist party in India, the changes resulting in military policy, and the changes -- less obvious but no less real -- taking place in foreign policy.⁷

Hessler remains as vague about changes in India's foreign policy as to the identity of informed and outspoken Indians. However, his article points in one definite direction the desirability of some kind of military partnership between India and the United States in the Indian Ocean. Sen seemed more specific when he said:

in contrast, he (Nehru) has sought alignment with both the United States and the Soviet Union in order to contain China in Asia.⁸

⁶ Chanakya Sen, "India and China: Response to Challenge," The World Today, XX No. 6 (June, 1964), p. 276.

⁷ William H. Hessler, "India as Prospective Partner," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXX No. 2 (February, 1964), p. 77.

⁸ Chanakya Sen, "India and China: Response to Challenge," The World Today, XX No. 6 (June, 1964), p. 277.

Sen, like Heesler, did not spell out in clear terms what in his view was the nature of the alignment that India sought with the Soviet Union and the United States. What kind of alignment was likely to take place?

Before we involve ourselves too deeply in what India did, or did not do to her foreign policy, let us examine the Chinese motives in attacking India.

There are some people especially in the western countries, who believe that the Chinese attacked India because she (India) was a non-aligned country. Four months after the attack at a CENTO meeting in Karachi, Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed the predominant American conclusion: "India's foreign policy of non-alignment had induced Communist Chinese aggression."⁹ But if that was the only reason for the Chinese attack on India, China would have also attacked Burma, a nation which is non-aligned and much weaker than India. On the contrary, with Burma, China settled her border dispute through negotiations, which she could have very easily done with India, or she (China) could have at least made an attempt to negotiate before taking an extreme step.

There is an element of truth in saying that the Chinese attacked India because she was a non-aligned nation. But that does not explain the whole truth. There are a number of other factors such as India's silent competition with China for the leadership of

⁹Cecil V. Crabb Jr., "The Testing of Non-alignment," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII No. 3 (September, 1964), p. 517. (He further stated that "the logical inference was that the Himalayan crisis demonstrated the bankruptcy of this policy for India and, *Pari Passu*, for other nations who espoused this philosophy.")

Asia, and at times of Africa. Mrs. Gandhi, India's Prime Minister, recalls her father (Nehru) expressing similar feeling at the Bandung Conference in 1955: "Maybe China does not want a partner for her in Asia."¹⁰ A second such factor is the large-scale economic and technical aid received by India, not only from the United States but also from the Soviet Union, and the Chinese differences with the Russians concerning the validity of such Russian aid to a non-communist country; India's exclusive pre-occupation with the human problems of poverty and illiteracy was such that she was content to assign a relatively low priority to defense requirements in the conventional sense.¹¹ All of this resulted in India's military weakness. There was also a close relation between China's Himalayan adventures and the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict.

Thus, the Chinese attack on India's northern border was not a result of only one factor. It was rather the cumulative result of many factors. There is also a widespread feeling that China's attack on India's border was more of an attempt to humiliate India and her policy of non-alignment in the eyes of newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa, rather than a genuine Chinese desire to settle the border dispute. Early in 1963, Indian political pundits, leaders, news media etc. felt that:

¹⁰ India News, March 4, 1966, p.1

¹¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, XIL No. 3 (April, 1963), p. 459.

Communist China had deliberately resorted to force in its border dispute with India in order to launch "an attack on non-alignment itself." Western and neutralist commentators alike agreed that Peking had seized upon border differences with India as a convenient pretext for the achievement of certain other diplomatic objectives at India's expense and to consolidate its position in Asia. Among China's aims seemed to be the goal of imparting a not easily forgotten lesson, which the most influential non-aligned state in world affairs, and all other states prone to follow Nehru's diplomatic example, would not easily forget. Thus one commentator was convinced that to a substantial degree, Chinese bellicosity was directed at India because that country had come to be widely regarded as "the voice of recurrent Asia, and even Africa... still another commentator attributed Chinese motives in the Himalayan affairs to a determination to weaken "the will of India, of confusing its sense of identity," by raising questions about the adequacy and future of its internal and external policies.¹²

From the writing of Cecil Crabb, a Rockefeller Foundation Research Scholar, it seems that the Chinese carried on a propaganda attack against India's policy of non-alignment just prior to their military attack on India's northern border on October 20, 1962:

The conviction that Mao Tse-tung's regime deliberately sought to discredit and undermine the concept of non-alignment both in Asia and on the global scale, in turn derived from several underlying beliefs about Chinese diplomatic motivations. For many months prior to the Himalayan crisis, Chinese policymakers had carried on an intensive, increasingly intemperate, propaganda campaign against Nehru's government, a prominent theme of which was that New Delhi's professed non-alignment was a sham and merely a thinly disguised ploy to conceal India's growing ties with, and dependence upon, 'Western imperialist.' Mao Tse-tung's government said India's Foreign Minister had repeatedly contended that "our policy of non-alignment is hypocrisy, that we are already aligned to the Western bloc, and this (Himalayan) war... is induced by the Western bloc, and we are using it to exploit the poor people of our country."¹³

¹²Cecil V. Crabb Jr., "The Testing of Non-alignment," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII No. 23 (September, 1964), p. 523.

¹³Ibid., p. 524.

These and other widespread beliefs in the diplomatic service and governmental circles lead us to the Chinese Government's hidden intention to destroy non-alignment not only in India, but the whole concept of non-alignment in the world. By destroying non-alignment in India -- the leading non-aligned nation in the world -- the Chinese Communists would thus hit at the foundation, or the root, of non-alignment.

Our main concern in this report is that of finding how successful the Chinese were in their probable attempt to destroy the concept of non-alignment, not only in India but in other Asian and African countries as well. Assuming the validity of our assumption the Chinese must have calculated that an attack on India would definitely bring an end to India's policy of non-alignment. They might have also calculated that such a disillusionment in India-- with non-alignment -- would have a chain reaction among other non-aligned nations, a chain reaction that would lead to the complete elimination of the concept of neutralism from the world. Lastly, the disillusion among the non-aligned nations would bring victory for the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Before going into the success or failure of the alleged Chinese belief and strategy, we will examine what belief motivated the Chinese to take such an enormous risk.

Earlier in Chapter II, we saw that India's policy of non-alignment is considered by India to be in her national interests. These national interests do not appear to have been materially changed by the Chinese attack on India's northern border. In the past the

competition between India and China was relatively quiet, and mainly in the economic field. This quiet competition is not over, but one more element -- the military strength of both countries -- has been added to this competition. From the Chinese victory in 1962, we learned that China is a superior military power. We also learned that China wants to spread communism in Asia through wars of liberation. Accordingly:

Peking prefers to see all states in the continent (Asia) aligned. A non-aligned country has no chance to become communist. An aligned country does. And Peking, it should be remembered, is actively seeking converts.¹⁴

While Moscow believes that countries like India are politically independent and therefore capable of being pushed through other means onto the path of what is called Marxist-Leninist development, Peking doggedly contends that these (non-aligned countries) could be converted to the right path only by wars of liberation...¹⁵

Curiously enough the United States, a rival of the Soviet Union, feels uneasy about Soviet intentions and her (Russian) economic and technical inroads into the non-aligned nations. The irony of the situation is that India still finds dangers in alignment and feels safety in non-alignment.

What, in fact, did happen to the concept of neutralism in general and India's policy of non-alignment in particular? Let us take a look around the world and note what changes the Government India made in India's foreign policy, immediately, during, and

¹⁴ Mario Rossi, "U.S. Threat: Fuel for Peking," The Christian Science Monitor, (December 8, 1965), p. 2.

¹⁵ Cecil V. Crabb Jr., "The Testing of Non-alignment," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII No. 23 (September, 1964), p. 532.

after the attack. Karunakaran, a reader in South Asian History at the University in Delhi, concluded:

Obviously, it has not led to a radical revision of India's foreign policy, particularly in relation to India's non-alignment in the "cold war." On the contrary, India's Prime Minister and other official spokesmen have repeatedly asserted that India stands firmly by non-alignment.¹⁶

He also made his observation of public opinion within the country in the following words:

It should also be noted that there was restraint in the criticism of the Government. Of course, there were exceptions of a hysterical outburst and attempts on the part of some frustrated individuals and parties to make political capital for themselves out of the nation's disaster. But they were rare exceptions and in the country in general their attempts stood exposed.¹⁷

Americans, like the Chinese, anticipated major changes in India's policy of non-alignment. This was probably the first major international event of recent times upon which both the United States and China seemed to agree. Of course both countries had their own different reasons for such a deduction. We have already examined the Chinese conclusion. According to Cecil Crabb:

it was an inherent American skepticism about non-alignment generally that had tended to focus upon the government of India, fountainhead of the postwar neutralist movement.¹⁸

He further stated that during the last twenty years on a number of occasions, at least on major world issues, "Nehru's government gave

¹⁶ K.P. Karunakaran, "Impact of the Sino-Indian Conflict on the Indian Political Scene," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1963), p. 99.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 520.

sufficient cause for irritating American sensibilities and arousing American ire."¹⁹ According to an Indian diplomat, the Kennedy administration sought essentially the same goal as Eisenhower and Dulles: "a closer identification with the West to the extent that New Delhi would not be able to escape the entanglements of the cold war."²⁰ Therefore, during Kennedy's time the administration was more sympathetic and tolerant of neutralism, and its need for economic assistance.

The second reason Americans anticipated a sweeping modification in India's policy of non-alignment was born of "their unconcealed desire for such changes."²¹ This expectation was re-inforced by an initial Indian reaction to Chinese aggression. Nehru confessed that we have been "living in an artificial atmosphere of our own and we have been shocked out of it..."²² The question was raised, therefore, what Nehru meant by 'artificial atmosphere.' Did Nehru mean the atmosphere created by the non-alignment or failure to maintain a balance of power in that part of Asia, or appeasement of Communist China and at the same time the maintenance of military impotence?

Lastly, the American observers failed to realize that the

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., p. 521.

²² New York Times, November 4, 1962, p. 1.

border crisis with China in 1962 did not actually pose a new problem to Indian policy-makers:

The border crisis with Red China had been accelerating for at least five years; and the relationship between India's policy of non-alignment and rising Sino-Indian tension had been under continual evaluation and re-evaluation for many months. On several occasions in this period, Indian officials had reiterated that mounting difficulties with Red China required no fundamental readjustment in the policy of non-alignment.²³

Indian officials, on the contrary, not only reiterated their faith in neutralism before the October 20, 1962 showdown with the Chinese, but they continued to proclaim that they neither needed nor desired to change the policy. In April, 1963, referring to the Chinese victory in the Himalayas, Nehru said:

Whatever temporary military success the Chinese may have gained by their aggression on India, I think it would be correct to say that they converted a friendly country like India into one basically hostile to them and united and determined against them. But the policy of non-alignment is not broken down and stands confirmed.²⁴

He even asked the (Indian) critics of the theory of non-alignment at the critical time of testing:

Are we to say that when we were safe we waved our flag bravely, but when danger comes our hands shiver, our feet become cold and we want to shelter under somebody's umbrella? Is that how a proud nation behaves? I am surprised at this kind of argument.²⁵

²³ Cecil V Crabb Jr., "The Testing of Non-alignment," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII No. 3 (September, 1964), p. 521-22.

²⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, XII No. 3 (April, 1963), p. 464.

²⁵ Cecil V. Crabb Jr., "The Testing of Non-alignment," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII No. 3 (September, 1964), p. 522.

On February 25, 1963, he told the Indian Parliament:

If we meet China, we defend the very principles for which we stand and if we give up those principles in meeting China what do we defend? Just a physical patch of territory.²⁶

The question that now arises exactly what did Nehru mean by 'artificial atmosphere'. If it were the atmosphere created by non-alignment, then it is sure that India would have given up the policy of non-alignment, if not immediately after the Chinese attack in 1962 then gradually over a period of time. Statements made by Nehru suggest that India had no such intention. If the policy were not changed during Nehru's life time, it would definitely have been changed after his death in 1964. If one were to look at the statements made by other Indian leaders, after Nehru's death, it would be seen that they seem to reaffirm faith in the policy of neutralism.

On August 15, 1964, former Prime Minister Shastri, in his independence day message to the nation, reaffirmed his faith in non-alignment in the following words:

We will steer clear of alignment of power blocs and pursue an independent policy. We adhere to the policy of non-alignment, co-existence, disarmament, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism.²⁷

On November 26, 1965, India's External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh said in the Lok Sabha: "Our foreign policy underwent the severest test in the last few months and our basic principles stood it well."²⁸

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ India News, January 21, 1966, p.5.

²⁸ Ibid., November 26, 1965, p. 2.

Let us pause for a moment and speculate. If instead of sticking to neutralism, India had renounced it (non-alignment), what might have been the consequences? Rajan feels that if India had given up non-alignment, this:

would not only confirm persistent Chinese propaganda that we have not been genuinely non-aligned all these years, but also give them an additional and dangerous handle against India in the rest of the world.²⁹

This and other reasons may have prompted Nehru and after him, Shastri and Mrs. Gandhi, to reaffirm their faith in non-alignment, in spite of the continued military threat from the Chinese on India's northern border.

On the other hand, if the 'artificial atmosphere' was created by a failure to maintain a balance of power in Asia, then India did not need to give up her policy of neutralism, because non-alignment did not stop India from arming the country. The most important question now before us is, why did India remain a weak nation militarily? Was it by choice or by oversight? Charles Heimsath says that:

Chinese military movements on the Himalayan frontier continued from 1954 (the year of the Panch Shila accord) and increased sharply in 1958 and 1959, when internal disorders in Tibet led to extreme measures against Tibetan people... Chinese road-building activities in Indian-claimed Kashmir and border clashes in the late summer and autumn of 1959 finally alerted the Nehru government to the immediate and long range dangers from China. But no effective military steps were taken by India to secure its control over the North East Frontier Agency or to reassert authority over the traditionally non-administered Aksai Chin region of Ladakh in Kashmir. If India could be said to have had

²⁹M. S. Rajan, "Chinese Aggression and the Future of India's Non-alignment Policy," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1965), p. 121.

a farsighted plan for checking China in the Himalayas and Chinese influence in Southern Asia, that plan must have been to develop the industrial resources of the country in order to support a military establishment powerful enough to hold border areas and an economic policy which would attract the under-developed countries in Asia. But immediate measures could accomplish little to offset Chinese moves; the strengthening of the border posts and the diplomatic talks with Peking which began in 1960, provided no real basis for Indian confidence.³⁰

From the above comments, Charles Hsimeath leads us to believe that India had long term plans (see below comments by Sen) to build up defence potentials. However, the plan failed to provide any insurance against possible military adventures by the Chinese. If India's failure to defend herself against China was mainly due to India's military weakness, and if such military weakness was not caused by non-alignment, then India did not need to give up her policy of non-alignment, but within these broad principles to make necessary changes in the internal structure, specifically in the sphere of economic development and the building up of the nation's defence potentials. India's Foreign Minister called these changes a new look and new orientation in India's foreign policy:

While we must take into account change and alignment of forces in the world, in the formulation and execution of our foreign policy there was no need for any fundamental change in the basic policy. Within this broad policy we could make whatever adjustments were required in the national interest.³¹

³⁰ Charles H. Hsimeath, "Nonalignment Reassessed: The Experiences of India," Foreign Policy in the Sixties, ed. Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 53-54.

³¹ India News, November 26, 1965, p. 2.

What are these adjustments? Are they mainly in the sphere of defense? Is a higher percentage of the Indian budget expenditure to be spent on defense? Will this necessitate changes in the basic industrial and economic complex of the country? Sen, an Indian commentator on current affairs, says:

In contrast to pressure upon the Government from a powerful section of the press to seek massive assistance from the United States, the Government's line of thought at the present moment seems to be that, while essential help in the form of transport and fighting equipment must be accepted, India should continue to try to build up an industrial base in order to meet her own defence requirements. This was the plan devised by Mr. Krishna Menon with Mr. Nehru's full approval; and although Mr. Menon is no longer in the Government, his ideas on the production of defence equipment remain. It is generally recognized in India that too great a dependence on the United States for arms would jeopardize the country's independence in both its domestic policy of building a socialist economy and its foreign policy of non-alignment. There is no inclination in New Delhi to abandon the prospect of Soviet assistance, nor to lose the political advantages which a policy of non-alignment seeks to obtain. Moreover, for the present the U.S. Government does not seem to want India to lose favour with Moscow; nor does the Soviet Government appear to object very strongly to India's acceptance of limited quantities of defensive weapons from the United States.

So long as the U.S. Government insists on a settlement of the Kashmir problem as a condition for large-scale and long-term military aid to India, the chances of military collaboration between India and the United States must necessarily remain limited. Equipment supplied by the United States and Britain at the time of the Chinese emergency, valuable as it is, will not make much difference from the point of view of a long term arms build-up. And if joint commonwealth -- U.S. arms aid over an unspecified period is not to exceed 100 million dollars, as reports from Washington suggest, the burden of building up a sufficient military "deterrent" to China (which seems to be Mr. Nehru's objective over the next five years) will fall squarely on India's own shoulders.³²

³² Chanakya Sen, "The Challenge to India's integrity," Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman (Belmont, California: Wedsworth Publishing Company Inc., 1965), p. 285-86.

From the above statements by Indian leaders and observations by Indian and foreign scholars, it seems that India refused to join any power bloc, or discard the policy of non-alignment after the Chinese attacked India's northern border in October, 1962. What attitudes were characteristic of other nations in the world at large and the United States and Great Britain, (who supplied the emergency military assistance).

According to Sisir Gupta's analysis two distinct attitudes can be found in the United States concerning India's policy of non-alignment at the time of Chinese attack on India. First, leading journalists like Walter Lippmann predicted:

They (the non-aligned) will no longer have India as their leader and their spokesman and their example, for India will no longer be unaligned.³³

Rosenthal of the New York Times, wrote from New Delhi in a dispatch:

Non-alignment is not changed, he (Nehru) says. But it is changed, and he now follows a policy which his country no longer really trusts, but which it allows him, as one allow an aged parent, the privilege of leafing through an old souvenir album.³⁴

These initial American reactions were "based on the assumption that the Soviet Union had forsaken India."³⁵ Second, the liberals in the United States did not get carried away, and continued to emphasize

³³ Sisir Gupta, "The United States' Reaction," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1963), p. 59.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid. (The Dravada editorial of 25 October was widely published in the American press and the justifiable conclusion drawn about Soviet unwillingness at that stage to estrange China. Also reports from various world capitals began to circulate that the MIG deal had been cancelled. To some newspaper analysts, this appeared as one more instance of Soviet perfidy; to others, like Walter Lippmann this

their faith in India's policy of non-alignment. Within the American administration the liberal view seems to have prevailed which may be illustrated by the following analysis by Cecil Crabb:

From the very inception of the Himalayan crisis, therefore, American officials stated categorically that they did not want New Delhi to forsake non-alignment, nor was there any official American encouragement to the government of India to request a Western Security guarantee.³⁶

Averell Harriman, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, was the first American official to speak openly in favor of India's policy of non-alignment. He stated:

that it was good for India, and for the West, that she (India) kept up her friendly relation, with the Soviet Union. Liberal elements in the United States quickly endorsed this view.³⁷

The author goes on at length to explain the Indo-Soviet relationship and concludes:

The complex nature of the problem was fully taken into account and as Mr. Harriman made it clear, the Indian policy of befriending the Soviet Union was no longer regarded as suicidal naivete.³⁸

A dispatch from Washington by the correspondent of a prominent Indian newspaper (Indian Express) summarized the Kennedy Administration's attitude on this issue by saying:

indicated the inability of the Soviet Union to influence or control China.) Ibid.

³⁶ Cecil V. Crabb Jr., "The Testing of Non-alignment," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII No. 3 (September, 1964), p. 528.

³⁷ Sis'r Gupta, "The United States' Reaction," International Studies V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1963), p. 60.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 63.

"We may expect the Americans to do nothing to encourage us to internationalize or extend the conflict in the Himalayas. Like us, the Americans would avoid escalation." On the basis of public and official statements in the United States, this observer concluded: "When we tell them that we do not seek tactical nuclear weapons, the Pentagon hears a sign of relief. When we proclaim that we have adequate manpower and we need only weapons Americans say 'Thank God.'"³⁹

Alternatively Moscow maintained neutrality in favor of China, at the time of border crisis and told parties to the border crisis that the fighting was harmful to the economy of both the parties. There was criticism of the Soviet attitude from many quarters of Indian life, in the dispute between India and China. However, for the purpose of this discussion it will suffice to say that with the passage of time Moscow was convinced of India's continued non-alignment, despite emergency military assistance from the United States to the tune of 80 million dollars. A leading theoretician and a member of the Central Committee of CPSU, indirectly attacked China for committing aggression on India:

...one could preach about the struggle against imperialism and simultaneously carry on provocative action which do not strengthen but only undermine the causes of peace and socialism.⁴⁰

The Soviet criticism of the Chinese action was very limited. But by continued economic and military assistance to India, the Soviet Union made it clear to the Chinese leaders that Moscow adheres to her ideological conviction that the best way to steer the non-aligned nations to communism is through means other than wars of

³⁹Cecil V. Crabb Jr. "The Testing of Non-alignment," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII No.3 (September, 1964), p. 528-29.

⁴⁰R. Vaidyanath, "The Reaction of the Soviet Union and other Communist States," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1963), p. 72.

liberation. Whereas:

Peking advocates revolutionary action in the Asian subcontinent. It has no use for co-existence. The latter applies in the relations among governments while revolution is meant for the masses. That is why Peking is interested in the impact of its policy upon the masses far more than upon the governments.⁴¹

No doubt the primary aim of Moscow like that of Peking remains the same; the spread of communism in the world. But the method to be employed and the emphasis put on the means to be employed differ. While Peking wants revolutions and wars of liberation, Moscow seems content with a slow process of economic aid. In the final analysis one thing remains: In the eyes of American and Russian leaders, India is still a non-aligned nation, and her foreign policy is an independent one.

We have seen that the leaders of the two big powers have regarded India as a nation still non-aligned. Let us also examine the views of leaders of the other non-aligned nations. What was their reaction? Egypt seemingly in the fore-front affirms that:

New Delhi's acceptance of Western arms-aid did not violate "the spirit and canon of non-alignment." Daily Nepali expressed it, "that Chinese policy-makers intended to inflict a severe blow to (the neutral side and weaken it thereby." Under these conditions, this source believed that "whatever India is doing for her defence (including the acquisition of Western Arms) by sticking to her neutrality strengthens to a great extent the cause of neutral nations..." Arab sources, like the Syrian Journal, Al Monar, believed that Peking was intent upon "killing the Bandung spirit and non-alignment"; Al Akhbar interpreted Mao Tse-tung's thrust into

⁴¹ Mario Rossi, U.S. Threat: Fuel for Peking?" The Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 1965, p. 2.

India as a deliberate "blow to the concept of non-alignment."⁴²

Against this background the non-aligned nations have urged China to settle her differences with India through negotiations. Even six of the non-aligned nations -- Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and Egypt -- have made certain proposals, known collectively as the Colombo proposals, in an effort to restore peace in the Himalayas. In essence the Colombo proposals:

- 1) barred India from re-occupying some 43 border posts in the Western Himalayas; 2) required Red China to withdraw twelve and one-half miles in Ladakh, while prohibiting India from re-occupying this territory; and 3) reorganized the McMahon line in the Eastern Himalayas as the cease-fire boundary line between India and Red China.⁴³

We shall not enter into the merits or demerits of the Colombo proposals, since it is not important for the purpose of our discussion. What we are concerned about is the attitude of the non-aligned nations, toward India's status as a non-aligned country after the Chinese attack on India's northern border, and what effect it had on China. According to an American scholar:

In company with many American observers, Chinese officials had badly miscalculated the effects of their attack upon India. The Colombo meeting made abundantly clear that -- after a period of initial shock during which the future of non-alignment seemed highly uncertain -- neutralist states not only were determined to remain outside cold war power blocs, but they also were resolved to use the Sino-Indian crisis to demonstrate the value of the neutralist

⁴² Cecil V. Crabb Jr., "The Testing of Non-alignment," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII No. 3 (September, 1964), pp. 522-24. (Indian commentators linked Western arms-aid to the "lend-lease" which America supplied to Britain and Russia before Pearl Harbor). Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 534.

philosophy. Far from being stampeded into joining a Western Alliance system, or possibly in some cases being intimidated into accepting docilely a satellite position in communist orbit, neutralist nations both applauded the Indian decision to hold onto its non-alignment policy and revealed that their own dedications to the neutralist precept had not been impaired.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 537.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

We have already established in Chapter II that India's policy of non-alignment was rationalized to a large extent, as being a policy of self-interest. At the time of her independence India looked at two world powers, hostile to each other, well-armed -- equipped with destructive weapons that India herself could not possess for a long time to come. She calculated that to be attacked by either of these powers would be disastrous for her. She would, therefore, refrain from provoking either of the two to attack her. India also felt that her joining either of these two coalitions, which were fairly evenly matched with hydrogen and atom bombs, would upset the balance of power. Therefore India's joining one side or the other, "might encourage either side to wage a war out of fear or confidence, upsetting the material and moral balance."¹ While an even balance prevailed, India could help maintain that balance by keeping away and also by playing the role of mediator. She herself did not fear aggression from either the East or the West. If by any chance, the unexpected happened and India was attacked by the Communist

¹Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Delhi 6: The Publication Division, 1961), p. 26.

bloc, the West would come to her aid in any event. Military air lifts by the United States and Great Britain at the time of the Chinese attack on India's northern border in October 1962, confirmed this assumption. On the other hand, the chances of a Western attack on India, unless India was aligned with the Communist bloc, were too remote, because India had been maintaining close relations with the Western powers short of military alignment.

Thus, India showed a possible chance of remaining non-aligned in the Cold War before October 1962 under the then prevailing military and political situation. India also felt that she would not be promoting her security by joining either of the blocs, nor would she in that case be able to fulfil the basic aim of her foreign policy of non-involvement in a world war. A view of the prevailing Cold War situation looked at through Indian glasses, India's policy of non-alignment seemed to be in the interest of India.

The Chinese attack in October, 1962, on India's northern border brought criticism of the policy of non-alignment from some quarters of Indian life.

... there was no acceptance of the "cult of personality" and individuals belonging to various parties criticized Nehru boldly and freely. Very few went so far, as some Swatantra Party leaders to say that a country needed a war-time leader, who should be different from a peace-time leader; but many exerted successful pressure on the Prime Minister to change his Defence Minister.²

After the attack the critics of the policy of non-alignment felt that

²K. P. Karunakaran, "Impact of the Sino-Indian Conflict on the Indian Political Situation," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1963), p. 100.

the policy of non-alignment would not serve India's national interest. They also felt it would be best for India, in the light of the new situation developing to formally draw nearer to Western alliance. There were still others who felt that India should enter into a dual alliance with the United States and the Soviet Union.

However, from the statements of prominent Indian leaders it seemed that India had decided to remain non-aligned. Now the important question is, whether or not the Chinese aggression on India's border called for a re-orientation in India's policy of non-alignment? The critics of the policy felt that India needed some re-orientation, whereas the Indian leaders who were actually involved in the policy decisions at the administrative level, felt it did not. But these two views in themselves do not solve the problems India is facing and likely to face in the years ahead. There are many aspects of the problem, a problem which needs to be examined before a definite answer can be reached.

Sisirrajan Shah, a professor from the State of Bengal, feels that the answer to the above question will depend on the following three questions:

- (i) whether our (India's) national interests have changed,
- (ii) whether non-alignment has proved to be an inadequate means of achieving them, and (iii) whether alignment is likely to achieve them better.³

The answer to the first question will of course depend on

³Sisirrajan Shah, "A Re-appraisal of Non-alignment," The Calcutta Review, CLXXV No. 1 (April, 1965), p. 20.

What India's national interest was before October, 1962. In the second chapter (page 34) of this report we have listed the aims of India's foreign policy. Let us review them once more. They were:

- 1) non-involvement in a Third World War.
- 2) Development of Indian economy and for that purpose keeping open all channels of international trade and aid.
- 3) Maintenance of India's independence in the sphere of external affairs.
- 4) Winning of international support on the Kashmir question.
- 5) Integration of the French and Portugal settlements with the Indian Union.
- 6) Securing a fair treatment and the dignity of Indians settled abroad.
- 7) Championship of the cause of colonial people.
- 8) Abolition of racial discrimination everywhere, particularly in South Africa.
- 9) Creation of the cause of consultative machinery in co-operation with neighbouring and other Asian countries.⁴

Have any of these aims changed since the Chinese aggression in October 1962? No doubt one or two of them have already been achieved. The rest of the aims remain to be solved. Since October 1962, an additional one can be added to the above list, namely, securing or defending India's northern border from future Chinese invasions.

However, we can say that in general India's national interests have remained the same. Given this, the next most important question is whether or not non-alignment will be able to serve such interests better. The answer to this question is also very hard to determine. At the time of the emergency in October, 1962, India's non-alignment did not prevent the United States and Great Britain from helping India

⁴Jagdish Chandra Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54 (Groningen, Djakarta: J.B. Walters, 1955), p. 61.

with military equipment. Further, these two countries did not demand from India any promise of alignment as a price for such assistance. Even the Soviet Union later on kept her promise of supplying MIGs to India. There is no sign of a possible reduction in economic aid from either the United States or the Soviet Union. In both these countries, there exists a tremendous amount of goodwill for India.⁵

Thus one of the aims of India's foreign policy, the developing of the Indian economy and for that purpose keeping open all channels of international trade and aid, has been served by non-alignment before as well as after October, 1962. Would this aim be served if India decides to align with the United States? Would the Soviet Union continue to give economic aid to India if this were to happen? On the other hand, would the United States continue to give economic assistance to India if she (India) is aligned with the Soviet Union? The answers to the above questions are difficult to determine since it is more a question of hypothesis rather than of fact. However, one thing is certain. If India does decide to align, it will most likely be with the Western alliance system or with the United States in a bilateral agreement. Such an alliance and/or agreement will have far reaching effects:

- (a) the Soviet Union will be against us. Is it not prudent at this juncture at least to keep the Soviet Union on the side of benevolent neutrality in the struggle with China? (b) It will sap the vitality of the nation by transferring a vital function of the defence of our territory to foreign personnel and resources.⁶

⁵ Sisirrajan Shah, "A Re-appraisal of Non-alignment," The Calcutta Review, CLXXV No. 1 (April, 1965), p. 20.

⁶ Ibid.

Perhaps it will help us to examine the desire of the United States to accept India as an aligned country. John Galbraith, American Ambassador to India expressed the American opinion on alignment four months after the Chinese attack on India in a speech for the Indian Council for World Affairs:

But just to be wholly clear let me say that we have no interest in extending our system of military alliance... And neither are we in the market for military bases. For years we have been withdrawing from various overseas installations... The notion that we seek new ones in India is rather silly... So if next week you were to propose a full scale defensive arrangement to Washington with troops, depots, joint command, and all of the paraphernalia of common defence we would almost certainly have to ask you to reconsider. And if any such treaty were presented to the Senate of the United States... it would, I am afraid, be overwhelmingly defeated.⁷

The above words of the Ambassador leave no doubt that the United States is not interested in establishing military bases in India. Yet, this should not lead any one to believe that in the future India should depend on the Soviet Union exclusively for military equipment. India can obtain a wide range of military equipment from the United States.

In the second chapter of this report we discussed a country's foreign policy, saying that to a large extent foreign policy depends on internal economic policy. We know that India follows a mixed-economic policy for developing India's economy. We know that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union follows a similar economic policy. We also know that since the Chinese attack in October 1962

⁷M. S. Venkatramani, "India and the United States: Some Issues Raised by Recent Development," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1963), p. 135.

India has made no attempt to change this economic system. A change is not probable in the near or the distant future. Thus for the success and continuation of India's present economic system, India should continue to receive economic aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Since foreign aid had become a vital necessity for our economic development, it was both desirable politically not to depend upon aid from one bloc only, and profitable to be able to get it from more than one source. A policy of non-alignment in world affairs cannot be effective, enduring and genuine, unless its economic basis is diversified.⁸

Therefore, the policy of non-alignment has helped India to continue with the kind of economic system (mixed-economy) India desires. In other words, she has kept open all channels of international trade, particularly those conducive to the growth of a mixed economy. Since the Chinese attack in October, 1962, India has not shown the slightest intention of making any changes in her economic system. Thus, economically speaking, it is not advisable at this stage for India to seek alignment with either the United States or with the Soviet Union. At this stage of India's development, no Indian government can afford to underestimate the importance of economic aid. Also from the purely selfish aspect of economic needs, it is important for India to continue to receive economic aid from both bloc nations. Karunakaran, an Indian scholar, puts it this way:

By extending firm on non-alignment, the Indian Government saved not only their foreign policy but also their basis

⁸ M. S. Rajan, "Chinese Aggression and the Future of India's Non-alignment Policy," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October 1963), p. 117.

economic policy and the internal political structure of the country, because they were all interconnected.⁹

Military alignment, at this stage, does not seem advisable unless India wants to make the necessary economic changes as well. To many in India, India's mixed economic system seems ideal for the country, not only for economic reasons but also for political reasons. However, we should not overlook what India will do if the Chinese decide to strike again with their superior military might.

How will she defend herself?

The above question has two sides to it: (1) the immediate defense potential and (2) the long term defense plans of India. Is India planning to depend permanently on outside help for defense of her territory? If that is the case, the answer is very simple. She may sign a defense pact with one of the superpowers (most likely the United States), and leave the matter in the hands of the United States. On the other hand if India wants to defend her territory singly then there is a need to survey the present military needs and to find ways of financing them. There is also a need to evaluate her future needs in general and the ways of meeting them. For these purposes a greater portion of the budget must be allocated to build plants to manufacture military equipment. Lastly, there should be a deadline set to achieve complete independence or self-sufficiency, not only in the military but also in the economic field.

The above discussion is important because the defense of

⁹K. P. Karuankaran, "Impact of Sino-Indian Conflict on the Indian Political Scene," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1963), p. 102.

India against the Chinese or any other power is as important as any other aims of India's foreign policy. Let us pause for a moment and find out whether or not the concept of non-alignment in any way prevented India from using arms or building up her defense-potential to defend the country. The past experience of India in the use of arms against Hyderabad, Pakistan in Kashmir, Goa, etc. clearly indicates that whenever India's national interest was threatened she did not fail to use arms. During those critical moments India always responded with a show of arms, successfully or unsuccessfully, illustrating that the policy of non-alignment did not hinder India's use of arms.

From the statements of prominent Indian leaders since the Chinese attack on India in October, 1962, it seems that India has entered into an arms race with China. In fact during the past fifteen years (1947-62), India has been in an arms race with Pakistan, and today still is.¹⁰ In the past India has complained that because of American military help to Pakistan, India has had to spend a larger proportion of her national budget for arms. It is not only a non-aligned India who is in an arms race with her neighbors. We can find many other non-aligned nations who have entered into an arms race with their neighbors. Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and Egypt may be cited as examples

...during the years when Yugoslavia feared a threat to its independence and territorial integrity, it accepted military aid from the US without having to give up its policy of non-alignment. Egypt, in the period following the Israeli-Anglo-French action of 1956 in the Suez, has been receiving

¹⁰ Krishna Raj, "Optimum Alignment," Seminar, VL (May, 1963), p. 24.

arms aid from the Soviet Union without in any way compromising its independent foreign policy. As recently as the 26th of last month the Defence Minister of Indonesia, another non-aligned country, stated at Jakarta that Indonesia, which has already been receiving Soviet military aid for some years, had signed a further arms agreement with the Soviet Union. Other non-aligned countries which have received or have recently arranged to obtain military aid from the Soviet Union include Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Guinea and Mali.

Following are the figures of the value of American military assistance received by some non-aligned countries over the period from 1950: Yugoslavia \$693,856,000. Ethiopia \$73,799,000. Ghana \$207,000. Libya \$7,168,000. Afghanistan \$2,822,000. Cambodia \$97,274,000.¹¹

If the other non-aligned nations were receiving military assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union without losing their status of non-alignment, why could India not receive such military assistance from either the United States or the Soviet Union? India already was receiving large amounts of economic assistance from both the U.S., and U.S.S.R. The total value of such economic assistance to India to which the United States was committed under various agreements up to the end of December, 1964, stands at 5,112.9 million dollars.¹² The total value of the Soviet commitment to India during the same period was 1,017 million dollars.¹³

We also know that India does not manufacture most of her modern military arms. Since India's independence on August 15, 1947 she had been dependent on England and France for her supply of modern

¹¹"Non-alignment and National Defence," Indian and Foreign Review, I No. 7 (January 15, 1964), p.5.

¹²Government of India, External Assistance 1964, (Faridabad, India: Government of India Press, 1965), p. 74.

¹³Ibid., p. 65.

arms. The most important question is why did India not accept military assistance from the United States or the Soviet Union. Did she fear, that such assistance from these super-powers would force her to give up her non-aligned status?

In fact, if we examine the period prior to the Chinese attack of 1962 on India's northern border, we find that India had signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to supply some MIG planes and also the technological skill to manufacture them in India. Similar negotiations were conducted with the United States for the supply of supersonic planes and technology. Unfortunately the negotiations with the United States failed.

Thus, it seems that prior to the Chinese attack on India's northern borders in 1962, India had no objection to accepting military assistance in purchasing military equipment and/or technical knowledge either from the United States or the Soviet Union. But India insisted on accepting such assistance on her own terms. Since the Chinese attack, India to meet the emergency, has been accepting military assistance from both the United States and Soviet Union on their terms.

India has been forced to make necessary changes in her foreign and domestic policy, due to the emergency created by the Chinese attack. This in turn made her dependent on the United States and the Soviet Union. But India's basic aim of self-reliance as an ultimate goal continues to guide her foreign policy.

Thus, we can say with some degree of confidence that it was not neutralism that stopped India from arming herself; it was

something else -- perhaps the greater preoccupation with economic development and the desire to spend a minimum amount on military budgets, perhaps a mistaken belief that China was not dangerous, perhaps a mistaken calculation of the defensive capacity of the Himalayas, or perhaps a combination of all the above. If the Indian leaders had sensed the magnitude of the Chinese threat, non-alignment would not have come in the way of arming India. To put it in the words of Rajan: "What was at fault with India under Chinese attack is our military unpreparedness, not the policy of non-alignment."¹⁴

Charles Meiswath writes along the same lines:

Non-alignment was never intended to compensate for a military policy, and it should not be evaluated in that perspective. But even in military terms it brought the distinct advantages of leaving open the possibility of assistance from both great powers against China -- provided both sides sought simultaneously to hamper Chinese aims. Of greater importance, non-alignment provided and does still provide the reinforcement by the great powers of Indian economic and political objectives.¹⁵

However, the Chinese attack in October, 1962, opened Indian eyes to a danger from China.

In our evaluation of India's policy of non-alignment we should bear in mind the changing international situation; for example, the increasing similarity of interest among super powers, in spite of their ideological differences, and the greater independence sought by their respective allies. Under these circumstances, it is worthwhile

¹⁴M. S. Rajan, "Chinese Aggression and the Future of India's Non-alignment Policy," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1963), p. 129.

¹⁵Charles N. Meiswath, "Nonalignment Reassessed: The Experience of India," Foreign Policies in the Sixties, ed. Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 63.

to recall what Clovis Maqaud, an Arab scholar said of neutralism in 1960:

Being no more than a particular policy, positive neutralism is therefore a passing phase which should last as long as do the facts of the international and Arab situation on which it rests.¹⁶

Since the conditions of the international situation are changing, non-alignment should change accordingly to meet the new demands created by the Chinese attack on India in particular and the changing world situation in general. What are these new demands that India is called upon to meet in her foreign policy?

The first of these new demands is the matching of China, not only in economic development but also in military strength. Secondly, India should not overlook China's recent explosion of an atom bomb. No doubt it does not pose a great danger today since China lacks any effective nuclear delivery system. But in the future when China possesses a large stockpile of nuclear bombs and an effective delivery system, how will India defend herself against such a possible Chinese threat? India has three possible alternative methods of self defence. i) Seek defence under an effective security system under the United Nations, ii) develop her own nuclear capacity to match that of China's, and iii) seek nuclear protection from the United States and the Soviet Union against China. Of the three alternatives the first one seems ideal. But to make it effective India will have to work hard within the United Nations to make the United Nations system effective. Thirdly, India learned a hard lesson:

¹⁶ Clovis Maqaud, "The story of Arab Positive Neutralism," *Neutralism and Disengagement*, ed. Paul F. Power (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 14.

that many non-aligned nations were non-aligned not only between the two 'power-blocs' (whatever the term may mean), but also in a conflict to which a non-aligned India and an aligned China were parties.¹⁷

Critics of neutralism blamed India's policy of non-alignment for failure to achieve full support of the non-aligned nations when the Chinese attacked India. However, it seems that the fault lay elsewhere, in the Indian diplomacy.

During the fifties the main thrust of Indian diplomacy was aimed toward the great powers and not at the countries of Asia and Africa, countries whose leadership India was trying to achieve. According to Michael Brecher this was largely a result of India's traditionally close ties with the West, at least since British days. Secondly, Indian officials with foreign policy responsibilities have a greater understanding of the West than of neighboring Asia and Africa. However, he (Michael Brecher) considers the most important reason to be India's need for continued economic aid from the industrialized nations, from either the East or the West.¹⁸ Which may be at fault for India's failure in gaining full support against the Chinese. It is now time for India to pay more attention to her Asian and African neighbors.

Lastly, we should also bear in mind that the bi-polar world situation that existed during the fifties is being transformed into

¹⁷K. P. Karunakaran, "Non-aligned Radicals," Seminar, VI (May, 1963), p. 17.

¹⁸Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, XV No. 2 (January, 1963), p. 217.

a multi-polar system during the sixties. No doubt the two super powers continue to remain supreme in the newly emerging world situation, but many other powers are reasserting their former international status (France) and some new ones are acquiring new international status (China).

All the above problems need to be examined in the context of India's desire to be a big power in future. Under such circumstances what is best for India? To get into the protective fold of one or more super powers or to reassert her position as an independent power? An independent India can guide her own destiny and judge all national and international issues on their merit without being influenced by other powers.

In the light of the existing national and international situation in a multi-polar system, taking into account India's size, population, strategic geographic position, and a national desire to be a big power, it seems that India should try to pursue an independent policy. Receiving all the necessary economic and military help from both the super powers and the other medium sized powers such as France and Great Britain will help her to meet immediate needs, but she is aiming at eventual independence at an early date.

Any desire on the part of India for permanent military and/or economic dependence on one or more powers seems to be a dangerous proposition in the present world situation. Where the changes in the national interest brings changes in the alignments. In recent days we are witnessing the disintegration of NATO. Even the monolithic communist world is splitting up, mainly because of conflict between

national interests of the nations concerned. How can we be sure that India's national interest will not conflict with that of the United States or the Soviet Union or both at a later date? How can we be sure that the others' national interest will not conflict with that of India's?

Taking into account the present international situation India will do well if she pursues an independent foreign policy. One may call it neutralism if one chooses, so but in the ultimate analysis it will be an independent policy. It will achieve for India the independence in her external affairs in the sixties which non-alignment achieved for India in the fifties. We can conclude our discussion by joining Rajan in saying that only national interest is permanent. Everything else is transitory in international relations.

A student of diplomatic history could, however, point out that, in international relations, the only permanent factor is the interests of a nation, and not friendships and enmities which are of a transient character, and any nation which relies wholly on its friendship (or, for that matter, enmities) to promote its national interests is bound to be surprised and disillusioned sooner or later (as India has been vis-a-vis China),¹⁹

¹⁹M.S. Rajan, "Chinese Aggression and the Future of India's Non-alignment Policy," International Studies, V No. 1 and 2 (July-October, 1963), p. 124.

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INDIA'S POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

by

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In the beginning part of the paper an attempt is made to acquaint the reader with what non-alignment or neutralism is, what the differences between the leading exponents of this policy are, and what motivated India to pursue such a policy.

India became independent on August 15, 1947. At the time of India's independence the world was being divided into a bi-polar system. India was thus presented with a challenge from the beginning of her independence in choosing a foreign policy in accordance with her national interests.

India's historical and factual backgrounds are examined, not to give justification to the policy of neutralism, but merely to acquaint ourselves with the Indian people, their past history, culture, civilization, geography, internal and external relations under the British and to know something about the pertinent views of the Indian leaders before she became independent. This was done because foreign policy is based not only on moral principles but also on concepts of national interests.

The paper also examines relevant views expressed by different major political parties within the country. Only one major political party, Swatantra (Independence) Party, showed objection to India's policy of non-alignment.

Internationally, non-alignment seems to have become popular in more than fifty nations by the early sixties, as opposed to the lone battle India was fighting in the early fifties. Most of these nations, where non-alignment is popular, are the newly-emerging

nations of Asia and Africa. As for the two super powers, non-alignment became more acceptable to them with the passage of time. However, until 1962 India's non-alignment never faced any major challenges.

The real test of India's policy of non-alignment came when China attacked India's northern border in October, 1962. In 1962 for a while it seemed that India's policy of non-alignment would change. Responsible Indian and Foreign observers thought that India would give up her policy of non-alignment. Some others thought that giving up non-alignment might not necessarily serve India's best interest. The emergency, created by the Chinese attack on India's northern border, forced India to accept military assistance on terms theretofore not acceptable to India. In the past, whenever India accepted military assistance, she insisted on terms favorable to her national interests.

In any event, the Indian leaders felt that India's national interests would be served by a continuation of the policy of non-alignment. This belief was based on the fact that China's attack on India's northern border did not materially change India's foreign policy aims. Since non-alignment served those aims in the past (before 1962), there was no reason why it (neutralism) should not continue to serve the same aims of India's foreign policy. Subsequent events have demonstrated that India's independent policy has continued to serve her national interests.

One more observation deserves our special attention in relation to India's policy of non-alignment. The bi-polar world of the fifties is changing into a multi-polar world in the sixties. Under

this changed international situation India's policy will continue to remain independent. Some may prefer to call it non-alignment, but in the ultimate analysis it will be an independent policy.