REVOLUTIONS AS RHETORICAL MOVEMENTS: A MOVEMENT STUDY OF THE EGYPTIAN ARAB SPRING REVOLUTION

by

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B.A., Doane College, 2013

A THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Communication
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

2015

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Abstract

The 2011 Arab Spring Revolutions across the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region drew international attention to the collection action phenomenon of revolutions. Despite having a significant impact on today’s globalized world, revolutions have been widely unexplored by social movement rhetorical scholars. This lack of study has prompted scholars to call for the investigation of the role human agency plays during revolutions (Morris, 2000). Rhetorical scholars are well-suited to meet this call but lack a methodological framework to examine revolutions. In responding to Morris’ call and with an interest in adding to the body of rhetorical social movement literature, this thesis asks two research questions. What are the rhetorical characteristics of revolutions? Are revolutions rhetorically distinct from social movements? To answer these questions, this thesis translates Jack Goldstone’s (1998) Divergent View of Social Movements and Revolutions into a rhetorical model for studying revolutions. This adaptation of the political science model relies heavily on Leland Griffin’s (1969) and Charles Stewart’s (1980) models of social movements. Additionally, the adapted model also incorporates James Wilkinson’s (1989) discussion of revolutionary rhetorical functions. The application of the new rhetorical model to the Egyptian Arab Spring reveals revolutions rhetorically develop and function in ways that create a clear distinction between revolutions from social movements. These findings prompt discussion of methodological and critical implications.
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Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely thank my thesis advisor Dr. Charles J.G. Griffin for his guidance, understanding and patience during the process of writing this thesis. His insight and mentorship allowed me to channel my passion for the topic areas into a final product of which I am proud. I also owe genuine gratitude to my committee members Dr. Timothy Steffensmeier and Dr. Colene Lind who assisted me with my research and challenge me academically during my graduate career. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my family and Kansas State family for their support and encouragement during this process. It is only with the support of all of these individuals that I was able to complete this endeavor.
Chapter 1 - Introduction & Rationale

In late 2010 and early 2011 the world witnessed the Arab Spring. Within a relatively short span of time a historically unprecedented number of pro-democracy uprisings spread across the Middle East Northern Africa (MENA) region. Many of these uprisings originated out of similar social, economic and political conditions (Rane & Salem, 2012). Despite this, the outcome of these collective protest actions varied greatly. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya underwent full-scale revolutions and former regimes were removed. Yemen forced out its ruling president but kept its political structure. Uprisings in Morocco and Jordan forced liberal economic reform within the nations’ political structures. Conversely, Bahrain, Iraq and Algeria’s efforts failed to remove their ruling regime, and Syria continues to rally against its regime. Finally, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates only experienced minor protests that failed to gain the widespread support of citizens (Johnstad, 2012).

As a whole, these events comprise the Arab Spring. However, when adopting a social movement approach to studying these events, there are vast differences between each state’s uprising and the change or lack thereof that resulted. However, social movement scholars attempting to account for these differences lack consensus in their focus and approach. In their influential article McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) categorize social movements, revolutions and social protests under the inclusive label of contentious politics. However, this catch-all approach has not allowed for the careful study of how revolutions form and develop. Piven and Cloward (1991) present a compelling argument when they note that there is clearly a problem when the participants and authorities recognize the difference between a riot and an election rally, but the literature does not. Jack Goldstone (1998) furthers that the popular demarcation drawn between social movements and revolutions is whether or not the collective action seeks to
overthrow the state. However, this seemingly clear demarcation falls apart when applied to historical revolutions that initially sought less radical change. Morris (2000) notes in his survey of social science theories about social movements that there is a lack of focus on human agency within these collective actions. As a result, the field lacks the ability to develop a nuanced understanding of the different forms of collective action.

This lack of understanding may be related to the objects of study for political scientists and sociologists. While both disciplines make use of communication as a means of understanding collective behavior, neither focuses specifically on the way that rhetoric employed by participants of collective actions and societal institutions functions to challenge or reinforce the status quo. Therefore, political scientists and sociologists are more focused on the context, history and actors involved in collective actions rather than the communication that brings these social phenomena into existence. It follows then, that communication scholars, particularly those who study social movement rhetoric, would be the ones to answer Morris’ (2000) call to investigate the role of human agency in collective action.

Rhetorical movement scholars are skilled in analyzing the unique ways that rhetoric brings people together to mobilize for change as reflected by a healthy body of literature. Thus, rhetorical scholars are uniquely prepared to offer insight into this area of social movement studies. Charles Stewart (1980) notes that rhetoric is the primary form of agency for movements, and rhetorically examining its functions reveals a movement’s purpose. Thus, rhetorical social movement scholars are poised to answer the call of Morris (2000) for studying human agency within movements and more specifically revolutionary movements like the Arab Spring. To do so requires a refinement of the available rhetorical approaches to studying social movements.
Rhetorical scholars also approach social movements through broad definitions. Modern social movement rhetoricians tend to treat “social movement” as an umbrella term for collective action as perceived by a critic (Sillars, 1980). However, unlike political scientists and sociologists, rhetorical movement scholars lack a developed base of literature focused specifically on revolutionary movements. That is to say that while several scholars have focused on social “revolutions” within civil rights, science, religion and linguistics (Jensen & Hammerback, 1982; Pauley, 1998; and Stewart, 1997) few have applied a rhetorical movement lens to examine revolutionary movements. Therefore, this research intends to answer Morris’ (2000) call for future research by refining broad rhetorical social movement approaches into a revolution-specific lens that borrows from relevant interdisciplinary revolution literature.

The exploration of revolutions as a collective communicative action is an area ripe for the renewed interest of social movement scholars. The unpacking of revolutionary rhetoric has the potential to reveal as much about those who participate in revolutions as the societies in which revolutions occurs. Additionally, rhetorical scholars can contribute to the academic and policy conversations about revolutions currently informed by political scientists and sociologists. Simons (1976) notes, social science can refine and challenge rhetorical theories about social movements. Thus, rhetorical scholars entering the study of revolutions can help expand our collective knowledge about a phenomenon that has social, economic, political and human costs. But perhaps more importantly, rhetorical scholars have the ability to demystify the language used to maintain and challenge the status quo. In the case of the Arab Spring, this status quo was tied to regimes with long histories of human rights abuse, economic inequality and fraudulent government actions (Johnstad, 2012). Thus, rhetorical insight into revolutions can promote the ethical use of rhetoric to reform, challenge and overthrow governments.
A closer examination of the current state of the field as well as the emergence of new revolutionary texts, reveals that rhetorical social movement scholars already possess the tools necessary to breathe new life into this important area of study. The remainder of this chapter discusses the current definitional state of social movements, the availability of revolutionary rhetoric and methodological tools, and the potential benefits of carving out a space for the rhetorical movement study of revolutions. The chapter concludes with an outline course of study.

Initially, it is critical to recognize that revolutions fall within the existing scope of rhetorical social movement studies. Many scholars have proposed definitions of what constitutes a social movement (Cathcart, 1972, 1980; Hahn & Gonchar, 1971; Griffin, 1952; Lucas, 1980; McGee, 1980; Riches & Sillars, 1980). A brief sampling of frequently cited definitions illustrates the diversity of these proposed definitions. Leland Griffin (1952, p. 84) defined social movement as a past event in which “(1) men have become dissatisfied with some aspect of their environment (2) they desire change – social, economic, political, religious, intellectual or otherwise – and desiring change, they make efforts to alter their environment (3) eventually, their efforts result in some degree of success or failure; the desired change is or is not effected and we may say that the historical movement has come to its termination.” This definition refers exclusively to historical social movements. Robert Cathcart (1983, p. 234) provided a narrow rhetorical definition in which social movements are essentially rhetorical transactions of a special type, distinguishable by the peculiar reciprocal rhetorical acts set off between the movement on the one hand and the established system or controlling agency on the other.” Michael McGee (1980) argues that social movements are a set of meanings that can be studied through ideographs. In this sense, social movements refer only to patterns of language characteristics (McGee, 1980). A scholar should look for way in which these patterns change as evidence of a
social movement (McGee, 1980). As the publication dates suggest, this conversation has died down in the last thirty years. Hahn & Gonchar (1980) and Zarefsky (1980) defend this move away from developing theory arguing that the development of an exclusively rhetorical definition of social movement is a dead end.

Without an agreed upon rhetorical theory of movement, the area of study moved forward through individually justified studies and methodologies. Riches and Sillars (1980) noted this trend when they reviewed 101 rhetorical social movement studies and found that 72 of the studies made no reference to rhetorical movement theory. Of the references that were recorded, only seven studies relied heavily on rhetorical social movement specific theory. They concluded that there was a clear divide between theory and the actual practice of rhetorical analysis of social movements (Riches & Sillars, 1980). This separation ultimately led to the abandonment of theory specific to social movements and the rise of individualized studies. Thus, rhetorical social movement scholars moved away from developing theory and instead focused on developing a body of study concerned with the unique characteristics each social movement. Modern social movement studies have ranged from the adapted Burkean analysis of the civil rights movement by Charles Griffin (2003) to an ethnographical approach to studying the rhetoric of coalition-building between a queer and immigration organization by Karma Chavez (2011). Yet, studies of modern revolutions through a social movement lens are notably rare and often focus on the media used by the movement instead of the movement itself (Moussa, 2011, Rane & Selma, 2012). While James Wilkinson (1989) wrote about the rhetoric of revolution, he argues that the rhetoric of revolution in a traditional sense, like the French Revolution, has died off. Other rhetorical scholars, like Cathcart (1983) only mention social movements that have brought about revolutionary change but stop short of labeling the movement a revolution. The
range of “movements” addressed by modern critics may be concerning to those that agree with Cathcart’s (1983) call for a narrow definition as not all of the studies focus on the rhetoric of confrontation and the dialectic entanglement required to meet his definition. However, others like Sillars have reconciled with this breadth by accepting a broad definition of movements. Sillars (1980, p. 30) argued movements are simply “collective actions that are perceived by a critic. They are defined by that critic in terms of the most useful rhetorical events, conflicts or strategies that will best explain the critic’s view of the movement.” Under this definition of social movements, the critic is responsible for justifying her or his selection of the movement and the lens of analysis. Thus, critics must perform their analyses with careful rigor when selecting the scope, method, standard and evidence of their study (Sillars, 1980). The continued development of rhetorical social movement studies suggests this approach has value. Nevertheless, this ever-growing body of literature still lacks in the area of theoretical development.

Specifically, when critics are tasked with justifying their analysis and methodology, developing and refining theory becomes unappealing. Riches and Sillars (1980) discovered the theoretical underpinnings of the majority of studied works were based in rhetorical theory and not specifically rhetorical social movement theory. A provided explanation noted that the established nature of the theory likely made it more appealing to scholars (Riches & Sillars, 1980). While this appeal is understandable and may guard against sloppy analysis, it also ties the development of social movement studies to the development of rhetorical theory. This is problematic as these theories require tailoring to be applied to social movements. Furthermore, it cuts off rhetorical scholars from developing alongside interdisciplinary movement studies.
While the theoretical debate about rhetorical definitions of movements died down around 1980 for rhetorical scholars, other disciplines began to rapidly develop and refine their own social movement theories. John Downing (2008, p. 40) identifies several areas of theoretical development including resource mobilization/rational actor, “New Social Movement”, contentious politics, solidarity social movements, social networks and transnational social movements. The discussion has become so expansive that academic journals like *Social Movement Studies* and *Mobilization* focus specifically on this developing body of literature (Downing, 2008). Further exploration of these specific areas of study is not necessary for this study. However, the boom of theoretical discussions among social scientists highlights the lack of development of rhetorical theory in studying social movements.

This may explain why revolutions have not been taken on in earnest by social movement scholars. The study of revolutions not only requires the tailoring of rhetorical theory, but also interdisciplinary theories that provide specific insight to revolutions. Furthermore, the burden of justifying methodology discourages the development of genres and sub-categorization because it requires the critic to return to the messy affair of definition. The value and need for such distinctions has been discussed extensively by scholars who viewed categorization as a means of continuing research while simultaneously investigating the theoretical nature of movements (Cathcart, 1983; Lucas, 1980; Riches & Sillars, 1980; and Smith, 1976). Of the scholars who were willing to set aside the definitional debate, many advocated for the development of sub-categories (Hahn & Gonchar, 1971; Lucas, 1980; and Riches & Sillars, 1980). More than thirty years later the field of rhetorical movement study still lacks developed sub-bodies of research and frequent studies that answer calls for future research. While this research does not intend to engage in the definitional dispute of rhetorical movement studies, it does intend to propose a
methodology for studying revolutionary movements in hopes of encouraging the development of a sub-body of research.

With an understanding of the current state of social movements, a discussion of the availability of methodological tools and revolutionary rhetorical texts follows. First, it is worth exploring the relationship between social scientists and rhetoricians. As scholars, each has the methods necessary to account for the complex revolutionary environments that include political, social and cultural factors. Lucas (1980, p. 262) explained, “Social movements are complex phenomena that invite interrogation from a number of perspectives.” Further, because sociological and rhetorical perspectives are complimentary as both are interested in how a set of beliefs identifying what is wrong and what needs to be changed energizes a social movement (Lucas, 1980). It is not uncommon for our field to borrow theories from political science or sociology. However, this benefit is mutual. Cathcart (1980) noted rhetoricians’ ability to provide unique insight to expand our understanding of confrontation within society. In addition, Simons (1976), though blunt regarding his distaste for purely empirical examinations of movements, did praise social scientists’ ability to test movement theories with reliable results.

In regards to revolutions, rhetoricians can provide extremely valuable insight. The rapid and volatile nature of revolutions is not conducive to traditional social science research. Those participating in revolutions may alter their accounts of their own participation during post-interviews regardless of the uprising’s outcome (Borch, 2006). This lack of empirical data complicates the study of revolutions through a quantitative approach (Johnstad, 2012). However, the advent of social media allows for real-time collection of data that is ripe for rhetorical analysis. These communication artifacts provide an unfiltered collage of rhetoric that can be analyzed to gain a broader understanding of the revolution as a whole. Thus, it is
imperative that rhetoricians engage in studying revolutions because of their potential to offer unique and valuable insight.

In political science, the distinction between revolutions and other social movements is often focused on intent or the goals of the collective action. An oversimplified definition simply asks whether or not the collective action seeks to overthrow the state. Goldstone’s (1998) rejects this definition suggesting that the distinction can be better illuminated by examining the framing of grievances, identification and mobilization of supporters, the available collective action and the relation of the group to other supporting and resisting groups. Such areas of focused interest are not unfamiliar to movement scholars. Specifically, Griffin’s (1969) dramatistic theory and Stewart’s (1980) functional approach to rhetorically studying movements both discuss grievances, identification, mobilization and a movement’s relationship with an opposing group. Furthermore, Goldstone (1998) advances an argument that while revolutions may be impossible to distinguish from other social movements in their developmental stages, it is the reaction of the government that alters the collective action’s development. Specifically, how a government limits the choices of a movement and how the movement reacts may be the first indication of a revolutionary movement. Such concerns align with Griffin’s (1969) and Cathcart’s (1980) discussion of the dialect entanglement necessary for a social movement to progress into public consciousness. Additionally, Goldstone’s work relates to Cathcart’s (1983) call for further investigation as to how a counter-movement, or the government in this case, impacts the movement. Goldstone (1998) suggests that there is a certain type of entanglement between the two parties that is necessary and unique to revolutions. Thus, Goldstone’s theoretical foundation for distinguishing revolutions is well suited for a rhetorical adaptation.
Approaches like Goldstone’s can be adapted to better inform the public in a timelier manner about revolutions by utilizing rhetorical analysis for real-time rhetorical artifacts. As mentioned previously, the collection of empirical data about revolutions is problematic (Johnstad, 2012). This difficulty is further compounded when revolutions take place in states that are capable of restricting journalist and scholarly access. The Internet, specifically social media, have provided an alternative view of these political, social and communication phenomena. Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) note that the Arab Spring coverage by government-run media, like Egypt’s, was vastly different from the coverage provided by social media. The frames provided by media sources influence individual and societal understandings of collective action (Hamdy & Gomaa). Unlike government-run and independent media outlets, social media users are free from corporate economic and political pressure that may cause revolution coverage to be sympathetic to the established order. Social media content, which has often been able to route around the restrictive attempts of protested governments, provides rhetorical scholars a venue to study revolutions as they are occurring. This gives rhetorical scholars a distinct advantage over scholars that must wait to collect data by empirical standards.

As previously discussed, the complexity of social movements calls for investigation by multiple disciplines (Lucas, 1980). Furthermore, the development of a sub-body of rhetorical social movement studies focus on revolutions meets the calls of rhetoricians willing to put aside old definitional debates. One way this call can be answered is through the translation of interdisciplinary theory into an approach that identifies the unique rhetorical aspects of a revolution. The consideration and adaptation of Goldstone’s (1998) conception of revolutions along with the rhetorical approaches of Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) provides a basis for such a methodological approach. This thesis adapts these insights and applies the resulting
rhetorical lens to the Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution. Thus, this research aims to lay foundational scholarship for the future development and refinement of rhetorical social movement analysis focused specifically on revolutions.

Egypt’s public unrest in early 2011 provides movement scholars a unique opportunity as social media sites preserved the unfiltered rhetoric used by protestors on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Within Egypt, Twitter and Facebook played a significant role in the Arab Spring Revolution (Rane & Salem, 2012). Additionally, the Egyptian Revolution was pre-empted and followed by widespread collective action that fits within traditional definitions of social movements. With the existence of what may be identified as a revolution occurring in between social movements, Egypt offers a case study that begs for a clearer definition of a revolution within the context of rhetorical movement studies.

This thesis asks two overarching questions. What are the rhetorical characteristics of revolutions? Are revolutions rhetorically distinct from social movements?

The body of social movement literature largely informs this research. Specifically, Griffin’s (1969) conception of the rhetorical stages of social movement development paired with Stewart’s (1980) functional rhetorical approach to movements serves as a basis for translating interdisciplinary research into rhetorical terms. Interdisciplinary scholarship is also foundational to this research. Goldstone (1998) offers a clear theoretical conception of how revolutions develop out of social movements. Finally, the work of communication scholars investigating social media’s role in the Arab Spring provides support for the analysis of Facebook and Twitter posts as rhetorical texts of Egypt’s revolution.

As mentioned previously, it is not the intent of this research to engage in old battles of definition. Instead, this thesis hopes that the translation of interdisciplinary research paired with
widely accepted rhetorical methodology will produce a reliable framework for analyzing revolutions rhetorically. The development of such a framework will help provide informed insight into the unique phenomena of revolutions. This examination consists of five chapters. Chapter one will provide a rationale and justification for the investigation of revolutions as rhetorically distinct and result in two research questions. Chapter two will review the current available literature involving selected rhetorical approaches to studying social movements, interdisciplinary approaches to studying revolutions and social media’s role in the Arab Spring. Chapter three will set forward a rhetorical methodology for identifying and analyzing revolutionary movements. Chapter four applies this methodology to the Arab Spring revolution in Egypt. Finally, chapter five will discuss implications, conclusions and areas of future research generated by this study.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review

This chapter covers the relevant literature necessary to adapt rhetorical movement scholars’ current methods into a more tailored approach focused on analyzing revolutions. This thesis’ model results from the tailoring of three theoretical models, two rhetorical models and one interdisciplinary. The models have been selected based on their broad scope as all three models focus on the entire lifespan of a movement.

Leland Griffin (1969) dramatistic model addresses the rhetorical periods of a movement that can be identified by dramatistic forms of rhetoric. Charles Stewart (1980) also seeks to understand the lifespan of a movement but does so through examining rhetorical functions. A more detailed discussion follows, but for now it is important to note that these rhetorical models are not linear in nature and do not seek to produce a timeline study of movements. Griffin (1969) argues that a movement can cycle between rhetorical periods while Stewart’s (1980) asserts that a movement can meet different rhetorical functions at the same time. Both Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) are concerned with analyzing a movement’s rhetoric as a product of rational human agency as a means of gaining insight into the movement’s purpose and progression. This focus pairs well with Jack Goldstone’s (1998) staged model that outlines the development of social movements into revolutions. His model seeks to understand how a ruling regime’s reaction to a social movement impacts its development into a revolution. Essentially, Goldstone (1998) takes a political science approach to understand the same dynamic relationship between a social movement and the ruling regime (counter-movement) that Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) address. These three models serve as the foundation for this chapter.

While Griffin (1969), Stewart (1980) and Goldstone’s (1998) models are foundational to this chapter, other relevant literature is necessary to produce a tailor rhetorical approach for
studying revolutions. The chapter is organized by academic discipline. Specifically, rhetorical approaches to social movements including Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) are discussed. Next, Goldstone’s (1998) model and interdisciplinary approaches to analyzing social movements are addressed before a summary of the available literature regarding social media as rhetorical text during revolutions.

**Section One: Rhetorical Approaches**

The rhetorical study of social movements has been heavily influenced by the dramatistic model as developed by Griffin (1969). Stewart’s (1980) functional approach has also gained traction among rhetorical movement scholars. Both approaches seek to understand themes of human agency through social movement rhetoric. These works provide a solid rhetorical foundation for the development of a revolutionary-specific model as both seek to examine the lifespan of a movement’s rhetoric. After understanding Griffin’s (1969) dramatistic and Stewart’s (1980) functional approaches, the chapter touches on Wilkinson’s (1989) brief discussion of French Revolution rhetoric. This summary of the rhetorical literature serves as foundation for an adapted rhetorical methodology that seeks to distinguish and study revolutionary movements.

Griffin asserts that all movements are inherently political as all are concerned with “governance or dominion.” Marginalized individuals who seek to disrupt the status quo of society by confronting those in power create, develop and maintained movements. This conflict is necessary for drama and as Griffin quotes Kenneth Burke (1957) “politics above all is drama” (p. 267). Thus, he justifies his application of a Burkean dramatistic approach to study movements. This approach assumes that dramatic scenes are rhetorically created by rational choices employed by an orator. To study movements is to study human agency through the
rhetoric that performs the functions of a movement and identifies its purpose. Studying movements in this way is to study the forms of movement action which contain meaning and motive. These identifiable dramatistic forms of rhetorical movement can be broken down into identifiable periods. The progression of a movement may not reach every period. It may also return to previous periods. Griffin (1952) originally identified three period of movement progress including inception, crisis and consummation. He later adapted his theory to align with Burke’s drama of social relation and included the additional periods of eloquence and stasis (Griffin, 1969).

The inception period is a time where the sentiments of marginalized individuals or a single rhetor are expressed. This period may benefit from a physical catalyst, like a shocking event, but the movement may also enter this period through more gradual means. Griffin (1969) describes this period as one where public tensions are innovated. It is a time of identifying the “good” and “evil” within society. During this time, marginalized individuals come together seeking solidarity and a re-envisioned status quo. The movement’s expression of understanding or a conviction of what must be resisted unites individuals. This period’s characteristics include dual rhetorical strategies that first seek to encourage doubt and misunderstanding among individuals and second seek to generate conflict with a representative entity of the status quo. A movement must generate conflict with the existing order through the rise of a counter-movement. Once a counter-movement announces itself, the movement can gain public notice and enter into the crisis period.

Griffin (1969) describes the crisis period as one of transformation and creation. During the crisis period, the movement calls for the allegiance of its members in their opposition to the old system of authority. With the rise of the countermovement there is a sense of urgency to
seek salvation through the conversion of others and direct action. In Griffin’s words it is “a time of mass decision; catharsis, purgation, the resolution of public tensions” (p. 466). The movement rhetorically kills the old authority system, and a new system must emerge.

The period of consummation follows once the movement has replaced the old system of authority. New reason, justice and identity that stems from the values of the movement indicate the emergence of a new system. Individuals no longer argue over meaning, values or desire. Instead, they share attitudes of benevolence. The classes of the new hierarchy exist harmoniously, and there is a widespread acceptance that the new order is “good”. Griffin (1969) calls this a time of redemption marked by the loving rhetoric of courtship. The rhetoric of assent, affirmation and allegiance to the movement also marks the consummation period. Thus, the leaders of the new authority system seek to actualize the vision of the movement.

When utopia cannot be achieved, the consummation period’s rhetoric of courtship morphs into the rhetoric of persuasion during the period of eloquence. Griffin (1969) describes this period as one marked by praise, respect, edification and transcendence of the movement. He goes on to state that this period can “be expected at the farthest reach of the movement, to transcend itself by passing, beyond language, into the region of Silence” (Griffin, 1969 p. 471). Once this occurs, the final period of stasis emerges. The movement has become the status quo and may be challenged by other social movements.

Griffin (1969) laid the foundation for much of the early work in rhetorical social movement studies. Years later, Stewart (1980) sought to respond to Griffin’s (1952) call for future research investigating the existence of rhetorical patterns and forms. He expresses frustration with the microscope, or specific case study, approach to examining social movements as it does little to identify the rhetorical patterns Griffin (1952, 1969) sought to identify. As an
alternative, Stewart draws from the previous works of rhetoricians, like McGee (1975), who called for rhetoricians to focus on the outward functions of movement rhetoric. This broad functional approach allows for the systematic study of the vast array of social movements that is capable of answering Griffin’s (1952) call for future research (Stewart, 1980). In an attempt to develop a macroscopic agency-focused method, he identifies the rhetorical functions a movement. He asserts that rhetoric is the primary form of agency for movements; movements and institutionalized collectives may function similarly but are constrained differently; and the extent to which a function is performed is reflective of a movement’s purpose (Stewart, 1980). These functions are not progressive stages, and some functions may dominate the rhetoric of the movement. The approach identifies five rhetorical functions of a movement; transforming perceptions of history, transforming perceptions of society, prescribing courses of action, mobilizing for action and sustaining the social movement. Stewart along with Craig Smith and Robert Denton, Jr. (2012) expanded this model in their book titled: *Persuasion and Social Movements*.

First, the movement must alter the perception of history, including the past, present and future, to convince followers than an intolerable situation exists and must be addressed. As a movement continues and succeeds, it may need to adapt formerly promoted perceptions. This function includes rhetoric that calls to attention an intolerable condition(s) that must be addressed. Stewart (1980) alludes that this is an initial stage that relates to Griffin’s (1969) inception period.

The second function, calls for the alteration of societal perceptions of the movement’s opposition. Stewart (1980) explains that the rhetoric must strip the opposition of their legitimacy. Within this function, the movement must also provide a new identity for its target audience in
order to create the conflict between “we” and “they.” The target audience is described in terms of moral goodness while the opposition comes to represent oppression and evil. This function must also alter the self-perceptions of the target audience so that they believe in their self-worth and ability to cast off the oppressive opposition. Often this is done by rejecting old labels attached to group among the target audience and replacing them with labels that instill pride in the followers.

In order to resist the “evil” opposition, the movement must, third, prescribe a course of action to address the problem. Here the movement’s demands and prescribed course of action are outlined. The rhetoric must answer questions of who should enact the solution and how it should be implemented. Additionally, Stewart (1980) identifies the potential for intra- and inter-movement conflict if multiple demands and solutions are proposed either by other movements or within different factions of the same movement. Thus, movements must be prepared to defend their actions from criticism and potential backlash.

Mobilizing for action is the fourth function. Stewart (1980) explains that movement’s rhetoric must function to mobilize its target audience to carry out a variety of actions. During this stage, groups of followers are both united and organized to carry out the movement’s course of action. The spectrum of this action is immense and includes action focused on self-change, gaining control of societal influence and garnering attention for the movement. Stewart (1980) explains that the central purpose of this function is to convince followers that victory is viable and foreseeable in the near future.

Finally, Stewart (1980) discusses how a movement must rhetorically function to sustain itself. This stems from Stewart’s assumption that social movements usually last for years. Regardless of how long a movement exists, it must continually defend itself as necessary and address setbacks. This period seeks to sustain the viability of the movement through continued
member conversation and the reinforcement of current members’ convictions. Further, the movement must enact rhetoric to remain visible.

Both Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) discuss movements in broad generalized terms. However, as previously mentioned in Chapter 1, rhetorical scholars have only explored revolutionary rhetoric in a very limited sense. Wilkinson’s (1989) fleeting discussion of the rhetoric of the French Revolution highlights this observation. While he outlines the main tenets of this type of rhetoric, Wilkinson (1989) is convinced that it is an outdated rhetoric that lost its appeal after being adapted by Marxist revolutionaries. Nevertheless, his discussion of the rhetorical functions of revolutions is noticeably similar to Stewart’s (1980) concept of movements’ rhetorical functions. Wilkinson (1989) argues that French Revolution rhetoric sought to perform three functions; appeal to moral generalities, create a binary world and demystify authority.

The French Revolution highlights rhetoric that engages in the evocation of moral principles that serve as a justification for rejecting the State. This form of rhetorical justification relates to the concept of natural law (Wilkinson, 1989). Thus, supporters of the revolution come together and step outside the legal and social bonds maintained by the state in order to appeal to a higher authority. Here Wilkinson approach differs from Griffin (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) approach. In Griffin and Stewart’s conception of social movements, specific grievances and goals are expressed by the movement. Griffin discusses this expression when referring to manifestos, proclamations and constitutions (p. 462). The expression of a specific course of action marks Stewart’s (1980) prescription function. However, Wilkinson notes that during the French Revolution rhetors sought to appeal more broadly to followers through moral generalities of “truth, justice, reason, and, of course, liberty” (p. 157).
Next Wilkinson (1989) discusses the creation of a binary world through rhetoric. This rhetoric seeks to create a simplified choice and eliminate the potential for individuals to remain indifferent. The movement is virtuous while the state represents vice. The movement promises liberty whereas the state practices oppression. Those who support the revolution are motivated by a pure patriotic spirit while the upholders of the state are only motivated by self-interest. The revolution fulfills this function by promising a new morally comprised society and denouncing those who stand in the way of change. The rhetoric is not a general critique of society but instead it is an emotionally charged confrontation of selected targets (Wilkinson, 1989). The rhetorical vision contains moral absolutes that leave no room for doubt. Essentially, the scene is in black and white. Thus, the creation of a binary world also functions as a mobilizing strategy. This differs only slightly from Griffin (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) discussions. All three scholars identify a period in which “the good” is identified and “the bad” is named.

Finally, Wilkinson (1989) asserts that revolutionary rhetoric, as represented by the French Revolution, seeks to demystify authority. He explains that this rhetoric seeks to put “at the top that which was on the bottom.” This rhetoric seeks to reverse societal values and promote the disrespect of the state. This function is similar to Griffin’s (1969) discussion of rhetoric that seeks to highlight misunderstanding during the inception period. But in Wilkinson’s (1989) view this rhetoric cannot be contained to one period or even the revolution itself. He notes that once the rhetoric of authority is unmasked in a rhetorical scene of moral absolutes, the new system of power lacks the rhetorical resources to live up to its promise. As a result in post-revolutionary states, power becomes synonymous with persuasion (Wilkinson, 1989). This conclusion is related to Griffin’s (1969) discussion of stasis and also relates to Stewart’s (1980) assertion that the movements must continually perform maintenance.
Wilkinson’s (1989) discussion of revolutionary rhetoric is extremely valuable to this research. However, it is worth noting that Wilkinson did not view his description as one that could be applied to contemporary revolutions. He argues that the revolutionary rhetoric of the French Revolution lost its distinctive effectiveness as humanistic ends were separated from violent means. He attributes this loss of power to the rise and fall of Marxist revolutions that called to attention the mystifying function of revolutionary rhetoric. Essentially, he argues that those who sought to demystify the rhetoric of the state found their own rhetoric demystified. The renewed appeal of revolutionary rhetoric during the Arab Spring does not invalidate Wilkinson’s argument but instead suggests that his observations were limited to the available data at the time of his writing.

Stewart (1980) and Griffin (1969) offer two different but related approaches to examining social movements rhetorically. Wilkinson’s (1989) brief discussion supplements a rhetorical understanding of how a revolution theoretically progresses. Both Stewart (1980) and Griffin (1969) welcomed the possibility of future refinement and adaptation of their approaches as rhetorical scholars gained new knowledge about movements. With this rhetorical foundation, literature relating to revolutions from the fields of political science and sociology can be examined.

Section Two: Interdisciplinary Approaches

The insights of political scientists and sociologists are particularly useful when tailoring a rhetorical methodology to specifically examine revolutionary movements. Sociologist Aldon Morris’ (2000) in his article “Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals” bemoans social movement theories’ lack of attention regarding human agency’s impact on the goals and strategies of movements. He argues these tactical decisions are made by leaders and thus
understanding human agency is critical to the study of social movements (Morris, 2000). As previously discussed, rhetoricians examine rhetoric as means of addressing concepts of human agency through discussions of constraints and empowerment. Therefore, rhetorical scholars and social scientists have a shared interest in investigating social movement, including revolutions.

On the surface, social scientists studying collective action seem to make a clear distinction between social movement and revolution. Goldstone (1998) notes that many who study collective action focus on the goals of the action to define it. Thus, if a collective action seeks to overthrow the state, then it is ipso facto a revolution (Goldstone, 1998). This method of distinction has been taken up by scholars who have sought to house revolutions, collective protests and social movements under the broad term of “contentious politics” (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 1996). Goldstone applauds this inclusive approach but notes that defining a collective action by its expressed goals ignores the progressive and adaptive nature of social movements and revolutions. Goldstone asserts that the progression of a movement is influenced by the conflict it generates and the resulting conditions that demand adaptation. It is Goldstone’s focus on conflict and adaptation that aligns his model with Griffin’s (1969) and Stewart’s (1980). Goldstone’s interest in identifying the distinct qualities of revolutions makes his model a good fit to adapt into rhetorical terms.

In his “Divergent Phenomena View of Social Movement and Revolutions” model Goldstone (1998, p. 129) argues that a repressive state response is the catalyst necessary to move a social movement toward a revolutionary identity. The initial stages of a social movement and revolution are impossible to distinguish, as the conditions that bring them about are shared (Goldstone, 1998). Here the model addresses the movement processes of grievance definition,
issue framing, member identification and strategy selection. This focus shares much with the previous discussion of rhetorical approaches to studying movements.

The inability to distinguish carries over into the period of social mobilization for a change. As first expressed, the desired change and goals of a social movement and a revolution may hold no distinction. Goldstone (1998) notes that the goals of the French Revolution were first expressed by the Estates General that “sought to reshape the conditions of social status, financial exemption and military and administrative service, as well as the royal tax system.” (p. 127). These goals do not meet the narrow definition that paints a revolution as collective action that seeks to overthrow the state. However, Goldstone (1998) argues that it is not the goals of the movement that result in a revolution but instead the state’s response to the expressed goals. Much like Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) identify conflict as a necessary condition for social movement, Goldstone (1998) argues that an initially weak or erratic state repressive response is needed to generate a revolution.

The model identifies three levels of repressive response; mild, weak/erratic and strong. Each response forces the movement to adapt and produce its own response. A mild state response aligns with the rhetorical discussion of a counter-movement/opposition. This conflict is necessary and beneficial for the movement to enter into public consciousness. Goldstone (1998) notes the mild state response legitimizes the movement and provides the conflict necessary for change. On the converse, if a social movement meets a strong repressive response by the state, the movement will be crushed entirely or driven underground and become ineffective. Goldstone points to examples of repressive regimes with the capacity to snuff out dissent. Revolutions then are the response to weak or erratic responses by the state that effectively raise the stakes of the conflict without eliminating the movement.
This relationship between a repressive state response and the development of a revolution is well supported by throughout various disciplines studying movement. Sabine Karstedt-Henke (1980) explains that when a state attempts to repress a movement but does so ineffectively, it provides momentum. The galvanized movement is now more likely to strike back against the state through extreme means. When referencing Griffin’s period of crisis, a survivable but repressive response from the state confirms the “we/the good” versus “they/the evil” dialect in material terms. Finally McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s (1996) suggest that nondemocratic regimes are more likely to experience rare but revolutionary mobilization whereas democratic regimes experience more frequent social movement mobilizations.

This examination of interdisciplinary movement literature provides guidance for the adaptation of rhetorical social movement methods to study revolutions. Social scientists benefit from a body of literature that is more robust in regards to revolutions than rhetorical movement scholars. However, that is not to say that other scholars are better equipped than rhetoricians to study such a phenomena. As previously discussed, social scientists struggle to gain truly representative accounts of revolutions from post-interviews as participants alter their accounts after the revolution (Borch, 2006). This lack of empirical data complicates the study of revolutions through a quantitative approach (Johnstad, 2012). This presents an excellent opportunity for rhetorical scholars to provide insight regarding revolutions. Thus, adapting a rhetorical method to study revolutions generates original scholarship and provides interdisciplinary insight regarding revolutions.

Section Three: Social Media as Rhetorical Text

The rise of social media and its use during the Arab Spring has garnered significant attention from communication scholars. At the time of writing, none of these studies directly
addressed the research question at hand. Nevertheless, their findings provide justification for the selection of social media as reliable rhetorical text when examining revolutions. Rane and Smith (2012) argue that studying social movements involved in the Arab Spring and their use of social media is essential for answering contemporary questions being asked in the field. While much of the literature in this section is specifically focused on the diffusion of ideas via social media during the Arab Spring, the authors’ discussions suggests that social media function as direct vehicles for revolutionary movement rhetoric. More specifically, where other scholars are concerned with identifying reliable ways to gather empirical data, rhetorical scholars must be similarly concerned with the quality of their analyzed texts. A review of the literature regarding the role of social media during the Arab Spring supports the selection of these texts as rhetorically representative. As a rhetorical text, social media facilitates communication, exists outside of state-controlled channels, supports the identification function of movements and allows for recognition of major influencers.

Initially, it is important to view social media as a facilitator of revolutions and not the cause of said collective action. Halverson, Ruston and Trethewey (2013) note that while the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt are often referred as “Twitter Revolutions” the role of social media is more nuanced. Rane and Smith (2012) concluded that the role of social media in the Arab Spring was the “facilitation of communication and the transfer of information” (p. 103). Social media helped mobilize individuals and enabled supporters to function as citizen journalists covering the movement (Rane & Salem, 2012).

As social media enables the spread of information outside the state-control channels, its use by supporters in inherently subversive. Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl (2005) argue that social media alters the playing field of collective actions and in doing so opens up “new vulnerabilities
for even the most established authoritarian regimes” (p. 365). Social media also facilitates the coming together of alienated or marginalized individuals as described by Griffin (1969) in his discussion of the inception period of movements. In Egypt, the advent of social media, specifically Facebook in Arabic, connected political bloggers to a much larger public audience in which their criticism gained traction (Rane & Salem, 2012).

In addition to serving subversive purposes, social media also facilitates the identification period discussed by Griffin (1969), Stewart (1980) and Wilkinson (1989). Revolutions require strong social ties for individuals to take on the risk of opposing the state (Halverson, et al. 2013). Not only do social media connect like-minded individuals, but social media also invite the expression of commitment. This expression is significant when considering the principles of consistency and commitment. Ciadini (2001) explains that even small verbalization of allegiance generates pressure internally and externally to behave in line with that commitment. Based on a survey design in Egypt, Tufecki and Wilson (2012) found “controlling for other factors, social media use greatly increased the odds that a respondent attended protests on the first day.” Thus, the expression is a rhetorical act of identifying and committing to the goals of the movement.

Finally, social media help identify the major influencers or leaders of the movement. Twitter, a social media network, played a significant role in the flow of information during the Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution (Lotan et al., 2011). While social media allow for followers to participate more directly in the construction of a movement’s public narrative (Halverson et al., 2013), Twitter allows for the identification of key influencers. Kwak et al. (2010) explain that the non-reciprocal nature of information sharing on Twitter results in it functioning more as an information-sharing network than a social network. Thus, well-positioned influencers can shape
how information flows (Lotan et al., 2011). For example, a well-known leader’s tweet is more likely to be shared across social networks and at an increased frequency than a tweet from a lower level follower who lacks notoriety. Thus, the unfiltered and preserved nature of social media texts makes them ideal for rhetorical analysis.

The literature in this chapter provides a foundation for the tailoring of a rhetorical approach to studying revolutionary movements. Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) provide the rhetorical framework necessary to identify the rhetorical periods and features of a social movement. Both address the required elements needed for a movement to progress towards its intended change. Wilkinson’s (1989) brief description of revolution rhetoric indicates that revolutions share rhetorical functions with social movements. However, to better understand both the shared and unique rhetorical features of revolutions requires interdisciplinary insight. Goldstone (1998) meets this need with his model that distinguishes between social movements and revolutions. Specifically, Goldstone (1998) argues that the context in which social movements occur is critical to the development of a revolution. The tailoring of Griffin (1969), Stewarts (1980) and Goldstone’s (1998) models requires a reliable rhetorical text in order to be applied. The literature based regarding the use of social media during the Arab Spring supports the use of social media as a primary rhetorical text for studying revolutions.

The remaining chapters of this thesis tailored and apply a rhetorical movement approach to studying revolutionary based on Griffin (1969), Stewarts (1980) and Goldstone’s (1998) models. In addition to outlining this new approach, the selection of Twitter and Facebook post during Egypt’s 2011 Arab Spring revolution is defended in chapter three. Chapter four applies this tailored methodology to the Egyptian Revolution through a rhetorical analysis. Finally, implications, limitation and future areas of study are discussed.
Chapter 3 - Methodological Framework

This chapter seeks to provide an applicable model to analyze the rhetorical development of revolutions and answer this thesis’ research questions. Additionally, the success of this model would allow for future investigation of revolutions by rhetorical movement scholars. This model seeks to answer the following research questions: What are the rhetorical characteristics of revolutions? Are revolutions rhetorically distinct from social movements? This chapter will utilize the Goldstone (1998) model that charts the distinction between social movements and revolutions. Specifically, this chapter is concerned with Goldstone’s (1998) stages of revolution development and realization. Griffin’s (1969) approach is laid over top of Goldstone’s (1998) model. The rhetorical periods of inception, crisis and eloquence are most prevalent when apply Griffin’s (1969) model to Goldstone’s (1998). More specifically, the abrupt conclusion to revolutions, which will be discussed later, results in a revolution being unable to enter into Griffin’s later stages of consummation, eloquence and stasis. Although brief, Wilkinson’s (1989) discussion of rhetorical functions of revolutions is included. Stewart’s (1980) rhetorical function approach is also incorporated to translate Goldstone’s (1998) model into rhetorical terms. Stewart (1980) sought to outline general rhetorical functions of social movements. However in this methodology a distinction is made between general social movement rhetorical functions and revolutionary rhetorical functions. This chapter will conclude by providing a rationale for the selection of a subset of tweets from the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring.

Before discussing the stages of this tailored model, a discussion of its assumptions is necessary. First, Goldstone’s (1998) model assumes that collective action cannot cycle between stages. Goldstone (1998) argues that a revolution cannot return to its previous social movement stages once a state attempts to repress it. This is in conflict with Griffin (1969) who allows for
movements to return to previous stages. This methodology sides with Goldstone’s model and hypothesizes that the radical nature of revolutionary rhetoric does not allow for the movement to return to prior stages and instead demands forward movement. This demand for forward movement does not conflict with Stewart’s’ (1980) assertion that movements can meet various rhetorical functions at the same time. Instead, this thesis’ model is divided into stages where certain rhetorical functions are expected to emerge. As a result, this model is sequential in nature.

Second, the following proposed model is an exclusively rhetorical method. This model assumes that the motivation of a revolution will become known through the movement’s rhetoric. This assumption is consistent with Griffin’s (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) discussions of the nature of social movement rhetoric. This thesis’ model assumes Goldstone’s (1998) argument that the causes of social movements and revolutions cannot be distinguished. Goldstone discusses these causes as material while this tailored model treats the causes as rhetorical inventions.

Based on these assumptions this model is separated into six stages. These stages include: 1) The identification of grievances, 2) the initial mobilization for action, 3) the state response, 4) the radicalized adaptation of purpose 5) the subsequent mobilization for revolt, 6) and the conclusion. As previously mentioned, these stages are entered into sequentially. Scholars applying this model should look for the emerging rhetoric as some rhetorical functions will permeate into later stages of the revolution after initially being deployed. The careful application of this model will allow scholars to examine how revolutions “sound” different than other social movement. Thus, this model seeks identify the unique rhetorical functions and features of revolutionary movements.
Section One: Identification of Grievances

This stage coincides with Goldstone’s (1998) discussion of the causes of movements and Griffin’s (1969) broad stage of inception. The “good” and “evil” of the current power system is slowly being identified by marginalized individuals brought together by their shared grievances. Griffin notes that this period may be brought on by a shocking physical catalyst. Per Goldstone’s model, this stage is impossible to distinguish from the initial period of social movements. During this stage, Stewart’s (1980) rhetorical function of altering perceptions of the past, present and future should be prevalent. These grievances can include a wide range of complaints that may, but not necessarily, relate to economic, political and social conditions. Additionally, Goldstone notes that these grievances may not initially be aggressive in their criticism of the state. Thus, this stage is more closely related to Griffin’s period of inception. Scholars can identify this period by rhetorical markers that include calls for “the people” to come together, uniting calls to resist the status quo and references to a brighter future for the marginalized population.

Section Two: Initial Mobilization for Action

The movement advances to its next stage of development as it begins to mobilize its followers for action. Here Goldstone (1998) is still unable to distinguish between a social movement and revolution. This stage continues to align with Griffin’s (1969) inception model. It’s clear that the movement has entered this stage when it begins to enact three of Stewart’s (1980) functions. These rhetorical functions may happen gradually in a staged progress or simultaneously. Regardless, the movement will employ rhetoric that seeks to alter the perceptions of the defined opposition. The rhetoric of the movement must also function in this stage to prescribe action and to mobilize individuals to carry out said actions. Again, it’s
important to note that initially the movement may not be organizing against the state or an entity of the state. In fact, Goldstone (1998) identifies this period as one of mobilization for a change in policies or attitudes. In this way, the initial rhetorical functions need not be tailored from Stewart’s original discussion.

As Stewart (1980) describes, the movement must rhetorically strip the opposition of their legitimacy and positively alter the self-perception of supporters. Scholars can look for rhetoric that describes supporters in terms of moral goodness while labeling the opposition as oppressive and evil. Supporters may reject old labels and take up new identities that indicate their ability to force change. Next, the movement must outline a course of action (Stewart, 1980). Scholars should identify instructions of who should do what and how it ought to be done as an expression of this type of rhetoric. An example of this rhetoric would include plans for a rally or protest. This rhetorical function may result in inter- and intra-movement conflict that creates various fractions of the movement. Finally, the movement must use rhetoric to mobilize for action. Here, supporters are united and organized to carry out the movement’s course of action. Markers of mobilizing rhetoric include messages crafted to convince followers that victory is viable and foreseeable in the near future. Scholars can look for rhetoric that highlights the unique opportunity for change and calls supporters to act before the moment passes.

**Section Three: State Response – Distinction Occurs**

All three scholars agree that the rise of a counter-movement is critical to the development of a social movement. For Griffin (1969), this is the final characteristic of the inception period. Once the movement generates conflict with the existing order, as represented by counter-movement, the social movement can gain public notice. For Griffin, this conflict is a dialectic entanglement between the movement and the counter-movement. Cathcart (1972) expands on
this conflict in his explanation of dialectic enjoinder. Essentially the two groups engage in a rhetorical battle that generates drama and allows for the movement to progress. Goldstone’s (1998) model is more specific about the requirements of the counter-movement. For a revolution to develop, the state must emerge as the counter-movement. Thus, a defining feature of revolutions is the dialectic enjoinderment between the revolution and the state. This is not to say that the initial purpose of the movement was directly against the state but merely that the state finds the need to respond. An adaptation of Goldstone’s (1998) three potential types of state responses and the resulting outcome allows for the rhetorical identification and examination of response.

First, the state can produce a mild response. The use of the label “mild” does not indicate that the state must be indifferent to the movement, but instead that its response legitimizes the collective action as a social movement. A mild response from the state is within the expected behavior of the regime and does not require the state to reassert its legitimacy as a means of justifying its actions. In essence, this is a “business as usual” response from the state. Rhetorical critics utilizing this model should be sensitive to the historical context of the state’s action in determining if a rhetorical response fits this definition of a mild response. If a state responds in a way that recognizes the movement as a legitimate expression of citizens, then the movement will continue as a social movement. An example of this legitimizing state response might include the state offering to meet with movement organizers to hear out their demands. The progression the resulting movement fits within Griffin’s (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) original models.

The second available state response is a strong targeted repression that eliminates the movement from the public sphere. Here Goldstone (1998) explains that the state rejects the legitimacy of the movement. Goldstone provides examples of the physical actions that a state
enacting this response will take including violent crackdowns and the imprisonment of supporters. These attacks must be both targeted and viewed as a legitimate expression of governmental authority. Goldstone explains these requirements are necessary for the public to accept the actions of the state and to avoid generating sympathy for the targeted movement. Johnstad (2012) notes that a perceived legitimate state will seek to frame the actions of a movement as a threat to the public. Thus, the state seeks to fulfill the function of altering perceptions of the opposition. As the state is rhetorically functioning as a counter-movement, it is fitting that it seeks to perform the same functions laid out by Stewart (1980). This type of violent action will be accompanied by state rhetoric that outlines the movement as a threat to public safety, frames the state’s actions protective of the public and highlights the shared goals of the state and the public.

The last option for a state response is of the greatest interest to this research. A weak or erratic response by the state that rejects the legitimacy of a movement in an effort to eliminate it can serve as a catalyst for a revolution (Goldstone, 1998). This response is repressive in nature but is ultimately counterproductive. Goldstone explains that when a state uses repressive and violent tactics any failure to target only the supporters of the movement damages the state’s perceived legitimacy and galvanizes the movement. The context of these weak or erratic responses hints to potential rhetorical markers of the state. Goldstone (1998) notes that state will attempt to justify its actions by arguing it used legitimate force. Furthermore, this use of state force may be constrained by domestic or international pressures (Goldstone, 1998). Scholars should look for the state to attempt to rhetorically justify its actions to multiple audiences by claiming that it is acting within its role as a governing force that has its citizens’ best interest in mind. This rhetorical justification of force is in line with Griffin’s (1969) dramatistic approach.
The major rhetorical difference between a strong and weak/erratic state response is the need for the state to specifically acknowledge its legitimacy. Strong state responses rhetorically assume legitimacy, where a weak/erratic response the state must rhetorically justify both its actions and its legitimacy to carry out said action. In this stage, both the state and the movement are projecting rhetorical visions that set “the stage” for their actions as just, moral and righteous. However, because these visions are in direct opposition to each other, only one vision can be accepted by the audience. Ultimately, weak/erratic state responses rhetorical constrains the movement to two choices: revolution or failure.

**Section Four: Radicalized Adaptation**

Once the state produces a weak or erratic response, the movement takes on distinct revolutionary rhetorical features during the radical adaptation stage. This stage is a precursor to Goldstone’s (1998) stage of mobilizing for changes in political regime and is related to Griffin’s (1969) conception of the crisis period. Wilkinson’s (1989) rhetorical functions emerge during this stage. In response to the state’s repressive actions, the movement, which has now taken on revolutionary form, will begin to appeal to moral generalities, create a binary world and attempt to demystify authority.

As Wilkinson (1989) explains in order to step outside the legal and social bonds maintained by the state, revolutions appeal to a higher moral authority. This move is rhetorically unique to revolutions, as it allows for the complete dismissal of the state’s authority while returning moral authority to “the people”. This appeal is broad and marked by rhetorical appeals for the people to rise up in defense of truth, justice, reason and liberty.

The revolution will also utilize rhetoric that creates a binary world. This rhetoric is more radicalized than the rhetoric used in the first and second stages. Here the revolution will paint
the world in absolute binary terms. Wilkinson (1989) notes that this rhetoric is emotionally charged and confronts selected targets. This binary world is more extreme than the divided world created by social movements and discusses by Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980). Unlike social movements, revolutions frame inaction and indecision among the people as support for the state as there is no gray area. An example of this type of rhetoric may include accusations that those who have remained uninvolved are condoning the abuse of the state through inaction.

The final rhetorical marker of this stage of radicalized adaptation is the emergence of rhetoric that seeks to demystify authority. Here the revolution is working against the state’s claims of legitimacy, especially as used for justification of the repression of the initial movement. This is related to Goldstone’s (1998, p. 30) discussion about the galvanizing effect of poorly executed repression that “terrorizes” citizens unconnected or only loosely connected to the movement. The revolution capitalizes on this poor display of state force and uses rhetoric that promotes the disrespect of the state and seeks to put the victims of the state at the top of the new order. For this function, scholars may look for rhetoric that paints state officials as childlike and reactionary instead of strategic. Other messages may present the head of state as self-appointed and fearful of the power of the people. It’s worth noting that this stage is marked by the emergence and not merely the existence of Wilkinson’s rhetorical functions. Wilkinson (1998) explains that this rhetoric is present during the entire revolution. The rhetoric of demystification of authority even goes beyond the revolution. After the emergence of Wilkinson’s (1998) rhetorical functions during the radical adaptation stage, the revolution can move into the radical mobilization stage.
Section Five: Radical Mobilization

During the radical mobilization stage, the revolution revisits Stewart’s (1980) mobilizing rhetorical functions including altering the perception of the opposition, prescribing action, and mobilizing followers. However, these functions are altered by the revolutionary nature of the movement. In this second period of mobilization, the revolution will seek to alter the perceptions of the opposition in ways that align with its rhetorical vision of the binary world of moral absolutes that Wilkinson (1998) describes. Here the revolution must, as Griffin (1969) details, urgently call supporters to seek salvation through the conversion of others and direct action. The revolution will paint the state as an oppressive, tyrannical and evil force that must be overthrown. Stewart (1980) notes that this rhetorical function must also seek to transform the supporters’ perceptions of themselves as capable of forcing change. This is critical as the direct action referenced by Griffin (1969), requires revolutionaries to risk imprisonment, physical injury and even death to support the revolution. In summary, the revolution’s rhetoric will function to alter the perception of the opposition as an intolerable presence that can be removed if only the people choose to stand together and revolt. An example of this rhetoric might include an activist justifying their personal risks as necessary while arguing if others joined there would be safety in numbers.

Stewart’s (1980) function of prescribing action is also altered during the radical mobilization stage. In his initial discussion of this function, Stewart is very clear that the movement must lay out a detailed course of action. In doing so, the movement risks intra and inter-movement conflict. However, as Wilkinson (1989) notes, specificity is counter to the interests of a revolutionary movement. The rise of inter-movement conflict favors the state’s position as it opens up rhetorical space for less radical alternatives than revolution. This space rejects the binary world of moral absolutes that the revolution seeks to project. Thus, in this
altered version of Stewart’s (1980) prescription function the revolution will become singularly focused on overthrowing the state. This rhetoric is marked by a lack of engaged discussion concerning post-revolution policy. Instead, protesters will constantly reiterate the need to overthrow the state to secure an intentionally vaguely-described brighter future. Attempts by the state to meet with “leaders” of the revolution will be called out as insincere attempts to divide the revolution. Essentially, anyone who stands to benefit from the end of the current system of power can align their specific interests with the intentionally broad goals of the revolution. This altered function aligns with sociological discussions of revolutions that identify revolutions as the physical representation of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat (Borch, 2006). As a result, the prescribe action is intentionally short-sighted as the revolution does not prescribe a course of action for transitioning after the current state is overthrown.

In order to carry out the revolution’s prescribed action, it must rhetorically mobilize for action. Obviously, this function is crucial to the success of the revolution. Stewart (1980) explains that mobilizing rhetoric functions to both organize and unify supporters. This rhetoric can seek to mobilize supporters to carry out a host of actions including those focused on self-change, gaining control of societal influence and garnering attention for the movement. For revolutions, it is necessary for supporters to join together in a public physical revolutionary crowd to confront the state (Borch, 2006). However, the rhetoric used to mobilize supporters must be carefully tailored as to not support the state’s rhetorical vision of the revolution as threatening. Once actively protesting and calling for a change in power, the revolution must present itself as a representation of the people and not a threat to the public (Borch, 2006). If the revolution rhetorically fails to mobilize its supporters in a non-threatening way, it justifies the state’s action to violently repress the movement. This is not to say that the revolution must only
mobilize for non-violent action. But only to say that whatever action is called for must be framed as a symbolic or physical attack aimed at the state, not the public. To achieve this function, activists might claim that violence broke out as the result of state action or that vandalism only targets symbols of state oppression. Scholars should also look for welcoming invitations to join the revolution by activist who state all are welcome.

The final altered rhetorical function of the radical mobilization stage requires sustaining rhetoric. As previously discussed, Stewart (1980) assumed that social movements usually last for years. However, it is in the best interest of a revolution to overthrow the state as rapidly as possible. Goldstone (1998) explains that the state benefits the longer it is able to resist a revolution. After initially failing to repress the movement, the state may seek to splinter the now revolutionary movement by offering moderate concession (Goldstone, 1998). Additionally, the state possesses the resources to punish supporters of the revolution. Thus, Stewart’s initial function of mobilization must be altered to meet the revolution’s need for rapid change. Here, the rhetoric of the revolution will seek to emphasize victories and create symbols of martyrdom in order to reinforce supporter’s convictions and justify setbacks which may include significant human costs. The rhetoric will continue to play to the binary world of moral absolutes as discussed by Wilkinson (1989) by justifying the sacrifices of supporters as heroic and acts of true patriotism. Scholars should identified calls by activists that more brave patriots will die if the pubic remains uninvolved as indicative of this stage. Dedications of commitment and action to martyrs should also be identified in this stage. Yet, the longer a revolution exists the more difficult it becomes to rhetorically sustain itself.
Section Six: Conclusion – Return to Social Movements

The revolution may conclude either in the successful overthrow of the state or in failure to sustain the revolution in the public sphere. These conclusions are in line with Goldstone’s (1998) model. If the state is successful, the movement may be eliminated entirely or repressed to the point where it only functions underground outside of the public sphere. If the latter occurs, the movement will need to regain support and cycle back through the stages of this model in order to return to a revolutionary status. If the model is successful in overthrowing the state, it will cease to function. This is in direct opposition of Griffin’s (1969) model which extends beyond the success of a social movement. However, the abrupt end of the revolution is the result of the rhetorical functions of the radical mobilizing stage. Specifically, the revolution rhetorically prescribes the singular action of overthrowing the state. Thus, once the revolution succeeds it cannot maintain Griffin’s period of consummation because support of the revolution splinters as there is no unifying rhetorical vision of what the new system ought to be. This splintering is supported by sociologists’ observations. If a revolutionary crowd is successful in its purpose, then the crowd dissolved into the multiplicity it was created from as there is no social association to maintain the crowd (Borch, 2006). From this multiplicity, new movements with more specific visions of the new system can arise.

The tailoring of Goldstone (1998) model into a rhetorical method is necessary to account for the unique rhetorical functions of revolutions that were only briefly outlined by Wilkinson (1989) and not discussed by Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980). Evaluating the viability of this tailored approach requires the careful application of this model to a case-study. In order to do so, a representative rhetorical text must be selected. The remainder of this chapter provides a rationale for the selection of a subset of Twitter posts as well as a brief background of the socio-
political context from which the revolution was formed. This text will be analyzed in chapter four alongside additional academic research examining the Egyptian Revolution.

**Section Seven: Rationale for Selected Text**

*Tweets from Tahir: Egypt’s revolution as it unfolded, the words of the people who made it*, is a published collection of activists’ tweets during the Egyptian Revolution (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). This collection of tweets will serve as the primary text for this thesis’ analysis. This thesis argues that the text is an appropriate selection for the application of the model based on the unaltered nature of the text, the representative quality of the tweets, the measurable influence of the users and the concise nature of the rhetoric presented.

The collection spans tweets posted between January 14, 2011 and February 13, 2011. The text contains both the date and time of each tweet. Tweets cannot be edited once posted. As a result, the content of the collection has not been altered in the ways that Borch (2006) explains are problematic of post-revolutionary interviews. Additionally, the text has not been translated as many Egyptians with access to Twitter posted in English. Thus, the text is unaltered from the time it was expressed as the revolution was developing.

Next, the authors recognize that the selection of English tweets excludes some of those who were active on Twitter during the Revolution (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). However by using English, the users gained an international audience in addition to their large Egyptian following (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). Additionally, the tweets routinely include informative post translating the chants heard in Tahrir Square and key messages of important speeches by state officials. As a result, the tweets preserve the rhetoric of the crowds, despite being recorded by a privileged activist class of Egyptians. Idle and Nuuns (2011) also acknowledge that their collection is not comprehensive. However, the collection does contain tweets from the Revolutions most
influential activists (Idle and Nuuns, 2011). As previously discussed, the non-reciprocal nature of information sharing on Twitter results in it functioning more like an information-sharing network than a social network (Kwak, et al., 2010). Therefore, key influencers can easily be identified. Based on the number of followers and re-tweets (when other users share someone else’s tweet with their own network), the authors selected the users who were particularly well-positioned to influence others and disseminate information. The selection of a collection like Idle and Nuuns’ (2011) allows for the rhetorical analysis of multiple influential activists and offers a more complete view of the revolutionary movement. As a result, this thesis argues that text is representative of Egyptian revolutionary rhetoric despite discussed limitations.

Finally, the concise nature of tweets promotes distilling of rhetorical appeals. With only 145-characters to craft messages, activists must be direct in their appeals. As a result, the text’s tweets are a blend of informative and persuasive messages. Many of the collections’ users utilized Twitter to report on what they saw in Tahrir Square while others constructed messages of solidarity and encouragement for protesters to continue to demand change. This blending of messages allows for the identification of revolutionary rhetoric and an understanding of the context from which it was produced. As a result, the tweets provide a multifaceted projection of the rhetorical scene which leaders of the movement sought to create. The text is well-suited for the application of this model as the tweets serve as a useful unit of analysis for the evaluation of each stage.

As this methodology is concerned with the origins of revolutions that cannot be distinguished from social movements, this analysis is supported by the incorporation of additional academic texts. These texts provide context to the socio-political setting of the Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution. Furthermore, the selected rhetorical text does not focus on the
historical context related to the revolution’s development. Therefore, supplemental texts are needed to gain a complete view of the revolution. The following academic texts will be incorporated into this analysis. Baron (2012) tracks the development of influential Facebook pages like Egypt’s April 6th Youth Movement (A6YM) over the course of several years. Similarly, Rane and Salem (2012) detail the development of the Egyptian political blogging community that served as a foundation for the dissent that encouraged the 2011 revolution. These texts are well-suited for this purpose because they are similarly focuses on the communicative aspects of the Egyptian Revolution through a social media lens. These academic investigations of social media influencers of the Egyptian Arab Spring offer a fuller picture of the revolutionary movement. Prior to beginning this thesis’ analysis, a brief background of the socio-political conditions surrounding the Egyptian Arab Spring is necessary.

Initially, it is important to understand the Egyptian Arab Spring as a successful non-violent collective action. While violence did occur on both sides of the revolution, rhetoric played a central role in the development of the revolution. Johnstad (2012) notes the significant distinction between non-violent movements and armed insurgencies. The former requires mass support and directly confronts the legitimacy of the state. The latter may only represent a small, but powerful, segment of the population. Large, sustained mass protests (Idle and Nuuns, 2011) and relatively limited violence on both sides (Rane and Salem, 2012) are notable characteristics of the Egyptian Revolution. The revolution easily fits Johnstad’s (2012) definition of a non-violent movement. Further, Johnstad (2012) notes that Egypt was one of only three non-violent Arab Spring movements to successfully bring down the protested regime. As a result, the revolution succeeded in directly confronting the state’s legitimacy through protest rhetoric. Thus, the Egyptian Revolution is an appropriate artifact for the application of the above model.
Section Eight: Contextual Background

The roots of the Egyptian Revolution are as entrenched as Hosni Mubarak’s presidency prior to 2011. The long and unpopular legacy of Mubarak served as rhetorical fodder for the revolution. A brief history of Mubarak’s rule offers insight to the large scope of grievances expressed by protesters. In 1981, President Sadat was assassinated, and Hosni Mubarak became the new Egyptian President. Violence during President Mubarak’s rule started with a failed assassination attempt in 1995. In the next decade, Egypt experienced a rise in terrorist attacks and deadly anti-government protests (BBC, 2015). Mubarak’s rule brought about three major categories of challenges: political, economic and social.

In December 2005, the Mubarak regime forced the Muslim Brotherhood, a rival political party linked to the 1952 Egyptian Revolution, to run as independents. The party won a record 20% of parliamentary seats (Political Factbook, 2013). An increase in Muslim Brotherhood arrests by the government in 2006 appeared as a response to the party’s success (BBC, 2015). The crackdown on the group was so severe that it gained the criticism of Amnesty International in 2007 and went on to accumulate over 800 arrests in a single month in 2008 (BBC, 2015). The crackdown came to a head when in June 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to win any seats in the upper parliament despite its record gains in the 2005 parliament. The group claimed that the elections were rigged and began protesting (Political Factbook, 2013). The 2010 parliamentary elections were internationally criticized as a blatant attempt by Mubarak’s party (the National Democratic Party) to stay in power through the use of election fraud and intimidation (Johnstad, 2012).

Economic hardships were another major stumbling block for the Mubarak regime. Despite relatively healthy economic growth in the years prior to the 2011 revolution, poor living conditions resulted in social unrest (Veltmeyer, 2011). The World Bank (2015) estimated
Egypt’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita to be $2,803.53 in 2010. While not the worst economy in the region, Egypt’s poverty rate steadily increased during Mubarak’s rule with 25.2% of the population living under the national poverty line in 2011 (World Bank, 2015). High unemployment rates among young people and women in rural areas, large rural-urban wealth disparities and a growing GDP budget deficit added to Mubarak’s economic struggles (African Economic Outlook, 2014). Egyptians with the education and means to seek work legally outside of the country did. However, it was not uncommon for less fortunate Egyptians to take on the risks of illegal immigration to seek out better economic conditions (Idle and Nuuns, 2011). The Egyptians’ frustration with their lack of economic opportunities flared during in the Spring of 2008 when food prices surged. The national factory workers’ strike on April 6th involved the online participation of 77,000 individuals who pledged to strike or at least support strikers in their calls for higher wages (Baron, 2012). The strike introduced tech-savy Egyptians to the potential of using social media as a tool for social mobilization (Baron, 2012).

Finally, the Mubarak regime’s constant extension of the 1981 Emergency Law, which functionally suspended the Egyptian Constitution, generated significant social unrest among Egyptians. The unpopular law allowed for indefinite detainment of citizens and resulted in widespread human rights violations by police and the military (Political Handbook, 2013). Both organizers of the April 6th workers strike (Baron, 2012) and members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Political Handbook, 2013) were arrested and tortured by Egyptian police. State-sanctioned police brutality served as a major catalyst for the Revolution after police beat 28-year-old businessman Khaled Said to death on June 6, 2010 (Halverson et al., 2013). Graphic photos of Saeed’s badly mutilated body posted online by relatives galvanized activists whose online protests carried over into the fall of 2011. Combined, the disputed elections of 2010, an
increasingly poor economic, and public outrage over police brutality all put Mubarak’s regime on unsure ground once the Tunisia Revolution began. Ultimately, this complex combination of socio-political conditions paired with the state’s inability to quell protest would signal the end of Mubarak’s 30-year reign.

The following chapter applies the tailored methodology to analyze the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution. This rhetorical analysis will investigate the revolutionary movement for the seven rhetorical stages of revolution development and realization. This analysis focuses primarily on a collection of Egyptian activists tweets and secondarily on supplemental academic research. Following the analysis, the final chapter of this thesis will discuss implications and areas of future research.
Chapter 4 - A Rhetorical Movement Analysis of the Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution

This analysis stays true to the compact and informal nature of Twitter and the tweets. All tweets appear in their original and complete form. The posts appear as posts with no alterations to spelling or grammar. All of the tweets also appear in chronological order in an effort to stay true to the sequential nature of the model. The users have been identified by their Twitter handle (username) and provided name. As the model is rhetorical in nature, this analysis is not necessarily concerned with the influence or degree of dissemination of the analyzed tweets. Instead, the analysis utilizes the tweets to illustrate the model by providing evidence of revolutionary rhetoric.

The chapter is divided into nine sections beginning with a brief overview of the conditions and events leading up to the early stages of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. The following seven sections include the sequential stages of the proposed model. These stages include: (1) The identification of grievances, (2) the initial mobilization for action, (3) the state response, (4) the radicalized adaptation of purpose (5) the subsequent mobilization for revolt, (6) the conclusion.

This chapter applies the theoretical model to a real-world context in hopes of gaining insight into the rhetorical functions of revolutions. The successful application of the model will provide answers to these research questions: How do revolutions rhetorically function? Are revolutions rhetorically unique from other types of social movements? After the conclusion of this analysis, the final chapter of this thesis addresses critical and methodological implications for social movement rhetoric.
When analyzing Egypt’s Revolution as a movement, it is critical to understand it in the larger context of the Arab Spring. Fraudulent elections, a sinking economy and widespread police brutality contributed to Egypt’s revolution. However, the Arab Spring’s first revolution in Tunisia also played a major role in setting the stage for Egypt’s revolution. The Tunisia Revolution was sparked by the self-immolation of 26-year-old street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010 in protest of police harassment against him (Halverson et al., 2013). Bouazizi died on January 4, 2011 from the incident but his identity as a martyr of the Arab Spring lived on through viral videos, Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags (Halverson et al., 2013). The similarities between Bouazizi and Egyptian Khaled Said, whom police beat to death in 2010, were not missed by Egyptian activists. By the time the Tunisia protests toppled the regime on January 14, 2011, Egyptians and activists in Algeria, Libya, Yemen and Jordan were already tuned-in and hopeful for similar change across the region (Johnstad, 2012). The Tunisian Revolution helped galvanize Egyptian activists to capitalize on similar socio-political conditions that many agree were as ripe for revolution (Baron, 2012; Idle & Nuuns, 2011; and Johnstad, 2012). Moreover, the Tunisian Revolution also set forth a guide for toppling an entrenched regime through the use of social media and mass peaceful protest. With an appreciation for Tunisia’s influence on the Egyptian Arab Spring, the primary text can be analyzed.

**Section One: Identification of grievances**

As a review, the first stage requires that marginalized individuals come together through shared grievances. Here the rhetoric should function to alter perceptions of the past, present and future for the purpose of identifying the “good” and “bad”. As previously mentioned, this
rhetoric will be marked by calls for “the people” to act and promises a brighter future for followers. Lastly, this rhetoric may be brought on by a shocking physical event.

The Egyptian Arab Spring sought to build on the momentum from the Tunisian Revolution. Previous Egyptian social movements failed to transfer mass online support into the streets (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). When movements were able to organize in the streets, police crackdowns brutally extinguished calls for change (Baron, 2012). Thus, a variety of social activists and already established social movement groups shared a common interest in organizing against the police and the Emergency Law that empowered the agency. Grievances regarding police brutality weaved together with the revolutionary spirit of the region as demonstrated by @tarekhalaby’s tweet.

@tarekhalaby, Tarek Shalaby, Jan 14
“WE WILL FOLLOW! RT @SultanAlQasemi: Tunisians are the heroes of the Arab World.

Even with the following sample of selected tweets from the text, the first stage of the model is evident. Obviously, marginalized Egyptians were brought together by the fall of the Tunisian government that was similar to their socio-political climate. By promising to follow and praising Tunisians, @tarekhalaby’s rhetoric functions to alter the perceptions of the present and future. In the present, Tunisians are heroes not only within the confines of their newly liberated country but also throughout the entire Arab world. Thus, those who seek widespread change should not only be lauded in the present but also followed in the future.

Praise for Tunisian revolutionaries quickly turned to criticism of Egyptians’ tendency to only mobilize online as indicated by @amuchmoreexotic’s tweet.

@amuchmoreexotic, Ben, Jan 14
I don’t understand how the people of Tunisia overthrew their government without me signing an e-petition or changing my Twitter avatar.
Here the rhetoric functions to alter perceptions of the past. It suggests that the failures of previous Egyptian social movements were not due to the lack of activists’ offline commitment. Instead, the tweet suggests that past failures could have been avoided if Egyptians would have been willing to take their online support to the streets. Even as critical as @amuchmoreexotic’s is, the message suggests the potential for future success through following Tunisia.

Three days later, marginalized Egyptians were pulled together again when three separate individuals set themselves on fire to protest police actions (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). On the surface, the tweet from @gsquare86 appears primarily informative. However, her use of all caps and Tunisian related hashtags promotes the rhetoric of grievance.

@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan. 17
“A MAN IN #EGYPT SET HIMSELF ON FIRE CHANTING AGAINST STATE SECURITY IN FRONT OF PARLIAMENT AT 9:00AM TODAY #sidibouzid #Revolution attempt?

The capital letters communicate shock and outrage. The hashtags #sidibouzid and #Revolution link the unidentified man’s actions to the Tunisian city where Mohamed Bouazizi became a martyr for his country’s revolution. The Egyptian man’s grievances involving police brutality were so severe that he chose to knowingly sacrifice his life to protest. The empathy felt by witnesses help unite those sympathetic to the man’s anti-police brutality protest. As the model predicts, marginalized individuals are pulled together by shared grievances all while slowly identifying the “good” and “bad” in the world around them.

The activist continued to meet the requirements of this stage by producing rhetoric that sought to alter the perceptions of the past.

@3arabawy, Hossam, Jan 17
people r setting themselves on fire. I suggest they burn down police stations and torture factories instead.
@monasosh, monasosh, Jan. 18
There is something incredibly sad abt ppl setting themselves on fire in a fatal hopeful/desperate attempt to be heard!

Both @3arabawy and @monasosh engaged in perception altering rhetoric. By suggesting that police stations and torture factories deserve to be burned instead, @3arabawy highlights past police actions as the cause for the present tragic protests. Thus, the future is one where police brutality and torture will not be tolerated. Note that the tweet also includes the word “people” instead of protesters, activist, radical or terrorist. By viewing those sacrificing themselves as Egyptian people citizens are invited to see their grievances in the protest act. Finally, @monasosh’s tweet highlights the “badness” of the current climate that demands such extreme protest. However, the tweet’s rhetoric also subtly suggests that the sacrifice opens the door for “the people” to be heard. Thus, police brutality was being protested by “the people” and not just the three who radically protested.

As demonstrated by the selected text, the start of the Egyptian Revolution clearly meets the requirements laid out in the first stage of the model. Activists drew from two shocking catalysts, the Tunisian Revolution and the self-immolation protests in Cairo, to air their grievances with the state of police brutality in Egypt. The rhetoric employed subtly identifies those who are willing to physically protest as “good” and representative of “the people.” Similarly, online-only activists are chastised for not be willing to take to the streets to protest the “badness” of the state of police brutality in Egypt. Having fulfilled the rhetorical requirements of this stage, the movement advances to the next stage of development.
Section Two: Initial Mobilization for Action

Here the infant revolution is still indistinguishable from a social movement. As such, the movement may not mobilize directly against the regime. Three rhetorical functions must emerge during this stage. The movement must strip the opposition of legitimacy and improve self-perceptions of supporters. For this function, the rhetoric will identify supporters as agents of moral goodness and label the opposition as evil and oppressive. Exchanging old supporter labels for new empowering labels may also occur. Additionally, the movement must outline a course of action and respond to the potential splintering of the movement. Finally, the rhetoric must mobilize for action. Rhetorical markers include calls for action and promises that victory is possible within the near future.

Within six days of the fall of Tunisia, Egyptians were calling for a mass demonstration on National Police Day, January 25th, 2011 (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). In a rhetorical move of solidarity, activists began using the hashtag #jan25. The #jan25 movement called for demonstrations across Egypt including Cairo, Alexandria and Suez. The movement devised a basic strategy that involved rapid demonstrations in multiple locations in an attempt to stretch out the police presence and mobilize poor communities that lacked Internet access (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). In Cairo, protesters converged on Midan Al-Tahrir, or Liberation Square as it translates to English. The police launched rocks, tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannon attacks at protesters to disperse the large crowd. Twitter users tweeted throughout the entire demonstration.

At first glance, @monasosh’s tweets might appear to reflect a movement in confusion.

@monasosh, monasosh. Jan. 21
Did we finally settle on a tag for the 25th of january?
@monasosh, monasosh, Jan 24
What time should we be in the streets tomorrow? #jan25

However, a closer look reveals the mobilizing function served by the hashtag #jan25. Twitter uses hashtags to organize tweets. Anyone seeking out information about the protest would merely need to search “#jan25” to access all public tweets using the tag. By agreeing on a common hashtag, the movement created a digital label for its followers. The hashtag functions to connect supporters and create easy access to important information, like when and where to meet. The genius of this mobilization strategy is highlighted by Tufeki and Wilson (2012) quantitative finding that Egyptians using Twitter to talk about the movement were more likely to attend the first day of protests than those who used Facebook for the same purpose. Therefore, the hashtag not only united and mobilized people digitally but it also encouraged and informed the physical mobilization of the movement.

Additionally, the hashtag was original and contained no symbolic connection with past or established social movements. The rhetorical choice is in conflict with Stewart et al.’s (2012) argument that social movements will seek to build legitimacy by conferring the legitimacy of other movements. Emerging social movements may strive to link themselves to previous movements or well-known advocates. However, Stewart et al.’s (2012) analysis focuses on heavily American social movements. In Egypt, where past movements failed and suffered police violence, Stewart et al.’s (2012) strategy would be counter-productive. The blank slate of #jan25 created opportunity but also demanded a course of action to be defined.

As the model predicts, the initial course of action laid out by the movement is not explicitly revolutionary. @adamakary’s tweets lay out clear demands and a course of action. Other users, like @Sandmonkey, tweeted links that directed users to web pages and blogs containing similar information. While this type of informative mobilizing rhetoric fulfills the
required function, it also promotes splintering within the movement. @3arabawy’s tweet indicates that not all agreed with the set course of action.

@adamakary, Adam Makary, Jan. 25
#jan25 protester’s demands: increase in minimum wage, dismissal of interior ministry, removal of emergency law, shorten presidential term

@adamakary, Adam Makary, Jan. 25
#jan25 protests will take place all throughout cairo, including shubra, mohendessin, in front of cairo university and on arab league street

@3arabawy, Hossam, Jan 25
@shadihamid I’m not expecting a revolution today. I’m expecting protests. So let’s not shoot high so as not to disappoint people later.

By reaffirming the debated course of action, @3arabawy addresses the disagreement directly. What is curious is his choice not to include the #jan25 hashtag in his reply. In this way, the movement continues to utilize the hashtag for a uniting function instead of a divisive one.

As the protests picked up, activists sought to strip rhetorically the police of their legitimacy by condemning their violent response to the peaceful protest. This strategy of stripping legitimacy aligns with Stewart et al. (2012). They explain that this example of coactive rhetoric attacks three major forms of state power: identification, terministic control and moral suasion (Stewart et al., 2012, pg 68). This rhetorical stripping takes legitimacy from the police and transfers it to the movement. Increasingly, the tweets referenced the protesters as peaceful in stark opposition to the violent oppression of the police. Intertwined within this stripping rhetoric were messages of empowerment for Egyptians. Not only were the protests exceeding police expectations but even organizers were surprised by the size of the demonstration (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). As the day wore on, activists began to grasp the significance of the protests and crafted promises of future success. The following tweets provide evidence of the stripping and mobilizing rhetoric required by the model.
@ashrafkalil, ashraf khalil, Jan 25
#Jan25 at the very least this is the biggest day of protest Egypt has seen in years

@TravellerW, Mo-ha-med, Jan 25
our strength is in our collective action. Egyptians, Believe in Yourselves. BELIEVE IN US. #25jan #egypt

@ashrafkalil, ashraf khalil,
#jan25 crowd chanting ‘salmeya’ peaceful

@TravellerW, Mo-ha-med, Jan 25
Police throws rocks @demonstrtrrs while we raised our arms We’re unarmed, they’re in full gear. We are strong, they’re weak. #25jan #Egypt

@norashalaby, Nora Shalaby, Jan 25
Those protesters that have remained in the streets despite the latest police brutality against us are really really brave #jan25

@mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy,
2. People handshaking, hugging & offering flowers to officers. Same protesters who later refused beating an isolated soldier. Classy. #Jan25

Tweets like @TravellerW’s frame the police not only as violent and oppressive but also as threaten by the peaceful people of Egypt. Other activists like @norashalaby and @mosaaberizing focus on framing the protesters are morally good, just and brave. As the model discusses, protesters threw off old labels in exchange for the label of powerful, peaceful protesters defending the people’s cause. Undoubtedly, January 25th, 2011 was a momentous day for Egyptian protesters both physically and rhetorically. The movement’s rhetoric functioned to outline a course of action, strip the opposition of legitimacy and mobilize supporters for action. In doing so, the movement fulfills the rhetorical requirements of the initial mobilization stage. Before the movement can advance, the rise of a countermovement is needed.

Section Three: State Response – Weak/Erratic

It is important to note that the initial protest focused specifically on police reform and legislative change. The police’s actions on January 25th, 2011, though violent, do not meet the
rhetorical requirements of a state response. Recall that Goldstone (1998) outlines three state responses: mild, strong and weak/erratic. A mild response from the state is within the expected behavior of the regime and does not require the state to reassert its legitimacy as a means of justifying its actions. A strong response engaged in targeted state repression that eliminates the movement from the public sphere. A weak or erratic response by the state that rejects the legitimacy of a movement in an effort to eliminate it can serve as a catalyst for a revolution (Goldstone, 1998). In regard to the initial police actions, the protested Emergency Law gave police the legal power to react in the way they did. However, after the police were unable to contain the initial protests using familiar tactics, the state was forced to response.

The Mubarak regime had little patience for the mass protests and began taking unprecedented actions to repress the protests. Initially, the regime sought to cut off communication among protesters. The state blocked Twitter on January 25th, 2011, but activists quickly found alternative means to access the site. On the following day, Mubarak’s regime blocked Facebook in an attempt to quell protesters but not before the widely-supported We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page called for mass protests on Friday, January 28th, 2011 (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). During the work week smaller-scale protests continued, and the number of deaths and injuries steadily increased.

Given the regime’s history of police violence and the continuation of the Emergency Law, it would seem that the state had few qualms about using force to maintain control. However, military force was never used in full force against protesters. It may be puzzling that the state did not provide a strong crushing response when initially challenged. However, Rane and Salem (2012) point out that Western media coverage of the protests framed the demonstrations as peaceful. These depictions restrained the available options for the Mubarak
regime. Specifically, a violent crackdown would force Western nations, like the United States, to cut political and economic ties (Rane & Salem, 2012). Without these ties, Mubarak had little chance of recovering even if the crackdown was successful. The remaining options for quelling protesters included detaining and harassing protesters, censoring state media, stationing military personnel in protest areas and cutting off communication.

The regime also attempted to rhetorically combat the movement. Instead of using the rhetoric of a strong state response, the regime engaged in rhetoric that proclaimed instead of assumed its legitimacy. This type of rhetorical response is identified by the model as indicative of a weak/erratic response. In a January 26th, 2011 statement Mubarak declared, “The Brotherhood organization is illegal, and a number of parties are exploiting the enthusiasm of youth to achieve chaos” (Fahim & Stack, 2011). The use of the word illegal and the attempt to place blame reveal a regime striving to appear legitimate. Goldstone (1998) explains that a strong state response would assume its legitimacy and not feel compelled to justify it actions. Johnstad (2012) echoes this sentiment when he argues that the perception of legitimacy is far more important than the expression of it by the state. Essentially, when a state expresses its legitimacy, highlights the existence of a credible challenge to the state’s legitimacy. As the model predicts, the Mubarak regime’s weak/erratic state response radicalized the demands of protesters and pushed the movement into the developing stages of revolution.

**Section Four: Radicalized Adaptation**

During this stage, the movement begins to generate distinctly revolutionary rhetoric. As the stage suggests, the tone of this rhetoric is radicalized and far less compromising than the rhetoric deployed prior to state-sponsored violence. In response to the state’s repressive actions, the movement will begin to appeal to moral generalities, create a binary world and attempt to
demystify authority. The appeal to moral generalities subverts the legal power of the state and appeals to moral law to justify supporter actions. As a result the people’s will, not the state’s, becomes law. Rhetorical markers of this function include calls for the people to rise up and defend truth, justice, reason and liberty. The movement will also seek to create a binary world by eliminating any neutral space in between the revolution and the state. Targeted rhetorical attacks and emotionally charged appeals rhetorically mark attempts to create a black and white world. The final rhetorical function of this stage seeks to demystify all established authority. Here the movement must frame the state’s response as an illegitimate attack on the entire population. Other markers include rhetoric that affords the state no respect and places the state’s victims at the top of the new order. The successful deployment of these functions transforms the movement into a revolution.

As the state rolled out new repressive actions, activists became increasingly outspoken. The work week limited the movement’s ability to organize a mass protest in immediate response to the state’s actions. Yet, the rhetoric indicates that the movement transformed into a revolution prior to The Day of Rage on Friday, January 28th, 2011. This aligns with sociological perspectives that argue revolutionary crowds form long before people gather in the streets (Borch, 2006). This developing revolutionary spirit did not go unnoticed by the Mubarak regime. After midnight on Thursday, January 27, 2011 the state ordered a complete shutdown of Internet and mobile service providers (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). The move cost the Egyptian economy millions of dollars. The move ultimately failed because as the rhetoric reveals activists had already transformed into revolutionaries committed to taking to the streets the following day.

@Ghonim, Wael Ghonim, Jan 26
The Egyptian government started to take really stupid actions that will result in nothing but encouraging more people to protest #Jan25
Wael Ghonim’s (@Ghonim) tweet seemingly describes the stages of state response and radical adaptation in less than 140-characters (135 to be exact). Ghonim, the head of marketing for Google in the Middle East and North Africa, was a considerable influence on the movement. On the 26th, he appeared on a popular Egyptian talk show to protest the state’s use of Internet censorship (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). Here his rhetoric promotes a disrespecting of the state and alludes to the people being aware the state’s tactics to silence them.

As predicted by the model and Ghonim, the state’s response only galvanized protesters. The following tweets provide evidence of rapid escalation of violence and protesters’ rhetorical response following the government’s actions.

@mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy, Jan 26
Live bullets? FUCK YOU MUBARAK!!

@ManarMohsen, Manar Mohsen, Jan 26
Hundreds are running into the streets because the security forces started to suddenly beat them with sticks. Observers and protesters #Jan25

@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan 26
Beatings and shootings on Ramses streets for no fuckin reason!

@3arabawy, Hossam, Jan 26
There r calls circulating widely via SMS for protests on Friday following prayers. #Jan25

Previous police crackdowns had been violent. But the use of live ammunition and the police’s inability to only target protesters provided the movement with ample evidence that change was necessary. In an effort to contain the crowds, military security forces were introduced to the streets (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). The presence of military officers further linked Mubarak’s regime to the violence. @mosaaberizing’s tweet both links the violence to Mubarak and promotes the demystification of authority through disrespect. The following two tweets frame the street violence as evidence of state violence against all citizens. The rhetoric promotes a binary world
in which Egyptians must side with the protesters or with the violent state. The movement continued to take on its revolutionary form the following day as demonstrated by the following tweets.

@HosniMobarak, Hosni Mobarak, Jan 27
Habib just sent me a bbm. He says I should prepare a farewell speech for my citizens. Where are you guys going? #jan25

@Sandmonkey, Mahmoud Salem, Jan 27
Whatever the outcome, whatever ur position, go out & join ur countrymen. These are the moments where history gets made. Be part of it. #jan25

@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan 27
Today is Khaled Said’s birthday. We all have to go in the streets tomorrow so his blood doesn’t go in vain #Jan25 #AntiTorture #FreeEgypt

@ManarMohsen, Manar Mohsen, Jan 27
One of the best things about this uprising is that it’s from and for the people, not the parties, not ElBaradei. Keep it that way. #Jan25

@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan 27
You can strike me with a bullet, but you can’t take away my dignity #EgyPolice #Egypt #Jan25

@Ghonim, Wael Ghonim, Jan 28
Pray for #Egypt. Very worried as it seems that government is planning a war cime tomorrow against people. We are all ready to die #Jan25

The first tweet is clearly satirical and represents a significant example of the movement’s attempt to demystify the Mubarak regime’s authority. While Western audiences are familiar with satirical attacks against politicians, Egypt’s state-controlled media limited Egyptian’s exposure to political satire. @ManarMohsen continues this rhetorical function by condemning all representations of formal authority. The tweet directly targets El Baradei, the likely opposition candidate for the Presidential election. Had the movement remained a social movement, El Baradei’s support would have provided useful political resources. However, as a revolutionary
movement, activists casted off symbols of the current state of power and rejected all established forms of authority.

The tweets also sought to appeal to moral generalities. @Gsquare86 first tweet attempts to tie the movement’s continuation with Khaled Said’s memory. By this point, Said was widely regarded as a martyr of the cause (Halverson, et al., 2013). As a martyr, Said’s legacy takes on a moral authority. Thus, by honoring him, the protesters seek justice, truth, reason and liberty. By hindering the protesters’ actions, the state becomes an enemy of moral law. In her following tweet, @Gsquare86 references her determination to hold onto her dignity despite police efforts to strip her of it. This appeal to moral generalities fulfills the required function.

In the last functional requirement, the movement seeks to create a black and white world. @Sandmonkey’s tweet seeks to flatten divides among citizens and in turn create a binary world of citizen versus the state. The constant depiction of the state as merciless and violent encourages feelings of sympathy for the protesters, or “people,” who want to bring about the end of such treatment. @Ghomin tweets just past midnight his concerns for the upcoming day. His use of war imagery eliminates the rhetorical space for neutrality and creates a binary world. By the time Egypt went offline, the movement had already transformed into a nationwide revolution.

**Section Five: Radical Mobilization**

As a full-fledged revolution, activists now needed to radically mobilize supporters. During this stage, the movement must return to the model’s original mobilizing functions that include altering the perception of the opposition, prescribing action, and mobilizing followers. Because the movement has transformed, the functions must take on new revolutionary forms. The revolution seeks to alter the perception of the opposition in ways that align with its rhetorical vision of the binary world of moral absolutes. Thus, the state is framed as an oppressive,
tyrannical and evil force that needs to be overthrown. Altering perception rhetoric must also seek to transform the supporters’ self-perceptions as capable of forcing change in order to justify the significant risk involved in participating.

The next function will set forth a course of action focused on the sole goal of overthrowing the state. Here the revolution will avoid risks of intra and inter-movement conflict by abandoning specific courses of action in exchange for a singular focus. Revolutionary rhetoric seeks to appeal to the masses and avoid divisive issues. Rhetorical markers will include appeals to overthrow the state but there will also be a lack of discussion for what ought to occur after the revolution. To carry out the prescribed action, the revolution must maintain a non-threatening position toward the public in order to resist the rationalization of state repression. Violent actions are likely to occur as a revolutionary crowd is destructive in nature (Borch, 2006). However, the revolution must frame both violent and non-violent actions as directed at and instigated by the state.

The last rhetorical requirement of this stage is radical mobilization. As previously discussed the movement has already taken on an identifiable form by this stage. Thus, the revolution must seek to rhetorically maintain and escalate mobilization. The revolution must rhetorically counter state attempts to splinter support or appease the public through moderate concessions. Additionally, the revolution must emphasize victories and hold up martyrs to reinforce supporters’ convictions and justify setbacks. In order to avoid a decline in support, the movement must maintain a state of urgency.

By nightfall on January 28, 2011, Egypt’s “Day of Rage”, protesters had gained control of Tahrir Square after a bloody day of confrontations with state security forces. Hundreds died with the highest body counts being reported in Cairo (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). After police and
security forces were overwhelmed, protesters took to burning state vehicles and Mubarak’s party headquarters. The violent scene gained international attention and further restricted Mubarak’s regime to produce a strong crushing response. In an attempt to appease protesters, Mubarak promised to dismiss his cabinet but refused to step down (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). Army tanks rolled in but took no actions to break up demonstrations. In a half-hearted effort, the regime announced a curfew that protesters promptly ignored (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). The state tasked the Army with enforcing the curfew but the Army never did so. Finally, in an attempt to promote chaos and frame the protest as a threat to everyday life in Egypt, the police were removed from the streets (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). During the following fourteen days, the regime would continue to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people and the world. The rhetoric produced both by the movement and the regime is fascinating and rich for analysis. The sheer amount of available text invites multiple studies. Therefore, this analysis focuses on selective defining events and the resulting rhetorical response. These events were selected based on major shifts in momentum and events that prompted the emergence of new rhetorical strategies and themes.

The Internet and mobile shutdown continued for four days. Some activists were able to sporadically access satellite connections of foreign media, but the majority of Egyptians were unable to access social media. However, during moments of brief access activists continued to promote the mobilizing rhetoric of the revolution.

@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan 29
I have internet access from an ‘unknown’ location, the people are in MILLIONS in the streets and will NOT stop until MUBARAK is OUT!

@monasosh, monashosh Jan 29
Popular committees now r being formed in Alex & Cairo to protect public & private properties from thugs #Jan25

@Sandmonkey, Mahmoud Salem, Jan 29
there’s no state at the moment, we’re governing ourselves #Jan25 #Egypt
As protesters recovered from the “Day of Rage”, activists reported on protesters organizing to maintain order after the departure of the police. As the model indicates, the revolution must frame itself as aligned with the people’s needs. Mubarak’s plan to scapegoat protesters for an ungoverned state backfired when the revolution was able to govern itself. Communal policing continued over the next thirteen days. As protesters became protectors of communities, violence against them became even more difficult for the state to justify.

In a distancing move, the military announced that it would not forcefully dispel the protest. The statement bolstered the revolution’s efforts to alter perceptions of the opposition. Without full army support, Mubarak’s regime appeared weak. Additionally, with the police off the streets the army was the only physical representation of the state’s response. As evident below, protesters’ embraced the rhetorical opportunity to alter the perception of the regime.

@Sandmonkey, Mahmoud Salem, Jan 31
word is army has permission to shoot live ammunition at protesters #jan25

@TravellerW, Mo-ha-med, Jan 31
#Army major (ra2ed) I just spoke to: “even if they order us to shoot at demonstrators, I will not”. #Egypt #Jan25

@ashrafkalil, ashraf khalil, Jan 31
#Jan25 Army announcement that it acknowledges peoples grievances and won’t turn weapons on citizens is a HUGE relief.

@TravellerW, Mo-ha-med, Jan 31
General mood on the streets is “he’s started to give concessions, so he’s afraid – so we should press ahead until he’s gone.

@Sandmonkey’s tweet, prior to the announcement, links the military to the regime by suggesting that the military was still seeking permission from the state. Thus, any violence carry out by the
military would reflect the regime’s violent intentions. @TravellerW’s first tweet functions to alter the perception of the army from loyal to the regime to skeptical and questioning. This rhetoric paired with the army’s promise to not use force helped calm protesters’ fears as expressed by @ashrafkalil. Without the threat of military force, little was left to keep the revolution from growing.

On February 1st, 2011, activists called for a Million Man March. The turn-out was the largest to date and included protests from all ages and classes (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). The revolution continued to successfully mobilize despite the Internet shutdown. More importantly, the revolution continued escalating. The regime switched strategies. After forceful efforts had failed, Mubarak’s newly appointed (and first ever) Vice-President Omar Suleiman promised to start talks with opposition parties (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). But the most effective strategy came when Mubarak announced plans to stay through the September elections but promised to not seek another term. As the model predicts, the state employed rhetoric designed to splinter support of the revolution. The strategy was effective in creating a sizable pro-Mubarak countermovement. Revolution protesters and pro-Mubarak supporters violently clashed in the streets of Cairo as they battled for control over Tahrir Square and the nearby Museum of Antiquities.

@ashrafkhalil, ashraf khalil, Feb. 1
Raucous pro-Mubarak rally happening right now around the corner from Tahrir. Looks like about seven hundred people #Jan25

@3arabawy, Hossam, Feb. 2
We r at very critical stage. The counterrevolution is out in full steam. You will collect our dead bodies from garbage bins if we don’t win.

The battle with pro-Mubarak supporters physically threatened the revolution’s momentum. To counter this attack, the revolution sought to rhetorically mobilize supporters to return to the
streets. @3arabawy’s first tweet calls attention to the urgency of the situation by appealing to the binary world of life and death.

@Ssirgany, Sarah El Sirgany, Feb. 2
Just to recap, over a million demanding change in Egypt’s street yesterday. No violence. Today, pro-mubarak ppl are out and all out war.

@Ssirgany’s tweet seeks to alter the perception of the opposition by blaming the pro-Mubarak forces for the intense violence. This rhetoric also serves to maintain the revolution’s position as non-threatening to the public. As the tweet suggests, the revolution is only violent when it is under attack.

@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Feb. 2
Every thug we confiscate we find that his I.S. says ‘police’ those r the only pro-Mubarak supports in #Egypt

@Gsquare86’s rhetoric functions to alter perceptions of the opposition when she links the pro-Mubarak supporters to the hated police. Thus, she dismissed the pro-Mubarak camp as a representation of the people and instead holds it up as an example of the state’s willingness to deceive the public.

@3arabawy, Hossam, Feb. 2
The shabab totally evicted Mubarak’s thugs from Talaat Harb. Tahrir is still under control of the shabab. Long live the revolution. #Jan25

@mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy, Feb 3
Tonight could be the defining night of our revolution. If we hold on, millions will join us tomorrow and there’ll be no stopping us.

Finally, @3arabawy and @mosaaberizing’s final tweets attempt to justify setbacks while emphasizing the revolution’s hard-fought victory. @3arabawy’s use of the Arabic word for
youth, shabab, also resists state media accounts that blamed the youth for the uptick in violence (Idle & Nuun, 2011). Finally, both tweets reinforce the revolution’s singular course of action.

The revolution continued to fulfill all three requirements of revolutionary mobilization throughout the following seven days. However, one specific rhetorical strategy mentioned by the model became a hallmark of the revolution. The death toll steadily increased as clashes with pro-Mubarak forces and, later, reintroduced police officers continued. An official fact-finding panel found that 846 citizens died during the revolution (BBC, 2011). As the model discusses, martyrs may be held up as a mean to reinforce the revolution’s cause and strengthen supporters’ convictions. This tactic helped the revolution make its final push to overthrow the state.

Themes of martyrdom were present early on in the revolution. However, on February 7th 2011, the martyrs of the revolution came into the national spotlight during a popular Egyptian talk show. Wael Ghonim, a prominent activist and marketing executive for Google, appeared on a talk show to condemn the regime’s use of Internet censorship on January 26th, 2011. Shortly after, security forces detained Ghonim and held him blindfolded for eleven days (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). Upon his release, he returned to the talk show. Ghonim gave a heartfelt interview and revealed himself as an anonymous administrator of the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page which helped spread initial calls for protests (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). As the host showed Ghonim pictures of protesters who had been killed, he broke down and left the stage. The scene breathed new life into the revolution. The following day protest surged in numbers and shortly after workers and students began striking (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). The revolution’s martyrs would remain a rallying point until Mubarak’s departure. The following tweets indicate the rhetorical themes of martyrdom were expressed online and in the streets.
@mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy, Feb. 7
“Stay strong, my sons, Ramy died for you. He had no interest in politics & could barely buy a shirt for himself.” [2/3] #Tahrir

@ManarMohsen, Manar Mohsen, Feb. 7
Egyptians everywhere are crying with/for both Wael and Egypt. Show that you care, that the current state is not acceptable. Tahrir tomorrow!

@mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy, Feb. 10
With the escalations growing, unprecedented numbers are expected to march tomorrow in what has been labeled ‘Friday of Martyrs’ #Jan25

@Salamander, Sally Sami, Feb. 11
In #tahrir with the ppl of #egypt. If they were to kill us today I would die next to my brothers and sisters. I have no regrets. #jan25

@Cer, Mohammed A. Hamama, Feb. 11
Walking in #Tahrir, looking at faces of martyrs in their poster. A human life, a human dream has ended thanks to Mubarak

@Ghonim, Wael Ghonim, Feb. 11
Dear President Mubarak your dignity is no longer important, the blood of Egyptians is. Please leave the country NOW. #Jan25

The revolution’s rhetoric was multifaceted on many accounts. However, the use of martyr symbols and themes served as a vehicle to meet all of the functional requirements of the mobilization stage. For example, @mosaaberizing’s initial tweet quotes a martyr’s mother speaking in Tahrir Square. Within the tweet, the opposition is framed as murderous and oppressive. Simultaneously, supporters are asked to carry on (mobilize) in their efforts to bring an end to the current regime (course of action). Martyr rhetoric also served a mobilizing function when activists label the February 11th protests as the Friday of the Martyrs (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). Coincidentally or not, the day also marked the end of the Mubarak regime.

Section Six: Conclusion - Return to Social Movements
Per the model, if the movement is successful in overthrowing the state it will cease to function. The crowd will dissolve into the multiplicity as the necessary social association will
fade as the revolution fulfilled its designated course of action. From this multiplicity, new movements with more specific visions of the new order can arise.

On February 11, 2011 Mubarak stepped down and fled the country. The army took control of the country but promised to relinquish power once a new government was established (Idle & Nuuns, 2014). While protesters were ecstatic to see Mubarak go, the lack of long-term vision for the revolution was evident. Even in the afterglow of the revolution’s success, activists debated with one another about the best path forward. While the text does not continue more than two days after the revolution, the lack of unification of post-revolution protesters is evidence through the following tweets.

@beleidy, Amr El Beleidy, Feb. 11
I cannot believe what just happened! Hosny Mubarak resigned! The army now controls the country!

@Ghonim, Wael Ghonim, Feb. 12
Dear Egyptians, Go back to your work on Sunday, work like never before and help Egypt become a developed country. #Jan25

@3arabawy, Hossam, Feb. 12
While middle class activists here on Twitter urge Egyptians to return to work, the working class strikes and protests continue. #Jan25

@Sandmonkey, Mahmoud Salem, Feb. 12
The supreme military council has made its 4th announcement. And it was good. #jan25

@norashalaby, Nora Shalaby, Feb. 12
Have to say, not so happy w army’s statement. Y r they keeping the old gov. in place?

@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Feb. 12
Tahrir square gained us Mubarak to step down, now the real resistance starts in factories, universities, towns, & streets. level 2

As the model predicts, the revolution ceased to function rhetorically upon Mubarak’s departure. That is not to say that activists stopped using revolutionary rhetoric to advance their ideas. Instead, the use of revolutionary rhetoric ceased to be used to promote the revolution and
is now used as an appeal to promote a multitude of changes in policy and attitudes. As indicated above, the class divides among Egypt’s population were quickly highlighted by the continuation of worker strikes across the country. Political debates also arose immediately upon the army’s announcement of its transitional plans. In the days that followed previously established political groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, re-emerged along with new parties (Political Handbook, 2013). Additionally, within two weeks of the military taking over the country’s transition, protest against military rule sprang up in Tahrir Square and were violently dispelled (Frontline, 2013). Thus, the return to multiplicity meets the model’s predictions. After eighteen days of protests and years of build-up, Egyptians entered into a new political landscape and its revolution secured its place in history.
Chapter 5 - Methodological and Critical Implications

Through the application of a tailored interdisciplinary model, this thesis argues that revolutions invite future rhetorical study as a distinct form of social movements. This analysis provides insight to the original research questions. This thesis first asked; what are the rhetorical characteristics of revolutions? The second asked; Are revolutions rhetorically distinct from social movements? This chapter will first answer the proposed research questions before addressing resulting implications of the analysis.

This analysis reveals several noteworthy characteristics of revolutions. A revolution produces rhetoric that reflects the socio-economic context from which it formed and reveals its stages of development. Rhetorical study reveals much about the causes, catalysts, people, state and outcomes of revolutions. Revolutions and social movements are initially indistinguishable from one another. Revolutions and social movements may form out of similar socio-political context and express similar grievances. During the model’s second stage, revolutions and social movements mobilize through the same rhetorical functions. It is not until the third stage of state response that revolutions become rhetorically distinct. The model labels three possible responses for the state once it emerges as the counter-movement. The legitimizing function of the mild state response allows the movement to continue as a social movement. The successful violent repression of the strong state response eliminates the movement from the public sphere. Finally, the erratic/weak state response attempts to violently repress the movement but ultimately fails. This response defines a revolutionary path for the movement. Therefore, this thesis argues that revolutions are ripe for investigation by rhetorical social movement scholars. The rhetorical characteristics of revolutions and the distinction between revolutions and social movements further support this conclusion.
First, the unique dialectical enjoinment between a weak state and revolution is another distinguishing characteristic of revolutions. Cathcart’s (1972) discussion of dialectical enjoinment informs the discussion of the impact of the erratic/weak response on revolutions. For Cathcart, the key to distinguishing rhetorically social movements from other forms of collective actions is to identify the dialectical enjoinment between the movement and the counter-movement. For a collective action to meet Cathcart’s definition of a social movement, this rhetorical clash must exist. The unique dialectical enjoinment that results from an erratic/weak state response distinguishes revolutions from social movements. This model borrows from Goldstone’s (1998) when requiring the state to emerge as a counter-movement and produce a weak/erratic response that proves counterproductive. The state attempts to rhetorically justify its actions by proclaiming its legitimacy. In response, the model requires the movement to radically adapt its rhetoric. These requirements translate into rhetorically distinguishable characteristics that separate revolutions from other social movements. Thus, revolutions can be distinguished based on the unique dialectical enjoinment between the state and the revolution.

Second, forward progression is an overarching characteristic of revolutions. The characteristic raises the overall stakes for a revolution and its supporters because the rhetoric cannot freely cycle between stages. This characteristic comes from an adaptation of Goldstone’s (1998) original discussion. Rhetorically, the revolution must progress through escalation or fail. As the model discusses, if the revolution fails, it must return to the beginning stages. Scholars can identify the stage of a revolution based on what rhetoric is present and what rhetoric still need to emerge. The characteristic of forward progression distinguishes revolutions from social movement. It also calls for the tailoring of Stewart’s (1980) discussion about the average lifespan of social movements. He argues that social movements can take years. However,
because revolutions rely on rhetorical escalation to avoid failure, the longer a revolution exists, the less likely it is to succeed. As a result, revolutions progress in a linear fashion and benefit from rapid development. These characteristics rhetorically distinguish revolutions from other social movements.

Third, single prescribed course of action and a rapid return to multiplicity also categorize revolutions. As described by the model, this feature of revolutions decreases the risk of inter-movement conflict faced by other social movements. The rhetoric seeks to appeal to all individuals that stand to gain from the removal of the state. There is an overall lack of rhetoric that seeks to prescribe a long-term course of action in case the revolution succeeds. The analysis revealed the prevalence of this rhetorical characteristic during the Egyptian Arab Spring. However, this singular focus to overthrow the state limits the revolutions ability to unite individuals after it succeeds. Borch (2007) explains that once protesters are no longer held together by the revolutionary mission, they return to the multiplicity. Thus, the revolution’s rhetoric ceases shortly after overthrowing the state. New social movements pick up where the revolution leaves off.

The rapid conclusion of revolutions distinguishes revolutions from social movements as the revolution cannot enter into Griffin’s (1969) later stages of consummation, eloquence and stasis. Griffin describes that during these later stages the new order takes shape based on the goals of the movement. People remain united because the social movement is still functioning rhetorically (Griffin, 1969). In post-revolutionary states, the opposite is true. The rapid dissolution of the revolution gives way to isolated individuals as the social and class ties established by overthrown system no longer exist. The end of the revolution creates a rhetorical void where the people lack a rhetorical vision of what the new order ought to be. This
instability, which is discussed in great detail later on, is compacted by the revolution’s rhetorical function that seeks to demystifying authority.

Finally, the features of a revolution characterize and distinguish it from a social movement. During the stage of radical adaptation, Wilkinson’s (1989) three rhetorical revolutionary functions emerge. These functions promote the appeal to moral absolutes, the creation of a binary world and the demystification of authority. These functions may at first seem related to functions of social movements. However, combine the functions creates a unique revolutionary characteristic. The appeal to moral absolutes rejects all established forms of authority, like the law and instead appeals to the higher moral authority. This rhetorical move empowers “the people” to decide what is just or not (Wilkinson, 1989). Essentially, the function removes the need for the state. In social movements, the state is often needed in order to enforce the new order. This is not the case for revolutions. Next, by creating a binary world that adheres to moral absolutes, the revolution removes all rhetorical space for indecision. That is to say, that the binary rhetoric of revolutions labels anyone who fails to support the cause as opposition (Wilkinson, 1989). The message is clear; join us or stand in our way. Unlike social movements that may benefit from an uninvolved larger public, a revolution suffers from the indifference of others. A revolution’s need for mass support is so great that it would rather risk offending some of the fence-sitters than fail as a result of a lack of expressed public support.

The final function discussed by Wilkinson (1989) both characterizes the revolution and continues to function after the revolution’s conclusion. Rhetoric demystifies authority, seeks to reverse societal values and promote the disrespect of the state (Wilkinson, 1989). However, once the rhetoric of authority is unmasked in a rhetorical scene of moral absolutes, the new system of power lacks the rhetorical resources to live up to its promise of perfection. While the
revolution may cease to function once the state is overthrow, the distrust of authority prevails. Recall that a rhetorical void following the overthrow of the state characterizes revolutions. The return to multiplicity invites new social movements to fill this void. However, Wilkinson (1998) notes that as a result of rhetorically demystifying authority, power becomes synonymous with persuasion in post-revolutionary states. Put simply, a public skeptical of authority needs persuaded that their grievances will be addressed. But with no respect for the rhetoric of authority, instability is likely to result as the public will have little respect for the new system and will be susceptible to the persuasion of outside groups vying for power. Therefore, revolutions’ unstable rhetorical outcomes indicate a clear distinction from social movements.

In summary, revolutions possess a variety of unique rhetorical characteristics. These characteristics include, a unique dialectical enjoinment between the state and revolution, a rhetorical requirement of forward progression, a singular-focus prescribed course of action, and a rapid rhetorical death that result in an unstable post-revolutionary state. As a result, revolutions are rhetorically distinct from social movements. The answers to this thesis’ research question align with previous scholars’ calls to develop sub-categories of rhetorical social movement studies (Hahn & Gonchar, 1971; Lucas, 1980; and Riches & Sillars, 1980). The continue investigation of revolutions appears promising as an area from which to grow this sub-development. Additionally, this analysis meets the call of Morris (2000) to provide insight into the role of human agency in collective actions like revolutions. Having responded to the calls of other academics, the remainder of this chapter focuses on discussing implications and future areas of study.

The answers to the research questions highlight a variety of implications, both methodological and critical. The chapter discusses three implications resulting from the above
analysis. The first covers the methodological implications of regarding revolutions as a distinct form of social movement. The second, probes areas of future study in post-revolutionary states and the chapter concludes with a discussion critical implications of state responses.

*Revolutions as a genre of social movements*

Initially, this thesis argues revolutions are a distinct undeveloped sub-categorization of rhetorical social movement studies. The analysis reveals that revolutions are rich with rhetorical text and ripe for future exploration. On a methodological level, treating revolutions as sub-categorization or genre of movements generates three implications that address the values of failed revolutions, the need for micro-level analysis and the limitations of the applied model.

The Egyptian revolution serves as only one example of the availability of worthwhile rhetoric produced by revolutions. In an attempt to evaluate the viability of every stage of the model, this thesis selected a successful revolution. However, the importance of analyzing unsuccessful revolutions cannot be overlooked. Even failed revolutions are worthy of investigation as the majority of the model’s stages are entered into before a revolution is crushed or fails. These completed stages reveal much about the socio-political circumstance in which the revolution formed. The type of response generated by the state also indicates the perceived level of threat the initial movement presents to the state. Therefore, the ability of the initial movement to mobilize individuals and prompt a state response reveals much about the people and the state. Future research should not discard failed revolutions as failures may reveal more about the effective rhetorical strategies of successful revolutions. A greater variety of studied revolution will aid in developing this genre of rhetorical movement studies.

This analysis also points to rhetorical themes in revolutions as an area for future study. As found in this study, the rhetoric of martyrdom emerged as a dominant theme of the
revolution. Halverson, et al.’s (2013) study of Arab Spring martyr narratives argues martyrs are an effective catalyst for social mobilization. Their analysis focuses heavily on the narratives of Mohamed Bouazizi and Khaled Said as sparks of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. However, this thesis reveals that martyr rhetoric was most prevalent during the later stage of revolutionary mobilization.

The deployment of martyr rhetoric in the late stages of the movement is rhetorically risky. Stewart (1980) explains that the movement must continually sustain itself. Doing so involves justifying setbacks and emphasizing victories. While martyr rhetoric emotionally appeals to the public, it also highlights the loss of life as a result of the revolution and the high personal costs of supporter commitment. Thus, martyr rhetoric must be careful not to be interpreted as a warning to those supporting the revolution. Additionally, the model explains that the revolution must be perceived as non-threatening to the public. If the rhetoric of martyrdom is misinterpreted or co-opted by the state, it can promote the view that the revolution is to blame for the loss of life. This may explain why Halverson et al (2013) views martyrdom narratives as catalysts for mass movements instead of tools for sustained mobilization. In Egypt, those responsible for Saeed’s death were easily identifiable. But as protest size increase and death tolls rise, it becomes a rhetorical struggle to place blame. Thus, scholars should explore the ways in which the language of martyrdom serves the required rhetorical functions of revolutions. More broadly, future studies developing the genre of revolutionary movements should consider thematic analysis as a promising area of investigation.

Finally, the methodological limitations of the current model hinge on its focus on the movement as the primary actor. As previously discussed, Cathcart (1972) identifies dialectical enjoinment as necessary factor for social movements. A revolution requires the dialectic
enjoinment resulting from a weak/erratic state response. Further as Goldstone (1998) notes and the model adapts, the longer the revolution exists, the more likely it is to sustain rhetorical attacks from the state. The model only focuses on the rhetoric produced by the state during the response stage. This is a limitation as the literature suggests that both the revolution and the state are constantly producing rhetoric that influences the outcome of the revolution. The Egyptian case study reveals that the most effective tactic to repressing the revolution did not involve force but instead utilized rhetoric to generate a powerful pro-Mubarak camp. A better understanding of how this relationship functions in a theoretical and practical sense would provide useful insight to the development of revolutionary movement studies. Thus, future research should examine the rhetorical tactics and strategies used by states under protest. This new research should include interdisciplinary viewpoints to account for the complex nature of state actions.

*Future research in post-revolution state*

As previously discussed, revolutions result in rhetorically unstable conditional. Wilkinson (1989) notes that the rhetorical function of demystifying authority has lasting effects that cannot be contained to the revolution. He explains once the rhetoric of authority is unmasked in a rhetorical scene of moral absolutes, the new system of power lacks the ability to live up to the rhetorical vision of the revolution. As a result in post-revolutionary states, power becomes synonymous with persuasion (Wilkinson, 1989). For Egyptians, the revolution unmasked all forms of established authority. This disregard for authority carried over into the transitional period led by the army. While the army never sided with the Mubarak regime, it also never officially sympathized with the protesters. As a result, rhetorical attempts to demystify authority were directed at the army. The resulting distrust inhibited some Egyptians from trusting the army with the transition. Smaller protests emerged days after Mubarak was removed.
and were violently crushed by heavy military force (Frontline, 2013). This marked the start of nearly two years of unrest in Egypt in which Islamists, the military, secular politicians and ethnic groups violently clashed and vied for a say Egypt’s future (Frontline, 2013). As explained above, the public, no longer united, rapidly found fault in the military’s new authority as it did not live up to the absolute moral perfection promised by the revolution. As predicted by Wilkinson (1989), power became synonymous with these groups’ ability to persuade followers. Ultimately, the military succeeded when General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi won the presidency and remains, at the time of writing, in power. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reality of power and order in post-revolution Egypt is far from moral perfection promised by the revolution.

Many regard the Arab Spring as a major step forward for the countries that were able to oust entrenched regimes that had often violated human rights (Johnstad, 2012). In Egypt, the removal of President Mubarak was initially a global symbol of triumph for citizen-led democracy (Veltmeyer, 2011). However, such massive political upheaval should be met with caution as the modernization of states often leads to destabilizing conditions. These destabilized conditions can serve as breeding grounds for extremist movements and ethnic conflict (Kornhauser, 1959). The demystification of traditional power structures results in the undesirable rhetorical outcomes of a revolution. The long-term effects of demystifying authority rhetoric highlight implications for the rhetoric of extremist movements and ethnic conflict.

Extremist movements and ethnic conflict rely heavily on the rhetoric of grievance and mobilization. Political scientist William Kornhauser’s (1959) theory of modernization’s destabilizing effects argues that the disturbance of traditional elites systems threatens individuals’ sense of security. This insecurity often results in religious and political extremism in the form of mass movements. In Egypt, the established Muslim Brotherhood returned to
power when the party’s presidential candidate Mohamed Morsi won the election in June 2012 (Frontline, 2013). As the first Islamist and civilian leader, Morsi’s presidency threatened secular Egyptians and the military. A little over a year later the military removed Morsi and arrested high-profile party leaders. Pro-Brotherhood protests sprang up and were violently extinguished by the military. Over 1,000 protesters died as a result of the excessive military force used (Frontline, 2013). Removed from the political sphere and galvanized by the deaths of protesters, some supporters turned to extremist actions. In September 2012, a militant Islamist group in the Sinai region claimed responsibility for a car-bomb assassination attempt on Egypt’s Interior Minister (Frontline, 2013). At the time of writing, Egypt’s current regime still faces the constant threat of extremist actions. In turn, those still supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups face the threat of extreme actions taken by the military against them. Future research in this area should explore the connection between revolutionary rhetoric and the rise of extremism in post-revolution states. Wilkinson’s (1989) observations along with Kornhauser’s (1959) political science theory of modernization’s destabilizing effects serve as useful additions to the available body of literature.

Post-revolution states are also susceptible to an increase in ethnic identity rhetoric that promotes ethnic conflict. Ethnic identities forms when individuals share a common inherited culture, racial similarities, a common religion, belief in a common history and ancestry, and a strong psychological sentiment of belonging (Taras & Ganguly, 2006). The rhetoric of ethnic mythos largely maintains these identities. Additionally, ethnic awareness and ethnic division increases as a result of the previously described instability resulting from revolutions (Kornhauser, 1959). This also aligns with Wilkinson’s (1989) observations as the lack of respected authority promotes power struggles among groups. As this analysis reveals, instability
and a rhetorical void categorize revolutions. As a result, post-revolutions states are at an increased risk of ethnic conflict (Kornhauser, 1959). Egypt, a largely ethnically homogenous state, saw an uptick in ethnic violence against minority Coptic Christians after the revolution (Political Handbook, 2013). Thus, the analysis’ identification of characteristic instability following a revolution relates to the conditions Kornhauser (1959) identifies as favorable to ethnic conflict. The applied model is unable to address this area of study as the final stage of the model involves the death of the revolution and the return to multiplicity. Future studies should explore how the rhetoric of revolution aids or hinders the development of ethnic identities. Additionally, Kornhauser (1959) notes the importance of promoting messages of nationalism to lessen the influence of ethnic identities. This observation invites future rhetorical study investigating how transitioning and new post-revolutionary governments can recycle the identification rhetoric of the revolution into a new sense of nationalism.

**Critical implications of state responses**

Goldstone (1998) and the applied model place a heavy importance on the type of response generated by the state. This aligns with Griffin’s (1969) conception of the dialectic enjoinderment which is required for a social movement to come into the public sphere. As previously discussed, Goldstone’s (1998) model lays out three types of state responses; mild, weak/erratic and strong. The model requires a weak/erratic state response for the development of a revolution. As previously discussed, while both responses attempt to violently repress the movement, the weak/erratic response sounds different than the strong response as it declares instead of assumes the state’s legitimacy to justify its actions. It is fairly obvious that all states wish to avoid the development of a revolution. However, the two remaining rhetorical responses for states prompt response-specific implications.
The mild response discussed by Goldstone (1998) involves the state recognizing and thereby legitimizing a movement. A mild state response aligns with the rhetorical discussion of a countermovement/opposition (Griffin, 1969; and Stewart, 1980). This conflict is necessary and beneficial for the movement to enter into public consciousness. More importantly for this discussion, Goldstone (1998) explains that a mild response that accepts the movement’s legitimacy pushes the movement toward limited protest, negotiation and a focus on legislative and attitudinal change. This type of response is most often generated by democratic states (McAdam et al., 1996). This produces promising and concerning implications for democratic societies.

Initially, as democratic states are more likely to legitimize social movements through mild responses, movements can be viewed as a preferred method of societal change. Mild responses provide a rhetorical space in which the public can make the state aware of their grievances. In democratic societies, the participation of the citizenry is held up as a defining feature of the political system (Goldstone, 1998). Citizens of democratic states are both empowered by movements and protected from the destabilizing effects of a revolution. Through mobilization, citizens actively participate in democracy. While the conflict produced by a countermovement is still necessary, it is less likely than a revolution to result in violent physical conflict. As a result, citizens can address their grievances through less physically violent means. This relative statement is not ignorant of the physical and symbolic violence that can occur during social movements. However, this thesis argues that the physical violence that results from social movements is, in general, on a smaller scale than revolutions. Thus, democratic regimes are insulated from the threat of revolution as less violent means for change are readily available to the public.
The promotion of social movements through a mild response is also in the best interest of democratic states but perhaps for more sinister reasons. Goldstone’s model (1998) argues, and Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) agree that a state response is not necessary for the development of a social movement. However, some movements may confront the state with harsh criticisms and pressing demands for change. When prompted to response to a movement, a mild state response eliminates the potential of revolution. Thus, a state’s choice to legitimize a social movement opens up rhetorical space to negotiate, placate, splinter and rhetorically attack the demands of the movement without the use of violence.

Goldstone (1998) points out that the state has far more physical resources available to it than the movement. Griffin (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) discussions of movement maintenance further reveal the state’s upper hand when it comes to rhetorical resources. Specifically, the movement may initially have more rhetorical freedom to define its rhetorical vision for the future. However, the state generally has more access and control over media and dissemination tools. Therefore, the state has more options to counter the movement’s rhetoric and interfere with its goals. Furthermore, Halverson et al (2013) note democratic states that publicly condemn human rights violations abroad, risk severe political backlash if the state produces a violent response. By tolerating social movements the state benefits from fractured interests. In Egypt, a critical mass of public support was needed to overthrow the regime. Similarly, movements seeking sweeping governmental change in democratic societies require a near majority of public support. In a democratic society, the more public support a social movement gains, the more influential it becomes. Thus, by acknowledging the grievances of supporters through a mild response, the state eliminates the likelihood of long-held grievances accumulating into a more powerful movement later on. Ultimately, the state maintains its position of advantage through a
mild response that limits the movement’s ability to produce revolutionary change. In this way, democratic states are still insulated from revolutions. However, the democratic state also gains an advantage over citizens’ most promising tool for change.

This thesis supports Goldstone’s (1998) assertion that democratic states are less likely to experience the violence that characterizes revolutions. However, citizens of democratic states should be made aware of the rhetorical and physically advantages held by the state to resist change. Future research should address the ways in which democratic states rhetorically respond to social movements and the effective strategies used by movements to overcome resource-related state advantages. Additional research may also explore the context and strategies of movements capable of gaining mass public support.

The remaining state response involves the violent repression of a movement. If a social movement meets strong state repression, the movement will be crushed entirely or driven underground and become ineffective. The state will then justify its actions by declaring the movement a threat to the public. By doing so, the state assumes its actions as legitimate and leaves little room for the public to question its authority on the matter. Goldstone (1998) identifies repressive regimes as most likely to violently eliminate dissent. This response is risky. If successful, the state may face political backlash from the international community. For example, had Egypt successfully invoked a strong response, its ally, the United States, would likely have condemned the state’s actions and called for reform and restraint in the future. If the attempted strong response fails, it transforms into a weak/erratic response capable of galvanizing a revolution. The high-risk of a strong response incentivizes the use of rapid, overwhelming violence against movements that the state will later rhetorically justified. Johnstad (2012) supports this conclusion when he notes that a regime’s perceived legitimacy is synonymous with
its political power. Strong responses may result in international backlash. However, these bridges can be rhetorically rebuilt between countries. What cannot be reestablished once damaged is the state’s perceived legitimacy. As noted above, the state opens up rhetorical space for critique and debate when it is forced to proclaim its legitimacy as a justification for its violent actions against citizens. Future research should explore the ways in which states respond to and limit debate regarding state legitimacy and authority.

First, it is important to note here that Egypt’s state response was violent and did result in considerable human loss. However, the state failed to generate a crushing response, and the revolution was able to survive. Halverson et al. (2013) note that international pressure may have decreased the willingness of the Mubarak regime to use force. The success of the revolution in Egypt inspired other revolutions in the Middle East North African (MENA) region (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). However, both the Egyptian military and the entrenched regimes abroad took a different lesson from the revolution: Use more force sooner. As discussed above, the Egyptian military began violently eliminating dissent weeks after the fall of Mubarak. Even though many view Egyptian Arab Spring as a victory for democracy, it seemingly replaced a regime hesitant to use extreme violence, with one that had few qualms about crushing dissent. Additionally, the rhetorical pressure of international influences was reduced as the need to avoid an ungoverned state overtook calls for human rights to be respected. Even the United States, a leader in calling for the international respect of human rights (Halverson, et al., 2013), provided little incentive to avoid violence. After the military broke up protests and killed 600 people on August 14, 2011, United States President Barak Obama publicly condemned the military’s actions (Frontline, 2013). However, the 1.3 billion of U.S. military aid to Egypt was not threatened (Frontline, 2013) as Obama declared in the same statement, “America cannot determine the future of
Egypt.” Obama rhetorically maintained the U.S.’s position on human rights while simultaneously expressing no desire to become involved with Egyptian affairs. With no risk of political consequences, the military continued to rule with an iron fist.

Johnstad (2012) explains the theoretical incentives for producing a rapid, strong response. His study reveals that the success of non-violent protests, like Egypt’s, can be predicted based on perceived levels of regime legitimacy. States with low perceived legitimacy are more susceptible to revolutions as political legitimacy is indicative of power (Johnstad, 2012). As the model explains, strong responses by the state rhetorically assume legitimacy in removing the protesters as a public threat. However, a weak/erratic response results when the state’s actions are viewed as an attack on the public. Therefore, the deployment of violent repression is most effective when the state can target a smaller number of protesters. This rapid response lessens the likelihood that the movement will be able to survive and develop into a revolution. Furthermore, those uninvolved with the movement are likely to view the state’s action as legitimate or at least as business as usual (Goldstone, 1998). Returning to Johnstad (2012), states capable of maintaining high-perceived legitimacy are less likely to experience revolutions. Thus, strong state responses help rhetorically maintain a state’s perceived legitimacy and protect it from being overthrown.

The silver lining for proponents of human rights and communication scholars may rest on the power of social media to organize movements. Of course, the following discussion only applies to states where citizens have access to the Internet and social media. However, even relatively small online populations, like Egypt’s (Political Handbook, 2013), can help spark revolutionary change. While scholars agree that social media did not cause the Arab Spring, many agree that social media did promote the dispersion of ideas (Baron, 2012; Halverson et al.,
This dispersion may allow for social movements to perform the model’s initial stages of grievance identification and initial mobilization in the safer online settings. The available research supports the viability of this implication as social media connect like-minded individuals and invite the expression of commitment. As previously discussed, this expression is significant based on the principles of consistency and commitment. Ciadini (2001) explains that even small verbalizations of allegiance generates pressure internally and externally to behave in line with that commitment. In Egypt, Tufecki and Wilson (2012) found “controlling for other factors, social media use greatly increased the odds that a respondent attended protests on the first day.” Thus, online expression functions rhetorically as an act of identification and commitment which is required by the model’s first two stages.

Unfortunately, the model also requires a degree of survivable violence carried out by the state during the period of response. Clearly, Griffin’s (1969) discussion of necessary conflict did not include the death of civilians. However, Goldstone (1998) and this model recognizes the violent climate in which a revolution functions. In order to survive the initial state response, supporters may return to online communities. The model requires forward rhetorical movement as the only alternative to failure. As a result, time spent radicalizing and remobilizing online should not be viewed as an alternative to returning to the streets. However, the movement may avoid continued violence by using social media as a means of gaining international attention. The state response may result in the revolution entering the public sphere on an international scale. Halverson et al.’s (2012) findings suggest that international pressure can lessen the use of violence by a regime. Additionally, online attacks against the regime’s legitimacy may also decrease the regime’s level of perceived legitimacy. This decrease increases the likelihood of
success for protesters (Johnstad, 2012). More research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness and viability of such rhetorical strategies.

This thesis asked the following two research questions: *How do revolutions rhetorically function? Are revolutions unique in rhetorical function in regards to social movements?* Through the review of available research, the development of an interdisciplinary rhetorical model of revolutions, a case study of the Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution and a discussion of methodological and critical implications, this thesis can developed the necessary insight to answer these questions. Revolutions are rhetorically distinct social movements that take on radically modified rhetorical functions in hopes of overthrowing the state. The development of a revolution from its social movement origins is dependent on a weak/erratic state response. This thesis provides a staged model for the future exploration of revolutions as a genre of social movements as well as several areas for future research. The unpacking of revolutionary rhetoric reveals much about those who participate in revolutions and the societies in which revolutions occur. Therefore, the continued investigation of revolutions by rhetorical scholars has as much to offer the discipline as it does the people living under repressive regimes who dream of change.
References


