DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, WORLD SYSTEM POSITION AND POLITICAL REPRESSION: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

by

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Problem of Political Repression

Concern with the functions and processes of the polity has long been an area of study (e.g., Levine and Cornwell, 1972; Orum, 1978). This is understandable given the far-reaching consequences of government in society. However, there is one topic that has received little serious consideration: government repression. At first glance, this is surprising since government repression has far-reaching social, political and human consequences.

But a closer look reveals some impediments that have contributed to this lack of consideration. Historically, it can be attributed to serious imperfections in the means available for monitoring government repression world-wide. The problem was (and still is) further compounded by government efforts to disguise and conceal the true state of affairs. These obstacles have been at least partially overcome by recent collections of comparative data (e.g., Gastil, 1978-82; Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, b) that have improved both the quality and quantity of data regarding, among other things, the extent of civil and political liberties, government sanctions, and political executions.
Public policy is another factor that can and has influenced the extent of focus on political repression. Since it often sets the tone for any coordinated effort to address social problems, its declining commitment to the problem of repression is unfortunate. In spite of efforts by organizations such as Amnesty International, which attempt to monitor violations of human rights around the world, the issue in recent years has been overshadowed by "more pressing" global problems. One contributing factor has been the declining commitment of the United States to the improvement of human rights and the elimination of repression. Klare and Arnson argue that the Reagan Administration has reversed the efforts of President Carter by acting "to downgrade the importance placed on human rights in official government policy" (1981:2). This shift is rather unfortunate for it serves to undermine many efforts directed at improving the sorrowfully deteriorated state of human rights.

These are some of the factors that have dampened the interest in government repression. Concomitantly, the acuteness of the problem has taken on new dimensions and is now an integral part of international relations. For example, according to some observers (e.g., Klare and Arnson, 1981), the Reagan Administration with the cooperation of its allies are engaged, with missionary zeal, in "supplying repression" to a number of right-wing authoritarian regimes through what is known as the
"international repression trade." This is an area of commerce in which authoritarian regimes actively trade with various western powers to acquire the technology and know-how to suppress opposition.

Furthermore, present circumstances in El Salvador, Chile and South Africa give us reason enough to pursue, for both intellectual and practical reasons, contributions in this area. Conditions of this magnitude undoubtedly pose a challenge for understanding the socio-economic conditions upon which such actions are founded and presents us with the question of the extent to which government repression is more endemic to certain nations.

Hopefully, the above discussion is sufficient to indicate the importance of repression as both an intellectual and moral problem, and thus one deserving of attention. Any effort to address this problem must begin with a discussion of the meaning of repression. The following section focuses on this issue. Then I state the purpose of this thesis which in general will be to examine and test three competing theoretical perspectives on government repression. I will then present a statement of the theoretical significance of the proposed research and conclude the chapter with a summary of the chapter and an overview of the remaining chapters.
Political Repression Defined

Like many issues of concern to social scientists, government repression has been defined in various ways. McCarmant (1984:22), for example, defines political repression as:

those coercive activities carried out by rulers against opposition, real or imagined, for the purpose of weakening its ability to oppose or take control.

Although McCarmant (1984) does not elaborate, this interpretation includes two essential elements: 1) the use of coercion; and 2) the purpose of coercion. Together these two features explain government repression as actions with specific intentions. This definition denotes acts of forcefully curbing or restraining dissent in order to maintain the status quo. It is a fairly accurate interpretation of repression. However, it is limited in its scope and some elaboration may therefore be appropriate.

First, one may argue that the threat of coercion is also repressive in nature and thus should be included in any definition, since it may serve to inhibit any potential opposition. Second, the above definition limits the idea of repression to coercive activities against a "real or imagined" opposition. Implicit in this, but perhaps in need of additional emphasis, is the notion that a perceived threat (by an opposition) against the authorities can be
crucial in coercive activities. As Duff and McCamant (1976:25) point out, repression is really a reflection of the insecurity felt by the government:

it is an indication that the government feels threatened. It is an admission by the government that the population would like to express its dissatisfaction with the government or the social situation...and would express such discontent if it were allowed to do so.

For comparison we can look to the definition provided by Bissel et al. (1978, cited in Stohl and Lopez, 1984:7):

the use of coercion or the threat of coercion against opponents or potential opponents in order to prevent or weaken their capability to oppose the authorities and their policies.

This definition is more complete than the former. A synthesis of the two, however, may provide a more adequate definition of repression. Thus, I will define government repression as the threat or use of coercion against opponents - perceived or potential - in order to inhibit their ability to express opposition to authorities and/or their policies.

Statement of Purpose

Recent focus on the human rights situation around the world has coincided with a rekindling of interest and scholarly research on political repression (e.g., Wolfe, 1973; Duff and McCamant, 1976; Timberlake and Williams, 1984) and democracy (e.g., Winham, 1970; Jackman, 1974;
Bollen, 1983; Bollen and Jackman, 1985). To a large extent existing comparative research has centered on tests of three alternative theoretical perspectives on political repression: the conflict approach (e.g., Jacobs and Britt, 1979; Williams and Timberlake, 1984); the modernization approach (e.g., Timberlake and Williams, 1984); and the dependency/world systems approach (e.g., Timberlake and Williams, 1984). However, cross-national research in this area is limited. In particular, researchers have not simultaneously tested all three perspectives.

This thesis represents an attempt to fill this gap by evaluating the empirical validity of the three alternative theoretical perspectives on government repression. The first step will be to review the three theoretical perspectives and examine the existing empirical research for each theoretical perspective. Then, specific hypotheses derived from the three alternative perspectives will be tested simultaneously.

Summary and Overview

In this chapter I addressed the problem of government repression. I also considered the definition of repression and concluded by outlining the purpose and significance of the thesis. Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the three theoretical arguments and includes an overview of empirical research on each orientation. Chapter 3 consists of a
discussion of the data and method used in the study. Chapter 4 contains the findings of the study. Finally, a discussion of the significance and implications of the findings is presented in Chapter 5.
The practice of emphasizing one approach and deemphasizing or ignoring the relevance of another is a common practice. Attempts at formulating explanations of government repression are also prone to this practice. Most cross-national studies of government repression have centered on tests of one of three contending "iconic" models; namely, the conflict, modernization, and dependency/world-system approaches.

This thesis departs from the conventional practice and will instead simultaneously test three hypothesis derived from the three competing theoretical perspectives. This chapter outlines the divergence, but more importantly, the relevance of each of the perspectives in explaining government repression. The chapter is divided into three main sections - each section contains an outline of the theoretical perspective and a discussion of the relevant empirical research.
The Conflict Approach

Proponents of the conflict orientation propose that a high level of internal economic inequality is a primary determinant of government repression. The contention is that economic inequality both reflects and perpetuates elite control of political power and this leads to government repression. This hypothesis has its foundations in the Marxian conception of the structure of society. In this regard, it may be appropriate to first examine the main elements of Marx's contributions to an understanding of the nature of society. This is followed by a discussion of the role of the state which will be centered around the debate between conflict theorists in the structuralist and the instrumentalist theoretical camps. Finally, this section concludes with a review of the extant empirical research.

Marx and Class Conflict. For Marx, society can be understood as consisting of two key elements: the substructure and the superstructure. The substructure (composed of the forces of production and the relations of production) is the foundation determining the character of the basic institutions of society (i.e., the superstructure). In the following passage, Marx and Engels (1968:182 [1859]) summarize their position on the nature of
the relationship between the substructure and superstructure:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general.

The mode of production is a system of production in which individuals interact with each other and nature for their material existence. Each mode of production is the product of the relationship between the forces and relations of production. The forces of production include the instruments and technology used in the production process. Within the relations of production, on the other hand, there exists a class of owners of the means of production and a class of non-owners (as well as various subsidiary classes such as the petit-bourgeoisie and the lumpen proletariat, in capitalism, which are aligned with one or the other of these two major classes). It is the relationship between the two classes in the capitalist mode of production which is of primary concern here.

Proponents of this perspective argue that there is open or incipient hostility between the two classes owing to the exploitation and domination of the non-owners by the owning class. It is important to note that domination, in
Marxist thought, is not an inherent part of the human condition, just as conflict is not an inherent feature of human nature. Domination and conflict are inherent (only) in class societies... (Miliband, 1977:18). The basis of this "inherent" domination of one class by another is the process of capital accumulation where the dominant class has to necessarily (and continuously) extract surplus value. The acceleration of capital accumulation and exploitation of the laboring class are the forces that give rise to the polarization of wealth between the two primary classes and that intensify the antagonism and hostility between them.

Although Marxists would argue that class domination is economically determined, it nevertheless transcends the economic sphere and emerges as the underlying feature of the superstructure—having "many different and related facets" (Miliband, 1977:20). In this tradition, the state emerges as an institution which reflects the existing relations between the classes. Unlike other theories of the state, Marxist theory does not see this institution as representative of "society as a whole." This, according to Miliband (1977:66), follows from the Marxian conception of society as "class society." The state is not detached from the prevalent class conflict but is a fundamental part of it: "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels, 1948:11). This famous and often quoted statement represents the foundation for much of the debate...
among political sociologists regarding the political economy of the state; and the extent of this controversy is no less intense within the Marxian school of thought than it is among those outside it (e.g., Miliband, 1977; Poulantzas, 1978). Within Marxism the controversy has taken the form of a debate between the instrumentalists and structuralists.

**The Instrumentalists.** Marxists of the instrumentalist persuasion (e.g., Sweezy, 1942; Domhoff, 1967; Miliband, 1977) generally regard the state as an instrument of the bourgeoisie. This interpretation of the state is closely aligned with the sentiments of Marx and Engels expressed in *The Communist Manifesto* (1948). According to Paul Sweezy, for example, the state is "an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure." (1942:243). Domhoff's (1967, 1971) work is representative of the major contemporary contributions to the Instrumentalist view. He provides an elaborate description of the professional and personal interrelationships and links between top government and corporate elites. This strong reciprocal relationship is further intensified by the exchange of strategic roles in government and the economy. Consequently, those of the instrumentalist persuasion claim that "corporate leaders act in concert with political and other institutional leaders to protect capitalist interests and to assure preservation of the prevailing class system" (Marger, 1981:104).
The Structuralists. The structuralist alternative puts more emphasis on the structure of society than on the links between the elites (Marger, 1981:104). Nicos Poulantzas (1969) is one prominent Marxist of the structuralist persuasion who argues that the contradictions of the (capitalist) economic system make it necessary for the state to represent the interests of the capitalist class:

"(T)he direct participation of members of the capitalist class in the state apparatus and in the government, . . . is not the important side of the matter. The relation between the bourgeois class and the state is an objective relation. This means that if the function of the state in a determinate social formation and the interests of the dominant class in this formation coincide, it is by reason of the system itself: the direct participation of members of the ruling class in the state apparatus is not the cause but the effect, and moreover a chance and contingent one, of this objective coincidence (Poulantzas, 1969, cited in Gold et al., 1975:36)."

Poulantzas views the state as relatively autonomous "from manipulation by specific capitalist-class members or interests" (Gold et al., 1975:38). Instead, he maintains that the state performs the function of "mediating" the contradictions of the capital accumulation process which are potentially destructive to the economic system.

Economic Inequality and Repression. Despite the differences between these two views, the underlying theme of both views is that the state is a function of the logic of the mode of
production; it is "the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms" (Lenin, 1974:8). As class polarization (characterized by economic inequality) increases, it intensifies class conflict and threatens the security and stability of the state and economic structure. This increases the likelihood that the state will engage in repressive activities.

This interpretation of the state provides us with a testable hypothesis: Economic inequality has a positive effect on repressive activities.

Previous Empirical Research. A number of researchers have examined the relationship between inequality and the use of force as a means of social control. Jacobs and Britt (1979), for example, tested this relationship in the context of state governments in the United States; that is, the unit of analysis in their study was the American state. They operationalized state coercion (the dependent variable) as the use of deadly force by the police. This indicator was measured by the number of killings committed by the police between 1961 and 1970 as a proportion of the mean population for the same period. The Gini index of income inequality for 1960 was employed as a measure of income inequality. After controlling for eight other variables (i.e., police per capita, percent change in population, percent black, percent of state residents residing in large cities, violent crime
rates, border status, southern status, and percent poor, they found a significant and positive relationship between income inequality and police use of deadly force.

Until recently, cross-national research examining the relationship between inequality and the use of repression has been limited. Williams and Timberlake's (1984) "Structured Inequality, Conflict, and Control: A Cross-National Test of the Threat Hypothesis" has been a welcome contribution to the literature. Drawing from the conflict argument, they test the hypothesis that income inequality has a positive impact on the use of negative sanctions by national governments. Government sanctions (1973–77) was used as an aggregate measure of government repression. Income inequality was estimated by the concentration of income in the top ten percent of total households in a country. With a sample of seventy nations, they found that inequality did not have a significant effect on government sanctions. They also included political exclusion as an independent variable in order "to explore the nature of the relationship" between the two (1984:420). The results indicate that politically exclusive regimes tend to be more repressive. In addition, they also found that income inequality had a significant positive effect on political exclusion. Given this, they suggest the possibility of an indirect relationship between income inequality and government sanctioning.

One important point of concern however, Williams and
Timberlake (1984) treated political exclusion as analytically distinct from repression. They used the Gastil (1982) "political rights index" as an indicator of the extent of political exclusion in a nation. This index reflects "the formalized ability of people to play a part in determining who and what laws or policies will govern one's country" (1984:423). Nations are ranked on a seven-point scale where a rating of (1) indicates that a state is least exclusive; having an open and competitive electoral process. A rating of (2) is given to states that are relatively free but experience extreme economic inequality or use intimidating violence. Ratings of (3) to (5) reflect states with "less effective implementation of democratic processes" (1982:9). A rating of (6) is given to states without a competitive electoral process and (7) for states where top political leaders "appear by their actions to feel little constraint from public opinion or popular tradition" (1982:15).

As mentioned, they predicted and presented empirical support for a positive relationship between exclusion and repression. A more appropriate interpretation of this index might be that it is simply another manifestation of government repression. Support for this claim can be established from their conclusion that: "Elitist governments are structurally repressive in the sense that they deny the masses access to political participation" (1984:425). In sum, while Williams and Timberlake (1984) included political
exclusion as an independent variable in their analysis, the nature of the "political rights index" suggests that it is more appropriate and theoretically sound to view exclusion as another aspect of government repression. In fact, in a later study by Muller (1985) on the relationship between income inequality, repression and political violence, the "political rights index" was employed as a measure of government repression.

These two indicators then (i.e., sanctions and exclusion) can be viewed as empirical manifestations of a similar concept: government repression. Consequently, by including political exclusion as an independent variable, the effect of income inequality on government sanctions may have been suppressed. In light of this, it is only fitting that this relationship be reevaluated. In this thesis I reexamine the relationship between income inequality and government sanctions — omitting the variable political exclusion.

The Modernization Approach

A major factor contributing to the increased concern with development and social change has been the emergence of new independent nations and the problems associated with their independence. The literature in this area is immense and was instrumental in leading much of the research in the social sciences during the 1950s and 1960s. Modernization theorists were basically concerned with societal evolution
and the transition of nations from traditional to modern societies (e.g., Levy, 1967; Moore, 1963).

By employing and modifying the typologies of classical evolutionary theorists, modernization theorists identified the dominant factors essential to "modernization." One main focus of modernization theorists has been the concern with political development. Contributions in this area — both normative and empirical — are substantial and reflective of an area of inquiry that is broad and diverse (cf. Chadok, 1973:229-251). Interestingly enough, amidst this diversity there remains a strong association between economic and political development. Another common feature of this social mobilization approach, as it is often called, is its emphasis on endogenous structural factors that are perceived as functionally constituting and influencing particular social structures.

The idea of government repression is very much related to the development issue. As Duff and McCamant (1976) state, modernization theorists hold that government repression is inversely related to economic development. This view can be attributed to the works of, among others, Lerner (1958) and Lipset (1959). Implicit in these works on economic development and political democracy is an argument about the causes of government repression. The discussion here will center on examining the relationship between economic development, political democracy and government repression.
Economic Development and Government Repression. While there have been numerous definitions of "modernization," it is often equated and associated with industrialization and technology. Levy (1967:190) defines modernization in terms of technological advancement and considers a society more modernized:

the greater the ratio of inanimate to animate power sources and the greater the extent to which human efforts are multiplied by the use of tools.

A somewhat broader but related definition of modernization is:

(the) total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the advanced, economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World...In fact, we may...speak of the process as industrialization. Industrialization means the extensive use of inanimate sources of power for economic production, and all that entails by way of organization, transportation, communication, and so on (Moore, 1963:89, 91-92 as cited in Appelbaum, 1970:38).

Note that there is a strong tendency to relate modernization with socio-economic (and industrial) development. Those who adhere to the modernization position regard these socio-economic changes as essential to the development of political democracy. Lerner (1958), for example, presents a sequential and causal interpretation of this process. He claims that the "secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence
Urbanization is seen as the "take-off" stage of this process—necessitating the transformation of traditional constructs and establishing the basis for the modern production process. This development encompasses increased literacy. As a nation's literacy rate increases, the mass media become prominent and further stimulate higher literacy and education. These socio-structural changes are essentially prerequisites and reproductive forces of economic development.

Just as modernization continues to promote education and literacy, it leads to increased public awareness and participation in the political process. This transition creates a more diffuse and democratic political structure. As Lerner explains, "Democratic governance...typically appears as a crowning institution of the participant society" (1958:64). Thus, economic development, or more generally, modernization necessarily spearheads processes of political change and initiates the emergence of a democratic political system. As such, economically developed nations are perceived to have greater civil and political liberties. This orientation, then, can be logically expanded to include the notion of government repression. Since the institutionalization of democratic processes involves the notion of a participant society (which includes the ability of people to express opposition and dissent), the lack of such freedom clearly reflects the exclusive and repressive nature of a regime. Therefore, as economic development
leads to democratization, the incidence of government repression also becomes less frequent and consistent. I will test the hypothesis that economic development has a negative effect on government repression.

Previous Empirical Research. The relationship between the emergence of modern institutions and democracy has been empirically analyzed by, among others, Lerner (1958), Lipset (1959), McCrone and Cnudde (1967), Smith (1969), Winham (1970), Bollen (1983) and Bollen and Jackman (1985). While diverse measures of political democracy have been used by previous cross-national researchers, there is general support for a positive relationship between socioeconomic development and political democracy.

Bollen (1983), for example, finds strong support for a positive relationship between economic development and political democracy for a sample of one hundred countries. Political democracy was measured with an index consisting of six indicators: (1) fairness of elections; (2) whether chief executives are elected or not; (3) the means of selecting legislators and the effectiveness of the process; (4) freedom of the press; (5) freedom of opposition groups; and (6) use of government sanctions (1983:471; see Bollen [1980] for a description of this index). Economic development was measured as energy consumption per capita (see Bollen, 1983:471-472).
However, the relationship between economic development and government repression has not been fully explored. Timberlake and Williams (1984) research provides little support for this assertion. The results of their analysis indicate that economic development has a negative effect on repression, but the effect is weak.

The Dependency/World Systems Approach

The influence of modernization theory has recently been eclipsed by the critique and revisions presented by proponents of the dependency approach regarding the nature of relations between modern and non-modern nations (e.g., Dos Santos, 1976 [1968]; Frank, 1969). The inability of most Third World nations and especially Latin America to overcome severe structural problems despite the diffusion of modernizing agents stimulated the early literature on dependency. Andre Gunder Frank (1968, 1969) and Dos Santos (1970) were among the first to propose a new direction in the study of development. Contrary to the modernization argument, Frank argued that increased contact and interaction through the influx of capital and technology from the developed nations is detrimental to less developed nations. It leads to the perpetuation of an inadequate infrastructure primarily because the relationship (based on unequal exchange) is one of exploitation by the developed nations. This then subjects the economies of less developed
nations to their more affluent and dynamic counterparts.

**Structure of the World Economy and the State.** Since these early works, proponents of dependency theory have expanded on and established some parallel with the world system paradigm. Adherents of world system theory propose that there exists a capitalist world economy composed of three structural categories (core, semi-periphery and periphery) which are linked through an international division of labor dominated by the core (Wallerstein, 1979). Like dependency theorists, world system theorists argue that non-core nations are exposed to exploitation by the core through exchange relations thus recreating the structural barriers that maintain the international division of labor and the world system (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 1977). The dependency/world system position suggests that dependence tends to distort the development process of noncore nations (Frank, 1969; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985). Although not all dependency theorists agree on the nature of uneven development, the basic view is that noncore nations do not follow the path of development proposed by modernization theorists. Tests of the dependency/world system theory by Chase-Dunn (1975), Rubinson (1976), and Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) suggest that dependence distorts economic development.

The underlying argument is that the extraction of surplus from non-core countries is facilitated by the converging
interests of core and non-core elites. This naturally contributes to continued peripheralization of non-core nations. In this process, the non-core elites are seen as systematically employing the local state structure — even to the extent of limiting political freedom — to maintain their advantageous position (cf. Bollen, 1983:470). In this regard, the state apparatus functions (through repression) to preserve the collective interests of elites in the periphery. Political democracy, as such, is not as common in non-core nations as it is in core nations (Chirot, 1977; Bollen, 1983).

An additional aspect of this argument is the claim of some theorists (e.g., Chirot, 1977:80) that semi-peripheral nations have political systems that are much stronger and repressive in relation to peripheral nations. As semi-peripheral countries "aspire to the core", the economic demands on them become more exorbitant (Bollen, 1983:470; see also Chirot, 1977:77). This leads to a tendency for governments in the semi-periphery to play a more direct role in the economic process — making them strong and less tolerant of dissent:

The state (in the semi-periphery) will have to repress* in order to keep consumption down and investment high. Since the state's short-term economic goal is to maximize investment while keeping cost down, the demands of a growing working class will* be repressed (Chirot, 1977:80-81).

From this, we can deduce the following: since non-core
nations remain dependent, experience uneven development and are characterized by elite domination, dissent by the masses posses a threat to the existing structural conditions. And this lack of tolerance for dissent may be greater in the semi-periphery. As such, semi-peripheral countries and to a lesser extent peripheral countries should be more repressive than core countries.

Previous Empirical Research. Results of previous cross-national research suggest the possibility of a positive relationship between dependence and political repression (Timberlake and Williams, 1984). However, this link is not only weak but it is also one aspect of dependency theory that has not been sufficiently explored. Timberlake and Williams' (1984) cross-national study suggests that dependence has no direct effect on government repression. Using cross-sectional data for seventy-two countries in circa 1975, they find that politically exclusive regimes (measured by Gastil's [1982] "political rights index") are more apt to resort to repression.

In examining the results presented by Timberlake and Williams (1984), I find that when political exclusion was regressed on dependence, the coefficient for dependence turns out to be significant. Based on the positive relationship between dependence and exclusion and also between exclusion and repression, they suggest a possible
indirect relationship between dependence and government repression. However, I have suggested reasons why it may be theoretically more reasonable to treat exclusion as another aspect of repression. Thus, it is likely that by treating political exclusion as an independent variable separate from repression, the impact of dependence on government repression may have been suppressed.

Given this probable situation, the relationship between dependence and repression will be reexamined by excluding political exclusion from the analysis. This will also enable us to assess more confidently the significance of this perspective relative to the others.

Other related cross-national studies include Bollen’s (1983) analysis of world-system position and dependency on democracy, and Bollen and Jackman’s (1985) analysis of the relationship between world-system position and political democracy. Both of these studies used Bollen’s (1980) political democracy index (that is, the six indicators listed above) and Snyder and Kick’s (1979) classification of world-system position. The results reported in both studies support the argument that non-core nations have less democratic regimes. In addition, Bollen (1983:476) also finds that economic dependence (measured by penetration of foreign capital) has no significant effect on political democracy.
Summary

The focus of this chapter has been on a discussion of the three major perspectives on government repression and the previous research. As the overview illustrates, each approach essentially emphasizes one main determinant of government repression.

The conflict argument, as summarized above, views repression as determined by economic inequality. In contrast, modernization theorists essentially argue that economic development is a key to greater political stability, freedom and less government repression. The third argument advanced by dependence/world system theorists suggests that due to the dynamics of the world economic system, countries in the semi-periphery (and to a lesser extent, countries in the periphery) are more likely to be repressive. In the following chapter, I discuss the data and method used to empirically evaluate the hypotheses derived from the three theoretical traditions.
Although other cross-national researchers have attempted to test hypotheses derived from one of the three perspectives discussed in Chapter 2, no effort has been made to empirically test simultaneously the empirical validity of all three arguments. In addition, as the review in the previous chapter shows, the results of previous cross-national research have been inconclusive.

Another drawback of earlier studies (i.e., Timberlake and Williams, 1984; Williams and Timberlake, 1984) is the inappropriate use of political exclusion in the analysis of government sanctioning. This may possibly explain why previous studies find no significant relationship between income inequality and repression (Williams and Timberlake, 1984) or between dependence and repression (Timberlake and Williams, 1984).

This thesis attempts to correct these shortcomings by:
1) examining simultaneously all three explanations of repression; and
2) omitting political exclusion from the analysis.
Findings from this study should provide more insight into the importance of certain structural factors that affect repression. Further, it may also possibly suggest why previous studies were unable to establish any significant relationships between income inequality or dependence and government repression.

In this chapter I describe the data and method. After a few words about the sample, I turn to the variables employed in this research and the operational measures or indicators of these variables. Following this, I describe the method of analysis employed and conclude the chapter with a summary.

Sample

The unit of analysis in this study is the nation-state. Sixty nations for which requisite data were available are included in the analyses (see Appendix I). There are obvious limitations associated with this sample. The most obvious problem is that this is a non-probability sample. However, due to the the lack of universality in the reporting of data for heterogenous units such as nations, this situation is unavoidable. The drawback of this sampling technique is the biasing effects that it can have on the results. This threat is minimized since the sample is well represented by nations in the core (n=13), semi-periphery (n=19) and periphery (n=28).
Dependent Variable

Government repression is measured as the number of government sanctions imposed "to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the regime, or the state itself" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983b:62). Specifically, this indicator consists of (a) censorship of individual or institutional political publications (i.e., government actions to restrict or intimidate the mass media by actions ranging from censoring news and reports to shutting down news agencies); (b) general restrictions on political activity (i.e., declaring martial law, mobilizing troops for domestic security and instituting curfews); and (c) restrictions on the social and political behavior of individuals, parties or political organizations (i.e., the persecution of individuals for political beliefs and activities, harassing or banning political parties, arresting opposition leaders for security reasons, deporting individuals who express opposition and arresting or deporting individuals involved in protest activities, strikes, riots and armed attacks) (1983b:62-63).

These indicators clearly represent actions that attempt to inhibit the ability of individuals or groups to express opposition. In this regard, this measure of repression
corresponds to the definition developed in Chapter 1. It is also one that is widely employed in existing cross-national research (e.g., Timberlake and Williams, 1984; Williams and Timberlake, 1984; Weede, 1986; Muller, 1985, 1986). Data for this variable were taken from The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983b:64-67). To ensure consistency in the number of sanctions imposed, the total number of sanctions between 1963-1967 (logged to base 10 in order to correct for skewness) was used.

Independent Variables

Economic Development. The level of economic development, which is the key independent variable in modernization theory, is measured as energy consumption (in kilograms of coal) per capita for circa 1965. I use this measure primarily because it is widely accepted as a reliable measure of economic development (e.g., Taylor and Hudson, 1972:291; Jackman, 1974:35; Bollen, 1983:472). Data for this variable were taken from the United Nations* (1966:344-347) Statistical Yearbook.*

World System Position. The measure of world system position used here is one developed by Snyder and Kick (1979:1104-1116). This measure reflects a nation's world system position for circa 1965. This classification of core, periphery and semi-periphery is based on a block-model
analysis of four networks of international interaction (i.e., the extent of trade flow, military intervention, treaty memberships, and diplomatic ties) reflecting the economic and political dimensions and influence of nations in the world-system. Unlike noncore nations, countries in the core are seen as dominant powers in the world economy and influential in international affairs (Snyder and Kick, 1979:1106).

This measure is used because it has been widely accepted in the literature (e.g., Bollen, 1983; Nolan, 1983; Frey and Dietz, 1984; Bollen and Jackman, 1985). Apparently, Snyder and Kick (1979) misclassified several nations in their analysis (see Bollen, 1983:473-476). Based on his reevaluation Bollen suggests that instead of being in the core, Spain, Portugal and South Africa should be classified as semi-peripheral nations. In addition, Taiwan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were also reclassified as peripheral nations. Since Spain, South Africa and Iraq are included in this analysis, I recoded them accordingly. Two dummy variables were created for the semi-periphery and periphery - with the core treated as the omitted (reference) category. This was done in order to estimate the deviation of the two dummy variables from the core.

\textit{Economic Inequality.} The measure of economic inequality used here is the distribution of income within a nation. The data for income distribution refer to the portion of a
nation's total income received by the upper 10 percent of households. As Williams and Timberlake (1984:422) state, the size distribution (or concentration) of income is viewed as more appropriate than the Gini index of income inequality since the theoretical implications of the inequality argument are focused on the concentration of wealth rather than its distribution across the population. A measure of the concentration of wealth rather than income would be more desirable since it is a more reliable measure of economic inequality. Cross-national data for this variable are not available. Income inequality data are for circa 1965 and were obtained from The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a:134-136)

Control Variables

It is important that relevant controls be included in a research design in order to reduce threats to the validity of the estimates. Control variables help minimize the effect of extraneous factors that may undermine any causal inferences of the research. In addition, it also provides for more accurate estimates of the relationships explored.

Political Conflict- Since it is reasonable to assume that political conflict can pose a threat to a particular regime and therefore also lead to increased sanctions, a control for political conflict was included. The number of protest demonstrations for the period 1963-67 ([1+1]logged base 10 to correct for skewness) was employed as a measure of political
conflict. This measure is based on the following definition of political conflict: "a nonviolent gathering of people organized for the announced purpose of protesting against a regime or government or one or more of its leaders; or against its ideology, policy, intended policy, or lack of policy; or against its previous action or intended action" (Taylor and Jodice, 1983b:19). Data for protest demonstrations were taken from The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983b:22-25).

**Eastern Bloc Status.** Another concern in this research centers on a possible confounding effect that the inclusion of eastern bloc countries may have on the estimates. Their unique status as highly centralized and "closed" social systems raises some uncertainties about their effects. Although there are only six eastern bloc countries in the sample, it is still reasonable to suspect the impact of these countries. Therefore, as a precaution, a dummy variable for eastern bloc status was included as a control variable in the analysis.

**Method of Analysis**

I used ordinary least-squares regression to estimate the effects of the independent variables on government repression by regressing the dependent variable (government sanctions) on the independent and control variables. The equation below summarizes the predicted effects of the
variables on government repression:

\[ Y = a + b_1 X_1 - b_2 X_2 + b_3 X_3 + b_4 X_4 + b_5 X_5 + b_6 X_6 + e \]

where \( Y \) = total sanctions (1963-67, logged base 10)

\( a \) = constant

\( b \) = unstandardized regression coefficient

\( X_1 \) = income inequality (circa 1965)

\( X_2 \) = energy consumption per capita (1965, logged base 10)

\( X_3 \) = peripheral status (dummy variable, circa 1965)

\( X_4 \) = semi-peripheral status (dummy variable, circa 1965)

\( X_5 \) = political conflict (number of protest demonstrations 1963-67, logged base 10)

\( X_6 \) = eastern bloc status (dummy variable, 1965)

\( e \) = residual term

Several diagnostics were used to assess the stability of the estimates. One specific concern is the problem of multicollinearity. When serious problems of collinearity exist, the regression estimates will be unreliable (Kim and Kohout, 1975:340; see also Rockwell, 1975). Using Haitovsky's heuristic test (Rockwell, 1975) the equations were checked for multicollinearity. Outliers are another common concern in cross-national research since they deviate from the predicted pattern and often bias the estimates. The plot of standardized residuals (which is a technique that
allows for the identification of outliers) was used to check for this problem.

Summary

This chapter contained a discussion of the sample and data and method. I presented a summary of the various indicators and operational measures used in the analysis. The last section contained a description of the method of analysis and various diagnostics that were carried out to assess the stability of estimates.
CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

This chapter presents the results of the analysis. The chapter is divided into two main sections. First, the bivariate results are presented and the issue of multicollinearity is examined. Results of several different regression analyses are reported in the second section.

Bivariate Results

The bivariate (zero-order correlations) results are presented in Table 1. Government sanctions (SANCTG67) and protest demonstrations (PROTES67) \( r = 0.512 \) have a strong relationship. This association is also in the predicted direction. The other variables that are related to sanctions in the predicted direction include income inequality \( (INEQ1965) \( r = 0.131 \), eastern bloc \( (EASTBLOC) \( r = 0.100 \), and semi-peripheral status \( (SEMIPHER) \( r = 0.280 \). However, these coefficients are relatively small, ranging from 0.100 to 0.280. Note that the relationship between government sanctions \( (SANCTG67) \) and energy consumption is
<table>
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<td>.056</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>-.196</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>.100</td>
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<td>2. PROTES67</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>-.084</td>
<td>-.286</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>-.220</td>
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<td>3. ENERGY65</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.544</td>
<td>-.482</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>4. INEQ1965</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.433</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>-.512</td>
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<td>5. PERIPHER</td>
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<td>-.636</td>
<td>-.089</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. SEMIPHER</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. EASTBLOC</td>
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<th>S.D.</th>
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<td>6.54</td>
<td>1.57</td>
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<td>34.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
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</table>

SANCTG67 = Sanctions, 1963-67 (log 10)
PROTES67 = Protest Demonstrations, 1963-67 ([+1]log 10)
ENERGY65 = Energy Consumption, 1965 (log 10)
INEQ1965 = Income Inequality, circa 1965
PERIPHER = Periphery, circa 1965
SEMIPHER = Semi-periphery, circa 1965
EASTBLOC = Eastern Bloc Nations, 1965
(ENERGY65) contrary to expectations (r = 0.056). This is also the case with the periphery (PERIPHER) (r = -0.196).

Multicollinearity or the existence of highly interrelated independent variables can seriously degrade the estimates. There is a fairly strong negative correlation between the periphery (PERIPHER) and semi-periphery (SEMIPHER) (r = -0.636). In addition, the matrix also indicates a relatively strong correlation between energy consumption (ENERGY65) and income inequality (INEQ1965) (r = -0.544). While these correlations are relatively strong, the general rule of thumb is that one need not be concerned with the problem of multicollinearity unless the correlation coefficients range from 0.8 to 1.0 (Kim and Kohout, 1975:340). However, Rockwell (1975:312) suggests that relying on this procedure is risky. Although there are a number of different tests to check for multicollinearity, Rockwell (1975:313) suggests that where dummy variables are involved (as in this analysis), the Haitovsky heuristic test should be used. Therefore to ensure reliability of the estimates a check for multicollinearity was undertaken for the full sample. The results of this test (Chi-square = 6.619; d.f. = 15) indicate that severe multicollinearity is not a problem.

Regression Results

Unlike the bivariate analysis, regression enables us to estimate the unique effect of each explanatory variable on
the dependent variable. Thus, it provides a more accurate summary of the relationship by controlling for the effects of other variables.

The first column of Table 2 lists the unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors for the full sample of 60 countries. Among the variables of theoretical importance, only income inequality (INEG1965) is statistically significant \( (b = 0.513) \). Although the coefficients for semi-periphery (SEMIPHER) \( (b = 0.418) \) and energy consumption (ENERGY65) \( (b = -0.104) \) are in the predicted direction, they are not significant. Also note that the coefficients for eastern bloc nations (EASTBLGC) \( (b = 1.949) \) and protest demonstration (PROTES67) \( (b = 0.534) \) are positive and significant. Given these results, one may be inclined to conclude that economic development and world system position do not influence government repression. Instead, only income inequality turns out to be an important predictor of government repression.

These estimates, however, were influenced by several outliers. In the plot of standardized residuals, El Salvador, New Zealand, the Philippines, Uganda, and Madagascar turned out to be extreme outliers deviating from the general predicted pattern. Checks were made to ensure that there were no coding errors that may have caused these outliers. The other possible explanations for this situation would be either data for these countries are unreliable or
## Table 2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eq.1 SANCTG67 (N=60)</th>
<th>Eq.2 SANCTG67 (N=55)</th>
<th>Eq.3 SANDEN67 (N=60)</th>
<th>Eq.4 SANDEN67 (N=56)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROTES67</td>
<td>0.534*</td>
<td>0.556*</td>
<td>0.312*</td>
<td>0.732*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODEN67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTBLOC</td>
<td>1.949*</td>
<td>1.779*</td>
<td>0.460*</td>
<td>0.563*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.550)</td>
<td>(0.466)</td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEQ1965</td>
<td>0.513*</td>
<td>0.048*</td>
<td>0.019*</td>
<td>0.024*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMIPHER</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.414)</td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.218)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENERGY65</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERIPHER</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
<td>(0.405)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.125</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>-0.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.687</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.648</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Unstandardized Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses

* Unstandardized Coefficient at least twice its standard error

SANCTG67 = Sanctions, 1963-67 (log 10)
PROTES67 = Protest Demonstrations, 1963-67 ([+1]log 10)
ENERGY65 = Energy Consumption, 1965 (log 10)
INEQ1965 = Income Inequality, circa 1965
PERIPHER = Periphery, circa 1965
SEMIPHER = Semi-periphery, circa 1965
EASTBLOC = Eastern Bloc Nations, 1965
SANDEN67 = SANCTG67/Population Density, 1965 (log 10)
PRODEN67 = PROTES67/Population Density, 1965 (log 10)
that these cases just do not fit the general pattern consistent with the rest of the cases.

The five outliers were deleted from the sample and the equation was reestimated. The correlation matrix was again checked for problems of multicollinearity. Haitovsky's test assured no severe multicollinearity (Chi-square = 5.627; d.f. = 15). The estimates for the sample excluding the outliers are reported in Table 2 (equation 2). The $R^2$ for the equation increases from 0.494 in equation 1 (with the full sample) to 0.604 in equation 2. But more importantly, we see that the same variables remain statistically significant. The major change, however, is in the coefficient for semi-periphery status (SEMIPHER). The unstandardized coefficient increases from 0.418 to 0.624 and is now almost twice the standard error. Note that the coefficients for energy consumption (ENERGY65) and peripheral status (PERIPHER) are not significant in either equation. In fact, the sign for peripheral status (PERIPHER) is in the opposite direction than was expected. In sum, these findings provide strong support for the conflict argument that income inequality is a key determinant of government repression.

Researchers involved in studies of political repression have debated the rationale for controlling for the effect of population size by standardizing events such as government
sanctions and protest demonstrations. Muller (1986) prefers to standardize events like these while Weede argues that "it makes little sense to standardize sanctions" (1986:439). Since there is no consensus on this matter, I reestimated the model once more in order to explore the effects of this procedure. Government sanctions ($\log_{10}$) and Protest demonstrations ([+$1\log_{10}$) were standardized by 1965 population density (logged base 10 to correct for skewness). Data for population density were taken from the United Nations' (1966:78-86) Statistical Yearbook. By this procedure we not only control for population size but territory as well.

Results for this analysis with the full sample size are reported in column 3 of Table 2. No severe multicollinearity was detected ($\chi^2$-square = 6.40; d.f. = 15). Note that the $R^2$ increases from 0.494 in equation 1 to 0.608 in equation 3. In addition, all the explanatory variables are in the predicted direction. However, like the estimates in equation 1 and 2, only protest demonstrations (PRODEN67) ($b = 0.812$), Eastern Bloc status (EASTdLOC) ($b = 0.460$), and income inequality (INEQ1965) ($b = 0.019$) are significant.

The plot of standardized residuals was checked for outliers. Canada, Chad, Venezuela and Puerto Rico turned out to be extreme cases. To examine the effects of these outliers on the estimates, the equation was reestimated without the outliers. Since the sample size was smaller, I
checked for multicollinearity again and no serious problem was detected ($\chi^2 = 5.89$; d.f. = 15). The regression coefficients are reported in equation 4 of Table 2. As the results indicate, the estimates remain fairly stable. With the exception of peripheral status, all the variables are in the predicted direction. Among the three key explanatory variables of concern, only income inequality has a significant effect on government sanctions.

Discussion of Findings

The most striking result of the analyses above are the estimates for income inequality (INEQ1965). The regression coefficients for this variable are fairly robust across all four equations. In relation to existing cross-national research, this contradicts Williams and Timberlake's (1984) analysis of income inequality and government repression.

Of course there are a number of factors that may explain this difference. Differences in time period, sample, measurement error, and the like. However, I suspect that there is something to be said about one point that has been stressed throughout: the inappropriate use of political exclusion in the analysis by Williams and Timberlake (1984). While it would be worth investigating this by reestimating their model, the income inequality data for the time period of their analysis (i.e., circa 1975) are not available. In fact, due to unavailable data, they used the same inequality data for circa 1965 that was used in this analysis. This is
another reason to suspect their findings and possibly explains the discrepancy between the results of Williams and Timberlake's (1984) analysis of inequality and repression and those reported here.

The findings also suggest that although in the predicted direction, economic development is not strongly related to repression. Interestingly enough, one other cross-national study (i.e., Timberlake and Williams, 1984) that has explored this relationship also found that economic development had a negative but relatively weak effect on government repression. This contradicts other research (e.g., Bollen, 1983; Bollen and Jackman, 1985) that supports the hypothesis of a relationship between economic development and political democracy.

World system position also has a relatively weak effect on government repression. Like economic development, there is some indication of support for the predicted effect of semi-peripheral status. In fact, the results for world system position are consistent with the argument. That is, the estimates for semi-peripheral status are greater than the estimates for peripheral status. However, the coefficients are weak, indicating that the relationship is not significant.

Recall that Timberlake and Williams (1984) found no significant relationship between dependence and government sanctions. However, the results in this analysis suggest
some support for the world-system argument. This is consistent with the findings of Bollen (1983) and Bollen and Jackman (1985) who present support for a negative relationship between non-core status and political democracy.

It may be appropriate here, to emphasize a point made by Bollen and Jackman (1985:444) that empirical support for the world-system position/dependency effect on political democracy/repression has been mixed. Specifically, various cross-national studies have found that dependency (measured by penetration of foreign capital) has no significant effect on political democracy (Bollen, 1983:476) or repression (Timberlake and Williams, 1984). On the other hand, there is consistent support for the world-system effect on political democracy (Bollen, 1983; Bollen and Jackman, 1985).

Summary

The findings reported in this chapter basically support the hypotheses derived from the three theoretical arguments. With the exception of peripheral status, all estimates are consistently in the predicted direction. However, income inequality is the only key independent variable that appears to have a strong effect on government repression.
CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have attempted to assess the validity of three different views of government repression. The aim was to contribute to the rather fragmented research existing in the area. Another intention of this thesis was to correct for several shortcomings that characterize the limited extant research on government repression. Due to limitations in the data, this endeavor has been confined to analyzing government repression for circa 1965. It has, in effect, only scratched the surface of this topic. In spite of this, it has helped remedy the concerns raised regarding previous studies and hopefully contributed to an area of inquiry that has received relatively scarce attention.

The discussion in this chapter will focus on some of the implications of the findings reported. In order to put this into perspective, it may be appropriate to consider some of the implications of this thesis in relation to the objective specified in Chapter 1. The first section will focus on this. Next, is a discussion of some possible policy implications that may be drawn from this contribution. Finally, I conclude the chapter with suggestions regarding
the possible direction of future research in this area.

Theoretical Implications

As outlined in Chapter 1, this research was primarily concerned with assessing the validity of three varying perspectives on repression. In this regard, the results provide strongest support for the conflict argument. Government sanctioning appears to be one tool of repression that is categorically applied in highly unequal conditions. The implication is that highly polarized economic conditions can indeed create an atmosphere of instability and insecurity within the state apparatus (which is presumably guided by the interests of the elite). And as the logic of the conflict argument suggests, this insecurity on the part of the state is manifested in the extent of repressive activities undertaken.

At the same time, there is no indication that economically developed countries are far less prone to use repressive means than less developed nations. This essentially contradicts the conventional wisdom of modernization theory. In other words, while researchers have shown that economic development may well promote political democracy and "openness", it would be misleading to generalize that government repression under these circumstances would also therefore be minimal. Regarding the impact of world system position, we see that although
there is support that nations in the semi-periphery are more repressive, this relationship is weak. This is also the case with the periphery.

There is also a broader and perhaps more important theoretical implication that can be drawn from this study. This centers on the importance of structural factors in explaining government repression. Like other studies, there is strong support that structural factors are crucial determinants of government repression and additional research should emphasize these factors.

Some students of government repression (e.g., McCamant, 1984) argue that theoretical perspectives like those examined here cannot provide adequate explanations of government repression. McCamant (1984) claims that any model of government repression must focus on the central role of the state. He views the perspectives examined here as focusing "too much on society. The focus must be on what is truly political, not social..." (1984:34). But we must also recognize that what he prefers to consider "truly political" does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, as this study has shown, its manifestation is influenced by and dependent on certain socio-economic factors as well. While the intention here was in no way to develop a model of government repression, it seems clear that any attempt to do so cannot ignore the important implications of these perspectives. Not doing so would severely undermine any
comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon.

Policy Implications

Along with the theoretical concerns, it is imperative that we recognize the significance of the structural factors examined here and their relationship to repression, because they provide us with possible solutions to the problem. Currently, most efforts aimed at addressing this problem focus on exposing such activities and then exerting public pressure to eliminate them. Amnesty International (1984) suggests preventive and remedial measures to counter activities such as torture and other inhuman treatment. These measures range from official ratification and declarations condemning such activities to developing a systematic judicial system to combat such acts. Such efforts are certainly invaluable. They also raise the awareness of the general public and even inspire scholarly research in the area. However, the success of such efforts in curbing repression have been limited.

As this research indicates, structural factors have an impact on the extent of repression. And since initiatives such as those prescribed by Amnesty International (1984) do not emphasize structural factors, it is no surprise why such measures tend to be ineffective. To comprehend and counter this phenomenon requires that we recognize the social atmosphere in which repression exists. Consequently,
constructive measures directed towards curbing repression must incorporate structural factors.

Suggestions for Future Research

Finally, a few words about future empirical research in the area. At this point, research on government repression is dictated and still severely hindered by the availability of data. As more information and data become available, future research must reevaluate the validity of the three perspectives.

With regard to government sanctioning, future research must also be sensitive to the indirect and/or interaction effects of key explanatory variables. For example, in spite of the fact that this research did not support assertions of the modernization and world system perspectives, it is possible that economic development and world system position may have indirect effects on repression. Furthermore, since it is obvious from the results that the key independent variables examined in this research are interrelated, future research can certainly contribute by exploring the significance of their interaction effects.
## APPENDIX I

Sample of Nations and Data

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* Eastern bloc nations
Sanct. = Total Sanctions 1963-67
Protest = Total Protest Demonstrations 1963-67
Ineq. = Income Inequality circa 1965
Energy = Per Capita Energy Consumption 1965
Density = Population per square kilometre of area 1965
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Winham, Gilbert R.

Wolfe, Alan
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, WORLD SYSTEM POSITION
AND POLITICAL REPRESSION: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

by

Sunil Kukreja

B.A., St. Cloud State University, 1985

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

College of Arts and Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1987
ABSTRACT

Considerable cross-national research has focused on the nature and structure of governments. Part of this research has centered on identifying the structural determinants of government repression. This latter body of research has been guided by three distinct theoretical perspectives: (1) the Marxian (conflict) perspective; (2) the modernization perspective; and (3) the dependency/world system perspective.

Proponents of the Marxian conflict perspective emphasize economic inequality as a major determinant of government repression. Proponents of the modernization perspective claim that economic development is crucial to increased political freedom, implying that as a nation develops government repression will decline. Dependency/world system theorists, on the other hand, argue that position in the world economic system is a key determinant of the political structure of nations and that nations in dependent positions tend to be more repressive.

Existing tests of these perspectives are limited and inconclusive. Further, cross-national researchers have failed to assess the validity of all three explanations simultaneously. I remedied this deficiency. Specifically, I used ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to assess the effects of income inequality, economic development, world
system position and several control variables (number of protest demonstrations and Eastern bloc status) on a measure of government repression (government sanctions) for circa 1965. Results suggest strongest support for the Marxian conflict perspective.