EDUCATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANGANYIKA AND EGYPT

by

KENYON NEAL GRIFFIN

B. A., Fort Hays Kansas State College, 1961

A MASTER'S REPORT

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1963

Approved by:

[Signature]
Major Professor
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Education: Tradition and Structure in Tanganyika and Egypt</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Educational Systems in Tanganyika and Egypt</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Political Socialization</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Political Recruitment</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Political Integration</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Evaluation</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to those who have encouraged, criticized, and otherwise aided in the research and writing of this report. I am especially indebted to Michael W. Suleiman, under whose direction this report was written; his advice has added greatly to my academic and personal growth.

Special thanks are also extended to other faculty members of the political science department. I have benefited from these contacts both in and out of the classroom.

To my wife, Leah, who typed the numerous drafts, gave freely of her editorial criticisms, and remained a patient wife throughout, I express my loving appreciation.
I. Introduction

The attitude concerning education's influence on modernization has undergone a great change with the emergence of newly independent nations since the end of World War II. While education was once regarded as an essentially conservative culture-preserving, culture-transmitting institution, the educational system now tends to be viewed as the master determinant of all aspects of change.

The increasingly important relationships of education to the systems of political and social stratification, as well as to the economy and the polity, have stimulated scholarly study of the relationship of education to the processes of political development. Until recently few political scientists or educators have given attention to the over-all educational-polity nexus. In addition, few empirical studies have focused upon specific ways in which the educational system affects the functioning of the political system.

Education and Political Development¹, edited by James S. Coleman, is one attempt to bridge this gap with a systematic study relating the educational-polity relationship to a theory of political development. Drawing on contributed essays, Coleman formulates a theoretical approach for the systematic study of education and political development. This approach is written in the general context of structural-functionalism and follows the typology and thought of Gabriel A. Almond's earlier essay, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics."²

The purpose of this research project is two-fold. The initial purpose is to apply Coleman's conceptual framework to two developing nations in order to gain insight into the significance of education on the process of political
development. The second purpose is to derive from the case studies an evaluation of the utility of Coleman's approach in studying education and political development.

Tanganyika and Egypt have been selected as the case studies. Both are faced with the typical problems of developing nations: high illiteracy, and economic, social, and political problems. Two major differences separate their respective educational systems, however. Egypt has a thousand year tradition of formal education while that of Tanganyika is less than one hundred years. A second difference exists in the post-primary education; Egypt's facilities are well developed while Tanganyika is burdened with a high wastage problem. Yet the framework of Coleman's theory can be adapted to either or to both in a comparative study.

Coleman's theory utilizes five concepts which have integral roles in the educational-polity relationship: education, political development, political socialization, political recruitment and political integration. The first two delineate respectively the goal and structure under consideration. The other three are identified by Coleman as functions of the political system which have a clear relationship to the educational structure.

Turning to definitions, Coleman describes education as that which is "limited to teaching and related activities in schools and universities." The definition of political development is set forth in a generic context which utilizes the concepts of differentiation, equality, and capacity of the political system. Coleman writes:

In these terms, Political Development can be regarded as the acquisition by a political system of a consciously-sought and qualitatively new and enhanced political capacity as manifested in the successful institutionalization of (1) now patterns of integration regulating and containing the ton-
eions and conflicts produced by increased differentiation, and (2) new patterns of participation and resource distribution adequately responsive to the demands generated by the imperatives of equality. 7

Political socialization is defined as the "process by which individuals acquire attitudes and feelings toward the political system and toward their role in it." 5 This concept basically comes to grips with the role played by schools in identifying the individual with the existing political system.

Political recruitment centers upon education's influence on upward mobility. Education vastly improves the chances for political elite status since such status is generally dependent upon belonging to the upper level of the social stratification system. Coleman reasons that in "achievement-oriented societies education tends to be the master determinant of social mobility...and therefore...that education is the main, if not sole, key to political mobility into elite status." 6

Political integration, Coleman's third function, is on a higher level than the other two functions. Within the structural-functional framework, political integration is the goal of the political system and is derived from the successful implementation of political socialization and recruitment. Coleman states:

The integrative role of education in nation-building and political development is more or less self-evident. If political socialization into the national polity has been and is effective and if the process of recruitment into bureaucratic and political roles has become regularized and legitimized, it is reasonable to assume that the society concerned is effectively integrated. 7

The importance of these five concepts will be discussed in relationship to the development of formal Western education and the process of modernization in Tanganyika and Egypt. A discussion of the contemporary educational
systems will follow a survey of the historical growth of education. The analysis will then focus upon education's influence on political socialization, recruitment, and integration in the two nations.

II. Education: Tradition and Structure in Tanganyika and Egypt

A. Tanganyika

Formal education was first brought to Tanganyika less than 100 years ago. Educational efforts in Tanganyika may be divided into four periods: (1) the German colonial period, 1834-1916; (2) the League of Nations Mandate, 1922-1945; (3) the United Nations Trusteeship, 1945-1961; and (4) the post-independence period.

A remarkable advance was made in the provision of educational opportunities for the African population under the German colonial administration. The bulk of this work was in the hands of various Catholic and Protestant churches and missionary societies. The mission schools were important in propagating the gospel and served as a means of providing primary education. The German administration opened its first school in 1893 and others followed. The objectives of such schools were to produce junior clerical workers, who could assist in administration; technical schools were to produce artisans. By 1914, the Government schools instructed about 6,000 pupils while the mission schools instructed 110,000 in 1,800 schools.

Education facilities in Tanganyika were practically terminated during World War I. The administration collapsed when the Germans were routed in 1916 and the British attempted to assume leadership. Only ineffective administration was maintained until 1922 when Tanganyika came under British domination through the League of Nations Mandate. Effective educational developments ceased for nearly a decade before the British revived such efforts.
Tanganyika's educational development received an impetus following the establishment of British hegemony in 1922. In undertaking the mandated territory, Great Britain assumed an obligation to "provide to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress...of Tanganyika's inhabitants." The responsibility for African education was clearly stated in the mandate. A fresh educational start was made in the 1920's and encouraging progress was made through 1931.

The first major development came as a result of the Phelps-Stokes Commission in 1924. Resulting from the implementation of the report, the African Education Ordinance was drafted which established a government educational system. Included in this educational system were government schools and grant-aided volunteer agency (mission) schools. All schools used the same curriculum and a uniform system evolved.

The world economic crisis reached Tanganyika in 1931, curtailing educational expansion and causing severe reductions in expenditures by both the government and missions. The situation improved slightly in 1936 when additional funds were available for education; funds were not the only limitation, however. The Permanent Mandates Commission criticized the British colonial administration in 1938 for providing only limited educational facilities and the consequent unavailability of educated Africans for administrative positions. This criticism partly centered upon the philosophy of education employed in Tanganyika. Sir Harold MacMichael, Governor-General from 1934-1938, believed it wise to limit education to the needs of the territory. He also argued that academic training should be greatly limited so the Africans would not become discontented. The educational system had hardly begun to recover by 1939 when the outbreak of World War II again brought an end to expansion. By 1945 the educational staff was reduced to a skeleton.
staff and recruitment for new personnel followed the conclusion of the hos-
tilities.

Education under the mandate centered largely on primary schools which concentrated upon reading, writing, arithmetic, and religion, and technical and trade schools. Mission education continued to play a predominant role in the educational developments throughout this period. Post-primary education developed slowly as is witnessed by the fact that no Tanganyikan student had attended a university course until 1950 when five students went to the United Kingdom. This group included Tanganyika's President, Julius K. Nyerere.

After World War II the United Nations Trusteeship Council replaced the League of Nations' supervision of British administration in Tanganyika. Renewed interest in education on the part of missions, the government and the Trusteeship Council resulted in important educational achievements. In 1947 a Ten Year Plan was implemented which made provision for primary, middle, secondary and senior secondary schools. Large scale expansion began at all educational levels; the main emphasis was upon the establishment of a primary school system aimed at accommodating thirty percent of the primary age group by 1956. By 1956, thirty-nine percent of the primary age group attended school. Middle schools were established in 1950; these schools accommodated the most qualified primary school leavers with training beyond literacy—the main goal of the lower level.

Under this plan the teacher training program also expanded rapidly. The annual output of primary school teachers rose from 353 in 1947 to 871 in 1956, and of teachers qualified at the middle school level from 17 in 1947 to 90 in 1956. The Ifunda Trade School was established in 1951 and in 1953 Makerere College was established for university level training.
Educational developments in Tanganyika in the period 1945-1961 are best characterized by rapid expansion of both quantity and quality of education.

In assuming the mandated territory in 1922, Britain agreed to prepare Tanganyika for independence. The development of political awareness and the political movement for independence had a positive impact upon the need for additional educational opportunity. By independence in 1961, there existed only a small indigenous elite capable of administering the government. They had been educated in a system patterned after the English system. This pattern provides the model for the system which has evolved since 1961.

The demands of modernization since independence have increased the pressure for expanded educational facilities. These demands are for qualitative and quantitative expansion. Qualitatively, the leaders recognize the need for an educated population to carry out plans for economic, social and political modernization. They also recognize the importance of fulfilling the expectations of the people for education as a tool of mobilization.

Table 1 indicates the expansion of facilities from 1953 to 1964. While the statistics indicate sizeable increases, the percentage of students in school to age group remained the same in 1964 as in 1961; grades I to IV had fifty percent; grades V to VIII had fifteen percent; and post-primary had less than two percent. Educational expansion after 1961 was greatest in grades V to VIII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Educational Expansion in Tanganyika</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Educational expansion after 1961 was greatest in grades V to VIII.
Three major changes have taken place since 1961 to adapt the educational system to Tanganyika’s needs. In 1961, the plan of the Committee on Integration of Education was implemented. This plan abolished education organized on racial lines dividing the European, Asian and African communities. The only difference in the primary schools today is the orientation of language. Swahili, English and Asian vernaculars are used in the separate schools; English is taught as a subject in all schools and is the medium of instruction in all secondary schools.

A plan introduced in 1965 proposed a structural change in the system. Until 1961, a 4-4-4 system was used by the primary, middle and secondary schools. At that time an 8-4 system was introduced with eight years of primary and four years of secondary school. The 1965 plan called for a reorganized seven year primary curriculum and four years for secondary school.15

Technical education prior to independence concentrated upon carpentry, masonry, painting, and plumbing. A change has been made recently to correspond with manpower needs. Courses in electrical engineering, machine shop engineering and motor vehicle repair have been developed. Trade schools have been changed into technical schools and a technical college has been founded at Dar es Salaam. Requirements for entrance to these schools have also been upgraded. Statistics on enrollment which indicate the growth of technical education since 1961 are unavailable. Using recurring expenditure figures, technical education received 3.6 percent of the educational funds in 1961 and under the five year plan, which will end in 1969, 3.5 percent is allocated.16 Thus expansion is focused upon post-primary education and technical education remains about the same.

Free schooling was introduced at the secondary level in 1964. Most secondary training is provided at boarding schools so the cost is high. This
move enables students to attend secondary school with less financial burden upon their parents. Under the constitution of the Republic of Tanzania, primary education is administered by the local authorities and volunteer agencies and partially funded by central government grants. Secondary education is a central government responsibility. All these schools are responsible to the Ministry of Education and Information and are funded wholly or in part by grant-aid.

Education in Tanganyika has undergone numerous changes since 1961. But the basic structure of the system remains the same. Students still prepare for the Cambridge School Certificate which is taken after the terminal year in secondary school. The orientation of the educational program is academic and no great emphasis has been placed upon the expansion of technical education.

Voluntary agencies still provide the foundation for primary and secondary education by maintaining sixty percent of the primary and sixty-three percent of the secondary schools. While the religious bias of the majority of schools is still present, all schools are becoming more secular at governmental direction. Attendance at worship services is no longer compulsory. All school principals are now Africans. Educational policies have not become public controversies, with the exception of the National Service Bill. President Nyerere and the ruling Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) look to the educational system for assistance in carrying out economic, political and social modernization. The changes since 1961 have been attempts to facilitate this process.

B. Egypt

The tradition of formal education in Egypt extends over one thousand years. This long tradition is unusual for developing nations and is a direct
result of the influence of Islam. This tradition may be divided into five periods: (1) Islamic education beginning in the tenth century to 1805 and the beginning of Mohammed Ali's rule; (2) modern secular education as developed by the French under Mohammed Ali's rule; (3) education under the British "temporary rule" from 1882 to 1922; (4) Egypt's period as an independent constitutional monarchy from 1923 to 1952; and (5) from the 1952 military coup to the present.

Until the nineteenth century, Egyptian education was religious by definition. The traditional system consisted of two types of schools. This included the kuttab, or elementary Koran-memorization school, which was the only road to literacy for the bulk of Egyptian children. A small minority of students ever attended the kuttab. The mosque-schools, situated in the larger towns, were taught by local religious scholars in traditional Islamic fields of learning such as Arabic grammar, theology, Islamic law and a smattering of history. Al-Azhar University, established in 970, was the leading school of the nation and sat at the top of the educational structure.

Education during this period was for boys; they would gather at the feet of a teacher in or near the mosque and memorize the contents of traditional grammatical or religious texts. Stress was placed upon learning the known, which was viewed as eternal and unchanging, rather than probing the unknown. Few of the boys who attended such schools finished the course. They generally attended while young and too small to work in the fields and yielded their places to younger brothers when they were old enough to work in the fields. Students who attended long enough to pass an oral examination would graduate with the title of Alim (man of learning). Subsequently an Alim could lecture in a school, become a judge in a religious court, a mosque preacher or functionary in the bureaucracy. Islamic education, patterned after the
traditional system still exists in Egypt today; Al-Azhar University is one of Egypt's most prestigious institutions.

Alongside this traditional Islamic educational system grew the modern secular system which dates from the first half of the nineteenth century. Mohammed Ali, who seized power in 1805, was impressed with the efficiency of the French soldiers whom he encountered during Napoleon's invasion of Egypt.

Mohammed Ali developed a modern secular educational system in order to lay the foundations for a modern army and an efficient administration. Education during this period was not only secularized but also Westernized. Mohammed Ali imported French expatriates to develop a school system based on the French model. Instructors were recruited from the ranks of European doctors, engineers and military officers to Egypt.

Also during his rule, Mohammed Ali sent over 500 students to Europe, chiefly to France, for scientific, technical and military training. Upon their return, these students were requested to make translations of their textbooks so as to enable other Egyptians to learn modern techniques. These efforts did not supplant traditional learning but created a dichotomy between the traditional and modern cultures, a dichotomy which exists even today among educated Egyptians.

Modernizing, secularizing and Westernizing developments continued in the Egyptian educational system under Mohammed Ali's successors with varying degrees of success. Both mission and government schools increased between 1849-1882. Missions from the United States and Europe established such schools as Assiut College (1865) and Pressley Memorial Institute for Girls (1865). In 1868 primary, secondary and higher educational institutions, in which religion was de-emphasized, were established by law. Ismail's wife opened the first girls' school founded by the government in 1873. Teacher
training institutions were also established. By the end of Ismail's reign nearly 100,000 of Egypt's 2,500,000 school-age males were in schools; this was a larger proportion than in many mid-nineteenth century European nations.\textsuperscript{24}

The Ministry of Education came under British control in 1882 with the implementation of the "temporary occupation". Neither the French influence nor teaching methods were replaced immediately, however. The British, apart from training an adequate supply of clerical assistants for the government, did little in the educational field. In terms of expenditure, they spent less on education in the early part of their occupation (0.87 percent of the total budget) than was spent under Ismail.\textsuperscript{25}

Lord Cromer, the British Resident, did not support modern secularized education for he saw in it the seeds of discontent from budding Arab nationalists. Budget statistics under Cromer's reign illustrate education's plight during the early part of this century. In 1905-1906, the proportion of the state budget devoted to education was still less than one percent; in 1919-1920 it was less than two percent. Illiteracy in 1907 was estimated at 94.6 percent when Cromer retired from Egypt. Enrollment in 1925 stood at 222,761 in elementary school and only 8,100 in secondary school.\textsuperscript{26} The British occupation government not only failed to expand the educational system, but the number of students relative to the growing population decreased. This failure, still remembered with bitterness, is one of the most criticized aspects of British rule in Egypt.

With the achievement of nominal independence in 1923, Egypt embarked upon an ambitious program aimed at providing compulsory and free elementary education. Educational expansion received encouragement during this period but it was hampered by World War II and financial problems.
Until 1951 the most notable feature of the school system was the distinction between primary and elementary education. Primary schools, although few, provided an academic education for entrance into an academic secondary school and later a university. Fees were not abolished until 1943, and the government made little effort to expand this type of education. The fees restricted primary school education to the well-to-do.

The elementary school facilities expanded rapidly after 1923 but at the expense of quality of education. A graduate of such schools could only enter a vocational school, return to the farm, or perhaps find his way into the traditional curriculum of Al-Azhar. Beginning in 1925, many elementary schools went to a half day schedule, utilizing the same teachers and facilities for both sessions. This dual system had its rationale in providing literacy training for the majority of children who would have had no education otherwise. It was believed that poor training was better than none at all. Three thousand schools and 900,000 children were involved in this system of education from 1925 to 1940.27 Even today, thirty-eight percent of all primary classes still operate on this plan with attempts being made to implement full time schools.28 In 1951 legislation unified all early education into a single six-year course terminating with an examination and a certificate. This remained a paper reform until the whole system was reorganized in 1955.

Public secondary education enrollment continued to lag in efforts to accommodate even the lower level graduates. This situation improved in the immediate post-war years and received a big boost after 1952.

Education unfortunately became a political tool during the last Wafd government. In 1949, legislation provided for free tuition to any academic secondary school for highly qualified students. In 1950, the Wafd government decreed free secondary education to all regardless of grades. Academic
secondary schools were consequently overwhelmed with students intent upon gaining white collar positions upon graduation. Finances spent on accommodating this influx resulted in a lesser amount expended for primary education. This situation existed until 1955 when the revolutionary government decreed that secondary education would remain free; but only the best qualified could enter academic schools.  

Egyptian higher education received considerable improvements under the monarchy. Three of Egypt's four state universities, in addition to Al-Azhar and American University of Cairo, were opened during this time: Cairo (1925), Alexandria (1942), and Ain Shams (1950). Higher institutes were also developed. One impressive facet of this expansion of higher education has been in student enrollment. In 1925-1926, 3,363 university under-graduates (excluding Al-Azhar and American University) increased to 13,927 by 1945-1946 and to 34,842 by 1951-1952. Another important aspect of this growth is the great increase in the number of girls enrolled.

While the period under the monarchy was characterized by expanding educational facilities and opportunity, the period was also characterized with numerous problems. It became apparent that the qualitative educational differences between the various schools did not contribute to the national interest. A major problem focused upon the inequality within the system and attempts to correct abuses. A more uniform system was developed which eliminated the most flagrant inequalities in selection policies. The educational system, especially at the lower levels, was not related to the students' environments; students viewed education as a means to a government position and a way to avoid manual labor. Renewed efforts to deal with those and other problems set the stage for the educational developments which followed the military coup in 1952.
The new leaders searched for a new educational system which would facilitate the modernization process. Education since that time has become a major government function, both as a means of providing a trained labor force and as a means of inculcating loyalty to the new Egypt. Enrollment has continued to rise and greater attempts are made to funnel students into a curriculum suited for individual needs and abilities. Table 2 indicates this expansion and the emphasis which is placed upon balancing the training with national needs.

Table 2: Educational Expansion in Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953-54</th>
<th>1964-65</th>
<th>1953-54</th>
<th>1964-65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1,392,741</td>
<td>3,294,832</td>
<td>45,144</td>
<td>34,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Preparatory</td>
<td>348,574</td>
<td>474,266</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>19,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Preparatory</td>
<td>3,260</td>
<td>41,559</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Secondary</td>
<td>92,062</td>
<td>174,452</td>
<td>22,102</td>
<td>33,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Secondary</td>
<td>18,838</td>
<td>91,252</td>
<td>3,235</td>
<td>6,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training</td>
<td>23,908</td>
<td>41,177</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>56,966</td>
<td>144,496</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>10,406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Educational expenditure was also raised sharply over that which had been spent under the monarchy. This expenditure increased from 6.8 percent of the national budget in 1926 to nearly fifteen percent in 1964. These figures on enrollment and educational expenditure indicate the demands of the Egyptian people for increased educational opportunity. Nevertheless, all has not been well during the post-revolutionary period. Financial problems, demands for education as a ticket to social and economic status, and over-expectations of job potential have all hindered educational policies.

Such policies have been the subject of political controversy; Nasser and his associates have looked to the educational system for assistance in carrying out their revolution. Their approach to educational problems is eclectic, but they see education as a potent means of stimulating the revival of Arab
culture, correcting past social injustices and developing national prestige within the framework of a modern society.

The administration of education in Egypt has traditionally been hampered by the isolation of the schools from the needs and environment of the people. Before the revolution, the people did not consider the schools as part of the local community but rather as part of the central government. Attempts to overcome this attitude have focused upon two approaches. First, educational leaders have attempted to relate education to the environment in which the particular school finds itself. Second, efforts have been made to arouse parental interest in the education of their own children by increasing local responsibility for education.

Administrative reorganization in 1960 laid the foundation for securing local responsibility for education. At that time, administrative units were divided and represented by either a governorate council, a town council, or a village council. In consequence, responsibility for the schools is in the process of being transferred to these local authorities. Governorate councils have charge of academic and technical secondary schools and teacher training institutes. Town councils have responsibility for the primary and preparatory education in their jurisdiction. Village councils have been entrusted with all other government primary schools. Since 1960, education at the higher institutes and universities has been considered a public service that should be administered centrally. Recently the Ministry of Higher Education assumed this responsibility and now shares responsibility for educational supervision with the Ministry of Education.33

Overall policy making, planning, follow-up and central services are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The unification of this aspect of administration under the Ministry has facilitated the standardization of
the schools; the decentralization of administrative responsibility has fostered the development of more interested and realistic patrons. These efforts have had considerable successes at establishing a bond between the schools and the communities. Continuing efforts suggest that the schools will one day influence the life of the local community and the community will provide a stimulus for the activity of the school.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite administrative reorganization, increased facilities and personnel, and greater expenditures, much illiteracy remains in Egypt. The government optimistically hopes to eradicate illiteracy by 1980. Besides the literacy problem, the government has sought to make the educational system more functional within the contemporary Egyptian environment. It has become apparent that education produces dysfunctional relationships in developing nations; steps to integrate the educational system into the activities of the new nation are some of the most important with which the Egyptian government will deal. More will be said about such problems later.

Four important similarities exist between the educational traditions of Tanganyika and Egypt. The impetus of education came as a result of an outside force. In Tanganyika this modernizing impetus came from European missionaries and imperial powers. In Egypt this was originally an Islamic influence. Later Mohammed Ali provided the impetus for education.

Both Tanganyika's and Egypt's educational systems experienced British influence. Today the system in Tanganyika reflects more of this influence than does Egypt's. Both nations are faced with the problem of partially educated students who feel they are faced with the problem of partially educated students who feel they are above many tasks since they have received some formal education. Both have retained the external examination system as a means of selection and promotion. Tanganyika is highly selective due to limited post-
primary educational facilities. Egypt provides greater latitude and opportunity in post-primary education and consequently uses the examinations for selection more than for promotion. Finally, both educational systems are becoming increasingly secular. Religion still plays an important part, especially in Tanganyika where funds are poured into the system from missions. Both nations have formulated policies which make secular education of primary importance and religious training of lesser importance.

The two educational systems are also distinguished by major differences. Both nations experienced missionary influence but Egypt cut these ties before the 1952 coup while Tanganyika continues to cooperate with and work through mission schools. The level of education and literacy is higher in Egypt, which has a well developed post-primary program, than in Tanganyika. Literacy figures vary from thirty percent in Egypt to ten percent in Tanganyika. Egypt has emphasized technical education and tied it to industrial development while Tanganyika has stressed academic, post-primary education.

The two countries also differ in the length of educational tradition. Tanganyika is more dependent upon the Western tradition as she has not developed an indigenous intellectual and cultural tradition to support an education system. Egypt on the other hand has been forced to mold the modernizing technology of Western education to the traditional Arab culture.

Primary factors determining these similarities and differences have resulted from the nature of foreign influences and the domestic traditions, problems and objectives of the various ruling regimes. The structure of the present Tanganyikan and Egyptian educational systems, which respond to these influences, will be discussed below.
III. The Educational Systems in Tanganyika and Egypt

Tanganyika, which is united with Zanzibar in a federal union, maintains a separate educational system. The system reflects the historical influence of the British educational tradition. An education is not considered a constitutional right which should be accorded to all. Tanganyika has, however, sought to implement policies to provide a universal primary education in the future.

The educational system is presently divided into four levels. These are: primary, secondary, higher school, and post-secondary. Primary education in Tanganyika is provided either free or at minimal costs for about fifty percent of the age group. This level is divided into lower primary and upper primary or middle schools with four years at each level. The phasing out of middle schools and the development of a seven year primary curriculum is under way. Prior to 1961, wastage was greatest at the end of the fourth year of school. The examination at this level has been eliminated and students are prepared for the primary terminal examination. The most successful will go to secondary schools. A small group join primary teacher training colleges; the majority will seek employment.

Secondary schooling is provided for approximately two percent of the age group and selection is based exclusively upon primary examination results. Secondary education is free and efforts are being made to expand this level to cope with the needs of the nation as well as from pressure caused by the expansion of primary schools. In 1961, 1,667 students sat for the terminal examination for secondary pupils, the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate Examination. By 1965, educational officials planned that 4,000 entrants would sit for the examination. Successful students would progress to higher schools for their fifth and sixth years of secondary education. Others
would be eligible to join teacher training colleges, government or private training programs, or directly into employment.

Higher school programs are a prerequisite for entrance into an East African or British university. The curriculum is narrowed to either arts or science encompassing several possible subject combinations. This level has been another area of emphasis for expansion. In 1961, 157 students sat for the Cambridge Higher School Certificate Examination; an increase to 500 was anticipated by 1965. Successful candidates at this level go to universities, either in East Africa or abroad. Alternatives include teacher training, immediate employment or private training programs.

None of these alternative programs include a sizeable percentage of the appropriate age group. This illustrates the low level of achievement of the educational system which has been unable to meet the needs of a developing nation. The schematic diagram below illustrates the educational progression. The curriculum is outlined for all levels in Chart II (page 21).

**CHART I**

**Tanganyika: Educational Progression**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Higher School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Schools</td>
<td>Technical College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teacher Training Colleges for Primary &amp; secondary teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gov't &amp; Private training programs for students of varied abilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
CHART II

Tanganyika: Structure and Curricula of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
<th>Primary Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HIGHER SCHOOL
- Science, Biology, Math, P/Ch Arts, English, Geo., His/Econ

ACADEMIC SECONDARY SCHOOL
- English, Math, Science, History, Civics, Geog., PE, Swahili, Religion, Art/hdwrk (in some: agric, current affairs, German or French)

PRIMARY SCHOOL
- Arithmetic and Practical Geometry, Swahili, English, Geography, History, Civics
- Current Affairs, General Science: Boys: Health, Biology, Ag science
- Girls: Health, Ag and Animal Husbandry

Handcraft or Homecraft

Arithmetic, Language Skills, Geography, Nature Study, Hygiene, Citizenship
- English, Handwork, Religious Instruction, Physical Training, Swahili
The structure of Egypt's educational system has changed greatly in the last fifteen years to meet the demands of a modernizing society. Two important changes resulted from the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution. The Constitution stated that education was a constitutional right to be provided by the state for all citizens. Also written into this document were provisions for compulsory education at the primary level and free education at all state schools. With the implementation of these reforms, primary school enrollment had increased by 1965-1966 to eighty percent of the age group. Since President Nasser's decree in 1962, education at all levels, including higher education, has been free.

The present system of education comprises the six year compulsory primary school which admits students at the age of six. This is followed by a three year course at a preparatory school which may follow either an academic (general) or technical curriculum. An examination at the end of the sixth year determines whether a student enters the academic or technical stream.

Examinations are given again at the end of both preparatory courses (ninth year) to determine students' future placement. Graduates of the academic courses may enter an academic secondary school, a technical secondary course, primary teacher training, or the secondary section of Al-Azhar. Graduates of the technical preparatory courses may terminate formal schooling or apply for selective entrance into a secondary technical course. Failures at the technical preparatory schools enter the labor market as semi-skilled laborers.

The curriculum in the secondary academic sections is a general course for the first year. During this time evaluation is made to determine if a student will specialize in scientific or literary subjects the final two years. A graduate of an academic secondary school may go to a university or to a higher
institute, depending upon his achievement. Secondary technical graduates may, upon selection, enter a number of different advanced terminal programs in the higher institutes. Others will terminate and seek employment as skilled technicians, often commanding higher salaries than those with university degrees in the humanities. A schematic diagram illustrates the educational progression in Chart III; the curriculum is outlined for the primary and secondary levels in Chart IV (page 24).
**Chart IV**

Egypt: Structure and Curricula of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
<th>University Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>Higher Institutes</td>
<td>University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various courses</td>
<td>(and Vocational</td>
<td>University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Arts, Sciences,</td>
<td>Training)</td>
<td>University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineering, Ed.,</td>
<td>Industrial,</td>
<td>University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medicine, etc.</td>
<td>commercial, ag.</td>
<td>University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to B.A., M.A. and</td>
<td>institutes &amp; colleges for</td>
<td>University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ph. D.</td>
<td>arts, P.E., Music, Social</td>
<td>University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Teacher training</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st year: Arabic,</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eng., Fr., Religion, Hist.,</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geog., P/Chem, Art, Math</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P.E., hobby</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd year: choose</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>curriculum</td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religion, Arabic,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English, Math</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physics, Science,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geography, Hist.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civics, Art, P.E.,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hygiene, Practical Work</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subjects: Koran and Religion</td>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Music</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arithmetic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Practical Geometry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History and Civics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Political Socialization

The diverse sources of political attitudes are important in the process of political socialization. This process includes: cognition—what one knows or believes about the system; feeling—how one feels about the system, including loyalty and a sense of civic obligation; and one's sense of political competence—what one's role is or can be in the system. The educational system is but one agency which is involved in political socialization. The basic question which Coleman's theory seeks to answer is: what part do the schools play in identifying the individual with the existing political system?

Coleman suggests that there is basic agreement with the conclusion of the Almond and Verba study, *The Civic Culture*, that: "Educational attainment appears to have the most important demographic effect on political attitudes. None of the other variables compares with the educational variables in the extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes." Coleman outlines issues where the data are inconclusive or contradictory. These four issues will be studied within the educational context of both Tanganyika and Egypt:

1. **the direction of political orientation imparted by the formal education;**
2. **the implication of congruence among the educational system and other socializing agencies or processes;**
3. **the consequences of manifest political socialization (that is, the inclusion of an explicitly political content in the educational curriculum);** and
4. **the significance of the school environment in the political socialization process.**

The direction of political orientation one gets from the influence of an educational system is more complicated than originally thought. The thesis has long been propounded that a positive relationship exists between education and democratic political orientation. Almond and Verba data suggest that the
"educated individual is, in a sense, available for political participation."^*.

Education, however, does not determine the content of that participation. Data from Seymour M. Lipset's *Political Man* and the Almond and Verba study indicate that for a participant democracy, a high level of education comes close to being a necessary condition, although not a sufficient one.

A definitive answer to the direction of political orientation imparted by formal education in Tanganyika and Egypt awaits further basic research. In Tanganyika the role of the educational system is overshadowed by the ruling party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). In 1964, the educational system touched approximately 500,000 students in a nation of over 10,000,000. TANU, both in its role as a political party and as the Government, exerts more significant qualitative and quantitative influence upon the population.

In Egypt, the term "guided democracy" has been used to imply the present state of the polity. Because the people are unprepared for democracy, they must be guided. The guide is the Revolutionary Command Council led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The role of formal education has a very important position for this guidance. The educational system has been reorganized and reoriented to fulfill its role in providing political socialization for the nation's youth. The goal of the Egyptian government is a democratic socialist state. The sovereign state includes the boundaries of Egypt but the development of a feeling of Arabness is also stressed.

There has been a marked intensification of the nationalistic tone of Egyptian education—a striving to lessen the influence of Western viewpoints and to focus on the Arabic language, Egyptian history, and the geography of the Arab world. In the general secondary school syllabus, stress is laid upon "educating the younger generation for membership in Arab Society."^\[45\]
Both the scientific and literary sections take required lessons in Arab nationality, local and national government, the policy of positive neutrality, and the philosophy and value of the socialist cooperative democratic system. In addition, the literary sections study the origins of the modern world from an Arab point of view, the history of the Arab world during the ancient and medieval period, and the contemporary history of the Arabs. The latter course stresses the nationalist movement and the struggle against imperialist powers, then takes the student down through a study of the 1952 revolution and the general Arab nationalist awakening. The geography course at the secondary level stresses the economic integration and interdependence of the Arab world. The universities also acknowledge their role in nation-building.

The orientation of Tanganyikan students encounters two overlapping and important experiences for political orientation. The academic curriculum oriented toward external examinations and formal, abstract learning, tends to be apolitical. The social science courses, such as British Government, have an implicit democratic orientation. But no explicit course work relates democracy to Tanganyika. Neither does it relate to political competence, affection or cognition.

The second experience is the educational orientation implemented by TANU. Because of the close inter-relationship of TANU and the government, the students learn, by the secondary level, cognition, affection and political competence within that context. One good example is the knowledge secondary students have of one-party government and democracy. This has been achieved without turning schools into propaganda mills because it is done outside the educational system.
The analysis of Egyptian curricula suggests that the educational system's orientation is largely pan-Arabic and socialist, in contrast to that of Tanganyika. Little mention is made of democracy per se in the syllabus. On the other hand, the talk of "social democracy" as a pre-requisite to political democracy probably makes its way into the classroom through teachers who share the regime's ideals. Egypt's educational system aims to enable youth to become potentially better citizens both of Egypt and of the larger Arab world.

Coleman's second projection concerns the implications relating to the way in which the educational system coincides with other socializing agencies or processes. It is difficult to establish a firm relationship of education and political development because of the diversity of sources and the fact that other socializing experience could negate or reinforce the school's imprint.

Two major features characterize the congruence issue of political socialization in developing nations. The first is the primacy which the family retains in socializing the mass population in rural areas; the second is that "the formal education system bears a much heavier load of socialization than it does in older countries."48

Research data on developing nations suggest general agreement with Coleman's propositions on political socialization. Four criteria for measurement—social mobilization, penetration of the national government, continuity in the communication system and presence of a mass educational system—indicate that Tanganyika differs in some aspects from the theory. The criterion of social mobilization, while difficult to measure entirely, suggests that considerable changes are taking place in Tanganyika which affect political socialization. The concept of mobilization refers to changes of residence, of occupation, of roles of face-to-face associations.49 Observations indicate that the changes resulting from increased education, greater economic opportunity, and indepen-
dense have brought changes even though accurate data on Tanganyika are unavailable. One indicator of increased mobility is the migration to urban areas. The table below indicates the growth of the seven largest urban areas in the nation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>99,140</td>
<td>128,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>22,136</td>
<td>53,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td>13,691</td>
<td>19,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabora</td>
<td>14,051</td>
<td>15,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morogoro</td>
<td>11,501</td>
<td>14,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moshi</td>
<td>9,079</td>
<td>13,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodoma</td>
<td>12,262</td>
<td>13,435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The exactness of measures for social mobilization will undoubtedly provide insight into socialization for national citizenry. It will also help evaluate the nature and intensity of the disintegrative effects of such national participation.

There is no mass educational system in Tanganyika. Less than fifty percent of the primary age group and a much smaller percentage of older children are in school. Therefore, a majority of students never come under the school's influence in socialization.

The uniqueness of the Tanganyikan system centers upon Coleman's suggestion of the weak penetration of the national government and the discontinuities in communication systems. In these two respects TANU plays a major role. First, because TANU is the Government and because TANU branches are located in even the smallest villages, the national government penetrates to the local level. Likewise, this same arrangement facilitates communication from the grass roots to the national government. Because of this pervading role of the party, national attitudes are inculcated in the masses. By stimulating the family
structures through the polity, the family institution may socialize less parochial and more national views.

When the situation in Egypt is compared to Coleman's four factors, one sees that if the family maintains primacy in socializing, it will not remain so for long. Perhaps that point of primacy has passed already. The criterion of social mobilization suggests that considerable changes have taken place which affect political socialization there. The increase of urban over rural population indicates a steady change of residence. In 1937, 27.9 percent of the population lived in urban areas and by 1960 this percentage had grown to 37.7 percent. The same change is noted in occupational changes.

As the population increases it becomes more difficult for one to earn a living farming on small plots of land. There is also a distaste among the educated for doing manual labor. Hence, those who are able to secure education go to the cities where they hope to find more opportunity; in most cases, an academic education has educated one out of his environment. He must go to an urban area for work. The less educated also drift into the cities after being pushed off the land. The roles of face-to-face relations have also changed and are continuing to change greatly in Egypt. There is the breakdown of class and sex barriers which have had traditional influence in such relations.

The degree of success enjoyed by the Egyptian national government in penetrating the whole polity has been limited by stringent financial conditions. It has not been able, for example, to provide the facilities for universal primary education even though requiring such by law. Discontinuities in the communications system are encouraged by bureaucratic inefficiency. It is important to note, however, that the mosques serve an important function as a communication channel. The "Friday Sermons" are an important means of sending down information from the central government to the people. These sermons are
prepared by a governmental agency and distributed to the local mosques for delivery. Attempts are being made to improve the government's penetration of all levels of society by such organizations as the Arab Socialist Union. This type of organization could have important effects upon both communication and making the polity aware of government policies and programs.

In Egypt, the school system can accommodate approximately eighty percent of the primary school age group, six to twelve. It is clear, therefore, that the schools do have an opportunity to influence the political attitudes of a majority of the youth. Information is unavailable to determine the quantity or quality of this influence. Coleman again draws upon the Almond and Verba study and posits some of their hypotheses which apply to both Tanganyika and Egypt.

What is the generalization from the nonpolitical experiences of the family or home to the polity? Is the attitudinal impact of earlier experiences only predispositional in character? How do educational experiences on the secondary level or above suppress, substitute for, or transcend earlier familial experiences? If the early family experiences are congruent, is there a cumulative effect, with later ones reinforcing earlier ones? Is there a strain toward congruence when authority patterns of a particular socializing agency are close in time and structure to the polity? Definitive answers to these questions are impossible to ascertain in either Tanganyika or Egypt because of the scarcity of data. The only conclusive observation which can be drawn agrees with Coleman: "The question of significance of congruence between familial authority patterns and the new national polity then becomes very complex."

The second major feature, the heavier load of political socialization carried by the schools, results for two reasons. One is due to the importance
of nation-building; the national government is the most effective of the re-
socializing institutions. The other is the increase in importance of the
national government's role because of the absence or underdevelopment of other
socializing agencies which can fulfill the political socialization process for
a national citizenry role.

Both of these generalizations are applicable to Tanganyika. The govern-
ment is the most effective of the resocializing institutions. It can counter
the primacy of the family's role in socializing. There is also an absence or
underdevelopment of other socializing agencies. But Coleman fails to consider
that the Government can utilize agencies other than the educational system to
provide such socialization and in the process affect more people. Tanganyika
has utilized the Ministry of National Culture and Community Development and
the TANU political organization as additional agencies of socialization.54

The conclusion is that the Tanganyikan situation does not fit Coleman's
theory in this instance. As suggested, both points show the wide gap between
the modern and traditional sectors of developing nations. This gap elevates
the formal educational system into a more determinant role for the elite.
But this gap neither diminishes nor extinguishes the role of the family as the
prime socializer. This is impossible until there is a universal educational
system so that every student will encounter political socialization for
national citizenry. Until such time, other national agencies will continue to
complement the family socialization process.

In Egypt, the government is the most effective resocializing institution.
At the government's command to counter the primacy of the family is the educa-
tional system, the military, the religious system, the bureaucracy and the
cooperatives among others. To one degree or another, these socializing
agencies are all underdeveloped as Coleman maintains.
But the Egyptian leaders, in their attempts to counter-socialize individuals whose orientations have already been formed to some extent along traditional lines, have stressed the need for a compulsory, free educational system. The impact of the educational system's influence on the youth can be understood better with the use of figures. By 1970 projected population statistics show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0 - 19</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 - 44</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45 - --</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If it is possible to educate (to the age of 15 as projected) the largest portion of these students, then a sense of larger nationhood can be instilled. This is in fact being done today but efforts are also made to instill a sense of Arabness. The potential role of education's influence on political socialization is great in Egypt.

Both of these points help illustrate the wide gap between modern and traditional sectors of developing nations. This gap elevates formal education to a more determinant role in political socialization. In Egypt the role of the family will tend to diminish as the prime socializer as the process of forging the new nation continues.

The third issue relates to the effects of manifest political socialization. Coleman suggests that deliberate efforts to inculate particular attitudes and behavioral dispositions through the injection of a specific political content into the educational curriculum could decidedly affect cognition, affection, and political competence.

Harvey Glickman states: "Despite the opportunity to use the schools
In Tanganyika, for purposes of indoctrination and contrary to experience elsewhere, TANU has steered clear of rampant distortion of a basic elementary curriculum. Two reasons help explain this rejection of indoctrination policy. The first is that the teachers are generally integrated into the polity and thus are able to pass along political affection without incorporating doctrinaire attitudes into the curriculum. A high percentage of teachers at the primary and middle school levels are African and presumably few would be anti-government. At the secondary and higher school levels a majority of teachers are expatriates. It is unlikely that they would be good instruments now would they be used as instruments of political indoctrination.

The second reason is suggested by Glickman. TANU's and Tanganyika's nationalistic struggle for independence was brief and overwhelmingly successful. By 1959, TANU's goals were assured so that "the march to independence in 1961 required not mass pressure but intelligent support." He concludes that the failure to adopt a policy of propaganda and indoctrination results, at least in part, from the nature of political environment rather than an outgrowth of party policy.

The degree of self-conscious and explicit manipulation of the curriculum is negligible in Tanganyika. As Coleman suggests, such manipulation is highly variable and "depends not only upon the content but also upon the particular context and the strength of reinforcing or negating experiences and influences in the larger environment outside the school." In Egypt, unlike Tanganyika, it is important to call attention to the civics training which exists at both the primary and secondary level. The requisite information for analysis of the quantity or quality of this training in Egypt is unavailable, however. The contrast of these two systems illustrates the significance of the particular context and environment as Coleman has suggested.
The fourth issue of the overview concerns the significance of the school environment in the political socialization process. Agreement based on various studies, including Almond and Verba, focuses on the hypothesis that the school environment is important to the formulation of political attitudes and orientations. Yet much more comparative data is needed before one can generalize how the authority systems in Tanganyikan or Egyptian schools influence political attitudes.

Irrespective of the authority system, Coleman maintains, the school culture contributes significantly to latent political socialization in two respects: achievement orientation and elitism. The schools in developing nations tend to teach students through formal, abstract, and objective lessons which have no organic relation to the students' environment. Tanganyikan students, especially at the secondary level and above, develop a sense of achievement by being set apart from others not participating in their intellectual experience. By being privileged to attend school, the students develop the view that the educated class has a "natural right" to rule.

The most conclusive evidence to verify this generalization would be to test the students' attitudes on their feelings. Such research has not been done. Some insight into this problem of achievement leading to elitism is gained by looking at the structure of the educational system.

Examinations are an integral part of Tanganyika's educational system. Statistics illustrate that of the students in secondary school in 1964, nineteen failed for each one who managed to succeed. Such an attrition rate doubtlessly justifies an elitist view by the successful few.

A second reinforcing factor is the development of expectations and aspirations resulting from the colonial experience. The ruling colonial elite was small, educated and powerful. It appears, from personal observations and
interviews with African secondary students, that a powerful latent force was created by the colonial experience. This recently has been reinforced by the movement of educated Africans into high government posts. At the cabinet level, of seventeen ministers, six held bachelors' degrees, three had attended a cooperative college, one had a theological degree, and six had completed secondary education. 61

While teaching methods in Egypt are still formal and authoritarian, they are no longer dominated by a foreign educational system unrelated to the nation's needs. Efforts have been made to make the curriculum relevant to the environment.

The equality and freedom of educational choice in Egypt differs from the existing situation in Tanganyika. Few developing nations can afford universal primary education or a wide variety of choice at higher levels. In Egypt, the equality of opportunity, the openness of the educational system and the lack of dependence upon highly restrictive examinations produce sufficient numbers of educated young people that a criterion other than education will eventually have to be used to select leadership.

The second aspect of the school environment relates to the degree to which the school is isolated from other influences. Evidence supports the view that the "effects of education upon attitude formation and change are most marked when the school is set off rather sharply from its environment. 62 Theoretical considerations suggest that such isolation tends to give schools a more powerful role as political socializers.

Such isolation exists in the Tanganyikan society but secondary sources suggest that the schools' significance as a political socializer is dependent upon the strength of the content, context, and experience of socializing experiences in the larger environment outside the school. The context of the
political environment surrounding the national movement for independence and the socializing efforts of TANU through various agencies and communication channels tend to have the basic influence on developing political cognition, affection, and political competence. The schools' role is complementary to these efforts.

Coleman's conclusion appears to be congruent with this situation in Tanganyika even with the employment of different forces for socialization. He states that from society's viewpoint, "what may be gained by more concentrated and undistracted—and therefore effective—socialization of the educated few may be lost by a deepening of the gap between the elite and the mass." 65

Up to the present, the educational system in Tanganyika has been only superficially related to the total national efforts of political socialization. The overwhelming backlog of totally unschooled children (approximately fifty percent at the primary age and ninety-eight percent at the secondary age) and the illiterates (ninety percent) illustrates the need for other socializing agencies. Tanganyika has been able to employ such agencies in a beneficent manner. The educational system does have a vital role in providing the competence necessary for elite leadership. It is presently impossible to ascertain the relative importance of the educational system as compared to latent or other socializing forces. Glickman argues convincingly that political socialization for the educated elite is done outside the school environment.

Isolation is a predominant characteristic of schools in Egypt. In both the rural and urban situations, the school curricula are set off from the traditional life just as in Tanganyika. Efforts have been made to make education relevant to the life of the people. But in the final analysis, the whole educational system in Egypt has been molded to educate and adapt the youth to the modern world rather than the traditional one. The school environment is
sharply separated from its environment. Accordingly, such education does have an important impact upon the attitude formation within Egypt today.

Coleman notes that in developing nations effective political socialization may be detrimental to the polity's broader interests if such efforts deepen the gap between the elite and the mass. Egypt has made effective strides toward the prevention of such a chasm. Two efforts stand out. The implementation of a nearly universal and completely free education provides equal opportunity for all students. In addition, students may go just as far as their motivation and academic abilities permit.

The division of the system into academic and technical education provides a place for nearly everyone. A person who is effectively used and employed in the society will be more effectively integrated than one who is dysfunctional and alienated to the system.

The crucial issues of the education and political socialization nexus suggested by Coleman are useful in approaching that relationship in both Tanganyika and Egypt. What is most apparent in applying the scheme to political socialization in both countries is the need for data which relate specifically to Coleman's categories. Only after such basic research has been completed will it become possible to assess the relative importance of the educational system.

V. Political Recruitment

The theoretical considerations of political recruitment bear a close relationship to political socialization. Gabriel A. Almond, in The Politics of Developing Areas, characterizes political socialization as the process of induction into the political culture and the inculcation of basic attitudes toward the political system. Political recruitment is distinguished from this as the process of induction of individuals into specialized roles.67
Coleman introduces this section on political recruitment by drawing out the importance of social stratification and upward mobility. He believes that current theory suggests that one's chances for "achieving political elite status are vastly improved if he belongs to or rises into the upper level of the stratification system." Also, in "achievement-oriented societies, education tends to be the master determinant of social mobility and therefore education is the main, if not sole, key to political mobility into elite status." Therefore, greater stress is placed upon the possession of formal education than characterized by developed nations' economies at earlier stages of their economic development. This results directly from limited employment opportunities in the modern sector of the economy and the domination of these opportunities by government agencies, with the lack of ancillary mobility mechanisms.

Four problems are noted by Coleman which evolve from the question of education, social stratification and political recruitment. These problems, which have general applicability to new states, include: (1) post-independence anti-intellectualism; (2) the tension between incumbent political elites and new bureaucratic and technical cadres; (3) the restricted political mobility of second-generation aspirants; and (4) the anomie potential of unemployed school leavers.

Concerning the problem of post independence anti-intellectualism, Coleman states that generally "the intellectuals, the ideologues, and political figures who led in the agitation for independence have been rejected as a major political stratum which wields influence as a class." This is not to imply that the educated have been displaced but that some political power has gravitated from the educated to the lesser educated who command local power hierarchies. Second, the educated elite feels threatened by a younger, better
educated elite.

Tanganyika does not follow this pattern of displacing the group Coleman terms intellectuals with lesser educated elites. After more than five years of independence the only major figure prominent in the independence movement to fall has been Kasanga Tumbo, the former Tanganyikan High Commissioner in London. He was recruited out of the labor movement, not the intellectual elite. By comparing the list of cabinet ministers at the time of independence with the list today one notices switching of offices but certainly not the displacement of political power by lesser educated elites. The theoretical approach offers no assistance for explaining this incongruency. An historical explanation undoubtedly provides the best answer. The political power has not slipped to lesser educated people who command local power hierarchies because such local hierarchies fail to exist. The German rule effectively destroyed the traditional political elites.69 Thus, in Tanganyika, the national government has been able to establish and maintain a nationalistic government owing partly to the lack of competition from local hierarchies.

The educated elites in Tanganyika have shown awareness that they feel threatened by the younger, better educated generation. The development of an elitist mentality has permeated both the political elites and this new educated generation. In one decade both have equated education with providing an exaggerated sense of superiority and special legitimacy; both view the educated as having a natural right to rule.

It appears possible that disintegrative feelings could tear Tanganyika apart unless the importance of alternative means of recruiting for powerful political positions is recognized. This problem is also found in the civil service. As Europeans have left or leave, the posts are Africanized by the recruitment of young, elite, university graduates, all roughly the same age.
This absence of a normal age spread within the administrative hierarchy will produce a generation of employment stagnation. Tension is created within the younger group when they find entrance into these higher positions closed to them for 25 to 30 years. Only a few years ago a man with a university education accepted administrative posts with fellow Africans having only teachers diplomas. Now, however, the younger, less educated individual will have to be content to take a lower level position and hope for unexpected attrition.

It appears to be imperative that students become aware that the educational system is not the only legitimate means of political recruitment. The intellectuals, ideologues, and political figures all served time in less attractive occupations and positions before achieving a higher or top rank. Younger students, once they become aware that the best positions are limited, may actually facilitate integration of the society by offering their services to the commercial and industrial sectors. This could encourage the growth and development of those sectors with purposive results for the polity. Tanzania diverges from Coleman's general pattern yet the conclusion is the same: "Education comes to be ambivalently valued; it is not disesteemed; it is feared." 71

Little evidence of Coleman's post-independence anti-intellectualism is to be found in Egypt's bureaucracy even though it is entrenched with an educated group which, prior to 1952, remained overwhelmingly dominant. With the 1952 revolution came numerous attempts to reform the bureaucracy by the Revolutionary Command Council. It appears that the bureaucracy has less to fear from the younger, better-educated generation than from the regime itself; reforms do not flow from the younger generation, but from the regime. In Egypt then, education is not at all feared. Indeed, the regime places great emphasis upon the development of education.
The second problem, that of tension between the political regime and the bureaucrats, often develops when the society attempts to implement the modernization processes. This process requires a more educated and stronger bureaucracy due to the need for skilled training. If the bureaucracy becomes politically competitive with the politicians, then serious disruptive forces come into play.

Available information does not support the contention that tension exists between the political elites and bureaucracy in Tanganyika. Three reasons help to explain the lack of such tension. First, many of the positions which demand specialized skills are held by expatriate personnel, primarily the British. Expatriates may feel the frustration resulting from conflict between the political elites and their own branches, but as they are not integrally involved in the political process no crucial or divisive tension results.

A second reason is that the indigenous bureaucrats tend to be integrated into the polity and accept the goals of the government. The third reason has been the " politicization" of the Civil Service. Tanganyika rejected in 1963 the British model administration with the civil services barred from politics by official regulations. This framework of a politicized administrative machine tends to ease potential points of tension between the requirements of the technicians and the demands of the politicians. 72

In summary, Tanganyika has experienced a growth in the bureaucracy because of the demand for increased services and functions requisite for modernization. Cleavage has been avoided by integrating the civil service individually and collectively through a process of politicization. Because members of the bureaucracy and political elites are recruited from the same social strata, and because both, at the upper level at least, have achieved their positions partially as a result of educational competence, a political in-
tegrative experience has developed.

In Egypt, there is tension between the political leaders and the bureaucracy. Nasser expressed this in 1964 when speaking to the National Assembly. He listed the bureaucracy as a problem area of his government; he stated that the bureaucrats must learn the subservience of their role to the people. 73 But the tension has come, not from the emergence of the bureaucracy as a better educated and more modernizing agency of government, but rather from the pressure of the ruling regime on the bureaucracy as the primary impetus for change. Nasser's government has accused the bureaucracy of possessing too much power and of using it to the detriment of the nation. Consequently, Nasser has moved to restrict the bureaucracy's power by reorganizing local government, establishing the Arab Socialist Union and reforming the bureaucracy itself. Due to the degree of equality, in recruiting for public office today there is little difference in social class between the ruling regime and the bureaucracy. No dysfunctional relationships have evolved as Coleman suggests is the usual case in newly developing nations.

The third problem concerning recruitment, that of restricted political mobility of second generation aspirants, arises when rapid development does not occur. The incumbent groups fill the channels of upward mobility and there is no place for new graduates to go which will allow them to fulfill their expectations and aspirations.

This problem in Tanganyika has already been discussed. The nation has not been able to modernize as rapidly as citizens' aspirations have risen. Glickman cites a recent study which suggests that demands for modernization are outrunning overall capacity of the political system to fulfill them. It is with rapid development that jobs will expand in industry and commerce for the newly educated elite; this will do much to resolve the frustration. In
the meantime, this "marked devaluation of education, coupled with the reduction of status position, has sharpened the generational tensions between incumbents and aspirants."74

Egypt, in the period since 1952, has also been faced with this problem of restricted political mobility for younger citizens. Malcolm Kerr suggests it is the difficult problem of economic productivity underlying every major social question in Egypt which holds the key to fulfilling the aspirations of the younger intellectuals.75 This restriction which exists for the younger generation has another facet--this concerns limited political mobility. Upper economic mobility can be resolved by rapid, industrial development; most educated Egyptians could find a satisfying role to perform under such conditions. The second problem concerns the limited access which educated persons have to those holding political power, for they have no avenues to such power. The ruling regime is a closed group of military officers and the young have little access to them unless they are part of the military establishment.76

The government is aware of the need to channel the younger generation into useful employment. It is also aware that the educational system produces too many specialists in literary and related fields who are unemployed while scientists are able to demand and secure good positions. Among the solutions to the problem, the Egyptian government supplies teachers to other Arab (and some African) nations. In 1953-1954, 624 teachers were exported including 580 for Arab nations. By 1963-1964, this total had increased to 4,908 including 4,615 to Arab states.77

While the contribution to education in the Arab world is beneficent on Egypt's part, such action provides useful employment of others who might otherwise become malcontents. Another solution, which goes to the root of the problem, concerns the education curriculum. In Egypt's Five Year Plan (1960-
1965) they envisaged a gradual reduction in the number of students enrolled in the literary course in the secondary schools, so that the ratio would eventually stabilize at a level of three to one in favor of science. By 1962-1963 the ratio of science to literary students had increased to a four-to-one ratio: 71,534 in science, 16,603 in literary courses. The long run effects of this strategy should be valuable and should overcome the problems created by past surpluses of university graduates in such relatively unproductive fields as law, commercial accounting and liberal arts.

The fourth problem of recruitment, the anomic potential of unemployed school leavers, is an extension of the problem of restricted political mobility downward to the mass population. Coleman believes the two problems are analytically separable, anomic interest articulation being often created by the introduction of mass education, mainly for political purposes.

In 1961, Tanganyika received a promise from TANU of a free, universal eight-year educational system. The government was cognizant of the consequences of disparities between the rising output of the schools and a low rate of expansion in the economy. To overcome the associated dysfunctional problems, the government has now embarked upon a program to regulate educational development so it will match economic development.

Rather than spread the limited educational resources over the whole population, emphasis has been placed upon expansion of the secondary facilities, teacher training colleges, trade schools, and on the new University College. Another effort involves the plan to shorten the primary-middle school course from eight to seven years. More emphasis will be placed upon terminal education with the realization that few will be able to pursue education beyond the seventh year if and when it becomes universally available.
Such planning and implementation of education strategy is designed to prevent the anomic outbreaks of disillusioned school leavers. If such a plan is successful, then a larger increase in the unemployed and under-employed of such school leavers will be lessened. If it fails, the tendency of school leavers' political orientation toward the polity consequently will be marked by disaffection and alienation and their behavior will be potentially anomic.  

Egypt first introduced free compulsory primary education in the 1956 Constitution and rather effectively implemented it by the early 1960's. Two basic problems existed in 1956 and were compounded in a limited way with the implementation of free and compulsory education.

First, those coming out of elementary schools were without special skills and difficult to absorb into the labor market. Second, the social climate in the Arab world, as in Tanganyika, is such that once an individual receives an academic education he becomes an "urban gentleman;" manual labor is beneath his dignity and he will only seek and accept white collar employment; there is thus an over-abundance of clerks in government and business. This problem, which still exists, acts as a drain on the economy as well as being a political problem.

During the past decade, Nasser's government has attempted several solutions to reduce the potential anomic behavior of this group. To absorb the ever increasing flow of students who complete the elementary level, the educational system has been expanded to allow most students to continue in school until aged fifteen. If students are successful in their examinations, they can continue for three years additional training; the same is true of higher institutes and university education. The fluidity which has accompanied this educational expansion has taken many potentially alienated and unemployed youth out of the labor market while they continue their education. This will
undoubtedly create greater aspirations which, if left unfulfilled, will create grave problems for the regime. If those aspirants can secure specialized training in a needed area such as industrial technology they will be able to fulfill their own aspirations while providing a greater service to the nation.

A second policy is the selection process for the academic and technical educational programs. As discussed earlier, all students secure the same basic elementary education. In the preparatory school, students are channeled into vocational and academic streams according to ability. In secondary school, another division is made between scientific and literary courses. Students are able to stop or switch curricula depending upon ability, interest and motivation. Perhaps the most useful portion of the educational system is the stress on vocational training which is designed to fill technical and semi-technical positions in the economy. Both the elementary schools and the vocational training concept attack the "manual work is degrading" idea, but this basic problem persists. Economic development is needed desperately to integrate the lesser as well as the better educated groups into the polity; unless assured of an economic role, the acceptance of the nationalist and socialist ideology is tentative at best.

It has been a wise policy to buy time for such economic development through expanded education. But unless Egypt can produce economic benefits for those marked by potential disaffection and alienation toward the polity, instability and violence will result.

These problems concerning recruitment are not as applicable to Egypt due largely to the fact that Egypt is an "old" developing state. Education is important in upward mobility and formal education is under more stress than it was during a similar period in most developed nations. But Egypt has been independent for forty-four years; the major impetus for modernization only
began in 1952. A major factor to consider is the development of a strong bureaucracy prior to the pre-modernization period.

VI. Political Integration

The integrative role of education in modernization and political development results from successful political socialization and political recruitment. Coleman states: "If political socialization into the national polity has been and is effective and if the process of recruitment of bureaucratic and political roles have become regularized and legitimated, it is reasonable to assume that the society concerned is effectively integrated."83

Coleman, aware that integration maintains degrees of effectiveness, suggests two major factors to facilitate an evaluation of educational development as a malintegrative force in the modernization process. The two factors are the elite-mass gap and the division among groups from which national unity must come.

In the first place, education may perpetrate the elite-mass gap, a situation which Coleman regards as "the most striking characteristic of the social structure in most developing nations."84 Both Tanganyika and Egypt are faced with this gap.

While a majority of Tanganyika's students come from a rural environment, the schools' curricula tend to alienate them from the rural environment and orient them toward urban customs and patterns. Students believe educated Africans should not perform manual labor; some even believe that whites are unable to do such work. Ostensibly, these whites do no work because they are educated. Therefore, African students view themselves as educated and above the degrading work of the masses.

J. E. Goldthorpe, an East African sociologist, also suggests evidence which supports the notion that an elite-mass gap exists in Tanganyika. His
contention centers on the Africans' ardent desire to acquire education as the main avenue to wealth and power. This very training which provides access to wealth and power also tends to cut them off from the tribe, its traditional customs and culture.\textsuperscript{85}

Unfortunately, data are unavailable which clearly describe the depth of the elite-mass gap in Tanganyika. Statistics from the Ministry of Education show that ten percent of the people are literate.\textsuperscript{86} This gives one notion of the cleavage but does not tell anything about the nature of the division. Available evidence indicates that in 1961 ninety percent of the population lived in rural areas.\textsuperscript{87} This, coupled with the fact that approximately ninety-eight percent of secondary age children will not get into school, gives some indication of the potential and future problem with which Tanganyika must cope.

More detailed information is available for Egypt. Of the people over ten years of age in 1960, two-thirds were illiterate (12,587,686) and another one-fifth (3,923,386) were just functional literates. Over sixty percent of the work force was engaged in agriculture (4,406,386), most of which was subsistence.\textsuperscript{88} Most of these have little opportunity to benefit from the present regime.

The Egyptian government has not forgotten them, however. It has embarked upon what is called a "soundly based campaign which should lead to the eradication of illiteracy within fifteen years."\textsuperscript{89} To implement this, literacy courses have been made compulsory for all illiterates aged 18-50, and literacy certificates are to be required for any position in a factory or commercial enterprise. While it will be impossible to achieve compulsory training for illiterates, the latter requirement for employment should be a stimulus for such training.\textsuperscript{90}
Other examples could be used to illustrate the cleavage between the elite and mass in Tanganyika and, if data were available, in Egypt. The point could be drawn that if the educational systems continue to expand their facilities, they will finally eliminate this gap. The system provides equal opportunity for all in Egypt; at the present, six years of school are compulsory for eighty percent of the school age children. By 1970, it is hoped that nine years of compulsory education will be required.

Tanganyika is aiming for a seven-year universal primary education late in 1970. Over the next fifty years the elite-mass gap should diminish and education will gradually be replaced by other achievement factors for mobility. Salary scales and promotions can then be based upon performance, not on educational certificates or degrees.

In the second place, Coleman suggests, education may perpetuate or intensify divisions among various ethnic, regional and parochial groups out of which must rise a larger sense of national identity. Tanganyika has not experienced educational development as a malintegrative force in creating tension among various groups.

There are in Tanganyika divisions among the various ethnic groups (Arab, African, Indian and European) and parochial (tribal and religious) groups but no divisions exist among regional groups. There are 200 Bantu tribes in Tanganyika which make up the vast majority of her population, with sizeable minorities of Arabs and Indians and less than 20,000 Europeans in a population of 10,000,000. The various ethnic groups all have equal opportunity for government-supported educational opportunities and facilities. This has existed only since 1962 when the educational system was integrated. Integration had the effect of providing more places for Africans, especially at the higher levels and consequently resolving a potentially dysfunctional situation.
Even though educational opportunities are not spread evenly throughout the nation, malintegration does not occur because the slighted regions are the ones where there is little or no demand for education. Certain differences exist between the forward-looking Chagga tribe on the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro and the destitute Wagogo on the semi-arid central plateau. The Chagga are progressive, wealthy and over ninety percent literate; the Wagogo are just the opposite. But any divisions among them are not viewed as resulting from disparities in educational development.

The religious groups have experienced some conflict over disparities in comparative educational development. The Christian mission schools have generally had a "hidden test" for entrance; conversion to one particular sect was a prerequisite for admission to that sect's school, to the exclusion of Moslem students. Moslems justifiably complained about such tests and the fact that only government schools were available to them. Until recently the number of mission schools vastly outnumbered government schools. This conflict has been partially resolved in three ways: (1) by integrating Moslem students into mission schools; (2) by establishing an office in the education ministry to develop Moslem education and (3) by opening more government schools.93

In Egypt there are few ethnic, parochial or regional divisions which can serve as a source of conflict over the allocation of education facilities and opportunities. Ethnically, the Egyptians are essentially a single people sharing a common ancestry and culture. Parochial divisions are slight; out of a total population of approximately 28 million, some 26 million are followers of Islam and only two million are Copts, Jews and Christians.94

In the past the Copts had an educational advantage and some discrimination exists toward the Jews today. But both groups are sufficiently small; no
serious political problem is created. Within the various regions, unequal educational opportunity does exist with the urban areas possessing more schools proportionately than rural areas and lower Egypt more fortunately endowed than upper. Since the demand for education in these areas is slight, little malintegration has resulted.

Even though the process of educational development has not overcome regional inequalities, equalitarian political policies have provided equal access to education for the various social groups. In 1964, Nasser personally was faced with this problem. His daughter had failed to obtain a sufficient score on her examinations to enter the university. Nasser states: "I am proud of this and feel confident that our country now enjoys equality of opportunity. The daughter of peasants can enter the universities but the daughter of the President cannot because her grades are not good enough."95

As Coleman stated, in most instances education has created neither the elite-mass gap nor ethnic, regional and parochial divisions; the above descriptions of Tanganyika and Egypt verify this observation. The discussion also shows how education has served to perpetuate them; two explanations for this are suggested by Coleman. The first is that individuals, groups or regions which are already more developed have an inherent advantage over their less developed counterparts. Such an advantage will continue until other influences balance out the more developed with the less developed.

The second explanation formulated to explain the discontinuity goes to the heart of the capacity-equality dilemma. Developing nations, including Tanganyika and Egypt, are heavily committed to social and economic development. To maximize capacity it is necessary to concentrate resources where they will do the most good in terms of the achievement-oriented goal. This may mean emphasis upon an elite versus a mass educational system, upon preferential
recruitment from groups or areas having the necessary skills or upon prefer-
etial allocation of development funds for quick and substantial returns.

Tanganyika has sought to cope with the discontinuity by allocating time
and resources to the problems that demand solutions. These solutions maximize
capacity and minimize equality. Examples include the limiting of educational
resources rather than spreading them thinly over the whole population, re-
cruiting from the educated elites, and investing in infra-structures which
create conditions for growth.96

The result in Tanganyika is commensurate with Coleman's position. It is
difficult to maximize capacity and equality at the same time. If a nation
seeks to minimize capacity and maximize equality, it may disperse meager re-
sources until system capacity is greatly weakened if not destroyed. Tangan-
yika has not yet demanded the maximization of both capacity and equality. If
the pressure for modernization which Glickman has observed is correct, and if
that pressure grows, the Tanganyikan government may be forced to minimize even
equality more in order to provide the economic demands of the polity.

Egypt has sought to cope with this problem by maximizing equality, by
developing a universal educational system and by tying this educational out-
put (trained personnel) to plans for industrial expansion. In short, Egypt
is attempting to have her cake and eat it too. The problem involved here is
that the government may disperse meager resources in attempting to maximize
both capacity and equality until the system is greatly weakened, if not des-
troyed. If it is possible to achieve both a broad educational base and rapid
economic development, the answer to the success may lie in the fact that Egypt
had a broader educational base—thirty percent literacy as compared to many
developing nations, such as Tanganyika, of nearer ten percent—and compara-
tively well developed post-primary facilities. On the other hand, the Egyptian
government leaders might take this as a warning that their present inability to stimulate industrial development focuses upon the present allocation of scarce resources.

Education as a tool of modernization has played a decisive role in the political development of both Tanganyika and Egypt. Increased educational efforts have yielded increased political capacity. Attitudes have been changed, the gap between the elite and masses has vacillated and more of the population is now capable of participating and is participating in the modernizing process. The educational systems have sought to produce individuals skilled in the methods and technology needed for all sectors of a modern society though the emphasis varies. The changed emphasis from the humanities to the sciences and from academic to technical training has laid the foundation for more effective societal adaptation. This has been more pronounced in Egypt than Tanganyika. But most significantly for political development, Egypt's new educational system has been oriented to play a major role in the realization of equality in a modernizing society dominated by achievement and universalist norms. Tanganyika hopes for the same achievement but has employed a highly subjective system to achieve the goal.

Optimism is not all pervasive, however. Increased differentiation has produced new patterns of integration and conflict management. In the immediate future Tanganyikans and Egyptians may anticipate some dysfunctional results from the failure of their educational systems to successfully achieve integration. This is inevitable in the short run for highly motivated aspirants who have not found places in the economic and political structure. The road to political development may well be paved by economic development in both Tanganyika and Egypt.
VII. Evaluation

The ultimate goal of inquiry into political phenomena is explanation. In contrast to the hyperfactualism which passed as explanation in the early years in this century, political scientists today believe the key to the explanatory process is the general statement or generalization. Attempts to prove and link empirical data to bodies of theory are now common within the discipline. Coleman's approach to the educational-polity relationship is a good example of such an attempt to produce a middle gauge theory. This evaluation will attempt to illustrate the way in which Coleman's efforts fit into an empirical broad gauge theory.

Coleman's approach relates generalizations about empirical data; this is observed in the relationships between political socialization, political recruitment, political integration, and political development. As a framework for making comparisons, Coleman's approach is also valuable; his organization around specific and related functions provides a basis for comparing two systems such as those of Tanganyika and Egypt.

Coleman's approach is limited by his failure to provide for an historical explanation of the educational-polity relationship. The differences in educational traditions of Tanganyika and Egypt and the impetus for modernizing education help to explain the evolution of the particular functions and goals of their respective educational systems.

Another limitation relates to the predictive value of his approach. Coleman does not attempt to suggest educational criteria for takeoff of a nation. He observes only that education is the prime determinant of change and makes no mention of the direction of that change. Perhaps the literacy rate or some measure of higher education might be keyed to some elementary concepts of predictable take-off of other structures and functions. Perhaps the
emphasis should be placed not on educational development but on developmental education, if one is interested in manipulating particular educational systems to achieve political development.

The greatest problem involved in applying Coleman's theoretical approach to two developing nations relates to the collection of data. Coleman suggests questions to be answered and hypotheses to be tested. But it is difficult to secure applicable data which will fit within the framework and at the same time be comparable. A more efficient application of the approach could be achieved by doing field research in each country, collecting a specific pattern of data to fit the framework.

An evaluation of Coleman's theoretical approach must consider his conceptual definitions. These are integrally related to the advantages of using this approach in studying educational-polity relationships.

The definition of education is limited to formal schooling. The usefulness of this definition lies in the concise definition which is limited to a manageable concept for study. By the same token, the concept of education, as Coleman uses it, limits analysis to only the formal structure and its relationship to political development. Much education which affects political development and the other three functions takes place outside the classroom. Youths, for example, receive training at home and in religious institutions which affect their knowledge and attitudes toward political development and political socialization, recruitment and integration. This problem is clearly illustrated throughout this paper (i.e. the role of TANU educational efforts in Tanganyika and the "Friday Sermons" in Egypt).

A related problem concerns the difficulty of empirically isolating formal education because of the many intervening variables of other educational experiences. Even after the formal educational experience has been isolated as much
as possible, it is still impossible to state categorically its exact influence. This is more the general limitation of the discipline than the explicit fault of Coleman.

Coleman's definition of political development is useful on two counts. First, there is a clear relationship of education to the definition of development. Coleman states that education would seek to be the prime determinant of political development. While data presented in the paper may not validate conclusively this relationship, they certainly lend support to that position. Also clear is the role of education in secular change as witnessed in societal adaptation to structural differentiation, political capacity and equality. This was best developed in the section on political integration. The government of Tanganyika is forced to modernize but yet must balance such consideration in order to achieve and maintain political stability. Egypt gives less consideration to traditional legitimacy than Tanganyika but is still caught up by modernization efforts.

Second, Coleman's definition of political development is effectively neutral. It implicitly favors neither a democratic nor a non-democratic society, even though a specific value judgment is made in any discussion of the relative development of nations. This lack of bias facilitates research in developing areas where political systems, such as those of Tanganyika and Egypt, are characterized by numerous non-democratic features. In the broad scope of political research and analysis, this inclusiveness will prove advantageous.

Political socialization is the most specific and developed of the definitions employed by Coleman. The suggestions for inquiry presented by the discussion of socialization and political development are valuable. They show that the schools may play a significant role in identifying the individual with the political system. Also of importance is the fact that the specific
identification will vary depending on other factors outside the formal school environment.

It is unfortunate that Coleman is not more explicit in defining political recruitment. Coleman clearly discusses the theoretical relationship of education, upward mobility, and political elite status. Left unclarified is the breadth of the category of political elites. Within this category he discusses and generalizes education's influence upon politicians, bureaucrats, and unemployed school leavers. The four problems discussed have general applicability to new nations and are worthy of research and analysis; they are not, however, closely related to educational and occupational mobility or to the issue of whether high occupational status necessarily leads to political power.

The discussion of political integration is conceptually on a higher level than the other two functions. Within Coleman's structural-functional framework political integration is the goal of the political system. The discussion of political integration focuses not on the positive relationship of successful implementation of political socialization and political recruitment, but rather upon the ways education may be disintegrative in the modernization process. Coleman suggests and pursues two questions of discontinuity--elite-mass gap and intensification or perpetuation of divisions--and education's relationship to these dimensions.

Coleman's work on the disintegrative implications of education illustrates the capacity-equality dilemma which faces developing nations. Two major problems are involved here. First, Coleman makes no effort to designate when or how political integration is achieved; it is helpful to know how disintegration may take place but it says little or what Coleman suggests is most significant. The second problem is the unclear designation of the relationship of political integration to political development. While Coleman
uses the two terms synonymously, he fails to distinguish how the achievement of integration will affect or contribute to political development. Since this point should tie together the whole conceptual framework, it is imperative that this relationship be more explicit.

The orientation of the theory (education to political development) creates certain problems for utilizing this theory for comparison. Coleman recognizes that the educational structure affects the polity just as the polity formulates and guides the educational system. This research suggests that the relationship is so intertwined that any theory of education and political development needs to incorporate explanations of the educational-polity relationships. An example of this is the process of political socialization where the relationship is not uni-directional. The political system significantly directs the process of political socialization as implemented by the schools. While Coleman intended to deal only with educational-polity relationships, some type of multi-variate analysis would be of greater theoretical value to illustrate the complexity of the processes involved.

The structural-functional framework in which Coleman conceptualized his theoretical approach contributed the inherent limitations and advantages of such an approach. First, Coleman does not state how he selected structure, functions or goals—political integration and political development. The lack of an objective criterion not only creates questions as to whether one has the right structure, function or goal but, on a practical plane, how does one distinguish one possibility from another? Second, criticism must be leveled at the analysis in general for not providing some utilization of quantitative measurements.

Coleman skillfully employs the structural-functional framework to study the survival or disintegration tendencies of political systems by isolating
the capabilities of the educational structure to perform different functions with available resources. This framework does not conceive of structural-functionalism as a static framework but rather as moving toward an ever-changing equilibrium. In this, political socialization and recruitment are continuing processes necessary for political integration. Changes are required of socialization and recruitment to achieve integration. Integration is stability but the stability concept is dynamic since it requires considerable effort on the part of the educational structure to perform specific requisite functions to maintain that stability.

The preceding analysis appears dominated by disadvantages and limitations. This is not an accurate impact of Coleman's approach. Education and Political Development is illustrative of the recent concern placed upon educational-polity questions and upon comparative politics and political theory. Much of the negative criticism has resulted from the under-development of political theory today. Coleman is writing within the context of contributing to the development of a general political theory. The negative criticism implies limitations of a creative work; it is sympathetic criticism, for to be otherwise would be to criticize Coleman for shortcomings of a creative piece of research.

Two general observations conclude this evaluation of Coleman's theoretical approach. The first concerns the explanatory power of the theory. As suggested previously, this theoretical framework provides no grand explanations of the deductive, broad gauge type. The theory does, however, deal with three significant issues in the educational-polity nexus. It deals with these issues inductively. The theory appears to be useful in explaining not so much the interrelation of functions to goal achievement as the ways the functions are fulfilled by the educational structure.
The predictive value of this theory is also limited. It best fits into the category of probabilistic theory. Coleman never states that if conditions X, Y, and Z exist then Q will result. While in an academic sense he does not claim predictive value for his theory, the application of this theory could be useful in determining prescriptive measures for educational-polity problems.

The second observation concerns the usefulness of the theory. Coleman's theoretical approach offers assistance in discovering and explaining new fields, new theories and new points of view. Coleman suggests leads to new research and his classification system will make the theory and related structural-functional theories more operative.

The tasks which Coleman set for himself in this project were Herculean. He has developed a theoretical framework and explanatory hypotheses. He has taken one structure of the larger social system and attempted to analytically separate its influence on the polity from other influences. And he has made significant progress in this attempt. From these efforts have come more precise definitions, more meaningful restatements of political relationships in educational-polity questions, insight for prescriptive measures for polities and assistance in discovering leads to new research, and a framework for comparison. This theoretical approach can usefully and effectively be applied in the study of educational-polity questions.
FOOTNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 13.

4. Ibid., p. 15.

5. Ibid., p. 18.


11. Ibid., p. 129.


   ** Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 1081.

   *** Knight, p. 23, 37, and 43.

16 Knight, p. 73.


22 Coleman, p. 179.

23 Matthews and Akrawi, p. 111 ff.


25 Matthews and Akrawi, p. 16.

26 Coleman, p. 172-173.


29 Coleman, p. 176.

30 Qubain, p. 70.


32 Coleman, p. 172.


34 Ibid., p. 120.


37 Ibid., p. 288 and 292-312.


40 Adapted from Sasnett and Sepmeyer, p. 34, and World Survey of Education, Vol. IV, p. 1148-1149.


42 Coleman, p. 18.

43 Ibid., p. 19.

44 Ibid., p. 20.


46 Ibid., p. 71-91.


48 Coleman, p. 22.


51 Basic Statistics, p. 32-33.

52 Coleman, p. 21.
Ibid., p. 22.

Glickman, p. 140.

Rat: Statistics, p. 34.

Glickman, p. 142.

57 The exact percentages of expatriate and nationals are unavailable.

Glickman, p. 142.

59 Coleman, p. 23.

Ibid., p. 23.


Coleman, p. 25.

Ibid., p. 25.

Almond and Coleman, p. 26 ff.


Ibid., p. 27.

Ibid., p. 27.


I recall a prominent visitor, a parliamentary secretary, to the Alliance Secondary School in Tanzania. He had four years of schooling; his career included work as a policeman, a member of the King's African Rifles, and a party worker. He visited the school to talk about recruiting students for agricultural occupations. The speech, given in English, was poorly read in halting English. After listing the advantages of a "KAR" or "C" in agriculture, he changed his tenor and spoke in Swahili. He assured the students that an education was not sufficient to hold a position of importance. The students should stop feeling their importance because they were educated and get to
work. A student remarked to me later, "What does he know? He has four years of school. I have ten. I'm better qualified for his job than he."

71 Coleman, p. 23.

72 Glickman, p. 143-145.


75 Coleman, p. 190.

76 Ibid., p. 192.


78 Qubain, p. 24.

79 Coleman, p. 29.

80 Glickman, p. 142.


83 Coleman, p. 30.

84 Ibid., p. 30.


In one sense the new seven year syllabus is an attempt to maximize capacity and equality by providing a terminal educational plan which will prepare students for work. It still minimizes equality as it is presently impossible to provide a universal, free educational system.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents and Government Publications


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents and Government Publications


Books


**Articles**


**Periodicals and Newspapers**


EDUCATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN TANGANYIKA AND EGYPT

by

KENYON NEAL GRIFFIN

B. A., Fort Hays Kansas State College, 1961

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1968
Education and Political Development in Tanganyika and Egypt

The relationship of education to political development has received little attention in past years from either political scientists or educators. James S. Coleman attempts to bridge this gap in Education and Political Development, a systematic study relating the educational-polity nexus to a theory of political development.

The purpose of this research project is two-fold. The initial purpose is to apply Coleman's conceptual framework to a study and comparison of the polities in Tanganyika and Egypt. The second purpose is to derive from the applications an evaluation of the theory's value as a guide for systematic analysis.

Part one outlines Coleman's conceptual framework. Part two surveys the historical development of formal education in Tanganyika and Egypt; emphasis is placed upon the most recent period when the drive for modernization has been the greatest. Part three summarizes the contemporary educational systems in each country. This section includes information on curricula and structures which is utilized in the application of Coleman's framework.

Parts four, five and six contain the comparative application of Coleman's three functions—political socialization, political recruitment, and political integration—and their relationships to political development. Part seven concludes with an evaluation of the theory's value. Conclusions from this study illustrate both advantages and disadvantages relevant to the utility of this theoretical framework.

Coleman's theory provides a useful outline for organizing materials. It suggests questions and hypotheses which need to be researched and answered. The approach to the educational-polity nexus is essentially descriptive. But
the utilization of terms which have been clearly conceptualized makes possible better descriptions and lends hope to eventually subjecting hypotheses to rigorous testing.

The framework is a theoretically comparative device, as illustrated by the two case studies on Tanganyika and Egypt. Much of this is due to the means by which the approach organizes the materials. The major problem encountered relates to this comparative aspect, however. Coleman suggests what materials may be useful in explaining education's relationship to political development. Much of the necessary data is not available so one is unable to compare data country-by-country and must compare similar information which relates to the topic at hand.

Coleman's theoretical framework is not a broad gauge theory capable of deductive generalizations. It is a framework for making comparisons which attempts to relate general statements about education and political development. While the framework Coleman developed does not always relate general statements clearly and concisely, the approach has considerable utility for the manner in which it does relate specific political functions to political development.